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UNITED WE STAND – DIVIDED WE ARE? DIVERGING

EUROPEAN VIEWS ON THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

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This thesis is about the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union toward the United States. In 2002 and 2003 EU member states were divided over what to do with Iraq: some aligned themselves with the US position, others were against the use of force. I assume that European governments did not consider Iraq and its alleged weapons programmes a direct threat, and their positions had more to do with their views on the transatlantic partnership than Iraq. My approach is based on social constructivism, therefore I consider identity-related issues as more important than for example economic interests.

I analyse European responses to the Iraq crisis from January 2003 until the outbreak of the war in March 2003. The primary sources are statements made by the leaders of the largest EU member states: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Poland, as well as joint declarations by two or more of these countries. Poland was not a full member of the EU in 2003, but I included it in the case study in order to assess the impact that the EU's 2004 enlargement might have on the transatlantic partnership. The method used is discourse analysis with special attention to fact construction and persuasion strategies. The EU is a unitary actor in trade issues, and therefore an important one. To compare CFSP with the Union's trade policy, I shortly discuss the EU-US banana dispute.

Despite its member states' differences, the EU was not wholly paralysed with respect to Iraq. However, its own member states as well as the US mostly circumvented the CFSP apparatus. There was wide agreement among the European leaders that the EU should act as one, but nobody seemed willing to change the already chosen position in order to achieve unity. A central problem was who is allowed to speak for Europe. The traditional Franco-German axis was perceived as arrogant, speaking for the whole EU without consulting others. This was challenged by the UK, Spain, Italy, Poland and others who aligned themselves with the US view. However, individual EU member states cannot influence the major issues of the world. With respect to the Iraq crisis, neither the anti-war nor the pro-war fraction had much influence on the US. Had the EU acted as one, its views would have been far more difficult for the US to ignore. All of the six major EU member states have some kind of a “special relationship” with the US; I suggest delegating all of these to the EU, turning them into one special and equal transatlantic partnership.

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1.INTRODUCTION

1.1. Starting Point: More than Iraq

Immediately after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, European leaders pledged unlimited solidarity with the United States. Hardly more than a year later, the dispute over Iraq led to “the most serious deterioration of transatlantic relations in recent memory”. Of course, there have been plenty of transatlantic disputes earlier, but with the Iraq crisis (and even before it) there started to be growing sense that the basis of the whole alliance is eroding.¹ The vast majority of European public opinion, as well as most European politicians, preferred containment to regime change by force in Iraq. Gordon and Shapiro argue that many European leaders supported the war because they accepted the reality, the necessity, and even the advantages of US leadership: “Europe's internal divisions over Iraq, in this sense, had much more to do with different countries' attitudes toward the United States than with different views of what to do about Iraq.”² I accept this assumption. The Iraq crisis exposed serious internal rifts among European governments over the future of European integration and relations with the United States³. In general, the European Union's common foreign and security policy (CFSP) appears to have been a casualty of the events following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The US has exploited the opportunity and pursued a strategy of divide and neutralize, therefore confirming its declared aim to prevent the emergence of any bloc that could countervail the US.⁴

The EU is the world's biggest market, trade unit, and provider of financial and technical assistance. Theoretically, this economic influence of the EU could be used as an instrument of CFSP, to induce and coerce others. The perspective of membership or associate status, prospective or actual preferential trade agreements, and various aid packages are used to solidify ties and encourage peaceful settlement of disputes. The EU's economic tools are transferred to the Commission and beyond the capability of any one member state to offer. Still, in practice EU economic assets can

1 Gordon& Shapiro 2004, 1-4.

2 Gordon& Shapiro 2004, 80.

3 Gordon& Shapiro 2004, 2.

4 Brenner 2003, 187-188.

only be used if there is at least a tacit understanding among member governments on the objectives and means to reach them. When the EU is divided, as during the Iraq crisis, agreeing on the use of economic assets becomes difficult.⁵

1.2. The Research Task

My case study consists of analysing statements made by the leaders of six major European countries on the looming war in Iraq from January 2003 until the outbreak of the war in March 2003. The primary sources are mostly interviews and speeches of prime and foreign ministers or other high-level officials, as well as joint statements by two or more countries. The countries included in my case study are France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Poland. The first five are the old major EU countries; Poland is the biggest of the new members who joined the EU in 2004. France and Germany opposed military action against Iraq, the other four aligned themselves with the US. To compare the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy with its common trade policy, I will also shortly discuss the banana dispute between the EU and the US, also known as the “Banana war” (chapter 5). Both the Iraq war and the Banana war involve the relations of the European Union with the United States, plus a number of other players and multilateral institutions, as well as the difficulty of forming a single European policy. My ultimate aim is to consider the possibility of a common EU foreign policy toward the US. The research question for the case study is how the leaders see the EU and how it should relate to the US. Further, their arguments about what to do with Iraq are accompanied by statements concerning their countries' foreign policy preferences and whole world order, and are thus linked to the roles of the EU and the US.

In my view, acting as one would be most beneficial in relations with the US and other great powers. I agree with Ekholm, who thinks Europe should work closer together also in politics - being an economic giant is not enough. He continues that a “setting in which a weak EU complains about the dominance of the United States without being able to create a closer union itself is a bad starting point.”⁶

⁵ Brenner 2003, 194-195.

⁶ Ekholm 2003, 103.

1.3. Background: CFSP

The roots of Common Foreign and Security Policy date back to the 1960s. Initially it was loose intergovernmental cooperation within the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC). Foreign policy cooperation was seen to strengthen commitment to European integration and advance peaceful development in the world. Various challenges during the 1970s and 1980s helped strengthen foreign policy cooperation, and the 1987 Single European Act aimed at strengthening the European Community's foreign policy actorness. The concept CFSP came around with the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, which also gave the European Commission more rights to take foreign policy initiatives. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 aimed at making CFSP preparation, decision-making and implementation more efficient, for example by allowing majority voting instead of unanimity in more cases, and gave the CFSP financing from the Community budget.⁷

The Treaty of Nice (2001) was designed to facilitate EU enlargement, and allowed more decision-making by majority voting⁸. It did not provide any specific provisions on CFSP compliance: it slightly modified one Article, which now allows a four-fifths majority of EU states to suspend certain rights of a member state for violating fundamental principles of the EU. Still, Smith considers it highly unlikely that EU states would invoke that provision for a failure to comply with a CFSP action or position, particularly because most CFSP decisions have inherent loopholes.⁹

Traditional instruments of CFSP include joint declarations and demarches, coordinated voting in international organizations and conferences, cooperation of EU member states' and Commission delegations with one another in third countries, and political dialogue. The Maastricht Treaty introduced the new instruments of common action and common position. Common strategies and the possibility to empower the Presidency to negotiate an international agreement in certain issues were added by the Amsterdam Treaty. The Nice Treaty gave a possibility for “enhanced cooperation” that could be used to enable decisions in certain implementation issues to overcome unsolvable differences of opinion; it has not been used so far. Regelsberger has compiled a table of

⁷ Koskela 1999, 14-15.

⁸ Kauppi 2003, 31.

⁹ Smith 2004, 234-235.

all use of EPC/CFSP instruments starting from their introduction. Mostly their numbers have risen quite consistently. For example, there were two joint declarations in 1972, 19 in 1982, 122 in 1992, and 197 in 2002.¹⁰

Smith argues that in the European Political Cooperation (later CFSP), procedures were at first the substance: they were important in themselves, primarily for internal confidence-building, not so much for achieving any desired policy goals. Smith calls this activity of eliminating mistrust and barriers negative integration; positive integration, ranging from common positions to joint actions, started around the early 1980s.¹¹ He further notes that “we must always keep in mind that EPC was originally intended to help reinforce European economic integration, not to solve complex international political problems. Widespread acceptance of the idea that Europe should play an international political role equal to that of its economic role came later.”¹²

Because the CFSP concerns matters of traditional “high policy”, it is important for the EU's credibility as an actor¹³. It has been considered reactive and declamatory. Some claim this is because of the lack of military capability, others blame the processes of interest formation and decision-making in the EU, and many believe the problem lies in the low level of coherence.¹⁴

In the EU, there currently exist two contradictory tendencies: acquiring military power and cherishing the EU's image as a civilian power¹⁵. Keisala notes that foreign policy does not have to entail military force; indeed the resort to military instruments may indicate the failure of foreign policy¹⁶. Marsh and Mackenstein argue that the caricature of EU as “an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm” is not all true. The defence spending of EU is surely far smaller than that of the US, but clearly larger than that of Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania. Two EU members, France and Britain, have nuclear weapons. The EU also has a global network of diplomatic representation, plus the national embassies of the member states. In addition, the EU benefits from special relationships of its member countries with third countries, often as a legacy of

¹⁰ Regelsberger 2004, 90-112.

¹¹ Smith 2004, 120-121, 135.

¹² Smith 2004, 247.

¹³ Keisala 2004, 105.

¹⁴ Keisala 2004, 13-14.

¹⁵ Keisala 2004, 20.

¹⁶ Keisala 2004, 14.

the imperial age.¹⁷

The Iraq conflict highlighted the long-standing drive for more European autonomy on security issues, but also exposed the equally long-standing divisions within Europe¹⁸. With the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy), the easy part has been achieved. There are the headline goal, requirements for meeting it, the resources already available and the consequent gaps to be filled, and the political and military structures to manage all this. The big issue remains member states meeting the challenge of capabilities, providing mobile and effective intervention forces with adequate naval and air support in the foreseeable future. ESDP could be used instead of NATO whenever the US does not want to get involved, and would make the EU visible and give it the credit.¹⁹

The most important actors of CFSP are the European Council and its President and the High Representative. Officially, the Council of Europe decides over the more general direction of CFSP. The member states are also active players, and they remain the most influential actors: both the Council of Europe and the European Council are intergovernmental bodies. The Commission is represented at European Council meetings, and it has some powers of initiative and implementation. The European Parliament has a say about the CFSP budget.²⁰ CFSP lacks leadership because of the many actors involved – even the High Representative of CFSP, or “Monsieur PESC”, is rather an assistant than a leader. However, as Keisala notes, it is not necessarily always bad that many actors can participate in the decision-making process.²¹ The EU does not and cannot have a single head of government like most states, or a predominant power that is the natural leader, like the US in NATO²². Crowe claims that there is wide recognition that neither the Council nor the rotating presidency is working properly in the field of external relations. The competitiveness and shortness of six-month presidencies lead to constantly shifting priorities and harmful solos to impress domestic audiences, for instance intruding in matters best left to the High Representative.²³ To

¹⁷ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 249.

¹⁸ Lansford 2005, xxii.

¹⁹ Crowe 2003, 539-540.

²⁰ Kauppi 2003, 37-38.

²¹ Keisala 2004, 132.

²² Crowe 2003, 541.

²³ Crowe 2003, 543.

quote Marsh and Mackenstein, the EU “enjoys a surfeit of leaders and a deficit of leadership.” This allows third party attempts to “divide and rule” by circumventing the EU and dealing directly with national capitals. As an example of this strategy, Marsh and Mackenstein mention the Bush administration's activities in the lead-up to the military intervention in Iraq 2003.²⁴ The planned constitutional treaty would give the EU a president and a foreign minister, a “Mr/Ms EU” whose task would be to represent the Union outwards. This would increase clarity. The EU would gain competence in all foreign and security policy matters, but using common policy would still be agreed by national foreign ministers.²⁵ However, the future of the treaty is uncertain.

Crowe states that the principle that all EU member states are equal risks being pushed to the extreme in foreign policy. It should be recognized that all member states are equal, but some contribute more than others and take more of the burden and risks. This is a highly sensitive area and maybe too difficult to formalize. The larger powers need to do much better, both over bigger and lesser issues, at taking a common line.²⁶ In the post-Cold War era, crisis situations have tended to cause a re-nationalization of foreign policy and even re-emergence of great power politics. During the Iraq crisis of 2002-2003, the EU was largely circumvented by the US but also by its own member states.²⁷

Nevertheless, Smith claims that EU foreign policy cooperation is well and alive. Especially since the inauguration of the Bush administration in 2001, the EU has showed more coherence in challenging US positions on several issues: national missile defence, banning land mines, the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, controlling small arms, the International Criminal Court, the death penalty, and numerous trade disputes.²⁸ In 2003, the EU gave out 150 joint declarations, 502 demarches, 32 common actions, 24 common positions, became party of 16 international treaties, did changes to two of its common strategies and was committed to political dialogue with 123 parties.²⁹ In the two-way process, in which the EU takes a growing number of principled CFSP and other actions in world politics, and other actors respond to them, the CFSP helps provide the valuable

²⁴ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 254.

²⁵ Tiilikainen 2004.

²⁶ Crowe 2003, 545-546.

²⁷ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 257.

²⁸ Smith 2004, 236.

²⁹ Regelsberger 2004, 92-93.

commodity of internal unity for the EU³⁰.

National foreign policies are often seen as the “primary inputs” into the process of EU foreign policy. However, since EU foreign policy has become increasingly rule-governed, Smith suggests that policy outcomes could be the result of a unique combination of EU and domestic influence, with varying combinations.³¹ The member states wish EU to protect, promote and project values like democracy, respect for human rights, solidarity, sustainable development, multilateralism, free trade, and the rule of law. They also want the EU to directly safeguard and pursue their national interests, such as regional and international security and maximum benefits from the global international economy, and they want to draw on the EU as a power-multiplier within their national foreign policies.³² EU member governments share similar views on many issues that set them apart of the US, and have not been shy to defend those. With the encouragement of their EU partners, Britain and France cooperated closely at the Security Council in 2002 to resist the attempt to exempt US citizens from the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction. The reality that there are specific European views does not prevent differences (like that over Iraq) from emerging, but it can mitigate the resulting frictions and damage to EU institutions.³³

There are two often mentioned orientations in European foreign policy: Atlanticism refers to an orientation over the Atlantic toward the US in European foreign policy, as typified by Great Britain; the opposite is the French way of emphasizing European values and developing a CFSP independent of American resources³⁴. Brenner claims that the question of what to do about overwhelming American power is unavoidable in the long term, and as it remains unsolved it paralyses any efforts to develop a strategic vision or a course of action for the EU³⁵. Crowe argues that a CFSP that only works with US lead is not enough, but this does not mean that the EU should set out to be in opposition of the US – they share long-standing common values and objectives. This common stance should be strong enough to ensure that the US cannot simply dismiss it. US leadership is inescapable and necessary, but the EU must carry enough weight to convince the US

³⁰ Smith 2004, 257.

³¹ Smith 2004, 8.

³² Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 257.

³³ Brenner 2003, 197.

³⁴ Raik & Palosaari 2004, 18.

³⁵ Brenner 2003, 205.

that its interest is sharing, not imposing its leadership. It is clear that a Europe able to act as one would carry more weight with the US and others than its individual member states. Shifting coalitions of European states cannot substitute the EU, only the Union can provide the glue to keep them together and combine their resources into strength to pursue common efforts.³⁶

Crowe suggests that the Iraq crisis seems to display everything that is wrong with the CFSP. There were superficial discussions and occasional minimalist declarations. The two permanent member states of the UNSC, France and the UK, made sure that the Iraq issue was reserved to be handled only at the UN, and the

“[...] other member states connived at their own irrelevance (and impotence) partly out of respect for the primacy of UN over EU obligations for Britain and France, but more particularly because they knew that any attempt to forge a common EU position on Iraq would be more damaging than helpful to a still fragile CFSP which was making real progress in other areas, notably the Balkans and even the Middle East.”³⁷

Crowe thinks it would have been remarkable if the EU had been able to formulate and actively pursue a common policy. The Iraq issue involved taking positions on such matters as the choice between war and peace, the legitimacy of military action, democratic control, the nature of the transatlantic relationship, the viability and future of the UN, stability in the whole Middle East, and effects on the world economy, as well as the war against terrorism and stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Above all, it brought up and failed to answer one of the questions most difficult for EU foreign policy: should it accept the prevailing US leadership and work together with it, or rather develop an independent line. It would be wrong to despair of the CFSP only because of Iraq, which proved to be too tough a test at this point of CFSP development.³⁸ However, Clark makes an interesting point to this:

“What mattered most in March 2003 was not the relative disunity of the EU on the positive steps to be taken against global terrorism, but its relative unity in agreeing that the United States' pre-emptive military action was both inappropriate and morally unjustified.”³⁹

³⁶ Crowe 2003, 536-537.

³⁷ Crowe 2003, 534-535.

³⁸ Crowe 2003, 535.

³⁹ Clark 2004, 585.

1.4. Transatlantic Relations

The transatlantic alliance has never meant all members sharing a precise world view and pursuing foreign policy together. However, there exist structures, expectations, habits and commitment to cooperation. Gordon and Shapiro argue that the end of alliance would not be beneficial to neither side of the ocean, even if it would not have to mean hostility. The world's two biggest repositories of democracy and economic strength should cooperate to spread their values (free markets and democracy), as well as to deal with the various other issues of the day.⁴⁰

The outpouring of support for the US in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks proved to be temporary as policies on both sides of the Atlantic continued to reflect individual preferences and interests. The Bush administration sought wide diplomatic support for its campaign in Afghanistan, but sought substantial troop contributions only after the main combat phase was over. This model is based on US forces and assets for direct combat and multilateral troops for nation-building and humanitarian tasks.⁴¹ Marsh and Mackenstein suggest that in the post-Cold war era, a de facto division of labour has developed: the US provides an overwhelming contribution to military engagements, while the EU is “left to sweep up the mess.” They argue this is hardly a sustainable state of affairs: the EU is unlikely to follow US lead blindly. In addition, because of the divergence of strategic interests, the US may not always want to get involved in European crises.⁴²

Even if US rhetoric has encouraged Europeans to more burden-sharing, US policies have not always been consistent with this. Some US initiatives within NATO have more to do with controlling ESDP than facilitating it. The US seems to want burden-sharing without surrendering any of its leadership. Further, even if the US has often criticized the growing transatlantic technology gap, its efforts to mitigate this have been inconsistent.⁴³ The US does not necessarily see a direct relationship between greater EU commitments and reduced US leadership, which is not an acceptable scenario for the EU⁴⁴.

⁴⁰ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 6-7.

⁴¹ Lansford 2005, xix.

⁴² Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 88.

⁴³ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 92-93.

⁴⁴ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 261.

The EU decision-making process is slow; this is why Marsh and Mackenstein note that the EU often performs better if its objectives can be pursued slowly and incrementally rather than in crisis situations demanding quick responses. This explains some of its failures and successes, as well as EU preferences for engagement and containment strategies and its increasing focus on conflict prevention. In those areas, the variety of EU's "soft" instruments gives it an advantage over organizations like NATO.⁴⁵ Smith thinks it is possible that only a major external crisis and/or a major shift in the US policy, such as withdrawing from NATO, would lead the EU to transform its ESDP plans into an effective independent military force. The division of labour, in which NATO threatens short-term punishment and the EU simultaneously offers long-term rewards, could be the future model, when both institutions agree on the political priorities in the case concerned.⁴⁶

According to Brenner, the US can play and has played three different roles in the evolution of the CFSP: a facilitator, a pole of definition or an obstructor⁴⁷. American apprehensions about a concerted global diplomacy of the EU have deepened. The emerging view is that, ideally, the EU's activities should be limited to Europe and peace-keeping missions, also financial contributions to American-led projects are welcome. Washington will actively defend policy areas which involve vital American interests from EU intrusion, except whenever the EU has value as an auxiliary. The US will also cultivate its bilateral relations with EU members to make sure its interests are respected. This emerging policy may weaken community bonds and hamper the development of CFSP. A less unified and competent EU is acceptable to the US as long as it remains viable enough to integrate new members.⁴⁸

The US has supported the deepening and widening of the EU, but has mixed feelings about its security dimension and CFSP. The US has an interest in burden-sharing, and developing European security and defence policy (ESDP) to enhance the EU's ability to assume responsibility of peace-keeping missions conforms with the US vision of their division of labour.⁴⁹ Brenner's view is that the US will continue to pursue a strategy that aims at preventing the EU from emerging as a unitary

⁴⁵ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 255.

⁴⁶ Smith 2004, 258-259.

⁴⁷ Brenner 2003, 188.

⁴⁸ Brenner 2003, 191.

⁴⁹ Brenner 2003, 192.

actor on the international scene except in some selected roles. The ingredients of that strategy are establishing strong bilateral ties with governments willing to place their friendship with the US above their commitments to CFSP, ensuring the subordination of ESDP to NATO, and keeping the EU out of issue areas involving significant American interests by urging local parties to disqualify the EU as a major player. Washington invited Poland to take command of an international peace-keeping force in Iraq, which Poland did. Brenner sees this as a tactical ploy to damage the solidarity-building efforts in the EU: the invitation came on the eve of an EU ministerial meeting meant to reaffirm commitment to the CFSP and discuss the challenges of the transatlantic relationship.⁵⁰

After the end of the Cold War, the future role of the US was unclear. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some old American approaches to foreign policy have surfaced: exceptionalism, unilateralism and moralism. There are differences within the Bush administration, but the prevailing mindset involves a sense of mission that recognizes few bounds.⁵¹ This view on foreign policy can be called, in R. Kagan's terms, multilateralism preceded by unilateralism. The US should realize important foreign policy goals through decisive US leadership, and if necessary, unilateral action, no matter how much opposition that would face. The administration was convinced that partners and allies would eventually follow the American lead in the Iraq issue.⁵² The process of multilateral negotiations is seen as lengthy, inefficient and frustrating, and the old institutions and alliances unduly constrain the US. However, the Bush administration did not systematically avoid working with allies both bilaterally and on multilateral forums. In Europe, Bush sought to develop relations with countries like Britain, Italy and Poland, whose leaders seemed sympathetic to American policies.⁵³

In the issues of the Kyoto protocol and the International Criminal Court, the Bush administration did not face any sanctions, even if the Europeans had different views. In other issues, like the ABM Treaty and Afghanistan, originally doubtful European allies eventually followed US lead. This approach had its merits but it underestimated the accumulation of resent in Europe over time.⁵⁴ If

⁵⁰ Brenner 2003, 191, 198.

⁵¹ Brenner 2003, 188-189.

⁵² Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 50.

⁵³ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 50, 54.

⁵⁴ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 70.

the Bush administration's assertive unilateralism is to persist, the EU member states may be persuaded to enhance EU capabilities in order to contain the US and to protect multilateralism.⁵⁵

The US dealt with both Afghanistan and Iraq with unqualified confidence in its own judgement and prowess, and others who wished to align with the US were expected to accept this. The value of allies is that the mission makes the coalition (alliance); any organizational arrangement that obliges the US to collectively deliberate with others is an unacceptable constraint and to be avoided. This line of reasoning makes unilateralism imperative. The current structural conditions allow this kind of foreign policy, and many governments find it in their interest to accept or even contribute to sustaining the American leadership.⁵⁶ Bush's decision to define the Iraq conflict as a struggle between good and evil and as an example of the new doctrine of "pre-emption" turned the debate away from Iraq toward the management of the international order. The aftermath of the Iraq crisis should convince the Americans that even a superpower may need allies.⁵⁷ Van Oudenaren suggests that after a few difficult years the Bush administration seems to have noticed that arguing with Europe over a range of issues is not productive, since it attracts US attention from other important policies and damages the prospects of getting European help to face challenges for example in Afghanistan, Iraq and the wider Middle East.⁵⁸

Lang calls for the Americans to end their ambiguity toward the EU and clarify some inconsistent stances toward it. The US should decide whether it prefers an EU with as many members as possible, which would be fragile and vulnerable to American divide and rule policies, or a smaller and stronger Union that could act as a partner in creating international order. The US wants to stabilize the "backyard of Europe" and has called for a higher-profile EU neighbourhood policy. At the same time, it fears that the area will become a European sphere of interest, harming US interests there. A highly salient question is the US view on CFSP/ESDP: a more capable EU could act as an active partner, but this can be perceived as a threat to American predominance.⁵⁹ How the US relates to the enlarged EU will depend on many factors, such as US domestic politics, how Europe

⁵⁵ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 261.

⁵⁶ Brenner 2003, 190.

⁵⁷ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 9-12.

⁵⁸ van Oudenaren 2004, 20-21.

⁵⁹ Lang 2004, 18.

itself evolves, and events elsewhere in the world. Enlargement is unlikely to reverse the trend toward more critical thinking: while many of the new EU member governments seem to be more pro-American than the EU15, American observers are aware that public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe has become more sceptical of the US and the Iraq war.⁶⁰

2.THEORY

2.1. Social Constructivism in International Relations

The end of the Cold War resulted in the revival and eruption of several nationalist conflicts. There were some nationalist conflicts during the Cold War, but its end seemed to open up spaces for people to reassess their identities and for groups to claim the right for their identity. Ethnic and racial identity make headlines, but identity has many faces. Already since the 1980s, international relations observers have started to rethink their methodologies and theories to include identity. The questions who we are, what identity we have and who defines us have far-reaching consequences.⁶¹

Risse defines constructivism shortly as “a truism that social reality does not fall from heaven, but that human agents construct and reproduce it through their daily practices”⁶². Wendt defines it with two basic, generally accepted principles: the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature⁶³. Constructivism combines international relations (IR) and social theorizing. There are many constructivisms, but most within IR agree that structures of world politics are social rather than material. Rosamond cites Knutsen (1997):

⁶⁰ van Oudenaren 2004, 19.

⁶¹ Zalewski & Enloe 1995, 279-281.

⁶² Risse 2004, 160.

⁶³ Wendt 1999, 1.

*“[Constructivists] all agree that the structures of international politics are outcomes of social interactions, that states are not static subjects, but dynamic agents, and that state identities are not given but (re)constituted through complex, historical overlapping (often contradictory) practices - and therefore variable, unstable, constantly changing; that the distinction between domestic politics and international relations are tenuous.”*⁶⁴

This places constructivism in a particular position in the debates about agency and structure normally labelled structurationist. Agents are bound by structures, but also capable of altering their structural environment, though in structurally contained ways. Social interaction is the mechanism for the reproduction of structures.⁶⁵ Wendt aims to develop a systemic approach, explaining international politics by reference to structure of the international system, but he also argues that it is impossible for structures to have effects apart from the attributes and interactions of agents. Structure and agents are not separate.⁶⁶

A key premise of idealist social theory is that people act toward objects, including each other, on the basis of the meanings those objects have for them. In the broad category of ideas is also knowledge, in its sociological sense defined as any belief an actor takes to be true.⁶⁷ The idealism in social theory is not the same as Idealism in IR: it is not a normative view how the world ought to be, and it does not assume that human nature is inherently good. Social structures are no less real than material ones, because shared beliefs and the practices connected with them confront actors as external social facts. It does not assume that social change is easy - it can be even more difficult to change social than material structures. Power and interests are also important, but their meaning depends on the actor's ideas.⁶⁸

The structure of any social system will contain three elements: material conditions, interests, and ideas⁶⁹. Meaningful power is constituted in large part through the distribution of interests, and only a small part of what constitutes interests is material. However, constructivism should not proceed as if material conditions like nature did not matter: human actions can have unintended consequences

⁶⁴ Rosamond 2000, 171-172.

⁶⁵ Rosamond 2000, 172.

⁶⁶ Wendt 1999, 12.

⁶⁷ Wendt 1999, 140.

⁶⁸ Wendt 1999, 24-25.

⁶⁹ Wendt 1999, 139.

for the natural environment that then feed back on society.⁷⁰ The term anarchy means “without rule” so it only tells what there is not; what gives anarchy its meaning are the people living there and the structure of their relationships⁷¹. The deep structure of an international system is formed by the shared understandings governing organized violence, which are a key element of its political culture. Structural change is difficult, while the existing structure disposes states to reproduce it, but states have been capable of making new things out of anarchy, changing the deep structure of international politics.⁷² Social structures are always in process, but society is still not infinitely changeable or unstable⁷³.

