

War or Peace for Finland?

Neoclassical Realist Case Study of Finnish Foreign Policy in the Context of the Anti-Bolshevik Intervention in Russia 1918 – 1920

Juha Mononen

University of Tampere, Finland

Department of Political Science and International Relations

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Department of Political Science and International Relations

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This thesis studies Finnish foreign policy decision making between the years 1918 – 1920 in the context of the Allied and Associated Powers intervention in the Russian Civil War. The selected case study is analyzed through two theoretical frameworks: John Herz's idealist–realist distinction of political thought and Randall L. Schweller's balance-of-interest theory. The former is used to analyze the interplay of power and ideology in international politics; the latter to study statesmen perceptions of power and interests of state actors.

The selected research method is a case study operationalized as a theoretically informed historical narrative. The first part of the thesis presents the international context of the intervention with a focus on the Great War, great power politics and Winston Churchill's anti-communism. The second part analyzes Finnish foreign policy decision making in detail. The narrative is centered on the first President of the Finnish Republic K. J. Ståhlberg and his non-interventionist reasoning. The counterfactual is provided by an analysis of the interventionist politics of C. G. E. Mannerheim. The concluding chapter presents an overview of Finland's strategic choices and forwards a new narrative for Finnish foreign policy.

The question for Finnish foreign policy during the first years of the Republic was: war or peace for Finland? Under the leadership of Ståhlberg, Finland chose peace over war. Ståhlberg's vision was based on his conviction that military forces should be defence forces. Ståhlberg – the father of the end of history for Finland – created a realist liberal foreign policy tradition that was anchored in a belief of liberal democracy as the best form of human government valuing internal evolutionist development over international ambition. Ståhlberg's vision was powered by liberal optimism heralding that political freedom renders future wars unnecessary. This belief in transcending crude power politics eschews the cyclical tragedy of international politics.

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1. Introduction: The Realist Tradition

“The greatness of the scholar does not alone depend upon his ability to distinguish between true and false. His greatness reveals itself above all in his ability and determination to select among all the truths which can be known those which ought to be known.”¹

Realism is ostensibly a rich set of assumptions about the world founded on pessimism regarding moral progress, belief in the essentially conflictual nature of international affairs arising from the anarchic nature of the international system and an understanding of power as the final arbiter of all things political.² These assumptions have led students of international politics to draft, in different ages, books that use historical cases in illuminating the seemingly eternal laws of international life: Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* and Mearsheimer's *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

Strictly speaking realism is a family of theories of international politics. Realism as an analytic science of international politics was born as a critique of the primitive, utopian stage of the political sciences, an approach labeled Idealism. E.H. Carr's discipline defining book *The Twenty Year's Crisis* was originally intended to be titled as *Utopia and Reality* as to stress the difference between wishing versus analysis. Since the infancy of the organized study of international affairs the discipline has been understood by some to be dominated by the debate between realist and idealist (liberal) paradigms, the interparadigm debate.³

Beside the seemingly apparent difference in the approach of studying politics as it is *versus* as it should be there has been considerable confusion as to what we all are trying to study. The level-of-analysis problem of international relations, identified by J. David Singer in the 1960s, showed the need for a more scientific and articulate approach, differentiating the study of the systemic level (examining IR as a whole) and the unit level (examining the actors in the international system).⁴

Classical realism made no clear distinction. Contemporary realist theories separate the levels: theories of international politics seek to explain the pattern of outcomes of state interactions. Theories of foreign policy, on the other hand, take as their dependant variable the behavior of individual states. Their aim is to explain what states try to achieve in the external realm, when and

¹ Morgenthau 1965, 166.

² Gilpin 1984, 287-304; Bull 1992.

³ Carr 2001.

⁴ Singer 1961, 77-92. It has since been preferred in IR not to integrate variables on different levels-of-analysis.

why they try to achieve it.⁵ Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) started as opposition to classical realism but has since become part and parcel of the realist tradition.⁶ FPA has in the early 21st century developed into an independent subfield of IR with specific characteristics: in pursuing multicausal explanations for foreign policy outputs it looks below the state level of analysis to explore the complex foreign policy decision making processes.⁷ In the field of foreign policy studies the latest advance in the realist tradition is a theory combining elements of neorealism and classical realism: neoclassical realism, a portmanteau coined by Gideon Rose in 1998.⁸

In the following chapter 1.1 I will map the evolution of the realist tradition, through developments in neorealism, challenges from social constructivism and the renaissance of classic realist insight, to its latest advancement, neoclassical realism. I will clarify my theoretical starting point by discussing the levels-of-analysis problematic and question the usefulness of the interparadigm debate throughout the work. In chapter 1.1.1 I examine neoclassical realism's basic assumptions and predictions and show what kind of methodological preferences it forwards. Chapter 1.2 presents my case study of Finnish foreign policy decision making between years 1918 – 1920 in the context of the Allied and Associated Powers intervention to the Russian Civil War after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Finally, chapter 1.3 brings forward two frameworks that I utilize in my case study: the ideal types dichotomy of political thought and the balance-of-interest theory of alliance formation.

⁵ Gilpin 1984, 145.

⁶ Rynning & Guzzini 2001.

⁷ Smith & Hadfield & Dunne 2008.

⁸ For an up-to-date account of realist analysis of foreign policy, see Wohlforth 2008, 31-48.

1.1. Neoclassical Realism

Gideon Rose's book review article *Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy* examines similarities in the approach of several authors in their study of International Relations (IR), in the process creating a powerful and simple handbook on neoclassical realist theory of foreign policy.⁹ In his article, Rose identifies four schools of foreign policy theories: 1) the Innenpolitik theories of foreign policy, which concentrate on the domestic factors on foreign policy and three schools based on the assumptions of political realism, stressing the influence of the international system on state behavior. These three theories are 2) offensive realism, 3) defensive realism and 4) neoclassical realism.

Neoclassical realism is a classification given by Rose to a wide range of academic researchers that share some similarities in their methods of inquiry and concluding assumptions. Other labels attached to these same scholars I have come across are neotraditional realism or neotraditionalism, motivational realism, modified version of classical realism, modified neorealism, fine grain realism and postclassical realism.¹⁰ Some scholars use these labels interchangeably, others favor one or the other for reasons they explicitly do or do not state. I chose to use neoclassical realism to invoke the heritage of classical realism.

The history of neoclassical realist theory originates from the United States. The immediate post-Cold War world in the early 1990s saw a proliferation of literature that painted a richer image of international life than offered by purely structural explanations. Neoclassical realism arose thus from two debates inside the realist tradition in IR. The first debate was between offensive and defensive realism and the second between classical and structural realists.¹¹ I will study these debates and neoclassical solutions to these debates in the concluding chapters.

Neoclassical realist scholarship in Finland can be found in Henrikki Heikka's theoretically informed historical narratives that take into consideration the structural causes of the international system, strategic culture, domestic politics and personalities in explaining Finnish foreign policy interests and practice. Markku Ruotsila fits smoothly into the neoclassical genre in using realist theory and concepts in constructing rich and entertaining historical cases. Alpo Rusi voiced early on the post-

⁹ Rose 1998, 144-172. The most accessible reader on neoclassical realism is Brown & Lynn-Jones & Miller (ed.) 1995. If one opposes the epistemological eras (neo-) and sees them as breaking rather than continuing traditions, I would see this thesis as continuing the tradition of constitutional realism as founded on Thucydides by Rousseau and continued by Aron and Hoffman.

¹⁰ Brooks 1997, 445; van Evera 1999, 1-13; Schweller 2001; 2003; James 2002, 4, 49, 54, 189; Rittberger 2004, 14.

¹¹ Lynn-Jones 1998, 157-159. See Vasquez & Elman 2003, for a thorough introduction to the contemporary debate(s).

Cold War need for more organic study of international politics in order to explain change, effectively laying the base for neoclassical realism. The Turku School of political history under tutelage of Juhani Paasivirta can be seen as setting a historical archetype.¹²

The fourth school of foreign policy theory, neoclassical realism, is a combination of the external, systemic study of international politics in determining state behavior with an appreciation of the internal, unit-level variables. Rose explains:

“[Neoclassical realism] explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realists. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.”¹³

Fareed Zakaria, one of the most prominent authors related to the neoclassical strand of realism has crystallized the idea by writing that a good theory of foreign policy should first ask and answer what effect the international system has on national behavior, because the most powerful generalizable characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative position in international system. According to Zakaria a skillful explanation of foreign policy should not ignore domestic politics or national culture or individual decision makers. A good account, however, must separate the effects of the various levels of international politics. In order to achieve a suitable balance between the parsimony of a spare, systemic first-cut theory (Waltz) and the greater descriptive accuracy of more complex approaches, historical case studies must be layered with additional causes from different levels of analysis. Hence after discussing the systemic effects on foreign policy decisions, the researcher’s final focus must be on selected variables like domestic regime types, bureaucracies or statesmen.¹⁴

Neoclassical realism is firmly embedded in the realist tradition adopting most of the assumptions held by previous advocates of realist research. Like all previous realist theories, the neoclassical variant sees the system as anarchic: there exists no universal sovereign. The emphasis of the study

¹² Heikka 2003 (b); 2005. Markku Ruotsila’s research is widely utilized in the case study, see chapters 2 and 3. Rusi stressed the importance of the study of the 1st image – classical realist starting point, the human factor – of IR. See Rusi 1990, 40-46. Juhani Mylly, in presenting the “Turku School of political history” identified early on the twin focus in security studies, see Mylly 1984. Scholars of the Turku School have employed methods that study, for example, domestic parties in International Relations.

¹³ Rose 1998, 146. See discussion on systemism as a better worldview than either individualism or holism, in James 2002, 30-36. My aim is to keep theory as simple as possible, otherwise James’ elaborated structural realism (ESR) would do.

¹⁴ Zakaria 1992, 197. For the classic work defining the levels of analysis and arrival at the systemic level, thus criticizing the human (1st) and the state actor (2nd) images, see Waltz 1954.

is on the importance of relative power in the competition generated by the system. The importance of security is highlighted in the face of rival centers of power. The neoclassical strand of realist theory pays less attention to explaining the properties of the system, (indeed it agrees with much of what Waltz has written about the systemic level) and focuses primarily on explaining specific foreign policy decisions. Neoclassical realism maintains that the benefits of a new, more scientific approach – structural realist theory – are not enough. Therefore they take a step back to the origins of the realist tradition forming a perspective that returns to the earlier view of Thucydides, Carr and Morgenthau. Anarchy is perceived as a permissive condition rather than an independent causal force. Because of the anarchic nature of the international-political system where no overarching authority exists to control what states do, unit-level forces within states can affect the choices they make. Influence (power) is the defining variable in the neoclassical version of realist theory, but the causal logic of the theory places domestic politics as an intervening variable between the distribution of power and foreign policy behavior. However, neoclassical realists believe there are definite limits to these domestic effects. The framework set by the systemic balance of power sets the limits for and constrains state action.¹⁵ Shifts in the balance of power change the possibilities of state behavior. These changes can materialize themselves as threats and/or possibilities; the international system offers fear and hope for statesmen. Regimes and individual leaders whose strategic ability is not effectively functioning will pay a price for their lack of vision.¹⁶

The two strands one must research to paint a rich yet parsimonious picture of state behavior are 1) relative power and 2) a chosen domestic variable. Neoclassical realists argue that relative material power establishes the basic parameters of a country's foreign policy. The dominant factor shaping the broad pattern of a nation's foreign policies over time is their relative material power vis-à-vis the other actors that constitute the international system. This is where any qualified analysis of foreign policy should start from. Neoclassical realists believe that domestic independent variables must be relegated to second place analytically because over the long run a state's foreign policy cannot hide or transcend the limits and opportunities thrown up by the international environment.¹⁷ In determining the dependent variable of the foreign policy behavior of a given state, relative power is therefore the chief independent variable, domestic variables secondary. Both elements are required to create good answers for the questions on foreign policy behavior. An ideal account of a nation's foreign policy would include systemic, domestic, and other influences while specifying what aspects of policy can be explained by what factors.¹⁸

¹⁵ Waltz 1979.

¹⁶ Walt 2002, 210-211.

¹⁷ Rose 1998, 146, 151.

¹⁸ Zakaria 1992, 198.

Each neoclassical realist author has had a different approach to the selection of the intervening domestic variable(s). Driven by questions rather than method, neoclassical realists have chosen varying variables ranging from regime types to state capacities. There is no one and agreed neoclassical realist intervening variable. Indeed, neoclassical realists tend to incorporate domestic variables in an ad hoc manner.¹⁹ Neoclassical realism, however, lays great importance to the intervening variable(s). This distinction separates neoclassical realists from other theorists of foreign policy: in stressing the primacy of relative power, the neoclassical realists part company with the Innenpolitikers. By arguing that the impact of power on policy is indirect and problematic, neoclassical realists separate themselves from structural theorists. The supreme intervening variable identified and introduced by Rose is decision makers' perceptions, through which systemic pressures must be filtered.²⁰ I have chosen to use these statesmen perceptions as my secondary variable.

Because foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being. Neoclassical realism analyzes therefore how the systemic pressures are translated through unit-level intervening variables such as decision makers' perceptions (statesmen worldview). In the neoclassical realist world leaders can be constrained by both international and domestic politics. "Decision makers' assessments of power are what matter."²¹ Rose's generalization of decision makers' perceptions as the intervening variable stresses the role of the actor in relation to the structural influence and therefore adds an important element to the study of foreign policy behavior: "...statesmen, not states, are the primary actors in international affairs."²²

The study of the role that individuals play in international relations, the personal goals and beliefs or human errors of statesmen, in overall, is making a comeback.²³ This also more accurately reflects the twin foci of classical realism (the power and interest of states) in determining foreign policy behavior.²⁴

¹⁹ Walt 2002, 211.

²⁰ Rose 1998, 157. Neoclassical realism also gives us a chance to promote cooperation between different scholars, a need that was voiced in Harle 1989, 34.

²¹ Wohlforth 1994-95, 97; Rose 1998, 152, 147.

²² Zakaria 1998, 42.

²³ Byman & Pollack 2001, 107-146. Note that classical realism has always acknowledged the impact of personalities and allows individual leaders to have heavy impact on state goals. Theoretically the difference is that for classical realism, human nature is a constant, for neoclassical realism an intervening variable – individuals can shape, to a certain degree, the 2nd and 3rd image.

²⁴ Schweller 1993, 73, 76-77. Schweller writes that "...by elevating the concept of state interest to a position equally prominent as that of the distribution of capabilities, the model more accurately reflects the two-pillared aspect of

It is important to stress that for neoclassical realists the structural determinants of the international system are not straightforward or easily quantifiable. In their view any capabilities-based theory which recognizes that capabilities contain significant non-material elements must recognize the difficulty of making precise power assessments. Changes in relative power are channeled and mediated by complex domestic political processes that act as transmission belts from relative power to foreign policy decisions. In some cases changes in perceptions of power may even be completely unrelated to actual material capabilities. In others, state reactions to similar systemic pressures and opportunities may be different, or responses may be less motivated by systemic-level factors than domestic ones.²⁵ Economic, social, military and other quantifiable resources that contribute to any actor's power status and reflect the relative power positions of other actors in the international setting vary and change: much of international life consists of periods of ambiguous threats and opportunities. Uncertainty is the dominant feature of international life: "International anarchy... [is] rather murky and difficult to read."²⁶

This is certainly true of the time period under study, the years 1918 – 1920. The Great War, the First World War or "the war to end all wars", had raged since 1914, leaving the empire of tsarist Russia in the midst of a civil war. The newly independent states were assessing their positions in the state system and debating their national identities, in the process constructing their national interests and defining their foreign policy interests and ambitions. The balance of power on which the old world order had rested had been overturned. The new was only in the making. Power calculations and ideological preferences were constant features that changed a given actor's perceptions of available resources and of actions best calculated to utilize these resources.

Information about the situation on the ground that dripped to the capitals of the great powers and to Paris, the host of the post-war peace conference, was scarce and unreliable. Naturally, a policy-maker's knowledge of the chaotic situation could not have been reliably accurate. Combined with the fact that their energies and concentration were divided across several theatres, their perceptions play a very important role. Information regarding the most important component in any balance of power – that of military power – was often absurdly inadequate. Often, it arrived to key decision makers late, once the situation on the ground had already changed. Some of the information sent to

traditional realist theory – its equal focus on both the power and interests of states. Unlike Waltz's theory, which is all structure and no units, the revised theory contains complex unit-structure interactions: predictions are codetermined by the power and interests of the units and the structure within which they are embedded."

²⁵ Schweller 2003, 338; 2004, 164; Wohlforth 1994-95, 105. For a thorough investigation, see Hagan 2001.

²⁶ Rose 1998, 152; Zakaria 1998, 184. See Christensen 1997, 65-97 for discussion about the role of misperceptions of capabilities and strategies determining foreign policy decisions.

the politicians was meant to achieve a political end, more often than not it was interpreted by politicians to fit into their ideological ambitions.

From a research perspective all this shows us the importance of studying the decisive political decisions by examining them in their rather murky contexts:

“Neoclassical realists... argue that the notion of a smoothly functioning mechanical transmission belt [of translating capabilities into national behavior] is inaccurate and misleading. The international distribution of power can drive countries’ behavior only by influencing the decisions of flesh and blood officials... and would-be analysts of foreign policy thus have no alternative but to explore in detail how each country’s policymakers actually understand their situation. ... the transmission of capabilities into national behavior is often rough and capricious over the short and medium term.”²⁷

Neoclassical realists believe that understanding the complex links between power and policy requires close examination of the context within which foreign policies are formulated and implemented. The neoclassical lens that views the impact of capabilities on foreign policy as indirect and complex is seen as its innovation contributing to the progress of realist tradition.²⁸ Before studying what this means methodologically we must recognize the basic assumptions and predictions of neoclassical realism.

²⁷ Rose 1998, 158.

²⁸ Rose 1998, 147. For an assessment of neoclassical realism’s contributing to the progress of realist tradition, see James 2002, 97; Glaser 2003, 266-279. For a convincing critique of neotraditional realism, see Vasquez 1997. My view on the matter is that the critiques do not understand the ambiguity (richness) of the realist tradition and that many realists fail to understand that there is no grand theory to be found. I argue that many good academics are wasting too much time on philosophy of science and not concentrating on relevant policy recommendations – their normative duty (see chapter 4.3). I accept Guzzini’s claim of realism as an “ambiguous tradition”, see Guzzini 2001.

1.1.1. Assumptions, Predictions

The first and most important neoclassical realist assumption is the state's aspiration to maximize its influence. This assumption is a modification from the power-maximization assumptions shared by classical realists and Mearsheimer's strand of structural realism, offensive realism. Neoclassical realists argue that states are driven by the system's competitive imperative. This imperative produces influence-maximizing behavior that manifests itself in the eternal rule of international relations: the stronger a state gets the more influence it wants.²⁹ Because of the system's competitive imperative any given state will try to expand its influence. It is, however, another neoclassical assumption that makes this influence-maximizing behavior not a self-fulfilling prophecy of conflict as in Mearsheimer's thinking.³⁰ It is in this discussion about the assumptions of neoclassical realism that one needs to get back to the interparadigm debate.

Alexander Wendt joined the critique of realism after the theory had failed to predict the end of the Cold War in another assumed manifestation of the realist-liberal debate in IR. With his article *Anarchy is what States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics*, Wendt self-proclaiming, however, tries and succeeds to build a bridge between the two traditions. He argues for the importance of process instead of structure in influencing state action:

“...self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure... Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. *Anarchy is what states make of it.*”³¹

Wendt aims to show that the Hobbesian world is an institution, a relatively stable set or structure of identities and interests, that is often codified in formal rules and norms. The motivational forces (assumptions in theories) underpinning institutions are born from actors' socialization to and participation in collective knowledge. Institutions are cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works.³² Wendt tries to show that the Hobbesian world is not real, but an institution on the bottom of the standard continuum of security systems – just another

²⁹ Zakaria 1992, 194 and notes.

³⁰ Offensive realism is a systemic theory and a theory of foreign policy. For the similarities of offensive realism (aggressive realism) and neoclassical realism, see Rynning & Guzzini 2001, 9. Rynning and Guzzini use these labels interchangeably, stating that: “many offensive realists in fact prefer the label ‘neoclassical’ to distinguish themselves from Mearsheimer and invoke the heritage of Carr and Wolfers.” Other authors use these labels interchangeably or label authors against their own wishes. See Freyberg-Inan 2004, 76; Lynn-Jones 1998, 157-182. Lynn-Jones classifies Zakaria's “variant of classical realism” as “an example of an offensive variant of structural realism, not classical realism”. Zakaria himself has identified his work on state-centered realism as a modified version of classical realism, see Zakaria 1998.

³¹ Wendt 1992, 394-395. See Wendt 1999 for his book on the same topic.

³² Wendt 1992, 399.

competitive security system. In a competitive security system states identify negatively with each other's security so that ego's gain is seen as alters' loss. Negative identification under anarchic external conditions towards other actors' security creates what in realist literature is defined as the security dilemma, constituting systems of realist power politics where risk-averse actors infer intentions from capabilities and worry about relative gains and losses. At the calamitous climax – in the Hobbesian war of all against all – collective action is impossible because each power must constantly fear every move of the other powers.³³

Wendt succeeds in showing the tendency in IR scholarship to view power and institutions as two opposing explanations of foreign policy as misleading. He asks a question that must interest all serious students of international affairs: are the foreign policy identities and interests of states exogenous or endogenous to the state system? For a neoclassical realist, the answer is: “Both.”

“...neoclassical realists occupy a middle ground between pure structural theorists and constructivist. ... Neoclassical realists assume that there is indeed something like an objective reality of relative power... They do not assume, however, that states necessarily apprehend that reality accurately...The world states end up inhabiting, therefore is indeed *partly of their own making*.”³⁴

Neoclassical realism is, then, a combination of realist and constructivist theorizing.³⁵ Therefore it contributes to the larger scheme of paradigmatic bridge-building. Neoclassical realism's basic premises crystallize around the idea that the interaction of objective and subjective factors define the essence of foreign policy, and that policy processes are brandished by international power dynamics.³⁶ In the case of small powers this is even truer than in great power politics. Though motivated to maximize influence states do not automatically adopt a predetermined course of action. Indeed, neoclassical realists argue that structural imperatives rarely compel leaders to adopt any specific policy over another. Yet it is agreed that the imperatives define the limits of political maneuvering. States are not blind to structural incentives. These incentives, as already stated earlier, can manifest themselves as threats and possibilities. States decide to respond or not to threats and opportunities determined by both internal and external considerations. Policy elites, usually centered on one leader, must reach consensus within an often decentralized and competitive political process.³⁷ According to neoclassical realism *anarchy is what statesmen make of it*.³⁸

³³ Wendt 1992, 400.

³⁴ Rose 1998, 152-153. Italics by author, not original.

³⁵ Dueck 2006, 4.

³⁶ Rynning & Guzzini 2001, 16.

³⁷ Schweller 2004, 164; Dueck 2006, 1.

³⁸ According to Zakaria's formulation, *anarchy is what governments make of it*: "Nations do not formulate and implement foreign policy and extract resources to those ends; governments do." Zakaria 1998, 187.

Neoclassical realism sees actors as having a role to play in creating the anarchy they act in. Instead of assuming that states seek security, neoclassical realists assume much of the tradition of classic realism that states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment. Security is just one, albeit a most important, element statesmen value when defining their interests. Neoclassical realists argue that states are likely to want more rather than less external influence, and that they will pursue such influence to the extent that they are able to do so. The central empirical prediction of neoclassical realism is that an increase in relative material power will lead eventually to a corresponding expansion in the ambition and scope of a country's foreign policy activity and that a decrease in such power will lead eventually to a corresponding contraction. It is likely that over the long term the relative amount of material power resources countries possess will shape the magnitude and ambition of their foreign policies. Neoclassical realism predicts that as the relative power of a state rises it will seek more influence abroad, and as it falls the actions and ambitions of the state will be scaled back accordingly.³⁹

Neoclassical realism, then, predicts an international system where states will use power to influence their strategic environment and will react to changes in its relative national power and its relative power position in the system. In the neoclassical world, where states have a natural desire to wield external influence: "...power is a means, whereas influence is the end."⁴⁰

³⁹ Rose 1998, 152, 167.

⁴⁰ Lynn-Jones 1998, 169.

1.1.2. Methodology⁴¹

Neoclassical realists aim at doing justice to the complexity of human experience and social phenomena. History is therefore viewed holistically as a complex web of elements. This view on history asserts all events, goals and motivations as both dependent and independent variables. In foreign policy analysis, if our aim is to explain specific foreign policy decisions, we cannot be satisfied by merely postulating these goals. We are forced to travel back in time, inquire into the genesis of these national interests and study the process by which they become the vitally important variables that they seem to be in the behavior of nations. Therefore, in constructing historical case studies we have to decide if we examine our actor's behavior in terms of the objective factors which allegedly influence that behavior, or if we do so in terms of the actor's perceptions of these objective factors. According to neoclassical realists power explains change only if it is viewed phenomenologically. Phenomenology is an approach to philosophy asserting that reality consists of objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human consciousness, not of anything independent of human consciousness.⁴² Power needs to be studied by a method of inquiry based on this premise. Neoclassical realists therefore claim that if realist theories wish to account for specific events, especially episodes of change, they need a perceptual approach to power.⁴³

With neoclassical realism and by studying a historical case where the reality of objective factors is now known, we can do both – study the general framework of power politics and the perceptions of key decision makers. For the general framework we can use the systemic level that produces a more comprehensive and total picture of international relations while the sub-systemic orientation produces richer and more satisfactory explanations. With this less coherent and somewhat atomized image we get richer detail, greater depth, and a more intense portrayal. Neoclassical realism continues in the classical realist tradition that it might not always produce simple, neat answers. To neoclassical realists, foreign policy behavior may look clocklike only from a distance. The

⁴¹ I have used Stephen Van Evera's straightforward prompting as the structuring methodology for the thesis: "Tell them what you're going to tell them; then tell them; then tell them what you told them." van Evera 1997, 122.

⁴² Husserl 1969. Edmund Husserl's (1859 – 1938) philosophy opposes purely positivist orientations and gives weight to subjective experience as the source of our knowledge of objective phenomena. Neoclassical realists administer this philosophical stance in the realist tradition. For a discussion of Morgenthau's use of Husserl, see Jütersonke 2007.

⁴³ Wohlforth 1994-95, 127. Classical realism, of course, has stressed this reciprocal view of constructing reality: "Since it is the human mind which mirrors the physical world and which determines the human actions within and with respect to it, the qualities of the mind must in turn be reflected in the picture we have of nature. Thus, the physical world, as we are able to know it, bears in a dual sense the imprint of the human mind; it is in dual sense its product." in Morgenthau 1965, 141. Also in *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau writes: Thus in the struggle for existence and power – which is, as it were, the raw material of the social world – what others think about us is as important as what we actually are"; Morgenthau 1955, 78. See also the work of early realist G. Lowes Dickinson whose book title clarifies his views: *Appearances – being Notes of Travel*". Lowes Dickinson writes: "What I offer is not Reality; but appearances to me." Lowes Dickinson 1914, v. The classic book on the importance of perceptions in IR is Jervis 1976. See also Jervis discussing the lessons we can learn from history pp. 217-287.

complexity of social life is endorsed by this new realist formulation. Neoclassical realism's worldview contains a philosophical insight that values the attempt to, but remains skeptical of, the possibilities of success of the human endeavor to reach definite answers.⁴⁴

From all this flows certain requirements for the methods we can or need to use. Several authors have concluded on the methodological requirements of neoclassical realism. Because neoclassical realism stresses the role of both independent and intervening variables it contains a distinct methodological preference for theoretically informed narratives. Students of international relations who wish to understand any particular case need to consider the full complexity of the causal chain linking relative material power and specific foreign policy decisions. The construction of historical narratives eschews a monocausal focus on either domestic or systemic variables and gives us freedom to trace how relative material power is translated into the behavior of actual political decision makers. Ideally these narratives are supplemented by counterfactual analyses that trace the ways different factors combine to yield particular foreign policies.⁴⁵ Counterfactual analysis is growing into an important and appreciated method in qualitative analysis, especially in the study of international history and international relations theory.⁴⁶ Neoclassical realists therefore favor beginning intellectually from the systemic level, before carefully tracing precisely how, in actual cases, relative power is translated and operationalized into the behavior, into the foreign policy decisions, of state actors.⁴⁷

Case studies are therefore well suited for applying neoclassical realist theories to historical data.⁴⁸ Cases can of course be constructed in different ways: "They are made, not found."⁴⁹ Realist theories and especially Schweller's balance-of-interest theory, (chapter 1.3) which I have chosen to use in my case study, lends itself well to confirmatory research. In confirmatory research, the design of the case is theory driven – the theory in effect lays out a hypothetical story that the researcher then

⁴⁴ Rose 1998, 172. "...neoclassical realism's relative modesty about its ability to provide tidy answers or precise predictions should not be seen as a defect but rather as a virtue, stemming as it does from a judicious appraisal of its object of inquiry."

⁴⁵ Rose 1998, 153, 165, 168. Rose writes that the neoclassical realist archetype is Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*. See also, Walt 2002, 211. For the realist philosophy of history and of our possibilities of finding truth, see Spegele 1996, 162-190.

⁴⁶ Goertz & Levy 2007

⁴⁷ Rose 1998, 166. For the "ecological view" of reality, the philosophy underlying the use of the historical method, the interdependency of variables and overall general differences between social scientists and historians, see Gaddis 2002, specially chapters 4 and 5. I believe neoclassical realism finds the best elements of both history and social science. My understanding of history is heavily influenced by the classics: E. H. Carr's *What is History?* and Marc Bloch's *The Historians Craft*.

⁴⁸ See articles in Symposium: History and Theory section, pp. 5-85 in *International Security*, 22:1 (Summer 1997)

⁴⁹ Levy 2002, 134. "Cases are analytical constructions. They are made, not found; invented, not discovered. This does not imply that there are multiple, equally valid answers to our question about the world, only multiple questions that we might ask..."

operationalizes in the particular case.⁵⁰ This operationalization is done by constructing a narrative: a description of a sequence of events. This story presents events caused and experienced by characters, in this case statesmen. I chose this research method because it is viewed to be the most sophisticated of all methods of inquiry.⁵¹

The advantages of this kind of an approach in studying a single foreign policy decision lie in its ability to contrast the actual facts with an expected process. Our research of the case study can reveal the answer to the *why*-question and reveal the causal mechanism.⁵² A case study that tests a hypothesis has the added benefit of offering explanations to phenomena that the theory the hypothesis is derived from can not explain or explains poorly. It is, of course, impossible for the researcher to know beforehand whether or not the actual decisions were made on the basis of the proposed theories or worldviews. The potential ability of research to uncover deviations between the actual story and the theoretical story is important. By uncovering differences between the actual story and the assumed story researchers can identify factors that are outside theories but that account for important facts in the historical case.⁵³

Historical narratives that use causal hypotheses and theoretical variables in identifying the intervening causal processes enable us to assess theory predictions while giving us good explanations for given historical outcomes.⁵⁴ This is of value to realism, whose research agenda has concentrated much on the abstract. Testing the causal mechanics that theories are based on has received less attention.⁵⁵ This is surprising since even before our journey through the history books, we to some extent, know the outcomes. To gain better understanding of events, we need to investigate whether the motivations of key decision makers are consistent with the expectations of different theories. As Walt states: "It matters what states do, but it also matters why they do it."⁵⁶

Theoretically informed narratives then offer us a colorful image of the statesmen's world and the foreign policy decision context, decision maker's perceptions and actual policy results. In politics we are learning to accept, even value, competing point of views – truths. In science, post-modernism has changed our understanding of the concept of truth. For an advocate of the realist approach to the study of international politics, which was founded on the wish for better

⁵⁰ Maoz 2002, 171

⁵¹ Gaddis 2002, 88.

⁵² Maoz 2002, 171.

⁵³ Maoz 2002, 163. Peace as an element of the national interest seems to be one of these factors that eschew the traditional realist calculations.

⁵⁴ George & Bennett 2005, 205-232.

⁵⁵ Walt 2002.

⁵⁶ Walt 2002, 224.

understanding of the phenomena and with a clear motive to create a better (if realist) world, the competing narratives for the hearts and minds of people is a fascinating way to study the theorists' and the practitioners' worlds. I believe this philosophical stance makes the realist tradition all the more relevant not only in studying historical cases, but more importantly for our contemporary world now that the post-Cold War realist malaise is waning and the appreciation of realism is gaining ground.⁵⁷ After all,

"...it would be fair to conclude that the realist tradition is the worst approach to the study of world politics – except for all the others."⁵⁸

With neoclassical realism we can tell better stories about world politics.⁵⁹ My case study, as so many in the tradition, is on the surface historical, most definitely prescriptive in intention and Hobbist in tone. As many have noted, Thucydides' *History* has no conclusion; neither has my account of the early years of Finnish foreign policy. Rather than attempting to offer any definite answers, I will end my postmodern fable by posing a question, offering material for self-reflection, and possibly, learning.

⁵⁷ For post-Cold War critiques of realism, see for example Gaddis 1992/93; Kegley 1993; Kratochwil 1993; Lebow 1994 and Kegley 1995.

For the realist defense, see Wohlforth 1994-95; Mearsheimer 1994/95 and Waltz 2000.

For the realist reading of what really ended the Cold War, see Schweller & Wohlforth 2000, 60-107.

For the realist recovery and re-appreciation after the bogged down Iraq intervention and halted democratization of the Middle East, see for example: Ikenberry & Kupchan 2004; Fukuyama 2006; Lieven & Hulsman 2006. Post-Cold War realisms are supplemented with a value amendment. New grand strategy slogans against the neoconservative democratic realism (Charles Krauthammer) that I have come across include ethical realism, liberal realism, pragmatic idealism, progressive realism, cosmopolitan realism, cosmopolitical realism, realistic wilsonianism and "new realism".

For a powerful critique of neoclassical or more generally "minimal" realism, see Lergo & Moravcsik 1994, 5-55 and James 2002, 185-186. See the response: Feaver et al. 1995.

⁵⁸ Walt 2002, 230. For a sobering account of the problems of realism, see Guzzini 2001.

⁵⁹ Patomäki 1996, 105-133.

1.2. Case Study: Finnish Foreign Policy 1918 – 1920

I have chosen to study Finnish foreign policy decision making between the years 1918 – 1920 in the context of the Allied and Associated Powers intervention to the Russian Civil War. My research starts from December 6th, 1917 when the Parliament of Finland, Eduskunta, adopted the declaration of independence that claimed sovereignty for the conduct of her external relations, and it ends with Eduskunta ratifying the peace treaty of Tartu with Soviet Russia on December 1st, 1920. The international context will be presented in chapter 2, Finnish foreign policy will be researched in-depth in chapter 3 and conclusions will be drawn in chapter 4.

I chose this case according to several criteria. I am primarily motivated to study Finland and small powers in international politics. Secondly, I want to study the relation of political idealism and political realism, ideology and power. Thirdly, the normative background for the thesis is provided by my will to study the traditional readings of social science theory and Finnish contemporary history. Fourthly, I will try to contribute to the discussion about the character (metanarrative) of international relations.

First of all, I wanted to study Finland, the first years of Finnish foreign policy decision making, the first ideas or steps of the Finnish Republic in international affairs. From the practitioner's point of view, I aim to study the first moments of the possible birth of a foreign policy tradition. We can then judge whether or not there exists a cultural element in the Finnish way of foreign policy or not. Finland's potentially decisive role in the intervention weighed heavily on my choosing of the topic – from one perspective world peace was dependent on Finnish actions.⁶⁰ Altogether, I find the Allied intervention to be a most interesting event in history. Some of the statesmen I hope to study in depth (Ståhlberg, Mannerheim) and other characters that feature in these times of great social, moral and political upheaval make political history not only worthwhile but highly enjoyable.

Neoclassical realist accounts have mostly been interested in great powers even if they acknowledge the importance of small powers in international affairs.⁶¹ Even in Finnish research the study of small powers has remained in the margin.⁶² On the systemic level, instead of studying the effects of bi- or multipolar systems on state behavior (which many neoclassical realists aim at) my aim is to

⁶⁰ See Tarkka's book review titled *Koko maailman rauha riippui Rajajoesta*.

⁶¹ See for example Zakaria's study on the rise of America to her world role or Schweller's analyses of the tri-polar system. This is only natural because for realists the world is largely created by great powers and because most of the scholars are American who study U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy.

⁶² Rusi 1998, 63. For a Finnish classic on small powers in international politics, see Väyrynen 1988.

study how small powers figure in realist theory and in the perceptions of statesmen.⁶³ My goal is therefore on one hand to explain a particular foreign policy decision and on a more general level to study the role of small powers in a neoclassical realist world. I will do this by using Randall Schweller's theorizing as a tool in analyzing statesmen's (Mannerheim and Ståhlberg) perceptions of 1) power, the relative distribution of capabilities and 2) interests, Finnish identity. My research question is: How did the Finnish elite perceive the power and identity of Finland in world politics in 1918 – 1920?

Secondly I wanted to study the interplay of power and ideology in international politics. The two seemingly opposite political motivators of power and ideology constitute different worldviews: political realism and political idealism. These views lie at the opposing ends of a continuum that contains different policy options. These policies must be studied in order to value the worldview behind these policies. An influencing contemporary experience motivated me to study this aspect of IR theory. In fact, the initial idea for this thesis came from researching the Iraq war and specifically the realist opposition to the war. This gave birth to a presentiment I have developed during my studies of realism's relation to interventions, war and warfare. The relation seems to be more complicated than the realism versus liberalism divide, the so called First Great Debate, might lead us to understand. The realist (clausewitzian) slogan of war as a continuation of politics by other means seems to be contradicted by the (on-going) Iraq war opposition by realists.⁶⁴ More weight to my initial hunch was given by the basic historical analogy to Iraq: Vietnam. Again, one finds realists opposing the war.⁶⁵ Therefore, from the theoretician's point of view my aim is to study, by using John Herz's theorizing, how in early 20th century, ideology and power, idealism and realism, aligned themselves in questions of intervention, war and peace. In the case of Finnish foreign policy 1918 – 1920 the issue of the use of force in promoting an ideology is manifested in the intervention to promote anti-communist ideology.⁶⁶

⁶³ Ariel Ilan Roth sees merit in neoclassical realists' attention to small powers too and praises Randall Schweller for including small powers in the study of international relations theory. See Roth 2006, 486-488.

⁶⁴ Might makes right? According to realists, clearly not. See signatories and statements at www.realisticforeignpolicy.org. All the leading realists (Waltz, Mearsheimer, Walt) are present. Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy is an ad hoc coalition of scholars that began as an informal study group set up by Christopher Preble of The Cato Institute. Their organizing principle is their opposition to an American empire and activist American foreign policy in which the United States would use its predominant military and economic power to promote change abroad. The coalition questions both the morality and the efficacy of using military force and diplomatic pressure and aims at promoting an alternative vision for American national security strategy that is consistent with their vision of American traditions and values.

⁶⁵ Morgenthau 1967; Mearsheimer 2005.

⁶⁶ The use of force in promoting an ideology has, of course, relevance beyond this historical case. Indeed, Mannerheim's interventionist reasoning, which I analyze in chapter 3.1.1 has been used to provoke thinking in relation to the American led pre-emptive strike to achieve regime change in Iraq, see Heikka 2003 (a).

