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THE MONGOLS, THEIR WARS AND CLIMATE CHANGE

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29.4.2010
KVPOS6 Pro gradu -tutkielma 40 op
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ABSTRACT

The causal relationship between climate change and violent conflict is emerging as a crucial one in the modern debate. As a possible causal pathway, climate change-induced food scarcity has been mentioned with reference to Mongols, a classical case study of Malthusianism. By studying the motivations of the Mongols’ wars of conquest by utilizing modern theories of security, it is possible to re-evaluate the motivations underlying these wars. As a theory, the societal security-related food security, and as a method, the process tracing of a case study may be utilized. During the formation of the Mongol Empire, the Mongolian Steppe experienced a sudden decline in temperature and as a result, the prerequisites in terms of environment for practicing nomadic livestock herding were diminished. The Mongols practiced warfare that was not directed against the enemy; rather, it was warfare for obtaining resources such as pasture lands that would have supported the Mongol society. The Mongols also thought of food and anything related as a security issue and a cause of war in the light of their contemporary literary sources when analyzed utilizing the theory of socially constructed security. Climate change-induced food security deficit in the form of climate cooling is indicated in debating the origins of the Mongols’ wars of conquest.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Few seem to realise that the present IPCC models predict almost unanimously that by 2040 the average summer in Europe will be as hot as the summer of 2003 when over 30,000 died from heat. By then we may cool ourselves with air conditioning and learn to live in a climate no worse than that of Bagdad now. But without extensive irrigation the plants will die and both farming and natural ecosystems will be replaced by scrub and desert. What will there be to eat? The same dire changes will affect the rest of the world and I can envisage Americans migrating into Canada and the Chinese into Siberia but there may be little food for any of them. (Lovelock, 2007)

The expected and anticipated social effects that are likely to follow the anticipated anthropogenic, man-made, climate change in the form of global warming in the future as outlined above by James Lovelock, the doyen of climate change research tradition, are emerging as a new field in the realm of social sciences. This is also reflected in the importance given to climate change-related and affected social processes by the Finnish people: a vast majority of Finns anticipate the competition for natural resources to increase in the future due to climate change in Finland (Turun sanomat, 14.7.2009). In the scientific Social Science discipline of International Relations (IR), the study of how nations and other international actors behave and interact with one another, one of the sub-fields emerging is the study of violent conflict – climate change nexus. Essentially, will the anticipated competition for natural resources prove to be a cause of violent conflict in the future in a world shaped by climate change or will the climate change generate co-operation instead of competition.

According to Thomas Homer-Dixon (Homer-Dixon in Kegley & Wittkopff, 2001, 468-470) scarcities of what he calls critical environmental resources, such as freshwater and forests, do contribute to civil conflict, but usually in association with other factors by creating social stress that may increase the likelihood of civil conflict in the regional context of developing world. For this reason, the regionality in the marginal developing world, they are often ignored by policy makers, but only at their own peril according to Homer-Dixon, as the consequences of such civil conflicts may also be felt in the developed world, for example, in the form of migration and political destability. Homer-Dixon also expects the role played by critical environmental resource scarcity to grow in the future. If this expectation were to be coupled with the anticipated effects of climate change such as the rising sea level, the mix could indeed prove to be highly volatile in terms of social consequences. As noted, these resource-related civil conflicts do not usually involve states. This is in line with the United Nations Human Security Project Data Set, according to which the role of inter-state conflict has been increasingly marginal in the last few decades with the dominant
role of conflict being acted out by non-state actors or by state within its borders or internal in
nature, findings (quoted in: Korhonen, 10).

The principal actor of international relations is, despite the growing importance of such institutions
as financial institutions, the state. Thus it is relevant from the perspective of International Relations
to study the violent conflict – climate change nexus with reference to the state institution, as has
been done, for example, by Lennon et al in the context of U.S. National security (Lennon et al,
2007), meaning more specifically: under what circumstances does a climate change lead to violent
interstate conflict? Further five questions regarding this line of research, the study of the climate
change - violent conflict nexus, have been identified by Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch
based on a review of existing literature on the topic:

1. Tighter coupling of the climate change models and the conflict models
2. Consider carefully what kinds of violence we expect to result from climate
change
3. The study of climate change and conflict needs to balance the positive and
negative effects of climate change as well as the effects of various strategies
of adaptation
4. Continue to disaggregate the effects of climate change in our systematic
conflict models, both in terms of geographical variations and types of change
5. Recent writings on climate change and security focus mainly on
consequences for the rich countries. If climate change leads to more
deprivation in the Third World, it could also generate additional terrorism that
impacts on the security in the wealthy part of the world (Nårdos – Gleditsch,
2007, 633-635)

A recent report on the state of research on the violent conflict - climate change nexus has identified
the following nine fields that should be considered in research for enabling the targeted
improvement in the research field: catalysts, natural disasters, agency, dynamic scarcity, local
mechanisms, regional perspective, low-level violence, course and outcome of conflict, accounting
for causal complexity (Buhaug et al, 2008, 37-39). Also the report identified the need for improving
the case study tradition. This thesis attempts to address these considerations in the light of the case
study analysis of the Mongols' wars of conquest. As an additional question setting one might
present the demonstration of causality between climate change and violent interstate conflict in the
light of modern security theories. Adopting a historical case as a starting point and focus of analysis
is justifiable for four reasons which will be discussed below.

First, as noted above, the climate change is only emerging as a phenomenon that should be taken
into consideration in terms of social effects and this, coupled with lack of interstate violent conflicts
in the modern world that could be analyzed for any role played by climate change, justifies taking a
retrospective position concerning the relationship between violent interstate conflict and climate
change. This means that suitable case studies may, lacking contemporary cases, be looked for in the past. The micro-level nature of the current research is well represented, for example, in studying the impact on Bangladeshi society by climate change induced social stress in terms of violent conflict (Saha, undated), but the other extreme end of the spectrum, an all-out interstate war, is not that well present. Naturally any analysis from a contemporary case should be given primacy in an analysis if such, especially on large-scale as the Mongols' wars of conquest which were in their day a world-class event with what amounts to global impact, should be found as any data would likely be in its optimal form for purposes of analysis. But given the statistics on the types of conflict cited above, this seems improbable. It should however be kept in mind that, as noted by Buhaug et al, that this type of historical case study may prove to be of little of value due to the fact that most effects of climate change are a thing of the future as of yet (Buhaug et al, 2008, 37). Things have changed since the Mongols' wars of conquest and will likely continue to do so in the future as well. Thus any case or statistical analysis has limitations already at the onset, as the findings will relate to a world that is not today or tomorrow. However, as far as the study of the climate change – violent conflict nexus with reference to inter-state violent conflict is concerned, a case study with its limitations from the past is better than no case study at all.

Second, according to Homer-Dixon a new analytical perspective is needed to better suit a changing world and to avoid making policy-mistakes due to outdated analysis:

> In this light, the concern about the potential national security implications of climate change in the Arctic… is wildly misplaced. Analysts’ reliance on a realist theory of international relations that’s grounded in a mechanistic ontology encourages them to highlight implications of Arctic climate change that are of secondary and tertiary importance to humankind, and even to Canada. Access to the Northwest Passage and to reserves of oil and natural gas in the Arctic basin will seem trivial in a world whipsawed by climate shifts resulting from loss of Arctic sea ice. Policymakers need to focus on what is really important, not on what fits their 20th century worldview. (Homer-Dixon, 2008, 8)

A retrospective look might prove to be a good starting point for producing this type of analysis; only what is important could be seen as surviving across centuries and this could in turn help in identifying what is important as recommended by Homer-Dixon. Also the use of retrospective case studies is well established in International Relations theory tradition, possibly due to its basic nature that seems to be somewhat resilient to changes on a very fundamental level concerning human and social activity in some of its forms such as violent conflict, for example, in relation to war, which usually entails, in a classical Clausewitzian sense, forcing one's will on another for reaching set war aims. This means technically that there are no wars without agendas and the task of the analyst is to uncover this agenda to better understand what brought the war about. As noted by Pekka Visuri
(Visuri, 1997), Thucydides' work on the Peloponnesian war is still usable as a text when studying strategy, a sub-field of International Relations. The Peloponnesian war preceded the Mongols' wars of conquest by some sixteen hundred years.

Third, such a study as this is of great value and use for the analyst who engages in it on a personal level for the simple reason of having to read through the relevant material and producing the analysis based on his analytical skills combined with his readings and other relevant data. First, it opens up another universe, the era of great wars when entire peoples wandered across the Eurasian continent and influences, cultures and peoples mixed in a manner most unpredictable and fruitful. Simply, it stirs the imagination and is thus an exercise in creativity. Second, this type of analysis requires combining knowledge from International Relations theory, palaeoclimatology, history and so on and is thus interdisciplinary requiring the ability to navigate different discourses in a manner that is comprehensible and results in an academic thesis. It is thus an efficient way for an analyst to develop his analytical faculty. Also the value of the position for the analyst created by the Finnish origins of Altaic Studies (Janhunen, 1999) should not be overlooked. This study may be seen as being a part of more than one hundred and fifty years of Finnish intellectual tradition related to Uralic and Altaic regions and peoples of Asia and their research. It is the tradition of such great names of Finnish intellectual history as M. A. Castrén, G. J. Ramstedt, C. G. Mannerheim and Uno Harva to mention but a few in a tradition that is acknowledged as being the leading one in the world in its field (Janhunen, 1999). Also the topic, the Mongols' wars of conquest, may also have relevancy for understanding the sources and origins of Finnish culture. In his study on Väinämöinen, the epic hero of the Finnish folklore classic Kalevala, the classical folklorist Martti Haavio has noted the similarities between the character of Antero Vipunen of the Kalevala, a mythological character loaned likely from the Sami mythology to the Finnish mythology, and that of the Li Tiä Guai the Wise of Chinese mythology. Haavio leaves open the question of how this motive has arrived in Fennoskandia and when and mediated by whom, but notes that the legend of the Wise was brought to China by the invading Mongols in twelve hundreds, it was a Mongol loan and not endogenous to the Chinese mythology (Haavio, 1950, 176-177).

Fourth, the limitations of the data available in terms of the volume of the climate change experienced concerning the temperature as variable. The most recent data on the research concerning the climate change - violent conflict nexus from the last thirty decades presented by Nils Petter Gleditsch (presentation at the 3rd Annual UPI-FIIA Open day, session 1, 1.3.2010) has as the highest value of change in average temperature .8 degrees centigrade. As the anticipated global warming is well in excess of this figure, cases with larger changes in the medium temperature
should be identified for purposes of case study and if possible statistical analysis to make sure the research is relevant for any anticipated future scenarios. This especially being the case when a change in average temperature of some 4 degrees centigrade is anticipated (Hertig & Jacobeit, 2008) a difference of one degree in one direction or another may make a larger difference than may seem. The national security scenarios for The United States have been studied in the report discussed above and the scenarios of that report, constructed based on temperature as variable, serve well to illustrate the differences between varying temperature changes:

The *expected* climate change scenario considered in this report, with an average global temperature increase of 1.3°C by 2040, can be reasonably taken as a basis for national planning...the environmental effects in this scenario are “the least we ought to prepare for.” National security implications include: heightened internal and cross-border tensions caused by large-scale migrations; conflict sparked by resource scarcity, particularly in the weak and failing states of Africa; increased disease proliferation, which will have economic consequences; and some geopolitical reordering as nations adjust to shifts in resources and prevalence of disease. Across the board, the ways in which societies react to climate change will refract through underlying social, political, and economic factors.

In the case of *severe* climate change, corresponding to an average increase in global temperature of 2.6°C by 2040, massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to massive nonlinear societal events. In this scenario... nations around the world will be overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities. Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to outright chaos. In this scenario, climate change provokes a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature.

The *catastrophic* scenario, with average global temperatures increasing by 5.6°C by 2100, finds strong and surprising intersections between the two great security threats of the day—global climate change and international terrorism waged by Islamist extremists. This catastrophic scenario would pose almost inconceivable challenges as human society struggled to adapt. It is by far the most difficult future to visualize without straining credulity. The scenario notes that understanding climate change in light of the other great threat of our age, terrorism, can be illuminating. Although distinct in nature, both threats are linked to energy use in the industrialized world, and, indeed, the solutions to both depend on transforming the world’s energy economy—America’s energy economy in particular. The security community must come to grips with
these linkages, because dealing with only one of these threats in isolation is likely to exacerbate the other, while dealing with them together can provide important synergies. (Lennon et al, 2007, 6-7)

Based on this it is reasonable to say that the volume of the change in temperature is the single most important variable in any analysis concerning the climate change – violent conflict nexus and should be treated accordingly.

As an alternative plausible perspective concerning the climate change – violent interstate conflict nexus research, the problem of nuclear war could be offered as a starting point. The nuclear war strategy research with its scenarios following a nuclear exchange or strike has a number of analogies that could be utilized: the problem of co-operation under mutual threat of destruction. As one example of these useful analogies the climate change, or perhaps rather the climate changing, impact of the weapon systems involved when utilized (for example see: Sagan, Ehrlich in; Ehrlich, 1984), and so on, also in terms of social impact(s), infrastructure destruction to mention but a few aspects. Still, the Mongols did fight their wars whereas, apart from the end state of the World War II, the nuclear war has never been fought. The research on nuclear warfare and its impact(s) is largely an exercise in scenario building using what knowledge has been gained on connection with nuclear tests, their fall-outs and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a classical example of this being perhaps the work of Herman Kahn (Kahn, 1961). This avenue would thus be characterized by a scenario-building with its possible worlds and their impact on human and social behaviour and therefore it would be a what-if -type of research, but still nevertheless quite fascinating in terms of trying to understand human violent conflict behaviour in connection with scenario building for post-climate change world. For these reasons the Mongols’ wars of conquest as a case study in researching the violent conflict – climate change nexus is relevant and useful in terms of increasing the understanding of this particular social phenomenon.

The study at hand may be seen as having two-fold academic value. First, in the discipline of International Relations it is a case study concerning the climate change - violent conflict nexus and thus belongs to the literature concerning the topic. The question investigated by this corpus is regarded as “vital” in terms of requiring established baseline knowledge (Gleditsch & Nordås, 2009). Second, it provides any one involved with the Altaic Studies, the study of Mongols among others, an outline of what the discipline of International Relations may contribute concerning the discussion on the motivations of the Mongols’ wars of conquest. This discussion is an on-going one as no generally accepted understanding concerning the motivations for these wars exists. The discussion may be seen as being between those of identity politics-related models of explanation contributions, meaning the need for the enemy as a facilitating condition for national unity, and
those of material models of explanation contributions, such as the climate change as having been
the causal factor in the form of food shortage in launching the Mongols’ wars of conquest. By
utilizing the theories and methods available in International Relations, the discipline dedicated
originally to the study of war and its many aspects, it is possible to contribute to this debate the
perspective of a specialized discipline and tradition. This way these dominant models of explaining
the Mongols’ wars of conquest may be evaluated for their consistency in the light of the knowledge
possessed by the discipline of International Relations on how, for example, the image of the enemy
and of the Other is connected with the motivations underlying the Mongols’ wars of conquest.
2. THEORY, METHOD AND MATERIAL

2.1. The theory of food security

According to Nils Petter Gleditsch it is possible, in the debate concerning the climate change – violent conflict nexus, to distinguish between two schools, or perhaps better, traditions: the neo-Malthusians and cornucopians. “In the environmental debate, neo-Malthusian doomsayers regularly clash with cornucopian prophets of environmental optimism.” (Gleditsch in: Crocker & al, 2007, 185). The cornucopian position is readily understandable as being one of optimism through the origins of the term (late Latin *cornu copiae*, ”horn of plenty” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1989)) and entailing the premise of non-causality in relation to climate change and violent conflict. This Thesis however focuses on investigating the possible causal connection and thus adopts the neo-Malthusian case as being potentially valid. This neo-Malthusian idea or line of thinking may called as being expressive of *environmentalism* (*environmentalistinen*) (Vuoristo, 1997), meaning attention given in analysis to environmental factors as being dominant in determining social behaviour. According to Paul Diehl geography is a source of conflict as states conflict over territorial control but what of the other dimensions of geography, the directions to which according to Diehl the research should be directed (Diehl, 1991, 23). One such direction could be the produce of the land, food.

The classical Malthusian School of economics is based on the conflict between the need for resources and the scarcities thereof. In essence it argues the case that there will always be more demand than supply of resources.

Malthus argued that increases in real income arising from productivity improvements (or other sources) would tend to cause population growth, leading to erosion and perhaps full dissipation of income gains. He also suggested that population might overshoot productivity gains, causing subsequent painful readjustment. (Brander & Taylor, 1998, 119).

As a mechanism of this readjustment Malthus cites wars in connection of large movements, wanderings, of peoples, which according to him are an expression of the need to feed large populations. This way the Malthusian school is of interest for an analyst of International Relations as the discipline was created with the problem of war in mind and remains its main focus. Malthusian economics may provide an appropriate approach for the analyzing the problem of war with reference to violent conflict related to climate change. Interestingly Malthus sees the motivations of the people and of their leaders as being different in nature, but interacting in practice:

An Alaric, an Attila, or a Zingis Khan, and the chiefs around them, might
fight for glory, for the fame of extensive conquests, but the true cause that set in motion the great tide of northern emigration, and that continued to propel it till it rolled at different periods against China, Persia, Italy, and even Egypt, was scarcity of food, a population extended beyond the means of supporting it. (Malthus, 1982, 84–85)

However the model created by Malthus is one of population growth and resulting scarcity and not of climate change-induced food scarcity. Indeed climate is a static element in the classical Malthusian school as present in the work of Malthus and thus it represents the thinking of the latter half of eighteenth century with its causal understanding being of the form human → environment. This is well present in the lecture given by the professor of Chemistry Pehr Adrian Gadd at the old Academy of Turku, in which he also touches on the problem of war and how it contributes to environmental degradation:

Kuinka tietämättömyys oikeasta talouspolitiikasta (hushållning), tieteiden halveksunta ja ihmisten oma välinpitämättömyys voivat tuhota parhaimmat ja suotuisammat ilmastot, joiden alueella on muinoin ollut ihanasti viljeltyjä maita, siitä ovat nyt surkeana ja hirvittävänä todistuksena koko Palestiina, suurin osa Persiaa ja osa Afrikan rannikkoa, jota asuttavat barbaarikansat. Suuren osan tällaisesta aiheuttavat elinkeinojen halveksunta ja laiminlyönti, sopimattomat lait, despoottinen hallitustapa, pitkät ja onnettomat sodat sekä kansalaisoikeuksien väkivaltainen rajoittaminen. (Quoted in: Niemelä, 2008, 79)

The change in the conception of the causation took place in the early 1900s, when climate was started to be seen as being one of changing nature and not a constant as was thought previously. It was during this time that Palaeoclimatology, the study of the climate past, was born in Sweden and made possible the reconstruction of past climates and thus created the understanding of historical changes in climate (Lamb, 1995). This change, which might be characterized as a paradigm shift, is well present in the work by Halford Mackinder, a founding figure of Geopolitics, a science intimately connected with the discipline of International Relations in an assisting capacity (Moisio, 2001) as an assistant science. Halford Mackinder continued on the Malthusian theme but with a model of climate that affected the society through its variability:

For some recurrent reason—it may have been owing to spells of droughty years—these Tartar mobile hordes have from time to time in the course of history gathered their whole strength together and fallen like a devastating avalanche upon the settled agricultural peoples either of China or Europe. In the West we hear of them first as the Huns, who in the middle of the fifth century after Christ rode into Hungary under a great but terrible leader, Attila. (Mackinder, 1942, 70–71)

This quote above expresses well the emerging idea of climate and its changes and fluctuations as a potential source of change in international relations. The concept of causality is emerging as being human ↔ environment one, with one affecting the other. Thus the analysis, as a direction which is suggested by Mackinder, should take into consideration environmental factors, such as precipitation
and its changes, as well. Neo-Malthusianism could be characterized as being Malthusianism amended with climate as an unaccountable changing factor affecting the food regime of a society. This accounting of environment and climatic factors in an analysis was first introduced to the discipline of International Relations by Crispin Tickell in 1970s, in his work that builds also on Palaeoclimatological research by Lamb and also touches on the potential for conflict with relation to climate both as a cause and a weapon in terms of climatic engineering and also addresses potential pathways for violent conflict such as political processes and the related decision making:

On a smaller scale, seeding of the clouds to induce rain in one place could in some circumstances prevent it falling in another where it is equally needed. This may already have happened in Israel at the expense of Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Jordan... The list of possible actions of this kind is already long. It will get longer as our ability, deliberate or inadvertent, to alter the climate becomes greater.

In nearly all cases it is hard conclusively to show cause and effect. Nothing is clear-cut. Those who divert rivers or seed clouds can plausibly maintain that changes elsewhere would have happened anyway. Governments which had authorised such actions would naturally enjoy the support of those who have benefited from them. They would thereby be strengthened in resisting pressure from other governments to undo—if it were possible—what had been done, to make reparation for damage caused, or to undertake not to repeat such actions. It is arguable that in the future governments will be under still greater domestic pressure to put national requirements first to ensure their own survival as well as that of their people.

But if the world is not to relapse into anarchy, with states warring over use and abuse of natural resources, some sort of international agreement in this respect... seems essential. (Tickell, 1986)

The decisive introduction of climatic factors to the analysis of violent conflict was however in connection with the article by Edward Miguel et al on the connection between violent conflict and precipitation changes in the Sub-Saharan Africa with reference to economic opurtunity (Miguel et al, 2004). Continuing the tradition initiated by Malthus, Miguel approached the topic by means of economic opportunity loss -analysis using the methodololgy of Economics. Similar methodological approach was also adopted by the influential Stern Commission in evaluating the economic impact of anticipated climate change (Stern Review Report, 2007). According to the economist Vesa Kanniainen Economics with its theories, methods and approaches provides any analyst with the superior toolkit for analysing climate change (Kanniainen, 2007). In the context of this study this may be understood as reviewing the Malthusian School and its premises related to violent conflict in terms of being food scarcity induced in the case of the Mongols as a theoretical starting point amended with the hypothesis suggested by Mackinder that they may have had climatic origins.

Which of the many theories of International Relations should one adopt as a theoretical framework
for studying the climate change – violent conflict nexus? Of the many concepts of security, the deficit of which is usually seen as the main cause of wars, which one would be the most suitable?

The current situation being open and evolving in terms of new approaches and theories:

Systematic research of climate change is new. By its very complexity, climate change research is an area that requires interdisciplinary approaches (team or individual). As an area of inquiry it is still, relative to other intellectual areas, underresourced and open to new approaches and theory. More climate change questions are unresolved then those few we now have a firm and conclusive scientific understanding of. Questions remain unresolved for both the methodologies employed and the results endorsed. Climate change research is progressing, as all areas of inquiry do, and the uncertainty that currently exists is nothing new. (Paci et al, 2004, 2)

Already based on its name the analytical concept of food security comes readily to mind. The concept of food security is a new one and is related intimately to the societal security of which it is an indicator and dimension. It refers to food and the regime built around it in terms of preparation, hunting, farming, pasturing and so as being expressions of a societal identity. Historically food has been an object on inquiry in International Relations theory, mainly as a weapon and not perhaps a cause of wars (for example see: Harle, Ed, 1980, Chapter 4), but this has been broadened to cover the various other aspects of food as well. The concept of food security is particularly useful when applied to climate change -impact, as it allows the analysis of a whole society through one analytical concept as food is where a human, and his society, is. It has an element of omnipresence and unpredictability when connected with climate change and must be approached appropriately:

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For purposes of analysis the concept of food security has been condensed into five A's by the Ryerson University Centre for Studies in Food Security:

Availability- sufficient food for all people at all times

Accessibility- physical and economic access to food for all at all times

Adequacy- access to food that is nutritious and safe, and produced in environmentally sustainable ways

Acceptability- access to culturally acceptable food, which is produced and obtained in ways that do not compromise people's dignity, self-respect or human rights

Agency- the policies and processes that enable the achievement of food security
Of these the dimension of availability allows the integration of classical Malthusian economics into the analysis as well as the more modern identity-related dimensions such as acceptability. Echoing this methodological outline quoted above the food security may be put into a larger context:

Whether we are discussing individual foods or whole systems, impacts from climate change on food security may include the introduction of new foods, etc. New foods can be invasive species moving into a region, such is the case with the northward moving tree line into what was tundra, the movement of deer north of 60º, and so on, or the introduction of store bought foods. How each society, sub-group, or household within a society, adapts to changes will have impacts on the overall system. There are global implications for the kinds of food systems we have in place. (Paci et al, 2004, 4)

This concept of food security has mainly been used in connection with, for example, the Arctic Indigenous Peoples, but as noted by Paci (quote above) the concept has also universal validity and is thus transferrable. The concept of food security as understood in this study does not seem to have been used in investigating the causes of violent interstate conflict. It usually refers to non-mainstream social groups and their societal identityt such as, for example, the immigrants (Koc & Welsh, 2002), but it has been used in evaluating the consequences for food security of a society following an interstate violent conflict (Koc et al, 2007).

