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**Comparison of the Immigrant Integration Policies of Sweden and  
Finland in Light of the EU Framework on Immigrant Integration**

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Department of Political Science and  
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### **Abstract**

Immigrant integration is an ever-increasing problem facing the members of the European Union. Policy-making on immigrant integration has occupied the agenda of member states of the EU as well as the institutions of the EU. This research presents a comparison of the immigrant integration policies of Sweden and Finland in the light of the emerging common EU immigrant integration policy using comparison analysis. The thesis answers the following three questions. First, how do the two-countries' immigrant integration policies correspond with the EU framework? Secondly, which country has succeeded in developing a more coherent immigrant integration policy? And finally, how do the policies meet the demands of their respective immigrant populations? The results are that both Sweden and Finland conform to the EU framework on immigrant integration extremely well. Sweden has a more coherent immigrant integration policy than Finland and that as a result, allows Sweden to meet the demands of its immigrant population better.

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## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

### **Chapter 1:**

#### **Introduction**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 1.1. Context.....                                     | 6  |
| 1.2. Aim and Research Question.....                   | 8  |
| 1.3. Boundaries of the Study.....                     | 10 |
| 1.4. Defining the Concept: Immigrant Integration..... | 10 |
| 1.5. Structure of Thesis.....                         | 13 |
| 1.6. Methodology Approach.....                        | 13 |
| 1.7. Research Design.....                             | 14 |
| 1.8 Collections and Analysis of Data.....             | 15 |

### **Chapter 2:**

#### **Theoretical Framework.....16**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 2.1. Immigration Theory at the National Level.....              | 16 |
| 2.2. Concept of Citizenship.....                                | 19 |
| 2.2.1. Citizenship Models.....                                  | 25 |
| 2.2.2. Jus sanguinis Model.....                                 | 26 |
| 2.2.3. Jus solis Model.....                                     | 26 |
| 2.3. Integration Models.....                                    | 27 |
| 2.3.1. Assimilation Model.....                                  | 28 |
| 2.3.2. Differential Exclusionary Model.....                     | 30 |
| 2.3.3. Multi-Cultural Model.....                                | 31 |
| 2.4. From Theoretical Models to Policy-making.....              | 34 |
| 2.5. Theories of Policy-making at the EU Level.....             | 36 |
| 2.5.1. Liberal-Intergovernmentalism.....                        | 37 |
| 2.5.2. New-Institutionalism.....                                | 39 |
| 2.6. Immigration Integration Policy-making at the EU level..... | 40 |
| 2.6.1. Policy Coordination and Benchmarking.....                | 41 |
| 2.6.2. Intensive Transgovernmentalism.....                      | 42 |

### **Chapter 3:**

#### **European Union's Framework on Immigrant Integration**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 3.1. Historical Perspective of EU Immigration and Integration Policy..... | 44 |
| 3.2. Treaty of Amsterdam and Beyond.....                                  | 46 |

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 3.3. EU Framework on Immigrant Integration – Hague Program..... | 48 |
| 3.4. Theoretical Findings for the EU Integration Policy.....    | 50 |

**Chapter 4:**

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| <b>Immigrant Integration Policy in Sweden.....</b>  | <b>52</b> |
| 4.1. General Overview of Immigration in Sweden..... | 52        |
| 4.2. Swedish Immigration Policy.....                | 54        |
| 4.3. Swedish Integration Policy.....                | 57        |

**Chapter 5:**

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| <b>Integration Policy of Finland.....</b>            | <b>61</b> |
| 5.1. General Overview of Immigration in Finland..... | 61        |
| 5.2. Finnish Integration Policy.....                 | 65        |

**Chapter 6:**

|                                   |           |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Policy Area Overview.....</b>  | <b>70</b> |
| 6.1. Labor Market Access.....     | 70        |
| 6.2. Family Reunification.....    | 72        |
| 6.3. Long Term Residence.....     | 73        |
| 6.4. Political Participation..... | 74        |
| 6.5. Access to Citizenship.....   | 74        |
| 6.6. Anti-discrimination.....     | 75        |

**Chapter 7:**

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| <b>Analysis and Conclusion.....</b>                     | <b>76</b> |
| 7.1. Swedish Immigrant Integration Policy Analysis..... | 76        |
| 7.2. Finnish Immigrant Integration Policy Analysis..... | 78        |

|                        |           |
|------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Conclusion.....</b> | <b>80</b> |
|------------------------|-----------|

|                       |           |
|-----------------------|-----------|
| <b>Reference.....</b> | <b>83</b> |
|-----------------------|-----------|

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

#### 1.1 Context

The movement of people and ideas is transforming all societies. It is challenging the dominant Western European concept of what constitutes a nation. As nationality detaches from ethnicity and place of birth, the dominant symbols and traditions are challenged.

Amongst other reasons oppression, pursuit of happiness and economic inequality are setting people in motion. International migration has become an ongoing and increasingly global undertaking.<sup>1</sup> The 20<sup>th</sup> century, which saw two world wars and the rise and fall of Communism, produced migration flows to an extent that had never been seen before in the modern age. These movements require countries to deal with the new experiences and effects of migration.

Europe has changed from the continent of emigration to a destination of immigration. Countries such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland have had to rethink their relationship to the world and the movement of people as they have transformed into receiving countries. The European Union is currently going through an era of exceptional immigration. Europe's proclaimed ideals of liberty and justice have been contested when thousands and thousands of migrants risk their lives on its borders. At the same time Europe is in an ever-increasing economic battle with other continents.

Nonetheless, only since the early 1990's have such movements of migrants been a major political concern for most of the members of the EU, due mainly to internal and international factors such as the increase of illegal immigration, religious diversity and aging of the European population.<sup>2</sup> The economic integration of Europe has brought the

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<sup>1</sup> Reitz, G. Jeffrey. "Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants: Research Themes, Emerging Theories and Methodological Issues.", *International Migration Review*, Vol: 36 Winter 2002, p. 1005.

<sup>2</sup> Melis, Barbara. *Negotiating Europe's Immigration Frontiers*. Published by Kluwer International, 2001, p. 1.

interconnectedness of migration policies on to the surface. Flows of immigrants change drastically when a neighboring country loosens or restricts access into its society and labor market. Therefore, European countries are not in full control of their immigration.

The increase of immigrants to Europe has created the need for European countries to rethink their policies towards immigrants and more importantly to integrating the immigrants. Recent events around Europe have made the need for integration much clearer. The assassinations of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and Theo van Gogh in 2004 as well as the civil riots in the Paris suburbs are just a few examples of why Europe is taking a closer look at its integration policies. In countries such as Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands immigrants or children of immigrants are already taking prominent roles in the political scene. In cities like Leicester or Rotterdam the number of people with a non-European descent is passing already the number of people with a European descent. Simultaneously countries such as Ireland and the United Kingdom have had to find ways to deal also with massive flows of immigrants from Eastern and Central Europe. Migration has become a hot button issue across the continent due to its impact on welfare policies, labor laws, security and national identity. Migration and integration force traditional states to rethink what constitutes a community, how diversifying lifestyles and values can be brought together and how to combine the need to serve the citizens of the nation and simultaneously be strongly part of the world.

Largely, the former official immigration policies of nation states did not deal with the problems people face when attempting to integrate into the host society. Immigration policy was for a long time seen purely as an issue of admitting the right people in. The turmoil's in France, Denmark and the Netherlands – to name a few – and the terror attack in Spain and the United Kingdom finally shook decision makers out of their sleep. The attention to integration issues has grown dramatically.<sup>3</sup> Integration is now largely seen as one of the most important areas of policy in creating safety, cohesion and prosperity. As a result of integration joining the immigration dialogue, there has been much academic

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<sup>3</sup> Reitz, G. Jeffrey. Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants: Research Themes, Emerging Theories and Methodological Issues. *International Migration Review*, Vol: 36 Winter 2002, p. 1013.

research conducted regarding the integration of immigrants into their host countries. In almost all of the EU member states one can find research conducted on how immigrants are being integrated into the society of that particular member country. Most prominent universities have institutes such as Oxford University's Center of Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) specializing on integration issues.

Integration research is a prime example of an interdisciplinary field of academic work bringing together researchers from various academic backgrounds ranging from political science, psychology, and sociology to economics and geography.<sup>4</sup> The study and tools of integration do not just lie in the realm of academia, but has attracted the attention of the press, politicians and more importantly the citizens as debates are going on in every member state about how the issue of integration should be handled, in part due to how the issue affects both the quality of life of the natives as well as the newcomers.

## **1.2 Aim and Research Questions**

As stated above, immigrant integration has become a major issue in the European research arena. The idea of not having an integration policy is seen by many researchers as a social catastrophe when looking at the possible consequences. For this reason, it is necessary to analyze the policies developed in the arena of integration of immigrants in the EU member states.

For this study, Finland and Sweden are chosen for examination. The two countries were chosen for comparison based on their historical relationship with each other (Finland was part of Sweden until 1809), their long history of passport free travel across their borders and them joining the European Union at the same time - in January 1995.<sup>5</sup> The two countries also have a linguistic link as Swedish is still an official language of Finland in which six per cent of the population state it as their mother tongue. Sweden, then again,

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Statistics Finland: [http://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk\\_vaesto\\_en.html#Foreigners](http://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_vaesto_en.html#Foreigners) accessed 02/11/2008.

hosts a large Finnish community as a result of children being sent during the Second World War from Finland to Sweden as well as heavy work-based emigration from Finland to Sweden especially in the 1970s. The economies of the two countries are also interlinked for instance through companies as the Nordic bank Nordea, the telecommunications giant Telia-Sonera and the paper and pulp company StoraEnso.

Despite their similarities they have historically approached the issue of immigration from highly different perspectives. In the 1960s and 1970s, Sweden was accepting a large amount of guest workers and political refugees while Finland was keeping a closed-door policy towards immigrants. Sweden's immigration policy has traditionally also had a stronger human rights and global justice emphasis, which means that Sweden hosts a relatively large number of political refugees. Even today the difference in number of foreign-born people in Finland and Sweden is quite large, with Sweden having about one million<sup>6</sup> and Finland with just over 130,000<sup>7</sup>. Due to all the reasons listed above, comparison of the different integration policies of Finland and Sweden is both logical and useful.

The object of this research is to carry out a comparison of the immigrant integration policies of Finland and Sweden in the light of the emerging common EU immigrant integration policy. My objectives are first to understand the framework of the different theoretical models that have been used in each country with regard to the policy formation. The second objective is to produce conjecture on the emergence of a common EU integration policy. With the conclusion of this study, I hope to delineate what are the differences and similarities in the policies of the two countries and how do they correspond with the EU framework? Secondly, to see which country has succeeded in developing a more coherent immigrant integration policy? and finally, how do the policies meet the demand of their respective immigrant populations?

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<sup>6</sup> Statistics Sweden: [http://www.scb.se/templates/tableOrChart\\_25897.asp](http://www.scb.se/templates/tableOrChart_25897.asp) accessed 02/11/2008.

<sup>7</sup> Statistics Finland: [http://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk\\_vaesto\\_en.html#Foreigners](http://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_vaesto_en.html#Foreigners) accessed 02/11/2008.

### **1.3 Boundaries of the Study**

The main point of this study will focus on the integration policies that are established for immigrants that are “Third-Country Nationals” (TCNs) and not immigrants from other member states of the EU. The reason for only focusing on TCNs is because the attention to integration policies has emerged mainly from the influx of TCNs into the host country. Those coming from EU member states are seen by most Europeans as sharing the same values as the host country. It should also be noted that policies related to illegal immigrants will not be covered in this study,.

With the theoretical perspective in mind, the study will stay at the macro level of decision-making and will also look at some policy implementation. The two countries’ policies with regard to integration will be studied based on their theoretical methods and will also focus on how these policies are achieved at the sublevels of the country.

### **1.4 Defining the Concept: Immigrant Integration**

It is necessary to have a clear understanding of the concept of immigrant integration if one is to understand the policymaking process. The concept will be explained according to the interpretation agreed upon at the EU level. Also, applicable communications and directives of the EU Commission have been chosen to make known the position of the EU. Furthermore, definitions from researchers that work in the area of immigrant integration will be shown in this study.

The first communications on integration by the EU Commission were released in 2000 and 2001 respectively. These communications stated a number of principles, which are still maintained today. The documents emphasize the need for a “holistic approach” to integration. This is elaborated as meaning an approach that does not just look at the economic and social aspects, but looks also at the issues associated with cultural and

religious diversity as well as citizenship participation and political rights of a minority. The Commission set out key points:<sup>8</sup>

- respect for fundamental values in a democratic society;
- the right of an immigrant to maintain his or her own cultural identity;
- rights comparable to those of EU citizens;
- active participation in all aspects of life on an equal footing (economic, social, cultural, political and civil).

In 2003 the Commission released another communication defining integration as a two way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of TCNs and the host country, which guarantees full participation of the immigrants to all sectors of society.<sup>9</sup> This suggests in other words that it is the duty of the host country to provide formal rights to the immigrants. The host country is expected to allow the immigrant to participate in all walks of society. The communication of the European Commission obligates the immigrant to respect the norms and values of the host country and to actively participate in the integration process, while providing them with the right not to give up their own cultural identity.<sup>10</sup>

Like many issues that the EU has dealt with, the communications referenced above have been met with criticism from the academic world. One of the academic critics, Rinus Pennix, sees the definition of integration as understanding it in terms of a process of the immigrant being accepted as a part of a society. Pennix sees the integration process as open and used for developing character and not something that should be used as an end process. His criticism towards the European Commission's communications lies in the fact that there is no requirement for acceptance by the member states. This then leaves room for variations of integration and therefore creates different outcomes for the immigrants. Furthermore, Pennix concludes that integration policies must have three domains: the legal/political domain, the socio-economic domain and the cultural/religious

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<sup>8</sup> EC Commission, *Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment*, Brussels, p. 17

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. 18

domain.<sup>11</sup> Pennix believes that the current communications do not include all three domains.

Other academics such as Friedrich Hekman argue that there is no one single definition of integration due to the complexity it has in creating different characters. He sees the integration of immigrants as an inclusion of a new population into an already existing social structure. Hekman states that integration is measured by the quality in which the new population connects to the system of socio-economic, legal and cultural relations. To Heckman, this is a complex and multifaceted process and as a result of this, integration policies cannot be analyzed in an abstracted manner.<sup>12</sup> Heckman maintains that there are four dimensions of integration. The first dimension is structural integration, in which he explains is “the acquisition of rights and the access to positions and statuses by the immigrants” The second is the ‘cultural’ dimension, which is the “cognitive, cultural behavioral and attitudinal changes not only of immigrants, but also of natives”. Third, ‘social integration’ is “about the development of personal relations and group memberships of immigrants in relation to native people”. Finally, the fourth dimension is ‘identificational integration’ which is the “formation of feelings of belonging and identity in relation to the immigration society”.<sup>13</sup>

For a successful integration process, three factors are needed according to Myron Weiner. Weiner’s processes are: the willingness of the society to absorb the immigrants; the commitment of the immigrants to their new society; and the structure of the relations of production.<sup>14</sup> These processes rely on each other in order for the other ones to occur.

The divergent although at times similar definitions of the above academics show that integration is not as easy as one would think. This is why it is important for a

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<sup>11</sup> Penninx, Rinus. *Integration Processes of Migrants in the European Union and Policies Relating to Integration*. Presentation for the Conference on Population Challenges, 2004, pp. 3-4.

