

Olga Voico

Putin's Russia and the New Concept of Power
An analysis of Vladimir Putin's power argumentation

University of Tampere

International School of Social Sciences

Department of Political Science

and International Relations

CBU Master's Programme in International Relations

Master's Thesis

September 2010

University of Tampere
International School of Social Sciences
Department of Political Science and International Relations
VOICO, OLGA: Putin's Russia and the New Concept of Power. An Analysis of
Vladimir Putin's Power Argumentation
Master's Thesis, 78 pages
Master's Programme in International Relations within Finnish-Russian Cross-Border
University (CBU)
September 2010

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to explore what makes a state powerful in contemporary world. Debate on the nature of political power is one of the most complicated ones in the Theory of International Relations and the ever growing complexity of modern global processes provides new forums for discussion. Not only scholars are preoccupied with the changing concept of power. Rhetoric of political leaders makes an important contribution to the process of power construction. Argumentation on power, and namely on Great Power Restoration has been one of the focal points of Vladimir Putin's rule. Thus, I have chosen Russia as an interesting and fruitful case for research.

The main research question of this study is 'What kind of an understanding of what makes a state powerful emerges from Putin's speeches?' In order to answer it I will analyze Vladimir Putin's argumentation on power applying Stephen Toulmin's Model of Argument, concentrating on those speeches in which the issue of *power* has been discussed. Using Toulmin's layout for the structure of argument I will identify its main elements – claim, data, warrant, rebuttal and qualifier. This will enable me to determine what is implicit in the argument and to create a coherent picture of what constituents of power are. The results of methodical investigation will be further put under theoretical analysis conducted according to the framework based on constructivist meta-theory and applying Barnett and Duval classification of forms of power.

The concluding part of this study answers the main research question revealing that the combination of compulsory, structural, and productive forms of power makes the state powerful.

Table of contents

1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Hypothesis and Research Question.....	2
1.2 Structure of the Study.....	4
2. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM.....	6
2.1 An essentially contested nature of the concept of power.....	6
2.1.1 Theories of International Relations on Power.....	6
2.1.2 Soft power and its relevance for this study	8
2.1.3 Specificity of power relations in the globalising world	9
2.2 Power – a fundamental concept in Russian political argumentation	10
2.2.1 Putinism - ideological source of contemporary debate on power in Russia ..	10
2.2.2 Aspects of Russian post-Soviet development and Great Power Restoration.	12
2.2.3 “Statist globalisation” and corporations as global players.....	14
2. CONSTRUCTIVISM AS THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	17
2.1 Preface on constructivism	17
2.1.1 Relevance of constructivism for the study of argumentation on power.....	17
2.1.2 Historical overview	19
2.1.3 Constructivism and meta-theoretical debate	20
2.2 Power in constructivism – material and spiritual compilation.....	21
2.2.1 Power as a social construction and a key concept.....	21
2.2.2 Power and its critical dimensions.....	23
3.3 Forms of power as guiding framework of the study	26
3.3.1 Compulsory power	26
3.3.2 Institutional power	27
3.3.3 Structural power	28
3.3.4 Productive power	29
3.4 Constructivist ontology and research problem, purpose of investigation	30
4. STEPHEN TOULMIN’S MODEL OF ARGUMENT AS METHOD.....	32
4.1 Role of language in constructivism.....	32
4.2 Primary data and method	34
4.3 From analysis of arguments to conclusions	39
5. ARGUMENTATION OF VLADIMIR PUTIN ON CHARACTERISTICS OF POWERFUL STATE.....	43

5.1 Soft power and the role of Russian civil society and economy in the construction of the strong state	43
5.2 Energy card and the role of natural monopolies in the process of power construction	54
5.3 Hard power and argumentation.....	60
5.4 Summary of arguments	63
6. FROM ARGUMENTATION TO BROADER CONCEPTUALISATION OF POWER.....	67
7. CONCLUSIONS.....	72
Bibliography.....	74

1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of power is one of the most controversial and largely disputed in the discipline of International Relations. On one hand, scholars discuss permanent features of political power and its constituents which have not changed for centuries. On the other hand, it is argued that basic attributes of power have been altered as a result of a heterogeneous and challenged process of globalisation. Referring to globalisation, it is most often presumed that it is not basically the character of internal, power within nation states that is being modified (still this takes place as well), but usually the broader “transnational and international context within which power operates”. (Goverde 2000, p.149)

Not only scholars of International Relations are preoccupied with the broadening of the concept of power. Political leaders repeatedly mention *power* in their public speeches, addresses, communiqués and interviews. Presidency of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, which lasted for eight years, was especially productive concerning the attention paid to the issue of power, both on international and domestic levels. A preliminary look into Putin’s political texts has shown that the issue of power has been largely discussed by the President and I have chosen Putin’s Russia to study how the understanding of power has evolved and how it has been constructed by the Russian President’s rhetoric.

Process of power construction went along with modifications in Russian foreign and domestic policy. Russian development after the disintegration of the Soviet Union has been problematic and contradictory. It was contradictory from the point of view of the incompatibility of its great-power ambitions and its real possibilities. The state, which had for a long period of time controlled its close neighbourhood and benefited from its influence over Europe and Eurasia, lost its position of the world super power. (Sakwa 2008, p.363) In his speeches Putin was repeatedly paying attention to the connection between successful economic performance and Russian foreign policy goals. At the same time he was mentioning other factors which might contribute to the restoration of the desired status of great power. (ibid. p.373)

Putin's Presidency was also a time when the attention of the whole world was attached to the events around imprisonment of the Russian oligarchs and energy disputes with 'rebellious' Ukraine. Gas conflict with Ukraine which started in March 2005 has been repeatedly turning into a drama of European scale in the years 2006, 2008 and 2009 and aroused the question of whether it is a demonstration of how Russia is using its energy card to achieve certain political objectives. In this study I will relate the process of power construction with the concrete case of the idea of modernization of Russian economy and transforming the country into a global energy power. I will study Vladimir Putin's argumentation on power to reveal what are the factors that make a state powerful in contemporary world.

1.1 Hypothesis and Research Question

Changes occur in the way global markets are functioning, and taking into consideration the role of energy security and the share of Russia in the list of world oil and gas suppliers, I suggest that the economic factor is the necessary element on the way to the realization of the primary goals of Russian foreign policy.

I have chosen this particular topic for my study out of the following considerations. Firstly, in spite of numerous publications related to the *nature of power*, this topic continuously offers new grounds for further research. World processes are not static and the list of power elements can and should be constantly modified and added up. From my point of view Putin's Russia is a fruitful ground for exploration of what makes a state powerful. By the end of Putin's second term some agreement has been finally achieved in Russia concerning its routes of development. What is interesting for the goal of my research is the role attributed to natural resources, particularly to oil and gas in achieving strategic goals of foreign policy. Although it has been argued that the economic factor is the crucial in determining the position of the state on the world arena, as the Russian example in the past has proved, abundant natural resources is not the only condition of power.

There should also exist domestic structures that able to "mobilize" these resources and to "convert" them into an effective means of "foreign policy influence". Thus, the

ability of the state government to manage resources is what matters most of all (Russett 2006, p.130).

Secondly, in Putin's style of government two contradictory lines can be traces. He combined the process of construction of an effective civil society, support for the development of market economy and liberal ideas with elements of authoritarian rule. It has been recognized that nowadays in the conditions of globalization, state authority is replaced by growing influence of financial-industrial conglomerates. Putin's Russia was an exception. Financial corporations granted to the state means necessary to promote its financial goals and served as an alternative driving force of the state. (Sakwa 2004, p.197) Thus, the main research question of this study is: 'What kind of an understanding of what makes a state powerful emerges from Putin's speeches?'

A preliminary look into primary sources of this study has driven me to the conclusion that economic factor, based on the access to energy resources, is one of the most important ones in the contemporary perception of a powerful state. In order either to re-affirm this idea or to come to some other conclusion, I will use *constructivism* as my theoretical framework. The main advantage of constructivist research on power is that it offers a combination of rationalist and interpretive approaches creating a framework which corresponds in a better way to the ever changing world and rapidly evolving field of global politics. In contemporary conditions of the spreading transnationalism, of increasing correlation in social, economic and political spheres the way in which political actors conceptualize power is not reduced either to material or spiritual issues. Consequently, the analysis should be able to grasp how the actors' understanding of power combines social, economic and political perspectives.

Within constructivist meta-theory much attention is paid to the importance of language and the role it plays in the process of analysis of politics. Linguistic intercourse is not only a part of the communication process; it can act as a space within which reality is constructed. It is language that creates a benevolent atmosphere for normative context to shape and affect in this way or another actions of individuals because the process of understanding and explication that transforms norms into actions has language as its cornerstone. (Zehfuss 2001, p.70) Thus language is placed at the core of the analysis and declared as a key factor shaping social reality, although the presence of material realm is not denied either.

In the analysis of power I conduct in this paper I also use language as the primary tool of my research. I presume that in the case of Vladimir Putin's presidency linguistic intercourse performs not only as a reflection of ideas and beliefs, as a means of communication and expression, but as an important element of power construction. Using Toulmin's Model of an Argument will enable me to distinguish power related arguments and to examine what kind of understanding of what makes a country powerful is constructed through rhetoric.

Classification of the forms of power introduced by Barnett and Duvall and discussed earlier in this chapter will serve as the main analytical tool which will be primarily used in the final chapter of this paper to put under theoretical evaluation the results of the analysis of Putin's argumentation on power, conducted by means of Toulmin's method.

1.2 Structure of the Study

Below I will briefly present the main parts of this Master's Thesis. The heuristic of the study will be introduced in Chapter 2. Concentrating on the theoretical and empirical issues that present the biggest interest and which have determined my choice of the topic, I will give an overview of the main tendencies of Russian development in the period of Putin's presidency, focusing on problems related to the process of construction of a strong state. I will also present the direction in contemporary discussion on power which is relevant for the purpose of my research.

In Chapter 3 I will introduce constructivism as a background to my research and more particularly constructivist interpretation of power. I will also talk about the role of language within this meta-theory and will explain the interconnection between method and theory in this study.

Chapter 4 is a description of the method, Toulmin's Model of Argument and the explanation of how this method will be used in my study. I will go briefly into the history of rhetoric and further on will present basic elements of an argument's layout.

In Chapter 5, on the basis of Toulmin's argumentation analysis I will proceed to the detailed review of Putin's speeches. Determining claims, data, warrants, qualifiers and rebuttals I will conduct the analysis. My first goal is to select primary material, speeches, which is of a highest relevance for this study and further on to look for power related arguments. After the implementation of the method, I will put in use the main theoretical tool of this study and will answer the main research question.

In Chapter 6 I introduce constructivism to evaluate theoretically the results of the analysis. I will apply classification of the forms of power offered by Barnett and Duvall and to reveal what makes a state powerful in the conditions of the global order.

In the Conclusions I will make generalisations and will perspective for the future possible research, relying on the fact that the ideology of *Putinism* continues to influence Russian reality. Thus, the results achieved in this study have a direct relation to the understanding of power which continues its evolution.

2. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

In this chapter I will present the background to the research problem and will focus on the issues that present the biggest interest for this study. The field of my investigation is a rather broad one. I make an attempt to encompass a theoretical elaboration with a concrete empirical case, thus, in the lines that follow I will focus on several subjects, which will be further combined for a purpose of achieving interesting results. Firstly, I will introduce the reader into the current debate on power, giving a brief overview of the already existing its interpretations and will concentrate on those definitions which are most useful for the purpose of this study. Secondly, I will pass towards the empirical part, namely that of the case of Putin's Russia. I will motivate the decision to choose Russia and its energy policy as the subject of this study and will present the most intriguing moments of its contemporary development, which are related to power analysis.

2.1 An essentially contested nature of the concept of power

2.1.1 Theories of International Relations on Power

As one of the central notions in political research, the notion of power has been in the core of attention of scientists forming the cornerstone of political theory. As the basis of the contemporary social disciplines had been formed at the end of the nineteenth century, the issue of power turned into the grounding point of appearing political science and fields of study related to it, international relations among them. (Goverde 2000, p.1)

Concurrently, the contents of this concept have never been constantly fixed. Philosophical disputes as well as global changes in the international politics unknown before, such as global conflicts, emergence of some states and disappearance of others, provided additional material for the enlargement of the concept of power. Basically, power as a theoretical notion can be at best characterized as being "in a state of flux"

and is in continuation accompanied by numerous ongoing discussions about its nature. (Goverde 2000, p.1)

However, integrating power into the discussion on the nature of world politics would be even more problematic than defining the concept of power itself. Gallie was the one who made a declaration that “power is an essentially contested concept” (Gallie 1956, cited in Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.2), and since then this supposition has been regularly replicated by other scholars (ibid.). On the whole, the contested nature of power is attributed not only to the failure of intellectuals to come to a common point regarding this issue, but to the understanding that power is embodied in numerous shapes and has a lot of looks that can not be formulated by one particular explanation (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.2).

Nevertheless, mainstream theories of International Relations have been for long trying to formulate a coherent approach to this problem. Traditionally, realists are viewed as the initiators of the debate on power of a state, limiting it to geographical location, natural resources, industrial capacities, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and government (Morgenthau 1955, p.133). Perceived as the most fruitful theory about power with Hans Morgenthau as the forefather of the tradition to interpret world politics in terms of power relations, political realism and Morgenthau’s [Politics among nations] had determined for a long time the direction into which the research on power should move. Explained mostly in military terms, power used to serve as a criterion for classification of the states and accounting for their behavior (ibid, p.1). The basics of this approach remain to be influential in the discipline of IR and in the real politics of concrete states.

All IR approaches offer an interpretation of their own. Only some of them, those which I consider to be the most relevant ones for my study will be reflected in this chapter, soft power among them.

I would like to discuss about soft power out of the following consideration. According to my preliminary analysis of primary material, I presume that along with realist interpretation of power which emerges from Putin’s speeches, a lot of attention is paid also to this type of power.

2.1.2 *Soft power and its relevance for this study*

Distancing from explaining power relations as an intercourse between two rivalries each of them striving towards domination, Joseph Nye has opposed realist assumptions on power and concentrated instead on benefits or disfavours created for the actors by the surrounding environment, which would influence in the future upon the amount of power accumulated. According to Nye, actors are placed within a certain establishment and the result of their adversary depends upon the ability to direct this establishment against the opponent and make it serve its own goals. (Berenskoetter in Berenskoetter & Williams 2007, p.8)

Joseph Nye has introduced the concept of *soft power* in 1990 and has further explicated it in 2004 in his book [Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics]. According to Nye, there exist the following possibilities to influence upon other people's conduct: using intimidation to cause something to occur ("sticks") (Nye, Wang 2009, p.18), creating positive motivational influence or providing financial compensations ("carrots") (ibid.), and constructing wishes of others in the desired way. A state will be able to benefit from international development if other actors of world politics subscribe to the same principles and have common desires with that state. Their willingness to take something as a model will manifest by cherishing the ideals promoted by the state, accepting its standards, or striving towards its quality of life. From this point of view, the key of success in international affairs lies not only in the possession of economic and repressive potential used to menace, but also in the ability to determine a plan of actions for the others and to magnetise. Thus, making other states desire the same things with the state who exercises soft power desires assimilates people into a particular group rather than causes to do something through pressure. (ibid.)

