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THEATRE OF DENIAL

How the International Community Avoided Interference in the
Rwandan Genocide, Examined by Using Erving Goffman's
Theatrical Frame

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VIRKKUNEN, HELENA: Theatre of Denial. How the International Community
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This master's thesis examines the international community's lack of interest in interfering in the Rwandan genocide that took place in the spring of 1994 as an act of theatre. The argument of the paper is that the leaders of the most powerful Western nations knew that a genocide was taking place in Rwanda, but due to the lack of strategic importance of this small eastern African nation, action to stop the genocide was considered unnecessary. However, in an attempt to maintain their public image, certain Western countries, namely the United States, France, and Belgium, seemed to be actively working on a resolution to end the violence in Rwanda on the arena of the United Nations (UN).

When looking back at the real intentions and actual actions of these states, one is reminded of a theatrical play. All the elements of a dramatic piece of theatre are present; actors with dual interests trying to convey the audience of their concern over a nation left at the hands of an oppressive regime. This is why this paper examines case Rwanda by using sociologist Erving Goffman's theatrical frame.

With Goffman's theatrical frame as the method of the study, this thesis is method-oriented. Goffman identifies the key elements of a play as follows: the theatre where the play takes place, the actors, and the audience. For the purpose of this thesis, the theatre is the UN. The actors are individual states, carrying different roles. As in any dramatic performance, the classic roles of villains and heroes can be identified. The audience of this play is the international public.

Theoretical framework of the paper is provided by discussion about the justification of humanitarian intervention. Three opposing views are presented. Realists oppose intervention to preserve the balance of power. State moralists approve of it with certain conditions, however underlining the autonomy of a state and its people. The cosmopolitan view considers state sovereignty to be inferior to international society of individuals, and thus advocates humanitarian intervention in all crisis situations.

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Acknowledgements

This thesis has its beginnings in Montreal, Canada, where I spent a study exchange year in 2004. A book in our course readings, LGen Roméo Dallaire's *Shake Hands with the Devil – The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, both introduced me to the Rwandan genocide as well as created a profound interest in the case. Based on Dallaire's own experiences on ground in Rwanda as the commander of the UN peacekeeping mission, *Shake Hands with the Devil* details an individual's battle against the most powerful countries in the world to save the nation from genocide. As we all know, Dallaire did not succeed in this mission impossible. He, however, demonstrated such humanity when facing both the devil and the uncooperative Western world, that Dallaire will continue to inspire myself and many others with his example.

I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Mika Aaltola for providing me guidance in piecing this puzzle of a study together.

1. INTRODUCTION

“Rwanda was the crime everybody saw, heard, and even smelt, but that the world, in full view of the raw and horrifying truth, did nothing to stop.” (Huband 2000, p.185.)

As a consequence of the horrors of the Holocaust, the world vowed to never again allow such systematic destruction of an ethnic group to take place. A legal framework, the United Nations (UN) Genocide Convention, was created in 1951 to underline the international community’s responsibility to act if a genocide was recognized to be taking place (Off 2002, p. 72). Delivery on this commitment came to test twice in the 1990’s, first in Rwanda and then in the former Yugoslavia. In both cases, the international community failed to act on the genocides.

The Rwandan genocide took the lives of approximately 800 000 to one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu. It was a well planned killing campaign executed in an efficient manner over a three-month period, starting on 6 April, in the spring of 1994. During the three months, the international community was seemingly doing something to stop the slaughter; deliberating about it within the UN. As a UN statement, dated 7 April 1994 says, the organization “will remain seized on the matter.” (Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1994/16.)

As a topic, the Rwandan genocide has been widely studied within many disciplines. As Lemkin (cited in Melvern 2006, p. 93) describes it, genocide can not be called a sudden or abominable aberration. Indeed, he sees it as a deliberate attempt at reconstructing the world. First and foremost, the initiators of genocide are theorists, barbarianism being only the second of their character traits. A key element of genocide is effective propaganda, created to spread racist ideology that places the victim outside of human existence. A further requirement for genocide is the dependence on military security, along with a certainty that outside interference will be on a minimum level. As Melvern concludes, “And so exactly it was in Rwanda in 1994.” (Melvern 2006, p. 93.)

When it comes to crisis management, the UN’s actions are the sum of its member states’ preferences. Such as with many other decisions concerning peacekeeping, the organization’s response to crisis situations is dependent not only on the member states’

political will, but also on their financial and material contributions. The members of the Security Council obviously hold greater political power than other member countries, along with being major contributors of troops, equipment, and funds to peacekeeping operations. According to this study, case Rwanda is a casualty of the powerful countries' political disinterest. As the remote African country was not of any strategic importance to these states, they were not interested in dirtying their hands in Rwanda.

Even though certain stereotypes of international relations, which are presented in this paper, had an effect on the international community's response to the Rwandan genocide, it is the view of this thesis that certain powerful Western countries, namely the United States, France, and Belgium, held the key for possible intervention regarding Rwanda. Had these states reacted to the situation, the assumption is that the UN as an organization could have tried to halt or stop the genocide.

This thesis examines the international community's response to the Rwandan genocide as an act of theatre. The approach was chosen as a result of extensive reading on the topic. Many authors on the Rwandan genocide, quoted in this paper, conclude that the powerful countries attempted to conceal their unwillingness to interfere in the genocide from the international public by denying a genocide was taking place. The massacres in Rwanda were labelled as a continuation of a centuries-long civil war, thus not obligating the international community to act on them under the UN Genocide Convention. However, as these countries had diplomatic presence in Rwanda, it is hard to believe that they did not receive political analyses or intelligence reports concerning the accumulating ethnic killings and anti-Tutsi messages on the media in Rwanda. Due to the dubious nature of the international community's response to the Rwandan genocide, the author found this incident of international relations to resemble that of a whole another discipline - a piece of theatre. There have been no prior studies of the Rwandan genocide from this point of view.

As this thesis emphasises the theatrical aspect, it is method-oriented. The method of the study is sociologist Erving Goffman's theatrical frame, which he introduces in his 1974 book *Frame Analysis*. Goffman identifies three main components of the theatrical frame as the theatre, the actors, and the audience. For the purpose of this study, the theatre will be the UN headquarters in New York. That is where the Security Council and the member countries convene to discuss and decide the organization's reaction to

numerous issues, including possible peacekeeping operations. The actors in this play are individual UN member countries. They are the performers on the stage of the United Nations, all contributing to the outcome of the performance. As in any play, the main characters carry a more decisive role in the outcome than the bit players. The main characters can also be divided into two groups depending on their motivations: the villains and the heroes. The audience's role is to follow the performance without the possibility to take part in it. That is exactly how the audience in this play, the international public at large, was left to react to the actions and inactions of the actors.

The theoretical frame of the thesis is provided by a discussion on the justification of humanitarian intervention. Three views are examined. Realists see no reason to justify humanitarian intervention due to its possible negative consequences for the international order. In their view, an intervention may only make things worse by threatening to alter the existing balance of power. State moralists, on the other hand, find certain justifications for humanitarian interventions even though underlining non-intervention in the sovereign territory of another state. The third view, held by cosmopolitans, finds humanitarian intervention not only to be justified, but expected in a humanitarian emergency. The cosmopolitans place more value on transnational society of individuals than a single state's sovereignty.

The data for this study is provided mainly by books and articles on the Rwandan genocide, and on humanitarian intervention. In the past 15 years following the genocide, numerous analyzes of the incident have been produced, many focusing on telling the story as it happened against the still often-heard denials of certain world leaders on their role in the play. In uncovering the behind-the-scenes actions of different actors in the play, these writings have taken advantage of leaked memoranda from both the UN as well as national administrations' archives.

At the beginning of this paper, an overview of Rwanda's history is presented to explain the nation's road to genocide. Chapter three handles the genocide, along with the international community's response to it. After this, four stereotypes which had an effect on the international community's response to the situation in Rwanda are looked at. All these stereotypes in their own way contributed to the course of action the UN and its member countries decided to take on Rwanda. Chapter five presents the method of study for this thesis, Erving Goffman's theatrical frame. In the following chapter, a

discussion of the justification of a humanitarian intervention is presented. Chapter seven consists of data analysis using Goffman's theatrical frame, with the aim to uncover the different roles of the key players in the play concerning possible intervention into Rwanda.

As seen from the coming pages, Rwanda's instability can be attributed to having started with the European colonizers' ethnic policies, of which consequences became the roots of the genocide. When the massacres began, however, these were not the states willing to do something about the matter. As Michael Barnett says, "The Rwandan genocide is not only about the evil that is possible. It is also about the complacency exhibited by those who have the responsibility to confront that evil." (Barnett 2002, p. 2.)

At the end of this paper, a play is presented to sum up the argument of this thesis. Representing the author's views, it is a harsh dramatization of the powerful countries' indifferent attitudes towards the fate of the Rwandans. However, even without added characterizations, the core argument of the play is only reality. As Roméo Dallaire puts it, "The big boys had decided they were not going in. Period." (Off 2000, p. 118.)

2. THE ROAD TO GENOCIDE

The genocide in Rwanda during the spring of 1994 can be interpreted as the culmination of centuries-long unease between the two dominant ethnic groups inhabiting the country, the Hutu and the Tutsi. This indeed was the dominant view among many Westerners in 1994. However, when examining Rwanda's history, it becomes obvious that for the most part, Hutus and Tutsis had been leading a peaceful coexistence along with the third ethnic group within Rwanda, the Twa. It was the incidence of colonization that made ethnicity an issue, creating deep frictions among the two main ethnic groups.

To understand the events that culminated in genocide, one has to take a look at the history of Rwanda. This historical perspective also helps to explain some Western countries' actions and inactions during the genocide. Thus, in the following, I will examine how Rwanda ended up on the road to genocide.

2.1. Rwanda before colonization

Historic records indicate that the area that is now called Rwanda was settled two thousand years ago by the ancestors of the Tutsi and Hutu people. The third Rwandan ethnic group, the Twa, is believed to be the region's original inhabitants. The three groups lived for centuries together in loosely settled principalities, and came to share a common language, Kinyarwanda, as well as the same customs and culture. The society's livelihood was based on farming; some cultivated crops, others cattle, and the lucky few prosperous ones did both.

The distinctions between the ethnic groups were largely based on their occupations. The Tutsi owned cattle, and the Hutu cultivated land. The Twa, as the more disadvantaged group, were workers and servants. The ruling elite, including monarchy, were Tutsi, whose power was passed down through generations. However, Rwandans themselves saw their differences as a matter of class and wealth. (Off 2000, pp. 11-13.)

During the Middle Ages, the Rwandans began to consolidate under a king-like figure, a mwami. The mwami's power was absolute, and according to Off, he was in an "almost

god-like” position. Even though local community leaders still exerted influence over their municipalities, they all reported to the king. By the end of the eighteenth century the country had become a strong, viable state, looking at opportunities to expand its territory. (Off 2000, pp. 12-13). As Huband notes, Rwanda’s army consisted of all three ethnic groups together fighting common enemies. In terms of religion, “pre-Christian religious practice was similar in all three” (Huband 2000, p. 165).

Indeed, as Huband continues, variety within pre-colonial Rwanda was “perhaps the major source of its stability”. Intermarriage, possibility to move within the class system, and the identification of Hutu and Tutsi more as social classes, not ethnic identities, was the way of life. (Huband 2000, p. 165).

2.2. Under colonial rule

Colonial rule descended on Rwanda in 1894, when a German Count named von Gotzen informed the king of Rwanda that Germany was now in control of East Africa. Rwanda was ruled in one administrative territory along with Burundi, although Rwanda was awarded special status as indirectly ruled kingdom. (Barnett 2002, p. 50).

As Off notes, nineteenth-century Europe was “abuzz with exploration and adventure”, but unfortunately for Africans, the white men were also entranced by the “pseudo-sciences of eugenics and race”. As was commonly believed at the time, the white were superior to the black, and thus natural world leaders. Coloured and black people were seen to be of lesser order, possibly even subhuman. (Off 2000, p. 13).

In Rwanda, the Europeans were intrigued by the Tutsi’s and Hutu’s ethnic differences, and particularly fascinated with the physical look of the Tutsi. They often were tall and thin, having thinner lips and more aquiline noses than the Hutu. John Hanning Speke, writing about Rwandans in the *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile*, described the Tutsi as men “who were as unlike as they could be from the common order of natives”. The Europeans assumed that the Tutsi’s look implied higher intelligence, and declared the Tutsi to be natural leaders. (Off 2000, pp. 13-14).

Germany’s rule over Rwanda lasted until 1916, when Belgium took over the country after Germany’s defeat in World War I. In terms of enforced racial distinctions,

according to Barnett, “Belgium took over where Germany left off, reinforcing and then solidifying the Tutsi rule”. They conducted a reformation of the political system in the late 1920’s, thus further empowering the Tutsi. (Barnett 2002, p. 50).

Belgium, as the colonial master, wanted maximum economic gain of Rwanda with as little possible cost. In achieving this, the European-created racial divide between Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, proved convenient. The Tutsi were given powerful positions, leaving the Hutu out of opportunities of advancement in the society. (Off 2000, p. 14).

Underlining the divide was the Belgian regime of forced labour, under which masses of Hutus were placed under Tutsi management to repair roads, conduct forest work, and similar tasks. Exhausted by the hard physical work, peasants had to neglect their own fields. This, in turn, resulted in repeated famines. (Gourevitch 1998, p. 57).

