

Anne Raja-Hanhela

PEACE AND SECURITY AT STAKE

AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY ARGUMENTS

JUSTIFYING THE EU ENLARGEMENT TO TURKEY

University of Tampere

International School of Social Sciences

Department of Political Science and International Relations

Master's Programme on Political Communication

International Relations

Master's Thesis

August 2008

University of Tampere
International School of Social Sciences
Department of Political Science and International Relations
RAJA-HANHELA ANNE: Peace and Security at Stake – An Analysis of the Security
Arguments Justifying the EU enlargement to Turkey
Master's Thesis, 87 pages
International Relations (Political Communication)
August 2008

The purpose of this master's thesis is to analyse how the EU enlargement to Turkey is justified with security arguments. Historically, security has been an essential reason for EU enlargement and European integration in general and there is a reason to believe that security justifications exists also when it comes to further enlargement. This study focuses on security argumentation of the European Commission which is examined by analysing the speeches of European Commissioner for Enlargement Mr Olli Rehn.

The theoretical framework of this study is based on constructive understanding of security according to which security gets its meaning through a linguistic process of securitization. Something becomes a security issue only after it is labelled as such by the political elite. This study focuses on the securitization process regarding the EU enlargement to Turkey and analyses what kinds of issues are raised to the agenda of security. Research data which consists of the speeches by EU Commissioner for Enlargement is analysed with speech act analysis that is based on the theory developed by J.L. Austin.

This study illustrates that peace and security are still important justifications for EU enlargement. In post-Cold War era European integration and EU enlargement have been justified with the threat of fragmentation of Europe and even with the possibility of recurrence of Europe's warlike past. In the case of Turkey the security justifications for enlargement derive from the changed European and international security environment, not from the past. Based on the analysis there are three main security related justifications to the EU enlargement to Turkey articulated by the Commissioner for Enlargement. Firstly, the enlargement is justified with the need to promote intercultural relations and prevent the clash of civilizations. Secondly, the enlargement is presented as a necessity because of its stabilizing effect on Europe and its neighbouring regions. Thirdly, the enlargement is justified with its positive effect on the EU's role as a global security actor.

The results of the analysis indicate that the European Union is taking a 'next step' in its European peace project and thus in its enlargement policy as well. The accession of the Central and Eastern European countries in 2004 and 2007 finally ended the division of Europe into the East and the West and finalized the project of creating durable peace in Europe. With the enlargement to Turkey the EU aims to continue the peace project by extending the European security community into new area. Equally important for the EU is to promote security and stability in its neighbourhood just outside EU borders as well as in the global scale. Turkey is considered to be a key factor in that project. Turkey as a Muslim country inside the EU would enhance the relationship between the West and Islam and it would be a benchmark of democracy to the rest of the Middle Eastern states. Finally, the enlargement would make the EU a more capable actor to take greater responsibilities in security matters that relate not only to Europe but the whole international community.

Table of Contents

- 1. INTRODUCTION1
- 2. CONCEPT OF SECURITY4
 - 2.1. Classical definition of security.....4
 - 2.2. Widening the concept of security and the idea of securitization.....6
 - 2.3. European security community11
- 3. SECURITY AND THE EU ENLARGEMENT18
 - 3.1. Securitization: Strategy to justify enlargement18
 - 3.2. Argument from past: Enlargement preventing Europe’s past becoming Europe’s future.....20
 - 3.3. Answering to new challenges: Enlargement extending the zone of peace and security25
- 4. ANALYSING SECURITY SPEECH ACTS31
 - 4.1. The meaning of language.....31
 - 4.2. Speech act analysis.....34
 - 4.3. Towards data analysis.....39
- 5. SECURITY SPEECH ACTS JUSTIFYING THE EU ENLARGEMENT TO TURKEY42
 - 5.1. SPEECH ACT I: Preventing clash of civilization and promoting intercultural dialogue.....42
 - 5.2. SPEECH ACT II: Secure neighbourhood means secure Europe52
 - 5.3. SECURITY SPEECH ACT III: Promoting the global status of the European Union59
- 6. DISCUSSION.....65
- 7. CONCLUSIONS75
 - Bibliography79

1. INTRODUCTION

European integration is a phenomenon that has been studied from various points of views and European studies can be considered as quite an extensive field of study within the discipline of International Relations. With all the developments going on in the European Union there is no reason to assume that the importance of this field of study would decrease in the future. This master's thesis deals with one of the most topical issues related to European integration, the enlargement of the Union.

There have always been several motivations for European integration, peace and security being the most important. The original idea of European integration was to prevent war among European nations ever happening again. (Wæver 1995b and 1998, O'Brennan 2006.) Other important motivations for closer cooperation have been creating functional single market, extending the zone of democracy and promoting the European norms and values but the core idea has been establishing a security community through integration (Deutsch et al. 1968, Adler and Barnett (ed.) 1998). The EU enlargement policy has an essential role in enhancing security in Europe and in the neighbouring regions, and enlargement can actually be considered as part of EU's security policy in its own right (Missiroli 2004). Even though the situation nowadays is very different from the early stage of integration after the Second World War, the security basis for European integration and enlargement has not disappeared. To illustrate this, I will focus on the EU enlargement to Turkey and show that the security argument is still strong when justifying further enlargement.

Turkey's possible EU membership has raised lively discussion among the citizens and politicians of both, the EU and Turkey. Discussion has dealt with issues like economy, culture, religion and human rights but the security issues have not been considered that deeply. It is however been studied that security arguments by the side of the EU played a significant role when arguing in favour of the eastern enlargement 2004 (Higashino 2004, O'Brennan 2006) and based on this it is reasonable to assume that security is not an insignificant factor in the case of Turkey either. For this reason I consider it interesting to take a closer look at the security argumentation of the European Union related to Turkey's EU membership process.

In this thesis I will examine how security arguments are used to justify the EU enlargement to Turkey. The security approach I have adopted follows the broad and constructivist understanding of security (see e.g. Buzan et al. 1998). Security is understood here as something that does not only relate to states and military threats but also individuals, groups, nations, regions or the whole globe can face common security threats and challenges. The threats can relate of course to the military sector but also to social, political, economic or environmental issues. Securitization and security speech acts are essential concepts in a constructivist security approach. The process of securitization means that political elites raise a certain issue above normal everyday politics and present it as a security issue. This issue is considered as something that is threatening the referent object of security, the entity that needs to be secured. The security speech acts that cause the securitization are usually made by political leaders.

An important starting point for my study is that language matters. With language we not only describe but also construct and define the reality. This study focuses on the security speech acts appearing in the speeches of the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Mr Olli Rehn. I consider the Commissioner as someone who represents the general views of the European Commission and it is important to notice that I am not examining his personal attitudes. I chose the speeches of the Commissioner because I consider that in those speeches the EU's motivations for further enlargement to Turkey are expressed. Although in the speeches there are supposedly various kinds of reasons expressed why Turkey, when fulfilling the accession criteria, should be inside the European Union in this study I am concentrating only on the security based arguments.

The purpose of the study is not to evaluate whether Turkey should be accepted to the European Union or whether the security arguments that I will present are qualified or not. My goal is to identify the security arguments that are used to justify the EU enlargement to Turkey and it can later be debated how strong or weak those arguments are. I consider this research task important because I support the constructivist view that language does more than just describes, it has an effect on how the reality is constructed. In my study I use speech act analysis as a method to find those speech acts that actually do more than describe, which construct one way to understand the EU enlargement process in the case of Turkey. An important viewpoint in the securitization theory is that when certain issue or issues are raised

to the field of security, above normal politics, then significant and even extraordinary actions are justified. During the previous EU enlargement rounds certain security issues have been presented as such important threats and challenges that there is no other reasonable way to react but through EU enlargement. I argue that these kinds of justifications can also be found in the argumentation concerning Turkey's EU membership.

In the theoretical part of this thesis I will present which are considered as the main reasons for the EU integration and enlargement in general level. I will also go through the security related arguments that have been used from the side of the European Union in the context of earlier EU enlargement rounds. Based on this background analysis I will construct different types of security speech acts that can be used when justifying further EU enlargement. In the data analysis section I will analyse which speech act types are emphasized in the speeches of Commissioner Rehn. Finally, in the discussion section I will consider the results of the speech act analysis in a wider context, for example, the special features of the security argumentation relating to this particular enlargement. I will also discuss the implications we can make about the current European security environment based on this study.

2. CONCEPT OF SECURITY

2.1. Classical definition of security

Even though security is probably one of the most studied issues in the discipline of international relations it is not a simple concept by any means. Therefore, always when studying security it is important to clarify what is actually meant by security. In this context a long history of the development of security studies and the different approaches of it is not needed, but in order to explain my own position I must shortly present the main aspects of security studies. I will first describe what is meant by classical understanding of security and then continue to present the accomplishments of those who started to broaden the concept of security. This will bring me to a constructivist way of understanding security which is an important starting point for this study.

Traditional understanding of security is based on ontology especially favoured by realism. According to it, the international system is anarchic and international politics is above all about struggle of power between states. According to Kenneth Waltz, there is no self evident harmony in anarchy. States are always ready to use force if they appreciate the possible outcomes of the use of force more than they appreciate peace. War is always possible because any state may in any point end up using force if it considers it beneficial for its goals. Because any state can use force whenever they consider it useful, all states must be always prepared for the possibility of war. (Waltz 1959, p. 160.) Constant fear of war leads to a development where every state is increasing its military power in order to have more security and more power than others. Eventually states end up in a security dilemma because while everybody is trying to increase their security they are actually creating more instability with their armament.

If states live in anarchy where always exists a possibility for war it is not difficult to conclude what the concept of security means in that kind of a situation. For realists security refers above all to the absence of fear and threat (Der Derian 1995, p. 28). This kind of thinking represents the negative security, freedom of threats, whereas the positive security refers to something being secured. The often used way to illustrate the differences of these two is the 'freedom from' and 'freedom to' distinction where the first represents negative security, and the latter positive security. (McSweeney 1999, p. 14.) It is obvious that the level of analysis in

the traditional security studies is the state. State is the referent object of security, the unit that needed to be secured.

The realist view was criticized by liberalists and they saw also the possibility of a certain kind of non-military power. According to them, states can gain peace and stability by multilateral cooperation. Liberalist view considered that states need to use their power together and organize the international society in a way that eliminates anarchy and makes wars less probable. (Kegley 1995, p. 4.) For realists the structure of international relations is not dependent on the relationships between states. Waltz writes that although all states in the world would be peaceful democracies that got along with each other it does not change the ultimate structure of world politics, which is the anarchy. With this argument realists have tried to answer to the argument that democratic states do not fight against each other. This argument of democratic peace theory seems contradictory to realist view about sustainable anarchy but their answer is that changes in the system do not change the whole (structure of the) system. (Waltz 2001, pp. 5-10.) For them the structure of anarchy always exists even if all states would be peaceful democracies.

It is clear that European integration project suits better for the liberalist view than the realist one. The founding fathers of the integration theory believed that states could produce peace and security through cooperation. However, the viewpoint of integration theorists was not so different towards security. The traditional viewpoint towards security was not forgotten and 'how to prevent war' was still the main question related to security. (Wæver 1995a, p. 391.) The means to reach peace and security were the ones that changed. Integration theorists viewed international relations from totally different perspective than realists. For them there was no international anarchy, and states, as well as other actors that became noticed, were able to act in other ways than competing with each other. (Ojanen 2007, pp. 54-55.)

In the following chapter I will continue with the development of security studies and enter to the era where the whole understanding of the concept of security experienced important changes. Both liberal and realist world view considered war and developments that could lead to war among nation states as the most important security problems. However, there have always been other difficult social problems such as poverty and environmental disasters but

for a long time they were not considered as matters of security. This one-dimensional view of security started to change outstandingly in the late 1980s onwards.

2.2. Widening the concept of security and the idea of securitization

The end of the Cold War meant big changes not just to the security conditions of states and individuals but also to the security studies. For long it had been obvious that the bipolarity was the main character of international order. But after the downfall of this world order there emerged several theoretical perspectives on the post-Cold War security order. Scholars started to re-conceptualize security. Probably the most important move that was made was the widening of the concept of security. Scholars like Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, also known as the Copenhagen School of security studies, can be considered as forerunners in this field of security studies. Widening the concept of security meant above all that state was no longer considered as the only referent object, 'the target', of security. Scholars started to use terms like environmental security and economical security in which the global environment and economic order were considered referent objects of security. Other things than war between states were also regarded as security threats. This widening of security concept also brought along some problems. Wæver reminds that the danger in broadening security concept endlessly is that suddenly everything becomes security and the concept will lose its meaning. (Wæver 1995b, pp. 47-54.) In my study I try carefully define why I look at certain issues through the lens of security and how they actually become security issues.

According to Wæver, the most important question is actually what makes something a security issue. His answer is that security is actually a speech act – something is a security issue only after someone names it as such. (Wæver 1995b, p. 54.) Therefore it can be said that security is a socially constructed concept. Security does not exist by itself but it is always defined by a securitizing actor, usually being political leaders, bureaucracies or governments, in general, the political elite (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, p. 40). Like Wæver put it, "security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites" (Wæver 1995b, p. 57). The process where elites label certain issues or developments as security issues is called securitization. In other words, securitization is about "linguistic construction of a security problem" (Balzacq 2005, p. 172). The actual words used in the process of

securitization are the security speech acts. By securitization an issue is lifted above everyday politics and the referent object of security is *presented* to be existentially threatened, even though the situation would not in reality be exactly that (Laitinen 1999, p. 153). By presenting the referent object as threatened the securitizing actor claims a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means and even break the normal political rules (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 24). This is the motivation for securitizations. By securitizing certain issues the securitizing actors can raise these issues in a new level of politics. After that the issues are taken more seriously and more serious actions can be justified.

When examining the security speech acts it is important to consider in what extent it effects to the security agenda and whether it will change it. An important aspect of securitization is that in order to get some issue securitized successfully the audience, who judge the speech acts, must approve the particular security speech act (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 41). One must also take into consideration what kind of an impact the security speech act has on wider pattern of relations (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 26). For my own research this means that when analysing the security speech acts made by the Commissioner Rehn it is not enough to identify them but I also have to explain why they were made, why they are important to identify and what their meaning to the real world is. The answer to the 'why' questions was partly already given in the introduction. I consider it important to examine the security speech acts because they are part of the argumentation which the EU elites use when justifying the enlargement to Turkey. In the later sections of this study I will discuss more specifically about the content of the security speech acts and how they actually justify the further enlargement.

The securitization theory is constructivist by nature because it shares the idea that the reality is constituted in linguistic and social practices. Also the sense of threat, vulnerability and (in)security are socially constructed, not objectively present or absent (Buzan et al. 1998, pp. 57). Social constructivism is an approach to social sciences that adopts a critical attitude towards conventional ways of understanding the reality. Constructivists consider that knowledge is constructed and sustained by social processes and therefore they consider it important to study social interaction and especially language. (Burr 1995, pp. 3-5.) According to constructivist thinking, the structures of reality, also when it comes to security, are not only material but there is also an ideational dimension. This means that we cannot use the same mechanical methods to study social phenomena as we use to study nature. When studying

social phenomena it is essential to take into account the social rules that are constituted by subjective interpretations of actors. (Wendt 1999, p. 68.) For example, we cannot examine European, or the global security environment only based on existing material structures such as different kinds of security organisations or defence mechanisms but we have to take into consideration the other kinds of structures as well. It is essential to consider also how different parties construct the security dynamics from their point of view, how they see the relationships between different actors and how they frame certain situations. These constructions of reality naturally affect the material reality as well, they affect actions that are made and how they are interpreted by others. Even though it is assumed that security is socially constructed concept it does not mean that there is no real world and real threats. Olav F. Knudsen however criticizes the Copenhagen school and actually the whole discipline of international relations of forgetting the real problems of international politics. He calls for “a return to the substance of security politics”. According to him, security research should focus on the study of potential large-scale conflicts and it should consider states the most important security actors in international politics. (Knudsen 2001, pp. 355-356.)

Although Knudsen thinks that the Copenhagen School partly focuses on irrelevant things he also justifies their work by saying that their views are usable, not just in those issues he would like the IR scholars to concentrate on. He appreciates the innovative value of the securitization concept “for the study of the politics of security policymaking” (Knudsen 2001, p. 358.) In other words, it is the early stage of security policy which the securitization concept focuses on. With the help of securitization theory we do not solve existing security problems but we can study how security issues end up to the security agenda and how they are used to justify some policies. In my study I identify these processes of security policymaking in the context of Turkey’s EU membership. The security reasons for EU enlargement do not exist by themselves but they are articulated by, for example, Commissioner Rehn and then they can be used as justification for certain policy. Knudsen considers that it is not as important to concentrate on these kinds of issues as it would be to concentrate on the existing problems. From my point of view it is also relevant to study how and why issues emerge to the security agenda. It is important to gain more knowledge of the processes where reality is constructed so there is a possibility to evaluate them and we can also present alternative ways to see the world.

Knudsen is also very worried about the neglect of the importance of state in the current security studies. He seems irritated about the current trend of denying state-centrism. (Knudsen 2001, pp. 361-362.) It is acceptable that he would like to focus more on state as the most important actor in international politics, and as a referent object of security, but I want to emphasize that at least from my part the concentration to the regional level of security and seeing the EU as a referent object of security does not mean that I deny the importance of states. I do not see this as an either-or question; other levels of security can be studied without forgetting the importance of states.

There are also other critical voices presented towards the work of the Copenhagen School. Ralf Bendrath, Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello argue that security can be framed also in other ways than is suggested by the securitization theory. They consider that there is a reason to expand the conception of possible connotations beyond the negative and limited ones associated with securitization. According to the authors, all threat frames do not belong to the life-and-death category of existential threats. Bendrath et al. are interested not only in what is considered a threat and what is considered to be threatened (referent object) but also about the connotations of these aspects. According to them, threat frames, concept they use to refer to the 'outcomes' of securitizations, can be different by nature. They can concern antagonistic actors or for example some structural problems, and dependent on the thing causing the threat, fear can be greater or weaker. (Bendrath et al. 2007, pp. 60-61.) In other words they see the securitization process as a more diverse phenomenon, the securitizations can differ in degree. I think the corrective they are doing to the view of the Copenhagen school is not very radical after all. How I understand the requirement of "threat to the survival of a referent object" (Buzan et al. 1998, Laitinen 1999) does not exclude for example structural problems. Threats towards referent object may take many forms and still be serious enough to be considered threatening the survival of it.

Holger Stritzel is also one of those who criticize the securitization theory. Stritzel recognizes the value of Buzan and Wæver's work in security studies and considers the idea of securitization to be the most important contribution to security theories since the 1990s but his criticism is directed towards the attempts of the Copenhagen School to construct a more comprehensive theory of security. Stritzel considers that there are too many tensions and boundaries in the securitization theory and it should be re-conceptualized in order it to be

more useful in examining the real-world securitizations. (Stritzel 2007.) According to Stritzel, the problem of the Copenhagen School's security theory is that it does not conceptualize the relationship between the actor and the audience clearly enough. Although he does admit that in their recent works the Copenhagen School has written more about the role of the audience. (Stritzel 2007, p. 362.) The most important aspect that Stritzel argues is that the securitizing speech acts and the securitizing actors should be embedded in broader social and linguistic structures. According to him,

“an actor cannot be significant as a social actor and a speech act cannot have an impact on social relations without a situation that constitutes them as significant. It is their embeddedness in social relations of meaning and power that constitutes both actors and speech acts.” (Stritzel 2007, p. 367.)

