Unintended, Unequal Hybrid Service Systems: The Presence of Despachantes in Brazilian Social Security

Abstract

Social security systems often involve complex eligibility rules. Even under digital simplification, applying for welfare benefits can be extremely burdensome. For vulnerable families, information asymmetry between applicants and social security is higher, demanding external assistance or brokerage. Such demand can be covered by family members, third-sector volunteers or, as in the Brazilian case, by despachantes—street-level brokers who provide help in application procedures for a fee, even in the case of basic welfare services. Despite the Brazilian National Social Security Agency (INSS)'s efforts for simplification, the burden imposed by its benefit systems' complexity and related application procedures opens gaps for despachantes. Institutionalised, they have enacted unintended hybrid service delivery systems—a phenomenon so far understudied in the empirical literature. Further, social assistance benefits, relying on more selective—thus complex—procedures while targeting vulnerable populations, might entail higher information asymmetry and the need for paying despachantes could reinforce existing inequalities. We ask whether applications for social assistance benefits are more likely to be brokered by despachantes than other INSS benefits, due to higher information asymmetry. We examine registry data for benefit applications between April 2019 and March 2020 (n = 4,036,461) through descriptive statistics and regression analysis. Results show despachantes' presence to be stronger in social assistance than in other benefits. The findings suggest that, when failing to build intelligible social policy systems, the state inadvertently enacts different tiers of welfare access. We discuss whether this is an exclusively Brazilian phenomenon, or an unavoidable development of welfare systems unable to provide actual implementation equality.