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Political Participation amongst Migrants

The Case of the Nordic Countries

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Master of Science –Thesis, 97 pages, 2 appendices

January 2012

Abstract

The ongoing process of globalization in combination with the ever increasing migration trends has brought integration issues to the limelight in the modern political world. The successful integration of migrants is one of the key themes that are debated in all migrant receiving countries, where successful integration is seen to be of utmost importance for the development of a society. Political participation amongst migrants is furthermore an important arena, which can be seen as a measure of successful integration. Even though this topic is deemed as an important focus area for future research on integration issues, it has been researched very little. The author aims to fill the research gap by attempting to analyze current trends of political participation amongst migrants in the Nordic countries and to identify some of the reasons that would help explain why some countries are more successful in activating migrant political participation than others. In attempting to address this aim, the author has applied a comparative analysis of the most similar cases and has thereby chosen the following relatively homogeneous countries: Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway, to be studied.

This study is divided into two parts; the first part of the thesis introduces the aims of the study, describes the research design, defines some of the central terms and outlines the theoretical framework for the study. The author further introduces the political opportunity structures theory as a means to understand the access and motivational initiatives that are present for migrant political participation. The political opportunity structures theory is seen as an interesting and important aspect in migrant and minority studies as it connects political participation with the underlying political structures in the country of settlement that can either constrain or enable migrant political participation.

Previous literature found that the presence of the right political opportunity structures in a society was seen to have a positive correlation to the political participation rates. For the purpose of this study, the author looks at the six most common core political opportunity structures used in previous literature; *electoral system*, *Citizenship Acts*, *political rights*, *political parties*, *access to labor market* and *access to educational opportunities*, for further analysis.

The second part of this study consists of data analysis and findings. Chapter 4 reviews migrant voting turn out and representation in local elections, and gives an overview of the current situation of migrant political participation through the analysis of statistical information. This chapter further shows the historical extent of interest migrants have shown to the political elections in the Nordic countries. In this chapter the author finally attempts to identify variations in the political behaviour of migrants in the Nordic countries that are worth examining in light of the research questions posed by this study.

Variations in migrant political participation that are identified in Chapter 4 are further analyzed in Chapter 5. This chapter reviews the observations through the six political opportunity structures presented in the *theoretical framework*. This analysis attempts to illustrate how and which political opportunity structures explain variations in migrant political participation in the Nordic countries.

The findings, which were observed in the comparative analysis, were very interesting. Contrary to belief, the analysis actually showed that Nordic migrant political participation had been relatively higher in the earlier times, whereas the trend now displays a rather gradual decline over the years. This trend was shown to be apparent for all the Nordic countries under scrutiny. This drop in the migrant political participation rate, although being a fact for all Nordic countries, has however been seen to vary significantly between the countries being studied.

Among the six political opportunity structures, the electoral systems, political rights and labour market opportunities were found to be the most significant factors that could help to explain the political participation variations amongst migrants in the Nordic countries. The comparative analysis suggested that Denmark, Sweden and Norway, had more migrant friendly elections systems that are deemed to be conducive for collective mobilization and could be one reason for the higher migrant political participation than in Finland. The analysis further suggested that the aforementioned countries were also seen to have stronger labour market structures, longer history of migration and migrant political participation. This again could be another reason for the lower ratings for migrant political participation in Finland. These and other important findings and suggestions for future research are further discussed and presented in the final chapter of the study.

Key words: Migrant, migration, migration history, the Nordic countries, political participation, Political opportunity structures, integration, democracy, multiculturalism, electoral systems, political rights, citizenship, denizenship, political party, labor market, education.

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Acknowledgements

The writing, researching and progress of a study can be very rewarding, but also frustrating, lonely and isolation experience, and hence is obviously not possible without personal and practical support of numerous people. It is therefore I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my family, all my friends, and my companions for their love, support, and patience over the time I worked with my thesis.

Many people on the faculty and staff at University of Tampere and University of Oslo assisted and encouraged me in various ways during the course of my studies. I would like to express my enormous gratitude to my supervisor Professor Heikki Paloheimo at University of Tampere for his expert guidance and quick and constructive feedback to all the drafts, issues and questions that I was met during the progress of study. I am also grateful to Professor Tor Bjørklund at University of Oslo for his utmost value-adding encouragement and assistance during the thesis.

Finally, I would like to thank my husband and student-colleagues who were willing to read portions of this study and provide with some very useful input. I am particularly thankful to my dear husband Uptej Srail for his critical but constructive feedback on my thesis, and especially for being beside me during the moments when I need him most.

Jaspreet Kaur Srail

1. Introduction

Current debates around the world involve migration issues as a key theme, something which is clearly evident from the political and national news headlines in all the migration receiving countries. The attention the migration phenomenon has received by the media is not surprising considering the rapidly increasing number of permanent migrants that the world has witnessed during the last century. This issue is an all pervasive one and includes all the Nordic countries. (Vertovec 1999; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007.)

The Nordic countries have traditionally been emigration countries, as seen from the trend in the late 19th and early 20th century, but a significant increase in the amount of incoming migrants during the past decades has made them substantially more multicultural. Consequently, migration and ethnic relations have become some of the fundamental issues debated in Nordic societies today. The growth in migrant population and increasing cultural diversity has given rise to a series of important and potentially divisive questions regarding the integration of newcomers.

Integration is regarded as the key instrument for successful inclusion of migrants in different spheres of the society, and in order to achieve thorough integration, the Nordic countries have introduced a number of different integration programmes, aimed at migrants. Although important, implementing integration programmes does not always mean successful integration, this being in the case of the Nordic countries or otherwise (Honoré 2003). One reason worth specifying is the continuously changing nature of migration. This can be seen from the more traditional form of inter regional migration witnessed in the early times when migrants came from relatively similar cultures and geographic areas. This is in contrast to the present form of migration originating both outside and within the Nordic countries. This latter feature is likely to influence Nordic societies a great deal in the near future where the challenges will not only be witnessed in the political arena but will also call for a change in the academic field. The academic research will, amongst others, need to take into account the ever expanding multidisciplinary and international framework. (Nordic Migration Research 2011.)

Academic research, which traditionally studied migration related issues through economic, sociological and public policy viewpoints, needs now to expand its scope for several integration perspectives. Employment, education, social and health services were the typical areas of concern through which migration integration studies were conducted before. Political participation of migrants on the contrary

is observed to be lacking from the traditional migration integration research. (Bergh & Bjørklund 2010.)

The available research on the migrant political participation patterns in the Nordic countries is, moreover, quite limited and is documented in varying degree (Nordisk Ministeråd 2003). The migrant political participation perspective has, furthermore, not been a subject to comparative study in the Nordic countries. Given the importance that successful integration has for the society's wellbeing and the limited comparative research done on the political participation area, this study will attempt to fill the research gap by examining the political participation of migrants in the Nordic countries.

1.1 The Aim of This Study

The ultimate aim of this study is to analyze political participation amongst migrants in the Nordic countries by documenting the current trend amongst the Nordic countries and then trying to identify the reasons why some countries are more successful in activating political participation than others. The author proposes to conduct the research by first trying to examine the electoral participation amongst migrants at a local level in the Nordic countries. The focus here will be to identify and document the variations in electoral participation amongst the migrant population in the different Nordic countries by using data from Nordic local elections.

The second part of the study will attempt to research the variations identified in the first part in order to see if the political participation opportunity structures can explain the turn out gap within the Nordic countries. The idea is basically to analyze those institutional explanatory factors that in the perspective of the political opportunity structure might help explain deviant political behavior amongst migrants.

The aim of this study is built upon three central research questions. These are as follows:

- **How do migrants participate in local politics within the Nordic countries? (Focus on migrant voting and migrant representation)**
- **Is there a significant turn out gap / variation in migrant political participation between the Nordic countries?**
- **How does the political opportunity structure approach explain deviant political behavior amongst migrants?**

1.2 Methods and Data

In order to understand the political participation amongst migrants in the best possible manner, this study proposes to use comparative political analysis. Comparative analysis is argued to help us understand and compare the current trend in other countries and thus help in obtaining more knowledge about a specific field, in this case politics. It can also help us to understand the strengths and weaknesses of our own political system. Through the examination of the experience of other states we can often find solutions to the political problems in our own country. (Wilson 1996.)

The comparative design is, moreover, one of the most commonly used research designs in the political science field. This design, if further argued, is believed to be better at understanding trends in voting behavior and preferences, or the institutions under which the development of immigrant politics occurs (Burnham et.al. 2004; Pennings et.al. 2006). The suitability of comparative research methods in order to address the research questions presented by this study is the key reason for applying it to this study. Comparative analysis is further considered to be an essential method in order to determine whether the relative ability of institutional factors account for the development of immigrant politics (Ireland 1994).

Comparative social science is traditionally known to be the most distinctive in respect to keeping qualitative and quantitative work apart (Ragin 1987). This can be seen from the fact that comparative research scientists using the quantitative means for research were observed to use statistical data in their work. The qualitative oriented researches were, on their side, seen to be using material and methods, which are typical of qualitative social research. (Luoma 1996.)

This study will, however, attempt to aggregate the above mentioned distinction of comparative science and will try to combine quantitative and qualitative strategies as a means to address the research objectives. The use of this method is derived from the *qualitative comparative analysis*, as defined by Ragin (1987), where he shows that one can probably achieve better results by combining both qualitative and quantitative methods within a single research project. The thought at the heart of this approach is the idea that researchers can often bring together certain elements that have conventionally been treated as an “*either / or*” option in otherwise single research projects (Denscombe 2007). The mixed use of comparative research analysis is furthermore argued to be more rewarding than research using either qualitative or quantitative research strategies (Ragin 1987).

Mixed use of comparative analysis methods in this research are, furthermore, chosen due to the data limitations. The author believes that combining qualitative data with statistical information will enable a broader examination of outcomes resulting from multiple and conjectural causes as argued by Ragin (1987).

1.2.1 The Art of Comparing: Comparative Research Methods

The comparative method is about observing and comparing carefully selected cases on the basis of some stimulus being absent or present. The comparative method operates on the logic where *the cases to be compared are produced under controlled conditions*. This, however, seems to be difficult in this research as controlling the political environment is not considered possible and these comparisons would as such not reach experimental standards. (Burnham et. al. 2004.) The conclusions in this study will, therefore, be drawn from comparisons and not from experimental outcomes.

Comparative approach is one of the more feasible ways to connect ideas (theory) about society and politics with what is actually going on in the world we live in (empirically founded factors) (Pennings et.al. 2006). Given the above, one can argue that comparative studies could best be conducted by means of theory-driven research questions as comparative research without theory will remain meaningless.

In terms of research designs, one can either use a research design that analyses similar kinds of variables within the collected dataset or a research design, which attempts to analyze differing variables within the dataset. The most important aspect of formulating either of the above mentioned research designs is to select cases that make it possible to reach a conclusion with respect to one's research question. This is also one of the biggest challenges met by many researchers in comparative studies, as they need to find a sufficient number of cases, which are indeed comparable but at the same time have differing variables or characteristics that help in answering the research question. (Burnham et. al. 2004.)

The author believes that applying the design of similar cases will be more suitable in addressing the research questions. We have for the purpose of comparison selected the following case countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The reasons and suitability for selecting these four Nordic countries is explained in more detail in the part below.

1.2.2 Cases

As mentioned above, we have chosen Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden for this study. The reason for choosing these countries, in particular, is that they share a lot of common attributes such as the close geographical proximity, common early history, similar cultural characteristics, homogeneous population and comparable similar social systems and values (Heidar 2004a).

These attributes combined with the interdependence and long standing mutual cooperation, both political and economical; make these countries suitable for further comparison. Above all, these countries share a long history of parliamentary government system and all of them constitute a distinctive sub-type of liberal democracy expressed by the “*three Cs*”: *Compromise, Co-operation and Consensus* (Heidar 2004b). This basically means that these countries represent the seven-point ideal-typical picture of the Nordic model of government (Arter 1999 cited in Heidar 2004b). These points are as follows:

- (1) *Dominant or strong social democratic parties*
- (2) *Working multi-party system*
- (3) *Consensual approach to policy-making*
- (4) *Consultation with pressure groups*
- (5) *Centralized collective bargaining*
- (6) *An active state*
- (7) *Close relations within political elite producing pragmatism*

The above mentioned commonalities together with the fact that the Nordic countries have experienced quite similar emigration and migration trends is believed to provide a very good platform for comparative research.

1.2.3 Data

The data used in this research is mainly obtained from publicly available archives from within the states being researched. The data gathered can generally be termed as documentary data. The advantage of documentary data is that it provides a cost-effective method of getting vast amounts of information that are held in documents. Documents are further a source of data, which is permanent and available in a form that can be checked by others and is open to public scrutiny. (Denscombe 2007.) Collected data

used in this study consists of government publications, legal directives, official statistics, booklets, evaluation reports, newspapers, journal articles and website pages.

Statistical data

The statistical data used in this study is collected from national statistics, relevant academic literature as well as publicly available published reports. In order to ensure sufficient versatility, the statistical data of Nordic local elections has been gathered over a wide-ranging time period; beginning from 1981, being the earliest available electoral statistical data to the most current elections of 2010.

The most essential source of this vast statistical data is unarguably from the national statistical databases of the countries under research. These are namely; Statistics Finland (STAT), Statistics Norway (SSB), Statistics Sweden (SCB) and Statistics Denmark (DST).

The country reports prepared for the European research project POLITIS have also been useful in this research. POLITIS is the result of the targeted research conducted for the European research commission. The report explores the potential of immigrants for the development of a civically active European society. The report was published under the following title: *Building Europe with new citizens? An Inquiry into the civic participation of naturalized citizens and foreign residents in 25 countries*, where national experts from the participating 25 EU countries prepared a country report on the contextual conditions and state of research concerning the civic participation of immigrants. These reports are further collected into one book “*European Immigration. A sourcebook.*” by Anna Triandafyllidou and Ruby Gropas (2007).

Another important source of data used in this study is the relevant academic literature available on the migrant political participation topic, published by known researchers in the field from each of the Nordic countries .

Legislative documents

Legislative documents such as Citizenship Acts and Local and Regional Elections’ Acts were further important sources that were studied to understand the opportunity structures for this research.

Citizenship Acts were mainly used for comparison reasons in this study. The Norwegian Nationality Act (51/2005), The Swedish Citizenship Act (82/2001), The Finnish Nationality Act (359/2003 & 80/2010) and Consolidated Act on Danish Nationality (113/2004) have been an important source of information for this matter.

Other important data sources for political opportunity structures have been the Local and Regional Government Elections Act (105/2011) in Denmark, The Finnish Local Government Act (365/1995), The Elections Act (837/2005) in Sweden and the Representation of the People Act (57/2002) in Norway.

MIPEX: Migration Integration Policy Index III

One of the most central resources used in this study is the *Migrant Integration Policy Index III* (MIPEX 2011). MIPEX is a study conducted by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group, and is an interactive reference guide for researching migration integration policies. It is a project, in which 31 countries in Europe and North America are compared to measure their integration policies in 7 different policy areas. Political participation policy is one out of the seven policy areas compared, where labour market mobility, family reunion, education, long-term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination integration policies were the other policy areas under research.

Using seven policy areas and 148 policy indicators MIPEX creates a rich, multi-dimensional picture of migrants' opportunities to participate in society by assessing the governments' commitment to integration. By measuring policies and their implementation it reveals whether all residents are guaranteed equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities. (MIPEX 2011.)

This study has chosen MIPEX as comparable research data due to the versatile use of MIPEX data in both quantitative and qualitative research on specific issues. It can be used for comparison across countries and to evaluate how different factors impact on policies and why countries differ from each other. Said in other words the rich and broad information provided by MIPEX is one of the key reasons that make it a good data source for this study.

1.3 The Way Forward – An Overview

In attempting to answer the research questions, the author has chosen the following layout for this study. Chapter 1 introduces the aims of the study and its guiding features. It presents the research objectives, questions and the study design.

The second chapter; *Migration and migrants and the explanatory factors*; will review and define migration and migrant terms, and also try to distinguish between the meanings the terms have in the different Nordic countries. This chapter will also review some central theoretical perspectives on push and pull factors causing migration. In the following subchapter, we have tried to present a brief summary of the historic background to migration for the individual countries in question and have also presented a brief analysis of the current situation of migration in the Nordic countries.

Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework and is also considered crucial in order to understand the definition of *political participation* in this study. It further reviews the need to examine migrant political participation by analysing prior research, and gives an overview of institutional approach and the political opportunity structures through an analysis of the literature available.

In Chapter 4 and 5, this study moves onto reviewing migrant voting turn outs and representation in local elections, and gives an overview of the current situation of migrant political participation through the analysis of statistical information. This chapter also studies the extent of interest migrants have shown by taking part in the political elections held in each of the Nordic countries under scrutiny. Simultaneously, it will attempt to find variations among the political behaviour of migrants in the Nordic countries that are worth examining in light of the research questions presented by this study. Variation found among migrant political participation will further be analyzed in Chapter 5, which also reviews the findings through political opportunity structures as presented in the *Theoretical Framework* –chapter. Important findings are discussed and concluded in the last Chapter 6.

2. Migration, Migrants and Explanatory Factors

This chapter; *Migration, migrants and explanatory factors*, will review the general definition of migration and the migrant terms in the Nordic countries. The chapter will further present some theoretical perspectives in order to explain the migration flows better, before the history of the migration pattern is analyzed and compared for the individual countries in question.

2.1 The Migration Process

According to Oxford dictionary of the Social Sciences, migration refers to “*general patterns of movement from one place to another*” (Calhoun 2011). In layman terms it can basically mean to describe the movement of people between a sending country (emigration country) and a receiving country (migration country). This could be a simple exercise executed by an individual, for example a nomad moving away from his place of birth to another place within the same country. This, however, would be an example of internal migration. In the case of external migration an individual will be moving away from his home country to another host country (foreign country), also known as international migration.

A very important factor to be noticed here is that international migration, hardly ever a simple individual action, is one in which a person decides to move in search of better life-chances. Migration in this case, is rather “*a collective action, arising out of social change and affecting the whole society in both sending and receiving areas*” (Castles and Miller 2009:20).

