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‘Cool to Rule’

Humanitarian intervention, Rhetoric and the Tony Blair missions to Kosovo and Iraq

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This thesis considers the theory and doctrine of humanitarian intervention through an individual. Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister since 1997 has seen and participated in a leading role to humanitarian operations in Kosovo and Iraq. Humanitarian intervention serves as a theory here whereas rhetoric is used as a method. I shall rely heavily on Kenneth Burke's notions of rhetoric as well as Jonathan Charteris-Black's writing of Tony Blair's particular rhetorical style. Humanitarian intervention is something that has not been defined conclusively, which results in the fact that it is still a contested topic. Here, I shall present it through Tony Blair, and my case studies will be the two already mentioned conflicts.

Tony Blair was an obvious choice for me, because unlike his Washington D.C. colleagues, he has seen both of the conflicts take place or being 'pushed along'. This also raises an interesting situation of Britain's friendship with America and willingness to support the world's only superpower in almost anything they suggest.

Kosovo and Iraq were and continue to be different kinds of conflicts, but they share the same denominators. Both have been argued through humanitarian intervention by the leaders of the intervening countries and criticised by others. There are no definite answers to these conflicts and therefore the situation is difficult.

The aim of the thesis is to find patterns of thought. Blair's persona has sometimes been described as lamb and wolf in same clothing; it is said that he genuinely believes himself in what he says. However, the two-sidedness makes others vary of his reasoning as to him most issues in a broad sense are of good versus evil.

Therefore it is not by accident that he is a strong advocate of humanitarian intervention. Rhetorical reasoning, humanitarianism and Tony Blair form a certain 'trinity' which this thesis addresses accordingly with the help of two real-life examples.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

EU European Union

MP Member of Parliament

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

UHI Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

US United States of America

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

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1 Introduction

1.1. Foreword

Jonathan Charteris-Black in the preface of his book suggested that because the governed have always preferred to be ruled by the spoken word rather than by physical force, we should be happy or grateful when, to some extent, power is based upon language, the leaders have the courtesy of taking trouble in persuading us, meaning that we at least have a choice of accepting or rejecting their arguments.¹ Mrs Thatcher wanted a 'Great Britain' whereas Mr Blair a decade or so later advocated for 'Cool Britannia', however, behind the youthful 'coolness' perhaps what he really wanted was Britain once again to be ruling the waves².

It is questionable whether this thesis would have been written without the 9/11 twin-tower attacks. Without them, I would suggest, military offensives in the name of humanitarianism would probably have been about something else entirely. There might not even have been any. The terrorist threat

¹ Charteris-Black, Jonathan. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. xi

² "Rule Britannia" written by James Thomson (1700-48)

would not have been used as plausible justification for acts that would have been condemned harshly during peace time. I use the term ‘peace time’ with a full knowledge that what I want to suggest means there has not been an actual time of peace in the world perhaps ever, but there have been times when the countries analysed in my thesis have been more in control of the situation and thus, at peace. During those times, Political leaders would have been charged for impeachment or would have been told of the weaknesses of their master plans before they were implement, had people not been paralysed, grown more cynical, and vindicated by fear. Franklin Delano Roosevelt said in his inaugural speech how [the Americans] have nothing to fear but fear itself, and I believe fear is something that has taken hold of large numbers of people, which is why sometimes even the worst ideas of our leaders suddenly sound like great plans for the future. Terrorism is the great unknown, which has turned many ‘in control’ issues upside down.

We will never know what would have happened in the world without the 9/11, but we must live with the fact that the world has changed.

The world post-9/11 is filled with interesting characters, one of them being the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. As a leader, I believe, he is far more interesting than any of the other contemporary political players. Also, his contradictive style is what keeps him alluring. The fact that he is British adds to his charm, as Britain and its people have been a special interest of mine; small island race, which at one point ruled over one third of the world – how did that affect their mentality? And how, if they did, overcome that?

1.2. Theories and Concepts

The question of humanitarian intervention and justifications and theories behind it has interested me ever since I first heard the term. It was an exciting concept but at the same time difficult to understand what it really meant for people. This I later combined with my interested in the English language and rhetoric. How people using the word understand it, and why? This thesis seeks different modes of

thinking about the issues I shall raise. The pattern of ‘humanitarian interventions’ has been very selective, I feel. It is understandable that the resources of intervening countries may not cater for all the needs in the world where there is a need for such action, but the trend so far has showed that the selection for countries where such is needed does not follow the path of emergency but rather the path of states’ interest. Tony Blair as I already mentioned, is I believe an interesting leader and someone worth discussing in this thesis, as I did not feel I should study neither the Bush administration nor the US policy towards other countries. Enough has been written about them. Blair on the other hand has participated in almost every campaign the US has suggested and remained the US’s only loyal friend. Or so it has seemed. Blair is a man of many contradictions, but he is also driven by the notion that politics in its basic form is about ethics.³

Therefore, he might very well be driven by a need to be a ‘humanitarian’, a caring leader rather than someone deluded by power and force and the evil ‘Other’. However, he is a man of contradictions and therefore it is sometimes difficult to see where he is aiming at. Also, his Britishness or Englishness and the British national character in general are interestingly complex creations.

I agree with Jonathan Charteris-Black and his approach to rhetoric and what he defines as Blair’s Conviction Rhetoric⁴, as well as Kenneth Burke’s view of man being a symbol user⁵ and further to his persuasion of rhetorical phenomenon as part of human action and symbolic order. I think of my research question as a pyramid or a triangle, with Tony Blair on top and humanitarian intervention and rhetoric on each side.

I ask how Tony Blair has advocated and argued the idea of a ‘humanitarian intervention’ in military operations like Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 1998 and 2003.

I have chosen a compilation of speeches from his ‘virtual home’, number-10.gov.uk and analysed them through the idea of humanitarian intervention and rhetoric.

³ To gain more information on the subject see Chapter 4. Also, Charteris-Black, Jonathan. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 148

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989)

2 Research Task and Method

2.1. *Humanitarian Intervention*

My theoretical framework will be humanitarian intervention. This has its supporters and critics, resulting in a sort of a limbo situation where it mainly only works as a theory and in theory, though military campaigns have been justified through it. ”’Humanitarian war’ is an oxymoron which may yet become a reality[,]”⁶ wrote Adam Roberts in 1993. ”’The recent practice of states, and of the United Nations, has involved major uses of armed force in the name of humanitarianism[.]”⁷ Humanitarian intervention has seen roughly as many definitions as there have been instances where such a justification has been needed or proven to have been useful when other reasoning has failed. Therefore the central problem is how to define ’humanitarian intervention’.

Mona Fixdal from the University of Oslo and Dan Smith from International Peace Research Institute in Oslo in their 1998 essay brought forth a few interesting points regarding the study of humanitarian intervention. To them, “[h]umanitarian intervention is one of the primary international security problems of today.”⁸ They felt, that the whole debate on the subject is not satisfactory and debates often lack certain aspects that the two scholars see as being vital. They feel that Just War tradition should be taken more into account while discussing and debating over humanitarian intervention.

⁶ Roberts, Adam. ‘Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights’ in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* Vol. 69, No. 3 (Jul., 1993) p. 429

⁷ Roberts, Adam. ‘Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights’ in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* Vol. 69, No. 3 (Jul., 1993) p. 429

Therefore, humanitarian intervention is a very vague concept. It seems straightforward enough on paper as a word among words – but when one tries to explain it to oneself ‘intervention on humanitarian grounds’ it still seems, maybe not as straightforward, but nevertheless, justifiable. Humanitarian grounds would seem to be the best example for an intervention, at least better than let us say, oil or world dominance. However, it sometimes seems that intervention on the grounds of oil or world domination would be and is far easier to justify – to put it crudely, people scheming world domination, rarely need to justify things they do, they just do it and perhaps answer to questions later at War Crimes Tribunals or stay silent.

Humanitarian intervention has problems on both sides of its justification. There are people sceptical about the whole term and practise, so that no matter what, they oppose such an effort. There are also people and nations who are unsure who has the right to use force in the name of humanitarian intervention or when such is justified and by whom as there is no clear ‘roadmap,’ not even uniform consensus of what it is, apart from the UN Security Council guidelines.

Ideally, we would be able to say, with conviction that “this incident, happening in this country is in dire need of a humanitarian intervention, this is a textbook example – see example on page 9 – humanitarian intervention is justified here”. Or the other way round, “this country over here, nothing that indicates any reason for intervening, it is just a local feud, no reason nor justification for humanitarian intervention – see example on page 10”. If it only were that simple, however, there is no such textbook nor is there any such higher authority that could foresee and justify interventions and be right on their outcome. We can make assumptions, draw comparisons and so forth, but decisions, good or bad are in the hands of the people – people intervening and people whose country is being intervened.

The co-directors of *Africa Rights*, Alex de Waal and Omaar Rakiya in their thought-provoking article raise a doubt over the fact of whether a military intervention can be humanitarian⁹. de Waal and Rakiya point out that Britain’s intervention to Greece in 1830 or France’s military expeditions to Syria and

⁸ Fixdal, Mona; Smith Dan. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’ in *Mershown International Studies Review*, Vol. 42 No. 2 (Nov., 1998) p. 283

⁹ de Waal, Alex; Omaar, Rakiya. ‘Can Military Intervention Be “Humanitarian”?’ in *Middle East Report*, No. 187/188, Intervention and North South Politics in the 90s (Mar.-Jun., 1994) pp. 2-8

Lebanon could also be seen as something they call “classic examples of 19th Century military “humanitarian intervention””¹⁰.

Therefore, William Harcourt’s definition, which also de Waal and Rakiya acknowledge as one that has rarely been bettered, serves as a starting point in the arduous task of defining “humanitarian intervention”. It is “a high and summary procedure which may sometimes snatch a remedy beyond the reach of law...[I]n the case of intervention as that of revolution its essence is legality, and its justification is its success”¹¹. That in most cases is a very pre-emptive definition, but also keeping it in line with the ‘mysterious’ and ‘unknown’, a certain something that for the reasons of difficulty and because it may prove to be impossible, has not been defined pre-emptively in legal context.

“The normative perspective most frequently found in the current literature on humanitarian intervention is grounded in international law and human rights...the scope of that discourse, however, focuses narrowly on how to balance state sovereignty and human rights against each other [.]”¹² Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith argue.

Humanitarian intervention should not be about presenting the case for the prosecution.

Of those definitions, there are *authorised* and *unauthorised* interventions. Authorisation means that it has been approved and is controlled by the United Nations’ Security Council. Political Scientist J. L. Holzgrefe argues in his article about the Humanitarian Intervention debate, that the United Nations Charter is the “paramount international convention governing the exercise of armed force in the international community”¹³. Therefore it is not all exceptional that Holzgrefe, who is a supporter of non-intervention policy, would support and value the Charter to such an extent. Alex de Wail and Omar Racial in their essay point out that the Charter was drawn in the atmosphere and in the “context of

¹⁰ de Waal, Alex; Omaar, Rakiya. ‘Can Military Intervention Be “Humanitarian”?’ in *Middle East Report*, No. 187/188, Intervention and North South Politics in the 90s (Mar.-Jun., 1994) p. 4

¹¹ Sir W. V. Harcourt, *Letters of Historicus on Some Questions of International Law* (London, 1843)

¹² Fixdal, Mona; Smith Dan. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’ in *Mershown International Studies Review*, Vol. 42 No. 2 (Nov., 1998) p. 288

¹³ J. L. Holzgrefe ‘The Humanitarian Intervention Debate’ in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (ed.) *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 37

extreme skepticism(sic) about ‘humanitarian’ justifications for intervention.”¹⁴ The use of force is only acceptable when used as self-defence. President Bush in his address to the nation in 2003 drew comparisons to self-defence when he sketched the outlines of why the Iraq campaign is justified and why the United States should act now. He said that “The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security...[r]ecognizing the threat to our country, the United States Congress voted overwhelmingly last year to support the use of force against Iraq.”¹⁵ However, a point to remember, authorisation of intervention is reserved exclusively to the Security Council, as the UN Charter article 2(4) gives the right to determine the right to use force and authorisation through a resolution, which is adopted under Chapter VII¹⁶. Sean D. Murphy’s edited article asks the vital question that was raised during the war in Iraq - was it the end of the UN Charter, because the Security Council could not reach an agreement which then resulted the US and the UK forming a what was called the ‘Coalition of the Willing.’ Sean D. Murphy argues that the new road to war against Iraq starting from the 1990s has brought significant changes and challenges to international law. Iraqi government as lead by Saddam Hussein repeatedly over the course of twelve years violated the Security Council resolutions.

However, to return to the *authorised – unauthorised* debate: A number of interventions have been conducted first without the Security Council authorisation, and only at later stages or after the end of the hostilities, they have been given authorisation, and to some interventions the world community and later on the Security Council have given a silent pardon, though they have never confirmed their changed attitude. Fixdal and Smith argue that “[t]he question of right (or legitimate) authority concerns both who has the right to resort to the use of force and how this right can be justified”.¹⁷ Sean D. Murphy’s view is that because states know they “cannot claim a right to go to war for any

¹⁴ de Waal, Alex; Omaar, Rakiya. ‘Can Military Intervention Be “Humanitarian”?’ in *Middle East Report*, No. 187/188, Intervention and North South Politics in the 90s (Mar.-Jun., 1994) p. 4

¹⁵ Murphy, Sean D. (ed.) ‘Use of Military Force to Disarm Iraq’ in *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 97, No. 2 (Apr., 2003) p. 424

¹⁶ M. Byers and S. Chesterman ‘Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law’ in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (ed.) *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 181

¹⁷ Fixdal, Mona; Smith Dan. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’ in *Mershown International Studies Review*, Vol. 42 No. 2 (Nov., 1998) p. 291

reason...states know they must explain and justify their actions internationally in relationship to the Charter's norms."¹⁸ Information age has also brought new challenges to the states and their governments. Informed public has access to information more easily and can question and criticise received information more readily. Security Council plays an important part in the matter as well, it is seen as an authority that 'authorises' in most cases. Abram Chayes wrote about the justification of intervention during the Cuban Missile Crisis coming to conclusion that "[t]he requirement of justification suffuses the basic process of choice. There is a continuous feedback between the knowledge and that the government will be called upon to justify its action and the kind of action that can be chosen."¹⁹

2.2 Rhetoric

Methodological approach I shall be using is rhetoric, which is explained by P. Albert Duhamel as "an idea, the concept of effective expression."²⁰ Jonathan Charteris-Black sees it as the "art of persuading others."²¹ Riikka Kuusisto in her study of *Western Definitions of War in the Gulf and in Bosnia: The Rhetorical Frameworks of the United States, British and French Leaders in Action* defines her view of Rhetorical inquiry as follows:

¹⁸ Murphy, Sean D. (ed.) 'Use of Military Force to Disarm Iraq' in *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 97, No. 2 (Apr., 2003) p. 632

¹⁹ Murphy, Sean D. (ed.) 'Use of Military Force to Disarm Iraq' in *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 97, No. 2 (Apr., 2003) p. 632

²⁰ Duhamel, P. Albert. 'The Function of Rhetoric as Effective Expression' in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jun., 1949) p. 344

²¹ Charteris-Black, Jonathan. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 8

Rhetorical inquiry politicizes many issues and problematizes many questions that formerly seemed neutral, personal, or self-evident. Rhetoric has always been concerned with the tactics of persuading and convincing with the means of revealing these tactics, no matter when and where they turn up²².

