UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE

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THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING SEEN

Postmodern visual culture of the United Arab Emirates

and content analysis of female Emirati self-portraits in Flickr

Master's Thesis

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This study examines self-portraits of young women from the United Arab Emirates in the online photo-sharing website Flickr. The primary focus of this research is to study how young Emirati women represent themselves and construct their identities in new media through visual self-representations.

The study concentrates on the images of members of Flickr group BanaaT UAE, out of which 170 members' images are selected as a sample for content analysis. The sample of self-representations is subjected to a historical and cultural comparison and contemplation with emphasis on national identity politics. In the analysis, the photographs are analysed against a backdrop of the history of the UAE, women's social standing, local and colonialist visual traditions as well as new information and communication technologies (ICTs).

The research findings indicate that the young Emirati women do not publish classic self-portraits with identifiable features as out of the 8,248 images studied in all, just seven included recognisable facial features, six of them children's and only one young woman's. Despite this, the study concludes that for these young women, Flickr is both a site of display as well as audiencing with its own socialising practices. Indeed, the photographs studied appear to have gotten their meaning from the fact they have been put on exhibit, underlying an importance of being seen.

Key words: United Arab Emirates, Flickr, women, photograph, self-portrait, identity

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Tämä tutkielma tarkastelee nuorten Emiraattinaisten omakuvia Internetin Flickr -kuvagalleriassa. Tutkimuksen ensisijaisena tarkoituksena on selvittää, miten nuoret Emiraattinaiset esittävät itsensä omakuvissaan ja miten he rakentavat identiteettiään uudessa mediassa.

Tutkimus keskittyy Flickr ryhmän BanaaT UAE jäsenten kuviin, joista 170 jäsenen valokuvat on valittu otokseksi sisällönanalyysiin. Otoksen omakuvat alistetaan historialliselle ja kulttuuriselle vertailulle sekä pohdiskelulle kansallista identiteettipolitiikkaa painottaen. Kuvia tutkitaan suhteessa Arabiemiraattien liiton historiaan, naisten nykyiseen yhteiskunnalliseen asemaan, paikalliseen ja kolonialistiseen visuaaliseen perinteeseen sekä uuteen viestintäteknologiaan.

Tutkimustulokset osoittavat, että nuoret Emiraattinaiset eivät julkaise klassisia, tunnistettavia kasvonpiirteitä sisältäviä omakuvia, sillä 8248 tutkitusta valokuvasta vain seitsemän esitti tunnistettavaa henkilöä; näistä kuvista kuusi esitti lapsia ja vain yksi nuorta naista. Tästä huolimatta, tutkimuksen johtopäätöksenä on, että nuorille Emiraattinaisille Flickr on sekä julkinen näyttäytymispaikka yhtenäistävine vastaanotto- ja sosialisointitapoineen. Tutkitut valokuvat vaikuttavatkin saavansa merkityksensä esillepanosta, nähdyksi tulemisen tärkeyttä korostaen.

Asiasanat: Arabiemiraattien liitto, Flickr, naiset, valokuvaus, omakuva, identiteetti

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In Espoo,

Anniina Mattsson

Contents

Transliteration

For the benefit of the reader, all Arabic words in the research have been transliterated into the Latin alphabet. In agreement with this, diacritics marking different vowel lengths, for example, have been left out. If possible, official sources have been consulted regarding the transliteration of names. However, in certain cases where even official sources included multiple variations of transliteration, the most consistent strand of transliteration was followed. Yet, in some instances, this lead to inconsistency between transliterations of the same name used by different people. For instance, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum's name is transliterated differently from Prophet Muhammad's. With the major family, such as Al Maktoum, only one form (with both words capitalised, without a hyphen) was used throughout to avoid confusion. Nevertheless, for most names used, the transliteration follows that of the sources.

Introduction

Interest in cultures and societies affected by Islamic religion increased throughout the 20th century as political and social turmoil throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) shaped political, economic and cultural interests of Western nations. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, however, many works have focused on geo-political particularities surrounding the foreign policies of the United States of America. To counter the overtly politicised view of Islamic religion and conclusions that support a contrasting view of the Orient and the Occident, us and the other, as promoted by Huntington's 1993 article *The Clash of Civilizations?* in *Foreign Affairs*,[1] a need for balanced and unprejudiced academic studies on the societies of the areas mentioned has been recognised. Media attention given to the Iraq war (invasion beginning from March 2003) highlighted the changes taken place in the media landscape of the Middle East (ME) and the Arabic speaking world, particularly the arrival of Qatari news channel *Al Jazeera*.[2] The changes shaping the media landscape reflect larger sociological changes at work in the countries of Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)[3]. At the same time, a combination of ambitious goal orientated internal policies, swift implementation of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) as well as wealth accumulated by rising oil prices and *laissez-fair* practices to lure international capital, elevated standards of living for the national populations of the GCC countries, none more than the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[4] However, extensive urban development, highly increased immigration and its globalised cultural impact on the local population have evoked heated internal discourse on national identity, its characteristics and perceived threats to it.

Growing amid the breakneck change and maturing into early adulthood in mid-to-late-2000s, the generation of young women has been in the forefront of realising the possibilities that improved education, rising standards of living, technological innovations as well as a hybrid of globalised cultural and national traditions can offer. However, while considerable amount of research has been devoted to the position of women on and off media in the MENA region, and to a lesser extent in the UAE, rather less attention has been paid to the content created by these young women independently of mainstream media companies. Equally, research on art and photography in the area has mainly been limited to colonialist context preceding nation states, postmodern technological change and the effects of especially Anglo-American media content. In addition, the new media landscape and the effects of access to a virtual public sphere of Internet have concentrated on virtual forms of Islamic religion, Muslim diasporas living outside the MENA region or purely economic factors such as profitability of Internet commerce in the ME. It would

seem therefore, that despite considerable potential of recent developments in communication studies, further research is needed in order to have a clearer understanding of young women's position in the rapidly changing nation of the UAE with easy access to different forms of media and new technological environments.

In a previous study on a similar subject, the conclusion was that the photographs of young women researched conformed to the visual traditions of Arab-Islamic art and representation avoiding the representations of living beings, favouring mosaic-like pictures of surfaces, or emphasising details in a way that the subject itself lost meaning while abstract constructions neared almost geometrical simplicity.[5] Whilst, as will be shown later on, sacred Arab-Islamic art avoids representations of living beings, all of the young women researched earlier took photographs of both humans and animals, with self-portraits being a significant category among the material.[6] Hence, this research aims to examine representations of living beings, concentrating on visual self-representations of young native women of the United Arab Emirates in new media to identify and gather information about the ways the young women represent themselves and construct their identities online.

The main question of this research is: **How do young native women of the UAE represent themselves and construct their identities in new media through visual self-representations?** The objective of this research is to examine a sample of self-representations acquired from the online photo gallery Flickr and subject them to a historical and cultural comparison and contemplation with emphasis on national identity politics. The hope of this research is to result in deeper cultural understanding of perhaps the most powerful generation of women in the UAE and the ME.

This thesis is divided into five sections. The first part introduces the reader to the primary sources and other literature used in this thesis. For avoiding unintended misinterpretations later on, the second (rather extensive) section presents the contemporary society of the UAE with chapters on the history of the former Trucial States, social position of young Emirati women, media landscape, censorship and new ICTs as well as the complexities faced by the nation state. The third section concentrates on art and photography in local context. The fourth section includes the actual methodological research as well as analysis on the results of the research. Lastly, the fifth section discusses the results in the context established earlier on Emirati society and self-portraits of young national women. The thesis ends with a conclusion.

I Literature review

Since, this research, as noted, aims to study self-portraits of young Emirati women, it is vital to reconstruct the context in which they produce their work. Consequently, the research literature covers extensive areas from orientalism to censorship, from oil economy to social networks. For clarity's sake, the sources in References have been divided into primary sources (actual research data) and research literature. In this section, the sources and research literature are discussed in the approximate order as they are utilised in the following sections.

Orientalism

> One of the most debated issues in the analysis of the contemporary Middle East has been that of 'orientalism', the question whether Western writing on the region over the past century or two has been, and continues to be, distorted by a set of prejudices born of European and imperial preconceptions.[7]
>
> – Halliday in *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East*

One cannot write about the UAE or any other geographical, political, cultural or ethnic entity that was earlier labelled as "oriental" without first acknowledging one's standing in relation to the orientalist discourse.[8] Orientalism, which stems from as far as 14th century,[9] is defined by Said as a construction of Western imagination that has no constant connection to geographical or political boundaries.[10] While the "'Eurocentric' idea of an 'Orient'", according to Hight and Sampson, acquired more specific nationalistic forms after it came into existence in the latter half of the 18th century,[11] according to Bhabha, the colonialist discourse aimed to establish a "degenerate" view of native peoples to "justify conquest".[12] Through the "repetitive, fetishistic" use of objects such as photographs, the aboriginal peoples were "mummified" in stereotypes that dismissed differences between individuals rendering them invisible.[13] Halliday summarises orientalist thought in three broad premises on language, religion and change. The first premise on language assumes that a region is characterised by its language and that an "Arabist" has an automatic ability to draw reasonable conclusions on Arab societies and people.[14] According to the second premise, Islamic religion, often referred to only as Islam, is a social phenomenon that pervades almost all aspects of life and can thus be used as a sole "explanatory factor".[15] The third premise follows from the second one in assuming that change is impossible in countries affected by Islamic religion.[16] It is understood that all of the orientalist premises have problems: the premise on language as a central character ignores native speakers,[17] the premise on all-pervasive Islamic religion ignores the huge differences between clerics and regular believers,[18] and the premise on change ignores change.

Anti-orientalist thought trailed political and intellectual changes of 1960s, which revolved around relations of power and subjugation.[19] Halliday credits the early anti-orientalist thought mainly to Maxime Rodinson writing that Edward Said's work "can be seen as coming at the end of, and to a considerable degree negating, an earlier body of debate and work".[20] However, while it might be easier to pinpoint fallacies in oriental reasoning, the anti-orientalist thought has its difficulties too. For instance, Halliday criticises Said's vague use of the term "oriental" and the way of making the ME a special case, remarking that racist literature can be found on all subject peoples regardless of their religion.[21] He also criticises Said's assumption that context can invalidate an idea; just "because ideas are produced in context of domination or directly in service of domination" does not make them automatically invalid. Quite contrary, a successful domination of a country relies on accurate information about it.[22] As Hight and Sampson note, in the current post-colonial discourse, it is often forgotten that "Orientalism as a field of study attempted to establish a positive cross-cultural understanding" originally with the peoples of Indian subcontinent and later on extending to areas of Asia and MENA.[23]

According to Halliday, the debate between the orientalists and anti-orientalists involves four different issues. Firstly, there is the question of evaluating, how to write about ME without succumbing to orientalism.[24] The second issue is about methodology and the competition between a traditional linguistically and culturally based approach, and a critical approach of discourse derived from postmodernism.[25] The third issue is centres on the Arab-Israeli conflict, with both sides of the debate blaming the other for bias.[26] The fourth and final issue is that of the absence of Middle Eastern ideas and ideologies, the "poverty of the intellectual life of the Arab world".[27]   In   the contemporary society, the anti-orientalists have, writes Halliday, gained a momentum within the academy, especially within postmodernism "with its analyses of discourse and subjectivity", while the orientalists have, surprisingly enough,

> received support from the rise of traditionalist and fundamentalist movements in the region [...] which advocate belief in the existence of an all-encompassing, determinant and unchanging Islam that is very similar to their own.[28]

As a result, the core problem for both the orientalists and the anti-orientalists appears to be that the myths of the dominators have turned into the myths of the dominated. In the present day discourse the orthodox and the orientalists have much in common, both emphasising unchangeing nature of the Islamic religion, a religion that is presented as an all-solving, all-encompassing set of social paradigms that have not changed since the Prophet do not need to change in the future either.[29] According to Halliday, both sides of the debate, fail to meet "the central intellectual task",[30] namely

to analyse the societies in concern: "Both camps, the orientalists and their critics, have shied a long way away from this task, focusing more on discourse than on the analysis of reality".[31] Hence, for researching a society of Islamic religion, Halliday advices to

> observe the contingency and variety of Islamic beliefs, and their reliance on other and identifiable factors such as states, classes, ethnic groups and so forth which use and interpret Islamic dogma for their own purposes. [32]

Secondly, the researcher should try to find explanations why the idiom of 'Islam' continues to prevail in the societies without leaning on the religion itself, since what needs to be explained is "the very continuity of social forms and beliefs".[33]

> Indeed, many of the phenomena identified as specifically Islamic are not unique to the Islamic world: dictatorial states, tribal regimes, fragile democracies, intolerance of minorities or of dissent are hardly the prerogative of *dor al-islam*.[34]

Overview on research literature used

As pointed out in the introduction, the interest following the 9/11 attacks and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan generated a rapidly expanding, though mainly English language, literature discussing Islamic religion and the societies it affects. However, quantitative large part of this writing concentrated on and around the War on Terror, lead by George W. Bush's United States government and provoked by fundamentalist at the fringes of Islamic *ummat*.[35] The UAE played only a marginal role in the current conflicts around the ME and as a result, most studies mention the Emirates only briefly or not at all. Within the GCC nations, the UAE has often been eclipsed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, even Qatar. As, Heard-Bey writes, the historical studies of the area and its societies were of interest mainly to "a limited number of specialists and people who lived and worked in the area" and scattered around in documents "concerning the entire Gulf".[36] Consequently, vast portion of the literature focusing on the country was tourism-centred until the very recent years of economic boom and increased geopolitical importance.

The chapters discussing the UAE, its history, creation, current government, economic policies, immigration and national identity rely heavily on Heard-Bey's *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, Davidson's *Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success* and Vine's *United Arab Emirates Yearbook 2009*. In addition, the discussion on oil economy was affected by the articles written by Prugh, Flavin and Sawin as well as Mastny and Cincotta in the World Watch Institute's *State of the World 2005*. For statistical information, the Central Intelligence Agency's *The World Factbook* was consulted in both 2009 and 2010. However, it must be noted that the statistical

information available varied from one source to another, as for example, T*he World Factbook* on the UAE, estimated the population of the country to 4.6 million in 2008, a 500,000 drop in one year compared with *Gulf News* statistics.[37] On top, the variations among the Emirati national population within the larger general population were rarely followed; for example, figures on total fertility rate (TFR) do not differentiate births by nationals and non-nationals.

At the beginning of Middle Eastern women's studies in 1960s and 70s, local women were often described as victims of a patriarchal social structure and often underestimated even in the scientific field.[38] The situation diversified only when academics in the field realised that descriptions of women as victims, victimised them twice; first in real life, then through academic representation that concentrated more on the structures of oppression than the women themselves did.[39] Women's stature in the larger MENA region and Arab societies is a subject of a vast body of research literature. However, more specific information concerning young Emirati women, their position in the society and the public sphere was harder to find. Studies on women's position in the UAE combined often both immigrant and national women without differentiation, or was limited to a particular minority of, for example, foreign prostitutes as was the case with Stoenescu's article 'Globalising Prostitution in the Middle East'. For certain aspects covered in this part, literature on the situation of the UAE was not available. In these situations, relevant literature on similar countries or circumstances was used. Such literature included, for example, Eickelman and Anderson's discussions in *New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere* as well as Ross' 'Oil, Islam, and Women'.

Few academic papers discuss the media landscape of the Persian/Arabian Gulf and women's position in it. Unfortunately in many cases the media landscape of the entire ME, and in some cases the whole MENA, has been treated as one. Such is the case in Sakr's three, otherwise informative, articles 'Seen and Starting to Be Heard: Women and the Arab Media in a Decade of Change', 'Freedom of Expression, Accountability and Development in the Arab Region' and 'Friend or Foe? Dependency Theory and Women's Media Activism in the Arab Middle East' as well as in Gawad's 'Attempts of the Arab World to Participate in Balancing the Flow of Information'. Consequently, specific information about the media in the UAE was somewhat lacking. For example, the Smalley's *Middle East and North Africa Media Guide 2007* works in practice as yellow pages for media industries in the area, not as an unbiased academic catalogue of media enterprises despite some interesting commentary it includes. Regarding the demographic of this research, however, Walters, Walters and Quinn's article 'From Majlis to Mobile: The Transitional Women of the United Arab Emirates' on female Emirati university students proved essential for understanding the

relationship of these young women and the media. Another good source was Rugh's *Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, radio, and television in Arab politics.*

Regarding new ICTs and the Internet, there is a large quantity of research done on different forms of new media, especially in Western context, but the problem of constant volatility remains. The rapid pace of technological change makes even the most recent research seem in one way or another out-of-date by the time of publication.[40] As Lister, Dovey, Giddings, Grant and Kelly write in the introduction to *New media: A critical introduction*, new media "cannot be addressed other than by combining, or synthesising, knowledges".[41] What is more, most books dealing with new media seem to have a commercial angel to them. New technologies and the Internet are often seen as a market to conquer, not a social phenomenon to analyse. According to Montgomery, for example, a mass of research on youths using the new ICTs has been done by newly formed market research firms concentrated on online research and usually funded by large commercial entities.[42] This has been partly because the organisations funding research have been "struggling with ethics and guiding principles for online research" and the business model of conducting online market research that could be sold to other companies has "become a staple in the new digital economy".[43] Because of extensive market research, "the Digital Generation has become the most heavily researched demographic group in the history of marketing" [44] – at least in the US. In addition to Montgomery's *Generation Digital: Politics, Commerce, and Childhood in the Age of the Internet* and Gillmor's *We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People*, both Gonzalez-Quijano's 'The Birth of a Media Ecosystem: Lebanon in the Internet Age' as well as Ulaby's 'Music and Mass Media in the Arabian Persian Gulf' proved valuable for their more localised view. Central literature used on the discussion on censorship included Mostyn's *Censorship in Islamic Societies*, Jansen's *Censorship: The Knot That Binds Power and Knowledge*, and Ekholm's *Kielletyt kirjat.* There have been few news reports on censorship in the UAE media with Carver's 2005 article 'Black books' in *Time Out Dubai* a rarity.[45]

Regarding the historical and the present state of visual culture and photography in the UAE, previous research appears patchy. As Naef points out, art publications "are often written by non-specialists and lack important details", while monograms and systematic catalogues of local art scenes "are relatively rare".[46] Thus, for broader understanding on the subject, general literature on arts history was used. These titles included Blair and Bloom's 'Art' in the *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim world*, Du Ry's *Art of Islam* as well as Grabar's 'Architecture and Art' in *The Genius of Arab Civilization*: *Source of Renaissance* and Grube's *Maailmantaide: Islamin taide*. For a contemporary take on the subject, Naef's 'Between Symbol and Reality: The Image of Women in

Twentieth Century Arab Art' was vital.

On the topic of photography, as Erdogdu remarks, colonial representations of Middle Eastern women in both art and photography have been extensively studied.[47] Since the early 1980s, the study of colonialist photography as leaped forward with concentrated studies on Polynesian, Middle Eastern, Australian, Japanese and Native American photographic representations.[48] On this area of research, Graham-Brown's *Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women in Photography of the Middle East 1860-1950* was the most important and wide-ranging source used. It was complemented by Rosemblum's *A World History Of Photography* as well as articles by Erdogdu (Picturing alterity: Representational strategies in Victorian type photographs of Ottoman men') and DeRoo ('Colonial collecting: French women and Algerian *cartes postales*') in *Colonialist Photography: Imag(in)ing race and place*. Because no comprehensive histories on photography in the UAE were found, the research had to rely on two quite different non-academic sources: Shukla's *The UAE Formative Years 1965-75: A collection of historical photographs by Ramesh Shukla* and Al-Sauty's *Photography in Oman: Photography and Islamic Culture*, which is discribed as a "multipurpose study that comprises general photography, rules of Islamic and Traditional Culture towards photography".[49] However, it must be acknowledged that neither of the authors are Emirati and thus their opinions on photography can vary from those of national Emiratis. Thus, the researcher has aimed to follow Rose's rule to consider "who is able to see what and how, and with what effects", in order to avoid blurring the analytical complexities of each particular visual culture and its differing power, race and gender relations.[50]

Rose's *Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials* (both the 2001 and 2007 editions) was used as the central source on methodology. In addition, chapters in Derrick and Wells' *Photography: a critical introduction*, Banks' *Visual methods in social research*, Kember's *Virtual anxiety: photography, new technologies and subjectivity*, Knowles and Sweetman's *Picturing the social landscape: visual methods in the sociological imagination* were used, as well as articles by Wagner in *Images of Information: Still Photography in the Social Sciences*, and by Winston in *Image-based Research: A Sourcebook for Qualitative Researchers*. Concerning the user base, Dewdney and Lister's *Youth, Culture and Photography*, though somewhat outdated, offered an invaluable look into youth photography.

In addition to the aforementioned literature, multiple local and international media accounts were used to reconstruct current events, ideas and attitudes otherwise not covered in the research literature. The photographs, graphs and screen captures presented in Appendices have been chosen to exemplify and explain points discussed in the research.

II Contemporary United Arab Emirates

Geographical and geopolitical conditions such as natural resources, access to seas and rivers as well as proximity to regional cultural and religious powers, affect the essential nature of life of an area and its inhabitants.[51] Each condition varies throughout the time from the slow pace of geological or climatic changes to the faster changes of value placed on certain natural resources or political circumstances.[52] Similarly, each condition can be viewed as either a blessing or a curse depending on the situation.[53] For the past inhabitants of the current geographical area of the UAE, the conditions of their lives have gone through both subtle and radical geological, climatic, political, religious, economic and technical changes throughout the millennia.

Nation creation

The UAE is situated on the Musandam Peninsula in South-East Arabia, between the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman in the Indian Ocean, near the geopolitically strategic Strait of Hormuz.[54] The area is characterised by the Hajar Mountain Range on the East coast and the Rub' al Khali desert on the west, which comprises two thirds of all the emirates.[55] The earliest signs of human occupation in the area are from humid Neolithic period around 5,500 BCE, two thousand years later, however, the situation changed as around conditions became arid and changed into desert climate.[56] The local economy became heavily dependent on the run-off water from the mountains stored in underground water tables and the agricultural activities concentrated in the oasis valleys around the mountains in reinforced communities.[57] The challenges presented by the desert were mostly avoided by using sea as a contact route.[58] Even though, the shallow waters of the Gulf made for a dangerous navigation they also contributed to ideal conditions for pearl oysters.[59] Therefore, pearling and trade have been perhaps the most central economic activity across the millennia for the population on the Gulf coast of the UAE.[60] Christianity spread to the area around 500-600 CE from Iran and southern Mesopotamia and a Nestorian Christian monastery was established on the island of Sir Bani Yas.[61] However, envoys of Prophet Muhammad arrived to the area in 630 CE and the people converted to Islam.[62] The death of the Prophet two years later caused a rebellion against Islam and its teachings leading to a significant, but in the end fruitless, battle in Dibba on the East coast.[63] In five year's time Julfar (present-day Ra's al-Khaimah) was being used as a base for Islamic conquest of Iran.[64]

During the 16th century, Portuguese and Ottoman powers competed over influence in the Gulf waters and both Italian and Dutch travellers wrote down the first Western descriptions of the UAE coastal areas.[65] From the beginning of the 18th century, English trade in the Gulf increased

tightening competition with the Dutch merchants.[66] In 1764, German surveyor Carsten Niebuhr in the King of Denmark's scientific expedition, noted that the area of Sharjah, east coast of the UAE and most of Musandam were "under control of Qawasim".[67] The Bani Yas, on the other hand, were traditionally concentrated around the inland oases of Liwa engaged in date palm cultivation.[68] However, the inhabitants migrated seasonally back and forth between the oases and Abu Dhabi tending large camel herds.[69] By 1790s, writes Vine, "political leader of the Bani Yas groups, the sheikh of the Al Bu Falah (Al Nahyan family)" moved to Abu Dhabi because of growing pearl trade. Roughly a decade later, members of another Bani Yas branch of Al Bu Falasah moved to Dubai Creek area and "established Maktoum rule in that emirate".[70]

Throughout the first decades of the 19th century, the English East India Company attacked the Qawasim navy of 20,000 sailors and 60 large vessels frequently in a fight over control of the Strait of Hormuz. British victory over the Qawasim resulted in a General Treaty of Peace signed in 1820 by the sheikhs of individual emirates of Sharjah, Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ra's al-Khaimah granting Great Britain rule over foreign affairs and defence.[71] Consequently, the area came to be known as The Trucial States and the peace enabled surveying and publication of first accurate maps during the next forty odd years.[72] According to Davidson, the area was considered in Britain to be "unworthy of colonial administration and expensive troop deployments", which led to a "cut-price" colonial administration heavily reliant on peace treaties and local agents from the elite families to rule the rest:[73]

> Thus, in many ways the centuries-old ebb and flow of tribal power had been frozen in time, as Britain signed treaties with which-ever family happened to hold the reigns of power at that time, and requiring the rulers to sign not only on behalf of themselves, but also on behalf of their 'future sons'.[74]

The pearling industry that had been the mainstay of the area for thousands of years, died down after the First World War.[75] The results were disastrous for locals who depended on the pearling for income and employment.[76] However, during the 1930s the sheikhs of Sharjah, Dubai and Abu Dhabi had signed agreements for oil exploration and between 1945-1951 Umm al-Qaiwain, Ajman and Ra's al-Khaimah followed the lead with their own agreements.[77] The transition from pearling industry to oil economy came fifteen years later, in 1962, when Abu Dhabi became the first emirate to export oil.[78] As wealth began increasing, the rulers of the emirates took upon themselves to invest in infrastructure: housing, hospitals, schools and roads.[79]

The British announced their withdrawal from the Gulf region and The Trucial States in 1968 by the end of 1971.[80] The rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan (Sheikh Zayed) and Sheikh Rashid Bin Saeed Al Maktoum tried to instigate a union between the

seven emirates, Bahrain and Qatar, but the talks fell through.[81] Two years later, on July 10, 1971, the rulers of six emirates (Fujairah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ajman, Sharjah, Dubai and Abu Dhabi)[82] agreed to merge into a union.[83] The same year, in December 2, 1971, the State of the United Arab Emirates was formed.[84] The event went largely unnoticed as Sir Arthur, K.C.M.G. and former Political Resident, does not "recollect that a single special correspondent of a major Western newspaper—let alone a politician or a statesman—took the trouble to attend the ceremony of its [the UAE] formation".[85] Abu Dhabi became the capital of the new nation and the following year Sheikh Zayed was chosen as the first president of the nation.[86] Ra's al-Khaimah became the seventh emirate in the federation joining the union formally on February 10, 1972.[87]

The government

The UAE is a federation of seven administrative divisions, or emirates, each with vast rights regarding their internal policies, civil defence, schooling and infrastructure, while the federal government manages tertiary education, defence and telecommunications.[88] Currently, the executive branch consists of the chief of the state, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, H. H. President Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan (since November 3, 2004), the Ruler of Dubai H. H. Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum (since January 5, 2006).[89]

The Federal Supreme Council (FSC) is composed of the absolute rulers of the seven emirates and holds the highest constitutional authority in the nation.[90] The FSC meets four times a year to sanction federal legislation, annual budget and establish general policies, with the rulers of the two most influential emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, having in practice veto power.[91] The president and vice-president are elected (thus far unanimously) from among the FSC members to five-year terms, with the last election held on November 3, 2004 after the death of Sheikh Zayed.[92] The president then designates prime minister and deputy prime minister as well as ministers for The Cabinet.[93] According to Heard-Bey, the positions of "Heir Apparent" and "Crown Prince" were established in each emirate "In response to a growing sense of uncertainty [...] about future distribution of authority and power" in 1969.[94] In addition to these administrative divisions, most of the emirates have also established local Consultative Councils.[95] The legislative branch is unicameral, consisting of Federal National Council (FNC), which has forty seats, half for rulers of member emirates to appoint, half elected (last time was December 18-20, 2006) for two-year terms.[96] The FNC has no power to change or veto legislation, only review it.[97] Political parties are not allowed in the UAE and there is no general suffrage.[98] Instead, the Electoral College for the

FNC consisted last time around of around 6,500 Emiratis (of which around 1,200 were women) appointed by the rulers of each emirate.[99]

The constitutional crisis of the 1970s could have resulted in the federation becoming centralised with more equal wealth distribution within the emirates.[100] However, Heard-Bey defends the "somewhat ambivalent constitution" that endorses strong president at the "apex of the legislative and the executive powers" for one central authority would have undermined traditional tribal structures of tribally defined leadership and its culmination in the "shaikhly principle" rendering individual rulers "nominal and therefore meaningless".[101] Indeed, the current federal system "leaves the benefits of the natural resources firmly within the authority of each emirate" for guaranteeing the significance of the individual rulers, who through decades have spearheaded economic policies to diversify the proceeds gained from oil.[102]

Diversifying rentier economy

Oil is the world's largest source of energy and strategically the most important commodity.[103] Middle Eastern oil politics were dominated by the Great Britain until the 1956 Suez crisis – since then the major influence has been the US.[104] According to Prugh, Flavin and Sawin, the decades long exploitation has resulted in a network of relationships and "natural resources curse" – "tendency for resource wealth to support corruption and conflict rather than growth and development" – between US firms and Arabian Gulf countries that have amassed fortunes for the royal families and their allies.[105] In addition, the exploitation has had a more sinister geopolitical side to it in the form of "Carter doctrine" applied in practice when the US forces pushed the Iraqi military out of Kuwait and its occupied oil fields.[106] Prugh et al. compare oil trade to narcotics addiction adding that the oil exporting countries are equally "dependent" leaning "on a continuous stream of oil revenues because they have failed to use past income from exports to diversify their economies".[107]

> James Woolsey, former director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, notes that in the 1990s the "Muslim Middle East," with a population of 290 million, had a smaller non-oil exports than Finland, which has 5 million people."[108]

According to Norton, the core problem with "geopolitical rents" is that they allow governments to ignore calls for political freedoms such as establishment and protection of democracy by keeping national budgets afloat without systems of internal taxation: "Taxation requires the active participation of citizens. It is no accident that political reforms have been pursued most seriously

when straitened resources have forced reductions in subsidies and increased taxes."[109] According to Kazemi and Norton, Middle Eastern "rentier states" have "put civil society in a straightjacket" by using...[110]

> ...power of the state to control resources, dominate the economy, and promote a non-reform oriented and state-dependent bourgeoisie; they have further used systematic repression as the dominant and preferred tool of the state against critics and dissidents; they have also manipulated socio-structural diversity to control various groups' attempts at political participation; and finally, various ideological appeals (from Arab nationalism to socialism to Islamism) have been used to rationalize repression and to sustain authoritarian control.[111]

Commenting on middle classes, Norton notes that it is "anxious to preserve its access to state largesse (rents), it is often palpably unenthusiastic about democracy as well".[112] In conclusion, Prugh et al. write, that oil revenue-dependent nations "tend to be more authoritarian, more corrupt, more conflict-prone, and less developed than countries with diversified economies".[113]

Regarding the UAE, Davidson argues that the rentier economy, or "ruling bargain", has its roots far further in history that the exploration of oil as concessions and licences for local goods, fishing rights, air landings and mining had been part of tribal economy for a long time.[114] Furthermore, the British took measures to intentionally hold back economic and technical progress, in, for example, pearling industry aiming to maintain the status quo and discourage autonomous ambitions with "'locational' rent [...] channelled directly to the local rulers" to encourage loyalty and decrease dependence on internal taxation of merchants "which had previously been their primary source of revenue".[115] Often, the rulers considered rents "personal revenues" leading to vast financial imbalances among the population.[116] While there was, in Dubai for example, some movement towards *majlis* of merchants channelling most of revenue to the people at large, this democratic movement was crushed in late 1930s.[117] Later on in Dubai in 1960s, there was another push for more democratic division of wealth in the form of Arab nationalism, but that too eventually withered away with an establishment of a complex system of monopolistic importing and construction licences given to notable members of the local society and supported by the rentier wealth.[118]

Concerning American influence, Heard-Bey reminds that only one percent of oil was exported to the US during the late 1980s and early 1990s, while eight percent went to Europe and the rest to the Far East.[119] Moreover, there are significant differences between the economies of the seven emirates in the UAE for most of the oil fields are on vast land and sea territories of Abu Dhabi, which accounts for "as much as 93 per cent of the country's total [oil] output and is heavily oil revenue dependent" although other emirates also have some reserves.[120] In addition,

Since the early 1980s, the two main economic aims of the UAE authorities have been to reduce the dependence on hydrocarbons and to boost private sector activity. This strategy has been developed in a bid to balance the country's vulnerability to changes in the world oil prices and to plan for the economy in the event of the depletion of oil resources.[121]

The strategy was put to action in an aggressive manner first in Dubai, which has evolved into the primary trading point of the Gulf, and slowly in other emirates as well with good results: currently the oil income accounts for 25 percent of the GDP,[122] at present around US$17,000.[123] The Emirate's Free Trade Zones – areas where foreigners are able to have 100 percent ownership and no taxes for companies – have turned out to be especially successful tool in luring international investment to the country,[124] considering that outside the free zones each company has to have a majority (at least 51 percent) Emirati owner in adherence to the *kafil* system.[125]

Legal system and the role of religion

"On many occasions I was amazed by his deep faith. He never said, 'I did,' he always said, 'It's Allah's wish' and his concern was to provide a happy and healthy life for his people whom he considered his children."[126]

– Ali Bin Salim Al Ka'abi reminiscing Sheikh Zayed

Different ways of interpreting Islamic law are divided into roughly four different schools of thought: *Hanafi*, *Maliki*, *Shafi'i* and *Hanbali*.[127] In the UAE, law is practiced dominantly based on the *Shafi'i* school of thought.[128] The Emirates have a dual system of civil and Islamic *Sharii'a* law and courts. The latter cover family and criminal matters and the former civil matters.[129] The judicial branch is headed by the president via the right to appoint judges to the Federal Supreme Court.[130] However, Freedom in the World 2007 observes that the judiciary is not independent in the country, noting that court rulings can be affected by political leadership.[131] Indeed, while all courts in the nation should be answerable to the Federal Supreme Court, in reality Dubai and Ra's al-Khaimah have their own supreme courts as well as additional courts for the Shi'a population.[132]

Since the mid-1970s, there has been shift in all the three major world religions into more orthodox direction, "a crisis in modernity", as Aldridge puts it.[133] A unifying characteristic of these orthodoxies has been to embrace modern technology and science (excluding some technologies in the field of reproduction) and use them to serve the people of faith.[134] This turn of events has been evident in the UAE as well, where contemporary ingenuity and technologies have been used to the fullest – a development that has perhaps somewhat confusingly earned the Emirates a reputation as a moderate Islamic state. Another trend among the orthodox Islamic movements, according to Aldridge, has been to target "degenerate regimes installed in power after independence from the

colonial powers".[135] Indeed, as Alavi notes, in Arab states the youth hopes for an Islamic government to free them from authoritarian rule, while democratic elections remain elusive for a fear of rise of Islamic radicalism.[136] However, as noted by both Davidson and Heard-Bey, the UAE was only "indirectly influenced by the British interests in the region".[137] Hence, combined with the relative youth of the nation state, the existence of a corresponding "degenerate regime" is questionnable. In addition, unlike many other countries with leaders of Islamic religion, the rulers of the UAE have not appeared to establish a divine relation to the Prophet Muhammad through genealogy.[138]

At its logical end, Islamist orthodoxy contradicts with democracy, which can make it possible for people outside the *ummat* to gain power.[139] However, according to Ahmed, the life of the Prophet discredits this, for it contributed "the concept of universalistic humanity transcending tribe and clan", providing stability and safety:[140]

> A person was judged by his behaviour not his lineage – 'nurture' not 'nature'. [...] many of the Muslim rulers in the Arab, Indian and Ottoman dynasties were sons of slaves.[141]

Indeed, the UAE (with variation between different emirates) has walked a line between tolerance and piety. The main religion is Islam with the daily prayer times accurate to the minute printed in newspapers.[142] All in all Muslims constitute a 96 percent of the population (Sunni Muslims are a majority, while the Shi'a are a minority of 16 percent) and the remaining four percent consists of mainly Christians and Hindus.[143] Hence, it seems as though there would be no need for, as Aldridge writes, "social engineering" to fix the social fabric and conventional culture disrupted by "other religions".[144] Most immigrants, after all, are "loyal" fellow Muslims from the ME and South-East Asia, with "a sense of belonging since they share a common culture", according to Khalfan Musabih, a cultural adviser at the Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation.[145] However, opinions on the issue differ greatly.

Immigration and identity crisis

> We are building buildings but losing the Emirates.[146]
>
> – Major General Dhahi Khalfan, the Dubai Police Commander in Chief

According to Mastny and Cincotta, most of ME is in early stages of transition "from short lives and large families to the longer lives and small families".[147] At this point of transition, many of the countries are in a situation where the population has been growing for decades, with high birth rates (above four per woman), while infant and child mortality have fallen "resulting in higher

proportions of children surviving overall".[148] Consequently, the region is in the middle of "youth bulge" – a situation where more than 40 percent of all adults are between the ages 15 to 29.[149] However, in the broader ME the situation is more extreme with 65 percent of the population under the age of 25.[150] The central risks associated with large number of young adults are harsh economic conditions and mass unemployment that can lead to civil unrest and, in a worst-case scenario, internal warfare in a form of domestic terrorism, state-sanctioned aggression or ethnic and political rebellion.[151] Thus, nations with youth bulges face serious socio-political challenges within both "regional development and international security".[152] Huntington has argued that in many oil rich countries wealth is used to educate large numbers of youth without employment opportunities to follow: "Young, educated men in this region [...] often face one of three paths: migrate to West, join fundamentalist organizations and political parties, or enlist in guerrilla groups and terrorist networks".[153] Huntington's last two options appear to overlap somewhat, since *fundamentalist* organisations and political parties can be fronts for more ominous groups of terrorists and guerrillas. Therefore, he seems to suggest that the only viable option for the youth of the region is to migrate to West – a rather presumptuous assertion. Regarding the situation in the UAE, Huntington's hypothesis might ring true on immigration, not to West, but inside the ME.

At the turn into the 20th century, the collective population of the Trucial States was around 80,000 inhabitants, 68 years later in 1968 the first census ever counted 180,000 inhabitants.[154] Since, then, the population in the emirates grew from 332,000 in 1972 to a projected 7,557,000 in 2010, a 2,176 percent increase in 38 years.[155] Disturbingly, it is generally agreed that today only around fifth of the population or, around 19 percent are national Emiratis with citizenship, while back in 1968 the nationals still surpassed non-nationals two-to-one.[156] Based on 1982 statistics on ethnic groups, South Asians constitute for 50 percent of the inhabitants, Iranians 23 percent and other expatriates (including East Asians and Westerners) make up the rest.[157]

In this context, it is no wonder, that scores of Emiratis have voiced their concerns on immigration and realised the dangers inherent in a society so reliant on transient immigration population for its services, infrastructure and maintenance, admitting, as Heard-Bey writes, "their numbers cannot be reduced without jeopardising the achievements of the past years".[158] From visual culture point of view, the fears were exemplified in an illustration of an "extinct UAE national in a museum" in Grade 9 National Studies textbook (Appendix I: Figure 1) printed and distributed by the Ministry of Education at the beginning of 2006 academic year.[159] The illustration prompted concerned parents and school administrators to lodge a complaint, according to which the illustration – demonstrating the demographic changes the country is going through – "humiliated"

UAE nationals and created both misunderstandings and fights between foreign and national students. [160] Although the federal authorities have intermittently tried to discourage immigration, "the hedonistic pursuit of growth" has thus far trampled actions to actively decrease expatriate population or to alter citizenship policies. [161] A zenith of sorts was reached in 2008, when the President Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed announced that it the Year of National Identity. [162] With over 180 nationalities residing in the Emirates, [163] the year was marked by actions aimed at supporting nationalistic sentiment and soothing the most acute trepidation, among them a declaration that from then on Arabic would be used as the official language by all federal authorities. [164]

Young Emirati women

In all religious traditions, it seems that sex is everywhere regarded as the forbidden impulse *par excellence*. [165]

– Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle in *The Psychology of religious behaviour, belief and experience*

According to Stoenescu, sexual behaviour is largely considered "a social taboo" in the ME, [166] and the sexuality of young local women – females past their menarche – has become the canvas on which the foundations of social stability are reflected. [167] For example, Alavi notes that during the revolution in Iran, female chastity was considered central to public morale – an attitude underlined by the belief that masculinity, purity and honour of a family relied on "the actions and purity of women". [168] Indeed, Stoenescu argues that women in Muslim societies are considered "either decent or prostitutes", [169] a dichotomy originating perhaps from pre-Islamic Assyrian laws that defined "a woman's chastity as clan or family property", according to Mostyn. [170]

The contemporary Emirati society appears to adhere to similar standards with young Emirati women's worth tied to their chastity. For example, the categorical term "young Emirati woman", used in this research is not without its complications for Burns writes in his account of life in an all-female university in the UAE that " [in the UAE] it's fine to call the students 'girls'" or "ladies" but not "women" as it would correlate to making "a negative assumption" about the particular female's chastity. [171] As a result, even married and pregnant female students were "referred to as girls". [172] While the young unmarried women can take part in "clandestine meetings with boys", as Sharp reports, "it is virtually impossible for a young woman to admit to [them]" because "Even being friends with such a girl can damage a reputation": [173]

Mohammed, 24, does not know how many girlfriends he has had. [...]

His flirtations by phone and other means sometimes end in sex. Even with national girls, it is possible to keep it secret: "Hotels, flats, houses, anything - there's always a way," he says.

But he wants to marry a virgin eventually: "The girls I have sex with are different from the girls I would marry - these girls want to play around," he says.[174]

Indeed, sexual adventurousness can end in a sinister note for the young women. For instance, Burns recalls a conversation of two young Emirati women recounting "a brother-sister confrontation that ended with her brother threatening, 'If you do that again, you'll be dead, and I'll be in jail!'".[175] However, Mostyn acknowledges that most "ordinary devout Muslims will argue that men and women are treated equally in Islam in principle".[176] Yet, according to Puddington et al., women's social, economic and legal rights are not always protected because of "incomplete implementation of the law and traditional biases against women".[177] While the constitution of the UAE provides for equality, it does not specifically mention gender equality.[178] Indeed, by February 2003, the UAE had not committed to the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) "in any form", according to Sakr.[179] Thus, in accordance with *Sharii'a* law a brother inherits, for example, twice the amount that a sister does and one man equals two women in court testimonies.[180] However, as Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle point out, while the religious clergy might be well versed in religious scriptures and traditions but assuming that even "nominal members are familiar with their group's doctrine is risky".[181] In fact, according to Aldridge, Islamic modernisers often pass as a tradition customs relatively newly formulated, while other older traditions such as concubinage, authorised in the *Sharii'a*, are shunned.[182]

Between childhood and marriage

Because a lost chastity can be considered a social "catastrophe", according to Stoenescu,[183] and a fallen women can become unworthy of marriage, as Mohammed above demonstrated,[184] it seems quite contradictory that, according to El Guindi, "a woman's sexuality does not diminish her respectability".[185] Indeed, the Islamic religion "supports [...] combined image in womanhood",[186] as long as it is socially confined within matrimony. During the late19th century, photographs began playing a role in marriage negotiations as tools to inspect potential brides without the need to meet them face to face – a habit that has continued in classes to this day.[187] However, most often the inspection was only one-way, as the young women themselves had no chance to see the men they were to marry.[188] This practice seems to have changed since then, as these days the young Emirati women and men take a much more active role in finding suitable partners.[189] However, after the initial interest has been aroused at school, work or by chance, many still prefer their families to do the querying and decision making for them.[190] Furthermore, many are still sceptical of love marriages that are considered riskier than arranged family marriages.[191]

Marriage is part of a Muslim woman's communal duties and there are certain clear cut constrains to whom a Muslim woman may marry to.[192] One obvious bias against women is the continued, though infrequent, custom of polygyny – a practice of having multiple wives at the same time. It was originally sanctioned in *Surah* 4:3, after Prophet Muhammad received a vision after the Battle of Uhud telling him that a man could marry up to four women.[193] However, the concession came with limitations; firstly, the provision was thought to apply only in emergencies where orphaned children and widowed women needed protection of a man, and secondly, the husband was told to treat all his wives equally.[194] As the latter statement is nearly impossible to uphold in practice, some interpret this as an actual rejection of it.[195] Despite this, women are expected to marry only fellow Muslims, while Muslim men can marry women from among the "People of the Book", Christians or Jewish.[196]

One indirect consequence of increased immigration to the UAE has been widely skewed gender ratio among the inhabitants: in the age group of 15-to-64-year-olds, 73.9 percent are non-nationals and only a quarter or 26.7 percent are women with 2.74 males per each female.[197] For the total population there are 2.19 males for each female.[198] As a result, according to Stoenescu, Dubai has become "an international prostitution hub" with "cosmopolitan" prostitutes from Morocco, Uganda, the UK, Russia and Pakistan – even Finland.[199] While most of female migrant workers from countries such as Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka end up working as domestic workers, nannies and maids, Stoenescu writes that some are "pushed into prostitution my [sic.] abusive employers".[200] While temporary marriages are usually practiced in Shi'a Iran to sanction prostitution,[201] Gulf visitors in Egypt, for example, practice *zawag al-'urfi*, secret marriage contract that end at the summer's on divorce.[202]

In addition, as women from colonialist countries have been often considered, in Stoenescu's words, "desirable and unattainable", women from especially Eastern Europe are in "high demand", both as prostitutes and as wives.[203] According to Davidson, mixed-race marriages between local Emirati men and expatriate women from Morocco, Eastern Europe, Russia, Thailand and China as well as the US and Canada are on the increase while continuing to be a source of discrimination and condemnation.[204] Indeed, a family lineage of an Emirati male can be so important as to render him unsuitable for certain titles if his mother is from another tribe or emirate, let alone a foreigner.[205] For example, Fatima al Marri, Executive Director of the Knowledge and Human Development Authority stated at the conference on UAE National Identity: "A son of an Emirati-father and a non-Emirati mother, for instance, will not be truly loyal to his country".[206] Though, moments later, her view was challenged as "a young Emirati in the audience stood up to pronounce his loyalty and

strong sense of belonging, despite having a 'foreigner' as a mother" resulting Al Marri to retract her comment and apologise for the generalisation.[207] Yet, even the government discourages mixed marriages.[208] For example, in 2002 Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs launched Sheikh Zayed Marriage Fund that helps young Emirati men with dowry payments with an $11,000 sponsorship if they are marrying a fellow Emirati.[209] Mixed marriages are discouraged also indirectly as possibilities for young women to meet other nationalities are limited; dating web sites are blocked and most young Emirati women are enrolled in tightly secured and gender segregated state universities and can access Emirati women only beaches and clubs.[210] Furthermore, if an Emirati female decides to marry a non-Emirati man, she has to "effectively" give up her nationality and her children will not be allowed an Emirati passport or other state benefits and she will most likely be "ostracised from both her family and broader society, even if her fiancé is a fellow Muslim", according to Davidson.[211]

Amartya Sen states that women's' social standing is directly related to socio-economic challenges such as "population pressure":[212]

> Where women are free to determine when and whether they will have children, fertility rates fall. Research also shows that the more education a woman receives, the fewer children she has and the healthier and better educated those children are.[213]

Among the twenty-something female college students studied by Walters et al., six percent had children.[214] Moreover, their own families were "large by Western standards", which the authors connect to the inverse relation between education of the female students' mothers and fertility.[215] Of the female college students studied, 92 percent lived still at home, four percent lived with their husband's family, two percent with their own family and another two percent lived independently, leading Walters et al. to conclude that attending tertiary education has in effect "become a form of birth control" as the students can postpone "the inevitable" marriage delaying graduation for four or more years. [216] Despite this, according to Burns, many of his local female students "will never work" but will be ushered "towards marriage and motherhood".[217] In fact, Shawky and Milaat write, that girls in the ME marry traditionally "close to the age of menarche" as the custom of "early maternal marriage" is widely endorsed "as means to confirm fertility".[218] The total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.1 (children born per woman) is considered a "replacement rate" at which a population will stabilise when the number of births equals the number of deaths.[219] Based on the UNDP report statistics, the TFR in the UAE from 1970 to 1975 was 6.4, whereas from 2000 to 2005 the figure was estimated to have declined to 2.5.[220] Another estimate for 2008 put the TFR at even lower 2.43.[221] Infant mortality rate,[222] a leading indicator of social instability,[223] was estimated for 2008 to

total 13.11 deaths for 1,000 live births in the UAE: 15.32 for males and 10.8 for females.[224] Life expectancy at birth in 2008 was for total population 75.89 years: 73.35 years for males and 78.56 for females.[225] In case of divorce, according to Mostyn, daughters can stay with the mother until they "come of age", while sons can stay with her until their seventh or ninth birthday.[226]

Public sphere and civil society

It is often stated that the women in ME are confined to the private sphere while the men are free to participate to the public sphere.[227] Social segregation is in place to a lesser degree in the contemporary UAE too.[228] For example, Burns, who worked as a professor of journalism in an all-female university in Dubai, writes that he had to knock on the classroom door before breezing in so that the young women would have time to cover their hairs.[229] For the same reason, he acknowledges the possibly "dire" consequences for his female students had they spent any time alone with him in a room.[230] However, as Graham-Brown notes, the "social horizons" of women varied thoroughly from woman to woman.[231] Thus, depending on a woman's age, class, social status (unmarried, married, mother, widow), her family's status, ethnicity, religious and tribal domination, place of origin, education level, employment status or her family's stance on social issues, the woman could be either extremely active in public sphere or equally extremely confined. Indeed, what is also noteworthy is that the social segregation does not necessitate social confinement for there are both material an immaterial public areas – banks, beaches, clubs, schools, universities, hotels, taxis as well as "songs, stories, [and] religious practices"– for women only.[232]

