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THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA: THE CASE OF GENDER

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There has emerged a consensus around the world that HIV/AIDS should be highlighted as a serious global problem. It is seen as a humanitarian, development and global security issue. Regardless of perceiving HIV/AIDS as a humanitarian, development or global security issue, our common consciousness of HIV/AIDS is related to two different aspects: to its occurrence in multiple countries and to the international policy context. Thus what is global about HIV/AIDS is not only the magnitude of the problem but also the approved response to the problem.

The approved global response to HIV/AIDS is organized through a global governance regime. This regime consists of many multilateral and bilateral organizations, programs and funds which constitute a complex system. As a result of setting the HIV/AIDS on the global policy agenda, especially African states have had to adopt a multisectoral approach to their epidemics. Within the multisectoral approach there are different actors working against HIV/AIDS in cooperation. Consequence of the multisectoral approach is that the national level is bypassed and the global level is in direct contact with the local level.

Despite the direct contact of global and local levels, Africans can very seldom get their voices heard within the global level. Due to this the practices of global governance and the experiences of Africans do not always correspond. This has made many projects that address HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa ineffective in tackling HIV/AIDS, but not ineffective in establishing authority. The research will address this disjunction and shed light on the effects of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. Theoretically and methodologically the research is based on the analytics of government approach, which emanates from the work of Michel Foucault, although the research also contains methodological decisions that are based on the criticism of this approach.

More specifically, the research addresses the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS through the case of gender. This is because, even though homogenous and universal gender inequality is frequently rendered at the heart of Sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, there has been vast work done by a bunch of researchers who emphasize the heterogeneity and dynamism of sexual and gender relations in Africa. Hence, it is only by through simplification that sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS can be made governable through gender. Furthermore, this governance is only practiced within specific limits. If these limits are violated promotion of gender equality is forgotten and authoritarian practices are put into action. This is especially salient when the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is examined through its collision with the management of migration. From these perspectives it is possible to view the gender-based governance of HIV/AIDS as a political struggle.

According to the research, the contemporary global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is unlikely to solve the health crisis, but it helps to keep sub-Saharan Africa governable. In addition, the governance can be harmful to traditional ways, customs and habits. Thus the governance is suitable for managing risks of contemporary world order, but at the cost of discrimination. However, this scenario is not inevitable as there are some possibilities for resistance.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE

Already in the 1970s there were classical accounts written on transnational relations in world politics.[1] In the 1980s there were, for example, work published on international governance regimes.[2] However, it took until the end of the Cold War when the perspective of global governance was properly getting foothold in international relations. More attention than before was started to be paid to a global change that was seen as reorganizing political authority. Few years after the end of the Cold War James N. Rosenau influentially declared that

> the constitutions of national governments and their treaties have been undermined by the demands and greater coherence of ethnic and other subgroups, the globalization of economies, the advent of broad social movements, the shrinking of political distances by microelectronic technologies, and the mushrooming of global interdependencies fostered by currency crises, environmental pollution, terrorism, drug trade, AIDS, and the host of transnational issues that are crowding the global agenda. These centralizing and decentralizing dynamics have undermined constitutions and treaties in the sense that they have contributed to the shifts in the loci of authority. Governments still operate and they are still sovereign in a number of ways; but, as noted above, some of their authority has been relocated towards sub-national collectives. Some of the functions of governance, in other words, are now being performed by activities that do not originate with governments.[3]

This view was widely accepted and it was seen that the states now faced issues which they could not control on their own. These issues, such as environmental pollution or AIDS, were clearly problems that a single state could not solve on its own. Thus it was simply claimed that "the state's capacities for governance have changed and in many respects […] weakened considerably"[4].

In addition, as the state's capacity for governance was seen as changed and weakened, it was believed that authority has been in some extent transferred to somewhere else. In this transformation states were seen as losers and different non-state actors were perceived as winners.[5] Non-state actors were many times seen as more effective actors in relation to global issues than states. Non-state actors were, for example, perceived to master the network character of contemporary global order and thus they were seen able to influence certain global issues, such as respect of human rights, better than states.[6] Thus, due to the complexity of global issues that were now seen to haunt political authority and due to the existence of non-state actors that knew how to

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[1] See e.g. Keohane & Nye 1972 & 1977.
[2] See e.g. Krasner 1983.
[3] Rosenau 1992, 3.
[4] Hirst & Thompson 1996, 256.
[5] See e.g. Keck & Sikkink 1998, Risse et al 1999 & Cooper et al 2002.
[6] Keck & Sikkink 1998.

manage this complexity sometimes more efficiently than states, state led geopolitical management of global issues was seen as becoming all the time less plausible. Many were demanding a greater involvement of other actors than states to the management of global issues. They were advocating for genuine global governance, in which different types of actors would cooperate, as in a "interconnected world of diverse nation-states, in which non-state actors also wield enormous influence, hierarchial forms of managing global affairs are losing their efficacy and legitimacy."[7]

More specifically, the type of non-state actors that have since been particularly celebrated from the global governance perspective have been representatives of the so-called civil society.[8] There is no specific agreed definition on what civil society is, but at present the term is usually used when refering to different 'people's' consortiums that are in the one end highly organized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and in the other end much more loose gatherings of volunteers. Even though there is no specific agreed definition on what civil society is, it is widely agreed to be the main engine of global change. As put by Ann M. Florini, "[t]he state system that has governed the world for centuries is […] changing, and one of the most dramatic changes concerns the growing role of transnational civil society."[9] As a consequence of activities of this civil society, it is perceived that "[t]he site of politics has shifted from formal national institutions to new local and cross-border spaces"[10]. Thus what is seen as new in the contemporary global governance in relation to older form of management of global issues is the role of the civil society in it.

An empirical enquiry to contemporary management of global issues confirms the significance of civil society in contemporary world politics. For example, in relation to HIV/AIDS, the role of civil society is constantly emphasized and a greater involvement of it is frequently demanded. It is seen that without the civil society HIV/AIDS simply cannot be efficiently managed:

> The role played by civil society is often underestimated, largely because it is not systematically measured. Yet it is clear that without the nongovernmental sector's participation—including the work of vast numbers of volunteers at community level—many of the strategies and targets set by countries and the international community for responding to HIV would be unattainable. The experience and knowledge of these front-line providers is of utmost importance to national policy-making and to the development of stronger public health sectors.[11]

Furthermore, it is important to stress that today also states, and not only non-state actors or different scholars, have begun largely to celebrate the contribution of civil society. States actively fund

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[7] Held & McGrew 2002, 11.
[8] See e.g. Higgot et al 2000, Anheier et al 2001 & Kaldor 2003
[9] Florini 2001, 30.
[10] Kaldor 2003, 148.
[11] UNAIDS 2006, 222.

different civil societies and pursue for the capacity building of different civil societies, especially in the developing countries.[12] It is at present everything but rare to see expression from states that emphasize the role of the civil society, such as this:

> Progress towards democracy and the rule of law and the consolidation of human rights and *a functioning civil society* is a precondition for economically, ecologically and socially sustainable development. The simultaneous strengthening of development and security demands dialogue, coordination and cooperation between *all the stakeholders involved*.[13]

Hence, if the transformation of authority from states to non-state actors has taken place, it seems that today states have largely submitted to this transformation and are not confronting non-state actors. In fact, it seems that states are inviting non-state actors to participate into the governance of global issues. Non-state actors are celebrated in statements given by state representatives and non-state actors are invited to participate in the activities of international organizations. Non-state actors, especially those that represent civil society, have clearly become legitimate parts of global governance.

1.2. POLITICS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Despite the fact that the involvement of civil society to global governance is widely celebrated, it would be a bit too hesitant and uncritical to declare the contemporary form of global governance simply better or more just than the state led management of global affairs. As Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall have emphasized, the scholars of international relations need to be attentive to ways which power matters in global governance.[14] Fortunately, some scholars have replied to this call and there now exists some work on the analytics power within global governance.[15]

From the perspective of analytics power within global governance, the enlarged role of the non-state actors in shaping and carrying out of governance functions should not be seen simply as a transfer of power to these actors from states. Rather, this transformation should be seen as an expression of a changing logic or rationality of government. This is so, even though there does not exist clear hierarchy or chain of command in the contemporary global governance, but multiple actors that seem to be engaged in a complex competition against each other. However, what links

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[12] See e.g. Sending & Neumann 2006.
[13] MFAF 2007, 6. Emphasis added.
[14] Barnett & Duvall 2005, 24.
[15] See e.g. Duffield 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007a & 2007b; Dillon & Reid 2000, 2001 & 2009; Larner & Walters 2004; Lipschutz 2005; Sending & Neumann 2006.

the complexity of contemporary global governance together is liberalism or, as it is frequently called at present, neoliberalism. The practices and institutions that are prevalent in the contemporary global governance are liberal in their character and thus the rationality that guides global governance is liberalism.[16]

In this context liberalism should not be understood as a normative political doctrine or an ideology, but as a particular way of governance. Barry Hindess has written that it is unsophisticated to see liberalism as pursuing for the maintenance of individual liberty as an end in itself or to view liberty as setting the limits to objectives and manners of government. Liberal governments have frequently violated liberty by using different 'illiberal' means against the poor and other minority groups or against whomever in the states of emergency. Liberty is only respected when it is effective to govern through this liberty. Thus liberalism is about constant calculation on what is required by the government in order to achieve its aims efficiently and cost-effectively as possible.[17] Liberalism is about "calculation for this cost of manufacturing freedom"[18].

Civil society fits to this picture of liberalism very well. As liberalism, civil society is ambiguous notion that has been used in relation to many things. For example, civil society has been used to refer to particular value, space, anti-hegemony, etc.[19] However, from the perspective of liberalism as way of governance, civil society is simply "the correlate of a technology of government"[20]. From the perspective of liberalism as way of governance, civil society is seen as natural social bond which is a result of spontaneous synthesis between its members. Civil society is a reality arising from the interests of each individual part of it. Thus civil society is something that has to be respected by liberal government, but not in way of leaving it completely alone. On the contrary, civil society is a target of permanent governmental management, not in a way of direct intervention, but in a way of ensuring that the workings of individual rational interests guarantee 'the natural' functioning of civil society. Liberal government has to ensure that the environmental conditions for civil society are such that the rational economic interests of individuals can work 'naturally' and lead to consequences that are desirable for government.[21]

Regarding global governance, then, the rise of civil society should not be seen simply as a step towards a better future or even decline of state power. The self-association and political will-

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[16] Dillon & Reid 2001, 46–47; Barnett & Duvall 2005, 24.
[17] Hindess 2004, 27–28.
[18] Foucault 2008, 65.
[19] See e.g. Van Rooy 1998; Comaroff & Comaroff 1999.
[20] Foucault 2008, 296.
[21] Foucault 2007, 349–354 & Foucault 2008, 294–312.

formation characteristic of civil society does "not stand in opposition to the political power of the state, but is a most central feature of how power operates in late modern society."[22] Civil society has been granted its role because it can perform certain governance tasks most efficiently and cost-effectively. For example, at present underdevelopment of societies has become dangerous as it is perceived to correlate with terrorism and other hazards. Direct interference and societal reconstruction is, however, beyond the capabilities of legitimacy of individual governments. In this case, then, there is also a need for civil society actors, such as different development and humanitarian NGOs, which can legitimately act within these underdeveloped societies.[23]

It should be understood that civil society and state are not opposite forces within contemporary global governance, but both are subjects created by liberal rationality. At present civil society and state are both under constant pressure, which norms of liberal rationality lay on them, as acting against these norms is likely to cause outrage in other actors of global governance. If civil society actors do not act according to these norms states and other donors of civil society will take their money away.[24] If a state does not act according to these norms liberal states and civil society actors will try to force it to change it course; for example, by labelling the state as rogue state or by imposing different sanctions.[25] On the other hand, behaviour perceived as good will be celebrated. When civil society actors operate along the norms civil society is proclaimed to be an essential part in the efforts to manage contemporary global issues.[26] When a state operates along the norms it is also cherished. For example, if a developing country has adopted policies that are guided by liberal norms this country is usually said to be one of the success stories of development.[27] This way contemporary global governance should be grasped as a form of productive power that moulds and establishes actors – both civil society actors and states, or what sort of actors ever that are needed – along its own needs.[28]

The power that functions through liberalism is mostly a type of power that cannot be owned, but this type of power functions only through practices and in relation to something. Thus the target and operator of power are both constituted by power relation, which is formed between these entities when the operator successfully claims the position of authority and succeeds to portrait the target as being in subordinate position. Both of these positions already exist in the rationality of power

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[22] Sending & Neumann 2006, 652.
[23] Duffield 2001, 2.
[24] See e.g. Rau 2006, Swidler 2006 & Seckinelgin 2008.
[25] See e.g. Jackson 1990 & Cooper 1996.
[26] See e.g. UNAIDS 2006.
[27] See e.g. Harrison 2004.
[28] See e.g. Hindess 2004; Barnett & Duvall 2005; Lipschutz 2005; Sending & Neumann 2006; Duffield 2007a; Dillon & Reid 2009.

before these two entities are attached to these positions. Thus the power already exists before it is used.[29] From this perspective, then, it is not a reasonable thing to say that power and authority have been transferred from states to civil society or somewhere else in the contemporary global governance. In the contemporary global governance states, civil society or any other subject can practice power in a non-zero-sum game if one just acts according to liberal rationality.

The demands of a greater involvement of other actors than states to the management of global issues and the celebration of multilateral global governance cannot be clearly separated from liberal objectives. These demands and celebrations support the liberal rationality that guides contemporary global governance. As these demands and celebrations support this particular way of governance, these statements should be seen as politically charged statements. Thus, regarding these statements, what should be disputed is the naïve conception of liberal form of power. In order that these statements could be seen as politically charged more explicitly there is a need to understand the workings of contemporary global governance better than done at present. There is a need to understand the way in which action of different actors, whether they are states, civil society actors or international organizations, is guided by power and transmit power.

1.3. RESEARCH PROBLEM

This research will respond to the need to understand the workings of contemporary global governance better than done at present. However, it is beyond the reach of this study to do this as a whole due to the wide-scale of different issues present in the contemporary global governance. Because of this, the research will address the need to understand the workings of contemporary global governance better than done at present only in relation to one global issue. This issue is HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa.

Sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is an advantageous issue to examine the workings of contemporary global governance. The significance of the issue is self-explanatory as there are at the moment estimated to be 33 million people living with HIV of which 67 percentage live in sub-Saharan Africa.[30] In addition, sub-Saharan Africa is clearly conceptualized as a problem for the contemporary global governance. Sub-Saharan Africa is seen to be a home of a bunch of ineffective states which let famines, diseases and other maladies operate freely within the region. This has made the region

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[29] Foucault 1988, 103–104.
[30] UNAIDS 2008, 32.

dangerously instable as instability can lead to conflicts, mass migration and raise of religious fanaticism that have potential to viciously affect the rest of the world. Thus there is perceived to be a need to do something to sub-Saharan Africa within the different actors of global governance.[31] There is perceived to be an urgent need to manage different issues, such as HIV/AIDS, that are sources of instability in sub-Saharan Africa.

Sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is an advantageous issue to examine in two other senses as well. Firstly, due to the lack of money available at the region, region's civil societies are largely dependent on external funding. As a result, civil societies are largely equivalent to NGOs active in the region.[32] Donors view NGOs as the legitimate targets of funding because these organizations have the organizational capacity to act according to the views of donors. This shapes civil societies along the lines of donors as a internationally funded NGO can only be recognized as a civil society actor.[33] Thus the civil society as the correlate of a liberal technology of global governance is very salient fact and easily examined in the case of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS.

Secondly, there exists only a handful of works that have addressed sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS from the perspective of politics, in any kind of way. There is work done on security or political economy implications of HIV/AIDS.[34] In addition, there exists some work done from the perspective of global governance and HIV/AIDS related policymaking.[35] Despite the work done, as written by Catharine Boone and Jake Batsell, it seems that generally

> the HIV-AIDS issue has been conceived of as too private, too biological, too microlevel and sociological, too behavioral and too cultural to attract the attention of many political scientists. Most of the literature has concentrated on microsociological issues that speak directly to the interpersonal dynamics of the spread and prevention (education, behavior changes) of the disease. There is a growing microsociological literature that concentrates on the effects AIDS has on families and communities, and on householdlevel development issues like farming practices. When it comes to the more political, institutional, and macrocauses and effects of HIV-AIDS, the literature is very sparse indeed.[36]

However, as Martyn Sama and Vinh-Kim Nguyen state, "health is above all a political matter, of which biology and epidemiology are the expression. Epidemics of cholera, tuberculosis or HIV are the embodiment of politics"[37]. Thus it seems that the way HIV/AIDS intertwines with the issues that normally "preoccupy political scientists such as the state, institutional reform and development,

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[31] Duffield 2007a, 2.
[32] See e.g. de Waal 2006 & Seckinelgin 2008.
[33] Hilhorst 2003, 9 & Tvedt 2007, 29–30.
[34] See e.g. Ostergaard 2002; Lee & Zwi 2003; Prins 2004; Poku & Whiteside 2004; Elbe 2005 &2009.
[35] See e.g. de Waal 2006, Patterson 2006, Rau 2006, Swidler 2006, Seckinelgin 2008.
[36] Boone & Batsell 2001, 4.
[37] Sama & Nguyen 2008, 8.

democratization, civil society, globalization and global governance is not evident to many people."[38]

This research aims, from its part, to change the above-mentioned lack of understanding. The research wants to shed light on the politics of global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. In order to do this the research tries to answer the question: how does the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS work? The purpose of this question is not to simply describe how authority operates, but to direct attention to what happens when sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is globally governed? In other words, what kind of outcomes this governance tries to produce and how well it succeeds in this? Through answering to these questions it should be possible to view the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS as a political struggle where global liberal aims and opposition to these aims clash. Thus it should be possible to produce a more realistic picture of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS than portrayed by various influential liberal actors who are usually the ones advocating for the global governance of the epidemic. Through answering to these questions it should be possible not only to naively and uncritically celebrate the global governance, but also point to problematic aspects of this governance. It should be possible to show how the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS conceals in itself practices that pursue to rule Africans in very authoritarian manner. Also, it should be possible to show how certain authoritarian practices of this governance are at times not accepted, and thus resisted, by Africans themselves.

1.4. THE CASE OF GENDER

The research addresses the politics of global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS through the case of gender. This is because it is now widely acknowledged that gender is one of the key drivers of sub-Saharan HIVAIDS, as women are disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS when compared to men.[39] There are thought to be many reasons for this. It is highlighted that because sub-Saharan women do not have access to financial resources they are made susceptible to abuses. Also, the use of violence against women is identified to limit women's ability to protect themselves. Gendered poverty is recognized as factor as well because it is seen to push some women to sex work. In addition, women have to take care of HIV/AIDS patients, which results that girls are taken out of schools to help in households. This is seen to make these girls more vulnerable as education

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[38] Boone & Batsell 2001, 4–5.
[39] See e.g. WHO 2003; UNAIDS/UNFPA/UNIFEM 2004; UNAIDS 2002, 2004, 2006 & 2008.

correlates with women's ability to know how to prevent HIV infection. All this is seen to put gender inequality at the heart of Sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS.[40]

More importantly, the research addresses sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS through the case of gender because this case is a prime example of the type of politics inherent in the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. Even though knowledge concerning populations renders gender inequality at the heart of Sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, the issue is not that simple. The conceptualizations of gender and sexual relations in sub-Saharan Africa that are led from the knowledge of populations are homogenous and undynamic, despite the vast work done by a bunch of researchers who emphasize the heterogeneity and dynamism of sexual and gender relations in Africa.[41] Hence, when HIV/AIDS is addressed in sub-Saharan Africa through gender all this happens at the cost of simplifying complexity. It is only through this kind of simplification that sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS can be made globally governable through gender. Furthermore, this governance is only practiced according to its positive ethos within specific limits. If these limits are violated all the talk on promoting gender equality is forgotten and authoritarian practices immediately surround the violator. This is especially salient when the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is examined through its collision with the management of migration. Thus there is a great deal of selectivity involved within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in the case of gender. This selectivity means that practices of this governance do not benefit every African equally, but these practices function within certain limits and cherish certain ways of living more that others. From this perspective, then, it is possible to view the gender-based global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS as a political struggle. It is possible to view the global aims not as responding unproblematically to local needs, but as in a process of being tried to be imposed on some people. In addition, as these global aims are not seen as responding unproblematically to local needs, it is also possible to see these global aims encountering resistance.

When talking about resistance within liberal governance it is, however, essential to specify what kind of character this opposition has. In relation to liberal governance it is important to separate the question of resistance from the question of what kind of order would guarantee liberty to individuals. This is because one of the main tasks of liberal governing is to create specific kind of freedom and attract civil society to function within the limits of this particular freedom. Within liberalism

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[40] See e.g. UNAIDS/UNFPA/UNIFEM 2004.
[41] See e.g. Amadiume 1987 & 1997; Mama 1995; Oyewùmí 1997; Aarmo 1999; Kendall 1999; Arnfred 2005, 2006 & 2007; Chacha 2005; Tamale 2005; Wieringa 2005; Epprecht 2008.

> [f]reedom is never anything other […] than an actual relation between governors and governed […] [G]overnmental reason needs freedom […] it consumes freedom, which means it must produce it. It must produce it, it must organize it. […] Liberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats, etcetera.[42]

Thus if resistance is understood as pursuing some given liberal freedom we are not resisting liberal governance as such, but actually only acting within the limits set by it. In this way we would already on before hand define certain limits for resistance as resistance could only be practised within the limits of this particular freedom. Within liberalism, then, in the end resistance cannot be about anything ready-made. On the contrary, resistance has to be about refusal of liberal governance in concrete complex situations faced by individual people when these people themselves decide to perform an act of resistance. As written by Sergei Prozorov, "[p]ower relations become unacceptable not by virtue of any normative criterion but simply when(ever) they are not accepted."[43]

Above-introduced idea of resistance guides the design of my case study. Due to the requirement that resistance has to be about refusal of liberal governance in concrete complex situations faced by individual people when these people themselves decide to perform an act of resistance, my analysis will emphasize analysis of subjectivities. This emphasis will move the focus of the research a bit from the usual focal point of analytics of government approach, which emanates from the work of Michel Foucault.[44] Even though I see my research as theoretically and methodologically being part of this approach, the emphasis of subjectivities means that there will be less attention paid to rationality, tactics, technical means, mechanisms or other these kinds of aspects of government that are traditionally found within the analytics of government approach. These kinds of traditional analyses of government have been valuable as they have shown in many instances how subtle and insidious liberal governance can be, but at the same time they have tended not to find anything that would be outside governance or even point to the limits of governance. However, in the case of gender and sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS this outside can be at times brought to light and thus in this case it is therefore appropriate and fructuous to concentrate on subjectivities in order to disclose this outside through the refusal of liberal governance by Africans themselves.

Hence, instead of solely and extensively celebrating constitution of authority, my case study will culminate in the analysis of couple of African narratives that among other things also include acts of resistance. These narratives consist of personal narratives that I have collected myself from a

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[42] Foucault 2008, 63–64.
[43] Prozorov 2007, 74.
[44] See e.g. Burchell et al 1991; Barry et al 1996; Dean 1999; Foucault 2007 & 2008; Miller & Rose 2008.

group of Mozambican people within one particular gender and HIV/AIDS related NGO project and of one gender, HIV/AIDS and migration related Kenyan biographical novel called *Confessions of an AIDS Victim*. These narratives, especially when they are read together, point to the politics inherent in the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. On the one hand, these narratives point to the conformation of Africans regarding the ideals of global liberal governance. On the other hand, these narratives stretch liberal governance to its limits and reveal the arbitrary sovereign excess that nevertheless exists within liberal governing as not every practice of liberal governance is accepted in these narratives. These narratives bring out that due to the arbitrary sovereign excess of governance many Africans face questionable, paradoxical and unfair constrains that discriminate certain individuals and certain ways of living considerably. Thus, in relation to this particular case, these narratives contribute to the production of a more in-depth understanding of the target phenomenon of the research, which is, of course, the central objective of any case study research.[45]

The previous, however, does not mean that I would bypass completely the type of analyses usually done within the traditional analyses of government in my research. In the case of gender and sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS I will analyse official policy statements that render gender inequality at the heart of HIV/AIDS and elaborate the strategies of addressing this gender inequality. However, as these things are not the focal point of my research, I will do these things only in relation to subjectivities I am about to analyse and to extent that they are necessary. What is necessary is to show that my case can be situated on the trajectory of liberal government and that my case follows the logic of contemporary global liberal governance. What is not necessary, and is therefore out of the scope of this research, is extensive and extremely careful analysis of constitution of authority as there already exists plenty of these kinds of analyses in relation to Third World governance.[46] Naturally, however, I will not ignore these analyses but I intend to build my own case study on them. But now, before moving on to my case study, I will first introduce the basis of my analyses. I will introduce the central practices, institutions and trends in the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. In addition, I will further explicate the characteristics of liberal governance in relation to sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS and further conceptualize this governance as a part of liberal governance logic.

