

NORDIC APPROACHES TO PEACE MEDIATION

RESEARCH, PRACTICES AND POLICIES

*Edited by
Marko Lehti*



NON-VIOLENCE

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Tampere Peace Research Institute
TAPRI Studies in Peace and Conflict Research
No. 101, 2014

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TAPRI Studies in Peace and Conflict Research No. 101
TAPRI Net Series No. 10

Tampere Peace Research Institute TAPRI,
FI-33014 University of Tampere
Finland

<http://www.uta.fi/yky/tutkimus/tapri/>

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ISBN 978-951-44-9310-2 (print)
ISBN 978-951-44-9311-9 (PDF)
ISSN 1798-1409

Photograph on the cover: Noora Maja
Sculpture: 'Non-Violence' by Swedish artist Carl Fredrik Reuterswärd

Cover design and layout:
Juvenes Print – Suomen Yliopistopaino Oy

Printed by
Juvenes Print – Suomen Yliopistopaino Oy

Tampere 2014

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is a major product borne from the project *Peace Mediation in Nordic Countries. A Comparative Study* that has received its funding from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. We are grateful for the Ministry for its support. The project organized also the seminar and workshop *Approaches to Peace Mediation: Is There Space for a Nordic Approach* 14-15.8.2013 in Tampere. We thank all the speakers of the seminar and the audience for their contribution to broader debate on the essence and future of Nordic research on peace mediation. In particular, we would like to express our compliments to Charlotta Spolander from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for productive cooperation. Finally, we would like thank also Petter Nissinen for his help in organizing the seminar and Johanna Järvinen for polishing our language.

Marko Lehti & Jenny Saarinen

MEDIATING ASYMMETRIC
CONFLICTS

A SURVEY ON NORDIC STUDIES ON
PEACEMAKING

1. INTRODUCTION

Peace diplomacy and peace mediation in particular have taken new shape as well as gained visibility and acceptance in the post-Cold War world. The number and availability of mediation cases have dramatically increased since the mid-1990s and it has become a widely accepted global norm that international community has a responsibility to support peacemaking in order to prevent the continuation of humanitarian crisis. The United Nations as well as the European Union has adopted their own peace mediation agendas and organizations. For Nordic countries, peace diplomacy has offered a new kind of opportunity to gain an important role in global politics. Norway was a pioneer of new peace diplomacy in the early 1990s but Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have all, in one form or another, adopted peacemaking and conflict resolution in their foreign policy agendas. In addition to the activity of states and international organizations, the last two decades have borne witness to the emergence of peace mediator as a new international profession and the involvement of several non-governmental-organizations to peace diplomacy which, indeed, challenges states' ownership to diplomacy. The extension of the scope of traditional state-centric diplomacy and the increase of the amount of mediation cases has evoked broader scholarly interest towards peace mediation. The issue has been approached from various perspectives; some scholars have concentrated on mediation practices and styles while others have taken a more critical look towards the whole peace process.

The overall objective of this study is to map Nordic studies on peace mediation, facilitation, and conflict resolution published during the past fifteen years as well as to examine further what the major thematic questions discussed by Nordic scholars are and how these scholars have approached these questions. Beyond that, the aim is to research if it is possible to discuss more broadly about a specific Nordic approach or tradition. Right from the start it is

essential to give attention to how distinctions are drawn on a larger field of studies on peacebuilding and peacemaking and studies which focus on peace mediation, facilitation, and conflict resolution, in particular. Even though peace mediation, as such, is considered a frame of study amongst certain scholars, this has not been the case with most of the studies analysed in this survey.

This survey approaches ‘Nordicness’ through institutional affiliation. Thus a scientific profile on most important and well-known research institutes and departments in the Nordic countries has been closely sought. If we take a look on the overview in all Nordic countries, the obvious conclusion is that even though the amount of studies is rather satisfactory, almost all scholars specializing in this field are affiliated either to Swedish or Norwegian institutes. Swedish studies outnumbered Norwegian ones and a true giant of the study on peace mediation is the Department of Peace and Conflict Research in the Uppsala University. In Sweden, Lund University’s Peace and Conflict Studies has to be also mentioned when it comes to research carried out on mediation and related issues. It is justified, with certain reservations, to talk about the existence of Uppsala and Lund traditions in relation to studying peacemaking. In recent years, several Swedish scholars have concentrated on questions related to peace mediation. Among them could be mentioned Karin Aggestam, Cecilia Albin, Kristine Höglund, Isak Svensson, and Peter Wallensteen.

In Norway, research specializing on peace mediation and peace process has centred in particular at the University of Oslo, with a study background in history. In addition, there are some research institutes, such as the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) where mediation related themes have been analysed. However, the notion of ‘mediation’ is not necessary mentioned in their studies. The most productive contemporary Norwegian scholars under scrutiny in this survey are Mona Fixdal, Iver Neumann, and Hilde Henriksen Waage; however, other Norwegians are also mentioned.

In Finland, Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) and Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) have, in recent years, shown keen interest in peace mediation but despite few sporadic

studies serious academic research on peace mediation is lacking in the Finnish case. In addition, it is noteworthy to mention that challenges have emerged in the process of acquiring relevant literature for this survey, as many of the publications are not available in Finland, and this portrays the lack of interest on these issues. If there are only few studies made by Finnish scholars, none could be found by Danish ones if two Finns (Pertti Joenniemi and Timo Kivimäki) who were previously affiliated to Danish institutes are not taken into consideration in the Danish case. However, Danish situation may quickly change along with the new Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts (CRIC), headed by Professor Ole Wæver. The agenda of the new centre does not include the notion of ‘mediation’ as such but as the Centre’s broad understanding of conflict resolution and emphasis on ‘the role of the past in protracted conflicts and third party possibilities for breaking spirals of escalation’ in practice, the focus is on peace mediation process in broad terms.¹

This survey concentrates mainly on peer-reviewed academic publications. Most of the evaluated texts have been published in academic journals (Journal of Conflict Resolution; Negotiation and Conflict Management Research; International Negotiation; International Journal; Baltic Journal of Political Science; International Journal of Conflict Management; Cooperation and Conflict; Journal of Palestine Studies; British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies) or in edited volumes published by well-known international publishers. Bibliography also includes a few relevant monographs among which Svensson’s and Wallensteen’s *The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation* is the most recent. In other words, this is not a survey on broader debate on peace mediation but focus is kept on the main academic publications on peace mediation written by Nordic academic scholars.

‘Peace mediation’ is conceptualized in this survey as an intervention by a third party in a conflict to support, in peaceful ways, the achievement of peace, and this kind of mediation can take different forms at different stages of the peace process. A more precise definition on mediation and other relevant concepts to this survey can be found in the following chapter on key concepts.

¹ <http://cric.ku.dk/>

Conceptualization made in this survey is based mainly on the publications by Nordic scholars and found in the bibliography. The main challenge with the selection of studies has been that the term 'peace mediation' has not been used systematically by all scholars. Among Nordic scholars, Peter Wallensteen and Isak Svensson are the ones who in most systematic terms use the notion 'peace mediation' while others often prefer to use other related terms, such as peacemaking, peace negotiations, and just peace even though they are scrutinizing third party intervention to promote peace in peaceful ways. It seems that only those scholars who are interested in mediation in particular as a practical diplomatic skill use the term 'mediation' in systematic terms while 'mediation' is not necessary a key term for scholars studying the whole peacemaking process and the role of third-party intervention within that peace process.

Finally, it must be clarified that this survey is, above all, a general description of kind. Instead of an all-inclusive approach, the aim of this survey is to give an overview on the study made on peace mediation in Nordic countries but it does not aim to mark exhaustively every single study on peace mediation even though the bibliography at the end of this survey strives to be as extensive as possible. Unfortunately, some shortages might exist. Instead the study strives to represent the whole phenomena of peace mediation as it is presented and discussed in Nordic scholarly debate. Furthermore, it aims to bring up the essential research themes that the writers of this survey have regarded as the most interesting ones within Nordic research.

It is possible to identify certain themes which are typical to research carried out on peace mediation by Nordic academics. Several studies analyse the development of peace diplomacy and its challenges in asymmetrical conflicts. Among all studies there is a clear emphasis on case studies providing a more practical approach to mediation in asymmetrical conflicts. Most of the case studies are based on Norway's and Sweden's active involvement in the arena of international peace mediation efforts. Obviously Norway's efforts on Middle East peace talks or the Sri Lankan civil war have created a lot of research interest among the Nordic academics. The Norwegian model of cooperation between governmental and non-governmental actors in the field of peace mediation has also gained attention as a

research theme. In addition, there are some studies where a single Nordic mediator and their personal mediation practice are explored. Studies (also) representing theoretical approaches to mediation questions such as just peace and different roles of a third party in a conflict and concepts such as academic diplomacy have drawn attention.

The themes selected for closer scrutiny do not cover all possible focusses on peacemaking that Nordic scholars have studied but they are regarded by the writers of this survey as the most interesting and significant ones that have also introduced a fresh perspective to the study on peace mediation.

2. DEFINING (PEACE) MEDIATION

2.1. MEDIATION

‘Peace mediation’ or just ‘mediation’ is a core term of this survey but as a concept it opens possibilities for several interpretations and thus escapes strict and fixed definitions. In the simplest form, ‘mediation’ is referred to as ‘a way of resolving disputes between two or more parties’ by a third party, the mediator, who assists the parties in negotiating a settlement. Mediation is not limited to conflicts among states, neither to armed conflicts in general but mediation is a commonplace practice ‘in a variety of domains, such as commercial, legal, diplomatic, workplace, community and family matters’.² However, this survey is solely interested in mediation as a part of a peace process to end or prevent violent (or armed) conflicts among states (inter-state war) or civil war kind of a situation within which a state or states are one of warring sides (intra-state war). The scope of peace mediation could also be expanded to include mediation of armed conflicts among non-governmental parties but so far these kinds of cases have not been studied by Nordic scholars. However, according to Professor Peter Wallensteen this would be one of the future challenges on the study of peace mediation to be explored³.

Even though mediation is a commonplace practice in various spheres of society, there is seemingly no cross-disciplinary forum of discussion among scholars studying mediation in armed conflicts, labour disputes, schools, or family affairs. If we regard mediation as a *practical skill* used to solve disputes, the creation of a cross-disciplinary discussion forum on practices and styles of mediation

² <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediation>

³ Peter Wallensteen’s keynote lecture at ‘Approaches to Peace Mediation: Is There Space For a Nordic Approach’ seminar held at Tampere 14.8.2013

could be fruitful in order to gain a deeper understanding of peace mediation practices and styles because the volume of mediation cases is much greater, for example, in labour markets than in the case of international armed conflicts. However, so far academic study on peace mediation has taken place mainly within a framework of peace and conflict studies or international relations. That is a justified solution when peace mediation is understood as one part of a broader peace process in which mediation is intertwined with several other questions of peace and war.

Because of the broad and vague scope of the term ‘mediation’, it is necessary to have a useful definition on ‘peace mediation’. According to the *UN Guidance for Effective Mediation*, ‘mediation is a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements’.⁴ ‘A central aspect to any peace process is *incompatibility*’ and mediation is one particular practice used in order to find a solution for these incompatibilities that once triggered the violence.⁵ It is imperative to define particular features of peace mediation in comparison to other practices of peacemaking.

Three fundamental and essential elements characteristic to the process of mediation can be recognized. However, none of these are solely characteristic to mediation process but still their presence is crucial for peace mediation. Firstly, mediation, is ‘*a normative practice* embedded in a violent context that, through a structured process, intends to resolve an incompatibility by achieving an agreement between two or more participating belligerent parties, providing for a positive outcome and lasting peace’.⁶ Even though it sounds simple, it is important to remember that a primary goal of mediation process is always to create sustainable peace. However, defining the concept of ‘peace’ is not as simple a question as it sounds and thus a more profound discussion on fundamental terms

⁴ http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_1.pdf

⁵ Mikael Eriksson & Roland Kostić (2013a), ‘Peacemaking and peacebuilding: Two ends of a tail’, in Eriksson & Kostić (eds.) *Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding. Peace from the Ashes of War?* London: Routledge, 13.

⁶ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 11.

on defining ‘peace’ can be found only in a few studies on peace mediation. Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs have done groundbreaking work in their article *Beyond the absence of war: the diversity of peace in post-settlement societies* in which they note that ‘the current focus on the simple dichotomy of “failed” and “successful” peace...is unable to provide answers to ... why some post-war societies appear to face greater obstacles than others in establishing a more sustainable peace’. According to them, different war-endings contribute to different post-war societies but also that negotiated war-endings ‘generate different types of peace’.⁷

Secondly, ‘mediation is a *non-violent mechanism* for conflict resolution’⁸ by its nature and thus it radically differs from violent tools of peacemaking including all kind of military intervention and policies of coercion. The question of how peace mediation is interlinked with violent tools of peacemaking is not discussed by Nordic scholars. Still, as Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl mention, ‘the appropriate and timely use of force can make a difference in preventing outbreak of massive violence’ and could bring the parties to the negotiation table.⁹ However, it is obvious that the use of force even in order to receive a positive outcome does not bring peace and thus it needs to be accompanied by a political process of peacemaking, including mediation and negotiation.

Thirdly, mediation is one form of a *third-party intervention* to conflict but without military means. All forms of intervention are based on *voluntariness* and an assumption that the third party shares no part in the conflict. Mediation process can be domestic without a third-party involvement from outside although ‘most mediation processes are externally led’¹⁰ but, in any case, mediator cannot take a side in the conflict. Prerequisites for humanitarian

⁷ Kristine Höglund & Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs (2010), ‘Beyond the absence of war: the diversity of peace in post-settlement societies’ *Review of International Studies*, 36 (2): 369, 374.

⁸ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 11

⁹ Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl (2009), ‘Introduction: War and Peace in Transition’, in Aggestam & Björkdahl (eds.) *War and Peace in Transition. Changing Roles of External Actors*. Nordic Academic Press, 19–20.

¹⁰ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 11–12.

intervention by military means have been examined in various studies but the issue is seen predominantly as belonging to the sphere of international law (question of legal action) or to the sphere of morality (question of legitimate action).¹¹ Non-violent third-party intervention in peaceful terms based on volunteer participation is not seen in similar terms as an issue belonging to internal law but, vice versa, it is primarily understood as the moral responsibility of the international community. Still, even this kind of peaceful intervention may undermine local ownership of peace process and ‘the self-interest of individual mediators and of political mediators such as the state is likely to play an important role in shaping the ensuing peace. For example, there is often an underlying ideological agenda or normative tradition in which the mediator operates.’ This normative element of a peace process is rarely publicly articulated and it has, in recent years, become an important question in Nordic studies on peacemaking.¹²

Furthermore, it is useful to make a distinction between *mediation* and *arbitration*, on the one hand, and mediation and *negotiations*, on the other hand. In legal terms, mediation ‘differs from arbitration in which the third party (arbitrator) acts much like a judge but in an out-of-court less formal setting but does not actively participate in the discussion’.¹³ Difference between mediation and arbitration is, from a historical perspective, an important division as arbitration was seen as an essential practice to solve all wars among states from the mid-nineteenth century until the interwar era when mediation was, in practical terms, adapted to the diplomatic toolbox to solve several border disputes from the Baltics to the Balkans.¹⁴ However, the Åland case was still solved through arbitration and not that of mediation. The League of Nations, to whom Finland and Sweden gave the case to solve, passed it on to the Permanent Court of

¹¹ See for example J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane (eds.) (2003) *Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Political and Legal Dilemmas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹² Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 10

¹³ <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/mediation>

¹⁴ See for example David Cortright (2011), *Rauha. Ajatusten ja liikkeiden historia*. Helsinki: Gaudemaus/Helsinki University Press.

Arbitration and the Åland people were the largest population whose fate was decided by arbitration.¹⁵

Mediation is often regarded as a form of peace negotiations but the way these two are related differs among scholars. Following Svensson, a mediation process and negotiations differ on the level of communication among the parties involved in a conflict. In negotiations, the primary parties communicate directly with one another, whereas in a mediation process, communication takes place either via or with the assistance of a third party.¹⁶

Another Uppsala scholar Kristine Höglund, who has studied the relationship between (peace) negotiations and violence, does not use the term mediation at all even though a third-party mediator has participated to facilitate or mediate peace negotiations she has scrutinized. The general term Höglund uses is *peace negotiations* which is defined as a negotiation process to end conflict involving two or more parties. Negotiation is ‘a strategic situation, since the decisions of the actors are interrelated’. In Höglund’s view peace negotiations are part of a broader peace process and, even if not explicitly defined, Höglund considers mediation as a one-kind of negotiation situation involving third-party interventions.¹⁷

Mikael Eriksson and Roland Kostić emphasize in their terminology ‘sensual participation, ownership of the agenda and process legitimacy’ and along these criteria define three types of peace negotiation processes: a) domestically owned, b) third-party mediation, and c) pure third-party mediation. Thus for them mediation represents one form of negotiations. However, the way how they draw a distinction between ‘third-party mediation’ and ‘pure third-party mediation’ is interesting. According to them, third party often uses its power ‘to cajole to start negotiations or accept a certain outcome from the talks’. Thus it is necessary to make a

¹⁵ Håkan Wiberg (2004), ‘Nordic Peace – Another Dimension of Nordic Exceptionalism’ *Kosmopolis* 34, Special Issue UV 60, 208.

¹⁶ Isak Svensson (2012a), ‘Medling och förhandling’, in Aggestam, Karin & Höglund, Kristine (eds.) *Om krig och fred: en introduktion till freds- och konfliktstudier*. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 178.

¹⁷ Kristine Höglund (2008), *Peace Negotiations in the Shadow of Violence*. Leiden & Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 15.

distinction between those mediation cases that represent ‘force and persuasion in peacemaking’ like Bosnia or Kosovo and those belonging more to a pure third-party mediation situation in which peace agreement is more locally owned.¹⁸

Furthermore, in studies and guides defining mediation process several demarcation lines are drawn between mediation, facilitation, dialogue, or diplomacy in general. However, there is no universally agreed definition or any consensus on how mediation differs from other styles of dialogue that support peace negotiations.¹⁹ In a UN report on *Guidelines on Effective Mediation*, mediation is seen ‘alongside facilitation, good offices and dialogue’ as a method to support peacemaking. This kind of technical division between good governance, mediation, dialogue, and facilitation or moderated direct talks is more common to practitioners than to scholarly literature where it is rarely used, and scholars focus more on mediation as part of the whole peace process.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines good offices as practice of a third party when they facilitate talks, for example, in the form of providing venue and facilities instead of actively engaging in talks as a go-between.²⁰ The difference between mediation and facilitation is a question of form and style of mediation. Facilitation is more about supporting discussion among parties by offering a forum and acting as a messenger. Facilitator does not necessarily physically participate in peace negotiations. Mediator, in contrast, is more intensively engaged in discussion and actively participates in peace negotiations.²¹ Birger Heldt makes a distinction between

¹⁸ Mikael Eriksson and Roland Kostić (2013b), ‘Rethinking peacemaking: Peace at all costs?’, in Eriksson & Kostić (eds.) *Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding. Peace from the Ashes of War?* London: Routledge, 158-159.

¹⁹ Peter Wallensteen & Frida Möller (2008), ‘Third parties in Conflict Prevention: A Systematic Look’, in Mellbourn, Anders & Wallensteen, Peter (eds.) *Third Parties and Conflict Prevention*. Anna Lindh Programme on Conflict Prevention, 2008 edition. Stockholm: Gidlunds, 59.

²⁰ Wallensteen & Möller 2008, 64.

²¹ Isak Svensson, Isak (2008), ‘Democracies, Disengagement and Deals: Exploring the Effect of Different Types of Mediators in Internal Armed Conflicts’, in Öberg, Magnus & Strøm, Kaare (eds.) *Resources, Governance and Civil Conflict*. London: Routledge, 234.

mediation, moderated direct talks, and good governance, and calls them different peacemaking strategies. She notes that all these tools are used often and they do not necessarily follow each other in a planned order and thus make, in several cases, the whole peacemaking process distorted. She also explores how the change of a tool to another influences the peace process and how the change can also be a tactical tool.²²

Instead of a nuanced categorization, Wallensteen and Möller define modes of a third party's involvement in negotiation between belligerents as bilateral or indirect talks. The more common one of these two is bilateral talks in which the third party facilitates separate talks with the conflicting parties, but no serious negotiations or bargaining is involved. In indirect talks, instead, a third party is active in the exchange of information between the conflicting parties. Shuttle diplomacy is one example of indirect talks in practice.²³

2.2. PEACE PROCESSES

Although there are several definitions available on mediation situations, following elements are essential for them all: a) parties in conflicts, b) a mediator, c) a process of mediation, and d) the context within which mediation takes place.²⁴ All four elements require further explanation: what is the broader peace process of which mediation is part and how this broader process should be recognized in mediation situation, who can participate in mediation process and what are the strategies the mediator can use to persuade warring parties to peace.

While practitioners often concentrate on particular methods and practices in their writings, scholarly view approaches peace mediation as 'one among many practices in the peacemaking toolkit' which

²² Birger Heldt (2009), 'Sequencing of Peacemaking in Emerging Conflicts', in Aggestam & Björkdahl (eds.), *War and Peace in Transition. Changing Roles of External Actors*. Nordic Academic Press, 134–5.

²³ Wallensteen & Möller 2008, 63–4.

²⁴ Jacob Bercovitch (2002) 'Introduction: Putting Mediation In Context', in Bercovitch (ed.) *Studies in international mediation: essays in honor of Jeffrey Z. Rubin*. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 8.

‘takes place in the midst of other social and political contexts in which peacekeeping; bilateral, regional and systematic intervention; or sanctions may also be used’. ‘Mediation’ is part of a larger peacemaking process but so are also specific kinds of ‘methods of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts’.²⁵ Thus, peace mediation should be seen as one dimension and one particular practice of a broader process of peacemaking, peace process, or conflict resolution. These three terms are used as overlapping ways to describe the overall process and the semantic difference between terms is far from clear.

Peace process as a term was introduced in the 1970s to describe the transition from war to peace, usually through various kinds of negotiated settlements. Peace process is a multi-layered and multi-phased process but the most essential issue is a willingness of primary parties to solve the conflict issues through negotiated settlement.²⁶ Following the general definition for *conflict resolution*, it is referred to as ‘the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of a conflict’ and methods and procedures of conflict resolution include, but are not limited to, ‘negotiation, mediation, diplomacy, and creative peacebuilding’.²⁷

Peacemaking is an often used but rarely clearly defined general notion in scholarly studies describing the broader process from war to peace but perhaps it provides more emphasis on questions dealing with post-conflict societal peace. Following Wallensteen ‘peacemaking refers to the efforts to peacefully settle an ongoing armed conflict, including negotiation and mediation between the parties. Such efforts can be assessed in the immediate short term, that is, whether they actually served to end an armed conflict (or other types of armed behavior). The long-term perspective brings attention to its importance for the relationship between the warring parties, and potentially for peacebuilding after a conflict.’²⁸ Despite

²⁵ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 12.

²⁶ Höglund 2008, 15–17.

²⁷ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflict_resolution

²⁸ Peter Wallensteen (2012) ‘Academic Diplomacy: The Role of Non-Decision Makers in Peacemaking’, in Nan, Susan Allen & Mampilly, Zachariah Cherian & Bartoli, Andrea (eds.) *Peacemaking: From Practice to Theory*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 458.

the term selected to describe the whole process it is important to comprehend peacemaking process as a whole and avoid making artificial exclusions and one-sided definitions while still questioning the role of mediation within a larger process.

A fundamental and also dividing issue is the question whether peace process ends in negotiated peace agreement or whether a negotiated agreement is just one, even if important, phase towards sustainable peace. Galtungian division between negative and positive peace provides an explanation for different interpretations. If peace is merely understood as the absence of war or violence, then peace process comes to its conclusion in ceasefire and negotiated peace agreement. Even though not always explicitly pinpointed, many Nordic studies on peace mediation or negotiations have chosen this kind of interpretation as they examine mediation solely as a process to bring a war and violent activity to an end. However, if peace is understood to cover a multitude of positive content, such as the restoration of relationships, the creation of social systems that serve the needs of the whole population, and the constructive resolution of conflict, then negotiated or mediated agreement is not the end but only a culmination in a long process towards peace.

Peacebuilding is another term used to describe the whole peace process. In 1976, Johan Galtung defined *peacebuilding* as a promotion of sustainable peace by addressing the ‘root causes’ of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution.²⁹ During the last two decades, *peacebuilding* has referred to international peace-support operations which are in place in order to reconstruct collapsed states or societies after peace agreement is achieved. In the post-Cold War years, the previously hegemonic logic of peacekeeping was replaced by the logic of peacebuilding that includes the idea that after the end of an armed conflict international community does not just guarantee peace but that the establishment of a truly sustainable peace would require supporting the whole post-conflict societal development. The

²⁹ Johan Galtung (1976), ‘Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding’, in Galtung, *Essays in peace research*, vol. 2. Copenhagen: Ejlers, 282–304.

*Brahimi Panel Report*³⁰ from August 2000 defined ‘peace-building as including, but not limited to rebuilding civil society, strengthening the rule of law, through police restructuring and judicial and penal reform; improving the human rights situation by monitoring, educating and investigating abuses; democratic development including election and media regulation; tackling corruption; HIV/AIDS education and control; and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation’. Several large international peacebuilding operations have been established from the 1990s onwards in order to support failed and weak states after armed conflicts or humanitarian crisis.

Scholarly debate has recently criticized strongly international peacebuilding operation by noticing the so-called peacebuilding paradox: peacebuilding involves intervention on the establishment of sovereignty, indoctrination for the sake of enlightenment, and political coercion in the name of political freedom. It is emphasized that peacebuilding cannot be neutral as it reflects certain norms of good society and undermines local ownership.³¹ Still, according to scholars like Ioannis Tellidis, we should not forget, while critiquing, that ‘peace is desperately needed’. Therefore, the recent debate has concentrated on the discussion on a hybrid model of peacebuilding that would take more into consideration local experiences and ownership and cherish further ‘dignity and quality of life...what is actually needed in post-conflict scenarios’.³² Oliver Richmond has emphasized the importance of local and indigenous agency in peace process and has introduced the notion of ‘peace formation’ which he defines as a conceptual framework that ‘attempts to understand the local “formation” of peace’. According to him, ‘peace formation processes, where indigenous or local agents of peacebuilding, conflict resolution or development, in customary, religious, cultural, social or local political or local government settings, find ways of establishing

³⁰ <http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=brahimi+report+peacekeeping.pdf>

³¹ Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner & Michel Pugh (2011) ‘The end of history and the last liberal peacebuilder: a reply to Roland Paris’ *Review of International Studies*, 37(4): 1998–2003.