Social constructivism as such does not say much about European integration. Constructivists can emphasize the neofunctionalist spill-over effects and supranational institutions, or the intergovernmentalist way of interstate negotiations to understand the EU.⁷⁴ Wendt intends his model to be trans-historical and trans-cultural⁷⁵, and does not say much about the EU specifically. European integration studies increasingly consider the EU as a two-way process: policy-making and institution-building at the European level feed back into the political processes and structures of the member states⁷⁶. Constructivism assumes that “we cannot even describe the properties of social agents without reference to the social structure in which they are embedded.” It follows that the EU is expected not only to constrain the range of choices available, but also to influence the way in which interests and identities are defined. EU membership matters, because it influences the way member states see themselves and are seen by others.⁷⁷

Social constructivism is not a substantive integration theory but an ontological perspective or meta-theory. It can complement and compete with other theories, and does not have to develop into a comprehensive account of European integration.⁷⁸ Rosamond cites Matlár(1997) who has argued that there are some issue areas that do not require constructivist methods for explanation⁷⁹. Risse

⁷⁰ Wendt 1999, 111, 114.

⁷¹ Wendt 1999, 309.

⁷² Wendt 1999, 313-315.

⁷³ Wendt 1999, 186.

⁷⁴ Risse 2004,160.

⁷⁵ Wendt 1999, 338.

⁷⁶ Risse 2004,161-162.

⁷⁷ Risse 2004, 163.

⁷⁸ Risse 2004, 174-175.

⁷⁹ Rosamond 2000, 173.

has similar views: he admits that identity issues may explain the decision for EU enlargement, but not the quarrels over its details at the accession negotiations. When it comes to paying a price for the collective identity (offering favourable conditions to new members), the EU seems more like an exclusive club dictating the terms for membership.⁸⁰ Constructivists would shift the research agenda of EU into the analysis of the role of ideas, impact of shared beliefs, effects of dominant discourses, and processes of communicative action⁸¹. It would be possible to analyse the Iraq war case only as a set of rational choices, for example by underlining economic interests, but I see identity-related issues as more important. Smith thinks it is possible to claim that EU member states have fundamentally changed because of their participation in foreign policy cooperation: if common action reflects common interests, and common interests reflect a common identity, increasing foreign policy cooperation can result in new loyalties or even a distinct European identity. For the most part, CFSP does not provide direct material benefits (security or wealth) to the member states, nevertheless they continue to pursue it.⁸²

2.2. Alexander Wendt's Version of Constructivism

Hopf classifies Wendt as a “conventional constructivist”, one of those who distance themselves from the origins of constructivism in critical theory and are willing to accept some conventions. Conventional constructivists wish to discover identities and structures of their social reproduction, and then explain how those identities imply certain actions. Critical theorists have a different aim, namely exploding the myths associated with identity formation and thus promoting change.⁸³ Conventional constructivism (later only constructivism) rejects the mainstream assumption that there could be universally valid generalizations about the world, but also denies the critical constructivist position that the world is full of uniqueness and differences which do not allow generalization⁸⁴.

⁸⁰ Risse 2004, 173.

⁸¹ Rosamond 2000, 173.

⁸² Smith 2004, 8, 10.

⁸³ Hopf 1998, 181-185.

⁸⁴ Hopf 1998, 199.

For Wendt, states are the most important subjects in contemporary world politics, and will remain in that position at least in the middle term⁸⁵. This is because

*“states are homeostatic structures that are relatively enduring over time. Like other cultural forms states are self-fulfilling prophecies; once up and running they acquire interests in reproducing themselves that create resistance to disappearing of their own accord.”*⁸⁶

States have been challenged by other forms of organization, pirates and mercenaries, guerrillas and terrorists, but have survived well overall. Wendt also claims that regulating violence is one of the most fundamental problems of social order. Since the state is a structure of political authority with a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, when it comes to the regulation of violence internationally it is the states one has to control.⁸⁷

Not all constructivist approaches are as state-centric as Wendt's, for example Jørgensen has argued that the depiction of the CFSP as intergovernmental may relate the formal institutional reality, but it cannot capture the emerging norms and rules of the game, in short the governance regime of CFSP. Furthermore, in contrast to Wendt, Christiansen and Jørgensen have described the actors in the process of Treaty reform as civil servants, Commission officials, members of parliament and national ministers, rather than personified states.⁸⁸ Wendt admits that concrete individuals play an essential role in state action, but state action is not reducible to those individuals as an individual's action is not reducible to neurons in the brain. Both kinds of agency exist only in virtue of structured relationships among their elements.⁸⁹ However, this state-centrism does not mean that other actors are meaningless. Wendt admits that both domestic and transnational non-state actors, such as actors of civil society and the economy in liberal states, heavily influence the states. Nevertheless, states are the primary medium that channel the effects of other actors into the world system. Even if non-state actors are becoming more important than states as initiators of change, system change ultimately happens through states.⁹⁰ For example, as I note in chapter 5, Chiquita lobbied the US government to take action in the banana dispute.

⁸⁵ Wendt 1992, 424; 1994, 385; 1999, 8-9.

⁸⁶ Wendt 1999, 238.

⁸⁷ Wendt 1999, 8-9.

⁸⁸ cited in Rosamond 2000, 174.

⁸⁹ Wendt 1999, 221

⁹⁰ Wendt 1999, 9.

Wendt sees states as socially constructed, both from the inside and the outside. However, he thinks it is necessary to treat states as somehow given for purposes of systemic IR theory. Constructivist IR scholarship was born out of a rejection of this individualist view, but Wendt argues that it is not possible to study everything at once. Therefore, even if he considers it important, he leaves it to others to problematize the state “all the way down”.⁹¹ Zalewski and Enloe would not be happy with such an excuse:

“...it is important to begin to understand the problems inherent in saying that international relations cannot be a theory about everything and assuming that this then lets one off the hook in terms of thinking about the lives and experiences of marginalized identities [...], leaving the state as the central referent.”⁹²

But for practical purposes, I will also make that excuse. I am aware that public opinion – also in countries officially supporting the war – was largely against using force in Iraq, but the massive anti-war demonstrations had very limited, if any, influence on the decision-makers.

Wendt argues that states are actors, more than mere structures or institutions, and assumes that they have some human qualities like intentions, rationality, and interests. This human-like agency (“anthropomorphizing the state”) is constituted through the talk of decision-makers as well as by international law granting legal personality to states.⁹³ Corporate agents are less unitary than individual ones: although people have multiple identities and engage in contradictory behaviour, biology gives their bodies coherence and constrains their action to larger extent than is the case for discursively constituted states. However, it may actually be easier to assess the intentions and predict the behaviour of states than humans: the structure of corporate “minds” is typically written down, and their thoughts can be heard in public debates and decision-makers' statements.⁹⁴

Culture is not a sphere or sector of society distinct from the economy or polity, but present wherever shared knowledge is found. For Wendt, the concept of culture is neutral between conflict and cooperation: shared ideas do not equal cooperation.⁹⁵ Culture is a self-fulfilling prophecy, and must reproduce itself to be culture at all. It is still contested and changeable, because it consists of

⁹¹ Wendt 1999, 244.

⁹² Zalewski & Enloe 1995, 298.

⁹³ Wendt 1999, 10.

⁹⁴ Wendt 1999, 221-222.

⁹⁵ Wendt 1999, 142, 310.

many different rules, norms, and institutions, and the practices they include are often contradictory. In addition, agents are never perfectly socialized, having only shared beliefs, and shared beliefs can have unintended consequences. Exogenous shocks can transform the cultural order, as well as the invention of new ideas.⁹⁶ As opposed to natural selection, “cultural selection” is an evolutionary mechanism of transmitting determinants of behaviour by social learning, imitation and similar processes from individual to individual and generation to generation. This is what some call socialization.⁹⁷ Culture can be realized through coercion, self-interest or legitimacy. Cultural forms imposed by coercion tend to be the least stable, and those realized by legitimacy the most. Wendt gives a qualified yes to the question whether actors have a tendency to internalize a culture more deeply over time, moving from first degree internalization (by coercion) to third (legitimacy). The longer a practice has been around, the deeper it will be embedded in the individual and collective consciousness.⁹⁸ Correspondingly, it is often mentioned in literature that the CFSP is a relatively new project, and thus still weak.

Specific cultural forms like norms, rules, institutions, conventions, ideologies, customs, and laws are all made of common knowledge. Common knowledge concerns actors' beliefs about each other's rationality, strategies, preferences, and beliefs, as well as about states of the external world. These beliefs need not be true, only believed to be. Collective knowledge is something more than common knowledge. It is knowledge structures held by groups which generate macro-level patterns in individual behaviour over time, such as capitalism, the free trade regime, apartheid, and states. Structures of collective knowledge depend on actors believing something that makes them engage in practices that reproduce those structures.⁹⁹

Smith notes that constructivism has been criticized for being vague on the ways by which some ideas achieve permanence or dominance over others, that is, become institutionalized. It also tends to favour structure over agency, treating actors as passive rule-followers with little capacity to influence their social environment. Wendt's approach stresses general structural conditions (common fate, interdependence, homogeneity, self-restraint) that apply to EU member states and

⁹⁶ Wendt 1999, 187-188.

⁹⁷ Wendt 1999, 324-325.

⁹⁸ Wendt 1999, 310-311.

⁹⁹ Wendt 1999, 159-162.

may affect their general propensity to cooperate. However, to explain actual institutional and policy outcomes, Smith argues it is necessary to supplement these conditions with more specific factors at work in the EU.¹⁰⁰

2.3. Identity and Interests

Identity is a central concept in social constructivism. In philosophical sense an identity is whatever makes a thing what it is. For Wendt, identity is “property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions.” Two kinds of ideas can enter into identity, those held by Self and those held by Other. Identities are constituted by both internal and external structures.¹⁰¹ Wendt admits that state identities are also heavily influenced by domestic factors he does not address¹⁰².

In modern society, everyone must have a defined position and identity. The emerging type of society, in contrast, is based on anonymity: contemporary capitalism requires people to be any-ones, with fluid and mobile identities to allow flexible adaptation to any situation. Ojakangas suggests it would be best if we put aside all positions and identities and saw them as inappropriate. Only this would allow a non-exclusive political community without insiders and others.¹⁰³

The most important issue in social life is how actors represent the Self and the Other. This is the starting point for interaction, and the medium by which actors determine who they are, what they want, and how they should behave.¹⁰⁴ The basic idea is that identities and their corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how significant Others treat the actor. Actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how they think Others see them. Not all Others are equally significant, and power and dependency roles thus play a role.¹⁰⁵ Role-taking involves choosing from the available presentations of the Self who one will be, and thus what interests one intends to pursue. In real life, role-taking is mostly constrained by pre-existing shared understandings.¹⁰⁶ The

¹⁰⁰ Smith 2004, 25.

¹⁰¹ Wendt 1999, 224.

¹⁰² Wendt 1999, 11

¹⁰³ Ojakangas 2002, 116-120.

¹⁰⁴ Wendt 1999, 332.

¹⁰⁵ Wendt 1999, 327.

¹⁰⁶ Wendt 1999, 329.

actions of the Self tell the Other what roles the Self wants to take and give the Other, and vice versa. They both have their definitions of the situation, which they possibly revise during the interaction. Both want to “teach” the other side their definitions, and both can learn. Power relations play a role in this. Wendt quotes Karl Deutsch: “power can be seen as the ability to afford not to learn.”¹⁰⁷ This is related to categorization, or the labelling of things and phenomena, discussed in chapter 3.

In recent years, common European foreign policy has often been in relation to the US, attracting attention to different views on multilateralism and the use of force on different sides of the ocean. Even if the US is an invaluable partner, with which Europeans share many values and interests, it has also become Europe's most important Other, to whom Europeans relate their own actions.¹⁰⁸ Even during the 2002-2003 crisis over Iraq, opposing EU members remained in agreement over the importance of a UN mandate for intervention¹⁰⁹. The EU has a “Mr. Nice Guy” image due its devout multilateralism and traditionally non-coercive approach in its external relations. This image is encouraged by EU actions that frequently reflect its principles, and by comparisons with other leading actors, especially the US. The support of the Kyoto Protocol, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel land mines, the International Criminal Court, and so on, reflects commitment to international consensus-building and development of international law. The US has so far accepted none of the aforementioned international agreements, which reinforces the positive image of the EU.¹¹⁰

Gordon and Shapiro admit that America's vast military power, technological prowess and history have left Americans with optimism about fixing problems. Older European nations with their complicated historical experience are far more pessimistic and rather wish to manage problems.¹¹¹ Robert Kagan's famous argument is that the US guarantees and pays for the security of a free-riding Europe. Europe is a peaceful post-modern paradise, and does not value the use of force because it lacks the capability to use any. Europe tolerates problems like Saddam Hussein because it cannot “fix them”.¹¹² But the features with which Kagan has characterized the new Europe are also values

¹⁰⁷ Wendt 1999, 330-331.

¹⁰⁸ Raik & Palosaari 2004, 19.

¹⁰⁹ Marsh & Mackensteen 2005, 260.

¹¹⁰ Marsh & Mackensteen 2005, 251-252.

¹¹¹ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 56.

¹¹² Kagan 2003, 33-34, 41, 54-55.

that large segments of British and American population and a larger portion of the elite adhere to: postmodernism, multiculturalism, and universalism¹¹³. What Kagan does not take seriously is that Europeans could actually prefer peaceful solutions to fixing problems by military means. For example the Iraq crisis demonstrated that military means were not able to solve the problems of Iraq, not that militarily power works¹¹⁴. Smith suggests that although “the US-EU partnership can be formidable, the EU may be more influential as a global actor by celebrating its differences with the US and NATO rather than by attempting to imitate those actors.”¹¹⁵ Europe's Other could also be its own past that nobody wishes to return to¹¹⁶.

Wendt discusses four kinds of identity: personal/corporate, type, role and collective. *Personal or corporate identity* of intentional actors involves a consciousness and memory of Self, a sense of “I”. States, who do not have bodies, need a joint narrative of themselves as a corporate actor, and to that extent corporate identity presupposes individuals with a collective identity. Personal or corporate identities presuppose difference, because constituting an actor as a physically distinct being depends on creating and maintaining the boundaries between Self and Other.¹¹⁷ The myths, narratives, and traditions that constitute who a group is and how it relates to others, or group beliefs, are often inscribed in collective memory. Once collective memories have been created, it may be hard to get rid of them and their long-term effects, even if the majority of individuals has forgotten them at some moment.¹¹⁸ *Type identities* are shared characteristics that have social content or meaning. This content is given by more or less formal membership rules that define what counts as a type identity and orients the behaviour of Others toward it. An actor can have multiple type identities at the same time.¹¹⁹ *Role identities* take the dependence on culture and Others further. Characteristics giving rise to type identities are pre-social, whereas role identities exist only in relation to Others. Many roles are institutionalized in social structures that pre-date particular interactions. In effect, we are able to enact role identities because we carry Others around us in our heads.¹²⁰ *Collective identity* takes the

113 Crowe 2003, 164.

114 Keisala 2004, 156.

115 Smith 2004, 261.

116 Keisala 2004, 139-140.

117 Wendt 1999, 224-5.

118 Wendt 1999, 163.

119 Wendt 1999, 225-6.

120 Wendt 1999, 227.

relationship between Self and Other further, to identification. Identification is a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred. Collective identity is a distinct combination of role and type identities, one with the causal power to define the welfare of the Other as a part of that of the Self. Altruistic actors may still be rational, but the basis on which they calculate their interests is the group or team. This enables them to overcome collective action problems that can bother egoists.¹²¹

According to Wendt, there are three efficient causes to collective identity formation. First, the actors have to be interdependent, which means that the outcome of an interaction for each depends on the choices of the others¹²². Since interdependence varies, what happens where it is highest (“core areas”) is most important, and concentric circles of identification might then develop around the core areas. As pairs of significant Others go, so go prospects for collective identity in the system as a whole. Even if ties to peripheral actors are thin, the collective identities of core actors can lead to imitation of the core.¹²³ The emergence of a common threat or Other increases the vulnerability and sensitivity of actors to each other. Such a common Other can be abstract like the threat of war or ecological catastrophe, or personified in an aggressor.¹²⁴ Second, actors face a common fate: their individual survival, fitness, or welfare depends on what happens to the group as a whole¹²⁵. As the ability to meet one's needs unilaterally declines, so does the incentive to have identities that generate unilateral policies; and similarly, as the degree of common fate increases, so does the incentive to identify with others¹²⁶. Third, homogeneity or alikeness of the actors' identities: for example similar domestic values, such as democracy, welfare state, and the rising global consumerism may encourage collective identity formation¹²⁷.

Homogeneity does not automatically lead to collective identity formation. As actors become alike in some dimensions they may differentiate themselves along other, even trivial ones: homogenization weakens the basis of the boundary between Self and Other and thereby calls into

¹²¹ Wendt 1999, 229.

¹²² Wendt 1999, 344.

¹²³ Wendt 1999, 348.

¹²⁴ Wendt 1994, 389-390.

¹²⁵ Wendt 1999, 349.

¹²⁶ Wendt 1994, 389.

¹²⁷ Wendt 1994, 390; 1999, 353.

question the group's *raison d'être*. Inventing new sources of group differentiation keeps up the boundaries. Furthermore, as actors become more alike there is less potential for a division of labour between them. A division of labour increases the extent of interdependence and likelihood of common fate. “In sum, there is little theoretical reason to think that a convergence of corporate and even type identities will in itself generate prosocial security policies and thus collective identity.”¹²⁸

The EU cannot build a nation by force, and even more discreet measures of nation-building could be counter-productive.¹²⁹ An attempt to specify European interests was made already in 1973: the “Document on the European Identity” was designed to help define principles to guide the EU's external relations and future development. It stressed broad themes and common values like democracy, the rule of law, social justice and human rights.¹³⁰

Collective interests mean that actors make the welfare of the group an end in itself. However, even within a relationship and issue covered by a collective identity, collective identities will often be in tension with egoistic ones. Total identification, to the point of sacrificing one's basic needs for the Other, is rare. Even after internalizing a culture, which involves the formation of a collective identity, egoistic identities may still be important. The picture here is one of “concentric circles” of identification.¹³¹ Wendt claims that pairs of significant Others are crucial to the prospects of collective identity in the system as a whole¹³². In Europe, the most important pairs of significant Others could be the largest EU member states in relation to each other and the US.

Foreign policy is probably not an issue defining the group (the EU), but some “outer circle” where collective identity is weaker than in core issue areas, those that were the original areas of cooperation. EU member states are interdependent and relatively homogenic, and share a common fate at least in some issue areas . But are they homogeneous and interdependent and share a common fate in the issue area of foreign policy? Wendt argues that the internationalization of the state requires identification with respect to some state function (economic growth, military security

128 Wendt 1999, 356-7.

129 Keisala 2004, 135.

130 Smith 2004, 136.

131 Wendt 1999, 337-8.

132 Wendt 1999, 348.

and so on) and a collective capacity to sanction those who disrupt the performance of this function¹³³. The CFSP has very limited means of such sanctioning, at least for the present. However, it has been argued that European citizens will start to identify themselves as Europeans as the process of integration continues: the development of common rules, norms and institutions must eventually generate a common identity¹³⁴. Risse claims that the EU has acquired an “identity hegemony”: it defines largely what it means to be European¹³⁵.

As interdependence, common fate and homogeneity increase, actors have more incentive to engage in prosocial behaviour which expands the boundaries of the Self to include the Other. This can only proceed if actors can overcome their fear of being engulfed, physically or psychically, by those with whom they identify.¹³⁶ This makes self-constraint important. If actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, nor would do it out of self-interested opportunism, they can trust that their needs will be respected even in absence of external constraints. Even if states initially comply with the rules of the community for reasons of coercion or self-interest, continuing adherence will tend to lead to habitual compliance over time. External constraints become internal constraints: social control is achieved primarily by self-control.¹³⁷ A way of self-constraint is self-binding: unilateral alternatives one uses to relax the Other's anxiety about its intentions. Wendt mentions post-WWII German policies of constitutional constraint on using force abroad and subordinating foreign policy to a collective (EU) as examples. It will be hard to sustain a strategy of self-binding for a long time if Others never reciprocate, thus its success will eventually depend on the emergence of shared norms of self-restraint.¹³⁸

Individuals want to meet their needs, and those may conflict with the needs of group, which makes them worry about being “swallowed up” by the group. The same is true of groups relative to other groups. Identification is usually ambivalent, involving an on-going tension between desires for individuation and assimilation.¹³⁹ Marsh and Mackenstein note that international credibility is hard

133 Wendt 1994, 392

134 Howe 1995 and Adler 1997 in Keisala 2004, 136.

135 Risse 2004, 169

136 Wendt 1999, 357.

137 Wendt 1999, 359-361.

138 Wendt 1999, 362-3.

139 Wendt 1999, 337.

won and easily lost, especially in the case of the EU as an emerging and unique actor. This makes self-restraint necessary.¹⁴⁰ Similarly, Smith points out that CFSP is overtly political and oriented toward non-EU states, which increases the stakes involved. A single CFSP declaration could do serious damage to the EU's other policies if it offended important external actor(s).¹⁴¹ Smith claims that EU states have gradually realized this: “damage-limitation”, or shielding the evolving EU from unilateral foreign policy actions of its member states, has been generally agreed on since the 1970 Luxembourg Report. Radically independent or selfish foreign policies threatened to disrupt the hard-won efforts of economic integration.¹⁴²

Of Wendt's four kinds of identity, all but the first (personal/corporate) can take multiple forms simultaneously within the same actor. All people and states have many identities. Each is a script or schema, constituted to varying degrees by cultural forms, about who we are and what we should do in a certain context. Most identities are activated selectively depending on the situation, and there is no way to predict how internal identity conflicts will be resolved. Wendt offers a hypothesis to consider: in any situation the solution to identity conflicts within an actor will reflect the relative hierarchy of identity commitments in the Self; and that hierarchy will tend to reflect the order in which Wendt represented the four kinds of identity (personal/corporate – type – role – collective). The Self is a structure of knowledge, and identities are arrayed hierarchically in this structure by an actor's degree of commitment to them: some are fundamental to the self-concept, others more superficial.¹⁴³

People can have several identities at the same time, thus European and national identities should not be considered in zero-sum terms¹⁴⁴. But what about a Western identity, something connecting the European and the American ones? The identifications European, Western and American are of course historical conceptualizations, and contested ones, not something with given and stable qualities¹⁴⁵. Clark's view is that the West was established in late 1940s, the East (the Soviet bloc) being its antithesis. The practical expression of the West was NATO. Militant Islam could not

140 Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 262.

141 Smith 2004, 248.

142 Smith 2004, 136.

143 Wendt 1999, 230-231.

144 Risse 2004, 166

145 Clark 2004, 577; Risse 2004, 166-167, 170.

replace the Soviet bloc as a common threat: militant Islamic cells operate in many countries and it is hard to clearly identify them with the East, also, not all of their targets are in the West. The term West is still prominent in American political discourse, but it is unclear what other countries, if any, belong to it.¹⁴⁶ Clark argues that Europeans increasingly do not identify with it. Moreover, if Western values have been adopted everywhere, they become less distinctively Western.¹⁴⁷ Vogel doubts how far one can talk about a value community anymore, as US policy is increasingly inspired by the “good versus evil” world view of Christian fundamentalists. He also diagnoses the US with “völkerrechtliches Autismus” (international law autism) which began already before Bush, and is apparent toward practically all important multilateral agreements.¹⁴⁸ Nevertheless, Zarycki sees the West and the East as the main points of reference for the Central European identity. The West in the Polish case stands for Western Europe and is connected with wealth, civilization, and other positive attributes, while the East (Russia) stands for backwardness, despotism and disorder.¹⁴⁹

Marsh and Mackenstein argue that to maintain the support of 15, now 25, different governments, national parliaments and sets of media, EU foreign policy must be “principled”. It is possible to distinguish a broadly agreed core set of principles: international peace and security, sustainable development and encouragement of a multipolar world order. Derived from these principles, the basis of EU foreign policy is formed by the importance of international law, solidarity with the poorest countries, multilateralism, engagement and containment rather than confrontation. This has been complemented by the trend in the post-Cold War era towards conflation, or even the indivisibility, of values and interests. The promotion of liberal capitalist democracy, the rule of law and human rights is legitimated by the widespread acceptance of these values within the EU, and serves EU interests in the form of the expansion of global free trade and the democratic peace. The commitment to multilateralism and multipolarity is both principled and serves the Realpolitik calculations of EU member states.¹⁵⁰

The capacity to formulate interests and policy preferences is a precondition for actorness. This is

¹⁴⁶ Clark 2004, 580-583, 586-7.

¹⁴⁷ Clark 2004, 585-586.

¹⁴⁸ Vogel 2003, 30.

¹⁴⁹ Zarycki 1997, 97-99.

¹⁵⁰ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 251.

connected to identity formation and the level of cohesion inside the entity – be it a state or the EU.¹⁵¹ Rosamond thinks it is possible to see the EU as an agent with its own preferences, but the basis of those preferences may best be understood as the product of the interaction of interests below EU level.¹⁵² Interests presuppose identities, because an actor cannot know what it wants before it knows who it is. Identities may be chosen in the light of interests, but identities in themselves do not explain action since being is not the same thing as wanting. People may sometimes be wrong or deceived about their needs and act contrary to them¹⁵³.

Wendt's most famous argument is that “anarchy is what states make of it”, meaning that there is no logic in anarchy that would cause the need for power politics¹⁵⁴. The meaning of the distribution of power in international politics is constituted in important part by the distribution of interests, and the content of those interests is constituted in important part by ideas. How agents perceive the world is important in explaining their actions. They always have an element of choice in defining their identities and interests¹⁵⁵. Most of the time a variety of beliefs about how to meet security needs may be compatible with the national interest. Often these beliefs will be contested, but in many cases certain representations are simply never considered because of political inertia, ideological hegemony, or lack of imagination, which may contribute to the stability of the national interests over time.¹⁵⁶

George and Keohane (1980) have identified three national interests: physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being (“life, liberty and property”); Wendt adds a fourth, “collective self-esteem”, to the list¹⁵⁷. Self-esteem is a basic human need, and something individuals seek in group membership. Collective self-esteem refers to a group's need to feel good about itself, for respect or status. Like other national interests, self-esteem can be expressed in many ways: a key factor is whether collective self-images are positive or negative. That depends partly on relationships to significant Others: the Self sees itself by taking the perspective of the Other. Negative self-images

¹⁵¹ Keisala 2004, 124.

¹⁵² Rosamond 2000, 178.

¹⁵³ Wendt 1999, 231-232.

¹⁵⁴ Wendt 1992, 394-395.

¹⁵⁵ Wendt 1999, 135, 137-138

¹⁵⁶ Wendt 1999, 237-238.

¹⁵⁷ Wendt 1999, 235.

tend to emerge from perceived disregard or humiliation. Groups cannot tolerate such images long if they are to meet the self-esteem needs of their members, therefore they will compensate by self-assertion and/or devaluation and aggression toward the Other. Positive images tend to emerge from mutual respect and cooperation.¹⁵⁸

Wendt argues that the struggle for recognition may actually explain much of the behaviour, including war, that Neorealists have attributed to the struggle for security. Recognition is a social act that constitutes an Other as a subject with a legitimate standing in relation to the Self. There are two types of recognition: thin recognition means being acknowledged as an independent subject, such as a sovereign person; thick recognition is about being respected for one's special and unique characteristics. People can acquire and maintain a distinct identity only through recognition; one becomes a Self via the Other. If people want to be subjects, they will desire recognition of their difference. Struggles for thick recognition can take many forms, such as the pursuit of Great Power status or being God's chosen people, and be never-ending.¹⁵⁹

The desire for recognition can sometimes be satisfied without recognizing the Other. In hierarchies, one actor gets recognition by denying full recognition to another. However, those who are not fully recognized will sooner or later struggle for it, which makes this kind of social order unstable. Recognition is a precondition for genuine subjectivity, and can therefore be considered more important than security.¹⁶⁰ The possibility of hegemony suggests that the macro-level structures of physical and social power have a role in stabilizing unequal recognition. Nevertheless, the only way to get fully stable recognition from the Other is to give recognition in turn.¹⁶¹ Recognition also reduces the need to secure the Self by devaluing or destroying the Other¹⁶², which contributes to the Other's security.