According to the opening quote of this work good IR scholarship requires more than the creation of solid overviews that distinguish between true and false. Useful academic literature, according to the lawyer-turned-social-scientist Morgenthau, should expose us to facts that we ought to (but presumably then do not) know. This normative desire for a better understanding of the world is voiced also in the study of history.⁶⁷ As my chosen vehicle to reach this better understanding is twofold: the application of social science concepts to historical data, my objective must also be two-pronged. Thirdly, on one hand, then in the realm of social sciences I aim to critically study the traditional, school-book 101-reading of political realism, IR's dominant paradigm. On the other hand, in the realm of history I aim at a critical review of the traditional reading of early Finnish political history, its most important actors and their perceptions of reality and prescriptions for foreign policy.

I am motivated to conduct these critical studies as a result of two contemporary observations. In IR, political realism has degenerated into something of a caricature of the worldview and theories classical realism has advocated. Realists are more often quoted than read and more frequently criticized than understood – the unfortunate if natural consequence of this treatment is that realist theories, policies and even individual academics related to the tradition get labeled and discredited in a counterproductive manner.⁶⁸ Finnish contemporary history on the other hand does not, I argue, properly acknowledge the traditions and actors that have had crucial impacts on the development of the Finnish state and her foreign policy conduct. Even if our constructed case is only a single-case study exploring only one data point, we are on reasonably solid ground because our case is concerned with the years witnessing the birth of the independent Finnish Republic. The obsession of historical research with origins can be understood and to a certain degree justified because “roots” and “beginnings”, viewed through positive reading explain much if not all of the following phenomena, and through negative reading at least act as a facilitating framework and background for future options. Finland's foreign policy traditions and contemporary practices can be better understood by a new reading of the strategic choices Finland faced in 1918 – 1920 and by an analysis of the chosen foreign policy goals and behavior.⁶⁹ Altogether, my challenge is to study

⁶⁷ Bloch 1954, 12. "...history is not watchmaking nor cabinet construction. It is an endeavor toward better understanding..."

⁶⁸ For an overview, see Gilpin 1996.

⁶⁹ I think this will be extremely helpful in informing Finnish debates about the origins of her wars. The public imagination is largely dominated by the two previous wars; these battles also captivate the understanding of security matters. Our investigation should shed light on the nature of the Soviet assault that led to the Winter War (November 30th, 1939 – March 13th, 1940) and should be helpful in explaining the subsequent Finnish foreign policy decisions to administer the Bolshevik threat, especially Finnish decision to bandwagon against the Soviet Union in the Continuation War (June 25th, 1941 – September 19th, 1944).

traditional understandings and to problematize the possible simplified and distorted meanings we often assume. These are the “truths” my narrative aims to expose.⁷⁰

Fourthly and finally, I will try to contribute to a discussion about the character (metanarrative) of international politics. There is a thriving and intellectually stimulating debate about the nature of international life. The realist tradition offers various possibilities for existential readings of key texts and has the potential to give us a deeper understanding of the world – comprehensively more important for students than the study of politics. On the other hand, the paradigms of IR theory in general, and political realism (notoriously) in particular, are based on crucial assumptions about human nature and the nature of the international system. My aim is then to study what kind of assumptions about human nature and the world give potency to the Finnish way of politics. This will be done by analyzing theorists’ and practitioners’, statesmen perceptions of tragedy in international affairs and by finding distinction between pessimistic and optimistic traditions.

The Parliament of Finland adopted the declaration of independence on December 6th, 1917. The nation then plummeted after a communist rebellion straight into a civil war. From the international relations point of view and through the realist lens it was a War of Liberation. Finland found herself in a self-help system and after liberating herself from foreign forces and consolidating political power she was presented with a rare chance of influencing her strategic environment more heavily than her long-term relative power would have indicated. Finland’s geopolitical profile and especially the geographical proximity of the Russian capital of Petrograd (St. Petersburg) would have made Finnish participation important, crucial even, for the success of the intervention. Petrograd, and the first communist states’ faith, in some sense, was in the hands of Finland. The question for Finnish foreign policy decision making during the first years of the Republic was: *war or peace for Finland?*⁷¹

⁷⁰ My conception of truth(s) or knowledge in general is informed by postpositivist approaches in social sciences, especially by post-structuralists Derrida and Foucault. Social understanding is understood to be subjective and research agendas, theories and methods are viewed to be conditioned by culture, beliefs and life experiences. Emphasis on ethics in research and pluralism appear to be the most promising strategy for producing knowledge. For a thorough up-to-date survey, see Lebow & Lichbach 2007.

⁷¹ The question is derived from J. V. Snellman’s classic article *Sota vai rauha Suomelle* (Krig eller fred för Finland) first published in *Litteraturblad* in 1863. Snellman reflected on the Lithuanian-Polish January Uprising that lasted from January 1863 to 1865. The nations of the Western states were issued an appeal to assist in the struggle. The appeal prompted a European-wide discussion on war and peace. Another article I contemplated using in my title was Morgenthau’s classic *To Intervene or Not to Intervene*, first published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1967.

1.3. Balance-of-Interest Theory of Coalition Formation

All human knowledge is by definition always filtered through some (theoretical) worldview.⁷² Historical cases, however, are usually constructed in a manner that does not explicitly reveal the theory or theories that are used. Contrary to history, which aims at descriptive accuracy, the aim of science is, by exposing our worldview, to gain more credible (falsifiable) accounts of what happened and to gain generalizable theories and hypothesis from the empirical world – this is what distinguishes history from IR, the social science. My attempt therefore is to research my selected case study through two frameworks. The first framework, I assume as being the default worldview of historians and practitioners alike is the idealist – realist distinction of all political actions. The second framework is provided by a theory of the contemporary realist paradigm: Randall L. Schweller’s balance-of-interest theory of alliance formation. The former studies decisions as either realist or idealist – all decisions are either one or the other to a varying degree. The latter sees all political decisions as realist.


For illuminating the background framework (default worldview) I have found John Herz’s theorizing helpful. Through this specter some foreign policy decisions are more realist, some more idealist, but not necessarily mutually exclusive. This I deem helpful in the study of the realist tradition, especially in its relation to peace. Herz simply states:

“Political thought may in general be reduced to two major “ideal types”, one or the other of which each individual theory approaches to a now greater now lesser degree but which to some extent, and in one form or the other, is always present. These types will be called Political Realism and Political Idealism.”⁷³

Figure 1. Ideal Types of Political Thought

Political realism

Political idealism



Both ideal types of political thought have generated traditions or worldviews: realism and liberalism which can be regarded as both descriptive and normative. Statesmen with realist worldviews advocate realist politics (Realpolitik), and statesmen with liberal worldviews liberal politics.⁷⁴ We can study these traditions by studying statesmen.

⁷² Lyotard 1984.

⁷³ Herz 1951, 17. I assume that the reader is familiar with the interparadigm debate and the basic assumptions of both theories. For a good if a bit complicated introduction, see pp. 17-42.

⁷⁴ Doyle 1997, 17-18.

The other theory I have chosen to employ views all foreign policy decisions as realist. Schweller's balance-of-interest theory falls into the (neoclassical) realist tradition. Schweller looks for the causes of alignment in the relative material power of states, their position in the system, and in their political goals, interests. For Schweller, as for other neoclassical realists, structural conditions are permissive causes that let rather than make things happen. Unit-level actors (statesmen), by defining interests, then make things happen. Schweller's theoretical contribution is his emphasis on variation in state behavior: Schweller's theory aims to research how states choose sides in a conflict, and is helpful in answering why states choose, if they do, to join a coalition, and is suitable for constructing historical case studies.⁷⁵

The background for Schweller's theory is in two contemporary debates: in the debate between the neoconservatives and realists and in the intrarealist debate between different strands of realism. Ultimately, the question in both debates boils down to whether power attracts power or creates counter power, whether bandwagoning or balancing is the prominent feature of the international-political system.⁷⁶ Schweller argues that structural realism has a status quo bias and that realist political scientists ignore the role of positive inducements in the exercise of power. Schweller exposes the fake dichotomy of balancing and bandwagoning in realist theorizing claiming that all sides in the (intrarealist) debate have mistakenly assumed bandwagoning and balancing as opposite behaviors.⁷⁷

Schweller assumes (in line with neoclassical and offensive realists against defensive realists) that all states in world politics are compelled by the anarchic system to maximize their influence and to improve their position in the system.⁷⁸ Schweller argues that alliance choices are motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger, by appetite as well as fear. The systemic environment creates threats and possibilities for states. Systemic assumptions are however not enough if we are to correctly assess foreign policy decisions. States have different motivations. Schweller is convinced that we need to examine state motivation and study the unit level variables. Because

⁷⁵ Schweller is seen by some to move neoclassical realism "from pure critique to an independent paradigmatic alternative", see Roth 2006, 488. This is one reason I have chose Schweller ahead of other neoclassical theorists like Zakaria or Wohlforth. In this chapter I have collected the main elements of the balance-of-interest theory – core from the *International security* article (1994) with additional clarification from *Deadly Imbalances - Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* book (1997).

⁷⁶ Schweller 1994, 88. For an easily approachable introduction to the neoconservative versus realist debate, see Harry Kreisler's interviews of IR scholars (Boot, Podhoretz versus Mearsheimer, Walt and Waltz) on *Conversations with History* available online at: (<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/>)

⁷⁷ Waltzian dichotomy of balancing and bandwagoning: "Balancing and bandwagoning are in sharp contrast. ... Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit and power. Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of coalitions. They cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue. The goal the system encourages them to seek is security. Increased power may or may not serve that end." See Waltz 1979, 126. Schweller, however only refines but does not refute Waltz, see Schweller 2003, 74-79.

⁷⁸ Structural realists (Waltz) and defensive realists assume that states are interested in achieving greater security.

this end. Lambs do not join coalitions. Lambs are weak states that possess relatively few capabilities or suffer from poor state-society relations such as internal division along political or class lines. Foreign policies of a lamb are not driven by irredentist aims. *Jackals* are *revisionist* states that value what they covet more than what they currently possess and pay high costs to defend their possessions but even greater costs to extend their values. For revisionist states, the gains from nonsecurity expansion exceed the costs of war; hence they will employ military force to change the status quo and to extend their values. Jackals are dissatisfied powers and as expanders risk-averse and opportunistic: jackals bandwagon for profit.⁸¹

The foreign policy goals of the two types of states vary: lambs aim at self-abnegation, whereas jackals aim at limited aims self-extension. *Self-abnegation* is a policy goal that essentially contradicts the assumptions of influence-maximizing as formulated by neoclassical realists. A statesman that chooses, in Schweller's terms, self-sacrifice as a foreign policy goal must then define state interests differently from the traditional understanding of realism, and have other larger, for example systemic goals (such as world peace) or act from the neoclassical realist perspective in an irrational manner. *Limited aims self-extension* authenticates neoclassical assumptions about state behavior: an aspiration to maximize influence. States are viewed to always have a motive for self-extension and an expectation of making gains. Both of these goals are reached through Schweller's theory by certain foreign policy behavior.⁸²

In addition to giving us concepts to use in describing foreign policy actors, their goals and behavior (explanatory value), Schweller's balance-of-interest theory gives us an informed proposition of the outcome of future events (predictive value). As our aim is to test a hypothesis derived from the neoclassical realist balance-of-interest theory we must once again recall the basic assumptions to create a general hypothesis we can then turn into a specific hypothesis suitable for our case study. Schweller, and other neoclassical realists, base their theories on influence-maximizing assumptions. They predict that the stronger the state gets the more influence it wants or in other words that states are compelled by the anarchic system to improve their position in the system. The general hypothesis drawn from Schweller's theory is therefore that if any state has the power, the possibility and the incentive to join a coalition, the state would do that and bandwagon for profit. By utilizing Schweller's concepts, the state would be or become an insatiable revisionist power; its foreign policy goal would be limited aims self-extension that would be reached by jackal bandwagoning behavior.

⁸¹ Schweller 1994, 93-95; 1997, 105.

⁸² Concept that describes foreign policy behaviour but is not predicted by neoclassical assumptions (distancing) will be explained in the concluding chapter.

In our case study, Finland was in a position to choose to join a coalition in 1918 – 1920. Finland had an able and victorious military commander C. G. E. Mannerheim with motivated anti-Bolshevik forces (power) and a large international coalition, constituting all the active great powers, to join (possibility). Finland also had major interest in the freedom of her kin nations, territorial ambitions in East Karelia, strategic concerns with her eastern border and a strong wish for an ideologically friendly Russia (incentive). According to this hypothetical story (research hypothesis), derived from Schweller's worldview, Finland would then choose war over peace. Finland would jackal bandwagon for profit and would join the anti-Bolshevik intervention in Russia.

Offensive bandwagoning is a revisionist foreign policy behavior that favors joining a coalition in order to achieve self-extension. Bandwagoners do not attach high costs to their behavior. Instead, they anticipate the advantages of being on the winning side: alliances for them are a positive-sum game. According to Schweller a powerful revisionist state or coalition attracts opportunistic revisionist powers bandwagoning to share the spoils of victory. The goal of jackal bandwagoning is profit, essentially the desire to acquire additional territory.

“The goal of [*jackal bandwagoning*] is profit. Specifically, revisionist states bandwagon to share the spoils of victory... Typically, the lesser aggressor reaches an agreement with the unlimited-aims revisionist leader on spheres of influence, in exchange for which the junior partner supports the revisionist leader in its expansionist aims... Because the jackal is a form of predatory buck-passing: the jackal seeks to ride free on the offensive efforts of others.”⁸³

If Finland were to choose otherwise, if Finland were to choose peace, we are obliged to analyze and explain the forces that move the nation's foreign policy in a different direction. We must find reasons to explain why Finland would, in Schweller's terms, act like a satiated status quo state, and construct its foreign policy goal as self-abnegation (self-sacrifice, self-denial) in the process undermining the assumptions of influence-maximizing as formulated by Schweller's reading of neoclassical realism.⁸⁴ This leads us to evaluate the utility, functionality and efficiency of the balance-of-interest theory of coalition formation.

Case studies are good tools for testing hypotheses. Our chosen case study format, confirmatory research, nicely suits our needs. In confirmatory research the theory lays out a hypothetical story we must after its operationalization then evaluate. As we have laid down the suggested explanation for

⁸³ Schweller 1994, 93-95; 1997, 103, 106-107.

⁸⁴ In answering both the why-question and studying the counterfactual, by presenting both Ståhlberg and Mannerheim, I aim to do justice to the competing foreign policy doctrines and study what necessary conditions were in place for one or the other strategy to be chosen.

events to come it is important to stress that Schweller takes an objective view of bandwagoning, even if states tend to bandwagon for profit rather than security:

“This is not to suggest that bandwagoning effects are always undesirable; this depends on the nature of the existing order.”⁸⁵

⁸⁵ Schweller 1994, 93; Schweller 1997, 77. Schweller continues: “If [the existing order] is characterized by conflict, bandwagoning behaviour may enhance the prospects for a more durable peace.” Schweller’s realist premises, his value-free objective stance towards competition in international politics and comes clear in his quote: “Like change itself, bandwagon effects are feared by those who are content with the status quo and welcomed by those that are not.”

2. Anti-Bolshevik Intervention in Russia 1918 – 1920

The nature of the new order that was being brought into existence by the Bolsheviks in revolutionary Russia was terrifying the anti-communists. Winston Churchill who was to become the leading advocate of the intervention famously declared in 1918:

“Russia is rapidly being reduced by the Bolsheviks to an animal form of barbarism.”⁸⁶

The events that turned indispensable allies into bitter enemies were powered by a complex logic of more or less constant ideological differences between the different actors and by circumstantial calculations to maximize actor influence in the competition for power. In the following chapters I will trace the processes that led to the Allied intervention into the Russian civil war. I supplement the narrative by presenting Churchill’s worldview and the philosophical roots of his foreign policy, and expounding his perceptions of the reality and prescriptions for policy. I start by explaining the situation as it was in 1918 in the context of the Great War. In chapter 2.1 we can find the primary reasons for the deployment of the troops in Russia, though their initial task was very different from the mission we intend to study. In chapter 2.2 I study the Armistice between the Allies and the Associated Powers and Germany, which changed the operation from a war maneuver to an ideological intervention and how the situation evolved from there to optimism and seeming success. The following retreat and ultimate failure of the intervention is documented in chapter 2.3. Finally, in chapter 2.4 I compare the intentions to the results and draw conclusions. This final chapter sets us for the study of Finnish foreign policy decision making in the context of the intervention.

⁸⁶ Winston Churchill’s speech in Dundee on November 26th, 1918. “...civilization is being completely extinguished over gigantic areas, while Bolsheviks hop and caper like troops of ferocious baboons amid the ruins of cities and the corpses of their victims.”

2.1. The Great War

By March 1917, “Russia... was sick, politically, socially and militarily.”⁸⁷ Since the Great War had begun after the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914 in Sarajevo, Russia had stood by her Allies (British Empire, France and later Italy) and Associated Powers (United States) in the fight against the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire). This had come at a high price. The eventual Russian collapse resulted from external and internal political battles the tsarist Russia lost. Externally the Central Powers, especially Germany, inflicted heavy casualties to the Russian army exposing the weakness of the Russian state. In addition to these overt military attacks, Germany had since 1915 assaulted Russia covertly by financing Russian revolutionaries. These clandestine actions were aimed at undermining Russia’s ability to wage war and ultimately at forcing it out of the war.⁸⁸ Internally, the nature of the autocratic Russian state had driven all democratic or socialist movements into secret and conspirational channels, thus undermining the legitimacy of its regime.⁸⁹ As a result of the increasingly drastic early 20th century, the unorganized March revolution signaled the coming end of the three hundred year rule of the Romanov family’s oriental autocracy. Tsar Nicholas II abdicated on March 15th, 1917 leaving power to the Kerensky-led democratic Provisional Government, which tried to honor all tsarist foreign policy commitments to the Entente. Intense war weariness however continued to grow leaving the possibility for the Petrograd Soviet, with Trotsky at its fore, to conduct a bloodless coup on November 7th and 8th, 1917. Moscow fell eight days later.

After consolidating enough power the new entity, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, signed a peace treaty with Germany, having previously declined this by unsuccessfully resorting to the “Neither peace nor war” stance, at Brest-Litovsk on March 3rd, 1918.⁹⁰ Russia was finally out of the war. The peace treaty signed by the Bolsheviks was a military necessity. Russia’s military had been destroyed by war and revolution. The separate peace seemed to bring to reality the worst fears of Allied leaders – “when the Bolsheviks seized power and the Eastern Front became inactive, the crowded German troop trains began rattling westwards...”⁹¹ Russia’s withdrawal from the war, its desertion of the Allies and Associated Powers at the desperate peak of the struggle against Germany

⁸⁷ Kettle 1981, 13. Note that the Russians adopted the modern Western calendar 14.2.1918. Therefore the Russian February and October revolutions are here March and November revolutions. The Julian calendar was 13 days behind the Gregorian. St. Petersburg was Petrograd during the years 1914-1924.

⁸⁸ Kettle 1981, 25-27, 34-35; Walt 1996, 131-132 (Chapter 4. The Russian Revolution).

⁸⁹ Carr 1973, 31. Carr’s role as a British civil servant during the years under study and his fascination with socialism must be recognized and his historical accounts must be studied in this context. Carr admired Lenin and called Stalin “a great Westernizer”. For a review of Carr’s works on socialism and the Russian revolution, see Haslam 1983. For Carr’s more profound biography, see Haslam 2000.

⁹⁰ For the initial reactions to Russia’s peace, see Kennan 1956, 71-84.

⁹¹ Kinvig 2006, 8.

was perceived by many Allied statesmen as an unforgivable betrayal.⁹² Soviet Russia further increased the anger of anti-Bolshevik statesmen by publishing secret treaties, repudiating the debts of former Russian governments, expropriating land and factories, nationalizing British and French owned factories and by proclaiming worldwide revolution. The vehicle to promote international communism, The Communist International, was created by the Bolsheviks in Moscow in March 1919.⁹³

For the Allies and Associated Powers, Russia's collapse profoundly changed the overall configuration of the war. Indeed, Russia's elimination and the resulting paralysis of the Eastern Front would make the achievement of their war aims highly problematic.⁹⁴ Even in her sorry condition at the end of the war, the Russian military was able to hold down one hundred and sixty enemy divisions on the Eastern Front.⁹⁵ The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk changed the military balance of power drastically. At the time of the truce in March 1918 the Allied and Associated Powers had one hundred and seventy three divisions, totalling nearly two million men on the Western Front; Germany had one hundred and seventy seven divisions.⁹⁶ After Russia's withdrawal, Germany shifted forty divisions from the Eastern Front raising their manpower on the Western Front to over three million.⁹⁷ The prospect of losing the war to Germany, if the Allies could not keep or get Russia back in the war, was very real. Britain and France had of course recognized early on the importance of keeping Russia in the war against Germany and had started supplying her with military material to the White Sea ports of Archangel and Murmansk, and to Vladivostok in Siberia already in 1916. By 1917 the British Navy was delivering three million tons of military stores a year to her eastern ally.⁹⁸ During the years prior to Russia's collapse the Allies and Associated Powers conducted military preparations in the context of the power politics of the Great War, which events and ideological motives would eventually turn into an ideological intervention force.

After the November coup and the German-Soviet peace treaty, the re-establishment of the Eastern Front became a vital priority, and the necessity to act more vigorously was signaled by the shipping of large quantities of military material to Russia's northern ports. The protection of these military materials offered a powerful incentive later to send troops to Russia. In North Russia, the British

⁹² Carr 1981, 7-8.

⁹³ The Communist International (Comintern or the Third International) was designed to fight for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and for the creation of an international Soviet republic as a transition stage to the complete abolition of the State. The Comintern held seven World Congresses, the first in March 1919 and the last in 1935.

⁹⁴ Kettle 1981, 54.

⁹⁵ Silverlight 1970, 6.

⁹⁶ Goldhurst 1978, 3.

⁹⁷ Walt 1996, 135; Goldhurst 1978, 3.

⁹⁸ Kinvig 2006, 2, 8. Murmansk could be supplied all year round; Archangel only during summers when it's port was ice-free.

had established a naval presence to counter the German submarine threat.⁹⁹ This presence formed a power, a possibility to influence the external environment, when interests altered. In South Russia where the Allies had previously fought side by side, after the Volunteer Army was set up in December 1917, the French and the British negotiated the division of responsibility of anti-Bolshevik activities.¹⁰⁰

The Allied and Associated Powers coordinated their military efforts and policies in the Great War. The Allied Supreme War Council that was established in November 1917 consisting of the heads of the state and Foreign Ministers of the Big Four (Britain, France, Italy and the United States) was meant to coordinate the political aspects of grand strategy.¹⁰¹ The War Council's military adjunct, the Permanent Military Representatives, was created to vision the military aspects of grand strategy.¹⁰² Even if both elements were firm in their execution of the Great War, the Russian question was to prove more difficult. National interests continued on one hand to have a prominent influence on the political decisions. On the other hand, the military effort was hampered because of problems of command and organization – coherent overarching policies could not be formulated. However, the Allied and Associated Powers Generals were the first to vision of anti-Bolshevik activities in their meetings in Versailles.¹⁰³

The lowly state of the Russian army as well as her near bankruptcy were known to the Allies during the war, but inaction seemed an impossible option for the reasons stated above. Indeed, the withdrawal of Russia from the war created a desperate military crisis for the Allies in late 1917 and early 1918: “Doing nothing in Russia was unthinkable.”¹⁰⁴ The problem was that despite the massive British loans and great quantities of military supplies that were being shipped to Russia, little was achieved. Few of the supplies seemed even to reach the front. This had given impetus to the idea of sending military troops to encourage the Tsar to fight on. In late January 1918, it was decided to send an Allied mission out to Russia.¹⁰⁵ These initial acts of the intervention had Bolshevik blessing. Trotsky accepted the British landing in North Russia and the subsequent temporary cooperation against the perceived German threat.¹⁰⁶ In March, the British followed by the French and Americans occupied Murmansk to counter the threat of Germany. Japan landed

⁹⁹ Hudson 2004, 43.

¹⁰⁰ Hudson 2004, 127. French took responsibility of Bessarabia, the Ukraine and the Crimea, the British of Cossack territories, the Caucasus, Armenia and Georgia. The Volunteer Army was initially set up by General Alekseev and General Kornilov.

¹⁰¹ Kennan 1956, 131; Godlhurst 1978, 3. From its creation until the Armistice the War Council met eight times.

¹⁰² Godlhurst 1978, 3. The Permanent Military Representatives met since its creation until the Armistice fifty one times.

¹⁰³ Woodward 1977, 171.

¹⁰⁴ Woodward 1977, 174-175.

¹⁰⁵ Kettle 1981, 42.

¹⁰⁶ Carr 1981, 11.

troops in Vladivostok in April, the British and Americans followed two months later. The idea to revitalize the Eastern Front with the introduction of foreign armies became then the initial mainspring for the intervention in Russia.

The goal to minimize the effects of Brest-Litovsk was to be reached by creating a war front in Russia which would tie down German divisions and keep them away from the Western Front. Allied troops were first meant to stiffen the backbone of the loyal Russian soldiers and secondly to destroy the anti-war Bolshevik regime. To achieve this aim the Allied and Associated Powers leaders invested hopes in their former allies, the anti-Bolshevik Russians, and subsequently agreed to extend secret financial aid to General Kaledin and any other Russian faction that might reinvigorate the Eastern Front.¹⁰⁷ The British Secret Service increased its activities and had various projects and clandestine operations to combat the Bolsheviks.¹⁰⁸

Russian opposition to the Bolsheviks had started immediately after the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd, and the advance of troops associated with it to take over cities all over the former Russian Empire soon thereafter. Hostilities intensified after Brest-Litovsk. At first, the civil war encompassed violent antagonism between Russians and non-Russians, socialists and monarchists, soviets and tsarist officers and between urban centers and rural communities.¹⁰⁹ Eventually the war boiled down to hostilities between the Communist Red Army, and the anti-Bolshevik White movement.¹¹⁰ The White movement is in some sources referred to as the White Army even if it lacked general coordination and was made up of extremely heterogeneous diffuse actors hardly deserving to be called an army. Much of the planning done for the Allied and Associated powers intervention placed high hopes on the Russian Whites. The mission was largely perceived as support for the Whites against their weak opponents. Indeed, the planning in London and Paris for the continued fighting on the Eastern Front proceeded on the assumption that the Bolshevik regime rested on fickle foundations, was not widely approved by the Russian people, and could easily be tackled.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Woodward 1977, 171.

¹⁰⁸ British participation in the Kornilov uprising, the Lockhart Plot, actions of Augustus Agar and Sidney Reilly are most well known examples of espionage and underground counterrevolutionary actions to overthrow Lenin. Reilly gave inspiration to the character of James Bond 007. See Long 1995, 1225-1243; Aisworth 1998, 1447-1470 for colorful descriptions.

¹⁰⁹ Salvadó 2002, 107. To describe the Russian Civil War only as a struggle between the Reds and the Whites is misleading. I am however forced to concentrate on the White movement. My approach is justified because of Mannerheim's affiliation to the Russian White Generals. For discussion of other actors, such as the so-called Green Army, see Butt (ed.) 1996.

¹¹⁰ The most important actors, Generals Yudenitch, Kolchak and Denikin are more closely studied in the next chapter. For an alternative view that claims that by April 1918 the civil war was at an end and that the Soviet government was securely established, see Coates 1935, 80, 127.

¹¹¹ Kinvig 2006, 28; Hudson 2004, 22, 36. "To a certain extent this support took the form of training anti-Bolshevik forces in the hope that, eventually, they would be entirely self-supporting and in supplying large quantities of arms."

To understand our case in the correct historical context it is important to acknowledge the difference between a *coup d'état* and a revolution. The Bolshevik seizure of power, a *coup d'état* or more descriptively a *coup de force* from the democratic Provisional Government in November 1917 was perceived as a revolution only by the Bolsheviks themselves. For the democratic forces, the White movement, and international interventionists the Bolshevik violent overthrow of Kerensky was an illegal and illegitimate action. From their perspective the struggle for power they fomented was real revolution, from the Bolshevik perspective, this was counter-revolutionary rebellion.

The ultimately unjustified optimism of the leaders of the Allies contributed to mission creep and the continuing expansion of the intervention. The seeming necessity of taking action did not however translate into an organized and thorough effort. The intervention was executed hastily, with incomplete preparation, unclear financing and open questions of transport and local conditions.¹¹² The polyglot international forces that were to perform the dangerous and difficult intervention put under way without a proper plan had various problems in being an efficient fighting force. Consisting of various nationalities of war-weary soldiers that were deemed unfit for service in other theatres of the war, the troops were of limited value in Russia. Difficulties were increased by the harsh, cold climate, the difficult medical situation and war weariness. In some units, it only logically followed that whisky came to pose another problem. The general logistics faced serious challenges from corruption, theft and general lack of coordination. Even problems feeding the local population and distributing fuel and ammunition were widespread. Language posed a lasting problem as did the officers and soldiers that meddled in local political affairs. The communications between the military and political decision makers were problematic. The limited reliable information available about the kaleidoscope of regions, actors, and political interests which made up the Russian problems intensified problems on the field.¹¹³

The anti-Bolshevik intervention performed by the Allies and the Associated Powers can roughly be divided into three separate campaigns or theatres: in north-western Russia, southern Russia and Siberia. The forces were made up of the British troops, the Czechoslovak Legion, and the American

¹¹² Kinvig 2006, 22.

¹¹³ See Hudson 2004, 143; Kinvig 2006, 22, 35, 74, 83, 87, 107-108, 111, 115, 120. Kinvig quotes the local commander as saying his troops were "one of the most motley forces ever created for the purpose of military operations". In other parts he describes the recruiting process as "barrel being scraped and rescraped", the available troops being "neither keen nor capable", some being "pure adventurers". Reinforcements delivered were "of poor quality or inappropriate for the Russians". It must be remembered that the war weariness was taking its toll in the U.K. too. The British military forces was at the time in the midst of a "wave of unrest" – "state of general incipient mutiny in January and February [1919]". Spanish influenza and the generally bad hygiene situation caused problems too. Hudson writes that the Americans were untrained and unsatisfied to be under the British command.

troops.¹¹⁴ All exogenous interventionist actions can be understood and to some extent were tied to the endogenous anti-Bolshevik actors. Russian Whites were presented by Generals Yudenitch and Denikin and Admiral Kolchak in North-West, South and East respectively. After Admiral Kolchak seized power and declared himself the Supreme Ruler, the civil war can be seen to be a war between Red Bolsheviks and the White Generals aided by the international interventionists.¹¹⁵

Great Britain had a leading role in bringing about the anti-Bolshevik intervention. They were best positioned of the Allies and Associated Powers to promote anti-Bolshevik policies because of their powerful naval forces. Britain's leading statesmen had also the strongest motivation – they had been in the war allied to the Russians, considered the White Russians as friends, and had powerful ideological presentiments against Bolshevism. My general focus on British post-Armistice views and especially Winston Churchill's motives for the intervention is justified because this was the reasoning Mannerheim valued and advocated. Ståhlberg, on the other hand, had a reasoning of his own, not necessarily related to any international vision. Anyhow, the primary impetus for the intervention, initially at least, came from British soldiers, not her politicians.¹¹⁶ British planning for the intervention began in May 1918. Prior to the Armistice, British anti-communism was only one aspect of the fight. Initially, it was much more important to target the Central Powers. All this was bound to change with the Armistice and Churchill.¹¹⁷

The United States joined the Great War as an Associated Power to Great Britain and Russia after the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1st, 1917 and once the perceived tyrannical monarchy of Tsar Nicholas II was replaced by a democratic government following the March revolution.¹¹⁸ The latter event altered the ideological composition of the coalition and gave America a “more inspiring rationale” for war.¹¹⁹ Pleased and hopeful of the coming democratic progress, the U.S. started providing the Russian Provisional Government with economic and technical support. In July 1918, President Woodrow Wilson finally, after long

¹¹⁴ I concentrate here mostly on the North (-West) theatre because of its importance to the Finnish decision making. Also my primary focus is on British (and to a certain degree American and French) foreign policy decision making. It has also been necessary to reduce the characters portrayed to a bare minimum. It is worth noting that the Japanese participation and motivation in the East is not discussed here even if Japan had, by far, the most numerous troops participating in the intervention: twenty eight thousand increasing to seventy thousand. Other (minor) state participants were Ireland and Canada with Greeks, Poles, Serbs, Romanians, Australians, Chinese, Italians and Senegalese contributing to the intervening troops too. The Caspian, Central Asian and Caucasus dynamics is largely ignored.

¹¹⁵ Butt (ed.) 1996, 31.

¹¹⁶ Woodward 1977, 171.

¹¹⁷ For a thorough account of the different strands and the development of British and American anti-communism, see Ruotsila 2001.

¹¹⁸ The United States did not join the Great War as an ally to the Entente powers because of Woodrow Wilson's aversion towards behavior he perceived as *realpolitik*. Wilson was determined not to reproduce similar power politics that had in his opinion led to the war in the first place.

¹¹⁹ Kennan 1956, 14.

opposing involvement in the intervention following the “Do Nothing”-policy and wishing for the self-help system to work its own way, bowed to the Allied (especially the British) “massive, continual and in the long run decisive” pressure. Wilson reluctantly agreed to send the American North Russia Expeditionary Force (the Polar Bear Expedition) to Archangel and the American Expeditionary Force Siberia to Vladivostok, five thousand and ten thousand strong troops, respectively.¹²⁰ Wilson made it clear that he opposed the attempt to re-establish the Eastern Front – a project his advisers deemed as unrealistic. Wilson was out to rescue the Czech Legion.¹²¹ In his only statement regarding the intervention, an unpublished aide-mémoire, Wilson highlights the helping of the westward moving Czechs and the guarding of military store as the primary motivators for the intervention.¹²² Americans reached their destination in early September. Other motives for the American participation from the power politics perspective were to counter Japanese expansion in Siberia and to prevent Germans (or Bolsheviks which were perceived as German agents) gaining control of the military supplies. Ideologically America acted to counter Bolshevism and to act on its desire to support Russian liberalism.¹²³

Because of the long-standing Franco-Russian alliance since the 1890s and heavy French investment in Russian state securities, industry and banking French stakes in Russia were high.¹²⁴ France was throughout the Great War well-informed of the Russian army’s disintegration and perceived their eventual withdrawal from the war and the following collapse of the Eastern Front as inevitable.¹²⁵ After the November revolution the French had started supplying and encouraging anti-Bolshevik resistance, mainly in the Ukraine and the Don motivated by the protection of stockpiled war supplies in various Russian ports and the fate of the Czech Legion. These motivations were, however, secondary to the fear of the new Bolshevik Army used as an instrument of *guerre sociale*.¹²⁶ After the revolution, the French temporarily cooperated militarily with the Bolsheviks wishing they would organize against the Central Powers. These wishes were unfounded and by late spring 1918, Paris was already committed to overthrowing the Bolshevik regime. French planning

¹²⁰ Woodrow Wilson’s worldview and roots for his foreign policy can be studied by analyzing the Fourteen Points, published on January 8th, 1918.

¹²¹ Woodward 1977, 174; Kinvig 2006. Americans made up the “largest and most important contingent in North Russia” yet with a “reluctance to get involved that was to characterise its role throughout the intervention”

¹²² Quoted in Goldhurst 1978, 22-23. The Czech Legion was, of course, meant to be evacuated from Vladivostok and should have moved eastwards, not west towards Bolshevik controlled Russian heartland.

¹²³ Lasch 1962, 205-223. Lasch makes convincingly the argument that the American Siberian intervention was targeted against the Germans. See also, Trani 1976, 440-461 for a good overview of multiple motives.

¹²⁴ Carley 1983, 123-141. Carley notes that Russia accounted for almost thirty percent of French foreign direct investments. France had also invested heavily in Russian railways for strategic reasons.

¹²⁵ Carley 1976, 414.

¹²⁶ Carley 1976, 425. We can safely assume that the French were initially at least motivated more by power political necessities rather than ideological motives. Either way, the French had few soldiers to spare away from the home front to this venture and later when the ideological motives became more important French influence grew even if their actions (at least in the vicinity of Finland) remained non-existent.

for the intervention began at the end of April 1918.¹²⁷ The French actions were bound to be political – military intervention was impossible due to German offensives and threatening presence in the Western Front.

The Czechoslovak Legion was during the Great War a voluntary armed force made up of ethnic Czechs and Slovaks in Russia fighting with the Entente against the Central Powers in order to create an independent Czechoslovakia, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After Brest-Litovsk, the Legion had reached an agreement with the Bolsheviks to be evacuated through Vladivostok and the United States to resume fighting on the Western Front in France. After an incident in Chelyabinsk in May 1918, the forty thousand strong Czech forces became entangled in the anti-Bolshevik fight.¹²⁸ Between May and August 1918, the Czech Legion that almost by accident became involved in the intervention took control of almost the entire Trans-Siberian railway from Samara to Vladivostok. Their intended retreat had transformed itself into something quite different.¹²⁹ Overall, the anti-Bolshevik presence in Russia was formidable since the November revolution: the first seemingly most opportune moment to overthrow the Bolshevik regime presented itself in July 1918. From the international point of view now was the time to act.

The mid-summer months of 1918 were “Bolshevism’s darkest hour”; the regime was politically isolated, without an army, circled by hostile armies and facing an armed revolt and famine.¹³⁰ After the summer, when the Tsar family’s assassination in Yekaterinburg in July had shown the relentless stance of the Bolsheviks, the White momentum gained strength. In the Far East, the British and Japanese had begun disembarking at Vladivostok in early August; Americans arrived later the same month. The beginning of the foreign intervention can be set to April 1918 with the landing of Japanese at Vladivostok. The perceived potential of the intervention was great and it “provided a hope and rallying-point for all elements in Russia itself which were opposed to the [Bolshevik] regime.”¹³¹ In the South, French landed in Odessa in mid-December 1918, and soon they occupied the north Black Sea coast, whereas the British supplied massive amounts of military material, including aircrafts and tanks, and instructors to General Denikin. In November a British fleet was sent to the Baltic theatre, where they took effective control of the sea, blockaded and contained the Bolshevik fleet at Kronstadt.¹³²

¹²⁷ Carley 1976, 436; Kennan 1956, 301. The French also favored the intervention to Siberia by Japanese.

¹²⁸ Hudson 2004, 82; Carr 1981, 11. Carr writes about the Czech Legion as deserters from the Austrian Army, Some sources value the Czech Legion at seventy thousand, Jenkins 2002, 351, some at fifty thousand, Coates 1935, 98.

¹²⁹ Coates 1935, 112; Kennan 1958, 136-165.

¹³⁰ Kennan 1958, 437.

¹³¹ Carr 1973, 169.

¹³² Hudson 2004, 157. Hudson argues that the Baltic theatre was for the British “very minor and of no great importance in the general order of things.”

