University of Tampere

School of Management

Politics

VENLA VOUTILAINEN

State of Our Sociospatial Making

Cases of state territorialisation from the Sino-Burmese borderlands

International Relations

Master's thesis

March 2015

University of Tampere

School of Management

Politics

VOUTILAINEN, VENLA: State of Our Sociospatial Making: Cases of state territorialisation from the Sino-Burmese borderlands

Master's thesis, 99 pp. incl. two maps

Degree Programme in Politics / International Relations

March 2015

The territorial sovereign state is the primary unit of International Relations. In this thesis, it is argued that its perceived dominance in the 'real' world out there has also come to dominate the political as well as the academic field as the only imaginable spatial extension of political authority. The mainstream of IR can only analyse questions of how the territorial state functions in the international system, not how the state comes to dominate social life as a territorial form of political authority.

The purpose of this thesis is to reimagine the state and territoriality in International Relations. To this end, inspired by political geography and sociology, alternate conceptualisations of space and the state are suggested. They can be used to form a basis for analysis of sociospatial phenomena that takes into account the social as well as the spatial, and starts with human agency, not structure. In chapter four I then build on these conceptualisation to suggest ways to analyse state power as ascending from local social relations, and the territorialisation strategies and effects that make political authority territorial.

Viewed as an effect, the territorial state is but one possible form of sociospatial organisation of political authority, although it does currently have the strongest international acceptance for its source of sovereignty. Nevertheless, competing political authorities can employ supporting, parallel, or competing systems of rule with the state that can be territorial, but also, for example, network-, kinship- or mobility-based. The making of political authorities and their spatialities is demonstrated with cases from the Sino-Burmese borderlands.

The cases build on fieldworks conducted by ethnographers, anthropologists, and political geographers. The focus of the analysis is on the territorialisation of political authority, especially of the Burmese state, in spaces with competing spatial claims for authority. The cases demonstrate that international borders tell little about the realities on the field; state territory and power are constantly renegotiated and redefined by actors varying from armed groups, state military, central and local government officials, drug lords, businessmen and ordinary farmers.

Aluevaltio on kansainvälisen politiikan perusyksikkö. Tämän tutkimuksen mukaan valtion dominoiva asema käytännön kansainvälisessä politiikassa on johtanut siihen, että myös akateemisessa tutkimuksessa siitä on tullut poliittisen auktoriteetin ainoa kuviteltavissa oleva tilallinen muoto. Kansainvälisen politiikan valtavirta pystyy vastaamaan vain kysymyksiin siitä, miten aluevaltiot toimivat kansainvälisissä suhteissa, mutta ei siihen, miten valtio muodostuu sosiaalisissa suhteissa niiden toimintaa määrääväksi alueelliseksi poliittisen auktoriteetin muodoksi.

Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on kuvitella valtio ja alueellisuus uudelleen kansainvälisen politiikan tieteenalalla. Tätä tavoitetta varten tutkimuksessa ehdotetaan poliittisen maantieteen ja sosiologian

käsitteisiin perustuvia tilan ja valtion käsitteitä. Näitä käsitteitä voidaan hyödyntää sosiaalistilallisessa tutkimuksessa, joka ottaa huomioon fyysisen tilan ja sosiaalisten suhteiden keskinäiskonstituution sekä ottaa lähtökohdakseen ihmisen toiminnan rakenteen sijasta. Kappaleessa neljä näitä tilan ja valtion käsitteitä hyödynnetään määriteltäessä alueellisuutta ja valtion valtaa. Valtion vallan oletetaan syntyvän paikallisista sosiaalisista suhteista ja vallankäytön tilojen keskinäisistä suhteista nousevana ilmiönä. Poliittisen auktoriteetin alueellisuus taas käsitetään alueellistamisstrategioiden vaikutuksena (*effect*).

Valtio käsitetään tässä tutkimuksessa rakenteellisten prosessien vaikutuksena. Näin käsitettynä aluevaltio näyttäytyy yhtenä mahdollisena poliittisen auktoriteetin sosiaalistilallisena muotona. Aluevaltion erottaa muista kilpailevista poliittisen auktoriteetin muodoista se, että kansainvälisesti sitä pidetään ainoana suvereenina muotona. Poliittinen auktoriteetti voi kuitenkin olla myös muuta kuin alueellista, kuten esimerkiksi verkostoihin, samankaltaisuuteen tai mobiilisuuteen perustuvaa. Poliittisten auktoriteettien tilallisuuden muotoutumista ja kilpailua demonstroidaan tutkimuksessa Kiinan ja Myanmarin rajaseutujen tapausten kautta.

Käsitellyt tapaustutkimukset perustuvat etnografien, antropologien ja poliittisten maantieteilijöiden tekemiin kenttätutkimuksiin Kiinassa ja Myanmarissa. Tapaukset keskittyvät poliittisen auktoriteetin, erityisesti Myanmarin valtion auktoriteetin, alueellistumiseen raja-alueiden tilassa, jossa on kilpailevia tilallisia poliittisen auktoriteetin muotoja. Tapaukset tulitaukosopimuksista, huumekaupasta ja maansiirroista osoittavat, että kansainväliset rajaviivat kertovat vain vähän eletystä todellisuudesta, jossa valtion alueellisuus ja valtio täytyy neuvotella ja määritellä jatkuvasti uudelleen. Tähän prosessiin osallistuvat mitä erilaisimmat toimijat valtion armeijasta, valtion virkamiehistä ja aseistetuista ryhmistä aina liikemiehiin, huumelordeihin ja tavallisiin maanviljelijöihin.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADB   Asian Development Bank

AFO   Anti-Fascist Organisation

AFPFL   Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League

AP   autonomous prefecture

ASEAN   Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BSPP   Burma Socialist Programme Party

CPB   Communist Party of Burma

CPC   Communist Party of China

FDI   foreign direct investment

GDP   gross domestic product

GMS   Greater Mekong Subregion

IR   International Relations

KIA   Kachin Independence Army

KIO   Kachin Independence Organization

MNC   multinational corporation

MNDAA   Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army

NDAA   National Democratic Alliance Army

NDA-K   New Democratic Army – Kachin

NFPP   National Forest Protection Program

NLD   National League for Democracy

NOC   national oil company

ODI   outward foreign direct investment

PLA   People's Liberation Army

POE   private-owned enterprises

PRC   People's Republic of China

PSC   Politburo Standing Committee

RC   Revolutionary Council

SASAC   State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission

SEZ	special economic zone
SLC	state-linked company
SLCP	Sloping Land Conversion Program
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
SOE	state-owned enterprise
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
TVE	town and village enterprise
UN	United Nations
UWSA	United Wa State Army
WTO	World Trade Organization
YUPD	Yunnan United Power Development

POLITICS VS. ETYMOLOGY OF A NAME: MYANMAR OR BURMA?

There is much confusion as well as political weight in the application of the name of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (the current official name); many know the country by the name Burma but the official name is Myanmar. The name Myanmar is used for example in the UN setting. However, the UK (see e.g. https://www.gov.uk/government/world/burma) and the US (see U.S. Department of State 2014) use the name Burma. EU uses the name Myanmar/Burma but for example in office names (like the EU External Action Service office) the name Myanmar is applied (see e.g. http://eeas.europa.eu/myanmar/index_en.htm). So what should be used in this study?

Whether to use the name Myanmar (derived from *myanma*) or Burma (derived from *bama*) is a political choice more than anything else. Etymologically the names mean the same thing; the ethnic majority group living for the most part in the lowlands of the country. Both of them have been used interchangeably long before the colonial period, *myanma* however in more formal settings than *bama*. However, during the colonial period the words were used to refer to the colonial Burma that consisted of multiple ethnicities whereas the word originally meant only one ethnic group. This is true for both the name Myanmar as well as Burma; the country and the "Burmese nation" are a colonial creation. There is no original word in Burmese that would refer to the whole population consisting different ethnicities. (Lintner n.d.)

So when the nationalist movement in the 1930's decided on whether to call the country Burma or Myanmar, the choice was merely between two words with different pronunciations but the same meaning (Lintner n.d.). Their interpretation was that Burma referred to the country as a whole and in 1948, the country was given the name Union of Burma to encourage national unity. The military junta's interpretation was the opposite and after the military coup in 1988, the junta changed the name of the country to the Union of Myanmar. Their reading was that the name Burma reflected the colonial rule and the name Myanmar would give the nation more unity and independence. The name change has been contested by the opposition because it was done by the junta that did not come to power in democratic ways and thus had no authority to change the name. (Kipgen 2013.)

The military coup was condemned in the Western world and financial aid and loans were frozen and heavy sanctions were put on the country. Most Western countries also continued to call the country Burma as the junta was not deemed a legitimate ruler of the country. After the junta stepped down and the country started opening up, the name Myanmar has become more popular and accepted to use by the international community like the UN (Kipgen 2013). However, there still is uneasiness about which name to use (see e.g. Perry 2014; Schiavenza 2014), especially as the speed of reforms

has slowed down and the government is reluctant to address the worsening situation of the Rohingya Muslim minority.

The focus of this thesis is in the years of military rule and the time after the opening up of the country and therefore, following David I. Steinberg (2001, xi–xii), I will use the name Myanmar for the most part. However, when times before the name change are discussed, the name Burma will be used. The term Burman will be used to refer to a person belonging to the ethnic majority, Burmese to any citizen of the country and when talking about national policies. The intention behind the choices is to make them as unpolitical as possible while at the same time reserving the readability of the text; Myanmar is the official name and therefore it is used but the use of Myanma, the adjective derived from Myanmar, tends to make text difficult to understand.

1. INTRODUCTION

Indisputably, the rise of China is one of the biggest issues of our time that has even been called the Chinese century. The US-led world we have known, if not loved, is changing. No matter which International Relations scholar you might ask, China is bound to play a role in their predictions about the future be their theory of choice neorealism or democracy theory. The influence of Chinese choices and policies affect an ever larger part of the world from heroin addicts in Southeast Asia, investors in Africa, to diplomats in the UN. The rise of China in mere 30 years from a poor rural country to the banker of the world and the roaring dragon of economic miracles has been astonishing to most of the world. FDI from the developed world has poured in China, making its industrial reformation possible. Now China is becoming a major source of ODI itself and is gaining more and more influence and foothold in the international economy, especially since the US and Europe have been crippled by the financial crisis of 2007/8 and the economic and social crisis that followed. The seemingly endless growth and expansion of the Chinese economy is a glimmer of hope for the world economy in crisis but it has created also a lot of anxiety and fear of China taking over the world with soft power created by its bottomless pockets filled with foreign reserves.

How then, to study this new power in the global game of states? Should one look at the material and economic power of the dragon, and try to understand whether its rise will be a dangerous one? What about the soft power of China, is it challenging or accommodating current norms and regimes, or will it bring about a new collection of Chinese norms? Litres after litres of ink have already been spilled while trying to understand China, and to predict the future of the international system/society in which it is a major material and ideational player. Some predict a China threat (see e.g. Rapkin & Thompson 2003; Kugler 2006; Goldstein 2007; Mearsheimer 2001; 2006), predict a future of rivalry and insecurity in an Asia that resembles pre-1945 Europe (Evans 2011, 88), some assimilation due to economic consideration (Moore and Yang 2001; Scobell 2001), some (Economy 2001; Taylor 2006) a danger to the Western-built international community and its democratic and rights-based norms, and others (Johnston 2003; Foot & Walter 2013, Chan et al. 2008; Kent 2007; Chen 2009; Bijian 2005) an assimilating dragon.

Crudely said, the IR discussion is divided to two camps; those who predict a China threat and those who predict a peaceful rise, be it in material or ideational terms. China is taken to be just another Western-style hegemon rising to power (see e.g. Schweller & Pu 2010; Friedberg 2005). From (neo)realist and neoliberal accounts to constructivist ones, all states are treated as actors that exist prior to interaction, and therefore have corporate identities that make them essentially the same, only

situational and contextual interests might vary. The world is made of territorial states and those states are in rivalry for primacy, be it material or ideational, to step in the hierarchy of power. (Agnew 2010, 571–572.) To me, this, albeit fairly typical IR setting, seems limited. It takes China as well as the international system/community as fairly static. World history runs its similar course through the passive space and there is not much we can do about it. All states are the same except for their relative power, institutions that possess "a monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion and the ability to extract tax revenues in a given territorial space", like Max Weber has it defined and that acts as the basis for most of IR research, excluding Marxist conceptualisation (Biersteker 2013, 247). I could not see how this could help me understand what interested me in China most; the working of the state outside of its territorial borders, especially in Myanmar, the new aid darling of the Western world.

An alternative exists in the current literature (see e.g. Shambaugh 2004; Burman 2008; Buzan 2010; Chan 2010; Kang 2003; for critique, see Acharya 2003); to treat China as a case of exception, to which Western-based models of the international system/society don't apply. Instead of the grand world narrative, these scholars their attention on regional and historic specifics. This unique China is based upon its imperial past, communism, and rejection of capitalism and cultural particularity, as if China had never been 'tainted' with Western concepts. This brings us closer to asking questions like what China is and how it comes to being, and transforms. However, what this 'China-exceptionalism' fails to take into account is that the rise of China is happening in a world that has been shaped and institutionalised to a large degree by the US and 'Western values'. No matter how different China is or is portrayed to be, if it wants to operate globally, it has to deal with the legacy of the what has been and still is in the world, such as discourses and practices about what it means to be a sovereign state. (Agnew 2010a, 570–572; 579.) This can be witnessed for example in how China strongly advocates for the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention, a strongly Western concept, and as the principles of neoliberal capitalism are applied in its trade and foreign policies.

As I read more about what had been written on China and the state, I started noticing that most IR research assumes that the world is neatly divided states based on the principle of sovereignty as territorially distinct units that contain society within them and mark the borders of political authority. This has limited the discipline's ability to imagine political authority that is not defined in territorial terms and left the nature of the state unquestioned. The extraterritoriality of Chinese companies that in China's case are deemed often as mere extensions of the state and its policies are hard to analyse if state territoriality is simply assumed to exist in the world, or at least that it is unproblematic to utilise in academic exercises. Finally I ended up asking questions like how does the state come into being. IR answers questions of how the system of states comes into being, and how it functions, but

does little to our understanding how the state comes into being as a territorial political authority. The purpose of this thesis then came to be to reimagine statehood and territoriality in alternative ways that allow for change and creation of political authorities.

I argue that mainstream IR does little to our understanding how political authority, and its sociospatial extension, come into being, and as such, do not help us understand transformation. Mainstream IR, such as neorealism, institutionalism and even moderate constructivism, study the workings of the world that is comprised of certain, knowable parts. Their premises are different from each other, but what they have in common is the assumption that the world we are supposed to study is organised in territorial nation-states. This is very understandable, even somehow self-evident; these territorial states seem to exist in the world. They are loved, and killed and died for, and their power becomes apparent in the use of police force and the border control practices. The heads of states convene in the United Nations, and make decisions that affect the real lives of people. It seems impossible to imagine that life could be organised in any other way. However, the attempt to do so is not to depart from IR, and even less, to somehow deem existing literature irrelevant. It is just to ask different questions. I just wanted to try and see if I open up my sociospatial imagination in the context of the most important unit of study of IR, the state.

In chapter two, I argue that the state, and especially its territoriality, has been left under-conceptualised, and taken as an unproblematic given, or as a given because it is too difficult to think of it otherwise, even though it is the single most important actor in international relations. The state is taken as a self-evident actor that exists prior to interaction. Its most important quality is sovereignty because it guarantees the security of the inside of the state. As an aspect of sovereignty territory is thought to be an unproblematic aspect, a fixed and static unit of bordered space. Therefore, the constitution of territory is not of interest for the discipline, except its social construction by constructivist approaches. Even they remain agnostic about physical space and therefore the co-constitution of the physical and the social is left outside of analyses. I argue that this is due to the uneasy attitude of IR to time and space, especially space. It is taken as a fixed, passive arena where social relations happen.

In chapter three, time and space are defined in a way that takes them both as interrelated concepts that are both important; time cannot be valued over space or the other way around because all life exists and happens in time and space. Space is then defined as the co-existence of trajectories of processes of change. As such, it is always in a state of flux, always open. The trajectories that constitute space are both social and physical. To understand this, the co-constitution of physical and

social space is further elaborated on. On this conceptualisation, I build my argument that the state, instead of an unproblematic actor, should be analysed as an effect of structural processes that make the state appear as a structure above society, organising and controlling the lives of people. However, as an effect, it is actually everyday practices and discourses happening in society that make the state appear in social relations. Although here I speak of the state, any form of political authority are constituted like this but what makes the state different in our time is the powerful discourse of sovereignty that makes territorial nation-states seen as the only legitimate sources of ultimate political authority. However, even this sovereignty has to be made to work in practice, in the material and social world. Understanding time, space and state like this means accepting that there are multiple, heterogeneous truths in the world, for example about the state. This can be scary, but necessary to admit if we want our theories to be able to relate to the world as it is lived, not only as it should work if things were eternal and absolute.

In chapter four, I suggest some concepts to help analyse how the state comes into being in social relation through practices. First, I argue that scaling creates relations between spaces; for example state space can appear as 'higher' than for example the local scale. These relations between spaces in turn create power relations and fortify existing power structures, although they do have transformative potential as well. The scaled power can take various forms. I introduce two; despotic and infrastructural power following Merje Kuus and John Agnew's (2008) adaption of Michael Mann's (1984) concepts of state power. Despotic power refers to the

In the remainder of the thesis, I showcase how the concepts could be applied in research. As my case I have chosen cross-border interactions between the Yunnan province in China and its neighbouring states of Kachin and Shan in Myanmar. If territory is thought of in terms of absolutes, borders and borderlands mark the success (or failure) of state territorialisation as they are key in regulating physical transnational flows (van Schendel 2005, 3). The Sino-Burmese borderlands provide an especially interesting example because the Burmese state was mapped and initially territorialised, although not fully, under the British colonial rule, whereas political authority in China has traditionally been centralised but not effectively territorialised. Currently, both countries embrace the principle of sovereignty and especially its aspect of non-interference. However, neither state has never really been able to maintain the border, but instead the people living in the area contest the border in their everyday life and practices. Especially upland people living in the mountains along the border of China and Myanmar have never effectively been under the control of the state. They have also engaged in cross-border travel as well as trade to some extent regardless of central government's

control policies on either side of the border. The political authority of the Burmese government is also constantly contested by armed groups[1] operating in the Kachin and Shan states.

In chapter five I showcase some geographic issues, and especially economic and foreign policy relations between the Chinese central government and the governing regime in Myanmar as well as local contracts and partnerships between the Yunnan province and the Kachin and Shan states after the military take-over of Myanmar in 1988. This is a turning point in the relations of the two countries because the Western world set heavy economic and diplomatic sanctions on Myanmar and cut off new development assistance as did Japan (International Crisis Group 2009, 1). With the economic liberalization of China from 1978 onwards and the opening up of private sector in Myanmar following the military take-over in 1988, the cross-border activities have prominently increased. This is also when both states' legit private sector, at least to some extent, started to grow and gain political leeway. To understand the Chinese business actors, both the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as private sector companies are introduced and their relations to the central government discussed.

In chapter six, I utilise the concepts I have defined in earlier chapters to find the processes and struggles that create, maintain and/or diminish spatialities of political authorities in the Sino-Burmese borderlands. My focus is on the territorialisation of the Burmese state, following the rationale of my thesis to understand the making of the modern territorial state. Also territorialisation strategies of the Chinese state are showcased as well as alternative spatialities. I focus on three interrelated cases. First if ceasefire capitalism, a term introduced by Kevin Woods (2011) to describe the territorialisation of the Burmese state through business deals and land concessions. Second case is the cross-border drug trade and related anti-drug policies, through which especially Chinese businessmen have participated in the making of both armed group's spatial authority making as well as the territorialisation the Burmese state to previously uncontrollable highlands by participating in anti-drug schemes financed by the Chinese state. The third case is closely related to the anti-drug schemes because they support rubber plantations in Myanmar that require land concessions.

Out of the existing accounts of IR, my work resonates with critical theory and post-structuralism, especially with the work of R.J.B. Walker on dichotomies such as inside/outside and time/space. At

---

[1] I try to avoid using the term 'insurgency' when talking about these groups, although it is the term often deployed when talking about the various armed groups operating in the Myanmar territory. Instead of insurgency, terms like armed group and conflict are utilised because the word insurgency is normatively-loaded and creates a sense of illegitimacy in contrast to legitimacy of the state (Brown 2010, 58). The problematic nature of this kind of setting is one of the carrying themes of this thesis and will be discussed in depth in section 4.3.

the same time it relates to pragmatist[2] works in IR and the ethnographic turn[3] that emphasises everyday practices and actions to avoid static state-centrism (Lie 2013, 202). However, I was not able to build merely on IR discussions on state, territory and sovereignty because most IR scholars either leave them, especially in regard to physical space, unanalysed or take only into account their social construction, remaining agnostic about the physical. Critical theorists who recognise the problems associated with the dominating concepts of state, territory and sovereignty have settled for criticising them but not really offering alternative conceptualisations. Therefore, I looked into writings from the disciplines of critical/political geography, ethnography, anthropology and to a lesser extent, sociology. Political geography provides me with conceptualisations of territory and territorialisation, as well as the recognition that boundaries are fluid and do not actually separate what they are claimed to separate, at least not in totality (Dean 2005, 809; 811). It also helps me see political organisation not as something that happens in somewhere, but also how that somewhere transforms that organisation.

The essential question for this thesis is how does the state come to appear in social relations as a territorially organised structural power that constrains social life beneath it? The result, my hybrid conceptualisation of the state as an effect of structural practices, enables us to take a look at what has been silenced in the centre of IR research when state and territory have been taken as a given. It also opens space for emancipatory research; where as a structural statist view of the state would take people as passive objects, "waiting to be contained, controlled, disciplines or simply disposed by an all-pervasive state power" (Antonsich 2009, 800), taking the state as an effect produced in everyday practices relocates the power back to the people.

---

[2] See e.g. Neumann (2002) and Schatzki et al. (2001).
[3] See Lie 2013 for discussion about the relationship of anthropology and IR, Neumann (2012) for ethnographic IR research.

2.   ONCE UPON A TIME IN WESTPHALIA…

The two most common definitions of the state, in academic as well as real life, are the principle of sovereignty and the Weberian conceptualisation of the state "as an institution that possesses a monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion and the ability to extract tax revenues in a given territorial space" (Biersteker 2013, 247). From the Weberian point of view, the state has two aspects; the exercise of power through institutions and a clearly defined territory where it deploys that power. Within state borders, the state and society are related but outside the borders there is only relations between states. (Agnew 1994, 53–54.) They are governed by the principle of sovereignty that is defined in the *Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States* from 1933: "[t]he state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states". From the international law perspective then, the sovereign state is a territorial entity and within its geographical borders lives its population. Inside the borders the state governs its own affairs and society, minds its own business. This s*overeign equality* is one of the founding principles of the United Nations from which stems the idea of non-intervention[4]; all states were created equal and are as such to be left alone by other sovereigns.

These definitions are so common and well-known that it almost sounds like stating obvious facts about the world when one sets out to define the state and sovereignty. However, the role of the territorial state in social theory, or in the world for that matter, has not always been what it is today. For example Marx and Engels did not take the state or society as a fixed tightly bounded entity but as something that was and would be influenced by various cross-border trajectories (Albrow 1997, 45; cited in Lacher 2003, 531). At that time, the definition and positions position in social theory as well as the international society was still being negotiated in real life as well as in social sciences. Later, as the European modernist vision of territorial states in social sciences grew dominant, Marxist internationalism came to be seen as a subversion. The social sciences actually helped to facilitate the centralisation of the nation-state as the locus of sociospatial organisation of modern life. They were not reflectors or observers of that form of territorial organization of social life, but helped to legitimise it and delegitimise alternatives. (Lacher 2003, 523.)

---

[4]The Responsibility to Protect principle has challenged the principle of non-intervention in the last decades, which has generated a lot of discussion about the nature and future of sovereignty but this will be discussed later in this chapter; at this point, the focus is on what the world was taken to be in the mid-20th century.

Especially in the Western world, the principle of sovereignty was deemed important after the two World Wars because it legitimated of a preservation of a fixed territorial order of sovereign states as this was thought to be essential for preserving global stability (Murphy 1996, 83). For the emancipation movements in colonialized countries, the idea of the equality of sovereigns and the principle of non-intervention were practical rhetoric tools for realising their independence. The position of sovereignty was made to be the organising principle of relations, both in the political as well as in the academic sphere. At the same time, International Relations was still building its position as a discipline of its own, separate itself from political theory[5]. The practical rules of the US-led community of states were became defining rules of IR as well as it evolved in the context of the new world superpower (Guzzini 1998, x; 5).

Sovereignty is the founding principle of the international order in the imagination of IR[6] (Havercroft 2011, 19). First of all, states were assumed to be equal and separate actors in the international society. Fixed territoriality became a founding aspect of the sovereign state that separated it from other states. Additionally, it separated the domestic order from the international anarchy. This helped IR separate itself from other political theory; the extraordinary, the state of exception without rules became the field of IR and the state of normalcy based upon the ultimate authority of the sovereign that of political theories. The fixed borders of the state also separated societies from each other and from the state. The state became to be seen at the same time as the fixed territorial container of society and as existing above it, as the ultimate authority governing it.

As the Weberian concept of the state and the international law definition of sovereignty became the dominant and later static definitions of the state, the boundary between the inside and the outside of the state started looking natural and fixed. This has resulted in a situation where their relationship, and the constitutions of their separation is not analysed, and the fixation of the territoriality of the state has led to thinking in terms of either/or; *either* the territorial state is relevant throughout history *or* it is disappearing as society is no longer contained within it. (Agnew 1994, 53–54.) This has serious repercussions for the (spatial) imagination of the discipline. As will be demonstrated in the following section, the two traditional mainstream approaches of International Relations, neorealism and institutionalism, take the state as an unproblematic actor that exists prior to interaction with other

---

[5]Sovereignty served to separate the domestic from the international. Domestic politics were left to the political theorists. International politics, became the unit of analysis for International Relations.
[6]Like will be discussed later in this chapter, the state-centrism, ahistoricism and territoriality assumptions of this imagination have been criticized, but alternatives have either fallen to the same trap, remained agnostic about the relevance of physical world, or have not suggested alternatives at all.

states. Additionally, the principle of sovereignty is taken as an ahistorical constant. Thus the sovereign state is central because it is the (territorially fixed) locus of legitimate authority.

