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MIRRORED EUROPE

**HOW THE EUROPEAN SELF IS CONSTRUCTED IN NEWSPAPERS
THROUGH DEFINING TURKEY**

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Abstract

In my thesis I examine the self-images of Europe reproduced in two European newspapers. My viewpoint is to study articles that discuss Turkey's accession negotiations with the European Union in order to find the self-images reproduced by mirroring the self (Europe) to the other (Turkey). By discussing what Turkey should be in order to gain accession in the European Union, the articles formulate their own perception of Europe.

My research material consists of 57 articles published in the Brussels-based European Voice and Finnish Helsingin Sanomat in October – December 2005. By comparing the articles published in two different countries I attempt to reach a setting that enables enough differences for comparison.

My research method combines discourse analysis with the self-other nexus, the theory of self and the other mutually constructing each other. I also conduct a hegemonic discourse analysis to reveal the hegemonic structures in the articles. As the background theory I use cultural and political research conducted on European boundaries, foremost studies of European identity formation and the historical relations between Europe and Turkey.

In the articles, Europe is commonly depicted as prosperous, democratic and developed when defined through the other, Turkey. The European Voice has a more positive image of Europe than Helsingin Sanomat. In the European Voice a European Turkey is seen as ideal, but a more Turkish Europe as a large threat. On the contrary, the discourses of Helsingin Sanomat contain more criticism to the European self. Europe is seen more duplicitous and incoherent than in the European Voice.

It is possible to distinguish three different self-image categories of "Europe": 1) the Europe of ideals, 2) the Europe of masses and 3) the Official Europe of the decision-makers. The Europe of ideals is the common basis for the Europe of masses and the Official Europe, but forming a coherent European self-understanding proves difficult due to the gap and mistrust between the two latter images.

From the viewpoint of hegemony, both papers have the tendency to evaluate both Europe and Turkey from the traditional hard politics viewpoint of the power-holders – mainly economy and politics. In addition, both *inevitability of deepening the European integration* and *Turkey's subordinate position to Europe* reach a somewhat hegemonic position. This suggests that the papers consider the viewpoints of the European elite to be important in defining the European self and the suitability of the other into this self-image.

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FOREWORD

The question of who belongs to Europe caught my interest years ago. The less understood northern country called Finland joined the European Union in 1995 after decades, well, centuries of self-debate about whether we are part of the West or the East. Joining the European Union, on its part, gradually diminished the great national need to prove the Western identity of the Finns. The less understood Northern European country developed a self-acceptance of being European as well as the friends in Sweden, Ireland and Greece. The discussion of whether Finland was European or not was intense: did the Finns have European drinking habits, European manners of conduct, European street café culture, European political culture? The discussion was (thank heavens) diminished year after year, as people noticed that the other European Union members were as normal in some habits and as weird in some as the Finns.

The idea of clarifying the elements of “being European”, however, caught my interest, and I decided to pursue these mystic pan-European characteristics in my thesis. In academic year 2005 - 2006 I had a chance to study European Union politics and culture in the heart of Europe, Belgium. My arrival in Leuven, 25 kilometres from the EU quarters in Brussels, dated exactly on the same time with the beginning of the EU – Turkey accession negotiations. Once again, the discussion about a country to be or not to be European had burst in flames. I decided to take advantage of the wide selection of the Europe-collection in the library of the Catholic University of Leuven, and to examine the European self-image of that discussion for this thesis.

The logical choice for the language of this thesis was English, since a clear majority of my sources were in English and the language I used for the year was – English.

Pori, May 2007

Janne Toivonen

1. INTRODUCTION

THE PRESENCE OF THE TURK IN EUROPE IS INCIDENTAL. THEY REMAIN AT THE END OF FIVE HUNDRED YEARS AS MUCH STRANGERS AS THEY WERE IN THE BEGINNING. EUROPEAN IDEALS AND WORDS, LIKE "NATION", "GOVERNMENT", "LAW", "SOVEREIGN", "SUBJECT", DO NOT APPLY TO THEM.

- PAVEL MILYUKOV, A RUSSIAN LIBERAL POLITICIAN, IN 1916

Pavel Milyukov was a liberal Russian, and wanted to show his connectedness to West and to European values. Unfortunate for him, the West didn't consider Russia much more *European* than Turkey. Throughout centuries they have both been *others* for Europe, and drawing a red line either on the Gulf of Bosphorus or on the Russian border was to mark the difference between *Europe* and *Orient*.

In October 3rd 2005, the European Union made a historical step. It started negotiations with Turkey about its accession into the EU. Suddenly, a major enemy of Europe, a major definer for the borders of Europe and a major *other* constructing the European self had been accepted to discuss joining the European family. This discussion was to release a lot of public opinions about Turkey and also Europe itself. It was time to define Europe – if Turkey was to join, who could be next? Where to draw the borders of Europe?

It has been obvious since October 3rd 2005 that when we are talking about Turkey and Europe, we are discussing the compatibility of these two entities. It is discussion about values, identities, mutual history and political and societal cultures. Despite the two entities have a long common history, the outcome of the discussion could not be predicted when the negotiations began. There was a good chance that the discussion about Turkey was going to be open and honest. It was time to reveal all the opinions about Turkey, since membership was (and is) at stake.

The European identity has been a vivid source of discussion every now and then. On December 14th 1973 in Copenhagen the Foreign Ministers of the nine Member States of the European Communities published a document on European identity, the first of its type. The document was more meant to strengthen the EC's internal unity and encourage the EC to pursue common policies than to declare a united European value structure.

Nevertheless, it contained references to 'shared values', 'common heritage' and 'close ties' developed in the 'course of history', suggesting that there indeed was a solid common basis on which to build the New Europe.

However, defining this common basis in detail has proved impossible for any academic or politician. We can illustrate the roots of this definition problem by thinking of Finland's position between East and West during the cold war. The Finns were not exactly part of the Russian camp but neither the Western one. Finland seemed to have a national trauma about attempting to belong to West, but were the Finns as 'Europeans' as the French or the Dutch? Europe was not, and is not, any ready-made coherent unit.

Autumn 2005 turned out to be rich in discussion about Turkey and Europe. It brought us back to the same old question: What is Europe all about?

The purpose of this thesis is to research the discourses and the self-other nexus of that discussion. I examine how the European self is being constructed through the other. The main assumption here is that the *other* is essential for any *self* to be coherent. For Europe, having *others* such as Russia and Turkey, has been essential to be able to define its own uniqueness.

First, I categorize the main discourses this discussion has produced of Europe, Turkey and their mutual relation. Second, I attempt to clarify the means by which the *self* (Europe) constructs itself by mirroring itself to the *other* (Turkey). Third, I discuss whether there are some hegemonic discourses guiding this discussion. All these three points come down to the same point, *the nature of the European self in the Turkey-discussion*.

In a nutshell, I examine 57 articles that were published at the time in two European newspapers to find out how Europe reflects Turkey, and what do these represented opinions and images tell about Europe itself. I use discourse analysis to reveal what and why the articles are talking about, and then reflect the findings with the self-other theory to discuss the European self-image. Then, I briefly reflect the hegemony order of the discourses to evaluate the possible sources of hidden power.

By conducting a critical analysis about everyday newspaper discourses I hope to reveal something that is not printed in documents like the one of Copenhagen 1973, but is rather used in everyday speech even without noticing. Many discourses hide their agenda under stereotypes and structures that usually do not wake our interest, and that is why I see it important to attempt to point out something that might not be noted in the normal act of reading. My motivation is to examine with a curious mind what kind of Europe is built in the newspapers, assess who actually builds it, and reflect what kind of a role does this Europe offer for its Turkish other.

2. RESEARCH MATERIAL

To research European identities by the chosen method, the research material was chosen according to the following basic criteria: 1) the material had to be of European origin, i.e. written by Europeans in European newspapers to enable the “Europe’s own voice” to be heard, 2) the newspapers examined had to be from different countries, to enable comparison between two European cultures, and 3) the *main* focus of the material should be something else than European Union itself, to enable concentration on non-directly outspoken assumptions of the European self.

Following these basic criteria, Turkey seemed an ideal target. It is a current issue on the European agenda, and the negotiation process of the possible membership is among the most important in the EU for years. It is the first time when dominantly Christian Europe negotiates seriously about a Union with a large Muslim state. Because of Turkey’s historical position as one Europe’s main others (to be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4), there is a good possibility that Turkey will awake more straight opinions about “what Europe is or should be” than for example the Balkan states Bulgaria or Romania, which are Christian and part of continental Europe.

The two papers I picked out to provide material are *Helsingin Sanomat*, the largest and most influential Finnish daily newspaper, and *The European Voice*, which is a Brussels-based weekly paper concentrating solely on European Union affairs. This, in my opinion, offers an interesting enough juxtaposition for the material: *Helsingin Sanomat* is a fringe-EU-state paper, while the *European Voice* is *the* core EU newspaper. The *European Voice*, published in English and focusing in the core issues of the European Union, proved to offer a better juxtaposition to *Helsingin Sanomat* than for example a British quality daily (such as *The Times* or *The Guardian*) would have done. An interesting possibility would have been to take a European yellow paper (eg. a Finnish or a British tabloid) and compare differences between quality paper articles and yellow paper articles, for example. However, concentrating on what two quality papers may between the lines say about Europeanness offers in my opinion a more fruitful basis for research than to examine the openly-spoken stereotypes of the yellow papers.

Helsingin Sanomat (HS, <http://www.hs.fi>) has a daily circulation of 420 000 copies (Finnish Audit Bureau of Circulations 2006), which makes it currently the second largest newspaper in Scandinavia after the Swedish *Aftonbladet*. HS is a highly influential paper, due to its large size and resources, and also the fact that it is the only national quality newspaper in Finland. HS is officially neutral and not politically bound, but it is also considered to be more positive than negative towards European integration. HS is a large daily paper, reporting on sports and culture as much as domestic news and foreign events. Its foreign news section is considered to be the widest amongst Finnish printed media, with foreign news usually covering 4-8 pages of the paper's 40 – 100 pages.

The European Voice (EV, <http://www.european-voice.com>), on the other hand, is a considerably smaller paper. The paper has normally 28 – 40 pages, it is published only once a week, and its circulation is 17 000 (BPA Auditing International 2006). Nevertheless, EV is at the moment the only printed newspaper that concentrates solely on European Union affairs. It has only one competitor, the Greece-based weekly *New Europe*, which however is more an all-around-Europe paper, focusing more on collecting domestic news of the Member States in one paper than concentrating in the politics of the EU core. On the contrary, EV attempts to achieve a "truly European" viewpoint in politics and international events, having also publicly expressed (see the paper's website) this goal and will. EV is part of Britain-based *The Economist publications*, officially stating itself off the viewpoints of its big brother, *The Economist*. EV focuses almost solely on politics instead of economy, and culture or sports are only seen on the pages if they are in some way intertwined with the European Union politics. Despite its British publisher, EV is considered to be neutral from state viewpoints on its opinions, and instead claims to take a European viewpoint on the issues. Neither of the papers is politically tied, and both are quality papers, not yellow press.

The differences, nevertheless, have to be realised and assessed as well. EV is printed in English, HS in Finnish. EV is a weekly paper, HS a daily. EV is solely a political newspaper, while HS handles affairs from culture and gardening to international business. Due to its small size, EV uses many guest writers and columnists, while in HS most of the stories are written by the paper's own journalists or free-lancers. Instead of considering these differences as problematic, I would like to think that they bring richness in the analysis. The numerous political articles, editorials and comments of EV are contrasted by several

reportages and even culture and sports news in HS. Furthermore, roughly two thirds of the HS articles consist of foreign news, economics, editorials and comments, making the materials similar enough to each other. The fact that EV uses many guest writers (politicians and academics) is not necessarily a problem either. EV makes its own decisions of publication, and many of the writers are writing in EV regularly.

The language question needs assessment as well. Since the focus of this paper is on discourses instead of sentence structures, it should be possible to make a fair comparison between the two papers. The translations I use in describing the details of the Finnish-written articles are my own. Being aware of the high accuracy needed in the translations, I try to preserve the correct theme of the articles through the translation process. The translations might not in some cases correspond exactly 100% word-to-word; in these cases I have rather thought of the core message of the sentence and function of the discourse. However, these exceptions are rare.

2.1 COLLECTION PERIOD OF THE RESEARCH MATERIAL

The articles were collected from the time period September 1st 2005 – December 31st 2005. Before September there was not much happening around the EU-Turkey negotiations issue, not in Brussels or Istanbul, and neither on the European media. The first flow of articles over the issue started to appear in papers in September, acting mostly as background stories towards the start of the official negotiations, scheduled on October 3rd. The end of September, just before the beginning of the negotiations and the first half of October, just after the negotiations started, provided the most articles. Also in November the issue was still high on the agenda. In December the amount of articles decreased, but still the issue was discussed especially on the typical end-to-the-year stories. The four-month period provided in total 68 articles in the two papers, 42 in HS and 26 in EV (of which 35 and 22, respectively, were selected for the final analysis, see the next sub-chapter). This number of articles is, in my consideration, large enough to be able to conduct thorough analyses and examine the possible tendencies and agendas behind the words.

The four-month period provided a large amount of articles during a relatively short time. The turns and changes that usually affect long-term international issues, are therefore

minimal in this case. During the chosen period, no real turns and changes that would affect the nature of the articles could be detected. Negotiations are estimated to last at least a few years, so the articles published one month before and three months after the start of the negotiations are still, for example compared to a time period of one year, “fresh” and “original” opinions about the subject, not distorted by the international events or wide media discussion.

Therefore, I believe that this gives a good ground to examine European opinions about Turkey in their original form. As this is the first time ever that Turkey’s possible membership in the EU enters the negotiation phase, the opinions about Turkey’s nature and suitability in the European family are likely to be pure.

2.2 LIMITATION OF THE MATERIAL

For the final analysis, only articles written by the papers’ own foreign news reporters or correspondents, or experts’ opinions printed in the news pages (not readers’ opinions pages) were accepted. In case the source was an international news agency (eg. *AP*, *AFP*, *Reuters*), the article was excluded. These articles were merely translated stories from the raw material offered by the agencies, not offering value considering the own viewpoints of the paper.

Limitation was necessary in order to examine only articles with the papers’ *own voice*. The news agencies’ stories are not loaded with the values of a newspaper and its journalist, and despite their publication is always a conscious choice and therefore participates in setting the paper’s editorial line and agenda, I exclude them here. On the contrary, editorials and comments can be expected to provide a sound basis for analysis, since they consist completely of the own voice of the paper.

All the readers’ opinions were excluded. The motives to select certain readers’ opinions for publication are usually different from the motives to select the stories to be written and published. In short, the fluctuation in the issues, the topics and the level of the readers’ opinions is wider than in the articles of the newspapers’ own production.

Only articles discussing Turkey's possible membership were taken into account. In other words, the article had to discuss 1) Turkey's action on the course to the possible membership in the EU, 2) the European Union's political actions or discussion about Turkey's possible membership, 3) the negotiation process itself, or 4) an event (culture, media, sports etc.) linked to and/or discussed from the viewpoint of the possible membership of Turkey.

It would have been possible to choose other countries or regions as the main focus instead of Turkey. For example, articles about Romania, Bulgaria or the former Yugoslavian republic states could have provided material as well. Compared to these countries as others for Europe, however, Turkey turns out to be more interesting. First, Turkey is homogeneously Islamic compared to mainly Catholic and Orthodox Balkan states. Second, Turkey is geographically mostly outside what is considered to be continental Europe, thus offering clearer distinction from the countries in European continent. Third, if Balkan states had been chosen, it would have been difficult to limit the material to focus on only one country. The amount of articles discussing situation in any of the Balkan states has been considerably smaller than the flow of articles discussing Turkey during the selected four months in 2005. Therefore, it would have been necessary to include at least two to three states in the analysis. This would have caused unnecessary fragmentation. Turkey alone offers a solid, geographically and religiously non-European basis for analysis.

However, not all the articles with the word 'Turkey' were included in the final analysis. First, either Turkey itself or Turkey's possible accession had to be the *main focus* of the article. The stories discussing an issue *related* to Turkey's negotiation position (eg. situation in Cyprus, the question of the Kurds or Turkey's relationship with the neighbouring states) were not taken into account. On these articles the main focus was nearly always on Turkey's relation with another group, and therefore the articles' connection to the EU was missing in nearly all the cases. For example, the many articles discussing the Kurds were providing interesting viewpoints, but due to their theme, they mirrored the position of Kurdistan as a sub-nation of Turkey rather than mirroring the area as part of Turkey with the EU. In these cases, no clear EU-Turkey counter-positions formed. Second, the articles considering solely European Union's situation were also excluded. Even if Turkey was mentioned in these articles, no counter-position formed, leaving the articles useless for this research.

2.3 THE FINAL COMPOSITION OF THE RESEARCH MATERIAL

Of the 68 articles in total, 11 were excluded by the basis stated above. The analysed consists of 57 articles, 35 in HS and 22 in EV. Nearly half of the articles are editorials, comments and reportages, offering good possibility to analyse opinions, images, values and interpretations.

3. METHODOLOGY

The methodological discipline of this thesis combines discourse analysis with theory of *the self-other nexus* (see 3.3) in the group identity formation, in this case European identity formation.

My intention is to examine how *European identity* is both produced and represented in newspaper articles. The idea is that by categorizing discourses about the other (in this case Turkey) in European newspapers it is possible to reflect what is said about the self in between the lines. Since the focus of the articles is on

WHETHER **THE OTHER** (TURKEY)
IS SUITABLE AND ACCEPTABLE TO JOIN
THE SELF (EUROPEAN UNION),

the definition of the other defines also the self. By saying something about the other the articles simultaneously reveal some characteristics of the self, since the two mutually construct each other.

A considerable part of the self-other reproduction takes place in everyday discourses. With discourse analysis it is possible to reach this identity construction, divide its parts into different categories, and challenge the natural-looking and obvious structures in texts. With discourse analysis we can differentiate the ways in which both the general representations about the European Union nature and the production of *our* identity against *them* are built.

A closer look into discourse analysis is taken in 3.1. I clarify my own methodological position in the field of this multi-disciplinary method and define some concepts I use in the final analysis. In 3.2, I continue the theory of discourse analysis by taking a look into the construction and basis of hegemonic discourses. In 3.3 I present the theory about *Self and the Other* and discuss how it can be used as a co-method in this research. 3.4 concludes the structure by which the content of the three sub-chapters is combined to conduct the analysis.

3.1 DISCOURSE AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Discourse analysis is an interdisciplinary study based on the assumption that language constructs reality. There are roughly two schools: 1) Linguistic school, focusing on detailed semantic structural analysis of the text, and 2) Critical school, which concentrates on the hegemony of certain discourses over the other, focusing its attention on the power structures that discourses generate and represent (see eg. Jokinen et al. 1993, 11; Fairclough 1995, 61, whose terms *linguistic analysis* and *intertextual analysis* correspond well to linguistic school and critical school).

The discourse analysts widely understand *discourse* as some kind of "language above the sentence" and "above the clause", thus suggesting that discourse is more than merely a selection of words.

Norman Fairclough, the developer of the *critical discourse analysis* theory, uses 'discourse' to refer to written or spoken language use, but also visual images and non-verbal communication. For Fairclough, every discourse is constitutive of social relations, identities and systems of knowledge and belief, and any text contributes in shaping these aspects of society and culture. (Fairclough 1995, 54-55.)

Finnish discourse analysts Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen stress the constitutive and reality-building nature of discourses. For them, the use of language is a practice in which we give significance to world we are living in; we arrange, construct, reproduce and change our social reality by using language (Jokinen et al. 1993, 18). In this view the language is not merely a reflection of reality, but also an element constantly constructing it.

Discourse is understood to be an act of the use of language on a certain context. Both the language and the act of speech together form a discourse, which is never value-free or free from its context. Discourse represents certain values and social categorisations, and it is always an act of construction.

Discourse analysis studies spoken or written texts, such as conversations, interviews, speeches, newspaper stories etc. The range of discourse analysis covers a broad area of understanding these texts, from interpretation of meaning-making and meaning-

understanding in certain situations to the critical analysis of the ideology and power relations the discourses represent (Jaworski and Copeland 1999, 6-7).

Gillian Brown and George Yule describe the analysis as “the analysis of language in use”. In their view analysis cannot be restricted to the description of linguistic forms independent of the purposes or functions that these forms are designed to serve in human affairs (Brown and Yule 1983, 1). This definition brings us to the function-seeking nature of discourse analysis. For example, when the French president starts his speech to the French people by saying “Citizens...” his discourse is functional. The discourse is meant to highlight perhaps both his own high status and his position as the father of the national family of citizens.

3.1.1 CONCEPTS

Discourse analysis is not a clear-cut method, but as Jokinen et al. note, more a theoretical framework to enable analysis. Jokinen et al. (1993, 17-18) base the theoretical framework of discourse analysis on five contextual assumptions:

- 1) The use of language by its nature constructs social reality,
- 2) There are several signifier systems which are both parallel and competing,
- 3) The acts of signification are tied into contexts,
- 4) Actors are connected, even tied, in the signifier systems, and
- 5) The use of language has consequences.

In other words, language and social reality are seen to be mutually constructive, mediated by actors who use language to represent the ideas about the world. The ‘objects’ we talk about are constituted in and given significance by the use of language. Discourse analysis intends to make these acts of constitution and signification visible, and also discuss their naturalisation and variation (Fairclough 1992, 41).

Other useful concepts of discourse analysis are 1) the *non-representative* character of discourses, 2) the *identity positions* in discourse, and 3) the nature of discourse analysis as an *argumentative process* instead of a clear method. *Contextuality* and its problems will be discussed on the following sub-chapter.

Discourses are *non-representative*. They are not considered to simply reflect reality (in other words, language is not thought to consist of exact reflective images of the "reality", the world outside its use). Rather, discourse analysis concentrates on the construction of this reality in social contexts, and as already noted earlier, language both constructs and represents the world around it. (Jokinen et al. 1993, 19-24.)

The interest of discourse analysis lies in the *constructions of identity* it continuously makes. Varying from text to another, subject can take different positions, but it can also have boundaries that tie it to one position. As an example, a person holding a knife can be defined as a murderer, surgeon or cook, depending on the context. These *subject positions* are never ready-made categories, but always produced in social interaction. The term *subject position* refers to the restricted role of the actors, but *discourse user* on the other hand provides the actor with more power over the discourses he/she chooses to use. (Jokinen et al. 1993, 37-40.)

Finally, discourses do not exist in the text, ready to be categorised and analysed. On the contrary, they are productions of the interaction between text and its interpreter in the event of analysis. All the texts are ambivalent and open to different interpretations, and therefore every discourse analysis is conducted in a unique context. Discourse analysis is *argumentative interpretation* rather than documentation of the characteristics of the text. (Jokinen et al. 1993, 27-29.)

3.1.2 CONTEXTUALITY

Discourse analysis is always contextual. Categorising discourses is always conducted in a certain social context, which cannot be separated from each other. Text is only a part of discourse, situated in interaction and context both on production and interpretation levels (see Figure 1 below).




Figure 1. (in Fairclough 1989, 25)

It is important to note that the effects of context can be discussed and challenged in both its act of speech (the situation of writing or speaking the text) and the interpretation made by the researcher. Therefore, it is important to attempt to contextualize texts on a certain time and place. (Jokinen et al. 1992, 30-31.)

The concept *cultural context* is important in both textual and conversational analysis. Cultural context means that the analyst is not required to attempt to achieve neutrality throughout the analysis, but if needed, also actively (and consciously) use his knowledge of cultural context (eg. stereotypes, cultural habits, societal beliefs or generalisations) to differentiate discourses (Jokinen et al. 1993, 32-33). For example, the post-9/11 fear of terrorism could be used as cultural context in some texts discussing the development of human rights and immigration legislation in Europe in the 21st century. Cultural context is similar to *Social conditions of interpretation* shown in Figure 1.