³² Ioannis Tellidis (2012), ‘The End of the Liberal Peace? Post-Liberal Peace vs. Post-Liberal States’ *International Studies Review*, 14(3), 429–435.

peace processes and dynamic local forms of peace, which are also constitutive of their state'.³³

Peacebuilding debate brings up a significant question on the role and position of peace mediation in peace process. On the one hand, mediation has gained a broader meaning as an important element of the whole peace process and not just a tactic to end an armed conflict. Mediation is currently seen as valuable practice or skill throughout the whole peacemaking process. On the other hand, criticism towards third-party intervention in the form of large-scale peacebuilding operations and Richmond's emphasis on local peace process brings up one question: what would be the position of mediation that represents a soft form of a third-party intervention? That question has not yet been studied but one suggestion is that even peace formation would need, in crucial times, third-party support, but at the same a broadened model of mediation is needed to offer new solutions.

Several Nordic scholars have recently challenged traditional focus on conflict mediation belonging solely to a peace process which leads to a negotiated agreement ending an armed conflict and instead called for approaches to understand peace mediation as a part of a broader peacebuilding process. In particular, peace mediation is examined as part of a broader peacebuilding process in recent books *Rethinking Peacebuilding. The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and the Western Balkans*, edited by Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl, and *Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding. Peace from the Ashes of War*, edited by Mikael Eriksson and Roland Kostić. Eriksson and Kostić argue that 'contemporary studies play only limited attention to the connection between peacemaking and peacebuilding and its implications for a more durable post-conflict peace' and if we want to study why some peace agreements fail and some last it is important to concentrate on analysing the position and implication of mediation in the whole peacebuilding process.³⁴ In similar terms, Professor Ole Wæver explained his understanding of conflict resolution and the part the mediation plays in that.

³³ Oliver Richmond (2013) 'Failed statebuilding versus peace formation' *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48(3), 384–7.

³⁴ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 5.

Mediation is not just needed for ending armed conflict but, in the best case, it is used to prevent conflict but also throughout the post-conflict peacebuilding process, for example, to reconcile conflicting identities and collective memories.³⁵

That is not to argue that previous studies on peace mediation have had no interest in post-conflict situation but that new studies present the role of peace mediation in peace process differently. Previously, mediation success was examined by studying if an agreement was achieved and, secondly, if the agreement has been sustainable. Success is usually measured by checking if an armed conflict has renewed within the following five-year period. New approaches concentrate on how mediated solution sets premises for building sustainable peace for years onwards and how the question of just peace should be recognized in mediated solution.

2.3. THE ROLE OF THE THIRD PARTY

Peace mediation process requires several actors. The number of parties involved in conflicts has increased but the same can also be said about the parties involved in mediation process. Still, all mediation processes involve a mediator and primary parties and/or representatives or advisers thereof. Primary parties of a conflict are the ones in disagreement, or, in other words, seeking control over a common or a limited resource. The so-called secondary parties in a conflict are not directly involved in a conflict, but do, in some way, support either one or some of the primary parties involved. Furthermore, there are third parties of a conflict, which refer to the ones whose aim is to make an effort to find a solution for the conflict at hand. It is also valuable to note that actors related to a conflict may vary their roles in different phases of a conflict.³⁶

Mediation situation requires ‘a form of intervention by a third party in a conflict or some other kind of a matter of dispute’.³⁷ When

³⁵ Ole Wæver’s keynote lecture at ‘Approaches to Peace Mediation: Is There Space For a Nordic Approach’ seminar held at Tampere 14.8.2013

³⁶ Svensson 2012, 178.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

defining a third party to a conflict, Wallensteen and Möller refer to the definition used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which defines a third party as ‘a party that is involved in either helping the warring parties to regulate the incompatibility or the level of the violence and work as an intermediary between the two’.³⁸

Mediation can be pursued by a single person like Martti Ahtisaari or Jan Eliasson, a non-governmental organization like the Carter Centre or the Crisis Management Initiative, a state like the United States or Norway, a regional body like the African Union or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or an international body like the United Nations or the European Union.³⁹

Individuals in a role of a mediator/a third party to a conflict are ‘people with particular status who can transcend the conflict divides, such as individuals with religious roles, retired statesmen or even businessmen’.⁴⁰ Traditionally, individuals practicing mediation are known as official representatives of their government who aim to assist formal interaction between high-level representatives of the parties in conflict.⁴¹ In recent years, two important studies focusing on Nordic peacemakers have been published. Svensson and Wallensteen have scrutinized the styles and modes of mediation through the experiences of Swedish diplomat Jan Eliasson. Mona Fixdal has edited a book *Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans* (2012) which focuses on several Nordic peacemakers including Martti Ahtisaari, Jan Egeland, and Thorvald Stoltenberg. It is worth to mention that despite Ahtisaari’s reputation in Finland there is no academic study on his work as a mediator written by a Finnish scholar.

Non-governmental actors’ activity in peace processes has dramatically increased. There are plenty of roles for non-governmental actors to take, such as the one of a pressure group. Roles of a facilitator, mediator, or an implementer of a peace process are also available for non-governmental actors. In addition, NGOs can play an important

³⁸ Wallensteen & Möller 2008, 58–9.

³⁹ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 12.

⁴⁰ Peter Wallensteen (2007), *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*. 2nd Edition. London: Sage, 266.

⁴¹ Bercovitch 2002, 10.

role as donor groups who take part in the transformation of social structures that are crucial for any peace process to be successful.⁴² However, especially the impact of non-governmental actors' third-party activity is mostly hard to ascertain. In spite of this, third-party activities of non-governmental actors may have stronger effect on lower levels of decision making compared to ultimate decision makers.⁴³

Timo Kivimäki and David Gorman emphasize the great variety and usefulness of activities that non-governmental actors may provide for peace processes. Roughly speaking, in all situations where exchange of ideas, information, and critical analysis is needed, non-governmental actors have a lot to give. On the other side, the authors recognize that whenever large scale power and persuasion is needed, official international institutions are likely to be more useful than non-governmental actors.⁴⁴ Furthermore, NGOs are useful 'in matching people, creating forums where enemies can meet' and helping 'brainstorming ideas on peace processes and peaceful solutions'.⁴⁵ Despite the growing presence and the significance of NGOs in peace processes, their role is not thoroughly studied and one major challenge is the fact that despite a growth in non-governmental third-party activity their impact on peace process is difficult to pinpoint as NGOs 'have impacts on lower levels of decision making rather than the ultimate decision makers'.⁴⁶

The arising interest of the international organizations on peace mediation has been noticed in Nordic studies and, in particular, the EU's role has been the target of Finnish studies.⁴⁷ Still, there

⁴² Timo Kivimäki & David Gorman, David (2008), 'Non-Governmental Actors in Peace Processes: The Case of Aceh', in Mellbourn, Anders & Wallensteen, Peter (eds.) *Third Parties and Conflict Prevention*. Anna Lindh Programme on Conflict Prevention, 2008 edition. Stockholm: Gidlunds, 181.

⁴³ Wallensteen 2012, 457.

⁴⁴ Kivimäki & Gorman 2008, 183.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 182.

⁴⁶ Wallensteen 2012, 457.

⁴⁷ Tanja Tamminen (2011), 'Strengthening European peace mediation capacities: A more proactive EU in the making?', in Piiparinen, Touko & Brummer, Ville (eds.) *Global networks of mediation: Prospects and avenues for Finland as a peacemaker*. FIIA report 32. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 45–52.

could have been more studies on closer scrutinization on the role of international or regional organizations. Somehow surprisingly a state has preserved, in peace mediation literature, a key actor role and, in particular, Norway's role as a peace mediator has been approached from various perspectives. However, for example, despite the emphasis on peace mediation at the Uppsala University no single study on Sweden's role as a peace mediator exists.

In regard to the role of states Svensson made a controversial observation when he compared democracies' and non-democracies' role as a mediator. He discovered that non-democracies are likely to be more successful in costly conflicts. As the successful outcome of a mediation process is not guaranteed, democracies' need to please internal audiences may hinder the strength of their mediation efforts. Instead, non-democracies have more freedom to use the withdrawal card in their mediation efforts, for they are not accountable to their internal audiences in the same sense.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Svensson 2008, 242.

3. MEDIATION IN ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS

3.1. TRANSNATIONAL WARFARE

As long as there have been wars and conflicts there has been a need for peacemakers and mediators among conflicting sides but as wars have changed during the past decades and centuries so have also the forms of peacemaking and peace diplomacy. As Mona Fixdal reminds, ‘peacemaking is not a uniform activity; unvarying and consistent over time. Rather, the nature of a conflict – the parties to it, what they fight about, and the way the war is being fought – will define the constraints within which a peacemaker operates, and tasks and challenges he or she faces.’⁴⁹

Peacemaking itself has a long history, and there have been various efforts to introduce and establish international systems that would solve and, in the best case, prevent wars, and perhaps in the future not just end one particular war but all wars. Before post-Cold War era the most intensive period of searching for mechanism of peacemaking was the end of the imperial age from the late 19th century to early the 20th century. During those times the aim was to establish a permanent system of arbitration that was the major agenda of the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907.⁵⁰ Peacemaking was then understood as a regulated system among sovereign states. However, the collapse of old multiethnic Empires of Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman created new challenges when

⁴⁹ Mona Fixdal (2012a) ‘Introduction: Peacemaking in Asymmetrical Conflicts’, in Fixdal (ed.) *Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2.

⁵⁰ John Gittings (2012) *The Glorious Art of Peace. From the Iliad to Iraq*. Oxford University Press, 142–9.

several ethnic conflicts spread, stretching from the Baltic Sea to Syria, which had a lot of common elements with current asymmetrical conflicts. International community and, in particular, the League of Nations were involved in mediating and solving many of these.⁵¹ Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen was involved in several early mediation cases among which the most famous is the Turkish–Greek peace treaty of 1922 that was based on massive exchange of population. The treaty, in practice, destroyed centuries-old multiethnic societies but was celebrated in its time, and Nansen was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and has been considered a national hero in Norway.⁵²

During the Cold War era international community was ‘rather successful in preventing, avoiding and resolving conflicts between states’ even though there were serious conflicts in Southeast Asia and Africa. Simultaneously, the proportion of conflicts within states – not between them – increased steadily; however, the international community was incapable to cope with these as ‘the principles and practices of international law and diplomacy with their emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention’ prevented international community to intervene in these conflicts. ‘Hence the realities of the Cold War restricted opportunities for peace diplomacy.’⁵³ That is not to say that states did not negotiate at all with non-state actors like rebel or terrorist groups even though that might have been rare but that these discussions can be defined merely as peace overtures without a possibility of a public process of peace mediation among state and non-state actors. Niall Ó Dochartaigh and Isak Svensson have discussed the mediators’ role in indirect negotiations by focusing on overtures between the British government and the IRA in the 1970s and early 1980s,⁵⁴ but as non-

⁵¹ Gittings 2012, 150–158; Martyn Housden (2012) *The League of Nations and the Organisation of Peace*. Pearson Education Limited.

⁵² Carl Emil Vogt (2005) ‘Fritjof Nansen and the Norwegian Peace Tradition’ http://www.hum.au.dk/forskorskoler/historiephd_old/papercarlemil2005.pdf

⁵³ Vidar Helgesen (2007) *How Peace Diplomacy Lost Post 9/11. What Implications are there for Norway?* Oslo Files on Defence and Security 03/2007, 6–7.

⁵⁴ Niall O. Dochartaigh & Isak Svensson, (2013) ‘The exit option: mediation and the termination of negotiations in the Northern Ireland conflict’ *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 24(1), 40–55.

state actors were not recognized as agents of war there was no open mediation to end this kind of a conflict.

International community's efforts and ability to mediate conflicts concentrated mainly on conflicts between states like in the case of the Iran–Iraq War in which the Swedes played an important role twice in the 1980s. First Olof Palme was nominated Special Representative of the UN's Secretary-General on November 1980 and mediation efforts took several years. However, there were long periods without active mediation and only low-level contacts were in place. The conflict finally ended in ceasefire in August 1988 two and a half years after Palme was murdered. Jan Eliasson, who took already part in the Palme mission, was appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Iran–Iraq in September 1988 and finally in 1991, over a decade after the beginning of the mediation process, Iran and Iraq signed an agreement which included the withdrawal of forces, demining, and the creation of a buffer zone as well as allowed the UN to start monitoring it.⁵⁵

In the post-Cold War era, the amount of intra-state wars has decreased in drastic terms but 'yet at the same time powerful states are projecting power and conducting military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Georgia'.⁵⁶ Large majority of war-kind conflicts have not any more occurred between states but rather have taken place within states and thus they can be defined as civil wars as most of the violent activity has been limited within the territory of a collapsing state. However, simultaneously transnational violence has spread its influences far away from the war zone. These conflicts are distinct from inter-state conflicts since they often take place within collapsing or weak states or, in other words, in cases where a state is loosening legitimacy for given territory. States are not fading away but in several conflict areas states have lost 'the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in a given territory'.⁵⁷ Typical

⁵⁵ Isak Svensson & Peter Wallensteen (2010) *The Go-Between. Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation*. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 137–47.

⁵⁶ Aggestam & Björkdahl 2009, 16.

⁵⁷ Jay Winter (2012) 'Postscript: War and Peace in a Transnational Age', in Fixdal, Mona (ed.) *Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2. See also Aggestam & Björkdahl 2009, 17–18.

examples from the 1990s are Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda but new cases have continuously appeared and the Syrian War is the latest example.

Classical Westphalian dichotomy and approach between internal–external, but also that of local–global, has appeared in blurred form. Several conflicts, in particular in the Balkans and the Middle East in the 1990s, challenge the Westphalian understanding of warfare as sole monopoly of states and instead of classical inter-state warfare the current violent conflicts represent a new kind of transnational warfare.⁵⁸ In studies focusing on peacemaking these conflicts are often defined as *asymmetrical wars*. The term is used to pinpoint how warring parties are not anymore only states but involve parties other than established governments like different rebel, paramilitary, and terrorist groups. The confusion on who the parties of the war are and thus who should be allowed to participate in peace negotiations are characteristic to new wars. The situation is often more blurred when it is examined closer as the rebel group can be, in practice, divided into several subgroups without any clear commanding hierarchies. The distinction between a soldier and a civilian that appears clear in classical Westphalian wars has also blurred and is also intertwined with targets and motivation of violence.

Asymmetrical wars ‘concern most essentially the claim to independence or statehood of an ethnic or national group initially ruled by others’ and, therefore, ‘the question of identity – whether it is conceived of in ethnic, religious, or national terms – is thus at the heart of these wars’.⁵⁹ Claims to power and political arguments are frequently based on identity discourses and ethnic homogeneity. As these conflicts are identity-based, they draw heavily on discourses of historical enmity, hatred, and insecurity, which trigger basic existential fears of group survival, expulsion, and ethnic cleansing.⁶⁰ As wars are about ‘identities’ and ‘memories’, the role of civil population has changed from a passive observer and a source of support into one of a main target of war, and the struggle is over the

⁵⁸ Winter 2012.

⁵⁹ Fixdal 2012a, 4.

⁶⁰ Aggestam & Björkdahl 2009, 17.

minds of people. The notion of ‘ethnic cleansing’ was introduced in the 1990s to describe the character of wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda which ended in brutal effort to physically destroy another ethnic group. Ownership of territory and expression of authenticity of one’s own community was seen required through the destruction of contradicting historical sites – sites of memory – as well as people themselves.

Furthermore, considering these ‘new wars’ it is difficult to make a distinction between warfare and organized crime, and large-scale violation of human rights has become commonplace in new wars. Thus the conflict often generates an extensive refugee problem that is transnational by nature. According to Winter, ‘war outside of the Westphalian state system appears to be increasingly intractable and frighteningly interminable’ as ‘subnational or transnational warfare at its worst is war without rules or ethnical conventions’.⁶¹ She pinpoints three specific features of the landscape of asymmetrical wars and how they play a significant role in peacemaking. All these three questions have been approached by several Nordic scholars. The *first* thing to note is that due to the amount of several sides in a conflict ‘multiple actors have to be involved in peacemaking’. Previously, peace negotiations took place only among states and non-state actors were excluded from peace diplomacy. Furthermore, there could have been a demand of a change of regime even before the negotiations start. Currently there is no possibility to this kind of luxury and it is important to involve all warring parties in negotiations. *Secondly*, in asymmetrical conflicts ‘those who sign the accords do not control all of those engaged in the conflict’ as was the case in state-centric diplomacy. Rebel and terrorist groups do not represent the whole population and they have not received their legitimacy through democratic procedures. *Thirdly*, the abuses of human rights have become commonplace in new conflicts and it is necessary to note in the process of peacemaking the question of justice and how war criminals are punished. Still, most of those who participate in peace negotiations have soiled their hands in blood. Thus, she concludes that ‘post-Westphalian peacemaking is not a matter for the faint hearted, but for those who can look war in the face, and see it as the abomination it is, whatever form it

⁶¹ Winter 2012, 254–5.

takes. For this, they deserve our attention, our respect, and our understanding.⁶²

3.2. PEACE DIPLOMACY

Several scholars have contested the notion of ‘new wars’ introduced by Mary Kaldor⁶³ in the 1990s as a justifiable term to describe the wars in the post-Cold War era. However, criticism is barking up the wrong tree. All features of new wars are certainly not new as such and this kind of idea of ‘new wars’ can already be found from the Cold War era and, in particular, from interwar and colonial era. However, although freedom movements and terrorist activists have existed since the 19th century, classical wars were seen to be the privilege of sovereign entities. The nodal point of the Westphalian system has been the monopolization of foreign policy and army to territorial sovereign states. Logical conclusion to that is that states have a privilege to wars and wars in Clausewitzian terms can be seen as one, even though extreme, tool in a political system. Peacemakers have to recognize the nature of war but also prevailing hegemonic discourse on what is understood as war or, as Fixdal writes, it is ‘war’s quintessential image’⁶⁴ that sets a frame for peacemaking itself.

The end of the Cold War changed, in drastic terms, international norms and practices and it enabled the development of a new kind of peace diplomacy. Simultaneously the understanding of the limits of state sovereignty and human rights has drastically changed. The integrity of a state was a dominating norm throughout the Cold War era but since the 1990s the intervention set by international community to end a humanitarian conflict was regarded as legitimate and even as an obligation for international community.⁶⁵ Several humanitarian interventions like Bosnia and Kosovo express a new

⁶² Winter 2012, 254–6.

⁶³ Mary Kaldor (2007) *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*. 2nd edition. Stanford University Press.

⁶⁴ Fixdal 2012a, 3.

⁶⁵ David Chandler (2002) *From Kosovo to Kabul. Human rights and International Intervention*. Pluto press.

norm which the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) has modified in 2000 into a form according to which sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect civilians, and the international community has a secondary responsibility if a sovereign state fails to fulfill its duty. However, there are not many cases in the 2000s when Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been applied and only in the Libyan case it was used for legitimating international intervention. Scholars argue about its importance and some like Alex Bellamy emphasize that it is the single most important development of international diplomacy⁶⁶ while others like Aidan Hehir call it the Emperor's new clothes⁶⁷.

Peacemaking and peace diplomacy have been also redefined as part of this drastic change of international norms. The 1990s was in particular a golden age of new peace diplomacy and some forty conflicts were successfully solved through peace negotiations. Third-party intervention to negotiations and peace mediation became accepted as wide-spread practices of international peace diplomacy but simultaneously diplomacy was not anymore limited exclusively among states but instead the states facilitated and mediated negotiations among various warring parties. In contrast to the Cold War norms, the change was drastic but it took place step by step through individual cases among which the Israel–Palestinian negotiations in 1993 in Oslo were a groundbreaking event (to be analysed in chapter 5.1.).

The Rwanda genocide in 1994 challenged the overwhelming optimism towards new peace diplomacy but according to Vidar Helgesen the date which marked the beginning of a new era was 11 September 2001. If the Oslo Peace Process in 1993 was a groundbreaking event for opening peace mediation also towards asymmetrical conflicts and allowing rebel or even terrorist organizations like PLO, which was at that time labelled as a terrorist organization, to participate in peace process, in the post-9/11 era 'terrorism has become policy making's mental Berlin Wall'. The

⁶⁶ Alex J. Bellamy 'The Responsibility to Protect: Added value or hot air?' *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48(3), 333–357.

⁶⁷ Aidan Hehir (2010) 'The Responsibility to Protect: "Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing"?' *International Relations*, 24(2), 218–239.

effects of this change have been drastic for conflict resolution efforts as ‘in the era of global terrorism, asymmetrical conflicts at the national level have increasingly come to be seen through the prism of global campaign against terrorism’. The result of this has been that attention is not paid to the dynamics of each conflict anymore but primarily the concern is the tactics of rebels and whether they use terrorist methods in their method of war. This kind of activity delegitimizes them as potential participants of peace discussion. In the post-9/11 era, it has not been anymore possible to negotiate, for example, with the terrorist-labelled Hamas, and therefore ‘Norway is caught between international anti-terrorist policies which it cannot influence and peace diplomacy ambitions it cannot live up to precisely’ because of the EU and US policies.⁶⁸

In contrast to Helgesen, Kristine Höglund pinpoints that even though the ‘need to stop violence’ calls for negotiations with terrorists, these negotiations are a risky business for states as they are widely seen as a sign weakness and irresponsibility. Vice versa, violence for terrorist groups is a prime form of acting and, thus, seeking peaceful dialogue between states and other parties is difficult for them and participation in negotiations may unbalance the credibility of the terrorist group. Nonetheless, labelling rebels as terrorists is also a rhetorical tool used to deny the rebels’ legitimacy and possibility to negotiate for peace.⁶⁹ The questions that require more research are how the war on terror has set new limits to peace diplomacy as well as how much global security framework defines what cases are mediated and what cases are not grasping the attention of the international community.

3.3. PARADOX OF ASYMMETRIC NEGOTIATION

‘There are different types of wars evident today and the peacemaking during and after asymmetrical conflicts poses its own distinct

⁶⁸ Helgesen 2007, 9–11, 14–16.

⁶⁹ Kristine Höglund (2011) ‘Tactics in Negotiations between States and Extremists. The Role of Cease-Fires and Counterterrorist Measures’, in Zartman, I. William & Faure, Guy Oliver (eds.) *Engaging Extremists. Trade-Offs, Timing, and Diplomacy*. United States Institute of Peace Press, 222–4.

challenges and dilemmas' and thus asymmetrical conflicts require asymmetrical diplomacy.⁷⁰ Or, as Helgesen notes, 'if asymmetric conflicts are to be resolved then asymmetric diplomacy is needed meaning that states should learn to negotiate with terrorists'.⁷¹ The main question is how asymmetric diplomacy differs from state-to-state diplomacy and what kind of new practices it requires. Helgesen, in his turn, takes a rather practical viewpoint by pointing out that asymmetric diplomacy provides what negotiators need in order to have a better understanding of the rebels' political interests, to assure rebels that participation in diplomatic process is the best way to influence the future, and to also negotiate with terrorist to end terrorist activity. As all this is certainly important, other Nordic scholars have either examined asymmetric negotiation situations from a more general point of view or then studied the particular toolbox of a mediator to equalize the negotiations situation.

As Fixdal points out, asymmetric negotiation situation holds a paradox as 'best negotiation situations are among equals and thus efficient negotiations is not possible in asymmetric situation'. Some minimal equality between the negotiating parties is required because if the negotiating parties are very unequal 'the party with more power have an undue advantage' and in that situation peace negotiations are merely able to continue with the unilateral actions of the stronger party.⁷²

Even though asymmetric negotiation is in theory a paradox, the acceptance of an asymmetric situation is also reality if a third party intervenes to end an asymmetric conflict. What strategies does the mediator use to balance the asymmetric negotiations and to moderate power asymmetry? Following Fixdal, the principal requirement for a successful negotiation situation among asymmetric parties is that negotiating parties have a basic respect for the people they are negotiating with and on behalf of.⁷³ In current asymmetric conflicts this not necessarily the case and the mediation situation holds

⁷⁰ Fixdal 2012a, 4.

⁷¹ Helgesen 2007, 13–14.

⁷² Mona Fixdal (2012b) *Just Peace. How Wars Should End*. Palgrave Macmillan, 35–8.

⁷³ Fixdal 2012b, 27.

discrepancy of expectations by parties and often ‘the bargaining situation is inevitably unfair’. Mediation may also be used by parties who are not committed to negotiations and compromises. Mediation, therefore, becomes a cover for more ‘devious objectives’ such as enhancing international legitimacy or gaining time. The parties in conflict must have a certain degree of recognition towards each other in order for official negotiations to take place.⁷⁴

Participation in mediation process offers as a by-product for a non-state actor (international) recognition and grants certain legitimacy for its position as the opponent (participating state) and the international community agrees on non-state actor’s agency. Thus, gaining this international recognition may be enough for rebels. However, although the non-state actors lack a legal status they still have the burden of proving their acceptance to be included to peace process and ‘if such a group cannot claim popular support or if it has engaged in violation of the laws of war, its plea to be brought into the negotiations process is often ignored’.⁷⁵ Mediation situation may offer for a state actor an opportunity to preserve status quo. Sri Lanka’s case (to be analysed in chapter 5.1.) offers a good example of these contradicting interests participating in a peace process.

In recent years, the spoiling problem has gained some attention within peace mediation literature. Spoiling refers to international or national acts of violence aimed at derailing a peace process. Yet in academia it has remained a relatively unexplored area of research and thus the role of a spoiler as one of the players influencing the mediation process should be noticed in the study of mediation process. Still, peace process almost by definition produces spoiling behaviour since it challenges established assumptions of who is a patriot and a traitor, an enemy and a friend, and who becomes the winner and the loser when peace agreement is to be implemented.⁷⁶ Höglund concentrates in her study on how incidents of violence influence the course of peace negotiations. High-profile incidents of

⁷⁴ Svensson 2012, 177–8.

⁷⁵ Fixdal 2012a, 17.

⁷⁶ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 28.

violence ‘may serve as a reminder of the cost and risk of continued fighting’ and then strengthen efforts to achieve peace, but in the most cases influences are negative and peace talks are postponed, stalled, or cancelled altogether. If violence affects either inter-party mistrust among negotiating partners or intra-party opposition to peace talks, effects are damaging for negotiations.⁷⁷ Höglund does not examine how a third party could manage this kind of a situation.