On the basis of the definition above one can conclude that a migrant is a person who, as a result of participating in the migration process, moves from a sending country to a receiving country. The person in question is considered as a migrant from the perspective of the receiving country (migration country) and an emigrant from the perspective of the sending country (emigration country). One commonly used argument or factor to distinguish a migrant from a tourist is the duration of stay of the person in the receiving country. A period of one year is currently being used as a norm to distinguish between a tourist and a migrant, where a migrant is a person who stays for at least a year in the receiving country and a tourist would be a person who stays for a duration of less than a year. This is

one of the more general definitions used for migrants and is, as evidenced above, more or less based on the duration of stay factor. (Castles and Miller 2009; Brochmann 2002.)

There are, however, a large variety of different factors which are being used to define a migrant by the different countries in the world. The differences are also evident within the Nordic countries itself, even though the foreign policies and cultural values of these countries are considered to be quite similar. Some of the factors that were observed as being used within the Nordic countries under observation; Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, were period of residency, place of birth, nationality or permanent residence status.

2.2 The Migrant

In order to set a platform for further comparison within the countries under observation it is important to identify and compare the different factors that are used in defining a migrant. This part of the chapter will, therefore, aim to identify the various definitions and factors used by governmental authorities in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland in distinguishing a foreign person as a migrant.

The Finnish Migration Service Office (Maahanmuuttovirasto 2010) defines a migrant as *a person who moves from one country to another in order to build a new life in a new country*. The Finnish definition of a migrant is, as seen above, very similar to the definition given by Castles and Miller (Castles and Miller 2009). In Norway, however, a special focus is emphasized on the place of birth, where a migrant is seen to be *a person who is a resident in Norway, but is born abroad and has parents who are both born abroad* (own translation)¹. The Norwegian understanding of a migrant could be argued to be similar to one of the very traditional views on migrants, some of which are generally seen as being practiced in the various citizenship acts today. According to this view a child is only seen to be acquiring the citizenship of the country (Norway) if he or she is born in the country and at least one of his/her parent's is a native citizen (Norwegian). (Utlendingsdirektoratet 2010.)

The term migrant is, moreover, a relatively new term that is being increasingly used instead of the more commonly used traditional terms that were being used to describe a migrant, such as foreigner or

¹ *Innvandrere – en person som er bosatt i Norge, men er født i utlandet og har foreldre som begge er født i utlandet*

an alien. These traditional terms are not considered to be politically correct today and are hence not used as often as they were in the past and are especially seen being replaced in the official languages of various nations. There are, however, still some countries that use these older terms to describe migrants, such as the United States and Denmark, where the word alien is also used in their official language. It has also been observed that the Danish authorities have been using the term alien to describe a person who *is not a Danish citizen* (own translation)². (Udlændingsservice 2010.)

The Swedish migration authorities have, on the other hand, a more comprehensive definition of a migrant compared to the other Nordic countries. The determination of a migrant is based on a variety of different characteristics when it comes to Sweden. This includes both the general features of the migration process as well as the specific features of the migrant. According to the definition used in Sweden *a migrant is considered to be a person, who has an intention to stay in Sweden for at least 12 months, has a permanent resident permit and is registered in Sweden* (own translation)³. (Migrationverket 2010a.)

As is seen above, the word migrant has been defined varyingly within the Nordic countries itself, even though these countries share a lot of common attributes. On the one hand, the Nordic countries seem to have used some common factors (both implicitly and explicitly) in their definitions, for example the implicit use of the duration of stay in their definition of a migrant whereas, on the other hand, there are also some differing factors, for example the use of citizenship in defining a migrant in Denmark, the use of the place of birth factor in Norway, the intention of stay factor in Finland and the status of having a permanent resident permit factor in Sweden. This means that some countries give more importance to certain factors than others and vice versa.

Similar variations can also be noticed in the migration history of the Nordic countries. These countries have rightly, as explained earlier, experienced more or less similar migration flows but they still do differ from each other on the basis of migration numbers, migration history and nationalities of the migrants seeking residence.

² *En udlænding er enhver person, som ikke er dansk statsborger* (Udlændingsservice 2010).

³ *En invandrare en person som har för avsikt att stanna i Sverige i minst tolv månader, har uppehållstillstånd/uppehållsrätt och folkbokför sig i landet* (Migrationsverket 2010).

It is, however, important to understand the explanatory factors and the recent theoretical perspective of migration in order to get a thorough perspective of the migration process, before embarking on the history of migration in the individual countries under observation. The next part of the chapter is, therefore, dedicated to introduce some of the explanatory factors that result in migration as well as the recent theoretical perspectives on the topic, before a country by country analysis is presented.

2.3 Theoretical Perspectives and Explanatory factors

There are a variety of theories concerning the causes and effects of migration and this part of the chapter will review some of the more central theories in order to explicate the migration process in general. All theories emphasize on different factors to explain migration, and it could be argued that each theory has its rightful place in the migration research field, and it is, therefore, hard to claim that one theory is more correct than the other. Although different it can be roughly ascertained that most of the migration theories generally speak of four main aspects in order to explain migration movements. These being the economic aspect, the historical-structural aspect, the transnational aspect and lastly the migration systems and networks approach aspect. Some of them emphasize on factors belonging to the recipient countries (attraction factor), others point to migration pressures experienced in countries of origin. Other authors see social networks, history and globalization as the essential factors, which cause migration. To understand these views in more detail, this chapter will further describe each of the above mentioned aspects in brief below.

Economic theories of migration

The economic theories of migration argue that the economic factor is one of the central factors that increase or decrease migration. The Neoclassical theory is especially the dominant paradigm, which explains the economic factor that plays an important role in migration studies. The Neoclassical perspective, again, has its origins in the earliest systematic theory on migration. The systematic theory on its part was founded in the 19th century by the famous geographer E.G. Ravenstein, who formulated the statistical laws of migration. These were, however, general statements which were unconnected with any actual migratory movements. (Castles and Miller 2009.)

These so called general theories emphasize the tendencies of people to move from sparsely to densely populated areas or from low- to high-income areas, or link migration to fluctuations in the business cycle. The last mentioned approach is also often known as “*push-pull*”-theories, where “*push factors*” impel people to leave the areas of origin, and “*pull factors*” attract people to certain countries. “*Push factors*” can for example be demographic growth, low living standards, lack of economic opportunities and political repression, while “*pull factors*” include demand for labor, availability of land, good economic situation and political freedom. (ibid.)

The Neoclassical approach is mainly used in economics now-a-days but it can also be found to have reasoning in sociological, demographical and geographical studies as well. The current Neoclassical approach has an individualistic and non-historical aspect, which emphasizes on the individual’s decision to migrate. According to the above mentioned approach, a migrant is seen to be a rational individual whose decision to migrate would more likely be based on rational comparison of the relative costs and benefits of remaining at home or moving, than anything else. (ibid.)

This approach further assumes that migrants have perfect knowledge of wage levels and employment opportunities in destination regions, and their decisions are based on these economic factors. The central concept evident in this theory is *the human capital*. This means that people decide to invest in migration, in the same way as they might invest in education or vocational training, and will migrate if the expected rate of return from higher wages in the destination country is greater than the costs incurred through migrating. (Chiswick 1999.) Chiswick further argues that migrants are positively selected, when the more highly skilled are more likely to move because they are more likely to obtain a higher return of human capital investment in mobility. This though, if true, negatively affects the sending countries, which experience a “*brain drain*”-phenomenon (Chiswick 1999).

Neoclassical theories are seen to be able to explain work based migration, rather well, but on the other hand have been criticized for their limited perspective. It is illogical to assume and treat all migrants as market-players who have full information about their options and the freedom to make rational choices. What makes this point illogical is that a lot of migrants, instead, have limited and contradictory information, and are subjects to a range of constrains. A very good illustration is the example of the poorest migrants who lack the knowledge of the economic situation and wage levels of the destination country and are, therefore, unable to participate in utility based migration. On the whole it can hence be deduced that Neoclassical theories help to explain the migration rationale of the individuals in the intermediate status (middle class) who belong to areas undergoing economic and

social change. This theory can, however, not be generalized to all kinds of migration and thus has a very limited target group. (Castles and Miller 2009; Chiswick 1999.)

This theory does not further explain why a certain group of migrants go to one country rather than another and lacks historical experiences as well as family and community dynamics. Some of the weaknesses in the Neoclassical theory have, however, been tried to be addressed by the dual (or segmented) labor market theory and the new economics of labor migration theory.

The dual (or segmented) labor market theory gives importance to institutional factors as well as race and gender in bringing about labor market segmentation. American economist Michael Joseph Piore (1979 cited in Castles and Miller 2009) argues that international migration is caused by structural demand within advanced economies for both highly skilled workers and lower-skilled manual workers to carry out production tasks. This divides workers to primary and secondary class, where the majority of the ethnic group becomes the primary labors and the migrants are deemed to be the secondary labor group. The workers in the primary labor market are positively selected on the basis of human capital, but also often through membership of the majority ethnic group, male gender and, in the case of migrants, regular legal status. Conversely, those in the second market are disadvantaged by lack of education or vocational training, as well as by gender, race, minority status and irregular legal status. (Piore 1979.)

Dual labor market theory also explains the role of employers and governments in international migration but it still lacks the role of the family and community as part of the migration process. The new economics of labor migration theory reviews these factors and argues that migration decisions are not made by isolated migrants, but by families, households and even communities. Further, migration cannot be explained only by income differences, factors like chances of secure employment, availability of investment capital, and the need to manage risk over long periods need to be considered. It is often the whole family that comes together to decide whether one or more members should migrate not just to get higher wages but also to diversify income sources and to provide resources for existing activities. (Castles and Millers 2009.)

As with the Neoclassical theory, the new economics approach also focuses on the supply side of migration factors that impel people to cross borders in search for work. The difference is that the first considers migrations as an individual action whereas the new economic theory focuses on collective actions taken by a much wider range of factors. All three economic theories of migration review

interesting perspectives, and without any doubt, all provide important insights into migration. Given this it is, however, impossible to conclude that migration can fully be understood through economic analysis alone. Using only economic perspective to explain migration is, therefore, a very limited perspective, which ignores historical, structural and transnational factors.

The historical-institutional approach

An alternative approach to explain migration was presented in the 1970-80s. This approach was called the historical-institutional approach and its main focus is on the unequal distribution of economic and political power in the world economy. This theory sees migration mainly as a way of mobilizing cheap labor for capital. The difference between economic approach and historical approach is that the former sees migration as voluntary movement, like that from Europe to USA before 1914, and the latter sees migration as a mass recruitment of labor, for example the situation after the Second World War. The availability of labor was both a legacy of colonialism and the result of war and regional inequalities within Europe. (Castles and Kosack 1973; Castles and Millers 2009)

Supporters of the historical-structural approach developed another theory called world systems theory. This theory was found in the late 70's and was inspired by a Marxist political economy view, and especially by the dependency theory. This theory argued that the underdevelopment of Third World countries was first a result of the exploitation of the resources through colonialism and later exacerbated by unfair terms of trade with powerful developed economies (Frank 1969 as cited in Castles and Millers 2009; Baeck 1993). Accordingly the world systems theory believes that the manner in which less developed "peripheral" regions were incorporated into a world economy, controlled by *core* capitalist nations, accelerated rural change leading to poverty, displacement of workers, rapid urbanization and the growth of informal economies. Thus, there was an unequal distribution of economic and political power and dependency of Third World countries on developed capitalist nations, which again led to the rise of migration. (ibid.)

Though, historical-institutional theories fulfill the gaps in economic theories, it can still be criticized of its' dominant focus on western countries and their capital interests. This approach takes migration as a temporary phenomenon, which does not explain permanent migration. Both economic and historical-institutional theories seem to have one-sided perspectives and cannot clarify the great complexity of

contemporary migrations. The Neoclassical approach disregarded the historical-structural aspects and the role of the state, whereas the historical-institutional approach does not take into account human motives and groups. Another theory called the migration systems and networks theory has focused on the role of family, group and community as essential factors in the migration process, which cannot be ignored in migration studies.

Migration systems and networks theory

Sociological theoretical models, by contrast, focus on the origin of the decision to migrate and its consequences. The second phase of migration in many countries included families who came after the single male migrants who had arrived with the first wave of migration, hence the migration systems and networks theory.

Both the migration systems theory and the networks theory emerged with the rapid growth of migration research in 1990s. The basic idea of the migration systems theory is that a specific country can be part of several migration systems and to examine factors causing migratory movements one needs to examine both ends of the flow and study all the linkages between the places concerned. (Castles and Millers 2009.) These linkages can be categorized as “*state-to-state relations and comparisons, mass culture connections and family and social networks*” (Fawcett and Arnold 1987: 456-457).

This theory further suggests that migratory movements generally arise from the existence of prior links between sending and receiving countries based on colonization, political influence, trade, investment or cultural ties (Fawcett and Arnold 1987). The theory is based on the assumption that the basic idea of any migratory movement can be seen as a result of interacting macro- and micro-structures. Macro-structures refer to large-scale institutional factors, while micro-structures include the networks, practices and beliefs of the migrants themselves. These two main structures; macro- and micro structures, are further linked to each other with several intermediate mechanisms called *meso-structures*. (Castles and Miller 2009.)

The macro-structures are for example states, organizations, laws, structures and migration control policies practiced by both sending and receiving countries. These structures can effect controlling or allowing migration. The micro-structures are the informal social networks developed by the migrants themselves. Some authors have also used terms like cultural capital (knowledge of other countries,

capabilities to travel) and social capital (personal relationships, family, and friends) to refer to micro-structures. (Castles and Miller 2009.) Irrespective of the term we use, the main argument is that the family and community are crucial in migration networks and this is a very central part of the theory. Recent research on migration has shown that migration decisions are usually made by the participation of whole families rather than individuals. Families have, more recently, been sending one or more family members to work in another region or country, in order to maximize income and survival chances. (ibid.)

The intermediate meso-structures act as linking mechanisms between two main levels. Intermediate structures are used to refer to certain individuals, groups, or institutions that have taken on the role of mediating between migrants and political or economic institutions. Recruitment organizations, lawyers, agents, smugglers, who can also be referred to as the “*migration industry*”, are very typical examples of meso-structures. (Harris 1996 in Castles & Millers 2009.)

Transnational theory

Transnational theory is one of the most recent theories on migration and is based on the idea of transnationalism and globalization. According to the supporters of this approach, the rapid technological improvement in the transport mode and communication lines has made it increasingly easy for migrants to maintain close links with their areas of origin, which in turn promotes circular or temporary mobility. This mobility has features, which allow people to migrate repeatedly between two or more places where they have economic, social and cultural linkages. (Castles and Miller 2009.) This theory could also be used explain the latest migration flows to predict the possible inflows of migration in future. This theory is, however, seen as a relatively new theory in migration studies, and many authors see it as being incomplete so far.

2.4 History of Migration in the Nordic Countries


Different perspectives on migration have shown that there can be many different factors, which cause migration. They can vary from an attractive economy of the receiving country and low development of the sending country, to historical and social factors.

Migration in the Nordic countries seems to be a result of many different factors. There are economic factors, historical events, social networks (family reunification) and transnational factors (European Union) behind the migration flows to the Nordic countries.

Figure 1 below shows the inflows of foreign population into the Nordic countries from 1995 to 2001. According to this figure Sweden has had the highest number of migrants during the time period and Finland the lowest, Norway and Denmark, on their side, vary on the second spot. The differences are remarkable, especially considering the fact that Sweden and Finland are both neighbor countries sharing borders and still further, all the Nordic countries have had a common passport-control area since the 1950s, which has allowed for free movement of the people between these countries (Fagerlund and Brander 2009).

One possibility to find an explanation regarding the differences between the Nordic countries could be the historical events in each country before 1995. Another factor to consider is the limited time period being depicted in Figure 1. Given the limitations one can conclude that Figure 1 is not the best possible source to make conclusions. The author will therefore attempt to study the history of migration one by one in each of the Nordic countries under research in order to portray a detailed picture of the migration phenomenon.

Figure 1: Inflows of Foreign Population in the Nordic countries 1995-2001(thousands)



Source: Salt 2004

2.4.1 Denmark

One of the reasons for the moderate migration trend to Denmark in recent times can be attributed to the homogenous population and the strong sense of national identity. The recent impression left after the Mohammed cartoon affair in 2005-2006 in combination with the very restricted migration controlling measures adopted by the Danish government do not further leave doubts about the future direction of migration flows in the country. The foreign policies of the country have, however, not been so strict. Denmark has historically experienced a continuous inward influx of migrants over the last six hundred years. This has resulted in Denmark having the second largest number of immigrations among the Nordic countries.

Denmark faced its first inflow of migrants in the 16th - 17th century. The immigrants, during this first period of migration, consisted of Dutch farmers, Jews and immigrants from several other European countries. The Jews were invited by a special invitation of King Christian IV with the thought that Jews will quicken the economic life of the country. In the mid-17th -19th, the second period of Danish migration saw the rise of constant inflow of Germans, who are considered to have left an essential effect on both the cultural and historical development of modern Denmark. (Hedetoft 2006.)

Economical reasons have further continued to be the central factors behind the Danish migration flows from the second half of the 19th century until World War I. Attracted by the Danish economy, and in some cases expressly invited by the government, a huge number of unskilled workers arrived from Poland, Germany and Sweden. There is no precise record of the number of migrants during the earliest periods but there is doubt that they were considerable. (ibid.)

The third period of migrant influx started in the 20th century following the general trends of migration and consisted of multiple waves of refugees. After World War II, Denmark saw the arrival of many Eastern Europeans, Jews and Germans who arrived on the basis of asylum to Denmark. The flow was accelerated by the “boat people” from Vietnam and other refugees from Chile in the 1970s. The continuous conflicts and wars thereafter further led to the arrival of several new groups from the Middle East through the 1990s. This along with the liberal labor policies, allowed under the guest worker policy, allowed the entry of many laborers from Pakistan, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Morocco. This policy was, however, suspended in 1973 putting a full stop to the labor immigration policies adopted by the Danish government. The majority of the migration during the last decades has therefore been based on asylum, family reunification and international cooperation (European Union). (Hedetoft 2006.)

2.4.2 Finland

Traditionally, Finland has been considered to be more of an emigration country than an immigration country. One of the main reasons for the outflow is argued to be because of the relatively low industrialization and ample work power within the country. Migration to Finland was also an area under tight governmental control in the mid 20th century, where the borders were strictly controlled in the decades after the Second World War, and it was not until the 1990s that Finland saw itself as a receiving country for immigrants. (Sagne et. al. 2007.)