Later on she continues, that “argumentation and politics are usually seen as political activities, aspects of politics...[a]rgumentation is one of the linguistic dimensions of political action.”²³ John S. Nelson continues and elaborates that “argument is rhetorical [it is] not in the cynical sense of empty or manipulative words but in the artistic and political sense of styles or patterns of speech.”²⁴ Jonathan Charteris-Black is along the same lines concluding, that [e]ffective rhetoric involves us with the drama of the present by providing convincing explanations of what is right and wrong[.]”²⁵ To return to Duhamel, “the content of the idea ‘rhetoric’ or of the conception of what constitutes effective expression is dependent upon the epistemology, psychology and metaphysics of the system in which it occurs.”²⁶ Kenneth Burke, one of the restorers of rhetoric, and in Kuusisto’s terms, one of the fathers of the ‘new rhetoric’²⁷, is in Joseph Schwartz’s opinion a rhetorician who works within the historical tradition of the term. T. S. Eliot has noted that “[Burke’s] significance, his appreciation, is the appreciation of his relation to what has gone before. You cannot value him alone; you must set him up, for contrast and comparison, among the dead.”²⁸

Burke’s ‘new rhetoric’ is broad as it accepts it both as the “art of persuasion...and the study of the means of persuasion available for any given situation.”²⁹ It also covers the “use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.”³⁰ A man is a

²² Kuusisto, Riikka. *Western Definitions of War in the Gulf and in Bosnia: The Rhetorical Frameworks of the United States, British and French Leaders in Action* (Suomen Tiedeseura, 1999) p. 40

²³ Kuusisto, Riikka. *Western Definitions of War in the Gulf and in Bosnia: The Rhetorical Frameworks of the United States, British and French Leaders in Action* (Suomen Tiedeseura, 1999) p. 45

²⁴ Nelson, John S. *Tropes of Politics: Science, Theory, Rhetoric, Action*. (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998) p. 9

²⁵ Charteris-Black, Jonathan. *Politicians and Rhetoric* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. xi

²⁶ Duhamel, P. Albert. ‘The Function of Rhetoric as Effective Expression’ (Jun., 1949) p. 354

²⁷ Kuusisto, Riikka. *Western Definitions of War in the Gulf and in Bosnia* (Suomen Tiedeseura, 1999) p. 46

²⁸ Schwartz, Joseph. ‘Kenneth Burke, Aristotle, and the Future of Rhetoric’ in *College Composition and Communication*, Vol. 17 No. 5 (Dec., 1966) p. 210

²⁹ Schwartz, Joseph. ‘Kenneth Burke, Aristotle, and the Future of Rhetoric’ p. 211

³⁰ Schwartz, Joseph. ‘Kenneth Burke, Aristotle, and the Future of Rhetoric’ p. 211

symbol-using animal says Burke. He is a persuader, who “finds the proper ‘name’ and tries rhetorically persuade others that this is the proper ‘name’ ...[for Burke] rhetoric operates only in the world of probables, not in the world of scientific demonstration.”³¹ Burke’s logic is that “wherever there is ‘meaning’ there is persuasion.”³² Like Duhamel’s definition of what constitutes effective expression, Burke’s understanding of rhetorical realm is vast: “any non-verbal object/symbol becomes a rhetorical tool because it has rhetoric in it. He draws liberally from ethics, psychology, anthropology and psychoanalysis for samples of such object/symbols.”³³ Kuusisto writes that “[f]or Burke, rhetoric is *par excellence* the region of insult and injury, but it also contains resources for adoration, sacrifice, devotion and desire...rhetorical expression is closely related to situations where the presence of strife, enmity and faction is apparent... [but] love, too, often produces rhetoric.”³⁴ Language is very important for Burke and he feels that “man reveals his symbolising capacity through language. The persuader must, it follows, be an adequate analyst of language. Rhetoric is concealed in every meaning no matter how scientific the pretensions might be.”³⁵

Burke’s new rhetoric follows the path of Aristotelian rhetoric, only transferred to the 20th century. Aristotelian rhetoric was “primarily concerned with the deliberation of things in which two alternative are possible.”³⁶ In Ancient Greece, the difference between Aristotelian and Platonic rhetoric was mainly difference of attitudes. T.S. Eliot has noted that “rhetoric never improves, but the material of rhetoric is never quite the same.”³⁷

³¹ Schwartz, Joseph. ‘Kenneth Burke, Aristotle, and the Future of Rhetoric’ p. 213

³² Schwartz, Joseph. ‘Kenneth Burke, Aristotle, and the Future of Rhetoric’ p. 213

³³ Schwartz, Joseph. ‘Kenneth Burke, Aristotle, and the Future of Rhetoric’ p. 214

³⁴ Kuusisto, Riikka. *Western Definitions of War in the Gulf and in Bosnia* (Suomen Tiedeseura, 1999) p. 53

³⁵ Schwartz, Joseph. ‘Kenneth Burke, Aristotle, and the Future of Rhetoric’ (Dec., 1966) pp. 213-214

³⁶ Duhamel, P. Albert. ‘The Function of Rhetoric as Effective Expression’ (Jun., 1949) p. 350

³⁷ Schwartz, Joseph. ‘Kenneth Burke, Aristotle, and the Future of Rhetoric’ (Dec., 1966) p. 215

2.3 Outline of the Study

Sketching out the framework of my thesis I shall start by introducing the theory of humanitarian intervention; I call it theory, because although there is a sense that it is a somewhat flesh and blood procedure, it consists of so contradictions and issues which have not been able to define pre-emptively yet, and there is also a sense of feeling that it never will be. I shall introduce the idea with the help of scholars that have made significant contributions to the issue. I shall also touch upon the theories of Just War and non-intervention doctrine. Then, I shall continue on to the world of rhetoric, where I shall introduce the ideas of Kenneth Burke and Jonathan Charteris-Black in a more thorough fashion. After that the non-theoretical part begins with introduction of Tony Blair, Britain and the British past, from where Blair's rhetorical strength stems. After that I shall tackle the case studies of Kosovo, concentrating on the NATO air strike and Operation Allied Force through the speeches of Mr Blair. This was the first instance when Blair used the notion of humanitarian intervention as a justification and therefore it is where I begin. The case of Iraq is limited to the year 2003 with a preamble concerning the US-UK bombing in 1998. Finally I shall arrive at conclusions.

3 Humanitarian intervention Debate

3.1. Customary international law vs. UN

For the co-directors of *Africa Rights*, Alex de Waal and Omaar Rakiya humanitarian intervention is defined as meaning “the violation of a nation-state's sovereignty for the purpose of protecting human

life from government repression or famine or civil breakdown [.]”³⁸ J. L. Holzgrefe, a political scientist from the University of St. Andrews explains his view as

The threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or a group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory the force is applied.³⁹

Sean D. Murphy in his book about the humanitarian intervention has come to a similar definition that he calls conventional. He has added to the list of states or group of states also international organisations.⁴⁰ Ryan Goodman has argued on the basis of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention (UHI)⁴¹, that although the threat is there were UHI legalised, that countries would use humanitarian intervention as a justification but nevertheless, wage war with ulterior motives.⁴² However, Goodman argues that the impact of states would be the opposite.

Murphy defined his position on the humanitarian intervention debate thus he was:

not to declare humanitarian intervention legal or illegal, moral or immoral, prudent or imprudent, but to explore issues of legality, morality and prudence in humanitarian intervention from the standpoint of competing values of world order and with particular attention to the potentially greater use of the United Nations after the Cold War⁴³

³⁸ de Waal, Alex; Omaar, Rakiya. ‘Can Military Intervention Be “Humanitarian”?’ in *Middle East Report*, No. 187/188, Intervention and North South Politics in the 90s (Mar.-Jun., 1994) p. 3

³⁹ J.L. Holzgrefe ‘The Humanitarian Intervention Debate’ in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (ed.) *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 18

⁴⁰ Murphy, Sean D. *Humanitarian Intervention: United Nations in an Evolving World Order* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) pp. 11-12

⁴¹ UHI is defined by M. Byers and S. Chesterman as meaning countries or country resorting to humanitarian intervention without the Security Council authority; thus unilateral. More in ‘Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law’ in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (ed.) *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) pp. 117-178

⁴² Goodman, Ryan. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War’ in *American Journal of International Law*. Vol 100 No. 1 (Jan., 2006) p. 107

⁴³ Murphy, Sean D. *Humanitarian Intervention: United Nations in an Evolving World Order* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) p. 2

I can relate to his position. Even if I believe that humanitarian intervention is already used as an ulterior motive, does not mean that the issue as a whole is not interesting. Because it is so difficult to justify properly, any try is worth it.

Interventions solely on humanitarian grounds have been recognised long before the United Nations' authorisation/unauthorisation debate. Such interventions went, before the UN, through customary international law. According to Simon Chesterman and M. Byers "an informal unwritten body of rules that derives from practice of states together with *opinio juris* [.]"⁴⁴ Therefore, according to Holzgrefe, the debate of whether international law is about interpretation of international conventions and whether customary law still exists despite the creation of the UN. Critics of customary international law argue that the interventions before the UN was established were not sufficient enough to establish such procedure. They say that there was a visible lack of involvement when compared to the humanitarian catastrophes that took place. However, those for the customary international law feel that it still exists, because UN "neither terminated nor weakened"⁴⁵ such understanding. However, when one thinks of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the debate over it when it was adopted in 1948, David P. Forsythe reminds that "[e]ven Eleanor Roosevelt, US representative to the Human Rights Commission, argued repeatedly that the Declaration was not intended legally binding."⁴⁶ Sean D. Murphy argues in the similar vein that "[t]he Charter itself, like the U.S. Constitution, is a living document deliberately designed by its founders to have the capacity to meet new threats to peace and security."⁴⁷ Lord Halifax in 1945 outlined their aim for the UN to be a successful organisation:

⁴⁴ M. Byers and S. Chesterman 'Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law' in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (ed.) *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 179

⁴⁵ J. L. Holzgrefe 'The Humanitarian Intervention Debate' in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (ed.) *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 45

⁴⁶ Forsythe, David P. 'The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945-1985' in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 100 No. 2 (Summer, 1985) p. 252

⁴⁷ Murphy, Sean D. (ed.) 'Use of Military Force to Disarm Iraq' in *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 97, No. 2 (Apr., 2003) p. 633

We want it to be free to deal with all the situations that may arise in international relations. We do not want to lay down rules which may, in the future, be the signpost for the guilty and a trap for the innocent⁴⁸

Therefore, sometimes a moral obligation could go past the law or agreement. Strong critics of both the UN and the United States have argued that the UN has been a tool for the US, or that documents like the Declaration of Human Rights or the UN Charter do not represent the collective will of the UN members but more of the foreign political concerns of the Western states⁴⁹. Even though the Declaration of Human Rights was adopted already in the 1940s, it took almost thirty years for it to become a legally approved document, and still violations occur. Thus there seems to be a real market for humanitarian intervention.

However, Goodman argues that it is difficult to escape the fact that unilateral humanitarian interventions are unlawful, but may be subject to change or revision as Iraq and Kosovo have shown.⁵⁰ He acknowledges the fact that the fear of ulterior motives is one of the main arguments people have of opposing the legalisation, because then humanitarianism could be used as a pretext.⁵¹

3.2. *Just War tradition and non-intervention*

Fixdal and Smith argue that the link between humanitarian intervention and Just War tradition is often forgotten or belittled. International law, natural law, philosophy and so forth are most often discussed,

⁴⁸ Murphy, Sean D. (ed.) 'Use of Military Force to Disarm Iraq' in *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 97, No. 2 (Apr., 2003) p. 633

⁴⁹ More on the subject at de Waal, Alex; Omaar, Rakiya. 'Can Military Intervention Be "Humanitarian"?' in *Middle East Report*, No. 187/188, Intervention and North South Politics in the 90s (Mar.-Jun., 1994) pp. 2-8

⁵⁰ Goodman, Ryan. 'Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War' in *American Journal of International Law*. Vol 100 No. 1 (Jan., 2006) p. 112

⁵¹ Goodman, Ryan. 'Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War' in *American Journal of International Law*. Vol 100 No. 1 (Jan., 2006) p 113

but the theological aspect; the Just War tradition's importance is often ignored. Fixdal and Smith summarise the tradition as such:

Just War is the name for a diverse literature on the morality of war and warfare that offers criteria for judging whether a war is just and whether it is fought by just means. This tradition thus, debates our moral obligations in relation to violence and the use of lethal force. The thrust of the tradition is not to argue against war as such, but to surround both the resort to war and its conduct with moral constraints and conditions.⁵²

St Augustine of Hippo from the fifth century and thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas, are quoted often in the just war literature. As a tradition it is mainly Western and Christian though some elements are drawn from Greek philosophy as well as Koran and Islam. St Augustine of Hippo did not get the needed recognition until centuries later Thomas Aquinas made it more systematic, and even then, he "did not get recognition until in the sixteenth century, when both Catholic and Protestant writers turned to his writings."⁵³

Fixdal and Smith defend their view of transferring the Just War ideas and criteria to help to explain humanitarian intervention, because Just War tradition developed in the field of theology, and there are still scholars arguing the case through religious ethics. However, Fixdal and Smith point out, that most moral philosophy is secular, just like their approach. Even though the time of the crusades in their twelfth century sense is now over, holy wars are not. James Turner Johnson argued that "[h]istoric crusades were conceived by their participants as just wars, and that even on the theoretical level the same sorts of arguments were used to justify each."⁵⁴ They take different forms and are not solely fought because of religion, but the aspect and perhaps reasoning is still there. Therefore, small plunge to the world of religion and religious tradition is not out of place when talking about the Just War tradition and humanitarian intervention.