2.1. The rejection of time and space of the mainstream

Classical realism takes the human nature as the ultimate explaining factor of war; insecurity and conflict are an inherent part of the human condition. Politics is about trying to contain that nature and maintain peace although there is no final solution to it; conflict is inevitable. To Hans Morgenthau, for example, power is sought not only to gain a relative advantage but also to create "a secure political space", such as a territory. In the modern world, from the classical realist view, the sovereign state is one such secure political space. (Jackson & Sørensen 2013, 73–74.) In modernist Europe, when the locus of sovereignty gradually moved from the monarch to the state, Enlightenment and revolutions in Europe corroded the basis for hierarchical dynasties of the monarchs. The multiplicity of religions ate away their authorisation. The bordered and sovereign nature of the nation-state enabled new imagined communities, nations, to pursue freedom and all things good within them, regardless of those outside of the community. (Anderson 2007, 40–41.). The territorial state became the only possible place for the pursuit of all things good and virtuous whereas the outside was a place of war and violence. The state became the only possible place and guarantee of security. Inside the state there is politics and outside *realpolitik,* politics based upon merely security and material interests. (Agnew 1994, 60-62.)

What is important here is that the centrality of the state in classical realism is not inevitable, only power and self-interest are (Forde 1995, 144). Other international systems than the state system are imaginable but the system of sovereign states is the one that has organised international life in the last centuries. Sovereignty is what separates political order within from the anarchy and inevitable conflict outside. To Morgenthau, sovereignty (as defined in international law) is a doctrine that has legitimized the modern state system since the late 16th century; a good enough constant but not something perpetual or permanently fixed. (Morgenthau 1967; cited in Biersteker & Weber 1996, 4.) Also E.H. Carr takes it as a "convenient label" to refer to the independent authority states claimed to have in modern times, but not a constant (Carr 1964; cited in Biersteker & Weber 1996, 5). Neither does he take the modern territorial state as the only possible form of organisation of life, but as a convenient political fiction that people believe in and accept. Therefore, as long as states are believed

to exist as actors on the international agenda, theory can also take them as such. (Carr 2001, 137; 139; 143–153; cited in Luoma-aho 2009, 300.)

In classical realism, the sociospatial imagination about the possible forms of organisation of life is not fixed. However, in structural neorealism, institutionalised by Kenneth Waltz, unlike in classical realist accounts, the imagined and not-fixed nature of sovereignty is no longer recognised (or at least not analysed), and the state is taken as the only actor in international relations. This is because structural explanation is prioritised over historical validity; the system of states has "an existence outside the historical contexts in which it [has] evolved". (Agnew 1994, 56–58.) World history is perceived to be a timeless "tragedy of endless repetition" where the anarchic structure cannot be escaped (Patomäki 2011, 340). The explaining factor of anarchy is the structure of the international system, not human nature like in classical realism. The focus of the analysis is in the structure of the system and the state is assumed really to exist as an actor outside and prior to interaction. (Jackson & Sørensen 2013, 79.) Sovereignty organises the structure; within their territories, states decide on their own how to deal with problems and the international structure is anarchical because there is no global authority to organise it. (Biersteker & Weber 1996, 5–6). The ultimate goal of the state is to survive and for that, it tries to gain as much relative advantage as possible.

As state sovereignty is based upon the previous model where sovereignty was endowed in the physical person of the monarch, the state is often thought as a biological entity. This naturalises the state as a given, and as a naturalised individual. (Agnew 2005, 439–440.) The state is pre-supposed and defined prior to any analysis and supposed to have an existence outside of interaction. With this static and substantial view of the state, it is hard to deal for example with private actors performing governance functions because they operate in a state-field, but are not public state-actors. (Hibou 2004, 20). This favours the thinking of entities and the relations between them, which IR tends to put first, or inside them or the system of entities as a whole. This thinking discourages the studying of relations that have no primary level and/or which cut through the entities. (Neumann 2004, 265–266.) Therefore, if there are forces that would cut through the body of state, such as transnational corporations, it is seen as a sign that the state is under threat. What is state-related is presupposed to the analysis, and therefore things considered non-state are left out before the analysis is even started.

Liberal institutionalism has been depicted as a challenger to neorealism because it raised other actors and interests than the state to the international agenda. For example Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) argued that military concerns were not the only nominator of state behaviour but that with the rise of economic, social and ecological interdependence states had to take into account other

10

factors as well. However, their attempt was not to replace realist theory with a liberal interdependence one but to bridge the two together. They took complex interdependency[7] as one ideal extreme and the realist ideal of the world system as another. Most of the time, real world situation would fall somewhere between them. (Keohane & Nye 1987, 726–729; 731.)

In similar thought, Richard N. Cooper (1972) argued that as world trade grew, structural interdependence grew because both counterparts of trade relations were more and more sensitive to changes in them, not just the other (weaker) dependent one. Therefore there was a growing need for countries to make joint economic decisions and policies, and thus institutional interdependence grew as well. (Cooper 1972, 159–163.) However, it did not challenge the primacy of the territorial state, only that its interests were more multi-faceted (most of the time) than what realists would have us believe, and that multinational corporations and international organizations were relevant to international analysis as situations of complex interdependence occurred in the world. (Biersteker & Weber 1996, 6–7.) However, the sovereign territorial state remained the central actor (Agnew 1994, 58); the idea of billiard balls was maybe fine-tuned to take utilitarianism into account, but the ideal of the state was left caricatured as a material subject. (Walker 1995, 31.)

These theories do not care to explain *what might exist* in international relations. Therefore, they are inadequate to explain transformation as the study of transformation is essentially about contemplating on what forces/structures/preferences could be. Rather, their purpose is to "describe how "motion" occurs – *given* a set of structures or preferences" in international relations. (Ruggie 1993, 169–171.) A system of territorial states is "unhistorically accepted, conceptually assumed and philosophically unexamined", as the territorial state is taken as a fact of nature and its actions in the world are then studied (Elden 2005, 10). This does not make them necessarily bad theories, they are just only able to answer, or even imagine, questions of a certain kind. For example neorealism is good at understanding logics of relations of force, but to be a grand theory, it has to discount or ignore "the integrity of those domains of social life that its premises do not encompass". (Ruggie 1993, 169–171.) Their conceptualisations of the state or sovereignty are not inherently bad, but they are potentially dangerous because they are important, and they are what our discipline is organised around. Therefore, it is important to reflect on what the assumptions they make about the state and the society and if they are leading us astray. (Schouten 2009, 5.) When their premises come problematic is when

---

[7] Complex interdependence refers to a situation where the state does not monopolise contacts between societies and states do not use force against each other (Keohane & Nye 1977, 24–25).

they dominate the field and exclude alternative theoretical imaginaries; when they trap the rest of the discipline to the territorial trap with them.

The ideal of a territorially fixed sovereign state has trapped our discipline in John Agnew's (1994) famous territorial trap[8]. The trap is set, when a scholar takes state territory as a fixed unit of sovereign space, and obscures the interaction of processes of different scales (like local, national or international) with polar conceptualisations like domestic/foreign and national/international and/or views the society as a national phenomenon, contained within the territorial state. (Agnew 1994, 53–54; 59–60.) The assumption of sovereignty being contained within the territorial borders can be witnessed in political life as well. Solutions to most problems are sought through intergovernmental channels. Taking the state as a territorial given has also made policy makers focus on the heads of states and their actions and leaving many other actors unnoticed. Also environmental and cultural phenomena not responding to state boundaries are still understood through national citizenship or boundaries. The way data is collected is also state-based and makes thinking of geography in a non-state-way difficult. (Murphy 1996, 102–103; 105.)

2.2. Globalisation as a move away from territoriality: Still no reflection on time/space

The assumptions of the mainstream have of course not been left uncriticised. Especially the end of the cold war inspired many scholars to question the connection between legal (*de jure*) sovereignty and international anarchy. In many accounts, the traditional view of sovereignty as the ultimate authority over a territory and society within it is no longer accepted as sufficient depiction of the world. (Agnew 2005, 437.) Numerous scholars (see e.g. Murphy 1996; Teschke 2002; 2003; Osiander 2001; Branch 2012) have made their contribution to establish that the dominant understanding of Westphalia is a myth with little or no factual basis; the (European) states of the 17th century bore little resemblance to modern states (Murphy 1996, 83). It is widely accepted that the system of states has not always been comprised of territorial nation-states but rather has varied historically (Jarvis &

---

[8]Although Agnew had a crucial point in his formulation of the trap, there are some aspects of it I will not adhere to. Like most globalisation theorists, that are discussed later, he also takes the territorial nation-state encapsulating the society as a valid thing of the past. His territorial trap formed into one when the world changed but IR theory did not; he accepts the territorial state as a valid thing of the past. (Lacher 2006, 120.)

Paolini 1995, 6–7) from absolutist, liberal, and totalitarian to the modern (or post-modern) state of our time (Biersteker 2013, 247; 251).

These chronological mappings are based on an understanding of world history as a story of inevitable progress, for example from developing to the magnificent Western model of democracy and perpetual peace. (Patomäki 2011, 340.) Space is transferred to time; differences in space (e.g. centre–periphery) are actually taken to mark difference in time. The transformation of the periphery to resemble the modern centre is only a matter of time as there is only one temporality and no space where all states follow the same trajectory of development from barbarian to modern, enlightened states. (Massey 2005, 147–148). The problems inherit in this kind of single-temporality thinking is evident when one is reminded, for example, that the formal demise of the medieval-form Holy Roman Empire happened in 1806; closer to the birth of the European Community (1958) than the assumed birth moment of the modern state in Westphalia (1648) (Ruggie 1993, 167).

Globalisation scholars (e.g. Behr 2008; Beeson 2003; Strange 1996) argue that the shrinking scope of issue-areas that nation-states are able to govern effectively indicates that the concept of (state) sovereignty is no longer capable to describe the world. (Beeson 2003, 357.) This view is based on absolutism; the state either is or is not sovereign. If the state cannot contain the society or political and economic life within its territorial borders, it is no longer sovereign. Others (see e.g. Shaw 1994; Linklater & Macmillan 1995; Scholte 2000) concentrate on the arguments that also society is "spilling out" of state territories. These world/global society approaches to globalisation portray it as not only something that connects distinct parts of the world together, but that also creates a single global culture or society. For example Jan Aart Scholte (2000) argues that "'global' relations are social connections in which territorial location, territorial distance and territorial borders do not have a determining influence. In global space, 'place' is not territorially fixed, territorial distance is covered in effectively no time, and territorial frontiers present no particular impediment". (Scholte 2000, 179; cited in Amin 2002, 386.)

Scholars argue that now in our post-modern times civil society has shifted from national to global, reproduce "sovereignty [...] as the hallmark of society" (Lacher 2003, 529). The notion of state-centric Westphalian modernity is not questioned *per se* but instead accepted as a valid thing of the past. Old theories are accepted as having been valid because social and political authority *really were* territorially organized and the past *really was* defined by the state. , as a result, globalists exaggerate the territorial features of the past. (Brenner 1999, 59.) The artifice and incompleteness of the modern state based on sovereignty are not recognised (Walker 2000, 225) but instead accepted as valid things

of the past whereas post-modernity is marked by 'globality' instead of sovereignty. The socio-spatial imagination remains one-sided, seeing social relations and the territorial organization of social life as either national territoriality or global non-territoriality, nothing else is deemed possible. (Lacher 2003, 529.) Space is continued to be seen as ahistorical and temporally fixed; the only difference between global and national social spaces is that of geographical size. From this view, geographical space seems to be filled with social practices, not as produced or reconfigured by them (Brenner 1999, 54– 55; 59.) Thus, the global space is the container of society instead of the state, but the problem of fixed territoriality remains. Globalist theorists have failed to analyse the dialectical process of construction and renegotiation of space.

According to deterritorialisation theorists, the world is becoming borderless as flows of ideas, people, and products make state borders increasingly porous. In their view, time loses its meaning as communication technology and ways of travel become faster and more efficient; world is all space and no time. In their view, the spaces of fixed and enclosed territorialisation, the territorial states, are undermined and replaced by "new geographies of networks and flows", like electronic media and internationalising capital, that are spatial but not territorial. The world is being re-organised sociospatially. The old sociospatial form of organisation of social and political life, territoriality, is taken to be dichotomous with the new global form of sociospatial organisation; the more the world is organised in networks and flows, the less there is of territorial organisation. And therefore, the less there is state. (Brenner 1999, 60–62.) This takes spatiality in absolutes; more of one means less of the other. Additionally, it takes the transformation as inevitable course of history; like absolutist states transformed into territorial ones, so will territorial states give way a global political authority.

2.3. Legal/empirical sovereignty, but still territorial

As a response the globalisation critique and in defence of the concept of sovereignty, some scholars have disaggregated the concept of sovereignty. According to Janice E. Thomson (1995), sovereignty is best understood as the exclusive authority to make decisions, not as state control, because the issues and regions under state control are in the state of flux whereas the states' claim to ultimate authority has remained constant over three centuries. She however suggests that empirically authority and control are hard to separate and the understanding of their relationship is a central problem for IR. (Thomson 1995, 214; 223.) James A. Caporaso (2000) separated the four pillars of the Westphalian order: authority, territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship. Authority refers to the recognised

exclusive right to make rules, territoriality links that political authority with physically bounded space that sets limits to it. Sovereignty combines authority with the exclusion of other authorities. Citizenship as well is defined by the territorial boundaries. (Caporaso 2000, 7–11; 14.)

Perhaps the most known version of disaggregating the concept of sovereignty has been made by Stephen D. Krasner (1999). He categorises the aspects of the term sovereignty in four groups: 1) international legal sovereignty, 2) Westphalian sovereignty, 3) domestic sovereignty and 4) interdependence sovereignty. International legal sovereignty refers to (legal) practices of mutual recognition between entities that are often territorial and have formal juridical independence. Political organization that excludes, be it *de facto* or *de jure*, external actors from the given territory constitutes Westphalian sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty is achieved when these formally organized political authorities can exercise effective control *within* the polity's territory, framed by territorial boundaries. Interdependence sovereignty refers to the control of flows of goods, people, information and capital *across* borders. Different forms of sovereignty are created with different combinations authority, control and legitimacy. (Krasner 1999, 3–4.)

These types of sovereignty can co-exist, or a state can have only one or two types of sovereignty but not the others. Taiwan is an example of a state with no international legal sovereignty but that has Westphalian sovereignty, and Somalia of a one with international legal sovereignty but practically no domestic or interdependence sovereignty. When theorists argue that states are losing sovereignty as they are losing control of the movements across their borders, they are focusing on the ability of a state to exercise control, not its authority. The scope of activities that state control effectively is declining as international phenomena are becoming more transnational in nature, such as terrorism, environmental degradation, drug trafficking and so on. If a state is not able to control the flow of ideas, people or capital across its borders, it is losing interdependence sovereignty and most likely also the ability to control them domestically, which results in the loss of domestic control, but not necessarily to the loss domestic authority or sovereignty and much less to the erosion of international legal or Westphalian sovereignty. (Krasner 1999, 4; 12–13.)

These redefinitions make it possible to argue (against deterritorialisation and/or global society approaches) that it is just a certain aspect of sovereignty that is possibly eroding, rather than the entire concept of sovereignty. However, these accounts remain in the territorial trap as well. They are all based upon the organisation of social and political life in territorial terms. In all of them, political authority stops at the territorial borders of the state. Controlling phenomena crossing borders is considered is just that; *control*. Political authority does not cross borders. These scholars continue to

separate the domestic and the international; domestic is not as relevant because the international structure is taken as the primary site of international relations. Additionally, also society is still assumed to reside within the territorial state.

All these accounts concentrate on the discrepancy between the states' international legal sovereignty and their limited empirical sovereignty. Jackson is interested in how quasi-states, states that are incapable of supporting themselves on their own, are treated in the international system, what are the constitutive rules, rules that define the game, of the sovereignty game. The existence of weaker states without them being taken over or divided up by other, stronger states, to Jackson, indicates the changing rules of the game. (Jackson 1990, 34–37.) However, his model does not explore how states are constituted as states, as sovereigns. He takes states as prior to sovereignty, prior to interactions, and state territoriality as a given even if some governments are not able to effectively govern those territories. Whereas I agree with Jackson that sovereignty is renegotiated and changes in time, but this does not mean that a state would exist on its own, or would achieve statehood, outside of the struggles over control and sets of relationships that come to define what it means to be a state. Being a state comes into being through contestation and maintenance; states do not exist as abstract individuals. (Agnew 2005, 440.)

Thomas Risse's (2011) formulation of areas of limited statehood, where statehood is understood in Weberian terms, describe the limited ability of a state to enforce rules and control the means of violence in a territorial, sectoral, social and/or temporal dimension. Territorial in Risse's formulation refers to parts of the state's territory[9], sectoral to specific policy areas, social to specific parts of the state's population, and temporal to certain time periods. It is important to notice that the opposite of limited statehood is not unlimited statehood but rather *consolidated* statehood. Consolidated statehood refers to the areas where and the degrees to which the state is able to enforce decisions and control the means of violence. As such, statehood is not dichotomous. However, an area of limited statehood does not mean an area that is lacking in governance or that is anarchical. (Risse 2011, 1–5; 9.) Risse's conceptualization has merits in that it does not assume the state government to be able to govern effectively everything, everywhere, and all the time. The establishment of state's political authority is not just about controlling a territory in the eyes of other states, nor is it fixed but rather contested and changing, and even at its best, consolidated with other forms of authority. The problem

---

[9] Risse's understanding of territory takes space as cartographic space; territorial space refers to a certain area on a map, like a country or a part of a desert.

with Risse's formulation is that it takes the ideal Westphalian state to actually exist in the Western world, at least most of the time[10]. (Risse 2011, 28.)

2.4. Social constructivism: Agnosticism towards physical space

Many conservative constructivist IR theorists have taken sovereignty as a definitive factor in the state's social identity. To be a legitimate state, the state needs to fulfil intersubjective ideas of legitimate statehood and what is considered to be appropriate state action. To maintain its sovereign state identity, the state needs to keep up basic institutional practices that change over time. (Reus-Smit 1999, 5.) Sovereignty is the organising principle of international society but it is not constant and nor is it guaranteed as other states may not deem a state's claim to final authority legitimate from here to eternity, always constituting anarchy between separate state units, but in constant change and with possibility of chancing; the anarchic system can change. (Biersteker 2013, 260–261.) For example Alexander Wendt (1994) accepts the Westphalian state system as a valid description of the world (past) but does not take it as a given constant; the system can change for example into a society, from anarchy to authority. This can happen if states start identifying themselves more collectively and political authority starts to internationalise[11]. (Wendt 1994, 393.)

Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (1996) suggest that state sovereignty is a social construct. They define sovereignty as external recognition given to a state to exercise authority over its affairs. Their analysis focuses on how that recognition is gained and given though practices and constantly renegotiated and reformulated in interactions between state and non-state actors. To them, state and sovereignty constitute each other (Biersteker & Weber 1996, 11–12.) Biersteker (2013) suggests that the statist territorial form of sovereignty defined in the Montevideo Convention of 1933 and the founding principles of the United Nations is changing to a contingent definition of sovereignty. Whereas the statist sovereignty is based upon the inviolability of borders and the principle of non-intervention, the contingent form promotes the R2P (responsibility to protect) principle and democratic domestic regimes as a prerequisite for international recognition. (Biersteker 2013, 255.)

---

[10] States of exception, such as the hurricane Katrina, can temporarily create areas of limited statehood even in the Western world (Risse 2011, 5).

[11] From this gradual change, sovereignty, constituting the current anarchy of mutual recognition, is relocated, to varying degrees, to transnational authorities. In this state system, sovereignty is not a stable feature of state agency but one possible social identity; transferring sovereignty to a collective does not erode the state, only reorganises state power. This new form of state would break down "the spatial coincidence between state-as-actor and state-as-structure". (Wendt 1994, 393.)

However, also for him, the territorial form of sovereignty is a valid thing of the 20th century. In a similar thought, Alexander B. Murphy (1996) takes sovereignty as an ideal that is both a shaper of circumstance as well as an outcome of it. It is historically relevant because it has shaped the way people understand authority and territory, but its meaning is not a static constant. He distinguishes sovereignty in the sense of what states are allowed to do internationally and what their obligations are, and sovereignty as the relationship between territory and power. According to him, understanding the content of the first aspect has fluctuated over time between systemic and anarchic views, but the latter has steadily moved towards a more accepted sovereign territorial ideal. This ideal has become the only imaginable spatial framework for social life. (Murphy 1996, 87–89; 91.)

Constructivists have made the crucial point that the idea of sovereignty is not naturally given[12] but rather socially constructed in their interaction and practices (Agnew 2005, 440). They also help us understand different identities and objectives different states have as well as their rules for dealing with each other (what sovereignty is). However, the state is taken to exist *a priori* to social interaction, only its identity changes over time. Space stays a constant. Only being interested in the social reality has its downside; constructivist approaches tend to lose sight of the material world and overemphasise the social in their takes on territory and territorial borders. Some forget that "social constructions are always constructions of something: hence they are not entirely arbitrary and people are not able to design the world deliberately according to their wishes". (Forsberg 2003, 8–9.)

At their best, constructivist approaches no longer treat territory as objective, but acknowledge the social construction of its social meaning. However, constructivist scholars are mainly interested in the social reality and do not really engage in ontological discussion about the 'real' world because according to constructivist epistemology, we can only know about the social world, social interpretations of the material world. The social world, the shared system of meanings, symbols and practices, is what interests a constructivist scholar and most of them are either agnostic or not really interested about "the language-independent real world out there". (Guzzini 2000, 159–160.) Constructivists can analyse how the physical is constructed in the social world but not how the physical constructs the social; how the physical and the social worlds are in a constant process of co-construction.

The "picture of politics organised into sovereign states" holds the discipline's ontology and us captive. There are defenders and there are critics, but even the critics always use that picture as a starting point.

---

[12] This is however not necessarily a new observation; Walker (2000) argues that the 'naturalness' of sovereignty was an artificial construct was well known already by philosophers of the state like Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant (Walker 2000, 225).

(Havercroft 2011, 1–2.) If these trapped theories would be applied to the cases of the Sino-Burmese borderlands I will introduce in my analysis, they would miss important aspects of it. Theories concerned with only time and not space might take the introduction of neoliberal property rights in Myanmar as examples of how the Burmese state moves towards its capitalist modern future. They would miss the complex relationships and the existing forms of rule, authority, and property rights, and sociospatial imaginations that already exist, and how they interact with other forms of sociospatial processes. Constructivist analysis on the other hand could analyse how discourses about property change, but would miss the importance of the spatial.

3. SPATIAL TURN IN IR? THE STATE AS AN EFFECT OF PROCESSES

Due to the uneasiness of IR to really conceptualise time and space, which is shared with the social sciences at large; most theories have difficulties with dealing with time and especially space (Massey 1992, 67). Space and time appear to us as self-evident as they are basic categories of our existence (Harvey 1989, 201; cited in Ruggie 1993, 147). The problem for theory is that is these essential concepts are taken as self-evident, and as common sense, many underlying assumptions that go unnoticed when they are not conceptualised (Massey 2005, 147–148). Our perception of time and space have developed in a certain context of practices, discourses and habits. New time–spaces are difficult to theorise, or even understand as the 'old' perceptions of time and space dominate our thinking. (Harvey 1989, 201; cited in Ruggie 1993, 147.) Current thinking in social sciences is dominated by the European modernist vision of capitalist nation-states and to a lesser agree, Marxism, that both have been built on an universalist vision of a grand narrative of history moving in a linear fashion towards one end, although they predict different outcomes. (Dirlik 2002, 17.)

This can be witnessed for example in the historical mappings of the development of the state have not translated to (m)any theoretical formulations about the state and its changing form. When the idea sparks some scholarly debate, the entries simply criticise the statist tendency, but do not do anything about it, or show that the state has a history but do not adjust their concepts to accommodate the state's changing nature. The changing nature of the state is not easy to articulate when the vocabulary is based upon a discourse of its statist form. (Walker 1995, 34.) Additionally, whatever historical mappings have been made, they have mainly focused on the development of the Western states. Scholars have tended to either assume that all states will follow the Western path of development or that developmental states such as China are something completely different (although these states exist prior to interaction) from the Western ones. I find neither assumption satisfying.

To really escape statist state-centric thinking, we need not only to rethink our basic assumptions and forget the stories we tell about the state, but also reformulate them in a way that allows for heterogeneous forms of sociospatial organisation and overlapping authorities in time and space but also is theoretically applicable. If political authority is not thought of as exclusively based on the modern state, political authorities, including the state, can be seen as multiple mixtures of modern, pre-modern and non-modern elements. Pre-modern or non-modern has not been replaced by the modern, not even in Europe, but instead various discourses and alternatives co-exist, contest and mutually construct each other. (Dirlik 2002, 24.) As a global condition, modernity, including sovereignty, "affects all our actions, interpretations, and habits, across nations and irrespective of

which civilizational roots we may have or lay claim to. In this sense, it is a common condition on a global scale that we live in and with, engage in dialogue about, and that we have to reach out to grasp". (Wittrock 2000, 58–59.)

To understand how modern statehood is made to work in space and time, in this chapter I will conceptualise space in relation to time, and the state in a way that is sensitive to both space and time, contexts and historical change. I do not assume the territorial state to be the only system of authority and social organisation, but rather one amongst many not only in time, but also in space. The purpose of this chapter is to find a way in which to analyse how the state appears in as a social and material reality. This approach is sensitive to the fact that even in the heyday of the territorial state, alternative forms of sociospatial organisation have existed; the fact that "we have nation-states now doesn't mean that there aren't other ways of organizing those things, or that other ways of organizing life are no longer important or no longer present". (Schouten 2009, 4.)

To open my imagination to new sociospatial imaginaries, I have turned to geography, especially its sub-disciplines of political geography and critical geopolitics, to find a reflexive understanding of space that takes into account the co-constitutions of the physical and the social. Additionally I have taken some influences from critical IR scholars and sociologists. The most important lesson I have taken from anthropology is taking the world in its complexity and heterogeneity; it opens up the question of "what one studies when one studies politics", or the state, instead of taking it as a given. (Schouten 2009, 4.) I define the state as an effect of structural practices, the state is constantly changing and restructuring in time and space, realized in the everyday practices that take place in multiple locations simultaneously, instead of being a historically and geographically fixed, unchanging entity. This allows for a more flexible and historically sensitive reading on the state.

It will allow us to apply the same conceptualisation to all states without assuming they will all follow the same path and thus enables us to talk about state and globalisation outside of the Western world. It allows for a consideration of histories but takes into account the current other processes and discourses that shape the state process. This does not imply that all states would be inherently different as they do share practices and discourses and the same processes, such as neoliberalism and globalisation, affect them all, to varying degrees. Additionally, the possible sources of political authority are not limited to state actors but instead churches, NGOs and multinational companies (MNCs) can become sources of political authority, also without challenging state authority, through social practices (Brown 2012, 64–65). This should not be seen as an exercise of relativisation, of 'anything goes', looking at how state sovereignty works and how it is taken for granted is not a move

away from constant foundation of political life but rather a reminder that its making and upholding has been acts of artifice all along. (Walker 2000, 226.) It is not irrelevant how we see states, where we think global politics happen or who we see as a relevant actor. Academic thinking effects political thinking and can thus have an influence on how politics work. (Sjoberg 2008, 481.)

