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FAITH IN RUSSIA?
EXPLORING NATIONAL IDENTITY DISCOURSES ON
RUSSIAN BELONGING AND THE ROLE OF RELIGION

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International Relations
Master's Thesis
January 2009

Abstract

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This thesis engages in an interpretative exploration of contemporary discourses about Russian national identity with a particular focus on questions concerning Russia's European and international belonging, the role ascribed to religion, and possible connections drawn between these two dimensions.

This investigation starts off by a historical review of the role of religion as well as ideas of Europe in Russian identity. After subsequently examining the place of religion in International Relations theory and analysis, the thesis proceeds by laying out a theoretical framework inspired by constructivist ideas which accentuate the intersubjective character of meaning, and consequently the centrality of narratives for studying (national) identities. Securitisation theory is suggested as a particularly instructive tool for inquiries into identity constructions at the nexus of national identity and religion.

The analysis is conducted by means of a research method called "Q Methodology" which facilitates the systematic study of human subjectivity. The research material consists of 17 individual Q sort sessions conducted with students at the MGIMO University in Moscow, Russia.

By extracting four distinct discursive positions on the question of Russia's place in the world and the place of religion in Russian identity, it is shown that a rich variety of – frequently competing – narratives about Russian national identity exists. In pointing out that some of these discourses do only marginally or not at all feature in the pertinent literature, new fields for inquiries into Russian identity constructions are revealed.

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1. Introduction

In this masters thesis, my aim is to explore discourses on religion, national identity and international belonging in Russia.

By way of introduction, allow to me share an anecdote. In the summer 2005, I was participating in the *International Summer school in Karelia (ISSK'05)* at the Petrozavodsk State University in North-Western Russia. The main theme of the summer school was 'Eurasia'. One topic that naturally came up during many of the discussions among students and teachers was that of whether (and in what ways) Russia "belongs to Europe". As an International Relations student in a master's program dealing with Russia, I was not unfamiliar with that question and the related arguments. Nevertheless, I found myself surprised by many of the arguments presented by the Russian participants who were sharing their ideas of Russian-European relations. What struck me here was the fact that these arguments often employed discourses I had not heard during my (apparently) Europe-centred studies.

These, to me, novel lines of argument proceeded along a so-called "spiritual" connection or commonness between Russia and Europe. The term 'spirituality', as employed by our Russian colleagues, apparently denoted ideas related to religion or, more specifically, Christianity. It seemed to me that arguments relating to this spirituality concerned two broad areas: Firstly, it was used in connection with the threat of Islamic terrorism. As the argument went, both Russia and 'the West' (including Europe) are facing a common enemy threatening their security, well-being and ways of life. The Islamic background of the terrorist threat was stressed in such a way that all Christian religions were called upon to unite in the face of the common enemy. The other argument concentrated on less violent threats and evolved around Huntingtonian ideas of a 'clash of civilisations', stating that the world is made up of competing cultural civilisations whose differences are incommensurable (Guzzini 2003:4). Since these civilisations are seen as competing rather than, for example, complementing each other, interactions between them were described as conflictual. In this sense, immigration to Russia, for example by Chinese people in the far East and by people of other than Christian religious affiliations was depicted as a cultural threat and a potential beginning of the end of the Russian people and culture altogether. With regard to such existential fears, it was suggested for Russia to re-orient itself much stronger towards Europe with which it shares such important traits as a

Christian religion. Obviously, part of the argument also was that Europe should likewise receive Russia with open arms for the same reasons.

In both cases, thus, (Christian) religion was described as a major common factor uniting Europe and Russia. It seemed to me that this type of argument about a 'spiritual' connection was deeply rooted in the understanding of the 'Europe and Russia'-complex in the mentality of many Russian participants. At the same time, I realised that references to a common identity based on religion are rarely, if ever, thoroughly analysed in the literature on the topic that I have encountered so far.

I therefore consider it a worthwhile enterprise to explore the 'spiritual' connection between Russia and Europe in this master's thesis, which will be guided by the following research questions: *Are understandings of Russia and Europe linked to (Christian) religion in Russian identity constructions?* More specifically, I want to look at the question of *what role is attributed to religion in contemporary Russian national identity constructions*, and: *whether ideas of Russian belonging internationally (esp. with regards to Europe) are seen to have a decisive religious component?*

In what follows, I will explore these questions in more detail. On one hand, I will look into the question of Russian belonging internationally, that is, the place that is drawn up for Russia in the world. On the other hand, I will attempt to shed light on the internal dimension of Russian identity construction, with a particular focus on the role of religion.

Some of the questions posed above are not new to International Relations or, more generally, other social sciences and have been subject of various research projects. However, I would claim that what I present here is a rather novel combination and consequently a worthwhile focus. I would claim that the combination of exploring Russian discourses on international, and especially European belonging and the place of religion in these has not been studied in detail yet. In particular this holds true for the perspective I have chosen for this thesis, namely to look at how Russian individuals subjectively construct discourses in this topic area. Following my initial astonishment in Karelia, my hope is that research in this area can possibly bring to light new discursive structures and arguments, so far not covered extensively in the literature or even totally unknown.

The special focus in examining the issues posed by my research questions will not be on “official” discourses produced by politicians and other opinion leaders – although these will certainly play a role, as will be explicated below – but on how individual members of the public see the questions of international belonging and the role of religion in contemporary Russia, as well as whether and how they construct relationships between them. In other words, my aim is to let these people *speak for themselves*, to listen to their *subjective voices*. In order to enable the Russian participants in my study to speak in their own ways and with their own voices, I employ a scientific procedure called “Q methodology”, which presents a rather unique combination of both qualitative and quantitative research techniques and thereby aims to “provide a foundation for the systematic study of subjectivity, a person’s viewpoint, opinion, beliefs, attitude, and the like” (Brown in van Exel and de Graaf 2005:1). In short, this methods works by presenting participants with a set of statements on a given topic which they are asked to rank-order from their individual point of view. These individual expressions of viewpoints are then factor analysed in order to identify statistical correlations between the sorts of participants. Correlated sorts are assumed to represent patterns of agreement and disagreement, which are then subjected to a qualitative interpretation in order to analyse the existence of common discursive structures within the group of participants (which in turn, can be tentatively assumed to appear in the wider population as well).

Q methodology has been used for several decades and is said to enjoy increasing popularity among scholars and students of various disciplines (van Exel and de Graaf 2005:1), however, it is not usually part of the regular canon of methodologies taught at universities or in basic text books. This thesis therefore is just as much an exploratory study of identity construction processes as it is a venture into novel (or unconventional) methodological concepts aimed at helping us make sense of the world “out there”.

This research project ties in with the body of research in IR concerning questions of national identity construction, or “identity politics”, which has received increased attention in the years following the end of the Cold War and the ensuing profound political and economic changes in many parts of the world. It has been argued that the end of the Cold War resulted in the declining significance of some non-national identities (such as the belonging to the “capitalist” or “communist” block), which has led to an increase in the relative importance of national ones (Mansbach and Rhodes 2006:1), in particular in the formerly socialist world. In the situation of thoroughgoing societal upheaval combined with the loss of central elements of identification

and belonging, the “rediscovery” of “national identity” has received considerable attention as an important factor for the creation of social cohesion and allegiance to often newly created institutions and authorities, first and foremost in the states that emerged from the disintegrating Soviet Union. However, and as will be shown below, national identities are never self-evident, natural or simply “out there” but rather result from diverse efforts made by various actors engaged in the social construction of meaning and knowledge. This, in turn, points us to the necessity to explore in detail the processes and ideas through which identity construction operates in each particular case – that is, to look at how communities talk and imagine themselves into being.

In a similar vein, arguments about a “resurgence of religion” as a factor in national and international politics are abound. The role of religion in international relations, both in theory and practice, had been largely ignored during the Cold War, when the focus seemed to be on ideological divisions (Rinehart 2004:271), and when sociological secularization theory, in a rather simplistic and unilinear conception of ever-progressing modernization and its results, suggested that religion would become irrelevant (Gill 2001:121). By trying to explore the religious dimension of Russian national identity, this thesis is not aiming to take a strong stance from the outset on either side of the discussion about the need, identified by some, to abandon the “secular base” of international relations theory and research (Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003). It rather takes the numerous indications of an intensifying significance of religion in contemporary Russia seriously and looks at how this phenomenon is possibly related to national identity constructions. In this way, ideas with religious connotations are primarily examined as one of the many possible “markers” of national identity. Nevertheless, the research outcomes of this thesis may provide some tentative insights and allow me to comment on the emerging debate about a possible “re-introduction of religion” into the study of International Relations, and the postulated need for repositioning some of the discipline foundational assumptions.

The structure of this thesis is as follows: In the subsequent section (chapter two), I will lay out the “playing field” by looking at the question of Russian identity from two perspectives (Europe and religion), particularly by providing an overview of how they have developed over the course of history.

Chapter three will set out the theoretical framework for the analysis this thesis aims to undertake. This chapter will begin with a reflection on the social scientific conceptualisations of 'religion'. As a matter of fact, as I will point out, such an enterprise is best begun from a discussion of a general non-treatment (or ignorance) of the topic of religion in the modern social sciences, which can be traced back to the strong influences of a secularist mindset that has held sway over various social science disciplines. Following this, chapter three will proceed by expounding the basic tenets of a theoretical approach to studying international relations, called Constructivism, which – in short – is based on the assumption that the world “out there” is neither self-explanatory nor accessible without the interpretation of social construction processes. As will be shown, in contemporary IR, it is more appropriate to speak of “Constructivisms” in the plural, which also points us to the fact that a clear and detailed definition of the chosen approach and its basic tenets is required.

I will then proceed to explaining the specific ideas that constructivism holds ready for investigating issues surrounding identity, and in particular the construction of national identity. By doing so, I will highlight the features of national identity construction that are of primary importance for the analysis of my research problem, such as the necessity to point out 'otherness' in order to establish a stable sense of the self. Building upon theories put forward by the so-called Copenhagen School in IR, I will also show how notions of otherness can at times be narratively translated into security issues (a process known as 'securitisation'), which in turn can have an integrative capacity for a community as it inscribes a line of demarcation between 'us' (the threatened) and 'them' (the threat). The chapter will be concluded by a discussion of how I relate the ideas about religion and identity in a theoretical manner for the purposes of the thesis at hand, with a particular view to the connection between religion and the construction of national identities.

In chapter four, I will explain the methodological tools used for the analysis of discourses on Russian belonging and the role that ideas about religion play in identity-discourses. I will start by shortly pointing out some of the shortcomings of 'traditional' methodologies in a social scientist's toolbox, such as surveys or open-ended interviews. This will lead me to the proposition that a method called “Q Methodology” is suitable for exploring discourses about identity in a way that allows for the research subjects to speak with their own voices while still enabling the researcher to obtain reproducible results that lead to rigid and – to some extent –

generalisable conclusions. I will then introduce the subject of my research alongside an elaboration of the specific research layout applied.

Chapter five consists of the interpretation of the results of the technical application of Q methodologies proper. Based on the outcomes of Q-methodological research, I will show that four distinctive discourses can be identified in the material collected, each presenting its own view Russia's place in the world and on the place of religion in Russia. I will then discuss how these discourses can be seen to contribute to answering my original research questions, namely whether and how the religious dimension is afforded any particular importance for Russia's place in and relations with the wider world, and – in conclusion – will furthermore point out some of the wider implications of my findings, for both the literature on Russian national identity constructions and the theoretical as well as methodological tools employed in this thesis.

2. Laying the ground: Russian ideas of religion and of Europe

In this chapter, my aim is delimit the “playing field” within which the research conducted for the thesis at hand will proceed. As my aim is to explore discourses on national identity in Russia, with special consideration of the role of religion and Russia's international belonging, it is necessary to first get an overview of the general themes present various discussions of these topics. Insights gained in this section serve both for the composition of the *concourse* used in the Q methodological study in chapter four and for the interpretation of results in chapter five.

2.1. Religion in Russian identity

It is often suggested that knowledge of the role of Orthodoxy in Russian history is one of the keys for understanding Russian national identity, in particular regarding an ideology of a symbiosis of Orthodox faith, the Russian State and Russian land, the importance of which has fluctuated over the course of history but can still be said to have some relevance in contemporary Russia (Turunen 2005:11; Agadjanian 2000:97; Franklin 2004:95).

The introduction of Christian faith in Russia is conventionally dated to the 10th century. In 988 Prince Vladimir of Kiev decided to officially convert himself as well as his people to the Christian faith. His decision to impose new religion onto his people, the Rus (*Russia* being the Latin expression for the “Land of the Rus”), is said to have been guided by a general strategy aimed at integrating the culturally and ethnically diverse peoples and territories of his dominion. By creating a single 'obligatory' religion, and by closely associating the central spiritual authority with himself, Vladimir aimed to unify the diverse people under his rule, to establish a sense of nation, and to strengthen his authority.

The choice of religion does not appear to have been primarily a matter of spiritual compassion but rather based on economic, (geo)-political and cultural considerations – out of a number of monotheistic religions, Vladimir chose the Byzantine form Christianity as the most suitable for his purposes (Turunen 2005:12; Krindatch 2006:31). Legend has it that Vladimir ordered a mass baptism of the whole population of Kiev in 988, and ever after these events, up until the October Revolution of 1917, the Russian state and church have been closely intertwined, which

often made a clear distinction of secular and religious power all but impossible. An important function of the church was to spread “reminders of itself throughout the familiar environment, permeating ordinary life” (Franklin 2004:96), which was meant to serve the state by advancing cultural integration and social cohesion. Church and religion were thus employed to become an essential component of national identity.

As Franklin points out, Christianity in Rus was particularly in its beginning a *public identity* that was imposed in a top-down manner, and only later became assimilated and accepted as a private identity, too. Owing in part (at least) to the strong interest and support from the state, the process of christianisation of Rus continued and spread to all regions of the vast land. As a result, by the fifteenth century, the church enjoyed a monopoly position making it the dominating institution of the Russian public cultural space, and Christianity had become deeply embedded in definitions of Russian identity. (Franklin 2004:97.)

The alleged (“international”) unity of all Christianity, which was still upheld when Vladimir decided to convert his people, came to an official end in 1054 when the Christian church split into an Eastern (Byzantine/Greek) and Western (Roman/Latin) wing – as is well known, the schism has remained unresolved until today. Based on Vladimir's earlier decision to be more closely affiliated with the 'Greek' tradition of Christianity under the leadership of the Patriarch of Constantinople (as Byzantium came to be called after 337; it later became Istanbul) that, according to sacred history had succeeded the Latin empire of the Old Rome, Russia became part of the Eastern Orthodox tradition. The dominance of Constantinople came to end when the (Islamic dominated) Ottoman Empire captured the city in 1453, which led to claims that Moscow was its obvious successor at the helm of Eastern Christianity, and therefore the city became referred to as the “Third Rome”. The year 1589 saw the official severance of any ecclesiastical dependence on Constantinople, when the Moscow patriarchate was established, making the Russian Church an autocephalous church, thus further strengthening its position inside Russia and the perception of Orthodoxy as an important signifier of Russian identity. (Duncan 2000:10-12, 142)

Radical changes to the symbiotic relationship between state and church were introduced by Peter the Great, who aimed to modernize Russia along Western lines. To achieve his objectives, Peter aimed to reduce the church's influence over contents and forms of cultural expression, in particular in 'high' culture, for example by encouraging artists to use worldly subjects instead of

customary Byzantine symbolism. An architectural example may serve as an illustration of Peter's profound will for change: In St. Petersburg, which Peter had built as his “Window to the West”, the city's widely visible main church in the Peter and Paul fortress exhibits a western-inspired spire instead of a traditional onion dome. Peter also aimed to subjugate the church to the state and deprived it of its independence and certain powers by virtually turning it into a department of the state administration. Despite the thorough realignment of the relationship between state and church and the advancement of ideas rooted in the tradition of European Enlightenment, however, it would be misleading to describe Peter's policies as 'secularising', for Peter himself continued to consider Orthodox Christianity an important component of Russian national identity. (Turunen 2005:13; Franklin 2004:102; Tolz 2001:34.)

The Tsars succeeding Peter continued to see Orthodoxy as an either given or essential element of being Russian and to a varying degree considered religious diversity a threat to the nation's unity and security, which resulted in repeated attempts at conversion of non-Orthodox subjects. Indeed, a close connection existed also in a legal sense between Russian ethnicity and Orthodox religion in that only foreigners were permitted to subscribe to other faiths, and proselytism of ethnic Russians was considered a crime punishable by law. Russian imperial religious legislation thus served to secure the monopoly of the Russian Orthodox Church and its superiority over other religious denominations, who were often also subject to discrimination or persecution – all based on an “ideological symbiosis of faith, state and land” (Turunen 2005:13). Also in cultural production, and especially literature, this linkage was upheld, for example, by the commonly applied equation of Orthodoxy with 'real' Russianess and, in reverse, of non-Orthodox with non-Russian features (Franklin 2004:104).

The aforementioned “inseparable unity” of orthodox faith, Russian state and Russian land came to an abrupt end with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 – as the communists aimed to do away with the ideological monopoly of the church and to furthermore replace religion with atheism. The initial approach consisted of separating the church from the state and depriving it of its property and legal privileges. It was assumed that by thus losing its powerful position and influence over ordinary people, the church, and with it people's religious affiliations, would simply disappear on their own. Anti-church policies were subsequently intensified, leading to increasing persecution of clergy and ordinary believers, as well as the destruction of churches or their confiscation in order to convert them into profane places or “museums of atheism”. These

anti-religious sentiments found their culmination in the introduction of laws that made certain religious activities a criminal activity.

Such extreme measures chosen by the communist leadership have been explained by their set of mind, in which they considered religion and church as significant relics of the “old society” (Krushchev in Turunen 2005:17), which communism was supposed to transcend once and for all, in order to enable progress and modernisation in all spheres of society. Moreover, it can be argued that traditional religious affiliations were seen as a threat in that they constituted a form of competition to the Communist quasi-religious rites, symbolism and doctrines that had emerged as part of Soviet ideology and policy. It has indeed been claimed that in many respects a *new* tripartite symbiosis consisting of communist ideology, the Soviet Party State and Soviet land had succeeded the old ideological symbiosis of Orthodox faith, Russian state and Russian land (Turunen 2005:18). Also, intense anti-religious sentiments did not keep communist ideologists from invoking Orthodox religious symbolism if circumstances were seen to necessitate it. By way of illustration, it was in particular during World War II (or the “Great Patriotic War”, to use the original Russian denomination more instructive in this context), when it was seen as a crucial imperative to stir patriotic feelings in order to mobilise the population into a joint war effort. For this purpose of mobilisation, imaginaries of past heroic struggles of the Russian people against invaders of their country (such as Napoleon, the Teutonic Knights or the Mongols) were invoked, in many cases by exposing an alleged historical parallel between the past “infidel enemies” with the current ones, and thereby implying “a depth of historical identity, and even a kind of affinity with a religious identity, which normal Soviet rhetoric [...] would tend to oppose” (Franklin 2004:104).

At the latest after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became clear that the Communist Party's proclaimed goal to obliterate both church and religion in Russia had certainly not been achieved. Indeed, what happened after the initiation of *perestroika* (“reconstruction”) and *glasnost* (“openness”) policies in the late 1980s has been declared by many observers as a “religious revival” (Krindatch 2006). In a first step, atheistic and anti-religious state policies were abolished and freedom of religion declared as an “inalienable right of citizens” (Turunen 2005:29). While various religious associations were revived or newly founded, the most substantial developments concern the Russian Orthodox Church, which has again become a visible and significant part of Russian society and an important point of identification for many. This regained importance has been attributed to various factors, including a general

feeling of economic, political and also moral instability after the Soviet Union's collapse, in which the church with its over 1000 years of history and a clear moral message is seen as a “solid rock” and trustworthy institution (ibid. 34; Krindatch 2006:31; Agadjanian 2001a:474).

Franklin appositely summarises that the religious revival in contemporary Russia manifests itself by

the phenomenal scale of church restorations [...], re-opening of monasteries, by the virtually obligatory presence of senior churchmen at major state and public ceremonies, by the reintroduction of religious rhetoric into public discourse, by advocacy of a 'return' to religious values, by legislation which by implication favours the Orthodox Church over other faiths in the Russian Federation: in short, by a flood of phenomena which [...] have had the effect of reinstating a perception of Orthodoxy as an 'official' religion, as the 'established' Church, of implying visibly, tangibly, and audibly that Orthodoxy is the natural, traditional, and (for some) necessary component of the identity of the nation and the state (2004:105).

Also research employing statistical data show a considerable increase in Russians describing themselves as believers and a decrease in those considering themselves atheists. However, religious self-identification can not be confused with actual religious practice or the existence of a personal believe system. For example, in 2002, 57 per cent of participants in a national survey considered themselves believers, out of which eight per cent stated they attend church services at least once a month, while 43 per cent never visit church. It is also important to note that the word “Orthodox” is used and understood by many not as a strictly religious term but rather in a sense denoting ethnicity: 80 per cent of respondents in 2002 claimed to consider themselves Orthodox, which is considerably more than the percentage of believers – moreover, half of those claiming to be atheists also considered themselves Orthodox. (Krindatch 2006:43; Turunen 2005:35-36.)

Finally, it can of course not be forgotten that in addition to those Russians who confess (or, for many, rather profess) to Orthodoxy and Orthodox religion, there are other religious and ethnic minorities with a long in Russia that are also considered as “traditional”, such as Islam (ca. 10 per cent of the total population), Judaism (ca. four per cent), and Buddhism (0.7 per cent). Studies have shown that general attitudes among majority Russians towards these minorities are rather positive and tolerant; majority attitudes were also not considerably altered by the rather strong rhetoric surrounding the wars in Chechnya, which was framed by some in a religious context. However, beyond their 'objectisation' as targets of expressions of tolerance on part of the majority population, these groups have neither actively nor passively played a

large part in definitions of Russian national identity, which can probably be explained by the fact that various religious denominations are spread over a much larger number of ethnic groups and territories, making both a unified standpoint and perception as a unified group hard to achieve. (Warhola 2007; Krindatch 2006:36-41.)

The revived popular definition of Russian identity as being grounded to a significant extent in Orthodox religion, however, is also challenged from various directions. Some proponents of Eurasianist ideas (see below), for example, necessarily have to build upon a combination of different ethnics and religions in their designs of a resurrected Russian empire, while there have also been calls for forging a Russian national identity defined in strictly civic terms, build upon the solidarity of all citizens of the Russian Federation regardless of ethnicity or religious affiliation. (Tolz 2001:249).

In the above, I have shown how a religious component has been present in Russian national identity constructions throughout much of the country's history, although in various forms and intensity. In conclusion, Agadjanian thus appositely summarises the situation in contemporary Russia as one in which for some “the Russian national idea is conceivable without religion, [while] those who include religion in their argument certainly dominate” (Agadjanian 2001b:359)

2.2. Russia and the “European Question”: Russia and Europe or Russia in Europe?

It has become a commonplace that the question of Russian 'belonging' internationally has been discussed in the country (and outside) for centuries, with “the West” respectively “Europe” having continuously served as important points of reference (Duncan 2005:277; Tolz 2001:70; Morozov 2004a:1). As these debates have been ongoing for several hundred years and taken place in various historical settings, the array of different arguments and lines of argumentation are naturally manifold and diverse. As a starting point for conceptualising these debates, it has been suggested that two broad approaches to Russia's belonging can be distinguished, namely a “Westernising” (*zapadnichestvo*, derived from the Russian word for the West, *zapad*) and a “Slavophile” (*slavianofi'stvo*) discourse. This division goes back to debates among Russian intellectuals that took place between the late eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth century and revolved around the question of how to evaluate the legacy of the far-reaching political,

economic and cultural reforms introduced by Peter the Great. To put it simply, the fundamental question that sparked these fervent intellectual exchanges was whether Peter's attempts to implant European models were beneficial or destructive for Russia, and whether in the future Russia should follow its very own path or rather continue to copy the West. As Pursiainen points out, on a more abstract level, the division between these two lines of argumentation can be described as “Universalism vs. Particularism”(1999:72).

In this section, I will build upon this broad conceptual division in order to explicate the basic tenets of the most prevalent discourses on Russia's belonging and its relations with Europe.