I accept Stritzel's idea that the social situation in which the securitizing actor gives his speech act does matter when we think the successfulness of the securitization. The main point of Stritzel's criticism is that this has not been said clearly enough in the securitization theory of the Copenhagen school.

Thierry Balzacq poses similar type of criticism towards the Copenhagen School as Stritzel. He argues that the social context and the audience should be more carefully examined (Balzacq 2005). Balzacq also demands that the intentions of the securitizing actors' should be better noticed. He writes that “with very few exceptions, political elites use discourse to win a target audience without necessarily attending to one of the basic rules of a successful speech act – sincerity”. He also argues that when studying security speech acts, one should consider what they *do* as well as what they actually *mean*. (Balzacq 2005, p. 176.) I agree that it is reasonable to consider the situation in which the securitization is made from this point of view as well. Like mentioned, by securitizing certain issues the securitizing actors raise them above normal politics and they can claim a right for more serious or even extraordinary actions. We should always, as Balzacq suggests, consider also the motives behind the securitizations. From my point of view this is an important part of each securitization analysis. I will discuss more about the conditions of successful security speech act later in the methodological part of this study.

I agree with Stritzel and Balzacq that the relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience could be more clearly conceptualized. On the other hand, in my empirical study this is not such a relevant point because I am concentrating on the side of the securitizing actor and the speech act, not the audience. With my research data it is possible to examine what are the security speech acts like, but it does not offer a possibility to examine whether the audience finally accepts them or not. But it can still be asked whether it is sensible to think that the security speech acts given by Commissioner Rehn as a representative of the EU would be accepted by its audience in the current social situation. I think this is a justified assumption. The audience in this case can be considered to be all Europeans, politicians, decision makers, 'ordinary' citizens and media. From my point of view the EU Commissioner for Enlargement has such a positional power at the moment that he has the authority to do security articulations and the audience, people in Europe, accept his authority in this issue. One argument to support this idea is that it is the European Commission who gives the statements and recommendations concerning the progress of Turkey's membership negotiations.

After going through the development of security studies and the main points of the constructivist security understanding I will now move again one step closer to my research question and discuss about European security. In the next section I will write about the special nature of European security environment.

2.3. European security community

In addition to the so called constructivist turn another major change in security studies concerns the levels of security. Like mentioned earlier, traditionally security was about states and security threats coming from the side of another state. At 1990s IR scholars started to re-conceptualise security and they came up with the argument that state is no longer the only referent object of security. This means that besides state level, security dynamics can be studied in local, regional, inter-regional and global level. Buzan and Wæver claim that the regional level of security has increased its importance in international politics already since the decolonisation and especially after the end of the Cold War (Buzan and Wæver 2003). In this section I will present the idea of regional security complexes (RSCs) and explain how it is interlinked to securitization processes. I will focus on the European security complex, which

can also be described as a security community, and explain the history of it and the changes it is facing today.

Although the regionalist perspective of the Copenhagen School is rooted in territoriality and security, just like the neorealist approach, the constructivist understanding of security distinguishes these two perspectives from each other (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 11). The classical definition of regional security complexes emphasized the interlinked national security problems of the states but after adopting the more constructivist approach to security also the idea of regional security complexes was developed further. The new definition acknowledges all actors, not just states, and all security threats, not just the military-political ones. Buzan et al. give the following definition of security complexes after the widening of security agenda and re-conceptualizing the whole idea of security:

A security complex is defined as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another. (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 201.)

Regional security complexes are socially constructed in the sense that they are dependent on the security practice of the actors. It is always possible that the region is reconstructed based on what and whom the actors securitize. (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 48.) EU-Europe can be considered as a regional security complex because the security dynamics of all states and units among it cannot be separated from each others. The other regional security complexes in the current world are according to the authors, North American RSC, South African RSC, Middle Eastern RSC, Central and Southern African RSCs, Post-Soviet RSC, South Asian RSC and East Asian RSC (Buzan and Wæver 2003, Map 2). In addition to the security complex divisions Buzan and Wæver sketch the current world order by categorizing the leading powers of current world to superpower, great powers and regional powers. According to them, after the Cold War the USA has alone held the super power status. The criteria for super power status are that it must be capable of, and also exercise, global military and political reach. The superpower need to see itself as superpower and most importantly also be accepted by others as having this position. Great power status is less demanding to achieve. Great powers need not to have as big capabilities in all sectors as super powers and they do not have to be as active in the securitization processes all over the world. Great powers and regional powers are distinguished based on how they are treated by others. Great power status

means that they are considered by others to have potential to gain superpower status in the future. Great powers are also usually capable of operating in more than one region. According to Buzan and Wæver, the great powers of post-Cold War time are Russia due to its recent super power status and China, the EU and Japan all on the basis of them being regularly talked about and treated as potential challengers to the US and as potential superpowers. (Buzan and Wæver 2003, pp. 34-36).

According to the regional security complex theory, there can be different kinds of security complexes. One special kind of a regional security complex is a region where the primary fears and concerns of the units inside it are no longer defined by each other. This means that the RSC is becoming a security community. Any regional security complex is based on the security actions and concerns of actors, meaning that a security complex does not exist without securitization dynamics. Often this means that the actors of a security complex securitize each other but this is not the case in today's EU-Europe. Simplifying, it can be said that in a security community actors do not treat each others as security problems anymore but as friends. (Buzan and Wæver 2003, pp. 54-56.) The original definition given by Karl Deutsch et al. defines security communities as a group of people that is integrated so that "there is real assurance that members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way." According to the authors, there can exist two kinds of security communities, amalgamated and pluralistic communities. Amalgamated security communities emerge when two or more previously independent units merge into a single larger unit which has some type of a common government, whereas pluralistic security community maintains the legal independence of separate governments. (Deutsch et al. 1968, pp. 5-6.) Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett who wanted to revisit Deutsch's security community concept define pluralistic security community as a "transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change". When the security community is in this mature point, the actors of the region also share an identity and it becomes very difficult for the members of the region to imagine war among themselves. (Adler and Barnett 1998, pp. 30, 55.)

The European Union is generally considered as a best example of pluralistic security communities in today's international system (Wæver 1998, O'Brennan 2006). The EU clearly fulfils the criteria described above since the member states surely do not want to solve things

with physical fight and they have dependable expectations of peaceful change. John O'Brennan writes that it has been the aim since the early stage of integration to put an end to the power rivalries among European states and create a security community instead. During time the European integration has led to durable peace between former enemies as well as to an establishment of set of institutions and legal order which all are quite strong evidences about the success of European peace project. (O'Brennan 2006, p. 160.) In later chapters I will present based on studies of O'Brennan and others, how the enlargement process has become an instrument for extending the existing security community, and similarly, how further integration is being justified with the need to extend the security community.

Regional security complexes are often separated by insulator states. Insulator is a state which is between two regional security complexes but it is not strong enough to unify these two worlds into one. According to Buzan and Wæver's definition, Turkey is currently one of the states having an insulator status. (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 41.) The insulator states can have different kinds of roles. One possibility is that they do not actually have a role, meaning that they can be in relative isolation from the security dynamics from each side. Another possibility is that the insulator is involved to the security dynamics of both sides. Turkey has been playing the latter role rather than the former. (Buzan 1991, p. 196.) Harun Arikan argues that the security dynamics between the EU and Turkey are nowadays actually more intense than ever before. During the Cold War Turkey played an important role between the Euro-American side and the communist Soviet Union. After the end of the World War II the communist threat drove Turkey to seek security from the West and it tied close relationships with the United States and in 1952 Turkey became a member of NATO. The close relationship between Turkey, Europe and the US was in everybody's interest because the main aim was to have a strong coalition against the Soviet Union. (Arikan 2006, p. 198, Desai 2005, p. 370, Yilmaz 2007, p. 47.) In 1959 Turkey applied the associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) and in 1963 Turkey took the first step towards European community when the association agreement, the so called Ankara agreement, was signed. (Kütük 2006, p. 276.)

During the Cold War Turkey was considered by Europe and the Western block in generally as a bulwark against communism. It was important for them to prevent the influence of Soviet Union from increasing in the Middle East. It goes without saying that Turkey played an

important security role from the European perspective. For Turkey the Cold War and the security interdependence with the Western world was a chance to be recognized as a European state. In 1970s Turkey's strategic importance to the West was only increased due to the unstable conditions of the Middle East and close relations with Turkey were considered important. (Arikan 2006, pp. 198-199.)

After the end of the Cold War and collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe the position of Turkey and its geo-strategic importance to Europe was of course also reconsidered. However, it became soon apparent that the importance of Turkey's position did not decrease, it just transformed. The securities of Turkey and the EU are still very much interlinked. Regional military conflicts of Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East as well as the emergence of political Islam concern both Turkey and the EU. (Arikan 2006, pp. 204-206.) During the post-Cold War era it has become clear that relationship between the West and the Muslim world is one of the most important challenges we are facing today. This again increases the importance of Turkey for the EU and to the rest of the Western world. The often presented argument is that Turkey inside the EU could offer a possibility for better dialogue and cooperation between the EU and the Muslim world. Burak Akçapar calls this process as the "next fundamental peace project" for Europe. (Arikan 2006, p. 209, Akçapar 2007, p. 10.)

Throughout the long common history of Europe and Turkey in security matters Turkey has always played some kind of a special role for Europe. After all changes Turkey can still be considered as a 'special case' which is actually one of the reasons I consider it interesting to study particularly the case of Turkey. When considering the specialness of Turkey one issue to be noticed is that Turkey is a society where military related security issues are present more obvious than in any EU- European state. According to Pinar Tank, the military has traditionally three roles in Turkish politics. It is committed to stay outside of the politics but it intervenes if required to protect the state. The military also sees itself as responsible for safeguarding Turkey's democratization as a part of Westernization, while it refrains from acting as an instrument of political government. Finally, the military is in the paradoxical position of wanting a place in the Western community of states while retaining a certain degree of suspicion towards the West. (Tank 2001, pp. 221-222.) This unique arrangement of political and military power inside Turkey is something that certainly causes concerns in the side of the EU.

The geostrategic position of Turkey gives without a doubt a reason to consider Turkey as a special case. Turkey's location between the Europe and the Middle East has always been an interesting issue to the United States and it is that for the EU as well. According to Tank, in addition to the US and the EU also Turkey regards itself as a special case. This is exactly because of its geostrategic position on NATO's southern flank. (Tank 2001, pp. 223.) Tank argues that there is actually an ongoing redefinition of Turkish foreign policy and a part of it is geographic repositioning aimed at strengthening Turkey's regional role. Turkey participates to the competition for allegiances in the Caucasus and Central Asia with Russia and Iran and because of the support from the United States its position is not weak. Tank argues that Turkey's political elite believes that one of the reasons behind the EU's interest to integrate Turkey into Europe is the potential role that it may play in the European Security and Defence Policy, and this reinforces Turkey's impression that it should be regarded as a special case and as an alternative centre. (Tank 2001, pp. 224.) The fact that Turkey is located in delicate region in geostrategic terms and the viewpoints according to which Turkey is very aware of its importance and possibilities regarding optional partners re-enforce my thoughts about the interestingness of the security dimension of Turkey's possible EU membership.

Gülnur Aybet represents a view according to which Turkey's specialness has to be recognized but it cannot mean different or unfair treatment compared to the other applicants in the history of EU enlargement. He rejects the idea that Turkey would ever accept anything else but a full membership in the EU, for example some kind of privileged partnership, and predicts that if Turkey after all the changes it has made is not accepted to the EU as a full member it would have wider repercussions for Turkey's relations with the EU and the West in general. According to him, rejection by the side of the EU would send negative signals to the Islamic world and especially to the Muslim populations of the Balkans. Aybet writes that a refusal of Turkey's membership would make the EU look like a 'Christian Club'¹ despite all its opposite efforts. He argues that a collision in the EU-Turkey relations might encourage Turkey to seek stronger ties from somewhere else, for example Russia or its Middle Eastern neighbours, and it would become more isolated from the West. (Aybet 2006, pp. 529, 539.)

¹ 'Christian Club' is a term used to describe the EU by for example Turkey's former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz who claimed that Turkey was excluded from the accession process on religious grounds in the EU's 1997 Luxemburg summit (see e.g. Aybet 2006, p. 538).

Thomas Diez and Barry Buzan considered the security consequences of Turkey's possible EU membership in their common article in 1999 and came to a conclusion that an alternative option to full membership would be better for European security. Diez and Buzan argued that the EU and Turkey should find an alternative to Turkey's full membership because the stability and security of Europe would be better guaranteed if Turkey would stay as an insulator state. They argued for example that Turkey's membership could lead to too close (negative) security dynamics between the European and the neighbouring security complexes. (Buzan and Diez 1999.) However, in 2005 Diez wanted to revisit and correct the previous arguments by Buzan and himself. He argues that the situation from 1999 has changed so much that the argument is not valid anymore. He refers to developments in the EU, such as 2004 enlargement and the membership of Cyprus, and to positive developments in Turkey as reasons why he has come to a different conclusion, according to which Turkey as an EU member would bring more stability than an insulator Turkey would. (Diez 2005.)

It is clear that also the European Union considers that Turkey, which fulfils the accession criteria, belongs inside the European security complex rather than to a position of an insulator state. As the EU Commissioner justifies with the security speech acts the EU enlargement to Turkey, it also justifies why Turkey should be a part of the European security complex, or the European security community. Like mentioned, the purpose of this study is to open up the reasons for this, to explain what the issues that make the enlargement to Turkey needed and justified are.

3. SECURITY AND THE EU ENLARGEMENT

3.1. Securitization: Strategy to justify enlargement

In this chapter I will discuss the relationship between security and the enlargement of the European Union. Before going to my research data I will consider what kind of ways there are to justify EU enlargement and European integration in general. Before focusing more closely on the security arguments I will first shortly present the main motivations for integration.

Historically, the idea of European integration was to prevent wars like the First and Second World War ever happening again (see e.g. Wæver 1995a, p. 393). The purpose was to create common interests for the states, for example in economic terms, which for one would prevent them from fighting against each other. These were the first steps towards European security community. A mutual security threat, in this case the possibility of a new war in Europe, is one of the strongest reasons that can lead to an emergence of a security community (Adler and Barnett 1998, p. 38). Although in economic terms the integration helped Europe to survive in the tightening competition of the world market, the original justification for European integration was undeniably peace and security. There were actually several security problems that could be considered as a reason to tighten the European cooperation. In the 1940s and 1950s, the early stage of integration, the most obvious one was the communist threat. At that time it was important to separate the East and the West and European integration was one way to emphasize that Western European countries really did belong to the West. In addition, the economy could be considered a matter of security and survival. The question was whether Europe would recover from the losses caused by the war, and the economic dimension of the integration was presented as a solution to this problem. European integration also offered an answer to the German question; how Germany could return to the scene of international politics after the happenings of Second World War. The answer was to bind Germany into NATO and the European Community. There was also another security argument that supported integration, a more general historical argument. The idea was that Europe had to make a choice to “change course from wars to integration”. The threat was that wars among European states would happen again and the solution was to avoid the emergence of such security concerns that would be directed at each other by turning energies elsewhere. (Wæver 1998, pp.81-83.)

In addition to the original security argument – to prevent war among European states – there are other motivations to ongoing European integration as well. First, it must be noticed that the security argument has become more multidimensional. As I will present in the following sections, the original argument of a return of the balance of power system and war has appeared in enlargement discourses until lately, but the security environment of today's Europe is however more diverse, and so are the security issues related to EU enlargement. Threats in the European security environment are not just armed conflicts between states but they can be environmental disasters, conflicts arising from minority questions related to ethnic, religious and cultural issues or for example conflicts related to energy supplies. (see e.g. Arıkan 2006, p. 19.) These are all security issues that are related to European integration. They are also security issues that can be used as an argument in favour, or against, of EU enlargement. They are issues that can be *securitized* that is to say presented as a threat to the referent object, the EU. Subsequently, an answer to those problems can be presented in the form of stronger and wider European Union. This is the logic of securitization being a strategy to justify enlargement. First, the security threats are pointed out and then the enlargement is presented as an answer. This issue will be dealt with in more detail later when I discuss the securitizations that have been used earlier in the context of EU enlargement.

When it comes to other than security reasons for EU enlargement the economic motivation for integration was already mentioned; the creation of the European single market was and still is one of the most important reasons for the existence of the EU. One example of political motivations would be the promotion of democracy. Extending the zone of democracy has always been at the core of European integration and thus one aim of further enlargements. It is a common argument that enlargement is needed in order to enhance and spread democracy. This is also closely related to the security justification since an essential part of EU ideology, and in generally the western idea, is that democracy leads to peace and security. Another motivation and justification for integration would be history, the common European heritage appreciating the same norms and values that has created the common European identity. This argument was strongly used in the context of Eastern enlargement in 2004. The enlargement was all about re-uniting Europe and as Harun Arıkan put it, that particular enlargement process can be considered as “a means of ending the unnatural division of Europe”. (Arıkan 2006, pp. 26, 45.)

When it comes to Turkey's possible EU membership, it can be said that all these possible arguments have appeared in the general discussion. If I included in my examination all participants of the discussion – politicians, media and citizens in all member states – I would soon notice that the discussion can be quite contradictory. The same arguments are used when justifying the enlargement to Turkey or when arguing against it. For example the 'common heritage' reasoning has been used both ways. Turkey can be considered as an essential part of European history and cultural heritage, and that can be presented as a clear basis for membership. On the other hand, simple arguments such as 'Turkey does not belong to Europe' have also been used as a reason not to accept it in the EU (Kütük 2006, p. 275, Redmond 2007, p. 313). I want to specify here that I am well aware of these contradictions and for this reason I want to concentrate on one point of view, which is the argumentation of the European Commission, and how it is used when justifying the EU enlargement to Turkey.

Above I presented the most important motivations for European integration; security, democracy, functional economy and historical and cultural reasons. Following sections concentrate on the security based justifications of EU enlargement that have been used before and those that can be drawn from the theoretical literature of the field.

3.2. Argument from past: Enlargement preventing Europe's past becoming Europe's future

As presented earlier, peace and security were the most important reasons that launched the integration developments in Europe. Later the same idea, enhancing security by bringing people and states together, has continued in the form of EU enlargement. Enlargement has in fact become an essential part of the European Union security policy. Antonio Missiroli argues that there are two basic grounds for this statement. Firstly, by extending the EU's norms, rules and opportunities enlargement has made instability and an emergence of conflicts on the continent very unlikely. Secondly, the new member states have given to the EU possibilities for new policies and have also strengthened the EU as an international actor. (Missiroli 2004, p. 16.) The enlargement policy has in other words become an important tool for the EU to provide security in Europe and in its neighbourhood as well as to position itself in a way in the international community.