It may also be useful to assess the *conditions* in which acts of speech are conducted, since these conditions may define the formulation of the text (Jokinen et al. 1993, 33). For example, if a CEO of a large company has to defend the decision of the company to fire 500 employees, he/she very well might formulate his/her words according to the anticipated critical questions he/she awaits to get. In similar ways, the leaders of the EU may choose

their words functionally, thinking of the coherence of the Union. This concept of condition is similar to *Social conditions of production* shown in Figure 1.

Contextuality is an important matter also inside the texts. Discourses have a functional nature, and in the analysis it might prove useful to examine the *contextual function* of each piece of text (Jokinen et al. 1993, 41-42). For example, a MEP talking about immigrants can start his speech by stating "I have absolutely nothing against immigrants", which would suggest he/she is in favour of liberal immigration policy. If, however, he/she continues the sentence "...but I think we should build big walls around Europe" the meaning of the speech turns upside down. These structures, also called *semantic moves*, can be used consciously or subconsciously, and are planned to manage our opinions and perceptions (van Dijk 1998, 39-40).

In Chapter 4 I attempt to clarify some of the cultural context by giving guidelines of the discussion around *European identity*.

3.1.3 DISCOURSES IN MEDIA

Allan Bell discusses the relevance of media discourses as research material. He defines four main reasons for the interest in discourses in media (Bell 1998, 3-4):

- 1) Media are a rich source of readily accessible data for research,
- 2) Media usage influences and represents people's use of and attitudes towards language in a speech community,
- 3) Media use can tell us a great deal about social meanings and stereotypes projected through language and communication, and
- 4) Media reflect and influence the formation and expression of culture, politics and social life.

Media texts are important in shaping opinion and agenda. Media has an established, powerful position in directing people's interests in certain issues and leaving others unnoticed. According to Norman Fairclough, media language is an important element within the research of contemporary social and cultural change (Fairclough 1995, 2). Furthermore, it is widely understood that media can never reach complete neutrality. Each medium text is written from a viewpoint with certain beliefs on the background and

selected positions for subjects in the text. Media represents the world selectively, and consuming these selected media texts inevitably shapes our knowledge and beliefs.

A very relevant notion for this thesis is that media projects social identities and versions of “self”, and that these projections entail certain values. Media representations define social relationships, especially between the audience of the media (mass population) and agenda-setters (like rulers, like politicians and church leaders). Media texts can be good barometers of cultural change, and media reflects and stimulates these processes of change. (Fairclough 1995, 17-18, 60-61.)

3.2 HEGEMONY AND POWER IN MEDIA

In media, the concepts of hegemony and ideology are present as much as in other parts of society. In the last decades, “the question of the illusion of an objective media representation” has experienced severe inflation in journalism research. The focus has been more and more given to questions like who are the ones controlling the media and how and by which means do these ownership relations affect the media content.

Mass media relations are often not clear, but more consisting from hidden relations of power (Fairclough 1989, 49). The owner relationships, agenda, news criteria and business arrangements of the media are often not clear to ordinary readers and viewers.

There is a sharp divide between producers and interpreters, since the interaction of the two does not take place face-to-face. Because of this, the media discourse is built for an *ideal subject*, an imaginary reader for whom the media texts are constructed. Actual readers have to negotiate a relationship with this ideal subject. This contains a possibility for the media to powerfully influence social reproduction. The readers are positioned in certain roles by the media, and even one whole population can be diminished to a relatively homogenous output. (Fairclough 1989, 49-50, 54.) An example of this is the *marketization* of audiences. This means a discourse in which the audience is more and more seen as consisting of more and more homogenous consumers.

Single texts are not very significant as such from the viewpoint of power and hegemony, since the effects of media power are cumulative (Fairclough 1989, 54). The positions and

roles for the readers, the representation of causality in the news, selection of sources and the possible agenda in the issues that media handle are all examples of issues that may really be exposed only when compared intertextually.

Media discourses are intertwined with general social power relations. To explain this, I use the term *order of discourse* originally created by Michel Foucault (*l'ordre du discours*). Order of discourse means the sets and networks of conventions that underlie and determine the actual discourse, and therefore also the mutual relations of the discourses (Fairclough 1989, 28). In other words the conventions and social roles guide the actions taken in certain situations. As an example related to EU reporting, we might think of an 'order of European discourses'. We have the popular discourse of the EU, often considering the independence of the nation states, but we also have the more official EU discourse used at high level, stressing the unity and common targets of the EU states over the national independence. The order of discourse of the two is negotiated in the media articles about European Union.

Fairclough mentions three practices of media that are of high importance thinking of power and hegemony: media products are *embedded, layered* and they *rely on sources*. Earlier versions of the news are typically embedded in the later versions, making the product layered. (Fairclough 1995, 48-49.) Therefore, one piece of news might carry a considerable load of history and earlier assumptions inside it. Moreover, reliance on sources makes media dependent on information from outside (which is usually biased). Ordinary people feature as typifications of reactions to news, but not as news sources – entitled to their experiences but not their opinions, and controversies can usually be found there where also division within establishment can be found (Fairclough 1995, 49).

As some critics to the previous we can note that ordinary people have been taken into a more active role in media in the last years. It is, however, important to assess the roles they are given. It can be assumed that they still mostly provide mere typifications, or even that their viewpoints and language are used in persuasion and consent, to legitimise the hegemonic discourses of the power-holders. I return to these questions in the hegemony part of the analysis itself.

Through discourse, people may legitimise or delegitimise certain power relations without being actively conscious of the consequences of their discourse practice. Many discursive practices that seem universal and natural are in fact ideological, and the power-holders need to be potent to control the order of discourse to maintain their position in power. The constant doses of news, received by most people every day, are a significant factor in social control. Therefore, to have the ability to determine the order of discourse is to have power, and the order of discourse is defined by social orders. (Fairclough 1989, 36-37.)

Media positions itself between the public and private orders of discourse, and this relationship is constantly reshaped. Thus, media both “plays the game” and shapes it. (Fairclough 1995, 63-65, and 1989, 37.)

Fairclough assesses the *media order of discourse* by dividing it into three models (depending on what is considered to be the main definer for the order): *code*, *mosaic* and *hegemony*. First, in the slightly old-fashioned *code model* the media practices are dominated by stable unitary codes imposed from above. A more common understanding is the *mosaic model*, which stresses the cultural diversity: the system is highly pluralistic instead of having a single web of power running through the whole system. Third, the *hegemony model* empathises the focus on the (consent-based) ways in which also in the pluralistic system an overall domination may be sustained. (Fairclough 1995, 67-68.) The hegemony model is perhaps the most functional here, leading us to think about the ways to produce hegemonic discourses in a highly pluralistic system.

The concept *hegemony* itself also needs definition. The basis to create hegemony is the ability to reflect one’s ideology in language (for example media texts). The use of language is always ideological, and Fairclough describes language as a materialised form of ideology. This ideological discourse, as I have already discussed, is constructed by the structures in society, but also constantly constructs and redefines these structures. An ideological discourse battles with other ideological discourses in order to achieve a hegemonic position, and even better, to naturalise its ideological assumptions as part of common sense. Hegemony constructs allies and integrates dominated groups into the circles of power by consent. (Fairclough 1998, 73, and Fairclough 1989, 2-4, 86-91.) Typical for popular ideologies is that they refer to historical connotations and attempt to appeal in

common sense by gluing new events as parts of larger context, thus naturalising the existence of the ideology (Hall 1992, 272-273).

In this thesis, I understand hegemony as cultural leadership and the “winning discourse”, persuading the readers to actively adopt the concepts it offers. I use hegemony as an analytical tool, following Fairclough. For him, hegemony is useful since it fits in the dialectic relationship of discursive events and ideological structures. A *hegemony* dominates economic, political, cultural and ideological spaces. However, hegemony constantly needs to renew its hegemonic position, and this continuous hegemonic battle takes place in discourses. (Fairclough 1998a, 76, 96.)

3.3 THE SELF-OTHER NEXUS

The idea of *the self and the other mutually constructing each other* has its background in psychology, but it is also used in social studies to depict relations between certain groups, nations, ideologies or identities. I base the self-other theory I use here on the thoughts of two Norwegian academics: Iver B. Neumann, political science researcher, who has notably contributed to the European application of the self-other theory, and Johan Galtung, who is mainly a peace researcher but has also contributed to a critical interdisciplinary assess of the construction of the European Union. Neumann has studied the formation of European identity (as the self) against “the East”, especially Russia and Turkey (as the others). His view of mutually constitutive self and other comes close to discourse analysis in some occasions, which in my belief contributes well to the methodological coherence of this thesis. Neumann refers to several philosophers and researchers in composing his view of the self-other nexus.

Neumann divides the views of the self-other nexus in *ethnographic, psychological, continental philosophical* and *eastern excursion* paths with different focuses. He focuses on the so-called eastern excursion path, starting from the assumption that the marginals in society, “the strangers”, are the ones that in the first place lead us to the question of who is self and who is the other (Neumann 1999, 11). The focus is on the geographically immediate Eastern others and their influence on the European identity.

Self-other nexus means here that both self and the other need each other to exist and to be recognised. The most known theorist to relate the question of identity formation to the self-other nexus is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. According to Hegel, the possibility to give or withhold recognition to the known other is constitutive to our self. Quoting: "Each is for the other the middle term through which each mediates itself." (Hegel 1977, 112.)

Separating *self* from *the other* is something belonging to everyday life, present in individual social life as much as in politics. Comparison between self and the others are used constantly, since human being is a social race. The *other* is something that separates the self from everything on its outside. The *other* is essential to any meaning, meanings can only be constructed through dialogue with the other, and the marking of the differences of the other marks the symbolic order called *culture*: in other words the other is essential for the constitution of any self. (Hall 2001: 328-332.)

Friedrich Nietzsche and Mikhail Bakhtin have also made important contributions to the self-other nexus, especially when thinking of the coherence with discourse analysis. Nietzsche stresses that individuals formulate the world by the act of knowing, and denies that the world would simply present itself to people. Since this knowing doesn't take place from any solid foundation, the self will know the other and everything else only as a series of changing perspectives, i.e. the self and the other will differ according to situation. Bakhtin continues from the same idea, suggesting that the other is necessary for the self to be able to know itself and the world, since meaning is created in discourses. (in Neumann 1999, 12-13.)

It is also worthwhile to note one idea from the ethnographic path. Neumann refers to Emile Durkheim's idea of the necessity of social boundaries. Creating social boundaries, for example dividing populations into different categories, is not a *consequence of integration*, but rather a *necessary ingredient* to achieve integration (in Neumann 1999, 4, 35). In the case of the European Union, we could say that Europe needs first to recognise its neighbours and their characteristics to be able to develop its own identity, to reflect its own habits and values from those of the other. For example, we hear often how the EU's foreign policy is compared to that of the US, or we discuss about whether the publication of critical cartoons over prophet Muhammad should be allowed in European countries or not. Following Neumann, this means that while conducting that, we at the same time construct

an own, distinctive identity for the European Union. Delineation of the self from the other is an active and ongoing part of identity formation pulling human collectives together (Neumann 1999, 35).

Collective identities are multifaceted and changing. There is not only one *East* but instead many *easts* for Europe. For example Turkey is just one point of reflection for the European Union. Erik Ringmar's notions of European identity turn important here. Ringmar denies the ontological existence of self, as self only comes to existence by *acting* or *having acted*. Therefore, there we should not ask the question "What are we" (since no conclusive or concise answer can be found) but rather questions such as "What are we like?" and "What is the other like?" Narratives and the existence of self and other in stories and texts constitute the process of self-making. (in Neumann 1999, 222-223.)

Thus, we should not try to find existing answers to the question of European (Union) identity. Nor should we try to find concise categories of what we are. On the contrary, we have to search for images and attributes of self and other, to find hints of what we are *like*.

Neumann's work on Turkey as Europe's historical other is used in my thesis as contextual background theory.

From Johan Galtung's work, I use his considerations of the mutual existence of self and the other:

Positive image of self, positive image of the other	Positive image of self, negative image of the other
Negative image of self, negative image of the other	Negative image of self, positive image of the other

Figure 2. (Following Galtung, in Hedetoft et al. 1993, 13-15)

This fourfoldtable presents the four possible relations of the self-images between self and the other. A positive image of the self combined with a negative image of the other is the most familiar type of this relation, inflating the positive sides of self and using the negative other to highlight the boundary between the two. This self-other relation is often used for example in nation-building. On the other hand, negative image of the self combined with positive image of the other refers to an inverted nationalism of non-reflected xenophilia. (Galtung 1993, 15) However, what is the most important in this table, these biased images of self and the other are found in common discourses, and they always seem to have a (conscious or sub-conscious) function their users want to fulfil. A combination of positive self-image and negative other-image could function as increasing internal coherence. Negative self-image combined to positive other-image, on the other hand, would at long-term be destructive for this coherence, and could be used by, for example, sub-nationalities to achieve incoherence and/or change in society.

I use Galtung's ideas basically to show that the self-other nexus can have both positive and negative sides. The nexus is not always consisting of positive self and negative other, but since self and the other are mutually constitutive, it can vary depending on context. On the same line with this are for example Shmuel Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen, who state that the perceived differences of the *in-group* and the *out-group* are not necessarily based on value judgements, and that the out-group is not inevitably looked down (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995, 72-102). Broadly speaking, other cultures act as reflection points via which we can mirror and evaluate our own society.

3.4 CONCLUSIONS OF THE METHOD APPLIED

The research method is to 1) categorise the texts produced about Turkey into different discourses, 2) reflect aspects of hegemony and power in these texts, and 3) reflect these discourses with the self-other nexus to find out how *Europe* and *European* are being produced in the articles.

The method concentrates on the constructive nature of language. I focus on examining the discourses by which the different actors participate in identity building. I concentrate on the interpretation side, since assessing the production context of the articles would take

massive work, and is in my opinion also irrelevant here. I believe that the examination of the articles (i.e. speech products instead of the whole acts of speech) is sufficient to be able to make conclusions of the assumed identity-building. Secondly, also the ordinary citizens do not usually see the production contexts. Therefore, the text itself is the most important part of the identity formation via media.

How then to define the different discourses in the text? Jokinen et al. suggest initiating analysis by searching and identifying differences and similarities in the material. To help categorising the discourses, they also present four main ideas by which to differentiate varying discourses in the material (Jokinen et al. 1993, 50-51):

- 1) Discourses cannot be found as coherent, complete unities, but rather as fragmented pieces located through the whole text,
- 2) Identifying discourses does not mean merely identifying different issues in the text. It is more relevant to identify the ways in which a certain issue is represented and what kind of a meaning it is given in the text,
- 3) The researcher should identify the different discourses by similar differences as the producer of the text,
- 4) The researcher should try to examine whether the words have not only literal but also contextual meanings.

In other words, it is necessary to analyse all the information in the whole text to “assemble” discourses from even the non-obvious hints (1), and to think of what kind of functions these pieces have for the whole text rather than highlight their literary meaning (2). The language of the text has to be followed carefully, and the differences between discourses should be based on similar differences as used in the text itself (3) to avoid the interpretations being mere reflections of researcher’s own ideas. Finally, the contextual meanings (4) differ from situation to another, but the analyst should be able to note whether the text at some point gets contextual power from certain structures of the text. Jokinen et al. also use the terms *invisible meanings* or *mythical meanings* when talking about contextually loaded structures, since the structures often use “holy” or “obvious” things, such as family or religion, to legitimate the message (Jokinen et al. 1993: 58).

However, there is not only one method to categorise discourses in the text. Ian Parker has listed seven characteristics of discourses to help the categorisation (in Jokinen et al. 1993, 60-63).

- 1) Only the text itself is relevant. Researcher should not think of the abilities of the producer of the text or his/her motivation to produce the text,
- 2) Discourse is connected to objects. Either an object does not exist before it is mentioned in a discourse, or then the discourse re-defines the object,
- 3) Discourses include different positions for a subject. A subject either produces himself or is produced in a discourse,
- 4) Despite discourse does not have clear boundaries, its metaphors and analogies form a concise unity,
- 5) Discourses refer to other discourses. They form an intertwined and intertextual system,
- 6) A discourse also refers to its own speech and comments its own concepts, which helps us in its recognition,
- 7) A discourse is contextual and historical, and therefore always connected to a certain period of time.

I do not consider the first point (the relevance of only the text itself) to be crucially important here. Despite it is true that in categorizing the discourses it is important to maintain the concentrate firmly on the text only, in the analysis of these categories it is as important to think of the context of production. As this "second analysis phase" of the negotiated discourse categories (negotiating process forming the first phase) is conducted by the self-other theory, I believe that the methodological basis proves sound.

From the viewpoint of power and hegemony, the discourses produced about the relationship of the European Union and Turkey can be expected to reveal hints of the possible hegemonic voices inside the EU. The discourses also mirror the negotiation, reflection and mediation of the power relations in the two mediums, Helsingin Sanomat and the European Voice.

The focus in the hegemony analysis is in: 1) the question of representation, and 2) the projection of cultural values. The question of representation includes an assessment of the social agents contributing in discussion: reporters, politicians, institution leaders, experts,

NGO-representatives and ordinary people (Fairclough 1995, 185). Is it the establishment and professionals or the ordinary people and non-professionals who get to contribute, and with what sort of content? Secondly, how do these agents project the cultural values?

I have formulated four questions for giving a brief analysis of power and hegemony in Chapter 5.7:

- 1) Which are the main sources and voices talking in the articles?
- 2) Which assumptions and even discourses are considered natural?
- 3) How do the discourses legitimise themselves? Do they persuade the readers or attempt to diminish them into certain broad categories such as *Europeans*?
- 4) Is it possible to negotiate hegemonic discourses in the text?

Hegemony is, however, secondary in the analysis. The main focus is in finding the discursive differences and the self-other positions they impose.

4. IN SEARCH OF THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY

ANY EUROPEAN STATE WHICH RESPECTS THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN ARTICLE 6 (1) MAY APPLY TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE UNION. --- THE CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION AND THE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE TREATIES ON WHICH THE UNION IS FOUNDED, WHICH SUCH ADMISSION ENTAILS, SHALL BE THE SUBJECT OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES AND THE APPLICANT STATE.

TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, ARTICLE 49

THE UNION IS FOUNDED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LIBERTY, DEMOCRACY, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, AND THE RULE OF LAW, PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE COMMON TO THE MEMBER STATES.

TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, ARTICLE 6 (1)

By referring to *any European state* and broad principles the European Union itself leaves very unclear what it means by *Europe*. We have, of course, ideas and stereotypes about what Europe is: geographically stretching on east-west axis from the shores of the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains and the Bosphorus, and on north-south axis from the United Kingdom and Scandinavia down to the Mediterranean Sea. Or, we can draw the line by ethno-cultural differences, and define the boundaries by leaving out the Eastern Slavic peoples, the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian people, Muslim Turks in the east and Muslim North Africans in the south. This would lead us to three entities: the Latin Christian, the Orthodox Christian and the Muslim. Alternatively, we can leave the task of defining Europe to politicians, and let the boundaries of the European Union decide what Europe is and what it is not.

However, these definitions are vague, and they overlook the importance of the critical assessment of the definitions used of Europe and European identity. In this thesis I assume that these definitions are always dependent on the user or the context of those terms.

I assess the problems of these definitions in 4.1. In 4.2 the main issue is how and with which reference points Europe is *framed* and defined, and in 4.3 I apply the self-other theory in the mutual framing constitution between Europe and Turkey. In 4.4 I take a

concluding look on the possible construction material of European identity – the common history and common culture in Europe. I also attempt to tackle one of the prominent questions: does (at least some kind of) common European identity exist?

4.1 EUROPE, IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

I begin by discussing the problem of defining Europe, identity and European identity, and clarify what are my assumptions of the three in this thesis. In my opinion, these are the most critical definitions if we at all try to define the values we might connect with *Europe*.

4.1.1 DEFINING 'EUROPE'


To assess this problem of definition from different viewpoints, I divide *Europe* into *geographical*, *political* and *cultural Europe*.

Geographically we first have to note that actually Europe is not a continent at all, if we use the definition of continent as a landmass of very great size, possessing a well-defined maritime perimeter, and linked to other continents either by a single narrow isthmus (such as between the North and South America or Africa and Asia) or not at all (Australia or Antarctica). We can see, that by some definition Europe is already culturally constructed as a continent.

Still, even if we treat Europe as a legitimate continent of its own, we can distinguish at least four different possibilities to be called Europe (see Map 1 below): 1) *Continental Europe*, having the Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Bosphorus and the borders to Russia, Belarus and Ukraine as its boundaries, 2) *Europe of the Continent, Scandinavia and Britain*, Scandinavia including Iceland, excluding only Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Turkey, 3) *Ural-Atlantic Europe* including "the European part" of Russia until the Urals and both Belarus and Ukraine, but excluding Turkey, and 4) *A broader Europe* including Ukraine, Belarus, Russia as maybe larger than just the European part, Turkey, and possibly Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and other countries in the Mediterranean region, or even the former Soviet states at Caucasus.

Every one of these different *Europes* can be argued to carry the most correct definition. Also the states on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea have every

now and then claimed their Europeanness. They might not strictly speaking belong to geographical Europe, but as Josep R. Llobera notes, neither do islands such as Britain or Ireland (Llobera 2001, 178).



Map 1: Four different Europes: 1) Continental Europe, 2) Europe of the Continent, Scandinavia and Britain, 3) Ural-Atlantic Europe, and 4) A broader Europe.

As we can note, *Europe* avoids clear geographical definition, and culture and/or politics is ever-present in its definition. Maybe we should even move on, and forget talking about Europe. Voltaire suggested already in 1760 to simply talk about a dichotomy of the *terres boreales or terres arctiques* and the *terres australes and antarctiques*, because, as Voltaire remarks, if you situate yourself around the Sea of Azov, east of Crimean, you cannot tell where Europe leaves off and Asia begins (in Pocock 2002, 58). In the (post)modern world this would maybe turn out to be too broad from being a useful division, but it nevertheless still shows us the difficulty of drawing Europe's borders.

Following Montserrat Guibernau we start to realise the uselessness of drawing strict borders to Europe. Guibernau states that the *idea of Europe* did not start with

geographical division, but as connected to political and cultural heritage embodied in the Greco-Roman and Christian heritage (Guibernau 2001, 6). William Wallace continues in the same spirit. For him the task of defining Europe's boundaries belongs to politicians and lawyers rather than to geographers and economists (Wallace 1990, 8). We need to seek our definition of Europe from both cultural and political Europe.

Politically, moving from Ancient Greece to modernity, the easiest and most prominent answer to the question "What is Europe?" would naturally be *the European Union*. Having started as a peace project after the bloody first half of the 20th century – and all the bloody centuries before that – the EU has grown from economic cooperation to a true Union. Political questions are handled more and more on supranational level. The EU has stressed its will to guard and promote the European values (yet without ever definitely defining what those might exactly mean), and it already solely represents its member countries in many international arenas, such as the WTO. Isn't this outspoken political commitment enough to convince us that the European Union *is* Europe?

Not quite. Countries such as Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia (and other Balkan states) do not belong in the European Union, but are still considered to be part of European politics on a broader level, with all of them having close contact with the EU decision making mechanisms and at least some kind of agreements about free trade with the EU (Switzerland, Norway and Iceland also being part of the European Economic Area, EEA). Thus, the political concept of Europe is often considered to be broader than just covering the 25 member states.

The treaties of the EU and EC, as seen in the beginning of this chapter, don't provide much help. The same avoidance of strict definition can be noted in the other treaties, for example the Treaty of Rome (1957) establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). It simply states that "any European country is eligible for membership to the EC", without defining the Europe we are talking about (Treaty of Rome, article 237).