On the opposing side, the leaders of the new Bolshevik regime – Lenin and Trotsky – were gradually becoming more organized after finding themselves in a situation where large parts of Russia were occupied by either White Russians or the allies of the former bourgeois government who were ready to resist the Bolshevik attempt at dictatorship of the proletariat by military force. The two antagonists had however transitionally common anti-German interests and the Allies and the Bolsheviks acted temporarily on collaborative ventures.¹³³ In Murmansk, the Murmansk soviet cooperated, under accepting oversight from Trotsky, with the British against the threat of a possible German attack through Finland in conjunction with the White Finns. A Finn Legion, around five hundred Red Finns were under the British command in Murmansk countering the German threat and defending the over nine hundred and fifty kilometer Murman railway leading to Petrograd. The treaty between Red Finns and Britain for the Murmansk Legion was signed on June 7th, 1918.¹³⁴ The German-White Finn threat never materialized. The changing balance of power and the weakening of Germany pushed the momentum towards Allied and Associated Powers ideological aims. There was no one clear turning point operationally when the interventionist actions were deliberately targeted against Bolsheviks, rather than as a good addition to the actions targeted against the Central Powers. However, the expedition to Archangel in early August 1918 can be regarded as an anti-Bolshevik invasion from the very start at least from the point of view of local commanders if not from the point of view of political leaders. The first victims of the intervention were members of the Kem soviet shot by advancing Brits in July 1918.¹³⁵ The armistice that ended the Great War between the Central and the remaining Entente Powers melted away the basis for sending of military material and forces to Russia and gradually changed the operation from a war maneuver to an ideological intervention.

¹³³ Hudson 2004, 54-58. For a detailed account, see Nevakivi 1970.

¹³⁴ Polvinen 1971, 22

¹³⁵ Kinvig 2006, 29.

2.2. Armistice: Anti-Bolshevik Intervention – Optimism and Advance

The armistice between Germany and the remaining Entente powers was signed on November 11th, 1918 at Compiègne, France. It ended the Great War and in removing the initial power political motive for the Allied and Associated Powers intervention unmasked the underlying reasons for the Allies interest in the Russian civil war. The armistice removed at a stroke the primary justification for the intervention in Russia. The intervening powers had always had many motives for their actions and it was only gradually after the armistice that the Allied military actions were solely targeted against Bolshevism.

The armistice did however constitute a major political turning point, changing the balance between idealist and realist elements in Allied foreign policy thinking: ideological motivation for the intervention, anti-Bolshevism, had never been entirely absent but now moved to the core.¹³⁶ The leadership of the international intervening forces was now forced to seriously consider future policy towards the Bolshevik regime. Support was extended to Russian armies “committed to the crusade against Bolshevism.”¹³⁷

What was to become the anti-Bolshevik intervention after the ending of the Great War in November 1918 started early, as we have learned, as an attempt to continue Russia’s contribution to the fight against Germany. The initial motive behind Allied and Associated Powers intervention in Russia was the fear that the revolution would shift the balance of power in favour of Germany.¹³⁸ The Allied and Associated Powers’ decisions and discussions on a preferable policy towards Russia were to follow a repetitive path throughout the intervention that left the situation unclear: no definite interventionist policy was agreed upon, yet in deeds what had become the occupation of Murmansk and Archangel were continued and other actions promoting the future possibilities of a successful intervention were taken.¹³⁹ This resulted in a contradictory situation where the commanders were suggesting policies that seemed far in excess of what the governments had indeed determined, and continued to press for reinforcements.¹⁴⁰ Military material and support for the Whites continued to flow. The lack of a coherent Allied and Associated Powers policy regarding the goals and execution of the intervention forces us to study individual statesmen’s perceptions and

¹³⁶ Kinvig 2006, 76-78.

¹³⁷ Carr 1981, 12.

¹³⁸ Walt 1996, 202.

¹³⁹ Some of these decisions were based on climatic necessities; it was impossible to withdraw from frozen ports.

¹⁴⁰ Kinvig 2006, 79, 83, 92. Kinvig writes that the Foreign Secretary Balfour did not even know about some of the deployments and that discussions were to support "Lloyd George's position and endorsed his peace proposal, but left in place the contradictory policy of providing the Whites with war matériel and leaving in place the British troops supporting them..." See also Ruotsila 2001.

policy prescriptions. This leads us in the following chapters to study in-depth the foreign policy thinking of Winston Churchill.¹⁴¹

Admiral Kolchak, positioned at Omsk, declared himself the Supreme Ruler of the White Russians a week after the Armistice on November 19th, 1918. Before the coup that made him the head of the Siberian Regional Government with dictatorial powers, Kolchak had come back to East Russia after a long detour that took him via London, across the United States to Japan and finally across the Sea of Japan to Vladivostok. Kolchak's reactionary regime worked behind a constitutional façade but in reality was based on his strong executive powers and reliance on ad hoc policy advice groups. Kolchak and his army, firmly supported by Churchill, was almost wholly dependant on British ammunition, clothing and arms. British support for the Kolchak regime was crucial.¹⁴² After long relying on a policy of non-recognition preferring to wait and see who really represented Russian people, the Allied and Associated Powers finally loaned Kolchak their ultimate political support. On May 26th, 1919 the Allied leaders in Paris announced that they would be:

“...disposed to assist the Government of Admiral Kolchak and his Associates with munitions, supplies and food, to establish themselves as the government of all Russia.”¹⁴³

The conditional *de facto* recognition of Kolchak's government was thus granted in the Paris Peace Conference in late May.¹⁴⁴ Russia, of course, was not present at the conference. To convince the Allies and Associated Powers of his government, Kolchak promised to convene the Constituent Assembly, to hold free elections, permit the League of Nations to draw up borders and, most importantly, to recognize the independence of Finland and Poland. The Allies, in addition to the *de facto* recognition, promised the Russian Whites munitions, supplies and food.¹⁴⁵

The recognition of Kolchak as the leader of the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement did not alter the fact that the White Russians were incapable of creating a coherent overarching strategy. The three White leaders led now nominally by Kolchak hosted rather independently the Russian and the Allied anti-Bolshevik measures: Yudenitch in north-western Russia, Denikin in southern Russia and Kolchak himself in Siberia. The three theatres came to be the main war fronts. All in all, the intervention in Russia came to involve over one hundred thousand troops from over ten countries.

¹⁴¹ For a good realist account of the different policy options and policies chosen by the Allies and Associated Powers towards the Bolsheviks during the intervention, see Walt 1996, 158-168.

¹⁴² Swain 2000, 65.

¹⁴³ Quoted in Mawdsley 2000, 154.

¹⁴⁴ Ruotsila 2001; Mawdsley 2000, 154; Goldhurst 1978, 205. This is disputed or wrongly reported in many non-academic sources.

¹⁴⁵ Goldhurst 1978, 205.

Great Britain, as stated earlier, had a leading role in the anti-Bolshevik intervention. Even if Prime Minister Lloyd George was open to conciliation with the new Bolshevik government, his new Secretary of State for War Winston Churchill had different views. Churchill became the Secretary of State for War in the post-Armistice, ideological, phase of the intervention, on December 19th, 1918. He started working on January 14th, 1919. Disagreements between different actors were plentiful and in the general heyday of international politics the issues to be solved were numerous – the first real world war had just ended. The future world peace that was to be built was taking much of the attention: the Peace Conference at Versailles opened in January 1919. Russia was only one, even if arguably one of the more important points of interest and attention. The always willful Churchill, the most energetic and powerful advocate of the intervention after the Armistice, was in a position to make independent policies.¹⁴⁶

Churchill's worldview was focused on power in international relations. He stressed the importance of relative material power and drew an essential distinction between great and small powers. Churchill embraced traditions to understand world politics and foreign policy and highlighted the study of history: only by respecting the past could one be worthy of the future. The policy prescriptions Churchill advocated grew out of his historical understanding and his attachment to the traditions and values of aristocratic 19th century diplomacy and statecraft. His prescriptions for policy stressed the importance and possibilities of firm and resolute policies based on the willingness to use force. The abandonment of abstract moralizing was seen as vital for successful foreign policy. Very much in the tradition of Lord Palmerston, Churchill had no permanent allies and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests of the British Empire. All in all, Churchill viewed politics among peoples as an unceasing struggle for power. He is also viewed to have possessed a tragic sense of life.¹⁴⁷

Regarding Russia, Churchill was in favour of a well-coordinated and determined intervention and wanted maximum support for all the anti-Bolsheviks. Churchill was certain that Bolshevism could be defeated by military force. The military ambience for Churchill's political philosophy was created in the so-called Kotlas-Vyatka plan. The plan was approved by the British War Cabinet on July 11th, 1919.¹⁴⁸ The blueprint envisaged Admiral Kolchak's troops advancing westwards along the Trans-Siberian Railway – the Czech Legion had earlier decided to build up their right flank to

¹⁴⁶ Kinvig 2006, 83, 92; Ruotsila 2001, 94.

¹⁴⁷ Thompson 1983. See especially pp. 25-. Even if Thompson is almost exclusively interested in Churchill during and after the Second World War, I deem his unique study about the correlation of contemporary IR theories and statesmen worldview as extremely helpful. I have compiled this chapter as an abstract of the book. Discussion about tragedy in IR, pp. 76, 99-104.

¹⁴⁸ Ruotsila 2002, 9-10.

facilitate the main advance that would be from Yekaterinburg towards Perm and Vyatka – eventually reaching the Allied Archangel front.¹⁴⁹ The British forces were scheduled to descend to the rendezvous via Dvina River and Kotlas railway from Archangel.

Churchill's perceptions of Allied power and interests regarding the Bolsheviks were clear and it was Churchill's views that came to resonate most closely to Finnish interventionist foreign policy decision making.¹⁵⁰ His perception of the reality and prescription of politics was:

“Of all tyrannies in history the bolshevist tyranny is the worst, the most destructive, and the most degrading. ... The miseries of the Russian people under the Bolsheviks far surpass anything they suffered under the Tsar. ... There are still Russian Armies in the field ... who never wavered in their faith and loyalty to the Allied cause, and who are fighting valiantly and by no means unsuccessfully against that foul combination of criminality and animalism which constitutes the Bolshevist regime.”¹⁵¹

Churchill wanted to “strangle Bolshevism in its cradle”.¹⁵² Because Churchill – the anti-Bolshevik crusader – deemed it impossible to use British (Allied) conscripts in large measures because of domestic opposition, his plan was to help and subsidize the intervention executed by others in any way possible.¹⁵³ This would be done by sending military supplies, arms, advisors and volunteers and by encouraging and using the Border States to help the Russian Whites. Churchill's aim was to “try to combine all the Border States hostile to the Bolsheviks into one system of war and diplomacy”.¹⁵⁴ Churchill created these plans in December 1918 and advanced them almost without changes until early 1921 – in the process giving a name for a school of anti-communist thought, *Churchillism* or military anti-communism.¹⁵⁵ In Churchill's memoirs, the chapter discussing the intervention describes all the internal and external actors (including the Border States) and presents a map of forces in Russia on the day of the Armistice in November 1918, presumably perceived by him to be one the most opportune moments for the intervention. Churchill championed: “Such was the panorama of anarchy and confusion, of strife and famine, of obligation and opportunity presented to the western conquerors on Armistice Day.”¹⁵⁶

¹⁴⁹ Mawdsley 2000, 104.

¹⁵⁰ Ruotsila 2005.

¹⁵¹ Winston Churchill's speech *Bolshevist atrocities* in Aldwych Club Luncheon, Connaught Rooms, London on April 11th, 1919.

¹⁵² Quoted in Churchill 2007, 77.

¹⁵³ The description is used by Jenkins 2002. See pp. 345-369 chapter 19 *Anti-Bolshevik Crusader* for Churchill's ideological determination. Other statesmen to be studied in this context (known to have connections with Mannerheim but whom I'm forced to ignore) would be Poland's Jozef Pilsudski and France's Ferdinand Foch.

¹⁵⁴ Ruotsila 2001, 169.

¹⁵⁵ Ruotsila 2005, 18, 27. Other anti-communist options listed by Ruotsila are “negotiation and pacification option” associated with Woodrow Wilson and “preference to trade cooperation” of Lloyd George; both of these options hoped to contain, not destroy the communist regime.

¹⁵⁶ Churchill 1929, 103. Neoclassical realism sees foreign policy as threats and opportunities. Churchill's worldview seems to validate this.

France was naturally relieved to witness Germany's weakness and eventual collapse. From the point of view of French interventionists, the Armistice not only changed the balance of power but also changed the nature of the Bolshevik question. Even if as early as spring 1918 the French had adopted a policy of unremitting hostility towards the Soviet government, Germany's power and French limited resources had forced her to channel her energy as necessitated to her survival and play a less active and ambitious role in Russia.¹⁵⁷ After the armistice and the increase in French power she could use to exert influence, Bolshevism was no longer a Russian matter but an international problem – the French anti-Bolsheviks set their sights solidly on the destruction of Russian Bolshevism.¹⁵⁸

The end of 1918 and early 1919 was a time of optimism and anti-Bolshevik advance. Early 1919 held pivotal moments for the Allied and Associated Powers intervention. Even if the British War Cabinet had decided in March on the withdrawal of all troops from North Russia, Churchill had made the most of the necessary arrangements for the safe evacuation of the troops. The Relief Force was transformed by Churchill into an offensive force.¹⁵⁹ At the beginning of 1919 it looked highly likely that the Bolshevik regime might collapse almost on its own. In the north the Allies were in a strong position on the Murmansk railway and south of Archangel, the White Finns were close to Petrograd, Admiral Kolchak controlled Siberia and the Czechs held most of the Trans-Siberian railway. General Denikin was in control of much of the Caucasus, the French had landed at Odessa, and the Baltic States were fighting for their independence.¹⁶⁰ In 1919 the Bolsheviks controlled only areas around Moscow and Petrograd – the regime's survival seemed highly unlikely:

“By the end of 1918 the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic was confined within approximately the same boundaries as medieval Muscovy before the conquests of Ivan the Terrible; and few people – few perhaps even of the Bolsheviks themselves – believed that the regime could survive.”¹⁶¹

There were attempts at a negotiated settlement to end the hostilities. The Prinkipo plan in early 1919 was a special peace conference where the representatives of all Russian belligerents were to be invited. The Allied and Associated Powers promised to recognize the Russian revolution and to offer assistance if the Bolsheviks agreed to end the hostilities. The policy aimed to moderate the

¹⁵⁷ Carley 1983.

¹⁵⁸ Carley 2000, 1276. Marshal Foch's interventionist thinking is quoted at length in Churchill 1929, 24-27.

¹⁵⁹ Kinvig 2006, 322. “His was the central role in alarming the public about the apparent plight of the troops in north Russia, so that a 'Relief Force' might be despatched. ... Thus the Relief Force was turned into an offensive task force responsible for a substantial thrust into the heart of Russia, on the pretext that this was necessary for a safe withdrawal.”

¹⁶⁰ Hudson 2004, 36-37. The railway connecting Murmansk to Petrograd was finished at the end of 1916. The Baltic theatre was managed from the Helsinki archipelago from May 1919 onwards, where the British had their mission headquarters.

¹⁶¹ Carr 1973, 259.

Bolsheviks.¹⁶² Churchill, in his personal style, wrote about the venture on an island used by the Young Turks to exile pariah dogs captured from Constantinople:

“To Bolshevik sympathizers the place seemed oddly chosen for a Peace Conference. To their opponents it seemed not altogether unsuitable.”¹⁶³

The military interventionists naturally did not support the plan. Churchill aimed at transforming the meeting into a planning session for the intervention. The plan ultimately failed after the Russian Whites refused the offer with contempt, opting to continue their armed struggle against the Bolsheviks in the hope that the Allies would increase their share in the intervention. The Bolsheviks on the other hand perceived the momentum to be on their side in the civil war, the self-proclaimed revolutionary self-defence, and were delighted to see the initiative wither.

War continued. During most of 1919 the Bolsheviks held only a circle approximately eight hundred kilometres in diameter around Moscow, the Bolshevik capital since March 1918. In April, General Yudenitch had arrived to the Baltic to take yet nominal command of the seventeen thousand strong troops and to organize and lobby for an attack on Petrograd. By the end of May, the Allied and Associated Powers forces in North Russia had advanced south to the northern tip of Lake Onega. The British officers had formed the Russian North-Western Government to support the attack on Petrograd.¹⁶⁴ The second seemingly most opportune moment to overthrow the Bolshevik regime presented itself in October 1919. From the international point of view now was the time to act.

By mid-October 1919 the anti-Bolshevik mass was gaining velocity and creating momentum for success. In the South, General Denikin had captured Orel on October 13th from his base area in Ukraine, ready for his drive on Moscow. In the East, Kolchak's armies, though evidently in retreat, were still masters of huge realms of territory in Siberia and recovering some lost ground.¹⁶⁵ In the North-West, General Yudenitch opened his offensive on a wide front on October 12th making rapid progress first to fifty five kilometres of Petrograd, later on October 16th to only forty kilometres from the city. By October 20th his men were within sixteen kilometres of the centre of Petrograd. Optimism of success was proving to be more than a mere chimera: Churchill's interventionist

¹⁶² Ruotsila 2001, 18, 81. Prinkipo was the largest of nine islands that make up the Princes' group in the Sea of Marmora a few miles off the Turkish port of Constantinople.

¹⁶³ Churchill 1929, 170. Later during his exile from Stalinist Soviet Union, Trotsky would spend time here.

¹⁶⁴ Hudson 2004, 164. This was done without governmental authorization. The military officers were operating freely from political oversight and were promptly dismissed. In their creative attacks on Kronstadt in August 1919, they used Finnish territory; Björkö for naval operations and an airport in Koivisto for aerial assaults in August and September 1919.

¹⁶⁵ Coates 1935, 186.

policies were now being sustained by concrete successes on the battlefields. Churchill was not the only one tempted to believe that "...ultimate victory for the Whites was on the horizon."¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶ Kinvig 2006, 304-305.

2.3. Retreat and Failure

Under the vanguard of the working class – with the determined political leadership of Lenin and the ruthless organizing of Trotsky – the Bolsheviks had been able to transform themselves into a formidable fighting force. Even if the easy start of the war was perceived by Lenin to be the “triumphal march of Soviet power”, opposition to the socialist utopia was considerable and the struggle intensified to the brink of White success.¹⁶⁷ However, the Bolsheviks quickly learned the necessities imposed by political power, rejected some of the clearly idealist thoughts about the conduct of international affairs and injected a dose of realism to the attainment of their utopia. Before this, Trotsky had of course famously proclaimed to issue few revolutionary proclamations on foreign affairs and then shut up shop. Lenin’s militarization of Marxism and Trotsky’s decision to use tsarist officers were the clearest examples of this new operational realism and eventually proved vital to the Red Army success.¹⁶⁸

Under the political surveillance of communist commissars, the former tsarist officers brought discipline and experience to the Bolshevik conduct of war. The Bolshevik way of war was to practice “total war within the context of the civil war”.¹⁶⁹ For Lenin, war was the “engine of social change”.¹⁷⁰ As the People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, Trotsky aimed to create a centrally commanded, trained and disciplined mass army of conscripted peasants, commanded by specialists. The old imperial army and navy were abolished and the Red Army was formed on January 28th, 1918. The decision to recruit bourgeois specialists was made on March 31st, 1918. By February 1919 the Red Army had one million eight hundred thousand men in arms, by 1921 five and a half million.¹⁷¹

Although enjoying advantage in numbers, the Red Army had several problems: it lacked weapons, which meant that only one third of the troops were armed, the desertion rate was high and the troops were thrown into combat with little or no training. The first officers only graduated in 1921 from

¹⁶⁷ Quoted in Mawdsley 2000, 4.

¹⁶⁸ During the conduct of the war Trotsky had time to write his major work *Terrorism and Communism*. His views on the continuation of politics by other means, or war as an integral part of the revolution, were based on Clausewitz and Jaunes. See Knei-Paz 1979, 253. Knei-Paz writes that Trotsky’s “approach to military organization was fundamentally traditional and conservative... based on orthodox rules of hierarchy and command”. Trotsky opposed the advocates of Marxist military strategy. For Lenin’s fondness of Clausewitz, see Kipp 1985, 184-191. Carr sets the birthday of the Red Army at 23.2.1918. On the birth of Soviet Russia’s ideological, offensive and highly militarized grand strategy, see Heikka 2005, 222-228.

¹⁶⁹ Jacob Kipp 1985, 189.

¹⁷⁰ Carley 1983, 5.

¹⁷¹ Ziemke 1996. Ziemke describes Trotsky as “the pragmatist”.

the Red Army's Military Academy that was created in 1918.¹⁷² In the grim domain of secret policing the Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission) created under the presidency of Felix Dzerzhinsky to combat the perceived counter-revolutionaries in December 1917 had by this time made the Lubyanka Square a potent enemy. Strategically it was important that the Bolsheviks held the Russian heartland and its crucial large city centers.

The Allied appearance of success then quickly vanished. Retreat and rapid collapse led to failure. In the North, the final offensives under British command to mitigate their withdrawal had boiled down to a farce, indifferent officers lacked self-confidence, and confusion and indiscipline reigned the day. The last British soldiers left Archangel on September 27th and Murmansk on October 12th, 1919. Upon their hurried and disorderly evacuation the British destroyed vast amounts of military supplies, dumping much equipment in the White Sea.¹⁷³ After the chaotic offensive of General Yudenitch had ended in defeat before the end of October, the British decided to withdraw also from the Baltic.¹⁷⁴ By November 25th, 1919 the North-Western Army had ceased to exist and the momentum in the strategic environment of Finland for challenging the Bolsheviks was over.

In South Russia, General Denikin was quickly after October 1919 ousted from Orel and was forced to retreat: a week after taking Orel, the Whites had lost it again. Denikin's offensive had collapsed from its own weight, overextension and incompetence.¹⁷⁵ The retreat ended at the Crimea, where Denikin finally left Russia for Constantinople. In the East, Admiral Kolchak's armies, which had formed the main front and top priority for the Bolsheviks, collapsed from over-extension and internal betrayal. The Red Army counter-attack in June and July 1919 broke through the Urals and sent Kolchak on his nightmarish retreat toward Siberia. The October optimism of the interventionists proved to be short lived. The Czech Legion handed Kolchak over to the Bolsheviks in Irkutsk where the nominal Supreme Leader was executed and his body disposed of in a local river in early February 1920. The last events of the intervention were played out in the South where the Whites were confined to the Crimea peninsula hastily trying to organize mass evacuations. By the end of 1920 the Bolsheviks had destroyed the last White places of refuge.

From a military point of view the international intervention and the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement failed for two supreme reasons. Firstly, geostrategic positioning favored the Bolsheviks. Secondly, the Reds developed an advantage in military forces. However, more important than the

¹⁷² Salvadó 2002, 112.

¹⁷³ Kinvig 2006, 264. Some offensives of the final push were to end in the "most substantial and severe disciplinary verdict ever passed on Royal Marines" in court martial.

¹⁷⁴ Kinvig 2006, 286.

¹⁷⁵ Ziemke 1996, 505.

military reasons explored in this chapter were the political decisions that affected the overall grand strategy and eventually decided the military aspects as well. The crucial political aspects of the intervention are discussed in the next chapter.

To contextualize the failure of the intervention one needs to study the changes in military thinking and in society by and large. The military background for the Russian civil war and the Allied and Associated Powers intervention was of course the Great War. The war had redefined what men understood by warfare, destruction and suffering was brought forth on a scale never experienced before. Qualitatively and quantitatively, humanity had experienced a new world of war.¹⁷⁶

Technologically the years before our case study had witnessed the development, indeed revolution, in firepower. The most dramatic developments were witnessed in the increase in power in small units and improvements in small arms technologies especially in infantry rifles and machine guns. Firing speed and firing range had improved dramatically and artillery had been developed to be lighter yet more powerful. These developments in firepower and mobility threatened the cavalry as the capital unit of warfare. On the strategical level, developments in firepower and the evolution of machine guns shifted advantages from offensive initiatives and favored defense. Revolutions in communication technology had implications for command and control and for transport, especially with the introduction of the railroad and steam engine.¹⁷⁷

In our case study, however, technological innovations and their application in military strategy played a rather minor role.¹⁷⁸ The war we have studied was fought mainly by horses. The Red Army's victories in the civil war were won by cavalry. The free maneuvering of massive independent operations played a crucial role.¹⁷⁹ All in all, the war paid witness to a limited presence of modern equipment. Mechanisation was minimal; horse-drawn carts, for example, were the main form of transport even if armoured trains were characteristic and played a large role on both sides.¹⁸⁰ Strategy was based on mass infantry and cavalry charges. The machine gun was the only widely used new technology.¹⁸¹ If we study more closely the military reality on the ground, we find that the initial geostrategic positioning put the anti-Bolsheviks at a disadvantage. The Bolsheviks, whose ideology, of course, had most support in large urban industrialized centers, were strongly occupying the heartland – large, compact, densely populated area with industrial resources and

¹⁷⁶ Strachan 1983, 150.

¹⁷⁷ Strachan 1983, 108-120, 150, 158.

¹⁷⁸ Reds had fifty nine tanks by October 1919, few hundred airplanes of questionable quality and several improvised river gunboats. See Mawdsley 2000, 184.

¹⁷⁹ Strachan 1983, 158.

¹⁸⁰ Mawdsley 2000, 184.

¹⁸¹ Salvadó 2002, 111-112.

fertile land – of Russia.¹⁸² Hence, the Bolsheviks controlled much of the industrial potential of the country, which is crucial for any war effort. Apart from the industrial potential of the center, the arms depots of central Russia came in handy. The Red Army was able to live off the tsarist arsenals for much of the early war.¹⁸³ In implementing the army hierarchy the inherited central army apparatus was invaluable. The population base of the heartland, approximately sixty million people, favored the Bolsheviks and constituted their greatest advantage.¹⁸⁴ From the communication perspective the railway that was centered on the new Bolshevik capital was particularly important.

The White anti-Bolshevik military strategy, on the other hand, suffered from Russia's geography. The geopolitical realities were unpromising: the three armies were disposed over a front of a thousand and one hundred kilometers. This led to chronic overextension. The problems were highlighted by the Whites controlling the ethnically and politically diverse areas in the fringes of the disintegrating Russian empire. Geography left the White Generals and their international allies with an extremely poor communication network.¹⁸⁵ The anti-Bolsheviks were therefore unable to coordinate their efforts and the overall strategy suffered from bad communications – Kolchak's spring offensive, for example, had begun with a complete lack of consultation with the British.¹⁸⁶

Geostrategic reasons defined much of the conduct of the war. Indeed, the war was largely decided by possession of the railway network that converged on Moscow.¹⁸⁷ The railway played a major role in logistics; fast transport of troops and arms to the front was crucial. Occupying the railway provided also more freedom in determining possible lines of operations. Bolsheviks fared better in these operations.

The second and undoubtedly the simplest explanation of the military failure is that the Reds had an advantage in military forces. At the end of the war the Reds outnumbered the Whites five to one.¹⁸⁸ The combined combat forces of the Whites never exceeded two hundred and fifty thousand, whereas the Red Army boasted an army of millions of men.¹⁸⁹ However, this might and indeed should be read as a political success. At the start of the war, the Bolsheviks only had three

¹⁸² Salvadó 2002, 107-108; Mawdsley 2000, 14, 70, 274-275.

¹⁸³ Mawdsley 2000, 63, 184.

¹⁸⁴ Mawdsley 2000, 146, 154, 185.

¹⁸⁵ Salvadó 2002, 109-110. Envoys between Denikin and Kolchak traveled for four months; telegraphic exchanges via Paris took over a month.

¹⁸⁶ Kinvig 2006, 217. The White "Army" was extremely badly organized; maybe simplest explanation is because it was led by an Admiral without a fleet over five thousand five hundred kilometres away from nearest port. See Mawdsley 2000, 108, 153, 279.

¹⁸⁷ Salvadó 2002, 106. Churchill perceived this important too: "[Moscow] lay at the center of a web of railroads... and in the midst a spider!" Quoted in Mawdsley 2000, 275.

¹⁸⁸ Swain 2000.

¹⁸⁹ Mawdsley 2000, 181.

regiments of disciplined military force, the Latvian Rifles, thirty five thousand strong troops.¹⁹⁰ At the end of the war, they had been more successful in recruitment. The effects of Brest-Litovsk peace treaty favored the Bolsheviks too – the Great War obligations of the Whites proved a supreme strategic asset to the Bolsheviks. After the treaty, Lenin signed a trade treaty with Germany and his ultimately pro-German policy meant that that the Reds could transfer bolshevized troops from the West to more important theatres that now defined the progress of the civil war.¹⁹¹

The White Generals, on the other hand were without reserves or motivated soldiers. The plentiful military resources supplied by the Allies and Associated Powers were squandered by the inefficient and corrupt administration. The foreign troops, such as the Czech Legion were mishandled and were eventually alienated from the White Generals. Altogether, it seems that the momentum in the fight for the hearts and the minds of ordinary Russians was firmly favoring the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks had three hundred and thirty one thousand soldiers in August 1918. By December they had seven hundred thousand and by 1920 already five and a half million soldiers. The White Generals at their peak strength had troops of comparative modesty: Kolchak had one hundred and twenty thousand, Yudenitch seventeen thousand and Denikin one hundred and ten thousand.¹⁹²

Churchill later reflected on the war he perceived as a *Ghost War*. For Churchill, the Russian Civil War was a strange war: “thin, cold, insubstantial conflict... a war of few casualties and unnumbered executions”.¹⁹³ From the Allied and Associated Powers point of view Churchill criticized the naïve, indecisive and confused grand strategy. He was sure that a coherent and determined army would have answered the Bolshevik threat.¹⁹⁴ The reasons that no coherent multilateral intervention plan was ever contemplated and accomplished were, of course, political. We must study comparatively the foreign policies of the White Generals and the Bolsheviks to find the real reasons for the anti-Bolshevik failure; this will be done in the next chapter.

Churchill believed that brisk military action from the anti-Bolshevik actors would have defeated the Bolsheviks. Regarding Finland, Churchill perceived the most opportune moment to be in September 1919:

“Finland, fully mobilized, awaited only the slightest encouragement from the Great Powers to march also on that city [Petrograd].

¹⁹⁰ Salvadó 2002, 106.

¹⁹¹ Swain 2000, 43, 55.

¹⁹² Salvadó 2002, 112-113.

¹⁹³ Churchill 1929, 232.

¹⁹⁴ Churchill 1929, 232, 234-235.

...But everything fell to pieces. ... The Finns were chilled and discouraged by the Allies and stood idle.”¹⁹⁵

Churchill believed that Finland could place one hundred thousand men on the battlefield and reports that on two occasions Finland was ready to march and occupy Petrograd.¹⁹⁶ In the chapter on Finnish foreign policy (3) I will study the reality behind Churchill’s perceptions. My aim is to ask what kind of foreign policies were advocated, by whom and why: was Finnish decision making completely sub-ordinate to the Allied policies?

Already by early January 1920 Churchill was sure about the complete victory of the Bolsheviks in the near future. This did not, of course, bring an end to Churchill’s opposition to the Bolsheviks: he continued to urge support for all who tried to oppose them but now he was increasingly alone. The peace treaties in Finland’s vicinity were signed in 1920, in Estonia on February 2nd, 1920, in Lithuania on July 12th, 1920 and in Latvia on August 11th, 1920.

¹⁹⁵ Churchill 1929, 255-256. The other opportune moment Churchill identified was on May 20th, 1919 when Kolchak had advanced farthest.

¹⁹⁶ Churchill 1929, 235.

2.4. Conclusion – Results versus Intentions

The realist maxim of evaluating policy results rather than policy intentions forces us to look beyond the motives and intentions of the statesmen involved. Because history shows no necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy we must acknowledge the distinction between the desirable and the possible. Prudence, the supreme virtue in politics according to political realism, is evaluated in international politics decision making by the political requirement of success. “Political ethics judges action by its political consequences.”¹⁹⁷

The intervention was a failure that led to the consolidation of the dictatorship of the Communist Party to the communist state, which during and after the Allied and Associated Powers intervention came to be the same thing.¹⁹⁸ The intention of the military interventionists, Churchill’s vision of a determined and well-coordinated international offensive to support the White Generals against the Bolsheviks, suggested an operation which would combine the armed forces of the Allied and Associated Powers with those of the states bordering Russia. Despite efforts to agree and coordinate a military policy to solve the Russian problem, unilateral national political decisions continued to rule the day. Seemingly opportune moments for action were different for different actors (and historians).¹⁹⁹ The results were almost the opposite of the intentions.

We must look for reasons for the military failure from the strategical but also from the political level. From the international point of view we firstly need to evaluate the Allied and Associated Powers intention of re-establishing the Eastern Front and assess the results. Secondly, we need to weigh the feasibility of the intervention plan that followed from these results. Finally, we need to assess the results of this intervention. This forces us to move to the Russian point of view. It was ultimately the Russian actors’ perceptions of their interests and prescribed policies to attain these interests that defined the progress of the intervention. To understand what won over the hearts and minds inside Russia we need to study comparatively the domestic and foreign policies of the Bolsheviks and the White Generals. This leads us to study their perceptions on the peace and land issues, and the effects of the subsequent policies on the recruitment of troops and on patriotic allegiance. I will end this chapter by reviewing the results, which were indisputably opposite to the intentions, and by laying out the background for assessing Winston Churchill’s statesmanship – his perceptions of reality and prescriptions for policy.

¹⁹⁷ Morgenthau 1955, 9. See also Mononen 2006.

¹⁹⁸ See Carr 1973, chapters 7-9.

¹⁹⁹ I have recognized from the international perspective two different perceived moments to act: July 1918 and October 1919. In our study of Finnish foreign policy we will find also two: July 1919 and October 1919. Clearly the different actors perceived different resources, threats and opportunities in international politics.

We now know that no Eastern Front against the Germans was ever established. As the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers was to re-establish the Eastern Front by reinvoking the Russian fighting spirit, we might conclude that their reasoning on this account was hopeful. The Allied and Associated Powers failure gives weight to the argument that having suffered greater losses than any other belligerent, and than all her Allies put together, Russia would no longer fight for the Entente – Russia had indeed lost the ability to continue fighting. With historical perspective (or hindsight) we might therefore conclude that the initial reasoning for the international intervention was flawed and that the results did not correlate with the intentions.²⁰⁰

The initial power political motive for action in Russia led gradually to the ideological intervention – the undeclared war against Lenin. We are forced to question how feasible this intervention plan was. Was it possible to destroy Bolshevism? The feasibility of the intervention plan must be appraised by analyzing the three components of power that could decisive influence the outcome: the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers, the endogenous Russian anti-Bolsheviks and the potential power of the Border States (Finland).

Churchill's determination to fight Bolshevism and to achieve his aim of full-scale regime change was always in trouble because of the tools at his disposal. He deemed it impossible to use British conscripts in large measure because of domestic opposition. Also from the domestic politics point-of-view, the Allied war weary populations had little support for more war. The endogenous anti-Bolsheviks were, of course, always going to be the most important actors. Indeed, the Allied and Associated Powers rested their hopes and promoted the White Generals with abundant financial and military support. Eventually, the failure to "restore Russia to sanity by force" was caused because of their continued belief in the substantial indigenous White movement – in the end it proved a fallacy.²⁰¹ In North Russia, for example, the Whites were entirely a creature of the British and could not survive without them.²⁰² The failure of the endogenous anti-Bolshevik movement, it can be concluded, caused the overall failure.

When in the next chapter we turn our attention to Finnish foreign policy I not only aim to study why Finland did not choose to join the anti-Bolshevik coalition but also present the counterfactual of our

²⁰⁰ Even the initial reasoning for the intervention has been questioned. The westward flow of German divisions that had started after Brest-Litovsk had ended in May 1918, while the first moves of the intervention in the form of the Archangel landing did not take place until August. See Kinvig 2006, 317. This perception conflicts with Walt 1996, 131-132.

²⁰¹ Lloyd George's description, quoted in Coates 1935, 67.

²⁰² Kinvig 2006, 205; Coates 1935, 358-.

case study. Then we can judge whether or not the Allied and Associated Powers intentions regarding the third pillar of possible power were realistic or not. Were the possibilities of defeating the Bolsheviks with the power of the Finland real? What would have needed to be done differently for the optional policy to be acutated?

Naturally, the situation in Russia and the alignment of the hearts and minds of ordinary Russians was the defining determinant to any intended external interventionist policy.²⁰³ Since the seizure of power, when war communism had concentrated most political authority under democratic centralism to Lenin, he had been able to materialize his political thinking on peace and land reform issues. Bolshevik early promises on Soviet power, peace and land reform were popular and a main reason why they were able to seize and consolidate power in 1917 – 1919.²⁰⁴ From the domestic politics point of view peace was a vital element in Bolshevik success and the signing of the separate peace at Brest-Litovsk was the defining event that kept Bolsheviks in power.²⁰⁵ Peace for Lenin, however, was not an abstract moral construct that was desirable in its own right. Quite the contrary: “Lenin’s goal was not simple pacifism but the transformation of World War into international civil war.”²⁰⁶ Anyhow, the public appeal to peace was powerful in attracting followers even if thousands were to experience the civil war aspect of the international peace.

The Great War and the subsequent economic catastrophe required any party governing any kind of Russia to create a popular program for social change. The Bolsheviks, contrary to their opponents, made an effort to win over the peasantry.²⁰⁷ The promises, however, were or could not be kept. The skeleton structure provided by the soviets was important for the implementation of the policies, albeit a miserable implementation, because of the Russian character and contemporary

²⁰³ There is considerable disagreement regarding the domestic conditions in Russia during the civil war and to the public appeal to the social programs of the Bolsheviks and the Whites. This offers an interesting insight into the richness of realism and the inescapable ideological essence of all human beings, even “realists”. Carr and Kennan are both well-known realists theorists but were also active in influencing public debate as practitioners. Former is known to have had socialist sympathies, latter anti-communist tendencies. Their reading of the Russian Civil War and the intervention differ on various aspects. A good example is their different reading of the sentiment that the Russian people were firmly in support of the Bolshevik movement’s progressive domestic agenda. According to Carr’s reading, the hearts and minds of the population were set on changes in the social order. This is reinforced by the “almost effortless success of the Petrograd coup” in November 1917; Kennan, on the other hand, highlights the Bolshevik seizure of Moscow which was carried out with “brutality and bloodshed”. (See Carr 1973, 264; Kennan 1956, 44.) The realists also differ on their evaluation of the politics of peace. Carr sees it as an extremely powerful tool in mobilizing popular support behind the Bolshevik policies – Kennan as an extremely helpful tool in destroying the only force of organized armed resistance to Bolshevik power. (See Carr 1973, 264-275; Kennan 1956, 74.) I eventually decided to abandon extensive use of both accounts in my narrative, although I had deemed then as the best available sources because of their utilization of realist concepts.

²⁰⁴ Mawdsley 2000, 273.

²⁰⁵ Mawdsley 2000, 31, 277.

²⁰⁶ Mawdsley 2000, 8, 277. “The Bolsheviks dreamed of turning world war into civil war; in the end only Russia suffered this fate.”

²⁰⁷ Mawdsley 2000, 139.

circumstances.²⁰⁸ All in all, the land reform pushed the peasants to favour the Bolsheviks against the perceived reactionary Whites that would have returned the land to its former owners.

One of the most important elements defining the outcome of the war was the special mobilization of workers, trade unionists and party members that gave the Bolshevik army its backbone. In the recruitment of man power from the countryside, the Bolsheviks were better. Indeed, one of the Bolsheviks greatest strengths was the mobilization of proletarian forces.²⁰⁹ In addition, the strict regime of Trotsky, which reversed the seemingly unstoppable flow of deserters, was important. The party membership, an indicator of popular support, seems to indicate, however, that there was significant coercion to support the Bolsheviks.²¹⁰

The coercion to gain popular support and suppress dissent was done by the Red Terror, which constituted from the outset an essential element, a policy imposed from above on the population, of the Bolshevik regime.²¹¹ “For the Bolsheviks terror was not a defensive weapon but an instrument of governance.”²¹² The Red Terror was “Lenin’s child” and under Lenin, who died in January 1924, the campaigns of mass arrests, deportations, and executions claimed tens if not hundred of thousands of lives.²¹³ Meanwhile, the secret police Cheka organized and operated concentration camps, which eventually became permanent, designed to suppress dissent among the state’s own citizens.²¹⁴ Their leader, Dzerzhinsky, called for the “extermination of the bourgeoisie as a class”.²¹⁵

It is then in some ways ironic that the international constitution of the intervening forces that tried to end this bloodshed can be seen to even contribute to the Bolshevik war effort. The intervention converted nationalistic patriotism to work in favor of the Bolsheviks. A week after the Great War had ended Lenin, presumably not blind to the possibilities stated: “History has veered round to bring patriotism back to us.”²¹⁶ The Bolshevik propaganda was efficient in manipulating public

²⁰⁸ Mawdsley 2000, 10, 15, 77.