Wendt admits that he accepts much of the criticism of his claim that “anarchy is what states make of it”. Maybe even more than individuals, states are predisposed to define their interests in self-interested terms. Wendt's question is whether states can expand their Selves to contain Others,

¹⁵⁸ Wendt 1999, 236-267.

¹⁵⁹ Wendt 2003, 511-512.

¹⁶⁰ Wendt 2003, 512-514.

¹⁶¹ Wendt 2003, 513-514.

¹⁶² Wendt 1999, 237

maybe first for self-interested reasons but over time internalizing this identification “We”. Then the members of this group would no longer be self-interested relative to each other with respect to the issues that define the group.¹⁶³ We cannot understand self-interest without understanding the Self, and especially its relationship to the Other: self-interest is a belief about how to meet one's needs that is characterized by a purely instrumental attitude toward the Other. However, Wendt points out that self-interest does not exclude cooperation and consideration of the Other's interests. In fact, taking those into account and “being social” will help to anticipate the Other's behaviour which is helpful in an interdependent world.¹⁶⁴

2.4. Norms

Smith proposes that norm development within EPC/CFSP can be conceived in terms of four steps. First, informal, uncodified customs emerge, for example the often unspoken traditions and practices in the day-to-day interaction among European officials. Second, these customs are codified or ordered into explicit, written norms, which are then turned into rules with rights and obligations. Finally, a transition from rules to legal rules (formal laws), which involve behavioural and legal obligations, may take place.¹⁶⁵ In the EPC/CFSP, which covers sensitive issue areas and is informal in nature, norms took time to develop and any attempt to formalize them caused a fierce debate. The legalization of the political cooperation system was such a disputed topic that treaty status was given to it only in 1986 (with the Single European Act). Smith argues that political cooperation would not have been created at all if EU states had tried to deliberately impose legal rules on themselves.¹⁶⁶

Actors will support norms to the extent that stable patterns of interaction help them solve problems, reinforce existing norms or maintain valued social relationships. Once a norm has matured into a rule or law, violation of it can result in internal psychological discomfort and external embarrassment, even when there is no authority to impose compliance through punishment. When

¹⁶³ Wendt 1999, 241.

¹⁶⁴ Wendt 1999, 240-241.

¹⁶⁵ Smith 2004, 117-118.

¹⁶⁶ Smith 2004, 120.

made public, norms can encourage “rhetorical entrapment” since actors must live up to the norm or face the risk of shame or damaged reputation, which can erode political power.¹⁶⁷

Shannon borrows Katzenstein's definition of norms as “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors within a given identity.” He states that constructivists are better in explaining patterns of norm conformity than instances of violation. The rationalist claim that norms are violated when they conflict with interests cannot tell a priori when this will happen, and is also challenged by evidence. Shannon suggests an answer from political psychology: norm conformity or violation results from an interplay of individual and social needs. Leaders are sensitive to social expectations because of political and psychological reasons, and thus norm conformity is the default option. Norms provide rules for acting safely, and norm conformity helps maintain positive social reinforcement and self-esteem.¹⁶⁸ Norm violation may occur when the leader's perceived “national interest” conflicts with a norm, *and* the nature of the norm or the situation is fuzzy enough to allow room for interpretation. Leaders who value their standing in the international society seek to avoid negative social judgements that norm violation might cause, this is why a motivated leader seeks to perceive the situation in a way that allows exemption from the norm.¹⁶⁹

There are norms at all levels of social life up to the global. All norms have two important components: a prescription (what to do) and parameters (when the norm applies). Both prescription and parameters must be considered when talking about norm violation, and both of them are vulnerable to subjective interpretation.¹⁷⁰ Shannon criticizes constructivists for treating shared expectations as clear and unproblematic common understandings of what a norm's prescriptions and parameters are. He notes that messages are only received through the filter of human agency, and humans are rather imperfect interpreters of reality.¹⁷¹

People tend to avoid provoking negative social judgements, and have a need to maintain a positive self-image. A moral dilemma may result from trying to please all audiences, for example act according to perceived national interests for the national audience and try to behave appropriately

¹⁶⁷ Smith 2004, 118.

¹⁶⁸ Shannon 2000, 293-294.

¹⁶⁹ Shannon 2000, 294.

¹⁷⁰ Shannon 2000, 295.

¹⁷¹ Shannon 2000, 298.

for the international audience. The interplay of the individual will and the social ability determines the outcome.¹⁷²




Figure 1. Shannon (2000, 301): Framework for decision: conform or violate?

The EU has five core norms (peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights), and four minor norms (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance). The reinforcement and expansion of these norms allows the EU to legitimate itself as something more than the sum of its parts.¹⁷³ Even if all member states share objectives like promoting the respect of human rights and reinforcing international security, these objectives are vague enough to leave room for different interpretations and policy choices¹⁷⁴. EU member states also have other commitments beyond the EU: notably the formal NATO commitments and wider transatlantic solidarity.

In the case of the Iraq crisis, some European leaders had a motivation to violate the norm of non-intervention (maintaining peace). A covert operation, or denying participation would have been hard, but the strongly supported human rights norm allowed an excuse of breaking other norms; Saddam Hussein's atrocities against his own people were widely cited. In addition, the norm of non-

¹⁷² Shannon 2000, 300.

¹⁷³ Manners 2002 in Keisala 2004, 19.

¹⁷⁴ Keisala 2004, 127.

intervention has parameters allowing the use of force in self-defence¹⁷⁵ – Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction and its alleged willingness to share those with terrorists justified the pre-emptive use of force. As for finding room for interpretation of the norm, I discuss the categorization and particularization of issues in the following chapter, and come to the conclusion that there is always room for creative interpretation. Shannon comes to this conclusion as well: norms exist in the abstract, often formalized in international law, treaties and codes, and their meaning is negotiated in social practice. To take concrete effect, norms must be interpreted and applied by humans, and subjective interpretations are unavoidable.¹⁷⁶

3.METHOD

3.1. Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis means studying the use of language (and other meaning-transmitted action) and analysing in detail how social reality is produced in various social practices. Words and deeds are not seen as two opposites, but both are considered action that reproduces or changes social reality. The focus is on how actors use language to make things understandable: it is assumed that there is more than one way to make a phenomenon understandable. What kind of descriptions and explanations are understandable in different situations? In practice, all this means that there is no rush to name reasons to actions and phenomena. The ways in which actors describe phenomena and name reasons to them are studied as such, and explaining the social construction of reality is attempted on this basis.¹⁷⁷

Emphasizing communicative and discursive practices is also typical of social constructivism. In order to understand and explain social behaviour, we need to take words, language and communication seriously: it is through discursive practices that agents make sense of the world.¹⁷⁸ Rules and norms are important in constructivist approaches, but this does not mean they could

175 Shannon 2000, 305.

176 Shannon 2000, 304.

177 Suoninen 1999, 17-19.

178 Risse 2004, 164.

never be broken. Accepting the legitimacy of a social or political order may increase compliance with its rules, but does not guarantee it. Risse compares two cases, violations of the EU's *acquis communautaire* and traffic rules: both sets of rules are widely and in principle considered legitimate but still often violated. He argues that we can find out from the rule-breaker's way of communication if he considered the rule or norm legitimate. Does the rule-breaker try to justify his behaviour, or to offer compensation, or maybe confess he did wrong?¹⁷⁹

Potter views language through the metaphor of a construction yard, where descriptions and accounts construct the world or at least versions of it. These descriptions and accounts themselves are constructed - they are human practices and could have been otherwise. The opposite metaphor he mentions is language as a mirror that reflects things in the world on its smooth surface.¹⁸⁰ Potter argues that factual accounts have a double orientation. They are used to *accomplish an action*, and also *build their own status as a factual description*. "A central feature of any description is its role in categorization: a description formulates some object or event as something; it constitutes it as a thing, and a thing with specific qualities."¹⁸¹

The method used in the case study is the type of discourse analysis that Potter calls *the focus on discourse with a stress on rhetoric*. He sees rhetoric "as a pervasive feature of the way people interact and arrive at understanding." Part of interest is in the alternative claims and arguments that an argument undermines: any description counters a range of competing descriptions, potentially if not actually.¹⁸² Analysis can be done with different types of material, such as written documents, speeches and face-to-face meetings.¹⁸³

One central dimension of arguing is the speaker-audience relationship. Speech is not only speech about something, but also to someone. Speech aims at convincing the audience about an argument. The persuasiveness of an argument depends on the audience, and therefore it is fruitful to study the reception of the argument whenever possible, or a text's relationship with its audience: who does it

179 Risse 2004, 164.

180 Potter 1996, 97-98.

181 Potter 1996, 108-111.

182 Potter 1996, 106.

183 Jokinen 1999, 126.

aim to persuade?¹⁸⁴ The existence of a public sphere ensures that actors, like the European leaders cited in my case study, have to explain and justify their behaviour regularly and routinely. The audience for these arguments can be other state actors in an international setting as well as the larger public of democratic polities. Debates in the international public sphere are more likely to invoke identity-related issues than domestic debates. Many international public discourses touch on normative issues linked to the social identity of actors – states and their citizens. For example, the international human rights norms are increasingly a part of being a civilized state.¹⁸⁵

Defensive and offensive rhetoric use similar means, and are often used side by side, complementing each other. Different strategies can be combined, and many of them can be used in a single sentence. This makes identifying them and analysing their functions in the material a challenge.¹⁸⁶ Through a detailed analysis of rhetorical strategies we can see how facts are construed, how subject positions and identities are supported and how categories are constructed, strengthened or questioned. Rhetorical analysis enables us to examine how things are made seem normal and justified, or construed as abnormal or undesirable. It can also be seen as a part of analysing power relationships, because rhetorical argumentation is inseparably connected with the construction and deconstruction of hegemonic discourses.¹⁸⁷

3.2. Categorization and Particularization

The world is not categorized by God or nature. Reality enters into human practices with the categories and descriptions that are part of those practices.¹⁸⁸ Categorization is a central feature of any description, because humans 'pack' reality into different 'packages' (versions/accounts of reality) in their communication. They also wish to sell their 'packages' to others, and rhetorical means are important in this. Therefore, rhetorical means are not some empty shells but a fundamental characteristic of the use of language and the production of reality.¹⁸⁹ For example, the image of a

184 Jokinen 1999, 128-129.

185 Risse 2000, 12-13.

186 Jokinen 1999, 156.

187 Jokinen 1999, 156-157.

188 Potter 1996, 98.

189 Jokinen 1999, 130.

militaristic, unilateralist America and a pacifistic, inward-looking Europe are caricatures that obscure the fact that many Americans still value international cooperation and peaceful solutions, and many Europeans still see force as a necessary part of international affairs¹⁹⁰. People do categorization whenever they use language to make statements. A category consists of at least two distinguishable objects or events that are treated equivalently. Some cognitive psychologists assume that acts of categorization represent fundamental psychological processes and that their importance is based on perceptual, and possibly biological factors.¹⁹¹

That categorization is biologically important is explained with the need of organisms to reduce information. Categories help organisms reduce the infinite differences among stimuli to cognitively usable proportions. Social psychologists often suggest that prejudice arises from the normal process of categorization, which is considered to be the basis of all thought. To formulate tolerant thoughts, one needs to use language, which is full of categories and their built-in bias toward simplification and stereotyping. Thus an expression of tolerance involves further simplifications and distortions, which means further prejudice.¹⁹²

In matters of rhetoric, categorization and particularization can be seen as strategies for thinking and making arguments rather than near-automatic processes. Thinking starts when we stop unthinkingly following the orders of our schemata (categories), but argue about which category to particularize, or how to categorize a particularization.¹⁹³ The selection of categories can be controversial. It is relatively easy with natural objects, but even the category of 'chair' can get contested. Political concepts are notoriously contestable. Arguments about the essence of categories can be more fundamental than arguments about problem cases. Disagreement about words does not have to be trivial, since often more than words are involved.¹⁹⁴

However, Billig concludes that the categorization approach leads to a limited view of thought. The individual faces a complex and untamed stimulus world, which must be caught in different

190 Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 5-6.

191 Billig 1996, 151.

192 Billig 1996, 152-154, 157.

193 Billig 1996, 150, 170.

194 Billig 1996, 166, 176-177.

categories to achieve security of knowing how to react to the stimuli.¹⁹⁵ Billig argues that the categorization approach tells only half of the story, for it ignores the capacity for invention of the human thought. To balance the one-sided approach, Billig reverses the principle of categorization, however, the reversal does not replace original but only complements it. Categorization refers to the process of a particular stimulus being placed in a general category and being robbed of its particularity; particularization means that a stimulus is considered in its particularity.¹⁹⁶ Billig argues that the biological importance of categorization can also be reversed: sometimes it is best that the organism differentiates a special stimulus from the others. If we need to put particulars into categories in order to survive as perceiving and thinking beings, we also need the capacity to pick out particulars.¹⁹⁷

The Special case strategy is commonly used in legal disputes: it is argued that the special features of a particular case are special enough to make it a legitimate exception to the law. It must be argued that the essence of the particular resides in its special particularities, rather than its similarities to those other cases that are labelled without argument.¹⁹⁸ The basic structure of such an argument starts with a general rule or procedure telling that all Xs are Y; for example that all acts containing a particular characteristic are illegal and anti-social. Then a difficult case arises: it clearly has the characteristic X, but also the characteristic of W, which is generally associated with socially approved actions. An argument about which location is to be preferred for the essence of the particular matter follows. Often such arguments will not confine themselves to the particular instance, but will cover the general consequences and the wider social values involved. The particular features of the specific case become conceived as generalities, and the particularization is translated into a categorization. The original rule will not be left untouched, regardless of the way the decision goes. If the particularization is unsuccessful, the rule “all Xs are Y” is strengthened by the additional rule “including those Xs with Ws”. If the particularization is successful, an exception clause must be built into the rule. In this way, simple rules become complicated with all sorts of sub-clauses resulting from instances which are controversially categorized.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁵ Billig 1996, 158.

¹⁹⁶ Billig 1996, 160-161.

¹⁹⁷ Billig 1996, 162-163.

¹⁹⁸ Billig 1996, 173-174.

¹⁹⁹ Billig 1996, 175.

Since all particulars contain their particularities, it is theoretically always possible to apply the Special case strategy. In rhetorical situations each party attempts to apply the label which suits its purposes best. Such disputes are not only about words, but about whole networks of meaning, or schemata, which the word brings to mind. The rhetorical force of language is so strong, that only choosing a term implies a position. Here Billig's example is President Reagan naming a US operation in Grenada a 'rescue mission', while labelling the Soviet operation in Afghanistan an 'invasion' that should not be compared to the US activity.²⁰⁰ Since it is impossible to envisage all future possible problem cases, any categorization, no matter how much redrafted, is vulnerable to the strategy of particularization when an unforeseen event takes place. The oscillation between categorization and particularization can be expected to continue without the last word.²⁰¹

In order to justify offending action, Cicero advised to plead ignorance, necessity or accident. Scott and Lyman's (1968) excuse strategy is different from a justification, because this strategy admits the wrongfulness of the action. Justifications recognize a general sense in which the act was impermissible, but claim that particular occasions permitted or required doing so. It is admitted that a certain sort of action runs counter to our attitudes, but the present act's essence suggests that it should not be categorized under the forbidding attitude, but very differently. With attention to the special features of the case, and some creativity, the dominance of the general attitude category can be prevented.²⁰² Those who supported military action against Iraq, for example, argued that they wanted peace, but "real peace" or "peace with security", that could be achieved only by forcing Saddam Hussein to disarm.

Neither a general ideology nor a general political attitude can tell exactly what to do in every possible situation – choices between theoretically justifiable courses have to be made. Decision-making implies an end to deliberation, and the chosen alternative must be defended against criticism: the deliberator must become an advocate. In order to argue that the ends justify a particular set of means, one may find that the means start creating the essence of the ends. The location of essence is a matter of controversy, as always. The more the advocate claims that the

²⁰⁰ Billig 1996, 172-173.

²⁰¹ Billig 1996, 176.

²⁰² Billig 1996, 212-213.

essences of the ideology are so obvious that everybody must see them, the greater the indication of controversy. Advocates may resolve inconsistency between their attitudes and actions to their own satisfaction, but not necessarily to that of the critics'.²⁰³

According to Billig, role-playing experiments have shown that when someone invents his own arguments and is then required to defend his position, he is likely to be persuaded by the truth of his own argumentative creations. The advocate may set rhetorical tasks which give new insights further confirming his position, and also withdraw his attention from considering other possibilities. Once a rhetorical task has been set, a pattern of difference can be found and justified with knowledge and wit. These differences then function to confirm the original belief, because they represent reasons for holding it. The process could be described as adapting schemata in order to provide the believer with self-confirming evidence.²⁰⁴ Advocacy involves the use of strategies for justifying a particular case and for undermining the critics of it. Simply declaring one is for or against something is not advocacy; that begins when one gives reasons for this view. Billig suggests that arguing for one's consistency and for the critic's inconsistency is highly important.²⁰⁵

3.3. Rhetorical Strategies

The resources for building plausible fictions and those for building credible facts are often the same: there is no neat separation between truth and fiction²⁰⁶. Juhila considers leading officials' speech as fruitful material to study: it usually attempts to be direct description of reality without polemics or explicit pro and con argumentation. However, they are implicitly present.²⁰⁷ To get concrete research tools, I combined Juhila's five fact construction strategies with the sixteen rhetoric strategies presented by Jokinen, and also took ideas from Billig and Potter. Some of the means listed by Jokinen were similar, and many overlapped with Juhila's strategies. The result of my combination was 16 different rhetorical means of persuasion/fact construction to search for. What kind of a European Union or transatlantic relationship are these documents trying to promote?

²⁰³ Billig 1996, 218.

²⁰⁴ Billig 1996, 198-199.

²⁰⁵ Billig 1996, 187.

²⁰⁶ Potter 1996, 173.

²⁰⁷ Juhila 1993, 186.

1. *The use of categories*: everything can be described in various ways, as noted above. All categorization can be seen as part of persuasive rhetoric.²⁰⁸

2. *Distancing the argument from one's own interests*: persuasion is difficult, if the speaker is considered to be advancing his own interests. The sincerity of the speaker is emphasized when he claims that he is, against his own interests, facing and admitting realities and simply reporting them to others. A way to gain apparent neutrality and to avoid being accountable for the argument is to present it as something generally known or something said by someone else. However, sometimes the speaker may admit his interests and allegiances to appear honest and trustworthy.²⁰⁹ Actors who can legitimately claim authoritative knowledge or moral authority, or both, can probably convince a sceptical public better than actors suspected of promoting private interests²¹⁰.

3. *Justification with the speaker's status* means that certain categories of speakers are given the right to know. Every person can speak from a number of categories. It is of interest which category comes alive in each situation: from the choice of a speaker category, it can be interpreted to whom one is aiming the speech at.²¹¹

4. *Backing the argument with a consensus*. If it is shown that several others support an argument, it no longer appears one's personal opinion. If it can be argued that everyone has come to the same conclusions simultaneously and/or independently, it gives the argument more credibility. For the analyst, it is interesting how a consensus is built between statements of several parties, how different parties are construed as (in)dependent of each other, and how their versions of reality are interpreted as (not) being in harmony. Using 'we' instead of 'I' gives the impression that the speaker is speaking for a larger group. A way to suppress alternative ideas is referring to a truth or virtue shared and known by everyone, implying that "everyone" and "even a child" knows how something is.²¹² Arguing about the general attitude is a strategy which is well suited for political arguments²¹³.

5. *Backing the argument with an expert's statement*. Direct citation is a way to support an argument

208 Jokinen 1999, 141-142.

209 Jokinen 1999, 133-138.

210 Risse 2000, 13.

211 Jokinen 1999, 135-136.

212 Jokinen 1999, 138-139.

213 Billig 1996, 217.

with someone else's argument. It is especially valuable to show that someone with prestige supports the argument: therefore specialists' statements and research results are beneficial.²¹⁴ The expert can be the speaker himself, or an outsider²¹⁵. The heads of the UN weapons inspections in Iraq, Mr Blix and Mr El Baradei, for example, were frequently but selectively cited.

6. *“The facts speak for themselves.”* In this strategy, arguments are made to appear as facts that are independent of the speaker and his interpretations. Speaking about facts downplays the role and responsibility of actors; facts are what they are, and they must be accepted. All alternatives are unrealistic, the only possible or wise response is the one argued for.²¹⁶

7. *Persuading with details and narratives:* by telling detailed descriptions and placing them as parts of a narrative of the events one can give an authentic and truthful impression. With a detailed description one can make the audience do the desired categorization themselves, and appear as someone respectable who sticks to the facts and does not throw mud on others.²¹⁷ Pleading authentic, personal presence and observations is convincing, since outsiders have not “been there and seen that”. Concrete, descriptive details strengthen the impression of authenticity. The speaker has been present as an observer, not as a participant, and anyone could have observed the same neutral facts. The one or a few cases described in detail can be made to represent a larger number of cases, the amount of details making it easy to forget about principles of statistical generalization.²¹⁸ On the other hand, critics may examine the details and undermine their consistency. Therefore, a vague or formulaic account may be preferable, providing just enough information to sustain some action but not providing claims that critics could undermine.²¹⁹

8. *Quantification:* presenting things with numbers creates an impression of certain, uncontroversial information. One can quantify with numbers, percentages, shares, and so on, or verbally by using words like *small, big, smaller, bigger, marginal* or *huge*. It is interesting to study how different dimensions of examination are used to make small numbers appear even smaller in order to support

214 Jokinen 1999, 138-139.

215 Juhila 1993, 178.

216 Jokinen 1999, 140-141.

217 Jokinen 1999, 144-145.

218 Juhila 1993, 158-163.

219 Potter 1996, 118.

the argument, and vice versa.²²⁰ Quantification is at its strongest in *all* or *none* arguments. Even if there are only two examples of a certain pattern occurring, it can be argued that all cases follow the pattern – all of the two did. Big numbers can be impressive.²²¹

9. *Extreme expressions* such as *every time, never, fully, certainly not, forever, completely*, as well as numeric extremes already mentioned, are used to emphasize those features that one wants to get associated with the object. They either maximize or minimize some features of the object being described. They can also be used to produce an image of the regularity of some action, which is of course more serious than occasional action. However, sometimes the excessive use of extreme expressions can irritate rather than persuade the audience.²²² Even single words and phrases can create a factual impression: words and phrases emphasizing the inevitability of things, such as *naturally, exactly, of course, clearly, definitely, fact* and *real* express there is no option²²³.

10. *Metaphors*, if used successfully, can create desired connotations efficiently – without the need to make long and complex arguments²²⁴.

11. *Examples and analogies* make an argument easier to understand and to receive. Comparing one's argument with a lesson from the past (with some similarity) can demonstrate how ridiculous it is to argue otherwise.²²⁵

12. *A list of three* gives an impression of a more common pattern or regularity. If *for example* or *and so on* are added to the list, it gives an impression of a longer list of evidence.²²⁶

13. *A definitiveness strategy* persuades the audience that there is only one possible and rational way of taking care of things. The speaker may give quasi-options, options that no rational person would support and that are thus easily dismissed, to make his option appear as the only one that makes sense. Since there is only one realistic option, all speculation and discussion on the matter is unnecessary and only harmful.²²⁷ Contrast couples are two choices given, out of which the one

220 Jokinen 1999, 146-147.

221 Juhila 1993, 168-172.

222 Jokinen 1999, 150-152.

223 Juhila 1993, 155.

224 Jokinen 1999, 148-150.

225 Jokinen 1999, 153-154.

226 Jokinen 1999, 152.

227 Juhila 1993, 163-167.

argued for is loaded with positive meanings and the other with negative. Various different sets of contrast couples can be created out of any situation.²²⁸

14.Repetition and tautology are especially popular means of persuasion in advertisements. They can be studied by observing how a certain formulation or quotation is used during a discussion, how they are tied to one's own arguments and given new meanings.²²⁹

15.Preparing for an assumed counter-argument aims at preventing the opponents from using certain arguments against one's own. For example, a sentence may begin “I certainly do not oppose X, but...” or “It could be argued that X, but in fact...” – the argument follows only after the “but”. Studying what arguments the speaker tries to protect from counter-arguments and how he does it tells much about the audience he wishes to persuade.²³⁰ It may be wise to stress the importance of the whole topic, and downgrade the criticism as trivial and not befitting the importance of the topic. With this strategic move, criticism of inconsistency can be dismissed unanswered.²³¹

16.The use of irony can effectively undermine the competing argument by producing it as twisted and ridiculous. Sarcastic jokes can silence the opponent. Irony may be aimed at an argument as well as its presenter.²³²

4.CASE STUDY: EUROPEAN RESPONSES TO THE IRAQ CRISIS

My case study focuses on the period between January and March 2003. Before that, I will shortly introduce relevant earlier events.

4.1. How the Dispute over Iraq Started – Events up to 2003

In August 1990, Iraqi troops invaded the neighbouring Kuwait. At the request of Kuwait and the US, the UN Security Council met and passed a resolution condemning the occupation; another

228 Jokinen 1999, 153.

229 Jokinen 1999, 154.

230 Jokinen 1999, 154-155.

231 Billig 1996, 202-205.

232 Jokinen 1999, 156.

resolution imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. In November 1990, UNSC Resolution 678 set Iraq a deadline for withdrawal and authorized the use of force in case it does not. The US assembled a coalition of 34 countries; all the six countries included in my case study contributed either military or financial aid (Germany). After the deadline expired in January 1991, the US-led coalition attacked Iraq. Besides the occupation of Kuwait, human rights abuses and Iraqi potential to develop WMDs were used as justifications, and debate on the real motives still continues. Combat operations ended in March 1991. No-fly zones were established to protect the Kurdish and Shi'ite groups, monitored by the US, the UK and France. A UN Special Commission was established to monitor Iraqi compliance with WMD and missile restrictions. Iraq did not cooperate fully, but some evidence of a biological weapons programme was found.²³³

In 1996, the consensus over Iraq broke down publicly for the first time after the 1991 Gulf War. Iraqi troops intervened in an intra-Kurdish dispute in Northern Iraq, which had been practically autonomous and protected by US, British and French air power since 1991. Americans reacted with missile strikes, which France denounced. France withdrew from participation in the Northern Iraqi no-fly zone, saying that the US and the UK had taken the operation beyond its humanitarian purpose.²³⁴ By 1996, many Europeans, especially the French, had come to believe that the sanction on Iraq would never achieve Saddam's overthrow or his full compliance with UN resolutions. Saddam seemed capable of living with and even profiting from the sanctions regime, while it caused suffering among the Iraqi people and anti-Western resentment in the Arab world. In 1997 and 1998, the US government worked hard to reshape the containment regime and to create consensus in the UN Security Council. Three times the US also threatened to use force. The compromises that were reached all broke down quickly.²³⁵

In December 1998, the UN weapons inspectors left Iraq because of continuing Iraqi obstruction. The US and the UK did not achieve consensus in the UN but nevertheless launched a four-day air and missile strike campaign, Operation Desert Fox. The operation failed to bring Saddam's regime down and it further shattered the consensus on Iraq. France, Russia and China all condemned the

²³³ Wikipedia 10.11.2005.