The task to define Europe *culturally* must be, if possible, the hardest one of all three. How, first of all, to define the boundaries of what is called the European culture? For centuries Europe has been a melting pot under influence from various cultures. Greek architecture and theatre or the Italian renaissance period might be the first thoughts when we try to

define European culture, or we might refer to the great composers of the 18th and 19th century. But, undeniably, for example the influence of Orientalism on the European culture in the end of the 19th century has been significant. It seems difficult to evaluate whether the culture influenced by foreign stimuli is still purely European or instead a mixture of different, even mutually distant cultures.

It might indeed turn to be impossible to recognise *European culture* when viewing it from Europe, but if viewed from Japan, similarities uniting the Europeans could definitely be found (Pagden 2002, 23-24). We could see how football unites Europeans, no matter in which country you go (despite, sad to say as a Finn, maybe in Finland). Street cafes, European art or secular societal culture could be other observations of dominant sights around Europe and thus also identity construction pieces.

However, since the Japanese viewpoint cannot be applied here, I have to think of Europe as a concept consisting of similarities but escaping strict definitions.

In this thesis, the work understanding of *Europe* is the broad Western and Latin Christian entity. I have to stress that strict definitions and boundaries for this entity are extremely hard to draw. This definition *by most parts* excludes the Orthodox Christian and Muslim entities, despite once again clear boundaries should not be defined. There seems to be a shared popular belief that *the East* does not exactly belong to "our common Europe", and that the North African countries are culturally even more different. This, in my opinion, still has its influences in the formation of European identity. Still, I want to note once more that this definition is only a working tool and an assumption of the general atmosphere.

There is at least one shortcoming in the above-stated definition: after all the assessment and attempts to escape traditional definitions I am close to be back in square one and depict in this thesis *Europe* as simply a non-Orthodox and non-Muslim, common-heritage-bounded collection of peoples. However, I believe that by continuously maintaining a critical attitude towards this broad and unfixed definition it is possible to avoid accepting the easy answers. Furthermore, in the analysis I try to find whether these Western and/or Christian values are still the ones the political actors and the media refer to.

4.1.2 'IDENTITY' AND 'EUROPEAN IDENTITY'

By identity I mean human being's connectedness into some social bond or bonds. Identity defines what we are and with which social group we share the feeling of solidarity. It is commonly understood that identities are not fixed and definite, but variable and dynamic, and in some cases also context-bound.

I choose to work with a concept of identity close to *national identity*. National identity means the attachment of people to a nation, its political system and values, so that they can feel coherent and self-productive in the system with which they identify themselves. Anthony D. Smith has categorised some dimensions belonging to this complex and abstract concept of *national identity* (Smith 1992, 60):

- 1) *Territorial boundedness* of separate cultural populations to their 'homelands',
- 2) The shared nature of *myths of origin and historical memories* of the community,
- 3) Common bond of a *mass, standardised culture*,
- 4) Common territorial *division of labour*, with *mobility for all members and ownership of resources by all members* in the homeland, and
- 5) Possession by all members of *a unified system of common legal rights and duties* under common laws and institutions.

We can also make a division between *civic* national identity and *ethnic* national identity, as is widely understood in the research of nationalism. The civic basis for national identity rises from successful state-building and functioning institutions and rights, whereas the ethnic belongingness is a result of successful promotion of a common language, a common history and common heroes into the minds of citizens.

Smith separates individual identities from collective identities on basis that collective identities tend to be more intense and persistent than more context-bound and situational individual identities (Smith 1992, 59-60). One of the main questions in identity formation is "when and why do people sometimes think in collective terms such as *we* and sometimes in individual terms as *I*" (Calhoun 2001, 47). Again, this seems to be dependent on context, but is indeed crucial in understanding the functions of identities.

Robert Hettlage recognises three problems in naming and realising identities (Hettlage 1999, 244-248):

- 1) *The problem of complexity*: identity is composed of various constituents, 'partial identities',
- 2) *The problem of provisionality*: identity-formation is an ever-ongoing process,
- 3) *The problem of transcendence*: one feels insufficient knowledge in trying to describe identity.

This problem framework fits well in the case of European identity formation. First, Europe is a good example of a unit in which the citizens may have several identities: we can distinguish at least *local*, *national* and *supranational* identities. For a Finn there would be at least 1) communal, 2) regional, Finnish and Scandinavian, 3) Northern European, and 4) European identity. Second, as Europe is constantly reforming and enlarging, also the European identity is in the state of re-processing. Third, the problem of transcendence is as constant issue in the European identity discussion as ever.

The identity formation in the European Union, or in the broader concept of Europe defined in the earlier sub-chapter, is likely to be different from the national identity formation. The EU is not a nation-state, but constructed in a different way. The fact that even the core states of the European Union are unable to define *Europe*, contributes to the difficulty to build a sense of common solidarity. Europe is a construction constantly on the move, and therefore it is hard to define its common denominators.

Realising the problematic nature of the question, my work concept of the *European identity* means attachment to the European Union and/or its partner states (Norway, Switzerland etc.), a sense of belonging to either *Europe* (of some kind) and/or *the European Union*. This identity can be primary or secondary. This includes some kind of understanding of certain shared values, since without any shared values there would neither be a sense of solidarity.

The Eurovision Song Contest is, in these terms, a good example of collective European (broader than merely the one of the EU) identity. It is common European culture, an event shared in every member country of the Eurovision network, as well in Portugal as in Ireland. The value of each cultural event such as Eurovision Song Contest is, of course, extremely difficult to measure and always context-bound. The cultural value can vary from

country to country, but nevertheless it is hard to deny that there is *at least some kind of value* for a large group of Europeans. Here, it is worthwhile to note that Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and even Israel, Georgia and Armenia take part in the contest, suggesting that it is always easier to keep the boundaries more wide and open in sports or culture than in the time of political decision-making.

4.2 FRAMING EUROPE

Comparison to others is used every day all around Europe. For example, the European Union draws boundaries by highlighting its actions as a unity. When talking about the possible sanctions against Iran, the EU discusses about acting as a whole, comparing its possible actions against the propositions of the others, valuing other suggestions from its own basis.

As already stated, the identity formation needs *othering*. The other face of integration is exclusion, and social and physical boundaries are efficient defining points for identity. Reference groups are needed to build identity, and for example Eurovision, the Council of Europe and the European Football Federation UEFA intend to bring together, *to include*, their members. However, by conducting this they also draw boundaries by making *exclusions* between the members and non-members.

Hettlage calls these reference groups *frames*. The success of identity formation depends essentially on the successful fixing of these reference constructions into everyday speech so that they become something unquestionable, unchangeable and natural. This naturalisation of the artificial is important in the process of distinction from the others. (Hettlage 1999, 246.)

The answer to the important question – whether external exclusion strengthens Europe’s internal identity – has to some extent be “yes”. Maybe exclusion itself is not the strengthening factor, but as the reverse side of inclusion it must have an effect to the internal coherence of a certain group. Without the strengthening effect of the inclusion-exclusion process we would talk of some kind of world citizenship at its purest form, a situation without reference groups or local and national preferences. Cederman argues that if we want to forge a European identity and put forward European ideals, we have to

consider both the benefits of deepening and widening of the Union, but also the negative effects of exclusion and dilution (Cederman 2001, 3).

The history of the EU, as Hettlage notes, has been a continuous process of disagreements between economic and political union, small and large geographical definitions of Europe, opening and closing of borders, centralisation and federalisation, globalisation and the sense of Europeanness, re-nationalisation and regionalisation (Hettlage 1999, 248). In other words, the problem of inclusion-exclusion and drawing boundaries has always been present.

A significant part of the basis for shifting from one collective identity to another seems to be a contraposition to other groups (Calhoun 2001, 47-48). It is possible to find several others for Europe, both present-day and past others. Past others can be for example *the Old Europe*, the continent whose states were constantly at war against each other, or an ideology like fascism (which, of course, is still present as well). The present others can be different religions, such as Islam, or geographical and political others like the US, Africa or Asia. Thomas Risse argues that even *the New Europe* itself can be the other for European states inside its system, and that there is a continuum of Europe playing this role for Britain until the present Union, maybe continuously so (Risse 2001, 204-206).

In the south, the Mediterranean Sea and Islamic culture on its southern shores have formed somewhat clear boundaries for the European self. In the east, however, the self-other nexus has been more shifting. Johan Galtung differs four historical or still existing main others for Europe in Eurasian space: 1) the Arabs/Muslims, 2) the Turks/Ottomans, 3) the Russians/Soviets and the less proximate 4) the Yellow Peril – Attila and Genghis Khan, later on the Japanese (Galtung 1993, 16).

Putting Europe in frames has from time to time led to *Eurocentrism*, a tendency (usually linked to the European elite) to consider Europe self-contained and even superior compared to its others (Davies 1997, 16). This tendency was strong after the Enlightenment when Europe achieved its military superiority and colonial might, but trails of Eurocentrism have certainly not disappeared. For example, could the comment “We’re not carpet-traders here in Europe” by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration of Luxembourg, Jean Asselborn, during the difficult phase in the beginning of the accession

negotiations in October 2005, be a sign of anything else but some alleged European superiority?

4.3 TURKEY AS EUROPE'S HISTORICAL OTHER

Iver B. Neumann takes a look at the history between Turkey and Europe from the self-other viewpoint. He contributes to the view that Turkey indeed is the *dominant other* (i.e. the main other) for Europe, due to its proximity and socio-cultural position. Turkey's position as the other has developed from the biblical, apocalyptic other, to a less threatening, but still religiously distinctive other. Turkey is still a crucial mirroring-point for Europe.

4.3.1 THE APOCALYPTICAL OTHER

The relations of the two reach from the ages-old hostilities of Islamic Ottoman Empire and the Christendom of Western Europe to present-day negotiations of forming a common Union. Already the ancestors of *the Turk* (*the Saracen* and *the Ottoman*) were particularly relevant others because of their military might, physical proximity and strong religious tradition (name *Saracen* was used during the crusades of all the Muslims, and its successor as the other, the *Ottoman Empire*, was founded in 1299). Above all, the ancestors were religious others for the Christian Western self. The term *Europe* was not widely used before the fifteenth century. Its concept was not clear, and rather more accurate terms such as *Franks*, *Holy Roman Empire* and *Christendom* were in use. (Neumann 1999, 39-43.) The European political self was not yet strong enough to take the place of religious self as a projection point to the others.

Around the mid-15th century the projection was still mainly based on the religious difference. However, Europe started to slowly emerge as a concept, with for example the Pope Pius II seeking to unite the forces against the Ottoman Turk by referring to "our Europe, our Christian Europe". Signs of the emerging political self-other nexus between the Ottoman Empire and Europe were already visible. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Europe tried to unite its forces to stand against the Ottoman Empire, and King Christian I of Denmark is quoted to have said: "the Grand Turk was the beast rising out of the sea described in the Apocalypse". (Neumann 1999, 44-45.) Despite its feared otherness, The Ottoman Empire also moved slowly towards some cooperation with European states:

some European countries made political alliances and pacts with the Empire in the end of 15th and early 16th century.

Still, the Ottoman Turk continued to be culturally distant, threatening and mythical other for at least three centuries, with Christianity continuing as a strong collective force among European people. The strong military presence of the Ottomans in the Southeast Europe strengthened the conflict of the two cultures. Despite Europe had also other religion-based others, such as India (Hindi) and China (Confucianism), Turkey was the most imminent one. It was not seen suitable to the Westphalian system of European states due to its fundamentalist nature, and the Dutch thinker Hugo Grotius even demanded a league and crusade of the Christian states against the Turk in 1625. (Neumann 1999, 50-51.)

4.3.2 MOVING POLITICALLY CLOSER TO THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM

In the end of the 17th century the first notion of “what Turkey should do to become European” was outspoken. The founder of the US state of Pennsylvania, William Penn, declared that the Ottoman Empire *could only be included in the European society of states if* it renounced Islam (in Neumann 1999, 51). What makes this worthwhile is that it practically started the tradition of holding concrete *entry requirements* for Turkey’s accession. This tradition still continues in form of tight membership requirements set for Turkey and comments from politicians that even meeting these requirements might not be enough to get accepted.

The threatening presence of the Ottomans started to diminish with the halt of its armies outside Vienna in 1683. This marked a major shift: the military power of the alliance of the European states proved stronger than the Ottoman power. Europe started to feel superiority over its southeastern neighbor, and the other was to be seen as barbarian in cultural, religious and political terms. Furthermore, the idea of *raison d’etat* as a common ground of culture within the European state system was also noted in the 18th and early 19th century. (Neumann 1999, 51-52.)

The will to exclude the Ottoman other followed, and was preferred by many. The *father of conservatism*, Edmund Burke, elaborated the notion of a *Commonwealth of Europe* in the end of 18th century. Burke based his concept on the many similarities of the European states: monarchy, Christian religion, Roman law tradition, and old Germanic customs and

institutions. Burke went as far as to claim “no citizen of Europe could be altogether an exile in any part of it”. (Neumann 1999, 52-53.) Burke stressed the need of natural relations between peoples, and pursued a concept of family between the states where there was no space for the Ottoman Turk.

However, a stronger and more inclusive tendency was emerging. As the Ottoman Empire retreated from Central Europe and its imminent threat diminished, it slowly continued to have a larger role in the political life in Europe. The Ottoman Empire was invited for the first time to participate in a European congress as the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699, ending the hostilities between the Empire and the Holy League of Poland, Austria, Venice and Russia) was signed. This Treaty acknowledged the formal existence of non-Muslim states for the first time. European states, especially France and Britain, had a continuous diplomatic contact with the Ottoman Empire, and after losing two wars in the late-18th century, the Turks themselves started to note the need of alliance with Europe. The constant political contacts led to the Ottoman Empire joining the Tri-Partite Alliance against Napoleonic France with Britain and Russia. The wish of the conservatives to preserve the Ottoman Empire, as it was, led Europe to ‘the Eastern question’ discourse, seeing The Turk no longer as the uncivilized barbarian, but as an *odd man out*. (Neumann 1999, 52-55.)

4.3.3 THE ‘SICK MAN OF EUROPE’ AND THE EUROPEAN ENLIGHTENMENT

From this political situation (Europe’s dominance combined with the internal problems of the Ottoman Empire) and atmosphere it was a short way to the famous notion of the Turk as the *Sick man of Europe*, first noted in mid-19th century. By this nickname, the Turk was for the first time counted to be at least partly member in the European concert of states formed in Vienna. By the term it was considered to be temporarily ill, to be able to belong to Europe if only it could heal itself (Neumann 1999, 55-56). This forms an analogy with the first entry requirements for the Ottoman Empire stated in the end-17th century, feeding the otherness of the Turkey and the idea of Turkey’s internal change as an unconditional prerequisite for political rapprochement with Europe. The change was in Turkey’s own hands, but the reforms were to be made according to the European model and standards.

Meanwhile, formulated by the relationship with the others, the *Idea of Europe* was progressing. The former Idea of a worldwide and all-inclusive international society lost ground to the Idea of Europe as the privileged association of Christian, European, or

civilized states. The Idea of Europe started to develop to a standard of civilization (including basic individual rights; organized and efficient state bureaucracy; a fairly nondiscriminatory domestic system of courts, codes and laws; adherence to international law; and conformity with accepted norms and practices of *civilized* international society with outlawing such practices as slavery and polygamy) and drew strongly from its differentiation towards the others. (Neumann 1999, 56-57.)

This club of *the civilized* meant exclusivity, and only partial political recognition was to be granted to the Turks. Europe was strengthening its own civilized identity with such notions of the other as natural law theorist James Lorimer's: "In the case of the Turks we have had bitter experience of the consequences of extending the rights of civilization to barbarians who have proved to be incapable of performing its duties, and who possibly do not even belong to the progressive races of mankind." (Neumann 1999, 57.)

Guibernau suggests that this return to strong categorization between 'civilized' West and *uncivilized* and even *barbarian* East is at least in part result of the period of Enlightenment (Guibernau 2001, 10). Enlightenment must have had some kind of an effect on this development, at least together with the fact that the development of the Turkish society stagnated in the 18th – 19th centuries. Due to secularization in Europe, the other was not measured anymore only on religious basis, but more and more by their societal values: *humanity, law and societal mores*.

The Turk was once again expected to learn new tunes to play in the Concert of Europe. Europe demanded domestic reforms as exchange to its political support, and these reform demands were often linked to Europe's own economic interests. Around mid-19th century the Ottomans introduced better protection for life and security, drew a new penal code and improved the immunity of the minority religions, but still at the Second Hague Conference of 1907 the Ottoman Empire was granted a second-class status (by prohibiting it from nominating a permanent member to the court of Arbitration) due to its cultural difference. (Neumann 1999, 58-59.) One could draw an analogy of these events to the present day relations with Turkey.

4.3.4 AN OUTSIDER FOR GOOD?

In the 20th century the centrality of the Turkish other in the European self-formation has somewhat diminished. From Turkey's side, the largest contributor in this process was the modernization of the Turkish state by the founding of the Republic of Turkey by Kemal Atatürk in 1923. Modernization was actually at the same time also strong Westernization, as Turkey adopted new policies leaning on secularism, order and rationalism. Turkey negated its Ottoman territorial claims and defined its territorial boundaries as Anatolian borders, thus also formulating its own others to be able to formulate a strong new self-identity (Göl 2005, 121-140). An extreme form of nationalism, including strong belief to state institutions such as the education system or the army was intended to take the place of religion as a source of identity. The self-image of the Turkish state elites became attached to Kemalist modernization, meaning strong commitment in secularism, statism and centralization. (Zürcher 1997, 184-215.)

The otherness of the secular Republic of Turkey was replaced in the bipolar cold-war world by the Soviet bloc, and has remained somewhat diminished (Neumann 1999, 60). However, despite Turkey might not be as constitutive other for Europe as centuries ago, it still continues to draw strong opinions. It has a Western-model market economy, it is a member in NATO and it enjoys a custom union with the EU, but still it is not accepted in the Union of European states (after having its 1987 application rejected officially because of economic reasons). Only less than ten years ago in 1997, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands at that time, Hans van Mierlo, opened up the discussion whether the cultural difference still is practically the only reason to exclude Turkey from the European Union. Van Mierlo was the first politician in the 90s openly demanding honesty from the EU in its Turkey-relations.

The centuries-old hostile relations still define the present-day opinions. Llobera argues that Turkey is still envisaged as "an Islamic country that traditionally, in its Ottoman incarnation, was the fiercest and most important adversary of Western Christendom". Besides the Ottoman past and Islamic tradition, Llobera refers to the country's poor human rights record and the issues of Cyprus and Kurdistan. (Llobera 2001, 177.) Turkey is often considered not to be part of Europe, and therefore also not eligible to be part of the European Union.

Llobera also refers to another interesting phenomenon: the Turkish political elite sees itself as Kemalist-tradition modernizers, and this elite finds it difficult to understand why the EU has been so reluctant already for decades. (Llobera 2001, 177.) In other words, this would suggest there is a gap between the Turkish and European elites about the just and acceptable EU membership conditions.

Johan Galtung depicts an even more pessimistic view on Europe's relations with its Turkish other. Galtung thinks that as Muslims the place of the Turk as the evil other is secured, and that the EU membership is ruled out as contaminating the Christian self. As a NATO ally Turkey is acceptable, since at this position Turkey is a useful instrument for the balance of power against for example the other Middle East states. (Galtung 1993, 17-18.)

Galtung's thoughts are 13 years old, from the time when Turkey's membership was a very distant matter on the agenda of European integration. We also have to note that we have already accepted the idea of Turkey as a possible Union partner at least *to some point*, since the negotiations are ongoing. However, as we can see in the final part of this thesis, Turkey is still used as the other, especially in these times in history when we are considering whether Turkey will be more than just a trade partner and military ally. One important question – not to be assessed here but to be kept in mind – is:

Does the Kemalism-influenced modern Turkish identity correspond to the European image of that identity or not?

By analyzing the arguments for and against the non-inclusion of Turkey we might find something that tells something about our own identity, our images and stereotypes towards the others.

4.4 DOES EUROPEAN IDENTITY EXIST?

Getting towards the end of this chapter, I want to discuss the most prominent questions: Does European identity exist at all, and if the answer is at least to some extent yes, of which elements could it consist of?

In varietate concordia, or Unity in diversity, is the well-known and often-used slogan of the European Union. The slogan consists of some verbal art, since it simultaneously attempts to convince that despite all the small differences, the EU forms a firm community. Attitudes in the (Western) European countries have been measured since the seventies with annual Eurobarometers. Thinking of their function for the EU, Eurobarometers provide information of how diverse the 'unity' still is.

The last Eurobarometer of the year 2005 (number 63, year 2005) asked the same question as many times before: "In the near future, do you see yourself – 1) Only NATIONAL, 2) First NATIONAL and then EUROPEAN, 3) First EUROPEAN and then NATIONAL, 4) EUROPEAN only and 5) EQUALLY BOTH?" On average 37% of the EU citizens answered that they see themselves only as members of their own nationality, and 48% of the EU citizens answered that they see themselves as members of their own nationality firstly, and only secondly as Europeans. Mere 7% saw themselves as equally Europeans and with their own nationality, 4% as firstly Europeans and then members of their own nationality, and just 3% Europeans only. The results show that strong commitment to the own nation seems to continue, and that Europeans believe it continues in the near future as well. The results haven't changed much from the times of signing the Treaty of Maastricht. In year 1993 (Eurobarometer 40) they were remarkably similar: 40% saw themselves as members of their own nationality only, 45% as firstly own and secondly European nationality, and 7% firstly European and secondly own nationality. The correspondence to present day results is striking, and the differences nearly fit in the standard margins of error of the surveys.

The EU identity building clearly has problems, but is it fair to compare it to the process of nation-state identity-building? In European states, the 19th century nation-building processes were conducted by using elements of common history, common heroes and common language on a shared territory. The EU is a large entity consisting of these various nations, languages and cultures. As Pagden notes, "the new Europe --- has no 'national' heroes, no stirring narratives of independence or origination" and "the history of Europe is the collective history of all its parts" (Pagden 2002, 25-26). The European Union is obviously a much larger, abstract and complex entity than any single nation state, and thus cannot rely on a common history nor shared symbols. Haller has created three hypotheses concerning the relation of national identity and European identity (Haller 1999, 270-272, 291):

- 1) *A neutral relation* between the two. European integration will not affect the identity of a single nation state or its citizens,
- 2) *A complementary relationship*. Europe can be considered as 'emerging nation', and multiple identities can exist. And,
- 3) *A competitive or exclusive relationship*. The EU is gaining more and more importance as a political actor, which reduces the power of national parliaments and might lead to loosening of the national identities, since the state gradually loses its ability to serve and represent its citizens. However, national governments and citizens may fear these homogeneous tendencies, and oppose European integration.

Thinking of the reactions that European integration awakes, it might be the most fruitful to talk about a complementary and even sometimes competing relationship between the identities. We can see trails of national fears of losing sovereignty, but also hints of the two being capable to coexist. When a European travels to, as an example, China, he is likely to present his/her origins by referring to both own nationality and being European. We can assume this does not only happen because of practical reasons (i.e. to make somebody understand where around the globe for example Denmark is situated) but also because of spiritual and cultural connectedness. We, the citizens amongst the integration, are likely to share some kind of common identity. Measuring the magnitude of this feeling is difficult.