3.1. Space as co-existence of trajectories

The spatial turn in social sciences initiated in the 1980s by authors such as Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey who argued that space was left unanalysed. They argued that space has an operational and instrumental role in the making of the world and the social. (Patomäki 2011, 339–340.) Agnew's territorial trap reflects the same concern. The social construction of space had been analysed already in the 1970 in the field of geography, but it left geographers merely analysing the end product of social life that other disciplines study. After the spatial turn, the construction was not taken as one-sided anymore; not only was the spatial constructed by the social but also the social was spatially constructed as well. Society is organised spatially and that spatiality makes a difference to social life. (Massey 1992, 70.) I see the spatial turn as necessary for also IR and for this end, suggest a way to conceptualise time and space in a more reflexive manner than what has been thus far. This is essential because all social processes have a geographical extent and a historical duration; all action is embedded in the world (Crang & Thrift 2000, 3).

As biological beings, human beings inhabit physical space, attached to the surface of the planet by gravity. In this thesis, I will assume that there exists a natural space independent of human action, but by no means do various phenomenon and living things even then are static but in constant process of becoming. I understand space as non-Euclidean[13], as folded and relational "with reference to the connection of actors in any one place to dynamics across space". In this understanding of space, Euclidean issues, such as spatial proximity, are recognised but not the only issue in the analysis of space. (Ettlinger 2011, 538; 542.) Space is open, the coincidence of trajectories of in-time-changing processes but different sociospatial strategies struggles over its meaning and can make it seem as fixed and that fixity as natural. However, once humans come into contact with that space, as social beings, they attach meanings to it. This is what social constructivists have already argued for. However, physical space cannot be taken as a neutral product of social action. It plays a role in

---

[13] Euclidean understanding of space meaning that a straight line connects any two points (Ettlinger 2011, 538).

people's lives and co-constitutes social space. Physical space restricts and enables social action. One cannot climb a mountain simply by thinking and acting like it is flat.

The defining feature of physical space is the mutual externality of parts. First, in absolute terms, the parts of physical space can only be situated in one location at one given time and no other being can be in the exactly same location at the same time. In more comprehensible terms, a person as a physical being can be at one place at a time. This is the location (or locus) of the person, for example on the ground or sitting in a chair. Second, an agent or a thing can occupy a physical place that is defined by its range, surface and volume. A physical place can be for example a house that has different properties, such as walls. Third, agents and things can have (a) position(s) in relational terms; something is positioned in relation to something else, for example sitting next to someone else. (Bourdieu 1996, 11–12.)

Through social interaction, discourses and practices, the locations, places and positions in physical space are collectively constructed socially meaningful in appropriated social space (space that has identities attached to it) (Bourdieu 1996, 12); space is represented as having social effects. This gives social categorisations, identities and relations spatiality. (Agnew 1994, 55.) For example, the physical position of two people sitting in chairs that are in line in itself does not have any other meaning. But, as the position is constructed in appropriated social space, it can become socially meaningful. For example, the two people might be heads of states and the person sitting behind the other is given lower social status based upon the sitting arrangement. Therefore, "the locus and the place occupied by an agent in appropriated social space are excellent indicators of his or her position in social space" (Bourdieu 1996, 12). However, this is not always the case; the diplomat sitting behind the other might also be seated that way by mistake or for some other reason other than indicating her social position.

Social space is a "structure of juxtaposition of social positions" constituted by "the mutual exclusion (or distinction) of positions" that constitute it. For example living in the city gives the agent a position in relation to those in the countryside and also to the others living in the city. The physical place the agent occupies as a physical being is translated and given meaning in the social space. The location of a social agent (such as a person) or a thing constituted as a property in social space is "characterized by its position relative to other locations" and their distance from each other. The permanent(ish) place an agent occupies, the relative positioning of her localizations to other agents' localizations and the places she legally occupies characterise the agent. (Bourdieu 1996, 12.) These spatial social positions are relationally constructed and in the constant process of becoming. No identity is constant or permanent, not even nationality, even though most political theories would have us think so.

"Space does not exist prior to identities/entities". Instead, "the relations 'between' them, and the spatiality which is part of them, are all co-constitutive". (Massey 2005, 10.)

What is crucial here is that once physical space and social space interact, their co-constitution makes them intermeshed. Spatiality refers to this mutual embeddeddness of space and society (Ettlinger 2009, 219). Therefore, the distinction between physical and social space is a purely theoretical exercise. I will use the term space to refer to the complexity that is created thought the co-constitution of physical and social space. This space is a product of interrelations, co-constitutive with multiplicity, and always under construction. (Massey 2005, 9.) The interrelational aspect of space has often been forgotten in IR, how the spatial organisation of human life is an evolving product of action and relational performances, not just a neutral context where action happens (Soja 1980, 210; cited in Shapiro & Neaubauer 1990, 100); it does not pre-exist its doing (Rose 1999, 248; cited in Amin 2002, 389). Additionally, physical space is not only a product of social action, but social action is also constructed and contested by it. Material changes, such as climate change, pandemics or the depletion of a source of energy, alter "the matrix of constraints and opportunities for social actors, giving rise to different situations of strategic interaction among them". (Ruggie 1993, 154.)

By taking space co-constitutive with multiplicity I mean, following Doreen Massey (2005) that it is a part of a complexity of trajectories[14]. Trajectory is a process of change in a phenomenon that is temporal but also inherently spatial in the sense that it is are positioned "in relation to other trajectories". The phenomenon might be anything from a social convention to a geological formation. It is important to note that a trajectory is not necessarily a linear one which brings us to the third attribute of space, constant process of construction. This means that space is always open, "a simultaneity of stories-so-far". There is no predetermined future; space is always open to new connections and juxtapositions. This does not mean however that everything is linked or that all interconnections have been made. Space is never ready. (Massey 2005, 9; 11–12.)

Places are given meaning and value, and activities are separated with boundaries through spatial strategies. People residing in space both conform to a spatiality but also "constitute a space-shaping practice" with their movements; societies stretch and withdraw in time and space. This spatiotemporal distantiation is tied to the structure of domination because "[w]hat happens within a society or a locale is shaped in part by the forces operating at the extremes of its extensions". The greater the

---

[14] There is no universal dominant trajectory that would travel through geographical fixed space and comes across ahistorical, static others occupying fixed space like the modern linear time / static space thinking would have us think. By accepting multiplicity, we can see other trajectories and stories as well. For example globalisation is not a historical inevitability but as one history among others (maybe connected) histories and futures. (Massey 2005, 10–11.)

spatiotemporal distantiation, the less visible are the activities of the society. (Shapiro & Neaubauer 1990, 97; 100.) This is what Michel Foucault calls "governance at a distance", how citizens are conducted by materialised societal norms in everyday practices. The normalisation of norms makes governance from distance possible, otherwise constant presence of acts of control would be needed to maintain positions of authority. (Foucault 2000, 341; Foucault 2007a, 193; cited in Ettlinger 2011, 538.) So, the activities of people can be analysed in two ways; "in terms of the presently operating forces whose effects they re-inscribe or resist; and in terms of the more remote forces that continue to shape their movements". (Shapiro & Neaubauer 1990, 97; 100.)

The practices and meanings of social space tend to be retranslated "into physical space in the form of a definite distributional arrangement of agents and properties". The social hierarchies and distances are naturalised as fixed from the social onto the physical. As they become naturalised, the social seems to "arise out of the nature of things". As social space is inscribed in physical space, the structures of social space are resistant, or at least slow, to change because changes in the social space require changes in physical space as well, like deporting persons. (Bourdieu 1996, 12–13.) The naturalisation can be 'natural', unintended, but also a result of authoritative strategies. Due to the resistance of change in physical space, spatial strategies have both intended and unintended effects. Therefore, the two spatial strategies (territorialisation and scaling) introduced in the next two sections should not be taken as absolute, but rather as porous and constantly contested *tendencies* towards a certain spatial organisation of life. They can even be constituted by practices that are not intended as a spatial strategy.

3.2. State space as an effect of structural processes and practices

In order to be able to understand and analyse processes that seem to cut through the entity of the state, we need to stop thinking about the state as if it was a person, a biological entity. Instead, as a form of space, the state should be seen as being constantly formed as the old and the new forms of power and authority interact, exist in parallel and struggle over domination. (Egnell & Haldén 2013, 3–4.) I take the state as an open social system that is co-constituted and determined by relational complexes serves as a basis for thinking about the state in a new way. A state cannot be reduced to its insides, its inner components, but instead, the past, the outside and interrelations are also an inherent part of what a state is (conceived to be). (Patomäki 2003, 361.)

Following Timothy Mitchell (1991), I will take the state as a set of structural effects, as a powerful (unfinished) product of everyday practices. Primarily, this is an ontological stand on how what is, *is*. I do not take the state as a static entity, but as something that exists in social relations and practices. Its forms and functions are (re)produced in social struggle (Glassman 1999, 677–678); what a state is is constituted in bundles of social practices that are "every bit as local in their materiality and social situatedness as any other" (Ferguson & Gupta 2002, 992). What we call the state "arises from techniques that enable mundane material practices to take on the appearance of an abstract, nonmaterial form" (Mitchell 1999, 77). This is *not* to deny the "power of the political arrangements that we call the state". Social benefits, state constitutions, military practice, policing and border controls have very real social and material effects on the lives of people. (Mitchell 1991, 81; 94.) I call the processes that make the state effect statization, a term already used by some political geographers, to express the processual nature of the establishment of state control. In French it is called *étatisation*, "a gradual process through which society becomes increasingly dependent on, or dominated by, relations with the state". However, statization should not be taken to mean the growing control of society by a separate sphere called the state, but as "the intensification of the symbolic presence of the state across all kinds of social practices and relations". (Painter 2006, 755; 758.)

No state, like no any other form of political authority exists in a vacuum, but is rather negotiated and transformed in the context of the existing form(s) of political authority that cross paths with it. The world came together for the first time under industrialising capitalism and European empires. The spread of modern state sovereignty is the outcome of this comingtogether as students, government officials, traders and farmers have come in touch with its principles, powers based on them, and the material effects of that power. This has been no inevitable or universal phase of human development but a process of spreading of norms and values, albeit a powerful one, amongst others that come together in spaces. (Patomäki 2003, 364.) Sovereignty is "a practice that serves to identify the character, location, and the legitimacy of political authority, especially the authority to judge what is authoritative" (Walker 1995, 26) that has come to dominate how political authority is to be organised but it still needs to be made to work in each local encounter. It is about more than just the international discourse about what it means to be a state; it has to made to work. Being called a state does not ensure that the state actually appears and plays an authoritative role in the social relations it claims to have authority over. This it witnessed in countries like Somalia. On the other hand, Taiwanese state appears in social and material realities much stronger even though it does not have legal sovereignty.

Alternative forms of authority co-exist and overlap with others, such as the territorial state, and they have to deal with other existing forms political authority. Alternative forms do not necessarily

challenge each other, but they need to deal with the social and material realities that have been created by the processes that created the effects of political authority. (Davis 2009, 402.) No form has fixed meaning or effect; history remains open. As trajectories of political authority, and social and material realities intersect and interact, past struggles can be reopened and given new meanings. This creates new (im)possibilities; "new combinations of the existing elements of social contexts can be invented and innovated; new social forces can emerge; and also genuinely novel elements may be innovated and fed into the processes of present and near-future political struggles". What used to be suppressed can become viable and former possibilities become less viable. (Patomäki 2003, 364.) For example readings of history can be given new meanings as present social realities change.

How political and social life is organised is affected by various factors. For example, John Ruggie (1993) identifies three dimensions that were crucial in changing the European experience of time and space, and how system of rule was organised and imagined, when medieval systems of rules transformed towards what is now identified as the modern system of states; material environments, strategic behaviour, and social epistemology. Material environments include issues like climatology, pandemics, and weapons. The changes in the material world changed the constraints of social action and strained the existing arrangements to the point of collapse. Related to the material changes, strategic behaviour changed as well. For example, the demographic decline caused by, among others, the Black Death, disadvantaged the land-owning class and created opportunities for entrepreneurial politicians. Various changes in strategic behaviour and material shocks ultimately came to change the system of rule, but not directly to the territorial state that our era has become familiar with. At the same time changed what Ruggie calls social epistemology, "the mental equipment that people drew upon in imagining and symbolizing forms of political community". In the linguistic realm, the "I-form" of speech became dominant, separating I and you, me and the world, and eventually the private form the public. In visual arts, where scale had been determined by importance, and subjects had been rendered from multiple angles, the single fixed viewpoint became dominant[15]. Similarly, political space came to be defined as it appeared from a single fixed viewpoint, which is institutionalised in the concept of sovereignty. (Ruggie 1993, 152–159.)

Therefore, the norms and practices of the international society are not irrelevant. For example, if territorially fixed sovereign states are the norm, there will be reluctance to accept other forms of state to the international society, but not impossible; change happens. (Egnell & Haldén 2013, 5.) An

---

[15] Most significantly, "this was precision and perspective from a particular point of view: a *single* point of view, the point of view of a *single* subjectivity, from which all other subjectivities were differentiated and against which all other subjectivities were plotted in diminishing size and depth toward the vanishing point" (Ruggie 1993, 159).

example of the co-existence and co-constitution of different trajectories would be capitalism 'with a Chinese flair' as the Chinese state-controlled economic policy has sometimes been named. The existing norms, institutions and tendencies of neoliberal capitalism have crossed paths with pre-existing trajectories that in effect make the Chinese state appear to exist. The trajectories of capitalism alter and become part of those state-effecting processes and practices, and make the Chinese state appear different than it was before and more similar to the capitalist states in the West, but not made it the same. There is no linear, universal time where the world would progress from feudalism to territorial sovereignty to global capitalism or something else but global processes and discourses, and encounters of individuals with alternative practices and cultures, alter what a state, or any other form of political authority, appears to be. (Patomäki 2003, 363.)

There are multiple different paths of states as effects that are independent and dependent of each other to various degrees. The more the paths come together, the more they might start looking like each other but are never the same. (Patomäki 2003, 363.) As an example, when they were not in touch with the European powers, the paths of cultures and civilisation outside of old continent had their own relations and paths. These paths have come "gradually together over the centuries of expansion of capitalism and European imperial states". However, no matter how strong the influence of European ideals and modes of governance have been, this influence has not resulted "in a simple imposition of the abstracted and idealized system of mutually exclusive nation-states". The influence of new ideas and practices does not erase the existing spaces, practices or ideas. "To the contrary, what emerged was a complex dialectical interplay of resistance and attempts to appropriate and modify the European — and later Western — modernity to fit various local circumstances (in some cases with disastrous results)". (Patomäki 2003, 363–364.) Ultimately, then, everything is local even if it is endlessly replicated across space (Dirlik 2002, 34).

The contextually specific modifications and applications of the same phenomena happen as the social relations and practices that give the state the effect of existing are maintained and transformed as actors interact with other actors. New behaviours emerge as actors come into contact with "new legislations, political settings, institutions, economic systems, societies, business actors, and individuals across the world". (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 405.) By no means are there interactions restricted within state territorial borders or within the people who have been naturalised as being the society under that state's control. As political officers go abroad, they meet new colleagues and interact with alternative views of the world and the state. After interaction, neither side is necessarily the same. For example nationalism was first embraced in colonies through young intellectuals who knew a European language and studied in Europe and got familiar with the concepts of nation and

nation-state and applied them at home. The travel of both people and knowledge became easier and easier through technological advancements, the more was there spread of ideas. (Anderson 2007, 167; 171.)

The state understood this view is not just a subjective belief of an individual. The processes and practices constituting the organisation of social and political life make the state appear as if it was a structure that contains people's lives and gives them meaning; they constitute statization. Because of the way the state is constituted as a power that exists 'out there' and that has different material and social effects to people's lives, the state cannot simply be wished away. However, what the state is understood to be or how life is thought of to be organised can change, and even in time, the state can become less dominate in our sociospatial imagination. What state is practiced to be is not permanent or inevitable. (Mitchell 1991, 81; 94.) Therefore, what the state means and in practice is, needs to be understood as mutable in time and space. There is no clear starting point, something that was and is now becoming something else. Instead, the state is always in a state of transition, always becoming. It has never had a static existence and it will never become 'ready'. (Jarvis & Paolini 1995, 5–6.) Neither are the activities conceived of as state-initiated predetermined but produced though action, struggle and resistance. The state is "fundamentally enabled by forms of power and struggle emanating within the broader society, rather than as representing any permanent congealed power in its own right" (Glassman 1999, 677–678); the state is "but one of a number of expressions or mediations of power, rendered in routine, mundane acts and discourses" (Sidaway 2002, 161).

Statization can occur in practices by both state and non-state actors. Due to the pervasiveness of the state in much of social life in our era, practically all actors can be seen to be involved in the "doing of the state". It is not simply the doing of only bureaucrats and state institutions or simply a result of routinized administrative practices, but comes into being through the imaginations and representations of ordinary people in their everyday lives. Therefore, the question of what or who make the state appear to exist as the locus of ultimate political authority is not an ontological but an empirical one. In order to understand the complexities statization, we need to consider actors who seem to have little to do with the modern state, like merchants, clan leaders and hunters. The frontier between 'state' and 'non-state' is fluid, and to begin to understand it, one needs to look "at the way in which actors negotiate their relationships to the state, how they at times 'produce' statehood without realizing it, and how at other times they consciously and willingly contribute to 'constructing' states". (Hagmann & Péclard 2010, 542–543; 549–550.) Similarly, both state and non-state actors can be involved in constituting de-statization (Painter 2006, 758).

4. SOCIOSPATIAL STRATEGIES FOR MAKING OF THE MODERN STATE

The processes that make the state appear as a structure are multiple and different in different contexts. The most fundamental ones of our time, I would argue, are the processes that make the modern territorial nation-state appear. They have, after all, been so strong they continue to guide not only the academic imagination but also everyday relations all over the world. The Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty is based on the complete territorialisation (successfully maintained borders and total exclusion of other sources of authority) and hierarchical scaling that makes the state seem to nest lover scales and exercise power over them. However, these spatial strategies can never be complete, they are rather tendencies. (Agnew 2010, 570). In this chapter I will conceptualise them both in order to understand how the territorial state and its power come to exist in social relations.

If the state is not taken as an entity, neither can (state) power be thought of as located in single entity. The power to regulate and control does not initiate from the state somewhere up high, but the state itself is a product of processes of regulation and control (Mitchell 1991, 90). When the police use force, the tax agency collects taxes or when a state official confiscates land in the name of state legislation, their actions constitute what appears as state exercising its power. They constitute the very thing that gives the authority for the actions. If power relations should be seen to be produced in everyday practices; people are the vehicle of power, not something that power is (merely) exercised on. Therefore, the root of power relations is found in the mundane everyday life, not in institutions of a high scale in which they can however become crystallised and formalised. (Ettlinger 2011, 547; following Foucault 1980a–b; 1990.) The purpose of section 4.1. is to find a way understand how the state comes to be seen as a power 'up-there', organising life, and giving authority to actors associated with the state. I argue that the scaling of power relations creates the effect of a state scale restricting and acting on society.

It is safe to say that the state scale is at least one of the most dominant scales in the contemporary world. This is why IR is mesmerised by it, and takes it as a given reality. However, if we understand the state as an effect of processes, of which scaling is one, it opens up more avenues of research to understand how the state comes into being, and how state power is exercised. What constitutes the state effects, however, cannot be assumed ontologically, but should be approached empirically, although previous research does offer some hints on where to look. What is important to remember is that the sociospatial processes and relations that make the state appear, are not restricted to the state. For example, actors or practices that are identified as state-related or political (which is defined by

the state), are not necessarily sufficient to understand how state power comes to be exercised in social life. This means for the researcher to let go of the separation between public and private spheres, or the state from society. As the state effect is produced in social life, the insulation of the society from the state, or the political from the private, is only one specific form of how the state appears, is present, in social relations. (Poulantzas 1978, 70; cited in Painter 2006, 759.) For this end, state power is conceptualised in section 4.2. in a way that allows for the inclusion of actors and processes that seem to have nothing to do with the state.

The state, like other systems of rule, needs to have a spatial extension with which to differentiate human collectivities from another because all forms of polity occupy some sort of place; physical as well as social. The spatial extension of political authority can be territoriality, but just as well networks, mobility or kinship, just to name a few. That extension defines upon what and/or whom that political authority can exercise legitimate dominion. (Ruggie 1993, 148–149.) As such, state spatiality is essentially "a conditional, contested and ultimately changeable modality" of power; it defined where power can be exercised. Therefore, the spatiality of political authority is struggled over by actors "entangled in actual power geometries and institutionalised spatial practices". (MacLeavy & Harrison 2010, 1038.) Some sort of spatial power is bound to appear in each social relations. Even if territoriality of an authority is unbundled, it will not be located some place else but rather the place is becoming something, somehow else spatially organised. (Ruggie 1993, 174.) For the purposes of this thesis as an exploration to the making of modern statehood, territorialisation as a spatial strategy is conceptualised in section 4.3.

4.1. Scaling makes the state appear as a structure

Scale means "the level of geographical resolution at which a given phenomenon is thought of, acted on or studied". It creates relations between spaces for a specific social claim, activity or behaviour. (Paul 1999, 219.) A simple example would be the United States; the states and the federal state make claims for the same territory, and exercise authority over it, but they are thought of as existing on different scales; the federal and the state scales. Being 'located' on different scales gives them different powers based on their relations to each other's space. Scales are however not given or fixed (Wissen 2009, 884), but products, as well as factors, in the construction and dynamics of the interactive making of geographical realities (Marston 2000, 220–221). As such, spatial scales are never fixed but continuously contested and reconstructed in "their extent, content, relative importance and interrelations". (Swyngedouw 1997, 140–141; cited in MacKinnon 2011, 23.) Thus, scale is both

historically and contextually specific, and always in a state of flux. It does not exist outside of the community of producers that both constructs and contest it (Jones 1998, 26); rather, they are a way of "framing conceptions of reality" (Delaney & Leitner 1997, 94–95; cited in Marston 2000, 221).

As a rhetoric device, scale is not a neutral 'truth' but rather "a representational trope, a way of framing political-spatiality that in turn has material effects". (Jones 1998, 27.) For example, claiming to act on a certain scale can give actors power and authority over others and access to resources and decision-making. "Actors help produce scales through their activities, and scales, in turn, constrain and guide these activities by providing (or taking away) resources" (Lebel et al. 2005). Practices are more powerful than discourse in effecting transformation and change. For example nationalism needs to be effected by practices of passport check-points, inclusion and exclusion in services and so on. Racism is more effectively eradicated by practices that create new social knowledges, like exposing segregated population to each other through work and leisure activities, than by awareness raising campaigns consisting of speech acts. (Ettlinger 2011, 552.) What is crucial here is that the processes and social relations who participate in scalar struggles, are *not* bounded inside the spatial boundaries that are defined in the struggle. For example the boundaries and the relations to other scales of a state scale is not constructed and constructed only within what is perceived as the state. For example international NGOs participate in the struggles over scale in various locations and contexts even though they are not restricted within the perceived boundaries of those scales.

Scaling is "a relational, power-laden and contested construction that actors strategically[16] engage with, in order to legitimate or challenge existing power relations" (Leitner et al. 2008, 159). It can be a tool for sociospatial strategies that create control and/or empowerment (Wissen 2009, 884) as they fortify or relativize the importance of scales and/or create new ones. They are ultimately about the "scalar spatiality of power and authority"; where is the spatial boundary of political authority perceived to be and how it relates to other spatial authorities. (Leitner et al. 2008, 159.) The definition of scales express the geometries of social power; certain definitions strengthen the power and control of some while others are disempowered (Swyngedouw 1997, 169; cited in Marston 2000, 238). Although scales are subject to transformations through practices and discourses, they can stay relatively fixed even for long periods of time as once they are produced, they start to exist independently of actors' perceptions. (Swyngedouw 1997, 169; cited in Marston 2000, 238.) Once established, scalar

---

[16] Strategically here does not mean that the sole, or even conscious, purpose of an actor enmeshed in scaling struggles. Rather, strategic means that practices and discourses are engaged in in way that serves a purpose. For example when climate change issues are debated over, their main function is not to engage in scaling per se, but as an effect, they can fortify, diminish or even create new scales. Scaling is an effect of these strategies, produced in the struggle for power.

structures manifest existing power structures. As such, they can influence wider political, economic and social processes in carious spatial contexts. (MacKinnon 2011, 32.)

The making of the state scale as a structure, like any other scale, then, happens in thousands and thousands of encounters and practices, but scalar relations and their reconstruction in those encounters makes local practices seem vertically organised. A case in point is James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta's (2002) fieldwork on the operations of a government programme in India. Even though field officers brought the state to the physically same level as the society, the monitoring and regulating aspect of the state made people experience the state as above them. The sense of hierarchy was established for example by surprise monitoring visits; the higher officials had continuous access to local worker's space whereas the local workers had a specific time slot when they were allowed to visit the higher official's office. (Ferguson & Gupta 2002, 984–985.) The vertically higher scalar position of the state officials gave them more power in relation to the local scale actors. However, scalar practices work both ways and should not be merely seen as "the control of groups in place" as people and processes not associated with the dominant or 'higher' scale can contest and redefine their positions in scales as well the scales themselves. (Jonas 2006, 403.)

The state does not appear the same everywhere, but rather there is "qualitative and quantitative social and spatial variation" no matter how standardised the operation of state institutions is (Painter 2006, 764). Materiality, in addition to the social, helps us understand why particular dimensions of scale become fixed or undone; successful scaling depends not only on the discursive powers of actors and institutions, but also their ability to manipulate the material dimensions of scale. (MacKinnon 2011, 28; 30.) For any representation of scale will pass because to be successful, it has to be practically effective. "In terms of the expectations it sets up, in terms of activities that it informs and structures, it has to be consistent with the way the world, both natural and social, is." (Cox 1998, 44.) Material and social realities, like difficult mountainous terrain and local traditions, can cause contradictions and hindrances to state-making, as well contribute to "the production of unintended state effects and to state practices that escape the control of the actors who initiated them". (Painter 2006, 764.) Discursive and material realities diverge which creates a "field of possibilities" for challenging norms and discourses, like scales. (Ettlinger 2011, 548–549).