In international relations the generators of soft power are mostly rooted in the preferences that an institution or a state communicates to the outside world via its practices, in the way it conducts its domestic system and arranges its connection with other participants to the global processes. In certain cases state officials consider it troublesome to make soft power operation which does not reduce its significance. Soft power of a state is composed predominantly out of the following elements: "its culture" (in segments which arouse interest and enchant), "its political values" (in the case when a state repeatedly demonstrate its faithfulness to these values both on domestic and

international levels), “its foreign policies” (if other communities perceive this state as an agent of an authorised and decent supremacy). (Nye 2009, p.19)

In his essays on soft power Joseph Nye claims that the role of a military component in the structure of power is gradually decreasing, replaced by other important constituents like “technology, education and economic growth” At the same time, Nye reduced in importance the significance of “geography, population and raw materials” (Nye 1990, p.153).

In Nye’s understanding the power of the coming century will not be based solely on the access to some material benefits but largely on the aptitudes to guide the conduct of other states and to direct it into the necessary course. Thus, the possibility to supervise the official position of other states becomes of a crucial importance. Although the role of military dominance is losing its relevance, states preserve their position as key actors in world politics, leaving though enough space for the activity of other actors. Transnational corporations with their substantial economic might are gradually increasing their share in world affairs. According to Nye, a state is powerful if it manages to arrange a “complex coalition” (ibid.) with non-state actors. The use of military methods does not disappear from world politics, remaining the ultimate means of achieving goals. However in the everyday practices “other instruments such as communications, organizational and institutional skills, and manipulation of interdependence” (ibid.) determine the outcome of intergovernmental interaction. Interdependence does not necessary presume cooperation and consensus. On contrary, in most of the cases it signifies unequally distributed reciprocal vulnerability. In this type of relationship a stronger state applies intimidation towards its less powerful partner. “Interdependence” (ibid.) manifests unevenly in areas like defence, commerce, industry and business. Consequently, constructing and counteracting the relationship between the puzzle of transforming one state into a stronger or weaker one is the central process in the pursuit for power. (ibid.)

2.1.3 Specificity of power relations in the globalising world

Thus, new contemporary visions offer a diverse picture of power relations. Diversified world politics does not concentrate any more on the interactions between nation-states

solely due to the reason that systems of governance have their roots in the interactions on the domestic level and on individual-social structures. Financial organisations, for example, play nowadays a role similar in its importance to the role of inter-state rule. People, communities, companies, non-governmental organisations, business groups do not view a nation state as a guarantee of their profits and well-being. On contrary, they actively engaged in the process of promoting their goals exploiting state structures or avoiding them. Thus, the world order is not any more determined exclusively by the “balances of power among states”, but also by the practice of dispersion and allocation of power among numerous agents and within a large number of social systems. (Cerny in Goverde 2000, p. 172)

The issue of globalisation has occupied the minds of politicians and researchers, but the challenging nature of the concept of power has been often neglected, global nature of world politics being prioritized. This approach is inconsistent because these two concepts, those of global governance and power are closely connected. They both have as their grounding essentials components like regulations, arrangements, and associations that conduct, normalize, and organize social public existence. (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.2)

In the conditions of the globalising world, when various institutions formally and informally set out activities that beneficiate certain actors and create difficulties for others the character of power relations influences the perception of globalisation as a whole. It can not be interpreted neither as a positive or negative phenomenon, because it offers to its participants not only collaboration, harmonization and compromise, but also general unfairness, unequal opportunities, and disproportionate restraints. (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p. 17)

2.2 Power – a fundamental concept in Russian political argumentation

2.2.1 Putinism - ideological source of contemporary debate on power in Russia

Democratic transition and attempts to create market economy in a short period of time have provoked economic catastrophe, impoverishment of large masses of population

and durable crisis in all spheres of state activity in Russia. Partly due to the painful democratic experience most of Russians choose in favour of a strong hand at power than democratic freedoms and values. Specificity of Russian development in the turbulent 1990s gave birth to a contemporary ideology of “*Putinism*”, a phenomenon which is puzzling political scholars and concerning Western leaders preoccupied with the perspectives of democracy in Russia. Emerged in the years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency and prospering also with Putin as a Prime Minister, *Putinism* is associated with “the rise of political authoritarianism or managed democracy” (Beer 2009, pp.37-39) and is related to such events in Russian politics as ‘centralisation of political and economic power, the emasculation of parliamentary politics, the muzzling of the media, a return to the rhetoric of Great Russian nationalism and a bullying interference in the affairs of neighbouring states in what the Russians call “the near abroad” (ibid.).

Defined as “the inheritor of Russia’s first liberal experiment” (Beer 2009, p.39), *Putinism* gained its popularity among Russian population whether the West likes this fact or not and became some kind of united element for disoriented Russians.

The importance of the concept of ‘*Putinism*’ for this research dues to the fact that as an ideology it has contributed to the process of power construction in Russia (Gvozdev 2004, p.29). However, it is problematic to offer a consistent definition of this recently emerged concept. Gvozdev equalizes it with the following events: an attempt to substitute chaos of the Yeltsin’s years with internal peacefulness and reconciliation, with strengthening of vertical of power as one of the most important objectives (ibid. p. 30). Emphasis on political stabilization as a condition for further development was not innovatory, having roots in Russian history, just as the majority of events in contemporary Russia. Peter Stolypin, tsarist prime-minister in the years 1906-1911, in the period of instability following the Revolution of 1905 stressed the key role of political order as a basis for accelerating economic progress. In its turn, a vibrant market economy would offer Russian Empire the necessary instruments for restoring Russian leading positions in world politics shattered by the loss in the war with Japan and domestic instability. (ibid.)

A specific feature of Russian “managed pluralism” (Gvozdev 2004, p.29) became the belief that although democratic values and freedoms and values should be an indispensable part of Russian reality, their blind implementation particularly in the

circumstances when state apparatus is relatively weak will have devastating consequences for Russia (ibid. p.31). Thus, basing on Gvozdev, I would define the political system which had emerged as a product of Putinism as a structure offering space for reasonable rivalry and freedom of self-determination, but with a state having the last word in any social, economic or political modifications (Gvozdev 2004, p. 31). This domestic structure, along with developments in the international system has had a crucial influence on the vision of power which had been formed.

As far as the economic sphere is concerned, “state-directed capitalism” is preferred, with acknowledgment of the positive role that private entrepreneurship and foreign investors can play for the stimulation of economic growth. However, all key decisions in the economic sphere must be taken up with the approbation of the state. This refers particularly to the commercial activity related to strategic natural resources which must be exploited by domestic and foreign business community in cooperation with the Russian state. Thus, Russian state performs as a system, determining the boundaries within which non-governmental actors can operate according to the rules established by Kremlin (Gvozdev 2004, p.32).

2.2.2 Aspects of Russian post-Soviet development and Great Power Restoration

In spite of its shattered positions, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union Russia retained the title of the nuclear power, a place of the permanent member of the UN Security Council, and strengthened its decisive function of ensuring European energy security. Regardless of its reduced lands, poor economic performance and relative preparedness of armed forces, in the years of Putin’s presidency the dreams of restoring former might were not forget and the determination to be identified as a great power with key role in global affairs was replicated in official declarations and was being progressively more actively converted into concrete actions. Russia step by step regained control over domestic situation, which was in chaos after the shocks of the reforms and as a result of achieved economic progress obtained a certain sensation of its self-belief. Russian intensions to re-establish its positions in the region it had been historically dominating and in the world were not welcomed by other actors. It was hard

to comprehend how a restored great power might fit in the existing global order taken over by the USA as the only superpower. (Sakwa 2008, p.363)

Elected as a president, Putin preserved Ivanov as the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; nevertheless substantial transformations occurred in the way foreign policy was conducted. A new Foreign Policy Concept was accepted on 28 June 2000 and in this document a strong desire to assimilate into the existing global order came together with claims about “Russia’s great power status” (Sakwa 2008, p.372). In spite of the fact that the majority of the constituent parts of the newly adopted document had been previously mentioned, under Putin foreign policy gained a new direction oriented towards more realist comprehension of Russian international surrounding and its true possibilities disparate from romantic aspirations. Richard Sakwa argues that Putin’s new realism was just as “ambitious” as previously elaborated Russian foreign policy doctrines, but at least it was featured by an understanding that Russia was definitely short of resources crucial for achieving the position in the world that it believed belonged to it. Putin pointed out as the basics the necessity to reconstruct the national economy. The role of diplomacy was to compensate the shortage of tangible funds. (ibid. p. 372)

Russian attempts of self-determination coincided with the continuously evolving international relations, with the period of the development of the international system which had not yet completely recovered from the traumas of the end of the bipolar world and was in a state of instability. As enduring procedures of disintegration of some states and the emergence of others have been completed, economic might proved to be a more precise indicator of the power of a state than barely delineated military potential. Russian case is an important point in favour of this argument. Economic backwardness characterised for Russia in the 1990s was one of the key factors that challenged Russia’s great power ambitions in anticipation of the Putin’s period when economic recovery provided enthusiasm and determination to its foreign policy. Moderate successes in the sphere of international recognition of its potential have been achieved. In 2002, for example, Russia changed the title of guest into that of member of what became G8 and joined thus the assembly exercising control over the administration of world economy. However, the inconsistency between ambitions and potential persisted and what were even more dramatic, other global actors were not disposed to recognize the status that Russia perceived as its own. Although in the year 2007 Russia achieved the tenth place in the top of the leading world economies, its fiasco to incorporate,

assimilate into the ever changing global order provoked continuous strains in foreign policy (Sakwa 2008, p.382).

2.2.3 “Statist globalisation” and corporations as global players

The interconnection between markets and politics has been earlier stressed by regime and institutionalist theories and also by writings on the new global order. In the 1970s this issue gained particular attention as academics initiated discussions on the influence of the capitals’ holders upon the executives. The suggestion that unbalanced money-making reliance concerns the sovereignty of the state and endows particular agents with springs of pressure belongs among others to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. (Berenskoetter in Berenskoetter & Williams 2007, p.8)

A new century has brought with it several new centres of rapid economic development. Former developing countries have transformed into actors of global significance owing to ascending oil and services prices, substantial financial inflows from abroad and alterations in world market conjuncture in the world. The process of transformation into global economic powers has been primarily conducted under the surveillance of the ruling regime in cooperation with corporations controlled by these very regimes, giving birth to the occurrence of “statist globalisation”. Such changes in global power distribution have provoked discussions about the return to state centric system. Some scholar mention, on contrary, that corporations controlled by states are active participants in transnational financial processes and that by their activity they further stimulate global economic interaction. (Harris 2009, p.6).

Global companies run by national states have achieved a high degree of control over certain sectors of world economy, and significantly increased the revenues of state budgets. This phenomenon is predominantly factual for China, Arab Gulf States and Russia and in spite of its specificity it does not fall out of the overall process of globalisation that has captured the world. It simply demonstrates that globalisation is penetrating into these societies and is being assimilated in accordance with their national and historical specifics. (ibid.)

For the purposes of this paper only the Russian case is relevant, and it will be discussed in the lines that follow. As the first signs of the coming financial crisis emerged in the USA in 2007, Russian economy was experiencing high rates of growth caused primarily by favourable oil and gas commerce. In addition to that, Russia, along with India and China, was in the group of states which were producing 50% of the global economic progress. (Harris 2009, p.6)

Oil and gas reserves were not only a rich source supplying Russian reserve fund but also an important “statist economic and political power” (ibid. p.11). As Carola Hoyos claimed in 2007, Russia’s Gazprom was among the new “Seven Sisters”, transnational corporations which practically controlled global oil and gas supplies reaching every corner of the world with its actions (Hoyos, cited in Harris 2009, p. 13).

When Putin became the President, Russia was on the way to “comprador capitalism”, a system in which selected circle of the privileged with connections abroad make use of national wealth in a way that is profitable for foreign transnational corporations (Sakwa 2008, p.311). At this time local manufacturing and business formations would fall out of the requirements of the global conjuncture. One of the biggest problems in Russia was the failure to create satisfactory conditions for fair economic activity which would be attractive for foreign and domestic investors. While fraud, criminality and economic insecurity were dominating Russian internal market, it was highly problematic to convince industrialists that durable projects should be launched. (ibid.)

Thus, talking about Putin’s strong hand the circumstance of the Russian state nearly falling apart must be taken into consideration. In order to guarantee protection for foreign capitals and to convince foreign partners in the liability of Russian companies acting in other states, secure domestic system was required (Harris 2009, p.22). If during Yeltsin years a group of oligarchs, controlling financial flows and having access into politics were establishing the rules according to which the relationship between state and business develop, Putin radically changed the situation.

The lack of foreign and domestic investment as well as the capital flight was among the key problems preventing economic growth. The regression in the ration of investment significantly surpassed the regression in production registered in the first years of drastic economic reforms. The total concentration of foreign and domestic capital in the

period from 1990 and 2000 was reduced by 75 percent. The huge shortage of investment had as a consequence a deficit of national financial funds and enormous scarcity of production that will continue influence Russian economic performance in the coming years. As a result of an enhanced attractiveness of Russian economic environment introduced together with Putin's rule, the rate of investment raised from 5.3 per cent in 1999 to 17.7 in 2000. One the explanation of such improvement was that it was officially declared by the President that no substantial rearrangement of possessions gained during Yeltsin years will take place. Thus, the holders felt more secure about planning their business for a durable perspective (Sakwa 2008, p.302).

Initially cautious of financial inflows from abroad, particularly of those directed towards bigger companies, Russian authorities later on were keen on catching the attention of foreign investors. However, this could not be done without secure domestic economic and political climate. Although the rate of foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown in 2006 in comparison to 1990s, its level still remained relatively low in comparison with other countries. In China, for example, in 2006 more than \$70 billion was invested, while in Russia only \$10 billion. The majority of foreign assets are absorbed by companies specializing on food preparation and commerce, at the same time as energy business obtained a comparatively insignificant share due to the difficulties related to security of assets of investors owning the minority of shares and to limited possibilities of transferring revenues to the country of origin (Sakwa 2008, p.302).

2. CONSTRUCTIVISM AS THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader into the essentials of the theoretical framework which has been chosen for the investigation of the following research question: ‘What kind of understanding of what power is emerges from Putin’s speeches?’ Accordingly, the theory this study relies on is constructivism and this chapter will reflect the following issues. Firstly, I will present motives explaining why I consider constructivism to be suitable for the analysis of power argumentation. Secondly, I will go briefly through historical circumstances which have contributed to the consolidation of its present position of an influential meta-theory. Thirdly, I will approach power, the key concept of my study, from constructivist perspective and will present it as an essentially social phenomenon. Further on, I will introduce the main analytical tool, the classification of forms of power elaborated by Barnett & Duvall. Ultimately, I will explain the connection between the ontological position and the research problem of the investigation, determining the role of theory in the overall research design.

2.1 Preface on constructivism

2.1.1 Relevance of constructivism for the study of argumentation on power

Before proceeding to the presentation of the theoretical framework of this study I will explain why out of the variety of IR theories I have chosen namely constructivist meta-theory for the power analysis. One might suggest that one of the materialist approaches, for example, might be more suitable for a study on power. Especially if we look at the particular events in contemporary world politics and observe that material or physical might of a state continues to play a significant role in the political weight that this particular state possesses. Morgenthau’s elaborations about power made in the last century remain to be topical nowadays as well. Traditionally perceived as the most

fruitful state-centrist theory about power realism determined for some time the direction into which the research on power should move. Explained mostly in military terms, power used to serve as a criterion for categorization of the states and accounting for their actions (Berenskoetter in Berenskoetter & Williams 2007, p.1). The basics of this approach remain to be influential in the discipline of IR and in the real politics of concrete states. However, power understood in military terms is only a part of the picture which emerges from Putin's speeches.