In terms of religion, Belgium saw as its task to convert Rwandans into Christianity. European missionaries, often being the only foreigners with knowledge of Kinyarwanda, had a great influence on the Rwandans. The church held a prestigious position in the Rwandan society, being a crucial social element providing education, thus further advancing the Tutsi’s position. (Huband 2000, p. 166). As a result, the right to higher education was also denied to Hutus (Off 2000, p. 14). According to Gourevitch, the Catholic schools of Rwanda, dominating the colonial education system, practiced open discrimination against Hutus (Gourevitch 1998, p. 57). As Off sums it up, “the Belgian-imposed caste system meant that being a Tutsi mattered even more than ever before” (Off 2000, p. 14).

In 1933, Belgium conducted an exhaustive census in Rwanda, using physical characteristics to determine who was a Tutsi and who was a Hutu. As Off writes, “to ensure everyone was registered correctly, the Belgians took to measuring craniums and nose lengths to determine “racial” class” (Off 2000, p. 14). According to the census, the Hutu were the ethnic majority (85% of the population), before the Tutsi (14%) and the Twa (1%) (Gourevitch 1998, pp. 56-57).

All the inhabitants of Rwanda were then issued an identity card which had the Hutus “locked into an inferior social position for life” (Off 2000, p. 14). Tutsis, on the other hand, took full advantage of the new caste system, enjoying the absolute status of prestige awarded to them. As Barnett says, this classification, along with its political

institutionalization, had a strong effect on Rwandan culture. All parts of society echoing such segregationist messages created an indelible reality of its own (Barnett 2002, p. 51). Gourevitch agrees, stating that the Rwandan's idea of a collective national identity "was steadily laid to waste" (Gourevitch 1998, pp. 57-58).

2.3. Surfacing of ethnic unrest

Rwanda's path to decolonization began in 1947, when the UN Trusteeship Council visited the country on several occasions to observe Rwanda's standing (Barnett 2002, p. 51). The Western world had started paying attention to the abuse of colonies after the Second World War, which led to the United Nations' involvement in the matter. The UN, in addition to making country-specific evaluations on African colonies, began pressuring the European colonial masters to loosen up their grip on the colonies. (Off 2000, pp. 14-15.)

The Council produced a series of documents, disapproving of Belgium's colonial rule and insisting on giving Rwanda independence. Support to and opposition of independence within Rwanda followed the ethnic lines. The Hutu supported independence, demanding majority rule. The Tutsi, on the other hand, felt that democracy would threaten their position. A group of Hutus decided to issue a proclamation demanding majority rule in anticipation of a UN visit. This, as Barnett describes, triggered "an intensification of the struggle for independence and ethnic rivalry". (Barnett 2002, pp. 51-52).

The following Hutu Revolution, a series of violent outbreaks resulting in diminution of Tutsi political power and the fleeing of nearly 120 000 Tutsi into neighbouring countries, took place between 1959-1961 (Barnett 2002, p. 52). The Hutu took power in 1960, and a year later declared Rwanda a republic (Off 2000, p. 15).

Belgium responded to the unrest by switching their preference with the Hutu (Barnett 2002, p. 52). The imposed ethnic lines that had benefited the Tutsi now were turned against them (Off 2000, p. 15). Belgium also decided to take action in efforts to calm the Hutu unrest; the schedule for Rwanda's independence was determined due to a 1959 UN resolution. Rwanda would become independent in 1962, and elections were to be

held in 1961. The September 1961 elections resulted in Hutu-majority parties winning vast majorities of the seats. (Barnett 2002, p. 52.)

According to Huband, the revolution's success was due to the fact that no-one condemned it. The outside world did not react to the happenings in Rwanda, largely due to Belgium's inactive stance towards the situation. As Huband notes, if Belgium was not voicing concern over its colony, "the rest of the world would remain silent". (Huband 2000, p. 170).

In Barnett's words, Rwanda's independence on 1 July 1962 was a "stunning revolution in its external and internal" relations. The mythology of the Tutsi's superiority was almost overnight turned into inferiority; this ethnic group was now seen as dictators having abused the native peasantry for decades. The sudden social change within the Rwandan society did not trouble its new leader. President Kayibanda, newly installed head of state, found the use of ethnic terror and sowing division among his constituency to be tools in maintaining his rule. (Barnett 2002, p. 52.)

According to Off, during the first decade of Hutu government 20 000 Tutsi were killed. In addition to this, another 300 000 fled to Uganda and Burundi. The Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries formed rebel movements, which during the 1960's conducted frequent attacks into Rwanda. This only worsened the remaining Tutsi's position in Rwanda, as they were targeted for retaliatory action by the Hutu government. (Off 2000, p. 15.) Mass violence in Rwanda is considered to be the product of this tumultuous time. Huband notes that "there is no record of mass killings in Rwanda prior to colonial rule on the scale of 1959 and after independence". Indeed, as Huband continues, the use of mass killings as a political tool, of genocide as a policy, is not a part of the pre-colonial historical memory of the Rwandans. (Huband 2000, pp. 164-165.)

2.4. Polarization of ethnicity

Even though Rwanda was now under strict Hutu rule, friction occurred within the leadership. The Southern Hutus tended to be more open-minded towards the Tutsi, whereas those coming from the Northern parts of the country could be labelled as extreme Hutu nationalists. In 1973, a coup d'état was carried out by a northern Hutu,

General Juvénal Habyarimana. (Off 2000, p. 16.) Habyarimana ruled the country with the grasp of a dictator. In 1975 he declared Rwanda to be a single-party state, its whole population belonging to the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND). The general re-organised the country's political life, centralizing the power into hands of his inner circle. Rwanda's military and the church were now also managed by Habyarimana, his wife, and their confidantes. (Barnett 2002, p. 53.)

With the Cold War consuming the rest of the world's political thinking, Africa became a target of a new kind of colonialism. Western governments were in the need to establish spheres of influence in the region, which meant offering their help to potential allies in order for them to maintain their power. France decided to aid the francophone Rwanda¹, providing Habyarimana substantial military support along with weapons deliveries for the General to defend himself against the Tutsi rebels. (Off 2000, pp. 16-17.)

By the 1970s, the Tutsi rebels had formed into an organized movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), formed by Tutsis who had fled Rwanda in the early 1960's. During the following decades, the RPF was transformed into a rebel army. The RPF had its base in Uganda, just over the border of Rwanda. From there it conducted attacks into Rwanda, which the Rwandan army would have had a hard time suppressing without the help of the French. The RPF maintained a high level of discipline, and became even more professional in its conduct in the late 1980s under the leadership of a Tutsi grown in exile, Paul Kagame. (Off 2000, pp. 16-17.)

The consequences of the Hutu revolution hardly hit Rwanda on 1 October 1990. The victims of the revolution, the RPF, crossed the border from Uganda, and invaded Rwanda. The ensuing war, according to Huband, fostered a climate of political extremism within the society. While the RPF was able to maintain a unified front and give a coherent message to its supporters, the Habyarimana government faced the challenge of a starkly polarized opinion among the Hutu population. (Huband 2000, p. 171). The political consequences of the invasion "crystallized a process that had slowly been developing prior to this invasion". As the regime was making amendments to deal

¹ The Rwandans had been taught French by Canadian priests, who took over managing Rwanda's churches after the Belgians left the country.

with the RPF opposition, the stronger its belief grew that only extremism would work in order to save the government. (Huband 2000, p. 172).

Taking steps seemingly developing Rwanda's democracy, Habyarimana on 18 April 1991 declared the country a multi-party state. At the same time he also added the term 'democracy' in his own party's name; the former MRND was now MRNDD, the Republican National Movement for Democracy and Development. Within six months of Habyarimana's announcement of the new political system, twelve opposition parties had emerged. Seven of the parties, however, were created by Habyarimana himself to give appearance of democracy. Several of the remaining five parties were infiltrated by extremists supporting the government. (Huband 2000, pp. 172-173.)

In order to remain in power when facing both internal and external challenges, the Habyarimana government felt that oppressing and manipulating the population would be its salvation. In doing this, the ethnic card was the most useful tool. If attacking Tutsi threat could not be used, the regime turned on other Hutus. The RPF's invasion of the country thus polarized the Hutu opinion between moderates, extremists, and the government. (Huband 2000, p. 171.)

Important role within the regime was played by Habyarimana's wife, Agathe, "the Lady Macbeth of Rwanda", as Off calls her. Agathe Habyarimana had during her husband's reign been building a militant group of supporters, and was in charge of a small but powerful team of extremists who had close ties to the area in northern Rwanda where the Habyarimanas' originated. The group, called 'Clan de Madame', were sent throughout Rwanda to spread the message that the rest of the Hutus had to be prepared to exterminate the opposition. (Off 2000, pp. 17-18.) The term the Madame's associates used of Tutsi and moderate Hutus was *inyenzi*, Kinyarwandan for cockroaches. The Clan's propaganda was not exactly subtle; in a speech given at a political rally supporting the MRNDD, Ministry of Information official Léon Mugesera stated that "We the people must take responsibility for wiping out the scum" and "Know that the person whose throat you do not cut now will be the one who will cut yours". (Off 2000, p. 18.)

Aiding to get the message out was a government-licensed broadcaster, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC). Radio being the foremost source of information for

the Rwandans, the RTLMC quickly monopolized the airwaves with its ethnic propaganda. The prime message from RTLMC to its mostly young listeners was reminding them of Tutsi oppression. (Off 2000, p. 18.) Also helping to spread the Habyarimanas' message were local burgomasters, town and village leaders. What Off calls "a system of blind obedience to authority", the Rwandans' stance to their leaders, provided the Clan an effective means to feed the population the hate message (Off 2000, p. 19.)

2.5. The Arusha Accords

The Arusha Accords, signed on 4 August 1993, seemed to promise a more stable and democratic Rwanda. The peace process had begun in the summer of 1992, but it wasn't until 14 July 1993 that a ceasefire between the government and the RPF was agreed on. (Huband 2000, p. 171.)

The Accords had two protocols, first of which covered the integration of the armed forces of the government and of the RPF. The other protocol included a number of issues, such as deletion of references to ethnic groups in official documents and ratification of human rights instruments. The two protocols, combined with earlier agreements, comprised the eleven-article accords that included power sharing, the rule of law, transitional institutions, repatriation of refugees, and the resettlement of displaced people. (Barnett 2002, p. 62.)

The Arusha Accords also included an agreement of a broad-based transitional government. It would stay in power no longer than 22 months, after which there would be multiparty elections. The president's powers were to be reduced, making him only a figurehead. Therefore, real power would be placed with the prime minister and the council of ministers, as well as the Transitional National Assembly. (Huband 2000, p. 174).

The accords also outlined that an international force would monitor the agreement's implementation. It was

1. to help provide security throughout the country, for humanitarian assistance, and for the expatriate community;
2. to monitor the cease-fire agreement, which included the establishment

and maintenance of a demilitarized zone (DMZ) around Kigali; 3. to investigate all reported infractions of the cease-fire agreement; 4. to help maintain public security by monitoring the activities of the gendarmerie and police; and 5. to assist with the demilitarization and demobilization and integration of the armed forces, a task that was expected to take seven to nine months and involve almost thirty thousand personnel on the government's side and twenty thousand for the RPF. (Barnett 2002, p. 62.)

In essence, the international force was to provide security in the country, and create an environment which would give both parties of the agreement the assurance that they were able make cooperative moves without compromising their position (Barnett 2002, p. 62).

As the signing of the peace agreement was celebrated, below the surface lied opposing intentions. According to Gerard Prunier, Habyarimana's conceding to the agreement was not out of genuine will to develop Rwanda's road to democracy, but a tactical move to buy time and look good in the eyes of foreign actors (Huband 2000, p. 176). During the same year as the Accords were signed, armed power within the Habyarimana regime had started to shift towards the extremist armed militia, the Interahamwe (Huband 2000, p. 176).

The RPF secured much of its demands in the Arusha agreement, but Paul Kagame saw the situation as it was: he understood Habyarimana's intentions behind the signature. As Huband puts it, "In practice, the Arusha accord was undermined by having been signed by a Rwandan president who intended to use it as a tool to pursue the very same goals that had created the war and the need for a peace agreement in the first place" (Huband 2000, p. 177).

3. THE GENOCIDE

The genocidal campaign in Rwanda started on 6 April 1994, after the death of President Habyarimana. His plane was shot down while landing on the Rwandan capital Kigali's airport, also claiming the life of the President of Burundi. Suspicion on the responsibility of the attack has fallen on many targets, from the RPF to foreign governments including Belgium. It is still, however, unknown who conducted the attack. Only twelve hours afterwards, the Rwandan government forces were at war with the RPF. (Off 2000, p. 46-47.) As Rice and Loomis put it, the assassins' munitions "brought down both the airplane and the uneasy power-sharing agreement between Hutus and Tutsis" (Rice and Loomis 2007, p. 71). As a consequence, by the fifth night of the genocide Rwanda's presidential guard along with their militia allies had exterminated the fledgling opposition political class (Huband 2000, p. 189).