Eickelman and Anderson argue that new ICTs have enabled a new wider Muslim public sphere emerge with objectives increasingly verbalised in "the normative language of Islam" located "at the intersections of religious, political, and social life".[233] This new kind of civil society is vastly different from the traditional public spheres that were mostly controlled by religious scholars.[234] It is also unlike the public spheres of post-colonial nation states bent on homogenising national discourses through state media monopolies.[235] While in the old days, public discourse revolved around the permission to interpret and was highly specialised, in contemporary public sphere, the discussion is more diverse, with broader subject matters, new interpreters and larger, more varied audience.[236] The authors write that the "asymmetries [...] between senders and receivers, and between producers and consumers" have decreased with more people participating in the discussion.[237] Furthermore, the new ICTs have confused the distinction between private and public communication as messages suppressed in one medium can move to other mediums while at the

same time taking on new meanings.[238] Thus, the new ICTs have, according to the writers, "create[d] new standards of public rhetoric", a public sphere with a new kind of civil discourse.[239]

However, public discourse regarding women's rights is often viewed as a cultural continuation of old colonialist practices in the ME. According to Leila Ahmed, the perceived cultural juxtaposition between the Occident and the Orient has trumped Muslim women's emancipatory ambitions for any criticism of the "central formulations of her culture" have been judged through a prism of "cultural loyalty and betrayal".[240] This perception of conflicting cultures has led to a situation where criticism has been countered as Western influence not worthy of attention. For instance, according to Sakr, in Egypt foreign financial support of women's rights movement is considered "a form of neo-imperialism […] that undermines their 'authentic' national culture […] and Arab-Islamic heritage".[241] The suspicion of Western neo-colonialist influence is persistent in many levels of relations as internationally backed non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in the ME are often suspected for promoting Western gender relations and aiming to maintain unequal power relations and dependency.[242] In Islamic context, according to Maukola, the feminist movement can be divided into three "ideals": the first ideal, Islamist-Feminism, states that equality between genders is best materialised within Islamic culture, where men and women complement each other whilst being different from one another.[243] In the second ideal, equivalent to modernist feminist thinking in the West, the bases for equality are sought from within Islamic traditions, but in contrast to Islamic-Feminists, the Islamic laws are interpreted to better suit contemporary conditions.[244] The third ideal seeks to separate the sacred and the profane, or religion and secular institutions and move religion to the private sphere.[245] In addition, there is "state feminism", which, for example, can be credited in Egypt and Tunisia for dragging reproductive issues from the private sphere into the public through structural changes.[246]

In the UAE, the issue of women's rights are entwined with ruling families and political marriages similar to aforementioned state feminism. According to Ahmed, the importance of political marriages was already exemplified in the life of Prophet Muhammad and his marriages, which tied the early community and caliphs together forging tribal coalitions.[247] Stories of the women of the Islamic heritage have been traditionally used as examples of persistence, grace and independence,[248] and, according to Ahmed, women of the Prophet's life – his wives Khadija and Aisha, daughter Fatima – are to this day considered role models as "warriors, consultants, and scholars".[249] The true "Mother of the Nation" and the "First Lady" of the UAE is considered to be Sheikha Fatima Bint Mubarak Al-Qitbi, the wife of former President Sheik Zayed, even though she is not the mother of his eldest son and the current President Sheikh Khalifa.[250] According to

Davidson, most women's associations in the UAE are under the patronage of Sheikha Fatima, and for this reason, avoid tackling controversial topics.[251] Branches of associations can be found from most emirates to Ajman and Umm Al Quwain with teams for health, culture and arts, social affairs and religion.[252] In the beginning, the associations undertook efforts to extend medical care such as maternity checks to women in far-off communities.[253] Later on, they have among other things, hosted the 2002 Arab Women's Media Forum, which, according to Sakr, "was well intentioned" but "dominated by the diplomatic protocol dictated by the presence of several wives and sisters of Arab heads of states".[254] Apart from the situation of Palestinian women, the conference "did not identify rights denied, 'problems' encountered, or women who had been prevented from speaking out".[255]

While Emirati women are known to have played important roles in several political imbroglios of the past,[256] it seems that their most important purpose in the public sphere and civil society is still to act as seals of political unity. Indeed, forging alliances through arranged political marriages between different tribes, subsections and ruling families within the UAE and larger Gulf area has been part of the political scene for decades.[257] For example, the current ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum wed Sheikha Hind Bint Maktoum Bin Juma Al Maktoum, a daughter from the other branch of the ruling family in arranged marriage "to preserve the family's unity" and to bring the branches together, according to Davidson.[258] Furthermore, in a move of regional impact, he took Jordanian Princess, and half-sister of the current King Abdullah of Jordan, Haya Bint Al Hussein as his "junior" wife in 2004.[259]

Even though many a wife and a daughter of ruling elites have become national symbols of progress and model behaviour throughout the ME and in the UAE,[260] in the government women are still underrepresented.[261] Sheikha Lubna al-Qasimi became the first female minister in 2004 when she was appointed Minister of Economy and Planning and, for example, the ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Sultan al-Qasimi has five women in his consultative council.[262] Indeed, Mernissi observes that rapid development in economics and mass communication, along with legal reforms and universal schooling in the ME "have produced a stratum of women whose very existence subverts the patriarchal order and accelerates the process of modernity".[263] However, Walters et al. believe that the extreme changes in the UAE society and its core values may have reinforced nationals' attachment to tradition, limiting opportunities for young women outside the traditional roles of wife and mother.[264] Heard-Bey seems to agree, stating that "the society of the native population" has hardly changed despite the torrent of development stating: "Attitudes, values, behaviour and customs which were formed under quite different circumstances continue to be essential to the family's life".[265] As a consequence, it is no wonder that, for example, remaining dependent on one's

family is socially acceptable and even expected of young women, who by law remain dependents up to the age of 26 or until the time they marry.[266]

Education and career opportunities

According to Graham-Brown, economic changes during the heyday of colonialism between 1830s and 1950s affected women differently from men and depended on social class, geographical location, ethnic and religious background.[267] While the contemporary colonialist photographic evidence tended to emphasise stability or, alternatively, the disappearance of traditional society,[268] literal elites emulated Western styles.[269] Far from a straight line from retrogressive ways to progressive modernity, the Gulf countries were, according to Graham-Brown, "relatively unaffected by these economic currents until the 1940s and 1950s".[270] Furthermore, as each emirate has been allowed to forge their own policies on education, the situation within different emirates has varied greatly. The Emirate of Abu Dhabi, especially, trailed the other emirates on areas of education and healthcare because of the reluctant Sheikh Shakhbut Bin Sultan Al Nahyan.[271] Writes Davidson:

> When Shakhbut was approached for advice in 1954 by Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan Al-Qasimi of Sharjah, who was struggling with the dilemma of whether or not to permit the sons of an exiled man to remain in a Sharjah school, Shakhbut proudly informed him that such matter would never even be an issue in Abu Dhabi because there was not even a single school.[272]

Before Sahrjah introduced Emirate's first school for boys in 1953, teaching had been organised in *Qur'anic* schools attached to mosques.[273] Literacy rate "hovered just above 20 percent", according to Walters et al., by 1970,[274] and the following year the UAE government made education obligatory and free for all.[275] Prior to this, there had been just two girls' schools.[276] Indeed, among the female college students studied by Walters et al., only 23 percent of the students had parents who had a received high school diploma or more.[277] Moreover, "Only 4 percent came from families in which both parents had a college degree" despite coming from "prosperous" families.[278] Women's associations in the UAE organised highly popular adult literacy programs for women during the early 1970s to ensure more knowledgeable development and nurturing for younger generations.[279] The success of these programmes reflected, according to Bhatia, "traditional respect for learning" in the UAE.[280] Similarly, 16 percent of the students in Walters et al. study cited "parental encouragement" as a reason for attending their respective university.[281]

Tertiary education in the UAE is free and for this reason, the nation is the world leader in percentages of women educated beyond high school.[282] Yet, Burns argues that, the national educational system promoted in the past abstract over practical, which "resulted in too few UAE

nationals trained for—and entering—the workforce".[283] It seems as though in the UAE by and large, marriage can spell an end to studies or a career outside home, a trend that Burns compares with the 1950s US, where "women were often expected to go to college but leave with a 'Mrs.' Degree".[284] However, the problem is not so much marriage, as marriage by itself should not limit one's opportunities in life, as Sakr confirms, "because gender inequalities are linked to a dichotomy between public and private spheres, visibility in the public sphere is a prerequisite for achieving change in the private sphere."[285] Burns too writes somewhat hopefully that the college experience would encourage the young women to spur their prospective daughters to follow their example to higher education and maybe further independence.[286] In consequence of these developments, these days the literacy rate is for the entire population 77.9 percent, for males 76.1 percent and for females 81.7 percent.[287] For girls, the expected time spent in school from primary to tertiary education is 12 years, one year more than for boys.[288] Yet, according to Heard-Bey, the level of education offered in government schools "has not kept up with international standards" relying "for decades on importation of textbooks, curricula, designs of school buildings and foreign Arab teachers".[289] This has resulted in considerable difficulties as expatriate teachers are expected to teach the value system of the local society and prepare students to the UAE labour markets.[290] The severity of the perceived national plight was highlighted at the UAE National Identity –conference by Ahmad Al Tayer, Chairman of the National Human Resources Development and Employment Authority, who commented that currently Emirati students were "being taught Islamic studies in English by a Pakistani".[291] Indeed, despite the efforts taken, Davidson still considers most of the universities "second or third tier [...] institutions".[292]

According to "common belief", "economic growth promotes gender equality".[293] On a societal level, women working outside home have been linked to increased political influence, more equal gender relations, lower fertility rates, increased parental contribution to girls' health and education as well as greater in-family respect for women for additional sources of income.[294] Female participation in labour force affects women's political activity on an economic level as additional advantage and respect, on a social level as stronger networks and political collectives and on an individual level as firmer sense of identity and socio-political views.[295] Yet, according to Ross, as most labour markets are affected by "occupational segregation" by gender, women tend to be placed in "low-wage export-oriented industries" with tradable goods such as processed agricultural produce and textiles, identified as "traditional women's work" requiring few skills or physical strength.[296] In an occupationally segregated society, men, on the other hand, are concentrated on sectors of non-tradable goods (construction, retail), which pay better and cannot be

imported.[297] However, Ross argues, that different types of economic growth affect women's position differently.[298] Oil and mineral-based economies often suffer from the so-called "Dutch Disease", an economic situation where manufacturing and agricultural sectors decline while services and construction increase.[299] Ross explains the consequences for women in this situation with the concepts of "female unearned income" (income the female did not earn, accumulated to her household) and "reservation wage" (compensation that the female finds sufficient to join the workforce).[300] The former affects the latter for a husband's high salary increases female's reservation wage.[301] In other words, the more the family household earns without the woman's direct contribution, the more she expects to earn herself to work outside home.[302]

Based on the Dutch Disease model, oil and mineral wealth increase the amount of foreign currency, raise exchange rates and make it cheaper to import than produce tradable goods.[303] At the same time, the new capital boosts demand for non-tradable goods; labour force follows and raises the production costs for tradable goods even further.[304] Hence, manufacturing and agriculture suffer while construction and other non-tradable services boom.[305] Following these changes, men's pay and government subsidies to family households (which in the UAE include, among other things, "free education and medicine, high-paying government jobs, short working hours, expensive pensions and inexpensive housing loans", according to Walters et al.)[306] increase, consequently raising women's unearned income and, as a result, their reservation wages.[307] Thus, women's participation in workforce declines and as increased labour force participation is essential for greater political influence, women's political influence also declines (Appendix I: Figure 2).[308] As a result, Ross argues, that rise in the value of oil and mineral-based economies strengthen patriarchal structures and hinder women's chances to enter work outside their homes, adding a new dimension to the "resource curse".[309] Hence, according to Ross, it is oil, not cultural traditions such as Islamic religion, that has prevented women from reaching equality with men by reducing need for their contribution in the workforce, decreasing their political influence and helping to maintain "atypically strong patriarchal norms, laws, and political institutions" (Appendix I: Figures 3 and 4).[310]

In all, Ross suggests, that the effects of oil economy dampen any increases in income – which should in general strengthen female political participation.[311] The wealthiest nations in the MENA are the ones with "the fewest women in their nonagricultural workforce, have been the most reluctant to grant female suffrage, have the fewest women in their parliaments, and have the lowest scores on the gender rights index".[312] In addition, through labour remittances, the oil economy has indirect but similar consequences on nations that send workers to oil rich countries.[313] Furthermore,

Davidson argues that the rentier mentality has spread from the ruling families downward to the entire society and created a "patrimonial network" of individuals, who are placed on government agencies in line with their family connections.[314] This network has in the extreme cases led to situations where particular lineages or subsections of a tribe dominate certain agencies; conversely, members of other tribes are routinely sidelined from positions of power.[315] However, Davidson does also recognise that in recent years the many development projects have been spearheaded by a new generation of well educated "technocrats" from disadvantaged families and lineages.[316] Yet, the case for women is somewhat different as the segregation of sexes means that women are needed and employed, for example, as airport and police staff to handle female travellers and prisoners.[317]

Typically however, write Walters et al., Emirati women seeking employment have "tended to gravitate to the government sector" for a more "hospitable" environment.[318] Despite this, women are still vastly underrepresented in the government and media, "largely unable to find meaningful employment outside home".[319] "Unequal partners in a society in transition",[320] the women live among constantly shifting contradictions as on the other hand, the society actively invests in women's education and employment opportunities while at the same time discouraging attitudes that are considered too independent, modern or far from traditional family centred values.[321] Despite these difficulties, the overall situation appears to be improving for women as more possibilities have opened up in recent years as a result of the process called 'emiratisation' to replace expatriate workers with as many native Emiratis as possible.[322] However, according to Davidson, the policy is often nothing more than "disguised employment" as, especially government employees, are often accused of delegating their responsibilities to the nearest expatriate assistant.[323] Furthermore, the process has been complicated by the effects of the Dutch Disease, which have elevated the female unearned income through the wealth of their extended families and consequently elevated the expectations of both male and female Emiratis. Writes Heard-Bey:

> In this country, inundated by foreign labour, thousands of nationals are unemployed. Often national employees have high expectations. While the governmental sector may indulge their special demands, in the private sector they are expected to work on a par with expatriates.[324]

Moreover, as Walters et al., observe, "Most students expect jobs that give them management roles".[325] However, one possibility for new graduates is the high-tech sector as the government hopes to replace expatriates with tech-savvy locals.[326] Indeed, the past few years have seen many firsts in the UAE: the first female pilot,[327] the first female racing club,[328] the first female investment fund,[329] and the aforementioned first female Emirati photographer.[330] Thus, these days one can hardly complain of a lack of competent, ambitious, resourceful female models. Indeed, in Graham-

Brown's view, it was because of feminist movements throughout the ME that "women began to act consciously to project new images" even letting themselves be photographed in public.[331] As the First Lady of Qatar, Sheikha Mozah put it: "I'm not there for the sake of a photo opportunity".[332]

Style in modesty

Wearing a scarf, a veil or another type of covering to hide one's upper body with a cloth has been part dressing within the populations of the ME for millennia.[333] The trend, becoming a sign of social status, started with Assyrian nobility and spread from there on to the women of lower classes who until then had appeared head uncovered in public. Writes Alavi:

> If a woman covered herself completely and stayed at home, it was a sign of her high status, because her family could then afford to support her.[334]

However, the association with upward mobility extended far beyond the ME areas, for some Roman sculptures of Palmyra, for example, depict veiled women.[335] Similarly, women covered themselves in Syria and Greece well before the introduction to Islamic religion.[336] According to Mostyn, veiling was in the Prophet Muhammad's time reserved solely for his wives with the *Qur'an* simply advising women from drawing attention to their bosoms, legs and "hidden charms".[337] Particularly *suwar* 24:30 and 24:31 have been interpreted to promote modesty at their core:[338]

> Tell the believing women to lower their gaze and be modest, and to display of their adornment only that which is apparent, and to draw their veils over their bosoms.[339] (The *Surat* of Light)

However, Aldridge, for example, states that the "Traditional Muslim dress [...] is a modern invention", sanctioned solely to avoid the possible disruption that women's uncovered bodies could cause.[340] Interestingly though, the same way that modesty has been expected from both sexes, so too has veiling or covering been applied to both sexes in variation throughout history; as Macdonald notes, among the Muslim Berber Tuareg men "the practice continues even now".[341] Indeed, it seems that attitudes on veiling (itself an inadequate term used to convey a wide variety of different dress types from, as Aldridge puts it, "state-regulated voluminous garments, through colourful peasant attire to fashionable designer scarves worn by affluent women")[342] tell more about the person speaking, than the practice itself. In the West, the practice has become the symbol of otherness.[343] According to Macdonald, "Western cultural context that privileges 'ocular-centric or vision-based' epistemology" has been obsessed with veiling and unveiling since colonialism, ignoring the differences between times, locations and individuals.[344] Calling the issues of veiling "A colonial obsession", Macdonald quotes Fanon, who acknowledges that "the veiled woman 'frustrates the

colonizer. There is no reciprocity. She does not yield herself...'".[345] As Alloula writes:

> These veiled women are not only an embarrassing enigma to the photographer but an outright attack on him. It must be believed that the feminine gaze that filters through the veil is a gaze of a particular kind: concentrated by the tiny orifice made for the eye, this womanly gaze is a little *like the eye of the camera, like the photographic lens that takes aim at everything*.[346]

As the veiling has become almost synonymous with oppression and patriarchy in the West,[347] the underlying assumption in the debate has often been that all Muslim women want to be liberated from their veils to reap the benefits of openly sexualised Western women.[348] However, this belief seems to be far from the truth, as many Muslim women seem to feel that a covering protects them from feeling like sexualised objects, freeing them in Aldridge's words, "from the voyeuristic gaze of male *flâneurs*".[349] At the same time, in absence of outside appearances, a covering moves the emphasis to inner qualities such as skills and inner strength.[350] Najla Al Awadhi, a member of the FNC, considers the assumption that all Muslim women would, if allowed, want to wear Western clothing "arrogant".[351] Bouthaina Shaaban, Syrian minister of expatriates agrees; to illustrate, she once exemplified it by covering mid-lecture and continued as usual: "I don't feel that Western women are more liberated than Muslim women [...] I was trying to make the point that the hijab doesn't make a difference. My mind is still the same."[352]

In Iran, when ideological Islam became stronger Western style clothes were considered a sign of corrupt imperialist effects.[353] In both Iran and Turkey, the government sanctioned veiling with Kibbey going as far as to argue that in Iranian society veiling was a practice of "state terrorism" against women with a background in Shah's more liberal policies.[354] In consequence, however, veiling could have positive effects as well, for example, for Iranian women from conservative families, covering freed them to move outside their homes and explore opportunities such as a higher education.[355] For the current generation of young women, though, the situation seems to have changed:

> ...while young women elsewhere in the Islamic world have taken up wearing *hijab* as a sign of independence, in Iran the enforced dress-code has resulted in young women bending the rules of appropriate as far as possible.[356]

Thus it seems that, for many young Muslim women, the decision whether to veil or not is a difficult question of self, a conundrum which can result in a *hijab* becoming either the cornerstone of identity or only a mere prop.[357] Indeed, as Ahmed's opinion, Muslim women from the Gulf are "caught up in a global charade in which public appearance is locked with tradition".[358] Were they to uncover themselves and expose their Westernised selves, they could face gossiping, and in the worst

case, ostracism from their humiliated families.[359]

Thus, as Ahmed writes, it indeed seems as though the women are both the "embodiment" and the "primary victims" of values, at least considered, very old.[360] For example, in the 1880s a significant population of *ajami* Arabian-Persian traders, living on the Persian side in the villages of Lingah and Qishm chose to relocate to Ra's al-Khaimah and Sharjah after new Persian laws blocked the "merchants from registering new boats unless their wives agreed to stop covering their faces".[361] However, according to Davidson, the dress code for Emiratis (*abayat* for women, *dishdashat* for men) has been "far more varied and individualistic" in the past and tightened only in recent years as the traditional clothing has come to "serve as a national uniform of privilege for citizens of rentier states" in the UAE, as well as around the Gulf.[362] Indeed, as Graham-Brown notes, a certain dress type might have had a strong symbolic values as a sign of ethnicity, class and region throughout the ME with even single villages having their own distinct styles.[363] Davidson's argument appears to be supported by the photographs of Shukla as most Emirati women featured in them, photographed in public places, have covered their faces with traditional masks (*burqa*, but wear a loose dark covering that leaves the front open exposing the flowery, billowy dresses underneath.[364] Furthermore, in Shukla's photographs, many women's head coverings are transparent, revealing features underneath.[365] Despite Davidson's assertions about national uniform, it seems that many locals think that appearance is not all, as the Foreign Minister, Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan told the people gathered at the National Identity conference:

> What makes us Emiratis is more than our beards or our dishdashas.[366]

According to Macdonald, the stereotypical view of a veiled woman has been almost synonymous with passiveness, "intrinsically incompatible with women's agency".[367] However, as part of the backlash against islamophobia evident after the September 11, 2001 attacks, many Muslim women, especially ones living in diasporas, have sought and been sought to voice out their opinion.[368] In these discussions, the veil has been framed alternatively as a fashion accessory, symbol of resistance, evidence of female agency or freedom of choice.[369] Emirati Najla Al Awadhi seems to fit in the last category, for her covering should be "a basic freedom" not a mere choice.[370] However, she also acknowledges that:

> The emphasis on human substance is being compromised because of the zealous overemphasis on the surface or on the apparel a Muslim woman chooses to wear.[371]

In Al Awadhi's opinion, many a Muslim naïvely presume that modesty can be achieved simply by covering, when in fact "modesty is an attitude, it's a behaviour, it's a way of life, it is not easily

attainable; it is a life-long effort to maintain, it's far deeper than the clothing we choose to wear".[372] Thus, for Al Awadhi, choosing to veil is as much about devotion as it is about living life one one's own terms, free of objectification.[373]

Media landscape

The traditional communication forum in the UAE was *majlis*, defined by Walters et al. as "a sort of gender-segregated salon", where community and family members gathered to discuss local matters.[374] Another type of forum for discussion evolved when, the printing press was established under the indirect control of the French government in Egypt in the late 18th century.[375] According to Rugh, the first periodical publication called *Jurnal al-Iraq* written by and for Arabs both in Turkish and in Arabic was published in Baghdad in 1816.[376] In the early 1960s, newly established nation states of the ME aimed to foster indigenous news outlets and gain independence from Western media producers, for example, through multiple attempts at regional cooperation of news agencies.[377] The first word processing programs using digitised Arabic were developed in mid-1980s, making it possible to harness global readership for newspapers such as *al-Sharq al-Awsat* and *al-Hayat*.[378] However, despite these advances, by 1998, only five Arab states (Lebanon, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE) had reached the UNESCO minimum standards for daily newspaper circulation (hundred copies per thousand people).[379] Furthermore, Rugh remarks that all the mentioned states have small populations, wealth and a "fairly large numbers of literate, newspaper reading expatriate Arabs living and working there", possibly hinting that the nations would not have achieved the level on their own.[380]

In the UAE, news dailies are published in five different languages: Arabic, English, Malayalam, Persian and Urdu.[381] The English language newspaper *Gulf News* has the highest average circulation rate of 91,985 during weekdays and 94,247 during Fridays, is also the most widely read among non-Arabs (over 50 percent).[382] The *Khaleej Times* comes on the second place with an average circulation of 69,326 and a non-Arab readership of 29 percent.[383] In Arabic, the leading paper was *Al Khaleej* (54 percent readership), followed by *Al Ittihad* (29 percent), *Al Bayan* (23 percent) and *Emarat Alyoum* (11 percent).[384] However, Smalley notes that although some publications in the ME have committed to auditing their circulation numbers in the past few years, the market is far from "mature" with a small portion of magazines audited.[385] As a result, the media landscape of the ME has exaggerated circulation figures, which in turn have caused the advertising industry to demand accountability.[386] With the largest and most diverse publication front,[387] the

UAE media companies have been in the forefront of newly audited publications.[388]

Arab media outlets have been often criticised of government involvement (somewhat hypocritically, usually by actors in countries with their own national broadcast services and official news agencies).[389] However, one must take into account the shifting lines between local, national, transnational, international and global mediums in the ME. For example, Arab nationalism gained ground in Dubai as a result of well educated Arab expatriate population from Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Egypt smuggling in communist newspapers from elsewhere.[390] In the UAE, the official government news agency Emirates News Agency (WAM) was founded in 1976 and it is located in the capital Abu Dhabi.[391] Regarding newspapers, *Al Bayan*, *Emarat Alyoum* and *Emirates Today* are owned by Dubai government through Awraq Publishing,[392] while *Al Ittihad* is owned by the Abu Dhabi government.[393] Also, the Abu Dhabi Media Company launched a new English language newspaper *The National* in 2008 with expatriate journalist scouted from *The Wall Street Journal* and *The New York Times*, among others.[394]

Broadcast media

According to Rugh,

> By the middle of the 1970s, every Arab country, including even the poorest ones, had built its own television system, [...] all Arab countries were active in radio broadcasting for both internal and external audiences, and in many places the programming was extremely varied and rich.[395]

Ulaby writes that the first radio stations were private networks launched either by Western oil companies or individual rulers such as one set up by Saudi Arabia's King Abdul Aziz in 1932.[396] The first female radio broadcaster in the UAE hailed from Sharjah and worked in the radio station established in 1967.[397] In 1972, Abu Dhabi had three Emirati women employed by the local radio station working in news, children's programs and occasional plays.[398] Since then, the airwaves have been "dominated" by government owned entities with established private media companies that have entered to market only recently.[399] The increase of private radio stations has been most remarkable in the UAE: out of international and pan-Arab radio stations listed in the Media Guide 2007, three out of five are broadcast from the UAE.[400] However, Smalley writes that the international radio waves "are dominated" by *BBC Arabic Service* (broadcast from the UK and Egypt) and *Radio Monte Carlo* (broadcast from France) with *Radio Sawa*[401] – the former *Voice of America* – rebranded by the US government in March 2002 to target the huge youth market.[402] On national level, there are in all twenty-two radio stations in Arabic, English, Hindi, Malayalam,

Tagalog, Urdu and Tamil, enough for a title of "the most developed commercial radio market in the region", marks Smalley.[403]

While TV channels can be divided into pan-Arab and national categories, as in the *Media Guide 2007*, they usually "technically fall into both categories":[404]

> In reality, many state-owned channels are aimed at pan-Arab audiences with broadcasting by satellite enabling them to be received across the region and, in many cases, around the world.[405]

Because ME is linguistically a relatively homogenous region, there is fierce competition in the regional satellite channels targeting family markets. According to Ulaby, the satellite television revolution stemming from Jordan and Dubai's Media Cities and Egypt's Media Production City "signalled the end of the monopoly of state-run television" with Western brands such as *Music Television* entering the market.[406] Most of the most prominent "free-to-air" channels concentrate on a variety of music programming with different combinations of Western, Gulf and Arabic pop music.[407] Visually, according to Ulaby, the music video streams "depict traditional dances, festivals, or pastimes such as falconing [...] often set in countryside or rustic village settings" with actors dressed traditionally.[408] Most importantly in regards to this research, "if women are at all depicted, strict gender segregation is observed".[409] Despite this, there has been a popular backlash against music videos, which have been accused of corrupting the youth with some pop idols "banned from performing in many Gulf countries".[410] As a result, a new more conservative pop music type *nashiid* of devotional religious songs has gained prominence especially around the Gulf.[411] In these songs, "God, rather than a woman, is often the object of devotion when the topic of love is broached".[412]

Another case of transnational or regional impact is the hugely influential Arabic language news channel *Al Jazeera*, launched in November 1996 with the financial backing of Qatari government, but aimed from the very beginning to provoke discussion throughout the Arabic speaking world.[413] Succeeding in this, the effects from *Al Jazeera* have been felt on all levels from local to global and the channel "now rivals *BBC* in terms of global audience with an estimated 50 million viewers" with brand recognition in the global top five.[414] Previously, Smalley points out, state owned TV channels avoided "controversial" topics and were thus "largely distrusted" with many turning to *BBC* and *CNN* for news coverage.[415] *Al Jazeera* jolted the region with its openness and "audacity" with reporters "banned from various Arab countries".[416] According to Sakr, Qatar is the only country of the GCC that has abolished its Ministry of Information and censorship along with it. Despite this, *Al Jazeera* has been accused of being controlled by its native government and conciliating regional powers.[417]

Nevertheless, the launch and subsequent success of *Al Jazeera* spurred other regional nations to establish their own transnational news channels with Saudi Arabian MBC Group launching *Al Arabiya* in 2003, Saudi Arabian government starting *Al-Ekhbariya*, Iranian government following with *Alalam* and US establishing *Alhurra*.[418] According to Smalley, the managers of Dubai and Abu Dhabi stations were "among the first in the region to recognise that their national television stations had to evolve if they were to retain any sort of viewer base" and moved on to "operate their media outlets like private companies".[419] At present, the broadcast media in the UAE is essentially divided into blocks owned by individual emirates.[420] Work opportunities in broadcasting, however, are still considered unsuitable for young national women in the UAE, as Burns recalls how two of his students told that their "families would kill" them if they considered a career as TV presenter.[421] However, the Deputy CEO of Dubai Media Incorporated and a General Manager of *Dubai One TV* and member of the FNC, Najla Al Awadhi seems to disagree, writing that in 2007 (only a year after Burns' article) "majority" of applications for positions in local television come from Emirati women.[422] Yet, she too admits that when she joined Dubai TV six years earlier, members of her extended family considered a career in television "quite scandalous" and "certainly not appropriate for a young respectable Emirati girl".[423]

Internet and the new ICTs

In 1990, Tim Berners-Lee coded the hypertext software that became the basis of the current World Wide Web.[424] However, the official release of the Internet occurred three years later, in April 1993.[425] Down the road, Berners-Lee's Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) enabled publication of web pages that could be linked to similar pages published elsewhere in the Internet.[426] "A worldwide network linking smaller networks of computers", as Sturken and Cartwright define it, the Internet that begun as a military research in the 1960s had reached millions of computers around the world by the 1990s.[427] Tightly connected with technological innovations, the evolution of the Internet was affected by three central "laws" predicting development in high-tech: Moore's Law[428], Metcalfe's Law[429] and Reed's Law[430] essentially foreseeing that the Internet would become more important and powerful the bigger it grows.[431] Indeed, powerful enough for Manovich to consider Internet "the most material and visible sign of globalization".[432]

According to a utopian view promoted by the US government, the global information network was to eventually provide both knowledge and power to all individuals with access to it by allowing information to be published and spread more freely.[433] This, the argument goes, makes the

medium fundamentally more democratic than centrally controlled broadcast mediums like television and radio, for example.[434] Sturken and Cartwright mention "Net guru" Rheingold as an example of visionaries promoting Internet's communal possibilities founded on the theoretical groundwork laid by McLuhan's idea of global village epitomised in the Internet that "democratizes society and collapses distances and cultural differences, forming communities based on shared interests across geographic, national, and cultural boundaries".[435] During the past decade and a half, however, it has become painfully clear that the Internet has not fulfilled the utopian dream as access to the net is limited in many parts of the developing world, language restrictions hinder cross boundary cultural dialogues and expensive technologies needed are out of boundaries for many peoples. Furthermore, the form of social interaction is intimately connected with the Internet, the technologies that enable it and the applications that take advantage of these technological possibilities. Fundamental technologies that have affected virtual social interaction in the Internet and around it in past years have included electronic mail, email lists, online mail lists (forums), web logs[436] (blogs), wikis, content management systems, syndication tools, handheld devices such as personal digital assistants (PDAs), camera mobile phones and short message service (SMS).[437]

Eickelman and Anderson state that prior to the Internet, audio- and videocassettes were the low-cost media of choice for circulating messages across the MENA "past official and self-appointed guardians".[438] However, the situation has changed considerably in the past years as new ICTs have stretched and redefined politics of public sphere regionally and in the UAE. As the authors assert: "New media undermine the theatre of the state".[439] According to Rugh, however, old-style mass media has still greater impact in the ME than newer ICTs, because of limited access to newer communication devices in the Arab countries.[440] Writes Rugh:

> Web sites, it is true, are somewhat similar in function to the mass media and may at some time in the future develop into true competitors for print media, radio, and television, but that has not happened yet, certainly not in the Arab world.[441]

Regarding most of the Arab States, Rugh appears right in his assertion. According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 2007/2008, the mean for Arab States in 2005 was 88 Internet users per 1000 people.[442] On the whole, 28 million people of the 334 million inhabitants in the MENA region use the Internet, spending six to seven hours online each week.[443] However, Smalley states that there is "a massive digital divide between countries".[444]

According to Gonzalez-Quijano, Lebanese new technology sector "played major roles in what can be called the incubation period of information technologies in the Arab world" between 1995 and 2000.[445] Since then, the regional shift has moved from Beirut to the UAE, which has

invested "more than a billion and a half dollars" to free zones of Dubai, especially.[446] The UAE is currently the "most wired" country in the region, with a rapid change behind its present state:[447] the Emirates had zero Internet users in 1990 per 1000 people, but by 2005, the figure had risen to 308 per 1000 people.[448] In December 2009, when the average Internet usage in the Arab world was 28.8 percent, in the UAE it was 74.1 percent.[449] According to the Internet World Stats, in 2000, 735,000 used the Internet while nine years later, in December 2009, the amount of users had grown to 3,558,000.[450] However, the Internet users of the UAE constitute only 6.1 percent of users in the entire MENA, while the population of the UAE constitutes only 2.37 percent of the entire region.[451] Thus, many countries in the region have actually more individual Internet users than the UAE.[452] Surprisingly though, Gonzalez-Quijano notes that the late development of the Arab information market actually benefited the region as it was able to avoid the dot-com bubble of the early 2000s.[453]

Many major global online brands like Google and Yahoo! offer services in Arabic.[454] The biggest regional business site is AME Info, owned by Emap Communications with 752,438 unique visitors in March 2006, while *Aljazeera.net* is the biggest news site with 15 million unique visitors per month.[455] The biggest Arabic online community is found in *Maktoob.com* with 3.7 million registered users.[456] In the UAE, especially the Dubai government has invested on online services with twenty-five municipal departments online since 2001 and 90 percent of all services online by 2006.[457] Furthermore, the local newspapers and publishing houses have exploited the opportunities offered by the Internet to the fullest. All daily newspapers have extensive homepages with archives, digital versions of the daily paper and many opportunities for the citizen journalists to partake in the process.[458] According to Gonzalez-Quijano, the digitised Arabic desktop publishing software developed in the 1980s helped regional newspapers to evolve into online versions during the early 1990s "beginning with *al-Sharq al-Awsat* in 1995 in image (PDF) format, and direct on-line text in more recent years".[459] Since then the numbers have swelled to hundreds of online publications.[460] Currently, according to Gonzalez-Quijano, the regional media scene is going through "generational change", with "the introduction of new technologies [...] accompanied by a significant turnover of personnel".[461] At the same time, journalistic emphasis has changed from editorial commentary to news reporting: "The current style increasingly approximates international standards for the on-line press, in which news content has become more important".[462]

Social norms and virtual worlds

Montgomery calls the generation that came of age at the beginning of the new millennium "Digital Generation", adding that it has embraced all new forms of technology "from wireless devices and digital products–from video games to cell phones to iPods".[463] Montgomery suggests that these teens (and young adults) can be considered the "*defining users*" of new digital media culture because of the vitally important role the Internet plays in their lives and relations:[464]

> The digital media were challenging many of the conventions and institutions of the past, blurring or obliterating the boundaries between public and private, commercial and noncommercial, school and home, local and global.[465]

As high-tech innovations were implemented and taken on in a very rapid pace during the past decade in the UAE, the first generation to have the possibility and the resources to get acquainted with the Internet and related technologies was born on average a decade earlier between 1985 and 1990 reaching the teen years between 2000 and 2005 and early adulthood between 2005 and 2010. The new ICTs in the UAE are used mostly to maintain casual everyday relations between colleagues, business associates, family members, pen pals and schoolmates. For example, the students researched in the Walters et al. study spent "as much time on the Internet as they did in the combined activities of reading magazines, newspapers and books".[466] The time used browsing the net was twice the amount used for shopping or watching television; it even surpassed time used in physical contact with friends.[467] Because of great connectivity, 80 percent checked their emails at least once a day,[468] and 38 percent admitted doing so during class daily or several times a week, while 33 percent confessed to chatting with their friends during class.[469] On average, the young women used 7.3 hours a week surfing the Internet and an additional 3.0 hours chatting on the Internet.[470]

However, the same technologies are also being used to counter, bypass and undo the restrictions set by societies and governments. Rheingold, who coined the term "smart mobs", asserts that mobs of youths wage wars against "the powers-that-be" using mobile phones, laptop computers, radio scanners and the Internet as tools of activism.[471] Citing an article in *The New York Times* that investigated the lives of teenage hackers, Montgomery concludes, that some of these young dissidents have reached a status of "folk heroes" for their antics.[472] As Alavi notes discussing Iran, one of the lures of the Internet is that young people can pass the strict social rules imposed on them: "In virtual reality, it is easy to meet people, flirt, tell derogatory jokes, agree meetings and keep contact".[473] Through blogs, one can listen in on secret conversations of a closed society.[474] In a report by Sharp, a 22-year-old young Emirati man Saud says he encountered his girlfriend two years

previously while instant messaging (IM), since relationships forged online are hard to establish in real life.[475] Writes Sharp: "Although they talk on the phone, he has seen her only five or six times, by following her from a distance as she shops with her family in a mall. He says she's beautiful."[476] Neither wants their families finding out about the affair for fear of ruining the slightest prospects of getting married to each other.[477]

Saud and his girlfriend's situation reveals the conundrum young face trying to reconcile the norms of public spheres online and off. As Montgomery has noted, many new ICTs blur the boundaries between private and public.[478] IM, for example, is an "ephemeral" communications tool that has some features of face-to-face conversation vanishing "as soon as the exchange takes place" but also having features that make logging, copying, pasting and publishing past conversations possible; "Thus, an intimate conversation between two friends could be broadcast to others, betraying an expected confidentiality".[479] Grinter and Palen found, that especially younger teenagers used IM to "carve out a private world within the public space of the home" trying to gain control of their own space and keep their activity unnoticed from parents who might want to influence the times their offspring spent talking over a phone or meeting with friends.[480] In the study of Walters et al., every student used the Internet to do things their parents would have condemned, while the so-called "risk takers" who spent most time online acknowledging the problematic behaviour and the possibility of getting into trouble for it.[481] The anticipated troubles were not limited to parents or family members as "a slim majority" confessed to copying schoolwork and expropriating PowerPoint presentations.[482]

As the Internet evolved into "read/write" forum,[483] blogs became one of the essential software platforms allowing a user to create an Internet journal.[484] While normal web pages are "page-centric", explains Hourihan, blogs are "post-centric", since a posting is the key unit of blogs.[485] According to Scoble, ease of publishing,[486] discoverability or tags, cross-site conversations, permalinking (linking to a particular post versus the entire site) and syndication (getting the block updates through RSS without need to visit the site) made blogs successful.[487] Certain amount of subjectivity tends to be part of blogs' nature, because of the unofficial character of acquiring, updating and maintaining most of them. Consequently, blogs have been criticised for being self-centred without broader appeal for general public.[488] However, one arena, where bloggers have had globally astounding success, is politics. As Drezner and Farrell argue, blogs can be an informal outlet in countries where media is controlled by the state.[489] In Iran, for example, according to Alavi, the freedoms enabled by anonymity, hold particularly true for young women who have for the first time in contemporary times been gained true freedom of speech.[490] In Egypt

bloggers have organised multiple demonstrations – and been arrested as a consequence.[491] Moreover, during the Iraq invasion of 2003 multiple Iraqi nationals started blogs to voice their frustration and anger and let the outside world know what life in Iraq was really like.[492] Consequently, the Iraqi blogger Riverbend got her blog, chronicling her life in war torn Baghdad before, during and after the Iraq War, turned into a book and a stage play.[493] While research by Perseus found out that "the typical blog is written by a teenage girl who uses it twice a month to update her friends and classmates on happenings in her life".[494] Indeed, according to David Huffaker "several key features that make them [blogs] not only appealing to teens, but also a useful tool for adolescent development" such as possibilities for giving feedback, constructing one's identity, expressing moods and building sustained archives of experiences.[495]

In addition to the Internet and blogs, mobile phones have been another new communications tool to affected both social norms, and indeed, photography. Mobile phones have proven especially important technological step for countries lacking reliable telecommunications networks.[496] In 2008, there were 9.358 million mobile connections in the UAE.[497] Furthermore, female students studied by Walters et al., considered the devices important enough to use them even on the campuses, where mobile phone use was banned with three-fourths owning one and using them on average 5.4 hours a week.[498] Indeed, for Gillmor the fundamental difference to regular old-fashioned telephone is, in part at least, silence: "in a place where being overheard can lead to big trouble, it's much safer—as long as one's messages aren't being intercepted—to simply send a quick SMS".[499] The same attitudes are echoed among the youth in the UAE: according to the Walters et al. study, the students took risks with their mobile phone usage, for example, keeping contact with their "boyfriend they were not supposed to have".[500] As Ahmed Bin Desmal, a 20-year-old "Bluetooth king" explains: "In our country it's very rude to go up and talk to them [girls]".[501] While sending a SMS requires recipient's phone number, Bluetooth technology allows mobile phone users to contact each other within a 10-metre radius.[502] Hence, young women are "being bombarded with the phone numbers of hopeful admirers" in public places.[503] For young people mobile phones may provide the only means for uncontrolled communication. Sharp accounts a story of a young couple that has been in relationship for five years in secret from their families; the 26-year-old Ahmed's conversations with the love of his life were limited to ten minutes a day – the time it took her to drive from work to home. Despite this, he declared that he will marry her.[504] After all "She knows all my secrets, I know her secrets".[505]

Censorship

Censorship has many faces and uses. It can be moral, religious, political, economical or functional – "a form of surveillance" used to block culturally offensive material, to exercise power, maintain the status quo or disrupt it.[506] It can also come in the form of indirect sets of infrastructural, developmental and material restrictions posed by governments and private corporations to hinder possibilities of others.[507] As Jansen remarks, the main point is not whether there is censorship, but what kind of censorship.[508] Writes Sakr:

> …it is important to recognize that censorship is achieved not only through direct suppression of content, but also by more fundamental and less visible means, including regulation of media ownership, regulation of entry to the profession of journalism and regulation of printing and distribution, as well as extra-judicial intimidation of media practitioners and bars on access to information.[509]

Mostyn observes that Islamic literature, from the writings of the *Qur'an* and the *Hadith* onwards, has prioritised the freedom of community over the freedom of the individual: "The sense of community - the concept of *umma* - reinforces patriarchism and family solidarity in Islamic society".[510] However, issues sensitive for censorship are not only limited to the Islamic religion and the Prophet Muhammad, but reach all the way back to the beginning of the Old Testament and "the biblical tradition that started with the Prophet Abraham (the Muslim Ibrahim)".[511] On the other hand, Mostyn also acknowledges that the tradition of *hisba* (a concept that commands to do good and forbid evil) is "the Islamic foundation stone of the freedom to express opinions" including both the duties and the rights of every person to "defend the rights of others and those of the community when these are threatened or violated".[512]

Modifying the Fred S. Siebert and Theodore Peterson's four theories of the press[513], Rugh has divided the media landscapes of Arab states into four categories based on the degree of government involvement and history of formation: the mobilization press, the loyalist press, the diverse print media and the "transitional" system of print media.[514] According to Rugh, the countries (the UAE included) in the second category, "the loyalist press", "have experienced […] linear development along traditional authoritarian lines, although there have been ups and downs in the degree of freedom."[515] Political parties have played little or no role in the formation of the media in these states, and excluding government owned television- and radio broadcasting infrastructure, the ownership of the media is mainly in the hands of private owners.[516] In these states the level of government involvement is high, but the means of control indirect and subtle.[517] Laws concerning the freedom of the press are often more liberal than the common practice, and the press tends to be loyal to the current regime in the ways it presents important issues.[518]

Berenger connects democracy to freedom of expression in the ME by stating that freedom from "governmental intervention or intimidation" is vital for governmental transparency, open elections, independent judiciary, liberal economy and free exchange of ideas.[519] Sakr agrees with Berenger, estimating that the majority of citizens of Arab countries "lack functioning institutional mechanisms for holding their governments to account".[520] This, according to Sakr, is especially true in countries where "legislation empowers heads of state to rule by decree".[521] Assessing trends in transparency and accountability in the MENA region, Sakr focuses on how governments of the region deal freedom of expression in the media.[522] Sakr hypothesizes that the reduction in rents will in the future lead to a decline in welfare and as a result prompt taxation of individuals, which in turn might lead to greater government accountability – representation of the people in exchange for taxation.[523] In the meanwhile, apart from Qatar, which Sakr maintains is free of censorship, the biggest divergence among the rest of the GCC countries is "whether the length of the prison sentence imposed for such offences was measured in months or years".[524]

Regarding the UAE, Freedom in the World 2007 states that the "constitution provides for some freedom of expression" but that "the government severely restricts this right in practice".[525] As an example, the report quotes the Printing and Publishing Law (No. 15 of 1980) that prohibits pornography and forbids the publication of "defamatory" or "negative" material about presidents, friendly countries and religious issues.[526] As a result, the level of discretion for local religious is noticeable in material published in the country. For example, the children's comic book Asterix: Mansions of God has been banned and, somewhat irrationally, Quentin Tarantino's Pulp Fiction was re-edited into chronological order.[527] Moreover, broadcast and print media are not the only areas subject to censorship in the UAE. Similar control is used in academic life, where the Ministry of Education censors curricula and textbooks for public and private schools: The Freedom in the World 2007 Report testifies that one foreign lecturer was sacked after showing and discussing the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.[528]

According the Oxford English Dictionary the word "censor" is a derivative of Latin *censure* to reckon, be of opinion, judge, rate, assess or estimate.[529] Related to a census taker, Jansen writes, a censor's job is to asses and classify "the products of the people's minds: ideas and their surrogates, books".[530] According to Ekholm, the portrait of a censor is complex, but along general lines, censors can be divided into three groups: private citizens, organized groups and librarians or teachers.[531] The last group can be further divided into literal, moral and sociological censors based on what type of material they deem unacceptable.[532] Ekholm's definition mainly concerns Western countries, so it cannot be applied to the ME or the UAE as such. Nonetheless, it can be assumed,

that similar groups of unselfish people, concerned about the common good and the rapid change in contemporary society, are found in the UAE as well. As Mostyn argues: "the Islamic world has become increasingly cynical of the so-called benefits of western 'modernization'".[533] Thus, since the creation of the union and the rise of Emirate identity, preserving a unique cultural tradition against what perceived corrupt foreign influence has become a priority. Yet, it must be noted that the exact extent of concerned individuals' power on censors remains unclear.