⁵² Fixdal, Mona; Smith Dan. 'Humanitarian Intervention and Just War' in *Mershown International Studies Review*, Vol. 42 No. 2 (Nov., 1998) pp. 285-286

⁵³ Johnson, James Turner. *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War – A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) xxiii

⁵⁴ Johnson, James Turner. *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War – A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) p. xxvi

3.3. *Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello?*

The justice to resort to arms, *ius ad bellum*, and the justice of the conduct of war, *ius in bello*, are two categories, in which the Just War theory is divided. When compared to, and talked about in the context of humanitarian intervention, the justice to resort to arms is discussed more thoroughly. In sense, it is the very reasoning of why and in what case one is able to wage war, so that it would be justified within the Just War tradition. Fixdal and Smith see that “[t]he Just War tradition has several advantages in dealing with the range of problems involved in determining the legitimacy of using force. Its first advantage is that it recognises politics and the reality of power alongside ethics.”⁵⁵ The tradition also “provides the means for avoiding the tendency in so much writing on the international relations to present ethics and politics as disconnected and dichotomous.”⁵⁶ One can distinguish them from one another, but it is unhelpful to treat them separately. Both should be discussed in the same study. Paul Ramsey sees that “A political action is always an exercise of power and an exercise of purpose. Power without purpose and purpose without power are both equally non-political.”⁵⁷

Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith have drawn up a Just War criteria table⁵⁸ that is constructed of the different ways the justice of resorting to arms (*Ius ad Bellum*) is justified in the Just War literature.

⁵⁵ Fixdal, Mona; Smith Dan. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’ in *Mershown International Studies Review*, Vol. 42 No. 2 (Nov., 1998) p. 287

⁵⁶ Fixdal, Mona; Smith Dan. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’ in *Mershown International Studies Review*, Vol. 42 No. 2 (Nov., 1998) p. 287

⁵⁷ Ramsey, Paul. *The Just War - Force and Political Reality* (New York: Schribner, 1968) p. 8

⁵⁸ See more on Fixdal, Mona; Smith Dan. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’ in *Mershown International Studies Review*, Vol. 42 No. 2 (Nov., 1998) p. 286

- * Right Authority – concerns the legitimacy of the authority to declare war
- * Just Cause – Lethal force is justified through Just Cause.
- * Right Intention – motives for responding must be just as well as cause and goals.
- * Last Resort – war only as a last viable alternative.
- * Proportionality – resorting to war must do more good than harm.
- * Reasonable Hope – the cause needs to be achievable.
- * Relative Justice – absolute justice cannot be vested upon or thought up of referring to just one state.
- * Open Declaration - one must be made which lists all the formalities of going to war and resorting to force.

This form of a table or criteria can be used as well to find ways of justifying a humanitarian intervention. Similarities can be found at least in theory, but also in practice.

Dictionaries define sovereignty as ‘freedom from external control as well as supreme power especially over body politic.’ Fixdal and Smith have argued that

[t]he Just War tradition places sovereignty at its core... [s]overeignty has two distinct meanings that are not always kept separate...sovereignty signifies a state’s material capacity for control of intrastate affairs. Sovereignty in this definition is always a matter of degree [.]⁵⁹

As earlier mentioned, Paul Ramsey has talked of political action as an exercise of power and purpose. If one of the two is missing, the power or purpose, it makes the issue as non-political.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Fixdal, Mona; Smith Dan. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’ in *Mershown International Studies Review*, Vol. 42 No. 2 (Nov., 1998) p. 292

⁶⁰ Ramsey, Paul. *The Just War - Force and Political Reality* (New York: Schribner, 1968) p. 8

A Decision not to intervene can be an exercise of power and purpose as well. There are also moral limits to territorial sovereignty Terry Nardin and Jerome Slater argue, as well as exceptions. However, there is not a uniform code to define the limits and exceptions.⁶¹

The dilemma exists because of the tension between human rights and the non-intervention principle as well as the morality. Who has the right authority and when is the intervention used as a last resort.

3.4. A few considerations on humanitarian intervention

Greece in 1830, Syria and Lebanon in 1860, and Crete in 1866; One could think of them as ‘normal’ wars, but they were all conducted on humanitarian grounds, even though such term as ‘humanitarian intervention’ was not used at the time. The grounds for such operations lied in the persecution of Christians in Muslim-areas of the Ottoman Empire.⁶² Greece and Crete were British missions, whereas Syrian and Lebanese expedition was carried out by France. It is not to say they were any better than those interventions of today, but they are to give perspective of the world of humanitarian intervention. The “civilising missions” to Africa could have also been seen as humanitarian interventions of their time, philanthropic imperialism in order to spread Christianity and “civilise the savages”. History also reminds us of the humanitarian catastrophes, most notably in what happened to Armenians (1914-1919), the forced Ukrainian famine by the Soviets in the 1930s, massacre of the Chinese by the Japanese in 1931-1945, and the extermination of Jews in 1939-1945.

⁶¹ Nardin, Terry; Slater, Jerome. ‘Nonintervention and Human Rights’ in *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 48 No. 1 (Feb., 1986) p. 86

⁶² more in de Waal, Alex; Omaar, Rakiya. ‘Can Military Intervention Be “Humanitarian”?’ in *Middle East Report*, No. 187/188, Intervention and North South Politics in the 90s (Mar.-Jun., 1994) pp. 2-8

These often also serve as examples when the subject of yet another intervention is brought to the surface. The newer cases, the so-called 1990s trend with Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone are the ones mainly seen as humanitarian, dismissing other similar campaigns either as normal wars or internal conflicts. Iraq has tried to join the ranks of the others, and the question Kosovo is still under scrutiny as well as the Somali campaign. Ken Roth argues that there has been a time when humanitarian intervention would have been a welcomed justification for Iraq. In the late 1980s the Iraqi government slaughtered more than one hundred thousand Kurds. The *Anfal* genocide of 1988 as it is known would have been more than a justification for a campaign.

4 Rhetoric

4.1. *Rhetorical Language and Kenneth Burke*

”Rhetoric refers to human behaviour and communication seen as embodying strategies for affecting situations,”⁶³ says Joseph R. Gusfield in the introduction to Kenneth Burke’s rhetoric. In *Permanence and Change*, Burke stated, that “every way of seeing is also a way of not seeing.”⁶⁴ The example Burke gives in the *Philosophy of Literary Form* is a situation where question ‘what was said’ is asked and the answer is only a word ‘yes’. However, the one asking the question does not know what was really said unless he is aware of the context of what was supposed to have been discussed. Answers such as ‘yes’

⁶³ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 6

⁶⁴ Burke, K. *Permanence and Change*. (1965) p. 49

here, are what Burke calls “not merely answers, they are *strategic* answers, *stylized* answers.”⁶⁵ To Burke’s logic, action always equals motion. Even symbolic action, which is Burke’s term referring to language and action, as they cannot be separated. Thus, “[a]ction cannot be separated from language because the situation within which the actor acts is defined and understood by the actor through the concepts available to him.”⁶⁶ Therefore, rhetorical language as a subheading is slightly misleading. There is no language without rhetoric, but looking at it from another angle, language cannot be seen as rhetorical or used in a rhetorical manner, unless there is prior knowledge or understanding what rhetoric is.

Burke refers to man as a symbol-using animal. Our so-called reality is nothing but collection of symbols, in other words

Take away our books, and what little do we know about history, biography, even something so “down to earth” as the relative position of seas and continents? What is our “reality” for today (beyond the paper-thin line of our own particular lives) but all this clutter of symbols about the past combined with whatever things we know mainly through maps, magazines, newspapers, and the like about the present?⁶⁷

People use symbols day in day out in both ordinary and extraordinary situations. Burke’s whole definition of a man is (*italics his own*) that

*Man is the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative) separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order) and rotten with perfection.*⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Burke, K. *The Philosophy of Literary Form – Studies in Symbolic Action*. (University of California Press: Los Angeles, 1973) p. 1

⁶⁶ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 11

⁶⁷ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 58

⁶⁸ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 70

To be able to live up to this image, a man must know what words mean, what the symbols he uses mean. Therefore, the negative or irony is an invention only reserved for men. A monkey or a parrot can be taught to speak, but as they lack the understanding of words other than what they are concretely, they do not understand the negative or sarcasm. There is a difference if a man says “what a lovely building” and means it than when he says it thinking it should be bombed to the ground. Referring to Burke,

[t]here is an implied sense of negativity in the ability to use words at all. For to use them properly, we must know that they are *not* the things they stand for. Next, since language is extended by metaphor which gradually becomes the kind of dead metaphor we call abstract, we must know that metaphor is not literal.⁶⁹

Language, essentially to Burke is abbreviating ideas and meanings to a form where less needs to be said. Sometimes there is a need to explain that Queen Elizabeth is the Queen of Great Britain, who lives at Windsor Castle, loves horses and corgis, is married to the Duke of Edinburgh and has four children. However, this would need further elaboration if the one being explained all this does not know what Great Britain for example was. However, in most cases, referring to Queen Elizabeth is enough to remind one of who the other one is talking about – or to use different explanation, obviously depending on what kind of a picture the other has built in one’s head about the Queen. Burke explains, that “abbreviation is also a kind of substitution, hence a kind of “displacement,” while it is also necessarily a kind of “condensation”...condensation also can be viewed as a species of substitution.”⁷⁰ If one were to say ‘Canadians are polite’ and then in the street he would be mugged by a gang of Canadians, would Canadians as a nation still be polite to that person? One could say that they are polite, or judging this one gang’s behaviour, one could say Canadians are untrustworthy thieves and robbers, the whole nation. Burke reminds that “[e]ven if any given terminology is a *reflection* of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a *selection* of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a *deflection* of reality.”⁷¹

⁶⁹ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) pp. 65-66

⁷⁰ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 61

⁷¹ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 115

From the Queen to Canadians, meaning is what keeps the language interesting, but also challenging. Sometimes we are not aware what one means when one says, in the Burkean example⁷², the word ‘art’ as it can be both ‘good art’ and or ‘art’ in general, and any art, even something that is called art sarcastically. Therefore there are two meanings, ‘correct meaning’ and ‘any meaning.’ However, how can we be sure of which in reality is the ‘correct’ meaning? And when does one know when correct meaning is what we are looking for and when not? One can say ‘London is in Canada.’ At first it would seem preposterous and silly. How could London be in Canada if it is the capital of Great Britain? However, by consulting the world atlas, we might notice that there really is such a place as London in Canada. On the other hand, we could use London as a metaphor as well, and say London is in Canada, by referring to similarities found in even the smallest of towns and villages. Ottawa has Sussex Drive, as does London in England and therefore, poetically and metaphorically London can be found in Ottawa, thus London is in Canada. Or metaphorically the essence of London can be found in Canada too and therefore ‘London is in Canada’. Words and meanings are like building blocks with which to create meanings and definitions. Therefore, the user of the language, rhetorician, must be aware of how words work.

4.2. Rhetoric and Politics

“[T]he more democratic societies become, the greater the onus on leaders to convince potential followers that they and their policies can be trusted”⁷³. In Classical Rhetoric, mainly Aristotelian, the central notions were ethos, logos and pathos. Ethos refers to the speaker’s relationship with the audience, a form of goodness “taking a chance that was morally worthy.”⁷⁴ John S. Nelson compares ethos to pretext: “[W]hat moves the speaker to talk as she does, when and where she does”⁷⁵? However, one must also remember the speaker’s relation to their audience. Logos on the other refers to

⁷² Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 90

⁷³ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 1

⁷⁴ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 11

⁷⁵ Nelson, J. S. *Tropes of Politics: Science, Theory, Rhetoric, Action*. (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998) p. 138

the proofs to support the argument the speaker is arguing. It emphasises their reasons and according to Nelson, “strives toward the ancient category of truth.”⁷⁶ Nelson suggests that a lesson to remember is that “logical [logos] reasoning seldom, if ever, proceeds far or well without reasoning also from ethos, pathos and mythos.”⁷⁷ Pathos, the ability to arouse feelings has suffered a de-valuation in the modern usage. ‘Pathetic argument’ is one of the worst things that one speaker can say to another. ‘Pathetic’ means a failed attempt, even a desperate one, whereas pathos in classical usage was a neutral or even positive, driving “towards the ancient category of beauty.”⁷⁸ Nelson continues saying it “targets the speaker’s invocation of emotion, imagination, and volition to evoke particular feelings from the audience.”⁷⁹ Charteris-Black sees the rhetorical goal as “to establish his [the speaker’s] ethos by convincing the audience that though difficult decisions may not be popular, they are, nevertheless, right.”⁸⁰ Mythos, Nelson says is further concerned of the speaker’s origination and narration and figuration. Lee C. McDonald says that the Greek “mythos” was a “tale uttered by the mouth”...it had a narrative and dramatic quality and pointed toward the divine, that is, the unknown.”⁸¹ He continues that “[m]yths are poetry, but a special kind of poetry – the poetry men live by.”⁸² Charteris-Black sees myth as a story that provides explanation “of all the things for which explanations are felt to be necessary.”⁸³ The origins of the elements, male and female, the universe, good and evil; everything that has a bit of mystery in them, or are believed to have because the origins are unknown. Lee C. McDonald argued in the 1960s that myth in today’s frequent usage refers to illusions that are normally contrasted and compared with ‘reality’. Myths, however, are the bearers of other meanings, so they