²⁰⁹ Mawdsley 2000, 78, 181-184.

²¹⁰ The party membership was in February 1917 around twenty four thousand and in October of the same year three hundred thousand. Then it temporarily dropped before picking up by early 1919 to three hundred and fifty thousand. In March 1920 the membership had swollen up to six hundred thousand. See Mawdsley 2000, 7. Carr reads it through socialist sympathies differently and asserts that the party membership “rose steadily” during the civil war years; from twenty three thousand in early 1917 to three hundred and thirteen thousand at the beginning of 1919 and four hundred and thirty one thousand in January 1920. See Carr 1973, 211. The Komsomol membership rose from ninety six thousand in September 1910 to four hundred and eighty two thousand in October 1920. See Mawdsley 2000, 246.

²¹¹ Pipes 1990, 789, 792; Mawdsley 2000, 83.

²¹² Pipes 1990, 790.

²¹³ Pipes 1990, 795, 838.

²¹⁴ Pipes 1990, 832-837.

²¹⁵ Quoted in Mawdsley 2000, 81.

²¹⁶ Lenin in a speech to a Moscow Party Worker’s meeting on November 27th, 1918. Quoted in Swain 2000, 160.

information and made the most of the surprising turn of events by harnessing the artistic talent of the urban centers it occupied.²¹⁷

From the foreign policy point of view, the Bolshevik doctrine of formal self-determination won them much support. From the perspective of Finnish foreign policy and other bordering states that could have played a major role, the most important issue was the national self-determination the Bolsheviks advocated. The Bolshevik propagandistic doctrine of national self-determination nullified much of the external possibilities of the more honest if reactionary White movement. The Bolsheviks offered to recognize the Baltic States' independence and end the hostilities.

The most important reason for the anti-Bolshevik vision to fail was because the White Generals had irreparable problems in their domestic and foreign policies. Regarding the issue of peace and war, the White Generals' stances on the Great War obligations reveal the strong interaction between domestic and international politics. Continuing war, initially at least, reflected the mood of the population.²¹⁸ However, as the Entente obligations proved too heavy for the impoverished Russian nation, the continuation of the war proved a heavy strategic burden for the Whites. A politically uneducated population tends en masse to study international politics through abstract concepts. Peace will always triumph over war as a more attractive choice in this kind of comparison.

Regarding domestic politics, contrary to the Bolsheviks, the White armies were unable to win general support from the population in the territories they were in control of. The Whites had no program for labor or land and altogether no determined attempt to address the social ills. The Whites lacked a comprehensive social policy.²¹⁹ However, contrary to a general misperception, the Whites were not wholly reactionary. Kolchak was not a monarchist and his regime did not call for a restoration of tsarism. Rather, the White Generals disliked politics, and indeed, "feared the people".²²⁰ The Generals were not prepared to embrace political and social reform.²²¹ General Denikin, for example, rose to political leadership by accident, was not ambitious for power and his politics were extremely narrow. Denikin's program of conservative Russian nationalism stressed independence from foreigners – clearly an unconscious move. His solution to the troubles was military rule; he disregarded any attempt at social reform. Denikin believed himself to be above politics.²²² This sentiment of "being above politics" can be made more vivid by presenting a slogan

²¹⁷ Swain 2000.

²¹⁸ Pipes 1990, 328.

²¹⁹ Swain 2000, 18, 153.

²²⁰ Mawdsley 2000, 135, 280.

²²¹ Mawdsley 2000, 197.

²²² Mawdsley 2000, 95-96.

which Yudenitch coined and under which he astonishingly preferred to work: “Against the Bolsheviks, without politics.”²²³

It was not a surprise then that the Generals lost the support of the moderate political Left. Kolchak was unable to make the government work and his army rule was disastrously inefficient. Kolchak’s economic policy was inoperative. Kolchak had no effective land law to counter the Bolshevik decree on land. Hence, the peasants were less attracted to the idea of being liberated by the Whites. Kolchak himself identified five reasons for his failure: exhaustion, poor army supply, and weakness of command structure, efficient Bolshevik and weak White propaganda.²²⁴

As already mentioned earlier the Whites were not successful in gaining popular support from the areas they controlled, indeed they lacked any effective mobilization for support. Kolchak’s propaganda organization was set up too late, was ineffective and unpopular among his army’s high command. This led to the alienation of the peasant majority and to difficulties in raising popular support. As an inevitable result the majority of the Russian nation, the peasantry, remained passive to the outcome of the civil war. The self-supply policies that were intended to ease the pressure on the peasantry turned the White troops to looting. To add to these miseries of the people, the Whites were cruel too. The military dictatorship of Kolchak led to arbitrary conduct and general lack of order.²²⁵

In the realm of the foreign policy of the White Generals, the successful execution of the intervention would have required the participation of all possible external forces and effective, coordinated strategic plans to encompass all actors. This would have required an excellent foreign policy. On the contrary the Generals had difficulties in even mutual domestic support and cooperation. Instead of collaboration, the principal Generals had severe political differences and rivalry for the limited supplies available. The effect this had on the international coalition was crucial. The Supreme Leader of the White movement, Admiral Kolchak’s perceptions of reality and prescriptions for policy eventually destined the anti-Bolshevik effort to failure. Kolchak’s apolitical character made for a diplomatic catastrophe. Kolchak’s ungrateful attitude towards the Czech Legion alienated the best anti-Bolshevik troops fighting for the White cause.²²⁶

²²³ Quoted in Mawdsley 2000, 197.

²²⁴ Mawdsley 2000, 136-137, 155, 210, 220. Mawdsley highlights that the Allies did not provide economic aid.

²²⁵ Mawdsley 2000, 104, 135, 137-138, 191, 210, 279-280.

²²⁶ Goldhurst 1978, 154. Kolchak was also disliked by the Americans. Denikin’s Volunteer Army, turned Allied Forces of South Russia are reported to have become one of the finest endogenous military units of the war. See Salvadó 2002, 109.

Other Generals were of similar mold. In the North-West, General Yudenitch was an imperialist and a perceived arch-reactionary and was able to achieve only minimal support from the Estonians and none from the other Baltic States and Finland during his offensive. In the South, General Denikin's "Great Russia"-policy, the refusal to concede independence to any of the nations that were part of the old empire, robbed him of much support. The whites were determined to deny the independence of most of the new potential actors in a successful intervention. The national independence movements of the newly independent states were in general as hostile to Whites as to the Reds.

Because of our focus on Finnish foreign policy decision making, the feasibility of the intervention plan is an important question. The counterfactual case or the answer to the *what if*-question reveals the importance of Finnish strategic choices in 1918 – 1920:

“A concerted plan with Finland under the White General, Mannerheim, would have divided the Red Army into two fronts but Kolchak refused to accept the independence of that nation.”²²⁷

According to this perception, “...Finnish support would certainly have made Red Petrograd indefensible”.²²⁸ We will study these valuations in the next chapter. If we, however, want to single out the most important endogenous Russian reason for the failure of the anti-Bolshevik intervention, we must look at the political essence of the White Generals. Military priorities and therefore the whole anti-Bolshevik vision were undermined by Russian anti-liberal chauvinism.²²⁹

Winston Churchill's, who had the most prolific role in bringing about the intervention, determination to destroy Bolshevism grew out of his ideological anti-communism and his perception of the Russian collapse in the Great War as treachery.²³⁰ Even if the key decisions for the intervention were made before his appointment, Churchill did his best and at times succeeded in extending and revising policies he deemed as inadequate and inefficient. At the very first meeting of the War Cabinet Churchill attended, on December 23rd, 1918 Churchill opposed intervention with small forces and favoured a large scale coalition. He prescribed the policy that the Allies would intervene properly with large forces, abundantly supplied with mechanical devices. The other option was to allow the Russians “to murder each other without let or hindrance”...²³¹

²²⁷ Salvadó 2002, 108.

²²⁸ Mawdsley 2000, 281.

²²⁹ Salvadó 2002, 108-109.

²³⁰ Churchill can be viewed to have based his interventionist foreign policy on the domino theory. In a speech to the members of the House of Commons on March 3rd, 1919 Churchill pronounced his (sinking of the) Titanic theory effectively laying basis for the proto-Cold War. See Little 2007, 32 + notes.

²³¹ Quoted in Kinvig 2006, 91

Churchill indeed made the most of his tenure to combat Bolshevism. He attempted to transform the Prinkipo option, which was an effort to moderize the Bolsheviks and aimed at a negotiated settlement between the warring sides in Russia, into a planning conference for a much expanded intervention. He thoroughly tried to influence and alarm the general public about the difficult situation of the troops in north Russia, enabling that a Relief Force might be dispatched. The Relief Force was in effect turned into an offensive task force that could facilitate the White Generals in their offensives, on the pretext that this was necessary for a safe withdrawal.²³² Churchill regarded gloomy or unfavorable reports as defeatism on the part of the writer and unashamedly described the reality with his ideological preferences.

However, in many ways the results of the intervention were contrary to Churchill's intentions. For example, by their acts the interventionists facilitated even if unwillingly, the inhumane actions of the White Generals. Their pronounced anti-Semitism is well-documented. During 1919 more than one hundred thousand Jews were murdered in South Russia alone.²³³ Churchill's strong advocacy of gas-warfare is another laconic reminder of how interventions are in fact executed.²³⁴ For Britain, the cost of the intervention was in military terms a thousand casualties, and financially, one hundred million pounds.²³⁵ Most sources are highly critical of Churchill for his advocacy of the intervention.²³⁶ After our in-depth study of Mannerheim and the Finnish potential to decide on the fate of the Bolsheviks, we can also better evaluate Churchill's foreign policy goals and behavior.

The intervention was a failure and the civil war ended in defeat of the Whites. The Bolsheviks consolidated their power and set their sights on the utopian and violent Marxist-Leninist experiment. Internally after the intervention, the Leninist regime destroyed or drove out the most educated and culturally important elements of Russian society, the hated bourgeois intelligentsia. Democratic centralism under Stalin's leadership degenerated into brutal dictatorship and oppression that manifested itself in the gulag-institution, the purges of Marxist intelligentsia, and the collectivization of agriculture, the extermination of the kulaks and the setting of the state on the

²³² Kinvig 2006, 322.

²³³ Kinvig 2006, 232-233; Swain 2000, 115-116; Mawdsley 2000, 210. Churchill tried several times to have these curtail these outrages. See Churchill 1929, 255 for his views.

²³⁴ Kinvig 2006, 128. "Since his days as Minister of Munitions, Churchill had been an enthusiastic proponent of gas."

²³⁵ Salvadó 2002, 111.

²³⁶ See for example Coates 1935; Jenkins 2002, 351; Kinvig 2006, 271, 277, 317, 322-324. The intervention is seen to constitute a major political and strategic misjudgment and to have underscored his reputation as a reckless military adventurer. His assumptions of the westward flow of German divisions and Russia's ability to continue the war are seen to be flawed as is Churchill's labelling the Russian collapse as treachery. On the strategic level, Churchill is criticized for his "converging armies strategy" or the "big hand - small map" approach to strategy. His great strategic plan for the destruction of Bolshevism with great forces advancing on the Bolshevik heartland from all points of the compass is perceived as naive. Churchill's belief in the possibility of creating a twenty to thirty thousand strong force to overthrow the Bolsheviks is seen as a delusion. His self-belief and fixation on destroying the Bolsheviks are seen as liabilities. All-in-all, Churchill is perceived as a rash military adventurer.

road to harsh military industrialization. The system was kept in motion by delusional purges, brutal deportations and secret police control. The Russo-German military cooperation and collaboration started after Brest-Litovsk and continued through the inter-war years despite Soviet support for German communists.²³⁷ The international outcasts had mutual interests during the interbellum years to change the governing principles and institutions that ended the Great War. With historical perspective, the Communist threat to world peace came externally manifest in the totalitarian Nazi-Soviet Pact that led to the Second World War.²³⁸

Because the intervention was half-heartedly endeavored and eventually failed it left a sustained trace on the Bolshevik mind. It offered a powerful propaganda device for the Bolsheviks to use in their global class war. The standard Soviet version of the political history asserted that the intervention was brought by the forces of capitalism and imperialism solely to restore the *ancient régime*.²³⁹ The intervention worked the psyche of the communist state, and had it not already by doctrine been confrontational, it would have been “pushed” towards the inevitable struggle for existence vis-à-vis the capitalist world.²⁴⁰ This winner-history needs to be contrasted with the loser-history perceptions of General Denikin who appeals in the epilogue of his memoirs:

“Reader, if you ever come across a Russian White warrior with toil-worn hands and wearing shabby clothes, but with the open gaze of a man who has the right to look you straight in the eyes, remember that in shedding his blood for his own country, he was also saving your *home* from the Red Terror.”²⁴¹

The intervention failed to save Russia and the world from the Communist tragedy.²⁴² It left the world in the inter-war years to face a growing threat perceived with clarity by Churchill and described rather poetically in his memoirs:

“...Russia, self-outcast, sharpens her bayonets in her Arctic night, and mechanically proclaims through self-starved lips her philosophy of hatred and death.”²⁴³

²³⁷ See Gatzke 1958, 565-597.

²³⁸ The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, officially titled the Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was signed in Moscow on 24.8.1939. The Treaty of Rapallo, signed in 1922, already had a military element to it. For discussion on which one of the two totalitarians started the war, see Haslam 1997, 785-797.

²³⁹ Carley 1983, 33-34.

²⁴⁰ Carr 1981, 19. “Visions of international revolution had been encouraged – almost imposed – by the traumatic experience of the civil war.”

²⁴¹ Denikin 1973, 368. Italics original.

²⁴² Kennan 1990/91, 473-474. “Russian communism was a tragedy not just in its relations to others, but also a tragedy within itself, on its own terms... captive of certain profound and dangerous misperceptions of political-philosophical nature, revolving around the relationship between means and ends, between personal and collective morality; between moderation and unrestrained extremes in the exercise of political power.” For a philosophical study of the same theme, see chapter “Moderation and Excess” in Camus 1991, 294-301.

²⁴³ Churchill 1929, 459.

3. Finnish Foreign Policy 1918 – 1920 in the Context of the Allied Intervention

The grand sweep of ideology that came to dominate the 20th century had its roots in 19th century philosophy. In Finland nationalism grew from the national epic *Kalevala* compiled by Elias Lönnrot (1802 – 1884) in the 1820s. The ideology of nationalism had come to Finland from Germany and Scandinavia through the University of Turku where Finnish language was developed to form the cultural bedrock of the young nation. It was then promoted in politics by statesmen like J. V. Snellman (1806 – 1881), in arts by composer Jean Sibelius (1865 – 1957), poet Johan Ludvig Runeberg (1804 – 1877), and author Aleksis Kivi (1834 – 1872).²⁴⁴ Communism, visioned by Karl Marx in the *Communist Manifesto* in the 1840s, offered another competing emancipatory and progressive philosophy.

Germany's rise to great power status, after the unification led by Otto von Bismarck in the 1870's, balanced the power of Russia in the Baltic Sea region.²⁴⁵ This combined with Russia's collapse in the Great War that led to the ideology-motivated Russian Civil War and to her extraordinary temporary weakness formed a window of opportunity that Finland confident of the legitimacy of her goal, yet unsure of the best possible route, traversed through to become an independent state. Already the March Revolution of 1917 had Finns hoping for the best:

“In Finland ... the Revolution generated a heady mood of freedom in which the basic facts tended to be overlooked. It was believed that a 'Free Russia' had been born which would guarantee freedom and even independence for Finland.”²⁴⁶

Finland, the Grand Duchy, did not wage war and had almost escaped the Great War without violence even though it was a constituent part of a belligerent power.²⁴⁷ The tsarist reactions to the March revolution aimed at stabilizing the empire's domestic turmoil while leaving the Entente-aligned foreign policy intact. In Finland the former goal was partly successfully reached by return to legality and the ending of the oppressive measures of tsardom. This was not enough. The following October Revolution divided the Finns on the issue of how to proceed with the independence bid; the Social Democrats favored turning to the Bolsheviks, the bourgeois parties towards the West for recognition. The social and political gulf deepened then fatefully during the autumn of 1917.²⁴⁸ The

²⁴⁴ Jutikkala & Pirinen 1979. According to the authors the Finnish spirit witnessed her “golden age” in the turn of the century with the likes of composer Sibelius and poet Eino Leino (1878-1926).

²⁴⁵ See Heikka 2005, 184-203 for a historical study of the First World War and the birth of the Finnish Republic (“Escape from Empire”).

²⁴⁶ Jussila & Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 92.

²⁴⁷ Couple of thousand Finns composing the 27th Prussian Light Infantry Battalion, Jaegers, fought in the Baltic front. Their future commander Mannerheim served as commander and fought on the Austro-Hungarian and Romanian fronts. The possible German landing and a concomitant Finnish rebellion constituted a grave threat to Petrograd. See Polvinen 1967, 16.

²⁴⁸ Paasivirta 1957, 56-80.

November strike and the violence of the Red Guards pushed centrists to join a bourgeois block constituting a clear polarizing turning point in pre-civil war politics.²⁴⁹ In the midst of a general strike declared by the trade union organization on November 15th the Eduskunta declared itself the repository of supreme power dissolving the century-long union between Russia and Finland. Finland's Declaration of Independence was then presented on December 4th by the government led by P. E. Svinhufvud.²⁵⁰ Eduskunta issued its own declaration two days later because of Western opinions that it would carry more weight. December 6th is the official Finnish Independence Day.

After the declaration of independence, Finland sought recognition from other states. It soon became clear that Russia's recognition was to be gained before recognition from the cautious Western states.²⁵¹ Lenin and Trotsky, partly following the Bolshevik doctrine of formal self-determination, and partly believing that it would help the cause of international revolution, recognized Finnish independence on December 31st, 1917 at the same time encouraging the Socialists visiting Moscow to seize power. Lenin's view was that the "right to separate" would be eventually replaced by the "right" to unite...²⁵² According to Bolshevik ideology every nation had to be granted the right to secede from Russia in order to carry out its own revolution and finally return to the fold as a member of the federation of Soviet republics. In the absence of a Finnish army or a police force, which were abolished during the Russification period at the start of the century and the March revolution, the political strife turned into violence. Different groups had already started creating their own armed forces – the Civil Guard for the bourgeois "Whites", the Red Guards for the socialist "Reds".

The War of Liberation that started after an armed communist revolt and progressed into a full-scale internal civil war, lasted from January 28th, 1918 until May 16th, 1918 and was one of the most cruel and bloody ones in the history of Europe. The various names that came to describe the conflict show that in spring 1918 Finland was fighting several wars at the same time with actors motivated by various ideological elements. From an international perspective, the primary aim for the Whites was to free Finland from the Russian military presence: forty thousand soldiers and additional naval units.²⁵³ The presence had significantly decreased from a hundred thousand in fall 1917 to about seventy-five thousand by mid-January 1918.²⁵⁴ The by and large demoralized, homesick and

²⁴⁹ Polvinen 1967, 160-161.

²⁵⁰ Jussila & Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 103.

²⁵¹ Paasivirta 1957, 28.

²⁵² Polvinen 1967, 54-55, 191-192; Carr 1973, 368; Jutikkala & Pirinen 1979, 216. For Lenin's perceptions of Finland as a Western state, see Julkunen 1988, 55-58.

²⁵³ Polvinen 1967, 164, 215; Jutikkala & Pirinen 1979, 216.

²⁵⁴ Manninen 1988, 45.

undisciplined Russian forces had two goals: to defend Petrograd from external dangers and to facilitate Finnish socialists working for a revolution. The civil war ended with the Whites being victorious. Casualties of war: eleven thousand soldiers (five thousand three hundred Reds, three thousand four hundred Whites, six hundred Russians and three hundred Germans). Altogether with the victims of sicknesses and terror the number that perished in the war rose to thirty eight thousand five hundred.²⁵⁵

The Finnish-Russian interaction during our case study years was conducted in the shadow of the Russian-German security dilemma. The birth of the Finnish Republic, and Finland's escape from the empire, formed the background for the cruel civil war that left Finland, under her united façade, a bitterly divided entity.²⁵⁶ Russia, on the other hand, in 1918 was no one single actor but consisted rather of many states: "Russia, as a political concept ceased to exist at the start of 1918."²⁵⁷ It was in this context that independent Finland was presented with a project of world historical significance. The Allied intervention in the Russian civil war to destroy Bolshevism was without a doubt an ambitious and risky venture. Finland, however, had a major interest in her Eastern neighbor, indeed, "Finland's future depended, above all, on developments in Russia."²⁵⁸ It was obvious that the revolutionary tide had spilled over from Russia. Now it was time to decide whether the conservative anticommunist wave that was gaining momentum in the Allied headquarters in London and Paris would be strengthened, muted or ignored by the Finns. Finland's unique geographical position meant that Finland was of interest to the ideological anti-communists of the Allies and Associated Powers that favored – in current parlance – a pre-emptive strike for a regime change in the evolving situation in the Russian civil war. St. Petersburg is located less than four hundred kilometers from Helsinki. Lenin himself at the time believed the fate of the revolution to be in the hands of Finland.²⁵⁹

Finland as the rear (*selusta*) of the revolution made her an important actor. Bolshevik activity was high in Finland in the early years of the 20th century. Leading revolutionaries used Finland as a base for action and as a window towards Europe spending lots of time in different cities, not only the capital. Magazines and journals were published in the freer semi-autonomous Grand Duchy before being distributed to the capital and other embryos of the revolution. The use of explosives and other

²⁵⁵ Meinander 2006, 156.

²⁵⁶ Heikka 2005, 184-203.

²⁵⁷ Polvinen 1967, 157.

²⁵⁸ Jussila & Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 106. Jussila interestingly notes that in 1917, "As in 1905, an unsuccessful attempt was made to turn Finland into an anti-revolutionary bastion." It does not fit into this work to analyze the previous attempts, though it would be highly beneficial.

²⁵⁹ Lenin reflected later that "smallest amount of help", with "insignificantly low sacrifices" would have led to the fall of Red Petrograd in "the shortest period of time".

terrorist tactics were taught in Finnish underground cells. Lenin and Stalin of course, famously met each other for the first time in Tampere in December 1905.²⁶⁰

As we have learned from the previous chapter on the intervention, the individual statesmen of the Allied and Associated Powers states even if agreeing on the necessity of keeping the Eastern Front active were divided as to the desirability and possibility of a successful ideological anti-communist intervention into the Russian civil war. Finland was no exception. Finland, faced with the option of participating in the intervention, was divided in opinion. The Finnish elites discussion on foreign policy issues split among ideologically close actors – all of them but the communists motivated by national independence – along two strands. Chapter 3.1 presents the group of foreign policy decision makers who favored active participation in the intervention - I have labeled this group the interventionists. Mannerheim's political thinking will be analyzed in depth in chapter 3.1.1. where I will also present matters of military strategy. Chapter 3.2 presents the non-interventionists. This section of the elites, centered around K.J. Ståhlberg, opposed Finnish participation in the anti-Bolshevik activities. Ståhlberg's anti-interventionist foreign policy thinking is analyzed in chapter 3.2.1. In the concluding chapter 3.3 I analyze the dynamics and interplay of the two strands – the Mannerheim group and the realist group – both motivated sincerely by the Finnish national interest, yet arriving at totally opposing conclusions for foreign policy. Here we can find the answers to why the non-interventionists won the debate.

²⁶⁰ Smirnov 1970, 37-39. Lenin visited Finland close to 30 times and spent altogether 18 months of his life in Finland; first time during the first revolution in 1905, last prior to his departure to lead the revolution in 1917. He had contacts with all the leading social democrats. In Helsinki, Lenin stayed in Ullanlinna at Vuorimiehenkatu 35, in Kruununhaka at Vironkatu 9, Liisankatu 19, in Töölö at Töölönkatu 46 and in Sörnäinen at Sörnäisten rantatie 1.

3.1. Interventionist Foreign Policy – C. G. E. Mannerheim

For those who saw the Finnish civil war of spring 1918 also as a part of the larger struggle that was ongoing in different forms all over Eurasia, national borders mattered little. In their view, the ideological struggle between bolshevist revolutionaries and the old establishment was played out on a European-wide arena where nation states were pieces in a much larger puzzle. These anti-Bolshevik elites were usually centered on one political or military leader. The central statesman in the Finnish interventionist movement was Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (4.6.1867 – 28.1.1951).

Mannerheim was prior to 1918 unknown in Finland except among his relatives and friends of Swedish speaking nobility.²⁶¹ The civil war brought him to the knowledge of the wider public. The years through 1918 to 1920 were then years of constant changing of roles for Mannerheim who had just months ago resigned from the Imperial Army:

“He was the Commander-in-Chief of the War of Liberation and the hero of the victory parade, then ‘only-a-soldier’ pushed aside by the pro-German orientation, foreign policy visionary appointed Regent in December 1918, a presidential candidate in July 1919 who had lost the elections...”²⁶²

The quick reversal of political fortune for the hero of the fight for independence clearly showed that Mannerheim was difficult to categorize and surely not a typical Finnish politician. Mannerheim was special, not only in the Finnish but also in the pan-European context:

“The politics of Gustaf Mannerheim were so different from the politics of most Finns in the twentieth century because he was one of the last great aristocrats in European politics. He was a baron, and his father a count. Gustaf Mannerheim did not grow up among the masses, but in a castle. He never learned, or needed to learn, to be thrifty as the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Fame was for him a very sharp spur. His life’s goal was far above the ordinary.”²⁶³

Mannerheim was different when compared to the other Finnish politicians not only because of his background as a soldier who did not traditionally belong to the Finnish political elite but also because of his wider political thinking.²⁶⁴ Mannerheim’s early career as a legendary soldier was also atypical. He was expelled from the Finnish Military School he had joined aged fifteen for disciplinary reasons. Mannerheim himself regarded this knock on his self-esteem and honor as a

²⁶¹ Rintala 1969, 21.

²⁶² Vares 1990, 5. ”Hän oli vapausotaylipäällikkö ja voitonparaatin sankari, sitten saksalaissuuntauksen tieltä syrjään siirretty ‘vain’-sotilas, joulukuussa 1918 valtionhoitajaksi nimitetty ulkopoliitiikan suunnanmuuttaja, heinäkuun 1919 hävinnyt presidenttiehdokas...”

²⁶³ Rintala 1969, 35-36. For similarities in character and career between Mannerheim and Charles de Gaulle, see Kanninen 2003.

²⁶⁴ Rintala 1969, 19. “He was simply pro-Finnish. This would be, for most Finnish political figures, a correct resolution. For Mannerheim, however, this is an overly simple and misleading interpretation. He was an extremely complicated, sophisticated, and atypical Finn...”

turning point in his career ambition.²⁶⁵ He then joined the Imperial Army and volunteered for the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 – 1905, the first of five wars he fought in.

Prior to his return to St. Petersburg from the war, Mannerheim had put to his superiors an idea of riding through Mongolia back to the Russian capital. It came to reality in the expedition of 1906 – Mannerheim's adventurous fourteen thousand kilometer trip across Asia from West to East. Inspired by his uncle A. E. Nordenskiöld, Mannerheim set out on the journey in July 1906 and returned to St. Petersburg two years later. With his horse Filip, Ma-ta-khan (Mannerheim's Chinese name) traveled along the Silk Road and lived up to his guise as an explorer whilst still ensuring that his task as a military scout was being fulfilled.²⁶⁶ After his adventures, Mannerheim continued serving in the Russian Imperial Army in the First World War until in July 1917 he became convinced that it was time for him to leave. Being occupied in military matters, he had not received news from home and knew next to nothing of the events in Helsinki. After hearing about the declaration of independence, Mannerheim felt there was no possibility for him to continue serving in the Imperial Army.²⁶⁷ He resigned and traveled to Helsinki where he met with the political elite that aimed at independence.

As the newly appointed commander-in-chief, Mannerheim travelled under the guise of merchant Gustaf Malmberg to Vaasa where the support for the Civil Guard was strongest to set up the headquarters of his improvised privately funded army. On January 25th, 1918 the Civil Guard were declared the government troops, the country's official armed forces with the mission of not only restoring order but also disarming and expelling Russian troops from the country. The commander-in-chief held responsibility for all military questions and no Ministry of War was established. Jaegers, the German trained Finnish independence fighters that came to form the backbone of the Finnish Army were recalled to Finland on January 19th and arrived at the end of February. Mannerheim was finally in a position to plan for the actualization of his anti-Bolshevik vision.

²⁶⁵ Mannerheim 1951.

²⁶⁶ Klinge 1988. See also the "Mannerheim project" Klinge forwards. Mannerheim was an enthusiastic horseman. Mannerheim 1951, 139. On his journey, Mannerheim met His Holiness Dalai Lama, to whom he gave a gun as a gift, stating that during these times even a Holy Man needs it more than a prayer wheel...

²⁶⁷ Mannerheim 1951, 231.

3.1.1. “...and Not Only Finland!”

Mannerheim had experienced revolution and its effects both as a tsarist military officer and on his travels inside Russia during the Great War. Several of his colleagues and acquaintances had been arrested or murdered, he himself had had a couple of close calls but had managed to escape the “trash”.²⁶⁸ Mannerheim saw the newly acquired *svoboda* of the masses as extremely detrimental to the society as the indiscipline of the troops soared, mutinies were wide spread and general infrastructure was in confusion and chaos.²⁶⁹

Early on, Mannerheim had had discussions with the “society preserving forces” – his officer colleagues in the Russian Imperial Army – about raising a counter-revolutionary movement against the “minority dictatorship”.²⁷⁰ His first move after securing the liberation of South Ostrobothnia, as the commander-in-chief in the Finnish War of Liberation was to send news of it to Stockholm from where the news was hoped to spread all over Europe. Mannerheim’s message was clear:

“In the hope that the fight against Bolshevism which the improvised Finnish Army had begun would be regarded as a common cause by all responsible and thinking people in our part of the world, I ended my message with an appeal to all who were able and willing to do so to hurry to our help to save Finland – and not only Finland!”²⁷¹

As the commander-in-chief, Mannerheim was the leader of a motivated anti-Bolshevik force that formed a possibility to exert influence in Finland’s strategic environment. Prior to Mannerheim and the Jaegers, the Finnish Army had basically been non-existent.²⁷² These two elements came to constitute the core and the leadership for the early Civil Guards (Suojeluskunta). These troops came to form the White Army that emerged victorious from the civil war and eventually came to be the backbone for The Finnish Defense Force.²⁷³ The strength of these troops for Mannerheim to utilize was at the end of 1917 thirty thousand men, by the start of the civil war thirty five thousand men, by the end of the war seventy thousand and in 1920 roughly a hundred thousand men. In essence, the military was built of patriotic peasants who lacked military training. Mannerheim’s leadership

²⁶⁸ Mannerheim 1951.

²⁶⁹ Mannerheim 1951.

²⁷⁰ Mannerheim 1951.

²⁷¹ Mannerheim 1951, 266. “Lähetin voitosta sanan myös Tukholmaan, mistä uutinen levisi yli Euroopan. Toivoin, että maanosamme kaikki ajattelevat ja vastuuntuntoiset ainekset käsittäisivät yhteiseksi asiakseen sen taistelun, johon maasta poljettu Suomen armeija oli käynyt bolshevismia vastaan, ja päätin sanoman kehotukseen, että jokainen, joka halusi ja voi, rientäisi avuksemme pelastamaan Suomea – eikä ainoastaan Suomea!” (Translation mine; as are all the following quotes translated from Finnish)

²⁷² Jaegers not only brought themselves, but ammunition and perhaps more importantly a five-volume basic text in Finnish on tactics and military education, see Heikka 2003 (b), 39-40.

²⁷³ Other possible terms to describe the troops are: white guards, security guard, civic guards, national guard, white militia, defence corps, protection guard, protection corps and protection militia. The White Guards separated from the armed forces and became an independent organisation in February 1919; they were disbanded after the peace treaty that ended the Continuation War.

abilities, in addition to the experience of the Jaegers, were crucial.²⁷⁴ The Finnish way of war was to utilize rapid, mobile offensives.²⁷⁵ However, differences among the political elite in perceptions of power and interests led to disagreements. Mannerheim was forced to abandon the power that he could have used to project his perceived Finnish foreign policy interests.

Mannerheim resigned as the commander-in-chief only two weeks after leading the victory parade on May 16th, 1918 in Helsinki. His resignation was due to disagreement about the future Finnish Army – which he did not want modeled after or created by the Germans. He travelled to Sweden at the end of May worried and frustrated by the continued pro-German foreign policy orientation of Finnish elites – a de facto military alliance with the Central Powers. Mannerheim’s resignation was an indication of his distaste for the German orientation in Finnish foreign policy. Inexperience in matters of foreign policy and misplaced thankfulness among the Finnish political elite led, according to Mannerheim, to a naive admiration of the Germans. Furthermore, Mannerheim regarded the incorrect reading of the balance of power that predicted the Central Powers winning the war as dangerous, and the more emotive aspects of this admiration with a sense of pity.²⁷⁶ Indeed, the majority of the Finnish general public, uneducated in the self-interested world of international politics perceived Germany’s “aid” to be motivated by humanitarian and anti-Bolshevik sentiment and not for influence or power maximizing reasons. This view was reinforced by the relief arising from the liberation of Helsinki by the German troops.²⁷⁷

Mannerheim’s domestic support was strong even if he was viewed with reserve by the majority of the bourgeois elite. From their perspective Mannerheim was seen to have qualities that alienated him from them. He was viewed by different groups as being a “Tsar’s general” and perceptions of him being “Russian” or “Swedish” made him suspect.²⁷⁸ The bourgeois elite saw Mannerheim as a qualified soldier but nevertheless only a soldier, and soldiers had traditionally not been acknowledged as actors in Finnish politics. Mannerheim was also deemed politically inexperienced, a political upstart, and lacking knowledge of local traditions.²⁷⁹ Altogether, despite enjoying respect among the larger strata of the Finnish population, Mannerheim had little political support in the

²⁷⁴ Mannerheim is described as “a first-class military expert”. See Mawdsley 2000, 28.

²⁷⁵ Heikka 2003 (b), 40.

²⁷⁶ Polvinen 1971, 30, 257; Paasivirta 1957, 115. During the German orientation Finland had made treaties that would, in the long run, have led Finland to become primarily a resource exporter for German industry. For Mannerheim’s uneasy relation with Germans and pro-German Finns, see Jokipii 2004, 90-114.

²⁷⁷ Paasivirta 1957, 215, 229. German motives are analyzed in pages 157-158.

²⁷⁸ Vares 1990.

²⁷⁹ Vares 1990, 8-11. “Mannerheim yielded. A short time later, in May 1918, he resigned because of overwhelming opposition to his large policy of Finnish intervention in Russia.”

political circles of Helsinki. Many agreed that the “soldier had done his task and had moved, in every way, to the reserve.”²⁸⁰

Mannerheim’s resignation in May 1918 was viewed differently by different political groups. It is interesting to note that at this point Ståhlberg defended Mannerheim and was worried about the increase of German (or any foreign) influence in Finland. The Activists who quite naturally favoured the pro-German orientation but who later were to become Mannerheim’s active supporters in his large policy that advocated active participation in the intervention were at this point most firmly opposed to their former commander-in-chief.²⁸¹

However, when the German collapse started to seem inevitable in the fall of 1918, Mannerheim was needed to better Finnish relations with the Allies. Mannerheim was asked to substitute the pro-German politicians and be a spokesman for the young nation in negotiations with the Entente powers. Mannerheim had already tied contacts with the Western diplomats during his stay in Stockholm in the summer. The Finnish senate had then however rejected his wish to talk to the Entente. By fall the leading Finn politicians had drawn the necessary conclusions from the change in the balance of power and reverted to Mannerheim’s vision. As a private person, he traveled to London – a day after the signing of the Armistice on November 12th, 1918 – to touch upon the political climate and to forward his interventionist thinking. Mannerheim started his high-level active politicking for the intervention after the armistice and during the ideological stage of the intervention. In London, Mannerheim got the impression that the British government lacked an understanding that Bolshevism was a global danger. The official British response to Mannerheim’s interventionist plans was at this point of time still indifferent.²⁸² In time the effects of the armistice would change the British view of Finland; the anti-Bolshevik motivation shifting Finland into a completely different role.²⁸³ As the British interests towards Finland grew it activated its military and intelligence presence in the region: the secret service (MI6) moved from Stockholm to Helsinki. The city was deemed a reliable place for communications with the West, yet close to action.²⁸⁴

²⁸⁰ Vares 1990, 13. ”...sotilas oli tehnyt tehtävänsä ja siirtynyt joka suhteessa reserviin.” Rintala 1969, 31-32 writes that “Mannerheim’s large policy was destined to remain largely unfulfilled. After the signing of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, such an advance upon Petrograd by Finnish troops was incompatible with the desire of the German military command to prevent a recurrence of hostilities on the Eastern Front. The Finnish Government, anticipating the victory of the Central Powers, refused to risk German displeasure, even though the prospect of Finnish territorial expansion into East Karelia was by no means unattractive. Mannerheim therefore resigned as Commander-in-Chief.”

²⁸¹ Rintala 1969, 42.

²⁸² Mannerheim 1951, 374; Polvinen 1971, 111-113. Mannerheim met General Poole on his visit to London and also traveled to Paris where his ideas were more readily received.

²⁸³ Sundbäck 1991, 48.

²⁸⁴ See Kotakallio 2006, 7-35 for a detailed account of cooperation in intelligence matters between Finland and Britain the now allies in the making.

As the most high-profile Finnish leader, distinct from the pro-German orientation and sympathetic to the Entente cause, Mannerheim was asked to become the Regent of Finland on November 17th, 1918. The monarchists reluctantly changed their focus to Mannerheim's authority and charisma; the fear of another rebellion was always lurking in their minds. Despite republican suspicion, Mannerheim was elected as the Regent by a vote of seventy three to twenty seven. He was appointed on December 12th, returning to Finland on December 22nd, 1918. Prior to his return from London, Mannerheim spoke of his intervention plans to British Foreign and War Offices and published his thoughts through conservative newspapers.²⁸⁵ Mannerheim also knew the leaders of the White movement and had extensive correspondence with them and their representatives prior, during and after the intervention and the civil war.²⁸⁶

As the Regent, Mannerheim finally got a chance to act on his thoughts. Mannerheim responded positively to Estonia's plea for help against the Bolsheviks. This act would create a friendly southern neighbor, would signal a favor for the Entente and contribute to the creation of a purposeful base for the future larger intervention. Mannerheim perceived an opportunity to influence Finland's strategic environment and was motivated to oversee the unofficial intervention of Finnish troops in the Estonian Liberation War.²⁸⁷ The troops returned after a successful campaign to Finland in February 1919. The Entente powers viewed these developments with pleasure; Finland's German orientation seemed to be ending. Prior to Mannerheim, the Western states had not viewed the militarily weak and German-friendly Finland as a potential ally for the intervention.²⁸⁸ More importantly even, the Entente powers did not believe it was possible to create good relations with Finland's Berlin-oriented senate.²⁸⁹ The clearest example of Finland beginning to be oriented to the democratic West, apart from German General von der Goltz leaving Finland in December 1918, was the March elections. Mannerheim's prior diplomatic work was to bear fruit too as Nordic cooperation was enhanced and the Allied and Associated Powers recognized Finnish independence, the UK on May 6th, 1919, the United States the day after.