I will first present more precisely the security argument that is based on the idea of justifying European enlargement by warning about the security threats of Europe's past. This security justification for European integration was quite an obvious one after the First and Second World Wars, but what I consider interesting is that it has not disappeared from the agenda during the later EU enlargement processes. In this chapter I will go through two quite recent studies by Atsuko Higashino (2004) and John O'Brennan (2006) that deal with the security justifications of the 2004 EU enlargement. I want to present these studies in detail because they have similar research questions as well as theoretical and methodological approaches to my own study.

Higashino argues that the "European peace and security argument", as she calls it, was constructed as one of the most important grounds for the eastern enlargement in 2004. This means that significant actions and policy instruments for eastern enlargement were demanded in the name of European peace and security. (Higashino 2004.) According to this argument, the reason for the necessity of European integration is in the dark and violent past of our continent. Buzan and Wæver argue that in post-Cold War Europe the strongest security discourse has been the argument that Europe's past cannot become Europe's future. Europe cannot return to its past of wars and power balancing and this is the reason why integration is a necessity. In this argument the existential threat that is threatening the referent object of security, the EU-Europe, is that history would repeat itself. (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 356.) Security discourses like 'Europe's past cannot become Europe's future' do not naturally emerge from nowhere but there is always someone, the political elite, who constructs them. As Knudsen reminds, policies with security implications are not given by 'nature' but they are always chosen by the political elite and decision makers who have an interest to frame them in a certain way (Knudsen 2001, p. 359).

The argument that Europe's biggest threat is its own past also offers a solution: integration is the right way to gain durable peace and security. Higashino writes that the argument of Europe's threatening past was used by the elites when justifying the EU's eastern enlargement in 2004. According to her, before the eastern enlargement the European elites carefully warned of the heavy costs of choosing *not* to integrate. The price to pay could be the fragmentation of the Union, the rise of nationalism or even a return to Europe's previous

balance-of-power system and war. (Higashino 2004, p. 350.) The idea that the situation in Europe could ever again be the same as it was before and during the First and Second World War seems from today's perspective rather impossible and it raises a question of how these kinds of arguments can be effective, or whether indeed they are effective. According to Buzan and Wæver, the power of this kind of argumentation does not rely on its likelihood but it can better be described as a myth that is maintained by the elites in order to justify their integration project. However, it can never be said for certain that the possibility does not exist. (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 376.) I think the power of the argument lies exactly there. No matter how impossible the option of a terrible war in Europe seems now, when somebody is reminding that it was the reality only approximately six decades ago and argues that it can be avoided with a certain policy, it does not seem so irrelevant an argument at all. Moreover, it should also be taken into account that we do not have to go back to the World Wars I and II when thinking about the unbalances of Europe. Following the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe there was an argument presented by some realists that the removal of the "artificial straitjacket" provided by the cold war, as O'Brennan expresses it, would mean a return to a more pure form of Hobbesian anarchy (O'Brennan 2006, pp. 156-157). In this respect the argumentation based on Europe's past does not seem so out-of-date.

The argument of Europe's past being a reason to integration has existed across the history of European integration. Nowadays it has become self evident to argue that European integration is needed in order to avoid fragmentation. Fragmentation is presented to be a threat as such, and integration as an aim in itself. In this discourse there is a clear choice between integration and fragmentation, and it is not a matter of how Europe will be, but rather whether Europe will be. The threat of Europe's fragmentation is represented to mean the end of peaceful and stable Europe. (Wæver 1998, pp. 90-91.) It is however good to remember also that integration is not considered by everybody as some kind of a security proof. In addition to fear of fragmentation there has always existed also fear of integration. According to this view, the integration threatens the sovereignty and national identities of European states. (Buzan and Wæver 2003, pp. 356-358 and Wæver 1998, p. 89.)

Higashino and O'Brennan agree that EU elites did use security speech acts in order to justify the eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004. Next I will explain more detailed the logic of justifying EU enlargement with security speech acts. According to Higashino and O'Brennan,

European integration as a whole is an example of desecuritizing effect. Higashino writes that even though a securitizing move dramatizes certain issue to be a matter of survival, and lifts it above normal politics, the actual policy instrument that follows might well be a desecuritized one, where the issue is actually being normalised. According to the authors, the European integration process – and the eastern enlargement as a part of it – can be seen as a process of desecuritization through integration. The logic is that EU enlargement is a repetitive process of securitizing moves which are made in order to generate a desecuritizing effect, peaceful and stable Europe. (Higashino 2004, pp. 351-352, O’Brennan 2006, p. 162.) Accordingly, it can be said that EU enlargement is justified by elites through a system of securitization and desecuritization. By securitizing issues they can draw attention to security challenges that are linked to for example the EU’s eastern enlargement or to Turkey’s EU membership, and then they will present the benefits of enlargement for the situation. As a matter of fact, integration is presented as an only answer to those security problems. This is the logic of justifying enlargement with security speech acts. First the security challenges are highlighted, and then integration is presented as the right and only option to tackle them.

Like mentioned, Higashino and O’Brennan both have analysed the discussion concerning the EU’s eastern enlargement in 2004 and they argue that EU elites did use the system of securitization and desecuritization when justifying the enlargement. According to O’Brennan, a range of issues considered to constitute geopolitical problems for the EU were framed as existential threats to peace, security and welfare of the EU. He gives several examples of the securitization moves leading to desecuritization treatment within the framework of the enlargement process. The securitization moves concerned many kinds of issues from environmental issues to EU-Russian relations. O’Brennan argues that the EU elite’s strategy of securitization and desecuritization was very evident for example with respect to nuclear power stations in the candidate states. Nuclear power stations were considered to constitute an existential threat to the EU which justified the securitizing move, and the desecuritization strategy was built on the benefits of EU integration, for example, the EU having capacity to give aid for decommissioning of aged mechanisms. When simplifying, the threat was that a nuclear disaster would happen and the best and only solution was the help that the EU could give. (O’Brennan 2006, p. 163.)

Another interesting example which O'Brennan gives concerns the EU-Russian relations and how the EU representatives needed to actually desecuritize Russia. The logic was that since there was instability created by the fragmentation of Russian power and the uncertain conditions of Russian's domestic politics there was a question whether it is sensible to take the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) to the EU if it poses a risk that the EU will somehow become more involved with those instable conditions of Russia. In this case the securitization was already quite clear without any extra effort from the side of the EU, the threat was the whole unstable situation in Russia. But what the EU representatives needed to do, in order to justify the enlargement, was to desecuritize Russia as an existential threat within the enlargement framework. The task was to ensure everybody that when the Central and Eastern European countries are inside the EU, then they can deal with Russia as members of the EU front and there will be no tensions and risks. Over time Russia did transform in EU discourse from "a strategic rival to a strategic partner". This confirmed the idea that if the CEECs are inside the EU there is a great possibility to deal with Russia in the spirit of cooperation, and if they are left outside no one really knows what can happen. O'Brennan considers the institution of Northern Dimension as one of the desecuritization moves that were taken during the above described process. The objective of the Northern Dimension was to strengthen cooperative structures and diminish potential tensions with Russia through constructive engagement. The most important instrument of desecuritization was according to O'Brennan, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia and it became an essential mechanism for building EU-Russian relations in the context of eastern enlargement. The intention was to create mutual understanding between the enlarging EU and Russia. The reduction of threat, the desecuritization, was to be achieved through ongoing political dialogue and institutional interaction. (O'Brennan 2006, pp. 166-167.)

In this section I have attempted to explain the logic of justifying EU enlargement through the system of securitization and desecuritization. It is important to explicate here that the power of justification comes from first representing a certain issue as a security problem and then giving the EU enlargement as an only possible answer to it. Then I have also given some examples of the use of securitization and desecuritization system in practice. In this section the examples of justifying enlargement with security arguments have derived from the Europe's warlike past. The message of these arguments is that the borders of the EU need to

be extended in order to preserve and enlarge the European security community and to prevent its collapse, which would mean return to imbalance and even war.

When it comes to Turkey's EU membership process it is interesting to see whether this old argument of preventing Europe's past becoming Europe's future is in some way present when justifying the EU enlargement to Turkey. It is interesting to evaluate whether Turkey's EU membership is considered important by the EU commission in order to prevent internal conflict in Europe or does the justification for Turkey's EU membership derive from somewhere else. My hypothesis which is based on earlier studies and literature concerning the security dimension of Turkey's EU membership is that the EU enlargement process to Turkey represents new face in the enlargement policy of the Union. I do not consider it likely that the EU enlargement to Turkey would be justified with the same arguments than for example the eastern enlargement in 2004. There are security based justifications but probably the threats which are reasons for these justifications do not relate to Europe's past but newer threats that are linked to the specialness of Turkey. In the following section I will concentrate on these security arguments that also justify further enlargement but which derive from new European and international security environment and new kinds of threats.

3.3. Answering to new challenges: Enlargement extending the zone of peace and security

Sven Biscop writes about the changed nature of European security since the end of the Cold War. He argues that although there have been armed conflicts in Europe also in 1990s, and the risk of them still exists on the borders of the European Union, one can observe a clear change in the EU-European security environment. Other factors than military threats have become to the core of the European security such as organized crime, illegal immigration, social and economic underdevelopment, ecological problems and lack of democratic institutions. According to Biscop, there is increasing awareness of the importance of values in international relations, such as democracy and respect for human rights. (Biscop 2005, pp. 2-7.) P. H. Liotta also writes that the European Union has lately incorporated values and norms as a basic *ethos* in approaching security (Liotta 2006, p. 33, italics in original).

As the awareness of the many dimensions of security has increased so has the number of international players. The multidimensional nature of security has been recognized and there

are also many non-state actors involved. In response to the changing security environment states and international organisations, the European Union among others, have sought new ways to deal with security. It was noticed that only a comprehensive security concept can provide an effective response to the new security environment. First attempt to create a distinctive European security strategy was attempted by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1995. In the resulting Common Concept the WEU emphasized “Europe’s new responsibilities in a strategic environment in which Europe’s security is not confined to security in Europe”. WEU also highlighted the importance of the maintenance of international peace and order, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, the rule of law as well as the need to prevent economic imbalances from becoming a threat to Europe. (Biscop 2005, pp. 2-4.)

In December 2003 the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy. It is characterized by broad, multidimensional and comprehensive notion of security. This means consideration of all aspects of security – political, socio-economic, ecologic, cultural and military. Another important characteristic is a focus on dialogue, cooperation and partnership. European Security Strategy outlines five key threats to Europe; terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. According to the Security Strategy, the first threat, terrorism, poses a growing strategic threat to whole Europe by putting lives at risk, imposing large costs and seeking to undermine the openness and tolerance of European societies. The Strategy emphasizes Europe being both a target and a base for terrorism. In the Strategy it is said that the second threat in the list, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, is potentially the greatest threat to Europe’s security because we are entering a new stage where the possibility of a WMD arms race increases, especially in the Middle East. Regional conflicts, violent and frozen, are considered as a third threat to Europe. They threaten regional stability, destroy human lives, social and physical infrastructures and they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. The fourth threat, state failure, is often associated with organised crime and terrorism and it also adds regional instability. The fifth threat, organised crime, is an internal threat with external dimension including for example cross-border trafficking of drugs, women and illegal migrants and it can also have links with terrorism. (European Security Strategy 2003, pp. 3-5.) This list of key threats also appoints how the concept of security is understood in today’s Europe. Threats are multidimensional and often linked to each others.

The strategic objectives presented in the Security Strategy also try to take into account the nature of new security threats. Three strategic objectives outlined in the Strategy are 1) addressing the threats 2) building security in Europe's neighbourhood and 3) strengthening the international order. The first objective relates to the nature of new and dynamic threats. In an era of globalisation it has to be taken into account that threats that are far away may become as much a concern as those that are near. The third objective, strengthening the international order, means that the EU considers Europe's security and prosperity being increasingly dependent on effective multilateralism. The EU is in favour of strong international organisations and it wants regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security. (European Security Strategy 2003, pp. 6-8.)

The second objective is what actually combines EU enlargement and the European Security Strategy. The Strategy acknowledges that even though we live in an era of globalisation, geography still matters. It is in Europe's interest to have well-governed countries on borders. According to the Strategy, weak neighbouring states and those that are somehow connected to the violent conflicts pose security problems for Europe. The integration of new countries can bring stability and security to Europe but it also brings the EU closer to troubled areas and therefore the Strategy demands that it is the EU's task to promote a ring of well governed countries around Europe. (European Security Strategy 2003, p. 8.)

One way of extending the zone of security over the borders of the EU is the enlargement process. Kenneth Keulman supports the view that security in Europe demands sustainable democracies in the borders of the EU. He argues that the EU has taken this notion seriously and it has attempted to increase its influence beyond its borders, the expansion of the Union being one of the means. With this the EU attempts to increase stability and extend the fundamental principles on which it is founded. (Keulman 2006, pp. 48, 53-54.) The eastern enlargement is considered as a successful example of overcoming the old enmities in Eastern and Central Europe and establishing peace within the Union. The European Security Strategy aims to continue this strategy of spreading peace. (Quille 2004, p. 426-427, Biscop 2005, 16-18.) The second strategic objective of the European Security Strategy does not automatically mean that the EU should continue further enlargement as far as possible. There are other means to obey this strategy, for example the EU's neighbourhood policy, but it definitely

offers another justification for the EU enlargement. There is a clear argument of enlargement being needed so that the EU can spread peace and security to its neighbourhood.

The above described argument is different from the one presented in the previous sub-chapter. In that European integration was justified by reminding the horrors of past and the threat being the recurrence of them. This newer argument derives its power from the changed nature of threats and security environment. Enlargement is a part of the strategy of extending the zone of security around Europe, and if this is unsuccessful the threat is that the direction will be the opposite and the possible disorder in the EU's neighbourhood will have effects on the security of Europe, for example in the form of terrorism. Turkey's possible EU membership has been considered to have a stabilizing effect on regional security. Even though Europeans have not always been enthusiastic about Turkey's EU membership it is recognized that Turkey plays an essential role in promoting peace and security in the neighbourhood of the EU (Aykan 2005 and Redmond 2007). Turkey is perceived as a model state to other more unstable and radical states of the Middle East and Mahmut Bali Aykan writes that the hope of the EU has been that by supporting Turkey in its democratic developments there might be some spillover effects on the other countries as well (Aykan 2005, p. 340).

In the list of key threats of the European Security Strategy the political Islam is not mentioned as a direct threat to Europe. There have, however, been suggestions of Islam being the greatest threat of Europe and the whole Western world already since the late 1970s (Roberson 1998, p. 104). Every now and then there have been events, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 being surely one of them, which have accelerated those discussions. Samuel Huntington's prediction of "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1993) has been rejected by many but it has never been totally forgotten. Zeki Kütük actually argues that some European leaders have proved with their actions that they more or less support Huntington's view about civilizational blocs of the post-Cold War world. According to Kütük, excluding Turkey from the EU for so long based on cultural and religious background tells about discrimination and frames the EU strongly as a "civilizational project" for Christians only. (Kütük 2006, pp. 275, 281-282.) This view is not however supported by everyone and there actually exists quite a strong opposite perspective as well. Turkey's EU membership has often been suggested also as a one way to prevent the cultural confrontation. It has been argued that if Turkey would be accepted to the EU it would be an encouraging signal to everybody about the possibility of the

two worlds being able to act together peacefully, and even as close partners (Akçapar 2007, p. 10). Accordingly, it can be said that the challenge of cultural coexistence has appeared as one security based argument when considering Turkey's possible EU membership.

Another reason why the EU hopes its strategy of extending the zone of peace and security would be successful relates to EU's urge to increase its international status as a global security actor. Keulman writes that one of the EU's goals is to promote the EU as a global political actor. The European Security Strategy attempts to prove the EU's abilities by presenting the EU as a global security actor who is actively dealing with all major global security threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, the break-up of states, regional conflicts and organized crime. (Keulman 2006, p. 50.) Gerrard Quille argues that the EU's ability to achieve greater coherence in its neighbourhood is actually kind of a test for the EU's comprehensive approach to security. If the strategy is successful in Europe, and in its neighbouring area, it will bring credibility to the EU's strategy. This would be welcomed by the EU which is generally considered to be a weaker international actor than the US when it comes to security issues. Successful enlargement and neighbourhood policy would act as a proof of EU's abilities. This actually relates to the third strategic objective of the European Security Strategy that was to strengthen the international order. The EU wants to extend its influence and support international responses to security challenges through multilateral approach. (Quille 2004, pp. 427-428.)

Seiju Desai argues that Turkey's EU membership could be useful for the EU in its efforts to reach more important status in the global politics. He writes that while being an important actor in economic and development issues the EU is also willing to build stronger capability to face international crisis, also in military terms if necessary. According to Desai, Turkey would make an important contribution to the EU's possible military operations. Turkey's geographical location, its military infrastructure, which due to NATO membership is respectable and compatible with European armed forces, and logistical means would be a remarkable asset to the EU when facing crisis outside the EU borders. In addition to these advantages Desai reminds once again that Turkey has different kind of relationship with the Muslim world than any other European state or the EU as a whole. These kinds of religious and cultural values could play an important role in a world where Islam is the most rapidly growing religion. (Desai 2005, p. 382.)

Hence, when we consider the ways of justifying enlargement based on current and future security challenges rather than threats of the past it seems that at least three arguments can be found from the research literature. The first is that EU enlargement is a part of wider security strategy that aims to secure Europe's neighbourhood in order to prevent disorder spreading to Europe. The second argument used, especially regarding the case of Turkey, is that the EU enlargement to Turkey would promote intercultural dialogue which again would enhance stability and security. And finally, it has been stated that EU enlargement is a part of development that increases EU's importance as a global security actor.

4. ANALYSING SECURITY SPEECH ACTS

4.1. The meaning of language

In this section of my thesis I will explain the methodological framework of my study. First, I will concentrate on the importance of language in the study of international relations. Because I have decided to examine meanings and effects of speeches it is obvious that I consider language as an important research subject. In this section I will discuss why and how language became important to researchers of international relations. Then I will more explicitly concentrate on the theory of speech acts which is the basis for my own analysis. I will also explicate with more details how I am going to carry out my data analysis.

When studying language, and the usage of it, there is always the preconception that language matters. After the so called linguistic turn many social scientists, among them also IR scholars, started to raise language to a central position in their research work. The basic idea in studying language in social sciences is that the words people use can do more than just describe the world. In the case of security what is said about security and how it is said does not only describe but it (re)shapes the security reality; how actors and relationships between them are viewed and what kinds of meanings are given to certain situations. (Laitinen 1999, p. 97.) From my point of view security is not a self-explanatory concept any more than for example goodness or badness. By using language we give the meaning for the concept in a certain context. Like Michael Shapiro put it, language is not just about objects but it actually constitutes objects and our reality. However, this does not mean that there exists nothing if we do not recognize it or speak about it. Rather it means that the ‘things’ in the reality do not have meanings without the connections people give to them through language. (Shapiro 1981, p. 20.)