<sup>12</sup> Heckman, Friedrich. National Modes of Immigrant Integration: How can They be Conceptualized and Described. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rs> accessed: 10/10/07.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Weiner, Myron. *Determinants of Immigrant Integration*, in *Immigration and Integration in Post Industrial Societies*. (ed.) by Naomi Carmon. London: Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 59.

government to select the right theoretical perceptions of integration, because that is where the policies originate and are then implemented into the society.

### **1.5 Structure of Thesis**

The thesis is made up of seven chapters including some subchapters and is followed by a conclusion and reference.. The second chapter introduces the theoretical approaches and models used by Sweden and Finland. Citizenship models are also looked at in this chapter due to their significance to immigrant integration policy. Chapter three looks at the ever-emerging integration policy at the EU level while chapter four and five look at the individual immigration and integration policies of Sweden and Finland respectively. Chapter six compares the main policy areas of integration of Sweden and Finland and the thesis is concluded with chapter seven which analyzes the integration policies of Sweden and Finland with the conclusion following.

### **1.6 Methodological Approach**

For this thesis, qualitative, quantitative and secondary analysis methods of research will be the primary methods used. Using these research methods will allow for proper analysis of immigrant integration policies.

Qualitative methods allow for multiple methods and strategies to be used in research. Qualitative research looks at the understanding of human behavior and reasons behind the behavior. Social Science researches point to the fact that quantitative methods allow for 'flexibility', so that it can be used for various purposes and its ability to be modified as the study proceeds.<sup>15</sup> Qualitative research methods fits perfectly when studying immigrant integration policies, as qualitative methods allow us to interpret the policies that are socially constructed.

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<sup>15</sup> Denzin, Norman K. & Lincoln, Yvonna S. (Eds.). (2005). *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Quantitative research is the collection, analysis and quantification of numerical data used for a study. Quantitative research can more broadly be characterized as concentrating on measurement, causality, generalization and replication.<sup>16</sup> For this thesis, quantitative research is used by way of immigrant population and surveys conducted on immigrant integration specifically in Sweden and Finland.

Finally, secondary analysis was used for the gathering of information and data for this thesis. Secondary analysis is archived data used for research material. The re-use of data provides an opportunity to study raw data of recent or earlier research to gain methodological and substantive insights.

### **1.7 Research Design**

For this thesis, comparative research design is used since the subject is comparing the levels of immigrant integration in Sweden and Finland. Comparisons provide an analytical framework for examining and explaining social and cultural differences as well as serving as a tool for developing classification of social phenomena and for comprehending if the shared phenomena can be explained by the same cause.<sup>17</sup> By doing research on national comparisons, societies, their structures and institutions can be better understood.

For the purpose of this particular thesis, comparative research design is fitting for the analysis of the immigrant integration policies of Sweden and Finland. Comparative research design does not go without its downsides. Linguistic and cultural factors, mixed in with differences in research traditions and administrative structures can affect the quality of the results of any study in a comparative analysis.<sup>18</sup> For this study, language was a challenge for finding adequate research and data on immigrant integration in English as most detailed material on the two countries is published in the native languages (Finnish and Swedish).

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<sup>16</sup> Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 444.

<sup>17</sup> Hantrais, Linda. *Comparative Research Methods. Social Research Update*.  
<http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/sru/SRU13.html> accessed on: 01/08/2008.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

## **1.8 Collections and Analysis of Data**

A variety of sources for data were used in this thesis. This data involved both quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques. The quantitative data that was obtained is primarily comprised of secondary analysis of the data, which as stated before has been collected by others and is official statistics. It is argued that the collection of secondary data has a considerable advantage such as cost and time spent on research; high quality data generated by experienced research is easily obtained.<sup>19</sup>

The qualitative method of data collection will be from EU institutions in forms of treaties, communications and other state documents. Furthermore, the reviews of relevant literature, books, journals, and articles are used to provide insight on immigrant integration practices in Sweden and Finland, as well as providing theoretical models. It is important to mention that most sources used for this study are generally about immigration and not directly about the integration of immigrants. Empirical literature is used to understand the different policy models of immigration, as well as to how they are used in Sweden and Finland. Statistics on immigrants and official reports have been useful for this study.

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<sup>19</sup> Bryman, A. (2001). *Social Research Methods*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 198.

## **Chapter 2**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

For this thesis, various theoretical concepts will be looked at to understand the methods of immigrant integration. The first phase will be looking at the different immigration integration models and immigration theory on the national level. This then leads into looking at the integration policies and to what influence do theoretical models have on the policymaking process. The second phase will look at how policymaking theories are related to the policymaking models at the EU level in its relations to integration. Since this study aims to compare the integration policies of Finland and Sweden in light of the EU's emerging integration policy, it is needed to understand the process of how they have been developing within the framework of the EU. It is also important to understand the concept of immigration, citizenship and citizenship models when discussing immigrant integration policies. One cannot have integration policy without immigration policy; therefore immigration theory will also be discussed in the theory section. Citizenship forms the basis of the theoretical models used for this study, as they are grounded on the different ideas of nationhood with the nation-state.

#### **2.1 Immigration Theory at the National Level**

The immigration policy of a state shapes its immigration patterns as well as its integration policy, which in turn has an impact on the demography, culture, economy and politics of a state. However, immigration policy theory is not well defined and lacks proper discussion in the academic setting according to researcher Eytan Meyers. In the article Theories of International Immigration, Meyers defines the six major theories of Immigration Policy, which are: Marxism, Realism, Liberalism, the “national identity” approach, domestic politics and institutionalism. For the purpose of this thesis, the “national identity” approach will be used for explaining the national immigration policies of Finland and Sweden. The national identity approach functions well for interpreting the selected countries as both Finland and Sweden can be considered to be classical European nation-states where the notion of citizenship has always been strongly linked to

ethnicity and language and where a particular religion (Lutheran church) has played a key role in building the national identity. This will be elaborated further into the thesis.

An important explanation for immigration policies is what Meyers terms as the “national identity” approach. He argues that the distinct history of each country, its ideas of what being a citizen means, the nationality, as well as debates over national identity and social conflicts within the country all shape a country’s immigration policy. Meyers argues that the national identity approach “downplays the importance of external and situational factors”.<sup>20</sup> This approach builds upon sociological and psychological theories and concepts such as national identity, nation building, prejudice and alienation. Meyers says that this approach also “utilizes the historical research method, usually focusing on the history of one or two countries. The national identity approach resembles some aspects of the constructivist approach in international relations, including its focus on ideas and identity, as well as its characterizations of the interests and identities of the state as a product of specific historical processes”.<sup>21</sup>

The national identity approach focuses on the unique history and traditions of each country and uses a historical approach, while still downplaying the importance of external and “situational” factors. Meyers argues that today’s perceptions of foreigners and policies of citizenship are derived from historical experiences that “crystallized in the decades before World War I”. He demonstrates how certain idioms played a significant role in judging what was a political imperative and which issues were seen to be in the interest of the particular state. He emphasizes that in an expansive or restrictive citizenry these interests are not automatically given by economics, demography or military considerations. According to Meyer, these interests are results of self-understanding how the ways nationhood is talked and thought about.<sup>22</sup> Meyer also states that many current problems with immigration and nationhood date back from when the nations were first started. “They reflect unresolved contradictions between exclusive ideas of the nation-

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<sup>20</sup> Meyers, Eytan. “International Immigration Policy”, McMillan. 2007 pp.14

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. pp. 16

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. pp.23

state and inclusive ideas of republican and universal principles of individual human and civil rights”.

The national identity approach can, according to Meyer also explain the variations in immigration and citizenship policies between countries of destination based on the fact that their notions of national identity differ. Meyer lists three such distinctions, which all seem to overlap. These distinctions are 1) between “settler societies, which accept large scale immigration, and ethnic states, which tend to reject such immigration”; 2) between homogeneous and heterogeneous countries”; and 3) between countries whose citizenship laws tend towards citizenship by heritage and those countries whose citizenship laws tend towards citizenship by birth.

The first distinction is between the settler societies, which have been built by immigrants and are therefore more apt to favoring permanent immigration, and ethnic states, which for the most part tend to oppose such immigration especially of those who have different ethnic origins. Finland and Sweden would without a shadow of a doubt fall under the ethnic state distinction. Meyer argues that “For Europeans, membership in their societies is tied to shared ethnicity and nationality...This is very different from Australia, Canada, and the United States, where nation-building through immigration led to ideas of membership based on civic participation and a generally shared commitment to democratic values. In asserting that they are non-immigrant nations, European states reject ethnic diversity as a positive societal value. Immigration, therefore, is seen as a fundamental threat to national unity and the common good”.<sup>23</sup> Comparing the immigration policies of settler states with ethnic states proves this. One will find that the settler states have more relaxed immigration policies than the ethnic states.

The second distinction assumes that “ethnically homogenous countries are less likely to accept ethnically dissimilar permanent immigration than heterogeneous ones”. Meyer goes on to argue that “a highly homogeneous culture, such as may be found in an ethnically undiversified nation with a dominant religion, and which as a consequence of

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid. pp.23

its insularity has experienced little immigration in the recent past, may have a lower threshold of tolerance than a more heterogeneous one, whose identity may have come to be founded on political rather than ethnic criteria”.<sup>24</sup>

Both Finland and Sweden could be characterized as heterogeneous nations although Sweden is dramatically changing in this respect. If one approaches the distinction rather as a scale than two clear groups, one could say that Sweden is moving faster towards heterogeneous identity than Finland. Especially the metro political area of Stockholm stands out as a place where the traditional characteristics of being Swedish are strongly challenged.

The third distinction is on whether citizenship is obtained by heritage or birth. Both countries fall rather clearly to the group of countries where parenthood – therefore heritage – is the predominant way of obtaining a citizenship. Both in Finland and Sweden a child received citizenship if one of the parents has the citizenship of the particular country. The place of birth does not play a role in defining citizenship excluding cases where the child’s parents citizenship cannot be identified or the child does not receive another citizenship at birth.

All the three distinctions therefore show a high resemblance between the two countries and makes them fit for comparison.

## **2.2. Concept of citizenship and its relationship to migration**

The idea of citizenship dates back to Ancient Greece where to be a citizen meant taking part in the running of the society. The modern idea of a ‘citizen’ is strongly linked to the emergence of the nation state. Rainer Bauböck defines it as a status of full and equal membership in a political community that governs itself<sup>25</sup>. The status of a citizen entails in all nations a set of preferred virtues and brings along a number of rights ranging from

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.pp.24

<sup>25</sup> Bauböck, R. *How migration transforms citizenship: international, multinational and transnational perspectives*. IWE Working Papers No: 24. 2004. p. 2

social welfare, right of residence and voting rights to schooling. In a way citizenship can be seen as an agreement on rights and responsibilities between a regionally defined community and an individual<sup>26</sup>.

The nation state is today's most dominant and most powerful political entity. The nation state legitimizes itself by representing the expectation of the people or citizens. The state regulates political, economic and social relations in a bounded territory. Geographic borders, a constitution and laws formally define most modern nation-states. According to the constitution of a great majority of nation states, all its powers derive from the people of the nation. The most famous example of this linkage is perhaps the Constitution of the United States originating from 1774, which states:

*“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”*<sup>27</sup>

Constitutional membership to this entity, then, is marked by the status of ‘citizenship’, which lays down rights and duties attached to this belongingness.<sup>28</sup> The responsibilities and freedoms of the individual are strongly linked to the national state. Even the supranational structures like the United Nations and the European Union build on the sovereignty of the nation state. The governance structure of the European Union looks at the individual living within its remit in a dual way: as a European citizen and as a citizen of a member state. The representation of the individual – the citizen - is built on both.

The true impact of migration to the receiving nations and to the concept of citizenship is an issue of great debate. One thing is, however, clear: migration puts pressure on the renewal of the idea of a citizenship. Currently 200 million people live outside their

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<sup>26</sup> *ibid.* p. 5

<sup>27</sup> The Constitution of the United States of America. The Library of Congress.

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/ciudad europea.htm>, The History of the European Union, accessed 29.09.2007.

country of origin<sup>29</sup>. The reasons of moving outside one's original political entity range from war, work and family to political persecution and a dream of a better standard of living. Immigration and emigration transform both the country of departure and the country of arrival. Acquiring citizenship of the new hosting nation is of significant importance for many newcomers to a country.

Citizenship is seen as the link between the state as a political entity and the nation as the community of people.<sup>30</sup> Citizenship identifies the rights of all citizens within a political community, as well as a corresponding set of institutions guaranteeing these rights.<sup>31</sup> Citizenship embodies exclusion and inclusion as possible mechanisms and initiates the debate on belonging, commonality and rights. The decision on who should belong to a nation is one of the most crucial political debates. It is exactly because of this why integration and immigration has taken such a central role in today's politics. Obtaining and governing citizenships is a largely a process of exclusion. Next to the political implications, it is in most countries also linked to debates on shared cultural norms. Debates on citizenship reveal the true power relations within a nation as the criteria are decided by those who are in the majority leaving out those who are in the minority.<sup>32</sup> In most cases the objects of the policy have now power in the decision-making process. It should therefore be of no surprise the migration and citizenship policy is one of the most heated political debates in most developed nations. The emotional aspects of the debate demonstrate how citizenship is not purely a rational negotiation on rights and responsibilities but it also entails various cultural obligations<sup>33</sup>.

With more people migrating to different countries, the contrast between a citizen and a non-citizen has become less clear. Bauböck suggests that migration increases the

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<sup>29</sup> UNDP. Human Development Index. 2009.

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/ciudad europea.htm>, The History of the European Union, accessed 29.09.2007.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Castles, Stephen and Miller, J. Mark. *The Age of Migration*, London: The Guilford Press, 1998, p. 43.

<sup>33</sup> Giugni, M & Passy, F. *Models of Citizenship, Political Opportunities, and the Claim-Making of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities: A Comparison of France and Switzerland*. American Sociological Association Section on Collective Behavior and Social Movements Working Paper Series, vol. 2, no. 9 1999. p. 8

importance of plural understanding of citizenship and strengthens the role of transnational actors such as international NGOs in global politics. Even when the phenomenon can be defined as universal, the true implications vary between places. The status of a newcomer depends largely on the country of origin and its relationship with the receiving nation. Issues such as trade relations and colonial history play roles in the decision-making. Migration creates forms of multinational diversity and new relationships between the two countries<sup>34</sup>. Simultaneously emigration spreads the citizens of nation states to live under the rules of various different countries.

It goes without question that immigration in many ways also challenges the traditional concepts of citizenships and their links to specific rights and welfare. According to Zygmunt Bauman, “migration casts a question mark upon the bond between identity and citizenship, individual and place, neighborhood and belonging”<sup>35</sup>. Especially in nations of high immigration, diversity creates numerous overlapping political communities often even stretching themselves across national borders. Nation states have answered to the changing circumstances in various ways: limiting the number of newcomers, increasing regional political and economic integration, creating (albeit often unsuccessfully) guest worker policies and by defining certain rights and responsibilities as universal, i.e. detaching them from the idea of citizenship.

Some researchers suggest that growing global migration makes strong welfare states vulnerable to migration motivated by better standards of living<sup>36</sup>. Both Finland and Sweden can be characterized as such countries. The restrictions on movement even within the European Union give backing for this estimation. In many countries, immigrants who have legally resided in a country for many years can after a certain amount of time obtain permanent residency. This gives them the freedom of not having to continuously renew their status with immigration authorities but still makes a clear

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<sup>34</sup> Bauböck, R. *How migration transforms citizenship: international, multinational and transnational perspectives*. IWE Working Papers No: 24. 2004. p. 2-3,7

<sup>35</sup> Bauman, Z. *Culture in a globalised City*. In: *Occupied London*. 2008

<sup>36</sup> Pioch, R. *Migration, Citizenship and Welfare State Reform in Europe: Overcoming marginalization in segregated labour markets*. Paper to submit to BIEN's 9th International Congress. 2002. p. 2-4

difference to full citizenship. Arrangements such as permanent residences amount to a notion of “quasi-citizenship”<sup>37</sup> and demonstrate the challenges the idea of a citizen is in. This “quasi-citizenship” in some cases extends certain benefits such as the right to work, obtain social security and health care, access to education and other benefits that citizens may receive. It in a way makes migrants greater objects of national legislation and policy-making without giving them full rights to participate in the democratic process shaping these frameworks.