Höglund and Svensson have closely studied several practices that mediators have in an asymmetric situation. According to them, ‘asymmetry is a multidimensional and dynamic concept’ and for example in the case of Sri Lanka legal asymmetries, material imbalances, imbalance in negotiations’ capacities, and tactical asymmetries can be recognized. In regard to legal asymmetry the case pinpointed that the state has the ability to sign treaties, and participation in negotiations does not offer the state any further value. Rebel groups lack international recognition and thus similar legal status to sign treaties. The mediator needs to accept the imbalance as it is but then the mediator could apply equalizing strategies towards the parties to manage the asymmetric situation. They could either disregard the asymmetries (even-handedness) or seek to empower the weaker side (equalizing). The latter is challenging if the mediator tries to preserve their impartiality at the same time.⁷⁸ During the Oslo Back Channel Norway more or less even-handed the Israelis and the Palestinians but in Sri Lanka both methods were in use as it will be more closely analysed in chapter 5.1..

⁷⁷ Höglund 2008, 5, 13, 154.

⁷⁸ Kristine Höglund & Isak Svensson (2008a) ‘Damned if You Do, and Damned if You Don’t: Nordic Involvement and Images of Third-Party Neutrality in Sri Lanka’ *International Negotiation*, 13(3), 345–6.

4. MEDIATOR'S STYLES AND PRACTICES

Regarding studies on peace mediation, there can be recognized a division between those scrutinizing peace mediation situation as part of a broader conflict resolution process and those who approach peace mediation as a practical diplomatic skill. The first grants more attention to the whole process and focuses on (long-term) influences of peace mediation situation as the latter emphasizes more mediator's perspective and concentrates on styles and practices available for mediation situation. However, the division is far from simple and clear. Among Nordic scholars, particularly Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen have in their studies emphasized that scholarly interest should also focus on 'the styles of international mediation' because 'style is crucial for understanding how the mediation process unfolds'.⁷⁹

4.1. MANDATE

According to Wallensteen, the *appointment* and *mandate* of the mediator as well as the *approach* taken by the third party when dealing with all the parties in a conflict are two crucial issues when it comes to the work of a third party in a conflict.⁸⁰ Mediator's mandate is essential in defining the approach of the mediator to peace process. Svensson and Wallensteen remind that 'no mediator end up by chance in a conflict' and also mediation has its history. 'All mediators operate under a mandate' but who sets the mandate and what the mandate says are pivotal questions to pose in order to

⁷⁹ Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, xi.

⁸⁰ Wallensteen 2007, 267.

examine the whole mediation process, which, following Svensson and Wallensteen, is underestimated in peace mediation literature. ‘While the mandating agency can be an asset to the mediator, it may also restrict what the mediator can do, because the mediator must navigate between the primary parties and the mandating agency.’ Furthermore, the mandating agency ‘shapes the way the primary parties view the third party’.⁸¹

Mandates can be given by parties themselves or by an external actor. In the first case, the mandate is usually given ‘through an informal process’ and formal invitation follows later. In this case the work of the mediator is confidential by nature and only when ‘results are achieved the world knows what has been going on’. However, the parties retain a veto and thus the position of the mediator is weaker. The external actor mandating the mediator could be ‘a major power, an international or regional organization, or some other body or group to which the country in question formally belongs or whose authority it has to respect’. Even though the parties have to accept mediation process, they can remain unhappy with the objective or the mediator and strive to ruin the process in different ways.⁸²

Most commonly the mediator to an international conflict has been chosen, for example, by the UN Security Council or the Secretary-General. In general, the UN appointment procedure is seen as impartial and the conflicting parties may have an influence on who is chosen. The mandate given by the UN Security Council guarantees in the best way the required international support and cohesion for the mediator to enter into a conflict. Furthermore, following Svensson and Wallensteen, regional context is important for all conflicts and, in particular, for protracted conflicts and third-party interventions which require regional support. However, Wallensteen emphasizes that the primary parties to a conflict have to accept and agree on the third party’s role in conflict in all cases.⁸³

⁸¹ Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 11–15.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 12–14.

⁸³ Wallensteen 2007, 267; Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 115.

Bercovitch makes a distinction between formal and informal mediation activities by an individual mediator. In addition to formal mediation activity carried out by government officials or political incumbents, there is information mediation practice, which may refer to either well-experienced mediators specialized in international mediation, or to other scholars who, with their professionalization, have a possibility to give an input to the negotiation process between the belligerents.⁸⁴ It is worthwhile to notice that most often the cases of this so-called ‘unofficial third-party intervention’ are carried out by independent non-governmental institutions like the Carter Centre or the CMI.⁸⁵

In her analysis on Norway’s involvement in the Oslo Back Channel, Aggestam defines the mediation practiced as ‘quasi-informal’ in kind. The term ‘quasi-informal’ refers to mediation, which is not strictly formal or informal, but more like a combination of the two. The Oslo Back Channel gives a good illustration of what kind of results the coordination of informal and formal processes of mediation might cause. The networking of officials at Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and academics from the NGOs provided flexibility and made it possible to offer a suitable negotiation milieu for the belligerent parties according to their preferences at different stages of the negotiation process. Instead of the traditional way of focusing on a multitude of dichotomies and distinction between formal and informal mediation activities, more interest should be given to the possible interplay between different actors practicing mediation.⁸⁶ Furthermore, as Kivimäki and Gorman note, ‘good ideas, analyses and innovations on solutions do not require mandate and thus can be offered by anyone, also non-governmental entities’.⁸⁷

Svensson and Wallensteen also make a distinction between ‘primarily political and humanitarian mediation’ and they continue

⁸⁴ Bercovitch 2002, 10.

⁸⁵ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 12.

⁸⁶ Karin Aggestam (2002) ‘Quasi-Informal Mediation in the Oslo Channel: Larsen and Holst as Individual Mediators’, in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.) *Studies in international mediation: essays in honor of Jeffrey Z. Rubin*. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 58, 72–4.

⁸⁷ Kivimäki & Gorman 2008, 183.

to argue that ‘the significance of humanitarian mediation has been disregarded in the international mediation literature’. They follow with their definition that ‘political mediation involves diplomatic negotiations between conflicting parties to find a way to solve an incompatibility or to develop procedure for settling the conflict’. Mediation in humanitarian crisis situation ‘does not aim at resolving underlying political issues but serves to manage a humanitarian situation’ and it concentrates on achieving temporal ceasefires, delivering sufficient assistance and, in general, managing emergency situation. Because ‘humanitarian issues may be less sensitive’ than conflicts dealing with ‘national issues of power and territory’, they can constitute ‘an entry point’ to expand negotiations also to politically crucial issues.⁸⁸

4.2. MEDIATION STYLES

When it comes to practices and styles of peace mediation, the focus has traditionally been on one particular peace mediation case or on working practices of an individual mediator. The role of an individual mediator should not be overestimated, even if the mediator’s personality, without a doubt, affects the styles of mediation as some mediators ‘may appear tough, rude, uncompromising, principled, and even dull’ while others, in contrast, are ‘open, attentive, culturally sensitive, flexible, or even charming’ because ‘a bit of artistry and acting skills’ are required from all mediators. Nevertheless, the mediation practices are not based on the activity of an ‘individual star’, mediation is always team work and thus instead of focussing on one particular mediator the focus should be more on the mediation team as Svensson and Wallensteen remind.⁸⁹

Mediation teams consist of qualified individuals representing different professional fields who work in unity under one mandate in order to gain a successful mediation outcome. While introducing mediation team as a recommended way of practicing mediation, the advantages related to a well-known and experienced individual

⁸⁸ Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 15, 131.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 117–8.

mediator are not forgotten. Mediators' personal connections to world politicians and their ability to draw public attention to the process can be of great support for the continuation of the mediation process. Still, the complex nature of today's conflicts demand larger resources and knowledge in order to be resolved than any single, even the most successful mediator can bring forth. Besides, mediation teams are an easy access for young diplomats to gain valuable experience on mediation in practice. Eliasson himself is a good example as he first participated in top Iran–Iraq negotiations as part of Olof Palme's team and then later took full responsibility of peace negotiations.⁹⁰

A mediator's level of experience is connected to the outcome of a mediation process, but on the other hand, it is obvious that every mediation case is unique and methods and style of mediation must be chosen according to the case in hand. For that purpose, it is important to recognize specific styles in mediation that are based on exhaustive empirical studies on peace mediation cases. Therefore, recent studies on mediator's styles and practices utilize experiences of one mediator to outline a more general categorization of mediation styles and practices. Svensson and Wallensteen particularly search for generalizations and call for more comparative approach in their study on Jan Eliasson.⁹¹ They recognize four key dimensions of mediation style: *scope*, *methods*, *mode*, and *focus*.⁹² They have examined these dimensions through various mediation cases in which Eliasson has been engaged but they also briefly compare him with other mediators. The question of scope is primarily linked to an entry to mediation process as the other three are connected to an actual mediation situation but also the way how to exit from mediation. Additionally, they identify opposing policies in each dimension that are not necessarily exclusive but each mediator can apply their own mix of options.

Concerning the *scope* of mediation, 'the support from key international actors and the acceptance of the main parties in the

⁹⁰ Ibid., 129.

⁹¹ Ibid., 128–9.

⁹² Ibid., 114.

conflict' has been crucial for Eliasson as well as for many other mediators. Primary question when setting mediation in current asymmetric conflicts is to 'whether to include all parties or exclude some' but also how to define who relevant parties are and how long the process will remain open for new parties as in asymmetrical war non-state actors change all the time. It is also difficult to recognize who could represent who as there is no legal or democratic procedure on which this right is based. The mediator has to deal with the complexity of the asymmetrical conflict but Svensson and Wallensteen call for simpler arrangements and suggest that the mandating organizations would already decide on participation.⁹³ In contrast, Fixdal emphasizes that it should be the mediator who, in the final state, decides who is invited to participate in negotiations. Even though the mediator decides to be as inclusive as possible, all parties do not necessarily want to participate and might altogether contest the legitimacy of the mediator.⁹⁴

Eriksson and Kostić approach the same questions from another angle and emphasize how *representation* and *involvement* of the primary parties is crucial for a successful peace mediation process. However, as they continue, 'the degree of participation and involvement in negotiations by the primary parties is clearly influenced by type and practices of the mediator. In particular, procedural issues are intimately linked to ownership of the process in the post-agreement phase.'⁹⁵

Confidential and open mediation appear to Svensson and Wallensteen as opposite *modes* of mediation. Their particular target of study, Eliasson, had varied these methods in his mediation cases – from confidential mediation in the Iran–Iraq War to emphasis on openness and public attention in the Darfur case. It seems that more open approach is easier to apply in humanitarian mediation cases. However, these options do not seem to be either–or but in all peace negotiations the actual conduct remains confidential and the mediator cannot 'publicly reveal much beyond that to which

⁹³ Ibid., 133.

⁹⁴ Fixdal 2012a, 17.

⁹⁵ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 160–2.

the parties can agree, if the mediation is to continue'. Question of openness is intertwined with media publicity of mediation and what is informed and for what reason. Often the situation is personified with one star mediator in media that enables wider publicity and may restrict the understanding of the complexity of mediation situation.⁹⁶

Alternative options for *methods* of mediation are, following Svensson and Wallensteen, forcing and fostering. Their case Eliasson 'has primarily used a fostering style' alike most of the other Nordic mediators but, for example, Richard Holbrooke, an American mediator for Bosnian War, 'chose a more forcing approach' and 'explicitly threatened the Serbian side during the negotiation with coercive methods'. The latter method was based on developing leverage as fostering was based more on efforts to create momentum through confidence building measures.⁹⁷

Several distinctions are used in mediation literature in order to describe different methods of mediation, and they are referred to as 'soft' and 'hard' mediation, 'power-based' or 'trust-orientated' mediation, or then mediator's strategies are defined with terms like 'facilitation', 'formulation', and 'manipulation/directive strategies'. Wallensteen sees it important to make a fundamental distinction between mediators with much power, 'muscle', and those with less or no physical power.⁹⁸ Traditionally inter-group negotiations and neutral mediation has been seen as the most effective form of peacemaking as 'in the past two decades members of the international community have resorted more frequently to third-party power mediation'.⁹⁹

The issue of 'power mediation' is intertwined with another classical question in peace mediation literature – the role and legitimacy of biased mediators and mediators with profound self-interest. Impartiality towards the incompatibility is seen as

⁹⁶ Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 118–9.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 116–8, 123.

⁹⁸ Wallensteen 2007, 269.

⁹⁹ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 6.

an essential characteristic in defining the third party¹⁰⁰ but while examining various mediators and mediation processes closer with a critical eye the requirement of impartiality seems problematic and difficult to delineate. Wallensteen names the United States of America as an example of a player in the field of international peace mediation, which, in the strictest sense, cannot always be cited as a third party to a conflict. The USA has itself appointed an actor, such as the President, the Secretary of State or some other high-ranking official of the administration to several international conflicts over a long period of time. According to Wallensteen, the USA cannot be seen as a third party in the true sense, as it often has its own interests in the outcome of the mediation effort. In addition, the USA's capability to resort to military power emphasizes its interests in the playground of international conflicts. Due to this appearance of the USA, only few Americans have been appointed as special representatives for mediation by the UN.¹⁰¹

Following Eriksson and Kostić, 'the interests and motives of the intervening liberal powers are framed around the humanitarian ethos of peacebuilding and the alleviation of human suffering. Yet, as the cases of the USA-led Western-power interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan show this is highly questionable.' Power negotiator enters into the peace process with ready-made solutions and therefore 'the powerful third party provides most of the normative and practical solutions intended to promote a durable settlement'. That is why they seriously arise a question whether 'locally arranged peacemaking processes are always the better alternative' even though home-grown peace negotiations are rare.¹⁰² Svensson and Wallensteen take a more cautious position but they also emphasize that long-term and stable international mediation support requires some local institutional settings in the conflict area.¹⁰³

According to Wallensteen, the level of power a mediator holds is directly related to the format of the peace talks. The methods of

¹⁰⁰ Wallensteen & Möller 2008, 58–59

¹⁰¹ Wallensteen 2007, 268–9.

¹⁰² Eriksson & Kostić 2013b, 159–162.

¹⁰³ Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 132.

leading peace talks used by a mediator with little or no physical power are characterized by persuasion, confidence development, and deal-making. On the one hand, these kinds of efforts tend to demand a lot of effort and are often time-consuming. On the other hand, the activities demand real action from the conflicting parties and commit the parties in a long-term peacebuilding process. In a case when a mediator holds a greater amount of power, a permanent ceasefire or a constitution seems more likely to be achieved in a shorter period of time compared to the format of talks mentioned first.¹⁰⁴ In contrast to power-based mediation, 'neutral mediation and negotiations are often more protracted, achieving peace takes longer, and in the meantime suffering and destruction continue'. However, if we examine durability of a peace agreement or the quality of peace solutions achieved, in power mediation weak legitimacy and weak commitment by the primary parties often suffer.¹⁰⁵

Nordic countries are often seen as having a reputation of being neutral and impartial, or non-biased in a mediation situation. Some Nordic mediators have followed this principle of impartiality very strictly even so that this kind of ignorance to question war crimes has raised harsh criticism later. For example, Fixdal notes that Stoltenberg may have 'exaggerated the instrumental importance of his neutrality' when he rejected to agree on Bosnia's role as a victim of the Serbs' aggression.¹⁰⁶ Even if a mediator is not a judge they cannot altogether escape or ignore questions on aggressive and immoral warfare. Although there is a lot of experience which supports the importance of the idea of mediators' impartiality in their position, this does not mean that this position should be entirely neutral. In a case where the mediator is known to have a close relationship with one of the parties of a conflict, it may help to place some pressure on this or, like in the case of the famous Oslo Back Channel in the early 1990s, Norway's close relationship with Israel made it easier for Israel to accept Norway as a mediator rather

¹⁰⁴ Wallensteen 2007, 270–1.

¹⁰⁵ Eriksson & Kostić 2013, 7.

¹⁰⁶ Fixdal 2012a, 13 and in more details Mona Fixdal (2012c) 'The Priority of Peace: Thorvald Stoltenberg', in Fixdal (ed.) *Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans*. Palgrave Macmillan, 119–138.

than Sweden which has traditionally taken a more critical view towards Israel's policy against the Palestinians. However, Norway even abandoned its strict reading of impartiality principle during the peace process as it informed and listened to Washington's advice throughout the peacemaking process and, in the end of the process, heavily pushed the agreement on the direction the U.S. supported.¹⁰⁷ Still, this did not harm Norway's brand as a peace nation.

The termination tactic of a mediator is one particular form of forcing method. Svensson finds support for the claim that not all types of actors can imply a termination-threat in a credible manner. Although the termination tactic can be applied by strong and weak mediators alike, it is more challenging for weak mediators, since their strength is based on the commitment to the peace process itself. If the mediator using the termination tactic has been invited to provide assistance with the peace process by the belligerents themselves, the threat of termination is likely to be more effective.¹⁰⁸ Also the credibility of a threat of termination is an important factor affecting its applicability. In addition, the termination tactic has turned out to be more effective in cases where the negotiation channel seemed feasible compared to the ones where the threat of war is obvious.¹⁰⁹

Svensson has also studied the credibility of third-party mediators. In the study on the occurrence of third-party security guarantees in internal armed conflicts, he examines the relationship between the promise to enforce or verify post-treaty behaviour and the provision of expected services. Svensson takes into consideration all internal armed conflicts from 1989 to 2003 according to the list of conflicts from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, 2005). The aim of placing the research focus on promises and requests besides the actual peacekeeping is to gain a deeper understanding on

¹⁰⁷ Waage 2007, 163, 170–4.

¹⁰⁸ Isak Svensson (2008) 'Democracies, Disengagement and Deals: Exploring the Effect of Different Types of Mediators in Internal Armed Conflicts', in Öberg, Magnus & Strøm, Kaare (eds.) *Resources, Governance and Civil Conflict*. London: Routledge, 242.

¹⁰⁹ Kristine Höglund & Isak Svensson (2011) 'Should I Stay or Should I Go? Termination as a Tactic and Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lanka' *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*, 4(1), 25–8.

the processes of peacekeeping actions. The premature assumption in Svensson's research is that due to its traditionally honest and credible reputation the UN is more credible in its commitments to safeguard peace agreements compared to the non-UN peace guarantors. A third-party security guarantee often refers to the verification and monitoring of the process of national recovery, controlling and supervising the disengagement of forces, and the deterrence of violators of agreements. Previous research results show a clear evidence of the strong linkage between third-party security guarantees and the likelihood of peace. The outcome in the Svensson's study is that the UN's role as a third party in the field of peace mediation is strong and it still can be seen as the main agency responsible for maintaining global peace and security. Reputation is named as the one ultimate resource for the UN to act in its role of a peace guarantor. Therefore, the UN should be serious in its efforts to protect and strengthen its reputation and practical capability to act as a peace guarantor, for it is not something that is unbreakable.¹¹⁰

The fourth and last dimension of mediation styles that Svensson and Wallensteen list is the *focus* of peace negotiations. The mediator has to encounter in their work a normative question on narrow or wide peace. Thus, whether the focus on peace negotiations is on 'the immediate war-related issues or on broader dimensions, including justice', it is good to notice that 'peace may contradict justice in a number of ways'. A challenging question is how to relate justice with peace from mediator's perspective. How much and in what way the issues that are regarded as reasons for the war should be noticed in the peace process? What questions are attached to humanitarian law including the question of war crimes? And then, is it right that peace agreement 'corresponds to principles of legality and justice'? The mediator has limited opportunities to 'pursue a justice-based approach' if they wish to talk with all parties. Still, the mediators are expected to act from a moral high ground and are usually mandated

¹¹⁰ Isak Svensson (2009) 'Guaranteeing Peace: The Credibility of Third-Party Mediators in Civil Wars', in Bercovitch, Jacob & Gartner, Scott (eds.) *International Conflict Mediation. New approaches and findings*. London: Routledge, 116–118, 122, 129. About the Uppsala Conflict Data Program see <http://uppsalaconflictdataprogram.wordpress.com/>

by and represent ‘an organization based on international law and humanitarian rules’. Therefore, balancing between broader and narrower understanding of peace is always difficult and omnipresent in all mediation situations. Lakhdar Brahimini, the well-known mediator in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, argues that it is ‘not mediator’s role to focus on human rights’ and that ‘peacemaking implied talking to people with blood on their hands’. Eliasson, in his term, has taken a more humanitarian ethos and, in particular in Darfur, his goal was to end human suffering of the population, and concentrating primarily on humanitarian questions may lead to quick and successful results as in Burma and Sudan.¹¹¹

Fixdal also notes differences among mediators who aimed merely to find a quick end to war and those who worked ‘for a particular kind of solution, one that is better than others from a moral point of view’. In contrast to Svensson and Wallensteen, Fixdal argues that as ‘injustices gives rise to grievances, which in turn can lead to renewed conflict and violence’, the mediator should not regard justice in too simple a form, and it is essential that the mediator considers what could the role of a third party be in building just peace (this important phenomenon is discussed separately in chapter 6).¹¹²

¹¹¹ Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 120–2, 126.

¹¹² Fixdal 2012a, 17–18.

5. NORDIC MODEL: NORWAY AS A PEACE NATION

Distinguished Nordic politicians were, from time to time, used as peace mediators during the Cold War era but small (Nordic) *states* did not act in any role as mediators. In the post-Cold War era new peace diplomacy opened up a possibility for non-state actors to participate in a peace process and thus states lost the monopoly of being the sole actors in peace diplomacy. Simultaneously various international organizations like the UN and regional as well as non-governmental organizations were involved in peacemaking. As part of this process several small states like Norway have been profiled as peacebuilders and they have determinately built their brand of a peace mediator. Norway led the way to the new peace diplomacy and the Norwegian government set peace diplomacy as its priority in the 1990s. The Norwegian opening was followed by the Canadian, Swiss, and Swedish governments who stepped up ‘their support of peace efforts’ and a decade later also Finland followed their lead.¹¹³

Nordic scholars have approached the emergence of new peace diplomacy and mediation practices in the 1990s through two cases in both of which Norway had a central role as a mediator or facilitator: the so-called Oslo Back Channel in 1993 and the Sri Lankan civil war in 2002. It is possible to examine the development of peace mediation practices by examining closer these two cases as well as critically evaluating the question on who should and who are allowed to participate in peace negotiations but also questions of impartiality and credibility of the mediator.

¹¹³ Helgesen 2007, 8. See also Iver B. Neumann (2011) ‘Peace and reconciliation efforts as systems-maintaining diplomacy: The case of Norway’ *International Journal*, 66(3), 573; Pertti Joenniemi (2013) ‘Finland: a non-traditional peacemaker’ *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 19(1), 53–9.

5.1. THE OSLO BACK CHANNEL

The Palestine–Israel conflict has deep roots reaching all the way to the mandate rule of interwar era but in the post-Second World War era it metamorphosed into a conflict between Israel state and Palestinians without their own state. As negotiations following the existing international norms were possible only among states, the Palestinians could not participate in negotiations on peace and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) could not represent Palestinians in state-centric negotiations. This changed in the early 1990s, and Norway had a significant role on the sidelines generating successful conditions for direct Israel–Palestinian discussions.¹¹⁴ Norwegian scholar Hilde Henriksen Waage has explored in detail in her several articles Norway’s surprising role as a facilitator in the very first direct Israel–Palestinian discussion and the efforts that were made in order to begin the peace process. This so-called Oslo backchannel diplomacy was groundbreaking in terms of negotiations even though it did not bring about a lasting peace to the Middle East. However, it challenged old practices of peace diplomacy and opened a door for negotiations with rebel and terrorist groups at least in certain cases.

The initiator for foray of peace was the U.S. government, and during 1992 it was considered that there was ‘a new window of opportunity for peace negotiations’. Washington organized its own peace congress in Madrid in October 1991 which established a diplomatic link between Israel and its Arab neighbours. However, manoeuvres to establish a direct contact between Israel and PLO did in fact take place in Norway and it all started in a very informal way and outside the spotlights of international diplomacy. It remains a mystery whether it was just a lucky chance or whether it was clearly planned from the very beginning. Two Israeli academics, the three Palestinian representatives of the PLO, and a Norwegian couple ‘came together under the auspices of a research institute in a small Norwegian town on 20 January 1993. None seemed likely candidates for a government mandated peace mission, yet the secret meeting that cold winter day launched a process that evolved into the “Oslo

¹¹⁴ Fixdal 2012a, 4–9.

back channel” that ultimately, some eight months later, produced the accord that was to change the face of the Middle East.¹¹⁵

Negotiations in the early stage were ‘entirely informal and exploratory’ and Norway’s role was ‘modest and largely unplanned, developing as it went along’. Norwegians did not regard themselves as mediators but as facilitators. Following Waage, the host ‘never interfered in the negotiations or even were present when they going on’. However, the Norwegians established clear “‘ground rules” that mandated total secrecy and the retractability of all positions put forward in the talks and prohibited “dwelling on the past grievances”’. The host was also responsible of the famous Oslo spirit that cherished the atmosphere of friendship and humour. As negotiations continued and Israeli participation changed into an official one, the status of peace talks was upgraded. At this point also Norway’s role changed and ‘from May 1993, Norway was no longer a mere facilitator, but also an active mediator. Norway’s new foreign minister, Johan Jørgen Holst, wanted to play an active, personal role. He wanted to be the key person, with complete responsibility.’¹¹⁶

The setting of the negotiations was clearly asymmetrical and the host ‘did everything they could to ensure asymmetrical process. They strove to make all logistical arrangements just perfect’ and to empower the weaker site, the Palestinians. But in its mediator’s role Norway ‘did not involve being on equal terms with each of the involved parties’ in the end of the process and the Norwegians took ‘a clear stand on questions related to the Declaration of Principles and on the negotiations over mutual recognition’. The Norwegians also kept the Americans informed on the process throughout the peace discussions which culminated into the signing of the Oslo

¹¹⁵ Hilde Henriksen Waage (2005) ‘Norway’s role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Small State and a Weak Belligerent’ *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 34(4), 6–7; Hilde Henriksen Waage (2007) ‘The Minnow and the Whale: Norway and the United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East’ *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 34(2), 158.

¹¹⁶ Waage 2005, 8–12; Waage 2007, 165–170.

Agreement in Washington on 13 September 1993 and a snapshot of Arafat and Rabin shaking hands in front of President Clinton.¹¹⁷

5.2. THE SRI LANKAN PEACE TALKS

In 1983, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE, also known as the Tamil Tigers) opened up an armed campaign against the Sri Lankan government in order to create an independent Tamil state. The long civil war ended finally in 2009 with a military victory of the Sri Lankan forces over the Tamil Tigers. The last operation was, however, preceded by an effort to achieve negotiated peace and Norway was appointed, following the request of the warring parties (Sri Lankan government and the LTTE), a peace mediator in January 2002 but the mediator's role was preceded by a more unofficial role of a facilitator. Already in late 1999 Sri Lankan President Kumaratunga 'publicly announced Norway's role as a facilitator' and with this move aimed to strengthen the peace process. However, it was not until the regime change in 2001 when mediated peace process was initiated, and the ceasefire agreement was signed in February 2002. That was followed by six rounds of negotiations before the LTTE withdrew from peace talks in 2003 and a couple years later escalating violence ended the efforts of reinitiated peace process.¹¹⁸ Thus, the peace process is now regarded as a failure even though it was first celebrated as a success.