2.2.1. Slavophile and Eurasianist approaches: Russia apart from Europe?

Early proponents of a Slavophile orientation in Russian intellectual thought reject the idea of a single, universal world-wide civilisation but rather consider distinct civilisations as the basic units of world history. The 'uniqueness' of Russia and Russianess is stressed, and with it the need to advance the country's development based on its own social and spiritual features, which are seen as irreconcilable with those of the West and the purportedly 'universal' values it represents. For example, faced with ideals of the European Enlightenment and the gradual abolishment of feudalism and absolutism in Western European countries (especially after the French revolution), Slavophiles aimed to frame the persistence of autocracy and serfdom in Russia as essentially positive features of the Russian economic and political system, and indeed as the only option to rule a state of Russia's dimensions. While Peter and proponents of Westernism considered the conditions in Russia, and in particular the strong role of peasant and traditional Orthodox culture, as backward compared to Western Europe and as an impediment to development, Slavophiles stressed in a culture-centric way that it was exactly the reliance of the role of the peasantry and the “spirit of community” (opposed to emerging Western individualism) and conciliation in the Church that should be seen as innately superior features and the path to follow and built upon in the future as well. (Pursiainen 1999:72-75, 83; Tolz 2001:60-66; Zimmerman 2005:4).

These particularistic ideas rooted in a view of the world stressing the competition of rival (organically developed) cultural-historical entities found a modified expression in the the teachings of *Eurasianism* which was developed by exile intellectuals in the 1920s and 30s and combined criticism of Western culture with the proclamation of a superior alternative,

epitomised by Russia itself. It is important to note that in doing so, these discourses rely on descriptions of Europe or the West in highly idealised terms as a unified entity without internal differences (Laruelle 2004:116). Eurasianist thought has at its centre the idea that Russia has both an eastern (Asian) and a western (European) dimension, both of which comprise influences on and interests of Russia that have to be balanced in domestic and foreign policies (Dijkink 1996, ch. 8). Eurasianism furthermore is based on the assertion that the Eurasian continent is a distinct geographical and geopolitical entity that shares crucial psychological, historical and cultural traits, and most importantly a common destiny. Compared to the West, distinguishing features were seen in

the power of the absolute over the momentous, the priority of believe over pragmatism that gives the spiritual preference over material life, and manifests the superiority of the collectivist lifestyle over individualism (Pursiainen 1999:83).

The existence of different religions in the Eurasian space is not seen as being in conflict with these ideas, but rather Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism are appreciated for sharing spiritual and moral-ethical principles and a sense of mysticism with Orthodox religion. To corroborate this, allegedly positive examples for the successful integration of the Eurasian continent are at times invoked, such as the multi-ethnic empires created by the Huns or the Mongols. (ibid. 84; Laruelle 2004:116; Shlapentokh 2007:231.)

While Eurasianist thought was not particularly influential during Soviet times, a revival of the basic tenets was witnessed in the early 1990s in the ideas of Neo-Eurasianism, which actually is a rather imprecise label applied to a body of highly diverse and at times contradictory positions. This approach combines the 'classic' ideas of Eurasianism with an adaptation to contemporary circumstances and serves as a point of reference in various narratives about Russia, especially in Russian nationalist discourses, but has also entered the social sciences and school textbooks to some extent. As a political ideology, Neo-Eurasianism advocates the resurrection of a Russian empire in the post-Soviet space as a solution for contemporary Russia. Whether this empire should be built mainly on economic relations or include also political integration is, however, subject to considerable debates among proponents of various Neo-Eurasianist streams. (Kolossoff and Turovsky 2001; Protsyk 2003; Laruelle 2004:118.) Based on the division of the world into competing civilisations, or “ethnoses”, it is seen as Russia's “historical mission” to build an alternative cultural and political world to the currently dominating European/Western universalism, which is seen as unsuitable for conditions elsewhere and even considered destructive if copied to cultural entities seen as being based on a very different

history and spiritual composition (Shlapentokh 2007:231). Furthermore, a crucial element of most Eurasianist discourses is a claim that Western and European culture is morally inferior because its achievements, for example, in the economic and political spheres, are based on an individualist and materialist ideologies, which is seen to eventually lead to its “spiritual death” and demise (cf. Neumann 1996:198-202).

2.2.2. Westernising approaches: Russia as part of Europe?

As was seen in the previous section, in sketching out an independent path of development and a particular place and nature for Russia, Slavophile and Eurasianist discourses heavily draw on antipodal comparisons and juxtapositions with the West or Europe. Intellectual and political traditions of thought that challenge this line of argument can be summarised under the heading 'Westernism'. It should be pointed out from the outset, however, that ideas falling in this category are similarly diverse as 'Eurasianist' ones and have developed in different historical settings, which is why they can by no means be reduced to a singular position advocating the unmitigated emulation of Western models in Russia. Rather, as Pursiainen explains, the common denominator of Westernist approaches can be seen as a shared understanding that “the fate of Russia [lies] in the spirit of Enlightenment, as part of a more or less linear development that will lead to a conclusive universal end” and that “the point of comparison is in one way or another West European or Western modernization” (1999:73). In other words, Westernism supposes Western teleological development and modernization as a universal feature of world history.

Even before the eighteenth century, European intellectual, political and economic influences were present in Russia to varying extent. However, it was only with the reforms introduced by Peter the Great that the West became an “integral and most essential ingredient of Russian identity”, as he aimed to turn his country into a European state. Peter advanced Westernisation by emulating European models in the cultural, social and administrative spheres, while at the same time also holding on to an autocratic regime and other 'traditional' features. Those supportive of his ideas purported that Russia had been destined to become a fully European state and that Peter had simply helped the country on its 'natural path' (Tolz 2001:72-73).

As was explicated above, the term 'Westernism' was coined in debates that ignited in Russia roughly a century after Peter the Great's death. Starting from the famous *Philosophical Letters*

by Peter Chaadaev, published in 1829, in which the author urged Russia to fully adopt Western ways of thinking and development as he claimed that despite Peter's reforms Russia had failed to achieve any significant progress or to contribute positively to the development of humankind, intellectuals split into those supporting an independent path for Russia (see above) and those supporting Chadaev's thesis (Pursiainen 1999:73). Early Westernists considered as superior the European political and economic models and were preoccupied simply with the question of how these could be implemented in Russia. Soon, however, more refined and also critical ideas emerged that rather asked *which* of the European features would be most valuable and suitable to copy (Neumann 1996:39).

Subsequent debates in this broad tradition of thinking about the Russian path of development can be seen to fluctuate around this central question of what Europe actually constitutes and how Russia should relate to it. In other words, the crux was and continues to be not so much *whether* but *in what ways* Russia is and should be European, and thereby, what Russia is itself. As Neumann puts it, “[i]n discussing Europe, the Russians have also clearly been discussing themselves, and so the debate is an example of how Russians have talked themselves into existence” (1996:194).

An important discursive vehicle in this context has been a distinction drawn between notions of a “true” and “false” Europe, respectively, which can be traced through several centuries of Russian intellectual debates. In applying this dualism, it has been possible for Russia to be described as a truly European country despite the apparent differences and situations in which Russia and other European countries appear to have chosen different paths. For example, in the nineteenth century, Russia was invoked as the 'true Europe' by the Russian state when European states turned away from the institutions of the autocratic rule of the *anciens régimes*, thereby abandoning values that were considered defining for being European at this time. This enabled a construction of Russia as European country by projecting a set of Russian values onto the entire continent. Similar examples include the description of Western European countries during the Cold War as 'false Europe' when they failed to turn to socialism, or contemporary debates about the alleged American dominance in Europe, which are claimed to threaten its unique and positive features, which in turn Russia could help to defend. (Neumann 1996; Morozov 2004c:4-6; Prozorov 2007:318.)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with it the sudden disappearance of many certainties, Russia was “trying both to rediscover and, as much as possible, to reinvent itself” (Trenin 2002:12). In the ensuing debates, Westernising discourses were particularly strong in the early 1990s, such as the 'Kozyrev doctrine', named after the Russian foreign minister at that time (Kolossoff and Turovsky 2001:147). In the hope for concessions and compensations from Western countries, this doctrine called for an almost unconditional strengthening of ties with the West. For different reasons, such as intensifying nationalist/geopolitical discourses and little positive response from the West, however, adherents of this Westernising approach soon found themselves disillusioned over its prospects (Tsygankov 2007:383).

Under president Putin, the framing of Russian foreign policy can in some ways be seen as a compromise or combination of elements from the two orientations discussed above: Russian foreign policy is to be pursued with a 'multi-vector' logic and under pragmatic considerations, meaning that foreign policy is formulated and evaluated in terms of 'what it brings' for the country, primarily with regard to economic and security aspects. Resultingly, the following objectives can be discerned: Russian economic leadership in the post-Soviet space, more effective use of its geopolitical resources (raw materials, weapon technologies, reanimation of 'special relationships'), and a differentiated approach to the West with relations in Asia as a counterbalance (Kolossoff and Turovsky 2001:148-51).

Coming back to the 'European question', it has been stated that the European vector has turned out to be the most important one for Russia owing to several reasons. Firstly, there is a high economic interdependence between Russia and the EU, with the EU's share in Russian foreign trade at over 50% (Hubel 2004:349). Secondly, increased security cooperation between Russia and the EU seemed beneficial for both sides since, especially for Russia, it offered an opportunity to counterbalance US hegemony, and could also help the EU in strengthening its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Forsberg 2004:248-9). The positive expectations from his field, however, have not materialised, due to the more pronounced primacy of the US as well as ignorance and bureaucratic inertia on both sides (ibid. 256-9).

The importance of a European vector has also been explained with reference to the perception of shared common values between Russia and Europe. Writing from an English School perspective, Aalto (2007:462) points out that, for Russia, the European direction contains the

highest potential for a “thicker version of international society”¹, meaning that such shared values provide an “important reference point for Russia’s political identity” (ibid. 468). Elsewhere, it has been pointed out that discourses about Europe and the West, be they positive or negative, do in most cases at least implicitly acknowledge an intellectual connection with these reference objects: even when invoking Europe as a negative reference object, most contemporary Russian discourses rely on concepts grounded firmly in European intellectual traditions, such as the nation state. (Prozorov 2007).

In the above, my aim was to show how references to Europe are manifold and diverse, but in any case are usually seen as constitutive to most discourses of Russian belonging. Or, as Morozov (2004a:3) aptly puts it “Europe is indispensable for any definition of Russia”, as no politically viable alternative to Russia being part of Europe seems to be in sight – not even Eurasianism, which may come closest to conceptually separating Europe and Russia, but already through its very name acknowledges Russia as at least partly of European, rather than an entirely independent solitary entity.

Thus, both (Orthodox) religion and 'Europe' appear to play a considerable role in narratives of Russian belonging and identity. Before turning to a detailed analysis of the possible relationships or a relatedness drawn between these elements by members of my research target group, however, it is both prudent and necessary to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of this work, i.e. conceptions of religion and national identity construction processes, which I will do in the ensuing chapter.

¹ In an English School terminology, relations between states can be depicted as taking place in three different types of arrangements, depending on the strength and quality of interactions: 1) an *international system* exists when states are aware of other states' existence but otherwise have little in common; 2) the term *international society* connotes the existence of shared rules and institutions (a 'thick' version of international society here means that not only formal institutions are shared but also values and standards of conduct); 3) *world society*, finally, refers to a situation in which common values and identities are particularly strong and transcend the level of state interactions (thus including individuals and civil society, for example). (Aalto 2005:7; Buzan 1999:5.)

3. Towards a theoretical framework: Religion and identity construction in IR

In the following chapter, my aim is to lay out the theoretical framework for this thesis. A theory for a research project, of course, is not an end in itself but rather a necessity if one aims to explain phenomena in the social world. The social world is inherently complex, meaning that there is always *more* than what an observer can see, and even much more than she could explain. Due to that complexity, it is simply impossible to describe *all* factors and processes of a given event since too many details would be available and would need to be included in the analysis. Through a theory one can construct a specific set of assumptions and point out the factors one assumes be of explanatory value for the observations made in a specific piece of research. Thus, instead of being “buried under a pile of detail”, this should enable the researcher to provide weighted and ordered observations and to develop explanations for the events studied (Rosamond 2000:5). Obviously, it could be argued that the theoretical framework a researcher chooses can be restricting because she has to define and stick to certain definitions and assumptions. On the other hand, if a piece of research is to fulfil the requirements of validity and reliability, one is bound to properly state and define one’s underlying assumptions in order to enable others to comprehend, reproduce and further develop the findings.

In this thesis my aim is to research ideas about Russian identity with a particular focus the relationship between religion and possible linkages with the place carved out for Russia internationally. In what follows, I will firstly explain how religion is understood for the purposes of this thesis. Since religion is a rather novel element in International Relations studies, this requires a look at the discipline's treatment of the subject in the past, and in particular at the influences of secularism theory. I will then turn to a discussion of the what is understood as identity and the processes through which identities are constructed. Lastly, I will point out some interlinkages between the concepts of religion and national identity.

3.1. An overlooked dimension? Secularism vs. religious resurgence in International Relations

In recent years, claims to the effect that religion has acquired renewed significance in world politics have increased substantially (Nardin 2003:272). In particular since the end of the Cold War, many analyses of international conflicts have pointed to religious elements in various respects. Often cited examples include the notorious terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the perpetrators of which are commonly seen to have been religiously motivated, various ethnoreligious conflicts in countries of the former Soviet Union, on the Balkans, and in Northern Ireland or the continuing conflicts in the Middle East. But also non-violent struggles are often mentioned, such as disputes over the possibility of Turkey (as a “Muslim country”) joining the European Union, or discussions over whether a European Constitution should make reference to God or Christianity (Diez and Barbato 2007:1; Farr 2008; Fox and Sandler 2004:20; Hatzopoulos and Petitto 2003; Wæver 2008:209).

These developments stand in stark contrast to the small volume of works in the discipline of International Relations explicitly dealing with religion. Indeed, it has been argued that religion has been effectively “exiled” from IR, which finds expression in assertions of a void in the literature and the absence of an “adequate theoretical understanding of religion in general and of the recent global resurgence of religions in particular” (Hatzopoulos and Petitto 2003:4). Explanations for this neglect of religion in IR have been found in two interrelated factors: Secularism theory, which has influenced the social sciences as a whole, and the “Westphalian presumption” (Thomas 2003:23), which is of particular importance for IR. I will turn to each of these factors in turn before turning to the challenges addressed at them.

3.1.1. Secularisation theory

A discussion of secularisation theory presupposes a definition of what is understood as religion in the first place. As Gill states, defining religion is a “slippery enterprise” because of the wide spectrum of religious movements “from Judaism to yoga, [and] Buddhism to UFO cults” (2001:117). However, a definition approximating most religions would refer to “a system of beliefs and practices oriented toward the sacred or supernatural, through which the life experiences of groups of people are given meaning and direction” (ibid.), thus providing guidance and prescribing actions. A further crucial element of religion, and one that distinguishes it from moral or ethics – which similarly prescribe “appropriate” behaviour – is

that it ultimately involves *faith*. This element comes into play in religious taxonomies through the fundamentally defining references to the supernatural and the divine, which – by definition – cannot be positively known through reason alone. Being religious thus requires the acceptance of such “transcendental justification” of how things are and how one should act; and in the absence of ultimate rational explanations, an act of faith is necessary for accepting these. It is exactly through this condition of faith that religion can make a claim to hold a monopoly on ultimate truth, i.e. a truth that can (and should) neither be explained nor questioned by rational inquiries only. (Laustsen and Wæver 2003:154-155.) Furthermore, religion often takes on an institutional form (such as a “church” in Christian terms), which supposes the existence of authoritative structures. Thus defined, religion can be seen to include both ideational and institutional aspects, both of which are relevant for political inquiries.

In particular early modern social scientists, such as Emile Durkheim (whose ideas have continued to influence the field of social scientific inquiries to this day) were eager to stress the *functional* aspect of religion, treating it as a social (and moral) force that through “beliefs and practices [...] unite into one single moral community [...] all those who adhere to them” (Durkheim in Smith 2000:797). It is this perspective of religion as an important factor for creating human communities that provides the starting point for the concept of secularisation: In short, secularisation theory purports that modernization combined with the rationalising tendencies inherent in it will lead to a demise of religion through several interconnected developments. Firstly, an increasing reliance on rational scientific explanation would erode the authority of religious ideas and their power for understanding life based on references to the supernatural. Secondly, modernisation theory presumes a pattern of cultural pluralisation and social differentiation, including in the religious sphere. Faced with competing claims to ultimate truth brought forward by different religions in a pluralising society, which obviously will make any claim about a monopoly on knowledge seem less convincing, it is assumed that peoples' trust in spiritual explanations will further decline. Lastly, modernisation in general involves the idea of an increasingly powerful nation state extending its reach into important societal areas where religious groups used to play a significant role, such as welfare provision, e.g. assistance to the poor, but also as a reference object for identification, first and foremost, the nation state. All of the above developments are seen to also diminish the influence of the church as an institution.

In a political sense and based on the above predictions, secularisation theory predicts two major consequences. Firstly, it is assumed that religiously motivated arguments and religious values will play an ever decreasing role in decision-making as they have to compete with other social movements based on rational philosophies in mobilising collective action and creating a sense of belonging. Religion would therefore lose its potential to function as the glue that holds communities together. Secondly, it is predicted that secularisation eventually results in the institutional separation of church and state, both because of the declining moral authority of the church and its diminishing functional role in the provision of social welfare etc. In sum, by largely disappearing from the public sphere, religion would at most retain relevance in peoples' private lives. While adherents of secularisation theory do not generally assume that the above processes would happen without conflict, secularisation is nevertheless seen as an unilinear and irreversible feature of modernity. (Gill 2001:120-123.) This assumption about the inevitable secularisation of modernising societies has crucially informed the development of modern social science and its theories, and, as some claim, attained a paradigmatic status in the field, which effectively precluded questioning of its contents and predictions (Hurd 2004:236).

In the discipline of International Relations, as a part of modern social sciences born out of the Enlightenment project, theories have thus often unquestioningly been built upon assumptions of secularisation theory, which has led to the total ignorance or serious neglect of religion (Hatzopoulos and Petito 2003:5). In addition to secularisation theory, another – although related – element that is specific to IR is worth examining here, not least because it can be seen as a “founding act” of the discipline (Laustsen and Wæver 2003:148), namely the origins of the modern state system based on the Westphalian Treaty of 1648: The peace of Westphalia brought about the end of a series of violent conflicts commonly referred to as the “Wars of Religion”, an era that is widely seen as a “barbarous and backward” (Thomas 2003:24) period in which brutal struggles were fought over religious doctrines. By instituting the principle of *cujus regio, ejus religio*², the treaty created the foundations of an international system based on sovereignty and on pluralism among states, meaning that interventions (on religious grounds) in the domestic affairs of another state is prohibited. This elimination of religion as a “valid reason” for inter-state conflict created a fertile intellectual ground for assumptions over the declining importance of religion, the logic of which was also translated onto the domestic level. The treaty is often credited as an act of moving international relations towards an enlightened future characterised by tradition giving way to modernity, and superstition and religion being

² *cujus regio, ejus religio*, lat. = "Whose realm, his religion", i.e. the ruler determines the religion of her realm.

overcome by science and rationality. On a domestic level, the norm of sovereignty is seen to have weakened the role and powers of the church, and as laying the ground for social and political orders opposed to the traditional arbitrary rule of kings, instead supposing that individual subjects assemble a society and choose a sovereign ruler. The church and its religion is thus no longer required to legitimise the state but instead the “will of the people” is now the decisive force. (Fox and Sandler 2004:11; Laustsen and Wæver 2003:147-148; Hurd 2004:241.)

3.1.2. Challenges to the presumptions of secularist thought

In describing religion as an out-dated and declining factor, secularisation theory in combination with the post-Westphalian order has thus provided stable foundations for neglecting religious elements in IR theorising and studies. However, this lack of attention to religion, and the underlying theoretical assumptions, can be challenged in several respects.

The first line of argumentation challenging the dominance of secularisation theory in the social sciences targets its origins and questions the intentions of those who devised the theory. As Fox and Sandler (2004:17, 32) claim, the founding generations of modern social science were not merely analysts of socio-political developments but rather “advocates” of a new worldview in which religion *ought not* to play a role. In their view, religion was associated with dogma, ignorance, and superstition, in other words, as being the opposite of all that Enlightenment and modernity stand for. If modernity was to provide a better basis for life, religion was thus to be overcome, both in society and the sciences. Similarly, in the particular case of IR, critics find a “distorted [...] understanding of what the Wars of Religion” preceding the Westphalian settlement were about: The common reading suggests that war, devastation, bloodshed and – in particular in contemporary discussion – extremism and fundamentalism ensue when religion is brought into international politics, and that peaceful coexistence therefore requires the banishment of religion from politics in order to avoid religiously-based violence of the past (Thomas 2003:24). These critics claim that the heritage of assumptions on the dangers of religion has decisively informed later generations of social scientists, reaching “the proportions of a dogma [...] that religion is not important” (Fox and Sandler (2004:17). The *theory* of secularisation and the *doctrine* of secularism are thus often unquestioningly conflated in the social sciences (Wæver 2008:209-210).

A second line of questioning makes reference to empirical data, based on which it can be claimed that the predictions of secularisation were at best partly true in Western countries, while developments in the non-Western world often outright contradict its claims. Sociological data cited suggests that religion is continuing to be an important part of people's lives and an object of identification, as well as a factor that influences politics, including in those Western countries, where modernisation is most advanced (Fox and Sandler 2004:20). Indeed, it has been claimed that modernisation, instead of leading to a demise of religion, has actually caused a backlash and religious resurgence, especially in non-Western countries. For example, Western secular ideas as a whole are seen as foreign to cultures they were imposed upon at the expense of traditional lifestyles, which is compounded by the failure of governments to deliver on modernisation's promises, thereby being unable to command legitimacy for their guiding ideologies (ibid. 12; Gill 2001:122). But also in the West itself, where secularisation has been instituted in many respects, such as the formal division of state and church, (Christian) religion is seen to continue playing an important role that needs to be analysed for the sake of a better understanding of political developments. Hurd, for instance, identifies distinctly Christian convictions in the very notion of the "sovereign self" that is at the core of the post-Westphalian moral order, and which is thought to fulfil a modernising mission towards Enlightenment by following a "master plan" that is, she claims, essentially "providentially pre-ordained" (2004:241; Diez and Barbato 2007:3). Assumptions rooted in secularisation theory, it is argued, have thus merely resulted in such phenomena being largely unnoticed and unanalysed.

Finally, secularist assumptions are challenged from a normative perspective that focuses on the repercussions for democratic politics. In fact, this line of argument is mainly concerned with the doctrine of secularism, which, in short, prescribes that religion and politics must be kept separate for the sake of peace. However, as was shown above, this doctrine has considerably influenced secularisation theory and its proponents and thereby contributed to its wide application – consciously or unconsciously – by social scientists, and is therefore important to be mentioned here. The underlying problem found in secularist thought is that it relies on a separation between 'religion' and 'politics' as though these were naturally given entities. However, as Wæver points out, "there is no entity called religion" (2008:215). Rather, these two entities – alongside others, such as 'law' and 'the public' – were invented in early modern Europe as a specific way of organizing society. Like other social constructions that aim to distinguish between categories, the creation of this division as well as its maintenance are thus highly politicised processes (Hurd 2004:256). In general the politics of secularism are more

compatible with some religious denominations and their innate doctrines, mainly those in the West and with Protestantism in particular. But even in Western countries, the dividing line between a religious/spiritual sphere and a political one has been drawn based on very different principles (compare, for example, French laicism and American secularism!), which shows that an all-encompassing and generally applicable secularism is an impossibility in the first place.

The import of the creation of two distinctive categories lies in that these entities are afforded a different status in modern political life: Based on the modern maxim that religion must be kept out of politics (and *vice versa*), those persons, ideas, arguments assigned to the realm of politics are permitted to participate in public debate, while those seen as belonging to the religious sphere are not. Secularism thus creates a closure of political space and, by assuming that this closure is a natural and neutral one, is unable to engage in discussion with those locked up in the religious sphere – not even on the question of whether the dividing line is drawn in the right place. This is true in political affairs but also in social scientific inquiry where anything falling in the 'religious' category is either assumed to be irrelevant or alternatively easily seen as principally extremist, that is, outside the frame of 'normal' politics and 'reasonable' discussion. The risk of these practices of demarcation and exclusion is seen in that they have the potential to severely limit the diversity of debates in a ostensibly pluralist framework, which is why some analysts call for a reconsideration of the place of religion assigned to it by secularism. The result of such a reconfiguration could be a “deeper pluralism” (Thomas 2003:45) that would enable the acknowledgement of the potentially positive contributions of non-secular and non-Western approaches to public life, as well as helping to counteract the perceived need to use radical and violent means by those who find themselves 'locked out' from possibilities to engage in politics (Hurd 2004:256; Wæver 2008:228-230). In a similar vein, for IR, the promise of re-examining theoretical assumptions rooted in secularism is that it may open up of the field of inquiry and reveal new factors for analysis, and thus contribute to a richer understanding of contemporary international politics.