At the same time the growing amount of transnational actors involved in power relations as a result of a globalized world talks in favor of some approach that would not be limited either to state-centric line or to those prioritizing non-governmental agents of power. In addition to the already existing problematic and debate around this highly disputable concept, I plan to investigate the role of non-state actors in the construction of power, taking however in consideration the organizing role of the state. The case of Putin's Russia is a convincing demonstration of a very interesting interplay among these two.

The main advantage of constructivist research on power is that it offers a combination of rationalist and interpretive approaches creating a framework which corresponds in a better way to the ever changing world and rapidly evolving field of global politics. In contemporary conditions of the spreading transnationalism, of increasing correlation in social, economic and political spheres the way in which political actors conceptualize power is not reduced either to material or spiritual issues. Consequently, the analysis should be able to grasp how the actors' understanding of power combines social, economic and political perspectives.

Weakened and diversified world politics does not concentrate any more on the nation-states' politics. Systems of administration have their roots in the interactions on the domestic level and on individual-social structures. Financial organisations, for example, play nowadays a role similar in its importance to the role of inter-state rule. People, communities, companies, non-governmental organisations, business groups do not view a nation state as a guarantee of their profits and well-being. On contrary, they are actively engaged in the process of promoting their goals using state structures or avoiding them. Thus, the world order is not any more determined solely by the "balances of power among states", but also by the practice of dispersion and allocation

of power among numerous agents and within a large number of social systems (Goverde p. 172).

This introductory part will further evolve into a detailed elaboration on constructivist interpretation of power which, in my opinion, suits the best to the purpose of this study.

2.1.2 Historical overview

Constructivist meta-theory has emerged out of the Third Debate in IR. Its ideas have been institutionalised in a particular historical and cultural context. In the 1980s the Cold War confrontation remained to be the most troubling event of the world politics. As a response to nuclear race numerous social movements have intensified their activities, appealing for the parts in the conflict to stop the nuclear competition. As the desired end of the Cold War had occurred, it became clear that the leading IR theories had not been able to foresee and to justify, interpret this event. (Fierke 2007, p.16)

“Reflexive modernity” or the coming comprehension, perception of the essential constraints and equivocalness of the progressive technological and social development tracing from the beginning of the 20th century was another historical factor that contributed to the consolidation of constructivism. The spirit of disappointment with the achievements of the modern society mostly in North America and Western Europe was provoked by the understanding of the fact that the human civilization is not as powerful as it presumed, that technology is not able to cope with ecologic catastrophes, poverty and starvation. (Fierke 2007, p. 151)

The unexpected realisation of the western societies that their values, norms and ideas can no longer be easily prescribed to other communities became especially significant for the field of IR. In the context of spreading waves of nationalism on the European continent and decolonization in other parts of the world, the survival of the European international society was seriously questioned. In addition to this the whole set of well-established diplomatic procedures went into crisis. The appearance of the term Third World in world politics and huge discrepancy between the North and the South reminded that the world in reality is not administered by the progressive doctrines of the North. (ibid. p. 153)

In constructivist interpretation these events demonstrated that global politics does not function according to some inborn fixed rules which perform autonomously from the individual's conduct, knowledge and social intercourse. Although the system of international relations is not governed by one central authority and claimed to be anarchical, it is a regime whose laws and practices are established by human actions. Thus, international reality is determined not by some inevitable virtues inferred from human character or world anarchy, but by regulations produced by social interaction. (Fierke 2007, p.155) Thus, power is no longer viewed as a natural phenomenon resulting from human nature or institutional frameworks solely, as something that can not be modified. On contrary, it is a product of social reality, the result of the activity of the participants to the process; it is constructed and determined by their deeds.

2.1.3 Constructivism and meta-theoretical debate

Constructivism as a theory has emerged out of its debate with other approaches. In its discussion with rationalism, ontology, or the nature of being, has become the major issue of dispute. Meditating upon the nature of objects the global realm consists of rationalists accept individualist ontology, as the core of inquiry is centred on human beings or particular countries. Constructivists, on contrary accentuate "social ontology" (Fierke 2007, p.170). Due to the fact that humans, just like states are primarily of a social origin, they can not move apart from the framework of norms and values which shape their identity and the opportunities at their disposal (ibid).

Although the concept of "social structure" (ibid.) is an indispensable part of rationalism as well as constructivism, their approach to it differs significantly. Rationalists consider that material structure initially limits and restraints any pursuits and engagements of the states, offering the space just for rivalry and handing over material resources. Every single action of the state within this structure pursues its own interests and strives towards accumulation of benefits. Constructivism admits the significance of material constituent, but prioritises the role of norms and co-operative comprehension of the necessity to act within the limits imposed by these norms. The actors are guided not

primarily by personal concerns, but the rules established by various agents of social structure. (Fierke 2007,p.170)

In accordance with constructivism world politics has “social facts” (Adler 1997, p.323) as its main constitutive elements. These facts would not have had any of their present authority without the allowance granted to them by people. Simultaneously, constructivists not only accept as true the presence and role of the material constituents, but also claim that material reality goes into opposition when affected. As we can see, constructivism encloses both materialist and interpretive conceptions and represents a middle ground between two schools of thought. (ibid.)

2.2 Power in constructivism – material and spiritual compilation

2.2.1 Power as a social construction and a key concept

Although the concept of constructivism has been introduced only in 1989 by Nicolas Onuf, understanding of power offered by it dates back to the works of classics of philosophical thought. For centuries power has been associated with human feelings and emotions.

Acknowledging that the material reality exists, constructivism does not limit its causation to material factors solely, rather stresses the importance of social determinants. It is assumed that identities, interests and conduct of elected representatives are “socially constructed” by conjoint understanding and impression of the reality. (Hopf 1998, p.177)

Thus, it significantly extends the understanding of power to that including also “the power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology, and language, that is, discourse” (Hopf 1998, p.177). This idea of correlation between material and ideational elements of power, accepted by constructivists originates from the works of Michel Foucault, Antonio Gramsci and Max Weber and constitutes their basic assumption on power (ibid).

The way states behave in relation to other participants of the world politics depends upon the dominating social practices on the domestic arena and abroad. According to Richard Ashley, social practice delegates power to the state, determines its capacities which are recognized by the society. Along with the power to govern “intersubjective” perceptions, presented above, constructivism emphasizes one more form of power. Namely possession of financial and military recourses which allow bringing into action discursive power by supporting agencies whose task is to promote social practices. (Ashley in Hopf 1998, p.177) An important aspect of power in vision of constructivists is to “reproduce, discipline and police” (Hopf 1998, p.180).

Conventional and critical constructivists approach power slightly differently. The critical group presumes that power is practiced in every social intercourse, leading position belonging always to one of the parts. Further clarification of this type of relations is an important type of critical constructivists’ research programme. Conventional constructivists agree upon the fact that “power is everywhere” but do not use it as a starting point for their research and are not interested in examining this topic. The statement of critical constructivists about the authoritative nature of social reality brings them at some point of agreement with realists and neorealists, corresponding to their perception of the nature of world politics. (Hopf 1998, p.180).

Constructivist understanding of power is based on the presumption that we can talk about power not only in the case of some conflict of interests, but also in the atmosphere of consensus. As Lukes argues, one of the goals of power and simultaneously the demonstration of its effectiveness is the ability to avert any incompatible interests and to avoid direct confrontation (Lukes cited in Berenskoetter 2007, p.10).

Basic constructivist assumptions about the role of social structure and non-material constituents in the destiny of political actors have influenced its approach to power as well. Rationalist approaches such as neorealism and neoliberalism believe that “material power”, based on either military or financial resources, or including both of them is the most significant element of supremacy and domination in world politics. According to constructivist scholars, only the combination of “material and discursive power” can lead to the effective analysis of International Relations (Hopf 1998, p.177).

In the process of social construction of power, separate attention is paid to the role institutions play in this process. For constructivists, this issue is topical because in their interpretation institutions do not only mirror power relations or offer solutions to difficulties caused by joint actions of several actors. Institutions assist to clarify how new norms appear and dissolve in the social structures, influencing the degree of significance attached to this or that problem by states. Institutions act as means which spread new values and ideas and possess the capacity to initiate modifications within states. (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.42)

However, liberal constructivists concentrating solely on the importance of the non-governmental institutions in the structure of power completely neglect the role of the state, stressed by the statist constructivists. Might of one state is progressively established by the skills of its authorities to cooperate and activate advantageously within the civil society and to use non-governmental actors in the promotion of their own goals. Still, the level of success in this manoeuvre depends from one state to another. States with long and stable democratic traditions accommodate quickly to the new tendencies of global development. Countries with developing economies are more vulnerable to the tensions and requirements of globalisation due to the internal instability and established practices of state-centric policy-making. (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.44)

2.2.2 Power and its critical dimensions

Barnett and Duvall present the following conceptualisation of power. In a broad sense, “power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate” (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.8).

Such explanation presumes that analysis of power should be conducted on the basis of two “dimensions”, which form the cornerstone of the above mentioned definition. They are: the *types of social interactions* which represent a mechanism that makes power perform and the “*specificity*” of these interactions which makes it possible to influence upon actors’ capacity to perform tasks and comprehend issues. In accordance with the first dimension, power can be a characteristic of distinct actors and their relationships,

or a collective action of creating social nature of actors, “their social identities and capacities”. It can act by applying direct physical force and producing orders or controlling the content of social structures and schemes of comprehension that favour some member of a social relation and prejudice others. (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.9)

The second dimension refers to the proportion to which social interactions, serving as a working space for power are explicit and clearly expressed, targeting the specific social group, or are ambiguous and socially expanded. An example of the first case would be pointing a gun to somebody, specifying thus the object and the goal of this action. In the second case, precedents of international organisations which make prescriptions and decide upon who take part in the discussions and makes concluding declarations can be used. (ibid.)

Under the first dimension it is analysed if power is performed in “interactions or social constitution” (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.9) One approach of this dimension views social relations as consisting of individual deeds of actors directed towards each other. In this case power manifests by means of intercommunication among actors, which in its turn influences upon the degree of their ability to manage own destinies. From this point of view, power is practically converted into a quality belonging to the actor, which can be set into motion as a device used to form the behaviour and circumstances for such behaviour of other actors (ibid).

Another approach is made of “social relations of constitution” (ibid. p.9-10). In this case, power operates by means of social interactions that tentatively anticipate social status of actors and participate in the process of their development as social individuals with corresponding intellectual and spiritual attributes. Thus, this approach studies how specific social relations influence upon the process of creation of specific types of actors. Due to the fact that this kind of interactions in reality produces diverse social types that possess diverse knowledge and personal attributes, they influence directly upon the skills, potentiality of the actor to create his own fate. (ibid.)

This theoretical differentiation between two types of power, that “working through social relations of interaction or in social relations of constitution” is similar to the difference often met in the writings on power: “power over” and “power to” (ibid. p.10). Definitions of power originated from social relations of acts and performance presume

that certain actors dominate in the relationship over others, and consequently they are “power over” definitions. The second group of definitions which concentrates on the process of developing of actors out of social interaction are similar to “power to” definitions. (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.9)

The above mentioned particularities of interaction and constitution determine specific characteristics of the “effects of power” (ibid.). As a result of the fact that power is an attribute of actors’ deeds and relations, there is an inclination to analyse its impacts mainly in the limits of the activity of the target of power. Alternatively, constitutive power is considered to generate results exclusively in the terms of personal characteristics of the participants of the social interaction. However, there are no motives for researchers who have chosen as a basis one of the two definitions to limit themselves solely to the impacts determined by it and totally exclude those offered by the alternative definition. Let us presume that power operates by means of the activity of certain actors and results in creating the style and dimensions of the ability of actors to take command over their own lives. Then it manifests in a large number of impacts, spreading from those that entirely influence upon the conduct of others to determining the boundaries of actors’ perception of the environment surrounding them and their own inner world. Interaction power, then, can predetermine actors’ perceptions and their personal features. Correspondingly, if power performs in social relations of constitution, it activates in the direction of transforming actors into social beings, and outlines essential vocations in which they are supposed to participate as subordinates. And constitutive power, therefore, structures attitudes’ predispositions of the person. Consequently, researchers who analyse power through the prism of social communication are able to trace its impacts on individuality, and those who analyse using constitutive approach observe impacts produced on concrete deeds. (Barnett & Duvall 2005, pp.10-11)

The second crucial explanatory dimension refers to the nature of social relations which manifest as an arena for the exercise of power. Interactions can be “direct or diffuse”. In the first case we deal with concrete, eventual and realistic correlation between the participants of the interaction. It is considered that this type of partnership between the subject and the object are physical and rationally unavoidable. A result of this need of social collision is the growing confusion in monitoring power in action when the social

remoteness is increasing, just as remoteness between motivation and final impact. (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.11)

Approaches of diffuse relations presume that power can be exercised even if the relations are isolated and negotiated, or take place at personal, chronological and social extension. This kind of power performance is usually associated with the activity of international organisations, which spread their influence by some invisible mechanisms. (ibid., p.12)

3.3 Forms of power as guiding framework of the study

Barnett and Duvall present the following forms of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive. In the lines that follow I will take a closer look at each of these.

3.3.1 Compulsory power

Compulsory power centres its attention on a variety of correlations between actors that permit one of the actors to form in a straight line the position and acts of the other one. One of the most successful definitions of power reduced to pure authority is that of Robert Dahl, which defines power as “the ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do” (Dahl 1957, p. 202-03, in Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.13) This definition has *intention, conflict and resources* as the characterizing features of power. Thus, firstly there should exist a strong desire from the part of A to modify the behaviour of B in the way that A wishes. Secondly, B is not willing to follow the route prescribed by A, as this would lead to a certain weakening of its own positions and there exist an initial contradiction in the results that A and B strive towards. Finally, A is victorious in his aspirations due to the fact that he possesses certain material or ideational that would compel B to change its position. This form of power remains to be significant for major IR theories. Analysis of power in International Relations continues to look at the way in which one state is capable to employ resources it possesses to promote its concerns which are in conflict with concerns of another state. Interpreting power in such terms

inevitably brings great powers to mind. Powerful states possess the capacity to establish the course into which world politics develops by means of their crucial material benefits. They are able not only to decide upon the spheres of public life that must be managed but also to organize the politics of less powerful states (Gilpin 2002, in Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.14).

However, states are not the only actors which possess the above mentioned capacity to govern policies of other states. Multinational corporations can deploy their funds to influence upon overseas financial strategies of small countries and international monetary procedures. Furthermore, this form of power is performed by international organisations, like the World Bank or the United Nations (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.14).

Field of action of compulsory power is not reduced only to material, but comprises as well “symbolic and normative resources”. Thus, non-governmental actors, for the most part various civil society organisations have proved that they can make certain states and multinational corporations follow ideas and standards they promote by exploiting oratorical and figurative instruments (ibid. p.15).

3.3.2 Institutional power

Institutional power differs from compulsory power by the fact that it presumes “indirect control” of one actor over another one, while compulsory power involves “direct control” (ibid. p.15). In particular, the centre of attention in this case is official and unofficial organizations that act as intermediaries between A and B, while A, acting in the frames of the regulations and practices that characterize those organisations, directs, pushes, and restricts conduct and reality circumstances of B (ibid.).

If compulsory power is directly based on the supplies that are used as a means of influence over B, then in the case of institutional power, A doesn't formally own the institution that determine the destiny of B. There exists a probability that a governing actor directly rules the organisation, which transmits the desired policies further on. In case when an organisation is run totally by a single actor, then it would be correct to relate this kind of interrelation to compulsory power. In practice, it rarely happens so

that there is only one governing actor, organisation being frequently autonomous from countries whose share in financial contributions is the prevalent. (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 2004 in Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.16).

