Hämeen linnan linnoittaminen kustavilaisella ajalla 1772-1808

Abstract

Esillä olevassa tutkimuksessa pohditaan, mikä oli sisämaassa sijaitsevan Hämeen linnan asema ja merkitys Ruotsin strategiassa vuosina 1772-1808.

Tutkimuksen aikarajaus pohjautuu seuraaviin tapahtumiin: Sotilasylipäällikkö Stackelberg kirjoitti Kustaa III:lle 7.12.1772 kirjeen, jossa hän tiedusteli, eikö myös Hämeen linna tulisi saattaa puolustuskuntoon Viaporin tapaan. Linnoitustoimen budjettiehdotusta vuotta 1809 varten käsiteltiin 29.11.1808. Siinä ei mainita Hämeen linnaa eikä mitään muutakaan Suomen linnoitusta.

Stackelbergin kirjeen jälkeen tammikuussa 1773 uudeksi kuninkaallisen linnoitustoimen johtajaksi ja päämajoitusmestariksi valittiin Axel Magnus von Arbin, joka pian nimityuksensä jälkeen sai tehtäväkseen laatia suunnitelman Hämeen linnan puolustuskunnon kohentamiseksi. Toimeksianto tuli hyökkäysuhan alla, Tanska ja Venäjä suunnittelivat hyökkäystä Ruotsiin keväällä 1773, minkä vuoksi olen kutsunut suunnitelmaa "hätätilalinnoitussuunnitelmaksi". Se piti sisällään mm. jäisen kruunulinnan, joka olisi tullut Vanajaveden päälle. Vaikka tätä suunnitelmaa ei toteutettu, se oli voimassa aina tammikuun 1777 lopulle saakka.

Vuonna 1776 von Arbin sai tehtäväkseen laatia uuden suunnitelman Hämeen linnan puolustuskunnon kohentamiseksi. Suunnitelma valmistui 15.12.1776 ja hyväksyttiin 30.1.1777. Työt Hämeen linnassa alkoivat keväällä 1777 ja jatkuivat aina Ruotsin ajan loppuun saakka. "Hätätilalinnoitussuunnitelma" oli bastionilinnoitussuunnitelman esiaste, vaikka olikin itsenäinen suunnitelma. Edellinen pitää sisällään elementtejä, jotka jälkimmäinen toteutti. Niistä on syytä mainita puolustussyvyyden kasvu ja kaponieeri. Lisäksi edellinen on osittain bastionimainen. Tutkimus osoittaa, että ruotsalaiset rakensivat Hämeen linnan bastionilinnoituksen valmiiksi Suomen sotaan (syttyi 21.2.1808) mennessä. Tämän lisäksi Suomen sotaan mennessä valmistuivat kaupungin uuden paikan länsipuolelle ns. Turuntien skanssi ja itäpuolelle ns. Siltaskanssi sekä vallihauta kaupungin uuden paikan ympärille. Kaupunki oli varavaruskunta, sillä sinne majoitettiin sotilaita. Majoitusrasitus jatkui vielä Venäjän vallan aikana. Kaupungin ympärille tulevista puolustuslaitteista oli puhunut jo sotilasylipäällikkö Stackelberg vuonna 1776 valmistuneessa sotilassuunnitelmassaan.

Esillä olevassa tutkimuksessa pohditaan, mikä oli sisämaassa sijaitsevan Hämeen linnan asema ja merkitys Ruotsin strategiassa kustavilaisella ajalla (1771-1809). Tutkimuksen aikarajaus on seuraava: Uusi sotilasylipäällikkö Stackelberg kirjoitti 7.12.1772 Kustaa III:lle kirjeen, jossa hän tiedusteli, eikö myös Hämeen linnan puolustuskuntoa tulisi kohentaa Viaporin tapaan. Tiedossa nimittäin oli, että Tanska ja Venäjä suunnittelivat hyökkäystä Ruotsiin keväällä 1773 palauttaakseen vuoden 1720 hallitusmuodon maassa voimaan. Marraskuussa 1808 käsiteltiin linnoitustoimen budjettiehdotusta vuotta 1809 varten. Siinä ei enää mainittu Hämeen linnaa eikä mitää muutakaan Suomen linnoitusta.

