Yevgeny Primakov's operational code and Russian foreign policy
Bernier, Pihla (2018)
Bernier, Pihla
2018
Politiikan tutkimuksen tutkinto-ohjelma - Degree Programme in Politics
Johtamiskorkeakoulu - Faculty of Management
This publication is copyrighted. You may download, display and print it for Your own personal use. Commercial use is prohibited.
Hyväksymispäivämäärä
2018-11-06
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:uta-201811192865
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:uta-201811192865
Tiivistelmä
Yevgeny Primakov was an important figure in both Soviet and Russian foreign policy circles throughout his lifetime until 2015. He was a critical leader in the 1990s holding positions of both Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister, which also coincided with times when Russia was charting a new foreign policy course. He reinvented a foreign policy school of thought called Statism which has been the most influential with Russian leaders for many years and continues to be so today. Current research has not adequately addressed his importance. This thesis set out to investigate his beliefs and worldview utilizing the operational code method using Alexander George’s ten question model. Research was conducted based on Primakov’s own writings, speeches and interviews.
Yevgeny Primakov has been called both a westernizing leader and a hard-liner, but it was found both of these labels are incorrect. Rather, he should be viewed as a patriotic pragmatist. His actions were motivated by advancing Russian interests of which one of the greatest was restoring Russia as a major player in international relations again. His attitude towards the United States was complex, viewing them as a rival, yet not as an enemy. He opposed American hegemony which had emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union. Primakov wanted Russia to get back in the great power game as an equal and came up with innovative and pragmatic strategies to make it happen. The most important of these strategies was a foreign policy concept called multipolarity which was intended to diversify Russia’s foreign ties with other emerging powers and counterbalance the unipolar system he thought would cause instability and chaos in the long-run.
It was found that Yevgeny Primakov was more important for Russia’s foreign policy formulation than first meets the eye. His ideas and efforts have been praised by both past and present Russian leaders, including Sergey Lavrov and Vladimir Putin. After comparing Putin and Primakov’s operational codes they were found to be remarkably complementary. Putin has implemented many of Primakov’s ideas and listened to his recommendations. This is perhaps because Putin himself lacks the qualities of a grand strategist, whilst Primakov embodied them. In the future, other scholars could use Primakov’s operational code and the analysis presented here to evaluate if Russian leaders are putting into practice a “Primakov Doctrine,” an idea which has sometimes been discussed, but not officially declared.
Yevgeny Primakov has been called both a westernizing leader and a hard-liner, but it was found both of these labels are incorrect. Rather, he should be viewed as a patriotic pragmatist. His actions were motivated by advancing Russian interests of which one of the greatest was restoring Russia as a major player in international relations again. His attitude towards the United States was complex, viewing them as a rival, yet not as an enemy. He opposed American hegemony which had emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union. Primakov wanted Russia to get back in the great power game as an equal and came up with innovative and pragmatic strategies to make it happen. The most important of these strategies was a foreign policy concept called multipolarity which was intended to diversify Russia’s foreign ties with other emerging powers and counterbalance the unipolar system he thought would cause instability and chaos in the long-run.
It was found that Yevgeny Primakov was more important for Russia’s foreign policy formulation than first meets the eye. His ideas and efforts have been praised by both past and present Russian leaders, including Sergey Lavrov and Vladimir Putin. After comparing Putin and Primakov’s operational codes they were found to be remarkably complementary. Putin has implemented many of Primakov’s ideas and listened to his recommendations. This is perhaps because Putin himself lacks the qualities of a grand strategist, whilst Primakov embodied them. In the future, other scholars could use Primakov’s operational code and the analysis presented here to evaluate if Russian leaders are putting into practice a “Primakov Doctrine,” an idea which has sometimes been discussed, but not officially declared.