Approaches to Individuation in Realist and Anti-Realist Metaphysics: A Comparative Study

Abstract

In metaphysics there is an ongoing discussion about the nature of reality and whether it has any categorial structure independently of categorizing activities. There is also an ongoing metametaphysical discussion about the nature of metaphysics as a discipline and whether its subject matter is confined to the mind-independent realm. The objective of this study is to increase understanding of metaphysical inquiry when mind-dependent structures are not, per se, excluded from the scope of metaphysics.

This thesis is a comparative study of the differences between metaphysical realism and anti-realism which are scrutinized through their opposing attitudes towards metaphysical individuation. Metaphysical realism, in its moderate form, is characterized as an account according to which there are some individuals which are individuated mind-independently. Metaphysical anti-realists, in contrast, oppose this and maintain that there is no privileged way in which reality is divided into individuals, but all individuality and thus all the categorial divisions are relative to our conceptual frameworks. The choice of individuation as the demarcating factor is defended by its being the form of mind-independence which best captures the differences between realist and anti-realist views which do not differ, for instance, in beliefs of existence of external reality.

In realist metaphysics, metaphysical individuation needs to be accounted for in mind-independent terms. Questions of individuation concern what makes something a self-identical unified whole that is distinct from everything else. In realist theorizing the question of individuation is particularly challenging when it comes to explaining how structurally complex entities are unified into individual wholes. In anti-realist approach no mind-independent explanation of individuality needs to be given. However, I suggest that even anti-realist theories need to give some sort of constitutive explanation of individuation. This is because epistemic/cognitive or perceptual acts and events of individuation through which we entertain singular thought and perceive and identify individuals do not alone suffice to explain the successes of these referential activities. The distinction between constitutive or metaphysical individuation and individuation as an act or event is also examined in more detail.

As anti-realist metaphysics rejects mind-independent individuation, constitutive explanation of individuation is given conceptually. From the point of view of conceptual relativity, what individuals there are, or exist, is relative to conceptual frameworks. Some concepts play a role in adding to ontological structure, but which ones so do is judged within each framework and through pragmatic considerations. I also examine a different, Kantian-inspired approach to conceptual individuation which focuses not so much on our conceptual conventions but on the basic conceptual structures of thought, which make acts of identification and reidentification of individuals possible.

This study contributes to the metametaphysical discussion of the nature of metaphysics. The subject matter of metaphysics is often distinguished from conceptual aspects. Yet, this study motivates a reconsideration of such distinction by examining whether constitutive form of individuation could be accounted for in conceptual terms for individuatively mind-dependent entities. Whether such entities do or could exist, however, is a metaphysical question of its own.