Another important aspect of this form of power that must be mentioned is that A and B are standing apart from each other in a social context, and are interconnected just in a roundabout way. Located at some distance one from another, A shapes the actions of other actors promoting various tools that an organisation is legitimized to apply to its members. Thus power is coming not from A directly but is performed through “socially extended, institutionally diffuse relations” (Barnett & Duval, 2005, p.16).

Compulsory and institutional forms of power both belong to distributive power, as they are inclined to find answers to the following: “who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell cited in Lipshutz 2007, p. 227). The following two forms of power, structural and productive, are ‘constitutive’ (Lipshutz 2007, p. 227) for the reason that deals with the construction and establishment of ‘society, state and market’ (ibid.).

3.3.3 Structural power

Structural power is related to the “constitutive, internal relations of structural positions” that establish to what type of social organisms actors belong (Barnett & Duval 2005, p.18). This form of power relates to the purpose to establish what are the social aptitudes and pursuits that characterise a particular actor. Adepts of structural power define *structure* in a way different from those who concentrate on institutional power. Thus, the former delineate structure as a compilation of canons, courses of action, and standards that restrict the conduct of previously established actors with permanent inclinations. The latter define structure as an “internal relation”, whereas the type of interrelation between A and B is that very determinant that is decisive in the position these two occupy in the structure. From this angle, social organisms that are reciprocally created are completely interconnected and all their attributes are predetermined by the social position they reside in. (Barnett & Duval 2005, p.18).

Schmitt defines structural power as the power which is inherent in the ruler's ability to institute and modify the dogmatic clauses which stipulate the procedures of foundation and operation of various organisations (Schmitt cited in Lipschutz 2007, p. 228). The country, for instance, is empowered to indicate what elements of a market are, to make directive administering markets and to establish conditions for their execution. Thus, the ruler is the one that establishes the structure and his status is more profitable than that of an agent even with the capacity to control the market. (Lipshutz, in Berenskoetter and Williams 2007, p.228).

This form of power generates the destinies and circumstances of actors in the following ways. Firstly, a place that actors occupy within a structure does not produce identical public benefits; on contrary, structures distribute discrepant capabilities and benefits to various statuses. Secondly, structural power is creating not only the material properties of actors but also their identities and level of importance they attribute to their own position within the structure. Therefore structural power is capable of preventing an actor from distinguishing its own supremacy within the structure (ibid. p. 18).

3.3.4 Productive power

Productive power has similar characteristics to those of structural power. They are equally focused on the "constitutive social processes" that are not subjects of control of some particular agents of power, but that are established by consequential procedures of these agents. The core of attention of the two forms of power is the social derivation of the capabilities of the actors, their identities, and real activities. (Barnett & Duval 2005, p. 20)

Main distinction consists in the fact that productive powers brings about more comprehensive and disperse social procedures. This form of power distances from structural determinants and gives preference to different "social powers" (ibid.) which act by intermediary of "systems of knowledge and discursive practices" (ibid.).

3.4 Constructivist ontology and research problem, purpose of investigation

Conducting research within theoretical boundaries of constructivist meta-theory implies that particular ontological considerations would frame the logic of investigation. Accepting “social ontology” (cf. above; Fierke 2007, p.170) that is accentuated by constructivism, my study will ground on a theoretical presumption that power is not a production of the activity of particular individuals or directed actions of states, as it would be in the case of rationalist ontology. Rather, being of a social origin, power construction is determined by a combination of spiritual and material factors; it is a result of the activity of a large set of participants to the social process, just as of their interests, norms and values.

Classification of the forms of power introduced by Barnett and Duvall and discussed earlier in this chapter will serve as the main analytical tool which will be primarily used in the final chapter of this paper to put under theoretical evaluation the results of the analysis of Putin’s argumentation on power, conducted by means of Toulmin’s method. The role of the theory in my research design will be to thus to answer the question: which of the above presented forms of power emerges from Putin’s speeches. When this analytical step is performed, further elaborations on power will proceed.

Approaching power as a social construction, one of the basic issues to explore is what the building elements of this construction are. Looking into Putin’s speeches I plan to find out what are the main social structures that a state must interact with in order to be powerful internationally. I presume that these structures do not limit to domestic ones only, but include also foreign mechanisms such as international law and various institutions. The core of my attention, however, transnational oil and gas companies will constitute. The motive for this is the presumption that not only states possess the capability to exercise direct or diffuse influence over policies of other actors operating within the boundaries of the international system. The case of Putin’s Russia will be used to demonstrate that such companies, particularly Gasprom, also act as important participants in the process of power construction, on international and domestic level. I will also determine what kind of role is attributed by state to non-governmental elements - cooperative, confrontational or that of rivalries.

In the analytical chapter of this paper I will start from basic constructivist approach to power. My hypothesis is that the vision of power which will emerge out of Putin's speeches after the argumentation analysis based on Toulmin's model of argument would be conducted is that of a diffuse nature, combining elements from previously mentioned forms of power. Thus, I will initially identify what, according to the studied primary material, are the agents of power – rulers or 'sovereigns' as Schmitt puts it (Schmitt cited in Lipschutz, 2007, p.228) or 'social subjects' (ibid.). Further on, my goal will be to identify through which type of power these agents are pursuing their goals.

It is not enough to identify what types of resources (economy, armed forces, populace, etc.) can be combined into a particular guide on power and to what degree these supplies can be successfully exploited in political sphere. Thus, simply to possess a resource does not imply to be able to exercise power. 'Will' to bring these resources into play is just as important as the resources themselves and represents a resource itself. (Berenskoetter in Berenskoetter & Williams 2007, p. 6)

To conclude, I stipulate once again that constructivist ontological positions presented in this chapter have a crucial importance for the understanding of the main concept of this paper. Results of the analysis of the primary material, which is Vladimir Putin's speeches, will be further submitted to theoretical evaluation.

4. STEPHEN TOULMIN'S MODEL OF ARGUMENT AS METHOD

In this chapter I will introduce the method of the study and will explain how I will apply it in the task of answering the main research question of this paper: 'What kind of an understanding of what makes a state powerful emerges from Putin's speeches?' In my analysis I will be looking for arguments which include discussion on power and will apply the method, Stephen Toulmin's model of analysis of argument. Thus, in the introductory part of this chapter I will put forward the interrelation between method and theory, which is constructivism. I will ground reasons which will justify the position that in this investigation method goes hand in hand with the theoretical framework. Further on, I will present Toulmin's model itself and will give a detailed overview of what elements of an argument according to Toulmin are. In the final part of this chapter I will explain how I intend to arrive from setting the arguments out to generalizations about what the contemporary vision on power is.

4.1 Role of language in constructivism

As I have elaborated previously the theoretical framework of this study is based on constructivist understanding of power, according to which power is no longer perceived as an inevitable manifestation determined only by human nature or systemic characteristics. Furthermore, as a product of social reality power is influenced by actions of the participants to social process. Additionally, constructivism which portrays the world of politics as the one determined by language and concentrates on the interaction of symbols would combine with a method based *on linguistic approach*.

The forefathers of the actual rhetorical culture claimed that the action of rhetoric deals with actual, concrete realm, and does not concentrate on visionary, abstract systems. Thus, its proceedings are related to a certain temporal and areal point bringing to an issue selective periods in the activities of nations, civic communities. (Jasinski 2001, p.12) Similarly, if we take a look at the content of Vladimir Putin's speeches, we can make up a list of the most topical problems facing the Russian population for the moment when the speech was made. Such problems are economic underdevelopment, high level of corruption, disintegration of the state, political inefficiency, and a variety

of social problems. The issue of power, or to be more precise, the appeal towards the great power restoration and a consistent plan of actions for the realisation of this goal is one of the key topics in Putin's political argumentation. Thus, I would conclude that speeches serve as a reflection of Russian social reality and can be further scrutinized for the exposure of what power, as a social phenomenon within this social reality represents by itself. Therefore, I accept position of Jasinski, who claims that "social reality is constructed through rhetorical practice" (Jasinski 2001, p.21).

One of the most important questions within constructivism is the level of importance that should be attributed to language and the role it plays in the process of analysis of politics. Positions of the most prominent scholars regarding this issue differ significantly. Some of the scholars, like Onuf and Kratochwil stress the primordial importance of language and choose it as a focus of their attention. Alexander Wendt, for example, is not so enthusiastic about language and barely mentions it in his works. However, he admits that language, indeed, is an important element of social research and that it is an effective mean to illustrate a concrete situation rigorously. Thus, the only role of language, according to Wendt, is to present the reality and express some information to the audience. (Onuf 2001, p.243)

Linguistic intercourse is not only a part of the communication process; it can act as a space within which reality is constructed. It is language that creates a benevolent atmosphere for normative context to shape and affect in this way or another actions of individuals because the process of understanding and explication that transforms norms into actions has language as its cornerstone. (Zehfuss 2001, p.70) Hence language is placed at the core of the analysis and declared as a key factor shaping social reality, although the presence of material realm is not denied either.

Onuf has made an attempt to create a theory of IR based which would have social reality as its main constitutive. The centre of his attention is the interaction that constantly takes place between human beings and society, the interaction which in the result produces social reality. (Zehfuss 2002, p.151)

Onuf perceives the reality through this act of creation. Generally speaking people constitute the real world by means of their actions. Speech acts may be these very important actions. There is a dual interaction between speech acts and reality.

Performed again and again speech acts may be incorporated into the social structure in the form of regulations, producing the foundation for design and interpretation of individual behaviour. Much politics is involved in this procedure, as the rules administer the advantages in an unequal manner, offering prerogatives to a limited group of people. Onuf's theoretical framework is grounded on the following notions: speech acts, deeds and rules. In the speech act theory Onuf claims that social reality is created by deeds which express themselves in pronouncing of the words rather than in certain corporal movements. The functions of the language are both to reproduce some actions and to accomplish them. Onuf focuses on the role of words as in his opinion language allows individuals to create their own realm. (Zehfuss 2002, p.151)

4.2 Primary data and method

Vladimir Putin's public declarations have been chosen as primary data for the analysis. I have selected a number of Speeches, Annual Addresses to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, and Interviews given to Russian and foreign mass-media. I will use the sources in the original Russian language and my research material has been limited to the years of Putin's presidency, so the speeches I will analyze refer to the period 2000-2008. I will perform the translation from Russian into English language myself. In order to answer the research question of my study 'What kind of an understanding of what makes a state powerful emerges from Putin's speeches?' I will concentrate on those speeches in which the issue of *power* has been discussed.

In this task I will use Stephen Toulmin's argumentation analysis. In his book "*The Uses of Argument*" (1958) Toulmin offers a structural model for analysis of rhetorical arguments. He compares an argument with an organism and suggests that its analysis might enable the researcher to distinguish two levels in structure of the argument: the gross one, which refers to its anatomy and a finer level, related to its physiology. The main anatomical elements of the argument are the stages indicating the gradual development from the introductory presentation of the issue proposed for solution to the concluding assumptions. The finer level can be observed when we narrow down our analysis and come to study the performance of the argument "sentence by sentence". However, there exist many possible ways to set the argument out. (Toulmin 2003, p.89)

Toulmin's mode differs from that of Aristotle who had introduced a rather simple approach to the analysis of the finer level of the arguments. It was reduced to laying the argument into three clauses: "minor premiss, major premiss, *so* conclusion". Toulmin's objection was that this pattern was not enough sophisticated and clear and that the constituent parts of the argument could not be reduced to the number of three (Toulmin 2003, p.89.). Instead, Toulmin proposed his own *layout for the structure of the argument*.

As we see Toulmin's model is not the only possible solution to study arguments. I have this particular method out of the following consideration. Primary data offers a large space for analysis. Addresses to Annual Addresses to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation are pages long and not necessarily containing direct reference to the notion of *power*. To point out declaration, which is the starting point in the analysis of an argument from supportive material I need a method which would clearly distinguish between all elements of an argument. Each of these elements is carrying out its own function in the analytical process. In addition to that, the discussion on power in Putin's speeches does not always explicitly present to the audience the answers to key questions of my research. None of the most elaborated speeches tells *what the elements of power are*. On contrary a lot of information is implicit. In order to bring it to surface I will make use of Toulmin's model.

Operating with the notions of applied logic Toulmin inquires what the qualities that a consistent argument's layout should possess are (Toulmin 2003, p.89). Now I will present what are the elements of an argument according to Toulmin and will demonstrate how I will make use of them in my analysis.

In my analysis of Putin's argumentation I work on the basis of a presumption that in case Putin declares something he makes simultaneously a *claim*, which is a needed attribute of any declaration. If the claim is expected to be questioned or to raise some objections, it is necessary to produce some evidence in its support. What is the way to do it? In case the declaration is based on some solid grounds, Putin must generally have some facts at his disposal that he can appeal to. Therefore, if it is expected that the claim arouses some debate or disagreement, he is free to introduce these facts as a ground that the claim relies on.

To offer an example of claim and data, I will analyze the argument used by Putin in his “Opening Address” at the Security Council Session on Russia’s Role in Guaranteeing International Energy Security.

Russia’s well-being in the present and the future directly depends on the place we occupy in the global energy market... Russia makes an important contribution towards maintaining global and regional energy security. (Putin 2005b.)

Thus, the President claims that Russia’s positions in commerce with energy products are important determinants of its domestic welfare and success of its foreign policy. As one of the biggest oil and gas suppliers in the world Russia realizes its responsibility as a serious and reliable partner, expressing concern regarding problems related to energy security of a global character. At the same time Putin asserts that Russia can offer significant support to the international community in the process of ensuring global energy security.

The following information serves as data in this argument. In the situation when energy remains to be one of the driving forces of the world economy certain parts of the globe do not have a regular access to the sources of energy. In the future such situation might provoke an increasing number of regional conflicts because of the lack of reliable supplies. Russia occupies leading positions in the world in the amounts of oil and gas production and has a reputation of a trustworthy partner. Plentiful natural resources, the level of its technological development and the ability to compete on the world markets give Russia the possibility to participate more actively in the process of ensuring global energy security. (Putin 2005b.)


Consequently, we can already differentiate between the *claim*, or final results that we attempt to demonstrate (C) and the facts used to support the claim, called *data* (D). If the initial declaration provokes a question, “What have you got to go on?” (Toulmin, 2003, p.90) the best answer can be provided by offering some solid facts. More questions may follow even after the comprehensive pieces of information have been provided. Further on, no more additional data will be expected, but the clarification of the role it played in the process leading to the establishment of the conclusion. Now, the question asked will be “How do you get there?” (ibid.). To be able to answer this

As this figure demonstrates, the expressed, open, clear repulse comes from data to claim, data acting as a ground. The function of the warrant, which is “incidental and explanatory”, is just to indicate unambiguously, expressly the rightfulness of the step made and to prove its relation to a broader group of steps, articulating their lawfulness as well (Toulmin 2003, p.92).

In this way the difference between data and warrant is clarified: “*data are appealed to explicitly, warrants implicitly.*” Furthermore, warrants are of a more broad character, applying to and justifying the legitimacy of all arguments of the relevant category. Consequently, warrants are constituted on the grounds distinct from those of data (ibid.).

The model of layout achieved is not a final one, there are still some elements missing. There exist various forms of warrants and the proportions of influence they assign to the conclusions vary as well. In certain cases warrants authorize us to support the claim explicitly, characterizing our final assumption with the adverb “necessarily”. In other cases, when adverbs such as “probably” and “presumably” are introduced, the evolution from data to claim is either provisional, or depends on some circumstances, deviations and stipulations. The pattern of analysis might not be completed by indication of *data, warrant and claim*. Further on it might be necessary to include a *qualifier* (Q), which would reveal the proportion of influence assigned to the claim by data on the merit of the warrant (Toulmin 2003, p.93) and a *rebuttal* (R) which denotes conditions under which the warrant is not legitimate any more (ibid. p.94).