A third force was also operating in Rwanda, responsible for carrying out the genocide. The Interahamwe, a group of young men attached to the ruling political party MRND, had previously had the assignment to guard the president and the city of Kigali, but was transformed into a "machine of extermination" by the Hutu elites. (Barnett 2002, p. 129.) Just three weeks into the genocide, in late April, already 200 000 people had been killed (Off 2000, p. 70). As Barnett notes, this rate of killing exceeded the one of Holocaust. According to his calculation, the rate during the first and crucial weeks of the genocide was 333 and 1/3 deaths per hour, and thus five and 1/2 deaths per minute. (Barnett 2002, p.1.)

Unlike the Holocaust, no modern industrial technology was in use in the Rwandan genocide. As Barnett notes, "the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide employed primarily low-tech and physically demanding instruments of death that required an intimacy with their victims". (Barnett 2002, p. 1.) Most Hutu death squad recruits were trained to use machetes, a slower method of killing than shooting, but one that proved efficient in the long run (Off 2000, p. 60). According to Human Rights Watch, it is estimated that Rwanda imported 581 000 machetes during years 1993-1994. This equals to one machete for every three adult Hutu male in the country. (Off 2000, p. 45.)

As Neier points out, the killers did not try to hide their actions. "The killing did not take place at out-of-the-way sites established for the purposes of putting people to death and

disposing of the remains. It took place throughout the country: in virtually every village and in almost every urban neighbourhood”. (Neier 1999, p. 48.)

Huband agrees, describing his own experience in Rwanda during the genocide. The violent killings even took place within a view of the foreign troops’ evacuation of their own citizens:

“Halfway up the hill lay a pile of corpses. From nearby houses women, old and young, were casually led to the pile and forced to sit down on it. Men with clubs then beat the dead and dying bodies and surrounded the women as they sat, screaming, pledging for their lives. Suddenly the men turned on the women. They beat them until they no longer moved, then went to find more people to kill, within a view of the school were the evacuees packed their children, pet dogs, teddy bears, and suitcases into the trucks lent to them by Rwanda’s army”. (Huband 2000, p. 190.)

Those Rwandans who could, fled to Tanzania. On 30 April, another one of the unfortunate records relating to the genocide was made, as 250 000 people crossed the Rusumo Falls Bridge into Tanzania. This was the largest crossing of its kind by a group of people in one day. The next day, 150 000 more Rwandans followed them. (Huband 2000, p. 195.)

The genocide was over by mid-July. The RPF declared victory over the government forces on 18 July 1994 (Dallaire 2003, p. 474).

3.1. International response

When talking about providing protection to civilians in hostile environments, Joshua Smith notes that “The willingness to act usually depends on the authority to act” (Smith 2006, p. 58). Even though the UN had the authority to act on a case like Rwanda, it did not do so. Smith continues by stating that if an organization such as the UN or EU fails to act on a genocide, a full-fledged intervention to stop such a massacre could be led by a coalition of willing states. This also failed to happen in Rwanda. Instead, when the genocide began, the international community chose to withdraw its support to Rwanda. This decision was reached even though UN troops were on ground in Rwanda during the genocide.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, UNAMIR, was established by the UN Security Council resolution 872 on 5 October 1993 (S/RES/872). It had the

mandate to contribute to the security of Kigali, monitor the ceasefire, monitor the security situation in the wake of the election, assist in mine clearing, investigate allegations of violations of or non-compliance with the Arusha Accords, monitor the return and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, assist in coordination of humanitarian assistance, and investigate incidents concerning the activities of the gendarmerie and the police. (Ryan 2000, p. 131.)

UNAMIR was 2519 strong when the genocide started. As the killing campaign began, the UN decided to evacuate most of its troops on ground in Rwanda. This was done for the troops' own protection, after ten Belgian soldiers guarding Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana were killed and mutilated. The decision was taken at the Security Council meeting on 21 April, leaving UNAMIR Commander General Dallaire with 270 troops. (Ryan 2000, p. 131.)

The 21 April resolution, number 912, also authorized the enlargement of UNAMIR, due to which the UN Secretariat attempted to mobilize support in order to send UNAMIR an additional force of 5500 (S/RES/912). However, as this course of action did not have the support of the United States, the massacres continued without effective international opposition.

On 17 May the Security Council agreed on resolution 918, giving UNAMIR the mandate to help civilians (S/RES/918). This turned to be an empty promise to the Rwandan people, as none of the Security Council members was willing to provide the troops needed to achieve this (Ryan 2000, p. 132).

UNAMIR eventually got its enforcements by August 1994 in the form of French-led Operation Turquoise. The troop strength at the time was 3500, with almost all the main contingents coming from African states. This, unfortunately, was too late, as the mass killings had ceded by June ² (Ryan 2000, pp. 132-133). As Huband concludes, "By the end of May there was no purpose in sending more UN troops – there was nobody left for them to protect" (Huband 2000, p. 213).

² Even though the enforcements arrived in Rwanda too late in terms of stopping the genocide, UNAMIR's role in aiding the post-genocide country was important. The enforced UNAMIR operation helped in training a new national police force in Rwanda, monitored the Zaire border, assisted in rebuilding efforts of the country's infrastructure, and protected the UN human rights monitors in Rwanda.

UNAMIR was fully drawn from the country in April 1996 (Ryan 2000, p. 133).

3.2. Proposed intervention plan

The ICISS report *The Responsibility to Protect* defines broad requirements for a successful humanitarian intervention. Three main themes are identified; a strong coalition with substantial political resolve, a unified military approach, and unified operational objectives. As Joshua Smith points out, in some cases regarding a threat to civilians' lives, "defeating a single group of poorly trained and equipped militia might serve to end genocide – indeed, this may have been the case in Rwanda" (Smith 2006, p. 76).

As soon as the killings in Rwanda began in large numbers, General Dallaire drafted a plan for the UN on how to respond to the situation. Dallaire insisted that only 5500 extra troops would prevent the crisis from escalation. This assessment was later to be endorsed by Pentagon advisers (Mann 2005, p. 449).

Obviously, it is impossible in realistic terms to evaluate how Dallaire's intervention plan would have worked. But, as Valentino points out, when looking at the RPF's defeat over the Hutu perpetrators by a lightly armed force of approximately 25 000 men, it becomes obvious that a Western force would have had good chances of success in stopping the genocide. As he says, "... once on the scene, a well-equipped Western military force would have faced relatively light opposition and suffered relatively few casualties". (Valentino 2004, p. 245.) According to estimates, this would not have been unbearable cost-wise. As Barnett states, what differentiates the genocide in Rwanda from other genocides is the relatively low cost the intervention would have required (Barnett 2002, p. 2).

4. STEREOTYPES

When looking at the international community's response to the situation in Rwanda in the spring of 1994, certain stereotypes concerning both Rwanda and international order in general were strongly at play. In their different ways, these beliefs, occurrences, and establishments contributed to the way the genocide in Rwanda was both seen as well as responded to.

As seen above, Rwanda's history has been marked both with peaceful coexistence between the Hutu and the Tutsi, as well as inequality between the two ethnic groups brought about by colonial powers. Thus, it is not a country that has been ethnically divided for most part of its existence. I will start examining the stereotypes by taking a look at the misleading interpretation of Rwanda's history that was well spread in the Western world – a history of a country caught in an endless cycle of ethnic unrest.

In this chapter, I will also consider the role of two powerful UN institutions, the UN Genocide Convention and the Security Council. As will be demonstrated, these two institutions are the organization's – and thus the international community's – foremost tools against genocide. The final stereotype looked at in this chapter is case Somalia. The unsuccessful UN peacekeeping mission in 1993 to capture Somali warlords had an effect on both the UN's as well as the United States' take on future missions.

4.1. The perceived history of Rwanda

“Right up to the day the last Tutsi was killed in the spring of 1994, exactly a century after the first German, Count von Gotzen, arrived in Rwanda, reality was juggled by foreigners”. (Huband 2000, p. 170.)

As described earlier, the Hutu and the Tutsi had led a rather peaceful coexistence within Rwanda prior to colonial rule. As Huband notes, “The emergence of rigid boundaries between Tutsi and Hutu is relatively recent” (Huband 2000, p. 171). The colonial policies that emphasized the significance of ethnicity not only altered the Rwandans' interpretation of what ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ meant, but also coloured the Western world's understanding of Rwanda's history.

Huband calls the common Western interpretation of Rwanda's history as centuries-long ethnic rivalry between the Hutu and the Tutsi "mythico-history". Contemporary research on the topic widely accepts that "it was the colonial era that served to transform a complex status hierarchy into a simplified ethnic antagonism – a hierarchy in which, apparently, the subdivision among the Tutsi became less significant". (Huband 2000, p. 171.) Barnett agrees, stating that "The coupling of ethnicity and violence is due largely to a colonization process that introduced myths of a superior race coming from the north to conquer and inferior native population (which in gross terms led to a feeling of entitlement and superiority among the Tutsis and a massive inferiority complex among the majority Hutu); and that institutionalized and ethnocracy". (Barnett 2002, p. 51.)

The Belgians issued the Rwandan population identity cards in 1933, an incident Mann describes as "a deadly aid to the genocide" sixty years later (Mann 2005, p. 449). Physical features were the foundation on which the issuance of the identity cards was based on. The occupying evolutionary theory of the time described Caucasians as the genetically superior race, from which other peoples could be ranked in descending order. The order depended on how closely others resembled Caucasians in physical and morphological structure, as well as on the artefacts they produced. (Barnett 2002, pp. 50-51.)

When preparing for the genocide, the genocidaires used the identity cards to determine their targets. This took place even though, as Barnett points out, the Hutu-Tutsi divide was falsely created from the beginning. As a product of close co-habitation and intermarriages, in many cases a Rwandan's ethnicity was a mixed one. Indeed, "during the genocide Hutus were mistakenly killed because they had "Tutsi" features, and Tutsis were able to pass for Hutu because they had stereotypical "Hutu" features". (Barnett 2002, p. 50.)

Huband attributes the dramatic changes between years 1916-1931 to have been important in turning the country into "an ethnic battleground". The cycle of mass murder during the latter part of the 20th Century, as he notes, was brought about by the German and French colonialists. "As much as in Burundi, colonial interference with the existing social structure in Rwanda created the conditions for the instability of the system that emerged as a consequence of the colonial presence". Even though the racial

categories of Hutu and Tutsi were not invented by the colonizers, according to Destexhe, “the policies practiced by the Germans and the Belgians only served to exacerbate them”. (quoted in Huband 2000, p.167.) Barnett describes colonialism to have “institutionalized ethnicity and infused it with a perverse and distorted “scientific” belief system that naturalized the Tutsi destiny to rule over the majority Hutus” (Barnett 2002, p. 50).

The colonizers therefore played an essential role in creating the ethnic split in the country, as well as “ensured that the important feeling of belonging to an ethnic group was fuelled by ethnic, indeed racial hatred”. Indeed, as the Nigerian academic A.O. Ikelegbe describes colonialism, it was “the axe that tore African tradition away from its roots, setting populations adrift, with little opportunity to draw upon the experience of the past”. (cited in Huband 2000, p. 168.)

As the popular images of “ethnic” and “tribal” politics in the African continent suggest a never-ending cycle of warfare and violence, Rwanda fitted well in this categorization. Therefore, at the time of the genocide, it was common by both decision-makers and the popular media to portray the violence as “the latest and bloodiest instalment in a centuries-old pattern, an inevitable by-product of two rival ethnic groups crowded into the same, small geographic space and forced to compete over scarce resources and for power”. (Barnett 2002, p. 51.)

4.2. The UN Genocide Convention

The concept of genocide, a legacy of the Second World War, was defined at 1948 UN convention as an act “committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” The Genocide Convention, coming into effect in 1951, carries with it a legal obligation: international law requires participating countries to the Convention to act if a genocide is recognized to be taking place. (Off 2002, p. 72.) As Melvern calls it, the Genocide Convention is the world’s “first truly universal, comprehensive, and codified protection of human rights” (Melvern 2006, p. 93).

In Article I of the Convention, the Contracting Parties recognize genocide as a crime under international law. The Parties “undertake to prevent and to punish” this crime.

Article II defines genocide as an act “committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”. Five acts of taking part in genocidal activity are defined; for example, “killing members of the group” and “causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members of the group”.

Article III defines the acts that are punishable: genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide. The next article, IV, determines that no-one can escape the punishment if they have taken part in any of the actions described in Article III. Everyone from private individuals to public officials and constitutionally responsible rulers shall be punished.

In terms of this study, an interesting Article is also number VIII. It states that “Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III”. (U.N.T.S. (United Nations Treaty Series), No. 1021, vol. 78 (1951), p. 277.)

Even though the Convention condemns a genocide and urges UN member states to act on it, it does not provide any clear guidance on how to prevent or stop genocidal acts (Crawford 2002, p. 431).

4.3. The power and the influence of the UN Security Council

As Bailey notes, it is sometimes said that the UN has been more successful in handling economic and social problems than in advancing peace and security. It is with the Security Council (SC) that the primary responsibility of preserving the world peace rests (Bailey 1975, p. 3). This role was determined at the creation of the United Nations.

The major powers emerging victorious from the Second World War wished to have a predominant role in maintaining international security and peace. Even though there were attempts by smaller countries to curb the great powers’ primacy at the UN’s founding meeting in San Francisco in 1945, China, France, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States would not give concessions. The primary responsibility of maintaining international peace was accorded to the Security Council. All member

states were to ‘agree to accept and carry out’ Security Council’s decisions (Bailey 1975, p. 3). However, not all the Security Council decisions are binding, as it can also pass resolutions ‘requesting’ or ‘calling upon’ states to act on matters. (Ryan 2000, p. 21.)