Two contemporary events may be cited as evidence of the relevancy of food security in the modern world. Consequently they also serve as evidence of the relevancy of any food security -related conflict analysis, past or present, for the purpose of understanding modern day conflicts in terms of what is their underlying motivation. First, there is the case of whaling. The practice of whaling is an ancient one in countries such as Japan and Norway. A practice that may at one time have been necessary for the obtainment of, for example, ambergris and whale meat, it has now become a practice of threatening the biodiversity of the seas. Ambergris is needed mainly for use in the cosmetics in the case of the Sperm whale, and other whales are needed for traditional dishes, especially in the case of Japan. The countries, and societies, practicing whaling are not mainly, especially in the cases of Japan and Norway, struggling indigenous pre-modern societies with limited if any financial resources. The whales are rapidly becoming increasingly under the threat of extinction, but whaling continues, as it has become a part of the identity of the societies involved: whaling in Japan is a matter of patriotism and has led to straining between the relations of Japan and Australia (Times Online, 19.2.2010). Arguably this is not a conflict between pre-modern societies with scarce food resources, but a conflict of societal identities divided by the issue of maritime biodiversity. This coupled with increasing demands for whale protection has led to a level of conflicting confrontation in relations between whaling and non-whaling countries.
Second, in February 2010 it was reported that a rebel group of guerrilla fighters had prevented the delivery of United Nations food aid as provided by World Food Programme (WFP) to its destination by outlawing the organization in Somalia (Taloussanomat, 28.2.2010). The group, al Shabaab, that controls southern parts of Somalia claims that the food aid hampers the local farming threatening the farmers' livelihood. Also the Programme has been accused of political motives. This is a case where identities connected with food cultures and what might be called a strategic perspective on food have become merged. Food both represents a foreign culture and is used as a means of promoting non-Somali values and also threatens the economic system of the parts of Somalia controlled by al Shabaab. In the light of these two cases it may well be argued that the analytical framework of food security has validity and applications beyond indigenous societies as well and is for this reason the analytical concept adopted in this study.

Also, by way of providing perspective on the theory of food security, it may be pointed out how the Roman Emperor Augustus the Divine referred to the measures he had undertaken to increase the food security among the people of Rome during his reign. Especially important according to Augustus seems to have been the liberation of the people of Rome from fear and danger related to food and the lack thereof.

Ankarassa elintarvikepulassa en jättänyt viljatoimituksia suorittamatta, vaan yksityisillä varoillani ja toimenpiteilläni järjestin muutamassa päivässä koko kansan vapaaksi pelon vallasta ja vaarasta. (Augustus, 2009, 61)

Panem et circenses, the famous latin saying by the Roman satirist Juvenalis (http://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panem_et_circenses) may be more fitting for describing the Roman politics than one might think; it would be tempting to characterize it as a key element in the Roman strategic thinking and tradition. It could be said that the food security has always been part of the functions of human society and thus the theory of it is, in a way, omnipresent, the exception for this being perhaps the modern era as lived by those in what is known as the rich industrialised world with its ample food resources, although even this population segment has considerations such as ethical treatment of animals, non-pesticide agriculture that may be seen as being food security-related.

2.2. Method

How to best study the climate change – violent conflict nexus? What is the optimal approach, for example, in studying this problem with relation to the Mongols' wars of conquest in terms of their motivations as hypothesized by Malthus and Mackinder with relation to food security? Two
methodological traditions may be distinguished in Social Sciences including the theory of
International Relations: the traditions of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. This division
reflects the general observation on the nature of the scientific tradition in general made by C. P.
Snow in 1959 (Snow, 1998). According to Snow the field of science may be divided into two
distinct cultures, humanist and scientific, mainly based on the amount of mathematical approaches
in their methodological toolkit, this referring to the amount of quantitative data utilized. According
to Snow the problem characterizing the modern day and age is the problem of miscommunication
between these two cultures that prevents the discovery of effective solutions for the problems faced
by the humanity. These two cultures, or traditions, may also be found in connection with the
problem of climate change – violent conflict nexus research methodology.

The approach of quantitative methodology, mainly that of statistical methods as is understandable
considering the origins of the debate in Economics with its statistical approaches, has been outlined
in a recent report (Buhaug et al, 2008) dealing with the current state of knowledge and research
related to the climate change – violent conflict nexus. The report concludes the use of quantitative
methods as being the optimal choice as the data yielded by statistical research designs is by nature
generalizable. Thus it could be used anywhere, anytime and by anyone. According to the report:

There is considerable room for improvement within the case study tradition. Yet, in our view, the most important immediate challenges lie within
generalizable, statistical research. Data limitations, rigid research designs, and overly bold assumptions have so far effectively prevented direct and thorough
evaluations of prevailing causal models. These challenges are not insurmountable. Recent and ongoing advances in data collection and
statistical software (notably within geographic information systems, GIS), coupled with constant refinement of theoretical models, facilitate more
precise and localized analysis of environment-conflict linkages than what has so far been published. (Buhaug et al, 2008, 37)

The position taken here is not however hostile toward qualitative research tradition. On the contrary,
eventual development of an interdisciplinary research programme combining what is best in both
qualitative and quantitative research methodology traditions to examine the problem of climate
change – violent conflict nexus is recommended by the report. The report also identifies and
acknowledges the lack of correspondence between the quantitative and qualitative research
traditions’ research results as being a central problem. The situation being that case study -analysis
has shown cases where environmental factors arguably have played a role in violent conflict but no
statistical link has been found. This means that there is no agreement among the scientific
community of International Relations on the climate change – violent conflict nexus causality. In
the light of the research it is impossible in terms of probabilities, as any science would not claim
possession of absolute knowledge, to say whether climate change will result in violent conflict or
"Quantitative, cross-national research on the environment and conflict has generally failed to uncover correlational linkages that stand up to conventional robustness tests." (Buhaug et al, 2008, 36)

But what is the qualitative, the case study, tradition like in terms of its approaches and methods? Thomas Homer-Dixon is widely considered to be the leading scholar in this tradition, known as Toronto School (Obioha, 2008, 311), and according to him what he calls process tracing -approach is the optimal method for investigating the climate change – violent conflict nexus. The method involves analysing cases where environmental factors have led to violent conflict on a case-by-case approach, in each case aiming at uncovering the process and the factors affecting them that eventually led to violent conflict. The method differs radically from the one recommended as optimal by Buhaug et al as cited above as it is, in principle, non-generalizeable as every violent conflict is its own individual case with individual processes that led to it. The”orthodox”, as Homer-Dixon calls it, methodology is designed based on the tradition of natural sciences and is based on testing a hypothesis against statistical data. In analysing the differences of the various methodologies in quest for the optimal method, Homer-Dixon has arrived at the following typology of the three dominant methodologies:

Correlational analysis of large amounts of quantitative data on the relative frequencies of environmental scarcity and conflict across many societies and over time. Such an approach involves statistical estimation of the probability of obtaining a given correlation observed in the data if, in actuality, there is no correlation in the real world between the variables in question. Second, researchers can undertake a controlled-case comparison, in which cases are selected that vary on the independent variable, environmental scarcity, but that are essentially the same for all other variables that might affect the incidence of conflict. Researchers aim to select cases that control for all variables except environmental scarcity so that scarcity's effect on conflict can be isolated. If sufficiently similar cases are not available, researchers can instead undertake thought experiments using counterfactual analysis in which researchers ask: What would have happened if the independent variable changed its value but all other factors remained constant?

Finally, researchers can undertake process tracing of the causal processes in a selection of cases where environmental scarcity apparently contributes to conflict. Here, in violation of the strict canons of conventional political science, cases are selected explicitly on both the independent and the dependent variables. The aim is to determine if the independent and dependent variables are causally linked and, if they are, to induce from a close study of many such cases the common patterns of causality and the key intermediate variables that characterize these links. Process tracing often involves dropping down one or more levels of analysis to develop a more finely textured and detailed understanding of the causal steps between the independent and the dependent variables. (Homer-Dixon, 1995)

Of these three methodologies Homer-Dixon recommends the use of the last one, process tracing.
Homer-Dixon bases this on the current state of the knowledge, that is, according to him, only evolving and on the poor understanding and complex nature of the systems under investigation, thus rendering them poor objects for statistical enquiries. In essence, it is not known what would be the appropriate dependant and independent variables. The method of process tracing allows for development and refining of hypotheses and the study of possible existing causal links, this way the data produced could then be subject to other methods of investigation as well as the amount of knowledge would grow in proportion with understanding. This way the tradition of process tracing may be seen as not being antagonistic, let alone hostile, toward statistical methods and their utilization. It could be said that there is a common understanding of the need for combining the qualitative and quantitative research traditions.

The report by Buhaug et al already cited above, has also reached some conclusions that come close to the critique made by Homer-Dixon in terms of their recommendations:

First, large-N studies have so far failed to adequately account for proposed indirect and conditional effects of climate change, even though recent additions to the literature are beginning to explore the role of intervening factors… Second, large-N investigations of environmental scarcity and armed conflict – as in fact most research on civil war in general – suffer from overly aggregated research designs… A third significant limitation of previous research concerns the dependent variable. Almost all statistical assessments of environmental scarcity and conflict look only at the most severe forms of organized violence: civil and interstate war. Yet, these conflicts are arguably the least likely to emerge from an increasing scarcity of renewable resources… Fourth, research in the field has long suffered from a dearth of reliable environmental data… Fifth, the case study literature tends to select cases on the dependent and main independent variables; i.e. to study only countries where both conflict and scarcity are prevalent…Finally, the public debate on the security implications of climate change has been dominated by NGO reports, national security, and statements by national and international public officials. (Buhaug, et al, 2008, 33–36)

As both traditions seem to agree on the value and relevancy of the case study -method, or process tracing as Homer-Dixon calls it, it would seem appropriate to follow this method in the context of this study as an application. This method has been used by Homer-Dixon with reference to various cases (Homer-Dixon, 1994). This should be done however in a way that takes into account the critique(s) as cited above in choosing the case to be studied as well in designing the research setting. But to start in the logical order of things: what would be the appropriate case to study and why would it be, taking into account the above critique(s), appropriate and merit being the topic of a study?

But what would be an ideal case study process tracing when investigating the climate change – violent conflict nexus? The motivations underlying the Mongols' wars of conquest could be offered
as an object for such an investigation. These wars are cited by Malthus as a case of readjustment following a food crisis as was seen above and have since also been cited, with connection to changes in climatic conditions with impact on food security, by Mackinder. These wars are what might be called a classical case study with reference to climate change, food and violent inter-state conflict. They have also been present in other authors such as Iivari Leiviskä as a case of Malthusianism and its social impact including violent conflict:

Suurten joukkojen liikkuneiset ovat olleet tavallisina tavallisina Sisä-Aasian karuilta aroseuduilta, joilla silloin tällöin sattuu perättäisiä kuivia vuosia pakottaen asukkaat liikkeelle etsimään karjalleen laitumia ja ihmisille ravintoa. Liikkeelle lähteneet heimot houkuttelevat ja pakottavat toisia mukaansa, joten käyvät mahdollisiksi niin suuret joukot kuin oli mukana hunnien vaelluksella 4. vuosisadalla j. Kr ja mongolien valloitusretkellä 13. vuosisadan alkipuolella. (Leiviskä, 1938, 185)

It would be an appropriate way to start unravelling the climate change – violent conflict nexus by re-evaluating a classical case based on which, at least partly, (Neo-) Malthusianism is ultimately based on. This could be done in the light of the most recent data concerning the contemporary climate and by utilizing the theories and approaches of modern security studies. But what was the Mongol society responsible for these wars like? How did they fight their wars and for why and where environmental factors, namely climate and its changes, indicated as motivation for these wars? This particular case study for process tracing allows the factoring in of the critique(s) according to Buhaug et al as cited above in the research design for a retrospective case study chosen for process tracing.

First, a small case study allows for investigation concerning any intervening factors as the subject matter in terms of sources, physical area of the events, timeline and so on are comparably small. The study at hand is not a large-N study but a small one in terms of scope, in relation to statistical studies concerning the region of sub-Saharan Africa (Miguel et al, 2008) for example, and this type of research could prove to be a fertile way of exploring the role of intervening factors.

Second, the study design could not be characterized as aggregated; rather, as noted, it is small and manageable and of course for this reason could not provide exhaustive answers on the climate change – violent conflict nexus, but if a number of this type of investigations were to be carried out, some kind of statistical answer could possibly be found in the form of intervening factors. And if not an answer then at least, as recommended by Homer-Dixon, variables for statistical analysis could be isolated from a large selection of case studies. A variable that is present in a number of cases could easily be used for such a purpose. What might be critiqued could be exactly the limited size, but as noted due to limitations in suitable case studies in the Introduction this case at hand
seems to be the optimal one to choose.

Third, the business of International Relations theory is the study of actors of the international system and dominantly these actors are states, thus it is warranted to study the actions taken by states when faced with climate change and, as noted, if need be this should be done by means of retrospective case study analysis if no suitable contemporary case is to be found. As for the focus given on the most severe forms of violence, they are regarded as hallmarks of the state institution in the Weberian classical tradition and for this reason International Relations should focus on the severest forms of violence in studying the climate change – violent conflict nexus with reference to states to ensure the relevancy of the findings to the discipline of International Relations. To be sure all violence should be regarded as important, but in studying the climate change – violent conflict nexus with reference to small communities, other disciplines might prove to be more fertile.

Fourth, the case studies for process tracing should be selected with keeping in mind the availability of data, with the case of the Mongols' wars of conquest there are various climatological data sets available with different methodological approaches and variables and the accompanying analyses in some cases as well. This means that there is data available, and not only concerning the climatic conditions of the era under investigation, but also on social conditions, political institutions and so on. Also due to the central position of the Mongols in the history of the world, most of this data is readily available and well commented, documented, translated and edited by the members of the respective scientific communities. We may move back in history, but not in complete darkness. There are various sources and contemporary research that will guide anyone on interested in the issue of the origins of the Mongol’s wars of conquest.

Fifth, as the for the dependent and main independent variables, meaning the prevalence of scarcity and conflict, the Mongol society before the rise of Chinggis Qahan was interfighting but in the sense of clan- and other such disputes rather than all-out civil conflict. Also the Mongolian Steppe does not seem to have been that scarce before the time of Chinggis Qahan in terms of food resources considering the growth in animal stock and so on. Rather, the case of the Mongols’ wars of conquest as having been induced by climate change, could be seen the result of a wealthy society not being able to cope with changing climate conditions and in order to maintain its standard of living resorts to war.

Also, as Malthus, based on the quote above, bases his theory of scarcity leading to war among others on the case analysis of the Mongols' wars of conquest it must be, in order to understand the
School he founded, encouraged to investigate the case analyses that he cites. This will facilitate the understanding of his theory and its origins, a theory which is frequently cited and remains a significant part of the Economic Science. Otherwise one would have to conclude prima facie that the theory in question is either false or correct. As the study of war is the business of International Relations theory, as noted, it may help in this process by uncovering the role of food scarcity in the case of the Mongols' wars of conquest by using the theories and approaches available to it. This way the claim made by Malthus of the Mongols’ wars of conquest as having been driven by food scarcity may be re-evaluated. Certainly the point of critique made by Nils Petter Gleditsch will be avoided by choosing the case at hand for the purpose of process tracing: "Postulated events in the future are cited as empirical evidence” (Schwartz & al, 2000, 78). This is a point of critique that becomes understandable if the amount of scenario-building around climate change is looked at.

2.3. Material

This study utilizes literary sources, both European and Mongol, contemporary to the Mongol Empire as its main material in the investigation. The material may be divided into two groups: European contemporary literary sources and Mongol contemporary literary sources. This Chapter deals with these sources and their use in the study at hand.

The first of the contemporary Mongol sources to Chinggis Qahan is the Yassa (Riasanovksy, 1967, Chapter II), the law of the Mongol empire created by Chinggis Qahan for the purpose of governing the Mongol population throughout his expanding Empire. It has been compiled by the historian of the Mongol law Valentin Riasanovsky from various sources into a coherent compilation for use in academic research. Various other versions exist such as the one produced by Lamb (Lamb, 1931, 65-74), which according to Riasanovsky is based on a misreading of an eighteenth century Persian chronicle that deals partly with the customs and traditions but not with the law of the Mongol Empire. The version compiled by Riasanovsky is accepted for wider use in academic research by the relevant academic community. Example of this is the doctoral thesis written under the auspices of the University of Helsinki in the discipline of History by Antti Ruotsala which cites Riasanovsky’s version of the Yassa as a source (Ruotsala, 2001). Thus utilizing this version of the Yassa in this study should be seen as justifiable as a primary source.

The second contemporary Mongol source is the Secret History of the Mongols (Onon, 2001) by an unknown author or authors, although Judge Sigi Kutuku has been cited as potential author (Ihalainen, 1993, 95) that is dated to have been completed during the reign of Ögödei Qahan, the son and heir
of Chinggis Qahan in the first half of the thirteenth century while earlier parts of it seem to have been produced during the life time of Chinggis Qahan (Onon in: Onon, 2001). This dating is based on the Chinese cyclical system of calendar that is based on years named after animals and the History is said in the text to have been completed during the year of the Rat, thus giving the years 1264, 1252, 1228 as possible dates of completion (Ihalainen, 1993, 95). It is an official history of the Mongols, the name Secret History refers to internal as in the meaning history of the Mongols. It is the account of the rise of Chinggis Qahan as narrated by the Mongols. It has been translated a number of times, for the first time for the European and wider academic audience in 1866 in the form of a translation based on the Chinese translation by Archmandrite Kafarov. The translation that has been used in this study is the most recent one and by a native Mongolian speaker and a leading scholar of the Altaic Studies Urgunge Onon (Onon, 2001). Thus it should be considered a reliable source in terms of translation and cultural understanding. The Secret History has also been used by Antti Ruotsala in his dissertation (Ruotsala, 2001), although the translation is an older one, but still the demonstrates the value of the work as a primary source in academic research.

The first contemporary European source is the famous travel account by Marco Polo (Polo, 1957), a work that’s has for some seven hundred years been influential in the European literary tradition and is credited for having created the tradition of the study of other peoples’ and cultures in the European intellectual tradition. A note concerning the use of Marco Polo's classical work as a primary source in analysis might be in order at this stage since as noted by Ruotsala, any scholar utilizing the work of Polo will have to make a statement concerning the justification of utilizing Polo’s work due to possible case of plagiarism and/or presenting second-hand information as first-hand eyewitness accounts. The Polos, Marco and his father Niccolò and uncle Maffeo, set out from their native Republic of Venice to the faraway Mongol Empire, where other Europeans had been before them, some time after 1271 in conjunction with a merchant trip to the Eastern Mediterranean region. They returned to Venice in 1295 via sea travel around the southern part of the Asian continent. After some time Polo was imprisoned and during this time dictated his famous work. Ever since the return of the Polos the credibility and accuracy of their travel stories, for which they were famous in Venice, has been an object of public and academic debate both for and against that has not been made any easier by the fact that the existing versions of Polo's work are copies of copies of copies and so on.

The original produced by Polo by dictation to his comrade Rustichello of Pisa, a man known for having produced a number of chivalric romances based on King Arthur or a popular story writer of
the day and age as noted by Ruotsala, during his time as prisoner of war in Genoa in likely in 1298 has not been traced, however 143 other versions have been (Ruotsala, 1997, 126). Three main explanations may be isolated concerning the origins of the Polo’s work. First, Polo visited China and the work is authentic. Second, the work uses words which, as noted by the famous scholar Pelliot, are of Persian origin, indicating that the work might possibly be a product of plagiarism from a Persian original. Third, the Polo family had trading interests in Constantinople and Crimea and it has been suggested by the sinologist Frances Wood that Polo may merely have looked after these interests and chronicled the stories he heard from arriving merchants and travellers and presented their stories as his own (Ruotsala, 1997, 130). This essay cites the work as a credible and accurate first-hand witness account accepting, as does the biographer of Khubilai Qahan Rossabi (Rossabi, 1988, 148) that Polo should be given the benefit of the doubt until definite proof is provided that his stories are taken from other sources, possibly Persian ones as some of the expressions he uses are from Persian language. Also as noted by Ruotsala Polo would have rejected any accusations of plagiarism as the concept of authenticity was different in 13th and 14th centuries, the era of worship of the various relics more or less original associated with Christianity, from the one that is commonly accepted in the 21st century. As noted by Ruotsala the final verdict on the originality of Polo's work may not at this stage be given, but the work serves as a valuable source of information on the Mongol Empire, be the information first- or second-hand (Ruotsala, 1997, 131-132) contemporary nevertheless and dealing with the topic of this study.

The second contemporary European source is the travel, or perhaps better a spy account by Johannes de Plano Carpini of the Order of the Saint Francis, who as a Papal emissary travelled to the Mongol Court in 1240s leaving from Rome in 1245, some fifty years before Marco Polo, and produced an account of this travel for the Holy See with recommendations for how to fight the Mongols during wartime (de Plano Carpini, 2003). His mission seems to have been twodimensional. First, he was to make contact with the Mongol leadership and to deliver them a personal message from the Pope, in essence to make a diplomatic contact as the Europeans were concerned with the threat of the Mongols and their possible further invasion of Europe. Second, he was report on the Mongol society, army and government to the Pope, in essence to gather intelligence concerning the potential enemy and how to defeat them in battle. This the friar did by providing counsel of some detail on how to defeat the Mongols in battle. The friar was a scholar and a learned man of his day and age and thus serves as a valuable, precise and competent source concerning the Mongol society. His reporting may be seen as representing the considerable Scholastic intellectual tradition that is quite central to the wider European intellectual and academic
tradition. The work has been used also by Ruotsala in his doctoral dissertation (Ruotsala, 2001) as a primary source. It may thus be seen as a valid and relevant source with a record of related citation in the research associated with it.
3. THE MONGOL IDENTITY AND SOCIETY

3.1. Identity and its study in the theory of International Relations

The concept of identity with its origins in psychology refers to how some one, an individual or a group, perceives itself. In the discipline of International Relations it is used in connection with states and societies, though frequently similar they usually are two different things as state is best characterized as being an institution and society is best seen as an informal network built around shared identity. When identity is spoken of in the context of the discipline of International Relations theory it is understood to refer to the identity that the members of a social group share and which brings them together as a society. It could be said that to study the identity of a society is studying its most basic nature and its functions, as the identity of a society is omnipresent as it is to be found were the members of the society in question are to be found. The concept of identity is treated by Alexander Wendt as being for analytical purposes equal with that of the structure of society meaning in practice culture and the changes in it (Wendt, 2005, 314). Wendt further identifies two ways of approaching this change in the theory of International Relations. First there is the rationalist approach which puts emphasis on the states and encourages treating them as given and the analytical focus should be put on how the behaviour is changing in an interactive process with the environment. This means that basically any change in the identity should reflect anticipated gains. This approach may, as noted by Wendt, be seen a game-theoretical one (Wendt, 2005, 315-316). The second approach is the constructivist one. This approach is based on the notion that societal change is more than just an adjustment to changing conditions on part of the society and that factors such as the survival of an identity and so on play a role in any consideration taken. The states are more than just trying to optimize gain; they aim at preserving the sources and factors which define those interests, in essence, for example, identity. The states are seen as having a constructed identity and seen as working to preserve it (Wendt, 2005, 316). These are what Wendt calls the “meta-hypothesis for thinking about structural change in international politics.” (Wendt, 2005, 316). Wendt also sees them as not being mutually exclusive.

One model of the theory of International Relations of how an identity is formed or how a society forms its identity is the model to be found in the work by Kenneth Waltz. According to Wendt:

[H]e discusses two mechanisms by which”structure affects behavior,” competition and socialization. Competition affects behavior by rewarding
those who produce goods efficiently and punishing those who do not, and socializations does so by rewarding and punishing for conformity to social norms. (Wendt, 2005, 318)

Any policies carried out by any agent of international affairs would thus be designed with a view of benefiting one's society in order to be rewarded by the society in question for having carried out these beneficial policies. After all, government service may be seen as providing the society with a service, a good. Thus, the success, or indeed failure, of a government in keeping the support of the society it serves can be seen as an expression of the government in question as having practised policies which are in keeping with the identity of the society for which they are benefiting. The law of a society could be seen as one expression of the norms of a society and the customs, manners and traditions observed as another. Thus, the laws, traditions, manners and customs of a society could be studied to determine what kind of structure, what kind of identity they are designed to promote. This way various descriptions and recordings of social customs, laws, etc become relevant references for studying the identity of a society. This approach has an interesting analogy-quality to it when compared with the earlier cited model by Crispin Tickell (Tickell, 1986) of how climate-related conflict may be born as a result of pursuit of self-interest on part of the decision makers in international relations. Wendt also puts forth a critique of Waltz’s approach. According to Wendt this model proposed by Waltz is essentially an economic one and not sociological. Wendt sees this as being problematic due to the tradition of economics which holds actors as given in social processes rather than being affected by them as sociological perspective would have it. Wendt also critiques Waltz's Darwinist approach to a selection as a) it means that there must be identities in existence before the competition for survival and b) as many states do fail, the amount of natural selection would seem to be low to begin with.