⁷⁶ Nelson, J. S. *Tropes of Politics: Science, Theory, Rhetoric, Action*. (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998) p. 139

⁷⁷ Nelson, J. S. *Tropes of Politics: Science, Theory, Rhetoric, Action*. (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998) p. 141

⁷⁸ Nelson, J. S. *Tropes of Politics: Science, Theory, Rhetoric, Action*. (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998) p. 141

⁷⁹ Nelson, J. S. *Tropes of Politics: Science, Theory, Rhetoric, Action*. (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998) p. 141

⁸⁰ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 11

⁸¹ McDonald, L. C. “Myth, Politics, and Political Science” in *Western Political Quarterly* 22 (March 1969) pp. 141

⁸² McDonald, L. C. “Myth, Politics, and Political Science” in *Western Political Quarterly* 22 (March 1969) pp. 141

⁸³ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 22

have a certain universal value in them. McDonald says that myth is something that “never was, but always is.”⁸⁴

For Burke, all rhetorical action involves identification, people identify themselves to one another, but also, other people identify people to different categories according to persuasion by other people or own assumption. To flesh up Burke’s own example, let us think that Tony Blair and George W. Bush are colleagues. Blair is not identical with Bush, but as far as their interests are joined (or so we think) Bush is identified with Blair. Blair might even identify himself with Bush or vice versa, if he thinks their interest are joined or assumes so. Within similar limits, we can think of “war” as a “*special case of peace*.”⁸⁵ According to Burke, people will understand war much better that way. Identification therefore is

affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication would be of man’s very essence. It would not be an ideal, as it now is, embodied in material conditions and partly frustrated by these same conditions; rather, it would be as natural, spontaneous, and total as with those idea prototypes of communication, the theologian’s angels, or “messengers.”⁸⁶

One could say therefore, that at least in the ‘West’ the world community identifies with “The West’. Which is here understood and persuaded in the same way as ‘London’ or ‘Sussex Drive,’ being of a metaphor than actual placing on the atlas. Jonathan Charteris-Black argues that “[m]etaphor is a highly effective rhetorical strategy for combining our understanding of familiar experiences in everyday life with deep-rooted cultural values that evoke powerful emotional responses.”⁸⁷

⁸⁴ McDonald, L. C. “Myth, Politics, and Political Science” in *Western Political Quarterly* 22 (March 1969) p. 141

⁸⁵ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 180

⁸⁶ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) pp. 181-182

⁸⁷ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. xi

Charteris-Black and Burke approach rhetoric from different angles, as earlier mentioned. Much of Charteris-Black's definition is build upon the notion that rhetoric is about persuasion. Burke comes to similar conclusion with his idea that man is a symbol user; if I call cat a mouse, I need to have a good reason or at least *a* reason for it. That is persuasion too.

Charteris-Black argues that “[a] very common way of communicating ideology is through myth.”⁸⁸ Ideology for Charteris-Black is a “belief system through which a particular social group creates the meanings that justify its existence to itself, it is therefore and exercise in self-legitimisation.”⁸⁹ To achieve that, he argues is through the use of metaphors. Burke has a similar approach to the subject. He questions what is known as ‘brainwashing’ and forcing ideologies to people, because he believes it is essentially persuasion that has reached somewhat scary proportions but nevertheless, in a way has succeeded. He believes the ‘brainwasher’ was also similarly motivated, that is, the person also believed mostly what he was saying himself. Burke asks “[d]o we simply use words, or do they not also use us?”⁹⁰ He says that to him, “[a]n “ideology” is like a spirit taking up its abode in a body: it makes that body hop around in certain ways, and that same body would have hopped around in different ways had a different ideology happened to inhabit it.”⁹¹ In conclusion, both come to similar agreement, at a first glance, Burke's definition uses stronger words, or should we say stronger imagery. Charteris-Black argues that to reach this goal of self-legitimisation, one simply uses metaphors. “By making decisions about what is right and wrong, good and bad, an individual engages in a process of self-legitimisation that places him-, or her-, self within a social group that shares those meanings.”⁹² That is, one needs to convince oneself to believe in the persuasion. Burke approaches the issue from a different, but nevertheless similar angle. Rhetoric must be thought of as a body of identifications, and therefore, they “owe their convincingness much more to trivial repetition and dull daily reinforcement than to exceptional rhetorical skill.”⁹³ Believing in, or convincing yourself to believe in what you are saying is

⁸⁸ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 22

⁸⁹ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 21

⁹⁰ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 59

⁹¹ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 59

⁹² Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 21

⁹³ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 185

of course part of the rhetorical skill, part of *good* rhetorical skill. However, sometimes the media overlooks certain statements or speeches that are thought of being particularly good examples of use of rhetoric, which in a way makes it uncommunicative and bad – something that did not deliver in the end, whereas sometimes bad, even ridiculous or childish usage is backed by national headlines making it ‘good rhetoric’ even if it was not even intended that way. Audience reaction therefore matters greatly.

Phil Graham et al. in their article ‘A Call to Arms at the End of History’⁹⁴ talk of different legitimisation strategies. They found four categories, the first one being one which appeals to “good” legitimate power sources, that is, either to God, Nation or People. The other one appeals to either history or historical mythology, third one is concerned of constructing an evil ‘other’ and the last one appealing to uniting behind a legitimate power source, such as the United Nations. More of then than not, however, the UN is not the power source so NATO or a certain coalition on a moral crusade could be seen or interpreted as being legitimate.

Charteris-Black argues that there are two ways in which the persuader might seek to influence the receiver: “Persuasion either seeks to *confirm* or to *challenge* existing beliefs, attitudes and behaviours – persuasion is never devoid of intention. However in both cases persuasion involves exploiting existing beliefs, attitudes and values rather than introducing completely new ones.”⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Graham, P., Keenan, T., and Dowd, A.-M., ‘A Call to Arms at the End of History: A Discourse–Historical Analysis of George W. Bush’s Declaration of War on Terror’ in *Discourse & Society* 15/2 (2004) pp. 199-221.

⁹⁵ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 10

4.3. *Hitler's Mein Kampf and Kenneth Burke – An Experiment.*

Burke, in the *Philosophy of Literary Form* analysed the rhetoric of Hitler's '*Battle*'⁹⁶. He argued that it was not merely fruitful to see the patterns of Hitler's political thought and compare them to what he did in his time, but rather, to try also to "discover what kind of 'medicine' this medicine man has concocted, that we may know, with greater accuracy, exactly what to guard against, if we are to forestall the concocting of similar medicine in America"⁹⁷, or other countries and ideas for that matter. Burke calls the book as the 'well of Nazi magic'⁹⁸. Movements and ideologies need a centre Burke says. It can be a centralised circle of ideas or, as Hitler chose, a certain Rome, where all roads lead. In Hitler's case it was Munich. Nevertheless, that was his ideological centre, and cleverly so that the idea would be generally graspable to all people he aimed to influence. Along with a common denominator, the movement also needs a common devil. The idea of good and evil is important in this respect. Burke argues that "[m]en who can unite on nothing else can unite on the basis of a foe shared by all."⁹⁹ Hitler writes in *Battle* that "[i]t is part of the genius of a great leader to make adversaries of different fields appear as always belonging to one category only, because to the weak and unstable characters the knowledge that there are various enemies will lead only too easily to incipient doubts as to their own cause"¹⁰⁰. For Hitler this 'evil' was the 'international Jew' but in today's context 'evil' for example Tony Blair is Saddam Hussein, who respectively is in Blair's view, comparative to Hitler. After having essentialised the enemy, Burke argues, Hitler's enemy is automatically justified. It was evident that the Jewish worker in the 1930s Germany was at stark odds with the 'International Jew' the Capitalist, the epitome of evil. However, Hitler would have argued that the worker was part of the 'Jewish plot'.¹⁰¹

Burke introduces the idea of sexual symbolism which is clearly evident in Hitler's writing. The Masses of ordinary German workers are feminised. The Germany in crisis is like the Wagnerian Siegfried,

⁹⁶Hitler, A. *Mein Kampf*

⁹⁷ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 211

⁹⁸ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 212

⁹⁹ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 212

¹⁰⁰ Quoted in Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 212

¹⁰¹ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 213

“dehorned Siegfried”¹⁰², Burke says. Therefore, the masses (feminine) need to be lead by a dominating male, because the rival male is the villainous Jew.¹⁰³

Hitler’s unification device, how to unify the nation, as summarised by Burke has the following unificating features:

Inborn Dignity – rather than stressing man’s natural born dignity, Hitler gave it a horrendous twist and made “Aryan” above all others leaving Jews and Negroes inferior race.

Projection device – The curative process that comes with the ability to hand over one’s ills to a scapegoat, thereby getting purification by dissociation.

Symbolic Rebirth – Inborn dignity and Projection together for people to feel good about themselves again and move forward toward a goal.

Commercial use – Making Jewish Capitalism the evil, it meant that ‘Aryan’ Capitalism would be its opposite.¹⁰⁴

This was Hitler’s thread throughout the Battle, but slightly altered it could be used to define other situations as well. Burke is concerned of such happening in American politics,

because although the desire for unity is genuine and admirable. The desire for national unity, in the present state of the world,* is genuine and admirable. But this unity, if attained on a deceptive basis, by emotional trickeries that shift our criticism from the accurate locus of our trouble, is no unity at all.¹⁰⁵

One could argue, that looking at Hitler’s argumentation and rhetorical strength, had he been born in let us say, Britain and having acquired a different kind of life, he would have been a master persuader and rhetorician on the side of the ‘good’.

¹⁰² Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 213

¹⁰³ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 213

¹⁰⁴ See Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) pp. 218-219

* ‘present state of the world’ refers to the 1940s, when Burke first wrote his essay.

¹⁰⁵ Burke, K. *On Symbols and Society*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 230

5 Tony Blair

5.1. *British Politics and Rhetoric*

The media has often noted how Tony Blair overcame a difficult childhood in northern England and Scotland eventually graduating from Oxford and becoming a barrister. Jonathan Charteris-Black suggests, that “[h]is period as the pre-eminent political figure in British history will be remembered by ambivalence of consensus and conflict, of the lamb and wolf.”¹⁰⁶

Difficult childhood or not, fact remains that like most British public political figures, Anthony Blair was privately educated. Having been born in Edinburgh but living most of his childhood in Durham, where his local constituency is today, he returned to finish his education in Fettes College, which is sometimes referred to as the Eton of Scotland. From Fettes to Oxford reading law at St John’s College, he graduated with second class honours. When the Labour leader John Smith died in 1994, Blair was to be his successor with a task to revitalise the Party. His rise in politics has sometimes been described as ‘meteoric’.

Whether the British politicians like it or not, imperial legacy is not easy to shake off. The sun never set in the British Empire and suddenly it was lost. Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne in their 1998 essay proposed, that before Margaret Thatcher came to power, “the British foreign policy had become preoccupied with the question of decline, and how a former imperial power should adjust to the ‘reality’ of life outside the premier league of states.”¹⁰⁷ Mrs Thatcher, it seemed, was a staunch supporter of the Empire; she wanted to put the ‘Great’ back to Britain which was about making Britain

¹⁰⁶ Charteris-Black, Jonathan. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p.

¹⁰⁷ N. J. Wheeler; T. Dunne. ‘Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy in *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 74 No. 4 (Oct., 1998) p. 850

an important player in the world stage again. The Falklands proved that. Thatcher, remembering Britain's born again 'Greatness' wrote in her memoirs how Britain had "ceased to be a nation in retreat. We have instead a new found confidence – born in the economic battles at home and tested and found true 8,000 miles away...Britain found herself again in the South Atlantic and will not look back from the victory she has won"¹⁰⁸. Some might argue, like Jackie Ashley in the Guardian that "Blairism is just Thatcherism softened for a soppiest age."¹⁰⁹ This is not entirely far from the actual truth. One can notice a form of Thatcher-worship in the Tony Blair style. Jonathan Charteris-Black has noted that "Blair realised how successfully she [Thatcher] had developed a personality cult based on certainty and aggression and this is something that ultimately – in spite of appearances of consensus – his rhetoric has sought to emulate."¹¹⁰ That can be seen as one of the vital components of his success as a political leader. Blair himself has said to "think in headlines."¹¹¹ He understands the modern media in such a way that his speeches follow a certain very persuasive pattern. "[P]olitical speeches are now designed to contain phrases that are brief, topical and frequent so that they can be readily taken up as 'sound bites' to be constantly recycled through the broadcast media."¹¹²

In 1998 Blair's speech on British foreign political concerns: "I have said before that though Britain will never be the mightiest nation on earth, we can be pivotal. It means building on the strengths of our history; it means building new alliances; developing new influence; charting a new course for British foreign policy."¹¹³ Britain, a small island nation with Imperial past, ruling at one point one third of the world, is also burdened with another kind of past, more of an invented one, with myths included – Britain as a country of heroes, worldwide recognisable heroes, idealised to such an extent that they have become larger than life and therefore lost their human quality. Field-Marshal Montgomery¹¹⁴,

¹⁰⁸ Thatcher, M. *The Downing Street years* (London: Harper Collins, 1995) p. 235

¹⁰⁹ Ashley, J. *Blairism is just Thatcherism softened for a soppiest age* [24.01.2006] [WWW-document]

¹¹⁰ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 143

¹¹¹ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 143

¹¹² Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 12

¹¹³ Blair, T. [20.07.2006] Speech by the Prime Minister on foreign affairs Tuesday 15th December 1998 [www-document]

¹¹⁴ Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein was in decisive role during the Second World War, in particular in the battle of El Alamein, but he also masterminded the Operation Market Garden, to control the Ruhr area.

who himself has become one of those larger than life heroes, suggested rather flamboyantly, the reason why Britain is preoccupied with ‘greatness’ he said, that “[f]or many years we have not known final defeat; freedom is in our blood and has given us a sturdy and unique strength.”¹¹⁵ Charteris-Black defines Tony Blair’s rhetorical style as what he calls ‘Conviction Rhetoric’. This ties in with the notion that “politics is ethics[:] In order to create value in a market place of ethics, there is a need to make bold rhetorical contrasts between right and wrong, between good and evil”¹¹⁶. According to Charteris-Black, Blair ‘came out’ as a Christian, when he joined the Christian Socialist Movement in 1992¹¹⁷. Therefore, Blair’s conviction rhetoric relies heavily on what Charteris-Black calls the most basic of all myths: the contrast of good and evil. “Blair and those who are ‘on-message’ are represented as agents of good involved in a struggle against the forces of evil.”¹¹⁸ This, argued by Charteris-Black, gives “Blair an epic dimension to his own political action since the ability to classify certain political entities as ‘evil’ implies moral authority on the part of the speaker.”¹¹⁹ This ‘epic dimension’ in a way raises Blair in his own conviction and ideology to the ranks of mythical British heroes.