Tammikuussa 1773 uudeksi kuninkaallisen linnoitustoimen johtajaksi ja päämajoitusmestariksi valittiin Axel Magnus von Arbin. Hän sai tehtäväkseen laatia suunnitelman Hämeen linnan puolustuskunnon kohentamiseksi. Suunnitelma valmistui 10.3.1773 ja hyväksyttiin viisi vuorokautta myöhemmin. Se oli voimassa aina 30.1.1776 saakka, jolloin uusi bastionilinnoitussuunnitelma hyväksyttiin. Sen laatimisen von Arbin oli saanut tehtäväkseen vuoden 1776 alkupuolella, se valmistui 15.12.1776 ja hyväksyttiin 30.1.1777.

Olen vuoden 1773 linnoitussuunnitelmaa kutsunut "hätätilalinnoitussuunnitelmaksi", koska se laadittiin kiireessä hyökkäysuhan alla. Siinä on elementtejä, jotka antavat aiheen kutsua sitä bastionilinnoitussuunnitelman esiasteeksi. Tällaisia elementtejä ovat bastionimaisuus, puolustussyvyyden kasvu ja kaponieeri.

Bastionilinnoitussuunnitelman käytännön toteuttaminen alkoi keväällä 1777. Linnoitustyöt jatkuivat Ruotsin ajan loppuun saakka. Tänä aikana suunnitelma saatiin toteutettua. Hämeen linnan bastionilinnoitusta eivät siis venäläiset rakentaneet valmiiksi. Lisäksi Suomen sotaan mennessä valmistui kaksi skanssia, Turuntien skanssi kaupungin uuden paikan länsipuolelle ja Siltaskanssi itäpuolelle, ja vallihauta kaupungin uuden paikan ympärille. Linnoitustoiminta oli varsin aktiivista aina vuoteen 1784 saakka, jolloin päämajoitusmestari von Arbin erotettiin. Kustaan sodan (1788-1790) jälkeen linnoitustoiminta hiljeni, joskaan ei loppunut.

von Arbinin vuonna 1767 valmistuneesta sotilassuunnitelmasta alkaen Hämeen linna nähtiin merkittävänä linnoituksena strategisesti merkittävän sijaintinsa perusteella. Tällainen käsitys oli vallalla aina vuoteen 1782 saakka, jolloin sotilasylipäällikkö Fredric Posse esitti linnoitustöiden lopettamista Hämeen linnassa. Sen jälkeen linnaa pidettiin lähinnä rasitteena. Sen linnoitusmäärärahat supistuivat Kustaan sodan jälkeen merkittävästi. Määräraharenessanssin se koki kahdeksan vuorokautta ennen Suomen sodan puhkeamista.

Hämeen linna ja Hämeenlinnan kaupunki olivat Kustaa III:n suosiossa. Tämä näkyy siitä, että kuningas vieraili alueella peräti neljästi, valtakunnan linnoitustoimen johtaja laati kahdesti linnan puolustuskunnon kohentamissuunnitelman ja kaupungin uuden paikan asemakaavan, hoviarkkitehti Desprez suunnitteli kaupungin uuden kirkon, kuningas myönsi siihen rahaa ja avusti myös uuden sillan rakentamisessa vain muutaman esimerkin mainitakseni.

Hämeen linna oli kolmessa vuosikymmenessä kokenut huomattavan muodonmuutoksen. Sotilasylipäällikkö Stackelbergin vuonna 1772 Kustaa III:lle lähettämän Hämeen linnan tilaa koskeneen raportin mukaan linnoitus oli surkeassa kunnossa. Sen puolustuskyky oli olematon. Suomen sodan aattona tilanne oli toinen. Vaikka rakenteissa ja rakennuksissa olikin tapahtunut ränsistymistä, oli linnoituksen puolustuskyky kolmen vuosikymmenen aikana tehtyjen muutostöiden ansiosta huomattavasti kohentunut. Hämeen linnasta oli tullut todellinen place d'armes, tukilinnoitus, sellainen, jollaiseksi päämajoitusmestari von Arbin sen halusi.