Indeed, according to Mostyn, censorship in the ME often relies to the person doing the actual censoring.[534] He tells a story of meeting a young Palestinian man working as a censor in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.[535] With an office full of banned books and he was probably "the best read man in the Kingdom" and would rather not censor any of the books, but felt compelled to do so to justify his job.[536] Hence, Mostyn argues that most censors in the ME pull books, films and music out of the market simply to maintain their positions.[537] Although the UAE seems to have a rather effective network of censors, an article by Haidar claims that, "technically there is no official censorship of the local media".[538] Instead, "informal consultations between editors and the minister of information" are preferred, adds Sakr.[539] While the Ministry of Information has a censorship department, it monitors only imported media content like magazines, newspapers and the Internet.[540]

Methods of censorship in the ME have become more sophisticated since the 1960s with new techniques of control allowing manipulation of distribution channels, newsprint supplies and prices as well as indirect and direct public subsidies.[541] However, the most effective of new techniques has been self-censorship.[542] According to Mostyn, the "Locals in the Gulf are unwilling, on balance, to be newspaper reporters at all",[543] hence, most newsrooms are filled with expatriates who are expected to write knowledgeable editorials in line with local customs and values.[544] Dependent on their jobs and facing possible deportation,[545] most people working in the local media, according to Haidar, "know that they should not publish anything that is contrary to the public morals, offensive to the religious and social norms and/or defamatory of the government" turning to self-censorship instead of challenging the existing customs.[546] The same goes for the few locals who, connected via blood relations and social networks, are unwilling to criticize their government, rulers or the leading families.[547] According to Burns, especially national women are "discouraged" from entering journalism for it could expose them to "unsupervised exposure to men who are not their relatives" in addition to possibly risky work situations and long hours.[548] Mostyn argues, that self-censorship corresponds to "subtle forms of psychological torture" when editors are "inclined to exaggerate" their responsibilities,[549] while Puddington et al. condemn the system of self-censorship and claim

that it results in the publication of government statements often "without criticism or comment".[550]

Lately, according to Eickelman, the increased possibilities to access illicit information by new ICTs has "eroded the ability of authorities to censor and repress, to project an uncontested 'central' message defining political and religious issues for large numbers of people".[551] While the censors can still control the mainstream broadcast and print media with confiscation, destruction and sequestering, "the exclusivity" has been lost, leading to blurring of "official" and "hidden" transcripts.[552] Eickelman credits public education and alternative mediums for changing the "authoritative discourse", stating that efforts to control one medium have fed alternative media sources (such as smuggled audiocassettes, desktop publications and leaflets multiplied with photocopy machines and spread through faxes or emails and SMS messages) and led to "a 'civil society' of dissent".[553] This trend can, writes Eickelman, increase social and political instability in the short run,[554] but also lead to a "trend toward a freer market in religious, political, and social ideas and foster a pluralism often resisted and poorly understood both by states and religious authorities".[555]

Then again, as Jansen writes, "censorship is an enduring feature of all human communities".[556] Governments and businesses have "vested interest in keeping information secret" and privatising it, and turning public resource into private commodity, "cultural capital".[557] With digital technologies, the fight to guard content has become a top priority affecting everyone from the users to the producers.[558] In the UAE, the changes the new ICTs have brought, have mimicked those of the rest of the world. However, in some areas the Emirati culture has defined and dealt with problems in unique ways. The most drastic way has been enforcing of real life rules and regulations on the virtual world, among them censorship. Even though, in an article from the Agence France-Presse from April 000, the UAE Information Minister Shaikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahayan predicted that censorship in the Gulf "would come to an end within five years because of increased Internet usage", making censorship laws futile.[559] Despite this, *Freedom in the World* reports that the government passed a 29-point law on Internet-based crime in February 2006. The law addresses, for example, the forgery of government documents, the use of the Internet for exploitative ends and the abuse of *Sharii'a* law.[560]

While Internet access is widely available in the UAE, there have been reports of sites blocked by the government-owned Internet service provider Etisalat. In addition, despite good averages, access to the Internet varies depending on geographical location inside the country. The *Freedom in the World Country Report* mentions Dubai Media City (DMC) or the "Media Free Zone" as an example of a geographical area where media content produced for foreign audiences

has in contrast seen few restrictions.[561] In addition, some of the sites blocked elsewhere in the UAE can be accessed from, for example, Dubai Internet City (DIC) and other free zones.[562] James Montague quotes in *Time Out Dubai* "a local IT journalist" Matthew Wade, who explains that the free zones do not use Etisalat's ISP and thus enjoy free access to all possible sites.[563] However, as Sakr has noted, such free zones are nevertheless "vulnerable to regulatory changes".[564] In addition, according to Montague, some residential areas built by Emaar construction company use as their Internet service provider Sahm Technologies (subsidiary of Emaar), which allows free access to all users. In conclusion, the supplier of services decides the level of access and "Internet paternalism ends if you choose (and can afford) a certain address" writes Montague.[565] In the *Foreign Policy* a short report, 'Caught in the Net' discusses the blocking of voice-over Internet protocol (VOIP) services in the UAE. The report concludes that while the possibility of making free-of-charge long-distance phone calls from home PCs makes Western telecom operators nervous, the decision to block VOIP altogether hints at measures designed to protect the local telecom monopoly.[566] In spite of this, a spokesperson for the company denied the accusation, but did not offer any other explanation. As a result, it can be concluded, as Sakr notes, that regardless of all the commotion surrounding new information technologies, "the Internet has not altered the balance of power" – in the UAE, at least.[567]

The Andalus syndrome

> This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while.
>
> – George W. Bush[568]

After the World War I, political developments stemming from Europe and the US had a profound impact on the ME and its people; the region was divided to mandated areas after the Ottoman empire collapsed, the Zionist were granted an chance to establish their own nation in Palestine and oil was found in several geographic locations.[569] The agreements behind these developments were the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence of 1915-1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the Balfour Declaration of 1917.[570] According to Männistö, political opposition to colonialist control divided into two throughout the region;[571] on the one hand, there were secular, nationalist movements and on the other, traditional religious groups that used Islamic religion to differing degrees.[572] Since the end of colonisation and the process of decolonisation, prefixes such as "neo-" and "post-" have been attached to remind that the nations and peoples colonised have not returned to the precolonised state of "uncontaminated and pure" culture, as Siikala writes, but something

different – a state of neocolonialist or postcolonialism.[573]

While neocolonialism is often associated with economic and political relations, postcolonialism is evoked in discussions on culture and its products.[574] The Western discourse on postcolonial culture has been especially concerned about the "eternal" problem of subjectivity: in precolonial times, the subject was a Western researcher and the object a native, regarded as uncultured child.[575] In romantic oriental descriptions, native peoples were either described as noble savages, or not noble enough to escape their primitive selves.[576] While the native did try to resist colonial definitions, even the resistance was contextualised from the colonialist perspective.[577] In Polynesia, for example, the aim to record the native's point-of-view slowly evolved into series of mirroring texts, with natives mirroring colonised view of themselves back to the colonisers.[578] Whilst anthropology soon abandoned the aim of native point-of-view as unattainable, nationalism seized it to its own purposes through practices of autoethnography.[579] According to Ahmed, the general response to Western cultural hegemony was either to mimic it uncritically or to reject completely it.[580] The former happened in Fujairah in the 1950s, according to Davidson, for example, where several postage stamps included pictures of "American presidents, astronauts, and other celebrities".[581] As Männistö points out, colonialism for the colonised "meant a violent break" from local interpretation of past as well as hopes for the future.[582] Colonialism not only disrupted the present, but also retold the past.[583]

However, in the postcolonialist context, representations of Muslim women appear to have become more varied. For instance, Männistö's found in his research that the opposing views of the Occident and the Orient were abandoned during Cold War when Islamic religion was seen, if at all, as "a potential ally against atheistic communism".[584] This non-religious strategic view was challenged only after the Islamic revolution of Iran and further altered in post-Cold War 1990s.[585] At the same time though, Männistö argues that the Iranian revolution of 1979 may have been "a catalyst" of sorts for "intellectual" and "normative" renaissance for the Islamic civilisation in the ME because it forced surrounding countries to include movements leaning on Islamic religion in internal politics for fear of more serious confrontation.[586] In Western countries it strengthened the representational myth of Islamic politics as "fanatic, monolithic and violent" – an image, which obscured more varied and conciliating interpretations.[587] Indeed, lately the Western "Islamophobia" has been spurred on by Iraq wars of early 1990s and 2000s as well as the "*Pax Talebana* that existed before 11 September 2001", writes Mostyn.[588] Yet, according to Männistö, the wars of the past two decades have also highlighted a need to "refind" Islamic civilisation, while utilising old contrasting positions between the good and the bad, the orderly and the disorderly of East and West.[589] Add into

this the pseudo-religious rhetoric occasionally used by the Bush administration after the 11 September 2001 attacks,[590] and the result for Muslims has been what Ahmed calls "The Andalus syndrome" – a peculiar sense of loss, injustice and cruelty – never far from "the Muslim mind".[591]

According to Sturken and Cartwright, the changes in the late 20th and early 21st centuries can be summed up in three words: globalization, convergence and synergy.[592] While the concrete wiring of the telecommunication networks around the world has made globalization of media possible on a practical level, the convergence of global media landscape has meant that more companies seek to intensify their businesses through synergy; creating both horizontal and vertical models for business.[593] The authors remark that the progress has been contradictory in parts, including both "tendencies toward globally shared visual cultures" and "the rise of an abundance of local discourses and *hybrid* media cultures that defy categorization according to geography and nationality":[594]

> Visual culture, which generally does not observe differences in language and levels of literacy, is key in this climate of globalization.[595]

The circulation of images around the world can be understood in several different frameworks, one of them being cultural imperialism that the writers define as "an *ideology*, a politics or a way of life is exported into other territories through the export of cultural products."[596] Sturken and Cartwright claim that the growth of multinational corporations and the emergence of a global information system have resulted in homogenization, including "a collapse of borders and distances, and of differences of taste, language, and meaning". All this has happened at the expense of specific cultural and national identities that will give way to identities clung on global brands instead of "an empire".[597]

One such "empire" has been "the Great American Entertainment Machine", as Washington Post columnist Bob Thompson calls it, washing the shores of all nations of the planet.[598] In fact, Rugh states that "Arab audiences know much more about America than Americans know about Arabs".[599] Furthermore, because of the international political force of the US, even American news of national level might have global effects.[600] Indeed, in accordance with the Andalus syndrome, Halliday writes that many people in the ME believe that they have been "singled out by the West".[601] At its extreme, all Western communications are considered "cultural aggression" or "cultural imperialism".[602] Ahmed explains that "the new TV culture has left young teenagers confused about their 'moral center'": "They no longer distinguish right from wrong. They wake up watching TV reality shows from the West and fall asleep watching them".[603] Indeed, Youssef reports that a 27-year-old Thamar Mubarak blames "excess availability" media, especially satellite

channels, for erosion on national identity and values.[604] While dealings with the large expatriate population can be avoided, "the media is inside every home and every pocket and is constantly redefining what it means to be an Emirati".[605]

According to Ahmed, it is a "gut reaction" and a "bazaar response" of Muslims around the world to distrust West and especially the US for it is the American media that appears to "dominate the world" with particularly threatening enmity towards Muslims.[606] For instance, when George W. Bush visited the UAE in January 2008, *Gulf News* published a Letter to George W. Bush on its front page (continued on the opinion pages) blaming Bush of "total ignorance" on issues of ME policy and telling him that his "dreadful record on both [democracy and human rights] gives you no moral right to lecture others".[607] In the extreme, writes Mostyn, even at the core of the censorship issue are the perceived prejudices of the West for "A number of Muslim writers even believe that freedom of speech is permitted in the West on condition that it does not target Israel".[608] Even though, this idea is unsustainable both in its historic and contemporary forms, writes Halliday, many in the West consider the myth of transhistorical hostility to the Orient convenient to sustain.[609] In addition, to an extent, the feeling appears mutual. Consequently, "The restless generation", as Ahmed calls it,[610]

> ...has grown up with the media and feels familiar with American culture. It is ambiguous about what it sees: it cannot live by the American standards it observes, yet paradoxically it wants them. It also feels contempt for much of what it sees on television (particularly sex and violence) and *believes it to be representative of American society*. Frustrated, it finds its only legitimate sense of identity in its own traditional civilization, which is Islam. This generation therefore emphasizes its Islamic identity by rejecting the West.[611]

Thus, the mirror of media distorts the image of two interconnected cultural traditions both ways doing a disservice to both parties. As Ahmed observes, the juxtaposition of East and West, Islamic or Christian values ultimately serves – especially, journalistic – media eager to cover both sides of the story, reducing multiple sides to bilateral shouting game.[612] International media also plays an active role raising local or national issues that are politicised internationally because of public outcry.[613] For example, the publication of a tape showing Sheik Issa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan torturing an Afghan man with the help of police officers lead to an international incident, eventually forcing the UAE government to acknowledge such behaviour.[614]

While Ahmed bemoaned in 1999, that Muslims had yet to discover "how to use media to project ideas and images of their own culture and civilization",[615] the first steps to tackle the media imbalance were actually taken already in late 1970s in the form of multinational news agency pools.[616] Moreover, since then, "the only free television network" in the ME, *Al Jazeera* has in its short existence managed enrage both the US and Israel, according to Mostyn.[617] Indeed, the

antagonism went far enough to get the *Al Jazeera* Kabul offices bombed twice by Americans.[618] However, experts interviewed agree that the "let's just copy the west" attitude is still worryingly prevalent with many companies aiming to shadow visual global brands as closely as possible.[619] For example, regarding modern forms of visual culture such as graphic designing, local ingenuity seems be experiencing difficulties getting off the ground as it was reported in 2006 that a local auctioning website had not only copied the name (*ebay.ae*) and the style of its better known rival in the US but had practically copied the logo with only minor modifications.[620] Moreover, according to Miles, the UAE news channels *Abu Dhabi TV* and *Al Arabiya* "are clear imitations of Al-Jazeera", which itself is an imitation of *CNN*.[621] Nevertheless, there are examples of the opposite too. In the summer 2007, for instance, it was reported that the first comic book starring the first ever "Emirati superhero" Ajaaj had been published by Watani, a non-profit organisation aiming to fight the waves of Western media content and endorse indigenous culture.[622] Even more interestingly, the handsome Ajaaj was actually trailing behind the first female Emirati superhero Iman, created two years previously.[623]

Trouble in the nanny state

In her research Jansen writes that "History is a form of storytelling", or in Napoleon's words "the fable agreed upon".[624] Although, "we cannot know history 'as it really happened'",[625] there are always sporadic facts that can be traced in the history of the area and its culture. According to Ahmed, Muslim history is often interpreted either as Euro- and Arab-centric story of a quick 7th century rise and equally swift 1258 fall after the Mongol invasion, or alternatively as a cyclical development of consecutive waves of nomadic tribesmen invading cities and succumbing to the corrupting nature of urban life as Ibn Khaldun suggested.[626] While neither interpretation is particularly accurate, nor takes contradictory developments or details in consideration, the effects of both views appear to still resonate throughout the MENA region. For instance, Stothoff Badeau argues that the "peak" of Arab civilisation after the first Arab conquests was a result of pluralism and cultural heritage of the subjugated peoples and the possibility of the once marginalised Arab tribes to learn and partake in the process changing into willing students.[627]

Following the "ibn khaldounian" line of thinking, one could state that the marginalised tribesmen of the UAE have reached their cultural height through a process of partial assimilation and learning from the large numbers of expatriate workers employed. Indeed, as Walters et al. note, the 1950 Dubai of "a city of huts lining unpaved streets",[628] has transformed itself with foreign labour into a multicultural cosmopolitan city with world's tallest skyscrapers,[629] 12-lane highways,

artificial islands and indoor ski slopes. Moreover, the surrounding emirates have emulated Dubai's vision with their own landscape – and culture – transforming projects.[630] While the geographic features of each individual emirate might have previously affected the different types of social compositions that evolved, since then internal politics, advent of oil exploration and international capital appear to have levelled the differences.[631] However, occupying a vastly more extensive land area (about 87 percent of the total, AppendixI: Figure 5) than the other emirates,[632] the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and its rulers have had an upper hand over the other emirates throughout the history of the nation. Furthermore, the aforementioned fable agreed upon has tended to glorify the former president Sheikh Zayed, often portrayed as the father of the nation and a true model to which each Emirati should aim at.[633]

One reason why Sheikh Zayed was able to avoid internal enemies and reach a consensus as well as he did may have been because he was able to spread of the oil wealth flowing to the newly established nation with benevolence.[634] Indeed, as Heard-Bey remarks, although the rulers mostly arise from established ruling families, all individuals have to prove themselves suitable for the position, "guided by", in Mostyn's words, "its chief men who derived their authority from noble blood, noble character, wealth, wisdom and experience".[635] A leader of insufficient qualities would be ignored and people would simply move to pay allegiance to someone else.[636] Despite this, Davidson calls the present status quo of power distribution "neo-patrimonial" and equates most consultative councils to mere "arms of a 'monarchical presidency'".[637] Indeed, in the future, the presidency is highly unlikely to move to other emirates from Abu Dhabi as it contributes the most to the national coffins with Dubai on the second place.[638] Moreover, both the federal Council of Ministers (CoM) as well as the Federal National Council are both filled with members of mainly Abu Dhabi and Dubai ruling families or people closely associated with them.[639] In addition, in the Supreme Council of Rulers (SCR) veto power given to Abu Dhabi and Dubai only.[640] According to Davidson, even the first female Minister for Economy and Planning Sheikha Lubna Bint Khalid Al-Qasimi, member of the Sharjah ruling family, essentially part of the same elite network with close ties to neighbouring emirate of Dubai.[641]

According to Davidson, the wealth accumulated from recent developments and the increasing expatriate population has created "mini-rentier" elites even among the general Emirati population that get their income from renting out properties gained through low interest rate government loans or free land given to previous generations.[642] The *kafil* system has guaranteed an Emirati "sleeping partner" comparatively good returns for next to no work.[643] In fact, according to Davidson, around 54 percent of government social security recipients "are believed to be of

working age" as the "extreme nanny state" of the UAE has turned many Emiratis to voluntarily unemployment.[644] Moreover, those who do work are universally considered to have laxer terms, better pay and chronic absenteeism.[645] However, while the oil wealth and foreign investment shows in national averages such as the GPD, the full picture is much more complicated. Many Emiratis do not have access to lucrative construction projects, private beach properties, international education or frequent travelling. Instead, they are dependent on their social standing and network to provide opportunities.[646] Hence, for those born in one of the smaller emirates, to a family void of valuable connections, the pressure to live up to the image of wealth may have become overpowering – and ultimately over-financed.[647] On some level, it seems almost as though many Emiratis fell victim to the stereotype of an oil sheikh lush with money during the boom years. In order to counter the this trend, the government has introduced multiple indirect ways to extract income from the population in the form of parking meters, road tolls and government fees as well as a possibility of value-added tax (VAT) in the future.[648]

Yet, despite these measures, the government still needs to solve problems associated with their continuing dependence of oil revenue in the future as well as the large, and fickle, expatriate workforce.[649] Indeed, most high level calls for good neighbourly behaviour,[650] and comparisons to the US,[651] have really amounted to none because in the end, most expatriate workers can never officially become even immigrants since the UAE does not allow long-term immigration into it.[652] All immigrants are treated as expatriate workers and not naturalized – even after decades, in some cases, generations, of living and working there.[653] Hence, it is no wonder that many expatriates have no loyalty for the country. As Rupert Chesman explained: "Dubai isn't a melting pot of different cultures, it's more of a mosaic, where different nationalities rarely interact with each other".[654] Consequently, one must ask whether declining reliance on expatriate workers would end the cultural growth seen in the previous decade. As Stothoff Badeau notes, what comes next is equally essential, because the result of synthesis can create a fragmented society lacking "distinctive character" united solely by "imperial rule".[655] Remarks *Al Ittihad* newspaper columnist Nasser al Zaheri: "We can build glass towers but we won't remember the death of an Asian labourer who died falling". [656]

The immense disparity between national and immigrant populations highlights underlying issues of citizenship, its definition of membership, rights and privileges.[657] According to Kazemi and Norton, there is an "inherent tension between citizens' rights before the state and their duties and obligations to the state" in the ME because

> ...the current ideas of citizenship are largely new to the Islamic world and are essentially borrowed from the
> West in the past century. Prior to the nineteenth century, the relevant concerns were individuals' and groups'

duties and obligations in the social system as defined and codified in Islamic law. Specific rights of citizens, and the necessity of their protection by the state, were not the dominant concerns.[658]

The authors write that in the ME, "citizenship rights can be conditional and even withdrawn. Of particular relevance there are three major groups—women, ethnic and religious minorities—whose basic citizenship rights are structurally constrained and restricted in practice".[659] While other GCC countries have inched towards formal democracy,[660] similar developments are in Heard-Bey's opinion (voiced in 2004) "less likely in the UAE in the near future" although most probably unavoidable "in the longer term".[661] According to her, the main obstacles are the large expatriate population without civil rights as well as structures of the federation and the constitution.[662] In fact, as the first elections were held in the UAE for half of the forty positions in the FNC in 2006,[663] the balance of power hardly changed. Davidson argues that the democratic momentum was lost with predetermined "electoral colleges" that represented only a fraction of all Emiratis above the age of 18 and were chosen by the rulers to vote on the twenty open positions.[664]

In reality, however, Kazemi and Norton appear to be correct reminding that "rulers are more likely to change as a result of actuarial realities than withdrawal of public confidence".[665] Indeed, the recent financial troubles of Dubai have already appeared to affect the balance of power within the UAE. One clear hint of this shift was seen after Abu Dhabi protected Dubai from its creditors in the beginning of 2010,[666] and the name of the long waited world's tallest skyscraper changed from Burj Dubai to Burj Khalifa in honour of the President.[667] Behind the power struggle of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, though, the nation has been forced to face more seriously questions regarding the economic paradigm shift from oil to free market policies:

> The global financial crisis, tight international credit, falling oil prices, and deflated asset prices caused GDP to drop nearly 4% in 2009. [...] The crisis hit Dubai hardest, as it was heavily exposed to depressed real estate prices.[668]

One practical approach has been to promote economic diversification and emiratisation even further; both processes, which can in the long-term benefit from the national youth bulge.[669] As Mastny and Cincotta remark, several oil-exporting countries have absorbed youth bulges into large armed forces, specially created urban employment and expanding bureaucracies.[670] However, managing the changes towards a society less reliant on foreign labour will require good governance, strong national and regional institutions and ethnic cohesion.[671] Indeed, in the worst-case scenario, current demographic trends and environmental risk factors can result in "resource wars" in the next decades.[672] However, as resource conflicts are more likely fought between economically and environmentally marginalised people and the elites, instead of competing countries in the future,[673]

the social structure of the UAE is likely to stay precarious without massive restructuring of laws concerning citizenship and taxes for there are only so many people one can deport. Hence, it appears imperative that the nation, with a help of its young, talented population, will move towards a more inclusive society by, for example, in the essence of postmodernism, broadening its "'grand' or 'master' narratives"[674] created to strengthen a narrow national narrative and a ruling bargain behind it.[675] As the Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan conceded living "in isolation [...] with the excuse that we are preserving our national identity" would not work.[676]

III Visual culture and photography

The term "Islamic art" is used over and over again to describe art including different styles created by both Muslims and non-Muslims for Muslim and non-Muslim patrons during different periods of time in the last 1400 years covering different geographical areas from Europe to Asia.[677] Hence, researchers Blair and Bloom conclude, that the lowest denominator for Islamic art seems to be that it was created in areas "where Muslims were an important, if not the most important, segment of the society",[678] in other words, in a social context affected by Islamic religion. The art itself evolved from pre-Islamic Byzantine, Central Asian, Roman and Iranian traditions, on top of which the most valued Arabic component was added.[679] Artistic centres changed throughout centuries and dynasties, each period and location having distinctive forms of art not found elsewhere or at other times.[680] Because of the broad characterisation and orientalist roots, the term "Islamic art" has suffered inflation and many scholars prefer to use regional or dynastic categories,[681] while many others, in Muslim countries especially, would rather use categorisations based on nationalities.[682] However, both ways have problems, as Muslim societies have traditionally been multiethnic and multicultural.[683] Furthermore, too strict divisions can cause fragmentation blurring the common features marking the field.[684] Consequently, in contemporary use, the term "Islamic art" is mainly used with religious styles like calligraphy.[685]

Common characteristics of "Islamic" art

The common thread going through art created in Islamic context is decorativeness. There were five decorative themes that took place throughout the Muslim world regardless of time and place: calligraphy, geometry, colour, stylized depictions of flora as well as figural decoration.[686] Bookmaking was the most revered and best paid for form out of all the arts and crafts (such as glass- and woodwork, metal-ware, ceramics, and textiles) practiced in Muslim societies. Calligraphers benefited from immense patronage and formed highly favoured elite.[687] They were venerated for writing the sacred words of God, depicted indirectly through his words describing the revelation,[688] and thus finest examples of bookmaking were often copies of *Qur'an*, frequently including detailed decorations made by a team of bookmaking specialists from calligraphers to illuminators, binders and gold beaters.[689] According to Blair and Bloom, admiration for bookmaking was such that "it was one of the reasons that printing with movable type only began to be adopted in the Islamic lands in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries".[690] However, Heard-Bey states that poor socio-economic conditions and a lack of materials prevented artistic creativity in earlier times: no illustrated manuscripts were produced even though some religious tracts were

copied by hand.[691] Instead, local traditional poetry described a varied array of social situations like battles, important historical occasions, generous sheikhs, and religion.[692]

Grube credits the development of geometric styles to a natural progress from calligraphy,[693] while Blair and Bloom, think it was the result of "the mechanical nature of weaving on a loom" used to make textiles that "encouraged the production of multiples and the use of symmetrical, repeating, and geometric designs".[694] Either way, the geometric style came to signify Islamic art and style (the term "arabesque" used during the Italian Renaissance to describe intricate designs).[695] The abstract, geometric style, originally traced to the Abbasid capitals in Iraq, itself spread rapidly with Islamic religion.[696] The most distinct geometric type used between 10th and 15th centuries, has oblique, slanted cut with abstracted motifs to the point of obscuring the line between foreground and background.[697] Because figural imagery was deemed unnecessary in the Islamic religion, floral designs that used to frame figures became the main artistic themes.[698] The motives behind the motifs were natural forms like leaves, tendrils and stems, in the beginning recognisable, later on more abstracted, stylized and geometrized patterns that could be extended infinitely.[699] One of the main reasons why geometric patterns became so popular was that they could be used practically on all mediums from paper to architecture and ivory to weaving.[700] Yet, the most elaborate motifs were often made to decorate frontispieces of *Qur'ans*, where patterns beginning from a central star shape often radiated into polygons.[701] According to Grube, the abstract never ending emblems suggested a belief to the eternal nature of the creator, while at the same time reminding the maker and the viewer of their own fleeting existence.[702]

The art of Muslim culture often includes use of bright and vibrant colours.[703] This can be seen in, for example, ceramics with diverse techniques of glazing as well as metal- and woodwork in which two or more types of metal or wood (ivory and bone with ebony and teak) were inlaid together.[704] Blair and Bloom state that the "decorative combination of blue and white, so often identified with Chinese porcelains, derived from the Islamic lands where potters invented the technique of painting in cobalt under a transparent glaze".[705] As to what induced the exuberant use of colours, there are two different theories: according to the first one, the vivid colours of arts and crafts were used in contrast with the sandy landscape and its monotonous colours.[706] This, however, could not have been the case since plenty of other societies live in similar surroundings without the same appreciation of intense colours.[707] The second theory attributes the use of vibrant colours to the *Qur'an* and its rich descriptions of Paradise, which Muslims tried to evoke. Blair and Bloom ascertain that "Muslims, particularly mystics, often elaborated the symbolic values of color, but these values were often contradictory and meaningful only in specific geographical or chronological

contexts".[708] Hence, they conclude that the most likely motives behind the vivid colour chemes were practical result of locally available materials.[709]

> Say: 'Shall I tell you of recompense
>
> with God, worse than that? Whomsoever
>
> God has cursed, and with whom He is wroth,
>
> and made some of them apes and swine,
>
> and worshippers of idols—they are worse
>
> situated, and have gone further astray
>
> from the right way.'[710]

Despite widespread misconception, the holy book of Islamic religion, *Qur'an* does not forbid representation of living beings.[711] However, the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, the *Hadith*, do so.[712] For example, one famous anecdote tells that on the Judgement Day, the artist will be asked to bring his creations alive and will be, after failing, be punished for mimicking the creator.[713] As Du Ry writes: "Islam's essentially anaturalistic art was laid down in the teachings of the great Prophet Muhammad, in which he counseled [sic.] against the representation of men and animals".[714] However, according to Grabar, while "Islam asserted with full force that only God is the Creator and only He is to be worshipped, neither one of these basic tenets was associated with the matter of representation of living forms".[715] Blair and Bloom, on the other hand, go so far as to state that "[figural representation] was apparently not a subject of great importance in Arabia during the late sixth and early seventh centuries".[716] While Maukola states, that aniconism seems to have Semitic roots as the Fifth Book of Moses, for example, forbids images, according to Grabar, the aniconism had and has more to do with "a constant interplay between traditionally image-free nomadic worlds and urban, bourgeois morality", not so much with "traditional Semitic attitude".[717] Indeed, as Grabar notes, the most important contribution of "Islamic art" was "its success in finding other ways to express its ideas".[718]

Furthermore, Muslims have historically had no need for religious images in the same way as used in Christian countries, because the *Qur'an* is non-narrative and inconsecutive, there is no similar storytelling tradition to proselytize believers and teach the faith.[719] In addition, since Islamic religion has no priests or intercessors, there is no need for images of saints.[720] On top, Prophet Muhammad is not worshipped in the same manner as Jesus is in Christianity, because he was not considered divine. However, historically figural depictions of even Prophet Muhammad could be found in Persia and India, for example, where virtually all books included images of real and

imaginary humans and animals.[721] However, Blair and Bloom write, these images were "not meant as religious icons but to illustrate historical or literary texts".[722] The Prophet's face was visible "in some cases" but "by the Ottoman times a conservative reaction had set in and artists often covered his face and even his body with a veil".[723] However, as Yousfi explains, for Muslims

> …the truth is that all God's prophets are better and more beautiful than the rest of us humans, and no depiction comes even close. That is why we do not accept representations of images of the prophets even in a positive spirit, not to even mention publishing images that offend prophet's honour.[724]

At the core of the misunderstanding is the fact that the *Qur'an* forbids idolatry and repeatedly condemns both idols and idolaters.[725] For example, it is better to marry a believing slave girl than idolatress,[726] and idolaters are not allowed to occupy a place of worship.[727]   The absence of human figures gradually came to be viewed as a law and aniconism became central to the art of Islamic religion.[728] However, Du Ry states that only "the most orthodox" respected the ban, even while "its influences have constantly affected even the most emancipated artists".[729] For example, one should note that the extent of the ban was mainly limited to the sacred: in architecture mosques and religious schools, or *madaaris*, and in literature the *Qur'an*.[730] As Du Ry notes, mosques were "provided with very little interior adornment", because "the Prophet desired modest living and abhorred all the vanity which had led the unbelievers into idolatry".[731] Images in sacred places were also feared to lead the mind of the worshipper away from God.[732]

Secular buildings such as palaces and bathhouses were frequently decorated with images of people – in palaces members of the court, guards and servants, in bathhouses bathers – engaged in activities Blair and Bloom describe as "inappropriate" for religious situations.[733] Likewise, secular literature from chronicles, scientific treaties and histories to prose and poetry was regularly illustrated with figures of humans and animals; sometimes merely to explain the text, but often added as a decoration.[734] For example, a copy of al-Biruni's *Chronology of Ancient Peoples* from 1307 depicted Adam and Eve completely naked.[735] In Du Ry's *Art of Islam* variations of the art affected by Islamic religion are followed from the Umayyads to the Ottomans and the Safavids, and along the line, one finds examples of figural representations created during all dynasties: the Umayyads were affected by Byzantine influences that included, among other things round stucco sculptures depicting "a female dancer with bare breasts", while the Tulunid ruler Khumarawaih "had numerous wood sculptures of himself and his courtiers set up in his palace".[736] During the Ghaznavid rule palace of Lashkari Bazar was decorated with "reliefs of Assyrian kings" of intimidating character.[737] Likewise, during of the Great Seljuq Empire in Persia architectural ornamentation included, for example, "portraits of princes and courtiers", while ceramics had

scenes from "heroic deeds of the legendary Persian kings".[738] Because portrayals of men and animals can often be found on objects of everyday use, but not in decorations of sacred buildings,[739] one could conclude that the term "Islamic art" should be used in the same manner as "Christian art", namely only when discussing implicitly religious art.

As a result of Western cultural influence, writes Naef, local artistic traditions became to be looked down in the ME for they were not art for art's sake but a domain of craftsmen and hence, "*non-art*".[740] The absence of figurative representations was regarded a symptom of "cultural backwardness" and "a less advantaged stage of development".[741] To mend this unfortunate state of artistic affairs, a "modern Arab art" movement emerged between the 19th and the 20th century around the ME supplanting local artistic traditions (noticeably, excluding calligraphy).[742] The first School of Fine Arts was established in 1908 in Cairo, however, the art establishment developed at a lot slower pace during the next twenty to thirty years.[743]

Two distinct periods can be identified in the modern Arab art movement; the first, a period of adaptation of Western aesthetic values active until 1950, the second, a period of integration between the Western and local traditions from the 1950 onwards to the 1980s at least.[744] The first period was marked by picturesque scenes and landscapes, European techniques and mediums, as well as, conventions of orientalist gaze.[745] The landscapes were very much dominated by romanticised rural scenes and traditionally dressed people, especially women, with contemporary modernist changes taking place at the same time left out.[746] Regarding portrayal of women, Naef writes that the local painters avoided overtly sexualised harem scenes and odalisques most importantly for their utter disconnect from reality as well as, in lesser extent, their "unacceptable" content.[747] Indeed, according to Naef, the only example of a harem scene painted by Syrian Tawfid Tariq was not produced "erotic fantasy" in mind, but to criticise polygamy and decadence that was considered to have resulted in the defeat of Islamic dynasties.[748] Furthermore, much more shockingly nude paintings separate of orientalist traditions had by then become mainstay of Arabic paintings and iconography.[749] However, as the practice of nude painting, in Naef's words, "infringed on the indigenous moral codes" and caused offence, it was followed only as an essential part of European academic painting without much possibility for displaying such works.[750] For example nude painting classes were discontinued at the Cairo School of Fine Arts in the early 1980s after opposition from Islamic fundamentalist groups.[751]

The second phase of modern Arab art from 1950s onwards has been characterised by a quest for authenticity of both form and content encouraged by political changes, such as Arab nationalism of the late 20th century.[752] However, despite a differing ideological background, certain scenes of

women and rustic landscapes continued to dominate in the art as examples of genuine local nature, and later on, of working class "truth and suffering", writes Naef.[753] Soviet style social realism affected the figurative art that evolved into nationalist realism, in which the message became equally central to the aesthetic qualities.[754] According to Naef, the suffering of the people was often embodied in a type woman representing "love, compassion and passivity" in the face of "injustice and despotism", or occupation, as was the case in Palestine.[755] While only a handful of women became artists before the 1950s, in the latter part of the 20th century the amounts of female arts students increased, as the profession was considered too economically uncertain for young men expected to support their future families.[756] However, Naef remarks, that the women often portrayed similar type scenes of "Peasant women, brides and dancers", where the "idealised and harmonious" daily scenes occupied by suffering women representing whole societies.[757] In conclusion, the portrayal of individual women was mostly limited to commissioned "bourgeois paintings of the 1930s and 1940s", during the 20th century.[758]

Colonialist types

According to Graham-Brown, three unequal power relationships "between colonizer and colonized, the creators of Orientalist fantasies and their subjects, male and female" affected photography of Middle Eastern women: development of photographic technique trailed expanding colonialism and the unequal cultural relationships that were the result of it were preceded by women's changing social roles in homeland.[759] As Erdogdu remarks, interest in colonial photography was a result of growing British colonial power that fueled curiosity in cultures and countries dominated, technical developments in the field of photography as well as "scientifically informed studies of race and culture" in the Victorian period.[760] First encounters of the ME and photography were played out in continuum of the colonialist gaze, as a number of European experimenters of early daguerreotype and calotype made their way, equipment in tow to Egypt and Palestine from 1839 onwards.[761] According to Rosenblum, around 40 photographers from US and Europe "are known to have been attracted to the Near East before 1880".[762]

Graham-Brown writes that the Orient was habitually perceived as female "womb of the world"; "fertile", "fruitful" "mother or seductress" ready for sexual experimentation.[763] The volumes of early photographs had an effect on the image of the Near East back in the Mother Land.[764] Indeed, the entire 19th century was flush with orientalist themes from literature and linguistics to visual arts and photography.[765] However, most often the borrowing of themes and

visual trends moved from West to East as the Orient came to fit existing visual conventions, creating what Graham-Brown describes as "pseudo-culture with its own internal logic".[766] Odalisques, bathhouse and harem scenes guarded by dark featured eunuchs dominated especially paintings of French orientalists (such as the French academy's oriental school of painting), who created scandalous sights to be enjoyed "at a safe distance".[767] The essential oriental fantasy played with the thought of a harem full of lustful wives (four!) and concubines (limitless!) waiting for the male of the house to show up and take control.[768] Graham-Brown notes that the veiled and secluded women allowed uninformed European males to imagine a world in stark contrast with the "Christian monogamy with its sexual taboos and emotional problems, which the fantast wished to escape".[769] However, in her research on Algerian postcards, DeRoo dismisses overtly generalised metaphors of "sexual conquest", "penetration and possession", especially evident in Alloula's work *The Colonial Harem* that reduce representations "to a monolithic masculine colonial imperative".[770] On the contrary, DeRoo finds that most – even the sexualised depictions of half-dressed young Algerian women – were actually sent and collected by both French men and women for revealing indigenous women were considered separate from mores of French society.[771] DeRoo concludes that the cards (often addressed to "Mademoiselle") provided female viewers with a culturally acceptable way of "imagine and desire sexuality".[772] Thus, the assertion that representations of Oriental women were created solely for the pleasure of white heterosexual males can be questioned.

Furthermore, the photographers' gender had little to do with the kind of material they produced.[773] In fact, many Western women who came to the MENA region as wives of officials, missionaries or independent travellers, ethnographers, doctors and political advisers repeated or discredited central orientalist views according to their views regarding women's status in their homelands.[774] Women who accepted the norms of their home societies tended to emphasise the "moral superiority of Christian cultures", writes Graham-Brown, even when they had access to women's areas off-limits to their compatriots.[775] Indeed, even independent female travellers with hunger for social and intellectual freedom tended to ignore native women, or, as in the case of Isabelle Eberhardt, see them as "sad and passive victims".[776] Furthermore, in contrast to Euro-American male's fantasies, in female missionary thinking Oriental women's licentious position was considered both a mark of their shameful position, and of Islamic religion's degenerate nature, which both needed improvement (and Christianity).[777]

The market for oriental photographs reacted to the needs of Victorian public and most representations were created using the conventions of picturesque to appear familiar and thus "authentic" for the colonialist public.[778] Orientalist themes seen in paintings were recreated in

photographic medium, "proving" that the scenes created earlier indeed reflected reality.[779] The view evolved from 19th century compositional rules used on costume studies and illustrations, often including rural background scenery as well as technical props to colour typecast handicrafts.[780] Strangely enough, the aesthetic category of picturesque seems to have divided into lower and higher schools, which could be distinguished based on the level of sympathy they aroused through depictions of poverty, weariness and general plight.[781]

The colonised people were seen as the "other" in both time and space: the geographical distance was accentuated by the historical feel of the other.[782] According to Hight and Sampson, there is "overwhelming" evidence of certain "dynamic rhetoric" that was used to accentuate "racial and ethnographic differences between white Europeans and Americans and non-European 'races' and 'places'".[783] Essentialising practices regarding aboriginal peoples were especially rampant among scientific communities of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[784] Empirical scientific disciplines such as physical and biological anthropology as well as ethnography promoted the idea of polygenesis and Christian faith encouraged colonialists to "civilize" the natives.[785] The results, documented with new photographic techniques were exhibited in museums across Europe and America from 1850s to 1950s.[786] Using the picturesque view, the natives were often depicted either surrounded in their natural environments (real or, most often, recreated in a studio) to emphasise the difference between orderly European cityscapes or outdated, disorderly and "decadent" colonised landscapes.[787]

Pinney has further divided the latter category into two distinct paradigms of representing native peoples: firstly, "salvage paradigm" and secondly, "detective" or "identificatory" paradigm.[788] The first paradigm, salvage anthropology, aimed to identify and document peoples and groups (regarded as species) thought to be pure (as opposed to hybrid specimens affected by colonialist culture) and in danger of extinction under the effects of Western modernisation.[789] For example, In Erdogdu's study of 19th century photographs of Ottoman Turk men, elites with Europhile tendencies, western clothing or non-manual labour were generally not featured.[790] Instead, the men were often portrayed in type photographs of small groups of manual labourers in studio environment "mid-action while practicing their trade, or in settings that characterised their ethnicity" exemplifying the perceived backwardness of their culture.[791] Thus, remark Hight and Sampson, the people of aboriginal people were portrayed "in a kind of preserved state for scrutiny and/or delectation by the Western beholder/reader".[792] The second paradigm was most prominent in "type photographs" – such as rousseauean "noble savage" – that aimed for "scientific rigor" in documenting "markers of difference" between societies that from the Western point of view were

perceived to be on a linear line of progress.[793]

In the Algerian postcards studied by DeRoo, men and women were portrayed separately, in ahistorical contexts without names "or recognizable landmarks", men depicted as more active, mid-work while the (young) women were more often posing in "inviting" sexualised positions – the more European complexion the woman had the more erotically she was represented.[794] However, as DeRoo notes, the photographs of women broke "private, cultural and religious" boundaries or home and veil, depicting situations that would not be in reality accessible to potential tourists.[795] Indeed, overall, studio photographs combined the picturesque conventions better than other representations in mainstream media with sharp and thought-out details; in particular, religious paraphernalia such as prayer beads and *Qur'ans* were used as signs of religious irrationality.[796]

Automated gaze

Many researchers of visual culture state that vision has a special, privileged position among senses in Western, especially Euro-American, culture.[797] Indeed, as Jenks remarks:

> ...the weight of evidence certainly seems to convince us that the dramatic confluence of an empirical philosophical tradition, a realist aesthetic, a positivist attitude towards knowledge and a techno-scientistic ideology through modernity have led to a common-sense cultural attitude of literal depiction in relation to vision.[798]

This conclusion is often, but not always, combined with arguments that highlight the English language habit of invoking the act of seeing in many metaphors, such as "in the eye of the beholder".[799] On the other hand, in research of Arab cultures, comparable arguments have been used in emphasising, as Miles does, the oral nature of the culture surrounding the *Qur'an* and the Prophet's sayings as well as the meanings of "root" letters.[800] Thus, on the surface it may appear that in English-speaking cultures vision is the key to cultural significance, while in Arabic speaking cultures the essence can be derived from oral tradition.[801] These statements are of course over-simplifications for importance is bestowed on both text and images in both cultural hemispheres, as Jenks notes "any such totalising assertion of singularity is abusive of the infinite variety of human experience".[802] For example, according to Hamid Naficy, eyes are anything but passive organs in the Islamic religious thinking:

> [eyes are] active, even invasive organs, whose gaze is also construed to be inherently aggressive.[803]

Naficy's stance is best illustrated by the already cited The Sura of Light that tells women to "lower their gaze and be modest", in particular when interacting in public with unrelated males.[804] Indeed,

Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (the exiled Egyptian religious cleric and writer, creator of Islam Online and host of Al Jazeera program *Religion and Life*)[805] thinks that looking at a member of opposite sex is forbidden for "*the eye is the key to the feelings, and the look is a messenger of desire, carrying the message of fornication or adultery*".[806] Moreover, Ayatollah 'Ali Meshkini goes as far as to equate gaze with rape, telling that "Looking is rape by means of the eyes [...] whether actual sexual intercourse takes place or not".[807]

Consequently, the automated gazes of photographic (and film) cameras have experienced resistance and, according to Al-Sauty, there is still widespread suspicion towards photography in Islamic countries.[808] The suspicion concerns both posing for photographs as well as producing them as both are widely interpreted to be against regulations of Islamic religion.[809] The logic behind the argument is based on the prohibition of all "impressions resembling living beings" no matter what medium they are produced by, as worded by Al-Sauty.[810] However, according to Graham-Brown, the aniconistic mentality of Islamic religion was not the reason why photography was viewed with suspicion as both the Shah in Iran and the Sultan in Turkey promoted photography's advancement.[811] Although photography was more readily embraced by Christian minorities in the ME, by the beginning of the 20th century, many wealthy Jews, Christians and Muslims had had photographs taken of them.[812] Indeed, some scholars (Al-Sauty seems to rely especially on Al-Qaradawi), think that these restrictions do not apply to photography as a photographic representation does not create anything implicitly new.[813] In fact, even the Islamic clerics at the al-Azhar university have stated that photography is closer to reproduction than creation.[814] Indeed, for Al-Sauty cameras simply reveal "the unknown side of God's creations".[815] However, Al-Qaradawi states that photographic images are prohibited if they are used as objects of worship.[816] Thus, no images should be placed in sacred places such as mosques.[817] While, according to Al-Sauty, "ordinary photographs of humans" should not prevent anyone from praying in places outside mosques.[818]

Motives of photograph taking matter, as well, Al-Qaradawi's states: "*if someone wants to make a picture of an animate being with no intention of competing with Allah (God) as creator or for its glorification or respect, there is no prohibition of doing so*".[819] Indeed, in Al-Sauty's opinion, photography should be used to better society.[820] For example, photographs depicting forbidden acts such as violence, nudity, tattoos, fashion, women's faces, wigs, statues of worship, pork, improperly dressed and dirty children or drugs and alcohol consumption are prohibited.[821] Al-Sauty especially underlines the need to protect children from photographic depictions of violence as Islamic religion is a religion of peace.[822] Indeed, according to Al-Qaradawi:

...Islam intends to block all avenues leading to what is haram. For example, as Islam has prohibited sex outside marriage, it has also prohibited anything, which leads to it or makes it attractive, such as seductive clothing, private meetings and casual mixing between men and women, the depiction of nudity, pornographic literature, obscene songs, and so on.[823]

Thus, as a general guideline, he advices all photographers to stay close to Islamic scholars in order to avoid breaking religious rules unintentionally.[824]

In Graham-Brown's view, photography has been resisted more vehemently in "cultures where the regulation of women's visibility was an important aspect of patriarchal control, [because] photography might suggest not only an assertion of the photographer's power over the subject, but a loss of male control over women".[825] Thus, it seems as though the receptiveness to photography was more affected by gazing rules surrounding women than anything inbuilt in the technology.[826] However, as Graham-Brown notes, "this aspect of patriarchal control often conflicted with the wishes of the photographer, and sometimes, [...] the wishes of women themselves".[827] Indeed, some lower class women did work in photography studios as models, while the men of the house likely objected upper class women's modelling.[828] Even though some female models were dressed in clothing of other (upper) classes in type photographs, their poses and demeanour often revealed their real actual social status.[829] Yet, it has to be noted that the assumption on female models' class is most likely based on circular logic, according to which a female model must be of a lower social standing (a dancer or a prostitute, for example) merely for the act of modelling.[830] The notion that respectable, publicly invisible women would have posed for photographers was unthinkable, and hence women who exposed themselves and become visible, must have been "disreputable". However, in many old colonialist photographs, women's gestures suggest that they would have wished to remain unphotographed, but (for having been paid to model, for example) had no choice but the pose.[831] According to Graham-Brown, in such occasions, many tried to cover their faces or gesture in some other "defiant" way.[832]

Of course, the limits of respectability varied throughout social classes, countries and ethnic backgrounds.[833] For instance, women who were photographed by their family members were often depicted in an outfit, pose and environment suitable for their class.[834] By the end of 19th century, it had become ordinary for women to appear in photographs, and some, while still covering in public, even pursued available opportunities for being photographed.[835] For example, the women could insist that they must hold the child in their laps during the process.[836] Naturally, though, these photographs were still meant only for the eyes of the closest family.[837] In fact, photographs were early on restricted to the private sphere of family:[838] a man could photograph the uncovered women

of his family and the results could be viewed by the family, but should not be published.[839]

In Al-Sauty's opinion, this should be the case even today for even a publically revealed face or hands of a woman should not be photographed.[840] Furthermore, photographs of non-related males and females together should be avoided for group photographs depicting could become problematic should women's family members confused visual overlapping for touching.[841] Surprisingly though, Al-Sauty argues that publishing still images of women is less permissible than moving images as they "flick away quickly".[842] In addition, in his opinion, a photograph of covered woman can be taken and published and the restrictions be bypassed if the photographs are taken for "good" and "strong" reasons, such as governmental, medical, scientific or educational purposes, but should not be used for commercial purposes.[843] Instead, Al-Sauty encourages the use of images of prepubescent girls in advertising and packages of commercial products such as makeup and shampoos.[844] However, in his opinion, the best idea would be to avoid using female models all together and try to promote products with other means.[845] Alternatively, if this is impossible, then take extreme close-ups that do not show the woman's eyes and hence break the gazing norms.[846]

Emirati representations

> The Assyrians are credited with the introduction of picture journalism. They used to serialize their victories. Each serial number indicated color pictures of kings and citizens taken captive. These tablets were put on show in the palaces, public halls and main streets.[847]

As both Gawad and Shapiro demonstrate, hierarchies of power can be both supported or criticised through photographic means.[848] In the contemporary UAE, it appears as though the former rings true for critical documentary photography seems to be vastly outnumbered by visual culture supporting the present status quo. While historically, the Arabs "regarded elaborate ceremonies and official symbols as vain and pompous nonsense", according to Grabar,[849] this attitude seems to have faded with the centuries for pictures of political leaders are an essential part of the political order in the contemporary Muslim societies.[850] Indeed, in the UAE, current and past leaders are depicted in posters, paintings and photographs all over the emirates in hotel lobbies, offices, billboards and car windows. The representations of rulers seem to reflect national – and to an extent regional – political state of affairs. In fact, according to Davidson, the political leaning of each institution can be measured in the numbers of portraits of leaders on the wall.[851] The popularity of portrait photographs followed European commercial trends becoming prevalent only among the wealthy before the end of the 19th century and gaining common ground during the 1940s and 1950s.[852] The photographs from the early 20th century indicate, in Graham-Brown's opinion, a need to portray

pictures of "family cohesion, prestige and success" in styles that imitated European lifestyles.[853] Certainly, as the internal stability of the UAE relies on ruling bargain,[854] which from a cultural and historical standpoint relies in itself on perception of good governance, the emphasis in representations of rulers has changed from "great warriors and charismatic leaders" to "savvy politicians, shrewd businessmen, and patrons of the arts" in recent times, as Davidson notes.[855]

While the cult of personality hardly surpasses the sanctioned devotion aimed at the memory of Ayatollah Khamenei on the other side of the Gulf, nevertheless, especially Sheikh Zayed is often portrayed in similar way as a fatherly, humble and modest figure.[856] Davidson describes this cult of personality as "state-sponsored hero-worshipping" of another scale in comparison to the former ruler of Dubai, Rashid Bin Saeed Al Maktoum, who was "rightly regarded as the 'Father of Dubai'" with large unofficial posters of him hung around the emirate.[857] Most recently, the impact of local politics on national billboards was particularly evident after the death of the former ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Maktoum Bin Rashid Al Maktoum in January 2006. Inside a year, one could notice that portraits of Sheikh Hamdan Bin Mohammed Bin Rashid, son of the current ruler Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, began to appear on posters around the emirate "and on a dedicated website that is advertised outside major shopping malls", as Davidson notices.[858] Months later, on February 1, 2008, he was named the official crown prince of Dubai, and his brother Sheikh Maktoum Bin Mohammed Al Maktoum joint Deputy Ruler of Dubai.[859]

According to Graham-Brown, photographs of female entertainers changed the portrayal of women in the ME from 1920s to 1940s generating "new stereotypes and ideals for women's appearance, and new images of women's sexuality" mixing both Eastern and Western influences while exhibiting latest fashions.[860] This, however, seems not to have been the case, at least for upper class Emirati women, who may be a presence in the public sphere, but are rarely portrayed in pictures. In fact, Al-Sauty argues that women should avoid all situations where their photograph could end up on public display in a newspaper, exhibition or photographic competition.[861] According to Al-Sauty, "a devout Muslim family [...] will not allow his wife, sister and daughter (unless she is under the age, before menarche) to have her face photographed and be published or watched on TV".[862] In his opinion, it is imperative for woman's modesty to act in evasive ways in front of cameras and do her best to avoid being photographed.[863]

The resistance to being photographed appears regional, as for example, in Qatar, photographs of the wife of the current Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani,[864] Sheikha Mozah "were prohibited until very recently" and "the Arab world was astonished", according to Miles, when she was seen in *CBS*'s *Sixty Minutes* with her husband.[865] Miles states that

the reluctance to be photographed stems from Wahhabi beliefs and Ahmed agrees:[866]

> In spite of strong Wahhabi influences in society, the sheikha [Mozah] is pushing the boundaries of women in public life, [...] allowing some photographs to be taken of her. Yet she is still regarded as a model for young women in Islam.[867]

51-year-old Sheikha Mozah is obviously a trend setter of her own generation,[868] as the evasive attitude seems to apply especially to women from higher echelons of the society. Women, who may have vast powers but tend to stay in the background and remain either completely unphotographed or covered by clothing. For example, when the US First Lady Laura Bush visited the UAE, she was photographed surrounded by veiled women in a Pink Majlis (Appendix I: Figure 6).[869] On other occasions, women of the ruling families have been honoured for their work on charitable issues and had their sons attend the award ceremonies and act as substitutes receiving the prizes.[870] Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that, for instance, photographers are banned from photographing Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum's first wife Sheikha Hind Bint Maktoum Bin Juma Al Maktoum.[871]

However, in the UAE too, there are obviously exceptions to the rule, particularly among the younger generations. For example, the daughter of the current ruler of Dubai, Sheikha Maitha Bint Mohammed has represented the nation in international sports events as a member of the national female taekwondo team.[872] In that position, she has also been photographed without a head covering, wearing simple sweat suits.[873] In addition, younger daughters of Sheikh Mohammed have been released to public presumably because of the girls' prepubescent age. Another exception is Sheikh Mohammed's second wife, Princess Haya Bint Al Hussein who appears often in public wearing western clothing. Moreover, the birth of the couple's first child, daughter Al Jalila Bint Mohammed that coincided with the 36th independence day of the UAE, was publicised through Reuters with pictures of the couple leaving hospital carrying the newborn baby.[874]

For regular Emirati females, the social norms regarding photography seem to be laxer but still an issue. For example, Shukla's collection of photographs from 1965 to 1975 feature around twenty photographs that include local women and girls.[875] Only one of the women featured has been caught without head covering, but as the caption notes, the woman tying her *burqa* in front of a mirror, was most probably "*completely unaware of being photographed*" as "*cameras were rare in the emirates*" during the mid 1960s.[876] Otherwise, however, the women's lives represented in the photographs seem varied and active as they are seen socialising under trees, selling, buying and carrying different types of produce and water in the streets, waiting in hospital queues, playing instruments as well as participating in weddings and national celebrations together with men.[877]

Citizen photography

According to a popular proverb, the priorities of commercial media are determined by the amount of blood: if it bleeds, it leads.[878] However, reality does not seem to be as black and white; while stories with deaths seem to be pushed to the top that is often where the story ends visually, at least in the West, as actual pictures of the dead or dying are seldom published.[879] In the UAE, the media's attitude towards representations of the dead and the dying appears to be less rigid. Although infrequent, pictures of the dead can be found in the newspapers and magazines (and their online versions), as in the case of an Asian man, found dead in Al Qouz Industrial area in Dubai (Appendix I: Figure 7).[880] Even though a different set of rules is usually applied to animals, one can also spot graphic depictions of animal cruelty in mainstream media, as was the case with a dog thrown over a wall in Satwa, Dubai (Appendix I: Figure 8).[881]

Since the advent of third generation mobile phones, simple calls and SMSs have made room for email, Internet telephony and other non-verbal communication and entertainment, in particular both still and video cameras. However, the reception of camera phones has not been all positive. Gillmor hints at the demise of professional photojournalists, since "everyone's becoming a photographer".[882] However, Gillmor also notes that "public photos and videos are not new" for poor pictures of newsworthy content have made headlines and been featured in multiple different formats from embarrassing moments to police chases.[883] By present day, citizen photographs taken amid natural (South Asian tsunami of 2004) and political catastrophes (JFK's assassination in 1963, Abu Ghraib prison abuse of 2003 and 2004, London bombings of 2005) have become "canonical images" of the day.[884] Following this global trend, readers' photographs have become bread and butter of everyday journalism also in the UAE. For instance, a report by Readers Editor Anupa Kurian in *Gulf News* details a saga of a mystery photograph depicting a horrific multicar accident that took place on the Dubai – Abu Dhabi highway on March 2008.[885] Originally, the inadequately credited photo arrived at the news desk attached to a chain email followed by several emails showing the same photograph:[886]

> The debate raged but the Editor-in-Chief refused to approve because there was no clear source. Finally, when it looked hopeless, at 5.55pm the international news agency Associated Press (AP) filed the photograph with their credit but without a photographer's name. Gulf News published it on Page 1 with attribution to the wire service.[887]

All the other morning dailies from English dailies *Khaleej Times* and *The Gulf Today* to Arabic dailies *Al Bayan* and *Emarat Alyoum*, *Al Khaleej* and *Al Ittihad* had published the photograph as part of their coverage of the accident crediting the photograph variably to a reader, to themselves or

no one.[888] Apart from *Gulf News*, only *Al Ittihad* "clarified that it was published on several websites".[889] The incident demonstrates both how hectic newsroom wrangling can lead to poorly sourced material, but it also shows how – at least in *Gulf News* – the standards of news reporting are held in high esteem in the UAE. In the end Kurian declares, that "Gulf News would like to seek out that photographer and reward him/her for their presence of mind and a powerful image that would be the envy of any professional in the field",[890] showing that despite using an uncreadited photograph in the end, the Gulf News did its best to get to the bottom of it.

