Beyond the Political Rhetoric: The UK’s Position on its Participation in EU Civilian Crisis Management Post-Brexit
Hancock, Conor Patrick (2021)
2021
Yhteiskuntatutkimuksen maisteriohjelma - Master's Programme in Social Sciences
Yhteiskuntatieteiden tiedekunta - Faculty of Social Sciences
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Hyväksymispäivämäärä
2021-12-14
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:tuni-202111168446
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:tuni-202111168446
Tiivistelmä
Utilising the qualitative research method of document analysis, specifically employing an inductive form of Qualitative Content Analysis, this study delves deeper in to the UK Government’s position on the future of UK participation in EU Civilian Crisis Management (CCM) post-Brexit.
The UK’s House of Lords’ European Union Select Committee Inquiry Report of 2018 entitled: Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations laid the foundation for the study; with the UK Government response to it being systematically analysed in the expectation that it would provide further insight in to the UK Government’s position on EU CCM and assist in understanding what the future of UK-EU CCM may look like in a post-Brexit world and why. The inquiry report which set in motion the response is briefly examined in this paper and similarly, the most recent full-scale review of UK foreign policy published by the UK Government in early 2021, entitled Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy is also considered.
The study found three underlying common themes because of their noticeable consistent recurrences throughout the response document, both explicitly and interpretatively. They encapsulate the most relevant points in the document when attempting to better understand the UK Government’s standpoint. One theme was the UK Government’s positive assessment of EU CCM and reiteration of shared UK-EU foreign policy interests; the second, its focus on the utility of other multilateral organisations aside from the EU; and the third theme, the UK Government’s reluctance to accept anything other than an unprecedented Third State model. The alternative being the proposed participation on a case-by-case basis of which no real detail has yet been presented. In summary, this study suggests that the UK Government is ‘hedging its bets’ in an attempt to secure a role in EU CSDP and CCM matters akin to its role pre-Brexit either as standard practice or on a case-by-case basis. In a scenario where this was not to materialise, it seems likely that the UK would rather utilise the position it holds as part of the UN and NATO than participate directly with the EU within the current Third Country framework.
The UK’s House of Lords’ European Union Select Committee Inquiry Report of 2018 entitled: Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations laid the foundation for the study; with the UK Government response to it being systematically analysed in the expectation that it would provide further insight in to the UK Government’s position on EU CCM and assist in understanding what the future of UK-EU CCM may look like in a post-Brexit world and why. The inquiry report which set in motion the response is briefly examined in this paper and similarly, the most recent full-scale review of UK foreign policy published by the UK Government in early 2021, entitled Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy is also considered.
The study found three underlying common themes because of their noticeable consistent recurrences throughout the response document, both explicitly and interpretatively. They encapsulate the most relevant points in the document when attempting to better understand the UK Government’s standpoint. One theme was the UK Government’s positive assessment of EU CCM and reiteration of shared UK-EU foreign policy interests; the second, its focus on the utility of other multilateral organisations aside from the EU; and the third theme, the UK Government’s reluctance to accept anything other than an unprecedented Third State model. The alternative being the proposed participation on a case-by-case basis of which no real detail has yet been presented. In summary, this study suggests that the UK Government is ‘hedging its bets’ in an attempt to secure a role in EU CSDP and CCM matters akin to its role pre-Brexit either as standard practice or on a case-by-case basis. In a scenario where this was not to materialise, it seems likely that the UK would rather utilise the position it holds as part of the UN and NATO than participate directly with the EU within the current Third Country framework.