²³⁴ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 40-41.

²³⁵ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 40-42.

strikes, and France withdrew its last military contributions from Iraq. However, the US was unwilling to use force without broad international support, and even after Operation Desert Fox the Clinton administration continued to seek consensus at the UN. Before September 2001, the Bush administration also followed these lines, seeking consensus on a “smart sanctions” regime. By the end of the Clinton presidency, the failure to agree on Iraq had become one of the most divisive issues in the Atlantic alliance. The clashes at the UN created a legacy of bitterness and betrayal, and Gordon and Shapiro claim that this legacy had an important impact on the split over Iraq in 2002.²³⁶

Initially the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (aka 9/11) seemed to bring the United States and Europe closer together, in a new period of transatlantic cooperation based on a common threat. At France's initiative, the UN Security Council passed a resolution offering the US any assistance necessary. However, the Bush administration did not want to risk delays or diminish US control by accepting too much international assistance. The war on terror would not be impeded by the indecision of allies.²³⁷ Snyder thinks 9/11 was an important cause of the Iraq war. It undermined America's sense of security, based on the protection of two oceans, and its commitment to freedom as an open immigration-based society. Eliminating the Taliban regime in Afghanistan could not match the crime of 9/11.²³⁸ Many Americans also genuinely believed that Iraq had something to do with the 9/11 attacks. “For Americans, September 11 changed the world; for Europeans, it changed America”: while the Americans tended to see the world almost exclusively through the lens of international terrorism, Europeans still focused on the consequences of the end of the Cold War.²³⁹

Marsh and Mackenstein claim that the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to some re-nationalization of EU states' foreign policies. The US encouraged this by mostly circumventing the CFSP apparatus and dealing with national capitals directly. Divisions within the EU developed quickly. Responses to 9/11 re-opened the Atlanticist – Europeanist division, previously subsumed within the St Malo process. Military action in Afghanistan refocused attention on the pacifist, neutralist and militarist broad groupings within the EU.²⁴⁰

236 Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 42-44.

237 Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 59, 62-63.

238 Snyder 2003, 656-657.

239 Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 84.

240 Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 96.

In his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002, Bush declared that he “will not wait on events, while dangers gather. [...] The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.” This doctrine of “pre-emption” was later formalized in the National Security Strategy (of September 2002), and its first operational use was against Iraq.²⁴¹ In his address, Bush denounced the “axis of evil” (Iraq, Iran, North Korea) that posed a danger by trying to acquire WMDs that they might provide to terrorists. A message to US allies was also included: Bush hoped all governments would join eliminating the terrorist threat, but even if some of them hesitated America would act. The speech confirmed the worst fears of many Europeans. Bush focused on military issues such as the need for large increase in defence spending and spoke in the Manichean terms of good and evil. The pre-emption doctrine indicated that the Bush administration's simplistic foreign policy approach was reducing everything to the military aspects of the war on terrorism.²⁴² Gordon and Shapiro claim that the Bush administration decided to end Saddam Hussein's reign, by force if necessary, already in early 2002 with little input from the allies. At latest in January 2003 President Bush decided that force would be used, and deployed massive military forces to the Gulf region.²⁴³ The US Congress authorized the use of force against Iraq in October 2002, even unilateral and/or pre-emptive action²⁴⁴.

The British Prime Minister Tony Blair had supported all previous US military actions against Iraq, and had taken a clear moral stand on defending human rights and confronting dictators. However, Blair felt that the only way to get domestic support for a war was to get UN approval. Colin Powell also favoured taking the case to the UN, and the French position seemed to promise that a tough new resolution was possible. Speaking at the UN on 12 September 2002, Bush challenged the organization to enforce its resolutions and said, to the relief of Europeans, that the US will work with the Security Council for the necessary resolutions. This led to eight weeks of difficult negotiations.²⁴⁵ Finally, on 8 November 2002, UNSC Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously. However, the unity was illusory: the resolution was an effort to reconcile different views, and it only provided a mechanism for the scenarios of either full non-compliance or full compliance – no

²⁴¹ Lansford 2005, xix-xx.

²⁴² Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 66-68.

²⁴³ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 9.

²⁴⁴ Lansford 2005, xx.

²⁴⁵ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 106-108.

mechanism to agree whether Iraq was complying or not. In legal terms, Resolution 1441 consisted of two contradictory resolutions in one. Saddam Hussein's response revealed the divide within the international community: he convinced France and others that war was not necessary, and the US and Britain that war was the only remaining option.²⁴⁶ In December 2002, Iraq submitted its weapons declaration, consisting mostly of old and incomplete data. Nobody was satisfied with this response, but the views on what to do about it differed. The French and British did not agree with the US view that a “material breach” of Resolution 1441 had taken place and war was authorized.²⁴⁷

The true reasons behind the Iraq war are heavily contested. They are not the main issue of this thesis, but I will briefly introduce some points. What exactly were the Europeans for or against? According to Snyder, the true goals of the Iraq war were *punishing the larger Arab world* for 9/11 (and sympathies for Osama bin Laden), demonstrating American power and resolve to *deter terrorists and rogue states*, and spreading *democracy*. The Bush administration failed to justify the war largely because it would not admit the real reasons for it.²⁴⁸ Had the Bush administration's main goal been preventing terrorist from getting WMDs, there would have been more likely donor countries than Iraq. However, Snyder does not agree with such alleged true reasons of the war as a US aim to create an empire, protecting Israel, or oil.²⁴⁹ Oil was a relevant factor in the sense that it made the Gulf a strategic region for the US and the West, but considering the huge costs of the war and the post-war reconstruction, security and humanitarian needs, the war is not an economic bargain for the US. Bush and Vice President Cheney do have close relationships with the energy sector, but starting a war halfway around the world would not be the likely simply to help the President's friends.²⁵⁰ Instead, Snyder argues that irrational feelings and some kind of an obsession with Iraq influenced the Bush administration's decision-making. Many regretted that Saddam had not been removed from office in 1991. Since the US has overwhelming power, there is no need to contain regimes in rogue states like Iraq when simply eliminating them is possible.²⁵¹

In early February 2003, Colin Powell introduced evidence of the alleged Iraqi WMDs to the UN

²⁴⁶ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 112-114.

²⁴⁷ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 115-119.

²⁴⁸ Snyder 2003, 653-654.

²⁴⁹ Snyder 2003, 655-656.

²⁵⁰ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 80-82.

²⁵¹ Snyder 2003, 658.

Security Council. The US estimated that Iraq had 100-500 tons of forbidden chemical weapons, and president Hussein had also permitted their use. In addition, Iraq had two of the three basic components needed to build an atomic bomb. Powell said US intelligence had proved the connections between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda, and that Saddam has turned Iraq into a safe haven for it.²⁵² The Bush administration's exaggeration of Iraqi WMD capabilities, well beyond what the UN weapons inspectors and other intelligence agencies thought, created problems. When it turned out that many confident American claims were not true, American credibility was further damaged. Europeans had been berated for not going to war to eliminate an Iraqi WMD capability that did not exist.²⁵³ Some members of the "Coalition of the Willing", who participated in exaggerating Iraqi WMD capabilities, have later accused the US of deceiving them.

It is puzzling why Saddam Hussein did not cooperate fully with the UN, even if we know today that he actually had nothing to hide. The head of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix, has made some guesses. One point is that because Saddam had repeatedly heard from the Americans that only his resignation would lead to the dropping of sanctions, he had no motive to cooperate with the weapons inspectors. It is humiliating to have to let inspectors into targets that are important signs of state sovereignty, and Iraq may have wanted to keep facilities with conventional weapons in secrecy. Furthermore, maybe the Iraqi regime did not mind that others believed it had dangerous weapons.²⁵⁴

Another issue that puzzles me is that leaders of established democracies acted against the will of their electorate and supported the use of force. The Iraq war faced opposition all over the world. For example, in mid-January 2003 people marched against the war in 18 different countries: in Japan, Russia, the Middle East, Europe and the US²⁵⁵. In mid-February, some of the largest public protests in decades took place in Europe: almost one million people gathered in London, the largest protest in British history, as well as nearly one million in both Barcelona and Madrid, and even more in Rome²⁵⁶. Then what is the value of public opinion in foreign policy decision-making? According to the traditionalist or realist view, public opinion is irrational and volatile. The average citizen is

252 YLE 6.2.2003

253 Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 169-170.

254 Blix 2004, 301-2.

255 YLE 18.1.2003.

256 Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 144.

usually indifferent to the topic, ill-informed and led by irrational impulses, and therefore hardly able to make rational decisions. A good foreign policy decision-making process is *not* a democratic one. Public opinion often has an impact on policy-making in democracies, and this causes democratic foreign policy to be incoherent and erratic. For example, the Spanish leaders stated that they act responsibly by confronting terrorists (and their sponsor Saddam). The liberal Kantian view, in contrast, claims that public opinion is a force of peace and reasonableness - and because it does not have much impact, current foreign policy is reckless and bellicose.²⁵⁷

4.2. The Opposition: France and Germany

Economic interests were used to explain French and German positions. Both countries had once had significant trade relations with Iraq, but twelve years of sanctions on Iraq had reduced business interests to a minimum: in fact, the US was a far bigger importer of Iraqi oil. If commercial interests and cynicism had really been the main factors behind French and German policy, they should have chosen to join the coalition and get a share of the spoils. Anti-Americanism, the negative image of Bush and resentment of many of his policies, did contribute to the opposition on Iraq, but this does not explain why some European governments chose to support the war and others not. Only 17 months earlier France and Germany strongly supported using force in Afghanistan. For France and Russia, and increasingly Germany, the debate about Iraq was also a question of world order and a test of how an increasingly powerful United States would accommodate allied views after 9/11.²⁵⁸

Mihalka claims that the German SPD-Green coalition had to take an anti-war position to win the elections of September 2002, since 80 % of Germans opposed a war in the absence of a concrete threat scenario. Thus France, which tends to oppose the US more or less actively, gained a major ally and did not have to passively go along with US policies. Belgium and Luxembourg would not have opposed the US on their own.²⁵⁹ However, as early as July 2002, Chirac announced that:

“As for the Middle East problem, sadly, it is of course complex and Germany and France have, as for Iraq, a common position. (...) We are convinced that there's no way out through

²⁵⁷ Everts 2001, 2-3, 10.

²⁵⁸ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 77-80.

²⁵⁹ Mihalka 2005, 293.

violence, that it's only through a political agreement that the violence can be stopped and the way paved for an agreement."²⁶⁰

After the Cold War, the EU has been at the heart of French foreign policy. According to the French strategy, a strengthened EU could prevent the unified Germany from dominating European affairs and also countervail the hegemonic US. The premises of this strategy are various. First, the US contribution to maintaining international stability is seen as valuable, but its hegemony not as wholly benign. Second, French interests, as well as those of the world community, are best served by attempting to constrain the US. France is a permanent member of the UNSC, highly influential in the EU, and has a deep tradition of active engagement in world affairs, and thus has both the opportunity and a perceived obligation to lead the promotion of a multipolar international system. Third, France could serve as a pole of attraction for countries who share its suspicions about uncontrolled American power. Fourth, such a strategy can be compatible with friendly relations with the US.²⁶¹

France has been less comfortable with the US dominant world position than its other European allies, partly because of its self-image that will not allow a role of a subordinate²⁶². Tensions exist between the declared priority of Europeanizing foreign policy, which binds Germany to the Union but limits France's margins for manoeuvre, and the desire to maintain France's status as a world power²⁶³. The Franco-German axis is viable also in the CFSP field. France has a very strong position in the EU, but its self-promotion and arrogance do not easily attract supporters, and the accession of new member countries in 2004 moves the Union's centre toward the East. France has a strong position in its former colonies in Western and Northern Africa, and the Mediterranean remains a central foreign policy focus.²⁶⁴

France's security concerns "begin at home": there are 5-7 million Muslims living in France, many of which are economically, politically and socially marginalized. The potential of unrest (which turned into rioting in immigrant-populated suburbs in November 2005) among French Muslims is

²⁶⁰ Chirac 30.7.2002.

²⁶¹ Brenner 2003, 198-199.

²⁶² Brenner 2003, 199.

²⁶³ de La Serre 1996, 35-36.

²⁶⁴ Kivinen 2003, 73-74.

one reason why Chirac has attempted to portray France as favourable toward Arab and Muslim causes. The French government opposed the 1998 Operation Desert Fox and the 2003 Iraq war and has a diplomatic tilt toward the Palestinians. France has nevertheless cooperated with the US to weaken Al-Qaeda: it has helped hunt down Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, conducted joint naval operations targeting terrorist transport networks, and collaborated in intelligence, judicial and police capabilities.²⁶⁵ In February 2003, Britain and France renewed their collaboration to develop ESDP, laying out an ambitious plan despite their antithetical positions over the Iraq crisis²⁶⁶.

In the Iraq crisis, it was clear from the beginning that activating CFSP to have the full weight of the EU behind the French position was impossible, since Tony Blair's support for the US ruled out an anti-war consensus. Chirac still attempted to represent the French position as the European one, "in name if not in fact." The French distrust of President Bush was widely shared in Europe and elsewhere, which emboldened President Chirac to assume the role he and much of the French elite aspired to: the champion of enlightened international principles.²⁶⁷

Advancing German interests through the EU has long been a deciding theme in German Europapolitik. The feeling of younger generations is that such a "German way", similar to the French and British ways of advancing their interests, is only practised now, as expressed by Schröder's anti-war election rhetoric.²⁶⁸ Germany is the biggest EU member country and also the most pacifist one. A central goal is a European Germany, that is totally different from the earlier one. Peace politics enjoys wide support among the voters.²⁶⁹ Germany's defence spending has declined significantly, and further cuts are planned. Americans have criticized this policy as having profound impacts on the capabilities of NATO as a whole.²⁷⁰ Traditionally, the Germans have concentrated more on trade, monetary and financial issues and less on foreign policy, security or defence in their Europapolitik. Like the Federal Republic, the Community has been perceived as an economic giant and a political dwarf.²⁷¹ Most likely Germany will emphasize the civilian aspects of

265 Pauly 2005, 6, 11-13.

266 Brenner 2003, 200.

267 Brenner 2003, 202-203.

268 von Kyaw 2004, 97.

269 Kivinen 2003, 74-5.

270 Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 91.

271 Rummel 1996, 47.

security also in the future. Problems such as protecting the environment and economic globalization emphasize the meaning of the soft aspects of the CFSP that Germany has promoted.²⁷² The respect for and the implementation of human rights is one of the fields where Germany tries to strengthen its international profile²⁷³.

The German Westbindung, or western orientation, has been based on European integration and special relationship with France on the one hand, and on a strong commitment to NATO alliance and transatlantic relationship on the other. According to the principle of “equal distance”, the partnership with France should not undermine the transatlantic partnership. Being a trustworthy ally of the US proved to be a wise policy: it enabled the reunited Germany to join NATO despite the suspicions of the British, French and others.²⁷⁴ German interests demand a strong Europe that functions both internally and outwards, and Germany's contribution is of crucial importance, because it is the biggest member state. Von Kyaw argues that the German foreign and Europe policy has lost its long-term direction, and become less predictable. Nurturing the special Franco-German relationship should not be allowed to damage the transatlantic relationship or the EU's internal cohesion. Germany needs to develop more sensibility toward its other partners besides France, especially the small and the new of them.²⁷⁵ CFSP will remain be the most important framework for German foreign and security policy. Rummel claims that a “German politician would never use the notion of 'independence' in connection with the Federal Republic's foreign policy.” However, relations with Paris and with Washington have been more important than consultations within EPC or CFSP.²⁷⁶

In 1998, after Iraq had expelled UN weapons inspectors, Germany did not participate in the US-British bombing campaign. In September 2002, Schröder ruled out German participation in a war against Iraq, even if it had UN mandate. He rallied support with his “German way” of not participating in “adventures”. Some Germans were concerned this would cause isolation and harm the predictability and reliability that had driven German security policy, but the overwhelming

272 Kivinen 2003, 76.

273 Rummel 1996, 55.

274 von Kyaw 2004, 98.

275 von Kyaw 2004, 101-103.

276 Rummel 1996, 48, 60.

majority of Germans opposed the war.²⁷⁷ Thus, Schröder abandoned the Atlanticism he had pursued earlier, for example strongly supporting American-led military actions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. It was surprising that Germany was the first to depart from alliance norms, because it has a strong tradition of trying to join a consensus both within Europe and across the Atlantic. It was against everything Germany had stood for since the founding of the Federal Republic.²⁷⁸ For Germany, CFSP is normally something to be done in cooperation with the US, and not something to be developed into a counterweight to the US²⁷⁹.

EU enlargement will strengthen Germany's position and there is also a new generation in power, which is less bound by the burden of the past.²⁸⁰ Over the past years, Germany has accepted more international responsibility in order to be seen as predictable and dependable, as well as to gain more influence. German historical experiences also matter: Germany participated in active combat in Kosovo partly to prevent genocide. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the concept of German responsibility widened to cover new threat levels and operations outside Europe. Germany deployed troops to support Operation Enduring Freedom, solidifying its role as a responsible, global player, a normal democracy that had left the shadows of WWII behind. There was some opposition among the public, but wide acceptance among German leaders. Brunstetter claims that Germany's position on Iraq was the best representation of its self-confidence and sovereignty in international security issues. Germany continues to support the war against terrorism, but its participation has limits when diplomatic means remain and there is no clear mandate.²⁸¹

Besides the alleged existence of WMDs, Americans used historical analogies to justify the war: comparing Saddam Hussein with Hitler demonstrated the historical duty to humanitarian intervention against terror regimes. Vogel thinks this was specially targeted at German criticism.²⁸² A year after the Iraq invasion, US-German relations had improved and they shared the goal of rebuilding war-torn areas. Nevertheless, Brunstetter believes that the partnership will never be as

²⁷⁷ Brunstetter 2005, 28-29.

²⁷⁸ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 10, 175.

²⁷⁹ Kivinen 2003, 76.

²⁸⁰ Kivinen 2003, 75.

²⁸¹ Brunstetter 2005, 31-33.

²⁸² Vogel 2003, 28.

smooth again as in the past.²⁸³ Germany ended up contributing more to the Iraq war than many who officially supported it. It gave the US basing and overflight rights, maintained chemical and biological warfare detection vehicles in Kuwait, and deployed antimissile defence systems to Turkey. Despite all that Germany was compared with Libya or Cuba rather than thanked for its contributions.²⁸⁴

An extremely simplified chain of events in the intra-EU dispute (in early 2003) starts with the Elysée Treaty anniversary declaration which was perceived as arrogant. This leads to the Letter of Eight putting France and Germany back in their place, after which both sides consistently advocate their views. The joint declaration of Chirac and Schröder on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty (22.1.2003) emphasizes the importance of Franco-German friendship and its contribution to building Europe. “France and Germany are aware that they exercise a historic joint responsibility to support and pursue the building of Europe. Their ambition is to continue their role of initiating proposals, without imposing anything, and so giving a lead to their partners.” The declaration emphasizes also the importance of strengthening the EU and its common foreign, security and defence policies (CFSP and ESDP) “so that the Union can take on its full role in the international arena and promote at world level freedom, peace and democracy in accordance with its values”.²⁸⁵ The declaration does not mention Iraq, the US or transatlantic relations, but it strongly (over)emphasizes the Franco-German leadership and initiatives, which annoyed the Spanish and British leaders. They wanted to demonstrate that there are other countries and opinions in Europe, and did it in the form of the Letter of Eight.

French officials were keen to underplay differences and emphasize unity. In January, de Villepin emphasized cooperation among European Security Council members, France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Germany. Europe has a clear position, that of disarming Iraq.²⁸⁶ A month later, Raffarin noted the in the special European Council of 17.2.2003, common ground was found on the essentials: the goal is to disarm Iraq, everyone recognizes the UN Security Council's role and opts for the peaceful route, the use of force is only the last resort. There were differences only over

²⁸³ Brunstetter 2005, 33-34.

²⁸⁴ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 171.

²⁸⁵ France and Germany 22.1.2003.

²⁸⁶ de Villepin 28.1.2003.

methods. The building of political Europe must not be overshadowed by the crisis, the EU has coped with difficulties before.²⁸⁷ Fischer admits that there are differing views in the EU, with France and Germany on one side and Great Britain and Spain on the other. Those were not sorted out by the common EU declaration, but it is important that this common position was found. Europe is capable of acting. In the declaration, most important is that it underlines the peaceful disarmament of Iraq, not that it does not rule out the last resort. The declaration states that violence should be used only as the last resort, and the war is not unavoidable. Fischer considers this a very good formulation.²⁸⁸ As the interviewer suggests that CFSP lays in ruins, Fischer calls this a strange statement. It is strange, because it concerns a process in development, and because the EU was not built for war and peace. The crisis poses a great challenge for everyone, not only for Europe. Fischer claims he said already after 9/11 that EU is not yet ready for such crises, but he thinks that a common European identity can emerge from the crises. The peoples of member states seem to be further in this: the great anti-war demonstrations were an all-European, even global event. It is important to note that they were not anti-American demonstrations; the generation that was out on the streets is deeply bound to America.²⁸⁹

Fischer does not agree with his interviewer's suggestion that the Letter of Eight would have opened a divide in Europe over relations with America. Europe does not define itself against the US, for this they have too much in common. What is needed is more Europe, not less USA. Fischer does not have a problem with the substance of the Letter of Eight, but he does not agree on the method of its expression: when one is of different opinion, that must be settled in the framework of the Community method. Europe will always have different views on important matters, and that is not bad at all: exactly these many differences are Europe. Nobody wants France and Germany to dominate Europe.²⁹⁰ But who is of different opinion, whose is the standard? France and Germany did not use Community methods to express their anti-war positions.

On the day of the Letter of Eight's publication, the Vilnius 10 group (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania) received a draft for their

²⁸⁷ Raffarin 26.2.2003.

²⁸⁸ Fischer 20.2.2003.

²⁸⁹ Fischer 20.2.2003.

²⁹⁰ Fischer 20.2.2003.

own declaration. It was more explicit in its support for US policy than the Letter of Eight, and meant to convince American senators who were to vote on the NATO accession of these countries. The draft was written by Bruce Jackson, “a sort of freelance envoy to the Soviet bloc [...] with considerable, if ill-defined, influence within the Bush administration”. The Vilnius 10 countries were to take it or leave it, only minor changes were possible. Mr Jackson was also involved in the Letter of Eight, and the White House as a whole was well informed about both letters, even if they officially came as welcome surprises.²⁹¹ The letter of the Vilnius 10 was issued on 5 February 2003, and it was even more irritating than the Letter of Eight for the French and Germans. A major annoyance was the signatories' reference to the “compelling evidence” of Iraqi WMDs presented by Colin Powell to the UN – Powell made this presentation only a day after the letter was finalized, so none of signatories had seen this evidence.

Chirac noted, in passive tense, that the Letter of Eight was seen to create a crisis in Europe and to be at odds with the CFSP. However, he thinks it is of no consequence, but the Vilnius 10 statement is different. EU candidate countries acted irresponsibly when they signed it, because EU membership and good manners require a minimum of consideration and consultation with others. They missed a good opportunity to remain silent. He calls the candidate countries' behaviour not nice, childish, and “reckless of the risks of falling too quickly into line with the US position”. It is also dangerous, because it will create hostility in the EU15; he reminds them that all the member states have to ratify the enlargements. It is more acceptable for EU members to sign such letters, because “when you're already in the family you have more rights”.²⁹² Gordon and Shapiro argue that Chirac was, ironically, furious with the Central Europeans for exactly the same offence that he committed in the eyes of the Americans and the British: disloyalty to those who considered themselves as the natural leaders of the alliance.²⁹³

De Villepin repeatedly refers to the Americans as “our American friends”, and notes that France and the US have been friends for 225 years. There are differences but relations remain particularly close. They have the same prime concern: to disarm Iraq. Like France, the US has chosen the UN,

²⁹¹ The Financial Times 28.5.2003.

²⁹² Chirac 17.2.2003.

²⁹³ Gordon & Shapiro 2004, 132-134.

collective security and responsibility. Unity of the international community, and its mobilization in the form of diplomacy and American military pressure can shake Iraq's resolve.²⁹⁴ Thus, de Villepin considers it acceptable and within international law that the US and Britain sent troops near Iraq. That is an element of pressure, but if Americans go further and take unilateral action, France will not be able to join it.²⁹⁵

Fischer thinks a sustainable, peaceful order for the 21st century requires both the UN and the US. One of its supporting pillars will be the transatlantic zone of peace, but this requires Europe to become stronger. Currently we are in a transformation phase that does not question the transatlantic relationship in itself, or its institutions, but makes clear the need to develop them further. The stronger Europe becomes, the more important its voice will be in its partnership with the US. This partnership is irreplaceable.²⁹⁶ According to Voigt, the expectation in Europe is that the Iraq crisis is about setting a new direction for world politics, and who will have a say about it. He thinks this is already decided, the US is the only world power. For the Americans, the Iraq crisis is about reorganizing the Middle East, not the world.²⁹⁷ The monopoly of violence must remain at the Security Council, but Fischer does not see any incompatibility between the power of the US and the UN: both are needed for a peaceful world²⁹⁸.

Raffarin repeats several times that the unity of the international community is important, and France consistently works to preserve it. The freedom of France to make its own decisions is compatible with this. Differences over Iraq must not undermine the strength of the Franco-American relationship. The sympathy and solidarity which emerged after 9/11 has not wavered. France and the US share objectives in Iraq, and only disagree on how to achieve them.²⁹⁹ However, de Villepin notes that respect toward friends is needed. Much of the blame and criticism Bush and the US have given France is unfair. France wants to act responsibly, and French officials have avoided criticizing in order to make the coming hours and days as little painful as possible. France and the

294 de Villepin 16.2.2003.

295 de Villepin 28.1.2003.

296 Fischer 20.2.2003.

297 Voigt 7.2.2003.

298 Fischer 26.2.2003.

299 Raffarin 26.2.2003.

US will continue to fight terrorism, regional crises and proliferation together within the UN.³⁰⁰ Similarly, Voigt advises “rhetorical disarmament” on both sides, Germany and the US. One should concentrate on the issues that can be solved, and bear in mind that the US and Germany agree on their judgement of Saddam. In most cases, such as Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia, Germany and the US stand side by side not only with words but also deeds.³⁰¹

Fischer tells that he is deeply bound with the US, and that the everyday culture his generation is much influenced by it, as well as its understanding of democracy. One must not forget the freeing from National Socialism, nor Cold War, Berlin, German unity and the transatlantic pillar for peace and stability. Fischer does not see any alternative for transatlanticism. When there are different views with the most important partner, then those must be discussed: an alliance of free democracies should survive different views. If agreement on something is not possible, there must be tolerance. Democracy is based on policies that can convince the majority. Therefore, Fischer calls for a strategic transatlantic discussion on the Middle East and the pre-emption strategy. In that debate, it will turn out that a stronger Europe is the trustworthy ally of the US, not a weaker one. The US is strong enough to fight a war alone, but for building peace it needs the UN and strong partners, above all Europe.³⁰² There is no axis that could be an alternative to the transatlantic partnership, and similarly bound Germany is in the European integration process. In a partnership of democracies it is natural that there are differences, and that they are discussed.³⁰³

The French note that there are other problems in the world than Iraq³⁰⁴. Moreover, winning a war in Iraq may be quick, but what about winning peace, stability and unity? Divisions in the international stage are also harmful, for example for solving the Israel-Arab conflict.³⁰⁵ Fischer does not believe that a war and a long-term presence of a strong Western army would start a wave of democratization in the Middle East. The Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflicts play a major role in the area. Everything must be done to find a cooperative solution, and the US, the UN and

300 de Villepin 19.3.2003.