Christian Lund (2011), has named the situation, where there are multiple institutions (also other than state institutions) making binding decisions, fragmented sovereignty. According to him, these institutions can be in competition with each other, complement each other or form alliances. Together they constitute fragmented sovereignty that is not necessarily something on the verge of collapse but

something that is making separate things become cohere. (Lund 2011, 887–888.) Aihwa Ong (2004) applies her term graduated sovereignty "to describe the rescaling of state power across the national landscape and the differential scales of regulatory effect on the rights and privileges of different segments of the population". Defined like this, sovereignty is not seen uniform nor static. Ong takes it as "the contingent outcomes of various [state] strategies". (Ong 2004, 72.)

4.2. Scaled centralised state power

Although power relations are ultimately resolved at the local level in practices and discourses, for example the hoped result or the motivation between an act realising state power in everyday life, can be initiated elsewhere than in that particular actor's head. To understand how political authority is realised in power relations, I utilise and further modify Merje Kuus and John Agnew's (2008) take on Michael Mann's (1984) concepts of despotic and infrastructural power[17]. Despotic power refers to the power of the political authority elite over the rest of the society; basically, what the elite can get away with without serious contestation. For example the North Korean elite has high despotic power and can practically execute any decision, whereas many other heads of states can only get away with a limited range if actions; overturning central norms like private property or individual freedom would be considered a revolution. (Mann 2003, 54–55.)

Power based on coercion alone is not very effective because domination cannot be everywhere all the time; it is restricted by the material realities of the world. For example in Southeast Asia, people have long been able to escape state control in the periphery, like the Kachin did, and still do, in Burma. On the other hand rulers could augment their power by moving people to the centre where their despotic power was stronger. (Carsten 1998, 218; 232.) In the centre, the royal courts could control and tax the population whereas from the periphery, at best, they could get some tribute or capture some slaves, but they were not able to effectively control the highlanders. The people living in the periphery could utilise geography to their advantage: for example the Karen people fled to the mountains to avoid the royal troops. (Malseed 2009, 367.) To overcome the material restrictions, most ruling elites try get at least some form of popular authority from the majority of the population they claim authority over.

---

[17] Although Mann has used them in the study of specifically territorial state power, I believe that with the modifications I, and Kuus and Agnew have made, the concepts can be utilised to analyse exercise of power backed by other forms of political authority, not only territorial state power.

However, popular consent does not need to be based on democracy or nationality, but can also be based on efficiency, or being more popular than the other competing sources of political authority. For example, if a private company is seen to provide more efficiency and services than for example the state, it can have greater authority over some issue-area. (Agnew 2005, 442; 444.) Sometimes, legitimacy as perceived by the person that is the object of the exercise of power, is not relevant, but what matters is whether *other* authorities allow the acts and decisions of that power-exercising authority. (Tilly 1985, 171.) For example the US deployed despotic power to destroy the Iraqi government, but failed to get the legitimacy to back up the use of coercive power. (Agnew 2005, 442.) Alternative local political authorities were able to compete with the US power. At the same time, other state authorities on the international stage, while perhaps not seeing the US actions as legitimate, did not challenge the use of power, as such accepting it.

Despotic power is not necessarily territorially fixed[18], but can also be based on other spatialities. For example in Southeast Asia, the traditional notion of the state was defined by its centre, not its borders. The extent of the kingdom was not fixed nor clearly defined but rather in a state of flux; the power of the ruler faded from the centre outwards and in the outskirts of the sovereign's power, it merged with that of the neighbouring sovereigns. The power of the ruler was measured by the number of people he could control, on the loyalty between persons, not by the geographical extent of his control, clear-cut mappings of space. (Carsten 1998, 218; 232.) In today's world, elites formerly associated with the territorial state can shift loyalties to other entities than the territorial state. (Kuus & Agnew 2008, 102.) This could involve for example "the attenuation of territorial sovereignty in the form of the diffusion of authority across multimodal financial network involving transnational corporations, banks, other states, debt-rating agencies, and NGOs" (Agnew 2005, 444). Another example of the shifting of despotic power from the centralised state form is the transformation of Chinese ministries to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have been turned into transnational Fortune 500 companies with profit-turning responsibilities for stakeholders of which the Chinese state is the largest. The change enhances the state's embeddeddness in spaces and regimes outside its territory. At the same time it disaggregates authority to more, less controllable entities that are more similar to transnational companies than state branches. As state power is disaggregated to various actors and institutions, the more there is outside pressure to take into account and internalize regimes and regulations. For

---

[18] This is Kuus & Agnew's own reading of Mann's concept. For example Daniel Neep (2013) argues that Mann's definition of the state is based on territorial state institutions; to him, state is centralised and its political power stops at defined territorial boundaries (Neep 2013, 72; 74). This of course does not render Kuus & Agnew's reading less relevant for this thesis. In fact the modification of Mann's concepts is absolutely necessary to make the move from the territorial view of the state to a spatial one.

example Chinese SOEs have had to take into account not only the central government's policies, but also international business regulation to attract foreign investors. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 405.)

Infrastructural power refers to the state's ability to "actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm". This means for example the state's ability to levy taxes and collect information. (Western) capitalist democracies tend to have more infrastructural power than despotic power as they can enforce almost all their decisions relatively fast on all of their population and territory. (Mann 2003, 54.) An example of infrastructural power is the institutionalisation of state-defined property rights. The more the ownership of land and resources are practiced, recognised and defined by state institutions, the more infrastructural power the state in that respect has. (Woods 2010, 9.) Mann takes infrastructural power to be limited in the state's territorial borders (ideal infrastructural power would mean total penetration and effective immediate enforcement of decisions in the state territory), but based on Kuus and Agnew's reading it can be strongly territorial but alternatively also based on networks (Kuus & Agnew 2008, 102). For example currencies and educational provision can create externalities that are not based on nationality nor territory. (Agnew 2005, 443.)

Following Foucault, Aihwa Ong (2004) takes government as technologies of ruling. With this, she essentially refers to, I believe, what is called in this thesis infrastructural centralised power. According to her, political power is exercised through networks of technologies that link centrally made strategies to regulate spaces and populations. These technologies of ruling are invented as calculative, ideologically (e.g. neoliberalism) informed responses to specific problems. An example are free trade zones that create a state of exception, islands of distinct governing regimes. From this view, for example the Chinese opening (*kaifang*) and market reform policies are about practical solutions and specific assemblages to specific problems, and the meeting and contradiction of different political, economic and ethical rationalities. They are where neoliberal logic, standards of statehood, welfare of the people and other rationales come together as the production of new spaces of exception. (Ong 2004, 72–75.) The state's infrastructural power can be 'carried in' by actors and practices that are not state-related. For example NGO-led projects, if they inhere to state-making institutions or rules, can become the vessels of statization. An example are development projects that aim at formalising land rights of nomadic people. While possibly protecting the land of the people against land grabbing, they also transform customary land rights to official, often contradictory, forms of state-initiated categorisations and definitions of property rights. (Woods 2010, 9.)

The more similar is the execution of state-related policies, the more centralised and coherent can the state effect thought to be. However, declining central power in the sense of the centre being less able to enforce its decisions does not necessarily mean that state power or the effectiveness of the political system is declining. In everyday life, local governments represent the central state to ordinary people. Be the policies or decisions made in whatever 'scale' of the government, their enforcement appears state-initiated anyway. (Zhong 2003, 8.) Diffused power is created in social interaction, and social and market-based association, not through centralised command. This form of power is created by human agency and has to be sustained by legitimate collective action. It is based upon networks that can be, but are not necessarily, constrained by the central territorial authority. If they are, diffused power becomes territorial and authoritative as well. However, diffused power does not have to be and often is not territorially restricted but rather restricted by the purpose of the social or market interaction. (Agnew 2005, 442–443.) State-related policies can be important drivers in the exercise of this kind of more disaggregated power (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 406).

States do not even necessarily hold a monopoly over the means of coercion. Instead, they can have a number of agreements, both spoken and unspoken, with other sources of authority. This does not necessarily mean disorder and conflict, but can enforce the state's power by giving access to people, issues or areas state powers were not able to reach before. (Brown 2012, 61–62.) For example in the histories of European statizaton, what are now considered state and non-state actors had a symbiotic relationship in state-making. 'Military entrepreneurs' traded their ability to threaten with or use violence. The lack of monopoly of violence of state actors could be supplemented with informal local relationships with powerful and armed local actors. (Gallant 1999, 26–27; cited in Brown 2012, 62.) The degree to which 'private violence' is deemed legitimate or illegitimate, the boundary of illicitness, shifts in "historical and ongoing struggles over legitimacy, in the course of which powerful groups succeed in delegitimizing and criminalizing certain practices". To varying degrees in the course of time and space, bandits make states and state make bandits. (Abraham & van Schendel 2005, 7–8.) Great Britain's new private police force (see e.g. Potter 2015) is a case in point of the changing relationship between public and private in a 'traditional' strong Westphalian state. The diminishing presence of the police due to budget cuts (see e.g. Dodd 2014) is compensated with modern-age military entrepreneurs.

Additionally, the separation of transnational companies (as representatives of the private, the society) and the state gives leeway in the ways goals can be pursued. If firms are understood to be outside of the formal political order, they can pursue goals differently than what would be accepted of a state institution. (Mitchell 1991, 89–90.) The Chinese attempt to control internal issues transnationally

reflects the state's ability as a sovereign to authoritatively define the political (and the non-political). Political in this context means the things that are subject to state coercion. What is not political can be delegated to non-state actors and with that, it becomes something else – economic, religious, cultural… What is defined as political or economic creates possibilities (as well as impossibilities) for the exercise of power. For example the production, sale, and consumption of tobacco are in most countries left to the private sphere. The production, sale, and consumption of cocaine, however, are defined illegal and as such as something belonging to the political sphere. As such, the state becomes the relevant authority to abolish the production, distribution and use of cocaine both domestically and internationally. Tobacco can cross borders freely whereas the flow of cocaine is prevented by an international prohibition regime. This separation of the economic realm from the political is done in a way that seems natural to us despite the relatively short history of the separation. (Thomson 1995, 222.)

Similarly, the imagined separation of the state and the society enabled Western NGOs to work in Myanmar even though the diplomatic relations and economic relations were frozen under sanctions. Even though the NGOs receive funding from state institutions and have most likely aligned their policies with state development policies, they are not perceived as acting as part of the state. For example, the marketization of state branches, such as SOEs, helps the relocation of state sovereignty to areas external to the state's geographical borders. The marketised corporations, still under the supervision of the state, "take up power, authority and legal legitimacy to the detriment of subaltern population" and in effect 'make way' for the transnationalisation of state sovereignty. These "transnational sovereignty arrangements" operate through states and legislations and are not only market practices, but also diplomatic and governmental in nature. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 409.)

Even though we take the "public" and "private" organisation as networks of power and regulation enmeshed together, it does not mean that we should take them to be "a single, totalized structure of power". Instead, there are always conflicts and contestation between and within them. (Mitchell 1991, 90.) Additionally, as state and its power are constituted and transformed in the multiplicity of local encounters mould the spaces where state agents come into contact with other agents, but are also themselves shaped by them. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 403–404.)

To summarise, all power relations are eventually realised in everyday practices and encounters of people. The state structure is not self-evidently *the* dominate factor and reason of everyday practices what guides the action of individuals. However, as the state scale does appear in social relations, and creates relations of spatial power, it does also have real power and effects, but is an effect itself as

well. However, in the fuzziness of reality, practices can deviate from existing norms and transform them; not all exercise of state power is successful or effective. (Ettlinger 2011, 548–549.) What comes essential then, is to study the intended as well as unintended effects of the use of power. The focus of this thesis is how territorialisation is produced through state territorial strategies on the one hand, carried 'in' by various actors and processes, intentionally and not, as well as how other processes and struggles for political authority can also produce it in effect, as a side-product. Territorialisation as a concept is defined in the next section.

4.3. No territory, no state? Territorialisation as a sociospatial strategy

I take territory[19] to be one possible form of organisation of space. In the Western world, the territorial organisation of state and society has developed to be the dominant view of how space should be organised. However, this is not the case everywhere in the world nor is it absolute anywhere in the world but rather in process of becoming and retreating, being created and dismantled. I follow the lines of Edward Soja's (1971) argument on the political organisation of space; its purpose is to shape the sociospatial processes of competition, conflict and cooperation of the society to maintain solidary (and peace) within it. The control of resources, such as land and power, the enforcement of authority and order, and "the legitimation of authority through societal integration" are instrumental in the organisation of space. (Soja 1971, 7; cited in Elden 2010, 803–804.) All these aspects are inherent in the concept of territory but it is only on possible form of spatial organisation, it does not refer to all forms of spatiality (Kuus & Agnew 2008, 101).

In this thesis, territory comprises of an idea of a unit of space of sociospatial organisation that is bordered (Kuus & Agnew 2008, 101); political authority is exercised within it, control of resources is organised under that authority and society is attempted to be contained within it. Therefore, territory is not a static unit of space, but it is used "for political, social and economic ends" (Agnew 2005, 441). It is used to establish control and access of resources but also the ordering and organizing people's lives as well as their activities and livelihoods (Das 2014, 72). Territory should be viewed as a porous and by no means perpetual product of networked practices, not as some "timeless or solid geographical foundation of state power". For example, the (seeming) territoriality of the state has to be constantly constructed and politically mobilised. Therefore, "territory should be examined not as an actual state space, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such spaces

---

[19] See Painter (2010) for other usages. Territory is widely used concept but has become rather void (or, from another perspective, too full) of meaning. Very rarely is it defined what it is actually used to refer to.

appear to exist". (Painter 2010, 1115–1116.) Territorialisation in turn is a strategy of practices that makes territory appear to exist.

Territory "is a bounded space which there is a compulsion to defend and secure—to claim a particular kind of sovereignty—against infringements by others who are perceived to not belong" (Cowen and Gilbert 2008, 16; cited in Painter 2010, 1097). The making and sustaining of borders is essential for territory. The bordering of territory is based on domination or control as the modality of power. It is possible that the exercise of that power is legitimate, but it is nonetheless based on demarcation through domination. The bordering aspect of territoriality requires border control and enforcing commands hierarchically throughout the territory. (Agnew 2005, 442.) This makes territoriality conflictual in its nature as it generates rival territories. To maintain and reproduce the borders of the given territory, it is necessary to create practices and discourses of the other(s). (van Schendel 2005, 3; cited in Das 2014, 69.)

Territorialisation is about the making or expanding of territories. It is about moving the borders inside of which claims to political authority are made. State territorialisation strategies can be viewed as attempts to "create and impose a form of spatiality that both serves the ends of the state and seeks the systematic annihilation of non-state spatial alternatives". (Lefebvre 1991, 9–30; cited in Neep 2013, 75.) In time, the border becomes more and more a part of the daily life and the memory of the old organisation fades away. Old cross-border networks grow weaker and new networks, like those of smuggling, are created because the border is accepted as a fixed reality. Eventually, the border can change from a social fact to a naturalised one, but it still must be maintained. (van Schendel 2005, 373.)

What is essential here is that territorialisation does not happen in a physically or socially empty place but it will have to compete with the existing forms of sociospatial organisation; the territorialisation of space confronts lived space. This makes the space contested in various ways. For example, nomadic lifestyle does not fit in strictly bordered space very well as it is based on constant movement. The relations and identity of the nomadic people are based on their relations to each other, not to the space they inhabit. To make territorialisation stick, promoting permanent cultivation can be used as a state territorial strategy to control resources. (Das 2014, 71–72.) State territorialisation and the related monopolisation of land and resources can also bring about civil war and peripheral conflicts as local power-holders and ordinary people resent what state territorialisation and the spatialisation of power bring with them, such as marginalisation of minority groups and extraction of resources that have belonged to that group. (Brown 2012, 68–69.) Multiple territorial claims can be made at a given

point in time and these claims can be made by various actors, not only states and many may have authority, though not exclusive, and power. In such an instance, the one exercising more *de facto* capacity to enforce decisions and control actions will have more influence even if another source has the *de jure* authority. (Vandergeest & Peluso 1995, 389.)

Tongchai Winichakul's (1994) concept of geo-body links territorialisation strategies with the spatial creation of nationhood. Like territorialisation strategies, the geo-body of a nation is socially constructed and it creates effects; "the geo-body of a nation is a man-made territorial definition which creates effects-by classifying, communicating, and enforcement-on people, things, and relationships". (Tongchai 1994, 16–17.) In a way, a geo-body is the language a nation uses to achieve spatial expression; how it merges identity, culture and territory into an inseparable spatial and temporal whole. For example, the narrative of the geo-body of China, both in China and in the West, has long been based on a single-origin myth of how "a singular "Chinese culture" matching a homogenous ethnicity that spread out from the Yellow River valley some 5,000 years ago". It makes the Chinese state seem as an inevitability that spreads from the centre and assimilates and homogenises on its way. (Oakes 2012, 316–317.)

The discourse of geo-body makes the territoriality of the nation-state seem a natural fact that can be viewed on maps (Oakes 2012, 316). Therefore, perhaps the most important technology in creating and imagining a geo-body of a nation is modern mapping (Tongchai 1994, 16). Modern mapping helps conceptualise abstract space[20] that is linear and homogenous, and can be cut into discrete, comparable units (Vandergeest & Peluso 1995, 388–389). When space is abstracted, smaller spaces nest in larger abstract space like a national park nests in national territory. This is in no way a neutral process; "[m]aps do more than represent reality; they are instruments by which state agencies draw boundaries, create territories, and make claims enforced by their courts of law". (Vandergeest & Peluso 1995, 388–389.) This sort of abstract space is measurable and has empirically quantifiable physical dimensions. Theoretically, abstract space can be sold and bought like any commodity. It does not consider experienced space of "everyday routines, social interactions and lived experiences". (Neep 2013, 75.)

People do not respond to abstract and homogenous space pictured in maps and government policies because they experience space that multiform, "located, relative and varied". More often than not, for

---

[20] The abstract space of the state is how IR has long viewed state territoriality; as homogenous and total. One homogenous nation inhabits the abstract state space that is not further analysed. The lived experiences do not matter to most IR because they are not seen from the homogenous space that is the state. The way abstract space is ordered conceals the violence and artifice of its production and makes the national territory seem as the natural state form. (Neep 2013, 76.)

example "territorial land-use planning is […] often a utopian fiction unachievable in practice because of how it ignores and contradicts peoples' lived social relationships and the histories of their interaction with the land". For strategies creating abstract space to be successful in the long term, they will need to be accepted by the people over whom the authority claims are made. This is true for all kinds of spatial strategies This can be achieved with social pressure and/or the use of violence although with the latter it is difficult to achieve lasting acceptance. (Vandergeest & Peluso 1995, 389.) Local power-holders can also be bought off for example through provision of rents; for example insurgency groups can be transformed to border control groups like has been done in Myanmar (see further discussion in the analysis chapters) (Brown 2012, 69).

Territorial strategies need to modified to local conditions to make them successful. For example in the Naga Hills between India and Burma in the late 19th and early 20th century, the territorialisation strategies were different from each side of the border as they were tuned to fit the local customs and social life. On the Indian side, land was given different meanings (e.g. for plantation/forest) and the arrangement of territorial control that had existed before was replaced by a cartographic imagination of space to secure the standing of colonial rule and companies in the area. On the Burmese side, the colonial rule was territorialised through village chiefs and headmen. They were given gifts, tax collection rights and slave release payments and persuaded to participate in "state revenue collection and "state making" practices". The unadministered Naga people's war-like habits, such as head-taking and occasional slave-taking from the administered territories were used as legitimation for territorial expansion. In the colonial period it was common to base territorialisation strategies on bringing about order and civilisation. 21st century strategies include development and nationalisation. (Das 2014, 64–66; 69–70; 72.)

Territorialisation is a strategy[21] of practices to establish a territorial form of sociospatial organisation of life. Inherent in territorialisation is the creation, shifting and maintenance of various borders both in physical space and in social life that can be but need not be parallel with each other. One example of these borders are national borders, both based on 'natural' borders such as rivers and imagined borders. In addition, territorial bordering includes the bordering of social life inside the territory. Be it state or other source of political authority, the power and authority are claimed, appropriated and established on the lives of people physically residing within the territory. The routine of territory needs to be maintained to make the territorial borders to stick. It is "laboriously generated through

---

[21] In this context, strategy is supposed to entail both conscious efforts to create a certain outcome as well as unintended effects that contribute to the goal of the strategy, which is here the establishment and maintenance of state territoriality.

complex uneven networks of countless mundane actions", like control of border crossings, policing of smuggling and the issuing of visas. (Painter 2006, 765.)

The spatial extension of rule does not need to be, and is not in many occasions, based on territoriality. Instead, it can be based, for example, upon kinship or movement and migration as is the case with nomadic people who base claims of ownership and control on cycles and routes of migration, not fixed territory. Additionally, even if a system of rule is territorial and relatively fixed, it does not need to be based upon exclusivity. (Ruggie 1993, 149.) For example amongst the tribes that have come to be called Kachin in Myanmar, organisation of social and political life is based upon kinship and lineage; individuals represent particular lineages and places. They have continued to be the basis of the Kachin society although the people associated with the lineages are separated in three state spaces. For example cross-boundary marriages are common; as Kachin from Myanmar marry to Kachin in China, they benefit from China's economic development but do not lose their cultural and living environment that is not separated by international borders. (Dean 2005, 816–817.)

Sociospatial change happens when spatial structures and spatial strategies, or in other words, emergent social and political projects, interact. "[A]gency lies with the social forces advancing such projects". These forces have scalar dimensions and repercussions but are not scalar themselves. (MacKinnon 2011, 31.) Focus should be put on "processes of interaction and between inherited scales and emergent social activities". This adds the dimension of time (duration) to the analysis. It connects the existing material and social realities inherited from the past to the new materialities and social relations and struggles of the present. It also emphasizes, how certain structures and practices can become (temporarily) sedimented and 'fixed'. Scales are not vertically given but can become fixed in vertical positions for a certain duration of time. (MacKinnon 2011, 31.)

Territorialisations of political authority can be viewed as trajectories of change of social and physical practices in time that co-exists in space. The trajectories and how they meet with each other and other trajectories vary in different contexts. There are many other sociospatial strategies that can be used to specialize political authority, but territorialisation and scaling were chosen for this thesis as the territoriality and the vertical organisation of national/global are important aspects of state as it is understood in IR but their meaning is usually not reflected upon. The reconceptualization helps us see that for example fluctuations in state territorialisation are not in any way unique to the era of globalisation. Rather, territoriality is only one of many possible forms of spatial organisation of political authority, contested by physical and social space, discourses and practices, and alternative trajectories of sociospatial organisation.

To summarise, territorialisation is about creating borders and excluding other forms of authority from the territory, which is bordered space. Scaling on the other hand is about establishing relations of power between spaces. Scaling does not (necessarily) aim at excluding but establishing a relation to other forms of authority. Both of these spatial strategies are constructed, maintained and contested. Certain organisation can become to be seen as fixed, but that does not mean that the form would be something natural or permanent, even less something existing a priori. Both of the strategies have both materially and socially real effects and territoriality and scale are themselves effects of sociospatial struggles.

5. CONTEXT OF THE STUDY: SINO-BURMESE BORDERLANDS

In the following chapters, I will apply my formulations about political authority, power relations, and territorialisation to cases from the Sino-Burmese borderlands. Both China and Myanmar make interesting cases for this kind of analysis. First of all, the rise of China is without a doubt one of the big issues of our time and as such, understanding the Chinese state is of importance to any political analysis. Additionally, after the Maoist era, China has embraced, albeit with many reservations and with a 'Chinese flair', modernisation and capitalism, the two arguably most powerful processes of the last century or two. In my view, to understand the complexity of the 'Chinese century', we need to look not only in the growing power of China in Africa or Latin America. Southeast Asia is often seen as the natural backyard of China, and as such provides a good observation site for analysis trying to understand the multifaceted realities, trajectories and the actors involved with historical perspective. The Chinese state, what 'Chinese' is, as well as the identities, statehood and spaces of power of the neighbouring small countries are constantly renegotiated where China meets Southeast Asia. It is something much more complex than the big dragon using its economic power to bully the small tigers next to it. (Tan 2012, 87–88.)

It was actually the democratization and opening up of Myanmar from 2010 onwards was what initiated my interest towards the country and the Southeast Asian region as a whole. A seemingly sovereign, closed state had started opening up to the world, and with it, foreign actors, values and identities. For a few years, Myanmar was celebrated as another victory of Western values and neoliberal capitalism; triumph of democracy over totalitarianism, capitalism over socialism. Myanmar seemed to be following the teleological path towards capitalist modernity. At the same time there was a sense of great hurry; China, as Myanmar's big powerful neighbour, had worked with the country when Western countries stayed away, and had grasped much of the country's economic life and natural resources. The Sino-Burmese borderlands make an excellent case of a sphere where local traditions, history, social conditions and institutions come together with modernist Western discourses. On the one hand, there are nationalist modernist projects going on; national subjects are "culturally homogenized, biopoliticed, and localized within the national territory". On the other hand, at the same time, in the capitalist modernist view, subjects that are hybrid and flexible, and that have transnationally, not only nationally, laying solidarities, are celebrated. (Ong 1997, 171; 173.)

Southeast Asia is a good example how an existing power relations came in contact with Western standards of statehood. In the pre-colonial time, political authority was centralised in economic centres with the royal families. Power and ability to control radiated from the centre, and the

hinterlands were affected by it only to a low degree, if at all. The peripheral hinterlands were not based on centralised rule due to, in part at least, difficult physical terrain they had they had to deal with it. The acceptance of the local population was instrumental to the exercise of power because compliance could not be guaranteed with force. The hinterlands that were more based on diffused than central power resisted colonial rule more effectively than the centres of power, and the colonialists were not able to directly control all of them. In independence transitions, the international standards of statehood and nationalism became powerful state-making tools, and fresh independent governments adopted Westphalian ideals, such as territoriality, and colonial practices to achieve them. Existing multiple and overlapping sovereignties were to be forged into one absolute sovereign. (Brown 2012, 65–66.)

In this chapter, I will introduce some aspects of both China and Myanmar that are relevant to the later analysis. The focus of this thesis is on the territorialisation of the Burmese state, and to a lesser degree that of China, in the borderlands. The focus of the analysis is on state territorialisation in the context of ceasefire agreements in Myanmar, and the liberalisation of trade in both countries that has enabled private ownership, opened cross-border trade, and raised the presence of the state in the borderlands. Temporally, in the case studies the focus is on the period of 1988–2010. The year 1988 transformed the official relations of the countries in significant ways as both regimes started opening up their economy. In 2010, after two decades of having close economic and political relations without much outside interference, thanks to the sanctions set by Western countries on Myanmar, Myanmar opened up to the rest of the world. This will most likely in time transform the relations between the two countries, but that would be enough analysing for another whole thesis.