The Sri Lankan case has been used by Höglund and Svensson to analyse the toolbox of a mediator in asymmetric situation but also Norway's interest and motives to participate in this faraway conflict. The Sri Lankan case also brings about questions concerning mandate and impartiality of the third party and the representativeness of parties in negotiations. The Norwegian policy towards mediation was 'based on impartiality, emphasizing ownership of the process by the primary parties, and seeking a high degree of internationalization'.

¹¹⁷ Waage 2007, 160–2, 170–4.

¹¹⁸ Kristine Höglund & Isak Svensson (2009) 'Mediating between Tigers and Lions: Norwegian Peace Diplomacy in Sri Lanka's Civil War' *Contemporary South Asia*, 17(2), 175–7.

Vice versa, ‘Norway was selected as a mediator because the parties saw it as an unbiased intermediary, which had the potential to gain access to both sides’. Norway had engaged with Sri Lanka previously through several development projects and thus it was a well-known actor. However, Norwegian impartiality was partly challenged due to the accused influence of the Norwegian Tamili Diaspora but also due to the argument that Norway was ‘too lax to terrorism and holds a generally sympathetic attitude towards non-state actors’.¹¹⁹

Norwegian mediator encountered a classical asymmetric situation among negotiating parties and both practices, even-handedness and equalizing, were applied during peace mediation situation. The mediator strove to change the imbalance of political capabilities by allowing the import of radio equipment, and after the incidents at the sea the mediator tried to change the status quo. In the case of violations against ceasefire both parties were treated in equal terms and despite the imbalance of military capabilities the mediator aimed to maintain the current circumstances. However, beside material and legal asymmetries there can be recognized also ‘a clear tactical asymmetry as the LTTE committed more acts in violation of the cease-fire than the government did’ and the Nordic monitors were blamed of being blind toward this and the mediator’s strategies were criticized which broke further the trust to successful ending of peace process. Still, the main reason for failure of the peace process was not that of Nordic monitoring operation and the mediator’s strategy but in primary parties’ interests and policies and, among all others, lack of mutual respect and trust. ‘The Sri Lankan conflict has shown itself remarkably resistant to conflict resolution efforts, including international mediation.’ Mediating asymmetric conflicts is always dancing on the blade of a knife and primary parties easily accuse mediator of favoring the other party. In this situation it is challenging to retain impartiality.¹²⁰

Mandated by primary parties, Norway’s role as a mediator was weak and vulnerable as it was based on support on both sides and its credibility collapsed when Norway’s role was one of the main questions in the Sri Lankan elections in April 2004 which ended

¹¹⁹ Höglund & Svensson 2009, 180–3.

¹²⁰ Höglund & Svensson 2008, 348–356.

with the victory of a coalition critical towards Norway's role. Both primary parties also capitalized the weak position of the mediator by rearming and rebuilding their military capacities during ceasefire. Another problematic setting was Norway's double role as a mediator and an observer of the implementation of the peace process as part of a monitoring mission with other Nordic countries because neither the Sri Lankan government nor India, the influential regional power, did accept the involvement of the great powers or the UN.¹²¹

Besides difficulties to preserve impartiality, it was as challenging to emphasize local ownership of the peace process. There were only two primary parties in negotiations – the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE – and this was criticized by many as 'it excludes larger segments of Sri Lankan society. Important stakeholders, such as the Muslim minority, non-LTTE Tamili groups, and representatives of civil society, were left out.' If we view the situation from the perspective of the LTTE, the question was a classical bargaining of their position as a sole representative of the Tamili area and therefore the mediation situation offered recognition to the LTTE as well as simultaneously marginalized other stakeholders. Höglund and Svensson note here a paradox that, due to the exclusive nature of peace negotiations, it was possible to achieve a ceasefire in a relatively short time but that simultaneously the two-party model 'ultimately led to reduced legitimacy' of the peace process. Mandated by two primary parties, Norway lacked a power to open up negotiations to include other stakeholders. Therefore, in a situation where two primary parties 'had the veto power over design of the process, with a mediator without authority', the Norwegian mediation goal of local ownership of process proved to be awkward and deleterious towards the whole peace process.¹²²

Furthermore, the Norwegian goal for the internationalization of the peace process and an effort 'to direct the attention and wider engagement of the international community towards Sri Lanka' ran into trouble with the emergence of the war on terror and the LTTE's reputation as a terrorist organization hindered the development. The peace process did not raise international trust toward the LTTE and

¹²¹ Höglund & Svensson 2009, 181, 184.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 183–5.

thus several powers like the UK in 2001 and the EU and Canada in 2006 listed it as a terrorist organization and thus excluded it from international community. Alongside this the LTTE grew more frustrated and finally ‘the possibility for Norway to convince them about the viability of peace talks waned’.¹²³

5.3. THE NORWEGIAN MODEL

Why peace diplomacy was regarded nationally as an important goal? How these faraway conflicts became important targets of foreign policy prioritization? Iver Neumann introduces a comprehensive interpretation on the interest of small states towards peace mediation from the perspective of the history of diplomacy. According to him, Scandinavian countries ‘have consistently spent sizeable resources on systems maintenance in such diverse areas as institution-building – the League of Nations and the UN, for instance; peacekeeping; development and disaster aid; and the role of third parties’ and a more active role as a peace mediator is merely a logical continuation of this approach.¹²⁴

Nonetheless, adopting an active third-party role as a mediator or a facilitator widened the scope of traditional state diplomacy. Third-party activity in conflicts has been part of traditional diplomacies as long as there has been modern diplomacy but in a classic setting third party has participated in crisis management, for example, with military intervention and with guaranteeing peace treaties. This has been great power activity and while a great power has acted as a mediator, it has applied power mediation to persuade warring parties. Small states, however, adopted ‘the weakest form of third party diplomatisation’ and acted merely as a facilitator ‘that offers its services not as an active broker, but as a discreet presence with certain human and material resources to offer’. This was the role and the practice previously executed by ‘a sizable community of organizations in Geneva and elsewhere that specialize in facilitation, centring around organizations such as the International Committee

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 182, 185–6.

¹²⁴ Neumann 2011, 571–2.

of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Centre for Human Development'. During the early post-Cold war years small states entered into this 'networked, multi-stakeholder ball' which was previously dominated by international organizations.¹²⁵

The first state that adopted the new policy was Norway in the early 1990s. Several Nordic scholars – both Swedes and Norwegians – have studied how peace mediation became part of the Norwegian foreign policy agenda and how the role of 'peace nation' became a significant element of Norway's international brand. Neumann recognizes that the seeds of Norwegian peace diplomacy in the late 1980s were sown by 'Geneva/Oslo interface, with ICRC playing a focal role'. In 1989, following the assignment as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the former foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg recruited a key Norwegian presence at Geneva's ICRC, Jan Egeland, to work with him. Working as a State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1999 Egeland developed the so-called Norwegian model that preferred 'to work at ad-hoc setups, drawing Norwegians who had networks in the relevant areas and fearing that the codification of the peace efforts he had initiated would hamper their development within the MFA'. A new momentum occurred when the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a separate section to deal with Peace and Reconciliation in 2000.¹²⁶

Höglund and Svensson discuss the country's self-perception as well as international image or brand. Thus a reputation of being a skilled and effective peacemaker is important in order to gain visibility and a position in international community. Being a 'peace nation' was also about international branding but having the peacemaking agenda was and is also part of national identity building. It is a narrative which presents a small northern country as 'a great, moral power'.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Neumann 2011, 573–4; Iver B. Neumann (2012) 'After securitization. Diplomats as de-securitizers' *Baltic Journal of Political Science*, No. 1, 11.

¹²⁶ Neumann 2011, 574–6; Neumann 2012, 13–16.

¹²⁷ Höglund & Svensson 2009, 177–180.

Norwegians have presented ‘peace’ as an important part of their legacy and Norway is seen to be particularly suited for undertaking mediation activities. Neumann maps the historical legacies of Norway’s peace nation image from four sources. Firstly, he emphasizes the importance of Norwegian involvement in the Anglo-American peace movement at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Secondly, he pinpoints a link between Norway’s strong missionary tradition and peace image. Thirdly, he also links peace activity to internationalist workers’ movement. And fourthly, he underlines Norway’s active role in the League of Nations as well as in the UN. In particular, Fridtjof Nansen’s role as a national hero and an early pioneer of peacemaking and humanitarian work is prioritized.¹²⁸

Øystein Haga Skånland picks up four elements on which Norway’s image or brand as a great peacemaker has been built for national and international audience. Firstly, he mentions the advantage of smallness which underlines that Norway lacks colonial burden that is often intertwined with great power interests. And secondly, due to its smallness it does not have any reason to show off its muscles and thus Norway as a mediator is capable to form a confidential relationship and it would rather take the role of a facilitator than a mediator. Thirdly, Norway has deep roots in investing in peacemaking and it holds a natural legacy of humanitarianism and peace activism. Fourthly, there is a close cooperation among civil servants, NGOs and academic institutions in Norway.¹²⁹ This kind of a combination of several actors and operating with private actors is also seen by Jan Egeland as main characteristic of the ‘Norwegian model’.¹³⁰

In many terms new peace diplomacy transformed traditional state-to-state diplomacy more into a networked one in which the states are also networked with private actors and which also diplomatized non-state actors as they are part of the mediation process. Necessary

¹²⁸ Neumann 2011, 573–4.

¹²⁹ Øystein Haga Skånland (2010) ‘Norway is a peace nation: A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement’ *Cooperation and Conflict*, 45(1), 38–41.

¹³⁰ Neumann 2011, 575. See more about Norwegian style of mediation Ann Kelleher & James Larry Taulbee (2006) ‘Bridging the Gap: Building Peace Norwegian Style’ *Peace & Change*, 31(4), 479–505.

redefinition of diplomacy alongside with the peacemakers' role may also explain why the new active role has not been unanimously accepted in Norway and criticism has been continuously presented mainly from the political right which has argued that Norway's true interests lie closer and that peace diplomacy removes resources from traditional foreign policy.¹³¹

¹³¹ Skånland 2010, 41–3, 45–7.

6. CALL FOR DURABLE AND JUST PEACE

Mikael Eriksson and Roland Kostić set a fundamental question: ‘Why some peace processes fail during the implementation phase, while others endure?’¹³² The success of a peace process is traditionally measured by counting those which concluded to a peace treaty while the question of durability of peace agreements has been approached by categorically examining five years’ period after the signing of a peace treaty and listing cases in which peace has been preserved and which have fallen into a new armed conflict.¹³³ However, this kind of approach does not discuss what makes certain agreements more sustainable than others and why certain agreements offer a basis for long term peace process while others do not. New approaches to durability of peace have concentrated on focusing how a mediated solution sets premises and enables or, in the worst case, prevents the building of sustainable peace for years onwards.

One branch of discussion has concentrated on how different forms and styles of negotiations influence durability. It has been argued that peace in conflicts ending to the victory of one side is more durable than mediated solutions. Øyvind Østerud has provocatively argued that ‘lasting peace is more likely to following the victory of one party to a civil war than following a negotiated settlement’ and in that way trying to challenge the significance and the impressiveness of peace diplomacy.¹³⁴ This argument is, however, heavily criticized by pinpointing that a mediated solution saves lives in the short term and, in particular, that the argument of durable peace which follows

¹³² Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 5.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹³⁴ Øyvind Østerud (2006) ‘Lite land som humanitær stormakt’ *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift*, vol. 4, 311. Citation by Helgesen 2007, 15. See also Fixdal 2012b, 43.

military victory does not hold anymore. According to the statistics of the Cold War era, a great majority of conflicts ended in military victory in contrast to conflicts in which peace was negotiated. This overall picture has since changed and already in the 1990s in 42 cases peace was achieved through negotiation and in 23 cases by military victory. Nonetheless, if we examine the durability of peace agreement within five years' period, there is a greater tendency in negotiated settlement of the renewal of violence in contrast to peace followed military victory. For example, 'one third of 69 peace agreements 1989-2000 resulted in civil war five years of signing them'.¹³⁵

Non-interference suggested by Østerud is not seen by other Nordic scholars as a relevant option for peaceful third party intervention but instead the importance of local ownership of peace process is pinpointed by many as an essential element for durable peace. It is argued that external mediators may focus on short-term security and power-sharing issues rather than on reaching a comprehensive agreement in the long term. Furthermore, the solutions achieved by power mediation often introduce fixed solutions and norms that erupted legitimacy of peace treaty. In this matter, theory and practice are, however, contradicting and include a paradox: according to theory, 'the promise of a durable peace settlement ought to be high' in the cases in which warring parties take responsibility of the peace process but 'in literature on peacemaking, home-grown negotiations between the primary parties are seen as unusual'.¹³⁶ Warring parties rarely start peace process on their own terms and a third-party help is needed to kick off the work.

After all, if we accept the premise that 'locally arranged peacemaking process are always the better alternative', how then a third-party intervention in best terms would be able to support local ownership of peace process and recognize 'the presence of traditional institutions and actors' which could help to overcome societal divides.¹³⁷ Thus, what is called for is a need for a hybrid

¹³⁵ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 5; Helgesen 2007, 15. Between 1990 and 2007 altogether 646 documents were signed that can be classified as peace agreements. Fixdal 2012b, 7.

¹³⁶ Eriksson & Kostić 2013b, 162.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 162.

model of peacebuilding but also peace mediation. Emphasis on impartial facilitation executed by Nordic states supports obviously more local ownership than great power based power mediation but it does not automatically lead to durable peace as the Sri Lankan case proves. Beside the style and form of mediation, local ownership is linked to the very essence of negotiated peace.

6.1. JUST PEACE

The question of ‘just peace’ has been discussed in several recent studies and it is regarded as one of the most important issues in achieving a truly sustainable and durable peace. Many scholars regard justice as single most important element which enabled transformation from negative peace – end of armed conflict – to truly positive peace. The question of just peace is related to just war tradition but following Mona Fixdal there cannot be drawn a straightforward linkage between *jus post bellum* (justice after wars) and the rightness of how the war was started and fought. According to her, the principles of postwar justice cannot be found in the concepts and principles offered by the just war tradition even though they are not irrelevant to the question.¹³⁸

She notes further that ‘while many share the goal of justice, there is no agreement on what justice after war is’. The relationship between peace and justice, according to her, should not be regarded as ‘two faces of a single good. They are, however, two values that prove much easier to support than to undermine one another.’¹³⁹ The challenge is that if peace is equated with justice, it is not possible to ‘analyze when these two values support each other and when they are in conflict with each other’.¹⁴⁰ There are several cases in which peace and justice seem to clash. In some cases ‘the goal of justice can lead people to reject peace proposals that in hindsight seem better than any alternative’.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, Fixdal quotes Avishai

¹³⁸ Fixdal 2012b, 3.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 158–9.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 41.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 5.

Margalit's point that 'peace can be justified without being just' and continues by arguing that the value of even a negative peace should not be underestimated as even just war is accompanied by deep suffering and pain. Still, she continues that there may be situations when justice is more important than peace and that 'a minimum degree of justice is often a prerequisite for peace'. If peace agreement is seen only as unfair and a source of grievances situation escalates to discontent, conflict, and violence.¹⁴²

According to Fixdal, it is important to focus, instead of universal legal norms, more on 'the process of negotiation and the joint agreement reached by adversaries' while looking for just peace.¹⁴³ Thus negotiating and mediating practices and the mediators' role are crucial for just peace. Mediators should try 'to secure a set of peace terms that are as unproblematic as possible and that will also be acceptable to the parties'.¹⁴⁴ The position of a mediator is challenging as following a general rule of peace diplomacy 'mediators have to negotiate with the people who are responsible for the fighting and who control the weapons' and thus the mediator should avoid positioning themselves to question war crimes and becoming a prosecutor.¹⁴⁵ The authority which punishes and prosecutes remains elsewhere. Punitive peace terms are not a prerequisite for just peace and often it creates a fertile ground for a new conflict. How then the question of justice should be noticed as part of the mediation process aiming primarily to close down armed conflict?

Cecilia Albin and Daniel Druckman have in their studies tested the relationship between justice and peace by analysing several conflicts. They have focused on 'how the parties relate to each other and are treated in the process'. Their primary observation is that peace treaties are more durable when principle of equality is recognized but they then extend the argument to concern procedural and distributive justice. The procedural justice refers to transparency, fair representation, fair treatment, and fair play as well as voluntary

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 158–9.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 160.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 38.

agreement in the negotiation process while distributive justice covers equality, proportionality, compensation, and need. In their analysis, these qualities are operationalized and measured, but this kind of an analysis merely points out a positive relationship between justice and a durable peace but does not explain how justice is connected to peace or peace mediation situation and why it supports the durability of peace.¹⁴⁶

Eriksson and Kostić argue that traditional literature on peace mediation has approached the question from too narrow a perspective while concentrating only on objective issues like agreements and the amount of violence that are easily observed and measurable. The core question is, according to them, fairness of peace which is a very subjective issue. Thus they conclude that in a peace process there are ‘a number of unmeasurable aspects, such as norms and influences’ and, furthermore, they argue that ‘conventional studies in this regard usually do not take account of the long-term processes that shape the outcome of peace’ but instead concentrate only on short-term goals of the peace process and the peace agreement itself.¹⁴⁷

They also emphasize the ‘link between the form of a mediation process, the peace agreement and the character and success of the post-conflict peace’ and pinpoint that this relationship has been hitherto under-studied. Their overarching claim is ‘that peace processes and peace agreements, in terms of how they treat the primary parties, their participation and their concerns, can either lay the foundations for successful conflict resolution or engender social tensions that complicate and undermine the long-term prospects for domestic ownership and a sustainable peace’.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, the presences and character of motives, interests, and normative settings of a third-party mediator are crucial for long term success of a peace process.

¹⁴⁶ Cecilia Albin & Daniel Druckman (2010) ‘The Role of Justice in Negotiation’, in Kilgour, D. Marc & Eden, Colin (eds.) *Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation. Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation*, Vol. 4. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer Science, 109–119; Cecilia Albin & Daniel Druckman (2012) ‘Equality Matters: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars’ *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(2), 155–173. See also Fixdal 2012b, 44.

¹⁴⁷ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 9.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 17.

According to this theme, the peace that follows many contemporary conflicts is often unsatisfactory and marked by a continuation of inter-ethnic tensions, lack of order, and an eruption of violence.¹⁴⁹

6.2. MEDIATING IDENTITIES

The nature of war has changed and, as there are more parties to the conflict, it has become less likely that peace process will come to a successful conclusion and, in addition, the high intensity of new wars has created ‘a more hostile postwar environment’ than in earlier classical wars.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, mediation of asymmetric wars needs to concentrate on issues which are relevant to new wars and find sore points that are the source of incompatibilities. A new kind of mediation process needs to acknowledge the importance of identities, collective memories, and history. These phenomena are usually attached to a long peacebuilding process following the end of an armed conflict but reconciliation process may also require a third-party mediator. Until recently the role of mediation as long term trust building has been an ignored question in studies on peace process. The notion of ‘just peace’ can be comprehended as a legal issue but also as an identity issue as many recent Nordic studies have done.

Identity-based conflicts are more difficult to resolve via negotiations than classical wars on territories. Negotiations situation is often framed a zero-sum game and parties are not ready to make compromises in questions that concern the survival of society.¹⁵¹ On the negotiation table is placed the whole existence of society as it is based on shared identities and collective memories that have been simultaneously the target and the root cause of a conflict. It is easier to give up territory than yield on identity issues. Thus, ontological security may be more essential as an obstacle for achieving a peace agreement than the question concerning physical security but also an obstacle for achieving just peace.

Karin Aggestam has scrutinized how just and durable peace

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹⁵⁰ Fixdal 2012b, 45.

¹⁵¹ Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 26

arrangements may be constructed and implemented. She introduces a new term – recognitional just peace – that links the discussion of just peace more profoundly to conflicting identities and ontological security. The nodal point for successful peace process, in her mind, is the practices of acknowledgement, recognition, and apology which are attached to the broader issue of the politics of reconciliation that often includes antagonistic processes that relate to existential concerns and thus relate to the question of ontological security. According to Aggestam, justice and reconciliation constitute a symbiotic relationship and that it is the role of reconciliation that is so far undertheoritized.

The prevailing peacebuilding dogma emphasizes political stability and national unity over the requirements of justice, difference, and distinct political communities. Instead of concentrating on the question how to govern a post-conflict society that is linked to ‘good governance’ and democracy, it is also crucial to look at collective memories as they have played a significant role in protracted conflicts. The mobilization of the past is a powerful force as it relates to emotions and motivation and guides people’s actions. The past, or more precisely how the past is collectively remembered and presented, builds a societal identity. The most recent armed conflicts are also struggles over memories and in the post-war situation contradicting narratives on how to remember (or forget) history of a conflict keep the conflict going on even when there is no open violence. The political and antagonistic nature of addressing historical injustices underlines the causes of a conflict and thus these questions are essential for reconciliation and a prerequisite for just peace.¹⁵²

Aggestam suggests the politics of recognition as a solution for mediating the deadlock into which the communities are hijacked by contradicting narratives of the past. Following Aggestam, ‘several peace negotiations outline interest-based strategies with sufficient material incentives as a way to bypass conflicting historical narratives and historical grievances’. Or, in several cases, collective memories and historical narratives are treated as a judicial question which belongs

¹⁵² Karin Aggestam (2013) ‘Recognitional just peace’, in Aggestam & Björkdahl, Annika (eds.) *Rethinking Peacebuilding. The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and the Western Balkans*. London & New York: Routledge, 34–8.

to the special court of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. According to prevailing peacebuilding practices, reconciliation and peacebuilding are depoliticized and therefore peacebuilding literature fails to recognize the conflictual nature of politics.¹⁵³ It is obvious that collective memories and narratives play a critical role in (new) conflicts and therefore they need to be assessed and revisited as part of reconciliation.

Aggestam makes a distinction between thin and thick forms of recognition. Firstly, thin recognition refers to the situation in which each party recognizes the other as an autonomous entity that has an agency in solving a conflict. This step has usually been taken already as part of peace negotiations. Secondly, thick recognition refers to a situation in which the other party understands and accepts the other party's fundamental feature of identity, culture, and history or, in other words, 'to acknowledge the other side's historical grievances is a first step towards recognizing the fact that there are several narratives of the conflict'. Politics of reconciliation means, in practice, the will to open up and call into question the terms of inclusion and exclusion and to question who we are. Politics of recognition addresses the past in order to generate and enable forward-looking practices. Accepting diversity is about acknowledging the other side's narrative and empathy is about expanding the horizons of understanding and co-constructing realities.¹⁵⁴

Therefore, it seems obvious that questions concerning conflicting histories can and often should be negotiated and they could be recognized also by a third-party mediator. According to Aggestam, steps of thin and thick recognition should be followed by a mutual acknowledgement and apology. It is not enough to agree on the existence of alternative histories but it is necessary that each party makes some sacrifices on their own identity and compromises that often require making concessions and breaking taboos.¹⁵⁵ The recognition and the acknowledgement of historical narratives of sufferings and trauma through apology, symbolic gestures, and

¹⁵³ Aggestam 2013, 43.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 44–6.

concessions support best just and durable peace but it is, in practice, difficult to achieve as parties have fortified themselves respectively behind the roles of the victim and the guilty one and often these roles resist compromises and friction in simplified settings.¹⁵⁶ Inclusive transnational histories are required instead of exclusive narratives. The process of reconciliation often takes generations and the idea of recognitional just peace demands if this process could be sped up by noticing its importance and what could be the role of a third-party facilitator in this process. The recent history of international peacebuilding offers more or less just examples on what could happen if these questions of identity and ontological security are not noticed.

The most dramatic example is Bosnia-Hertzevovina where the Dayton Agreement ended the war in 1995 but simultaneously established fixed and inflexible structures that have prevented almost two decade's emergence of true societal peace. Narratives of the 1990s war are still clashing, the myth of victimhood is firmly anchored to identities of three ethnic communities, and transnational narratives are suppressed.¹⁵⁷

All in all, studies on peacemaking have emphasized the importance of just peace as criteria for success of peace process and in that connection, for example, Aggestam and Wæver have given attention to question how third party mediation could support post-conflict reconciliation. Asymmetric wars are about identities and it is often the collective memories that are also conflicting and because of that conflict often remains open after the end of an armed conflict. Thus, there is a need to mediate identities and collective memories to achieve sustainable peace and in that field new theoretical and empirical research is needed to understand this process better.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ Sirkka Ahonen (2012) *Coming to Terms with a Dark Past. How Post-Conflict Societies Deal with History*. Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 20–3.

¹⁵⁷ See for example Roland Kostić (2013) 'American nation-building abroad: Exceptional powers, broken promises and the making of "Bosnia"', in Eriksson, Mikael & Kostić (eds.) *Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding. Peace from the Ashes of War?* London: Routledge, 22–39.

¹⁵⁸ See more Jay Rothman & Marie L. Olson (2001) 'From Interests to Identities: Towards a New Emphasis in Interactive Conflict Resolution' *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(3), 289–305.

7. BRIDGING A GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

In their book, Svensson and Wallensteen call for bridging over ‘the gap between theory and practice’ and note that many policymakers are unfamiliar with theoretical debates while ‘theoretical discussions are not always firmly anchored in the policymakers’ reality’.¹⁵⁹ Peace mediation is certainly not the only form of policy where worlds of scholars and practitioners do not necessarily meet. The views and focus of scholars and practitioners often greatly differ from each other. Academic research aims to introduce a more nuanced and diversified interpretation of the whole peace process, develop theories that generalize peace mediation situation, and, in general, critically observe the peace process in its entirety. Practitioners’ expectations towards academic research underline more practical benefit and they await applied knowledge, guidelines for mediation situation, and case-based background knowledge to be applied by the mediation team. Nonetheless, if practitioners, diplomats, and politicians are expecting applicability from research, there is also an internal demand for applicability of research results among the researchers interested in conflict resolution and peace related activities¹⁶⁰.

For both groups, academics and practitioners, the ultimate goal is the same: changing world into a more peaceful place and looking for the best tools to solve conflicts in a peaceful manner. The relationship between academic research and peace mediation practice is not discussed in so many words by Nordic scholars but a division can be recognized between those scholars who have had

¹⁵⁹ Svensson and Wallensteen 2010, xi–xii.