301 Voigt 7.2.2003.

302 Fischer 20.2.2003.

303 Fischer 26.2.2003.

304 de Villepin 16.2.2003, Raffarin 26.2.2003.

305 de Villepin 16.2.2003.

Europe are needed.³⁰⁶ Fischer says that France and Germany, as well as Iraq's neighbour states, are doing everything to convince Saddam Hussein that he must cooperate fully and disarm. However, he is not sure if this attempt will be successful.³⁰⁷ Fischer sees the consequences of a possible war as highly risky, especially for Europe because of its unchangeable geopolitical location close to the Middle East. Others are no longer directly affected after they draw their troops from the region, but the Middle East will always be Europe's neighbour, and its problems always Europe's problems.³⁰⁸

Germany will not participate in a military action and will do everything to reach a peaceful implementation of Resolution 1441. Before setting any ultima ratio, all other means have to be explored. That is what the UN Charter says.³⁰⁹ Fischer notes that the current federal government has decided for military action three times during its existence. This time they are not convinced. Fischer does not see why we should stop the inspections process, and a new resolution would mean stopping the implementation of 1441. That is why the German government is against it. Fischer notes that Iraq is at the moment more controlled than ever, and its capability to harm others is smaller than ever.³¹⁰

Resolution 1441 is perfectly clear: inspections must continue to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, *insofar as there are any*. There is no indisputable proof of WMDs. Nothing at the moment justifies a war, and the region truly does not need another war. This is the opinion of the of a large majority of people and world leaders.³¹¹ Inspections have progressed without any incidents since November, and are starting to produce results. There is no proof of WMD programmes in Iraq. War is the last resort, and if the inspections fail, France has never ruled out the use of force to enforce law. France is not a pacifist country, but in present circumstances the use of force is not justified.³¹²

De Villepin claims that 1991-98 inspections in Iraq worked, more weapons were destroyed than during the Gulf War. He also draws an analogy with South Africa, which disarmed peacefully.

306 Fischer 20.2.2003.

307 Fischer 5.2.2003.

308 Fischer 13.3.2003.

309 Fischer 20.2.2003.

310 Fischer 26.2.2003.

311 Chirac 10.2.2003.

312 Raffarin 26.2.2003.

(This is an interesting opposite to the Polish analogy of pacifism and concessions to Hitler.) According to de Villepin, the US has a new sense of vulnerability and believes its security is at stake in Iraq; he thinks that security is at stake elsewhere. A war against Iraq could lead to an out-of-control spiral of similar wars elsewhere. Inspections are more effective and legitimate.³¹³ As long as the inspections work, there is no need for any new approach (UNSC Resolution). France will use its freedom to make its own assessment, meaning France will veto a new draft resolution. De Villepin is notably reluctant to say this clearly.³¹⁴ “Only if the inspections fail, let's consider other options [...] can't rush things”³¹⁵. Fischer claims he sees no appeasement policy in Iraq, but a containment policy that works. He questions any connection between 9/11 and Iraq. When we have no concrete threat, but an abstract expectation that is used as a ground for military attack, we get a balance problem in the future world order. He notes that the justifications have changed: first it was 9/11, then the threat of nuclear armament, then the threat of biological and chemical weapons, now it is about humanitarian intervention to remove a horrible dictator. This has made the German government increasingly sceptical.³¹⁶

The joint declaration of France, Germany and Russia on 10 February 2003 notes that there is a debate over the means to achieve the common aim of the international community, to disarm Iraq. “This debate must continue in the spirit of friendship that characterizes our relations with the United States and other countries.” UNSC Resolution 1441 provides a framework whose possibilities have not yet been thoroughly explored. The inspections have already yielded results, and France, Germany and Russia favour the substantial strengthening of their human and technical capabilities. The Iraqi regime must cooperate actively. Finally, “Russia, Germany and France note that the position they express reflects that of a large number of countries, particularly within the Security Council.”³¹⁷

Fischer claims that on 11 September, the post-Cold War phase ended. The new strategic threat is composed of religious hatred, national rivalry leading to nationalistic confrontation, weapons of

313 de Villepin 16.2.2003.

314 de Villepin 28.1.2003.

315 de Villepin 16.2.2003, 28.1.2003.

316 Fischer 13.3.2003.

317 France, Germany & Russia 10.2.2003.

mass destruction, and terrorism. A war against Iraq could have unintended consequences and unleash all these.³¹⁸ To accord primacy to the doctrine of pre-emption over principles of legitimate defence would rock the international order and undermine collective security and multilateralism³¹⁹. France agrees with the US goal of disarmament, but the idea of regime change is not acceptable: who should decide what regime is good or bad? It would bring instability into international relations.³²⁰ Eliminating WMDs could justify an intervention and is of general interest, whereas regime change means that one or more countries assume the right to intervene and change regimes they do not like.³²¹ There are other proliferation issues, such as North Korea, and therefore we have to act legitimately through the UNSC to be effective³²². The threat of the spiralling use of force worries the international community³²³. We may become captives of an automatics of having the military march in. One has to always think about the alternatives, war means that many innocent people will suffer and die. In addition, Iraq is in one of the most dangerous regions of the world, with a dangerous regional conflict.³²⁴ Fischer has doubts about a policy of negotiating with North Korea but not with Iraq. This could be understood by all the rogues of the world: if you have a nuclear weapon, we will negotiate, if you do not, no negotiation. This will increase the risk of proliferation.³²⁵

Raffarin argues that France is fighting to uphold international law, and people's confidence in it is at stake. The UN embodies the respect for international law, and it is important to rely on it. Global threats like terrorism, WMD proliferation, and organized crime demand collective action, the path of using force is not shorter or more certainly successful. Therefore, international law and collective responsibility are the conscious choices of France. Global threats exist because of and are fuelled by resentments and frustrations stirred up by persistent crises. We must combat them by striking at their root causes: to create a safer, fairer and more prosperous world. War could divide the international community and accentuate splits and tensions also in Iraq and the whole complex

³¹⁸ Fischer 20.2.2003.

³¹⁹ Raffarin 26.2.2003.

³²⁰ de Villepin 16.2.2003.

³²¹ Chirac 17.2.2003.

³²² de Villepin 28.1.2003.

³²³ de Villepin 19.3.2003.

³²⁴ Fischer 26.2.2003.

³²⁵ Fischer 13.3.2003.

region. Most countries and people support the French position.³²⁶ The German position was often dismissed as election rhetoric, but Fischer claims that the federal government told its American partners about its deep scepticism and worry from the beginning, long before the election campaign began. The German government's position is based on its concern about the long-term risks, namely humanitarian risks, regional stability, and consequences for the fight against terrorism and on the anti-terror coalition staying together.³²⁷

On 16 February 2003, NATO Defence Planning Committee's 18 members reached agreement, after two months of arguing. The US had never before made supporting its out-of-area operations a test for loyalty to NATO, but this time it did push a role for NATO even if the same tasks, such as defending Turkey, could have been done on a bilateral basis. This way the Bush administration made life difficult for Schröder by undermining his anti-war position: Germany had to vote yes to the deployment. Germany had long depended on NATO and did not want to damage it.³²⁸ Clearly in response to this, a joint statement of Belgium, France and Germany reaffirms their determination to honour their NATO obligations, notably regarding Turkey, and reaffirms the importance they attribute to the transatlantic relationship. Following Turkey's request, Belgium and Germany have agreed to the NATO Secretary General's proposal to "invite the military authorities to provide military advice on prudent defensive contingency planning in support of Turkey. [...] The decision by NATO does not in any way prejudge the ongoing efforts by Belgium, France and Germany to continue to work within the framework of UNSCR 1441."³²⁹

Probably his domestic audience in mind, Fischer denies that Germany is militarily involved in the conflict. Germany will not deny assistance to its allies, Turkey and Israel will be sent rockets. There are German aircraft in Turkey for purely defensive purposes in the framework of NATO. Germans will guard the American bases in Germany. The German forces in Kuwait, as those in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa, are there in the framework of the fight against terrorism. Fischer notes that Germany has become the second biggest troop contributor in the world, spending two billion euro for this, not to mention putting German lives at risk. Fischer would like to see some who criticize

³²⁶ Raffarin 26.2.2003.

³²⁷ Fischer 13.3.2003.

³²⁸ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 139-141.

³²⁹ France, Germany & Belgium 16.2.2003.

Germany to contribute that much.³³⁰

The French-Russian-German Memorandum (24.2.2003) declares that full disarmament of Iraq remains the imperative objective of the international community. The authors' priority is to achieve this peacefully through the inspections regime. No evidence has been given that Iraq still possesses WMDs or capabilities in this field. The inspections are functioning well and have already produced results. Iraqi cooperation is improving, while not yet fully satisfactory, as the chief inspectors say in their latest report. The Security Council must give a real chance to the peaceful settlement of the crisis. First, a clear programme for the inspections is needed, defining the most important remaining tasks. What is required of Iraq shall be clearly defined. This would oblige Iraq to cooperate more actively, and also provide the Council means to assess its cooperation. Second, the inspections should be reinforced. Third, a realistic and rigorous timeline should be set for the inspections and assessment. The combination of reinforced inspections, clear programmes of action and timelines, and the military build-up provide a realistic way to reunite the UNSC and exert maximal pressure on Iraq.³³¹

On 15 March 2003, Russia, Germany and France once again reaffirm that nothing justifies abandoning inspections and resorting to force. The inspections are producing results, Iraq's disarmament is "under way". The signatories refer to their memorandum to achieve key disarmament tasks within a tight timetable, which is also supported by China. Similar suggestions have been made by other UNSC members, and on the basis of these the Council's unity can be maintained. "A special responsibility falls to every Security Council member to avoid its division at this crucial moment." The peaceful route is supported by the vast majority of the international community, and adopted as a priority by the UNSC; all Council members should make every effort to ensure that the peaceful route prevails.³³²

Chirac's statement on the war after it had begun is rather moralistic. Chirac hopes there will be as little bloodshed as possible, and no humanitarian catastrophe. As if in comparison, it repeats the French principles of the primacy of law, fairness, dialogue between peoples and respect for others,

³³⁰ Fischer 26.2.2003.

³³¹ France, Germany & Russia 24.2.2003.

³³² France, Germany & Russia 15.3.2003.

wish to find long-term solutions to crises, and the UN being the only legitimate framework to build peace. He concludes that “France will not accept Europe remaining unfinished. Europe must realize the need to express its own vision of world problems and support this vision with a credible common defence.”³³³ Fischer hopes that unilateral decisions do not reoccur. It is not only a German-American question to improve their relations, but a general one, especially between Europe and the US. He thinks one of the conclusions to draw from the past months is the need to discuss open questions about the world we want to live in after 9/11. The UN was not damaged, quite the contrary: the weeks and months before war made clear its meaning for a public of millions around the world. Even if the moment is bitter since a single UNSC member decided to start a war within national competence, Fischer is optimistic that the UN will prove its necessity in building peace and stability soon.³³⁴

4.3. The Willing: the UK, Spain and Italy

Britain has an extensive set of bilateral relations, and at the same time it “continues to shoulder a heavy and mostly self-imposed burden in the “executive management of international society”. It is always prominent in multilateral decision-making and quick to take on costly responsibilities in crises. The British view is that the benefits of CFSP joint actions can only be judged on a case-by-case basis, whereas the freedom to decide for oneself is fundamental³³⁵. The biggest problem with respect to the CFSP is the UK's special relationship with the US. However, even if the basic premise of Britain, advancing its own interests, remains the same, in many cases it is better done via the EU.³³⁶ In Britain's relationship with the CFSP, Hill sees five points of tension: the desire to lead European foreign policy vs. the practical exclusion from the Franco-German partnership; the acceptance of the value of collective foreign policy-making in principle vs. the tendency to opt in and out of it in practice; the continuing British commitment to intergovernmentalism vs. views of other states that the CFSP need more of the Community method; Britain's traditional attachment to NATO and the American partnership vs. the newly evolving European defence dimension; and

³³³ Chirac 20.3.2003.

³³⁴ Fischer 19.3.2003.

³³⁵ Hill 1996, 85-86.

³³⁶ Kivinen 2003, 71-3.

procedural issues.³³⁷

The identity of Britain is problematic: is it in Europe and divided from America, or in the Anglosphere and divided from the Continent, or is it really in the multiculturalist present and divided from its British past? Britain may have more in common with other English-speaking nations, particularly Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, than it has with continental European nations. The nations of the Anglosphere share common conceptions of limited state role in the society, the free market and the independent individual.³³⁸ Over more than a thousand years, the British identity for the dominant or core people has been reinvented several times. The identity of this core began with the kingdoms of south-eastern England, expanded into England, then into Great Britain after England's union with Scotland and Ireland. In the late nineteenth century, at the time of the great worldwide expansion of the British Empire, empire became central in the British identity. After losing its empire, Britain has received a sizeable portion of it back as immigrants, mainly from India, Pakistan, the West Indies and Africa. These imperial immigrants have substantially transformed the overall population living in Britain, which is no longer quite the same as the British people.³³⁹

The UK arguably made an important difference in convincing the Bush administration to work through the UN, but the limits of this influence are also clear. The UK had to side whole-heartedly with the US with no attempt to change its objectives or means to achieve them.³⁴⁰ Kurth presents an interesting argument: some imperial institutions, the Royal Navy and the British Army, have attempted to move from their dominant roles in the British empire to prominent but subordinate roles in the American one. They have, along with the British intelligence services, experienced the benefits and frustrations of being the most loyal ally of the greatest empire. They have continued to perform well in their new transimperial roles, recently in Afghanistan and Iraq.³⁴¹

Hughes claims that it is in fact Britain that is most damaged and isolated because of its approach to Iraq. Blair was believed to be the most pro-European Prime Minister in decades, but his credentials

³³⁷ Hill 1996, 85-86.

³³⁸ Kurth 2003, 163-164.

³³⁹ Kurth 2003, 165-166.

³⁴⁰ Crowe 2003, 537.

³⁴¹ Kurth 2003, 167.

as a multilateralist are damaged both in the EU and at the UN. In these organizations, Britain has been in the minority and not in the lead. In the EU, only five of the 15 members supported the British position on Iraq, and as post-war assessments are made in Brussels, British commitment to Europe will be questioned more than that of the others. Although Spain, Italy and others also sided with the US, their profile was much lower. In addition, Italy and Spain are generally considered countries committed to Europe, despite Berlusconi and Aznar's less pro-European views. According to Hughes, the enlargement will not rescue the UK. Hughes thinks many central and eastern European countries felt pressured to sign declarations supporting the UK-US view on Iraq. Once the candidates are “safely inside” both the NATO and the EU, the diversity of their views, interests and alignments will become apparent. There is no “new Europe” that the UK could try to lead.³⁴²

Until July 2005 the only significant international terrorist attack on the UK homeland was the bombing of an aeroplane over Lockerbie in 1988. UK authorities were preoccupied with terrorism related to Northern Ireland, and did not fully appreciate the threat from Al-Qaeda. The UK is in particular risk because it is the closest ally of the US, has deployed military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and taken a leading role in international intelligence, police and judicial efforts against Al-Qaeda. Taped propaganda messages of Al-Qaeda have repeatedly threatened attacks on the UK.³⁴³

The foreign policy ambitions of Spain are limited by its finances, and it is not able to afford such engagements as the US, the UK, France or even Germany. This makes reinforcing European foreign policy and defence important for Spain.³⁴⁴ After the launch of CFSP with the Maastricht Treaty, Spain was fully committed to strengthening it. Aznar continued the traditional line in European policy, but also was very interested in strengthening the “special relationship” with the United States and reinforcing the Atlanticist dimension of Spanish foreign policy.³⁴⁵ He was one of the architects of the Letter of Eight³⁴⁶. Magone concludes that Spain is pro-European, but the Aznar government had “a very realistic notion of the superpower status of the United States.” Spain is caught between the two, and concerned about the axis of France and Germany, which results in

³⁴² Hughes 2003, 1-2.

³⁴³ Gregory & Wilkinson 2005, 2.

³⁴⁴ Magone 2004, 231.

³⁴⁵ Magone 2004, 211-212.

³⁴⁶ YLE 30.1.2003.

counter-alliances with Italy and the UK.³⁴⁷

Since the 1980s, Spain has been a good European and a good NATO member³⁴⁸. After the end of the Cold War, it started to seek a higher international status as a middle power, a place of its own apart from EPC. It also defined more precisely its own priorities within EPC, against the general tendency to concentrate on Central and Eastern Europe.³⁴⁹ The priority areas of contemporary Spanish foreign policy are Morocco, the Mediterranean, Latin America and Gibraltar. Spain was an initiator of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. After decades of rhetoric, Spain started to strengthen its relations with Latin America in the early 1990s, and relations between the EU and Latin America as well. Throughout the 1990s, Spain contributed troops to several NATO- and UN-led peacekeeping missions.³⁵⁰ The “Europeanization” of the Spanish foreign policy agenda reaches its limits when an interest perceived as part of the country's identity is at stake, such as relations with Latin America. The Spanish security interests in North Africa (Maghreb) and even wider Arab World are also important, and will stay on the Spanish agenda. However, Spain is committed to CFSP, even if sometimes balancing between European ideals and emerging national self-confidence.³⁵¹

There are seventeen autonomous communities, and all these have their own regional subcultures that shape the overall national political culture. Magone states that it is wiser to speak of political cultures in the plural because of this diversity. Spanish society has several identities, namely local, regional, national, and European, that exist simultaneously.³⁵²

Spain has become a destination of immigration: many illegal immigrants try to enter Spain via the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Melilla, two small Spanish territories in southern Mediterranean, neighbouring Morocco. The Aznar government adopted one of the toughest immigration laws in the EU. Spain is the home of Al-Qaeda operatives, including some of those who prepared the 9/11 attacks.³⁵³ One major problem for Aznar was the revival of terrorist activity of Euskadi Ta

347 Magone 2004, 215.

348 Kivinen 2003, 78.

349 Barbé 1996, 123.

350 Magone 2004, 222-228.

351 Barbé 1996, 124-125.

352 Magone 2004, 30-33, 43.

353 Magone 2004, 47, 230.

Askatasuma (ETA), the independence movement of the Basque Country. The terror campaign led to strong resolve of the government to fight terrorism, supported by the Spanish population which went to the streets in millions to demonstrate against ETA. Several Basque organizations were banned.³⁵⁴ Aznar himself was the target of an ETA car bomb in 1995, but he narrowly escaped³⁵⁵. Since September 2001, Spain has participated in the fight against international terrorism, and Aznar has been able to link his struggle with ETA with it. Aznar ensured that ETA was classified as a terrorist organization on the lists of illegal organizations kept by the EU and the US.³⁵⁶ Interestingly, ETA was added to the US list only in April 2003, perhaps as a reward for Aznar's support for the Iraq War.

The fiercest opposition Aznar faced resulted from his unconditional support for a war in Iraq. Magone argues that anti-war opposition was more intensive in Spain than in any other country. In March and April 2003, over three million people demonstrated against the Iraq war.³⁵⁷ Magone accounts that 90 per cent of the Spanish population opposed the Iraq war, as well as the opposition parties, and some members of the government resigned in protest. The opposition has demanded a full inquiry into the reasons for participating in the Iraq war.³⁵⁸

Europe and the Atlantic Alliance constitute the two main pillars of Italy's official policy. Because of its internal crises, Italy senses a risk of being excluded from the emerging core of the EU and marginalized in the G-7, or getting treated as a second-rank country.³⁵⁹ Italy's history is shadowed by fascism, and it has had to concentrate on domestic problems, such as the competition of communism and Western democracy and economic development. Earlier Italy kept a low profile in foreign and security policy, and this has changed only in recent years. The Berlusconi government has promoted Italian interests more energetically also in the EU. The Mediterranean orientation has been emphasized, and the government has also close connections with the US.³⁶⁰

Italy's foreign policy has shown remarkable continuity for the past fifty years. In defence and

354 Magone 2004, 24-25.

355 Magone 2004, 230.

356 Magone 2004, 229-230.

357 Magone 2004, 49, 58-59.

358 Magone 2004, 214.

359 Bonvicini 1996, 103.

360 Kivinen 2003, 77-78.

international security, Italy has held on to its bilateral relationship with the US and the primacy of NATO and supported EU security and defence initiatives as long as they do not contradict with the transatlantic alliance. This is because of Italy's relative weakness in the international system, and because of shared threats with the US (earlier the Soviet bloc, now terrorism and regional instability). The effect of Berlusconi has been a slight shift toward Atlanticism.³⁶¹ Italy's main security concerns are the Balkans and the broader Mediterranean basin: threats emerging from these regions' instability are mass migration, religious fundamentalism, ethnic conflict, WMD proliferation and the spread of organized crime. Al-Qaeda-style terrorism is also perceived as a threat, and Italy has taken domestic action and cooperated with the EU, NATO and G-8 anti-terrorist efforts.³⁶² Berlusconi “sold” the Iraq war to the public by arguing that in the war on terror, Italy is in any case already a target of terrorism, and therefore there is no choice. Italians did not participate in the war's early phase of major combat operations.³⁶³

On 27.1.2003 the EU reached a common compromise, agreeing that the inspectors in Iraq should be allowed to do their work. Three days later the so-called Letter of Eight revealed the division within the EU. The contents of the letter were not controversial, but its timing and symbolism were highly significant. It was published as an open letter in the Wall Street Journal and some European newspapers, and its purpose was to express the more Atlanticist European views than those of France and Germany. The leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, who opposed the war, were not informed of the letter beforehand.³⁶⁴ The EU presidency, Greece, said it was not informed about the letter, and neither the EU's foreign policy High Representative nor the Commissioner for external affairs were informed³⁶⁵. The letter was originally proposed³⁶⁶ by an editorial page editor of the Wall Street Journal, then drafted by one of Aznar's advisers, and sent to London by Aznar. Prime Minister Blair became enthusiastic about it, and his office coordinated further signatures. The White House was also informed.³⁶⁶ The assumption that France and Germany were the natural leaders of Europe, as their Elysée Treaty anniversary declaration implied,

³⁶¹ Sedgwick 2005, 115-116.

³⁶² Sedgwick 2005, 108-109.

³⁶³ Laurence 2005, 5.

³⁶⁴ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 128-130.

³⁶⁵ YLE 30.1.2003.

³⁶⁶ The Financial Times 28.5.2003.

had long caused resentment in Europe. Britain considered itself to be equally important for Europe's future as France and Germany, especially in foreign policy. Spain, with a growing economy and ties to the vast Spanish speaking world, now saw itself as a rising European power that deserved to be taken seriously. Italy resented never being treated as an equal, and many smaller member countries felt that the Franco-German vision of the EU gave excessive weight to the larger countries. Blair, Berlusconi and Aznar felt Chirac and Schröder were deliberately undermining them politically by portraying themselves as the true spokesmen of Europe and its anti-war sentiment.³⁶⁷ The Letter of Eight was “an opportunity to put France and Germany in their place”³⁶⁸. President Bush was most grateful that the European leaders signed the letter, which “clarified the issue that we're dealing with – and that is that Saddam Hussein is a clear threat to peace. It was a strong statement”.³⁶⁹ The letter was signed by the prime ministers of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Hungary, Poland and Denmark and the Czech president. It speaks of “we Europeans”, and of Europe and the US as “we”. It declares that the “real bond between the US and Europe is the values we share: democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the rule of law. [...] Today they are under greater threat than ever.” The 9/11 terrorist attacks were an attack on “all of us”, and showed how far terrorists are willing to go to destroy our common values. Today more than ever the transatlantic bond guarantees our freedom. Largely thanks to American bravery, generosity and far-sightedness, Europe was set free from two forms of tyranny in the 20th century, namely Nazism and communism. The continued cooperation of Europe and the US has guaranteed peace and freedom in Europe, and the transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the Iraqi regime's attempts to threaten world security. More than ever, it is vital to preserve unity and cohesion. The fight against terrorism and WMD proliferation demands firm determination and cohesion of the international community. “Our strength lies in unity.” The Iraqi regime and its WMDs clearly threaten world security. This has been recognized by the UN. “We Europeans” have reiterated our backing for the Resolution 1441 and pursuing the UN route at the NATO Summit in Prague and the Copenhagen European Council. The Security Council must maintain its credibility by ensuring full compliance with its resolutions, or world peace will suffer. “Europe has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Indeed, they

³⁶⁷ Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 130.

³⁶⁸ The Financial Times 28.5.2003.

³⁶⁹ Bush 30.1.2003.

are the first victims of Iraq's current brutal regime.”³⁷⁰

Blair says that there was a clear position of the Franco-German summit, and it was important to make clear that there were other views in Europe, which was done by the Letter of Eight³⁷¹. A special clarification of Frattini states that the Letter of Eight does not contain contradictions with the document of fifteen EU Foreign Ministers, as has been incorrectly interpreted by “some of the media”. With the Letter of Eight, its signatories “had no intention whatsoever of creating divisions among European countries, as was likewise true for those who signed the French-German document.”³⁷² Spain works to maintain international cohesion reflected in resolution 1441, also in the EU, and in initiatives such as the Letter of Eight³⁷³. Probably aimed at France and Germany, Palacio notes that in “the case of Europe, differences of opinion have also complicated the implementation of the so-called common foreign and security policy, or CFSP. Although the CFSP remains an intergovernmental policy, we should not forget that it is a common policy, common to all, and should be drafted by all.”³⁷⁴

Blair defends the EU accession countries after Chirac's criticism. He would have actually liked to see these countries in the meeting in Brussels on 18 February, where Chirac stated that they should keep out of what happens in Brussels. Blair hopes they would be seen as full members of the EU already. They are perfectly entitled to express their own views, as Britain, France or any member country. Due to their real sense of history their views are interesting. They also know the value of Europe and America sticking together. This does not mean that there would be no disagreements, or that Europeans must always do what America wants or vice versa. The idea of not dividing America and Europe is a strong undercurrent of discussion not only in the accession countries, but it was also an aspect of the Brussels meeting.³⁷⁵

The Letter of Eight, as well as Blair's remarks about the accession countries above, were directed against the arrogance of France and Germany. For example the Financial Times argue that the

³⁷⁰ Spain, Italy, the UK, Poland et al. 30.1.2003.

³⁷¹ Blair 19.2.2003.

³⁷² Frattini 4.2.2003.

³⁷³ Aznar 5.2.2003.

³⁷⁴ Palacio 17.2.2003.

³⁷⁵ Blair 19.2.2003.

letter's purpose was to "fire a shot at France and Germany, not the whole EU"³⁷⁶. The British, Spanish and Italian leaders all strongly emphasized unity.

Palacio's account on unity is the most comprehensive one. The international community agrees on the principles and objectives of opposing Saddam Hussein, but the public's impression is a division to the point of confrontation. The alleged divisions are between countries in favour of war and peace, and countries tearing Europe apart and others supporting Europe - a Europe built on confrontation with the US. These false impressions of division are used for political manipulation, which makes matters deteriorate further. Stirring up emotions in this way can result in the rise of Euroscepticism and failure of Euro-Atlanticism, and more generally shatter the multilateralism that has been constructed for the past fifty years. Everyone agrees that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant, Palacio also argues that all agree he threatens the international community and has WMDs which may fall in the hands of terrorists. Everyone agrees he must disarm immediately, and that the use of force is the last resort. Nobody wants war. The international community also has deep, shared concerns about the impact of the Iraq crisis on the Middle East. Opinions differ on the best way to disarm Iraq. However, it is important that the differences do not paralyse the international community and let Saddam Hussein take advantage of this.³⁷⁷

Blair notes that there is a difference between him and Chirac, but they also agree upon many issues. If you disagree with a country over a particular issue, there is no need to fall out with them completely, and that should not happen with France. Blair also notes that he has a very good relationship with Chancellor Schröder. In times of disagreement over an issue, they should concentrate on what they have in common. Blair also acknowledges that it is worth pointing out that Germany is taking a leading role on Afghanistan, and doing a superb job, on behalf of the international community.³⁷⁸ Blair does not agree with the claim that France, Russia or China oppose a war because they have contracts to explore oilfields in Iraq³⁷⁹. Frattini notes that he has a great friendship with Joschka Fischer. Actually Germany and Italy will do exactly the same in the case of a conflict: allow Americans to use bases on their territory. This is why it is paradoxical that the

³⁷⁶ The Financial Times 28.5.2003.