Because I take power relations are taken to be constructed and contested in the mundane, in the everyday practices, it follows suit that my analysis needs to move from the actor, the microscale, to the meso- and macroscales. The analysis should ne ascending, not top-down, because "mundane, everyday practices are part of a macroscale societal picture, precisely because power is diffuse, signifying that everyday practices produce, reproduce, and elaborate societal norms". Ascending analysis begins with specific practices, like in the case of making of borders, border controls and cross-border mobility, not from larger structures as the dominating factor. (Ettlinger 2011, 548; following Foucault 1980b–d; 2007b.) However, I saw it fit to first introduce some larger contexts as they do play a role in what plays out in the everyday life. I do not assume state policies to predetermine what ordinary people, or even government officials do but rather as larger background contexts that do have some relevance in the local encounters. Additionally, it is important to notice that issues brought to the fore in this chapter are not, however, to be taken as primary or the most influential

factors in how political authority spatialities form at the local level. Based on my analysis in the territorialisation practices, I have noticed that actors traditionally defined as private, play a significant role in the contestation as well as construction of the state, and therefore special attention is given to them here as well.

5.1. Myanmar: Colonial geo-body, military rules, and competing nationalisms

Myanmar is located in Southeast Asia. Its neighbouring countries are Bangladesh and India in the west, China and Laos in the north/northeast and Thailand in the east. Myanmar has a long coastline in the Indian Ocean which makes it strategically important especially to China (and to the US). The physical geography of the country is characterised by the lowlands in the centre of the country and delta in the south that are surrounded by highlands that form a horseshoe-like ring. (Brown 2012, 112.) The current estimated population of the country is over 60 million and there are approximately 135 national races. Myanmar is divided into 14 states, in seven (Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Chin, Mon, Arakan and Shan) of which the majority of the population is ethnic minorities. (Burma Center Prague 2014.) Most people identifies with the ethnic majority group, ethnic Bamars, or Burmans, reside in the lowlands. Approximately two thirds of the total population are Burmans. The ethnic minorities populate the mountainous highlands. The royal rule of the lowlands in pre-colonial times was based in the centre and the hills acted as refuge for peasants, rebels and other mobile people, as well as a "practical space of subversion to the central monarch". (Brown 2012, 112; 114.)

The country came under British colonial rule as a province of British India after the three Anglo-Burmese Wars, all won by the British. The southern parts of the territory now linked to the state of Myanmar, were taken over in the first and second war in 1824–1826 and 1852. The constituted the main geo-body of 'Burma Proper'. The Northern high-lands, known as 'Frontier Areas', was taken over in the third war in 1885–1886. Whereas 'Burma Proper' was administered directly by the colonial administration, the 'Frontier Areas', were governed indirectly through local Kachin and Shan chiefs. Karenni States were left out of both of the areas, as a buffer zone between the frontiers and the centre, administered indirectly much like the 'Frontier Areas'. (Heikkilä-Horn 2009, 145–147.) Before the British colonialization, the geographical area that now is Myanmar had never been under one rule nor was it thought of as one geographical entity (Burma Center Prague 2014).

Map 1. The 14 states and their capitols of Myanmar.

Note: The capitol of Myanmar is currently Nay Pyi Taw, not Rangoon.

Source: CIA (2013).

During the colonial period, Burmese, as well as ethnic, nationalism emerged for the first time. However, the British would not accept any ethnic state but enforced the first cartographically precise borders; an internationally recognised and sanctioned state of Burma that put ethnic groups under the jurisdiction of a state they did not participate in. (Malseed 2009, 367–368.) The ethnic and geographical divisions of what is now known as Myanmar are remnants of the colonial period when the British divided Burma; "[t]here was no 'Burma' before the British started to 'imagine' it as a particular entity east of the British Raj and gave it a 'geo-body' by mapping it" (Heikkilä-Horn 2009, 145). The Sino-Burmese border evolved as Burma (1948) and the People's Republic of China (1949) were established as independent states but was not settled until 1960 because the PRC saw the border defined by the British as imposed on it. In the border settlement, two areas from Kachin[22] and Wa states were recognised as Chinese territory. (Dean 2005, 813.) However, the border has never been effectively enforced from either side and cross-border mobility has never stopped because most of the families are spread on both sides and many Dais used to live on the Burmese side. There is no natural borderline and no artificial one either; the border can be crossed through forests or paddy fields. (Weng 2006, 200.)

When the territory known as Burma was mapped, further divisions were based on partly geographical and partly ethnic groupings. This categorised the population into different ethnic groups and the categorisation favoured some groups over others. The groupings moved on to the independent state of Burma and in the constitution of 1947 four ethnically based states (Kachin, China, Karenni and Shan) were created to which later three more (Karen, Arakanese and Mon) were added. Kachin, Chin and Shan elites participated in the Panglong conference where the constitution was drafted. (Heikkilä-Horn 2009, 150–151.) Ethnic states were endowed with different rights, some with a potential for secession, many without. The new Burmese state endowed itself with sovereignty over the Burman lowland areas as well as frontier highland areas that were governed by ethnic minorities that the state was not *de facto* able to control. (Oh 2013, 5–6.)

After gaining independence, Burma/Myanmar has been ruled by four major political regimes. In 1948–1962, the regime was based on a British-style parliamentary government. (Kyaw 2002, 78.) The ruling party was the nationalist Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League AFPFL[23] that was

---

[22] The concession of the Kachin area was one of the factors behind the outbreak of violence in Kachin state by the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) in 1961 (Dean 2005, 815). See for more discussion on the conflicts along the border in section 6.1.

[23] AFPFL's predecessor Anti-Fascist Organisation (AFO) was created to resist the Japanese occupation of Burma. Later, it was renamed AFPFL. It consisted of various nationalist parties, and before the independence of the country, its primary objective was to resist the British colonialization. (Thawnghmung 2011, 6–8.)

committed to social welfare and market economy. Soon after independence, dissatisfied ethnic groups[24] took up to arms and the country was stridden with civil war. Soon the AFPFL was split. The military took the position of a care-taker for the government in 1958–1960 to restore stability, and in 1962 the Revolutionary Council (RC) seized power altogether. (Thawnghmung 2011, 5–8.) The RC adopted the Burmese Way to Socialism instead of capitalism, and replaced the multiparty parliamentary system with a single-party system by the Burma Socialist Program Party[25] (BSPP) that was established by the RC. (Kyaw 2002, 78.)

During the socialist regime, the Tatmadaw fought with armed groups on various fronts. The social order in cities deteriorated in 1988 as non-armed civilians living in the government-controlled areas participated in unrepresented numbers in demonstrations against the socialist government. The legitimacy of the ruling party BSPP deteriorated, and the situation was made worse by bad handling of demonstrations. Many peaceful demonstrations turned violent to the point that there were fears of the state collapsing. The state had to concentrate on handling the situation in cities and left the border regions to be. The political situation with the opposition got stuck in a deadlock by September 1988 and both the US as well as the PRC prepared for intervening. The BSPP leaders decided to let the Tatmadaw, the state armed forces, take over the state. The BSPP was replaced with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) that was renamed in 1997 the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). (Maung 2007a, 9–13.) The junta rebuilt collapsed socialist institutions and promised to establish a market economy (Kyaw 2002, 79).

In 1990, free multi-party elections were held and won by the opposition's National League for Democracy (NLD), in which many ethnic leaders ran as candidates, and that got roughly 60 per cent of the votes and almost 81 per cent of the seats. (Maung 2007a, 1.) However, after the elections, SLORC would not hand over power to NLD but instead oversaw the national convention draft a new constitution. The highly junta-controlled convention was held on various occasions until 2008. (Thawnghmung 2011, 8–9.) In 2010, the first democratic elections since 1990 were held, although they were dismissed by many as a disguise to continued military dictatorship. However, the Tatmadaw initiated extensive reforms in the country, and in 2012 by-elections, NLD won 43 seats.

---

[24] For example the Kachin and Shan elites seemed to be satisfied with the constitutional arrangements that empowered state councils to make laws and raise taxes. However, dissatisfaction amongst the population of the two states soon grew due to many things, such as failure of the government to provide economic assistance to them, and the promotion of Buddhism in Kachin state where the majority of the population is Christian. (Thawnghmung 2011, 5–6.)
[25] The BSPP mixed socialism, Buddhism and isolationism in its policies. Under BSPP rule Burma co-operated with other socialist countries. (Burma Center Prague 2014.)

I will concentrate on the Kachin and Shan state because they are located next to the Yunnan province border and are areas where political authority's linkage to territory is constantly attested. Myanmar has never been able to control its border with China (Steinberg 2001, 225). Both states are home to many different ethnic groups of which the most relevant to this study are the Kachin, Wa and Kokung. Both of the states are rich in natural resources like forests, gems, minerals, rivers and fertile lands that make outside forces interested in them. These resources are threatened e.g. by deforestation, climate change, illegal wildlife trade and construction of large dams. The natural resources and their exploitation have fuelled conflicts in the states. (Wai 2012, 48–49.) Approximately 65 per cent of FDI to Myanmar goes to Kachin, Shan and Rakhine states of whom especially the Kachin and Shan have been targeted for land deals for companies operating in mining, hydropower, logging and agribusiness sectors (Kramer & Woods 2012, 12). China and Myanmar share a 2,185-kilometer-long mountainous border along Yunnan province on the Chinese side and Kachin and Shan (northern half) states on the Burmese side.

The Kachin and Shan states bordering China are among these mountainous states that have escaped central control. The Kachin state borders China and India in the northernmost part of Myanmar. It has a population of approximately 1.5 million. (Kachin Development Networking Group 2007, 3; 6.) The ethnic majority are the Kachin who consist of various loosely affiliated tribes and clans but most commonly Kachins describe themselves as consisting of six tribes. The Kachin nationalist project can be considered one of the most successful ones in Burma as the definition of a Kachin nation has been internalised by most of those who identify themselves as Kachin. Most of the Kachin live in Kachin state but some live in neighbouring territories in China and India as well as in other parts of Myanmar. (Thawnghmung 2011, 14.) Most Kachins live on shifting cultivation of rice, and the state's economy is based on agriculture. However, the state has rich natural resources including jade and timber that have made some local entrepreneurs very rich. Many Kachin feel left out of state-initiated activities that have benefited non-Kachin residents of the state, such as Chinese investors. These include the commercialization of agriculture and natural resources exploitation. (Thawnghmung 2011, 14.)

The Shan state is the biggest ethnic state in Myanmar both territory- and population-wise with approximately six to seven million people. The state borders not only China but also Laos and Thailand. The ethnic majority are the Shan, but many other ethnicities, including Kachin people, reside in the area. Some Shan live in the Kachin state. The state has never been effectively unified due to mountainous terrain and thick jungles, and many competing authorities, such as chieftains and war-lords. Like most of Myanmar, also the Shan state is primarily rural. Like the Kachin state, it is also rich in natural resources such as minerals and precious stones. It is also known for poppy

cultivation as it is part of the Golden Triangle that produces much of the world's heroin. (Thawnghmung 2011, 15.) Opium production and trade have been the state's economic backbone for decades after the CPC came to power in China and prohibited opium. The losing side of the raise to power in China, the Nationalist Chinese (Kuomintang), retreated and set up militia in the mountains of Shan state along the Chinese border. In Wa Hills, the CPB that could not work in mainstream politics anymore, set up their underground armed activities. Both groups became were involved in the drug trade, and the ethnic Chinese became a source of finance capital to opium farmers and traders. (Woods 2013, 6–7.)

5.2. China: "The sky is high and the emperor is far away"?[26]

The legal territory of People's Republic of China (PRC) covers approximately 9,600 square kilometres of which 60 per cent is mountains and plateaus. The western part of China is landlocked and characterised by mountains ranging from the 4,000-metre plateau in the farthest west to highlands that are about 1,000 to 2,000 metres above sea level. The lowlands of the eastern provinces with warmer climate and access to sea make them more conducive to framing and trade than the western landlocked provinces although when China's trade was based on the Silk Route, they were more central economically than the current economic centres in the eats. (Démurger et al. 2002, 154.) Mobility in physical space and mobility in social hierarchy have long been linked in the traditions of the imperial China. To gain social opportunities, such as education or high office, people had to move from rural areas towards the urban centres. Power and prestige correlated with the physical location of the person; space was imagined to be arranged vertically. The Maoist era failed to eliminate the differences between rural and urban areas despite of efforts to 'reverse' the social hierarchy of space by moving city people to the country side. In the post-reform China, power and prestige are perceived to be located in regions that are most affected by overseas investments and economic reforms. Getting access to the centres of power, such as special economic zones, is one of the central concerns of the everyday lives of the Chinese. (Liu 1997, 92–93.)

---

[26] A Chinese proverb that describes the attitudes of local government officials toward the central government (Zhong 2003).

Map 2. The provinces, regions and municipalities of China.

Perhaps the biggest reform China has gone through after its opening up in 1979 is the increasing economic mobility, the reach of enterprises to national and international markets, inside and outside the country. (Hendrischke 2006, 93.) Gonzalez-Vicente (2011) has argued that China has adopted an 'entrepreneurial statehood'. One manifestation is the 'Going Out' strategy in the 21st century that combines foreign policy and international activities of Chinese enterprises, both state-owned and private. The strategy has aimed at encouraging firms to go abroad and provide the managers with skills and knowledge needed in it as well as giving institutional support to these kinds of activities for example by simplifying requirements and easing the access to credit. The official incentive behind the strategy is to better the global position of Chinese companies so that they are in a good position to lead industrial development. On the other hand the state aims to control the internationalization of Chinese enterprises and includes them in broader foreign policy objectives, but also allows for managerial autonomy to companies. The centrality of SOEs in the rhetoric as well as practice of China's foreign policies ties them to the state apparatus and the central government (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 402; 404).

Behind it and the resulting decentred internationalization process the Chinese state, he identifies three parallel drivers: central government planning, SOE and SLC strategies and local contingencies once the companies have gone overseas. Through the interaction of these drivers the Chinese state gains more international presence and is at the same time transformed itself. This transformation is produced by territorialisation processes and cultural encounters. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 405.) While the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the highest body of the Communist Party of China (CPC), holds the ultimate decision-making power in foreign policy, there is a myriad of other actors, both official and others, that affect foreign policy. Already the official actors (e.g. CPC organs, People's Liberation Army (PLA) departments, government agencies) hold various motives and visions of Chinese national interest not to mention other influencing actors such as academic experts, local officials, chief executives and bank directors. Also the media and popular opinion have a growing influence. (Jakobson & Knox 2010, 1.)

One special flair of the economy of China is also the large, influential SOEs. According to the Forbes 500 list in 2013, 10 largest Chinese companies are all state-owned except for one Hong Kong -based one (CNNMoney 2014). Many of them hold practical monopolies in their respective fields. Many current big SOEs have evolved from former ministries, for example PetroChina from Ministry of Petroleum and Sinopec from Ministry of Petroleum and Ministry of Chemical Industry. The central government controls and guides Chinese companies to a certain degree. In the case of SOEs and state-owned banks, the state remains the majority stake-holder. However they are becoming more and more

like multinational companies than government branches. When SOEs and state-owned banks listed to the international stock markets, their objectives went through a transformation. They had to become concerned about Fortune 500 rankings as well as profit maximization. In order to attract foreign investments, they have to adhere with international rules. The involvement of international private stakeholders and investors has created a mixture of public ownership, and transnational and private ownership. This has restricted the central government's ability to control the SOEs and the state-owned banks. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 405.) Most significant SOEs practically have a monopoly in their respective field (Morck et al. 2008, 340). Most of China's FDI originates from SOEs (in 2006, 82% of total non-financial outward FDI) even though in 2006 they only comprised 26% of the number of establishments with overseas investments (Yeung & Liu 2008, 67–68). The only "FDI heavyweights" not explicitly controlled by the state are Lenovo and Huawei (Morck et al. 2006, 340).

Even though the state-owned sector is still the dominating business sector in China, private sector has been growing rapidly ever since private ownership has been possible. Private personal property and ownership have been protected by the constitution since 1999 and in 2004 private assets and capital since 2004. The state was the sole owner of the SOEs until 1995 when it was decided to "grasp the large and let go of the small"; smaller SOEs were sold to private individuals. Most Chinese private companies, be they domestic or foreign-controlled, are based on former SOEs or collectives. POEs have also been established on former township and village enterprises (TVEs). (Ralston et al. 2006, 826–827.) The growth of the private sector has brought a class of the 'nouveaux riches' in China and in its part increased the domestic saving rate. (Li 2001, 223; 227–228.) Domestic private-owned enterprises (POEs) contribute about one third of China's GDP even though they have only recently become well established. Contrary to the export-driven SOEs, the POEs produce goods and services to the domestic market. The POEs have traditionally been discriminated against by limited loans and resources, higher taxes and banning certain industries from private companies. (Ralston et al. 2006, 826–827.)

The importance of private companies to the economy has been recognized since the late 1990s. Only recently have they started to get the same encouragement and rewards as the SOEs (Ralston et al. 2006, 826–827). The central government actively encourages and supports private-owned Chinese companies in their internationalization as well. The central government controls several tax revenues with which it can finance the "going out" of these companies. (Yeung & Liu 2008, 62.) Additionally, the easy line of credit from Chinese policy banks has helped Huawei to undercut its competitors' bids in acquisitions. Even when acquisitions are more private in nature, they have to be approved by the

Ministry of Commerce. The state can also control overseas investments and cash flows by controlling currency exchange. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 405–406.)

In the last two decades of reformation and restructuring of the SOEs, the state sector has shrunk and the importance of the SOEs in the economy has been downplayed. They still do play an integral part in many strategically valuable sectors, such as raw materials, energy resources and banking. (Ralston et al. 2006, 827.) At the same time, economic reform has also made it possible for local governments to raise some taxes and also establish town and village enterprises (TVEs) outside the state planning structure. These enterprises are often founded by party cadres and well-connected entrepreneurs. (Yeung & Liu 2008, 62.) These low-educated "self-made" entrepreneurs became rich when the TVEs grew rapidly in the early 1980s (Li 2001, 223; 227–228). Many of these TVEs have grown or transformed to transnational companies (Yeung & Liu 2008, 62). Central government policies are not necessarily implemented on the local government level but instead they can be modified to fit local circumstances. Therefore, two localities are not necessarily similar to each other. This has resulted for example to the 'fuzziness' of property rights; a mixture of formal and informal property rights. This localises the conflicts as there is no higher authority were e.g. entrepreneurs could take their case than the local authorities. (Hendrischke 2006, 96.)

The majority of SOE shares are non-tradable and are owned by the state and state-controlled institutions, such as other SOEs. Thus the state owns the majority of the shares and with that, the ultimate decision-making power. All of the internationally listed SOEs have a parallel authority structure in addition to the board – the Party Committee of the enterprise. The Party Secretary and Party Committee members hold most of the real decision-making power and authority whether they sit in the board or not. If the board and top executives are not Party members, they have little or no real authority. (Morck et al. 2008, 343.) SOEs and SLCs can be seen as a part of the state apparatus because of their ownership structure, administrative arrangements, their centrality in the state's foreign policy, the control of the Party of the appointments (and removals) of top SOE executives and their central role in the vision and leadership of the Party. As the ties between the Party and the SOEs are strong both at the institutional and personal level, the SOEs should not have an imperative to downsize the state apparatus. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 404.)

The relationship between SOE executives and the political leadership is symbiotic – they both rely on each other. The SOEs benefit from state support (loans, foreign aid policies etc.) and the successful SOEs support the political leadership by supplying jobs and providing revenue to the state. The business executives and high-ranking officials have close personal ties. (Jakobson & Knox 2010, 25–

26.) The appointments of CEOs and other senior managers of large national as well as local SOEs are directed by state institutions. The CEOs of the largest SOEs are appointed by the Communist Party of China's Organizational Department and other senior positions mostly by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Appointments to top-level positions are part of the careers of successful party bureaucrats. Exchanges of positions can happen quickly without prior notice to the shareholders. (Morck et al. 2008, 344.) Generally, however, SOE leaders do not attempt to affect foreign policy decisions that do not concern their respective business sector, but energy sector high executives do have the capability and can exercise it occasionally, for example when they are consulted as experts when foreign policy concerning their respective sector is being deliberated. Private business and local/regional government-owned enterprises' executives do not have the same political capital. (Jakobson & Know 2010, 24–26.)

SOEs cannot merely be seen as a unified strategic branch of the Chinese central government. Instead, with their internationalization the SOEs are becoming more and more independent from the government and its objectives and discourses and might even confront them. For example in Peru the SOE Shougang's managers actively intervened in the workings of the Peruvian state by challenging the local elite and as such contradicted the Chinese foreign policy discourse of non-intervention. Other companies have transformed through joint ventures from predominantly Chinese to international entities their only responsibility to Beijing being profitability. It can thus be argued that with the state branches becoming more and more autonomous with their own distinctive motives and logics the state is becoming more heterogeneous as it internationalizes. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 406–407.)

Even though the SOEs are an integral strategic part of the state apparatus, their foremost principle is that of profit. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 404.) Sometimes the actions of SOEs (or other Chinese businesses for that matter) are in contrast with Chinese foreign policy goals. It is however hard to assess whether it's because e.g. energy security trumps diplomatic concerns or because the companies are acting independently according to their own interests, not foreign policy ones. (Jakobson & Know 2010, 29–30.) It is especially difficult for the state institutions to oversee, and even less, control, the national oil companies (NOC) because the companies have more resources and capacity than the institutions overseeing them. The leaders of NOCs are highly ranked in the CPC and the NOCs have an institutional background in former ministries which grants them with great deal of power. (Jiang & Sinton 2011, 7; 25.) Many Western as well as Chinese scholars[27] have also questioned if it is the

---

[27] E.g. Zha Daojing, Xin Ma and Philip Andrews-Speed.

state that pressures the companies to go overseas but rather that the firms are pushing the government to help them in competition with other companies (Zweig 2010, 9–10).

Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente (2011) has argued that the internationalization and the re-territorialisation of the Chinese state takes place when state-owned enterprises go abroad and start pursuing their own goals, teaming up with various local business and governmental actors. He argues that the central government is not able to fully control the goals or the actions of the SOE's, but that they have also goals of their own. This decentralized and fragmented process disperses and dislocates state power but does not take away its real effect. It also leads to transformed understandings of the state that are beyond the control of the central government. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 403.) By getting involved in the overseas investment projects and even pushing companies to go international, the Chinese central government is expanding to spheres formerly outside of the state sphere. The process is based on mixtures and fluctuating of the line between public and private, as well as communist and capitalist ideologies. Profitability and international expansion are the common objective of both the state and the companies although at the same time the internationalization process is diversifying private firm interests and with that the objectives of the state system. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 406.) Often it is unclear whether Chinese companies are actors or tools of foreign policy.

In my analysis, I focus on the Yunnan province in China, much like the neighbouring Kachin and Shan states, has been considered a backward hinterland in China. The terrain is marked by mountains that cover 94 per cent of the province. It is however the seventh biggest province in China and shares an international border of more than 8,800 kilometres with Myanmar, Laos and Viet Nam. (Poncet 2006, 303.) The Yunnan province is further divided to 13 prefecture-level regions of which six share a border with Myanmar: Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture (AP), Lincang District, Dehong Dai and Jingpo AP, Simao District, Baoshan Municipality and Xishuangbanna Dai AP. Within these six regions, there are three national-level checkpoints that have been agreed both by the Chinese and Burmese governments. (Kahrl et al. 2004, 9; 17.) Yunnan has a significant population of non-Han ethnic groups (Démurger 2002, 158). The Dehong Dai and Jingpo AP is home to most of the Kachin living on the Chinese side of the Sino-Burmese border, and has also been the economically the fastest growing prefecture in Yunnan since 1982. (Dean 2005, 818.) F

In Yunnan, until 2000, the formal state administration extended 'lower' than in other provinces; whereas in other parts of China, the 'lowest' level formal administration reaches is the township level, in Yunnan, the a village-level of government called the village office existed. These village offices were more vertically linked than village-ruled village committees in other provinces. However, they

lacked size, resources and budgetary independence to have real power. They were only capable of maintaining order instead of driving policy changes or economic development. Enterprises were not the concern of local administration, and they did not come as interconnected as in the rest of China. (Pieke 2004, 527–528.) The central government, although the local and provincial governments are able to enforce policies and decisions of their own as well, has ultimately most of the power to define the rules of the game that is state government. However, the local–central power relations are by no means a zero-sum game in which the increase of local power would result in a decrease of central power. (Zhong 2003, 8.) Overall, Chinese local governments have traditionally had room to pursue their own foreign economic and political interests, the degree varying in time. They have been able to resist total centralization by the central government. Yunnan and other border provinces have also implemented local-to-local diplomacy with local governments on the other side of the border to solve issues like smuggling, illegal immigration and drug trafficking (Cheung & Tang 2001, 92–93; 110–111). In Yunnan, the provincial government has gained some independence from the central government and has been able to guide its own foreign and economic policies with Myanmar. Sometimes central guidelines have been disregarded due to conflicting local interests.

People living along the border between the Yunnan province and Myanmar have traded and interacted with each other for centuries. Tight control over border regions has only restricted this exchange, not ever stopped it completely. (Kuah 2000, 72–73.) Ethnic Yunnanese traders have been an integral part of the borderlands societies and have had better access to Kachin and Shan natural resources and areas than colonial overlords during British rule, or the Burmese government after independence. (Woods 2013, 6.) For border provinces like Yunnan, economic ties with the neighbouring countries are more important than opening up international trade (as is the case with coastal provinces) (Cheung & Tang 2001, 110). Since the opening up from the 1980s forward, cross-border trade has increased and economic as well as social relations have been renewed between people living along the border between Myanmar and Yunnan. Also minority cultures have been revitalized. In Yunnan border trade and related activities with Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos make up more than 50 percent of its revenue. (Kuah 2000, 75.) ODI going from Yunnan to Myanmar is concentrated in the energy sector and agribusiness. Yunnan United Power Development (YUPD[28] develops hydropower resources in Myanmar. It signed a MoU to build China's first build-operate-transfer[29] (BOT) hydropower project

---

[28] YUPD comprises Yunnan Huaneng Lancang River Hydropower Co., Yunnan Power Grid Co. and Yunnan Machinery Equipment Export-Import Co Ltd. (Maung 2007b, 18).
[29] YUPD builds and manages the station and operates it for 40 years after completion after which it is transferred to the Myanmar government (Maung 2007b, 18).

in Myanmar in 2006. YMEC plays also a big role in building hydropower plants. (Maung 2007b, 18; 24.)