Alexander Wendt has identified what he calls the”two logics” for explaining the process of identity formation within the theory of International Relations. The first logic is that of natural selection Wendt, 2005, 321-324), something that may be seen as an application of Darwinian Theory of evolution to social sciences. This logic is based on the notion of organism that are not competitive in changing conditions will be replaced by other organisms better suited to survive in these conditions. What survives the selection process is what ever the properties of the units surviving are, so not all properties are beneficial per se just for surviving this process as the units will transfer all of their surviving properties to the next generation of units. The process does not allow for learning, as all change is transmitted via mutations. Wendt also sees this logic as producing self-help societies with permanent vested interest in the self-preservation: identity and interest may, on some level, be connected with each other. This would then survive through self-sustaining logic.
Interestingly this would have led to a situation where, in the course of time, all identities and interest would have been reduced to the largest common denominator in terms of interest supporting survival. The second law of Thermodynamics would then, in addition to the universe, rule the social identity formation as well, leading ultimately to one single global identity. This model is seen as problematic by Wendt due to the survival of the states created after 1648, or the states of the Westphalian Peace Treaty. This would mean that the selection pressure is not constant and that therefore some state formations are here to stay, in essence the Westphalian system. The second logic identified by Wendt is that of cultural selection (Wendt, 2003, 324-335). This is a process whereby things are learned by imitation and by social learning. Basically this logic means that things which promote and support survival are learned either through experience or by means of social learning, in essence borrowing from others. This logic is contrary to the one of natural selection as the units, for example states, may regulate and adjust them selves by learning useful skills and so on. This way the competition becomes replaced with a learning process. This could also be seen as the non-Darwinian choice in the sense that no unit needs to perish, merely to learn new ways. In terms of how collective, or societal as they could also be called, identities are formed Wendt sees four master variables as guiding this process: interdependence, common fate, homogeneity and self-restraint (Wendt, 2005, 343). These are the facilitating conditions for a collective identity. The first three are what Wendt sees as “enabling” the collective identity the fourth, self-restraint, is a “permissive” one. These are the variables that are to be found in connection with any collective identity in various forms. But what was the Mongol social, or collective identity like, what was it about?

3.2. The Mongol identity

*Omnia mea mecum porto* could be simplest way of summarizing the Mongol identity. The Mongols were above all on the move and from this organizing principle the identity of the Mongol society becomes understandable. According to historian Joseph Fletcher the Mongghols (the root of the modern word Mongol) were in the twelfth century the leading of many tribes habiting the Steppes of Mongolia and did not form a singular ethnic or linguistic group (Fletcher, 1986, 12). In other words, they did not have a social identity. Also there is according to Fletcher a great probability that the members of the Mongghol tribe were not all ethnically Mongghol nor speakers of the Mongghol language. However they formed the Mongghol confederation of the Steppe that competed with three other confederations: the Naiman, the Tatar and the Kereyid. These competing confederations also included members of the Mongghol so the mix was considerable and expresses fluidity in
terms of identity, or rather lack thereof. The Steppe economy was one of pastoral nomadism and hunting characteristics of which are pasturing from one pasture land to another in a nomadic fashion. The opposite of this nomadic perpetual movement is the sedentary agricultural economy, an expression of which was the Chinese economy of the time. The nomadic migrations followed the season and the changes in availability of the water and grass needed to feed the livestock based on an annual cycle. One Mongol family would have needed some twenty to forty animals for upkeep (Fletcher, 1986, 15), so the herds of any tribe might be quite large and require feed accordingly. There was no fixed housing or stable and secure sources of water and grass and as a result, as noted by Fletcher (Fletcher, 1986, 13) the way of life was hard and uncertain and the livestock, the wealth of the tribe, could be lost overnight due starvation or other unfortunate events. This migration, which according to Fletcher, mostly followed fixed routes would lead to formation of a social structure that differs radically from that of sedentary population, although according to Fletcher the Mongols did engage in some level of sedentary agricultural practices but on a level sufficient to affect the social structural features of their society (see above). According to Fletcher the Mongols' future hallmarks, initiative and quick adaptability were a consequence of their nomadic pastoral economy (Fletcher, 1986, 14). This led to high level of mobility and ability to carry it out and the Mongols, as demonstrated later with their warfare, took full advantage of these naturally evolving characteristics of their society and its order. This was also an efficient form of organisation for war as well, since the tasks of a nomadic Mongol herder in peacetime could easily be converted into wartime fighting skills. Also the nomadic way of life made a sustained war effort possible: any war in fixed habitation conditions is immediately highly destructive in terms of infrastructure and so on, whereas on the steppe the tribe could move according to the course of war with its resources and thus any war effort could be sustained for very long indeed. According to Fletcher (Fletcher, 1986, 14) war was dominantly present in the Mongol society and the heroes were the most highly esteem social group. Of course, as noted by Fletcher, this social organization meant that there was no need for a supratribal leadership as every tribe would essentially take care of its business. Also the form of wealth, the livestock, would have been difficult for any central authority to control and stockpile. In this social system the loyalty of any tribe had to be bought.

As a central essential of the Mongol social identity emerges the animal, livestock, be in the form of a sheep, horse and deer and so on, the Mongol society depended on them and revolved around them. The most famous construction of the Mongol culture, the yurt, is made of horse’s hair. Set against this background it becomes understandable that the migrations that set the pace for Mongol life were the only fixed environmental factor for the Mongols as they were dependent, through their
livestock, of the sources of water and grass alongside these migration routes. The animal had two main functions, two roles of an essential of an identity, the one that might be called temporal and the other that might be called spiritual.

The temporal function of the animal was multidimensional. The traveller and merchant Marco Polo, who visited the Mongol Empire during the reign of Khubilai Qahan, the grandson of Chinggis Qahan, and lived there for several years serving the Emperor has described his travel experience in a work that is regarded as the founding work of all ethnographic and exploration research (Joki in: Polo, 1957, 19). These travels took place in the latter half of the thirteenth century. According to Polo the Mongols ate only meat and mare's milk in various forms: game, butchered livestock, hare-like Pharaoh Rat, and also camel and even the meat of a dog provided the dog is fat. The milk they let sour so it become kumis, which has a low alcohol percentage and according to Polo is similar to white wine (Polo, 1957, 97). The Mongols' diet regime based on this account by Polo is one based on animals and animal products. A similar contemporary first-hand witness account is given by the Monk Johannes de Plano Carpini. De Plano Carpinin describes the Mongol diet consisting almost exclusively from meat of various kinds, including wolf and human, and that all that may be eaten is eaten, including the placenta of horses after they have given birth. The drinks are also according to de Plano Carpini made from milks of various kinds and that wines and spirits are only consumed when they are delivered to the Mongols from outside sources, for example as gifts (de Plano Carpini, 2003, 47-48). The accusation of cannibalism is an interesting one: Polo tells us how the Japanese ate the soldiers of the Imperial Chinese army sent by Khubilai Qahan to conquer Japan (Polo, 1957, 257). Perhaps the enemy of de Plano Carpini has over the years become the friend of Polo, and consequently the enemy of the friend of Polo is now the cannibal? Based on the witness accounts of these two mediaeval travellers it may be concluded that the Mongol diet regime was an animal-based one. The animal was also the source of clothing in addition to food and provided the means of travel. Polo speaks of the Mongol warrior whose armour is made of leather tanned extremely hard and of their horses which were fed with nothing but grass (Polo, 1957, 98). This way the animal was, in a temporal everyday manner, the *sine qua non* of the Mongol society; the source of food, mobility and clothing. A Mongol society is difficult to imagine without its animals and animal products.

The animal was also a spiritual essential of the Mongol identity, a part of the system of beliefs and religious practices. Polo speaks of the sacrificial ceremonies performed by Khubilai Qahan at his court. The Imperial Stable had some ten thousand white horses that the milk of the mares no one
who was not a descendant of Chinggis Qahan was allowed to drink except for one family which was given this privilege as a reward for courage during war. The astronomers, or magicians as Polo calls them, informed the Qahan that he had to perform a sacrifice with the milk of these mares every year in August to ensure the spirits and other deities in all directions would be benevolent and protect the people and the crop. According to Polo Khubilai Qahan complied and performed the sacrifice with his own hands by sprinkling the mares' milk at an ordained location (Polo, 1957, page 111). Another form of horse sacrifice in relation to the Mongol society has been discussed by John Boyle in connection with the Mongols of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Boyle, 1965). The practice of religious ceremonies related to the protection of the livestock is discussed by de Plano Carpini, who also tells us that the an ongon, an idol of the Mongols, was placed on both sides of the doors of their dwellings with a model of an udder made with felt for the purpose of protecting the cattle (de Plano Carpini, 2003, 37-38). This way the animal was also a spiritual essential of the Mongol identity.

3.3. Social networks in the Mongol society

The Mongol society put enormous value on social networks, indeed the Mongol society was all about social networks and they also offer a way of approaching the various aspects of Mongol society and its societal identity as the binding force of the Mongol society.

“Conquest” meant not only mass butchering and destruction—there was plenty of that—but also intermarriage. Khans scrutinized newly conquered or surrendered peoples, marrying the other side’s best warriors to Mongol women, creating relations of kinship and duty. Mongol men, meanwhile, took many conquered wives and sired children. Prospective wives were also presented as gifts to seal alliances. (Chinggis Khan is said to have taken or received more than 500 wives; today he has about 16 million male descendants—making Chinggis, if not the father of all peoples, a grand patriarch all the same.) Thus patrimony was king. But empire was sealed through exchanges of daughters. (Kotkin, 2004, 507)

This way, through the practice of social network-building, the cohesion of the Mongol society was transferred to cover other societies as well. Effectively, due to loyalties that came with family connections and which were transferred to the descendants as well, competing tribes and clans were made part of the Mongol social structure and open to any commands and orders coming from the Qan, who was at the top of this system. As noted above the loyalty of the Mongols had to be bought due to the autarkic nature of the units of the Mongol society perennially on the move in the Steppe. This social network-building may have proved cheaper and more lasting than mere purchase of loyalties by means of livestock for example.
But were the Mongols identity-conscious? Did they have a clear conception of their identity, of who they were? The historian Stephen Kotkin refers to the Mongol Empire as being that of exchange, an open uninhibited space of social interaction:

[T]hat they developed a novel form of political organization—an empire built upon exchange. They and their vassals fostered not an ethnic culture but an imperial culture, really an imperial system. Exchange for them was not a byproduct of interaction, not an occasional phenomenon, but the raison d’être of their empire: empire as exchange—essentially without barriers of religion, tribe, or language, thanks in large measure to Realpolitik (the inverse scale of the conquerors to their conquests). (Kotkin, 2004, 503-504)

This could be seen as being an expression of what might be characterized as being an open identity readily accepting influences from other societies leading to the birth of a society that was wonderfully cosmopolitan:

To their court in China, Mongol conquerors famously imported Persian mathematicians, engineers, physicians, and cooks; Uyghur scribes, merchants, and officials; Hungarian slaves; Syrian and Venetian traders; Byzantine craftsmen; and Tibetan lamas, appointing Chinese mostly to lower posts. Persian often served as the common tongue in higher circles in China. To their court in Persia, the Mongols brought Chinese physicians, astronomers, and agronomists as well as Christians. Mongol imperial chancelleries in both capitals and elsewhere received and issued documents according to every calendar known. Extensive geographical knowledge was exchanged about river crossings, mountain passes, and water supplies, transforming cartography. The Mongol court in China had a better sense of Africa than did the successor Ming dynasty. Released Christian slaves and merchants may have carried Chinese innovations such as gunpowder and wood-block printing westward. Symbolically, a silver fountain at Qaraqorum, the Mongol imperial meeting ground, joined wine from Persia, rice beer from China, mead from the northern forests, and koumiss, the fermented Mongol drink. (Kotkin, 2004, 505)

It should be noted however that this Empire of exchange did not mean that the Mongols would have automatically given up on their nomadic Steppe identity and readily accepted non-Mongol influences beyond comforts and luxuries of life. Quite the contrary, the shift from nomadic identity of the Steppe to that of the sedentary dwellers was not painless let alone unanimous. The Mongols had according to Ruotsala a distinct identity, a conception of who they were and what they were about in terms of their way of life. The Mongols made a strict difference between those living in city and those living in yurts, in essence Mongols who are practicing the nomadic Mongol lifestyle. (Ruotsala, 2001, 21) The identity of the Mongols as a society was according to Urgunge Onon, a scholar on Mongols, a creation of Chinggis Qahan for the purpose of facilitating the united Mongol nation (Onon in: Onon, 2001, 4). This identity was challenged when Khubilai Qahan became the Great Qahan, a title which he was never able to fully consolidate among the Mongols, and Emperor
of China, or the Son of Heaven. Khubilai had become acquainted with the ways of the Chinese, a sedentary people and enemy of the Mongols, and was seen as being, in essence, a foreign influence leading the Mongols away from their nomadic way of life with his policies (Rossabi, 1988, 33-34). Khubilai Qahan became associated with an identity foreign to the Mongols. This seems to indicate that the Mongols had indeed formed an identity as a nomadic pastoral society and were not willing to forego this identity, even if caused them difficulties in ruling and consolidating an empire. The Mongols were a people of the Steppe with their own highly specialized way of life that reflected the conditions under which it evolved.

This has not always been the dominant perception as noted by Bat-Ochir Bold according to whom the study of the Mongol society has frequently been an arena for ideological debate rather than science (Bold, 2001, 2-3). An expression of this according to Bold is the way Mongol society has been classed as “feudal” based on a model claiming universal validity. According to Bold the rise of the Mongol Empire may not be explained through this model of social development but through analysis of the Mongol society and its distinctly Mongol features, which render it an anomaly in the model of social development that postulates the development of a society through a set of stages, such as feudalism as feudalism was never the social norm among the Mongols (Bold, 2001, 24). According to Bold this does not, as the acceptance of a universal model would suggest, that there was no social development among the Mongols. It rather means that new approaches to the Mongol society should be found.

3.4. The Mongols' wars of conquest

The best known, and arguably the one with most impact, of the many dimensions of the Mongol society is the military dimension, the machinery as a whole that was used for generating security for the Mongol society, or to carry out its policies other means. The Mongols' wars were those of conquest, characteristics of which are aerial expansion, annexation and war aims that are set in accordance with these characteristics. Though these characteristics should not be confused with grand strategy, which is to be found in the logic of these conquests: why was a given area worthy of conquest? What was the motivation behind the warfare? The Mongols' wars of conquest have been divided into three parts by Boyle (Boyle, 1970, 3-4) that took place after the unification of the Mongols or the creation of the Mongol identity as Onon would call it and the fighting that took place on the Steppe for the control of the new forming confederation.
The first stage of the Mongols' wars of conquest took place 1206-1227 and is called “the initial stage” by Boyle. These were the wars fought against the North China (China was at this stage of her history divided into two kingdoms, the North and South; Beijing was taken in 1215), then Westwards against Sultan Muhammed, the ruler of Chorasmia (later known as Khiva) by succession. The Sultan had by conquest carved for himself an empire that included what is today Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan alongside of Afghanistan and most parts of Persia and this now became part of the Mongol Empire under formation by these wars. This latter campaign took place between 1219-1223 and was legendary by its scope: the Sultan was chased around what was once his empire and met his fate on an island in the Caspian Sea, also in the course of this campaign the province of Khorasan was laid to such ruin as not to have recovered to this date according to Boyle. Interestingly, as will be later discussed in connection with the nature and motivations of the Mongols' wars of conquest, the province is part of what is today Afghanistan. During the course of the chase of the Sultan the Mongol troops crossed over the Caucasus to defeat a Russian-Qipchaq Turk Army in the Crimea and then returned to Chinggis Qahan following the Northern Shore of the Caspian Sea, joined him somewhere in Central Asia and returned to Mongolia with him.

The second stage is what Boyle calls the “period of consolidation and expansion” which took place under the leadership of Ögödei Qahan (1229-1241). Ögödei was the son and appointed heir to Chinggis Qahan. During this stage the Empire was consolidated for example in Northern China, whose occupation was completed. The expansion advanced from now on to the West and South-West. Sultan Jalal al-Din, the son of the Sultan Muhammed slain to death on an island in the Caspian Sea and who had created himself a new empire in the Western Persia, was defeated and killed. Armenia and Georgia were subdued and the Seljuq rulers of Rum, or effectively Asia Minor, were made vassals of the Mongol Empire. Also Russia was attacked under the command of Batu, the Great Qahan's nephew, crossing the Volga and during 1237-1240 effectively took all the Russian principalities only to advance toward Western Europe. Advancing through Poland to Hungary the army of Duke Henry of Silesia was defeated at Liegnitz and that of King Béla of Hungary at Mohi. The path to the whole of Europe lay open before the Mongol conquerors. A detachment pursued the fleeing King down the Dalmatian Coast while the main army stayed on the Hungarian plain. It is thought that the army was preparing for an invasion of the Western Europe when a message was received, on 11th of November, 1241, that the Great Qahan was dead and that all Mongols had to return to Mongolia for the election of the new Great Qahan in a Khuriltai, a form of an electoral meeting or conclave. The Mongols retreated by way of the Balkans to the Volga delta where they set
up the Golden Horde and then continued to Mongolia.

The third stage is the one that Boyle calls the “period of pax Mongolica and the “national” dynasties”. This stage started with the short reign of Güyük (1246-1248), the son of Ögödei, who was to be followed by Ögödei's nephew Möngke after an interregnum of three years in 1251. He was to be the last Qahan to rule from Mongolia in the traditional manner of the Mongols. The Mongol Empire started at this stage to demonstrate signs of breaking into smaller independent political units. Möngke was the elder brother of Hülegü, whom he sent eastwards, and of Khubilai, whom he sent southwards. Khubilai was tasked with a mission to conquer the Southern Chinese Kingdom under the rule of Sung-dynasty and to make them part of the Mongol Empire and later, as successor of Möngke (during the years 1260-1294) to transfer the capital of the Khanate from Qara-Qorum to Beijing. The rule of Khubilai was from now on increasingly part of the history of China, as was well represented in the founding of the Mongol Yüan-dynasty that was to rule China. Hülegü was to terminate the Ishmaelite sect of Assassins in Alamut, North Western Persia, and to sack Baghdad, terminate the Abbasid Caliphate and to found the dynasty of the Il-Khans who were to rule over what is today called Middle East for a century in a perpetuated conflict with the Mameluks of Egypt. The Il-Khans sought an alliance with the Europeans, who were present in the Holy Land due to crusades, against the Mameluks continuously but in vain. These were the three stages of Mongol dominion as identified by Boyle. Interestingly the Mongols seem to have faced a situation similar to the one faced by the United States and its allies in the modern epoch: a mixture of extremist Islamic movement coupled with large territories to be subdued.

We may study the many aspects and features of the Mongol society through the prism of their wars. The topic has also relevancy for the modern warfare as the Mongols' strategy and tactics seem to have influenced the twentieth century theories of strategy. In the Finnish translation of the Lamb's biography of Chinggis Qahan there is included a foreword by the anonymous translator in which the translator recommends the work for Finnish military officers for the purpose of studying the special characteristics of warfare rather than as a historical study (Suomentajan alkulauase in: Lamb, 1931). As noted by John Boyle (Boyle, 1970, 8) the tactics used by the Germans during the World War II against France were exactly those as used by the Mongols with high mobility and speed of the operations provided by huge numbers of horses readily available. The Blitzkrieg doctrine was not a novelty. Also the Mongols' notorious brutality in terms of their war operations, or perhaps better counterinsurgency measures, is echoed today by strategist Edward Luttwak in his work of dealing with counterinsurgencies faced by the U. S. Military, also in the Middle East and Afghanistan, both
theatres of Mongol operations in their day and age, based on analysis or historical successes and failures in dealing with counterinsurgency:

    Occupiers can thus be successful without need of any counterinsurgency methods or tactics if they are willing to out-terrorize the insurgents, so that the fear of their reprisals outweighs either the desire to help the insurgents if any, or their own threats. (Luttwak, undated)

Set against this background the Mongols' operational brutality becomes an expression of carefully calculated willingness to out-terrorize all those opposing the Mongol Empire, mainly the populations of the conquered territories (for example see: Boyle, 1970, 4-5). This systematic terrorization of civilian population has given the Mongols' wars of conquest an infamy of epic proportions that also seems to have been, even if the contemporary witness accounts are seen in keeping with the spirit of the time that valued exaggeration in expression (Ruotsala, 1997, 131), at least partly valid. But what was this warfare like in the context of strategy and tactics in their operational applications?

3.5. The nature of the Mongols’ strategic culture

The two most frequently cited strategists are Carl von Clausewitz and Sunzi in terms of strategic theory. The study of strategy seems to revolve around the Schools founded by these two classics of strategy. Of the two von Clausewitz was European and Sunzi Chinese, who has been an object of interest in Europe since late 18th century. They had more than two thousand years between them. Clausewitz is widely considered to be the defining strategic theorist of the European tradition and Sunzi in turn is widely seen as the defining strategic theorist of the East-Asian tradition. They are frequently seen as being the masters of antagonistic, or perhaps better competing, schools on how strategy should be practised. As the Mongols and their wars are frequently seen as being one of the most successful war projects ever, it is useful to see under which school could the Mongols be read as followers, essentially; were the Mongols Clausewitzians or Sunzians or did they perhaps have a distinctly own style defying all theories of strategy. Before embarking on a mission of defining the nature of the Mongols' strategy, it would be useful to look at their tactics, the application of strategy, in practice. Sixteen tactics have been isolated by Dalintai:

1) Crow Soldiers and Scattered Stars Tactics (also known as Ocean Waves Tactics)

   When facing the enemy, the army would split into small groups consisting of three to five soldiers to avoid being surrounded. When the enemy regrouped, the Mongols too regrouped. They were to appear suddenly, like something dropping from the sky, and disappear like lightning. The attack would be
signalled by a shout or the crack of a whip. One hundred cavalrymen could surround one thousand enemy soldiers and one thousand cavalrymen could control a front thirty-three miles long in order to attack the enemy at the right place and the right moment.

2) The Cavalrymen Charge Tactics (also known as Chisel Attack Tactics)

A group of cavalrymen would make a direct charge into the enemy line. If the first charge failed, a second and even third group would attack. No matter how great the opposition, even if they numbered a hundred thousand, they were unable to withstand the charges. Finally, in response to a signal, the Mongol cavalrymen would charge from all directions into the enemy lines in order to destroy their formation.

3) Archers' Tactics

The archers, armed with shields, dismounted from their geldings and shot at the enemy, sometimes using the geldings as shelter. Other archers shot from horseback. (The horses were trained to stop dead in mid-gallop to allow the archer to take aim.) Once the enemy came under fire, their lines would be broken and they would scatter in disorder. At that point, the cavalrymen would attack.

4) Throw-Into-Disorder Tactics

If the enemy was strong on the battlefield or sheltering in a fort, the Mongols would herd oxen and wild horses into the enemy lines to cause confusion.

5) Wearing-Down Tactics

When the enemy stood in a defensive position with spears planted in a row, thus preventing a cavalry charge into the line, the Mongols would withdraw their main forces, leaving only a few small detachments to harass the enemy by shooting arrows into the spear-held line. Due to lack of food, water, and rest, the enemy would eventually have to move. Once the weary forces were on the march, the Mongol army would launch a surprise attack.

6) Confusing and Intimidating

In 1204, Chinggis Qahan ordered his soldiers to set up camp on the Sa'ari Steppe in western Mongolia. Every able-bodied man lit five fires some distance apart, thus scaring the Naimans and enabling Chinggis to defeat them.

When the Mongols encountered numerically superior forces, they often sent troops to stir up dust behind their own lines by means of branches tied to the tails of their horses. On seeing the dust, the enemy often believed that large reinforcements were at hand and fled.

The Mongols also mounted stuffed dummies, small Mongol children, and females on the spare horses to suggest that the army was much bigger than it actually was. This trick was used by the Mongol general Shigi-qutuqu in 1221, when he engaged Jaldin at Biruan between Kabul and Ghazna.

7) Luring into Ambushes

As soon as battle started, the Mongol soldiers would feign retreat, deliberately throwing away gold and silver and other impedimenta. Such tactics were used sparingly - for example, if they could not break into heavily fortified cities or through a strong pass. In 1211, when the Mongols first
attacked the Jin territory in northern China, Chinggis Qahan sent Jebe and Guyigu Nek ahead to attack the famous Chabchiyal Pass. The Mongols could not break through this pass because it backed onto mountain cliffs and was strongly fortified. Instead they decided to lure the enemy out by slowly retreating. The Jin army thought that the Mongols had given up, so they chased after them and were surprised, after a certain distance, to see the retreating soldiers suddenly turn to counter-attack. At that moment, the main Mongol army appeared from all sides in a pre-arranged ambush and slaughtered the enemy until their bodies piled up as far as Chibchayal, 'like rotten logs'. Jebe stormed the gate of Chibchayal and took the pass.