¹⁶⁰ Wallensteen 2012, 460; Timo Kivimäki (2012) *Can Peace Research Make Peace? Lessons in Academic Diplomacy*. Ashgate Publishing, 21.

a close relationship with peace mediation practitioners or who may have even sometimes participated in peacemaking operations and those who have adopted a more theoretical view and are, in practice, studying critically the role of the mediator.

7.1. ACADEMIC DIPLOMACY

In the field of peace mediation there seems to exist several scholars who have time to step away from their academic ivory towers to the field of peacemaking and, in addition, certain mediators like Eliasson have had clear academic credits. As scholars have an active role in the peace process it is justified to talk about academic diplomacy. Wallensteen uses the term *academic diplomacy* only when scholar takes the role of a third party to a conflict but Kivimäki uses the same concept for different kinds of peace actions by academics and this way he emphasizes the broad content of it.¹⁶¹ Academics may assume several roles in the field of peace work. They could be advisors, adopt various consulting duties or act as a third party.

The first of these available roles is an *advisor*. This often takes the form of advising positions for the departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although advisory roles bring academics close to real decision making power, it is more likely to find students of these academics exercising the real decision-making power in peace-related political affairs.¹⁶² In his study on ecological conflicts, Gunnar Sjöstedt identifies the importance of scientific knowledge and academics' involvement in the resolution process. Academics' contribution has turned out to be valuable, for example, in conceptualizing an environmental issue. As one example of the usage of scientific and technical knowledge, Sjöstedt provides the dispute over the fate of a Czech nuclear plant called Temelin, in which diplomatic discussion among the Austrian and Czech officials was based on available

¹⁶¹ Peter Wallensteen (2011a) 'Academics in Peacemaking', in Wallensteen Peter (ed.) *Peace Research – Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, 231–237; Wallensteen 2012, 457; Kivimäki 2012, 3.

¹⁶² Wallensteen 2011a, 232.

scientific facts.¹⁶³ Another example of an academic team that gave an important input, for instance, by defining relevant concepts for conflicting parties is the one led by Peter Wallensteen, related to the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, in which Jan Eliasson served as a mediator.¹⁶⁴ Sjöstedt remarks that the need of scientific knowledge brings academics close to the actual conflict resolution process, which traditionally has been only dominated by official diplomats and relevant policy makers.¹⁶⁵

There are several relevant modes for academics to adopt a consulting role. *Independent projects* provide one option for academics to be involved in peacemaking. Even though these kinds of independent projects demand a short-term commitment, they are often able to provide a clear impact. As an illustration, Wallensteen represents a project called the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions (SPITS) which was carried out by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the Uppsala University. The aim of the project was to deliver an input on the UN reform process on sanctions. The project was financed by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.¹⁶⁶

Another consulting role for academics is the one of a *commentary*. In practice, this may refer to giving comments on peace related issues in the media or, for example, lecturing on peace related topics in seminars. In other words, commenting is about ‘communication research to the general public’.¹⁶⁷

The *problem-solving workshop* is a commonly used practical instrument among academics in the field of conflict resolution. In reality, a problem-solving workshop can be implemented in a form of an academic seminar consisting of regular academic debate with the aim of clarifying problematic issues related to the conflict in case.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶³ Gunnar Sjöstedt (2009) ‘Resolving Ecological Conflicts: Typical and Special Circumstances’, in Bercovitch, Jacob & Kremenyuk, Victor & Zartman, I. William (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*. Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 225–8.

¹⁶⁴ Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 44.

¹⁶⁵ Sjöstedt 2009, 236.

¹⁶⁶ Wallensteen 2011a, 232.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 233.

¹⁶⁸ Wallensteen 2012, 461.

The Middle East seminar in 1990 is one of the examples Wallensteen gives as a useful option of a problem-solving workshop in practice. The Department of Conflict and Peace Research at the Uppsala University, with Wallensteen himself steering the ship, organized a low-key, academic seminar on Middle East related issues. In order to guarantee the credibility of the seminar, Wallensteen saw it important that the seminar was to be organized in a way that it fulfilled the criteria of an academic seminar and that the participants owned academic credits. In the end, the seminar included participants from three groups: the first was Palestinians from the occupied territories and from the diaspora; the second group consisted of Israelis with political and academic backgrounds; and the third group represented the so-called neutrals, referring to Swedish and American academics with some Jewish personalities included.¹⁶⁹

Looking back it can be observed that that the academic seminar increased the confidence among the parties and later on served as a beneficial umbrella for direct talks in the Middle East peace process. According to Wallensteen, the role of formal and informal mediation efforts, including academic seminars, is to 'shed new light on known situations'. Being a successful case, the Middle East seminar proved the claim that academic insights are useful for decision-makers involved in a peace process. As a consequence, the seminar gave a great boost for the work of Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research, and made it well known in the field of peace activities.¹⁷⁰

In addition, academics may become involved in peace processes in the role of a *third party*; in other words, academics in the usage of diplomacy for peace. According to Wallensteen, the integrity of a researcher forms the ultimate basis for an academic in the role of a third party, and gives him the authority to practice this role in the eyes of the belligerents. For Wallensteen, a clear example of academic diplomacy is the case of Bougainville Rebellion in Papua New Guinea, where he, as an academic, was invited in a local dispute

¹⁶⁹ Peter Wallensteen (2011b) 'An Experiment in Academic Diplomacy: The Middle East seminar 1990', in Wallensteen Peter (ed.) *Peace Research – Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, 256.

¹⁷⁰ Wallensteen 2011b, 261–2.

resolution process in the role of an advisor.¹⁷¹ Instead of sticking into this rather narrow description, Kivimäki sees important that all actions aiming to bring conflicting parties together and encouraging parties to take part in conflict-prevention activities should be included in the definition of academic diplomacy. According to Kivimäki, there is a great menu of options available for academic peace diplomacy.¹⁷²

Academics may have also important role in initiatives that aim to stabilize the tenuous situation and not let it turn into a conflict. Kjell Åke Nordquist refers to them as ‘general prevention’ activities. In the case of East Timor that Nordquist is studying these initiatives took form, for example, as an organized research network, an academic conference, a meeting for local political leaders and decision makers, and the support provided for the establishment of a reconciliation commission.¹⁷³

Even though academics may take the role of a third party to a conflict, the examples known of such activities are rare. One central explanation for that is surely a feature of confidentiality which is the crucial starting point for this kind of activity. There are several academic skills known to be valuable for a third party to a conflict, such as capability to listen, to extract essential points, and to draw conclusions from theoretical insights and to apply them. Still, academics in the role of a third party are often highly vulnerable beyond their own control when compared to others practicing third-party diplomacy, such as states. Yet, it is this obvious vulnerability that brings belligerents close to academics and makes it easier for them to trust academics as mediators.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Wallensteen 2011a, 233.

¹⁷² Kivimäki 2012, 2–4. Kivimäki himself is known both as an actor in practical peace work and as a peace-researcher. He has been actively involved in a great variety of efforts such as peace dialogues and academic seminars focused on East Asia.

¹⁷³ Kjell Åke Nordquist (2008) ‘Securing Independence and Peace in East Timor – Conflict Prevention Through Non-Governmental Actors’, in Mellbourn, Anders & Wallensteen, Peter (eds.) *Third Parties and Conflict Prevention*. Anna Lindh Programme on Conflict Prevention, 2008 edition. Stockholm: Gidlunds, 190–8.

¹⁷⁴ Wallensteen 2012, 463–4, 475.

7.2. CHALLENGES OF ANALYSIS AND PRACTICES

Various active roles that scholars can take in the course of the peace process express the particularity of peace mediation in relation to several other fields of international diplomacy where similar kind of interaction is not possible or seen as natural. Still, active participation of academics in a peace process is just one particular dimension of broader question on how the gap between academic studies and policy practices can be bridged and how the expectations of scholars and practitioners can be brought closer together. As a conclusion of their study, Svensson and Wallensteen list ten implications which, according to them, are ‘applicable to mediation in practice and mediation research’ and where scholarly and practical interests meet.¹⁷⁵ Even though these are a particular conclusion on the basis of particular study, they can be also treated as a new opening in an always challenging debate between academics and practitioners on how policymakers and practitioners benefit from academic research and whether research produces applicable results or not.

Firstly, they give attention to the lack of professionalism and how self-learning in mediation process should be supported. Even though there are experienced mediators the likes of Jan Eliasson or Martti Ahtisaari, ‘in many conflict situations, diplomats, politicians, or representatives from civil society engage themselves as mediators’ without previous experience or knowledge on how to mediate in an armed conflict. Even though every mediation case is unique and methods and style of mediation must be chosen according to the case in hand, there is a need to learn from previous mediation processes and experiences of mediators. According to Svensson and Wallensteen, more studies are needed to compare different mediators’ experiences. Furthermore, it is important to find ways to transmit this knowledge to new mediators. ‘There is a need to create systematic approaches to learning, sharing, training, and knowledge production in the field of international mediation’, as they conclude.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Svensson and Wallensteen 2010, 128.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 128–9.

As for the *second* implication, the authors pinpoint the importance of a mandate as a starting point for analysis of mediation and mediation practices. Every mediator is sent to the field by someone, which can be, for example, a government, an intergovernmental organization, or a nongovernmental body, and the mandate not only authorizes but may also restrain mediators' choices. Thus, 'there is a need for would-be mediators as well as mediation researchers to scrutinize the mandates'. Svensson and Wallensteen want, in particular, to place focus on how to minimize 'discrepancies between mandates, on the one hand, and available resources, anticipated outcome, and phases of conflict, on the other hand'.¹⁷⁷

Thirdly, authors are of the opinion that specific styles in mediation have not gained enough focus in mediation research and thus they want to set mediation styles as a new research agenda. Their focus is on empirical and comparative approach on different mediators and are based on a belief that this kind of a study 'could shed light on conditions under which different mediation styles are effective in bringing about peaceful resolution' for conflicts and crises. Therefore, a more detailed description of different mediation styles in action together with empirical study on their success would be of great importance for practicing mediators to enhance their competence.¹⁷⁸ Just recently *Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans*, edited by Mona Fixdal, has in its own terms responded to this call for empirical study but it is merely a beginning rather than an exhaustive study.

Fourthly, the authors discuss the difference between political and humanitarian mediation and argue that most often mediation is seen identical to political mediation, which underrates the role of various humanitarian mediation initiatives which continuously take place in the field. The relationship between political and humanitarian processes in conflict setting would urgently demand a closer examination. The *fifth* implication made is that building sustainable peace would require supporting a channel of direct negotiation

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 129–130.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 130–1.

between belligerents and this should be the target in every mediation process.¹⁷⁹

The *sixth* implication Svensson and Wallensteen emphasize is that capacities and expertise on which mediators can rely are still too much on ad hoc basis. Thus, 'there has to be an institutional setting for international mediation' and that would make reacting easier and quicker but also change operations into less dramatic and more routine ones. Furthermore, institutional backing is required to manage the complicated relationship between the mediator and the media. Additionally, as their *seventh* note Svensson and Wallensteen emphasize the complexity of current asymmetrical conflicts that 'points to the need for broader approaches that can manage the multidimensional aspects of conflict' but each case requires thorough analysis or diagnosis before the mediator can enter and choose who the potential parties of peace negotiations are.¹⁸⁰

The *eighth* implication arises an important question on the plethora of the third parties, how their roles lack coordination and how different third parties appear to be competitors. It seems that in a humanitarian mediation situation constellation is often more simple. Therefore, it would be important to conduct a closer study on the competence of different mediation styles at different stages or settings of a conflict. Current mediation process calls for better coordination and division of labour and more research is required if this goal is to be achieved.¹⁸¹ This would require both further studying of the process but also the intervention of scholars by facilitating discussion between third parties.

The *ninth* implication of Svensson and Wallensteen calls for attention to intraparty relations. Even though the mediator's role is to facilitate dialogue among parties, the intraparty divisions and tensions between doves and hawks, moderates and fundamentalists, are often crucial for creating a successful mediation situation. The move towards a common goal, a sustainable peace, would also, from time to time, require that the mediator could interfere in intraparty

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 131–2.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 132–3.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 134.

conflicts but of far the challenge of the intraparty tensions has been ignored in peace mediation literature as well among practitioners.¹⁸²

As the *last* point, Svensson and Wallensteen direct their attention on how to define success and what would be the indicators measuring it. However, as they remind, ‘success of mediation is an elusive concept’.¹⁸³ While other Nordic scholars have not literally concentrated on bridging the gap between research and practice, many of them have, in one way or another, discussed about how to define success of a peace process. Their approach towards peacemaking practices, in general, and to peace mediation situation, in particular, is more critical and, for example, Eriksson and Kostić criticize normative settings and ‘one-size fits all’ solutions that liberal peacebuilding set for peace mediation and thus demand that scholarly attention should focus on the role and motives of intervening third party. Mediators cannot in any case be purely impartial as they are also representatives of another culture. Therefore, according to them, studies on peace mediation should take ‘more into consideration the power, intentions and interests of third parties’.¹⁸⁴ This kind of research agenda does not perhaps meet the expectations of applicability like practitioners have expected but it also raises, from a practical perspective, an important question on how it is possible to preserve or change a process into one as much locally owned as possible and how it is possible to remain open for local solutions and alternative models to build society and economics in long term perspective.

¹⁸² Ibid., 134.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 135.

¹⁸⁴ Eriksson and Kostić 2013b, 159.

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Nordic research on peacemaking is currently a vital and expanding field within peace and conflict studies. Several innovative and interesting studies have been published in recent years. Study on peace mediation is a branch of this broader framework but there can also be recognized a division between a narrow approach which focuses on mediator's practices and styles and a broader approach which comes across with mediation while focusing on peacemaking process as a whole. It is perhaps not possible to talk about the existence of Nordic school on study on peace mediation as such but, at the same time, it is obvious that Nordic scholars interested in peacemaking and peace mediation are aware what the contribution of other Nordic scholars is and thus it can be concluded that Nordic researchers clearly discuss with each other.

On the basis of this evaluation on Nordic research the following remarks on the future emphasis of research and broader suggestions for future development should be made.

1. Even though the amount of studies focusing on peace mediation has increased in recent years, it is also remarkable that research concentrates on few Nordic institutes and departments in universities and that a handful of scholars dominate the whole field. It would be highly important to broaden the geographical scope of peace mediation research and establish stronger basis for study on peacemaking and peace mediation, in particular, in Finland and Denmark. A new Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts (CRIC) may already have filled this gap in Denmark.
2. Secondly, it is important to bring closer the narrow and broader approaches on the study on peace mediation. At the

moment the debates and approaches are separate but two approaches should not be regarded as exclusive as both can learn from each other. It is noteworthy that, for example, the Sri Lankan case is studied by Nordic scholars who focus purely on practices and styles of Norway as a mediator. The way peace process and third party's role is linked to the failure of the whole process has not been discussed by Nordic scholars. Furthermore, the question of justice as part of Sri Lankan peace talks has been ignored. The core question is if it is relevant to focus on peace mediation practices and styles without taking into consideration the whole process but, vice versa, study on mediation practices and styles is also highly important for outlining the interpretation of the whole process.

3. Thirdly, even though the amount of peace mediation studies has increased, there is still a call for further empirical studies. Several Nordic scholars have been interested and focused in their studies on Nordic mediators – persons or states. It is recommendable that the scope should be widened to cover non-Nordic cases but also the role of non-state actors' activity. Furthermore, besides analysing the current cases, historical studies on the recent past as well as on the interwar cases should be paid attention to and this would strengthen knowledge on peace mediation.
4. Fourthly, it is important to scrutinize what particular challenges there are in the mediation or facilitation of asymmetric conflicts. Thus, it is crucial how mediation practices need to take into consideration certain questions, e.g. how to mediate identities, collective memories, and histories. These are often causes of a conflict as well as targets of warfare themselves which aim, for example, to destroy the sites of memory, strengthen certain identities, and deny others. After the end of a violent conflict struggles over memories and identities remain as part of a post-conflict society restraining development towards sustainable peace. These kinds of questions have gained more attention

in peacemaking literature but so far they have not been dealt in the context of peace mediation. There is obviously a need to develop a new broader theory on mediation in different stages of conflict resolution.

5. Fifthly, the recent debate on peacebuilding emphasizes local ownership of peace process. Still, third-party intervention is often needed to end violence but the question remains of how it is possible to guarantee that already during peace negotiation there is sufficient local ownership. It seems that long term problems are seeded already in peace settlements but there is not enough study available to focus on the significance of initial peace negotiations for long-term peacebuilding.
6. Sixthly, it should be suggested that, besides constituting its own branch of research field, peace mediation can also be considered a meeting point for research as well as for practitioners or policymakers. While theoretical discussion takes place more within the frame of studies on peacemaking in more general terms, the discussions on peace mediation focus more on practices and peacemakers' perspectives. Thus, peace mediation can be used as a gate which enables a natural forum for the exchange of opinions and experiences. In order to develop this kind of interaction new kind of institutional forums are needed and here the Nordic framework would be the obvious solution.

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Pertti Joenniemi

PEACE MEDIATION AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION:

THE POLICIES PURSUED BY FOUR
NORDIC COUNTRIES

1. INTRODUCTION¹

The aim of this paper is to chart the unfolding of peace diplomacy and in particular the development of peace mediation in the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish foreign policies. At large, the conduct and organization of peace diplomacy of these four Nordic countries is probed against the backdrop of an altered international environment with both war and peace in transition.

Recent trends and developments in the sphere of international security obviously blur many of the distinctions part of traditional policies and undermine previous consistencies. The alterations also challenge established processes of conflict management and call for changes in the way it has been understood, conducted and structured. It has therefore been necessary to explore the utility of the traditional strategies applied and reflect on the options opening up as well as difficulties encountered in adapting to an altered setting of wars and conflicts.

While the concept of ‘new wars’ coined by Mary Kaldor² remains contested, it is nonetheless clear that profound changes have taken place in the causes, dynamics and consequences of war. It has even become rather difficult to define and delimit wars by the drawing of various clear-cut boundaries around violent practices. Above all, the classical distinction between wars between states and intra-state wars has largely collapsed and if nonetheless upheld, it appears that while the number of deadly conflicts has significantly declined over the recent decades, the proportion of intrastate conflicts to interstate conflicts has grown markedly. In other words, there has been something of an upsurge in the local and intra-state conflicts

¹ I thank Jenny Saarinen for collecting some of the material used in the study.

² Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in the Global Era*. London: Polity Press.

whereas the classical state-to-state wars have been quite limited in number.³

This implies more generally that a formative moment has occurred in the unfolding of violence and wars. Conflicts frequently amount to in-between situations with war and peace existing in parallel. There are considerable spatial and temporal discontinuities present with the consequent ambiguity challenging conceptions premised on viewing peace as normal and war as exceptional. In addition, there is far less equivalence between the parties with warlords, militias, pirates, mercenaries or criminal gangs contributing to a proliferation of the scene. Conflicts and wars seem to have become rather hybrid in essence in escaping any clear-cut categorization. Moreover, it has in many cases become difficult to identify the root causes of conflict for these then to be remedied by some particular measures of conflict management and peace-building.

The changes also imply that wars have by and large lost their previous power political nature and in consequence, the classical *Realpolitik* approach is far less applicable than it used to be. It has become redundant as wars rarely unfold between states with sovereignty as a key concern. It then also follows that altered thinking and new approaches, solutions and exit strategies are called for as to the efforts of curtailing violence and regulating wars. Whereas the main emphasis used to be on preventing war through deterrence and by balancing the opponent through the creation of a credible counterforce, the emphasis is now increasingly on conflict resolution and regulation of conflicts.

This re-thinking and re-evaluation implies, among other things, that peace mediation has gained in centrality. It has not just become conceivable but has also turned increasingly acceptable. Thus, while the efforts of mediation were quite rare during the years of the Cold War, they have in the aftermath of that period increased considerably in number and have in fact become something of a

³ For detailed information, see for example, *Human Security Report 2012*. Simon Fraser University, Canada (<http://www.hsgroup.com>); Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, 'Armed Conflicts 1946–2012'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(4): 501–521.

standard approach.⁴ The applicability has changed in the sense that conflicts can with the end of the Cold War polarity be tackled through mediation and other efforts of conflict resolution without risking a grave deterioration and re-polarization in the conduct of international relations.

The change in the views concerning mediation is actually quite profound as it has turned from something questionable to a rather positive approach. It has been questionable due to the aversion brought about by the outbreak of the Second World War. Those events furnished mediation with connotations of appeasement.⁵ Moreover, the aim of the rather ideologically premised confrontation between the blocs was victory, not compromise and the same attitude was largely extended to apply to the other disputes of that period, whether related to the Cold War or not. The battle was seen as existential in nature and it was waged between right and wrong, democracy and dictatorship, capitalism and socialism, liberation and imperialism. The aspiration towards compromises in the sense of mediation was hence viewed as morally questionable if comprehended as conceivable in the first place.

In fact, the increased emphasis on mediation may be interpreted in two quite different ways. In essence, it can be seen as standing in essence for a continuation of traditional state action, although adapted to altered conditions, or it can be viewed as an approach and activity that breaks rather profoundly with the state-centered tradition of peacemaking. It does this among other reasons in being premised on different thinking compared to the traditional and rather political approaches, but also in involving actors part of the civil society such as various prominent personalities, private groups or religious networks. In any case, mediation in its post-Cold War forms clearly tests the limits of conventional and state-based diplomacy and stands in several ways for a broadening and change of diplomacy.

⁴ Some 20 per cent of political conflicts were mediated between 1945 and 1962 against 34 per cent between 1963 and 1989, and 64 per cent between 1990 and 1996. See International Crisis Behavior Project Data Archive, www.icbnet.org.

⁵ For these arguments, see Peter Wallensteen (2009), *Understanding Conflict Resolution. War, Peace and the Global System*. London: Sage, p. 4.

Mediation, that is being in the middle (*mediare*), belongs in essence to the realm of peacemaking and is in that context different from other related activities and approaches such as those of peacekeeping and peace-building. Whereas mediation primarily refers to a third party opening up and facilitating contacts and the use of channels of communication between protagonists for their differences to be settled, peacekeeping points to enforcement and peace-building entails, in turn, processes conducive to social and economic development. Mediation may unfold separately from the other two, albeit the tree can also co-occur or be mutually interwoven.⁶ Whereas mediation is closer to problem-solving and hence limited as to the underlying ambitions, peace-building entails rather far-reaching transformative ambitions. However, the level of ambition may also vary in the context of mediation as evidenced by the distinction made by Jacques Faget.⁷ Facilitators are restrictive in their approach and act, he argues, as intermediaries between warring parties and have little control over the negotiating process whereas formulators have a more significant role in exerting control over matters such as the site, formulation of the agenda and managing the information flows while conducting their mediation Manipulators are even more ambitious in aiming at actively interfering not just with the process but also with the contents and may even present ultimatums. Thus, the range and nature of good offices can vary to a considerable degree in the context of mediation.

With this variance in mind, questions are posed regarding the profiles of the four Nordic countries in the sphere of mediation and peace diplomacy at large. In what ways have they responded to the new challenges and utilized the various opportunities that have opened up in the post-Cold War international environment? What are their conceptual inroads grounding the policies pursued,

⁶ For an analysis of this relationship, see Jaques Faget (2011), 'The Methamorphosis of Peacemaking', in Jacques Faget (ed.), *Mediation in Political Conflicts. Soft Power or Counter Culture?* Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 2–4. Also Touval and Zartman define and categorize mediation in similar terms, see Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, 'Introduction: Mediation in Theory', in Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (eds.) (1985), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*. Boulder CO: Westview, p. 12.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

how do the different concepts applied relate to each other, and are there changes to be traced over time pointing to a dynamic process not just in the sphere of peace diplomacy but also foreign policy more generally? It is also probed whether the Nordics belong to the facilitators rather than formulators or manipulators in their efforts of mediation. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings of the charting of the Nordic profiles but it also aspires to address the question whether there exists a joint Nordic profile in the sphere of mediation and if not, what is the meaning of the diverse departures and policies of the Nordic countries.

2. THE CASE OF DENMARK

2.1. RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE OF FAILED STATES

Conflict prevention and peace promotion are in the Danish case first and foremost embedded in efforts of coping with failing and failed states. The policy emerged at the beginning of the 1990s and did so for multiple reasons.

The main one clearly consisted of that state failures and humanitarian crises occurred with increasing frequency. They were part of the turmoil that prevailed during the immediate post-Cold War years and impacted a number of regions: Asia, Europe, Latin America and particularly Africa. The fragility of a considerable number of states and their inability to provide basic services, including those related to security, had extensive consequences and contributed to the occurrence of genocide, humanitarian catastrophes, extensive flows of refugees, resurgence of pirates at sea as well as the emergence of terrorists and terrorist strikes.⁸

In consequence, new departures had to be considered within the international community as also evidenced by the UN Secretary-General's document *An Agenda for Peace*, issued in 1992.⁹ Regional organizations were redesigned, furnished with additional

⁸ As noted by Lothar Brock et.al. in their analysis of fragile states, the reasons for fragility are not uniform. Instead, they vary to a considerable degree and impose limits on what external actors can achieve. See Lothar Brock, Hans-Henrik Holm, George Sorensen and Michael Stohl (2011), 'Fragile States and Violence: The Limits of External Assistance'. *Global Dialogue*, 13(1) (www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?d+498).

⁹ As to the early years, see David S. Gibbs (2000), 'Realpolitik and Humanitarian Intervention'. *International Politics*, 37(1): 41–55.

competences and provided with broader mandates as indicated for example by the development of ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council and ECOWACS for the part of Eastern Africa.

In parallel, the coining of better, more coherent and consolidated policies took place in a number of countries, including Britain, Canada and the Netherlands.¹⁰ Denmark was thus one of the countries that during the beginning of the 1990s focused on state failures and developed new foreign, security and development policies with the fragmentation of states as a point of departure. This was done among other reasons because it was considered important to secure the results of the aid and development work underway or already carried out. It was noted in a number of cases that the results achieved through years of development cooperation could be destroyed once violent conflicts occurred and state structures broke down. It was therefore obvious that specific policies and approaches recognizing the enduring link between development and security were called for.¹¹ The *sine qua non* for success therefore pertains to factors such as the legitimacy of the government and its competence and the capacities available for delivery of results.

Thus, in 1995 Denmark decided to enhance its preparedness in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution by establishing an entity gathering experts to be employed at short notice in various preventive and peacebuilding missions. The entity, called International Humanitarian Service (IHB; Internationale Humanitære Beredskab) was initially part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was tasked to contribute to the efforts made by the governments or by the international community in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in order to enhance peace and stability. In its government programme, issued in October 2011, the Danish Government made a distinction between ordinary development aid and means to be employed within a global frame

¹⁰ See for example Tonny Brems Knutsen (1997), 'Humanitarian Intervention Revisited: Post Cold-War Responses to Classical Problems', in Michael Pugh (ed.), *The UN, Peace and Force*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 146–165.