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[45] See e.g. Yin, 2003.
[46] See e.g. Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995; Brigg 2001 & 2002; Cooke & Kothari 2001; Rankin 2001; Cooke 2003; Harrison 2004; Lazar 2004; Bryant 2005; Moore 2005; Duffield 2005, 2006, 2007a & 2007b; Seckinelgin 2008.

2. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF SUB-SAHARAN HIV/AIDS

2.1. APOLITICIZED GOVERNANCE OF LOCALITIES

HIV/AIDS, as it has been stated, "is the first global epidemic of which we have been commonly conscious"[47]. There seems to have emerged a consensus around the world that HIV/AIDS should be highlighted as a serious global problem. It is seen as a humanitarian catastrophe as the HI-virus is now so prevalent especially at some poorer regions of the world that the consequences of the virus are seen as devastating for these areas. These areas are perceived to be in a need of immediate relief, which can be only achieved through global cooperation. Global cooperation is also perceived to be central in the long-term attempt to sweep the burden of HIV/AIDS completely from these poorer regions. In this case tackling HIV/AIDS is understood as being intertwined with the development of these regions. Either way, the taming of the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS is seen as a common responsibility of us all. Yet, this common responsibility is made even greater through different prognoses where the future is seen potentially even gloomier than the present as the growth of global networks and the weakening of state borders could spread the devastating effects of the virus to areas outside the poorer regions of the world. Thus, in addition to being perceived as a humanitarian and development issue, HIV/AIDS is also grasped as a global security issue. In this way HIV/AIDS is a good example of the merging of humanitarianism, development and security so prevalent in our times.[48]

As it can be already seen from the previous, regardless of perceiving HIV/AIDS as a humanitarian, development or global security issue, our common consciousness of HIV/AIDS is related to two different aspects. According to Hakan Seckinelgin, "the globality of the disease is related to both to its occurrence in multiple country contexts across the world and to the international policy context"[49]. Thus what is global about HIV/AIDS is not only the magnitude of the problem but also the approved response to the problem. As Seckinelgin continues, "the *globality* locates policy formulations into a certain *global* context whereby *global* intervention policies are to be supported by *global* funding with *other resources* formulated accordingly."[50]

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[47] Barnett & Whiteside 2006, 374.
[48] See Duffield 2001.
[49] Seckinelgin 2008, 33.
[50] Ibid. Emphasis in original.

Also, regardless of perceiving HIV/AIDS as a humanitarian, development or global security issue, the approved global response to HIV/AIDS is organized through the very same global governance regime. This regime consists of many multilateral and bilateral organizations, which constitute complex system where the coordination is, however, mostly centralized to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).[51] In addition to these organizations, there also exist influential programs and funds that are important parts of the governance regime. Most of these programs and funds were launched by the time and after the Special Session of United Nation's General Assembly (UNGASS) in June 2001 to discuss HIV/AIDS. UNGASS produced a final Declaration of Commitment, according to which HIV/AIDS should be treated as a matter of highest priority especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In this way HIV/AIDS, and especially sub-Saharan epidemic, was firmly set on the global policy agenda.

Even though UNGASS was a highly important moment in the evolution of the global governance of HIV/AIDS, it wasn't the beginning of it. The beginning of the global governance of HIV/AIDS can be better situated in the mid-1980s. From the beginning, at the centre of global governance there were different UN agencies with the World Health Organization (WHO) taking the lead role by founding the Global Program on AIDS (GPA). Bilateral donors also activated themselves with the United States being the most salient donor through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), but other bilateral donors started to contribute as well mainly, though, through funding of GPA. GPA took the professional and technical lead and established AIDS programs in its member countries. In this way general consensus among the major powers started to emerge that the problem should be managed multilaterally.[52] In 1996 this multilateral governance was clarified and strengthened when the GPA and other subordinate HIV/AIDS related programs of different UN agencies were merged under UNAIDS. Since then HIV/AIDS has all time moved higher in the priority list of global policy agenda, as exemplified by already mentioned UNGASS.

The common acceptance of the fact that HIV/AIDS should be treated as a matter of highest priority and through cooperation has not lead to consensus in the views about how the HIV/AIDS should be fought, especially in the resource poor settings. For the resource poor settings there have been mainly two paradigms of tackling HIV/AIDS. Namely, these paradigms have been prevention and treatment; although, community-based care, education, protection from violence and promotion of human rights have all been frequently emphasized as well. For a long time prevention was considered as a best way to tackle HIV/AIDS, but lately the situation has been more confusing. For

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[51] Poku 2002, 119.
[52] O'Manique 2004, 45.

example, although the UNGASS Declaration of Commitment still acknowledged "that prevention of HIV infection must be the mainstay of the national, regional and international response to the epidemic"[53], the programs and funds launched by the time and after UNGASS have mostly concentrated on treatment. For example, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the World Health Organization's 3 by 5, the HIV/AIDS Initiative of William Jefferson Clinton Presidential Foundation, the United States' President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the World Bank's Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP) all made access to treatment their main priority.

The parallel promotion of treatment has been an outcome of two processes. Firstly, from about mid-1990s there emerged a constantly growing dissatisfaction in international atmosphere to the fact that HIV positive people in Africa, and other resource poor settings, rarely held access to multiple drug therapy that kept HIV positive people alive in the industrial world. Secondly, there was a gradual appearance of treatment successes in resource poor settings in the beginning of Millennium. Before the early Millennium the use of multiple drug therapy was simply seen as too complicated and costly to be implemented in the resource poor settings by the aid providers. However, in the beginning of the Millennium the dissatisfaction in international atmosphere on the access to multiple drug therapy had grown so large that the pharmaceutical companies were, for example, made to face certain limitations in relation to intellectual property rights and in the year 2002 Barcelona AIDS conference several groups presented examples of treatment successes in resource poor settings. It was in this atmosphere that treatment got into the focus of international efforts. Yet, the enthusiasm behind the promotion of treatment has been lately turned down a bit because it has been noted that the channeling of resources from the prevention to treatment has created problems as treatment cannot influence the increasing infection rates. Thus prevention is now being tried to bring back as a central focus, for example, by UNAIDS.[54]

Even though individual actors can voice differing policy priorities within the global governance regime, as exemplified by the shifts from prevention to treatment and back, there still exists a common framework that guides the regime. The existence of this common framework is a result of the fact that the whole regime is bound up with comprehensive development ideas as exemplified by the inclusion of the fight against HIV/AIDS to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In this way the global governance of HIV/AIDS is firmly anchored to general development framework and, further, to neoliberal development principles. Of course, there should not be anything

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[53] UNGASS 2001, 10.
[54] Seckinelgin 2008, 25–31.

surprising in this intertwining of HIV/AIDS governance and neoliberal development principles as I have just listed a bunch of international funds, programs and organizations that constitute the backbone of HIV/AIDS governance. Because what is neoliberal development, if it is not delegation of traditional state functions to other stakeholders? As written by David Craig and Doug Porter, the neoliberal development orthodoxy that emerged in 1980s saw the answer to underdevelopment in dismantling of state power. The idea was that by dismantling state power the instruments used by elites to accumulate political and material wealth would be undermined and the peasantry would be free to take advantage of new market opportunities. Thus the view emerged that states should be displaced as the engines of development and the state functions should be externally delegated to international regulatory bodies, like International Monetary Fund (IMF), and internally delegated to non-state organizations, like different NGOs.[55]

However, during the decades following the 1980s the state's role has been gradually reinvented and the state has been brought back to development. Nevertheless, this has not meant that the state has gotten back its old role as an engine of development. On the contrary, the state has been only brought back when the state has been able to fundamentally transform in the terms of neoliberal principles. The state that has been brought back has as its primary function to "facilitate the movement of capital across space, while at the same time ensuring that the logics of the market […] are both articulated into and bolstered by social services, protection and security measures."[56] Thus the state has been included to the neoliberal development in neoliberal terms.

All the above-mentioned about neoliberal development is highly evident within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS as most of the African states have adopted a multisectoral approach to their epidemics as promoted by different international organizations. Within the multisectoral approach there are many different actors working against HIV/AIDS in cooperation. Usual actors that participate in the multisectoral cooperation are government, international non-governmental organizations, civil society, private sector and community of international donors.[57] Consequence of the multisectoral approach is that in most of the African countries it is impossible to speak about national approach against the epidemic, in a strict meaning of the word national. Usually 'national' measures aimed against the HIV/AIDS cannot be voiced without mentioning different international organizations, international donors or NGOs. Although governments of African countries are partners in the multisectoral approach, usually the approach marginalizes their position. Within the multisectoral approach international organizations, international donors and

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[55] Craig & Porter 2006, 59–60.
[56] Ibid, 118.
[57] Seckinelgin 2008, 59.

international NGOs operate directly with the local people without a proper contact to the African governments. Thus, in the case of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, national level is usually bypassed and the global level is in direct contact with the local level.[58] As stressed, for example, by the World Bank in relation to HIV/AIDS, the local government's main function is only "to create enabling environment for the participation' of other stakeholders".[59]

Despite the integration of local people into the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS through the direct contact of global and local levels, local people in Africa can very seldom get their voices heard within the global level.[60] The result of this is that the practices of global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS and the experiences of Africans do not always correspond. This has made many projects that have tried to address the problems caused by HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa ineffective. However, despite these failures, international policy circles are still insisting that they know what works. They denote that they know which are the best practices and tools for dealing with HIV/AIDS. They measure the success of interventions by wider implication of these practices and tools, not by the long term outcomes of these interventions. If local people do not seem to be responding to these practices and tools the problem is usually perceived to be with the knowledge of local people, not in the neglect of local people's own experiences of their lives in their multiple social contexts. In this way, within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, local people's lives usually make sense only according to knowledge that international policy makers have, even though this knowledge may not have any resemblance how local people experience their circumstances.[61]

What international policy circles seem to be doing, by dismissing the failures of projects and insisting on their knowledge, is apoliticization of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. This apoliticization of governance in relation sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is hardly surprising as similar apoliticization has been present in the general development framework for a long time. As written by James Ferguson, the development industry forms an anti-politics machine that dispels politics from development by insisting that it consists only of neutral-technical policies and not politics of any sort. However, in reality the anti-politics machine is highly political as it renders the politics of those who are to be developed as neutral-technical problems to which the anti-politics machine has

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[58] Swidler 2006, 270–273.
[59] World Bank 2003, 13.
[60] See e.g. Treichler 1999, Downing 2005, Rau 2006, Swidler 2006 & Seckinelgin 2008.
[61] Seckinelgin 2008, 100.

neutral-technical "solutions". In this way under the cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object the anti-politics machine performs extremely sensitive political operations.[62]

Furthermore, 'the anti-politics effect' regarding the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is made even stronger, than is usual in development, by the fact that it is a global health issue. According to Mika Aaltola, pandemics are refined into governance exercises that are thought to be beyond politics. Modern health propaganda highlights the general human interest and because of this the political agenda of health policies often go unrecognized. However, alternative visions, different agendas, co-optive purposes and clashing interest are present in the global health governance. The global health governance differentiates among actors and defines the way in which they collaborate. In this way even expert-driven neutral-technical health governance recognizes some legitimate forms for politics. Thus the apoliticization of governance action in pandemic emergencies is among the most important places to look for the ways in which politics and power hierarchies matter.[63]

From this 'anti-politics' perspective, then, the question whether prevention or treatment is the right way to fight HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa loses some of its meaningfulness. Instead, what becomes the most meaningful thing to know is: what kind of politics the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS dispels, regardless if this governance recognizes prevention, treatment or whatever else as its main priority? Acknowledging the politics inherent in the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is extremely important as the authoritarian attempts to improve human condition have a gloomy history in modern times. James C. Scott has investigated a bunch of these authoritarian attempts and concluded that these attempts usually not only fail to improve the human condition but actually make it worse. These attempts have many times diminished the skills, agility, initiative, and morale of their intended beneficiaries. Pretty much the only thing these attempts have usually succeeded in has been the abolition of local autonomy and extension of institutional authority of the improvers.[64] Hence, I will now start to concentrate on the politics inherent in the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. In order to do this, I have chosen a starting point that is obvious. As the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is organized along the neoliberal development principles and the aim of the governance is a direct intervention in aspects concerning human sexuality, the obvious starting point is the thoughts of a man, who investigated both the interventions in human sexuality and liberal governing: Michel Foucault.

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[62] Ferguson 1994, 256.
[63] Aaltola 2009, 155–158.
[64] Scott 1998, 349.

2.2. BIOPOWER, BIOPOLITICS AND LIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY

According to Foucault one of the thresholds of modernity is "the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of political techniques."[65] Foucault saw that during the eighteenth century the old right of the sovereign to decide over life and death of its subjects started to disappear and was to a large extent displaced by power to foster life or disallow it to death; to make live or let die. Thus this power acted on humans as biological beings, instead as political or juridical subjects, and expanded the domain of political power into man insofar as man is a living being. This power Foucault named as *biopower*.[66]

In order to understand what is at stake in biopower, it is necessary to see how biopower is related to the emergence of population as something more than a collection of individuals. Foucault has written that in the second half of the eighteenth century population suddenly posed a much more complex problem to political power than it used to. Before this the question concerning population was traditionally raised in a rather simplistic manner; for example, large population could provide many troops for the sovereign's army etc. During eighteenth century the things, however, started to change. Population was considered as a set of processes which management was a fundamental basis for state's power.[67] What was invented was that the population has dynamics of its own which depend on different circumstances. For example, population has a mortality rate, average life expectancy, birth rate and morbidity level which all are a result of different set of variables. Thus what political power has to do from now on is to know these population processes and to manage them in a best possible way. In other words, political power has to be able to rationalize the group of human beings constituted as population and invent strategies for the management of population dynamics. These procedures of modern political power are named by Foucault as *biopolitics*.[68]

The emergence of biopolitics was a precondition for the workings of biopower as biopower could not function properly without the systematization of knowledge over population offered by biopolitics. Before the emergence of biopolitics there were already disciplinary techniques of power in use that centered on a human body as machine. These techniques of power aimed for optimization of capabilities of the body in order to maximize body's utility for the workings of power. The uses of these types of techniques of power were named by Foucault as *anatomo-politics*, which represents the first pole in development of biopower. However, the uses of

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[65] Foucault 1978, 141–142.
[66] On biopower see especially Foucault 1978, 135–145 & Foucault 2003, 239–263.
[67] Foucault 2007, 68–70.
[68] Foucault 2003, 242–247.

techniques of anatomo-politics were fragmented in society's different institutions such as prisons, schools, military barracks and factories. Thus the different techniques of anatomo-politics did not necessary function in accordance to each other and certainly could not on their own reach a phenomenon as wide and complex as human life in general. But after the birth of the second pole of biopower – biopolitics – and the entanglement of anatomo- and biopolitics in the nineteenth century, Foucault saw that the power finally got a hold of human life in general. From now on different techniques of power, which aimed human beings, could exist in harmony with each other and constitute great technologies of power over human life such as the deployment of sexuality.[69]

As political power began to tighten up its grip on the biological existence of humans, political power was suddenly faced with new problems concerning its legitimacy as an authority of human life. This was due to the inherent 'naturalness' in the idea of population. The population had a dynamics of its *own*, which were located outside the rule of the sovereign. Hence, from now on the population also acted as a limitation against the king's power. The dynamics of the population was to be respected by everyone including the sovereign, who actually anymore was not the sovereign in the strict sense of the term as he as everyone else was ruled by the idea of population.[70]

On the other hand, even though population could not function under traditional autocracy, this did not mean that the idea of population was impenetrable to political power as such. In parallel with biopower, a way of governing started to develop that was more in accordance with the implications of the idea of population. This way of governing was the liberal way of governing or the liberal *governmentality*, as Foucault has put it. By the ambiguous concept of governmentality Foucault at first tried to mostly grasp the birth and development of the type of power that can be called government in the Western societies.[71] Later, and especially when used within general frame of liberalism, one of the most important purposes of this concept was to refer to a way in which conduct of people is conducted in the name of certain objectives, which do not originate from a single power block.[72]

It was liberalism as way of governing that Foucault saw as most suitable form of governing to exist in parallel with biopower. Reason for this lies in the basis of liberal governing, which highlights the importance of naturalness to the practice of government itself. In the basis of liberal way of governing there exists a requirement of self-limitation of governmental reason founded on

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[69] Foucault 1978, 139–140 & Foucault 2003, 249–253.
[70] Foucault 2007, 76.
[71] See Foucault 2007, 108–109.
[72] See especially Foucault 2008.

knowledge of the natural course of things. This respect for knowledge of the natural course of things is generally most noted in the field of economics, which good liberal governance is expected to organize itself accordingly. But, as Foucault has written, the requirement of self-limitation according to knowledge of the natural course of things is inherent in liberal government also in relation to other fields of knowledge as well, in which knowledge of the population is one.[73]

Even though liberal way of governing respects knowledge of the natural processes and does not directly interfere in these processes, liberal way of governing is still *governing*. Liberal way of governing just does not anymore deal directly with things, but with rational interests. The subject of the liberal government is *homo œconomicus*, who is someone who pursues his own interests and whose interest converges spontaneously with interest of others. Thus the *homo œconomicus* is a person that must be let alone for the sake of the public good. But, on the other hand, *homo œconomicus* is also rational economic man whose interests respond systematically to environmental variables. Thus *homo œconomicus* is also a person who accepts reality and in this way is eminently governable. In the liberal way of governing "*homo œconomicus* […] becomes the correlate of a governmentality which will act on the environment and systematically modify its variables", as Foucault has stated.[74]

Naturally, liberal government is not interested only in governing of one *homo œconomicus* at the time, but of governing them as a collective. Hence, *homo œconomicus* has to be placed to a single ensemble with other rational economic men. According to Foucault, this ensemble is civil society, which is inseparable element in the liberal government in relation to *homo œconomicus*. In the liberal way of governing civil society is seen as natural social bond which is a result of spontaneous synthesis between its members. Civil society is a reality arising from the interests of each individual part of it. Thus civil society is something that has to be respected by liberal government, but not in way of leaving it completely alone. On the contrary, civil society is a target of permanent governmental management, not in a way of direct intervention, but in a way of ensuring that the workings of individual rational interests guarantee the natural functioning of civil society. Liberal government has to ensure that the environmental conditions for civil society are such that the rational economic interests of individuals can work naturally and lead to public good. In other words, liberal government is a management of civil society in order to ensure the 'natural' workings of the economy, population, etc.[75]

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[73] Foucault 2008, 28 fn.
[74] Ibid, 271.
[75] Foucault 2007, 349–354 & Foucault 2008, 294–312.

The perspective of civil society points to one of the fundamental principles of liberal governmentality: a frugality of government. This means that liberal governmentality, as put by Colin Gordon, "economizes on its own costs: a greater effort of technique aimed at accomplishing more through a lesser exertion of force and authority."[76] In order to better understand the principle, it is instructive to see it in the light of some historical changes in practices of government due the liberal criticism of these practices. According to Foucault, for example, the sovereign was usually considered to be the owner of things and lands under his rule. In addition, the sovereign could also exercise a hold over his subjects as they had personal relation to the sovereign. Thus there was direct hold of government over things and people. However, on the basis of liberalism this direct rule gradually got labelled as ineffective. On the basis of liberalism government must no longer intervene and have a direct hold on things and people. Government can only exert a hold over a thing or an individual when the interplay of interests in a civil society makes particular thing or individual interest of all. Thus it is the utility value of governmental interventions that becomes decisive in liberal governmentality. Only when natural workings of civil society are threatened it is economic for government to make an intervention.[77]

Yet, when thinking about liberal governmentality through historical trajectory, it should be noted that there are different liberalisms, which contain some differences in the way of governing. Especially in relation to the role of civil society it is easy to point to the historical transformations in liberal governmentality. Graham Burchell has written that for early liberalism civil society was a concept that outlined correlate of government. However, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries civil society was commonly recast to social or just society, especially under the so called welfare states. But, nowadays, under neo-liberal policies, it is civil society again that is transformed to an autonomous part of governmentality.[78] As civil society is transformed to an autonomous part of governmentality also in the case of global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS and as my interest does not lie in liberalism *per se*, I will not consider the historical transformations of liberal governmentality more accurately in this work than I have done so far. For the purposes of this work the perspective on liberal governmentality that culminates in civil society is adequate and most pertinent. Within contemporary global governance, as stated by Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann, "the political agency and self-association of civil society emerges as a key asset for the formulation of new policies and for the practice of governing societies."[79]

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[76] Gordon 1991, 24.
[77] Foucault 2008, 45–46.
[78] Burchell 1996, 28.
[79] Sending & Neumann 2006, 652.

Before moving on, it is still important to make one more remark. This remark clarifies the relation between biopower and liberal governmentality. Even though there is no reason why biopower cannot function without liberalism as exemplified by Nazism, which was, according to Foucault, "coincidence between a generalized biopower and a dictatorship"[80], biopower and liberal governmentality are interconnected. Mitchell Dean has stressed that liberal governmentality is bound up essentially with biopolitics as biopolitics is a necessary condition of liberal governmentality. The emergence of a liberal governmentality is dependent on the discovery of the processes found in the population according to which the liberal governmentality can organize itself accordingly.[81] Thus what distinguishes liberal governmentality from other ways of governing is the biopolitical nature of liberal governmentality and nothing else. This is important to notice as liberalism is often deeply associated with democracy or rule of law. However, democracy or law are not essential parts of liberal governmentality. Democracy and law are parallel with liberal governmentality only when "participation of the governed in the drawing up the law in the parliamentary system is the most effective system of governmental economy."[82] This disjunction between democracy, law and liberal governmentality is also apparent within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. As it will soon become clear, the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS cannot be characterized as democratic or as guided by law, but it can be characterized as population-based liberal governance.

2.3. POPULATION-BASED GOVERNANCE OF SUB-SAHARAN HIV/AIDS

Biopower, biopolitics and liberal governmentality are all fundamental concepts when trying to grasp the global governance of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. This is due to the fact that the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is, to a large extent, population-based liberal governance. In other words, it is largely biopower practiced through liberal governmentality. This becomes salient when it is noted how global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS involves construction of populations, identification of population processes and invention of strategies for the management of population dynamics; it is organized through the mobilization of civil society; and, it tries to transform the lives of the local people along the lines of biopolitics-based liberal governmentality, although not that effectively as will soon become clear. Through the understanding of these three dimensions it is possible to become aware of what is largely at stake in the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS.

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[80] Foucault 2003, 260.
[81] Dean 1999, 113.
[82] Foucault 2008, 321.

Firstly, then, it is important to understand the dimension of population construction, identification of population processes and invention of strategies for the management of population dynamics. In the case of HIV/AIDS the mechanisms of population construction work pretty much in the same way regardless of the region of the world. In relation to every region population construction is mostly done by international agencies which try to statistically identify and forecast the population dynamics in relation to HIV/AIDS. Main agencies which compile these statistics are the WHO and UNAIDS. These two agencies jointly prepare annual updates of the global state of HIV/AIDS and jointly or separately provide different kinds of epidemiological data for all kinds of purposes. They provide data about the prevalence rates and other relevant factors in different regions, countries, areas, etc. Thus the statistical surveillance does not provide data only for collective populations but also, for example, adult, child, urban and rural populations separately. In addition, the statistical surveillance is extended to generate different sub-populations that urgently need to be targeted by singling out specific risk groups such as sex workers and drug users. When possible, data on, for example, sexual behaviour and other relevant population processes is also gathered by these international agencies. Hence, these procedures are biopolitics *par excellence* as these agencies produce "the 'vital' knowledge about the biological characteristics of the world's populations and sub-populations needed to rein in the pandemic."[83] In addition, this 'vital' knowledge makes it possible to govern the population economically and efficiently through strategies that focus on those people who are members of risk groups or on those factors that put these people to risk. Naturally, these kinds of strategies are seen as essential and frequently put to function in relation to fighting sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS.[84]

Secondly, it should be understood how the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is organized through the mobilization of civil society along liberal governmentality. As already briefly mentioned, there is a direct contact between the local and global levels within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. This bypassing of the national level has lead up to a consequence that in the local contexts the most salient actors are not the governmental officials but different international, regional and national NGOs. At the global level these civil society actors are seen as ideal targets of international funding because they are seen as specialist of the local and thus most effective executors of HIV/AIDS related projects.[85] However, in many cases the local expertise of civil society actors can be called into question. Because the substantial difference between civil society actors and international donors in terms of funds, the views of the international donors

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[83] Elbe 2005, 407.
[84] Elbe 2009, 131.
[85] See e.g. UNAIDS 2006, 202–222.

usually are more important than the views of the local people. If the civil society actors, who get funding for their HIV/AIDS related projects from the international donors, do not respect the views of the donors, the donors take their money away. This means, then, that the project has to be closed down.[86] Due to this Seckinelgin has stressed that the idea of closeness between civil society and the local people can be put into doubt. Civil society actors are more localizers of the global policies than true specialists of the local.[87]

Finally, and most importantly, the effect of two previous dimensions on local people in sub-Saharan Africa has to be understood. This effect manifests itself mainly in three ways. Firstly, the biopolitical constructions of risk groups and identification of risk factors together with the strategies that target these groups or factors tend to move responsibility for the disease solely to the individual. If prevention of HIV/AIDS is organized mainly by funding civil society projects that target people who are at risk, the social context of the disease is neglected. However, among the international donors there is a persistent idea that civil society projects which target people at risk can change the behaviour of these people. This idea does not consider the fact that usually people most at risk do not have many opportunities to affect their lives. They are at risk because of social context; for example, is there a point of educating a women prostitute on condom use whose men clients in any case decide about the use of one due local power relations?