In May 1222, the Mongol generals Jebe and Sube'etei and 20,000 Mongol cavalrymen pursued the fleeing Kypchaks (or Cumans) from the western side of the Caspian Sea towards the northwest, to Kiev. The Mongols met the joint forces of the Russians and the Cumans, 30,000 men, on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River. Some say that Sube'etei, with only 2,000 Mongol cavalry, lured the Russians and Cumans for nine days towards the small Kalka River that flows into the Sea of Azov, where the main Mongol cavalrymen (numbering 20,000) were waiting. Under the direction of Jebe and Sube'etei, the Mongols attacked the enemy at the end of May and destroyed most of their forces.

8) Arc Formation Tactics

The Mongols would send out two detachments in a wide curve, like the tips of a bow, but with the main forces staying at the centre of the arc, hiding in shady places to await the enemy. These two detachments went ahead to engage the enemy, shooting to infuriate them and lure them to where the main forces were waiting. These two detachments also closed in from the flanks or from behind the enemy. The Mongols called these tactics 'bow tactics'. The Cossacks also used these tactics to defeat their enemies.

9) Lightning Attack and Surprise Attack

These two tactics were perhaps the most important of all: lightning attack meant speed, and surprise attack meant suddenness. In 1203, the Mongols attacked Ong Qan, who had erected a golden yurt and was feasting. For three nights and three days, under Chinggis' command, they fought, and in the end Ong Qan and his son fled, though his entire army surrendered. This was an example of Chinggis 'surprise attack' tactics.

In 1213, the Mongol army, commanded by Jebe, failed to take the city of Dongchang (Mukden), so they retreated for six days over a distance of some 170 miles. The enemy defending the city thought that the Mongols had given up, but Jebe returned, covering the distance in one night and launching a surprise attack.

10) Outflanking Tactics (a)

When the Mongol cavalrymen could not attack the enemy from the front, they would leave a small detachment to draw the attention of the enemy. Meanwhile the main force went round the back, by way of difficult paths, to attack the enemy from the rear. There are two examples in the History to illustrate these tactics. In 1207, Chinggis Qahan ordered Dorbei-doqshin to attack the Tumet people in the northern part of Mongolia. He left a small detachment on the main road, and ordered his best soldiers to travel along paths made by wild animals. They climbed the highest mountain and then
suddenly descended as if from heaven, finishing the enemy while they were feasting.

In 1213, when the Mongol cavalrymen under Chinggis Qahan wanted to take the Chabchiyal Pass, the Jin army fortified the pass and spread iron spikes along the road to the north to prevent the advance of the geldings. The entrance to the pass was also reinforced by an iron gate. Chinggis left a small detachment to shoot at the Jin army, and then took his main army west and back to the southern end of the pass. He captured a place called Nankou, and went on to take the pass.

11) Encircling Tactics

Chinggis used these tactics many times in order to destroy his enemies. The tactics were based on the enemy's strengths and formations. If the enemy openly exposed his flank and rear, and the city defenders were weak, the Mongols would encircle them from all sides. If the enemy deployed their forces by the rivers, exposing two or three flanks, then the Mongols would encircle them from all sides of the riverbank.

In 1221, Chinggis destroyed Jalaldin Mangubirdi, who had deployed his soldiers on the west bank of the Indus, by attacking on two or three sides. Plano Carpini (who was in Mongolia in 1246) records that the Mongols always sent the captured personnel and non-Mongol soldiers in first, led by a few Mongols, to fight the encircled enemy. Only then would the strong regular army appear, as if from nowhere, to reinforce the stronghold, outflank the enemy on both wings, and destroy him.

12) Open-the-End Tactics

If the enemy was very strong and ready to fight to the death, the Mongols would leave a gap in their ranks. In this way, the enemy might think they could see an escape route, scatter, and start to run. At that precise moment, the Mongols would fix upon a suitable place to kill the fleeing enemy.

13) Combining Swords and Arrows

The Mongols avoided hand-to-hand fighting if at all possible, preferring to use bows and arrows, with a range of 200 to 300 yards, to kill the enemy. Plano Carpini records: 'If at all possible, the Mongols never engage in hand-to-hand fighting. They always first use arrows to kill the enemy and their horses. After killing or wounding the enemy and their horses, making them too weak to fight, the Mongols move in to finish them off.'

14) Hot Pursuit Tactics and Dispersing Tactics

If winning, the Mongols would pursue the enemy so that no one escaped alive. If losing, they would disperse in all directions, so that the enemy was unable to catch them.

15) Bush Clump Tactics

These tactics involved dividing the soldiers into many small groups which, although keeping in contact with each other, maintained a low profile as they advanced. Such tactics were also used at night-time, and on dark or cloudy days.

16) Outflanking Tactics (b)

The Mongols faced a march of more than 1,500 miles to their goal in Bukhara
and Samarkand. The Khwarazem Shah had deployed his forces along the Syr Darya River. The Mongols divided their forces into four contingents, three of which moved to face the Shah across the Syr Darya. The fourth and largest contingent, commanded by Chinggis himself, turned north and then due west into the Kizil Kum Desert, instead of turning south. There were neither roads nor water in this region. For several months, Chinggis made his way secretly across the desert, while the Shah's forces were being worn out on the battlefront. In March 1218, Chinggis approached Bukhara from more than 400 miles behind enemy lines. This campaign is regarded by military historians as one of the most dramatic outflanking manoeuvres of all times. (Dalintai in: Onon, 2001, 281-287)

Underlying these tactics was according to Dalintai five elements:”speed, suddenness, ferocity, variety of tactics, and iron discipline.” (Dalintai in: Onon, 2001, 281) Also a factor was Chinggis Qahan's care for his men as the took care not to exert his men beyond their capabilities. Another factor is the meritocratic nature of Chinggis Qahan's system of rewarding and recruitment, no one was promoted or rewarded without merit and recruitment was done "by recruitment or impressment of skilled non-nomads. To the Mongols, talent was a form of booty, to be diffused throughout Mongol-ruled territories.”(Kotkin, 2004, 507) The Mongols' main concern was delivering results, not ethnic or other such factors.

How could the Mongols' strategic culture described then in the light of the sixteen tactics identified as quoted above? The difference(s) between Clausewitz and Sunzi have been studied by strategist Michael I. Handel based on a comparative study of their texts, not so much on cultural, historical and so on factors (Handel, 1993). According to Handel the differences are what might be called of operational nature: Clausewitz and Sunzi agree on the fundamental issues of war such as the primacy of politics, meaning the classical Clausewitzian dictum of war being a continuation of politics by other means. This means that the war aims are set in a political process and their enactment is being set as the goal of the war. War is seen as a tool for the politician and any war leader, provided he is not a politician, is merely enacting the orders issued to him by politicians. The differences between Clausewitz and Sunzi arise in relation to how the war should be conducted, what tactics should be given primacy and so on, for example Clausewitz puts emphasis on the art-like qualities of the commander, whereas Sunzi's approach could be characterized as being more scientifically minded. The difference is one of professional nature related to the practice of strategy as a profession by professionals. Handel has identified the following four differences of operational nature between Clausewitz and Sunzi (Handel, 1993, 155-157).

First, there is the value of intelligence. For Sunzi the highest and most valuable part of any army is
its intelligence corps and Sunz in sees the victory as being dependant on them and their effectively discharged duties. For Clausewitz this is not the case. Second there is the use of the element of surprise. Sunzi puts huge value on the element of surprise as being the key to a decisive victory whereas Clausewitz with the dictum of friction and so on does not share this vision with Sunzi. Third is the deception, misleading one's enemy, a cognitive approach to warfare so to speak. This is also valued by Sunzi and dismissed by Clausewitz. Fourth, the controlling and forecasting of the events taking place in the battlefield during battle. A classically Clausewitzian is the notion of the uncontrollable and unpredictable nature of the events on the battlefield as they unravel. For Sunzi this is again something that the commander should aspire for rather than resigning himself to the fate as it takes its course. Based on these four differences and on the sixteen tactics used by the Mongols as cited above, were the Mongols Clausewitzian or Sunzian? The Mongols with their emphasis on surprise and intelligence are, as one might have expected based on the geographical location of Mongolia in East Asia, best characterized as being Sunzian.

Through their network of spies, traders and informers, Chinggis and his generals built up an exceptional understanding of the economic, military, and political conditions of the countries they wanted to attack. It was said that in the mornings, when the air was at its clearest, a Mongol could see for up to four or five miles and hear the sound of hoofs up to twenty miles away. Even in recent times, a horseman could ride from Ulaan-Baatar to Kalgan in nine days - a distance of some 600 miles. In 1221, Chinggis's army rode 130 miles from Bamian to Ghazna, by way of Kabul, in two days. Every man learned to ride from the age of three, and served in the army from the age of fourteen until he was sixty. (Dalintai, in: Onon, 2001, 208-209)

This element of Sunzi was of course present already in the operations as discussed by Dalintai, but in terms of analysis; how fundamental is this characterisation as a demarcating factor in relation to Clausewitz?

The works by Clausewitz and Sunzi should not be seen as mutually excluding; rather they should according to Handel be seen as mutually complementing. According to Handel what explains the differences on recommendations between Clausewitz and Sunzi is not the cultural background or even the epoch, but the level of analysis. Handel sees Clausewitz as representing the more operational level of strategy on which the friction and so on have a huge baring on any operation to be carried out by the Army and this then accounts for Clausewitz's negative perception of the more subtle and complex forms of warfare such as deception and intelligence. Sunzi according to Handel represents the more higher levels of strategy, the level of outcomes as Luttwak would call it, on which the intelligence is used in planning and so on and deception is merely planned to be executed, thus liberating the commander from the toils of the field commander, whose perspective Clausewitz
represents. This way, when combined, the works by Clausewitz and Sunzi complement each other and give a fuller picture of strategy. Seen this way, the Mongols should perhaps be seen as having been both Clausewitzian and Sunzian, but with Sunzi perhaps being the one followed more on the recommendations, for example in terms of intelligence as noted. But in any case this means that the Mongol Army may be subject to analysis utilizing the same theories and approaches as would be used with any other army and that these factors may also be used in explaining the outstanding success of their wars of conquest. For wars of conquest they were, aiming at territorial expansion in geographical space rather than, for example, merely annihilating populations or spreading a political system as would be the case in an ideological war.

3.6. The Mongol Army and social networks

As noted earlier, the Mongol society was all about networks and revolved around them. Sociality and its applications were the organizing principle of the Mongol society. This applied to their warfare as well. As noted by Theodore"Teddy" Roosevelt: [T]he Mongol armies developed a certain ant-like or bee-like power of joint action which enabled them to win without much regard to the personality of the leader.” (Roosevelt in: Curtin, 2003, XV) Roosevelt further cites a French historian according to whom the victories of the Mongols were””anonymous victories”” (see above) in comparison to those of the Turkic later conquerors such as Tamerlane, whose personality was a decisive force in the leadership of his army and in victory as well. This perspective taken by Roosevelt is in strict contrast to the frequently encountered perspective of the decisive and even determining nature of the personality of Chinggis Qahan to the success of the Mongols' wars of conquest (for example see: Fletcher, 1986, 34) as he is, for all intentions and purposes, seen as a larger-than-life -figure whose sense of destiny and personal characteristics made the successes possible. Of course this is justifiable in the sense that the social networks were as crucial to the Mongols as they were and Chinggis Qahan through the loyalties and alliances made by him and in his name kept the Mongol society and its allies in check so that effective warfare was possible. This is the perspective taken partly by Fletcher (see above). It has already noted how the Mongols built a system of loyalties and alliances by means of marriage and that Chinggis Qahan was in the middle of the this socio-political tribal constellation, its apex so to speak. However it was the army that did the fighting, although Chinggis Qahan, no desk war manager in the fashion of the modern Pentagon, did do his part in the field operations as well, and for this reason the perspective offered by Roosevelt, also a military historian and a Colonel of the U. S. Army of the San Juan Hill fame in addition to being a lawyer by training and the serving United States President at the time of his
writing in 1907, merits closer analysis. How much did the “bee-like” quality that Roosevelt speaks of owe to the Mongol society's characteristic social network quality as its defining principle? How much was the Mongols' warfare an expression of their social organization in terms of the emphasis put of social networks?

The military historian Timothy May (May, 2006) has studied the training methods employed by the Mongol military as part of the strategic culture of the Mongol society. They reveal the contingencies to which the Mongols were preparing in the course of battle as well as their operational *modus operandi*, the method of warfare. Like so many other ancient societies the Mongols used hunting as a way of training their soldiers. The hunting allowed for the training with the bow on a live target that in normal peacetime would otherwise not have been possible for example. The community hunt also provided a social opportunity for the men to get to know each other and this way facilitated the community building among the Mongol army and ultimately enabled the “bee-like” warfare that Roosevelt speaks of. As an example of the applications of hunting practice for the purpose of warfare May cites the Parthian shot -tactic for which the Mongols were especially notorious in battle (May, 2006, 622). The Parthian shot involves the rider on a horse galloping turning on saddle to face the rear and then delivering a shot with a bow. According to May this practice seems to have been developed by the ancient Parthians who hunted large cats with this method. Large cats are likely to attack when threatened and for this they need to be escaped during the hunt should the first shot prove to be non-lethal. This is made possible by the Parthian shot. This shot also has applications in warfare, especially in the Mongol strategic culture that includes the practice of false fleeing during which the Parthian shot could be deployed against enemy troops of the pursuit. For the topic at hand the most interesting is however the pattern of organization which according to May underlies all the Mongol military training:

In the practice of the *nerge* the Mongols would fan out over several miles forming a circle. Gradually this circle would close and contract until all of the animals were trapped within this ring of men and horses. After the Khan, or ruler, killed a few animals, others would begin their hunt. Some animals were allowed to escape in a symbolic act of clemency. A hunt of this size naturally required excellent communication and discipline in order to maintain the circle in addition to preventing animals from escaping until the appropriate time.

The *nerge* was then adapted to warfare and applied through several techniques. The most obvious was the encirclement of the enemy, or double envelopment, in which the wings of the Mongol army would wraparound the opposing army so that they overlapped. In addition to making it possible to attack the enemy from multiple angles, the surrounding of enemy forces allowed the Mongols to employ another tactic. By leaving a gap in their encirclement, the Mongols created a seemingly innocuous hole that appeared
to be a means of escape for those enclosed by the Mongol ranks, much as animals were permitted to flee during the *nerge*. During war, however, the gap served as a trap. Realizing that when cornered, the enemy would resist stubbornly, the Mongols allowed a safety valve in order to let the enemy escape. However, the fleeing troops quickly discovered to their detriment that the Mongols simply pursued and hunted them. Often discarding their weapons in their haste, the enemy rarely could maintain any semblance of effective defense once they chose to escape. (May, 2006, 219-220)

This way the Mongols were able to convert their societal practices related to hunting to serve the purposes of warfare in an efficient manner. The practice also compensated for the Mongols' inferiority in number, after all the Mongols took the Northern China under Chinggis Qahan only with some one hundred and twenty five thousand men. The population of the conquered territories was in excess of one hundred million. Timothy May:

> As in the *nerge*, the warriors gradually tightened their circle around the enemy, forming a dense mass from which none could escape. It is thought that large numbers were required to perform this maneuver and maintain the noose around the enemy; as in the *nerge*, however, although certainly beneficial, this was not required. Just as skilled hunters were able to hold their positions to herd or direct the route of animals, so skilled warriors could do the same while encircling the enemy. Because of their archery skills and great mobility, the Mongols did not require superior numbers of troops to encircle an enemy. (May, 2006, 220)

The "bee-like” warfare seems to have been a natural outcome of the mobilization of the Mongol society and in this sense the Mongol army was truly an army of anonymous victories; the victories were essentially applications of the Mongol society's naturally occurring network-based organization.

This pattern of the Mongols has what seem to be some similarities with the method of warfare of the Finnish Army during the Winter War of 1939-1940 under the supreme command of Marshal C. G. Mannerheim. During the war the IV Army of the Finnish Army adopted what is know as ”Mott tactics” (mottitaktiikka) as its chief operational pattern for the purpose of defeating the advancing Soviet Army in the Ladogan Karelian theatre. This tactic utilized the high independent level of mobility of the Finnish Army and compensated for the inferiority in numbers and equipment. This operational practice was introduced to the commander of the IV Army General Hägglund and to Colonel Hannuksela by Colonel Valo Nihtilä of the Finnish Head Quarters on a mission to ensure the proper and effective use of the troops. The adoption of this tactic is attributed to the influence of the German military strategy, especially that which resulted from the experiences of the World War I, among Finnish officers (Tuunainen in: Juutilainen, 2009, VII). Of course as noted by Boyle (see above) the Germans seem to have known their Mongol cases as well, but at the same time, as is the
case provided that the Finnish officers read the biography of Chinggis Qahan as recommended by its anonymous translator (see above), there may have been other influences affecting the decision as well. The Mott tactics did not determine the outcome of the war, but they were of great importance during the war.

This suitability of the highly mobile Mott tactics was also appropriate for the Finnish Army due to its social network-based organization during the Winter War. Juha Mälkki (Mälkki, 2008) has studied the formation of the soldiers' identity during and before the Winter War aiming at determining the societal identity factors that led to the success of the Finnish Military during the Winter War when a superior enemy was, not defeated but rather blocked so that a peace by negotiations was made possible. Mälkki has isolated three factors that led to the success of the Finnish Military which he calls the immaterial elements of the performance of an armed force ("asevoiman suorituskyvyn aineettomat elementit").

First, there is the streamlined fighting skill ("linjakas sotataito") which is the outcome of collectively accepted notion of fighting that penetrates the organization through all levels and enables the whole to function: "Kulutussodankäynnin tehokas toteuttaminen vaati ammattisotilaiden yhteisesti jakamia, ymmärtämiä sekä hyväksymiä näkemyksiä erityisesti kurin, kurinalaisuuden sekä johtamisen käytännöistä." (Mälkki, 2008, 337). This was an element that was present in the Mongols Army, a good example of which is the earlier discussed form of military training in the Mongol army which quite clearly was built on shared notions such as discipline and leadership. Any community hunt would fail without these elements.

The second element identified by Mälkki is the experience of locality ("paikallisuuden kokemus") (Mälkki, 2008, 337-341) which relates to how a common fighting force is created in social interaction among peoples from various parts of Finland. This resulted in what Mälkki calls the emergence of two organizations of the Finnish Army. The other one being the official military organization the other, and more extensive one, was the social network organization that was not controlled by anyone and was formed based on shared identity. The Mongols, who whenever they defeated a tribe, added the forces of this tribe to their own, would also have had to deal with this as the Mongol army was a myriad of social identities due to the earlier discussed meritocratic nature of the Mongol Army. One way seems to have been the also earlier mentioned networking policy of intermarriage to ensure loyalties.
The third element is the two organizations (*kaksi organisaatiota*) (Mälkki, 2008, 341-348), which has already been mentioned in connection with the previous element. This means, in practice for the Finnish Winter War, that the fighting in the front line was done by the irregular reserves rather than the regular army and that this may have been the cause of the Finnish success. The Finnish Army was characterized by a level of conflict in terms of the discipline as the Finns, having been accustomed to a high level of independence in terms of their activities, and the professional soldiers who were identified with discipline were in rear lines away from the men who then could fight as a network based on co-operation against a common enemy. This saving of the professional troops to the last was also present in the Mongol Army: Chinggis Qahan never sent his Guard to the battle if it could at all be avoided. The men of the Mongol Army who did the fighting may have done so largely on their own based on the “second organization” of the Mongol Army utilizing on social networks. This would be consistent with Roosevelt’s observation of the “bee-like” fighting style and may, as it may in the case of the Finnish Army in the Winter War, explaining the Mongols’ efficient warfare that would eventually lead to the largest-ever land empire. To the men on the battlefield Chinggis Qahan may have been, much like Marshal Mannerheim was to the Finns, a distant figure shrouded in legends, a grand strategist who set the aims of the war and became a source of inspiration and culture for the troops. In this sense it may be appropriate to promote the setting of one leader-united people as in the case of Mannerheim, who became the idolized face of the Finnish Army, Chinggis Qahan may also be seen as the face of the Mongol Army and of the Mongol people.

The defining characteristic of the Mongols' strategic culture and its applications seems to have been a social network-based approach. The social networks that were of such defining importance to the Mongol society were also, not surprisingly considering the importance given to them, present in the way they fought their wars. But this network-approach was not the only thing the Mongols had that facilitated success in war. The Mongols may have known the use of gunpowder for military purposes (Lamb, 1931, 206-210) and they also engaged in biological warfare catapulting the remains of those who had died of the plague over the walls of the cities they had laid siege and in general are credited for having provided the plague with an opportunity to spread from Central Asia throughout the world (Jutikkala, 1987, 45-46) to mention but a few of their strategic assets. Timing is everything in affairs of men and in war as well. The enemies of the Mongols had all been growing weaker and as a result did not provide the Mongols with a match. As noted by William Atwell there seems to have been a perfect window of opportunity for the Mongols and their wars of conquest created by global climatic conditions:
Of interest here is the fact that virtually everywhere the Mongols attacked during this brief period recently had experienced, or was just then experiencing, significant economic problems caused, at least in part, by “anomalous” climatic conditions. The extent to which the Mongol homeland itself was being affected by those same anomalies remains to be studied. Given what is now known about conditions in other parts of the northern hemisphere at that time, however, Gareth Jenkins’s comment that the Mongol’s “enthusiasm for the task of conquest may well have been fueled by a climatic defeat at their backs” (Jenkins 1974: 226) may be as relevant for this period as for the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries that were his primary focus. (Atwell, 2001, 45)

The success of the Mongols in their wars may have been a result of coming together of a number of factors such as the structural features of the Mongol society and the window of opportunity created by climatic changes affecting all actors of international relations in the warring proximity to the Mongols. With just one or a few of these factors present the Mongols might, as would be the case purely in the light of strategic resource analysis considering the superior resources possessed by for example the North Chinese Kingdom, been severely defeated.

Nothing lasts forever and all things come to an end. According to T. S. Eliot the world ends with whimper rather than a bang. This was the case with the Mongols who gradually, in a manner of speaking, melted into the societies which they had taken. The limits of their strategic reach, or force projection capabilities, were found mostly the easy way on land. According to the historian Arnold Toynbee the Mongols simply could not have advanced further on land in Europe as the forest zones that they ran into were not a suitable terrain for their cavalry-based warfare and did not support their lifestyle (Toynbee, 1952, 5). Nomadic identity has, like any other identity, its limits, and due to this the Mongols were to rule over Russia from the Golden Horde based in the Steppes of Volga Delta. In the Middle East they never advanced beyond the Caliphate and from Persia the Il-Khans would later advance to India to found the Mughal Empire that was to last until the consolidation of the British Colonial rule in the mid-nineteenth century. The Mongols were to find their limits on sea the hard way. Khubilai Qahan was to attempt the invasion of Japan twice, both invasions being phenomenal failures, especially the second one carried out with some one hundred and forty thousand men (Rossabi, 1988, 209). There was another naval operation against Java with some initial success but this was to fail following the death of Khubilai Qahan (McNeill & McNeill, 2003, 124). The Mongols had clearly run into an element they could not overcome: water. This is understandable given their origins and identity based on the Steppe and its horseback mobility. It would have been difficult for a society so strongly built around the way of life appropriate for the Mongolian Steppe to carry out any shift to maritime social structure as this might, and did, have proved all but impossible. The Mongols were no superhuman though they could, as noted de Plano
Carpini, survive extremely hard conditions and had a reputation for being indefatigable.

3.7. Explaining the Mongols' wars of conquest

One of the central questions related to the Mongols' wars of conquest is related to the nature of their origins: what set them in motion? Why did the Mongols initiate these wars? The debate on the topic has been divided into seven schools as identified by Ch'i-ch 'ing Hsiao:

1. The greedy and predatory nature of the nomads
2. Climatic change (desiccation)
3. Overpopulation of the Steppe
4. Chinese interruptions of trade leading to inability to sell excess production
5. The need to balance the pastoral nomadic economy with its fluctuations in production by plundering from the stable Chinese agrarian economy
6. The construction of a supratribal polity
7. Nomad psychology, meaning the need to feel superiority in relation to the Chinese, divine Heaven-ordained destiny to rule the world and the destiny of their leaders to conquer the world (Fletcher, 1986, 32-33)

As noted by Fletcher, all these reasons may have been, at varying degree, applicable to the case at hand and are in many cases interrelated with one leading to another. As an example of this Fletcher takes the case of explaining the Mongols' wars of conquest as having been motivated by climate change in the temperature and not in desiccation as is the case with number two above. According to Fletcher a decline in temperature would bring into play third and fifth reasons and provide the motivation for sixth from the list by Hsiao cited above. The decline in temperature would significantly worsen any growth conditions for grass and other vegetation needed for sustaining pasturing economy and would then lead to the need of looting the food required for which purpose a polity would be created. This well presents the difficulties and complexities concerning the analysis at hand. So the causality is not, as noted by Tickell (Tickell, 1986), in any ways clear-cut or certain when analysing the role played by climatic factors, be the case at hand past or present. The events unravel as a consequence of myriad of factors intervening with each other and with one being in retrospect the logical outcome of another one.