Although Finland is mainly argued to have been an emigration country, it also boasts of its own peaks of multiculturalism in the distant past. Leitzinger (2008) describes Finland’s period of immigration and multiculturalism to be in the 14th and 15th century. They portray the historical patterns of immigration to Finland, first being under the Swedish rule for more than 600 years and later under the Russian Grand Duchy, both periods having their impact on emigration and migration to Finland. (ibid.)

The majority of the non-Finnish population consisted of Swedes and Germans during the Swedish rule. It was also persons of these origins that held the most vital positions in society at the time. The country also witnessed another wave of migrant influx towards the end of the Swedish rule, when Polish, Ingrians and Baltic citizens added to the non-Finnish population. (Leitzinger 2008.)

After the end of Swedish rule in 1809, Finland experienced a high wave of emigration. Thousands of Finns emigrated to Sweden, the US and Canada in 1809-1917. This period did, however, also notice its share of inward migration as well, when several people from Europe settled in Helsinki and other major towns in Southern Finland. These first waves of modern inward migrants included Swiss cheese makers, Bavarian brewers, Norwegian sawmill proprietors, British textile industrialists, Italian ice cream makers, Jewish merchants and Tatar carpet and fur traders. They made infinite contributions to the Finnish economy and today they are well integrated into Finnish society and daily life. Many of these immigrants brought with them some core cultural traits, which are still visible in Finnish society today, for example the traditional clothing of the Roma people, the language and religion of the Tatar people and so on. (Tanner 2011.)


Finland furthermore experienced its' first refugee inflow receiving over 32,000 Russian refugees as a result of the Russian revolution (Saksela 2003). Some historians have also argued that Finland was home to more foreign nationals than Sweden at the beginning of World War II, and was therefore more multicultural than it is today. This trend did, however, change in the 1950s when Finland started experiencing more domestic migration, where native Finns began migrating from rural areas to cities of Southern Finland. (Saksela 2003; Tanner 2011.)

In spite of the growth in industry and thereby the need for manpower Finland did not experience labour shortage, which was atypical of the other European countries of the time. The slight inflow of migrants that did, however, arrive did not find work and housing in Finland and were thus attracted to countries like Sweden, Norway, and other Western European countries like Germany and Switzerland after the World War II (Tanner 2011.)

Migration as a phenomenon, being both inflow and outflow, can also be observed from the graph below (see Figure 2), which shows that Finland has historically experienced more outward migration than inward migration. Immigration was first observed to have crossed emigration numbers in 1970. This inward migration to Finland was mainly due to the result of the various conflicts in the world and included mainly refugees from Chile and Vietnam. This phenomenon was again witnessed in the

1980s, when Finland received more migrants than emigrating residents, a result that can be attributed to returning migrants. These return migrants were former citizens of Finland who returned to their country of origin from Sweden and the US. (Ahlgren-Leinvuo 2005.)

Figure 2: Emigration and Migration in Finland (1945-2000)



Source: Statistics Finland; Figure: Jouni Korkiasaari, Institute of Migration 2003.

Inward migration continued to increase in Finland when Finnish President Mauno Koivisto declared in April 1990 that all Finns living within the former Soviet Union could be considered return migrants to Finland. This group of individuals, known as Ingrians, was poorly treated by the Soviet Union. Many Finns, moreover, felt that some Estonian or Russian citizens from the Ingria region were sufficiently Finnish in terms of ethnicity and therefore had a morally legal right of return. This declaration saw that about 25,000 Ingrians, who fulfilled the criteria, had migrated to Finland by the year 2003 and another 22,000 were waiting for their decision. (Tanner 2011; Korkiasaari and Söderling 2003.)

Moreover, the increase in the number of asylum applications has also had its impact on the immigration trend in Finland in the 1990s. The largest refugee groups in Finland in the recent times are observed to be from Somalia, Yugoslavia, Iraq and Iran. (ibid.)

2.4.3 Norway

The recent Norwegian immigration policies are argued to be alike with its attitude towards the European Union. The country is said to be selective in admitting migrants but on the other hand, ensures social equality for newcomers like many other European countries aspire to be able to do. Norway has historically been colonized by both Denmark and Sweden and received its independence in 1905. The country was furthermore known to be an emigrating rather than an immigration country in its early days. (Cooper 2005.)

Norwegians are known to have emigrated to the United States as early as the latter half of the 19th century. The low economic development of the country is considered to be one of the main reasons that made many citizens leave the country in the hope of better opportunities. A lot of this early emigration was, however, temporary and the phenomenon is seen to have reversed in the last couple of decades where many emigrants returned to Norway for permanent settlement. This latter inflow is, however, quite recent and the country did not, unlike its Nordic peers, experience any counter immigration in its early days when its residents were emigrating. It was actually not before the 1970's that the country witnessed its first significant migrant inflow with the exception of some migration from the Nordic countries in the 1960s. (Cooper 2005.)

This relatively late immigration trend in Norway is, however, interesting to note given the early interest the country has shown in refugee issues and the central role the famous Norwegian Arctic explorer and diplomat Fridtjof Nansen played when he became the first High Commissioner for refugees of the United Nations (then the League of Nations) in 1921. In addition to the above, Norway also established the Norwegian Refugee Council in order to help refugees from World War II. Despite its refugee work, Norway maintained to be quite homogenous with a largely white Christian population until the 1970s. (Coopers 2005.) Although minimal, most of the immigrations before the 1970s were from its neighboring Nordic countries. This is said to be influenced by the common labor market and the common passport-control area established by Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland in the 1950's. The establishment of the common labor and passport-control area meant that the countries in question allowed their citizens and foreigners to travel freely in between them. (Coopers 2005; Fagerlund and Brander 2009.)

The late 1960s saw a special time for Norway, when Ocean Viking (an oil drilling company) discovered oil in the North Sea and the Norwegian economy started booming. The country did,

however, have its labor limitations in order to meet the economic demands and sought to resolve these by liberalizing its foreign policies. The Norwegian government tried to solve the labor shortage by inviting a number of labor migrants from Morocco, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and particularly Pakistan. This was to be Norway's first period of intercontinental immigration and consisted mainly of single men. These "*guest workers*" were initially expected to be temporary, but were seen to remain in the country and in turn caused the next wave of migration. (Cooper 2005; Djuve and Friberg 2004.)

These single male migrants were soon after seen to be followed by their families, on the basis of family reunification, which resulted in increasing the number of migrants in the country. The increasing immigration to Europe during this period did, however, take its toll on many European countries, which began arguing about the mismanagement of migration and the need to implement actions in order to stop the migration flows into Europe. This debate motivated the Norwegian government to take a similar action and an "*immigration stop*" was enacted in 1975. Although enacted, this "*stop*" did not cease all migration altogether as many migrants were now observed to be using other channels such as asylum and family reunification in order to reach Europe. (Djuve and Friberg 2004.)

If one was to quantify the latter two periods summarized above, one will see that Norway received only a meager 223 refugees between 1960 and 1970 compared to 1978 and 1979 where the number rose to 1,680 refugees between these two years alone. Over a thousand of these were the "*boat people*" from Vietnam and Chile. The asylum seeking migrants is still considered to be the present and the most significant reason for migration inflows to the country. The numbers of asylum seekers and sending countries have naturally varied from year to year, but the six largest asylum groups between the period 1990 to 2003 are recorded to have been from Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Serbia, Montenegro and Iran. The fact that Norway also joined the European Economic Area (EEA) has also had its impact on the increasing intra European migration. The EEA agreement allows, amongst others, the free movement of people in between the member countries. The EEA pact is formed amongst the EU countries and the few non-EU countries within Europe. (Cooper 2005; Djuve & Friberg 2004.)

2.4.4 Sweden

Looking at Figure 1 above, one can conclude that Sweden has both historically had and still has the highest number of migrants compared to other Nordic countries. Another feature worth noting is also

the fact that the country is the largest out of all the Nordic countries, in terms of size and population. The country is further known for its liberal market economy and migration policies, which is evident from the number of labor migrants it recruited in the 1950s and 1960s. This period of migration is also known as Sweden's first stage of modern migration (Westin 2006).

The earliest migration movements in Sweden can, however, be tracked back to the 12th century. The Hanseatic League centered in Germany in the 12th century and dominated trade in the Baltic and North Sea region until the late 16th century. Cities like Visby and Stockholm in Sweden became important links for trade during this period and saw many German burghers settle in these towns. During the 17th century, Sweden was also ruling over parts now belonging to Norway and Finland, which helped increase the total number of migrants and population in the then united Sweden. These inhabitants comprised of nationalities such as Danes, Estonians, Finns, Germans, Latvians, Norwegians, Russians and the Saami people. These inhabitants were later to play a very essential role in Sweden's early industrial development. The conditions were although not always favoring migration as these earlier centuries described above. This was seen in the 18th and 19th century when Sweden saw its fair share of emigration, triggered by eventualities such as the wars with Russia and the strong famine that had devastating effects in southern Sweden. These factors caused a wave of emigration to the US and Denmark, countries which were not only seen to be economically better off than Sweden but also in need of labor during this period. (Westin 2006; Bäck and Soininen 1998.)

This outset of outward migration in combination with the country's internal struggles was not seen to be reversed until World War II, when the net migration numbers (net of outward and inward migration) was seen to be in Sweden's favor. This period, also known as the modern era of migration, can be divided into four distinct stages, with each stage representing different types of immigrants and immigration. The first stage comprised of refugees from Sweden's neighboring countries beginning in the period just before the outset of the Second World War in 1939, and ending in the years after the end of the war in 1948. This stage saw an influx of refugees (Jews) from Germany and other neighboring countries such as Finnish children who were evacuated at time of the Soviet attack in 1939 and towards the end of the war and finally refugees arriving from Estonia and Latvia. (Dahlstedt 2003; Westin 2006.)

The second phase, spanning the period 1949-1971, comprised of laborers from Finland and southern Europe. This was the period when the Swedish export industry began flourishing and companies were looking for labor. The cooperation pact within the Nordic countries also played a vital role in enabling

large scale migration from Finland during this period. The labor shortage was, however, not seen to be fulfilled by Finnish laborers alone and many labor migrants from Yugoslavia and Greece also came to Sweden in search of better lives. The Swedish foreign policy was also quite favorable at the time and did not treat these migrants as “*guest workers*” or as temporary migrants, but rather as permanent future citizens. These factors in turn saw many people settling down in Sweden during this stage. These migrants had further similar rights to family reunification, at par with native Swedes, which made up the major factor for the next phase of migration. (Dahlstedt 2003; Westin 2006; Bäck and Soininen 1998.)

As with other countries in Europe at the time, Sweden also tightened its foreign policies in the 70’s and enacted the “*migration stop*” to non-Nordic countries. This saw the next stage of Sweden’s modern migration period, where most of the migrants came on the basis of family reunification with the migrant workers who had earlier arrived in the previous stage. This period also saw the start of refugee based migration, where the Ugandan Asians were seen to be one of the first non-European refugees accepted by Sweden in 1972, who were followed by the “*boat people*” from Vietnam in 1973. Sweden also received a staggering 18,000 Chilean and 5,000 Argentinean, Uruguayan, Brazilian and Peruvian refugees between 1973 and 1989. The late 70s saw even more refugees arriving in Sweden. Christian Orthodox Syrians arrived on the basis of asylum, stating religious persecution in their country, whereas the Kurds from Turkey, Iran and Iraq were granted asylum based on humanitarian grounds. (Westin 2006; Bäck and Soininen 1998.)

The fourth phase starting from 1990 to the present can also be categorized as mostly comprising of asylum seekers from southeastern and Eastern Europe. This can be seen from the significant number of refugees who arrived from former Yugoslavia; Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo during this period. These individuals were mainly moved by conflicts, civil unrest and wars in their home countries. Family reunification is another source of immigration being practiced by early settlers in Sweden today. The free movement of people in the European Union has also had its effects on the migration flows in Sweden in the recent times. (Westin 2006.)


2.5 Current Migration Situation in the Nordic Countries

Although the Nordic countries were relatively late in being considered as migrant recipient countries in their early days (i.e. not taking the intra-Nordic migration into perspective), they can now truly boast of being international and colorful when it comes to their inhabitants. It is indeed very hard not to see a good mix of cultures and ethnic backgrounds in the Nordic area today. We have however noted, in the country by country analysis above, that some of the Nordic countries had enacted the “*immigration - stop*” in the 1970’s, so the next natural question that arises is in relation to the current state of Nordic migration. Is it such that all intra-continental migration has stopped? Does the current Nordic migration only consist of EU/EEA nationals? This next sub-chapter will try to describe the current migration situation in the Nordic countries.

Figure 3 below, gives us a quick overview of the overall migration trend in the Nordic countries in the recent times. In general one can observe that the overall trend of current migration hasn’t changed a lot since the 20th century. According to the *Nordic statistical yearbook 2010* (Agerskov 2010), also represented in Figure 3 below, the intra-Nordic migration is still prevalent and accounts for a staggering 19% of the total immigrants in the Nordic countries. The EEA and Baltic countries are also major contributing countries that respectively account for 21% and 13% of the total number of migrants in the Nordic region. This is mainly driven as a result of the free labor market and similar cultural and linguistic traits (the latter being of special importance for the intra-Nordic migration). Looking at the migration numbers from European countries in total, including non-EEA countries, one can see that they comprise a staggering 60% of the total migrants in the Nordic region as of 2009. Given the above one can say that the current migration trend to the Nordic countries is still, as it was historically, led through the movement of inhabitants within the Nordic and other European countries. (Agerskov 2010.)

The second largest group of individuals migrating to the Nordic countries can be categorized to be coming from the Asian countries. Asian migrants account for approximately one fifth (22%) of the total number of migration in the Nordic area as of 2009. Most of these individuals are the later arriving family members of labor migrants who came during the early waves of migration in the 1960s, especially true in the case of Norway and Denmark. In addition to the above, the Nordic countries have also witnessed some asylum and labor quota –policy (highly skilled individuals) based migration from Asia and Africa.

Figure 3: Total Immigration in the Nordic countries (2009)



Source: Agerskov 2010

Looking at the current migration situation in the individual Nordic countries one can see that Sweden having approximately 1.3 million migrants is still undoubtedly the leading migration receiving country amongst the Nordic countries, see Table 1 below. If on the other side one is to see the migrant proportion to the total population in the individual countries, Norway can be argued to be as equally multicultural as Sweden today. The table also shows that Norway has now, both in terms of migrant to population proportion as well as the absolute migrant numbers, surpassed Denmark in terms of being a major migrant receiving country in the Nordic area. Finland on the other hand, still has the lowest number of migrants as well as migrant to total population proportion (2.9 %), and can be argued to be significantly less multicultural than its peer Nordic countries.

Table 1: Number of Migrants by country (2009-2010)

Country	Total Population	Migrant Population	Migrant population out of the total population (%)
Denmark	4 992 000	542 778	9.8
Finland	5 351 427	155 705	2.9
Norway	4 858 200	500 500	12.2
Sweden	9 373 379	1 337 965	14.3

Source: SSB 2010 (Norway); Sisäasiainministeriö 2009 (Finland); SCB 2010 (Sweden); and Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Invandrere og Integration 2010 (Denmark).

When looking at the composition of the top ten foreign nationalities in the individual Nordic countries, one can observe that nearly all the countries have the same mix of migrant nationalities, see Table 2 below. The concentration of the migrant nationalities does, however, differ greatly amongst the different Nordic countries. One reason for this could be due to the differing nations targeted by the individual Nordic country when inviting labor migrants in their industrialisation era. Another reason could be attributed to the migration systems and networks theory, where other members of one community travel to the same host country where former members of their home community now reside.

Although differing in concentration some migrant groups are seen to be representing quite similar groups of nationalities. Migrants from Somalia, Iraq and Germany are visible in all the Nordic countries, see Table 2. The first two mentioned nationalities can be argued to have arrived on the basis of asylum, as a result of the ongoing conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. The presence of the German immigrants can be explained through the historical German trade links, the World Wars as well as the relatively recent international cooperation allowing free movement of people in Europe.

In addition to asylum based migration, the Nordic labor market policies in the early 1960s have also left their mark on the Nordic migration situation today. An apparent mark of this is the large community of Polish migrants prevalent in Norway, Sweden and Denmark today. Migrants from Poland have further increased in recent times due to the free movement policies enacted in the European Economic Area. Pakistani's are also a major group of labor migrants who arrived on the basis of labor policies in the 1960's. They are today the eldest and biggest minority community residing in Norway and Denmark. (Cooper 2005; Westin 2006; Hedetoft 2006.)

A relatively recent and increasing trend is the number of migrants that are seen to be arriving from Thailand (mostly female). A lot of Thai residents (female) have been seen as coming on the basis of work (au pair's) and later are seen as having settled down with native Nordic males. Many Nordic males have also been seen to be travelling to Thailand in order to find a life partner who later comes to Northern Europe based on family re-unification laws. (see e.g. Sisäasiainministeriö 2009b.)

Table 2: Top Ten Foreign Nationalities by Country (2009-2010)

Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
Turkey	Russia	Poland	Sweden ⁴
Germany	Estonia	Sweden	Iraq
Iraq	Sweden	Pakistan	Somalia
Poland	Somalia	Iraq	Poland
Lebanon	China	Somalia	Denmark
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Thailand	Germany	China
Other Africa	Iraq	Vietnam	Thailand
Pakistan	Turkey	Denmark	Germany
Yugoslavia	Germany	Iran	Iran
Somalia	Great Britain	Turkey	Finland

Source: Sisäasiainministeriö 2009a (Finland); SCB 2010 (Sweden); and Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Invandrere og Integration 2010 (Denmark); SSB 2010 (Norway)

⁴ Sweden has included Swedish nationals in the list in order to classify the total population in order of ethnicity and to demonstrate equality amongst all its residents.

In summarizing, one can say that some of the most common factors of recent migration in the Nordic countries are related to work, education, family reunification and asylum. These four factors although being central in all Nordic countries seem to attract migrants differently. Migration in Norway is seen to be mainly based on a work visa or on family reunification whereas asylum seekers and students represent a relatively small group of migrants. Finland also attracts migrants based on educational reasons in addition to family reunification and work. (SOPEMI 2009; Agerskov 2010; Sisäasianministeriö 2009a.)