It should be noted that this problem does not disappear by just highlighting the importance of contextual factors as a significant barrier to the effective preventative interventions as done in global discourse. Despite of this highlighting, funded preventative interventions usually rely on and expect the individuals to be able to rise above the social context and take control of their lives.[88] Thus the idea, which implicates that civil society projects which target people at risk can change the behaviour of these people, should be considered from the perspective of liberal governmentality. The subject of these interventions seems to be an ideal rational subject – *homo œconomicus* – who responds systematically to information organized according to international perspective and distributed to her through manipulation of civil society.

The idea of civil society projects, targeting people at risk, as parts of liberal governmentality becomes easier to grasp when it is realised that the expectation of individuals to rise above their social context and take control of their lives is connected to general liberal individualization of public health. The individualization of public health is an ongoing process in which public health is

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[86] Rau, 2006, 290 & Swidler 2006, 282–283.
[87] See Seckinelgin 2008.
[88] Ibid, 102.

organized more according to demands of liberal governmentality. Especially in the so-called developed world the individualization of public health is all the time becoming more and more important. As illustrated by Peter Baldwin:

> With basic sanitary infrastructure in place throughout the developed world, and chronic disease the main enemy, prevention now focused on individual behaviour – cultivation of the habits of moderation, prudence, abstemiousness, and risk avoidance, habits that maintained health while sparing citizens intrusive statutory supervision […] Citizens were entrusted with more responsibility, and authorities were reluctant to dictate behaviour that was, in any case, unlikely to come about via threats. A taste for low-fat food and plenty of roughage was hard to encourage at gunpoint.[89]

Hence, in individualized public health system people are no longer compelled, but informed and educated. In individualized public health system people are persuaded, not coerced, to behavioural change along the lines of liberal governmentality.

However, the functioning of individualized public health in Africa is undermined by the fact that individualized public health is dependent on the parallel existence of general liberal environment. According to Alex de Waal, the efficacy of individualized public health system depends on high levels of health awareness, a climate of liberal individualism and universal access to quality health services. Where these conditions are lacking individualization is less effective and actually masks social structures that determine behaviour.[90] Needless to say this disjunction has an effect on the lives of local people in sub-Saharan Africa as many preventative projects, due their individualism, are not likely to make a difference if Africans do not suddenly transform themselves and their local contexts suitable for the workings of biopolitics-based liberal governmentality. In this way many preventative projects demand a transformation of Africans and in certain extent also function for this transformation.

Secondly, in relation to treatment related projects, the rolling out of HIV/AIDS drugs along the lines of biopolitics-based liberal governmentality also work for the transformation of Africans. In the words of Nguyen, the rolling out of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) along the lines of liberal governmentality constructs "new forms of therapeutical citizenship; that is, claims made on global social order on the basis of a therapeutic predicament."[91] In order to understand previous claim it is important to realize something about how ARVs work. The treatment of HIV with ARVs has a long-term therapeutic character which requires that the patients are fully adherent to their treatments and that there is medical apparatus in place that documents and monitors patients' response to the

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[89] Baldwin 2005, 261–262.
[90] de Waal 2006, 102.
[91] Nguyen 2005, 126.

drugs. This is essential as over time HIV in patient's body becomes resistant to certain ARVs and thus the drug cocktail that one is having has to be altered from time to time in order to keep one at shape and alive. Because of this long-term therapeutic character of ARVs it is important for NGOs, who are usually rolling out the drugs in local contexts, to produce disciplined patients, who will come back to them. If the NGOs do not succeed in this task they cannot authorize continuation of their projects. However, many times, when ARVs are available, the production of disciplined patients is not a problem. For hopeless sick people access to ARVs, which will make them healthy again, is usually such a life changing experience that the intimate relationship between them and the NGO builds up quite naturally.[92] This relationship and HIV positive people's all the time improving physical condition result a support and further demand for the NGO lead rolling out of ARVs.

What should be emphasized, in relation to a support and further demand for the NGO lead rolling out of ARVs, is the idea of pharmaceuticalization of global health. The idea of pharmaceuticalization of global health comes from João Biehl, who has written that the pharmaceutical companies are themselves using the activist discourse according to which access to drugs is a matter of human rights. The logic of this is to put pressure on governments and international HIV/AIDS initiatives through the activist voices from different societies. What is the problem in this is the depoliticization of the economic injustices that have lead to the health crisis, by equating the treatment of HIV/AIDS to ARVs. By equating the treatment of HIV/AIDS to ARVs, health can be only acquired through rolling out of pharmaceutics along the lines of liberal governmentality.[93]

Finally, when considering the effect of global governance of HIV/AIDS on local people in sub-Saharan Africa, it is important also to realize transformative impact of civil society projects on African people who work in these projects. This impact is a result of the fact that working in internationally funded civil society projects is pretty much the only way for African people to acquire agency in relation to HIV/AIDS. Reason for this is that without international funding Africans do not usually have access to resources needed for implementation of these projects and even if they manage to start a some kind of project on their own still the internationally funded projects usually get all the attention due to their privileged access to resources. Thus, naturally, African people have also themselves started to connect their agency to organizational forms and tasks seen appropriate at the global level in relation to civil society. To be an actor, in relation to HIV/AIDS, Africans have to fulfil the conditions set to them by global policies. However, this does

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[92] See e.g. Robins 2004, Nguyen 2005 & Biehl 2007.
[93] Biehl 2007, 1100–1106.

not guarantee that these people would hold agency in the eyes of people who are being targeted by projects they work in.[94]

The current situation, in which civil society actors have to fulfil the conditions set to them by global policies, is in fact constructing Southern developmental elites, who are capable of so-called 'development speech'. These elites are the ones who can draft documents and reports, which are in accordance with biopolitical knowledge and thus understood by the international donors and other people working in development.[95] Besides that this construction of elites can be grasped as a part of larger transformation process of African people by biopolitics-based liberal governmentality, it also makes a bunch of preventative, and in this way also treatment related, projects not likely to make a difference. With the construction of developmental elites there rises "a disjuncture between what these people consider to be the problems of HIV/AIDS and what those people living with the disease experience throughout their everyday lives."[96]

As it should have now become clear, the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS can be, to a large extent, conceptualized as a biopower practiced through liberal governmentality. Through global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS biopower tries to take a firmer grip on the lives of Africans and transform them to the direction that is seen on the basis of biopolitical knowledge more suitable to them than their present state. However, as it should have now also become clear, the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is in many ways some sort of failure. In sub-Saharan Africa many projects are not likely make a difference because of the disjunction between liberal policies and African people in their multiple social contexts. In addition, biopower does not target people that systematically, but fragmentary. Biopower has much more influence on Africans who have access to ARVs or who work in NGO projects than on people who do not. Thus, from this perspective, it can be stated that the global governance of HIV/AIDS tries to be biopower but does not completely succeed as it many times does not properly reach its subject. Next I will start to consider this disjunction more closely by extending the discussion beyond the Foucault-inspired perspective.

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[94] Seckinelgin 2008, 138–143.
[95] See e.g. Tvedt 1998, 83.
[96] Seckinelgin 2008, 145.

2.4. AMBIVALENCE OF POSTCOLONIAL BIOPOWER

Edward W. Said has criticised Foucault's work as Eurocentric. This criticism is based on a fact that Foucault did not show interest to critical colonial or postcolonial work, even though in these contexts scholars were engaged with similar critiques of power. Said's critic is felicitous as references to colonial or postcolonial situations are scarce in Foucault's work. Of course, this does not mean that the ideas of Foucault would not be applicable to colonial or postcolonial contexts, which is also confessed by Said later in his critique.[97] Naturally, this confession is hardly surprising as Said's most famous own piece of work owes a lot to the ideas of Foucault.[98]

In addition to Said's work, Foucault's thoughts have been applied to colonial and postcolonial contexts in some other classic texts as well. Similarly as in Said's *Orientalism*, but geographical focus on Africa instead of Orient, Valentin Mudimbe has written about 'Africanism' as a Western construct which defines Africa along the standards of the West.[99] In addition, Arturo Escobar has written about the power relations in development from the Foucauldian perspective. Escobar stresses that the developed countries try to 'develop' developing countries according to knowledge that only they possess. In this way the standards of the knowledge of development are set by hierarchical relation between developed and developing countries and thus development is mostly only a relation of power between the rich and the poor.[100]

More specifically, Foucault's idea on governmentality has also been put to use in colonial and postcolonial contexts. For example, Nicholas Dirks, Donald S. Moore and Tania Murray Li have all engaged with the idea of governmentality in their works.[101] In these contexts the idea of governmentality has provided a more sensitive tool for analyzing power relations than the ones derived from Marxist or structuralist debates. As put by Moore, "[b]y displacing power from structural dictates of state and capital, governmentality offers a useful means to explore how […] subjects participate in the projects of their own rule."[102]

Even though the ideas of Foucault have been highly applicable in colonial and postcolonial contexts, some of his ideas have, indeed, needed supplement. For example, Homi K. Bhabha has stressed that the colonial power could not fully reach its subject, but could only produce an

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[97] Said 1988, 9.
[98] See Said 1987.
[99] See Mudimbe 1988 & 1994.
[100] See Escobar 1995.
[101] See Dirks 2001, Moore 2005 & Li 2007.
[102] Moore 2005, 6.

ambivalent state of mind in which native internalized partly the standards of colonial power and partly not. Thus the colonial subject was a mixture of the self and the colonizer.[103] As was written by Frantz Fanon during colonial times, "[t]he black man has two dimensions [...] [t]hat this self-division is a direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond question"[104].

According to Elísio Macamo the ambivalent state of mind can be perceived at the present day as well. Macamo, who writes in the context of Africa, situates colonialism on the general framework of modernity and suggests that the roots for this ambivalence lie in the fact that modernity was introduced to Africa by colonialism. Same time as colonialism brought modernity to Africa colonialism was premised on the denial of that same modernity from Africans. Thus, "[s]ince the onset of colonialism, African social experience has been structured by the ambivalence of promise and denial".[105]

Similarly, and adequately in relation to my research, the imperfectness of colonial authority has been highlighted in the case of colonial medicine. Warwick Anderson has written that the natives were targets of colonial medical interventions, "but there is little evidence of direct hit. [...] [I]f changes in clothing, housing, diet, toilet, and manners occasionally reshaped subjectivities, they did so in ambiguous or unpredictable ways."[106] Megan Vaughan has provided us a detailed study of reasons behind this failure of colonial medicine. In her study she compares Foucault's idea of biopower to the workings of British colonial medicine in Africa and concludes that they can be differentiated mainly in four ways. Firstly, colonial states where hardly modern states and thus they could not create systems of population surveillance and control common to Europe. Secondly, there was a need to distance Africans from Europeans on the basis of racist stereotypes. Thus differences among Africans were addressed only hesitantly. Thirdly, and related to previous point, Africans were perceived foremost as members of groups and it was these groups, rather than individuals, who were seen to possess distinctive psychologies and bodies. Finally, the need to get hold on the lives of Africans was uneven. For example, Africans were expected to be docile bodies when they were working in mines, but their life outside their work did not interest colonial officials.[107]

It is important to note that these differences between the workings of European biopower and colonial medicine has not completely disappeared at present, but have continued to effect contemporary global health policies. As put by Anderson,

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[103] See e.g. Bhabha 1994.
[104] Fanon 1986, 17.
[105] Macamo 2005, 8.
[106] Anderson 2000, 236.
[107] Vaughan 1991, 8–12.

colonial medicine was a socio-spatial discourse that becomes reframed as a discourse on human rights and governmentality in the twentieth century. Medical experts continued to represent African and Asian bodies as diseased, lazy, and grotesque – as symbolic inversions of a European social body – but they also began to hold out the hope that a colonial body subject to strict protocols of personal and domestic hygiene might reform itself, or rather that an individual might use these technologies of self-care to acquire a generic citizenship.[108]

From these perspectives, then, when applying Foucault's thoughts to colonial or postcolonial policies it seems to be important to be able to take into account the ambivalence of biopower. This ambivalence of biopower seems to be a result of the fact that, on the one hand, there is an effort to take a grip on the lives of people, very much in line with the ideas of Foucault. But, on the other hand, it seems that biopower remains distant to the people by trying to reach them by imported governance models, which acquire legitimacy for their deployment from old stereotypes. This way the imported governance models cannot be fully relevant for the everyday lives of people, who are being governed, and thus the imported governance models have unpredictable outcomes as the biopower does not get proper grip on the lives of people.

2.5. AMBIVALENCE OF BIOPOWER WITHIN SUB-SAHARAN HIV/AIDS

In relation to my topic, ambivalence of biopower can be made more apropos by pointing out that regarding Africa the unpredictability caused by imported governance models has been emphasized many times. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz have written that since the independence of African countries the adjustment of imported political models to the historical, sociological and cultural realities of Africa has been complex, painful and chaotic.[109] The blame, for this complex, painful and chaotic adjustment of political models, is frequently cast to Africans and especially their leaders. This, however, is not completely correct as modern African political actors have always had to function in circumstances which they haven't been able to fully influence. According to Jean-Francois Bayart, the complex, painful and chaotic organization of African governance in general has to be

> related to the manner in which Africa is inserted in the international system through economies of extraction or predation in which many of the leading operators are foreigners, whose local African partners have to a considerable degree based their careers on the use of armed force.[110]

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[108] Anderson 2000, 235.
[109] Chabal & Daloz 1999, 51.
[110] Bayart 1999, 114.

It can be claimed that currently fashionable neoliberal development principles, according to which the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is also organized, have especially been a cause of complexity, painfulness and chaos in Africa. As Achille Mbembe has written, due to neoliberal development principles Africa has witnessed a birth of governance logic that "forces features belonging to the realm of warfare and features proper to the conduct of civil society to coexist in a single dynamic".[111]

Mbembe's claim can be best grasped when his 'warfare/civil society nexus' is viewed as an outcome of the process started in the 1980s. By the end of 1980s almost all African countries found themselves under the neoliberal tutelage of international creditors as these countries had failed to repay their debts. After this failure the tutelary government exercised by the World Bank, IMF, and private and public lenders was no longer limited to imposing respect of broad principles, but was significantly strengthened. The tutelary government started to involve direct interventions in domestic economic management, credit control, implementing privatizations, laying down consumption requirements, determining import policies etc. Thus under this tutelary government African states had to let market forces operate autonomously and freely. Mbembe stresses, very much in line with Bayart, that the result of this has been that the African states have lost their administrative power and the hegemony of state has been broken down. This has led to establishment of all kinds of private powers in the region as international networks of foreign traffickers, middlemen and businessmen are linking with local businessmen, technocrats and warlords. These linkages have triggered methods of governance that rest on indiscriminate violence and high-level corruption. Furthermore, these harsh methods of governance are accompanied by the fact that what African states have left is control of the forces of coercion, which these regimes have widely used to deal with public protests and to collect different payments from the inhabitants.[112]

Due to this confused and harsh organization of governance in African contexts many commentators, including Mbembe, have altogether questioned the usefulness of the term 'civil society' in relation to Africa. Wachira Maina has written that in Africa the assumed boundaries between the state, political society and civil society are rather porous, often blurring into each other. Maina lists that in Africa the state can use civic sphere and civic institutions for its own aims, only the official organizations are recognized as civil society organizations, inside civil 'society' there exists violent conflicts between different groups, and the state tries to actively dissipate those oppositional forces

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[111] Mbembe 2001, 74.
[112] Ibid, 82–86.

it distrusts. All this puts the normal workings of the civil society in doubt.[113] As written by de Waal, in African context civil society is only a label that different actors use when they can gain something by using it. For example, "opposition leaders find the label 'NGO' convenient and wives of government leaders set up well-protected 'NGOs'."[114]

As civil society is also an integral element of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, it becomes relevant to further question the future outcomes of this form of liberal governance from the perspective of confused and harsh reality of African governance. This questioning can be made by pointing to four separate points. Firstly, as already stressed in the previous chapter, NGOs funded by international donors have become constitutive of 'civil society'. The result of this has been that, even though civil society is at the global level much celebrated partner in the fight against sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS and the views of civil society organizations are valued highly on the global rhetoric, the actual tasks performed by civil society organizations are rather simple and fragmented. Civil society organizations are mainly delivering immediate relief to people affected by the HIV/AIDS and carrying out simple prevention task such as distributing condoms and education material as seen suitable for them at the global level. This has frustrated some civil society organizations, notably some bigger African NGOs, which have called into question that they should only carry out simple projects that consist of simple tasks. These NGOs have claimed that the projects they are carrying out do not change anything in the long run because the structural causes undermine achievements of individual projects very quickly. Thus these NGOs do not anymore just simply accept their roles as natural parts in the global apparatus. On the contrary, these NGOs have politicized their role, as Douglas Webb has stated.[115]

Secondly, and related to previous point, the relatively short term nature of civil society projects usually leave effects of the projects quite shallow. As civil society projects are particularly prone to donor impatience and changing policy agendas at the global level, it is hard for them to make a long-term effect in local communities. Donor impatience is a result of the fact that among international donors an emergency perspective is most widely adopted in relation to HIV/AIDS. Thus international donors demand quickly some kind of results from the funded projects or they take their money away. The result of this has been that civil society projects have to overtly emphasize work they have done. Usually this is done by trying to present advantageous figures on number of condoms distributed, people accessed to voluntary and counseling testing (VCT), distribution of ARVs, etc. Even though it is apparently good to have advantageous figures on short-

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[113] Maina 1998, 135–136.
[114] de Waal 2006, 55.
[115] Webb 2004, 23–25.

term, the emphasis on these short-term successes undermines the fact that these successes do not mean anything without some kind of idea what to do in the long run. For example, through VCT people can know their HIV-positive status but this does not end the stigma attached to the disease. Thus HIV-positive people are still most likely to keep their status as a secret and behave like nothing has changed, by for instance not using condoms. Changing policy agendas at the global level also have a similar effect on the undermining of long term influence as donor impatience. Changing policy agendas – for example, from prevention to treatment and back from treatment to prevention etc. – are always fatal to a number projects that happen to be concentrating on 'wrong' issues at the time. In this way lot of projects are closed down before they can make an impact as money goes to projects which are concentrating on issues highlighted at the global level.[116]

Thirdly, it should be noted that the outcomes of liberal policies promoted by international actors in relation to HIV/AIDS are twofold. This is because the response to HIV/AIDS is organized along the same principles which, in some extent, contribute to the spread of HIV and prevent availability of pharmaceuticals in Africa. The search for profit of pharmaceutical companies has made the price of HIV/AIDS drugs high and difficult for Africans to have access to.[117] Also, liberal economic policies have played their role in ravaging traditional safety nets. This way pushing people to poverty and increasing their vulnerability in front of HIV/AIDS.[118] It is relevant to question that only civil society projects could act as counterforce to these liberal policies that contribute to the spread of HIV and project people from their predatory character. Thus also in relation sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS it seems to be appropriate to cast a following doubt:

> If African health systems are ungovernable it may be in large part because powerful international donors work at cross-purposes, setting competing agendas, cycling policies at a rate that defies bureaucratic assimilation, fragmenting health efforts, and undermining local systems of accountability.[119]

Of course, this point is somewhat parallel with the argument made in the previous chapter according to which the efficiency of public health organized along liberal governmentality is dependent on parallel existence of mechanisms needed to make liberal governmentality work for the public good. In the case of liberal policies, which have contributed to the spread of HIV and prevented availability of pharmaceuticals in Africa, parallel mechanisms needed would be, for example, at least some sort of minimum social security and access to health services. Without some

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[116] Seckinelgin 2008, 65–70.
[117] See e.g. Lee & Zwi 2003, 28 & Aginam 2006, 148–149.
[118] See e.g. Altman 1999, 563–565, Bancroft 2001, 92–95 & O'Manique 2004, 5.
[119] Sama & Nguyen 2008, 9.

sort of protective mechanisms liberal policies continue, in some extent, to have predatory character that have negative outcomes in relation to HIV/AIDS.

Finally, it is worth to emphasize that direct use of force against civic activity in many places of Africa is always possible also in relation to HIV/AIDS. This claim was affirmed in the year 2005 when the first ever police shooting against AIDS protesters anywhere in world occurred in the South Africa. Demonstrators from the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) occupied a hospital in Queenstown in the Eastern Cape Province to deliver a memorandum to provincial health administrators. The demonstration ended with police opening fire against TAC protestors.[120] Even though South Africa is in many ways very specific kind of country compared to rest of the continent and these kinds of incidents have been rare so far in Africa in relation to HIV/AIDS, the brutality of countermeasures is still something that people have to take in to account when participating in civic activity. This is made evident by the fact that the brutality of countermeasures has not been rare in relation to African civic activity in general.[121]

All four previous points put a big question mark on the future successfulness of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, as it is organized along the lines of contemporary liberal governmentality. At present the actual tasks performed by civil society organizations are too simple and fragmented, but still this seems to be what international donors mainly from civil society organizations want; the short-term nature of civil society projects and changing donor agendas largely block long-term effect in local communities, but still international donors demand quickly some kind of results or they take their money away; the global response to HIV/AIDS is organized along the same principles which, in some extent, contribute to the spread of HIV; and, the celebration of civil society at the global level fails to take into account the harsh reality from time to time faced by African civil activists. Further, besides putting the future successfulness of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in doubt, these points importantly illustrate that within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS the limitations faced and the problematical consequences produced by the governance are, in fact, highly related. One should not, however, be surprised about this as it can be pointed that the contradictory nature of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS stems directly from the general contradictory nature of contemporary global liberal governance.

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[120] For an account of the incident see e.g. de Waal 2006, 34–39.
[121] See e.g. Chabal & Daloz 1999, 77.

Mark Duffield has written that the emergency perspective, prevalent especially in the humanitarian thought, offers an essential justification for global liberal governance to ignore existing laws, conventions and restrains in order to directly intervene in lives of people whose conduct is seen as problematical. It is on the basis of this emergency that, for example, the NGO movement has been able to expand to almost every corner of the world. However, within global liberal governance it has also been noticed, especially in the developmental thought, that acting on the basis of emergency rarely solves the root problems that create these humanitarian emergencies. Thus on the basis of developmental thought it is simply argued that poor people should be made self-reliant in order to avoid future humanitarian emergencies. Self-reliance is seen as a solution, although on the basis of global statistics on poverty, health and mortality it is easy to argue that self-reliance is impossible. Hence, in practice, situation has appeared where humanitarian assistance and development recurrently move in and out of each other. Development holds solution to humanitarian emergency by trying to make poor people self-reliant and humanitarian assistance attends the impossibility of this developmental aim. In this way Third World is made to function according to permanently renewable emergencies, which legitimate contemporary global liberal governance.[122] From this perspective it is easy to understand the simplicity, fragmentary and short-term nature of civil society projects in relation to sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS.

Furthermore, global governance's contribution to the spread of HIV and ignorance of the harsh African reality can be also connected to the general contradictory nature of contemporary global liberal governance. According to Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, there is an inherent need in the global liberal governance, on the basis of its biopolitical nature, to exercise discrimination in favour of life processes, which are judged to be beneficial to the species, over those life processes which are judged not to be. Ultimately it is through this selection that global liberal governance specifies who shall live and who shall die.[123] Mbembe has termed this lethal characteristic of contemporary global liberal governance as *necropolitics* and argued that this term and its derivative *necropower* are needed alongside biopolitics and biopower in order to grasp the nowadays common violent forms of subjugation of life to the power of death that exist in many parts and in relation to many things in our world.[124] It is important to understand that global governance's contribution to the spread of HIV and ignorance of the harsh African reality are largely one specific case of necropolitics. This can be done by noticing what kind of life contemporary global liberal governance values and what kind of life it discriminates in relation to sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS.

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[122] Duffield 2007a, 46–51.
[123] Dillon & Reid, 104.
[124] See Mbembe 2003.