The SC consists of five permanent members (The United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China) and ten non-permanent members who are elected to the position by the General Assembly for two-year terms. Non-permanent members can participate in Security Council discussions by invitation, but they are not allowed to vote. The presidency of the Council rotates every month, and it operates in all UN’s six official languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish). (Ryan 2000, p. 21.)

The Security Council primarily has two sets of tools in handling threats to international peace and security. Chapter VI of the UN Charter orders “Peaceful settlement of disputes”, whereas Chapter VII authorizes “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression” (Engström 2009, p. 4). These tools, however, are only indirect in terms of actual action. As Hurd points out, much of the Security Council’s power is contingent on the voluntary cooperation of member states. The cooperation can be measured for example in contributions to peacekeeping missions and the countries’ national enforcement of sanctions regimes. (Hurd 2002, p. 35).

In terms of the planning and execution of peacekeeping operations, the permanent five Security Council members have a special role. Due to the permanent five’s veto right, many resolutions are being circulated among them during the drafting process. The informal consultations before the proposals are submitted give the permanent members opportunity to suggest changes in the text – with the understanding that their support might otherwise be withheld or the veto used. (Ryan 2000, p. 21.) The United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China also carry significant military capability in terms of conducting successful peacekeeping operations. As Kramer notes, military capability to change the situation on the ground in a crisis-torn country plays “a significant role in garnering international consensus for forceful humanitarian intervention” (Kramer 2007, p. 121).

Quoting the UN Charter, concerning making armed forces available, the permanent members “shall consult with one another and...with other Members...with a view to such joint action...as may be necessary for...maintaining international peace and security” (Bailey 1975, p. 105). Consulting one another as the first measure is explained by looking at these countries’ military assets. As Weiss et al. note, the “Permanent members possess the military capability to act quickly and decisively” (Weiss, Forsythe and Coate 2001, p. 29).

As Hurd concludes, the Security Council is invested with social legitimacy. The high social status of the Council implies to a significant amount of “social capital”, which it can use to induce compliance by other UN member states (Hurd 2002, p. 35). In other words, the power the Security Council possesses “is a function of the esteem in which the body is held by the membership of the United Nations in general” (Hurd 2002, p. 47).

4.4. The Somalia effect

In March 1992, a temporary ceasefire was agreed between warring Somali warlords Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed. The clan heads’ battle for political power had been going on since October 1991, and due to the lack of a central authority in Somalia, the situation in the country had become a humanitarian crisis. The country did not have an army, a police force, civil service, banking system, or schools and hospitals that functioned. The Somali people faced malnutrition as the majority of foreign humanitarian aid was being seized by the warlords. A Security Council resolution of April 1992 mandated the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to monitor the ceasefire in the Mogadishu area. In July that year UNOSOM’s size was increased by 500 soldiers, and by August, an additional 3500 troops were allocated to the operation. This, however, did not improve the situation; by the end of 1992, “the humanitarian problem had become desperate”. (Ryan 2000, p. 125.)

By this time, it was estimated that two million Somalis were at risk of malnutrition, and only 20% of international humanitarian aid was getting through to the people. According to one estimate, approximately 3000 people were dying every day.

Therefore, on 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council authorized the United Task Force on Somalia (UNITAF), legitimizing the United States-led operation Restore Hope. President G.H.Bush, during the final months of his presidency, had decided to boost the UN operation with the weight of the Pentagon. Operation Restore Hope's 37 000-strong force had an authorization to use all necessary means to create a secure environment for humanitarian aid's safe delivery. Even though the operation was led by the US, over twenty states participated in it. (Ryan 2000, p. 125). This, however, did not translate to success on the field.

In October 1993, the United States suffered a major tragedy when 18 of its soldiers were killed in action in the Somali capital of Mogadishu in an operation to catch Aideed (Dallaire 2003, p. 241). In the aftermath of the incident, two US soldiers' bodies were abducted by the local people and dragged in the streets of Mogadishu. As footage and pictures of this filled the American public's television screens and newspapers, a strong public outcry generated against sending troops into unstable and chaotic circumstances. As a result, not only did the newly sworn-in Clinton administration (Clinton's tenure started in January 1993) change the US policy towards peacekeeping missions, but so did also the United Nations. Michael Barnett says that "what would later be dubbed the "shadow of Somalia" cast a pall across the UN." These decisions had an unfortunate effect on a mission that was being initiated in October 1993; UNAMIR in Rwanda. The failure in Somalia, initially also a UN mission, inflicted a return to traditional interpretation of peacekeeping: from the Mogadishu incident onwards, peacekeepers were to remain neutral and impartial towards all the parties of a conflict. (Barnett 2002, p. 13.)

5. ERVING GOFFMAN'S THEATRICAL FRAME

Erving Goffman (1922 – 1982) was a Canadian-born sociologist who during his lifetime was a strong exponent of the dramaturgical approach. His main research interest was “the common man in mass society”. Goffman draw inspiration from a variety of fields of study, for example linguistics, game theory, communication theory, political science and psychiatry. Among academics, Goffman received a mixed reception. Even though he produced numerous successful books, reviews of his work in academic journals were scarce in his lifetime. Interest in, as well as appreciation towards, Goffman’s work has however grown in the years following his death. (Johnson Williams 1986, pp. 348 – 367.)

The methodological approach of this study is provided by Erving Goffman’s theatrical frame. He presented this thesis in his 1974 book *Frame Analysis - An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. In the following, I am going to take a closer look on the central themes of this publication.

5.1. Frame analysis

By a frame, Goffman refers to a definition of a given situation. The definition is almost always to be found, however though, individuals in the situation being not the ones creating that definition. It is the society that can be attributed to be creating the definition. A strong cultural emphasis is placed on framing; primary frameworks of a social group form a central element of its culture. In any given situation a multitude of frameworks can be involved, as well as none at all.

According to Goffman, the individual in the situation assesses correctly what the situation ought to be for them, and acts accordingly. When an individual recognizes a particular event, he has a tendency to employ to his response a primary framework. A primary framework carries with it a sense of meaningfulness; “...a primary framework is one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful” (p. 21). An individual perceives events in terms of primary frameworks, the type of framework employed providing a way of describing the event to which it is applied. Even though primary frameworks vary in

their degree of organization, every primary framework allows its user to perceive, locate, label, and identify a seemingly infinite amount of concrete occurrences defined in its terms.

Goffman divides primary frameworks into two broad classes: natural and social. A natural framework identifies an occurrence as un-oriented, undirected, and unguided. Thus events occurring in these situations are understood to be created of natural determinants. There is no wilful agent causally or intentionally interfering in the outcome of the situation, nor an actor continuously guiding it. In terms of analysis of the outcome, there are no sanctions involved, whether they are positive or negative. As Goffman says, “success or failure in regard to these events is not imaginable” (p. 22). As elegant examples of natural frameworks he cites occurrences in physical and biological sciences, a more ordinary example being the state of weather.

Social frameworks, on the other hand, are greatly influenced by an agency’s aim, will, and controlling effort. The main live agency, the human being, can be flattered, coaxed, affronted, and threatened. Its actions can be labelled as “guided doings” (p. 22). They subject their doer to “standards”, social appraisal of the action based on various determinants such as efficiency, economy, honesty, good taste, and so forth. A continuing corrective control has to be sustained in managing the consequentiality. Motive and intent are always involved, helping to select which social framework is to be applied.

Guided doings, even though being actors within the social framework, have natural tendencies to them. Goffman makes the assumption that “although natural events occur without intelligent intervention, intelligent doings cannot be accomplished effectively without entrance into the natural order” (p. 23). Guided doings, thus, seem to follow two kinds of understanding. One pertains to the manipulation of the natural world, in accordance to the constraints that natural occurrences impose. The other one pertains to the special worlds where the actor can become involved – those worlds, however, varying considerably.

Rules are involved in all social frameworks, even though differently. As examples, Goffman compares a game of checkers and driving a vehicle. Even though both activities’ rules can be explained in writing, for example in a booklet, there is a

difference between them. The checkers game incorporates an understanding of the participants' governing purpose, but the traffic code in turn does not establish where and why one is to travel, only giving the restraints needed to be observed when getting there.

Goffman argues that the meaning of an act is a product of social definition. The definition is derived from the object's role in the society, which becomes a given. The role can, however, be modified, but not completely recreated. As he says, "Observers actively project their frames of reference into the world immediately around them, and one fails to see their so doing only because events ordinarily confirm these projections, causing the assumptions to disappear into the smooth flow of activity" (Goffman, p. 39).

5.2. The theatrical frame

"All the world is like a stage." (Goffman 1974, p. 124.)

Goffman describes a performance on a stage as an arrangement which turns an individual into a stage performer. The stage performer, on his part, is an object that can be looked at thoroughly without offense, as well as expected to demonstrate engaging behaviour by persons in the audience. The number of participants in a play is an irrelevant factor; the performance as such is not heavily dependent on the size of the cast. The audience region of the theatre is often divided from the stage by a line.

Goffman rejects the idea of interaction between the audience and the performers. According to him, the first issue is not interaction but the frame. A conversation constitutes of direct replying responses to the other's statements, but in regard a performance, it is only the fellow performer who is allowed a direct response like this. Thus, the central understanding is that the audience "has neither the right nor the obligation to participate directly in the dramatic action occurring on the stage, although it may express appreciation throughout in a manner that can be treated as not occurring by the beings which the stage performers present onstage" (p. 125).

Goffman distinguishes performances by their purity. With purity he means "the exclusiveness of the claim of the watchers on the activity they watch" (p. 125). Most

pure performances are for example the ballet, dramatic scriptings, most orchestral music, and nightclub acts. As second most pure performances Goffman defines contests or matches presented for viewing. The purity of these acts comes from the contestants' drive for winning. They must thus act such as something large was at stake beyond the affair's entertainment value for its watchers. Ceremonials come third on the purity list. Events such as weddings and funerals typically contain watchers, but they are there by invitation, not as paying audience. The next class Goffman defines as lectures and talks, albeit being a very mixed class in terms of performance purity. This is due to the variety of performances that can be categorized under the class, examples varying from demonstrations by visiting specialists provided to medical students in a surgical theatre to stand-up comedians delivering political analysis. The most impure class to Goffman is work performances. For example, at a construction site an individual can observe a constructor at work, without the latter showing any regard for the dramatic elements of their work.

5.2.1. Dual roles

When considering the unstaged, real social life, theatrical imagery seems to guide an individual's perceptions toward a distinction between a person and a capacity he may perform. Goffman takes as example an imaginary individual named John Smith, who at once can be known as a loyal friend, bad father, and a good plumber. The word "role", therefore, is used for both on- and offstage activity.

Goffman, however, finds the term "role" to be inadequate. When for example talking about John Smith, his personal identity must be taken into account. Thus, Smith can be defined to be a concrete organism possessing distinctive identifying marks. As part of the personal identity, Smith claims a multitude of functions and capabilities, which can be domestic, occupational, and so on. Thus, also an individual employed in stage acting can be said to demonstrate a dual self; a stage actor and a staged character.

It is not only the actor performing on the stage who possesses a variety of functions. The theatregoer, on the one hand, buys the ticket, comes to see the play, and spends his money on refreshments during intermission. But this is not his only function. The theatregoer collaborates in the unreality onstage. He sympathetically participates in the unreal world generated by the scripted characters. As Goffman says, the theatregoer is

“raised (or lowered) to the cultural level of the playwright’s characters and themes, appreciating allusions for which he doesn’t quite have the background, marital adjustments for which he doesn’t quite have the stomach, varieties in style of life for which he is not quite ready, and repartee which gives to speaking a role he could not quite accept for it were he to find such finery in the real world” (p. 130). Goffman here introduces the term onlooking, reminding the reader that it is more suitable for real, offstage activities. However, onlooking as an activity belongs from the beginning to the theatrical frame.

It could be argued, then, that theatrical audiences consist of two elements; theatregoers and onlookers. Goffman illustrates the difference between the two using laughter as an example. There is a clear distinction between laughter as a response to a successful sketch, and laughter following an unscripted break up for example. In the first instance, the individual laughs as an onlooker, in the second as a theatregoer.

An additional natural feature of a stage production is the final applause’s wiping the make-believe away. Activity portrayed onstage is now seen only as presentation.

5.2.2. The organization of the inner world of a play

In order to understand the organization of the inner world of a play, we need to get a clear view of the “relation an individual can have to other kinds of doings” (p. 133). In everyday activity one can predict some natural events’ taking place with a large amount of certainty. Interpersonal outcomes, however, are more problematic. In terms of make-believe, one can arrange to the script what is to come. Thus, when talking about fabrications, the fabricators “have some opportunity to “play the world backwards”, that is, to arrange now for some things to work out later that ordinarily would be out of anyone’s control and a matter of fate or chance” (p. 133).

Corresponding to the arrangements will be numerous information states. By an information state Goffman means “the knowledge an individual has of why events have happened as they have, what the current forces are, what the properties and intents of the relevant persons are, and what the outcome is likely to be” (pp. 133-134). In other words, every character in every moment is attributed a temporal perspective, an orientation. During a play, a single information state concerning the inner events of the

play is shared by the players, the producer, the prompter, and so on. This knowing, according to Goffman, is more appreciable than the knowing individuals normally share about their real world, due to the playwright's advance decision on how the play will work out.