In both Finland and Sweden, permanent residents have the privilege of being able to vote in local elections for example, city council elections. These rights have created a new form of citizenship in which an immigrant has fewer rights than a citizen but more rights than a quasi-citizen. In T. Hammar’s book on migration, he refers to these immigrants with permanent residency as ‘denizens’.<sup>38</sup> In some cases migrants are objects of legislation from two separate sovereign entities, the hosting nation as well as their country of origin, for instance like US citizens obliged to continue paying income tax to the United States whilst working abroad when making over 80 000 US dollars.

Quasi-citizenship has also received a boost internationally. Many international organizations have adopted human rights standards, like the United Nations, World Trade Organization and others, and therefore developed basic guarantees for citizens and non-citizens ranging from civil and social rights.<sup>39</sup> However, these conventions only work when states embrace these guarantees in their national laws. The countries explored in this thesis – Finland and Sweden - are typical European nation states in the sense that they have adopted the universalistic principles of more open borders but full integration and citizenship is slowed down or even hindered by debates on who belongs and who

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<sup>37</sup> Castles, Stephen and Miller, J. Mark. *The Age of Migration*, London: The Guilford Press, 1998, p. 43.

<sup>38</sup> Hammar, T. *Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International Migration*. Aldershot: Avebury Press, 1990, p. 15-23.

<sup>39</sup> Sosyal, Y. N. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Memberships in Europe*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

does not<sup>40</sup>. For both nations, membership in the European Union has created an additional level between universal human rights and national rights and responsibilities.

The Maastricht Treaty, which was signed by the members of the European Union in 1991, provided the broadest example of transnational citizenship. The treaty legally established legality of EU citizenship and adopted the following individual rights:

- Freedom of movement and residence in the territory of member states;
- The right to vote and to stand for office in local elections and the European Parliament in the state of residence;
- The right to diplomatic protection by diplomats of any EU state in a third country;
- The right to petition the European Parliament and the possibility to appeal to an ombudsman.<sup>41</sup>

Creating a legal framework for a EU citizenship has been one of the biggest steps in European integration and has resulted into movement within the EU on a historical scale. The progress taken towards stronger integration continued in 1999 – after Austria, Sweden and Finland had joined the union in 1995 - with the Amsterdam Treaty, which integrated the Schengen Agreement to the European Union's integration process and introduced the common visa and border control policy. As Pioch points out, the Amsterdam Treaty stretched European integration beyond economic integration and strengthened the European Union as a political union<sup>42</sup>. The Schengen Treaty implemented by several member states has since created more genuine possibilities for the European Union citizens to see the impact of the integration process in their daily lives.

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<sup>40</sup> Bauböck, R. *How migration transforms citizenship: international, multinational and transnational perspectives*. IWE Working Papers No: 24. 2004. p. 5

<sup>41</sup> Martiniello, M. *Citizenship of the European Union: a critical view*, in R. Bauböck (ed.), *From Aliens to Citizens*. Aldershot: Avebury Press. 1994, p. 31.

<sup>42</sup> Pioch, R. *Migration, Citizenship and Welfare State Reform in Europe: Overcoming marginalization in segregated labour markets*. Paper to submit to BIEN's 9th International Congress. 2002. p. 3

Despite these broad privileges, EU citizens living in another member state cannot vote in elections for the national parliament in the state that they are residing. Employment is still generally favored towards a national of that state even when EU legislation clearly forbids such action. Due to its short history, it is yet unclear whether EU citizenship will develop beyond a quasi-citizenship. This is made even clearer by the fact that an “EU passport” is still factually a passport of one of the member countries. It is also important to realize that EU citizenship does not help the immigrants who come from outside the EU.

### **2.2.1. Citizenship Models**

The problems created by immigration were discussed in the previous chapter. Migration has brought onto the surface in most developed nations debates on religion, gender equality, shared values and racism. High immigration countries have had to introduce more consistent policies responding to the challenges posed by integration and social cohesion. The main issues for the states have been defining the criteria for citizenship, the procedure for acquiring one and the rights and responsibilities brought by this status.<sup>43</sup> The concerns for the newcomers were the ways how to integrate to the host society whilst maintaining the valuable aspects of one’s own culture and how to gain a level of equality especially in terms of employment and education for oneself and one’s children.

The access to citizenship varies from country to country and it more often than not depends on how the state conceptualizes itself.<sup>44</sup> Even when researchers such as Bauböck suggest that global migration increases the importance of transnational approach to the growing super diversity<sup>45</sup>, we are yet to see how this would translate into national legislation.

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<sup>43</sup> Castles, Stephen and Miller, J. Mark. *The Age of Migration*, London: The Guilford Press, 1998, p. 42.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Bauböck, R. *How migration transforms citizenship: international, multinational and transnational perspectives*. IWE Working Papers No: 24. 2004. p. 23

Most countries still follow one of two different models of citizenship: the ethnic-state or the nation-state. The difference stems mostly from the birth history of the nation.

According to Brubaker, Germany like most European countries are based on the *jus sanguinis* tradition, where the nation is defined based on a shared ethnicity and culture<sup>46</sup>. From the two countries investigated in this thesis, Finland fits this description relatively well even when its latest policy reforms show movement to another direction. France on the other hand – partly due to its revolutionary history – is based on the *jus solis* rule, which stresses the contractual and republican aspects of citizenship<sup>47</sup>. Sweden could be seen to be closer to this tradition especially from the 1970s onwards. This model is also closer to the North American and Australian immigration policies.

### 2.2.2 Jus sanguinis Model

This model is the classic European definition of citizenship and closest to the history of most European nation states. It bases on an idea of a shared heritage and puts great emphasis on shared ethnicity. *The jus sanguinis* model entails that the people of a nation all come from a common ethnicity and therefore the immigrant is largely addressed as an exception to the rule. In this model the goal of the integration policy is for the newcomer to adapt to the dominant culture. Therefore the cultural obligations posed are usually relatively high. This model is strongly challenged by immigration as even after hard work on the language and culture, the immigrant is left to a somewhat paradoxical situation. Due to the nonnegotiable issues of heritage and ethnicity, it remains difficult for the immigrant actually become a true member of the hosting community<sup>48</sup>. This means often that a nation using this model will be reluctant to grant citizenship to a minority, which does not share a common background with the rest of the society. Finland has historically been linked to this model of citizenship due to its highly homogenous population. The recent policy changes have, however, pushed the country further away

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<sup>46</sup> In: Giugni, M & Passy, F. *Models of Citizenship, Political Opportunities, and the Claim-Making of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities: A Comparison of France and Switzerland*. American Sociological Association Section on Collective Behavior and Social Movements Working Paper Series, vol. 2, no. 9 1999. p. 7

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. p. 8

from a clear model and have in political reality stirred up an national identity crisis of massive proportions.

### **2.2.3. Jus solis Model**

This model is mostly based on law and a pluralistic understanding of national culture<sup>49</sup>. The nation is seen as a political entity with a constitution that must be followed by the citizens. The culture of the hosting country is more defined by the present day and aspirations than in the *jus sanguinis* model. It allows new entrants into the society as long as they abide by the constitution and adhere to the political norms. The articulation and even manifestation of the national culture is particularly strong in countries following this model. Symbols of unity and hope such as French flag or the Statue of Liberty play a crucial role in communicating the republican ideal. This model accepts diversity within the society and legally does not recognize the superiority of one ethnicity over the other.

Within the *jus solis* model, one can identify two different strands: the *multicultural model* followed still by Canada and for a long time by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden and the *assimilationist model* followed by countries like France, Australia and the United States.<sup>50</sup> Where the multicultural model builds on the coexistence of various cultural, religious and ethnic groups, the assimilationist model to a great extent expects the immigrant to choose for the republican ideal of a state<sup>51</sup>.

### **2.3. Integration Models**

There are four main theoretical models that are used to define and explain the creation of different immigrant integration policies. The models are ‘assimilationist’, ‘melting pot’,

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid. p. 9

<sup>50</sup> Castles, Stephen and Miller, J. Mark. *The Age of Migration*, London: The Guilford Press, 1998, p. 42.

<sup>51</sup> Giugni, M & Passy, F. *Models of Citizenship, Political Opportunities, and the Claim-Making of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities: A Comparison of France and Switzerland*. American Sociological Association Section on Collective Behavior and Social Movements Working Paper Series, vol. 2, no. 9 1999. p. 9

‘multicultural’ and ‘differential-exclusionary’.<sup>52</sup> The first three theories propose different types of integration policies, while the last one deals with policies that lead to exclusion of immigrants. For this study, only three of the four theories will be examined, assimilationist, multicultural and differential-exclusionary as they are more fitting for this study. The melting-pot approach is maybe most famous for its strong presence in the American society and is somewhat far from the European experience.

The three models will be used to best explain the integration policies of Finland and Sweden. To fully understand the Finnish integration policy; both differential-exclusionary and assimilationist models will be taken into account, while for Sweden, the multicultural model will be utilized. The melting-pot theory does not fit in here do to the fact that Sweden and Finland are both homogenous and have already an established culture. The reasons for these models being chosen to analyze the integration policies will be alluded to later on in the study.

### **2.3.1. Assimilation Model**

Assimilation is a process in which immigrants to a new society are expected to adopt the characteristics of their host society. This process does not happen overnight but is believed to evolve over time. In countries with a strong assimilation policy, the government’s immigration and integration mechanisms put emphasis on teaching the way of living of the host society. Many researches believe that the process goes faster if the immigrants have more exposure to the host society. Assimilationist approach has therefore relatively strong pedagogical aspects as the norm of living in a society is rather explicitly defined. The results of assimilation have both economic and socio-cultural dimensions that begin with the immigrant’s generation and continue through to the future generations.<sup>53</sup> The social class of the immigrants regularly arises significantly in the

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<sup>52</sup> Carmon, Naomi. *Immigration and Integration in Post-Industrial Societies*, New York: ST. Martin’s Press, 1996, p. 23.

<sup>53</sup> Alba, Richard D., and Victor Nee. 2003. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and the New Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

second and third generation and their social and educational status approaches the one of the hosting society.

Throughout modern immigration history, assimilation has been the most prominent of integration methods. Assimilation creates a process in which being exposed to the majority society encourages the immigrant to absorb and influence cultural values and norms of that specific society.<sup>54</sup> However, assimilation does not stop with just the absorption of culture and language skills but has several stages that continue for generations. These include developments such as friendships and romantic relationships with members of the hosting society, participation in the political process and joining voluntary activities. It is therefore believed that assimilation and equality increases generation by generation.

Theorists like Alba and Nee believe that there are four domains in which an immigrant can be considered assimilated:

- Having friends that are from the host country
- Having colleagues that are from the host country
- Having inter-ethnic neighbors
- Speaking the official language of the host country fluently.<sup>55</sup>

Assimilation was one of the earliest theories of immigrant adaptation. It played a major role especially in the United States of America from 1880 to 1920, when roughly 24 million immigrants mainly from southern Europe were absorbed into the United States.<sup>56</sup> Even, today assimilation is still taking place in the United States with the new generation of immigrants, mainly from Latin America and Asia. Research by Waters and others show that these new immigrants are well on their way to becoming fully integrated in American society. Research has shown that based on spatial concentration, intermarriage, and socioeconomic advancement from one generation to the next, these

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid, pp.23

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, pp.25

<sup>56</sup> Waters. 2005. ASSESSING IMMIGRANT ASSIMILATION: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.

immigrant groups are becoming American in such the same way that the European immigrants did before them.<sup>57</sup>

In Europe, assimilation has been widely used in France since the 1980's. Integration was seen in France as a process where new immigrants would assimilate into the French culture and French values. In part, this was an easy thing to do as most of the migrants to France in the 1980's were from the former French colonies, where they already spoke French and were accustomed to the French way of life.<sup>58</sup> Today, this method is no longer working that well for France as more immigrants are coming from an increasingly heterogeneous background and are wishing to keep their own culture active.

Assimilation is a traditional way of looking at immigrant integration. It takes the premise of incorporating the minority group into the larger society and therefore works on uniform notions of what being a citizen of a particular country means. Assimilation is usually explained as an undertaking of continuous conforming leading to acceptance in the local society, which would result in the loss of cultural diversity.<sup>59</sup> Importantly, this model gives the opportunity for foreigners who are already living in the host society to gain acceptance at the cost of losing their own cultural background. This model works well for countries like the United States, where the country was founded on immigration and where there was not already a homogenous culture established. For countries like Finland and Sweden with a strong national identity largely defined by ethnic origin and the place of birth, a model like assimilation runs into problems as it is made next to impossible for an immigrant to adapt to that culture.

### **2.3.2. Differential Exclusionary Model**

In the Differential Exclusionary model (also known as the guest worker approach), immigrants are only incorporated into certain aspects of society, mainly in the labor market and in some aspects of the welfare system. Immigrants are excluded from large parts of the society, such as political participation. Immigrants are welcomed as workers,

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid. p16.

<sup>58</sup> Faini, Ricardo. The Social Assimilation of Immigrants. New York. World Bank, 2007, p.4

<sup>59</sup> Bolaffi, Guido, et. al., Dictionary of race, Ethnicity and Culture, London: Sage Publications, 2003, p. 19

but not as permanent residents.<sup>60</sup> Access to citizenship is only for those who share the same ethno-cultural background and hence why this model is usually used in countries where the population is within one ethnical majority.

The idea behind this theory is that immigrants are treated as temporary guests for a specific purpose and therefore the need to invest in sharing of values is secondary. Their main purpose in countries following this path is to fill voids in the labor market. As a result, very little is done to integrate the migrant into the general society, facilitate family reunification or combat racism. Features of this can be seen also in the countries of this research in relation to construction workers and seasonal help for agriculture coming mostly from the Baltic countries and Russia. Germany is often cited as a country that uses differential exclusionary. Sweden's recruitment of Turkish and Finnish workers in the 1960's and 1970's had similar features. However, recent changes to the German naturalization law as moved the country away from ethnic citizenship.<sup>61</sup> Most countries having a history with a guest worker policy have realized over the last 15-20 years that most of the workers did not stay temporarily and therefore investing in integration from the first moment on would have been wise. Countries like Austria, Switzerland and the new immigration countries in Southern and Eastern Europe are considered as having differential exclusion integration policies.

### **2.3.3. Multi-Cultural Model**

Many countries of immigration have used the Multi-Cultural Model. It first became an alternative to the other integration models around 1956, when the United Nations held a conference on "Union of Diversity". The conference called for a "cultural differentiation within a framework of social unity".<sup>62</sup> This model is actively becoming one of the most used methods for integration as will be explained why below.

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<sup>60</sup> Castles, S. (1995). How nation-states respond to immigration and ethnic diversity. *New Community*, 21(3), 293-308.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. pp22.

<sup>62</sup> Carmon, Naomi. *Immigration and Integration in Post-Industrial Societies.* , New York: ST. Martin's Press,1996, p. 24.