Regarding the kind of life that contemporary global liberal governance values, Dillon and Reid write that, since the times of Foucault's explorations, idea of population has evolved as a consequence of increasing influence of biophilosophy. Biophilosophy has disseminated through the evolution of the evolutionary theory of molecular biology, which too classically depends upon the concept of population. Evolutionary talk has generated biophilosophical ideas that consist of allied accounts of complex adaptive systems, knowledge-based societies and network organizations. Through these ideas an understanding of collective life has emerged that sees collective life as complex spontaneously adaptive phenomenon that intelligently mutates according to different environmental pressures. For example, this account of collective life now underlies different liberal explanations of global economic success and victorious military strategies.[125] This is made explicit in the following passage in relation to economic success:

> The relative success or failure of different localities and regions in the international political economy at any particular time is due to their historical accumulation of assets and liabilities and their *ability to adapt to changing circumstances*, and not the result of 'natural' resource endowments. The recent rise of resource-poor Japan is testimony to this view.[126]

On the basis of these kinds of accounts of collective life "species capacities for adaptation and learning are celebrated as among highest expressions of what it is to be a human being."[127]

Through the celebration of adaptation and learning as highest expressions of collective life, simultaneously discrimination against other forms of life is being done. Dillon and Reid continue that collective life seen as capable of adaptation and learning is continuously exposed to changing fitness tests posed by the rugged landscapes that global liberal governance sets for it. Thus life has to continuously prove its capability of adaptation and learning.[128] If life does not succeed in these fitness tests, it is not a kind of life global liberal governance wants to cherish. On the contrary, these kinds of lives can be harmful for the potential of adaptive life and thus global liberal governance seldom regrets if these harmful other forms of life die. This is also the case in relation to the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. If liberal economic policies bring transformations that ravage traditional safety nets and in this way increase vulnerability to HIV/AIDS or if there exists states that do not offer protection or treatment to citizens in a way that is needed for liberal governmentality to work, the blame is on life that has not been able to adapt and learn. This kind of life is simply not needed by liberal governmentality and it can let it die. This choice between what

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[125] Dillon & Reid 2000, 128–130.
[126] Agnew & Corbridge 1995, 6. Emphasis removed and added.
[127] Dillon & Reid 2009, 146.
[128] Dillon & Reid 2000, 131.

kind of life shall live and what kind of life shall die is an expression of sovereign power over life that exists at heart of contemporary liberal developmental biopolitics.[129]

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the above highlighted confused and harsh organization of governance in relation to HIV/AIDS is not just relevant for civil society actors or global governance in general, but for local people. For local people all this, together with the individualism, pharmaceuticalization and development elitism highlighted in the previous chapter, means that in most cases biopower targets them only superficially, partially and inconsistently, if at all. By neglecting social context, by not holding agency in they eyes of people who are being targeted, by being too simple and by being too short term in their nature, civil society projects, together with the predatory character of liberal policies and absence of protective state, ensure that 'proper' workings of biopower are mostly blocked. Local people are usually targets of biopower only for certain amount of time and only in relation to certain aspects of their lives when, for example, civil society project is carrier out in their community. In addition, at times biopower does not only target local people at all, but rather outcomes of liberal policies in fact restrain the workings of biopower completely, sometimes even mutating biopower to deadly necropower. Thus, in practice, within the context of global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, biopower reaches its subjects only through disaggregated and confused manner. In this way the outcomes of global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS are usually prime examples of an ambivalent postcolonial biopower. It is questionable that this kind of biopower can solve the health crisis. What is, however, not that questionable is that this kind of power can help to maintain the status quo of contemporary international politics. There is, then, clearly also a more authoritarian side present in the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS than the one which aims for the well-being of its subject population. Next I will further explicate this.

2.6. SOVEREIGNTY AND FREEDOM WITHIN/FROM LIBERAL GOVERNANCE

So far I have broadly examined the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. I have shown that it is largely population-based liberal governance that tries to take a grip on the lives of Africans and transform them to the direction that is seen on the basis of biopolitical knowledge more suitable to them than their present state. More compactly, I have conceptualized this governance, to a large extent, as biopower practiced through liberal governmentality. However, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, biopower does not always function in straightforward Foucauldian way, but mostly

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[129] See Agamben 1998 & 2005; Duffield 2007a; Dillon & Reid 2009.

in postcolonial ambivalent way. Through this reading of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS I have cast a doubt that it is highly questionable that the contemporary form of global governance can solve the health crisis posed by sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. However, the aspect that cannot be questioned is that this governance is performing a political operation, even though at the global level this governance is portrayed as an apolitical ensemble that aims for the well-being of its subject populations. This governance regime is deeply intermingled with the ideas of the general global liberal governance and thus it aims for the well-being of its subject populations only in terms of contemporary liberal governmentality. In addition, this governance is participating in the one of the general goals of global liberal governance as it tries to create particular kinds of subjects through whom global liberal governance can function. Needless to emphasise, this selectivity and this creation of particular kinds of subjects are nothing but parts in a highly political mission and it would simply wrong to assume that this political mission would benefit everyone.

When stretched to its limits, then, it is clear that the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS conceals in itself clear-cut political decisions that have discriminating effects for some Africans. In this extent this liberal governance consists of policies that are not that different from any other kind of contemporary or past liberal policies. As put by Dean, "[t]he ethos of liberal government today – indeed, as ever – is as much about life as liberty, responsibility as freedom, obligations as rights, decision as choice, and violence as much as contract."[130] Thus what is important to understand in the context of liberalism as way of governing is that in the end this governance is always practiced within certain limits which have been constituted through sovereign political decisions, even though liberalism tries to blot out these political decisions through naturalising and depoliticizing the created order.[131] Furthermore, these decisions always involve a deployment of a bunch of 'illiberal' means that are put to play in order to ensure the continuity of established limits. Frequently within liberalism individuals, groups and peoples who cannot be trusted to govern themselves face constraints in an authoritarian way.[132]

It is in these constraints faced by people who cannot be trusted that sovereign power, which nevertheless exists within liberal governance, becomes especially salient. When these constraints are activated it is decided that the target of these constraints constitutes an exception which has to be treated differently than one would be when practicing business as usual. In the extreme case this means that one's life is taken away without consequences. As written by Giorgio Agamben, "[t]*he*

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[130] Dean 2002, 123.
[131] See e.g. Schmitt 1976, 69–73; Cooke & Kothari 2001; Dean 2002; Cooke 2003; Prozorov 2004 & 2007; Schmitt 2005, 59–63.
[132] See e.g. Dean 1999, 132–138, Hindess 2001.

sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice"[133].

Within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS sovereign power also becomes salient in the above-mentioned way. As it is impossible to wipe out sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS straight away due to the fact that there are not enough resources made available or genuine political will to this task at the moment, governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS involves decisions of who to help and who to not. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, this decision is made along the lines of which kind of life is valued and in order to keep sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS and other Third World maladies manageable through global governance. Regardless of the reasons guiding this decision of who to help and who to not, this decision is prime expression of sovereign power. This is a decision that could be made otherwise, but is chosen to made in a particular way. This decision, then, constitutes and enforces the limits of *a particular way* of governing sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS globally. Furthermore, as everyone knows that we are dealing here with a deadly disease, this decision is also a choice to save other people and to kill others.

Naturally, the type of sovereign power meant here should not be confused solely with state sovereignty or with some personified authoritarian ruler. Within liberal government the existence of sovereign power is more complex as this power is delegated to various institutions, personages and groups. For example, sovereign power is delegated in some instances to politicians, in some instances to legislatures, in some instances to doctors or in some instances even to individual families; for instance, when it is to be decided if a life of a permanently hospitalized family member is to be terminated or not.[134] Within liberalism the user of sovereign power is not fixed, but varying and depending on a particular situation. Within liberalism sovereign power can be in different situations dispersed to nearly anyone and thus the sovereign is not always the same particular person. On the contrary, also within liberal governmentality, as classically phrased by Carl Schmitt, "[s]overeign is *he* who decides on the exception."[135]

Equally, within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS the sovereign power is delegated to various actors who use sovereign power at particular instances. The choice to save other people and to kill others is made in different situations by donors, policy makers, state officials, NGOs, etc. These actors are the ones who are made and trusted to do the decision on behalf of 'the sovereign' as the use of sovereign power has been dispersed to these actors within this particular form of

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[133] Agamben 1998, 83. Emphasis in original.
[134] Dean 2002, 123–124.
[135] Schmitt 2005, 5. Emphasis added.

liberal governance. It is important to emphasize that these decisions cannot be clearly seen as biopolitical 'letting die' decisions as people will not die in these instances because of neglect. As stated by Susan Craddock in relation to development of AIDS vaccine and access to ARVs,

> the market-driven dynamics characterizing pharmaceutical research and development within a United States and European-dominated neoliberal model of global capitalism, where intellectual property regulations guaranteeing monopolies to major pharmaceutical companies have generated a shift away from unprofitable diseases and towards medical products that will guarantee a return on investment. United States and EU governments in turn underwrite these profitable arrangements through punitive trade negotiations at the bilateral or global level. *Global neglect is then perhaps the wrong phrase, since it takes a great deal of money, hours of negotiations, and consistent political coercion to make sure that people cannot access cheaper generic antiretrovirals or benefit from an AIDS vaccine with limited market potential.*[136]

Hence, by looking empirically at what is happening in the world today in relation to HIV/AIDS or other Third World maladies, it would be a bit too hesitant to argue that the sovereign right of death has disappeared completely due to the introduction of biopolitics. In many instances at present Third World people are actively killed by clear-cut political decisions and not just left to die. What is at stake in contemporary global liberal governance, then, is not just biopolitics, even though liberal governmentality organizes itself largely around biopolitical knowledge. Within global liberal governance it is the intersections and oscillations of biopower and sovereignty that constitute the power that functions through this governing.[137]

On the basis of above-mentioned, it is philosophically possible to see in contemporary global liberal governance continuous mutual leaning on of Foucault's and Schmitt's thought. Prozorov has written that for Schmitt the sovereign is simultaneously inside and outside of the order in relation to which one is sovereign. Sovereign is at the borderline of the order as the sovereign establishes the limits of the order and at the same time violates them. This is because sovereign is the one who decides upon its own limits and thus its decision cannot be constrained by those same limits. The conditions of possibility of order are contained in the founding decision that cannot be incorporated into order. This means that the foundation of constituted order cannot be based on the constructed principles, but the founding decision emanates from nothingness. Biopolitics, on the other hand, hides all this as it portraits the constituted order as being based on 'natural' processes. In fact, due to the requirement of biopolitical knowledge to be about natural course of things, order based on biopolitics can only exists in so far as it is able to veil its origin as emanating from nothingness.[138] However, as it has been already emphasized, within any kind liberal governing this is not constantly

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[136] Craddock 2007, 1053. Emphasis added.
[137] See e.g. Dean 2002; Reid 2005 & 2006.
[138] Prozorov 2007, 81–95.

possible. When stretched to its limits liberal governmentality frequently deploys constraints that reveal the arbitrariness of liberal order.

Despite the murderous consequences of the intertwining of sovereignty and biopolitics, seeing the liberal order ontologically as an order that emanates from nothingness is advantageous when theorizing about resistance and freedom within liberal governmentality. Seeing the foundation of liberal order as based on sovereign decision is a one possible way through which concrete resistance and freedom can be approached. This is important as theorizing emanating from the thoughts of Foucault has been frequently accused of leading to apathy in terms of resistance and freedom, even though there exists vast literature that claims otherwise.[139] On the contrary to the liberal view of freedom and resistance, in this literature freedom is not connected to any particular form of order that guarantees liberty to individuals or neither is resistance judged on the basis of what kind of order is being tried to be constituted by the act of resistance. Particularly within liberal governmentality view of freedom and resistance as consisting of pursuing some given intelligible goals is highly questionable as liberal governmentality functions through subjects whose autonomy is constituted by liberal governmentality. Furthermore, if freedom and resistance is understood as consisting of pursuing some given intelligible goals we are already on before hand defining certain limits for freedom and resistance as freedom and resistance can only be realized through these particular goals. This way, naturally, freedom and resistance can never be freedom and resistance in relation to these particular goals. Hence, in the literature that concentrates on the thought of Foucault, freedom and resistance, freedom and resistance are especially understood as concrete practices of individuals in real situations rather than imaginary final states. Freedom and resistance are about ways of realizing that the present is never given, about conceiving that it can always be otherwise, even though this 'otherwise' cannot never be permanently defined. In this way concrete freedom and resistance are always about continuous possible transformation of our concrete present. As put by Thomas L. Dunn,

> [t]ransformation is thus not a distant flight away from the conditions of our being but, instead, a metamorphosis, or morphing, of the virtuality of our lives, building concretely upon the experience of the present so as to realize our freedom as practice.[140]

Above-introduced view of concrete freedom and resistance is very compatible with the view of liberal order as ontologically emanating from nothingness. Same way, as concrete freedom and resistance are oriented to realizing the contingency of the present, view of liberal order as

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[139] See e.g. Rajchman 1985, Deleuze 1988, Bernauer 1990, Halperin 1995, Simons 1995, Patton 1998, Dumm 2002, Oksala 2005 & Prozorov 2007.
[140] Dumm 2002, 15.

ontologically emanating from nothingness is oriented to realizing the contingency of constituted liberal order. Realization that the foundations of liberal order derive from sovereign decision renders liberal order not as ontological reality that cannot be transgressed but as the sediment of arbitrary sovereign decision. From this perspective, then, every form of liberal governmentality, or every diagram of liberal governmentality, as put by Prozorov,

> *is* the veil that conceals precisely that there is nothing behind it to conceal, that it *enfolds the void*. Perhaps, this is the key lesson that Schmitt, probably unwittingly, teaches us: order is always far more fragile than it appears. Moreover, it is most fragile precisely at the moment of its recourse to extreme displays of its sovereign majesty, because sovereignty is radically heterogeneous to the existence of the diagram *qua* diagram. The force of the diagram is strongest when it is able to avoid any invocation of its sovereign excess and thereby prevent the rupture of its self-immanence. Conversely, when such cracks in the interiority of the diagram are both visible and articulable, it acquires heterotopic features that enable concrete freedom.[141]

Hence, one particular way how liberal governmentality can be concretely resisted and spaces for practices of concrete freedom opened is to stretch liberal governmentality to its limits, to bring out the sovereign excess that exists within liberal governmentality and in this way to reveal the true contingent essence of this form of governmentality.

Of course, the previous is not intended to mean that it impossible to resist liberal governance in any kind of way within the limits of autonomy granted by the governance. This should be already evident, as in a process of conceptualizing the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS as biopower practiced through liberal governmentality, I have also pointed to the disjunction between the general ideas of this governance, civil society actors and local people. Hence, the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is not any kind of omnipresent strict domination. The global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is a framework in which different actors more or less autonomously operate. The global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is an ensemble that grants this autonomy to some actors in order that this autonomy would function in accordance with the general ideas of this governance. However, as it has been pointed out, this usually is not a complete success as within this governance there figures dissatisfaction, from the parts of some NGOs and local people. Thus in the case of global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS it is easy to endorse the classic view of African reality according to which "an apparatus of control and domination or a line of dependence are not just what the government […] want them to be, they are also what the actors, even if they are subordinate, make of them."[142]

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[141] Prozorov 2007, 91–92. Emphasis in original.
[142] Bayart 1993, 37.

However, the resistance practiced within the limits of autonomy granted by the governance has always two problems. Firstly, as liberal governmentality mostly functions through and manipulates autonomous interests of civil society, it is somewhat naïve to talk about credible resistance practiced within the limits of autonomy granted by the governance. Liberal governance is about governing through this autonomy and it seems to be very virtuous of taking hold of any kind of interest as it can continuously remodel itself according to new interests. In relation to this, Andrew Barry has written that there is no strict opposition between forms of rule and resistance within liberal governmentality, but it is "in conjunction with specific political conflicts, scandals, accidents and other events that new forms of governmental practice often develop."[143]

Secondly, and related to the first problem, if the governmental construction of autonomous subjectivity is only way through which resistance is practiced the cruel irony of liberal liberation is never fully noticed. If there is no outside to be reached through resistance, if there is no possibility to change the whole rationality of governance, liberal governmentality as such cannot never be properly criticized. If the governmental construction of autonomous subjectivity is the only way through which resistance is practiced we cannot properly criticize the use of our autonomy, use of ourselves or use of other people as instruments of governmental rationality. This is so because we could never escape liberal governmentality completely as our resistance could only be practiced within the limits set by the same governmentality. Thus the strategic situation of governmentality could only change, but the fact that the same governmentality would continue to use our autonomy, use ourselves and use other people as instruments of governmental rationality would never change.[144]

Practicing resistance, then, only within the limits of autonomy granted by liberal governance clearly is not enough, even though it is necessary without a doubt. This is because in the end resistance practised within the limits of autonomy granted by liberal governance can only be at its best about deluding authority and not about resisting it as such. This kind of deluding can at times improve the position of certain individuals and groups but only *within* liberal governance. This kind of deluding cannot change the whole system of governance. In the case of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS there is, however, exactly a need to resist the whole system of governance as within this system it is made possible to pursue political liberal mission, to put some Africans under different constraints and to even kill some Africans. Paradoxically, what seems to be not so much possible within this system is to tackle sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS once and for all. Therefore, now I will start my analysis of the

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[143] Barry 2004, 199.
[144] Prozorov 2007, 31–32.

global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in the case of gender which will eventually culminate in the analysis of subjectivities in order to disclose the selectivity faced by some Africans within this governance. Even though this analysis will bring out a great deal of conformity with the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, the analysis will also at times stretch liberal governance to its limits and reveal the arbitrary sovereign excess that nevertheless exists within this the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS.

3. HIV/AIDS, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF BIOPOLITICS

3.1. WHY TO STUDY GENDER WITHIN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE?

It is now widely acknowledged that, in relation to HIV/AIDS, gender "plays an integral role in determining an individual's vulnerability to infection, his or her ability to access care, support or treatment, and the ability to cope when infected or affected."[145] It is emphasized that most of the time this role of gender means that it is women who suffer the burden of HIV/AIDS more than men. This is seen especially to be true in countries hit hardest by HIV/AIDS, as "[m]ost women in the hardest- hit countries face heavy economic, legal, cultural and social disadvantages which increase their vulnerability to the epidemic's impact."[146] In particular, and as usual in the case of HIV/AIDS, the situation is seen as being untenable in sub-Saharan Africa where "[i]n most of the region, women are disproportionately affected by AIDS, compared with men – expressions of the often highly unequal social and socioeconomic status of women and men."[147]

It is no wonder, then, that there are now many internationally funded civil society projects, carried out at various countries in the sub-Saharan Africa, that focus on the issues of gender and unequal position of women in relation to HIV/AIDS. In addition, two prevalent ideas in development at present – gender mainstreaming and empowerment – have meant that, in general, into many civil society projects, which had not directly dealt with gender before, some kind of gender component have been integrated in order to fulfil the expectation of gender sensitiveness.[148] This has been also true in relation to projects that concentrate on sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. In these ways gender and its referent object in practice, the unequal position of women, have become basic themes in the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS.

However, not everyone have been fully convinced about the desirability of connecting sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS and gender in the way this is done at present. Katja Jassey and Stella Nyanzi stress the connections between the colonial history and development machinery's contemporary problematization of gender and HIV/AIDS. They write that examining how gender relations are constructed differently in Africa than in the West, in order to explain the peculiar rapid heterosexual spread of HIV in Africa, is a politically correct alternative to examining 'the different nature of

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[145] WHO 2003, 5.
[146] UNAIDS 2004, 43.
[147] UNAIDS 2006, 15.
[148] Obbo 2007, 282–286.

African sexuality' as done in colonial times. The talk on gender does not change the fact that, as HIV is primarily transmitted through sexual intercourse and as it has reached epidemic proportions in Africa, the problem and focus of interventions is once again some kind of 'natural African sexuality'. For example, in the thought which connects the spread of HIV to gender African men are seen, due to their privileged *traditional* roles, as bullies who use women at their own pleasure with little thought of the consequences. In this way, despite the gender vocabulary, it is some sort of traditional/natural African sexuality which becomes pathologisized.[149]

Similar sort of arguments, concerning the problematic consequences of applying gender in Africa along the Western lines, have been presented earlier as well, especially by some African feminists. Most famously this has been done by Ifi Amadiume, Amina Mama and Oyèrónké Oyěwùmí.[150] These writers have emphasized that the Western ideas of gender do not fit without difficulties to African social life. The Western ideas of gender are culturally specific and thus these ideas cannot fully grasp the historical and cultural complexities of African social life. However, as the Western ideas of gender have now been imported to Africa for decades, the African social life has gradually started to transform along these ideas. For example, Oyěwùmí, who has studied gradual introduction of Western ideas of gender among Yorùbás, writes:

> Since the colonial period Yorùbá history has been reconstituted through a process of inventing gendered traditions. Men and women have been invented as social categories, and history is presented as being dominated by male actors. Female actors are virtually absent, and where they are recognized, they are reduced to exceptions.[151]

Hence, what is absolutely essential to take into account when connecting gender and sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, is the difficulty of investigating sexuality and gender in Africa beyond the imported stereotypes. Usually the perceived 'traditional' gender roles and sexualities in Africa are on a closer scrutiny not that traditional and many times these perceived traditions do not have full correspondence in the actual lives of African people. Usually these perceptions, as put by Signe Arnfred, "tell more about the minds of those who made them than they tell about Africa and Africans"[152].

Related to above-mentioned, it is illustrative to consider how the donor-driven conceptualizations of gender and sexuality in relation to sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS are homogeneous and undynamic, despite the work done by those African feminists, mentioned above, and also other researchers who

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[149] Jassey & Nyanzi 2007, 13–14.
[150] See Amadiume 1987, 1997; Mama 1995; Oyěwùmí 1997.
[151] Oyěwùmí 1997, 82.
[152] Arnfred 2006, 59.

have highlighted the heterogeneity and dynamism of sexual and gender relations in Africa.[153] However, as this heterogeneity and dynamism of sexual and gender relations does not fit to the global picture of gender and sexuality in Africa, these voices are largely neglected.

Furthermore, it should be noted how, regarding the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, neglecting the heterogeneity and dynamism of sexual and gender relations in Africa is, in fact, essential. It is only through this neglecting that the sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS can be made globally governable along the lines of gender. Without this neglection the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS would lack the legitimacy needed to organize itself along the Western thinking of gender. However, as these neglected views exist quite saliently – for example, in academic discourse – these views cannot be made to disappear completely and thus they are confronted quite explicitly. This confrontation is exemplified by the following passage from a document by the WHO:

> Gender is a culture-specific construct. As a result there are significant differences in what women and men can or cannot do in one culture as compared to another. But what is fairly consistent across cultures is that there is always difference between women's and men's roles […] in almost every country worldwide women have less access to and control of productive resources than men, creating unequal balance of power that favors men.[154]

As it can be seen, gender is acknowledged to be a culture-specific construct but at the same time it is stated that this does not actually matter because there is, in practice, universal unequal balance of power between men and women that favours men. Later in the same document same kind of argument is made in relation to the multiplicity of different roles available to men and women within a particular culture:

> Despite the existence of multiple masculinities and femininities, however, it is the dominant ideology that most greatly influences women's and men's attitudes and behaviour, making both women and men more vulnerable in the HIV/AIDS epidemic.[155]

Again the existence of multiplicity within gender is confessed but, then, immediately bypassed as irrelevant.

However, the multiplicity of sexual and gender relations in Africa is anything but irrelevant. For example, Arnfred's analysis of the development of a unified, donor financed and donor supervised plan for the ministry of Agriculture in Mozambique, the so-called PROAGRI, illustrates this well.

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[153] See e.g. Aarmo 1999; Kendall 1999; Arnfred 2005, 2006 & 2007; Chacha 2005; Tamale 2005; Wieringa 2005; Epprecht 2008.
[154] WHO 2003, 9–10.
[155] Ibid, 11.