The present study examines the position and significance of Häme Castle in Swedish strategy during the age of King Gustav (1772 ­ 1808). In 1777 work was begun on the construction of a system of bastions around the castle. The study considers the nature of the fortification and how it had changed by the outbreak of war with Russia in 1808. A further object of contemplation is where the necessary construction materials were obtained and by whom for fortification work was accomplished.

It should first be noted, however, that the building of Häme Castle was initiated in the early 1370s when Magnus Kase was commander of the Castle, as has been shown by Knut Drake, who is well versed in the mediaeval construction of Häme Castle. The stone castle replaced a wooden structure on the same site; there is mention of the castle in a deed of reconciliation drawn up in 1308. Häme Castle achieved its present form with the reparations begun in 1726. At this time the third storey was added, as a result of which the lower eastern and southern towers the concealed.

Häme Castle figured frequently in military strategies of the 1770s. All in all 182 military strategies were drawn up in the period 1722 ­ 1771, in the majority of which Häme Castle was not perceived to be significant from the perspective of defence, nor was there support for its being equipped. In 1723 the military strategy of the quartermaster general, Axel Löwen, was completed, in which there was indeed a role for Häme Castle. According to Löwen the castle should be equipped with breastworks, moats and palisades. In his later plan, in a memorandum submitted to the Admiralty in 1731 and in a military strategy of 1738 Löwen was no longer so positive in his attitude to Häme Castle as in 1723. In his military strategy of 1738, Löwen evinces thirteen reasons regarding why Häme Castle is not appropriate as a place d armes. However, only five of these reasons are connected to remote defence and as many as eight to the castle and the safety of the magazine therein and local defence. According to Löwen, Häme Castle was not suitable for an armaments depot, and poor communications rendered it impossible to deliver the necessary materiel to the front in time of war.

However, Colonel Axel Magnus von Arbin, member of the fortification commission for Finland set up in 1766 was of totally different opinion. In his military strategy read to the fortification commission 10 ­ 11 January 1767, he takes the view that there is a need for two fortifications of the place d armes type, one to be located on the coast and the other inland. The appropriate places for auxiliary fortifications are Helsinki and Hämeenlinna, the former due to its fortified harbour to which military materiel could be delivered and in which Swedish and Finnish troops could meet up and the latter due to its spacious magazine and easy access. Since it is the function of the place d armes to cut off some crucial route thereby compelling the enemy to press further into the interior by some circuitous route, the location of Häme Castle was eminently suitable, as it was situated at the intersection of main thoroughfares. The tasks of a support castle included serving as a ba! se for light troops, as their regular rendezvous and magazine. The eastern border of the main defence area was the Kymijoki river and the western border was a line from Helsinki to Hämeenlinna and on to Vesijärvi. It was in this area that the enemy would need to set up his main operation. The enemy needed such a large force that its logistics would be rendered problematic. The Swedish army s use of guerrilla tactics exacerbated these difficulties, the objective being to disperse the enemy into as small groups as possible, which could then be eliminated one by one. According to Löwe Häme Castle was located a long way from everything, according to von Arbin it was at a suitable distance from both the border and the coast. The distance to the coast was some 12-16 Swedish leagues (129 ­ 171 kilometres) and to the border 15 ­ 17 Swedish leagues (160 ­ 182 kilometres). Häme Castle could serve as one mustering station and Helsinki as the other. The condition of Häme Castle was not equal to its task. The Finnish fortification committee proposed that the magazine, armaments depot and bakery be retained. Around them a line of defence should be built. In the fortification 400 ­ 500 men could be billeted, thus necessitating a barracks and a main guardroom. According to von Arbin, these should be built of stone, with the moat fortifications of the same material. The moat should contain water, which is a superior alternative to a dry ditch.