5.3. Economic policies and public–private relationships

The year 1989 marks a shift in the relations between China and Myanmar. In the 1960s and 1970s Burma, under the rule of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), had been in civil war, and China had isolated itself in the Cultural Revolution. *Official* border trade had been virtually in a standstill. Even after China started to open its borders in 1978, the Communist Party of Burma CPB was not able to engage in border trade because the northern border areas were under the rule of various armed groups. (Kahrl et al. 2004, 4.) Even on the Chinese side, the reforms that enabled provinces to implement their own economic agendas in the broader 'space' the central government awarded them in the name of economic development and socialist capitalism, favoured mainly the coastal provinces[30] (Cheung & Tang 2001, 93–94). The period of 1949–1978 the central government tightened its grip over foreign policies and provinces only facilitated the implementation of its agendas. (Cheung & Tang 2000, 92–93.) Border regions were heavily controlled because of political considerations and also the fear of social and moral pollution of the Chinese people. Officially, only some cross-border trade amongst people living in close proximity of the border was allowed to make up for shortages in or sell surplus of agricultural produce. The restrictions were however undermined by inefficient control, corruption and smuggling. It was not until the 1990s that the potential of border provinces for trade development was realized and policies favouring them were implemented. (Kuah 2000, 72–77.)

Burma's foreign exchange holdings and international liquidity hit rock-bottom in 1988. In addition, all major donors but China cut off assistance to Myanmar due to the illegitimate regime change in 1988. However, in 1989 the military regime started moderately opening up the private sector, joined Myanmar in regional cooperation schemes and organisations[31], and sold a lot of the state's resources. This gradual opening up coincided with the liberalization of the Chinese economy which further encouraged the development of the private sector in Myanmar, and enabled China to answer quickly to the new situation. (Steinberg 2001, 225; 229; 231.) Before the late 1980s, the Sino-Burmese

---

[30] Especially during the 1980s the coastal provinces were the main beneficiaries as special economic zones (SEZs) were established and coastal cities developed to connect China to the global economy. (Kuah 2000, 74–75.)
[31] Myanmar joined for example the Greater Mekong Subregion[31] (GMS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This ended the former socialist regime's isolationism and non-aligned neutrality. (Kudo 2010, 270.)

relations had been hindered by the (c)overt CPC support to the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) that was behind some of the armed struggles[32] against the Burmese socialist government. Just before the cold war, this Chinese dual-track diplomacy was switched to cooperation with the new government. (Kudo 2010, 270.)

On August 5th 1988, the trade cross the Sino-Burmese border was legitimised and formalised with an agreement between the Myanmar Export Import Services (MEIS) and the Yunnan Province Import Export Corporation. Previously, border trade had been labelled informal and *ad hoc*. The 1988 riots and demonstration had however resulted in a shortage of commodities and cross-border trade was planned to help the shortage by importing necessary items from China. First border trade checkpoints, of which some were later developed into border trade zones, were established two months later and in 1991, Myanmar formed border trade supervision committees, and in 1996, the Department of Border Trade (DBT) was established. All these actions liberalised, normalised and institutionalised border trade. (Kudo 2010, 270–272.) Majority of official cross-border trade was on a government-to-government basis but private firms and cooperative societies were allowed to engage in it. (Maung 2007b, 9–10.)

The territorialisation of the Chinese state in the borderlands after 1988 has been justified with notion of development and better welfare for the people. Infrastructure projects were said to have provided the local people with higher standards of living and better quality of life than even the people living in the centre of the country. State infrastructural power was strengthened at the same time with wide infrastructure projects, often with the help of China, Thailand or India, that improved access to neighbouring country markets as well as to remote areas within the country. The price of this state-building was paid by the local population who were forcefully relocated and whose land was confiscated. (O'Connor 2011, 4.) The 'Open up the West' campaign (*Xibu da kaifa*), launched in 1999, aims to help inland western provinces of PRC to catch up with the development of the coastal eastern provinces. It comprises of projects to attract investments to the provinces of the west as well as to protect the environment. The projects, that enable new forms of control by the state, are legitimated with rhetoric of development, but at the same time categorise certain types of people, and nature, as needing improvement. (Yeh 2005, 10; 12.)

---

[32] Even before Burma gained its independence, the Communist Party of Burma was expelled from the AFPFL. Not long after, the party started transforming from a political party to an insurgent organisation whereas the Burma Socialist Party grew within the AFPFL and gained more supporters than CPB. (Lintner 1990, 10–11.)

Nonetheless, inland and border provinces have been catching up with coastal ones. These 'late-comer' provinces have adopted policies mostly in concert with those of the central government, not undermining or conflicting them. (Cheung & Tang 2001, 93.) Even though the 1978 reforms gave the provinces more autonomy, the central government still influences them strongly. (Kuah 2000, 76–77.) Provinces are increasingly conducting foreign relations on their own, but their agendas are only rarely in disconcert with those of the central government. However, the competing economic interests and strategic considerations are gradually changing and diversifying the international behaviour of China. (Cheung & Tang 2001, 119–120.) No matter how strict regulations the central government implements, the remoteness of the provinces from Beijing makes them impossible to be effectively monitored by the central government (Kuah 2000, 78). The cross-border relations between Yunnan province and Myanmar are exactly that; relations with Yunnan, not necessarily China (Dean 2005, 823).

To bridge the gap between more economically integrated coastal provinces and the land-locked inland provinces like Yunnan, the State Council launched the Great Western Development plan (*xibu da kaifa*) in 2000 (Su 2014, 3). When the border provinces were given more autonomy by the central government to ease border trading, the Yunnan provincial government acted fast. It implemented fiscal and institutional changes, such as tax reductions and cutting down red tape, and also marketed the border region to attract domestic and foreign investors. An economic co-operation district was also established between three official border towns (Wanding, Ruili and Hekou) and Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. The provincial government is free to encourage investment, give tax reductions and levy charges on trade conducted in the border towns. It can also decide which types of industries can operate in the economic zones around the border towns and how the zones function. At the macro-level, cross-border co-operation has resulted in the creation of economic blocs, such as the Mekong River Economic Sub-Basin. (Kuah 2000, 79–80; 82–84.) In the 1990s there were talks of large regional infrastructure projects with Myanmar and the ADB to connect Yunnan and Kachin and Shan states as well as to create a Golden Quadrangle. (Steinberg 2001, 159–160). Yunnan has become China's energy powerhouse and an important processing centre for raw material coming from Laos and Myanmar (Su 2014, 3; 7).

Chinese companies and capital improved the infrastructure and raised the level of industrialization in Myanmar when the Western world kept the junta under sanctions. Dozens of hydropower projects were implemented throughout Myanmar and most of the energy produced was imported to China. The Chinese state-owned enterprises have also helped the junta to exploit other natural resources better. (Haacke 2010, 120.) Chinese development assistance has been closely linked to Chinese

business interests in Myanmar. For example, the Chinese government has helped Myanmar to build many new factories with development assistance, and cheap loans from state-owned Chinese banks, and in many projects of these projects, Chinese companies have been involved. The central government encourages Chinese businessmen to operate and invest in Myanmar. (Maung 2007b, 31–33; 37–38).

6. CEASEFIRES, DRUG POLICIES, LAND CONCESSIONS, AND THE FUZZINESS OF TERRITORY

Borderlands are often portrayed as distant for power (Sturgeon 2004, 466), but they are also the place where the territoriality of the state, the difference of 'us' and 'them', and the sole authority of the state are negotiated. Borderlands, in the conventional sense, are spaces through which an international border runs. In this sense, in borderlands, a society overlaps the border. They might also be internal to legal state territory where there is weak state penetration due to in part difficult terrain and populations that resist state's efforts to endow control and authority over them, and their labour and resources. Even a country can be considered a borderland if it acts as a buffer zone between two empires. (Brown 2012, 58.) All these aspects of borderlands are true for the Sino-Burmese borderlands: an international border crosses them, the terrain is difficult and people resist state control and state penetration, especially on the Burmese side is weak. Additionally, Myanmar can be considered, or at least having been, a buffer zone between China and India where the political systems of lowland and highland peoples are separated by "zones of mutual interest" (e.g. of policy-makers in China, India, Thailand in addition to 'locals') rather than by boundary lines (Sturgeon 2004, 264). All this makes the borderlands an interesting case for analysing statization, state-making, and spatial strategies.

Additionally, borders and cross-border activities mark the fixed imagination of territorial state-based theories; thinking of mobility as crossing borders takes borders as prior to mobility. Mobile groups count only when "they move between the units that count", that is, territorial nation-states. As they do not keep within the primary imagination of social organisation, they are deemed deviant and out of control. (Abraham & van Schendel 2005, 11–12.) Borderlands are a source of anxiety and insecurity for state elites because they can only partly be seen; physical distance is used to escape state control. (Abraham & van Schendel 2005, 23.) Parts of the borderlands can only be imagined by state actors whereas people that are part of the lived space, can manipulate and the border, border practices and the difficult to their advantage. At the same time, they can act as negotiating agents that constitute (or contest) the border. They act in multiple contexts, and use their location in the borderlands as a negotiation tool with state agents on either side of the border. The relations between the state and the borderland people can be seen as a sort of a dance, changing but inherently interlinked. (Sturgeon 2004, 466.)

These cross-border movements and relations contest the territory and legitimacy of the territorial state. Rather than being fixed in time and space, state borders are being refigured. It is not only states that

control or manipulate borders, people living around them do too. In borderlands, power and profit can be gained from controlling the borders and the trade crossing them. The actions of local people can sustain or strengthen state-set borders but can also undermine or reconfigure them. Defiance to state control is manifested by unauthorized cross-border movements and trading, smuggling or aiding of illegal immigrants. (Oh 2013, 1; 4.) Not every cross-border action is about defying or contesting the border. If Kachin villagers continue their century-old tradition of rotating five-day market system and go buy vegetables from the Chinese side of the international Sino-Burmese border, they are following their practices in their lived space. However, the Chinese border official is part of state territorialisation at the border; the control of people crossing is done to establish territorial state order, and its limits. (Dean 2005, 812–813.)

In the cases I present, conventional IR can see the security of China concerns concerning the border regions of Myanmar and the Yunnan province. It can analyse the geopolitical interests of Beijing in Myanmar as presented themselves as concerns for energy security and power plant construction. It can see ethnic strife in several northern states as internal unrest and potential for war, but not as much more. The cross-border drugs trade, including related smuggling and criminal activities, could be analysed as a phenomenon of globalisation, although it has taken place in the area for centuries. It could also analyse the Chinese investments in Myanmar, such as energy and infrastructure projects, mining ventures and agricultural land concessions as compromising the sovereignty of Myanmar. While all valid notions, and most likely also true, my approach reveals how these phenomena, the material reality they happen in, and the responses, strategies and everyday practices come to sing the state to existence, not the other way around.

6.1. Ceasefires as state territorial strategies

Myanmar has been in a state of civil war for practically all its years as an independent country. When the country gained independence, the central state claimed territorial sovereignty upon the whole terrain within its newly established international borders. This includes states that used to be under the governance of their own spatially organised political authorities, like the ones that are now known as the Kachin and Shan states. Colonial rule had never been effectively established in these spaces. In the Panglong conference in 1947, the Kachin and Shan elites agreed to rights of states. Amongst the states with more rights than some others, the Kachin and Shan elites seemed to be satisfied with the constitutional arrangements that empowered state councils to make laws and raise taxes. The Shan

state was also given the right to secession after ten years. However, dissatisfaction amongst the population of the two states soon grew due to many things, such as failure of the government to provide economic assistance to them, concessions of three Kachin villages to China, and the promotion of Buddhism (Kachins are for the most part Christians). Soon after independence in 1948, the country was stridden with civil war as ethnic groups took up to arms. (Thawnghmung 2011, 5–6.)

Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) was founded in 1961. KIO has its own army called Kachin Independence Army (KIA) (Kachin Development Networking Group 2007, 6). The Kachin state was effectively controlled by KIO from the 1960s up until a ceasefire with the ruling junta in 1994 (International Rivers 2011). There are other armed groups in Kachin state as well, such as the New Democratic Army-Kachin, Kachin Defence Army and Lasang Awng Wa Peace Group, who all signed ceasefires with the junta in the early 1990s. Unlike KIO that has refused to disarm itself, these groups have been transformed to state-authorised border guard forces or people's militia. (Thawnghmung 2011, 14–15.) In June 2011, the ceasefires were broken as conflict resumed in both Kachin and Shan states (Kramer & Woods 2012, 7). Initial peace agreements have been signed with various groups, but no new ceasefire agreements have been signed and the fighting continues to this day. It remains unclear whether the future elections in 2015 will further or pull back the process towards peace. (The Economist 2015.)

During the socialist regime, the government's response to ethnic 'insurgency' was a military one; the army attempted to disarm the opposing armed groups. Their stand was highly uncompromising, and nothing less but the complete elimination of the armed groups was deemed acceptable. The raging civil war and the 'Communist threat' were used to legitimate the military rule. State territorialisation was based almost solely on brute force and military tactics. (Lintner 1990, 2.) Even though the military managed to take control in many areas from the 'resistance', large areas continued to be controlled by various armed groups (Thawnghmung 2011, 6–8). Several groups built their own *de facto* states that were both politically and territorially extensive. In a way, the Burmese state was in war against other states, albeit the others were not internationally accepted as such. Many tactics were adopted from the British, such as 'scorched earth'. (Brown 2012, 118.) Additionally, people who belonged to an ethnic minority but lived in a government-controlled area were successfully separated from people of the same origin living in areas controlled by the armed groups; they preferred living quietly and safely to vocalising their support to the 'resistance' and their nationalist sentiments. (Thawnghmung 2011, 6–8.) The Tatmadaw, the Burma Army, has had to deal with armed ethnic groups ever since the country gained independence. One strategy has remained throughout the different regimes, and times of conflict and cease-fires; ethnic strongmen, selected by the Tatmadaw,

are contracted to help fight the armed groups. In exchange, these strongmen are allowed to use their "territories of influence" for opium production and even tax it, as well as to use government-controlled roads and town for trafficking it. Over the years, these Tatmadaw-backed businessmen have expanded their businesses into the licit economic sector as well, mostly to agribusiness. (Woods 2013, 7.)

With the military take-over in 1989 in the newly-named Myanmar, ceasefires were signed throughout the country which made it possible for the junta to liberalise border trade and invite Chinese investments to the country. (Kahrl et al. 2004, 4.) The sanctions imposed by the Western countries pushed many political leaders towards increased reliance on natural resources and dependency on the Chinese private sector as one of the only few options for revenue. (Kahrl et al. 2004, 38.) The ceasefires with armed groups enabled the junta to extend its territorial reach and assert its authority over its peripheral regions. At the same it took a turn from socialist regime towards a market-oriented economy. The economic control of the resource-rich ethnic areas was a state-territorialisation strategy. (O'Connor 2011, 3–4.) In Kachin state, after the ceasefire, KIO maintained its military infrastructure and administrative role in some areas of the state. However, all natural resources were claimed as official property of the state. (Kachin Development Networking Group, 8.) The same happened in the Shan state that used to be the base of the CPB. After CPB disintegrated, cease-fire agreement were signed between the junta and former CPB groups. The ethnic groups were allowed to keep their armed forces and continue with the drug trade in exchange for not fighting the state troops. In nine years, the opium production more than doubled. (Chin & Zhang 2007, 7–8.)

The military takeover of the country changed state territorialisation practices. After the military takeover in 1989, the junta started accommodating the armed groups to the state apparatus through military-economic agreements. (Brown 2012, 111.) During the first half of the 1990s, the Tatamdaw made ceasefire agreements with most of the armed groups in the country, including the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and the Shan State Army (SSA). Most groups were able to maintain some territory, access to arms, and were given business opportunities, and additionally they were enabled to have contact with the ethnic minorities living in state-controlled areas. The ceasefires allowed the SLORC/SPDC focus their military efforts against the remaining fighting groups. SPDC transformed some of the ceasefire groups to border guard forces and people's militias, technically under the control of Burmese army. (Thawnghmung 2011, 9–10.)

Instead of trying to squash military opposition, except for those unwilling to disarm, the control of land, and natural and human resources, legitimacy building through promised peace and development,

became the primary territorialisation strategies. (Brown 2012, 111–112; 118.) As ethnic political leaders exchanged in effect the control of their territory to the state army for joint resource concessions, they turned to more businessmen than political leaders (Woods 2010, 4). This state-making and territorialisation strategy has proven much more effective than its predecessor, although the governance established through cooperating ceasefire groups limits the state's ability to enforce policies. For example, most major border gates are under ceasefire group control which hindrances border trade (Kudo 2010, 282). The ceasefires, while bearing many benefits, such as freer movement and less violence, led to "greater military presence, intense exploitation of natural resources, and development initiated displacement". (Thawnghmung 2011, 18.) The KIO/KIA practices of territoriality have presently been forcefully contained to limited areas that have shrunk due to the larger, stronger and better-equipped Burmese army (Dean 2005, 820–821.)

The junta's strategy to incorporate ceasefire groups to the state included their transformation to border guard forces under the control of the Tatmadaw. In Kachin state, the number of state troops increased from 26 battalions in 1994 to 41 in 2006. At the same time, confiscations of land and buildings increased. They were used for military purposes or sold to outside business actors for a profit. Left landless, local people have had to relocate to other areas. (Kachin Development Networking Group 2007, 1; 9.) Only smaller groups, like the MNDAA and NDA-K, agreed whereas the largest groups, like KIO and UWSA, rejected. As a response, the government cut communication with the groups, withdrew doctors and teachers from the areas, and did not hold elections in areas under the groups' control. In 2011, conflict flared again. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 16.) Many armed groups based in Shan state signed ceasefire agreements with the government in the 1990s and some formed political parties. United Wa State Army, SSA-North and SSA-South have refused to disarm and SSA-South continues to fight a guerrilla war against state forces. (Thawnghmung 2011, 16.)

The border between areas under the control of the state and the areas controlled by KIO/A is more controlled an explicit than the border between Chinese territory and the KIO/A controlled areas. For example territory is marked more often and more clearly with gates, guards and flags in the borders of state/KIO/A than in the China/KIO/A borders. In essence, the border between territories controlled by KIO/A and the Burmese government mark an international border; "the crossings display hoisted flags of both governments, armed guards in respective uniforms, and gates/checkpoints where identification is checked and often tax on goods charged". (Dean 2005, 820–821.) This reflects the Burmese state's goal of establishing absolute territorial rule; flexible and overlapping territorialities (or any other form of alternative spatial organisation of political authorities) are not tolerated if they can be avoided. At the same time it reflects the nationalist wishes of the Kachin of international

recognition as a nation of their own; the borders with the state that claims territorial authority over them are maintained with traditional military and border control practices.

The sociospatial organisation across the Sino-Burmese border, where border control practices would be expected from the traditional view of the territorial state, is a completely different story. KIO/A's political authority is organised on the other hand based on territoriality against the Burmese state territory, but at the same time, it is based on the traditional spatial organisation of the Kachin; spatiality based on flows. In their everyday lives, the Kachin cross the orders for trade, for marriages, and many other imaginable function of everyday life. Also KIO/A officers commute through China in cars under Chinese plates with military escorts, make formal visits, and official agreements on trade and on the handing over of prisoners, and even celebrate the founding date of the KIO with Chinese local-, prefecture- and provincial-level officials. The Chinese spatial organisation of political authority is more flexible than that of the Burmese state; it allows for mutually adaptable and co-existing spatialities. By granting de facto autonomy to the KIO/A, it can more easily on the other hand govern what goes on the Kachin territory, like opium cultivation (this is further discussed in the next section). (Dean 2005b, 820–821; 825.)

The flexibility of space between Chinese and KIO/A authorities allows the Kachin people to gain better living standards on the other side of the international border. The Chinese villages by the Sino-Burmese border have developed faster than their Burmese counterparts. The roads are in better condition, and services like communications and health clinics, and goods are more readily available on the Chinese side. The people living by the border cross it regularly, and it has been made easy by the Chinese officials. In practice, to the borderland-Burmese, "China has become the provider of almost everything – from vegetables to consumer products, from technology to manpower for construction and maintenance, as well as for the electricity and phone lines, including mobile network (that can be used on the Kachin side near the border) and internet access". (Dean 2005, 824.) In practice, then, the people residing on the other side of the border are brought under the governance of China in addition to that of KIO/A and the Burmese state. In their everyday practices, people are able to take advantage of the co-existence of political authorities by moving in space.

In the Shan state as well the local ethnic group leaders not only have ethnic, but also professional and personal relations across the border with Yunnan authorities. The Chinese side knows the ethnic groups are willing to engage in trade to benefit both sides of the border, legal or illicit. With a weak central government Chinese commercial activities in the borderlands cannot be as easily monitored. It seems that Chinese actors support the leaders that are *de facto* in control. SOEs have been suspected

of selling weapons ultimately ending up with ethnic armies, and some technical and military advisement has allegedly also been given to the ethnic groups. However, the PRC cannot support ethnic armed groups even if they are ethnic Chinese without invoking old memories of an aggressive Chinese regime in the region. (Haacke 2010, 126–128; 132.)

Kevin Woods (2011) calls the process of state-building by creating military–private partnerships to gain authority over landscapes that have previously escaped state control ceasefire capitalism. In ceasefire capitalism, businessmen and local elites together create landscapes that can be controlled by the state/military apparatus out of spaces outside of state *de facto* governance. In Myanmar, in ceasefire agreements with ethnic insurgence/paramilitary groups customary land rights were substituted with concessions to private parties. Property rights were established and shifted from the local people customarily inhabiting and cultivating the land to private actors from e.g. China. Finance, landscape production, governance and state formation co-emerged in space and time and established increased military–state control over space. The privatization of selected state functions made spaces formerly neglected landscapes secure, or legible, enabling the state or the military to govern them. The privatization also intensified the importance of territoriality as leaders 'lost' part of their sovereign power. (Woods 2011, 751–752.)

6.2. Cross-border drug policies: Bringing the state in through private sector

The extent drug trade and cultivation in Myanmar has been made possible by the interrelations of 'public' and 'private' in Burma/Myanmar. Government has relied on private businesses and business people to fund the state machine even if the official state policy has been a socialist one. Parties and party officials have relied on financial support from business to take care of monthly expenses. For example, during the years leading to independence, business people were a way to access workers and peasants over whom they had influence; they were able to buy votes and order their workers to vote a certain way. During the Burmese Way to Socialism, only people engaging in economic activities, legal or illegal, had the resources to fund government officials and committees or even public goods. Therefore, despite the official socialist policies, local officials needed to preserve (illegal) business practices. (Kyaw 2002, 79–82; 85–88.) After China started opening up, Chinese officials did not separate between illegal and legal trade either. In the 1980s, black market trade between China and Burma thrived and most of it was controlled by KIO or the CPB that funded their activities with the revenues. (Dean 2005, 818.)

During the socialist regime (1962–1988), cross-border trade was officially illegal in Burma. However, the government controlled somewhat 60 kilometres of the 2,200-kilometre border and the ban had merely official-legal significance. (Dean 2005, 815.) At the same time, businesses did rely on their good relations with state officials to gain access to government-controlled resources and, during the socialist period, to even be able to operate. Tax evasion and smuggling has been made possible (only) by having powerful officials to protect[33] the business. In the 1980s, anti-smuggling legislation worked in the favour of influential smugglers; it helped them create a monopoly. These businessmen were tipped off before major raids and were able to escape them. Instead, the anti-smuggling campaigns served to eliminate competition as the products of those who did not have strong enough ties to the government were confiscated in them. The shortage of the products also multiplied their prices. Most legal businesses could not afford as good relations as the illegal businesses because they were not able to reap equal profits. Those who could, were mostly large capitalist companies. (Kyaw 2002, 88–91.)

Until 1987, clientelistic networks between government and business people helped create a social and political equilibrium in the country (although compared internationally, Myanmar deteriorated to the list of the least developed countries). (Il)legal businesses helped provide jobs and meet people's economic needs and financed government activities. Burma's three largest notes were demonetised in 1987, but the people could not exchange the old notes to currency of legal tender. As a result, people could only afford basic food items. Trade declined drastically as consumer demand withered away. Additionally, as businesses were no longer able to contribute to political and religious events, people that had worked to organise them, such as performers and carpenters, experienced economic hardship as well. The old equilibrium of public and private networks crumbled and with it collapsed social and political stability. The socialist government was blames for taking away the people's money, and riots and uprisings became commonplace all over the country. (Kyaw 2002, 87–88.) The state's sovereignty had been built on fluid networks of people and favours both from the public and private sectors. As the private got weaker, so did the public.

The Tatmadaw legitimated its power with various activities of state development and nationalist agenda: new schools were built, Buddhist activities were supported and grand sports festivals were held. However, the new regime did not have the funds for them. Instead, in 1988–1998, a very small

---

[33] Having friends in high places enabled people engaged in illegal business practices to be left untouched by the police and customs officers. If an officer made the mistake of extorting money from a friend of an influential party cadre, he was often transferred to a remote area. (Kyaw 2002, 89.) Power was exercised in a spatial manner; a state official's power and social status was dependent on where he was physically located. The further from the centre of political power, the less power he had.

segment of the population, mostly business people, contributed approximately 80 per cent of the funds needed to bankroll of the legitimating activities. Although the junta promoted market economy reforms, the power relations between illegal and legal traders, and big and small companies stayed pretty much the same as during the socialist period; those with power could get away with almost anything, although not always if their activities were illegal, and the fates of small- and medium-sized business' owners was dependent on the police and customs officials and whether the businessmen would afford even a small bribe or not. (Kyaw 2002, 93–94; 98–99.)

As cross-border trade, people's movements across borders and the consumer economy grew in the 1990s and 2000s, so did 'illegal'[34] trade. Especially drugs, such as opium, heroin and amphetamines, have re-emerged and with them, prostitution. As a result, the number of new HIV/AIDS infections has skyrocketed. (Sturgeon et al. 2013, 63.) The main opium-producing states in Myanmar used to be the Kokang and Wa states, but in the mid-2000s the production moved to the Shan and Kachin state because of opium bans in the Kokang and Wa states. In these states, all the parties involved in the ethnic conflict in Myanmar participate in the drug trade. The cultivation is also a way for poor farmers to make ends meet when their crops are not enough to feed their families. Opium is also widely used for ceremonial and medicinal activities. (Transnational Institute 2010, 2.) Earlier most of the heroin had been shipped to Hong Kong but the opening up of trade on land, the trade flows concentrated in Yunnan. (Chin & Zhang 2007, 8.) The Chinese and Burmese authorities have increasingly controlled the borders and retaliated against major drug traffickers in the 1990s and 2000s, but increasing amounts of drugs cross the porous border. Increasingly the smugglers are peasant acting as mules. (Chin & Zhang 2007, 11.) Cross-border movement happens also for other drug-related reasons; Chinese drug users are known even to go to Myanmar to kick their habit because the punishment are stricter on the Burmese side (Weng 2006, 199).