The Multi-Cultural approach takes on the notion that immigrants should integrate into certain aspects of the new society, but at the same time keeping their traditions and lifestyle. The concept is that different backgrounds in a society have a positive effect on each other and that by having these differences creates a common national space.<sup>63</sup> The goal then for the nation is to create a "civic unity" while at the same time doing what it can to protect the ethnic diversity of the nation.<sup>64</sup>

According to Parekh multiculturalism requires societies to move from recognizing difference to accepting diversity. When respect can be handled on the level of legal arrangements, true acceptance of multiculturalism requires drastic changes in attitudes and ways of thought.<sup>65</sup> True multiculturalism means that the society does not commit itself to one particular political doctrine or idea of a good life but sees society as a constant dialogue. According to Parekh it begins from accepting the desirability of cultural diversity and structures its political life accordingly.<sup>66</sup> Multiculturalism therefore sees societies as a room of dialogue.

Parekh defines two approaches to a society being multicultural. One, made famous by the United States and France, seeks to assimilate the different cultural groups under one republican identity. The other, which Parekh defines as multiculturalists, cherishes diversity and difference and makes them central to its self-understanding.

The most notable countries to use the multi-cultural approach in policymaking are Australia and Canada. Both countries have large numbers of immigrants who have different cultural norms such as language. In Canada's case, the multi-cultural approach was developed as a response to the growing separatist movement in Quebec as well as the

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<sup>63</sup> Haqrald, Runblow. Swedish multiculturalism in a comparative European perspective, Dec 1994, p. 623-624

<sup>64</sup> Fuchs, Lawrence H. "An Agenda for Tomorrow: Immigration Policy and Ethnic Policies". The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science, 1993. Vol: 530, p. 122-136.

<sup>65</sup> Parekh, Bhikhu: Rethinking Multiculturalism: cultural diversity and political theory. Harvard University Press. 2002. P. 2

<sup>66</sup> Ibid p. 340.

growing influence of other ethnic minorities in society.<sup>67</sup> The country under the leadership of the national government encouraged the bilingual and multi-cultural ness of the country. The government actively promoted the acceptance of differences supported financially ethnic organizations and making sure that institutions took a role in promoting human rights and disavowing racism, the fundamentals of the multi-cultural approach.<sup>68</sup>

What Parekh refers to, as dialogue is also the one most criticized by the ones seeing multiculturalism as a flawed concept. As highly different communities strengthen themselves, cohesion of the entire society is challenged. A multicultural society should therefore foster a sense of unity.<sup>69</sup> In most countries the challenges have arisen from clashes between cultural and religious traditions and the civic rule. The danger of multiculturalism is characterized as creating a society of bubbles where there is no guarantee of a rule of law with respect to local legislation. The criticism towards the model has been extraordinarily strong in the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom. This realization has in the United Kingdom led to a national dialogue on British ness, in the Netherlands into the creation of a cultural canon and in numerous countries to the introduction of nationalization ceremonies.

The idea of having a multi-cultural society is appealing to many countries with a population consisting of different ethnicities and different religions. However, the model can be very vague as there is a lack of theoretical models defining what a multi-cultural society should be.<sup>70</sup> It has also proven to be a struggle to find the right and efficient instruments to carry out the approach. There is also a lack of research on how well the

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<sup>67</sup> Heisler, S. Barbara and College, Gettysburg. *The Future of Immigrant Incorporation: Which Models? Which Concepts?* in Migration and Social Cohesion (ed.) by Vertovec, Steven. Massachusetts: Edwar Elgar Publishing.1999. p. 127.

<sup>68</sup> Munro, J. Multiculturalism-the Policy. *In Multiculturalism, Bilingualism and Canadian Institutions.* (ed.) by K. Mcleod. University of Toronto: Guidance Center. 1979, p. 13.

<sup>69</sup> Parekh, Bhikhu: *Rethinking Multiculturalism: cultural diversity and political theory.* Harvard University Press. 2002. p. 196

<sup>70</sup> Heisler, S. Barbara and College, Gettysburg. *The Future of Immigrant Incorporation: Which Models? Which Concepts?* in Migration and Social Cohesion (ed.) by Vertovec, Steven. Massachusetts: Edwar Elgar Publishing.1999. p. 127.

model is actually used in a society, this in major part due to the relatively newness of this approach being implemented as a model in integration.

In the case of Europe, the multi-cultural approach did not get developed by the policy-makers but rather by academics and NGO who focused on immigrants. Two notable European countries that did implement this approach were Sweden and the Netherlands. Both countries have ended up in problems with the approach especially in terms of assuring gender equality, respect for sexual minorities and giving immigrants the skills to participate fully in the democratic process.

#### **2.4. From Theoretical Models to the Policy-Making**

Historically integration policies have varied from country to country. Some countries still choose the approach of not recognizing immigrants as full members of society, while others prefer full assimilation into the society. As a third category one can identify those countries that recognize the different identities and make changes accordingly to fit the need of diversity. There are links between the theoretical models and the actual policies of integration, but that is not to say that the policies can totally be explained and based on the theoretical models.<sup>71</sup> Since policymaking can be complex, theory mainly provides an outline in which the policy is created.

Policymaking does not just happen overnight, it involves various factors that progress over time.<sup>72</sup> There are many actors involved in the policymaking process, actors such as NGOs, elected officials and government institutions all having different views and opinions on the policy. As a result of there being many levels to the policymaking, the

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<sup>71</sup> Gary, P. Freeman. "Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies", *International Migration Review*. Vol:38, Fall 2004, p. 945.

<sup>72</sup> Sabatier, A. Paul. *Theories of the Policy Process*. Oxford: Westview Press, 1999, p. 1.

policy may take decades before it is actually formatted and then implemented into society.

Like the general policymaking process, integration policy also shares the same characteristics. It should not be assumed that if a theory exists that there is then only one kind of policy that goes with the theory. In fact, there can be many different forms of a policy based on a single theory. Gary Freeman believes that "integration policy is multifaceted and comprises of loosely connected sets of regulatory rules, institutions and practices in various domains of society within which migrants and natives work out their differences".<sup>73</sup> Integration comes out of the accumulation of interactions between the immigrants and the natives as well among the institutions and society as a whole. Immigration and integration law is also extremely difficult to isolate as a particular area of policy as it has a spillover effect to other legislative areas such as social policy, education and culture.

There are three sets of sub-policy areas in which theoretical approaches can be used for making integration policies.<sup>74</sup> The sub-policies deal with the regulations of border control, citizenship and cultural structure of the country.

Border control (entrance regulations) and citizenship regime are carried out by a consensus reached at the government level through legislation. The legalities that determine how and why an immigrant first enters a country play a vital role in the integration process. The type of acceptance of the immigrant, whether it be for labor or refugee purposes is determined at this stage. Secondly, the policy on citizenship shapes the ability of the migrant to obtain full constitutional rights.<sup>75</sup> At this stage, the theoretical approach that has been used will ultimately affect how the policy is developed. For instance, in a differential-exclusionary approach, the regulations on

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<sup>73</sup> Gary, P. Freeman. "Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies", *International Migration Review*. Vol:38, Fall 2004, p. 946.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, p.953.

<sup>75</sup> Soysal, Yasemin. *Limits to Citizenship*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

entrance and acceptance would be mostly restricted, while in a multi-cultural approach humanitarian concerns would take precedent.

For the last sub-policy, cultural structure, states policies either encourage immigrants to preserve their cultural identities or lose them. The level in which the transformation occurs is also determined by the state's policy. Studies of policies on cultural practices have focused on two topics. Firstly, to what extent should cultural diversity be recognized and secondly, whether immigrants should be seen as individuals or as members of an ethnic group.<sup>76</sup> This is also where the theoretical approach is used when determining to what length the state will go to preserve the ethnic identities of immigrants. The differential-exclusionary approach would not allow for the preservation of the ethnic identities, while the multi-cultural approach would allow for the preservation at the same time leaving room for the immigrant to transform into the host society. These three sub-fields will be looked into greater detail in the subsequent chapter detailing the specific country policies on integration.

## **2.5. Theories of Policymaking at the EU Level**

European integration theories as well as policymaking theories are needed to explain how EU policy is formulated.<sup>77</sup> Institutionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are two theories that are used to explain the EU's immigration integration policies. These two theories will be used in this study to explain the policies on integration at the EU level. The reason for focusing on these two theories is due to the fact that decisions are made on multiple levels in the EU and at each level there is a theory that best explains the reasoning.

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<sup>76</sup> Gary, P. Freeman. "Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies", *International Migration Review*. Vol:38, Fall 2004, p. 958.

<sup>77</sup> Wallace, H., Wallace, W. *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p.15.

EU decision-making can be explained according to Bombers by a range of different decisions taken at different levels in a multi-level system of governance.<sup>78</sup> There are three categories that decisions are classified as. The first level is the "history-level" decisions, this is where the EU is transformed and the main interests of the member's states are challenged. In the middle level there are "policy-setting" decisions, where EU policies are arbitrated by the member states, and thirdly at the bottom there is the "policy-shaping decision" where the details of a policy are determined.

Decisions on immigration and integration policy at the EU level are done at both the first and second levels. When dealing with these policies, the sovereignty of the member states is often at stake, which is in the realm of the first level. Subsequently, much of the process with regards to policy setting and shaping is done at the second and third levels. Liberal intergovernmentalism is more fitting for the study of the first level of decision making, while new institutionalism better suits the study of policies that are done at the second level.

### **2.5.1. Liberal Intergovernmentalism with Two-Level Game Theory**

The two theories discussed in this chapter, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Two-Level Game Theory, used in conjunction with each other are the primary theories used when explaining European immigrant integration processes.

In order to fully understand Liberal Intergovernmentalism, we must first look at the Two-Level Game Theory, which Liberal Intergovernmentalism is founded on. Robert Putnam, the sociological theorist behind the Two-Level metaphor, used this theory to explain international bargaining and the connection between domestic politics and international bargaining outcomes. Putnam sees bargaining as a multilevel "game" which is played by policymakers. The policymakers in question are the chief negotiators for their respective countries whose aim it is to achieve common ground on the topic being negotiated. On

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<sup>78</sup> Peterson, J. & Bomberg, E. *Decision-making in European Union*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, p. 9.

one side, the negotiator is trying to achieve a common opinion with his foreign counterparts while on the other side the negotiator is trying to achieve domestic approval for the negotiated agreement. Domestic approval is necessary for the ratification of the result on the domestic level.<sup>79</sup>

The main idea that emerges from the two-level game theory is that if an agreement is finally reached and ratified between the negotiators, it will to some extent represent the preferences of domestic groups from each of the countries at the negotiation table. Due to the need of domestic ratification, the negotiators have their hands tied during the bargaining at the first level and must take into account the goals and wishes of the interest groups at the domestic level even though these groups are not physically present at the negotiation table. Putnam sees that having one's hand tied can in fact be a bargaining advantage at the international negotiation table as the chief negotiator for a country can use the prospect of a ratification failure to extract concessions from the others at the table.<sup>80</sup> This theory helps draw attention to the importance that domestic politics plays on international cooperation and has been used by other theorist to explain European integration.

One such theorist, Andrew Moravcsik applied the 'two-level games' theory to European integration by developing 'liberal intergovernmentalism' (LI). Moravcsik believed that the policy making in the EU is mostly intergovernmental and that states are rational actors. He developed LI with a three-step analysis of integration. The first two steps were 'national preference formation' and 'interstate bargaining' and the third-step being 'institutional bargaining'.<sup>81</sup> The first step in the process is to explain the national interest and often then not Moravcsik indicates that economic interest dominates decisions in the European integration process. In this first step, a variety of actors are influencing the domestic policy process much like is done in the two-level game theory. Interstate

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<sup>79</sup> Putnam, R., Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the logic of two-level games, *International Organization*, 42, 3, 1988. pp 434-436

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, pp.438

<sup>81</sup> Moravcsik, A. (1993) 'State preferences and power in the EC: a liberal intergovernmental approach'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31(4), pp 480-482

bargaining, the second stage, seeks to explain the efficiency and distributional outcomes<sup>82</sup> meaning that the bargaining between the states are determined by the preferences of the states. An example often given in terms of the EU is how other European countries caved in to France's demand for a common agricultural policy. The third and final stage, institutional bargaining, looks at why states choose to delegate their decision making to international institution like the European Union. Moravcsik believes the one reason why is that it reduces cost to the states, once decisions are decided, there is no need to decide them again and makes all other negotiations easier and less costly. Another reason for this is that States prefer this level of cooperation because it enables them to avoid domestic constraints such as judicial or bureaucratic challenges. This last reason is why Liberal Intergovernmentalism fits well in to the subject of immigration and integration of immigrants due to the domestic political factors that immigration and integration often play at the national level.

Since Liberal Intergovernmentalism, as mentioned above allows states in some ways to bypass the domestic institutional constraints when it comes to certain hot topic issues like immigration, state policy makers are often "escaping" as Virginie Guiraudon puts it to Europe by shifting policies to EU level cooperation, like immigration and integration policies and creating a "Europeanization of immigration policies".<sup>83</sup> This allows state policy makers to avoid the national constraints when it comes to the issue of immigration since it is a sensitive issue regarding state sovereignty.

### **2.5.2. New-Institutionalism**

New-Institutionalism allows for important insight and tools for understanding the role of institutions in the policy making process of the EU. This theory suggest that institutions are not impartial and they cannot easily change policies based on their preference but they have much political behavior. In the world of the EU, new-institutionalist see the

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<sup>82</sup> Laursen, Finns. *Theories of European Integration*,

<sup>83</sup> Guiraudon, V., Seeking New Venues: Europeanization of Migration-related Policies, Debate on Immigration Policy, *Swiss Political Science Review*, 7(3): pp 99-104

Union's institutions as being more than just arbiters in the decision making process and have become strategic players where the institutions actually matter.<sup>84</sup>

The definition of institutions varies, however, according to Bulmer it comprises of "formal institutions, informal institutions and conventions, the norms and symbols embedded in them, and policy instruments and procedures"<sup>85</sup> Another theorist, Rosamond makes the point that institutions are not used as vessels in which politics can occur, but they can offer a framework in which political actors can carry out a higher number of constructive sum deals.

It is however common, that after some time, national governments lose control over institutions that were originally created to strengthen them as the EU develops according to its own integrative logic. Pierson suggests that "actors may be in a strong position initially where they will seek to maximize their interest and nevertheless carry out institutional and policy reforms that fundamentally transform their position in a way that is unanticipated and undesired"<sup>86</sup> Thus, national governments may not be aware of the implications and consequences of being a part of that institution when they originally begin their cooperation with the institutions.

According to Bulmer, institutions do not always reflect the interest of the units compromising them. The European Union's decisions and policies are therefore not purely a collection of views from its members. The institutions create a bias by shaping preferences by structuring the access of political forces to the political process. Institutions can develop endogenous institutional momentum for policy change that goes beyond mere institutional negotiation.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Peterson, J. & Bomberg, E. *Decision-making in European Union*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp.10-12.

<sup>85</sup> Armstrong and Bulmer. *Theories of European Integration*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 2000, p. 115.

<sup>86</sup> Pierson, P. (1996) 'The path to European integration: an historical Institutionalist approach', *Comparative Political Studies*, 29(2), p 126

<sup>87</sup> Bulmer, J. Simon. *New Institutionalism, The Single Market and EU Governance*.

Since the idea is that institutions set beliefs, knowledge and norms they are regarded by March and Olsen, to a large extent as being important to the shaping of the behavior of those participating in the institution. This is why it is useful to examine the effects of institutionalization of a common EU migration policy. North argues that cooperation becomes ‘institutionalized’ when ‘individuals repeatedly interact and when they have a great deal of information about each other, and when small number characterize the rest of the group.’<sup>88</sup> This to a large scale is the case in the European Union. That is why people like Bulmer and others believe that institutionalism has provided insight into policies like immigration.