When connecting these ideas of philosophy of language to the concept of security and how it has been studied in the field of IR it can be said that there has occurred a change. When realism was the hegemonic school of thought security did not have many meanings and it was not studied in that sense. Like Higashino writes, the traditional understanding of security took the “objectivity of security” for granted and did not take into account that security is actually discursively constructed for example by political leaders (Higashino 2004, p. 348). Earlier,

security was taken as a given concept that referred to the absence of war among nation states. Since then it has not only been presented that security does not only relate to state security but also that we need to concentrate on the language, the security speech. The only way to find out what is security actually about is to study what issues are securitized through the use of language and what are the motivations to do that. When arguing that security is discursively constructed it does not mean that we could neglect the external context. Balzacq is not even ready to use the expression “language constructs reality” but prefers a view that language shapes our perception of it. From my point of view it is acceptable to consider that language can construct our reality but the external context must be taken into account. Like Balzacq argues, all security problems ‘out there’ are not entirely contingent on how we define them. The essence of some security problems, for example certain environmental catastrophe, cannot be discursively defined to be something else. For this reason, to ensure security argumentation to be theoretically credible, it is always necessary to explain the external context, with what kind of security problems we are dealing with. (Balzacq 2005, p. 181.) In this study I concentrate on the ongoing process of Turkey’s accession to the EU and examine what kinds of security references there exist that are used to justify the enlargement. In other words, I examine the process where the issues are only just brought to the agenda of security.

Language and the meaning of it can be studied from different viewpoints and different amount of emphasis can be given to it. One approach is to emphasize the need to understand the logic of language. According to this view, signs in our language represent ideas, and the structure of statements represents the structure of ideas. This view ignores all external things that could have an effect on how signs are used. It assumes that ideas are directly presented through signs and for example the context where the certain statements are made does not disturb the direct link from ideas to signs. The alternative – more rhetorical mechanism – to approach language is supported for example by Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin and Jacques Derrida. They do not approve the approach that there would be a direct link between a sign and what it signifies but they underline the importance of the context. According to them, meaning of a certain statement can only be understood in the context in which it is made. (Shapiro 1981, p. 27.) As I will explain later this is an important notion in my study as well. There is a reason why I consider the speeches by Commissioner for Enlargement worth studying and why I think I can make important findings from them. I consider the context being such that the language in these certain speeches does matter.

K. M. Fierke writes that the work of Wittgenstein started the linguistic turn in philosophy. Wittgenstein's work can be divided into two eras when it comes to language. *Tractatus* (1922) that started the change brought the ordinary language back under scrutiny. In this work he still thought that language can mirror the reality. In his later work, *Philosophical Investigations* (1958), he rejected this idea and stated that people are not outside of language and they cannot observe it from distance. In other words he argued that we cannot go behind our own words and then compare them to reality. (Fierke 2002, p. 337.) Both of these steps in the linguistic turn have had an effect on many schools of thought in International Relations (IR) although it has to be remembered that Wittgenstein wrote his studies in a certain historical context and he never actually wrote about IR. The later thoughts of Wittgenstein have been widely accepted for example by constructivists and poststructuralists. (Fierke 2002, pp. 333-337.)

Wittgenstein and Austin are both language philosophers who argued that language does more than just describes. This is opposite to positivist view according to which words are just labels we used to describe objects in the real world (see e.g. Fierke 1996. p. 469). For them the role of words and expressions is strictly organizational, their only contribution is to give a form to the utterance (Shapiro 1981, p. 29). Wittgenstein approached the meaning of language with a metaphor of language games. He wanted to analyse the different roles that words play in language. The only role for words in our ordinary language is not to be signs of certain objects. If this would be the case then children would learn their native language by a method where a parent or some other teacher would just point objects and then name them. In reality knowing a language is more than just knowing the names of objects. There are various kinds of language games that a person has to know in order to know a language. Wittgenstein has many examples; Giving orders and obeying them, Describing the appearance of an object or giving its measurements, reporting an event, speculating about an event, making jokes, asking, thanking, cursing, praying etc. These examples indicate that knowing a language means knowing a vast system of rules of how words are appropriately used. (Wittgenstein 1981 pp. 27-37, Shapiro 1981, p. 48.)

The idea of language game is that using language is like making moves in some game. Using language is also a form of action and it has to follow certain rules. Without these rules it

would not be possible for people to communicate and we would not be able to give meanings to objects or actions. (Fierke and Nicholson 2001.) Wittgenstein uses a chess analogy to explain how the rules work. The idea is that a move within a game of chess is an expression of following the rules of chess, it would be meaningless and illogical to for example use some other rules because then the move would not mean anything (Fierke 1996, p. 469). Similarly, there are rules in social relations and in the language use that has to be understood and used properly in order to make speech (acts) sensible. The rules of social pattern that Wittgenstein describes are not same as causal laws. People follow the rules in their actions but it is always possible to break the rules or change them. If somebody breaks the rules it does not mean that the rule is falsified. If everybody stopped following certain rule it would be replaced with another one. (Fierke 1996, p. 470, Wittgenstein 1981, p. 136.)

J. R. Searle divides rules that regulate social behavior into two groups, constitutive rules and regulative rules. The distinction between them he explains with a couple of everyday examples. The etiquette rules are examples of regulative rules. The etiquette rules regulate the social behavior and relationships between people but the relationships exist independently of these rules. On the other hand, there are constitutive rules, like the rules of football, which not only regulate how to play the game but they also create the possibility of that activity and define it altogether. Football does not exist outside those rules because the whole game is constituted by acting in accordance with those rules. According to Searle, language is a system inside of which there is a measure of constitutive rules, and speech acts are performed according to those rules. (Searle 1971, pp. 41-42.) This means that in the use of language there are rules that constitute the meaning of words and sentences, if these rules are not understood the language is not meaningful.

4.2. Speech act analysis

After considering in a more general level the meaning of language and why it is important and valuable to study language in the field of international relations, I will now continue with concentrating on speech acts more specifically. I will illustrate the logic of speech acts and how it works as a research method in my own data analysis.

Research method refers to those practices that researcher uses to get findings from the data. Research method sets limits also to the process of reasoning, it sets rules to what kind of interpretations one can make from the findings. Without proper research method researcher can easily end up just proving one's own hypotheses and prejudices with empirical examples. (Alasuutari 1994, pp. 72-73.) It is essential that research method is public, explicit and codified. However, it is never possible to gain all information and it is therefore important to admit that all methods have their limitations. In social sciences the aim rarely is to find a final answer to a particular research question but rather describe and explain social phenomena. (King et al. 1994, pp. 8, 15.) This applies to my study as well. My intention is not present definite truths about the security reasons for Turkey's EU membership but to illustrate how the European Commission views them and justifies its policy with them. Finding final answers is actually impossible because when dealing with language we always have to remember the role of researcher's interpretation. In this study the choice of research method was fairly easy because the theoretical framework and method are somewhat tied together. The assumption which the whole study is based on is that political elites, in this case the EU Commissioner, do speech acts that have other than just descriptive effects and for this reason they can be considered as actions. When analyzing the speech acts I take into account the context in which they are made, who is the one uttering the speech acts, who is in the audience and what is the content of those speech acts.

Austin continues the idea of Wittgenstein that the use of language should be understood as part of other activities. Austin developed the concept of speech act which means an utterance in which "saying something is doing something". (Shapiro 1981, p. 50.) Austin does not although mean that every word that is said has this kind of power. According to him, there are two kinds of sentences, constative and performative. Constative sentences are statements that refer to some circumstances in the reality but there is not any other meaning in the sentence than this descriptive one. It could be understood as 'just' saying something. Performative sentences, on the other hand, are statements that actually do something when they are said, in other words they have performative power. Austin gives example like "I do" as said in the wedding ceremony or "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth" as said when breaking a bottle against the stem. These are performative sentences, or just performatives, because they do not just describe "what am I doing" or they do not state that "I am doing it", but to say it, is to do

it. (Austin 1975, pp. 3-6.) It is natural that in my research analysis I am interested in the performative sentences, the speech acts that do something when they are said.

According to Austin, there are different levels or aspects of meaning in every utterance, and people emphasize the level that is most compatible with the intentions they have when doing the utterance. The types of speech acts are locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary. Locutionary act refers to the content of the utterance, what it is about. It means saying a sentence that simply makes sense. Illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are the ones that have performative power. Illocutionary act is about what happens *in* saying something, for example warning a listener of something. The perlocutionary act refers on the other hand to what person achieves *by* making the utterance. (Austin 1975, pp. 109, 121.) The force of perlocutionary utterance is based on the effect of the utterance on those who hear it. With the example of warning the listeners of something, it may cause them to protect themselves somehow. (Shapiro 1981, p. 54.)

Based on the explanation above it appears that the most interesting things in speech acts are their performative force, the illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. Wæver argues that by uttering security certain issue is moved to the field of security, above normal politics and that justifies even extraordinary means (Wæver 1995, p. 55). According to my point of view, this uttering security is a part of the strategy to justify EU enlargement. The whole logic of securitizing in order to desecuritize is based on Austin's thoughts about the force of performative speech acts. When the Commissioner presents certain security related issue as a reason for the EU enlargement to Turkey it follows the logic of performative speech acts. The act happens in saying the sentence, doing the securitization and justifying the enlargement based on that, and by saying it, he aims to a certain achievement – to a long term desecuritization and peace and security in Europe.

It is important to notice here that a security speech act, and the desecuritization that may follow, can be a very strong argument. The power of a security speech act derives from the specialness of security matters. Security is normally regarded as rather a positive concept but according to the Copenhagen School, it should not necessarily be always seen as a good thing when something is about security. The authors write that when something is dealt as a security matter it can also tell about the inability to deal with the issue as a 'normal' thing.

This confirms the idea of security being something more important than anything else which again reinforces the power of desecuritization as well. The desecuritization process is about moving the issue from the emergency zone into the normal political sphere. (Buzan et al. 1998, pp. 4, 29.) When this is successful – avoiding the emergence of a disaster and turning the situation back to normal – there is a big chance that the means that were needed to make this happen are generally accepted. For example, when first presenting that rejecting further enlargement might mean fragmentation of Europe and even return of violence, the whole issue area is put into the emergency zone. After that, the benefits of the enlargement are presented as something that will prevent the situation from going worse and as something that will maintain the situation normal. The desecuritization process which means bringing the situation back from the security zone to the normal politics shows that it is not always a positive thing when something is connected to security. An argumentation that is based on the process of securitization and desecuritization is powerful because it is about first showing the security nature of a certain issue, and then with certain actions bringing it back to the normal politics. For example, first bringing up the security threats relating to unstable situation of Russia in early 1990s and then offering the EU membership as an instrument to build peaceful relationships and normalize the situation between Russia and the Eastern European Countries (see O’Brennan 2006, pp. 165-167).

Even though J.L. Austin was not interested so much in the truthfulness of statements, like the positivists, he however pays attention to the validity of speech acts. The question is not so much about true-false criterion but he created the concept of infelicities that refers to situations in which performative sentences, speech acts, can be invalid. An example of a situation where a performative statement can go wrong is when the statement is becoming from the wrong person in the wrong circumstances. (Shapiro 1981, p. 51.) This goes again back to the importance of context. When analyzing speech acts, the external conditions that might have an effect on the utterances must be taken into consideration. After all, words do not mirror the reality directly but they get their meaning in the right context. Similarly, Austin thought that it is illogical to assume that every person’s words in a certain situation could be considered as a valid action. In some situations statements can be unqualified and in order to be able to consider the validity of the statements Austin created felicity conditions. By evaluating them we can find out whether the circumstances in which the words are said are

appropriate enough so that we can consider the utterance as a meaningful and functional speech act. (Austin 1975, p. 8.) The felicity conditions that need to be met are the following:

- (1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect.
 - (2) The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate.
 - (3) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and completely.
 - (4) The participants must have appropriate intentions, thoughts and feelings.
 - (5) Doing an utterance means undertaking of an obligation to conduct oneself subsequently.
- (Austin 1975, pp. 14-15, Searle 1971, p. 52.)

When considering the situation for my data analysis I argue that the felicity conditions are satisfyingly met. When it comes to the first condition Commissioner Rehn has given his speeches in official functions in a manner that is generally accepted. He has also been an appropriate speaker because of his status in the European Commission and the audience has been relevant. It is reasonable to assume that what Commissioner Rehn says in those occasions is taken seriously by the listeners. It is also reasonable to assume that the speeches were given following a certain correct protocol. All these reasons prove that the conditions two and three are met. Nor condition four forms a problem. As long as anyone is able to evaluate participants' intentions, thought and feelings there is reason to believe that the participants, especially the speaker Commissioner Rehn, have been interested in the issue in hand – Turkey's possible EU membership – and they have knowledge about it. When it comes to the fifth felicity condition one has to keep in mind that the type of speech acts I am looking at are those in which the Commissioner Rehn as a representative of the European Commission says that something is a security threat or challenge, and because of that the enlargement is needed. I think there is a reason to believe that when these kinds of speech acts are done they also have effects on the actions of the Commission. When the representative of the Commission brings up that there are certain security reasons why the EU enlargement to Turkey is needed the Commission supposedly commits oneself to act accordingly, and works in favor of the enlargement. This, from my point of view, shows that also the fifth felicity condition is satisfyingly fulfilled.

I have written earlier that the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School has faced criticism about the inadequately conceptualized relationship between the speaker and the

audience (see e.g. Balzacq 2005 and Stritzel 2007). Higashino has paid attention to the structure of the securitizations that justify EU enlargement and has carefully explained from which elements is the securitization constructed. She considers it important to take notice which is the threat that is expressed, what the rhetorical structure of the securitization is like and who are the securitizing actors and their audiences. (Higashino 2004, p. 353.) Higashino's 'checking list' when studying securitizations, or in other words security speech acts, is partly alike to the felicity conditions defined by Austin but in this point it is good to pay extra attention to the question of audience – the actual threats and how they are constructed will be dealt with in the data analysis section. When it comes to my research it is obvious that the role of securitizing actor belongs to the Commissioner for Enlargement representing the official stands of the entire European Commission. The speeches that I have chosen to analyse have been held by the Commissioner in different kinds of places and occasions, for example in universities, conferences and meetings of various kinds of decision makers and gatherings of civil organizations. This speaks in favour of my conclusion according to which the audience consists of politicians, decision makers, citizens and media especially in Europe but also from all over the world. The role of a Commissioner in general is different from state leaders for example, and there is no reason to assume that he would have some kind of a special audience he would have to take into consideration like the home audience might be for a single president or a prime minister.

4.3. Towards data analysis

In the theoretical section of this study I have presented my approach to security studies and explained the logic of justifying EU enlargement through process of securitization and desecuritization. In this methodological part I have considered the meaning of language and explained in more detail where the idea of security speech acts actually comes from, and why it should be considered important. In this final section before the actual data analysis I would like to present my research data and clarify how I am going to proceed using these theoretical and methodological tools in my analysis.

Like mentioned earlier, my research data consists of speeches by EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Mr Olli Rehn. He has been a Commissioner for Enlargement since November 2004. One month later the European Council decided that the European Union will open

accession negotiations with Turkey. I consider this a good reason to limit the timeframe of my research data to concern the time that Mr Rehn has been the Commissioner responsible for enlargement issues. I acknowledge that I am forced to leave a lot of interesting data concerning my research question outside my study but to be able to carry out thorough analysis I consider the quality and suitability of the data more important than the quantity of it.

The speeches of all EU commissioners are available in the official web site of the European Commission. My research data was also collected from this source. I went through all the speeches that could be found from the site of Commissioner Rehn. In the first stage I collected all the speeches in which there was even one reference to Turkey. Then I collected those speeches that in somehow dealt with Turkey's EU membership and in which there were also some kind of reference to security aspect. Because my study is a qualitative research by nature I then went through the speeches in order to find a few key speeches for my final speech act analysis. To the final stage of analysis I chose eleven speeches from the time frame November 2004 to May 2008.

In the following section of my thesis I will present the security speech acts justifying the EU enlargement to Turkey that I have discovered through analysing the speeches. First I will present the "Preventing clash of civilization and promoting intercultural dialogue" speech act. I will discuss how Commissioner Rehn justifies Turkey's EU membership with arguments that relate to the relationship between Europe and Islam, or in more general, to the relationship between the Western world and Islam. The second speech act "Secure neighbourhood means secure Europe" concentrates on how the EU enlargement to Turkey is justified with the need to create regional security and stability to Europe and its neighbourhood. Finally, the third speech act "Promoting global value of the European Union" is a little different by nature and it is about justifying the EU enlargement to Turkey based on its positive effects on the EU's global status. Accordingly, it can be noticed that all the speech act types I identified from earlier studies and research literature as representing 'new' arguments justifying the EU enlargement to Turkey can be found also from the speeches of Commissioner Rehn. Instead, the 'old' argument of justifying EU enlargement with Europe's warlike past was not identified in this data analysis. Because of the qualitative nature of my research I am not going to concentrate too much on which speech act was the strongest and I will not for example count statements from the speeches and do comparison of them. From

my point of view it is more important to identify the speech acts and then discuss about the meanings of them.

Before moving to the analysis section it is useful to remind that when analyzing the speeches of Commissioner Rehn I do not consider them as his personal opinions but as official stands of the European Commission. It is also important to bear in mind that although this analysis focuses only to security argumentation of the EU enlargement to Turkey it does not, however, deny the importance of many other factors that are connected to the EU's motivations for further enlargement.

5. SECURITY SPEECH ACTS JUSTIFYING THE EU ENLARGEMENT TO TURKEY

5.1. SPEECH ACT I: Preventing clash of civilization and promoting intercultural dialogue

I trust that neither Turkey nor the European Union will lose sight of the key strategic value of the whole project; that is, peace, security, democracy and prosperity in Europe, from Helsinki to Lisbon, from Lisbon to Istanbul, and beyond (Rehn 27 November 2006, Helsinki).

I have mentioned earlier that in the history of European integration the main purpose of the project has been creating peace between European states. There have of course been economic and other reasons as well but the essence of integration is peace and security. EU enlargement is an important instrument in extending and strengthening security in Europe. Like Commissioner Rehn reminds in the quotation above, the essence of the EU enlargement process to Turkey is the same that it has always been; first two things he mentions are peace and security.

Peace and security, as well as democracy and prosperity are justifications to EU enlargement that have come up each time the EU has extended its borders. Every enlargement round is however different and every time there are some particular themes that are taken under discussion and also some specific grounds that are used for or against the enlargement. The case of Turkey is not an exception and there has been a lot of debate in media and among politicians and citizens whether Turkey should become a member of the Union or not. The discussion has dealt with everything between economy and human rights. Arikan considers that in European and in general western studies concerning Turkey's possible EU membership, which are often done based on EU documents, the economic, political and cultural issues are presented as working against Turkey whereas the security issues are presented as something that support the membership (Arikan 2006, p. 3). John Redmond agrees with Arikan and argues that even though the strategic value of Turkey is recognized in the EU it is still considered outsider due to historical, religious and cultural reasons. He actually wonders how it is possible that European nations who fought against each other in bloody wars less than seventy years ago and have now been able to put all that in the past are not ready to concern

Turkey as it is today but want to always remind about the historical differences of it. According to Redmond, the attitudes Europeans have towards Turkey are for some reason very deeply ingrained and from his point of view it seems that these beliefs might prevent Turkey never to be offered anything more than a partial membership of the EU. (Redmond 2007.)