4.4.1 WHO NEEDS COMMON EUROPEAN IDENTITY?

This basic question can be tackled on two levels. First, it might be that the members of an association, in this case the European Union, would want to feel real connectedness to the association they are part of (even if many citizens are not taking part on a voluntary basis). Or second, it serves the purposes of the power-holders to impose a common identity to strengthen their own power. As both Cederman and Calhoun note, a common European identity is needed above all to legitimate the European Union and especially deepening of the Union's political aspect (Cederman 2001, 1; Calhoun 2001, 37). In economic or cultural union common identity wouldn't be as relevant or even crucial question as in a Union reaching towards political unity. The will to strengthen the common identity is much imminent now than in the days of a functionally organized economic community of six or nine closely connected West European states.

Calhoun recognizes the question of common identity as a question of internal coherence, but asks what is the goal of this search for internal unity. Is it to reach total uniformity, or should we, as Calhoun comes to suggest, feel common enough with something like *family resemblances* (concept originally by Ludwig Wittgenstein, in Calhoun 2001, 52-53)? In this scenario different parts of Europe could have overlapping or even conflicting identities, as long as they would possess some common denominators, just like the similarities in the physical looks of the members of a family. This would leave space for differences instead of pushing cultures into similar forms.

However, as the EU is not yet close to being a single state, the need for collective identity is not urgent (Armingeon 1999, 236). It seems that collective identity is something not needed at the present day but in the future. Reaching shared common identity and being able to refer to *recognized* common values (some common values to which we can refer, of course, already exist) would serve the needs of those planning the further integration: the integrative European elite. If Europe really is to become a federation, as its destiny is constantly by many elites mentioned to be, clear boundaries and common values are needed. This mechanism resembles, indeed, the nation-state building process of the 19th century, and we have to ask also to which extent do we still need the similar symbols and myths that were needed in the 19th century to bring citizens together under one nation-state? Are we so familiar with the postmodern fragmentation that we don't care about banal national symbols anymore?

The way or the other, the discussion about a common European identity has been much more imminent in the era of the European Union than it was in the time of the EEC. There are outspoken intentions of further integration in the EU, while the EEC was more satisfied with the economic (and cultural) space it had created. The more political integration is at stake, the louder the discussion of the need for a common identity seems to be.

4.4.2 THE ETHNIC AND CIVIC PILLARS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

There are many possible pillars of common European identity we can refer to. To make categorization slightly easier, I divide the possible pillars into two categories following the theorizing of national identities: 1) the *ethnic identity pillars*, and 2) the *civic identity pillars*.

Components of European ethnic identity count at least the twelve-star blue-and-yellow flag of the European Union, the anthem of the EU (Ode to Joy by Beethoven), the standardized passports, and also the annual celebration day of Europe (Europe Day, the 9th of May). The problem with these *ethnic symbols* is that the equivalent national symbols continue to be stronger, and the attachment to the European symbols is not that powerful. In Eurobarometer 62 in year 2004, 82% of the EU citizens thought that the EU flag is a good symbol for Europe, but just 50% claimed to identify with the flag (whatever 'identifying' means in this case) (Eurobarometer 62, 2004).

One more ethnic component could be the common history of the European states. The wars, for example, have often been felt throughout the continent, from the era of the complex loyalty and kinship networks of the European monarchs to the murderous and traumatic World Wars in the 20th century. This consists a common understanding of Europe's violent past, or "the will to overcome past conflicts" (Llobera 2001, 178). This would mean that the Europeans share a common notion of history as partly an uncivilized phase Europe needs to leave behind. Pagden talks about this common *othering* of the past with his reference to the "shared history of antagonisms to overcome" (Pagden 2002, 20).

Furthermore, Europeans have a long history of referring to themselves as 'we Europeans', especially when confronted by an alien culture. According to Pagden, this custom has developed long before the 19th century when for example Africans or Asians gradually became to have a similar convention. (Pagden 2002, 33.)

Anthony D. Smith lists a number of *partially shared traditions*, belonging to the 'family of cultures' and not necessarily shared by all Europeans. The list includes "the Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institutions, Judeo-Christian ethics and cultural heritages like Renaissance humanism, rationalism, empiricism, romanticism and classicism" (Smith 1992, 70). This draws a line over 2 500 years, from the Greco-Roman traditions to the latest developments in culture. However, as this list is not strictly inclusive or exclusive, it gets close to the concept of 'family resemblances' by Wittgenstein. These shared traditions definitely draw a boundary between Europeans and non-Europeans, but due to the varying value of these elements for different European peoples,

it is difficult to evaluate their importance for the hopes to build a common European identity.

Twelve European Union states have a common currency, Euro, which can be understood to have both ethnic and civic value. Its cultural value is *ethnosymbolic*, but as an economic structure (maintaining a low, controlled inflation rate and offering strong currency exchange rates) and a feature of economic policy mechanism, I count it as part of civic institutions. An interesting part of Euro is that it divides the EU into two categories: the Euro states and the non-Euro states. This, on its part, has contributed on the discussion about the *core states* of the Europe, i.e. the states that have advanced the farthest in the integration process. Therefore, Euro is also a boundary and comprises both inclusive and exclusive elements.

The basis of the European civic identity, on the other hand, seems to be in the old democratic culture, namely the specific cultural and political heritage embodied in the Athenian democracy and the Greco-Roman traditions (Guibernau 2001, 6). To keep this political culture flourishing, the EU has its civic institutions: the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice and the European Commission just to name a few. It has built a growing, yet not very transparent, bureaucratic system, and European citizens can under certain circumstances take their legal cases to be decided in the European Court of Justice.

One way to reflect European civic identity is the Copenhagen Criteria. It was laid down in 1993 to be fulfilled by any country wishing to join the EU. By the criteria, every EU candidate must have reached an international stability that guarantees democracy, legality, human rights, and the respect and protection of minorities. Furthermore, the candidate has to run a functioning market economy and abilities to withstand the competitive pressures and forces of the EU single market, and it also must be able to fulfill the economic, political and monetary obligations of the EU. (European Commission 1993, and Guibernau 2001, 176-177.)

The Copenhagen criteria list is useful, since it includes in one document the outspoken values that the European Union has claimed to defend. Therefore, it can be seen as one cornerstone of the European civic identity. However, it is highly uncertain that many European citizens know the contents of the Copenhagen criteria, and as uncertain is

whether the EU acts according to its own principles. For example, Vera Gowlland-Debbas highlights the contrast of the development of this civic identity in the field of human rights and the controversial immigration policy the European Union conducts (Gowlland-Debbas 2001, 221-223).

Education and media form possible civic pillars as well. European education networks have ethnic value besides their civic value, as the tradition of European scholars and academics moving between countries and universities dates back to the birth of the European universities. Nowadays, the widely used *Erasmus* and *Socrates* exchange programs belong to the same continuation, and undoubtedly produce some common sense of belonging among the Europeans.

Media is a more controversial issue, but undeniably plays an important role in the formulation of public opinion. Denis McQuail (2001, 195) raises three questions about the role of the European media: 1) Whether the media can be counted as a coherent institution in Europe, 2) Whether the media contributes to conflict (exclusion) or to integration (inclusion) in Europe, and 3) Whether the media is a force for change or a conservative influence in Europe. All of these are relevant questions, and not simple to answer. First, it would seem impossible to claim media to form a coherent European institution, as media is traditionally very connected to nation-states and their interests (McQuail 2001, 225). However, some traditional European media exists (for example TV channels Arte, Euronews and Eurosport, newspapers The European Voice and New Europe, and cinema organization Europa Cinemas), and on the new media side there are vast possibilities in addition to the numerous already-existing news providers (such as the EU Observer or Euractiv.com) to increase European discussion and connectedness and to form imagined virtual communities without borders. New media fits well in the idea of a Europe without borders, and it has true possibilities to grow its importance as a civic institution.

Part of the discussion of the pan-European media as well, *language* remains another highly controversial issue. Many European languages belong in the three groups (Latin, Germanic and Slav) of the Indo-European family, but on the other hand there are also other categories (such as the Finno-Ugric languages), and we also have to note that the differences between the Indo-European sub-groups are significant. The Latin, Germanic and Slavic speakers are not able to understand each other's languages, despite some loan

words and common basics exist. Nevertheless, the EU has successfully promoted the European language family as a whole, not drawing exclusive boundaries that having only one or two official languages would draw. Instead, there are no less than twenty official languages, the EU thus promoting language to be a strongly inclusive element. Comparison to the United States, for example, shows the difference: Spanish is spoken by 30 million native speakers of the total population of 300 million in the US, but still Spanish is not an official language. Within the EU, even 1,5 million Estonian speakers can boast using an official EU language amongst the 450 million citizens of the EU.

4.4.3 THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND SECULARITY

One more ethnic component, religion, is maybe the most influential component of all. Latin Christianity is true common history if taken as a whole, and not divided in different categories such as Protestantism and Catholicism. Religion has grown to unite Europeans for 2000 years, and has been common culture ever since the last regions in Europe were Christianized around the 12th – 13th centuries. Religion has played a central role in building the boundaries of Europe by the self-other nexus. The inclusive and exclusive sides of Christianity have possibly been the largest single contributor in the molding process of the modern Europe. The exclusive element is still continuously working in for example keeping the Muslim countries outside the definitions of Europe. On the other hand, the inclusive element of the Catholic Church, the Pope, continues to gather people together from everywhere around Europe (and the world).

However, the all-over Christianity in Europe doesn't mean that it would automatically have a uniting role in society. Religion is actually in decline nearly everywhere in (Western) Europe (Guibernau 2001, 14). It has lost its power as a gluing factor in society, and even if many still are nominally part of church, the real effect of religion in their identity is more and more doubtful.

As result of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, Europe built a strong tradition of secularity that retained a Christian outlook but was associated with other values. State and church have grown apart from each other, and no state works on fundamentalist basis. This process has led to the weakening of mass allegiance to traditional religions and the rise of secular values grounded upon humanist principles. (Guibernau 2001, 9-13) In other words, with secularisation many Christian values have

been included into the non-religious circles of life, forming the value basis together with the humanist principles of the Enlightenment. Present in all European cultures, secularism might actually form the strongest basis to define Europe, and the Christian legacy continues to be a key component of European identity.

4.4.4 A EUROPE IN PROCESS

Hettlage illustrates the problems in collective framing of the EU identity with his ten theses (Hettlage 1999, 248-260):

- 1) Until now, the EU has concentrated on the economic mechanism of inclusion,
- 2) The economic process of integration only exercises limited political influence,
- 3) The EU thus produces more problems of exclusion,
- 4) Tendencies of disintegration and exclusion endanger the EU and strengthen the nationalist 'revival',
- 5) The reason for the deepening problems of the EU is its lack of identity management,
- 6) Vis-a-vis cultural policies, the EU relies upon the regions in order to avoid dealing with the problems of nation states,
- 7) Regionalisation is not a solution to the problem but only a transfer of it,
- 8) The EU therefore needs a new methodology of cultural-self definition,
- 9) The identity management of Europe needs a new organisation of the system of education, and
- 10) A transnational politics of identity involves working towards a multi-layered identity.

In other words, the situation is a bit like as Hedetoft (1993, 137) illustrates by Magritte's painting "*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*" (a painting depicting a pipe and stating "It's not a pipe"). We hear discussion about the European identity and its emergence, development and components, but does this identity really exist? Yet, a better question could be whether we even want it to exist, since that existence would practically mean a deeper, probably federalist, European Union. Alan S. Milward has compared the discussion of federalism and national sovereignty to bogeymen, meaning that they are discussed to avoid the real issues (Milward 1994, 446-447). In this case, we talk about sovereignty and federalism without touching the real issue: is Europe coherent enough to act as one?

One reason for the fact that the European identity is underdeveloped could very well be that nobody actually has wanted it to develop. As Pagden notes, people have to be able to understand the EU and its mechanisms much better than nowadays to be able to develop European identity (Pagden 2002, 27-28). The EU should be more transparent, more democratic, and give people more possibilities to see what it really consists of. But do the European leaders want this at all, or is it better to leave the citizens out and maintain the control in the hands of those in power? In this scenario, European integration and also European identity could be things no politician wants to develop further, at least at the moment.

Europeans surely comprise at least some kind of a family. If not the most coherent one, then at least a family of 'family resemblances' and similarities, such as those mentioned in the previous sub-chapter. "I'm feeling European among other things", Jacques Derrida said in year 1992, and little has changed (Derrida 1992). Europeanness is developing by mass communication and integration, but it is difficult to tell how much of this Europeanness each identity includes.

I finish this chapter with a figure by Norman Davies, presenting an interpretation of Margaret Shennan's conception of Europe's cultural circles. Shennan's concept, combined with Davies' interpretation, is an interesting attempt to catch Europeanness in all its complexity, and to illustrate the relations of different traditions and practices produced by five different cultural circles around Europe. I show it as an example of an attempt to reach the *unity in diversity* in Europe.




Figure 3: Europe's cultural circles (by Margaret Shennan, interpreted by Davies). Taken from Davies 1997, 1238.

5. THE ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLES

The analysis is conducted in three phases. First, I include a brief quantitative analysis in order to examine how often certain issues are raised on the agenda. Second, I examine the discourses in the two papers respectively. Third, I compare the papers' discourses to be able to analyse the similarities and differences, and also evaluate the discourses from the viewpoint of the possible hegemonies.

5.1 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

The number of articles week by week is presented in the table below. Weeks 35 – 39 are in September, weeks 39 – 44 in October, weeks 44 – 48 in November, and weeks 48 – 52 in December 2005. Week 40 marks the beginning of the negotiations.

WEEK	EV	HS	WEEK	EV	HS
35	2	1	44	0	0
36	0	0	45	0	1
37	0	2	46	0	5
38	1	0	47	1	2
39	11	0	48	0	2
<u>40</u>	2	11	49	0	1
41	2	0	50	0	2
42	0	4	51	3	0
43	0	2	52	0	3
			TOT	22	35
			SEP	14	3
			OCT	4	17
			NOV	1	7
			DEC	3	8

Table 1: Number of articles by week and month, weeks 35-52

Of the 57 articles, 18 were published before the start of the negotiations and 39 after the negotiations had been launched. The first half of the research period (September – October) saw the publication of 38 articles, and 19 were published in the latter half (November – December). This reflects well the news criteria in journalism: issues are considered more interesting when they are fresh – which explains the large number of articles published exactly when the negotiations between Turkey and the EU started in October 3rd 2005. HS published eight articles from October 2nd to October 5th, while EV published fifteen out of its total amount of twenty-two in its three weekly issues of weeks 39 to 41 (majority of these articles, 11, were published in its special issue of the negotiations on September 29th). EV's coverage of the negotiations nearly ended after this period. It published just one article in November and three more in the end of December. HS continued reporting more steadily. It published at least one article nearly every week until the end of the year, with the peak of five articles in week 46 in November.

To conclude, we can highlight a few points. 1) The coverage *concentrated heavily* on start of the negotiations, 2) EV showed *incapability or unwillingness to continue coverage* after week 41, and 3) HS was *more successful in continuing the discussion* over the whole rest of the year.

The quantitative analysis turns more interesting as we add to it the qualitative factor, i.e. categorize the articles by the issues they bring into discussion. I divided the issues into 18 categories: 10 domestic policy issue categories and 8 foreign policy issue categories. The rules to divide the issues into certain categories were simple: *when the issue was mentioned in the context of considering Turkey's possible accession*, it was counted in the equivalent category. If the issue was raised without having this function, it was not counted. Counting an issue out was a rare exception, since the articles were already chosen because of their context dealing strictly with *accessibility* (see sub-chapter 2.3). However, for example considering the issue of Turkey's political leadership, the normal interview answers of Turkey's ministers were in most cases not counted. Only when the paper discussed the abilities or 'western-mindedness' of these ministers or their political parties, they were considered to be an issue the paper wanted to raise. One article can include many issues. For example article 7 in EV "*Neighbours from hell?*" discusses several: the EU membership resistance in Turkey, the status of Cyprus, religion and the question of living standards and income.

THE ISSUES ON THE AGENDAS	NUMBER OF ARTICLES IN EV (PERCENTAGE)	NUMBER OF ARTICLES IN HS (PERCENTAGE)
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THE ISSUES CONCERNING TURKEY'S DOMESTIC POLICY AND DEMOGRAPHY

(1) Democratic issues and human rights (freedom of speech, women's rights, torture, civil legislation)	11 (50%)	14 (40%)
(2) Religion (Islam, freedom of religion)	9 (41%)	10 (29%)
(3) Economic progress	7 (32%)	4 (11%)
(4) Minorities in Turkey (especially the Kurds)	6 (27%)	7 (20%)
(5) Turkey's political leadership	5 (23%)	4 (11%)
(6) The influence of the military / police forces in Turkey's domestic policy	6 (27%)	1 (3%)
(7) Demography (Turkey's population and its age structure)	5 (23%)	3 (9%)
(8) Living standards and income in Turkey	4 (18%)	7 (20%)
(9) EU membership resistance in Turkey	2 (9%)	1 (3%)
(10) Other domestic policy matters	2 (9%)	2 (6%)

ISSUES CONCERNING TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY AND GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION

(11) Turkey's foreign policy climate (especially towards the United States and the Arab countries)	11 (50%)	3 (9%)
(12) Turkey's geographic location	2 (9%)	1 (3%)
(13) The status of Cyprus	5 (23%)	7 (20%)
(14) Recognition of the Armenian Genocide	4 (18%)	5 (14%)
(15) Historical and cultural differences between Turkey and the EU (also the issue of prejudices)	5 (23%)	9 (26%)
(16) The absorption capability of the EU	3 (14%)	2 (6%)
(17) Political problems in the EU itself	4 (18%)	9 (26%)
(18) Other foreign policy issues	0 (0%)	3 (9%)

Table 2: The issues raised on the EV and HS agendas in September – December 2005

(1) Includes all the democratic freedoms of an individual and the state of the legislation concerning these rights, (2) The influence of religion, (3) Turkey's economic changes, new economic legislation, the change of the country's economic performance, (4) The status of Turkey's minorities, (5) The performance and action of Turkey's political leaders in issues concerning accession negotiations or country's political culture compared to the EU's political culture, (6) Discussion of how intertwined the military and police forces are into Turkey's internal affairs, (7) Discussion of the possible effects of the

structure of Turkey's population in the EU and the European economy, (8) The distribution of wealth in Turkey and the income gap between Turkey and the EU member states, (9) Polls or opinions concerning the resistance in Turkey towards the EU membership, (10) Other domestic policy issues mentioned, (11) The climate of Turkey's foreign policy towards non-EU states and the possible effects of this foreign policy on the EU politics, (12) The geographic location of Turkey, (13) The status of Cyprus and its Turkish part, (14) Demands for Turkey to recognise the alleged Armenian Genocide of 1915, (15) The issues raised from non-Islamic historical and cultural differences between Turkey and the EU, (16) The capability of the EU to enlarge with Turkey, (17) The internal political problems inside the EU and their influence on the negotiation process, not including the polls of citizen opinions about Turkey, (18) Other foreign policy issues.

Other domestic issues were Turkey's capability to include the EU's *acquis communautaire* in its legislation (two articles in HS, one in EV) and Turkey's electoral system (one article in EV). Three other foreign issues, all in HS, discussed the football fight between Switzerland/UEFA (the European Football Federation) and Turkey, a fight that awoke some political tension.

To summarize the table, the issues most frequently on the EV's agenda were:

- 1) Turkey's foreign policy climate (mentioned in 50% of EV's articles) *and* Democratic issues and human rights (both 50%),
- 2) Religion (41%),
- 3) Economic progress (32%),
- 4) Minorities in Turkey *and* The influence of military or police forces in domestic policy (both 27%).

A similar summary for HS produced the following order:

- 1) Democratic issues and human rights (40%),
- 2) Religion (29%),
- 3) Historical and cultural differences between Turkey and the EU (26%),
- 4) Minorities in Turkey *and* Living standards and income in Turkey *and* The status of Cyprus (all 20%).

First, I want to note that the sample of the articles especially for EV is relatively small, and it is therefore impossible to make any waterproof conclusions on basis of publishing frequency. Comparing is difficult: for example in the question of EU's absorption capability, the three articles discussing it published in EV give it a significantly larger percentage, 14%, compared to mere 6% of the two HS articles. However, the number of articles in both papers is too small to tell whether the reason for the difference is just a

result of the shortness of the sample period or a real long-term difference in the agenda setting. Therefore, any interpretation of *Table 2* has in the first place to be considered as making the issues raised on the agenda visible.

The democratic rights of citizens stand out as an important question in both papers, similarly as the question of the state of minorities, above all the Kurds. This would hint that the individual liberties, equality before the law and humanitarian treatment of people in all situations (also as demonstrators or prisoners) are values a state needs to respect in order to be European. Also the frequent discussion of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide belongs on the same agenda of the *recognition of humanitarian values*.

Religion was also considered important by both papers. In most of the articles it was discussed merely as a cultural difference, whereas in some articles it was combined with the comment of Turkey's 70-million population, raising the question of the (religious) influence of the large Muslim state on Europe. The importance of the issue could suggest at least two things: the importance of Christianity and its values or the importance of the secular, non-fundamentalist tendency in European religious life. Or, alternatively, a combination of the two. It is probable that both elements are present as reasons to hold this issue on the agenda, but by quantitative analysis it is impossible to tackle the roots of this question. Therefore, let us call it at this phase the *recognition of secularity and/or Christian values*, and return to this question in the following sub-chapters.

EV clearly weighted traditional 'hard politics' (traditional state policy areas such as economy and foreign policy) more important than HS. Issues of 1) The influence of Turkey's foreign policy climate on the EU politics, 2) Turkey's economic progress, and 3) The influence of military and police forces in Turkey's domestic policy were all frequently on the EV's agenda (appearing in, respectively, 50%, 32% and 27% of the articles compared to HS's 11%, 11% and 3%). Also Turkey's demographic situation appeared on EV's articles notably more often than in HS (23% to 9%).

In HS, on the other hand, 1) Political problems in the EU itself (26% to EV's 18%), 2) Historical and cultural differences (26% to EV's 23%), and 3) Living standards and income (20% to 18% in EV), were raised on the agenda slightly more often than in EV. Furthermore, if we combine the issues of historical and cultural differences and the

football dispute (the football dispute raised similar questions of cultural difference), we can note that in 35% of its Turkey-related articles HS referred to the question of compatibility of the negotiators. Compared to the 23% of EV this is a slightly larger number, but we can note that both papers discussed this issue often. The most interesting difference, though, is that HS seems to be more willing to criticize the EU's own political coherence than EV.

If we count out the major turning point, the start of the negotiations, there were two events during the research period that had an effect on the issues raised. *First*, two weeks after the beginning of the negotiations, the case of the prosecution of a Turkish author Orhan Pamuk came on the agenda. Turkish government wanted to prosecute Pamuk because of his critical comments about the lack of freedom of speech, especially in the question of the Armenian Genocide. This issue raised especially in HS several articles about democratic rights and Turkish legislation. *Second*, there was a short football-related conflict in mid-November after a World Cup qualifying match between Turkey and Switzerland. Swiss national team was allegedly harassed in Istanbul before the decisive match between the two teams, and the game itself ended in violent chaos. This led in publication of three articles about the incident in HS. Despite the articles were published in sports pages and discussed football they also included references to cultural differences between Turkey and Europe. *Furthermore*, an issue that appeared on the agendas only after the beginning of the negotiations is the absorption capability of the EU, i.e. whether the EU structures are able to receive the newcomer.

The *two least discussed issues* are somewhat surprising. Both the geographic location of Turkey and the EU membership resistance in Turkey were discussed altogether in only six out of fifty-seven articles. First, Turkey's geographic position on the boundary between Europe and Asia has traditionally been a big issue in Europe (as discussed in Chapter 4), raising questions about Turkey's suitability to join the Club of Europe. During the ongoing negotiations, however, it doesn't seem to be a particularly interesting issue. Second, news of both support and resistance towards membership are normally high on the newspaper agendas when political enlargements are in sight. Here, the polls of the opinions of Turkish citizens towards the membership are rare to find.

