Linguistic Mistakes and Semantic Rules

Abstract

This paper critically examines the idea that language use is governed by semantic rules. In the literature, two competing rules have been proposed: the truth rule and the rule of use. The truth rule requires speakers to always use expressions truthfully, while the rule of use requires speakers to use expressions in accordance with meaning. The rule of use has been claimed to be better at making justice to the intuitions on linguistic mistakes, but it is unclear how these rules of use should be formulated. By focusing on a recent suggestion by Indrek Reiland, I assess various candidates for rules of use and show that even these fail to accord with the intuitive notion of linguistic mistakes. I propose that linguistic mistakes should be understood in terms of what I call expressions’ linguistic function. However, this implies that only rules that can capture this notion of linguistic mistakes rely on speakers’ intentions and therefore should be taken as instances of the general relationship between means and ends rather than being intrinsic to meaning.