5.2. British Imperial Legacy

Therefore it is arguable that Blair’s ‘magic well’ is as he himself said “building on the strengths of our history.”¹²⁰ The last of the warrior-kings, King Henry the Fifth (1387-1422) has been said to have been both a tyrant and the greatest man ever to have ruled England. The great rhetorical strength and gift of speechmaking that will now be attributed to Henry the Fifth, is in fact mostly of William Shakespeare’s

¹¹⁵ Montgomery, Lord. *A Concise History of Warfare*. (London: William Collins and Sons, 1968) p. 19

¹¹⁶ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 148

¹¹⁷ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 146

¹¹⁸ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 150

¹¹⁹ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 151

¹²⁰ Blair, T. [20.07.2006] Speech by the Prime Minister on foreign affairs Tuesday 15th December 1998 [WWW-document]

creation. Celebrated historian Felipe Fernandez-Armesto has accused Henry the Fifth being a myth; a myth that grew larger than the man “[w]ith a bit of help from deluded historians and mythopoeic film-makers, Shakespeare turned Henry into a box-office hero and a romantic lead. The myth became more important than the man - just as well, for those who like their past to be comforting or inspiring.”¹²¹

Few can argue that speeches such as “Once more unto the breach!” (Act 3, Scene 1) or “We few, we happy few, we band of brothers” (Act 4, Scene 3) are not inspiring. In fact, those slogans are ever present reminders for today’s politicians how an uplifting and inspiring speech should sound, despite the fact that they were written by a playwright.

During the Second World War, Prime Minister Winston Churchill used the mythic quality of Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth to raise war morale. In his 1940 speech at the House of Commons he called the R.A.F. pilots who fought in the Battle of Britain as “the few” when addressing the house saying: “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.”¹²² The phrase is used even today to describe the R.A.F. pilots who fought in the battle. Charteris-Black argues that “persuasive political phrases must necessarily be creative and appealing incarnations in order to compete for attention with the ever-increasing artfulness of advertisements through and ever-increasing number of media channels.”¹²³

After Henry the Fifth, the mythical leadership in war has not been attributed to kings or queens but rather to high-ranking soldiers or members of parliament. Even if Churchill was the most prolific leader in war, or his rhetorical strength is difficult to surpass, Britain has another favourite hero, Nelson¹²⁴, whose greatness grew beyond proportions. The warring history is not without its equal in Nelson, who, like Henry the Fifth more than four hundred years earlier became a myth and a legend. Nelson was not a king, but “was elevated as models [alongside Wellington] of all that was outstanding in the British national character.”¹²⁵ His biographers have concluded that he was a man of many contradictions, but as a leader, he was unrivalled. He also coined the perhaps most memorable plea in the history of Britain as he addressed the fleet at the cape of Trafalgar in the morning of October 21st, 1805. “England

¹²¹ Fernandez-Armesto, F. ‘The Myth of Henry V’ [20.11.2005] [WWW document]

¹²² Churchill, W. ‘The Few’ [20.11.2005] [WWW document]

¹²³ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 12-13

¹²⁴ Vice Admiral of the White The Right Honourable Horatio, Viscount Nelson of the Nile and of Burnham Thorpe

¹²⁵ James, L. *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (London: Abacus, 1998) p.164

confides that every man will do his duty”. ‘Confides’ was then changed to ‘expects’ as it was easier to signal, but the legendary plea was born. However, Nelson was, in his heart a soldier and not a statesman: Nelson biographer, Edgar Vincent argues that he “fought on a simple prospectus: Death or Glory”¹²⁶ and he gained both. Another soldier, a great British commander in the Second World War, Field-Marshal Montgomery or “Monty” was given similar praise from his men. As so-called ‘new wars’ during and after the Cold War, have taken different approaches, politicians have gained a new more memorable role in the world stage. Presidents and Prime Ministers are the new heroes and villains of the hour, in a much more pronounced way as was the case in the past. Charteris-Black concludes that “within the contemporary context, the media have a powerful influence on how persuasion is performed. Speeches are encountered in the domain of the home and therefore the tone and the style of delivery need to be intimate and domesticated.”¹²⁷

Although Blair spoke of different kind of Britain in 1999, he had, only a year earlier in 1998 told of a different kind of Britain in his speech at the US State Department, when he had a message to tell the Americans about Britain. About ‘new Britain,’ Britain, who does not need to look to its past.

For years, we were known more for what we once were than what we could be. For years we were content to rest on former glories, rather than the self-confidence of present day achievement. I know what many used to think of us: we were "quaint", a little "old fashioned". A country of pageantry and ceremony, bowler hats and stiff upper lips...But Britain today is defined by a lot more than its history. Today, the British people are breaking down old fashioned class barriers, seizing new opportunities, creating new products, building strong communities.¹²⁸

This was rather pronouncedly the spirit of ‘Cool Britannia’ rather than ‘rule’¹²⁹. However, as it is the trend often in ‘looking back what Britain once was,’ Blair too fell to the old trap; he described the essence of ‘Englishness’ not ‘Britishness.’ The English, confusing concept to many, even to ‘real’ Englishmen and -women, are often described as the archetypical people in bowler hats with stiff upper

¹²⁶ Vincent, E. *Nelson: Love & Fame*. (Yale: Yale University Press, 2003) p. 5

¹²⁷ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 12

¹²⁸ Blair, T. [16.07.2006] Speech by the Prime Minister at the US State Department Friday 6 February 1998 [WWW-document]

¹²⁹ N. J. Wheeler; T. Dunne. ‘Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy in *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 74 No. 4 (Oct., 1998) p. 850

lips. That aptly enhances the mythic quality and romantic past of the island race. Henry the Fifth was English, Nelson and Monty and Churchill were English. The New Labour rides on presupposition that these values are old-fashioned and no longer in use, though used even in their rhetoric almost in every speech. Robin Cohen has argued that “Britishness is best understood in terms of interaction with along six uncertain frontiers – those with the United States, Europe, the former white Dominions, the wider Commonwealth, the internal Celtic fringe and the body of ‘aliens’ seeking to acquire British citizenship”¹³⁰. Charteris-Black has his own theory of this as he talks about legitimisation and self-legitimisation. He says that “[t]he essence of legitimisation by political leaders is to identify a set of values regarding what is good and bad which form the basis of political action”¹³¹. This, he says is not a rational process. Ethical language is employed in order to form basis for an emotional invitation “to share a perception of what is right and wrong”¹³². To return to Blair’s ‘epic dimension’, Charteris-Black argues that “[d]escribing ethics and morality in the language of conflict created the potential for both Thatcher and Blair to describe actual military conflict in terms of morality and ethics”¹³³. One can argue as Charteris-Black does, that this was the basis of legitimisation of Thatcher’s Falklands and Blair’s ‘Second’ Gulf War. What is often known as the ‘Blair Doctrine’ speech, the Chicago Economic Club speech is argued to have provided a rationale for later intervention¹³⁴ in Kosovo in 1999 according to Anthony Seldon. The ‘Blair doctrine consisted of five objectives:

A verifiable cessation of all combat activities and killings

The withdrawal of Serb military police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo

The deployment of an international military force

The return of all refugees and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid

*A political framework for Kosovo building on the Rambouillet accords*¹³⁵

¹³⁰ Cohen, R. ‘The Incredible Vagueness of Being British/English’ in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* Vol. 76 No. 3 (Jul., 2000) p. 581

¹³¹ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 22

¹³² Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 22

¹³³ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 162

¹³⁴ Seldon, Anthony (ed.) *The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997-2001*. (London: Little, Brown and Company, 2001) p. 300

¹³⁵ Blair, T. [22.09.2005] Tony Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International community’ 24 April 1999 [WWW document]

In his speech, Blair said that these aforementioned aims were non-negotiable; Milosevic would have to accept them, because according to Blair “many of our problems have been caused by two dangerous and ruthless men”¹³⁶, those them being Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic.

It is therefore understandable that time and again, Tony Blair and also Britain want to prove themselves in the eyes of the United States. A former colony, now the world’s only superpower, the stakes are high. Britain wants to be a good friend now that it no longer has most of North America as its subject to the Crown. Blair’s delivery at the State Department continued by trying paint out the picture of creativity, ingenuity, and imagination of the British people. He had to make amends too. He admitted Britain will never return to its former glory, to return to its days when it figuratively ‘ruled the waves’ in the military sense. However, as Blair noted, what Britain could be is “a shining example to all of what a modern state should aspire to.”¹³⁷ In his December speech the same year, Blair once again reminded the special relationship Britain and the United States enjoy. “Britain’s relationship with the US has been fundamental to our foreign policy throughout this century. Twice the US has come to our help to preserve democracy and freedom in Europe.”¹³⁸ The roles certainly have changed since the colonial days. When Blair argued that though Britain will never be anything like a superpower, special relations with the US certainly can give Britain and its Prime Minister a pivotal role in the world, thus “[i]t means realising once and for all that Britain does not need to have to choose between being strong with the US, or being strong with Europe; it means having the confidence to see that Britain can be both.”¹³⁹ Though Blair was quite determined to wipe the ‘olde worlde’ feeling of stuffy Britishness off the new and improved version of Great Britain, the fact remained that language and history were

¹³⁶ Blair, T. [22.09.2005] Tony Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International community’ 24 April 1999

[WWW document]

¹³⁷ Blair, T. [16.07.2006] Speech by the Prime Minister at the US State Department Friday 6 February 1998 [WWW document]

¹³⁸ Blair, T. [20.07.2006] Speech by the Prime Minister on foreign affairs Tuesday 15th December 1998 [WWW document]

¹³⁹ Blair, T. [20.07.2006] Speech by the Prime Minister on foreign affairs Tuesday 15th December 1998 [WWW document]

binding features of the sought friendship, as well as the fact that the US was the world's only remaining superpower. He argued that it was “underpinned by deep-rooted commitment to political pluralism and freedom, by the myriad personal and cultural ties between the British and American peoples, and by two societies comfortable with each other.”¹⁴⁰ Similar value system and similar aims help these two countries and their leaders to see eye to eye about a multiple of things. Values such as they are, are extremely important to Blair. In his Blair doctrine speech he reminded how [t]he spread of our values makes us safer.” As well as how “our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish.”¹⁴¹

5.3. Blair significance

Jonathan Charteris-Black attributes the speech at the House of Commons on March 18th 2003 as the “most important political speech he has made to date”¹⁴². It was indeed difficult task, because had he not been able to keep the vote to his favour after he had already asked the military ground forces for support in Iraq. Had he lost the vote, he would have had been forced to resign. However, he was successful enough in convincing the very reluctant House of Commons and the general public to support the military intervention in Iraq, even if people were under the impression that a second UN Security Council resolution was needed before the hostilities could start. Charteris-Black has sketched out a sort of map or a timeline of Blair's usage of the word ‘evil’ from where one can draw different kinds of theories. According to Charteris-Black, most speeches before the famous ‘9/11’ Blair viewed things such as social injustice as being ‘evil’. However, after the September terrorist attacks, ‘evil’ was used to describe those involved in the new wave of terrorism. After terrorism, Blair returned to one of his projects, which was Iraq. First he called the regime of Saddam Hussein as evil and then finally, Saddam Hussein became the ‘evil’. However, Charteris-Black's timeline has a few inconsistencies: Saddam Hussein and his regime have to Blair, always been characterised as ‘evil’. He used the word

¹⁴⁰ Blair, T. [20.07.2006] Speech by the Prime Minister on foreign affairs Tuesday 15th December 1998 [WWW document]

¹⁴¹ Blair, T. [22.09.2005] Tony Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International community’ 24 April 1999 [WWW document]

¹⁴² Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 166

for the describing the Government and reign of Saddam Hussein as early as in 1998, long before the twin-tower hits, when he announced and tried to convince the House of Commons why the target bombing Iraqi bases was essential. Charteris-Black is right though in noting after the failed hunt of Osama bin Laden, “Saddam Hussein became the embodiment of evil with references to other historically evil men [,]”¹⁴³ namely the Nazis.

A few months after the 9/11, Blair spoke at the Lord Mayor’s banquet. Charteris-Black called this style as being more noticeable in Blair rhetoric than in the previous rhetorical masters’ style, nevertheless having its roots in Winston Churchill and Margaret Thatcher. “[T]he integration of a populist discourse of colloquial phraseology and familiar metaphor – with dramatic, personal statements of moral and ethic belief”¹⁴⁴. At the Banquet Blair spoke of shattered dreams, illusions and humanitarian tragedies that one cannot turn a blind eye to. Blair speech was like a subtle ‘call to arms’ speech.

Once chaos and strife have got a grip on a region or a country trouble will soon be exported. Out of such regions and countries come humanitarian tragedies; centres for trafficking in weapons, drugs and people; havens for criminal organisations; and sanctuaries for terrorists. After all it was a dismal camp in the foothills of Afghanistan that gave birth to the murderous assault on the sparkling heart of New York's financial centre.¹⁴⁵

He warned how trouble will soon be exported, in the opening lines of his speech he had reminded how

Following the outrage of 11 September, we pursue those responsible for it in Afghanistan. It is clear the Taliban are unravelling. But they are not beaten yet or Al Qaeda yet hunted down. We must continue until they are. This mission is important in all its aspects, military, humanitarian and diplomatic¹⁴⁶.