Security issues have strongly defined the Europe-Turkey relationship in the past. Even though it is often argued that Turkey has never been fully accepted inside Europe, due to security matters the relationship has occasionally become closer. Hakan Yilmaz argues that there has been an ongoing discourse of shutting Turkey outside from Europe for centuries but when the security situation has demanded it, Europe has been ready to loosen its attitudes. He identifies three stages in the discourses that define Turkey as an outsider for Europe. In the first stage, until the end of 19th century, Turkey was defined as an outsider on the grounds of religion. Turkey as an Islamic country was considered to belong to other group of states than the Christian Europe. During the second stage, from the end of 19th century until the interwar period Turkey was rejected based on civilization. It was argued that Turkey with different kind of historic background, way of life and religion does not belong to the same civilization as Europe. The third stage started after the Cold War and since then the explanation has been, in general, the culture. Yilmaz writes that during the Cold War the relationship changed because Europe needed a strong alliance against the Soviet Union. (Yilmaz 2007, p. 47.)

In this chapter I will present the first speech act I have identified from the speeches of Commissioner Rehn that aims to justify the EU enlargement to Turkey. The speech act can be called cultural-religious speech act since it justifies the enlargement with the need of preventing clash of civilizations and promoting intercultural dialogue. When following the logic of justifying the enlargement with security speech act which I presented earlier, the cultural confrontation is first presented here as a potential security risk to Europe that could come true if the enlargement failed, and then the EU enlargement is shown to be at least a partial answer to this danger. As I have argued earlier I have adopted the perspective that words do more than just describe the reality around us. Commissioner Rehn does not only describe what kinds of security issues relate to Turkey's possible EU membership but in saying something he also does something. (See e.g. Shapiro 1981, p. 50, Austin 1975, pp. 109, 121.) The cultural-religious speech act is meant to prove to its audience that the EU

enlargement to Turkey is the sensible thing to do because the final outcome will be safer Europe and better relations between Europe and Islam.

According to Yilmaz, the cultural-religious argument has in the history been presented as an obstacle for Turkey's 'Europeanness' and Akçapar is warning the EU not do that again because it would only create division between Christian and Muslim worlds which is not in line with the principles of European integration (Akçapar 2007, p. 27). In the current world situation the cultural and security issues have been tied together very strongly. This has also changed Turkey's position in the international arena. Leinonen and others write that the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001 and the change it caused to the international atmosphere made Turkey a symbolically important state. Turkey being a Muslim country and having close cooperation with European states and the United States is an example that the confrontation between the West and Islam is not necessary. (Leinonen et al. 2007, p. 31.) It has also been argued that the old insulator position of Turkey is becoming appreciated again. Turkey being a bridge between two worlds and civilizations, the East and the West, is an old argument and in the current situation it is hoped that she could again become ever stronger link between the West and the Muslim world. (Kütük 2006, Aykan 2005.) This argumentation is also present in my research data. Commissioner Rehn repeatedly links security and the importance of cultural dialogue together.

The EU's treaties have proved to be the most effective peace treaties between our nations. Similarly, the accession of Turkey could pave the way for lasting peace between Europe and Islam. (Rehn 27 November 2006, Helsinki.)

This debate about how to deal with radical Islam is one of the reasons why Turkey is a central part of the debate about further enlargement of the EU. In my view, Turkey's accession process is the best way to engage with the most important community of Muslims on our doorstep, and to enhance the spread of democracy and understanding between faiths. (Rehn 25 September 2005, Washington DC.)

As these quotations show Commissioner presents a wish of durable peace between two civilizations, Islam and Europe, and it is obvious that it derives from the long and complicated history that Turkey has had between these two different kinds of worlds. Commissioner refers to enlargement treaties as peace providing policy acts that have earlier strengthened peaceful cooperation between European nations. By referring to 'Europe' and 'Islam' as whole, not just to Turkey as a nation, Commissioner sets this particular enlargement treaty special kinds

of expectations. This time it is not just about providing security between states but about bringing together two civilizations. Commissioner also emphasizes the particular value of the Turkey's EU membership process when improving the relationship and understanding between these two different kinds of worlds. He considers Turkey's joining to the Union being the most important and effective tool to achieve this goal.

Your country plays a central role as a bridge between Europe and Islamic world. Turkey is important in turning confrontation into cooperation and integration. This is why the EU opened accession negotiations with Turkey. Accession negotiations are the essential and crucial method for pursuing the goal of a more European Turkey. (Rehn 4 October 2006, Ankara.)

Here Commissioner Rehn explains that Turkey is needed inside the EU because it helps to turn the potential conflict into cooperation and as outcome there will be peace between civilizations. He clearly expresses that this is one reason to the whole membership process. Like Higashino writes the issue that is securitized gets often dramatized but the actual aim and effect of the securitization – the enlargement – normalizes the situation. (Higashino 2004, p. 351) In the case of Commissioner Rehn's speeches the intended normal situation is to have Turkey that has adopted European values inside the European Union which would have a positive and security providing effect on the relations between Europe and the Islamic world as well as between the East and the West in general.

During the long EU application process that Turkey has gone through the so called civilization factor has always been present. Zeki Kütük argues that for a long time Turkey was denied to get the status of a candidate state because the European Union was considered by so many EU leaders above all "civilizational project". He uses the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council Summit, where Turkey was once again rejected by the EU, as an example of EU's civilization-based discrimination that has according to him, labeled the EU's attitudes for decades. In Luxembourg candidacy was denied from Turkey whereas for example Slovakia who according to the EU Commission's own reports, did not meet the Copenhagen political criteria either, was accepted to become a candidate country. Based on this example and many individual comments made by European leaders Kütük is ready to argue that until the end of 1990s also in the official EU discourse Turkey was doomed outside of Europe on cultural, religious and "civilizational" reasons. (Kütük 2006.)

Iver B. Neumann has written about the relationship between Europe and Turkey and especially about Turkey's "otherness" in relation to Europe. According to him, Turkey has played an important role in Europe's identity building process. Since the middle ages Saracens, barbarians and later Ottoman Turks have been 'the other' to whom Europeans have reflected themselves. 'The other' is something that is fundamentally different from 'us' and first the Saracen was 'the other' above all for Christendom and afterwards the 'Ottoman Turk' played an important role as 'the other' for Europeanness. When constructing 'us' it is essential to know who 'we' are not and according to Neumann, this most important other for Europe has been 'the Turks'. (Neumann 1999, pp. 39-45.) Across the years the European discourse concerning Turks has sifted from barbarian to "sick man of Europe" and in 20th century due to for example Turkey's NATO membership to normal and modern state. Neumann argues that today's representations of Turkey are not free from echoes of earlier representations. According to him, discussion of European identity that goes on without end in sight, deals with these memories still. (Neumann 1999, p. 62.)

Culture, religion and civilization are concepts that are present also in the speeches of Commissioner Rehn when he grounds the EU enlargement to Turkey. He does not try to ignore Turkey's difference or the history of its otherness but actually the fact that Turkey is different, and it has a special place between two different kinds of worlds is brought up as a positive thing. Desai writes that there exist two kinds of perspectives among European states – in the first one Turkey's EU membership is seen as a security risk and in the other one as a security opportunity for Europe. The security risk thinking is based on a fear that Turkey's locations in the unstable region would increase the risk of Islamic radicalism spreading to Europe. (Desai 2005, p. 367.) Phillips writes about the same issue by stating that European Christian Democrats base their criticism towards Turkey's membership on a fear that a Muslim state in the EU would mean importing the various problems of the Middle East also to Europe (Phillips 2004). The security opportunity perspective, on the other hand, means that Turkey's membership in the EU would enhance security and stability in Europe and in its neighborhood by creating a new tie between Europe and the Muslim world. From this perspective Turkey's joining to the EU would prove that the clash of civilizations can finally be forgotten. (Desai 2005, pp. 367-368.)² My research data illustrates that the European

² Desai himself argues that Turkey presents to the EU both a security risk and opportunity. The future of EU-Turkey relations also in security terms depends on whether the EU wants to preserve its old identity as "a closed

Commission has definitely adopted the security opportunity perspective. The speeches show that Turkey's cultural and religious difference is presented as an important opportunity for the European Union to create more stable, secure and tolerable Europe.

As a secular republic with a predominant Muslim population, a staunchly democratic Turkey integrated into the EU would be a powerful example against fundamentalist claims of an essential incompatibility between democracy and Islam (Rehn 27 November 2006, Helsinki).

Here Commissioner Rehn describes the benefits of Turkey's accession to the whole international community. The importance of successful enlargement is great because it is connected to the East-West relationship in a broader level. He argues that Turkey's joining to the European Union would show both, the Western and Muslim worlds that Islam and western democracies can live in an atmosphere of cooperation. The big expectations that Commissioner Rehn has concerning Turkey's EU membership process can be found from many of his speeches:

Turkey is an important partner for the EU in today's international political climate, when the challenge is to curb terrorism and fundamentalism and at the same time to build bridges with moderate strands of Islam that respect democratic values. Europe needs Turkey as a safety anchor in one of the most unstable areas of the world. Turkey is a model of democracy in the Islamic world. It can also help to turn the clash of civilizations into dialogue and coexistence. (Rehn 20 April 2007, Helsinki.)

The potential of this particular enlargement to build dialogue in the place of confrontation is expressed here very clearly. Commissioner Rehn does not offer Turkey's EU membership as a final answer to Islam-West relations but he considers that it would have a great impact on international security especially "in today's international political climate" when the whole idea of clash between civilizations has re-emerged not least in the consequence of the events of 11 September 2001. In addition to this international level importance Commissioner Rehn reminds that the EU enlargement to Turkey would give at least a partial answer to existing security threat of Europe. At the same time when arguing that Islamic and western states can live side by side in peace he securitizes the whole Islam-West (or Islam-Europe) relationship. Relationship between these two cultures and civilizations is presented as an issue of security

inward-looking, secure and prosperous Christian club" or is it able to become a "New EU" whose identity is based on multiculturalism and who recognizes Turkey's potential to make the EU more capable actor in the global scale. Naturally, Turkey has to "evolve from being a modern state to a post-modern state sharing the liberalist-based values of the EU". (Desai 2005, pp. 387-388.)

to which the EU enlargement to Turkey would be one answer. Commissioner expresses that Europe needs Turkey for safety reasons, meaning that if Turkey would not become a member of the Union there is a greater security risk than if it did access.

When justifying the EU enlargement to Turkey Commissioner Rehn draws attention also to possible problems that might derive or have already emerged from the cultural differences between Islam and Europe. For him, however, these potential problems are a justification for Turkey's EU membership rather than a reason to exclude Turkey from Europe. He does not separate cultural and security issues but acknowledges that tensions in West-Islam relationship might create security related problems to Europe and therefore it would be better if Turkey were inside the EU.

In our era, without denying the role of geopolitics, it is evident that global cultural and identity politics have become more dominant. Thus, the relations between Europe and Islam – inside and outside Europe – is a if not the major challenge of our time. Again, we need both containment and cooperation. The European Union shall show resolve against terrorism and firmly contain all kinds of fundamentalism, while at the same time we shall continue building bridges with the moderate strands of Islam which respect universal democratic values. The 21st century world is not doomed to a clash of civilisations, but can be built on dialogue and cooperation. This is not least of the reasons why the Commission two weeks ago presented the negotiating framework for Turkey to the member states. (Rehn 12 July 2005, Berlin.)

In this argument Commissioner Rehn clearly states that relationship between Islam and Europe is one or even the most important challenge of our time. He connects to this challenge the threat of terrorism and clash of civilizations but argues at the same time that this does not have to be the reality. Cultural-religious issues are in this example strongly lifted above normal politics and hence securitized. After doing the securitization the EU enlargement to Turkey is presented as a de-securitizing effect. Commissioner Rehn argues with exact words that in order Europe to avoid clash of civilizations better dialogue must be built with Muslim world and the EU enlargement to Turkey is one way to do this. He suggests that there are various reasons to the enlargement but this cultural-religious one is very important one. Consequently it can be said that Commissioner Rehn disassociates himself from the alleged European tradition of discriminating Turkey with cultural and religious reasons. In Rehn's argumentation the cultural and religious background of Turkey is actually presented as an advantage for Europe and especially, to European security. Rehn does not expect culture- or religion based difficulties from Turkey's EU membership but presents it as a mean to improve

relationships between Europe and Islam which would increase security in Europe. The European Commission has obviously adopted the idea that Turkey's EU membership would not be only an agreement between the EU and Turkey but it would send a positive signal to the entire Muslim world and improve relationships between them (Redmond 2007, Akçapar 2007).

In my view, we are not doomed to an eternal conflict between the West and the Muslim world. As we used both containment and cooperation to win the Cold War, we should today show resolve against Islamic fundamentalism and firmly contain all kinds of terrorism, while continuing to build bridges with Islam and respect universal democratic values. Turkey plays a key role in this. (University of Oxford, 1 May 2008.)

Above Commissioner Rehn again clearly brings up even the most terrifying threats that are often connected to Islam – Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. He discusses about the greatest risks that are linked to the Muslim world and based on which many would argue that the EU should avoid of getting involved with these states. Commissioner however acknowledges these threats and argues how important it is to tackle them with the tools we have, the Turkey's accession being one of them. He does not consider the EU enlargement to Turkey increasing the risk that the EU would get more threatened by religious fundamentalism and terrorism but actually sees the enlargement as an opportunity to build better relations with Islam and prevent the negative developments.

An often used justification for the EU enlargement to Turkey by Commissioner Rehn is that Turkey would become a bridge between civilizations.

If Turkey succeeds in its reforms and meets the criteria for accession, it will become an ever stronger bridge between civilizations (Rehn 17 January 2007, Brussels).

When justifying the enlargement with security reasons and potential risks the 'other option', what would happen if the enlargement does not come true, is always present. There is a need to create dialogue between cultures because if that would not be done some kind of threat might face Europe. The other option in the case of this speech act is of course the clash of civilizations, and when concentrating on the EU-Turkey relations the other option could also be that if Turkey is not accepted to the EU, it would turn to other possible partners. It has been argued that the European Union is not the only possible reference group for Turkey. As has been described earlier Turkey's relationship with Europe has been rather complex and it is

not clear at all that Turkey is interested in waiting forever that the EU's doors would open for her. Buzan and Wæver write that after the Cold War Turkey was one of the many states that faced an identity crisis. There emerged questions whether Turkey's strategic role that was so important to the US and Europe during the Cold War would be forgotten. Even though Turkey has not become an unimportant state to the West either, the "opening of Central Asia", as Buzan and Wæver call it, offered Turkey a chance to identify itself in a new way. Even though the new pan-Turkey never emerged, Central Asian states belonging in a way to same family with Turkey offered an alternative reference group to it, especially when the EU relations are sour. (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 393.)

One kind of a threat scenario about what would happen if Turkey were completely rejected by the European Union is that Turkey would totally abandon all the reforms it has successfully implemented during past years and turn its back to Europe or even turn into some kind of anti-West state ruled by religious extremists (Aykan 2005, p. 341, Phillips 2004). This scenario implies that a new chapter in clash between cultures and civilizations would occur if Turkey is rejected by the EU.

In the speeches of Commissioner Rehn there appears argumentation that brings up the possibility of Turkey choosing another way and the disadvantages that would follow.

Would the EU be better off without the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as stable, democratic and increasingly prosperous members? Would the EU be better off with a Turkey that turns its back on us and rejects democratic values? I strongly believe not. (Rehn 12 July 2005, Berlin.)

Here Commissioner Rehn refers to the success of previous EU enlargement and argues that the EU enlargement really has proved to provide stability in earlier occasions. He also sets a question what would happen if for some reason this time Europe, or Turkey, would choose differently and the EU enlargement to Turkey would not occur. The Commissioner sets his question in a way that can be interpreted as a slight warning; why should we take a risk and find out what would happen if Turkey gets rejected because it is obviously safer to support Turkey in its road to Europe.

In the following example Commissioner Rehn mentions some current international events that could be seen as consequences of the unstableness of the Middle Eastern region or the inability of two civilizations to understand each others.

For those who still question the strategic value of such a step, I simply invite them to look at the news: on issues as different as the energy crisis, Iran, Iraq or the cartoons crisis, Turkey appears as a key player which we absolutely need on our side or as a bridge and a moderator between civilizations (Rehn 9 March 2006, Athens).

With his reference to cartoons crisis Commissioner Rehn probably wants to show that there are current problems and conflicts that emerge because the coexistence of Islam and the West is not as good as it should be. The cartoon crisis emerged when Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published cartoons of the prophet Muhammad and infuriated the Muslim world (Seeberg 2007, p. 28). The reactions were strong in both sides and the event can be considered as an example of existing cultural contradictions. Commissioner Rehn argues that in these kinds of situations it would be important to have better dialogue between Islam and Europe, and that is what Turkey's EU membership could provide. Commissioner emphasizes Turkey's important role as a bridge between civilizations and also mentions how essential it is to have Turkey "on our side". Obviously it depends on the interpreter how this is understood, who are on the other side that Turkey cannot go? One quite safe interpretation is that Turkey going to the other side, whoever it would include, would be somehow more harmful to the EU than it would be to have Turkey joined to the Union. It is also rather safe to assume that those harmful things would have something to do with security and stability because the importance of Turkey is particularly related to things like Iraq, Iran and energy crisis. One more interpretation that can be made is that at least in some cases the harmful things that might happen if Turkey turned to the "other side" would be related to cultural confrontation because the need to have Turkey on our side is related to the current case of cartoons crisis which definitely is a symptom of misunderstanding between Islam and Europe. All in all it can be said that in the cultural-religious speech act that I have identified from the speeches of Commissioner Rehn there exists in some level also the perspective that the EU enlargement to Turkey is needed because otherwise there is a chance that Turkey chooses another alternative that would be more harmful for European security than the realization of the enlargement.

5.2. SPEECH ACT II: Secure neighbourhood means secure Europe

In comparison to previous EU enlargement rounds it goes without saying that Turkey's geopolitical location creates new challenges, opportunities and expectations to the enlargement process. Like mentioned earlier Turkey has for a long time been an insulator state, a state between two different kinds of security complex (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 41). It is also a well known fact that the Middle Eastern security complex is one of the most unstable ones in the world. A hope has been presented that the EU enlargement to Turkey would have some positive effects on this situation. It has even been argued that the security reasons are the only ones why Europeans are ready to consider closer ties with Turkey, because they acknowledge how an important player Turkey is in maintaining security in the eastern Mediterranean. (Redmond 2007, p. 308.)