Indigenous photographers

During the Victorian times, many photographers from Europe and America established their own photographic studios throughout the ME: Istanbul, Cairo, Algiers, Beirut.[891] However, the market for oriental photographs was not entirely dominated by men and (occasional) women from colonial homelands, rather local entrepreneurs having learnt the discipline soon established themselves as independent vendors:[892]

> Ottoman photographers capitalized on representational conventions already popularized by English illustrators of Ottoman types during the first half of the nineteenth century.[893]

The profitability of commercial photography aimed at foreign markets was probably the main reason locals set up their own studios.[894] In Iran, Nasir ed-Din Shah launched a school of photography in 1860 and appointed a court photographer.[895] While the medium was first used by governments as a propaganda tool to counter orientalist images flooding the market, it soon began to appeal to local elites whom considered it "the embodiment of modern technology", according to Graham-Brown.[896] By 1900, photographic studios were being established in most provincial towns in Turkey and Egypt, for example.[897] However, in the Arabian Peninsula, indigenous photography did not develop before 1940s and 1950s.[898] While some areas, such as Mecca and Medina had been covered already in late 19th century, Graham-Brown describes the volume of photographs coming from the Gulf region as "minuscule".[899]

Even though Erdogdu writes that, the Armenian Abdullah Frères made use of "the immediacy of their medium" and captured realistic local urban settings,[900] this immediacy did not extend to depictions of interaction with women, who were not present in type photographs of males, perhaps because of social taboos of Ottoman Turkey.[901] Indeed, Graham-Brown notes that in general photographic history of the ME is highly skewed towards males and females of lower classes.[902] Photographic profession remained male dominated in the ME until the 1950s, although

some women worked in postproduction positions such as retouching.[903] After the availability of handheld cameras, women did take candid photographs within their families, but professional female photographers were near to nonexistent apart from few exceptions in Nazareth, Ankara and perhaps Istanbul and Beirut.[904] However, Graham-Brown notes that "scattered references" hint at the possibility that some women might have worked as photographer of women in studios as well as travelled in the homes of women to take their photographs.[905]

This way of working seems to have remained somewhat unchanged for Al-Sauty recommends that females are photographed only by other females (preferably at home) and that female photographers should cater only to female art designers.[906] As portrait photography tends to be focused on eyes, a problematic area for Islamic religion, portraits of female clients should especially be taken by female photographers.[907] If a female photographer is not available, a female chaperone (by the studio if necessary) should be present at all times and do all adjustment needed to the posture of the client – in fact, the male photographer should not even talk to female customers.[908] Going into visual extremes, Al-Sauty recommends using longer focal length when photographing to maintain space between the male photographer and his female client.[909] Because of these difficulties, Al-Sauty encourages female photographers to run their own studios and specialise in female portraits.[910] A studio in one's home, for example, would also spare the female photographer from travel.[911] This, in Al-Sauty's opinion, is a positive thing as finding a suitable, "*Mahrem*", partner for travelling to scenery locations could be complicated.[912] If, however, one would – for one reason or another – break the rules of travelling alone and take landscape photographs, the results would be forbidden by the Islamic religion according to Al-Sauty's interpretation, regardless of their content.[913] Moreover, benefitting from their sale would also be prohibited.[914]

Regarding photography in the UAE, fragments of the photographic history can be found in different coffee table histories that rely mostly on photographs taken by oil explorers in the early to mid 20th century, but there appears no definite history of the field. For example, the earliest photographs featured in Heard-Bey's history of the UAE are dated 1936 and include mostly rulers of different emirates as well as equipment used for the "*first geological reconnaissance of the Trucial States*".[915] On the other hand, an Indian expatriate, Shukla began taking photographs of the UAE during his first visit in 1965. Few years later, after relocating there, he had gained a reputation with his photographic and painted portraits of several rulers, many of them which "adorn government buildings, palaces and private collections" these days.[916] Indeed, his photographs have been used in military uniforms, dirham notes and postage stamps,[917] perhaps the most telling sign of

how few local photographers there has been.

Thus far there seems to be no national female photographer equivalent to, for example, Iranian American Shirin Neshat, who has gained major international publicity for her works dealing with women's position in Iranian Islamic culture.[918] The most notable local exception appears to be "the first professional female photographer" Alia Al Shamsi, who has worked for Emirates Today and Emarat Al Youm since graduating from Griffith University in Australia in 2004 with a Bachelor's degree in photography.[919] Al Shamsi's work has been featured in coffee table books and exhibitions, most notably at the Biennale di Fotografia in Brescia, Italy in 2006.[920] Another mark of budding female photography scene in the UAE was a multimedia report featured in the *BBC News* website in March 2009, featuring photographs and narration by an Emirati female identified as "Fatima" retelling the story of her sexual abuse while similarly showing photographs that she used to express her anxiety and deal with the situation.[921] Fatima's work hinted that photography among the younger female Emiratis is used as a tool for a lot more than just documenting everyday life.

IV Researching photographic self-portraits in Flickr

> At the centre of concern with visual research and analysis is the 'image', which is no more than a picture, however manufactured, of something that has human significance. Generally most images represent a person, object, place or event in the image maker's psychic landscape. Thus, whatever else they may be – ideology, personal statement or even accident – images can always constitute data for one purpose or another.[922]
>
> – John Grady in *Picturing the social landscape: visual methods in the sociological imagination*

For Krippendorf content analysis is "a way of understanding the symbolic qualities of texts".[923] This means, writes Rose, that the elements of content under scrutiny "always refer to a wider cultural context of which they are part".[924] However, Banks notes that understanding visual representations "embedded in social practice" requires knowledge and familiarity with both scientific knowledges of visual analysis as well as "the tacit knowledge that enmeshes visual forms".[925] Thus, in a sense, all the cultural knowledge hidden in each image is just data without reliable connections to the surrounding context. For these reasons, in addition to the research itself, the following section discusses both the theoretical views associated with analysis of photographs as well as the contextual particularities possibly affecting the results of this research.

Untruthfulness of photographic images

According to Kember photography has originally been considered positivist form of expression for the practice relies on Euclidean geometry, "the [inverted] cone of vision" used in cameras and resulting in geometrically "true" focused images.[926] Indeed, according to Victor Burgin, ideology is inherent in all the point-of-view arts such as painting and photography, which "position the subject in such a way that the object photographed serves to conceal the textuality of the photograph itself – substituting passive receptivity for active (critical) reading".[927] However, Kozloff notes that procedural differences between painting and photography are essential for their truth value.[928] While on canvas nothing happens without human interference, decision-making and conscious artistic manipulation having only "hypothetical" connection to the real, photography is at its core "reactive", "tethered" to reality.[929] Shapiro agrees; whereas a viewer is usually aware of the work that goes into paintings and can thus relate to the social formation of them, "clarity and detail" can evoke a sense of "real" in photographs,[930] which gained a "norm of truthfulness of representation" by claiming to be innocent of manipulation and "meaning-creating practices":[931]

> Of all modes of representation, it [photography] is the one most easily assimilated into the discourses of knowledge and truth, for it is thought to be an unmediated simulacrum, a copy of what we consider the "real."[932]

For Derrick and Wells, the indexical nature of the photographs is "the source of the authority of the image", the world as it was at the time of "the original exposure".[933] No matter how unlikely the scenarios captured, one knows that they really took place, resulting in "an aura of authenticity".[934] Indeed, Winston argues that some essential truthfulness is inherent, though limited, in all photographic images' "continuum of authenticity".[935] As Harper states, photography is often "thought of as a 'reflection' rather than an 'interpretation' of what was photographed".[936]

Many theorists of visual culture go even further, denying completely the agency of the photographers by discussing "camera" as if it was a living and learning organism on itself. While the photographic technology can "ideologically naturalize the eye of the observer", as Sekula notes, it's hardly likely that "it" is self-conscious enough "to technicalize and thereby deny that its form of representation is a practice".[937] In fact, one could wonder whether Shapiro's notion of "training the camera" would bring any results.[938] To exemplify the absurdity of this line of thinking, Kozloff modifies an old National Rifle Association slogan to photography: "Cameras don't take pictures, people do!"[939] Indeed, in Adelman's opinion, "The photograph is ultimately an extension of the photographer not of the technology and technique of photography".[940]

At the same time, though, art is fundamentally reliant on the technology and materials used to produce it.[941] Furthermore, the technologies and materials used have indirectly affected art's broader social functions. For example, the technical possibilities that allowed hand held cameras were integral to the development of snapshot culture and genre.[942] While the photographs' "subjective" and "manipulable" nature has been evident for the very beginning, as Wagner has noted,[943] most people trust the reality photographs represent because they do not themselves engage in manipulation for "deliberate manipulation is beyond our common experience", according to Winston.[944] Moreover, he maintains that while technical manipulations of lighting, angles, objects, framing, shutter speed and aperture all carry "semantic force", they are "often not consciously noted" especially when used subtly.[945] Despite this, however, digital imaging technologies established in the beginning of the 1990s evoked sensible unease. The easy manipulation of pixels – a hybrid term of *picture* and *element* – at the core of a digital presentations of any kind, "the molecular level of graphics" so different from the earlier more tangible means of post-production generated a sense of panic.[946] Ritchin, for example, claimed that digital images have brought with them "the end of photography as we have known it".[947] For Gillmor, on the other hand, "Photos are evidence of nothing in particular" anymore. Furthermore, according to Mitchell:

> ...the distinction between the causal process of the camera and the intentional process of the artist can no longer be drawn so confidently and categorically...[948]

However, as Graham-Brown demonstrates, illustrations and photographs – or "art" and "documentation" – overlapped to great extent already during the 19th century as limited technology for printing visuals meant that many photographs were printed as engravings, which at the same time were often based on photographs.[949] Indeed, Kember argues that "the fantasy of omnipotence" created through photographic images had made people "invest" in the false notion of realism in photography, which in the end came under increasing doubt with new digital technologies that "undermine[d] the realist status of the photographic image", even though "decades of semiotics" had shown it to be "already lost to photography".[950]

Where photography "was a major carrier and shaper of **modernism**", as Derrick and Wells contend,[951] it seems that digital imaging technologies have become major carriers and shapers of postmodernism,[952] relying more and more on "a technology in flux" with continuous changes and upgrades, as Lister et al. note.[953] Indeed, technological demands for equipment and knowledge have increased with new ICTs. In addition, equipped with multitude of choices to work and rework digitised works of visual art, the aesthetic nature of visual culture seems to have changed. Salo underlines the ease with which text can be duplicated, multiplied, modified and added on top of images.[954] Lister et al., however, think that these features affect all new media texts that can exists solely in "permanent state of flux".[955] According to Manovich, though, there are many more essential qualities to digital images than just duplication and modification. On Manovich's "tentative" list of qualities that describe computer-based images are discreetness (they are broken into pixels, and as such work more like a language than an image), modularity (typically consists of multiple layers corresponding to meaningful parts in the image), dualist nature (underneath the surface there is underlying code), compression (such as JPEG, can result in a presence of noise), interconnectedness (images as interfaces: the image-interface).[956] Furthermore, Manovich lists also uses as representations as well as iconic tools, hypertext links, control panels and image-instruments, among others.[957]

The most ominous feature of digital images, however, appears to be simulation, the "ability to generate realistic images out of nothing – to simulate it from scratch using only numerical codes as the object or referent", as Kember explains.[958] This ability has, according to Salo, resulted in pervasive collage techniques and surrealism.[959] While digital simulation at its core is inherently no different from artistic simulation of painting, the underlying assumption of truthfulness has resulted in a situation where, as Gillmor remarks, even grossly manipulated images can have a worryingly strong effect on public opinion.[960] While "doctoring" photographs has become unacceptable in news media,[961] the limits of acceptableness have become increasingly blurred. However, it is important to

remember that out of all the different forms of media that have changed as a consequence of new ICTs, photography has largely remained unchanged. While the methods for recording and post-producing have been altered, the practice itself has remained practically same. One must also remember that, as Williams argues, distinct medium is created "through many complex social transformations and transitions; it is [...] the product of culture and not a given consequence of technology".[962] However, as Lister et al. remind, each particular technology can have multiple different uses with "some becoming dominant and others marginal for reasons that have little or nothing to do with the nature of the technology itself".[963]

Social scientific approaches to visual culture

Wagner notes that "photographs are at least as ambiguous as the contexts in which they are examined and viewed".[964] Nonetheless, multiple disciplines of natural sciences use photographs for "data collection, experimental manipulations, and comparative analysis" and in certain fields – such as astronomy – they are the sole object of inquiry.[965] Noting the way in which photographs bind two established research practices of analysing human artefacts and human activity,[966] Wagner laments "lack of consensus about the significance and meaning of photographic image" in social sciences.[967] However, during the past thirty years since Wagner's criticism – published in 1979 – photographs and other visual material have become much a more common objects and tools of research in social sciences, such as visual sociology, visual anthropology, social psychology,[968] and indeed, visual journalism.

Despite the wider appeal of visual research, however, a certain sense of mandatory justification has lingered on in social sciences until recent years. Grady, published in 2004, for example, still felt the need to list reasons how the study of visual culture and images can benefit social sciences.[969] Moreover, one dispute appears to have surrounded the very issue of what exactly constitutes visual research. For instance, Knowles and Sweetman seem to suggest that utilisation of visual material as data counts as visual research only if the data has been produced during the process of research as an methodological part of "*doing* research".[970] They do not count content analysis as genuine visual research for the visual material is simply a pre-existing "*object* of inquiry" and "does not play an integral part in the research process itself".[971] However, according to Rose, producing images as part of visual research is "relatively rare" for most research concentrates on images already produced and published.[972]

Indeed, overall the proliferation of visual field of social sciences has lead to improved

categorisations of ideological debates, research traditions and methodologies bringing a sense of academic clarity even as the multitudes of approaches remain.[973] Whereas Derrick and Wells contend that the recent debate has divided into two branches of viewership and interpretation versus truthfulness and reality,[974] according to Rose, the wider ideological discourse surrounding visual culture has tackled everything from the essence and practicality of the term "visual culture" to the (in)visibility of social differences of gender, class and race, systems of looking, differing audiences and the agency of images themselves.[975]

While some of the wider discourses suggested by Rose appear to overlap somewhat (one cannot study particular audiences without considering their systems of looking, for example), the more specific theoretical-methodological discussions have come to acquire their own distinct contexts of application. In fact, the categorisation that Rose proposes for the field, has evolved far from the three theoretical approaches (anthropological, poststucturalist and semiotic) that Knowles and Sweetman acknowledge.[976] For example, Rose's theoretical-methodological classification (compositional interpretation, content analysis, semiology, psychoanalysis, discourse analyses, audience studies, anthropological approach and research photo production) appears to include all of the approaches suggested by Wagner,[977] Banks,[978] as well as Derrick and Wells – short of pure socio-historical documentation.[979] Indeed, as Rose notes, the wider social scientific literature theories of visual culture include theorists who argue for the effects of production, others who emphasise the context and relation images have with other images and yet others who believe that "the most important site at which the meaning of an image is made is not its author, or indeed its production or itself, but its audiences" with their varying meanings to it.[980]

Research design

This research is, in scientific terms, an inductive one,[981] aiming to distinguish visual methods that are commonplace in the self-representations of young Emirati women to form a more comprehensive view of the contemporary photographic norms among the Emirati population, and especially the young national women. As mentioned in the Introduction, the main question of this research is: **How do young native women of the UAE represent themselves and construct their identities in new media through visual self-representations?** As Wagner has noted, photography cannot be categorically adapted to social research simply as a "soft" or "hard" application, for it has a "dual potential".[982] Consequently, for a more thorough examination, both hard and soft sides of photography are utilised in this research, which as a whole also has a deductive side to it as part of a

three-layered combination of **context – data – context**.

The previous parts of this research reconstructed the context and ground rules around which the representations analysed come to reality. The context was established to help the subsequent analysis and answers more general questions regarding the realities of young Emirati women, their participation in modern and postmodern forms of media publishing as well as the new forms of visual media and ICTs with coexist restrictive practices of a relatively conservative society. While the "hard" part of this research concentrates on the constructive aspect of representations, aiming to deconstruct the prevalence and the visual means with which the young women represent themselves,[983] the "soft" reflective perspective is taken into account again in the final analysis of context. Regarding Hall's categorisation,[984] both **constructive** and **reflective analyses** are formed as part of the latter layer of context; constructive as the means of the representations are studied, reflective for the hierarchies, meanings and values of the representations are compared to the previously established context. Even though questions regarding intention cannot be answered in this research, a few broader questions surrounding cultural and religious influences can perhaps be illuminated through indirect contextual analysis utilising the results of the content analysis. To sum, the first layer of the research established the environment in which the photographs come to be (deductive), the second, codes the content (inductive) and the final layer analyses the content through the filter of the established context (comparing deductive and inductive, content with the context, constructive with reflective).

The central method applied to bring results is content analysis of, what Wagner called, "naïve photographs" of young Emirati women, used in synthesis and followed by an analysis of meanings and values incorporated in the content.[985] According to Pietilä, content analysis can be used on three different types of documents: audio documents (unprepared speeches and live radio broadcasts), visual documents (paintings, drawings and photographs) as well as texts (official documents, letters and newspaper articles).[986] Seppänen writes that people observe textual and visual materials in different ways.[987] While people read texts in a linear fashion, visual representations are observed as either entities or one part at a time, without any preset visual order.[988] However, this does not have an effect on content analysis itself, since the idea is to find meaningful details in both the texts and visual representations.[989]

According to Rose, content analysis is "methodologically explicit" and based on "a number of rules and procedures that must be rigorously followed" for the analysis to be truthful in line with the ideals of natural sciences.[990] Rose quotes Krippendorf, who emphasises two aspects of content analysis: replicability and validity.[991] To make sure that those two aspects are fulfilled, content

analysis uses numbers to achieve consistency.[992] In fact, at its simplest, content analysis means quantifying visual representations,[993] as Rose writes, by "counting the frequency of certain visual elements in a clearly defined sample of images, and then analysing those frequencies".[994] However, according to Seppänen, content analysis does not have to mean just quantifying large amounts of material, but can also be used as a tool for understanding visual context of few representations analysed in more detail.[995] In addition, it can help to understand what types of visual norms are present in the public discourse.[996] Catherine Lutz and Jane Collins write that content analysis can, despite the image of oversimplification, help to discover "patterns that are too subtle to be visible on casual inspection" as well as guard "unconscious search [...] for only those which confirm one's initial sense of what the photos say or do".[997] However, both Seppänen and Rose agree, that content analysis includes both quantitative and qualitative elements.[998]

Banks criticises positivistic framework for ignoring the research subjects and perhaps creating a false sense of objectivism:[999]

> Discussing similarities and differences between 'our' and 'their' visual use – 'we' do visual things to 'them' or conduct research on 'their' visual forms – is only a meaningful proposition within positivistic research paradigms, that is those which understand the task of social science to be to collect objectifiable data from research subjects who need have little concern for or comprehension of the project.[1000]

In line with constructive viewpoint, however, this research does not take photographic images as given re*presentations* of *objective* positivist reality, but tries to adopt the winstonian "mild realist position",[1001] or in Knowles and Sweetman's terminology "*pragmatic* realism".[1002] Yet, defining the line that separates the somewhat objective photographic truth from the (digitally or otherwise) manipulated subjective meaning evokes ambiguity and is practically impossible. Thus, it is better to concede that the broader cultural meanings of the self-portraits can be considered only through a comparison of two interpretations; one of social culture of the contemporary UAE and the other of photographic depictions of life in the UAE. As Knowles and Sweetman write, "the apparent ambiguity of pictorial representation is only really a difficult if one is working within a realist paradigm, and seeking to establish truths rather than interpretations".[1003]

Flickr as data source

Sampling in content analysis should be both representative and significant.[1004] Rose cites Krippendorf and Weber's strategies for sampling, which can be random (using a random number table to choose images for further study), stratified (selecting an image from each subgroup present

in the original dataset), systematic (picking every *n*th image for analysis with consideration to possible seasonal cycles) or cluster (choosing a random group and analysing that group only).[1005] As the main question of this research states, the aim is to study new media self-portraits of young Emirati women. While new media can come in many forms and be accessed through different technologies,[1006] the Internet has become the most important arena for its publication and is thus used as the main new media source for this research. However, the Internet is highly less organised and more ambiguous by form than traditional print or broadcast media, for example. It is also greatly more immense than any collection of publicly published material available offline. Thus, it is very important to define clearly what source *within* the Internet is chosen for the final content analysis.

Employing categories introduced by Krippendorf and Weber,[1007] it could be possible to pick random photography blogs analyse their content. However, establishing a logical way of selecting the blogs for analysis can be difficult for blog lists are many and there appears no definitive database for all blogs published from within the UAE, for example. In addition, blogs started out text centric and majority appears so even when they concentrate on photography as a subject. For these reasons, an initial Internet wide cluster decision was made to collect the photographic data from an "online photo management and sharing application" Flickr that aims to "**help people make their content available to the people who matter to them**" and to "**enable new ways of organizing photos and video**".[1008] These goals Flickr fulfils by features that enable a user to upload images by different applications and technologies,[1009] organise the images with "tags",[1010] edit and manipulate the content and form of the images with a partner application Picnik[1011], share the images (and information about them)[1012] with others through groups and/or family and friends and to create or let others create, for example, cards or DVD covers out of the images.[1013]

Flickr application was originally created by a Canadian software company Ludicorp, founded by Steward Butterfield and Caterina Fake, as part of a "Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game" called "Game Neverending".[1014] However, the production of the game was never finished with development problems and financial troubles.[1015] Hence, the company concentrated on developing Flickr, which was launched at fast pace in February 2004.[1016] During the following year new features were added and the Flickr platform begun evolving with increasing user input.[1017] Eventually, as Flickr community grew from hundreds of thousands to millions,[1018] Internet service provider Yahoo! bought Ludicorp and Flickr in March 2005.[1019]

Flickr web site and the underlying user pages can be browsed through without a user account. However, for posting, storing and sharing images, one must register as a new user or use

one's existing Yahoo! user account.[1020] The user account is free and includes a possibility to upload two videos and 100 MBs of images each month.[1021] However, only the 200 most recent images are displayed on the list of photos thus emphasising the "photostream" ideology behind Flickr – a term used of sorting out the uploaded images in chronological order with the newest first.[1022] As the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) page of Flickr puts it, a photostream is "a visual history of everything you've ever uploaded to Flickr".[1023] Images and other content can be deleted only by the user who uploaded them, but if the user account has been inactive for "90 consecutive days" or the user has violated "Community Guidelines" the account can be removed.[1024] For a yearly fee of $24.95, one can purchase "Pro account", which includes unlimited upload possibilities and other features such as statistical information on viewership.[1025]

Regarding the social networking aspect of Flickr, the user can personalise her profile with individual "buddy icon"[1026], customised Flickr URL[1027] and (optional) personal information such name, gender, marital status and other descriptions. Each user can also add other users as "Contacts"[1028] with additional possibility to check them off as "Family" and/or "Friend" as well as subscribe to a daily email newsletter or RSS deed to receive information on what their contacts are up.[1029] For user-to-user communication, there is FlickrMail,[1030] and for sharing private content with people without Flickr user accounts there is "Guest Pass", an invitation the user can send out to whomever she wishes.[1031]

Overall, there are seven different levels of copyright or *usage licence* that the user can define for her content from "None (All rights reserved)" to "Attribution-NoDerivs Creative Commons".[1032] The copyright categories are roughly based on Creative Commons categories; as described by Gillmor, Creative Commons is an "alternative copyright licensing system that allows the creator of a work to decide which rights he wants to reserve for himself, while allowing the public to build on his ideas".[1033] In addition, the user has also a possibility to patch together an individual copyright terms that allow her to specify the extent of commercial use, modifications and attribution to the original author.[1034] However, as copyright infringement can become an issue for a talented and creative "flickerite", Yahoo!'s Copyright and Intellectual Property Policy states that accounts of users repeatedly caught violating copyrights of Yahoo! or others can be shut down.[1035] However, perhaps the best sign of how seriously copyright infringements are dealt with within Yahoo!, is the post of Copyright Agent who can be contacted if one suspects that her material is being used without consent.[1036] However, one must take into account that all content uploaded into Flickr or other parts of Yahoo! Inc. can be used, altered, reproduced and distributed by the company based on the Terms of Service.[1037]

Flickr allows multiple levels of privacy for both individual users as well as groups. For example, individual images and videos can be defined public and accessible for viewing to only the particular user herself, to the user and her family and/or friends or "Anyone".[1038] Similar restrictions can be set regarding downloading, sharing and printing images or blogging about them, displaying EXIF data (information on the camera used) of images, public searches of images and profiles as well as a possibility to get invited to Getty Images.[1039] Without opting out, the category "Anyone" can mean that the images may be used in third party Flickr APIs (Application Programming Interface) or blogged about elsewhere.[1040]

Flickr Community Guidelines state that all content should be tagged for an appropriate safety level.[1041] The user can adjust the default safety level for each image uploaded so that "other members only see images within their specified comfort zones".[1042] The three safety levels are "Safe", "Moderate" and "Restricted"; the first level is for content meant for public global audiences, the second one for content that might upset some people and the third one for content "unsuitable for children, your grandmother and your workmates".[1043] Conversely, the user can also adjust the safety levels of her searches to access content of only certain levels, or of certain content or media type.[1044] Flickr administrators can re-tag any content to a more restricted safety level if it is considered to violate the safety standards and can ultimately either continue to moderate certain users, warn them or ban them altogether.[1045] Porn and nudity *per se* is "not disallowed on Flickr", however, distribution of it is restricted.[1046] Basically this means that the user can upload restricted content and showcase it privately but that moderate or restricted content is not allowed in, for example, buddy icons or posted in public areas such as groups and that only safe and moderate content is allowed for videos.[1047] At the same time, however, Yahoo! Terms of Service (point 6. MEMBER CONDUCT) prohibit the user from uploading or distributing any content considered "vulgar" or "obscene".[1048]

Sturken and Cartwright point out that the whole Internet was still during the 1990s "strikingly dependent of the simple format of text".[1049] The writers find this textual virtual reality surprising especially, since it came about at the same time as a large amount of imaging technologies were becoming available.[1050]

> The Internet was introduced when computer communications technology was principally text-based; the Internet was not visual because the technology to make it so was not available.[1051]

It was not until the introduction of World Wide Web structure and the HTML that the Internet began to catch up with the ways of looking of the rest of the society.[1052] Thus, the writers conclude that with only in the late 1990s with the "explosion" of the WWW, the Internet finally became "a truly

visual and aural medium".[1053] However, despite years of progressive change, Flickr, among other Internet platforms, is still highly dependent on words. As Bausch and Bumgardner remark: "A photo might be worth a 1,000 words, but you can't extract those words from a photo automatically".[1054]

For these reasons, all uploaded content in Flickr, still or moving images, needs to be defined by verbal descriptions of different kinds. There are five basic categories of text in a single photographic page: types, tags, metadata, titles and descriptions (Appendix I: Figure 9). Annotations of type (the options are "Photos / Videos", "Screenshots / Screencasts" and "Illustration/Art / Animation/CGI" describe the method with which the content was created, the category of visual medium to which it belongs.[1055] "Tags", on the other hand, are verbal labels or keywords of sort that the user can add to her content to make them more easily searchable and allow grouping similarly tagged images to be found.[1056] As Flickr user striatic (Striatic) points out, tags can be used to describe anything from the type of medium, content, genre, location, subject (more specifically, object photographed) or their name with tags ranging from the weird and wonderful ("mynecktie", "sequentialdream") to worthless ("photo") revealing at the same time the people behind the millions of Flickr photographs ("me").[1057] One image can have up to 75 tags; the user can either restrict the tag-giving to herself or allow other users to tag her images as well.[1058] However, a user should keep in mind as Bausch and Bumgardner note, that tags are also links which – depending on their accuracy – can draw attention to the images they describe.[1059]

Metadata, or, "data about data", means in Flickr that each photograph taken with a digital camera has information incorporated into the image file describing the technical specifications of each individual image.[1060] This information, seen on a Flickr page under the headline "Additional Information", can be included to or excluded from the content published by the user.[1061] Metadata can have information on, for example, exposure time, ISO speed, date and time, copyright or focal lenght.[1062] The last categories of verbal annotations are titles and descriptions, which the user can add to any uploaded content.[1063] In addition to these type annotations, there are "notes" and comments. Notes are messages that users can write over images focusing on certain part of an image, for example (Appendix I: Figure 10).[1064] Comments work in the same way as comments do in regular blogs, allowing a space for users to discuss. In general, the user can define for each individual piece of content who can comment on it similar with the same categories discussed earlier and if the particular image is part of a group pool, restrictions on commenting do not apply to the members of the group.[1065] Cursing is allowed in Flickr discussion boards as long as it is not "offending, insulting or harassing anybody".[1066] Trolls, or "people whose purpose is to disrupt an online forum, not make it better", as described by Gillmor, on the other hand, are not allowed and

group moderators and administrators are encouraged to ban them.[1067]

All Flickr users can start groups, which, as already mentioned, can be either private (joining through invitation, no listing about the group elsewhere in Flickr) or public (with or without invitation).[1068] An administrator of a group can change it (or parts of it; image pool, discussion board) from public to private but not vice versa.[1069] Groups include a group pool of photographs and a discussion board.[1070] Only group members can add images to the group photograph pool.[1071] Images previously marked as private (for example, friends/family) will become accessible for all members of a group after it has been submitted to a group pool.[1072] Each individual image can be added to ten different group pools (or sixty, for Pro account users).[1073] In general, groups and their members are expected to follow the Flickr Community Guidelines, which state, as mentioned, that only content created by the user can be uploaded and all content should be tagged for an appropriate safety level.[1074]

Each group has at least one administrator (the user who created the group), but technically moderators and members are optional – although highly recommended.[1075] Administrator can create and change the group description and name as well as create a "personalized URL" and a group icon and define the levels of public access to the group, its photography pool and discussion boards.[1076] In addition, the administrator(s) can establish group moderation and participation rules and act on them (remove and/or ban members, moderate the discussion board and accept and delete images on the group pool), while moderators can only act on the rules but nor define them.[1077] The first administrator can promote members to moderator or administrator status, however, an administrator cannot be stripped of the status.[1078] Thus, limiting the amounts of administrators is recommended.[1079] A member can leave a group at any time, but the entire group can be deleted only if the remaining member, moderator or administrator chooses to leave it.[1080]

Sampling and data gathering

One major difficulty with new media published in the Internet is the ephemeral nature of it. Content used as research data can be modified, updated or completely deleted in the span of a research. One solution to the problem of dynamic data has been to mark the exact date (and sometimes the time) and the Internet address from where the data was retrieved.[1081] Yet, this method of log keeping does not guarantee a more stabile dataset for it simply states when and where the data was found without securing access to it later on. On research terms, this dynamism hinders especially replication of research projects: without access to the same data, one can hardly test the conclusions.

Consequently, saving the entire research data as a snapshot in time would be an ideal solution. However, that is easier said than done. The content in Flickr is stored in backend systems and is accessible dynamically using the Flickr web page interface. Meaning that, the web pages are created as users access them and can dynamically change either by users adding or modifying content, or by Flickr changing their web page interface in some way. To get around this problem, the content data could be loaded, viewed and stored (printed or saved as a web page, for example) manually in a serial manner with a limited speed depending on the storing method used. This slow manual approach would mean that the data might change during the course of it; for example, since a user account can be deleted in Flickr if it stays inactive for three months straight,[1082] it might disappear in the middle of data collection.

This problem could be partly avoided using Flickr API[1083] to access content data in backend systems.[1084] Listed in Flickr pages there are so-called method calls that can be utilised in creating a customised computer application that collects specific information from the Flickr backend systems.[1085] For example, a method used in an application call can collect a list of all members in a certain group. However, using an applications does not fully guarantee a static result as running it will also take time during which changes can take place in the dataset, indeed, the entire access provided for external Flickr applications is maintained "on an ad hoc basis" and could be discontinued "at any time".[1086] Despite these uncertainties, using an application is far faster and logically more reliable way to gather data than other manual methods described.

As the aim of this research was to study images by Emiratis, using Krippendorf and Weber's categories,[1087] a Flickr wide cluster decision was made to concentrate on a Flickr group that identifies with the UAE. However, there are several groups in Flickr that explicitly connect with the UAE ("UAE BEST"[1088], "UAE Flickr Meet"[1089], "Featuring UAEian artists"[1090] and "z3eme_U.A.E"[1091]), particular cities ("Dubai today"[1092], "Dubai 360°"[1093], "Dubai-in-Pictures"[1094], "Abu DhaBi"[1095] and "Al Ain"[1096]), the Emirati people ("Emirati Corner"[1097]) and their culture ("UAE Culture"[1098]), to name a few. Hence, regarding the research question and the relevance of the sampling, a group identifying also with female gender was chosen. Consequently, all the data was gathered from the members of a Flickr group called "♥ಌ BanaaT UAE ಌ♥" (BanaaT UAE).[1099]

There were three main reasons for choosing BanaaT UAE as the group to for research in this thesis: firstly, the group's description stated explicitly that the group was meant for females only:

JuSt Girls (^_^)banoTaaaaT o boyaat bas No 4 GuyS ,, HaVe FuN WiTh Us ..[1100]

Secondly, the group name was a (somewhat informal) transliteration of Arabic and appeared to

suggest as such a connection to the especially Arabic speaking population of the UAE by rendering the group name incomprehensive for non-Arabic speaking population. Thirdly, the group name "BanaaT UAE" referred to both females and national Emiratis as *banaat*, means daughters in Arabic and the UAE, words that together seemed to imply connection with the nation in question as daughters of the nation.

For data gathering, a decision was made to create an application to collect both characteristics about the users as described in their profiles as well as content uploaded into Flickr by those users. The initial phase of data gathering encompassed all members of the BanaaT UAE group. The information collected included a unique user identifier, username, real name (first name + last name submitted in the profile), gender (submitted in the profile), Flickr administrator status (admin / non-admin), Flickr Pro status (Pro / non-Pro), location (submitted in the profile), number of images uploaded, profile URL, photostream URL and buddy icon URL. Most of the information was available through the Flickr API, but the gender of each user had to be collected through the web interface.[1101] **The first run on the API was made on Sunday, August 2, 2009** from approximately 6 PM to 8 PM.[1102]

The members of BanaaT UAE were divided into two levels; there were two administrators ("AdmIns", BintKhalifa and AL – Roo3 Daughter) and regular users, or "GiRls".[1103] In Flickr it would be a possibility to establish a third group of moderators, but this had not been done in BanaaT UAE.[1104] The safety level of the group was marked as "Safe".[1105] Participation in the group pool was limited to members of the group, as were the group discussions.[1106] For example, in order to study the photographs published within the group, one needed to become a member of it. (Consequently, for the purposes of this research, one was required to join the group, thus affecting the group numbers. Thus, the actual number of the group members is *members – 1 researcher =* 1728. Henceforth, the numbers of group members are cited without the group presence of the researcher.) However, additional information of the group told that the group was open to all participation as a public group, which meant that anyone could join it.[1107]

In consequence, unsurprisingly, a quick inspection of the result of the initial data gathering revealed that all of the 1728 members in the BanaaT UAE group were not female nor Emirati. As a result, out of 1728 members, 668 identify as female, 206 identify as male, while most, 854 in all, have either marked this particular information private or left it blank all together. Out of the 668 females, 550 have at least one image on their photostream. All information gathered must have been marked public by the user, as external Flickr applications are not able to collect information the user has marked private. The actual number of users that had publicly identified to be females with at

least one uploaded *public* image on their account and located in the UAE[1108] was found to be 172. However, a further inspection of user profiles revealed that 2 users did not belong to the required target group of Emirati females.[1109] Thus, these users were eliminated from the research pool, reducing the number to **170 or 9.84 percent of all BanaaT UAE group members** (Appendix I: Figure 11). These 170 users had 8,253 images combined on their photostreams with a mean of 48.55 images per user. The minimum amount of images for a user was 5, while the maximum was 308. The median of 27.00 and the mode of 9 implied that the mean was effected by few heavy users. This was confirmed with visual analysis of the photo count (Appendix I: Figure 12). Out of the 170 users, 8 were subscribers of Flickr Pro services.[1110]

The Flickr platform supports PNG, JPEG and non-animated GIF file formats; images in other formats are automatically converted to JPEG.[1111] Images can be stored and published in the service in several sizes (48x48 pixels for buddy icons and for other images the longest side can be either: 75, 100, 240, 500 or 1024 pixels).[1112] Images in original size can be stored and published only in the subscription based Pro service.[1113] All images on display in Flickr are covered with a transparent image in order to prevent them from being copied and saved with an easy right-click.[1114] This transparency cover can be bypassed with some effort,[1115] and Flickr admits that it does not shield users from content theft.[1116] However, circumventing it for research purposes would have been legally unsound and ultimately unnecessary. Thus, a second external Flickr application was used to download images from the 170 users defined earlier.[1117]

The second run on the API was made on Thursday, August 13, 2009 from approximately 9:30 PM to 11:30 PM. Between the initial data gathering done eleven days earlier and that second data gathering, the numbers of images for the 170 BanaaT UAE users had increased by 6 to 8,259. However, a closer analysis of the discrepancies suggested that, in fact, 2 users had deleted 5 images and 5 users had added 11 more. As the Flickr site shows when each image was uploaded, identifying images added after August 2 to separate them from the previously defined dataset was easy. However, reclaiming deleted images is not possible afterwards. Thus, the final number of images included in the dataset was readjusted to **8,248**.

Identifying self-portraits

A self-portrait is by definition a portrait of the author, or as Merriam-Webster defines it: "a portrait of oneself done by oneself".[1118] As simple as this definition sounds, it has its limits for the definition of a self-portrait obviously depends on how one defines oneself. Furthermore, while a portrait is

usually understood as "medium close-up" of one person – in this case the author – other ways of framing and staging are equally possible.[1119] Indeed, at the extreme end, a self-portrait can be void of the author's direct presence, a mere reflection of a state of mind. Moreover, even photographic portrays taken by someone else, while by definition not self-portraits, can still have the same public identity building function as self-portraits that are more traditional. Indeed, a sample of self-portraits can include variables that can vary from complete absence of humans to a group of them, from self-authored portraits to photographs taken by someone else. For these reasons, it was concluded that in order to differentiate and sample the self-portraits from other images, a nuanced strategy was needed. Hence, the images were put through the major sampling procedure of identifying and marking all images that appeared to include **a presence of a female author** and **be taken by her**.

In this category were included all images that suggested the person or body parts shown belonged to the author of the photograph. Many of these photographs, based on angle and framing, appeared to be author's own body shots (usually taken with a right hand and pointed towards the other hand holding something). As the group studied consists of females only, determining the gender was vital for the process. However, this was quite unproblematic as most Emirati men and women wear gender specific clothing.[1120] For images that left the author's gender in doubt were kept in the dataset as all self-portraits of female users include a female, even if the gender is not explicitly visible. In short, all photographs with at least one female, or someone that could *not* be eliminated as clearly male were left for further scrutiny. **The only exceptions left in the dataset were photographs that showed a shadow of the person taking a photograph. These kinds of images were interpreted to be self-portraits without the author being directly present in the photograph**. In all, **479** images with a presence of a female author were found.

Sturken and Cartwright remark that it is impossible these days to talk about computer media purely in the context of looking as the increasing media convergence means that "image, text, sound [...] converge in the social production of meaning, and can no longer be studied in isolation".[1121] Moreover, as Pietilä notes, one document can include aspects of more than one type, comic books, for example, include both visual and textual content.[1122] Indeed, according to Rose, all visual images are "multimodal" in the sense that they are often accompanied by other mediums such as texts that interfere with their meaning.[1123] While the images cannot be reduced to words, for example, they nevertheless are affected by them.[1124] Thus, as Seppänen advices,[1125] texts – **tags, titles** – in close proximity with the visual representation (Appendix I: Figure 9) were included into the research. The idea was to identify images that might have been left out by the previous sampling

process for they did not bear the most obvious signs of self-portraiture (angle, framing, reflection). Hence, as the next step the images were put through two further sampling procedures to identify and mark images that had been **tagged** or **titled with words synonymous with or suggesting a self-portrait**.

For the purposes of resource management, only tags and titles clearly suggesting self-portraiture were taken into account. There were 15 such tags that included: "me", "i", "am", "moi", "im", "self", "selfportrait", "ana", *"anaa"*, *"aanaa"* "¬°•|anaa", *"anii"*, "*'anii*", *"wanaa"* and *"wa'anaa"*. No clear Arabic equivalent of "self-portrait" (as in variations of "*suurat daatyyat*") was found among the tags or titles.[1126] If possible, the titles used by the BanaaT UAE users were even more ambiguous than the tags. As the possibilities given for titles in Flickr are more varied, the scope used on titles was also wider. Yet, again, for the purposes of resource management, only the most unambiguous titles were included in the analysis (merely one image was titled explicitly as "Self-portrait XD"). However, while the previous visual sampling allowed for better scrutiny of the dataset, the images tagged and titled as self-portraits were found to include everything from drawings to non-human objects and empty landscapes. As a result, the titled and tagged photographs were sampled in a way to maintain a consistent presence of the authors in the photographs. In the end, the actual number of significantly tagged images was 25, but as 1 image had been tagged with two different equally significant words, the resulting number of individual images tagged as self-portraits or words synonymous with it was **24**. In addition, there were **30** different titles that were used in the images suggesting presence of the author even though. There were no duplicate titles.

The next step in the research was to combine the results from these sampling procedures. As there was some overlapping between the results (Appendix I: Figure 13), the actual number of images initially identified as self-portraits was **507** by **122** different BanaaT UAE users. These users represented 7.06 percent of the 1728 BanaaT UAE group members. Overall, out of the 8,248 selected images, the self-portraits totalled 6.15 percent.

Content coding self-portraits

Wagner states in his essay 'Avoiding Error' that content analysis is "a process in which a set of materials […] is systematically surveyed with respect to predetermined variables".[1127] Indeed, the next step was to code the sampled images into further categories, to assign "descriptive labels" to them, as Rose advices.[1128] Although "descriptive" and ultimately also "interpretive", these categories must be, according to Rose, "*exhaustive*", "*exclusive*", "*enlightening*" and "completely

unambiguous".[1129] In other words, the categories must cover all necessary aspects regarding the research question without overlapping or confusing the results.[1130] Moreover, writes Rose:

> ...the codes used must depend on a theorized connection between the image and the broader cultural context in which its meaning is made.[1131]

...as the validity of the entire research relies on the dependability of the link between the image, its code and the context it appears in.[1132]

According to Grady, a coding sheet should be established before the sampling process, even though the sheet will most likely be modified as the coding advances.[1133] Rose suggests using codes that take into account the research question, relevant research literature, broader cultural context and the researcher's "familiarity" with the dataset.[1134] As the research question – **How do young native women of the UAE represent themselves and construct their identities in new media through visual self-representations?** – is interested in representation and construction of identities, the content coding was divided into three distinct parts dealing with personal level of self-representation, more general social identity building as well as stylistic influences.