Tony Blair has not had an easy task of persuading his opponents and fellow countrymen that war in Iraq or war on terrorism was the right thing to do. Kosovo was in many ways different, as the public opinion was not so much against him. There were no large-scale anti-war demonstrations in London to the fashion of Iraq campaign, even if both countries and campaigns are still, to use colloquial

¹⁴³ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 150

¹⁴⁴ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 162

¹⁴⁵ Blair, T. [30.08.2006] Speech by the Prime Minister at the Lord Mayor's Banquet 12 November 2001 [WWW-document]

¹⁴⁶ Blair, T. [30.08.2006] Speech by the Prime Minister at the Lord Mayor's Banquet 12 November 2001 [WWW-document]

expression, like open wounds, without reconciliation in sight. Nevertheless, Blair may have, without his knowledge been judged on the basis of person rather than by what he believes in. Charteris-Black argues that people evaluate ideologies through those people that advocate them. “[F]lesh and blood presence of a leader is important.”¹⁴⁷ As J. M. Burns has said “[L]eadership acts as an inciting and triggering force in the conversion of conflicting demands, values, and goals into significant behaviour.”¹⁴⁸

6 Case Kosovo

6.1. *Rambouillet Peace Conference*

Operation Allied Force, the use of force by NATO in the name of peace and human rights, began on March 24, 1999. Otto von Bismarck more than a century earlier had famously noted how the Balkans were not worth the bones of one Pomeranian Grenadier¹⁴⁹. The First World War triggered from there; it has been torn by communism, Nazi occupation and internal conflicts. By no means, the issues still raw and bitter over there can be settled peacefully if at all. If the people from the region cannot see the end to their differences, is it right that neighbouring countries try to settle the conflicts or better yet, the World’s leading economic countries? Military organisations such as NATO or even the United Nations?

NATO’s response in the early months of 1999 and October 1998 were to end attacks aimed towards the Kosovar Albanians. During the year 1998 the conflict between Serbian military and police forces

¹⁴⁷ Charteris-Black, J. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 26

¹⁴⁸ Burns, J. M. *Leadership*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978) p. 38

¹⁴⁹ Blair, T. [14.04.2005] Prime Minister’s speech: Doctrine of the International community at the Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 1999 [WWW document]

against the Kosovar Albanians had resulted in over 400 000 being expelled from their homes with over 1 500 Kosovar Albanians dead¹⁵⁰. This was seen as ‘ethnic cleansing’ or ‘a flight from genocide’ or then it ‘echoed the Holocaust’ as British tabloids the Daily Mail and the Sun proclaimed. John Pilger writing in the *New Statesman* questioned the havoc around the attack, he said that the British press, at least the tabloid press was one hundred percent behind Prime Minister Blair at that time, in Pilger’s view, the build-up to the invasion was “a series of fraudulent justifications”¹⁵¹ The US Defence Secretary talked of over 100 000 Albanian men being missing, the US Ambassador on the other hand pointed how over 200 000 Albanian men may have been killed.

Hansjörg Strohmeyer, a judge and a policy adviser in the United Nations office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs settled for different kinds of figures, instead of hundreds of thousands, his count was around 1 500 people killed. However, October 1998 NATO felt the situation in Kosovo had deteriorated enough to start a military offensive. NATO air raids were the first step, followed by what was called ‘Operation Allied Force’ on March 1999, after the Republic of Yugoslavia had refused to sign the Rambouillet Accords in February and March.

6.2. *Rambouillet Accords*

Operation Allied Force came as a response to the rejection of the Peace talks in Rambouillet, France in February 1999. The substantial air and military strike was intended to seek peace by means of war. Marc Weller writes about the complexity of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of

¹⁵⁰ Strohmeyer, Hansjörg. ‘Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor’ in *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Jan., 2001) p. 46

¹⁵¹ Pilger, J. [05.05.2004] ‘How Silent are the Humanitarian Invaders of Kosovo?’ in the *New Statesman*, December 8, 2004 [WWW document]

Yugoslavia (SFRY) and its connection to the changes in the international political climate after the Cold War. According to Marc Weller, “the Rambouillet conference represents a theatre in which many of the tensions underlying this continuing post-Cold War transformation were played out.”¹⁵² He argues that Kosovo and the people of Kosovo were just pawns in the play, because what he calls meta-questions were in fact the somewhat real issues of the ‘play’. Among those meta-questions is “the legitimacy of the threat or use of force in international relations”¹⁵³, which became one of the central issues among the critics of the NATO intervention. The Rambouillet peace conference also saw the change in the roles of the international actors come to life. It was the perfect stage to play out and to try out different roles, even if it was at the expense of the people in Kosovo.

Weller writes that a stand was made against the rise of the US dominated uni-polar system. Russia’s place was still undecided, so it was seeking a preferably controlling role in the peace talks and also to block and veto in the matters where consensus was needed. France was as well trying to retain its role as one of the leading powers and tried to do whatever was in its power to keep the decision making in the hands of the Security Council and not NATO. The whole of the so called ‘Contact Group’, a group consisting of countries of influence with a significant interest in policy developments in the Balkans, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and Russia. Alongside the Contact Group, NATO and the UN Security Council, the OSCE – Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe as well as the EU were also seeking ways to influence the proceedings. The EU presence and the fact that the peace talks were held in France was also a symbolic gesture to show that the Europeans were able to “sort out their own backyard.”¹⁵⁴ NATO however, was also seeking a leading role and with the Security Council adopting Chapter VII in March 1998, there was no authorisation for the use of force, unless they would resort to other justifications. NATO’s justification then became due to impending humanitarian disaster in the form of doctrine of humanitarian

¹⁵² Weller, M. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo in International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 75, No. 2 (Apr., 1999) p. 211

¹⁵³ Weller, M. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo in International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 75, No. 2 (Apr., 1999) p. 212

¹⁵⁴ Weller, M. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo in International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 75, No. 2 (Apr., 1999) p. 212

intervention¹⁵⁵. This did not impress Russia and China and the tension grew in the Security Council. NATO on the other hand was seeking a very decisive role in the proceedings. It was also supporting Kosovo independence, and was pushing for a self-governing role in Kosovo. The area had gone unnoticed during the Dayton Peace talks in 1995 but there had been demands before for the self-governance in 1991. “Self-governing” under NATO mandates. The Contact Group meeting in January 1999, it was confirmed that the situation over in Kosovo “remains a threat to peace and security in the region, raising the prospect of a humanitarian catastrophe.”¹⁵⁶ The North Atlantic Council, NATO’s most senior governing body, declared a statement.

The crisis in Kosovo remains a threat to peace and security in the region...[s]teps to this end must include acceptance by both parties of the summons to begin negotiations at Rambouillet by February 1999 and the completion of the negotiations on an interim political settlement...[i]f these steps are not taken, NATO is readily to take whatever measures are necessary in the light of both parties compliance¹⁵⁷

Weller argues that the action NATO was daring. NATO held on to the argument of humanitarian disaster. He says that “[b]y linking the political settlement to this looming emergency, acceptance of political settlement was converted into a step necessary to avoid this disaster.”¹⁵⁸ The justification was forcible humanitarian action to achieve settlement. The settlement included certain ‘non-negotiable elements and the outcome can be seen as both ‘what NATO wanted’ and what NATO did not want’ the late addition of military annex, forced the SFRY and President Milosevic to say ‘No thank you’ for the plan.

¹⁵⁵ Weller, M. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo in International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 75, No. 2 (Apr., 1999) p. 217

¹⁵⁶ Weller, M. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo in International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 75, No. 2 (Apr., 1999) p. 222

¹⁵⁷ Weller, M. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo in International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 75, No. 2 (Apr., 1999) p. 223

¹⁵⁸ Weller, M. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo in International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 75, No. 2 (Apr., 1999) p. 223

6.3. *Speeches on Kosovo*

In his speech at the NATO 50th anniversary conference, in early March 1999, British Prime Minister, Tony Blair touched upon the subject of Kosovo while addressing the conference. In the opening remarks he said how it was the time to celebrate the past and plan for the future, about the NATO enlargement, partnership and European defence. However, the subject Kosovo also emerged, Blair promised how NATO's mistakes done at the early stages of Bosnian crisis were not to be repeated at Kosovo. "We will not allow war to devastate a part of our continent, bringing untold death, suffering and homelessness."¹⁵⁹ According to Blair, both Hubert Vedrine and Robin Cook had made excellent progress at Rambouillet. However, he added, "the Balkans are littered with agreements that are signed but not implemented...to bring stability to Kosovo, an international force is an indispensable element. Only NATO is equipped to lead it. Either side in the negotiations can wreck the chances of full agreement. But both must understand their interest in success."¹⁶⁰ During this speech, Blair's style was more forceful than normal; he was almost fiercely promoting the upcoming campaign. He was not prepared to make any amends. "We will not accept prevarication in the negotiations. No side can be allowed to obstruct the process. In this crucial period President Milosevic and his commanders must also understand that NATO will not stand by in the face of renewed repression in Kosovo or atrocities

¹⁵⁹ Blair, T. [27.01.2006] Prime Minister's speech at the NATO 50th anniversary conference on March 8, 1999 [WWW document]

¹⁶⁰ Blair, T. [27.01.2006] Prime Minister's speech at the NATO 50th anniversary conference on March 8, 1999 [WWW document]

like the one we witnessed recently at Racak.”¹⁶¹ He also threatened with International War Crimes Tribunal and was adamant that there would be no peace, no real peace in the Former Yugoslavia area, until all that is despicable to him, authoritarianism and nationalist governments are removed and replaced with democracy. However, he returned to his moderate peace-building mode later on, saying that NATO can only help to provide a stable base; the rest is up to the people of Balkans. “Political change should be achieved by political means. More war will only set back those dreams of security and prosperity to which the ordinary people of the Balkans aspire.”¹⁶²

Exactly a month after the Operation Allied Force, Blair gave a speech in April what has been called the Doctrine of International community or Blair doctrine. Tony Blair and his cabinet prefer the title Doctrine of International community as it is the speech’s ‘name’ at virtual number ten and most likely at the real number ten as well. Thomas G. Weiss has criticised the usage of the term ‘international community’ unless all it is for is to confuse people. According to him, there is no such thing, “if this word implies shared values and common convictions. Within the international relations lexicon, it refers commonly to ‘peace-loving states’ – a fiction when there are so many among the 189, and counting, UN member-states that are anything except law-abiding.”¹⁶³ The speech was given at the Chicago Economic Club, and it seems it was Blair’s rallying speech for more American support, and to warrant the ‘international community’ to intervene in the affairs of other nations. Thomas G. Weiss feels the term is without a policy edge. “Using it allows analysts to avoid pointing the finger at which specific entities are responsible when the so-called international community fails to respond or makes a mess of things. It also permits everyone to claim responsibility for successes. Because the old adage goes, ‘success has many parents, but failure is an orphan’”¹⁶⁴ Nevertheless, Blair sketched out the

¹⁶¹ Blair, T. [27.01.2006] Prime Minister's speech at the NATO 50th anniversary conference on March 8, 1999 [WWW document]

¹⁶² Blair, T. [27.01.2006] Prime Minister's speech at the NATO 50th anniversary conference on March 8, 1999 [WWW document]

¹⁶³ Thomas G. Weiss. 'Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons' in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 38, No. 4 (Jul., 2001) p. 423

¹⁶⁴ Thomas G. Weiss. 'Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons' in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 38, No. 4 (Jul., 2001) p. 424

horrible things happening in Europe to the Economic Club, drawing parallels to the World Wars. “Awful crimes that we thought we would never see again have reappeared... This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambition, but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand.”¹⁶⁵ All this, had to be seen in the wider context though, Kosovo was not an isolated case, as it had political, security and economic implications. Blair also wanted to justify his stand on the matters saying how “people want to know not only that we are right to take this action but also that we have clear objectives and that we are going to succeed.” This was then followed by what one might call the doctrine part, the five objectives that according to Blair were non-negotiable.

a verifiable cessation of all combat activities and killings; the withdrawal of Serb military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; the deployment of an international military force, the return of all refugees and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid; and a political framework for Kosovo building on the Rambouillet accords. We will not negotiate on these aims. Milosevic must accept them.¹⁶⁶

Eight years on, and the situation in Kosovo is still uncertain, and the Milosevic trial never concluded as he died in captivity. However, as Blair said in 1998, “Just as I believe there was no alternative to military action, now it has started I am convinced there is no alternative to continuing until we succeed... Success is the only exit strategy I am prepared to consider.”¹⁶⁷

Blair returns to his justification and criteria or guidelines of how to determine where and when it is good and rightful to intervene. These five objectives he called not as much as rules, but general guidelines in future interventions. This would imply interventions were what he was after.

First, are we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress; but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators. Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? We should always give peace every chance, as we have in the case of Kosovo. Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are

¹⁶⁵ Blair, T. [14.04.2005] Prime Minister's speech: Doctrine of the International community at the Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 1999 [WWW document]

¹⁶⁶ Blair, T. [14.04.2005] Prime Minister's speech: Doctrine of the International community at the Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 1999 [WWW document]

¹⁶⁷ Blair, T. [14.04.2005] Prime Minister's speech: Doctrine of the International community at the Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 1999 [WWW document]

there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? In the past we talked too much of exit strategies. But having made a commitment we cannot simply walk away once the fight is over; better to stay with moderate numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large numbers. And finally, do we have national interests involved? The mass expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo demanded the notice of the rest of the world. But it does make a difference that this is taking place in such a combustible part of Europe.¹⁶⁸

This all suggested Kosovo was always thought to be a long-term intervention, a step forward or at least in different direction as British foreign policy normally would have in the past. It has been criticised of its short-term practicality, of concerns to “get the details right, a natural suspicion of strategic visions; based on pervading uncertainty that goes back at least to the 1930s about the role that Britain should play in the world[.]”¹⁶⁹ Maybe in a way Blair thought he would be there to see the Kosovo crisis finished and solved. Obviously it is still possible in 2006, but at this point would seem unlikely.