In the speeches of Commissioner Rehn the idea of Turkey's role as a stabilizer is strongly present. In the previous chapter it was brought up that Turkey has been considered by many, including Commissioner Rehn, as a bridge between civilizations. Another expression that is often used by the Commissioner to describe the position of Turkey is 'an anchor of stability'. This is related to an also often used phrase of Turkey's 'strategic importance'. The anchor status and strategic importance for Europe both refer to the geopolitical location of Turkey in the middle of often so unstable regions of Balkan and the Middle East. Turkey itself, as well as the United States and the European Union are well aware of how important it is that Turkey remains stable and democratic state that would work as an example to other countries in that area, and that it has viable relations with the EU and the US³. (Aykan 2005, p. 340.) The importance of stable and secure neighbourhood was stated also in the European Security Strategy which emphasizes how important it is to have "a ring of well governed countries" in the borders of the Union (European Security Strategy 2003, p. 8). The EU enlargement process to Turkey is a vital tool in maintaining and improving relationship between the EU and Turkey as well as between the EU and the wider Middle East. When studying the speech

³ It is noticeable that the strategic importance of Turkey is acknowledged not only in Europe but in the US as well. During the Cold War Turkey was considered important by the US government because of its position in the East-West frontier – the East then referring to the Communist part of Europe. Nowadays it has become apparent also to the US that the strategic importance of Turkey derives from its position between the East and the West again, but this time meaning between Europe and the Middle East. Turkey is considered as an essential security partner not because of its abilities to effect on European security *via* its NATO membership like a few decades back but because of its security potential towards the Middle East. (Park 2004, pp.495-498.)

acts that justify the EU enlargement to Turkey this ‘strategic importance’ justification appears strongly.

My argument is that the second speech act ‘secure neighbourhood provides secure Europe’ is based on a logic that the whole unstableness and disorder that is related to the eastern Mediterranean area is presented as a security threat to Europe and after that the EU enlargement to Turkey is given as (a partial) answer to the problem. What the Commissioner wants to say is that in order to have secure Europe we need secure and stable neighbourhood, and Turkey’s EU membership is an important step in reaching this goal. The impact of Turkey’s EU membership process to security of Europe and its neighbourhood is in the Commission seen as a two stage process. From the perspective of European security it is a prime concern that the states that are in the borders of the EU, like Turkey, are stable and democratic. In order to attain this goal the EU has implemented for example the neighbourhood policy. Another essential tool to promote security in the EU’s neighbours is of course the prospect of EU membership. As Commissioner many times states, enlargement has been the most successful way of “extending the area of peace and stability, democracy and the rule of law” (Rehn 17 January 2007, Brussels). Consequently, the first stage in the Turkey’s EU membership process that provides security to Europe is of course the EU membership process itself. During the process Turkey adopts the values and reforms that are needed in order it to become a ‘normal’, stable European state.

Turkey has been negotiating its EU accession since October 2005. This was always going to be a long and winding road, on which the journey is as important as the destination. That is, the EU accession perspective serves as the anchor for reforms that help Turkey to transform itself into a more open, democratic and thus self-confident society, committed to the values shared by all Europeans. (Rehn 1 May 2008, University of Oxford.)

As can be seen from the quotation of Rehn’s speech the process, the prospect of membership is already an essential tool to provide security in Europe. The posed threat is of course an unstable and unpredictable anti-European Turkey but this option can be rejected by the EU enlargement because already the journey to the EU, the beginning of the process will help to create stable, democratic and European Turkey.

The second stage in the ‘secure neighbourhood, secure Europe’ speech act concerns the effects on European security that will take place after the EU enlargement to Turkey has

realized. This relates to the expectations that Turkey would be an example to the rest of the states in the unstable regions of Balkan and the Middle East. It is hoped that the European understanding of democracy would gain ground in a wider region thanks to Turkey's EU membership and this would for one provide security in the EU's backyard. Again, when referring to the logic of desecuritization by securitization, first the unstable situation in the Middle East – near to the EU but not quite in the current borders – is presented as a threat to European security and then the EU enlargement to Turkey is provided as an answer because Turkey would act as an example of democratic Muslim state to its own neighbours.

Turkey remains a key country for Europe, as it was during the Cold War. But the tearing down of the Iron Curtain did not reduce Turkey's strategic value. On the contrary, Turkey became more important to us. Look at the news on TV – be it about Iran, Iraq, the Middle East, the energy crisis or the dialogue with the Muslim world, news reports constantly demonstrate that we need Turkey as an anchor of stability in the most unstable and dangerous region, and as a benchmark of democracy for the wider Middle East. The high stakes of the Cold War have been replaced by other, more complex challenges, in which Turkey remains a vital strategic partner in Europe. (Rehn, 27 November 2006 Helsinki.)

Commissioner Rehn gives various reasons why it is essential to have at least one stable partner inside the region that is so close to EU borders but is so unpredictable and even dangerous as he says. Mentioning states like Iran and Iraq do not produce peaceful images to peoples' mind and to say "Middle East" is alone enough to remind about all the disorder that nobody wants to have any nearer to Europe than it already is. By describing these dangers that are geographically not far from Europe the Commissioner illustrates that despite its internal stability the EU is not permanently safe from conflicts. The Cold War is in the past but new and even more difficult challenges are present. He argues that in front of these challenges and dangers the EU cannot just step aside but it has to be prepared and the way to do that is tie Turkey into the EU. Commissioner Rehn mentions that the EU *needs* Turkey to be its partner in the difficult task of providing security to the Middle East. Once again Commissioner Rehn first represents the unstableness of the EU's neighboring region as a threat to European security and then offers the EU enlargement to Turkey as a necessary answer to that.

Based on the speeches of Commissioner Rehn the European Commission has a lot of faith in Turkey's ability to enhance stability in the Middle East. The European Commission has adopted the perspective that Turkey can be an example for other Muslim states about how to combine respect for own values to modernity. Like he mentions, Turkey can be the

“benchmark of democracy” for the rest of the Middle East. Bill Park writes that Turkey itself has been eager to ensure that it can be that kind of an inspiration for other countries in the region (Park 2004, p. 505). However, it has to be remembered that Turkey’s relationship to the rest of the Muslim world is not trouble-free either. Following the Kemalist ideology Turkey has chosen to keep religion and state apart and does not therefore accept Iranian fundamentalism for example which of course complicates cooperation despite neighbourhood and common religious background. In addition to secularism, also Turkey’s close relationship with Israel and its membership in NATO have been considered in Muslim and Arab world as issues that prove Turkey’s belonging to the West. (Park 2004, p. 504.)

Leinonen and others also warn about exaggerating the nature of the relationship between Turkey and the rest of the Muslim world because Turkey after all made its choice about directing itself towards the West already in the time of Atatürk (Leinonen Anu et al. 2007, p. 33). Recently under the leadership of Justice and Development Party (AKP)⁴ Turkey has made an effort to create closer relationship to both its neighbors, Europe and the Middle East. AKP is working in favor of Turkey’s EU membership process but it also acknowledges Turkey’s Islamic and Middle Eastern roots and has tried to create closer relationship to that direction as well. Park quotes the current president and former prime minister of Turkey Abdullah Gül who has stated that “Turkey feels a responsibility to work toward the goal of a bright future for the Middle East” and that Turkey is ready to work for “multilateral regional cooperation in the Middle East”. Turkey has for example organized joint summit in Istanbul for the Middle Eastern states attended by Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran to discuss about the Kurdish issue and the possible solutions for Iraq war. (Park 2004, pp. 504-506.) In the European Commission this kind of development is probably seen in a positive light. The Commissioner carefully emphasizes how important it is to all parties that not only Turkey remains as a stable democracy but that it supports similar developments in other Middle Eastern states as well.

Our mutual interests are substantial and numerous. There is a wide range of geopolitical challenges and opportunities in the region and beyond which the EU needs to address together with Turkey: stabilising Iraq, supporting the Middle East Peace Process,

⁴ The Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the Turkey’s parliamentary elections in 2002 gaining 35.7 per cent of votes and has been the party in power since. AKP is described to have religious roots but it respects the secular foundations of Turkish politics. AKP has been favourable towards Turkey’s EU membership but there are also differing opinions inside the party. (Diez 2005, p. 171.)

rebuilding relations with Iran, to name just the most pressing ones. Turkey is an anchor of stability in the wider Middle East and a key regional actor in South Eastern Europe. (Rehn 5 June 2007, Istanbul.)

Commissioner brings up again the various troubles that are related to the EU's neighbouring regions. Here the Commissioner states that the EU is ready to act upon these issues but it needs Turkey in order to be effective because Turkey's position in the region is such an important one. The Commissioner does not specify in detail what is Turkey's role in the stabilizing process and what could be the new instruments that could be used if Turkey were in the European Union. It seems that the EU is eager to do something to the fragile situation in its neighbourhood and is hoping that Turkey would be the missing piece that would make the EU such a strong player that it would have the potential to make a difference. More secure and stable backyard is obviously in the EU's interest but it needs a channel to improve its scopes for action and Turkey is considered to be one due to its unique position. Like Park writes, Turkey can have one foot in the European security community but the other one is always planted in the conflict-prone regions of Balkan and Middle East (Park 2004, p. 513). The European Commission wants to once again see this rather as an opportunity than as a risk. Together with Turkey the EU has a chance to have an impact on the developments of its near abroad areas that are so essential to its own security. The Commission has clearly adopted the viewpoint that Turkey can guarantee security much better as a member state of the EU than as an insulator state between European and Middle Eastern security complexes (Diez 2005, p. 174).

In his statement presented above Commissioner Rehn (Rehn 5 June 2007, Istanbul) notices that the European security environment is not limited to the borders of the European Union. He mentions that Turkey's EU membership is needed because it plays an important role when dealing with security challenges in the European borders and *beyond*. He also emphasizes that "Turkey is an anchor of stability in the wider Middle East". He obviously considers that it is not just internal European issues that can have an effect on European security. The same notion is made in the European Security Strategy that acknowledges how important it is to be prepared for both regional and global security challenges. The speech act that securitizes the unstable nature of European neighborhood is closely connected to the risk of regional conflict that is classified as one of the key threats in the European Security Strategy. It is argued in the Strategy that integrating new states to the EU increases European security but it can also bring

the EU closer to unstable areas with various security related problems. According to the Security Strategy, it is the EU's task to promote security and build closer cooperation in the neighbouring area of the EU. (European Security Strategy 2003, pp. 6-8.)

Based on Commissioner's speeches it can be said that the EU enlargement to Turkey is targeted to increase European security above all in the issues that relate to the external security challenges of the EU. The 2004 Eastern enlargement was justified with the argument of 'Europe's past cannot become Europe's future' – with the threat of internal conflict. It was also justified for example with the threat of internal environmental disaster concerning the nuclear power stations. (Higashino 2004, O'Brennan 2006.) In the case of Turkey the perspective is wider and the threats are seen to come outside the EU borders.

As I have written, the European Commission considers that if Turkey is inside the Union it would show a favorable example to the other states in the region and this would provide more stability to the region. Another perspective to how Turkey's accession would enhance stability is that it would make the EU a stronger regional security actor.

Bulent Aras and Salih Bicakci argue in their article that Turkey really can make a contribution to the European security and make the EU policy toward the Middle East more "active, dynamic, timely and influential". They emphasize that the EU and Turkey are much better off when dealing with the insecurities and instability of the Middle East together than acting both alone. According to them, the EU would lose a remarkable chance to improve regional security if it rejects Turkey. (Aras and Bicakci 2006, pp. 378-379.) This perspective is different from that of Gilles Dorronsoro who writes that Turkey's membership could actually risk the EU's ability to be an important strategic actor in the Middle East. According to him, the EU would be more easily drawn in the middle of the problems and could not act as an impartial actor anymore. (Dorronsoro 2004, p. 51.) The European Commission views the situation from the more positive angle and considers Turkey as an essential partner in the task of providing regional security.

It [Turkey] provides a major contribution to European peace-keeping missions, such as the one in Bosnia. It is a key partner in the fight against terrorism and illegal trafficking in drugs, arms, and people. (Rehn 5 June 2007, Istanbul.)

Turkey already has a customs union with the EU, participates in many EU programmes and is a member of NATO, which makes it far more than a privileged partner in terms of security policy (Rehn 4 October 2006, Ankara).

The EU has obvious interests in integrating Turkey fully into its policies and institutions, given the valuable role that the country could play in so many policy areas, ranging from energy security to combating terrorism, from furthering stability in the Middle East to promoting a market around the Black Sea (Rehn 25 September 2005, Washington DC).

Here Commissioner Rehn draws attention to the Turkey's multiple abilities as a security actor. He reminds that Turkey has for long been a member of many European security instruments and has proved to be a serious actor in regional security issues. He also argues that Turkey would be a beneficial security partner for the EU not just because the power of Turkey's army but because it can help the EU to face the new security threats that can concern anything from illegal trafficking of drugs to energy problems and terrorism. The Commissioner aims to show that it is absolutely sensible for the EU to use this kind of potential that Turkey has to offer because it improves the EU's capability as regional security actor.

Aras and Bicakci consider Turkey's potential to enhance security in the Middle East emerging from its more active foreign policy. They write that during the past few years under the ruling of AKP party Turkey has improved its relations with neighbouring countries remarkably. Turkey has for example taken an active role in promoting peace between Israel and Palestinians as well as between Israel and Syria and has even become a potential mediator in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Turkey has actively spoken about the necessity of peace in the Middle East and this has been recognized and appreciated also by other countries in the region. (Aras and Bicakci 2006, pp. 374, 378.) Commissioner Rehn obviously shares many of the thoughts of Aras and Bicakci. The European Commission is eager to combine the strengths of the EU and Turkey in order to create peace and stability in the Middle East. As the authors wrote Turkey can besides be an example to the Middle Eastern states it also has a potential to play an important functional role for example in the Israel-Palestinian peace process. If Turkey were a member of the European Union it would mean that the EU could take a key role in these kinds of security process outside the EU borders that however have a great impact on European security as well.

5.3. SECURITY SPEECH ACT III: Promoting the global status of the European Union

The third speech act I have identified from the speeches of Commissioner Rehn is different by nature compared to the first two. The speech act is about justifying the EU enlargement to Turkey with the EU's need to gain more important status as a global actor. The logic of this speech act comes from the EU Commission's point of view that there exists a threat of the EU remaining only as an economic actor who would have little role in high politics issues such as security politics. The EU would like to finally forget the often repeated saying of the EU being an "economic giant" but a "political dwarf" and prove that the EU is more than a weak and unstable actor that is too much dependent on the national interests of its member states (see e.g. Michalski 2005, p. 124). However, Turkey's EU membership is presented by the Commissioner as something that would make the EU stronger in a global level because it would be able to seize new opportunities concerning for example the Islam-West relations or the Middle East.

Improving the EU's capacity as a global actor is a project that is connected to many issues, not just to Turkey's possible EU membership. For example, the failure with the constitutional treaty was a big setback for the EU when considering its chances to enhance its global role (Algieri 2006-07, p.114). In the time of writing the Union is in serious troubles also with the Lissabon treaty, the successor of the constitutional treaty, and it remains to be seen what kind of effects does this have on the global aspirations of the EU. However, in this chapter I will clarify how the EU's urge to become real global actor in all policy areas is used as a justification for Turkey's EU membership. First, it is reasonable to discuss what kind of an actor the European Union finally is and why is the aim of becoming an important global actor such an important one that it can be considered as a security justification for the EU enlargement to Turkey.

Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler conceptualize the meaning of actorness with four requirements. According to them, characteristics of political actor are shared values, domestic legitimation, ability to identify priorities and formulate policies and finally, the capacity to utilize different kinds of policy instruments. Authors write that the first requirement does not provide serious problems in the case of the European Union because the European values to which the EU is based on are clearly stated in the treaties of the Union. The second and third

requirements are more problematic. It is safe to say that the EU does not always enjoy full support among European citizens and it is also painfully clear to all Europeans how difficult it sometimes is for the EU to create coherent and consistent policies. The beginning of the Iraq war in 2003 and how the EU handled it has been used as the latest example about the Union's inconsistency that is one of the greatest obstacles in the EU's way to become an important global actor. (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, pp. 30-31.) As long as the EU is not able to form a unified stand in issues like whether to support military actions or not it is impossible to speak about global actor who could take bigger responsibilities to its shoulders when it comes to the challenges of international community. When considering the fourth requirement of actorness, the availability and capacity to use different kinds of policy instruments – economic, political and military – the authors argue that the EU has more or less access to all instruments but the ability to utilize them depends on many issues, for example whether the EU is able to find its coherence and consistency (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, p. 33).

Accordingly, Bretherton and Vogler write that the EU holds the value base and capabilities to be a significant international actor but the biggest problems are in how to put its abilities in practice. When considering the nature of the European Union as an international actor one should not play down the role of values. According to Liotta, the EU has adopted values and norms to be an essential part of its security approach (Liotta 2006, p. 33), and Helen Sjursen writes that the EU is happy to frame itself as a normative and civilian actor, and even more happy when the EU is considered as such by the other actors as well (Sjursen 2006, p. 235).

As I have illustrated in the earlier chapter the European Commission considers Turkey's EU membership as an important step towards peace, security and stability in the Middle East. Solution in the Middle East would of course make a great positive impact on European security environment but the challenge of the Middle East can also be reviewed from the actorness point of view. If Turkey became a member of the Union and the EU then would be able to contribute to the negotiations in the Middle East it would not just potentially provide security and strengthen the EU's role as regional security provider but it would change the nature of the EU as a global actor as well. I do not claim that the EU Commission believes it would be able to make a solution to the problems of the Middle East just by having Turkey as a member but from my point of view, the aim and hope is that Turkey, a Muslim country inside the EU, would give new assets to the EU to become a more important participant

concerning the troubles of the Middle East. So far the United States is clearly the most important external actor in the region since the EU has not been able to turn its economic presence into real political influence (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, p. 159). Seiju Desai argues for his part that Turkey's membership could be a significant factor when trying to reinforce the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that the EU has tried to develop since the Balkans conflicts. Desai writes that Turkey's geographical location, military infrastructure and logistical means would be great assets for the EU's possible military operations in the future. (Desai 2005, p. 382.)

When trying to clarify why it is so essential to the European Union to become a global actor we once again turn back to the basic principles and to the meaning of the EU. Originally the purpose of the EU was to create peace in Europe which simply meant non-war among European nation states. Today the situation is different, Europe's security is connected to many issues outside Europe, and it is therefore essential that the EU can have an impact on the happenings of the whole world.

The EU was slow to develop the ambition to play a major global role. The EU founding fathers did not set out to build a superpower. Instead, their goal was to create an alternative of international governance in Europe, to end the great power rivalries that had led to two world wars. But as the years went by, the EU became more engaged in global affairs --- in recent years, we have seen the Union engage in a wider range of activities outside of its borders – not only in development aid and institution building but also in diplomacy and security missions. (Rehn 1 May 2008, University of Oxford.)

As can be seen from the excerpt of the speech of Commissioner Rehn the EU is engaged to global affairs in many ways and in order it to have more ability to influence how things work in the world, it must reach a certain position in a global level. The EU has also declared that it feels a responsibility towards the rest of the world and is ready to answer to the challenges outside the EU's own borders. According to the Security Strategy, active "preventive engagement" helps to avoid future problems and activeness in these kinds of issues also means greater political weight. (Security Strategy 2003, p. 11.) Commissioner Rehn mentions in his speech that in order to reach the global position the EU must use "smart power" which means using all available policy instruments. He emphasizes that firstly, the EU must make its external policies coherent and effective and secondly, it has to be able to extend the European zone of peace and security by right kind of neighbourhood policy;

The second guiding principle to reinforce the EU's smart power is to project its values and interests in its own neighbourhood more effectively in order to extend the European zone of peace and prosperity, liberty and democracy (Rehn 1 May 2008, University of Oxford).