³⁷⁷ Palacio 17.2.2003.

³⁷⁸ Blair 19.2.2003.

³⁷⁹ Blair 7.2.2003.

Italian Left accuses the government of being vassals of Bush and points to Germany as a model.³⁸⁰

Frattoni believes that all EU members must move together in CFSP despite differences. In his discussions with the French and the Germans, he has found no closure but great openness. The Italian position is not in favour of “an imbalance towards the Commission”, nor a purely intergovernmental system; some middle ground solution has to be found. The founding EU members, which include three small and three large countries, have shared the same aim of broadening consensus for fifty years and could play a fundamental role in the question of the balance between small and big members. Europe has always functioned with variable geometry (“cores”) and will continue to do so. The founding members can act as a driving force in Europe, but Italy also shares many views with the Spanish and the British governments. In an EU with 25 members variable geometry based on strengthened cooperation is inevitable. The new Europe has to interact with the US in synergy, and on a different level also with China and Russia.³⁸¹ Palacio suggests that the rift among Europeans should help realise the urgent need to develop common foreign and defence policies³⁸².

Palacio's vision is that Spain will play a new role in the world in the 21st century, based on its economic potential and its values, culture, history and geostrategic situation. Spain is located on the Mediterranean, and this area will be a centre of tensions as well as of a dialogue of civilizations in the 21st century.³⁸³

The Italian leaders strongly emphasized their country's importance. Frattoni argues that Italy is fully involved in the search for a solution in the Iraq crisis, and not merely mediating. Italy is “now a country that counts not only for the quantity but for the quality of its actions.” Italy pursues strengthening cohesion among European countries and also between the US and Europe. These two cohesive forces have characterized Italian foreign policy for 50 years. Together with Germany, Italy is perhaps the only country that has been a convinced supporter of European integration and at the same time a friend of the US. A second line of Italian foreign policy arises from its old relations

380 Frattoni 13.2.2003.

381 Frattoni 1.3.2003.

382 Palacio 17.2.2003.

383 Palacio 23.3.2003.

with Arab countries, including Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Frattini states that they constantly hear the same message from these countries: they count on Italy, because it is close to the Americans and could convince them to avoid unilateral attack, and with a variety of instruments, such as European pressure, help keep the Arab world united. Frattini accounts that Italy, first alone but then with an unanimous vote, helped insert a paragraph to the final declaration of the European Council stating that a peaceful solution is the aim but the use of force is not ruled out in extremis. This move managed to save both Euro-Atlantic and European cohesion.³⁸⁴ Frattini also says that the Italian government worked directly on the EU document of 17 February, and the Greek presidency acknowledged its contribution. The EU's conclusions (of 17.2.) are Europe united and speaking with one voice.³⁸⁵ Frattini thinks that a “Europe which counts is not a Europe which opposes the United States; Europe which counts is a Europe which with a single voice convinces the United States or helps the United States to achieve a common objective.” The best instrument for that is the UNSC since “[u]nilateral action would create problems.”³⁸⁶

Mantica states that France, Germany and Russia are not interpreting Resolution 1441 and the previous ones correctly, because they do not agree on setting a time limit to the inspections. Instead, they want to increase the number of inspectors in Iraq, but Mantica says it is Saddam Hussein who must, according to resolutions, demonstrate that the weapons are destroyed, not others. This position destroys the credibility of the UN and makes reaching a united EU position difficult. The efforts made to reach the common EU document of 17 February were in vain, because a new Franco-German stance again undermined European unity: the French-German-Russian agreement was not communicated to or agreed on with European partners. Mantica calls this policy a “traditionally French” one. With its conduct France “has often weakened the possibility of building a European army and of offering Europe the opportunity of having its own defence policy and its own military structure.”³⁸⁷ Straw calls Chirac's statement to veto the draft resolution under any circumstances “extraordinary and inexplicable”: he does not understand why it is in France's interest to threaten veto. France not only signed Resolution 1441, but was also active in negotiating

³⁸⁴ Frattini 1.3.2003.

³⁸⁵ Frattini 19.2.2003.

³⁸⁶ Frattini 1.3.2003.

³⁸⁷ Mantica 9.3.2003.

it, and now will veto a resolution requiring Saddam's compliance.³⁸⁸

Palacio thinks that the system of building Europe counts on different points of view and is designed to accommodate these. Iraq served as a catalyst, the world has changed from Cold War bipolarity toward a system of multilateral fora. Today this causes fuss and readjustment, but it is important to concentrate on integrating projects and not stick to details. France, Germany and Belgium have announced they will study European defence policy, and Spain is willing to participate in every project for the future of European defence.³⁸⁹

Blair notes that some of the rhetoric used about America has been more savage than what you hear about Saddam Hussein and his regime. A sense of perspective is needed: America is an ally, and the UK and the US have been together for the past hundred years. That is still no reason to do whatever America wants, but it is a reason to approach the issue looking upon America as an ally and not some alien power. "People who want to pull Europe and America apart are playing the most dangerous game of international politics I know." Together Europe and America can "sort the problems of the world", and setting up Europe and America as rival poles of power is dangerous. A dialogue is needed, and America also has to listen to its allies. It has listened, that is why it chose the UN route. If the UN route does not work this time, it will diminish the prospects of persuading America to take the multilateral route again.³⁹⁰ Palacio argues that Europe must work hand-in-hand with the US to face the threat posed by Iraq. It should not be forgotten that Europe and the US share values and principles, and they both need each other. Both have a vested interest in protecting multilateralism, as embodied by the UN and NATO.³⁹¹

Berlusconi calls the US "the best friend of my country". Italy has always been a faithful ally of the US, and is also in Iraq issue. Italy will help the US convince everyone that they unite – the EU, the US, Russia, all UN members – and Saddam Hussein will understand he has no choice but to destroy his weapons. When asked if Italy will join the coalition of the willing, Berlusconi does not say yes or no but that Italy will never forget that it owes it freedom, wealth and democracy to the US, many

388 Straw 13.3.2003.

389 Palacio 23.3.2003.

390 Blair 19.2.2003.

391 Palacio 17.2.2003.

young American lives were sacrificed for them. The US is the guarantee of freedom and democracy, and to Berlusconi, represents those.³⁹²

The Statement of the Atlantic Summit, made in the Azores by Bush, Blair, Aznar and the Portuguese Prime Minister Barroso, reaffirms their commitment to the core values of the transatlantic alliance: democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. “We will face and overcome together the twin threats of the 21st century: terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. All nations must unite to defeat these dangers. We will not allow differences of the moment to be exploited in ways that bring no solutions.” The leaders declare that their countries' security is tied to peace and security throughout the world, and they are working together to bring security to Afghanistan and peace, security and freedom to the Middle East. “We urge our friends and allies to put aside differences, and work together for peace, freedom and security. The friendship and solidarity between Europe and the United States is strong and will continue to grow in years to come.”³⁹³

In the press conference of Azores Summit, Bush announced that the next day would be the moment of truth, the last day that the draft resolution could be voted up or down, and one way or another the diplomatic path would close. During the remaining day, Bush and others will “work the phones” and talk to their partners.³⁹⁴ Blix argues that by the time of the Azores summit, all attempts to reach consensus at the Security Council had already failed. He sees the Azores meeting as a strange gesture: its purpose was probably to express the unity of the three countries whose draft resolution was still under consideration at the Security Council. The summit's declaration seemed threatening, and Blix considers it aimed more at other Security Council members – support the resolution or step back – than at Saddam Hussein.³⁹⁵

The war's supporters described the threat posed by Iraq and its weapons in great length and detail. They were ready to go quite far in order to convince others. In early February, Britain's prime minister Tony Blair faced fierce criticism after his government's Iraq report turned out to be partly

³⁹² Berlusconi 30.1.2003.

³⁹³ the US, the UK, Spain & Portugal 16.3.2003.

³⁹⁴ Bush 16.3.2003.

³⁹⁵ Blix 2004, 284, 287-9.

copied from a thesis of a Californian student. British opposition blamed Blair for misleading the public. The British government admitted that the report was partly copied but the rest of it was based on new intelligence data. The US secretary of state Colin Powell had already praised the document for its excellent details.³⁹⁶ All the documents I read are notably silent about this incident, and prefer to quote UN reports instead.

Neither Bush nor Blair dare claim that there would be a direct link between Saddam Hussein and the men who committed the 9/11 attacks. Nevertheless, Blair insists that we must deal with both terrorism and WMDs, because otherwise “they will come together in a deadly form”.³⁹⁷ The world of today is very much different from that of the Cold War: earlier there were some “rules of the game”, but the main characteristic of terrorists is not respecting any rules³⁹⁸. Blair notes he has never said that Iraq would be about to attack the UK, but Saddam Hussein clearly poses a threat to his region. And because the world today is interdependent, if any country uses WMDs Britain will be involved in some way. There was no way Britain could have stood apart with Afghanistan and 9/11. Terrorists operate in many countries, also in those that have not taken a high profile in the fight against terrorism.³⁹⁹ Blair claims that he already talked about weapons of mass destruction in 2001, before and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. WMDs are not only a problem according to Britain and America as the letters signed by Eastern European leaders demonstrate. Germany and France also agree that WMDs are a problem, they only disagree on what to do about it.⁴⁰⁰ Frattini further argues that we should not use events from the past to justify the present: the fact that Saddam Hussein's weapons were earlier largely supplied by the West is not our fault⁴⁰¹.

³⁹⁶ YLE 9.2.2003.

³⁹⁷ Blair 31.1.2003.

³⁹⁸ Palacio 31.1.2003.

³⁹⁹ Blair 7.2.2003.

⁴⁰⁰ Blair 7.2.2003.

⁴⁰¹ Frattini 13.2.2003.

It was often mentioned that Saddam Hussein has been playing games of deception already for twelve years. The UN inspectors were allowed back in Iraq as pressure grew, but they are not there to play hide-and-seek; the Iraqi regime must cooperate actively and honestly, and that is not happening.⁴⁰² All political and diplomatic means must be used to avoid a confrontation. Saddam Hussein must understand the inevitability of disarmament and cooperate; the inspections can only work if this happens, and therefore the inspectors do not need any more time.⁴⁰³

A scenario of violence always demonstrates a failure of the international community to make progress in dialogue. To reach a peaceful solution, there must be a clear message, and the unity of the international community, backed with the threat of force, is needed. The positions of the Arab League and Arab countries, of the EU, and of the NATO meeting in Prague have been crucial: they have unanimously supported the Resolution 1441.⁴⁰⁴ Palacio notes that there has been personal criticism on her because of Spain's "excessive actorness", but clarity and cohesion are needed these times⁴⁰⁵.

Aznar notes that the fight against terrorism is the principal preoccupation of Spanish foreign policy. This has been promoted in Spain's bilateral ties and all multilateral fora. Spain has used all its power to promote anti-terrorism policies, and they have become part of the international community's agenda. This will help and has helped Spain in its fight against ETA terror. Spain can offer its experience to help other countries dealing with terrorism. After 9/11, no responsible government can ignore the threat of terrorism. Saddam's regime is one of terror, and has used WMDs against its neighbour states and its own people. It has links with terrorist groups and finances Hamas suicide bombers. It is only a question of time before WMDs lay in terrorists' hands. Abu Musal Al Zarkawi, whose task is to acquire toxic substances for Al-Qaeda, lived in Baghdad for some time; some of his collaborators have been arrested in the UK and Spain.⁴⁰⁶ According to Aznar, the deputy prime minister of Iraq has said that the Spanish position could lead to the extension of terrorism to Spain. Aznar declares that Spain will not accept threats of any kind and

⁴⁰² Blair 31.1.2003.

⁴⁰³ Palacio 31.1.2003.

⁴⁰⁴ Palacio 31.1.2003.

⁴⁰⁵ Palacio 23.3.2003.

⁴⁰⁶ Aznar 5.2.2003.

even less any referring to terrorism. He argues that we (the Spanish) are already used to this kind of threats, and we know that in their face we must be firm and determined.⁴⁰⁷

“We all know, ladies and gentlemen, that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.” Aznar lists UN inspectors' estimates from the 1990s, with plenty of numbers, showing that Iraq has (or at least back then was assumed to have) WMDs.⁴⁰⁸ Palacio quotes Mr Blix's words to argue that Iraq has not complied with various UN resolutions for twelve years, Resolution 1441 demands active cooperation, not only letting inspectors in, and the Iraqi weapons declaration does not seem to contain any new proof to reduce the number of open questions⁴⁰⁹. Straw uses quotes from the briefings of Blix and El-Baradei to support his case that Iraq is in breach of Resolution 1441. Together with the evidence presented by Powell they “leave no doubt that [...] Iraq is in further material breach of resolution 1441.”⁴¹⁰

Straw notes that all NATO members pledged their support for the implementation of Resolution 1441 and commitment to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq, without restrictions or conditions. However, France, Germany and Belgium have resisted the proposal about contingency planning to help Turkey in case of military action against Iraq. France and Germany have resisted as if this decision would somehow prevent any further UNSC consideration of Iraq's material breach.⁴¹¹

The role of Italy is to attempt to find some middle ground, reconstruct unity and find a solution. The next step should be to better define the tasks of the inspectors and set reasonable deadlines of some weeks, no more. It is still Saddam Hussein who has the onus of proof and not the inspectors.⁴¹²

Frattoni notes that the Italians have spoken at length with their Arab friends on the other side of the Mediterranean, and have asked them to persuade and pressure Saddam Hussein to go into exile.⁴¹³

Frattoni argues against an alleged Franco-German plan to increase the number of inspectors in Iraq. Blix himself has said that increasing the number of people working with him is useless; it does not

407 Aznar 5.2.2003.

408 Aznar 5.2.2003.

409 Palacio 31.1.2003.

410 Straw 13.2.2003.

411 Straw 13.2.2003.

412 Mantica 9.3.2003.

413 Frattoni 19.2.2003.

matter how many inspectors there are if Saddam does not cooperate. Frattini states that this plan does not exist, and “it is wrong to make public opinion believe that there are options of foreign and military policy that actually have no basis.”⁴¹⁴ The plan is probably what came out as the French-German-Russian Memorandum eleven days later.

Straw welcomes the memorandum of France, Germany and Russia. It accepts that Saddam must disarm fully, and that he is not cooperating fully. Straw points out that nobody who spoke at the Brussels Summit on 17 February disputed the fact that Saddam is not cooperating.⁴¹⁵ Two weeks later, Straw argues that only “unrelenting pressure - including the threat of force - rather than casting around for excuses to delay” makes a peaceful solution possible. The Franco-German proposals to bolster the inspections regime are unrealistic and impractical. They shift the burden of proof from Saddam Hussein to the inspectors and send Saddam the message that defiance pays. He quotes Blix to state that the problem is the active cooperation of the Iraqi side, not the number of inspectors.⁴¹⁶

In mid-February, the Americans who had argued they needed no second resolution, started to insist on bringing one to the vote in order to help Blair with his domestic concerns. France, which had fought hard to require such a resolution, wanted to avoid the vote and a veto against the US.⁴¹⁷ The US and Great Britain gave a new draft resolution to the UN Security Council on 25 February, also signed by Spain. The draft resolution did not ask for a specific authorization to use force against Iraq, but its acceptance would have been interpreted as such.⁴¹⁸

Blair believes that a second resolution is needed, because 1441 will either be followed through and implemented or ignored, which no one wants⁴¹⁹. Straw tells that the new Resolution introduced by the UK, the US and Spain will not be put to vote immediately, some more time will be allowed for Iraq to disarm voluntarily, and for the inspectors to work and make their report in March. The new resolution declares that Iraq has failed to use the final opportunity given by 1441.⁴²⁰ In

414 Frattini 13.2.2003.

415 Straw 27.2.2003.

416 Straw 13.2.2003.

417 Gordon&Shapiro 2004, 147-148.

418 YLE 25.2.2003.

419 Blair 19.2.2003.

420 Straw 27.2.2003.

circumstances where there was a clear breach of Resolution 1441, for example the inspectors saying they cannot do their job, and everyone else wanted to take action, it would be unreasonable for one country [France] to use a veto. It would be wrong because “otherwise you couldn't uphold the UN”; you have passed a resolution (1441) and then fail to act on it.⁴²¹

Frattoni thinks it is natural that negotiations in a discussion forum like the UNSC begin from different positions, with the “French memorandum” on the one side and the Spanish-British-American proposed resolution on the other. He believes that a shared result will emerge, facilitating both views. Frattoni believes that the consensus of the public opinion lies with the UN, and the best line of action is to confirm that the UN is credible. The idea of “no to war without ifs or buts” can be contradicted on these terms.⁴²² “It is one thing if the US intervenes with ten [UNSC] votes in favour and five against, quite another in the opposite situation.” No matter how the Iraq incident finishes, Mantica believes there will be a confrontation regarding what the EU is and how the UN functions.⁴²³

Blair claims (in mid-March in the Azores meeting) that even a few days earlier he was prepared to set out clear tests in order to conclude whether Saddam is complying fully or not, and a clear ultimatum if he refused to do so. Now there is an impasse, because some [Chirac] say there should be no ultimatum, no authorization of force in any new UN resolution, instead simply more discussion in the event of noncompliance. People say all diplomatic avenues have not been exhausted, but we tried to do that. From our perspective, and that of world security, we cannot go back to the UNSC for more discussions. More discussion means more delay, and that is the game Saddam Hussein has been playing for the past twelve years. However, even at this late stage (16 March), we try to get the UN to be the root of resolving this.⁴²⁴

Blair notes that a war could still be avoided if Saddam did what he should do and that is no mystery. South Africa simply stopped its nuclear weapons programme, called in the inspectors and cooperated with them.⁴²⁵ Aznar refers to earlier cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and South Africa, all

⁴²¹ Blair 7.2.2003.

⁴²² Frattoni 1.3.2003.

⁴²³ Mantica 9.3.2003.

⁴²⁴ Blair 16.3.2003.

⁴²⁵ Blair 7.2.2003.

of which gave up their WMD programmes and arsenal with UN supervision and inspections. Saddam Hussein should do the same.⁴²⁶ The war's opponents used the same examples of peaceful disarmament to support their argument that the inspections should be given more time.

German and French leaders mentioned a vicious circle or spiral of automatic military intervention that a war against Iraq might cause; the war's supporters see different vicious cycles. Blair argues that if Iraq is allowed to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, they will threaten the region, and there is no way Britain could exclude itself from any regional conflict there⁴²⁷. And if the international community does not force Iraq to comply with its obligations, Aznar thinks it opens the same road of non-compliance to other countries⁴²⁸.

The Spanish were perhaps the most enthusiastic to back their arguments with UNSC resolutions. Aznar claims that the Iraq crisis is only a new episode of the problem that emerged in 1990 as Iraq invaded Kuwait. In 1990, UNSC authorized the use of force and Spain participated in the US-led coalition, and ever since Spain has defended the Resolution 687 (April 1991) that orders Iraq to destroy all its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Based on Resolution 1441, and its approval by the EU, the Atlantic Alliance, and the Arab League, there is a complete consensus in the international community. The Spanish government works to achieve a second resolution and to prevent the UNSC being bypassed or blocked.⁴²⁹ Later, to justify the war without any second resolution, Palacio points to precedents: in January 1993, a day after North American and British forces took military action in Iraq, the UN Secretary General announced that the action was supported by a UNSC mandate based on resolutions 678 and 687⁴³⁰. Palacio interprets the common declaration of the European Council to support the Resolution 1441, and the resolution allows even war against the Iraqi regime. France may decide to oppose this, but it has accepted the declaration.⁴³¹

The Middle East peace process is of vital importance, and Straw notes that the European Council

⁴²⁶ Aznar 5.2.2003.

⁴²⁷ Blair 7.2.2003.

⁴²⁸ Aznar 5.2.2003.

⁴²⁹ Aznar 5.2.2003.

⁴³⁰ Palacio 19.3.2003.

⁴³¹ Palacio 23.3.2003.

recently called for the early implementation of the road map⁴³². Frattini claims that the Italians requested adding the connection of the rapid solving of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and the Iraq crisis to the Brussels summit's conclusions⁴³³. For Aznar, the Middle East is a question separate from Iraq, but affects it. He believes that the disarmament of Iraq would contribute to the stability of the region. The objective of Spain is to have a Palestinian state and to guarantee Israel's security; Saddam Hussein with his WMDs and expansionist attitude is an obstacle on the way.⁴³⁴

As regards the anti-war dissent in Italy, Mantica notes that there is a strong peace movement which has deep-rooted legitimacy⁴³⁵. At the Azores press conference, Aznar says that they did not come there to make a declaration of war: they continue to make every possible effort to achieve greatest possible agreement, and for international law and the UN to be respected. "We are well aware of international world public opinion, of its concern. And we are also aware of our responsibilities and obligations." Nothing prevents Saddam from disarming, it is his sole responsibility.⁴³⁶ To justify the war politically, Palacio mentions the mothers of Halabja [whose sons the Iraqi regime killed], WMDs, the changed international order with terrorists as the new threat, and that Saddam has avoided compliance with the will of the international community for twelve years and now is the time to show he did not succeed. If Saddam does not permit peace, Spain will save no efforts to contribute to the region's stability, to offer the Iraqi people a better future with liberties, material well-being, and dignity. "Our compromise is legal and sincere. It respects our convictions, our allies, and the Iraqi people."⁴³⁷

If there would be war, Italy would only commit logistic support and after the conflict support for peace-keeping, reconstruction and humanitarian aid. Italy already has 10 000 soldiers in missions around the world, and cannot allow itself a broader commitment.⁴³⁸ Italy will not participate in a war, but will understand the difficult decision its American friends take⁴³⁹.

432 Straw 27.2.2003.

433 Frattini 1.3.2003.

434 Aznar 5.2.2003.

435 Mantica 9.3.2003.

436 Aznar 16.3.2003.

437 Palacio 19.3.2003.

438 Frattini 13.2.2003.

439 Frattini 1.3.2003.

The supporters of military action all stubbornly insisted that “we all want peace” but made some interesting redefinitions of the term. According to Straw, not forcing Iraq to disarm now, after twelve years of bitter experience, would lead to a path of folly and weakness. Saddam still in office, strengthened, emboldened, and having WMDs, the will of the international community set at nothing and the UN tricked again would not mean peace.⁴⁴⁰ Aznar claims his government works for peace and security; the aim is peace with security and they are sides of the same coin.⁴⁴¹ Frattini thinks there is a communication problem between governments and public opinion. Public opinion needs to understand that the alternatives are not war and peace, because everyone wants peace, but “a false peace in an unstable region with twelve years of unfulfilled UN resolutions and a stable peace which is the exclusive consequence of effective and total disarmament and respect for international law.”⁴⁴²

As a short epilogue to this part, I must note that since early 2003 the Coalition of the Willing has become less willing. Several countries have withdrawn their troops from Iraq. A year after the war started, in March 2004, terrorist bomb attacks killed 201 and injured 1500 people in Madrid. A few days later, the newly elected successor of Aznar, prime minister Rodriguez Zapatero, decided to withdraw all the 1300 Spanish soldiers from Iraq, unless the UN takes over in Iraq (which it did not).⁴⁴³ Laurence estimates that during the first two years of the Iraq war, a newly found national pride at playing a part in the war on terror seemed to be stronger than the large Italian pacifist bloc. The death of an Italian caused by an American bullet in March 2005 restored ambivalence about Italy's close alliance with the US, especially concerning the latter's sensitivity toward its allies and the costs of the Iraq war. The Italian distaste for the Iraq war has become mixed up with anti-American sentiments, left over from earlier confrontations.⁴⁴⁴ Gregory and Wilkinson claim that a key problem in implementing the UK's counter-terrorism policy is that the government has been doing this shoulder to shoulder with the US, and not as an equal decision-maker. Following the US lead has proven costly in lives, military expenditure and the damage caused to the counter-terrorism campaign:

⁴⁴⁰ Straw 27.2.2003

⁴⁴¹ Aznar 5.2.2003.

⁴⁴² Frattini 1.3.2003.

⁴⁴³ BBC News 17.3.2003.

⁴⁴⁴ Laurence 2005, 1, 4.

*“There is no doubt that the situation over Iraq has imposed particular difficulties for the UK, and for the wider coalition against terrorism. It gave a boost to the Al-Qaeda network's propaganda, recruitment and fundraising, caused a major split in the coalition, provided an ideal targeting and training area for Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists and deflected resources and assistance that could have been deployed to assist the Karzai government and bring bin Laden to justice.”*⁴⁴⁵

Two-thirds of Britons believe there is a link between Tony Blair's decision to invade Iraq and the London bombings of 7 July, 2005, and many believe there will be more attacks. This suggests the government is losing the battle to persuade people that terrorist attacks on the UK have not been made more likely by the invasion of Iraq.⁴⁴⁶

4.4. Poland: the New European

Poland was not a member of the EU in 2003, but its accession in May 2004 already seemed certain. Furthermore, even if Poland and other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries were not full members of the EU in 2003, they were already expected to behave as if they were: the President of the European Commission reminded them that the EU is a family and warned them of solos⁴⁴⁷.

Poland has a stormy modern history dominated by the loss of independence for 123 years after 1795, and serious threats to its independence during the WWII and the communist period after it. Its geopolitical position between two more powerful nations, Germany and Russia, is difficult.⁴⁴⁸ Due to bitter historical experience, Poland is not only suspicious of Russia, but also of other European great powers. This is why Poland opposes strengthening the current Franco-German axis in the EU and its Atlantic orientation is relatively strong. The Poles fear that the Franco-German axis might ally itself with Russia against the US; this fear was strengthened when the French, German and Russian leaders jointly criticized the US over Iraq.⁴⁴⁹ However, Sanford argues Poland is overcoming its traditional security dilemmas. Historical factors, once overwhelmingly important for the national identity, are now balanced with an unparalleled speed of modernization and

⁴⁴⁵ Gregory & Wilkinson 2005, 3.

⁴⁴⁶ The Guardian 19.7.2005.

⁴⁴⁷ YLE 22. February 2003.

⁴⁴⁸ Sanford 2004, 178.

⁴⁴⁹ Raik & Palosaari 2004, 24-25.

