Freedom from, Freedom to, and Freedom in: A Hegelian Account

Abstract

This paper argues that important forms of freedom may be analyzable not only in terms of “freedom from” and “freedom to” but also in terms of the proposed category of “freedom in”. It is one thing to be free to dance, and another thing to be free in dancing; one thing to be free to lead a self-directed life and another thing to be free in leading a self-directed life; one thing to be free to relate to others as a moral or legal person, a family member, or a citizen, and another thing to be free in being related to others as a moral or legal person, a family member, or a citizen. Such freedom-in has two important facets: a relational one (constituted in one’s relations to others and institutions), and an agential one (consisting of the exercise or process of doing something), which come together in such “relational, processual states” as self-realization through social roles. Hegel’s theory of social freedom, embedded in his notion of Sittlichkeit or ethical life, illustrates this structure of freedom.