According to Commissioner Rehn, one way to provide peace is to project the EU's own values further in its neighboring states. At this point Turkey's EU membership is considered important. By the EU enlargement to Turkey the Commission aims to take a step towards a new region where it can promote its values and ways of action and in the same time promote its own role as a global actor. To make it sound less imperialistic Commissioner Rehn also states that the EU must be careful when choosing its policy instruments; "when we seek to promote our values, we need to use different approaches in enlargement, associate, neighbourhood and third countries" (Rehn 1 May 2008, University of Oxford). Even though the aim is clear, to promote European values and gain political influence in new areas, it is essential not to act too aggressively.

The reason I call the argumentation about the EU's need to promote its global value a security speech act is that even though it is different by nature there is still the same logic as in the two speech acts presented earlier in this study. It is used as a justification to the EU enlargement to Turkey and handled as a security issue. Enhancing the EU's global role – this time by taking Turkey inside the EU – is presented as a necessity or otherwise the EU will not have enough influence on many issues that have an impact on European security. It is also necessary to show to the world that the EU is a new kind of global security actor who proves that there is no reason why the West and the Islamic world can not work together. In the current situation there is mistrust between Islam and the West, also in Muslim communities inside Europe, and in order to prevent the situation going worse they have to learn how to live together peacefully. The EU enlargement to Turkey is hoped to send a strong positive signal to Muslim world about the EU's abilities to act with all kinds of partners. (Redmond 2007, p. 313.) According to the Commission, the European Union must behave as uniting force between civilizations, not as an arrogant Christian club. This will benefit the EU in two ways, providing security and stability in Europe and beyond, and promoting the image of Europe as a global actor with great capacity to act also in security terms.

The Union cannot be a closed club of Christians only. The European Union is based on common values – democracy, the rule of law and a regulated market economy – not on a single creed. (Rehn 18 November 2004, Euro Club.)

The debate whether enlargement makes the European Union stronger or more fragmented and thus weaker has emerged especially after the 2004 enlargement when ten new members joined to the Union at once. Commissioner Rehn argues in favour of the perspective according to which enlargement has provided new capacities to the EU and made it a stronger actor in the global level as well.

Enlargement has proved its capacity to transform applicants into functioning democracies, market economies, and true partners in meeting common challenges. --- It has increased Europe's weight in the world and made us a stronger international actor. (Rehn 17 January 2007, Brussels.)

Franco Algeri argues that further enlargement would make the governance system of the European Union too difficult to deal with. According to him, enlarging the Union over the current 27 member states without significant re-organizing of the governance system would paralyze the EU's working capacity and make its aspirations of a greater global role shift further away. (Algeri 2006-07, p. 114.) Algeri refers to the EU's internal troubles when it comes to the problems of how to develop the institutional structure of the enlarging EU. Commissioner Rehn does not discuss in the following quotation about the EU's governance system but it can be assumed that he as a member of the European Commission is also in favour of some kind of a solution to the EU's organizational problems. However, the following extract of his speech shows that in general the Commissioner considers the EU enlargement to Turkey reinforcing the global position of the EU.

A failure of Turkey would be a failure for the European Union, while a successful Turkey will enhance the role of the European Union as a true world player. Ladies and Gentlemen, this gives us new responsibilities and new opportunities. (Rehn 7 October 2005, Kayseri.)

Commissioner argues that if Turkey's membership would not realize it would be a setback for the European Union also in the way that the Union would lose a great opportunity to enhance its position as a global actor. He strongly supports the idea that the EU would be able to take a bigger role and more responsibility in dealing with its neighbouring regions like the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia if it will be able to establish a constructive

relationship with Turkey (see Buzan & Wæver 2003, 375). Naturally, the successful EU enlargement would mean close and functional relationship with Turkey and in that case there would be better chances to succeed in the more extensive target as well. The Commissioner brings up that the EU is aware of the new situation that Turkey's membership would involve. It is ready to answer to the new responsibilities, for example in the area of providing peace and security, and it is also willing to use the new opportunities and influence the EU would gain.

6. DISCUSSION

In the previous section I have presented three security speech acts which I was able to identify from the speeches of Commissioner Rehn concerning the EU enlargement to Turkey. I argued that with those speech acts Commissioner justifies the EU enlargement to Turkey by first presenting a certain security threat and then offering the enlargement as an at least partial answer to the security problem or threat. In this chapter I will consider the meaning of those security speech acts I have identified in a wider context. I will discuss what the security speech acts tell us about the enlargement process in general, what is especially interesting in the security argumentation of this enlargement and what does this analysis of the speech acts tell about the current security environment of the European Union.

The first obvious, but however important, notion is that after over 50 years since the first steps of European integration further enlargement of the Union is still justified with security arguments. The world, Europe and international relations have changed dramatically during the past decades but two very important reasons to continue unification Europe and extension of the EU's borders are still peace and security. However, we surely cannot claim that the security arguments would not have changed across the years. As a matter of fact, when it comes to the EU enlargement to Turkey I am ready to argue that the European Union wants to take, and has already taken, an important next step in its enlargement policy. This can be noticed from the security argumentation concerning the possible EU enlargement to Turkey. The security justifications for further enlargement do not derive from Europe's own past anymore but from the new challenges of international security. The original aim of securing Europe has been present in each enlargement process, and still is, but this time the European Commission has adopted a new point of view to European security and thus to the reasons for further enlargement. In the case of Turkey, the Commission has evaluated the security risks and benefits from a new perspective. From the Commission's point of view the EU needs more integrated Europe and further enlargement not only in order to establish permanent peace among European nations and avoid the recurrence of Europe's warlike past but especially in order to be better prepared for the security threats of today and tomorrow.

In post-Cold War era the ultimate threat to Europe was the repetition of the violent past and for this reason the European integration was presented as a necessity (Buzan and Wæver 2003,

p. 356). As I have mentioned earlier, Higashino and O'Brennan argue that before the 2004 EU's eastern enlargement further integration was justified with this argument of 'Europe's past cannot become Europe's future'. According to the authors, the EU elites argued in favour of the enlargement by warning about the risks that might come true if the enlargement would not be accepted. The threat that the EU enlargement would eliminate was the return of balance-of-power system and even a new violent conflict among European states. By going through the enlargement Europe would avoid the ultimate disaster and the European security community would be expanded. (Higashino 2004, p. 350, O'Brennan p. 156.)

When considering the history of Europe this kind of argumentation in the context of the EU's eastern enlargement is not such a big surprise. After all, the whole process was about re-uniting Europe and "ending the unnatural division of Europe" (Arikan 2006, p. 45). When it comes to the security argumentation concerning the possible EU enlargement to Turkey, the discourse of 'Europe's past cannot become Europe's future' cannot be identified. Turkey's EU membership is justified with security reasons but it is not justified with same arguments as the 2004 enlargement and the European integration after the Cold War in general. From my point of view the reason for this is that the EU is really taking the next step in its enlargement policy in the case of Turkey. As I have brought up when analysing the security speech acts, the threats that are presented as justification for Turkey's EU membership do not derive from the past but from the various risks of contemporary and future world. The EU enlargement to Turkey is needed – from security point of view – because it would help to promote dialogue between Islam and West, make Turkey an anchor of democracy and security in the Middle Eastern region and strengthen the EU's position as a global actor who can make a difference in global security and other high political matters. The results of my analysis support the hypothesis that I draw based on earlier studies and the theoretical literature concerning the security dimension of Turkey's EU enlargement. In the literature security dimension of Turkey's possible EU membership was linked especially to Turkey's unique position in the geopolitically delicate region and in the between of Islam and the West. My own analysis supports this view by showing that the security justifications of the EU enlargement to Turkey do not derive from Europe's past but from Turkey's special role and from the current developments of European security environment.

Even though the security argumentation in Turkey's case has changed, risks and threats are new, it can be seen as a some kind of continuation of the EU's enlargement policy. The original aims, extending the European security community and providing peace and security ever wider have not changed. After the 2004 eastern enlargement, and later the joining of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 which completed that particular process,⁵ had been approved and agreed the European Union was in a place where it could start planning schedules to the next step which included the accession of Turkey. From my point of view it was important for the EU to first 'correct the history' and bring the Central and Eastern European states back where they belong before it was possible to start really act within new challenges. Like Commissioner Rehn expresses it: "inside the borders of the European Union we have achieved an era of deep peace" (Rehn 1 May 2008, University of Oxford), it was essential in 2004 to complete the first European project before starting a new one, or at least beginning a new phase in the European project of providing peace and security. Of course it has to be remembered that the EU has had to adapt to the course of history and it is difficult to say how much for example the 9/11 attacks and the way it changed the world has affected security argumentations concerning Turkey's EU membership. It is impossible to know whether the argumentation would be different or less strong if the situation was different, or whether Turkey's membership would be considered as important by the European Commission. It is clear that many things have had an effect on how the security speech acts presented by the Commissioner have taken their form but I argue that an important background factor is that the EU is ready to take the next step in its ambitious peace project after it has succeeded in the 'home front' by reuniting Western and Eastern Europe.

Although the security arguments preceding the eastern enlargement in 2004 and the argumentation concerning Turkey have different content the purpose and way of using them are similar. In both cases EU enlargement is framed as a tool to expand European security community through desecuritization process (O'Brennan 2006, p. 156). EU enlargement is in both times presented as the best and most logical answer to the existing security challenges. As I have argued earlier the security justifications for the EU enlargement to Turkey are linked also to the EU's position in a wider world, as a regional as well as a global actor. This

⁵ Bulgaria and Romania are considered to belong to the same group with the ten Central and Eastern European member states that joined in 2004. These states together with Bulgaria and Romania form the group of states that joined to the Union during the fifth enlargement round. Due to certain difficulties in fulfilling the accession criteria Bulgaria and Romania did not join the EU until 2007. (See e.g. COM(2006) 214 final.)

can be also considered as a continuation and as a next step to the earlier enlargement rounds. O'Brennan writes that already the eastern enlargement was viewed as a part of ongoing project of turning the EU into more important actor worldwide, even into a super state that would challenge the power of the US and the emerging rivals like China and India (O'Brennan 2006, p. 158). This project is obviously hoped to continue even more strongly with the help of Turkey's EU membership which is framed by Commissioner Rehn as an important mean to enhance the EU's global status.

My argumentation about the ambitious next step that the European Union is taking with its aim to further enlarge to Turkey is suitable also when considering how the enlargement would change the balance of European security complex. As I have written earlier the EU is a special kind of security complex which is not based on securitization of each other, meaning that the members of the European security complex do not frame each other as enemies or security problems but as friends (Buzan and Wæver 2003, pp. 54-56). For this reason the EU can be considered as a security community where states based on the definition of a security community do not solve their problems with physical means but find some kind of an alternative way to deal with even difficult issues (Deutch et al. 1968, pp. 5-6). According to the security complex theory, Turkey has so far been an insulator state between the European and Middle Eastern security complexes, a state which has some kind of security dynamics with both but cannot be considered to belong either of them (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 41, Buzan 1991, p. 196). Regional security complexes are not however permanent by nature. They can take new shape if the internal relations between the members of the RSC change, or if there occurs some shift in the relationship between the RSC and some external state (Buzan 1991, p. 216). The Commissioner's security argumentation concerning Turkey's EU membership offers changes to the situation between the European security complex and the insulator state Turkey. The EU's aim is to have Turkey, who has adopted the European values and ways of action, inside the Union and along with that create closer relationships to the neighbouring Middle Eastern security complex. The EU expects Turkey to become a bridge between these two security complexes and to offer new influence to the EU also when it comes to the Middle East and various security challenges there. In other words, if everything should go as the European Commission is hoping for, the European security complex, or community, would extend to cover Turkey as well.

This would be the interpretation that one would easily make; when a state becomes a member of the European Union it naturally belongs to the European security community. The need to extend the zone of peace and security to Turkey and beyond was articulated by the Commissioner in his various speeches. Integrating Turkey to the European security community can definitely be considered as a new step in European security but the situation is not, however, as simple as that. When reviewing the Commissioner's argumentation it can also be noticed how he emphasizes Turkey's 'bridge status' *between* Europe and Islam and how Turkey would be some kind of a *mediator* in the troubles of South Mediterranean region. From my point of view this kind of argumentation shows that in the case of Turkey the EU membership would not, at least at the beginning, maybe not ever, mean full 'membership' in the European security complex. Earlier, during the Cold War, Turkey was considered as a bulwark against communism (Arikan 2006, p. 198) and after the emergence of political Islam Turkey was classified if not as bulwark but at least some kind of a separating wall between Islam and Europe, and that position is not to be changed even after full EU membership. Overall, it can be stated that Turkey's EU membership would naturally change the security dynamics in the interface of European and Middle Eastern security complexes but such dramatic changes that one would first think about are not going to follow from the EU's enlargement to Turkey. Turkey's position *between* the two worlds is not going to end even if it gains a full membership of the European Union.

I consider it interesting and important to discuss what the speech act analysis that I have carried out tells about the current European security environment. I have written earlier how the whole concept of security has gone through big changes since it was noticed that issues of security do not consider only states anymore and that the aspect of security is connected to other than military issues as well (Wæver 1995b, pp. 47-54). The European Union itself is a proof about the widening of the concept of security because even though the EU is often criticized about its inability to act coherently in security issues it, however, undeniably is a supranational security actor and we can speak about the security environment of the EU. What defines the nature of the security environment of the EU, which I here call simply the European security environment because the EU obviously is the strongest security actor inside Europe, is in great deal dependent on what kind of a security actor the EU itself is.

Often the EU is described as a ‘civilian power’ which means using the civil means to support its policy objects as well as the ‘civilising’ influence of the Union towards others. Lately the EU’s civilian role, as opposed to military, has been under a lot of discussion. The question is whether the EU can be a strong global actor without military resources but then on the other hand, would the losing of civilian power status finally do more harm to the Union. (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, p. 41.) Another label that has been attached to the EU as a security actor is ‘normative power’. Ian Manners argues that the normative basis of the EU has been built in its different kinds of treaties, declarations and policies during the past 50 years. They are the internal principals of the EU which it is trying to place to the centre of its relations with rest of the world. According to Manners, the five core norms of the EU are peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights and the four minor norms are social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. Manners believes that the EU has the potential to become a global actor who sets normative world standards. (Manners 2002, pp. 239, 242-243 and Keisala 2004, pp. 18-19.)

The EU’s reputation as a civilian and normative security actor is in line with the findings of my security speech act analysis. Based on my analysis the European Commission is willing to further enlargement to Turkey due to its security benefits. Other things naturally count as well but this study focused on security argumentation only. The identified speech acts dealt with intercultural relations, extending zone of peace and security with civilian means and strengthening the EU’s global position in order it to be able to spread ‘all the good’ that the EU has to offer. The justifications for the EU enlargement to Turkey – prevent clash of civilizations and promote intercultural dialogue instead, and extend the zone of peace without military means – shows that the EU has strong normative emphasis when it comes to the enlargement policy as well. The Commission believes that by first helping Turkey to become a stable European democracy, Muslim state in the core of Europe, the consequences are far-reaching and the Muslim world, as well as the whole Western world, will notice that there is no reason why these two cultures should be each others opponents. In addition, Turkey would act as an example of the benefits of democracy to its neighbour states. Both of these developments that the European Commission is offering as a justification to Turkey’s EU membership are examples of civilian means that provide peace and security.

Manners believes that the EU has potential to set normative standards (Manners 2002, p. 239) and so seems to believe the European Commission as well. Commissioner Rehn argued that the EU enlargement has benefited the EU also when it comes to its global position and the enlargement to Turkey means a great opportunity for the EU to enhance its global value. According to him, the European Union should definitely seize the opportunity Turkey's membership offers and become stronger actor in high political issues such as security.

Overall, it seems clear that the security role of the European Union has changed quite rapidly since the late 1980s. The end of the Cold War and the re-uniting of European continent through the EU's eastern enlargement were already great changes but the acceleration of globalisation, more and more delicate relationship between Islam and the West and the ongoing conflicts in Europe's neighbourhood have changed the European security environment furthermore and set new challenges and requirements also to the EU. It is clear that the EU must today take into account not just issues inside its own borders but the whole global scale of security. Security threats concerning Europe may emerge wherever in the world. My analysis of the Commissioner's speeches reflects this change as well. When continuing the comparison between security argumentation of the 2004 eastern enlargement and the possible enlargement to Turkey it is noticeable that the European security environment appears different. In context of the eastern enlargement the security perspective was more inward looking and the security justifications for the enlargement emerged from Europe's own violent past and the fear of its recurrence. Now, in the case of Turkey, the international and global scale is taken into consideration such as it was articulated in the European Security Strategy; the EU is ready to take bigger role and more responsibility when it comes to the security challenges of its neighbourhood and the whole international community (European Security Strategy 2003, p. 11).

Sven Biscop and P. H. Liotta have written about how the European Union has become aware of the need to reform the concept of security. According to them, the EU has noticed for example when preparing the European Security Strategy that in current situation the Union needs to adopt a comprehensive notion of security. This means taking into account all aspects and actors of security and also acknowledging the importance of norms and values in international relations. (Biscop 2005, pp. 2-7 and Liotta 2006, p. 33.) When considering my analysis about the security speech acts in the case of Turkey's EU membership it can be

noticed that the comprehensive approach to security appears in the security discourse but there are also some elements that represent more traditional way of understanding security. Of course my phrasing of the research question partly defines how the concept of security appears in the analysis and this has to be taken into account. Many aspects that the European Commission probably links to security are not dealt with in the context of Turkey's EU membership, for example environmental issues. However, based on my analysis the European Commission views security from a wide perspective, including for example the cultural aspect to the field of security. Commissioner Rehn argues that European and global security can be improved by promoting intercultural dialogue and considers it important to enhance the coexistence of Islam and the West due to security matters. From his point of view, the world can be made safer by concentrating on cultural matters.

Commissioner Rehn also speaks in favour of improving the global value of the European Union and considers that the EU is ready to take greater responsibilities on security matters that do not touch only Europe. The EU is eager to promote its own values of democracy and human rights that it regards as precondition to peace and security. This illustrates that the EU really has adopted the norm and value based approach to security. Hard power and military force is not considered as only or even prime option to provide peace and security but the EU wants to invest in soft power, spreading its values and good example of how to gain durable democracy, peace and prosperity.⁶

Despite on the EU's aspiration and ability to view security from a wide-ranging perspective there appears also hints from the more traditional viewpoint to security. In the European Security Strategy it is stated that even in the era of globalisation the geography still plays an important role when it comes to security (European Security Strategy 2003, p. 7). In the speeches of Commissioner Rehn the risk of armed conflicts between states is acknowledged and it is naturally considered as a major threat to European security. This illustrates that even though security is reviewed from wider perspective it does not reject the importance of good and peaceful relationships between states. Although Commissioner Rehn is confident that

⁶ The term soft power was introduced by Joseph Nye as an opposite to hard military power. It refers to power of persuasion, a situation where power is rooted in factors like culture and values. Actor who has soft power can make other actors to want the same issues without hard military power because they admire its values and want to act similarly. (Nye 2004, p.5.)