What could be called the standard model of explaining the Mongols’ wars of conquest in the context
of this study that seems to have been widely accepted by the scientific community is the need for an enemy as a facilitating condition for national unity, after all, as noted the united Mongol nation and its identity was the creation of one man, Chinggis Qahan who also led these wars. This model is based on the idea that there may be no identity without enemy; some one must represent all that”we” are not so that we may define ourselves, a task which is then accorded to the enemy or perhaps better the image of the enemy or the Other. This model is accepted by Onon (see Onon in: Onon, 2001, 4) and by Ruotsala, who speaks of the Mongol society as having been charged with energy that had to be discharged in some direction, preferably against the enemy it could be said (Ruotsala, 2001, 22), as well as by Fletcher (Fletcher, 1986, 33) as explaining the motivations for the Mongols' wars of conquest. Of the seven schools of explaining the motivations behind the Mongols' wars of conquest these three cases all fall under number six, the creation of a supratribal polity, a Mongol state with its own distinct identity so to speak. This could be called the standard model for explaining the Mongols’ wars of conquest and be characterized as being an expression of instinctual model of aggression as most famously formulated by the doctor of Medicine and ethologist Konrad Lorenz. The instinctual model of aggression holds aggression as being a genetic instinctual characteristic of all animals, including humans, in whose case the question is of inherited aggressive tendencies or drive, an expression of which is the phenomenon of warfare (Huntingford in: Groebel & Hinde, 2001, 26). This model of aggression entails the notion of aggression as a constant re-charging energy within the human system that builds up and requires eventual discharge that is followed by a period of peace, which shall not last as the aggression instinct has re-charged and requires, yet again, discharge. And so on ad infinitum. It has been postulated that this instinct is an expression of natural selection that has favoured individuals who have a high level of aggressive energy and who as a result have been competitive in the competition for resources and for this reason been able to procreate and transfer on the strong aggression instinct. This model, according to Huntingford now discredited, would explain the Mongols' wars of conquest as being an exercise in discharging aggressive energy as echoed in the model in the form as being cited by Ruotsala (see above). The enemy would then merely be anyone suitable for the purpose of acting as the target of this discharge of aggression. This model is analogous with the notion of producing the enemy as part of politics of identity that require an enemy for the purpose of facilitating national unity based on us versus them -setting.

As already mentioned the climatic explanation suggested by Mackinder in the form of changes in precipitation is already present in the form of changes in desiccation in the above cited list of seven models for explaining the motivations for Mongols' wars of conquest. However a model explaining
the Mongols' wars of conquest as being a result in climatic conditions in terms of decrease in temperature has also been put forth as discussed above by Fletcher by Gareth Jenkins according to whom:

[I]t is, *ex hypothesi*, my contention that a major climatic downturn did much to encourage an end to the infighting and vendettas among the Mongol clans and make possible their reorganization under Chinggis' military authority. One might even argue, more vigorously, that for the Mongols in this situation, general reorganization and mutual burying of differences had become essential to survival. While it is indeed the case that the Mongols “... a nation of not more than a million people, conquered a multitude of other nations with a population of around 100 million,” their enthusiasm for the task of conquest may well have been fuelled by a climate defeat at their backs. (Jenkins, 1974, 226)

Jenkins bases this hypothesis on data related to the climate conditions of the time in question produced by means of Norwegian snow-line measurements; glaciometric data from Iceland, Switzerland and Alaska; compilations of data from Northern Chinese literary sources; records of climatic change in various parts of Southern Russia from records of chronicles from contemporary era and from the records of travellers. An elegant data set combining both qualitative and quantitative sources that indicates, based on all sources, decline in temperature during the time of the rise of Chinggis Qahan based on which Jenkins has formulated his hypothesis (see figure in: Jenkins, 1974, 223). This means that during the time of initiating the Mongols' wars of conquest the climatic conditions in terms of temperature were not favourable for a nomadic pasturing economy in the Mongolian Steppe in the light of the data used by Jenkins. According to Jenkins this decline was unprecedented for at least two millennia and according to Jenkins this sharp decline could not but have affected the growth conditions of the Steppe grass adversely. Especially the conditions would have been fatal to livestock during the winter when ice crust likely would have formed preventing the animals from eating the grass with ensuing consequences. This means that this decline in temperature, given the Mongols' dependency on their cattle as well as on the game in the light of their meat-based dietary regime, must have dramatically damaged the Mongols' society.

The change in temperature seems to have been, depending on the source, no less than two degrees centigrade and not in excess of two degrees centigrade. A change of two degrees centigrade below the medium seems to have been the volume of change in decrease of the temperature during the time of the rise of Chinggis Qahan. According to historian Eino Jutikkala a decrease in the median temperature in the order of one degree centigrade may have consequences fatal to any agricultural economy as the growth season may be shortened by three to four weeks (Jutikkala, 1987, 63). In this light the growth season for the grass used to feed the Mongols' livestock would then have
decreased by six to eight weeks per annum. This would seem sufficient to significantly disrupt the Mongols' dietary regime and perhaps even to threaten its survival as breeding animals might not survive the cold period. A scenario such as the one hypothesized by Jenkins above took place recently in Mongolia: "the enormous losses experienced between 2000-2002 when dzud caused the loss of over 25% of livestock forcing many families into acute poverty, fueling rapid migration to cities and halting GDP growth.” (Goodland et al, undated, III) However as noted by Atwell in the citation above, the impact that this cooling had on Mongolia during the time of Chinggis Qahan is not sufficiently studied (Atwell, 2001, 45).

It should be noted however that the data used by Jenkins is compiled from global investigations and not *in situ* from Mongolia. Would any data produced from local samples support this hypothesis outlined above? This type of data has been produced by Jones and Mann as part of their study of reconstructing the past climates in Earth's history:

We review evidence for climate change over the past several millennia from instrumental and high-resolution climate "proxy" data sources and climate modeling studies. We focus on changes over the past 1 to 2 millennia. We assess reconstructions and modeling studies analyzing a number of different climate fields, including atmospheric circulation diagnostics, precipitation, and drought. We devote particular attention to proxy-based reconstructions of temperature patterns in past centuries, which place recent large-scale warming in an appropriate longer-term context. (Abstract in: Jones & Mann, 2004)

The data produced by Jones and Mann and reproduced in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007 report (Solomon, S. et al, 2007, Chapter 6, 468) indicates a decrease of some two degrees centigrade in the median temperature in the Mongolian Steppe coinciding with the Mongols' wars of conquest. This decrease in the average temperature was not anthropogenic however, it was a result of natural events and thus its value as an analogy with the current anthropogenic global warming may be limited:

Like the rise of the Jurchens in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries and that of the Mongols in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, occurred at a time when icecore, tree-ring, and other evidence indicate that volcanic activity was affecting temperatures and altering wind and precipitation patterns in much of the northern hemisphere. (Atwell, 2001, 62)

As the volcanic eruptions are one-off events beyond human control unlike the current global warming which is a result of human activity, the analogy may be a limited one with implications concerning any contemporary analysis using the Mongols’ wars of conquest as a baseline for any knowledge or understanding of the violent conflict - climate change nexus. Also these volcanic
events are unpredictable and sudden unlike the current warming meaning that they affect the climatic conditions in a cooling manner until all dust delivered to the stratosphere by the heat discharged with a volcanic event has landed to the Earth's surface and the Sun's radiation may again warm the surface of the Earth. This debris in the Earth’s atmosphere is known as the Dust Veil and its measure, or operational unit, is the Dust Veil Index (DVI), a concept created by the climatologist H. H. Lamb (Global Change Master Directory, NASA: Volcanic Loading: The Dust Veil Index, CDIAC NDP-013). This is not the mechanism with the current global warming which is expected to continue at an exhilarating rate and last for an indefinite perido of time. Thus the time-line of the global warming is much longer and the effects are likely to be in sync with this time-line. Thus the analysis using the case of the Mongols as a starting point has its limitations.

Bat-Ochir Bold (Bold, 2001) has taken what might be called the interactionist (Bold, 2001, 149) perspective to the development of the Mongol society and also to the reasons that led to the wars fought by Mongols. According to Bold the Mongol society developed in an interaction with the physical surroundings of the Mongolian Steppe and thus is dependant on them remaining static so as to ensure that the society and its structures supporting the lives of the members of the society may continue. According to Bold the Mongols were essentially, in terms of their culture and policies, pacific and only a change in the physical conditions of the society could force them to bellicose policies. Bold compares the situation to that of the contemporary Europe which was indeed feudal. According to Bold the wars fought in the mediaeval Europe were wars of the feudal lords seeking the expansion of their personal power in terms of how much territory their domain had under control. In Mongolia the wars were about the survival of the society and were fought for pasture lands that were needed to ensure the continuation of the society. They were, for the society engaged, wars of necessity and not of politics of self aggrandizement as was the case in Europe at the same time according to Bold. The Mongols' wars of conquest were a result of changes in the natural environment that brought about the need for finding new pasture lands which were possible to integrate into the Mongol society given the pastoral nomadic structure of the Mongol society. This nomadic nature of the Mongol society was also according to Bold the reason for these wars indirectly. The Mongol society was based on nomadic pasturing economy that required very little specialized skills or other factors of production. For this reason the idea of increased value through specialized production methods was foreign to the Mongol society: in essence, there was no incentive for diversifying the production structure away from the nomadic pastoral economy. Thus the society, when faced with a sudden worsening of, for example weather conditions adversely affecting the economy of the society, would be facing extinction and thus forcing about the wars, such as the ones waged by Chinggis Qahan, as a policy necessitated by survival. The Mongol
society was not one of autarkic nature. The Mongols needed a variety of products from trading partners, products such as iron and tea and even grain. The trading relations were however quite one-sided with China, the main trading partner: the Mongols had more use for the Chinese products than the Chinese had for Mongol products.

As evidence of how this vulnerability of the Mongol society has directed the course of the Mongol society to a bellicose direction Bold cites research that combines palaeoclimatological data with data concerning the wars, migrations and borders (Bold, 2001, 150-156). The case of borders with China is an interesting one from the perspective of International Relations as one of the dominant theories of International Relations, realism, considers the borders and the conflicts that take place within what might be called border territory, to be symptoms of larger issues such as struggle over power (Forsberg in: Forsberg, 1995, 26). Also the likelihood of any border conflict depends on the existence and power of an interest group that would have interests in seeing the borders re-demarcated; it is the existence of such groups which according to Jack Snyder best explain any border-related conflict (Forsberg in: Forsberg, 1995, 32-33). Border may be seen as an indicator, a sort of a thermometer, of larger events forming that manifests itself in the form of border incidents. But the border may also be a pacific zone of exchange as it was according to Bold most of the time between Mongolian tribes and China with both parties regarding trade as mutually beneficial. Based on the charts compiled by Bold the changes in temperature, winter thunder storms and dust fall correlate with changes in the Sino-Mongolian border as do migrations and wars indicating possible causal connection (Bold, 2001, 152-153).

In his study Bold has identified what he calls “war-favouring conditions of the Mongols” (Bold, 2001, 150) which he has arrived at based on correlating the above mentioned variables with palaeoclimatological data but also with the recordings of ancient Chinese chronicles which tell of worsening climatic conditions in the Mongol homeland, today's Mongolia (Bold, 2001, 151). What Bold has done is synthesize data from various sources in an elegant framework for explaining the Mongols' wars of conquest that seeks to settle a pattern behind, not only the Mongols, but also of the other peoples of the Inner Asia as well as they lend each other cultural traits and practices. According to Bold when studying the Mongol society the following should be taken into account: “the close connection between natural and geographical conditions, the livestock economy, the nomadic way of life, the organisation of tribes and families and military activity.” (Bold, 2001, 156)
The main findings of statistical research concerning scarcity, population pressure and internal conflict have been summed by Buhaug et al from statistical research spanning some twenty years. The main findings are as follows:

- Soil degradation, population density, water scarcity, deforestation all increase risk
- No direct effects, some mediated through infant mortality
- No effect of population density
- Population density increases risk, scarcity no effect on economic growth
- Negative rainfall deviation (instrument for economic shock) increases risk
- No effect of population density
- Land pressure decreases risk in some models, land pressure population growth increases risk for ‘70s
- No effect of environmental factors or population density
- Accumulated consumption decreases risk
- Rainfall deviation increases risk, climate zone and land degradation has no effect, water scarcity decreases risk
- Land degradation increases risk, water scarcity and drought close to significant, no effect of pop. density and pop. Growth
- Population density and land pressure increases risk
- No effect of population density when controlling for distance to capital
- Forage scarcity increases severity, high vegetation cover increases frequency of raids.

Many of these factors may be identified as being present in the case of studying the origins of the Mongols' wars of conquest, such as the pasture lands and high vegetation cover, but on the whole the picture is far from clear when the case at hand is set against this background. For example some of the findings are contradictory within the table as quoted above and also the findings are gathered from a number of statistical research report throughout the world and also the selection of variables may not be the optimal for the study of the reasons behind the Mongols' wars of conquest since, as noted earlier, no significant climate change in terms of the volume of change in temperature is present. Also the data refers to intrastate political and social conditions, but could of course be
applicable to the social conditions, which were chaotic, before the rise of Chinggis Qahan and the subsequent formation of the Mongol nation in the Mongol society. This approach however would miss two points, the first being the volume of the change in temperature which should be regarded as being the most crucial variable and which is not represented clearly in the findings above in terms of temperature in excess of the historical median as one might see as desirable given the context of the study at hand, and the second being the fact that the climatic event indicated in the Mongols' wars of conquest was one of cooling and not warming, as is the case with the findings above which have indeed been produced under what is the current warming climate.

But what was the climate, the experience of weather in any given place at any given time, like to the contemporaries of Chinggis Qahan, how do they describe the weather and climate in Mongolia? According to de Plano Carpini, who was present at the creation so to speak, has this to say concerning the climate of Mongolia during his mission based on his experiences:


Lopuksi totean lyhyestä, että tartarien maa on laaja, mutta muutoin paljon arvottomampi kuin saataa sanoakaan. Tämän me näimme omin silmin, sillä kiertelimme sitä viisi ja puoli kuukautta. (Plano Carpini, 2003, 30-31)

This experience of the climate in central parts of Asia from some eight hundred years back that seems to indicate indeed a cool climate as demonstrated by the climate data related to this period and place is echoed closer to the modern time by the experience of the weather by C. G. Mannerheim on his mission in Asia. During this trip, funded by the Russian Army as a spying expedition during which Mannerheim assumed the identity of an explorer on an academic exploration, a number of scientific observations were made, these also including meteorological
observations. The expedition was taken by surprise in Khapt-kau-su when the weather all of a sudden turned into a storm like of which Mannerheim had never experienced before. On May 24th 1907 the ”temperature fell from 18.3 °C to -0.4° and a heavy hailstorm changed to a snowstorm.” (Meinander in: Mannerheim, 1940, 14). A well recorded observation of how rapidly the climate may change in the central parts of Asia.

As noted earlier, the study of war and its causes is the business of the discipline of International Relations and thus evaluating any causal links between food scarcity and violent conflict as claimed by Malthus also falls under the auspices of International Relations theory. This would also include the study of the causes and motivations underlying the Mongols' wars of conquest as well as they are cited as evidence of the validity of this theory by Malthus. Above the question of climate change – violent conflict nexus has been discussed in connection with the Mongols' wars of conquest and the debate concerning the causes and motivations of these wars in the light of investigations other than those of International Relations discipline nature. What light might the theories and methods available in the field of International Relations for the study of war and conflict shed on the possible causal link between climate change and the onset of the Mongols' wars of conquest with reference to the claim made by Malthus that these wars were driven by food scarcity? Would they validate or invalidate the hypothesis put forth by Jenkins as cited above concerning the climate-induced food crisis origins of the Mongols' wars of conquest or would any such investigation support the standard model with its wars-of-conquest-as-national-identity-project-model? This question is the topic of the next chapter.
4. TEXT ANALYSIS OF THE MONGOLS' SECURITY POLICY

4.1. How an identity is securitized: theory and practice

Ideally any research involving process tracing in the field of International Relations should be based on a large amount of literary and other sources such as, for example, audiovisual recordings and first-hand witness accounts. This material from various sources would then be arranged and studied systematically in a manner that would allow tracing of the various processes that led to the ultimate outcome under investigation, in this case the outcome being the Mongols' wars of conquest. In order to assess the reasons and motivations behind the Mongols’ wars of conquest in a relevant manner that would facilitate evaluating them, it should be done in the light of appropriate analytical framwork(s) of International Relations theory. This would allow for a much fuller understanding and critique and could be seen as the contribution of the International Relations theory to the debate concerning what drove the Mongols. This is not however possible in the ideal manner outlined here, as would be the case with modern case studies, with the case at hand, so any inquiry will have to do with a material that is available. Although it should be kept in mind that first-hand literary contemporary sources are available and have been used in this Thesis as part of the process tracing approach. In the previous chapter the Mongol culture and identity and their wars as they were during the time of Chinggis Qahan and the palaeoclimatological data related to the period in question as well as the debate concerning the reasons and motivations underlying the Mongols' wars of conquest were discussed. In this chapter the question whether the conclusions reached in the previous chapter cascade into what may best be characterized as the Mongols’ security policy and strategy, namely; does it seem plausible, in the light of modern security theories and what we know of war in terms what they are fought for, or the war aims as it might be best expressed, that a food security deficit caused by climate change on the Mongolian Steppe led to the Mongols' wars of conquest?

Security studies were originally all about the state and its survival, meaning essentially the survival of the insitutions of the state, such as the military and the administration of the executive branch of the government. This is referred to as the "narrow” concept of security, meaning that it is narrowed down to the state and its institutions and the number of threats is limited to mainly those in the form of direct use of force or aiding it. Increasingly this is changing as the "narrow” concept of security is being replaced with the "broad” concept of security, a concept that has been increasinyg dominant since the publication of the United Nations Development Programme Human Security Report in 1994 (UNDP, 1994). The broad security covers virtually anything that may be seen as
being threatened. Usually it is, however limited to more social, economic and environmental aspects of security, for all intentions and purposes, and thus at its core we find the concept of identity and the threats posed against it. This means essentially and most commonly threats against a way of life, a way of thinking, the perception that one has of oneself. A good example of this intertwining of security, society and identity is the case of Malaysian educational policy (Collins, 2005). It was decreed by the Malaysia government in 2002 that the language of instruction in all schools in Malaysia should be English. As a reaction to this Chinese educationalists resorted to securitizing extreme rhetorics and consequently were threatened with state security measures by the Malaysian government, meaning that they were seen, based on defending a medium of education, as posing a threat to the Malaysian society and state. Collins sees this as revealing the weakness of the Mandarin educational system and the consequent need of protecting it and thus, by proxy as it were, the Chinese identity itself as it is faced with competing languages and cultures. Things are apt to change, and this means one's identity as well and also the identity of a society, a change that is not always uncomplicated.

The identity under threat and its wider connections may best be studied through texts produced by the actors of international relations, by allowing the actors to tell what it is that they perceive as being threatened and by whom or by what. What is the actors' perception of themselves in the world and how it generates into action? One must learn to respect the identity of actors in international relations in order to be able to understand their security concerns. One must learn to see how one man's livelihood, for example for a lumberjack cutting down the Amazon rainforest, and the security of it is the insecurity of another man, the indigenous man whose ancestors have for millenia lived in the rainforest and whose very way of life depends on the existence of the forest. A challenging field to be sure, but how to study this maze of security and insecurity? Which way to take when choosing a theory for the present Thesis for example in order to ensure that recent theoretical and methodological advances are taken into account to ensure theoretical and methodological validity of the work at hand?

According to what is known as the Copenhagen school of security studies (Williams, 2003, 511) security is a social construction, a product of social interactions in communication among actors of international affairs and may be best understood by studying these interactions in their various forms. In keeping with the speech-act theory that underlies the approach taken by the Copenhagen school security is "spoken" by actors who are in a position of designated authority to produce security by means of speech within one of the sectors of security. Each of these sectors has their own referent objects to which security spoken refers to, for example in the military sector it is the
What can be securitized is quite open: the limitation for this could be that it must be linked with an existential threat; a threat to the very existence of what whatever is the referent object of the securitizing speech-act. For purposes of security analysis the concept of security has been divided into five sectors of security: environmental, societal, economic, military. Three different types of unit have been distinguished for purposes of analysis:

1. Referent objects: things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.
3. Functional actors: actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. Without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security. A polluting company, for example, can be a central actor in the environmental sector – it is not a referent object and is not trying to securitize environmental issues (quite the contrary). (Buzan et al, 1998, 36)

The referent object is of special interested as it can be almost anything, a village, a group, a society or, indeed, a state, the traditional unit of narrow security analysis. This way it is possible to see narrow security, the national security thinking, as being incorporateable into the broad security analytical framework of the Copenhagen school. The narrow and broad securities are not necessarily mutually excluding, though the broad security may be seen as “infiltrating” the narrow concept of security. “In principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object.” (Buzan et al, 1998, 36) However, there are certain characteristics which may be found associated with most securitizing speech-acts, such as that most actions carried out to fill a security deficit are associated with a collectivity or carried out in its name.

To conclude, one can study security discourse to learn what referent objects are appealed to and can study outcomes to see which hold security legitimacy so an appeal to their necessary survival is able to mobilize support. (Buzan et al, 1998, 39)

The theory of securitization is based on the following notion of how securitized issues, or issues as security issues, are constructed as such by means of language utilized for the purpose by an actor in international relations:

The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action “because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure”). This definition can function as a tool for finding security actors and phenomena in sectors other than the military-political one, where it is often hard to define when to include new issues on the security agenda. Must new issues affect the military sector or be as “dangerous” as war? To circumvent these restrictive ties to traditional security, one needs a clear idea of the essential quality of security in general. (Buzan et al, 1998, 26)

This social constructivist perspective is also reflected in the function of the analyst, who must learn to “navigate” within the mental landscapes that lie behind the language that has produced the speech...
containing securitizing dimensions and meanings. The analysis is all about uncovering the hidden that is behind the speech produced by the securitizing actors:

The quality is the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labeling it as *security*, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means. For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to assess some objective threats that “really” endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to understand the process of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. (Buzan et al, 1998, 26)

The matter at hand that is being attempted to securitize does not become securitized just by presenting it as such *per se*. The securitization in initiated with a securitizing move and if this is accepted by the audience in a process of negotiation, then a securitizing speech-act may be performed and the matter at hand has thus become securitized. Also if something is a security matter for a long enough period of time it may become institutionalized, it could be said that it becomes a part of an accepted way of life. What makes a successful securitizing speech-act could perhaps be best understood through the concept of legitimacy as defined by the originator of the term in international affairs, Prince de Talleyrand:”legitimacy... is first and foremost a requisite for the peace and happiness of the people, as well as the most solid and even the only guarantee of the existence and continuance of nations.” (Quoted in: Calasso, 1995, 54). If a matter under negotiation for a prospective securitization is perceived as being legitimate by the audience, it may be accepted as securitized. In this case it would mean that what leads to successful securitization could be perhaps predicted based on what is considered legitimate by a society. If this were the case, then any securitizing actor would be merely stating a”popular request” for a matter to be securitized. Much like a good showman, a securitizing agent must read the wishes of his audience.

**4.2. Critique of the Copenhagen School**

The Copenhagen school has been critiqued from various perspectives and for various aspects. Michael Williams (Williams, 2003) has critiqued the Copenhagen school for placing too much attention on the language in an age when communication, based on which decisions are made, is dominantly visual. This perspective adopted by Williams could be perhaps characterized as technological due to its emphasis on the impact of audiovisual communication on securitization. However, as valid as this perspective may be for the modern world indeed increasingly driven by audio-visual forms of communication, it may not be applicable for the purpose of critique when dealing with the Mongols and their wars of conquest. At that time, of course, there were no modern technological mediums of communication and thus the critique fails to make its point, but only partly. An element relevant to the Mongols and their wars with relation to Williams' critique may be
found in the old manuscripts and in their illustrations. Marco Polo's account of his travels has over centuries been translated a number of times in numerous languages, including Finnish which reflects the wide influence of the work. For the French translation, the fourteenth century Livres des Merveilles, a number of illustrations were made and some of them have been reproduced in the Finnish translation (Polo, 1957). On page 291 there is an illustration of the Khubilai Qahan's navy sailing for Japan as part of the invading Imperial Chinese attack expedition. The sailors manning the ships have distinctive European physical features and also the ships themselves are distinctly European. The illustrator, most likely a European native, has used the people and ships he was familiar with and seems to have had no knowledge of the actual circumstances and characteristics of the attack and for this reason has resorted to his imagination and the use of what he knew to exist and its forms, such as European ships. His illustration is however ultimately based on the text, or coded language, produced by Polo. Thus, the word comes before the image when dealing with security matters before the era of audio-visual communication, when live-feed is increasingly available for matters related to war as well as for peace. For this reason the Copenhagen school with its emphasis on language and the securitizing speech-acts contained and produced within it, is an appropriate approach to be used when studying securitization in the context of the Mongols' and their wars and also perhaps other conflict predating the era of audio-visual communications technology.