The results suggest that EV promotes more the 'traditional' hard values and HS slightly more the 'new' soft values of the EU. Also, they suggest that EV concentrates more than HS on the problems of Turkey, as only HS frequently asks critical questions of the EU's own political coherence. The absence of the Turkey's membership resistance from the discussion hints that the papers would like to think that the Turkish will to join the EU is unproblematic.

Indeed, both papers concentrate heavily on issues concerning Turkey's suitability. EU's internal problems and alternative viewpoints to negotiations are not handled in any considerable magnitude. This gives a rather narrow-in-scope view to the whole issue of Turkey's membership. The European representation of Turkey becomes close to the good old 'Sick man of Europe', suggesting that European influence could heal Turkey's ever-present problems, but that Turkey still has a lot to do before it is really accepted to join its healers. Both papers discuss the symptoms of the patient from a rather *Eurocentrist* viewpoint. The European solution seems to be the only one available. Cooperation with Middle Eastern countries or with the US is not on the agenda as an alternative to the European Union. This Eurocentrist tendency is, deliberately or not, highlighting Europe's leading position as a source bringing solutions for the problems that are easily represented as an ages-old continuum consisting of religion or other cultural differences.

5.2 NEGOTIATING THE DISCOURSE CATEGORIES

I negotiated in total eight relevant discourse categories in the texts. The eight discourses can be divided in three subcategories by the issues they discuss: 1) The nature of modern Turkey, 2) The impacts Turkey's accession would have on Europe, and 3) The question of which one of the two, Turkey or Europe, is responsible for the success or failure of the negotiations. The different discourses are from one to eight:

1. What is the nature of modern Turkey?

1. 'Ottoman' discourse
2. 'Sick man of Europe' discourse
3. 'Part of Europe' discourse
4. 'Developing on its own' discourse

2. What would Turkey's accession mean for Europe?

5. 'Pandora's Box' discourse

6. 'Possibility' discourse

3. Who is playing the main role in the negotiations?

7. 'Europe is responsible' discourse

8. 'Turkey is responsible' discourse

OTTOMAN highlights cultural differences, taking often (not in every case) a doubtful approach into Turkey's possible accession. This discourse often discusses the historical or religious difference of Turkey and Europe.

SICK MAN OF EUROPE includes a thought about Turkey as a problematic case, a patient that can be healed through Europeanisation. Turkey is not on the same level as Europe, but Europe is an answer to its problems and cooperation with Europe means 'healing' from its sickness.

PART OF EUROPE stresses the European characteristics of Turkey, the similarities between Turkey and Europe (thus also the Turkish characteristics of Europe), and the easiness of cultural exchange or political cooperation between the two.

DEVELOPING ON ITS OWN imposes that Europe is not necessary for the development of Turkey. Turkish development may or may not happen through joining the EU.

PANDORA'S BOX discusses both the problems Turkey's accession would cause to Europe and how the accession would change the nature of the EU. This discourse may also suggest that Turkey will never properly integrate into Europe even when in the EU, but will merely form a block of its own (or blocks with certain non-EU states such as the US) and act solely on its own political basis.

POSSIBILITY stresses the positive impacts of Turkey joining the EU. It sees Turkey as either complementing Europe or giving Europe a new possibility for self-development.

EUROPE IS RESPONSIBLE discusses the effect of Europe's politics and/or characteristics on the negotiations. This discourse often highlights the negative effects of the Europe's political state to its Turkey-relations and puts the responsibility of the success in the negotiations on Europe's actions.

TURKEY IS RESPONSIBLE, opposed to the former, highlights the Turkish responsibility on the outcome of the negotiations. This often implies a thought that Turkey may only join Europe if it is able to reform itself.

The negotiation of the discourses is based on the methodology explained in Chapter 3, especially the list of Jokinen et al. about recognising discourses (1993, 50-51) and the slightly more precise list by Ian Parker (in Jokinen et al. 1993, 60-63). I will not explain the semantic construction of the discourses in high detail, since the idea is to think of the functions of the discourses and a large-scale semantic analysis would lead us for too many pages onto sidetracks. Instead, I focus in separating and highlighting the constructive structures of the discourse, and trust that the examples and the underlined details combined with explanation and interpretation will be enough to clarify the constructive elements.

In the following chapters, by underlining certain words on quotations I wish to highlight some semantic choices the articles use in creating certain meanings. Underlining is aimed to reveal how meanings are created by certain word selections, juxtapositions and contrasts, and it should give evidence of how the articles lure us to accept the viewpoints they present. In most cases I underline the words to give evidence of the *contextual functions* and *semantic moves* explained in Chapter 3.

On my examples I use the number of the article in brackets to refer to the article discussed (Article number 7 of the European Voice will be referred as EV 7). All the quotations in bold and *italics* are quotations straight from the text, also the ones inside brackets. The ones inside brackets *not in bold or italics* are my own notes.

5.3 DISCOURSES IN THE EUROPEAN VOICE

Examples of all eight discourses could be interpreted out of the EV articles. All the examples I could find of the different discourses are presented, due to the fact that even the most frequent discourses are present in just ten articles or less.

5.3.1 OTTOMAN

The Ottoman discourse is often direct; Turkey is depicted as a proud nation, and this pride is in many of the cases argued to result from the country's past: *"today's Turkish pride is a continuation of the Ottoman past" ... "The Turkish take pride in the Ottoman Empire although it is not a part of the normal Kemalist view" ... "Accounts of early Ottoman diplomacy point to a similar pride to explain difficulties in establishing useful diplomatic ties between the Sublime Porte and Europe. Historians cite the Ottomans' difficulty in accepting European states as the reason why the Ottoman Empire didn't send a resident representative to Europe until almost 350 years after the Milanese diplomat --- was accredited to Florence" (EV 6, in the article the word 'pride' and its different forms are mentioned six times). Also, *"Turks perceive the European leaders patronising"* (EV 7) refers to this same problem caused by, allegedly, Turkey's uneasy nature: *"They are a proud country, the EU is telling them what to do and it will take a large jump --- for Turkey to accept this"* (EV 7). Another article refers to the same issue, though naming it to be a prejudice: *"old prejudices about Turkey, with religion playing a role, make the country an unpopular EU aspirant"* (EV 16).*

Moreover, some very strong notions referring to a strong cultural difference between Turkey and Europe could be found. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration of Luxembourg, Jean Asselborn, is quoted saying *"Turkish politicians still have things to learn"* referring to the differences in negotiating style, continuing from the same issue in a more aggressive style *"We are not carpet-traders here in Europe"* (EV 6). Cypriot MEP Marios Matsakis even calls Turkey *"a severe parasite"* (EV 10). Religious and economic difference is brought up as well. Religion is mentioned in nine articles in total, sometimes combined with Turkey's poorness, eg. *"predominantly Muslim and poorer"* (EV 16). The difference is efficiently highlighted when all the different attributes are packed together: *"Turkey's accession would be different from previous enlargements because of the combined impact of Turkey's population, size, geographical location, economic, security and military potential, as well as cultural and religious characteristics"* (EV 15). One article reminds that Turkey is *"still a developing country"* (EV 11).

Finally, highlighting the cultural difference is also indirect. This is done by referring to the extreme difficulty of the negotiations, to the fact that the negotiations are expected to last long, and to the fact that the EU might still not accept Turkey after all (without giving any

straight explanation for why this might happen). The headline of one article states that *“Turks are braced for a long trek to Brussels”* (EV 15), while a Greek MEP Kostas Hatzidakis is quoted: *“Turkey might never become an EU member”* and *“Turkey should be the one making all necessary concessions and far-reaching reforms --- and still, the outcome of the process might not be positive”* (EV 10). Moreover, *“The Commission admits ‘the catching-up process of Turkey’s income levels with the EU is expected to last several decades’ ”* (EV 15), and *“During Germany’s recent election campaign Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer predicted it could take ten or 15 years before a ‘Europe capable’ Turkey emerged”* (EV 8). Here, the word *admits* calls the reader to believe that Turkey’s huge economic backwardness is a clear fact, now even admitted by the Commission.

5.3.2 SICK MAN OF EUROPE

The discourse is straightforward. Turkey’s position is to be the patient, whereas Europe plays the nurse. The discourse presents Turkish symptoms, and constantly reminds that the European way is the cure to these problems. The discourse does not particularly support or oppose the accession, but focuses instead on subjecting Turkey into a subordinate role: *“The European course can lead Turkey to a new phase in its history and ensure a better future for its citizens”* (EV 10) and *“For EU supporters, accession negotiations are the way to a more prosperous and democratic Turkey”* (EV 18). As *the* in the sentence above already suggests, European solution is presented as the only cure for Turkey. No other options seem to be available for the sick patient: *“Erdogan should stay cool and avoid an aggressive or over-emotional reaction, of the sort that Turkish leaders have made in the past, by threatening that Turkey would turn its back on the West and on modernisation if it were rejected by the EU”* (EV 1, as we can note, the example also draws from the Ottoman discourse), *“Turkey is vulnerable to the economic slowdown which now seems to be gathering pace. That said, the economic (and political) outlook for the country is now far better than it would have been if the EU had completely turned its back on its huge neighbour”* (EV 9). The discourse also manages to decrease the pressure of Europe to accept a reformed Turkey, since *“the process by which Turkey opens and closes chapters of the acquis communautaire is, at the moment, more important than actual membership, since this process itself will keep the pressure on government to continue with domestic reforms”* (EV 9).

One article expresses clearly what we are talking about: *"we are once again approaching one of those so-called turning points where all eyes turn to the 'Turkey question' in Europe"* (EV 12). Here, the 21st century negotiations are represented to be a continuum of the 'Eastern question', a common issue in the European politics in the 19th century.

European values are, implicitly, often present in this discourse: *"as Turkey has moved closer to the EU, so have its views on many global issues --- While in the past Turkish foreign policy has focused on the importance of military security and balance-of-power politics, it now increasingly appreciates the value of civilian instruments of law, economics and diplomacy, as well as multilateral settings in which to pursue its aims"* (EV 2). Moreover, *"in case accession negotiations are opened with Turkey, they should contribute to focusing the reform agenda on issues dealing with the roots of the problem, such as that of the electoral threshold"* and *"A third respect where Europe could play an important role concerns the wider measures that need to be taken to combat terrorism while respecting human rights and civil liberties"* (EV 12). Or, *"Progress on Turkey's EU talks is seen as vital if there's to be an improvement in women's rights in the country"* (EV 11). Assuring the rights of minorities is seen as one value: *"Westrhein says that Olli Rehn, the European commissioner for enlargement, has taken a keen interest in the Kurdish problem. 'The EU has been trying to highlight it,' she says"* (EV 13).

One article (*Turkey talker*, EV 5) concentrates only on two discourses: the 'Sick man of Europe' and 'Part of Europe'. The chief EU negotiator of the Turkish government, Mr. Ali Babacan, is presented as *"a new breed of Turkish politician"*, suggesting that also Turkish political culture has to learn European habits if the country wants to flourish and become healed: *"Babacan is an open and friendly person who is actually prepared to listen when you talk to him. But he is going to have to learn, and learn quickly"*, a Dutch MEP comments, creating a position in which Babacan's personal characteristics represent the whole Turkey. Babacan, representing new Turkish political culture raising from traditional foundations (*"Although his private life is quite conservative, he very much presents the modernist, liberal wing of the party"*), possesses the possibilities to become healed, but to achieve this it has to be a good student and learn the European rules to. An example of this position is set by economy, giving credit to the healing effect of Babacan's European style: *"The economy is in good shape after years of crisis and Turkey is an increasingly attractive market for foreign investment. He is largely*

credited for this success." In its final paragraph, the article reminds that it is Babacan-type politicians Turkey needs to become healed with the European solution: *"Little is known of Babacan's long-term ambitions but if the EU can eventually find room in its ranks for a Muslim country, maybe it will be prime minister Babacan who will take it to the promised land."*

5.3.3 PART OF EUROPE

Mr. Babacan's personal characteristics are presented with another discourse, reflecting his European values: *"Babacan was known for his sense of humour, for being a hard-worker and as a consensus-builder and many say that he has managed to strike a fine balance in his party as a modernist without offending the traditionalists", and "he speaks good English and French".* In the article context, these attributes rise to obtain a meaning of something belonging to a good (maybe the ideal?) European leader: *"The softly spoken Babacan has a reputation for being a quick thinker, calm under pressure, --- a skilled negotiator and possesses a knack for creating a conducive atmosphere during even the most tortured deliberations".*

'Part of Europe' discourse is not really seen in EV articles when culture or society are concerned. In only one article it is possible to find a suggestion of cultural similarity with observations *"Turks already feel part of Europe"* and *"Turks do not identify with their Eastern neighbours Iran and Iraq"* (EV 7), which anyway are merely reprinted *Turkish* opinions about the issue. Another article does not exactly talk of Turkey as part of Europe, but suggests that Turkey's participation could be acceptable: *"European leaders and to some extent their citizens, have come a long way towards accepting, broadly, the idea of Turkish EU membership"* (EV 1).

In politics, however, similarities between Turkey and Europe are brought up: *"like the EU, Turkey believes that threats to use force against Iran are likely to be counter-productive", "In the Balkans, Turkey's policies have long been aligned with those of the EU", "Turkey has also supported the European Security and Defence policy", "Turkey has taken part in every EU-led military operation except that in the Republic of Congo"* (EV 2).

The position of the ruling Turkish party AKP also has already its place in the European political family: *"In Recep Tayyip Erdogan --- we have an honest leader committed to*

integration. His Justice and Development Party (AKP) is already an EPP observer member” (EV 17), “The AKP has --- even asked to join the European People’s Party, a group made up of conservatives and Christian Democrats” (EV 14), and “AKP has pushed through a raft of EU-inspired reforms to the 2002 Civil Code, which substantially improved the rights of women and were this week described by Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn as ‘Scandinavian’ in standard” (EV 14).

The discourse is most of the times situated in a context that shows Europe and European politics in a positive light. Europe has good standards for women’s rights, and European foreign policy leans on diplomacy against the use of force in Iran. This position is challenged only once. An expert in Ottoman diplomacy is quoted: “Every country has some sort of pride... we are not so different from France in that respect. Turko-European relations have not been a total confrontation. Relations between France and Germany have been a story of conflict and co-operation. Turko-European relations are no different” (EV 6). This is the only example in the European Voice material that hints that European relations might not be too rosy after all, and that Turkey would indeed fit in this structure that includes also conflict besides harmony.

5.3.4 DEVELOPING ON ITS OWN

The discourse of Turkey developing or having developed on its own, without the European bait, can be found in only one article. The difference to the rich and frequent use of the ‘Sick man of Europe’ discourse is notable.

Only once the Turks are allowed to be sceptical towards the EU benefits: “Do we really need the Copenhagen criteria? We will turn them into Ankara criteria and move forward with or without the EU”, the article quotes “many Turks” saying on October 3rd. Also the possibility of Turkey progressing without the EU is mentioned: “mood about the future is much more positive than in the EU. This is not only because of the nearing perspective of EU membership, but is also the result of finally reached macroeconomic stability and high economic growth, successful privatisations, a significant rise in foreign direct investment, democratic reforms and perhaps the Newsweek’s cover-page proclaiming Istanbul as ‘the hippest city of Europe, which may not need Europe after all’ ” (EV 18).

5.3.5 PANDORA'S BOX

Pandora's Box is a discourse loaded with fear. It presents Turkey as causing problems if accepted in the Union, creating problems for the Union, and in some cases even destroying Europe's nature and self. The discourse builds heavily on *othering*, drawing a kind of a horror scenario in which Turkey would be harmful to the European self, if let join Europe. Therefore, the discourse suggests, it is better to exclude Turkey and maintain its position as the other.

According to the discourse, Turkey's accession would have an impact first in its own political balance: *"Turkey's regional superpower status will be strengthened" and "Islamic fanaticism will gain momentum, as a 'European' Turkey will be seen as a traitor to fundamental Islamic values. This may lead to an intensification of Muslim terrorist attacks"* (both EV 10). Also, the possible impact on the EU institutions is mentioned: *"Turkish membership of the EU could potentially create problems for CFSP" (EV 2), or "A predominantly Muslim and poorer member would be the most powerful player in the Union --- The EU's institutions are likely to be bypassed by member states if they fear that their political interests are not well defended in a Union where Turkey wields such power"* (EV 16).

Turkey as the *Trojan horse* is a scenario of Turkey's impact on the EU foreign policy. It includes the idea that Turkey, by joining, will increase the American power in the EU, or at least will try to increase the importance of the transatlantic agenda of the EU. This is once mentioned straight: *"One of the big worries about Turkish accession, seen from the 'core' EU countries such as France and Germany, is that it would be a Trojan horse for American interests in Europe"* (EV 2), and otherwise in similar ways: *"it is likely that, due to its current strong relationship with the US, Turkey will join the 'pro-Atlanticists' and seek to influence the way the foreign and security policy develops", "As a traditional UK, Italy and US ally, Turkey will soon become part of an Anglo-Turk-Italian axis, establishing the exertion of an even stronger intra-European transatlantic influence"* (both EV 10).

Compared to the moderate political fears, the European economy is more threatened. *"In economic terms Turkey's poverty, combined with its huge size and population, will constitute a major burden for the EU. Turkey's need for economic assistance via the structural funds will be enormous. Next to that, a big part of the Turkish population*

is currently engaged in farming, which will pose a great challenge to the Common Agricultural Policy”, “it will be the poorest member state and unfortunately the rapid increases in the cost of living usually associated with EU membership will mean that it will become even poorer” (both EV 10), and “If you read between the lines of the issue paper [Commission report on Turkey], it is going to be quite expensive”, “Shoring up Turkey’s eastern and southern borders against drugs, arms and human trafficking is likely to be expensive too” (both EV 15). Turkish poverty will lead to also other consequences: “The number of people living below the poverty line and the number of the unemployed will increase drastically. Many Turks will be forced to leave their homeland in search for a better living in other European member states” and “as Turkish manufacturing costs will inevitably be low, many more European businesses, such as car and electronic industries, will move to Turkey” (both EV 10). Turkey’s economical weakness, thus, presents a clear threat: “The prospect of a Muslim and poorer member state being the most powerful player in the Union is what worries many European politicians most” (EV 15).

The last example guides us to perhaps the strongest part of the ‘Pandora’s Box’ discourse, which suggests that the accession of Turkey would irreversibly change the nature of EU. “Financially, Turkey’s integration would spell the end of the EU as we know it. A Union where a country as big and as poor as Turkey is a full member could never afford to redistribute wealth to its poorer members to the extent that it does now” (EV 16), “The Independent Commission on Turkey --- has questioned to what extent the EU can continue its policy of redistributing vast swathes of the EU budget towards its poorer members if Turkey joins” (EV 15), “Valéry Giscard d’Estaing believes --- that Turkish membership would turn the Union into a mere customs zone” (EV 17) or with much stronger words: “Turkey will exert serious demands for an Islamisation of Europe – not just for religion but also for culture and traditions. Inevitably, Europe will become less European and more Asiatic; less Christian and more Islamic; less Western and more Middle-Eastern” (EV 10). The European values are, in this discourse, counter-positioned by the Turkish values, in the example above through religion. A merger with the other would lead to a collapse of the European system: “Turkey will be an opened Pandora’s Box of complicated and serious problems – a severe parasite on Europe. It will pose an unnecessarily high risk of a catastrophic EU politico-economic collapse and will irreversibly alter European values and way of life” (EV 10).

Notable in this discourse is that many possible impacts, conditional and thus speculative of their nature, are presented as unconditional, as we can see by the underlined words. However, this is seen solely in article 10, which consists of the opinions of a hyper-critical, aggressive Cypriot MEP.

5.3.6 POSSIBILITY

Turkey is also seen as a possibility, mainly due to geopolitical and demographic reasons. Turkey's young population is seen as a possibility for ageing Europe, and the EU's importance in the problematic regions east from its borders could increase with an eastern enlargement: *"The geo-political advantages of a close relationship are evident. So is the demographic argument: Europe is old and needs young blood"* (EV 17), *"Turkey's proximity to, and ties with, troubled zones such as the Balkans, the Arab Middle East, the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq and Central Asia, could strengthen the EU's role and influence in such places"* (EV 2), and *"Turkey's young population is seen by some analysts as a chance for plugging gaps in current members' labour markets, to compensate for the effects of demographic ageing"* (EV 15).

Two articles present these possibilities in an unsure and conditional context: *"While the prospect of Turkey being part of the West's most successful integration club is a fascinating geo-political development, permitting the West to build a bridge to the Muslim world, it is also a very challenging step for the Union"* (EV 16), and *"Turkey's membership could be beneficial [article not stating the possible benefits], provided that the accession progress triggers the necessary reforms in Turkey"* (EV 10).

One article includes an openly positive sentence, however without giving any causes for the argument: *"Turkey and the EU need each other"* (EV 18).

5.3.7 EUROPE IS RESPONSIBLE

The two last discourses collect together a broad scope of issues under the viewpoint 'who is responsible for the outcome of the negotiations'. The first one of these discourses considers the matters in which the EU is seen to be responsible.

Three articles include Turkey's viewpoint to the European responsibility. This discourse presents the Turkish astonishment of the hard European criteria for membership or unwillingness to accept them: *"It is hard to find a Turkish businessman or academic who really believes that the country will make it into the EU. On this most are pessimistic --- 'The conditions for Turkish membership in the EU are virtually revolutionary in character, they require a fundamental change in the structure of government"* (EV 9) and *"for Turks, Europe represents peace, democracy and prosperity. People in the country are shocked at the hostility that politicians in France, Austria and Germany have shown towards Turkey's membership. They do not understand why the countries oppose the membership of another democracy"* (EV 7). In the third article, a comment from a Turkish integration opponent depicts an even more unfair image of the EU: *"Can we still consider the EU as a credible, fair and desirable partner? Given the conditions, does it make sense to start negotiating?"* (EV 18)

The other five articles including the 'Europe is responsible' discourse discuss it solely from the viewpoint of the internal problems of the Union. The EU is in problems with its single member states acting on the basis of their own interests, *"For Ankara it is an anxious time. Although talks are expected to last the best part of a decade it is keen to press ahead and keen to see that Austria will be a fair arbiter of the process, despite previous obstructionism"* (EV 21), with its institutional problems leading to the question of absorption capability: *"Giscard d'Estaing believes --- that Turkish membership would turn the Union into a mere customs zone. I don't see the problem, as long as EU enlargement is accompanied by deepening"* (EV 17), *"comments echo a renewed emphasis from member states on the fourth criterion for EU membership: that the EU is able to absorb the country concerned. --- making the EU fit for absorbing Turkey will be a difficult task"* (EV 15), and *"the capacity of the EU to absorb the newcomer --- could be the most difficult to fulfil", "Institutionally, too, the EU is unprepared for Turkey" (both EV 16). Furthermore, the democracy deficit between the EU elites and EU citizens is presented as one issue: *"The Union is blatantly unprepared to embrace Turkey. The gap between the EU leaders and the population has never been wider on such an important issue."* (EV 16)*

One article discusses an incident of September 28th 2005, in which the European Parliament decided to postpone a vote on EU-Turkey customs agreement, part of the

accession negotiations. The decision was loathed straightforwardly, as *"an own goal for the EU"*, leading to an interestingly straightforward comment by a socialist German MEP Martin Schulz, aimed to the conservative EPP group of the EU: *" 'You don't want Turkey in because it is Islamic and far away. Croatia is closer and is catholic.' "* (both EV 4).

There is hardly any demand for a more strict definition of 'Europe' itself to back up the 'yes' or 'no' told to Turkey in the negotiations. Demand for the EU to discuss and define the boundaries of Europe is addressed once in the whole EV material: *"we must conduct the long-overdue debate about the geographical limits of Europe, which for me is a physical place with a common identity, not some vague cultural area"* (EV 17).