²⁸⁵ Ruotsila 2002, 6. For the best account of Mannerheim's and Churchill's collaboration, see Ruotsila 2005, 17-44 (Chapter 4. Churchill, Finland and the Russian Intervention 1919-1920).

²⁸⁶ See Vlasov 2007, 54-115 (chapter Valkoisten kenraalien kohtaloita). Mannerheim also had extensive communications via exchange of letters to his relatives and acquaintances in high society. It is not rare in these letters to find Mannerheim sharing his perceptions of current affairs and his view of the need to conquer Petrograd. See Mannerheim 1983, 175, 182, 192. Here we can also find Mannerheim giving credit to Ståhlberg's foreign policy thinking. Mannerheim as an eyewitness to the revolution was in a good position to inform other actors. Mannerheim is known, for example, to have given a first-hand account of the revolution to baron Wrangel, see Luckett 1971, 48, 125.

²⁸⁷ Polvinen 1971, 115-116.

²⁸⁸ Polvinen 1967, 174.

²⁸⁹ Polvinen 1971, 107

During his time as the Regent of Finland (12.12.1918 – 26.7.1919) Mannerheim cooperated actively if secretly with the Activists on interventionist foreign policy. Even if Mannerheim was by his position as the commander-in-chief and by his international connections the supreme single figure to be studied in the context of the interventionist foreign policy he was not the only driving force. The so-called War Party featured men from the highest positions of authority in the capital Helsinki to dedicated patriots from the peripheral regions of rural Finland. In central position were the men involved in the Activist movement.²⁹⁰

The Activists were a heterogeneous political movement created to oppose russification in the early 20th century and to promote Finnish independence. Later the movement developed into the Jaeger-movement. In December 1918 the Activists had created a secret combat force, the so-called Centre, to protect White Finland against Soviet Russia. Its aim was to secure the newly gained independence and bourgeois social order in the event of a renewed leftist attempt to seize power, to assist Finland's kindred irredentist nations, to secure the strategically best possible defensible eastern border and to advocate interventionist foreign policy to destroy Bolshevism. Mannerheim was given the pseudonym "Andersson" in the Activist communications.²⁹¹ The first reference to Andersson is from July 7th, 1919.

The threat of a renewed left-wing *coup d'état* was real. The Finnish labor movement had split in two after the war: the social democrats led by Tanner opted for parliamentary politics whilst the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) that was set up in Moscow sought another armed revolution. All the red leaders that were to compose the Finnish Communist Party had, following the example set by civil war dictator Manner, escaped to Russia via Viipuri.²⁹² The leader, Otto-Ville Kuusinen did return to Finland in May 1919 and remained there, in hiding, for over a year.²⁹³ Finnish communist forces in Russia numbered over six thousand men, gaining experience for a looming new war against the Finnish government troops.²⁹⁴ The Activists were convinced that a new materialization of the threat was on the horizon and that the battle should be joined on two fronts, one in domestic

²⁹⁰ Martti Ahti uses terms post-independence Activism and Rightwing radicalism to describe the latter phase of the Activist movement and distinguish its offensive interventionist policies from the politics aiming single-mindedly towards independence prior to 1917/1918.

²⁹¹ Ahti 1987, 166. Ahti has researched the intervention policy from a conspirational perspective. His focus is on the Activists and their extra-parliamentary political thinking and actions. For mutual interests and similarities in the thinking of Mannerheim's and the Activists, see pp. 111, 128-129. For differences, see pp. 76-77, 129. Later, in 1920, Mannerheim used his influence to arrange finance for the Activists. For a discussion about Activist geopolitical reasoning and their thoughts on Great Finland and the strategically best defensible eastern border, see Soikkanen 2005.

²⁹² Paasivirta 1957, 226.

²⁹³ Jussila & Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 127.

²⁹⁴ Polvinen 1971, 71.

politics and another in the international political context.²⁹⁵ The Activists distrusted parliamentary politics and envisioned a right-wing *coup d'état* and the strengthening of their own power by other extra-parliamentary action.²⁹⁶ The war party exaggerated and arranged provocations to gain popular support for their policy of intervention. Great Finland thinking (Suur-Suomi ajattelu) reinforced the projects to help kin in their survival struggle. Finnish Activists made interventions to East Karelia, the Olonets expedition set out on its project on April 21st, 1919. Olonets was conquered April 24th. To the disappointment of the participants, the local population was passive and not too enthusiastic to be liberated.²⁹⁷

The Activists and Mannerheim had different interests. Mannerheim favored cooperating with the White Generals, the Activist, as did most of the population, viewed them with suspicion and a threat to Finnish independence.²⁹⁸ Mannerheim was above all focused on Petrograd, while Activists were interested in annexing the kin areas of East Karelia.²⁹⁹ Mannerheim was convinced of the Bolshevik threat and that the conquest of Petrograd constituted the answer.

General Yudenitch, the commander of the White Russian counter-revolutionaries in the Western theatre, situated in Helsinki, approached Finland for logistical support for intervention to Petrograd in January 1919. The Finns responded by relying on delay tactics. Yudenitch's imperialist political views and his brass White Russian reasoning did not sit well with his need for friends. Yudenitch's stance on Estonia's independence and belief in the *Russia, one and indivisible* destined his cooperation bid for larger political projects doomed to failure. The arrogant and uncommunicative General, lacking an army, then spent his days and weeks isolated in the hotel *Seurahuone*.³⁰⁰ Mannerheim was dismayed by this attitude and the following inaction. He was disappointed but placed his trust on the Entente powers, most of all on France. The French did encourage the Finns to co-operate with the White Generals. The United States and Britain (except for Churchill) counselled the opposite.³⁰¹

²⁹⁵ Ahti 1987, 100-103.

²⁹⁶ Blomstedt 1969, 376. Blomstedt reports on the coup rumors and about the Civil Guards troops situated in manors outside of the capital ready to march on Helsinki prior to the Presidential election.

²⁹⁷ Ahti 1987, 105-111.

²⁹⁸ Ahti 1987, 129-130.

²⁹⁹ Vares 1990, 22. "Mannerheimin ja aktivistien intressit veivät tosiasiassa eri suuntiin, vaikka perustarkoitus – bolshevikkien lyöminen – ja tavoiteltu ilmansuunta olivatkin samoja: Mannerheimille oli tärkeintä Pietari, aktivisteille heimoalueet."

³⁰⁰ Polvinen 1971, 133. Polvinen writes about Finns approaching former foreign minister Sazonov for White Russians view of Finnish independence. Response was disappointing and cooperation seemed impossible.

³⁰¹ Polvinen 1971, 189-190.

Regent Mannerheim in a meeting with British military officers on May 26th, 1919 gave four conditions for Finnish participation in the intervention: neutralization of the Baltic Sea, construction of an impartial zone between Petrograd and Finland, the Petsamo area and a vote in East Karelia determining their joining Finland or staying within Russia.³⁰² In addition, Finland would require Entente powers to send military material, victuals and money to facilitate for the intervention. Mannerheim was disappointed with the British response that stressed the need for cooperation between Finland and General Yudenitch. The White Generals had their doubts about Finland too. It would be a knock to their self-esteem if the Finns liberated Petrograd, their capital. More importantly the politically illiterate and strictly conservative Admiral Kolchak held on to his principles and did not recognize Finnish independence even after Entente powers had done so.³⁰³ Even if the plans for the intervention were hampered by hesitation and lack of mutual trust, the military went on with its duty. By the end of May 1919 the military plans for the intervention were ready.³⁰⁴

In the summer, the frustrated Yudenitch approached Mannerheim again. Negotiations were held on May 8th and on May 20th, 1919 on the prerequisite basis that Finnish independence must be recognized and that she would be compensated territorially. Without approval from Kolchak, formally the supreme leader in the White movement, Yudenitch then in June acted on his own and contacted Mannerheim again. Negotiations moved along swiftly and were concluded with an agreement sketch ready to be signed on June 18th, 1919.³⁰⁵ The secret Mannerheim-Yudenitch Memorandum was transmitted to the Entente powers – Mannerheim was to lead the co-operated offensive to Petrograd.

Winston Churchill had come to know of Mannerheim's interventionist thinking in the early months of 1919. The collaboration of the like-minded was active and their relations respective throughout the years 1919 – 1920.³⁰⁶ Churchill perceived the preconditions of Mannerheim as preposterous and completely unrealistic, yet began "a frenzied activity aimed at its promotion" in the context of the Kotlas-Vyatka plan, approved by the British War Cabinet on July 11th, 1919.³⁰⁷ Accompanying this,

³⁰² Polvinen 1971, 191.

³⁰³ Polvinen 1971, 144-145.

³⁰⁴ Ahti 1987, 137-146. Ahti perceived the plans as "optimistic".

³⁰⁵ Ahti 1987, 175; Polvinen 1971, 209.

³⁰⁶ Ruotsila 2002, 6; 2005, 1. "Winston Churchill never visited Finland. His knowledge of Finnish history, culture and the Finnish political system was very limited."

³⁰⁷ Ruotsila 2002, 9-10. Ruotsila names this the first St. Petersburg plan. See his article for a thorough, enlightening investigation of the topic.

the British increased their naval activity in Finland during the summer 1919.³⁰⁸ The seemingly most opportune moment to overthrow the Bolshevik regime presented itself to Finland in June-July 1919. From the Finnish point of view now was the time to act.

The Mannerheim-Yudenitch agreement had a political element Yudenitch left out in his communications with Kolchak: Finnish independence was agreed upon, national autonomy for East Karelia, rights to religion, language, schools and cultural institutions for the Ingrians were to be granted, and a League of Nations decision on Petsamo and on the neutralization of the Baltic would be acted on later. Yudenitch was not the only one acting on his own, Mannerheim also acted without the knowledge of his superior: the newly elected government. The Allied reaction to the Mannerheim-Yudenitch draft accord was a double-deal: they wished for Red Petrograd to fall yet no military supplies or financial assets could be provided. No agreement could be made, no guarantees given. An official statement, branded by Mannerheim as platonic, was that the Entente had “nothing against the intervention...” When Admiral Kolchak finally got his hands on the draft accord he characterized it as a “product of imagination”.³⁰⁹ Kolchak is reported to have reacted to the negotiated sketch by stating: “Fantastic, one would suppose that Finland had conquered Russia.”³¹⁰ General Denikin opposed the sketch too. The White Generals needed and wanted help but were unwilling to compromise on their perceived political interests.

From the Finnish perspective, the moment with the most potential for the intervention, when the future of Petrograd was in the balance and Finland (Mannerheim) in the position to tip it one way or another, was now over.³¹¹ The intervention was at its most executable stage just prior to the ratification of the new Finnish constitution in July 1919.³¹² The decision to alter the course of world history had loomed large in the minds of the selected few. The interventionists feared that the political centre would likely elect Ståhlberg as the new President and turn its back on all promises of assistance to Finland’s kindred nations.³¹³ This would signal the coming end of all interventionist ambitions. The altered domestic situation in Finland prompted Winston Churchill to lament in a Cabinet meeting in early June 1919:

³⁰⁸ Sundbäck 1991, 60. See article for discussion of British military plans regarding Finland during the intervention years. Sundbäck reports of British plans to unite Mannerheim and Oskari Tokoi’s Muurmansk Legion to fight the Bolsheviks.

³⁰⁹ Polvinen 1971, 220. Some sources report that Kolchak agreed to this plan, see Sundbäck 1991, 60.

³¹⁰ Quoted in Silverlight 1970, 309.

³¹¹ Original description (*Pietari vaakalaudalla ja Suomi temppeliharjalla*) is used in Polvinen 1971.

³¹² Ahti 1987, 311. Ahti uses Polvinen’s description but sees Mannerheim, not Finland to be in the position to tip it one way or another: “Mannerheim temppeliharjalla”.

³¹³ Jussila & Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 131.

“In the meantime a new Government had been established in Finland and *Mannerheim’s wings had been clipped...* The new domestic situation in Finland rendered the capture of Petrograd unlikely.”³¹⁴

Events proved the fears of the interventionists justified. Mannerheim ratified the constitution on July 17th, 1919. The presidential election between Mannerheim and Ståhlberg was held in the Eduskunta: Ståhlberg won one hundred and forty three votes to fifty votes and was elected to be the first President on July 25th, 1919. After losing the election, Mannerheim was cast aside for the second time. Interestingly he was now supported by people who had earlier put him aside in favor of the German orientation and opposed by them who had hesitated in giving up on him.³¹⁵ Whatever the reasons, the result was clear:

“...Mannerheim suffered a clear defeat in the elections to the Centrist and Leftist candidate K. J. Ståhlberg. The enterprise for the conquest of Petrograd by the Finns came to nothing.”³¹⁶

After the election, Mannerheim negotiated about the role of commander-in-chief that Ståhlberg had offered him. However, Mannerheim set too high demands: domestically he demanded the Civil Guards under his command, an expansive role in civil service appointments and the denial of amnesty to the Red prisoners. In the realm of foreign policy Mannerheim demanded in effect that the interventionist foreign policy would be activated. Finland would support the White Generals and actively participate in the conquest of Petrograd. This would be accompanied by a declaration of war between Finland and Russia.³¹⁷ After his demands were not agreed upon he declined the post declaring that his appointment, without the required political action would have only given the nation a false sense of security.³¹⁸

After losing the presidential election, Mannerheim voluntarily withdrew from Finnish politics, retired from public life and left in mid-September for West Europe, to the United Kingdom and France.³¹⁹ Mannerheim traveled abroad (again) deeply worried. He saw the new liberal regime underestimate the danger of communist radicalism and was unimpressed and worried by its frightening inability to understand Bolshevism’s actual objectives and methods. For Mannerheim,

³¹⁴ Quoted in Silverlight 1970, 309. Italics by author.

³¹⁵ Vares 1990, 39. Lauri Relander and Väinö Tanner both got one vote.

³¹⁶ Polvinen 1971, 22. “...vaaleissa Mannerheim kärsi selvän tappion keskustan ja vasemmiston ehdokkaalle K.J. Ståhlbergille. Hanke Pietarin valtaamiseksi suomalaisten toimesta oli sillä erää rauennut.”

³¹⁷ Vares 1990, 44; Polvinen 1971, 255. Ståhlberg also offered Mannerheim the post of ambassador to Paris on August 11th, 1919.

³¹⁸ Blomstedt 1969, 393-394.

³¹⁹ Rintala 1969, 42. “For the next twelve years he held no official position and was, politically, a very lonely man. The main reason for this isolation – symbolized by the defeat of 1919 – was the rejection by the large majority of Finns of the idea of armed intervention in Russia.”

the gains of the War of Liberation were in danger: “the battle between the two worldviews was a matter of life and death”.³²⁰

Churchill met Mannerheim for the first time in person on October 10th, 1919. The two anti-Bolsheviks found common interests. Mannerheim became encouraged and convinced that eventual success was in the horizon and started drafting a public appeal to waken up the Finnish political elite and public that it was in Finland’s power to influence Russian civil war and in her interests to do so.³²¹ The fatal blow to Bolshevism was going to be delivered and Finland needed to be a part of it.

Yudenitch for his part started taking action, rather surprisingly, the day after the presidential election on July 26th, 1919 moving to Narva and taking control of the North-Western Army. The North-Western government recognized Finnish independence on September 23rd, 1919. Militarily Yudenitch and his outnumbered forces were left with the hazard-option. The thrust towards Petrograd started on October 7th, 1919. The pressed Bolsheviks were forced to call Trotsky to help. He arrived in Petrograd on October 16th to lead the defence. By October 20th Yudenitch’s troops had made their way to the outskirts of the city and posed a real threat. The prestige-aware White Russians had difficulties in asking for help for their project. All the subsequent moves to secure Finnish backing for the intervention formed a process of bargaining where the real thoughts of the supreme leader of the Whites, Admiral Kolchak, remained hidden under ambiguous and diplomatic wording. The denial of the most important matter, Finnish independence, was crucial. This state of affairs changed when the Generals were forced by necessity to act: an official request for help was issued by Yudenitch, already in retreat, to Finland, on October 23rd, 1919.

This is the background for the famous open letter Mannerheim sent from Paris to President Ståhlberg on October 28th, 1919. The letter was published in Helsinki newspapers on November 2nd, 1919. Mannerheim stressed the urgency of Finnish military participation in the capture of Petrograd.³²² In his letter, Mannerheim tried to convince the President and the Finnish public that Finland had the power to influence the change of the regime in Russia by participating in the intervention and that it was in the Finnish interests to do so.

”Mr. President! At this moment, when the Finnish nation is standing in front of decisions that will define her future, I consider it my patriotic duty to express my definite conviction based on thorough research of the state of affairs and the prevailing

³²⁰ Mannerheim 1951.

³²¹ Ruotsila 2002, 14.

³²² Mannerheim’s letter to Ståhlberg on October 28th, 1919. The following fragments are from this letter.

mood in Paris and in London. The development of events has once more, presumably for the final time, given our nation a chance, by participating in the decisive battle against the cruelest despotism that the world knows, with relatively few casualties to secure our freedom and create a preconditions for safe and happy future and to show to the world that unbounded sovereignty of the constitutional state of Finland is in the pro-European interests. In the well-informed circles nobody doubts that the defeat of the soviet power is just a matter of time. Europe's opinion is that Petrograd's fate is in the hand [sic] of Finland and that the question of the conquest of Petrograd is not considered as a finno-russian question but as a global issue, to accomplish eventual peace and serve humanity."

Mannerheim warned that if Petrograd would be conquered without the Finns, the future relations with her eastern neighbor would be difficult to arrange. He was convinced that the Soviet government knew that the Finnish Army could decide the fate of Petrograd and that if Finland would leave the soviets to power they would not hesitate to use their power against them later. Absence of war with the Bolsheviks would be an illusion:

"...and peace with the Bolsheviks, which in the eyes of the world would assign us beside them, would give us nothing but deceiving security."

Mannerheim argued against mere material support for the White Russians saying it might weaken Finnish power and let the situation alter become to constitute a threat. He visioned and ended his appeal:

"Whereas we could with brisk action gain guarantees that our voice will be heard in future international settlements, we would raise our nation to a powerful and respected international position and acquire the compassion and gratitude of our times. World's sights are set towards us, and all Finland's friends ask anxiously are we going to prove ourselves worthy of our position as a free nation and are we going to contribute, according to our power, to the achievement of peace in Europe. It is being asked, will our nation, that year afterwards on the verge of defeat shouted for help, reject the request that has been issued to her. On these decision that now will be determined, will depend, whether contemporary world and posteriority can accuse our brave and chivalrous nation that it timidly withdrew from the achievement that the interests and care of mankind for its future success demand."³²³

³²³ "Herra Presidentti! Tällä hetkellä, jolloin Suomen kansa seisoo ratkaisujen edessä, jotka tulevat määräämään sen tulevaisuuden, pidän isänmaallisena velvollisuutena julkilausua asiointilan ja Pariisissa ja Lontoossa vallitsevan mielialan perusteellisen tutkimisen synnyttämän varman vakaumukseni. Tapausten kehitys on vielä kerran, kaikesta päättäen viimeisen, antanut kansallemme tilaisuuden, ottamalla osaa ratkaisevaan taisteluun julminta despotiaa vastaan, minkä maailma tuntee, suhteellisen vähillä uhreilla turvata vapautemme ja luoda nuorelle valtakunnallemme turvallisen ja onnellisen tulevaisuuden edellytykset sekä näyttää maailmalle, että Suomen oikeusvaltion rajaton suvereniteetti on yleinen eurooppalainen etu. Asiantuntevalla taholla ei kukaan epäile, että neuvostovallan häviö on nyt vain ajan kysymys. Euroopan mielipide on, että Pietarin kohtalo on Suomen kädessä ja kysymystä Pietarin valloittamisesta ei pidetä suomalais-venäläisenä kysymyksenä, vaan maailmankysymyksenä, lopullisen rauhan aikaansaamiseksi ja ihmisyyden palvelemiseksi." "...ja rauha bolsevikien kanssa taasen, joka maailman silmissä asettaisi meidät heidän rinnalleen, ei antaisi muuta kuin pettävän turvallisuuden." Sitä vastoin me reippaalla toiminnalla aikaansaisimme takeita siitä, että äänemme tulee kuulluksi tulevissa kansainvälisissä selvityksissä, kohottaisimme kansamme voimakkaaseen ja kunnioitettuun kansainväliseen asemaan ja hankkisimme itsellemme nykyajan myötätunnon ja kiitollisuuden. Maailman katseet ovat suunnatut meihin, ja kaikki Suomen ystävät kysyvät levottomina, osoitammeko itsemme asemamme arvoisiksi vapaana kansana ja myötävaikutammeko mekin, voimaimme mitan mukaan, rauhan aikaansaamiseksi Euroopassa. Kysytään, tuleeko kansamme, joka itse vuosi sitten häviön partaalla huusi apua, nyt torjumaan sen pyynnön, joka on sille tehty. Niistä päätöksistä, jotka nyt tehdään, tulee riippumaan, voivatko nykyisyys ja jälkimaailma

The overall reception of the appeal was reserved.³²⁴ Some sections of society agreed with Mannerheim's reasoning, with newspapers championing the National Coalition backing Mannerheim's letter and the mooted intervention to Petrograd.³²⁵ Most did not. The interventionist plans did not materialize, Mannerheim continued to keep his distance from Finnish politics and Churchill seemed to lose interest in Finland.³²⁶

On his continued travels abroad, Mannerheim kept close contact with the politically active anti-Bolshevik elite. Mannerheim's "enigmatic journey" as a private citizen to Warsaw to recover his belongings from his time as a commander in Poland and to socialize with the Polish aristocracy suited quite naturally for his interventionist political action.³²⁷ Mannerheim spent two weeks in Poland from late November to mid-December and met twice with Poland's independence hero Józef Piłsudski in Warsaw in late 1919, on December 4th and on December 12th. Mannerheim talked to the Field Marshal and to the Entente diplomats about the necessity of a Polish-Finnish offensive against the Bolsheviks, in effect offering Finnish help for the undertaking.³²⁸

Mannerheim shuttled between residencies in major European cities convinced of the possibilities of success for an international anti-Bolshevik coalition. In early December Mannerheim traveled to see Churchill. Both of them were open in their disregard of Allied current policies and push for military action.³²⁹ They met on December 12th, 1919 and discussed ambitious plans for military intervention and fervently talked people over for their cause. This was ultimately for nothing, since all of Mannerheim's actions were finally doomed to go unfulfilled when Yudenitch's forces were dismantled at the end of January 1920. Mannerheim's and Churchill's cooperation ended in mid-1920. By the time of the signing of the peace treaty in Tartu, Mannerheim was valued and defended in Finland as a symbol, not as a political actor.³³⁰

Mannerheim's primary motivation for the intervention grew from his anti-communism. Other reasons have been found in Mannerheim's persona, such as Mannerheim's hunger for a historical role and "strong ambition to appear as a victorious General, victor of Bolshevism, and savior of

syöttää urhoollista ja ritarillista kansaa siitä, että se arkamielisesti on vetäytynyt siitä teosta, jonka ihmiskunnan edut ja huolenpito sen omasta vastaisesta menestyksestä vaativat."

³²⁴ Polvinen 1971, 300.

³²⁵ Vares 1990, 47.

³²⁶ Ruotsila 2002, 15.

³²⁷ Hovi 1979.

³²⁸ Hovi 1979, 136-137, 142. Hovi writes: "Mannerheimin Varsovan-matka oli näet selkeä esimerkki sekä kansallisen että kansainvälisen intressin esiintymisestä kenraalin toiminnassa."

³²⁹ Ruotsila 2002, 16.

³³⁰ Vares 1990.

Russia.”³³¹ Mannerheim’s decision to finally abandon the interventionist project is seen to be based on his analysis on the political realities; interventionist foreign policy lacked popular support and was not executable.³³² Mannerheim was not in a position to convince the Finnish political leaders. It is argued that Mannerheim’s vision of the threat and his strategy in 1919 were for most Finnish politicians too abstract and for the Western great powers too peripheral.³³³ Britain’s wait for independent action and Finland’s (and other bordering states) wait for British or Entente guarantees made firm action impossible.³³⁴ However, as Mannerheim later in life reflected in his memoirs, his interests for the intervention were motivated by rather sentimental considerations. He saw Finland’s chivalrous assistance constituting a “favor” for Russia that would create a band of gratitude between the nations:

” To have taken part in an operation which, so far as Finland was concerned, would be limited to co-operation in the capture of Petrograd and securing a sufficiently large basic area for a stable and healthy government, would represent such a valuable service to reconstituted Russia as to provide in all probability the most enduring basis for future friendly relations. It would indeed be a generous gesture for a neighbor who had lived until quite recently under Russian oppression to repay this with chivalrous assistance”.³³⁵

Mannerheim labeled this difficult phase in Finnish history, when his interventionist vision went ultimately unfulfilled, as an era when “achievements are thwarted” (Saavutukset tehdään tyhjiksi).³³⁶ In October 1919, Mannerheim saw that it was only a matter of time until the Russian nation would break under the unrestrained terror and deceitful promises of the Bolsheviks. It would have been better to act when the opponent was weak and not later when the inevitable confrontation would be more devastating. Mannerheim was convinced that if the Bolshevik regime was not destroyed, it would become a threat to the whole world and especially to Finland – the unanswered threat would grow into a mortal danger. Later he would continue to express deep regret for the failure of the intervention. In addition to the reasons stated above that mainly arise from the international structure, there was a domestic Finnish political trend working against Mannerheim’s

³³¹ Polvinen 1971, 111, 150, 203; Ahti 1987, 305.

³³² Ahti 1987, 194; Rintala 1969, 42.

³³³ Heikka 2003 (b), 47.

³³⁴ Ruotsila 2002, 19.

³³⁵ Mannerheim 1951, 450-456. “Ottamalla osaa sotatoimiin, jotka Suomen kohdalta olisivat rajoittuneet Pietarin valloituksen avustamiseen ja niin suuren tukialueen turvaamiseen, että sen pohjalla olisi voitu muodostaa luja ja terveesti ajatteleva hallitus, olisi uudelleen syntyneelle Venäjälle tehty sellainen ‘palvelus’, että tulevat ystävälliset suhteet todennäköisesti olisivat siten saaneet mitä kestävimmän perustan. Jos naapuri, joka aivan äskeisiin aikoihin asti oli elänyt Venäjän siron alaisena, maksaisi tämän ritarillisella avunannolla, se olisi ylevä teko. (Kieltäytyminen sitä vastoin olisi helposti voinut saattaa sen valtakunnan johtajat, jonka rajanaapuri oli Suomen väistämättömänä kohtalona, omaksumaan suomalaisvastaisen asenteen.)” Another General to lament the loss of an historical moment was General von der Goltz; Germany had plans to conquer Petrograd in late August-September 1918, see Polvinen 1971, 51. See Vahtola’s article for von der Goltz’s interventionist thinking. Mannerheim, in his personal correspondence to his brother Johan on February 21st, 1918, responds to the rumors of a German offensive on Petrograd and signals his fears that “we won’t make it before them to Petrograd” and expressing explicitly the need to get there. See Mannerheim 1983, 175.

³³⁶ Mannerheim 1951.

interventionist policy. This political movement manifested itself in less dramatic form, in laws and institution building. We can study it through the thoughts and deeds of K. J. Ståhlberg.

3.2. Non-interventionist Foreign Policy – K. J. Ståhlberg

There was strong opposition to Finnish participation in the anti-communist actions envisioned by Churchill and Mannerheim. Those who saw the Finnish rebellion turned civil war as a national tragedy, which had its roots in domestic inequalities and political problems as much as in foreign agitation, favored a non-interventionist foreign policy. The central statesman in the non-interventionist movement was the first President of Finland, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg (28.1.1865 – 22.9.1952). During his school years in Oulu in Northern Finland, young Ståhlberg was nicknamed *The Politician*. The primus of his class, he was active in school, working for the student organization and writing frequently in its magazine. Ståhlberg felt special pride in his work as a librarian, maintaining and adding to the school library.³³⁷

Ståhlberg was born in Suomussalmi in 1865. His family was related to the national philosopher J.V. Snellman, and he inherited the Fennoman ideology from previous generations. Ståhlberg laid especially great importance on the use of Finnish language, which he did in the weekly discussion groups his student organization arranged on topics ranging from women's emancipation to questions of power in politics.³³⁸ Ståhlberg, in his articles, essays and poems, clothed his faith in democracy and the importance of the Finnish state in strong nationalistic romanticism. His stress on political prudence was already a recognizable trait and it would continue to feature later heavily in Ståhlberg's realism.³³⁹

Ståhlberg has been described as serious, sensitive and responsible, upright, balanced, and peaceful and calm – all of this “almost to the point of being irritating”. Both Ståhlberg's personality and his political positioning are described as “distanced” from all social groups.³⁴⁰ Ståhlberg has also been described as an “isolating President”.³⁴¹ As a politician he was a pragmatist who preferred practical work and avoided grand systemic thought.³⁴² Ståhlberg was regarded always to be modest yet sure of the justification of his opinions. His persona was of a stereotypic lawyer, preprogrammed for a life of calculated rationality rather than powerful emotional outbursts. Ståhlberg studied for a double degree at university and held different juridical posts as a civil servant before starting his long career as an academic and a politician – which culminated in him as

³³⁷ Liakka 1968. In his school time writings, Ståhlberg used the pseudonym Outo – Weird.

³³⁸ Liakka 1968, 14-22.

³³⁹ Blomstedt 1969, 23.

³⁴⁰ Borg 1968, 6.

³⁴¹ Pietiläinen 1992, 75.

³⁴² Nousiainen 1985, 59. ”Lähellä käytäntöjä viihtyvä, systeemejä karttava.”

the “scholar President”. He studied in Vienna and Berlin and was known as a lecturer to be a pedantic planner with a no-nonsense style of teaching.

After moving permanently to Helsinki and settling down with his new wife, Ståhlberg even had time to pursue interests other than law and to become a *devout Helsinkian*, to enjoy the vibrant conversations in *Kappeli* and to contribute to the city and its lively nights out. Ståhlberg, however, can be described as being withdrawn. This would later harm his political operation. As President, Ståhlberg did not undertake a single foreign trip. How much this is due to his lack of knowledge of languages is unknown; Ståhlberg did not speak English. Ståhlberg also had serious problems with his public appearances. His stuttering made public presentations challenging.³⁴³

Ståhlberg studied widely on issues relating to voting, women’s rights and worker’s conditions and ultimately distinguished himself as a social reformer. After his graduation, Ståhlberg had traveled on foot across Finland from Helsinki to Oulu gaining invaluable knowledge of the problems of the Finnish working class. Ståhlberg was a convinced liberal, he believed in constitutionalism and democracy. Ståhlberg’s political thinking was developed in the language and the conscription debate. In the latter, Ståhlberg was one of the civil servants dismissed from his post for opposing the new law. Ståhlberg is said to have admired few political leaders: Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill.³⁴⁴ To later generations he is known mainly as “the father of the constitution and of parliamentarism” as well as for his efforts at unifying the population after the civil war. He was early in advocating universal and equal suffrage and the emancipation of women to become active members of Finnish society. Finnish women, after all, got their right to vote first in Europe in one of the more radical parliamentary reforms in 1906.

By the time of the March Revolution of 1917, Ståhlberg already was a significant politician directing the work of the constitutional committee that was to formulate a proposal for a new form of government and to define Finland’s relations with Russia. The strengthening of the Bolsheviks and their ideas of national self-determination caused confusion as to who exercised the supreme authority in the Grand Duchy. The Power law that transferred the power from Petrograd to Helsinki and from the Senate to the Eduskunta resulted in a conflict with Russia – it was not sent to the provisional government for approval. A manifesto claimed during the Kornilov uprising in September, fixed cosmetically some of the issues and Finland was governed on the basis of these

³⁴³ Virkkunen 1978, 24.

³⁴⁴ Virkkunen 1978, 167.

temporary arrangements until 1919.³⁴⁵ By the time the Ståhlberg-led committee sent its compromise proposal, which was done in cooperation with Russian lawyers, the provisional government was overthrown in the October Revolution setting the stage for later dramatic events. Prior to the civil war, Ståhlberg was until the very last minute on a conciliatory course.³⁴⁶ Ståhlberg had opposed the declaration of independence at first because of the existing severe split in domestic politics and because of the low chance of success in such a risky venture. In Ståhlberg's reasoning, everything already gained should not be made vulnerable by setting all bets on violence.

The most important issue in early 20th century independent Finland was the constitutional debate. The battle lasted for 16 months until July 1919. The monarchists had European examples abound: Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the great powers Germany and the United Kingdom. Republics at this point were exceptions; the United States was far away. Eduskunta ill-fatedly elected the German prince Friedrich Karl as the king of Finland on the day Germany approached the Allies for an Armistice on October 9th, 1918. The German defeat in the Great War undermined the pro-German orientation of Finnish policy.³⁴⁷ The monarchist idea was therefore doomed. Ståhlberg was the natural leader of the republicans. Ståhlberg had multiple reasons for opposing monarchism, several of them related to issues of foreign policy.³⁴⁸ Ståhlberg opposed monarchy obviously for democratic and domestic reasons arguing it to be unnatural for the Finns. However, that he did also and more importantly so because of reasons related to foreign policy has not been very well examined. Ståhlberg argued that a monarch:

“...would, by his family connections, support Finland's international position, even if experience has taught us that family ties do not last if the interests of the nations collide. Political interests make nations ally and stay in alliances, regardless of the family ties of the leaders.”³⁴⁹

Ståhlberg, quite tellingly feared that monarchy could lead to foreign policy adventurism. Ståhlberg's views on interventionist foreign policy must be studied in this context.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁵ Polvinen 1967, 104.

³⁴⁶ Pietiläinen 1992, 44. See Blomstedt 1969, 340, 344 for Ståhlberg's conciliatory politics.

³⁴⁷ Jussila & Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 124-125. The pro-German monarchist orientation was supported by the Activists and was based ultimately on the German troops in Finland under General von der Goltz.

³⁴⁸ For Ståhlberg's thoughts on monarchism, see Blomstedt 1969, 353, 355.

³⁴⁹ K. J. Ståhlberg, ”*Hallitusmuoto II*,” 12.6.1918, ”Hän tukisi sukulaissuhteillaan Suomen kansainvälistä asemaa, vaikka kokemus on osoittanut, etteivät sukulaissuhteet kestä enemmän kuin korsi, jos kansojen edut käyvät vastakkain, ja että asialliset edut saattavat kansat liittoutumaan ja pysymään liittosuhteissa aivan hallitsijain sukulaissuhteista riippumatta.”

³⁵⁰ For discussion about monarchists basing their decision on foreign policy considerations and the links between monarchism, pro-German orientation and territorial expansion and interest in East Karelia, see Polvinen 1967, 29-40; Blomstedt 1969, 359, 362, 365; Jutikkala & Pirinen 1979, 222, 226.

3.2.1. "Critical is the Position of Our State."

The most opportune moment to realize the interventionist plans was before the ratification of the new constitution in the summer of 1919. Therefore the most important battles for non-interventionist foreign policy were fought in the form of the constitution-debate in favor of the republic. The presidential election in July was then a clear turning point. As the first President, Ståhlberg played an important role in applying presidential power to facilitate establishment of the new political institution. It is characteristic of Ståhlberg's foreign policy that he conducted his politics in the form of institution building (constitution), with reference to law (presidency); Ståhlberg's foreign policy thinking is hidden in the undramatic forms of parliamentary politics and has to be found.

On July 26th, 1919 after taking care of formalities and accepting the presidency, Ståhlberg started his inauguration speech to the Eduskunta with a powerful warning:

"Critical is the position of our state. In need of defense and stabilization is her external security as well as domestic circumstances."

Ståhlberg reflected on the difficult domestic and foreign policy situations, and the still open wounds of the civil war. He continued:

"Our recently confirmed constitution has created a strong base for Finland's existence and completely unique national and social life that have risen to independence through world historical events and famous deeds of Finnish citizens. As vital condition for these however are that all attacks on the external security and domestic legal order and legitimate state authority are averted and that the means necessary to do that will be taken care of. But at the same time it is demanded that people occupying public positions do their function so, that every citizen feels she is enjoying legal protection and that state measures, in cooperation with Eduskunta and the government are building national and social unity that brings with it outward strength too."³⁵¹

Ståhlberg's message was intended for the domestic audience: the Activists and the interventionists, the whole of the population was to unite and build a strong Finnish republic. The nation needed strengthening in order to safeguard its existence in the face of external threats. More importantly, to

³⁵¹ Inauguration speech *Eduskunnalle* on July 26th, 1919. "Vaaranalainen on maamme asema. Puolustusta ja vakaannuttamista kaipaavat sekä sen ulkonainen turvallisuus että sisäiset olot. Äskettäin vahvistetulla hallitusmuodolla on luotu luja pohja maailmanhistoriallisten tapausten ja Suomen kansalaisten mainehikasten töiden kautta itsenäiseksi kohonneen Suomen olemassaololle sekä täysin omintakeiselle valtiolliselle ja yhteiskunnalliselle elämälle. Elinehtona näille kuitenkin on, että kaikki hyökkäykset maan ulkonaista turvallisuutta sekä sisäistä oikeusjärjestystä ja laillista valtiovaltaa vastaan torjutaan ja että sitä varten tarpeellisista keinoista huolta pidetään. Mutta samalla on vaadittava, että julkisissa toimissa olevat tekevät tehtävänsä niin, että jokainen kansalainen tuntee nauttivansa laillista oikeusturvaa, ja valtion toimenpiteillä Eduskunnan ja Hallituksen yhteistoimin sekä vapaalla kansalaistoiminnalla on rakennettava valtiollista ja yhteiskunnallista eheyttä, joka tuo lujuuutta myöskin ulospäin." Ståhlberg's style is difficult; much of it is written in the passive form (as if it is not a person but an institution that is speaking) and cannot be smoothly translated sentence to sentence.

be able to defend itself from external challenges and from more powerful states, Finland needed to demonstrate it was capable of effectively, and in a civilized manner, managing her own affairs. The new President was not for the first time expressing this message. At the end of the civil war, when battles were still raging, Ståhlberg published his most influential and well-known articles, titled *The Bases for the Future*, in *Helsingin Sanomat*. The two articles were in print on April 16th and on April 18th, 1918.

In his articles, Ståhlberg asserted that the revolution against the Finnish social order, against the Parliament and the government that was started by the leadership of the Socialist party and aided and encouraged by the Russian anarchists, had led to the bloody civil war. After the destruction and devastation brought on by the illegal violence – worse than it ever had been under foreign rule – it was necessary to start again the societal life to defend Finland's position as a constitutional state (*oikeusvaltio*) and civilized nation (*sivistyskanssa*).³⁵² Ståhlberg wrote in opposition to the monarchist form of government, arguing that it was reactionary and without natural roots. Universal suffrage and the republican form of government which already existed had to be confirmed and developed, even if the revolution might be perceived by some to be the outgrowth of such reforms. Ståhlberg argued against this view and said the illegal gamble (*rikollinen uhkapeli*) to opt for extra parliamentary means had indeed completely undermined the legitimacy of the socialist attempt.