The authority of the warrant is sustained by its *backing* (B). The following scheme shows us how it refers to other elements of the argument:



Source: Toulmin 2003, p.97

How can we distinguish the backing from other elements? To differ it from warrant we should keep in mind that warrants act as bridges and are of a more imaginary character. As far as backings are concerned, they can be described as absolute and affirmative declarations. Just like data is used to justify the claim, in the similar way the function of the backing is to support the warrant (Toulmin 2003, p.98).

Although data and backing have something in similar, they vary as well significantly. Both elements can be presented in a form of candid assumptions; still their functions in the argument as a whole differ. Data is an *absolutely compulsory* element of the argument, because a claim produced without having any information there to justify it, is not an argument at all. However, there exists a possibility that the warrant would not be challenged, that its authority would be accepted without any further clarifications. In this case the necessity to appeal to the backing disappears. Consequently, in spite of the similarities between two elements, a crucial distinction is that there can be arguments without the backing of the warrant, but there can be no argument without data (ibid.).

Not much will be said comparing backing, qualifier and rebuttal on the ground that the difference between the grounds justifying the warrant's authority, the force conferred to the warrant and the conditions of its rebuttal are quite obvious (ibid. p.99).

4.3 From analysis of arguments to conclusions

Nowadays in a democratic society none of the major political decisions is taken without a prior public address to the population of the state. The appreciation that the society

gives to a particular political decision is a result of human perception of particular components of political argumentation.

Argumentation analysis, as an analytical tool will allow me to explore that part of a political discourse that can not be traced by merely making acquaintance with a political text. Political discourse as an object of argumentation analysis and as a reflection of social interaction will serve the goal of studying a particular social issue, power. Namely the head of the state became in Russia the most influential publically speaking personality, exercising crucial authority upon the character of political discourse in the state. Choosing primary material for my analysis I have paid a particular attention to political discourses that are characteristic for the President only, like Annual Addresses to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Presidential discourse, in my opinion, expressing major ideas and tendencies of its time is that very reflection of the nature of objective reality which will allow me to generate what kind of vision of power, which in constructivist interpretation is also a part of social reality, is characteristic for the society at the beginning of a new millennium.

As I am not interested just in personal opinions of a particular political leader upon the issue what power is, but in a larger political discourse, I need information presented on a rational basis with all supportive material so that its content might be further used for generating conclusions.

Political speech is a complicated multidimensional phenomenon. As one of the most important forms of contemporary communication, it possesses a set of characteristic features. Political speeches, as a part of public speech are viewed in this study as an element of the process of communication and as one of the types of social interaction, as a political act itself. Out of the consideration that a political speech is a result of the action which is produced by large groups of society (parties, social movements, and organizations), a high level of its public influence is thus presumed. (Yudina 2004, pp.172-173) Interpreting Putin's speeches I will be looking for the altering point of views upon the power in the altering world and every new speech set out for the analysis is a new perception, a new vision, a new perspective upon a new international situation.

In the process of applying Toulmin's method to the analysis of Putin's arguments the first task to fulfil is to recognize the constituent parts of the selected arguments. These parts, as I have previously elaborated are: claims, data, warrants, and the rest. Nonetheless, even after distinguishing all parts of an argument it might still remain unclear, where the real power of the arguments in the construction of social reality originates from. How can a set of selected constituents create a coherent picture of what makes a state powerful in contemporary world?

Studying the text in such terms I presume that each element of the argument carries its own particular task. Thus, the main function of a claim is to pronounce a distinct opinion on an ambiguous or disputable topic that the speaker needs the public to approve. In order to clarify a statement, particularly an elaborated one, it is essential to start with determining the claims. This process can be a rather complicated one due to the fact that claims can be inconceivable as a result of mixed grammatical structures, where claims and other parts of an argument are frequently interwoven. Although sometimes the number of claims in an argument is limited to one, the predominant number of interconnections is centred on the main claim and several subordinate claims (Jasinski 2000, p.24).

The following types of claims are distinguished: claims of fact, claims of value and claims of policy. In case individual talks about precedent or current events related to humanity he is generating a "factual" assertion which gains the features of a claim when questioned or contradicted, which is *claim of fact*. It is very easy to overlook this type of claim presuming that the speechmaker is simply summarizing well-known facts. The claim obtains its quality of a claim when placed under suspicion (ibid. p.25).

At times it can be problematic to distinguish between claims of fact and *claims of value* due to the reason that a number of words possess the virtuosity of both representation and interpretation. The intermixture of facts and values is vividly present in political speeches (ibid. p.26-27).

Claims of policy answer the following question "What should we undertake?" and "How our plans should further develop?" The term policy referring to a set of activities or behaviour we accept of which is determined for us from above (ibid. p.27).

The function of claim is to reflect the basic assertion related to power, to name those determinants that transform a state into a powerful state. Are they of an economic, political, social or whatever nature? It will allow me to answer the question what does it mean for a state to be powerful. However, in order to make my analysis constructivist, it is necessary to determine what would be that very relationship between the understanding of what power in contemporary world is and the broader social reality, how they are mutually constructed and interrelated. To achieve this goal, it is necessary reflect upon the following questions: “What does power do?”, and “How has power come to mean and be able to do what it does?” (Guzzini in Berenskoetter 2007, p.23). The answers to these two questions will be offered by data and warrant correspondingly.

5. ARGUMENTATION OF VLADIMIR PUTIN ON CHARACTERISTICS OF POWERFUL STATE

In the chapter that follows, I will examine the primary sources searching for power related arguments. To answer the main research question of this paper: ‘What kind of an understanding of what makes a state powerful emerges from Putin’s speeches?’ I will set out the chosen arguments into their constitutive elements using Toulmin’s Model of Argument. Ultimately, applying the above mentioned method I will determine what the main argument on power is and how it is justified.

5.1 Soft power and the role of Russian civil society and economy in the construction of the strong state

This section is opened with an abstract of Putin’s interview to Indian mass-media. In the argument set out below Putin expresses his opinion regarding the position that Russia must occupy in the contemporary international architecture and introduces the concept of “great power” explaining how it is related to contemporary Russia.

Argument 1.

Russia is ready to become a part of the new multipolar world and to guarantee the observance of the rules on the international arena, but not a great power with particular rights. Russia wishes to be equal among equals. That’s why we need economic and military might, to guarantee the observance of the international law and of the equal rights of all the participants of international communication. (Putin 2007.)

Putin claims that there is no place for superpowers in the contemporary world and that Russia is promoting the idea of the multipolar world with equal rights and democratic order.

To justify this claim the following data is presented. The term “superpower” dates back to the times of the Cold War confrontation and should not be used in the new conditions of the globalizing world. The existence of a superpower creates conditions when weaker

states do not feel safe, as they realize the existence of menace coming from superpower. Russia, on contrary, wishes to integrate into the world where all states will have equal right and opportunities. (Putin 2007.)

There is also rebuttal in this argument. In case other states do not agree with this affirmation and attach the label of “superpower” to post-soviet Russia, it means that these states pursue the goal of threatening with Russia and creating for Russia an image of enemy.

The warrant is the following. Although Putin denies that aspirations of regaining former might, lost as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, persist in Russian political debate, he admits that Russia is pursuing the goal of increasing its economic and military arsenal. Consequently, *power* remains to be one of the main concerns of the Russian ruling apparatus but its nature, sources and destination are different from those of the former times. Thus, *power* remains to be an indispensable part of Putin’s rhetoric, although the vision of power in Putin’s Russia has gained a new specific. While the main idea that Russia must be a strong state persists, the characteristics of the strong state have changed.

Argument 2.

In the beginning of the year 2000 Putin mentioned the concept of an “effective state” as synonymous to that of the *powerful* state.

In the West the idea of Russia as a strong state is at times interpreted in a wrong way. Talking about a strong state we mean first of all a more *effective state*. (Putin 2000a.)

Putin claims that Russian perception of a strong state differs significantly from that of the negative image that is created in the West when a term “strong” is mentioned in relation to Russia. He introduces and develops the concept of the *effective state* to tell what means *powerful* for Russians themselves.

As data which supports peaceful character of the planned course of actions directed towards the rebuilding of the power of the state, and simultaneously presenting his

vision upon what this state must represent by itself, Putin is creating an imaginary *effective state*, enumerating its main characteristics. They are:

1. An effective state, and consequently a strong state is a state which *determines the rules of the game* and guarantees that all participants follow strictly these rules, with no exceptions permitted.
2. This state must also secure the right to property in equal measure to everybody, which refers to all types of property, not limiting to private one solely; the role of the state is to ensure equal possibilities for everybody.
3. In order to achieve the above mentioned goals, *judiciary and tribunal systems* should be strengthened; much is still to be done in the process of combating corruption. (Putin 2000a.)

As a warrant in this argument I would define the following. Modifications in domestic affairs are the starting point for future transformation of Russia into a stronger state and namely reformation of the state from inside out will create the foundation for its later restoration as one of the most influential global actors. Presumably, when talking about *the rules of the game* Putin talks about the relations between the state and business, implying implicitly that from now on, business community will be the one to follow the rules established by the state.

Argument 3.

The following power-related argument has been found in the Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation which took place on May 16, 2003. It is the continuation of the previously elaborated argument and it further presents the concept of the *effective state*.

Historical experience has proved that a state like Russia can exist and develop in its boundaries only if it possesses the status of a powerful state... Now we should undertake the following step and all our decisions and actions should be submitted to help Russia to occupy a place among really strong, economically advanced and influential states of the world. (Putin 2003a.)

In this argument the focus of Putin's declaration is his assurance that the only possible road of future Russian development is towards restoration of its great power status.

Strong degree of confidence in necessity and possibility of realization of this goal derives presumably from emerging economic growth, stimulated by rising energy prices.

Providing data for this claim, Putin enumerates the factors which are necessary for attaining so strongly desired status of great power and indicates thus the path towards leadership in global affairs. For this to be achieved three conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, Russia must be a state with a high level of development of its civil society and stable democracy. As a result of realization of this goal, human rights, civil and political rights will be guaranteed. Secondly, Russia necessitates competitive market economy. It must transform into a state whereas property rights are protected, and economic liberties allow ordinary people to work and to earn without fear and any kinds of limitations. And finally, Russia will be a powerful state with a strong army, with modern, well-equipped and operative military forces. Russian army must be able to protect the state, its allies, and national interests of its citizens. The combination of these elements will lead Russia to occupying a position equal with that occupied by other great powers. However, the disposal of the above mentioned resources is not enough. It is highly important that the consolidation and mobilization of intellectual forces, joint efforts of centers of power, civil society and all the people in the country would be reached. (Putin 2003a.)

Backing is the presumption that Russian aspirations towards a stronger state are a natural phenomenon which has roots in its historical past, it is an inevitable must.

I would distinguish the following as a warrant. If the above mentioned three factors are a necessary attribute of transformation of Russia into a truly powerful state, then, these factors, namely *developed civil society, prosperous economy and strong army* are the features that make a state powerful in contemporary world. In this scheme, the crucial role is attributed to civil society as an element which will allow the consolidation of all the rest of the factors. This argument states that economic and military recourses are the key in the power of the state and they will be converted into practical application by a developed civil society.

Argument 4.

Another argument which focuses on domestic social structures as the basis for Russian affirmation in world affairs is encountered in Putin's last Address in the year 2007. He does not make any concluding remarks and does not trace the line under the results of his Presidency, saying that there is still much to be done and the time has not come yet to make any political testaments. The focus point of his speech is the role of the civil society in the construction of Russian power abroad.

I am sure that our country will occupy a decent place in the world only then, and we will be able to preserve our statehood and sovereignty – when our citizens will see and will feel, will be sure about the fact that all the efforts of the state are directed towards the protection of their essential interests: improving of their lives, rising the level of their welfare and their security. (Putin 2007a.)

Putin claims that it is necessary that every citizen of Russia feels the connection between his own destiny and the destiny of the state. Each of the Russians must be given the possibility to contribute with his efforts and his labour to the process of enlargement of Russia's funds and as a result to the improving of the quality of his own life. The realisation of the plan of restoration of Russia as a strong and influential state, which has been gradually presented in the Addresses from the year 2000, can take place on the condition of the constructive cooperation of all strands of Russian society. The importance of this element is just as important as the need to mobilise financial resources into this direction.

The following information supports the claim and serves as data. Spiritual unity of the nation and common moral values are just as important as political and economic development. The society gains the power to determine and solve extensive national tasks only if it is united by a common system of moral principles; if respect towards native language, original culture and cultural values, memory of forefathers, and towards every page of own history is cultivated. All these are viewed as a national wealth which serves to the purposes of the strengthening of the state. Russia is only at the beginning of a complicated process of domestic and international recovery, and the more united the society will be, the faster this transition will be. (Putin 2007a.)

The warrant which acts as a bridge between claim and data is the presumption that civil society is one of the key constituents of the effective state, which has been introduced in

the previous argument. Performing the function of mobilisation of all the other power resources, the civil constituent has its firm place in the line of creation of a powerful state.

Argument 5

The accent on financial aspect of Russian development is predominant in Putin's argumentation on power in the first year of his presidency.

The only real option for Russia is the choice to be a strong state. Strong and self-confident. Russia must be strong not against world community and other states, but together with them.....Stable democracy is the main guarantee of a democratic society and the grounding foundation of a strong state, which is respected in the world. (Putin 2000a.)

In this argument Putin claims that effective, competitive and socially just economy is the key towards Russian political development and transformation into a strong state. The claim is similar to the claim in the above elaborated argument, the data, however, is different.

The following serves as data. For a long time Russia has been appealing to foreign recommendations, and credits which, in Putin's opinion symbolized its weakness and incapability to govern foreign and domestic affairs. (Putin 2000a.)

Economic backwardness remains to be a serious problem for Russia. Growing discrepancy between Russia and world forerunners is pushing Russia into the group of third world countries. Although the general dynamics of economic development looks not so bad, the majority of the population continues to live in poverty and the economic success recently achieved can be easily overthrown by external unfavourable conditions. In comparison to development rhythms of other states, Russia is moving very slowly. Putin is mentioning informational revolution and due to the fact that Russia is involved in all world processes, it must also actively participate in economic globalisation. (Putin 2000a.)

As a warrant for the first part of the claim the following assumption might serve. More intensive cooperation with foreign partners is viewed by Putin as a process which might increase its strength. Nevertheless, distancing from reliance on foreign economic

assistance which had been flowing into Russian economy is a necessity, as it is viewed as a factor weakening Russian potential and creating dependency on the West.

Argument 6

In his second Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation which took place on April 3, 2001 I have identified the following argument concerning the power of the state and the interrelation of politics and economics.

In the process of achieving our economic and social goals we should take into consideration not only the domestic situation, but the solidity of our positions on the international arena as well (...) The prestige of our country in world affairs, political and economic situation in Russia itself depend on how competently and effectively we apply our diplomatic potential (Putin, 2001a).

Discussing about the possible ways to realise primordial goals of Russian foreign policy, Putin makes a claim that overall strengthening of Russia's positions in world affairs is the necessary condition for future prosperity. He declares that there exists a direct connection between major spheres of life, like domestic politics and economy and Russian prestige in the world.

The following information serves as data. Russia is rapidly integrating into the world economic processes, consequently, the state must ensure and guarantee the interests of Russian economy abroad, should contribute to the progressing competitiveness of Russian business, and fasten the process of joining the World Trade Organization on the conditions that are benevolent for Russia.