Europe and Islam can live peacefully together, especially after the EU enlargement to Turkey, he also brings up the challenges that are linked to the Islam-West relationship and even considers it as one of the biggest security challenges of our time. He believes that a conflict, or “clash”, between civilizations can be avoided but however, he considers this risk big enough to justify the EU enlargement to Turkey with it. This illustrates a security perspective where the security threats emerge from traditional setting of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Here ‘us’, Europeans and ‘them’, the Muslim world, are not considered such different that they would not be able to live in peace and cooperate but they are, however, considered so unlike that peaceful process like the EU enlargement to Turkey is needed in order to create permanent peace. Without the peace providing developments like Turkey’s EU membership ‘them’ are considered as source of unstableness.

At the beginning of this study I set a research task to identify security speech acts from the speeches of Commissioner Rehn that justify the EU enlargement to Turkey. In the theoretical part of this thesis I separated based on the earlier studies and literature two types of security speech acts that have been used as justification to European integration and enlargement; the speech acts emerging from Europe’s own past and the ones that derive from new threats that are not bound to the EU’s internal issues. According to earlier studies (Buzan and Wæver 2003, Higashino 2004 and O’Brennan 2006), since the end of the Cold War the most often used reason to continuation of European integration and enlargement has been the argument that Europe’s past cannot become Europe’s future. The newer justifications relating especially to Turkey’s EU membership were identified in various studies and articles to be the Islam-Europe, or in general the Islam-West, relationship, unstableness of the South Mediterranean region and the potential securing effect that a European Turkey could have on it and the EU’s urge to enhance its global status (see e.g. Akçapar 2007, Aykan 2005, Biscop 2005, Desai 2005, European Security Strategy 2003). My intention in this study was not only to identify the security speech acts from the speeches of Commissioner Rehn but also to discuss the meanings of them and consider which speech act types were emphasized by the Commissioner. When discussing in this chapter the meanings of the identified speech acts and what they tell us about the nature of this particular enlargement, the current European understanding of security or about the EU as a security actor it has become clear that in the case of the EU enlargement to Turkey the speech acts emerge from the new security challenges that are not restricted only inside the EU borders. Security appears still as a strong

justification to further enlargement but the reason is not the fear of reoccurrence of European war but various security challenges that are linked to each other. Geography, culture, religion and globalisation are all factors that make the European Commission to view Turkey as a security opportunity to Europe and its neighbouring areas. In the current situation the Commission has noticed that the EU cannot afford to look only inwards but it has to evaluate its security environment from a wider perspective. This viewpoint appears strongly in the argumentation of Commissioner Rehn when it comes to the possible EU membership of Turkey. The EU enlargement to Turkey is needed because the work of securing Europe is not done. Among European nation there exists durable peace and the European integration is considered a successful peace project for a reason. But the project should continue, the EU still needs to work in favour of intercultural dialogue, secure neighbourhood and greater influence on essential security matters in a global level.

7. CONCLUSIONS

At this point of my thesis work I have presented the most essential theoretical background for my research topic, carried out an analysis of my research data and discussed about the meanings of my findings. To conclude my study I will in this section shortly go through the most important results of my research, make an evaluation of the biggest benefits and shortcomings of my work as well as take a look at the possible follow-up research of my topic.

My research task was to find out how the Commissioner Rehn as a representative of European Commission justifies the EU enlargement to Turkey with security reasons. Based on the history of European integration and earlier studies concerning the EU enlargement I had a presumption that since peace and security have been the greatest motivations for European integration and EU enlargement in the past, there probably is security motivations to the EU enlargement to Turkey as well. My intention was to identify how the European Commission views these security motivations by carrying out a speech act analysis of the speeches of Commissioner Rehn that concern the Turkey's possible EU membership.

Based on the security speech act analysis it can be said that the Commissioner does concern security as an important motive for the EU enlargement to Turkey. Security reasons for the enlargement are considered from quite a wide perspective. Firstly, the Commissioner argues that the enlargement to Turkey is needed in order to promote relationship between Europe and Islam and also in a wider context, between the West and the Muslim world. According to the Commissioner, the EU enlargement to Turkey would illustrate to both sides that there is no reason why these two cultures cannot live peacefully next to each other. From Commission's point of view the enlargement would also help to put an end to the 'clash of civilizations' discussion. Secondly, Commissioner Rehn considers that the EU enlargement to Turkey would provide security to Europe and its neighbourhood because of its stabilizing effect. The European Commission has adopted the idea that in order to enhance security in Europe the EU must extend the zone of peace and security outside the EU's current borders. The Commissioner argues that Turkey's accession to the EU has stabilizing effect on Europe because it helps Turkey to turn into stable, democratic and true European state which already means extending the zone of democracy, stability and therefore security. In addition to that,

the European Commission expects Turkey to become after her joining to the Union an example, a benchmark of democracy, to the wider Middle East which again would provide security to Europe and its neighbourhood. Thirdly, Commissioner Rehn views the EU enlargement to Turkey essential in security terms because it would promote the EU's status as a global security actor. The European Commission considers that Turkey's accession would give the EU new possibilities as security actor for example in issues relating to the situation of the Middle East. Also being able to unite the Western and Islamic worlds in a new way, by having a Muslim country inside the EU, would prove to the rest of the world that the EU has new capabilities in the current world situation where it has become essential to understand religious and cultural issues in order to provide security. Enhancing the EU's global role is considered necessary because it is the only way the EU can have a saying in many important matters that relate to the security of Europe as well. After all, in the era of globalisation security threats relating to Europe can emerge wherever and therefore it is crucial that the EU is one of the global level actors who have real influence on world politics also when it comes to security issues.

When considering the major benefits and shortcomings of my study, or any research for that matter, there appears the question of limitation. In order to have coherent and deep enough analysis a researcher is forced to make some limitations to his or her research task but at the same time one feels that so much important information is neglected. In my own research I also had to draw some limits to the comprehensiveness of my study. In my case these issues were for example the period of time and the number of actors I would include to my security speech act analysis. My choice was to concentrate on the argumentation of the European Commission which meant that I decided to analyse the speeches of the Commissioner for Enlargement, Mr Olli Rehn. I consider him representing the stands of the entire Commission when it comes to the enlargement issues. From my point of view the argumentation of the European Commission is a relevant target for research because it is the Commission that initiated the EU enlargement to Turkey and who is responsible for implementing the various stages of the process. The Enlargement Commissioner is the person who most probably has a great expertise in issues relating to the enlargement and whose opinions for that reason are appreciated by other decision makers as well. All in all, despite the fact that I consider the research data that consists of the speeches of Commissioner for Enlargement very much valid it does not remove the fact that other relevant point of views had to be left out of this study. In

order to create a truly comprehensive picture of the entire EU's security argumentation concerning Turkey I would at least have to analyse the speeches of the European state leaders as well. In that case I would however have to take into consideration many background factors starting from each state's internal political situation and therefore it was simply too much to deal with in a master's thesis. As mentioned in this study as well, it is always a challenging task to find out the 'common stand' of the EU to anything due to its lack of one voice. As long as this is the situation the researches just have to adapt to the situation.

From my point of view the most important thing that my work has to offer is a thorough analysis about the EU enlargement to Turkey that does not try to seize every complicated issue related to the process but that concentrates on security matters only. Turkey's journey to the European Union has been such a long and complicated one that it has to be discussed from various perspectives but often when doing so there is not enough emphasis put on the security perspective. My work also offers a viewpoint that discusses the security perspective of Turkey's enlargement process and at the same time takes into consideration the wider context of European integration and the EU's enlargement policy especially. In this work I have pointed out the similarities as well as the specialness of the security argumentation concerning Turkey compared to earlier security discourses relating to European integration and EU enlargement.

When I was considering the topic for my master's thesis it was clear from the beginning that it would have something to do with the Turkey's EU membership process. I have for long been interested in the issue especially because of the 'specialness' that seems to be a crucial part of it. No other country has such a multi-phased relationship with the European Union, and its institutional predecessors, or from my point of view no other EU candidate has ever raised such a lively discussion relating to so many different and interesting issue areas such as religion, identity, culture and security to name just a few. My decision to concentrate on the security perspective of the process turned out to be very interesting choice and the topic has truly been worth studying. My focus has been in security argumentation, especially in the process of securitization when issues are brought to the security agenda. I consider it important to find out what kinds of security standpoints are related to Turkey's EU membership when the accession process is still unfinished. Now I have had a chance to examine what is the enlargement about in security terms – which are the most important

security matters that justify the whole membership process. It is interesting to see whether the security argumentation will change during the process, does it gain more ground in the discussion or will there be other issues that will bypass it when the process proceeds. Alternatively, it is also interesting to witness what will happen if the membership process faces even more difficulties and is completely endangered. Then also the next step of EU's peace and security project would be endangered and it would be interesting to see how that would effect on the EU's argumentation. Accordingly, this study is not an end point to this research topic but the research work can continue from here. Another option is to look a little bit backwards and concentrate more deep on the idea of Turkey as a next step in the EU's enlargement policy. This would need more thorough analysis about the previous enlargement rounds and comparison to the security argumentation of them and the case of Turkey. Yet another interesting possibility would be to examine the developments of security argumentation relating to Turkey from the beginning of the process to the present day. As mentioned, Turkey's accession process has lasted for decades and during that there have been major changes in the European security environment which surely have affected the security perspectives of Turkey-Europe relations. The end of the Cold War, EU membership of the former Eastern Bloc states and the developments after the September 11th attacks are just the most obvious ones. Overall, when finishing this project, I am delighted to notice that the research topic still appears interesting and there is still a lot to find out in this area.

Bibliography

Adler, Emmanuel – Michael Barnett (ed.) (1998), *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Akçapar, Burak (2007), *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Alasuutari, Pertti (1994), *Laadullinen tutkimus*. Tampere: Vastapaino.

Algieri, Franco (2006-07), "A Weakened EU's Prospects for Global Leadership" *The Washington Quarterly* 30:1, pp. 107-115.

Aras, Bulent – Salih Bicakci (2006), "Europe, Turkey and the Middle East: Is Harmonisation Possible?" *East European Quarterly* 40:3, pp. 367-381.

Arikan, Harun (2006), *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU membership?* Ashgate: Hampshire.

Austin, J.L. (1975 2nd edition original 1962), *How to Do Things with Words*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Aybet, Gülnur (2006), "Turkey and the EU after the First Year of Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges." *Security Dialogue* 37:4, pp. 529-549.

Aykan, Mahmut Bali (2005), "Turkey and European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P): A Turkish View." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 13:3, pp. 335-359.

Balzacq, Thierry (2005), "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context." *European Journal of International Relations* 11:2, pp. 171-201.

Bendrath, Ralf – Johan Eriksson – Giampiero Giacomello (2007), "From Cyberterrorism to Cyberwar? Back and Forth: How the United States securitized Cyberspace" in Eriksson Johan

and Giampiero Giacomello (ed.), *International Relations and Security in the Digital Age*. London: Routledge, pp. 57-82.

Biscop, Sven (2005), *The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power*. Hants: Ashgate.

Bretherton, Charlotte – John Vogler (2006), *The European Union as a Global Actor*. New York: Routledge.

Burr, Vivien (1995), *An Introduction to Social Constructionism*. London: Routledge.

Buzan, Barry (1991), *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Wheatsheaf.

Buzan, Barry – Thomas Diez (1999), “The European Union and Turkey.” *Survival* 41:1, pp. 41-57.

Buzan, Barry – Ole Wæver (2003), *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, Barry – Ole Wæver – Jaap de Wilde (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Der Derian, James (1995), “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard” in Ronnie D. Lipschutz *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 24-45.

Desai, Seiju (2005), “Turkey in the European Union: A Security Perspective – Risk or Opportunity?” *Defence Studies* 5:3, pp. 366-393.

Deutsch, Karl W. (1968), *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of the Historical Experience*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Diez, Thomas (2005), Turkey, the European Union and Security Complexes Revisited. *Mediterranean Politics* 10:2, pp. 167-180.

Dorrnsoro, Gilles (2004), "The EU and Turkey: Between Geopolitics and Social Engineering" in Dannreuther, Roland (ed.) *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*. London: Routledge, pp. 48-61.

Fierke, K.M. (2002), Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations *International Studies Quarterly* 46, pp. 331-354.

Fierke, K.M. – Michael Nicholson (2001), Divided by a Common Language: Formal and Constructivist Approaches to Games. *Global Society* 15:1, pp. 7-25.

Higashino, Atsuko (2004), "For the Sake of 'Peace and Security'? The Role of Security in the European Union Enlargement Eastwards." *Cooperation and Conflict* 39:4, pp. 347-368.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1993), "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72:3, pp. 22-49.

Kegley, Charles W. Jr. (1995), "The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics: An Introduction" in Kegley, Charles W. Jr. (ed.) *Controversies in International Relations: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Keisala, Katja (2004), *The European Union as an International Actor: Strengths of the European Civilian Power*. Tampere: Tampere University Press

Keulman, Kenneth (2006), "European Security and Defence Policy: The EU's Search for a Strategic Role" in Adamski, Janet et al. (ed.) *Old Europe, New Security: Evolution for a Complex World*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 43-56.

King, Gary – Robert O. Keohane – Sidney Verba (1994), *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Knudsen, Olav F. (2001), "Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization." *Security Dialogue* 32:3, pp. 355-368.

Kütük, Zeki (2006), "Turkey and the European Union: The Simple Complexity." *Turkish Studies* 7:2, pp. 275-292.

Laitinen, Kari (1999), *Turvallisuuden todellisuus ja problematiikka. Tulkintoja uusista turvallisuuksista kylmän sodan jälkeen*. Tampere: Poliitiikan tutkimuksen laitos.

Leinonen, Anu et al. (ed.) (2007), *Turkki Euroopan rajalla?* Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

Liotta, P.H. (2006), "Symbolic Security: Europe Takes a Human Face" in Adamski, Janet et al. (ed.), *Old Europe, New Security: Evolution for a Complex World*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 27-42.

Manners, Ian (2002), "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40:2, pp. 235-258.

McSweeney, Bill (1999), *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Michalski, Anna (2005), "The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion" in Melissen, Jan *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 124-144.

Missiroli, Antonio (2004), "The EU and its Changing Neighbourhood: Stabilization, integration and partnership" in Roland Dannreuther (ed.) *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*. London: Routledge, pp. 12-26.

Neumann, Iver B. (1999), *Uses of the other: "The East" in European identity formation*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Nye, Joseph (2004), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

O'Brennan, John (2006), "Bringing Geopolitics Back In: Exploring the Security Dimension of the 2004 Eastern Enlargement of the European Union." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19:1, pp. 155-169.

Ojanen, Hanna (2007), "Kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimuksen teorit ja Euroopan integraatio" in Tiilikainen, Teija – Teemu Palosaari *Integraation teoria*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press, pp. 53-80.

Park, Bill (2004), "Between Europe, the United States and the Middle East: Turkey and European Security in the Wake of the Iraq Crisis." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 5:3, pp. 493-516.

Phillips, David L. (2004), "Turkey's Dreams of Accession." *Foreign Affairs* 83:5, pp. 86-97.

Quille, Gerrard (2004), "The European Security Strategy: A Framework for EU Security Interests?" *International Peacekeeping* 11:3, pp. 422-438.

Redmond, John (2007), "Turkey and the European Union: troubled European or European trouble?" *Foreign Affairs* 83:2, pp. 305-317.

Roberson, B.A (1998), "Islam and Europe: An enigma or a myth?" in Roberson (ed.) *The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit*. London: Routledge, pp. 104-129.

Searle, J.R. (1971), "What is a Speech Act?" in J.R. Searle (ed.) *The Philosophy of Language*. London: Oxford University Press.

Seeberg, Peter (ed.) (2007), *EU and the Mediterranean: Foreign Policy and Security* Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark.

Shapiro, Michael J. (1981), *Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Sjursen, Helen (2006), "The EU as a 'normative' power: how can this be?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 13:2, pp. 235-251.

Stritzel, Holger (2007), "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond." *European Journal of International Relations* 13:3, pp. 357-383.

Tank, Pinar (2001), "Turkey as a 'Special Case' for the EU. Will the Genrals Retreat from Politics?" *Security Dialogue* 32:2, pp. 217-230.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959), *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (2000), "Structural Realism After the Cold War." *International Security* 25:1, pp. 5-41.

Wæver, Ole (1995a), "Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in E.U. Studies." *Journal of International Affairs* 48:2, pp. 389-431.

Wæver, Ole (1995b), "Securitization and Desecuritization" in Lipschutz Ronnie D. (ed.), *On Security*. New York: Columbia University press, pp. 46-86.

Wæver, Ole (1998), "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community" in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wendt, Alexander (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1981 Finnish translation original *Philosophische Untersuchungen* 1953), *Filosofisia tutkimuksia*. Porvoo:WSOY.

Yilmaz, Hakan (2007) ”Turkki Euroopan kartalle” in Leinonen Anu et al. (ed.) (2007), *Turkki Euroopan rajalla?* Helsinki: Gaudeamus, pp. 45-59.

On-line sources

COM(2006) 214 final. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION; Monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania. Brussels, 16.5.2006. At

http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=506DC0214 1.7.2008

European Security Strategy (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World. At <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> 24.7.2008

Speeches of Commissioner Rehn

Rehn, Olli “The challenges of an enlarging Europe” 18 November 2004, Helsinki. (Unofficial translation from Finnish) At

http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2004_en.htm 17.12.2007

Rehn, Olli “EU enlargement under stress – the policy of consolidation, conditionality and communication” 12 July 2005, Berlin. At

http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2005_en.htm 17.12.2007

Rehn, Olli “What’s the future for EU enlargement?” 25 September 2005, Washington DC. At

http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2005_en.htm 17.12.2007

Rehn, Olli “EU and Turkey together on the same journey” 7 October 2005, Kayseri. At http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2005_en.htm
17.12.2007

Rehn, Olli “Deepening and widening: the false dichotomy” 9 March 2006, Athens. At http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2006_en.htm
17.12.2007

Rehn, Olli “Europe’s next frontiers” 4 October 2006, Ankara. At http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2006_en.htm
17.12.2007.

Rehn, Olli “Turkey’s accession process to the EU” 27 November 2006, Helsinki. At http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2006_en.htm
17.12.2007

Rehn, Olli “Enlargement – the EU keeps its doors open for South Eastern Europe” 17 January 2007, Brussels. At http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speech_2007_en.htm
17.12.2007

Rehn, Olli “The EU’s soft power and the changing face of world politics” 20 April 2007, Helsinki. At http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speech_2007_en.htm
17.12.2007

Rehn, Olli “Why Turkey and the EU need each other: cooperating on energy and other strategic issues” 5 June 2007, Istanbul.
At http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speech_2007_en.htm
17.12.2007

Rehn, Olli “Europe’s smart power in its region and the world” 1 May 2008, University of Oxford. At http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/index_en.htm
16.5.2008