The military strategy Berndt Otto Stackelberg dates from 1776. Four years earlier he had been appointed supreme commander for Finland. This strategy was approved by Gustav III on 15 October 1776. Due to the mention therein of Häme Castle, it merits discussion. According to Stackelberg, the condition of the castle should be improved largely because of the defensive equipment stored there. There was in Häme Castle a safe ands spacious place for provisions, muskets and ammunition and the locality should be put into defence condition without delay. The latter is a clear reference to the plan for the improvement of the defensive condition of Häme Castle currently under way and delegated to the quartermaster general, von Arbin.

The military plan of the supreme commander Stackelberg was the last to attribute any importance to Häme Castle in the organisation of defence. In 1782 the military strategy of General Fredric Posee, commander of Finland, in which he shed doubt on the importance of Häme Castle even though he recommended that the defence works be completed. The following year he proposed that work be discontinued at Häme Castle. The commander-in-chief General Count Wilhelm Mauritz Klingspor made as many as three military strategies between 1802 and 1808, which were published by Ridderstad in 1849, most likely in arbitrary order. The dominant feature in all three of these is emphasis on the defence of the border region, and Häme Castle was obviously not relevant in such thinking. In one of his strategies Klingspor takes the view that the only real significance of Häme Castle is as an interim lager for supplies en route for the border. It is likely that he was initially positively disposed! to Häme Castle, but later came to take a more negative view.

On 15 January 1773 Axel Magnus von Arbin was appointed quartermaster general and head of the royal fortifications operations. He was charged with drawing up a plan for the improvement of the defensive capability of Häme Castle. I refer to it as the fortification contingency plan as it comes at a time when Denmark and Russia were planning an attack against Sweden. The plan was completed on 10 March 1773 and approved on 15 March 1773. It consisted of two defence lines inside each other. The depth of the defence was enhanced through pitfalls, which were extended as far as the edge of the marsh, to the east von Arbin planned a caponniere and an embankment which would be raised higher with ice in winter. The contingency fortification plan was never realised. In the middle of March 1776, von Arbin was again charged with drawing up a plan for the enhancement of the defence capability of Häme Castle. This was completed on 15 December 1776 and approved by the division of war of the Council of State at a meeting on 30 January 1777. It includes an inner defence line supported by two bastions and two semi-bastions. The inner line, which went around the buildings of the encircling wall utilised the old east and west rondels dating back to the 1500s and located at the western and eastern corners of the Castle. For the north and south towers von Arbin planned full bastions. The outer line of defence consisted of full bastions at both northern and western corners with semi-bastions between them and the semi-bastions of the southern and eastern corners. On the lake side the defence rested on both the outer defence line and the caponniere.

The drawing of the main plan was complemented by a plan for the encircling walls. The objective was to make maximum use of the distinctly dilapidated outer bailey. The spaces planned for would house among other things a gunsmith s, a carriage house, kitchen facilities, billets for 45 men and facilities for officers and non-commissioned officers.

Three rooms from the buildings of the bailey were designated for the use of the rank and file. In addition there is the plan completed in October 1775 in the hand of A. Wadman, masterbuilder working in Viapori for a wooden barracks for 100 men. von Arbin probably commissioned the wooden barracks with a view to including between the western outer bailey building and the bastions. In total 145 men could have been billeted in the fortification, which was probably enough to ensure the fortress.

There are some similarities in the two fortification plans of Quartermaster General von Arbin. These are the two inner defence lines, the caponniere, the bastions, the depth of defence and economy. It still remains to be considered whether the contingency fortification plan of 1773 was valid on 30 January 1777 and why its implementation was not begum. Since I have not found any decision to show that this contingency plan had been superseded I conclude that it was still in force in 1776. In practice it was abandoned only on 30 January 1777, when the plan for the fortification by bastions was approved. There are several likely reasons for the contingency fortification plan not progressing beyond the design stage. It was probably originally considered to be an interim solution pending the completion of the actual improvement plan. Since in April 1773 Russia and Denmark gave their assurances of peace there was no need to set about implementing the plan. The quartermaster general was not active in the implementation of the plan.