What I would suggest as a warrant is that Putin is continuing the idea of the importance of soft power. In this speech the stress is on the role of diplomacy as an important tool of foreign policy. Looking back to the definition of soft power, presented in chapter 1 of this paper, I would presume that Putin is preoccupied with the necessity to restore the process of spreading Russian influence behind the borders of the state. What would be the possible ways to achieve this goal? As this argument demonstrates, nothing new was invented. Taking into consideration the fact that the former Soviet republics have traditionally been the object of Russian interest and went out of control in the aftermath of collapse of the Soviet Union, I would presume that the diplomatic potential might be directed into this direction. Obviously, the importance of the economic constituent of

soft power is fully realized by the President. Economic sphere transforms into an important constituent of diplomacy. As Russia is an important supplier of energy resources, its diplomatic prestige depends not solely on the accurateness of diplomatic ceremonial, but also on the commitment to international obligations and their accurate fulfillment.

Argument 7

On April 18, 2002, Putin already makes some conclusions to what has been achieved and which objectives pointed out in the previous Addresses have been realized.

Along with the consolidation of political stability business climate is improving... We must wisely put into service the new position of the state in the world economic community. All this is gradually changing the attitude towards Russia in the world. Our country is turning into a solid and predictable business partner. (Putin 2002a.)

The *claim* is that the representatives of the Russian business community have demonstrated success in their cooperation with foreign partners, as has done Russian economy in general. In Putin's view, this progress should be put into service to improve the prestige of Russian Federation. Putin continues the idea of the importance of economic factor for the foreign positions of Russia.

As *data* he refers to the accomplishment of obligations which has had a strong influence upon the degree of esteem granted to Russia on the part of other states. The amount of data is considerable. Putin says that Russia has managed to pay its foreign debt not only in time but sometimes well in advance before the deadline. Macro-economic signifiers have improved. Russian companies are integrating into world economic processes; Russia exports not only raw-materials but machinery and technologies as well. For the first time after the ten-year pause Russia occupied the first place in the world on the amounts of commerce with energy products, and the seconds place on the amount of oil extraction. As a result, foreign banks and agencies increase the share of trust towards Russia. (Putin 2002a.)

On this basis, it is possible to specify the warrant in this argument: much attention is continuously being given to the role of soft power. Improving indicators of economic development are meant to create a message to other participants of world politics that situation in Russia has take a more optimistic turn in comparison to unstable '90. As

soft power theoreticians presume, economic progress of a certain state, Russia in this case, increases its attractiveness in the eyes of other actors. Economic success on domestic level can serve as an impetus for the states in Russian close surrounding to wish to follow its model, take into consideration its recommendations and proposals. For Russia this would mean the possibility to interfere more actively in the policy conducted by these states and spread its influence further on. Internationally, this would definitely make Russia more powerful, especially if we remember the lost status of super power and ambitions towards its restoration.

The qualifier “certainly”, which signifies that the degree of force attributed to the warrant is high, further emphasizes the importance of this message. It suggests that the speaker is convinced in his truth and would tolerate no objections.

Argument 8

In the same Address I have found one more important argument on the sources of power of the state in the contemporary world.

We are building with all states of the world – I would like to stress this: with all states of the world constructive and normal relationships. However, I would like to attract your attention to something else: tough competition – for markets, for investments, for political and economic influence has become a standard in international community and in contemporary world. In the fight, in this fight Russia must be strong and competitive. (Putin 2002a.)

Putin claims that the end of military-political confrontation has not automatically created conditions for Russia to regain its strength and influence. Military threats have been replaced by global competition, which is less aggressive but no less demanding and recourse-consuming.

As data the President says that states compete with each other in all he fields of economics and politics, including the level of attractiveness of business climate, the degree of maturity of economic freedoms, forms of taxation. In the period of transformations, as a result of its impotence, Russia has lost most of its positions on the international markets and other actors, who proved to be stronger, will not return them to Russia voluntary. To offer examples, Putin talks of the situation on the oil and steel markets, aircraft transportations and commerce with other products and services. (Putin 2002a.)

The warrant in this argument is that political power of Russia is closely tied to how actively it will integrate into the new world economic system and how competitive its economy will be in comparison to economies of other states. In this raise for profits strategic branches of Russian economy, like energy sector, must be actively included. As the confidence in the reliability of Russian partners grows, companies can more actively undertake financial operations on the international level, increasing profits and competitiveness of Russia in general. For the power of Russia in the world to increase, new ambitious goals must be set up for the national economy.

I have also identified a rebuttal in this argument. Putin says that if fast rates of growth in economic sector are not achieved, than Russia will keep falling behind the rest of the world and its opportunities in world politics and economics will be considerably reduced.

Argument 9

The year 2003 represented by itself a turning point in the epoch of Putin's presidency and the events occurred in that times were important from perspective of power construction. As a result of three years of activity Putin mentioned a number of objectives achieved and problems solved. Although, his platform was far away from its complete realization, some progress in all spheres of public life in Russia was achieved. As Putin declares himself, the integrity of the state has been restored in juridical terms and in reality. State power has been strengthened and the federal power has been approximated to the regions (Putin 2003a.).

I repeat once again: the success of our state at an enormous degree depends upon the success of Russian entrepreneur (Putin 2003a.).

Once again the decisive role of economic factor is stressed. However, now the accent is put on the important role of Russian business in promoting Russian national interests abroad. Putin claims that the final result of all Russian aspirations must be the return into the ranks of the richest, most powerful, and most respected states of the world. This step will become realizable when stable and rapid economic growth is guaranteed.

To provide data for this claim, Putin tells that Russia can not any further depend on the financial donations of international organizations or some unexpected changes in the economic conjuncture abroad. Thus, to reduce reliance on foreign factors everything that Russia embodies and offers to the outsiders must be competitive: products and

services, technologies and ideas, business and the state itself, private companies and state institutions, entrepreneurs and civil servants, students, professors, science and culture. Nevertheless, the driving force of economic progress is namely private initiative, of both, native and foreign business working on Russian territory. Russian business, in its turn must be modernized, and obtain such features as enterprise, flexibility and mobility. (Putin 2003a)

The relative strength of the qualifier “obviously” reduces however the affirmative strength of this argument.

The warrant is that to make Russia competitive, attractive and strong, private initiative must be actively supported by the state supported.

Argument 10

In the next speech I have chosen for the analysis, Vladimir Putin talks about the factors that would strengthen the positions of Russian state in its nearest neighborhood – in the Community of Independent State (CIS).

Joint efforts in different spheres will influence positively upon the level of development of CIS member states. Thus, enlarging Russian market, Russian energy resources, money transfers from the people who are employed in our country are signifiers of a certain level of economic progress of our partners from CIS (...) It is also important to enlarge common scientific and educational space. (Putin 2004b.)

Putin claims that Russia is continuously interested in its closer neighborhood, former Soviet Republics and is using political, financial and cultural bounds in order to increase its influence in the region.

To support his claim with data, Putin talks about the importance of the CIS region in the whole structure of European security and the necessity to deepen cooperation in this direction. If this goal would be realized, then there exists a prospect for transforming CIS into an influential regional organization. Putin denies the fact that Russia possesses monopoly on policy-making in the Community, on contrary, Russia faces concurrence from the part of other state members. (Putin 2004b.)

In my interpretation a warrant in this argument is the ever increasing importance of the CIS region for the geopolitical interests of Russia. In order to attract the states from this

zone into the sphere of Russian interests, not purely economic factors should be used. Putin mentions briefly that Russia possesses energy resources, but this is not the only area of attraction. In the context of soft power the Presidents proposes to implement also various educational and cultural programs. In such a way, not only economic and political dependence on the high level will be created, but also the populations will continue feel themselves attached to Russia through linguistic, cultural, ideological motives. Thus, the presentations about the sources of power are not limited solely to economic factors, and dependence on sources of energy, but also on the whole basic set of soft power elements.

5.2 Energy card and the role of natural monopolies in the process of power construction

Argument 11

In the last years the fuel and energy complex was the stabilizing factor in Russian economy. In the nearest perspective, it must become the factor of growth (...). We must be sure of the energy security of the state, which will be the guarantee not only of economic prosperity, but also of social stability. (Putin 2000c.)

Putin claims that revenues from fuel and energy sector are of primordial importance for the national budget. However, they do not only contribute to general indicators of economic growth, but ensure welfare of the Russian society.

The data is the following. At the moment when the speech was made, the energy sector was providing up to 30 per cent of revenues of the consolidated budget, 45 per cent of foreign currency receipts, and about 30 per cent of the industrial production of the state. (Putin 2000c.)

The rebuttal of this argument is that recent achievements in this area will be lost if innovations are not implemented and investors are not attracted. The technological basis created by the investments of the past years was exhausted, equipment was outdated and depreciated. This state of affairs menaced the energy stability of the state and budget incomes. The external conditions also influenced the amount of profits received and the extent at which Russia could obtain economic and strategic advantage.

The warrant is that the President implicitly links energy security of Russia with its social stability. If we remember the claims about an effective state, with society as a uniting element of a strong state, energy also becomes one of the building blocks in the construction of a strong state.

Argument 12

The state must create an active system of protection of national companies of fuel and energy complex in the international arena. Any restrictions introduced against our companies and goods must be put under careful examination and vigorously contested. Or even a better solution would be to prevent such actions. (Putin 2000c.)

Putin claims that Russian state must promote more actively the interests of domestic oil and gas companies and support diplomatically their initiatives in other countries. Russian embassies and trade missions must react operatively in case foreign partners refuse to pay for the delivered products or if they provoke problems with transit. The role of diplomats is also to achieve lower transit prices and other taxes paid by Russian companies.

As Putin tells that other states have been for a long time actively protecting the producers of their goods on foreign markets. Statesmen of foreign countries, Russian partners, feel free to raise questions related to the interests of their companies on the highest international level. They do not simply wait for some kind of decision, but sometimes insist aggressively on the necessary solution of their problem. Russian possibilities in this sense are huge. Putin gives an example of the debt on fuel and energy products of all the countries of the CSI altogether, which is evaluated in the sum of 70 milliards of rubbles. (Putin 2000c.)

As Putin enumerates main interests in fuel and energy complex that Russian diplomacy must promote. He tells that the development of the Sakhalin direction and the access to the resources of the Kara Sea are among primary objectives. Along with these, acceleration of the construction of new port complexes in the Baltic and in the Black Sea, modernisation of already existing and building of new pipelines, consolidation of the common market of fuel and energy resources of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan must be implemented. Additionally,

realisation of energy, gas and oil bridges to China, active cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan should be promoted. He says that it is a prerogative of the state to look for new markets and new partners. This should be done on the basis of Russian geostrategic interests. (Putin 2000c.)

The warrant here is the suggestion that the state and companies that conduct the extraction and further commerce natural resources are tightly bound one to another and must serve each other's needs. Oil and gas producers will carry the desired policies to the importing states and the country of origin will promote the economic interests of these companies on global markets. Gazprom, thus, is granted by the state the authority to influence directly policies of other states, and is transformed by this state in one of its important power tools.

Argument 13

The Government will support competition and all kinds of innovations introduced by the companies. It is also necessary to make business more transparent and as well as fiscal matters of the companies. The Government controls access to subsoil resources and the system of their transportation. It is the obligation of the Government to keep an eye on fulfillment by the companies of license obligations. Those who break the rules will be deprived of the right to exploit subsoil resources. (Putin 2000c.)

In this argument's claim Putin makes himself clear upon the issue of relationship between Russian Government on one side and foreign companies as well as natural monopolies acting in the fuel and energy complex on the other side. He claims that this relationship must be characterized both by support and control from the part of the Government. Putin's main concern is not to allow any structural changes in this sphere until all the risks and possible consequence for the welfare of the Russian state in general are analyzed. Particular attention will be paid to this problem.

I have pointed out the following as backing. The ground of these actions is to ensure Russian energy security, and as a result to strengthen its economy and to increase its competitiveness internationally.

Data in this argument is not very extensive. Putin points out once again the importance of companies for national economy.

Warrant is that the role of the state in the management of oil and gas reserves will be increased. Supporting the expansion of companies is viewed as an important direction of Russian foreign policy. Energy, which is the engine of social and economic progress, must be guided by the state.

Qualifier “clearly” attributes a high degree of assurance to the information presented by the speaker.

Argument 14

In the circumstances of rigid international conjuncture the economic leadership of a state is determined first of all by its scientific and technological advantages...We must make a serious effort towards attraction of investments into the development of modern infrastructure and of innovations. Russia must fully realize its potential in spheres like up-to-date energy technology, transport and communications, space and aircraft building. Russia must transform into a prominent exporter of intellectual services...A rapid progress in the above mentioned areas is a real chance to modify the whole structure of national economy and to occupy a decent place on the global markets (Putin 2006a).

Putin claims that modernisation of the key sectors of Russian economy is a way to global economic leadership which can be further transformed into political influence.

The following serves as data in this argument. Putin tells, with regret, that the majority of the technological equipment used by Russian industry lags not just years but decades behind the advanced level of high-tech. Of course, private entrepreneurship is regarded as a driving force in all sectors of economy, and the state will be creating conditions for the development of Russian business. Nevertheless, namely the leap forward in the above mentioned areas has a crucial importance. (Putin 2006a.)

Putin tells that at that moment Russia already feels confident in the mining and extraction sector. The competitiveness of its companies in this sector is very high. Gazprom, for example, has reached the third place among the leading world corporations in terms of capitalisation. At the same time it managed to preserve low

tariffs for Russian consumers. Such a result had not been achieved all on its own, but has been stimulated by carefully planned on the part of the state. But this should not be viewed as a limit of possibilities and more efforts must be applied to keep on moving. It is necessary to create conditions for the rapid technological modernisation of the energy sector. New refining and processing facilities must be developed, perspective markets must be assimilated. Concurrently with ensuring Russian domestic development needs, obligations to traditional partners must be fulfilled. Today's Russia needs an unrestricted access of all of its production to global market. Only in this case it will fully benefit from economic integration and will be enabled to occupy a decent place among the most developed states of the world. (Putin 2006a.)

The warrant in this argument is the implicit idea that the successful promotion of the interests of the state's economy on the global markets is one of the attributes of a powerful state. In Russian case, energy is one of the most powerful tools in the process of conquering foreign economic space and gradually penetrating into their political orbit. Leadership of the state gives full account of the possible advantages of their position as oil and primarily gas suppliers and is determined to make use of it for the achievement of further political goals.

Argument 15

The next piece of material is related to Russian gas monopoly, Gazprom, and to the role attributed to this corporation in Russian economy and its foreign policy.

Gazprom as a strategic company had to be and was preserved as a unitary organism. Similarly, we will continue the process of its modernization in the future (...) Gazprom is the key element of the energy security of the state, and of its export potential. In addition to this, it is also very important to mention that the company is a powerful mechanism of Russian economic and political influence in the world. (Putin 2003b.)

In this argument Putin claims that natural monopoly Gazprom is an important constituent of Russian foreign policy and of its political influence abroad. He declares that the role of the state in managing affairs of Gazprom has always been crucial and will remain significant in the future due to the strategic importance of this organization for Russian national interests. Consequently, increasing presence in the economies of

other states, implemented by means of transnational corporation, in this particular case, of Gazprom is the symbol of soft power.

As data, the President presents details about the relationship between the company and the state and clarifies why it is so important. Putin tells that the control share of Gazprom belongs to the state. He appeals however for the transparency of the corporation, declaring at the same time that the state will not allow investors to break it into parts and eliminate the influence of the state. Putin also determines plan of actions for Gazprom for its future projects. He requires that new profitable and dynamic markets in Europe and Pacific Asia should be occupied by the company. (Putin 2003b.)