Juha A. Vuori (Vuori, 2008) has produced his critique based on the need to understand the social and political contexts in which the securitization takes place with a view of keeping in mind that securitization may also fail with ensuing consequences. According to to Vuori the focus of the Copenhagen school has been on what may be considered to be the democratic European political orders. Indeed according to Vuori the concept of securitization virtually necessitates the need for a democratic order as the securitization is usually seen as a process by which matters are removed away from democratic political order, it is a justification of non-democratic procedures, and thus securitization theory could only be used in connection with modern democracies. If this is accepted, the scope of the Copenhagen School would be very narrow indeed. According to Vuori this should not however discourage or prevent the studying of non-democratic political orders in terms of securitization and indeed according to Vuori most theorists of securitization have deemed various differing political orders around the globe to be suitable for studying securitization but have not, however, suggested how to go about accomplishing this. Vuori's thesis is that this could be done by applying illocutionary logic to securitizing speech-acts and that such an act may contain more than one intention or effect and that consequently securitization may be used for purposes of more than one political agenda. Also both social and language analysis are needed to understand what lies
beneath the very securitization itself, but neither of these fields is sufficient as felicity in one is not sufficient for successful securitization while neither is entirely determinat. Securitization is thus an open social process according to Vuori up to and including the chance of failure. The study of the Mongols's wars of conquest serves as a good case for testing the ideas put forth by Vuori: despite of the many democratic features of the Mongol society, such as the election of the Qahan in Khuriltai,
or the electoral meeting of those who were to be under the Qahan's command, the Mongol society was not a democracy in modern terms. Rather, as noted by Bold (Bold, 2001) it was a distinct unique social system of its own kind, reflecting its own historical development. Quite simply, it was a Mongol society. Thus studying it meets the Vuori's observation that securitization should studied in non-democratic modern societies as well.

Claire Wilkinson (Wilkinson, 2007) has based her critique on two observations. First, she sees the Copenhagen school as being constrained by what she calls the"Westphalian straitjacket", by which she refers to the eurocentric underlying assumptions of the Copenhagen school that prevent it from being fully explanatory when analyzing events outside of Europe, as the relationship between speech and action are culturally constructed and thus changeable between different cultures in different parts of the world in different times. For addressing this she recommends more focus to be vested on the various processes involved in the securitizing process rather than just focusing on the speech-act itself. Securitization should be understood as being an expression of the culture and society in which it takes place and should be studied within this context and with its terms, features and peculiarities. Second, the underlying conception of the connection between speech and action is according to Wilkinson unable to account for political processes involved in the securitization process in some cases as the securitizing speech-act is frequently given priority over other forms of political expressions which leads to their exclusion when, in some cased, they may be the ultimately determining factors related to securitization in terms of its success or lack thereof. In essence the agency becomes problematic. For ameliorating this Wilkinson suggests focusing on developing analytical apparatus for more covering analysis of the connection between speech and action, as the relationship between these two may differ between various cultures. Studying the Mongols' wars of conquest in terms of securitization certainly meets the need identified by Wilkinson for broadening the scope beyond the post-Westphalian Europe. The second point however is perhaps a bit more problematic concerning the nature of the societies encountering each other at that time of world history. According to Richard Halperin (Halperin, 1985) the reason for peaceful co-existence, for example, in the case of the relations between the Mongol Golden Horde of Southern Russia and its northern fiefdom, Muscowy, may be explained through the lack of avoiding dealing with the fact that Muscowy was a fiefdom. The Mongol supremacy simply was not talked about. According to
Halperin this also applied to other societies of the age as well in similar situations with social heterogeneity and so on. This means that, in terms of written records, there are considerable gaps that exist as a result of systematic omissions and hints, for example related to how Mongols taxed Russians, may be found scattered here and there in texts. This means that when studying the Mongol sources they must be carefully investigated for just a few words that may give us a hint of what they thought. Not necessarily everything was written down.

Also, as noted by Limnéll (Limnéll, 2009, 77), the Copenhagen school has been critiqued for dynamics of excessive securitization, this meaning that all matters, regardless of their relevancy to, for example, one's physical survival, may be turned into matters of security. This may be corrected by keeping in mind the basic nature of the theory, which is to remove matters from the security political agenda and to return them back to the normal political agenda where they once again are under the democratic processes and may be affected by democratic means. Thus the Copenhagen school serves to strengthen and broaden the democratic decision making process. It should also serve as a kind on "over-kill detector" as matters, if analyzed in terms of securitizing dynamics, may be exposed and demonstrated as not being of such nature as to merit securitization. Thus any over-kill, a term from classical nuclear strategy meaning that excessive strategic nuclear force is used to produce an outcome that is out of proportions in relation to the amount of force used, should be avoidable and force of destiny -like securitizing dynamics preventable.

4.3. Studying securitization with reference to Mongol society: the approach

Technically any form of text (a recording of a speech, a document, and clay tablets with arrowhead writing on them and so on) may be subjected to analysis for determining whether it contains securitizing speech-acts or moves to produce them. As part of his study on the construction of threats in the Finnish security discourse Jarno Limnéll (Limnéll, 2009) has utilized various types of political setting of the Finnish government. In addition to the traditional securitizing speech he has included various institutional procedures and legal regulations, overall aiming at producing a covering description of how a matter becomes securitized in the Finnish context in a process that includes legislation, administration and so on. Also, in addition to the discursive part of the theory, Limnéll includes the material part of the threat, the actual experience of threat, but gives primacy however to the speech-act and the linguistic dimension in general. With these sources he has studied the processes in which threats are securitized in the Finnish debate. The similar approach may also be used when studying other governments, past or present. What perhaps matters the most is the existence of suitable documents, such as legal documents, and access to them for the purposes of
analysis. This way it becomes possible to study the possible securitization of food security by the Mongols for researching the climate change as the cause of the Mongols' wars of conquest hypothesis as suitable contemporary Mongol documents do exist and they are available for the purposes of analysis. Also it is possible that threats exist even if they have not been securitized. This means, by way of critique, that securitization or the study thereof does not automatically lead to the sources of all that may lead to war; also other factors must be taken into account, such as the act *per se* as suggested by Wilkinson (Wilkinson, 2007). The speech-act alone securitizing an issue should not be considered as being the exhaustive approach when the causes of wars are studied as the critiques cited above could be summarized.

In terms of choosing a sector of security for food security analysis, the societal sector is the most useful as the life-cycle analysis food production and consumption reveals a chain that covers the whole of the society as, in order to survive, all humans must eat. "In the societal sector, as we have defined it, the referent object is large-scale collective identities that can function independent of the state, such as nations or religions.” (Buzan et al, 1997, 22) Thus the identity of a society becomes the referent object of food security analysis and its securitization and its study becomes in this case the process of demonstrating whether an acute threat to the food security of a society became the reason for a violent conflict. The aim of the analysis being to uncover why something is desired to be securitized, it is a study of identity and how its securitization may have led to war. The purpose of this study ultimately being, as noted by Limnéll in relation to his own work similar methodology (Limnéll, 2009, 77), to access and evaluate the social factors related to the Mongol society that underlie the securitization itself.

4.4. The Mongols' texts: an analysis in the securitization theory framework

It is possible to study the possible securitization of food security by means of Mongol texts contemporary to Chinggis Qahan, as these texts would likely contain any speech-acts related to securitization of food security by the Mongol leadership, namely by Chinggis Qahan and his successors and closest advisors. Two such Mongol texts dating from the time of Chinggis Qahan are known as discussed earlier and also contemporary European accounts are available for investigation. The Mongol sources are the *Yassa* and *The Secret History of the Mongols*. The European accounts are those of Johannes de Plano Carpini and Marco Polo. These texts are used as a material for investigating how and what did the Mongols thought of as being a security issue, what was their security architecture, or perhaps better, mental security landscape, like and what it was that they would have fought a war for. What was for Mongols a *casus belli*?
The utilization of Mongols' law for purposes of securitizing speech-act analysis could be critiqued from the perspective that strict rules concerning food and various processes related to it are an integral part of many an ancient law, such as the law of Hammurabi. This could be seen as invalidating the point that the Mongols would have securitized food security by including it as part of their legislation: if everyone does it, it is not a security issue, to summarise the critique. Rather, it could be thought of as a social norm, the inclusion of various food-related items in legislation. But is it not a norm that frequently requires securitization in order to survive, is it not the socially widely accepted norms that determine what may undergo successful securitization as the audience has indirectly already accepted the securitization before the negotiation with the securitizing agent based on the norms followed by the audience? Securitization would thus reflect the very core norms of the society under analysis, the values associated with societal identity. Excluding the study of legal texts for purposes of securitizing speech-act analysis would miss the world in which these laws were produced as a key component of any analysis. A codified system of law could be seen as one of the hallmarks of an organized society, an essential institution as it were, that makes the function of a society possible and would thus give a representative picture of the society. This would explain why the origins of societies are, as in the case of the Old Testament with Moses, associated frequently with lawgivers.

Prior to the modern age of food production food has always been scarce for the vast majority of humanity and, as noted by Jutikkala (Jutikkala, 1987, 27) the famine was always a threat in the form of long-term fluctuations in climate. It could be seen as creating an institutionalized security concern that the Copenhagen school speaks of due to its omnipresent nature. This threat could well be seen as having led to the inclusion of food in ancient systems of law and indeed in treating it as sacred as Jesus Christ did when he according to Bible set the communion as the act of creating a community among believers and when he performed the miracle of the five loaves and two according to John. When analysing the role played by climate in securitizing food security in pre-modern societies, one must understand that the conditions in which food was produced differed radically from the modern, maybe even post-modern, world. This pre-modern world was the world of Malthus and his logic of scarcity, the conflict between resources and the need for them characterized by food and other resource scarcity. This was changed by the birth of the modern world with its technological improvements as well as changes in human behaviour. According to John Kenneth Galbraith:

Malthus lives as the prophet of what came to be called the population explosion; by the even less gifted in metaphor, the population bomb. And, indeed, he speaks a grim truth to the poorer agricultural countries
of Asia and Africa today, although the rich industrial world, aided by contraceptives and aborted pregnancies, has escaped his grasp. (Galbraith, 1987, 79)

Set against this background, it could be seen that it would be an exception to find a pre-modern society that has not included what might be characterized as elements of food security in its legal system. A good example of this is the widespread tradition of childmurder, which according to Jutikkala was only rooted by the spread of the Christian faith. Children were murdered as infants and newly-borns as a means of population control throughout the world in the pre-agriculture society and this tradition was then continued on in the agricultural society and discontinued only as a result of systematic rooting by ecclesiastic institutions (Jutikkala, 1987, 31). The murder of a newly-born was not criminalized in the legal systems of the time and thus murdering an infant was not necessarily seen as a security matter as the infant was not entitled to personal security. Today the matter has changed and the right to live has been included in various legal systems and infants are seen as entitled to personal security in terms of protection of their lives. Also, as noted by Ruotsala, the Yassa may be studied with the perspective of practical purpose as well meaning literal and everyday practice-related reading of the Yassa, (Ruotsala, 2001, 28) in addition to seeing it as a product of a shamanistic clan-society with strong religious connotations and purposes.

Also the frequency of food security-related wars may have been dominant in terms of the nature of wars as being expressions of war aims. The Father of History Herodotus describes two wars in the first book of his History, the second being what might be characterized as a security dilemma -war. Of these two wars the first one, waged by king Alyattes of Lydia against the Mileto, is fought repeatedly based on the harvesting seasons of an agricultural society; the aggressor attacks the enemies, does not destroy the houses or anything else, merely burns the grain and forest and loots some of the grain that is not burnt (Herodotos, I, 17). Partially this strategy is adopted as a result of keeping the war on land, as the people of Mileto had naval superiority, but it had other reasons as well for being the adopted strategy of the Lydians. According to Herodotus destruction was avoided as a tactic specifically for the reason that the king wanted to make sure the people of Mileto would have a place and infrastructure whence to start their crop year from and to make sure the king would have something to loot also the next time: effectively the Mileto were a target of repeated looting quests by Lydia for food. According to Herodotus he continued this method of warfare, which he had inherited from his father, for eleven years repeatedly. The reliability of Herodotus as a source of ancient history may of course be questioned, as his work does contain elements which seem, for the modern reader, as fanciful. It should be kept in mind however that Herodotus does represent the thinking that existed millennia ago in terms of why and how wars are fought. Also recent archaeological findings may have given new credibility to Herodotus as an accurate and relevant
historian. Recently the remains of an army were found in the Egyptian desert, an army that has for long been considered to have been the product of Herodotus' vivid imagination as these may be the remains of an army that Herodotus wrote about (Tharoor, 2009).

4.5. The Mongol law Yassa

For a law the Yassa is an interesting one as it seems to have been a codex for regulating all the aspects of the Mongol society. In his work on the history of the Mongols the well-established Russian historian of Eurasia Lev Gumilev (Gumilev, 1987) refers repeatedly to the Yassa as the source of the ways and means of the warfare as conducted by the Mongols. It is a sort of standing order issued by the commander-in-chief for the whole of Mongol army on how to regulate it as it was read and interpreted by commanders in the field. Thus it was very broad in scope, much more so than legal systems today. The finality of the word of Yassa is emphasized by the fact that it only includes two punishments: death and banishment to Siberia (Gumilev, 1987, 159). Its purpose was to regulate the very identity of Mongol society as expressed for example by the sections concerning the use of alcohol, which was a significant part of the Mongol culture at the time with deeper cultural connotations than merely intoxicating oneself (Ruotsala, 2001, 110-113). Chinggis Qahan in his Yassa:

33. If unable to abstain from drinking, a man may get drunk three times a month; if he does it more than three times he is culpable; if he gets drunk twice a month it is better; if once a month, this is still more laudable; and if one does not drink at all what can be better? But where can such a man be found? If such a man were found he would be worthy of the highest esteem. (Riasanovsky, 1967, Chapter II)

The function of Yassa as a codex for regulating the Mongol identity is well expressed in that it mainly applied to Mongols and other residing on the Steppe; the conquered nations were allowed to continue their own legal traditions and institutions (Ruotsala, 2001, 21). The Yassa was never intended as the law that was to cover the whole of the Mongol empire from Hungary to Manchuria. The Yassa also expresses Chinggis Qahan's aim of regulating the religious aspects of the Mongol identity as well, after all in the shamanistic tradition, which dominated the Mongol society, each man was essentially his/her own priest and the shaman was essentially just a mediator between this and the other world and thus the shamanistic system may be seen as a source of potential competition for the Mongol social and political authorities. Shamanism is a form of uninstitutionalized religion that is hard to control. As a result of what remains an unclear infight among the Mongols, Chinggis Qahan had the Chief Shaman of the Mongols executed and appointed a new one and he included in the Yassa sections that are related to avoiding offending deities.
The intimate connection between the law and the religion is common in many cultures, for example Georg Brandes tells how in ancient Rome the priests were in charge, in addition to leading worshiping, of passing the judgment when a law was violated (Brandes, 1922, 106). This way, as noted by Ruotsala, Chinggis Qahan was able to claim something of the powers earlier invested in the shaman, who were politically powerful class before the rise of Chinggis Qahan and his state religion. Indeed Chinggis Qahan was later deified and the European Papal emissaries were expected to bow before his idol when they first encountered Mongols (Ruotsala, 2001, 80). Chinggis Qahan created a new united Mongol society and its identity by taking over the institutions of the Mongol clans, such as shamanism. It is of interest when studying the securitization of food security in the the Yassa, that the function of a shaman was to avert any disaster facing the community, the shaman was in effect the mediating principle between the community and the forces beyond human control (Ruotsala, 2001, 26). As is usual, when a state is being created, he did this by means of giving a law, the foundation of any form of organization. The idea that society is built on law is well present in the ancient Nordic laws. The mediaeval law of Helsingland states that:

Maata on lailla rakennettava. Niin muodoin ei kukaan voisi maassa asua, ellei siellä olisi lakia. Sen vuoksi on laki säädetty, ensin sen on säätänyt Jumala ja sitten kuningas jalousntyisten miesten ja koko rahvaan suostumuksella, jotta hyvät saisivat nauttia sävyisyydestään ja vääriä kuritettaisiin. (Quoted in Jutikkala, 1965, 28)

According to Vilho Harle (Harle, 1998) the societies of the ancient may be divided into two categories based on how they perceived the order as being best reserved and created out of chaos. The two categories are 1) the societies which are based on moral principles or principle-oriented pattern societies and 2) those based on political power or power-oriented pattern societies (Harle, 1998, XII). This means that in a principle-oriented society the order is being created and maintained through the following of moral rules and power may be seen as being exercised on a number of social levels by various actors without regulating and controlling central authority. In power-oriented societies order is created through the use of force and it becomes the organizing principle of any this type of society; regulating and controlling central authority is the sine qua non of this type of society. Harle also has identified the following three elements of principle-oriented patterns in a society: a) the order will emerge spontaneously among men provided that the set moral codex is followed and harmony will ensue, b) the order is guaranteed by the ideal ruler embodying perfection in terms of moral rules being followed and c) morality must be set as the basis for foreign relations. For the power-oriented social pattern Harle has identified the following modus operandi: national identity coupled with exclusion of the Other assisted by ways and means to be considered to be use of force bring about the social order (Harle, 1998, 212). The earlier discussed
standard model of explaining the Mongols’ wars of conquest as having resulted from the need of an enemy as facilitating condition for national unity may be seen as an expression of a power-oriented social pattern society. There should be traces of the Other as the enemy when Mongols speak of their wars and the aims of the wars if this were the case.

Harle has produced this taxonomy based on reading of classical texts from various cultures spanning millennia and thus it may also be used as an approach in studying the ideas of the nature of social order as they are expressed in the *Yassa* and in the *Secret history*. In the light of the law of the Mongols, under which category would the Mongol society fall? It would be tempting, in the light of the military record of the Mongol empire and the standard model for explaining the origins of their wars of conquest, to cast the Mongol society as being power-oriented, virtually a military dictatorship focused on subjugating all others. The picture however, is more nuanced. To be sure China under the Yuan-emperor Khubilai, the grandson of Chinggis Qahan, was for all intentions and purposes a state partly characterizable as being ruled by an invading military force, as may be read in the depiction produced by the traveler Marco Polo (Polo, 1957), but was this the case for the whole of the Mongol society or was it only the conquered lands that were under what amounts to military control?

As noted by Gumilev, (Gumilev, 1987, 139) the Mongol society was falling apart during the time of the rise of Chinggis Qahan to power. He became the organiser of a new Mongol state that replaced the infighting and outfighting various groups and clans. In Chinggis Qahan the new order that replaced the old chaos was embodied and this founding principle of the Mongol society is well crystallised in a section of the maxims of Chinggis Qahan treated as part of the Mongol law by Riasanovsky:

2. If the Grandees, Knights and Bekes of the children of the many sovereigns to come will not strictly observe Yassa, the state will be shaken and collapse. People will again eagerly look for a Jenghiz Khan but will not find him.

(Riasanovsky, 1967, Chapter II)

It was either chaos without Chinggis Qahan and his law or order with Chinggis Qahan and his law. Chinggis Qahan may be said to have been the order and thus the provider of security if chaos is understood to have been an element that was the source of insecurity. The principles of the order he created are to be found in the *Yassa* in a codified form and give us an idea of the nature of the social order of the Mongol society, whether it was principle-oriented or power-oriented. The *Yassa*:

3. Whoever intentionally lies, or practices sorcery, or spies upon the behaviour of others, or intervenes between the two parties in a quarrel to help one against the other is also to be put to death. (Riasanovsky, 1967, Chapter II)

This is hardly the law of a society based on the coercive use of power by an authority. Rather this is
a law that expresses the notion of the Mongols as being morally fit to settle their own affairs and being able to agree with one another and thus reaching non-conflictive mutually acceptable ways of reaching *concordia*. Also the respect for one another's privacy is hardly a feature of a society utilizing informers to control the public opinion as would often be the case with societies that could be associated with power-oriented social patterns. The *Yassa* goes further in securing harmonious social relations for the members of the Mongol society:

30. The *Yassa* of Jenghiz Khan forbids lies, theft and adultery and prescribes love of one's neighbour as one's self; it orders men not to hurt each other and to forget offences completely, to spare countries and cities which submit voluntarily, to free from taxes temples consecrated to God, and to respect the temples of God and their servants. (Riasanovsky, 1967, Chapter II)

The *Yassa* seems to be designed for regulating social networks of the Mongol society based on the principle-oriented notion of the Mongols as independent self-governing individuals, who are not to be forced into anything against their will and whose privacy is to be respected. Based on the *Yassa* the Mongol society seems to be characterizable as being principle-oriented. As a result the Mongol society could be characterized as having been harmonious with legitimate government with popular support. This perception was well expressed with the gift of the poet by Geoffrey Chaucer, the fourteenth century English poet, testifying how far the good contemporary reputation of Chinggis Qahan's government had carried and how central his law and the order created by it were to it:

> This noble king was called Genghis Khan,  
> Who in his time was of great renown  
> That there was nowhere in no region  
> So excellent a lord in all things.  
> He lacked nothing that belonged to a king.  
> As of the sect of which he was born  
> He kept his law, to which that he was sworn.  
> And thereto he was hardy, wise, and rich,  
> And piteous and just, always liked;  
> Soothe of his word, benign, and honorable,  
> Of his courage as any center stable;  
> Young, fresh, and strong, in arms desirous  
> As any bachelor of all his house.  
> A fair person he was and fortunate,  
> And kept always so well royal estate  
> That there was nowhere such another man.  
> This noble king, the Tartar Genghis Khan.  
> (Quoted in: Weatherford, 2004, 239-240)

Chinggis Qahan seems to have been famed for his *Yassa* and strict following therein and not only in Asia but Europe as well. This reputation of good proof is an indication also of how much value and signifigance was placed on law and it’s following by the contemporaries, thus demonstrating the value of any analysis utilizing legal texts.
It should however be kept in mind, as noted earlier, that the *Yassa* was mainly for the Mongol society and others living on the Steppe, the core of the Empire in terms of groups of population so to speak. In the conquered nations it was a different story. The Mongol Yuan-Emperor of China, Khubilai, trusted no one, be they Mongol or Chinese, and during his reign expanded the imperial Censorate, an imperial office that controlled the civil service and reported on their actions to the Emperor, to an unprecedented level. It has even been characterized as the “marvel” of the Yuan-dynasty (Rossabi, 1988, 74). This is a far cry from the respect of privacy as decreed by Chinggis Qahan in his law. The reign of Khubilai was the reign of the need to control one's subjects and servants and the people hired to control the people and this was done by means of the greatest surveillance machinery in the history of China. Thus the nature of the Mongol society, principle-oriented, became something else, power-oriented, in the conquered lands. The Mongols' domestic policies did not generate into foreign policies in terms of transferring legal practices or values. The principle-based social order of the Steppe changed into power-oriented social order for ensuring the survival of the occupying power by means of force, by necessity it could be said, brought about by an illegitimate government. And at the same time the *Yassa* was the law on the Steppe, regulating the relations between Mongols and ensuring them with, for example, what amounts to the right for privacy. This way the Mongol empire, the largest land empire in the history, was an empire of double standards, principle-oriented and power-oriented at the same time. The three principle-oriented patterns of society as described above according to Harle may all be found in the *Yassa*, with Chinggis Qahan as the idealized ruler and towns being spared and so on, and the *modus operandi* characterizing the power-oriented patterns may also be detected in another part of the system of government created by the Mongols.

This system of double standards has been characterized by Robert Cooper as being an essential part of the international order of the modern world today, a defining feature of the global age, which seems have been initiated by the Mongols in this sense. The Mongols had one law for themselves and others living on the Steppe and the conquered populations were ruled through arrangements with their respective institutions, an occupation policy that utilized already existing facilities rather than created new ones. Efficient policy for example in China where the Emperor was a regnant figure and thus enabled to ruling of China through one office held by a Mongol, say Khubilai Qahan. According to Cooper:

> We need to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of state, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, and deception, whatever
is necessary for those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. (Cooper, 2000, 37)
The politics promoted here by Cooper are those of the globalized world, so it should be fitting that Chinggis Qahan has been, as noted earlier, been considered to have been the founder of globalization. In this light it is only appropriate that the Washington Post should have elected Chinggis Qahan as its Man of the Millennium in 1995 (Onon in Onon, 2001, 5). After all the politics and administration of the Empire he founded seem to have, in many ways, anticipated the politics and administrative practices of the modern globalized world. Also in terms of military occupation and the policies and practices associated with it.

4.6. Analysis of the Yassa concerning the securitization of food security

The Yassa includes many sections related to food and, if the concept of food security is to be, in addition to including as one level the lack and/or scarcity of food, understood in its broadest form, as has been done by White et al who have coupled the food security with water security (White et al, 2007), to water as well. It emerges across the Yassa that food and water were indeed the subject of exceptional measures taken by the Mongol government as is expressed by the codification of matters concerning food and water in the Yassa and that these legal regulations were accepted by the Mongol society, after all they would have not ended up as part of the legal system had it been otherwise considering the principle-oriented nature of the social pattern of the Mongol society. After all, things that are punishable by death in the case of misconduct are expressed as securitized as the use of lethal force against the perpetrator is required and the termination of a member of a society would normally be considered an exceptional measure by most. But what kind of sections does the Yassa contain concerning food and water, what does the Yassa say?