5.3.8 TURKEY IS RESPONSIBLE

Two articles draw from both 'Europe is responsible' and 'Turkey is responsible' discourses: *"there is hard work to do on all sides. Turkey must implement a whole series of political reforms, notably relating to basic religious and other freedoms --- the Union must urgently introduce the structural changes foreseen in the EU constitution which are vital for enlargement"* (EV 17) and *"Europe's leaders need to work hard to make the Union fit for Turkey, perhaps as hard as the Turkish government needs to make its country fit for the EU (EV 16).*

The main issue in the discourse of Turkey's responsibility is the demand for democratic reforms. Some of the articles are concisely built on this viewpoint, already seen from the headlines: *"More progress needed on women's rights"* (EV 11), *"'Zero-tolerance' on torture but abuses persist"* (EV 8), *"Freedom rows show Turkish split"* (EV 19), and *"MEP accused of insulting Turkish army"* (EV 22). These articles, respectively, construct a setting where the texts as whole implicate that if Turkey cannot conclude its reforms (in the European way), it will pay the consequences. Examples of this can be found usually in the concluding remarks of these articles, such as *"'There have been positive steps like the end to the death penalty and the lifting of the state of emergency [in the largely Kurdish south-east] but if de facto people are still losing their lives, then this is very serious"* (EV 8), *"reforms have to take root"* (EV 19), and *"Ankara had faced swathe criticism from the EU over the case, with Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn claiming that it was Turkey rather than Pamuk which was on trial"* (EV 22).

In other cases, Turkey's responsibility is brought up as one among the other issues, to suggest that progress in negotiations depends on the Turkish reforms: *"Turkey's membership could be beneficial, provided that the accession process triggers the necessary reforms in Turkey. The key to the success lies solely with Turkey"* (EV 10), or *"the OECD still worries that economic reforms have simply not yet gone far enough to be sure they are deeply embedded"* (EV 9). In one article the inevitable need for change in Turkey is issued by a Turkish poem: *"it is generally accepted that there is no way back in this historical process --- It is quite plausible that more and more intellectuals will be punished for what one of Turkey's greatest poet, Nazim Hikmet, once defined as 'not giving up the hope in the world, in your country, in your people' "* (EV 20). Also cultural difference and the need for Turkey to 'learn' European ways is addressed by a policy analyst at the European Policy Center in Brussels: *"They will not go into this [negotiations] and do what they are told. They will look at it as a bartering process. It will get easier when they realise this is not the case"* (EV 6).

There is one more interesting example of the use of this discourse. In one article Turkey is expected to show its patience and thus gather sympathy around Europe: *"Erdogan, who has shown on many instances that he is more mature and pragmatic than his predecessors, should read the political situation carefully --- The price could be that Erdogan must accept a more explicit reference to a privileged partnership being introduced in the framework for negotiations --- There are still significant pockets of opposition, though, and Turkey can only win them over by showing, patiently, that it is a modern and mature state --- Such a response would show that Turkey wants to inject sincerity into its relationship with the EU and that it understands the political climate in Europe. It would be a good step, if Erdogan wants to vanquish scepticism about Turkey"* (EV 1). In this way the discourse *both* puts the responsibility solely on Turkey (in a parental way: the Turkish leaders have to learn how to behave and act mature, i.e. to grow up) *and* successfully removes Europe's own responsibility to accept Turkey in the EU even in the case it fills the conditions (by linking maturing and patience to accepting 'privileged partnership'). This is a good example of the discursive power of certain acts of speech.

5.4 DISCOURSES IN HELSINGIN SANOMAT

HS discourses are analysed in the same way as EV. Translations of the examples from Finnish to English are purely my own. The translations correspond to the original pieces of text, but I have taken the freedom to make minor changes (to translate the samples of text in such way that not merely the original meaning of the words, but also the original meaning of the pieces of text as whole is preserved in the translation) when needed. However, in roughly nine out of ten examples the translation is conducted word-by-word. Because the amount of HS articles is considerably larger than EV articles, all the discourse examples I could negotiate in the texts are not used below. In some cases there are several examples of the same use of the discourse. In these cases I have usually chosen only one example to present the viewpoint discussed.

5.4.1 OTTOMAN

In HS, 'Ottoman' discourse is the most frequently used of all the discourses. It does not depict the Turks proud as the discourse in EV, but concentrates more on the difficulties for Turkey and Europe to understand each other: *"We have to keep in mind that Turkey's membership is all about a 40-year old process in which a completely new kind of a country wants to join the Union"* (the Finnish PM Matti Vanhanen in HS 7), *"It is understandable that Europe confronts Turkey with mixed feelings, even fear. That is resulting from the difficult history of Europe and the Turkish Empire"* (HS 13), *"Hüsein Ragıp Bilgic, 26, believed that Austria and all the other EU states simply fear Turkey. 'They still consider us Ottoman conquerors', the youngster told"* (HS 4) and a quotation from Turkish PM Erdogan: *"Foreign capital means foreign investment. Here, we are dominated by a bureaucratic culture that is unable to understand that"* (HS 21). The two articles considering culture in the material depict similar cultural differences: *"A doll dressed in a wedding dress opens its arms to Europe, but as the ferry turns back home, the doll turns its face back towards Asia. The dress gets dirty in the heavy weather as it moves back and forth between the continents. This clarifies Turkish Murat Morova's biennale artwork, depicting Turkey's journey between the European Union and its own values",* suggesting there are differences between European and Turkish values, continuing: *"Mehmet Güleryüz is anxious whether Turkey's own cultural identity will survive. 'If Europe awaits our culture to adapt in the European culture and claims that our culture is backward – as I believe they do – they make a mistake"* (both HS 15), or *"Exhibition was declared*

to have brought Turkey closer to Europe" (news about Picasso-exhibition in Istanbul, HS 29), suggesting there clearly is a difference.

Fears and stereotypes were brought up in the discourse in the year's last three articles. "Sociology student and journalist Inam is annoyed that in Austrian discussion the Turkish EU-membership, immigration, Islam and scarfs of Muslim girls are all packed together" (HS 33, reportage about the Turkish living in Austria), "Full membership of Turkey would only crystallize the cultural differences of Muslim Turkey and the EU, and the societal conflicts derived from these differences are already present in some member states" (comment by the representative of the Freedom Party of Austria, HS 34) and "[EU] Citizens were not asked whether they want Belarus as their neighbour. In Turkey-negotiations the EU aims even to the borders of Iraq and Syria" (HS 35).

Like in EV articles, also HS brings up the 'long way to go' theme to back up the cultural differences in this discourse. "Turkey will still face a serious crisis in its EU relations when it realises how many reforms it really has to make" (Finnish Turkey-journalist Tom Kankkonen in HS 18), "There is still a long way to go for Turkey" (HS 2), "Croatia's legislation is not a big problem for the EU, and it can start membership negotiations already in a few years. Negotiations with Turkey, however, are expected to last at least ten years" (HS 11), and "Turkey realises it still has a lot to do, but this is the beginning of a long process" (Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Erkki Tuomioja in HS 17). The strongest example is quoted from Johannes Voggenhuber, an MEP of the Austrian greens: "I guess we now have to start the negotiations, but I'm against the membership" (HS 34).

Main cultural conflict is seen to be caused by the difference in the judicial systems, awaking critical discourse in HS: "A lot has to be done before Turkey can be called as a European judicial state" (HS 13), "an ordinary Turk has a one in a million chance to get a fair trial, taken that he is foolish enough to trust in the Turkish courts and judges" (Burak Bekdil, a Turkish journalist, in HS 26), and "Bekdil's case looks as it does not fit in the European principles of freedom of speech. With Turkish principles the prisons of the EU member states would be filled with journalists" (a comment by Olli Rehn in the same article). One article depicts the experiences of representatives of the European Parliament visiting the Orhan Pamuk trial in Istanbul: "the group of

representatives appeared to be terrified of their experiences in a court in Istanbul. 'The lawyers were very aggressive, and they tried to drive us out of the court room. The representative of the British Embassy was driven away" (HS 32).

An event of its own, reported only in HS, is the 'football war' between Turkey and Switzerland. This three-day and three-article incident manages to raise a few interesting comments belonging to the same discourse focusing on differences: "Turkey is known to be one of the international football's nuisances due to the behaviour of its spectators --- The Swiss have also complained about the way they were treated when arriving in Istanbul on Monday. The team had to wait for hours in the passport control at the airport. The team bus was, allegedly, stormed with eggs" (HS 22), "'It was total hell' [Swiss defender Philipp Degen] --- 'I am happy, but only because I got out of there alive' [Swiss midfielder Benjamin Huggel] --- 'We have a different mentality. We are driven in surge of emotion when we lose' " [Turkish striker Hamit Altintop] (HS 23), and "The behaviour of the spectators in a football match is not part of the EU membership criteria, although it is an indication of the general atmosphere of the country" (Olli Rehn in HS 24). Especially the last comment is interesting, since it includes the question whether a football-related incident can effect the whole EU negotiations.

Finally, there is one reportage (HS 20) among the articles about the life of a 'normal Turkish family' living in Istanbul. The article, common for a reportage, focuses on depicting the atmosphere and details of the culture explained. In the article, many kinds of family-concerning matters are discussed: ever-present religion "A singing call for prayer flows in stereo into the corridor", societal age hierarchy "Gülezer Güldiken urges to step in and stretches her hand to be kissed, which is not weird since the guest is notably younger than her", living conditions "The two-room apartment is completely full, inhabited by six adults and one child", position of children in the family "'In Turkey family values are more important than in Europe. We are tied to our families even when we're forty years old. In Europe you can begin your own life when you're eighteen' " and marital and relationship issues "As most young Turkish couples, also Arzu and Sükrü can only move together after the 'amin' of the Imam", "The family was glad that Arzu found a fiancé the family could accept". In the context and function of the story, to produce information to the Finnish readers about

Turkish habits, the Turkish habits act as reflective for the reader to compare her/his own (European) habits.

5.4.2 SICK MAN OF EUROPE

'Sick man of Europe' discourse is present much less than 'Ottoman' discourse. Europe is presented as a kind of doctor in one article, *"Especially on women's rights the Turkish legislation is already on Scandinavian level, Rehn notes. Still, the laws should be made to work in practice"* (HS 25), in another article it is reminded that the patient is constantly being diagnosed: *"EU Commission will publish its next report on Turkey's progress in the 9th of November"* (HS 17). Slightly surprising, though, is that economy is present in this discourse only once: *"The interest of the foreign investors has increased after the EU-related reforms and government's privatisation projects. Turkey leaped from 75. position to 35. position in the foreign investment list"* (HS 21). The generally good effects of the EU on Turkey are mentioned twice: *"Gül [Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs] argues that the reforms are beneficial for Turkey"* (HS 17) and *"according to Pamuk, the EU membership brings peace to Turkey. To stay outside will increase nationalism"* (HS 19).

The culture article examples used in the 'Ottoman' discourse analysis can be used here as well. The Picasso-article's notion *"Exhibition was declared to have brought Turkey closer to Europe"* (HS 29) brings us to a setting that importing European art into Turkey is an answer to bring the two closer to each other. The other article highlights the progress EU has meant for freedom of speech: *"The head of the Turkish organisation PEN, Vecdi Sayar, does not believe that freedom of speech would have improved so much without the 'stick and carrot' from the EU --- 'Nowadays even the smallest case of censorship will lead into a big fuss, whereas earlier it was normal.' The mental change could according to Sayar be seen already in the end of the 80s, but has speeded up by the EU reforms --- 'With the EU influence freedom of speech and human rights will come true"* (HS 15). In this discourse the EU clearly is a catalyst pushing Turkey towards a better future.

5.4.3 PART OF EUROPE

The difference to the 'Part of Europe' discourse in the EV articles is that HS gives more space for Turkish opinions to view their 'Europeanness': *"Sükrü is more positive. He thinks that young people would have less problems to have a western spouse, since*

*young people know western habits. 'They have always taken example from the west', Sükrü thinks" (HS 20). The Turks have a positive image of Europe, even the countries that don't want them to be part of Europe: "In Turkey people have for ages had a positive image of Austria, Bülent Öztoplu tells. 'On the cafe walls and in private homes you see pictures of two green paradises: Switzerland and Austria" (HS 33). The discourse also reflects European stereotypes that still categorize Turkey more Asian than European: "Turkey is much more European than the West thinks" (HS 18). Orhan Pamuk, the author accused of degrading the Turkish nation, analyses the reasons why Turkey is already part of Europe: "Pamuk stressed that Europe has never defined itself by Christianity, but instead by individualism. If Europe's soul is enlightenment, equality and democracy, if it is to be a union predicated on peace, then Turkey has a place in it, Pamuk said in his speech" (HS 19). The meaning here is left somewhat unclear. It can be that *because* Europe is enlightened, equal and democratic, *it should accept* Turkey and be inclusive, or then the message is that Turkey is on the same level as Europe what it comes to individual rights, equality and democracy and should therefore be accepted. One way or the other, the discourse is strong: it names some foundations of Europe and links Turkey to them.*

Otherwise, we can find a few single examples of the discourse throughout the material: "Commission states that Turkey could already be considered to have a functioning market economy. The report notes that economic growth has been strong, there has been a significant decrease of inflation, interest rates have come down and the budget gap has narrowed down" (HS 21), combined with the comment of the women's rights. Also the popularity of Olli Rehn in Turkey can conditionally be counted into this discourse: he is called "Mustafa Olli" and described to have "won hearts by constantly talking about football, which seems to have taken effect in the football-loving Turkish" (both HS 14). This way, the discourse reproduces the similarities of the two parties. One article reviews the political proximity of Turkey to the EU, and wonders whether there can be any other options than a full membership: "It is hard to imagine what kind of benefits a 'privileged partnership' would give for Turkey, since it has already for long been the EU's associate member. The Customs Union, signed ten years ago, allows free trade of goods except for agricultural products. Turkey can take part in high-level meetings, several EU programs and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and as a NATO member it participates in the EU-NATO security cooperation. Moreover, Turkey can get financial and other support for reforms, as

other candidate countries. It is difficult to see how the EU-Turkey relationship would progress in any other way than by Turkey's full membership" (HS 1).

Three articles considering freedom of speech note that "The Foreign Minister of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, has insisted that Pamuk will not be sentenced to jail. 'I am sure that also in the case of Pamuk the court will make the right decision --. Charges of this kind have always been dismissed', he said in an interview. Gül noted, however, that the judiciary is independent, and that government will not try to affect the trial", "There is freedom of speech in Turkey. Everyone can say their opinion as long as there is no violence or forcing linked with it', Gül said on Wednesday in Istanbul. 'Don't forget that the process is not yet even in the courtroom" (the Pamuk-case, HS 31 [first] and HS 27 [second]) and "Morova does not have too many expectations of the EU what it comes to freedom of speech. 'Of course the EU ideals (on the freedom of speech) should be pursued but I don't believe that even the EU itself is totally implementing them' " (Turkish artist Murat Morova in HS 15). The first example tries to restrain the critics over the Pamuk-trial by noting that no matter what the case is, no verdicts have been given yet and by stressing the (European-style) independence of the judiciary. The second example suggests, in an interesting way, that even if Turkey has to make reforms, Europe is no perfect and ideal example either.

5.4.4 DEVELOPING ON ITS OWN

I could negotiate the discourse only in three HS articles. Two of them are reportages about atmosphere in Turkey, one a political analysis of Turkey's possibilities in the negotiations. Discussing the reportages, the first of them suggests that for the ordinary people, the EU is only secondary to the everyday progress of the society: "Earning the daily bread is more important for people than the EU', thought Muhammed Göral, 29, from Istanbul, when asked of the reasons for the lack of EU-enthusiasm" (HS 4). The second one highlights that Turkey has progressed on its own already for long, taking example from the West following its own will: "Nothing would change at our home even if we would be accepted in the EU, only our grandchildren's education would improve', mother Güleser says --- In Turkey the Westernisation of the culture is by no means tied in the EU. The western lifestyle started to appear among the Turkish bourgeoisie already in the 19th century with the reforms of the Osman sultans. Arife, the youngest daughter of the family, remarks that it is everyone's own business to decide how much example to take from the West. 'If we would get into the EU we

could travel more and see how people live around Europe. Then, we could choose ourselves which models to bring home and which not', she says" (HS 20).

The political analysis story includes an interesting discourse about how Turkey's pursue to become a member at any cost could actually be harmful to the country's internal political balance: *"AKP's politics have been constructed mainly to conduct the EU-demanded reforms. Postponing the negotiations, it was feared, would have strengthened the position of those opposing the reforms. 'The recent events have shown us that the policy aiming to a full EU membership is very fragile to crises', researcher Hasan Ünal from the Bilkent university commented" (HS 6).*

5.4.5 PANDORA'S BOX

'Pandora's Box' discourse was nearly absent in HS articles. There's a short reference to the possible threats Turkey could bring to the EU in one editorial evaluation widely the different viewpoints of the accession: *"It is understandable that Europe confronts Turkey with mixed feelings, even some fear. That is affected by the difficult history of Europe and the Turkish Empire, but also suspicion towards the Islamic culture and fear of the Turkish labour flowing to Europe in masses" (HS 13). In another editorial, the discourse is present to warn that the accession might change the European self: *"It is still doubtful, whether the EU is trying to swallow too big a bite in the case of Turkey. Ambitious enlargement pace does, in any case, stop the deepening of the integration. The assimilation of Turkey as part of the EU could fundamentally change the nature of the Union" (HS 9).**

5.4.6 POSSIBILITY

The same two editorials, however, represent also opposite views, and see Turkey's accession equally as an opportunity: *"In the best case, Turkey's membership could be beneficial for the EU. There are huge markets in the country of more than 70 million citizens and improving (hopefully) living standards, and Turkey's demographic situation is much better than of the Europe of grandmas and grandpas" (HS 9) and *"Turkey can be the right solution to the problem that the ageing of the population brings to Europe --- enlargement is the right response to the international competition accelerated by countries benefited from globalisation. Enlargement would also keep the continent open for new ideas and influences. Closing the gates would, the paper [the Financial Times] claims, mean that Europe's fate is to diminish"**

(HS 13). The latter example, thus, strongly supports Europe's role as a dynamic, open-minded unit. The last sentence makes the discourse even stronger, since it means that if Europe is not to stay dynamic, it is to diminish (without stating what 'diminish' means in this context), including an argument that Europe is meant to stay adaptive to new ideas.

The two other examples of the discourse are somewhat loose and undefined: *"It [Turkey] is a dynamic country that can have a lot to give to Europe"* (a comment from a Finnish Turkey-journalist Tom Kankkonen in HS 18) and *"Generally speaking, Tuomioja considered the start of the negotiations remarkable. 'Turkey's membership is absolutely the best solution for the credibility and safety of Europe', Tuomioja said"* (HS 5). It remains unclear which attributes the interviewees really refer to.

5.4.7 EUROPE IS RESPONSIBLE

'Europe is responsible' discourse was frequently present in HS. The discourse can be negotiated mostly in the Turkish and Finnish comments concerning the negotiations (examples are concentrated heavily to the beginning of October), whereas the European sources highlighting Europe's responsibility are hard to find.

The difficulties in the beginning of the negotiations awoke the clearest examples of this discourse in form of a fierce critique towards the EU. The EU actions in the opening phases of the negotiations are described as humiliating for Turkey: *"According to Tuomioja, the EU gets no points for its style in which the negotiations were started. He estimates that the beginning of the negotiations 'seemed like an attempt to humiliate Turkey'"* (HS 5), *"the valueless spectacle, reaching its climax on Monday night, does not in any way increase the appreciation of the EU as an institution"* (HS 9), and *"According to Suvi-Anne Siimes [head of the Finnish Left Alliance party, in opposition] Turkey was an object of a shameful, tricky game"* (HS 7).

Two articles accused the EU of duplicitous and hypocritical manners: *"Turkey had so strongly wanted to be part of the Western Europe for decades that it carried out the demanded reforms, revised its laws and signed a customs agreement with all the EU member states. Turkey kept its word, the EU didn't. Austria – who got unofficial support from many other member states in the corridors – broke the promise given last December and was ready only for the second-class membership of Turkey in the*

EU" (HS 8) and "behind the scenes many state heads of states gave Austria pats on the back and said: 'We don't like Turkey so much either'. " (HS 35)

Moreover, the discourse puts at stake the credibility of the EU: "To revise the official decisions and commitments or to give last-minute demands would make the EU's own credibility look a ridiculous thing" (comment article before the negotiations, HS 1), "EU has perfectly succeeded in destroying its own credibility" and "during Sunday and Monday it was seen that EU's word cannot be trusted and that it acts in an unjust way" (both HS 8). Furthermore, the capability of the EU member states to act together is put under serious doubt: "EU is dominated by the national agendas, connected to 'failure of a long political process' " and that "Perhaps the main problem of the EU is that there is no common mission at the moment" (both HS 7), and "Typical for the EU negotiation processes, a 'rotten compromise' was made" (HS 13). It is also reminded that the EU has to be able to find unanimity over Turkey, and that referenda are going to be held at least in France and Austria (HS 8, 11) and that already during the negotiations "Austria has 70 chances to block the negotiations" (HS 11).

The gap between the European leaders and the European citizens is very much present in the discourse: "the greatest problem of the EU, also admitted by the Commission, is the alienation of the citizens from the EU" (HS 13), "Katainen [head of the right-wing opposition party National Coalition] argues that Finland has to undergo a thorough discussion of enlargement and Turkey's membership. 'We haven't had even the briefest discussion over the issue', he criticized" (HS 7) and "The Europe of citizens is not merely ceremonial speeches, mighty conferences and festive scenes. The Union has to gain abilities to sell its citizens the direction and policy where it is heading. That is what matters, after all, also in the issue about Turkey. The beneficial effects of Turkey's membership have to be clarified to the citizens. If that fails, the whole project might fail" (HS 13). Strongest examples of the discourse declared the EU to be in a crisis: "In decadence" and "EU has driven itself into a deep depression, from which it will not rise for a long time" (both HS 8), "'crisis' is the correct word to use of the EU's current state", "Katainen thinks that the spectacle indicates the 'lack of political leadership' and 'a state of general stagnation' " and "there are no such visionary leaders as in the past years" (all three HS 7).

The Turkish sources are presenting this discourse in five articles, with opinions from ordinary people, experts and political leaders. Ordinary people are mainly represented in the text as irritated by the dishonesty of the EU: “ *I’m not waiting anything of the EU anymore. If they were going to let us join, they wouldn’t cause us all these inconveniences’ ” and “ *EU has no right to treat us like a marionette after we have done everything that was demanded’ ” (both HS 4). The opinions of experts and political leaders are similar: “It is obvious that the EU does not want to accept Turkey’s full membership. I think that even if the accession negotiations begin, the EU will try to invent [clearly referring to the alleged dishonest and duplicitous nature of the EU] some tricks to spoil the membership” (comment by Bilkent university researcher Ünal, HS 6), “Prime Minister Erdogan calls for honesty from the EU, and Bülent Arinc, the Spokesman of the Turkish Parliament, criticized EU of its ‘political manoeuvres that make every sensible man wonder’. *‘It is time to test the honesty, fairness and objectivity of Europe’, Arinc declared” (HS 4), and “ *‘As the Turks hopefully knock on the door of Europe, they are at the same time anxious it will be slammed close’ ” (Orhan Pamuk, in HS 19).****

The Turkish sources argue that Europe’s actions have straight indications in the Turkish societal atmosphere: “One year ago nearly 75 percent supported the EU membership, in the last months the polls have estimated it to be around 59 – 63 percent. The Turkish have complained in the polls that the EU demands too much from Turkey and has different rules for Turkey compared to the other candidates” (HS 4), “Bülent Öztoplu has lived in Europe for 25 years, and he is the head of Echo, an organisation supporting the youth of the immigrated families. Öztoplu thinks that the adaptation of the immigrants would be better if the atmosphere in the countries where they reside would be more positive about the European future of Turkey. Münire Inam agrees: *‘It would give a ‘you’re part of us’ sign” (HS 33).*

5.4.8 TURKEY IS RESPONSIBLE

First of all, there is a discourse of a shared responsibility present in three articles, referring to the shortcomings and need to learn on both sides: “Turkey has from time to time had a good reason to be irritated of the EU’s delaying and blocking attitude. Turkey’s acceptance into the Union is doubted in Europe because of practical issues but also national and religious emotions. That is why we have to expect an attitude from Turkey to be serious about the obvious responsibilities of the membership criteria”

(HS 2), *"Both the Union and Turkey should remember that the criteria demands are meant to be implemented, not merely something to be traded as any goods"* (HS 9), and *"Barroso commented: 'Europe has to learn more about Turkey, and Turkey has to win the hearts and minds of the EU citizens, because they are the ones who in the end decide about the membership' "* (HS 13).