Arnfred writes that PROAGRI's main aim, the transformation of subsistence agriculture into a subsistence agrarian sector which contributes with surpluses for the market and the development of an efficient and participatory entrepreneurial sector, is catastrophic when considered from the perspective of multiplicity of gender relations in Mozambique. This is due to the fact that 55 percent of the farmed area in Mozambique is located in three Northern provinces of the country. These provinces are populated by Makhuwa, Maconde and Yao peoples who are all matrilineal which differentiates them from the people of the more southern provinces who are generally patrilineal. Among these matrilineal peoples it is women who control the food production and the distribution of food as well, which puts these women to a better position than women in the patrilineal areas. However, the transformation of subsistence agriculture to a more market orientated one will, especially in the matrilineal areas, imply the transfer of social power from women to men. In order to realize this, one has to only think who, men or women, would populate the new efficient and participatory entrepreneurial sector which the PROAGRI tries to develop?[156]

As illustrated above, despite the frequent highlighting of gender at the global development discourse, the reality of development is often blind to multiplicity of sexual and gender relations in Africa – as seems to be the case also in relation to other Third World regions.[157] Again one should not be surprised by this as this blindness stems directly from the general nature of contemporary global liberal governance. As emphasized by Duffield, when aiming for the better management of risks for liberal way of life at the level of population, there is no need to understand the multiplicity of gender relations, among the so-called traditional communities as such. Rather than this, it is much more important to examine the discriminatory and exclusionary effects of these traditional communities, including their impact on women, in order to problematize these traditional communities along the lines of liberal governmentality. Through this prolematization these traditional communities can be made globally governable.[158]

It should be now possible to piece together the outlines how the integration of gender to the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is done along the lines of liberal governmentality. Gender, when brought together with the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, is pretty much stripped from its revolutionary content it once had in relation to social order in the West. Within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS gender is tried to made solely to serve the liberal governance logic by neglecting the multiplicity and complexity of gender relations in Africa and by using the concept in order to make traditional communities governable. Furthermore, this

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[156] Arnfred 2005, 121-123.
[157] See e.g. Rankin 2001 & Lazar 2004.
[158] Duffield 2007a, 108–110.

neglecting is also an indicator of selectivity that exists within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. This simplification means that practices of this governance do not benefit every African equally, but these practices function within certain limits and cherish certain ways of living more that others. From this perspective, then, it is possible to view the gender-based global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS as a political struggle. It is possible to view the global aims not as responding unproblematically to local needs, but as in a process of being tried to be imposed on some people. In addition, as these global aims are not seen as responding unproblematically to local needs, it is also possible to see these global aims encountering resistance. Now I will concentrate on bringing out this political struggle through analysis of the workings of global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in the case of gender. But, naturally, before I can start to conduct my analysis on gender within this governance, I have to first pause for a little while and quickly introduce the way this analysis can be done.

3.2. HOW TO STUDY GENDER WITHIN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE?

In relation to investigating the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, Seckinelgin has claimed that the international policy environment is manifested by particular language. By using this language, international actors produce representations of sites and actors of policies. Also, this language is used to make sense of local people within the international policy context.[159] This Seckinelgin's claim is very much in line with the general ideas found in the different studies of governmentalities. According to Peter Miller and Nicholas Rose:

> All government […] depends on a particular mode of 'representation': the elaboration of a language for depicting the domain in question that claims both to grasp the nature of that reality represented, and literally to *re*present it in a form amenable to political deliberation, argument and scheming.[160]

Hence, it can be stated that it is through language that governing is elaborated. For example, before sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS can be become manageable it is first essential to conceptualize relevant sites, actors and targets within the governance, as noted by Seckinelgin. This kind of conceptualization is the only way that whatever phenomenon can be made as an object of government and thus governable.

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[159] Seckinelgin 2008, 127.
[160] Miller & Rose 2008, 31.

From this perspective, then, governing is about inscribing something to reality that does not exist in this reality as such. It is about making reality function in a particular way through conceptualizing it in this particular way. As put by Foucault, governing is

> marked by the articulation of a particular type of discourse and a set of practices, a discourse that on the one hand, constitutes these practices as a set bound together by intelligible connection and, on the other hand, legislates and can legislate on these practices in terms of true or false.[161]

Thus governing has a discursive character which means that the conceptualizations of governance are more than just language. Conceptualizations of governance, which make up the discourse of government, are statements (*énoncés*) which can be assigned particular modalities of existence. This means that these statements are in relation with a domain of objects; statements are endowed with repeatable materiality.[162]

In other words, discourse of government is made up of signs, but what this discourse does is more than just description of different things. Thus what is important is not the signs as such, but this more; this connection that these signs have with material practices. In this way discourse is not about language, but about practice. Connection of discourse and practice makes it possible to systematically shape objects in practice according to the rules of discourse which existence is, nevertheless, grounded in practices. Thus discourse is about regularity of different practices which could not acquire this regularity without systematizing effect of discourse and at the same time the rules of discourse cannot be immanent in anywhere else but in these very same practices. In this way the point in paying attention to discourse lies in revealing the conditions under which things happen how they happen in practice.[163]

Furthermore, the intertwining of discourse and practice means that the enunciation of statements contained by discourse has to be always done in relation to the domain of objects of which one is speaking. Thus it is not possible for the speaking subject to enunciate any kind of statements one wishes, but enunciation of statement presupposes that one occupies the subject position which is determined by the intertwining interplay of statements and practices. In this way a statement is a result of the intertwining interplay of statements and practices that make that particular statement possible. Statements are not results of expressions of individual psychological subjectivity.[164]

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[161] Foucault 2008, 18.
[162] Foucault 1972, 107.
[163] Ibid, 46–49.
[164] Ibid, 55.

When analysing discourse of government, or any other discourse, what is not important, then, is who is speaking or rhetoric that is being used. From the perspective of analysis of discourses only statements, their conditions of emergence, their intertwining interplay with each other and with practices, and their consequences as such are important. As written by Foucault,

> [t]o describe statements, to describe the enunciative function of which they are the bearers, to analyse the conditions in which this function operates, to cover different domains that this function presupposes and the way in which those domain are articulated, is to undertake to uncover what might be called the discursive formation.[165]

Even though Foucault made use of his above-outlined archaeological method in his analyses concerning governing, he did not that much explicate systematically and extensively the uses of this method in this particular context. Fortunately, later on his followers within the analytics of government approach have took this task as governing, nevertheless, differs somewhat from questions concerning different knowledges (*savoirs*), in relation to which Foucault himself systematically and extensively explicated the uses of his archaeological method.

Foucault's followers within the analytics of government approach have not altered the basis or logic of Foucault's method in any kind of way but only specified and explicated to what attention should be focused. For example, Dean has influentially made explicit the uses of Foucault's method within the analytics of government approach. According to Dean, the analysis of governmentality should be especially concerned with the fields of visibility of government, with the technical aspect of government, with the rational and thoughtful activity within government and with the formation of identities. The examination of fields of visibility of government refers to the need of government to 'picture' who and what is to be governed. Government needs its object to be 'visible' and it tries to achieve this by preparing different maps and graphs or by using other, not necessarily strictly visual, ways to conceptualize who and what is to be governed. The concern for the technical aspect of government refers to by what means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques and technologies is authority actually constituted and rule accomplished. The approach to government as rational and thoughtful activity refers to form of knowledge that arises from and informs the activity of governing. Governing always has a rationality that ties different practices of government together, even though this rationality might be at first difficult to notice by looking only at one single practice of government. Finally, the attention to the formation of identities refers to individual and collective forms of identity through which governmentality operates. In other

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[165] Ibid, 115–116.

words, this refers to subjects that government presupposes and tries to construct in order to make governing function.[166]

In addition to dimensions sorted out by Dean, there is still one dimension that can be included to the analysis of governmentality. As the last dimension sorted out by Dean, concerning the attention to the formation of identities, refers only to the forms of identities that can be found within the governmental jargon, these identities should not be confused to the subjective identities of people in their actual lives. Thus the identities found within the governmental jargon refer strictly, and only, to abstract subjects that government presupposes and tries to construct in order to make governing function. How this task actually succeeds is a different matter. Therefore the analysis of governmentality can be extended from the analysis of the governmental jargon to the analysis of actual subjectivities of people targeted by government. In other words, to the analysis of how the construction of subjects, which government needs in order to make governing function, actually succeeds. This kind of extension of the analysis of governmentality was also in Foucault's mind in the later years of his life when he started to concentrate on the history of subjectivities. By concentrating on subjectivities, Foucault saw that "in this way one could take up the question of governmentality from a different angle: the government of the self by oneself in its articulation with relations with others."[167]

Naturally, the analysis of actual subjectivities of people targeted by government cannot be conducted through reading of governmental jargon. The analysis of actual subjectivities needs different kind of research material than provided by the government itself. The analysis of actual subjectivities can only be conducted through research material that allows the expression of individual experience unlike the governmental jargon, which tries to fade away everything that is particular. Thus, when including the analysis of actual subjectivities of people targeted by government to the analysis of governmentality, also research material through which it is possible to say something about the subjective experiences of people needs to be included. However, as analysis of subjectivities cannot be done before knowing something about the other dimensions of governmentality, there is no need, yet, to continue discussion on the kind of research material needed for analysis of subjectivities. This discussion is something that I will get back to later when I finally reach this dimension of my research. At the moment more important matter to consider is what the other dimensions, the analysis of governmentality should be especially concerned with, mean when brought to the context of global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS.

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[166] Dean 1999, 30–32.
[167] Foucault 2000, 88.

As I have already in the previous chapter conceptualized the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, to a large extent, as biopower practiced through liberal governmentality, the question, what the Dean's dimensions of governmentality mean when brought to the context of this governance, figures quite easily. Firstly, the rationality inherent in the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is liberalism. As already explained, this governance tries to achieve its aim through economical frugal governing that grants autonomy to different actors inside civil society and tries manage their interests along the lines of this governance's own needs. Secondly, this rationality also informs what kind of forms of identities this governance needs. It needs active, skilfull, capable and rational subjects of civil society, who are able to take the matters in their own hands along the global knowledge submitted to them. Thus, in other words, this governance is based on the idea of some sort of *homo œconomicus*. Thirdly, the field of visibility this governance needs can be grasped through the idea of biopolitics. As any form of liberal governance, the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS needs knowledge about population and population processes it seeks to manage. It is through this, mainly statistics-based, knowledge of populations and population processes that this governance can 'picture' who and what is to be governed. Finally, regarding technical means through which the authority is constituted and rule accomplished, there are naturally complex network of different ways of persuasion and education at different points of this governance where authority is actually consituted and rule accomplished. However, what lies on the basis of all this persuasion and education is the conditionality of funding and other resources. If in somewhere this persuasion or education does not succeed, the money and other resources are channelled to somewhere else. But, it should be noted that, as within liberal governmentality in general, this last dimension of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is highly interwined with biopolitics as the whole complex network of different ways of persuasion and education are based on the invented startegies for the management of population dynamics. Thus within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS these two dimensions concerning the field of visibility of governance and technical means of governance are not always separable.

On the basis of previous, it should be already clear that there would not be much point in extensive and extremely careful analysis of constitution of authority within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS as the conceptualization of it as largely biopower practiced through liberal governmentality has already, to a large extent, revealed the logic of this governance. Thus I will approach this governance from the opposite perspective. As already outlined in the introduction, I will emphasize analysis of subjectivities in order to not to find only authority but also resistance to the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. However, before concentration on resistance

becomes possible I have to show that the subjectivities I am about to analyse are subjectivities of people who are targeted by liberal governance and how these particular subjectivities are targeted by this governance. Thus I have to show that my case can be situated on the trajectory of liberal governance and that my case follows the logic of contemporary global liberal governance. This I will do by firstly identifying the knowledge about population and population processes and also the invented startegies for the management of these population dynamics that the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS needs regarding gender. In other words, I will firstly concentrate on the biopolitics of gender. Secondly, I will move to technical means, which are based on the invented strategies for the management of population dynamics, through which the authority is actually tried to be constituted and rule accomplished. This I will do in relation to subjectivities I am about to analyse and thus I will only concentrate on a particular civil society project which agency stems from the biopolitics of gender. After this I will move to analyse subjectivities through narratives of people reached by this very same project. Then, from these narratives I will move in due course to the analysis Kenyan biographical novel called *Confessions of an AIDS Victim* which I will read in relation to the results of my other analyses.

Methodologically the design of my research, then, does not follow faithfully those designs that are usually found within the analytics of government approach. This research only uses this approach partially to bring out the background of the subjectivities I am about to analyse. Even though the design of my research does not faithfully follow those designs that are usually found within the analytics of government approach, my research still does faithfully follow the ideas of Foucault methodically. Despite of the fact that Foucault's own analyses were always extensive and extremely careful constructions of discourses, his archaeological method allows also opposite direction of analysis. As written by Foucault,

> [i]t can be said that the mapping of discursive formations, independently of other principles of possible unification, reveals the specific level of the statement; but it can also be said that the description of statements and of the way in which the enunciative level is organized leads to the individualization of the discursive formations. The two approaches are equally justifiable and reversible.[168]

Hence, in this research when analyses of government are conducted that seem to follow the ones usually done within the analytics of government approach, it should be remembered that the point is not to read statements in order to construct a discourse, but the point is to read statements from the perspective of the discourse of liberal governing that is already explicated. In this way I do not seek to construct a discourse by reading statements, but show that certain statements are parts of already constructed discourse.

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[168] Foucault 1972, 116.

3.3. BIOPOLITICS OF GENDER

In this chapter I will mainly focus on the joint report by the UNAIDS, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) called *Women and HIV/AIDS: Confronting the Crisis*. This report is the most comprehensive report on gender, unequal position of women and HIV/AIDS in the developing world done so far by the UN agencies and it is also widely cited in other reports and documents on HIV/AIDS. This report compiles all the knowledge, considered as relevant regarding gender and HIV/AIDS, in relation to population and population processes. Also, this report introduces the invented startegies for the management of these relevant population dynamics. In this report these gendered population dynamics that drive HIV/AIDS are, again, seen as being most alarming in sub-Saharan Africa, which is the region most concentrated on in the report. Thus this raport is a central piece in the discourse on the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in relation to its biopolitical dimension.

As a report concerning biopolitics should, *Women and HIV/AIDS: Confronting the Crisis* starts with statistical data. The report announces that within the world's adult (ages 15-49) population the percentage of women living with HIV/AIDS is now 48 percent. This percentage has risen steadily since the year 1985 when the percentage of women living with HIV/AIDS was 35 percent. Of partcular concern are the young women who now make up over 60 percent of 15- to 24-year olds living with HIV/AIDS. Of all regions, sub-Saharan Africa is identified as being the most devasteted as 77 percent of all HIV-positive women are sub-Saharan Africans. Sub-Saharan Africa is also a only region in the world where infected women are on top compared to infected men as 57 percent of HIV-positive people in the region are women.[169]

The picture that emerges from a biopolitical perspective is quite clear. Gender can be isolated as one of the key drivers of the HIVAIDS pandemic. In addition, the significance of gender seems to be all the time becoming more and more important as among the young people the pandemic seems to be even more gendered than among the general population. In the region hardest hit by HIV/AIDS, sub-Saharan Africa, all this is even more evident as on the basis of statistics there the gender is maybe even *the most important driver* of HIV/AIDS. To be a woman in sub-Saharan Africa means that your risk to acquire HIV-infection is higher than the general risk to acquire HIV-infection among the whole population of the region. In addition, this risk increases if you happen to be one of the region's young women. Thus it is no wonder that, according to the report, it is this

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[169] UNAIDS/UNFPA/UNIFEM 2004, 1–2.

gendered nature of HIV/AIDS, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, which needs "to be addressed if HIV/AIDS is to be brought under control."[170]

But, first, before gendered nature of HIV/AIDS can be addressed, it has to be known what causes this gendered nature of HIV/AIDS. In the report this cause is identified as general gender inequality. According to the report, women in many regions do not own property or have access to financial resources. This lack of resources is seen to make women susceptible to abuses. Also, the use of violence against women by men is identified to limit women's ability to protect themselves from HIV/AIDS as rapes and sexual abuses make a mockery of the notion of safer sexual relations. Gendered poverty is recognized as a factor as well. Gendered poverty pushes some women to sex work and makes some women dependent on doing sexual favours to men in order to get gifts from them. In addition, it is stated that, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, women have to take care of HIV/AIDS patients. Because of this many girls are taken out of school to help in households. This makes these girls more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS as education correlates with the women's ability to know how to prevent HIV infection, to delay sexual activity and to take measures to protect themselves.[171] According to the report there is, then, no doubt that "[a]t its heart, this is a crisis of gender inequality, with women less able than men to exercise control over their bodies and lives."[172]

Due to the above kind of problematization of gender inequality in relation to HIV/AIDS the report, then, naturally proclaims that the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women should be seen as fundamental aspects of fighting HIV/AIDS.[173] Of course, there is nothing new on this as it was already acknowledged in UNGASS Declaration of Commitment "that gender equality and the empowerment of women are fundamental elements in the reduction of the vulnerability of women and girls to HIV/AIDS"[174] Also, MDG number 3 – focuses on gender equality and women's and girl's empowerment – and MDG number 6 – focuses on reducing the impact of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases – provide basis for *Women and HIV/AIDS: Confronting the Crisis* report's advocacy for the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women regarding the fight against HIV/AIDS.

However, the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women are in themselves not specific enough strategies of managing population processes in order to tackle HIV/AIDS. Thus the

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[170] Ibid, 9.
[171] Ibid, 7–8.
[172] Ibid, 7.
[173] Ibid, 9.
[174] UNGASS 2001, 9.

report moves next to specifying the strategies of how gender equality and empowerment of women can actually be achieved at the level of populations. Of course, as there exists already strategies of managing population processes regarding HIV/AIDS in general, the report concentrates on how these already existing strategies can be used gender sensitively. In the report it is introduced how prevention, treatment, community-based care, education, protection and promotion of human rights can be made to "respond to women's needs and circumstances"[175].

The idea, which the report repeats many times, of making the already existing strategies to respond to women's needs and circumstances is absolutely essential. It is through this idea that biopolitics and liberal governmentality interconnect in the case of HIV/AIDS and gender. As stressed earlier, liberal governmentality does not anymore deal directly with things, but with rational interests. The subject of the liberal government is *homo œconomicus*, who is someone who pursues rationally one's own interest and whose interest converges spontaneously with general interest of civil society. Due to this rationality and this convergence, the interests of *homo œconomicus* respond systematically to environmental variables of civil society. Thus *homo œconomicus* is also a person who accepts reality and in this way is eminently governable by managing civil society. By managing civil society, it is possible for liberal governmentality to attain biopolitical goals economically and effectively.

In order to understand the interconnection between biopolitics and liberal governmentality, in the case of HIV/AIDS and gender, it should be noted that the idea of responding to women's needs and circumstances can be read along the above-mentioned lines of liberal governmentality. Firstly, the idea of responding to women's needs can be read as an idea of responding to women's interests. Secondly, the circumstances part should be seen to refer to an idea that these interests of women are rarely readily salient as the widespread discrimination of women hinders their ability to express their interests. In these cases obstacles need to be removed and women need to be encouraged to make their interests heard. Naturally, it is to this removing of obstacles and to this encouraging of women that the governance needs to act on in order that the biopolitical goal of addressing gender inequality in the case of HIV/AIDS can be dealt through civil society.

This 'liberal governmentality reading' of the idea of responding to women's needs and circumstances is widely supported by the report. Firstly, the report lists comprehensively different obstacles that hinder women's ability to express their interests. For example, the report states that "[m]any girls and women know very little about their bodies, their sexual and reproductive health

[175] UNAIDS/UNFPA/UNIFEM 2004, 57.

or HIV/AIDS."[176] In addition, even if some girls and women have proper knowledge, "[f]or many girls and women, knowledge is not enough. They need to learn not only how HIV is transmitted but also how to negotiate abstinence, unwanted sex or safer sexual relations."[177] This is seen as particularly hard because:

> Given unequal power within a relationship, it is frequently difficult for women, especially young women with older husbands, to refuse sexual relations. They may fear, rejection and abandonment, or they may simply believe that they are required by marriage to be sexually available.[178]

Due to this, there is especially a need to ensure that "young women are able to *articulate what they want* as well as what makes them comfortable."[179]

In addition to unequal power within relationship, discrimination, unequal access to education and treatment, violence and the fact that in many countries women cannot take human rights for granted are all highlighted in the report as obstacles that hinder women's ability to express their interests. For example, it is emphasized in the report that many women do not even want to know their HIV status as "[b]oth in the community at large and in their own homes, they are frequently blamed for infections and risk violence, abandonment or even being killed if they are found to be HIV-positive."[180] Naturally, without this knowledge of their status, women are, then, unable to even have any kind of interest in relation to HIV/AIDS. As another example, it is stated in the report that in the sub-Saharan Africa more than half of the girls do not complete primary education. At the same time it is stressed in the report that basic education "gives the most marginalized groups in society – notably young women – the status and confidence needed to *act* on information and refuse unsafe sex"[181]. Thus, in other words, the report states that most of the women in the sub-Saharan Africa, at present, cannot express their interest in relation to HIV/AIDS due to the lack of education.

Secondly, the report lists how obstacles that hinder women's ability to express their interests are to be removed and how women are, then, encouraged to make their interests heard. Even though the report goes through the needed response in relation to all the obstacles it has listed, what is actually prescribed is rather simple. It is simply education of different kinds. According to report, at the most basic level, women need "education on their human rights, reproductive and sexual health and

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[176] Ibid, 11.
[177] Ibid, 13–14.
[178] Ibid, 17.
[179] Ibid. Emphasis added.
[180] Ibid, 27.
[181] Ibid 39. Emphasis in original.

on how to deal with domestic violence."[182] On the top of this basic education women need to be educated on all sorts of more subtle matters. For example, women need "assertiveness and self-esteem building and inter-personal communication and leadership skills development."[183] Also, women should be provided "life skills they need to make informed choices and to develop both economic and intellectual independence."[184] However, what women actually need the most is that women need to know "that they can act in their own *self-interest* and that they will be supported by their communities and governments."[185]

Hence, the liberal governance logic in relation to HIV/AIDS and gender is starting to emerge in full. Due to the obstacles that hinder women's ability to express their interests, at the moment there actually does not exist women's interests as such in relation to HIV/AIDS in developing countries. Thus the women in developing countries cannot be, yet, considered as proper subjects of liberal governmentality. The fact that, from the perspective of liberal governance logic, women's interests do not exist is essential as it provides legitimacy for educating these women along the lines of biopolitical knowledge and liberal governmentality. Through education these women are tried to be made liberal subjects who have required skills and self-confidence to act according to their self-interest that stems from biopolitical knowledge. It is in this way that civil society could be mobilized economically and effectively to pursue biopolitical goals in relation to HIV/AIDS. In this way different civil societies of developing countries can made to put liberal pressure on their governments and 'traditional' authorities that somehow restrain the workings of liberal governmentality. In addition, the existence of this pressure also offers liberal governmentality evidence of an existence of legitimate referent object to which liberal governmentality can see itself responsible for. Thus actors within liberal governmentality can, then, advocate for it and also to use other means, which are seen suitable at particular time, to support it.

As it can be seen from the previous, within this liberal governance logic in relation to HIV/AIDS and gender, the role given to civil society is central but peculiar. On the one hand, civil society is an object of governance as it is something that has to be created by creating subjects that act on their self-interests. On the other hand, civil society is also a subject of governance that pursues biopolitical goals. However, this object/subject character of civil society should not be understood as strict dichotomy because it is not that civil society is strictly first an object of governance and then it becomes a subject of governance. This is not so as already 'the creation' of civil society,

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[182] Ibid, 15.
[183] Ibid, 17.
[184] Ibid, 40.
[185] Ibid, 51. Emphasis added.

through educating subjects, is done mainly by civil society projects. The ways, through which obstacles are to be removed and women encouraged, that are introduced in the report are ways already put to practice by different civil society organizations. Thus 'the creation' of civil society should not be seen as a single event but as a slow capacity building process. This is important to remember as this aspect points to the complexity and dynamism inherent in the global governance of HIV/AIDS, which I want to bring to light. In other words, in the case of HIV/AIDS and gender, it should be remembered that civil society is managed, not dominated, to put pressure on government and 'traditional' authorities.

Furthermore, even though the gendered nature of HIV/AIDS is problematized through the unequal position of women, the education this problematization gives legitimacy to does not have to be directed solely on women. This is also, in many instances, emphasised in the report. For example, it is noted that "[e]ncouraging dialogue between young men and young women will help ensure that young men are sensitized about respect and appropriate and inappropriate sexual behaviour"[186]; and, that it is important to "[e]ncourage men and boys to share the burden of care."[187] In addition, in the report, some civil society projects are already celebrated as forerunners of involving men. In particular, this is done in relation to sub-Saharan Africa where, for example, "men are beginning to organize effectively against violence against women by examining their own attitudes and behaviours."[188] According to report, this is a hopeful response as it means that there are men who "understand that changing behaviour is a way to safeguard their own health."[189]

Education of men, on the basis of problematization concerning the unequal position of women, point to the further significance of gender as concept suitable for the workings of liberal governmentality. Gender inequality provides legitimacy to educate not only women but also men in developing countries along the lines of biopolitical knowledge and liberal governmentality. It is in this way, as stressed also by Duffield, that "gender and the position of women have been absorbed as a formative aspect of non-material development."[190] The present-day popularity of referring to gender in relation to developing countries has to be connected to this potential the concept has in transforming developing countries compatible with liberal governance logic. Use of gender vocabulary is nowadays one of the most effective ways to conceptualize different local authorities, ways, habits and customs as something that need to be transformed along the liberal governance logic.

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[186] Ibid, 17.
[187] Ibid, 33.
[188] Ibid, 47.
[189] Ibid.
[190] Duffield 2007a, 109.

As already emphasized, all this happens at the cost of simplifying complexity. For example, in the case of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS and its organization around gender, large amount of heterogeneity, dynamism, and multiplicity of gender and sexual relations in sub-Saharan Africa has to be ignored in order that the sub-Saharan epidemic fits completely to the picture portrayed by *Women and HIV/AIDS: Confronting the Crisis* report. It is only through this ignoring that local politics can be dispelled from the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS and this governance can acquire the legitimacy it needs in order to function.