Education is also an important factor causing migration in Denmark now, whereas work based migration ranks second in the country. Entries on the basis of family reunification and asylum are seen to have decreased significantly in Denmark during the last few years. One reason for this decrease can be attributed to the stricter migration policies practiced by the Danish government in recent years. Sweden, considered as being the most liberal migration policy country amongst the Nordic countries, has received most of its recent migrants on the basis of family reunification, education and asylum in contrast to work based migration. This is in contrast to the other Nordic countries where work based migration is still seen to be one of the main sources of migration. (SOPEMI 2009; Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Invandrere og Integration 2010; Migrationverket 2009b.)

3. Theoretical Framework

This chapter outlines the theoretical framework of this study. The aim of the chapter is to define the concept of political participation and review the need to examine migrant political participation. An overview of the institutional approach and selection of independent variables through the perspective of relevant academic literature will also be given.

3.1 Defining the Concept of Political Participation

In political science studies there is virtually an endless list of definitions of political participation that have been presented and discussed (Deth 2001). It is, therefore, more common to see the term political participation being used in a variety of different angles than in one single definition. Political participation in layman terms refers to the citizens' political activities aimed at influencing political decisions. There are four central points of importance in this general definition of political participation. The first is that political participation refers to people in their role as citizens and not as politicians or civil servants. In the second, political participation is understood as an activity ("action") – simply watching television or claiming to be curious about politics does not constitute participation. The activities of the citizens we define as political participation should be voluntary and not ordered by the ruling class or obliged under some law or rule. Finally, political participation concerns government and politics in a broad sense of the words ("political system") and is neither restricted to specific phases (such as parliamentary decision making, or the "input" side of the political system), nor to specific levels or areas (such as national elections or contacts with officials). (Deth 2001.)

One of the more often used definitions of political participation that includes the above mentioned criteria is the one mentioned and adopted by Verba and Nie (1972). In their seminal work, *Participation in America; Political Democracy and Social Equality*, Verba and Nie define political participation as "... those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take" (Verba & Nie 1972:2). In other words, the authors understand political participation as a behavior designed to affect the choice of governmental personnel and/or policies. This definition is, however, often criticized to be a narrow definition of political participation because it reflects a limited range of activities (Conge 1988). According to Conge (1988), the forms of activities that this definition excludes are passive

forms such as civil disobedience and political violence, efforts to change or maintain the form of government, behavior outside the sphere of government, behavior mobilized by the government, and unintended political outcomes.

In his review; *The concept of political participation: Toward a definition*, that is mainly based on Verba and Nie's idea of political participation, Patrick J. Conge (1988) sets two fundamental requirements for an elaborative definition of political participation. According to his work, a good and comprehensive definition of political participation should satisfy two competing requirements: (1) *generality*; the definition should be broad enough to encompass a range of behavior in a variety of cultural settings; and (2) *precision*; the definition must be limited in scope, that is, some behavior must be excluded in order to enhance explanatory power.

Conge has further, on the basis of these two above mentioned fundamental requirements, disaggregated the concept of political participation into six major issues that are to be included into a comprehensive definition of political participation. These issues are as follows:

- (1) Active and passive forms
- (2) Aggressive and nonaggressive behavior
- (3) Structural and Nonstructural objects
- (4) Governmental and nongovernmental aims
- (5) Mobilized and voluntary actions
- (6) Intended and unintended outcomes

A definition that incorporates all of the above mentioned issues is considered to be able to meet the first requirement, generality, of the comprehensive definition. Such a definition, according to Conge, can be formulated as follows: "*political participation is any action (or inaction) of an individual or collectivity of individuals, which intentionally or unintentionally opposes or supports, changes or maintains some feature(s) of a government or community*".

The foregoing conceptualizing of political participation would certainly meet the requirement of generality. However, the problem here is that its scale is so broad that it becomes virtually meaningless and therefore incapable to apply in practice. In other words, this implies that the second requirement of

the definition; precision, is just as important a feature as the first requirement of generality. The concept of political participation has lately been so greatly inflated as a result of the continuous efforts of extension that it risks becoming indeterminate. This is very rightly summarized in Conge's conclusion in which he states that the meaning of political participation cannot be so general as to include practically everything, neither can it be so narrow as to ignore the richness of political behavior. One fitting definition that encompasses both features is proposed by Conge in the following: "political participation then may be defined as individual or collective action at the national or local level that supports or opposes state structures, authorities, and/or decisions regarding allocation of public goods".

The definition introduced by Conge is coincidentally very close to the definition given by Nelson (1972) in his study: *Access to Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations*. In this study, Nelson investigates the character of urban poverty in developing countries and considers the impact of cityward migration on urban political life, and examines the means by which the urban poor protect or advance their political interests. Nelson based his study on the following definition of political participation: "action by private citizens intended to influence the actions or the composition of national or local governments".

Conge finds Nelson's definition to be very similar to his own and argues that the behavior outside the realm of the government is best excluded from a definition of the concept. Sharing Conge's view, this study, therefore, proposes to use Conge's definition of political participation but with the modification of taking the importance of the richness of political behavior into consideration.

3.2 Why Examine Migrant Political Participation?

One characteristic feature justifying political participation studies is the universally accepted idea of the inseparable relationship between political participation and democracy. This is also evident from the legendary phrase inked by Parry et al. (1992), where it is said that "Any book about political participation is also a book about democracy." This fact is also substantiated by Kaase and Marsh (1979), where they write that, "... the notion of political participation is at the center of the concept of the democratic state". (as cited in Deth 2001.)

3.2.1 Western democratic state and political equality

The roots of the relationship between political participation and the democratic state can be found as far back as the early literature of the Greek city-state of Athens. The word democracy comes from the root of the Greek word δημοκρατία – (*dēmokratía*), which means “*rule of the people*”. (Paloheimo and Wiberg 1997). In this early discussion of political participation, in order to be able to enjoy freedom, the possibility to participate was seen as a natural part of human nature and political participation was seen as a prerequisite for the success of human beings’.

The idea of political participation has been cited in Aristotle’s (384-322 BC) famous quote in which he states; “*Man is by nature a political animal*”. Those who rejected the opportunity of practicing their political rights were seen as failures. “*We do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all*” (Thucydides c. 460 BC-c.395 BC.) (cited in Hussain 2011.)

Since those early signs of the democratic state, the idea of a democratic state and political participation has walked alongside each other. Today, political participation has become such a central element of a democratic state that it has become a necessity to each state that has based their political decision-making on democratic principles. Universal suffrage and equal possibilities to participate in politics are seen as prerequisites or even certain features of a democratic state.

Every democratic state is by nature required to be able to give all its citizens an equal share in the political decision-making in order to be able to call itself democratic. The reason for this lies in the nature of the word democratic, which is positively correlated to the number of political participants. In other words, it can be said that a state having more political participants is deemed to be more democratic and vice-versa. This can also be evidenced in the study conducted by Verba and Nie, where they record the following: “*Where few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is*” (Verba and Nie 1972: 1).

This view is also substantiated by Robert Dahl in his seminal work *Democracy and its critics* (1989), where he argues that political equality together with effective participation is one of the most fundamental demands of a well functioning democracy. Dahl further goes on to describe, and at the same time challenge, the conservative “*principle of inclusion*”, in which he states that everyone who is affected by political decisions should also have the right to participate in the decision making process.

This implies the inclusion of immigrants, guest workers and asylum seekers who are living in the host country on a permanent basis and are thus affected by political decisions.

This view of an all-inclusive political participation and thus the granting of political rights to migrants has also been advocated by the well known political philosopher Will Kymlicka (1995) in his book *Multicultural citizenship*. In his work he argues that fairness in a decision-making process also implies taking the interests and perspectives of minorities and migrants into consideration. The standard political rights and correct political opportunity structures are deemed to be of vital importance in order to be able to call oneself democratic and at the same time increase political participation.

In conclusion, one can say that the exclusion of migrants from political rights is contrary to the core principal of democracy. Democratic equality can only be said to be achieved if all individuals in the community get the same basic rights, inclusive of political participation, while being able to lead their individual daily lives. (see e.g. Entzinger 1999, Etzioni 1993; Walzer 1997).

3.2.2 Political participation: A Successful Key to Integration

This principle of democratic legitimacy has also influenced the debate on how to integrate its immigrant population and strengthen its social cohesion by focusing on the political integration sphere. Integration in general terms means, “*the inclusion of individuals or groups (as minorities) on equal terms in society, in an organization or in different areas of society*” (Hagelund 2002:401). More specifically, integration can be divided into three major dimensions: the legal-political, the cultural, and the socio-economic dimensions of the integration process (Entzinger 2000).

An ideal integration process proposes to stimulate the inclusion of migrants in all of the aforementioned dimensions. These are, however, not equally weighted in terms of importance when it comes to implementation in the Western states. Some dimensions are seen to be given more priority and thus have been attempted into effect earlier than others. This can be observed from earlier times when the integration debate mainly revolved around the socio-economic or cultural factors within multicultural economies, compared to the relatively recent focus on the political integration sphere of integration (Ahokas 2010).

This is also evident from Lise Togeby's seminal work (*Fra fremmedarbejdere til etniske minoriteter* 2003), where she argued that "*integration is not only about education and work. It is also about migrant involvement in all sectors of society, including official discussion and the decision making process. One can argue that integration is about involving migrants equally like civics and other residents in (Danish) society*"⁵ (own translation).

Political participation also seems to positively affect the integration process by strengthening the social cohesion between society and the minorities. Thompsson (1970) argues that political participation promotes integration by increasing political awareness, knowledge and the consciousness of the citizens, which helps people to develop and to formulate new visions and alternatives in the new society. According to Thompsson, political participation promotes the feeling of being part of an entity and the host society and thus contributes to integration (as cited in Wrede 1981).

This correlation between political participation and the integration process has been also recognized by the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly has consistently maintained pressure on Member States to adopt the relevant European conventions and measures to improve migrant democratic participation. In the Assembly's Recommendations, after a meeting in August 2009, the member states were recommended to work more effectively on different aspects of integration measures that promote equal political participation in the society. (Huddleston 2009).

This recommendation also appears clearly in two of the European common basic principles (CBP) of integration in which especially CBP 9 is seen to be focusing exhaustively on the case of migrant political participation and integration. (Huddleston 2009: 11) These principles state the following:

"7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens."

"9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration."

In addition to increasing interest towards migrant political participation, the European Union has also launched several projects to promote integration of migrants in many European countries during recent

⁵ *Integration handler meget om uddannelse og arbejde, men ikke kun om det. Det handler om at inddrage de etniske minoriteter i alle samfundsforhold, også i den offentlige samtale og i de demokratiske beslutningsprocesser. Man kan sige, at det drejer sig om at inddrage de etniske minoriteter som medborgere på lige fod med andre borgere i det danske samfund."* Togeby 2003:11

decades. An example of these projects is EPACE: a project implemented in cooperation with Finland, Sweden and Estonia in order to conduct studies and *incorporate good practices for the promotion of democracy*. The study conducted for the aforementioned project concluded that democratic participation is good for migrant integration because “*the more (immigrant) people participate in politics, the more they get used to democracy*”⁶ (own translation). (Ahokas 2010.)

In summarizing, political activities can, therefore, be defended on the basis of their intrinsic value and the necessity for the mental well being of human beings on the one hand, and on the requirement to articulate interests and opinions in a decision-making process that aims to take those expressions into account, on the other hand.

3.3 Analytical Perspectives: Studying Migrant Political Participation

Political research has, in principle, sought explanations for the political behavior of migrants through an ethnic approach (ethnic, religious and cultural characteristics), a class-based approach (class position and socio-economic factors) and an institutional approach (Ireland 1994). During recent years, especially, the institutional approach has increased in popularity among the three mentioned approaches. The institutional approach focuses predominantly on those political opportunity structures (citizenship rules, migration policies etc.) in the country of settlement that can either constrain or enable political participation (Bird et al. 2011).

This approach is argued to provide important insights into likely factors influencing the process of representation. It is, therefore, unsurprising that this approach has become increasingly influential in the literature of immigration in comparative politics (Bird et al. 2011). The compatibility of the institutional approach with comparative political science and its suitability for migration studies are the core reasons for applying it in this study.

⁶ ”*Mitä enemmän osallistutaan poliittisesti, sitä paremmin sopeudutaan demokratiaan*” (Ahokas 2010:13)

3.3.1 Institutional Approach: Political Opportunity Structure

In recent literature on migrant political participation, the role of political institutions has become the centre of attention. This can also be seen in the works of known academics such as Freeman (1992), Ireland (1994), Joppke (1987) and Togeby (1999, 2003) that have shifted significantly from the research interest of cultural and socio-economic determinants that were inherent in the earlier studies, towards institutional factors in current studies. (Bird et al. 2011)

In order to illustrate what is meant by the institutional approach in this study, this chapter will summarize the core ideas of Patrick Ireland's study "*The policy challenge of ethnic diversity*". In his study, Ireland has compared different forms and levels of political participation among similar ethnic groups in France and Switzerland. By using the institutional approach in this study, Ireland aims to show how the state guided institutions have a key position in the immigrant's inclusion in both countries. (Ireland 1994.)

Ireland's study defines the institutional approach as a combination of political opportunity structure and of new-institutionalism. The approach, as Ireland notes, concentrates on the institutional context and attempts to clarify the influence of the institutional setting of the receiving society on the (political) opportunities of immigrants. This means basically that instead of examining the characteristics of individual migrant voters, like in the ethnic and class theory, explanations for migrant political participation in institutional approach are sought in the characteristics of social and political institutions. (Ireland 1994.)

The core concept of Ireland's work is the political opportunity structure. Political opportunity structure in its original definition means those "*consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent, dimensions of political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations of success or failure*" (Tarrow 2007: 77). The definition is broad in itself due to the fact that the political opportunity structure is not a unified concept or theory, but rather a cluster of variables that describes certain features of the political system, which is thought to be relevant for political mobilization. (Tarrow 2007.) The latter factor is often seen as a major weakness of the political opportunity structure approach. This is due to the fact that the political opportunity structure may often in different studies mean and point to fundamentally different things. Hence, it becomes difficult for scholars to operationalize and to know which factors should be included as independent

variables when studying migrant political activity, resulting in purely theoretical and abstract arguments. (Ireland 1994.)

Ireland suggests, therefore, that in order to be able to investigate how the state guided institutional context shapes the migrant political behavior, a researcher needs to narrow down and specify the definition of political opportunity structure. This definition should be focused on the access possibilities to decision-making, or how open the political institutions are for new demands and which options there are for new demands and also which options there are for social movements or people to take action (Ireland 1994). Hence, considering the weaknesses of earlier studies, he narrows down the definition of political opportunity structure to the cluster of variables that includes “*the immigrant’s legal situation; their social and political rights; and host-society citizenship laws, naturalization procedures, and policies in such areas as education, housing, the labor market, and social assistance that shape conditions and immigrant’s responses*”. Ireland includes, moreover, those institutions i.e. unions, political parties, and religious and humanitarian solidarity groups), into the concept of political opportunity structure that have acted as institutional gatekeepers controlling access to the avenues of political participation available for immigrants.

In this study, the aim is to apply institutional channelling theory by using some differences in Ireland’s definition of the political opportunity structure. Given the definition of political participation in this study and the limitations of data on migrant political participation in the Nordic countries, the focus of the study is on opportunity structures in the macro –context and the meso-context. The idea is to study those opportunity structures within the macro and meso-level that help us to understand the responsiveness of the political system and are argued to have had the capacity to mobilize people in previous migration studies. Political opportunity structures that are believed to shape the electoral participation of migrants and are, moreover, selected to be studied here are reviewed in the section below. The political opportunity structures to be reviewed are as follows:

- **Electoral Systems**
- **Citizenship Acts**
- **Political Rights**
- **Political Parties**
- **Access to Labor Market**
- **Access to Educational Opportunities**

The author would, however, like to highlight here that limiting political opportunity structures to the six above listed factors does not mean that other possible opportunity structures might have a less impact on migrant political participation. Political opportunity structures such as size and spatial ethnic concentration of ethnic groups and institutions and social networks at micro-level; party competition and the cost of campaigns at meso-level, and membership and participation in non-governmental organizations at micro-level are also worth consideration while studying migrant political participation (Bird et al. 2011). An ulterior motive behind the selection of the aforementioned factors is that these six factors are seen as being central to shape the trends of migrant political participation in previous political research. Secondly, the author agrees with Hammar (1989;1990) that the electoral participation is argued to be the most fundamental and at the same time the easiest way of influencing political decisions. Other kinds of political participation support mechanisms such as access to non-governmental organizations and are seen in this view as complementing support mechanism to political participation policies and are not deemed to be able to substitute for voting rights (Huddleston 2009). Given these reasons, the electoral participation approach based primarily on the state structures seems to be the most reasonable starting point. Thirdly, the author would like stress the importance of well limited research design, which not only helps to achieve the aim of the study, but can also sometimes be more rewarding than a multidirectional study, which might only *scratch the surface*.

3.4 Literature Review on Political Opportunity Structures

This study will analyze the effects of political opportunity structures on migrant political participation through the six core factors. In order to justify the selection of these factors, the related academic literature on migrant political participation in this chapter will be reviewed.

3.4.1 Election systems

One of the most important factors explaining political participation and political action has been the openness of the electoral system (Hammar 1990). The openness of the electoral system and the opportunities provided, which enable people to cast their vote for their own candidates are some of the key factors that can be argued to have significance in explaining migrant political participation. (Ireland 1994; Togeby 1999; Hammar 1990)

The impact of the election system on (migrant) political behaviour has been studied, for example, by Danish scholar Lise Togeby. Lise Togeby's article "*Migrants at the polls: An analysis of immigrant and refugee participation in Danish local elections*", reviewed migrant political participation in Denmark in comparison with Sweden (Togeby 1999). In this study, Togeby finds it surprising that Sweden, which has gone in most areas much further than Denmark in terms of creating a multicultural society, has a lower voting turn-out than Denmark. In order to find some of the core explanatory factors for the higher political participation among migrants in Denmark, she has based her study on two main hypotheses:

- (1) *Immigrant voter turn-out in Denmark is surprisingly high compared to other countries because certain ethnic groups, in certain cities, are mobilising collectively to participate in local elections.*
- (2) *This collective mobilisation is nurtured by the Danish political opportunity structure.*

These hypotheses are discussed through two sets of data concerning the Danish local elections in 1998 with a focus on Turks and Lebanese in the two largest municipalities in the country: Århus and Copenhagen. There are not independent analyses of Swedish conditions in Togeby's study, but the Danish political opportunity structure was compared to the Swedish opportunity structures in order to explain the differences in voting turnouts among migrants.