## **2.6. Immigration Integration Policymaking**

A country’s integration policies rely on the policy-making process to a great deal. Since this thesis deals mainly with the policy-making process at the national and EU level, it will look at Helen Wallace’s analysis of policy-making theories. According to Wallace there are five models for the policy process: Community method, EU Regulatory model, Multi-Level governance, policy coordination and benchmarking and finally, intensive transgovernmentalism.<sup>89</sup> For this thesis, not all of Wallace’s models are relevant; therefore only policy coordination and benchmarking as well as intensive transgovernmentalism will be used.

### **2.6.1. Policy Coordination and Benchmarking**

This technique according to Wallace is an import from the OECD. This form of policy making aims to create and implement a ‘best practice’ that is gained from specialist expertise, those who are front runners in the specific policy, like immigration.

Benchmarking comes from the idea that it is possible to single out areas that contribute to underperformance of a certain policy area in relations to other countries, like the

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<sup>88</sup> North, D. C. (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. P 12.

<sup>89</sup> Wallace, H., Wallace, W. (2000) *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 28-35

United States for example. Benchmarking does not only look at the negative, but also the positive experiences and implements those positives into other polices that are lacking.

There are four main aspects that help clearly define policy coordination and benchmarking:

- The commission develops a network of qualified experts that assist the commission;
- Experts independently promote ideas and techniques;
- The council's high level committees focus on brainstorming rather than negotiating, creating a creative side to the council;
- There is a dialogue with the appropriate committees of the European Parliament.

One important characteristic of this theory is that it consists of both intergovernmentalism as well as supranationalism. Policy coordination and benchmarking at the EU level, help to improve and if needed change performance in certain areas. It develops key indicators for comparing and evaluating as well as understanding how best practices have been achieved. This theory can be seen as promoting 'Europeanization' by converging national polices and at the same time promote 'nationalization' by implementing only the best national practices.

### **2.6.2. Intensive Transgovernmentalism**

In the area of immigration, Intensive Transgovernmentalism explains the policy making process the best. This model used by Wallace, relies heavily on the cooperation between the relevant national policy makers while not relying on intensive participation of EU institutions. This model is typically used when certain issues deal with state sovereignty. Supranational structures are mostly regarded as venues for discussion by national policymakers. The main definitions for this approach are:<sup>90</sup>

- European Council sets the direction policy;
- Council of Ministers control the consolidating of cooperation;

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<sup>90</sup> Wallace, H., Wallace, W. *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.34

- Commission has a limited role;
- EP and ECJ is mostly excluded from the involvement;
- The policy process is not open to national parliaments or the public.

Especially in issues related to border controls, asylum and refugee problems, this form of policy have been widely used since they deal with sensitive national interests of the member states.

## Chapter 3

### EUROPEAN UNION'S FRAMEWORK ON IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

#### 3.1 Historical Perspective of EU Immigration and Integration Policy

The late 1990s were a time of immense focus on immigration for the EU. With the spotlight on immigration policy so bright, immigrant integration policy emerged as a result of that focus. The ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 instilled the importance of having a meaningful integration policy alongside an immigration policy. Rinus Pennex, a notable researcher in the field of European immigrant integration, sees the lack of meaningful integration policies for newcomers as leading to negative perceptions of immigration and immigrants which then promotes combative immigration policies.<sup>91</sup> Therefore, a successful integration policy goes hand in hand with a successful immigration policy.

In the past Europe was divided in a sense that the Northern European countries were considered immigration countries, while Southern Europe countries were considered as the starting point for emigration. Today, all member countries of the EU are considered to be immigration countries. During the period between 1950 and 2000, the foreign-born population of Western Europe grew from 1.3 percent to 5.9 percent.<sup>92</sup> Immigration flow was no longer just affecting North Europe; it was affecting the whole of Europe.

There were a variety of reasons for this increase in immigrant population. First, countries like Germany, the Netherlands, France and Belgium gave up on policies that encouraged foreign-born residents to move back to their home country after the need of their labor was gone. As a result, many migrants sought family reunifications and the governments allowed their family members to move to the new country. Second, Southern Europe experienced large increases in migratory flow from countries in Africa and the Middle East. Third, the fall of communism also increased the flow for migrants from Russia and

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<sup>91</sup> Penninx, R. Immigration without integration: a recipe for disaster, Policy Brief 17, p. 1.

<sup>92</sup> Mullan, Brendan. The US and Western Europe in Historical Comparative Perspective in *Regulation of Migration* (ed.) by Böcker Anita and others. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis Publishers, 1998, p. 37.

other former communist countries.<sup>93</sup> Eastern Europe once an area of emigration has now become one of immigration from countries like Ukraine and Moldova.

European countries dealt with the above reasons to the increase of immigrants by creating restrictive laws on immigration. The formation of a common EU policy on immigration is often referred to as “Fortress Europe”; meaning the EU is creating an imaginary wall around its borders to protect the inside of Europe from outsiders. Andrew Geddes gives the analogy of the EU immigration policy as being like fishing: you catch some bigger fish and keep them but you let the weaker and less desirable fish go back to the sea.<sup>94</sup> The EU has a system that allows easier access for those immigrants who have certain skills, in say technology or healthcare or construction, but makes it harder on those who are less attractive like refugees and imposes much stricter restrictions than those who have skills.

Another problem Europe is facing is the increasing negative attitude many EU citizens have against immigrants and more importantly the liberalizing immigration policy. A recent Eurobarometer survey found that 48 percent of respondents believe that immigration should be handled at the member level while 48 percent felt that it should be handled at the EU level.<sup>95</sup> In many European countries the current recession has made immigrants victims of European fear for survival. A recent poll by Finland’s leading daily Helsingin Sanomat showed a strong increase in anti-immigration attitudes. In the survey carried out during the first months of 2010 showed that nearly 60 % of the respondents wished to limit immigration to Finland. The attitudes are most negative towards non-European immigrants. It is clear that EU citizens are split on the issue of immigration policy.

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<sup>93</sup> Rea, Andrea. Wrench, John and Ouali, Nouria. *Discrimination and Diversity in Migrants, Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market* (ed.) by Rea Andrea and others. London: Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 1.

<sup>94</sup> Geddes, A. *Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?* Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 6.

<sup>95</sup> Eurobarometer: [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm)

### 3.2 Treaty of Amsterdam and Beyond

The ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 was the first major step in creating a common immigration policy at the EU level. For the first time immigration and asylum were listed under the first EU pillar by way of title IV, which gave competence on immigration matters to the EU.<sup>96</sup> Researchers cite the Amsterdam Treaty as being a landmark decision for the EU as it relates to immigration and asylum policy.

The treaty created changes mainly to the institutions of the EU. The treaty established that after five years of a transition period, the Commission would be the one to act on immigration issues, instead of previously sharing that role with the Council. After the transition period, which ended in 2002, Parliament would share the legislative power in a co-decision manner with the Commission. The Treaty also gave the European Court of Justice the jurisdiction to interpret title IV.<sup>97</sup> Other changes brought on by the treaty were that Immigration issues were made subject to binding regulations, decisions and directives from the EU. The treaty also allowed some members flexibility with the option to opt-out of certain aspects of the treaty; countries to opt-out on policy were Denmark, United Kingdom and Ireland.

After the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Tampere summit held by the European Council in October of 1999 was the next significant moment in the creation of a common EU immigration policy. The Justice and Foreign Ministers of each EU member state met in Tampere, Finland to create an "area of freedom, security and justice".<sup>98</sup> The Council sought out to ensure the freedoms and rights of EU citizens, but at the same time also to those who "seek protection in or access to the European Union".<sup>99</sup> In order to meet these goals the Council sought to develop:<sup>100</sup>

- Partnership with countries of origin,

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<sup>96</sup> Analysis of the Treaty of Amsterdam in so far as it relate to Asylum Policy by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles. <http://www.ecre.org/research/analysis.pdf>. accessed: 02/10/2008

<sup>97</sup> Ibid. p.35

<sup>98</sup> Bendel, P. "Immigration Policy in the European Union: Still bringing up the walls for fortress Europe?". [www.migrationletters.com/200501/20050103\\_EU\\_Bendel.pdf](http://www.migrationletters.com/200501/20050103_EU_Bendel.pdf) accessed:02/10/2008.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid. p.4

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. p.5

- Creation of a common EU Asylum System,
- Management of migration flows,
- Integration into the EU societies of third country nationals

The Council sought out to meet the above goals within five years of the Tampere summit. The highlight of many Immigration researchers was that this was the first time the Council had set out a plan for Third Country Nationals. The goals however set out by the Council in Tampere turned out to be too ambitious and not all the goals were met, like the partnership with countries of origin.

As many of the goals were not met from the Tampere Summit, the European Council came up with a new five year strategy from 2005 to 2010 called the Hague Program. The Hague Program takes from what the main theme of the Tampere Summit was, the 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'. Immigration and Asylum tops the Hague agenda along with the prevention of terrorism. The Hague program contains the following measures:<sup>101</sup>

- A common European asylum system for those granted asylum by 2009;
- measures for foreigners to legally work in the EU based on labor market requirements;
- a European framework to guarantee the successful integration into host societies;
- partnership with third countries to improve asylum systems;
- a unified policy to expel and return illegal immigrants;
- funding resources to manage borders;
- common visa rules.

The Hague program is much more direct than what came from the Tampere summit which will be looked at in the next section. Like the goals from the Tampere summit, The Hague goals are just as ambitious and set out over 11 major tasks to accomplish in

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<sup>101</sup> Hague Programme: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/hague-programme-jha-programme-2005-10/article-130657>

five years. This is the first time in which it was made clear that the EU seeks to create a common framework for the integration of immigrants into the host societies. What makes it even more difficult is that the Commission leaves it up to the individual member states to implement the more than 11 tasks by 2010.

### **3.3 EU Framework on Immigrant Integration – Hague Program**

2004 was a huge year for immigration and integration policy formulation at the EU level. During the Dutch Presidency in 2004, 25 ministers responsible for immigration met together to come up with 11 basic principles for successful integration of immigrants. The principles decided on were:<sup>102</sup>

- Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.
- Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.
- Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.
- Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.
- Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way, is a critical foundation for better integration.
- Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens.
- The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless

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<sup>102</sup> Council of the European Union (2007). "Presidency Conclusions."  
[http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf): accessed 02/10/2008.

practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.

- The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.
- Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public-policy formation and implementation.
- Developing clear goals, indicators, and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration, and to make the exchange of information more effective.

Through these basic principles of integration, the EU has considered integration as a long-term and continuous process for the EU, individual member state, their citizens as well as the immigrant. It is clear that the EU believes that immigrants should be incorporated into the legal, economic, social, and cultural domains of the society to ensure a healthy integration. The basic principles also seek to emphasize the importance of immigrants adhering to the basic fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU, which include liberty, democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law, not only at the EU level but at the national level as well.

Employment was regarded by the basic principles of integration as being a huge piece to the puzzle of integration. By being a productive member of a country's workforce, the immigrant becomes visible to host society and allows for negative prejudices to disappear. The EU has set up funding so that member states can offer training to migrants, which would provide skills needed in the workforce as well as insuring that migrants receive permits that make eligible to work in their host country.

Education is another necessity for a successful integration process. The EU stresses the importance of available language courses for newcomers into a member country. Giving basic civic courses are seen as being useful to the migrant as to speed up the process of

integration. Furthermore, the EU encourages immigrants to take an active part in political and social process of their host country, which would create a feeling of belonging.

### **3.4 Theoretical Findings for the EU Integration Policy**

In light of the basic principles outlined above, the multicultural approach seems to best fit for the analysis of the EU approach to integration. The multicultural approach favors a holistic integration process. It implies that immigrants should receive equal rights in all areas of society without the need to give up their basic beliefs, language, religion or diversity.<sup>103</sup> The EU clearly agrees with this statement as can be read from number seven of the basic principles of integration, which states that diverse cultures are guaranteed and should be safeguarded under the Charter of Fundamental Rights as long as they do not conflict with national or EU law.<sup>104</sup>

Assimilationist and differential exclusionary approaches do not possess the means to explain the integration policy formulation of the EU. Assimilationist approach does not encourage for the immigrant to continue their cultural beliefs, language or religion. The differential exclusionary approach does not even see value in an integration policy. These two approaches go against all of the EU's policies on integration.

In understanding the EU's policymaking and decision-making process, liberal intergovernmentalism and liberal institutionalism are both fitting in theorizing this process. The main principle of liberal intergovernmentalism is that the states are the core actors who negotiate their differences in the international arena and in this case, the arena would be the EU.<sup>105</sup> The member states see the EU as a way to develop EU cooperation as to avoid the domestic legal and political constraints. Geddes sees this as a way of

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<sup>103</sup> Castles, Stephen and Miller, J. Mark. *The Age of Migration*, London: The Guilford Press, 1998, p. 248.

<sup>104</sup> Council of the European Union (2004). "Presidency Conclusions." [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf): accessed 02/10/2008

<sup>105</sup> Caporaso, J. Regional Integration Theory: Understanding Our Past and Anticipating Our Future, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol: 5 No: 1, p. 9.

member states escaping to Europe to attain domestic policy objectives.<sup>106</sup> The decision to create more rights to third country nationals is an example of such an act by the member states.

New institutionalism has also been used in the process of implementing the EU's integration policies. New institutionalism as stated before is the idea that "institutions matter and are the source of much political behavior and not impartial black boxes which simply transform preferences into policies".<sup>107</sup> An example is how the role of the Commission with regards to immigration and integration policy has intensified. It has used its power to issue communications and directives to the member states. It has created networks with NGOs, academia and other institutions like the ECJ. This has also allowed for the lobbying of immigration rights to third country nationals. It is becoming clearer that the institution's role in creating common policies is greater than pure coordination of the parties involved.

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<sup>106</sup> Geddes, A. *Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?* Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 27.

<sup>107</sup> Peterson, J. & Bomberg, E. *Decision-making in European Union*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp.10-12

## **Chapter 4**

### **Immigrant Integration Policy in Sweden**

From the EU member states, Sweden and Finland were selected as the study cases for this the thesis. In this chapter, Sweden's integration policy will be examined at closer range. Finland will be examined in the following paragraph. Since immigration policy and integration go hand in hand, these chapters will also give a general and historical overview of Sweden's and Finland's immigration policy in order to fully understand the integration policy with respect to the EU's framework on integration.

#### **4.1 General Overview of Immigration in Sweden**

Immigration to Sweden is not a new phenomenon. As a super power in the 17<sup>th</sup> century Sweden occupied most of the modern day Nordic countries as well as parts of the Baltic region bringing many on the occupied lands inhabitants to what is now Sweden. The first large migration to Sweden was in the 1600s when a large amount of Finnish peasants were relocated to central Sweden and still to this day continue to be the largest minority in Sweden, keeping their Finnish language in use.<sup>108</sup> The Finnish peasants and other immigrants from the Baltic's were extremely important to Sweden's development.

The largest increase of immigration to Sweden happened after the Second World War. The first group of migrants which lasted from the late 1940s to the early 1970s was due to labor shortages in Swedish labor market. Since Sweden was for the most part left unharmed after the war, it had the ability to supply products and infrastructure to the rest of Europe that was rebuilding itself after the devastation of war. Since demand was high and the labor shortage even higher, Sweden was forced to look elsewhere for workers.

Previously when Sweden needed to find workers, it only had to look to its neighbors, but since the Nordic countries were dealing with their own labor shortages at the time,

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<sup>108</sup> Westin, C. "Immigration to Sweden 1940-1990 and the Response of Public Opinion." *Migration*, 18, (2) 1993, 143-70.