Turkey is responsible discourse itself can be negotiated in material as often as 'Europe is responsible' discourse. It is present, however, throughout the whole material from September to December.

On its strongest, the discourse links Turkey's 'shortcomings' (concerning the membership criteria) straight to its acceptability in the EU. Numerous examples of this can be found: *"If Turkey reforms itself, it will become a member', Katainen noted"* (HS 7), *"Already the fact that Pamuk could be charged according to the Turkish criminal code is a scandal. A state where such a thing can happen does not belong in the European Union"* (HS 2), *"If Turkey wants to join the EU, its government has to take care that the Turkish enterprises fulfil their commitments"* (HS 3), *"before the EU membership Turkey has to solve the issue of Cyprus"* (HS 17), and *"MEPs urged Turkey to revise its criminal code so that it wouldn't restrict freedom of speech. 'If the situation does not change, the effects to the negotiations can be enormous' "* (HS 32). The discourse is clear: *if* Turkey doesn't follow the demands, *it will not* become a member at all or at least the vital negotiations will be damaged.

The discourse also reminds that Turkey is under control: *"Union: the bomb strike investigation is a test for Turkey"* [headline of HS 27] and *"This is an important test for Turkey. It can now show that law is law, no matter who the suspects are"* (about a bomb strike to a book store in Kurdistan, HS 27), *"The EU has constantly had to note Turkey about its stumbles on the road to the EU"* (HS 21), and *" 'Turkey is no more a mere candidate country, but a country negotiating with the EU', Rehn reminded in Ankara. 'This means that it is monitored more and more in Europe' "* (HS 12).

In EV material, it was possible to find a few examples where the concise article acted by this "if you don't reform, then..." setting (EV 8, 11, 19, 22) putting responsibility of the negotiation success on Turkey. In HS material, the same setting can be seen in five articles:

“Turkey not yet eligible for the EU” (HS 2), “Rehn urged Turkey to accept Customs Agreement with the EU” (HS 12), “Turkey assures to meet the EU-conditions” (HS 17), “Rehn is tired of violations against freedom of speech” (HS 26) and “Union: the bomb strike investigation is a test for Turkey” (HS 27). Every one of these articles consists of various discursive elements pushing the responsibility to Turkey. HS 12 focuses on reforms in general: “Rehn urged Turkey ‘to put all its energy in carrying out the reforms’ --- Rehn welcomed the law reforms already made, but reminded that they also need to be implemented in all areas of life. He thinks Turkey should now focus in developing human rights, and the rights of religious minorities, trade unions and women --- he demanded Turkey to ratify ‘without delays and in good will’ the Customs agreement between Turkey and the enlarged EU”. HS 2 doubts the membership on basis of violations of freedom of speech and the denial of the Armenian Genocide: “It is outrageous that the official Turkey refuses to confront its own history” and “A law that makes the mere mentioning of the facts to be ‘insulting the Turkish identity’ and therefore criminal, is in a clear conflict with the principle of freedom of speech”. In HS 26, Rehn grabs the same issue and urges reforms: “Rehn insists Turkey to stop the continuous violations of freedom of speech, if not immediately, then at least in 1 – 2 years --- ‘We cannot tolerate violations of this kind from the states wanting to become members’ “. In HS 17, Turkey itself accepts this position as the subject of responsibility: “Gül assured on Monday that Turkey will continue the legislative and economic reforms, and thus will fulfil the EU criteria”.

HS 26 is an interesting exception, since it is the only example throughout the whole HS material mentioning the possibility that the violations and shortcomings might not represent the whole Turkey: *“The violations of freedom of speech are considered to be provocations organised by the EU-opposing nationalists working in the judiciary system”*. It is not mentioned in any other article that the violators and ‘provocative’ elements might actually be just a fraction of Turkish society. Usually Turkey is presented as one, with every case representing the whole society.

5.5 DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE PAPERS

In EV, the OTTOMAN, SICK MAN OF EUROPE and TURKEY IS RESPONSIBLE discourses were present the most often. TURKEY IS RESPONSIBLE discourse could be negotiated in 12 articles, OTTOMAN and SICK MAN OF EUROPE 9 times respectively. PART OF EUROPE and EUROPE IS

RESPONSIBLE discourse appeared, respectively, in 8 articles, whereas PANDORA'S BOX and POSSIBILITY both in 5 articles. DEVELOPING ON ITS OWN was present only in one article.

In HS, on the other hand, OTTOMAN discourse appeared by far the most times, altogether in 23 articles. After that, EUROPE IS RESPONSIBLE could be negotiated in 14 articles and TURKEY IS RESPONSIBLE in 13. PART OF EUROPE was present in 11 articles, whereas SICK MAN OF EUROPE only in 6. 'Possibility' was negotiated in 4, DEVELOPING ON ITS OWN in 3 and PANDORA'S BOX in 2 articles.

The main difference between the two papers is that HS presents notably more Turkish voices and opinions, which at least partly may come down to the difference in the papers' resources. In EV, the Turkish opinions are nearly absent, whereas HS publishes several reportages observing and trying to reach the opinions of the ordinary Turkish society. This difference has an effect throughout the material. In HS, we hear more critical voices about Europe and the EU, forming many EU-opposite positions especially when combined with the critical voices from the Finnish (mainly opposition) politicians. In EV the EU is criticized in a few articles (five). However, the critics are mainly politicians or experts of the EU institutions (for example MEP Schulz in EV 4, the former Belgian PM Wilfried Martens in EV 17) and not 'outsiders' such as ordinary Turkish people. Furthermore, the focus is most of the times in the absorption capability of the EU, which takes the critique more to conditions than structures. In HS, the critical attitude towards the EU, also its structures and institutions and not merely the difficult situation (i.e. doubt of the absorption capability), is much more persistent.

Another notable difference is that in EV the assumed impacts of Turkey's accession are presented focusing more to the possible trouble they could cause than in HS. Considerably more often than in HS, EV draws scenarios of a trouble-prone accession linked especially with the threat of the economic deprivation and end of solidarity. The threat of the increase in US influence in Europe is completely absent in HS, despite in EV it is mentioned a few times.

Furthermore, the SICK MAN OF EUROPE discourse is very frequent in EV, particularly from the European point of view. EV mentions once straight that the issue is the 'Turkish question' of Europe, linking the present discussion to the Turko-European history. Thus, it

suggests that Europe still has a problem what to do with its patient, the Turk, still the sick man needing Europe's compassion and advice. The article about Turkey's chief EU negotiator (EV 5) is a good example of this EV discourse: if Turkey is able to develop itself some European-style characteristics and a business mind, it might be welcome to 'the Promised Land'. Europe is the active part, Turkey the passive object. As we combine the EV SICK MAN OF EUROPE discourse to its TURKEY IS RESPONSIBLE discourse (often, in five articles, they appeared together), we begin to see one of the main editorial lines of EV: Turkey is responsible and Europe's actions are meant to help it. If we add here the fact that the EU's own actions were not much criticized, we can see the one-sidedness of the EV agenda. There is a tendency for EV being on the European side. This gives an example of how the 'good self – bad other' nexus works in practice.

Certainly, it is not possible to accuse EV of propaganda, since this 'Europe is good, Turkey needs development' agenda is also challenged from time to time (EV 6 suggesting that Turkey might not be any different from Europe what it comes to political disputes, EV 9 asking whether reform demands are too revolutionary, and EV 18 challenging the fairness and credibility of the EU). We also have to keep in mind that Turkey is presented as a possibility in as many articles as it is presented as a threat. Nevertheless, when compared to HS, it is easy to see the difference. First of all, in HS the SICK MAN OF EUROPE discourse is presented evenly by both Turkish and European sources. This means that a setting where Turkey would only be represented as something observed is not created. Second, the appearance of the TURKEY IS RESPONSIBLE discourse in HS is comparable to its use in EV, but HS does not combine this to the SICK MAN OF EUROPE discourse more than once. Turkey's subject position is, thus, more independent in HS than in EV. HS focuses in the OTTOMAN discourse, clearly having an agenda to find out the not only political but also everyday life differences between Turkey and Europe. This becomes visible when comparing the PART OF EUROPE discourse between the papers: HS presents the discourse more often through Turkish comments about everyday life.

One more notable difference can be found in the POSSIBILITY discourse. Both papers firstly concentrate on the aging of the European population and the possibility the Turkish population offers, but in other assumed benefits we can see a difference. EV focuses on the possibility for the EU to increase its foreign policy power and significance in the world by enlargement, whereas HS stresses the possibility for Europe to show its openness.

The similarities can be found most of all in the OTTOMAN, TURKEY IS RESPONSIBLE and PART OF EUROPE discourses. PART OF EUROPE discourse is (despite having also its differences, as stated above) quite similar in both papers: both note that Turkey does not feel Asian, highlight Turkey's economic development and its political connectedness to the EU, and challenge Europe (EV suggesting that Europe has its disputes too, HS that not Europe either might always be able to follow its own ideals) at least once. Both impose a similar responsibility to Turkey, stressing that it has to convince Europe by showing determined mind to pursue the reforms. In OTTOMAN discourse both highlight the long and indefinite nature of the negotiations (thus referring to the cultural difference there is to be tackled) and the (difficult) historical continuum from the Ottoman Empire to the present day. Both papers connect both the modern-day Turkey and the modern-day Europe to the past.

5.6 EUROPEAN SELF IN THE TURKISH MIRROR

What then, do these findings reveal about the European self-image? Through the self-other reflection I divide the examples to *positive* and *negative* findings of this image.

In EV, it is possible to see continuous use of the Turkish other to highlight the positive sides of what Europe is considered to consist of. First of all, we have the talk of the Turkish pride, maintained for historical reasons, and the talk of "*still developing country*" having a "*long trek to Brussels*" and "*still things to learn*". The text thus suggests that Turkey is backward, not as developed as Europe, and searches its greatness from the past, the only era it used to be on the same level with Europe. Thus, the text suggests, Turkey does not completely understand its present position in the hierarchy. It has a self-image based on the illusion of the old might. Europe is represented as developed, and because Turkey is *only* compared to Europe (not even once to, for example, the US), the texts mediate a view of Europe in the top of this development hierarchy. Europe has no need for foolish pride but since it is showing the way, it can act responsibly. "*We are not carpet-traders here in Europe*", as Mr. Asselborn notes. European culture is not anymore in the age of bazaars and haggling, but preciseness and peak of development. As one article suggests: "The European course can lead Turkey to a new phase in its history and ensure a better future for its citizens."

SICK MAN OF EUROPE and PART OF EUROPE discourses guide the reader towards either the European characteristics of Turkey or the characteristics Turkey should obtain from Europe. These characteristics contain numerous values that in the discourses become the way of European self-reflection:

“The way to more prosperous and democratic turkey”

“Threatening that Turkey would turn its back on the West and on modernisation if it were rejected by the EU”

“...Interest in the Kurdish problem. The EU has been trying to highlight it”

“Progress needed on women’s rights”

“Electoral threshold”

“It [Turkey] now increasingly appreciates the value of civilian instruments of law, economics and diplomacy, as well as multilateral settings”

“MEP accused of insulting Turkish army”

“Combat terrorism while respecting human rights and civil liberties”

“Like the EU, Turkey believes that threats to use force against Iran are likely to be counter-productive”

Drawing an analogy to the ‘developed’ image, Europe sees itself as prosperous and democratic, protecting human rights, rights of minorities and equal rights for women. It is based on liberal market economy. A reference to the Turkish modernisation suggests Turkey is backward and needs to be modernised (Kemalism has not from this point of view succeeded to modernise Turkey enough on European standards). Once again, this highlights the exemplary role of Europe. Furthermore, Europe focuses on developed multilateral diplomacy and guarantees human rights and civil liberties even in the case of terrorism fight. Europe is thus farsighted and long-term, instead of fighting nearsighted wars (in the context, this acts as a comparison between Europe and the US as well).

Turkey’s chief EU negotiator Babacan is observed in a context where his skills are evaluated from the European point of view. The article finds that he is a hard worker, a good consensus-builder, a skilful diplomat and has abilities to combine traditionalism with modernism and liberalism. He also knows languages and is able to be calm and maintaining a sense of humour even under pressure. Are we assuming an image of an ideal European top politician, who is diplomatic, avoids fundamentalism and is not offended easily? The text clearly suggests so.

Interesting ideas about the European self can be noted as the articles discuss the possible threat Turkey's accession presents for Europe. Turkey's accession is seen to *"irreversibly alter European values and way of life"*, stating unconditionally that if Turkey joins, Europe is no same anymore. There seem to be two schools about how Europe would change. The first one is more moderate, having as its main idea that *"a Union where a country as big and as poor as Turkey is a full member could never afford to redistribute wealth to its poorer members to the extent that it does now"*. Europe is represented, once again, as wealthy. Nevertheless, Europe also acts by solidarity and redistributes its wealth to reach more equality. If Turkey joins, according to this idea this pursue for equality will end or at least be diminished.

The second school is more aggressive suggesting that *"inevitably, Europe will become less European and more Asiatic; less Christian and more Islamic; less Western and more Middle-Eastern"*. Here, the geographical, religious and cultural boundaries are highlighted. The implication is that Europe is Christian, can be geographically defined and carries Western cultural values. Thus, Turkey is definitely the other, and Europe has to maintain the boundaries and protect the Christian and Western self by excluding Turkey. Also the wealth of Europe has to be protected, since *"the prospect of a Muslim and poorer member state being the most powerful player in the Union is what worries many European politicians most"*. This raises questions about the reasons why this is considered to be the most serious threat. Is it that the rich Christian elite simply wants to maintain its position on the top of the decision-making hierarchy? Or that Turkey is seen willing to act controversially to the traditions of the European decision-making? The way or the other, at least the wealth European self is seen something fragile and valuable, something to be protected. On its most aggressive, the discourse sees Turkey as *"a severe parasite"* attempting to penetrate through the protection, to harm the European idea.

Discussing the assumed benefits of Turkey's accession, it is obvious that realities are understood. *"The geo-political advantages of a close relationship are evident. So is the demographic argument: Europe is old and needs young blood"*. The demographic situation in Europe awakes anxiety, and the solution to it, the paper suggests, lies outside the present Europe. Europe has to enlarge to survive and maintain its leading position in development. Turkey could be permitted to join because the EU needs Turkey. Turkey

could also boost Europe's importance in world politics. *"Turkey's proximity to, and ties with, troubled zones such as the Balkans, the Arab Middle East, the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq and Central Asia, could strengthen the EU's role and influence in such places"*. This suggests that Europe is ready and willing to increase its power and importance, ready to expand outwards to be able to spread its influence, maybe even to Europeanise the states named. This development would also permit *"the West to build a bridge to the Muslim world"*, which means that there is no bridge yet. The West (of which Europe is a part) understands that it is separate from the Muslim world, and letting Turkey join the EU could be a step to break out from this separated situation.

Turkey is still, on this religious and cultural basis, the other for Europe. Europe seeks to distinguish itself from the other, especially when it is assumed that also more others could be joining Turkey in causing insecurity for the European self: *"One of the big worries --- is that it [Turkey] would be a Trojan horse for American interests in Europe"*. A danger for Europe is that the US and Turkey together would try to penetrate through the protection of the European self and seek to alter the European self in an irreversible way: *"it is likely that --- Turkey will join the 'pro-Atlanticists' and seek to influence the way the foreign and security policy develops"*. Europe, thus, is here negotiated to be something non-American and non-Muslim. To define the above-quoted *American interests* would need more examination of how Europe and the US define each other, but since these interests are to threaten the foreign and security policy, it can be assumed that the European values of multilateralism and diplomatic solutions would be challenged. The notion *"Turkish membership of the EU could potentially create problems for CFSP"* includes an idea that there is some kind of a coherent common foreign policy in the EU (despite the issue is actually highly controversial in the EU). This common policy seems to be something that should stay intact of any foreign influence. There are also warnings about the incompatibility of the self and the other, such as *"a 'European' Turkey will be seen as a traitor to fundamental Islamic values"*. Discourse about Turkey as the Trojan horse others both Turkey and the US, having the idea that Europe is to stay exclusive.

The European self is not only defined with positive attributes or being something valuable and unchangeable. European self is also challenged. Europe is either seen to act against its own values or to be an unclear, undefined entity. Criticizing EU's hard reform demands for Turkey suggests that there could be double standards in the EU accession. Turkey is maybe

given too high standards to achieve, since the EU does not even want it to achieve these standards. In the discourse, the EU is accused of obstructionism and its fairness is questioned. Thus, Europe is duplicitous. Europe wants to maintain its open, inclusive image, and maintain Turkey's hope of accession – but in fact wants to remain exclusive. This becomes outspoken only once: *“You don't want Turkey in because it is Islamic and far away. Croatia is closer and is catholic.”*

Moreover, the coherent European self, with its Christianity- and wealth-based common politics, is challenged in a couple of more examples. First, the reference to the “Scandinavian” standards when talking about women's rights suggests that there are double standards inside Europe as well. Second, the comment about the history of conflicts between France and Germany and the comparison of this tendency to the relation between Turkey and Europe proposes that the difficult history should not be an obstacle for belonging to the same entity. Thus, Europe is seen again as duplicitous, being able to stand some characteristics when they belong to the self, but not when they belong to the other. Europe's incoherence is mentioned also in another example: *“The gap between the EU leaders and the population has never been wider on such an important issue”*. Do we actually have *two Europes*, one of the citizens' and one of the elite? The discourse suggests that Europe is actually not sure about what it is and thus not able to build its identity: *“we must conduct the long-overdue debate about the geographical limits of Europe, which for me is a physical place with a common identity, not some vague cultural area”*. This is a clear demand of boundaries and as clear a confession of the lack of those boundaries.

Also in HS, especially the SICK MAN OF EUROPE and PART OF EUROPE discourses bring on surface reflections of what Europe is thought to consist of.

“The interest of the foreign investors has increased after the EU-related reforms and government's privatisation projects”

“Commission states that Turkey could already be considered to have a functioning market economy”

“With the EU influence freedom of speech and human rights will come true”

“Turkey should now focus in developing human rights, and the rights of religious minorities, trade unions and women --- to ratify ‘without delays and in good will’ the Customs agreement”

“If we would get into the EU we could travel more and see how people live around Europe. Then, we could choose ourselves which models to bring home and which not”

“The EU has constantly had to note Turkey about its stumbles on the road to the EU”

“It is outrageous that the official Turkey refuses to confront its own history” (About Armenian Genocide)

The reflections are already familiar: the European economy, first of all, is based on liberal openness of the markets, with foreign influences and ownership being common. Liberal individual rights such as freedom of speech and religious freedom are considered important, as are the protection of the workers' right for functioning trade unions and the rights of women and minorities. These individual freedoms are contradicted by the Turkish comment of the restrictions in movement, the inability to “travel more”. A European, thus, is both protected from violations and liberated to choose. The EU is once again more developed, having to *constantly* note Turkey about its stumbles and pride, not willing to accept the same standards as Europe. I can't help drawing an analogy to the period of Enlightenment in Europe and the birth of the 'Idea of Europe' (see 4.3.3). Also then, back in the 18th – 19th century, Europe was very conscious about its civilized identity, and frustrated of the difficulty to transfer this identity on the Turks. This advanced European self is reflected through the Turkish other in the reportage about a normal Turkish family. Many differences between Turkish and European lifestyles are highlighted:

“A singing call for prayer flows in stereo into the corridor”

“Stretches her hand to be kissed, which is not weird since the guest is notably younger than her”

“The two-room apartment is completely full, inhabited by six adults and one child”

“In Turkey family values are more important than in Europe. We are tied to our families even when we're forty years old. In Europe you can begin your own life when you're eighteen”

“As most young Turkish couples, also Arzu and Sükrü can only move together after the 'amin' of the Imam”

“The family was glad that Arzu found a fiancé the family could accept”

All these examples are, in the context, brought up as habits we rarely see in Europe anymore, as something not belonging to modern Europe. All the values above tell about the great importance of family values in Turkey, and are contrasted to a more individualistic Europe. The society is more important than the individual, and the coherence of the family unit and preservation of traditions more important than the individual freedoms. Compared to Turkey, thus, Europe stresses individualism over family and society. It is important to keep in mind that in Europe there are considerable regional and cultural differences in the relation to traditions and the gluing power of society. Thus, othering Turkey here, in my opinion, acts only as showing that *compared to Turkey*, Europe is different. However, also the controversial Turkish author Orhan Pamuk suggests that Europe has *"never defined itself by Christianity, but instead by individualism"* and links Europe with *"Enlightenment, equality and democracy"*. This highlights the importance of individualism and the image of Europe as a liberal, rights-securing entity.

As in the EV articles, also in HS the history-based differences actively separate the European self from the other. HS talks about a *"completely new kind of a country"* and suggests with examples of cultural difference that Turkey is still something unknown for Europe. The Turkish self may not be really known in Europe, as can be interpreted from the Turkish comments *"They still consider us Ottoman conquerors"* and *"annoyed that --- the Turkish EU-membership, immigration, Islam and scarfs of Muslim girls are all packed together"*. This would suggest that Europe's conclusions of the Turkish nature are guided by history and stereotypes, and that Europe is not interested to really find out what the *real Turkishness* is. This would tell of European ignorance or pride. These attributes fit poorly in the normal Enlightened and developed European self-image. Turkish otherness is sometimes undefined, vague notions such as *"Exhibition was declared to have brought Turkey closer to Europe"*. Furthermore, the European self is something to be protected, yet not as strongly as in EV articles. Turkey's possible impact as changing the nature of the European self is mentioned only once, but together with the protectionist *"there is still a long way to go"* discourse Europe maintains distance to Turkey and keeps firmly in its control the moment of the accession, doubtful to ever happen.

The European experiences of Turkish society strengthen the self-other nexus. Comments such as *"the group of representatives appeared to be terrified of their experiences in a court in Istanbul"*, *"I am happy, but only because I got out of there alive"* and that

disorder in sports events is *"an indication of the general atmosphere of the country"* contribute to the atmosphere of 'dealing with the other'. The other is represented as awaking fear and astonishment, being uncivilized compared to self. Europe, thus, is once again represented as more developed than its Turkish other.

In contrast to othering Turkey, also *openness* and *inclusiveness* are mentioned in HS as parts of the European self. Both openness and inclusiveness are seen to maintain Europe's dynamism, but it is doubtful whether Europe adopts these standards. For example, *"enlargement would also keep the continent open for new ideas and influences. Closing the gates would --- mean that Europe's fate is to diminish"*, suggests this openness to be close to some kind of *an ideal*, something that Europe would wish to be but what it might not totally fulfil. Europe should maintain its inclusive nature to be able to maintain its development: according to the discourse Europe is meant to be in movement. Strict definition of its boundaries and adopting exclusion as its policy would mean a halt in Europe's development. The discourse also proposes that inclusion would diminish the fear the other causes in self: *"the adaptation of the immigrants would be better if the atmosphere in the countries where they reside would be more positive about the European future of Turkey --- It would give a 'you're part of us' sign"*. Inclusion suggests that clear definitions and boundaries about self should be avoided.