Togeby's main finding in this study was that voter turn-out among migrants is higher in Denmark than in Sweden because of the Danish local election system. She argues that the Danish electoral system makes it possible for people to vote for their own candidates, and the local opportunity structure is therefore deemed to be more open to new groups than the Swedish political structure, which allows voting for candidates mentioned on the party list only. According to Togeby, the Danish local election system creates a political opportunity structure that is exceptionally conducive to collective mobilization, and the proportional election system combined with the possibility of casting personal votes makes the chances of succeeding good if small groups collectively aim at having single candidates elected. (Togeby 1999.)

Hammar (1990) also argues that the electoral system is a central element in political participation. In his study: *Democracy and the Nation State* (1990), he argues that the differences in voting turn-outs illustrate an impact of electoral systems and therefore that the lower migrant voting turn-out in Sweden might be a consequence of discouraging electoral systems. One of the core weaknesses in the Swedish electoral system in Hammar's opinion is that political parties have already ranked their candidates in

order of preference. Voting for a political party rather than for an individual candidate from the immigrants' own country may serve to reduce their interest in voting and election campaigns.

3.4.2 Political Rights

Rights have a direct impact on people's possibilities to participate in societal activities. Political rights of migrants, therefore, have a central role in delimiting or liberating their access to the political sphere of a host country (Rogstad 2007). Regardless of their importance for migrants, political rights have usually been interlinked with the basic rights of native citizens and there have been very few meaningful channels for political expression available for migrants before the 70s (Togeby 1999).

The wave of migrant workers (to the West) after the Second World War changed the state of affairs in the West and the question of non-citizen voting rights emerged as an important issue in the 70s. During this period, immigrants and their children started to comprise a growing group of the society's members in many European countries. As a rule, however, they were underrepresented in the democratic process with consequences both for them and for democracy itself. The majority of migrants lived permanently in host societies without having any influence on decisions that affected their daily lives or on general political decisions. (Togeby 1999; Bäck and Soininen 1998).

T. H. Marshall was one prominent figure who is believed to have had a major impact on the equality discussion in the West. Marshall suggested that, when examining the development of representative democracies from a citizens' point of view, one should consider whether all individuals in the community have gained an increasing and equal number of rights, and it is only if they have that one can conclude that equality and democracy has indeed been achieved. (Rex 2000.)

Marshall divided rights into three main categories that can be seen to be central in achieving equality among all residents of society. These categories are civil rights (natural rights), political rights (voting rights) and social rights (health and work rights) (Rex 2000). According to Marshall, equality firstly depends upon providing for legal rights; that is, equality before law; secondly on the political rights; the right to vote locally and nationally; and thirdly, upon social

rights in the form of a guaranteed minimum standard of living for all. (see e.g. Ring 1995; Rex 2000; Brochmann 2002).

In addition to the academic research, the debate is also affected by increasing co-operation between Western states at an international level. This can be seen from the formation of the United Nations, European Union and regional cooperation agreements such as the Nordic official co-operation in the Nordic region. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948), which represents the first global expression of rights to which all human beings are inherently entitled, was adopted and proclaimed by the General assembly of the United Nations in 1948. It arose directly from the experience of the Second World War; by signing the declaration, member countries were obligated to provide for equal freedom and rights to minorities regardless of the individuals' race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (United Nations 1948.)

Another central covenant adopted by the United Nations that is seen to be having an impact on the political right issue was The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1976) that required its parties to commit to respect the civil and political rights of individuals, including the right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, electoral rights and rights to a due process and a fair trial. ICCPR was signed and ratified in all member countries (including the Nordic countries) by the end of the 1970s. (United Nations 1966.)

The issue of granting voting rights in the municipal elections to non-EU migrants was also on the European political agenda in the 1970s. This was captured in the report of the Conference of European Ministers held in Belgium in 1981. At the conference, a special focus was paid to the role of the migrant as a political subject. The claims for the political rights of migrants were framed within the discourse in the Belgian delegation to the 1981 Conference of European Ministers with the following statement: *“The migrant’s integration –apart from economic, social, and cultural aspects-involves the question of political participation, since the migrant has a political dimension, as does any other human being; his status in the receiving country cannot be divorced from this fundamental dimension”* (Soysal 1998).

The emergence of discussion on migrant politics was further a natural continuum on the discourse of universal suffrage and universal equality. It was argued here that if the equal

participation of women in the democratic process can be argued in terms of justice, experience and interests, it could be contended that these are also equally valid for other underrepresented groups such as immigrants. (Hernes 1987 cited in Bäck and Soininen 1998.)

As a result of the ongoing discussion, the enfranchisement of alien residents was put on the political agenda of many European countries, and Ireland became the first country in Europe to give its migrants the right to vote in the local elections held in 1963. The Nordic countries had already granted voting rights to their Nordic citizens under the Nordic cooperation agreement, but these rights weren't expanded to all migrants until the end of the 70s. Sweden was the first country among the Nordic countries to enfranchise migrants in 1976. This was followed suit by Denmark in 1981; and Norway in 1982. (Togebly 1999.) Finland had allowed Nordic migrants/citizens to vote in the local elections held in 1975, and these rights were expanded to all noncitizens in 1992 (Lepola 2000).

Today, on a worldwide basis, 65 of the world's nearly 200 states permit some form of migrant voting and 30 of 65 states that allow such voting are European (Andres 2007 as cited in Castles and Miller 2009). Table 3 below describes how 27 EU- countries can be differentiated into groups with regard to their voting right policies towards Third Country Nationals in the EU states.

Table 3: Voting Rights for Migrants in EU-states

EU member state	Foreign nationals (non-EU nationals)
Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland	Have no voting rights (at local, national and EP elections)
Belgium, Estonia	May vote in local elections only but cannot be elected
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden	Non-discriminatory regime whereby all legal immigrants may vote and stand for elections at the local level when certain requirements are fulfilled (e.g. regarding type of status in country and of a minimum duration, obligation to register to vote etc)
Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, UK	Local enfranchisement is restricted to immigrants who hold citizenship of specific countries (e.g. Commonwealth, countries with former colonial ties etc)

Source: Gropas 2011

As described in Table 3, the variation in granting voting rights is quite broad among EU-states. EU-states differ from each other in relation to granting most liberal rights (i.e. granting both the right to vote and the right to stand in elections) to those countries that do not allow any voting rights or electability to non-citizens. The latter are among the first group of countries in the table, and these countries are Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Poland. These countries do not accord any voting rights and electability to non-citizens in any election at the local, national or European level. Non-citizens belonging to this group of countries must first attain citizenship to become eligible to vote or stand in elections. There are also few countries (i.e. Estonia and Belgium) in Europe that accord non-citizens only the right to vote but not the eligibility to stand in elections.

The Nordic countries belong to the third group of countries that have the most liberal political rights for migrants. This group of countries gives both the right to vote and eligibility to stand in elections at a local level to non-citizens when they have fulfilled certain requirements. These requirements are usually a duration of residence and a specific resident status. (Groenendijk 2008). The last group of states grants voting rights and eligibility to stand in elections on the basis of reciprocity. This means that countries will allow non-citizens certain rights only if their nationals were extended the same voting rights in the homelands. The last group of states grants voting rights and eligibility to stand in elections on the basis of reciprocity. This means that countries will allow non-citizens certain rights only if their nationals were extended the same voting rights in the homelands.

The Nordic countries belonging to the third groups of countries can be argued to be migrant-friendly and liberal in granting political rights to migrant citizens. Seen from this perspective, the political opportunity structure in the Nordic countries appears to be advantageous for immigrants. Election statistics, media reports and several other informing reports on migrant political participation in the Nordic countries have, however, shown that regardless of the relatively liberal political rights, migrants and minority groups are still under-represented in the Nordic states. (Hammar 1990.) Hence, the idea of this study is to analyse whether formal rights actually function in practice, that is, if they actually guarantee political equality and stimulate migrants to participate in politics.

3.4.3 Citizenship

Citizenship is one of the linchpins of international research on migration studies today. This is due to the fact that citizenship of the nation-state widely defines the rights for migrants in the host society (Rogstad 2007). Models of citizenship in the migrant receiving countries are essential instruments in determining the degree of access for minorities to the national public space. Accordingly, it works as an internal control mechanism of nation-state that restricts the civil, social and political rights of migrants. By determining the status of immigrants with citizenship, the host country controls among other things the political rights of immigrants by often limiting them to citizens only. (Layton-Henry 1990.) Due to this fact, citizenship status can be argued to be at the vital centre of the political life of migrants in the host society.

Definition of Citizenship and Naturalization Principles

Citizenship is understood formally as a full and equal status of membership in a political community that governs itself (Bauböck 2006). Citizenship, in practice, has a central role in guaranteeing the possession of a number of rights and duties for citizens in the nation-state (Hammar 1990). In order to be full and equal members of a nation-state with citizens, non-citizens must obtain the status of a citizen through naturalization.

Citizenship is traditionally recognized for non-citizens according to two naturalization principles: *Jus sanguinis* (law of blood) and *Jus soli* (law of territory). States that are following the principle of *Jus Soli* confer citizenship to those individuals who are born within the states' territory. Classical immigration countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia attribute citizenship to all persons born within their territory. Most European states and especially previous guest worker countries (e.g. Germany and Switzerland), place more emphasis, however, on the second principle of naturalization: *jus sanguinis*; according to which a country confers citizenship to persons who are children of citizen parent(s). Hence, the persons who lack the *blood bond* with native citizens are not (always) eligible for citizenship. The Nordic countries are also adherents to the latter principle. (Bauböck 2006; Hammar 1990; Brochmann 2002.)

In recent years, the Western countries have also opened other pathways of acquiring citizenship for non-citizens. This is enabled through the third principle of citizenship *jus domicile*. According to *jus*

domicile, citizenship may be granted to persons with real or effective residence within the state territory. This principle is usually beneficial for those migrants who do not fall under the criteria of the two aforementioned citizenship principles. The Nordic countries are a good example of countries practicing the *jus domicile* principle in their citizenship policies. (Bauböck 2006; Hammar 1990; Brochmann 2000.)

Citizenship and Political Sphere

The idea of limiting political rights to citizens is based on the traditional viewpoint of the society, according to which natural citizens alone have the right to participate in the democratic decision making process in their country as opposed to non-citizens. (Brochmann 2002.) This fact remains valid for the Nordic countries, as is the case with most of the countries in the world (Hammar 1990). It is only upon naturalization that immigrants are guaranteed full political rights in the Nordic countries. Table 4 below summarizes the different levels of political rights granted to the different categories of migrants.

Table 4: Political Rights and Migrant status

Political Rights	Status
Very few rights	Illegal entrants, temporary workers, refugees
Some political rights	Immigrants with a residence period of 2-4 years, denizens ⁷
Full political rights	Naturalized immigrants

Source: Layton-Henry 1990; Bauböck 2006; Hammar 1990

As Table 4 above suggests, it is only when a person achieves the status of a denizen that s/he achieves basic voting rights in the local elections held in the Nordic countries. Denizens are, as Hammar notes, those migrants who are given “*a special legal status of long-term resident foreign nationals and enjoy most of the civil liberties and social welfare rights given to resident citizens, often including rights to family reunification, some protection from deportation, and voting rights in local elections, as well as quasi-entitlement to naturalization*” (Hammar 1990). In other words, denizens are the group of

migrants who have been living in the country for a longer period and have somewhat a secure residence status. A migrant is called a denizen when s/he has obtained full residential rights with only some restrictions. Denizens are not regular or plain foreign citizens anymore, but they are also not naturalized citizens of the receiving country.

Denizenship guarantees some political rights for migrants, but in order to get full political rights in the Nordic countries, they must obtain the citizenship of the receiving country. Attaining citizenship is, therefore, of importance not only as a means to be promoted in the migrant hierarchy levels but also in expanding one's political rights. It has also been argued that long-term exclusion from citizenship can also play a decisive factor in the individual's political sphere (Brubaker 1989). In countries like the Nordic countries, this factor only affects a person's political activity on the national level given that some political rights are already granted to individuals when they are considered denizens. These rights include, first and foremost, the right to vote in national elections, and thus the right to take part in national policy. (ibid.)

If, on the one hand, the limiting of naturalization has negative effects on the political activity of an individual, the granting of citizenship has, on the other hand, likewise positive effects that can support the overall integration of immigrants, including political integration. According to (Hammar 1989), the four dimensions of citizenship: legal, political, social and cultural and psychological dimensions; have a major role in integrating migrants into the new society. Hammar (1989) argues that the legal dimension of citizenship represents the formal role of a citizen, where the citizenship is simply an individual person's formal membership of a state. The social and cultural dimension of citizenship signifies membership of a nation and represents the membership of a dominant cultural group in a particular state. The third dimension of citizenship is said to be the psychological dimension, which expresses an individual's identification in the world. The last dimension is the political dimension, which is the status and rights given by citizenship. (Hammar 1989.)

Citizenship here involves loyalty to the state and support for its fundamental principles of government and basic shared values. In other words, citizenship status includes all those central elements that are necessary for a successful integration. When immigrants gain the psychological and legal security that comes with citizenship, they are more likely to put down roots, to contribute to local community initiatives, to care about integrating, to invest in linguistic skills and social capital, and more generally to develop stronger feelings of identity and loyalty for the host country (Kymlicka 2003).

Extension of an immigrant's political rights from the local to the national level via citizenship are deemed to become a resource that is considered to positively affect migrant political participation and could work as an instrument to promote political participation in a long term perspective (Togebly 1999; Wilhemsson 2008.)

3.4.4 Political Parties

Political parties, being a channel of expression for democratic alternatives, can be argued to be major actors and a channel of expression in the politics of many countries. Political parties have a major role in linking individuals and groups of citizens to the political process, and they serve as devices for organizing and focusing on political participation. (Wilson 1996.)

The political parties' importance as "gatekeepers" between the people and political participation has been highlighted, for example, in the study of Verba et al. (1972), according to which institutions like political parties can variously weaken or reinforce the effects of differences in resources. Furthermore, institutional arrangements, can act as conduits that funnel that participation straight into policymaking circles, exert little sway over it, or effect a "lockout" of outsider groups. In order to avoid "lockouts" of certain groups in society, in the opinion of Verba et al., it is important that political parties include different groups of minorities equally in politics.

This is an issue, which has become even more central in today's society where increasingly multicultural and ethnically diverse societies have created new demands for the political parties. This involves that the political parties' role is no longer only to manage the representation of traditional group interests but also to be able to represent, aggregate and channel a much broader range of interest representation in society. (Soininen 2011.) Consequently, an equal representation of different minority groups in society is dependent on how responsive the party system of the country is for immigrant minorities.

Thus, the question to be studied here is how the political parties in the Nordic countries go about performing their traditional key functions of recruiting and socializing members and nominees, and of channelling and aggregating interest in a society that includes new groups with few opportunities of equal political influence.

3.4.5 Other Factors

The aforementioned factors of electoral system, electoral rights, citizenship and political parties play a central and crucial role in granting political access for immigrants in host countries. Political participation is also deemed to be enhanced if an immigrant has, in addition to the previously mentioned factors, other necessary resources such as education and employment that help people in their daily life during the integration period. (Hammar 1990; Bäck and Soininen 1998.) In the perspective of the definition of the political opportunity structure, two other factors will be studied in this study: migrants' access to labor market and access to educational opportunities.

Access to Labor Market

Increasing unemployment and the difficulty in getting a foothold in the labor market have been actively discussed topics in the Nordic countries. Getting a new job in a new country is often the first step in the integration process that is deemed to have positive effects on other integration spheres, including the migrant political participation sphere. (Bäck and Soininen 1998, SOU 1984:12.)

A significant proportion of foreign citizens of working age are, however, outside the workforce or unemployed. This exclusion from work-related institutions has further consequences in that migrants are denied the process of integration into the host society provided by these institutions. The high unemployment among migrants leads to a situation in which elementary forms of linkage such as one's own income, place of employment, colleagues and work identity are absent. (Bäck and Soininen 1998.) Therefore, it is not surprising that many immigrants in such a marginalized social position show little interest in politics.

The lack of knowledge, as Bäck and Soininen note, about political life and sporadic contacts with society, combined with a feeling of not being able to influence one's immediate situation, creates a kind of social citizenship that is incompatible with the social citizen who wishes, knows, and believes that s/he is able to influence the political distribution of resources.

The aforementioned correlation between unemployment and political behavior of migrants was, for example, shown by Swedish scholar Hammar in his contribution *Rosträtt och medborgerskap* (Voting

rights and Citizenship) (SOU 1984:12). This study was based on the effects of the immigrant's occupational status and unemployment. This study found that the participation of unemployed voters was 13-14 percent below the average for both Swedish and foreign entitled voters. As registered unemployment is about twice as high among foreign citizens, as among Swedes, the effects of decrease in participation were much greater for the migrants. (SOU 1984:12.)

In order to find if there is a likely correlation between employment rates and the migrant political participation in the Nordic countries, this study will analyze some of the central opportunity structures of the labor market at the macro level.

Education

Previous research on political participation has shown that in most societies, participation is correlated most closely with the level of education. The higher an individual's level of education, the more likely it is that the individual will be an active participant in politics. In countries where illiteracy is high, participation is generally low because much of the population is unaware of what is going on in politics. (Wilson 1996.)

The same correlation between education and political participation can also be applied to migrants. There is a strong agreement among researchers and politicians in the receiving countries that education and good skills of the receiving countries' native language align positively with migrant integration. For example, a report by the Danish government documents that "*Education is a basic element for integration of migrants into the society. It is also often a condition for becoming part of the Danish job market. Education is about the achievement of good language skills and the acquisition of qualifying education*"⁸ (own translation). (Mikkelsen 2008.)