There is a rebuttal in this argument. Putin tells that the closed character of the system of conduct of Gazprom is a disadvantage which makes the country unattractive in the eyes of foreign investors and reduces the prestige of Russia in general

On the warrant...Telling that the success of the whole country depends on the successful implementation of all the goals that have been determined by the state for Gazprom, the crucial importance of this corporation not out of economic motives solely. It is also important for the foreign policy plans of Russia and for its structure of power. Gazprom becomes the symbol of soft power itself.

Qualifiers like “naturally” detect a high level of assurance of the speaker, excluding any possibility for objection or refutation. The function of the qualifier in this case is to stress the importance attributed to the problem discussed and to demonstrate not only the informative, but also the coercive character of the argument. This kind of qualifiers places the claim into the category of claims of policy, when it does not simply inform but determines what course of actions should be taken. Qualifier shows that the degree of deliberation of the speaker is very high.

Argument 16

Russia’s well-being in the present and in the future depends on the place we occupy in the global energy market. (Putin 2005b.)

Putin claims that Russia must make use of its natural advantages and occupy a leading position supplying the world economy with traditional forms of energy. Major position in the energy market will stimulate rapid development of Russian economy in general.

Data is the following information. Increasing volumes of oil, gas and coal extraction as well as electrical energy production guarantees Russian energy security. Modernization of the companies which work in this field will ensure their access to foreign markets and will improve the business climate in Russia, attracting thus foreign capital. Putin talks about the necessity to get an access to new markets, and mentions particularly the importance of the Asia-Pacific region. (Putin 2005b.)

This is the warrant. National energy and fuel companies, actively extending their activity beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, become the mechanism that will contribute to Russian economic revival. The state makes a deal with industrial organizations operating abroad: it provides them political, legal and administrative support in exchange for material revenues which will be further used for the needs of this state.

5.3 Hard power and argumentation

Previously elaborated arguments have focused on soft power. Such attention to soft elements of power construction has not excluded its military constituent. The role of Armed Forces, although mentioned not so often, still maintains its position and the military constituent of power is actively discussed.

Argument 17

We should all build our house, our own house strong and safe, because we clearly see what is going on in the world. We clearly see it! As it is said “Buddy wolf knows who can be eaten”. He is eating, and is not listening to anybody, and it looks like he is not ever going to listen. (Putin 2006a.)

Putin claims that the international environment that Russia exists in has turned to be even more unstable and hardly predictable than it was in the years of the Cold War. The degree of new menaces that the world is facing today has not been entirely evaluated yet. From a more general perspective, there is a tendency towards the enlargement of the conflict area in the world. What is extremely dangerous is that it is directly affecting the zone of vital interests of Russia.

The following serves as data. Terrorism has turned into one the most important threats to Russian national security. Local conflicts serve as major contributors to terrorists acting as source of their armament and the arena for practical application of their combating skills. Putin is saying that somebody, not mentioning any concrete names or states, would like Russia to get deeply involved in such conflicts and consequently, would not be able to solve any of the problems related to its development as a modern and successful country. (Putin 2006a.)

Another serious danger consists in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In case such weapons fell into the hands of terrorists, what their ultimate goal is, the consequences would be disastrous. Putin also tells that not all international actors have managed to overcome the mentality characteristic for the times of the Cold War, although radical changes have taken place in the world. This is also considered as a threat to Russian interests. (ibid.)

Taking into consideration all the facts mentioned above, Putin requires that Russian military and foreign doctrines would give an adequate solution to these problems. It must be clarified how an effective fight against terror and against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons should be conducted, how local conflicts in the world can be settled. (ibid.)

Implicitly, Putin is hinting also upon suspicion and distrust not only towards illegal terrorists groupings, but he seems to be much more concerned with menace coming from some other states. Although the Cold War has ended long ago, the spirit of hostility and competition among two former superpowers persists also in the times of a Cold Peace. We remember that this argument was pronounced in the year 2006, when contradictions between the USA and Russia upon the problematic of NATO extension, non-proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction and Russian exploit of its energy card as a tool of promoting its own foreign policy goals have reached their point

In the context of such problematic external conditions, the issue of Russian military potential is introduced. It is reflected in the argument I set out below.

Argument 18

Modern Russia needs an army which has all the possibilities to react adequately to all modern threats that it faces. We must have Armed Forces able to fight in global, local, and if necessary in several local conflicts simultaneously. They must be able to guarantee security and

territorial integrity of Russia...We must be always ready to deter potential aggression from the outside and acts of international terrorism. We must be able to respond to any attempts of political pressure on Russia from the outside, including those, whose final goal is to strengthen own positions at our expense. The stronger our Armed Forces will be, the lesser the temptation to exercise such kind of pressure upon Russia will be. (Putin 2006a.)

Putin claims that in order to respond effectively to new and old challenges Russia military potential must be increased and it can be used in the equal measure against those who violate its borders or try to exercise political pressure. He tells that strong army remains to be the key guarantee against any type of interference from abroad.

Introducing data, Putin talks firstly about current problems that Russian Army is facing. State financing going into this direction is definitely not enough to create competitive and professional Armed Forces. The state has failed to provide the army and naval with contemporary equipment which would allow to fight in the conditions of new global threats. Military exercises were conducted only on the maps. In the last years important changes have occurred in the structure of the Armed Forces. (Putin 2006a.)

Military reforms will be continued in the future. A modern structure of Armed Forces has already been created. Military units are receiving now modern arms and equipment, which will form the basis of Russian defense up till the year 2020. Mass purchase of the military equipment for the needs of the Ministry of Defense has begun. Naval shipbuilding has been reanimated; as a result new ships practically of all types are being constructed. In the nearest future the Russian Navy will be complemented by two new nuclear submarines with strategic weapons on the board. Further on, Putin enumerates the main requirements for the level of tasks that Russian Army would be able to perform. In the period of the following five years the number of fresh long range aircraft, of submarines and launch systems must be increased. Plans and directions of military development of other states must be taken into consideration, and Russian Armed Forces must be informed about the most up-to-date inventions in military industry. Putin stresses the importance of the Army in general for the Russian society, and tells that the Army is a part of the Russians, of the Russian society. (ibid.)

Thus, the warrant in this very extensive argument is the idea that hard power preserves its important role, which, judging from the amount of detailed description of the armament will be increased. Military resource remains to be crucial in the conditions of

globalisation, and obviously Russia does not view itself as a powerful state without tanks, aircrafts and submarines.

5.4 Summary of arguments

The study of Putin's argumentation on power conducted with the help of the Toulmin's model of argument revealed the following. In the years 2000-2008 the necessity to strengthen the power of the state has been in the top agenda of the Russian governance. Although I have not discovered any direct quotations indicating that Russia is pursuing the goal to regain its position as a superpower, there is a constant appeal to increase national economic and military potential. In addition to that, the issue of power has been repeatedly mentioned in Putin's Speeches both on domestic and international level. High degree of assurance in the correctness of the path chosen for Russia, which is a path of powerful state, is characteristic for the whole period of Putin's presidency.

Addresses to National Assembly in the years until 2006 touched upon primarily the necessity of construction of an effective political system, modernization of Russia from inside, perfection of the power of the state and of the local governance. Problems related to the transformation of the social sphere were discussed; repeatedly new economic goals were set up. In the year 2006 a vision upon Russia's most wanted position in the contemporary architecture of international relations was presented, and Russia's desired share in world economy was put forward. Military factor was mentioned as one of the key determinants influencing upon Russia's power and influence upon global affairs. Thus, although by the end of Putin's second term as President the core of the attention of the assertor had moved partially from domestic problems focusing on concrete geopolitical objectives, internal factor is continuously mentioned as the cornerstone for power construction.

Democratic order in the world is a necessary structural condition for the realization of Russian foreign policy goals and of its successful cooperation with other states. Determining the desired position for Russia in the global democratic order, Putin talks about a strong state which has equal rights with other countries and which promotes its policy on the basis of the rule of law and respect towards other actors.

Putin's main argument on power becomes visible as the analysis of his claims about the relation between economics and politics, the importance of attractiveness of business climate for the welfare of the state in general, the degree of maturity of economic freedoms, the necessity to modernize Armed Forces progress.

One of the most important points in Putin's argumentation on the characteristics of a strong state is the usage of the concept of the *effective state* as synonymous to that of the *strong state*. Main characteristics of such state are: the rules of the game are established by the state, the state is the guarantee of fulfilment of democratic rights and equal rights for all its citizens, the state has well developed judiciary and tribunal systems.

Economy is an important constituent of Russian soft power. Putin's argument is that Russian economy must be independent on foreign sources of financing; it must be competitive and modernised. Only in this case it will be an active element of soft power of the state. Attraction of foreign investors and increasing the degree of openness of economic sector will increase perspectives and will contribute to economic growth. Diplomatic apparatus must be actively used to promote Russian economic interests abroad, particularly of the interests of Russian business. If this goal is realised with success, Russian political influence abroad, namely in the former Soviet Republics will be consolidated. Cooperation with foreign partners has a favourable influence upon economic indicators. Economic progress is supposed to increase the attractiveness of Russia for other states, to convince them in the correctness of the chosen path of development, and make them accept Russian recommendations. Internationally, this would increase Russian potential as it would gain possibility to interfere into affairs of other states and make them accept policies favourable for Russia.

As the analysis of the arguments has revealed, particular attention is paid to the role of the energy sector in the process of achievement of the economic and political goals mentioned above. Its revenues are viewed as the main source of income of Russian budget and as the guarantee of the welfare of the Russian society in general and of social stability.

The form that relationship between the state and natural monopolies as well as foreign companies embodies is an important element of the power of the state. This relationship is conducted by the rules of the game, which in its turn are determined by the state.

Thus, Russian authorities reserve the right to interfere into certain policies of companies which operate in the energy sector on Russian territory if some actions of these companies menace Russian national interests. These companies are supported as well as controlled by the Government, the latter following the goal of ensuring Russian energy security, strengthening its economy and increasing its competitiveness internationally. Energy is viewed as an engine of economic progress which will enable Russia to become more powerful. In Russian case the function of energy recourses is to consolidate Russian positions in the global order, and to penetrate into political orbit of the states whose economic space has been conquered.

As it has been revealed in the arguments Gazprom is an important tool of Russian soft power. This company has a strategic significance for Russian national interests; this fact serves as a ground for the state to interfere actively into its policies. The main function of this corporation in Russian soft power is to increase Russian presence in the economies of other states and to contribute to Russian economic revival. Gazprom is an example of how the state makes an agreement with companies: it provides them political, legal and administrative support in exchange for material revenues which will be further used for the needs of this state.

Russian civil society is another element of the power of the state. It is expected to strengthen Russian influence abroad and to create centers of attraction for the population of other states. It has been revealed that the role of spiritual unity of the nation and common moral values is equalled to that of political and economic development. The power of the state grounds in its society. Its mobilising function can be performed only if a system of common goals, principles and values exists within the social order.

Hard power is also discussed in the arguments that have been studied. Although it is not mentioned as often as soft power, it maintains solid positions in Putin's argumentation on what a strong state must be like. Putin claims that the international environment that Russia exists in has turned to be even more unstable and hardly predictable than it was in the years of the Cold War. The degree of new menaces that the world is facing today has not been entirely evaluated yet. Consequently, in order to respond effectively to new and old challenges Russia military potential must be increased and it can be used in the

equal measure against those who violate its borders or try to exercise political pressure. Putin declares that strong army remains to be the key guarantee against any type of interference from abroad. Military resource remains to be crucial in the conditions of globalisation, and obviously Russia does not view itself as a powerful state without its military arsenal.

In the conclusion of this chapter I would sum up Putin's argumentation on power in the following way. To become an influential actor in IR Russian domestic structures must be reformed. Well developed civil society and democratic institutions, guarantee of human, civil and political rights, competitive market economy are the characteristics that make a state powerful internationally. The last element is hard power, namely strong and modern armed forces. These three elements constitute the understanding of power which emerged from Putin's speeches. The first two elements civil society and economy make part of soft power and the last one to hard power. Thus, in the new global order a combination of soft and hard power is required with focus on soft power. Crucial role is attributed to civil society, which must be an element which consolidates, mobilises intellectual forces, centres of power and population.

The main argument on power which has emerged in the result of the analysis is that developed civil society, prosperous economy and strong army make a state strong in contemporary world. In this structure, the role of the civil society is to convert economic and military power into practical application.

6. FROM ARGUMENTATION TO BROADER CONCEPTUALISATION OF POWER

Analysis of Vladimir Putin's speeches conducted in chapter 5 has demonstrated that power relations involve non-governmental agents of power like civil society, transnational corporations, private entrepreneurs whose interaction is ensured by the organising role of the state. Understanding of power which has been revealed is a mixture of social, economic and military elements.

Although, Putin avoids mentioning directly the term "great power" or "superpower" in his speeches, an imaginary strong Russia possesses attributes of a great power. These attributes are: competitive economy, mobilised civil society, and strong army which altogether guarantee political influence in the world. Economic growth stimulated by high energy prices is viewed as an important cornerstone to achieve this goal.

In this chapter constructivist meta-theory will be applied to conduct the analysis of the arguments which have been laid out with the help of Toulmin's Model of Argument in the previous chapter. Classification of the forms of power by Barnett and Duvall will serve as the main analytical tool which be applied to evaluate theoretically the results of the analysis of Putin's argumentation on power. The task of the above mentioned analytical tool is to answer which of the four forms of power - compulsory, institutional, structural or productive is constructed by Putin's discourse, and how these forms are connected.

The advantage of this tool is that it gives a structure for integration of different combinations. This classification not only emphasizes a whole variety of types but also indicates to correlation between those. (Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.4) This capacity of integration of different forms of power is important because admitting that "power is the production, in and through social relations", my analysis has supported the idea that power "does not have a single expression or form" (ibid. p.3).

Conducting the research within the limits of the "social ontology" (cf. above; Fierke, 2007, p.170), I presumed initially that power is of a social origin, determined by the

actions, interests and values of a variety of actors. Pursuing the goal to identify what actors possess the power and how they construct it I have revealed the following forms of power in Putin's arguments: compulsory, structural, and productive. In the lines that follow I will present them more detailed.

Compulsory power is one of the forms of power which, according to Putin's arguments makes a state powerful in contemporary global order. Traditionally viewed as a form of power characteristic for great powers, it is described as the ability to make use of their material benefits to determine policies and to direct behaviour of other states which do not possess such resources (cf. above; Barnett & Duvall 2005, p. 14). In Russian case abundant energy resources serve as the main material advantage. As it has been revealed from Putin's argumentation, fuel and energy complex is an important constituent of the construction of the strong state. Although multinational corporations can perform as independent actors and make use of their capital to interfere into policies of weaker states, exercising thus compulsory power, (ibid.), in Russian case oil and gas monopolies are the tool of the state and act on its behalf and under its surveillance. Gazprom is a key tool in Russian compulsory power, which is directed towards conquering foreign economic space and gradually penetrating into their political orbit. Leadership of the state gives full account of the possible advantages of their position as oil, and primarily gas suppliers and is determined to make use of it for the achievement of further political goals. Material resources are continuously viewed by Russian President as a tool to press forward Russian national interests which do not always coincide with the interests of the state chosen as an object of attention.

Markets in general are an important element of compulsory power. Russian state is particularly interested in creating beneficial working conditions for foreign and domestic capital out of the consideration that economic agents must take the social responsibility and direct their profits towards concrete social needs. It is the state which takes the role of the regulator of the market activities and establishes particular rules according to which capital is governed. Based on material capabilities, compulsory power in case of Putin's Russia operates through "social relations of interaction" (cf. above; Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.10); it is an attribute of one particular actor, state, and represents by itself *power over*.