The first section with relevant entry is concerned with the purity of water and ashes and is directed against urinating into water and ashes: “4. Whoever urinates into water or ashes is also to be put to death.” (Riasanovsky, 1967, Chapter II) The part concerned with water is readily understandable as being related to conditions with scarce pure water resources and the latter is also understandable as being related to cooking on open fire in camping conditions and also in general. The second entry is related to the method of animal slaughtering and the conservation of blood in the process:

8. When an animal is to be eaten, its feet must be tied, its belly ripped open and its heart squeezed in the hand until the animal dies; then its meat may be eaten; but if anyone slaughter an animal after the Mohammedan fashion, he is to be himself slaughtered. (Riasanovsky, 1967, Chapter II)

As the law of Islam, the Sharia, forbids the use of blood in preparing the food of believers, all animals must be slaughtered in such a way that the food is Halal, allowed, and free of blood which
is done by bleeding the animal to death by cutting its throat. Any meat that has blood in it is Haram, banned, and may not be eaten by believers. The Mongol law seems to be especially designed for preventing this method of butchering from being utilized and blood being wasted in the process, as blood can be used as a raw material in preparing food. Also the section indicates that Chinggis Qahan was concerned with non-Mongol influence on the Mongol dietary regime as far as the process of food preparation is concerned.

The third and fourth entries are concerned with the sharing of food resources in social interaction, expressing the nature of the Yassa as a law for regulating the Mongol society in a society-facilitating manner that supported the creation of trust among the peoples under the rule of Yassa:

12. He forbade his people to eat food offered by another until the one offering the food tasted of it himself, even though one be a prince (Emir) and the other a captive; he forbade them to eat anything in the presence of another without having invited him to partake of the food; he forbade any man to eat more than his comrades, and to step over a fire on which food was being cooked or a dish from which people were eating.

13. When a wayfarer passes by people eating, he must alight and eat with them without asking for permission, and they must not forbid him this. (Riasanovksy, 1967, Chapter II)

The first part related to accepting food that one is offered seems to be related to poisoning. The best way to assure oneself, that the food that one is being offered is not poisoned, is to see the person offering the food consume it himself. This of course with the notion in mind that the person offering the food has not beforehand taken antidote to the poison so that deception concerning the nature of the food and of the act of sharing might be concealed. This section indicates that the Mongols thought of food also as a potential weapon, thus adding a dimension of classical "narrow" security analysis when it comes to Mongols' securitization of food.

The section may have drawn its inspiration from Chinggis Qahan's own life experiences. Chinggis Qahan's father Yisugei, a powerful leader of his Mongol tribe, needed the support of another Mongol tribe, the Onggirat, in his war against the Tatars and the Merkit, and he embarked on a diplomatic mission to them with his nine-year old son Temüjin (Chinggis Qahan's birth name), who was to be engaged with the daughter of the leader of the Onggirat, but was poisoned on the way back by the Tatars who invited him to partake in their meal (Gumilev, 1987, 142). This poisoning led to the Temüjin and the rest of the family becoming outcasts of the Mongol society and the political constellation created by his father being shattered. The second part of the section 12. may be understood as a measure to make sure that food resources are being shared evenly and that no man will eat more than his fair share and that the means of food preparation (fire, dishes) are in a
suitable condition for cooking at all times. These are effective measures for protecting the society that is nomadic in an environment with scarce food and water resources and they turn the society as a whole into one system that provides food security for the members of the society by carefully regulating the various aspects related to food. This idea is well present in the entries concerning the sharing of food. The same line is continued in the following section:

14. He forbade them to dip their hands into water and ordered them to use some vessel for the drawing of water. (Riasanovsky, 1967, Chapter II)

The Mongols also hunted, an aspect of the Mongol society that is covered by the following section of the Yassa:

27. He ordered that soldiers be punished for negligence; and hunters who let an animal escape during a community hunt he ordered to be beaten with sticks and in some cases to be put to death. (Riasanovsky, 1967, Chapter II)

In this section Chinggis Qahan has equated the negligence demonstrated by a soldier that may lead to defeat in a battle with potentially disastrous results, with that demonstrated by a hunter during a community hunt. The case of a private hunter losing his game is not mentioned and likely precisely because he is a private hunter: the survival of a community does not depend on him. The Yassa does not seem extend to individuals outside the community who live on their own, it is in a way a law of societal regulation and also, as noted, military regulation and creation of society. In Mongol society the individuals living such individual lives were referred to as the"people of long will' or 'free condition' (üütü dürü-yin gü'ün)" (Gumilev, 1987, 140). They were individuals who, for some reason, had found it impossible to live in the Mongol society and who had abandoned it, and lived in nature surviving on hunting, fishing and sometimes even by robbery as best they could in harsh natural conditions. It was among these people that Chinggis Qahan lived after his father was murdered.

The societal nature meaning the governing the Mongol societal relations and the emphasis given to them is well expressed in the following section, which designates the camp, the physical expression of a Mongol society, as the space in which a crime is committed and from which the perpetrator must be driven out and killed:

32. (The Yassa of Jenghiz Khan prescribes that) a man who chokes on food must be driven out of the camp and immediately killed (Riasanovsky, 1967, Chapter II)

It is the act of choking on food that is the crime punishable by death and, perhaps even worse in Mongol society, decamping. This is a harsh punishment in the light of the People of Long Will discussed above. It could be interpreted that the crime of choking is punishable twice: first by decamping and followed by this by death. Thus the crime must have been considered horrendous by the Mongol society. This becomes understandable against the background of scarce food resources and the Yassa's idea of creating a food security regime by means of law as expressed in the light of
the sections of the *Yassa* cited above. The same theme of intimate connection between the society of which one is a member and the food resources available is present in the *Secret History* in the form of a lament that is repeated by members of Chinggis Qahan's family throughout sections of the *opus* that deal with the hardships of the Chinggis Qahan's family after they were ousted from the Mongol society and became men of long will following the assassination of Chinggis Qahan's father who also was the head of the Borjigi clan:

> Apart from our shadows we have no friends, apart from our tails we have no fat, (Onon, 2001, 66)

The fat mentioned refers to the tails of the sheeps that are native to Mongolia and have fatty tails as a characteristic. Thus the lament refers to a time of dire conditions in terms of food resources. The coupling of loss of friends, or of society as it may be interpreted, with diminished food supply gives a clue as to what were the forces that bound together the Mongol society during the time of Chinggis Qahan and makes the role and significance of food understandable.

### 4.7. Violisation in the Mongol texts Yassa and Secret History of the Mongols

According to Jarno Limnéll (Limnéll, 2009) securitization should not be seen as necessarily leading to exceptional measures taken by the state, rather it should be seen that through securitization an issue is accepted to the security political agenda. Words are only words, for example political election-related promises, and do not necessarily lead to actions. Limnéll recommends the use of “violisation” developed Iver Neumann for dealing with occurrences of extreme securitzation (Limnéll, 2009, 73), such as initiating a violent conflict. The concept of violisation refers to a situation when violent means are adopted to act out securitization, such as war. This means, as put forth by Limnéll, that securitization is the acceptance of an issue on the security policy agenda and should not be seen as *casus belli* being adopted at large by the society or government accepting a successful securitized issue on the agenda as a result of a negotiation for action to be taken. One should not perceive the securitization spectrum as being automata. Indeed, based on the above sections of the *Yassa* it becomes a valid claim that the Mongols did think of food and water in terms security, but did they initiate a violent conflict as a result of this securitization, did they violize food security? After all, the *Yassa* may decree what amounts to a double punishment for choking on food, but it is not said that the security/law enforcement apparatus of the Mongol state ever acted this out if no one ever choked on food. Indeed the section could be seen as aiming to make sure that the members of the Mongol society are provided with incentive for making sure that no one ever eats too much too fast, thus making it more table manners promotion- than security-related law.

Traces of violisation could of course be looked for in the already mentioned Maxims of Chinggis
Qahan included as part of the Mongol law by Riasanovsky (Riasanovsky, 1967, Chapter II). They are the principles by which the Mongol society was ruled by Chinggis Qahan, the very essence of Mongol policy as suggested by calling them maxims. These maxims, like the sections of the Yassa, are attributed to Chinggis Qahan by Riasanovsky. What kind of, if any, food related statements on violisation of food security there are to be found in these maxims? The first that could be seen as including an entry related to why the Mongols fought their wars of conquest is the following:

19. He also said: "After us the descendants of our clan will wear gold embroidered garments, eat rich and sweet food, ride fine horses, and embrace beautiful women but they will not say that they owe all this to their fathers and elder brothers, and they will forget us and those great times.” (Riasanovsky, 1967, Chapter II)

Certainly the maxim quoted above can be seen as summing up the loot of the Mongols' wars of conquest, these including high-quality nutritious food and also emphasizing the importance of societal ties as many are credited for the success, but not really stating that the wars were fought for food. Further statements are to be found in another one of Chinggis Qahan's maxims:

22. He also said:"My bowmen and warriors loom like thick forests: their wives, sweethearts and maidens shine like red flames. My task and intention is to sweeten their mouths with gifts of sweet sugar, to decorate their breasts, backs and shoulders with garments of brocade, to seat them on gold geldings, give them to drink from pure and sweet rivers, provide their beasts with good and abundant pastures... (Riasanovsky, 1967, Chapter II)

This same line of reasoning in terms of the reasons behind the policies carried out, the political agenda, is continued by the son and heir of Chinggis Qahan, Ögödei Qahan, in the Secret History when he summs up his life, work, achievements and mistakes. Also in Ögödei Qahan's government attention was paid to pasture lands and the supply of water, they were what seems to have been a fixed item on the agenda of the Mongol leadership. According to Ögödei Qahan:

[281] Ögödei-qahan said: 'Sitting on [my] father's great throne, the deeds that I have accomplished since my father'[s reign] [include] campaign against the Jaqut people. I finished off the Jaqut people. My second deed was to establish post-stations [so that] our messengers [can] gallop swiftly towards their goal and transport our necessities. My third deed was to have wells dug in places without water and to bring [the water] forth. I provided the people [of] the nation with a sufficiency of water and grass. My fourth deed was to post scouts and garrison commanders among the people of cities in all quarters and to permit the [of the] nation to rest. (Onon, 2001, 277)

In this last sentence he expresses the idea that war is not the ideal and at all times desired way of life for the Mongols; rest was a policy aim as well and desired. The idea of Other and the relentless need for its destruction, as expressed in the poem by nineteenth century poet Coleridge in which Khubilai Qahan is driven by the warlike spirit of his ancestors, is not present:

In Xanadu did Kubla Khan
A stately pleasure-dome decree:
Where Alph, the sacred river, ran
Through caverns measureless to man
  Down to a sunless sea.
So twice five miles of fertile ground
With walls and towers were girdled round:
And there were gardens bright with sinuous rills,
Where blossomed many an incense-bearing tree;
And here were forests ancient as the hills,
Enfolding sunny spots of greenery.

But oh! That deep romantic chasm which slanted
Down the green hill athwart a cedarn cover!
A savage place! As holy and enchanted
As e'er beneath a waning moon was haunted
By woman wailing for her demon-lover!
And from this chasm, with ceaseless turmoil seething,
As if this earth in fast thick pants were breathing,
A mighty fountain momentsly was forced:
Amid whose swift half-intermitted burst
Huge fragments vaulted like rebounding hail,
Or chaffy grain beneath the thresher's flail:
And 'mid these dancing rocks at once and ever
It flung up momentsly the sacred river.
Five miles meandering with a mazy motion
Through wood and dale the sacred river ran,
Then reached the caverns measureless to man,
And sank in tumult to a lifeless ocean:
And 'mid this tumult Kubla heard from far
Ancestral voices prophesying war!

The shadow of the dome of pleasure
Floated midway on the waves;
Where was heard the mingled measure
From the fountain and the caves.
It was a miracle of rare device,
A sunny pleasure-dome with caves of ice!
A damsel with a dulcimer
In a vision once I saw:
It was an Abyssinian maid,
And on her dulcimer she played,
Singing of Mount Abora.
Could I revive within me
Her symphony and song,
To such a deep delight 'twould win me,
That with music loud and long,
I would build that dome in air,
That sunny dome! those caves of ice!
And all who heard should see them there,
And all should cry, Beware! Beware!
His flashing eyes, his floating hair!
Weave a circle round him thrice,
And close your eyes with holy dread,
For he on honey-dew hath fed,  
And drunk the milk of Paradise.  
(Coleridge, 1797)

As the work by Coleridge is what may be considered to be classical and to have had affected the European perception of the Mongols in addition to its literary value, it seems appropriate to cite the work here in toto. In general the poem may have been, being contemporary to Malthus, a source of inspiration and an expression of explaining the Mongols’ wars of conquest through what might be called otherworldly factors, the otherworldly factor in this case being the ancestral voices inspiring Khubilai Qahan’s bellicose policies. Certainly it demonstrates that the Mongols were in vogue in the late 18th century and Malthus is thus following what seems to have been a trend. It also demonstrates that the food scarcity model as put forth by Malthus does not seem to have been the dominant form of discourse related to the Mongols.

According to Gumilev clan (oboq) formed the basic element of Mongol society in the 12th century. A clan was then led by members of the aristocracy, who held the following titles:

- **ba'atur** (hero)
- **noyan** (lord)
- **sechen** (wise)
- **taishi** (prince, member of a clan of importance)

They ruled over the lower ranks of the Mongol society, who were:

- **nökör** (the retinue)
- **qarachu** (commons)
- **bo'ol** (slaves, this including other clans that had been subdued by stronger clans)
- **unagan-bo'ol** (not actual slaves, rather members of other clans who had voluntarily joined another one for whatever reason) (Gumilev, 1987, page 139)

The main function of the ba'atur and of the noyan in this social architecture was to obtain pasturelands and the people to take care of the livestock and yurts as needed by the clan. According to Gumilev this system was falling apart before the rise of Chinggis Qahan (Gumilev, 1987, 139). As Chinggis Qahan was the one to unite the Mongols under one leadership replacing the infighting clan chiefetains, it was only nautral that he should assume the functions of the ba'atur and noyan on
a new national level and thus provide political continuity to the Mongol society in terms functions of the social levels and the social structure, the identity of the Mongols as noted earlier. He continued the already existing social institutions and their functions and in this sense was true to the Mongol heritage. The obtainment of pasturelands essential to the Mongols’ food security was at the core of Chinggis Qahan’s strategic agenda and based on the maxim and the section of the Secret History quoted above, also violated in the process of Mongols’ wars of conquest.

This claim of violation of food security is further present in the characteristics of the Mongols’ warfare, of how these wars were conducted. The Mongols pastured their horses and livestock on the lands they had conquered alongside with killing of millions of people according to Chinese sources (Jutikkala, 1987, 52). According to Lamb they also razed down all structures to make way for pasturelands in addition to killing the local population and pasturing their cattle (Lamb, 1931, 91). Also according to Lamb the Mongols took numbers from among the conquered populations as slaves based on their skills, especially artists and scientists who were deemed useful (Lamb, 1931, 90). In this way Chinggis Qahan continued also the function ba’atur and noyan in terms of obtaining workforce in addition to pasturelands. Of course looting of, for example, precious items in general was also carried out. This way, through wars of conquest, Chinggis Qahan transformed the Mongol clans into a single Mongol nation with distinct identity while still keeping the essential functions and structures of the Mongol society continued and intact thus making the survival of the Mongol identity possible. In this light the wars led by Chinggis Qahan and his successors may be seen as a logical execution, ex officio as it were, of the traditional functions designated to the Mongol leadership. In this sense Chinggis Qahan was no great innovator but a loyal follower of the traditions of the Mongol leadership, but on a new national level of his creation. The success of these wars was not however a logical outcome, but as noted earlier, strongly influenced by factors beyond his control, such as the weakening of China and of the Kiev Rus’.

This tradition, or perhaps better, modus operandi, of working toward secure food regime on a state-level was to continue on the new national level of the Mongol Empire after Chinggis Qahan, who had successfully turned into into a norm of a unified Mongol society. Khubilai Qahan, the Son of Heaven as well the Great Qahan of the Mongols, had a sophisticated policy of providing his subjects with continuity in terms of their food regime during his reign in China. According to Marco Polo (Polo, 1957, I, Chapter 21) Khubilai Qahan created a system of ensuring the steady supply of food to his subjects by:

a) Creating a system of Imperial granaries throughout China from which the people during times of
bad harvest, for example according to Polo due to bad weather, locusts, worms or floods, could buy grain for planting for no more than one fourth of the market price for four measures of grain from varieties which were specifically chosen for their suitability for local conditions affecting the growths, and by

b) Creating a system whereby any one county that had lost cattle was given animals from the Imperial horde, a result of the one-tenth taxation by the Emperor to ensure cattlerherding as a viable livelihood. Additionally, if some one, no matter how many, lost cattle through a lightning strike, no taxes were carried regardless of the size of the horde for three years, although this practice seems to have been based on traditional Mongol religion: the Emperor considered it a bad sign to allow anything into his treasury that had the mark of God's hatred on it as embodied in being struck by a lightning, to be sure a practice to promote survival in all conditions nevertheless.

4.8. The Mongols' image of the enemy in the light of their texts

Earlier the research by Harle (Harle, 1998) was cited in dealing with the nature of the social pattern of Mongol society in the light of the Yassa. It was mentioned according to Harle as a characteristic of the power-oriented social order to have a system of the Other as a central characteristic of the moral order. As the Mongols' social order in the time of Chinggis Qahan seems to have been that of principle-oriented social pattern it should serve no point to look for the dominant Other in their texts. However as the Mongols waged wars of epic proportions it would seem fitting to investigate if they thought of their enemies as the Other, especially when, as has been noted earlier, it is accepted that they needed an enemy to facilitate national unity and that this was the motivation behind their wars of conquest. This too may be done by using the two Mongol texts, the Yassa and the Secret History, as sources. The Other in this context, and more broadly in the context of International Relations, means the image that the enemy is being accorded by an actor in international relations.

Vilho Harle (Harle, 1991) has, based on psychological research classification, isolated four images of the Other, of the enemy, mainly in the European and Middle Eastern tradition. The issue however according to Harle, is not how the enemy is depicted; rather it is a question of how the relationship between self and the enemy is seen, or what the difference between the good and the bad is. According to Harle the content of the image of the enemy tells much about the self, one may ask what has led to the juxtaposition between oneself the the other, the enemy as it were. Harle sees this juxtaposition between "us" and "them" as inevitable for as long as there are antagonisms of any
form: the content of the image of the enemy may vary but the idea, the enemy, stays. Harle sees it as unlikely that there could be a war that would be entirely neutral in terms of the enemy as the opinion formation of the people, completed freely, is always a factor outside military perspective. Harle has arrived at the following classification of the enemy (Harle, 1991, 18-20, translated by the present author).

1. Loved enemy (*rakastettu vihollinen*)

Loved enemy is the equal partner in combat and war, that is needed for the”common outcomes of the war”. The partners are equal, match their forces and this way are acting out divine will. There are two main variations of the loved enemy:

- Symbolic enemy (*symbolinen vihollinen*)

Symbolic enemy was to be found in primitive, ritualistic war. War was a repeated ritual acted out in a neutral territory; the parties feasted together both before and after the battle. The battle was ended when the first drops of blood were shed or when some one was maybe entirely killed accidently. The purpose and mission was the strengthening of communities, discharging hostile, aggressive emotions. The symbolic enemy was not threatening or evil, but an important partner in life-sustaining ritual.

- Valued enemy (*arvokas vihollinen*)

Valued enemy was to be found in heroir wars, lastly during the times of chivalry. During the time of idolization of warriors and heroism waging war was a means to demonstrate manhood, courage and of obtaining honour. The enemy was loved, honoured and honourable adversary, an adversary worthy of a fight. The question is of awakening individualism, the dispersal of communities and of former command power, a time when brave men faced each other. The event depicted by Homer in *Iliyad* is typical of this development: Akhilles opposes his ruler openly, no longer fighting on the order of the supreme ruler, but only for his own honour.

2. The evil enemy (*paha vihollinen*)

The evil enemy is experienced as being different in terms of characteristics, one, which”we” have nothing in common with. The kind that the complete innihilation of is both justified and”in accordance with out duty”. This kind of enemy is the enemy of God. The enemy is associated with wars fought for religion or God. Killing the enemy removes the evil, but at the same time guarantees continuing life for God's supporters. The world is seen as a battleground between the good and the evil; the enemy is identified with evil and destruction. The enemy is no longer symbolic and under no circumstances respected adversary: the enemy is to be wiped off the face of the earth, so that God and his supporters may live secure. (Harle, 1991, 18-19)

Further variations or sidethemes may also be identified in the form of the following four types in relation to the evil enemy according to Harle (Harle, 1991, 19-20):
**The attacking enemy** (*hyökkäävä vihollinen*)

This is the enemy of defensive wars and national defence with the aggressor seen as a threat to either territory or ideology. This is usually characterized by the enemy as being the evil enemy with good *versus* evil-setting.

**The exploitable enemy** (*riistettävä vihollinen*)

An image of the enemy created as a result of the economic and social development of the society, with enemy either as a) in the way of expansion or b) a source of new assets. The enemy is to be enslaved and subdued and all assets transferred to the conqueror and this is to be justified by means of lack of civilization or other such factor related to the value of the enemy.

**The dominating enemy** (*alistava vihollinen*)

This is the type of enemy to be found in connection with wars of liberation: the enemy denies independence from the dominated and they in turn justify uprising by, for example, the exploitation of the oppressor.

**The invisible enemy** (*näkymätön vihollinen*)

The most despised enemy, that works by means of guerrilla-tactics and moves among us undetectable. This enemy may also take the form of, for example, radiation or illness. Also the invisible enemy can not be destroyed regardless of the amount of force used.

Of these enemies, the loved enemy and the evil enemy with its variations, which was the type accorded by the Mongols to their enemies in the light of the contemporary Mongol sources available? Could the image of the enemy produced by the Mongols shed light on the reasons behind their wars? It could well be thought that any strategic agenda concerning their wars would be reflected in the image of the enemy the Mongol society would have produced. If this were the case the enemy the Mongol society would most likely have seen itself as facing would have been the evil enemy (*paha vihollinen*) in its exploitable (*riistettävä vihollinen*) variation. If the Mongols' wars of
conquest are seen as reflecting a food security deficit in the societal sector of the Mongol society's security architecture, it would be logical to produce an enemy that is to be exploited, for example, in terms of the food and pasture land resources held by the enemy. But is the exploitable evil enemy to be found in the Mongol texts?

The *Yassa* is quite neutral when it comes to images of the enemy. For example the above quoted law that singles out Islamic practices as illegal may be seen against a shared social background of not wasting food resources. Thus it is not directed against Islam *per se* as a religion and as such does not express a notion of Islam as the enemy. This being especially the case as the *Yassa* includes law decreeing temples, including mosques, as freed from taxation. This neutrality of the *Yassa* may be seen as a logical consequence of its nature as a legal codex, but it does tell us that the Mongols did not have an institutionalized enemy as far as the law is concerned. But what is the case with the *Secret History*? Being a more substantial in terms of the content, after all it is what may be considered the official history of the Mongols and of Chinggis Qahan produced with the support and blessing of the Mongol leadership, and for this reason must assume the form of a broad explanatory narrative concerning the events discussed, it may shed light on the issue.

The epic history of the Mongols starts with narrating the mythological origins of Chinggis Qahan's family. It then moves on to recount the founding of one the Mongols' first clan as a result of what seems to have been an internal conflict over animal resources. Interestingly the clan's identity is based on a geographical location that is chosen based on its rich *flora* and *fauna* resources, first there is the need for these resources, and then a society is built around them. The *Secret History*:

[9] Qorilartai-mergen had fallen out with his people when they banned each other from hunting sable, squirrel, and other wild animals in the Qori-Tümed lands. Because of this ban, they formed the Qorilar clan. He deemed Burqan-qaldun, rich in wild animals and gazelles, a good place. (Onon, 2001, 40)

This section indicates that animal resources were a source of internal conflict among the Mongols but also formed the basis on which the location of a clan was chosen. The section expresses the concern of the founders of the Qorilar clan felt in relation to access and sufficiency of animal-related resources and also the conscious recorded decision of choosing a location for the clan in the proximity of these resources, indeed forming the clan for the purpose of utilizing and obtaining these resources. These events predate the time of Chinggis Qahan. The location was planned carefully around the policy aim of societal food security in its broadest sense, as the animals provided the raw materiel for food as well as for clothing, arches and so on. By choosing this location the newly-formed clan had access to resources that enabled it to continue the way of life and indeed identity characteristic of the Mongols that is based on the animal as the key source of
society-supporting and enabling products. This section indicates, first, a record of animal resource conflicts among the Mongols and, second, the understanding of animal resource access therein as being the organizing principle of the society and thus the guiding policy of the society, a grand strategy if you will. The events are however recorded in a manner that may be seen as being neutral in terms of not generating images of the enemy.