A migrant person is also more likely to participate in politics if s/he masters the native language in the receiving country; a fact that was also found in a Swedish study. The previously mentioned study analysed political behaviour among a group of Turks in Stockholm according to their educational

⁸ "Uddannelse er et grundlæggende element i indsatsen for at integrere udlændinge i det danske samfund. Ikke mindst er uddannelse ofte en forudsætning for at kunne indgå på det danske arbejdsmarked. Uddannelse handler både om opnåelse af gode danskundskaber og om erhvervelse af en kompetencegivende uddannelse." (Bedre Integration 2000:27 as cited in Mikkelsen 2008)

background. The study found that political participation was much higher among those Turks who were well-educated in the group. (Hammar 1990).

In the perspective of the theoretical framework of this study, the author will analyze those educational opportunities for migrants provided by the receiving countries that promote among other things linguistic skills of the local language among migrants.

4. Political Participation and Representation of Migrants

This chapter aims to give an overview regarding migrant political participation in the Nordic countries by reviewing electoral participation and representation among migrants in the local elections of the Nordic countries. Local elections in the Nordic countries are held every fourth year in order to elect councillors of municipalities. Municipalities are the basic local administrative units of these countries and are responsible for providing basic services for their citizens. Municipalities in the Nordic countries are provided with a broad authority to engage in a wide range of discretionary activities at the local level municipality but a large portion of these activities are subject to control by national policy making. (Lawrence 2004).

Municipalities are of vital importance to their citizens to whom they provide the necessary services. Some of the central responsibilities of municipalities are building, maintaining and operating schools and outpatient medical facilities along with other infrastructural services (water and electric power supply) in the area. Municipalities are furthermore first-line providers of various social services – care for pre-school children and other needy groups like the elderly and migrants – and are primarily responsible for running integration programs and other necessary services to migrants that are set by national governments. (Lawrence 2004.) In order to have an influence on local decision-making and on the quantity and quality of the services that migrants receive, it is essential that migrants use their political rights effectively.

4.1. Voting Turnouts in Municipal Elections

Table 5 below presents election data about the electoral participation of migrants in the local elections of the Nordic countries. Data presented in the table includes voting turnouts among migrants in five different municipal elections of each Nordic country. Electoral data presented here is collected from the earliest to the latest available election data on migrant electoral participation.

Table 5: Voting Turnouts among Migrants in the Nordic Countries (%)

Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
61 (1981)	34.4 (1992)	35 (1991)	60 (1976)
53 (1985)	16.7 (1996)	36 (1995)	52 (1982)
52.5 (1997) ⁹	17.7 (2000)	40.5 (1999)	41 (1991)
39.8 (2001)	13.5 (2004)	32.8 (2003)	35 (1998)
36.8 (2009)	18.6 (2008)	35.6 (2007)	36.9 (2006)

Resource: Togeby 1999, 2003; Mikkelsen 2008; Bjørklund & Bergh 2005; IMDI 2010; Benito 2005, Wilhemsson 2008

The general impression is that migrant political participation in municipal elections in the Nordic countries has been low. On the basis of election statistics (Table 5), however, it is arguable that migrant political participation has rather been declining over the time than been low from the outset. This is to be seen, for example, in the 1976 elections¹⁰ in Sweden where a 60 percent turnout amongst the migrants was recorded. Similar observations are to be made of the 1981 Danish elections where over half of the enfranchised migrants voted in the elections. When these aforementioned voting turnouts are compared to the data from the latest elections, we can observe that migrant participation has halved since the first elections in both countries.

Nevertheless, migrant electoral participation has not been similar in all the Nordic countries, and there is a lot of variation in the participation rates of these countries. Norway, for instance, having quite stable participation rates (32.8% - 40.5%) among migrants, seems to be treading the middle path in the Nordic countries, whereas Finland has exceptionally low voting turnouts among migrants. The rate of

⁹ Information about the total migrant voting turnout in the municipal elections of 1997 was not available for Denmark. Therefore, the average value of migrant voting turnouts from the city of Årshus (49%) and Copenhagen (56%) in Denmark has been used.

¹⁰ The local elections in 1976 were the first elections in Sweden allowing migrant voting (Hammar 1990).

migrant participation (34.4%) in Finland was highest in 1992 when immigrants voted for the first time in the local elections but it has decreased distinctly since then, having been between 13.5 to 18.6 percent in the last two elections. This is a phenomenon, which is also observable in the other Nordic countries.

Participation rates have been on the decrease in all the Nordic countries since the 1990s. Voting turnouts among migrants in Denmark and Sweden have declined by approximately 20 units and political participation rates for migrants in Finland are becoming alarmingly low. Norway is the only country among the Nordic countries, which experienced an increase in the migrant participation till 1999 but participation rates for migrants have begun to decrease gradually also in Norway in the 21st century.

Regardless of the decrease in migrant participation, Sweden (36.9%) and Denmark (36.8%) are the leading countries in migrant participation leaving the Norwegian participation rate (35.6%) very closely behind. Participation rate is significantly below Nordic levels in Finland, being only 18.6 percent in the last elections.

4.2. Migrant representation in the Nordic countries

Migrant representation in politics means a relation between nominated and selected candidates. In other words, it describes how many seats are won by migrant candidates via elections and which foreign nationality groups these elected migrant candidates represent. (Togebj 2003.)

Table 6 reviews the representation of migrants in local elections in the Nordic countries. The table includes statistical information from the most recent elections of each country. Elections under the review are the local election of 2007 in Norway, 2008 in Finland, 2009 in Denmark and 2010 in Sweden. Data for this table is collected from different sources, and there is some variation in the definition of migrant in the different data sources. Some of the Nordic countries have defined migrants as persons coming from both EEA and North America whereas other countries have limited migrants only to third-country nationals. In order to avoid confusion and to present data on migrant representation in the Nordic countries in the best possible way, information about the definition of a migrant in each country is clarified during the table analyses.

Table 6: Nominated and Elected Migrant Representatives in Municipal Elections

Country	Year	Nominated Migrants	Elected Migrants
Denmark	2009	247	47
Finland	2008	527	12
Norway	2007	1026	140
Sweden	2010	766	132

Source: Ahokas et al. 2011(Finland); IMDI 2010 (Norway); Bhatti and Hansen in press 2011; Mikkelsen 2008; Togeby 2003 (Denmark), SCB 2011 (Sweden)

Denmark

In Danish election statistics, migrants are defined as Third Country Nationals. Hence, the Danish data about nominated and elected candidates presented in Table 6 does not include migrants coming under the European Economic Area (EEA) and North America. This narrow definition of migrant explains also in some degree the reason for the small number of migrant candidates in Denmark compared to its peer countries.

In the Danish elections of 2009, there were 247 nominated candidates with a migrant background, and 47 out of the 247 candidates were elected in the elections. The largest ethnic groups represented in the elections were from countries such as Turkey (38), Iran (15), Pakistan (12), Sri Lanka (11), Lebanon (10) and Somalia (8). Elected candidates also corresponded to these last mentioned nationalities. Most of the seats were won by Turkish, Iranian, Lebanese, Iraqi and Pakistani people. The Turkish people won slightly below half of the total 47 seats (44%) and Iranian and Lebanese candidates each won 10 percent of the total 47 seats. Other nationality groups gained less success in the elections and won less

than 10 seats in the elections. This was, for example, the case of the Sri Lankan candidates where only one out of 11 representatives won a seat.

Male migrant candidates were highly represented in the Danish elections. There were a total of 188 male candidates represented in the elections in proportion to 59 female candidates. Candidates were mostly nominated by the biggest political parties or parties located on the left. The highest number of the nominated candidates was among the Danish Social Democrats (62 candidates), the Danish Socialist People's Party (44), the Radical Left Party (36) and Coalition of Liberal Alliance and Slesvigsk Party (42). Denmark's Liberal Party (21), the Danish Conservative Party (20) and the Red-Greens (17) had also several migrant candidates on their list.

Generally speaking, the results for the Danish elections can be argued to be good although migrants lost 5 seats compared to the elections held in 2001. In 2001, 52 candidates out of the 197 nominated candidates were elected in the local elections. On the other hand, the representation of migrants has increased from 1.2 percent in 2001 to 2.7 percent in 2009.

Finland

The elections in 2008 were exceptional in Finland because of the high number of nominated migrant candidates. The number of migrants in the 2008 elections was 527 candidates compared to 264 candidates in 2004. It should, however, be considered here that migrants are defined in a broader perspective in the Finnish election statistics compared to the Danish definition of migrant. Migrants in the Finnish data are defined as people whose mother tongue is not one of the native languages of Finland: Finnish, Swedish or Sami.

Although migrants standing in the elections represented several different language groups, most of them were from Finland's neighboring countries or other European countries. Among the highly represented migrant groups were candidates representing language groups such as Russian (151), Estonian (58), English (33) and German (19). Nominated candidates included also some candidates from third countries who were candidates speaking Arabic (33), Spanish (22), Kurdish (19), Somali (18) and Turkish (17) as their native language. Since Finnish electoral data is based on the candidates' language, it is not possible to give exact information about the candidates' country of origin.

There were slightly more male migrant candidates represented in the elections than female. 52 percent of the nominees standing in the elections were men and 48 percent of the total candidates were women. The difference was, however, relatively small and it cannot be argued to be a significant factor here. Gender played a more substantial role among the elected candidates where over 60 percent of male candidates were elected compared to 40 percent of elected women. The candidates nominated in the elections represented mostly the age groups 25-44 (52%) and 45- 64 (40%). Migrants below 25 and over 65 were scarcely represented in the elections.

The large political parties in Finland had a significant role in nominating migrants in the 2008 elections. The number of nominated migrants was the highest among the Finnish Social Democratic Party (99), National Coalition Party (95) and Centre Party of Finland (94). In relation to the party's size, however, most of the migrants represented small political parties such as the Green League (72), Christian Democrats in Finland (52) and the Finns (14).

Norway

It can be argued that migrants were well represented in the Norwegian local elections in 2007 due to the wide-ranging representation of various ethnic nationalities. There was a relatively high number of candidates standing in the local elections of Norway in 2007, 1026, out of which 140 were elected.

The majority of the elected candidates were male (76), and 64 of a total of 140 candidates were female migrant candidates. Most of the candidates in the elections had an Asian or African background and only one fifth of the candidates were migrants from Eastern Europe. The four largest ethnic nationalities elected in the elections were: Iranian, Pakistani, Indian and Somalian nationals. The Norwegian Labor Party had nominated significantly more candidates than any other political party in the elections. The Labor Party had 78 migrants on their candidate list, followed by the Socialist Left party (25); Conservative Party (10); Progress Party (7) and Liberal Party (6).

Sweden

The elections held in 2010 were exceptional for Sweden due to the reason that the Swedish anti-immigration party "Sweden Democrats" was elected into parliament for the first time. This did not,

however, have an impact on the number of migrant candidates standing in the elections. Sweden had in total 766 migrant candidates in the 2010 elections, out of which 132 nominees were elected. Although the nominated candidates were slightly less represented than in the 2006 elections (798 candidates in 2006), the number of elected candidates increased with 8 percent in comparison to the last elections.

In Table 6, the number of elected candidates (132) represents those migrants who are not nationals of Sweden. The number of candidates would have been even higher if also naturalized migrants (migrants with Swedish nationality) had been included into the electoral statistics. Elected candidates were mainly from European, Nordic and North American countries and only 10 percent out of the total 132 candidates were from Asian, African and Southern American countries. Men had clearly higher representation in the elections than women. There were 407 nominated men and 359 nominated women candidates in the elections out of which 107 men and 57 women were elected.

The Swedish Social Democratic Party, which had 181 candidates on their party list, nominated the highest number of candidates in the Swedish elections. The Green Party had the second most candidates (114) and was followed by the Moderate Party (96), the Left Party (84), and the Centre Party and Liberal People's Party; both with 43 migrant nominees.

A short summary

In summarizing one can say that migrants are represented in the municipal elections of all Nordic countries today. There are, however, variations in the number of both nominated and elected migrant candidates in the countries. Migrant representation is clearly higher in Norway and Sweden than in Denmark. The number of nominated migrant candidates has also increased in Finland during the last years, but the proportion of elected candidates is nonetheless still low in the country. The probability of being elected seems to be higher among migrants in Sweden and Norway.

However, it should be considered here that the term migrant has been understood differently in the data sources. The Danish data includes only the Third Country Nationals but still 19 percent of them were elected. We can thus argue that the probability of being elected might be even higher in Denmark if all the migrant groups would have been included in the data. The percentage rate for elected migrants is also relatively high in Sweden (17.2%) and Norway (13.6%), and it is the lowest in Finland (2.3%).

5. Looking for the Explanatory Factors through Political Opportunity Structures

The previous chapters have given an overview regarding the situation of political participation among migrants in the Nordic countries. They also reviewed some of the core political opportunity structures that are argued to have significance in explaining political behaviour among migrants. This chapter will hereby attempt to study how these structures function in practice within the Nordic countries

5.1 Reviewing the Nordic Electoral Systems

Differences among electoral systems are believed to be one of the central explaining factors in the previous political participation studies. At first glance, however, the Nordic electoral systems seem to be quite similar. This is due to the reason that all Nordic countries have an electoral system based on the principles of direct election and proportional representation in multi-member electoral divisions. Another similarity among the Nordic countries is that they have fixed four-year electoral terms and elections to local councils are (also) hence held every four years in the Nordic countries. Given the last mentioned similar factors among the Nordic countries, it can be argued that the countries have more or less similar electoral systems.

A closer examination of the Nordic electoral systems reveals, however, some of the core differences among the Nordic electoral systems. Table 7 below compares the Nordic electoral systems in more detail. As it is illustrated in the table, Nordic countries differ from each other in terms of voting methods (casting a vote for a candidate or list) and in the number of elections that are held at the same time as the local elections.

Table 7: Nordic Electoral Systems

Country	Electoral System	Vote for list/person	Electoral term	Other elections
Norway	List Proportional Representation	Preferential voting (list)	4 years	County councils
Denmark	List Proportional Representation	A list designation or the name of a candidate	4 years	Country council
Sweden	List Proportional Representation	Preference voting (list)	4 years	Riksdag, country council
Finland	List Proportional Representation	Candidate	4 years	

Source: Bergh and Bjørklund 2011; Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development 2008; Suomen Kuntaliitto 2011; Valmyndigheten 2011; Ministeriet for Sundhed of Forebyggelse 2011; Oikeusministeriö 2010

In Chapter 3, Togeby's study conducted on migrant political participation indicated that the Danish electoral system, which includes the possibility of casting a vote directly for candidates in the elections, was the reason for higher political participation of migrants (Togeby 1999). When reviewing the Nordic electoral systems we notice that the opportunity to vote directly for a candidate is found in two countries among the Nordic states; Denmark and Finland. The thing to be considered here is that although Finland allows the casting of votes directly for candidates, it still has a low political participation rate for migrants in the country. Thus, we cannot simply determine that having the opportunity to directly vote for candidates is responsible for the higher participation rates among

migrants, this electoral system is, therefore, just one of the varying, multiple factors that affect this outcome.

One certain factor is the multiple forms of voting that are provided for people in order to express his/her vote in other Nordic countries. As we can see in the Table 7 above all the Nordic countries, excluding Finland, have multiple options to cast a vote in the elections. A person in Denmark can either vote a list or vote a candidate directly. Similarly, people in Sweden and Norway can vote for a political party and at the same time mark on their ballot paper the candidate that they prefer to be elected (Bergh and Bjørklund 2011; Valmyndighet 2011). Finland is distinguished from others here because it is the only Nordic country, which does not have multiple options to cast a vote in the elections. These multiple options can increase political participation rates for two reasons: higher probability for mobilization and increased odds of migrant candidates to be elected in the elections.

Migrant candidates have increased odds of being elected in countries that have electoral systems including preference voting. In preference voting, like in Sweden and Norway, a voter can cast the preference vote by marking one of the candidates on the ballot paper with a cross. This means the position of those (migrant) candidates, who are placed below in the candidate list, strengthens with preference voting. This is also evidenced in recent research where it was argued that “*migrant non-top-ranking candidates were 50 percent more likely to get elected via preference voting*” (Tahvilzadeh 2011.)

Moreover, migrant candidates on the lists have a mobilizing effect among migrants, who belong to the same (e.g. language, religious, ethnic) community, and cause thereby higher political participation in the candidate’s “*own*” community. The probability for higher mobilization is caused by the minority groups’ strong will to vote for their “*own*”. This, for example, was seen in the local election of 1999 in Norway where three candidates of Pakistani origin were elected due to the strong mobilization phenomenon among the Pakistani community in the Oslo area (Bjørklund and Bergh 2005).

The odds for mobilizing people to the ballot boxes might be, moreover, higher in the other Nordic countries (in comparison to Finland), because they hold national and local elections concurrently, whereas in Finland they are not. County elections are held simultaneously with local elections in Denmark and Norway. In Sweden there are parliament elections (Riksdag) and county elections that overlap with the municipality elections. Election campaigns together with active ongoing discussions on the political issues are features that might mobilize passive voters towards the ballot boxes. This has

been, for example, studied by Hammar, who has argued that participation rates among the Swedish natives are often equally high in all these elections (national, regional and local) in Sweden because elections take place on one and the same day, whereas separate elections (as occurs in Finland) tends to reduce the general turnout. (Hammar 1990).

5.2 Two Ends of the Spectrum: the Nordic Citizenship Acts

The Nordic Citizenship Acts are outlined in Table 8 below. By comparison it can be concluded that all the Nordic countries have naturalization policies based on the combination of two principles: *jus sanguinis* and *jus domicile*. The latter naturalization principle is especially argued to be of importance for migrants, as this principle allows for citizenship to be granted for those migrants who do not fall under the criteria of the first aforementioned naturalization principle.

Table 8: Requirements for Naturalization in the Nordic Countries

	Denmark	Finland	Sweden	Norway
Principle of Citizenship	Jus sanguinis & Jus domicile			
Residence time	9 yrs	5 yrs ¹¹	5 yrs	7 yrs
Language competence	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Good character	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Welfare and security independence	Yes	Yes	No	No
Dual citizenship	No	Yes	Yes	No

Source: The Norwegian Nationality Act (2005/51), The Swedish Citizenship Act (2001/82), The Finnish Nationality Act (359/2003 & 80/2010) and Consolidated Act on Danish Nationality (2004:113)

Sweden, among the Nordic countries, has a most liberal Citizenship Act; according to which a person can acquire Swedish citizenship if s/he has lived in Sweden for the previous five years and has led and can be expected to lead a respectable life. The Swedish Citizenship Act does not require knowledge of the Swedish language to be proven by participation in a language test, nor does it require a test of economic independence like other countries. Additionally, the country also allows dual citizenship, which means that a citizen can acquire Swedish citizenship without renouncing their former citizenship.