Structural power is another form of power that emerges from Putin's argumentation. Definition of a structure as "an internal relation – that is, a direct constitutive relation,

such that structural position A exists only by virtue of its relation to structural position B” (Bhaskar 1979; Isaac 1987 in Barnett & Duval, p.18) refers to Putin’s Russia in the following way. Social capacity of Russia as a strong state is determined by the position that it occupies in relation to other international actors, which in its turn is determined by the structure of globalisation. Globalisation is the social structure that forms contemporary Russian identity of a strong state, its capacity to influence the destinies of weaker actors and a variety of political and economic interests.

In Russian case global markets serve as a particular force, structure that gives advantage to certain actors and disadvantages others. Capacities and resources of Russia as a strong state are determined by globalisation as a structure. Whether Russia becomes a strong state or not depends upon how successful it manages to integrate into this structure and to answer to its requirements. In the arguments that have been set out in Chapter 5 Putin stresses that Russia is a part of the contemporary world-system, which is a multipolar world, and its interest is to become a strong state among other strong states. Thus, its self-understanding is determined by the position of other actors.

Russian capacities as a strong state in the structure of the global world are economic and military might, and from this resulting power to participate in all global initiatives and to act as a guarantee of international law. Putin claims that whether Russia becomes a strong state or not depends upon the position it occupies towards the “strong, economically advanced and influential states of the world” (cf. above; Putin 2003a.). Consequently, Russian identity of a strong state is determined by its relation to other states. Rising energy prices is the condition imposed by the structure which is globalisation, and it will be used to create advantages for Russia and to raise its potential. Inability to withstand the economic concurrence from the part of the forerunners of the global market is the main structural factor which had disadvantaged Russia in the ‘90s and has prevented it from joining the community of the strong states. More active integration into processes of economic globalisation, which is cooperation with foreign partners, promoting the interests of national business abroad and attracting foreign investment is a path towards occupying a more solid position in relation to other states.

Russian position within global markets of an important supplier of energy is an advantaging factor. Putin says that position of a reliable and predictable economic

partner that has been achieved in the first years of his Presidency has influenced the attitude towards Russia from the part of other states and the position it occupies in the structure of globalisation. The conditions imposed by the structure are: “tough competition – for markets, for investments, for political and economic influence” (cf. above; Putin 2002a.).

Power of Russia as a state is closely tied to how actively it will integrate into the new world economic system and how competitive its economy will be in comparison to economies of other states. In this raise for profits strategic branches of Russian economy, like energy sector, must be actively included.

Thus, as the new global order has become an inevitable reality, Russia tries to profit from it. Making its energy companies more competitive in international markets, it plans to strengthen the state due to the fact that the borders between economic, social and political become more and more interrelated.

To sum up, structural power works through “social relations of constitution” (cf. above; Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.10) and namely these relations determine what Russian capacities as a strong state are. Performing as a result of social relations of several agents, structural power is *power to*.

Productive power is the last form of power which has been revealed. It concludes the explanation of how social processes constitute the social capacity of a state as a powerful one. As the study of the arguments has demonstrated, dispersed social relations are viewed by Putin as an important element of the construction of the power of the state. Power is the production of the system of knowledge and discursive practices of domestic social forces. In his argumentation Putin talks about the relation between social forces and the identity of Russia as a great power. All parts of Russian society are entitled to contribute to the restoration of the former might of the state. Norms, a common system of moral principles, respect towards native language, original culture and cultural values, and customs of the nation are viewed as social forces forming the power of the state. Power of Russia relies on its domestic social order. Within this order people share knowledge and understanding that the state is powerful, creating thus particular social reality and power as a social concept. Thus, productive power is a set of normative and ideological perceptions within Russian society, the way

in which people perceive reality and create social identity of Russia as a strong state. Acting through “social relations of constitution” (cf. above; Barnett & Duvall 2005, p.10), productive power is *power to*.

To conclude, the following conceptualisation of power has been achieved. In case of Putin’s Russia the concept of a *powerful state* is intertwined with the concept an *effective state*. One of its main characteristics is among others cooperative relations with business community, which are established however according to certain “rules of the game”. Thus, the state acts as a “ruler” (cf. above; Schmitt cited in Lipschutz 2007, p.228) which establishes the structure of power relations.

Entrepreneurs, corporations, civil society, and non-governmental sector operate under the surveillance of the state and serve the needs of this state. Access to abundant natural resources is viewed as a political tool, which ensures welfare and support of the population. Growing interference of the state in economy is perceived as a necessary condition for Russia to strengthen its positions internationally. Putin’s vision of power is the combination of soft and hard power, with elements of soft power prevailing. While much attention is paid to the role of military factor, priority is given to developed civil society and democratic institutions in combination with competitive market economy. One of the goals of this study was to examine what is the role of Russian energy card in the process of power construction. The results of this study demonstrate however, that the issue of energy has not been dominating in Putin’s argumentation on power. Although much attention has been paid to the role of Gazprom in promotion of Russian political interests abroad and to its importance as a donator to the national budget, Putin’s vision of power includes also other elements.

As the analysis of the arguments has demonstrated Russia can be a strong state in the result of interaction of the following forms of power: compulsory, structural and productive. In Putin’s vision, a combination of these forms is a necessary condition for the restoration of Russia’s former might. Although both, *power over* and *power to* have been revealed in Putin’s understanding of what makes the state powerful, in contemporary Russian reality only *power to* operates. *Power to* is a part of political rhetoric and it is only presumed to take place some day in Russia.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to answer the main research question ‘What kind of an understanding of what makes a state powerful emerges from Putin’s speeches?’ To be able to answer this question I have conducted an analysis of Vladimir Putin’s speeches based on the Toulmin’s Model of Argument. A number of Speeches, Annual Addresses to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, and Interviews given to Russian and foreign mass-media have been selected as research material for the analysis. The sources were used in the original Russian language and they were limited to the years of Putin’s presidency, 2000-2008.

Constructivism had been chosen as a theoretical framework of this study with the purpose to examine the arguments on power set out with the help of Toulmin’s Model of Argument. I have chosen constructivism out of the variety of IR theories because of its ability to present a combined understanding of power including social, economic and political perspectives. Barnett & Duvall classification of the forms of power served as the main analytical tool of the study.

According to constructivist understanding of power, it was initially approached as a social phenomenon and the theoretical analysis revealed the following results. Diversified character of contemporary world politics implies a diffuse understanding of power, which does not limit to nation-state’s actors solely. Russian case is a specific one. Although, as it has been revealed that power relations include numerous domestic actors, like business community, ordinary citizens of Russia, non-governmental organizations, they do not possess the ability to promote their goals avoiding the structure of the state. They are put into condition when they must operate according to the “rules of game” and they serve the purposes of the state. The sovereign, deprived them of the independent capability to pursue their own interests independently.

Understanding of power that emerges from Vladimir Putin’s speeches is not limited to one form of power solely. It has been revealed that, according to Putin’s argumentation, the mixture of compulsory, structural, and productive forms make the state powerful in contemporary world. Compulsory power is being actively put into practice by Russian

leadership, while structural and productive power exist mostly in Putin's rhetoric, and represent a visionary understanding of what should be done in the future to make the Russian state powerful.

As a result of this study a new conceptualisation of power, accommodated to contemporary conditions of global politics, and taking into consideration Russian specific has been elaborated. A new understanding of power has emerged as a result of the political system of Putinism and was reflected in Putin's public declarations. The specific of this political system is a balance it creates between competition and freedoms on one side and the interference of the state in any social, economic or political modifications. My contribution was that I elaborated an up-to-date understanding of power, determined by global architecture and based on an empirical example of Putin's Russia.

Bibliography

Primary sources:

1. Putin, V. 2000a. *Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii*. [Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation]. http://kremlin.ru/appears/2000/07/08/0000_type63372type63374type82634_28782.shtml; last access 19.12.2008
2. Putin, V. 2000b. *Vystuplenie na zasedanii Konsud'tativnogo Soveta po inostrannym investitsiyam pri Pravitel'stve Rossii*. [Address to the Advisory Council on Foreign Investment under the Russian Government]. <http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2000/03/28501.shtml>; last access 19.12.2008
3. Putin, V. 2000c. *Vystuplenie na Vserossiyskom soveshchanii po voprosam razvitya toplivnoenergeticheskogo kompleksa*. [Excerpts Address to a Nationwide Conference on the Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector]. <http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2000/03/28480.shtml>; last access 19.12.2008
4. Putin, V. 2001a. *Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii*. [Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation]. http://kremlin.ru/appears/2001/04/03/0000_type63372type63374type82634_28514.shtml; last access 19.12.2008
5. Putin, V. 2001b. *Vstupitel'noe slovo na vstreche s predstavityami rossiyskikh delovykh krugov*. [Opening Address at a Meeting with Russian Businessmen]. <http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2001/01/28463.shtml>; last access 19.12.2008
6. Putin, V. 2001c. *Vstupitel'noe slovo na vstreche s predsedatelem pravleniya kompanii Gazprom Alekseem Millerom byvshim predsedatelem pravleniya kompanii Gazprom Remom Vyakhirevym Predsedatelem Pravitel'stva Mikhailom Kas'yanovym i zamestitelem Rukovoditelya Administratsii Prezidenta Dmitriem Medvedevym*. [Opening Remarks at a Meeting with Gazprom Chairman of the Board Alexei Miller, Former Gazprom Chairman of the Board Rem Vyakhirev, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and Deputy Chief of Staff of

the Presidential Executive Office Dmitry Medvedev].
http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2001/05/30/0000_type63378_141231.shtm
last access 19.12.2008

7. Putin, V. 2001d. *Vystuplenie na soveshchanií rukovodyashchego sostava sotrudnikov diplomaticheskoy sluzhby Rossii*. [Remarks at a Meeting of Top Members of the Russian Diplomatic Service].
<http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2001/01/28464.shtml>; last access 19.12.2008
8. Putin, V. 2002. *Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii*. [Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation].
http://kremlin.ru/appears/2002/04/18/0001_type63372type63374type82634_28876.shtml; last access 19.12.2008
9. Putin, V. 2003a. *Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii*. [Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation].
http://kremlin.ru/appears/2003/05/16/1259_type63372type63374type82634_44623.shtml; last access 19.12.2008
10. Putin, V. 2003b. *Vystuplenie na torzhestvennom sobranii posvyashchennom letiyu OAO GAZPROM*. [Speech at a Gala Meeting to Mark the 10th Anniversary of Gazprom]. <http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2003/02/29774.shtml>;
last access 3.11.2009
11. Putin, V. 2004a. *Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii*. [Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation].
http://kremlin.ru/appears/2004/05/26/0003_type63372type63374type82634_71501.shtml; last access 15.08.2010
12. Putin, V. 2004b. *Vstupitel'noe slovo na zasedanii Soveta Bezopasnosti po voprosam vneshney politiki Rossii na prostranstvakh Sodruzhestva Nezavisimyykh Gosudarstv*. [Speech at a Security Council Session on Russian Foreign Policy in the Commonwealth of Independent States].
<http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2004/07/74648.shtml>; last access 10.05.2010

13. Putin, V. 2004c. *Vystuplenie na sovmestnom zasedanii kollegiy Ministerstva finansov i Ministerstva ekonomicheskogo razvitiya i torgovli*. [Speech at a Joint Meeting of the Finance Ministry and Economic Development and Trade MinistryBoards].
<http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2004/03/62091.shtml>; last access 5.05.2010

14. Putin, V. 2005 a *Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii*. [Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation].
http://kremlin.ru/appears/2005/04/25/1223_type63372type63374type82634_87049.shtml; last access 5.05.2010

15. Putin, V. 2005 b. *Vstupitel'noe slovo na zasedanii Soveta Bezopasnosti po voprosu o roli Rossii v obespechenii mezhdunarodnoy energeticheskoy bezopasnosti*. [Opening Address at the Security Council Session on Russia's Role in Guaranteeing International Energy Security].
http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2005/12/22/1654_type63374type63378type8_2634_99294.shtml; last access 5.05.2010

16. Putin, V. 2005c. *Vstupitel'noe slovo na vstreche s predstavitel'yami obshchestvennykh organizatsiy rossiyskogo biznesa*. [Introductory Remarks at a Meeting with Russian Business Community Organisation Representatives].
<http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2005/03/85791.shtml>; last access 5.05.2010

17. Putin, V. 2007. *Interv'yu indiyскому telekanalu Durdashan i informatsionnomu agenzstvu PiTiAy*. [Interview for Indian Television Channel Doordarshan and Press Trust of India News Agency].
http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2007/01/18/0803_type63379_116978.shtml; last access 5.05.2010

Secondary sources:

Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the middle ground: constructivism in world politics. *European Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 3, No.3. pp. 319-363.

Barnett, M. & Duvall, R. (2005). *Power in global governance*. Cambridge: University Press.

Beer, D. (2009). Russia's managed democracy. *History Today*. Vol.59, Issue 5. pp. 37-39. Accessed via Academic Search Premier.

Berenskoetter, F. *Thinking about power*. In Berenskoetter, F. & Williams, M. (2007). *Power in world politics*. London: Routledge.

Cerny, P. *Globalization and the disarticulation of political power: Towards a new middle ages?* In Goverde, H., Cerny P. G., Haugaard, M., Lentner H. (2000). *Power in contemporary politics: theories, practices, globalizations*. London: Sage.

Fierke, K.M. (2007). Constructivism. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M., & Smith, S. (Eds.), *International Relations Theories* (pp. 166-194). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goverde, H., Cerny P. G., Haugaard, M., Lentner H. (2000). *Power in contemporary politics: theories, practices, globalizations*. London: Sage.

Gvozdev, N. The sources of Russian conduct. *National Interest*. March 1, 2004, pp. 29-38.

Guzzini, S. *The concept of power. A constructivist analysis*. In Berenskoetter F. (2007).

Harris, J. (2009). Statist globalisation in China, Russia, and the Gulf State. *Science and Society*, Vol.73, No.1, pp.6-33.

Hopf, T. (1998). The promise of constructivism in International Relations Theory. *International Security*, Vol. 23, No.1. pp. 171-200

Jasinski, J. (2000). Sourcebook on rhetoric. Key concepts in contemporary rhetorical studies.

Lipschutz, R.D. *On the transformational potential of global civil society*. In Berenskoetter F. (2007). Williams M.J. *Power in world politics*. London: Routledge.

Morgenthau, H.J. (1955). *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*. New York: Knopf.

Nye, J. S. (1990). Essay on soft power. *Foreign Policy*, Fall90, Issue 80, p.153, 19p.

Nye, J. S.; Wang J. (2009). Hard decisions on soft power. *Harvard International Review*. Vol.31, Issue 2, pp.18-22.

Onuf, N. G. (2001). *The politics of constructivism*. In Fierke, K. M. & Jorgensen, E. K. (2001). *Constructing international relations: the next generation*. Armonk (N.Y.) : Sharpe. pp. 236-255.

Russett, B.M. (2006). *World politics: the menu for choice*. Belmont (Calif.): Thomson/Wadsworth.

Sakwa, R. (2004). *Putin: Russia's choice*. London : Routledge.

Sakwa, R. (2008). *Russian politics and society*. New York : Routledge.

Toulmin, S. (2003). *The uses of argument*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Zehfuss, M. (2001). *Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf and Kratochwil*. In Fierke, K. M. & Jorgensen, E. K. (2001). *Constructing international relations: the next generation*. Armonk (N.Y.) : Sharpe. pp. 115-136.

Zehfuss, M. (2002). *Constructivism in International Relations: the politics of reality*. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press ; New York.

Yudina, T. *Diskursivnoe prostranstvo politicheskoy rechi*. Retrieved 15 February 2010 from the World Wide Web: http://russcomm.ru/rca_biblio/yu/yudina.shtml