Sweden needed also to look elsewhere. This time the labor immigration came from the South, from countries like Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey. The need for labor was so great, that employers and even officials from the government employment offices traveled southern Europe to place workers in jobs.<sup>109</sup> For the most part however, immigrants found their own way to Sweden and since labor was in demand, they were easily welcomed and were able to find a job quite easily. This easy access to Sweden lasted about 15 years before tighter restrictions were implemented.

In the 1960s Sweden started to establish more restrictions on immigrants coming to Sweden for work. Institutions were created to deal with the influx of immigrants and bureaucracy slowed the processes of immigrants entering the country. These institutions set up committees to assist with matters pertaining to issues relating to immigrants, such as permits, adjustments and citizenships.<sup>110</sup> The new restrictions set by the committees required immigrants to have the proper documentation like work permits prior to entering Sweden, something that was not required previously. By the early half of the 1970s, labor immigration to Sweden ended as a result of a sluggish Swedish economy and dropping unemployment.<sup>111</sup>

The second wave of immigrants to hit the shores of Sweden was for a different purpose than the previous wave. The late 1970s saw an influx of asylum-seekers to Sweden, the number of refugees seeking asylum in Sweden tripled. The majority of refugees were from South America fleeing the military junta from Chile and Argentina.<sup>112</sup> The active refugee policy of Sweden was part of the strategy of the Social-Democratic government led by Prime Minister Olof Palme to act as a voice of the developing world within the developed countries. Defending global justice and equality was one of the prime principles of Swedish foreign policy. Sweden also saw a large population of people from

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<sup>109</sup> Benito, Miguel. *Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Sweden*. [www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe/download/Sweden.pdf](http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe/download/Sweden.pdf) accessed on 02/11/07.

<sup>110</sup> Westin, Charles and Elena Dingu-Kyrklund. *Reducing Immigration, Reviewing Integration: The Swedish Rimet Report*, 1995.

<sup>111</sup> Benito, Miguel. *Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Sweden*. [www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe/download/Sweden.pdf](http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe/download/Sweden.pdf) accessed on 02/11/07.

<sup>112</sup> Vollmer, Bastian. *Immigration Policy in Sweden*. [http://www.emz-berlin.de/projekte\\_e/pj32\\_1pdf/MigPol/MigPol\\_Sweden.pdf](http://www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/pj32_1pdf/MigPol/MigPol_Sweden.pdf) accessed on 2/12/08.

the Middle East from countries like Iran and Iraq, who were fleeing religious and political persecution. The most recent influx of refugees happened between 1992 and 1994 when over 170,000 people fled from war-torn Yugoslavia to Sweden.<sup>113</sup>

## 4.2 Swedish Immigration Policy

The immigration policy of Sweden can be grouped into three different stages that correspond with the three main waves of immigration to Sweden. The first stage of policy formation after the Second World War starts from the mid 1940s and last well into the 1960s. During this stage there was very little integration policy formation and basically no implementation, immigrants were easily able to gain entrance into Sweden on the basis of the need for labor and a natural assimilation was expected and thought to be automatic, this approach although not ideal, did not exclude the new entrants from society. The second stage between 1965 and 1975 was when actual immigration and integration policy was debated and ultimately implemented; the policies produced during this period could be seen as a pre-multicultural approach that would eventually turn into a full multicultural model which is the current stage.<sup>114</sup> This was the first time in Sweden that integration was used in conjunction with the immigration policy. This will be looked at further in the following chapter on integration.

The first major legislation on immigration policy, which was passed by the Swedish parliament in 1965, was the Aliens Decree. This decree exempted citizens from Nordic countries from needing a permit to stay in Sweden, but all other nationalities would need to apply for a permit from the Swedish embassies in their country of origin.<sup>115</sup> This decree was in part due to the large increase in immigrants from countries other than the Nordics. In 1968 the parliament passed legislation providing all immigrants residing in

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<sup>113</sup> Jederlund, Lars and Kayfet, Victor. *In transition: From immigration policy to integration policy in Sweden*. [http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qa3760/is\\_199904/ai\\_n8835546](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3760/is_199904/ai_n8835546) accessed on 02/12/08.

<sup>114</sup> Westin, C. "Equality, Freedom of Choice and Partnership. Multicultural policy in Sweden." In R. Bauböck, A. Heller and A. Zolberg (Eds.) *The Challenge of Diversity. Integration and Pluralism in Societies of Immigration*. Aldershot: Avebury 1996.

<sup>115</sup> Geddes, A. *Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?* Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 108.

Sweden with free Swedish language courses. The following year, the government established a committee to be a working group on immigration as well as creating the Finnish-Swedish Council to improve relations with the Finnish minority. 1968 proved to be a big year for immigration reform, during this year a government foundation created a newsletter for immigrants that was published in eight different languages. Also, children were given the right to be taught their native language two hours a week. In 1969, the government created a new institution called the New Immigration Board. This board was given the authority to oversee three fields that had previously been under different ministries, these fields were:<sup>116</sup>


- Residence Permits (Previously issued by the Aliens Commission);
- Citizenship (Previously handled by the Ministry of Justice);
- Assimilation of Immigrants.

The new institution allowed for consolidation of aspects dealing with immigration and integration and provided a smoother process for not only new immigrants but also those who had been living in Sweden for a number of years.

**Figure 1. Projection of Swedish immigration and emigration**

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<sup>116</sup> History of the Swedish Migration Board.  
<http://www.migrationsverket.se/english.jsp?english/emigration/ehistorik.html>



The above chart<sup>117</sup> demonstrates the Immigration and Emigration pattern of Sweden from 1980 and 2006 as well as projecting until 2050. As noted previously, Sweden has always been a country of immigration, whereas emigration has consistently been below the immigration average.

In recent years, Sweden has received more immigrants than ever before in its history. During 2008, a total of 90,021 people received residence permits in Sweden. The largest Immigration groups currently are shown in the figure below:

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<sup>117</sup> Statistic Sweden

**Figure 2. The Largest Immigration groups.**

| <b>The largest immigration groups, coming from</b> |                |
|--|----------------|
| <b>Finland</b>                                     | <b>175 000</b> |
| <b>Iraq</b>  | <b>109 000</b> |
| <b>Yugoslavia</b>                                  | <b>72 000</b>  |
| <b>Poland</b>                                      | <b>64 000</b>  |
| <b>Iran</b>  | <b>58 000</b>  |
| <b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>                      | <b>56 000</b>  |
| <b>Germany</b>                                     | <b>47 000</b>  |

Source: Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, Sweden.

### **4.3 Swedish Integration Policy**

In 1975, Sweden finally started to include integration of immigrants into their immigration policy. The new direction was summarized by the parliament with a slogan that said “*Jämlikhet, valfrihet och samverkan*” which translates into English as “equality, freedom of choice and cooperation).<sup>118</sup> The new integration policies allowed for immigrants to vote in local elections if they had been residing in Sweden for three years, children were given the right to study their native language in elementary schools. The new measures also established funding for non-profit organizations, groups and magazines that catered to the immigrant population in Sweden. To help in the integration policies, the parliament established different refugee quotas for regions as way to avoid immigrant concentration to the large cities as a way of insuring that immigrants were given the resources they need as well as allowing cities not to become overburdened with a large amount of immigrants and not enough resources to go around. The government also created an *ombudsman* position to ensure that immigrants had a person to go to when they faced discrimination based on their ethnicity.

The integration policies of the late 70s and early 80s were very much in line with the economic and political philosophy of Sweden. Sweden’s long attachment to the social

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<sup>118</sup> Benito, Miguel, ‘Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Sweden’, Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, 2005. <http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe/download/Sweden.pdf>, Date of visit: 03/07/08.

welfare ideology played a major role in the creation of their integration policies. The notion of equality was a must for anyone residing in Sweden including those who had not been born there.<sup>119</sup> On the economic front, Sweden's corporatist structure enabled immigration policies to be handled in a corporatist setting.<sup>120</sup> The policies set forth by Sweden received favorable opinions both domestically and internationally. The idea that multiculturalism could be incorporated successfully into society was model for other countries to emulate.

In 1995, Sweden joined the EU and with most new entrants into the EU, Sweden had to adjust some of its policies especially in the area of immigration with respect to asylum seekers. Having been a signatory to the Dublin Convention, this aimed to sync asylum policies of the member states. The Convention set out limits to how an asylum seeker could choose their country to seek asylum. It required asylum seekers to seek asylum in the first country of entry. Since historically Sweden has seen large numbers of asylum seekers seeking refuge in Sweden it was in their best interest to ratify this treaty to protect itself from even larger flows of asylum seekers.<sup>121</sup>

The integration policy that Sweden implemented in the 70s stayed unchanged until 1997, when a new integration policy was officially accepted by the parliament. The new policy created an outline for the integration process of immigrants, it established classes for new immigrants introducing them to Swedish society, it funded grants to local governments for the acceptance of new refugees as well as changing the law so that citizens could hold dual citizenship and more importantly the new policy promoted and guaranteed equal rights to all no matter their ethnicity. The measures aimed to prevent discrimination and xenophobia in Swedish society. In order to carry out the new measures the government divided the then Swedish Immigration Board into two entities, the Swedish Integration

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<sup>119</sup> Geddes, A. *Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?* Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 120

<sup>120</sup> Brochmann, Grete and Hammar Tomas. *Mechanisms of Immigration Control*. Oxford and New York: Oxford International Publishers, 1999, p. 178

<sup>121</sup> Collyer, Michael. The Dublin Regulation, Influences on Asylum Destinations. *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Vol: 17, No: 4, pp.375-400.

Board and the Migration Board. The Swedish Immigration Board had previously been handling both integration and immigration issues.<sup>122</sup>

Most recently, Sweden has passed laws to implement EU directives and legislation with regards to immigration and integration. In 2003, Sweden passed an expansive anti-discrimination law prohibiting discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, disability and sexual orientation.<sup>123</sup> Sweden also passed legislation based on EU directives ensuring proper working rights to Third Country Nationals.

In 2008, the Swedish Government decided on strategy for integration that would last until 2010, at which time it would be reviewed again. The strategy identified seven areas that are important for the proper integration of immigrants in Sweden. The seven areas are:<sup>124</sup>

- Faster introduction for new arrivals;
- More in work, more entrepreneurs;
- Better results and greater equality in schools;
- Better language skills and more adult education opportunities;
- Effective anti-discrimination measures;
- Development of urban districts with extensive social exclusion;
- Common basic values in a society characterized by increasing diversity.

The aim of these seven areas is to increase the supply and demand of labor and to create quality and equality in Swedish society.

In 2009, an even more extensive integration program was passed by the Swedish parliament. The government presented this bill as a way to speed up the process of integration for immigrants. The new law requires:<sup>125</sup>

- The State, via the Swedish Public Employment Service, will have a coordinating responsibility for introduction measures.

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<sup>122</sup> Benito, Miguel. *Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Sweden*. [www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe/download/Sweden.pdf](http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe/download/Sweden.pdf) accessed on 03/15/08. p. 20.

<sup>123</sup> Ministry of Justice. <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2188/a/19443;jsessionid=asGBrta9vi-> accessed on 03/12/08.

<sup>124</sup> Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, Sweden

<sup>125</sup> Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, Sweden

- The Swedish Public Employment Service is required to produce a personal introduction plan together with the new arrival. This plan is based on individual's previous education and work experience and should always contain courses in Swedish language, civic orientation and employment preparation activities;
- An introduction benefit that is equal for everyone regardless of where one lives will be introduced. This introduction benefit is paid to newly arrived immigrants who actively participate in introduction measures. The benefit is designed so that it pays the recipient to work alongside his or her introduction activity.
- An introduction guide, will be assigned to a new arrival, to help the new arrival find a job. The guide is an independent actor, working on the instructions of the Swedish Public Employment Service. New arrivals will be able to choose their guides themselves.
- New arrivals who have an introduction plan are to take part in civic orientation.

Since Sweden has had such an expansive integration policy already before joining the European Union, it has not needed to radically change its policies to be in sync with the EU framework. The changes carried out can be seen as natural updates to the integration policy.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Integration Policy of Finland**

Chapter 6 will examine Finland's integration policy as well as give a historical look at Finland's overall immigration policy in light of the EU's framework on integration of immigrants.

#### **5.1 General Overview of Immigration in Finland**


Historically speaking, Finland is mostly considered a country of emigration. Many Finns left Finland to other countries in search of better working opportunities. The most popular country for Finns to migrate to up until the 1980s was Sweden, due to its closeness and the ease created by passport less travel between the two countries and Sweden's need of skilled laborers. The largest migration flow of Finns to Sweden occurred in 1970 when over 55,000 Finns left their homes in Finland to seek better opportunities in Sweden.<sup>126</sup> This was the peak of Finnish emigration to Sweden. Finns are still by and far the largest minority in Sweden. As of 1980s more foreigners have moved to Finland than Finns have left, as can be seen in the figure below:

#### **Figure 3. Migration to and from Finland 1945-2000**

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<sup>126</sup> Heikkilä, Elli & Timo Jaakkola (2000). The economic status of immigrants in the Finnish labour market. In Vuolteenaho, Jani & Topi Antti Äikäs (eds.): NGP Yearbook 2000, 59-75. Nordia Geographical Publications 29:2.

## Migration to and from Finland 1945–2000



Source: Statistics Finland; Figure: Jouni Korkiasaari, Institute of Migration 2001

In 1980s and 1990s Finland saw the largest increase of immigrants ever before in its modern day history despite the number still being quite low compared to other European countries. The first immigrants in the 1980s were generally people who had a specific job to perform and came mainly from other Western countries. In the 1990s things started to change slowly with the fall of communism in neighboring Russia. Finland passed a law granting the right of return for Ingrian Finns, who did not have jobs waiting for them in Finland nor did they have the benefits of networks that helped with employment and integration.<sup>127</sup> This left many of the Ingrian Finns unemployed and without services to help them adjust to living in their new home, this also created a huge drain on the Finnish welfare system.