In terms of the play's roles, Goffman gives an example of those of heroes and villains. The individual playing the hero acts as if he doesn't know the villain's intentions, and the individual playing the villain acts as if he is capable of hiding his intentions from the hero. Obviously, this happens even though both persons have a full and common knowledge of the distribution of this knowledge and of the play itself.

Even though the performers can be understood to be playing at containing each other, the matter gets more complicated when adding the audience to the equation. First and foremost, when looking at the audience's position, Goffman states that "members of the audience in their capacity as onlookers, as official eavesdroppers, are accorded by the playwright a specific information state relative to the inner events of the drama, and this state necessarily is different from the playwright's and in all likelihood different from that of various characters in the play – although one or more play characters may be accorded the same information state as the audience, a bridging function which may pass from one set of characters to another" (p. 135).

A prerequisite for being part of an audience in a play obliges one to act as if his own knowledge, in addition to that of some of the characters, is partial. A level of ignorance is also present, not ordinary ignorance though, but a willingness to be deceived for the duration of the play. In other words, the audience transforms into "collaborators in unreality" (p. 136).

5.2.3. Staged interaction

The theatre "stages interaction systemically designed to be exposed to large audiences that can only be expected to have very general knowledge in common with the play characters performing this interaction" (p. 142). Thus, the audience is systematically given the information it needs covertly, "so the fiction can be sustained that it has indeed entered into a world not its own" (p. 142). The audience relies on the writer's judgement on what they need to know, assuming that they are given enough information

in order to place themselves accordingly in terms of the events to come. The assumption thus is, that nothing they should know has been skipped, thus the full portrayal of a scene being provided.

6. VIEWS ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

At the centre of the debate on humanitarian intervention lies the question of state sovereignty and international norms regarding the use of force for humanitarian means. As Fixdal and Smith describe it, humanitarian intervention as an object analysis “sits at the intersection of the realist and idealist traditions in the study of international relations”. Humanitarian interventions are multilateral and based on cooperation, which gives them the idealist character, but also realism is involved as the actors in multilateral operations are states’ governments acting on their national interests. (Fixdal and Smith 1998, p. 283.)

The development of theories of sovereignty in the Western world, along with the experiences of colonialism and the long struggle of decolonization, generated a respect for the political and legal concepts of non-intervention and self-determination. Helping to create the conditions for decolonization was, however, the development of another set of norms, that of human rights. Human rights norms elevate the status of the individual in international politics, and challenge “the inviolability of sovereignty as a legal protection for states which violate human rights”. (Crawford 2002, pp. 401-402.) Before the establishment of the UN, human rights largely belonged to the domestic jurisdiction of a state, thus not being a matter of international concern in terms of international law (Rodley 1992, p. 39).

6.1. Sovereignty

The discourse of sovereignty describes the world with nation-states as the principal actors, the principal objects of interest, and the principal centres of power. The structure of political power is associated with a corresponding structure of territorial space. Thus, supreme power is exerted inside a particular territorial boundary. (Camilleri and Falk 1992, pp. 2-3.) However, as Fixdal and Smith point out, sovereignty has two distinct meanings. When looked at in substantive terms, sovereignty means a state’s material capacity for the control of intra-state affairs. Thus, state sovereignty in this definition is a matter of degree, as no state can be completely self-contained and able to exclude external influence. On the other hand, in a formal sense, sovereignty describes the state authority as being the supreme power. There is no matter of degree involved in the

formal sense of the term; the sovereign state decides matters within its territorial jurisdiction. (Fixdal and Smith 1998, p. 292.)

As Roberts points out, the presumption against military intervention has been a successful ordering principle of international politics. He argues that “the protection which it provides has been one basis for so many states joining, and staying within the United Nations” (Roberts 1993, p. 434). Indeed, building on the tradition for sovereignty and respect articulated in the Treaty of Westphalia, international law as well as the UN Charter prohibit states the use of force, except in self-defence (Crawford 2002, p. 425). As Nye puts it, “sovereignty and non-intervention are two principles that provide order in an anarchic world system” (Nye 2005, p. 155).

6.2. Humanitarian intervention

Tesón defines humanitarian intervention as “proportionate help, including forcible help, provided by governments (individually or in alliances), to individuals in another state who are victims of severe tyranny (denial of human rights by their own government) or anarchy (denial of human rights by collapse of the social order)” (Tesón 2005, p. 23). Fixdal and Smith on their part describe it as “intervention into armed conflicts for humanitarian purposes with a range of means including armed force” (Fixdal and Smith, p. 284).

Humanitarian intervention challenges international legal conventions and powerful normative beliefs against each other. The rule of law and state sovereignty may be violated in protecting individual rights. As Crawford points out, “interventions that are at least nominally motivated for humanitarian purposes are conducted and may well seem imperative in some situations” (Crawford 2002, p. 425). On the other hand, as she continues, “at issue is the future of millions of people, who, if not rescued by the international community, or some benevolent power, may be left to suffer or die at the hands of brutal dictators or genocidal aggressors” (Crawford 2002, p. 399).

6.3. Theories of humanitarian intervention

Tesón and Nye have separately categorized the main theoretical approaches to humanitarian intervention. Tesón defines the positions towards humanitarian intervention to be absolute noninterventionism, limited interventionism, and broad interventionism (Tesón 2005, p. 24). Nye has categorized the points of views with different titles: those of realists, state moralists, and cosmopolitans (Nye 2005, p. 160). In the following, I will take a look at the arguments of the theoretical approaches using Nye's categorization.

6.3.1. Realist point of view

For realists, the key institution in international politics is the balance of power. Order and peace represent the key values. Thus, from the point of view of the realists, international intervention is justified "when it is necessary to maintain the balance of power and to maintain order". Preserving the order is also seen as a preventive measure; by restoring the order, possibility of the crisis' escalation to war is decreased. (Nye 2005, p. 160.) When states' essential interests are in question, the states do not need humanitarian or human rights arguments to justify their interventions. Risking lives without a definable national interest only leads to over-commitment, damage with relations to other governments, and decline of domestic support. The truly vital interests of a state are threatened by the external policies of rivals, not the internal ones. (Hoffman 1996, pp. 277-278.)

Henry Kissinger finds the general acceptance of certain universal principles, such as conventions condemning genocide, war crimes, and torture, to have been the most dramatic transformation in the nature of current international affairs. This, in Kissinger's words, amounts to a revolution in the nature of the way the international system has functioned for more than three hundred years. He sees that a new period of global interventionism may be ahead of us, with consequences of unforeseeable kind. As Kissinger argues, humanitarian intervention is more likely to create more problems than it intends to solve. It is not possible to know beforehand whether an intervention is going to succeed as well as estimate its casualties. Thus, he finds an intervention to have too many unknown variables that the intervener cannot control. Kissinger sees an

intervention as irrational policy that compromises national interest. (Kissinger 2001, pp. 234-252.)

Kissinger does not advocate a strong role for his home country, the United States, despite its military capability to conduct humanitarian interventions. In order for humanitarian intervention to be included in United States' foreign policy as a top priority, Kissinger sees that four conditions have to be met. The principle has to be universally applicable, it must lead to actions that are sustainable by domestic US opinion, it has to attain resonance within the international community, and it has to have a connection to the historical concept. (Kissinger 2001, p. 256.)

Simon Chesterman, on the other hand, finds the very notion of humanitarian intervention to be inconsistent in principle. In his opinion, the efforts to establish a right to humanitarian intervention challenge traditional legal approaches and therefore raise questions over "evidence and motive in the formation of international law" (cited in Welsh 2002, p. 506).

Chesterman argues that the notion of humanitarian intervention only emerged during the 19th Century, not being established as a legal right. According to Chesterman, humanitarian intervention "lies in the earlier conflict between the moral impetus to war over religious differences and the legal restraints that came to be placed on states entering into a society of equals". Humanitarian intervention to him is thus an issue that creates an uneasy relationship between international law and international morality. Furthermore, Chesterman sees that humanitarian intervention does not qualify as a legitimate exception to the UN Charter's ban of use of force. He notes that the Charter's purpose is to delegitimize individual acts of war by giving the Security Council the sole authority for the use of non-defensive force. (Welsh 2002, pp. 505-506).

Thus, Chesterman sees a negative consequence if a right to humanitarian intervention would be acknowledged. He finds that the motives of interventionists could be compromised, and thus humanitarian intervention be used to further states' self-interests. He says that "States have demonstrated their willingness to intervene on any number of dubious bases – the question ... is whether a further and necessarily subjective legal basis should be given for future interventions" (Welsh 2002, p. 506). Hans Morgenthau shares the same concern by arguing that "All nations will continue to

be guided in their decisions to intervene and their choice of means of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests” (Morgenthau 1967, p. 430).

6.3.2. State moralist point of view

For state moralists, the key institution in international politics is a society of states with certain rules and international law. Emphasis is added on non-intervention in the sovereign territory of another state. Their key value thus is the autonomy of both the state and its people. Therefore, state moralists rarely justify intervention. (Nye 2005, p. 26).

Charles Krauthammer, even though a well-known realist in international relations theory, can be labelled as a state moralist when examining his opinion towards humanitarian intervention. His acceptance of a humanitarian intervention culminates in a single criterion: it can be undertaken “where it counts”. Krauthammer defines his stance over the United States’ possible involvement in a humanitarian intervention as follows:

“We will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places where there is a strategic necessity – meaning, places central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom.” (Krauthammer 2004, p. 16).

Krauthammer finds only a few occasions in recent history where intervention has counted. As examples he mentions Germany and Japan in mid-20th Century, along with modern-day Iraq and Afghanistan. Krauthammer sees that in the same way Germany and Japan were transformed to oppose communism instead of becoming followers of the ideology, Iraq and Afghanistan could be turned into pro-Western states. Even though this undertaking is enormous, as Krauthammer notes, it has to be tried. (Krauthammer 2004, p. 16.)

Michael Walzer’s argument follows the same lines. He finds that in an international society of independent states, only aggression can justify war. The states’ rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty have to be respected. However, Waltzer argues that when crimes that “shock the moral conscience of mankind” are being committed, any state which is able to stop these crimes should do so. Or, as he adds, at

the very least the state should have a right to do so. Outside help is sometimes the only viable way to fight against the massacre or enslavement of political opponents, religious sects, and national minorities. Waltzer finds the idea of a nation-state's self-determination non-applicable in cases when a government savagely turns against its own people (Waltzer 2006, p. 101).

Waltzer also addresses the issue of motives behind humanitarian interventions. He acknowledges all states, large and small, to have ulterior motives. As he says, "There is no such thing as a pure will in political life". But, as Waltzer concludes, humanitarian intervention can not be expected to depend on the moral purity of its conductors. (Waltzer 2006, p. xiii.)

6.3.3. Cosmopolitan point of view

The cosmopolitans find the key international institution to be a society of individuals, and the key value justice. Thus, national boundaries have no standing in moral terms, as they simply "defend an equality that should be abolished if we think in terms of distributive justice" (Nye 2005, p. 27). Cosmopolitans find all human beings being 'citizens of the world'. Even though individuals are being born into different societies, being human is the overriding fact. Thus, there is a notion of world ethics applied to citizens of the world. World ethics can be defined as universal moral rules and values that should inform human conduct in all parts of the world. (Dower 2009, pp. 60-61.)

Cosmopolitans find the civilian society to be a society without borders. Civilian rights are recognized by fellow civilians no matter of location. Thus, Frost argues, humanitarian intervention in contemporary world politics has to be understood to be directed at maintaining the civil society. The aim of the intervention will thus be to repair the civil society. (Frost 2001, pp. 44-54.)

Therefore, an intervention is justified if it promotes human rights and individual justice (Nye 2005, p. 27). States only have rights if they promote the welfare and rights of their citizens. Because of this, the question of state sovereignty misses the point of the matter, the real issue being how to meet the worlds' citizens' needs. (Fixdal and Smith 1998, p. 294.) Indeed, as Dower argues, the role of states in human rights violations has become obvious. As he says, "...it has become increasingly clear that often states themselves are

actually impediments to the realization of human rights, if not active perpetrators of human rights violations”. (Dower 2009, p. 180.)

Calvocoressi compares international intervention in defence of human rights to a situation in which a person is aware of their neighbour’s child abuse. “What do you do, and what are you entitled to do, and what ought you to do?” he asks. For Calvocoressi, crimes against humanity are crimes against the person, and therefore the location in which they take place is secondary. Thus it does not make a difference whether the state accused is executing these crimes domestically or externally. He finds the sovereign state’s claim to immunity in terms of intervention to be ethically flawed. Indeed, the claim in Calvocoressi’s words is “deeply ingrained, hallowed by time reinforced by propaganda, and buttressed by vested interests”. (Calvocoressi 1992, pp. 1-12.)

Thomas G. Weiss agrees, pointing out that the only first-order principle when considering a humanitarian intervention is humanity, or in other words the sanctity of life. He finds values such as consent, neutrality, and impartiality as being second-order principles. (Weiss 2001, p. 420.)

Fernando R. Tesón finds a ground for moral permission to use force in a case of severe anarchy or tyranny in another state. The moral permission, in his argument, goes a long way in establishing also a legal permission. Because the ultimate justification of states’ existence is the enforcement and protection of the citizens’ natural rights, a government that substantially violates those rights betrays the purpose of its existence, thus forfeiting both its domestic and international legitimacy. Therefore Tesón finds foreign armed forces to have the moral permission to help the victims in that state, given that the intervention is proportioned “to the evil which it is designed to suppress”. Also, the intervention has to be welcomed by the victims of the oppression. (Tesón 2005, p. 16).

