The Nominalist Theory of Natural Kinds and Kind Essences

Abstract

This chapter outlines eliminativist nominalist theory of natural kinds, which denies the existence of natural kinds as separate general entities. Yet, there is general talk about entities belonging to natural kinds made true by the entities or structures of entities of the nominalist basic ontology, of which our trope theory SNT serves as an example. The preferred conception of natural kind terms is their having a plural reference as predicates applying to objects or as plural names. In many cases, the source of the necessity of certain features to the members of a natural kind might be only the fact that the kind term tracks objects having certain features or a certain kind of structure in every possible world. The nominalist theory stresses the epistemic and explanatory functions of natural kinds and natural kind classifications. By contrast, the adopted nominalist basic ontology takes care of the metaphysically heavy functions of collecting the necessary properties of the members of the kind and determining the identity conditions of objects.