The Freedom of Information Act in the Mexican Higher Education System : An Agency Theory Framework
Aguilar Burgoa, Emmanuel (2021)
2021
Master's Programme in Research and Innovation in Higher Education
Johtamisen ja talouden tiedekunta - Faculty of Management and Business
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Hyväksymispäivämäärä
2021-05-04
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:tuni-202103312782
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:tuni-202103312782
Tiivistelmä
The general purpose of this exploratory and qualitative study is to understand the dynamics of FOIA regulations in the case of Mexican public universities, through the theoretical lenses of Agency Theory. The research explores the characteristics of principal-agent relationships in the system, and the costs that universities assume when implementing FOIA regulations. Additionally, it explores how these regulations encourage specific types of transparency and accountability in the relationships of the system.
The research gathers information from interviews conducted with transparency managers in 12 different universities of the country, and from a document analysis made to an information request and the strategic planning documents of those same universities. The results are divided into three main sections. The first section describes the characteristics of the emerging principal-agent relationships in the system, the information asymmetries, and the opportunistic behavior of the university managers. The second section describes the costs that universities assume when implementing FOIA regulations, reflected on the leadership, people, operation, and planning dimensions. The third section describes the types of transparency and accountability that emerge in these relationships, as well as their interactions in the system.
This research found three goals in the system which are in conflict with university autonomy: horizontalization, bureaucratization, and legitimation. However, most information asymmetries are present in the citizens-university relationship. These two elements arise an agency problem in the HE system, characterized by the risk-aversion and opportunistic behavior of university agents. In turn, this problem creates costs that universities assume, which are related mostly to non-financial issues, particularly in terms of the career and the psychosocial aspects of people in the organization. Finally, this study found how transparency and accountability emerging from FOIA regulations interact in the forms of institutional answerability and sanctions. The results from this study highlight the relevance of the Agency Theory as a tool to understand the impact of transparency in the field of Higher Education, the need to evaluate the cost-benefit of FOIA regulations in HEIs, and the urgency of shifting transparency efforts towards voluntary transparency in universities.
The research gathers information from interviews conducted with transparency managers in 12 different universities of the country, and from a document analysis made to an information request and the strategic planning documents of those same universities. The results are divided into three main sections. The first section describes the characteristics of the emerging principal-agent relationships in the system, the information asymmetries, and the opportunistic behavior of the university managers. The second section describes the costs that universities assume when implementing FOIA regulations, reflected on the leadership, people, operation, and planning dimensions. The third section describes the types of transparency and accountability that emerge in these relationships, as well as their interactions in the system.
This research found three goals in the system which are in conflict with university autonomy: horizontalization, bureaucratization, and legitimation. However, most information asymmetries are present in the citizens-university relationship. These two elements arise an agency problem in the HE system, characterized by the risk-aversion and opportunistic behavior of university agents. In turn, this problem creates costs that universities assume, which are related mostly to non-financial issues, particularly in terms of the career and the psychosocial aspects of people in the organization. Finally, this study found how transparency and accountability emerging from FOIA regulations interact in the forms of institutional answerability and sanctions. The results from this study highlight the relevance of the Agency Theory as a tool to understand the impact of transparency in the field of Higher Education, the need to evaluate the cost-benefit of FOIA regulations in HEIs, and the urgency of shifting transparency efforts towards voluntary transparency in universities.