Finland's population is much more ethnically homogenous than the populations of most European countries. The fact that Finland is such a homogenous country has traditionally been seen in its restrictive immigration policy where tough restrictions were put in place

<sup>127</sup> Forsander, Annika (2001). Immigrants in the Finnish Labour Market – Is There Ethnic Segmentation?, in Heikkilä, Elli (ed.): Muuttliikesymposium 2000, 250-266. Siirtolaisuusinstituutti, Siirtolaisuustutkimuksia A 24.

in granting residence and work permits.<sup>128</sup> Finland's entrance into the EU in 1995 prompted Finland to change some of its views on immigration and moved the country from the image of being a country of emigration to a country of immigration. However, compared to other members of the EU, the number of foreign residents residing in Finland is still quite low. By the end of 2007 there were 132,708 foreign citizens living in Finland (Compared to one million living in Sweden).<sup>129</sup> The table below gives a representation of Foreigners living in Finland from 1990 to 2007:

**Table 1. Representation of foreigners in Finland 1990-2007**

| Country of citizenship:      | 1990          | 2000          | 2001          | 2002           | 2003           | 2004           | 2005           | 2006           | 2007           |
|------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Russia                       | .             | 20,552        | 22,724        | 24,336         | 24,998         | 24,626         | 24,621         | 25,326         | 26,211         |
| Estonia                      | .             | 10,839        | 11,662        | 12,428         | 13,397         | 13,978         | 15,459         | 17,599         | 20,006         |
| Sweden                       | 6,051         | 7,887         | 7,999         | 8,037          | 8,124          | 8,209          | 8,196          | 8,265          | 8,349          |
| Somalia                      | 44            | 4,190         | 4,355         | 4,537          | 4,642          | 4,689          | 4,704          | 4,623          | 4,852          |
| China                        | 312           | 1,668         | 1,929         | 2,086          | 2,372          | 2,613          | 2,992          | 3,382          | 3,978          |
| Thailand                     | 239           | 1,306         | 1,540         | 1,784          | 2,055          | 2,289          | 2,605          | 2,994          | 3,470          |
| Germany                      | 1,568         | 2,201         | 2,327         | 2,461          | 2,565          | 2,626          | 2,792          | 2,978          | 3,318          |
| Turkey                       | 310           | 1,784         | 1,981         | 2,146          | 2,287          | 2,359          | 2,621          | 2,886          | 3,182          |
| United Kingdom               | 1,365         | 2,207         | 2,352         | 2,535          | 2,651          | 2,655          | 2,762          | 2,910          | 3,143          |
| Iraq                         | 107           | 3,102         | 3,222         | 3,420          | 3,485          | 3,392          | 3,267          | 3,045          | 3,036          |
| Former Serbia and Montenegro | .             | 1,204         | 1,935         | 2,177          | 2,782          | 3,336          | 3,321          | 3,340          | 2,986          |
| Iran                         | 336           | 1,941         | 2,166         | 2,363          | 2,531          | 2,555          | 2,562          | 2,602          | 2,611          |
| India                        | 270           | 756           | 892           | 1,012          | 1,169          | 1,343          | 1,619          | 1,990          | 2,333          |
| United States                | 1,475         | 2,010         | 2,110         | 2,146          | 2,149          | 2,040          | 2,086          | 2,199          | 2,296          |
| Afghanistan                  | 3             | 386           | 719           | 1,061          | 1,312          | 1,588          | 1,833          | 2,011          | 2,197          |
| Viet Nam                     | 292           | 1,814         | 1,778         | 1,713          | 1,661          | 1,538          | 1,657          | 1,811          | 2,010          |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina       | .             | 1,627         | 1,668         | 1,701          | 1,694          | 1,641          | 1,584          | 1,599          | 1,658          |
|                              |               |               |               |                |                |                |                |                | 37,072         |
| Others                       | 13,883        | 25,600        | 27,218        | 27,739         | 27,129         | 26,869         | 29,171         | 32,179         |                |
| <b>Total</b>                 | <b>26,255</b> | <b>91,074</b> | <b>98,577</b> | <b>103,682</b> | <b>107,003</b> | <b>108,346</b> | <b>113,852</b> | <b>121,739</b> | <b>132,708</b> |

**Source: Statistic Finland**

By studying the table, one sees that the three largest groups of foreigners living in Finland are Russian, Estonian and Swedish. By looking at the population size, both Russian and Estonians are more than double that of Sweden. The large number of

<sup>128</sup> Heikkilä, Elli & Timo Jaakkola (2000). The economic status of immigrants in the Finnish labour market. In Vuolteenaho, Jani & Topi Antti Äikäs (eds.): NGP Yearbook 2000, 59-75. Nordia Geographical Publications 29:2.

<sup>129</sup> Statistics Finland: [http://www.stat.fi/til/vaerak/2007/vaerak\\_2007\\_2008-03-28\\_tie\\_001\\_en.html](http://www.stat.fi/til/vaerak/2007/vaerak_2007_2008-03-28_tie_001_en.html)

Russian foreigners is due in part to the right of return of Ingrian Finns from Russia. Another contributing factor is that of an increasing number of Russian and Estonian women marrying Finnish males.<sup>130</sup>

In 1995, shortly after joining the European Union the government led by the Center Party created a committee on immigration and asylum policy. The goal of the committee was to bring Finland in line with that of the other members of the EU. The committee was affiliated with the Ministry of Labor at that time as the Ministry of Labor carried the most responsibility within the scope of immigration.<sup>131</sup> The fact the Ministry of Labor was put in charge of the policy reform indicates the feelings of most Finns at the time that immigration into Finland would mainly be labor immigration, Asylum policy took a back seat during this time as can be seen from the table below on asylum grants.<sup>132</sup>

**Table 2. Number of asylum seekers in Finland 1997-2007**

|   | 1997 | 1998  | 1999  | 2000  | 2001  | 2002  | 2003  | 2004  | 2005  | 2006  | 2007  |
|---|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Asylum-seekers                          | 973  | 1,272 | 3,106 | 3,170 | 1,651 | 3,443 | 3,221 | 3,861 | 3,574 | 2,324 | 1,505 |
| Decisions on asylum <sup>1)</sup>       |      |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| – Asylum granted                        | 4    | 7     | 29    | 9     | 4     | 14    | 7     | 29    | 12    | 38    | 68    |
| – Residence permit granted              | 277  | 372   | 467   | 458   | 809   | 577   | 487   | 771   | 585   | 580   | 792   |
| – No asylum or residence permit granted | 278  | 240   | 1,330 | 2,121 | 1,045 | 2,312 | 2,443 | 3,418 | 2,472 | 1,481 | 961   |

Source: Statistics Finland

During the time that the Ministry of Labor was formulating its immigration and asylum policy, only 11 asylum seekers were granted asylum out of 2,245 applications, 649 were granted residence but with restrictions meaning the majority were not able to gain employment while living in Finland. Part of the committee's recommendation was to create a comprehensive integration policy for immigrants in Finland. It should also be noted that Finland did not get its Ombudsman for minorities until a few years after Sweden.

<sup>130</sup> Heikkilä, Elli & Timo Jaakkola (2000). The economic status of immigrants in the Finnish labour market. In Vuolteenaho, Jani & Topi Antti Äikäs (eds.): NGP Yearbook 2000, 59-75. Nordia Geographical Publications 29:2.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Statistics Finland: [http://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk\\_vaesto\\_en.html](http://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_vaesto_en.html)

## 5.2 Finnish Integration Policy

As noted previously, integration of immigrants had been part of the Ministry of Labor when integration policy was first established. The ministry was in charge of the integration of immigrants, the reception of asylum and refugee seekers, placement of refugees in the municipalities, work permit issues, return migration issues concerning expatriate Finns.<sup>133</sup> The ministry sought out to create a policy that promoted a multicultural society that prevented racism. In creating an integration policy, the ministry also realized that a multi-faceted integration policy does not just affect the immigrant, but also helps foster the original population's attitudes towards immigrants.

The Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers went into effect on May 1, 1999. This was the first comprehensive integration law that had been passed in Finland. The integration law promoted the integration, equality and freedom of choice of immigrants through measures which helped the immigrant acquire the knowledge and skills needed to function in Finnish society.<sup>134</sup> At the same time the law left room for the immigrant to keep their native language, cultural and religious beliefs intact.

This law was amended in 2005 in which the implementation of integration was transferred to the Ministry of Interior, Development and Economic offices, Employment offices and municipalities. Immigrants who were unemployed or restricted from working due to their residency but received social benefits were all eligible for an individual integration plan outlining in detail their action plan to becoming integrated into Finnish society. The individual integration plans included language instructions (which is seen as

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<sup>133</sup> Heikkilä, Elli & Timo Jaakkola (2000). The economic status of immigrants in the Finnish labour market. In Vuolteenaho, Jani & Topi Antti Äikäs (eds.): NGP Yearbook 2000, 59-75. Nordia Geographical Publications 29:2.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid

the most important aspect of integration into Finnish society) free of charge provided by the local municipality, a detailed plan for employment or studying, daily routines and social contacts.<sup>135</sup> If an immigrant is active in executing their plan, they are eligible for social benefits supplement connected to their integration support. If the migrant fails to follow their integration plan they will risk losing their benefits supplement.

The amended law reads as follows:<sup>136</sup>

Duties of the Ministry of Interior:

- The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the general development, planning, steering, monitoring and coordination of the integration of immigrants and the reception of asylum seekers and beneficiaries of temporary protection, and also for the provision of assistance to victims of trafficking. Reception and organizing centers may be set up under the Ministry of the Interior.
- Advisory boards may be set up under the Ministry of the Interior in order to assist the Ministry to meet its responsibilities.

Duties of Employment and Economic Development Centres and State Provincial Offices:

- Under the guidance and supervision of the Ministry of the Interior, Employment and Economic Development Centres are responsible for regional coordination or the integration of immigrants, the reception of asylum seekers, the planning, guidance and monitoring of reception of beneficiaries of temporary protection, and other duties.
- State Provincial Offices participate within their sphere of competence in the planning, guidance and supervision of measures and services promoting and supporting the integration of immigrants and ensure that the needs of immigrants are taken account in planning and organizing other services and measures within their sphere of competence.

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<sup>135</sup> European forum for migration studies, 'Final report to the European Commission, Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies towards Second Generation Migrant Youth in Comparative European Perspective', Bamberg, 2001.

<sup>136</sup> Ministry of Interior, Finland

- An advisory board on immigration matters may be set up to support an Employment and Economic Development Centre with a view to developing and planning the integration of immigrants, discussing other immigration related issues, and promoting ethnic equality and good ethnic relations.

#### Duties of Employment offices:

- Employment offices are responsible, jointly with the respective Employment and Economic Development Centres, for the provision of labor market services promoting and supporting the integration of immigrants, of instruction in reading and writing and of basic education for immigrants registered as jobseekers.
- Immigrants who are entitled to an integration plan are referred by employment offices to municipal measures and services in cooperation with the municipality if the immigrants cannot, because of their state of health or for other comparable reasons, participate in labor market policy measures.
- Employment offices and the respective municipalities cooperate in the organization of measures and services to promote and support integration and in the provision of information about them.

#### Duties of municipalities:

- Municipalities have general and coordinative responsibility for developing planning and monitoring the integration of immigrants. Municipalities organize measures and services promoting and supporting the integration of immigrants.
- Municipalities ensure that the integration of immigrants is promoted and supported by means of the measures and services if the immigrants receive social assistance and are entitled to an integration plan, or if employment offices refer them to municipal measures and services.

- Municipalities cooperate with the respective employment offices in integration efforts and give immigrants information about services provided by employment offices and other service providers.

Measures and services promoting and supporting integration:

In order to promote and support integration, employment offices and municipalities may:

- Provide guidance, advisory services and information services;
- Provide information about Finnish society and hot it functions;
- Provide Finnish or Swedish language teaching;
- Provide adult skills training and take appropriate labor market policy measures;
- Provide instruction in reading and writing, and teaching to augment basic education;
- Provide interpretation services;
- Take measures and provide services to promote equality in all its forms;
- Take measures and provide services to meet the special needs of immigrant minors;
- Take measures and provide services for special needs groups
- Take other measures and provide services that encourage immigrants to acquire for themselves the skills knowledge needed in society.

The integration plan has not been implemented without problems. One of the major problems is the issue of resources, or the lack thereof. Many times immigrants have to wait an excess amount of time for Finnish language classes to become available or to even meet with an integration representative from the local offices. Once a language class does come available, it may be that there are students from different cultures who all have different levels of education.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

It is important to note that in Finland cultural integration is not mandatory, for the migrant it is an option. He /she is entitled to keep their native language and ethnic identity while at the same time adapting to the new society. Migrants still face a hard time in Finland. Unemployment is high among migrants in Finland and they are often at risk of being stigmatized. Migrants also face negative attitudes of them from Finns, as stated earlier how Finland is a homogenous country, this is then not a surprise that there is a negative view of outsiders. A common argument in the immigration debate is Finland's strong welfare state policy. As welfare is determined by residency and not employment, this can contribute to migrant's dependency on the benefits instead of supporting integration into the labor markets.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter 6

### Policy Area Overview

This chapter looks at the progress in terms of integration in Finland and Sweden. I have chosen to structure the chapter on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which has been carried out by the British Council and Migrant Policy Group from 2005 onwards. MIPEX measures integration policies of 25 EU Member States and three non-EU countries. MIPEX is one of the most comprehensive comparative studies on integration policies and is partly financed by the European Commission. I have selected to use MIPEX as a core of this chapter due to its strong emphasis on EU policies and cooperation. According to the authors, it is intended as a mirror that can be held up to EU member states in order for them to assess their own progress in integration of immigrants in the labor market and full citizenship<sup>139</sup>. In this chapter, the comparisons and findings of the MIPEX authors are supported with complementary and more recent information.

MIPEX builds six policy areas out of 140 indicators.. The six areas are: labor market access, family reunion, long-term residence, political participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination.<sup>140</sup> In this chapter these six policy areas will be looked at for both Sweden and Finland and will be used as a tool to compare their performances in the specific policy area.

#### 6.1 Labor Market Access

In 2007, Finland had 65 000 immigrants who were counted as part of the labor force. Unemployment amongst immigrants was three-fold to the native population. Unemployment was exceptionally high amongst immigrant women<sup>141</sup>.

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<sup>139</sup> Niessen et al. (2007). Migrant Integration Policy Index. British Council pp.XI

<sup>140</sup> Niessen et al. (2007). Migrant Integration Policy Index. British Council pp.12

<sup>141</sup> Arajärvi (2009). Project on employment obstacles and inactivity traps faced by immigrants Ministry of the Interior's publications 2/2009. Pp. 28

It does not, therefore, come as a great surprise that Finland scores only 70 out of 100 in MIPEX when it comes to labor market accessibility to migrants. While Finland scores high on security of employment and employment rights for migrants, Finland scores low when it comes to employment eligibility and labor market integration measures. The reason for the lower score for eligibility is because Finland recognizes migrant skills under different procedures than for EU nationals.<sup>142</sup> For instance if a migrant has a certificate for a certain skill from an institution outside of the EU, the certificate would not be recognized, while a EU citizens who has a certificate of skill from another EU country would have his or her certificate recognized. Another factor for the lower score is that migrants do not have equal access to many jobs that EU nationals do. In his recent report on employment of immigrants commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Interior Affairs, rapporteur Pentti Arajärvi pointed out that especially knowledge over the Finnish labour market, lack of qualifications accepted by Finnish authorities and lack of language skills limit the full employability of immigrants<sup>143</sup>. When it comes to entrepreneurship, migrants from outside the EU must prove more than just a successful business plan they must also prove that they have knowledge in the field as well as having sufficient liquidity.<sup>144</sup> Despite these negatives, Finland still scored highly, this in part due to strong employment rights Finland affords to all its workers. In order to improve the current situation, Arajärvi suggests making integration plan a right for every immigrant and improving the guidance and advisory services for immigrants<sup>145</sup>.

In percentage comparison, the situation in Sweden and Finland looks quite alike. The unemployment of non-EU immigrants is significantly higher than unemployment of EU nationals in both countries – 15,1 % compared to 5,3 % in Sweden and 18,9 % compared to 6,7 % for Finland<sup>146</sup>. It is however worth noting the difference in the total numbers:

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<sup>142</sup> Ibid. pp. 25

<sup>143</sup> Arajärvi (2009). Project on employment obstacles and inactivity traps faced by immigrants Ministry of the Interior's publications 2/2009. Pp. 4

<sup>144</sup> Ibid. pp. 26

<sup>145</sup> Arajärvi (2009). Project on employment obstacles and inactivity traps faced by immigrants Ministry of the Interior's publications 2/2009. Pp. 98-100

<sup>146</sup> Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (2008) Employment in Europe 2008 Pp. 58

when Finland has 93 000 non-EU born residents, in Sweden the number rises up to 559 000<sup>147</sup>. When a mere 1,7 % of Finland's labor force is non-EU born, in Sweden the percentage is the fourth highest in the European Union – 10,6 %<sup>148</sup>.