Only six days elapsed from the approving of the fortification plan on 30 January 1777 for the work plan also to be approved. During the first year effort was invested in covering the dry ditch, in digging a new moat, in shaping the earthworks and in detonating stones. Of these the moat was largely completed by 1786, since in the work plan for that year there is no longer any mention of digging the moat. The construction of the earthworks, on the other hand, continued considerably longer, and there is not absolute certainty when they were completed. However, by 1808 they were in place. In order to ensure a supply of soil work on digging a new moat outside the former moat began in 1787.

The plan of quartermaster general von Arbin included encircling wall constructions and a two-storey wooden barracks for one hundred men. The plans for an officers mess, i.e. the building in the eastern outer bailey were complete as early as in 1776. They were processed with the overall plan and the plan for the outer bailey on 30 January 1777. The drawings were the work of von Arbin and approved by Gustav III. Nevertheless the wooden barracks was constructed first. Construction work on it began in 1778 and it was complete the following year. 1789 saw the beginning of work on the southern outer bailey or main guardroom to the west of the crown bakery. The building was completed three years later. In 1784 it was the turn of the western outer bailey. This included a gunsmith s, a workshop and a carriage house. The building was probably finished in 1794. There is a situation drawing from the year 1793 showing that the ovens of both storeys and the fireplaces and bellows were incomplete. Work on the building in the north outer bailey with its billets for 45 men and kitchen was probably begun in 1795. The completion of the north outer bailey building may have taken as much as ten years, making its likely date of completion 1805. Due to its greater size, more time was clearly needed for this than for the main guardroom. The need for time was increased by the meagreness of resources but decreased by peacetime. I therefore assume that the building in the northern outer bailey was completed in 1805. The eastern outer bailey, i.e. the officers mess, although never actually realised, serves as an answer to the question as to why the southern, eastern and western bailey building was left unplastered and why the southern bailey building was most likely plastered, at least according to the drawings. The external appearance and surface material of the buildings reflected the socials status of their occupants, thus the three buildings mentioned needed no plastering: the purpose for which they were to be used did not so require as the status of the users in the society of the Castle was not that of the officer class.

Originally the town of Hämeenlinna was situated to the north of the Castle and on the same island in the lake. In connection with the royal progress to Finland in June 1775 Gustav III decreed that the town should be transferred to the north of Pyövelinmäki (Hangman s Hill) close to the present location of the railway bridge. However, the townsfolk were opposed to this. The proposed a hill Niementaustanmäki to the south of the Castle, which found favour with the quartermaster general, von Arbin and which Gustav III approved. The King signed the decree on the transferring of the town on 25 August 1778. The townsfolk had already begun the process of moving. In his statement of 11 May 1776 von Arbin notes that he considers the situation dangerous because the Castle can afford no protection. He proposes the construction of two castellets, one to be situated to the east and the other to the west of the hill in question and also that the town be encircled with a moat. Of these work commenced on the moat probably in 1784, since the work plan for that year mentions the sinking of piles and levelling under the heading of Byarbetet. This was complete before the outbreak of hostilities with Russia in 1808 as it appears on a site plan of Hämeenlinna and its surroundings completed in 1811.

When the construction of von Arbin s castellet to the west of the town began, i.e. the castellet by the Turku road, is unclear. Since it is likely that the castellet was built around the same time as the digging of the moat, work may have begun in 1784. At all events, it was complete by 1807.