The first set **– personal representation –** centred on the appearance of the young women by coding the compositional and stylistic construction of authors depicted. For this purpose, Rose's "compositional interpretation" was utilised together with some analytical tools used in the analysis of moving images discussed by Rose as well as Bordwell and Thompson.[1135] Furthermore, to test the colonialist stereotypes of sexual allure and local photographic customs of "gazing rules" both modesty, the presence of hand/s and direction of gaze were coded into 8 categories with a combined 33 variables:

Shot distance[1136]

    Extreme long shot

    Long shot

    Medium long shot

    Medium shot

    Medium close-up

    Close-up

    Extreme close-up

    Other

Screen frame[1137]

    Open

    Closed

    Other

Focus[1138]

    Sharp

    Soft

    Other

Light

    Daylight outdoors

    Night time outdoors

    Indoor lighting

    Candle light

    Other

Clothing[1139]

    Not revealing

    Standard

    Revealing

    Not featured

Hand/s

    Yes

    No

Identity

    Identifiable (face – eyes, nose and mouth – uncovered)

    Only eye/s

    Only mouth

Other

No facial features included

Gaze[1140]

Direct

Indirect

None

According to Wagner, one can use different coding categories based on, for example, presence or "copresence" of certain elements or the area it covers in each photograph.[1141] In this research, the main presence thus far sampled has been that of the assumed female Emirati user account holders. However based on familiarity with the dataset, as mentioned earlier, many photographs included depicted a hand of the author holding varying types of paraphernalia in it. These photographs were kept in the dataset as they, firstly, included a body part of the author and could thus in the most narrow sense be considered self-portraits and, secondly, could also be considered to have a strong identity building function representing objects of association together with the author. Hence, the second coding set concentrated on **social identity** with the changing paraphernalia of the images coded into one category with 16 separate variables:

Religious

Nationalist

Work

Education

Media and popular culture

New ICTs

Courtship, marriage, children and home life

Friendship

Travel

Food and dining

Photography

Nature, plants

Animal/s

Haram[1142]

Other

None

The last coding set surrounded **photographic style** and aimed to identify possible effects of local artistic traditions as well as new technologies with 6 categories and 15 variables:

Calligraphy and/or text on image[1143]

    Yes

    No

Flora[1144]

    Yes

    No

Geometric shapes[1145]

    Yes

    No

Colours[1146]

    Vivid

    Realistic

    Subdued

    Grey scale

    Unconventional colour manipulation

Grainy appearance

    Yes

    No

Multiple images, superimposed images

Yes

No

Findings

Personal representation was coded through eight categories of shot distance, screen frame, focus, light, clothing, hands, identity and gaze. Out of these categories, the first four concentrated on the expressive content, or mood of the image, even though, as Rose points out, "It is very hard to evoke mood of an image through codes".[1147] The results showed that the most common shot distance used in the images was "extreme close-up" with 240 images or 47.34 percent. In the screen frame category, the most common label was "open", used in 494 images or 97.44 percent of all. Focus was coded in this research only regarding the sharpness or softness of the entire images following Rose's remark that soft focus can be used in to create a sense of "romantic or nostalgic feel".[1148] The most used focus type was "sharp", used in 328 images or 64.69 percent. Out of the variables for light sources, "other" turned to be the most frequent, used to label 239 images or 47.14 percent.

The latter four categories of clothing, hands, identity and gaze were used to get a better feel of how closely the young women followed normative to strict rules regarding modesty, gaze and photographic representation. In the clothing category, the most common variable was "not featured", which was used in 308 images or 60.75 percent. Hands, conversely, appeared to be one often-appearing aspect that seemed to get highlighted and included in the images repeatedly. Indeed, 337 or 66.47 percent of all photographs included one or more hands. Regarding public identity building, most images did not reveal the identity of the author. In fact, 388 or 76.53 percent of the images did not include any facial features. Similarly, 412 or 81.26 percent of the images did not include gaze of any sort.

Shot distance	Values	
	% of Photos	Count of Photos
Extreme close-up	47.34%	240
Close-up	33.14%	168
Medium close-up	13.02%	66
Medium shot	2.56%	13
Medium long shot	1.78%	9
Other	1.38%	7

	Long shot	0.59%	3
	Extreme long shot	0.20%	1
	Total	**100.00%**	**507**

		Values	
Screen frame		**% of Photos**	**Count of Photos**
Open		97.44%	494
Closed		1.78%	9
Other		0.79%	4
Total		**100.00%**	**507**

		Values	
Focus		**% of Photos**	**Count of Photos**
Sharp		64.69%	328
Soft		35.11%	178
Other		0.20%	1
Total		**100.00%**	**507**

		Values	
Light		**% of Photos**	**Count of Photos**
Other		47.14%	239
Indoor lighting		29.39%	149
Daylight outdoors		19.92%	101
Night time outdoors		2.56%	13
Candle light		0.99%	5
Total		**100.00%**	**507**

		Values	
Clothing		**% of Photos**	**Count of Photos**
Not featured		60.75%	308
Standard		30.97%	157
Revealing		4.54%	23
Not revealing		3.75%	19
Total		**100.00%**	**507**

		Values	
Hand		**% of Photos**	**Count of Photos**
Yes		66.47%	337
No		33.53%	170
Total		**100.00%**	**507**

Identity	Values	
	% of Photos	Count of Photos
No facial features included	76.53%	388
Only eye/s	14.60%	74
Other	3.94%	20
Only mouth	3.55%	18
Identifiable	1.38%	7
Total	**100.00%**	**507**

Gaze	Values	
	% of Photos	Count of Photos
None	81.26%	412
Indirect	11.83%	60
Direct	6.90%	35
Total	**100.00%**	**507**

The second content description to be coded was social identity depicted in the photographs through various props and paraphernalia. Content coded *haram*, as mentioned earlier, included indications of violence, nudity, tattoos, fashion, women's faces, wigs, statues of worship, pork, improperly dressed or dirty children as well as drugs or alcohol use. Money and gambling were also coded as *haram*.[1149] Because of the wide variety of all things *haram*, the variable ended up being the most common with 150 images constituting 29.59 percent of all photographs. The category consisted of 16 variables out of which the absolute and relative frequency counts were as follows:[1150]

Social identity	Values	
	% of Photos	Count of Photos
Haram	29.59%	150
Courtship, marriage, children...	10.65%	54
Other	7.10%	36
Food and dining	6.71%	34
Photography	5.92%	30
Friendship	5.92%	30
New ICTs	5.72%	29
Travel	5.52%	28
Animal/s	4.73%	24
Media and popular culture	4.73%	24
Nationalist	4.14%	21
Nature, plants	3.35%	17
None	2.76%	14
Education	1.97%	10

Religious	0.79%	4
Work	0.39%	2
Total	**100.00%**	**507**

The last coding set of photographic style had six categories of calligraphy, flora, geometric shapes, colours, multiple images and grainy appearance. However, characteristic often featured in classic Islamic art appeared mostly absent in the images researched. 262 or 51.68 percent of the images did not have calligraphy in them and majority of 468 or 92.31 percent of the images did not include any type of flora, stylised or not. Furthermore, geometric shapes were absent from 427 or 84.22 percent of the photographs. Colours were most often left untouched as 278 or 54.83 percent had realistic colour schemes. Similarly, 372 or 73.37 percent of images did not have graininess to them. In addition, 471 or 92.90 percent of the images did not have multiple images collected into one.

	Values	
Calligraphy	**% of Photos**	**Count of Photos**
No	51.68%	262
Yes	48.32%	245
Total	**100.00%**	**507**

	Values	
Flora	**% of Photos**	**Count of Photos**
No	92.31%	468
Yes	7.69%	39
Total	**100.00%**	**507**

	Values	
Geometric Shapes	**% of Photos**	**Count of Photos**
No	84.22%	427
Yes	15.78%	80
Total	**100.00%**	**507**

	Values	
Colours	**% of Photos**	**Count of Photos**
Realistic	54.83%	278
Vivid	20.91%	106
Subdued	11.05%	56
Grey scale	8.88%	45
Unconventional colour manipulation	4.34%	22
Total	**100.00%**	**507**

Grainy Appearance	Values % of Photos	Count of Photos
No	73.37%	372
Yes	26.63%	135
Total	**100.00%**	**507**

Multiple Images	Values % of Photos	Count of Photos
No	92.90%	471
Yes	7.10%	36
Total	**100.00%**	**507**

Analysis

As Rose has noted, several codes can be attached to each image.[1151] However, the way content analysis breaks images into pieces ignores their relations and interconnectedness as well as the compositional expressiveness.[1152] In this research, each image was attached in all with 15 labels, part of them implying presence, part of them absence of certain type of content or style. For further quantitative analysis, certain coding categories were analysed in relation to other categories following advice given by Rose.[1153]

Personal representation

Regarding personal representation, the results appeared to imply that self-portraits – defined as **medium close-up portraits of the author done by the author – were almost entirely absent**. In fact, out of the medium close-up, medium shot and medium long shot photographs only 5 included identifiable facial features (eyes, nose and mouth):

Shot distance	Identity	Values % of Photos	Count of Photos
Medium close-up	No facial features included	59.09%	52
	Identifiable	5.68%	5
	Only mouth	4.55%	4
	Other	4.55%	4
	Only eye/s	1.14%	1
Medium close-up Total		**75.00%**	**66**
Medium shot	No facial features included	13.64%	12
	Only mouth	1.14%	1
Medium shot Total		**14.77%**	**13**
Medium long shot	No facial features included	6.82%	6

Other	2.27%	2
Only eye/s	1.14%	1
Medium long shot Total	**10.23%**	**9**
Total	**100.00%**	**88**

As mentioned before, the images tagged or titled as self-portraits included also photographs that appeared to have been taken by people other than the author. Of these many were photographs of children. Indeed, out of the 7 portraits (including the 5 medium close-ups) that included identifiable facial features, 6 portrayed children. The only image that portrayed a young woman with identifiable features was a close-up (neck and head) of woman leaning her head backwards on an armchair or sofa (Appendix II: Figure 14). However, the photograph had been framed horizontally in such a way that less than half of the face was actually visible. Moreover, the photograph had been shot from such a low angle that the young woman's face was practically shot from beneath it, compressing features. Thus, even the sole identifiable self-portrait included in the dataset had been constructed in a way that appeared to intentionally obscure the identity of the author. While the identifiable photographs of children may portray the account holders in their early stages, the results of this research appears show that **young Emirati women do not**, for one reason or another, **publish classic medium close-up self-portraits with identifiable features**.

This result, however, does not mean that the young women do not take photographs of themselves and feature themselves in photographs otherwise. In fact, all of the 507 images in the dataset included the author either directly or, as in a few cases, indirectly (shadow or reflection). However, most of the images seemed to include the author merely as "information not intended by the photographer", as Wagner writes.[1154] Indeed, as Rose remarks, the rigid codes of content analysis do not differentiate between shades; a code is either found or not found in an image.[1155] For example, while hand/s appeared in 66.47 percent of all photographs, the shades of code did not distinguish between the photographs focused on a prop held *in* a hand and photographs focused *on* a hand. Thus, a photograph of hand by definition can be considered a self-portrait of sorts but if the focus is on the prop and not the hand then one can assume that the intention might have been for the author not to feature in the photograph at all.

The relationship between facial features and hands can be demonstrated by the way only a combined 2.96 percent of photographs that included hand/s included also mouth, eyes or identifiable features. In contrast, out of the images that did not feature hand/s a combined 16.57 percent included either eye/s, mouth or identifiable features:

Hand	Identity	Values % of Photos	Count of Photos
Yes	No facial features included	61.14%	310
	Other	2.37%	12
	Only mouth	1.38%	7
	Only eye/s	0.99%	5
	Identifiable	0.59%	3
Yes Total		**66.47%**	**337**
No	No facial features included	15.38%	78
	Only eye/s	13.61%	69
	Only mouth	2.17%	11
	Other	1.58%	8
	Identifiable	0.79%	4
No Total		**33.53%**	**170**
Total		**100.00%**	**507**

While majority of the images did not include any facial features, it is also notable how the percentage of "no facial features included" varies between images with (61.14 percent) and without (15.38 percent) hand/s in them. Similarly, 63.31 percent of images with hand/s did not include gaze while only 17.95 percent of images without hands did not include gaze:

Hand	Gaze	Values % of Photos	Count of Photos
Yes	None	63.31%	321
	Indirect	1.97%	10
	Direct	1.18%	6
Yes Total		**66.47%**	**337**
No	None	17.95%	91
	Indirect	9.86%	50
	Direct	5.72%	29
No Total		**33.53%**	**170**
Total		**100.00%**	**507**

The main reason for the apparent division between images of hand/s or facial features appears to be the large number of very close shot distances. Indeed, in **a combined 93.49 percent of all the photographs the shot distance was either extreme close-up, close-up or medium close-up**. In contrast, only a mere 6.51 percent of the images had a longer distance and a wider framing to them. While Bordwell and Thompson point out that there are no definite meanings one can pinpoint for certain framings, angles or distances, as context and function are what make up the meaning of each shot,[1156] it appears as though **the young women have chosen to use extremely close shot**

distances for the purposes of obtaining open screen frames. As noted earlier, **97.44 percent of the photographs had an open screen frame** (meaning that some action was left outside the frame) while only 1.78 percent had an open screen frame. Thus, in the greater part of the images the action – and, indeed, the author – was left out of the images resulting in a variety of images that featured only one part of the author's body.

The short shot distances also affected the analysis of light sources and focus. As **most images were too closely shot to give any indication of how the photographs were lit**, the results of this category of can be considered only for those images that were clear enough to be coded. Hence, following the most prevalent label of "other" was indoor lighting apparent in 29.39 percent of the images and outdoor daylight used in 19.72 percent. Outdoor night time shots constituted for 2.76 percent and candle light shots for 0.99 percent. While soft focus can possibly give an air of romance or nostalgia to an image, as Rose noted,[1157] softness found in the photographs (35.11 percent of all) appeared to have multiple causes from poor equipment to movement and distance. For example, in the latter case, many images were shot so close that they ended up unfocused and blurry. However, while poor equipment (for example, camera phones) could be noticed in the quality of some images, in the images that featured the cameras used (usually taken as a reflection from a mirror) the equipment appeared mostly semi-professional with systems cameras the most prevalent. Moreover, many photographs appeared to have been intentionally softened in post-production. However, **there did not seem to be noteworthy popularity for romanticising self**, as the difference between sharply focused facial features and softly focused ones was quite insignificant:

Focus	Identity	Values % of Photos	Count of Photos
Sharp	Only eye/s	39.39%	39
	Only mouth	8.08%	8
	Identifiable	6.06%	6
Sharp Total		**53.54%**	**53**
Soft	Only eye/s	35.35%	35
	Only mouth	10.10%	10
	Identifiable	1.01%	1
Soft Total		**46.46%**	**46**
Total		**100.00%**	**99**

This was more noteworthy as the difference between sharply and softly focused images not including facial features was a lot more imbalanced with nearly two-thirds focused sharp and less

than one-third focused soft.

Focus	Identity	Values % of Photos	Count of Photos
Sharp	No facial features included	65.11%	265
	Other	2.46%	10
Sharp Total		**67.57%**	**275**
Soft	No facial features included	30.22%	123
	Other	2.21%	9
Soft Total		**32.43%**	**132**
Total		**100.00%**	**407**

Regarding modesty, **shot distances affected the analysis of clothing as well for 60.75 percent of the photographs were so tightly framed as not to feature any**. As mentioned earlier, "revealing" meant exposure of left legs, arms, body and/or hair. In consequence, out of the 23 photographs labelled revealing, majority exposed only hair. Only one image had a glimpse of revealed lower abdomen and few had uncovered upper arms or legs. Hence, as a combined 95.46 percent did not either feature clothes at all, or had the young women dressed in standard or not revealing clothing, it appears that **the users conformed almost entirely to the (rather strictly defined) modesty norms established outside the net**.

In a similar way to clothing, gaze was not featured in 81.26 percent of the photographs. However, it is noteworthy that in the images where it was featured either directly or indirectly, the photographs included in 78.49 percent of cases only eye/s:

Gaze	Identity	Values % of Photos	Count of Photos
Indirect	Only eye/s	51.61%	48
	Other	7.53%	7
	Identifiable	4.30%	4
Indirect Total		**63.44%**	**59**
Direct	Only eye/s	26.88%	25
	Other	6.45%	6
	Identifiable	3.23%	3
Direct Total		**36.56%**	**34**
Total		**100.00%**	**93**

Gaze	Values % of Photos	Count of Photos
Indirect	63.16%	60
Direct	36.84%	35

Total	**100.00%**		**95**

As vast majority of the photographs did not feature gazes and 63.16 percent of the gazes included were indirect, the results seem to suggest that **the "gazing rules"** discussed in earlier sections **may have had an effect on the behaviour of the young women researched**.

Social identity

Concerning social identity, the "*haram*" label in the set comprised the largest portion (29.59 percent) of the photographs with "courtship, marriage, children and family life" becoming second (10.65 percent) and the rest of the variables trailing off steadily as follows: other (7.10 percent), food and dining (6.71 percent), friendship (5.92 percent), photography (5.92 percent), new ICTs (5.72 percent), travel (5.52 percent), animal/s (4.73 percent), media and popular culture (4.73 percent), nationalism (4.14 percent), nature and plants (3.35 percent), none (2.76 percent), education (1.97 percent), religious (0.79 percent) and work (0.39 percent). Among the themes evoked in social identity, images labelled "photography" appeared the most accurate in regards to the research question as they often showed self-portraits taken against a reflecting surface. After some further sub-coding it was found out that among these images, 24 were found to portray the authors in addition to their photographic equipment:

		Values	
Social identity	**Explicit**	**% of Photos**	**Count of Photos**
Photography	Yes	80.00%	24
	No	20.00%	6
Total		**100.00%**	**30**

While these explicit self-portraits indicated that the females *within* them had indeed taken the photographs, in all of the cases the identity of the author remained unknown with the facial features left out completely, overshadowed by a bright flashlight or blurred in postproduction. Considering the rest of the images, though, **these self-portraits**, as far removed as they appeared from the Merriam-Webster definition,[1158] nevertheless **appeared the closest one could get to a the traditional view of a self-portrait**.

While one unexpected results of the research was how badly education and work fared in the social identity category, another surprise though, was **the prevalence of photographs depicting items and suggesting situations considered forbidden**. As the *haram* variable comprised such a

large portion of the set, it was decided to recode this variable with sub-variables of violence, nudity, tattoos, fashion, women's faces, wigs, statues of worship, pork, improperly dressed or dirty children, drugs, alcohol, money and gambling:

Haram	Values % of Photos	Count of Photos
Women's faces	52.00%	78
Fashion	30.67%	46
Tattoos	6.67%	10
Violence	6.00%	9
Money	3.33%	5
Gambling	0.67%	1
Nudity	0.67%	1
Total	**100.00%**	**150**

The further coding results showed that women's faces were with 51.68 percent segment by far the most frequent *haram* content to feature in the dataset. The next biggest segment was fashion with 30.87 percent and 46 photographs consisting mostly of images of fashion accessories. However, coding the sub-variables turned out complicated because of the vague nature of Al-Sauty's definitions as well as significant overlapping. For example, many women had henna tattoos on their hands while at the same displaying fashion accessories, for instance. Thus, **the results for the sub-variables cannot be considered definite or replicable, but merely suggestive of a more general trend**.

Photographic style

For photographic style, it appeared that characteristics considered common in the traditional art of the area were mostly not featured. Indeed, most stylistic features coded such as calligraphy, flora, geometric shapes, colour, multiple images and grainy appearance were used in less than half of the photographs examined.

Calligraphy and text (coded also if it appeared as an essential part of the photograph *within* it on a mobile phone screen, for example) was featured in 245 images or 48.32 percent of the images. However, in most cases, **text was in the shape of digital "watermarks" or stamps**, rather than blessings or *Qur'anic* verses. Furthermore, text was rarely more than an added layer, usually written in common fonts and straight line. As **flora** was featured only in 39 images or 7.69 percent of all coded photographs, **it was obviously not a particularly popular theme** among the young

women. The same appeared to be the case for **geometric shapes as only 15.78 percent of the photographs included any**. Furthermore, **the most popular shape seemed to be heart** although frames superimposed on the images were another style that appeared somewhat frequently. The case was similar for multiple images (featured only in 7.10 percent) and graininess (featured in 26.63 percent). While the graininess of images was coded in order to establish prevalence of mobile images, in the end it was found that **many images appeared were intentionally colour managed to have a grainy look to them**. Indeed, **colour management and manipulation was found to be the most prevalent visual technique** coded with a combined 45.17 percent of the images colour managed in some way. However, a closer inspection appears to suggest that in the end, **establishing authorship through a digital watermark was considered more important than colour management** as 32.74 percent of non-colour managed photographs had some type of calligraphy or text on them versus the 26.23 percent of colour managed images (vivid, subdued, grey scale, unconventional) that had some:

		Values	
Colours2	**Calligraphy**	**% of Photos**	**Count of Photos**
Realistic	No	32.74%	166
	Yes	22.09%	112
Colour manipulated	Yes	26.23%	133
	No	18.93%	96
Total		**100.00%**	**507**

Research limitations

Multiple limitations to the current research affect the representativeness, reliability, replicability and validity of it.

The representativeness of the research subjects of the study was foremost affected by the Internet censorship that limits access to Flickr in the UAE. As the website appears to have been blocked since the end of 2006 in the majority of the country,[1159] only the young women living, working or travelling in places with unobstructed access can maintain their Flickr presence, continue to upload content and take part in the groups and communities. Because the geographic limits of Internet censorship are quite unclear, it is impossible to determine how representative of the average young Emirati women the current sample of this research is. Despite this, one must not assume that all the users come from social elites as young women from rather more disadvantageous backgrounds can also have access to the uncensored Flickr if they happen to work

in companies located in one of the free zones, for example, or have the ability to bypass the block by other means.

In addition to access, though, the young women participating must have also had both accesses to economic resources and high-tech equipment as well as knowledge on how to use them. However, because those users of BanaaT UAE who had not identified themselves as females or residents of the UAE were excluded from the study, the research may have also ignored a significant portion of female Emirati users who may have chosen to publish in Flickr without information on their gender and location. As a result, the research subjects chosen may have been people with stronger feelings regarding their nationality and gender. Still, it can also be reasonable to assume that the users and the images chosen for the research represent a random subset of images (recommended by Wagner, for example),[1160] but there is no way of knowing for sure. Furthermore, including images uploaded by users not identifying as females located in the UAE might have skewed the results as well.

Rose writes that "content analysis must address all the images *relevant* to the research question" placing strong emphasis on representativeness of the data, or research objects.[1161] Representative data does not automatically mean analysing every important image, though.[1162] For this reason, there are sampling strategies that at the same time reduce the size of the research making it more manageable without neglecting validity. As Rose notes, variation affects sample size, which in turn affects the reliability of the research:[1163]

> If there is absolutely no variation, a sample of one will be representative. If though there are a whole range of extreme variations, the sample size must be large enough to contain examples of those extremes.[1164]

Furthermore:

> The sample should not be so large that it overwhelms the resources you have available for analysing it.[1165]

As mentioned before, out of all the photographic material, only pictures tagged, titled or looking like apparent self-portraits (the definition of self-portrait included all photographs that appeared to have the female author in them) were taken into account in the final analysis. In the end, 507 images were separated for more detailed coding from a sample of 8,248 images. While, the images coded represented only 6.15 percent of the sample and the users who created them only 7.06 percent of the 1,728 BanaaT UAE group members, the reliability was not compromised as *all* images that appeared to feature the author were in the end coded. Furthermore, even images that did not appear to feature the author were taken into account if the title or the tags suggested clearly otherwise. Thus, by definition, all variations central to the research question were included in the research as

well.

Regarding reliability of this research, because Flickr allows users to determine privacy status of their images, only images in the public domain were analysed. Consequently, the reliable results apply only to photographs displayed in the public sphere. However, because of certain features of the Internet and new ICTs such as anonymity and easy copying, it must be admitted that in the end, it is impossible for the researcher to determine reliably whether photographs researched were truly self-portraits and not copies of someone else's work, for example. While it was assumed that photographs without clear clues of outside participation were indeed taken by the female Emirati account holders, the users might have also lied about their gender and/or location. Yet, this did not seem to be the case in majority of the photographs as gender was often very clear in the images. Indeed, regarding differentiating males and females in close-up images based on polished nails, made-up eyes or hairless legs, the study relied on quite stereotypical view of gendered sexuality and its representations. At the same time, though, the society of the UAE has also very rigid gender lines. In fact, the maintaining of gender lines is such a concern in the nation that posing and dressing in other gender's clothing is considered a severe violation of cultural values.[1166] Thus, one could pretty surely assume that, for example, a mouth glossed with a heavy layer of lipstick did really belong to a female and not to a transvestite male. Similarly, it was fair to assume that a pair of feet with pink socks on them belonged to a female.

Rose advices visual researchers to ask multitude of questions about the images analysed regarding content, composition, material form, relation to other images and series, viewer's point-of-view, vantage point, colour, technology used, genre characteristics and its relation to them, signifying components, signifying knowledges, excluded view points, empowerment and disempowerment, stability between components and contradictions in it.[1167] However, for several reasons, manageability the most important of them, all these aspects could not be coded or analysed within this research. Regarding composition, for example, spatial organisation (volume, relation, connections, direction, lines, shape and rhythm) appeared too multifaceted to be analysed through content analysis even if one could notice some carefully arranged scenes among the snapshots. Furthermore, angles used in the photographs seemed to be most often affected (and limited) by handheld cameras. In addition, coding screen ratio, for example, did not appear useful regarding the research question.

Regarding replicability, content analysis tells the researcher little of the production or the reception of images, however, concentrating only on "the *compositional* modality of the site of the *image* itself".[1168] For obvious reasons, this can be a problem regarding scientific replicability as for

the purposes of validity differing interpretations may have to be ignored.[1169] To avoid this, Wagner has advised in his essay "Avoiding Error" to "use several analysts" to "expand the process of conceptualization far beyond what it would be for an individual alone" as a "consensus in which some images are interpreted can suggest an important area of conceptual clarity".[1170] Similarly, Rose writes that the codes must be completely clear-cut and unmistakable for the research should be able to be repeated similarly by some other coder, making the process "replicable".[1171] Advising to do a pilot coding with at least two different coders on a small sample to test the original coding sheet and make sure that the coding categories are clear.[1172] Unfortunately, however, for the purposes of manageability, again, multiple coders could not be used during this research. While multiple opinions of culturally aware individuals were consulted on certain problematic photographs, for most parts the coding was done by the researcher. Consequently, the replicability of this study may have suffered.

However, answering Wagner's question: "Are these images representative of the phenomena studied, or just a personal vision of it?",[1173] one must hope that this research has not resulted in a widely skewed personal vision. After all, as Rose contends, reliable connections between the content and the context can guarantee valid conclusions.[1174] Notes Banks:

> Clearly it is not merely a question of looking closely but a question of bringing knowledges to bear upon the image.[1175]

For establishing valid connections between the data and the context in which it appears, the first sections of this research were devoted to cultural context and gathering the knowledges Banks alluded to.[1176] The last parts of the research will be used to discuss the contexts introduced earlier in the light of the results. Hence, to answer the question whether other young Emirati women photograph similar images, one can presume that the results could be applicable at least to the young Emirati women as a whole, if not to other age groups, genders or nationalities. Indeed, while a multicultural population inhabits the UAE, it seems as though the national Emirati population has remained somewhat homogenous, or become even more cohesive under the stress of increasing expatriate population. Thus, one may assume that the visual means of expression may have also become more cohesive. Unfortunately, for this research though, individual attitudes could not be established to guide in analysis, but the research has to rely on "collective" expressions of cultural and religious identity.

V Discussion: Broader cultural meanings of self-portraits

While photographs are in some official contexts such as identification considered unambiguous, they nevertheless share a certain vagueness with "gestures, and other systems of representation and symbolization", remarks Wagner.[1177] In addition, as Graham-Brown has noted, "photographic images do not exist in a vacuum" but "have various layers of significance, contained within the images themselves and in the context in which they appear".[1178] Furthermore, different exhibition locations have "their own economics, their own disciplines, their own rules for how their particular sort of spectator should behave, including whether and how they should look", remarks Rose.[1179] Indeed, a layer of significance can be manifested in the form the photographic images is presented, the context in which it is exhibited and viewed, the captions that are next to it, the aesthetic values that created it, the ideologies that shaped it and the relationships of power that were played when taking it.[1180] Moreover, another layer is added to the photographic image by the researchers studying it.

According to Seppänen, content analysis has been criticised for not being able to satisfactorily deal with cultural aspects of images, the links that bind them to broader cultural contexts.[1181] Indeed, as Rose points out, content analysis says nothing about the production and the "audiencing" of images because it assumes an air of objectivity.[1182] Furthermore, content analysis does not "demand reflexivity" from the researcher.[1183] As meaning can vary from one audience to another and the associations and motivations for each image are known only to the author – a researcher utilising content analysis can only attempt to trace them – the importance of establishing a correct context needs to be taken into account when discussing how and what to analyse. According to Hall, there are processes of "encoding" and "decoding" in all communications.[1184] Yet, the "meaning structures" of both the encoder and the decoder are rarely balanced, leading to miscommunication, which is often the result of dissimilarity between the parties.[1185] Hall writes, that the usual analytical distinction given to denotation (usually universally understood factual meaning of signs) and connotation (shifting, more culturally nuanced meanings of signs) is faulty as "There will be very few instances in which signs organized in a discourse signify *only* their 'literal' (that is, near-universally consensualized) meaning".[1186]

Moreover, discussing theories of Michel Foucault, Rose points out that "Intertextuality refers to the way that the meanings of any one discursive image or text depend not only on that one text or image, but also on the meanings carried by other images and texts".[1187] However, utilising Rose's compositional interpretation to describe photographs,[1188] one must take into account that this type of visual connoisseurship demands vast contextual knowledge. Indeed, as the old-media

"viewer" or "reader" has transformed into "user" with the new ICTs, according to Lister et al.,[1189] it appears as though the move has also transformer intertextuality to intervisuality. Unfortunately, the connoisseur is as good as her associative intervisuality. Moreover, despite the suggestions of meanings and associations a researcher might find in a piece of work, there is no guarantee that author had any form conscious knowledge of them.

Postmodern styles and technologies

According to Lister et al. several changes have been tied to the development of new media and new ICTs, among them fragmentation of the old geopolitical order, increasing globalisation, change from industrial age to post-industrial age (especially in the West) as well as change from modernity to postmodernity.[1190] Moreover, there are multiple distinct positions in the discussion surrounding new media and postmodernism.[1191] For instance, write Lister et al., there are postmodernist identity politics in which new media is only one site and contributor to continually constructed and contested shifting identities,[1192] which the consumerist "postmodern media subject" constructs through (media) consumption.[1193] Similarly, there are post-structuralist theories of self, in which the subject is constructed through preceding discourses of which new ICTs can help the subject to escape by letting her to construct her own discourses.[1194] Furthermore, postmodernism can be viewed as a crisis in which new ICTs have led to a mediated "hyperreal" completely disconnected from surrounding reality or knowledge where seeing is not believing anymore as we have entered the time of simulacrum, in Jean Baudrillard's words.[1195] Despite broad changes, though, new ICTs have not fulfilled neither utopian nor dystopian views espoused on previous decades.[1196] On the contrary, as Lister et al. note, in the postmodern "the past has become a vast reservoir of styles and possibilities that are permanently available for reconstruction and revival".[1197] However, the essential nature of change is hardly new, even though the constant flux represents interesting questions for a media researcher.[1198] As Williams has written, each culture includes "dominant, residual, and emergent elements" with fluctuating importance pushing and pulling them between periphery and centre stage.[1199] Furthermore, past dominant cultural strains can be used as resources "to challenge and resist dominant cultural practices and values" at another time.[1200]

In addition to this, cultural influences are also copied between different geographical areas. For example, in the West, Arab-Islamic artistic traditions, motifs and techniques were imitated during the Middle Ages and the premodern times, according to Grabar.[1201] Later on, as Western tourism began, Muslim cultures affected fine arts such as writing, painting and architecture of

"minds tired of the classical tradition".[1202] While the local contexts often eluded the westerners, the influences were absorbed into several fields nevertheless.[1203] Vice versa, Ernst questions, whether, for example, "occidentalist" portrayals of Madonna and the Christ, created by Muslim artists and sponsored by Muslim rulers, can be even considered Islamic.[1204] Although Middle Eastern artists have embraced local visual traditions considered authentic since the rise of Arab nationalism in the late 20th century,[1205] it appears as though the "Islamicated" content has somewhat trumped traditional, handcrafted mediums previously considered "non-art".[1206] Indeed, it seems as though, in the UAE at least, the local art scene is still very much trying to make sense of the multiculturalism that has washed over most of the local culture. Furthermore, while artists and artisans have been very mobile throughout centuries, moving on the edges of cultures from one point of cultural mix to the next,[1207] the new ICTs have made actual travelling somewhat outdated, expanding access to different cultures and histories.[1208] For Muslim artists, art and Islamic culture, writes Ernst, this has meant that:

> There are Asian painters, including Muslims, who use strictly modern, Western modes of abstract painting, as well as Americans and Europeans who utilize forms associated with traditional Asian art, including those associated historically with Islam. There are artists in Asia employing media and styles of modern abstract painting to express traditional subjects and artists using traditional styles and media to express modern, more "Western" subjects.[1209]

Going even further, Ernst contemplates whether each medium has an inherent culturally bound style.[1210] If this is the case, it seems as though the techniques, styles and media associated with Islamic art (calligraphy, geometry, colour, stylized flora, figural decorations)[1211] could result in Islamic art regardless of the artists' cultural background. Or, conversely, a Muslim artist with a Western medium – oil painting, digital imaging technologies – in her hands would produce Western art.[1212] While the medium of photography is old,[1213] it can hardly be considered traditional to the ME and thus, all forms of photography could, in line with Ernst's notion, be considered Western.

Since the late 1990s, both the governments of the UAE as well as singular emirates have aimed to relocate the nation to the better side of the "digital divide" cutting through the ME.[1214] Fighting above its weight class, the UAE has become the most technologically networked nation in the area.[1215] Combined with "mass amateurization" of visual arts and photography, it would be easy to consider all resulting content Western, at least at their most technical level. The picture appears more varied than that, though, and one is inclined to regard the results of constantly renewing digital technologies and culturally motivated traditional content as "hybrid" art,[1216] which has made use of available techniques from culturally specific starting point. Traditionally (and religiously)

venerated calligraphy,[1217] for example, was so fundamentally bound to manual methods, that introducing movable type was delayed in MENA region,[1218] and computerised typography has little to do with the centuries old traditions of Islamic calligraphy that included years of patient studying, varying styles and techniques as well as visual expression for mythical connection to the divine.[1219] In fact, digital watermarks so widespread in the research data were hardly blessings or *Qur'anic* verses, but more often an added layer, usually written in common fonts and straight line. However, the watermarks may have had multiple motivations from technical and technological (ease of application) to the social (fear of being copied). Indeed, establishing authorship appeared to be one of the most prominent motivations for watermarks or "stamps" added to photographs even though anonymity used to be a norm for past artists and calligraphers.[1220]

Similarly, the technical possibilities photo-manipulation and digital technologies have to be considered regarding other research results. While geometric patterns may have been used in the past because of their practical applicability on all kinds of mediums from architecture to ivory,[1221] applying geometric patterns to photographs requires either existing geometric shapes to be photographed or enough computer application know-how to create such patterns digitally. Hence, it was no wonder, that only 15.78 percent of the self-portraits included geometric shapes, or that the most popular outline appeared to be simple heart, a western visual shape. Likewise, exuberant and prevalent use of colour manipulation had most likely more to do with easy colour management techniques of multiple computer softwares than local sandy landscape or *Qur'anic* depictions of Paradise, as noted earlier.[1222] While graininess, featured in 26.63 percent of the self-portraits, might have been a sign of prevalent mobile images, it was more likely a combination of technical, artistic ambition and easy image manipulation as many images appeared were intentionally colour managed to have a grainy look to them. All in all, though, digital technologies do not simply affect the medium and content of images. For example, Al-Sauty thinks that digital photography benefits especially female photographers, who can now avoid leaving their studios to process or print the pictures.[1223] Thus, digital technologies appear to have increased local female photographers range both artistically, methodically and socially.

House of mirrors

According to Shapiro, one can find internalised, naturalised ideologies in photographs, for example:[1224]

> ...criminology has become a science there has been a tendency to look for *generalizations which support a*

representation of the criminal with other modes of discourse in focusing attention on the criminal as *a type of person* and [...] *away from the historical and structural conditions involved...*[1225]

Similarly, it appears that Muslim women in photography have become a distinct category supported by generalisations and ideologically skewed representations – such as the portrayal of the whole Orient as a sexually available female[1226] – with very little regard for individual differences, historical or structural conditions involved. In addition, as Dewdney and Lister point out, teenagers are often considered challenging for having a clearly identifiable social culture that is often "reduced to [a commoditised] caricature".[1227] In consequence, it seems as though the social category of young Emirati women is a minefield of misrepresentations akin to a house of mirrors where it is impossible to trace the origin of reflections.

Photographs were an essential part of colonialism and often used in compliance with geopolitical aims.[1228] However, Hight and Sampson remind that not all photographs created in the colonial context adhere to a particular set of "racial stereotypes and markers of inferiority".[1229] Indeed, essentialising colonialist photography does not further understanding on these practices but merely repeats the same mistakes.[1230] A large part of the photography was simply motivated by curiosity and fascination with the unknown, unfamiliar and strange.[1231] In order to understand the different "other", many photographers came to use familiar aesthetic practices that enabled the colonialist viewer to distance him or herself from the colonised and, at the same time, gaze upon the wonders on offer from within an established cultural window such as the picturesque.[1232] However, the native peoples aimed to counter this colonialist visual rhetoric throughout the history of photography in the ME;[1233] for example, in 1900 Ottoman officials banned the sales of photographs of Muslim women.[1234] Moreover, according to Graham-Brown, the natives rarely co-operated with the colonialists photographers.[1235] Regarding type photographs, for instance, J.E. Hannauer, a clergy man and amateur photographer complained that "many people [...] object to being photographed with their heads bare".[1236]

Unsurprisingly, then, the local photography assistants soon established their own studios to compete in the profitable markets with their own representations.[1237] However, as mentioned earlier, the few female photographers working in the field earlier were restricted to serving all-female clientele, postproduction or taking candid pictures within the family structure.[1238] Thus, one can quite confidently state that possibilities for internalising colonialist visual rhetoric through generations of female photographers or archives of photographic records appear unlikely for the young Emirati women studied in this research. Consequently, enduring caricatures of orientalist photography such as odalisques and harem scenes with multiple wives and dark featured eunuchs

were not found within the data.[1239] While some photographs depicted traditional clothing and decorations[1240] (usually on a young girl, Appendix II: Figures 15 and 16), nothing comparable to colonialist costume or handicrafts types were found.[1241] In the end, the only common feature between colonialist picturesque photographs and Emirati self-portraits appeared to be the use of various paraphernalia as a symbolic signifier.[1242] This finding, however, does not necessitate historical continuity between the two photographic practices. Indeed, it is most likely the result of the ongoing technological, social and institutional changes that have gradually positioned the young as the consumer decision-makers of their families in the UAE and elsewhere.[1243] Combined with the financial bubble of the early 2000s, many youths in the UAE had their consumption supported by their parents who themselves have lived through an incredible increase in wealth. This combination appears to have led to a situation in which the perception of others counted ever more.[1244] This could be seen from the photographs analysed as well, as 30.87 percent of the photographs labelled *haram* featured fashion accessories, for instance.[1245] In fact, the prevalence of various paraphernalia appeared to conform to Dewdney and Lister's observation that the young use photographs as a way to "map out" their relationship to mainstream culture:[1246]

> …meanings, beyond obvious use and function, are coded in commodities and expressed through patterns of consumption.[1247]

Dewdney and Lister note that all paraphernalia are

> ...carriers of symbolic meaning and to represent them photographically may well be to signal this symbolic value for a variety of reasons, desires and aspirations.[1248]

While these values are culturally dependent,[1249] the photographs themselves are used ubiquitously as "a means of representing and communicating value".[1250]

Snapshot: Tool of power and belonging

According to Dewdney and Lister, one major motive of everyday snapshot culture is to "validate relationships",[1251] and as Graham-Brown has established, women did begin taking candid photographs within their families right after handheld cameras became available in the ME.[1252] Musello states that family photography can serve multiple purposes for both taking and viewing photographs can be used as catalysts for social interaction.[1253] Continues Musello: "…the *act* itself *signifies* that people involved and/or the event they are engaged in are important to him and 'worthy' of being recorded and remembered":[1254]

> Photos may serve families thus either by graphically *depicting* bonds and relationships or by stimulating and

facilitating the *enactment* of these bonds.[1255]

Family photographs serve the purpose of documentation, the idea to "capture" and "record 'appropriate' elements of family life" that will help preserve memories through "key" photographs.[1256] Repetitive and routine documentation of shared activities, such as different rites of passage, record a change, giving the photographer and the entire family "a sense of time".[1257]

Despite their documentary nature, however, candid photographs have contradictory "evidentiary value" that requires intimate knowledge of events and people depicted to understand the content fully for contextual settings are often "ambiguous or undecipherable", though common, especially in travel photographs.[1258] In fact, familiar surroundings and everyday actions are often trumped by less frequent moments.[1259] Furthermore, the significance and context changes with fading memories and transformations within the family.[1260] As Flickr's self-proclaimed aim is to "**help people make their content available to the people who matter to them**", the photo-sharing site appears to fulfil the same tasks usually assigned for an actual tangible photo-album.[1261] Indeed, among the "All time 150 most popular tags" the three most popular appear to be "wedding" (with 10,674,591 uploads), "travel" (7,926,587 uploads) and "party" (7,840,486 uploads), a curious similarity that seems to prove Musello's argument that "'Special' and 'positive' activities are emphasized", especially celebrations of milestones achieved.[1262] Flickr also fulfils other tasks assigned to family photographs, for example, acting as "surrogates" for geographically separated people by complementing correspondence over great distances.[1263] Noticeably, it also underlines the importance of being seen, enabling exhibitionism on a global scale.

The shooting of snapshot photographs is guided by beliefs internalised at a young age, stemming from family norms with a clear idea of "proper" use of camera:[1264]

> …what pictures are proper for public display, those with whom you share your photos and those with whom you do not.[1265]

After all, as Susan Sontag asserted: "Photography [...] is mainly a social rite, a defence against anxiety, and a tool of power".[1266] Indeed, family photographs are a process of few select individuals, events, topics and locations that play an essential part in creating, maintaining and presenting a cohesive group identity with personality.[1267] While children are the most often documented people when young, the levels of family photography decline after the first five years only to resurge when the children reach adolescence and start taking photographs themselves.[1268] In Dewdney and Lister opinion, the main reasons for photography's appeal to youth is "its ability readily to provide images of themselves during time, and through a period, of social transition".[1269]

This process of identification and positioning in larger cultural context happens mostly through shared practices with peers as race, gender, family background and material circumstances are "tested against the institutional possibilities and expectations available".[1270] Moreover:

> The exploration of identity through its signifying practices has a special relationship to photography since photography is itself a signifying practice.[1271]

Regarding technical considerations, Dewdney and Lister remark that for young people social reasons were far more important and tended to overshadow the process of choosing which images to develop further.[1272] Thus, photographs were essentially assessed by the "intimate cultural valuing of the images" by their peers.[1273] Remarkably, portrayals of others were valued on technical aspects such as exposure and focus while portrays of the author herself were valued solely on "subjective flattery".[1274] However, it appeared as though throughout their development the youths became increasingly unwilling to print technically bad negatives as their experience grew.[1275]

Somewhat similar development and emphasising could be found among the young women of BanaaT UAE, also. For example, one supplementary reason for the prevalence of extreme close-up, close-up and medium close-up shots may have been the lack of tripods, remotes and assistance. While few photographs included hints of the presence of supporting structures (for example, Appendix II: Figure 17), it appeared as though most users had not invested in tripods to support their handheld cameras. Hence, without assistance or automated/manual remote, the shot distance of most self-portraits was limited to arms' length. However, one distinct difference between the youths researched by Dewdney and Lister in late 1980s and the youths studied here in late 2000s is, is the use of digital technologies. No more are the amounts of photographs limited by laborious techniques, inhibitively expensive materials or equipment. Indeed, even the cheapest camera phones allow for closer to a hundred photographs, while Flickr allows the users to upload up to 200 images each.[1276] Thus, one can assume that the threshold for publishing technically less ambitious photographs might have decreased in the past twenty years.

While the social identity sub-category of photography was included in only 30 photographs or 5.92 percent of all self-portraits studied, it is important to note that out of the 122 BanaaT UAE members a total of 25 or 18.85 percent had included at least one image of them that included photographic equipment (usually reflected from a mirror, for instance). As these photographs appeared the closest one could get to the traditional view of a self-portrait,[1277] this seems to suggest that photographer's identity played a part in these young women's lives. While Sontag may have considered all photographs insignificant "frozen moments",[1278] these photographs studied appeared to have gotten their meaning not from viewers and their recontextualising gaze, as Barthes would

have it,[1279] but from the possibility the authors had to take them and put them on exhibit. As Montgomery remarked, new technologies and new forums it has created have become "indispensable allies in the quest for identity" for many youths.[1280] With multiple tools for "self-reflection and documentation" to display "to the infinite audiences of cyberspace",[1281] which – regarding visual culture and photography – is not restricted to language barriers.

Role of identity in bit-isised world

> A bit has no color, size, or weight, and it can travel at the speed of light. It is the smallest atomic element in the DNA of information. It is a state of being: on or off, true or false, up or down, in or out, black or white. For practical purposes we consider a bit to be a 1 or 0.[1282]
>
> – Nicholas Negroponte in *Being Digital*

The Internet is part of a wider societal "change from atoms to bits", wrote Negroponte already in 1995.[1283] In a "bit-isised" or digitised economy, more and more processes that used to be dealt with in analogue form are done digitally.[1284] Manovich writes that the modern society from 1950s onwards begun to shift towards a service and information society, reaching "a so-called post-industrial" status by the 1970s and then, by Castells definition, becoming a network society.[1285] According to Sturken and Cartwright, the Internet, and more specifically the World Wide Web, grew out to become a forum for personal expression and political activity in the shadow of commercial business, enabling cheap self-publication that "changed the power relations between producers and consumers in the mass media."[1286] In these new circumstances of social conduct, members of the "Digital Generation" have become the defining users with their identities at the centre stage.[1287]

> Castells defines identity as a
>
> ...process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or related set of cultural attributes, that is/are given priority over other sources of meaning. For a given individual [...] there may be a plurality of identities.[1288]

Such a plurality can also be a source of stress, when different identities contradict each other in self-representation and social action. Identities become identities through individualisation even though "identities can also be originated from dominant institutions, they become identities only when and if social actors internalize them, and construct their meaning around this internalization",[1289] writes Castells, at the same time distinguishing between roles and identity.[1290] While identities organise meaning, roles organize functions.[1291] In a network society meaning is organised around "a primary identity", which is self-sustaining across time and space.[1292] However, all identities are constructed

and influenced by history, geography and biology, productive and reproductive institutions, collective memory and personal fantasies, power apparatuses as well as religious revelations.[1293] Individuals, social groups and societies then rearrange these materials and their meaning "according to social determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their social structure and in their space/time framework".[1294] At the same time, though, according to Lister et al. it is important to distinguish between identity and subjectivity, the former, which the writers define in the context of new media to concern constructed aspects of one's interests and preferences put on display.[1295] Although the terms are "often used interchangeably", subjectivity has broader basis in the historical and cultural contexts of each individual thus being more fundamental to one's sense of self.[1296]

Consequently, it appears as though Castells' identity equals more or less Lister et al.'s subjectivity while Castells' role appears to overlap with Lister et al.'s identity only partly. Either way, it appears as though in the pluralism enabled by new ICTs, identity/role creation has become easier, but the identities/roles also less stable.[1297] With more possibilities for change, it remains a question whether the core subjectivity/identity has also become less stable, more fragmented than at the time of mass media. In fact, the Internet has been characterized by Sturken and Cartwright as "a potentially dangerous medium", especially because it allows people to pretend to be someone else, as the users are not actually seen.[1298] However, not all analysts are agreeing on the level of danger involved. For instance, the cultural theorist and psychologist Sherry Turkle has argued that "the shifting of roles and identity on the Internet is indicative of the ways in which many people experience identity as a set of roles that can be mixed, matched, and imaginatively transformed".[1299] In this perspective, the identity play experienced on the Internet has a real life counterpart in the way our daily selves have "multiple, fragmentary, and complex" sides to them.[1300]

To be sure, as Montgomery points out, adolescents often use media carefully to nurture a "private self" when alone.[1301] Many teenagers felt that the lack of visual appearance allowed them to "be their 'true selves'":[1302]

> Internet role-playing thus allows people to create parallel or alternative personae that can facilitate their negotiation and transformation of identity in real life.[1303]

According to Susannah Stern, for example, teen girls use their homepages for "self-clarification" to "explore their beliefs, values, and self-perceptions" using variety of tools aiming to understand, who they are and who they will become.[1304] In this sense, homepages are used as a "virtual equivalent" of bedroom walls with pictures and writings.[1305] Similarly, for the many young Emirati women studied, the Flickr photo gallery may act as a substitute bedroom wall of sorts, as photographs of the younger, more photogenic future leaders can be easily found in the Internet, virtual idolizing has

become technically easy. Besides, spreading actual posters and photographs of crown princes on bedroom walls may have been considered inappropriate for the young women in question. Indeed, the common thinking seems to conclude that the role-playing enabled by the Internet is purely for fun, or as Turkle argues, something very typical to our nature.[1306] However, a differentiation must be made between voluntary and forced role-playing with its intrinsic anonymity. For in regions where public censorship is strongly reinforced, anonymity and role-playing might be a necessary part of virtual conduct. Furthermore, if people really do like role-playing as much as it is often assumed, then why would anyone want to pose as them and not as something better, more fine-tuned or completely fabricated? Indeed, it appears as though the rise in social networking sites such as Facebook suggests that people are more attached to their cultural primary identities than many new media theorists let us believe. Thus, for example, expressions of national identity spill over to virtual space, as was the case in this research (Appendix II: Figures 18 and 19).

Embodiment of self

'And then a few more days go by, and he's going to demand that you two exchange pictures, but in the end he'll get impatient and he'll send it along even though you never send yours.[1307]

– Rajaa Alsanea, *Girls of Riyadh*

Grady notes that "the key in coding images is to identify just what the presence or the absence of some element in an image may indicate".[1308] Thus, identifying the presence or absence of, for example, face can be meaningful and should be considered a variable. However, after coding, the difficult part will be analysing *what* exactly an absence or a presence signifies. As noted in previous sections, portrayal and behaviour of Emirati women is undergoing major transformation. The same way female entertainers of the early 20th century changed the norms of women's representations,[1309] the current wave of media technologies and global content has changed attitudes towards women's photography and portrayal. While the older generations of the ruling classes still appear unwilling to expose themselves, the younger generations seem to take less issue with exposure. Thus, one would assume that publishing self-portraits in the Internet would no longer be such an issue.