The above discussion provides ample reasons for reconsidering theoretical assumptions and for “taking religion seriously” in IR theory and scientific inquiry. Before explicating how I intend to take religion onboard in this thesis, however, a discussion of the overarching concept serving as the vehicle for this move, namely 'identity', is in place and will be dealt with the following section.

3.2. A theory of identity and its construction

In this thesis I am interested in researching Russian mentalities with regard to questions of religion and international belonging. The word ‘mentality’ can be understood to denote “the characteristic attitude of mind or way of thinking of a person or group” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 1995) and thus suits quite well my purposes of exploring lines of thought and arguments specific to Russian patterns of thought. However, in International Relations literature, another, related, term has been discussed more extensively and therefore seems to be more suitable for constructing a theoretical framework: In order to be able to resort to instructive writings for my research project, I will thus use this concept of *identity*.

Theories of identity come in many flavours and based on a wide range of ontological and epistemological assumptions (Cederman 2001:141; Neumann 1999:1; Ringmar 2002:116). In the widest sense, identity can be defined as a ‘sense of belonging’. To be sure, in any society every individual’s identity contains multiple partial identities at the same time, some of them being more visible and public while others are restricted to the very personal level (Hopf 2002:1-4; Schöpflin 2003:478). This general description, however, is probably the only thing that different currents of identity theory can agree upon. There is consequently disagreement on questions of why identity is, how it is constituted, and whether and by what processes it may be altered. I will look at these questions in more detail below.

3.2.1. Why is identity?

One important question concerning identity, of course, is as to *why* individuals have it in the first place. Some accounts avoid this discussion altogether and are instead content with the assumption that identity simply is a naturalistic phenomenon grounded in basic human instincts (Aronovitch 2000:460). Such a position, obviously, is not conducive to any profound research on the topic of identity, since it rules out any further questions due to its overly simplistic assumptions. In rejecting such essentialising views, other theorists go to great length in explaining why identities are such an essential aspect of human existence – these different explanations I would put under three headings, notably those inspired by *structuralist*, *psychological* and *constructivist* ideas, all of which, in my view, have something to contribute to the debate.

Approaches with a structuralist background do not have too much interest in processes that happen at an individual or cognitive level but rather concentrate on deeper factors shaping the social world. An illustration for such a preoccupation with structure can be found from classical literature on nationalism and national identity as evident, for example, in the writings of Ernest Gellner. In his attempts to explain the phenomenon of modern nationalism, Gellner expressively employed an “Olympian apoliticism”³ (van den Bossche 2003:492-93) and thus concentrated on factors like the conditions brought about by industrialisation and its impacts on societies, rather than looking into how political processes shape and influence identities. In this way, Gellner’s approach provides a straightforward theory that stands out in its simplicity because it allegedly provides insights that are valid for all nations and all instances of nationalism at the same time. I would argue, however, that this simplicity comes at the expense of neglecting the individual and political processes that shape identities. Therefore, and because the simplicity of a theory cannot be a goal in itself (Cederman and Daase 2003:7), I elect to look further for a more complete account of why identity is.

Some sort of remedy for an overly structuralist view of identity is provided by approaches that take cognitive or psychological arguments onboard. Theorists subscribing to this perspective point at cognitive difficulties all humans encounter when being confronted with the – perhaps not objectively but surely subjectively – indefinite complexity of the social world. They argue that neither our senses nor our minds are capable of processing in its own right *everything* that is and happens around us, since that would cause a cognitive overload. The argument goes that – in the effort to avoid such overload – the human mind is constantly generalising and categorising the received information in order to make sense of it, resulting in a situation where “our knowledge of the world, our vision, is invariably and necessarily partial and particular” (Schöpflin 2003:479; Cederman and Daase 2003:12). From this perspective, identities can be seen as categories or “heuristic devices” (Hopf 2002:4) that enable us to make sense: A person (be it the ‘self’ or an ‘other’) is not perceived entirely as a singular individual but rather as belonging to a certain category (or identity) that is imbued with certain a priori assumptions. This logic of cognitive generalisation and categorisation can be seen to result in the emergence of collective identities by leading to the emergence “in-groups” as a human collective assumed to share similar traits, and “out-groups” composed of those individuals or groups not seen to share the relevant characteristics (Ashley 2002:9).

³ ‘Olympian’ here refers to the fact that during the Ancient Olympic games politics were supposed to be left outside the games and wars were to be suspended for the duration of the event. (Wikipedia 2005a, 2005b.)

This notion of identity as a necessity of human existence already appears helpful for answering the question as to why people have identities. However, I think that constructivist-inspired ideas can yet contribute to a more complete conception. Here, the point is that identities are *social* constructs, that is, they emerge only through dealing with other people because “[w]hat we are ‘in ourselves’ is impossible to determine for the simple reason that we can come to think of ourselves *as our selves* only through interaction with others” (Ringmar 2002:118, emphasis in original). The claim by an actor to possess an identity is only successful and completed when it is also recognised by others as such; without social interaction, there would thus be no sense in referring to identity in the first place (Greenhill 2008:345). On the other hand, social interaction depends *on* these very identities it produces and is at the same time conditioned by them, as I will point out in the following section. This seeming contradiction due the reciprocity of the argument, however, is a conscious choice I make here in order to get most out of the idea of interaction or, as it is also referred to, *intersubjectivity*.

Having thus established that identity is (a) affected by social structures, (b) a cognitive necessity and (c) a result of social interaction, I will now turn to a discussion of *how* and through what processes particular identities are produced, re-produced and transformed. In doing so, I will rely primarily on the constructivist side of the argument, while keeping in mind also the other factors introduced above.

3.2.2. How is identity [produced, reproduced, transformed]? A constructivist approach to identity

Basing one’s theory on constructivist ideas is easier said than done. The heading ‘Constructivism’ combines many different approaches that are based on various and at times conflicting assumptions (Christiansen et al. 1999:529; Hopf 2002:278-79; Cederman and Daase 2003:5-6) – speaking of ‘Constructivisms’ in the plural may thus be more to the point. One starting point for describing constructivist thought is to state what it rejects (Christiansen et al. 1999:531-32): Constructivists are united in that they are suspicious of overly rationalistic and materialistic⁴ accounts of the social world, on one hand, and of those post-modern or reflectivist ideas that imply epistemological relativism, on the other (see also Cederman and Daase 2003:5).

⁴ “Materialism is the philosophical view that the only thing that can truly be said to 'exist' is matter; that fundamentally, all things are composed of 'material'” (Wikipedia 2005c) – social sciences research conducted from this perspective therefore does not consider ideational or spiritual aspects do be relevant.

Looking for common features of constructivist approaches in a positive manner, one can point at them sharing basic ontological assumptions, namely that both human consciousness and ideational factors shape the social world, while the existence of material phenomena is not denied (Guzzini 2003:9) – the essential claim constructivists make is “that there is such a thing as socially constructed reality” (Christiansen et al. 1999:530). This statement has two important consequences, the first of which is that social realities are seen to exist by human agreement only, that is, they are not 'natural givens' but only emerge through discursive interaction (see below), which in turn points us to the fact that they are not stable but rather in constant change (and changeable), and consequently, that social realities are not eternal truths but dependent on time and place (ibid.).

Obviously, stating that social reality is constructed also requires an explanation of how this happens. A central concept with regard to the construction of social reality is language, since most social interaction takes place through discursive processes. Language is a tool that enables understanding, but at the same time it provides the framework in which social interaction takes place; linguistic structures determine what is intelligible, thinkable and imaginable (Hopf 2002:21): “all human activity depends on controlling a radically unstable reality to which words approximate [...] by will or convention” (Said 1994:29).

Of course, language and discourses can and do change, whereby socially constructed facts are enabled, transformed or obscured. Constructivists, however, assume that the capacity to influence discursive practice is distributed unevenly across society, which, in turn, suggests that questions of power over discursive formations – and hence over the construction of social reality – must be taken into account (Guzzini 2000:169-70). Here, it is instructive to note that constructivist approaches are not content with a conventional definition of power understood as an actor's material capacity to compel another one to do (or not to do) certain things. This narrow conceptualisation of power is challenged in three respects: First, following Foucault, power does not exclusively reside with physical actors but is rather diffused over all levels of society: “Power is everywhere”. For example, ideas, practices and conventions have the power to induce certain types of behaviour (Newmann 2004:143). Second, power is not only oppressive or coercive, but instead a creative force that can positively produce (social) facts (Wandel 2001:374). Third, and as a consequence of the foregoing reasons, power is to be understood as essentially *intersubjective*: the extend of an actor's (or idea's, or discourse's) power does not necessarily depend on a material and objectively measurable source but is

conditioned by whether or to what extent it is implicitly or explicitly *recognised* within a discursive community as being significant (Guzzini 2000:172-173).

To summarise the constructivist epistemological position, it thus has to be kept in mind that it stresses

the social or intersubjective construction of meaning (and hence knowledge). Understanding is not a passive registration, but an active construction: we need concepts to make sense of the world. They are the condition for the possibility of knowledge. This position opposes both the reduction of knowledge to an objectivist ('data speaks for itself') and to a subjectivist position (since there is no private language game). (Guzzini 2003:9-10).

What, then, does all this mean for my research project exploring Russian identity constructions? It should have become clear by now that for the purposes of my research, identities are considered social facts, that is, they are embedded in social realities that, in turn, are constituted, upheld and changed by discursive processes. In International Relations theory, there are several constructivist approaches that deal with questions of identity. Among the many scholars that attempt to classify constructivism(s), Hopf (2002:278) defines three such approaches, notably *normative constructivism*, which concentrates on international norms and states' adherence to them; *systemic constructivism*, where the focus is on how inter-state relations shape states' identities; and *social constructivism*, which is concerned with the domestic origins of state identities. Out of these, social constructivism appears as the most suitable for my purposes because I, too, do mainly investigate identity construction at the domestic level. In the following paragraphs, I will point at the processes through which domestic identity constructions occur. The departure point for this argument is given Cederman and Daase's (2003:12-18) account of identity construction⁵ through *Inter-generational Transmission Mechanisms*, *Intersubjective Categorisation*, and *Boundary Formation*, which I propose to complement with the concept of *securitisation*.

a) Inter-generational Transmission Mechanisms

An essential aspect of identities is that some persist for long temporal durations. Cederman and Daase point out some "group maintenance" mechanisms (2003:14) that are conducive to an identity's 'survival'. First, there is the fact that many identities are strongly embedded in a spatially delimited dimension – an identity can thus be linked to the place or territory of birth,

⁵ In fact, the authors refer to their approach as 'sociational' – as opposed to 'social' – constructivism in order to stress that it takes the analysis all the way down to the individual level and accounts for processes in the personal dimension as well.

thereby automatically reproducing a crucial category of belonging. Second, identities can be constructed as rooted in ideas that are on a highly abstract level and thus acceptable and applicable over generations. History is an obvious example here: while the construction of identity through historic narratives is bound by historical memory and jargon, these restricting factors are themselves social constructs. The continuous discursive struggle over how history is written (which some refer to as “mythmaking”) can therefore produce new meaning and alter the constitutive markers of identity (Mansbach and Rhodes 2006:5-6; Bhikhu 1994:501).

b) Intersubjective Categorisation

As was explicated above, cognitive limitations of the human mind make the establishment of categories a basic fact of social life; based on different attributes, people are assigned to particular categories (I like to think of them as ‘groups’). In any given society, we can expect a multitude of different, often overlapping groups based on, for example, language, skin colour, political affiliation or religious denomination. The construction of a common identity for a larger group of people, such as a nation, requires that different categories are combined into a seemingly coherent whole – some categories thus have to be defined as more relevant than others. Far from being an ‘objective’ exercise, the definition of significant categories, of course, is a political act that involves the application of discursive power. Moreover, this process is also influenced by the established, deep-rooted discourses that define what is thinkable and imaginable. As regards the particular case of *national* identity constructions, Mansbach and Rhodes' (2006:4, 12; see also Mansbach and Rhodes 2007) have devised the helpful notion of national identity as a “second-order socially constructed” phenomenon, meaning that it is typically based on a combination of a number of more immediate and specifically constructed traits such as language, ethnicity, citizenship, or religion. An understanding of these different traits or “markers”, their relative importance, as well as an awareness of how the 'formula' changes over time in the construction of any given identity is therefore imperative.

c) Boundary Formation and Securitisation

Through processes of boundary formation identities are delimited from others. Cederman and Daase refer to the role of territorial borders in the construction of identities and stress that, from a constructivist perspective, borders are not eternally fixed although they may appear as such. Rather, borders are essentialised through discourses, that is, they are imbued with

meaning and used for “the mental linking and summarising” of the different parts of a territory (Simmel in Cederman and Daase 2003:16).

However, I would argue that apart from the physical borders mentioned above, boundary formation is an important aspect of identity construction also in many less tangible areas. In this respect, the notion of *social boundaries* as an immanent and inevitable part of identity constructions is important to consider (Neumann 1999:35). The point here is that any identity always needs to be constructed *ex negativo* as well, that is, by stating what it is *not*, because “the formation of the self is inextricably intertwined with the formation of its other” – without knowing what is alien to us, we cannot conceive fully of what we are ourselves (Neumann and Welsh 1991:332). Indeed, as Said explains, identities thus constituted are best understood

not as essentializations (although part of their enduring appeal is that they seem and are considered to be like essentializations) but as *contrapuntal ensembles*, for it is the case that no identity can ever exist by itself and without an array of opposites, negatives, oppositions (1994:52; emphasis added).

A conceptual hierarchy of 'otherness' often applied in IR recognises “enemies, strangers and Others” (Neumann and Welsh 1991:332), thereby making possible a distinction between those others who are recognised as sharing some attributes with the own in-group and those who are fully outside. The necessity of ‘others’, therefore, does not mean that they always are necessarily constructed in strongly oppositional terms or as a threat: ‘Otherness’ may at times simply denote a small degree of difference. Furthermore, the ‘other’ does not have to be of the same category as the self but can be of a different kind. For example, among the possible notions of ‘others’ for a national identity are not only other nations as such (i.e. the same category) but can also be constituted by a different set a fundamental values or past traumatic events in the history of the own nation (Hopf 2002:9; Bhikhu 1994:501).

A helpful theoretical device for understanding the logic of inscribing social boundaries that are at the heart of identity constructions vis-à-vis an 'other' is offered by the securitization approach in International Relations. In short, this so-called Copenhagen School is rooted in the principal assertion that 'security', defined as “survival in the face of an existential threat” (Buzan et al. 1998:26) does not have a fixed and universally valid meaning, but is rather best understood as intersubjective and political (Laustsen and Wæver 2003:150). This is to say that in the political world, threats (by being social facts) do not simply 'exist' or 'emerge' by themselves but are rather brought into being through speech acts by political actors – the act of

'securitization' is a central concept in the Copenhagen School and refers to a rhetorical move which makes an object a security issue. A securitising move has important political repercussions: When an object, such as a state, a nation, the economy, or the environment, is perceived as threatened and in need of defence or protection, the pursuit of security is usually given priority over all other concerns. In the defence against such a threat, political actors often claim (and are granted) the right to act outside the usual rules of political procedures. Consequently, Buzan et al. distinguish between *politicisation*, by which an issue becomes part of the normal political discourse and process, and *securitization*, as way of discursive escalation, which allows for a potential breaking of the 'rules of the political game', for example, the use of excessive force or the limitation of rights that are normally considered fundamental and inviolable (Buzan et al. 1998:23).

To be sure, politicisation and securitization must not be understood as simple one-way processes, but rather as intersubjective ones: to be successful, they require that claims by an actor aiming to securitise an issue be noticed, accepted and reproduced by members of the political community. Furthermore, a central idea of the Copenhagen School is that different reference objects produce different outcomes of securitising speech acts: the securitization of a national identity, for example, supposes very different reactions than the representation of the environment as being threatened. Consequently, also the potential of different referent objects to become successfully securitised varies widely and must be carefully considered in their and analysis.

Not least for the sake of completeness, it is important to note that the logic of securitization can certainly be reversed, too, and work in a reverse logic. This is because issues can of course also be presented as being *not* threatening, and objects can be presented as *not* being in (immediate) danger. Rhetorical moves that in such ways revoke representations of danger are accordingly labelled as *de-politicising* and *de-securitising* (Neumann 1998).

Coming back to the question of identity and the constitutive function of 'otherness', securitization theory provides for the understanding of two crucial processes: Firstly, by politicising or securitising objects, such as markers of an identity, their attributes are confirmed and upheld as being crucially important for the self-definition: if something is worth being defended (with extraordinary means, even up to the abolition of rules and values otherwise viewed as imperative) it certainly must be important and highly relevant for the community

seen in possession of it. By looking at the reference objects of securitising discourses about a human collective, it is thus possible to deduce the elements that are considered of central importance for this group's identity and its survival. Secondly, in most acts of securitization, not only a threat *per se* is identified but, by extension, also the source it is emanating from. In being identified as emanating existential threats, these entities are thus positioned as fundamentally external to the self: Here, securitization inscribes boundaries that serve to clearly demarcate an inside from an outside, or 'us' (the threatened) from 'them' (the threatening other). Security language can thus have an integrative capacity that advances political integration through the identification of existential threats. Indeed, it has been claimed that “without the inscription of external dangers, there could be no well-bounded social identities” (Väyrynen 1997; Huysmans 2002:44). An analysis of discourses with a securitising dimension can therefore be instructive for elucidating what 'others' are seen as crucially constitutive to an identity.

3.2.3. Particular features of 'national' identities

The object of inquiry of this thesis, that is, the notion of national identity as a particular instance of identity construction, has been touched upon in various occasions in the foregoing discussion. However, before proceeding to the possible theoretical linkages between national identity and religion, a more detailed explication of the notion of national identity is in place.

In line with the ideas behind constructivist theory presented above, it is evident that any national identity is the product of social construction. That is, the contents or elements of any national identity are not given or natural and simply waiting 'out there' to be discovered by politicians, researchers, or ordinary members of a public, but rather evolve through complex and inherently political processes and continuous (re-)definition. Moreover, it is instructive to note that, in the first place, the *concept* of 'national identity' (or of the 'nation' more generally) is deeply embedded in an overarching ideology commonly referred to as 'nationalism' ⁶. Smith aptly summarises four core ideas of nationalism as follows:

⁶ By using the term 'nationalism' in this context, I refer the wider tradition of thought that is at the basis of past and contemporary (international) politics as well as one of the fundamental objects of social scientific approaches engaging with the structures and effects of the same. This is different from – although closely related to – the concept of nationalism understood as a *social movement*, which is usually active at the level of a particular group aiming to accentuate the uniqueness and secure the 'self-determination' of their particular imagined community.

1. The world is divided into nations, each with its own individuality, history and destiny;
 2. the nation is the source of all political and social power, and loyalty to the nation overrides all other allegiances;
 3. human beings must identify with a nation if they want to be free and realise themselves;
 4. nations must be free and secure if peace and justice are to prevail in the world.
- (Smith 1991:74)

The very idea that the world would be made up of distinct communities referred to as nations – that preferably occupy their own territory and are able to determine their affairs themselves – must therefore be understood as historically evolved and socially constructed as well; despite its enduring impact it is, at least from a conceptual perspective, only *one* way of understanding and ordering the world⁷. The exact origins of the modern idea of the nation are hotly debated but some of the most crucial factors for its development are commonly seen to have emerged in Europe during the era of the Westphalian treaty in the seventeenth century (see chapter 3.1 above). While acknowledging the risk of presenting immensely complex historical processes in an overly simplified fashion, Mansbach and Rhodes (2006, 2007) provide an instructive account of these various processes and developments as having been caused by both “push” and “pull” factors, which often mutually reinforce each other. Both of these factors, however, have considerably been supported by extensive social and technological changes at the structural level, such as new means of communications evident in road and railway systems, telecommunications in its various forms, mass newspapers, emerging educational systems and so on.

Among the most prevalent pull factors were strategies of the emerging territorial state, themselves inaugurated by the Westphalian treaty, that aimed to unite (“pull together”) their polities and to inspire allegiance with the state in order to secure subjects' willingness to make sacrifices, for example, in terms of financial resources (taxes) or the fulfilment of duties (soldiers). This was achieved by inspiring a sense of “common purpose and common future” for these communities through narratives of the nation. Furthermore, allegiance to and legitimacy for the state was promoted by constructing borders demarcating an exterior populated by various threats, protection from which was promised by the state (Ashley 2002:21).

⁷ To my mind, any researcher studying issues surrounding national identity should thus be aware that she is potentially engaging in the reification of the ideology of nationalism at the expense of other ideas. Given the fact that research itself is deeply embedded in scientific traditions and relies on established paradigms in order to generate(new) knowledge, however, this note is not meant to suggest that completely 'out-of-the-box-thinking' would be easily attainable or even desirable under all circumstances.

The push factors are seen to originate from activities of “national entrepreneurs”, defined as individuals, such as members of cultural or economic elites, but also the larger masses, who aim to establish political institutions that would serve their particular groups' interests and advance their well-being, resulting in demands for a state's political apparatus to serve the subjects it is comprised of: the notion of a nation as a community of people sharing common traits as well as a shared history and future effectively serves to justify these claims. (Mansbach and Rhodes 2006, 2007).

Both “pushing” and “pulling” logics thus necessarily require narratives of what makes a particular nation unique and what distinguishes it from others, and the intellectual resources and practices employed for this purpose vary widely between different thus defined nations and across time. However, the most commonly used elements are found in language, ethnicity, culture, religion, and citizenship (ibid. 4, 12); and usually discourses about a given national identity will consist of a combination of references to several of these “markers”, combined with stories of their importance throughout history, in the attempt to construct a seemingly coherent and exhaustive definition of a nation's distinguishing traits.

Owing to the above developments, which further intensified during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the idea of the state and the nation as ideally overlapping entities has continuously evolved and – in addition to nations' own narratives – also found expression (and re-affirmation), for example, in the foundation of the United *Nations* (sic!) as the ultimate forum for administering world affairs (Smith 2000:812).

3.3. Linking national identity and religion

In the preceding sections, I have attempted to approach the topic of this thesis – Russian national identity constructions with a focus on religion and relations vis-à-vis Europe – from different angles in order to arrive at the theoretical groundings that guide my research. The first section has argued that – for the sake of academic scrutiny as well as out of normative considerations – there is a case for reconsidering the wide-spread ignorance of religion in IR theory and analyses. While there is a plethora of widely differing phenomena and movements referred to as 'religious', it was suggested that one important defining feature applicable to most of them is that they centrally include references to the sacred and supernatural, which in turn

presupposes an *element of faith* to be present for the acceptance of this basic characteristic (that can not be defined or comprehended by a purely rational logic).

In the second section, I have argued that identity, like other phenomena in the social world, is best understood as essentially constructed through social interaction, and is conveyed through various narrative processes that define its constitutive elements. Therefore, identities are not given or stable but rather politically contested and in flux – although this may not always be noticed by the holders of these identities. In order to establish a stable sense of identity, such narratives must necessarily and simultaneously be based on both an inclusive logic (saying what “we are”) and an exclusive one (to show what “we are *not*”), the latter of which can include the inscription of sharp delineating lines, for example, through the securitisation of (aspects of) an identity. Furthermore, I have shown that in the particular case of national identity constructions, different logics contribute to the establishment of essentialised images of what a nation 'is' or is supposed to be. A particularly important principle in this context is the discursive combination of several more specific traits, such as language, ethnicity, religion, into a seemingly coherent whole.

For the thesis at hand, there are several relevant linkages between the theories and concepts explicated in the foregoing chapters. The most obvious connection between national identity and religion is when a specific denomination is included into the canon of defining traits for a nation, examples for which are numerous, ranging from unequivocal “Islamic republics” to references to God in a constitution or on national emblems. Such references can then also be employed for straightforward delineations from other nations not sharing the same religion.

But also on a more subtle level, religious terminologies can continue to live on in the narratives of nations, although the corresponding state may be professedly built upon secularist foundations. This happens, for instance, when different denominators employed for defining a nation are imbued with (quasi-) religious qualities, for example, by viewing a certain territory as “sacred lands”, or by construing the purpose (or mission) of a nation in terms of a divine destiny. Examples for the latter have been found in such different contexts as the American “Manifest Destiny” (portraying the United states as ordained and destined by the god to expand across the North American continent) or a mission to advance Communism on a global scale carved out for communist Russia in the 20th century. Smith (2000:799) refers to such instances

of religious jargon being implicitly or explicitly present in political discourses as the “messianisation of politics”.