The bridge from the Niementaka hill east to the upper Viipuri road was completed in January 1794. Because since 1741 the Castle had been a bridgehead position securing the town, it was considered that there should also be such an arrangement by the new bridge. The bridge castellet was complete before the outbreak of war with Russia as it can be seen in a Russian map of 1809 and in two aquarelles by Sergeiev which he painted 1809- ­ 1811. According to the former the bridge castellet was built during the period 1794 ­- 1808

. Those building the fortifications of Häme Castle were soldiers, artisans and convicts. Contrary to expectations, no volunteers appeared at the construction site. The first to arrive to build the fortifications were 294 enlisted men and 25 officers and non-commissioned officers of the Pori Brigade. Information is extant from 1777 -­ 1780. During this period those participating in addition to the Pori Brigade included a small contingent from the barracks of the artillery regiment, the Uusimaa regiment, the Hämeenlinna regiment, the regiment of the province of Turku and the Ostrobothnian regiment. At that time no convict labour was used. In 1779 the costs incurred by them were slightly over 3 riksdaler and in 1780 less than 1 riksdaler. The number of convicts at work began to rise after the mid 1780s and they were set to do manual tasks. The skilled work was in the hands of artisans and included the bricklaying of the heating ovens, setting up the frames for the constr! uction of the buildings, and glazing the windows. There were no construction professionals in Hämeenlinna. According to a catalogue of plots of land from 1780 there were six such men, among them two glaziers, two carpenters and two joiners and one coppersmith. At the end of the 1770s and at the beginning of the next decade the need for skilled craftsmen was great, for the move to the Niementaka hill was under way and construction was also in progress on the fortifications. For this reason it is likely that the artisans of the town were sufficiently occupied with the transfer of the town and that they could not therefore work on the site of the fortifications. That craftsmen came if necessary, for example, from Viapori, is born out by the mention, for example, in a work report of 1778 of payment of soldiers civilians and artisans travel costs.

The main construction materials were earth, natural stone, brick, chalk, timber and window glass. Earth was obtained by digging the moat and levelling the fortifications site. The most common type of earth is fine sand, silt and moraine, which were used for the earthworks, the ravelin and the castellets, in Häme Castle also for covering the fortification structures from the 1730s and building the road to the Castle towards the new site of the town.

Natural stone, which in the work reports is referred to as grey stone (gråsen) is either granite-gneiss or granodiorite. The latter is darker in colour than the former. Stone was needed for the cladding of the moat walls, for the foundations of the buildings and for the east wall which replaced the caponniere. Brick was a very common construction material in 18th century fortifications, both in Häme Castle and in Viapori and Svartholm. Although the latter two both had their own kilns the brick were chiefly delivered from private kilns. This was not the case in Häme Castle. The brick required arrived on site from the castle s own kiln, which was probably located on the lands of the Harviala manor south of the open stretch of lake known as Miemalanselkä. In Hämeenlinna there was no upsurge of entrepreneurship at least due to the fortification works as there was in Helsinki and the Lovisa area. Nevertheless, the number of bricks delivered to the fortifications site of Häme Castle during the period 1779 ­ 1784 was 607,150.

Chalk is needed in bricklaying. Initially it was supplied to the fortifications site from Kalkkimäki (Chalk Hill) in the village of Äimälä in the Municipality of Pälkäne, and after 1782 from Kalkkivuori (Chalk Mountain) in Loppi. The chalk from Pälkäne was dolomite and not well suited to bricklaying. In 1777 the chalk was fired where it was quarried in kilns built for the purpose on site, and after 1778 this was done in Valkeakoski. By contrast Kalkkivuori chalk is quartz, and eminently suitable for bricklaying. This was fired in kilns constructed close to where it was quarried. The only mention of timber is in the work report for 1777. There is it stated that in spring 1778 a quantity of timber is to be delivered to the fortifications site, the total length of which is 17 kilometres. Other work reports make no mention of orders for timber. Trees were sawn into planks. According to an article by Toivo J. Paloposki on the timber industry in Häme province one log 13 to 14 inches thick would yield 2 to 3 full-width planks. The quantity is not large, but is due to the width of planks at that time, the rotting of large trees and splitting of planks due to drying. Because of the transfer of the town, wood was not taken from the immediate vicinity of the Castle but from farther along the Vanaja waterway. Waterways south of the Castle might have been the forest south of the stretch of open water at Miemala, the shorelands of the Hiidenjoki river at Kernaalanjärvi and onwards along the Puujoki river as far as Turkhauta. Another possible area from which timber may have been harvested is the Sääjärvi river and around its tributaries. North of the Castle possible candidate sites include the Vanaja waterway as far as Valkeakoski and Lempäälä. The logs were transported to the fortifications site by kedging. Wood was needed for the two-storeyed barracks building and for the works of the moat.