In another incident during the early stage of his warlord career Chinggis Qahan had made an alliance with the Qan of another clan. The sons of this Qan were members of Chinggis Qahan band but chose to forsake him, as they were entitled to as Mongols, and decided to pursue their own agenda. Chinggis Qahan sends a messenger after them with the following message:

Now be good companions to the Qan my father... And let no one set up camp at the source of the Three Rivers. (Onon, 2001, 156)

According to Onon (Onon in; Onon, 2001, 4) the editor of the Secret History, this incident is the sign of a new Mongol identity on a national level. Chinggis Qahan here couples the survival of the Mongol nation with the Mongol control of the area marked by rivers Kelüren, Tu'ula and Onon. Chinggis Qahan rises above the situation and gives priority to Mongol national survival. Interestingly, in terms of understanding the image of the enemy the Mongols would have, no enemy is named as being a threat to the control of the source of the Three Rivers. The threat would come from anyone who would set up camp on location. Thus the enemy is determined based on actions and not on identity. The enemy is the one who threatens the control of a territory that has pasturelands and water readily available. Appropriately it was at the source of the River Onon in 1206 that the Mongols met and bestowed the title of Qan on Chinggis Qahan (Onon, 2001, 190). These tribes that formed the Mongol nation at the time also included the Tatars, who for long had been the enemy of the Mongols, as was present in assassinating Chinggis Qahan's father, whom are referred to in the Secret History as "the vengeful enemy that destroyed [our] forefathers and fathers, we took revenge." (Onon, 2001, 205) This is the most negative characterisation of the Mongols' enemy and yet the Tatars were included in the Mongol nation and Chinggis Qahan even took two Tatar girls as his wives. The Tatars, while enemies, do not seem to have been the archenemy beyond redemption and designated for annihilation. This neutrality and even respect for the enemy for his courage and fighting skills is also present in the depiction of the events of Chinggis Qahan's campaign against Northern China at that time ruled by Jin-dynasty, whose soldiers are referred to as "courageous" before in a matter-of-fact manner depicting their slaughtering and piling up like "rotten logs" (Onon, 2001, 234). This element of matter-of-factness when the Mongols chronicle their campaigns is a repeated undertone of the Secret History, if a nation is wiped out, it is merely noted companied with an explanation of how the nation in question deserved its fate through its own actions without characterizing the enemy per se. This same has been noted by Lamb as part
of the Mongols' warfare: the atrocities were not directed against anyone in particular but were according to Lamb a result of nomad's way of life since the nomad will make away with anything he has no need for. This according to Lamb also applied to prisoners taken by Mongols who then were on occasions slaughtered en masse: Chinggis Qahan simply had no use for all the prisoners taken (Lamb, 1931, 197).

As noted above in connection with the Yassa, Chinggis Qahan set pasturelands and water as one of his war aims, something that he fought wars of conquest for, something that he violized. This same policy of food security that Chinggis Qahan had inherited from the old Mongol clan society structure was then continued by his son Ögödei Qahan. In the already cited and discussed last part of the Secret History that deals with his reign he sums up his life's work:

[281] Ögödei Qahan said: “Sitting on [my] father's great throne, the deeds that I have accomplished since my father ['s reign] [include] campaigning against the Jaqut people. I finished off the Jaqut people... My third deed was to have wells dug in places without water and to bring [the water] forth. I provided the people [of] the nation with a sufficiency of water and grass. (Onon, 2001, 277)

Here we have two recurring themes: what might be called the absence of the Other and resources related to food. Of the two the presence of food-related resources and their security is an item on the policy agenda inherited by Chinggis Qahan from the old Mongol clan society and its structure, it was then continued by his son Ögödei Qahan and later taken to China by Khubilai Qahan, his grandson and Ögödei's nephew. It could be said that the core of the Mongols' grand strategic agenda was that of food.

4.9. The nature of the Mongols’ atrocities during war and their implications concerning the nature of the origins of the Mongols’ wars of conquest

As noted earlier in the Introduction, the dominant form of war in the recent decades has been the intra-state violent conflict. Many of these have been in the form of genocide or ethnic cleansing, meaning acts of violence carried against a specific group of people in general, as the terms are used in a manner that may be considered interchangeable (Chirot & McClellan, 2008, 21-22). Based on the underlying motivations and forms, meaning why they were carried out, of these acts of violence the following typology has been produced from the perspectives of Sociology and Psychology for purposes of analysis (Chirot & McClellan, 2008, 30-57):

Utility (tarkoituksenmukaisuus)
This is the case when a group may have the resources required for acting out its agenda, but this process is being hampered by resistance. Even if it would be possible to choose means other than violent for realizing an agenda, violence is the chosen method for dealing with any resistance. The choice is made on the basis of utility; maximum output with minimal input. This policy choice is not driven by ideological or other such considerations, but is quite simply an expression of cost-effectiveness. In this frame it is common to start the process of deleting resistance by means of bribery and other such ways and means before violence is resorted to. However if the resistance continues the stronger party may start to consider violence as being the inexpensive alternative and act accordingly.

Revenge (*kosto*)

Revenge may play part in the above mentioned utility-based motivation as well. This is the motivation of, for example, a war leader who's army has been attacked, for example by local resistance groups. The rhetorics of prestige and honour as being defended coupled with what is perceived as just reason are found in conjunction with this motivation. This is the motivation of a power that does not tolerate being attacked or defeated, so it may hide what might be considered as utility-motives. It may also be found as a cause per se, the preservation and promotion of one's group's honour and prestige. In this case it may become a case of senseless mass murder defying all reason in trying to explain it.

Pure fear (*silkka pelko*)

This is the case when one perceives a threat to one's self and to one's group, an existential threat so to speak. It is the motivation of self preservation as driven by the logic of survival. This motivation has also what might be called an element of pre-emption: the enemy is to be destroyed before the enemy has the chance to inflict more damage. This motivation has also played on inter-personal level when dealing with dynastic quarrels or pre-emption thereof.
Fear of contamination (*saastumisen pelko*)

This is the motivation that may be found underlying such mass murders and deportations that are in connection with ethnicity, social class, religion and ideology. This is the most powerful motivation of the four. The actions carried out under this motivation may seem especially irrational and beyond comprehension.

These four motivations are not according to Chirot and McCauley mutually excluding and may be found in intimate connection with each other. But which one, of these four motivations, is to be found underlying the Mongols' wars of conquest? According to Chirot and McCauley (Chirot & McCauley, 2008, 35-36) the actions carried out by Chinggis Qahan during his campaigns fall under two of the categories cited above: utility and revenge. This is seen as being well present in the case of the Afghan city of Herat, which was initially saved as the city had declared itself open, but later on annihilated as a result of the people of Herat having risen to rebellion against the Mongols. Saving the city was an expression of calculated utility, but open defiance of the Mongols in the form of a rebellion could not be left unpunished. This utility- and revenge- based reasoning is then to be found in connection with all the atrocities carried out by the Mongols. The historian David Morgan has called this the "Harry Truman -strategy": surrender or you will be destroyed and those who surrender are treated in a magnanimous and tolerant manner in terms of how the post-war conditions are arranged between the victor and the vanquished (Chirot & McCauley, 2008, 36).

It should be noted however when analyzing the Mongols' wars of conquest and the atrocities that took place in connection with them were not necessarily operations undertaken for the purpose of terminating the enemy in the literal physical sense of the concept. For the Mongols it seems, on occasion, to have sufficed to make sure that the enemy, clan, tribe and so on, would not be able to muster forces for an offensive in the future. This meaning that the enemy is made harmless, preempted, rather than killed to the last man, woman and child. A case of this is the treatment of the Merkit, a tribe in the Steppe that rebelled against Chinggis Qahan who had promised the Merkit earlier that they would stay as one undivided tribe, by Chinggis Qahan. Following the defeat of the Merkit in a war Chinggis Qahan set about destroying them as an act of revenge. He did this by dividing the Merkit and sending them off throughout the Steppe”in all directions until they were no more.” (Onon, 2001, 182). The Merkit were not thus physically killed, rather the society and the identity of the society formed by the Merkit was destroyed by dividing the society and scattering it about. As noted, given the attention and importance attributed by the Mongols to their society and
its social links, this division of the community may have been worse fate than death. This method of terminating populations conveys the use of force against the civilian population but also the strategic modus operandi of attacking the societal identity of the enemy; identity is an object of warfare and the essentials of the identity objects for destruction. A line similar to this was taken by the U.S. Military during the planning and target selection for the first-ever nuclear bombing. Special emphasis was given to "psychological factors" and as a result Kyoto with its central position in the tradition of Japanese culture was presented as a preferred primary target, but ultimately Hiroshima and Nagasaki were selected. The purpose was to damage, in modern terminology, the Japanese national identity by attacking its essentials in the form of bombing Kyoto, to affect and damage the Japanese society and identity itself. Target Committee:

It was agreed that psychological factors in the target selection were of great importance. Two aspects of this are (1) obtaining the greatest psychological effect against Japan and (2) making the initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it is released. (Target Committee Minutes, May 10-11, 1945)

The Mongols and their wars of conquest seem indeed, as noted, to have been a prelude to the modern globalized age in many ways.

Of the motivations for massmurder and genocide according to Chirot and McCauley outlined above, the two last ones could be seen as being associated with the Other, as they require a clearly defined enemy and have an element of irrationality to them. After all they would be specifically designed against some one in particular and deals such as surrender would not be considered once action would be taken against the enemy. Certainly trading of any kind, as was the case with Herat, would not come into question. The standard model for explaining the Mongols' wars of conquest in terms of their motivation as being the result of a need for an enemy in order to facilitate national unity (for example see: Onon in; Onon, 2001, 4) is not supported by the studying of the Mongols' concept, perhaps rather image, of who or what they thought of as being their enemy in their contemporary texts. Indeed the Mongols seem to have been balanced and neutral as far as their texts tell us in terms of how they perceived their enemies, but of course as noted by Harle the image of the enemy on the everyday national civic level may have been a different, although unrecorded, story. This neutrality in relation to the enemy would have also made possible the mode of flexible warfare they employed with dealing, negotiating and so on. Surely any evil enemy would have been worthy of total annihilation from day one and not only following a rebellion. Had the Mongols been driven and motivated by the image of the enemy, they would have most likely recorded this in some form as they recorded the pasturelands and other such goods as their war aims, and also it would have been demonstrated in the modus operandi of their warfare. Recorded words of the
Mongols' leadership about the aims of their wars demonstrate that these aims were discussed, that they were set deliberately and were not random events and decisions. Why only record the ones related to material interests and goods? If some one was to be terminated, why not record this as well? This omission or negligence in terms of the enemy becomes understandable when it it set in its context as being just a feature of the Mongols' warfare and its *modus operandi* and not the aim of the war. After all, a war by necessity on a conceptual level requires an enemy, but the enemy may just be some one who is in the way of obtaining something that is true aim of the war being waged.

These two forms of motivation detected by Chirot and McCauley would be consistent with the food security-related origins of the Mongols' wars conquest -model as put forth by Malthus as part of his system of political economics (Malthus, 1982, 84–85), as material interests, such as food, would be the driving force of the Mongols, rather than images of the enemy necessitating the destruction of the enemy. This would also allow for the integration of climate change as having induced the food security deficit that was to be filled by means of armed and violent conflict as the climate change induced food security crisis -hypothesis as put forth by Mackinder (Mackinder, 1942) and Jenkins (Jenkins, 1974) would explain the Mongols' wars of conquest in terms of their initial motivation. This would allow the factoring in of the climate change that took place in the light of the palaeoclimatological data in the Mongolian Steppe at the time of the rise of Chinggis Qahan and the Mongol Empire. This sharp drop in the average temperature, that seems to have been well in excess of one degree centigrade (Jones & Mann, 2004), would have been in all probability sufficient to cause a significant threat to any form of agricultural livelihood, including nomadic pasturing, the Mongols' national livelihood at the time, and create impetus for wars of conquest for the obtainment of pasturelands and other goods in the form of loot. This would then have been expressed in securitization and violization of food security. The aim of this Thesis is not to evaluate the invalidity or validity of the Malthusian School of Economics, that would be a matter for the economists, but the claim made by Thomas Malthus, namely that the Mongols' wars of conquest were food scarcity-related in terms of what was their impetus, seems valid in terms that it warrants further investigation if historical associations of the climate change – violent conflict nexus are deemed necessary as the climate change induced food security deficit with ensuing wars for filling this security deficit is indicated when evaluating the cause of the Mongols' wars of conquest in the light of this limited research.

It has been stressed by Thomas Homer-Dixon that no simplistic claims should be made concerning the climate change – violent conflict nexus as conflict is only likely in connection with other factors (Buhaug et al, 2008, 36). Climate change alone is unlikely to be the source of any conflict. It can be
best seen as being a “threat multiplier” that exacerbates the threats of various kinds that are already in existence as recommended by report supervised by a number of retired military officers of high rank (National security and the threat of climate change, 2007). This is well evident in the case of the Mongols' wars of conquest. As noted earlier as part of the structure of the Mongol society the social mechanisms that facilitated the waging of wars related to food security had for long been present in the Mongol society, Chinggis Qahan continued this tradition on a national level. Had these mechanisms not been in place, it may well be doubted if these wars, at least on the scale they did, would ever have taken place. The Mongols did not march, or perhaps more appropriately horde, out ex nihilo so to say. Also the success of the Mongols may be seen as being an expression of 1) timing, with both China and the Rus' in a state of weakness there was a window of opportunity for these wars due to lowered probability of resistance and 2) of the structural features of the Mongol society with its sophisticated nomadic way of life that facilitated the hoarding of Eurasia but which, like everything had its limits as noted. In the case of the Mongols and their wars of conquest all these factors coincided with climate change adversely affecting the Mongol society. It was indeed a “threat multiplier” that set in motion dynamics that were in existence ad hoc, before the fact. Based on this single case study it may not be claimed that climate change is connected with violent interstate conflict by definition; for this much more case and statistical studies are needed. But in the case studied here, the Mongols wars of conquest, it seems to have been indicated.

Climate change is increasingly acknowledged as being the number one challenge faced by the humanity in the globalized era. Many of the characteristics which seem to fit as characteristics of the modern era may also be found in the case of Mongols. It is only appropriate this being the case, that climate change should also be indicated in the origins of their wars of conquest that set the precedence for globalization. It should also be noted when speaking of the challenges related to climate change that if, as noted by Jenkins (Jenkins, 1974), a small army in relation to the enemy is able to take Northern Jin-dynasty China, then the challenges of climate change may well be equally surprisingly surmountable.
5. CONCLUSION

In the light of a research setting that combines modern security theories, namely the Copenhagen School referring to social construction of security and food security referring to food regime as a vital part of societal identity with data concerning the past climatic conditions of Mongolia it is viable to present as probable that the Mongols’ wars of conquest had a dimension of climatic origins. This meaning that the Mongolian Steppe experienced some eight hundred years ago a steep decline in temperature that was sufficient to create a threat of such magnitude as to be sufficient to threat the Mongol society’s food regime, which was based on livestock with its well-being connected with suitable climate conditions, and thus also the societal identity of the Mongol society and its survival. This resulting security deficit, which threatened both the societal identity and physical and economic survival of the Mongol society, was then filled with wars of conquest toward more temperate climates and the resources in the form of water and pasture lands to be found there. Traces of this securitization and violisation are to be found in the Mongol contemporary literary sources, which reveal food as being an object of measures for increasing security, such as war. This securitization and violisation was then also present in the conduct of the war in the form of pasture lands as being the war aim and the military being employed in producing these pasture lands in the form of atrocities directed against the populations of occupied territories involving the razing down of existing structures. The societal identity of the Mongol society may also be studied by utilizing the contemporary European sources.

Climate change has been connected with the analytical concept of “threat-multiplier”, meaning that climate change multiplies the impact and severity of threats already in existence, such as overpopulation, already existing scarcities in resources and so on. This was also the case of the Mongols’ wars of conquest. The Mongols had been skirmishing with the Chinese before; the lifestyle was vulnerable to exogenous shocks from, for example, climate, and so on. These are some of the processes which contributed to the coming about of these wars. However the single most important threat-multiplier may likely have been the window of opportunity presented by the temporary weakness of the Mongols’ adversaries that indicates as noted by Atwell a process of social weakening as having been present.

The standard model for explaining the Mongols’ wars of conquest is that of the need for an enemy as a facilitating condition for national unity and the wars as a means of promoting this national unity and destroying the Other against whom the national identity would have been defined in connection of having to discharge any violent energy of the Mongol society. Although it should be kept in mind as noted in connection with Fletcher’s work as discussed above that the many reasons
suggested as possible reasons for the Mongols’ wars of conquest are to some degree interrelated. This model could be seen as being connected with the security dilemma, the dilemma posed by inability to know the intentions and motivations of other actors in international relations leading to actions that are based on perceptions and possible misperceptions as basis of policy leading possibly to consequences up to and including war. These perceptions and misperceptions have been discussed by Robert Jervis (Jervis in: Knorr, 1983, ed. 152). The absence of the image of the evil and threatening enemy as the Other in the Mongols’ texts does not support this model, as is the result if the work by Harle on the nature of societies based on their ideas of social order (Harle, 1998) and the content of the image of the enemy (Harle, 1991) are utilized. Also it is not supported by the Mongols’ conduct of warfare, which does not seem to have been directed against any one as the enemy per se but was rather based on territorial expansion, obtainment of pasture lands and water and other comparable loot. The atrocities against civilian populations were based on utility rather than hatred against the population as such (Chirot & McCauley, 2008). This also does not support the standard model. The Mongols were identity-conscious and demonstrated willingness and readiness to fight for the preservation of their identity as was the case with Khubilai Qahan’s attempts to gain acknowledgement as the Great Qahan which failed due to his policies as being perceived as Chinese rather than Mongol. This would support the model of explaining the Mongols’ wars of conquest as being measures for the purpose of securing the food regime of the Mongol society as hypothetisized by Jenkins (Jenkins, 1974), a core part of any societal identity. Also this is supported by the Mongols’ construction of food and related values as securitized and indeed violized, a casus belli. These wars were indeed wars of national survival but based on the absence of the Other of the enemy in their texts not against existential threat posed by an enemy in the form of the Other. The Mongols’ wars of conquest do not seem to have been connected with security dilemma.

This Thesis commenced with a question setting as put forth, based on their careful evaluation of existing literature, by Gleditsch and Nordås (Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007). In this conclusion an attempt to answer these questions as set forth by Nordås and Gleditsch will be made based on the case study analysis of the processes that led to violent conflict in the case of the Mongols' wars of conquest with reference to climate change - violent conflict nexus. This case has the virtue of being a classical example cited by such central figures as Malthus and Mackinder of how scarcity in food resources leads to violent conflict. Thus the topic is one of importance as far the foundations of the question regarding the relationship between scarcity and conflict are concerned.

First, according to Nordås and Gleditsch, a tighter coupling of climate change with conflict models
is needed. This means that the research in terms of climate change in well organized and based on a
number of theories and models available whereas the case with conflict research is far from this
ideal state. In this Thesis the classical Malthusian model of scarcity in food resources leading to
violent conflict was researched with reference to the Mongols' wars of conquest and the then
affecting climatic change using social constructivism -influenced theories of security. This way it
has been demonstrated, at least in the case of the Mongols' wars of conquest, that this is possible
and could perhaps be done also with other cases as well. Malthusianism was coupled with
contemporary security theories with reference to climate change as present in the light of
palaeoclimatological data.

Second, the type(s) of violence we expect to result from climate change needs according to Nordås
and Gleditsch be carefully considered. In the light of the case analysis at hand it could be said that
the violence resulting will be the function of the ways and means available for the society engaged
in violence: the Mongols, with success, turned their society into an effective fighting force without
too much innovations and building on existing structural capabilities. There was no what might be
called Deus ex machina -effect meaning that miraculously the Mongol society without organic
connection to its earlier structures turned into a devilish army lead by a supreme genius of strategy.
Also the limits of the Mongol reach were a result of this function: the large forests were by nature
foreign to them and they never settled in Russia but the Volga Delta and the naval warfare was
something that was never mastered by the Mongols. They never changed their identity as nomadic
riders. Also the windows of opportunity should not be overlooked as motivations behind any violent
conflict, whatever the nature and origins of such a window may be.

Third, it is necessary according to Nordås and Gleditsch to balance the negative and positive effects
of the climate change as well as the possibilities offered by strategies of adaptation. In the case of
the Mongol's wars of conquest due to the food regime threat created by the climatic change there
really does not seem to have been any other than negative effects in terms of the Mongol society.
Though it should be kept in mind that we are dealing here in the case of the Mongols and their wars
with a case of climate cooling rather than warming which is the case in the modern world, although
the food security implications may be largely the same. This also applies to strategies of adaptation:
according to Bold (Bold, 2001) the situation was so bad on the Mongolian Steppe that the Mongols
had no chance but to resort to war: there simply may have been no room for adaptation as the
Mongolia Steppe was simply not in such condition in terms of climate as to support any human
society without additional external resources pooled by means of war. Also the strong identity of the
Mongols may have played role as rendering unacceptable any changes in lifestyle as was the case
when Khubilai Qahan was unable to consolidate his position as the Great Qahan due to his perceived China-oriented sympathies. It may be the case in anticipating the future warming of the climate to evaluate the possibilities of adaptation on a case-by-case basis with special attention given to the security of the food regime and possibly to finding ways of adapting in an acceptable manner.

Fourth, according to Nordås and Gleditsch the disaggregation of climate change with systemic conflict models should be continued as the impact(s) would vary according to geographical and other variables and therefore any systemic conflict model would be impossible. This study has focused on a single case with arguably considerable impact still felt in the world. No systemic conflict model could possibly be formulated based on study with as limited scope as that of this study. However it is possible to isolate variables, factors, that are present in the study at hand and which, in the light of the analysis above, have contributed to the Mongols' wars of conquest and which could be used as variables in designing future research ventures. These variables are: 1) the presence of a verifiable change in climate of such magnitude that is likely to affect the food regime of the society under analysis in an adverse manner, 2) presence of securitizing and/or violizing speech-acts concerning and/or related to the food regime of the society in question, 3) social structures that would facilitate any violent conflict. The last one may be of special interest as not any society has the facilitating structures for engaging in violent conflict.

Fifth, the literature on climate change is according to Nordås and Gleditsch focused on the rich world and ignores the impact it may have on the developing world for example in terms of creating support for terrorism. As the study at hand focuses on pastoral nomadic society and in a way on the way it conducted relations with the rich world, in essence China, its perspective could be seen as presenting the perspective of both the rich and the poor world in circumstances affected by climatic change in the form of decrease in temperature. The Mongols’ wars of conquest were, in a way, the periphery taking over the centre.

As an additional question setting the demonstration of causality with reference to the climate change – violent conflict nexus was presented in the beginning of this study and also as discussed above. As there are contemporary literal sources are available this was possible. This way the causality could be studied by using the modern concepts of food security and the approach to the construction of security known as the Copenhagen School in security studies. Of these the concept of food security is especially useful as it has been developed in the contemporary world of climate change.
Geoffrey Dabelko (Dabelko, 2009) has the following recommendations which, by way of advice for any analyst engaged with the climate change – violent conflict nexus, may also be adopted as recommendations that based on this Thesis may well be recommended. First, one should avoid overselling the link between terrorism/violent conflict and climate change as, according to Dabelko, climate change is likely to induce these phenomena only in connection with other factors. Second, one should not forget about already present and on-going problems with resources and related conflicts as they may according to Dabelko be overshadowed by the attention given to climate change, though the climate change is likely worsen these already existing problems. It would be insensitive toward people already facing these problems to put them on a second priority after climate change. Third is the issue of assumed mass migrations which according to Dabelko should not be assumed as taking place in the future with certainty that they often are discussed. Any migration is an issue of push and pulls factors and climate change may be one of them but not necessarily the strongest one. Fourth, one should not forget that any efforts taken as means of climate mitigation may cause social conflict. Any measures taken as means of mitigating the effects of climate change should according to Dabelko be”conflict-proofed”. This means that mitigation efforts should be studied with a view for their potential of creating new social conflicts and inequalities. This means in practice a careful and thorough analysis in terms of its social impact when planning for any climate mitigation scheme.

As already noted the Mongols' wars of conquest as well as their success were the coming together of various factors such as facilitating social structures and windows of opportunity, or perhaps better of vulnerability, created by the weakened condition of their enemies. Thus the situation was unique and unlikely to be repeated. However it does demonstrate how, in circumstances unpredictable as an eruption of a volcano is, the politico-social landscape may change rapidly in less than one generation. This dynamism that is characteristic of natural phenomena should not be forgotten in the interest of producing models that give politico-social predictions without the element of nature's dynamism and all contingencies should be planned and prepared for.
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APPENDIX 1.

Eurasia on the eve of the Mongol invasions, c. 1200

(Source: Wikipedia English; article: Mongol Empire)
APPENDIX 2.

Mongol Empire in 1227 at Genghis' death

(Source: Wikipedia English; article: Mongol Empire)