¹¹ For an analysis, see Hans-Henrik Holm (2001), 'The Disaggregated World Order in the Making: Policy Towards Failed States as an Example'. *International Politics*, 38(3): 357–374.

for stabilization, reconstruction and recreation of capabilities in conflict-ridden areas.¹² As a follow-up, the name of the body was changed to the Peace and Stabilization Response (FSB; Freds- og stabiliseringsredskabet) in order for it to be better in line with the contents as well as the nature of the projects initiated and work carried out.

As argued by Hans-Henrik Holm, the Danish decision to develop policies and acquire competences with the fragility of states as a conceptual point of departure stood out as a logical consequence of the challenges encountered during the 1990s. The persistent problem of failing states both in Europe and Africa had created a need for new types of policy responses with development being increasingly linked to state-building, and it also called for cooperation and coordination between foreign policy, development policies as well as engagement in peacekeeping. “The new security policies have brought about this need for reassessment and policy change,” he concludes.¹³

The need for better coordinated and more coherent policies was also underlined in 2009 in the context of an agreement between the major Danish political parties concerning defence¹⁴ and it figured as a central theme in the new *Strategy for Denmark’s Development Cooperation*.¹⁵ The whole-of-government approach ranging from diplomacy to development projects and humanitarian delivery to military activities was then as a follow-up applied in preparing a policy paper on the Danish engagement in Afghanistan and it also structured papers focusing on Somalia.¹⁶ The stress on the need for coordination and coherence further appeared as central themes in a major policy document published in 2010 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning Danish policies and contributions in regard to fragile states.¹⁷

¹² *Et Danmark der står sammen. Regeringsgrundlag*. October 2011. Copenhagen: the Government, p. 38.

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 12.

¹⁴ *Forsvarsfordrag 2010–2014*. Signed in June 2009.

¹⁵ *Freedom from Poverty; Freedom to Change. Strategy for Denmark’s Development Cooperation*. Danida. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. July 2010.

¹⁶ See for example *Politikpapir for Danmarks engagement i Somalia*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2011.

¹⁷ *Fred og stabilisering. Danmarks politik for indsatser i skrøbelige stater 2010–2014*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010.

The latter document departs from that failing and failed states constitute one of the most acute challenges in the sphere of peace and security in various parts of the world. It notes that Denmark has pursued active policies in the fields of development as one of the key donor countries and has also contributed to quite complicated efforts of stabilization at various sites of conflict and struggle. In addition to continuing its own endeavours in regard to peacemaking and stabilization, Denmark aims according to the document at a strengthening of the aspirations of the international community at large in this area of vital importance. Furthermore, the document sets the goal for the part of Denmark that there has to be a coordinated whole-of-government approach spanning the fields of foreign, development and security policies. This is required in order for Denmark to be able to apply a broad array of instruments composed of military, political, humanitarian, stabilizing as well as development-related means in tackling various issues pertaining to the fragmentation of states.

The policies developed further depart from that Denmark opts for prevention as to the choices to be made in regard to the various phases of a conflict cycle. This applies to Danish projects but is also valid in view of facilitating efforts of conflict prevention in various other contexts: in Denmark's cooperation with other countries, in the UN as well as in regard to various regional endeavours.

The Government announced at the beginning of 2012 in the form of a joint statement delivered by the ministers in charge of foreign, development and defence policies that conflict prevention, stabilization and reconstruction in failing states remains a priority area in Danish policies. Also the level of ambition was specified in the sense that the focus will increasingly be on acute and particularly difficult cases such as those of Libya, Somalia and South Sudan.¹⁸ Moreover, the number of fragile countries targeted should be limited, albeit the efforts should span over a longer period than has usually

¹⁸ The new line was announced through a statement by Foreign Minister Villy Søvndal, Minister of Defence Nick Hækkerup and Minister for Development Aid Christian Friis Bach "En ny sikkerhetspolitik" (A New Security Policy), published in *Jyllands-Posten*, 20th of January 2012. The Danish partner countries consisted in 2011 of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, the occupied parts of Palestine and Burma.

been the case in the sphere of development policies. In essence, Denmark endeavours at tackling the true causes of instability, conflicts and terror rather than just focusing on the symptoms, the three ministers stated. There has to be competences and capabilities available that allow for rapid, flexible and effective responses to crisis. It was further stressed that the prime aim is one of locally rooted and tailor-made conflict prevention for longstanding and durable results to be achieved. Notably, Denmark should according to the statement refrain in the future from acting on its own as joint endeavours based on common efforts in the context of broad alliances are the best guarantee for success. The ministers therefore also stressed that cooperation with organizations such as the UN, EU and NATO adds to the prospects of achieving the desired results in conflict affected areas.

Denmark's failed state policy was further specified, with emphasis on the whole-of-government approach, in a paper prepared in 2013 for a ministerial steering group dealing with the failed states policy and efforts of stabilization. The paper presents diplomacy, development aid, military competence as well as civilian competences, including the police and emergency services, as the elements upon which Danish contributions rest.¹⁹ In addition, it outlines various ways of ensuring a better coordination of stabilization, peacebuilding and development interventions and advocates more effective planning, dialogue, coordination as well as mobilization of all the instruments and actors conducive to stabilization in fragile and conflict affected states. Moreover, the paper states that strengthening of Danish efforts will take place in collaboration with the countries themselves and through regional and multinational organizations being able to use mediation and dialogue to prevent conflicts from breaking out or deteriorating.

¹⁹ See *Danmarks samtænkte stabiliseringsindsatser i verdens brænpunkter*. The paper is available on the Foreign Ministry's website and was submitted for a final round of discussion in September 2013.

2.2. INCREASED EMPHASIS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Overall, the doctrine developed implies that Denmark contributes to efforts of conflict prevention, stabilization and reconstruction in fragile and conflict affected states through international cooperation. Denmark's participation takes place in the context of the UN, EU, OECD, NATO, World Bank as well as in the sphere of various regional organizations. In addition, the Policy Paper on Denmark's whole-of-government approach lists the Nordic countries as partners of cooperation in a number of projects and it also singles out the United States, Canada, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Australia as frequently engaged in joint endeavours and countries applying similar approaches.²⁰

The UN stands out, according to the Danish view, out as an as an important actor and partner of cooperation in tackling the issue of failed states. It does so owing to its legitimacy and the broad array of tools applicable also in efforts of assisting and remedying failing states. Yet the departure rests on the issue that there is still a need for further development and Denmark has therefore been pushing for better coordination of the tools and policies at the disposal of the UN. The strategy paper issued in 2010 notes that the overall efforts of the UN in some country-specific projects have stood out as fragmented, uncoordinated and void of any jointly agreed strategic direction.²¹ Denmark has thus aspired to improve the cooperation between various UN-bodies such as the Department of Political Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacebuilding Support Office and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. In addition, Denmark has opted for a better utilization of the experiences gained for example in the context of the revision of the justice and security sectors.

As to the EU, Denmark has been actively engaged in improving further the Union's competence in the field of comprehensive

²⁰ Ibid., p. 11.

²¹ See *Fred og stabilisering. Danmarks politik for indsatser i skrøbelige stater 2010–2015*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 21.

conflict management. The aim has been one of contributing to the breaking down of various bureaucratic barriers hampering a maximal employment of the EU's competences and resources. The various limitations have been a Danish concern and were hence included among the themes important in the context of Denmark's EU Presidency in 2012. Consequently, and in order to improve the Union's readiness to response to situations of crisis and its and to acquire capabilities and competences needed in handling post-crisis challenges, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized, together with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), a conference on "Ensuring a Comprehensive EU Approach to Crises: Readiness, Response and Recovery". The conference took place in Brussels in February 2012. The paper underlying the preparations and introducing the themes of the conference stated that it is important to examine whether the structures and processes in place can ensure that relevant EU instruments are sufficiently integrated and coordinated. It was also noted that there exists a need to move towards greater coherence and consistency as to the activities of various EU-related actors, including the EU-missions, EU delegations, Special Representatives and Member States.

According to the paper, another measure to be examined consists of further decentralization of decision making powers from Brussels.²² It was stressed that although decisive steps towards a more inclusive, multilateral and coherent external action of the EU have taken place, there are still institutional divides and operational obstacles that need to be remedied for the Union to be able to

²² See the paper prepared and distributed by the European Council on Foreign Relation (2012), "EU External Action: From CSDP to 'Flexible Engagement. Background Paper presented at the Conference on Ensuing a Comprehensive EU Strategy to Crisis: Readiness, Response and Recovery". Further information is provided by the EU2012.dk and ECFR information sheet "Ensuring a Comprehensive EU Approach to Crisis: Readiness, Response and Recovery", 25th of January 2012. See also the introductory presentation by Foreign Minister Villy Søvndal at the conference, "The EU's Conflict Prevention and Crisis Response", *The European Union Security and Defence Union*, 2012, 3(1): 7-8.

conduct timely and effective policies in the fields of crisis prevention, management, and post-conflict development.²³

A similar emphasis on coordinated and comprehensive approaches has been reflected in the various Danish policy-documents prepared in order to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. The first National Action Plan was adopted in 2005 and then revised in 2007 on the basis of cooperation between representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, National Police representing the Ministry of Justice as well as various civil society organizations.²⁴

Although aiming in general at a focused impact in tackling the problem of failed and failing states, the Danish efforts of conflict prevention have nonetheless spanned Africa, Asia as well as the Middle-East. Out of these regions, Africa has clearly received most attention as a continent frequently plagued by the problem of fragmentation. Africa's standing as a key target is also evidenced by that the various policy-papers outlining the strategic approach issued since 2004 have mainly focused on that continent. The papers have, among other things, dealt with ways of funding peace and security-related projects, and these projects have been frequently launched in cooperation with the African Union (AU). It may further be noted that Somalia has, out of the different target countries, attracted most attention and piracy has been singled out as an issue-area warranting special treatment.²⁵

²³ For evaluations concerning the development made, see among others, Stefan Lehne, (2013), 'Promoting a Comprehensive Approach to EU Foreign Policy'. Carnegie Endowment. Europe; Richard Gowan (2012), 'The Case for Cooperation in Conflict Management'. No. 59, European Council for Foreign Relations; Nicoletta Pirozzi (2013), 'The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management'. *EU Crisis Management Paper Series*. Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces. DCAF Brussels.

²⁴ *Denmark's National Action Plan for Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Danish National Police, 2008.

²⁵ See *Politikpapir for Danmarks engagement i Somalia 2011*. Danida. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The strategy on piracy was developed jointly by four ministries, *Strategy for the Danish Counter-Piracy Effort 2011–2014*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, May 2011.

Denmark has in general supported the efforts of African countries to be involved in handling security challenges on the continent. The Peace and Stabilization Fund established in 2011 as an inter-ministerial institution has in particular funded projects in East Africa as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan.²⁶ For the AU to be able to take decisions and undertake actions of its own, Denmark has specially supported the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU, and regionally the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa and Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa have been singled out as recipients of support.

Denmark's most extensive endeavour, pursued together with a number of other countries, has taken place in Afghanistan. Both civilian and military means have been employed and the whole-of-government approach has included political, strategic as well as tactical elements. Accordingly, also the first Danish strategy concerning Afghanistan prepared in 2008 was based on contributions from all relevant ministries. A task force consisting of the directors of various ministry departments was established. In fact, much has been invested in conflict management and peace diplomacy as the fact that Afghanistan ranks highest in 2013 among the recipients of Danish development aid also indicates.²⁷

More generally, Denmark supports the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. The organization brings together conflict-affected and fragile countries, donor countries part of the OECD and civil society actors. The aim is one of catalyzing transition from conflict and fragility to more peaceful relations. The Danish Minister for Development Aid has co-chaired the organization and Denmark has in general actively contributed to the implementation of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The New Deal

²⁶ For an evaluation of the policies pursued in East Africa, see Katja L. Jacobsen and Johannes R. Nordby, 'Danish Interests in Regional Security Institutions in East Africa'. *DIIS Report* 2013: 14.

²⁷ For a summary of the policy pursued, see the draft paper on the coordinated Danish policy of stabilization, *op.cit.* p. 2. The latest Afghanistan-strategy covers the years 2013–2014.

figures as a key agreement between fragile states organized as g7+ and partner countries. Denmark has, as a partner country, been active in particular in South Sudan and Afghanistan in the context of the New Deal.

2.3. THE ADMINISTERING OF COORDINATED POLICIES

The whole-of-government approach as to failing and failed states initially emerged in 2004 and did so in the context of an agreement concerning long-term policies in the field of defence. The agreement was then followed up by establishing of an inter-ministerial coordination group consisting of civil servants from a number of relevant ministries. The next step, taken in 2010, consisted of setting up a steering-group consisting of directors of departments from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, the Prime Minister's Office as well as the Ministry of Justice. The group has been mandated to take strategic as well as operative decisions and it has also been tasked with the administration of the Peace and Stabilisation Response (FSB). It meets regularly and may establish regional task forces such as the one dealing with piracy or issues related to Afghanistan. Furthermore, an inter-ministerial secretariat focusing on the Danish policies in regard to failing and failed states was established in 2009. It is hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and consists of civil servants from the MFA and the Ministry of Defence.

In 2009 an entity called the Global Frame (Globalramme) was set up in order to provide financing for projects related to fragile states in Asia, the Middle-East as well as Europe. The annual sum to be spent on various projects has been 150 million DKK. As part of a revision of the previous policies, the Global Frame was renamed and the new Peace and Stabilization Fund also has a larger amount of means at its disposal.

3. THE CASE OF FINLAND

3.1. ENGAGING THE STATE

The Finnish efforts of developing a distinct profile and capacity in the sphere of peace mediation are of relatively recent origin, although the promotion of mediation as an integral part of the country's foreign policy leans on previous experiences. These have accumulated over time including, inter alia, peace processes in Northern Ireland, Western Balkans, Aceh, the Horn of Africa and South Caucasus.

Two different factors seem to account for why peace mediation was placed on the national agenda around 2008-2009. Firstly, voices were raised in the public debate arguing that the various non-state activities in the sphere of conflict resolution and peace promotion should be complemented by policies pursued systematically by the Finnish state. These voices turned out to be quite influential and generated much attention. In fact, they amounted rather quickly to an almost nationwide consensus extending beyond the usual political cleavages. In consequence, it was broadly concluded that the state of Finland should indeed invest in, accumulate resources, generate competences and engage in peace mediation. Policies should be developed aiming at advancing a far more pronounced national role, but also to add to international awareness concerning the contemporary needs in the field of peace mediation.

For the second, the interest in the field grew further with the question of country branding turning into a national concern. A link between the two issue areas emerged as the Country Brand Delegation, established by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, included peace mediation in its final report *Mission for Finland*,

published at the end of 2010.²⁸ Obviously, the Delegation was influenced by the former President Martti Ahtisaari being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize as well as the success in the Aceh peace process with Ahtisaari as the lead negotiator.²⁹ The Delegation viewed these achievements as a potential to be utilized and developed for purposes of branding, and consequently various proposals were made to that effect. It initiated, among other things, an annual event, the Ahtisaari Convention, in order to bring together various international conflict mediators to discuss ways of settling ongoing disputes, but also to educate Finnish crisis management specialists as well as the public at large on issues pertaining to conflict resolution.

The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded already in May 2010 to the various requests and recommendations by issuing guidelines for peace mediation.³⁰ The aim expressed was one of Finland seeking ways to strengthen its role in brokering peace, reinforcing domestic peace mediation capacities and improving the preparedness to take part in peace mediation operations, but also to help develop the international peace mediation structures and in general impact the unfolding of the international system in the sphere of peacemaking. The profile searched for is that of Finland as a “vanguard of peace meditation”, although partnerships should be established with countries already having a pronounced profile in peace mediation such as Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

A further landmark consisted of the government formed at the beginning of 2011 incorporating peace mediation into its programme for the years 2011–2015. It pledged, in particular, to prepare an Action Plan on Peace Mediation in order to “strengthen Finnish

²⁸ Mission for Finland: How Finland will demonstrate its strength by solving the world’s most wicked problems. *Final Report of the Country Brand Delegation*. Available at: http://www.architecture.com.au/i-cms_file?page=13538/mission-for-finland-branding-report.pdf.

²⁹ For the various phases of the peace process, see Timo Kivimäki and David Gorman (2008), ‘Non-Governmental Actors in Peace Processes: The Case of Aceh’, in Anders Mellbourn and Peter Wallensteen (eds.), *Third Parties in Conflict Prevention*. Stockholm: Gidlunds förlag, pp. 163–185.

³⁰ *Peace Mediation – Finland’s Guidelines*. Available at: http://www.formin.fi/public/default.aspx/nodeid=40158&contentlan=28&culture=en_US#Peace_Mediation.

capabilities and participation, taking account of opportunities for the flexible use of resources through the establishment of a stabilization fund”.

The Action Plan was subsequently prepared – in consultation with various civil society actors – and published in December 2011.³¹ It was noted in the plan that the nature of the various conflicts to be tackled has changed profoundly and that there are hence reasons to emphasize the importance of international cooperation in order for the international structures, capabilities and competence to be strengthened. According to the plan, more effective tools have to be developed to prevent, contain and resolve conflicts in all stages of possible conflict cycles. Furthermore, Finland set itself the task of contributing to the coining of such tools, and pledged to do so in cooperation with like-minded countries, organizations and civil society actors. Still another conclusion pertained to that networking was granted the position of a main approach to be applied both in an international as well as domestic contexts and, more generally, peace mediation was seen as an integral part of a broader and comprehensive package of crisis management.

3.2. STRENGTHENING THE UN-SYSTEM IN THE FIELD OF MEDIATION

In setting priorities and aiming at improving international peace mediation structures, Finland has identified the UN as a major platform for action and networking. The aim of the policies pursued has been one of promoting mediation in order for it to become one of the core issue-areas in the policies of the UN.

A partnership was established in 2010 with Turkey with the two countries initiating the Group of Friends of Mediation active in the context of the United Nations. The Group aspires at developing the mandate and competences of the organization in mediation-related questions by bringing together traditional as well as new and emerging mediators. The effort is one of raising the level of awareness within

³¹ Action Plan for Mediation. Available at: <http://www.formin.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=23644&nodeid+1514&contentlan+2&culture=en-US>

the UN and the international community and, more specifically, to bring together countries from different continents and cultures to share best practices. In addition, the Group aspires to promote synergy and facilitate the emergence of a cooperative culture in the sphere of mediation. Moreover, it aspires to avoid overlapping authority for clear roles and coherence to prevail in the efforts of brokering peace.

The Group comprises of 37 member states (with the United States approved as the latest member) and it has also been joined by various regional organizations as well as the UN. There are hence altogether 45 members in the Group. It contributed to that the first-ever General Assembly resolution (A/RES/65/283) on mediation in the UN system was adopted unanimously in June 2011. The resolution was jointly presented by Finland and Turkey.

As a follow-up of the resolution, a document on the various mediation fundamentals to enhance the prospects of success was prepared in September 2011 by the Secretary-General and subsequently presented at the General Assembly. The document titled *UN Guidelines for Effective Mediation* draws extensively from the organization's own experiences but also leans on advice and insight provided by various member states as well as other actors experienced in peace mediation. The presentation of the guidelines at the General Assembly was followed by a ministerial meeting in September 2012 organized by Finland and Turkey. The coining of the guidelines was broadly characterized as a landmark event and it has in general been felt that the UN is now on its way of making considerable progress in adapting its efforts in the field of mediation to the contemporary challenges in the sphere of international relations.³²

The Finnish aim in this context has, according to Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, been one of disseminating the guidelines as widely as possible and to contribute to that they become a tool commonly

³² For further information on the approach of the UN in the sphere of mediation, available at: <http://www.peacemaker.un.org>. As to the design and management of mediation processes, see *United Nations Guide for Effective Mediation* disseminated by the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), based in the Policy and Mediation Division of the Department of Political Affairs (September 2012).

used.³³ Among other things, activities in the sphere of mediation should according to Finland be included in the UN's regular budget in order to add to the prospects of predictable and stable funding. Moreover, the initiatives taken at the General Assembly should in the Finnish view be expanded also to apply to other forums and organizations of the UN, including the Security Council. In addition, Finland aims at enhancing the role of women in mediation among other things by strengthening the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

Finland will, according to the guidelines concerning the future UN-policies issued in July 2013,³⁴ continue to prioritize – along with a strengthening of the UN's political operations (SPM) and enhancement of the responsibility to protect (R2P) – peace mediation. Also Finland's financial support to relevant UN bodies, above all to the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), will continue. More generally, the aim is one of adding to the range of financing so that in addition to the western countries also others increase their voluntary contributions, albeit the long-term aim is one of including the financing of mediation into the UN's regular budget.

It is further noted in the guidelines that a precondition for successful policies consists of that there are capable and trustworthy Finnish mediators available to be assigned various tasks pertaining to mediation.

3.3. BOLSTERING THE COMPETENCES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Along with the UN, the European Union has been a major platform and target for the Finnish efforts of enhancing international peace mediation. As such, the Union's strength in the sphere of soft power is seen as formidable, although it has also been argued that it

³³ See speech by Minister Tuomioja at the Friends of Mediation Ministerial Breakfast in New York, 27 September 2012. Available at: <http://formin.fi/public/Print.aspx?contentid=258834&nodeid=15145&culture=en-US&contentlan=2>.

³⁴ *Suomen ulkoasiainhallinnon YK-strategia* (The UN-Strategy of Finland's Foreign Policy Administration). Ulkoasiainministeriö, July 2013.

remains to some extent potential in nature and therefore needs to be fully developed and widely employed.³⁵ The EU has undoubtedly played a key role in several peace processes and it possesses a wide array of tools – such as the Instruments for Stability (ifS) or the option of nominating Special Representatives – but the Union has according to Finnish views not been very systematic in developing its own mediation capacities. The role of conflict prevention and mediation should be increased in the European External Action Service (EEAS): it should be ascertained that the preparation of the stability instruments of the Union is carried out on a broad base between the Commission and the EEAS and that the resources of the Unit for Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Mediation are sufficient.³⁶

A considerable step forward was taken in 2009, during the Swedish EU Presidency, with the Council approving a Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities. Yet it appears that the existence of such an opening is not very well known, and the concept has also suffered from a slow implementation.³⁷ At large, emphasis has remained on traditional crisis management with less stress on mediation and dialogue.

Notably, the structures and preconditions for active engagement in mediation are there but they need, in the Finnish view, to be utilized to the full. “It is our common responsibility to make sure that the division has adequate resources and necessary support for its actions”, stated Minister for Foreign Affairs Tuomioja in outlining the role of the EU in the sphere of brokering peace.³⁸

³⁵ For these arguments, see the speech by Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja in Brussels, 25 April 2012 delivered at a conference on international peace mediation organized by the European Parliament. Available at: <http://formin.fi/public/Print.aspx?contentid=247735&nodeid=15145&culture=en-US&contentlan=2>.

³⁶ See Finland’s Action Plan for Mediation, p. 13.

³⁷ For a study of the EU’s profile in the field of conflict management and peace mediation, see Tanja Tamminen, ‘Towards Efficient Early Action. The EU Needs a Regional Focus and Proactive Tools to Prevent and Manage Conflicts’. *Briefing Paper*, 113. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, September 2012.

³⁸ Op. cit., p. 2.

In order for the EU structures to be developed further, Finland and Sweden have jointly proposed the establishing of a European Institute of Peace (EIP). The proposal was included in a letter and a non-paper addressed to the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton.³⁹ The EIP should, in their view, exist as an independent and non-profit think tank based on the common values of the EU.⁴⁰ It could, more concretely, focus on mediation and dialogue in countries where the Union is not directly involved. The proposal has been discussed in the European Parliament and it was then requested that the EEAS undertakes a cost-benefit analysis of the establishment of such an institute. The results of such an analysis were published in 2012.⁴¹

A Draft Concept Paper, dating from April 2013 and attributing mainly to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, takes into consideration various suggestions concerning the mandate of the EIP. It focuses on the financing, field and range of activities as well as the division of labour within the planned EIP and, in general, takes up thoughts put forward in the debate in aiming at bringing the broad discussion to a positive end and the establishment of the institute.⁴² A group of core countries, including also Finland and Sweden, have recently intensified their cooperation to secure the establishment of the institute which is expected to take place during 2014.

³⁹ See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 'Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt propose Establishment of the European Institute of Peace, 3.9.2010. <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=199709&contentlan+2&culture=en-US>. The text of the letter is available at: <http://the.mediateur.eu/index.php/publications-and-resources/260-discussion-paper-a-european-institute-of-peace-value-added-risk-and-options>.

⁴⁰ See Heli Kanerva, 'The Development of Governmental Structures of Finnish Peace Mediation', in Piiparinen, Touko and Brummer, Ville (eds.), *Global Networks of Mediation. Prospects and Avenues for Finland as a Peacemaker*. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs: Helsinki 2012, p. 111. See also Gunilla Herolf, 'Establishing the Knowledge Base of a Smart Power: A Blue Print for an EU Institute for Peace'. Directorate-General for External Policies. Policy Department (EP/EXPO/AFET/EWC/2009-01/06).

⁴¹ See Peter Brorsen, *European Institute for Peace: Costs, Benefits and Options. Final Report on a Study Commissioned by the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs*, October 2012.

⁴² See European Institute for Peace. "Creating a Hub for Peace Mediation, Informal Dialogue". *Draft Concept Paper*, April 2013.

3.4. OTHER MEASURES ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

Finland has, in addition to activities in the context of the UN and EU, supported various regional organizations and in particular the African Union (AU) in their efforts of mediation. For the part of the AU, the aim has been one of contributing to the replacement of the current mostly ad hoc based activities with more permanent ones. Among other things, this objective has been furthered by the African Union Mediation Support Capacity Project that takes advantage of the African experience in the sphere of practical mediation work. Finland has also been part of supporting cooperation between the AU and the EU as well as the AU and the UN in issues related to mediation. The Finnish Action Plan on mediation departs from that these forms of cooperation and support will be continued also in the future.⁴³

The Action Plan also notes the central role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the field of mediation as well as conflict prevention and resolution. The aim in the case of the OSCE is according to the Plan one of strengthening the structures and measures that support mediation at level of the Secretariat and in field missions in the context of handling the conflict cycle.⁴⁴ Recently the Conflict Prevention Centre of the OSCE has expanded its work in the sphere of mediation support. A framework document has been prepared and the aim is according to the Secretary-General Lamberto Zannier one of using the lessons gained during a pilot-phase to establish a full-fledged, fully institutionalized mediation support capacity. A Friends-of-Mediation Group consisting of Switzerland, Finland and Turkey as the key countries advancing the work of the Group has convened in Vienna for such a capacity to be created.