Europeanization.⁴⁵⁰

Since 1989, a foreign policy based on three points has enjoyed almost complete consensus among the elite and the public. The first point was to re-establish Polish independence and sovereignty on a secure basis; second point the “Return to Europe” or membership in all pan-European bodies, association with the EU as soon as possible, and close bilateral ties with major European countries; third, officially dual-track foreign policy until the collapse of USSR, but primarily west-oriented, with EU and NATO membership as grand goals. Nobody of significance has advocated neutrality or alliance with Russia as an alternative to the Euro-Atlantic choice. The Poles have always considered themselves culturally and geographically part of European civilization, and should therefore join all European organizations, which would guarantee its frontiers and national security and give a framework for the activities and development of a medium-size state. The legitimacy and stability provided by this idea would smooth over the social stresses and costs caused by the economic and political transformation.⁴⁵¹

Polish security thinking is trapped between two worlds: the old world of national territorial defence, based on a large conscript army, and the new thinking based on new threats and small, modern and professional military forces⁴⁵². After the end of the Cold War, NATO membership was a priority in security politics in CEE, despite the EU's ambitions to develop its hard security dimensions. Since there is no guarantee of how the US will see NATO in the future, CEE countries may see the ESDP as some kind of a plan B.⁴⁵³

Since the early 1990s, Poland has become one of the closest allies of the US, or even its protégé, in central and eastern Europe. For Poland, the US and NATO are the security guarantor it has been looking for since the late eighteenth century. Zaborowski and Longhurst argue that Americans and Poles also agree on a range of foreign policy issues, which is illustrated by Poland's support of American policies over Iraq. Especially since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Poland has appeared to be closer to the US than many long-standing West European allies. Germany and France have departed

450 Sanford 2004, 185.

451 Sanford 2004, 181-183.

452 Zaborowski & Longhurst 2003, 1025.

453 Raik & Palosaari 2003, 16.

from the inner circle of US allies, and Poland has been keen to fill this place.⁴⁵⁴ The reason why Poland and other ex-communist states, also partly true for Spain and Britain, supported the US over Iraq is that they do not share the Franco-German view of the world. Poland does not seek to constrain American hegemony. Since it is unable to provide its own security, it will accept a hegemonic system as long as the hegemon is liberal-democratic and not a nearby state. For Poland, being America's protégé is an improvement both for its security and its status.⁴⁵⁵

Mihalka suggests that NATO survived the end of Cold war because it still provided security against future unspecified threats. NATO allies do not offer the US much militarily, but give financial and political support at crucial moments. After 9/11, the US took action in Afghanistan and Iraq to tackle the major global threats of terrorism and WMDs, providing a public good for its allies. “Such actions by the US substantially enhanced the value of belonging to NATO, especially for the applicant countries. They could be assured of protection against transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, but they would not have to pay much if anything for it.” The ESDP cannot offer comparable free-riding benefits, since there is no liberal hegemon within the EU. Thus, the French position of preferring ESDP over NATO and a multipolar world is short-sighted, the EU cannot ever provide similar security at virtually no cost as the US/NATO.⁴⁵⁶ But are terrorists a threat to smaller European countries, such as the new EU members which do not have large immigrant communities or many links with “dangerous areas” such as the Middle East? It could be exactly the alliance with the US that puts them on Al-Qaeda's agenda, as was at least partly the case with Spain and Britain.

One rationale for Poland's Atlanticism has been its exclusion from EU decision-making bodies, but that changed in 2004. Zaborowski & Longhurst believe that Poland will keep its orientation because of security concerns, the EU's divisions over foreign and security policy, and out of sense of gratitude and loyalty to the US. The EU itself is changing: the Franco-German axis can no longer speak for Europe, and the enlargement will bring a more Atlanticist flavour to CFSP. There is no division between the US and Europe, but rather inside Europe.⁴⁵⁷ Raik & Palosaari claim CEE

⁴⁵⁴ Zaborowski & Longhurst 2003, 1009-1010.

⁴⁵⁵ Zaborowski & Longhurst 2003, 1013.

⁴⁵⁶ Mihalka 2005, 285-288, 300.

⁴⁵⁷ Zaborowski & Longhurst 2003, 1026-1028.

countries still tend to see a West as opposed to the East, and believe that unity of the West will strengthen their position as parts of the Western bloc. Another reason for the former Communist countries' emphasis on transatlantic partnership is their sense of gratitude to the US for its support during the Cold War – however, many are starting to think that they are no longer indebted, the debt to the US has been paid now. Therefore, Raik and Palosaari suppose that if the US would start gathering a new “coalition of the willing” now, not all CEE countries would necessarily participate. The Iraq war contributed to more negative feelings toward the US in CEE.⁴⁵⁸

The Polish view is that the Iraq crisis did not divide Europe, NATO or the transatlantic community; it only revealed existing splits. Germany and France oppose not only US policy on Iraq, but its whole concept of solving problems. The US is not an empire and does not want to be, it is inward-oriented.⁴⁵⁹ Rotfeld believes that Poland should do its best not to harm transatlantic solidarity. It is interested in deepening cooperation both among Europeans and in their relations with the US.⁴⁶⁰ Rotfeld thinks it is not only wrong but also harmful to ask whether Central Europe should “go with Europe against America or with America against Europe”. Europe should not build its identity in opposition to the the US, but in close cooperation with it. It is a strong Polish interest that the US is present in Europe, both militarily and politically.⁴⁶¹ According to Rotfeld, Europe has some kind of a moral duty toward the US, because it liberated Europe in two World Wars, treating European security like its own⁴⁶².

Rotfeld denies that the Letter of Eight would have divided Europe; it only disclosed the factual situation which was known before it⁴⁶³. Poland does not support war and will not start a war. It supports the position that European Union does: once again, Rotfeld notes that the Letter of Eight and the EU position are compatible.⁴⁶⁴ The Letter of Eight was not a Polish initiative, and came to Poland from Madrid and London. Before signing it, the Poles compared it with the EU resolution of 27 January, and considered their contents fully compatible. There were two motives to sign: first,

⁴⁵⁹ Rotfeld 6.3.2003.

⁴⁶⁰ Rotfeld 27.2.2003.

⁴⁶¹ Rotfeld 6.3.2003.

⁴⁶² Rotfeld 31.1.2003.

⁴⁶³ Rotfeld 31.1.2003.

⁴⁶⁴ Rotfeld 6.2.2003.

Poland thinks that the US must be able to count on Europe at least showing solidarity when it defends their common values. Second, this message must be compatible with the standpoint of EU member states.⁴⁶⁵ The Letter of Eight was not meant to be directed against anybody specific; the intention of the authors was to express their solidarity, as Europeans, with the United States and to recall the basic values underlying the transatlantic partnership.⁴⁶⁶

Rotfeld claims that in the EU, as well as in other multilateral organizations, national views and domestic politics decide. In the EU, there is no unambiguous support for the US determination to disarm Iraq, and declarations will be like that of 27 January. Greece, the President of European Council at the time, had a different view than the signatories of the Letter of Eight. Rotfeld's point seems to be that the EU can only produce too ambiguous, watered-down declarations, therefore Greece was not consulted. Besides, publishing the letter without asking Greece to sign at all caused less harm than publishing it after a Greek refusal to sign. As the interviewer notes that the Greeks had intentions to go to Saddam Hussein and mediate, Rotfeld says this is the other side of the medal, but only Saddam Hussein would benefit from such negotiations. The power of unity against a rule-breaker is most important.⁴⁶⁷

In response to Chirac's speech reprimanding CEE countries, Rotfeld states that some countries have to stop their paternalistic treatment of former Warsaw Pact countries. As Europe is trying to find "a common path" that accommodates both national ambitions and strategic interests, the stereotype of CEE as "poor relatives" who should behave is unacceptable. Rotfeld quotes President Kwaśniewski's speech, which was addressed at Americans but applicable also to Europeans: leadership must be cooperative and based on rules acceptable to all parties, otherwise it can be seen as hegemony or domination.⁴⁶⁸ Cimoszewicz notes that Germany did not consult with Poland before it gave out its joint position with France, and equally Poland did not consult with Germany before signing the Letter of Eight. One should look at one's own behaviour before criticizing others.⁴⁶⁹

Rotfeld states that

⁴⁶⁵ Rotfeld 6.3.2003.

⁴⁶⁶ Rotfeld 27.2.2003.

⁴⁶⁷ Rotfeld 31.1.2003.

⁴⁶⁸ Rotfeld 27.2.2003.

⁴⁶⁹ Cimoszewicz 17.2.2003.

*“[w]e have neither a feeling of superiority, nor a feeling of inferiority toward our partners. We have the right to expect that we will be treated normally - not better, not worse than other countries.”*⁴⁷⁰

For Rotfeld, French behaviour in the Iraq crisis is nothing new or surprising, but as for Germany there is a new phenomenon. It is based on pre-election rhetoric, promises that Chancellor Schröder must keep, but also on post-war pacifist tendencies in Germany. Rotfeld does not want to criticize Germans for being too pacifist, and says he would worry more if they were more militarist.⁴⁷¹ Rotfeld notes that it is not the same to be anti-war and anti-American, and Germans have the full right to decide not to participate in a possible military operation⁴⁷². Cimoszewicz criticizes a Polish weekly, which called French and German leaders traitors, for “less intellectual provocation”⁴⁷³.

Rotfeld considers France's aspirations to become the leader of Europe justified because of the unique French contribution to European culture and civilization, the country's political and economic position in Europe, and because the unity of Europe was originally a French idea. He also sees it as natural that great powers like France or Germany have a “somewhat different role to play in Europe.” They can be seen as the engine of the train pulling Europe forwards, but these engineers should cooperate with all the attached cars and agree together on the direction they should go.⁴⁷⁴

Rotfeld does not see Poland as a bridge between Europe and America, as some have suggested. He dismisses this kind of suggestions as childish, since western Europe, including France and Germany, has far more day-to-day information channels and institutional links with the US than Poland does. Disagreements over Iraq with France and Germany are rather an incident than a deep crisis. In the end, Rotfeld thinks it will rather bring the countries even stronger together than divide them.⁴⁷⁵ There is no significant difference between Poland and France or Germany on central issues of European security, and also not on the use of force. For all EU states, as well as for Poland, war is the last resort.⁴⁷⁶ Rotfeld believes that when it comes to the final decision, France will join the US

⁴⁷⁰ Rotfeld 6.3.2003. *“Nie mamy ani poczucia wyższości, ani poczucia niższości wobec naszych partnerów. Mamy prawo oczekiwać, że będziemy traktowani normalnie – ani lepiej, ani gorzej niż inne państwa.”* (My translation.)

⁴⁷¹ Rotfeld 31.1.2003.

⁴⁷² Rotfeld 6.3.2003.

⁴⁷³ Cimoszewicz 17.2.2003.

⁴⁷⁴ Rotfeld 27.2.2003.

⁴⁷⁵ Rotfeld 6.3.2003.

⁴⁷⁶ Rotfeld 27.2.2003.

side. The coalition against Iraq will be the same size or not much smaller than that of 1991.⁴⁷⁷

As the interviewer suggests that one should respect the society's feelings, Rotfeld changes the topic to WWII, comparing the mid-February anti-war demonstrations with the enthusiasm that Chamberlain met after returning from Munich 1938, having apparently secured peace by concessions to Hitler. Rotfeld tries to use Polish history as an argument: dictators like Saddam Hussein do not understand other languages than that of force, and trying to pacify them will lead to worse results than answering to their aggression on time.⁴⁷⁸

Rotfeld states that in the US, the federal government takes care of foreign and security policy and gives the states autonomy with everything else; in the EU, in contrast, matters of agriculture and many others are delegated to Brussels, but foreign and security policy is a symbol of sovereignty that European states do not easily want to give up. He sees the European Parliament as a consultative body that does not take decisions on political matters.⁴⁷⁹

There are some contradictions in the statements of the Polish leaders. Europe should support the US, but they seem careful not to condemn French and German positions. The common position of the EU (the European Council declaration of 27 January) is mentioned several times, and the Letter of Eight's compatibility with it underlined. foreign policy in the EU is taken care of nationally. The undercurrent seems to be politeness toward the US *and* European partners, a careful balancing between the two.

Poland has supported a strong role of the UN during the whole crisis, since that is how the order of the contemporary world should be. But “unfortunately” he must add that “many times during the UN's existence it turned out that our hopes related to the effectiveness of this organization were bigger than its effective capability to fulfil these hopes [...]”⁴⁸⁰ According to Rotfeld, Powell's presentation at the UN, showing evidence of Iraqi WMDs, was to convince everyone⁴⁸¹. On the topic of the “second resolution”, Rotfeld states that it would not be the second, but the 18th

477 Rotfeld 31.1.2003.

478 Rotfeld 6.3.2003.

479 Rotfeld 31.1.2003.

480 Cimoszewicz 17.2.2003. “Niestety [...] często w okresie istnienia ONZ okazywało się, że nasze nadzieje wiązane ze skutecznością tej organizacji były większe niż jej efektywna zdolność do spełniania tych nadziei [...]” (My translation.)

481 Rotfeld 6.2.2003.

resolution on Iraq since 1991⁴⁸². Saddam Hussein still has a chance: either to leave Iraq or make a complete turn-around in his policies⁴⁸³.

The position of the Polish government on Iraq formed on 17 March is some sort of a justification for a war. It has eight paragraphs. The first emphasizes the importance of cooperation between Europe and the US for world peace. That is also the basis of the European security system, and acting according to its national security interests, Poland aims at strengthening its alliance ties. The second paragraph notes that the use of force is the last resort, and all members of the coalition agree on this. Then the crimes of Iraq are listed: it has not fulfilled UN Security council resolutions for twelve years. The fourth paragraph notes that Resolution 1441 was the last chance. Fifth, Saddam Hussein must be removed from power now, anything else would be a military and a political mistake and would damage UN authority. It is stated that Polish participation in the operation is to force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions. Sixth, Polish participation is also based on the NATO agreement reached in Prague. The seventh paragraph states that the Polish contingent shall be no more than 200 soldiers, which is on the limit of possibilities of the Polish armed forces. They will have specialist and supporting tasks, especially related to logistics. The last paragraph repeats that there is still a possibility to solve the crisis politically, and appeals to the power-holders in Baghdad to immediately and unconditionally submit all their WMDs under international control.⁴⁸⁴

Sending only a small number of soldiers, and not for direct combat, sounds harmless. However, in September 2003 Poland actually took control of a sizeable area in the occupied Iraq, as the leader of a multi-national force. By that time, 60 per cent of Poles were against having troops in Iraq.⁴⁸⁵ Van Oudenaren notes that while the Bush administration appreciates the European contributions to the coalition forces in Iraq, it has few illusions about these forces: they have been heavily supported and subsidized by the US, and have operated under restrictive engagement rules that have left the actual fighting to the Americans and the British.⁴⁸⁶ Poland's contribution to the Iraq coalition (in March 2004) was fourth-largest, around 2500 soldiers – not 200 as initially promised by the

482 Rotfeld 6.3.2003.

483 Rotfeld 31.1.2003.

484 The Polish Government 18.3.2003.

485 Al-Jazeera 3.9.2003.

486 van Oudenaren 2004, 23.

government. In March 2004, Poland officially criticized the US for the first time: president Kwaśniewski said that Washington deceived them about the weapons of mass destruction, which were the main justification for invading Iraq.⁴⁸⁷ In 2005, the American public has also started to accuse Bush of misleading everyone, and his popularity ratings have sunk⁴⁸⁸.

4.5. What Will Change after Enlargement?

The 2004 enlargement of the EU was different from the previous ones in size, scope, and character, and Missiroli claims it will radically change the institutions and policies, even the nature of the EU. Its effects on the EU's external projections can only be guessed, since membership may alter the new members' expectations and priorities, and eventually their behaviour.⁴⁸⁹ Lang concludes that enlargement is only one of the many factors shaping transatlantic cooperation, and its impact should not be overestimated⁴⁹⁰. Similarly, Raik and Palosaari argue that the enlargement will not have significant effects on transatlantic relations, and there will be no division between old and new members over relations with the US. The most significant effects of the enlargement are for the relations with Russia and the former Soviet Union. The importance and difficulty of their eastern relations makes the new member states value both the transatlantic partnership and a strong CFSP. The experience of earlier EU enlargements is that there exists a logic of integration: new members have mostly adapted to the development of CFSP. The newest enlargement will probably not be an exception. The negative consequences of enlargement are more difficult common decision-making, the new members' limited resources and interest on the Union's global activities. On the other hand, older member states may use the enlargement as an excuse to explain the difficulties and inefficiency of the CFSP.⁴⁹¹

The aim of CEE countries is full membership in the EU, which does not involve any peripheral position or being left outside of cores. The best way to prevent marginalization is active participation in all EU activities, including the CFSP. To demonstrate their support to the CFSP,

⁴⁸⁷ Al-Jazeera 18.3.2004.

⁴⁸⁸ The Washington Post 4.11.2005.

⁴⁸⁹ Missiroli 2004, 47.

⁴⁹⁰ Lang 2004, 18.

⁴⁹¹ Raik & Palosaari 2004, 5-6, 14.

applicant countries have sent contingents to EU missions in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2003. In principle new EU member states support the deepening cooperation in CFSP, but are less enthusiastic when it comes to the details of this – a phenomenon which is familiar also among the older member states.⁴⁹² The Iraq crisis did not prevent the EU from working well together in the Balkans, and almost all old and acceding members participated in first two EU-led peace support operations in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina⁴⁹³.

Most NATO members and applicants did not consider Afghanistan or Iraq direct threats. Mihalka argues that common values or old NATO cooperation habits cannot explain these countries' choices; they supported the US to keep NATO viable and thus gain free(-rider) security.⁴⁹⁴ For the people of EU accession countries, the most important issues in late 2003 were unemployment, the economic situation and crime, not terrorism or defence and foreign affairs. Foreign policy issues including Iraq are not highly salient, and therefore governments can largely ignore public opinion without fear of mass demonstrations.⁴⁹⁵

There are different shades of Atlanticism among the new EU members: it is strongest in Poland and the Baltic states, mildest in Slovenia and something in-between elsewhere. Strong Atlanticist sentiments often coincide with strong anti-Russian ones.⁴⁹⁶ CEE countries do not form an Atlanticist bloc together with Britain: they do not have any tradition of a great power status and no global ambitions. They will keenly let Great Britain be the brake of CFSP development.⁴⁹⁷ The new member states do not wish to act as a bloc in the EU and most likely will not, even if they share some common views. For all of the new members, it is important to find partners among the older member states.⁴⁹⁸ Missiroli argues that after the signing of EU-NATO framework agreements on security and military cooperation, there is less to win by adopting a staunch pro-American position in the internal EU game. This may result in the new members looking at the UK, not the US, as their partner in CFSP, ESDP, and other matters.⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹² Raik & Palosaari 2004, 17-18.

⁴⁹³ Missiroli 2004, 52.

⁴⁹⁴ Mihalka 2005, 293-294.

⁴⁹⁵ Mihalka 2005, 298-299.

⁴⁹⁶ Missiroli 2004, 51.

⁴⁹⁷ Raik & Palosaari 2004, 21.

⁴⁹⁸ Raik & Palosaari 2004, 6.

⁴⁹⁹ Missiroli 2004, 50-53.

According to Lang, the risk of enlargement comes rather from internal frictions of the EU than from direct clashes between the EU and the US. An EU permanently divided into Gaullists and Atlanticists is not a likely scenario, for it would require ongoing confrontation between the leading representatives of these options. None of these are interested in escalating the divide over transatlantic relations, and although many of the new members defend a close transatlantic relationship, an EU deadlocked in foreign and security affairs is not desirable. Lang believes that new members' Atlanticism will become softer, and they will take a "Europe and America" approach, becoming more cautious in siding with the US since this could weaken their position in Europe and their relations to important EU partners like France and Germany.⁵⁰⁰ My findings from the Polish case study material support this view.

The EU25 will consist largely of states for which foreign policy has traditionally meant relations with their neighbours and their immediate security, and beyond that doing good, mainly through the UN, to the best of their ability. It may become a problem for the EU as a whole to think strategically about the uses of power in the way that only a minority of its members still do, mostly those with imperial or global tradition.⁵⁰¹ Missiroli notes that issues of the new member's direct neighbourhood will be their vital interests. In matters of secondary importance to them they are likely to align with the prevailing consensus, and be mainly passive and reactive in their conduct of CFSP/ESDP. None of the new member states has significant overseas interests or extensions, apart from large and often also loud ethnic communities in the US. Their commercial and diplomatic outreach is modest compared to most current member states. Therefore the 2004 enlargement will not significantly widen the geographical horizons of the EU's external policy.⁵⁰² However, if the new member states fail to modernize their infrastructure, promote education and research, fight corruption and create an efficient state apparatus, the EU may become increasingly busy with itself, "digesting enlargement".⁵⁰³

Raik & Palosaari argue CEE countries are concerned about the requirements for continued US and NATO security guarantees: is the price of partnership having to participate in US-led coalitions also

⁵⁰⁰ Lang 2004, 14-15.

⁵⁰¹ Crowe 2003, 545.

⁵⁰² Missiroli 2004, 50-51.

⁵⁰³ Lang 2004, 14-15.

in the future, and is partnership worth that price? Would even that guarantee US support in the future, since the focus of American foreign and security policy has moved away from Europe? US-Russian relations based on the war on terrorism also cause concern, and these concerns emphasize the importance of an EU policy on Russia. In addition, the new as well as the old EU members are concerned about the influences of American policies on the international system, like the weakening of international law and multilateral cooperation.⁵⁰⁴

5.EU-US TRADE RELATIONS: THE BANANA WAR

5.1. External Relations of the EU

In this chapter, my aim is to consider why the EU manages to act as one, and therefore as an equal, with the US in trade matters, but not too often in foreign and security policy issues. My example of a transatlantic trade dispute is the so-called banana war between the EC/EU and the US, both having several allies. It was fought under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later at the World Trade Organization (WTO) between 1993 and 2001. Even though it was a product-specific dispute, and though neither of the main protagonists (the EU or the US) had any substantial producer interest to defend, the banana dispute proved to be politically and legally testing, and possibly the most important trade dispute under the GATT or the WTO to date.⁵⁰⁵

The European Union's "external presence" is manifested in four broad ways: trade policy, development cooperation, foreign policy and interregional dialogue; the most important of these is probably the EU's role in trade issues⁵⁰⁶. Its solidarity with the world's poorest nations is reflected in its share – more than half – of the world's official development assistance. It has a web of bi- and multilateral trade and aid relationships.⁵⁰⁷ Smith suggests that although "the US-EU partnership can be formidable, the EU may be more influential as a global actor by celebrating its differences with

⁵⁰⁴ Raik & Palosaari 2004, 20.

⁵⁰⁵ Weiss 2003, 121, 138.

⁵⁰⁶ Rosamond 2000, 175.

⁵⁰⁷ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 251-252.

the US and NATO rather than by attempting to imitate those actors.”⁵⁰⁸ For example, in mid-1980s the EU developed political and economic links with Central America, confronting two long-standing principles of US foreign policy: the Monroe Doctrine and keeping communism out of the Western Hemisphere. The EU generally agreed that problems with communist insurgents were not to be considered as part of the East-West conflict but reflections of more fundamental socio-economic inequalities. Thus, the EU provided a welcome economic-based solution, in contrast to US military instruments. For Central America, turning to the EU was, at least so they wished, a way to escape US dominance and interference.⁵⁰⁹

Ideology and ideas play a role in trade policy⁵¹⁰, and different views on problem-solving on both sides of the Atlantic have caused conflict also over trade issues. Because of the EU's preferred policy of engagement, together with its economic interests, it has economic contacts with countries like Libya and Iran; the US policy is to isolate and confront these countries.⁵¹¹

Along with diplomacy, subversion, and military strategies, economic strategies are a foreign policy instrument. As societies become more sensitive to international economic forces, they also become more vulnerable to modes of economic influence. Economic instruments may be negative, such as economic embargoes and boycotts, or positive, for example foreign aid. Their legitimacy varies: they may be considered interfering in other state's internal affairs, but as alternatives to military strategies they may have wide support.⁵¹² Many instruments of foreign policy belong to the area of the European Communities, since it is mostly responsible for external economic relations. The EU is an effective negotiator in “low policy” matters such as trade and aid. Furthermore, as Keisala notes, the “division between political and economic matters has always been vague, but it is even more so at the time of globalization.”⁵¹³

Hocking and Smith⁵¹⁴ have argued that an actor chooses its foreign policy instruments, of course, among those it has, and depending on the situation, but the choice also depends on the legitimacy of

⁵⁰⁸ Smith 2004, 261.

⁵⁰⁹ Smith 2004, 140.

⁵¹⁰ Woolcock 2005, 238.

⁵¹¹ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 123-124.

⁵¹² Hocking & Smith (1995) in Keisala 2004, 116.

⁵¹³ Keisala 2004, 15.

⁵¹⁴ in Keisala 2004, 117.

instruments as defined by the dominant norms and rules of the international system. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s the EU began to use trade policy for geostrategic aims as an alternative instrument to the missing common foreign and security policy. The promotion of economic and thus political stability has been an important factor in EU bilateral trade negotiations, for example in the Euro-Mediterranean agreements.⁵¹⁵ By making trade and aid conditional upon certain norms of human rights and democracy, the EU can influence the behaviour of others⁵¹⁶. Keisala argues that the EU's enlargement policy is a good example of how different aspects of EU action are connected, how economic power may be used to promote the EU's values and interests, and how the EU succeeds in acting coherently despite the weaknesses of CFSP. The enlargement process also demonstrates how the EU is able to define the concepts of normal in Europe.⁵¹⁷

When the European Economic Community (EEC) was established in 1957, some member states had still colonies and other dependent territories. The EEC's development cooperation was originally based on an association with those overseas countries and territories, and was defended as a free-trade area compatible with the GATT.⁵¹⁸ After these territories gained independence, links with the EEC were still maintained. Enlargements of the EEC substantially increased the number of former colonies of its member countries.⁵¹⁹ Since 1963 bananas produced in certain African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries could enter the European Communities (EC) duty free, while a common external tariff was applied to third country bananas. Different national protectionist policies were also in place. The production of so called “dollar bananas” in Latin America is generally considered economically more efficient than production in Europe or ACP countries, the ACP bananas being available in Europe only because of the protectionist practices of several EC member states.⁵²⁰ This protectionism was justified as development cooperation. In 1975, the first Lomé Convention was signed between the nine EEC members and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries; by 2000 there were 77 ACP signatories. The new Cotonou agreement of 2000 took the EU-ACP partnership further than “trade and aid”, it has a profoundly political agenda.⁵²¹

⁵¹⁵ Woolcock 2005, 240.

⁵¹⁶ Keisala 2004, 118.

⁵¹⁷ Keisala 2004, 106.

⁵¹⁸ Weiss 2003, 122-3.

⁵¹⁹ Marsh and Mackenstein 2005, 227-229.

⁵²⁰ Weiss 2003, 123 and footnote 11.

⁵²¹ Marsh and Mackenstein 2005, 227-229.

The vested interests behind the EC's preferential banana import regime were “disguised as a noble, morally and legally compelling commitment to development assistance for the benefit of needy ACP developing countries”⁵²². However, quite the opposite can also be argued: the ACP countries' reliance on bananas is a direct result of their colonial history and the Lomé Convention, both of which contributed to the growth of banana production to supply the European market⁵²³. Weiss states that, in sum, both the original adoption of the controversial EC banana regulation and the its opposition by the US-led coalition of WTO members were based on narrow, antagonistic and politically influential producer and trading interests⁵²⁴. A similar interpretation of the banana dispute is a battle of two Goliaths (multi-national banana distributors on both sides of the Atlantic) with David (the ACP countries) as a largely forgotten bystander⁵²⁵.

The EU has a common commercial policy and a common external tariff, and Rosamond states that it has long been clear that the Commission should conduct trade relations with outside parties. The Commission also negotiates economic cooperation agreements that establish privileged relations with third countries and association agreements. In all of these circumstances the EU acts as a bloc and negotiates with single states, with blocs of states and within international agreements such as the GATT.⁵²⁶ Piipponen notes that trade politics is also politics, not mere technical questions. Common decision-making is possible, because trade policy belongs to the exclusive competence of the Community. The possibility to make decisions by qualified majority voting is important, even if rarely used.⁵²⁷ The Commission proposes a mandate to the Council, which adopts it by qualified majority vote. Then the Commission negotiates in consultation with the member states and the final agreement is adopted again in the Council by qualified majority vote. In practice, unanimity is still the basis of EU trade policy, at least when major sectors or member states are concerned.⁵²⁸

However, Meunier sees the situation as more complex: the EU trade policy-making process is characterized by uncertainty over the voting rules that will be used, both at the mandate and the

⁵²² Weiss 2003, 125.