There were lots of badly needed reforms that demanded undivided attention: the national economy needed to be actuated, the freedom of religion-, of trial and liberty of the press established, and new taxation laws codified. Laws for associations and internal order needed to be arranged and the Army created. The Foreign Ministry needed to be started up and organized. Ståhlberg laid the foundations from which future development, internal and external, should accrue. Ståhlberg perceived it essential that the experienced violent upheavals should not be answered by other violent extreme overthrows or by countering, reactionary measures. Continuity based on historical development was essential:

“A new revolution to the opposite direction would then set aside what has been built and there would be the danger that on that road we could not resist falling under guardianship and rule of any nation that can create and sustain permanent state institutions, rule of law and legal societal life; that independent Finland would for who knows how long a time become just a temporary dream.”³⁵³

³⁵² During the civil war Ståhlberg bravely resisted the demands to give over the Bank of Finland to the Bolsheviks. Even when threatened with violence and personal injury Ståhlberg was determined not to support any illegal efforts. See Paasivirta 1957, 72.

³⁵³ Ståhlberg article *Tulevaisuuden lähtökohdat* was in print in *Helsingin Sanomat* on April 16th and on April 18th, 1918. The manuscripts for the articles were ready before Helsinki was liberated, on April 6th, 1918. “Uusi kumous vastakkaiseen suuntaan pyrkisi sitten taas syrjäyttämään, mitä sitten olisi rakennettu, ja se vaara olisi tarjona, että sitä

After the civil war, Ståhlberg continued his work as a member of the parliament. His speech *Hallitusmuoto II* on June 12th, 1918 was Ståhlberg's strongest stand in defense of his preferred form of the constitution. In the realm of foreign policy, Ståhlberg lays out this doctrine:

“And with this I do not mean as much the danger that the novelty and perhaps the inexperience in the matters that now present themselves to the Finns in the realm of foreign policy would lead one to turn away from domestic concerns and on its expense towards grand foreign policy ideas. Now that Finland has internationally stepped into the group of independent nations it naturally has to cope as well as possible with the difficulties it confronts but such as our nation, has to, I believe, find her essential functions in the fields of internal, cultural, societal and economic development. What I mean is that our nation for both internal and external tasks has to rely on herself, to exercise and develop her internal strengths, and not to rely predominantly on external help.”³⁵⁴

Ståhlberg warned that monarchism might endanger Finnish independence, and he strongly advised against believing in a magic trick that could defeat all problems, especially the ones raised by the external environment. Ståhlberg had four main points in his defense of republicanism: Finland was already a republic; the majority of the population favored a republic; a republic would have more national value and it would help Finland elude falling into a *de facto* vassal state status under Germany or into dependency on any foreign government.³⁵⁵ Ståhlberg realistically valued Germany's aims and advanced caution: Finnish independence and her wishes for territorial expansion in East Karelia or East Karelia's national autonomy were not high on the German agenda, even if Finnish politicians liked to believe so.³⁵⁶

To Ståhlberg Finland had been a republic since the unanimous parliamentary decision taken on December 6th, 1917. It was only natural that Ståhlberg then stayed clear of and formed an

tietä emme voisi olla joutumatta jonkun sellaisen kansan holhouksen ja kurinpidon alaiseksi, joka kykenee luomaan ja voimassa pitämään pysyvää valtiolaitosta ja oikeusjärjestystä sekä lainalaista yhteiskuntaelämää, että itsenäinen Suomi, kenties kuinka pitkiksi ajoiksi tulisi olleeksi vain ohimenevä unelma.”

³⁵⁴ Ståhlberg's speech *Hallitusmuoto II* delivered on June 12th, 1918. Ståhlberg had given these views also prior to the socialist revolt, see *Hallitusmuoto I* delivered on December 6th, 1917. Here Ståhlberg mostly refutes the “anarchist views” of Otto-Ville Kuusinen and defends strong executive powers and highlights the democratic nature of the constitution. See Räsänen 1998, 263-272 for a comparative study of the different views on executive power of the republicans and monarchists. ”Tällä en tarkoita niinkään paljon sitä vaaraa, että uutuuden viehäytys ja ehkä kokemattomuuskin niissä tehtävissä, joita suomalaisille nyt avautuu ulkopoliittikan alalla, saattaisi liian paljon kääntymään pois sisäisten olojen huolenpidosta ja sen kustannuksellakin suurisuuntaisiin ulkopoliittisiin tuumiin. Kun Suomen kansa on kansainvälisestikin astunut itsenäisten kansakuntien joukkoon, on sen luonnollisesti koetettava myöskin siinä eteen tulevista vaikeuksista selviytyä mahdollisimman hyvin, mutta sen kokoisena ja sellaisena kansana, kuin meidän kansamme on, on luullakseni etsittävä varsinaiset tehtävänsä sisäiseen, sivistykselliseen, yhteiskunnalliseen ja taloudelliseen kehityksen alalla. Tarkoitin enemmänkin sitä, että kansamme sekä sisällisiä että ulkonaisia tehtäviä varten on nojaututtava etupäässä omaan itseensä. omien sisäisten voimiensa hyväksi käyttämiseen ja kehittämiseen eikä etupäässä ulkonaisiin apuvoimiin.”

³⁵⁵ Blomstedt 1969, 361.

³⁵⁶ See Vahtola 1989, for Germany's interests and policies vis-a-vis Finland. Germany's foreign policy was divided between interventionists and those preferring status quo.

opposition to the Senate's German orientation. He favored non-alignment through summer 1918.³⁵⁷ The form of the constitutional debate had therefore started in earnest even before the war was concluded. Ståhlberg was the leading figure for the republicans even if he was to give up active politicking to profess his skills in law. Ståhlberg was appointed the first President of The Supreme Administrative Court on July 22nd, 1918. Seemingly from the sidelines Ståhlberg had to witness to the demise of his policy. The struggle for the republican constitution was a defensive battle. On July 14th, 1918 votes were divided fifty seven to fifty two, barely a month later on August 7th, 1919 seventy five to thirty two. Eduskunta then decided to ask the Senate to facilitate the election of a King, which was held on August 8th, 1918 and on October 4th, 1918. International politics then intervened – the German defeat in the Great War forced Finns to abandon the idea of the Kingdom of Finland. On December 12th the prospective King was informed to give up his crown. Friedrich Karl renounced his nomination and gave up his novel kingdom on December 14th, 1918. Two days later General von der Goltz left Helsinki. Finland was in a state of confusion and needed re-orientation. Mannerheim was elected as the Regent.

In the March 1919 parliamentary elections the republicans had won a majority. In April Mannerheim, whose interventionism was starting to reach its peak before the summer, asked Ståhlberg to lead the new government. At a dinner arranged by Mannerheim, he asked Ståhlberg to become the Prime Minister stating the obvious:

“It is your thought which has prevailed and which must now be acted upon. This thought whose soul you have been...”³⁵⁸

Ståhlberg declined.³⁵⁹ The constitution debate was slowly but surely, now that Germany's monarchy was weak, turning towards republican success. The first statesman for Finland had to be chosen and the first landmark to guide future policies needed to be set. This happened in the first presidential election of 1919. Ståhlberg was, similarly to being reserved about becoming the Prime Minister, also reluctant to enter the presidential election. He was unsure if he was the uniting figure that was so desperately needed and still in mid-June favoured Mannerheim for the post.³⁶⁰ Mannerheim ratified the republican form of the government on July 17th, 1919 and laid the road for the first presidential election.

³⁵⁷ Blomstedt 1969, 358, 360.

³⁵⁸ ”Sehän on teidän aatteenne, joka nyt on voittanut, joka on toteutettava, jonka sieluna te olette olleet.” Quoted in Virkkunen 1978, 9.

³⁵⁹ Blomstedt 1969, 373. Ståhlberg declined on April 7th, 1919.

³⁶⁰ Pietiläinen 1992, 14. See Blomstedt 1969, 370, 378 for further elaboration on the candidates.

As the first elected President (25.7.1919 – 1.3.1925) the fifty three year old Ståhlberg gave the Finnish presidential institution its real substance.³⁶¹ He had won the election with a sizable margin and his institutional position was therefore legitimate. His persona on the other hand aroused dissatisfaction. After his election, Ståhlberg got extremely bad press, especially from the Swedish language newspapers and from the Activist circles. His widely-used pejorative nickname was *Plootuvuori*. Threats against his life were commonplace. To add to these miseries even the presidential aide-de-camps refused to continue serving under Ståhlberg.³⁶²

From these difficult settings and from a weak political status as a member of the small Liberal Party, Ståhlberg chose to accomplish the presidential institution with a style suiting his political philosophy. He withdrew to majestic isolation trusting the inherited leadership-authority and his formal position.³⁶³ Slowly, little by little he legitimized his personal leadership with his scarce yet purposeful actions.³⁶⁴ During Ståhlberg's presidency political activity in Finland started finding the regular channels of European multi-party parliamentarism. The president-led system created a working balance between the presidential and the parliamentary focus of authority. The President acted mainly as a leveller and a conflict-solver, not as a leader in the political arena. Presidential powers, including his leading role in foreign policy, were perceived as through a parliamentary filter.³⁶⁵ Ståhlberg's presidential politics was intensive, his range of action selective and his position of action independent.³⁶⁶ With his respectful attitude towards the Parliament, more than showing how far presidential power reached, Ståhlberg showed where it should not try to reach. At the end of his presidential term in 1925 Ståhlberg would have probably been re-elected unanimously. He opted not to re-run and to oversee democratic change and continuity the elections offered.

Ståhlberg had his statesman vision and his presidency was based on national objectives that aimed on one hand at stabilizing the republican constitution and on the other at uniting the nation and curing the still open wounds of the civil war.³⁶⁷ After winning the presidency Ståhlberg took a conciliatory approach towards Mannerheim. After Mannerheim turned down Ståhlberg's offer for the commander-in-chief position, the relations of the two broke down. Ståhlberg did not think of

³⁶¹ See Puntila 1971, 123.

³⁶² Blomstedt 1969, 388-389.

³⁶³ Nousiainen 1985.

³⁶⁴ Nousiainen 1985, 75. For a thorough analysis of Ståhlberg's presidency see pp. 73-95. Nousiainen does not mention the possible intervention even once.

³⁶⁵ Leutonen 2002; Nousiainen 2006. There has been established a code of conduct under which the president has after the election broken away from everyday party politics and taken on a role of neutral head of state, emphasizing the unity of the people. The system was strong enough to struggle through the difficult decade following independence. The record of the 1920s: 13 governments and nine different prime ministers.

³⁶⁶ Nousiainen 1985, 272.

³⁶⁷ Nousiainen 1985, 79-80.

Mannerheim as a loyal democrat.³⁶⁸ Their relations were reduced to dinner invitations, the majority of which Mannerheim politely refused.³⁶⁹

After the election the Bolsheviks approached Finland with a peace proposal on September 11th, 1919. Alignment with the Entente meant that French and British views weighed heavily. France opposed peace while Britain continued her own line of politics with only ambiguous advice to offer. Finns opted for wait-and-see tactics, opposed separate peace treaties and held as minimum requirements national autonomy for Viena, Olonets and Ingria. This decision was influenced by belief in the still struggling White movement.³⁷⁰

In the negotiations with the government on October 7th, 1919 a decision was made that Finland would not participate in the offensive on Petrograd on its own initiative. It was also predetermined that if a request of this sort were to be presented, the matter would be given further consideration.³⁷¹ In these discussions with his closest political and military counsellors, the East Karelia matter was concluded not to be solvable by military means. This was mainly because of the promise made to the Allied and Associated Powers at the peace conference that territorial matters would not be solved with violence and because of the lack of military and financial resources to wage war. East Karelia was left on its own until diplomatic efforts in the future.³⁷²

Ståhlberg's stance in relation to the intervention – now at its international peak – was cautious. He worked long hours and pondered all the different aspects of the matter. Overall, Finnish foreign policy was subtly aligned with the Allied, especially British, foreign policies that were, by this time diluted regarding the intervention. Ståhlberg thought that Finland should stay on the defensive without definitive guarantees from the Entente.³⁷³ The main elements against brisk interventionist action were therefore already decided upon before Mannerheim's famous letter on 28th October, 1919. Ståhlberg received a telegram from Paris to his office on the morning of the 28th. His immediate reaction was to cry out: "Damn!"³⁷⁴ After reading Mannerheim's letter highlighting Finland's potential for decisive influence on the intervention and in deciding the faith of Petrograd

³⁶⁸ Pietiläinen 1992, 65.

³⁶⁹ Virkkunen 1978, 58.

³⁷⁰ Polvinen 1971, 266-267, 272.

³⁷¹ Blomstedt 1969, 398. Additionally, the troops in Repola and Porajärvi were instructed not to fight the White Russians and the citizens were instructed to observe passive resistance.

³⁷² Blomstedt 1969, 399.

³⁷³ Blomstedt 1969, 396. For Ståhlberg's reasoning on the Entente guarantees, see p. 399.

³⁷⁴ Virkkunen 1978, 37. "Hitto." Damn was the strongest word Ståhlberg ever used. He was not known, contrary to some later Presidents, for swearing.

Ståhlberg called for his Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti for negotiations.³⁷⁵ The letter was published in Helsinki newspapers on 2nd November, 1919 – Ståhlberg had a few days to contemplate his public reaction.

During Yudenitch's offensive and the few days Ståhlberg had time to ponder on his public response, the White movement and Entente powers, especially France, tried to persuade Finland to participate in the intervention. Topping their list of people to be convinced was the President. Sick and bed-ridden, Ståhlberg met with the interventionists on October 30th, 1919. He stressed Eduskunta's anti-interventionist atmosphere and mood as an essential obstacle and gave no promises. The negative stance of the government was ratified on October 31st, 1919 and was pronounced to the North-Western government with notes on 1st and on 5th November, 1919.³⁷⁶

The decision to officially adopt an anti-interventionist policy was therefore submitted to the North-Western government with the first note prior to the general publication of Mannerheim's appeal. Ståhlberg's public response was designed to ignore the letter and stifle the discussion.³⁷⁷ This adopted policy came to embody the distanced, passive and ultimately British-sympathising foreign policy orientation Ståhlberg had chosen to follow since he was elected President and the leader of Finnish foreign policy. This can be seen as a natural continuation of the "non-aligned policy" advocated by the Ståhlberg-group, including liberals and the so-called Helsingin Sanomat-group, since independence. Ståhlberg embodied the politics of peace in the era of war.³⁷⁸ During the Great War years their view had been informed by power political reasons: they were certain that the Allies recently strengthened with the power of the United States would emerge victorious. More importantly it was informed by ideological reasons: they were drawn by the Anglo-Saxon political ideals such as democracy and parliamentarism. For these realist liberals non-alignment did not mean it in any strict neutrality meaning sense – it meant staying away from the pro-German stance

³⁷⁵ Rudolf Holsti (1881–1945) was Ståhlberg's confidant, party member and entrusted Foreign Minister from April 1919 until May 1922. After Holsti's resignation, President Ståhlberg is said to have sighed: "Thank God Holsti took care of the foreign affairs for almost four years." Holsti was also a student of IR and had published 3 books before his turning from theory to practice. Holsti's role in the first years of Finnish republic is studied by his son, see K. Holsti 1963.

³⁷⁶ Polvinen 1971, 299-300.

³⁷⁷ Ståhlberg's reaction to Mannerheim's letter is not well researched or documented. All the available sources however point to the direction that the issue was deliberately silenced to death. I have chosen to support this interpretation too.

³⁷⁸ I believe Ståhlberg and his faction to have evaluated policies with abstract concepts such as peace. In personal correspondence between Aino Malmberg and Ståhlberg dated on July 26th, 1919 Malmberg describes General Gough as "unusually liberal and intelligent man – and a man of peace". See National Archive VA Y 3908. Malmberg (1866 – 1933) was a Finnish patriot and feminist; graduated from the University of Helsinki in the first class to include women students. She was exiled by Russia in 1910 and returned to Finland after independence in 1917. Even though abstract distinction between war and peace is a simple explanation, I value it to be very powerful too.

and eluding Finland's slide into a de facto vassal state of the Central Powers. The real long-term aim was to tie up relations with the liberal West.³⁷⁹

When finally released for general publication Mannerheim's letter was unable to alter the general atmosphere and did not change the course the republic's policy on foreign and security matters was heading in. The public effect of the letter was minor.³⁸⁰ The letter only further separated the two statesmen.³⁸¹

After learning about the Finnish decision, the Estonian government decided to retain the troops of the retreating Yudenitch.³⁸² The victory of the non-interventionists led to negotiations with the Bolsheviks on the future peace treaty. The overall international balance of power was changing. The Bolsheviks were stronger than before and the Allied and Associated Powers increasingly undetermined in their intervention. The change in the geopolitical situation was leaving Finland alone in a state of hostility. Estonia started building peace in December 1919 with Latvia and Lithuania following suite. In early 1920 Finland was becoming increasingly isolated.

Ståhlberg had favoured peace with Soviet Russia, opposite to the general view, already in April 1918.³⁸³ Now he tried to foster as broad a cabinet as possible – he perceived it as strength in the forthcoming peace negotiations. By the end of March, the Soviets proposed an armistice, which on April 7th, 1920 the Finnish government approved. Negotiations for an armistice started at Rajajoki on April 12th, 1920, peace negotiations in Tartu on June 10th, 1920. The final peace treaty was signed on October 14th, 1920. Eduskunta ratified the treaty on December 1st, 1920 by one hundred and sixty three votes to twenty seven.

³⁷⁹ Paasivirta 1957, 38-42.

³⁸⁰ Blomstedt 1969, 400.

³⁸¹ Luoto 1983, 269.

³⁸² Blomstedt 1969, 400.

³⁸³ Blomstedt 1969, 356.

3.3. Conclusion: the Mannerheim-group versus the Realist-group in Finnish Foreign Policy 1918 – 1920

The presidential election of 1919 was the clearest demonstration of the opposing political views of the two groups I have presented. For the Finnish nation it was a question of:

“Mannerheim or Ståhlberg – idealism or pragmatism...”³⁸⁴

The idealism that Mannerheim advocated in his large policy, would have granted Finland a chip in the high-stake power poker of world politics. Ståhlbergian pragmatic realism rejected this and offered Finland a chance to demonstrate the viability of her claims to sovereignty – to manifest her will to decide upon her own matters. Ståhlberg’s success facilitated Finland’s on-going process of consolidating her national sovereignty. The year 1919 was a clear orientational turning point attaching loyalty to the Finnish constitution instead of any foreign power pole.³⁸⁵ This also started a strong developmental phase in the so far largely improvised Foreign Ministry.³⁸⁶ Even if the Finnish way was set, the competition of perceptions manifested in the presidential bid however continued to be reflected in the Foreign Ministry and the Civil Guards.³⁸⁷ Rather surprisingly, if we analyze the foreign policy decisions with Herz’s ideal types-dichotomy, we find Ståhlberg as the realist and Mannerheim as the idealist.

Figure 3. Ideal Types of Political Thought in Finnish Foreign Policy 1918 – 1920

Political realism

Political idealism

| | |
|-----------------|---------------------|
| K. J. Ståhlberg | C. G. E. Mannerheim |
|-----------------|---------------------|

Mannerheim’s idealism manifested itself in the attempt to promote an ideology by force, to use the Finnish state in the Allied anti-communist crusade. Mannerheim was motivated by an ideologically suitable Russia.³⁸⁸ The tool for this policy was war. Ståhlberg’s “small steps-politics” grouped him

³⁸⁴ Vares 1990, 39 (Chapter 4.2 Mannerheim vai Ståhlberg – idealismin vai pragmatismien tie?). For a description of Mannerheim as Ståhlberg’s “antagonist”, see Nousiainen 1985, 83; Blomstedt 1969, pics.

³⁸⁵ Pitkänen 1996, 24-31

³⁸⁶ One example of this was the establishment of the Washington embassy in the spring of 1919.

³⁸⁷ “Jako ’mannerheimiläisiin’ ja ’ståhlbergiläisiin’ säilyi ulkoasiainhallinnossa ja jopa terävöityi uuden presidentin aikana.” See Paasivirta 1968, 34-89, 148; Mansala & Suomi (ed.) 2003, 34. “Presidentinvaalin jälkeen näyttääkin monessa suojeluskuntapiirissä tapahtuneen kahtiajako mannerheimiläisiin ja ståhlbergiläisiin suojeluskuntalaisiin.” See Ahti 1987, 212; Punttila 1971, 135-136.

³⁸⁸ Labeling Mannerheim as an idealist is highly problematic. Mannerheim’s thinking of international politics was much more comprehensive. My labeling (apart the fact that it is essential for my realist liberal narrative) becomes more understandable when I present my ståhlbergian reading of realism as opposing grand foreign policy goals that are viewed to arise from idealism and ideologies. This theme, the contrast between ideological and realist objectives, is studied by Jansson 1963, 1-4 and See Seppälä 1986, 12-20.

as a moderate realist.³⁸⁹ He was above all considerate of the Finnish national interest.³⁹⁰ Ståhlberg perceived the best tool to promote Finnish development to be peace.

After the civil war the calming and normalization of the situation lessened the need for Mannerheim. His right wing values and politics, especially his interventionist plans had little real support. Mannerheim's political worldview was to the democracy- and class aware times too adverse and too conservative. Mannerheim's role therefore changed rapidly and in the end he was more readily adopted as a symbol, not as much as an actor.³⁹¹ The time for strong responses was over, and the nation was in a desperate need for unity and peace. Mannerheim, the Finnish icon was relieved of his active politicking:

“Mannerheim really was on top of the nation's cupboard, in a political glass cabinet, which said: ‘During revolutions, break the glass.’³⁹²

The main reasons for the Finnish non-interventionist foreign policy during 1918 – 1920 – to surpass the policy advocating the conquest of Petrograd – were of international-polical character. Britain was more inclined to ensure the independence of the new states on the Russian border and not risk them with uncertain military adventures. They were also wary of the White Russians, they were certain that if Yudenitch were to be successful, he would turn his troops against independent Finland.³⁹³ The White Generals nationality-policies were based on outdated imperial views that wished to freeze the situation to the status quo of 1914. All minority matters were claimed as Russia's internal matters and to be decided later. Mostly the Generals were considerate of the strategic aspects of Petrograd's security.

It is interesting to note that Mannerheim's thinking regarding the intervention was almost opposite to his thinking about international politics in general. Mannerheim was a strong believer in self-help, had a pessimistic view of the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement, yet still was convinced of the intervention. Mannerheim's trust in self-help comes manifest in his demands that no great power intervention, be it by Sweden or Germany, would be allowed to the Finnish civil war. He was convinced that:

³⁸⁹ Pietiläinen 1992, 40.

³⁹⁰ Penttilä 2006, 138. Penttilä writes: “Mannerheimin suunnitelma kilpistyi viime kädessä suomalaiseen realismiin: maan poliittinen johto ei ollut valmis lähtemään ristiretkelle ‘sivistyneen maailman puolustamiseksi’ – heille riitti Suomen intressien varjelu.”

³⁹¹ Vares 1990, 59-60.

³⁹² Vares 1990, 62 ” “Mannerheim oli todella kansakunnan kaapin päällä – poliittisessa vitriinissä, jossa oli korkeintaan teksti: “Vallankumousuhan sattuessa riko lasi.”

³⁹³ Polvinen 1971, 183 One man promoting this kind of political stance was E. H. Carr, then working for the Russian department of the Foreign Office.

“...nation’s freedom, if it is to become permanent, must be bought with her own efforts, with her own ordeals and with the blood of her own sons.”³⁹⁴

Indeed, Mannerheim’s testament is seen to be the realist maxim of self-help.³⁹⁵ In his order of the day in the victory parade on April 16th, 1918 Mannerheim stated it again if possible with even more intensity:

”New times with new responsibilities. And still, like before, will big questions be resolved with iron and blood. To protect our freedom must our army always stand ready. Fortresses, cannons and foreign aid will not help, unless every man knows for himself, that he is the one standing as the guardian of his nation.”³⁹⁶

Mannerheim was stunned when he on March 3rd, 1918 received news about the German intervention in the Finnish civil war and he promptly announced he would resign.³⁹⁷ He had not known that Berlin had indeed been contacted but that they had rejected the pleas because of the ongoing Brest-Litovsk negotiations. Mannerheim had accepted the commission on the explicit condition that foreign troops would not be called upon to help.³⁹⁸ Also it is interesting to note that Mannerheim’s views about the independent White Russian movement were pessimistic. He disappointedly laments the defeatist spirit, passivity and the lack of courage. His strong support for the intervention can only partly be explained by his view of the support for the “numerically insignificant Bolshevik movement as weak”.³⁹⁹ Mannerheim perceived the White Generals and General Denikin in particular to be arrogant and ignorant of facts.⁴⁰⁰ Mannerheim was equally unimpressed with General Yudenich and his army.⁴⁰¹ He was convinced, according to his memoirs, already by the end of December 1917 that “there was no signs of [endogenous] resistance“ and that the Soviet power would before long become established and develop into a mortal threat also for the

³⁹⁴ Mannerheim 1951, 253 ”...kansan vapaus, jos sen mieli tulla pysyväiseksi, oli ostettava sen omilla ponnistuksilla, sen omilla koettelemuksilla ja sen omien poikien verellä.”

³⁹⁵ Pohjanpää 1987, 62-63

³⁹⁶ G Mannerheim 1951, 346, 350. ”Uusi aika uusine velvollisuuksineen. Ja kuitenkin ratkaistaan nyt kuten ennenkin suuret kysymykset raudalla ja verellä. Suojellakseen vapauttamme täytyy armeijamme seistä valmiina. Linnoitukset, tykit ja vieras apu eivät auta, ellei joka mies itse tiedä, että juuri hän seisoo maansa vartijana.” Mannerheim comments his order of the day in his memoirs and writes: ”Vain sellainen kansa, joka pystyi itse itseään auttamaan, saattoi turvallisesti katsoa tulevaisuuteen, ja Suomen tulevaisuus itsenäisen valtiona oli sen armeijan varassa.”

³⁹⁷ Mannerheim 1951, 297-298. The search for a new Commander-in-Chief was actually started before agreement was reached. Mannerheim was worried that the world would see Finnish independence credited to German forces and thus undermine the credibility and self-confidence of Finnish sovereignty. This had naturally implications to military affairs too; Mannerheim was convinced a decisive victory should be gained before the Germans arrived. German military assistance came in early April when a force of 11 000 men, led by General von der Goltz shortening the length of the conflict. For discussion of Germany’s motives and them “inviting themselves”, see Polvinen 1967, 255. It is interesting to note that Mannerheim rewrote a chapter on Finland in Winston Churchill’s book on the Great War.

³⁹⁸ Jutikkala & Pirinen 1979, 219.

³⁹⁹ Mannerheim also writes about the arrogance and ignorance of facts of Russian in general and General Denikin in particular, see Mannerheim 1951, 201. Mannerheim was equally unimpressed by General Yudenich and his army, see 424-426.

⁴⁰⁰ Mannerheim 1951, 201.

⁴⁰¹ Mannerheim 1951, 424-426.

young Finnish state.⁴⁰² Mannerheim, after losing the presidential election, remained in the political margins until the threat he had so clearly foreseen actualized. Then, it was his leadership combined with the unity of the Finnish people, made possible by Ståhlberg's policies that made the total of 20th century Finnish strategic experience not a tragedy, but a success.

Indeed, Finland's democracy, which was based on Ståhlberg's institution-building and unifying policies (*eheyttämispolitiikka*) made her a bright exception in the 1930s when Right-wing radicalism was gaining momentum all over Europe. In Finland's strategic vicinity Poland became a dictatorship in 1926, Estonia and Latvia in 1934 and Lithuania in 1936. All the other Border States that achieved independence in 1917 – 1918 (Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) had already earlier succumbed to some form of Russian or Bolshevik authoritarianism or military action and were annexed to the Soviet Union in 1922. Finland was therefore the only nation to sustain freedom.⁴⁰³ We will benefit by supplementing our analysis with differences in the political thinking and personas of the two leaders of these two groups. The generalizable elements bring fore the issues we need to study in our decision maker if we are to understand the basis of their decisions.

First of all, these two statesmen had different goals in politics. Ståhlberg's goals were of national dimension; Mannerheim was a global thinker and doer. Secondly there was a clear difference in the way they yielded leadership – Mannerheim in an intensely personal manner, Ståhlberg through institutions. Thirdly there was a subtle difference in the way politics was conducted by these two statesmen. Fourthly, their understanding of history and historical time was different. Fifthly their understanding of the world differed and finally Mannerheim and Ståhlberg had different if not altogether contrasting experiences of war.

The ambition and goals of their politics differed. Whereas Mannerheim was a European cosmopolite, Ståhlberg had basically no connections abroad.⁴⁰⁴ This obviously reflected on their political thinking. Ståhlberg was a nationalist. For Mannerheim nationalism was just one of the many sins of modernity.⁴⁰⁵ This difference towards nationalism, Finnish identity and national

⁴⁰² Mannerheim 1951, 236. "...että neuvostovalta ennen pitkää vakiintuisi ja kehittyisi kuolettavaksi uhkaksi myös nuorelle suomen valtakunnalle."

⁴⁰³ For an assessment of the totalitarian threat and a survey of Finnish military politics between the wars, see Stover 1977. For a case study of Finland defending democracy in the interwar years; see Capoccia 2005, 138-176. Capoccia does not, however, single out Ståhlberg as the most important freedom defender.

⁴⁰⁴ Blomstedt 1969, 96. Blomstedt however later remarks that Ståhlberg had been in contact with Kerenski prior to the Provisional Government.

⁴⁰⁵ Rintala 1969, 19, 22, 120. "It is remarkable that Mannerheim was not a Finnish nationalist. The Finnish nation, in his evaluation, was not the highest value." "The world of Gustaf Mannerheim was sunken in more than one respect: he was

borders manifests itself rather surprisingly in the statesmen's differing perceptions of the best way to solve the East Karelia matter. During the pro-German orientation, monarchism and the appetency for German power formed a triad with territorial ambition.⁴⁰⁶ After resigning as the commander-in-chief Mannerheim was in contact with the Germans and was willing to use German power, indeed knowing his uneasy relation with the Germans – any possible power – to liberate Petrograd from the Bolsheviks.⁴⁰⁷ As we know, during this phase Ståhlberg stayed away from the German orientation and feared any excess foreign influence in Finnish matters. During the pro-German phase Ståhlberg opposed the violent settling of the Karelia matter with German help. As a realist Ståhlberg did not believe Germany was doing anything for altruistic reasons.⁴⁰⁸ After the German orientation, Mannerheim looked to the Allies for power. Mannerheim believed that Finland could join forces with the Allied anti-Bolshevik coalition and save the East Karelians. Finnish aid in the intervention would then be rewarded by territorial compensation. Ståhlberg on the other hand did not see this happening. Ståhlberg was not interested in using foreign power to promote Finnish self-extension and was ready to leave the East Karelians on their own until peacetime negotiations. Ståhlberg seemed to have sincerely believed in the possibilities of achieving autonomy for East Karelia through diplomacy.⁴⁰⁹ These two approaches towards nationalism, Finnish identity and national borders can be made more vivid by contrasting quotes reflecting the views on Karelia from the two statesmen. During the civil war Mannerheim, in his *Miekkavala* speech held at the Antrea station in East Karelia on February 23rd, 1918 famously proclaimed:

“...and I swear in the name of the peasant army, whose commander-in-chief I am proud to be, that I will not put my sword in sheath before legitimate order prevails, before all the fortresses are in our hands, before the last warrior of Lenin and hooligan has been expelled from Finland and from Viena Karelia.”⁴¹⁰

a cosmopolite in the age of nationalism; an aristocrat in the age of democracy; a conservative in the age of revolutions. These facts were at the same time his glory and his tragedy.”

⁴⁰⁶ Polvinen 1967, 29-40; Blomstedt 1969, 359, 362, 365; Jutikkala & Pirinen 1979, 222, 226.

⁴⁰⁷ Paasivirta 1957, 242; Polvinen 1967, 291, 296, 300.

⁴⁰⁸ Blomstedt 1969, 365. “Reaalipoliittikona Ståhlberg ei voinut uskoa, että Saksa suurvaltana arvioisi Itä-Karjalaa muun kuin oman saatavissa olevan etunsa kannalta”.

⁴⁰⁹ Virkkunen 1978, 64. Virkkunen forwards the idea that Ståhlberg believed this because Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had gained full independence even they were much more important economically.

⁴¹⁰ “Saapuessani Karjalan rintamalle tervehdin urhoollisia karjalaisia, jotka niin miehuullisesti ovat taistelleet Leninin roistoja ja heidän kurjia kätyreitään vastaan, miehiä vastaan, jotka Kainin merkki otsalla hyökkäävät omien veljiensä kimppuun. Leninin hallitus, joka toisella kädellä lupasi Suomelle itsenäisyyden, on toisella lähettänyt sotaväkensä ja huligaaninsa valloittamaan, niinkuin hän itse on ilmoittanut, Suomen takaisin ja kukistamaan meikäläisen punakaartin avulla Suomen nuoren vapauden vereen. Yhtä petollisesti ja katalasti hän koettaa nyt, kun tuntee voimamme kasvavan, ostaa kansaamme ja hieroo sen takia kauppaa Suomen kapinoitsijain kanssa, luvaten heille Vienan Karjalan, jota hänen punainen armeijansa hävittää ja ryöstää. Me tunnemme hänen lupauksiensa arvon ja olemme kyllin vahvat vapauttamme ylläpitämään ja puolustamaan veljiämme Vienan Karjalassa. Meidän ei tarvitse ottaa armonlahjana sitä maata, joka jo veren siteillä kuuluu meille, ja minä vannon sen suomalaisen talonpoikaisarmeijan nimessä, jonka ylipäällikkönä minulla on kunnia olla, etten pane miekkaani tuppeen, ennenkuin laillinen järjestys vallitsee maassa, ennenkuin kaikki linnoitukset ovat meidän käsissämme, ennenkuin viimeinen Leninin soturi ja huligaani on karkotettu niin hyvin Suomesta kuin Vienan Karjalastakin. Luottaen oikeaan jaloön asiaamme, luottaen urhoollisiin miehiimme ja uhrautuviin naisiimme luomme me nyt mahtavan, suuren Suomen.”

Ståhlberg the state-centered realist quite in opposition to this laconically concluded:” Finnish nation, as it is now, is more important than the Karelia question.”⁴¹¹

The second difference we can note is that the leadership of Mannerheim and Ståhlberg were almost totally opposing. Ståhlberg was a party leader and a believer in institutions, Mannerheim trusted in personal charisma and saw no place for parties. Mannerheim is described as “preparty” or “predemocratic” and “above parties” – he refused to join or lead any party and even refused to acknowledge their existence.⁴¹² Ståhlberg did not see a future without parties.⁴¹³ Another difference between these statesmen was how politics was conducted. The aristocrat and the scholar viewed politics differently and acted differently. Mannerheim’s mostly quoted thoughts came in the form of public speeches, Ståhlberg was known by his styled texts.⁴¹⁴ Ståhlberg positioned himself as an objective outsider, he was perceived by the political elite to be isolated – Mannerheim’s leadership was intensely personal. Mannerheim is said to have created political drama.⁴¹⁵

There also was a subtle distinction in the differences in their understanding of time. Both thinkers knew the historical significance of the events that were taking place but one could conclude that they had a different reasoning to the effects this should have on Finnish foreign policy. Mannerheim saw the years 1918 – 1920 as a historical opportunity. Especially the summer and fall of 1919 were critical moments: now was the time to act. For Ståhlberg, it seems, contemporary reality was always (just) a figure in the equation for the future. He treated events as if they were just indications of future events and not something to value in their own right. This naturally led to the controlling of explosive emotions and placed more importance on rational calculation and unwavering patience.⁴¹⁶ Ståhlberg is described as a “supporter of slow development, an evolutionist.”⁴¹⁷

Fifthly, there is a difference in the way our two statesmen had approached and had thereupon experienced the world. Mannerheim enjoyed traveling, traveled widely and his trip across Eurasia is even by contemporary standards impressive. Ståhlberg traveled scarcely and his life-defining trip

⁴¹¹ Quoted in Yrjö Blomstedt 1969, 359. ”Suomen kansa, sellaisena kuin se on nyt, on vielä tärkeämpi kuin Karjalan kysymys.”

⁴¹² Rintala 1969, 40.

⁴¹³ Merikoski & Skyttä 1968, 82.

⁴¹⁴ Blomstedt 1969, 116. Blomstedt uses the old Finnish word *stilisti* in describing Ståhlberg in his efforts to enhance his writing and style. Ståhlberg’s writing is characterized as “lawyer’s office prose”.

⁴¹⁵ Ahti 1987; Pohjanpää 1987, 39 Mannerheim drafted his speeches in Swedish. According to Pohjanpää, Mannerheim’s Finnish was rusty, almost non-existent in 1917 after many years abroad. He is said to pick it up extremely fast and his style improved rapidly to “original mastery”.

⁴¹⁶ Blomstedt 1969, 141.

⁴¹⁷ Pietiläinen 1992, 27.

would have been as a recently graduated student on foot through Finland.⁴¹⁸ Mannerheim lived up to his guise as an explorer and his field research on the fourteen thousand kilometer trip across Asia from West to East took him to the midst of various different social settings and manifested travelling as a means of education. Ståhlberg studied law in dusty libraries.

The most profound difference however was between how they had experienced violence, military and war. During their early careers, one had fought in the Russian imperial forces, the other had used passive resistance to fight the intense Russification of Bobrikoff and others. Mannerheim fought with the sword, Ståhlberg with the pen: “Ståhlberg was a man of peace...”⁴¹⁹

In our case study, Ståhlberg’s orientation towards peace was based on his realist assumption that it would benefit Finnish national interest:

”Tying up and enforcing the peace treaty and efforts smoothing relations with the Soviet Union in the next coming years on the basis of *state-centered realism*, detached from ideological emotions were the foreign policy circumstances where Ståhlberg showed dedicated statesmanship and political power without yielding to the pressure from the economic-, military- and political opposition.”⁴²⁰

Ståhlberg’s realist views appear from his reflection on the new condition of peace – the Treaty of Tartu. For him, it was perceived to be a: “...satisfactory peace”.⁴²¹ For Mannerheim the Treaty of Tartu pessimistically signaled and materialized the prospect of future ideological war. He perceived it as a: “Bad peace.”⁴²²

Whether the peace was indeed satisfactory or ugly, it had now been signed and waited to be ratified by the Finnish parliament. One chapter of Finnish foreign policy and international politics had ended, one aspect of international life explained. In the bleak days of domestic antagonism and international turmoil, politics was however not the only thing these two statesmen had on their mind. Love was interestingly enough causing personal agony for both Mannerheim and Ståhlberg. Mannerheim was in the middle of a scandalous divorce drama, Ståhlberg had lost his wife of over 20 years.

⁴¹⁸ See Finnish diplomat Ragnar Numelin’s classic study about the wandering spirit (*Ihmisen vaellusvietti*).

⁴¹⁹ Pietiläinen 1992, 77; Nousiainen 1985, 183. Ståhlberg was not familiar with military matters.

⁴²⁰ Nousiainen 1985, 82 ”Rauhansopimuksen solmiminen ja voimaansaattaminen sekä pyrkimykset suhteiden tasoittamiseen Neuvostoliittoon seuraavina vuosina valtiollisen realismin ajattelun pohjalta irrallaan ideologisista tuntemuksista olivatkin ne ulkopolitiikan tilanteet, joissa Ståhlberg osoitti asialleen omistautuneen valtiomiehen poliittista voimaa talouselämän, sotilaspiirien ja poliittisen opposition vastustukseen taipumatta.” Italics by author.