Attention is equally attached in the Finnish Action Plan to the Council of Europe as a body being closely connected with conflict prevention and peace-building because the respect of human rights, observance of the principles of the rule of law and support for democratic principles are the basic elements of mediation.

⁴³ See the Action Plan for Mediation, p. 15.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.15.

Furthermore, Nordic cooperation is viewed as an important channel for making mediation effective. The Finnish Action Plan states that cooperation in the field of training will be strengthened and new forms of cooperation will be sought for in order to produce added value for mediation. Finland has, among other things, cooperated with Norway in efforts to initiate a genuine national political dialogue among the various actors in Myanmar. In general, the idea has been one of supporting the local actors to build the necessary capabilities or platforms needed in the settling of conflicts. In 2011 Finland initiated a Nordic network on peace mediation in order to facilitate contacts, identify possible areas of further cooperation and exchange of information in a rather informal and flexible manner.⁴⁵ In addition to facilitating contacts between the relevant foreign ministry officials, it aspires to create linkages between various Nordic civil society actors, including researchers and research institutes.

3.5. THE NATIONAL LEVEL

With mediation turning into an integral part of the Finnish foreign policy, there has been a need to back this up with efforts of developing various competences within the country itself. This includes the structures and competences part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The country continues, as articulated by the Foreign Minister, “to build on the mediation experience that it already has”.⁴⁶ The aim is one of coordinating existing resources of the state administration and civil society so that these resources can be utilized fully in mediation-related activities.

The coordination, monitoring and planning of mediation has been anchored as a cross-cutting element in the activities of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with discussions taking place particularly in the

⁴⁵ See for example the speech delivered by Minister for Foreign Affairs Erkki Tuomioja at a peace mediation seminar held in Geneva in June 2012. Available at: <http://formin-origin.finland.fi/public/Print.aspx?contentid=251896&culture=en-US&cont>.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Security and Development Group of the MFA. Other branches of the state administration such as the Prime Minister's Office, Ministries of Finance, Interior, Justice and Defence, all with an important role in regard to mediation, have designated contact persons for mediation issues. Cooperation with government representatives, civil society organizations such as the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and Finn Church Aid, research institutions and universities, immigrant groups living in Finland and others involved in mediation takes place among other forms through meetings within a national Mediation Coordination Group. Led by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Group serves as a platform of sharing information, identifying new areas of cooperation in the field of mediation and advancing a multistakeholder approach to mediation. Training of personnel takes place primarily in cooperation with the Crisis Management Centre (CMC), a body part of the Ministry of the Interior.

A coordinator has been appointed within the MFA to work particularly with peace mediation and the ministry also hosts two special representatives of the Foreign Minister. The posts are currently held by Kimmo Kiljunen and Pekka Haavisto, with Kiljunen being among other things tasked with generating contacts with various relevant actors, including parties to conflict, and to add to the awareness as well as insight concerning regional conflicts in various parts of the world. His focus has been, in particular, in South East Asia, the paramount example being the National Dialogue process in Myanmar/Burma. In addition to providing advice, he is also entitled to make suggestions concerning mediation in particular cases. Pekka Haavisto has a similar mandate, although he is instructed to focus in particular on conflicts unfolding in the Horn of Africa with particular emphasis on Somalia and Sudan.

In addition to new structures and the establishment of the post of a coordinator, funding is also seen as important for an increase in the capacity of mediation. As noted in the Action Plan for Mediation, Finland receives international visibility and influence also in issues related to mediation through an allocation of economic resources.⁴⁷ The Peace Mediation Guidelines (2010) stated that "Finland has

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 33.

annually supported peace mediation with several million euros”.⁴⁸ A separate appropriation out of the means reserved for civilian crisis management (altogether some 17 million euros) has been reserved for projects directly related to mediation. This appropriation has since the year 2010 been annually around 400.000 euros. According to the Government Programme, various possibilities for the flexible use of resources through the establishment of a stabilization fund are being examined.

One of the activities initiated on the basis of a recommendation of the Branding Group consists of organizing the International Ahtisaari Day. The event takes place annually to provide a platform for advancing debate on issues pertaining to mediation and in order to bring together both international as well as domestic experts in the field.

National competences have also been largely advanced in order for Finland to be able to facilitate peace mediation in various international contexts and to do so by contributing to the improvement and strengthening of various international peace mediation structures and supporting actors and partners engaged in the more informal activities (track 2) part of reconciliation and peacemaking. However, as noted by Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, Finland has rarely acted as a mediator itself⁴⁹, although it has at the same time experiences, preparedness and competences available to be applied in the field of mediation if so decided.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has cooperated, in the field of mediation, with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) at the University of Tampere as well as the Åland Islands Peace Institute. The Åland Institute has, among other things, hosted a number of delegations from different regions plagued by conflicts in order for the visitors to be informed about the Åland Islands as a solution to a complicated

⁴⁸ Peace Mediation. Finland's Guidelines, *ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, speech by the Foreign Minister at a seminar on Peace Mediation, Geneva, June 2012.

ethno-territorial dispute.⁵⁰ The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has supported the visits, contributed to the spreading of information on the case and been part of organizing seminars on Åland as an example of peaceful governance in New York, Brussels and Geneva.⁵¹

⁵⁰ On the case of Åland, see Mikael Wigell (2013), 'The Åland Example as Norm Entrepreneurship', *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 20(1): 67–84. For information on the visits by different delegations, see John Granlund (2010), 'Det internationella kortet – altruism och egennyttan som skäl till att föra fram Ålandsexemplet'. *Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute, nr. 2*.

⁵¹ For the content of one of the seminars, see 'Autonomy – An Alternative to Secession? A Seminar on the Åland Islands as an Example of Peaceful Governance'. Seminar held in New York, March 15, 2001. *Publications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*, 7, 2001.

4. THE CASE OF NORWAY

4.1. A NEW FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY ENGAGEMENT

Initially, the decentralization of Norway's foreign policy took off in the early 1990s in the field of development policies and humanitarian assistance. The conclusion was then drawn that the challenges encountered call for a much closer cooperation between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various non-governmental actors.⁵² As a follow-up, the deviation from the traditionally quite state-centric pattern was also extended to apply equally to various efforts related to peace and reconciliation. The challenges met and the application of new approaches implied that the promotion of peace turned into an increasingly significant part of Norway's foreign policy.

⁵² For an account and analysis of the early years, see Øystein Haga Skånland (2010), 'Norway as a Peace Nation: A Discourse Analytic Reading of the Norwegian Peace Engagement'. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 45(1): 34–54. He views the White Paper of the Government in 1989 as having contributed to the articulation of a new approach, although 'peace promotion' still appeared in that context as subordinate concept in the official discourse and it was predominantly seen as a tool to be applied in the advancement of development aid, humanitarian assistance and promotion of democracy. See Government White Paper, no.11 (1998–1999). *Om utviklingstrei i det internasjonale samfunn og virkninger for norsk utenrikspolitikk*. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As such, peace-related themes have for long been integrally related to the Norwegian self-understanding.⁵³ Prominent Norwegians, such as Fridtjof Nansen, have mediated in international conflicts. Nansen was a polar explorer, diplomat, and Norway's representative to the League of Nations. In addition to helping refugees as well as displaced persons and relieving a wide-spread hunger in Russia, the Caucasus region, the Balkans, and Anatolia, he promoted talks between Turkey and Greece in the war in 1922. Nansen was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his achievements the same year. Overall, he left a legacy called the 'Nansen-tradition' in Norwegian policies⁵⁴, and that tradition remained notable also during the years of the Cold War with Norway being involved in various processes of peace diplomacy such as facilitating meetings between parties to the war in Vietnam⁵⁵ and initiating talks between Thailand and China.⁵⁶

Crucially, the experiences gained and the linkages created within Norway implied that there was, after the end of the Cold War and during the 1990's, preparedness within the political leadership as well as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to respond positively to initiatives taken and proposals made by various internationally well-connected individuals or NGOs active in different conflict-prone areas. This openness and the broadening of the actors involved as well as engagement in networking and willingness to provide space also for other type of efforts than conventional government-centered diplomacy implied that Norway was able to spearhead peacemaking

⁵³ Among the many studies on this theme, see Sigmund Olav Bekken (2007), *Identities and peace promotion in Norwegian foreign policy*. Thesis presented at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. See also Kristian Dobinson og Geir Dale (2000), 'Den norske ryggsekk. En analyse av "norsk" fredsdiplomati', in Geir Dale, et.al, (red.), *Grenser for alt. Kritiske perspektiver på norsk utenrikspolitikk*. Oslo: Spartacus Forlag, pp. 45–69.

⁵⁴ The tradition was mentioned for example by Foreign Minister Støre in his presentation on Norway as a nation of peace, see Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, 'Norge som fredsnasjon – myte eller virklighet?'. Speech at NUPI, 24 of April 2006.

⁵⁵ Rolf Tamnes, *Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie*. Bind 6. *Oljeolde*. 1965–1995. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, pp. 355–357.

⁵⁶ See Iver Neumann (2011), 'Peace and Reconciliation as System-maintaining Diplomacy: The Case of Norway'. *International Journal*, 66(3), p. 574.

and utilize the increasing importance of peace diplomacy. It seems that Norway's engagement during the first part of the 1990's was almost always based on the same pattern: initiatives were taken by well-placed individuals and NGO-workers, and these were then followed up by contacts and talks that also included representatives of states.⁵⁷

Norway's engagement in peace and reconciliation efforts in Sudan, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Mali as well as the Middle East all seem to follow a similar pattern. Broad contacts and networking have been combined with more conventional approaches and competence has been backed up by the application of considerable financial means. The facilitation of contacts between the protagonists in Guatemala appears to have been something of a test case in the sense that a back channel for contacts through meetings in Oslo between representatives of the Guatemalan Government and the URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca) was established already in 1990.

As to the Middle-East, the utilization of the established competences and created networks led in January 1993 to the initiation of a secret channel, the so-called Oslo channel, for talks between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. The initiative was first launched and discussed between non-governmental actors for the governments then to join the endeavours and approve the creation of such a channel. In fact, the Norwegian engagement in the Middle East was part of a broader pattern as the talks conducted with the help of the 'Oslo channel' functioned as a supportive and complementary tool for the public and official negotiations that took place in Washington. In general, the process was rather successful in the sense of amounting to what has later become known as the Oslo Agreement, and yielding a Declaration of Principles that cleared the way for the establishment of the Palestinian Self-Government Authority as well as a mutual recognition between

⁵⁷ For a more detailed description, see Øystein Skånland, *Peace Promotion as National Identity. The Emergence and Reproduction of Norway's Activist Peace and Reconciliation Efforts*. Paper presented at the 2011 ECPR Conference in Reykjavik.

Israel and the PLO.⁵⁸ The Declaration of Principles was then signed in Washington between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the leader of the PLO Yassir Arafat in September 1993.

The initial Norwegian success has later been followed up in various ways, above all by providing various forms of development aid and supporting the building of various institutions essential for a possible Palestinian state. Norway remained, despite the difficulties encountered in bringing the peace process to a positive end, a strong supporter of two-state solution, but has also supported internal Palestinian reconciliation. That is why Norway decided in 2005 to normalize diplomatic relations with the coalition Government that included Hamas.⁵⁹

The gained experiences implied that peace diplomacy was provided with an increasingly central standing in Norway's foreign policy. Engagement in bridge-building had already been singled out as one of the aims to be pursued in the field of foreign policy in the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Parliament in 1989⁶⁰, but it turned almost self-evident after the signing of the Oslo Accords that Norway should engage itself in various peace-related activities and also aspire to create additional preparedness and competences in the field. Whereas the promotion of peace had previously been seen as an integral part of the development policies, it turned more autonomous and was upgraded into an important part of the foreign policy in its own right.⁶¹

In aspiring for an integrated and coherent approach, the concept of a Norwegian Model has been introduced.⁶² It rests, among

⁵⁸ Among the many publications on the process, see Hilde Henriksen Waage, 'Norwegians? Who Needs Norwegians? Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway's Political Past in the Middle-East'. *Report 9/2000*. International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).

⁵⁹ Statement by Secretary of State Gry Larsen, 'Tolerance and Dialogue. Presentation at Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 28th of November 2012.

⁶⁰ Report to the Storting, *Stortingsmelding* no. 11 (1989–90).

⁶¹ See Government White Paper nr. 19 (1995–1996). *En verden i endring. Hovedtrekk i norsk politikk overfor utviklingslandene*. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁶² For an analysis of the model, see for example Kelleher, A. and Taulbee, J. L. (2006), 'Bridging the Gap: Building Peace Norwegian Style'. *Peace & Change*, 31: 479–505.

other things, on Norway's status as a small state and confidence in the country's impartiality as to the conflicts to be tackled as well as Norway's ability and competence to handle the issues at stake. Another essential ingredient consists of a rather flexible way of cooperation as well as a division of labour between the Norwegian Government, NGOs and academic institutions. Yet another feature essential in the context of Norwegian peace diplomacy pertains to endurance and the long-term perspective applied in approaching the settlement of conflicts. Thus, the aim is not merely one of achieving a cessation of violence and coining a peace treaty but also to set in motion and support political, economic and social processes conducive to a durable peace.⁶³ Moreover, the Norwegian endurance and option of setting long-term aims rests on a broad political consensus underlying the promotion of peace and reconciliation. As argued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Petersen, "We are able to keep up our commitment regardless of changing governments or political currents, and we remain engaged even at difficult stages in a peace process",⁶⁴

As part and parcel of efforts to move over from a mere staying with negative peace over to positive peace, development aid and humanitarian assistance has been extensively used to support the promotion of peace. The Norwegian Government has repeatedly underlined that peace and development are mutually dependent. In 2004 the Government presented a strategic framework stating that development policy should be an "important and integral element" of Norwegian foreign policy towards conflict-affected countries.⁶⁵ In

⁶³ See 'Norge i fredens tjeneste. Norsk bidrag till fred och försoning' (Norway in the Service of Peace. Norwegian Contribution to Peace and Reconciliation). *Rapport*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (07.07.2000).

⁶⁴ See Foreign Minister Jan Petersen, 'Norwegian Perspectives on International Peace and Security'. China Institute of International Studies Forum, Beijing, 20th of March 2005. *MFA Document Archive*. Jan Petersen has also argued that the promotion of peace is part of a broader pattern of Norwegian public diplomacy, see Josef Batora (2005), 'Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium-Sized States: Norway and Canada', in *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*. The Hague: Netherland's Institute of International Relations, p. 16.

⁶⁵ Government White Paper nr. 11 (1998), op.cit., p. 8.

line with this, the 2009 White Paper on development aid presented conflicts as one of the three challenges for Norwegian aid policy.⁶⁶

At large, Norway's engagement and participation has over the years consisted in one of its forms of acting as a mediator but above all a facilitator of negotiations with the responsibility for success lying basically with the protagonists themselves. Moreover, the country has contributed to a creation of back channels for secret negotiations and been an actor in the context of international coalitions set up to tackle a particular conflict. Norway has in cases such as Burundi, Guatemala, Haiti, Aceh, Mali, Nepal, Cyprus, Sudan, East Timor, West Balkans, the Great Lakes region and West Africa chosen to support other leading actors, but has, on occasion, also taken the lead in processes of peace promotion.⁶⁷ In general, the aim has been one of focusing on a limited number of cases and to bring them to a successful conclusion.⁶⁸ Furthermore, there has been a willingness to discuss with all of the parties of a conflict and it has also been of importance that Norway retains good relations with all of the major actors on the scene of international relations.

While many of the cases that Norway has dealt with in terms of peace promotion have amounted to a favourable outcome, others have not yielded the desired results. The cases of Sri Lanka and the Middle-East both stand for backlashes as the initial success has been reversed over time. As to Sri Lanka, the effort of brokering by initiating discussions in 2003 between the government and the

⁶⁶ Government White Paper nr. 13 (2008–2009). *Klima, konflikt og kapital. Norsk utviklingspolitikk i et endret handlingsrom*. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁷ The Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Norwegian foreign policy states that “Norway rarely appears on its own” in the sphere of peace promotion and reconciliation but engages itself as a general rule in combination with other actors, above all the UN. See St. meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 108. The Report states that Norway was then involved in peace diplomacy in some 20 countries and the more specific list provided offers information on the cases of Sudan, Somalia, Colombia, Middle-East, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, the Philippines and East-Timor.

⁶⁸ See the statement by Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, ‘Norway – a peace nation. Myth or Fact?’. The Nobel Peace Center, Oslo 24 of April 2006.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) broke down in 2007.⁶⁹ This experience seems to have amounted to that Norway has to some extent shifted emphasis in accordance with the so-called joint work-principle.⁷⁰ There is hence more stress on cooperation between various interested parties: the UN, and other multilateral agencies, regional organizations, neighbouring countries, other countries active in the sphere of peace promotion and NGOs. Norway prefers, in general, to cooperate with partners having the ability to respond rapidly to crisis and the option of gaining access to all of the parties of a conflict.⁷¹

The latter approach is well exemplified by the support given to the former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, in the context of the internal conflict and stalemate that emerged in Kenya after the December 2007 elections. Annan was mandated by the African Union (AU) to act as a broker between the parties, and he sought assistance from a group of advisers that included several prominent persons from other African countries. The intense diplomatic efforts of brokering succeeded in the sense that a power-sharing agreement emerged and an overt and extensive conflict could be avoided.

4.2. IMPACTING INTERNATIONAL PEACE DIPLOMACY

Norway has frequently cooperated with the United Nations in the field of peace promotion. This was the case already in 1990 when Norway was requested by the UN to facilitate the creation of contacts between the various actors part of the conflict in Guatemala. The more recent cases of cooperation consist of Norway helping to pave

⁶⁹ For an account of the process, see Kristine Höglund and Isak Svensson (2009), 'Mediating between Tigers and Lions. Norwegian Peace Diplomacy in Sri Lanka's Civil War', in Karin Eggsetam and Annika Björkdahl (eds.), *War and Peace in Transition. Changing Roles of External Actors*. Lund: Nordic Academic Press, pp. 147–170.

⁷⁰ The term used in Norwegian is 'dugnad'.

⁷¹ See Vidar Helgesen, 'Has Peace Diplomacy Lost Post 9/11: What Implications for Norway?'. *FHS Publications*, 3/2007. Oslo: Institut for forsvarsstudier.

the way for various UN operations in Haiti. Furthermore, Norway has been engaged in direct cooperation with the UN Special Envoy and has contributed by providing resources for the UN operation (MINUSTAH) in particular by setting up a reconciliation fund. For the part of Burundi, Norway has acted as a member of the UN's Peacebuilding Commission and has been tasked to lead the activities of the Commission in Burundi.

In addition, Norway has set up a standby force for peace mediation which is administered by the Norwegian Refugee Council and has been at the service of the UN. The Government has repeatedly underlined that a substantial amount of Norwegian funding available for peace and reconciliation efforts has been channeled through the UN.

The UN has in general been seen as pivotal for international peace and security with a competence to mediate, act as a peacebuilder, and function as a catalyst for justice and accountability. However, Norway has – in addition to cooperating with and supporting the UN – also aspired for reforms that aim at adding to the competence and resources available to the organization. The country has shared the view also held by a number of other countries according to which the ability of the UN to forestall and settle conflicts has been insufficient⁷² and Norway has supported various efforts of remedying the situation, including the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. In addition to acting as a member of the Commission, Norway has contributed to the Peacebuilding Fund and supported, in particular, the Mediation Support Unit. In general, Norway has in various ways aimed at furthering the development of the multi-lateral, integrated approach to the UN's peace efforts, i.e. an approach outlined in the Report of the High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence. Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg has co-chaired the Panel.

Notably, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been central in the Europe-related policies pursued by Norway. Support has in particular been provided for active involvement in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the Balkans, the Caucasus region and in Central Asia.

⁷² See Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, "Norge som en fredsnasjon – myte eller virklighet?". Speech at the Norwegian Center for Peace, Oslo, 24th of April 2006.

As to other regions, Norway has prioritized Africa and has therefore also coined a comprehensive strategy to guide the policies pursued.⁷³ Various forms of peace-related activities, most often in cooperation with the UN, African Union (AU) and other partners, have taken place above all in Sudan, the northern part of Uganda, Mali, Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as Somalia and Darfur. According to the strategy developed, Norway aims at strengthening the involvement of the UN in Africa and aspires to assist, as a key partner of cooperation, the endeavours of the AU in developing a civilian competence and capacity of its own in the sphere of peace-related operations. Furthermore, Norway aims at promoting the participation of African women in various activities related to peace, both locally as well as internationally in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and the Norwegian Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.⁷⁴

Notably, a rather broad evaluation report on peacebuilding was published in 2004. The report, called the *Utstein* study, was jointly developed by the Evaluation Departments of the Foreign and Development Cooperation Ministries of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK. Furthermore, a survey on the peacebuilding experiences has been carried out. The final report drew on four independent national studies to identify key findings for analysis and comparison.⁷⁵ A peacebuilding strategy paper was drafted in Norway in 2002, albeit it was not provided with an official status.⁷⁶

⁷³ *Plattform for en helhetlig Afrika-politikk*. Oslo: Utenriksdepartementet, 2007.

⁷⁴ *Regjeringens handlingsplan for gjennomføring av FNs Sikkerhetsråds resolusjon 1325 (2000) om kvinner, fred og sikkerhet*. Handlingsplan, Mars 2006. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁷⁵ 'Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding; Getting Their Act Together. Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding'. *Evaluation Report 1/2004*. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dan Smith, Director of PRIO, acted as a consultant responsible for the study.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34. As noted by Wenche Hauge, a PRIO scholar in her contribution to the *Utstein* report, the strategy basically summarized experiences and lessons gained from the various cases of peace promotion in which Norway had been involved, above all the one of facilitating peace in Guatemala. See Wenche Hauge, 'Norwegian Peacebuilding Policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead'. *Evaluation Report 2/2004*. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 11.

4.3. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE POLICIES PURSUED

Taking into account that the Norwegian activities started at the beginning of the 1990's and did so mainly in an ad hoc-manner, the change over time has been rather significant. Quite established practices have grown forth and stable administrative procedures and structures have been developed. It should also be noted that the funding earmarked for the promotion of peace has increased steadily since 1993.

The financing for various peacebuilding projects emanates from two sources: the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the MFA financing, above all, cases and projects entailing peace promotion.⁷⁷ In 1996 a special budget line was established within the MFA in order to have funds available that could be used flexibly for “measures contributing to the solution of local and religious conflicts creating refugees”. The funds set aside and the budget line established for peace promotion has then grown reaching the sum of 821 million NOK in 2008. Since then the amount earmarked for peace mediation has to some extent declined, although this has mainly occurred owing to adjustments in the set-up of the budget as funds previously appearing under the ‘peace and reconciliation and democracy’ item have been transferred to other items. In the 2013 budget the sum proposed by the Government was 650 million NOK.

Overall, the institutionalization of the engagement in peace promotion has developed gradually. It was noted in an evaluation of the Norwegian policies carried out in 1996 that the policies pursued were mainly of an ad-hoc nature, and therefore the evaluators recommended some moves of institutionalization.⁷⁸ In consequence, the MFA's Department for Human Rights, Humanitarian Affairs and Democracy set up a Unit for Peace and Reconciliation. Four persons were assigned to the unit in order to focus on mediation and peace

⁷⁷ See the report carried out by Dan Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 35.

⁷⁸ Evaluation Report nr. 11 (1998) (Sørbø, G.M., Hauge, W., and Smith, D.), ‘Assistance to Countries in Conflict. The Lessons from Experiences from Guatemala, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

facilitation. The new entity was also requested to gather the lessons learned from Norway's various projects and involvement in peace processes.⁷⁹ In 2004 the Unit, mandated to report directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was upgraded to a Section for Peace and Reconciliation. It employs currently 14 persons with some of them assigned to work as special envoys in regard to particular conflicts.

As to research and analysis, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) was established in 2010 to improve the MFA's contacts with research institutions and to contribute to the accumulation of relevant information and knowledge. In general, the ministry is linked to and cooperates with other Norwegian institutes relevant in view of peace promotion, in particular the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI). The ministry has annually some 30 million NOK at its disposal for research and analysis which is seen as important in view of the policies of peace promotion.

An evaluation carried out within the MFA in 2008 noted that research on conflicts has been given a high priority in Norwegian foreign policy. It was further pointed out that the funding from the ministry has resulted in increased efforts on conflict prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB) research, and has contributed during the period reviewed to the emergence of some rather useful forms of networking. In addition, a dynamic and competitive literature has been created, and "a web of significant contacts for Norway, leading to some unique outcomes in terms of peace processes building on previous networks of contacts and access" has emerged.⁸⁰

In addition, also the Oslo Forum facilitates networking. It is co-hosted by the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swiss Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and it convenes regularly senior conflict mediators, high level decision makers, key process actors, analysts and experts from a variety of institutional backgrounds in a series of informal and discreet retreats. The annual events in Oslo have been complemented by regional retreats in Africa and Asia.

⁷⁹ See Wenche Hauge, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁸⁰ 'Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building'. *Evaluation Report 8/2008*. Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad).

5. THE CASE OF SWEDEN

5.1. THE FORMATIVE YEARS

Conflict prevention turned into a key idea and core practice in the sphere of Swedish foreign policy during the 1990's, albeit the turn was preceded by experiences such as the mediation undertaken in the years 1965–1968 during the Vietnam War between the United States and North Vietnam/NLF as well as Olof Palme acting as the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative during the years 1980–1982 in the war between Iran and Iraq.⁸¹ The legacy of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and his various peacekeeping initiatives and emphasis on preventive diplomacy also impacted the development of Swedish policies. Other mediation efforts by prominent Swedes include Carl Bildt's assignments in the Balkans in the 1990s and onwards as well as Jan Eliasson's various UN-related mediation-tasks in the Middle-East and Africa.⁸²

Notably, Sweden's participation in 1995 in the first UN preventive deployment mission as part of the country's internationalist and multilateral vision of international relations in Macedonia added further to the weight of conflict prevention in providing experiences

⁸¹ See Ulf Bjereld, 'Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics, 1945–90'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 32(1): 23–35.