From an ethical standpoint, Tesón argues, the states’ rights under international law are derived from individual rights. He thus rejects the notion of states having autonomous moral standing, and therefore them holding international rights being independent from the rights of individuals populating the state. (Tesón 2005, p. 17).

Personally, I find the cosmopolitans’ argument on the justification of a humanitarian intervention most convincing. Even though I do not necessarily subscribe to the idea of

a society of individuals, I do find state sovereignty to be a secondary consideration when individuals' rights are being suppressed in any way by their own government. In a case of planned, extreme violence a government or a group of people is executing within a state against their fellow citizens, I support humanitarian intervention. I agree with Michael Barnett's assertion that "the UN is responsible for "the international community" and has a duty to intervene where states fear to tread". (Barnett 2002, p. 169.)

7. CASE RWANDA THROUGH GOFFMAN'S THEATRICAL FRAME

I will now return to Erving Goffman's thesis by using his theatrical frame as the method of study in examining international community's response to the Rwandan genocide.

First, I am going to describe the setting, the frame of the play, as the genocide started in April 1994. After this, I will turn my attention to the central themes of Goffman's theatrical frame: the theatre, the roles of the players, and the audience.

7.1. The frame of the play

"Meanwhile, by the United Nations, for France, for the United States, for the distant news desks of London, Washington, and elsewhere, it was deemed necessary to call it a war, because then the worldwide inaction could seem more justifiable." (Huband 2000, p. 185.)

The sentence above describes tellingly the UN's handling of case Rwanda. As there was little will amongst the powerful UN member countries to bloody their hands in a remote African country lacking strategic interest, their deliberations concerning possible intervention continued until to the point the genocide was effectively over. It has been argued that both the UN and its member countries lacked the information on what really was happening in Rwanda; mistaking the situation as a civil war instead of genocide. I find this explanation to be flawed. Taking into account not only the information modern-day intelligence is able to provide, there was also a constant stream of alarming updates of the escalation of the situation coming out of Rwanda.

The frame the villains of this play were trying to maintain was that of another Rwandan civil war. As it was not in the powerful countries' national interest to exert their military and financial capability on Rwanda, they sought to avoid the term genocide. As has been noted earlier, admitting genocide to be taking place requires action to intervene in or stop it by the UN Genocide Convention. Thus, a frame of civil war was attempted to be sustained. In these attempts the widely accepted perceived history of Rwanda was of use.

As Barnett points out, the excuses powerful governments frequently offer of their inaction during the Rwandan genocide revolve around claims of ignorance and duress.

They claim that they did not know and could not have known about the real situation in Rwanda, whether there was a civil war or a genocide taking place. In case of the majority of the UN member states that most likely was the case. Member states rely on the UN Secretariat to receive updates and critical information on the organizations' operations. This especially concerns the non-permanent members of the Security Council, who are less likely to have other sources of information. In case of Rwanda, it seems that the Secretary General was not relying the critical information he received from UNAMIR to the Security Council. (Barnett 2002, pp. 155-161.)

Carol Off is not convinced of the powerful countries' arguments of ignorance. As she asserts, "it doesn't take an expert to recognize that genocide was taking place in Rwanda" (Off 2000, p.72). In addition to the accumulating body piles on ground in Rwanda, the UN as well as its powerful member countries had the clues of a genocide in their disposal. As early as on 11 January 1994, General Dallaire had warned the UN by a cable of the possibility of an extermination campaign taking place in Rwanda in near future. This information he had received through an Interahamwe military trainer, who while opposing the RPF was also against killing Tutsi civilians and thus wanted to share his inside knowledge. Even though Dallaire did not use the word genocide in this cable, sent to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), he gave a chilling picture of what was going to take place within the next months: "Since UNAMIR mandate [the informant] has been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. He suspects it is for their extermination. Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis." (Off 2000, p. 42.)

As Off notes, "the cable predicts all that is to happen in the coming months" (Off 2000, p. 42). Even though the UN did not see the urgency of the matter, in the following weeks and months Dallaire kept feeding New York seriously alarming information from the ground: intervention plans to stop the killings, and pleads for more troops and material for the mission. A believable argument has been made that all this information was most likely already in the hands of powerful UN member states before Dallaire got it, due to immense intelligence networks and resources at their disposal. As Dallaire says, "a lot of the world's powers were all there with their embassies and their military attaches. And you can't tell me those bastards didn't have a lot of information. They would never pass that information on to me, ever". (Human Rights Watch: Leave none to tell the story, p. 142.)

Indeed, in attempts to stabilize the situation on ground in Rwanda, Dallaire often passed information collected by Belgian intelligence to the French and American ambassadors only to find they were already aware of it. Dallaire did this wishing to invoke action, fully well realizing the absurdity of the situation. As Off notes, since the US, France and Belgium had sophisticated intelligence gathering in place in Rwanda, they most likely knew more than Dallaire did. (Off 2000, p. 43.)

An example in case is Belgium. It was the work of Belgian intelligence that led Dallaire and UNAMIR to the informant who provided the information for the 11 January cable. Also, according to Barnett, the Belgian intelligence contacts kept “religiously” relaying information to Brussels until mid-April – keeping their capital better informed than the UNAMIR commander. (Barnett 2002, p. 161.)

What became the key issue in the Security Council debates over possible action concerning Rwanda was whether the word genocide would be used or not. The use of the word was most strongly advocated by New Zealand and Czech ambassadors. The United States, in its part, took the lead position in arguing against the use of the term. It received support from other states for, as Barnett says, a variety of reasons. The most pressing reason for being against admitting a genocide was taking place was a consideration of the international public’s response. Even though the UN Genocide Convention does not directly call for a military response to genocide, the Security Council imagined the international public would not be satisfied with any other course of action in case the word genocide was mentioned. The British ambassador, Sir David Hannay, stated that the Council would be a “laughing stock” if it did call Rwanda a genocide and then failed to act. (Barnett 2002, pp. 134-135.) Thus, the atrocities were not called by the name of genocide by the UN until the first week of May, roughly a month after the extermination campaign started and hundreds of thousands of victims had been eliminated (Off 2000, p. 71).

In conclusion, in the case of Rwanda the warnings coming from the field seemed to have gone unnoticed. As Valentino says, “In Rwanda, for example, UN and American officials failed to anticipate the genocide despite numerous warnings from well-placed Rwandan sources and foreign observers. Even reports from the commander of UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda, which warned of the potential for mass violence against civilians in the weeks and months before the genocide, did not move UN

officials”. (Valentino 2004, p. 242). The same argument was echoed in the words of the RPF. “We think Dallaire is giving correct reports [to the UN], but the [UN] secretariat doesn’t want to hear this. It’s the same reason why the UN Security Council refuses to use the word genocide. They didn’t want to blame the previous regime. France was one of them that didn’t want to. It is a matter of refusing to accept the correct analysis”. (Huband 2000, p. 199.)

The play concerning the Rwandan genocide involves numerous information states as described by Goffman. As will be demonstrated in the coming pages, the heroes in this play did not get their information on the events in Rwanda from the UN, but they had to turn to outside sources in order to be briefed accurately. Their information state on the events seems to, at least during the first weeks of the genocide, have lacked behind in comparison to the villains’ knowledge of the actual facts.

7.2. The theatre

The theatre in this play is the UN headquarters in New York. As stated earlier, it is this thesis’ point of view that when considering peacekeeping-related issues, the UN merely represents its member states’ policies in its actions. The organization by itself is powerless to act unless the member states have the political will to do this along with providing materiel for planned operations.

As Claude describes the United Nations, there actually are two independent UN’s within the organization. The first UN is comprised of the headquarters staff in New York, and the organization’s offices around the globe. The second UN is an entity formed by most of the world’s states, and the holder of real power in the organization. (cited in Ryan 2000, p. 2.) In the UN’s response to the genocide in Rwanda, the power very much laid in the hands of the member states.

Barnett and Finnemore describe international organizations’ power to classify and organize information to possibly be “identity defining or even life threatening”. It was indeed a question of existence for Rwandan Tutsis to have the UN and international community recognize the genocide. As “naming and labeling the social context establishes the parameters, the very boundaries, of acceptable action” the UN would have had to classify the situation as genocide in order to intervene. (Barnett and

Finnemore 1999, p. 710.) But, the member countries not willing to intervene and due to legal obligations the recognition of genocide places upon them, the situation in Rwanda was, as long as possible, classified as civil war. The UN Security Council time and again took advantage in the organization's strongly bureaucratic nature by remaining "actively seized of the matter" without delivering any solutions to intervene in or stop the atrocities.

Barnett finds the UN to bear moral responsibility "if its actions or omissions can be causally linked to the genocide and it does not have a compelling excuse for that behaviour". He especially finds the period of April 1994 excruciating when examining the organization's actions. As Barnett says, "the initial shock of the crisis and return to civil war quickly yielded to recognition of the bloodbath". However, high-ranking UN staff and Security Council members who had an obligation to urge UN to action did not do so. As many others, Barnett believes that an intervention in the early days of the genocide "might have either halted or narrowed the scope of the genocide". (Barnett 2002, p. 155.)

7.3. The roles in the play

As Goffman notes about the number of players in a play, it does not have to be big. The play I will analyze indeed does not include many key players. However, as is noted earlier when talking about UN Security Council's power, much of it can be labelled social power over not only other UN member states but also over the international community at large. The social power of the villains in the play involving Rwanda was very strong in the field of international politics.

7.3.1. The heroes

The heroes in this play are regarded as those who felt that the international community ought to do something to stop the massacres in Rwanda. Regarding the question of possible intervention, the UN Security Council was divided in two camps. Insisting immediate withdrawal from Rwanda were the United States and the United Kingdom who were joined by the muted voices of France, China, and Russia. Those who argued

for intervention were Czech Republic, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Spain. (Barnett 2002, pp. 100-101.)

New Zealand ambassador Colin Keating, the president of the Security Council during April 1994, was one of the most active promoters of an intervention into Rwanda in the UN. He was urging the fellow Security Council members to act on Rwandan violence already in mid-April, roughly a week after the genocide had started. On 14 April he voiced his opinion on wanting the Security Council to stop the massacres. Keating proposed that the UN should “increase the strength of UNAMIR and ... revise its mandate to enable it to contribute to the restoration of law and order and the establishment of the transitional institutions within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement”. (Dallaire 2003, p. 298.)

Although the definite date of when the term genocide appeared on Security Council’s private discussions can not be identified, Michael Barnett, who at the time of the genocide was on a year’s leave from academia and placed in the US mission to the UN, remembers it surfaced soon after the April 21 vote. This is when, according to Barnett, several representatives, including the New Zealand and Czech ambassadors, “began publicly entertaining the possibility of genocide”. (Barnett 2002, p. 134.) This conclusion was based on the information received not from inside the UN, but from independent reports and human rights organizations such as the Human Rights Watch.

Indeed, as the killings were escalating and the UN was still not acting on the situation, a group of like-minded Security Council members decided to act to find out the real standing about the situation. Contacted by Karel Kovanda, the ambassador of Czech Republic, Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch briefed him and the ambassadors of New Zealand and Spain of the happenings in Rwanda. The Human Rights Watch, having been one of the front-line agencies relying facts of the Rwandan conflict, was a source of first-hand information on the situation. Due to Des Forges’ briefing, this group of states forced a debate in the Security Council that finally ended in it condemning the massacres. However, the word genocide would not be used until the following week. (Off 2000, p. 71.)

The reason for not including the word genocide in the Security Council conversations was other Council members’ non-receptiveness towards its use. On 29 April, Colin

Keating in his final act as president of the Council, tried to push through a presidential statement calling Rwanda genocide. Karel Kovanda was helping in trying to put pressure on the permanent members; he lambasted the Council for spending only 20% of its time trying to broker a ceasefire and using 80% of its time discussing the withdrawal of UNAMIR. (Barnett 2002, p. 134.)

As an agreement was not reached, Keating decided on circulating a draft resolution for the last day of April and the final day of his presidency over Security Council. His plan was to force the member states which were blocking the presidential statement to explain their positions to the media. Keating's plan paid off in the sense that a major development indeed took place in the rhetoric of the Security Council. Even though the genocide was not fully acknowledged, following hours of intense debate the Council produced a statement that referred to it. (Barnett 2002, p. 134.) The statement "recalls that the killing of a member of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law" (Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1994/21).

7.3.2. The villains

Leslie Gelb identifies the problem of "teacup" wars as being in the centre of international community's post-Cold War approach to peacekeeping. By this term he means "wars of debilitation, a steady run of uncivil civil wars sundering fragile, but functioning, nation-states and gnawing at the well-being of stable nations". Even though Rwanda can not be labelled as only a "teacup" case, certain countries' response to it nevertheless follows Gelb's theory. As he explains, the response to these crisis situations greatly depends on the powerful countries' strategic interests. Thus, teacup wars "usually involve massive levels of human suffering but rarely pose a threat to the strategic interests of the countries represented on the Security Council." (quoted in Jett 1999, p. 8.)