In Prime Minister’s statement to the Parliament on the NATO summit in Washington only few days after the Chicago Economic Club speech, he explaining to the house how under NATO decision, air campaign should be intensified, targets increased and that there should be increase on the economic measures including an oil embargo. However, perhaps the most important thing or the outcome of Blair’s statement was the fact that he described the success of the summit by saying how there was “the total and unified commitment by all the members of the alliance to defeat and reverse the policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Each leader began his statement by saying NATO will and must prevail. It is our collective task now to make that victory, of justice over evil, a reality for Kosovo's long-suffering people.”¹⁷⁰

Beginning of May 1999, Blair was speaking at the Romanian Parliament, subject matter being once again Kosovo. He admitted that Kosovo was not a modern day conflict, but a reminder of what he called worst memories of the 20th century: people based on ethnicity are being persecuted. However, he

¹⁶⁸ Blair, T.[14.04.2005] Prime Minister's speech: Doctrine of the International community at the Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 1999 [WWW document]

¹⁶⁹ Sanders. David. *Losing an empire, finding a role: British Foreign policy since 1945* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990)

¹⁷⁰ Blair, T. [08.08. 2005] Prime Minister's statement to Parliament on the NATO summit in Washington 26 April 1999 [WWW document]

also maintained that “[t]he British people are engaged in this struggle because they see it as more than a fight for justice and fairness for the victims of Milosevic’s policies in the former Yugoslavia. They see that our values are being abused. They see that the stability of our continent is at stake.”¹⁷¹ By the end of the May, Blair had once again returned to his ‘just war’ claim, and when giving a speech on Europe’s new challenges, he once again reminded, how the situation in Kosovo was a just war and how there was great symbolism in the fact that the RAF and Luftwaffe planes were fighting together.

Today however, just a short flight away, another war is scarring our Continent. A just war, against the most evil form of racial genocide since my father’s generation defeated the Nazis. And though it is a grim affair, I cannot let pass without comment the great symbolism of RAF and Luftwaffe planes fighting, together, in a just cause. This too shows the power of progress.¹⁷²

6.4. Ruthless Men

“Many of our problems have been caused by two dangerous and ruthless men – Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic”¹⁷³ said Tony Blair at the Chicago Economy Club in April 1999. Approximately a month later, Blair painted yet another horrific image of him, stating how Milosevic was so evil that he was “determined to wipe a people from the face of his country. We are determined to stop him. And we will”¹⁷⁴ he added.

Blair’s style is very different from the type of wording and structure he uses four years later in Iraq. When talking about Kosovo, he can be more determined, matter of fact, rather than cautious and

¹⁷¹ Blair, T. [08.08.2005] Prime Minister’s speech to the Roumanian Parliament, 4 May 1999 [WWW document]

¹⁷² Blair, T. [27.01.2006] Prime Minister’s speech: The new challenge for Europe, 20 May 1999 [WWW document]

¹⁷³ Blair, T. [14.04.2005] Prime Minister’s speech: Doctrine of the International community at the Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 1999 [WWW document]

¹⁷⁴ Blair, T. [27.01.2006] Prime Minister’s speech: The new challenge for Europe, 20 May 1999 [WWW document]

eloquently appealing. In May 1999, talking about the new challenges for Europe, Blair once again criticised harshly ‘the other’s’ lack of morals and thus, evilness, which is evident from Blair’s stance, matching brutality with brutality.

There are no half measures to his brutality. There can be no half measures about how we deal with it. No compromise. No fudge. No half-baked deals. The whole of the NATO Alliance is clear about the conditions - his troops out, the refugee’s back home, and an international military force in to keep the peace. Until then, the air campaign goes on. And to those who disagree. I make two points. The first you live in a democracy and I defend your right to make clear your disagreement. The second is that we are talking here not about some far away place of which we know little. We are talking about the doorstep of the European Union, our own back yard.¹⁷⁵

With Milosevic, Blair touched upon a theme that he would repeat many times with Saddam Hussein, the idea of showing force or else no world dictator would ever take, in this case the international community and in Saddam Hussein’s case the UN seriously. In this case the international community in the form of NATO was already showing force, and therefore Blair was certain the message would deliver. “No half measures about the barbarism. No half measures about our response”¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Blair, T. [27.01.2006] Prime Minister's speech: The new challenge for Europe, 20 May 1999 [WWW document]

¹⁷⁶ Blair, T. [27.01.2006] Prime Minister's speech: The new challenge for Europe, 20 May 1999 [WWW document]

7 Case Iraq

7.1. *9/11 and all that*

The Case Iraq started a long time before 9/11 and the 2003 target bombing, which escalated into ‘total’ war and ended the era of Saddam Hussein’s rule. The ‘West’ or Britain alongside the US has issued ultimatums through and without the UN since the 1980s when Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship started. The present war has also been called the Second Gulf War, since as far as the arms inspection officers are concerned, they are connected. Had Saddam Hussein cooperated after the Gulf War, situation would have been somewhat different. The US and the UK have seen regime changes themselves, but Iraq has always remained a foreign political concern in both countries.

Iraq’s non-cooperation and disagreement over the Gulf sanctions meant that the country’s weapons arsenal was larger than what was agreed and on the whole, co-operation was not in the Iraqi agenda. Having grown tired of the game of playing cat and mouse with Saddam Hussein, the US and the UK decided to act. In 1998, Madeline Albright, the then US Secretary of State had promised that the campaign would be significant.

Blair’s Statement on the situation in Iraq to the Parliament on Thursday, 17th December 1998 explained how he had on the previous night authorised a US-UK military strike against Iraq. The objectives were to degrade Saddam Hussein’s military capacity in order to diminish the threat he posed to his neighbours and to weaken his ability to use and produce weapons of mass destruction. Blair argued that the threat Saddam Hussein posed was very much real and not theoretical.¹⁷⁷ This was Blair’s first contact in bombing Iraq – the Gulf war in the early 1990s had been helmed by the Conservatives with George Bush on the US side. This new military strike, would be carried out by a Democrat president Clinton and relatively new Labour Prime Minister. His stated opinion, at least in

¹⁷⁷ Blair, T. [15.06.2006] Prime Minister's statement to Parliament concerning Iraq, Thursday 17 December 1998 [www-document]

the House of Commons was that he would like to see Saddam Hussein and his 'evil regime' to disappear but that it was not one of the objectives of the campaign. If such came as an added bonus, it would be good for all concerned parties.

In 1998 there was no publicly spoken intention to remove Saddam Hussein from Iraq; the initiative was only to weaken the threat the weapons of mass destruction posed. Blair stated how the military operation was not and could not be a regime change, although, it would not have been unwanted.

No-one would be better pleased if his evil regime disappeared as a direct or indirect result of our action, but our military objectives are precisely those I have set out. Even if there was legal authority to do so, removing Saddam through military action would require the insertion of ground troops on a massive scale hundreds of thousands, as the British Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Charles Guthrie, made clear this morning. Even then there would be no absolute guarantee of success. I cannot make that commitment responsibly.¹⁷⁸

During that time, the Blair and British concern were still very much oriented to another crisis; one escalating in Kosovo. However, the April 1999 speech at the Chicago Economic Club and the December 1998 statement¹⁷⁹ concerning the US-UK military strike were not far apart from each other, even if the concerns were of two very different countries. December 1998 military strike to Iraq was in a way a prelude to the strike the 'Coalition of the willing' organised in early 2003. Tony Blair had a different partner back then, Bill Clinton, fresh from his own personal scandals. It was suggested back then, that the timing was conveniently colliding with the hot issues the United States was dealing internally at the same time, Blair, however, denied it. "I refute this entirely. I have no doubt whatsoever that action is fully justified now. That is my strong personal view. I know that President Clinton reached the same conclusion for the same reasons."¹⁸⁰ Rather, the strike was necessary, because it was

¹⁷⁸ Blair, T. [15.06.2006] Prime Minister's statement to Parliament concerning Iraq, Thursday 17 December 1998 [www-document]

¹⁷⁹ Blair, T. [15.06.2006] Prime Minister's statement to Parliament concerning Iraq, Thursday 17 December 1998 [www-document]

¹⁸⁰ Blair, T. [15.06.2006] Prime Minister's statement to Parliament concerning Iraq, Thursday 17 December 1998 [www-document]

seen that the danger Saddam Hussein posed to his neighbours, the Middle East and to the international community would be proportionate to the military operation that was launched. It was to be easy target bombing exercise with sea-launched missiles and precision bombing. This was, as Tony Blair promised, done to “help ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and more widely.”¹⁸¹

Five years later, Blair called for a different kind of approach. Early statements suggested that they had entered to the final phase of the Iraqi disarmament, which had, as Blair reminded, already taken twelve years. Echoing Kosovo:

One of the reasons why it is now so important to win the conflict is to ensure that others do not make the same mistake in the future. That in itself will be a major step to ensuring that the next decade and the next century will not be as difficult as the past. If NATO fails in Kosovo, the next dictator to be threatened with military force may well not believe our resolve to carry the threat through.¹⁸²

Blair reminded that action against Saddam must be taken now and without hesitation;

I repeat my warning: unless we take a decisive stand now, as an international community, it is only a matter of time before these threats come together. That means pursuing international terrorism across the world in all its forms. It means confronting nations defying the world over WMD. That is why a signal of weakness over Iraq is not only wrong in its own terms. Show weakness now and no-one will ever believe us when we try to show strength in the future.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Blair, T. [15.06.2006] Prime Minister's statement to Parliament concerning Iraq, Thursday 17 December 1998 [www-document]

¹⁸² Blair, T. [14.04.2005] Prime Minister's speech: Doctrine of the International community at the Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 1999 [www-document]

¹⁸³ Blair, T. [19.04.2006] Prime Minister's statement to Parliament following his meeting with President Bush, 3 February 2003 [www-document]

7.2. *War and terrorism or War on terrorism? Iraq from February to May with a little after thought in December.*

In February 2003, when Iraqi talks were heated and the Security Council resolutions needed to authorise the US-UK supported strike and possible war, Tony Blair toured and talked to different prime ministers and heads of state. In his statement to the Parliament after meeting President Bush in early February, Blair outlined the Iraqi disarmament history. In November 2002 the UN Security Council had concluded that Iraq was still within material breach of the resolutions. The 1441 Resolution stated clearly that Iraq should give accurate information about the weapons programme without delay and that Saddam Hussein should co-operate fully.

During that February speech, Blair's style was still a matter of fact – type and factual, according to Blair “[t]here is a duty on Saddam to co-operate fully”¹⁸⁴. The UN, according to Blair was still the right, legitimate authority and he felt that if the weapons inspector Dr Hans Blix would continue to report Iraq's non-cooperation, another Resolution should be passed to confirm Iraq's material breach. However, Blair was in a hurry. His view was that would there be a new Resolution, it should be a way of resolving the issue once and for all, and not a yet another delay tactic or worse yet, something that would avoid the implementation of the possible use of force if Iraq would not cooperate.

Saddam's cooperation or in this case, non-cooperation was not the only issue discussed with Bush as Blair came to the other important part of his statement talking about terrorism and the threat of the WMD, saying how Iraq was not the only country posing the risk. As Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organisation responsible of the 9/11 was also linked to multiple plots threatening Europe. The hurry Blair was in consisted mainly of the fact that he was aware that Iraq was not the only country developing WMD – “there are unstable, fiercely repressive states either proliferating or trying to

¹⁸⁴ Blair, T. [19.04.2006] Prime Minister's statement to Parliament following his meeting with President Bush, 3 February 2003 [www-document]

acquire WMD, like North Korea”¹⁸⁵. This statement came with a warning. Blair argued that there was a need for a decisive stand, and that the international community should act now, because soon it will not be just a threat but a reality.

That means pursuing international terrorism across the world in all its forms. It means confronting nations defying the world over WMD. That is why a signal of weakness over Iraq is not only wrong in its own terms. Show weakness now and no-one will ever believe us when we try to show strength in the future.¹⁸⁶

The possibility, and inevitability of war is only mentioned right at the end of his speech, when he said how he hoped that a conflict could be avoided, but if Saddam Hussein does not take the peaceful road, the road that the UN insists through resolutions and weapons inspections; Blair argues he must be disarmed by force, because “Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction and the threats they pose to the world must be confronted. In doing so, this country, and our armed forces, will be helping the long term peace and security of Britain and the world”¹⁸⁷.

The tone had somewhat changed by the end of the month when Blair briefed the MPs on the latest situation on Iraq. His opening suggested that war was inevitable, unless Saddam Hussein actively cooperates. “I do not want war. I do not believe anyone in this House wants war.”¹⁸⁸ He continued by recapitulating the history of the Iraqi crisis ending it with the Resolution 1441, and the so called ‘final opportunity’. Blair stressed how “[i]n all, 17 UN Resolutions were passed. None was obeyed. At no stage did he co-operate. At no stage did he tell the full truth.”¹⁸⁹ Blair argued that there were two paths before the UN of how to proceed from now on. the US, UK and Spain had introduced a new

¹⁸⁵ Blair, T. [19.04.2006] Prime Minister's statement to Parliament following his meeting with President Bush, 3 February 2003 [www-document]

¹⁸⁶ Blair, T. [19.04.2006] Prime Minister's statement to Parliament following his meeting with President Bush, 3 February 2003 [www-document]

¹⁸⁷ Blair, T. [19.04.2006] Prime Minister's statement to Parliament following his meeting with President Bush, 3 February 2003 [www-document]

¹⁸⁸ Blair, T. [06.03.2006] Prime Minister Statement on Iraq 25 February 2003 [www-document]

¹⁸⁹ Blair, T. [06.03.2006] Prime Minister Statement on Iraq 25 February 2003 [www-document]

Resolution, which would not, according to Blair to be put it to a vote just yet because Saddam Hussein would be given a yet another ‘last chance’. Blair also addressed the issue of ‘rushing into war’ and said that the UN had waited for twelve years already for Saddam Hussein to comply, and that it was still willing to wait. However, Blair stressed that it is not about time, but will – “[i]f Saddam is willing genuinely to cooperate, then the inspectors should have up to July, and beyond July; as much time as they want. If he is not willing to cooperate the equally time will not help. We will be just right back where we were in the 1990s.”¹⁹⁰ To Blair, everything was black and white in this address, as the path to peace was easy: “Today the path to peace is clear. Saddam can co-operate fully with the inspectors. He can voluntarily disarm. He can even leave the country peacefully. But he cannot avoid disarmament.”¹⁹¹ It was clear at this point that Blair had prepared for war. However, he introduced a far greater ‘threat’ as well: the authority of the UN.