¹¹ New Citizenship Act since autumn 2011 (before 2011 it was required that a person has been in permanent residence and domiciled in Finland for the last six years.)

As opposed to Sweden, Denmark sits on the other end of the spectrum. An applicant needs to meet a significant number of conditions for becoming listed in a naturalization bill, and thereby become a Danish national via the naturalization procedure. To attain a Danish citizenship, a person must have lived in Denmark for a continuous period of 9 years. An applicant must also prove his/her Danish skills, knowledge of the Danish society, Danish culture and history by presenting a particular examination.

Finland and Norway in this comparison are following the mid-path in their naturalization policies. Finland though can be argued to be slightly more liberal than Norway for two reasons; for allowing dual citizenship and by requiring a shorter period of residence to become a Finnish citizen. A person in Finland can be naturalized by application if s/he has; permanently resided and been domiciled in Finland for the past five years, hasn't committed any punishable act, has not materially failed to pay maintenance or any debt under public law, can provide a reliable account for his/her livelihood and has satisfactory oral and written skills in the Finnish or Swedish language.

The Norwegian Citizenship Act does not allow dual citizenship although there has been discussion on the topic when Sweden enforced its' dual citizenship law. Because of this reason the Norwegian Citizenship Act can be more closely compared to the Danish Citizenship Act than the Swedish or Finnish Citizenship Acts. The Norwegian government allows citizenship for those applicants who meet the following requirements: a person has stayed for seven years during the last ten years in Norway, has completed 300 hours of tuition in the Norwegian language or documented sufficient skills in Norwegian or Saami and the person must not have been convicted of a criminal offence (good conduct requirement).

The comparative analysis of the Citizenship Acts in the Nordic countries of interest to this study shows that there are a lot of variations to be found in the naturalization policies of the Nordic countries. Countries differ from each other both in the requirements of the residence period, language requirements, in granting dual citizenship to foreign citizens and the requirements for income.

In the Figure 4 below we can further examine how these requirements function in practice. This figure is based on MIPEx results and we can view some indicators that are relevant within the naturalization policy area, but were not included in the Table 8 above. Before going further into the MIPEx indicators and results, the author would like to describe MIPEx methodology. In the introduction chapter under the data –section, we can find the basic information regarding MIPEx. This short


definition of MIPEX methodology will describe in more details how MIPEX decides the scores for each policy.

As described in the introduction, the Migration Integration Policy includes 7 policy areas and 148 policy indicators on migrant integration in the MIPEX countries. These have been designed to benchmark current laws and policies against the highest standards through consultations with top scholars and institutions using and conducting comparative research in their area of expertise (MIPEX 2011). A policy indicator is a question relating to a specific policy component of one of the 7 policy areas. For each answer, there are 3 options. The maximum of 3 points is awarded when policies meet the highest standards for equal treatment.

Within each of the 7 policy areas, the indicator scores are averaged together to give one of 4 dimension scores, which examine the same aspect of the policy. The 4 dimension scores were then averaged together to give the policy area score for each of the 7 policy areas per country which, averaged together one more time, lead to the overall scores for each country. In order to make rankings and comparisons, the initial 1, 2, 3 scale is converted into a 0, 50, 100 scale for dimensions and policy areas, where 100% is the top score. (MIPEX 2011.) This methodology applies to all the 7 policy areas studied in MIPEX. We find naturalization, labor market and education more of importance here due to the fact that they are policy areas that we believe will have an impact on the migrant political participation in this study.

In the naturalization policy, MIPEX had studied it with four policy indicators that were (1) conditions for acquisition of citizenship for migrants (2) eligibility for naturalization (3) security of status and (4) dual citizenship. The first policy indicator measured those conditions for acquiring citizenship for migrants that might hinder or enable citizenship for them in the host country. Sub-questions under this policy indicator were related to the costs of naturalization policy for an applicant, language requirements and exemptions. The second policy indicator (eligibility for naturalization) studied, which migrant applicants are eligible for naturalization, and the third policy indicator (security of status) examined if a country had any additional grounds for refusing or withdrawing citizenship status.

Figure 4: Access to Nationality (%)



Source: MIPEX 2011

The figure above summarizes the average rating obtained by each Nordic country with regard to the easiness in acquiring access to the host country's naturalization process. The average rates above are derived by computing the N value of the four policy indicators mentioned above. (Please see Table 11 in appendices attached for detailed description of individual ratings for the different policy indicators.)

The average rates illustrated in the figure show that Sweden and Finland have one of the most liberal citizenship policies among the Nordic countries. Swedish nationality policies (80 %) are significantly more open towards foreign nationals than the policies operating in the other Nordic countries. Finland also did relatively well in comparison, by achieving the second best average rate (60 %) whereas Norway got an average rate of 40 percent in naturalization policies. Denmark again has the most demanding naturalization policies and performed below the Nordic average.

On the basis of the comparative data one can conclude that Sweden and Finland have liberal citizenship policies in the Nordic countries while Denmark and Norway are practicing more strict naturalization procedures. The conclusions arising from this comparative analysis seems to, however, be in contradiction with those arguments supposing that liberal citizenship policies (are more likely to) lead to higher political participation. (See e.g. Brubaker 1989.)

In the previous literature on migrant political participation, as discussed in Chapter 3, citizenship is argued to play a decisive factor in the individual's political sphere. It was further argued in this context that liberal policies in terms of granting citizenship also have positive effects that can support the overall integration of immigrants; including political integration. While studying the citizenship policies among the Nordic countries, it seems to be that liberal citizenship policies can cause both high political participation (like Sweden) and low political participation (Finland).

The question becomes even more interesting when we consider that naturalization requirements in Sweden and in Denmark are located on the extreme ends of the citizenship policy spectrum but despite this difference both countries have the highest political participation among the migrant population in the Nordic countries. It is hence logical to argue that there is not a clear correlation visible between the citizenship policies and migrant political participation in the Nordic countries.

Although it seems to be that citizenship policies have very little impact on high political participation at the local level, we cannot, however, ignore totally the correlation between liberal citizenship acts and political participation. This is not to be concluded because of two central reasons. Firstly, it should be considered here that political rights are not limited by citizenship at the local level. This means that citizenship does not have such an important role in the local elections as it has in the national elections, where it has an essential role in granting access for political rights. Since this research has focused only on local elections and therefore, does not have voting turnout rates for national elections included in the data, it is inaccurate to preclude completely the impact of naturalization structures.

Another hindrance for making final conclusions is that data on migrant political participation in the Nordic countries is not specific enough to make such a conclusion. In order to find a valid correlation between citizenship policies and higher political participation one needs to have relevant and more detailed local election data. So far, however, research based on citizenship and political participation has focused mainly on national elections since citizenship is given more prominence at a national level because citizenship is a crucial element in granting political rights at this level.

5.3 The Voting Rights for Migrants

The right to vote and to stand in the elections often go hand in hand. As per the current legislation, all countries in the Nordic region provide their legitimate foreign residents voting rights in the local elections. Denmark, Sweden and Norway also allow voting at regional level. This is, however, where it stops, as none of the countries allow migrants to vote or stand in elections at the national level.

Sweden was the first Nordic country that enfranchised migrants in 1975. This was followed by Denmark in 1980, Norway in 1983 and Finland in 1992. This meant that migrants now could for the first time enjoy various civil liberties such as the right to vote and stand in the local elections, as well as establish and be a member of a political party. The only criterion that differs between the Nordic countries is the length of residence that is required before a migrant is considered as being enfranchised.

A snapshot of the various political rights granted by the Nordic countries is summarized in Table 9 below. The Table 9 shows that Finland is probably the most liberal country, having a requirement of only 2 years of residence, with respect to the period of residence criterion before a migrant is considered enfranchised. Sweden and Norway, on the other side, both require that the person should have been a permanent resident for at least three years' before political rights are granted to him/her. Denmark, on its side, is seen as the most extreme and conservative in demanding a minimum of four years of permanent residence before these civil liberties are extended to its migrants.

Table 9: Political Rights of Migrants in the Nordic Countries

Country	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
Enfranchisement year	1980	1992	1983	1975
Right to vote	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Right to stand in elections	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Right to establish and be a member of a political party	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Residence time	4 yrs	2 yrs	3 yrs	3 yrs

Source: Local and Regional Government Elections Act 105/2011 (Denmark), The Finnish Local Government Act 365/1995 (Finland), The Elections Act 837/2005 (Sweden), Representation of the People Act 57/2002 (Norway)

Although it would be logical to argue that a country having the least demands for migrant enfranchisement would have the highest political participation, it is not the case among the Nordic countries. An example of such a case is Finland, which can be argued to be the least demanding country in the Nordic area when considering the required period of residence for migrants in order to provide full political rights for them at the local level. Despite being one of the most liberal countries in the above sense, Finland still has the lowest political participation among the Nordic countries. Hence, it seems that countries that require a longer period of residence have higher political participation among the migrant population than the country enfranchising migrants at the early period of arrival.

Low voting turnout among migrants, despite having political rights, can be caused by the fact that most migrants lack political knowledge and also motivation to participate in the politics of the receiving country. It has been shown in earlier political science studies that people who have been living in the country for a shorter period are known to be less motivated to vote in elections than those migrants who have been living there for a longer period. This fact of a strong effect of years of residence leading to a higher turnout was discussed in the study of “*Political integration of minorities*” by Johannes Bergh and Tor Björklund (2010). In their study, a positive relationship was found between years of residence and turnout. According to them, the longer an immigrant has stayed in Norway, the more likely s/he is to turn up on Election Day.

The condition to get the right to vote in Finland requires only one year less than Sweden and Norway. There is, however, a probability that the longer a person has lived in a country the more likely s/he has become aware of the political environment and political system in the new country. The importance of residence time has been shown for example in a study in Finland where it was found that even internal movement/migration can have an effect on the political activity level of people. This was found by Erik Allardt (1956) in his study *Social struktur og politisk aktivitet* (Social structure and political mobility), where he analyzed how mobility affects voting turnouts in Helsinki. He found in this study that people who have migrated to Helsinki after the age of seven (*inflyttade*, immigrants), had significantly lower voter turnout than those (*infödda*, natives) who were born in Helsinki or migrated there before turning seven. Similar results are, according to Allardt, to be found even in other countries. (Allardt 1956.)

It should also be taken into consideration here that the Nordic countries have enfranchised their foreign citizens in a different time schedule. Finland allowed its noncitizens electoral rights only in 1992 while other Nordic countries already took the same action in the 70s and 80s. Basically, it can be argued that the culture of political participation among immigrants in Finland hasn't become as strong as it is in Sweden, Denmark or Norway.

5.4 Political Parties and Inclusion of the Migrant Groups

In subchapter 5.3 above, a migrants' rights to establish and be a member of a political party have been reviewed. As illustrated in Table 9, there are no restrictions for migrants to either establish a political party or to be a member of a political party in the Nordic countries. Although there are no such restrictions for migrants on the macro-level, this subchapter will study the issue in the meso-context. In order to find out what kind of role political parties in the Nordic countries play in the migrants'

political inclusion, this part will study some of the political programmes, party principles and reports of the Nordic political parties. The author has collected this aforementioned data depending on how much focus each programme, report or party principle programme has on migration and integration issues. The aim of data analysis in this chapter is to find how much attention political parties give to migration issues, and if they do include political inclusion as a separate agenda in their political focus area. This chapter attempts to also cover some activities that political parties in the Nordic countries have taken in order to secure comprehensive representation of migrant groups in the society.

The political parties selected to be studied here are those parties that are currently represented in the Nordic parliaments and municipalities. This includes the following parties from each country:

Denmark: the Danish Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterne*), the Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*), the Danish Socialist People's party (*Socialistisk Folkeparti*), the Danish Conservative Party (*Det Konservative Folkeparti*), the Radical Left Party (*Det Radikale Venstre*), the Red-Greens (*Enhedslisten*), Denmark's Liberal Party (*Venstre*.) and the Christian Democrat Party (*Kristendemokraterne*). (Source: Folketinget 2011)

Finland: National Coalition Party (*Kansallinen Kokoomus, Samlingspartiet*), Christian Democrats in Finland (*Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit, Kristdemokraterna i Finland*), The Finns (*Perussuomalaiset, Sannfinländarna*), Centre Party of Finland (*Suomen Keskusta, Centern i Finland*), Swedish Peoples Party in Finland (*Suomen Ruotsalainen Kansanpuolue, Svenska folkpartiet i Finland*), the Finnish Social Democratic Party (*Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue, Finlands Socialdemokratiska Parti*), Left-Wing Alliance (*Vasemmistoliitto, Vänsterförbundet*) and Green League (*Vihreä Liitto, Grøna Förbundet*). (Source: Oikeusministeriö 2011)

Norway: Labor Party (*Arbeiderpartiet*), Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*), Conservative Party (*Høyre*), Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*), Centre Party (*Senterpartiet*), Christian Democratic Party (*Kristelig Folkeparti*) and Liberal Party (*Venstre*). (Source: Stortinget 2011)

Sweden: the Social Democratic Party (*Socialdemokraterna*), the Moderate Party (*Moderata samlingspartiet*), the Green Party (*Miljöpartiet de Gröna*), the Liberal Party (*Folkpartiet Liberalerna*), the Centre Party (*Centerpartiet*), the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*), the Christian Democrats (*Kristdemokraterna*), and the Left Party (*Vänsterpartiet*). (Source: Sveriges Riksdag 2011)

5.4.1 Political Party Structure and Party Programmes in the Nordic Countries

The Nordic countries have seven to eight main political parties that are running current governments and are visible in the political arena. These parties represent both right-wing, “centre” and left-wing parties. (Heidar 2004c.)

Another typical phenomenon to be observed in the Nordic countries is that all the countries have experienced a rise of a populist and mostly right-wing wave during the recent years. This phenomenon is spreading over the Nordic countries, and bringing anti-immigration policies and rhetoric into Nordic politics. (Norden 2010.)

The rise of anti-immigration parties has led to a change in the political discourse on migration policies in Nordic politics in such a way that migration as a political issue has become one of the central debates instead of being a marginal discussion previously (ibid.). This change in Nordic politics was to be noticed clearly while comparing the party programmes of the Nordic political parties. All political parties in the Nordic area have included migration issues in one way or the other as one of the central policy areas in their party programme.

Norway

Norwegian political parties can be divided into two spheres; those who want to control migration and those who welcome migrants to Norway. The Norwegian Progress Party is the only political party, which wants to have strict control over inward migration whereas most other parties are in favour of either free or selective migration (Fremkrittspartiet 2011).

A common thing to be met in political programmes is that parties aim to work for successful integration of migrants. *Linguistic education, anti-discrimination, inclusion, employment and integration* are the most commonly used words in the Norwegian political party programmes and their principles. (Arbeiderpartiet 2011; Sosialistisk Venstreparti 2011; Senterpartiet 2011; Venstre 2009; Kristelig Folkeparti 2009; Høyre 2009). Political participation and inclusion of migrants into political life are, however, less central themes among parties. The Centre party and Socialist Left Party are the only parties among seven political parties in Norway that have specifically mentioned political inclusion of migrants in their party programmes. According to the Socialist Left Party “*it’s important*

*to secure high political participation among all population groups*¹² (Sosialistisk Venstreparti 2011). The Center Party again believes that the best inclusion is achieved when newcomers themselves participate in important arenas like *work, organizational life and education* (Senterpartiet 2011).

Sweden

Political parties in Sweden also display a positive attitude towards migration in the country. Only the Sweden Democrats, an anti-immigration party, aim to have restricted migration policies in the country (Sverigedemokraterna 2011). A very common topic in the political party programmes is based on the integration of migrants, and party programmes also include some solutions to resolve integration related problems. This basically includes *unemployment, language skills, discrimination, lack of equality and open society* issues (Centerpartiet 2011; Miljöpartiet 2011; Socialdemokraterna 2001; Vänsterpartiet 2008; Socialmoderaterna 2007¹³; Folkpartiet Liberalerna 2009; Kristdemokraterna 2010).

Some Swedish parties have also highlighted the importance of migrant political participation in their party's political agenda. Swedish Social Democratic Party, Liberal People's Party and Left Party were three out of eight Swedish parties that find political inclusion of migrants to be of importance in a democratic state. Parties believe that low participation among migrants in Sweden is an issue that should be resolved with effective integration policies. (Folkpartiet Liberalerna 2009; Socialdemokraterna 2001; Vänsterpartiet 2008.)

Finland

All parties in Finland, except the anti-migration party "The Finns", welcome migrants to the country (Perussuomalaiset 2010). Parties that consider migration to be a positive thing can be divided into two different groups; those that will allow migration based on humanitarian reasons and those parties that are selective will only allow skill-based migration to Finland. Parties on the right-wing are among those

¹² Det er viktig å sikre høy valgdeltagelse i alle lag av befolkningen

¹³ Also known as Moderata Samlingspartiet

that are more eager to have skill-based migration in Finland whereas parties on the left wing would prefer to have a balance of both above mentioned migration groups.

Integration of migrants is a very central topic in Finnish party programmes. *Introductory programmes, societal knowledge, employment, equality, anti-discrimination* and *language education* are very commonly used terms among Finnish political party programmes (Vasemmistoliitto 2010; Suomen Keskusta 2010, Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit 2011; Suomen Ruotsalainen Kansanpuolue 2008; Kansallinen Kokoomus 2011; Vihreä Liitto 2010; Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue 2010).

Most of the political parties in Finland seem to handle political participation under the word *societal knowledge* without defining specifically what they actually mean by the aforementioned term. This study has, therefore, taken into account only those parties that have clearly mentioned political participation in their programmes. These parties are Christian Democrats of Finland, Social Democratic Party of Finland and the Green League.