But for now, enough has been said about the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS on a quite general level. Thus it is time to get more specific as it is only through specificities that the resistance to the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS can be eventually elaborated. In order to eventually bring this resistance to light I will now start to concentrate on a particular civil society project which agency stems from the biopolitics of gender and which tries to reach its target people along the biopolitical lines. Regarding this project I will next analyse the technical means how the authority is actually tried to be constituted and rule accomplished according to the biopolitics of gender. After this I will move to analyse subjectivities of people targetted by biopolitics through this particular project and, then, I move to examine this all from the perspective of the *Confessions of an AIDS Victim* novel.

3.4. RAISING GENDER AWARENESS IN MOZAMBIQUE

The particular civil society project I will now concentrate on is the Society for Women and AIDS in Africa (SWAA) organization's project called *Men & HIV/AIDS: Risks, Roles and Responsibilities*. Geographically this project is carried out in Mozambique by SWAA's Mozambican branch (SWAA-MOZ). The project's agency stems from the biopolitics of gender and it tries to reach its target people along the biopolitical lines as this project concentrates on the issue of inequality between men and women in relation to HIV/AIDS, which the project tries to address by working directly with Mozambican men and by raising general awareness of the issue.

The selected project can be viewed as a prime case of the complex and vibrant nature of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS I have been emphasizing. This is because SWAA is a big pan-African NGO that has, among the other big NGOs, gradually started to concentrate more and more on questioning the official policy responses to the epidemic not only at national level, but at

global level as well.[191] In addition, Mozambique is clearly something Graham Harrison has called a *governance state*. Governance state refers to an overtly neo-liberal developing country which has a government that acts only as a facilitator of participation of other stakeholders to its development. Development in these states is a shared project on which donors, NGOs and government all work together. In practice, this means that in these states development is largely planned and designed by donors, but 'owned' by the state. In these states, then, international community should not be seen as an external agent that acts on state, but it is "more useful to conceive donors as *part of the state itself*."[192] This is also true in relation to Mozambique where "[d]onors wield immense and detailed power, and are at the very heart of decision making and policy formulation, from conception of issues and options through to writing the final policy."[193] In other words, in Mozambique "the international community exerts a good deal of control and oversight over […] its core biopolitical functions."[194]

On the basis of previous, and by considering the fact that Mozambique has an estimated HIV prevalence of about 16 percent among its adult population[195], it comes as no surprise that Mozambique is also a governance state in relation to HIV/AIDS. What this means in relation to HIV/AIDS is that Mozambique has adopted the so-called "Three Ones" principles. "Three Ones" consist on three principles which are: one agreed AIDS action framework that provides the basis for coordinating the work of all partners; one national AIDS coordinating authority, with a broad-based multisectoral mandate; and, one agreed country-level monitoring and evaluation system. The way the "Three Ones" are adopted is agreed between the donors, NGOs and host government in meetings in which UNAIDS acts as facilitator and mediator.[196] As a result of adaptation of "Three Ones", country's HIV/AIDS epidemic is managed through multisectoral approach by different actors in cooperation along the lines set by donors. As this is true also in relation to Mozambique, it can be stated that "Mozambique has adopted the policies on HIV/AIDS internationally considered as the most appropriate."[197]

As stressed earlier, the management of HIV/AIDS in cooperation with different actors has given civil society organizations central role. Donors view these civil society organizations as specialists of the local and thus most effective executors of HIV/AIDS related projects. As a result of this, civil

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[191] Webb 2004, 24.
[192] Harrison 2004, 87. Emphasis in original.
[193] Hanlon & Smart 2008. 131,
[194] Duffield 2007a, 82.
[195] UNAIDS 2006, 18.
[196] UNAIDS 2005, 12.
[197] Sumbana & Lauriciano 2004, 88.

society organizations have, in fact, become most salient actors in local contexts. However, on a closer scrutiny the local expertise of civil society organizations can be many times called into question as these organizations act so firmly along the lines set to them by donors.

The questionability of the local expertise of a civil society organization can be also pointed out in relation to SWAA. Even though SWAA's basic mission and vision is articulated as advocating and empowering of localities, the organization's main concern seem to be achieving compatibility with donor views. This becomes clear by looking at SWAA's strategic plan. In this plan it is stated by SWAA that its mission is to advocate on behalf of women, children and families in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Its vision is a world free of HIV/AIDS, where African women and children are empowered to claim equal rights, access to health care, education, economic opportunities and socio-cultural opportunities.[198] However, already in the same page of the plan, where the mission and vision are stated, it is emphasized that the context of SWAA's work is actually biopolitical knowledge produced for the global governance of HIV/AIDS. This is evident if the following passage from the plan, which features under the title "the context of our work", is compared to biopolitical knowledge introduced in the previous chapter.

> According to the 2002 UNAIDS Report on the Global HIV/AIDS epidemic (2002), women's risk of HIV infection resulting from unprotected sex is two to four times higher than men's. The infection rate among women is increasing as a result of socioeconomic factors, their unequal power relationship with men, and their lack of autonomy. In most places women have poor access to education and to social and health facilities. Women have less power in negotiating sexual relationships, and there are a number of cultural and social practices that represent a major risk of HIV infection for women and young girls.[199]

As it can be seen, there is a familiar echo in this compared to previous chapter. This means that, in fact, SWAA can be seen as advocating on behalf of women, children and families in the fight against HIV/AIDS only if the biopolitical knowledge corresponds with the experiences of these women, children and families. Needless to say, this is not always so.

Furthermore, SWAA is also promoting a kind of strategies to counter HIV/AIDS that is seen as suitable at the global level. It is stressed in the plan that the complexity of factors influencing the impact of HIV/AIDS presents "special challenges that require *multi-sectoral responses.*"[200] Of course, this is natural as SWAA's own agency regarding HIV/AIDS stems from the contemporary multi-sectoral response that gives central role to civil society organizations. Also, as SWAA is funded, for example, by the European Commission, UNFPA, UNIFEM, World Bank and WHO, the

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[198] SWAA 2003, 3.
[199] Ibid.
[200] Ibid, 4. Emphasis added.

global perspective of the donors is naturally firmly integrated to SWAA's aims.[201] However, it should be noted that, by promoting a kind of response to HIV/AIDS that is seen as suitable at the global level, SWAA is also legitimating the contemporary multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS that is organized along the lines of liberal governmentality. Naturally, this is not something that is true only in relation to SWAA, but other NGOs that deal with HIV/AIDS are compelled to do it as well.[202] These NGOs provide the compatible 'local voice' which the contemporary multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS needs in order that the response can be seen as responding to the needs of people.

In addition, SWAA is functioning according to biopolitics of gender in a sense that it is educating Africans along the biopolitical lines and criticizing national and local authorities through advocating for groups that these authorities do not take into account. In the plan it is stated that one of the basic tasks of SWAA is to educate and inform communities on the impact of the HIV/AIDS. Also, it is stated that SWAA seeks to promote discussion of HIV/AIDS issues in national forums by participating actively in national forums that could influence HIV/AIDS related public policy.[203] In the plan these two tasks are given the highest priority and thus it can be said that SWAA's agency clearly cannot be separated from the biopolitics of gender.

Even though SWAA's agency clearly cannot be separated from the biopolitics, the agency of SWAA and the biopolitics of gender are not completely analogous. Besides educating Africans and criticizing national and local authorities, the plan also lists other tasks of SWAA which all do not go along perfectly with biopolitics. Of course, most of these tasks are ordinary tasks for a NGO that concern, for example, resource mobilization, networking, monitoring, evaluation, capacity building, etc. But, there also exists couple of tasks that at least have a potential of disturbing biopolitics of gender a little. Firstly, SWAA does not do the questioning of official policy responses to the epidemic only at national or local level but also in relation to international policy context. SWAA advocates also in different international forums and tries to "[i]dentify issues gaps, challenges and opportunities brought about by international public policy and inter-governmental organisations and institutions."[204] Secondly, SWAA is not only waiting to get acted on by donors but is also actively seeks to build up connections with other NGOs at community, national and international level. Naturally, building up connections is a trademark task of all NGOs as it is important in order that NGOs can identify different opportunities available to them and act efficiently. However, this kind

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[201] Ibid, 5.
[202] de Waal 2006, 64 & Seckinelgin 2008, 144.
[203] SWAA 2003, 9.
[204] Ibid, 12.

of coalition building also has other benefits, especially when connected to advocating in different international forums.

Related to above-mentioned, Webb has written that larger NGOs have moved more and more from direct support of small to medium numbers of people to addressing policy responses to the epidemic. Essential in this process has been the connection building with other NGOs and forming of coalitions in order to be able to advocate and lobby for a common cause at all the time bigger and bigger arenas. Thus when advocating and lobbying, especially at the international policy context, it is the size that matters.[205] In addition, building up connections, especially internationally, with other NGOs is many times essential to African NGOs in order to be protected from their state machinery. As emphasized earlier, a direct use of force against civic activity in many places of Africa is always possible. However, the use of direct force becomes harder if you have international activist support to back you up and ready to lobby for you.[206]

Hence, in order to represent Africans internationally and to overcome limitations of harsh forms of governance, building up connections is essential to African NGOs. Through this kind of connection building it would also be possible to criticize the biopolitics of gender in international arenas. However, this would need that NGOs would solve their legitimacy crisis and really represent the marginalized widely and not only along the lines set by the biopolitics of gender. Of course, this is a highly difficult think to do as within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS NGOs have such a central role. There is a lot of effort made that NGOs conform to the demands of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS as donors monitor and evaluate NGOs constantly. In addition, NGOs are educated and persuaded continuously to adopt the common principles in different meetings, workshops, conferences, etc. In this environment it is hard to look critically at such a fundamental aspect of the whole governance as the biopolitics of gender. However, despite of this environment, the fact is that NGOs are all the time invited more and more to participate in the policy dialogue by the UNAIDS and other central agencies where NGOs can voice their views.[207] Even though this is done from the perspective of making the contemporary form of governance more effective by integrating NGOs more strictly to it, this means that there nevertheless exists a possibility to criticize the biopolitics of gender.

What should be understood on the basis of previous, then, is the character of autonomy available to NGO subjects of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. It is through this autonomy that

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[205] Webb 2004, 23.
[206] de Waal 2006, 59.
[207] Webb 2004, 26.

the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS economizes its cost and tries to achieve more through lesser direct control. However, this autonomy also gives certain elbow room to NGOs that can be at times used to do things which do not completely go along with the original goals of the governance. Of course, in this use of their elbow room NGOs have to be very careful as they are monitored and evaluated consistently. Thus they cannot completely step outside the subject position, which makes their agency possible, without loosing their agency. Further, as the case of gender and HIV/AIDS demonstrates, the liberal governance can always find ways to make good use of ideas that had resistance value by the time of their invention. Thus there is in no way an 'end of history' in sight in relation to NGOs and the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, but an ongoing political struggle. A struggle that is characteristic not only in to sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS but also to other developmental issues.[208] This is something that some NGOs, such as SWAA, are beginning to notice by actively trying to find new possibilities to lobby for their cause. Although, yet, in very limited scale regarding the international context.

From the part of SWAA, the limited nature of political involvement regarding the international context becomes apparent when a particular project of SWAA is examined. The SWAA-MOZ's *Men & HIV/AIDS: Risks, Roles and Responsibilities* project is a good example of this. The project's starting point is that the Mozambique's social, cultural, economic and legislative circumstances have lead to inequality between men and women. This inequality has lead to the increased vulnerability of women to HIV/AIDS. For instance, due to women's poor economic situation many women use sex to acquire commodities and money that they need just to get by. In addition, many men consider that the decision to have sex is solely their right and thus see themselves justified to have sex as many times and as frequently as they want. To hold on to their sexual rights many men use violence, economic, psychological or social pressure. As a result women have little opportunity to protect themselves from the HIV; for example, as there is no law that defines domestic violence as a crime in Mozambique.[209]

The project seeks to change the inequality in Mozambique by working directly with Mozambican men and by raising awareness of the issue. The project seeks to address the "factors that allow and encourage men to dominate women's sexual lives."[210] The project's activities take place in Mozambique's capital Maputo and in the nearby district of Marracuene. In Maputo the project's aim is to raise awareness of the issue within ordinary people, legislators, media and other NGOs. In Marracuene district the project's aim is to organize meetings with the village elders, traditional

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[208] See e.g. Brigg 2001 & 2002; Bryant 2005.
[209] SWAA-MOZ 2006, 7.
[210] Ibid, 10.

healers and other respected individuals and by these meetings try to get these people to participate in the discussion about the inequality between men and women. Also, within the project similar meetings are organized with district's ordinary men and volunteers are educated to project workers. In addition, educational material and condoms are distributed.[211]

It can be seen from the previous that the project's aim is quite extensive. Ultimately, the project's aim is actually a creation of foundation for overcoming a structural cause that drives the epidemic in Mozambique. It is expected by SWAA-MOZ "that NGOs, policymakers and the media who will be directly targeted by this programme will continue to work on "the issue", long after the conclusion of the project."[212] In this way the project can be grasped as a one kind of model project for addressing HIV/AIDS when viewing it from the perspective of biopolitics of gender. The project seeks to educate Mozambican men along the biopolitics of gender. Also, some education is targeted to Mozambican women as the people, who are educated as project workers, can be both men and women. However, more importantly the project seeks, by building general awareness of the issue, to further mobilize the rest of the Mozambican civil society to pursue this biopolitical goal as well. By building general awareness of the issue, the project is also saliently putting pressure on the Government of Mozambique. Thus the project should be grasped as challenging the government and challenging different kinds of male authorities along the lines of biopolitics of gender.

Above-mentioned should be also seen to point to the peculiar position of big NGOs within the biopolitics of gender. Big NGOs are all the time more and more concentrating on advocating, but there cannot be a funded NGO project that solely advocates. As stressed earlier, this is because the agency of NGOs stems from their perceived closeness with the local level. NGOs are seen as specialists of local matters, which results legitimacy to their participation in the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. If a NGO only advocates, without rubbing elbows with local people, its perceived closeness with the local level is gone. Thus, even though big NGOs' number one focus is in advocating, they still have to conduct some work at the grassroots level as well. This is reflected also in the SWAA-MOZ's *Men & HIV/AIDS: Risks, Roles and Responsibilities* project in which the direct education of men is given least priority among the project's aims. Aims related to building general awareness of the issue are listed as more important.[213] The direct education of men is an almost unconnected part of the project which, however, has to be included in the project or the project could not legitimately put pressure on the government and other relevant authorities.

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[211] Ibid, 11.
[212] Ibid, 14.
[213] Ibid, 10–11.

Without this inclusion the biopolitics of gender would not be legitimately practiced within the project.

Despite the critical tone of my writing so far regarding the SWAA-MOZ's project, my point is not that the project is completely off the track. It is not difficult to find indicators, concerning Mozambique, which proclaim that the inequality between men and women is a real issue in the country.[214] Thus SWAA-MOZ's project certainly has a point. However, as the project is so firmly organized along the biopolitics of gender, the project is also problematical in same way as the biopolitics of gender. As emphasized in the previous chapter, the biopolitics of gender are based on the ignoring of large amount of heterogeneity, dynamism, and multiplicity of gender and sexual relations. It is only through this ignoring that the biopolitics of gender can be kept in function. This is true also in relation to Mozambique as the gender and sexual relations in the country are more complex than the biopolitics of gender proclaims. Even though the forces that have shaped the Mozambican social life since the beginning of colonial period, namely Portuguese colonialism, Christianity, state socialism and contemporary donor-driven development, can be all seen as favouring men, there still exists something that disturbs the completely patriarchal picture. The vast and populous matrilineal societies in the north of Mozambique have customs, practices and manners that put women of these societies in a better position than women elsewhere in the country. However, as the forces, which have shaped the Mozambican social life since the beginning of colonial period, have all been largely blind to the position of women in matrilineal societies, the forms of female power in matrilineal societies are under heavy pressure.[215] The already introduced PROAGRI is a good example of this.

Regarding SWAA-MOZ's project, then, it is important to realize how the project can be seen as continuing the simplification of gender and sexual relations in Mozambique. Even though the project's direct interaction with the local level is done in the patrilineal south, its tight connection to the biopolitics of gender has lead to the situation where the project's ultimate aim is the creation of foundation for overcoming the gender inequality as a driver of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique without acknowledging the complexity of gender and sexual relations in the country as a whole. In this way the project's gender awareness rising in Mozambique cannot be separated from advocating for the biopolitics of gender and thus the project should be seen as a one instrument of biopolitical governance. The project participates into the mission where Mozambique is mould as a legitimate referent object for the biopolitics of gender.

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[214] See e.g. da Silva & Andrare 2000.
[215] See e.g. Sheldon 2002; Arnfred 2005 & 2007.

However, it needs to be emphasized that in relation to HIV/AIDS the promotion of gender equality in Mozambique only along the biopolitics of gender is not inevitable. As stated earlier, the agency of big NGOs, such as SWAA's, is not completely analogous with the biopolitics of gender. These NGOs have some elbow room that can be at times used to do things which do not completely go along with the original goals of the governance. This elbow room might also be used for the gradual promotion of complexity of gender and sexual relations in Mozambique. As written by Arnfred, the genuine challenge for groups lobbying for gender equality in Mozambique is to "integrate some of the forms of female power which are still embedded in the social systems of the […] matrilineal societies in the north of Mozambique into the mainstream of nation's life."[216] Yet, in order that this integration would really be effective targeting only national level is not enough, but some of these forms of female power have to be made salient in the international context. In this way these forms of female power would present a challenge to the contemporary form of biopolitics of gender and thus further politicize the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS.

But, there is no need to jump into conclusions yet. Even though I have already written about gender and sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS at some length, no writing has been done in relation to actual success of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in the case of gender. Without any idea of this success it is impossible to fully assess the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. Furthermore and more importantly, without any idea of this success it is impossible to perceive any resistance to this governance. Thus now I will move to analyse these aspects of the governance. More specifically, I will move to analyse how the construction of subjects, which government needs in order to make governing function, actually succeeds in the case of gender within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS and in what extent these subjects refuse this governance. I will conduct this analysis in relation to this same SWAA-MOZ project and through narratives that I have collected from the people who were reached in one way or another by the project.

3.5. NARRATIVES WITHIN GOVERNMENTALITY RESEARCH

As it should have become clear by now, in the case of gender and sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, submitting biopolitical knowledge to people and teaching them skills that liberal subject needs in order to act are ways through which people are tried to be governed. How these biopolitical goals succeed are indicators of how well the governance functions. In other words, how these biopolitical

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[216] Arnfred 2005, 125–126.

goals succeed are indicators of how successfully biopower functions within this governance. Thus, in order to get an idea how biopower functions within this governance and to what extent people refuse this power, I have to now analyse subjective experience of people who are targeted by this governance. To be perfectly exact, as biopolitics of gender tries to make these people as autonomic agents of biopolitics, I have to analyse how these people experience themselves as agents of this biopolitics and to what extent they do not. As stated earlier, this cannot be done through governmental jargon, but this kind of analysis needs research material that allows expression of an individual experience. This is why I will now move to analyse narratives that I have collected from the people in Marracuene who were reached in one way or another by the SWAA-MOZ's *Men & HIV/AIDS: Risks, Roles and Responsibilities* project.[217]

The narratives were collected with the so-called 'empathy based role-playing method'.[218] On the basis of this method, people targeted were given a frame story which placed them in the year 2016 where HIV/AIDS rates were considerably lower within their region than at present and people were asked to write about how this change happened. The future orientation of the frame story was a result of the fact that the purpose of the frame story was to direct the people to write about their experiences of their own agency. The future oriented narratives can be seen ideal for this task as planned action has largely been seen to be tightly connected to the future oriented narrative imagination of that action and as individual experience in general has largely been seen to bear some kind of connection to narrative form.[219]

However, from the perspective of conducting research, the discussion about how big correspondence there is between experience, action and narrative is not that important. This is because the narrative material one is actually researching is always textual material that has been linguistically created as a *narrative version* of experiences and actions. Thus it is dead certain that the narrative material one is researching is not the actual experience or action, but one narrated version of human life's future or past events or processes. From this perspective, then, it would be naïve to read narratives as just some kind of straightforward expressions of experiences and actions.

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[217] All in all I have collected sixteen narratives from mixed group of people reached by the project. This mixed group of people includes individuals from project director to individuals who work within the project to men who are addressed by the project. This mixed status of people is a benefit as the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS target different people within a particular community very unevenly.

[218] The development and use of, and discussion on, this method have been in the recent years done solely in Finnish, see especially Eskola 1998. When used *only* as a data collection technique, which is the way I use it, the method is simply about writing small narratives on the basis of researcher's instructions. Naturally, in this case, the narratives were written originally in Portuguese.

[219] See e.g. Ricoeur 1984, Carr 1986, MacIntyre 1987, Kerby 1991, Fludernik 1996 & Herman 2002.

From this perspective, narratives should not be read just as expressing the content, but also as affected by the context of narration and the form of narrative.[220]

Even though the unauthentic nature of narrative material in relation to experiences and actions can be a problem to some disciplines, such as psychology, for international relations or political science this unauthentic nature is not a problem. On the contrary, for these disciplines this kind of unauthentic nature of research material is a possibility. It is a possibility because it is through context that political value can be given to narration and it is through form that divergent views can be expressed. Maureen Whitebrook has written that the politics of narration is bound up with the fact that narration is always directed to audience. Because of this role of audience, the narration has to happen in a way that is understandable to this audience. Narration requires capability to integrate one's own narrative to the general intelligibility which the narrator shares with listeners. In this way narration is inter-subjective negotiation where subjective experience and shared meanings mix together.[221] Thus, as emphasized by Hannah Arendt, it is through narration that a human can bring oneself to the public space and interact with this space.[222] It is from this perspective, then, that narration can be seen as a political activity.

Related to the importance of the context in narration, the form of narrative is highly important. As narration requires capability to integrate one's own narrative to the general intelligibility, the general intelligibility also acts as an obstacle of narration. Because of the existence of general intelligibility, narration cannot happen in whatever way, but in a way that respects the shared meanings. This idea of the general intelligibility as an obstacle of narration corresponds to the idea of discourse as a gatekeeper of serious speech, which was discussed earlier. However, through the form of narrative the strict, exact and serious nature of narration or speech can be stripped away a bit. For example, by using metaphors, irony, humour, poetics or other linguistical means, which are present at the more free-floating *forms* of narration, the strict, exact and serious nature of discourse can be overcome at times. The means present at the more free-floating forms of narration can disturb the order of language and in this way a narrative can express things that it actually does not say and which do not correspond to discursive order of objects.[223]

Despite of the above-mentioned possibilities that paying attention to context and form bring to narrative analysis, it should be stressed that paying attention to these two is, in fact, essential also in

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[220] See e.g. Genette 1980 & Herman 2002.
[221] Whitebrook 2001, 4.
[222] Arendt 1958, 184.
[223] See e.g. Nussbaum 1990, During 1992 & Whitebrook 2001.

relation to content. As written by Jens Brockmeier, the narrative should not be seen as simply the end product of narration, but it should be also seen as a process of interaction.[224] Thus narratives are always comments in relation to something and not simply windows to human minds, cognition etc. There is first something that triggers the need to tell and then content is organized in relation to this something.[225] In addition, expressed content is never the content itself to which the expression refers. There is difference between words and things and thus "content is always mediated through form"[226].

What this all means, then, in relation to narratives I am about to analyze? It means that, due to the frame story given to respondents, these narratives should be seen as commenting on respondents' own agency through a quite free-floating form of narration. As the respondents' agency results from the biopolitics of gender, their narrative comments can be seen as challenges to this form of biopolitics. Through their narration the respondents situate themselves quite free-floatingly to the context of biopolitics of gender and interact with this context. Importantly, as these people interact quite free-floatingly with this context, it should be also possible for them in these narratives to refuse the biopolitics of gender somehow; to point to its limits and to bring out questionable, paradoxical and unfair elements that exist within it, etc. Thus by analyzing this interaction it should be possible to say something about biopower, which functions through the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in the case of gender, and present some suggestive views about the future of this governance. Also, it should be possible to bring out some sort of resistance to this governance. In this way, through this kind of analysis of interaction, there does not open that big possibility to say something comprehensive about the individual 'minds' of the respondents, but there should open up a good possibility to further politicize the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS.

3.6. EDUCATING THE MEN OF MARRACUENE

First point that emerges immediately when taking a glance at the narratives is the variety that can be found in these narratives in terms of their biopolitical sophistication. Some of the narratives are much more in accordance with the biopolitics of gender than some others. For example, according to one narrative:

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[224] Brockmaier 2004, 296.
[225] See e.g. Bruner 1990 & Hutto 2008.
[226] Whitebrook 2001, 5.