However, according to Hall, even a regular head-and-shoulders passport photo is "not without ideological significance", as it implies prisoners, the hunted and wanted men.[1310] On the contrary, Shapiro states that portraiture as a genre tended "to be reserved for those in middling-to-high statuses".[1311] While, according to Musello, in the context of family photographs portrays can be idealised ("formal" and "posed" usually by professional, person "at their 'best'"), demystified

(minority among the three types; 'alternative' images of self-parody or surprise attack used to embarrass and demean) or natural (surprise "candids" in ordinary everyday contexts).[1312] Indeed;

> ...highest ideal in home mode portraiture is that of [...] the 'most natural' and 'complimentary' portrait possible.[1313]

While the goals of both natural and complimentary appear contradictory, the self-portraits researched did appear to fit into Musello's "natural" category for there did not seem to be significant popularity for romanticising self (35.11 percent of the photographs were shot with soft focus) nor were there professionally shot self-portraits either. Although, it must be noted that the content analysis applied did not differentiate between purposeful and accidental soft focus. Thus, the conclusion drawn could be vastly different had *all* of the soft focuses used been deliberate. Nevertheless, because the only identifiable self-portrait did not depict a classic head-and-shoulders photograph, as mentioned by Hall, the discourse on head-and-shoulders portraiture and its ideological background (especially in Western context) hardly touches this research.

To be sure, as the results of this research showed that young Emirati women avoided publishing classic medium close-up self-portraits with identifiable features, the majority of the self-portraits depicted severely cut parts of female bodies that most often portrayed either hand/s, eye/s or mouth. From the Western cultural perspective, writes Pollock,

> To cut up the body is to enact both a symbolic and psychic violence upon that body as imago, an ideal that is the basis of self. Since the later nineteenth century, [...] we have been gradually accustomed to the cutting up of specifically feminine bodies; indeed, their cut-up-ness has come to be a sign of that femininity.[1314]

As "visuality" – the various ways of seeing, looking, gazing, spectating, observing, being seen and unseen – is culturally constructed with specified meanings,[1315] at first, Pollock's assessment does not appear to suit the culturally specific context of the UAE. However, as discussed earlier, conflicting interpretations of Western "ocularcentrism" versus Islamic auditory traditions do not bear closer inspection.[1316] In addition, Western "scopic regime", as Martin Jay notes, has entwined with progress from premodernity to modernity and postmodernity.[1317] Thus, Pollock's argument, carried forth with Western cultural imperialism, might have had an actual, though rather unquantifiable, effect on the self-portraits of the young Emirati women. Conversely, however, the more likely explanation for the cut-up features are the ancient, yet still prevalent conceptions of aniconism and local gazing rules, mentioned in previous sections, that, considered through the prism of female clothing, for example, can be considered to "cut up" women's bodies, covering most and leaving certain cuts open for inspection. Moreover, as Al-Sauty advices, when a female is needed for a commercial shoot, should the picture be extreme close-up of the appropriate body part

such as lips, for example.[1318] However, contrasting Graham-Brown's view that cultures with patriarchal control are more likely to control female visibility with Pollock's view of feminine "cut-up-ness", the cultural route with which one comes to the conclusion appears somewhat trivial as in both cases the women end up in (metaphorical) pieces.

Indeed, in the research data, hands seemed to be often used as an alternative for more easily identifiable facial features as only a combined 2.96 percent included both facial features and hand/s. Why? According to Biedermann, hand is the most common part of the human body represented in symbolism with a multitude of meanings depending on, for instance, the position of hand and fingers.[1319] In the imagery of the New Testament, and Christian mythology as a whole, human figures are often represented holding something in their hand, which symbolizes their function or mission.[1320] In Islamic symbolism, the amount of fingers (five) is associated with the five pillars of faith: profession of faith[1321], ritual prayer (five times a day), *zakat* or almsgiving, fasting during Ramadan, and *hajj*, pilgrimage.[1322] Furthermore, within Islamic religion, five is used in numerous different divisions (for example, five groups of actions[1323] and five prerequisites of prayer[1324]). Biedermann writes that left and right hand are part of a dual system, where "often although not always", right side has been considered more positive.[1325] He believes that this is because right-handedness is more common in general, and as a result, it was considered better and yielding luck.[1326]

In cultures effected by the Islamic religion, Fatima's blessing hand is one of the most common symbolic figures, usually used as an amulet to protect against the evil eye.[1327] Fatima is a patron saint of fertility, a source of blessing, *baraka*, and a mentor between the God and humans.[1328] Günther argues that her epithets, which include, for example, the Resplendent, the supreme Mary and the Shining one, *al-Zahra'*, signify that "she represents the female ideal of Islam".[1329] Indeed, the legend of Fatima was resurrected during the Islamic revolution of Iran, during which she symbolized the female role model, "committed fighter" and "opposition to the Western woman pursuing only her individual emancipation".[1330] However, again, the prominence of symbolism for hands does not necessitate that the young Emirati women had any conscious knowledge of the meanings given. After all, content analysis merely tells whether an image includes the coded artefact, not how or why it was included. In fact, as Biedermann has noted, pictures of decorated hands can be mere sign that these women are part of a prominent class with enough leisure time and resources to decorate themselves Appendix II: Figure 20).[1331] Conversely, the images of hands may simply be an expression of the young women's artistic creativity channelled in a socially normative ways that do not expose their true identities or render them immodest in any way.

After all, local women have often been seen as the embodiments of national ideologies, vessels of "cultural continuity" essential for passing down knowledges and values.[1332] Writes Graham-Brown:

> women and photographic images of women have often been used as symbols for concepts which have little or no relation to their identity as women or as individuals.[1333]

From an anthropological point-of-view, native woman was often considered a "repository of traditional ways", a concealed source of ancient knowledge and perhaps even matriarchal power.[1334] A source that, in Algeria, for example, resulted in tug-of-war between the colonised and the colonisers of who had the right to define how local women were to be perceived for the state of women was considered to represent the state of the entire society.[1335] The purer the better.[1336] The control of men over women was often "encapsulated" in photographs that portrayed acceptable appearances:[1337]

> While certain groups of women have become very conscious of the nature of this imagery and the need to exert more control over it, generally speaking men continue to dominate the process of creating 'acceptable' public images of women, images which for the most part are internalized by women themselves.[1338]

As Berger succinctly puts it: "*men act* and *women appear*".[1339]

However, in the case of female self-portraits women both *act* and *appear*. Even though majority of the self-portraits had been shot with extremely close shot distances perhaps for the purposes of obtaining open screen frames (leaving most of the author outside the frame), they could nevertheless be considered *self-portraits*. Thus, the authors must have had some sort of awareness of being seen as a consequence of the photographs. After all, Al-Sauty thinks that the initial resistance towards photography stemmed from fear of private and personal lives being exposed.[1340] Similarly, it can also be noted that the young women are not doing their very best to act in evasive ways in from of cameras.[1341] Nor are they trying to avoid all paths to *haram*,[1342] or publishing these photographs for "good" and "strong" reasons, as defined by Al-Sauty.[1343] In fact, the mere act of including oneself in a photograph evokes a need to be seen, which in itself suggests a connection to unquestionably postmodern malaise of sorts for David Harvey states that visuality is the defining characteristic of postmodernity:

> ...there has emerged an attachment to surface rather than roots, to collage rather than in-depth work, to superimposed quoted images rather than worked surfaces, to a collapsed sense of time and space rather than solidly achieved cultural artefact.[1344]

Moreover, according to Nicholas Mirzoeff, the postmodern ocularcentrism differs from previous eras for increasing amounts on communication rely solely on the visual.[1345] Thus, in an ever more

visualised existence, there are also more opportunities for being seen.

Anonymity and modesty

Kline assumes that one reason behind many (Western) bloggers is the fight against the "crushing anonymity" of contemporary life, for chronicling one's rites of passage can "give a shape and meaning to the stages and cycles of their lives that would otherwise be missed in the helter-skelter of modern existence".[1346] However, in the new Muslim public sphere, discussed by Gonzalez-Quijano,

> The anonymity offered by the various forms of digital communication is one of its strong attractions.[1347]

As anonymity protects users from "the negative consequences associated with free expression in other contexts",[1348] it is no wonder that creating an account under false identity seems to be common practice in the Internet. In principle, however, Flickr does not allow anonymity. As mentioned earlier, the user account of Flickr acts at the same time as a Yahoo! User account,[1349] and Yahoo! Terms of Service actually prohibit forging identities, as point "3. YOUR REGISTERATION AND OBLIGATIONS" reads that a user will agree to "provide true, accurate, current and complete information about yourself" and to "keep it true, accurate, current and complete".[1350] Nevertheless, personal information such as email address, instant messaging (IM) name, real name and current location are optional in Flickr and can be left either blank or hidden from other users completely or partially.[1351] Moreover, even if the user has filled her real name to the account information, Flickr allows users to hide their profiles from other users so that it is invisible in searches.[1352]

What makes anonymity special regarding these young women, however, is that among other pictures recognisable pictures of children were featured. Indeed, as mentioned previously, out of the seven portraits including identifiable facial features, six portrayed children. Consequently, the idea that young – but physically adult – women protect images of themselves as adults more vigorously than as children is obviously different compared to the attitudes in the West, where most users are well aware of the possibilities of their childhood pictures ending up in wrong hands – or computers. In fact, even Al-Sauty encouraged the use of prepubescent girls in advertising instead of adult women.[1353] Yet, the motive behind both lines of thinking appears the same, to protect the most vulnerable. In the society of the UAE, it just so happens that young unmarried women are considered the most vulnerable people, expected to keep up an appearance of innocence until marriage and well into it too.[1354]

Tightly related to this issue is the matter of veiling. As discussed earlier, the results of this

research showed that a majority of the users conformed almost entirely to the modesty norms established outside the net. One significant difference to notice though was the absence of faces. While in general public, older Emirati women tend to cover their faces with scarves or traditional *burqa*, but younger generations of women often leave their face uncovered. Thus, the users appeared to conceal their identities and play with anonymity even though this is not a social norm or necessity for their generation in the UAE (Appendix II: Figures 21, 22, 23, 24). Quite the opposite in fact, despite otherwise modest attire of an *abayat* and a head scarf (leaving face, hands and feet uncovered), young national women put vast amounts of effort into the parts of their bodies that do show (make-up, manicures, pedicures and henna tattoos) when leaving home, revealing new areas of emphasis (Appendix II: Figures 25, 26 and 27). As Ebrahimian notes discussing the art of Shirin Neshat:

> ...what the veil does is that by concealing the body and the hair, *it frames the face*: the face is highlighted and the unknown eyes of the passerby or the spectator can zoom in, much like onto each feature—forehead, eyebrows, eyes, nose, mouth, and chin.[1355]

The veiled Muslim women have throughout the ages annoyed and obstructed Western minds and eyes.[1356] Veiling, however, has come to mean several different things to different people. In the context of the UAE an *abayat* can at the denotative level signify a garment meant to obscure female form, while on the connotative level it can, depending on the viewer signify either repression, empowerment, wealth, poverty, nationality identity, good or bad fashion sense.[1357] Although according to Macdonald, the culture of bodily adornment has been in equal measure a combination of beautification rituals as well as "solidarity", "mutual support and shared pleasures" among women,[1358] the way veil or *abayat* is worn and cut can at the same time signify either conformity to religious values or rebellion against them. Indeed, the overwhelming attention paid to young women's attire seems to characterise a sort of national obsession.[1359] Interestingly though, attention given to the myriad versions of the veil has a very postmodern essence to it with as most of the emphasis is put on the appearance.[1360] Indeed, as Derrick and Wells as well as Harper suggest, "The postmodern is not concerned with the aura of authenticity", giving way to the surface of "beauty" and "provocation".[1361]

While veiled women and the particular pieces of cloth have become a symbolic battlefield on both sides of the Mediterranean,[1362] the debate has also overshadowed and simplified all discussion regarding femininity in Islamic religion and culture.[1363] Hence, many researchers agree that Islamic law is much more complex and has multiple other problematic points affecting women's status and life than just veiling.[1364] As Macdonald acknowledges, even the more varied

depictions of Muslim women keep tripping on the issue of veiling as the "victim" discourse continues to overshadow more important discourses aiming to examine "the political and economic sources of women's oppression".[1365] Moreover, underneath the surface, most young Emirati women wear regular globalised trends, associated with the "'capitalist' construction of the female body: one that is sexualized, objectified, thingified", remarks Abu Odeh.[1366] Consequently, one can wonder, what level of uncovering or concealing would do justice to women caught up in the debate. After all, uncovering is itself an oxymoron as one's thoughts can never be uncovered no matter how nude a portrait is taken.

Whilst the most reasonable option here seems to be admitting that photography is not the medium with which the process can go any further than it already has, one must take into account Graham-Brown's note that the importance given to women's appearance "may [...] have an important bearing on their own sense of identity".[1367] To be sure, with more emphasis put on the visual, one's appearance has also become more important. For unmarried young women whose marriage possibilities may depend on their looks, the need to get feedback on their appearance from unknown people can be tempting, even addictive. As long as the feedback stays constructive, it may enhance the young women's self-esteem and sense of self-worth. For example, Abu Odeh recalls a discussion with a woman who told that at times the covering of the veil caused her to "lose touch" with her body and lead her to "binge on food" as a consequence.[1368] Hence, the woman concluded: "I need the public voyeur's gaze to control myself".[1369] So, can the young women be considered to pose for the male gaze? In the end though, it is hard to tell. Indeed, moving or clothing in sexualised ways is associated with pre-Islamic days of ignorance.[1370] Hence, it may have been gender-neutral or feminine "gaze" that the users were after in Flickr as the BanaaT UAE group was meant for women only even if it didn't adhere to Al-Sauty's view of password protected women's sphere.[1371]

Mobile women

In the Homeric world of Aristotle, all individuals had their own fixed social role and status and to an extent, write Muhall and Swift, the society and the national women of the UAE appear to inhabit a similar world, where...

> ...knowing how any given individual ought to behave in a given situation followed immediately from knowledge of their role; [...] determined by the position they occupy in the same hierarchies of kinship, household and society.[1372]

In this kind of society, right and wrong are not dependent on a universal measuring stick, but from

"an individual's identity" characterised by her role and position in the social matrix.[1373] Ahmed contends that globalisation has not managed to affect the boundaries maintained by tribalism, which "remain[s] strong even in societies considered modern".[1374] In fact, Ahmed argues that many Muslim nations merely reaffirm traditional tribalism with inherent expectations of loyalty and honourable behaviour from all members, especially females, who "symbolize a tribe's honor".[1375] Indeed, according to Walters et al., the society in the UAE still leans on traditional reciprocal, multilateral networks of kinship and friendship shaped by religion.[1376] Furthermore, as described in Alsanea's novel, behaviour among people of from the Gulf more is more closely linked with class and nationality than geographic location; public behaviour among women and men from same national background is still very much controlled regardless of place, if not for any other reason than to avoid unnecessary gossip.[1377]

Regarding the effects of the new ICTs, Walters et al. write that the female university students in the UAE have developed "an interactive culture" that differs increasingly from the life path of previous generations.[1378] However, while Lister et al., argue that interactivity – the ability to "write back into" a media text – is considered one of the essential characteristics of new ICTs, thought to bring additional value "At the ideological level",[1379] there is little evidence of such additional value for the young women at a societal level. Indeed, it appears as though the opposite has happened for Walters et al. conclude that despite the changes, contemporary "mobile women" have less power, are less visible and more silent than their grandmothers who "exercised a great deal of control over information" in *majaalis*.[1380] Doubting the possibilities for these young women to ever become "truly independent", the authors state that the greatest challenge of the UAE government is to both "convey to its young people Islamic spiritual values [...] while at the same time, becoming more tolerant and supportive of their desires and ambitions".[1381] This, they note, requires work on policies regarding the imbalances of kinship and class structures, legal mechanisms affecting the status of women as well as nature of work.[1382]

In the end though, the possibilities ahead each particular woman dependent on the social class of their family, tribe and emirate, their way of dressing, the place they work at, the education they have received and the husband they marry, as it does with the national ideology and values of Islamic religion.[1383] Even as tribal structures still affect the young women's lives, one cannot draw straightforward causations between the new ICTs and less social freedom, as the Walters et al. appear to suggest. In truth, the nation has gone through such vast changes during the last half a century, that constrains imposed on young women's public liberties might actually be the result of more multicultural society where *all* local people, not just women, have become somewhat

marginalised within their own country.[1384] Indeed, according to Gonzalez-Quijano: "the new techniques have been taken up by sectors of the population, such as women, who were earlier barred from public expression".[1385] Moreover, according to Walters et al., the Internet provided young Emirati women "momentary escape from family and from the inwardly turned, architecturally separating and walled family compound".[1386] Indeed, the Internet creates an illusion of place because of terms like "web site", write Sturken and Cartwright, leading "users to think of a physical space, although such a place exists only within virtual space",[1387] thus fulfilling "many of the concepts of the *public sphere*".[1388] However, according to Lister et al., "A public sphere must by definition be characterised by maximum access".[1389] In addition, while the different issues related to the access have been discussed earlier and appeared somewhat negligible regarding this research,[1390] it is important to note that as a commercial enterprise, Flickr is actually *not* a public sphere, but a commercial space aimed towards profit generation at its core.

> "What had happened? Communications had completed a transformation. The printing press and broadcasting are one-to-many medium. The telephone is one-to-one. Now we had a medium that was anything we wanted it to be: one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many."[1391]

Lister et al identify several characteristics for online communities such as "'insider' knowledge", "group specific identities" as well as online and offline relationships.[1392] These characteristic are in turn affected by the surrounding communications context that can determine the rationale of the group, the type of people who use the group with emphasis on computer literacy, gender and sociability with "time structure of the communication" and software used to run the group.[1393] Regarding Flickr, as Fake, one of the founders of Flickr, notes, "the thing that really makes Flickr Flickr is that the users invent what Flickr is", continuing with examples of groups such as "*Squared Circle*" or "*What's In Your Bag?*" and "*Sad Bikes*" that have redefined what a photography group can be like.[1394] Indeed, according to Kozloff, photographs give all viewers, states Kozloff, "a form of pseudo-intimacy",[1395] despite the fact that they divide viewer into insiders (those who were there) and outsiders (those who were not).[1396] As Dewdney and Lister write, "In the process of the circulation of photographic prints they will be 'captioned' by accompanying speech and conversation".[1397] After all, as Butterfield points out, photography is social by nature: "It's meant to be shared, talked about, pointed to, saved, archived and available by as many means as possible".[1398]

Indeed, even though the romanticist ideal of "original genius" continues to live, promoting a concept of a true auteur that can create something utterly unique from nothing, McLeod counters that "the idea that an individual author is *solely* responsible for all aspects of a work is an

ideological sleight of hand" and completely impossible.[1399] While the young women are perhaps not aware of photographic genres, with their "specific set of meaningful objects and locations", features and styles,[1400] it seems clear that many of them are fully aware of what could be called "Flickr aesthetic",[1401] for there are many images that stylistically, thematically or compositionally mimic and alter visual forms seen elsewhere in the Flickr community. In other words, the Flickr appeared to be more than a site display, but also a site of audiencing, that in turn appeared to affect production through socialising practices. For example, among the categories of social identity, friendship was often depicted in stylistically similar ways with feet or hands of two to six people put together on a star shape (Appendix II: Figures 28, 29, 30 and 31).

Burstein states that "technology *can* be a force for liberation, democratization, and social cohesion, but it is not *inherently* so".[1402] To be sure, technology can have unintended and unexpected consequences of both negative and positive nature. Regarding the blogosphere, – or "Flickrverse"[1403] – it is not clear whether a million new platforms translates to million more readers or mere virtual cacophony of largely ignored voices. While both visual and verbal blogs can have an "aggregate effect" and local impact, according to Lebkowsky,[1404] as Battelle aptly words it; "one of the myths of blogging is that since anybody can have a voice, then anybody can get an audience".[1405] Moreover, Internet works on the same social conventions as the world outside it; those already popular and influential tend to be the same online too. The blogosphere structure of linkages favours the most popular with majority of blogs remaining in the midlevel or below regarding incoming links.[1406] Indeed, as Prieur et al. have shown, only "a small minority" of energetic Flickr users have actually formed a "leading group of the community" by actively initiating and encouraging community forming sides of the site by starting groups, keeping up discussions, commenting other users' images and tagging with communal purposes.[1407]

Despite this, Burstein claims that blogs will "restore" "the lost voice of the ordinary citizen" on national and global basis.[1408] Indeed, because Flickr allows for both easy publication and distribution of images as well as transferring or copying them to other website or blog platforms,[1409] it has been used for grassroots journalism during natural and manmade catastrophes from Hurricane Katrina to London terrorist bombings of 2005, as Richardson mentions.[1410] Moreover, in Al-Sauty's opinion, there is a real need for female photographers in the ME,[1411] even though a career in photography is often blocked by "traditional attitudes" and hesitant parents.[1412] In fact, for the young women studied, Flickr is not only a public sphere of self-expression but can also serve as a portfolio and a business opportunity. For example, Flickr is in partnership with stock photo agency Getty Images that enables users to make their photographs available for the agency through either

"Rights-managed" licensing or "Royalty-free" licensing.[1413] Moreover, an online start that can encourage the young women to contact opportunities closer to home; such as the eight stock photo libraries listed in the Media Guide located in the UAE.[1414]

Repercussions of censorship

In his 1995 book on the coming digital culture, Negroponte predicted that in the future "many of the values of a nation-state will give way to those of both larger and smaller electronic communities".[1415] Roughly fifteen years later, the situation has changed to that direction even though physical space has not become as irrelevant as Negroponte anticipated.[1416] During the past decade, expectations for potential change were exponentially greater in the ME where many governments had a tight grip on almost all traditional mediums. Yet, as Eickelman and Anderson note, the overall situation of "gatekeepers" between the audiences and the producers has changed little. As Miles states: "In the Arab world media policy is based on whether the ruler thinks the new technology will weaken his grip on power or not".[1417] While certain gatekeepers may have lost their power, new ones have emerged as all the restrictions from official and unofficial censorship, infrastructure, required resources, training and access are still in place in some form or another.[1418] Indeed, the UAE is by no means the only country in the world to censor the Internet, or the only one in the region to do so,[1419] or even the most prominent (consider China's Great Firewall, for example).[1420]

Censorship at its core is an oxymoron and cannot ever include everyone, since someone must always do the censoring. As such, there will always be a group of people determining for the rest the limits of moral and immoral. Following David Hume's footsteps, freedom of speech can be interpreted in two different ways: as a negative or a positive freedom.[1421] Negative freedom in a simplified form means freedom from constraints while positive freedom includes (or should include) the means, resources and access to mainstream media or other relevant forums. Based on examples discussed earlier, it can be concluded that both positive and negative freedoms of speech are violated in the UAE presently: negative freedoms due to the stringent laws prohibiting certain types of information from being published and spread and positive freedoms due to a lack of egalitarian access to media forums such as the Internet. However, as Ekholm notes, there are multiple sides to censorship, not all of them bad.[1422] For example, Salman Rushdie's novel Satanic Verses was propelled into a bestseller after the notoriety it gained from the fatwa given to it.[1423] Furthermore, following psychoanalytical theory, general censorship can be interpreted as a social

tool blocking the unwanted, the harmful and the disruptive.[1424] Indeed, the repercussions of censorship for the young Emirati women differ little from the ones for the entire society. Nevertheless, as to social norms and restrictions, young women (and their chastity) are considered a core value to protect. Hence, the information available is often regarded as more corruptive to the female than the male character.

One must also note that censoring visual media can be more challenging than censoring textual media. For instance, a prominent cartoonist Naji el-ʿAli working for the newspaper *al-Khalij* in the UAE used to consider himself a "missionary" "because it is just a little bit harder to censor a cartoon than an article".[1425] As regards to censorship in Flickr, it turns out that Flickr itself restricts its content for legal reasons in certain countries,[1426] although not the UAE. However, reading Flickr discussions, it becomes clear that Flickr has been restricted in the UAE too. In the Flickr group Emirati Corner, for example, a message dated June 25, 2005 announces the unblocking of Flickr, indicating an earlier block on the site.[1427] In November the same year, Flickr was again blocked briefly only to be unblocked the same day – to be blocked again later in the same month.[1428] After the repeated blocks, a small resistance movement seems to have immediately gotten off the ground with petitions to Etisalat,[1429] guides on how to bypass the block using proxy servers,[1430] and groups created to inform and unite the UAE Flickr community.[1431] The following months Flickr was apparently unblocked partially, with access given only to non-visual content and then blocked again completely by the end of 2006.[1432] Consequently, the Internet censorship practically killed online communities that lost most of their participants. Despite multiple users trying to keep the Emirati Corner and other groups alive and going, the effort proved unsuccessful in the long run.[1433]

Under these circumstances, it should have been no surprise that the dataset included plenty of photographs (labelled *haram* in the coding process) that appeared to depict subversive messages, such as a photograph of a wrist stamped with the word "CANCELLED" (Appendix II: Figure 32). The dataset also included images with hints of rebelliousness, assertiveness and self-confidence. A user named "Şł¥LÎŠH ĴŏŐŏĵŏØŏ", for example, appeared to have felt assured enough to declare "God gave me style.." in three colours (Appendix II: Figure 33). In addition, several images played with gender and sexuality, for instance, a photograph by "Ϡ Ϡ 《яι¢ο 17 σ¢ιя》 ϠϠ" depicted a midriff covered in jeans with a silvery chain and baseball cap hanging from a belt topped with a text "BOYISH" (Appendix II: Figure 34), or a photograph of hand holding a military nameplate inscribed with Playboy bunny logo instead of a name. In fact, multiple images included props that seemed to depict traditionally masculine and rather violent themes. Such props included handcuffs, guns, snakes and more nuanced allusions to violence such as a picture of lips and chin covered in

nosebleed (Appendix II: Figures 35, 36, 37 and 38). Even though the results for the sub-variables could not be considered definite or replicable, they appeared to suggest of a more general trend of testing and re-establishing social norms of acceptable behaviour. Indeed, similarly to the survey conducted by Walters et al. it appeared as though the user group included so called "risk takers", who used photographic technologies and the Flickr forum in "activities that they knew might cause them trouble".[1434] In other words, the young women were breaking social norms and restrictions consciously, or as Walters et al. word it; "probing the boundaries of authority and the bonds of traditional".[1435]

During its existence, Internet has garnered conflicting and contradictory roles. Writes Montgomery:

> It can be an engine of collective action, sparking civic participation and mobilizing political movements; but it can also be a digital cocoon that promotes and encourages self-obsession and isolation. For youth in trouble, the Internet can serve as a vital safety net, where professional help is available just one click away; but it also can be a dark and dangerous underworld, where predators and pornographers lie in waiting.[1436]

With a personal diary, the idea is to keep it private and the risk is for it to become public. With a homepage, or an online photostream, the risk has become the expectation – to be public.[1437] Indeed, Daniel Chandler states that "On the Web, the *personal* function of 'discovering' (or at least clarifying) one's thoughts, feelings, and identity is fused with the *public* function of publishing these to a larger audience than traditional media have ever offered".[1438] However, according to Chandler and Roberts-Young the strong sense of one's own space within a homepage (or a photographic blog) can lead "some authors to slip into feeling that it is a purely private dream space".[1439] In the worlds of Lister et al.: "the supposedly 'virtual' environment has profoundly 'real world' consequences".[1440] Or, as the British comedian Jack Dee remarked rather sharply: "You're not surfing. You're not. You're sitting in your bedroom typing".[1441] Ahmed explains that young Syrian women using new ICTs...[1442]

> ...were all extremely wary of its side effects. [...] The young generation, the girls felt, was only reaping the worst of what technology had to offer, rather than the best. They complained that young men are looking at Internet pornography now and sharing dirty pictures on their cell phones. [...] ...many agreed that technology, though positive in some respects, posed a threat to their religious values and traditional society. It not only helped spread pornography among young men but also induced "slothfulness" and "wasted time."[1443]

Undeniably to a degree, one might agree with Habermasian theory of "'refeudalization' of the 'public sphere'" – or reduction of public sphere into sheer displays of characteristics in consequence of consumerism and "public relations industry" – in regards to whole media landscape in the

UAE.[1444] In fact, as Burns observed, a career in public relations is considered among the female Emirati students of journalism more credible than a career as a reporter.[1445] Moreover, freer flow of information is not the answer for everyone. As Miles points out, the possibility to vent off frustration online or on air does nothing to create political mechanisms for change.[1446]

So is the Internet censorship of the UAE justifiable in any way? Are the dangers of corruptive information real or merely perceived? The behaviour described previously is very similar to the behaviour of a typical college student regardless of their home country.[1447] Thus, the question of danger becomes one of context. While in Western world chatting Online with strange males is typically viewed as just that, chatting without any harm done, in the context of the UAE, such behaviour can compromise a young woman's integrity and have far-reaching consequences for her social status. Whether the dangers are as harmful as to require Internet censorship is another matter, for it should be up to the women themselves – and everyone else – to decide which available material or information is indeed harmful. Surely, it is as human to test boundaries, as it is to set them. Indeed, each society has its own taboos, uncompromised customs and rigid standards to which it tries to socialise the youngest members of its flock. However, one could ask whether the young women could attain a similar sense of self without access to Flickr? For majority of the young women the answer would most likely be yes, as the photos appeared to be no more than virtual extensions their interests, pointing out curious items in nature, home or school. However, those users who played with revealing their identities – some of them in a rather sexual fashion – there are no similar ways in which to reveal themselves physically without braking the norms of the Emirati society. Hence, especially the young women who uploaded images of their bodies appeared to do so in order to get feedback on their looks and who they really are.

Conclusions: The importance of being seen

Historians tend to underline continuity over disruption and discontinuation. Rapid change, when discussed, is often dealt with in absolute terms. In social sciences, equally problematically, historical perspective is frequently overshadowed by the present moment, leading to an unintended feeling of stagnant state of affairs. Continuity, however, is never as unchanging as it may appear nor is change as fast as it seems. Change rarely cuts abruptly and thoroughly between two completely different things, times, cultures or trends. Instead, hints of the coming often surface slowly, the same way that marks of the old way can be seen long after it has receded from the centre stage. For a social scientists it is a challenge to reach a balance between social circumstances that are "neither hegemonic nor static", as MacIntyre summarises.[1448] Indeed, as Lister et al. write, even attitudes towards new media are often polarised; while the critical approaches tend to emphasise continuity from older mediums to the point of stagnation, uncritical approaches have touted change equivalent to utopian dreams.[1449] Analytical approach requires knowledge of history, of how things came to be the way they are.[1450] Moreover, while many things needed to happen for the present to be the way it is, this does not mean that they evolved straight from point A to point B. Nor does it mean that things will "progress" the same way in the future. There might be dead-ends and abandoned technologies and worse; the technological sophistication of present can as well decrease, go backwards and lose the current levels of knowledge:

> Instead of images of linear sequences and chains of events we need to think in terms of webs, clusters, boundaries, territories, and overlapping spheres as our images of historical process.[1451]

As noted in this research, the UAE and its people have gone through several changes in culture, economy, environment, immigration and technology during the past hundred years. With accelerating pace of change, the Emirati society moved from seasonal semi-nomadic lifestyle supported by pearling industry and date cultivation to a period of oil exploration, urban and social development that was continued by a neoliberal investment bubble and ambitious visions of a new Golden Age. At the same time the balance of regional (later, national) power moved from the maritime power of the Qawasim hailing from Ra's Al Khaimah, to Abu Dhabi, Dubai and back to Abu Dhabi.

Surrounded by intense debate on national identity, the young women studied in this research grew into adulthood during mid-to-late-2000s, realising the possibilities of the hybrid culture shaking up their homeland. The aim of this research was to how young Emirati women represented themselves and constructed their identities in the new media through photographic self-

portraits identified from a dataset of 8,248 images. The results revealed that the young Emirati women do not display portraits of themselves that could be defined in traditional terms as identifiable medium close-up portraits of the author done by the author. Out of the seven photographs that included identifiable facial features, six portrayed children. Indeed, the only image that portrayed a young woman with identifiable features was a horizontally cut close-up of young woman leaning her head backwards in a way that left only half of her face visible (Appendix II: Figure 14), consequently making the Western research done on head-and-shoulders portraiture redundant for this research. In conclusion, it appeared as though the norm for these young women was to construct their self-portraits in ways that obscured their identities intentionally, adhering to somewhat stricter-than-average social norms expected of them outside the virtual world regarding modesty and the so-called "gazing rules", for example.

Despite this, among the users a small amount of "risk takers" could be recognised.[1452] While many users tended to break the rather restrictive norms of acceptable behaviour outlined by Al-Sauty, the risk takers had published photographs with what appeared to be subversive messages dealing with religion, violence, gender and sexuality. Moreover, in spite of the visual restraints of identifiability, the young women did feature themselves in the photographs either directly or indirectly, consequently fulfilling the most rudimentary expectation for a self-portrait. However, using content analysis as a method, it was practically impossible to determine within this research frame whether parts of the author were included in the photographs intentionally or not. Regarding the possibilities of digital technologies, the research showed that few culturally distinctive visual styles were continued in the photographs. Instead of calligraphy, images included digital "watermarks". In addition, depictions of both geometric shapes and flora were uncommon. The most prevalent digital technique used was colour manipulation, which was used distinctively in almost half of the self-portraits. It appeared as though the most important reason for any kind of additional image manipulation was to establish authorship and prevent copying of the material.

Through further historical and cultural comparison and contemplation, it was found that establishing causal connections between styles or content of the self-portraits and certain historical and cultural practices was exceedingly difficult. While some arguments could be made regarding aniconism and Emirati women's clothing in connection with modesty and the symbolic importance of hands in the local culture,[1453] for instance, it was practically impossible to establish whether the young Emirati women had any conscious knowledge of these meanings. As noted, content analysis merely tells whether an image includes the coded artefact, not how or why it was included. Moreover, establishing connections between non-regional elements was even more challenging. For

example, while the self-portraits included some traditional clothing and decorations, nothing comparable to colonialist costume or handicrafts types were found.[1454] Furthermore, the use of various paraphernalia as symbolic signifiers appeared to rather indicate an intricate connection to consumer culture as "a means of representing and communicating value", as Dewdney and Lister remarked rather than internalised colonialist visual practices.[1455]

In contrast, many techniques appeared to be more a result of accessibility and user-friendliness of new ICTs as well as lack of photographic experience. This raised theoretical questions of intervisuality as culturally distinctive techniques appeared to overshadow individual artists' cultural heritage. Hence, the young Emirati women using Western techniques and equipment would have, by definition, created Western photographic art. As this conclusion appeared implausible, it was more reasonable to assume the self-portraits belonged to the category of "hybrid" art, as suggested by Ernst.[1456] Despite the term's vagueness, however, some features such as stylistic graininess and some social themes such as friendship seemed to suggest a common aesthetic and thematic narrative among the young women. This could perhaps be a sign that for these young women, Flickr was both a site of display as well as audiencing with its own socialising practices.

Indeed, the photographs studied appeared to have gotten their meaning from the fact they had been put on exhibit and were being seen. As noted, Flickr fulfilled all of the tasks usually given to a tangible family photo-album. However, in contrast to a family album or a personal diary,[1457] in an online photostream the risk of becoming public has turned into an expectation. In fact, the behavioural expectations dictated by Al-Sauty appeared conservative in comparison to the self-portraits and the lives they depicted.[1458] Accompanied with telltale signs of both photographic ambition and identity, being seen appeared almost an intrinsic need for the young women, who seemed right at home in the pluralism of the new visual virtual public sphere without the restrictive language barriers of verbal expression. However, whereas the risk takers appeared somewhat consumed with the postmodern malaise of obligatory visual existence burdened with an obsessive concentration on one's appearance, in the end, even these users appeared well aware of the line between private and public remaining anonymous. In fact, while some self-portraits expressed a willingness to be seen in sexualised ways, for majority of the young women the photos appeared to be no more than virtual extensions their interests, pointing out curious items in nature, home or school.

As a conclusion, this research has shown that based on the forum, the users and their self-portraits studied, the young Emirati women studied must have been aware of being seen, and

perhaps even wanted to be seen, underlying an importance of being seen. Yet, as shown, the levels of exposure varied greatly through the dataset, never giving up the identity of the young women. While the surrounding society analysed in this thesis appeared somewhat restrictive, one should watch out for technological, legal or social determinism. Portraying the young women trapped in a gilded cage would be too simplistic, even though the young women appeared restricted as a consequence of protecting the most vulnerable of the society. As stated earlier, the possibilities of each young woman dependent on their social class, their family, tribe and the emirate they live in, the level of education they and their parents have, the husband they marry, as well as the national ideology and values of their interpretation of Islamic religion.[1459] Moreover, "the inwardly turned, architecturally separating and walled family compound", criticised by Walters et al.,[1460] can also provide both physically and emotionally safe surroundings for young women in the midst of considerable change. Indeed, even though the safety and security, of the family compound depend heavily on the benevolence of the head of the family, as a terrific situation can turn terrible without functioning judiciary, legal and social accountability for individuals, there is no universal truth in portraying the young women as "sad and passive victims" the way of previous orientalists such as Isabelle Eberhardt.[1461]

The hope of this research was to result in deeper cultural understanding of perhaps the most powerful generation of women in the UAE and the ME, and as a concluding statement, it appears as though the young women and their generation will have all the education, ingenuity, technical know-how and multicultural experience to become just that. Online photo galleries, digital photographing technologies and other new ICTs have enabled the young women to gain experience, audience, business opportunities and a global community in their own terms. As the Emirati women on the verge of adulthood are considered the most vulnerable in their society, Flickr has allowed them to interact without the need to sacrifice their cultural identities or themselves for a more radical social change. Moreover, while it cannot be stated that the new ICTs or photography would or could create any kind of social transformation, one can assume that the activity provided by the ICTs will boost further social activity down the line. Indeed, simply by posting their self-portraits, the young women have challenged the centuries-old and ideologically skewed representations of Muslim and Arab women.

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Maukola, I 2008c, 'Nainen islamilaisessa laissa, muslimin elämänkaari', University of Helsinki: Helsinki,
October 9, 2008.

Maukola, I 2008e, 'Islamilainen taide ja arkkitehtuuri', University of Helsinki: Helsinki, November 25,
2008.

Viitamäki, M 2008a, 'Johdanto jatkuu, yleiskatsaus islamin suuntauksiin', University of Helsinki, September
11, 2008.

Viitamäki, M 2008b, 'Islamin harjoittaminen, viisi peruspilaria', University of Helsinki, October 30, 2008.

Appendices

Appendix I: Photographs and graphics

Figure 1: Screen capture of *Gulf News* article discussing a Grade 9 National Studies textbook illustration of an "extinct UAE national in a museum". Nazzal, N 2006a, 'Book illustration spreads ill-feeling among pupils', *Gulf News*, last modified: September 18, 2006. Retrieved February 24, 2009 from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/09/18/10068378.html.

Figure 2: Model of how a rise in wealth generated by oil production effects economy and female participation in it. Ross, M 2007, 'How Oil Production May Reduce Female Political Influence' in 'Oil, Islam, and Women', forthcoming in *American Political Science Review*: 39. Retrieved May 6, 2009 from www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/Oil%20Islam%20and%20Women%20v5.pdf.

Figure 3: Figure showing how the amount of wealth generated from oil rents affects women's participation in the labour force. Ross, M 2007, 'Oil Rents and Female Labor Force Participation in the Middle East' in 'Oil, Islam, and Women', forthcoming in *American Political Science Review*: 41. Retrieved May 6, 2009 from www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/Oil%20Islam%20and%20Women%20v5.pdf.

Note: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates do not allow women to vote; they have been coded as granting suffrage in 2005 so they will not be excluded from the chart.

Figure 4: Figure showing how the amount of wealth generated from oil rents affects women's suffrage. Ross, M 2007, 'Oil Rents and Female Suffrage in the Middle East' in 'Oil, Islam, and Women', forthcoming in *American Political Science Review*: 42. Retrieved May 6, 2009 from www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/Oil%20Islam%20and%20Women%20v5.pdf.

Figure 5: Map highlighting the vast geographical differences in size between the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and the rest six emirates. Aotearoa 2007, 'Administrative map of the United Arab Emirates in English', *Wikipedia*, last modified: January 5, 2007. Retrieved March 5, 2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:UAE_en-map.png. Published under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 (http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/fdl-1.2.txt).

Figure 6: US First Lady Laura Bush participates in Pink Majlis in Abu Dhabi. Absal, R 2007, 'Laura Bush builds bridges of hope and concerns', *Gulf News*, last modified: October 22, 2007. Retrieved March 28, 2008 from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/10/22/10162182.html.

Figure 7: A dead man found in Al Quoz Industrial area. 'Police seek information on dead man' 2007, *Gulf News*, last modified: August 22, 2007. Retrieved March 28, 2008 from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/08/22/10148305.html

Figure 8: A dead dog found hanged in Satwa, Dubai. The same photograph was published in the print version of the paper as well. Landais, E 2007, 'Death by hanging for a dog in Satwa', *Gulf News*, last modified: July 2, 2007. Retrieved July 3, 2007 from http://www.gulfnews.com/nation/index.html, and March 28, 2007 from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/07/02/10136406.html.

Figure 9: Screen capture of a BanaaT UAE user's photograph page. » »ლ« £å3lØOØ3åh »ლ«. 2007, 'ლsisters 4 ever ლ', *Flickr*, last modified: September 28, 2007. Retrieved June 14, 2010 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/35996698@N00/1443413829. Published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.0 Generic licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/deed.en).

Figure 10: Demonstrating how notes work. NoOonalita ~ Bônita² [♥] luv u Dadi 2007, '....|>o<|....', *Flickr*, last modified: September 8, 2007. Retrieved June 14, 2010 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/nonalita/1352545853. Published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en).

Figure 11: Pie chart of the BanaaT UAE users studied further.

Figure 12: Visual demonstration of the photo counts of the 170 users studied.

Figure 13: Overlapping among the photographs identified as self-portraits.

Appendix II: Examples from the dataset

Because of the licencing restrictions applied by most of the BanaaT UAE users on their images, these photos cannot be published. Below is a listing of photos with links to them.

Figure 14: The only self-portrait with identifiable features. '*I thought =[*' by Şt¥LÎŠH ĴŏŐŏĵŏØŏ. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/26053966@N00/307871326.

Figure 15: A girl wearing traditional clothing. '*ʾsaakum min al'aiidiin al saalamiin*' photographs by Hazel Eyes ©. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/81209480@N00/276112752/.

Figure 16: A girl wearing a traditional burqa. '*Memoirs of a Bedouin*' by Meems*. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/58943785@N00/2599215098/.

Figure 17: In the shadowy self-portrait one can recognise the shadow of a tripod also. '*Me*' by T o T a. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/27061347@N00/15034646.

Figure 18: A hand holding an item with the colours of the national flag and a picture of the Dubai Crown Prince Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid. '••• *Ü.Ã.Ë* •••' by •ï¡÷¡ï• Ãl. ŴasmŶà •ï¡÷¡ï• and '*i* ♥ *Ûåé*' by •●ꞔМєємотïꞔ●•. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/68686600@N00/311121568.

Figure 19: A hand wrapped in a national flag. '••• *Ü.Ã.Ë* •••' by •ï¡÷¡ï• Ãl. ŴasmŶà •ï¡÷¡ï• and '*i* ♥ *Ûåé*' by •●ꞔМєємотïꞔ●•. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/meemoti/128312496.

Figure 20: Two hands, old and young, evoke caring, family and generational differences. The hennaed finger tips of the older hand suggest female gender while the younger hand appears gender neutral. '*-=galaa qalbii=-*' by ßrJ_3ÄjÈ-->DyNaMic<--BaCk 2 BaiSiC. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/burj_3aje/3015909051.

Figure 21: '*"El sbal fe 3ain Uma '3zal "*' by ▉♥▉ Mrs.Gucci▉♥▉ ...in <3. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/26606557@N05/3666405300.

Figure 22: '*.:: Doom 3ainy Teshteky Menk ::.*' by ♣3ẽĞřĕĞậĦ_9å¥3ǎĦ♣ ~ *FyS*. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/53634098@N00/296417774.

Figure 23: '*219443701_img*' by fraaaw.wlaaah. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/16444416@N03/2791963057.

Figure 24: '*ME*' by Dla3_la3. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/dla3_la3/268834586.

Figure 25: '*'aidakum mubaarak~ ~*' by •●ꞔМєємотïꞔ●•. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/meemoti/276281125.

Figure 26: '°ℳ *!i tahbanii? Walaa tahaba ad-diraahiim !i* ℳ°' by •‖[-NôŎNôŎ-]‖η.s]‖•ŕáηταşţíc ④. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/no0no0/2400740604.

Figure 27: '*2hdaa2 to* ○● *3ηĞåŞĦ Ğůяſ¡ə* ™ ●○' by » ĕŁ~MäĴ®Ŏő7a .. * Examz >.< *. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/majroo7at_dxb/264802332.

Figure 28: Example 1 of possible audiencing effects among the young Emirati women. '•¦ *FŪƊ mĬм̈ё* ¦•' by •‖[-NôÕNôŎ-]|η.s]|•ѓάηταşţíc ④. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/no0no0/2698034691.

Figure 29: Example 2 of possible audiencing effects among the young Emirati women. '*000*' by ♣ж¤PeAchY¤ж♣. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/peachy_/262834119.

Figure 30: Example 3 of possible audiencing effects among the young Emirati women. '*FwenDz For eVaaH*' by » ĕŁ~MäĴ®Ŏő7a .. * Examz >.< *. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/majroo7at_dxb/314936489.

Figure 31: Example 4 of possible audiencing effects among the young Emirati women. '*work shoes 1*' by ¨°o.O (*kalda'ii*) O.o°¨. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/50147746@N00/356215763.

Figure 32: Example of a subversive image. '*-=C@nCeLLed..uR SImPLy OuT oF My syStEM=-*' by ßrJ_3ÄjÈ-->DyNaMic<--BaCk 2 BaiSiC. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/burj_3aje/2690185308.

Figure 33: Evoking the divine. '*My history is my fashion*' by Şt¥LÎŠH ĴŏŐőĵŏØŏ. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/26053966@N00/298976966.

Figure 34: Playing with gender. '*Dıσя.мє*' by ४ ४ 《яι¢σ 17 σ¢ıя》 ४४. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/49072385@N00/286043869.

Figure 35: '*TaKe Me ** I'M YOURS ** ..!!*' by ª¨ЯëÐ¦ĈăŅÐŶ¨ª. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/candy28/2632292014.

Figure 36: '*Too much love will Kill you ...!*' by Ðя. Pяıή¢єss. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/30648444@N00/2540731931.

Figure 37: '*-=My Beretta=-*' by ßrJ_3ÄjÈ-->DyNaMic<--BaCk 2 BaiSiC. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/burj_3aje/2057116347.

Figure 38: '*Damah 3ala dami O dami damah*' by ⅏ GaMrAaH ⅏. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.flickr.com/photos/22787834@N05/2212457113.

Endnotes

[1] Huntington 1993. Huntington's original article was followed in 1996 by book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.

[2] Miles 2005.

[3] The countries forming the Cooperation Council For The Arab States of The Gulf (CCASG) or simply, the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

[4] Davidson 2008: 115.

[5] Mattsson 2007: 24-28.

[6] Ibid.: 31-32.

[7] Halliday 1995: 195.

[8] According to Said, the term "orientalist" referred until 1750s to researchers of Semitic languages, histories of the Bible, Islamic religion as well as other gifted enthusiasts outside academia. Said 1991 quoted in Männistö 1999: 68.

[9] Männistö 1999: 67.

[10] Said 1978 quoted in Hight & Sampson 2004: 6.

[11] Hight & Sampson 2004: 5.

[12] Bhabha 1994 quoted in Hight & Sampson 2004: 6.

[13] Fanon 1967 quoted in Hight & Sampson 2004: 7. Quite distubingly, Gawad, for example, felt forced to remind the reader still in 1978 that "Most of the Arab countries had ancient civilizations", a proof that "the people of these nations are not backward by nature". Gawad 1978: 173.

[14] Ibid.: 207.

[15] Ibid.: 203, also Graham-Brown 1988: 6.

[16] Halliday 1995: 203.

[17] Ibid.: 207.

[18] Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle 1997: 41. As Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle point out, "the knowledge of a religion's scriptures and traditions, is not considered a good measure of religiosity, simply because the majority of believers […] seem to be quite ignorant of what are considered basic elements of religious tradition". Such may not the case with religious clergy, but assuming that even "nominal members are familiar with their group's doctrine is risky".

[19] Halliday 1995: 199.

[20] Ibid.: 199.

[21] Ibid.: 210.

[22] Ibid.: 211, 213. However, Halliday does not seem to take into account the fact that evaluating the other tends to be closely linked to the idea of self. The mightier one thinks they are, the weaker one sees the opponents and vice versa.

[23] Hight & Sampson 2004: 5-6.

[24] Halliday 1995: 202.

[25] Ibid.: 202.

[26] Ibid.: 202.

[27] Ibid.: 213.

[28] Ibid.: 200.

[29] Ibid.: 207, 215.

[30] Ibid.: 200.

[31] Ibid.: 215. For example Ahmed gets caught up in the hyperbole in 1999, claiming that the two parties seem to be heading towards "a final show-down, a final crusade" between Islam and the West. Ahmed 1999: 218.

[32] Halliday 1995: 209.

[33] Ibid.: 209.

