The effects of board compensation on the voluntary establishment of an internal audit function

Abstract

Purpose: This study examines the effects of board members’ compensation on the voluntary establishment of an internal audit function in publicly listed firms. While previous studies have identified some individual determinants related to the voluntary establishment of an internal audit function, the existing evidence on how board members’ compensation affects voluntary use of internal audit is, at best, ambiguous, scarce and incoherent. Design/methodology/approach: Board compensation is a central incentive instrument in the classic principal–agent relationship between the owners and board members. The theme is empirically examined by using data compiled from Finnish publicly listed companies for the period 2015 to 2018. Since the dependent variable of the study is a binary variable, the logistic regression method was chosen as the statistical method of the study. Findings: Our results unequivocally show that generous compensation of the board members increases the likelihood of establishing an internal audit function. Thus, we conclude that good corporate governance can be improved through generous compensation of board members. Originality/value: Identifying the determinants of internal audit is vital to better understand the mechanisms that facilitate firms' improvement of internal control and risk management in terms of voluntarily adopting an internal audit function, and the implementation of good governance in general. Although numerous determinants of internal audit have been identified in previous studies, this study showed that one of the key determinants has so far been overlooked; namely, the remuneration of board members.