On the other hand, in a reversal of the this logic of linking religion and national identity, references to religion can be endowed with political significance to serve political purposes. This process of “politicisation of religion” (ibid.) has been observed, for example, when originally religious sites are declared national shrines, when traditional prophets are elevated into the rank of a national hero, or when holy scriptures or parts thereof are reinterpreted as national epics. Such practices can thus contribute to instilling a sense of one's nation having 'sacred' properties that go far beyond mundane' allegiance to a state based on characteristics, such as social welfare or the protection of property and well-being. In essence, it has been observed that religion

far from being squeezed out of the frame of a secularising modernity, re-emerges within it in new guises. Its legacies are not buried and forgotten, rather they are transmuted in and by nationalism. For, not only are specific motifs, symbols, and traditions of earlier world religions taken over and used by nationalists [...]; nationalism itself, through its conception of the nation as a sacred communion [...] becomes a novel kind of anthropocentric, intra-historical, and political 'religion' (Smith 2000:811).

However, the implications of these various possible linkages between religion and the idea of a nation are particularly important when considering that – as explicated earlier – a distinguishing feature of religion is that it involves a crucial *element of faith*, which in turn suggests that defining principles and truths are divinely preordained and eternal, rather than being subject to negotiations or change. As Laustsen and Wæver (2003) point out, this aspect of religion provides for a particularly fruitful ground for the securitisation of identity. This is because the eternal and unflexible nature of religious identities inscribe a rather strict either-or-logic when dealing with others (i.e. they can only fully belong to the same religiously-based community or not at all) or with challenges (perceived to be) addressed at them (Mansbach and Rhodes 2006:16). Instances of 'otherness' can thus more easily translate into strongly othering perceptions because of this lack of room for negotiation. Moreover, religion, by definition, does not deal with only some specific aspects of life or marginal, mundane matters, but rather provides for the principles of *being* in itself. It is therefore that threats directed at religion easily become defined as profoundly imperilling existence as such. In other words the relevance of religion with regards to its potential for securitisation lies in the fact that,

religion is existential, and hence [...] threats against sacred objects are often seen as

existential threats demanding immediate and effective action by the state or an entity endowed with similar power [...] [and hence] the possibility of success in making the security move on behalf of sacred objects is greater than when attempting to securitise most other objects (Laustsen and Wæver 2003:159)

Having thus laid out the theoretical assumptions that guide the analysis conducted for the thesis, I will now turn to the specific methodological tools employed in order to investigate potential linkages between religion and national identity and belonging in Russia, namely Q methodology.

4. Q Methodology as a tool for exploring discourses

4.1. New insights through “traditional” methods?

Obviously, in the social sciences there is a wide array of methodologies available to help the researcher in answering different kinds of questions. In the following, I will shortly discuss the question as to what methods would be available to my research project and also point out some shortcomings of the “traditional”, that is, established, methods for the particular questions I am asking. This will lead me to conclude that a rather novel method, named Q Methodology, is suitable for my purposes. I will consequently describe the fundamental features of Q Methodology and present the different stages of the Q methodological research undertaken for this thesis.

In accordance with the constructive ideas sketched out in an earlier part of this paper, I hold the conviction that the world is not simply ‘out there’ presenting itself to the observer in unambiguous ways. This is especially true of the social world and has important repercussions for any research into phenomena of the social world. Guzzini points us to the “twofold interpreted character of the social world” (2000:156). Let me explain what is meant by the notion of ‘twofoldedness’.

On one hand, ‘twofoldedness’ connotes that *meaning* (and therefore *knowledge*) is socially constructed, that is, it rests in discursive processes and is thereby (re-) constructed, upheld or obscured continuously in human interaction. Social action takes place within this ‘framework’ of socially constructed meaning: Any action is assumed to ‘make sense’ in a certain context for the actor (an individual, a group) performing it. This is not to say that action would always be *rational* in the sense attributed to it by ‘rational choice’-approaches and others that focus on benefit-maximisation. Nevertheless, action is usually preceded by an assessment of a given situation, the consideration of current knowledge and attention to a desired outcome. In short, social action is based upon *interpretation* performed by the actor(s). Needless to say, other actors in turn interpret any action against the backdrop of their own knowledge.

A researcher of social phenomena is thus confronted with the fact that social action is intertwined with interpretation. As the term interpretation implies, it is not a straightforward process with predictable results but rather the outcome of individual and collective construction

process. It is important to note that – in accordance with constructivist assumptions – not only the actor interprets the world around them and acts accordingly, but also the researcher herself can only interpret any social action – therefore, we should keep in mind that social science research is the result of a two-fold interpretation:

[N]o experience that is interpreted or reflected on can be characterised as immediate, just as no [...] interpreter can be entirely believed if he or she claims to have achieved an Archimedean perspective that is subject neither to history nor to a social setting. (Said 1994:32)

In the course of their studies, students of social sciences are usually required to familiarize themselves with two main and differing sets of methods of enquiry into social phenomena, namely “qualitative” and “quantitative” approaches. A good example of quantitative methods are social surveys in which the researcher assumes and pre-selects several possible answers to a given problem, which are then presented to a set of respondents who are asked to state their opinion by selecting the options they agree or disagree with most. Individual answers are then statistically correlated in order to determine significant common factors of agreement and disagreement and to project the distribution of certain sets of opinions onto a wider population.

A common challenge addressed at quantitatively-oriented methods is that the researcher interprets the social world even *before* the respondent is asked anything: when drawing up a questionnaire, the researcher necessarily censors and limits the scope of the possible answers – a respondent may thus want to give very different answers from those offered in a questionnaire but has no option to do so. Alternative and new points of view are thus hard to attain by use of a pre-defined questionnaire since respondents are bound to the interpretations made by the researcher in advance. In other words, subjects are assumed to subscribe to particular views on a certain question, which is pre-defined by a researcher. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that such statistical investigations rarely result in a real advance in knowledge since the researcher is forced to interpret the results of a survey by returning to the same categories that she superimposed by drawing up the questionnaire (Brown 1980:4; Durning 1999:391). What a social survey approach thus neglects is the fact that world-views and opinions are not monolithic and permanent structures. Rather, they are better described as a composition a different factors and view-points that are under constant discussion and reconstruction – although these processes proceed at very different speeds. This is especially true of national identities that I am after in this master’s thesis: Although the term ‘national identity’ has come to be used as a self-evident phenomenon and an inherent attribute of

humanity (Wong and Sun 1992:248) it is, in fact, far from clear what it denotes, what it is composed of in a particular society and how it is brought into being and upheld through discursive processes.

While surely being of benefit for certain types of social scientific investigations, what survey methods thus lack is a sensibility for the subjective perceptions of the respondents as well as the complexity of discursive constructions. In my opinion, what is needed for the task at hand is a method that takes a more “anthropological” (Aalto 2003:578) approach to the analysis of identity, namely one that uncovers the discourses and debates leading to what survey methods take as coherent and monolithic positions, thereby revealing the options, opinions and arguments *behind* such complex notions as ‘national identity’ and such. Therefore, it is instructive to look at the approaches located at the other ‘extreme end’ of the spectrum of social research methods and see what they would have to offer for an exploration of national identity constructions.

At the other ‘extreme’ of commonly used social research methods are qualitative methods that often stand in stark contrast to quantitative methods. Interviews with open-ended questions are a good example of such methods. These may help a researcher to get a more complete and thorough understanding of the respondents’ opinions and world-views, since answers are not pre-defined as with the quantitative methods. (This is not to say, however, that interviews would always result in novel insights: Also open-ended questions can be restrictive if the underlying theory and a researcher’s ideas are too one-sided.) A researcher can thus potentially uncover some elements of discursive constructions and show how different views are combined by a respondent so as to form an allegedly coherent point of view.

Among the drawbacks of methodological approaches involving open-ended interviews, however, is that they require a lot of resources (especially time) so that the number of interviews one researcher can complete is quite limited so that one can often wonder how representative a sample a researcher can analyse in the end and how much this can tell us about a broader population. There is hence the danger of particularity, that is, the risk that research relying on such methods is not able to illuminate much more than the particular case, while also the drawing of general conclusions is complicated by lack of “comparability” of different respondents individual worldviews (if laid out in an open-ended, unstructured way).

Another problem inherent in qualitative methods stems from the ‘twofold interpreted character of the social world’ mentioned above. With regard to an interview, this connotes that the analysis of interview material does not only record the interpretations expressed by the respondents about the world she lives in (that social sciences research is genuinely interested in) but is also influenced by the interpretations of the researcher herself. A text (like an interview) can only speak for itself in a quite limited way – a researcher analysing the material needs to attribute importance to the various expressions found – that is, some things will be interpreted as significant while others are not (the element of choice).

Of course, establishing a rigid theoretical framework and defining precise research questions can help avoid a total arbitrariness of the analysis. Still, there is reason to assume that the element of choice has an unavoidable influence on much qualitative research: different researchers may interpret the same material and come to very different conclusions as to its ‘meaning’. However carefully and ‘objectively’ one tries to proceed with the analysis.

In the light of the shortcomings and restrictions of more traditional social sciences research methods, and especially for the specific research project at hand, in which my aim is to let respondents speak for themselves, an exploration of an alternative methodological approach appears as an interesting path to take, namely so-called Q Methodology.

4.2. Reversing the focus: Basic tenets of Q Methodology

Although not widely known and employed in social science research and IR in particular, Q Methodology has developed a considerable body of literature since its inception by the psychologist William Stephenson in 1935. (Brown 1996; Brown 1986:72; Aalto 2001b:89; Horwood 2000:492.)

In short, Q Methodology was devised as a method to study “operant subjectivity” in a scientific way. The term “subjectivity” here refers to the view that – in line with constructivist ideas – our view(s) of the world and opinions are constructed by individual and collective processes, that is, they are not a given that can be deducted from external factors but rather are in the possession of each individual subject. The word “operant”, on the other hand, denotes that Q Methodology attempts to enable respondents taking part in a study to express their individual, subjective viewpoints and perceptions (and the connections between different elements of a

view) without being forced in pre-constructed categories (as employed, for example, by survey methods) – that is, they “operate” actively in the course of the research and speak for themselves. Furthermore, a difference between Q methodology and social survey methods is that respondents, rather than just assigning a certain value to a given statements, are also enabled (or indeed forced) to rank *among* statements. Thus, the meaning a given statement holds for an individual is determined not only by looking at how (high or low) it is ranked individually, but also by observing how that ranking compares with the scores given to other statements (Haesly 2005:245).

Q Methodology was developed by Stephenson as an alternative to the so-called R-methodological approaches, where “R” stands for the commonly used Spearman or Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (usually denoted as “r”, “Q” being used to show the close relationship with the more traditional method but at the same time to point at strictly contrasting characteristics). To be sure, Q Methodology also uses factor analysis based on calculations of correlations. However, R methods are interested in revealing correlations or relationships between traits or variables, for example, the correlation of respondents' age with them agreeing or rejecting a certain political statement, i.e. the scores of each set of persons on each of a set of variables are the raw data from which R factor analysis proceeds. Samples are thus defined in terms of populations of persons and significant correlations are then generalised to a wider population (Brown 1980:28).

Q Methodology, by contrast, reverses the focus of the research: attention is focussed not on “transindividual” characteristics (Brown 1996) but on how concrete individuals react to and think about materials they are confronted with. These reactions are recorded as individual samples which are then correlated in order to find potentially similar attitudinal structures among the participants in a Q study. In this way, Q Methodology can provide a researcher with *systematic* insights that are unavailable in other methods (Durning 1999:391). In what follows, I will explain the different steps required to conduct a Q methodological study of operant subjectivity.

4.3. Technical implementation of a Q methodological study

A Q methodological study proceeds in four basic steps. Firstly, a *concourse* (from the Latin word *concursum*, meaning “running together”) representing the volume of discussion on the

topic under investigation is constructed, from which, in a second step, a manageable number of statements (usually 40-60) is selected with the help of a theoretical model; this is called the *Q sample*. In a third step the Q sample is presented to participants who are instructed to sort (or rank-order) the statements into a quasi-normal distribution, the result of which is called the *Q sort*, which is recorded for each individual participant. The fourth step consists of a statistical analysis and correlation of all Q sorts collected for the research so as to identify patterns of subjective viewpoints among participants that can point at shared discourses (so-called factors) which are then subjected to qualitative interpretation and discursive analysis (Brown 1980; Wong and Sun 1998:252; Aalto 2001b:89). The following sections show in more detail the specific methodological research layout and implementation of the Q study conducted for the present thesis.

4.3.1. Concourse and Q sample

In order to study participants' subjective perceptions and viewpoints on a given topic, a researcher first needs to become familiarised with the volume of discussion, that is, all different statements of opinion and ideas present in the various discourses (Aalto 2001b:89). For the study at hand, I therefore had to look at discourses on Russian national identity, in particular those discourses dealing with Russian belonging internationally and with regards to Europe, and, on the other hand, narratives dealing with internal identity construction and with components related to religion.

A total of 98 statements were collected from various English-language sources between December 2006 and March 2007, such as different internet pages, news media, and scholarly books and articles. Aiming to present participants with as a genuine selection of statements as possible, special care was taken to select primarily original quotes. Thus, even those statements extracted from secondary literature, such as academic sources, are direct quotes that have actually been uttered by participants in discourses on Russian national identity. Some statements were minimally edited in order to ensure the clarity of their meaning and to avoid confusion caused by potentially ambiguous expressions.

As indicated above, the concourse is supposed to reflect the whole volume of discourse on the topic being investigated, but as Aalto (2001b:91) points out, the volume of a given discourse is virtually indefinite (see also Brown 1980:28). Therefore, to ensure that the most important

dimensions of a discourse are represented, it is necessary to construct a theoretical model that guides the selection of statements (cf. Wong and Sun 1998:254). As demonstrated in chapter two, the theoretical model I apply for this research assumes that national identity construction can have reference objects situated both inside and outside of the reference nation, and, at the same time, can be based on either an inclusive or exclusive (othering/securitising) logic.

Based on the theoretical model, I devised five categories (a-e) in which statements of the concourse could theoretically fall. Two of these categories deal with Russia's place in the world and its relationship with Europe and the West, where

- (a) includes statements from Westernising discourses, and
- (b) those that would fall in the category of Slavophiles and/or a non-Western belonging.

Regarding the religious component of the discourses, I identified three categories:

- the first (c) denoting statements that use religion as an essentialising and othering or securitising marker of identity; whereas
- category (d) represents statements that deal with the relationship between Russian national identity and religion in an inclusive way, while
- category (e) includes those statements that describe religion as playing a lesser or no role at all in contemporary Russian identity.

Out of the total number of statements in the concourse, 40 items were selected as the Q sample. It is obvious that the final Q sample cannot reflect the whole richness of the concourse. Limiting the number of statements, however, is necessitated by several reasons, not least practical needs and time constraints with a view to the Q sort sessions. It should also be noted that the necessary 'thinning out' of the full concourse into a more manageable sample is not a fact to be overly concerned about. This is because in Q Methodology the individual statements do not have a predetermined meaning (like in survey, for example) but are rather simply the tools through which participants are enabled to construct their own subjective view of a given topic. The placement in the different categories (a-e) is thus provisional in any case. More

important in the selection of the Q sample is that a good balance between the statements is maintained, so that the whole breadth of the discourse is reflected, which is exactly why a theoretical model is drawn up beforehand to guide further application of the Q study. (Brown 1986:59; Aalto 2000b:91; Aalto 2003:580).

The full Q sample is reproduced in table 1 below. Each statement is marked with the category it was provisionally assigned to (a-e). Owing to the fact that the Q sample was selected from real-life discourses, some statements obviously represent more than one category, which is consequently also indicated (e.g. “ab”).

TABLE 1
Q SAMPLE OF DISCOURSES ON RELIGION AND RUSSIAN NATIONAL BELONGING
(n=40)

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. All political processes active in our society since 1991, in fact, lack any religious constituents (e). 2. Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsored international terrorism to Western civilisation - Russia has taken upon itself to fight this threat on its own territory (a). 3. For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a foreign policy issue but also very much a matter of internal cohesion and territorial integrity of the federation (d). 4. In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong national identity is outdated - 'who I am' could also be defined by reference to other factors than a 'nation' (e). 5. Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthodoxy, and Russians must be aware of this threat (c). 6. Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle be considered equal to Russian Orthodoxy, although they should retain minority status, with Russia as a whole being regarded as a Russian Orthodox country (c). 7. Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and Protestant), and new religious movements of Western origins are all sources of danger to the integrity of Russian culture (bc). 8. It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic peoples has been the cornerstone of Russian statehood for centuries on end! Also, the two religions profess similar moral values, primarily asserting the priority of spiritual sources over the idea of uncontrolled material consumption (d). 9. Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been designed to serve as a link in the chain of humanity's development to achieve a specific conjunction of European culture and Asia's enlightenment (b). 10. One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodoxy (c). 11. One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy, that is, adherence to the teaching and rituals of the Russian Orthodox church (c). 12. Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West (a). 13. Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of European Enlightenment and Christianity to the East (ac).

14. Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should not be used to define who can and who cannot be Russian (e).
15. Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamentally different from that of the West (b).
16. It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Russians (~4%) do actually practice Orthodox religion. It therefore does not make much sense to call Russia an Orthodox nation. (e).
17. Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and its civilisation. There can be no Russia without Europe, just as there can be no Europe without Russia (a).
18. Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real' Europe (=Western Europe) and the 'genuine' Asia of the Far East. It is thus neither fully European nor fully Asian (b).
19. Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West (a).
20. Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the West, but it is not becoming part of the West (b).
21. Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskaia) nation, understood as the solidarity of citizens regardless of their ethnicity and/or religion. Local ethnic, religious, and cultural loyalties could still exist without being in conflict with a broader Russian identity (e).
22. Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe from negative forces in the East [such as Islamic radicalism] (ac).
23. Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, with Russia, flanked by the CIS neighbours, as an independent pole of power and influence (b).
24. Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and making them feel Russians (d).
25. Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the country's splitting along a new East-West divide inside Russia (b).
26. Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe by equating 'Europe' with 'Western Europe'. Such ploys, however, cannot change the geographic and historical realities. Russia's trade, cultural and political links with other European nations and states have deep roots in history. We are Europeans. Old Russia was united with Europe by Christianity (ac).
27. The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly target (and do already target) the religion of the true Godmanhood, that is to say, Holy Orthodoxy, the main bearer of which is the great eastern Christian civilisation and primarily Russia. Now the question is: will Russia adopt the neo-liberal standards, abandoning her Orthodox-imperial identity? (c).
28. The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially under the conditions of American dominance, is a highly urgent task. In many ways, Russia could take it upon itself (b).
29. The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's marginalisation - this process can only be reversed by a conscious Russian decision in favor of Europe (a).
30. The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and a principal foreign investor - it is the only political-economic 'large-space' into which Russia can integrate (a).
31. The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them European because Orthodox religion comes from Byzantium and is therefore fundamentally different from Catholic/Protestant Europe (bc).
32. The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia is a positive development, because it forces the Orthodox priests themselves to move on. We will witness several religious patterns in the future, for we live in a country with TV, computers and internet, so it's absurd to hold on to the domination of one religion (d).

33. The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was designed by its leaders to be a counterbalance to the Catholic West; its foreign policy was a rejection of the West. We can become European. But then Russia will lose its place as the first member of Russian civilisation and will become the last member of Western civilisation (bc).
 34. The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistakes linked to Islam. The historically usual forms of Islam, which gave the world an enormous cultural riches and played a very relevant role in the history of many peoples, are often purposely misconceived (d).
 35. The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier against the destruction of Russian statehood, the ideological aggression of westernisation and liberalism (bc).
 36. The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditional lifestyle and got used, in the past couple of years, to the increasingly predominant climate of spiritual and intellectual pluralism and can therefore no longer be satisfied with a statehood based on ethnic-confessional categories (e).
 37. The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi-religious state. As a separate Great Russian ethnos they will soon die out (d).
 38. The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russia are a good example of successful inter-ethnic and inter-confessional integration (d).
 39. There is not much good and worth imitating in the West (b).
 40. Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the path of faith and spirit (bc).
-

4.3.2. Selection of participants and administration of the Q sort

As the foregoing sections have demonstrated, in the course of preparing a Q methodological experiment, I proceeded by utilising a theoretical model of identity construction to select a concourse on the topic of Russia's relationship with Europe and the role attributed to religion in contemporary Russian identity. From the concourse, a comprehensive Q sample was selected for further study.

The selection of participants for conducting the actual Q methodological experiment was guided both by practical and theoretical considerations. All participants in the study were students at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO; in Russian: Московский государственный институт международных отношений (Университет) МИД России, МГИМО), an academic establishment closely affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I spent six month as an exchange student during 2006. MGIMO is considered the oldest and the best-known school in Russia for preparing specialists in International relations and Diplomacy and is sometimes referred to as the “Harvard of Russia”. It has been claimed that today, more than two-thirds of Russia's diplomats and senior

government officials are graduates of MGIMO (Wikipedia 2008; Bulatov 2008; Torkunov 2008).

Restricting the selection of participants to students from MGIMO had practical advantages in that I could safely assume that most would have suitable English skills; because my own Russian language skills were not sufficient for conducting scientific experiments or analysing results in Russian, I was dependent on finding a group of participants with suitable proficiency in English. Another practical consideration was that – since at the time of the experiment I was not situated in Russia myself – participants should be rather easy to reach so that all experiments could be conducted in the rather short time frame of approximately one week.

However, also when considering the topic and scope of the research at hand, there are good reasons for focussing the research on MGIMO students only. On one hand, owing to the fact that MGIMO is an “elite institute” in the field on international relations, most students can be expected to be aware of the topics discussed to an appropriate extent. As Aalto stresses, when researching topics of a more complex nature, it is important to “talk with people who are knowledgeable [and] show interest in the issues discussed” (2001b:103). Furthermore, the fact that many participants can be expected to fill rather influential positions (both professionally and socially) after their graduation from a prestigious institution such as MGIMO – and will potentially even be in places where national identity discourses are shaped – certainly add an element of interest to the study undertaken here (on the question of validity and generalisability of the result, however, see below).

The guiding principle for selecting participants out of the total population of MGIMO students was to achieve diversity in various respects. The aim was thus to involve persons with considerably differing backgrounds and interests, which was based on the assumption that in such a group also the variety of opinions and viewpoints on Russian national identity would be a given. This, in turn, would contribute to obtaining contrasting Q sorts and the consequent emergence of distinctive discursive structures for further analysis, and therefore also the potential for finding new ways to link national identity and religion. Criteria such as gender, age, duration of studies at MGIMO, major subject, geographic origin, and, obviously, religious denomination were used in order to assess and attain a diverse group of participants.

With the help of some of my former fellow students at MGIMO, I thus invited 17 persons to participate in an experiment on questions of Russian identity. Despite the effort to include a diverse group of participants, however, it is important to note that the 17 subjects who participated are not meant to be representative of any larger population in a quantitative-statistical sense – neither of “all students at MGIMO”, nor of “Russians” in general. This is because Q Methodology focus is on the exploration and analysis discursive patterns rather than generalisable dependencies between viewpoints and various political or social variables, like a social survey would do (Wong and Sun 1998:254; Dryzek and Berejikian 1993:51). Thus, in Q Methodology

it is the correlation between subjects (sorters) that is important. This means that individual viewpoints are kept whole, rather than atomized across variables, and that a larger number of statements across a smaller number of sorters can provide [...] validity in a statistical sense (Eden et al. 2005:416).

In other words, a Q methodological experiment can be considered as “valid” when it achieves to reveal major discursive patterns that exist in a given population, whereas the *quantitative* distribution of viewpoints among respondents will *not* be considered as representative of a wider population. Rather, what Q methodology is interested in are the discourse patterns evident in the idealised Q sorts and the discursive relationships between these. In this way, results of Q technique are seen as generalizable in the sense that discursive patterns found (alongside their internal logic) – which themselves can be described as distinctive ways of understanding and explaining that are shared by several respondents – can be assumed to be present in a wider population, too. The relevance of the results of a Q methodological analysis lies in the possibility to contrast these outcomes with the current knowledge in a given field, and thereby, for example, to identify gaps in the existing literature and to point out discursive patterns of particular importance for the purpose of guiding further scientific inquiries to be conducted with the help of other research methods (such as surveys), or uncovering new research topics more generally. Put plainly, the discursive patterns found through the Q methodological research conducted for this thesis are first and foremost seen to describe different viewpoints held by the actual participants, as well as the relations between these positions. However, since only those discursive constructions *shared* by *several* respondents are part of the analysis, there is good reason to assume that similar patterns also exist in the wider Russian population. Nevertheless, the analysis is not intended to (and can not) supply more detailed information about the percentage of Russians subscribing to one or another viewpoint.