[34] Ibid.: 209.

[35] As a term for community of Muslims, also terms *ummah* and *umma* are sometimes used.

[36] Heard-Bey 2004: 1.

[37] Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[38] Dahlgren 2006: 37.

[39] Ibid.: 37.

[40] Gillmor 2006: xiii.

[41] Lister et al. 2003: 1.

[42] Montgomery 2007: 25-26.

[43] Ibid.: 68.

[44] Ibid.:13, also 125.

[45] Carver 2005: 31.

[46] Naef 2002: 224.

[47] Erdogdu 2004: 107.

[48] See for example Hight & Sampson 2004.

[49] Al-Sauty 2006: vi.

[50] Rose 2007: 10.

[51] Heard-Bey 2004: 4.

[52] Ibid.: 4.

[53] Ibid.: 4.

[54] One third of the Western World's oil consumption passed through the Straits of Hormuz in 1978. Heard-Bey 2004: 6-7, Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[55] Heard-Bey 2004: 9, Central Intelligence Agency 2009, Vine 2009: 9-10.

[56] Central Intelligence Agency 2009, Vine 2009: 9.

[57] Heard-Bey 2004: 8-9.

[58] Ibid.: 9-10, Central Intelligence Agency 2009, Vine 2009: 10. While the camel was domesticated around 1000 BCE, first use of horse is from Mleiha period between 300 BCE-0. Vine 2009: 10.

[59] Heard-Bey 2004: 10-11.

[60] Vine 2009: 9-10. There are cues of foreign trade since the Umm al-Nar –period (2500-2000 BCE) involving Mesopotamia, Indus Valley, Bactria, Iran and Baluchistan.

[61] Ibid.: 10.

[62] Vine 2009: 10.

[63] Ibid.: 9-10.

[64] Ibid.: 9-10.

[65] Ibid.: 11.

[66] Ibid.: 11.

[67] Ibid.: 11.

[68] Heard-Bey 2004: 13.

[69] Ibid.: 13.

[70] Vine 2009: 12.

[71] Ibid.: 11-12, Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[72] Vine 2009: 11-12.

[73] Davidson 2008: 17-18.

[74] Ibid.: 18.

[75] Heard-Bey 2004: 11, Vine 2009: 12.

[76] Vine 2009: 12.

[77] Ibid.: 11.

[78] Ibid.: 11.

[79] Ibid.: 12.

[80] Ibid.: 11, 13-14. According to Davidson, the announcement was made already at the end of 1967. Davidson 2008: 58.

[81] Davidson 2008: 59-63.

[82] Transliterated as: "Abu Zaby, 'Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Ash Shariqah, Dubayy, and Umm al Qaywayn" in Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[83] Vine 2009: 13-14, Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[84] Vine 2009: 11, Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[85] Heard-Bey 2004: xxiv. K.C.M.G. stands for Knight Commander of St Michael and St George.

[86] Vine 2009: 11, Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[87] Vine 2009: 13-14, Central Intelligence Agency 2009. At present, the UAE is has a total land area is 83,600 km2, out of which only 3.04 percent is used for seasonal and permanent agricultural crops. (For comparison, Finland has the land area of 304,473 km2.) Its neighbouring countries are Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Sultanate of Oman. A unifying characteristic for all of the seven emirates is access to sea and existing environmental concerns that include desertification, insufficient freshwater resources and contamination caused by oil spills. The most serious geopolitical grudge the UAE is involved in concern three islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs about 70 km from the Western coast. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the claim to the islands, which hold both red dioxide deposits and are close to a mature oil field, are contested by Iran, which currently controls the islands. Attwood, Dajani & Naylor 2008, Central Intelligence Agency 2009, Heard-Bey 2004: 16-17.

[88] Central Intelligence Agency 2009, Australian Trade Commission 2008.

[89] Central Intelligence Agency 2009. Deputy Prime Minister posts are held by Sheikh Hamdan Bin Zayed Al Nahayan (since October 20, 2003) and Sheikh Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahayan (since November 20, 1990).

[90] Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[91] Central Intelligence Agency 2009, Australian Trade Commission 2008.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[94] Heard-Bey 2004: xxxi.

[95] Ibid.: xxxi.

[96] Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Heard-Bey 2004: xxviii.

[101] Ibid.: xxviii-xxix.

[102] Ibid.: xxviii-xxix.

[103] Prugh et al. 2005: 100, 102.

[104] Ibid.: 108.

[105] Ibid.: 108, 110. The most notable US firm is the Arabian American Oil Company or Aramco.

[106] Ibid.: 109.

[107] Ibid.: 102-104.

[108] Ibid.: 103-104.

[109] Norton 2003: 23, see also Prugh, Flavin and Sawin 2005: 110.

[110] Kazemi & Norton 2006: 202.

[111] Ibid.: 202.

[112] Norton 2003: 27-28.

[113] Prugh et al. 2005: 110.

[114] Davidson 2008: 25, 137-138.

[115] Ibid.: 23-24, 30.

[116] Ibid.: 30.

[117] Ibid.: 33-35.

[118] Ibid.: 53.

[119] Heard-Bey 2004: 5.

[120] Heard-Bey 2004: 5, Australian Trade Commission 2008.

[121] Australian Trade Commission 2008.

[122] According to Davidson the amount of UAE oil revenue is 37 percent of the GDP. Davidson 2008: 135.

[123] Australian Trade Commission 2008, Central Intelligence Agency 2009. See also Davidson 2008: 99-135.

[124] Central Intelligence Agency 2009. Free zones have been established in all emirates but Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain. Davidson 2008: 116.

[125] Davidson 2008: 114.

[126] Mohammed 2008a. Bin Salim Al Ka'abi is the director of H. H. Shaikha Fatima Bint Mubarak's office and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Family Development Institute

[127] Maukola 2008b.

[128] 'Shafi'i' n.d..

[129] Puddington et al. 2007: 848.

[130] Central Intelligence Agency 2009, Davidson 2008: 225. Federal Supreme Court is sometimes referred to as the Union Supreme Court.

[131] Puddington et al. 2007: 847.

[132] Davidson 2008: 225.

[133] Aldridge 2000: 125-126.

[134] Ibid.: 127.

[135] Ibid.: 131.

[136] Alavi 2007: 10.

[137] Davidson 2008: 17-18, Heard-Bey 2004: 3.

[138] See for example the official family tree of the royal family of the Kingdom of Jordan. 'Family Tree of His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan', n.d..

[139] Aldridge 2000: 131.

[140] Ahmed 1988: 27.

[141] Ibid.: 27.

[142] Central Intelligence Agency 2009. For example, both *Gulf News* and *Khaleej Times* publish the daily timings.

[143] Ibid. The source does not differentiate between nationals and expatriates. Thus, the large amounts of expatriates living in the Emirates may confuse the numbers.

[144] Aldridge 2000: 83.

[145] Musabih interviewed in Mohammed 2008b.

[146] Khalfan quoted in Attwood et al. 2008.

[147] Mastny & Cincotta 2005: 23.

[148] Ibid.: 23-24.

[149] Ibid.: 24, 26.

[150] Ibid.: 26.

[151] Ibid.: 23, 25, Population Action International quoted in Mastny & Cincotta 2005: 26.

[152] Ibid.: 25-27.

[153] Huntington quoted in Mastny & Cincotta 2005: 26.

[154] Heard-Bey 2004: 1-2.

[155] Mohammed 2008b, WAM 2010.

[156] Central Intelligence Agency 2009, Heard-Bey 2004: xxxiii.

[157] Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[158] Heard-Bey 2004: xxxiv.

[159] Nazzal 2006a.

[160] Ibid., Nazzal 2006b.

[161] Heard-Bey 2004: xxxiv.

[162] Abu Baker 2008.

[163] Mohammed 2008a.

[164] Al Baik 2008. Arabic language is, in the context of Islamic religion, seen as a sacred language of the Prophet used in the Qur'an. However, partially as a consequence of colonialist geopolitics, national borders in the MENA, South or Central Asia go rarely parallel to language boundaries. Thus, ethnic and cultural nationalism similar to that of Europe cannot be found in the ME. The announcement (of Arabic as official language) was received with enthusiasm among the intellectuals. Indeed, Political Science Professor at the UAE University in Al Ain, Abdul Khaleq Abdullah claimed that the Arabic language was before the announcement "on the verge of extinction" as the "fourth language spoken in this country". Consequently, it is no surprise that among (surprisingly, mostly younger) Emirati nationals in 2003, 20 percent of females and 25 percent of males were illiterate in Arabic. This is partly because private schools offering education in English or French are more highly regarded in comparison to federal schools. As the editorial put it: "So long as the centres of excellence, be they universities, hospitals or government ministries, are perceived to be in the West, Emirati identity will continue to be shaped by foreign influences". Viitamäki 2008a, Youssef 2008a, 'Our national identity must begin at home' 2008.

[165] Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle 1997: 204, emphasis in the original.

[166] Stoenescu n.d.: 12-13.

[167] Ibid.: 12-13.

[168] Alavi 2007: 201-202, researcher's translation.

[169] Stoenescu n.d.: 15.

[170] Mostyn 2002: 21.

[171] Burns 2006: 76. For the purposes of this research, the young Emirati photographers are referred to as both ladies, females and women, without any obscure association to sexuality in as far as chastity goes. Term "girls" is not used because the Flickr users researched are assumed to have reached the age of menarche and be thus, as a social category separate from children.

[172] Ibid.: 76.

[173] Sharp 2005.

[174] Ibid.

[175] Burns 2006: 76.

[176] Mostyn 2002: 106-107.

[177] Puddington et al. 2007: 848.

[178] Ibid.: 848.

[179] Sakr 2004: 158-159.

[180] Puddington et al. 2007: 848, Mostyn 2002: 106-107.

[181] Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle 1997: 41.

[182] Aldridge 2000: 203.

[183] Stoenescu n.d.: 12-13.

[184] Sharp 2005.

[185] El Guindi 2005: 78.

[186] Ibid.: 78.

[187] Graham-Brown 1988: 100, 'Dubai court annuls marriage to 'bearded lady'' 2010. In February 2010 it was reported that an Arab ambassador to Dubai had demanded an annulment of marriage on the basis that he had been shown pictures of the bride's sister while the actual bride was revealed to be "cross-eyed and had facial hair".

[188] Graham-Brown 1988: 100.

[189] Sharp 2005.

[190] Ibid.

[191] Ibid.

[192] Maukola 2008c.

[193] Mostyn 2002: 106-107, Maukola 2008c, Aldridge 2000: 203.

[194] Mostyn 2002: 106-107, Aldridge 2000: 203.

[195] Maukola 2008c.

[196] Maukola 2008c, Aldridge 2000: 203, Mostyn 2002: 17-18.

[197] Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[198] The age group of 15-to-64-year-olds is the biggest making up 78.6 percent of the total population. While in other age groups the gender disparity is not nearly as steep (0-to-14-year-olds: 48.9 percent girls or 1.05 males per female, 65-years-and-over: 35.2 percent women or 1.84 males per female). For the total population there are 2.19 males for each female. Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[199] Stoenescu n.d.: 23, Mattsson 2008: personal communication, January 30, February 12, 2008.

[200] Stoenescu n.d.: 17-18.

[201] Maukola 2008c, Mostyn 2002: 106-107, Alavi 2007: 186.

[202] Stoenescu n.d.: 26, emphasis added.

[203] Ibid.: 20-21.

[204] Davidson 2008: 204-205.

[205] Ibid.: 253.

[206] Al Marri quoted in Al Rahmani 2008.

[207] Al Rahmani 2008.

[208] Davidson 2008: 152.

[209] Ibid.: 152.

[210] Davidson 2008: 152, Stoenescu n.d.: 28-29.

[211] Davidson 2008: 152.

[212] Sen 2000 quoted in MacDonald & Nierenberg 2003: 41.

[213] MacDonald & Nierenberg 2003: 48.

[214] Walters et al. 2004: 69.

[215] Ibid.: 69.

[216] Ibid.: 69, 77.

[217] Burns 2006: 76.

[218] Shawky & Milaat 2001: 27-28.

[219] Bright 2003: 11.

[220] UNDP 2007: 243.

[221] Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[222] Infant mortality rates is defined by Mastny and Cincotta as "the portion of newborns dying before they reach their first birthday". Mastny & Cincotta 2005: 22.

[223] Ibid.: 22.

[224] Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[225] Ibid.

[226] Mostyn 2002: 106-107. Marital contract or *nikāh* is established between the families of the bride and the groom with bride's guardian or the bride herself signing the contract depending on local customs. The groom usually pays *mahr* or "a nuptial gift", that can be anything from property to money, coins and jewellery, to his bride or the bride's guardian. In case the marriage ends in divorce, the gift is expected to be paid back in full. A woman needs a valid reason for a divorce, while a man can simply articulate one's will for a divorce three times and be thus granted one. However, in practice, simple articulation of will is rarely valid these days. Mostyn 2002: 106-107, Alavi 2007: 217, Maukola 2008c.

[227] See for example Maukola 2008c.

[228] Burns 2006: 76.

[229] Ibid.: 76.

[230] Ibid.: 76.

[231] Graham-Brown 1988: 85.

[232] Ibid.: 86.

[233] Eickelman & Anderson 2003b: 1.

[234] Ibid.: 2.

[235] Ibid.: 2-3.

[236] Ibid.: 6.

[237] Ibid.: 4.

[238] Ibid.: 4-5.

[239] Ibid.: 5.

[240] Ahmed 1982 quoted in Graham-Brown 1988: 35.

[241] Sakr 2002: 843.

[242] Sakr 2004: 154. In a situation where a government does not support local NGOs, a sort of "catch 22" situation emerges, when NGOs devoid of state support and funding are forced to seek financial backing from their international counterparts and use "soft colonization" – for example, transnational contacts – to pressure their own governments to act. In consequence, the local government can blame the international funding as the very reason why NGOs should be reigned on, the foreign influence filtering through them suppressed and all local funding discontinued. Thus, a vicious cycle of denied support forces increasing numbers of NGOs to continually rely on international assistance leading to perpetual suspicion of neocolonisation masked as aid. For example, as Abu Odeh notes, feminism in the West is often seen as the cause of "rape, pornography and family disintegration", not as a response to them. Abu Odeh 2005: 98, Sakr 2004: 157-158, 171.

[243] Maukola 2008c.

[244] Ibid.

[245] Ibid.

[246] Sakr 2004: 156.

[247] Ahmed 1988: 28.

[248] Graham-Brown 1988: 213.

[249] Ahmed 2007: 97.

[250] Davidson 2008: 236-237.

[251] Ibid.: 211.

[252] Shukla 2002: 137.

[253] Ibid.: 137.

[254] Sakr 2002: 831.

[255] Ibid.: 831.

[256] See for example Davidson 2008: 34, 85, 242-243.

[257] Davidson 2008: 17, 29, 81, 145.

[258] Ibid.: 145, 'Hind bint Maktoum bin Juma Al Maktoum' n.d..

[259] Davidson 2008: 145.

[260] See for example Ahmed 2007: 124 discussing Qatar's Sheikha Mozah.

[261] Puddington et al. 2007: 848.

[262] Ibid.: 849.

[263] Mernissi 1987 quoted in Walters et al. 2004: 68.

[264] Walters et al. 2004: 67-68.

[265] Heard-Bey 2004: 2.

[266] Walters et al. 2004: 77.

[267] Graham-Brown 1988: 24.

[268] Ibid.: 24.

[269] Ibid.: 125-126.

[270] Ibid.: 24-25.

[271] Davidson 2008: 77-78.

[272] Ibid.: 77-78.

[273] Shukla 2002: 11.

[274] Walters et al. 2004: 65-66.

[275] Shukla 2002: 17.

[276] Ibid.: 17.

[277] Walters et al. 2004: 69.

[278] Ibid.: 69.

[279] Shukla 2002: 137.

[280] Ibid.: 137.

[281] Walters et al. 2004: 69-70.

[282] UAE Yearbook 2002 quoted in Walters et al. 2004: 65.

[283] Burns 2006: 76.

[284] Ibid.: 76.

[285] Sakr 2004: 158.

[286] Burns 2006: 76.

[287] Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[288] Ibid.

[289] Heard-Bey 2004: xxxiv.

[290] Ibid.: xxxiv.

[291] Youssef 2008b.

[292] Davidson 2008: 118.
[293] Ross 2007: 2.
[294] Ibid.: 3-4.
[295] Ibid.: 4, 11.
[296] Ibid.: 5.
[297] Ibid.: 9.
[298] Ibid.: 2, 26.
[299] Ibid.: 7.
[300] Ibid.: 8.
[301] Ibid.: 8.
[302] Ibid.: 8.
[303] Ibid.: 8.
[304] Ibid.: 9.
[305] Ibid.: 9.
[306] Walters et al. 2004: 66.
[307] Ross 2007: 9.
[308] Ibid.: 11.
[309] Ibid.: 2-3, 11, 26.
[310] Ibid.: 1-3, 25.
[311] Ibid.: 19.
[312] Ibid.: 20.
[313] Ibid.: 20-21.
[314] Davidson 2008: 153.
[315] Ibid.: 153-154.
[316] Ibid.: 157.
[317] Shukla 2002: 105.
[318] Walters et al. 2004: 76.
[319] Ibid.: 65.
[320] Ibid.: 65.
[321] Ibid.: 67-68, 76.
[322] Abu Baker 2008, Walters et al. 2004: 66, Pers. comm. July 21, 2006. Similar policies of favouritism of nationals are in place in other GCC countries such as Bahrain, where employers are expected to employ two nationals for every expatriate or face sanctions. Hamada 2008.
[323] Davidson 2008: 149.
[324] Heard-Bey 2004: xxxiv.
[325] Walters et al. 2004: 66.
[326] Ibid.: 67.
[327] 'Woman pilot receives praise' 2007.
[328] 'Women's race club spruces up' 2007.
[329] Brattle 2007.
[330] 'Alia Al Shamsi' n.d.., 'Interview with Alia Al-Shamsi' 2005.
[331] Graham-Brown 1988: 215.
[332] MacLeod 2008: 43.
[333] Alavi 2007: 198.
[334] Ibid.: 198, researcher's translation.
[335] Mostyn 2002: 106.
[336] Ibid.: 106.
[337] Ibid.: 105-106.
[338] Macdonald 2006: 8.
[339] Mostyn 2002: 104.
[340] Aldridge 2000: 206.
[341] Macdonald 2006: 8.
[342] Aldridge 2000: 206.
[343] Ibid.: 206.
[344] Zelizer 2001 quoted in Macdonald 2006: 7.
[345] Macdonald 2006: 9.
[346] Alloula 1986: 14, emphasis added.
[347] Aldridge 2000: 206. On another occasion, five-year-old Hannah Edward's passport photography was rejected in the UK because it "showed her bare shoulders" and could thus cause offence in a Muslim country. The case was reported in

The Daily Telegraph, in which the parents accused British officers of bending over backwards for political correctness. 'Five-year-old's Bare Shoulders 'May Offend'' 2007.

[348] Macdonald 2006: 10, 12-14.

[349] Aldridge 2000: 206.

[350] Alavi 2007: 201.

[351] Al Awadhi 2007a: 10.

[352] Shaaban interviewed in Ahmed 2007: 120.

[353] Alavi 2007: 201.

[354] Kibbey 2005: 55-57.

[355] Alavi 2007: 202.

[356] Ibid.: 24, researcher's translation.

[357] Ahmed 2007: 119.

[358] Ibid.: 84.

[359] Ibid.: 84.

[360] Ibid.: 84.

[361] Davidson 2008: 72.

[362] Ibid.: 153.

[363] Graham-Brown 1988: 121.

[364] Shukla 2002: 13, 34, 43, 54-55, 58, 63, 75, 83, 104, 106-107, 109, 121, 129, 131.

[365] Shukla 2002: 75. The transparent veils might have also been a fashion as photographs from 1938 Egypt show women wearing similarly see through veils on their faces. Graham-Brown 1988: 103.

[366] Youssef 2008b.

[367] Macdonald 2006: 19.

[368] Ibid.: 15.

[369] Ibid.: 15.

[370] Al Awadhi 2007a: 10.

[371] Ibid.: 10.

[372] Ibid.: 10.

[373] Ibid.: 10.

[374] Walters et al. 2004: 65.

[375] Gawad 1978: 174.

[376] Rugh 2004: 2, emphasis in the original.

[377] Gawad 1978: 173, 175.

[378] Gonzalez-Quijano 2003: 62.

[379] Rugh 2004: 4.

[380] Ibid.: 4.

[381] Smalley 2007: 47-49. There are seven Arabic (*Akhbar Al-Arab*, *Al Bayan*, *Al Fajr*, *Al Ittihad*, *Al Khaleej*, *Al Wahda* and *Emarat Alyoum*) and six English morning dailies (*7 Days*, *Arab News – UAE Edition*, *Emirates Today*, *Gulf News*, *Khaleej Times* and *The Gulf Today*), one evening (*The Emirates Evening Post*), one business (*Arabian Business Standard*) and one sports daily (*Sport100*) in English and one weekly business newspaper (*Dubai Times*) also in English.

[382] Ipsos-Stat quoted in Smalley 2007: 47

[383] Ibid.: 47

[384] Ibid.: 47.

[385] Smalley 2007: 6.

[386] Ibid.: 6.

[387] Out of all the 608 consumer magazines listed in the Media Guide 2007, 36 percent are produced in the UAE. While out of all the 313 Business and trade press listed in the Guide 42 percent are produced in the UAE. Smalley 2007: 141-184.

[388] Smalley 2007: 8.

[389] Gawad 1978: 174-175.

[390] Davidson 2008: 41, 46.

[391] Smalley 2007: 257. www.wam.ae. Out of global news agencies, Agence-France Press, Associated Press, Reuters, Bloomberg and Dow Jones all have offices in Dubai. There are also some regional players located in the UAE, such as Dubai Press Agency, Integral Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Press Trust of India (PTI) with a Middle East Bureau and specialised Real Estate News Agency. Smalley 2007: 258-260.

[392] *Al Bayan* is edited by a member of the extended ruling family Sheikh Hasher Bin Maktum Al-Maktum. Davidson 2008: 143.

[393] Smalley 2007: 47-49.

[394] 'About Us' n.d.
[395] Rugh 2004, xiv.
[396] Ulaby 2006: 216-217.
[397] Shukla 2002: 29.
[398] Ibid.: 105.
[399] Ulaby 2006: 216-217, Smalley 2007: 251.
[400] These stations are *MBC FM*, *Panorama FM* and *Radio Sawa*. Ulaby 2006: 216-217, Smalley 2007: 227.
[401] Which means "Together". Smalley 2007: 227.
[402] The station broadcasts a 24-hour mix of prevalent news with Arabic and Western popular music and according to the Media Guide 2007, it "became an instant hit". Smalley 2007: 227.
[403] Smalley 2007: 251, 253.
[404] Ibid.: 187.
[405] Ibid.: 187.
[406] Ibid.: 187, Ulaby 2006: 215-216, 'MTV launches new Arabic service' 2007.
[407] Ulaby 2006: 215-216.
[408] Ibid.: 215-216.
[409] Ibid.: 215-216.
[410] Ibid.: 215-216.
[411] Ibid.: 215-216.
[412] Ibid.: 215-216.
[413] Smalley 2007: 188, 'Al Jazeera' 2009.
[414] Smalley 2007: 188: "According to *InterBand*'s 2004 global survey, *Al Jazeera* is the world's most influential brand among all media networks and the world's fifth most influential brand behind *Apple*, *Google*, *IKEA* and *Starbucks*". Emphasis in the original.
[415] Smalley 2007: 188, emphasis in the original.
[416] Ibid.: 188.
[417] Adler 2009.
[418] Smalley 2007: 188, emphasis in the original.
[419] Ibid.: 188, 203. The satellite channels get their revenue from advertising and SMS messages the viewers send to choose particular videos, display comments on screen or participate in voting of reality TV shows imported from West and adapted to local customs. However, according to consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton, the concept of free-to-air channels is unsustainable with the eight biggest channels grabbing around 80 percent of all advertising revenue, while the rest 147 channels share the rest and have to rely on government subsidies. Hence, there can be expected some "drastic changes", "substantial rationalisation" and more shifts to pay-TV platforms. Smalley 2007: 187, Booz Allen Hamilton quoted in Smalley 2007: 187.
[420] Smalley 2007: 203-204. The Abu Dhabi owned Emirates Media Incorporated operates *Abu Dhabi TV*, *Abu Dhabi Sports Channel* and *Emirates Channel*. The Dubai Media Incorporated runs *Dubai TV*, *Dubai Sports Channel*, *One TV* and *Sama Dubai*. Fujairah Media manages *Dunia TV* and Sharjah TV controls *Channel 54* and *Channel 22*. The only independently run company is InTV, which operates *City 7 TV* from Dubai Media City free zone.
[421] Burns 2006: 76.
[422] Al Awadhi 2007b: 8.
[423] Ibid.: 8.
[424] Gillmor 2006: 11-12.
[425] Montgomery 2007: viii.
[426] Gillmor 2006: 11-12.
[427] Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 334.
[428] Moore's Law predicts that "the density of transistors on a given piece of silicone will double every 18 to 24 months", leading to extraordinarily rapid improvement in computing capability. Gillmor 2006: 159.
[429] Metcalfe's Law states, that "the value of a communication network is the square of the number of nodes, or end-point connections. That is, take the number of nodes and multiply it by itself." Gillmor demonstrates Metcalfe's Law with a "canonical" example of fax machines: one machine has no use for its owner, but two machines create value for both machines' users. With each machine in the network, more value is created; a network of five fax machines has thus a value 5^2 or $5 * 5 = 25$. Gillmor 2006: 160.
[430] Reed's Law emphasises the many-to-many aspects enabled by both personal computers and the Internet, calculating a network's value at "the number of groups *factorial*", meaning that a network of five computers is $1 * 2 * 3 * 5 = 120$. Gillmor 2006: 161, emphasis in the original.
[431] Gillmor 2006: 161.
[432] Manovich 2001: 6.
[433] Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 334.

[434] Ibid.: 334.

[435] Ibid.: 317.

[436] Depending on source, sometimes written together as "weblog".

[437] Gillmor 2006: 25-26, 28, 32, 33.

[438] Eickelman & Anderson 2003b: 9.

[439] Eickelman & Anderson 2003a: ix-x. According to Eickelman and Anderson, new media connect users and producers in three different contexts of social infrastructure of communication in Muslim societies: firstly, there is the layer of doctrinated religious discourse with "Spokepersons legitimized by conventional systems of learning", their authority slowly eroded by more active participation of "'low' forms of public religious expression" of "distinctly bourgeois character and settings" through new media technologies expanding the old public sphere of Islamic thought. Secondly, there is the context of Muslim majority countries, whose own local traditions and public sphere of Islamic thought long considered inline with Islamic practices come under criticism as new media spreads "competing religious authorities". Thirdly, there is the context "found in the larger public spheres in which Muslims are minorities", where new media enable continued interaction "between diasporas and homelands". Eickelman & Anderson 2003a: x-xi.

[440] Rugh 2004: x.

[441] Rugh 2004: x, xiii

[442] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 2007/2008 2007: 273, 276.

[443] Smalley 2007: 277.

[444] Ibid.: 277.

[445] Gonzalez-Quijano 2003: 63.

[446] Ibid.: 63.

[447] Smalley 2007: 277. The Internet country code of the UAE is .ae. Central Intelligence Agency 2009.

[448] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 2007/2008 2007: 273, 276.

[449] 'Internet Usage in the Middle East' 2009.

[450] Ibid.

[451] Ibid.

[452] Ibid.

[453] Gonzalez-Quijano 2003: 65.

[454] Smalley 2007: 277-278.

[455] Ibid.: 277.

[456] Ibid.: 277.

[457] 'On the hoof' 2007.

[458] For further discussion see Gillmor 2006: xxiv.

[459] Gonzalez-Quijano 2003: 62, emphasis in the original.

[460] Ibid.: 62.

[461] Ibid.: 72.

[462] Ibid.: 72.

[463] Montgomery 2007: 2.

[464] Ibid.: 107, emphasis in the original.

[465] Ibid.: 107-108.

[466] Walters et al. 2004: 71.

[467] Ibid.: 71.

[468] Ibid.: 71.

[469] Ibid.: 73.

[470] Ibid.: 72.

[471] Rheingold 2002 quoted in Montgomery 2007: 3.

[472] Montgomery 2007: 3.

[473] Alavi 2007: 29, researcher's translation.

[474] Alavi 2007: 53.

[475] Sharp 2005.

[476] Ibid.

[477] Ibid.

[478] Montgomery 2007: 114.

[479] Ibid: 114.

[480] Grinter and Palen 2002 quoted in Montgomery 2007: 115.

[481] Walters et al. 2004: 73.

[482] Ibid.: 73.

[483] Gillmor 2006: 23.

[484] The first blogs are from over a decade ago, created in 1997, the popular Blogger software was launched in 1999 by Pyra Labs. In blogs, the newest posting appears on top of the page, resulting in a blog structure that is in reverse chronological order. As a technology, blog is somewhere between email and homepage. Burstein 2005: xiii, Gillmor 2006: 28-29, Montgomery 2007: 135.

[485] Hourihan 2001 quoted in Gillmor 2006: 29, Gillmor 2006: 29, 31. However, link lists to other web sites, blogs and blog postings are also integral parts of blogs, as is also a possibility for the readers to comment on postings. Because of better bandwidth, many blogs these days include so called "rich media" formats – audio tracks, videos, animation and other multimedia.

[486] Agreed by Gillmor 2006: 28, Montgomery 2007: 135.

[487] Scoble interviewed in Kline & Burstein 2005: 130.

[488] Gillmor 2006: 139. Kline notes, that one reason behind the success of blogs (at least in the US) has been general mistrust of mainstream media – considered having failed its duty to question the motives behind the invasion of Iraq in 2003. As a result, much of the early discourse around blogs pitted mainstream media journalism against individual bloggers. Kline 2005a: 6-24.

[489] Drezner & Farrell 2005: 92. For example, in Iran the government has been divided into two on the issue; while the Minister of Information Mohsen Ejei has called bloggers traitors, other government officials have encouraged especially Islamic bloggers to a point, where blogging is these days taught at Basij-centers and religious seminars in the holy city of Qom. Alavi 2007: 9.

[490] Alavi 2007: 18.

[491] Wolman 2008.

[492] Brown 2004.

[493] Malvern 2006.

[494] Perseus Development Corporation 2003 quoted in Drezner & Farrell 2005: 85.

[495] Huffaker 2004 quoted in Montgomery 2007: 136. [Huffaker, "Gender in Online Identity and Language Use among Teenage Bloggers", masters thesis, Communication, Culture, and Technology Program, Georgetown University, 2004, http://www.soc.northwestern.edu/gradstudents/huffaker/.]

[496] Corbett 2008.

[497] Central Intelligence Agency 2010.

[498] Walters et al. 2004: 71-72.

[499] Gillmor 2006: 33.

[500] Walters et al. 2004: 71.

[501] Sharp 2005.

[502] Ibid.

[503] Ibid.

[504] Ibid.

[505] Ibid.

[506] Jansen 1988: 14, Ekholm 1996: 61, Mostyn 2002: 33.

[507] Jansen 1988: 14, Ekholm 1996: 61, Mostyn 2002: 33.

[508] Jansen 1988: 24-25.

[509] Sakr 2003: 35.

[510] Mostyn 2002: 21, emphasis in the original.

[511] Mostyn 2002: 29.

[512] "'Let there be among you a group that calls others to good, commanding good and forbidding evil.' (Qur'an III:104)". Mostyn 2002: 98.

[513] The original categories were authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and totalitarian.

[514] Rugh 2004: 25-26.

[515] Ibid.: 26.

[516] Ibid.: 26.

[517] Ibid.: 26.

[518] Ibid.: 26.

[519] Berenger 2006: 193.

[520] Sakr 2003: 30-31.

[521] Ibid.: 31.

[522] Ibid.: 30-31.

[523] Ibid.: 30.

[524] Ibid.: 37.

[525] Puddington et al. 2007: 847.

[526] Ibid.: 847.

[527] Carver 2005: 31.

[528] Puddington et al. 2007: 847-848.

[529] Oxford English Dictionary quoted in Jansen 1988: 14.

[530] Jansen 1988: 14.

[531] Ekholm 1996: 59-60. Another recent trend in censorship has been to justify tightened rules and regulations by economic concerns. As an indirect consequence of the new ICTs, these concerns have had most effect in the US, where copyright was originally created to protect an income for inventors and authors and. Hence, McLeod reasons that the copyright has more to do with free speech than economic policies. McLeod fears the possibility of "artistic mummification" of copyrighted materials as critical interpretations of copyrighted works can be thwarted by copyright laws bent on limiting "confusion the in the marketplace" and "unwholesome or unsavory context" of existing products or brands. Before the 20th century, private corporations were not as central to the society as they are in contemporary society and art was to criticise and problematise religion and government among other things. However, these days privately owned intellectual property is more and more central to the society and copyright laws forbid talking about them. Regarding the wider media landscape around the Gulf, Mostyn states that, "commercial considerations" amounting to censorship play a factor as advertising revenue from certain wealthy countries can be critical for economic survival of media companies. McLeod 2005: 8-9, 28-29, 64, 143, 179, Mostyn 2002: 50.

[532] Ekholm 1996: 60.

[533] Mostyn 2002: 19.

[534] Ibid.: 22.

[535] Ibid.: 29.

[536] Ibid.: 29.

[537] Ibid.: 29. However, the lines of censorship have never been fixed in the ME, as Haifaa Khalafallah observes, Arabic literature has divided into three separate currents because of it: "literature of exile" that "does not reach those who can comprehend it", sanctioned literature of official ideologies and "literature of underground" discussing "true aspects of its time". While many Pan-Arab newspapers, such as *Al-Arab*, *Al Ahram International* and *Al Hayat – International*, published in London and printed via satellite, fit the category of exile literature, such literature can also be written and published within the region too. This was the case for *Banat al-Riyadh*, for example, a novel by Saudi Arabian Rajaa Alsanea that was banned in her home country but readily available in the UAE. Eickelman 2003: 33-34, Mostyn 2002: 81, Smalley 2007: 11.

[538] Haidar 2005: 102.

[539] Sakr 2003: 37.

[540] Haidar 2005: 102.

[541] Eickelman 2003: 34-35.

[542] Ibid.: 34-35.

[543] Mostyn 2002: 42-43.

[544] Ibid.: 42-43. As an exception – although in line with broader foreign policies – Dubai Media Free Zone restricts employment of Israelis. Davidson 2008: 117.

[545] Burns 2006: 76.

[546] Haidar 2005: 102.

[547] Mostyn 2002: 42-43, Burns 2006: 76.

[548] Burns 2006: 76.

[549] Mostyn 2002: 50.

[550] Puddington et al. 2007: 847.

[551] Eickelman 2003: 33-34.

[552] Ibid.: 33-35.

[553] Ibid.: 33-34.

[554] Ibid.: 42.

[555] Ibid.: 34.

[556] Jansen 1988: 4.

[557] Ibid.: 168-169.

[558] In the US, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 made fighting intellectual piracy one of the cornerstones of international policies, and in the Gulf, "rampant piracy" has stagnated the local recording industry and "many smaller music labels have ceased producing new recordings" forcing artists to rely on concerts for income, according to Ulaby. Montgomery 2007: 99. Ulaby 2006: 214-215.

[559] Agence France-Presse 2000 quoted in Mostyn 2002: 34.

[560] Puddington et al. 2007: 847.

[561] Puddington et al. 2007: 847.

[562] Pers. comm. June 6, 2007, Davidson 2008: 217.

[563] Montague 2005: 28.

[564] Sakr 2003: 38.

[565] The website blocking done by Etisalat is actually performed outside the UAE by a Seattle based company Secure Computing. According to Montague's report, the system works like a filtering program that regulates what sites a user can or cannot access. The UAE government pays Secure Computing USD 2 for each Internet connection per year. According to Montague, the total cost of censoring the Internet in the UAE amounts to USD 2.6 million for over 1.3 million users. Derek Bambauer of Open Net Initiative (a research organisation that monitors Internet surveillance and restriction) states that over 15 percent of all sites have been blocked, among them pornographic, gambling and drug related sites as well as "Israeli top-level domains, sites on the Bahai faith, Middle East-oriented gay and lesbian issues, and English-language dating sites". However, a problem with filtering programs is that they often block out a whole lot of sites, which have no illegitimate or offending material, such as medical sites about breast cancer, for example. Bambauer interviewed in Montague 2005: 25, Montague 2005: 28.

[566] 'Caught in the Net: Skype' 2005: 92.

[567] Sakr 2003: 42.

[568] Bush 2001 quoted in Miles 2005: 111.

[569] Männistö 1999: 80.

[570] Ibid.: 80.

[571] Ibid.: 81-81.

[572] Ibid.: 81-81.

[573] Siikala 1999: 48.

[574] Ibid.: 48.

[575] Ibid.: 48.

[576] Maukola 2008a.

[577] Siikala 1999: 48-49.

[578] Ibid.: 50-51.

[579] Ibid.: 51-52.

[580] Ahmed 1999: 219-220.

[581] Davidson 2008: 28.

[582] Männistö 1999: 77.

[583] Ibid.: 77.

[584] Ibid.: 242-243.

[585] Ibid.: 242-244.

[586] Ibid.: 146-147.

[587] Ibid.: 148.

[588] Mostyn 2002: 16-17. For Ahmed, the change in Arab-American relations came when Saddam Hussein was elevated to "Hitleresque" heights around the First Gulf War. At the same time many Muslims, according to Ahmed, began to feel uneasy about what they felt extended hostility towards all Arabs, condemning Saddam for the atrocities he committed but at the same time admiring him for courage to stand up to the US. Ahmed goes as far as to state, that "So intense was the sense of humiliation and anger among Muslims that they would even rally behind the devil himself if he stood up to the West". Ahmed 1999: 221-224.

[589] Männistö 1999: 248-250.

[590] Mostyn 2002: 191-192.

[591] Ahmed 1999: 229.

[592] Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 315.

[593] Ibid.: 315, 318.

[594] Ibid.: 315-316, emphasis in the original.

[595] Ibid.: 317.

[596] Ibid.: 322.

[597] Ibid.: 324.

[598] Thompson 2002 quoted in Montgomery 2007: 7.

[599] Rugh 2004: ix. Indeed, according to Gawad, a 1977 study by the Cairo University found that "Arabic newspapers printed more news of the big powers than of the Arab countries themselves". Gawad 1978: 178.

[600] Rugh 2004: ix. However, according to Rugh, the few Arab newspapers printed in English are "intended for non-Arabs living in the Middle East" and thus their content is quite different from that of the Arabic counterparts.

[601] Halliday 1995: 211. These attitudes were demonstrated well during the failed attempt by the Dubai Ports World to buy American port operator Peninsula and Oriental Steam Company (P&O). The failure increased the perception of xenophobia towards all things Arab. However, there was some validity in the terrorism fears as the UAE has been accused of providing, for example the September 11th 2001 terrorists with possibilities to distribute funds. In addition, one of the pilots in the World Trade Center attack was a UAE national Marwan Al-Shehhi from Ra's al-Khaimah. Also, it has been claimed that some members of the UAE elite have associated themselves with Osama Bin Laden. Davidson 2008: 108, 289, 293-294.

[602] Tatarian 1978: 1-2.

[603] Ahmed 2007: 116, 118.

[604] Youssef 2008b.

[605] Ibid.

[606] Ahmed 1999: 216-217.

[607] 'Letter to Geroge W. Bush' 2008: front page.

[608] Mostyn 2002: 16, 19.

[609] Halliday 1995: 211.

[610] Ahmed 1999: 217.

[611] Ibid.: 217, emphasis added.

[612] Ibid.: 232.

[613] Ruthven 2001: 60.

[614] Worth 2009, 'UAE to probe sheikh torture tape' 2009.

[615] Ahmed 1999: 220.

[616] Gawad 1978: 178, Tatarian 1978: 52-53.

[617] Mostyn 2002: 193.

[618] Carter 2002 quoted in Eickelman & Anderson 2003a: ix-x. Furthermore, according to both Mostyn and Norton, the former US Secretary of State Colin Powell as well as the former US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice pressured Al Jazeera to stop airing alleged tapes from Osama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida operatives on the premises that they may have included "coded messages to terrorists". Mostyn 2002: 193, Norton 2003: 20.

[619] Wilcox 2006: 18.

[620] Ibid.: 18.

[621] Miles 2005: 220, 329, Rugh 2004: 237.

[622] Anderson 2007: 9.

[623] Ibid.: 10.

[624] Jansen 1988: 26.

[625] Ibid.: 26.

[626] Ahmed 1988: 30.

[627] Stothoff Badeau 1983: 6, 8-9.

[628] Walters et al. 2004: 65.

[629] Landon 2010.

[630] Sherwood 2006.

[631] Heard-Bey 2004: 14, 17.

[632] Ibid. 11.

[633] In the *United Arab Emirates Yearbook 2009*, Sheikh Zayed is titled "a visionary leader" whose "visionary role" made a huge difference on the nation's character. Sheikh Zayed was born "around 1918" in Abu Dhabi, the youngest of four sons of Sheikh Sultan, who ruled Abu Dhabi 1922-1926. Vine 2009: 14. See elso Heard-Bey 2004: xxxi.

[634] Heard-Bey 2004: xxiv, xxix.

[635] Mostyn 2002: 68.

[636] Heard-Bey 2004: xxx-xxxi.

[637] Davidson 2008: 160. A similar structure is still in place in present-day open *majlises* or councils held by both male and female members of ruling families, where constituents may express their grievances as well as "numerous informal channels for the decision-makers to become aware of mood swings among their constituents". Heard-Bey 2004: xxxi, Mostyn 2002: 68.

[638] Davidson 2008: 160.

[639] Ibid.: 161-163.

[640] Ibid.: 160.

[641] Ibid.: 162-163.

[642] Ibid.: 149-151.

[643] A term used by Davidson 2008: 115.

[644] Davidson 2008: 179.

[645] Ibid.: 179.

[646] Ibid.: 153-157.

[647] Pers. comm. June 5, 2006.

[648] Davidson 2008: 180-181.

[649] Central Intelligence Agency 2009, Davidson 2008: 189-193.

[650] Attwood et al. 2008.

[651] Al Rahmani 2008.

[652] Davidson 2008: 191-192. The restrictions on naturalisation are somewhat irrelevant as few expatriate workers aim to gain citizenship.

[653] Lynch 2010.

[654] 'Forging a modern sense of identity' 2008.

[655] Stothoff Badeau 1983: 10.

[656] Attwood et al. 2008.

[657] Kazemi & Norton 2006: 205.

[658] Ibid.: 205.

[659] Ibid.: 205.

[660] Bahrain has become constitutional monarchy and Oman and Qatar have held elections.

[661] Heard-Bey 2004: xxxii. Curiously, as both Mostyn and Norton observe, Western nations have seldom promoted democracy in the MENA region on anything other than rhetorical level as democracy has been found "an irritant in countries whose resources it [the West] needs to control and manipulate". Indeed, as Norton writes, "status quo is usually viewed as preferable to the potential turmoil of transition. Change is often perceived as jeopardizing Western links to stable authoritarian governments, especially in the Muslim world".
Mostyn 2002: 21, Norton 2003: 22.

[662] Heard-Bey 2004: xxxii.

[663] Davidson 2008: 165.

[664] Ibid.: 165-166.

[665] Kazemi & Norton 2006: 201.

[666] Landon 2009.

[667] Landon 2010.

[668] Central Intelligence Agency 2010.

[669] Mastny & Cincotta 2005: 24.

[670] Ibid.: 35.

[671] Ibid.: 32, 34.

[672] Ibid.: 31.

[673] Ibid.: 32-33.

[674] Lyotard 1985 quoted in Derrick & Wells 2004: 21.

[675] Davidson 2008: 174-175.

[676] Attwood et al. 2008.

[677] Blair & Bloom 2004: 75. For example, frescoes in the 'Ali Qapu and Ashraf palaces during the Safavids dynasty were "said to have been the work of a certain 'Jan the Dutchman', who became court painter to Shah 'Abbas at the beginning of the century". Du Ry 1970: 224.

[678] Blair & Bloom 2004: 75.

[679] Grube 1968: 8, Grabar 1983: 77-78.

[680] Grube 1968: 11, Grabar 1983: 78-79.

[681] Du Ry (1970) divides dynastic categories as follows: The Umayyads, the 'Abbasids, the Tulunids, the Buwaihids, the Samanids, the Ghaznavids, the Emirate of Cordova (or the Umayyads of Spain), the Fatimids, the Seljuks, the Seljuks in Persia, the Western Seljuks, the Ayyubids and certain local dynasties of Atabegs, the Moors and the Maghrib, the Mamluks, the Ottoman Turks, the Mongols in Persia: Ilkhanids and Timurids, the Safavids, and India.

[682] Blair & Bloom 2004: 76.

[683] Ibid.: 76.

[684] Ibid.: 76.

[685] Ibid.: 76.

[686] Ibid.: 78.

[687] Du Ry 1970: 192.

[688] Blair & Bloom 2004: 81. See also Grube 1968: 8. In a broader sense, written word, especially Arabic, was venerated with general literacy evolving together with the concept of People of the Book. Maukola 2008d.

[689] Blair & Bloom 2004: 76, 78.

[690] Ibid.: 76.

[691] Heard-Bey 2004: 140.

[692] Ibid.: 140.

[693] Grube 1968: 8.

[694] Blair & Bloom 2004: 80. The importance of textiles in the Islamic religion and culture can be exemplified, for example, with Ka'aba, the house Ibrahim built for God, covered in cloth since "the dawn of the faith".

[695] Grabar 1983: 80, Blair & Bloom 2004: 80. According to Du Ry, Arabesque is composed of "plant motifs stylized into geometric figures, including the many versions of the schematized split leaf and continuous stem". Du Ry 1970: 46.

[696] Blair & Bloom 2004: 79.

697 Ibid.: 79.
698 Ibid.: 79.
699 Ibid.: 79.
700 Ibid.: 79.
701 Ibid.: 80.
702 Grube 1968: 11, Grabar 1983: 92.
703 Blair & Bloom 2004: 80.
704 Blair & Bloom 2004: 80. However, Du Ry (1970: 47) states that "The religious prohibition on using objects made of precious metals like gold and silver forced the craftsman into an awkward position. He found himself obliged to forge noble forms in base metals or alloys such as bronze."
705 Blair & Bloom 2004: 81.
706 Ibid.: 81.
707 Ibid.: 81.
708 Ibid.: 81.
709 Ibid.: 81.
710 *The Koran Interpreted* 1983, V The Table: 65: 109-110.
711 Blair & Bloom 2004: 78, Grube 1968: 12.
712 Du Ry 1970: 10, Grube 1968: 12. Delcambre cites a story about Aisha, the Prophet's second wife, who had a textile with images on it. When the Prophet saw it, he "became angry and shouted: 'In truth, among those who will receive the harshest torments on the Day of Final Judgement there will be those who made images.'" Delcambre 2005: 55. Other *hadith* advice the believer saying that angels will not come to a house with figures or a dog, warning overtly ambitious artists that God will ask them to breathe life into their creations at the final judgment. Maukola 2008d, see also Grube 1968: 12, Delcambre 2005: 55, Palva 1998: 446.
713 Grube 1968: 12.
714 Du Ry 1970: 7.
715 Grabar 1983, 93.
716 Blair & Bloom 2004: 78.
717 Maukola 2008d, Grabar 1983: 95.
718 Grabar 1983: 97.
719 Also Maukola 2008d.
720 Blair & Bloom 2004: 78.
721 Ibid.: 79.
722 Ibid.: 79.
723 Ibid.: 79.
724 Yousfi 2007: 61.
725 Blair & Bloom 2004: 78, Delcambre 2005: 55.
726 *The Koran Interpreted* 1983, II The Cow: 220: 30-31.
727 *The Koran Interpreted* 1983, IX Repentence: 15: 181.
728 Blair & Bloom 2004: 78.
729 Du Ry 1970: 7.
730 For example Du Ry 1970: 46, Grabar 1983: 97.
731 Du Ry 1970: 17.
732 Maukola 2008d.
733 Blair & Bloom 2004: 78-79.
734 Ibid. 79.
735 Du Ry 1970: 201.
736 Ibid.: 24, 27, 51.
737 Ibid.: 63.
738 Ibid.: 93, 99.
739 Ibid.: 46.
740 Naef 2002: 221, emphasis in the original.
741 Ibid.: 221-222.
742 Ibid.: 221.
743 Ibid.: 222.
744 Ibid.: 222-223.
745 Ibid.: 222-223, 225.
746 Ibid.: 226.
747 Ibid.: 225-226.
748 Ibid.: 225-226.