The Social Democratic Party (SDP) argues that everyone living in Finland should be informed about Finnish society, with a special focus on democratic values. According to Finnish political parties, there should also be other complementary forms of participation in the society in order to secure equal participation opportunities for everyone. This was an issue highlighted by the Christian Democrats of Finland. In the opinion of the Christian Democrats, it is important to inform migrants about their rights and different participation forms (unions, organizations) from the beginning in order to secure the migrants' political participation (Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit 2011). Political participation is very important for the Green League. The party has included political participation as one of their three central goals (political participation, employment and anti-discrimination) of migrant integration (Vihreä Liitto 2010).

Denmark

Despite the strict migration policies applied in Denmark, the Danish People's Party is the only party among the political parties that would strictly control migration in the country (Dansk Folkepartiet 2002). Most parties in Denmark would rather tackle issues brought by migration with the successful integration of migrants. Like other Nordic political parties, even Danish political parties include integration topics such as *employment, language, equality* and *migration flows* in their programmes.

(Enhedslisten 2011; Konservative folkeparti 2011; Radikale venstre 2011; Kristendemokraterne 2008; Venstre 2011; Sosialdemokraterne 2010; Socialistisk Folkeparti 2010)

Conservative People's Party and Danish Social Liberal Party are the only parties that have also mentioned political inclusion of migrants in their party programmes. Conservative People's Party stresses an individual's own input in political participation in order to give them some rights whereas the Liberal Party believes that political participation is only achieved if the state gives an opportunity to do it (Konservative Folkeparti 2011; Venstre 2011).

The review of political party programmes shows that political parties in the Nordic countries highlight the importance of migrant political participation in varying degrees. There are few political parties in the Nordic countries that have highlighted the importance of migrant political participation. The rest of the parties do, however, refer to integration in very general terms, which basically includes employment, language and equality issues. It seems to be that political parties in the Nordic countries do not differ from each other to such an extent that it could explain differences in migrant political participation. In order to study the extent to which political parties play an active role in the political integration of migrants, the issue should be studied at a practical level.

Observations from countries such as Norway and Sweden have shown the political parties' work on the inclusion of migrants considering their different backgrounds (religions, cultures and languages etc) go a longer way in ensuring societal development and increased political participation among immigrants. (Refer e.g. Benito 2005, Bråten 2010.)

Swedish parties, for example, encourage migrants to join interest organizations and reserve special sections in political parties for migrants only thus ensuring migrant participation in their own way. For example, the social democratic party in Sweden has many sections, each of them for a specific language or country group (mostly in Stockholm). (Benito 2005.)

Political parties in Norway again have so called ethnic quotas to secure migrant representation in Norway. The Socialist Left Party of Norway has, for example, ethnic quotas for migrants in their county boards. The party's quota requirement in the county board for Oslo is that at least two out of totally 12 members should have a minority background. (Bråten 2010). The Labor party in Norway have specific groups for different minority groups from Asia, Africa and Europe. The Labor Party do

not have quotas for minorities, but the idea is that minorities are well represented geographically in the areas where they reside.

During the recent years the immigrant potential has been noticed by Finnish political parties as well and they have become more eager to have immigrants on their party lists (Weide 2008). A recent report (Ahokas et.al.2011) on migrant political participation published by the Finnish Ministry of Justice came to similar conclusions as Weide. This research conducted by the Ministry reviewed different tools used by the local government and political parties in order to improve societal participation of migrants. Research showed that Finnish parties have become aware of migrant representation and have established multicultural groups in order to improve the representation of migrants. So far political parties have, however, set only the biggest minority groups (Swedish, Russian, Somalian) as their target groups. (Ahokas et.al.2011.)

The observations listed above show us more variations among the work political parties do in order to integrate migrants into politics in the Nordic countries than what the political party programmes let us know. It seems to be that the focus on the political integration of migrants has existed longer and been more visible in Sweden and Norway than in Finland. This may partly explain the reason why migrants have been less visible in Finnish politics until the last few elections. In the last elections, Finland experienced a significant growth in the number of migrant nominees standing in the local elections (Chapter 4). It seems to be that political parties have increased interest on migrant groups and they have become more eager to nominate migrants in the elections.

Hence, it might be possible to find an even stronger positive correlation between migrant political participation and the political parties' nomination work in practice. This topic is, however, so broad in itself that it is difficult to examine it under one chapter in this study. Another reason that makes this challenging is that there is limited research done on political parties' activities that are directed on migrants in order to secure equal political participation. It was noticed during the data analysis done by the author that there is a significant gap in political science studies on the above mentioned topic.

5.5 Other Factors

Positive correlation between political participation and employment has been found in several political science studies (Wilson 1996). Therefore, migrant employment data has been collected for this study.

The idea is basically to study those labour market structures on a macro level that are likely to explain variations in migrant political participation in the countries under study.

Table 10: Employment Situation among Migrants in the Nordic Countries 2008 (%)

	Denmark		Finland		Norway		Sweden	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Native	82.6	75.8	73.0	69.3	80.5	75.8	77.9	74.5
Foreign	73.8	59.3	73.0	58.2	77.3	70.6	69.9	58.7
Unemployment (foreign)	6.6	7.5	11.0	19.1	6.6	4.3	11.5	12.9

Source: SOPEMI 2010 © OECD

Table 10 above illustrates employment and unemployment rates among both migrants and natives in the Nordic countries in 2008. This data comprises of people in the age range of 15 to 64 in the case of Norway and Finland, and between the age of 16 to 64 for Denmark and Sweden.

It can be observed here that the employment rate is lower among migrants compared to natives in all the Nordic countries. Unemployment seems to occur among both gender groups but the unemployment rate is slightly higher among migrant women than men.

Unemployment rates are particularly problematic in Finland and Sweden. In 2009, there were 19.1 percent of migrant women unemployed as opposed to 11 percent unemployed men in Finland. Unemployment rate for migrant men (12%) is slightly higher in Sweden than in Finland but unemployment rates among genders are relatively more balanced in Sweden (men 11.5%, women 12.9%).

Norway is the only country among the Nordic countries that has a lower unemployment rate among migrant women (4.3%) as opposed to men (6.6%). Denmark can be argued to be the second best in comparison, having an unemployment rate of 6.6 percent for men and 7.5 percent for women.

These variations in the unemployment rates of migrants can be caused by several factors in the Nordic countries. They can, for example, be due to the country's economic situation or general trends of employment in the country. There are many possibilities for the variations observed in the table above, but one interesting factor, that is studied here, is the labour market structures. With labour market structures, we refer to those policies that secure migrants access to the labour market in the receiving country; this is an issue, which was studied in the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX 2011).

The MIPEX report measured whether migrants with the right to work and live in the country also have the same opportunities in the labour market as natives. According to the MIPEX, the labour market policies of the host countries were successful if they worked effectively on four central policy indicators that are as follows:


- 1) **Access to employment** is a policy indicator, which measured those structures that can either enable or hinder the migrant's access to private employment, public employment or self-employment.
- 2) **Access to general support** is a second policy indicator under the labor market structures that studies if migrants are treated equally when it comes to the public employment services, vocational training, study grants and recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU.
- 3) **Targeted support** measures the integration of migrants into the labour market. This includes among others addressing the migrant's employment situation and promoting it in the areas where necessary, through information centres, public employment services and language acquisition programmes.
- 4) **Workers' rights** measures if migrant's have equal access with nationals to social security, equal working conditions and the right to membership in trade unions.

The performance of the Nordic countries, in the MIPEX comparison, in the four policy areas listed above is illustrated in Figure 5 below. The average percent rate of all policy areas for each country under study here has been included in the figure. The average value in the figure is derived by computing the N value of the four policy indicators mentioned above. (Please see Table 12 in

appendices attached for a detailed description of individual ratings for the different policy indicators.)

Sweden, gaining 100 percent in all four policy areas, definitely offers the best employment policies for migrants compared to its peer countries. Denmark (73 %) and Norway (73 %) are second best in comparison leaving Finland (71 %) behind with only two percentage units.

Figure 5: Access to Labor Market (%)



Source: MIPEx 2011

High employment rate among migrants and reasonably good labour market policies seem to be the reason for higher political participation in Denmark and Norway. A lower unemployment rate coupled with better opportunities for work life in these countries strengthen the migrants' feeling of belonging to the majority society and therefore, results in a higher participation rate.

Sweden and Finland are interesting cases here. On the one hand these countries have a high unemployment rate among the Nordic countries, but on the other hand they are completely different in terms of political participation trends among migrants. It seems to be, however, that a significantly

higher unemployment rate among migrant women in Finland and better labour market structures for migrants in Sweden, are logical reasons to conclude that Finland has the weakest labour market situation for migrants in the Nordic countries.

The migrants' weak situation in the Finnish labour market leads to a situation where migrants are living under a marginalized social position. In a marginalized social position, as presented in Chapter 3, an individual lacks those elementary forms of linkage (income, work place, work identity) in the society that are essential in the integration process. Sporadic contacts with the society and having a feeling of not being able to influence one's immediate situation creates a social citizenship that is not compatible with a social citizenship where a person believes that s/he is able to have political influence. (Bäck and Soininen 1998.)

Education


Education is, like employment, an individual resource that correlates positively with political participation. The more educated a person is, the more likely s/he is to turn up on the Election Day (Wilson 1996).

The Figure 6 below shows the educational opportunity structures in the Nordic countries in four dimensions that include (1) migrants' access to educational opportunities in the receiving country, (2) targeting migrants' needs in the education sector, (3) new educational opportunities for migrants and (4) provision of intercultural education for those who are in need of it.

The first policy indicator under the educational policy structures examines a migrant's access to pre-primary education, compulsory age-education and higher-education in the host countries. The second policy indicator (targeting needs) studies how good the host countries are at targeting the educational needs of migrants. A migrant's needs are targeted well if a country provides induction programmes for newcomers, has policies to address the educational situation of migrants and the needs of migrant children are taken into consideration in the educational environment. The last two policy indicators (new opportunities and intercultural education for all) attempt to measure how countries tackle with segregation between educational institutions and promote migrants societal integration. Moreover, it has been studied that schools include appreciation of cultural diversity in their official aim of intercultural education.

As we can see in Figure 6, the Nordic countries vary in a sense of granting educational opportunities for migrants. The figure below summarizes the average rating obtained by each Nordic country with regard to the education policy indicators. The average rate in the figure is derived by computing the N value of the four policy indicators mentioned above. (See Table 13 in appendices attached for a detailed description of individual ratings for the different policy indicators). None of the countries have established perfect educational policies in order to target and meet the migrants' educational needs. Sweden (77%) can still be argued to be having the best educational policies for migrant citizens among the Nordic countries whereas Denmark (51 %) seems to have room for improvement here. Norway and Finland achieving an average percentage of 63 percent in comparison are performing above the Danish average results, but are still below the best performance (Sweden).

Figure 6: Access to Education (%)



Considering the migrant political participation rates in the Nordic countries, it seems to be that there is no clear correlation between educational structures and political participation here. It appears to be that good educational opportunities in some countries have led to higher political participation (Sweden, Norway) whereas no such correlation is visible in Finland. Moreover, in Denmark educational structures may be argued to have less importance since there are high political participation rates among migrants despite the weak educational opportunity structures.

Before arriving at the final conclusions it is, however, essential to consider that this comparative data consists of educational structures on the macro level and does not include the micro structures (i.e. an individual's educational background). Because of the reason mentioned in the end , it is important to highlight that a study including the migrants' educational backgrounds together with education policies targeted at migrants would have been more specific and explained some question marks left behind by the figure above. This was not possible, however, due to the theoretical framework of this study but it would be worthwhile to look at this topic in future studies.

6. Conclusions

Migration has been witnessed as a phenomenon throughout human history where people have been observed to have migrated from one place to another. Either obliged to flee from their communities and countries as a result of conflicts or migrating in the hope of better life. Individuals and groups alike have wandered (migrated) from one place to another. The future prediction of migration as an international phenomenon is said to reach a much higher degree that will also encompass the European countries in a greater way. The European encompassment can already be seen from the political drivers in the EU who now recognise that migration will be a permanent feature of Europe – especially after the expansion of Europe by way of establishment of the European Union. This in turn will bring with it further integration issues for the newly arrived migrants and their receiving host states. It is, therefore, essential that the governments in the migration receiving countries respond to the challenges brought by migration by implementing effective tools, not only to soothe the problems but in order to contribute to the tradition of keeping up democracy and the norms of equal society.

One such tool is ensuring political participation for migrants, which is the primary topic of this study. As mentioned earlier, the aim of this thesis was to study the political participation amongst migrants in the Nordic countries, where the core idea was to review the political participation trends amongst migrants and identify some of the reasons that would help explain why some countries are more successful in activating political participation than others. The data analysis was, therefore, divided into two chapters, where the first chapter examined the local level electoral participation amongst migrants in the Nordic countries, and the second chapter analyzed the variations identified in the first chapter through the political participation opportunity structures prevalent in the said countries.

Findings

The author started the comparative analysis with the presumption that migrant political participation has been and still is, relatively low and stable in all the Nordic countries. This presumption was based on the recent general discussion and importance each Nordic state has given to the topic. The findings of this study have, however, shown the presumption to be incorrect. The comparative analysis showed that migrant political participation in the Nordic countries had in fact been relatively higher in earlier times and have rather declined gradually over time. This trend was shown to be apparent to all the

Nordic countries. The most significant decrease on voting turn outs were seen to be occurring in Sweden and Denmark where political participation amongst migrants decreased by approximately 20 percent in each country. This dip is based on figures recorded since the first migrant participation was registered.

Although the dropping migrant political participation rate is a fact for all Nordic countries, it has been seen to vary a lot in between the countries being studied. Norway, for example, has experienced a lesser decline in migrant political participation rates than other Nordic countries. Finland, on the other hand, has always had the lowest migrant political participation rate and has also experienced some of the greatest declines among the Nordic countries.

This study further attempted to find some explanations for the variations found above through the analysis of the political opportunity structures. The reason for analysing the political opportunity structures was in order to explain the variations in the political participation rates that were found through the review of previous literature on the topic. Previous literature found that the presence of the right political opportunity structures in a society was seen to have a positive correlation to the political participation rates. It was, therefore, assumed that the current political opportunity structures present in the Nordic countries could help explain the divergent political behaviour amongst the Nordic migrants.

The author further introduced six different opportunity structures where the electoral systems, political rights and labour market opportunities were found to be the most significant factors that could help explain the political participation variations amongst migrants in the Nordic countries. The comparative analysis suggested that Denmark, Sweden and Norway, had more migrant friendly election systems that are deemed to be conducive for collective mobilization and could be one reason for the higher migrant political participation than Finland. The aforementioned countries are also deemed to have stronger labour market structures, longer history of migration and migrant political participation. This again could be another reason for the higher migrant political participation compared to Finland.

Other political opportunity structures such as the Citizenship Acts, political parties and access to education were not seen to be as significant in explaining the variations in the Nordic migrant political participation. Some of the reasons for the abovementioned political opportunity structures not being found as significant can be due to the fact that the study focused on the macro-structures at the local level elections. Citizenship Acts, for example, might have a higher correlation with political participation at the national level because citizenship is a crucial element in granting political rights in

the national elections. The other structures could, however, have showed a different significance if micro-level analysis on the topic had been conducted. The general and high level side-by-side comparison of these structures, for the countries in question, was not able to distinguish a suitable significance.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

This research has showed that low political participation among migrants is a relatively common phenomenon in the Nordic countries. This phenomenon cannot, however, be blindly generalised to be similar to all Nordic countries, given the variations in migrant political participation among these countries. This study has further tried to explain the variations through the use of comparative analysis of similar cases and has been able to differentiate some of the broader and general differences in the various political opportunity structures in the Nordic countries. The author would, however, like to highlight that the method of conducting a comparative analysis of similar cases was not helpful in distinguishing the variations between nations that had similar overall and broader opportunity structures.

A statistically potential limitation of this research was the limited data available for this study area. Migrant political participation studies are a relatively new issue in the Nordic countries and the topic has been studied in a varying degree in the aforementioned countries. It was, therefore, challenging for the author to obtain comparable data from either previous studies on this topic or from the National statistical databases.

Another challenge with the data was the definition of the term migrant. The term migrant is a collective noun sometimes used to describe different categories of people. The term further includes several subgroups and is practised in different ways (nationality, language etc.) in order to categorize migrants into these groups in the national databases.

As a learning experience, this study has been an interesting and rewarding experience for the author. This study has not only deepened the author's knowledge on the topic but also improved the author's working methods for conducting an independent study. The time, data and length constraints of this study have limited the authors' ability to include other political factors and carry out further tests. Had these constraints been lifted, the author would have been enthusiastic to study the impact of micro-

factors on migrant political participation, in an attempt to analyse whether immigrants' individual resources (i.e. language skills, education) can help explain variations in the political behaviour among similar migrant groups in the Nordic countries. It would also be interesting to study if the migrant's membership and participation in non-governmental organization and/or political parties can help in finding the answer to clarify variations found in the political participation amongst migrants in the Nordic countries.

This is inadequately covered and should definitely be a consideration for future research direction. Considering a long tradition of Nordic cooperation, it is also of importance that the Nordic countries establish a common database for migration issues in these countries as means to share knowledge and increase regional democracy. This will not only contribute to migration research in future but also work better for the integration policies in the Nordic area.

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Consolidated Act on Danish Nationality 113/2004

Election Acts

Local and Regional Government Elections Act 105/2011

The Finnish Local Government Act 365/1995

The Elections Act 837/2005

Representation of the People Act 57/2002

Appendix I

Table 11: Citizenship Policy Structures in the Nordic countries by MIPEX 2011(%)

Policy / Country	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
Eligibility	40	65	20	60
Conditions of acquisition	25	48	68	71
Security of Status	43	64	50	86
Dual nationality	25	50	25	100
N	33	57	41	79

Table 12: Labour Market Policy structures by MIPEX 2011(%)

Policy / Country	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
Access	80	80	80	100
Access to general support	50	67	50	100
Targeted support	88	63	75	100
Worker's rights	75	75	88	100
N	73	71	73	100

Appendix II

Table 13: Education Policy Structures in the Nordic countries by MIPEx 2011 (%)

Policy / Country	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
Access	71	79	29	57
Targeting needs	80	90	90	90
New opportunities	38	40	30	88
Intercultural education for all	17	42	83	75
N	51	63	63	77