Participants were invited for individual Q sorting sessions during a period of one week in March 2007. Each participant was introduced to the topic of my research and was also ensured that all personal information would be kept strictly confidential. Participants were then handed a form to enter basic information about themselves, including a nick name to be used in the published study and a short “self identification”⁸. The form also contained instructions for performing the Q sort. A summary of the background information provided by participants can be found in table 2, a specimen of the form used for recording participant data, Q sorts and responses in Annex 1.

*TABLE 2:
PARTICIPANTS IN THE Q SORTING EXPERIMENTS (n=17)*

	Nickname	Gender	Year of Birth	Years of Study	Major subject	Origin (city)	“Self-identification”
1.	Shurikc	M	1987	2	Journalism	St. Petersburg	Russian, Christian
2.	Juliac	F	1977	2	European Law	Kursk	Russian Orthodox
3.	Elli	F	1986	3	International Relations	Krasnodar	Russian, Jewish
4.	Bella	F	1986	4	Political Science	Smolensk	Russian Orthodox
5.	Werter	M	1979	3	International Law	Astrakhan	Russian, Orthodox
6.	Vovlinzij	M	1987	2	Economics	Ekaterinburg	Russian, “considering the point [of religion]”
7.	Olja	F	1988	1	Journalism	Lahdenpohja	Russian Orthodox
8.	Vladimir	M	1986	4	International Relations	Lipetsk	Russian (Orthodox)
9.	Verundel	F	1986	3	Public Relations	Krasnodar	Russian Jewish
10.	Ksündel	F	1988	2	Journalism	Chelybinsk	Russian
11.	Dr. Schmurge	M	1987	3	Portuguese	Moscow	Russian Orthodox
12.	Namaskarsab log	M	1988	2	Hindi, Diplomacy	Yalta	Russian

⁸ When studying table 2, one should keep in mind that participants filled the form *after* hearing about the topic of the experiment, which may explain why many chose to identify themselves also in religious terms. As was explicated above, religious denomination was a factor in pre-selecting the participants, and several persons with Muslim background did indeed take part in the study. However, none of them seems to have chosen to mention this detail in the field “self identification”. Interesting as they may be, an analysis of the potential reasons for these phenomena are beyond the scope of this study.

13.	Patte	M	1984	6	World Politics	Vologda Region	Russian Orthodox
14.	Gonduras	M	1985	2	International Relations	Kaliningrad	Russian, Orthodox
15.	SPN	M	1986	3	Political Science	Sakhalin	Russian
16.	Joie de vivre	F	1987	2	International Relations	Kaliningrad	Russian/ Orthodox
17.	Denise	F	1987	2	International Relations	Moscow	Russian

Participants were then handed a pack of 40 credit card-sized cards, each of which showed one statement from the Q sample. In order to allow for easy recording of results and further analysis, the cards were numbered. Numbering was based on the alphabetical of the first letter with which each statement begins so as to randomise the order of the Q sample content-wise. Furthermore, cards were shuffled before each participant's Q sort began, in order to further avoid the impression of any preconceived structure in the set of cards. I instructed participants to place the cards on a grid arranged in a quasi-normal distribution, ranging from “1=most unlike my view“ to “10=most like my view”, with the middle (5-6) to be used for those statement causing neutral or no feelings or simply confusion (see Figure 1). I also clarified that the cards are to be rank-sorted on a horizontal scale and that the vertical order of the final Q-sort is not significant (e.g. all cards placed in the same column are assumed to be of roughly similar importance to the participant. I encouraged them to ask questions at any time or look up unknown words from an English-Russian dictionary that was available in easy reach. In addition, a Russian “assistant” of mine was present in all sessions and her excellent English language skills and readiness to help were pointed out as well. Participants were finally advised that a good way to start was to sort the cards onto three piles first, in order to achieve a rough division between “neutral” and “extreme” statements before proceeding with the Q-sort proper.

*FIGURE 1:
FORCED Q SORTING GRID*

<i>most unlike my view</i>					<i>most like my view</i>				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

The forced distribution usually employed in Q Methodology has received some critical attention as it may seem to unduly restrict respondents in the choices they can make. However, even in the forced grid, participants have ample room for expressing their individuality, as the number of possible different ways of sorting the Q sample goes exceeds several sextillion⁹ (Brown 1980:201, 265). And, as Aalto appositely points out, “life is about making tough choices, and in the 'real world' one continually makes these distinctions by preferring one option over another” (2001b:105). Asking participants to stick to the forced distribution is thus no 'unnatural' request – in many cases it may actually be helpful for participants to be more conscious of their own preferences. Lastly, it must be noted (and was similarly stressed to participants) that the sorting of statements does not necessarily have to reflect a participant's *absolute* viewpoints, but rather a *relative* arrangement of opinions. For example, a participant is not supposed to unconditionally agree with a statement she placed under 10 – the placement in this category rather shows that it is considered more like her view than those placed in column 9, and so on.

Time spent to complete the Q sort ranged from 15 to 30 minutes. After participants had confirmed that they wanted to do no more changes, the final Q sort was recorded and a few short questions were answered from the participants. Questions mainly focussed on experiences with the Q sorting experiment and the selection of the concourse (for details, refer

⁹ sextillion=10³⁶

to Appendix 1). Opinions on the concourse were mixed, ranging from full agreement with the breadth of the selection to a few complaints about a slight imbalance, with too many statements considered either neutral or extreme. Some participants also wanted to point out some statements by which they seemed to feel personally offended (their criticism was thus aimed at the source the quote originated from, not at the inclusion of the quote into the concourse); these remained singular cases nevertheless. Reactions to Q methodology in general, which was a novel experience for all participants, were very positive; with one participant, for example, praising the opportunity to be “flexible without categorising things”. Some doubts were also expressed about the method before the experiment was begun, mainly questioning the validity of results, seeing that only a small number of persons would be included in the study, which appeared to be at odds with the principles these critics had learned in courses on quantitative research methods. These doubts were dispersed however, after explaining that Q methodology differs in its aims from other traditional methods.

5. Let them speak for themselves! Analysis and Interpretation of the Q sorts

As was mentioned above, in essence Q methodology is a hybrid method, combining qualitative and quantitative approaches to social science research and ways of inquiry into the social world (Yanchar 2006). The research is begun by a qualitative phase consisting of the compilation of a concourse and the selection of Q samples, which are then rank-ordered by respondents. Next follows a technical step, representing the quantitative dimension of Q methodology: The individual Q sorts are subjected to a correlation and factor analysis, aimed at identifying similarities in the ways respondents sorted the samples, ideally resulting in the emergence of groups of largely similar patterns. The final phase is again of qualitative nature, when the statistical output is subjected to interpretation and “reconstruction” of discourses.

5.1. Calculating correlations and extracting factors

Special software¹⁰ is available for calculating correlations between Q sorts. Theoretically, the correlation between Q sorts can range from +1.00 (meaning that respondents have sorted statements in absolutely identical ways) to -1.00 (meaning that respondents have sorted statements in a diametrically opposite ways). An absolute correlation is of course very unlikely to occur, as not even the same person in real life is expected to rank-order the same Q sort in exactly the same way twice – a coefficient of 0.8 to 0.9 would usually be assumed even in this case (Brown 1980:211).

By identifying correlations between Q sorts, patterns of agreement and disagreement can thus be found among the Q sorts. If statistically significant correlations (composites) are found, these are called *factors*. Factors are thus meant to represent clusters of Q sorts showing broadly similar viewpoints: “factors can be considered as attitudes [...] the factor groupings therefore reflect actual audience segmentation” (Brown 1980:23). The extent to which different respondents' Q sorts overlap can be denoted by the correlation coefficient, called *factor loading*. In Q methodology, it is assumed that these commonly held viewpoints (may) represent discursive positions.

¹⁰ The most widely used software appears to be PQMETHOD (current version 2.11), which is freely available for download at <http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~schmolck/qmethod/>.

With the help of the dedicated Q software (PQMETHOD), the 17 completed Q sorts were analysed by applying *Principal Component Analysis* (PCA), a standard tool of statistical analysis packages, to extract an initial factorial solution (the software automatically extracts 8 factors by default). These initial factors were then subjected to a *Varimax* rotation, aimed at maximising the loadings on relevant factors. As a logical result of the rotation, the loadings on some factors are thus minimised, too, which leads to a final output of some (usually fewer) factors with high loadings – that are then subjected to interpretative analysis – and some with minimal loadings, which can be 'discarded' and are thus not included in the interpretation because they have no explanatory value for the data set¹¹. By processing the Q sorts collected for the study at hand, four distinct factors were extracted, accounting for 63 per cent of the total variance. The clustering of respondents into these factors and their respective factor loadings are shown in table 3.

TABLE 3:
PARTICIPANTS AND FACTOR LOADINGS (n=17) (BASED ON TABLE 2)

Respondent	Gender	Year of Birth	Years of study	Factor (=Discourse)			
				I	II	III	IV
1. Shurike	M	1987	2	0.23	-0.14	(0.64)	0.27
2. Juliac	F	1977	2	(0.58)	0.14	0.34	0.34
3. Elli	F	1986	3	0.37	(0.72)	0.15	0.16
4. Bella	F	1986	4	0.38	0.32	(0.66)	-0.28
5. Werter	M	1979	3	(0.80)	-0.16	-0.07	0.13
6. Vovlinzij	M	1987	2	-0.20	(0.77)	-0.22	-0.08
7. Olja	F	1988	1	(0.67)	0.03	0.00	0.14
8. Vladimir	M	1986	4	(0.65)	0.05	0.09	0.01
9. Verundel	F	1986	3	0.19	(0.72)	0.33	0.03
10. Ksündel	F	1988	2	0.24	0.29	-0.08	(0.62)
11. Dr. Schmurge	M	1987	3	0.03	-0.18	0.08	(0.84)
12. Namaskarsablog	M	1988	2	(0.67)	0.43	0.31	0.11
13. Patte	M	1984	6	0.46	0.19	0.35	0.43
14. Gonduras	M	1985	2	0.26	-0.11	(-0.73) ¹²	-0.01

¹¹ In plain words, the rotation aims to mathematically 'clean up' the factor matrix so as to extract a few factors with high relevance. The literature on Q methodology is divided over the best procedure for extracting factors: While some advocate the use of PCA and Varimax (which I use here) as tools for arriving at the most correct solution in a *statistical* (or *quantitative*) sense, others favour a *centroid* method for initial factor extraction and a subsequent *judgemental* or *theoretical rotation*, which they claim produces better results that are *qualitatively* more informative. However, both basic approaches to factor extraction are widely used and valid for Q methodological analysis. Furthermore, when applied to identical data sets, they have been shown to produce largely similar results (Watts and Stenner 2005:81; Aalto 2001b:114). The unrotated and rotated factor matrices are contained in Annex 2.

15. SPN	M	1986	3	(0.69)	0.22	0.33	-0.19
16. Joie de vivre	F	1987	2	(0.62)	0.27	0.15	0.35
17. Denise	F	1987	2	(0.66)	0.10	-0.32	0.18

Figures in bold face and parentheses are factor loadings of statistical significance at the 0.01 level. The significance level is obtained by the formula $(1/\sqrt{N})2.58(SE_r)=0.41$ where N is the number of statements (40). (Stephenson 1980:279-288; Aalto 2001b:113.). Q sorts with a significant factor loading on more than one factor are not included as defining sorts.

Based on the factor loadings of each cluster, an *idealised Q sort* can thus be arrived at, in which each statement is assigned a *factor score* which is based on the aggregate it has been assigned by the respondents defining each factor. The factor score of a statement can therefore be used to identify the degree of agreement or disagreement that each discursive position (i.e. factor) holds on each statement. Through a detailed investigation of the idealised Q sorts, that is, an analysis of how the statements are related to each other within a factor, an interpretative reconstruction of the discursive positions – referred to as “factor interpretation” – is thus enabled, which will be conducted in the consecutive sections.

5.2. Investigating the discursive positions: Where is Russia's place in the world, and does religion play a role?

In factor interpretation, the aim is to engage in “intensive deliberate meaning reconstruction” (Wong and Sun 1998:255) in the attempt to describe how high- and low-scoring statements fit together as a coherent world view. The exercise thus goes beyond a simple listing of scoring statements for each factor. Factor scores guide this enterprise both by showing which statements are assigned a high positive (indicating agreement) or negative (denoting disagreement) significance and by enabling comparisons between the different factors, thereby finding major points of agreement within and disagreement between factors. Here, it is important to reiterate that Q methodology does *not* aim to describe relationships between individual respondents or to make inferences about them and some social or political variables (like a survey would aim to do). Rather, what Q methodology is interested in are the discourse patterns evident in the idealised Q sorts and how these relate to each other.

¹² The Q sort of respondent No. 14 (“Gonduras”) shows a statistically significant loading on factor III, which however, is expressed in a negative loading. This fact connotes that the views of respondent No. 14 are diametrically opposed to those of individuals whose loadings are positive on factor III. Q sort No. 14 is thus included as a defining sort for factor III because it confirms that the arrangement of statements by the other defining Q sorts is a valid and coherent one. However, respondent No. 14 must not be considered as adhering to this discourse but rather as being in strong opposition to the views contained therein (see also Brown 2004).

The factor scores for all statements in the Q sample are displayed in table 4 below, which will serve as the basis for the interpretative meaning reconstruction below. Factor scores, it should be remembered, correspond to the scale used by respondents for rank-ordering the Q sample, ranging from “1=most unlike my view“ to “10=most like my view”, with the middle (5-6) representing statements considered of lesser importance, as causing neutral or no feelings, or simply confusion (see Chapter 4.3.2). Therefore, factor scores between 1 and 4 are considered as expressions of disagreement with a statement, and consequently those between 7 and 10 are seen as indicating agreement, while the degree of both attitude “directions” is revealed by the relative rank, that is, “10” connotes stronger approval than “9”, and so on. The main focus of the analysis is therefore on those statements located at either extreme side of the spectrum, but – in order to ensure a picture that is as concrete and comprehensive as possible – it is occasionally instructive to compare these also with statements that respondents considered to be of lesser (positive or negative) importance (i.e. ranks 5 and 6).

Based on the statistical analysis of respondents' Q sorts, four significant factors, that is, discourse patterns, were identified, which I have chosen to entitle as follows:

- Discourse I: *Conciliatory Eurasianism*
- Discourse II: *For a Civic identity – a cosmopolitan perspective*
- Discourse III: *Russia in the West, standing with the West (against Islam)*
- Discourse IV: *A (slightly confused) anti-Western identity*

I will present and discuss each of these factors in turn, which will provide a basis for a broader discussion of the results.

*TABLE 4:
Q STATEMENTS AND FACTOR SCORES (IDEALISED Q SORTS)¹³*

Statement	Discourse			
	I	II	III	IV
1. All political processes active in our society since 1991, in fact, lack any religious constituents.	5	4	3	6
2. Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsored international terrorism to Western civilisation - Russia has taken upon itself to fight this threat on its own territory.	7	4	5	7
3. For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a foreign policy issue but also very much a matter of internal cohesion and territorial integrity of the federation.	8	7	5	9
4. In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong national identity is outdated - 'who I am' could also be defined by reference to other factors than a 'nation'.	6	7	7	3
5. Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthodoxy, and Russians must be aware of this threat.	1	3	8	2
6. Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle be considered equal to Russian Orthodoxy, although they should retain minority status, with Russia as a whole being regarded as a Russian Orthodox country.	8	5	3	6
7. Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and Protestant), and new religious movements of Western origins are all sources of danger to the integrity of Russian culture.	3	4	4	2
8. It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic peoples has been the cornerstone of Russian statehood for centuries on end! Also, the two religions profess similar moral values, primarily asserting the priority of spiritual sources over the idea of uncontrolled material consumption.	6	8	4	5
9. Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been designed to serve as a link in the chain of humanity's development to achieve a specific conjunction of European culture and Asia's enlightenment.	9	5	8	4
10. One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodoxy.	2	1	2	9
11. One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy, that is, adherence to the teaching and rituals of the Russian Orthodox church.	7	2	2	5
12. Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	5	5	10	4
13. Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of European Enlightenment and Christianity to the East.	6	6	7	5
14. Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should not be used to define who can and who cannot be Russian.	9	10	9	7
15. Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamentally different from that of the West.	6	3	6	10

¹³ Readers familiar with Q methodological research may notice that my way of presenting factor scores on a scale from 1 to 10 (centred on 5.5 as the neutral midpoint) departs from the more frequently applied pattern centred on zero (with statements scoring either on the positive or the negative side, e.g. -5 to +5), which can be obtained directly from the PQMETHOD software: I chose to “convert” the software output to the original scale used by respondents due to the fact that my research used an even number of columns (10) in the sorting grid – without this conversion, the factor scores would have been presented in a hard-to-read and rather confusing manner (ranging from -4 to +5, centred on +0.5). This slight modification, however, does obviously in no way change the results in terms of relative differences between statement scores; it is simply a different way of presenting the same configuration. (See Annex II for the original, complete output obtained from the PQMETHOD software).

16. It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Russians (~4%) do actually practice Orthodox religion. It therefore does not make much sense to call Russia an Orthodox nation.	1	9	6	5
17. Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and its civilisation. There can be no Russia without Europe, just as there can be no Europe without Russia.	9	6	9	7
18. Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real' Europe (=Western Europe) and the 'genuine' Asia of the Far East. It is thus neither fully European nor fully Asian.	10	6	6	8
19. Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	6	7	6	5
20. Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the West, but it is not becoming part of the West.	7	9	5	6
21. Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskaia) nation, understood as the solidarity of citizens regardless of their ethnicity and/or religion. Local ethnic, religious, and cultural loyalties could still exist without being in conflict with a broader Russian identity.	8	10	5	4
22. Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe from negative forces in the East [such as Islamic radicalism].	4	2	7	3
23. Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, with Russia, flanked by the CIS neighbours, as an independent pole of power and influence.	10	6	4	4
24. Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and making them feel Russians.	5	8	5	4
25. Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the country's splitting along a new East-West divide inside Russia.	3	4	6	6
26. Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe by equating 'Europe' with 'Western Europe'. Such ploys, however, cannot change the geographic and historical realities. Russia's trade, cultural and political links with other European nations and states have deep roots in history. We are Europeans. Old Russia was united with Europe by Christianity.	7	5	8	8
27. The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly target (and do already target) the religion of the true Godmanhood, that is to say, Holy Orthodoxy, the main bearer of which is the great eastern Christian civilisation and primarily Russia. Now the question is: will Russia adopt the neo-liberal standards, abandoning her Orthodox-imperial identity?	2	6	4	7
28. The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially under the conditions of American dominance, is a highly urgent task. In many ways, Russia could take it upon itself.	5	4	7	10
29. The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's marginalisation - this process can only be reversed by a conscious Russian decision in favor of Europe.	4	4	6	3
30. The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and a principal foreign investor - it is the only political-economic 'large-space' into which Russia can integrate.	4	3	7	6
31. The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them European because Orthodox religion comes from Byzantium and is therefore fundamentally different from Catholic/Protestant Europe.	2	7	3	7
32. The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia is a positive development, because it forces the Orthodox priests themselves to move on. We will witness several religious patterns in the future, for we live in a country with TV, computers and internet, so it's absurd to hold on to the domination of one religion.	3	8	5	8
33. The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was designed	3	6	2	1

by its leaders to be a counterbalance to the Catholic West; its foreign policy was a rejection of the West. We can become European. But then Russia will lose its place as the first member of Russian civilisation and will become the last member of Western civilisation .

34. The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistakes linked to Islam. The historically usual forms of Islam, which gave the world an enormous cultural riches and played a very relevant role in the history of many peoples, are often purposely misconceived.	7	8	4	9
35. The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier against the destruction of Russian statehood, the ideological aggression of westernisation and liberalism.	4	1	1	2
36. The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditional lifestyle and got used, in the past couple of years, to the increasingly predominant climate of spiritual and intellectual pluralism and can therefore no longer be satisfied with a statehood based on ethnic-confessional categories.	5	5	10	6
37. The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi-religious state. As a separate Great Russian ethnos they will soon die out.	5	9	9	1
38. The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russia are a good example of successful inter-ethnic and inter-confessional integration.	8	3	8	5
39. There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	6	7	3	7
40. Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the path of faith and spirit.	4	2	1	3

5.2.1. Discourse I: *Conciliatory Eurasianism*

This first discourse, which is shared by a significantly larger number of respondents than any of the others, constructs the image of a particularistic Russia as an independent and self-conscious player in international politics. Nevertheless, the discourse does not make use of highly exclusionary or conflictual views of the environment surrounding Russia, which is why it is best described as a *conciliatory* version of thinking in an overall Eurasianist framework. Furthermore, the discourse also puts forward a view of Russia as being grounded in Orthodoxy, although the need for an open and inclusive definition of 'Russianess' in the domestic sphere is acknowledged, which further justifies the use of the qualifying adjunct “conciliatory”.

In the international dimension, Russia is described as an actor that does not need to rely on any other single entity and should be able to advance its own interests independently, in particular in a wider zone of interest constituted by ex-Soviet Union countries in its vicinity: “Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, with Russia flanked by the CIS neighbours, as

an independent pole of power” (23)¹⁴. However, this claim for political latitude in the external sphere is not based upon sharp-edged delineations from other entities populating the advocated multipolar world. Rather, this discourse acknowledges a close historical and cultural relationship with Europe (17), while significant cultural-historical linkages with other vectors, such as Asian cultures (18), are appreciated, too. In effect, Russia does not fully belong to either the West or the East but is rather located in between the two (9), which makes it ultimately a unique entity that is best served by a particularistic position in world politics. For the topic of the thesis at hand it is important to note that a religious component is not considered a fundamental building block of the declared affinity and common heritage with either Europe (31).

This discourse's view of an international environment that is thus characterised by difference but lacks sharp divisions and inherent conflicts is further evident in a “desecuritizing move” rejecting descriptions of external factors and influences as threats to Russia:

	DI
7. Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and Protestant), and new religious movements of Western origins are all sources of danger to the integrity of Russian culture.	3
25. Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the country's splitting along a new East-West divide inside Russia.	3
27. The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly target (and do already target) the religion of the true Godmanhood, that is to say, Holy Orthodoxy, the main bearer of which is the great eastern Christian civilisation and primarily Russia. Now the question is: will Russia adopt the neo-liberal standards, abandoning her Orthodox-imperial identity?	2

Overall, the rejection of above statements suggests that various influences emanating in the external sphere – such as the West and the values it conveys, other Christian denominations, or Islam, are not perceived in a threatening way, and are thus of low salience for identity-confirming definitions of “who we Russians are not”. Furthermore significant is that two of the statements repudiated above (7, 27) depict Russia as being firmly grounded in (Orthodox) religion; by dismissing the relevance of talk about religion as a threatened object, this discourse – in a reverse logic – can thus be seen to confirm that religion does not serve as a factor that decisively sets Russia apart from others or that it could serve as a basis for imposing strict demarcation lines.

¹⁴ In this chapter, numbers in parentheses refer to the corresponding statements in table 4.

However, despite the reluctance to securitise religion, this discourse nevertheless paints the image of Russia as being grounded to some extent in Orthodoxy. There is some support for the idea that Orthodoxy, defined as the teachings and rituals of the Orthodox Church, can be considered as *one* “pillar of Russia's existence” (11), while at the same time statements proclaiming a downright irrelevance of Orthodox religion in contemporary Russia are rejected (16, 32). However, these assertions are not based on a logic of othering of other religions, and Russian identity on a whole is seen as being better defined more broadly, and in the future could be widened to be defined even in simply civic terms regardless of ethnicity or religious affiliations of an individual (21), where religion is considered primarily a private matter (14).

Discourse I thus assumes that Orthodox religion does matter as a point of positive self-definition for Russia. However, while being a relevant factor, it is neither considered as a necessary condition for being Russian, nor is it in any way securitised in this discourse. The logic of this argumentation may appear to produce rather fragile societal outcomes, because delicate negotiations seem to be required if Russia is to be regarded as an Orthodox country in which other religions nevertheless enjoy an “equal status” (6). However, this discourse ascertains that such a balancing act is indeed possible and actually already successfully applied in contemporary Russia, as evident, for example, in the good integration of Turkic-Muslim people in Russia (38).