The possible negative sides of the European self are presented in HS remarkably more often than in EV. In HS, Europe is also divided in two: *the official Europe* acting as the scenes of Europe, and *the unofficial but real Europe*, home of the citizens: *"The Europe of citizens is not merely ceremonial speeches, mighty conferences and festive scenes. The Union has to gain abilities to sell its citizens the direction and policy where it is heading"*. This includes the idea that due to the gap between the elite and the masses, one united Europe cannot be born. The official Europe is not able to sell its idea about future to the masses, if it even has any. The official Europe is being heavily criticized for the valueless, shameful, humiliating and unfair game it is playing with Turkey, suggesting that the official Europe is a proud, incoherent and quarrelsome entity, something that the Europe of the masses does not support nor maybe even understand.

In this discourse, Europe has become a mere name under which the national states fight according to their national agendas, and yet this Europe demands Turkey to be patient and

win the European hearts on its side. This would suggest that the common European identity is in crisis, or maybe it has even never really existed. Or, it might be that the Turkish artist quoted of his disbelief of Europe fulfilling its own standards is right, and the European self is consisting of conscious separation of ideals and reality. These values are, however, seen as “holy” for Europe, and an idea to include the traditional other in the European self therefore awakes fear and rejection.

5.7. HEGEMONY?

As discussed already, it is possible to find discourses serving respectively both *elite* and *ordinary people*. We can assume that EV's *hard talk* serves better the interests of the elite – by speculating about economy, foreign policy, religion and solid democracy (supporting the economic growth and the interests of the businessmen as well) – and that the slightly more *soft talk* of HS gives more space for ordinary people's discourses to come into surface by promoting the historical and cultural values and everyday life. This suggests that the discourses in EV do not give as much importance for citizens as important part of societal structures as HS does.

The sources are mainly politicians and businessmen. This is remarkable considering the relative familiarity of Turkey for the Europeans. Europeans have in masses rushed to spend holidays in Turkey for years, Turkey regularly takes part in European football and singing contests, trade and investments with and in Turkey have increased over the last years, and there are approximately ten million Turks living as immigrants in the European countries. Still, only the top level is accounted to discuss Turkey in public. It is worthwhile to note that neither one of the papers ask *the European citizens* the question whether Turkey should be let in Europe.

While the European citizens are completely absent, the Turkish citizens are sources of opinions in only three HS articles. EV talks more in the voice of the European power-holders, and HS slightly more in the voice of national power-holders. Citizens, the objects of these two powers, do not have a large role in the discourses.

This discussion over the future of Europe is somewhat unchallenged. The conversation in both papers includes many naturalisations, outspoken assumptions that have been

naturalised and not needing explanations anymore. At least the following naturalised assumptions could be found in the discourses:

CONSIDERING EUROPE

1. Europeanness equals wealth, at least when compared to the others
2. Respecting human and civil rights is crucial for a membership in the EU
3. Those in power should be fair
4. The European Union should set an example with its behaviour for other parts of the world

CONSIDERING TURKEY

5. Joining the EU would be beneficial for Turkey
6. It is doubtful whether Turkey will really fulfil all the reforms set for it to join
7. Turkey is not eligible to join Europe tomorrow. The negotiations are bound to take at least a few years

CONSIDERING BOTH

8. The negotiations are bound to be more difficult than easy
9. It is not natural for Turkey and Europe to co-operate closely due to historical their cultural and political differences

These naturalisations fit together with Eurocentrism (discussed in 4.2). They persuade the reader to believe that they live on the right side, in wealthy Europe. Wealth means power and gives Europe a natural, hegemonic position over Turkey. Turkey is willing to join, actually has been willing to join already for 40 years, but Europe due to its hegemonic position can block the membership with whatever reasons it may find. Here we come to the question of the *fairness* and the *European moral* – blocking Turkey without sound justification is not fair or morally right and would therefore contradict the foundations of the European idea.

These naturalisations reveal two hegemonic discourses common for both papers. I call them the *Problematic compatibility* and the *Inevitable progress* discourses. These two discourses are ubiquitous in the texts and their viewpoints are not really challenged.

First, the *Problematic compatibility* discourse positions Turkey in a tough situation. It highlights the difficulty of the negotiations. It contrasts Turkey to the EU, leaving all the negotiable questions open. The sources are from the elite: politicians and businessmen of

the continent. They tell from their high-level positions how Turkey-issue should be handled and discussed – ordinary citizens are not needed to give guidance on this matter.

All the discourses accept two viewpoints: the negotiations are going to be hard, and accepting Turkey as a member will take time. Discourses argue these viewpoints by popularly referring to the continuous historical difficulties between the two entities. As discussed in the discourse categories analysis part, many articles depict a clear continuum between the Ottoman Turkey and the present-day Turkey, thus highlighting that the same problems still exist, bringing into readers' minds old images of the other, oriental and culturally distant Turks. Many articles also use this as an argument backing their view of the difficulty of the negotiations. The articles attempt to convince us that "the negotiations are likely to be difficult, because the Turks are unreliable and difficult to negotiate with" – instead of telling "the negotiations might turn easy, since the new Turkish government has taken rapid measures in implementing reforms". The difference is clear, and it establishes the power firmly in the hands of the European leaders. They insist Turkey to conduct massive reforms, themselves only promising to keep the "door open" instead of giving a clear promise of membership.

The other face of the same coin and maybe the reason for this position can be found in the *Inevitable progress* discourse. This as ubiquitous discourse reflects Europe's uncertainty over its own future. Many international organisations have clearly outspoken rules and definitions by which they take new members. The EU, however, is in trouble defining itself, and therefore it is also difficult for it to say yes or no to Turkey. It does not know, whether Turkey fits in the European picture or not. The discourse evaluates the pros and cons of Turkey's accession, but the leaders are unable to define the real meaning it would have on Europe since they don't really know what Europe is. This is highlighted by constant discussion in the articles about the *launch* and *advances* of the negotiations, but not nearly as much the *goal* of the whole process.

The discourse also naturalises the *inevitability* of the EU to develop further. Discourse suggests that Europe is to become something more. It discusses Europe's own development and progress, even criticizes Europe of being momentarily in a confused state and not being able to completely control itself, suggesting though that the Union has to deepen and grow closer to be able to overcome its difficulties. In HS, this is slightly

challenged by reminding that Europe cannot advance without the acceptance of its citizens. On the other hand the paper doesn't exactly consider stagnation to be any answer to the European integration problems either. Therefore, the only real answer is to advance in integration. In EV, this logic is more obvious. It does not even challenge the assumption that the integration should be deepened.

To conclude, both Turkey's subordinate position and the inevitability to deepen the European integration are hegemonic. They are legitimated by historical differences and intimidating scenarios of the Turkish influence in Europe, both popular discourses naturalising the viewpoints of the elite. This is also an indication of the position of the EU as something above the ordinary citizens. The citizens are ill-connected to the Union that decides over the direction of their continent as whole, which by its part diminishes the chances for a common European identity.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The European self is by no means coherent. Main assumptions about being European can certainly be found (wealth, democracy, the rule of law), but especially from the different reactions towards the other we can see that the continent is not understood similarly.

Religion, having acted for hundreds of years as the common basis for the whole European continent, seems to be in strong decline. In the articles, Christianity is considered important only rarely. The Islamic nature of Turkey is brought up in both papers relatively often, but according to the findings this acts more in highlighting the general cultural otherness of Turkey than in strengthening the Christian self of Europe. Maybe it is that the European everyday culture has implemented most of the attributes traditionally related to Christian religion (Judeo-Christian ethics, Christian humanitarian values), thus leaving the religion itself relatively useless for the modern European identity. This argument is in line with the strong secularity seen in today's Europe and the fact that the value of the Church itself is in decline.

In the European Voice, the European self is first of all defined by prosperity and development. The discourses clearly consider Turkey (and as well the US) as the other, stressing Europe's own developed nature compared to the relatively backward Turkish other. Europe is defined as something between a club of the wealthy elite distributing its prosperity to its members and a solidarity organization promoting human rights and individualism. Due to its advanced nature, Europe also seems to be prepared and willing to assume a more influential (in both politics and culture, maybe) role in the world. Europe considers Turkey to be a (foolishly) proud nation, with this pride obstructing the help Europe could provide for the sick man. Turkey needs Europe, and only the European solution for the *Turkish question* can be considered. The Turkish pride, however, might not be so strange for Europe itself. Also, Europe is seen as duplicitous and too demanding (to deliberately block Turkey from membership?), and even having different standards for different actors. An obvious tendency for Eurocentrism, however, is clearly visible in the articles. European Turkey is seen as an ideal, but even a slightly Turkish Europe awakes fear and rejection.

Helsingin Sanomat does not promote as coherent self-image of Europe. Today's Europe has similar common values as its (historical) basis, but these values are in danger to be mere ideals. Europe is built primarily on individual freedoms and human rights. The belief of the developed self is an important component as well, and economic liberalism and religion are firm cornerstones of the present Europe. However, it seems impossible to have one coherent Europe in reality, but instead even *three Europes*.

There is, first of all, the *Europe of ideals*, an inclusive entity maintaining its wealthy open-mindedness and dynamism by escaping strict definitions. Second, there is the *Official Europe*, the Europe of the elite. This is a Europe of fine ideals that are vaguely implemented, a duplicitous, unjust and exclusivist club. The Official Europe holds the masses out of the decision-making mechanism, thus securing its own power, and uses othering to legitimate the role of the European elite as an advanced leader. Third, there is the *Europe of the masses*, built on the historical ideals but not connected to the decision-making of the Official Europe. In HS discourses, both Official Europe and Europe of the masses build on the Europe of ideals, but the gap between them causes the incoherency of Europe.

In Helsingin Sanomat, the Europe of the masses criticizes the Official Europe for acting in an unjust and unfair manner. In the European Voice, the critique is more vague and derived more from the European elite itself. Whereas the European Voice sometimes seems to repeat the political agenda of the European Union, Helsingin Sanomat falls from time to time in Euroscepticism. The discourse in the European Voice is more derived from a functional Eurocentric basis, evaluating the positive and negative effects Turkey would have on the European self. In Helsingin Sanomat, the discourse has to do more with whether Turkey and Europe are compatible and what their cultural characteristics are like. Helsingin Sanomat also asks notably more often what Europe is and whether it has a vision of future, whereas the European Voice takes more for granted that there is at least some kind of a European vision.

It is difficult to draw waterproof conclusions and say that the European Voice is promoting the Official Europe and Helsingin Sanomat defending the Europe of the masses. First, there is a huge difference in the sizes of the papers. For HS it is definitely possible to broaden the Turkey-discussion to cover more opinions and viewpoints, thus also to include

more critical opinions in the discussion through a more participating and deeper journalism. In EV, the Eurocentrist point of view might be partly, but only partly, dictated by the financial realities. Furthermore, HS is a national newspaper, which explains partly the tendency towards heavier criticism than in the EV, a newspaper built to have a core-European function.

Turkey wants to be part of Europe. It is represented to want this quite coherently – there are only a few challenges to this discourse. But, Turkey is either backward (from the European viewpoint) or misunderstood (from the Turkish viewpoint). Its own development, separated from the European direction, does not really exist in the articles. Turkey's development only becomes active through European action. Kemalism does not seem to have fundamentally changed the European opinions about Turkey. As Llobera noted in 4.3.4, a gap of understanding still seems to be wide between Turkey and Europe.

There are notable differences in the discourses of the two papers. The fact that the representation of the same issue leads into different discourses, hints that the European core and a single member state talk with different tones, even with different understanding of the same issue. With a common European identity and a common understanding of the Turkey-issue, we could anticipate the discourses to be much more similar in the two papers.

The European Voice suggests, as one solution, that Europe should (re)define its boundaries to have a better self-understanding. Helsingin Sanomat, on the other hand, urges the gap between the elites and the citizens to be closed. Again, the way or the other, the discourses suggest that the masses do understand the roots and ideals Europe is built on and also do realise the self-other position between Europe and its others. However, the fact that the elite is not acting according to these ideal roots of Europe might be one factor that causes the gap between the citizens and the elite.

It is difficult to see how European identity could be further developed in this setting. Since the Official Europe is unable to impose its ideals to the citizens and the national agendas interfere the supranational agenda setting, identity development is in trouble.

The considerable exclusion of citizens from the EU agenda formation is clearly a European problem. The hegemonic discourses in Turkey-issue tend to be ones of the wealthy European elite, leaving little room for citizens' own interpretations of Europeanness and the compatibility of Europe and Turkey. The discourses mainly follow the same agenda: impacts of Turkey's possible accession to European economy, politics and (religious) culture. Not one article considers Europe from outside these ready-set boundaries, derived from the European prosperous self-image. Not one article challenges Europe as the primary reference point and the ultimate category for the European people to belong to. The question is about being European, not being the world citizen. Boundaries are considered to be important for Europe – the monolithic existence of Europe is one large hegemony in the articles. The concept of Europe as the reference point is not challenged, despite more and more Europeans might already feel themselves more as world citizens than merely Europeans. Thus, being European is considered somewhat supreme in the articles. Helsingin Sanomat challenges the existence of this supreme Europe by criticizing its inner coherence, but in the European Voice the criticism is not presented. Both papers have, however, a strong will to define world through the concept *Europe*.

In my opinion, a mere definition of European boundaries is not enough to build a more coherent European identity. It could, to some extent, help in developing a common identity, but would eventually clash with European ideals of openness, inclusion and dynamism. I do not either exactly share the idea of Cederman that the deepening of the Union would automatically mean that a more exclusive nature has to be adopted, especially what it comes to the geographical boundaries. Europe can define itself better on the level of ideas than on the map, and tight definitions of the boundaries of Europe would contradict to the humanist, enlightened principles Europe is built on. And, in my opinion, Europe is not in a deep crisis at the moment, maybe even far from that. Instead, there seems to be a very positive image of the core European self and its values, a basis that the elite-masses dispute cannot distract. The fact that Europe momentarily seems to be lost and unsure about its future direction, is causing disputes on the surface, but not threatening the inner elements.

I think it would be important for the European Union to stress two tendencies. First, the gap between the elite and the masses has to be narrowed. The masses have to be able to trust the political elites, since only in this way it is possible to reach 1) the Europe of the

citizens, and 2) such an EU that acts more according to its own democratic ideals. Second, Europe has to have a concise discussion about its own direction and principles. Europe has not always been built on inclusion (just thinking of the numerous wars in Europe and strong othering of the eastern cultures), but as I see it, exclusion would stagnate Europe. The transformation of the EU into a mere Club of the Chosen would contradict to Europe's ideals.

I have, hopefully, revealed from a narrow research setting some ways in which Europe defines itself through everyday discourses and uses the other to promote its own self-understanding. The time period I have examined is a small component in the long development, a time when the discussion has for the first time in the world history concentrated also on 'soft power' and real supranationality instead of being only on the level of the balance of power and national sovereignty. The discourses must be seen in the context where the end of the cold war and bipolarization of the world is less than twenty years behind. EU is still a very young organisation, and may not yet be mature enough to really discuss its future direction.

I leave the last words of this thesis to Orhan Pamuk, the controversial Turkish author and one of the central cultural personalities effecting the accession negotiations. Pamuk addresses the relations of Turkey and Europe, and ends up with a positive conclusion of the possibility of the two to form a political Union. I leave it to the reader to think whether the Europe Pamuk depicts is something existing in reality, or whether it is merely an ideal image the Europeans want to believe in.

"Europe has gained the respect of the non-Western world for the ideals it has done so much to nurture: liberty, equality and fraternity. If Europe's soul is enlightenment, equality and democracy, if it is to be a union predicated on peace, then Turkey has a place in it. A Europe defining itself on narrow Christian terms will, like a Turkey that tries to derive its strength only from its religion, be an inward-looking place divorced from reality, and more bound to the past than to the future."
(Pamuk 2005)

LIST OF ARTICLES

THE EUROPEAN VOICE

- (1) *"Erdogan need not ban privileged partnership from EU talks"* (1.9.2005, EDITORIAL)
- (2) *"Turkey offers EU more punch"* (1.9.2005, COMMENT)
- (3) *"Cyprus – the isle that divides Turkey and EU"* (22.9.2005, POLITICS)
- (4) *"Turkey talks move closer, but MEP's postpone customs deal"* (29.9.2005, POLITICS)
- (5) *"Turkey talker"* (29.9.2005, PORTRAIT)
- (6) *"Bazaar bartering may prove testing"* (29.9.2005, POLITICS)
- (7) *"Neighbours from hell?"* (29.9.2005, POLITICS)
- (8) *"Zero-tolerance on torture but abuses persist"* (29.9.2005, POLITICS)
- (9) *"Accession talks will result in fringe benefits"* (29.9.2005, COMMENT)
- (10) *"Historic chance or irreversible collapse of EU?"* (29.9.2005, COMMENT)
- (11) *"More progress needed on women's rights"* (29.9.2005, POLITICS)
- (12) *"Terror brings reforms into focus"* (29.9.2005, COMMENT)
- (13) *"Looking for best way to handle the Kurds"* (29.9.2005, POLITICS)
- (14) *"How Islam has brought stability to Turkey"* (29.9.2005, COMMENT)
- (15) *"Turks are braced for a long trek to Brussels"* (6.10.2005, POLITICS)
- (16) *"Dual challenge of Turkey's entry effort"* (6.10.2005, EDITORIAL)
- (17) *"Why I supported opening negotiations with Turkey"* (13.10.2005, COMMENT)
- (18) *"Can Europe handle Turkish optimism?"* (13.10.2005, COMMENT)
- (19) *"Freedom rows show Turkish split"* (24.11.2005, POLITICS)
- (20) *"Europeanisation and its enemies"* (21.12.2005, COMMENT)
- (21) *"Getting to do business with Turkey"* (21.12.2005, POLITICS)
- (22) *"MEP accused of insulting Turkish army"* (21.12.2005, POLITICS)

HELSINGIN SANOMAT

- (1) *"Turkin EU-neuvotteluja ei saa lykätä"* (2.9.2005, COMMENT, "Negotiations with Turkey should not be postponed")
- (2) *"Turkki ei ole vielä EU-kelpoinen"* (15.9.2005, EDITORIAL, "Turkey not yet eligible for the EU")
- (3) *"Kovaa peliä Turkissa"* (16.9.2005, ECONOMICS, "Tough game in Turkey")

- (4) *"EU-pessimismi valtasi turkkilaiset"* (3.10.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "Pessimism towards the EU has caught the Turks")
- (5) *"Turkin EU-neuvotteluille tie auki vasta Itävallan peräännyttyä illalla"* (4.10.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "Negotiations with Turkey got started only after Austria pulled back in the evening")
- (6) *"Turkki pysyi tiukkana pitkään"* (4.10.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "Turkey stayed strict for long")
- (7) *"Vanhanen: Laajentuminen haitannut päätöksentekoa"* (4.10.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "Vanhanen [Finland's PM]: Enlargement has harmed the decision-making")
- (8) *"Rappiolla"* (4.10.2005, COMMENT, "In decadence")
- (9) *"Turkin EU-neuvottelut alkoivat kompuroiden"* (5.10.2005, EDITORIAL, "An uneasy start for Turkey's EU negotiations")
- (10) *"Solmu ei auennut ilman USA:n panosta"* (5.10.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "The US was needed to open the deadlock")
- (11) *"Turkin ja EU:n neuvottelujen uskotaan kestävän ainakin kymmenen vuotta"* (5.10.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "The negotiations are assumed to last at least for ten years")
- (12) *"Rehn kehotti Turkkiä hyväksymään tullisopimuksen EU:n kanssa"* (7.10.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "Rehn [the Finnish Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn] urged Turkey to accept Customs Agreement with the EU")
- (13) *"Turkki koettelee EU-kansalaisia"* (9.10.2005, EDITORIAL, "Turkey puts EU citizens on test")
- (14) *"Mustafa Olli tutustui Turkin sydänmaihin"* (9.10.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "Mustafa Olli [Commissioner Rehn] visited the Turkish heartlands")
- (15) *"Turkin kulttuurielämä odottaa EU:lta muutoksia – hyvässä ja pahassa"* (17.10.2005, CULTURE, "The Turkish cultural life awaits EU-inspired reforms – in good and in bad")
- (16) *"Tapaus Hrant Dink on tuorein tahra sananvapaudessa"* (17.10.2005, CULTURE, "Case Hrant Dink is the latest stain on the freedom of speech")
- (17) *"Turkki vakuutti täyttävänsä EU-ehdot"* (18.10.2005, DOMESTIC NEWS, "Turkey assures to meet the EU-conditions")
- (18) *"Turkki on jo Eurooppaa"* (20.10.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "Turkey already is part of Europe")
- (19) *"Euroopasta täytyy löytyä paikka myös Turkille"* (24.10.2005, CULTURE, "There has to be space for Turkey in Europe")
- (20) *"Börek-piirakkaa Istanbulissa"* (30.10.2005, WEEKEND, "Börek pie in Istanbul")

- (21) *"Turkin taloudessa suunta on ylöspäin"* (14.11.2005, ECONOMICS, "Turkey's economy points up")
- (22) *"Blatter: Turkkia uhkaa jopa sulkeminen MM-karsinnasta"* (18.11.2005, SPORTS, "Blatter [Sepp Blatter, the FIFA Chairman]: Turkey threatened to be excluded from the World Cup qualification")
- (23) *"Jupakka muuttui sanasodaksi"* (19.11.2005, SPORTS, "Dispute escalated to a war of words")
- (24) *"Olli Rehn: Selvitys kuuluu Fifalle"* (19.11.2005, SPORTS, "Olli Rehn: Settlement is FIFA's business")
- (25) *"EU-komissaarin tupaillassa puhuttiin Turkista, Mikkelistä ja jalkapallosta"* (19.11.2005, DOMESTIC NEWS, "EU Commissioner's reception evening was discussion about Turkey, Mikkelä and football")
- (26) *"Rehn on tympäännytynyt sananvapauden loukkauksiin"* (22.11.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "Rehn is tired of violations against freedom of speech")
- (27) *"Unioni pitää pommi-iskun tutkimusta kokeena Turkille"* (24.11.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "Union: the bomb-strike investigation is a test for Turkey")
- (28) *"Turkki kamppailee Roj TV:n sulkemiseksi"* (3.12.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "Turkey fights to shut off Roj TV")
- (29) *"Picasson teokset saivat tuhannet liikkeelle Istanbulissa Turkissa"* (4.12.2005, CULTURE, "Picasso's works mobilized thousands in Istanbul")
- (30) *"Hyvä, paha PKK"* (11.12.2005, COMMENT, "Good, bad PKK")
- (31) *"Pamuk-oikeudenkäynti saattaa peruuntua Turkissa"* (14.12.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "Pamuk-trial in Turkey may be cancelled")
- (32) *"Pamukin oikeudenkäyntiä lykättiin helmikuuhun"* (17.12.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "Pamuk-trial postponed to February")
- (33) *"Turkin puolesta puhumalla ei saa pisteitä äänestäjiltä"* (29.12.2005, FOREIGN NEWS, "You don't get votes by supporting Turkey")
- (34) *"Itävaltalaista Turkki-keskustelua"* (29.12.2005, COMMENT, "Turkey-discussion à la Austria")
- (35) *"EU:n musta vuosi"* (31.12.2005, WEEKEND, "A black year for the EU")

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