The role of the villains in this story is accorded to the United States, France, Belgium, and Rwanda. Of the three Western states, two possess the most advanced military capacity for a rapid intervention. As Smith points out, of the world's militaries, "the US, UK, France and NATO are the most capable of deploying rapidly, with sufficient

logistics support and planning capacity to intervene, and presumably, to halt a quickly spreading, large-scale genocide in a country of any great size” (Smith 2006, p. 74).

The above-mentioned states’ capability of rapid military action was demonstrated soon after the genocide began in Rwanda on 6 April 1994. This action, however, was not taken to save Rwandan lives, but to evacuate Westerners from the deteriorating situation. On 9 April 1994, three days after the genocide started, France sent 190 paratroopers to Rwanda to oversee the evacuation of 1500 Belgian, 650 French, and 258 American and other foreign nationals. On 10 April 1994 Belgium sent 250 soldiers for similar evacuation purposes. (Huband 2000, p. 188.)

Huband does not spare his words when assessing some UN member states’ actions in relation to the genocide. “So complete had been the UN’s betrayal of Rwanda and the insistence of the United States, France, and other states that the country be left to die, and so completely had Rwanda been left to its horrifying fate, that the seeds of the United Nation’s broader sense of failure in Africa – a sense of failure that started with the unravelling of its peace plan in Angola, followed by the catastrophic failure in Somalia – took firm root. The rival agendas of the Security Council’s permanent members in particular exposed the absence of a global vision for what was supposed to be a global organization”. (Huband 2000, p. 214.)

7.3.2.1. The United States

Due to being one of the few countries in the world with capability of independently conducting large military operations outside its own borders, the question of preventing mass killings has fallen to the US before all other countries. Prevention of genocide was also a guiding principle of the Clinton administration in power at the time of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, as Valentino points out. When asked during the last year of his presidency whether a “Clinton Doctrine” existed to guide the foreign policy, Clinton responded believing that “whether within or beyond the borders of a country, if the world community has the power to stop it, we ought to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing”. (Valentino 2004, p. 245.)

Despite the good intentions, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, heading the organization in 1994, attributes the UN’s failure in Rwanda to have been

the fault of the US. “The genocide in Rwanda is 100 percent American responsibility”, he has stated. Boutros-Ghali’s argument is based on the assumption that had Washington approved an UN intervention into Rwanda in the spring of 1994, other countries would have followed. (Dobbs 1999, p. 357.) New Zealand ambassador Coling Keating agrees with Boutros-Ghali’s assertion. As he has stated about UN resolution 918, Keating asserts that “The United States has gutted this decision” (quoted in Dallaire 2003, p. 374).

The US vetoed the UN Secretary-General’s proposal on sending extra 5500 troops to Rwanda. Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the UN at the time, although acting on instructions received from Washington, did not believe Boutros-Ghali’s plan would work. She pointed out that few countries were really willing to contribute troops to the operation, “despite the rhetorical support for intervention in the Security Council”. (Dobbs 1999, p. 357.)

Even though Albright did not personally support the intervention, she was frustrated by the lack of action by her own government. As the author of her autobiography, Michael Dobbs, points out, Rwanda was one of the few occasions when Albright sharply confronted Washington by demanding new and more flexible instructions. “Goddamit, we have to do something”, screamed Albright in a telephone call to Washington colleagues Susan Rice and Richard Clarke. In explaining the US policy regarding Rwanda, Albright’s military adviser at the time, Mike Sheehan, cites domestic reasons. “It was untenable politically. It was politically impossible to go into central Africa. The American people were not ready for it”. (Dobbs 1999, p. 357.)

Indeed, the debate in the US at the time was very weary on the prospect of involvement in Rwanda. The senate largely followed Washington’s point of view when deliberating the situation. A powerful voice in advocating ending the violence in Bosnia, Republican Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, stated his views on Rwanda in a television program. “I don’t think we have any national interest here. I hope we don’t get involved there. I don’t think we will. The Americans are out. As far as I’m concerned in Rwanda, that ought to be the end of it”. (quoted in Rice and Loomis 2007, p. 72.)

7.3.2.2. Belgium and France

Whereas the United States does not have a historical relationship with Rwanda, France and Belgium have both been involved with the matters of the country for a longer period of time. The Belgians' involvement began with the colonization period, and France had been Rwanda's ally since the Cold War.

Either country's relationship with Rwanda was by no means over in 1994 when the genocide started. As Shiras points out, "French support did not halt with the end of the Cold War, and the French repeatedly stepped in to save President Habyarimana's regime when it was threatened. This political strategy ultimately proved unsustainable, with tragic consequences for the Rwandan people" (Shiras 1996, p. 98).

The consequences of the French support to ordinary Rwandans were not only tragic, but also lethal. As has come to light, France actually lent its expertise to train the perpetrators of the genocide. According to a Rwandan witness, "we had two French military officers who trained the interahamwe". In addition to this, he continues by explaining that "there was a major at the Affichier Centrale, a military camp where people were tortured. That was where the French military office was. I saw the French military show the interahamwe how to throw knives at the enemy, and to assemble and disassemble guns". (Huband 2000, 179-180.)

France's biased policy towards Habyarimana and his supporters did not halt even as the genocide started. On the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, which was shot down on 6 April 1994, were also several prominent Hutu Power radicals. Upon hearing of the attack, assuming the incident meant a Tutsi coup, several other radicals fled for refuge into the French embassy. (Mann 2005, p. 450.)

It seems that this support had grave consequences in terms of the Security Council's take on the situation in Rwanda. This was noticed in Rwanda as well. In the beginning of May, Paul Kagame of the RPF condemned the UN, "and in particular the way the French government had manipulated opinion in New York to move it against the RPF" (Huband 2000, p. 199).

7.3.2.3. Rwanda in the Security Council

“As the Security Council struggled to find the least obligating definition of the conflict in Rwanda, the Hutu power militias, under the direction of Colonel Bagosora, continued their “defence” of the country.” (Off 2000, p. 60.)

As luck would have it, at the time of the genocide Rwanda was one of the Security Council’s ten non-permanent members. The country’s ambassador to the UN, Jean-Damascene Bizimana, was a Hutu and a supporter of the incumbent Rwandan regime. The result of this was that the prime genocidaires, led by Colonel Bagosora, had their own spokesperson situated right at the heart of UN’s decision-making body. Bizimana proved to be a very efficient spokesperson of the Hutu Power cause. Through him, the masterminds of the genocide were able to portray the situation as the Rwandan government acting on self-defence against the threat the RPF posed to the stability of the country. The official line concerning Tutsi killings was that the population had overreacted to the assassination of president Habyarimana, and thus a few rogue Hutu elements had acted. This, however, was nothing like the threat the RPF posed to the country. (Off 2000, p. 73.)

Along these lines, the UN in mid-May received the Rwandan Foreign Minister, Jérôme Bicomumpaka, as well as the leader of the radical CDR party, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. Their message to the international community was that the Hutu were being killed in large-scale numbers, not the Tutsi, and the Rwandan government was doing its best to bring peace to the situation. As the Rwandan UN ambassador had underlined earlier, according to Bicomumpaka and Barayagwiza it was the RPF that was the enemy. Their message also included the notion of a civil war raging in Rwanda. (Off 2000, p. 73.)

The Rwandan government’s propaganda seems to have been very effective, even on the highest level of the UN administration. In a 20 April 1994 report the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali concludes that it was the rogue elements in Rwanda that had committed acts of violence in response to the president’s assassination, which led the Rwandan forces into war with the RPF. This was almost verbatim echo of Bagosora’s official line. (Off 2000, p. 60.)

One might wonder why the Rwandese representatives were welcomed to express their views at the United Nations. Michael Barnett, in a television interview describing the

atmosphere within the UN during the genocide, explains this. Even though many people knew what was going on in Rwanda, “[n]obody said, ‘Stop it’. Nobody said, ‘Your presence disgusts me,’” when the Rwandan ambassador to the UN held a speech at the Security Council proclaiming his government’s good intentions. As Off concluded about the Rwandan ambassador’s presence in the Security Council, “There was never a real moment in which they dressed him down, because if you did, you would be breaking the rules of the club”. (Off 2000, pp.70-71.)

7.4. The audience

By the end of April 1994, many human rights organizations and world leaders were calling Rwanda a genocide. The first newspaper accounts of a genocide taking place in the country were being published, which led to the media beginning to juxtapose the Security Council decision to reduce UNAMIR with the mass killings that were taking place. In the international public’s eyes, the Security Council started to look “either cowardly, cautious, or callous in its failure to call the killing in Rwanda by its rightful name”. (Barnett 2002, p. 135.)

According to Goffman’s theory on staged interaction, the audience can only be expected to have a very general understanding and knowledge in common with the play’s characters. The audience’s assumption is that they are given all the necessary facts and information they need to know by the actors, with the full portrayal of a scene being provided.

In regard cases like Rwanda, the audience’s knowledge on the facts of the matter largely depends on the information the UN gives of the situation at hand. As well as when looking at the Security Council’s social power within the organization itself, the UN itself in global terms carries similar social power within the eyes of the masses. The public expects the UN to be the foremost source of accurate information from the field, given that in many occasions it is one of the only outside actors operating within a remote, crisis-torn country. The conclusions the UN draws of a crisis situation is taken as a given, unless mainstream media is capable of giving a contrasting account of the incident.

In providing the international public a picture of the happenings in a country such as Rwanda, the role of the media is crucial. Roméo Dallaire understood this, and tried by using it to influence the Western opinion. “The media was the weapon I used to strike the conscience of the world and try to prod the international community into action. I would even risk the lives of my UNMOs [United Nations Military Observer] to ensure that the stories got out every day”, he recollects. (Dallaire 2003, p. 333.)

Goffman’s thesis’ central understanding on the role of the audience, that it neither has the right nor the obligation to directly participate in the action occurring on the stage, is very relevant when examining the international public’s role in the play concerning Rwanda. It is clear that no matter what the audience thinks of the play, its outcome is solely in the hands of the players. Even though many NGOs, private citizens and members of media were not only appalled over the massacres in Rwanda but strongly voicing their opinions, the power they had over the situation was very limited.

7.5. Dual roles

The dual role of a player Goffman describes can also be attached to the villains’ actions in regards Rwanda. Most obviously this is demonstrated in the actions of Rwanda itself. The genocidal forces of Rwanda have in this play not only one but two stages; the country itself where horrific massacres are taking place, and the UN Security Council. Even though the same fraction of the government is the mastermind of the genocide, its representative in the Security Council acts to enforce the image of a civil war raging in the country.

The US in its part also crafted a delicate dual role in trying to please both its national audience as well as the international one. Even though it was obvious that the country was not going to take military action in a remote African country immediately following the incidents in Somalia, the US wanted in international community’s eyes be seen to be doing something about Rwanda. The world’s superpower could not just simply say it was going to leave the Rwandans to their fate. Thus, the US’ only viable course of action to keep its face in the eyes of the international public was to maintain the position of a civil war taking place in Rwanda. As Carol Off says, “If it wasn’t so tragic, the way the US government avoided the issue would be comical” (Off 2000, p. 72). As an

example of the length the Clinton administration would go in this, is the following exchange between a reporter and State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelley:

Shelley: We have every reason to believe that acts of genocide have occurred.

Reporter: How many acts of genocide does it take to make a genocide?

Shelley: That's not a question I'm in a position to answer.

Reporter: Is it true that you have specific guidance not to use the word *genocide* in isolation but always preface it with "acts of"?

Shelley: I have guidance which...which...to which I...which I try to use as best I can. I'm not...I have...there are formulations that we are using that we are trying to be consistent in our use of. I don't have an absolute categorical prescription against something, but I have definitions. I have phraseology which has been carefully examined and arrived at... (quoted in Off 2000, p. 72.)

8. THE PLAY

It is early spring in New York. Even though it's still quite chilly on these latitudes, the promise of sunny summer days is in the air. The Central Park is slowly shedding its winter looks, as small areas of green grass reveal themselves in the midst of frozen soil. Even the park's birds seem to be singing in a louder and happier tune. Optimism is the notion with which to describe this glorious city's mood this day in early April, 1994.

The same feeling reaches to the gray, towering buildings in mid-Manhattan. The United Nations headquarters is buzzing with activity. This certainly also applies to its Office of Peacekeeping Operations as well. The unit, at the moment headed by Kofi Annan, has reached its peak of activity after the end of Cold War. Since 1990, new peacekeeping missions have been established by the rate of almost ten per year. The UN is eager to demonstrate both its effectiveness in securing the troubled areas of the world as well as its commitment to the two-word legacy of World War II, "never again".

The latest addition to the string of the Blue Berets' deployment is in a tiny African country called Rwanda. The UN is there to monitor a ceasefire between power-yearning parties which have signed a peace agreement to form a multi-party government. Known for its striking natural beauty of lush green forests and thousands of hills, Rwanda is most famous for its mountain gorillas through the Hollywood film *Gorillas in the Mist*. Most people know little else about Rwanda. That is, most people other than the French and the Belgians. Belgium, the former colonial master of Rwanda, along with France, has kept close watch over the country's events. The interest in Rwanda's happenings is manifested for example in military training the French provide for Rwandan troops.

Let me tell you a bit more about this country largely unknown for the large public. To put it short, Rwanda's inhabitants had lived more or less in peaceful cohabitation until it got colonized. The population consists of three ethnic groups, the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa people. Obviously, there had been rivalries and power struggles, but all in all, the ethnic groups "spoke the same language, followed the same religion, intermarried, and lived intermingled, without territorial distinctions, on the same hills, sharing the same social and political culture in small chiefdoms" (Gourevitch 1998 , p. 47.)