[749] Ibid.: 226.
[750] Ibid.: 227.
[751] Ibid.: 227.
[752] Ibid.: 222-223, 228.
[753] Ibid.: 229.
[754] Ibid.: 230.
[755] Ibid.: 229.
[756] Ibid.: 229.
[757] Ibid.: 230.
[758] Ibid.: 231.
[759] Graham-Brown 1988: 4.
[760] Erdogdu 2004: 107.
[761] Rosenblum 1984: 97-99, 104, Männistö 1999: 73, Graham-Brown 1988: 36.
[762] Rosenblum 1984: 120.
[763] Graham-Brown 1988: 7, 9.
[764] Rosenblum 1984: 120.
[765] Said 1978 quoted in Graham-Brown 1988: 5, see also 10, 40.
[766] Graham-Brown 1988: 7.
[767] Ibid.: 10, 40.
[768] Ibid.: 9.
[769] Ibid.: 9, 70. See also Männistö 2002a: 52.
[770] DeRoo 2004: 159.
[771] Ibid.: 165, 167.
[772] Ibid.: 167, 169.
[773] Graham-Brown 1988: 18.
[774] Ibid.: 18.
[775] Ibid.: 18, 20.
[776] Ibid.: 19.
[777] Ibid.: 12.
[778] Erdogdu 2004: 115-117, 122.
[779] Graham-Brown 1988: 40.
[780] Erdogdu 2004: 111, 114.
[781] Ibid.: 116.
[782] Graham-Brown 1988: 5.
[783] Hight & Sampson 2004: 1.
[784] Ibid.: 2-3.
[785] Hight & Sampson 2004: 3, Graham-Brown 1988: 14-17, Erdogdu 2004: 111. One of the most prominent anthropologists of the time was Finnish Hilma Granqvist, who did fieldwork in Palestinian village of Artas during 1925 to 1931.
[786] Graham-Brown 1988: 14.
[787] Ibid.: 39, Hight & Sampson 2004: 4-5.
[788] Pinney 1997 quoted in Hight & Sampson 2004: 10-11.
[789] Hight & Sampson 2004: 10, Graham-Brown 1988: 17.
[790] Erdogdu 2004: 109.
[791] Ibid.: 107, 119.
[792] Hight & Sampson 2004: 10.
[793] Ibid.: 11, Erdogdu 2004: 119-120, De Roo 2004: 160. According to Ahmed, the Berbers, Pukhtuns and Bedouins were the three ethnic groups most often understood to personify the archetypical "noble savage". Ahmed 1988: 132, quoted also in Männistö 1999: 70.
[794] DeRoo 2004: 162, 164.
[795] Ibid.: 164-165.
[796] Erdogdu 2004: 117, 121.
[797] Jenks 2006: 123-151. See also Banks 2001: 7, Zelizer 2001 quoted in Macdonald 2006: 7. On the other hand, as Martin Jay has shown, many 20th century French philosphers had particularly negative view of vision as a sense. See Martin, J 2006, 'In the Empire of the Gaze: Foucault and the Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-century French Thought*', in Hamilton, P (ed.), *Visual research methods: Volume II*, Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oakes, New Delhi: 55-83.
[798] Jenks 2006: 138.
[799] See for example Banks 2001: 7.

[800] Miles 2005: 25.

[801] According to Hallenberg, in addition to oral and aural sense, sense of smell is emphasised in Muslim cultures. Hallenberg 1998: 63.

[802] Jenks 2006: 138. See for example Banks 2001: 8-9.

[803] Naficy quoted in Mostyn 2002: 24.

[804] Qur'an quoted in Mostyn 2002: 104, emphasis in the original, El Guindi 2005: 84.

[805] Miles 2005: 41-42.

[806] Al-Qaradawi 1980 quoted in Al-Sauty 2006: 25.

[807] Meshkini quoted in Mostyn 2002: 24.

[808] Al-Sauty 2006: v.

[809] Ibid.: v.

[810] Ibid.: 1.

[811] Graham-Brown 1988: 62.

[812] Ibid.: 62.

[813] Al-Sauty 2006: 1, 8.

[814] Mostyn 2002: 179.

[815] Al-Sauty 2006: 8.

[816] Al-Qaradawi 1980 quoted in Al-Sauty 2006: 1.

[817] Al-Sauty 2006: 8.

[818] Ibid.: 9.

[819] Al-Qaradawi 1980 quoted in Al-Sauty 2006: 1, emphasis in the original.

[820] Al-Sauty 2006: 35.

[821] Ibid.: 10, 12, 73-74, 102.

[822] Ibid.: 10, 12.

[823] Al-Qaradawi 1980 quoted in Al-Sauty 2006: 20, emphasis in the original.

[824] Al-Sauty 2006: 18.

[825] Graham-Brown 1988: 61-62.

[826] Ibid.: 62.

[827] Ibid.: 61.

[828] Ibid.: 63-64.

[829] Ibid.: 67.

[830] Ibid.: 65.

[831] Ibid.: 65.

[832] Ibid.: 65, 67.

[833] Ibid.: 65.

[834] Ibid.: 65.

[835] Ibid.: 80-81.

[836] Ibid.: 81.

[837] Ibid.: 81.

[838] Ibid.: 62.

[839] Al-Sauty 2006: 18, 24, 97.

[840] Ibid.: 18, 22.

[841] Ibid.: 103-104. To avoid this problem, Al-Sauty advices to always stage group photographs of mixed genders in a way that shows empty space between each individual in it.

[842] Al-Sauty 2006: 18.

[843] Ibid.: 12-13, 18, 24, 35.

[844] Ibid.: 25, 32.

[845] Ibid.: 25.

[846] Ibid.: 25.

[847] Gawad 1978: 174.

[848] Shapiro 1988: 130.

[849] Grabar 1983: 95.

[850] Palva 1998: 451.

[851] Davidson 2008: 233. Despite the wide prevalence of posters, the rulers have not been commercialised in the same way as royal families of many European countries are for there are still few postcards, t-shirts and other paraphernalia sold with pictures of sheikhs.

[852] Graham-Brown 1988: 92-93. Interestingly, the portraits taken, followed European aesthetic traditions with roots all the way in the Renaissance.

[853] Ibid.: 95.

[854] Davidson 2008: 137-139.

[855] Ibid.: 138-139. The current ruler of Dubai Sheikh Muhammad Bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, for example, is an established *nabati* poet. Davidson 2008: 144.

[856] Alavi 2007: 49.

[857] Davidson 2008: 139.

[858] Ibid.: 146.

[859] Noueihed 2008.

[860] Graham-Brown 1988: 188-189.

[861] Al-Sauty 2006: 27.

[862] Ibid.: 35. Al-Sauty's view appears to be confirmed by Al-Olayan and Karande, who found that in advertising majority of pictures of women (when portrayed without males) tended to be closely linked to the products advertised, and that the women were most often covered with long dresses. Al-Olayan & Karande 2000: 69, 77, 80.

[863] Al-Sauty 2006: 47.

[864] 'Her Highness Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al Missned' n.d..

[865] Miles 2005: 19.

[866] Ibid.: 19.

[867] Ahmed 2007: 124, emphasis in the original.

[868] 'Mozah bint Nasser Al Missned' n.d..

[869] Absal 2007.

[870] Personal communication, July 23, 2006.

[871] 'Sheikha Hind Bint Maktoum Bin Jumaa Al Maktoum' n.d..

[872] Gomes 2008.

[873] 'Maitha bint Mohammed arrives in Beijing' 2008.

[874] 'Sheikha Al Jalila Bint Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum' 2007. As a rather interesting detail, photographs of a baby circulated the web right after the birth of Sheikha Al Jalila. Later on, it was claimed the pictures were taken by a doctor of the family, but no official acknowledgement followed. See for example, Ammonnews.net, http://www.ammonnews.net/arabicDemo/article.php?issue=&articleID=14356, or Flickr: 'Gooolo Masallah' by by Mr. Sa7lab {G.C. Edition}: http://www.flickr.com/photos/56555/2084616218/?addedcomment=1#comment72157603422494219.

[875] Shukla 2002: 13, 19, 34, 43, 53-55, 58, 63, 67, 75, 83, 99, 104, 106-107, 109, 121, 129, 131, 136. Excluding a photograph of Shukla with his wife and son on page 142.

[876] Ibid.: 19, emphasis in the original.

[877] Ibid.: 13, 34, 43, 53-55, 58, 67, 75, 83, 99, 104, 106-107, 109, 121, 129, 131.

[878] 'If it bleeds it leads' 2008.

[879] While blood can be found here and there, it most often leaking from a shrieking victim still very much alive. In the West the most controversial pictures of the attacks of September 11, 2001 were the leaping victims still alive jumping from the windows the World Trade Center to their deaths. Gillmor 2006: 50.

[880] 'Police seek information on dead man' 2007.

[881] Landais 2007. What makes these cases interesting is who and what they portray. The dead Asian man, for example, is not very likely to be a person of social importance. Rather, publishing his picture in a newspaper is most probably the last resort to get into contact with someone associated with the deceased. In the case with the hanged dog, on the other hand, a different cultural mindset seems to be at work as Islamic religion has a prejudiced attitude towards certain animals like pigs and dogs. For example, Delcambre cites *Hadith* transmitted by Bukhari, which states that "Angels do not enter a house where there is a dog or an image." Delcambre 2005: 55.

[882] Gillmor 2006: 35.

[883] Ibid.: 35-36, 120-121.

[884] Ibid.: xiv, 49, 120-121.

[885] Kurian 2008.

[886] Ibid.

[887] Ibid.

[888] Ibid.

[889] Ibid.

[890] Ibid.

[891] Graham-Brown 1988: 39.

[892] Erdogdu 2004: 107, 109, Rosenblum 1984: 120, 122.

[893] Erdogdu 2004: 111.

[894] Early on, mostly Armenian minorities specialised in photography extending their business from Turkey, Lebanon and Palestine to Egypt and further afield. Graham-Brown 1988: 55-56.

[895] Graham-Brown 1988: 57.

[896] Ibid.: 56-58.
[897] Ibid.: 58.
[898] Ibid.: 59.
[899] Ibid.: 59-60.
[900] Erdogdu 2004: 115.
[901] Ibid.: 117.
[902] Graham-Brown 1988: 55, 60.
[903] Ibid.: 62.
[904] Ibid.: 62-63.
[905] Ibid.: 62-63.
[906] Al-Sauty 2006: 25-27, 37-38.
[907] Ibid.: 42.
[908] Ibid.: 37-38.
[909] Ibid.: 39.
[910] Ibid.: 37-38, 51, 72.
[911] Ibid.: 72.
[912] Ibid.: 51, emphasis in the original.
[913] Ibid.: 51.
[914] Ibid.: 51.
[915] Heard-Bey 2004: photographic supplement between the pages 222-223, emphasis in the original.
[916] Shukla 2002: 143.
[917] Ibid.: 143.
[918] Ebrahimian 2006: 85-86. Neshat has since moved on to moving image, videos and feature films. Ebrahim 2006: 93.
[919] 'Alia Al Shamsi' n.d., 'Interview with Alia Al-Shamsi' 2005.
[920] Al Shamsi n.d..
[921] Lynch & Trujillo 2009.
[922] Grady 2004: 19.
[923] Krippendorf 1980 quoted in Rose 2001: 55.
[924] Rose 2001: 55.
[925] Banks 2001: 44.
[926] Kember 1998: 25-26. See also Derrick & Wells 2004: 24.
[927] Burgin 1977 quoted in Shapiro 1988: 128. See also Burgin 1990 quoted in Kember 1998: 25.
[928] Kozloff 1987: 236.
[929] Ibid.: 236.
[930] Shapiro 1988: 131-133.
[931] Ibid.: 135.
[932] Ibid.: 124.
[933] Derrick & Wells 2004: 36.
[934] Winston 1998: 61, Derrick & Wells 2004: 18.
[935] Ibid.: 66.
[936] Harper 1998: 27.
[937] Sekula 1978 quoted in Shapiro 1988: 128.
[938] Ibid.: 128.
[939] Kozloff 1987: 235. The original National Rifle Association slogan is "Guns don't kill people, people do".
[940] Adelman 1998: 148.
[941] Rose 2007: 14-15.
[942] Rose 2007: 15.
[943] Wagner 1979b: 147.
[944] Winston 1998: 61.
[945] Ibid.: 63.
[946] Negroponte 1995: 105-106, Kember 1998: 10.
[947] Ritchin 1991 quoted in Kember 1998: 1.
[948] Mitchell 1992 quoted in Kember 1998: 22-23.
[949] Graham-Brown 1988: 44, see also Männistö 1999: 125-126.
[950] Kember 1998: 10-11, 17, 35.
[951] Derrick & Wells 2004: 19, emphasis in the original.
[952] Cameron 1991, quoted in Kember 1998: 21.
[953] Lister et al. 2003: 2.
[954] Salo 2000: 181.

955 Lister et al. 2003: 17.
956 Manovich 2001: 289-290.
957 Ibid.: 290-291.
958 Kember 1998: 21.
959 Salo 2000: 181.
960 Gillmor 2006: 177.
961 Ibid.: 177.
962 Williams 1977 quoted in Lister at el. 2003: 83.
963 Lister et al. 2003: 14.
964 Wagner 1979a: 13.
965 Ibid.: 14.
966 Ibid.: 21.
967 Ibid.: 14.
968 Banks 2001: 2.
969 These included everything from "lucidity" to better documentation to enhanced educational possibilities to increasing social importance of visual media to more complex reading of research data. Grady 2004: 18-19.
970 Knowles & Sweetman 2004: 5, emphasis in the original.
971 Ibid.: 5, emphasis in the original.
972 Rose 2007: 6.
973 The best way to exemplify progress in visual social sciences is to compare the first and second editions of her *Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials* published in 2001 and 2007.
974 Derrick & Wells 2004: 24.
975 Rose 2007: 7-11.
976 Knowles & Sweetman 2004: 5-6.
977 Wagner 1979a: 17-18.
978 Banks 2001: 7.
979 Derrick & Wells 2004: 37.
980 Rose 2007: 14-19.
981 Chalmers 1999: 45, Kember 1998: 23.
982 Wagner 1979b: 159.
983 For discussion on "a cultural turn" in social sciences and Hall's analytical categorisations, see for example, Rose 2007: 7, Hall 1997 quoted in Seppänen 2005: 94-96.
984 Hall 1997 quoted in Seppänen 2005: 94-96.
985 Wagner 1979a: 17, 20.
986 Pietilä 1976 quoted in Seppänen 2005: 145.
987 Seppänen 2005: 149.
988 Ibid.: 149.
989 Ibid.: 149.
990 Rose 2001: 54, Rose 2007: 59.
991 Krippendorf 1980 quoted in Rose 2001: 55, Rose 2007: 60.
992 Rose 2001: 55.
993 Seppänen 2005: 142.
994 Rose 2007: 61-62.
995 Seppänen 2005: 144.
996 Ibid.: 144.
997 Lutz & Collins 1993 quoted in Rose 2001: 55, Rose 2007: 60.
998 Seppänen 2005: 146, Rose 2007: 60.
999 Banks 2001: 45.
1000 Ibid.: 45.
1001 Winston 1998: 66.
1002 Knowles & Sweetman 2004: 6.
1003 Ibid.: 13.
1004 Rose 2001: 57, Rose 2007: 63.
1005 Rose 2001: 57-58, Rose 2007: 63.
1006 Lister et al. 2003: 9-37.
1007 Rose 2001: 57-58, Rose 2007: 63.
1008 'About Flickr' n.d., emphasis in the original.
1009 'Upload' n.d..

[1010] According to the Flickr website "**Sets** are a grouping of photos and videos that you can organize around a certain theme" and "**Collections** are a grouping of Sets (or other Collections) so you can organize around grander themes". 'Organize' n.d..

[1011] Using Picnik to edit images requires a separate authorisation from the user.

[1012] 'Maps' n.d..

[1013] 'What is Flickr?' n.d., 'Share' n.d..

[1014] Fake 2006: x.

[1015] Graham 2006.

[1016] Fake 2006: x.

[1017] Ibid.: x-xi.

[1018] Graham 2006.

[1019] Kline 2005b: 119, 'Yahoo Acquires Flickr' 2005.

[1020] 'Help / FAQ / Yahoo! IDs, signing in and screen names' n.d., Bausch & Bumgardner 2006: 1. The Yahoo! user account enables a user to access online services by the Yahoo! Inc. Consequently, the creation of a Flickr user account is in fact the same thing as creating a Yahoo! account.

[1021] 'Help / FAQ / Free Accounts, Upgrading and Gifts' n.d..

[1022] 'Help / FAQ / Free Accounts, Upgrading and Gifts' n.d., 'Help / FAQ / Moving your Yahoo! Photos' n.d..

[1023] 'Help / FAQ / Photos' n.d.. The user does also have a possibility to manage the order of her photos by adjusting the posting dates.

[1024] 'Help / FAQ / Free Accounts, Upgrading and Gifts' n.d..

[1025] Ibid.

[1026] A "buddy icon" is basically a small visual (re)presentation of the user that appears in her profile as well as next to any possible comments she might make on discussion panels.

[1027] The URL will be in the form of http://www.flickr.com/photos/[customised URL]/

[1028] "There is a limit of 3,000 non-reciprocal contacts in Flickr." 'Help / FAQ / Contacts' n.d..

[1029] 'Keep in Touch' n.d., 'Help / FAQ / On the Flickr website' n.d., Richardson 2008: 103.

[1030] 'Help / FAQ / General Flickr Questions' n.d..

[1031] 'Keep in Touch' n.d..

[1032] 'Your account / Set a default license' n.d., 'Share' n.d., emphasis in the original.

[1033] 'License Your Work' n.d., 'Your account / Set a default license' n.d., 'Share' n.d., Gillmor 2006: 239.

[1034] 'License Your Work' n.d., 'Your account / Set a default license' n.d., 'Share' n.d..

[1035] 'Copyright and Intellectual Property Policy' n.d..

[1036] Ibid.

[1037] 'Yahoo! Terms of Service' n.d..

[1038] 'Share' n.d., 'Help / FAQ / Public/Private' n.d.. Since April 20, 2007, the names of photos uploaded to Flickr have changed with changes in privacy levels.

[1039] 'Your account: Privacy & Permissions' n.d., 'Help / FAQ / Getty Images' n.d..

[1040] 'Help / FAQ / On the Flickr website' n.d..

[1041] 'Flickr Community Guidelines' n.d..

[1042] 'Share' n.d., 'Your account / Set your default filters' n.d..

[1043] 'Your account / Set your default filters' n.d..

[1044] 'Help / FAQ / Content filters' n.d.. For users from certain geographical areas such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Germany and Korea searches have been limited to either "Safe" or "Moderate".

[1045] 'Flickr Community Guidelines' n.d..

[1046] 'Tips for running your group' n.d..

[1047] 'Flickr Community Guidelines' n.d.. Content in Flickr is moderated by indirect process in which users can "flag" content that they deem too stong for its safety level.

[1048] 'Yahoo! Terms of Service' n.d..

[1049] Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 338.

[1050] Ibid.: 338.

[1051] Ibid.: 338.

[1052] Ibid.: 338.

[1053] Ibid.: 339.

[1054] Bausch & Bumgardner 2006: 61.

[1055] 'Share' n.d., 'Help / FAQ / Content filters' n.d..

[1056] 'Help / FAQ / Tags' n.d., Richardson 2008: 103, Bausch & Bumgardner 2006: 6.

[1057] Striatic 2004a, Striatic 2004b.

[1058] 'Help / FAQ / Tags' n.d..

[1059] Bausch & Bumgardner 2006: 62.

[1060] Ibid.: 15-16.

[1061] Ibid.: 23-24.

[1062] Ibid.: 18.

[1063] Ibid.: 61.

[1064] 'Keep in Touch' n.d.. Notes, can be seen only when the mouse is over the image.

[1065] 'Your Account / Default Privacy' n.d., 'Help / FAQ / Public/Private' n.d..

[1066] 'Tips for running your group' n.d..

[1067] 'Tips for running your group' n.d., Gillmor 2006: 96-97.

[1068] 'Help / FAQ / Groups' n.d..

[1069] Ibid.

[1070] 'Share' n.d..

[1071] 'Help / FAQ / Groups' n.d..

[1072] Ibid.

[1073] Ibid.

[1074] 'Tips for running your group' n.d..

[1075] 'Help / FAQ / Groups' n.d..

[1076] Ibid.

[1077] Ibid.

[1078] Ibid.

[1079] Ibid.

[1080] Ibid.

[1081] This method has been used with sources and research literature accessed on the Internet in this research.

[1082] 'Help / FAQ / Free Accounts, Upgrading and Gifts' n.d..

[1083] An API is basically an interface to the content in Flickr that can be more easily used by a computer.

[1084] 'Flickr Services' n.d..

[1085] 'Flickr Services: API Documentation' n.d..

[1086] 'Flickr Services' n.d..

[1087] Rose 2001: 57-58, Rose 2007: 63.

[1088] http://www.flickr.com/groups/82943931@N00/.

[1089] http://www.flickr.com/groups/flickrfans/.

[1090] http://www.flickr.com/groups/uaeians-artists/.

[1091] http://www.flickr.com/groups/10272702@N00/.

[1092] http://www.flickr.com/groups/dubaiboygrp/.

[1093] http://www.flickr.com/groups/dubai360/.

[1094] http://www.flickr.com/groups/dubai-in-pictures/.

[1095] http://www.flickr.com/groups/abudhabi/.

[1096] http://www.flickr.com/groups/53858111@N00/.

[1097] http://www.flickr.com/groups/dubaicity/.

[1098] http://www.flickr.com/groups/uaeculture/.

[1099] BanaaT UAE can be found from http://www.flickr.com/groups/banaat_uae/.

[1100] '♥ღ BanaaT UAE ღ♥' n.d..

[1101] For creating an application, application for a non-commercial API key was made. The application authenticated with the Flickr API using the researcher's user account. This allowed the application to access information through the API, which is only available either to a Flickr member or specifically to the researcher's user account. The application requested through the Flickr API the unique group identifier for the BanaaT UAE group based on that group's URL. This was done because API calls must use the group's identifier rather than the URL or name. Using the group identifier the application requested all members of the BanaaT UAE group. The only relevant information for each member provided at this stage was the unique user identifier. Using these unique identifiers, the application requested for each user the full details of their user account. This included all required information, except for the gender of the user. To get the gender of the user, for each user, the application used the acquired user's profile URL to download that user's web page profile HTML, from which the user's gender was extracted. For all users that have entered their gender in their profile, their web page profile contains the text "I'm Male" or "I'm Female". Lastly, each user's information was output into a file from which it was imported into Microsoft Excel for further analysis. 'flickr.groups.members.getList' n.d..

[1102] The reason the initial data gathering took so long was, that Flickr suggest not exceeding one request per second in its developer site. 'Flickr Web Services' n.d..

[1103] '♥ღ BanaaT UAE ღ♥: 1,719 Members' n.d..

[1104] Ibid.

[1105] '♥ღ BanaaT UAE ღ♥' n.d..

[1106] '♥ౕ BanaaT UAE ౕ♥: Group Pool' n.d., '♥ౕ BanaaT UAE ౕ♥: Discussion' n.d..

[1107] '♥ౕ BanaaT UAE ౕ♥' n.d..

[1108] For most users interpreting their location was fairly easy as it was marked, for example, "AD, UAE", "fuj, UAE" or "ὐάε » ❤". Others, whose location was murkier, but nevertheless hinted at the UAE, for example, "Dar e'Zeen, Dar Zayed", "Dar Baba zayed, U.A.E", "SOme Where, I aM NOt Sure I gUess UaE", "Proud To Be Emarati" and "In His HEART, UAE", were interpreted to be located in the UAE and were taken into calculations. In addition, those users that listed UAE with other geographical locations, for example "Leeds-UK, United Arab Emirates", were also taken into account. Where the location was not clear for interpretation, that user was considered not to be from the UAE.

[1109] In this inquiry, user profiles and photostreams were searched for a clear indication that the user was *not* an Emirati female. For example, username Ms. Soccer_Roo turned out to be an American woman living in Dubai, while username UAE BlackBerry was found to be a cover for a commercial entity selling mobile phone goods through Flickr. However, users whose profiles and photostream content seemed simply ambiguous, were not cut off from the dataset. Again, users who mentioned double nationality were also kept in the set.

[1110] For the ten Pro users, the minimum number of images was 7 and the maximum was 308 with a mean of 128.88, a median of 119.00. There was no unique mode for Pro users.

[1111] 'Help / FAQ / Photos' n.d..

[1112] 'Help / FAQ / Photos' n.d..

[1113] Ibid.

[1114] 'Your account / Allowing downloads' n.d..

[1115] For circumventing the so-called "spaceball.gif" protecting images, see for example 'Download Photo Images From Flickr Protected By Spaceball.gif' 2009.

[1116] 'Your account / Allowing downloads' n.d..

[1117] For the selected 170 users, details of all photos uploaded by those users were acquired. In addition, the medium resolution images for each of the photos was downloaded.

[1118] 'Self-portrait' n.d..

[1119] For further framing categories see Bordwell & Thompson 2004: 262.

[1120] In images that did not reveal clothing, differentiating males from females was more challenging, but not impossible. For example, images of hands could be often identified as male or female based on nails as Emirati women tend to take very good care of their hands with henna tattoos and polished long fingernails. Likewise, eyes, lips and feet could be mostly categorised on gender specific lines.

[1121] Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 344-345.

[1122] Pietilä 1976 quoted in Seppänen 2005: 145.

[1123] Rose 2007: 11.

[1124] Ibid.: 11.

[1125] Seppänen 2005: 154.

[1126] The most common feature among the original 8,248 images was not to tag them at all. In fact, 6,136 or 74.39 percent had been left without tags. Among the rest 25.61 percent, the nine most common tags were: "uae", "ll759ll", "dubai", "eyes", "blue", "green", "red", "meems" and "hazel". Out of these "uae" and "dubai" obviously hint at local locations, while "eyes" and "hazel" appear to be popular tags for images of eyes. "Blue", on the other hand, can hint at both the colour and an emotion. The unusual tags of "ll759ll" and "meems" appeared to suggests connection with the screen names of certain users.

[1127] Wagner 1979b: 154.

[1128] Rose 2007: 64.

[1129] Ibid.: 65, 68, emphasis in the original.

[1130] Ibid.: 65.

[1131] Ibid.: 65.

[1132] Ibid.: 65.

[1133] Grady 2004: 25.

[1134] Rose 2007: 65.

[1135] While Rose admits that compositional interpretation is not a method *per se*, she also emphasises its utility as a descriptive tool that can help a researcher to focus on each image. Rose 2007: 35, 39, 40-49, 52-56, Bordwell & Thompson 2004: 262.

[1136] Shot distance is coded based on distance to the author depicted.

[1137] "Open" screen frame, usually used in film theory, implies that some action is left outside the frame. "Closed" screen frame, on the other hand, has all action within the frames. In this research, "open" and "closed" referred mainly to the portrayal of the young women in question. For example, an image of a shadow was coded "open". Rose 2007: 52.

[1138] "Sharp" focus stood for images thoroughly focused, while "soft" is coded for images that are blurry intentionally or unintentionally. Rose 2007: 53.

[1139] "Not revealing" means clothing that covers hair, body and/or all extremities. "Standard" clothing signifies uncovered hands and/or feet while the rest of the body is covered with clothing. "Revealing" indicates that legs, arms, body and/or hair is uncovered.

[1140] The aim with this variable is to code whether the "gazing rules" are respected in the self-portraits. Direct stands for images where the person is looking straight into the camera. Indirect stands for images where the gaze is directed past the camera.

[1141] Wagner 1979b: 155.

[1142] This variable includes the items (violence, nudity, tattoos, fashion, women's faces, wigs, statues of worship, pork, improperly dressed and dirty children or drugs and alcohol consumption) that Al-Sauty considers to be *haram* according to Islamic religion, even though, the issue of tattoos, however, is not as simple as Al-Sauty let's one believe. While, according to El Guindi, women are expected to (and do) "refrain from body or dress decoration or colors that draw attention to their bodies", certain *Ahaadith* have stories of Prophet Muhammad telling "a woman to color her fingernails with henna so that her hands were not like the hands of men". Al-Sauty 2006: 10, 12, 73-74, 102, El Guindi 2005: 78, 84, Hallenberg 1998: 32.

[1143] For the calligraphy and text category text both superimposed on the images and within images was taken into account.

[1144] As stylised flora is considered one of the common characteristics of art affected by Islamic religion, all flora depicted, stylised or not, was taken into account in this category.

[1145] Geometric shapes were understood as consistent and continuous parts of an image.

[1146] Colour and colour manipulation can have a strong effect on the mood and feel of images. The "vivid" variable is used for images with high saturation, while the "unconventional colour manipulation" refers to images that include more extreme or uneven forms of colour manipulation, such as one part of grey scale image left colourful.

[1147] Rose 2007: 72.

[1148] Ibid.: 53.

[1149] Although Al-Sauty does not include gambling among the actions he considers *haram*, the Qur'an forbids "arrow-suffling" (The *Surat* of Cow), usually interpreted as all forms of gambling. *The Koran Interpreted* 1983, II The Cow: 216: 30, Hallenberg 1998: 22.

[1150] For more on content analysis results, see Rose 2007: 68.

[1151] Rose 2007: 68.

[1152] Ibid.: 72.

[1153] Ibid.: 70.

[1154] Wagner 1979b: 156.

[1155] Rose 2007: 72.

[1156] Bordwell & Thompson 2004: 263-264.

[1157] Rose 2007: 53.

[1158] 'Self-portrait' n.d..

[1159] Za3tOoOr! 2005, MD..>> 2005.

[1160] Wagner 1979b: 153.

[1161] Rose 2007: 62, emphasis added.

[1162] Ibid.: 62.

[1163] Ibid.: 64.

[1164] Ibid.: 64.

[1165] Ibid.: 64.

[1166] Agarib 2008, see also Hallenberg 1998: 63.

[1167] Rose 2007: 258-259.

[1168] Ibid.: 61, emphasis in the original.

[1169] Ibid.: 61.

[1170] Wagner 1979b: 152.

[1171] Rose 2007: 68.

[1172] Ibid.: 68.

[1173] Wagner 1979b: 158.

[1174] Rose 2007: 61.

[1175] Banks 2001: 3.

[1176] Ibid.: 3.

[1177] Wagner 1979a: 13.

[1178] Graham-Brown 1988: 2.

[1179] Rose 2007: 11.

[1180] Graham-Brown 1988: 2-3.

[1181] Rose 2001: 56.

[1182] Rose 2007: 72-73.
[1183] Ibid.: 73.
[1184] Hall 2006: 198.
[1185] Ibid.: 198-199.
[1186] Ibid.: 201, emphasis in the original.
[1187] Rose 2007: 142.
[1188] Ibid.: 35.
[1189] Lister et al. 2003: 21.
[1190] Ibid.: 10.
[1191] Ibid.: 249-250.
[1192] Ibid.: 249.
[1193] Jensen 1999 quoted in Lister et al. 2003: 250.
[1194] Lister et al. 2003: 250.
[1195] Ibid.: 249-250, Mirzoeff 1998, Baudrillard 1988 quoted in Rose 2007: 4.
[1196] See for example, Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 317, 334 for utopian views.
[1197] Lister at el. 2003: 57.
[1198] At what point can the media text or photograph be considered complete? If users are allowed, for example, to add comments on an image in Flickr, should they be taken into account?
[1199] Williams 1977 quoted in Lister at el. 2003: 57.
[1200] Williams 1977 quoted in Lister et al. 2003: 57.
[1201] Grabar 1983: 80, 100.
[1202] Ibid.: 82.
[1203] Ibid.: 82.
[1204] Ernst 2005: 122.
[1205] Naef 2002: 222-223, 228.
[1206] See for example, Ernst 2005: 122-123, Naef 2002: 221-222.
[1207] Ernst 2005: 108.
[1208] Ibid.: 108.
[1209] Ibid.: 113.
[1210] Ibid.: 119.
[1211] Blair & Bloom 2004: 78.
[1212] Ernst 2005: 119.
[1213] "Old" is used in this context relative to newer digital technologies for among all the different visual methods developed through the times, photography is relatively new form of visual representation.
[1214] Smalley 2007: 277, also 'On the hoof' 2007: 52.
[1215] Smalley 2007: 277. The UAE's need for an outsized influence has been evident in other areas of regional and international politics as well. The nation has, among other things, cultivated an image of a charitable donor country, participating in international rescue operations of both natural and societal kind concerning especially fellow Muslim nations. Heard-Bey 2004: xxx.
[1216] Ernst 2005: 122-123.
[1217] Blair & Bloom 2004: 76, Maukola 2008d.
[1218] Blair & Bloom 2004: 76.
[1219] Maukola 2008d.
[1220] Ibid., Palva 1998: 456.
[1221] Blair & Bloom 2004: 79.
[1222] Ibid.: 81.
[1223] Al-Sauty 2006: 99.
[1224] Shapiro 1988: 141.
[1225] Ibid.: 148, emphasis added.
[1226] Graham-Brown 1988: 7, 9.
[1227] Dewdney & Lister 1988: 17-18.
[1228] Graham-Brown 1988: 4. See for example how DeRoo demonstrates with her study of Algerian postcards, how the French government promoted tourism as a tool in colonising Algeria. DeRoo 2004: 159-160.
[1229] Hight & Sampson 2004: 1-2.
[1230] Ibid.: 1-2.
[1231] Ibid.: 4.
[1232] Ibid.: 4-5.
[1233] See for example, Graham-Brown 1988: 65, 67.

[1234] Other photographic depictions banned were holy cities, religious Islamic buildings and ceremonies and calligraphies of God or the Prophet Muhammad. Graham-Brown 1988: 44, see also 56-58.

[1235] Graham-Brown 1988: 36.

[1236] Hannauer 1902 quoted in Graham-Brown 1988: 50.

[1237] Graham-Brown 1988: 55.

[1238] Ibid.: 62-63.

[1239] Ibid.: 9-10, 40.

[1240] In this case, more day to day clothing such as *abayat* are discounted.

[1241] Erdogdu 2004: 111, 114.

[1242] See for example Erdogdu's account of prayer beads and Qur'ans used to signify religious irrationality. Erdogdu 2004: 117, 121.

[1243] Vergis 2007: 18.

[1244] Ibid.: 18.

[1245] So-called lifestyle images without direct or indirect human presence excluded from the dataset, included, among other things photographs of meals and drinks (cakes, chocolates and Starbuck coffee cups were especially prominent) as well as exclusive locations such as bedrooms, hotel lobbies, swimming pools, and yards. One could find also photographs of airplane, concert and movie tickets, cameras and camera equipment and desktops with laptops, notebooks, sunglasses and piles of medicine packets. Many images could be interpreted to be manifestations of social and financial status such as photographs of wads of cash, cars, mobile phones, jewellery, laptops, perfumes, clothing tags and shoes, for example. However, it should be notes that while many lifestyle photographs seemed taken by the particular users, many others were obviously professionally produced photographs of different products.

Among the non-human images there was considerable amount of patriotic material in the form of pictures with colours of national flag in ribbons, pins, flags, wall decorations, for example, as well as pictures and drawings of the UAE rulers. Nature was present in many images of plants, trees and flowers (particularly roses) as well as pet cats, bunnies, horses and animals in the wild (camels) and in zoos. The images included also an extensive amount landscape scenery photographs taken both in the UAE and abroad, one clear category were photographs taken through airplane windows. In addition, cityscapes had been taken both in abroad and in the Emirates, with Dubai especially well represented in this regard. One noticeable detail was that many cityscapes looked as though they had been taken through car windows, as road signs and small numbered licence plates, for example, were regular features.

More poetic or sorts images included statement photographs with dolls, soft toys or hand-drawn characters manipulated in positions as well as images of candles and fire. These photographs had often text added on top of them, but there were also images centring on, for example, mobile phone messages. Another obviously edited category were images of absurdly and elaborately colour manipulated pictures such as strawberries with kiwi content or a broken egg with pink yolk. Non-photographic images included screen captures of chat discussions as well as cartoon and animation characters and other types of drawings and notes in notebooks.

[1246] Dewdney & Lister 1988: 71.

[1247] Ibid.: 30.

[1248] Ibid.: 59.

[1249] Ibid.: 59.

[1250] Ibid.: 66.

[1251] Ibid.: 77. See also Musello 1979: 106, 109.

[1252] Graham-Brown 1988: 62-63.

[1253] Musello 1979: 109.

[1254] Ibid.: 109, emphasis in the original.

[1255] Ibid.: 109, emphasis in the original.

[1256] Ibid.: 109, 112.

[1257] Ibid.: 106, 109, 112.

[1258] Ibid.: 113, 116.

[1259] Ibid.: 116.

[1260] Ibid.: 113.

[1261] 'About Flickr' n.d., emphasis in the original, Graham 2006.

[1262] 'Explore / Tags' n.d., 'Explore / Tags / family' n.d., 'Explore / Tags / travel' n.d., 'Explore / Tags / party' n.d., Musello 1979: 116-117.

[1263] Musello 1979: 112.

[1264] Ibid.: 116.

[1265] Ibid.: 117.

[1266] Sontag 1979 quoted in Kember 1998: 27.

[1267] Musello 1979: 105-106, 109-110.

[1268] Ibid.: 116.

[1269] Dewdney & Lister 1988: 28.

[1270] Ibid.: 28-29.

[1271] Ibid.: 29.

[1272] Ibid.: 51.

[1273] Ibid.: 105.

[1274] Ibid.: 53.

[1275] Derrick & Wells 2004: 32, Jacquette 2006: 5-6, Dewdney & Lister 1988: 105.

[1276] 'Help / FAQ / Free Accounts, Upgrading and Gifts' n.d..

[1277] 'Self-portrait' n.d..

[1278] Sontag 1979 quoted in Graham-Brown 1988: 2.

[1279] Barthes 1984 quoted in Graham-Brown 1988: 2.

[1280] Montgomery 2007: 210.

[1281] Ibid.: 210.

[1282] Negroponte 1995: 14.

[1283] Ibid.: 4-5, also 11-20.

[1284] Ibid.: 56.

[1285] Manovich 2001: 6.

[1286] Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 340-341.

[1287] Montgomery 2007: 2, 107.

[1288] Castells 1997: 6-7.

[1289] Ibid.: 7.

[1290] Ibid.: 6.

[1291] Ibid.: 7.

[1292] Ibid.: 7.

[1293] Ibid.: 7.

[1294] Ibid.: 7.

[1295] Lister et al. 2003: 251.

[1296] Ibid.: 251.

[1297] Ibid.: 251.

[1298] Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 336.

[1299] Turkle 1995 quoted in Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 336.

[1300] Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 337.

[1301] Montgomery 2007: 109.

[1302] Ibid.: 112.

[1303] Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 336-337.

[1304] Stern 2002 quoted in Montgomery 2007: 110.

[1305] Montgomery 2007: 110.

[1306] Turkle 1995 quoted in Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 336.

[1307] Alsanea 2007: 166.

[1308] Grady 2004: 25.

[1309] Graham-Brown 1988: 188-189.

[1310] Shapiro 1988: 127-128.

[1311] Ibid.: 126.

[1312] Musello 1979: 110-111.

[1313] Ibid.: 110.

[1314] Pollock 1990: 217-218.

[1315] Lister at el. 2003: 101. As Rose points out, referring to Crary 1992, the understanding of human vision are historically variable. Rose 2007: 2. Also, Foster 1988 quoted in Rose 2007: 2.

[1316] For further discussion, see Zelizer 2001 quoted in Macdonald 2006: 7, Miles 2005: 25.

[1317] Jay 1993 quoted in Rose 2007: 2, Rose 2007:2-3.

[1318] Al-Sauty 2006: 25.

[1319] Biedermann 1996: 173-174.

[1320] Ibid.: 49.

[1321] Profession of faith includes believing in one God, Allah, and the teachings of Muhammad, his Prophet.

[1322] Biedermann 1996: 174, Viitamäki 2008b.

[1323] These are obligatory, recommended, neutral, abominable, forbidden. Maukola 2008b.

[1324] These are ritual cleanliness, appropriate clothing, clean body, clothes and place of prayer, proper time and correct direction of prayer. Viitamäki 2008b.

[1325] Biedermann 1996: 248.

[1326] Ibid.: 248.

[1327] Günther 2004: 254, Biedermann 1996: 174. According to Palva, a crescent is the most often used symbol in Muslim cultures, while sun disk, tree, kite, horse, falcon, mosque, boat, Noah's ark, lion, waterjug, Muhammad's horse Buraq, Ali's mule Duldul and the Prophet's sandal are other popular symbols. Palva 1998: 450, 461-462, 477.

[1328] Very little is known about the actual historical figure other than that Fatime (c. 605-633) was the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad and his wife Khadija and married to Muhammad's cousin 'Ali b.Ali Talib. She was also the mother of Muhammad's only male descendents, sons al-Hasan and al-Husayn, as well as daughters Umm Kulthum and Zaynab. According to Günther her significance is mostly due to her genealogical position belonging to the people of the Prophet's house, "to the five people of the mantle, to the immaculates, and to the people of the ordeal". Fatima is an important figure for both the Sunni and the Shi'a Muslims; for the former her orthodox virtues such as piety are underlined, for the latter her importance as a cosmic force, luminous celestial miracle worker, and final avenger is stressed. Fatima's hagiographical literature is "manifold and portrays the Prophet's daughter as a multifaceted personality, appearing in Shi'ite texts as early as the tenth century". Günther 2004: 254-255.

[1329] Günther 2004: 254.

[1330] Ibid.: 255.

[1331] Gloves have often been associated with special occasions, and have as well been a sign of high social status or prominent class. Biedermann 1996: 176.

[1332] Graham-Brown 1988: 245, Naef 2002: 229.

[1333] Ibid.: 239.

[1334] Ibid.: 17.

[1335] Ibid.: 18, 30.

[1336] Ibid.: 17, also Hight & Sampson 2004: 10.

[1337] Ibid.: 246.

[1338] Ibid.: 246.

[1339] Berger 1972 quoted in Rose 2007: 9.

[1340] Al-Sauty 2006: 35.

[1341] Ibid.: 47.

[1342] Al-Qaradawi 1980 quoted in Al-Sauty 2006: 20.

[1343] Al-Sauty 2006: 12-13, 18, 24, 35.

[1344] Harvey 1989 quoted in Rose 2007: 16-17.

[1345] Mirzoeff 1998 quoted in Rose 2007: 4.

[1346] Kline 2005c: 246, 249.

[1347] Gonzalez-Quijano 2003: 75-76.

[1348] Ibid.: 75-76.

[1349] 'Help / FAQ / Yahoo! IDs, signing in and screen names' n.d..

[1350] 'Yahoo! Terms of Service' n.d., emphasis in the original.

[1351] 'Help / FAQ / Your Account' n.d..

[1352] 'Help / FAQ / Contacts' n.d..

[1353] Al-Sauty 2006: 25, 32.

[1354] As the core of the matter appears to be sexuality, it is important to note that in the West the public also appear more conscious of the potential sexual appeal of children to certain people. Hence, in a sense the view of children in the UAE seems more truthful to the asexual essence of childhood.

[1355] Ebrahimian 2006: 87, emphasis added.

[1356] Macdonald 2006: 9.

[1357] Princess Sarvath interviewed in Mostyn 2002: 106, Ahmed 2007: 119, Davidson 2008: 153, Macdonald 2006: 15.

[1358] Macdonald 2006: 14.

[1359] In a peculiar twist of fast change and old norms, the speed cameras put on place in most of Dubai's roads during the past years angered many motorists used to limitless speeds. In a snippet of a story, *Time Out Dubai* reported that they had caught on film a young man and, on another occasion, a young woman, both flashing their naked flesh to the flashing speed cameras. Unfortunately, the story did not disclose the nationalities of the perpetrators. 'Candid Camera' 2005: 11.

[1360] Al Awadhi 2007a: 10.

[1361] Derrick & Wells 2004: 22, Harper 1998: 32.

[1362] The significance of different types of dress worn throughout the MENA, have been freely used by non-Muslim artists as well. For example, Jane Brettle has reshot a variety of "iconic photographs" with a female model covered head to toe in black fabric with only eyes left exposed in her series *Beyond Black*. Grant 2007: 34.

[1363] Maukola 2008c.

[1364] Ibid.

[1365] Macdonald 2006: 7-8, 10.

[1366] Abu Odeh 2005: 93.

[1367] Graham-Brown 1988: 248.

[1368] Abu Odeh 2005: 101.

[1369] Ibid.: 101.

[1370] El Guindi 2005: 78.

[1371] Al-Sauty 2006: 26.

[1372] Muhall & Swift 1996: 80.

[1373] Ibid.: 81.

[1374] Ahmed 2007: 86.

[1375] Ibid.: 92-94. For example, the Article 340 of Jordan's Penal Code which grants immunity to a husband who has killed an adulterous wife or a reduced sentence to a relative who has killed a female relative "in observation of honor" – King Abdullah tried to tackle the law but tribal forces in the country so far been too strong.

[1376] Walters et al. 2004: 67.

[1377] Alsanea 2007: 111-115.

[1378] Walters et al. 2004: 77.

[1379] Lister et al. 2003: 20.

[1380] Walters et al. 2004: 75-76.

[1381] Ibid.: 77-78.

[1382] Ibid.: 78.

[1383] Graham-Brown 1988: 85, Walters et al. 2004: 68.

[1384] The high Internet users in the Walters, Walters and Quinn study had more trouble relating to their peers and spent less time with friends, while the extent of the circle of friends correlated to the hours the students spent online: less friends meant more time in the virtual world and vice versa. However, there were significant differences between the campuses of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, with the students on the former campus spending considerably less time surfing the Internet or chatting on it. The researchers explained the differences with cultural discrepancy and "philosophical divide" of campuses, Abu Dhabi being more "religiously conservative" city with greeneries and low-rise building and Dubai more vibrant commercial city with "hurly burly" pace of life. However, the explanation does not quite add up, since one might expect a vibrant city life with more cultural possibilities to translate into less, not more, time spent online. Thus, it could also be concluded, that the social life in Abu Dhabi might be more tightly knit with less time left for online socialising. Or, that the fast paces postmodern life in Dubai has, for Emiratis too, turned into hours spent in front of computer instead of face to face communication. Walters et al. 2004: 73-74.

[1385] Gonzalez-Quijano 2003: 76.

[1386] Walters et al. 2004: 77.

[1387] Sturken & Cartwright 2001: 341.

[1388] Ibid.: 337, emphasis in the original.

[1389] Lister et al. 2003: 180.

[1390] See also Walters et al. study, which found that that the young Emirati women were well equipped with both for all the students in the study had laptop computers (a requirement of the university prior to admission) and access to the Internet on campus during the school week. In addition, 78 percent had a home computer and a special place at home to use it. Walters et al. 2004: 65-79.

[1391] Gillmor 2006: 13.

[1392] Lister et al. 2003: 173.

[1393] Ibid.: 173.

[1394] Fake 2006: xi.

[1395] Kozloff 1987: 5.

[1396] Ibid.: 8.

[1397] Dewdney & Lister 1988: 68.

[1398] Butterfield interviewed in Graham 2006.

[1399] McLeod 2005: 103, emphasis in the original.

[1400] Rose 2007: 15.

[1401] Heffernan 2008.

[1402] Burstein 2005: xix, emphasis in the original.

[1403] Bausch & Bumgardner 2006: 60.

[1404] Lebkowsky interviewed in Kline & Burstein 2005: 39.

[1405] Battelle interviewed quoted in Kline & Burstein 2005: 165.

[1406] Drezner & Farrell 2005: 88.

[1407] Prieur et al. n.d.: 8.

[1408] Burstein 2005: xiv.

[1409] Richardson 2008: 105, 'Your account / Blogs' n.d..

[1410] Richardson 2008: 105, Bausch & Bumgardner 2006: xvii-xviii.

[1411] Al-Sauty 2006: 28, 30, 43.

[1412] Ibid.: 12.

[1413] 'Help / FAQ / Getty Images' n.d.. The difference between the two licensing agreements concerns the hypothetical buyers needs regarding the extensiveness of use.

[1414] Smalley 2007: 262.

[1415] Negroponte 1995: 7.

[1416] Ibid.: 7.

[1417] Miles 2005: 330.

[1418] Eickelman & Anderson 2003b: 14.

[1419] Alavi 2007: 9, 272, 381, Smalley 2007: 278.

[1420] Gillmor 2006: 210.

[1421] Chalmers 1999: 157-158.

[1422] Ekholm 1996: 61.

[1423] Ironically, the same has happened to content produced within Iran. Indeed, many Iranian entertainers have gained success for being banned. Mostyn 2002: 32.

[1424] Ekholm 1996: 61.

[1425] El-'Ali 1984 quoted in Mostyn 2002: 93-94.

[1426] 'Flickr' n.d..

[1427] WUSA ::the lazy sock:: 2005.

[1428] Saeed Khalifa | Photography 2005, Olivander 2005.

[1429] ಜ-759-ಜ 2005.

[1430] 7abo0ob el Emarat - An Emirati Identity 2005a.

[1431] 7abo0ob el Emarat - An Emirati Identity 2005b, 'How to Crack the Flickr Site in the UAE !!! Forget about Etisala' n.d., 'Flickr Blocked in The UAE' n.d..

[1432] Za3tOoOr! 2005, MD..>> 2005.

[1433] Bootie Da Lootie 2005, ~υαε×∂υ∂є~ 2006, MD..>> 2006.

[1434] Walters et al. 2004: 65-79.

[1435] Ibid.: 75.

[1436] Montgomery 2007: 211.

[1437] Chandler & Roberts-Young 1998 quoted in Montgomery 2007: 111.

[1438] Chandler 1999 quoted in Montgomery 2007: 111, emphasis in the original.

[1439] Chandler & Roberts-Young 1998 quoted in Montgomery 2007: 111.

[1440] Lister et al. 2003: 170.

[1441] 'Jack Dee - Live At The Apollo' n.d.

[1442] Ahmed 2007: 116.

[1443] Ibid.: 117-118.

[1444] Ruthven 2001: 62-63.

[1445] Burns 2006: 76.

[1446] Miles 2005: 328-329.

[1447] Walters et al. 2004:75.

[1448] Muhall & Swift 1996: 90.

[1449] Lister et al. 2003: 3.

[1450] Ibid.: 39.

[1451] Ibid.: 52.

[1452] See also Walters et al. 2004: 65-79.

[1453] Biedermann 1996: 173-174, Günther 2004: 254.

[1454] Erdogdu 2004: 111, 114.

[1455] Dewdney & Lister 1988: 66.

[1456] Ernst 2005: 122-123.

[1457] Chandler & Roberts-Young 1998 quoted in Montgomery 2007: 111.

[1458] Al-Sauty 2006: 12-13, 18, 20, 24, 35, 47.

[1459] Graham-Brown 1988: 85, Walters et al. 2004: 68.

[1460] Walters et al. 2004: 77.

[1461] Graham-Brown 1988: 19.