5.2.2. Discourse II: *For a Civic identity – a cosmopolitan perspective*

This discourse puts forward the picture of a Russian national identity that is ideally not based on a singular confessional or ethnic affiliation, such as Orthodox Christianity. Rather, 'being Russian' should be defined in strictly civic terms. Securitising views of external influences (whether defined in religious or cultural/political terms) are rejected, while ideas about Russian commonalities and relations with Europe and the West are nevertheless seen rather cautiously.

Discourse II thus strongly rejects the view that contemporary Russia is based on Orthodoxy or that the Orthodox church and its rituals should be afforded an influential role in society (11). At the same time, it can be seen to question claims about a profound religious resurgence and of Russia as an “Orthodox nation” since church attendance remains low despite the increased number of those professing an Orthodox denomination (16). Consequently, according to this discourse, to be Russian one does not need to belong or adhere to Orthodox Christianity (10),

and the definition of Russian identity should be developed along civic lines without consideration of ethnicity or religion. Rather, it should be based on an idea of solidarity among all citizens (21). Indeed, religion should be considered a private matter in the first place and not be relevant for political definitions of Russian identity (14). This view is further supported by a positive attitude towards the (historic) role of Russia's ethnic minorities as well as contemporary cultural and religious diversity within Russia, which should not only be advanced by passive tolerance but also by active policies (24). As a matter of fact, embracing ethnic and religious diversity features as a much-needed task for contemporary Russia in this discursive pattern (37). It must be noted, however, that apparently the current integration efforts in this regard are not considered sufficient or successful by adherents of this discourse (38).

Cultural and religious diversity inside Russia are thus imbued with positive significance. Similarly, the potential positive role of external influences on Russian society is affirmed rather than politicised and considered as in a threatening fashion (32). This is evident from the rejection of arguments that employ a language of strong othering of external entities, for example, with a view to the West and the values it represents (40), or of Islam as a source of danger for Russia (5, 22, 34). The strong rejection of statement No. 35 in particular provides a good illustration of the two tendencies discussed above, in that both a significant role for Orthodox church and, at the same time, securitising arguments about Western influences are called into question:

	Discourse			
	II	I	III	IV
35. The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier against the destruction of Russian statehood, the ideological aggression of westernisation and liberalism.	1	4	1	4

The discursive structure presented by DII, however, remains rather mute about the preferable options for Russia in the external realm. As was noted above, strong othering views of the West do not find support, and Russia is not considered as being fundamentally different from Western countries (15). However, this does not translate into a clearly Westernising outlook either: Adherents of this discourse see Russia as a potential “partner” of the West, but do not consider an extensive integration with Western or European institutions as a commendable option (20, 30). On the other hand, DII also exhibits a rather indifferent attitude towards

Eurasianist arguments, which do promote a view of Russia as a unique civilisational entity that would necessarily need to follow an independent path of development (9, 18, 23). In sum, it thus difficult to say (based on the material available) where proponents of DII see Russia's place in the world, since statements invoking stark differences with both the West and the East are rejected and views of decisive similarities with either of them, as well as those referring to a Russian singular position do not find much support either. What is clear, however, is that Discourse II holds the strong conviction that religion should play no role for Russian identity definitions; neither for pointing out possible commonalities nor to expose stark divisions within Russia or vis-à-vis external entities.

5.2.3. Discourse III: *Russia in the West, standing with the West (against Islam)*

This discursive position sees Russia's position in the world very differently from the two preceding ones, as the following statement reveals, which does not only hold the highest absolute score for DIII but also clearly distinguishes itself from all other discourses by the considerable relative score difference:

	Discourse			
	III	I	II	IV
12. Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	10	5	5	4

In building upon this unapologetic definition of Russia's place in the world, it comes to little surprise that the West is not merely where Russia generally belongs but also serves a model that Russia should imitate and learn from (39). The validity of Western models for Russia is further confirmed by an outright rejection of views depicting Western moral standards as being a threat for Russia's integrity (35), or as having low value or no authority (40). Consequently, associating Russia closely with the West is not seen as being dangerous or harmful for Russian society nor for the country's international status and influence – Russia can indeed become an equal member of “Western civilisation” (33), and she should seek to strengthen the ties with Western European political institutions, such as the European Union (30). This option is clearly preferred over the vision of a “multipolar world” in which Russia would be an independent pole of power and influence (23).

However, the rather general reference to a close association with “the West” is calling for more detailed differentiation, which is indeed provided by this discourse: While various positive views of 'Europe' and its political and cultural characteristics are confirmed by this discourse (17, 26), there seem to be some reservations about US American influences, which could pose a risk to “civilisational variety and risk”, if it should become too dominant. In a way, this line of argument can be considered to follow a similar logic as the one applied in the distinction between “true” and “false” Europe (see chapter 2.2.2) in that it produces antagonistic notions of a “good” West, primarily represented by Europe, that is worth integrating into, on one hand, and a depreciated West characterised by excessive American influence, on the other.

The view of a common destiny of Russia and the (idealised European) West is further confirmed by a securitising move that, similar to statement 12 above, sets this discourse clearly apart from all others:

	Discourse			
	III	I	II	IV
5. Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthodoxy, and Russians must be aware of this threat.	8	1	3	2
22. Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe from negative forces in the East [such as Islamic radicalism].	7	4	2	3

Here, it is instructive to point out that the notion of a threatening Islam is used to stress Russia's belonging to Europe/the West in that the country is referred to as being in the first line of defence (22). In line with the theory of securitisation, this move can thus be read as constructing a common identity for Russia and Europe united by inscribing a strict line of division vis-à-vis an external threat posed by 'Islam'. It is also noteworthy that the thus advocated unity of Russia and Europe in the face of a common external threat appears to also have historical roots because DIII agrees that “Old[!] Russia was united with Europe by Christianity” (26). However, as will be shown below, this view of a historical relevance of religion does not translate into crediting Orthodoxy as a decisive or necessary element of Russian self-definitions.

While the above-quoted statement 5 actually contains two securitised objects, namely Russia and Orthodoxy, I think that it is justified to partly ignore the 'Orthodox' component of this

argument and rather consider 'Russia' as the primary securitised object vis-à-vis the threat imposed by Islam. That is because DIII – in dealing with other statements contained in the Q sample – strongly rejects views of a pivotal role being played by Orthodox religion in defining contemporary Russia or deciding who can be Russian (6, 10, 11) and instead advocates Western ideals of “spiritual and intellectual pluralism” (36) that should be practised within a preferably secular framework (14). This assumption is further supported by the appreciation of the notion of a diverse, multi-ethnic Russia in which different peoples, cultures, and religions can peacefully co-exist to the common benefit (37, 38). Whereas Orthodox Christianity is thus not considered as a crucial marker of contemporary Russian identity by DIII, mild support is nevertheless expressed for the idea that the crucial Russian commonalities with Europe (which this discourse accentuates) are not only based on “trade, cultural and political links” but also have historical-religious roots.

It is also noteworthy that there appears to be an inherent twist evident in the discursive pattern presented by DIII: While strongly othering Islam as an *external* threat, whereby a common identity with Europe/the West is confirmed, the existence of ethnic and religious diversity (including Muslim religion!) *within* Russia is imbued with positive connotations, rather than being seen as a danger. It thus seems as if the securitised object(s), namely Russia and the West, and the source of the threat, viz. Islam, are not defined in a congruent manner: the latter appears to be primarily religiously constituted while the former is not (with the exception of some historical-religious links, which are considered moderately important). A possible explanation for this must remain tentative but may lie in a perception of Islam or the “Islamic world” as a wider cultural and political entity that goes beyond strictly religiously-defined characteristics.

5.2.4. Discourse IV: *A (slightly confused) anti-Western identity*

Discourse IV is characterised by a pronounced antagonistic view of Russia versus “the West”, whereas religion does not seem to be afforded a particularly prominent role in this relationship marked by built-in conflict. However, regarding a more precise definition of the importance ascribed to religion for defining Russian identity, the outlook of this discourse is somewhat contradictory and remains unclear.

The general tenor of this discourse is tellingly summarised in its most distinguishing statement:

	Discourse			
	IV	I	II	III
15. Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamentally different from that of the West.	10	6	3	6

This general mindset seeing the West in antagonistic terms and as a place where Russia does not belong (12) is furthermore evident in the agreement with the claim that there “is not much good and worth imitating in the West” (39). Moreover, influences emanating from the West (and especially the United States) are not merely considered as unsuitable or undesirable for Russia, but rather seen in a more hostile manner as threatening to Russia as well as to “civilisational variety and wealth” more generally, the defence of which Russia could and should engage in (28). In this way of construing oppositional images of Russia and the West – that go as far as requiring defensive strategies – a clear-cut line of division is inscribed through a securitising logic that serves to define what Russia is *not* by setting it clearly apart from what is seen as Western values and culture. Here, it is worth noting that DIV, much like the preceding discourses, recognises the existence of Russia's historical and political ties with Europe (17, 26). However, for contemporary Russia, claims to the effect that a “conscious Russian decision in favour of Europe” and closer integration with countries located in the West would be necessary are thoroughly refuted (29, 33). The main focus of this discourse's reasoning about Russian identity thus seems to be on othering descriptions of the West vis-à-vis Russia. By contrast, attitudes towards the 'non-Western dimension' expressed by DIV are built much less upon an othering or securitising logic: For one thing, 'the East' in general is not perceived as a source of threats (22), and regarding the relations with Muslim countries this discourse favours constructive policies (3) over the institution of othering or hostile views (5). The bottom line, however, is that from the point of view of this discourse, Russia is considered neither “fully European nor fully Asian” (18) but rather a unique and self-contained civilisational entity.

Overall, there is little response to arguments about religiously-constituted external threats, which may indicate that religion is not considered a highly decisive factor for Russian identity constructions in this discursive pattern,. This is illustrated, for example, by the rejection of descriptions of Islam as “essentially hostile to Russia” (5, 34). Furthermore, and despite its generally negative attitude towards the West, DIV does not rank Western denominations as particularly dangerous for Russian culture either (7, 34). The insignificance of religion for

definitions of Russia vis-à-vis the outside world is further confirmed by the dismissal of the idea that the Russian Orthodox church would be a crucial actor in guarding Russia from negative external influences (35).

Nevertheless, what comes to a more precise definition of the role attributed to religion with regards to Russian national identity, the pattern produced by DIV is somewhat unclear and appears to be internally contradictory. On one hand, it is suggested that Orthodoxy is an indispensable factor for determining who can be Russian (10). Similarly, the possibility of (or need for) defining Russian identity with reference to *other than* religious or ethnic markers is denied (21, 37). On the other hand, DIV appears to support the idea that religion is in fact “a private matter, and in today's world should not be used to define who can and who cannot be Russian”, which obviously contradicts the above-mentioned view of Orthodox religion as an essential marker of Russian identity. Moreover, support is also expressed for the idea that it is simply “absurd” to hold on to the domination of Orthodox religion in contemporary Russia (32). Regrettably, the research material does not provide clues that would be helpful for resolving this apparent internal contradiction (a tentative explanation is attempted in the below discussion, however).

5.3. Discussion: Consensus and disagreement in the discursive positions

As is evident in the above presentation of the different views contained in the research material, reasoning about Russian identity and belonging is taking place in an expansive intellectual field that offers a multitude of discursive positions. This can also be illustrated with reference to statistical data: As table 5 shows, the four discourses presented above show no or only weak correlations with each other. The lack of significant correlation indicates that the sorting patterns are clearly distinct for each factor, which, in turn, implies that each one holds its own approach for reasoning about the statements contained in the Q sample, and that there is clear potential for conflict among them.

*TABLE 5:
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DISCOURSES*

	Discourse			
	I	II	III	IV
I	-	0.27	0.24	0.25
II	-	-	0.23	-0.02
III	-	-	-	0.00

However, as has become evident in the foregoing separate interpretative treatment of the four different discourses, the worldview constructed by each of them concentrates on certain issue areas and thus at time fails to fully elucidate opinions on other questions. For example, some discourses focus more strongly on the external dimension of Russian self-definition, while others look in more depth at the domestic one, so that it is not always possible to directly compare these conceptions *in their entirety* with regards to the research questions. On the other hand, there are also certain issues on which (some of) the discourses seem to be able to agree. In the following, I aim to point out these main lines of disagreement and consensus, which will lay the ground for a reflection on the underlying research problématique of this thesis, namely the question whether religion is afforded a significant place in Russian identity constructions and in accounts of Russia's place in the world, and particularly in Europe.

5.3.1. Eurasianism vs. Westernisation revisited

The first and clearly discernible outcome of the above discussion is that the different discourses reflect very well the conflicting fundamental conceptions of Russian belonging in an international context: As will be recalled, these competing views are commonly referred to as “Westernising” and “Slavophile/Eurasianist” positions, respectively. Regarding this issue, Discourses I, III, and IV present markedly differing positions on the question of Russia's place and role in the world (with DII remaining largely silent on this question).

As was shown above, Discourse I promotes a view of a principally unique Russia as a necessarily self-reliant pole of power and influence that is best served by pursuing independent strategies, in particular in the area of the former Soviet Union. Although some historical-cultural linkages with both Europe and Asia are acknowledged, neither of these vectors is seen to be sufficiently momentous for making Russia belong fully to either one. Rather, DI

emphasises the need for Russia's cultural and geopolitical independence. Therefore, DI can be seen to stand in the *Eurasianist/Slavophile* tradition of thought. In a highly contrasting manner, Discourse III argues for manifest affinities between Russia and the West, and in particular with Europe. This affirmation of Russia's place in the West is closely connected to a strong appreciation of Western models, values and moral standards (and their validity for Russia), and consequently serves as a basis for the promotion of Westernising efforts in the political and societal sphere. As a matter of fact, a development of Russia towards the West is seen as the *only* option for Russia, which is why DIII is clearly consistent with the views inherent in the intellectual tradition of *Westernisation*. Discourse IV, by contrast, positions Russia in downright opposition to the West. For DIV the West thus serves as a negatively imbued object of comparison and for defining all that Russia is *not*, and goes as far as securitising Russian identity vis-à-vis the West and Western influences. Although not going to great length in *positively* defining Russia in relation with the outside world, DIV appears to largely share with DI an Eurasianist/Slavophile understanding of Russia's uniqueness and particularity, although employing a very different, that is, aggressive, language for describing this position.

These discourses (I, III, IV) thus evidently differ on the fundamental issue of Russian belonging and the related question of the preferable orientation for her future development. What is furthermore notable are the considerable differences in how these positions are embedded in perceptions of the outside world, that is, how external actors and influences are seen to impact on Russia and whether or not this translates into securitising views. As will be recalled, securitising moves can be highly relevant for identity constructions because of their capacity to advance political integration through the identification of existential threats, and through the demarcation of an inside from an outside, or 'us' (the threatened) from 'them' (the threatening other).

Here, the dynamics exhibited by the different discourses are again highly disparate: Both Discourse III and IV perceive certain aspects of the outside world as highly threatening, that is, they feature securitising argumentative structures, the referent object of which is Russia. However, the sources of the threats identified by these two discourses are very different and so are the repercussions for Russian identity constructions. Whereas DIV sees the West and the ideas it represents as imperilling the integrity of Russian culture and the country's existence as such, which serves to confirm Russian particularity by inscribing strict lines of division, DIII highlights Islam as a fundamental threat for both Russia and Europe. This antagonism further

serves for constructing a view of Russia and the West as being united in the face of a common enemy, which in turn supports the Westernising orientation of this discourse. In a remarkably contrasting manner to DIII and DIV, the worldview put forward by Discourse I lacks strongly othering or securitising elements with regards the outside world. Although advocating a view of Russian uniqueness and self-sufficiency, adherents of this discourse appear to be able to positively confirm this particularity without having to resort to highly conflictual views of external elements, whether they are constituted by the West (like for DIV) or emerging from other directions (as DIII's view of Islam demonstrates).

To sum up, it is evident from the above that a rich variety of discursive positions is available for imagining Russia vis-à-vis the outside world. The three distinct positions presented here exhibit a clear potential for conflict over the fundamental question of Russian belonging (e.g. Eurasianist/Slavophile vs. Westernising perspectives) as well as over the nature and dynamics of Russia's relations with the outside world (conciliatory vs. securitising conceptualisations). That is not to say, however, that these three discourses completely disagree on all issues contained in the discussion. Rather, there is a certain amount of overlap, for example, in the largely similar view of a pronounced Russian uniqueness shown by DI and DIV, or in the constitution of a securitised view vis-à-vis external factors (although based on very different threat perceptions) exhibited by DIII and DIV.

Having thus established the discursive field regarding the role of the outside world for Russian national identity constructions that emerged from the Q methodological research material, I will now proceed to a discussion on the role of religion put forward by the different discourses.

5.3.2. Contemplating the role of religion

Also on the question of religion, the views expressed by the four discourses show a considerable amount of disagreement. The most articulate and straightforward view on the role of religion in contemporary Russia is expressed by Discourse II: Adherents of this discourse clearly advocate a secular arrangement and a civic definition of membership in the Russian nation. Religion is entirely rejected as a relevant factor for contemporary Russian identity, and cannot serve as a variable for affirming commonality nor for expressing difference. That is, references to religious affiliation are not seen as applicable for deciding who can be Russian, and accordingly, religion is not seen as instrumental for inscribing otherness either, much less

in a securitising manner. Discourse III, for its part, appears to largely share this view of the broad domestic irrelevance of religion in today's Russia and correspondingly vindicates a pluralist model as a basis for Russian identity constructions. Both discourses (II and III) consequently also agree on a view of the Russian Orthodox Church as an insignificant (and preferably uninfluential) institution in contemporary Russia. However, DIII also shows striking differences with DII on other questions, for instance, in its moderate affirmation of the historical relevance of Russian-European links based on Christian religion and a simultaneous securitising move that positions Russia and Europe in opposition to an external threat constituted by Islam, which arguably serves to underline the unity of the former in the face of danger caused by the latter.

The perspective of religion as a mainly irrelevant factor purported by DII (and to some extent by DIII) is clearly challenged by Discourses I and IV. For DI, Orthodox Christianity matters as a point of reference for imagining Russia, which should indeed be called an Orthodox nation. However, as was pointed out, this view does not translate into a resolutely essentialising stance or an exclusionary perspective on other religions in Russia. This moderate approach is confirmed by DI's general lack of support for (and occasional rejection of) arguments securitising Russian identity with reference to religion. While Orthodox religion thus matters, it is not considered important enough to serve as a reason for inscribing stark divisions. Similarly, DIV – while advocating strongly othering views of the West – is unperturbed by descriptions of religious influences as particularly threatening for Russia. (What comes to more precisely explicating the significance of religion in Russian identity, DIV regrettably displays inextricable contradictions.)

5.4. Reflections: New insights and more questions

This thesis set out to explore discourses on Russian national identity and – in investigating discursive constructions of Russianess – employed a particular focus on (a) the role potentially attributed to religion, (b) ideas of Russian belonging vis-à-vis the outside world, and (c) a possible connection drawn between these two broad themes. Within this framework, a question of particular interest is whether a Russian-European relationship is possibly inscribed with religious significance. The Q methodological approach employed for this enterprise produced four distinct discursive patterns, each of which presents its own perspective on the above questions. As an 'added benefit' the outcomes of the foregoing interpretative exercise provide

some instructive insights into Russian national identity constructions that go beyond the original research problématique and can serve to reflect upon the themes presented in chapters 2 and 3, as the following will show.

Regarding the specific research question on a religious nexus in ideas about Russian-European relations, I would argue that the foregoing discussions have shown that discursive linkages between religiously-endowed arguments, on one hand, and ideas about Russia's international belonging, on the other, are indeed possible and considered valid by the respondents making up Discourse III. As was pointed out, DIII constructs an image of Russia as firmly grounded in Western ideals and as perpetually (and necessarily) gravitating closer towards Europe, with which it shares connections of a political, cultural, economic and historical nature, and also includes references to a joint Christian heritage. This view of Russian-European unity is compounded by an expressedly religious component that juxtaposes 'Russia-in-Europe' with Islam as a threatening external other. I would claim that this securitised perspective on Russian-European commonalities in the face of a perceived Islamic threat has so far found little, if any, attention in the literature, and therefore can be considered a genuinely new discursive position. While characterisations of Islam as an 'enemy' to Russia are certainly well-described in the literature, they are frequently held as a distinctive feature of Russian (Orthodox) nationalist discourses (cf. Verkhovsky 2001), which however tend to reject Western influences just as much, and thus do not have much in common with the Westernising views expressed by DIII. Also, despite the religious component that is constituted by Islam, Discourse III interestingly does not subscribe to views of Russia as an essentially Christian Orthodox country (as one may expect given the religiously-constituted threat) but rather promotes a pluralist conception of membership in the Russian nation. At the risk of oversimplification, it thus seems as if Islam is considered only an external, not an internal, other for Russian identity, and that (for reasons beyond the scope of this analysis) perceptions of the characteristics of 'Russian Muslims' and 'Muslim outside Russia', respectively, appear to considerably differ.

Furthermore, it can be argued that DIII provides another useful addition to the literature reviewed in chapter two: As was stated there, a fully Westernist vision of Russia's post-Soviet development is considered to have proved unsustainable soon after its emergence in the early 1990s (Tsygankov 2007:383; Kolossov and Turovsky 2001:147) because it had failed to deliver on its promises. However, in contrast to these claims, the decisive advocacy of Westernism

exhibited by DIII suggests that this discourse's adherents continue to see their position as a viable option for Russia and that confidence in Westernist ideals has either continued to exist or recently re-emerged in the discursive landscape on Russian identity.

Coming back to the question of religion, it was shown in the foregoing interpretative exercise that also the discursive position constituted by DI and, to some extent DIV, see religion – more precisely, Christian Orthodox religion – as a relevant marker of Russian identity. However, in contrast to DIII, references to religion here merely serve as a moderately positive distinguishing feature of Russian identity, rather than for inscribing fundamental otherness. In this context, it is helpful to recall the theoretical discussion in chapter three, which highlighted religion as a marker of national identity that comprises a particularly high potential for securitisation because of its existential nature and its claim to a monopoly on ultimate truth. According to the theory, difference and challenges (perceived to be) addressed at religiously-defined identities are thus more easily considered as existential threats due to the lack of room for negotiation. Against this backdrop, it is important to note that the discourses described here by no means employ references to religion in a securitised manner, and hence do not take religion to the extreme forms of othering provided for in the theory. This point obviously is not intended to prove the theoretical assumptions on the securitising potential of religion wrong. Rather, it simply suggests the conclusion that in the Russian context, the inclusion of Christian Orthodox religion as a relevant marker of national identity does not automatically result in highly essentialised – and even less so in securitised – perceptions of Russianess vis-à-vis other denominations, nor does it necessarily serve as a momentous factor setting Russia apart from countries not standing in the Orthodox tradition.

Nevertheless, the results of the analysis can be seen to illustrate the so-called post-Soviet religious revival in Russia because affirmative references to Orthodox religion clearly matter in self-definitions of several discursive positions extracted from the material, namely DI and DIV. It will nonetheless be recalled that the return of Orthodox religion into narratives of Russian identity is also most decidedly challenged by proponents of DII, which once more indicates that the idea of “Russia as an Orthodox nation“ is evidently contested rather than being an universally accepted element of national identity constructions.

It must furthermore be pointed out that upon closer investigation of the positions attesting to Orthodoxy as a relevant marker of Russian identity, one can not but notice a certain degree of

ambiguity in the discursive structure: In short, while both DI and DIV agree that “Orthodoxy” is an important pillar of “Russian existence”, they nevertheless endorse arguments pointing towards the need to define Russian identity more broadly and in a pluralist manner, and may even consider granting an “equal status” to other religious denominations in Russia. This seemingly inconsistent and rather diffuse conception of Russian national identity as being significantly 'Orthodox' and 'pluralistic' at the same time begs for a more detailed analysis, which can only be attempted provisionally in the context of this thesis.

I would claim that a tentative (and probably only partial) explanation for the ambiguity displayed in these positions can be found in the characteristic features of the very process of post-Soviet “religious revival” in Russia, which were explicated in chapter two. As was shown there, social surveys among the Russian population frequently reveal a numerical discrepancy between those who consider themselves “Orthodox” and those we think of themselves as “believers”, with the number of those subscribing to the former view considerably exceeding that of the latter (whereas the percentage of those “believers” who in fact actively and regularly practice their religion as dictated by religious doctrines is again even smaller). This inconsistency suggest that in Russia,

[...] religious self-identification frequently reflects neither a personal belief system nor a regular religious practice. Put another way, seven decades of consistent “atheisation” resulted in a society in which there exists a great difference between the notions of “being Orthodox” (or Muslim, or Jewish, etc.) and “believing in God,” and “practising religion and participating in the Church life.” Religion is often perceived simply as part of the traditional cultural environment, and as a component of ethnic identity and style of life (Krindatch 2006:42).