Most important reason, why life in the year 2016 in Marracuene has changed, is the change in the ways of the community's men. Now they support and help women and take part in the welfare of the family. Domestic violence is nonexistent. Men are more faithful to their wives and help them at home as well as in taking care of the children and the sick.

On the other hand, another narrative states unintelligibly that "AIDS was born in the year 1986 when one woman had sex with an animal. After this AIDS spread in every country. From the blood of the animal and from the woman developed HIV/AIDS." In addition to these extreme views, one analogous and another unintelligible to the biopolitics of gender, most of the narratives consist of views that situate more in the middle along this biopolitical scale. However, there is variety within these middle-ground narratives as well. When commenting on the change in Marracuene, most of these middle-ground narratives use familiar ideas from the global discussion around HIV/AIDS, such as these: "There were GATV [Gabinetes de Aconselhamento e Testagem Voluntária[227]] stations opened where people could go and get tested or to get advices and care."; "In Marracuene, for example, in the past a condom box strew untouched for over a month in the hospital waiting room. Now the situation has changed and a condom box empties in an hour."; "Because of the interventions from NGOs and government, many patients get treatment and medication, which can extend their life span."; "In Marracuene […] the infected had to be advised on how they can improve their lives, but also their relatives had to be advised on how to treat HIV/AIDS sufferers without discrimination and stigma."

Hence, the familiar ideas from the global discussion around HIV/AIDS, such as VCT, prevention, care, treatment and stigma reduction, are all represented in the middle-ground narratives. As a matter of fact, above-mentioned ideas are much better represented as a group in the middle-ground narratives than an idea of gender inequality as a problem in relation to HIV/AIDS. The middle-ground narratives touch the issue of gender inequality directly only a couple of times. In these cases the notions are quite simple statements such as "[y]ear 2016 will be better because we have activists for men." Thus, as a whole, gender inequality is acknowledged, but not promoted to any kind of special position in relation to other HIV/AIDS issues.

What is characteristic to the picture, which emerges from all of the narratives, is the fragmentary nature of these people's idea of responding to HIV/AIDS. Many familiar ideas are presented, but not that systematically. This fragmentary nature of these narratives corresponds to the view presented in earlier chapters according to which biopower usually targets African people superficially, partially and inconsistently. Different civil society projects that privilege different things come and go all the time in Africa and this is true also in relation to Marracuene. For

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[227] Office for Counseling and Voluntary Testing of HIV/AIDS

example, solely SWAA-MOZ has, since the year 2002, been involved in the district in a project that has provided home based care for people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), in a project that have counselled the general community, in a project that has supported PLWHA and in a project that has assisted the districts orphans.[228] This time the flavour of the donors is the education of men and thus SWAA-MOZ is conducting an education of men related HIV/AIDS project. It is only natural that this kind of short-term nature of projects leaves their effect quite shallow.

The problematic short-term nature of different civil society projects is in a way acknowledged in the narratives as well. This is not done directly but indirectly through promotion of extensive community wide solutions to HIV/AIDS. In the narratives it is frequently acknowledged that concentrating on any single issue is not enough to tackle HIV/AIDS. In the narratives change has happened in Marracuene mainly because the whole community has transformed and not just any single issue. As stated in one of the narratives, "[i]t seems that we are all members of the same family because we understand each other so easily when we talk about the problematic of AIDS." Little bit later the same narrative continues: "life is different because I now live in an intelligent, informed and open community." According to another narrative this transformation has not been achieved by concentrating on just a single issue either, but by comprehensively concentrating on multiple issues:

> The mission succeeded, why? Because we held lectures in communities and schools. First we held a meeting with the leader of locality after that with the secretariat, OMM [Organicacão da Mulher Moçambicana[229]], and with the leaders of quarters. At present people have the courage to contact us, because they want to get tested, they follow their treatments and agree to use condoms.

Thus in order to achieve the transformation there was a need to work on many different issues. People needed to be educated, influential people had to be integrated to the response and alliances with other organizations had to be made. In fact, in order to achieve the transformation there was a need at the community wide level to face other problems than HIV/AIDS as well. This is why Marracuenean activists also "established support groups for men and women that help the men and women of the community to solve various problems, not necessarily HIV/AIDS related."

What is backwards in all this is that, at the same time these people are promoting extensive community wide solutions, they are celebrating the NGO led response. In the narratives NGOs are promoted to the sole engines of change in Marracuene. According to one narrative:

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[228] SWAA-MOZ 2006, 9.
[229] A Mozambican women's organization.

Before people did not know what to do in order to protect themselves or what to do when they got ill, but now there is *an organization* in the community, which helps us and we can spread information on HIV/AIDS and on how to protect oneself from infection.[230]

The previous passage is not an exception, but one example among the many. In every narrative, which discusses how the change happened, all the extensive community wide solutions that these people dream about have been almost magically achieved through NGOs. This is further illustrated by the following example:

Different organizations, such as SWAA or FDC [Fundacão para o Desenvolvimento da Communidade[231]] have been very important in attaining transformation. Because of their education we do not have so many orphans or patients with AIDS. Also we can live safely because we know that everyone has gotten information and that they can and want to protect themselves.

Hence, in these narratives there is a peculiar mixture to be found that consists of coincident belief in extensive community wide solutions and in NGOs' projects ability to achieve this.

In addition, what makes the peculiar mixture found in the narratives even more peculiar is that the means through which the transformation is seen to be attained consists mostly on simple education. According to the narratives, education in different forms is the most important thing in the fight against HIVAIDS. For example, one narrative states that "in the year 2016 HIV/AIDS situation is better. We fight against AIDS in the community by giving instructions on protection, comforting the ill, describing the infection and protection mechanisms." Another continues that "we will have results because we have invested a lot on counselling. Number of ill people will decline because our message is well received in the community." Thus it is believed that by simply telling people about HIV/AIDS the situation can be changed. It is assumed that people will receive the message of the activists well in the community and start to behave according to the message. The assumption is simply that "[s]ituation gets better when people begin to follow advices".

As emphasized in the previous chapters, there are big obstacles in the realization of extensive community wide transformation through NGO led response. This is true also in relation to Marracuene. Already the fragmentary nature of these Marracuenean people's ideas manifests this. Many different familiar ideas are presented, but not that systematically. Different people emphasize different aspects and some have acquired much deeper sophistication in HIV/AIDS related issues than others. This fragmentary character of views points to the already mentioned short-term nature of NGO projects and to the problem of development elites. As stated earlier, the current situation, in

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[230] Emphasis added.
[231] A Mozambican NGO.

which civil society actors have to fulfil the conditions set to them by global policies, is in fact constructing Southern developmental elites, who are capable of so-called 'development speech'. These elites are the ones who can draft documents and reports which are understood by the international donors and other people working in development. This makes a bunch of projects not likely to make a difference as there raises a disjuncture between what elites consider to be the problems of HIV/AIDS and what the people in general experience throughout their everyday lives.

Yet, the belief that people will receive the message of the activists well in the community and start to behave according to that message neglects the effect of social context. There is no doubt that many people get infected and infect because of the social context, which stems also from the material conditions that people live in. It is difficult to confront these material conditions by simple education as it seems quite impossible, for example, to just talk your community's way out of poverty despite how hard you try. Thus, as already remarked, in sub-Saharan Africa there are serious limitations in the functioning of an individualized public health that expects an individual to rise above one's social context and take control of one's life along the submitted knowledge. The functioning of an individualized public health would need high levels of health awareness, a climate of liberal individualism and universal access to quality health services. As these things are not found in Marracuene either, such like these things are not found in most of the sub-Saharan Africa, the belief that Marracuenean people will receive the message of the activists well in the community and start to behave according to that message does not seem that realistic.

Despite the unlikely future success of NGO led response in relation to tackling HIV/AIDS, according to the narratives, the NGO led response has been a success in relation to creating, in people who work within NGO projects, an attachment to NGOs. It can be seen from the narratives, which were written by people who actually work within the SWAA-MOZ project, that these people sincerely want to believe in what they are doing. The existence of a NGO project with big plans has promised a big transformation in the community and a big role in this transformation to people who want to work within the project. To this transformation and to this role people want to believe. For example, the following passage captures sentimentally the sincere believe in the cause:

> At first I want to tell how marvellous this year 2016 is, because a lot of cry has calmed down and also silence has been broken. Anymore it is not necessary to hide suffering from HIV/AIDS. Everyone in Marracuene understands how AIDS is a reality and is protecting oneself from it. […] I am certain about my great significance in this transformation, because I told in my community about the importance of protection. I explained also that condoms do not cause sicknesses as it was claimed and I taught how condoms are used.

Again, the previous passage is not an exception, but one example among the many. In almost every narrative, which is written by a person who actually works within the project, there is an attachment in relation to the cause to be found. Sometimes this attachment can even get almost a religious-like form. As written by a person who works within the project, "[t]he best thing is that at some day I realize I feel better and I am saved like the rest. My life gets better all the time and every day I find out more what I have to do."

Hence, regarding the workings of biopower in the case of gender and sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, there certainly can be seen some potential in Marracuene. There are people who really seem to experience themselves as agents along the lines of liberal governmentality. However, this experience is not shared by everyone, but mostly just people who work directly in the SWAA-MOZ project. Regarding more specifically the biopolitics of gender, the workings of biopower is even more fragmented. From the part of these people, gender inequality is acknowledged as some kind of driver of HIV/AIDS, but it is not promoted to any kind of special position in relation to HIV/AIDS as done in the biopolitics of gender. In addition, as it is probable that the NGO led response in relation to tackling HIV/AIDS is not that big future success, the attachment to NGOs that some people feel is likely to fade away a bit. Even though there probably will be new NGO projects that reach new people and in this way new attachments are created, the unlikely future success of NGO led response means probably circulation of these attachments. This, then, again adds up further fragmentation to the already fragmentary nature of biopower. Thus the fragmentary nature of biopower is something that simply cannot be emphasized enough in relation to the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS.

Despite the fragmentary nature of biopower, the importance of this biopower should not be underestimated. The fragmentary nature of biopower does not undermine the fact that it is likely that this form of biopower will for a long time continue to reach some people and thus to operate in some extent. This means that biopolitics of gender, and other forms of liberal biopolitics, will also for a long time get at least a little bit of support from the part of Africans. From the perspective of biopolitics this support is essential as it offers evidence of an existence of legitimate referent object of biopolitics and without greater costs puts liberal pressure on authorities that somehow restrain the workings of liberal governmentality. In this way even the contemporary fragmentary biopower functioning within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in the case of gender can help to keep the governance regime in place. It helps to keep the sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS governable along the liberal governmentality.

At the same time as biopower should not be underestimated, however, it should not be overestimated either. Even though biopower is able to create attachments between local people and biopolitics, there also exist refusal and rejection of biopolitics from the parts of local people as exemplified by these Marracuenean narratives. As these narratives bring out the already highlighted peculiar mixture that consists of coincident belief on extensive community wide solution and in NGOs' projects ability to achieve this, these narratives bring out the paradox that characterises the contemporary global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. In addition to already highlighted disparity between community wide transformation and simple NGO education, this paradox is further illustrated within these Marracuenean narratives by the coexistence of references to problems created by poverty and individualizing solutions to these problems or miraculous disappearance of these problems. For example, there exists references to the simultaneous lack of public transportation and lack of public health services which makes it very hard for many to access treatment. But, in the future this does not matter because then "[p]eople *want to* access treatment, even though the public transport is scarce"[232], as stated in one of the narratives. Furthermore, there are references made to the need to have communal children's homes for the HIV/AIDS orphans and to the need to have community wide access to HIV/AIDS drugs, but the means to achieve these are not explicated. In the future life is just better because these material needs are somehow mysteriously fulfilled by education and people's will. According to the narratives, then, in the future a lot of essential public commodities have just appeared or the lack of these commodities has been compensated by enthusiasm of people.

The point in bringing out the paradox that characterises the contemporary global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS lies not in the curbing of people's enthusiasm, but in the positive value the emergence of this paradox in these narratives can be given. The emergence of this paradox in these narratives makes it possible to read these narratives also as some kind of satire that points to the ridiculousness of this governance. The paradox points to the impossibility, with the means available to the African people at the moment, to solve the HIV/AIDS crisis. Thus the emergence of this paradox poses a serious challenge to the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. The emergence of this paradox demands that the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS has to be able to solve this paradox or it cannot anymore unambiguously appear as a legitimate way of fighting HIV/AIDS.

The emergence of the paradox, then, emphasizes that at present the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS does not respond unproblematically to the needs of the local people, despite the

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[232] Emphasis added.

fact that this governance portraits itself as doing exactly this. Thus in this way the paradox also brings out the sovereign excess that nevertheless exists within liberal governmentality and in this way it reveals the true contingent essence of this form of governmentality. The existence of this refusal points to the limits of liberal governmentality; to frontiers where liberal governmentality cannot anymore appear as apolitical ensemble that aims for the well-being of its subject populations without making any dubious political decisions. On the contrary to this picture frequently portrayed by liberal ethos, the existence of this paradox highlights that the workings of the contemporary global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS lead also to consequences that are undesirable from the perspective of people whose well-being the governance claims to improve. Next I will move to analyse this aspect of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS even further through one gender and HIV/AIDS related Kenyan biographical novel called *Confessions of an AIDS Victim*.

4. HIV/AIDS, GENDER AND THE TRAGEDY OF LIBERAL GOVERNANCE

4.1. BORDERS OF THE GENDER-BASED GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS

Even though I have already touched the restrictions and limits that are present within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in the case of gender, it is possible to bring out these restrictions and limits to the fore still much more mightily than done so far. It is possible to bring out the fact that at the same time as some Africans are supported by the international community in their struggle against HIV/AIDS – although within specific limits, as already pointed out – some other Africans possibilities for life they want to live are taken away from them as they have stepped outside the limits they should respect. This tragic aspect is not exclusive to sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, but it is present in the other development-related Third World issues as well. In order to realize this it is necessary to take a further look at Duffield's recent work.

According to Duffield, the contemporary development industry is a part in machinery that aims for the discipline of non-insured life. Within the development thought Third World people are seen as relatively well covered by informal social security scheme that results from their strong communal ties and extended family support. It is this informal social security scheme that the contemporary development tries to strengthen and not by any means to replace. Development tries to improve this self-reliance in order to avoid developmental disasters. Thus non-insured people are ultimately trusted and expected to live within the limits of their own powers of self-reliance. Naturally, this expectation that those largely excluded from the global search of wealth and progress would all be satisfied with fulfilment of basic needs and homeostasis is unrealistic as exemplified by the amount of Third World people looking for a better life in the industrial world at the moment. Due to this unrealistic aspect, development concentrating on self-reliance needs as its complement different mechanisms through which it is possible to control international immigration until development realizes its contemporary goal and is able to make Third World people stay put. Thus there is a need to control non-insured surplus population that tries to penetrate among the insured populations in order that the contemporary way of life of these insured populations can be upheld.[233]

In relation to above-mentioned, what is happening around the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is paradigmatic. Alan Ingram has written that at the same time as efforts to tackle sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS are supported by the international community it is made sure that this is done

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[233] See Duffield 2005, 2006, 2007a & 2007b.

firmly within the limits set by the general aim of making Third World people self-reliant. Those HIV positive Third World people who are caught in the wrong place at the wrong time are not facing enhanced life changes, but their life changes are, on the contrary, reduced. Within HIV/AIDS it is thus in collisions between international development and management of migration where the intersections of biopolitics, liberal governmentality and sovereignty can be seen most saliently.[234]

In this chapter I will follow the previous insights and examine the constraints that are present within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in the case of gender through this governance's collision with the management of migration. Behind this collision there is a long history of Othering different diseases and of fighting different diseases through quarantines, travel restrictions and embargoes. As Susan Sontag has famously declared, diseases are unpleasant phenomena in every community and thus diseases are portrayed as Othernesses which have their origins outside the community.[235] For this Sontag's claim it is relatively easy to find support from the history of diseases. For example, in the 15th and 16th centuries in the case of syphilis the Russians blamed the Poles, the British blamed the French, the French blamed the Italians and the Italians called the diseases as the 'Spanish Disease'.[236] Another example is the early years of AIDS when the fuss about the origins of the disease where at its height which caused blaming of Africans, Haitians or Western conspiracy for the existence of the disease and in almost every country of the world AIDS was always seen as arrived from some foreign country.[237] In addition to blaming explicit outsiders, different minority groups whose lifestyle is situated at the margins of community are regularly also blamed for spreading diseases. In relation to HIV/AIDS, for example, gays, haemophiliacs, heroin addicts and Haitian immigrants were in the United States for a long time seen as being solely responsible for spreading the virus by the country's health officials, even though almost from the discovery of the disease there were in scientific journals also cases reported that were outside these minority groups.[238] Hence, as Aaltola has stated, the emergence of diseases have almost always emphasized the existence of different borders. Besides state borders, different social borders have been frequently deployed in relation to many diseases. This connection of borders and diseases is so close that in many instances diseases cannot be clearly separated from the deployment of borders that fashion the perception of these maladies.[239]

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[234] See Ingram 2008.
[235] See Sontag 1991.
[236] Pucey 1933 cit. Goldstein 2004, 78.
[237] See e.g. Sabatier 1988.
[238] See e.g. Grmek 1990; Patton 1990 & 2002; Farmer 1993; Treichler 1999.
[239] Aaltola 2009, 138–139.

Even though HIV/AIDS does not anymore cause same kind of panic as it did in the early years of the disease, deployment of different borders, limits and restrictions is still very much alive today as ever in relation to it. At present, almost half (47,3 %) of all the countries in the world have some sort of travel or residence regulations regarding HIV positive people and thirty states will even depart a foreigner if the foreigner is found out to be HIV positive while staying otherwise legally in the country. Furthermore, states are not the only actors that restrict the mobility of HIV positive people. For example, agencies which hire workers in foreign countries, employees and universities also often openly require foreigners to take a HIV test as a prerequisite for employment, assignment for study positions and stipends.[240]

Participation of other agents than states in the execution of mobility restrictions of HIV positive people brings back the idea of complexity of sovereign power as it exists within liberal governmentality. As already written, within liberalism sovereign power can be in different situations dispersed to nearly anyone and thus sovereign is not always the same particular person or institution. On the contrary, within liberal governmentality sovereign is whoever to whom the sovereign power has been delegated in that particular situation. The delegation of execution of mobility restrictions of HIV positive people to agencies which hire workers in foreign countries, employees or universities in different situations is a prime example of this liberal phenomenon.

The above-mentioned does not, however, mean that the liberal states would be the ones who employ delegated sovereignty in relation to the mobility restriction of HIV positive people and illiberal states would deploy state imposed travel or residence regulations. As usual with liberalism, the issue is not as simple as this. Even though majority of the states that deploy state imposed travel or residence regulations could be considered as illiberal states, there are also liberal states that do this as well. For example, the United States is among the list of fourteen countries in the world which either categorically refuse the entry of PLWHA or also require disclosure of HIV infection even for short-term stays. In addition, the United States is also among the list of thirty countries in the world which force HIV positive foreigners to leave if the foreigner is found out to be HIV positive while staying otherwise legally in the country.[241]

Furthermore, even in countries where there are no surveillance or border control measures for HIV positive people's entry, as there are not in many liberal states, there still regularly exist some sort of ways how the uninsured HIV positive people are managed if their presence presents a risk for the

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[240] Wiessner & Lemmen 2008, 4–6.
[241] Ibid.

insured population's way of life. Ingram's research on the United Kingdom's policies is an illustrative example in this sense. Ingram's research highlights how instead of adopting surveillance and border control measures in relation to HIV positive people, the British policy makers focused on redefining the boundaries of legitimate access to services of the National Health Service (NHS) by overseas visitors, by revisiting the charging regulations for 'overseas visitors'. These regulations specified that all people within the United Kingdom were entitled to free emergency treatment if their life was under immediate threat. However, failed asylum seekers or other people in the country without proper authority could not receive free treatment for HIV through ARVs. Thus people could be saved from AIDS-defining illnesses, but if they lacked money they were not saved from the condition that caused these illnesses – from being HIV positive.[242]

When thinking about HIV/AIDS and the management of migration within liberal governmentality, then, it is essential to understand the flexibility of this governmentality also regarding its deployment of sovereign power. The ways how the policing of foreign HIV positive people can be done within liberal governmentality are numerous. There are border control measures; requirements for foreigner to take a HIV test as a prerequisite for employment, assignment for study positions or stipends; denial of health care access; and, probably a lot of other possible techniques that are used which the writer is not aware of. The point, however, is not to list all these possible techniques but to acknowledge the existence of these techniques also within liberal states as all of these techniques are parts of the same phenomena. Thus one should not be deluded by the quantity of these techniques as all of these techniques are just different solutions to one of the most central problems of liberal governing; namely, what to do to people who are not seen fit enough to be treated as genuine liberal subjects, but are perceived as threats to the liberal way of life. Whatever the chosen technique is we are always dealing here with 'the dark side' of liberal ethos which is never about liberty or rights but about constraints and violence. This dark side that liberal ethos tries to hide, but never seems to succeed in this for good as in practice this dark side is indispensable for the functioning of liberal governmentality. There always seems to be plenty of people in the world who are not seen to be fit enough to be genuine subjects of liberal governmentality and thus these people have to be policed in an authoritarian manner within this same governmentality.

In the following I will concentrate on the previous in the case of gender. I will do this by analysing one gender, HIV/AIDS and migration related Kenyan novel called *Confessions of an AIDS Victim*. In this novel authoritarian policing of HIV positive people through management of migration is a theme to which the whole story is based on. Thus it can be said that in this novel the global

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[242] Ingram 2008, 885–888.

governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is in collision with the management of migration in the case of gender. By revealing this collision this novel stretches liberal governance to its limits and reveals the arbitrary sovereign excess that nevertheless exists within liberal governing as not every practice of liberal governance is accepted in this narrative. This narrative brings out that due to the arbitrary sovereign excess of governance many Africans face questionable, paradoxical and unfair constrains that discriminate against certain individuals considerably.

4.2. FICTIVE NARRATION

Confessions of an AIDS Victim, which is written by Kenyan writer called Carolyne Adalla, is an autobiographical account of a young Kenyan woman whose scholarship for an American University is taken a way from her because she is found out to be an HIV positive. The novel is not an authentic autobiographical novel as in the preface it is announced that the story is fictive and the name of the heroine – Catherine Njeri – differs from the name of the author, even though the narrative is told in the first person and the narrator is also the heroine. There is no further background information about this novel available and neither there exists further biographical information about the author.[243]

Naturally, the fictional character of the novel does not make it useless research material. Even though the novel is announced to be fictive, the world that the novel describes is not unambiguously fictive. By this I mean that the narrative contained by the novel does not include anything that one could announce to be fictive in the first place by just concentrating on the narrative. The only thing that makes the narrative fictive is the announcement in the preface of the novel and the fact that the author is named differently than the heroine. The narrative *itself* is not distinctly fictive. This kind of confusion is not rare in relation to novels in general as through history many fictive novels have been celebrated as authentic depictions of reality and many genuine autobiographical accounts have been read as fiction. Dorrit Cohn has given us a number of examples of this. For example, Jerzy Kosinski's *The Painted Bird* was first welcomed by its readers as an authentic account of Kosinski's own childhood in Nazi occupied Poland. Later, however, Kosinski added an epilogue to his book where he denied this to be the case. An opposite example is Henry Miller's *The Tropic of Cancer*. In a review of this book the reviewer read the story as fiction and celebrated Miller's ability

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[243] Krüger 2004, 109.

to create such a realistic hero. To this review Miller himself angrily responded that the theme, narrator and hero of the book are the same person – Henry Miller.[244]

The confusion between fiction and fact is not characteristic only to novels, but also to more 'serious' texts. Some kind of imagining is essential part of every act of writing or reading. In order to produce new knowledge or form new conceptions of something people have to reorganize old meanings and signs; they have to create fiction. From this perspective, then, fiction always plays some kind of part in all texts, regardless of how truthful they are understood to be. Hence, even the scientific discourse has to be always fictive in some ways. Of course, this does not mean that everything is fiction and that there is no truth as the truth is not based on any particular text but it has an intertextual character. Truth is formed in the intersections of different texts and thus it cannot be told in whatever way but only by respecting the order of knowledge. This order of knowledge always guides the production of new truths and thus, for instance, talking about fiction within science is not a reason for anyone to fear for the loss of sensible foundation. Fact and fiction are not so far from each other than it is typically assumed. For example, 'fictive' texts that respect the order of knowledge can be 'true' in a way, even though they are announced to be fictive, and this does not take anything away from the truth.[245]

Regarding the above-mentioned it becomes relevant to ask what it matters if a novel is an authentic account or if it is not when using a novel as a research material? What does it matter if an author is writing about one's own life or someone else's or, as Foucault has formulated the question, what does it matter who is speaking? While dwelling on this question Foucault highlighted that this problem of the author is culture specific. Since the 18th century within the Western culture the author has been a principle through which the literary whole has been organized. The author is not, however, the only way how this can be done and through history there has been other ways for this organization. For example, the Arabian *The Thousand and One Nights* does not rely on the author. It is important to note that in addition to being cultural specific, the author is also constraining figure. As continued by Foucault, the author functions as a regulator that hinders free circulation, free manipulation, free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In contrast to this, Foucault reflects a way to study fiction not through questions like "who really spoke?", "is it really he and not someone else?", "with what authenticity or originality?" and "what part of his deepest self did he express in his discourse?", but through questions like "what are the modes of existence of this discourse?", "where has it been used and who can appropriate it for himself?",

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[244] See e.g. Cohn 1999, 34–35.
[245] See e.g. Haraway 1991, Shapiro 1992 & Rancière 2006.