Sweden ranks the highest of all the countries included in MIPEX with a score of 100 out of all EU member states when it comes to labor market access for immigrants.<sup>149</sup> An immigrant who has had a residence permit for at least one year is eligible to work or become self-employed if the person has a sustainable business plan.<sup>150</sup> According to Sweden's Statistical Bureau, it takes approximately 7-8 years for an immigrant in Sweden to reach full employment. As in Finland, for immigrant women it takes even longer - up to 10 years<sup>151</sup>. Immigrants who are unemployed are helped by the state with language and vocational training. Immigrants who have lived in Sweden for more than two years will also receive the right to obtain study grants. If an immigrant loses their job, the immigrant still has the right to stay in Sweden and look for a new job. In its current integration strategy the Swedish Government has decided to carry out a wide-reaching experiment on qualified advice, emphasizing the responsibility of Employment Services, government-subsidized inroads jobs for recently arrived immigrants and decreasing the financial burden on integration services in the municipalities receiving high numbers of immigrants<sup>152</sup>. The strategy will be evaluated in a form of a report to the Parliament in 2010<sup>153</sup>.

## 6.2 Family Reunification

Migrants in Finland can sponsor their spouse or partner after a short period of residence usually lasting up to three months. Other family members including minor children,

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<sup>147</sup> Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (2008) Employment in Europe 2008 Pp. 107

<sup>148</sup> Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (2008) Employment in Europe 2008 Pp. 108

<sup>149</sup> Ibid. pp.186

<sup>150</sup> Swedish Ministry of Labor

<sup>151</sup> Regeringen (2008). Egenmakt mot utanförskap – regeringens strategi för integration. Skr. 2008/09:24. Pp. 9-12

<sup>152</sup> Regeringen (2008). Egenmakt mot utanförskap – regeringens strategi för integration. Skr. 2008/09:24. Pp. 37

<sup>153</sup> Regeringen (2008). Egenmakt mot utanförskap – regeringens strategi för integration. Skr. 2008/09:24. Pp. 62

dependent relatives and dependent adult children must fulfill additional requirements to reunify with their family members.<sup>154</sup> It is often the case that only the migrants immediate family can join the migrant in Finland, extended family and adult children must apply separately.

Sweden allows for family reunification after one year of residence, after the one-year immigrants can sponsor not only their nuclear family but extended family as well, such as parents or siblings. Despite the flexibility in sponsoring family members, Sweden can withdraw the permit if there is a breakup in the family within in the first three years. After the three years, the family members can apply for a residence permit of their own.<sup>155</sup>

### **6.3 Long-term Residence**

Immigrants can receive long-term residence permits after five continuous years of living in Sweden in which time studying is counted, but waiting for asylum decision is not. An applicant who applies for long-term residence must show that they have adequate means to support themselves. Once an immigrant receives a long-term permit they can leave Sweden and live in another EU member state for up to six years or for one year in a non-EU member state without losing their long-term residence. A long-term resident enjoys the same rights as Swedes to all social benefits.<sup>156</sup>

For Finland, the wait for long-term residence status is four consecutive years of living in Finland or two years if married or registered with a Finnish citizen. Years waiting for an asylum decision count, but time, as a student does not, which are the opposite in Sweden. Long-term resident holders must not reside in another country for longer than six months or the permit may be withdrawn.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Niessen et al. (2007). Migrant Integration Policy Index. British Council pp. 186

<sup>155</sup> Swedish Migration Board

<sup>156</sup> Ibid

<sup>157</sup> Finnish Interior Ministry [www.uvi.fi](http://www.uvi.fi)

#### **6.4 Political Participation**

Sweden gives the right to vote in regional and local elections to any legal resident that has resided in Sweden for at least three years. Immigrants are free to join political parties and to form their own association, which can receive public funding.<sup>158</sup> The state actively informs immigrants of upcoming elections and notifies them of their right to vote in local elections.

Like Sweden, Finland gives the right to vote to immigrants in regional and local elections but in the case of Finland the immigrant only needs to have resided in Finland for two years. The government on issues pertaining to immigrants often consults groups representing migrants. The downside is that those representing the immigrant's interest are often times selected by the government.

#### **6.5 Access to Citizenship**

For an immigrant to obtain citizenship in Sweden he or she must have lived in Sweden for five years before he or she can apply. Children of immigrants are not automatically Swedish even if they have been born in Sweden. They can however apply for citizenship before they turn 15 if their parents have long-term residency in Sweden or between 15 and 18 if they have lived in Sweden for at least three years.

In order to become a Finnish citizen a migrant must first live in Finland for 6 years consecutively before he or she can apply for citizenship. The process to citizenship can be long and expensive, the migrant must take a language test, pass income and criminal record checks and must have demonstrated "good character" while living in Finland. Once migrants have obtained Finnish citizenship, their security is much more favorable compared to other EU countries, a migrant can not lose their citizenship if it would

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<sup>158</sup> Niessen et al. (2007). Migrant Integration Policy Index. British Council pp.187.

leave them stateless not can citizenship be lost if they have had it for more than five years under any circumstance.

## **6.6 Anti-discrimination**

The Swedish law recognizes direct and indirect discrimination and harassment of immigrants in the private and public sector. Despite having tough laws that protect immigrants from discrimination and harassment, enforcement has not reached best practices, due to discrimination procedures usually taking up to a year to proceed. By law the state is bound to lead dialogue and disseminate information that leads to a public awareness of anti-discrimination.

Finland has made an effort to prevent discrimination against migrants by passing anti-discrimination laws. The Non-Discrimination Act, which was passed in 2004, protects migrants from public and private actors who would discriminate based on a persons ethnicity, race, religion and nationality. These protections extend to employment, education, social benefits, housing and healthcare. Finland also created an Ombudsman's for equality as well as an Ombudsman for Minorities and Discrimination.

## **Chapter 7**

### **Analysis and Conclusion**

An analysis of the immigrant integration policies of Sweden and Finland will be produced in this Chapter. The integration policies of the two countries will be examined individually using the theoretical methods outlined in Chapter 2 as well as keeping in mind the research questions for this thesis. Finally the chapter will end with the conclusion of the study.

#### **7.1 Swedish Immigrant Integration Policy Analysis**

The analysis of Sweden's immigrant integration policy is based on comparative findings and theoretical methods touched upon in the theory chapter. The policy making process and its possible effects from the EU will also be analyzed.

Sweden stands out as being one of only a few countries on the planet that has a sound and coherent immigrant integration policy with defined objectives. Through its policies Sweden has made clear that integration is a necessary component to its immigration policy and new policies must be developed with integration in mind. The holistic approach has been used in shaping Sweden's integration policy, which brings together all aspects of society, like social, economic, legal and cultural. This approach to integration came well before Sweden joined the EU and more importantly before the EU had formulated its own approach to immigrant integration. In this respect, Sweden stands out from the rest of the EU pact, as unlike the other member states, Sweden did not require the fostering of a coherent integration policy from the EU.<sup>159</sup>

As stated before, Sweden's most important flow of immigrants to the country was during the post WW II period, which was mainly labor immigration. Unlike the other countries

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<sup>159</sup> Report of the Integration Policy for the 21st Century.  
<http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/07/12/343893b3.pdf> accessed on 7/11/08.

during this period that needed labor immigrants, Sweden adopted an assimilationist approach and refraining from a “guest worker” ideology, which implied an exclusionist approach to immigration. The reason behind taking the assimilationist approach is because of the Swedish welfare state, which was rooted in universalism, which gives the right for all to receive the same services.<sup>160</sup> Even though Sweden took on an assimilationist approach, this approach of course requires the immigrant to abandon their origins; it still provided equality when it came to legal and economic matters. This was not the case for other immigrants living in the different parts of Europe. The assimilationist approach that Sweden took also made it easier for the transition to multiculturalism since an exclusionary approach was never taken by Sweden.

In 1975, Sweden announced that its immigration policy would be shaped based on the premise of multiculturalism in which the integration of immigrants was crucial to the success of its immigration policy. The main principle of the multicultural model as detailed in the theory section is to promote civic unity while at the same time protecting diversity in a society. Over the past 30 years, Sweden has continued to develop its policies based on the principles of this model, which led to the belief that Sweden’s immigration policy converged to an integration policy in 1997.<sup>161</sup>

Today in Sweden, the current debate over integration policy is whether multiculturalism has lived up to its expectations when it comes to integration. Many argue that the decision to utilize multiculturalism in the Swedish integration policy came in a time when Sweden was mainly a homogenous country with respect to ethnicity and culture.<sup>162</sup> The criticism today towards the policy is that multiculturalism is inefficient when it comes to the social inclusion of immigrants as the immigrant population increased throughout the years.<sup>163</sup> When it comes to economic terms, immigrants in Sweden do not do as well as

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<sup>160</sup> Fricke, Tobin. *Immigration, Multiculturalism, Sweden*.  
<http://splorg.org:8080/people/tobin/papers/multiculturalism.html> accessed on 7/11/08.

<sup>161</sup> Report of the Integration Policy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.  
<http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/07/12/343893b3.pdf> accessed on 7/11/08.

<sup>162</sup> Fricke, Tobin. *Immigration, Multiculturalism, Sweden*.  
<http://splorg.org:8080/people/tobin/papers/multiculturalism.html> accessed on 7/11/08.

<sup>163</sup> Geddes, A. *Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?* Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 121.

their native counterparts. This seems to be based on hidden discriminatory behavior by the native Swedes when it comes to employment practices. This is seen in the dramatic difference in the unemployment rate between native Swedes and the immigrant community.

## **7.2 Finnish Immigrant Integration Policy Analysis**

Prior to the Integration Law that was passed in 1999, Finland had an assimilationist approach to immigrant integration. The few immigrants that did arrive in Finland prior to the 1999 legislation were expected to adapt to the majority culture and socially give up their “old” culture. With the passing of the 1999 integration law (Act on the Integration of Immigrants and the Reception of Asylum Seekers), Finland adapted a multiculturalists method, in which the immigrants were given an active role in designing their own life in Finnish society, while at the same time preserving their own ethnical and cultural habits.<sup>164</sup>

Despite the 1999 Act being a step forward in the area of immigrant integration, the Act has had challenges emerge. The main challenge was the lack of resources given to achieve the goals of the integration Act. The local municipalities do not have enough resources to cope with the amount of immigrants requesting integration services, especially in large cities like Helsinki and Tampere.<sup>165</sup> Elli Heikkilä argues that waiting for services decreases the total time of integration actions and makes integration courses like language too heterogeneous.<sup>166</sup> Meaning that immigrants are not in courses with others who are at the same level they are, making learning the more difficult.

One problem Finland faces in integrating immigrants is in the labor market. Levels of education are quite high among the native population, meaning the number of people willing to do manual work is decreasing.<sup>167</sup> Since immigrants usually have lower

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<sup>164</sup> Koivukangas, Olavi; “The need for multicultural approach in Finland”, *Entering multiculturalism: Finnish experience abroad*, ed. by Olavi Koivukangas, Turku 2002, pp. 20-26.

<sup>165</sup> Heikkilä, Elli; “Immigrants and Integration in Finland” Institute of Migration, Turku 2002, pp. 7.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid. pp.8

demands than the native work force, immigrants are often not seen as suitable for the manual work jobs whatever their training and education may be. A study conducted by Annika Forsander and Anne Alitolppa found that immigrants in Finland are often then not hired to jobs that require little or no training.<sup>168</sup> Forsander fears that if immigrants are being marginalized in the labor market, then chances are they are also being marginalized in Finnish society.<sup>169</sup> The following graph demonstrates the current unemployment rate of the largest immigrant groups in Finland as of 2010:

**Figure 4. Unemployment rate among immigrant groups in Finland in 2010.**



Many researches in Finland, including Annika Forsander believe the high rate of unemployment among immigrants especially among Somali's is clearly due to discrimination. In many cases, these immigrants have degrees that were conducted in Finnish, so the excuse of employers for not hiring immigrants because of language skills is not a viable excuse.

<sup>168</sup> Forsander, Annika & Anne Alitolppa-Niitamo (2000). Maahanmuuttajien työllistyminen ja työhallinto – keitä, miten ja minne. Työministeriö, Työhallinnon julkaisuja pp.77

<sup>169</sup> Ibid. pp.77

## **Conclusion**

As with any study, certain conclusions were reached in this study pertaining to the comparison of the immigrant integration policies of Sweden and Finland in light of the EU framework in the area of immigrant integration. Of these conclusions, the findings that are in line with the aim of the study will be delineated below.

Firstly, the thesis aimed to delineate the differences and similarities in the policies of Sweden and Finland as well as how they corresponded with the EU framework on immigrant integration as well as aiming to find out which country has succeeded in developing a more coherent integration policy. Lastly, the aim was to see how these policies meet the demand of their immigrant population.

One of the major differences in the integration policies of Sweden in Finland, is primarily the fact that Sweden had a head start by about 25 years in formulating a viable immigrant integration policy, where for Finland it has only been the last 10 years that the country has put in place an immigrant integration policy that meets the needs of its immigrants. This of course is because for so many years, Finland was an emigrating country, while Sweden was an immigration hub, because of this Finland is still trying to assist which policies work best for its immigrant population. Another difference is in the number of immigrants each country has, Sweden has over 10 times the amount of immigrants than Finland has. As a result more resources are allocated in Sweden for the purpose of immigrant integration than in Finland. In Finland many municipal officials are not equipped to handle the influx of immigrants that Finland will soon face, in just the past 5 years the number of immigrants living in Finland is 5 times what it was in 2002.<sup>170</sup>


The goals of immigrant integration are similar when comparing the policies of these two countries. The two countries both take a multi-cultural approach to the integration of their immigrants. In comparing the two countries integration policy areas, as was done in Chapter 7, the similarities are very apparent when it comes to the technicality of the

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<sup>170</sup> YLE: <http://www.yle.fi/news/id86664.html>

policies. Both countries have adequate Integration laws that meet the goals of the EU framework on integration that are outlined in Chapter 4 in which legal, economic, social and cultural aspects of integration are regarded as interconnected to each other. In looking at the theoretical models, both Sweden and Finland took the approach of assimilation and then later switched to the multi-cultural approach, which has been seen as more fitting for the immigrant during their integration process.

Sweden stands out as being more successful in creating a more coherent integration policy in comparison to Finland based on the fact that Sweden had already created a coherent policy framework in which the problems were well defined and the goals of the policies were set out with a clear objective before the EU even had a framework on immigrant integration. Finland on the other hand did not have an integration law on the books until 1997. As shown in the table below recent findings of the 2007 Migrant Integration Policy Index ranked Sweden number one with a score of 94 in the EU for its integration policy, while Finland with a score of 75 ranked at number five with the major differences in labor market access and access to nationality. The fact the Finland does rank in the top five out of the 27 EU member states, indicates that it is moving in the right direction but still needs work on access to nationality, where it has scored the least due impart to its requirement to take a language test before an immigrant can be granted citizenship.



Lastly, the aim was to see how these policies meet the demand of their immigrant population. Finland still has work to do in terms of implementation and on resources. Many municipalities in Finland lack the resources to adequately meet the demands and goals set by the Immigration Integration Act as well as meetings the goals of the EU framework. Access to adequate language course continues to be a thorn in the side of integration in Finland. Out of the two countries, Sweden succeeds in meeting the demands of their immigrant, it is not to say that integration goes perfectly for every immigrant in Sweden, but Sweden manages to offer adequate resources and opportunities for immigrants to succeed in their new society.

The number of immigrants flocking to Europe will be a continuous flow. It is vital for member states to create a coherent immigrant integration policy that not only benefits the immigrants but the state as well. Sweden and Finland have a good start, which does not mean that there is not room for improvement as is the case for Finland and to some degree Sweden. The future will tell if the EU framework of immigrant integration will be mandatory for all EU member states.

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