If the UN cannot be the way of resolving this issue, that is a dangerous moment for our world. That is why over the coming weeks we will work every last minute we can to reunite the international community and disarm Iraq through the UN. It is our desire and it is still our hope that this can be done.¹⁹²

By March the UK, the US and Spain had held a summit in the Azores¹⁹³ and the UK government had published an outline of its vision for Iraq¹⁹⁴, should the military strike occur. On the following day, Blair was trying to convince the House to back him. The stress had changed from the history of the Iraqi disarmament to the fate and future of the Iraqi people; the fate of the UN, the European relationship towards the US and the security threat management in the 21st Century. However, the somewhat compulsory bit of recapping the history of Iraqi conflict could not be avoided. This time it was broader with more dates than in the previous statements. The speech was also paused, and as Blair had noted earlier, it was ‘thought in headlines’. There was also more of detailed information about the amounts of WMD and what they consisted of and of the negotiation procedures, both in the Security

¹⁹⁰ Blair, T. [06.03.2006] Prime Minister Statement on Iraq 25 February 2003 [www-document]

¹⁹¹ Blair, T. [06.03.2006] Prime Minister Statement on Iraq 25 February 2003 [www-document]

¹⁹² Blair, T. [06.03.2006] Prime Minister Statement on Iraq 25 February 2003 [www-document]

¹⁹³ 16 March 2003

¹⁹⁴ 17 March 2003

Council and with Iraq. Blair addressed the issue of France saying it could not accept any ultimatum and would veto a possible second Resolution in all cases. However, Blair was determined to get his motion seconded.

The only persuasive power to which he responds is 250,000 allied troops on his doorstep...Because the only route to peace with someone like Saddam Hussein is diplomacy backed by force. Yet the moment we proposed the benchmarks, canvassed support for an ultimatum, there was an immediate recourse to the language of the veto. And now the world has to learn the lesson all over again that weakness in the face of a threat from a tyrant, is the surest way not to peace but to war.¹⁹⁵

Blair outlines how patiently the UN has waited for Saddam Hussein to start cooperating, but argues that they have done so in vain because the hope is dim “that there was some genuine intent to do good in a regime whose mind is in fact evil.”¹⁹⁶ Therefore, it is dangerous, Blair argued to let Saddam Hussein out of the hook as it were, yet again.

That is why this indulgence has to stop. Because it is dangerous. It is dangerous if such regimes disbelieve us. Dangerous if they think they can use our weakness, our hesitation, even the natural urges of our democracy towards peace, against us. Dangerous because one day they will mistake our innate revulsion against war for permanent incapacity; when in fact, pushed to the limit, we will act. But then when we act, after years of pretence, the action will have to be harder, bigger, more total in its impact. Iraq is not the only regime with WMD. But back away now from this confrontation and future conflicts will be infinitely worse and more devastating.¹⁹⁷

This was an argumentative point as well as persuasive, but nevertheless, within the range of only three statements, the shift of the reasons to wage war were changing every time. Yes, the argument of Iraqi disarmament was still there “because they had waited for twelve years already” but all the time it seemed that there was a new reason, a more important reason than before. In this speech Blair also resorted to his old acquaintances, which normally gave him the absolution, namely the Nazis.

¹⁹⁵ Blair, T. [07.05.2006] Prime Minister's statement opening Iraq debate 18 March 2003 [www-document]

¹⁹⁶ Blair, T. [07.05.2006] Prime Minister's statement opening Iraq debate 18 March 2003 [www-document]

¹⁹⁷ Blair, T. [07.05.2006] Prime Minister's statement opening Iraq debate 18 March 2003 [www-document]

Naturally should Hitler appear again in the same form, we would know what to do. But the point is that history doesn't declare the future to us so plainly. Each time is different and the present must be judged without the benefit of hindsight.¹⁹⁸

According to Blair, the threat today is not the same, however, as the threat was in the 1930s. He is right in the matter that “big powers are not going to war with each other”¹⁹⁹, but rather, big powers are going to war together and disarming countries that do not play with same rules as the international system, namely, the big powers. He argues that the world is more and more interdependent because stock markets rise and fall together and insecurity spreads like contagion. This leads people to crave stability and order, which is one good reason why Britain should back the US in the military operation, because terrorists detest “the freedom, democracy and tolerance that are the hallmarks of our way of life.”²⁰⁰ Blair outlined how terrorists are planning their attacks in peaceful countries and spreading terror.

We all know that there are terrorist cells now operating in most major countries. Just as in the last two years, around 20 different nations have suffered serious terrorist outrages. Thousands have died in them. The purpose of terrorism lies not just in the violent act itself. It is in producing terror. It sets out to inflame, to divide, and to produce consequences which they then use to justify further terror.²⁰¹

Blair argued how the 9/11 changed the psychology of America, and what it really should have done was to change the psychology of the whole world. This speech was in a way a turning point for Blair and Britain. He needed the House of Common's support in the matter, almost pleading, putting them in the position of choice. Even if the choice was forward looking and concerned of authority over matters.

If this House now demands that at this moment, faced with this threat from this regime, that British troops are pulled back, that we turn away at the point of reckoning, and that is what it means - what then? What will Saddam feel? Strengthened

¹⁹⁸ Blair, T. [07.05.2006] Prime Minister's statement opening Iraq debate 18 March 2003 [www-document]

¹⁹⁹ Blair, T. [07.05.2006] Prime Minister's statement opening Iraq debate 18 March 2003 [www-document]

²⁰⁰ Blair, T. [07.05.2006] Prime Minister's statement opening Iraq debate 18 March 2003 [www-document]

²⁰¹ Blair, T. [07.05.2006] Prime Minister's statement opening Iraq debate 18 March 2003 [www-document]

beyond measure. What will the other states who tyrannise their people, the terrorists who threaten our existence, what will they take from that? That the will confronting them is decaying and feeble.²⁰²

That choice or a decision most probably sealed the House's vote for support. Bush and Blair's joint statement in April was filled with new plans for the bright future of the Iraqi people. Blair talked of Humanitarian aid flowing into Iraq under a new Security Council resolution (1472) and 'Oil for Food programme. the US and the UK talking about Iraq's reconstruction and self-government, not forgetting the reaffirmed promise to protect Iraq's natural resources.²⁰³ On the same day Blair sent a message to Iraqi people, printed in Arabic and delivered by the British soldiers in Iraq. It was an outline of a brighter future.

As soon as Saddam Hussein's regime falls the work to build a new free and united Iraq will begin. A peaceful, prosperous Iraq which will be run by and for the Iraqi people. Not by America, not by Britain, not by the UN - though all of us will help - but by you the people of Iraq.²⁰⁴

May was a time to celebrate as Blair thanked the Iraqi troops Iraq for 'a job well done'. It was evident that 'Rule Britannia' or 'Great Britain'²⁰⁵ was back: "You have made this whole country, our country, hold its head up high, and I think that is a wonderful, wonderful achievement. It is your achievement and thank you."²⁰⁶

Almost a year later, as almost as an afterthought, Blair spoke just before Christmas of the shadow that was lifted of Iraq with the liberation and victory: "The shadow of Saddam is finally lifted from the Iraqi people. We give thanks for that, but let this be more than a cause simply for rejoicing. Let it be a moment to reach out and to reconcile."²⁰⁷

²⁰² Blair, T. [07.05.2006] Prime Minister's statement opening Iraq debate 18 March 2003 [www-document]

²⁰³ Blair, T. [19.09.2006] Prime Minister and President Bush on future of Iraq 8 April 2003 [www-document]

²⁰⁴ Blair, T. [05.08.2006] Prime Minister's message to Iraqi people 8 April 2003 [www-document]

²⁰⁵ Please refer to the introduction.

²⁰⁶ Blair, T. [05.08.2006] Prime Minister thanks troops in Iraq 29 May 2003 [www-document]

²⁰⁷ Blair, T. [29.05.2006] Prime Minister: Shadow of Saddam lifted of Iraq 14.12.2003 [www-document]

8 Conclusion

Good and evil seem to dominate the argumentative style of Tony Blair. Good and evil is also a way to simplify and categorise certain complex issues in the international politics and in the thought of Tony Blair.

According to Jonathan Charteris-Black, political action for politicians, his example relying heavily on Tony Blair rhetoric, has its base in the values of good and evil. The West seems to be good, everything else, bad. Provocative argument, yes, but nevertheless, at least eighty percent true, arguably. Adolf Hitler was one of the 'evil' men Tony Blair uses in his 'darkness and light' comparisons. It is difficult to find rationally thinking person who would not see Hitler as the embodiment of, if not evil, then at least as a ruthless dictator, damnable and nefarious. In other words: Evil. However, whether political leaders, ordinary people and such like it or not, we all have a little Hitler in us. No one can be, what Blair has tried advocating for himself, a pure and innocent visionary, if one happens to be a leader of one of the most influential countries (at least when supporting the most influential Western country.

Hitler used what Kenneth Burke referred to as a unification device. Hitler's model, though perversely interpreted at times featured elements that are not too far apart from the Blair rhetoric. Man's inborn dignity, 'greatness' is part of the Blair rhetoric as well as projection device, where ills and foes are directed to one (or a collection if and when they represent the same thing) scapegoat. Blair is quick to argue how "many of our problems have been caused by ruthless men".

Blair rarely explained or explains what evil deeds Saddam Hussein has done, apart from recapitulating over and over again how he is and was hiding the WMD. Much is therefore relied upon what people will remember and how they remember it.

One man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist. Clichéd? Yes. With a hint of truth in it? Yes as well. Humanitarian intervention is a vague and highly controversial theory or a doctrine. Noam Chomsky questions the whole procedure. "The first question that comes to mind about "humanitarian intervention" is whether the category exists. Are states moral agents?"²⁰⁸ Ken Roth argues that 'humanitarian intervention' went out of fashion in the 1990s. It was a luxury of an era,²⁰⁹ seen as something to ease the tension of the Cold War and the genuine threat of terrorism. 9/11 was a turning point in that, he argues. However, if the 1990s operations were just to ease off the tension as he argued, then their motives might not have been as pure as one would have hoped even then and especially then. Up-dated to the 21st Century, "with the campaign against terrorism in full swing, the past year [2003] or so has seen four military interventions that are described by their instigators, in whole or in part, as humanitarian."²¹⁰ Michael Humphrey observes that "the moral outrage in the West against 'ethnic cleansing' and 'genocide' during the 1990s put the question of 'humanitarian intervention' in the foreground of international affairs"²¹¹. Tony Blair commented in 1999 that their "armed forces have been busier than ever – delivering humanitarian aid"²¹².

Janet Stromseth argued that "NATO's military intervention in Kosovo will shape international attitudes towards the use of force in response to human rights atrocities."²¹³ Her main argument however, was that it is a good thing that "the legal status of humanitarian intervention without Security Council

²⁰⁸ Chomsky, Noam. [05.09.2005] *Boston Review*, December, 1993 - January, 1994 [WWW document]

²⁰⁹ Roth, Ken. [02.10.2006] 'War in Iraq – Not a Humanitarian Intervention' January 2004 [WWW document]

²¹⁰ Roth, Ken. [02.10.2006] 'War in Iraq – Not a Humanitarian Intervention' January 2004 [WWW document]

²¹¹ Humphrey, Michael. *The Politics of Atrocity and Reconciliation – From terror to trauma*. (London: Routledge, 2002) p. 86

²¹² Blair, Tony. [14.04.2005] Prime Minister's speech: Doctrine of the International community at the Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 1999 [WWW document]

²¹³ Stromseth, Janet. 'Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: the case for incremental change' in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (ed.) *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 232

authorization remains uncertain [after Kosovo].”²¹⁴ This leaves a lot of room for different interpretations.

What was the point of the Rambouillet Accords? It clearly had a point as it was blatantly not a peace agreement to begin with, more like a document of surrender or an ultimatum. There were no generous peace offers, it was a good old fashioned ‘sign or get bombed’ deal. But did NATO want it to fail? The Appendix B, which constituted a negation on Yugoslavian sovereignty, was as it were the last resort for NATO (in case it wanted the Accords to fail) because no country could have signed that, unless sovereignty was not high on their list. The Appendix B made it clear that it was a document of surrender to be followed by a full-scale military occupation. Interestingly enough, the colonial powers in the 19th Century had a habit of instigating similar rights. The point 6a stated that “NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, or criminal.”²¹⁵

Iraq changed much of that; it changed Kosovo as well as the whole notion of terrorism, humanitarian intervention and so forth, at least in the media and in the thoughts of the ordinary citizens around the world. Ken Roth argues that “the Iraq war highlights the need for a better understanding of when military intervention can be justified in humanitarian terms.”²¹⁶ I agree with his argument that “‘Better late than never’ is not a justification for humanitarian intervention, which should be countenanced only to stop mass murder, not to punish its perpetrators, desirable as punishment is in such circumstances.”²¹⁷

I have done experiments with this thesis. I have questioned the Humanitarian Intervention as well as agreed with people staunchly supporting it. I have also tried to draw comparisons between Blair and

²¹⁴ Stromseth, Janet. ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: the case for incremental change’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 233

²¹⁵ Rambouillet Agreement, full text [16.04.2006] [WWW document]

²¹⁶ Roth, Ken. [02.10.2006] ‘War in Iraq – Not a Humanitarian Intervention’ January 2004 [WWW document]

²¹⁷ Roth, Ken. [02.10.2006] ‘War in Iraq – Not a Humanitarian Intervention’ January 2004 [WWW document]

Hitler. However, the point of the exercise there was not to humanise Hitler or to de-humanise Blair, but to see whether argumentative style changes much from one politician to another, through a mediator, Kenneth Burke. I have also agreed with Blair.

As I said in the beginning, Blair is a man of many contradictions. The values he stands for are contradictory as well. Humanitarian intervention and Tony Blair therefore fit each other perfectly. I have no definitive answers, but that was never the point of my study either. What I hope to have show is patterns. Patterns of interesting but yet controversial subjects in the field of international relations.

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