HIV/AIDS spread to China from outside its borders and initially spread in specific parts of Yunnan province. The prefecture of Dehong next to Eastern Myanmar border is the most drugs and HIV affected area in China. (Weng 2006, 196; 199–200.) For example this spread of the disease has made the use of injected drugs is a growing security concern in China. Rather than addressing the social problems leading to the use of drugs, the Chinese state has launched programs in Myanmar and Laos to counter the threat. A major part of opium and heroin and some of the amphetamine-type stimulants available in the Chinese market originate from Myanmar. The drugs enter mostly through the Yunnan province, located next to Myanmar, and has also acted as a gateway of drug abuse to the rest of China.

---

[34] See Abraham & van Schendel (2005) for a study on the arbitrariness of 'legal' and 'illegal' as part of the making of the state.

(Transnational Institute 2010, 1; 3.) Chinese village heads have utilized the border to their advantage, and constituted the border as side-product. On the one hand, they serve state interests and expansion of its authority by controlling local resource access. This gives them higher status, and they take advantage of state approval and economic support it provides in the name of development. On the other hand, they do also utilize their connections and loyalties on the other side of the border for, among other things, transferring illicit goods across borders. (Sturgeon 2004, 466.)

The government policies and practices towards drug trade in Myanmar have varied over time. In the late 1980s, the drug trade in Kachin state flourished and resulted in a lot of deaths. As the government was not concerned, KIO launched a campaign that curbed the trade for a while. However, after the ceasefire in 1994, poppy cultivation resumed. Those connected with the government officials were allowed to trade drugs. (Kachin Development Networking Group 2007, 39; 43–46.) Opium cultivation declined in Myanmar in 1997–2006 because of opium bans in key cultivating areas in Shan state and anti-drugs campaigns in the Kachin and Shan states. The effective bans were enforced by the ceasefire groups, such as National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Shan state and KIO and New Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA-K) in Kachin state in the wish of gaining international recognition and support. In 1999 the government also announced a 15-year opium cultivation elimination plan. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 13.) The bans always have only a limited effect because ceasefire groups, Chinese businessmen, Burmese drug lords, Tatmadaw units, government officials on all sides of the border as well as ordinary people participate in the drug trade along the Sino-Burmese border. Due to on-going instability and conflict in the Kachin and Shan states, illegal trade and opium cultivation are almost the only ways to make a living and fund (insurgency) activities. Chinese businessmen fund the activities of the Burmese drug traders and their expansion. Most drug traffickers are 'normal' risk takers like in any other business, not professional criminals. The trafficking is even taxed by all armed groups as well as the state government. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 14–15.)

Already in 1997–2006, the ceasefire groups as well as the junta were pressured by Chinese actors to eradicate poppy cultivation. Since 2006, the bans enforced by the cease-fire groups have been backed by Chinese opium substitution programmes, like the Opium Replacement Fund of the Yunnan province, promoting mono-plantations of alternative cash crops, like rubber[35]. However, from 2006

---

[35] This alternative rationale for the programmes designed to inhibit drug trade is the great demand for rubber in China where available, suitable, and arable land is in limited supply. Additionally, the concessions provide cover for illegal logging. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 3.) This side of the schemes is discussed in the next section.

onwards, the cultivation has been on the rise again as impoverished people are looking for means to support themselves. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 2–3; 13.) In 2000s, the business has still continued and government authorities are involved in it, at least through by allowing it by accepting bribes, although there has been anti-drug campaign launched by the SPCD and ceasefire groups. The campaigns have not worked because the government officials have allowed the local militia and ceasefire groups to continue producing drugs in exchange for cooperating with the state. Only poppy cultivations of those who could not pay bribes were destroyed. (Kachin Development Networking Group 2007, 39; 43–46.)

To combat problems and security concerns associated with substance abuse and poppy cultivation, the Chinese government, both on the national and regional Yunnan level, has implemented schemes to "fight the war" against drugs and AIDS. The anti-drug schemes aim to develop the border regions' economies by integrating them into the regional market establishing relations across the border between authorities and businessmen. In the programs Chinese companies' investment to the poppy-cultivating areas are promoted. The schemes are promoted as an alternative source of income by converting poppy fields to plantations of other cash crops, such as rubber, sugarcane, tea or corn. (Transnational Institute 2010, 1; 3.) Chinese companies are encouraged to participate in the schemes by financial incentives such as relaxation of labor regulations, tax and VAT waivers and permission to import the produced crops to China. The plantations made under the schemes have to meet several conditions, such as contributing to socio-economic development. The problem is that most plantations are mono-plantations, mostly rubber, and that some companies do not actually cultivate anything at all but just buy crops and import them under the scheme, making substantive profits. (Transnational Institute 2010, 4.) The benefits of shifting opium cultivation to rubber thought the Chinese programmes are reaped for the most part Chinese businessmen and local authorities, not the farmers themselves; land concessions are agreed upon between the Chinese and the Burmese authorities, and local people are excluded. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 3.)

Most opium in Myanmar is cultivated in isolated mountainous areas. It has many benefits compared to many other crops; it has high value compared to its weight which makes it easier to transport and traders are also willing to travel to remote villages to buy it and even give credit based on the sale of future crops. Opium cultivation enables the villagers to stay in the remote areas and even develop some education and health facilities there. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 14.) The Chinese investments made under the substitution program however are usually made in lowland areas where poppy is not actually cultivated that much. Closely related to programs trying to end the cultivation, the local authorities have resettled up-land communities to lower valleys. (Transnational Institute 2010, 4.)

Same kind of processes based on perceived remoteness, lack of connectivity and the resulting poverty have also been used as rationalizations of development cooperation interventions that have shifted cultivation and/or entire upland populations from the uplands to the lowlands. (Lagerqvist 2013, 57.)

6.3. Land concessions modify lived space to abstract space

After the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the socialist regime started moulding China into a social nation state. One of the strategies to secure frontier areas into the national territory was to classify frontier peoples to 'minority nationalities' that were ranked according to their 'social development', based on the modes of production. This linked minorities with land uses. For example in the Xishuangbanna Dai prefecture, one of the thirteen prefectures in Yunnan province, the state was territorialised by reorganising agricultural production into communes and rubber farms. In the lowlands, state control was effectively established by the end of the 1950s whereas in the highlands farmers continued on with their shifting cultivation until the 1970s. The transformation of the society and nature was legitimated by the national socialist ideology and backed up by the threat of force. (Sturgeon et al. 2013, 59–60.)

The communes were dismantled in the 1980s as part of the opening up strategy of the country. Commune lands and forests were divided and contracted anew; society and nature were once again transformed though imagining them in cartographic space and then applying the changes in physicals pace, this time legitimated by national economic development. With farming campaigns and new property rights rubber cultivation was shifted in increasing numbers from state land to household land. At the same time, shifting cultivation was shamed in the name of environmentalism and the highland people pictured as backward forest destroyers, who held back the economic growth of the country, to legitimate the establishment of nature reserves on their forests. As a result, the highlanders lost a lot of land which led to increasing poverty. (Sturgeon et al. 2013, 60–61; 63.) In the late 1990s, the central government made the most significant changes to forest and land resource tenure rights since the early 1980s; the Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP) and the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) that superseded many previous tenure agreements.

The rationale behind the programs was disastrous flooding along the Yangtze River in late 1990s and the concern for natural forests it raised. Additionally, the purpose of the NFPP was to restructure the forestry industry that had faced financial crises due to declining timber volumes. The logging ban on natural forests, part of the NFPP, concentrates on transforming logging-associated livelihoods and

enterprises towards more sustainable forest management ones. One of the goals is to increase natural forests in China, but the program has had reverse effects in the neighbouring countries where timber imports have increased substantially since 1988. Large forest areas have been logged and the timber transported to China in Myanmar. The SLCP can be seen as continuance to the 1980s shaming of shifting cultivation and the related relabeling of land and forest. Its goal is to convert arable land of the hillsides to forest and/or grassland. The legitimation for the program is on the one hand environmentalism and on the other, poverty alleviation. The assumption is that as the arable land of the hillside people can no longer used for farming, more labour will be available for other forms of employment. (Weyerhaeuser et al. 2005, 238–240.) Like the environmentalist programs of the 1980s, the SLCP in effect territorialises state space and increases the infrastructural power the state is able to wield. The state becomes present in the lives and social relations of the people who are told to what to do with their land, or forced to relocate to lower lands to find employment elsewhere, in a space that has already been territorialised by the state.

In Myanmar, all land is officially owned by the state. Land that has not been officially registered with the governments, is considered wasteland that can be confiscated from peasants farming it and then sold as a concession to a company. The lands that are not registered are usually used for swidden cultivation in the highlands where instead of formalized land ownership contracts, land use has traditionally been controlled in customary ways, based on customary rights. It is quite common that land is (unofficially) sold and transferred from one person to another by these customary rights even though the state claims ownership over them. The result is that land is claimed by multiple actors in rhetoric and in practice; various political authorities in addition to cease-fire groups and the Burmese state/military; also warlords and Chinese businessmen have their share of power. The reinforcement of state institutions undermines the customary, weak institutions and in effect also the customary rights to land. The agricultural sector in Myanmar has been increasingly privatized in Myanmar since the junta started reforming the country's economic policies from socialist to capitalist ones, and the cease-fire agreements gave the state access to former conflict zones. In the 1990s and 2000s, approximately 1.5 million acres of land was leased to 200 agribusiness companies by the government. (Woods 2010, 4–8; 13–14; Woods 2011, 754–755.) In the Burmese government's 30-year Master Plan for the Agriculture Sector, the goal is to convert 10 million acres of 'wasteland' for private industrial agricultural promotion by 2030. (Global Witness 2014, 5).

The logging bans create incentives for Chinese logging companies to search business outside of China's territorial borders, for example from Myanmar. The enterprises can get the logging concessions from either the government or the ethnic groups controlling the forests who finance their

operations mostly with illegal trade and smuggling. The involvement of Chinese logging companies in Myanmar is by all measures pervasive; in addition to logging and importing, Chinese companies build infrastructure needed for their activities, and use Chinese equipment, workers[36] and basic supplies. Most of the Chinese logging in Myanmar is done by small companies operating there without legal licenses to do so. This is possible thanks to a lack of regulation and enforcement of the border. Individual power based on status and relations tends to trump institutional power; institutions can exercise only limited control over natural resources unless they are backed by individuals with a lot of individual power. They cooperate with the few large companies with the needed paperwork who also take care of investing for infrastructure and dealing with officials. (Kahrl et al. 2004, 19; 34.) Logging companies need to constantly build new roads to northern Myanmar to be able to operate there. Especially in the farthest north, the terrain is rugged that makes high-grade roads expensive to build. Additionally, extreme weather and landslides frequently destroy bridges and roads. They have also made "roads for resources" deals, where the companies agree to build roads and bridges in exchange for a certain amounts of timber concessions. However, the built infrastructure has for the most part been scattered and disconnected in a way that only serves the companies' needs but not those of the people living in the area. (Kahrl et al. 2004, 21; 27.)

Rubber cultivation makes a lucrative crop alternative as the world consumption of rubber has increased at an average rate of 5.8 rate for in the last century. The world market price has come down since the world economic crisis, but rubber cultivation is still highly profitable. (Fox & Castella 2013, 158.) In the lowlands of Yunnan, farmers started planting rubber trees in their household lands. After China entered the WTO in 2001, the price of Chinese rubber was set by the world markets. The international price for rubber skyrocketed in 2003 and made lowland farmers richer than would have been able to even imagine before. (Sturgeon et al. 2013, 62.) On the other hand, it made local authorities and state farmers unsettled, lowland farmers dependent on the price of rubber (ibid.), but also made farmers on other sides of state borders pursue the Chinese dream that they witnessed in the sudden rise in the standard of living across the border (Dianna 2007, 1–2). However, in areas where rubber has not traditionally been cultivated, the plantations are joint projects between Myanmar military regional officials and Chinese companies, with Myanmar companies acting as cover so that the Chinese company that in reality owns the plantations[37] can avoid paying tax. In some cases, the ethnic armed groups have established plantations by either paying farmers or forcibly relocating them

---

[36] In 2003, a Chinese government official estimated that for example in Baoshan's Tengchong County, more than half of the population had been involved in logging in Myanmar! (Kahrl et al. 2004, 19.)
[37] In traditional rubber plantations, 90.5 per cent of rubber holders are small holders. (Fox & Castella 2013, 165–166.)

to the plantations. (Fox & Castella 2013, 165–166.) The majority of rubber produced in Myanmar is exported to China. (Global Witness 2014, 3.)

Private companies and land concessions given to them are used to meet government quotas for agricultural production. Whereas traditionally rubber has been cultivated by small family farms in the southern parts of Myanmar, new large-scale plantations are set up in Kachin and Shan states. The plantations are set up in the traditional *taungya* fields, defined by the state as 'wastelands', where local farmers farm their crops by using swidden cultivation. (Global Witness 2014, 3.) "Kachin State and northern Shan State have received the highest rate of increase in concessions in the country, which is from the significant increase in Chinese agribusiness deals supported by China's opium substitution program in northern Burma" (Woods 2013, 10; 15). Rubber concessions under the Chinese opium substitution programmes have mostly been made between the government of Myanmar and Chinese actors, but also the local non-state military authorities, such as army commanders, ceasefire groups and local pro-government militias, have made contracts with Chinese businessmen concerning the areas under their control. (Transnational Institute 2010, 7.)

Rubber production under the opium substitution program has actually been strongly supported in Shan and Kachin states by these local/regional actors. Most of the funding for the concessions originates from businesses based in Yunnan or Kunming, sometimes also Hainan or other provinces. The form of the contracts is usually a joint venture, at least in government-controlled areas. (Transnational Institute 2010, 7.) Burman businessmen lack the needed patron-client relationships with the ethnic groups and therefore have limited opportunities to invest there. Most agribusiness deals are carried through local businessmen, who are often of Chinese origin, with mainland Chinese investors. However, as the state gains strength in the ethnic spaces, the Burman companies receive more and more land concessions for agribusiness. (Woods 2013, 10.)

In Kachin state, one way of contesting and challenging the large land concessions to private companies has been the establishment of community forests. Under the scheme, villages form community forest user groups that establish community forests, led by an elected villager, in their former upland swidden fields. However, the community forests are based on land management plans that separate land used for forest and agriculture; the distinction is similar to state land classification, not traditional land management of the villages. Although these community forests enable the villages to have more say in the management of their land, and represent a bottom-up resistance against land dispossessions caused by land concessions to private companies, they and up fortifying the territorialisation of state power in village lands. They create a collective property regime according

to state laws and categories, not based on customary rights, and additionally change the traditional farming based on a mosaic of trees and swidden fields to forest land of state-desired trees, creating similar dispossession as the rubber plantations the CFs are used to prevent. (Woods 2010, 1–2; 14–15.)

Land concessions create new forms of policed property. They offer a revenue stream and power leverage to the governing regime. They also re-distribute power. When a resource or land is granted to an actor, the political territory is re-configured. It not only creates an owner of the resource/land, but also shuts off others who might have used it. This can be a local farmer banned from the land he has traditionally cultivated or an armed organization that used to feed its troops from the crops grown in it. As such, concessions to private actors can provide the state with a territorializing mechanism. Thus, assigning some functions of state and some control of resources/land to private actors, state building has not been disabled but quite the opposite. The concessions have given the state institutions a point of entry to spaces formerly controlled e.g. by armed groups or local elites. Governing of a resource is not merely about controlling the mining of jade or the logging of timber. For example in Myanmar, the shift of governance of jade mines from an armed group to the state was not only about the redirecting revenues. It also had to do with taking away sources of resources and undermining the influence of the insurgents and their ability for political control. Over time, authority moves from non-state institutions to state-controlled ones and enables more and more state control. Additionally, this has redefined the relationship between forest and agricultural land by separating them from each other when they traditionally have been managed together. Farmers are also forced to resettle in villages after losing their rights to their lands. (Woods 2011, 752; 754–755.)

7. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to approach the central issue of International Relations, the state, in a new way. I have always felt some uneasiness about the centrality of the state, but have come to realise through this work that it is not the state I am uncomfortable with, but rather the absolute manner in which it is imagined in the discipline. Reimagining such a central concept, especially one that is present in my everyday life, was not easy or comfortable. I set out find answers from various disciplines from political geography, still somewhat close to International Relations, all the way to agricultural studies. Once I even found myself contemplating on the premises of modern physics and the four-dimensionality of time–space. I believe that the end result, a conceptualisation of the state as a spatial political authority created in everyday practices, offers good additional insight to the working of international relations.

The cases showed how the more spatiotemporally reflexive concepts open up new kinds of avenues for research. They allow for a better understanding of change, and also the presence of history in our everyday lives. For example the lives of the Kachin people embody all at the same time age-old sociospatial imageries based on kinship and mobility. They continue on with their daily lives like their ancestors have done before them, despite of an international border that in turn is an artefact of the colonial period and ideals of modern statehood. At the same time they have embraced the same ideals behind that border; nationalism and sovereignty in their claims of a nation, and the right to a state of their own. KIO acts as a similar political authority as a state, establishing a border against what is dangerous outside of that border; Burmans and the Myanmar army.

What is importantly highlighted in the cases is that all social and/or spatial strategies are restricted by physical space, like the mountains and jungles of the borderlands hinder state territorialisation in Kachin and Shan states, and it can also be manipulated or used to the advantage of the actor, like when highland people's swidden cultivation is shamed as environmentally hostile and people are then forced to migrate to lower lands to cultivate rubber or find some other employment. This brings them closer to territorial power and more easily reached by state actors. This is something the mainstream IR approaches are not able to analyse, due to their uneasiness with physical space.

Another important factor in the cases are the intermeshed relationships of various actors of different origins, occupations, and motivations. What constitutes the state cannot be deduced to those officially identified with the state. Instead, both intentionally and not, others can also carry in the state and its policies, even NGOs trying to oppose state strategies. This is something to keep in mind in future IR research even if otherwise taking a different route to mine; research will leave a considerable amount

of blind spots if what is political, or even what is state-related, is assumed a priori to empirical analysis. Accepting this does make conducting research possibly more difficult, or at least more cumbersome, but I find it essential especially for research that hopes to have practical policy effects or that seeks to be emancipatory. The major challenge for this kind of research is that the researcher has to be willing to deal with multiple, changing and heterogeneous truths. The unit of the study does not stay put.

The ethnographic method was not easily brought to International Relations. I was lucky enough to find plenty of material from fieldwork studies, but realise that if the research was to be taken to the next level, it would require fieldwork also by the other herself. Now, I relied on maps and textual descriptions of what sociospatial relations look and feel like in the borderlands of China and Myanmar. The analysis could be made better if the researcher herself would also travel to the spaces and everyday realities she is trying to understand. For the purposes of the case studies presented in this thesis, the reliance on already written material was sufficient in my view as their function was to showcase how the concepts could be used in further research. And they did just that; they demonstrated that the approach suggested in this thesis can provide alternative, fruitful avenues for International Relations research to explore in questions of state power and sovereignty. Static absolutes do make nice grand theories, but they are rather estranged from the fuzziness of life.

For future research on Myanmar, I would find it interesting to analyse how the transformation of Myanmar from the 'axis of evil' to the aid darling of the West will, and already has to a still limited degree, introduce new techniques, rationales and authorities for state territorialisation. Already, the military is working with international finance institutions and the development aid industry to establish a neoliberal order in the country. The country's political and social conditions are transformed to make it lucrative to Western businesses to invest and tap into Asia's 'final frontier', full of natural resources. (Woods 2013, 1.) For the upland farmers, it will most likely mean more territorialized state power, more dispossession and more concessions. It hardly makes any difference if they go to Western or Chinese companies; either way, the traditional spatial organisation and sociospatial practices are increasingly replaced by a modern state territoriality. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

REFERENCES

Abraham, Itty & Willen van Schendel (2005), 'Introduction: The Making of Illicitness'. In van Schendel, Willen & Itty Abraham (eds.), *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization*: 1–37. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Acharya, Amitav (2003), 'Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?' *International Security* 28(3): 149–164.

Agnew, John (2010), 'Emerging China and Critical Geopolitics: Between World Politics and Chinese Particularity'. *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 51(5): 569–582.

Agnew, John (2005), 'Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics'. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95(2): 437–461.

Agnew, John (1994), 'The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international relations theory'. *Review of International Political Economy* 1(1): 53–80.

Albrow, Martin (1997), *The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Amin, Ash (2002), 'Spatialities of globalisation'. *Environment and Planning A* 34(3): 385–399.

Anderson, Benedict (2007), *Kuvitellut yhteisöt. Nationalismin alkuperän ja leviämisen tarkastelua.* Tampere: Osuuskunta Vastapaino. Translated to Finnish by Joel Kortti from 2006 English edition with new material.

Antonsich, Marco (2009), 'On territory, the nation-state and the crisis of the hyphen'. *Progress in Human Geography* 33(6): 789–806.

Behr, Hartmut (2008), 'Deterritorialization and the Transformation of Statehood: The Paradox of Globalisation'. *Geopolitics* 13(2): 359–382.

Biersteker, Thomas J. (2013), 'State, Sovereignty and Territory'. In Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*: 157–176. London: SAGE Publications Inc.

Biersteker, Thomas J. & Cynthia Weber (1996), 'The social construction of state sovereignty'. In Biersteker, Thomas J. & Cynthia Weber (eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct:* 1–21. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bijian, Zheng (2005), 'China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status'. *Foreign Affairs* 84(5): 18–24.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1996), *Physical Space, Social Space and Habitus*. Rapport 10: 1996. Institutt for sosiologi og samfunnsgeografi, Univeristetet i Oslo. Available at <http://www.samfunnsforskning.no/content/download/19953/504700/file/Physical+space,+social+space+and+habitus.pdf>, accessed 20 January 2015.

Branch, Jordan (2012), ''Colonial reflection' and territoriality: The peripheral origins of sovereign statehood'. *European Journal of International Relations* 18(2): 277–297.

Brenner, Neil (1999), 'Beyond state-centrism? Space, territoriality, and geographical scale in globalization studies'. *Theory and Society* 28(1): 39–78.

Brown, Sylvia (2012), *Youths in non-military roles in an armed opposition group on the Burmese-Thai border*. PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London. Available at <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/15634/1/Brown_3434.pdf>, accessed 9 February 2015.

Burma Center Prague (2014), 'About Burma: History and Geography'. Available at <http://www.burma-center.org/en/burma/history/>, accessed 25 March 2014.

Burman, Edward (2008), *China: The Stealth Empire*. Stroud: The History Press.

Buzan, Barry (2010), 'China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?' *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3(1): 5–36.

Caporaso, James A. (2000), 'Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty'. *International Studies Review* 2(2): 1–28

Carr, Edward Hallett (2001), *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. Hampshire: Palgrave.

Carr, Edward Hallett. (1964), *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919–1939*. New York: Harper & Row.

Carsten, Janet (1998), 'Borders, boundaries, tradition and state on the Malaysian periphery'. In Wilson, Thomas M. & Hastings Donnan (eds.), *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chan, Lai-Ha, Pak K. Lee & Gerald Chan (2008), 'Rethinking global governance: a China model in the making?' *Contemporary Politics* 14(1): 3–19.

Chan, Steve (2010), 'An Odd Thing Happened on the Way to Balancing: East Asian States' Reactions to China's Rise'. *International Studies Review* 12(3): 387–412.

Chen, Dingding (2009), 'China's Participation in the International Human Rights Regime: A State Identity Perspective'. Chinese Journal of International Politics 2(3): 399–419.

Cheung, Peter T. Y. & James T. H. Tang (2001), 'The External Relations of China's Provinces'. In Lampton, David M. (ed.) *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in an Age of Economic Interdependence*. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 91–120.

Chin, Ko-lin & Sheldon X. Zhang (2007), *The Chinese Connection: Cross-border Drug Trafficking between Myanmar and China*. Final Report to the United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. Available at <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.218.5385&rep=rep1&type=pdf>, accessed 7 February 2015.

CIA (2013), 'Burma Administrative Map 2007'. Central Intelligence Agency 2.4.2013. Available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/Burma.html>, accessed 5 March 2015. Page Size Base maps of the CIA are in the public domain. Accordingly, they may be copied freely without permission of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

CIA (2012), 'China Administrative Map 2011'. *Central Intelligence Agency Library* 14.11.2012. Available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/China.html>, accessed 5 March 2015. Page Size Base maps of the CIA are in the public domain. Accordingly, they may be copied freely without permission of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

CNNMoney (2014), 'FORTUNE Global 500: China'. Available at <http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2013/full_list/?iid=G500_sp_full>, referenced 27.3.2014.

Cohen, Youssef, Brian R. Brown & A.F.K. Organski (1981), 'The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order'. *American Political Science Review* 75(4): 901–910.

Cooper, Richard N. (1972), 'Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies'. *World Politics* 24(2): 159–181.

Cowen, Deborah & Emily Gilbert (2008), 'The politics of war, citizenship, territory'. In Cowen, Deborah & Emily Gilbert (eds.), *War, Citizenship, Territory:* 1–30. London: Routledge.

Cox, Kevin R. (1998), 'Representation and power in the politics of scale'. *Political Geography* 17(1): 41–44.

Crang, Mike & Nigel Thrift (2000), 'Introduction'. In Crang, Mike & Nigel Thrift (eds.), *Thinking Space:* 1–30. London: Routledge. Taylor & Francis e-Library edition 2003.

Das, Debojyoti (2014), 'Understanding Margins, State Power, Space and Territoriality in the Naga Hills'. *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 29(1): 63–80.

Davis, Diane E. (2010), 'Irregular armed forces, shifting patterns of commitment, and fragmented sovereignty in the developing world'. *Theory and Society* 39(3/4): 397–413.

Dean, Karin (2005), 'Spaces and territorialities on the Sino–Burmese boundary: China, Burma and the Kachin'. *Political Geography* 24(7): 808–830.

Delaney, David & Helga Leitner (1997), 'The political construction of scale'. *Political Geography* 16(2): 93–185.

Démurger, Sylvie, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Wing Thye Woo, Shuming Bao, Gene Chang & Andrew Mellinger (2002), 'Geography, Economic Policy, and Regional Development in China'. Asian *Economic Papers* 1(1): 146–197.

Dianna, Antonella (2007), *"The Chinese Know the Way": Rubber and Modernity along the China Laos-border.* Conference Paper: Critical Transitions in the Mekong Region. Available at <http://rcsd.soc.cmu.ac.th/InterConf/paper/paper4.pdf>, accessed 13 February 2015.

