Proportional representation reinvented: A study on the concept and applications of the Electoral Region model
Roinila, Aleksi (2014)
2014
Valtio-oppi - Political Science
Johtamiskorkeakoulu - School of Management
This publication is copyrighted. You may download, display and print it for Your own personal use. Commercial use is prohibited.
Hyväksymispäivämäärä
2014-06-02
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:uta-201406031568
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:uta-201406031568
Tiivistelmä
This paper studies three novel electoral systems and the concept of the electoral region on which they are all founded upon. The electoral region is a concept that preserves traditionally independent electoral districts but allows them to influence each other s voting results in order to generate greater proportionality in the overall election result.
The three new and as-yet untested electoral systems presented in this paper are applications of the electoral region concept that combine all electoral districts of a country into a single, nation-wide electoral region for calculating the seat distribution of the national parliament. This allows the electoral systems to distribute seats among parties as if there was only one nation-wide electoral district while still maintaining any number of electoral districts as vehicles of regional representation. If applied to federal elections, the electoral region concept would similarly permit individual states to elect their own representatives while ensuring that the overall seat distribution between parties at the federal level remains as perfectly proportional as the size of the representative body allows.
Using Finland s parliamentary elections of 2007 as a test case, this paper proves that the electoral region concept allows a degree of proportionality that is either on par with or greater than in any earlier system of proportional representation. As the three electoral systems presented demonstrate, this unmatched level of proportionality is achievable with a method that is far simpler than the multi-tiered systems that have thus far been required for achieving similar levels of proportionality in multi-district elections; Two of the three electoral systems introduced in this paper utilize only one electoral formula in their seat distribution from the national level down to the districts the widely adopted d Hondt formula and in all three the voter is only expected to cast a single vote in favor of a single candidate and party.
The three new and as-yet untested electoral systems presented in this paper are applications of the electoral region concept that combine all electoral districts of a country into a single, nation-wide electoral region for calculating the seat distribution of the national parliament. This allows the electoral systems to distribute seats among parties as if there was only one nation-wide electoral district while still maintaining any number of electoral districts as vehicles of regional representation. If applied to federal elections, the electoral region concept would similarly permit individual states to elect their own representatives while ensuring that the overall seat distribution between parties at the federal level remains as perfectly proportional as the size of the representative body allows.
Using Finland s parliamentary elections of 2007 as a test case, this paper proves that the electoral region concept allows a degree of proportionality that is either on par with or greater than in any earlier system of proportional representation. As the three electoral systems presented demonstrate, this unmatched level of proportionality is achievable with a method that is far simpler than the multi-tiered systems that have thus far been required for achieving similar levels of proportionality in multi-district elections; Two of the three electoral systems introduced in this paper utilize only one electoral formula in their seat distribution from the national level down to the districts the widely adopted d Hondt formula and in all three the voter is only expected to cast a single vote in favor of a single candidate and party.