The fact that “being Orthodox” is thus by many not seen as a strictly religious characteristic but is rather considered as a more loosely-defined ethnic marker may explain why respondents in my experiment do not seem to perceive a contradiction in their simultaneous accentuation of Russia as signified by Orthodoxy as well as by open, pluralistic values.

Furthermore, we may assume that due to the prolonged absence of institutionalised and widespread religious instruction in Russia, knowledge of religious doctrines is often rather limited. This, in turn, may suggest that not all respondents are well aware of Orthodox religion's (or, for that matter, most other denomination's) inherent claims to a monopoly on ultimate truth or the exclusive nature of membership in the community of believers. As a result, respondents describing Orthodoxy as a *defining* factor for Russian identity may not necessarily consider

religion to be an *exclusive* feature, or to serve for inscribing stark difference. This rather loose and flexible perception of what Orthodoxy stands for may thus also explain the lack of strongly othering or securitising views with regards to religion displayed by several discursive positions. However, the confirmation or refutation of these tentative explanations would have to be the topic of a different research project than the present one.

Lastly, it was noted above that in Discourse I, the lack of clearly demarcated lines of division based on religious markers extends into other dimensions of identity construction as well: This particular discursive position was consequently entitled “Conciliatory Eurasianism” because, firstly, it subscribes to arguments about Russian particularism – that in the literature are attributed to Eurasianist/Slavophile traditions of thought – and secondly, because it refrains from framing Russian difference vis-à-vis others in adversarial terms, but rather subscribes to conciliatory views in both a Western and Eastern direction. In recalling the pronounced Westernising position of Discourse III, we can thus assert that this thesis has revealed the 'classical' cleavage between Westernisers and Eurasianists, which plays a central role in the literature on Russian identity. As chapter two showed, neither of these two traditions of thought is a unitary one and between the two extremes are multiple possible perspectives. However, I would claim that this heterogeneity of discourses is often neglected in the literature, as many analysts pay particular attention to the most extreme expressions and thereby neglect to mention those (less 'exciting'?) ones that are built around rather moderate views. For instance, Pursiainen (2000:83) claims that Eurasianism “can be seen from the very beginning as entailing a sharp criticism of Western culture and the proclamation of an alternative”. Similarly, Tsygankov (2007:381) notes that

Eurasianist roots are in Russia's traditionalist philosophy that has always seen Russian values as principally different from – and often superior to – those of the [...] “decadent” and “rooten” [sic!] Western [...] civilisation.

In other words, it is often either implicitly or explicitly suggested that perspectives advocating Russian particularism are necessarily and inseparably linked to a pronounced anti-Western stance. I would claim that Discourse I, in the immanent conciliatory features explicated above, demonstrates that this is, in fact, not the case. The insight that a Russian particularist position is possible without explicit anti-Western references might not be a wholly novel one, but may nevertheless serve to remind us of the fact that there are numerous viable discursive positions beyond the most extreme cases so eagerly studied in parts of the literature. The limited research focus applied in this thesis does not provide for accurate inferences on whether the respondents

that make up DI hold stronger adversarial views of issues not included in the Q sample or what these issues may be (for example, democracy, human rights, capitalism?). In any case, and bearing in mind the overall aim of this thesis, it can be concluded that among the respondents in my Q methodological experiment, Orthodox religion is not ranked as a highly salient factor in either uniting or strictly separating notions in narratives of Russian national identity.

To listen to the voices of others must involve listening not only to what they say but also to the way or language in which it is said, if the imperial habit of imposing our traditions and institutions on others in both theory and practice is to be abjured.

(Tully 1995:57)

6. Conclusion

In this thesis I have ventured into discourses on Russian national identity and in the process paid particular attention to ideas about Russia's European and international belonging as well as to the role ascribed to religion. This exercise was built upon a theoretical framework that holds social reality as essentially a result of the intersubjective construction of meaning, which in turn, suggests that identities (like all other social facts) do not simply exist “out there” but are rather created, upheld and changed by discursive interaction. It was furthermore suggested that one central element in identity constructions is the need to highlight differences between the self and (an) other(s), and that – in extreme cases – this search for otherness can include securitising discursive practices that serve to inscribe stark lines of division.

In order to facilitate a detailed investigation of these discursive processes that “make” identities, I applied a research method known as Q Methodology. Q Methodology is a tool for the scientific study of subjectivity, which aims to provide subjects with the materials and operational procedures necessary to engage in the formation of their own opinions (Brown 1980:68). Rather than looking at national identity discourses only in official documents or speeches, this fieldwork method thus examines how individual subjects react to various statements on a selected topic and furthermore allows them to (re-)construct their own discourses. By means of an analysis of the statistical correlation between these individual “constructions”, I extracted four distinct discursive positions that are understood as worldviews, each of which is shared by a number of respondents. Through an extensive meaning reconstruction exercise, that is, interpretation of the discursive positions, I have shown that each of the four discourses takes its own stand on the issues under investigation in this thesis.

The fact that the analysis conducted in this thesis was able to extract four competing discourses on Russianess suggests that there is indeed a case for the application of “alternative” social scientific research methods, such as Q Methodology, which aim to uncover ways of

understanding and describing the world that do not (or only marginally) feature in officially sanctioned discourses and hence in the pertinent literature, which uses these discourses as its main object of inquiry. In the attempt to answer this challenge and to contribute to the body of research by exposing potentially novel ideas – or potentially new linkages drawn between them – I would claim the the foregoing exploratory analysis has produced three main insights into Russian identity constructions:

Firstly, in the discussion of Discourse III, I have demonstrated how a pro-Western perspective on Russian identity can be ingrained in outright anti-Islamic references (or *vice versa*), and how these two elements can perpetuate views of Russian-European unity and stress the need for continued integration. I have furthermore suggested that this finding may not have found much attention in the literature so far. I would therefore claim that this position constitutes an interesting topic for more detailed investigations, for example, into the internal argumentative structures of this narrative or its other central and interconnected elements that were not covered in the present analysis.

Secondly, I have established that the heightened potential of religiously-informed identity markers to become securitised, which is provided for by some theorists, does not materialise in the discourses on Russian national identity that I have described. I have thus concluded that the affirmation of Orthodox religion as a salient marker of Russian identity does not necessarily have to lead to strongly othering views of other denominations, neither in a domestic nor an international context. This insight may serve to broaden our understanding of post-Soviet “religious resurgence” as its repercussions are evidently highly heterogeneous, and certainly include moderate ways of incorporating religious components into identity narratives, too.

Thirdly, and contrary to what is frequently suggested in the literature, I have shown that views of Russian particularism can in fact be enunciated *without* necessarily having to rely on profoundly anti-Western notions. While the observation that such a discursive position indeed exists may in itself not be a wholly novel one, I would nevertheless claim that it is important to be highlighted here because it often tends to be only implicitly acknowledged, rather than explicitly analysed and discussed, in the literature. This insight may thus contribute to future inquiries into Russian national identity constructions by expanding the set of available perspectives.

The fact that the above insights have been attained by means of a Q methodological analysis necessitates several important qualifications, as well as some critical reflections. First of all, it is crucial to point out that what has been exposed above represents a *discursive potential* of ideas about Russian national identity. In other words, it shows *what* is possible to say or think about “being Russian”, and *how* different arguments can be connected. But as was stated earlier, I do not (and can not) claim that the results are representative of a wider Russian population in a *statistical* sense. Quite simply, this is not what Q Methodology aims to do. The four discourses described above were extracted because each of them connotes a shared understanding among several participants in my study. And since the diversity of personal backgrounds was a major factor guiding the selection of research participants, we may reasonably assume that similar views exist also beyond the limited group of respondents. But a detailed analysis of the percentages of Russians subscribing to one or another view uncovered here falls into the realm of other scientific methods, for example opinion polls, which my results may thus help to enrich and/or refine.

Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that this thesis consciously limited the focus of the research onto issues concerning religion and Russia's place in the world. The dynamics and arguments revealed must therefore be understood primarily within this frame of reference, rather than as all-embracing accounts of Russian identity constructions. For example, the restricted focus has excluded several other prevalent issues on the political agenda in contemporary Russia, such as questions of 'hard' security (e.g. NATO enlargement), the Russian relationships with the European Union, India or China, or the role of other relevant markers of identity, such as ethnicity or language. Rather than devaluing the outcomes of the present analysis due to a lack of *all-encompassing* accounts of Russian national identity discourses, I would argue that it is in fact only through this conscious limitation that I was able to arrive at the detailed picture of possible narratives that was presented in the foregoing chapters.

In a similar way, I consciously restricted the selection of respondents to a group of students at the MGIMO university in Moscow. As a result of this focus, the discursive positions exposed are potentially marginal ones (which is also indicated by their partial absence from the literature, as was mentioned above) – whereas by comparison we would expect analyses of discourses produced by the media, official documents, political or cultural elites, for example, to primarily reflect the most dominant, mainstream discourses that consequently also have a

more immediate impact on the definition of interests and, by extension, on actual state behaviour. However, I would argue that despite their frequent lack of immediately observable political consequences, also marginalized ideas are in fact a worthwhile object of inquiry. This claim is based on the conceptualisation of identities as being inherently contested and therefore in constant flux, which again suggests that they can and do change through a rearrangement of their constitutive discourses, or elements thereof. Put plainly, the marginalized discourses of today may in the future surface as pervasive narratives “once suitable political entrepreneurs are found and the overall strategic and politico-economic context permits them to act” (Aalto 2003: 588). Not least in the Russian context, where the search for a stable sense of post-Soviet identity continues to feature high on the agenda, mapping exercises of national identity discourses located on the margins of the political debate are thus useful for advancing our understanding of the possibly available discursive options, some of which may emerge as significant factors in future debates.

On a theoretical level, this thesis validates the theoretical conceptualisation of national identities as essentially contested social constructs, rather than monolithic and eternal facts. Put differently, I have shown that there is not *one* view of what “being Russian” is all about, but rather *many*, some of which are mutually incompatible in their most fundamental assumptions, and thereby cause a need for continuous political negotiation aimed at establishing a more or less stable *sense* of identity. This thesis thus supports theoretical challenges to essentialist accounts of identity, which assume its stability over time and similarity of its contents across individual members of a given community.

On the other hand, however, the affirmation of the multiple, unstable, fluctuating and fragmented nature of identity leaves me with a certain uneasiness regarding the analytical category of “identity” as such: If there is indeed such a huge variation in how people talk and think about themselves (and talk themselves in being a “nation”, for example), is there a sense in subsuming all these various factors and processes under a singular denominator called “identity”? Or does this attempt of a conceptual amalgamation rather obscure the inherent variety of the political activities and social outcomes of what I have here referred to as “identity construction”? As a matter of fact, some recent discussions within the discipline of International Relations have tried to address the problematic ambiguity of “identity” that has been brought about by the – in principle much welcome – softening of the concept by, *inter alia*, constructivist approaches. Brubaker and Cooper, for instance, assert that due to the

proliferation of the theoretical underpinnings of “identity”, “the term loses its analytical purchase”, and they consequently ask:

If it is fluid, how can we understand the ways in which self-understandings may harden, congeal, and crystallize? If it is constructed, how can we understand the sometimes coercive force of external identifications? If it is multiple, how do we understand the terrible singularity that is often striven for – and sometimes realized – by politicians seeking to transform mere categories into unitary and exclusive groups? (Brubaker and Cooper 2000:1.)

While it would be premature to speculate about the value of the proposed abrogation of the analytical category of identity in favour of more concretely defined and restricted notions¹⁵, the point I want to convey here is that there is a continuous need to critically scrutinize the theoretical concepts that inform our research in order to further develop and refine their explanatory value.

¹⁵ Brubaker and Cooper (2000:14-21), for instance, propose three “clusters” of terms: (1) the notions of “identification” and “categorization” to refer to processual or performative aspects, (2) “self-understanding” and “social location” as dispositional terms referring to subjective understandings of the self, and (3) “Commonality”, “connectedness”, and “groupness” as distinctions between different degrees of collective identifications.

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8. Annexes

Annex 1: Questionnaire distributed to respondents and used for recording the individual Q sorts

Information sheet on respondents / Q-sort experiment structure and instructions

Before Q-sort

1. Respondent's name: _____
2. Nickname: _____ | 3. Gender: female male
4. Email address: _____
5. Year of birth: _____ | 6. Years of study at MGIMO _____
7. Major subject: _____
8. Origin (city/region): _____
9. 'Self-identification' (nationality / confession, if any): _____

(All personal data will be kept strictly confidential and anonymised before publication!)

Instructions:

- Sort statements (cards) on a scale 1-10 (1 being 'most unlike my view', 10 'most like my view', 5/6 coming close to meaning ambivalence/indecision or simply representing confusion over the statement) by arranging cards onto the sorting grid into forced normal distribution, like so:

<i>most unlike my view</i>					<i>most like my view</i>				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
		x	x	x	x	x	x		
			x	x	x	x			
				x	x				

- Note: cards do *not* have to be distinguished vertically (e.g. all cards in any column are supposed to be of roughly equal importance, the vertical position is not significant!)
- Keep in mind that the Q-sort is not supposed to express the respondent's *absolute* opinion, but rather a *relative* arrangement, i.e. a statement placed under 10 does not necessarily mean that it reflects the respondent's opinion fully - rather, it simply means that it is considered *more significant* than those statements under 9, 8, 7 etc.
- A good starting point could be to read through the statements and first divide them onto three piles ('mainly agree', 'mainly neutral', 'mainly disagree'), then start sorting them onto the grid starting from the extreme ends.
- Questions concerning the method or the meaning of statements can be asked at any time during the Q-sort process!
- **Take your time!**

Annex 2: Full output of the PQMETHOD software (version 2.11), produced on 6 August 2008

PQMethod2.11 Religion in Russian identity
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Correlation Matrix Between Sorts

SORTS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1 Shurikc	100	30	23	36	27	-31	25	11	24	20	13	28	30	-24	13	31	4
2 Juliac	30	100	35	41	37	0	34	50	13	43	26	61	47	-16	52	50	31
3 Elli	23	35	100	41	20	29	33	35	70	34	3	51	34	-4	37	43	31
4 Bella	36	41	41	100	21	0	25	17	50	7	-23	57	33	-30	53	30	2
5 Werter	27	37	20	21	100	-20	39	41	6	15	17	44	42	22	38	50	64
6 Vovlinzi	-31	0	29	0	-20	100	-17	-5	25	5	-18	16	0	-6	3	5	-6
7 Olja	25	34	33	25	39	-17	100	35	18	34	11	47	23	16	40	46	38
8 Vladimir	11	50	35	17	41	-5	35	100	17	3	15	51	31	3	44	35	27
9 Verundel	24	13	70	50	6	25	18	17	100	13	-5	49	37	-20	24	38	22
10 Ksundel	20	43	34	7	15	5	34	3	13	100	23	37	22	9	11	39	30
11 DrShmurg	13	26	3	-23	17	-18	11	15	-5	23	100	10	42	-5	-10	23	6
12 Namaskar	28	61	51	57	44	16	47	51	49	37	10	100	54	-7	65	53	33
13 Patte	30	47	34	33	42	0	23	31	37	22	42	54	100	-11	47	47	32
14 Gonduras	-24	-16	-4	-30	22	-6	16	3	-20	9	-5	-7	-11	100	-13	2	20
15 SPN	13	52	37	53	38	3	40	44	24	11	-10	65	47	-13	100	52	27
16 JoieDeVi	31	50	43	30	50	5	46	35	38	39	23	53	47	2	52	100	35
17 Denise	4	31	31	2	64	-6	38	27	22	30	6	33	32	20	27	35	100

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Unrotated Factor Matrix
 Factors

SORTS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1 Shurikc	0.4318	-0.0380	-0.6051	0.0063	0.4568	-0.0509	0.0585	-0.0776
2 Juliac	0.7322	0.0853	-0.1840	0.0592	-0.2820	0.3492	-0.0764	-0.2028
3 Elli	0.6628	-0.3468	0.2881	0.2422	0.1918	-0.1260	0.2549	-0.1353
4 Bella	0.5804	-0.5274	-0.2045	-0.3308	0.1512	0.0763	-0.1108	0.1305
5 Werter	0.6173	0.4860	0.0695	-0.2701	0.0379	-0.2695	-0.2450	-0.0612
6 Vovlinzi	0.0209	-0.5017	0.5684	0.3420	-0.3063	0.0667	-0.1314	-0.0018
7 Olja	0.6024	0.2788	0.0960	-0.1411	0.2884	0.2519	0.2964	0.1087
8 Vladimir	0.5810	0.1577	0.0725	-0.2435	-0.4014	-0.0543	0.5097	-0.2710
9 Verundel	0.5374	-0.5579	0.1529	0.1915	0.2687	-0.3873	0.1346	0.0159
10 Ksundel	0.4476	0.1952	0.0940	0.5375	0.2769	0.5063	-0.1529	-0.0842
11 DrShmurg	0.2125	0.4396	-0.3832	0.6008	-0.2777	-0.1893	0.1728	0.1118
12 Namaskar	0.8470	-0.1496	0.0730	-0.0460	-0.1156	0.1191	0.0261	0.0809
13 Patte	0.6837	0.0452	-0.2057	0.2036	-0.2466	-0.3327	-0.1963	0.2726
14 Gonduras	-0.0783	0.5397	0.5622	-0.0793	0.1939	-0.0049	0.1681	0.3851
15 SPN	0.7069	-0.1422	0.0373	-0.3896	-0.2725	0.1661	-0.1303	0.1820
16 JoieDeVi	0.7538	0.1103	0.0393	0.1246	0.0266	0.0244	-0.0662	0.2317
17 Denise	0.5247	0.4106	0.3680	-0.0471	0.1558	-0.2622	-0.3200	-0.3751
Eigenvalues	5.6489	2.0570	1.5484	1.3467	1.1245	0.9537	0.7741	0.6480
% expl.Var.	33	12	9	8	7	6	5	4

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Cumulative Communalities Matrix
 Factors 1 Thru

SORTS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1 Shurikc	0.1865	0.1879	0.5541	0.5541	0.7628	0.7654	0.7688	0.7748
2 Juliac	0.5361	0.5434	0.5773	0.5808	0.6603	0.7822	0.7881	0.8292
3 Elli	0.4393	0.5596	0.6426	0.7013	0.7381	0.7540	0.8189	0.8372
4 Bella	0.3369	0.6150	0.6569	0.7663	0.7892	0.7950	0.8073	0.8243
5 Werter	0.3811	0.6173	0.6221	0.6951	0.6965	0.7692	0.8292	0.8329
6 Vovlinzi	0.0004	0.2521	0.5753	0.6922	0.7860	0.7905	0.8078	0.8078
7 Olja	0.3629	0.4406	0.4498	0.4697	0.5529	0.6164	0.7042	0.7160
8 Vladimir	0.3375	0.3624	0.3677	0.4270	0.5881	0.5910	0.8508	0.9242
9 Verundel	0.2888	0.6000	0.6234	0.6600	0.7322	0.8822	0.9003	0.9006
10 Ksundel	0.2004	0.2384	0.2473	0.5363	0.6129	0.8693	0.8927	0.8998
11 DrShmurg	0.0452	0.2384	0.3852	0.7462	0.8233	0.8591	0.8890	0.9015
12 Namaskar	0.7174	0.7398	0.7451	0.7472	0.7606	0.7748	0.7754	0.7820
13 Patte	0.4674	0.4694	0.5117	0.5532	0.6140	0.7247	0.7632	0.8375
14 Gonduras	0.0061	0.2975	0.6135	0.6198	0.6574	0.6575	0.6857	0.8340
15 SPN	0.4997	0.5199	0.5213	0.6731	0.7473	0.7749	0.7919	0.8250
16 JoieDeVi	0.5681	0.5803	0.5818	0.5974	0.5981	0.5987	0.6030	0.6567

17 Denise	0.2753	0.4439	0.5793	0.5815	0.6057	0.6745	0.7769	0.9176
cum% expl.Var.	33	45	54	62	69	75	79	83

Rotating Angles Used Between Factors

FTR#1	FTR#2	ANGLE	Generated By PQROT [16:18, 8/6/2008]
3	5	42.	
1	7	-22.	
2	7	-58.	

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Factor Matrix with an X Indicating a Defining Sort

Loadings					
QSORT	1	2	3	4	
1 Shurikc	0.2335	-0.1387	0.6370X	0.2732	
2 Juliac	0.5773X	0.1357	0.3402	0.3368	
3 Elli	0.3723	0.7174X	0.1500	0.1597	
4 Bella	0.3840	0.3208	0.6633X	-0.2756	
5 Werter	0.8045X	-0.1610	-0.0660	0.1324	
6 Vovlinzi	-0.2031	0.7734X	-0.2168	-0.0765	
7 Olja	0.6699X	0.0336	0.0006	0.1407	
8 Vladimir	0.6456X	0.0531	0.0853	0.0065	
9 Verundel	0.1896	0.7183X	0.3274	0.0321	
10 Ksundel	0.2387	0.2934	-0.0825	0.6216X	
11 DrShmurg	0.0252	-0.1837	0.0782	0.8400X	
12 Namaskar	0.6737X	0.4286	0.3106	0.1143	
13 Patte	0.4608	0.1885	0.3454	0.4313	
14 Gonduras	0.2608	-0.1129	-0.7341X	-0.0148	
15 SPN	0.6933X	0.2207	0.3257	-0.1941	
16 JoieDeVi	0.6166X	0.2719	0.1530	0.3462	
17 Denise	0.6632X	0.1005	-0.3162	0.1776	
% expl.Var.	26	13	13	11	

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Free Distribution Data Results

QSORT	MEAN	ST.DEV.
1 Shurikc	5.500	2.428
2 Juliac	5.500	2.428
3 Elli	5.500	2.428
4 Bella	5.500	2.428
5 Werter	5.500	2.428
6 Vovlinzi	5.500	2.428
7 Olja	5.500	2.428
8 Vladimir	5.500	2.428
9 Verundel	5.500	2.428
10 Ksundel	5.500	2.428
11 DrShmurg	5.500	2.428
12 Namaskar	5.500	2.428
13 Patte	5.500	2.428
14 Gonduras	5.500	2.428
15 SPN	5.500	2.428
16 JoieDeVi	5.500	2.428
17 Denise	5.500	2.428

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Rank Statement Totals with Each Factor

No.	Statement	No.	Factors							
			1	2	3	4				
1	All political processes active in our society since 19	1	-0.01	23	-0.48	28	-0.80	33	0.37	17
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sp	2	0.73	13	-0.75	31	-0.21	23	0.71	11
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not on	3	1.07	7	0.80	10	-0.42	26	1.10	5
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a	4	0.40	16	0.69	11	0.61	13	-0.97	34
5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and	5	-1.91	39	-0.86	32	0.86	9	-1.46	38
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in prin	6	1.03	9	-0.27	23	-1.02	34	0.50	16
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic	7	-1.24	34	-0.66	30	-0.69	31	-1.23	36

8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Is	8	0.48	15	0.96	9	-0.59	29	-0.48	25
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have be	9	1.14	5	-0.36	25	1.33	6	-0.63	30
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Or	10	-1.72	38	-1.98	40	-1.67	38	1.31	3
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Ortho	11	0.89	11	-1.35	38	-1.25	36	-0.01	23
12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	-0.02	24	-0.27	22	2.04	1	-0.61	29
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fru	13	0.24	19	0.36	15	0.62	12	-0.12	24
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world sho	14	1.21	4	2.40	1	1.48	4	0.74	10
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is funda	15	0.38	17	-0.95	34	-0.02	20	2.08	1
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage	16	-1.96	40	1.45	3	0.10	17	-0.50	26
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continen	17	1.24	3	-0.04	17	1.48	4	0.61	14
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the	18	1.45	2	-0.20	19	0.36	15	0.97	8
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	0.19	20	0.69	12	0.18	16	0.01	22
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of t	20	0.87	12	1.22	5	-0.28	24	0.14	20
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (ross	21	1.10	6	2.08	2	-0.13	22	-0.61	29
22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Eu	22	-0.73	29	-1.07	36	0.65	11	-1.20	35
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar wor	23	1.45	1	-0.11	18	-0.50	27	-0.61	29
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and	24	-0.22	25	1.12	6	-0.42	26	-0.69	31
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead	25	-1.26	35	-0.48	28	0.07	18	0.35	18
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from E	26	0.65	14	-0.25	21	1.31	7	1.07	6
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoub	27	-1.27	36	0.09	16	-0.55	28	0.74	10
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, espe	28	-0.36	26	-0.54	29	0.40	14	1.59	2
29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's	29	-0.80	31	-0.48	28	-0.02	19	-0.86	32
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partn	30	-0.77	30	-0.90	33	0.74	10	0.50	16
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make the	31	-1.29	37	0.57	13	-0.80	32	0.69	12
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Ru	32	-0.93	32	1.01	8	-0.11	21	0.97	8
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, wa	33	-1.17	33	-0.22	20	-1.48	37	-2.08	39
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and	34	0.95	10	1.03	7	-0.60	30	1.12	4
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barri	35	-0.67	28	-1.70	39	-1.85	40	-1.36	37
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the trad	36	0.01	22	-0.32	24	1.50	2	0.27	19
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and	37	0.05	21	1.40	4	1.44	5	-2.21	40
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds insid	38	1.04	8	-0.95	35	1.08	8	0.12	21
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West	39	0.34	18	0.43	14	-1.19	35	0.63	13
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated fro	40	-0.58	27	-1.12	37	-1.67	39	-0.97	34