⁴²¹ Ståhlberg’s speech *Tarton rauhansopimuksen johdosta* held on October 16th, 1920. ”...tydyttävä rauha”

⁴²² Quoted in Blomstedt 1969, 411. ”Huono rauha”

Mannerheim, of course, was known to enjoy good wines and to have an eye for beauty.⁴²³ However, in 1918 – 1920, Mannerheim was in the middle of a divorce process, which was back in the early 20th century not at all an easy process. Hoping for a swift end to his marriage with Anastasia Arapova whom he had married in 1892, in order to marry beautiful Kitty Lander, whom he was passionately in love with, Mannerheim, fearing a scandal was terrified and tired.⁴²⁴ Ståhlberg lost his wife Heddi, mother of his 6 children, in March 1917. The childhood friends had got engaged in 1891 and had married in 1893.

Here we have two presumably heartbroken leaders, motivated in acting in the best interests of Finland, both limited by the structure of international politics, arriving at the opposite conclusions for the best policy. The story that has thus unfolded is therefore a story of power and love, of war and peace. The eternal elements of international life bring us to the conclusion.⁴²⁵

⁴²³ Kanninen 2003, 169. For a descriptive of Mannerheim's private life, see Vlasov 2002.

⁴²⁴ Kuusanmäki 2003, 308-311. His marriage since the wedding on May 2nd, 1892 had effectually ended before the Russia-Japan war. Kuusanmäki refutes the claim that Mannerheim divorced Arapova for political reasons (presidential election) – the prince of Hessen was selected to be the king of Finland 3 days before Mannerheim filed for divorce in October 1918. The divorce became legal on September 25th, 1919.

⁴²⁵ See Hans Morgenthau's classic article *Love and Power*.

4. Tragedy of Small Power Politics?

Political realists are understood to share a tragic vision of politics.⁴²⁶ This perceived realist worldview is a result of classical realism's pessimistic view of human nature and the historical focus of international politics on the most violent aspect of human effort, war. Interestingly all different strands of realism have found different sources for tragedy in international politics. Classical realists find tragedy in international politics rising from the philosophical foundations of politics as well as from human nature. Carr viewed the dual nature of thought versus reality as the primary source:

“[Here]... is the complexity, the fascination and the tragedy of all political life. Politics are made up of two elements – utopia and reality – belonging to two different planes which can never meet. There is no greater barrier to clear political thinking than failure to distinguish between ideals, which are utopia, and institutions, which are reality.”

“The planes of utopia and reality never coincide. The ideal cannot be institutionalized, nor the institutions idealized.”⁴²⁷

That the ideals can be visioned of but never materialized is because of the only constantly featuring element in international politics: human beings. Morgenthau's worldview can be compressed in one word: tragedy. The dualism of (absolutely everything in) Morgenthau's worldview concomitant with the pessimistic view of human nature and its capacity for evil arising from the *animus dominandi* – the desire for power – constructs his calamitous, desperately gloomy world where: “Man cannot hope to be good but must be content with being not too evil.”⁴²⁸

As the realist tradition has evolved it has changed or rather clarified its focus from the study of all political action to the study of singular foreign policy decisions and to the study of the systemic level. Neorealists like Waltz share the understanding of the presence of force or the threat of force in international affairs but do not see the international system as tragic. Structural realist theorists of

⁴²⁶ Lebow 2003. See journal *International Relations* for a thorough debate about evil vs. tragedy in IR theory (vol. 17:4, 18:4, 19:2 and 3, 20:1 and 2, 21:1).

⁴²⁷ Carr 2001, 86, 95. It is said that Carr and Morgenthau, “both saw the twentieth century as a tragedy. The two had deep concerns about the relevance of liberalism as a doctrine for the twentieth century. And they had a similar understanding of history and the history of political thought.”

⁴²⁸ Morgenthau 1965, 192. Morgenthau sees tragedy everywhere; usually arising from the dualist antagonism of good - evil, God - human, spiritual destiny - animal nature etc. See especially chapter 8 The Tragedy of Scientific Man in “*Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*,” pp. 204-223. Here Morgenthau writes about the tragic complexities and tragic contradictions of human existence, great tragic antinomies of human existence [between political power and ethics], tragic tension between ethics of our minds and the ethics of our actions, tragic condition, tragic character and tragic sense of human life, tragic element inherent in human life and finally, the perennial human tragedy, p. 189, 201-203, 206-207, 221. Elsewhere Morgenthau writes: “It is that striving to escape his loneliness which gives impetus to both the lust for power and the longing for love, and it is the inability to escape that loneliness, either at all or for more than a moment, that creates the tension between longing and lack of achievement, which is the tragedy of both power and love.” See Morgenthau 1962, 247.

foreign policy (not Waltz) on the other hand have brought the concept back to a more central role in their writings. John Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* has become the outstanding example of the contemporary (offensive) realist worldview. The tragedy in Mearsheimer's world of great power politics arises from the anarchical structure of the international system that forces states, always possessing offensive military capabilities and uncertain of the intentions of other states, to fear each other and compete for power, and to seek hegemony, in their rational quest for survival.⁴²⁹ In the realm of foreign policy this reading of international politics then forces us to prescribe *Warrior Politics*.⁴³⁰

International politics is, as we have learnt from neoclassical realists, however only to an extent defined by the politics of power. Statesmen like Mannerheim and Ståhlberg, in the realm of small power politics, inhabited a world that was partly of their own making. The neoclassical realist worldview is therefore different; they do not view international politics as necessarily tragic.⁴³¹ This is what distinguishes neoclassical realism from offensive realism. Neoclassical realists can be found occupying the middle ground in the debate between defensive and offensive realists where the former find security plentiful, the latter scarce.⁴³²

We need to remember that statesmen have different motivations than just security. International politics is about possibilities as well as threats. The Finnish statesmen in our case study had to calculate the interests and balance the possible positive gains with the costs and risks that the endeavor to combat Bolshevism would involve. Mannerheim and Ståhlberg had differing views about how to maximize Finnish influence.


⁴²⁹ Mearsheimer 2001, Chapter 1.

⁴³⁰ Kaplan 2001 (a); 2001 (b). Robert D. Kaplan's *Warrior Politics* is the clearest contemporary presentation of foreign policy recommendations that advocate the outdated if traditional "it is necessary to do evil to do good" view of realpolitik and realism. See also Parag Khanna's book review *Tragic Realism*. For a tragic Finnish equivalent see Tomi Ervamaa's *Maailmanpahentaja* column in Helsingin Sanomat.

⁴³¹ Here we run into an unexpected conflict. Classical realism and its non-linear and non-cyclical understanding of history is sometimes viewed to bear resemblance with postmodernism as rejecting meta- or so called grand narratives. The tragic reading of classical realism (Lebow: *The Tragic Vision of Politics*) and offensive realism (Mearsheimer: *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*) in contrast accept and construct tragedy as the metanarrative of international politics. My view (as neoclassical realism in general) echoes the former view over the latter and aligns itself with the slightly more optimistic realist tradition of Snellman and Ståhlberg.

⁴³² For the best critique of the realist image of man, the flawed assumptions on human nature and the pessimism-bias that according to the author turns political realism into a tragic self-fulfilling prophecy, see Freyberg-Inan 2004. Freyberg-Inan's criticism is largely irrelevant to neoclassical realism because in our formulation human nature is a variable, not a constant – statesmen perceptions, whatever they may be, are what ultimately run rule over singular foreign policy decisions. Neoclassical realism therefore does not have an pessimism bias, or adopt a worst-case possibilistic focus. See Brooks 1997, 446. "[Neoclassical realism] does not assume states employ worst case reasoning; rather states are understood as making decisions based on assessments of probabilities regarding security threats."

Figure 4. Finnish Foreign Policy Options in 1918 – 1920 According to the Balance-of-Interest Theory of Coalition Formation



According to the balance-of-interest theory, Mannerheim’s foreign policy thinking was limited aims revisionism, and self-extension through jackal bandwagoning. Mannerheim perceived Finnish interests as common to the interests of the anti-Bolshevik coalition and favored joining the coalition. It was in the interests of all participants to change the Lenin regime and rid the world of the revolutionary actor. It was in the Finnish interests to join a coalition, achieve the aims stated above and possibly to be compensated territorially – East Karelia and the freedom of the kin nations were empowering and morally high-minded incentives.

Mannerheim constitutes the counterfactual in our case study.⁴³³ Mannerheim’s policies, if they had won the debate, would have validated our research hypothesis and certified neoclassical realist influence-maximizing assumptions as formulated by Schweller. The nature of the existing order, characterized as it was by conflict, made bandwagoning desirable for Mannerheim: war would have enhanced the prospects for a more durable peace. Against a ruthless enemy it was not enough to have military force but also convince them that you are not restrained by any moral consideration in using that force – this constituted the greatest chance for peace.⁴³⁴ Mannerheim however lost the decentralized and competitive political process in which national interests are defined and Finland’s

⁴³³ Counterfactuals are viewed to be a good way to study IR and especially specific foreign policy decisions, see Goertz & Levy 2007.

⁴³⁴ For similarities in Churchill’s reasoning on war, see Thompson 1983, 55.

chosen foreign policies, behavior and stated goals do not validate the hypothesis derived from Schweller's theory. I will later in discussion of Ståhlberg's worldview explain why.

Schweller's theory must be viewed as a handy tool that gives us concepts to use to evaluate foreign policy decisions and to study the basic theoretical assumptions behind these policies. However, the theory must be criticized for setting up a worldview that might or might not correlate with the worldview of the actors. Territorial expansion was just one of the interests Mannerheim valued and was definitely not the most important one. The complexity of human life, for example Mannerheim's history and affiliation with Petrograd and Russian bourgeois culture played a large role in explaining his policy prescription. Labeling Mannerheim's policies as jackal bandwagoning gives us little if any credible knowledge about the reality of the policy. All-in-all, by relegating state (smens') motivation simply to fear or to greed, the complicated and human picture of the world gets distorted. In narrating simplified stories theories threaten to distort the overall picture to a caricature.⁴³⁵ In our case study both statesmen were motivated by republican freedom: Ståhlberg through peace, Mannerheim through war. Mannerheim thought that through bandwagoning it was possible to achieve a (more) durable peace. I believe we are close to understanding the real character of international politics and history to see that both Ståhlbergian realism and the Mannerheim-Churchillian line of reasoning in our case study are equally defensible and that valuating policies through abstract concepts like war and peace offer us only a portion of the wisdom we need in foreign policy analysis.⁴³⁶

Mannerheim's worldview and philosophical roots for his foreign policy thinking are elegantly explored in the narrative of republican realism.⁴³⁷ The two strands of thought, conservative anti-communism and liberal republicanism, which empowered Mannerheim, were through his life intertwined. Throughout Mannerheim's political and military career his two philosophies of republicanism and anti-communism led essentially to similar foreign policy behavior.⁴³⁸ In our case study, Mannerheim can be understood to have viewed the emerging Soviet Union as the most modern form of Russian imperialism actualizing itself under a new ideological cloak. The intervention, the selection of war over peace was the lesser evil in creating a friendlier Russia. For Mannerheim, a White Russia created with Western help and therefore in debt of gratitude was the

⁴³⁵ Schroeder 2003, 114-127. For a critique of realism (I read it as any other simplifying theory as well) in studying history, see Schroeder's articles.

⁴³⁶ This forces us to seriously think the validity of realist foreign policy recommendations vis-à-vis totalitarian threats. If we believe that the struggle for ideas is the constituting threat to world peace – liberalism will not survive if it does not take the challenge of totalitarian belief systems seriously. This was, of course, understood by Mannerheim. For a discussion on the topic, see for example Macdonald 2007, and for a provocative historical view Podhoretz 2007.

⁴³⁷ Heikka 2005.

⁴³⁸ Heikka 2005.

lesser evil, Bolshevik Russia with its grandeur goal of world revolution and the appeal it aroused in the idealists in the West the greater. His reading of the situation in 1918 – 1920 motivated him to counter the old phenomenon of Russian imperialism he undoubtedly, after working in its service most of his career, knew so well. For our discussion about the character of international politics it is interesting to note that Mannerheim's legacy, value-based republican point of view eludes tragedy: "military history is not just an endless tragedy driven by the anarchic nature of the international system but a teleological process driven by pursuit of freedom".⁴³⁹

All said, the answer to the question: *war or peace for Finland?* posited in the title of this work is to be answered that Ståhlberg and Finland chose peace.⁴⁴⁰ In a position to influence, even decide the change in the systemic balance that would have undoubtedly favored human freedom, Finland chose inaction. The strategy that was chosen when the threat was still manageable even if distant and not directly targeted towards Finland led Finns to opt for a distancing strategy. From this perspective, Finland seems reluctant to use force to advance her values even if our overall historical experience in defending those values might suggest otherwise.⁴⁴¹

Regarding Ståhlberg's policies that became Finland's policies, Schweller's theory's explanatory power is more useful. Ståhlberg's foreign policy thinking, which at the end of the day prevailed, and set Finnish foreign policy, favored *distancing*. Ståhlberg did not perceive Finnish national interests to coincide with the international coalition and so he prescribed a policy that kept Finland out of the coalition.

⁴³⁹ Heikka 2005.

⁴⁴⁰ It is important to note that Snellman too, in his classic article *Sota vai rauha Suomelle* favored peace: "Kenellekään ei ole oikeutta vaatia, että kansakunta valtiollisissa asioissa katsoisi muuta kuin omaa hyötyänsä ja omaa tulevaisuuttansa. ...minun ei tarvitse sanoa monta sanaa onnettomuudesta, joka sodasta maalle koituu. Sota on aina hävittävää... mikään valtio ei ole koskaan käynyt sotaa muun kuin omien etujensa tähden... Kansakunnat toimivat ihmiskunnan hyväksi uhrautumalla toistensa puolesta ainoastaan nuorison haaveissa. Todellisuudessa jokainen kansakunta elää omia etujansa varten ja tekee siinä oikein; mutta sen pyrkimykset menestyvät sikäli kuin sen omat edut yhtyvät ihmiskunnan etuihin... Jos sitä vastoin heitettäisiin olevien olojen tulevaisuus aseellisen voimainkoetuksen epävarmasta tuloksesta riippuvaiseksi, olisi se kevytmielisyyttä, jopa mielettömyyttä kansassa, joka ei itse kykene mitenkään vaikuttamaan sodan päättämiseen... Järjetön ja väkivaltainen uudistushalu on silloin jättänyt kansojen kohtalon mielivallalle alttiiksi... Sanon tämän tietoisena siitä, että ääneni on vain erään yksilön ääni, mutta myös täysin tietoisena siitä, että tunnen, mitä se kansakunta, johon kuulun, ajattelee ja tahtoo." Morgenthau, in his article discussing the possible Vietnam intervention *To Intervene or Not to Intervene*, advocates peace too.

⁴⁴¹ Heikka 2005, 363-380. In his work, Heikka studies and compares the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line of geopolitical realism and the liberal republicanism associated with Mannerheim. His conclusion is that Finland has chosen values – and has been ready to die defending them – over realist balance of power imperatives. Elsewhere Heikka has concluded: "The essence of Finnish strategic culture: non-offensiveness, a strong will to defend republicanism when needed, and a commitment to the idea of international society... For Finns, the liberal legacy has been not only an intellectual inspiration for armchair-theorising or thinking about international law, but a reason to die for." See Heikka 2003 (b), 2-3.

“[*Distancing*] or no coalition ... posits that [a state] will seek to distance itself from others, choosing to remain isolated even though potential allies are available.”⁴⁴²

Distancing behavior has been studied and relabeled by other authors. Paul Schroeder has recognized hiding and transcending as methods of handling foreign policy options:

“[*Hiding*] could take various forms: ...declaring neutrality in a general crisis, possibly approaching other states on one or both sides of a quarrel to get them to guarantee one’s safety; trying to withdraw to isolation; assuming a purely defensive position in the hope that the storm would blow over, or... seeking protection from some other power or powers in exchange for diplomatic services, friendship, or non-military support, without joining that power or powers as an ally or committing itself to any use of force on its part.”

“[*Transcending*]...attempting to surmount international anarchy and go beyond limits of conflictual politics: to solve the problem...through some institutional arrangements involving an international consensus or formal agreement on norms, rules, and procedures for these purposes.”⁴⁴³

Ståhlberg’s foreign policy relied heavily on the belief in the possibilities to transcend the conflictual politics caused by international anarchy: Ståhlberg did not view world politics as necessarily tragic. This worldview gains support from the practitioner’s perception. Another iconic Finnish statesman to answer the inevitability of tragedy with a negative was J. V. Snellman, the founding father of the Finnish realist tradition.⁴⁴⁴ Snellman’s optimistic view of the future of international life is based on his belief in the eventual triumph of freedom: wars are not inevitable because gradually the cumulation of political freedom renders war unnecessary.⁴⁴⁵ Continuing this more optimistic realist tradition was also Ståhlberg who worked from his understanding of history as a base to build on, by adding new to the old and by continuing forward on the road of progress and development:

“In accordance with genuine liberalist tradition [Ståhlberg] had an empiric view of the world ... strong confidence in human ability to direct personal destinies and an optimistic belief in the future.”⁴⁴⁶

Finnish realism as constructed in the practitioner’s world by Snellman and Ståhlberg is a more optimistic realist tradition and stands in opposition to the traditional geopolitically focused and traumatic readings of Finnish foreign policy realism. Surprisingly enough, in addition to the

⁴⁴² Schweller 1993, 84.

⁴⁴³ Schroeder 1994, 117. John Arquilla has relabelled hiding as *by standing* defined as state’s propensity to avoid conflicts for reasons of self-preservation.

⁴⁴⁴ J. V. Snellman’s *Ajatuksia traagillisuudesta* was originally published in 1858. The full production of J. V. Snellman was published in 2005 to celebrate the 200th year since Snellman’s birth. The works are available online at: (http://www.snellman200.fi/kootut_teokset/fi.jsp). See Lahtinen 2006 for similarities in Ståhlberg’s thinking and Snellman’s life’s work in strengthening, developing (and civilizing) the Finnish nation.

⁴⁴⁵ Pulkkinen 1983, 73. “Sodat eivät kuitenkaan ole välttämättömiä, koska poliittisen vapauden kasvu tekee vähitellen sodat tarpeettomiksi.”

⁴⁴⁶ Nousiainen 1985, 93. ”Aidon vapaamielisyyden perinteen mukaisesti hänellä oli empiristinen maailmankäsitys – presidentinpuheissaan hän ei koskaan vedonnut ’korkeimman johdatukseen’ -, luja luottamus ihmisten kykyyn ohjata omia kohtaloitaan ja optimistinen usko tulevaisuuteen.” For Ståhlberg’s view on history, see p. 170.

optimism of realist practitioners, we find the Finnish realist theorists to be as open-minded and hopeful of the future. Realism arrived to modern Finnish IR research in the early 1950s from the United States and can be seen to start developing its distinct Finnish characteristics in Kullervo Killinen's two-volume *Kansainvälinen politiikka*, published in 1964.⁴⁴⁷ The founding father of modern Finnish realism Killinen constructed a worldview that assessed the political goal of emancipation from crude power politics to be attainable by politics anchored on the principles of liberalism.⁴⁴⁸

Understanding the anarchic nature of the international system and power as the final arbiter of all things political, Finnish realists have been able to construct their political worldviews and plan their policy prescriptions in a manner that allows for progress in international life instead of reproducing policies that generate a cyclic continuum of endless tragedy. Optimism regarding the advancement of political freedom and possibilities for cooperation and transcendence above the conflictual nature of international affairs are justified, but safeguarded by capacity for military self-help. Although Snellman and in our case study Ståhlberg viewed the world as anarchic and were aware of challenges that must be balanced with military power they perceived the advancement of political freedom as a positive trend in reducing violence in the long-term. Ståhlberg believed in cooperation among states, and had faith in international law and politics based on reconciliations.⁴⁴⁹ For Snellman and Ståhlberg small power politics was not tragic.

On a more general level, neoclassical realists assert that statesmen have a possibility to influence the faith of their nations. Statesmen are viewed as able to modify the external environment to a degree and possibly even to distance or transcend their nations above power politics. When constructing national interests statesmen weigh relative power with identity and form a synthesis of the two. A neoclassical realist account of any chosen foreign policy decision must start by assessing the material power position of the state and the perceptions of the statesmen of this power. In addition it needs to study the importance the statesmen give to identity in the construction of the national interest. We learned in the previous chapter (3) about the different perceptions of the reality Ståhlberg and Mannerheim had. We also got a glimpse of the ideal, the utopia that these statesmen valued.

⁴⁴⁷ Killinen 1964 (a) and especially 1964 (b). Finnish realism was then further developed by Risto Hyvärinen. Both realists were soldiers by background.

⁴⁴⁸ Heikka 2005, 280-282.

⁴⁴⁹ Kunttu 1995, 212. "[Ståhlberg uskoi] valtioiden yhteistyöhön, kansainväliseen oikeuteen ja sovitteluun pohjautuvaan politiikkaan."

In the following chapter 4.1 the most important (facilitating) variable affecting foreign policy decision making, relative material power is researched. I study in detail the case of Finland in 1918 – 1920 and generalize the findings on the role of small powers in a realist world. The aim is to shed light on the realist worldview to show what kind of a world theorists and practitioners alike inhabit. In chapter 4.2 the focus is on the independent variable, identity, the (making) defining element of foreign policy decision making. Here I analyze the two competing perceptions of Finnish identity in 1918 – 1920 and offer a short introductory view on the traditional realist narratives that have aimed to define Finnish identity in world politics. Finally, chapter 4.3 offers a new reading of political realism by studying its relation to peace and proposes a new narrative for Finnish realism.

4.1. Relative Material Power: Small Powers in a Realist World

Realists agree that the characteristics of the political world are mainly constructed and contested by great powers. Because small powers inhabit the same arena but lack similar resources, the interaction between the two is inherently lop-sided. Classical realists had no illusions about abstract concepts of justice or equality in international politics. Thucydides, writing some 2 500 years ago presented, but did not endorse, the democratic Athenians' crude conception of the importance of relative material power in the *Melian dialogue*:

“...in human disputation justice is then only agreed on when the necessity is equal; whereas they that have odds of power exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can get.”⁴⁵⁰

Much of modern classical realism echoes this view. Carr claimed the “dictatorship of the Great Powers” constitutes something akin to a law of nature in international politics.⁴⁵¹ Morgenthau saw the distinction between great and small powers that arose from the extreme differences in power among nations as an elemental experience of international politics. He viewed the position of small powers as perilous. He claimed that it was only the balance of power that could protect them; the small nation must look for the protection of powerful allies if it hoped to oppose attempts to violate its rights.⁴⁵²

Neorealism, focusing as it does on the structure created by the interaction of units, is interested in states only to the extent of their capabilities. Relative material power is then elemental to their enquiries. For Waltz, the theory and the story of international politics, a self-help system, is written in terms of the great powers. International politics is politics of the powerful where the inequality of nations is an undeniable, untranscendable fact of life. Indeed inequality, what much of politics is about, is inherent in the state system and cannot be removed. Units of greatest capability set the scene of action for others, enjoy wider margins of safety and define which games will be played and

⁴⁵⁰ Thucydides 1989, 365. Translation by Thomas Hobbes.

⁴⁵¹ Carr 2001, 99. Carr had a very negative stance towards “abstract concept of national self-determination” and the independence of smaller nations. His views have special importance for the time period under study. Carr writes: “The interlude of 1918, when nationalism momentarily resumed its disintegrating role, proved – at any rate in Europe – a dangerous fiasco. ... The victors of 1918 ‘lost the peace’ in Central Europe because they continued to pursue a principle of political and economic disintegration in an age which called for larger and larger units.” p. 211-212. “The liberal democracies scattered throughout the world by the peace settlement of 1919 were the products of abstract theory, stuck no roots in the soil, and quickly shrivelled away.” p. 29. Carr was very negative toward small powers and used Finland’s weakness as a case to illustrate the limits of weak powers. p. 198 Obviously, Carr was not really familiar with Finland’s experience.

⁴⁵² Morgenthau 1955, 429, 271.

how. In the international system the weak lead perilous lives where the imbalance of power is always a danger to them.⁴⁵³

In contemporary structural theorizing on foreign policy, offensive realism has a similar view of small powers. Mearsheimer sees the fortunes of all states – great and small powers alike – as being determined primarily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability. The tragedy in great power politics translates into tragedy in the realm of small power politics.⁴⁵⁴ It might not come as a surprise that we again find neoclassical realism occupying a more empowering plane in perceiving possibilities to transcend the brute power inequalities between nominally equal actors than other realist theories. Because neoclassical realists choose to study the twin foci of classical realism rather than focus on material power imbalances, the picture that is constructed leaves more room for the statesmen to exercise their virtú.

In our case study of Finnish foreign policy in the context of the Allied and Associated Powers anti-Bolshevik intervention in the Russian civil war, the question of relative material power relates to the question of whether small powers have independence in defining their interests or whether they are merely part of larger power political constellations. Winston Churchill's, whose impact on the intervention was crucial, relation to Finland supports the bleaker theoretical assumption:

“Finland itself had to be subservient to geopolitics and anticommunism alike. This was the rule, in fact, in every period and episode of Churchill's interaction with Finland. To him, Finland was relevant because of its geostrategical position (relative to Russia but in no other sense). He never regarded Finland as a co-equal actor in international affairs, and never saw it as a nation whose points of view or national desires should have equal weight to his own calculations of context, expediency, priorities or goals. Finland was there to be used. Both on a tactical and on a principled level, Churchill regarded all small nations as the proper tools of the Great Powers; tools in projects for which the small nations would have insufficient resources or insight but which nevertheless remained crucial for all nations to see through.”⁴⁵⁵

From a Finnish perspective, Churchill's knowledge of Finland and interest regarding the Finnish nation was that of a tool. Churchill was convinced that he had devised the perfect policy in balancing anti-communism and geopolitics, and that small nations like Finland would just have to act in the place that he had prepared for them in his overall framework:

⁴⁵³ Waltz 1979, 72, 131, 132, 142-143, 194. Waltz, however, admits that the dependent parties have some effect on the independent ones.

⁴⁵⁴ Mearsheimer 2001, 5.

⁴⁵⁵ Ruotsila 2005, 162. The first example is from the Winter War.

”...as [Churchill’s] knowledge about Finland grew, so did his interest in using it as an ally, proxy and pawn for his purposes.”⁴⁵⁶

The situation during the months of the civil war and the intervention was not easy for a weak, newly independent power like Finland:

“Equally inexperienced with foreign policy thinking and tangling to foreign powers in their feeling of weakness as the Reds were the Whites – except Mannerheim – in their German policy. To a small power, without her foreign policy traditions, lacking in military and economic resources, the civil war was a devastating blow. Her possibilities to avoid becoming a more or less powerless object of the great powers seemed non-existent.”⁴⁵⁷

As we have learned, although Mannerheim rejected the pro-German orientation after resigning as the commander-in-chief, he favored aligning with Entente interests as the Regent and afterwards actively advocated an interventionist policy that would have made Finland a projector of anti-Bolshevik interests. Without a doubt Mannerheim perceived Finland as a small power whose interests were subordinate to the big picture.

President Ståhlberg’s non-interventionist foreign policy thinking was based on the no-nonsense thought of Finland as a small power. He stayed clear of the German-orientation prior to the presidential election and opposed the Allies in their interventionist plans. He stressed the Finnish republic as just a normal small power and treated the Russian regime’s ideology as an altogether different issue to the Finno-Russian relations.⁴⁵⁸ Motivated as he was with Finland’s national interest, he saw Finland’s relative material power leaving it with no room for idealistic projections of her national interest, or goals on the international scene. What mattered were the Finnish nation and its interest. The Finnish nation needed to attach its loyalty to the constitution. Ståhlberg was delighted by the advent of national self-determination clearly believing small power possibilities to transcend the logic of crude realism. Ståhlberg was a supporter of the small state-idea. He saw the

⁴⁵⁶ Ruotsila 2005, 1-2, 5. Ruotsila concludes: “It can be argued that such a correlation between knowledge and action – this kind of objectification of small powers based on limited information, this utilization of small states as means to an end – is typical of the interaction between powers of unequal resources.” “Churchill in particular was an upholder of realpolitik. For him, smaller powers were tools only; that much fodder for high politics. ‘Small nations must not be allowed to tie our hands’, he stressed.”

⁴⁵⁷ Polvinen 1967, 259. “Yhtä tottumattomiksi ulkopoliittiseen ajatteluun ja heikkoudentunnossaan ulkomaisiin voimiin turvautuviksi kuin punaiset omalla suunnallaan osoittautuivat valkoiset – Mannerheimia lukuunottamatta – Saksanpolitiikassaan. Pienelle maalle, joka jo ennestään oli vailla omakohtaisia ulkopoliittisia traditioita, sekä riittäviä sotilaallisia ja taloudellisia resursseja, sisällissota merkitsi siinä määrin voimia kuluttavaa suoneniskua, että sen mahdollisuudet välttää joutumasta suurvaltojen enemmän tai vähemmän tahdottomaksi kiistakapulaksi näyttivät supistuvan lähes olemattomiin.”

⁴⁵⁸ Paasivirta 1968, 112. “Ståhlbergin yrityksistä normalisoida maan suhteita itäiseen naapuriin kävi samalla välillisesti ilmi, että hän katsoi siitä kokonaan erilliseksi kysymykseksi ideologisen suhtautumisen kommunismiin.”

new post-Great War Europe that was taking shape with all its new independent states as a major historical step forward.⁴⁵⁹

This underlines the working title of my thesis: advance guard or just a small state? (*Etuvaratio vai pieni valtio?*) Ståhlberg's foreign policy thinking stressed the importance of relative material power (realism), Mannerheim's the role of identity (idealism).⁴⁶⁰ Mannerheim's larger perception of international politics then gave weight to the Finnish national character and its geographic location. Mannerheim stressed Finland's role as the advance guard of Western civilization. Relative material power was then that of a civilization of a trans-national ideologue, in Mannerheim's case anti-communist conservatism. Indeed,

"Finnish national interest had thus started to restrain and restrict... [Mannerheim's] will to action."⁴⁶¹

Mannerheim, although rejecting the all-encompassing pro-German orientation, favored using German power to conquer Petrograd and later favored joining the coalition of the Allied and Associated Powers – it was their victory in the war that would weigh heaviest in the future balance of power. This came manifest in our case study regarding the anti-Bolshevik intervention to the Russian civil war. Mannerheim traveled to Paris and London to advocate his anti-Bolshevik interventionist plans with a certainty that Finland could not transcend power politics. In the matter under study ideological elements overshadowed the realist ones. Mannerheim was convinced of the importance of the ideological element of Finnish state. We must now look at the other foci of classical realism.

⁴⁵⁹ Pietiläinen 1992, 66. "Ståhlberg oli pikkuvaltioaatteen edustaja. Hän piti ensimmäisen maailmansodan päätösvaiheessa hahmottumassa olevaa Eurooppaa uusine itsenäisine valtioineen huomattavana historiallisena edistysaskeleena. Hän toivoi Kansainliitosta tasoittavaa tekijää valtioiden välille, konfliktien torjua. Ståhlberg ei ollut alueellisten laajennuspyrkimysten tai heimopolitiikan kannattaja. Ulkopolitiikassa hän lähti varovaisesti liikkeelle tietäen armeijan ja suojeluskuntien mielipiteen ja Mannerheimin tukijoukkojen katkeruuden. Hän sanoi heti heinä-elokuussa koettujen epäonnistumisten jälkeen julkisesti, ettei Itä-Karjalan yhdistäminen Suomeen asevoimin voinut tulla kysymykseen." Whether it was caused by foreign policy naiveté (which at least must be considered) or strong belief in the possibilities of justice and righteousness in world politics is beside the point of the narrative. I believe the latter to be true.

⁴⁶⁰ It is not rare to find political decisions that reflect purely one or the other; religious fanaticism as the example of idealism, old-school cynical Realpolitik of realism. However, in the bounds of rational foreign political decision making, statesmen in constructing their view of the national interest balance the elements of power and identity.

⁴⁶¹ Polvinen 1971, 150. "Suomen etu oli näin alkanut pidättää ja rajoittaa... hänen toimintahaluaan."

4.2. Constructing National Interests: Competing Perceptions of Identity

Neoclassical realists acknowledge the difficulties of statesmen to correctly assess the relative material power which defines the framework for policy options. In addition, they study the competing perceptions of identity that ultimately run rule over the construction of the national interest(s). Here is where much of the politics can be found: competing perceptions of identity are ultimately the determining and more volatile element of foreign policy decision making. Whereas Ståhlberg's foreign policy was based on the perceived identity of Finland as a small liberal Republic, Mannerheim's interventionist foreign policy was based on the perceived identity of Finland as the: "... outpost of the Western civilization."⁴⁶²

Analysis of Mannerheim's foreign policies must give enough weight to his view of the importance of the identity of Finland. He strongly believed that Finland was the outpost of Western civilization and that the Finnish historical mission was to protect this civilization in the North – and to be the advance guard against the East.⁴⁶³ Mannerheim's perception of the future balance of power saw that a future Bolshevik Russia would be a grave danger for the young Republic. Finland's geographic location could not be changed – its neighbors' identity, at this point, could. Finland's relative material power supplemented the power of a transnational community and was to be used in the idealistic projections of her national interest, goals on the international scene. In the literary scene Mannerheim's idealist thinking was put into words by Uuno Kailas in his poem *Rajalla*:

*“ Raja railona aukeaa.
Edessä Aasia, Itä.
Takana Länttä ja Eurooppaa;
varjelen, vartija, sitä.*

*Takana kaunis isänmaa
Kaupungein ja kylin.
Sinua poikas puolustaa
Maani, aarteista ylin.”⁴⁶⁴*

⁴⁶² Mannerheim 1951, 402, 410, 447. ”Länsimaisen hengenviljelyn äärimmäinen etuvartio”.

⁴⁶³ Mannerheim 1951, 402, 410, 447 ”Suomen historiallinen tehtävä: länsimaisen sivistyksen suojaaminen pohjolassa”.

⁴⁶⁴ See Kailas 1994, 239-241. The poem was published in 1931. Uuno Kailas was part of the Fire Bearers or Tulenkantajat-literary movement (with Mika Waltari) which worked in the 1920s under the slogan: “Open the windows to the West” (Ikkunat auki Eurooppaan). Kailas participated in the Olonets expedition. The poem continues: Öinen ulvova tuuli tuo; rajan takaa lunta. - Isäni, äitini, Herra, suo nukkua työntä unta!

Anna jyvää hinkaloon, anna karjojen siitä! Kätes peltoja siunatkoon! - Täällä suojelen niitä.

Synkeä, kylmä on talviyö, hyisenä henkii Itä. Siell' ovat orjuus ja pakkotyö; tähdet katsovat sitä.

Kaukaa aroilta kohoaa Iivana Julman haamu. Turman henki, se ennustaa: verta on näkevä aamu.

Mut isät harmaat haudoistaan aaveratsuilla ajaa: karhunkeihäitä kourissaan syöksyvät kohti rajaa.

- Henget taattojen, autuaat, kuulkaa poikanne sana - jos sen pettäisin, saapukaat koston armeijana - :

Ei ole polkeva häpäisten sankarileponne majaa rauta-antura vihollisen, - suojelen maani rajaa!

Ei ota vieraat milloinkaan kallista perintöänne. Tulkoot hurttina aroiltaan! Mahtuvat multaan tänne.

Kontion rinnoin voimakkain ryntään peitsiä vasten naisen rukkia puolustain ynnä kehtoa lasten

Raja railona aukeaa. Edessä Aasia, Itä. Takana Länttä ja Eurooppaa; varjelen, vartija, sitä.

In advocating his large policy of offensive interventionism, Mannerheim was speaking not only as a Finnish statesman but also as a member of a trans-national community of Western civilization. Mannerheim, by defending Finland defends the West from the perceived barbaric assault of Bolshevism. Mannerheim saw Finnish security in the large geopolitical context and in the context of a historical mission of the West in spreading liberal republicanism.⁴⁶⁵

Interventionist roll-back policies focused on Bolshevik Russia as a mortal threat in the future. Mannerheim's thinking of international politics in the context of the years 1918 – 1920 (and more generally) included therefore a prominent role for the nature of regimes in explaining the sources of conflict, orthodoxically a un-realist stance.⁴⁶⁶ This emphasis on the domestic regime type of Russia is what distinguishes Mannerheim from most other Finnish foreign policy leaders. In our case study, Mannerheim, contrary to his countrymen, drew a distinct difference between Russia and Bolshevism, Russians and Bolsheviks.⁴⁶⁷ Anti-interventionists, on the other hand, focused on the relative material power as they regarded Russia as a challenge, irrespective of its government's ideological stance. This led them to focus on the Finnish state and increasing her influence.

“Most Finns were convinced during the Russian Civil War that any Russian government, Red or White, was dangerous. This belief was not shared by Mannerheim.”⁴⁶⁸

The different policy options therefore had different ends and means. Is it just a co-incidence then that the more realistic foreign policy advocated a policy of peace?

⁴⁶⁵ Heikka 2005, 6. It is interesting to note that even if with historical perspective Mannerheim can be seen the icon of Finnish republican realism, in our limited perspective case study he was a challenger to it.

⁴⁶⁶ Heikka 2005, 6. Here we need some reservations because as I have used the statesmen to explain much, but not all, that happens in IR and because the foreign policy tradition Ståhlberg started has a clear preference to Western liberal democracies.

⁴⁶⁷ Polvinen 1971, 150. All interventionists did not of course share Mannerheim's view. This led to the interventionist group to be less coherent and unable to formulate a policy that suited all involved; their interests were different and led partly to their policy not being implemented.

⁴⁶⁸ Rintala 1969, 33-34.

4.3. Conclusion: The Realist Tradition and Peace

The orthodox reading of realism focuses on its acceptance of war as a tool for foreign policy. The realist (Clausewitzian) phrase of war has become famous:

“...War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means.”

“...War is an instrument of policy; it must necessarily bear its character, it must measure with its scale: the conduct of War, in its great features, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen...”⁴⁶⁹

The picture thus constructed sees realists advocating whatever means necessary to advance national interests and in the process justifying the use of military power. War is not seen as an abstract evil or a product of evil or irrationality: it is a just another tool of policy. Military measures are not much different from mere political writing. Morgenthau is perceived to advocate the violent and the power glorifying aspects of politics by declaring: “Political ethics indeed is the ethics of doing evil.”⁴⁷⁰

Realism thus understood sees world politics as a state of war.⁴⁷¹ It naturally follows from this reading of realism that peace has come to possess its own peculiar character – quite apart from the conventional understanding of the word. Through the realist lens, peace is merely then the absence of war, or war substituted temporarily by different means of struggle: politics. Peace and war cannot be abstractly categorized as good or evil but must always be assessed in the political context. Peace can be as we have learned, satisfactory, or even bad. Peace is viewed not to have a value of its own:

“Is not War merely another kind of writing and language for political thought? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself.”⁴⁷²

However, if we, as I argue we should, study the realist dictums and especially classical realism through the lens of what they are meant to achieve (in a specific context) rather than what they

⁴⁶⁹ von Clausewitz 1968, 121, 130. Clausewitz continues: “We say mixed with other means in order thereby to maintain at the same time that this political intercourse does not cease by the war itself, is not changed into something quite different, but that, in its essence, it continues to exist, whatever may be the form of the means which it uses, and that the chief lines on which the events of the War progress, and to which they are attached, are only the general features of policy which run all through the war until peace takes place. And how can we conceive it to be otherwise?” and later “...War is an instrument of policy; it must necessarily bear its character, it must measure with its scale: the conduct of War, in its great features, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws.”