⁸² For a list of the various engagements, see Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen (2010), *The Go-Between. Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation*. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., p. 8.

of success.⁸³ The mission was also of importance in the sense that conflict prevention became pivotal as a concept and an approach in competition with a variety of other potentially available and related concepts such as peace-building and crisis management. As argued by Annika Björkdahl, “with the end of the Cold War, the Swedish foreign policy identity was in need of reconstruction and selection of the conflict prevention idea was part of the incremental reconstruction of Sweden’s foreign policy”.⁸⁴

A Statement on Government Policy issued in 1994 declared that Sweden’s activities in the sphere of conflict prevention will be intensified. A study of Sweden’s participation in international military-based operations of peace-promotion concluded that the emphasis shall in the future be on preventing conflicts.⁸⁵ Similarly, conflict prevention figured prominently in the foreign policy declarations issued in 1997 and 1998, and it played an outstanding role in two Government Communications: the one on Human Rights in Sweden’s Foreign Policy⁸⁶ and another on Africa on the Move. Revitalizing Sweden’s Policy towards Africa for the 21st Century.⁸⁷

The increased focus on conflict prevention was conducive to the commissioning and publishing of a report on in 1997.⁸⁸ Above all, the report Preventing Violent Conflict – A Study aimed at identifying long term objectives for future Swedish policies in the field of conflict prevention. Two years later another policy document, Preventing Violent Conflict – A Swedish Action Plan, was presented to the Swedish

⁸³ See Annika Björkdahl (2007), ‘Constructing a Swedish Conflict Prevention Policy Based on Powerful Ideas and Successful Practice’. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 42(2): 169–185. See also Clive Archer (1994), ‘Conflict Prevention in Europe: The Case of the Nordic States and Macedonia’. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 29(4): 367–89.

⁸⁴ This is the argument presented by Annika Björkdahl in her study premised on interviewing key actors part of the process. See Annika Björkdahl (2002), *From Idea to Norm – Promoting Conflict Prevention*. Lund: Lund University Press, p. 74.

⁸⁵ Ministry Publication Series 1995: 24.

⁸⁶ Comm.1997/98: 89.

⁸⁷ Comm. 1997/98: 122.

⁸⁸ *Preventing Violent Conflict – A Study*. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Stockholm: Norstedts Tryckeri (Ds 1997: 18).

Government.⁸⁹ One of the priorities listed in the document consisted of a strengthening of the Swedish capacities for international conflict prevention in different policy areas, including mediation. In general the Action Plan aimed at enhancing a conflict prevention culture and presented a framework for conflict prevention in Sweden's Foreign Service. The measures outlined aimed in particular "at bringing about a gradual change in attitude and a new approach".⁹⁰ The Action Plan was broadly disseminated in Sweden but it was also presented on several international arenas, including the UN General Assembly and the European Union.

A third publication, *Preventing Violent Conflict – Swedish Policy for the 21st Century*, took explicitly note of that international attention was increasingly focused on the importance of preventing violent conflicts and that policies of prevention were in general very much called for in addressing the new security challenges of the post-Cold War era.⁹¹ It further concluded that the international community in a broad sense – states, international and non-governmental organizations and other actors – needs to adopt a conflict prevention approach or what may be called a conflict prevention culture. The document testified to that the increased prominence of conflict prevention was integrally part of a reformulation and reprioritization of the Swedish policies. Changes were called for, it was argued, as violent conflicts were no longer to be seen, as used to be the case, in the perspective of the Cold War and the subsequent risk of major escalation: Therefore, "the international community can now to a larger extent seek to prevent armed conflicts by concentrating more on the unique character of each conflict and less on the relations between great powers".⁹²

In addition to an analysis of the new security environment and the policies called for, the document focused on the way the Action Plan, issued in 1999, had been implemented, and it also presented

⁸⁹ *Preventing Violent Conflict – Swedish Action Plan*. Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Stockholm: Printing Works of the Government Offices (Ds 1999: 24).

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁹¹ (Skr. 2000/01:2). *Preventing Violent Conflicts – A Swedish Policy for the 21st Century*. Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Printing Works of the Government Offices.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

an evaluation of the preventive actions taken by the Swedish Government. In general, the document confirmed that “conflict prevention is a priority area in Swedish foreign policy”, and stated that “...this is a natural development of Sweden’s traditional policy of promoting peace and solidarity”.⁹³

In 2007 the Government issued a Communication providing general guidelines for Swedish action in the field of international peace-support and security-building activities. The aim was also to create a close link between foreign, development, security and defense policies. In addition, the aim was one of creating the basis for a more effective use of resources and to meet the raised level of expectations as to Sweden’s contribution in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security as well as fair and sustainable development. It was further noted that conflict-prevention, efforts of mediation and bringing about dialogue as well as imposing sanctions and contributing to measures of reconstruction are all areas in which Sweden aspires to be active with a view to preventing and averting conflicts and creating the necessary basis for lasting peace. As to the various means and methods applied in the implementation of such an approach, Sweden will according to the Communication continue to enhance the instruments of sanctions and strengthen Sweden’s capacity to act on mediation issues.⁹⁴

5.2. CAPACITY-BUILDING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Sweden contributed significantly to that the UN General Assembly adopted unanimously its first resolution on conflict prevention in 2002. The initiative was made by Sweden and a considerable amount of resources was allotted in order for a positive result to be achieved.

However, the active engagement also impacted Sweden’s own policies. As noted, part-taking in various UN-related activities – above all the UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia in the mid-1990’s

⁹³ Ibid., p. 2.

⁹⁴ See National Strategy for Participation in International Peace-support and Security-building Operations. *Government Communication* 2007/08:51.

– provided incentives for integrating conflict prevention into the country’s foreign policy. The UN also offered a platform for several prominent Swedes to engage in the conduct of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention, and these experiences then contributed significantly to the standing of peace diplomacy within Swedish policies. Jan Eliasson, Ambassador and later State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, has been one of the persons assigned by the United Nations for various peace-related missions. He took part in 1980–1986 in the UN mediation missions between Iran and Iraq, and served during 2007–2008 as the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General to Darfur.⁹⁵

In addition to developing competences of its own, Sweden has set itself the task of promoting conflict prevention on various international contexts, above all the United Nations and the European Union. As to the UN, according to the Government Communication on Preventing Violent Conflict –Swedish Policy for the 21st Century, the aim consists of a strengthening of the UN’s prevention capability. Sweden thus contributed, together with likeminded countries such as Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, to the establishment of an informal Group of Friends for Conflict Prevention of the Secretary-General⁹⁶, promoted the creation of a permanent fact-finding mechanism and supported the UN Trust Fund for Preventive Action.⁹⁷ Moreover, Sweden has cooperated extensively with the UN Department of Political Affairs as well as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.⁹⁸ The effort has, in general, been one of joining forces with other countries that also seek to strengthen conflict prevention as a central element of the international efforts to promote peace and security.

Major steps forward were taken in the context of the 2005 UN World Summit and in particular through the establishment

⁹⁵ For a more detailed profile, see Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen (2010), *ibid.*, p. 8.

⁹⁶ See Annika Björkdahl (2002), *ibid.*, p. 107.

⁹⁷ *Government Communication* (May 2001), p. 14.

⁹⁸ See Jan Eliasson (2004), ‘A Culture of Prevention – Sweden and Conflict Prevention’, in Anders Mellbourn, (ed.), *Developing a Culture of Conflict Prevention*. Södertälje: Gidlunds förlag.

of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Fund as well as the Peacebuilding Support Office. As part of an effort to reform and strengthen the UN in the sphere of conflict prevention, Sweden joined the Steering Committee of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and supported the implementation and follow-up of the UN system's Joint Action Plan for Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, adopted initially in 2000 by the Security Council. Furthermore, the Swedish Government adopted a national action plan in 2006 in order to contribute to the implementation of the UN plan. The national Swedish plan has inspired, it seems, several other countries and international organizations to follow suit.⁹⁹

Sweden has more recently contributed to a reforming and developing of the UN system in terms of peace mediation and conflict prevention as a member of the Group of Friends of Peace, a group established in 2010 in order to advance and strengthen the development of a UN-culture related to peace-building.

5.3. IMPACTING THE EUROPEAN UNION

In aspiring for a more pronounced role as an international actor, the EU has increasingly engaged itself in crisis management, conflict resolution and prevention as well as peace mediation. Sweden has, as one of the Member States, contributed significantly to this development.

Conflict prevention and various related activities figured as EU priority areas already at a relative early stage, although the Union mainly limited itself to financial contributions instead of acting out as a mediator. Up to 2006 the EU's engagement took place through the employment of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and after 2007 by applying the Instrument for Stability (IfS). Notably, the creation of a more consistent conceptual, political, and institutional

⁹⁹ The action plan covered the years 2006–2008, and another plan has been prepared for the years 2009–2012. *Implementation of the UN Resolution 1325. The Swedish Government's action plan for 2009–2012 to implement Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.* Government Office of Sweden, Stockholm 2009.

ground started in the spring of 2001, and this took place during Sweden's Presidency. A reference to conflict resolution was then included into *acquis communautaire* and the *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts*, the so-called Gothenburg Programme.¹⁰⁰ Already the *Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention* that fed into the Gothenburg Conclusions made ample reference to the importance of mediation and activities related to dialogue.¹⁰¹

The emphasis on mediation has since the initial years grown significantly. In particular, the reviewing of the European Security Strategy in 2008 offered an opportunity to expand the dialogue on mediation and a strengthening of the EU's capabilities. The process was again taken further during the Swedish Presidency.¹⁰² A number of high level meetings that brought together experts and officials also from the UN, OSCE and EU added to the awareness concerning the relevance of peace mediation. Furthermore, a dialogue was waged on all levels of the EU, including the Political and Security Committee which then tasked the Council Secretariat to develop a concept on EU Mediation.

Thus, in order to develop a coordinated and focused approach, the EU adopted the *Concept of Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capabilities*.¹⁰³ The document coined in 2009 clarifies the EU's ambitions and provides a policy basis for the Union's involvement in international peace mediation. It defines mediation as "a tool of first response to emerging or on-going crisis situations" and allows for the EU to act as a mediator. It secures political support, technical assistance and financing to formal as well as informal efforts of mediation, and does so both at a high political

¹⁰⁰ See *Presidency Conclusions*, Göteborg, 15 and 16 of June, 2001, SN 200/1/01/REV 1.

¹⁰¹ European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM (2001), 211, final.

¹⁰² See *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World*. S407/08 (Brussels, 11 December 2008).

¹⁰³ Council of the European Union, *Concept of Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capabilities* (Brussels: 15779/09, 10 November 2009).

level and that of the grass-roots.¹⁰⁴ A working group was tasked as a follow-up to develop an action plan in the field of mediation and dialogue. As noted by Antje Herrberg in her report on peace mediation within the EU, the concept was produced by the Swedish Presidency¹⁰⁵ and this development took place in the context of the EU forming and launching the Union's External Action Service (EEAS) and establishing the EU Delegations. As part of the development of the EEAS, a Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediations Instruments Division has been established and furnished with a mandate to provide support for EU actors – both the headquarters and EU Delegations. Yet, mediation-related questions are in particular handled by the Mediation Support Team (MST) and support for mediation is also included in the regular EU-budget.¹⁰⁶

In order for the Union to be able to respond to the growing need of conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue, Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt proposed – together with his Finnish colleague Alexander Stubb – the setting up of a European Institute of Peace (EIP).¹⁰⁷ The proposal was communicated in a non-paper in 2010 to the High Representative. A study was then commissioned to assess the EU's practices and capabilities for specific mediation functions and evaluate whether these can be usefully complemented by other initiatives, notably the EIP.¹⁰⁸ The various issues related to the EU's engagement have then been discussed in a series of seminars organized by a Steering Committee composed of the Union's External Action Service, the European Parliament and the Irish Presidency of the European Council. The seminars took place in 2013, with

¹⁰⁴ For an analysis of the mandate, see Catriona Gourlay (2013), 'The European Union as a Peacemaker – Enhancing EU Mediation Capacity'. *Background paper*. European Policy Centre

¹⁰⁵ See Antje Herrberg (2012), 'International Peace Mediation: A New Crossroads for the European Union'. *EU Crisis Management Papers Series*. DCAF Brussels – ISIS Europe, p. 11.

¹⁰⁶ Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/index_en.htm.

¹⁰⁷ On the Swedish position, see Carl Bildt, 'A call for a European Institute for Peace'. Building Peace in 2013. Oslo Forum. Geneva: *Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue*, pp. 7–8.

¹⁰⁸ Available at: <http://tntexecutive.gr/announcements/the-eu-as-a-peacemaker-enhancing-eu-mediation-capacity/?lang=en>.

Sweden being attached to the arrangements, in Berlin, Paris, Sofia as well as in Brussels at the European Parliament under the rubric “EU as a Peacemaker”.

5.4. SUPPORT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OSCE, CE AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to the UN and the EU, the Swedish policies of strengthening the international system of conflict prevention have also been geared towards the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Sweden set itself the goal of acting as a driving force for enhancing the role of conflict prevention within the OSCE already in the document on the Swedish policies to be pursued during the 21st century.¹⁰⁹ Sweden’s contribution in the case of the OSCE has mainly consisted of funding and making experts available for organization’s secretariat or to serve in its institutions and field missions. Sweden has also been proactive in the implementation of the 2005 ministerial resolution on women in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

In addition to the OSCE, also the Council of Europe (CE) has been viewed and approached as a relevant body in regard to conflict prevention and peace mediation. Beyond Europe and out of the various other regions, Africa has attracted most attention in the Swedish policies and has been the target of cooperation as well as assistance. Capacity-building and intense dialogue form the two key elements in Swedish cooperation with the African Union (AU). The AU Commission as well as other AU bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been targets of technical support, and Sweden has, in general, contributed to the African structures in the sphere of conflict prevention and peacebuilding have strengthened. As to specific countries, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Liberia, Kongo, Sierra Leone and Sudan have been among

¹⁰⁹ *Preventing Violent Conflict – Swedish Policy for the 21st Century* (2001), p. 71.

the recipients of Swedish support for measures related to conflict prevention.¹¹⁰

The Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Swedish Government Agency for Peace, Security, and Development, has more recently been engaged particularly in Kenya in order to contribute to peace, reconciliation and development.¹¹¹

5.5. THE CREATION OF NATIONAL COMPETENCES

Conflict prevention, including mediation, has in general been approached as a cross-cutting theme engaging various branches of Sweden's foreign service, although in 1996 some adjustments were made in order to take into account the increased attention devoted to conflict prevention. The posts of an investigator and a secretary were created in February 1996 in order for a study on conflict prevention to be carried out. In consequence and based on the results of the study, a Reference Group comprising of representatives from the relevant departments of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and from the Ministry of Defence was established. Moreover, a small Secretariat for Conflict Prevention was created in 1999 as also proposed in the study to ensure the pursuance of unified policies within the Policy Planning Unit. In addition, an interdepartmental Steering Group was created.¹¹² These measures, and in particular the establishment of a Secretariat, testified to the increased weight of conflict prevention within the administrative structures of Sweden's foreign policy. It showed, as argued by Annika Björkdahl¹¹³, that Sweden's top-level decision-makers prioritized prevention.

¹¹⁰ See www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2574/a/13945. On support to the AU and regional organizations, see the National strategy for participation in international peace-support and security-building operations. *Government Communication* 2007/08:51, pp. 14–15.

¹¹¹ See *Folke Bernadotte Akademin. Årsredovisning 2012*, p. 44.

¹¹² See Björkdahl 2002), pp. 179–180.

¹¹³ See Björkdahl (2007), p. 179.

However, she also notes that “a cross-cutting idea like conflict prevention cannot readily be compartmentalized into a Secretariat”, and in fact the Secretariat was relocated after two years to the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Conflict prevention was again approached as a fully cross-cutting theme integrated into the everyday routines of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. However, conflict prevention remains somewhat distinct in the sense that special means have been allocated for that purpose in the MFA budget.¹¹⁴

In the context of the cross-cutting approach, issues pertaining to conflict, peace and security and related questions such as mediation are handled by the Security Policy Department within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Department is divided into four divisions, covering UN affairs, the European Union, and Euroatlantic issues, including NATO and the OSCE. The fourth division covers thematic issues related to conflict and development. The Security Policy Department currently has a staff of 43 persons, of whom 10 are attached to the division dealing with conflict and development. The Department also employs several senior advisers and coordinators. Some 145 million Swedish Crowns have been earmarked in the state budget for the year 2013 for activities related to peace- and security-building.¹¹⁵

The fourth division also disposes of grants aimed at peace and security related activities and is tasked with steering the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA).¹¹⁶ As to various research entities, the Ministry cooperates in particular with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the Institute for Political Science at the University of Lund.

The main objective of the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), established in 2002, is to enhance the quality and effectiveness of international conflict and crisis management, with a particular focus

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p.180.

¹¹⁵ *Central government budget revenue and expenditure 2013. Estimated central government budget revenue 2013, Sweden's Ministry for Foreign Affairs.* Available at: <http://www.government.se/sb/d/2798/a/198909>.

¹¹⁶ *See Departments and their functions. Sweden's Ministry for Foreign Affairs.* Available at: <http://www.government.se/sb/d/3367/a/377735>.

on peace operations. Within the scope of this overall aim, the FBA is prepared to offer good offices for conflict resolution initiatives, such as talks between parties to conflict.¹¹⁷ Among other things, FBA is in charge of the Conflict Prevention in Practice Programme. The FBA budget in 2012 was approximately 213 million Swedish Crowns and the agency employed about 90 persons.¹¹⁸

In recognizing the close relationship between security and development, the aim of conflict prevention¹¹⁹, the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) was in 1998 provided with an explicit mandate by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to develop a national strategy on conflict prevention.¹²⁰ Prevention has therefore turned into an integral aspect of Sida's strategy and work in the field of development policies.

¹¹⁷ See *Förordning 2007: 1218*.

¹¹⁸ See *Folke Bernadotte Akademin. Årsredovisning 2012*.

¹¹⁹ See the Government Document, *Peace and Security for Development. Policy for Security and Development in Swedish Development Cooperation, 2010–2014*. Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden (2011).

¹²⁰ See UD/98/1567/IC and UD/99/1503/IC.

6. CONCLUSIONS

There seems to be some continuity but also a considerable amount of change present in the policies pursued by the four Nordic countries in the sphere of peace diplomacy. They have all been significantly affected by the end of the Cold War, although they have also been impacted by other changes part of the international security environment.

It seems, against this background, that Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have all made use of the altered conditions in ways of their own and, in doing so, developed profiles that are far from uniform. All the Nordics have been able to break away from their previously rather traditional and state-centered ways of conducting diplomacy and foreign policy and open up for new ways of thinking, implement new approaches and make room for various new groups in their conduct of external affairs. Various trends of decentralization and broadening of the customary sphere of foreign policy have been discernible in particular in the fields of conflict prevention and peace mediation.

Norway clearly stands out among the Nordics as a vanguard in the sense that it was early on in reacting to an altered setting of wars and conflicts and in providing peace mediation with a prominent role in the sphere of Norwegian foreign policy. This occurred already during the beginning of the 1990s and the start has then been followed up by investing more systematically into mediation and integrating brokering more permanently into the conduct and structures of the policies pursued.

Also Sweden reacted at a relatively early stage, although the follow-up appears to have been somewhat less systematic at least for the part of mediation and the way conflict resolution has been incorporated into Sweden's foreign policy. Finland, in turn, has the profile of a late-comer, albeit the country has over the recent years taken significant steps in order to incorporate mediation into the

conduct and structures of Finnish foreign policy. Denmark has for its part followed a rather steady path in having altered its foreign policy profile quite significantly owing to changes in both peace and war, albeit this has been done by focusing on the fragmentation of states as a key concern and without elevating mediation into a central aspect of the Danish policies. All of the Nordics have over the recent two decades and in the aftermath of the Cold War developed specific doctrines to support and guide their activities in the sphere of conflict prevention and peace policies at large.

A closer reading of these doctrines testifies to some similarities but it also shows that the four Nordics have actually chosen to apply somewhat different conceptual inroads in their efforts of adapting to and making use of the changes in regard to peace and war. They are quite similar to each other in the sense that their peace diplomacy has not just been narrowed down to place emphasis on negative peace. The four countries studied have neither limited their endeavours to the cessation and containment of war, nor is their aim merely one of managing conflicts. Instead, the various more limited aspirations have been complemented by the far more positive ones of peacebuilding. The latter, i.e. the effort of tackling the more profound roots of violent conflicts, have among other things taken the form of combining conflicts resolution with policies of development. Thus, all the four Nordic countries have linked their policies of conflict resolution with those pursued in the field of development aid rather than approaching development as something distinct and isolated from wars and conflicts.

As to the country-specific profiles, the conceptual emphasis has in the case of Norway been overwhelmingly on mediation. Engagement in brokering in the context of violent conflicts has stood out as the prime departure and has been prioritized in relation some other departures. Finland has for its part followed a similar path over the recent years. However, the Finnish and Norwegian choices appear to be somewhat different from those made by Sweden as mediation has in the Swedish case not figured as a prime conceptual departure. It has rather been approached as one aspect of the broader policies of conflict resolution. Denmark has an even more distinct profile of its own as it has not been process-oriented in its policies of tackling

conflicts. The point of departure has instead consisted of focusing on the causes of conflict and the unfolding of peace and war has therewith been anchored in states and their ability to exercise power.

In consequence, the fragmentation of states has been elevated into a core departure and seen as something to be counteracted for conflicts to be mitigated and peace to prevail. Thus, Denmark does not merely aim at facilitating communication and contribute to the establishing of contacts between belligerents. The aim is above all one of impacting the circumstances conducive to war and conflicts. It is quite far-reaching and entails transformative ambitions with the specific aim being limited to the adding to the competence and capabilities of governments to cope with the challenge of fragmentation.

What is common to the four Nordic countries is, however, that they have endeavoured at a strengthening of the standing of mediation and related departures in the sphere of international relations and international organizations. They have not confined themselves to a mere renewing and altering their own approaches and policies but have also aspired to extend such an ambition to apply to international relations at large. They have pushed quite successfully for reforms in the context of the UN, EU, OSCE as well as the Council of Europe but have also contributed to the creation of region-specific competence in various parts of the world.

However, it may also be noted that the Nordics have combined engagement in mediation and mediation-projects of the own and involvement in the reformation of the international system differently from each other. Finland has on the one hand prioritized the impacting and reforming of the international system but has on the other hand not complemented this approach by engaging itself systematically in specific, mediation-related projects of its own. In contrast, Norway has been active on both of these fronts in developing projects of its own as well as impacting the international system. Denmark and Sweden seem in this regard to be located somewhere in-between to the extent that their policies are comparable with those pursued by Finland and Norway in the first place. It appears, however, that all of the Nordics have concluded that their engagement in mediation and other peace-related activities can only take place in cooperation with

some other and like-minded countries and in a manner supported by some international organization, above all the UN. This clearly points to an internationalization of the policies pursued.

The impact of renewing their policies is also detectable in the way the structures and conduct of foreign affairs have developed in the four Nordic countries. Thus, Norway has chosen to provide mediation with a standing of its own with a distinct section, personnel and means earmarked in the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for that purpose. Finland has moved towards a similar direction, albeit it has done so in a clearly less pronounced manner. Denmark and Sweden have decided to handle conflict prevention and related matters in a cross-cutting manner, although Sweden tested for some years in the 1990s a system of providing conflict prevention with a separate standing. It can also be observed that the cross-cutting principle has in the Swedish case been complemented by establishing the Folke Bernadotte Academy as a separate entity in charge of various activities related to conflict prevention, although the FBA remains attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Denmark, in turn, has a profile of its own with an emphasis on the whole-of-government approach. The approach applied in regard to the fragmentation of states is thus inter-ministerial in nature with various procedures in place and bodies established in order to make sure that the policies pursued are well coordinated and broadly anchored within the government as well as in the various ministries. The Danish policies are hence not just cross-cutting within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also the government at large.

As the nature of wars has changed profoundly in the post-Cold War era, so have the forms of peacemaking. Conflicts are asymmetric in nature, and there is a corresponding need for asymmetric diplomacy in which participation in peace negotiations is not limited to states. Thus, the role and impact of various civil society actors in the sphere of conflict resolution and foreign policy more generally has grown in all four Nordic countries. The development has clearly contributed to a de-centering and broadening of the traditionally quite state-centered policies. It seems that the broadening started initially in the sphere of development policies but has then spread over to other spheres of foreign policy thereby also impacting the

way issues related to mediation and conflict prevention has been handled within the foreign ministries. The establishment of the Coordination Group within the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs is a case in point testifying to the emergence of new connections and constellations. One form of the broadening underway pertains to the increasing links with research institutes and researchers.

Various forms of research have been increasingly integrated into the making of foreign policy, and this trend has been quite visible in the spheres of mediation and conflict resolution. This trend is quite pronounced in Norway as well as Sweden but somewhat less distinct in the cases of Denmark and Finland.

In general, all the four Nordic countries have cooperated extensively with other countries and have in general also aspired for an internationalization of the policies pursued in the context of conflict resolution. It appears, however, that they have rarely been engaged in cooperation between themselves in this sphere despite their rather advanced cooperation in most other fields. Finland and Norway have joined forces in the case of Myanmar and Nordic observers were employed in the monitoring of the ceasefire agreement in Sri Lanka to strengthen the impression of impartiality but the conclusion nonetheless remains that there does not exist any joint Nordic profile in the sphere of mediation and conflict resolution. It may also be noted that the Nordics have quite forcefully and successfully impacted various international organizations such as the UN and yet not extended this endeavour to apply to the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Nordic Council. They have, as such, engaged themselves during the recent years in a rather vibrant cooperation in matters of security and defence but not enlarged this cooperation also to apply to questions of mediation and policies of conflict resolution.

The underlying reason could be that their conceptual inroads and profiles quite clearly differ from each other. Finland and Norway stand rather close to each other and Sweden has a more or less comparable profile while Denmark is more in a category of its own with its emphasis on the fragmentation of states as a conceptual inroad. However, the four Nordic countries are rather similar to each other in a broader perspective due to their emphasis

on conflict resolution and peace-making. They have distinct profiles but their policies do not conflict with each other. They are rather complementary in nature and thus provide a potential ground for cooperation premised on a division of labour.

Tampere Peace Research Institute

TAPRI Studies in Peace and Conflict Research

No. 101, 2014

In what ways is peace mediation organized in the various Nordic countries? Is there a particular 'Nordic model' for peace-promotion? How are Nordic scholars in the study field of peace mediation and conflict resolution related to practitioners of peacemaking? Is there a 'Nordic approach' to the study on peace mediation? What are the burning questions in the study on peace mediation at this moment according to Nordic scholars?

AUTHORS

Pertti Joenniemi is a Visiting Senior Researcher at Tampere Peace Research Institute in the University of Tampere. Previously he has worked as a Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI).

Marko Lehti is a Senior Research Fellow at Tampere Peace Research Institute in the University of Tampere and a Senior Lecturer of General History at the University of Turku.

Jenny Saarinen is a Research Assistant at Tampere Peace Research Institute in the University of Tampere and she holds a Master's Degree in Administrative Sciences from the University of Tampere.