Dirlik, Arif (2002), 'Modernity as history: post-revolutionary China, globalization and the question of modernity'. *Social History* 27(1): 16–39.

Dodd, Vikram (2014), 'Planned cuts to police will endanger the public, says UK's top police chief'. *The Guardian* 14.12.2014. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/dec/14/police-cuts-public-safety-bernard-hogan-howe>, accessed 10 February 2015.

The Economist (2015), 'Myanmar's ethnic conflicts: More process than peace'. *The Economist* (Asia edition) 21.2.2015. Available at <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21644224-reconciliation-continues-prove-elusive-more-process-peace>, accessed 27 February 2015.

Economy, Elizabeth (2001), 'The Impact of International Regimes on Chinese Foreign Policy-Making: Broadening Perspectives and Policies… But Only to a Point'. In Lampton, David M. (ed.)

The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in an Age of Economic Interdependence. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 230–253.

Egnell, Robert & Peter Haldén (2013), 'Introduction: The need for new agendas in statebuilding'. In Egnell, Robert & Peter Haldén (eds.), *New Agendas in Statebuilding: Hybridity, Contingency and History*. New York: Routledge.

Elden, Stuart (2010), 'Land, terrain, territory'. *Progress in Human Geography* 34(6): 799–817.

Elden, Stuart (2005), 'Missing the point: globalization, deterritorialization and the space of the world'. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 30(1): 8–19.

Ettlinger, Nancy (2011), 'Governmentality as Epistemology'. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 101(3): 537–560.

Ettlinger, Nancy (2009), 'Surmounting City Silences: Knowledge Creation and the Design of Urban Democracy in the Everyday Economy'. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 33(1): 217–230.

Evans, Michael (2011), 'Power and Paradox: Asian Geopolitics and Sino-American Relations in the 21st Century'. *Orbis* 55(1): 85–113.

Ferguson, James & Akhil Gupta (2002), 'spatializing states: toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality'. *American Ethnologist* 29(4): 981–1002.

Foot, Rosemary & Andrew Walter (2013), 'Global norms and major state behaviour: The cases of China and the United States'. *European Journal of International Relations* 19(2): 329–352.

Forde, Steven (1995), 'International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism'. *International Studies Quarterly* 39(2): 141–160.

Forsberg, Tuomas (2003), 'The Ground Without Foundation? Territory as a Social Construct'. *Geopolitics* 8(2): 7–24.

Foucault, Michel (2007a), *Security, territory, population: Lectures at the Collège de France*. New York: Palgrave. Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell.

Foucault, Michel (2007b), 'Subjectivity and truth'. In Lotringer, Sylvére. (ed.), *The Politics of Truth*: 147–167. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e). Translated by Lysa Hochroth.

Foucault, Michel (2000), 'The Subject and Power'. In Faubion, James D. (ed.), *Michel Foucault/Power*; 326–348. New York: The New Press. Translated by Robert Hurley.

Foucault, Michel (1990), *The history of sexuality: Volume 2. The use of pleasure*. New York: Vintage Books. Translated by Robert Hurley.

Foucault, Michel (1980a), 'Power and strategies'. In Gordon, Colin (ed.), *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other writings 1972–1977*: 134–145. New York: Pantheon. Translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham & Kate Soper.

Foucault, Michel (1980b), 'Two lectures'. In Gordon, Colin (ed.), *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other writings 1972–1977*: 78–108. New York: Pantheon. Translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham & Kate Soper.

Foucault, Michel (1980c), 'The eye of power'. In Gordon, Colin (ed.), *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other writings 1972–1977*: 146–165. New York: Pantheon. Translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham & Kate Soper.

Foucault, Michel (1980d), 'Truth and power'. In Gordon, Colin (ed.), *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other writings 1972–1977*: 109–133. New York: Pantheon. Translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham & Kate Soper.

Fox, Jefferson & Jean-Christophe Castella (2013), 'Expansion of rubber (Hevea brasiliensis) in Mainland Southeast Asia: what are the prospects for smallholders?' *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 40(1): 155–170.

Friedberg, Aaron L. (2005), 'The Future of U.S.–China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?' *International Security* 30(2): 7–45.

Gallant, Thomas (1999), 'Brigandage, piracy, capitalism, and state-formation: Transnational crime from a historical world-systems perspective'. In Heyman, Josiah (ed.), *States and Illegal Practices*: 25–61. Oxford: Berg Publishers.

Glassman, Jim (1999), 'State power beyond the 'territorial trap': the internationalization of the state'. *Political Geography* 18(6): 669–696.

Global Witness (2014), *What Future for the Rubber Industry in Myanmar?* London: Global Witness. Available at <http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/What_Future_English_ version_ April_2014_0.pdf>, accessed 3 March 2015.

Goldstein, Avery (2007), 'Power Transitions, Institutions, and China's Rise in East Asia: Theoretical Expectations and Evidence'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30: 639–682.

Gonzalez-Vicente, Ruben (2011), 'The internationalization of the Chinese state'. *Political Geography* 30(7): 402–411.

Guzzini, Stefano (2000), 'A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations'. *European Journal of International Relations* 6(2): 147–182.

Guzzini, Stefano (1998), *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold*. London: Routledge.

Haacke, Jürgen (2010), 'China's role in the pursuit of security by Myanmar's State Peace and Development Council: boon *and* bane?' *The Pacific Review* 23(1): 113–137.

Hagmann, Tobias & Didier Péclard (2010), 'Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa'. *Development and Change* 41(4): 539–562.

Harvey, David (1989), *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Havercroft, Jonathan (2011), *Captives of Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heikkilä-Horn, Marja-Leena (2009), 'Imagining 'Burma': a historical overview'. *Asian Ethnicity* 10(2): 145–154.

Hendrischke, Hans (2006), 'Corporate locality and translocality of private enterprises in China'. In Oakes, Tim & Louisa Schein (eds.), *Translocal China: Linkages, identities and the reimagining of space*: 93–108. London: Routledge.

Hibou, Béatrice (2004), 'From Privatising the Economy to Privatising the State: An Analysis of the Continual Formation of the State'. In Hibou, Béatrice (ed.), *Privatising the State*. London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd: 1–46. Translated from French by Jonathan Derrick.

International Crisis Group (2009), *China's Myanmar Dilemma*. Asia Report No. 177. Available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/177_chinas_myanmar_dilemma.pdf> accessed 14 January 2015.

International Rivers (2011), 'The Myitsone Dam on the Irrawaddy River: A Briefing'. *International Rivers* 28.9.2011. Available at <http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/the-myitsone-dam-on-the-irrawaddy-river-a-briefing-3931> accessed 7 February 2015.

Jackson, Robert H. (1990), *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jackson, Robert H. & Georg Sørensen (2013), *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5th ed.

Jakobson, Linda & Dean Knox (2010), 'New Foreign Policy Actors in China'. *SIPRI Policy Paper* No. 26. Available at http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP26.pdf, accessed 21 May 2014.

Jarvis, Anthony P. & Albert J. Paolini (1995), 'Locating the State'. In Camilleri, Joseph A., Anthony P. Jarvis & Albert J. Paolini (eds.), *The State in Transition: Reimagining Political Space*.

Jiang, Julie, & Sinton, Jonathan (2011). *Overseas investments by Chinese national oil companies*. Paris: International Energy Agency. Available at <http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/overseas_china.pdf>, referenced 24.4.2014.

Johnston, Alastair Ian (2003), 'Is China a Status Quo Power?' *International Security* 27(4): 5–56.

Jonas, Andrew E.G. (2006), 'Pro scale: further reflections on the 'scale debate' in human geography'. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 31(3): 399–406.

Jones, Katherine T. (1998), 'Scale as epistemology'. *Political Geography* 17(1): 25–28.

Kachin Development Networking Group (2007), *Valley of Darkness. Gold Mining and Militarization in Burma's Hugawng Valley*. A report by the Kachin Development Networking Group. Available at <http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/ValleyofDarkness-ocr.pdf>, accessed 7 February 2015.

Kahrl, Fredrich, Horst Weyerhaeuser & Su Yufang (2004), *Navigating the Border: An Analysis of the China–Myanmar Timber Trade*. Washington, DC: Forest Trends. Available at <http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_120.pdf>, accessed 6 February 2015.

Kang, David C. (2003), 'Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks'. International Security 27(4): 57–85.

Kent, Ann E. (2007), *Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Keohane, Robert O. & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1987), '*Power and Interdependence* revisited'. *International Organization* 41(4): 725–753.

Keohane, Robert O. & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1977), *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Kipgen, Nehginpao (2013), 'The politics of Myanmar versus Burma'. *The Hindu* 13.6.2013. Available at <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-politics-of-myanmar-versus-burma/article4807789.ece>, accessed 9 January 2015.

Kramer, Tom & Kevin Woods (2012), *Financing Dispossession. China's Opium Substitutions Programme in Northern Burma*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute. Available at <http://www.tni.org/briefing/financing-dispossession>, last accessed 27 February 2015.

Krasner, Stephen D. (1999), *Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kuah, Khun Eng (2000), 'Negotiating Central, Provincial, and Country Policies: Border Trading in South China'. In Evans, Grant, Christopher Hutton & Khun Eng Kuah (eds.), *Where China Meets Southeast Asia. Social & Cultural Change in the Border Regions*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: 72–97.

Kudo, Toshihiro (2010), 'Myanmar's Border Trade with China: Situation, Challenge and Prospects'. In Kagami, Mitsuhiro (ed.), *Japan and Korea with the Mekong River Basin Countries:* 265–294. BRC Research Report No. 3. Bangkok: Bangkok Research Center IDE-JETRO.

Kugler, Jacek (2006), 'The Asian Ascent: Opportunity for Peace or Precondition for War?' *International Studies Perspectives* 7(1): 36–42.

Kuus, Merje & John Agnew (2008), 'Theorizing the state geographically: Sovereignty, subjectivity, territoriality', in K. Cox, J. Robinson and M. Low (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Political Geography*. London: Sage, 117–32.

Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2002), 'The Politics of Government–Business Relations in Myanmar'. *Asian Journal of Political Science* 10(1): 77–104.

Lacher, Hannes (2006), *Beyond Globalization. Capitalism, territoriality and the international relations of modernity*. New York: Routledge.

Lacher, Hannes (2003), 'Putting the state in its place: the critique of state-centrism and its limits'. *Review of International Studies* 29(4): 521–541.

Lagerqvist, Yayoi Fujita (2013), 'Imagining the borderlands: Contending stories of a resource frontier in Muang Sing'. *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 34: 57–69.

Lebel, Louis, Po Garden & Masao Imamura (2005), 'The Politics of Scale, and Place in the Governance of Water Resources in the Mekong Region'. *Ecology and Society* 10(2): art. 18. Available at <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol10/iss2/art18/>, accessed 23 January 2015.

Lefebvre, Henri (1991), *The Production of Space*. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith.

Leitner, Helga, Eric Sheppard & Kristin M. Sziarto (2008), 'The spatialities of contentious politics'. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 33(2): 157–172.

Li, Cheng (2001), 'Diversification of Chinese Entrepreneurs and Cultural Pluralism in the Reform Era'. In Hua, Shiping (ed.), *Chinese Political Culture 1989–2000*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.: 219–245.

Lie, Jon Harald Sande (2013), 'Challenging Anthropology: Anthropological Reflections on the Ethnographic Turn in International Relations'. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 41(2): 201–220.

Linklater, Andrew & John Macmillan (1995), 'Introduction: Boundaries in Question'. In Macmillan, John & Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations*. London: Pinter Publishers: 1–16.

Lintner, Bertil (n.d.), '"Burma" or "Myanmar? Myanmar, bama, oh heck, simply Burma'. *Burma Center Prague*. Available at <http://www.burma-center.org/en/publications/articles/item/104-burma-or-myanmar/>, accessed 9 January 2015.

Lintner, Bertil (1990), *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB)*. Southeast Asia Programme. Book 6. Cornell University.

Liu, Xin (1997), 'Spaces, Mobility, and Flexibility: Chinese Villagers and Scholars Negotiate Power at Home and Abroad'. Ong, Aihwa & Donald Nonini (eds.), *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*. London: Routledge.

Lund, Christian (2011), 'Fragmented sovereignty: land reform and dispossession in Laos'. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 38(4): 885–905.

Luoma-aho, Mika (2009), 'Political Theology, Anthropomorphism, and Person-hood of the State: The Religion of IR'. *International Political Sociology* 3(3): 293–309.

MacKinnon, Danny (2011), 'Reconstructing scale: Towards a new scalar politics'. *Progress in Human Geography* 35(1): 25–36.

MacLeavy, Julie & John Harrison (2010), 'New State Spatialities: Perspectives on State, Space and Scalar Geographies'. *Antipode* 42(5): 1037–1046.

Malseed, Kevin (2009), 'Networks of noncompliance: grassroots resistance and sovereignty in militarised Burma'. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 36(2): 365–391.

Mann, Michael (2003), 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results'. In Brenner, Neil, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones & Gordon MacLeod (eds.), *State/Space: A Reader*. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd: 53–64.

Mann, Michael (1984), 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results'. *European Journal of Sociology* 25(2): 185–213.

Marston, Sallie A. (2000), 'The social construction of scale'. *Progress in Human Geography* 24(2): 219–241

Massey, Doreen (2005), *For Space*. London: SAGE.

Massey, Doreen (1992), 'Politics and Space/Time'. *New Left Review* I/196: 65–84. Available at < http://knowledgepublic.pbworks.com/f/MasseySpace.pdf>, accessed 21 January 2015.

Maung, Aung Myoe (2007a), 'A Historical Overview of Political Transition in Myanmar Since 1988'. *Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series* No. 95. Available at <http://inetapps.nus.edu.sg/ari/docs/wps/wps07_095.pdf>, accessed 24 May 2014.

Maung, Aung Myoe (2007b), 'Sino-Myanmar Economic Relations Since 1988'. *Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series* No. 86. Available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1317139>, accessed 24 May 2014.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2006), 'China's Unpeaceful Rise'. *Current History* 105(690): 160–162.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2001*), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Mitchell, Timothy (1999), 'Society, Economy, and the State Effect'. In Steimetz, Georg (ed.), *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*: 76–97. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Mitchell, Timothy (1991), 'The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics'. *The American Political Science Review* 85(1): 77–96.

Moore, Thomas G. & Dixia Yang (2001), 'Empowered and Restrained: Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Economic Interdependence'. In Lampton, David M. (ed.) *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in an Age of Economic Interdependence*. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 191–229.

Morck, Randall, Bernard Yeung & Minyuan Zhao (2008), 'Perspectives on China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment'. *Journal of International Business Studies* 39(3): 337–350.

Morgenthau, Hans J. (1967), *Politics Among Nations*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Murphy, Alexander B. (1996), 'The sovereign state system as political-territorial ideal: historical and contemporary considerations'. In Biersteker, Thomas J. & Cynthia Weber (eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 81–120.

Neep, Daniel (2013), 'State, Space, and the Sources of Social Power: Reflections on Michael Mann and Henri Lefebvre'. *InTrasformazione: Rivista di storia delle idee* 2(1): 71–80.

Neumann, Iver B. (2012), *At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Neumann, Iver B. (2004), 'Beware of organicism: the narrative self of the state'. *Review of International Studies* 30(2): 259–267.

Neumann, Iver B. (2002), 'Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy'. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 32(3): 627–52.

Oakes, Tim (2012), 'Looking Out to Look In: The Use of the Periphery in China's Geopolitical Narratives'. *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 53(3): 315–326.

O'Connor, James (2011), *State Building, Infrastructure Development and Chinese Energy Projects in Myanmar*. Irasec's Discussions Papers #10. Bangkok: Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia.

Oh, Su-Ann (2013), 'Competing forms of sovereignty in the Karen state of Myanmar'. *ISEAS Working Paper* #1. Available at <http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/ISEAS_Working%20Papers-25mar13.pdf>, accessed 23 May 2014.

Ong, Aihwa (2004), 'The Chinese Axis: Zoning Technologies and Variegated Sovereignty'. *Journal of East Asian Studies* 4(1): 69–96.

Ong, Aihwa (1997), 'Chinese Modernities: Narratives of Nation and of Capitalism'. Ong, Aihwa & Donald Nonini (eds.), *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*. London: Routledge.

Osiander, Andreas (2001), 'Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth'. *International Organization* 55(2): 251–287.

Painter, Joe (2010), 'Rethinking Territory'. *Antipode* 42(5): 1090–1118.

Painter, Joe (2006), 'Prosaic geographies of stateness'. *Political Geography* 25: 752–774.

Patomäki, Heikki (2011), 'On the Complexities of Time and Temporality: Implications for World History and Global Futures'. *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 57(3): 339–352.

Patomäki, Heikki (2003), 'Problems of Democratizing Global Governance: Time, Space and the Emancipatory Process'. *European Journal of International Relations* 9(3): 347–376.

Paul, Darel E. (1999), 'Sovereignty, Survival and the Westphalian blind alley in International Relations'. *Review of International Studies* 25(2): 217–231.

Perry, Nick (2014), 'Confusion remains about Burma name change'. news.com.au 4.6.2014. Available at <http://www.news.com.au/national/breaking-news/confusion-remains-about-burma-name-change/story-e6frfku9-1226943456675>, accessed 9 January 2015.

Pieke, Frank N. (2004), 'Contours of an Anthropology of the Chinese State: Political Structure, Agency and Economic Development in Rural China'. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 10(3): 517–538.

Poncet, Sandra (2006), 'Economic Integration of Yunnan with the Greater Mekong Subregion'. *Asian Economic Journal* 20(3): 303–317.

Potter, Alistair (2015), 'Britain's first private police force charging £1 a week to protect locals' homes'. *Metro.co.uk* 16.1.2015. Available at <http://metro.co.uk/2015/01/16/britains-first-private-police-force-charging-1-a-week-to-protect-locals-homes-5024070/> accessed 10 February 2015.

Poulantzas, Nicos (1978). *State, power, socialism*. London: New Left Books.

Ralston, David A., Jane Terpstra-Tong, Robert H. Terpstra, Xueli Wang & Carolyn Egri (2006), 'Today's State-Owned Enterprises of China: Are They Dying Dinosaurs or Dynamic Dynamos?' *Strategic Management Journal* 27(9): 825–843.

Rapkin, David & William R. Thompson (2003), 'Power Transition, Challenge and the (Re)Emergence of China'. *International Interactions* 29(4): 315–342.

Reus-Smit, Christian (1999), *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Risse, Thomas (2011), 'Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction and Overview'. In Risse, Thomas (ed*.), Governance without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Ruggie, John Gerard (1993), 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations'. *International Organization* 47(1): 139–174.

Schatzki, Theodore R., Karin Knorr Cetina and Eike von Savigny (2001, eds.), *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*. London: Routledge.

Schiavenza, Matt (2014), 'President Obama IS in Burma – or Is It Myanmar?' *The Atlantic* 13.11.2014. Available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/11/president-obama-is-in-burma-or-is-it-myanmar/382751/>, accessed 9 January 2015.

Scholte, Jan Aart (2000), 'Global civil society'. In Woods, N. (ed.), *The Political Economy of Globalization*. London: Macmillan.

Schouten, Peer (2009) 'Theory Talk #34: James Ferguson on Modernity, Development, and Reading Foucault in Lesotho', *Theory Talks* 22.11.2009. Print version. Available at <http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/11/theorytalk-34.html>, accessed 2 March 2015.

Schweller, Randall L. & Xiaoyu Pu (2011), 'After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline'. *International Security* 36(1): 41–72.

Scobell, Andrew (2001), *The Costs of Conflict: The Impact on China of a Future War*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute. Available at <www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pdffiles/pub63.pdf>, accessed 9 May 2014.

Shambaugh, David (2004), 'China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order'. *International Security* 29(3): 64–99.

Shapiro, Michael & Deanne Neaubauer (1990), 'Spatiality and Policy Discourse: Reading the Global City'. In Walker, R.B.J. & Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds.), *Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community*: 97–124. Boulder: Lynner Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Shaw, Martin (1994), *Global Society and International Relations*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Sidaway, J.D. (2003), 'Sovereign excesses? Portraying postcolonial sovereigntyscapes'. *Political Geography* 22(2): 157–178.

Sjoberg, Laura (2008), 'Scaling IR Theory: Geography's Contribution to Where IR Takes Place'. *International Studies Review* 10(3): 472–500.

Soja, Edward W. (1980), 'The Socio-Spatial Dialectic'. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 70(2): 207–225.

Soja, Edward W. (1971), *The Political Organisation of Space*. Commission on College Geography Resource Paper 8. Washington, DC: Association of American Geographers.

Steinberg, David I. (2001), *Burma: The State of Myanmar*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Sturgeon, Janet C. (2004), 'Border Practices, Boundaries, and the Control of Resource Access: A Case from China, Thailand and Burma'. *Development and Change* 35(3): 463–484.

Sturgeon, Janet C., Nicholas K. Menzies, Yayoi Fujita Lagerqvist, David Thomas, Benchaphun Ekasingh, Louis Lebel, Khamla Phanvilay & Sithong Thongmanivong (2013), 'Enclosing Ethnic Minorities and Forests in the Golden Economic Quadrangle'. *Development and Change* 44(1): 53–79.

Su, Xiaobo (2014), 'Multi-Scalar Regionalization, Network Connections and the Development of Yunnan province, China'. *Regional Studies* 48(1): 91–104.

Swyngedouw, Eric (1997), 'Neither global nor local: "glocalization" and the politics of scale'. In Cox, Kevin (ed.), *Spaces of Globalization – Reasserting the Power of the Local:* 137–166. London: MacMillan.

Tan, Danielle (2012), '"Small is Beautiful": Lessons from Laos for the Study of Chinese Overseas'. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 41(2): 61–94.

Taylor, Ian (2006), 'China's oil diplomacy in Africa'. *International Affairs* 82(5): 937–959.

Teschke, Benno (2003), *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations*. London: Verso.

Teschke, Benno (2002), 'Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism'. *European Journal of International Relations* 8(1): 5–48.

Thawnghmung, Ardeth Maung (2011), *Beyond Armed Resistance: Ethnonational Politics in Burma (Myanmar)*. Policy Studies 62. Honolulu: East-West Center. Available at <http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/22293/ps062.pdf?sequence=1&origin=publication_ detail>, accessed 10 February 2015.

Thomson, Janice E. (1995), 'State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research'. *International Studies Quarterly* 39(2): 213–233.

Tilly, Charles (1985), 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime'. In Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*: 169–191. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tongchai, Winichakul (1994), *Siam Mapped. A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Transnational Institute (2010), 'Alternative Development or Business as Usual? China's Opium Substitution Policy in Burma and Laos'. *Drug Policy Briefing* No. 33. Available at <www.tni.org/files/download/brief33.pdf>, accessed 26 March 2014.

Vandergeest, Peter & Nancy Lee Peluso (1995), 'Territorialization and State Power in Thailand'. *Theory and Society* 24(3): 385–426.

van Schendel, Willem (2005), *The Bengal Borderlands: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia*. London: Anthem Press.

Wai, Kyi Phyo (2012), 'The Role of Burmese and Kachin Civil Society in the Suspension of the Myitsone Dam'. In EarthRights International (ed.), *Land, Water, Rights: Voices from the Tibetan Plateau to the Mekong Delta: 47–56.* Available at <http://dg5vd3ocj3r4t.cloudfront.net/ sites/default/files/documents/land-water-rights.pdf>, accessed 27 March 2014.

Walker, R.B.J. (2000), 'International Relations Theory and the Fate of the Political'. In Ebata, Michi & Beverly Neufeld (eds.), *Confronting the Political in International Relations*. London: MacMillan Press Ltd.: 212–238.

Walker, R.B.J. (1995), 'From International Relations to World Politics'. In Camilleri, Joseph A., Anthony P. Jarvis & Albert J. Paolini (eds.), *The State in Transition: Reimagining Political Space*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.: 21–38.

Wendt, Alexander (2004), 'The state as person in international theory'. *Review of International Studies* 20(2): 289–316.

Wendt, Alexander (1994), 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State'. *American Political Science Review* 88(2): 384–396.

Weng, Naiqun (2006), 'Flows of heroin, people, capital, imagination, and the spread of HIV in southwest China'. In Oakes, Tim & Louisa Schein (eds.), *Translocal China: Linkages, identities and the reimagining of space*: 193–212. London: Routledge.

Weyerhauser, Horst, Andreas Wilkes & Fredrich Kahrl (2005), 'Local impacts and responses to regional forest conservation and rehabilitation programs in China's northwest Yunnan province'. *Agricultural Systems* 85(3): 234–253.

Wissen, Markus (2009), 'Contested terrains: Politics of scale, the national state and struggles over nature'. *Review of International Political Economy* 16(5): 883–906.

Wittrock, Bjorn (2000), 'Modernity: one, none, or many? European origins and modernity as a global condition'. *Daedalus* 129(1): 31–60.

Woods, Kevin (2013), 'The politics of the emerging agro-industrial complex in Asia's 'final frontier': The war on food sovereignty in Burma'. *Conference Paper #25.* International Conference 'Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue' at Yale University 14.–15.9.2013. Available at <http://www.yale.edu/agrarianstudies/foodsovereignty/pprs/25_Woods_2013.pdf>, accessed 3 March 2015.

Woods, Kevin (2011), 'Ceasefire capitalism: military–private partnerships, resource concessions and military–state building in the Burma–China borderlands'. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 38(4): 747–770.

Woods, Kevin (2010), *Community Forestry in Cease-Fire Zones in Kachin State, Northern Burma: Formalizing Collective Property in Contested Ethnic Areas*. Paper prepared for presentation at the CAPRi Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights, and Conflict in Natural Resources Management in Siem Reap, Cambodia on June 28 – July 1, 2010. The version has not undergone review. Available at <www.capri.cgiar.org/pdf/CAPRi_Conflict_Woods.pdf>, accessed 1 March 2015.

Yeh, Emily T. (2005), 'Green Governmentality and Pastoralism in Western China; 'Converting Pastures to Grasslands''. *Nomadic Peoples* 9(1&2): 9–29.

Yeung, Henry Wai-chung & Weidong Liu (2008), 'Globalizing China: The Rise of Mainland Firms in the Global Economy'. *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 49(1): 57–86.

Zhao, Hong (2011), 'China–Myanmar Energy Cooperation and Its Regional Implications'. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 30(4): 89–109.

Zhong, Yang (2003), *Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Zweig, David (2010), 'The Rise of a New Trading Nation'. *Center on China's Transnational Relations. Working Paper 31*. Available at <http://www.cctr.ust.hk/research/working_paper.html>, accessed 26 January 2014. Also published as a chapter in Dittmer, Lowell & George T. Yu (ed.), *China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic:* pp. 37–59.