Window glass was required for the buildings in the encircling wall and the wooden barracks and in the log guardroom. In the days of Gustav there were six glassworks in southern Finland, namely Inkere, founded in 1794, Liikola founded in 1795, Åvik founded in 1748, Mariedal and Tuorsniemi founded in 1781 and Nuutajärvi founded in 1793. Since the wooden barracks at Häme Castle was completed in 1779, the window glass can only have come from Åvik glassworks. This was the only glassworks east of the Gulf of Bothnia at the time. When in 1783 the main watch west of the crown bakery was completed there were already to operational glassworks, Åvik and Mariedal. However, construction work at Viapori continued until the mid-1780s and glass was needed there, too.

Communications from Mariedal were easier to Helsinki than to Hämeenlinna, thus it is highly likely that it was from Åvik that the glass was supplied for the main guardroom of Häme Castle. Regarding the buildings completed after 1784 there are four possible candidate glassworks: Åvik, Mariedal, Tuorsniemi and Nuutajärvi. Of these Mariedal is less likely due to the proximity of Viapori. Nor is Tuorsniemi very likely due to its remoteness. It is highly probable that the proximity of the towns of Rauma and Pori ensured a sufficient market area. The glassworks remaining are thus Åvik and Nuutajärvi, of which Åvik is the prime candidate, since glazing materials has already been supplied to the fortifications site and the route to Hämeenlinna was very direct; the Hämeenlinna cattle road traversed the Åvik premises. Nuutajärvi is a possible competitor only in the latter half of the 1790s. However, as a supplier of window glass it is not probable since during the period of interest it was a particularly small undertaking.

After 1784 and until the end of the age of Gustav two different quartermasters general held office: Johan von Hermansson and Nils Mannerskants. There was a drastic cut in the financial allocation to Häme Castle. Nevertheless the western outer bailey construction was probably completed in 1794 and the northern outer bailey construction in 1805 as reported. In addition to these, two castellets were built around the town and a moat was dug, a depot for artillery was built and the wooden barracks was repaired. By comparison of the construction activity under three quartermasters general it can be stated that most was accomplished under von Arbin. At that time effort was invested in the outer bailey constructions and the outer defence works, likewise the road connection from the Castle to the new location of the town and all manner of aid to the townsfolk. Least was accomplished under von Hermansson. Mostly the work was done on the earthworks. Under Mannerskants there was a slight upsurge of construction activity. The western outer bailey construction, the northern outer bailey construction, the ditches and the defence works of the town were completed.

Maps of the Russian sapper detachment show that prior to the war between the imperial Russia and the Kingdom of Sweden the fortifications had been completed. It also appears from the maps that the amount of building construction was very considerable and that it had begun to fall into disrepair. A map from 1810 shows that the 1809 fortifications were not accomplished and that both buildings and external defence works were in place.

In three decades Häme Castle had undergone a major metamorphosis. According to the report submitted to Gustav III by the supreme commander in 1772, the state of Häme Castle was lamentable. Its defence potential was nil. On the eve of the outbreak of war the situation was different. Although there has been some decay in the structures and buildings, the defence capability of the fortifications had been greatly improved due to the alternations accomplished over thirty years. Häme Castle had become a real place d armes, such as the quartermaster general, von Arbin, would have wished to see it.