This picture of one nation co-habiting the beautiful hills was fractured in early 1930s. Belgium, the colonial master of Rwanda at the time, decided to issue the population identity cards based on ethnic origin. In the words of Philip Gourevitch, “the identity cards made it virtually impossible for Hutus to become Tutsis, and permitted the Belgians to perfect the administration of an apartheid system rooted in the myth of Tutsi superiority” (Gourevitch 1998, pp. 56-57). The rationale for the Tutsis’ racial superiority was based on their more European-like appearance than of the Hutus. Therefore, the Tutsis were given the power in the Rwandan society, which started the decades-long discrimination of Hutus and planted the seed of the genocide.

Already in 1930s, as in 1994, it was difficult to determine a Rwandan’s ethnic origin by their appearance due to centuries of intermarriages. But, for the convenience of the regime that was about to commence a campaign of genocide, the population had identity cards which divided them into two ethnic groups. It was indeed quite handy for example for teachers to be able to divide the children in their class in half by seating the Hutus who would survive on the other side than the Tutsis who would be killed.

But, now back to New York in spring 1994. The following scenes take place at the UN headquarters. The actors in this story can be divided into the traditional good guys – bad guys format. The latter group is bigger, as in this story there are not many good guys at all. But, New Zealand, the president of Security Council at the time, certainly is one of them. The other one does not appear in person in this dialogue, only through references. This is because he is far, far away from New York - in Rwanda. This person is LGen Roméo Dallaire of the Canadian armed forces, the Commander of UNAMIR, UN’s Assistance Mission to Rwanda.

The bad guys are USA, France, Belgium and Rwanda itself.

Scene I

USA: Hey, France, did you hear what that overactive Canadian general is suggesting over there from Rwanda?

France: What’s that?

USA: Well, the dude’s met with this local guy who claims to have detailed knowledge about a genocide the Rwandan government is planning.

France: Oh, really, so what is the guy saying?

USA: He has showed Dallaire massive piles of arms that were hidden in a government-owned warehouse, and he's also told about detailed plans how the Hutu population is going to be mobilized to kill Tutsis by machetes.

France: But this is all old information – I can't believe how bad UNAMIR's intelligence team is if they only now received this information.

USA: Yeah, well, you know, the mission personnel doesn't even have enough pens and paper there not mention food – I guess intelligence is a far too sophisticated word to even apply to that area.

USA: But, Dallaire now wants UN protection for the informer.

France: Gosh, the general's way too an active a person to be working for the UN. Doesn't he realize that big powerful countries like us do not do charity for tiny African countries with no strategic importance? What does the guy think, that we're the Red Cross or something??

USA: Yeah, tell me about it.. Even the UNAMIR diplomatic head's great attempts to do absolutely nothing about the situation haven't diminished Dallaire's need to act humanly.

France: Well, this is what you get when someone outside the system is employed. These people have absolutely no respect for values such as inaction and bureaucracy.

USA: I know, this guy's really a pain. No wonder he comes from Canada.

France: Yeah. But, we have to act before Dallaire goes public. I guess we need some support for dismissing Dallaire from our friends. I can talk to Belgium.

USA: Great, let me get a good official comment from the Rwandan guys as well. It's really handy that they're one of the rotating members of the Security Council at the moment.

France: Oh, really, I didn't know. So African countries are actually allowed in in the Security Council??

Scene II

USA: Hi Rwanda, how's it going?

Rwanda: Really good thanks! Life here in New York couldn't be better, you know, I have a really nice apartment with maids and a chef and stuff.. It's really good to be a diplomat!

USA: Yeah, good for you. I guess many of your countrymen wouldn't mind swapping places with you.

Rwanda: What do you mean?

USA: Well, there's this crazy General in Rwanda, Dallaire, that we actually sent there, and he's proved to be taking his job a bit too seriously.

Rwanda: Oh yeah, he's the dude who's been harassing my superiors over there even though the UNAMIR diplomat who should be doing that couldn't care less.

USA: Right. Well, now Dallaire's found out about a genocide that is going to take place.

Rwanda: Oh, really, no-one had told him?!

USA: Well, you know, we like to keep our intelligence in safe hands.

USA: So, now we need an official line to feed him and possibly the public as well. What would you like us to say?

Rwanda: I've been instructed to go with the traditional stuff, so something along the lines of "two ethnic groups waging a civil war".

USA: Excellent, that's very reasonable!

Scene III

7 April 1994

France: Morning, Belgium - nice shot!

Belgium: Excuse me?

France: Well, two presidents going down with one shot is quite an achievement.

Belgium: I'm really not gonna say anything about my possible involvement in the crash, but I don't think whoever did it meant to kill the president of Burundi as well.

France: Yes, well, I guess that during these tumultuous times it's not really safe to be flying with the Rwandese president.

Belgium: So it was you who did it, right?

France: Why do you think I would have anything to do with it? I'm a sophisticated Western state.

Belgium: Well, not only have you been training the rebels in Rwanda but also shipping arms to them as well. Doesn't killing their president belong in the same category?

France: My dear friend, I'm not going to proceed with this discussion. Let the Rwandans themselves sort out the situation.

Belgium: That one I totally agree with. I mean I have some peacekeepers there but that's just for appearances.

France: Yes, well, you don't have to worry about them. I'm sure if things escalate there we're going to strip general Dallaire and UNAMIR of their last means of getting involved.

Scene IV

Security Council meeting, 8 April, 1994

New Zealand: Right, guys, today we're having this emergency meeting concerning the events in Rwanda.

NZ: I have to say that I, as the president of the Security Council, am really worried about the situation in Rwanda. It's been reported that during the 24 hours after the president's plane was shot down, all the government's Tutsi ministers have been killed by government troops.

NZ: And in addition to this, systematic killings of all Tutsis have escalated. Our brilliant general over there, Dallaire, has also reported that he and his troops are not able to move around the capital Kigali to secure people or places. They're constantly being stopped at road blocks by militias who seem to be taking orders from the government that's left.

NZ: To me, it seems that this is a genocide.

USA: I have to disagree with that assessment. I mean, isn't this obviously just a continuation of the age-old civil war?

France: Yeah.

Belgium: Yeah.

USA: I think we better consult Rwanda about this. What is going on?

Rwanda: My dear Security Council members, my government wants to assure you that they have the situation *fully* under control and most likely things will calm down in a few days. There really is no such thing happening as a genocide, it's just the old rebel groups that have gotten wild after the president's plane got shot down. My government is doing everything they can to calm things down.

USA: Well, there we go, good to hear that it's all good.

NZ: I'm sorry guys, but how can things be good when hundreds of people are getting killed as we speak?

NZ: I think we have to vote about whether to send in more troops to Rwanda.

NZ: I strongly support doing so. What Dallaire says is extremely important right now is to show to whoever is committing these horrific acts that the international community and the UN will NOT tolerate this kind of systematic elimination of an ethnic group.

NZ: Dallaire says that he can stop the killings and stabilize the situation with only 5000 more men.

France: But, is this really sensible? In my opinion there are two ethnic groups fighting each other – I think it would be a waste of energy and resources to try to intervene.

USA: Yeah.

Belgium: Yeah.

France: Therefore, I suggest we pull the troops out. The parties of the peace agreement clearly are not complying with the rules.

NZ: But guys, don't you think it's irresponsible to pull out the troops in the midst of this situation? Since the UN is on the ground in a country whose situation is clearly deteriorating, why wouldn't we try to help while we're there? It would really not take much of our money or effort. And I mean, that's both our and this organization's duty!

France: Well, let's have a vote.

Scene V

In a corner table at the UN cafeteria.

USA: Good job that we won the vote, guys.

France: Yeah, the sooner we pull the troops out the better. I mean, let's face it, it's their crisis, why wouldn't we let them sort it out?

Belgium: I know. I've already sent a couple Hercules jets towards Rwanda to get my people out of there.

France: Only your people?

Belgium: Well, obviously I'm gonna make sure that some of my good local friends get on board as well – I mean good Hutu friends. But, other than that, it's only Europeans.

USA: You better be strict about that. My planes just got there and what I hear is that the local people were trying to get aboard claiming that otherwise they will get killed. And I was like, "come on guys, we have to make sure here that all the Americans have room to get their pets and stuff with them".

France: Yeah, it was the same with me. And once again that Dallaire guy only added to the trouble by going mental over the fact that no locals were to be evacuated.

Apparently, he had thought that we're getting there to rescue the locals!

Scene VI

Late April, 1994

New Zealand: Morning everyone, thank you for attending this emergency meeting. I know we've been deliberating about this matter for many weeks, but I am now *demanding* that we declare the situation in Rwanda a genocide.

NZ: Seriously, is it possible that there still is *anyone* in this room who claims that systematic, organized killing of hundreds of thousands of members of an ethnic group in just a matter of weeks is something else than a genocide?

USA: Well..

Belgium: Hmmm..

France: Hmmm

Rwanda: Well...

NZ: Good. Therefore, it is high time for us to act. What is this organization good for if we just keep deliberating without coming into any conclusions? Now, I am going to recommend Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to give out a press release to declare the events in Rwanda a genocide. By this, I hope, the UN will finally realize its duties and follow its legal obligations to intervene as a genocide is taking place.

Epilogue

Unfortunately, New Zealand's wishes did not come true. Even though the UN admitted a genocide was indeed happening in Rwanda, the organization kept deliberating about what to do for a bit too long. UNAMIR II was deployed on July 7, 1994, three days after the RPF had managed to stop all the hostilities in the country (Off 2000, p. 82). Roughly a million people had been killed.

The tiny country seemed almost to be covered with the bodies. There were no rivers to be seen anymore as they had been over-flooded by corpses. It was the same with many roads; since there had not been time to even try to get rid of the bodies, they were just piled on and next to the roads.

Still nowadays, when driving on a street in his native Canada, Roméo Dallaire thinks he has hit a body or part of it, if there's a bump or a branch of tree on the road. Dallaire gets by his everyday life with the help of a handful of pills – on a daily basis. He has tried to commit suicide three times in order to free himself of the guilt he feels for not being able to stop the genocide.

The guilt still lingers on in Dallaire's mind even though he is a hero to many people – one of the only people who really tried to do something about the genocide. As with many others of the UNAMIR personnel, Dallaire had to leave Rwanda before his term ended due to mental problems caused by experiencing a hell on earth.

The years following the genocide Dallaire was somewhat coping with his post-traumatic stress disorder by burying himself into work. But, according to his own words, the real

breakdown of his mind came when Dallaire learned about the Western world's knowledge of the happenings in Rwanda in April 1994.

As leaked memos and reports revealed, many powerful Western countries had all along been well aware of the coming genocide in Rwanda through their sophisticated intelligence gathering. Not that anyone had shared this information with UNAMIR on the ground.

The end.

9. CONCLUSION

Even in the years following the Rwandan genocide, up to present day, the play around the matter has continued. Many world leaders since 1994 have descended on Rwanda to express their regret over the international community's failure to stop the genocide. This, indeed, is how the play has gone on – individuals responsible for crucial decisions involving Rwanda apologizing in the name of the whole international community. Michael Barnett calls the phenomenon “democratization of blame” (Barnett 2002, p. 154.)

By democratization of blame, Barnett means individuals' shying away from responsibility. By not owning their own role in the matter, they 'democratically' share the blame of failure with a group of people. Sadly, that also was the mentality which allowed the Rwandan genocide to happen. If others who knew what was happening in Rwanda did not want to do anything about it, why should we?

As this study demonstrates, the field of international relations at times closely resembles the world of theatre. Within both entities one can identify the same components: certain characters, their underlying motivations affecting the outcome of a given situation, and the spectator role of the audience. Thus, Erving Goffman's detailed analysis of the inner workings of a play offers an interesting tool in examining a complex incident in international relations such as the Rwandan genocide.

Complex seems indeed to be the most fitting adjective to describe the reasons why Rwandans were left on their own in spring 1994. Many aspects had a role in international community's response to the crisis: the country's strategically unimportant role, its misleadingly interpreted history, the failure in Somalia, certain Western powers' involvement in the country's internal matters, Rwanda's presence in the Security Council. Even when considering all these aspects, how was the immense human suffering just sidelined? As seen from the pages of this study, conclusion can be drawn that national interest overrode humanitarian concern.

As Weiss points out, the authorization to use force in Somalia included 18 mentions of the word 'humanitarian' (Weiss 2001, p. 423). Clearly, the UN Security Council was gravely worried about the consequences the Somali population would bear due to the

instability in the country. This sentiment, however, seems to have vanished somewhere between Somalia and Rwanda. In crude terms, the genocide in Rwanda happened in an unfortunate moment at the powerful Western nations' internal policy agenda.

It seems that the solution to crisis such as the Rwandan genocide will not be found anytime soon from discussions on international humanitarian intervention. Even though the recognition of an individual's and minority groups' human rights is widening, a state's right to sovereignty is still largely considered an overriding factor.

During the 15 years following the genocide, the 'never again' mentality of post-World War II period has, once again, gained momentum. New initiatives such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have taken their place in international relations debate. Even though the topic of an individual's right to non-oppressive existence is theoretically promoted, R2P's application in practice remains a dilemma. The dilemma will not be solved before powerful nation-states are ready to sacrifice for others without more substantial and strategic commendation than the gratitude of those whose lives have been saved.

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