⁴⁷⁰ Morgenthau 1965, 202.

⁴⁷¹ Doyle 1997, 48.

⁴⁷² von Clausewitz 1968, 122.

literally are saying (in an abstract fashion) we find a very different picture.⁴⁷³ Also if we study political recommendations and the real lines of policy debates, the picture of realist foreign policy is very different. If we would start by assessing the growth of the discipline in the context of the 20th century experience we would have a better chance of understanding realism. Classical realists (Carr, Morgenthau) had become disillusioned with idealist proposals to achieve universal peace. The realist tradition as a school of thought called for a more reality-based perspective on international relations aiming to provide a critical answer to the utopianism and moralism that had until then prevailed.⁴⁷⁴ Realists through studying history had found that war occurred where politics ended – war had been used in politics since the days of Thucydides. Idealists had by outlawing war (for example: Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928) and deposing power politics neglected the only tool there was and still is in building peace.⁴⁷⁵ The only peace available is a realist peace – based on the balance of power, upon the accumulation of deterrents against aggression. This insight into the seemingly irrational logic of international politics translates into a powerful foreign policy doctrine expressed in the Latin adage: *Si vis pacem, para bellum* – If you seek peace, prepare for war.⁴⁷⁶

Morgenthau makes his adherence to this twisted logic of foreign policy explicitly clear by describing liberal foreign policy behavior in world politics:

“How often have statesmen been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse?”⁴⁷⁷

And prescribing realist foreign policy to correct this:

“...the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result of forces inherent in human nature. To improve the world one must work with these forces, not against them.”⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷³ Work for new deeper understanding of classical realism, especially Morgenthau and realism’s normative aspects are well under way. For the best general overview of what it means to be a realist, see Williams 2007. For other accounts, see Little 2007, 91-127; Haslam 2002; Williams 1996; 1998; 2002; 2005. This understanding will presumably trickle to the text-books in the coming years. A good proto-example of this is the small space given for the proper understanding of realism in Baylis & Smith & Owens 2008, 104. In a chapter titled *Realism against wars: an unlikely alliance?* the authors conclude: “Realists are often portrayed as being advocates of an aggressive foreign policy. Such a representation has always lacked credibility.”

⁴⁷⁴ The world’s first department of International Politics was founded in 1919 at Aberystwyth University, Wales. E. H. Carr held the Woodrow Wilson Professorship chair from 1936 to 1947 much to the displeasure of the chair’s liberal patron David Davies. The department of international politics at the Aberystwyth University has a strong realist research tradition. The political science department at the University of Tampere on the other hand patronizes a tradition of critical study of political realism.

⁴⁷⁵ The Kellogg-Briand Pact (The Paris Pact) was an international treaty providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy signed in August 1928. Sixty-two nations ultimately signed or pledged adherence to the pact. When the Treaty became effective on July 24, 1929 Finland became a party to it.

⁴⁷⁶ This proverb can also be translated into *If you wish peace, prepare for war*. The source of this wisdom is unknown even in some sources it is attributed to a fourth century Roman military theorist Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus.

⁴⁷⁷ Morgenthau 1955, 6.

⁴⁷⁸ Morgenthau 1955, 3

Another important aspect to remember is that the realist tradition as it evolved through the seeming inter-paradigm debate did not change the goals of IR as a discipline: the idealists provided the goal of the discipline, the realists provided the paradigm.⁴⁷⁹ The myth of the inter-paradigm debate that draws a distinction between idealist and realist theory, like Herz's ideal types does, is I argue, a good framework to study foreign policy decisions. It must be understood as just another conceptual tool for us to evaluate different policies and different worldviews and values behind these policies. In this sense it does not even matter if the First Great Debate did or did not happen.⁴⁸⁰ From the IR theory point of view this is then a call for theoretical pluralism and tolerance.

From these perspectives they do seem rather arbitrary do they not, the notions of war and peace, of realism and idealism, good and evil? In the introductory chapter I presented the normative desire for a better understanding of the world as my motive to study critically the traditional readings of political realism in IR and Finnish understanding of her political history. I aimed to study traditional understandings and to challenge the possible simplified and distorted meanings we are taught to assume. I claimed there were some truths my narrative aimed to expose.

In the general realm of history and particularly Finnish political history, a truth which ought to be known, I argue, is that all nations deserve such a history as a basis for their future, which they understand and decide to create for themselves. In current public understanding Ståhlberg is not seen as a remarkable Finnish statesman.⁴⁸¹ In reality however, during his statesmanship and especially during his early presidency Ståhlberg did more lasting and crucial political acts than any other leader and created a state that in its essence is very similar to the Finland we enjoy today. With historical perspective it seems odd that many sources dealing with Finnish foreign policy 1918 – 1920 are comfortable leaving Ståhlberg out of the equation altogether even if the form of the government, it is widely believed among liberals at least, is one of the most defining elements of any given state's foreign policy.⁴⁸² From historical distance (now that we are intellectually free from the merciless logic of power politics, which tends to press the actors into two rival camps) Ståhlberg should be seen as an iconic figure who was always a step ahead and a head above the confronting parties of his time and later.⁴⁸³ Eventually Ståhlberg led Finland to her bright

⁴⁷⁹ Vasquez 1983, 23.

⁴⁸⁰ See, for example: Schmidt 2002, 9-31 and Ashworth 2002, 33-51. For critique of the idealist-realist division, see for example, Doyle 1997, 27-28.

⁴⁸¹ In the populist Great Finns competition he was voted 47th; behind violence-embracing nationalists Lalli 14th and Eugen Schauman 34th and even behind the violent enemy of Finnish independence Otto-Ville Kuusinen at 38th. See (http://www.yle.fi/suuretsuomalaiset/in_english/).

⁴⁸² I will later, in discussion of Ståhlberg's belief in liberal democracy, show why he is so important to the Finnish state.

⁴⁸³ After his active career, we now know, Ståhlberg remained the grey eminence whose opinion was valued by the political elite, especially by President Paasikivi. My sentiment of Ståhlberg as a great statesman is shared in

republican future despite the Left-wing attack on Ståhlberg's republic in 1918 in the form of the Communist rebellion and despite the Right-wing attack on Ståhlberg's persona later in 1930 with his and his wife's kidnapping (kyyditys). The constitution Ståhlberg drafted abode with only minor changes until 1999/2000 and was the basis on which Finland has developed into one of the richest and most equal liberal republics in the world. In absence of Ståhlbergian nationalist liberal grammar from 1918 we are at loss to explain the real Finnish experience.⁴⁸⁴

In the realm of social science, I argue that political realism's true character is a truth which ought to be known: realism attaches a value to peace. Classical realism was from its beginnings always openly normative. We recognize the leitmotif of realism if we understand that it was designed to be a tool for peace. Carr's aim was first of all to recognize and then to act against the total neglect of the factor of power in the study of international politics. He was motivated to study the fundamental trends and underlying causes of war instead of looking only at the current events that were often if not always sugarcoated and masked under ideological rhetoric. *The Twenty Years' Crisis* was targeted against utopian, well-wishing writers that believed in the possibility of the elimination of power and therefore were blind to the real causes of war. Carr dedicated his IR-defining book "to the makers of the coming peace".⁴⁸⁵

We will be in a slightly less precarious position to construct our Republic's national interests, and balance the values that define our identity with the international requirements, by understanding what realism is. I argue that by concentrating on the ugly aspects of power-maximizing, realists were keen to expose the underlying facets we need to find to foster peace: wishing is not enough.⁴⁸⁶ Realism from this perspective has a profound and inescapable normative element favoring peace.⁴⁸⁷ Classical realism, through this reading offers us very different roots for our contemporary realist

wideranging writings by Kekkonen 1968; Rintala 1971, Aatos Erkko, Pekka Hallberg, Olavi Borg and Jukka Tarkka. President Mauno Koivisto declared support for the "Ståhlbergian model" as he moved Finnish foreign policy towards parliamentarism during his presidency.

⁴⁸⁴ The recurrent misunderstandings about the passed vs. continuous confrontation (vastakkainasettelu) resurfaced after the National Coalition presidential and parliamentary campaigns and reached its most provocative apex with Kristian Smeds' *The Unknown Soldier* 2007 play in the Finnish National Theater. The explicitly violent play ends in a 15-minute song with a chorus: "Finland is dead." For the following debate see Volanen vs. Smeds in Helsingin Sanomat from December 18th to December 21st, 2007. Ståhlberg, of course, opposed violence.

⁴⁸⁵ Carr 2001.

⁴⁸⁶ This point that realism is somehow more honest about its approach to world politics is nicely put by essayist Clive James: "No ideology can tolerate a full historical consciousness. Only realism can." In the chapter on Raymond Aron in James 2007, 44.

⁴⁸⁷ Mika Aaltola has studied the structure of Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*' pedagogical philosophy in relation to Finnish 1970s and 1980s university education. Aaltola states that Morgenthau's goal was to teach how a free, liberal society could be saved from internal and external threats by understanding the irrational powers and capacity for evil of human nature. Aaltola 2007, 78-101. See also Harle 1988, 225-252 (especially pp. 241-243).

tradition: “For [Morgenthau] theories are devised to serve normative ends.”⁴⁸⁸ Indeed, for us to foster peace we need to acknowledge the evil aspects of international power struggle, the military and war. In the concrete policy proposals the American realists have shown their real character.⁴⁸⁹ In the Finnish context, the first theorist of modern realism, Kullervo Killinen, has explicitly emphasized the normative responsibility of IR scholars: “[International relations] as a science, has to be paving the road towards an international community, where peaceful solutions have replaced wars.”⁴⁹⁰ To lessen the evils of the *grammar* one needs to understand and manipulate the *logic*. Through this reading realist national strengthening is not the major threat to (world) peace. The real threat is perceived to arise from the various ideas, ideologues, messianisms, dogmas and radical politics that constitute the utopias and promises of paradises on earth and final emancipation from the human condition. The challenge of wise foreign policy is then to restrain these dangerous ideas that viewed through the realist lens tend to arise quite naturally and repeatedly from the irrationality of life.⁴⁹¹ Indeed, “hope that reason may one day gain greater control over passions constitutes the essence of realism and unites realists of every generation.”⁴⁹²

In our case study what distinguishes the idealists waging war – Lenin, Trotsky – from realists was their belief and want to extend the Bolshevik empire onto the world, to create a world-wide classless society. This according to Marx would bring about the end of history: the dictatorship of the proletariat would be a harmonious utopia of workers living in a paradise on earth. Mannerheim, from this perspective another idealist wanting to wage war, on the other hand seemed to believe that an anti-Bolshevik Russia would somehow be grateful to Finland; his idea is of a somehow

⁴⁸⁸ Campbell 2007, 208. Structural realism has, interestingly enough, been perceived to advocate peace too. “...smuggled into [Waltz’s] theory is a significant ideological dimension. There are two aspects to his ideological stance. The first in an aversion to war...” See Little 2007, 211.

⁴⁸⁹ Mononen 2006. I have tried to popularize this theme by looking at concrete practices (policy recommendations) rather than abstract theory in the context of American foreign policy in the early 21st century. In my article *Realistit, rauhan miehet* I argue that realists are reluctant to advocate military force to solve political problems. This is especially true in complicated nation-building efforts and in promotion of ideologies, even if the ideology is liberal democracy. In this regard, realists are men of peace.

⁴⁹⁰ Killinen 1964 (b), 360. “[Kansainvälisen politiikan] on tieteenä oltava luomassa tietä sellaiseen maailmanyhteisöön, jossa rauhanomaiset ratkaisut ovat korvanneet sodan.”

⁴⁹¹ Albert Camus (1913 – 1960) is the most prominent international student of humans’ reactions to the absurdity of life. In his classic *The Rebel – An Essay on Man in Revolt* Camus studies human reactions to metaphysical and historical structures. From an IR point of view it is interesting to note that Camus came to oppose ideologies: “Every ideologue is contrary to human psychology.” See Camus 1991, 116 notes. Camus devoted his life to oppose nihilism. Mika Waltari (1908 – 1979) is the most delicate Finnish student of the human mind, the struggle of idealism and realism, history and life. Waltari’s favourite character he constructed in his magnum opus – *Sinuhe the Egyptian* – was also one of the most personal voices in Waltari’s production. *Sinuhe* warns of the dangers of all ideologies. (“Hänen [Sinuhen]... pessimistisyytensä varoittaa kaikkien ideologioiden vaarallisuudesta.”) In other writings Waltari then studied how extreme idealism was bound to end in tragedy. (“millaista olisi äärimmäisen idealismin toteuttaminen ja välttämätön muuttuminen tragediaksi.”) See Lindstedt & Vahtokari 2007, 69, 86-95. Man’s existential struggle to find meaning to life; to find something absolute and eternal (ehdoton ja ikuinen) in a Helsinki setting is studied in Waltari’s classic *Surun ja ilon kaupunki*. It might be worth noting that despite understanding reality’s constraints on the world of ideas and his occasional but recurrent moments of madness, depression and alcoholism Waltari was no pessimist.

⁴⁹² Gilpin 1984, 304.

harmonious counterrevolutionary community. The “bad peace” hampered this goal of a mutual friendship between the Finnish and Russian nations. Churchill, of course, reasoned in a similar fashion: a favourable European balance of power was possible only with a friendly Russia. Through Herz’s theory it is just this “belief in an ideal state of things to be realized at some moment or under some condition yet to be attained” that distinguishes idealists from realists, no matter how accurate and sober their appraisal of contemporary power political positioning might be.⁴⁹³

Realists, like Ståhlberg, believed that no matter what, Russia would be a challenge, not because of its ideologically hostile, totalitarian stance but because of the realist maxim of politics being essentially a struggle for influence. According to this view, it is relative material power that matters most. For Ståhlberg, peace was the means to create ends that would facilitate Finland’s position in the struggle for this influence. Even “satisfactory peace” would enhance Finland’s possibilities to develop its society, economy and military forces, unify the nation and to create better resources to ensure the survival of its people. Ståhlberg had a higher-minded motive than to act like an influence-maximizer as formulated by Schweller. For Ståhlberg the struggle for power was the problem. Ståhlberg, soberly saw that the development of the world starts from the development of one’s own nation: it is as much a question of what a nation can do for international politics as to what a nation can do in international politics. States should find their essential functions from the fields of internal, cultural, societal and economic development and to exercise and develop their internal strengths. The primacy of domestic politics goals over ambitions in foreign policy should be the real realist dictum.⁴⁹⁴

In our case study, the realist assumption of influence-maximizing and the national interest of building a stable democratic Finland (*sivistysvaltio*) strong enough to defend against external challenges, and the policy of peace coincide. Ståhlberg, the first statesman of independent Finland who can be described as a realist, was a man of peace. Ståhlberg curbed the political passions of the day and focused his and the nation’s sights firmly on the development and strengthening of the weak and poor Republic.⁴⁹⁵ During Finland’s early years, Ståhlberg did not try to find support for expansionist politics but wanted to secure independence in order to build and cultivate the bedrock of the Republic.⁴⁹⁶ Ståhlberg tried, keeping his eye pinned down on the future, to create methods

⁴⁹³ Quote from Herz 1951, 35.

⁴⁹⁴ Morgenthau knew this. For an illuminating if brief description in the American context, see Williams 2007, 231-232. The relevance to contemporary situation is obvious.

⁴⁹⁵ Haslam 2002. Haslam sees realists having rationality as the goal not as a precondition. Through this reading, Ståhlberg installed rationality, where emotions reigned. See also Williams 2005 for a good account of *willful realism*.

⁴⁹⁶ Puntila 1971, 135; Seppälä 1974, 11-35. Puntila writes: “Kun Suomi 1920-luvun alkuvuosina etsi ulkopoliittista tietään, ei se pyrkinyt saamaan tukea laajentumistahtoiselle politiikalle vaan halusi turvata itsenäisyytensä saadakseen rauhassa rakentaa tasavallan perusteita.”

and systematic guidelines for the management of foreign policy and decision making on foreign affairs.⁴⁹⁷ The non-interventionists thus defined peace as an essential element of the national interest – making an ethical choice in the narrowed possibilities of a realist worldview.⁴⁹⁸

*“Käy valtakunnan ohjaksiin nyt mies
työn tyynen, vaan ei miekan; tuosta raaka
ei väkivalta riemuinne kenties.”⁴⁹⁹*

“Ståhlberg was a man of peace and a parliamentarian. ... Military forces for him were the defense forces. He did not approve or permit offensive politics from the Finnish Army. Diplomacy reigned first in foreign policy.⁵⁰⁰

Ståhlberg, as the first President of the republic, set the road for a distinct Finnish brand of realism.⁵⁰¹ Ståhlbergian realism or realist liberalism is a foreign policy tradition that finds the essential rules of the international anarchic system defining much, but not all, that goes on in international relations. The two-tiered approach or worldview is simplified as strong dedication to liberal democratic principles in politics and to self-help military power as the guarantor of independence in international relations.⁵⁰²

The mainstream interpretation of the Finnish realist tradition in (peace research and in) foreign policy is seen to start from J. V. Snellman: the Hegelian tradition is seen to have then developed through Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen and Zachris Topelius to J. K. Paasikivi, Risto Ryti and Urho Kekkonen. Finnish foreign policy is seen to be a combination of two defining strands: the Hegelian – trust in military self-help – tradition and the liberal legalist tradition arising from the late 19th

⁴⁹⁷ Paasivirta, 1968, 109-114. ”Ståhlberg pyrki ... myös maan ulkopoliitiikan hoidossa luomaan asioitten käsittelyyn ja niitä koskevaan päätöksentekoon järjestelmällisyyttä ja suuntaviivoja tulevaisuutta silmällä pitäen.”

⁴⁹⁸ K. J. Ståhlberg is the closest thing I have found from Finnish political history to a Diodotus – the “soft speaker”-character arguing for prudent moderation, Thucydides presented (constructed) to bring his own policy recommendations to the fore. See Lahtinen 2006, 115-117 for Snellman’s view of the necessity of peace in the development of Finland.

⁴⁹⁹ One verse of the poem titled *President Ståhlberg*. The poem is written by Eino Leino and dated on July 29th, 1919, the day Ståhlberg was inaugurated as the first President of the Republic.

⁵⁰⁰ Pietiläinen 1985, 77, 85. ”Ståhlberg oli rauhan mies ja parlamentaarikko. ... Sotalaitos oli hänelle puolustuslaitos. Hyökkäävää politiikkaa hän ei Suomen armeijalta hyväksynyt tai sallinut. Ulkopoliitikassa diplomatian keinot kulkivat ensimmäisinä.” Sentiment of Ståhlberg as an advocate of peace is shared by President Kekkonen: “Ståhlberg was a man of peace, a courageous man of peace...” ”Ståhlberg oli rauhan mies, rohkea rauhan mies...” See Kekkonen 1968, 58–60.

⁵⁰¹ Why write a realist narrative? My positive sentiment towards political realism is an outgrowth (I now understand) of realist opposition to (from their view unnecessary) Iraq war (March 2003–) and their normative stance towards peace. Had I experienced realist opposition to NATO-enlargement (1990–), the expansion of the presence of liberal West to the post-totalitarian space in Eastern Europe and the subsequent enhancement of Baltic security my sentiment could well be the opposite. For an illuminating critique of realist opposition to NATO-enlargement; see Heikka 2005, 323 + notes.

⁵⁰² Earliest modern theoretical form for this kind of political thinking can be found from John Herz. In his book *Political Realism and Political Idealism* Herz lays out the policy of realist liberalism, pp. 129-251. Latest contemporary representation is Ken Booth’s *emancipatory realism* in his *Theory of World Security*. See Booth 2007, 87-91, 249, 272-278. Realist liberalism is not to be confused with liberal realism or the so-called “English School” of international relations theory (Hedley Bull & Martin Wight) even if it shares many similarities. For a comprehensive study of Finnish narratives, see Harle & Moisio 2000. Another tradition Ståhlberg started was the 6th of December Independence Day celebrations (Linnan juhlat); Finland was ready to celebrate her independence for the first time in 1922.

century.⁵⁰³ The stress on this tradition is on national self-help manifested in the often heard quote originally from Snellman but made famous by Paasikivi and later by Kekkonen: “A nation must entrust only itself” (*“Kansakunnan tulee luottaa ainoastaan itseensä”*). The self-help slogan that has since come to dominate the Finnish mind in security matters is literally engraved in stone. Suomenlinna (Viapori) sea fortress’ King’s gate (Kuninkaanportti) bears a plaque with the famous quote: “Progeny, stand here on your own foundation and do not rely on foreign help.” (*Jälkimaailma, seiso täällä omalla pohjallasi äläkä luota vieraaseen apuun.*) This sentiment is enforced in the public mind by the Winter War and the heroic self-reliance of the nation.⁵⁰⁴

All competing or rather complementary realist narratives also stress similar dictates, which underline the competitive nature of the international system and the role of self-help. Finnish foreign policy is perceived to be a combination of two seemingly contradictory yet logically complimentary foreign policy traditions: Paasikivian fundamentalism and Snellmannian emancipatory approach. The former claims that small states, in their foreign policy, are not in a position to mix emotions – sympathies or antipathies – with foreign policy decisions. The latter that small states need actively to find solutions to the challenges presented by the changes in the external environment.⁵⁰⁵ Others have viewed legalism and the continuation of the Snellmannian tradition – the cautious, “un-Polish” attitude in Finnish external relations, especially vis-à-vis Russia as the defining element in the history of Finnish political thought.⁵⁰⁶ The most old-school realist view states that Finnish foreign policy is based solely on following balance of power imperatives. From this perspective Finnish foreign policy has been advised by a peculiar state-centered realism: a combination of loyalty to a foreign power pole with a strong emphasis of Finnish cultural exceptionalism. According to this view, in times of change it is important (and Finnish leaders have done so) to recognize the most important power pole and engage in loyalty to it. Good statesmanship, in this kind of tradition consists of the ability to swiftly switch sides according to balance of power dictates (*oikea-aikainen takinkääntäjä*).⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰³ See for example: Kekkonen 1961; Pulkkinen 1983; Käkönen 1988, 180; Blomstedt 1980; Heikka 2005 and Liikanen 2006. For a good historical account of IR research in Finland see Antola 1983, 226-260. Antola sees Yrjö Ruutu as establishing IR as a distinct field of study by writing the first textbook *Nykyajan kansainvälinen politiikka* in 1934 and setting the first research agenda in 1942 where he stressed the importance of studying IR theory, geopolitics, history and Finland. Ruutu opposed Mannerheim’s interventionist reasoning. For his views, see Soikkanen 1991, 116-132.

⁵⁰⁴ The self-help slogan was engraved by Augustin Ehrensvärd (1710 – 1772). Ehrensvärd was Swedish.

⁵⁰⁵ Seppälä 1986, 12-13. “paasikiviläinen fundamentalismi” = “pienen maan ulkopoliitikassa ei ole varaa sekoittaa tunteita – sympatioita tai antipatioita – ratkaisuihin.” ja ns. “snellmannilainen emansipatorinen lähestymistapa” = “pienen valtioiden on myös aktiivisesti etsittävä ratkaisua ympäristön muutoksen mukanaan tuomiin haasteisiin.”

⁵⁰⁶ Rentola 2007, 3, 42.

⁵⁰⁷ Penttilä 2006, 33-34. Penttilä sees the only exception being trade policies that have always heavily been integrated to the West. Values naturally do not play a great role in this kind of tradition. Penttilä sees Mannerheim as an Armfeltian figure in Finnish politics, for his views on the similarities of these two cosmopolitans, see Penttilä 2006, 72-73. See also chapter Idealismia ja reaalipoliittikkaa. The statesmen Penttilä analyses are J.V. Snellman, Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen

Ståhlberg is not traditionally viewed to be a part of the Finnish realists. I am convinced, however, that Ståhlberg must be seen as a practitioner of the Finnish realist tradition but not the one presented above. I argue that Ståhlberg brought the afore-mentioned two strands of tradition (Hegelian and legalist) to life in a rational and balanced manner in his political thought and made them a lasting legacy that still exists. The army is seen as a necessity but a strong belief in transcending power politics is the primary motivator in international relations – international cooperation with liberal democracies is viewed as natural and the “do it alone”-mentality plays no mythic role.

Ståhlberg continued nursing the political heritage of J. V. Snellman. The similarities of the political thinking of Snellman and Ståhlberg are striking. First of all, they shared a fairly optimistic worldview that shunned tragedy in international politics: both valued peace as a necessity for Finnish development and advocated it in their policy prescriptions. Secondly, both were nationalist but had a cautious approach to independence – their sights were naturally set on it, but slow evolution was not to be risked by resorting to military means and violence. Thirdly, most importantly, both were focused on Finland’s internal development. Even though both were labelled radical during their times, they categorically opposed radicalism and violent upheavals and stressed the need for moderate bourgeoisie reforms. The motivator for action for both statesmen was the internal development of the Finnish nation through science and arts and economic development. The ideal was the creation of a constitutional democratic state with observed rule of law.⁵⁰⁸

What makes K. J. Ståhlberg such an important figure in Finnish politics and for the Finnish Republic is that he, in the Fukuyama sense, found the end of history for Finland.⁵⁰⁹ 1919 was the year when Finland could finally attach her loyalty to the constitution and to the international treaties that were based on it.⁵¹⁰ Ståhlberg’s position is even more unique because of the polarizing

and J.R. Danielson-Kalmari, Paasikivi, Kekkonen, Koivisto and Vanhanen; Ståhlberg is excluded. Penttilä’s future recommendation is cosmopolitan, global realism.

⁵⁰⁸ Huovinmaa 1981, 10-13, 21; Lahtinen 2006. The liberalization of Finnish foreign policy to the Snellman-Ståhlbergian ideal was postponed for over seventy years since independence because of the unliberal world order. The unfavorable balance power forced Finland to make concessions on her external conduct. Finnish foreign policy has been slowly brought to its proper alignment by President Martti Ahtisaari (1994-2000) – the winner of Nobel Peace Prize 2008 – who always remembers to stress Finland’s need to be cooperating with “Western democracies”. Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb (2008-) on the other hand has moved to shake of the last remnants of *finlandization* and opened the discussion on security matters.

⁵⁰⁹ See Fukuyama 1989; 1992. Fukuyama asserted that the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of events but the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

⁵¹⁰ Pitkänen 1996, 24-31. Weijo Pitkänen has written about his vision of Finnish constitutional realism that can be understood as a 3-step process of adaptation, taking root and loyalty (*sopeutuminen, juurtuminen ja lojaliteetti*). The processes of taking root and loyalty to the law were then to follow in the first years of the Finnish republic and Ståhlberg’s presidency. Pitkänen sees that Finnish foreign policy is built on the “memory of knowledge of its identity as a border state” (*rajamaa*). “Finland and Finns remember the curses of the [eastern] border.”

extremes of his times. The atmosphere of the post-war Finnish society was poisoned. It was dominated by the harsh and non-compromising style of the winners that viewed any actions they sanctioned as legitimized by their victory in the war. This was a natural outgrowth of the cruel civil war in which only twenty to twenty-five percent of the dead had died in combat.⁵¹¹ The political and intellectual atmosphere despised compromises and sustained the opinion fronts that were only months ago real war fronts. In this atmosphere, where extreme thinking reigned supreme, reconciliatory thinking was labelled as ideological betrayal.⁵¹² The tense ideological wiring of the Finnish public was consequentially present also in the conduct of foreign affairs. Foreign policy was assessed by many using domestic ideological criteria, not through sober power-political evaluations.⁵¹³ Ståhlberg's vision in the early 20th century for Finland's constitution, which not only had belief in transcending the power imbalances of the external environment but also transcended the cruel bipolarity of domestic antagonism, was based on his conviction of liberal democracy being the best form of human government.

This realist liberal tradition had been evolving long before Ståhlberg gave birth to it with the events we studied. Finnish liberalism has its roots in the mid-17th century and later in the Finnish enlightenment work of Anders Chydenius (1729 – 1803), A. I. Arwidsson (1791 – 1858) and H. G. Porthan (1739 – 1804). Personalities such as J. V. Snellman (1806 – 1881), Elias Lönnrot (1802 – 1884), Johan Ludvig Runeberg (1804 – 1877), and Zachris Topelius (1818 – 1898) had crucial roles in facilitating the development of Finnish identity – onto which the Finnish state and Finnish liberalism attached themselves. The 19th century was a time of progress for Finnish liberal thought. The first liberal club was established in 1880. The first real liberal party, the Young Finns Party, was established in 1906 with Ståhlberg as its political power figure if not its nominal leader. The early liberal program included goals of freedom of the press, promotion of local self-government and liberation of economic life. In its behaviour it is described to be cool and rationalistic.⁵¹⁴

Finnish liberalism has indeed gone through a strategic experience that has given it specific national characteristics: the first Finnish foreign policy tradition was born between realist and idealist pressures.⁵¹⁵ The years under study 1918 – 1920 were merely the materialization period for the

⁵¹¹ Paasivirta 1957, 227.

⁵¹² Paasivirta 1957, 230. Paasivirta's description is comfortless. (*järkyttävä kuva sisällisodan myrkytetystä ilmapiiristä, mielipiderintama, sovintoajatus aatepetturuutta, vallalla oleva äärimmäisyysajattelu, joka halveksii kompromisseja*)

⁵¹³ Paasivirta 1968, 71. "Siten ulkopoliittisia asenteita arvioitiin herkästi sisäpoliittisista lähtökohdista, so. eri kansalaisryhmien edustaman ideologian mukaan"

⁵¹⁴ Jutikkala & Pirinen 1979, 180. Luoto 1983, 239. Jutikkala and Pirinen describe Finnish realist liberalism: "A realistic political sense and the calmness native to the Finnish character prevented any unrest among the youthful element; and liberalism... was cool and rationalistic."

⁵¹⁵ Kunttu 1989.

thoughts that had been developing since the mid 19th century. The accepting attitude towards military force and national defense distinguishes Finnish liberalism from pan-European liberalism. Early on in 1874-1878, when the Tsar Alexander II (-1882) who was more liberal compared to his predecessors, signed the Conscription Act thus introducing conscription and establishing the Finnish army, the Finnish liberals were pleased. They thought it would contribute to the national strength.⁵¹⁶

Ståhlberg was another good example of this attitude: he did not oppose the Army and viewed it as an important piece of the national security policy. Also, his relation to voluntary national defence was not negative per se. Ståhlberg, however, strongly opposed soldiers and members of the civil guards meddling in politics. According to him, soldiers had to stay impartial and obey the legitimate state authority.⁵¹⁷ Contrary to liberalism elsewhere, Finnish liberalism has always been realist. Arisen as it was gradually during the period when Finland was a Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire in tandem with national awakening the experience had created a national strategic culture. Russia has been through times an anti-liberal educative geopolitical reality. For Finnish liberals, domestic politics and foreign policy were **not** aspects of one and the same thing. Finnish liberals were **not unaware** of the fundamental difference between domestic and international politics.⁵¹⁸ Domestically a liberal, internationally a realist, Ståhlberg accepted the importance of military means in Finnish security policy. In his speech after the negotiations for peace were concluded in his address to the parliament, Ståhlberg declared a lasting realist liberal heritage for the Finnish Republic:

“And the function of this Army is by no means over once this peace is concluded. If we wish to make this peace and the achieved interests enduring, the Finnish Army needs to be on its guard to defend Finnish independence and freedom.”⁵¹⁹

In the sphere of economics, the realist liberal tradition can be seen as a similar continuum of thought to the realm of foreign policy. Finland had, of course, matured into a modern state apparatus much earlier than into a politically modern state. Finnish economic discussion was thus state-centred and her trade relations were bound, like politics, to Sweden, Russia and Germany.

⁵¹⁶ Jutikkala & Pirinen 1979, 109. “The liberals thought even if they did not say so – that the army would serve as an added pillar to support national autonomy.”

⁵¹⁷ Pietiläinen 1992, 77, 85. ”Tämä ei tarkoita sitä, että Ståhlberg olisi ollut puolustusnihilisti tai armeijan vastustaja. Kansallinen armeija oli hänestä tärkeä osa kansallista turvallisuuspolitiikkaa.” ”Myöskään vapaaehtoiseen maanpuolustustyöhön Ståhlbergin suhde ei ollut sinänsä kielteinen. Hän vastusti kuitenkin jyrkästi sotilaiden ja suojeluskuntalaisten sekaantumista politiikkaan. niiden oli pysyttävä puolueettomina ja toteltava laillista valtiovaltaa.”

⁵¹⁸ For the critique of the ”foreign policy without politics”- approach; liberalist foreign policy, see Morgenthau ”1965, 42-.

⁵¹⁹ Ståhlberg’s lasting heritage was declared in his speech *Tarton rauhansopimuksen johdosta* held on October 16th, 1920. “Eikä tämän sotavoiman tehtävä suinkaan rauhantekoon pääty, vaan jos mieli rauhaan ja sillä saavutettujen etujen tulla kestäviksi, on täysikelpoisen Suomen sotavoiman oltava vahtipaikallaan valmiina puolustamaan Suomen itsenäisyyttä ja vapautta.”

Economic ideals were filtered from and to abroad by a few remarkable statesmen, the most important being Finnish political scientist Anders Chydenius. Chydenius wrote his main work on free trade *The National Gain* in 1765 prior to Adam Smith. Finnish realist liberals advocated, with the leadership of Chydenius and Snellman, economic policies that combined elements of economic nationalism with features of economic liberalism and then pragmatically applied these to Finnish circumstances. The strong state was perceived as essential but only to the degree that it would combine national and social thinking – liberal reforms were perceived as a possible means of solving the problem of pauperism. The context for these economic worries was in the population growth and the rapid processes of industrialisation and urbanisation that had changed the society dramatically. Population growth during the 19th century was rapid. The Finnish nation grew from one to three million between 1810s and 1910s. By 1915, almost a quarter of the population lived in urban centers. Ståhlberg's imprint on Finnish economic life as the establisher of administrative law and his profile as a social reformer in relation with economic development is important. All in all, realist liberalism defended free trade and can be seen as an advocate of the rising force of capitalism.⁵²⁰

Ståhlberg, the nationalist liberal lawyer, created a tradition for independent Finland's foreign policy. According to him, a small power should (and great powers too) find her goals primarily in domestic politics. Identity and loyalty should be tied to the liberal republican constitution. Politics was to be done in accordance with legal arrangements based on legitimate processes. This tradition is heavily characterized by the primacy of domestic policy, trust in legalism and a strong belief in small power possibilities in transcending power politics.

Another element contrasting the traditional reading of Finnish foreign policy traditions is Ståhlberg's positive attitude towards reciprocal and balanced Western cooperation. The liberal Young Finn movement had a "strong Western charge in it" – Finland was deemed to be opened up towards Europe and the West.⁵²¹ The balance of power constraints, and geographical proximity to Russia, have been a constant (and at times self-imposed) limit to the proper materialization and identification of Finnish identity, as viewed and constructed by the likes of Ståhlberg, as one of the

⁵²⁰ Heikkinen ed. 2000, 19, 22, 24, 69, 71, 80-81. The authors mention Friedrich List (nationalism) and Adam Smith (liberalism) of having had the most influence on the Finnish thinkers. Ståhlberg occupied the associate professorship in economic studies in the Faculty of Law. Chydenius' full text of *The National Gain* is available online at: (http://www.chydenius.net/historia/teokset/e_kansallinen_johdanto.asp).

⁵²¹ Kunttu 1995, 213. "Nuorsuomalaisuuteen kuuluikin voimakas 'läntinen lataus'; turhaan ei ole puhuttukaan ikkunoiden avaamisesta Eurooppaan." Maybe for contemporary security policy debates it might be worth to note that Ståhlberg was however explicitly reserved towards Sweden. For (an account of) the "westernizing" narratives in post-1945 Finnish foreign policy, see for example: Browning 1999, Jakobson 1980, 1996. See also Snellmann's realist appraisal of and clear distaste for small power neutrality and his views of how to take advantage of positive currents in international relations to better national security in J. V. Snellman *Sota vai rauha Suomelle* p. 170-171, 173.

leading liberal republican states with a functioning democracy and free market economy with low corruption, effective rule of law and observed human rights. The early years of the republic were no different. The limits to Finnish actions were always present, the violent challenge was to follow later. Although international politics is not necessarily tragic, questions of war, peace and world order often entail a tragic dimension.⁵²² In our case study the beauty of the absence of war aged rapidly. In the short-term, the revolutionary war continued with ruthless Trotsky ready to expose the cloak and exploit the sensed weakness of the “shivering professor’s love of peace”.⁵²³ The faith of East Karelia’s national self-determination was left to the mercy of Bolshevik policies.⁵²⁴ In the long run, the unanswered threat foreseen by anti-Bolsheviks like Churchill and Mannerheim was realized in the Nazi-Soviet pact, the division of Europe into spheres of influence and total war.

From this historical perspective, one needs then to study the case closely and ask: can power politics be transcended? Even though Finland chose peace, attached political loyalty to her constitution instead of any foreign power pole, constructed her national Army and believed in the possibility to transcend power politics, Finland still had an unsolved security dilemma. Inexperienced in world politics, Ståhlberg relied on his anglophile Foreign Minister to conduct much of the foreign affairs. The 20s and 30s were then times of hectic foreign political maneuvering to hide from and transcend power politics (League of Nations, 1920 and Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1929) and to find protection against the unanswered threat. Finland tried, in the absence of multilateral realist liberal institutions, to balance the growing Soviet power with Britain and France (1919-1921), from the coalition of states from the Baltic rimland (early 1920’s), Nordic cooperation (1930’s) and, finally before and during the Winter War by requesting help from the US, Britain and France.⁵²⁵

⁵²² It is interesting to note that Snellman found an element of tragedy in human condition. For Snellman the contradiction between human commitment to the laws and habits of his times and to his own vision of the moral world order creates a tragic dilemma. The objective judgment of history therefore runs to a tragic conflict with personal moral orders. See *Ajatuksia traagillisuudesta* p. 435. Snellman echoing the classical realists finds this arising from the human soul: “...for the human soul has lost nothing of its mystery.”

⁵²³ Trotsky’s speech quoted in Polvinen 1971, 256.

⁵²⁴ After Bolshevik seizure of power the national aspirations were suppressed under the cloak of *formal* national self-determination. Centralization of political power to Moscow further diminished national, regional or local political pressing the particular nationalist needs. Bolshevik control of East Karelia was facilitated largely through Finnish communists. After the peace treaty of Tartu that ratified Soviet sovereignty in East Karelia Finnish attempts to oversee and protect the interests and rights of Karelians through the League of Nations and other states were doomed leaving the “first Scandinavian Soviet Republic” under Bolshevik rule. The dawning national awakening of the Karelians had started to manifest itself politically in 1905-1906; diaspora in Finland drafted the first autonomy plans in 1917 – full independence was for the first time proclaimed in February 1919. In 1918 a request for East-Karelia to be connected to Finland were presented to the Whites, the following expeditions did not secure autonomy. Russification and assimilation were achieved by promotion of Orthodox religion, detentions, expulsions and suppressing of cultural and language rights. See Stacy Churchill 1970, 24-29, 32-33, 40, 70, 125, 153-200.

⁵²⁵ Heikka 2003 (b), 42; 2005, 204.

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