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Correlations Between Factor Scores

	1	2	3	4
1	1.0000	0.2696	0.2416	0.2507
2	0.2696	1.0000	0.2330	-0.0207
3	0.2416	0.2330	1.0000	0.0039
4	0.2507	-0.0207	0.0039	1.0000

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Normalized Factor Scores -- For Factor 1

No.	Statement	No.	Z-SCORES
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	1.454
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real'	18	1.451
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and	17	1.237
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	1.214
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been des	9	1.138
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	1.101
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	1.070
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	1.035
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle	6	1.029
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	0.952
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	0.893
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the Wes	20	0.870
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsore	2	0.727
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	0.650
8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic	8	0.482
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	0.396
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	0.382
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	0.339
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	0.241
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	0.194
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	0.051
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	0.008
1	All political processes active in our society since 1991, in	1	-0.009

12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	-0.017
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	-0.224
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	-0.361
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the	40	-0.578
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier aga	35	-0.667
22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	-0.729
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and	30	-0.773
29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-0.796
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	-0.932
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-1.165
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-1.242
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	-1.262
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	-1.274
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them Euro	31	-1.292
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	-1.721
5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	-1.910
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	-1.961

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Normalized Factor Scores -- For Factor 2

No.	Statement	No.	Z-SCORES
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	2.400
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	2.076
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	1.446
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	1.398
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the Wes	20	1.219
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	1.123
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	1.026
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	1.010
8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic	8	0.961
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	0.800
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	0.687
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	0.687
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them Euro	31	0.573
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	0.428
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	0.365
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	0.088
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and	17	-0.040
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	-0.106
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real'	18	-0.203
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-0.219
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	-0.250
12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	-0.267
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle	6	-0.267
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	-0.315
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been des	9	-0.362
29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-0.476
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	-0.476
1	All political processes active in our society since 1991, in	1	-0.476
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	-0.542
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-0.655
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsore	2	-0.752
5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	-0.864
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and	30	-0.897
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	-0.945
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	-0.946
22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	-1.075
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the	40	-1.122
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	-1.350
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier aga	35	-1.704
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	-1.980

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Normalized Factor Scores -- For Factor 3

No.	Statement	No.	Z-SCORES
12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	2.039
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	1.499
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	1.478
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and	17	1.478
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	1.440
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been des	9	1.326
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	1.305
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	1.078

5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	0.863
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and	30	0.739
22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	0.652
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	0.621
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	0.609
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	0.399
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real'	18	0.361
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	0.184
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	0.103
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	0.075
29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-0.016
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	-0.017
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	-0.112
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	-0.130
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsore	2	-0.209
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the Wes	20	-0.280
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	-0.416
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	-0.416
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	-0.496
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	-0.550
8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic	8	-0.593
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	-0.605
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-0.685
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them Euro	31	-0.798
1	All political processes active in our society since 1991, in	1	-0.804
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle	6	-1.020
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	-1.187
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	-1.246
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-1.483
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	-1.667
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the	40	-1.672
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier aga	35	-1.850

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Normalized Factor Scores -- For Factor 4

No.	Statement	No.	Z-SCORES
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	2.080
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	1.589
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	1.308
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	1.122
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	1.098
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	1.075
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real'	18	0.970
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	0.970
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	0.736
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	0.736
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsore	2	0.713
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them Euro	31	0.689
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	0.631
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and	17	0.608
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle	6	0.502
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and	30	0.502
1	All political processes active in our society since 1991, in	1	0.374
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	0.350
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	0.269
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the Wes	20	0.140
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	0.117
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	0.012
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	-0.012
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	-0.117
8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic	8	-0.479
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	-0.502
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	-0.608
12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	-0.608
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	-0.608
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been des	9	-0.631
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	-0.689
29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-0.865
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	-0.970
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the	40	-0.970
22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	-1.203
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-1.227
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier aga	35	-1.355
5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	-1.460
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-2.080
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	-2.208

No.	Statement	No.	Type 1	Type 2	Difference
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	0.893	-1.350	2.242
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	1.035	-0.946	1.981
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real'	18	1.451	-0.203	1.654
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	1.454	-0.106	1.560
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been des	9	1.138	-0.362	1.499
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsore	2	0.727	-0.752	1.479
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	0.382	-0.945	1.327
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle	6	1.029	-0.267	1.296
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and	17	1.237	-0.040	1.278
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier aga	35	-0.667	-1.704	1.037
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	0.650	-0.250	0.899
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the	40	-0.578	-1.122	0.545
1	All political processes active in our society since 1991, in	1	-0.009	-0.476	0.467
22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	-0.729	-1.075	0.346
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	0.008	-0.315	0.324
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	1.070	0.800	0.271
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	-1.721	-1.980	0.258
12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	-0.017	-0.267	0.250
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	-0.361	-0.542	0.181
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and	30	-0.773	-0.897	0.124
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	0.952	1.026	-0.075
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	0.339	0.428	-0.089
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	0.241	0.365	-0.124
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	0.396	0.687	-0.291
29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-0.796	-0.476	-0.320
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the Wes	20	0.870	1.219	-0.349
8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic	8	0.482	0.961	-0.480
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	0.194	0.687	-0.493
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-1.242	-0.655	-0.587
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	-1.262	-0.476	-0.786
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-1.165	-0.219	-0.947
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	1.101	2.076	-0.975
5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	-1.910	-0.864	-1.046
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	1.214	2.400	-1.185
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	-0.224	1.123	-1.347
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	0.051	1.398	-1.348
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	-1.274	0.088	-1.362
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them Euro	31	-1.292	0.573	-1.865
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	-0.932	1.010	-1.942
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	-1.961	1.446	-3.408

No.	Statement	No.	Type 1	Type 3	Difference
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	0.893	-1.246	2.139
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle	6	1.029	-1.020	2.048
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	1.454	-0.496	1.950
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	0.952	-0.605	1.556
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	0.339	-1.187	1.526
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	1.070	-0.416	1.486
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	1.101	-0.130	1.231
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier aga	35	-0.667	-1.850	1.183
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the Wes	20	0.870	-0.280	1.150
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the	40	-0.578	-1.672	1.094
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real'	18	1.451	0.361	1.091
8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic	8	0.482	-0.593	1.075
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsore	2	0.727	-0.209	0.936
1	All political processes active in our society since 1991, in	1	-0.009	-0.804	0.795
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	0.382	-0.017	0.399
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-1.165	-1.483	0.317
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	-0.224	-0.416	0.192
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	0.194	0.184	0.010
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	1.035	1.078	-0.043
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	-1.721	-1.667	-0.054
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been des	9	1.138	1.326	-0.189
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	0.396	0.609	-0.213
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and	17	1.237	1.478	-0.241
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	1.214	1.478	-0.264
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	0.241	0.621	-0.381
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them Euro	31	-1.292	-0.798	-0.494
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-1.242	-0.685	-0.557
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	0.650	1.305	-0.656
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	-1.274	-0.550	-0.724
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	-0.361	0.399	-0.760

29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-0.796	-0.016	-0.781
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	-0.932	-0.112	-0.819
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	-1.262	0.075	-1.337
22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	-0.729	0.652	-1.382
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	0.051	1.440	-1.389
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	0.008	1.499	-1.491
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and	30	-0.773	0.739	-1.512
12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	-0.017	2.039	-2.056
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	-1.961	0.103	-2.064
5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	-1.910	0.863	-2.773

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Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 1 and 4

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No.	Statement	No.	Type 1	Type 4	Difference
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	0.051	-2.208	2.259
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	1.454	-0.608	2.062
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been des	9	1.138	-0.631	1.769
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	1.101	-0.608	1.709
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	0.396	-0.970	1.366
8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic	8	0.482	-0.479	0.961
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	1.035	0.117	0.918
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-1.165	-2.080	0.914
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	0.893	-0.012	0.904
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the Wes	20	0.870	0.140	0.730
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier aga	35	-0.667	-1.355	0.688
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and	17	1.237	0.608	0.630
12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	-0.017	-0.608	0.591
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle	6	1.029	0.502	0.526
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real'	18	1.451	0.970	0.482
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	1.214	0.736	0.478
22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	-0.729	-1.203	0.474
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	-0.224	-0.689	0.465
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the	40	-0.578	-0.970	0.392
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	0.241	-0.117	0.357
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	0.194	0.012	0.182
29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-0.796	-0.865	0.068
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsore	2	0.727	0.713	0.014
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-1.242	-1.227	-0.015
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	1.070	1.098	-0.028
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	0.952	1.122	-0.170
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	0.008	0.269	-0.261
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	0.339	0.631	-0.292
1	All political processes active in our society since 1991, in	1	-0.009	0.374	-0.383
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	0.650	1.075	-0.425
5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	-1.910	-1.460	-0.449
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and	30	-0.773	0.502	-1.275
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	-1.961	-0.502	-1.459
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	-1.262	0.350	-1.613
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	0.382	2.080	-1.698
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	-0.932	0.970	-1.901
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	-0.361	1.589	-1.950
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them Euro	31	-1.292	0.689	-1.981
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	-1.274	0.736	-2.010
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	-1.721	1.308	-3.030

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Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 2 and 3

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No.	Statement	No.	Type 2	Type 3	Difference
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	2.076	-0.130	2.205
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	1.026	-0.605	1.631
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	0.428	-1.187	1.615
8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic	8	0.961	-0.593	1.554
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	1.123	-0.416	1.539
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the Wes	20	1.219	-0.280	1.500
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them Euro	31	0.573	-0.798	1.372
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	1.446	0.103	1.343
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-0.219	-1.483	1.264
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	0.800	-0.416	1.216
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	1.010	-0.112	1.123
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	2.400	1.478	0.921
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle	6	-0.267	-1.020	0.752
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	0.088	-0.550	0.638
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the	40	-1.122	-1.672	0.549
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	0.687	0.184	0.503
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	-0.106	-0.496	0.390

1	All political processes active in our society since 1991, in	1	-0.476	-0.804	0.328
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier aga	35	-1.704	-1.850	0.146
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	0.687	0.609	0.078
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-0.655	-0.685	0.030
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	1.398	1.440	-0.042
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	-1.350	-1.246	-0.103
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	0.365	0.621	-0.257
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	-1.980	-1.667	-0.312
29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-0.476	-0.016	-0.460
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsore	2	-0.752	-0.209	-0.543
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	-0.476	0.075	-0.551
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real'	18	-0.203	0.361	-0.564
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	-0.945	-0.017	-0.928
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	-0.542	0.399	-0.941
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and	17	-0.040	1.478	-1.518
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	-0.250	1.305	-1.555
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and	30	-0.897	0.739	-1.636
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been des	9	-0.362	1.326	-1.688
22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	-1.075	0.652	-1.727
5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	-0.864	0.863	-1.728
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	-0.315	1.499	-1.814
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	-0.946	1.078	-2.024
12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	-0.267	2.039	-2.306

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No.	Statement	No.	Type 2	Type 4	Difference
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	1.398	-2.208	3.607
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	2.076	-0.608	2.683
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	1.446	-0.502	1.949
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-0.219	-2.080	1.861
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	1.123	-0.689	1.812
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	2.400	0.736	1.663
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	0.687	-0.970	1.657
8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic	8	0.961	-0.479	1.440
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the Wes	20	1.219	0.140	1.079
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	0.687	0.012	0.675
5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	-0.864	-1.460	0.596
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-0.655	-1.227	0.572
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	-0.106	-0.608	0.502
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	0.365	-0.117	0.481
29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-0.476	-0.865	0.389
12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	-0.267	-0.608	0.341
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been des	9	-0.362	-0.631	0.269
22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	-1.075	-1.203	0.128
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	1.010	0.970	0.041
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	1.026	1.122	-0.095
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them Euro	31	0.573	0.689	-0.116
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the	40	-1.122	-0.970	-0.153
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	0.428	0.631	-0.203
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	0.800	1.098	-0.298
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier aga	35	-1.704	-1.355	-0.349
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	-0.315	0.269	-0.584
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and	17	-0.040	0.608	-0.648
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	0.088	0.736	-0.648
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle	6	-0.267	0.502	-0.770
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	-0.476	0.350	-0.826
1	All political processes active in our society since 1991, in	1	-0.476	0.374	-0.850
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	-0.946	0.117	-1.063
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real'	18	-0.203	0.970	-1.172
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	-0.250	1.075	-1.324
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	-1.350	-0.012	-1.338
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and	30	-0.897	0.502	-1.399
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsore	2	-0.752	0.713	-1.465
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	-0.542	1.589	-2.131
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	-0.945	2.080	-3.025
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	-1.980	1.308	-3.288

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No.	Statement	No.	Type 3	Type 4	Difference
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	1.440	-2.208	3.648
12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	2.039	-0.608	2.647
5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	0.863	-1.460	2.324
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been des	9	1.326	-0.631	1.958

22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	0.652	-1.203	1.856
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	0.609	-0.970	1.579
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	1.499	0.269	1.230
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	1.078	0.117	0.961
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and	17	1.478	0.608	0.871
29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-0.016	-0.865	0.849
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	1.478	0.736	0.742
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	0.621	-0.117	0.738
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	0.103	-0.502	0.606
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-1.483	-2.080	0.597
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-0.685	-1.227	0.542
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	-0.130	-0.608	0.478
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	-0.416	-0.689	0.273
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and	30	0.739	0.502	0.237
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	1.305	1.075	0.231
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	0.184	0.012	0.172
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	-0.496	-0.608	0.111
8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic	8	-0.593	-0.479	-0.114
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	0.075	0.350	-0.275
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the Wes	20	-0.280	0.140	-0.421
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier aga	35	-1.850	-1.355	-0.495
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real'	18	0.361	0.970	-0.609
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the	40	-1.672	-0.970	-0.702
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsore	2	-0.209	0.713	-0.922
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	-0.112	0.970	-1.082
1	All political processes active in our society since 1991, in	1	-0.804	0.374	-1.178
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	0.399	1.589	-1.190
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	-1.246	-0.012	-1.234
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	-0.550	0.736	-1.286
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them Euro	31	-0.798	0.689	-1.488
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	-0.416	1.098	-1.514
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle	6	-1.020	0.502	-1.522
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	-0.605	1.122	-1.726
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	-1.187	0.631	-1.818
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	-0.017	2.080	-2.097
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	-1.667	1.308	-2.976

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 Factor Q-Sort Values for Each Statement

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Factor Arrays

No.	Statement	No.	1	2	3	4
1	All political processes active in our society since 1991, in	1	0	-1	-2	1
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsore	2	2	-1	0	2
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	3	2	0	4
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	1	2	2	-2
5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	-4	-2	3	-3
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle	6	3	0	-2	1
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-2	-1	-1	-3
8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic	8	1	3	-1	0
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been des	9	4	0	3	-1
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	-3	-4	-3	4
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	2	-3	-3	0
12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	0	0	5	-1
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	1	1	2	0
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	4	5	4	2
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	1	-2	1	5
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	-4	4	1	0
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and	17	4	1	4	2
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real'	18	5	1	1	3
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	1	2	1	0
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the Wes	20	2	4	0	1
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	3	5	0	-1
22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	-1	-3	2	-2
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	5	1	-1	-1
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	0	3	0	-1
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	-2	-1	1	1
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	2	0	3	3
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	-3	1	-1	2
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	0	-1	2	5
29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-1	-1	1	-2
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and	30	-1	-2	2	1
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them Euro	31	-3	2	-2	2
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	-2	3	0	3
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-2	1	-3	-4
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	2	3	-1	4
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier aga	35	-1	-4	-4	-3
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	0	0	5	1
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	0	4	4	-4
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	3	-2	3	0
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	1	2	-2	2
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the	40	-1	-3	-4	-2

Factor Q-Sort Values for Statements sorted by Consensus vs. Disagreement (Variance across normalized Factor Scores)

No.	Statement	No.	Factor Arrays			
			1	2	3	4
19	Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	1	2	1	0
13	Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	1	1	2	0
7	Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-2	-1	-1	-3
29	The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-1	-1	1	-2
40	Unlike in Russia, people in the West have deviated from the	40	-1	-3	-4	-2
1	All political processes active in our society since 1991, in	1	0	-1	-2	1
35	The Russian Orthodox Church is the last reliable barrier aga	35	-1	-4	-4	-3
20	Russia might be an economic and strategic partner of the Wes	20	2	4	0	1
17	Russia is an inalienable part of the European continent and	17	4	1	4	2
26	Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	2	0	3	3
14	Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	4	5	4	2
25	Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	-2	-1	1	1
3	For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	3	2	0	4
18	Russia is best described as a land-bridge between the 'real'	18	5	1	1	3
2	Developments in Chechnya posed the threat of Muslim-sponsore	2	2	-1	0	2
8	It is a fact that the union of Russian Orthodox and Islamic	8	1	3	-1	0
4	In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	1	2	2	-2
33	The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-2	1	-3	-4
36	The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	0	0	5	1
24	Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	0	3	0	-1
34	The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	2	3	-1	4
39	There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	1	2	-2	2
30	The EU is not merely the largest Russian trading partner and	30	-1	-2	2	1
22	Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	-1	-3	2	-2
27	The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	-3	1	-1	2
6	Islam, as well as Buddhism and Judaism, should in principle	6	3	0	-2	1
32	The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	-2	3	0	3
23	Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	5	1	-1	-1
38	The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	3	-2	3	0
28	The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	0	-1	2	5
31	The fact that Russians are Christian does not make them Euro	31	-3	2	-2	2
9	Located between East and West, Russia seems to have been des	9	4	0	3	-1
11	One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	2	-3	-3	0
12	Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	0	0	5	-1
21	Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	3	5	0	-1
5	Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	-4	-2	3	-3
15	Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	1	-2	1	5
16	It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	-4	4	1	0
10	One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	-3	-4	-3	4
37	The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	0	4	4	-4

Factor Characteristics

	Factors			
	1	2	3	4
No. of Defining Variables	8	3	3	2
Average Rel. Coef.	0.800	0.800	0.800	0.800
Composite Reliability	0.970	0.923	0.923	0.889
S.E. of Factor Scores	0.174	0.277	0.277	0.333

Standard Errors for Differences in Normalized Factor Scores

(Diagonal Entries Are S.E. Within Factors)

Factors	1	2	3	4
1	0.246	0.327	0.327	0.376
2	0.327	0.392	0.392	0.434
3	0.327	0.392	0.392	0.434

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Distinguishing Statements for Factor 1

(P < .05 ; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

Both the Factor Q-Sort Value and the Normalized Score are Shown.

No. Statement	No.	Factors							
		1		2		3		4	
		RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
23 Russia's interests are best served by a multipolar world, wi	23	5	1.45*	1	-0.11	-1	-0.50	-1	-0.61
21 Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	3	1.10*	5	2.08	0	-0.13	-1	-0.61
11 One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	2	0.89	-3	-1.35	-3	-1.25	0	-0.01
37 The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	0	0.05*	4	1.40	4	1.44	-4	-2.21
32 The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	-2	-0.93	3	1.01	0	-0.11	3	0.97
25 Russia's transformation and Westernisation could lead to the	25	-2	-1.26	-1	-0.48	1	0.07	1	0.35
27 The alliance of neo-liberals and Islamists will undoubtedly	27	-3	-1.27	1	0.09	-1	-0.55	2	0.74
16 It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	-4	-1.96*	4	1.45	1	0.10	0	-0.50

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Distinguishing Statements for Factor 2

(P < .05 ; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

Both the Factor Q-Sort Value and the Normalized Score are Shown.

No. Statement	No.	Factors							
		1		2		3		4	
		RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
14 Religion is a private matter, and in today's world should no	14	4	1.21	5	2.40	4	1.48	2	0.74
21 Russia should be working to form a civic Russian (rossiiskai	21	3	1.10	5	2.08*	0	-0.13	-1	-0.61
16 It is a statistical fact that only a small percentage of Rus	16	-4	-1.96	4	1.45*	1	0.10	0	-0.50
24 Russia's prime task is integrating its own Muslims and makin	24	0	-0.22	3	1.12*	0	-0.42	-1	-0.69
33 The Moscow principality, which later became Russia, was desi	33	-2	-1.17	1	-0.22*	-3	-1.48	-4	-2.08
26 Some in the West are trying to 'exclude' Russia from Europe	26	2	0.65	0	-0.25*	3	1.31	3	1.07
15 Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	1	0.38	-2	-0.95	1	-0.02	5	2.08
38 The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	3	1.04	-2	-0.95	3	1.08	0	0.12

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Distinguishing Statements for Factor 3

(P < .05 ; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

Both the Factor Q-Sort Value and the Normalized Score are Shown.

No. Statement	No.	Factors							
		1		2		3		4	
		RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
12 Our country's [=Russia's] place is in the West.	12	0	-0.02	0	-0.27	5	2.04*	-1	-0.61
36 The Russian society has moved far enough from the traditiona	36	0	0.01	0	-0.32	5	1.50*	1	0.27
5 Islam in general is essentially hostile to Russia and Orthod	5	-4	-1.91	-2	-0.86	3	0.86*	-3	-1.46
22 Russia's geographical position obliges it to defend Europe f	22	-1	-0.73	-3	-1.07	2	0.65*	-2	-1.20
28 The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	0	-0.36	-1	-0.54	2	0.40	5	1.59
32 The influx of non-Orthodox religious teachings into Russia i	32	-2	-0.93	3	1.01	0	-0.11	3	0.97
3 For Russia, relations with the Muslim world are not only a f	3	3	1.07	2	0.80	0	-0.42*	4	1.10
34 The public opinion suffers from a number of myths and mistak	34	2	0.95	3	1.03	-1	-0.60*	4	1.12
39 There is not much good and worth imitating in the West.	39	1	0.34	2	0.43	-2	-1.19*	2	0.63

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Distinguishing Statements for Factor 4

(P < .05 ; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

Both the Factor Q-Sort Value and the Normalized Score are Shown.

No. Statement	No.	Factors			
		1 RNK SCORE	2 RNK SCORE	3 RNK SCORE	4 RNK SCORE
15 Russia has a unique path of development which is fundamental	15	1 0.38	-2 -0.95	1 -0.02	5 2.08*
28 The defense of civilisational variety and wealth, especially	28	0 -0.36	-1 -0.54	2 0.40	5 1.59*
10 One could not be a Russian outside the framework of Orthodox	10	-3 -1.72	-4 -1.98	-3 -1.67	4 1.31*
38 The Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkic-Muslim worlds inside Russ	38	3 1.04	-2 -0.95	3 1.08	0 0.12
11 One of the main pillars of Russia's existence is Orthodoxy,	11	2 0.89	-3 -1.35	-3 -1.25	0 -0.01
4 In the contemporary globalising world, the ideal of a strong	4	1 0.40	2 0.69	2 0.61	-2 -0.97*
37 The Russians cannot exist without the multi-ethnic and multi	37	0 0.05	4 1.40	4 1.44	-4 -2.21*

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Consensus Statements -- Those That Do Not Distinguish Between ANY Pair of Factors.

All Listed Statements are Non-Significant at P>.01, and Those Flagged With an * are also Non-Significant at P>.05.

No. Statement	No.	Factors			
		1 RNK SCORE	2 RNK SCORE	3 RNK SCORE	4 RNK SCORE
7* Islam, Western mainstream denominations (both Catholic and P	7	-2 -1.24	-1 -0.66	-1 -0.69	-3 -1.23
13* Over the course of history, Russia has brought the fruits of	13	1 0.24	1 0.36	2 0.62	0 -0.12
19* Russia is part of Europe, but never of the West.	19	1 0.19	2 0.69	1 0.18	0 0.01
29 The enlargement of the EU poses the threat of Russia's margi	29	-1 -0.80	-1 -0.48	1 -0.02	-2 -0.86

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