⁵²³ Friends of the Earth 2001.

⁵²⁴ Weiss 2003, 125.

⁵²⁵ The Guardian 8.4.1999.

⁵²⁶ Rosamond 2000, 175.

⁵²⁷ Piipponen 2003, 20-21.

⁵²⁸ Woolcock 2005, 237.

ratification stages. This uncertainty has been reinforced by the increasing number of negotiations dealing with non-traditional trade issues, such as intellectual property and services – in these cases “mixed competence” of the EC and member states applies, and member states use their national processes for ratification.⁵²⁹ Because of this, Meunier predicts that there will be growing uncertainty if agreements negotiated by the Commission will hold. This constant threat of one EU member breaking from its ranks will damage the Commission's credibility on the long term. US negotiators are aware of EU's institutional uncertainties and can exploit those. Using a strategy of divide and rule, they can seek bilateral deals with sympathetic EU members.⁵³⁰ After considering different types of situations, Meunier concludes that EU member states do not benefit equally from sharing their external trade powers with others. States with conservative preferences can increase their bargaining power by negotiating with a European “single voice” but retaining their power to veto the deal. Member states with median preferences, especially small ones, benefit more from majority voting. Member states' preferences vary by issue, but they cannot opt out of the EU on an issue-by-issue basis.⁵³¹ This is an important difference to the CFSP.

5.2. Common Regulation, Diverging Interests

The completion of the EC's single market in 1993 led to the adoption of EC Council Regulation (EEC) 404/93, which established a common market organization for the banana sector. The import licensing mechanism established by this regulation, together with more than a hundred implementing and modifying EC regulations, was extraordinarily complicated and lacked transparency. It was based on a system of quotas differentiated by source (EC/ACP/other), category (“traditional/non-traditional” suppliers) and by group of economic activity.⁵³² Marsh and Mackenstein call the system quite openly discriminatory: the ACP countries could export practically all their banana export crop into the EU tariff-free. Latin American bananas had a larger quota, but were subject to a tariff. The US was willing to champion its transnational corporations operating in Latin America, of which especially Chiquita Brands International was interested in the

⁵²⁹ Meunier 2000, 109.

⁵³⁰ Meunier 2000, 132.

⁵³¹ Meunier 2000, 131-132.

⁵³² Weiss 2003, 124.

European market.⁵³³

Prior to 1993, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Germany did not apply quantitative or tariff restrictions on banana imports. They were the losers of EC's banana import regulation; Germany as the biggest banana importer, and previously most liberal, of the whole EU made the greatest losses.⁵³⁴ Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and Ireland imposed tariffs according to the general EC banana policy, and their consumers and government budgets were negatively affected by the common market organization⁵³⁵. Italy and the UK applied a quota and licensing system to favour specific ACP countries (their former colonies). The impact of 404/93 on the welfare of their consumers, traders and governments was mixed.⁵³⁶ France, Greece, Spain and Portugal have domestic banana production, which was favoured by highly restrictive regulations, accepted by the Treaty of Rome. France imported two thirds of its bananas from its overseas departments and one third from the African French zone countries. The Spanish market was reserved for domestic produce only. By the 1990s, Portugal and Greece were importing most of their bananas from Latin America. France and Greece won, Portugal and Spain lost welfare after 404/93.⁵³⁷ In the whole EU, consumers were the biggest losers of the banana market regime; traders, producers and state/EU budgets won. Overall, countries with domestic production were the winners and those which traded free earlier were losers.⁵³⁸ The Guardian cites a World Bank report arguing that the EU's banana regime cost European consumers \$2.3 billion a year in higher prices, of which only a tiny fraction benefited the producers, 70-90 per cent going directly to European distributors⁵³⁹.

Importers and member states brought a series of claims to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) against the EC banana import regime, and there were also cases in domestic courts. Germany has been the most active member state complaining against it: regulation 404/93 raised the price of bananas in Germany considerably. In 1994, in the case of Germany versus the Council, the ECJ

⁵³³ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 118.

⁵³⁴ Badinger, Breuss & Mahlberg 2001, 4, 37-38.

⁵³⁵ Badinger, Breuss & Mahlberg 2001, 5, 40.

⁵³⁶ Badinger, Breuss & Mahlberg 2001, 6-7, 42.

⁵³⁷ Badinger, Breuss & Mahlberg 2001, 7-10, 44-45.

⁵³⁸ Badinger, Breuss & Mahlberg 2001, 49-50.

⁵³⁹ The Guardian 8.4.1999.

refused to annul the regulation. EC member states were divided in two groups according to their economic interests: Germany was supported by Belgium and the Netherlands, while the Commission and those countries whose trade patterns benefited from it were in favour of the regulation. The ECJ had already established earlier that an individual within the EC may not invoke a breach of a GATT obligation to challenge the lawfulness of a Community act. This reasoning is applied to member states without noting that they are themselves members of the GATT and bound by it. On the other hand, the ECJ maintains that national law must be compatible with the international agreements (such as the GATT) signed by the EC. Germany has also questioned the Framework Agreement on Bananas (FAB), signed between the EU and some Latin American countries in 1994. At the time, the ECJ did not deliver an opinion, but has later ruled some aspects of the FAB incompatible with the non-discrimination obligation. Some rules implementing 404/93 have also been found invalid, but the general position of the ECJ remains the same.⁵⁴⁰

5.3. Transatlantic trade relations

The US had a strong political and economic interest in Europe after World War II: it needed to bind Western Europe into its own sphere of influence and have it as an ally against the Soviet bloc, and also needed prosperous markets for its goods. Over time, the European Community-US economic relationship became intense and highly interdependent. During the Cold War, security dependence on the US made Western Europe reluctant to confront it. The US, on the other hand, could pursue trade disagreements without much fear of the overall transatlantic relations deteriorating too badly, since the Europeans were so dependent on it. In the post-Cold War era, the number of transatlantic trade disputes grew: the EC/EU had become an equal partner or even a rival, and was increasingly self-confident as an international economic actor.⁵⁴¹

Already by the 1980s the support of the EC was necessary for any trade agreement, for example the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. There the EU supported a rule-based system because of the shift in its domestic norms towards a European-wide rule-based system, and it supported

⁵⁴⁰ García 1998.

⁵⁴¹ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 110-111.

multilateral rules to contain the growth of US unilateralism. In recent years the EU has begun to pursue a more systemic trade policy in terms of support for a multilateral, rule-based system and its contribution to global economic governance.⁵⁴² The EU has a comprehensive agenda, including trade and environment as well as labour standards. The EU draws from its domestic experience of establishing regulatory norms for markets, pursuing the establishment of trade rules that correspond to the current global economy.⁵⁴³ In the banana case, however, the EU gave its special ties with the ACP priority over multilateral GATT/WTO rules.

The EU and the US are linked to each other by extensive trade and investment relations, and Weiss claims a “transatlantic market place” already exists⁵⁴⁴. However, the US does not enjoy treatment more favourable than any other of EU's trading partners. The EU-US trade relations are based on unilateral provisions, restricted only by agreements under GATT/WTO that both have entered.⁵⁴⁵

US trade policy may seem puzzling, an ideological see-saw between protectionism and a more universally beneficial free trade approach, but Porter argues that “US trade policy has consistently involved an aggressive use of political measures to promote US economic interests.”⁵⁴⁶ During the past fifty years, the US has consistently used trade policy to protect industries with low levels of knowledge-intensity from foreign competition. At the same time, it has been eager to help knowledge-intensive industries, what most of its multinationals represent, to commercialize their technological innovations internationally through foreign branches and subsidiaries and most recently through intellectual property rights. The latter aspect has always been portrayed to be in the world's best interest, the free competitive markets enhancing growth and being a counterforce of fascism or communism. The interests of major US firms appear to coincide with global welfare, but Porter list ways in which these politics can be seen to tilt the rules in favour of the leading oligopolistic firms. The US has used its trade policy as a type of lever that it has sought to deny others. Overall, the US trade policy has been closer to that of a heavy-handed hegemon than a liberal leader.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴² Woolcock 2005, 234-235.

⁵⁴³ Woolcock 2005, 240-241.

⁵⁴⁴ Weiss 2003, 138.

⁵⁴⁵ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 116.

⁵⁴⁶ Porter 2005, 204-205.

⁵⁴⁷ Porter 2005, 217-218.

In the banana case, Weiss claims there is an evident causal link between Chiquita's election campaign donations and US policy. Both Dole Foods and Del Monte, the other large exporters of Latin American bananas to the EC, accepted that some protection was required to support the interests of EU and ACP banana producers. They were also surprised about the US committing significant resources to this WTO action, at the request of only one of the three companies involved, and against the apparent wishes of other US interests.⁵⁴⁸ The combined production of all ACP countries equals only 4 per cent of the three US corporate giants' sales⁵⁴⁹.

In 1993, some Central and Latin American countries complained about individual EC members' discriminatory policies. The quantitative restrictions by France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK, as well as the EC's 20 % tariff on Latin American bananas (with free access to ACP bananas) were ruled inconsistent with the GATT.⁵⁵⁰ In 1994, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Venezuela complained about the EC's import licensing regime, which the panel condemned to be inconsistent with the GATT. Some sympathy was shown toward the EC and the objectives of the Lomé Convention. Lomé signatories were reminded that the report would not prevent them from seeking to achieve their treaty objectives, including the promotion of banana production in ACP countries, by using instruments consistent with the GATT. The EC resisted to apply both panel reports, and instead concluded a “Framework Agreement on Banana Imports” with four of the five disputants⁵⁵¹. The FAB increased their quotas and thus settled the dispute. Germany unsuccessfully tried to challenge its compatibility with the Treaty of Rome.⁵⁵²

In 1996, the US became involved. Together with Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, it deemed the EC regime inconsistent with several WTO agreements. Again, the EC was found “guilty”, and its appeal was largely unsuccessful. As the two earlier Banana Panel reports, the EC was also reluctant to implement the third Banana Panel and Appellate Body reports.⁵⁵³ The EC's policy of non-implementation exposed the interpretation problems of the WTO “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes”, which the EC skilfully exploited.

⁵⁴⁸ Weiss 2003, 126.

⁵⁴⁹ The Guardian 8.4.1999.

⁵⁵⁰ Weiss 2003, 128.

⁵⁵¹ Costa Rica, Colombia, Nicaragua and Venezuela, plus the Dominican Republic.

⁵⁵² Weiss 2003, 128-129.

⁵⁵³ Weiss 2003, 129-130.

This gave rise to mounting tensions and frustration, souring the transatlantic relationship. The US threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs on EC products unilaterally starting in February 1999; this approach increased the tensions further. The US obtained Dispute Settlement Body authorization for sanctions in March 1999, the first ever such case in WTO. Ecuador also won a favourable “compliance panel” ruling later that year.⁵⁵⁴ The WTO dispute resolution mechanism still relies on the ability to deny access to one's markets, which favours large and important markets such as the US⁵⁵⁵. In April 2001, the US and the EC finally reached an understanding, and later also EC and Ecuador. The agreements were seen as satisfactory, representing a balance between competing interests. The EC is to adopt a new licensing system and must increase the tariff quota open to Latin American bananas; by January 2006 the EC is to introduce a tariff-only regime for banana imports. In July 2001 the US ended its retaliatory action against imports from the EU.⁵⁵⁶ Marsh and Mackenstein's account tells that the banana war “finally ended when Chiquita Brands indicated its satisfaction with the new provisions that came into force in July 2001.”⁵⁵⁷

There has been speculation if the EU will in fact introduce a tariff-only banana regime by 2006, but after the enlargement the lobbying power of the UK and other countries (and companies) favouring quotas diminishes. The new EU member states do not have such historic trade relationships as for example the UK does. There is concern if the consumers of the new EU members will push for decent social and environmental standards for their banana imports, or simply low prices.⁵⁵⁸

5.4. Lessons from the Banana War

Trade disputes, especially long ones such as the banana dispute, are damaging in several ways. They destruct economic welfare that is derived from the undisturbed functioning of the system, and undermine the predictability of rules, which is a central value of multilateral rule-based trade system. Inevitable frictions between members tend to cause “collateral damage”, for instance by frustrating the reaching of compromise or delaying ongoing negotiations – also with third countries

⁵⁵⁴ Weiss 2003, 130-132.

⁵⁵⁵ Porter 2005, 216.

⁵⁵⁶ Weiss 2003, 136.

⁵⁵⁷ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 119.

⁵⁵⁸ The Banana Link 2002.

or concerning other trade issues. The threat of unilateral self-help approaches under domestic legislation, as practised by the US, or the EC's stubborn defence of legally doubtful positions through exploiting every conceivable procedural device, calls in question their legal obligation to proceed in good faith.⁵⁵⁹ The banana dispute was handled “appallingly” by both sides. The US government took action against the EU after Chiquita's donation to the Democratic Party, and later tried to exaggerate the numbers of lost business in order to gain blessing for bigger sanctions against EU products. Furthermore, American cries of triumph over the EU after the WTO decision appeared insensitive in the context of a real war in Kosovo and the need for unity between NATO partners prosecuting it. The EU did not handle the dispute too well either. It undertook blatant stalling tactics to hold up the inevitable WTO ruling, and failed to invent new ideas for a regime that would both protect the fragile ACP economies and be compliant with global trade laws.⁵⁶⁰

The US claimed victory in the banana war, but it seems that nobody actually won. The banana dispute may turn against the US in the form of illegal drugs and immigrants. The banana farmers of for example the Caribbean islands cannot compete on a free market; one solution is continuing production under the Fairtrade scheme, but for many the alternatives are the cultivation of illegal drugs, emigration and poverty. Unlike bananas, illegal immigrants and drugs are important US foreign policy concerns. Latin American plantation workers and producers are not likely to benefit from the change of the EU's banana regime either.⁵⁶¹ “So the answer to who won the banana war is simple; nobody won. Apart from the lawyers. They always win”⁵⁶².

However, within the EU at least Germany is probably satisfied. As noted above, the EU's policy line is normally to promote multilateral rules, and as the result conforms with this, it cannot be too bad for the EU either. The EU acted so unified in the banana dispute that it was even difficult to find out single member states' views on the issue. German attempts to challenge the banana regulation and the framework agreement via the European Court of Justice were the only exceptions I found. Germany did not publish its view (that converged with the US view) on a newspaper without consulting its EU partners, as some countries did during the Iraq crisis. If the EU managed

⁵⁵⁹ Weiss 2003, 133-134.

⁵⁶⁰ The Guardian 8.4.1999.

⁵⁶¹ The Banana Link 2002.

⁵⁶² The Guardian 8.4.1999.

to act as one despite of its member states' very different historical experiences and national interests in the banana case, it should not be impossible to overcome these in the CFSP. As Piipponen notes, EU trade policy has been developed from similar points of departure⁵⁶³.

6.CONCLUSION

6.1. Conclusions from the Case Study

Much was said and written about Iraq in early 2003, of which the documents I read represent only a small part. However, even those few documents were repeating themselves, as the leaders (more or less) consistently advocated their views. All leaders emphasized the importance of the international community's unity, and often also argued that such unity exists based on Resolution 1441 and the common aim to disarm Saddam Hussein. All claimed they work for unity, but nobody seemed willing to change the position already chosen in order to achieve this. The preferred method of disarming Iraq of its WMDs depended on the belief whether it has those or possibly may have those. The ones who supported the war joined the American campaign to exaggerate the threat posed by Iraqi WMD capabilities, and Aznar tried to draw links between the Iraqi regime and Al-Qaeda. France and Germany doubted if Iraq had any WMDs. Blix believes that the absence of WMDs in Iraq most likely resulted from the functioning of UN inspection, destruction and control bodies and the US and UK military pressure supporting those⁵⁶⁴. Everyone agreed on the Iraqi regime's human rights abuses, for some they were a reason for war: the removal of Saddam Hussein would lead to more material well-being, dignity, and freedom for the Iraqi people. French and German leaders pointed out that war also causes innocent people to suffer and die.

As already noted, Risse argues that we can infer from the communicative practices of actors whether or not they consider a norm that they have broken legitimate⁵⁶⁵. This is similar to Shannon's idea that norm violation may occur if the actor is able to excuse or justify⁵⁶⁶. Polish and Italian

563 Piipponen 2003, 25.

564 Blix 2004, 294.

565 Risse 2004, 164.

566 Shannon 2000, 301.

leaders underlined the compatibility of the Letter of Eight and the European Council conclusions of 27 January, which could indicate that they considered the conclusions legitimate and binding – and thus felt the need to justify their action (signing the letter) that seemed to undermine the EU's unity. All leaders, as well as all joint declarations and EU documents, stressed the importance of the UN, Resolution 1441 and finding a peaceful solution. The divisive issue was how to achieve the latter: some preferred military pressure, others reinforced inspections. There were some redefinitions of 'peace' by those supporting the US. Only a real threat of force would result in real peace.

For the French, the Iraq crisis offered great opportunities for self-promotion or even glorification. The French leaders repeatedly mentioned “French values” (multilateralism, respect for international law, peaceful long-term solutions for difficult problems), as if in comparison to the values the US seemed to support. The French also often noted, correctly, that most people and leaders of the world share France's point of view.

The Germans emphasized how much they value the transatlantic relationship. US power is not a problem, but a powerful UN and a stronger EU are also needed. A stronger Europe would be a better partner for the US, not a rival. The EU and the transatlantic community are both partnerships of democracies, and therefore different views and discussions are natural, and tolerance for other views is needed. The Germans did not do such self-promotion as the French, but urged others to use the CFSP (rather than the Wall Street Journal) to express their views – and did not consult others themselves before giving joint declarations with France.

The British were clearly hard pressed between their domestic and American demands. Blair had major difficulties justifying the war to his public, and would have needed a precise UN resolution for this. France was the biggest obstacle on the way. It remained unclear to me why Blair chose to side with Bush to begin with – if not out of the tradition of involvement in Iraq and cooperation with the US.

The Spanish talked constantly about Iraqi WMDs and made long, detailed accounts on those (which I will not repeat), and also about terrorism. There were several references to the new world order after 1989 and 9/11, in which terrorism and WMDs are the main threats. The Spanish enthusiasm to

confront Iraq largely resulted from the country's internal problems with ETA and taking a tough stance against terror – Aznar explicitly admitted this. For Spain, as well as for Italy, the Iraq crisis was also an occasion to seek a more important international role.

The Italians talked relatively little about weapons of mass destruction, terrorism or Saddam Hussein's crimes. They were notably willing to tell how much Italy had contributed to this and that, and describe their country as an important actor. Its role was seen to be a mediator between the US and Arab countries, with both of which Italy has good relations, and they also emphasized how Italy has worked to maintain transatlantic unity.

The Polish leaders made every effort to show that they are both good Europeans and reliable allies of the US. They repeatedly noted that the Letter of Eight is fully compatible with the EU conclusions of 27 January. They could have argued otherwise: it is none of the EU's worries what they do, since Poland was not a member and about to join only a year later. They also pointed out that the French and Germans did not consult them or others before making their statements, therefore others did not have to consult them.

The argument that a stronger EU is needed and it should be a partner rather than a rival of the US was widely accepted. The single European voice could be composed of the following choir. Fischer: the stronger Europe becomes, the more important its voice will be in its partnership with the US⁵⁶⁷. Rotfeld: leadership must be cooperative and based on rules acceptable to all parties, otherwise it can be seen as hegemony or domination – this applies to both Europeans and Americans⁵⁶⁸. Frattini: a “Europe which counts is not a Europe which opposes the United States; Europe which counts is a Europe which with a single voice convinces the United States or helps the United States to achieve a common objective”⁵⁶⁹. Blair: setting up Europe and America as rival polls of power is dangerous. A dialogue is needed, and America also has to listen to its allies.⁵⁷⁰ Palacio: it should not be forgotten that Europe and the US share values and principles, and they both need each other⁵⁷¹. Chirac: “Europe must realize the need to express its own vision of world problems and support this

567 Fischer 20.2.2003.

568 Rotfeld 27.2.2003.

569 Frattini 1.3.2003.

570 Blair 19.2.2003.

571 Palacio 17.2.2003.

vision with a credible common defence”⁵⁷².

6.2. More Europe, Not Less America?

Crowe argues that a CFSP that only works with US lead is not enough, but this does not mean that the EU should set out to be in opposition of the US - they share long-standing common values and objectives. This common stance should be strong enough to ensure that the US cannot simply dismiss it. US leadership is inescapable and necessary, but the EU must carry enough weight to convince the US that its interest is sharing, not imposing its leadership.⁵⁷³

The future of the EU as an international actor depends on the attitudes of its member states, especially on how well the leading member states cooperate and coordinate with one another⁵⁷⁴. Some member states, such as Germany, are not enthusiastic about the EU acting as a traditional superpower. Britain is at the forefront of states opposing a federal Europe; Germany and France lead the original six to whom a federal Europe is much more acceptable. The Anglo-French relationship is the key to EU progress in the security domain, while the Franco-German relationship drives integration generally; both of these are cut across by national relationships with the US.⁵⁷⁵

All of the six countries of the case study have some kind of a “special friendship” with the US. Magone also calls the Spanish-American special relationship one among the many special relationships which help the US stay in its hegemonic position⁵⁷⁶. If structures of the international order are not given but based on shared beliefs, as Wendt and other constructivists suggest, then US hegemony is largely based on the acceptance and respect that it gets from others. Brenner states that this deference is based on the beliefs that the US creates public goods benefiting others, and does it better than anyone else could. The first belief is increasingly questioned. US hegemony varies by issue area: on economic matters the EU as a collective entity can rival the US.⁵⁷⁷

The EU has been capable to jointly express views that differ from those of the US, for example on

⁵⁷² Chirac 20.3.2003.

⁵⁷³ Crowe 2003, 536-537.

⁵⁷⁴ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 261.

⁵⁷⁵ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 257-258.

⁵⁷⁶ Magone 2004, 215.

⁵⁷⁷ Brenner 2003, 194.

the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and the death penalty. The EU division over Iraq did not prevent it from welcoming the decision of the Governor of Illinois to commute all death sentences to prison terms. The various associated countries and many other European countries aligned themselves with the declaration.⁵⁷⁸ The EU was not completely paralysed with respect to the Iraq issue either, and the acceding and associated countries were all aligned with these EU views. The Council of the European Union issued a declaration on Iraq in December 2002, underlining its full support for Resolution 1441, the role of the UN and the inspections⁵⁷⁹. In January 2003, the Council adopted conclusions on Iraq reaffirming its full support for the UN and urging Iraqi authorities to cooperate fully with the inspectors⁵⁸⁰. In early February, the Presidency carried out a demarche on behalf of the EU to Iraqi missions in Athens, Brussels and New York, telling that Resolution 1441 gave Iraq a final opportunity to disarm peacefully, and it must fully and immediately comply with all relevant resolutions⁵⁸¹. The Council's conclusions of 17.2.2003 expressed full commitment to the UN, that war is not inevitable, and the use of force should be the last resort. "The Union's objective for Iraq remains full and effective disarmament [...] We want to achieve this peacefully. It is clear that this is what the people of Europe want."⁵⁸² Since May 2003, the EU has provided humanitarian relief and political and financial support to Iraq. At a donors' conference in October 2003, the Union as a whole (including the acceding countries) pledged over €1.25 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq.⁵⁸³

According to Wendt, the internationalization of the state requires identification with some state function and a collective capacity to sanction those who disrupt the performance of this function⁵⁸⁴; the CFSP currently has very limited sanctioning capacity. Smith argues none is necessarily needed: once a norm has matured into a rule or law, violation of it can result in internal psychological discomfort and external embarrassment, even when there is no authority to impose compliance through punishment.⁵⁸⁵ Keisala claims that over time there will emerge a sense of we-ness in the

⁵⁷⁸ Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU 17.1.2003.

⁵⁷⁹ European Council Declaration on Iraq, 12.-13.12.2002.

⁵⁸⁰ Council Meeting – External Relations 27.1.2003.

⁵⁸¹ Demarche by the Presidency on behalf of the EU regarding Iraq, 4.2.2003.

⁵⁸² Extraordinary European Council, 17.2.2003.

⁵⁸³ The EU's relations with Iraq 2004.

⁵⁸⁴ Wendt 1994, 392.

⁵⁸⁵ Smith 2004, 118.

EU: governments will start to see their interests more similarly, which increases coherence⁵⁸⁶. It is unlikely that CFSP would not persist because it would be found unworkable. The experience of the EU in general, and especially of its external relations capacities, suggests that reproduction and incremental adaptation is more likely.⁵⁸⁷

Wendt argues that as pairs of significant others go, so go prospects for collective identity in the system as a whole. Even if ties to peripheral actors are thin, the collective identities of core actors can lead to imitation of the core.⁵⁸⁸ A directorate of large member states may still not be the solution: Wendt also states that only if actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them they can trust that their needs will be respected even in absence of external constraints.⁵⁸⁹ Many European nations have been victims of the abuse of power by others, and have their suspicions⁵⁹⁰. As Palacio points out, “[a]lthough the CFSP remains an intergovernmental policy, we should not forget that it is a common policy, common to all, and should be drafted by all”⁵⁹¹. The Franco-German axis may be a vital motor of integration, but needs to show more sensitivity toward others in order not to alienate them or provoke responses such as the Letter of Eight.

Besides internal coherence, the EU's presence in the international arena requires that it is perceived as important by other actors. Actorness is not only about objective external presence, but also about the validation of the collective Self by significant Others.⁵⁹² As a very significant other, the US could greatly facilitate CFSP by avoiding “divide and rule” strategies, but that may not be in its perceived interest. However, Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP, argues that

“[t]he EU is not always an easy body to deal with, but it would still be a mistake for the US to cherry-pick among its European allies. [...] The notion that the US would be better served by disaggregating Europe contradicts generations of American wisdom. [...] Attempts to divide Europe strengthen those who argue, misguidedly, that European identity lies in opposition to the US. What we want is more Europe, not less America.”⁵⁹³

586 Keisala 2004, 130.

587 Smith 2004, 246.

588 Wendt 1999, 348.

589 Wendt 1999, 359-361.

590 Crowe 2003, 545.

591 Palacio 17.2.2003.

592 Allen & Smith 1990 and Smith 1996 in Rosamond 2000, 177.

593 Solana 10.7.2003.

Single EU member states cannot easily influence the US, but the EU (if anyone) could. Therefore, why not delegate all the Special relationships of various EU member states to the EU, to have one collective Special relationship? Instead of many “junior partner” relations there could be one equal partnership, as in trade issues. Crowe claims that it is mostly an illusion that individual European countries could influence major issues. That the UK made a difference by convincing the Bush administration to work through the UN on Iraq is the exception that proves the rule. Someone has to share burdens with the US, and an effective EU could do this much better than any single European country.⁵⁹⁴ The US and European nations/the EU share many values and objectives, so there is no reason why the EU should always stand in opposition to the US. Crowe concludes that the lesson from the EU's disagreement over Iraq is that both the British-led Atlanticist camp and the French-led Gaullist one were ineffective, but a common EU approach would have been much more difficult for the US to ignore⁵⁹⁵.

Marsh and Mackenstein conclude that other actors need to recognize the EU as a legitimate international actor, but above all political will in the member states is needed to make the EU an effective international actor⁵⁹⁶. This makes self-restraint necessary – if some (or all) member states keep committing harmful solos, it will be difficult for all the others to whole-heartedly commit to the CFSP. As Tiilikainen points out, European leaders have talked about making the EU a superpower based on its economic capacity and normative influence rather than its military, but the vision will not materialize unless the leaders themselves believe in it⁵⁹⁷.

⁵⁹⁴ Crowe 2003, 537.

⁵⁹⁵ Crowe 2003, 546.

⁵⁹⁶ Marsh & Mackenstein 2005, 262.

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