"what are the places in it where there is room for possible subjects?" and "who can assume these various subject functions?". Thus according to Foucault we should study fiction simply as texts without pondering about their author or other irrelevant matters that lie outside these texts.[246]

In the case of the *Confessions of an AIDS Victim* I will follow the previous insight by Foucault and examine the novel only as text. I will examine it in a same way as I examined narratives in the previous chapter: as a comment on narrators own state which results from the workings of liberal governance in the case of HIV/AIDS and gender. As the narrators state results largely from the sovereign power, the narrative can be seen especially as a challenge to this form of power. Through narration the narrator interacts with the sovereign power and points to the limits of liberal governance by bringing out the questionable, the paradoxical and the unfair elements that exist within it. Through this interaction the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS can be once again politicized further. There is, of course, nothing new in this kind of reading of fiction within studies concentrating on HIV/AIDS or international relations. Within studies concentrating on HIV/AIDS all kinds of fictive writing has been celebrated as important subjects of research because it has been seen that through writing it is possible to describe experiences of HIV/AIDS that are outside the medical and other authoritative understandings of the condition.[247] Within studies concentrating on international relations fictive texts have been used in order to introduce new perspectives and in order to politicize old ones.[248]

4.3. POLITICAL TRAGEDY

From the perspective of narrative research the *Confessions of an AIDS Victim* starts adequately as in the first page of the novel the narrator/heroine of the story – Catherine Njeri – characterizes her life as a tragedy. This characterization is not by any means incorrect as the life story Njeri is about to tell is very sad and unfortunate. Four months before the beginning of the novel Njeri was granted a scholarship in order to continue her studies in an American university. Now, as Njeri starts to tell her story, however, Njeri is shocked because she has just found out that she is HIV positive. She acquired this information from the results of an HIV test which she took as part of the immigration requirements. Thus Njeri does not only have deadly virus in her body but she cannot either travel to the United States in order to continue her studies.

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[246] Foucault 1986, 119–120.
[247] See e.g. Brophy 2004 & Chambers 2004.
[248] See e.g. Weldes 2003; Nexon & Neumann 2006.

The novel consists of a letter that Njeri has written to her friend Marilyn. Njeri states that she has written this letter in order to tell Marilyn about her tragic fate and in order reflect her own life and emotions. According to Njeri, writing seems to be the only way she can emotionally vent her feelings and to understand her present state. In addition, Njeri hopes that this letter could be made public after she has gone in order to bring comfort to other people in similar position and to be a lesson for people who are not yet HIV positive. Njeri's urge to reach a wide audience turns Njeri's narration to a political activity in the Arendtian sense. As already stated, from the Arendtian perspective, narration is an important way through which a human being can bring oneself to the public space and interact with this space. Thus narration should be seen as political activity *par excellence* as it is as way of being in contact with the public space and to influence this public space by joining it as oneself. This is also a central theme in Njeri's letter. Njeri wants to find a way to express herself to other people. She feels that her story deserves to be told to a wide audience as she wants her story to have a wide affect. This feeling triggers Njeri's need to tell in the first place and organizes the content of her story.

The task that Njeri has took to herself, however, proves not to be an easy task. The shock caused by the fact of being HIV positive is so strong that it is hard for Njeri to articulate her experience. Njeri's narration is trembling and often quite chaotic as she tries to express her feelings. Njeri writes, "as I write, I am visibly trembling […]. 'It is not possible; it is not true.' I have said these words over and over during past three days. It is like a dream from which I hope to be shaken awake"[249]. After a while Njeri continues, "I cannot fathom the idea, but an AIDS victim! – that is what I am now."[250] This trembling and chaotic character of Njeri's narration does not stem only from the fear of physical death and pain. Njeri can already imagine the stigma attached to the disease. She states, "[p]retty soon I will be faceless and nameless. Catherine, the beautiful name my mother gave me, will only be mentioned in hushed voices and by wagging tongues."[251]

Njeri's fear of stigma is so powerful that at one point of her letter Njeri considers the possibility of concealing her state from other people for good. Njeri ponders that it is better that she keeps her HIV infection as a secret as long as possible because she feels that she could not bear the despising and rejection. However, as Njeri continues her writing she notices that she cannot escape the stigma she already feels. She is shattered by the thought of people treating HIV positive people like people suffering from leprosy were treated. Njeri thinks about loneliness that people suffering from AIDS experience. They lose their friends and nearly no one wants to have anything to do with them. This

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[249] Adalla 1993, 1.
[250] Ibid, 2.
[251] Ibid, 2–3.

is the reality that Njeri cannot forget. She wonders, "why do I feel so neglected and dejected, even before I pronounce that I am an AIDS Victim?"[252] Njeri feels that her possibilities for ordinary life have been taken away from her for good and she states that she lives in "the cocoon of hopelessness and dejection that is now my house."[253]

Njeri's description of her state enforces the view that an HIV positive person truly is a *persona non grata* and is treated likewise. Before one's physical death an HIV positive person is already socially dead because she is not seen or heard, as Judith Butler has written.[254] Social death is an important term as it is through this term that Njeri's difficulties of expression can be understood. The life of an HIV positive person is socially neglected experience and thus there are no earlier lived experiences available for Njeri to relate her present state. There are only pathological categories and desperate positions that are socially available to Njeri. It is no wonder then that in the course of her letter Njeri characterizes herself sometimes as a member of risk group and sometimes as an already dead person. However, in the end Njeri is not satisfied to any of these categories or positions that are available to her. Many times Njeri also questions these categories and positions; for example, Njeri asks,

> Don't we still pass for human beings deserving love, attention and company for as long as we still live – or have we degenerated so much as to drop the human status? […] Will the time come when AIDS sufferers will be considered as any other patients with no dejection and desolation?[255]

However, Njeri does not acquire answers to these questions through her writing. Njeri's new condition has left her with more questions than it has been able to provide answers. Nevertheless, through her letter Njeri is constantly searching for these and this search has a value in itself, even though at end of the letter Njeri announces that she is not completely satisfied what she has written as she has not been able to express herself better.

Despite of Njeri's 'failure', Njeri's search starts a process which significance especially Paul Ricoeur has highlighted. For Ricoeur, narration is an activity where one interprets one's life with the help of already existing narratives. Even though this means that one's life story is in some ways always constrained by already existing narratives, narration is never completely faithful to already existing narratives. This is because one *interprets* already existing narratives and does not strictly mould one's life in accordance with these narratives. When one narrates one constantly interacts

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[252] Ibid, 51.
[253] Ibid, 53.
[254] Butler 1997, 27.
[255] Adalla 1993, 51–52.

with the already existing narratives. This interaction constitutes a poetic process from which the uniqueness and individuality of narration can be found.[256]

Regarding Njeri's narration, it is also possible to find the uniqueness and individuality from the poetic process which is constituted from Njeri's interaction with the constraining social context she now finds herself. By paying attention to the poetic process of Njeri's narration it is possible to bring out substance that is not completely in accordance with the constraining social context and thus through this substance it is possible to question this context. It is possible to show how the treatment of Njeri is questionable, paradoxical and unfair. Furthermore, it is possible to show how this questionable, paradoxical and unfair character of Njeri's treatment is not only characteristic to Njeri's local or national context but extends all the way to the international context. When Njeri's situation is analyzed in this international context the management of migration collides heavily with the ethos of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in the case of gender. This collision, then, reveals the arbitrary sovereign excess that nevertheless exists within liberal governing.

4.4. CONTEMPORARY COLONIZED OTHER

Njeri's reflection of her life brings out the peculiarity of the way how Njeri is now treated so differently than before, even though Njeri does not feel that she has changed so much. Njeri feels that she is still the same person she was before she knew about her HIV infection, but now many constraints she is made to face tell a different story. Njeri's own view of herself has started to considerably differ from the way others see her. At times Njeri reminisces her former life. Njeri reminisces how she has always done well with her studies, how she has loved, how she has been loved, how many unforgettable moments she has shared with her friends, how she tried to get somewhere abroad to continue her studies like many of her friends had done and how she even succeeded in this by winning a scholarship for an American university. All of a sudden, however, this all is disappearing from Njeri's life. Njeri is afraid that her friends will desert her and that she will not be loved anymore. She is grieving over her lost scholarship and the fact that she cannot continue her studies anymore. For the worse, there is virus in her body that she cannot escape. Njeri's body has turned against her as it is now due to it that she is one-sidedly condemned. Thus there is no other option for Njeri than to adjust herself to her miserable condition. This causes a lot of anxiety in Njeri and she thinks that this adaptation process will not be easy. She writes,

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[256] Ricoeur 1991, 24–25.

I know I will find it extremely difficult to go about life in the face of the new development. I therefore need plenty of time to reflect and get used to my new self, just as a prisoner who with time, becomes fond of a spider.[257]

Njeri's anxiety can be compared surprisingly well with the time of colonialism. Especially Fanon's depictions of an anxiety caused by 'a black man's' body are very similar to anxiety Njeri is facing. According to Fanon, the consciousness of the body of a black man was solely a negating activity because the black skin only restricted and constrained life in a white world. Fanon gives an account of the situation in the first person: "I was expected to behave like a black man […] I shouted my greeting to the world and the world slashed away my joy. I was told to stay within bounds, to go back where I belonged."[258] Fanon continues, "Look, a Negro!" "Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened!"[259] Fanon tries to only to laugh at these exclamations, but soon notices that he is not able. He knows about the existence of legends, stories and history that are behind these exclamations. Now Fanon begins to see himself through the eyes of others. He notices his dark skin and ethnic characteristics. He is battered down by prejudices: cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishisms, racial defects… "The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly"[260]. Now Fanon writes, "I become aware of my uniform. I had not seen it. It is indeed ugly. I stop there, for who can tell me what beauty is?"[261]

On the grounds of Fanon's writing, then, colonial racism caused similar alienation from one's body than Njeri's alienation from her newly HIV positive body. This it not, however, the only interface between Njeri's and Fanon's writing. In addition to corporeal anxiety, the rejection faced by Njeri is quite similar to the rejection faced by Fanon. According to Fanon, in a colonial society black man wanted to be white; in a colonial society all the norms were white and everyone was expected to live according to these norms regardless of their skin color. But, if one was black one could never fully fulfill the expectations of these norms despite how hard one tried as in the end one was still black. Thus whatever the black man did the colonial society was still based on racism and the black man was eventually rejected.[262]

Njeri's narration highlights same kind of rejection than the one described by Fanon, even though the context is different. In the Njeri's case the rejection is not about the values of an occupant that the natives are also made to pursue, even though succeeding in this is impossible. However, in the

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[257] Adalla 1993, 6.
[258] Fanon 1986, 114–115.
[259] Ibid, 112.
[260] Ibid, 113.
[261] Ibid, 114.
[262] Ibid, 11.

Njeri's narrative one can spot a same kind of promise that has been made to Njeri but which is then dubiously broken, as the promise made to black man regarding the fulfillment of the expectations of white norms was always eventually broken in a colonial society. In order to understand this one has to take in to account the international dimension that is all the time lurking behind the Njeri's story. By this international dimension I mean that despite of the fact that Njeri's narration happens in Kenya, the geographical borders of Kenya do not completely define Njeri's narration. On the contrary, Njeri is constantly referring to people and things outside Kenya. On the course of the narrative it becomes clear that Njeri's best friend Marilyn studies in the Netherlands, Njeri's ex-boyfriend Brian studies in the United States and a lectured Njeri is familiar with is about to leave to the United Kingdom in order to continue his studies. In addition, Njeri parents have in her home village boasted to everyone how their daughter is traveling abroad to study. Naturally, Njeri's narration also touches her own ambitions of studying abroad. Hence, it is clear that awareness about possibilities outside Kenya has been present in Njeri's and her circle of acquaintances lives for a long time. The international dimension has presented to Njeri and her circle of acquaintances future possibilities which Njeri and many people she is familiar with have wanted to take advantage of.

The fact that international dimension has for a long time presented imagined possibilities to Njeri and her circle of acquaintances can be linked to Arjun Appadurai's ideas about the important role of imagination in the globalizing world. According to Appadurai, Benedict Anderson's idea of imagined community has lost its monopoly. People's imaginations are not anymore bound by the 'picture' of the nation state but it has been replaced by other images. For example, at the moment, there are more people than ever who imagine themselves or their children living or working in a different place where they have been born. These images of migration result from the flows of images, scripts, models and narratives that are not anymore restricted by national boundaries. It is all the time becoming easier at different parts of the world to see news and movies or to hear stories that mediate images of foreign places. There simply is not that many people anymore in our globe who do not know at least someone who is traveling to somewhere or returning home from somewhere at this very moment. This grown level of migration does not only have an effect on people who are traveling themselves but the stories of these people will also reach, and affect on the imagination of, people who have stayed put so far.[263]

From the Appaduraian perspective, then, it is possible to interpret Njeri's narration in a way that Njeri imagined herself already as a subject of the globalizing world. Njeri had seen how many of her acquaintances had taken advantage of the possibilities brought to them by globalization and she

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[263] Appadurai 1998, 4–6.

though she could also herself do the same. In a way the globalizing world had already given its promise to Njeri about the future study possibility that she could reach if she could do as well as her acquaintances. Njeri worked hard for this possibility which eventually paid off as Njeri was granted a scholarship by an American university. It was supposed to be a done deal but, then, suddenly the globalizing world breaks its promise to Njeri. Now, all of a sudden, hard work done by Njeri is not enough. It is revealed that she is HIV positive which means that she has hit a dead end regarding her dreams. She writes that because of HIV infection "[y]ou cannot carry on with your dreams. They are still shattered and death looms in the dark."[264]

In relation to previous, it is relevant to further stress the questionability of the procedure that has crushed Njeri's dreams. There is obviously no reason why an HIV infection and studying should be mutually exclusive. Even though if one happens to be an HIV positive, one can study and many HIV positive people all around the world do study. Hence, herein the question is not about Njeri being HIV positive as such because in the United States as in the rest of the world HIV positive citizens are allowed to study. Herein the question is, then, more about the place where Njeri comes from. Njeri is primarily perceived as a foreign threat to the United States; Njeri is seen as representing the Other. This perception is beneficial to the United States in terms of identity politics. By forbidding Njeri's, and other foreign HIV infected people's, presence in the country, the United States can externalize HIV/AIDS. It can send a message that HIV/AIDS is something that does not belong to the core of Americanism, as David Campbell has written.[265] More importantly in relation to this research, seeing Njeri as representing the Other also offers a solution to the drawing a line between people who are inside the liberal polity as genuine liberal subjects and who are not. From the perspective of liberal politics, this is a line that has to be drawn somewhere as HIV positive uninsured Africans who are out of place are, nevertheless, in general perceived as threats to the liberal way of life and in someway they always have to be policed. In the case of Njeri this policing is done with the help of national borders. Thus Njeri is a not so much a victim of AIDS than she is a victim of liberal sovereign power practiced through these borders. It is this power that puts Njeri to an awkward position which in some ways even resembles the position of the colonized people of the past.

Furthermore, it is worth to note that the policing of Njeri does not only take her agency away within the international arena but it affects her agency at the local level as well. In her letter Njeri ponders how she can explain to her parents and current employer that she will not travel to the United States

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[264] Adalla 1993, 82.
[265] Campbell 1998, 99.

after all. Njeri knows that people are expecting her to leave soon and the fact that she cannot now fulfill these expectations causes a lot of embarrassment as she will let many people down who are close to her. Thus in the case of Njeri international level cannot be clearly separated from the local level. Taking away of Njeri's agency internationally affects her life in the local context as it makes her to fear the scorn and stigma of her own community.

Through pointing out the intertwining of international and local contexts, Njeri's letter reveals an aspect that is very important in relation to sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS and also in relation to the worldwide HIV/AIDS pandemic. That is the continuum between all sorts of policing of migration regarding HIV/AIDS and the stigma suffered by HIV positive people. This is important as stigma is frequently highlighted as one of the biggest obstacles within the HIV/AIDS crisis. Due to stigma many people hide their HIV positive status which can restrain them acting in ways that protect themselves and others. This is confessed and highlighted by every actor from the United Nations to the grassroots level organizations. Also the state that has forbidden Njeri's entry proclaims in its global HIV/AIDS strategy that

> Stigma remains a primary barrier to combating HIV/AIDS. Fear of disease and discrimination inhibits people from seeking and offering information, testing, treatment, and care. HIV travels swiftly and surely under cover of silence and denial. [...] HIV is a virus that knows no borders, discriminates against no race, no gender, and no class. We will encourage people to fight the disease, not the people who live with it, and to treat people infected and affected by AIDS not with cruelty and discrimination but with dignity and compassion.[266]

When the previous is read from the perspective of Njeri's story the difference between liberal ethos and practices become especially salient. As has been stressed already many times, liberalism is as much about liberty and rights than it is about constraints and violence. Sometimes, as in this case, the constraints side of liberalism is so powerful that it makes the ethos side dubious altogether.

4.5. VICTIM OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES

Stigma and constraints that HIV positive people have to face causes a lot of confusion for Njeri through her whole letter. Njeri cannot fully grasp why HIV positive people are treated with discrimination and why they have to face so many constraints. Njeri's confusion does not, however, mean that she would not take responsibility for her own actions. On the contrary, due the course of her letter Njeri constantly blames herself and at the end of her letter she writes that "I regret every

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[266] OGAC 2004, 9.

single day I have lived a reckless life, regret every affair I ever indulged in."[267] Couple of pages later she ads that she knows that the shame and regret she now bears will never go away. She knows that she will have these feelings for the rest of her life. Njeri accepts that she is responsible for her own destiny. At the same time that she accepts this she does not, however, accept that she is the sole villain of her story. As in a tragedy of classical Greek, Njeri's *hamartia*[268] leads to tragic destiny because Njeri has not been able take her circumstances into consideration. Njeri has acted irresponsibly through her unthoughtfulness, but the circumstances have also played a part in her tragic destiny. She has made a human error that could have been avoidable, but at the same time the error would have never been an error without the impact of the circumstances.

From Njeri's letter it is impossible to say what action taken by Njeri has actually been the *hamartia* of her story. Njeri tries to scratch her head over it but she still cannot be sure. At the end, Njeri is left with five options as there are five different men whom each of them could be the one who has infected Njeri. These men consist of Njeri's latest boyfriend Alex and four other more short-term acquaintances. Njeri reflects that all of these five men have probably had relationships to other women in addition to her as all of these men are relatively comfortable money-wise which makes them very eligible partners among the women in Njeri's society. Njeri doubts that these men did not take advantage of their position. In this way Njeri refers to commonly accepted biopolitical truth that unequal position of men and women in sub-Saharan Africa makes women more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS than men. Later in her letter Njeri voices this more explicitly when she states that "AIDS has come to exploit the low status of the woman in African society."[269]

After her previous statement Njeri further highlights the unequal position of women. She writes that for their whole lives women are economically dependent on men. First women are dependent on their father and after this women are dependent on their boyfriends or husbands. At the same time many men do not hesitate to take advantage of their position. Njeri refers to so called 'sugar daddies' who give gifts to and spend money on women in order to have sex with these women. Njeri continues that in these relationships sugar daddies are the ones who have the advantage which means that they are the ones who decide on condom use.[270]

Njeri thinks that she also may have well faced the unfortunate fate of many African women who are victims of men's behaviour. Njeri writes that in retrospect she has found out that it is probable that

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[267] Adalla 1993, 80.
[268] A mistake that lead to unforeseen tragic consequences. See Aristotle 1968.
[269] Adalla 1993, 77.
[270] Ibid, 78.

Alex has also had other girlfriends besides her. Njeri is surprised how poorly she seems to have known Alex, even though they were together for three years. This terrifies Njeri and she ponders how trustworthy men as whole are. Njeri asks,

> how reliable are these men when it comes to not passing the infection on to their wives, when their blood warms at the sight of every beautiful lady in the office or the bar? […] How many men, on realising that they have contracted a venereal disease, will hesitate to pass the infection on to their wives?[271]

Hence, Njeri shifts the blame about the spread of HIV/AIDS more onto men than women. Women are victims of men's actions as a result of two trends. Firstly, women are passive recipients of the virus who "must die for the sins of their spouses"[272]. Secondly, as women are economically dependent on men who the economy favours, women can improve their situation in this sphere of life only "through love, fake or otherwise"[273]. According to Njeri, all this puts women in a great danger. In spite of what kind of life one is living, just being a woman exposes one to HIV infection. Njeri realizes that these are the circumstances in which also she has lived.

Regarding the previous, it is easy to see strong resemblance between Njeri's narration and the biopolitics of gender in the case of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. When Njeri's narration is viewed from the perspective of biopolitics of gender, Njeri seems almost to be exactly that ideal subordinate African woman to whom the biopolitics of gender refers. In relation to gender inequality and sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, it is the biopolitics of gender that talks through Njeri. This conformity of the biopolitics of gender and Njeri's narration makes it especially peculiar that at the international arena Njeri is treated how she is treated. Njeri seems to be a woman who has absorbed biopolitical knowledge and thus she should be the one who is supported by the international community. However, in the case of Njeri this just does not happen. Njeri is caught at a wrong place; outside the limits that border the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. Outside these limits one is not anymore supported regardless of who one is or what one does. Thus place one is caught at and who one is matters in the case of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. The global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS clearly has limits and these limits involve deployment of 'illiberal' means in order to ensure the continuity of these limits.

Furthermore, on the basis of Njeri's narration it is also possible to connect the deadly circumstances Njeri and other women are facing to the processes of international relations. Njeri writes herself that the circumstances that press the spread of the virus partly result from the spread of the Western

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[271] Ibid, 78.
[272] Ibid, 74.
[273] Ibid, 49.

lifestyle in Africa. According to Njeri, her society is "caught at a crossroads between Western behaviour and African morals."[274] This kind of connection has been made by others as well. Both Dennis Altman and Angus Bancroft have written that the spread of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS epidemic is intertwined, for example, with the disintegration of traditional communities, urbanization, road building, emancipation of social atmosphere, amplification of sexual freedom and large population movements. Thus the spread of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is intertwined with the development began by Western powers in the continent. In addition, and as highlighted earlier in this research, Altman and Bancroft continue that also the present Western driven economic policies play their role in increasing the vulnerability of some people in front of HIV/AIDS. These policies affect, for example, access to health services, incidence of poverty and rolling out of pharmaceuticals. In other words, these policies affect who will be infected and who will be not.[275]

Also Njeri herself, due the course of her letter, makes occasional references to the linkage between economic situation and the spread of HIV/AIDS. For example, Njeri wonders about the behaviour of prostitutes at the present times. Njeri cannot fully grasp how anyone can be a prostitute in a situation where this means almost a certain death sentence. For this puzzle Njeri is not able to figure any other answer than the most obvious one; Njeri states that "the economy is pretty bad."[276] Again, from this perspective, the denial of Njeri by the United States is hypocrite. As 'the only superpower of the world', the economic policies pursued by the United States have strongly affected the circumstances where Njeri has lived in. These circumstances, then, have strongly affected the fact that Njeri has been infected in the first place. This, however, does not matter as Njeri is now facing connive sovereign power which has contributed to the fate of Njeri, but makes sure that Njeri dies slowly and certainly without disturbing the security of the liberal way of life.

4.6. CATHARSIS OF THE TRAGEDY

According to Aristotle, a central element in a tragedy is catharsis; an emotional purification. When following a tragedy the audience can identify with the suffering of the characters in a play. Through this the audience can experience a catharsis and learn to control their feelings. They can learn to experience pity and fear in a balanced manner.[277] It is possible to interpret Njeri's narration also from this perspective.

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[274] Ibid, 74.
[275] Altman 1999, 563–565; Bancroft 2001, 92–95.
[276] Adalla 1993, 76.
[277] See Aristotle 1968.

Even though in the Njeri's narration the given pathological categories attract Njeri to make sense of her life through them, Njeri also manages to bring out her experience in 'a normal' way. Njeri's reflection brings out her humaneness to which the reader can identify. Njeri succeeds to mediate her regret, misfortune and suffering in a way that can be felt by the reader. Njeri reflection portraits a picture of a quite an ordinary person, instead of an image of a health or security risk. In this way the reader of Njeri's story can experience a catharsis in relation to victims of the sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS epidemic. The reader can understand the complexity of the lives of the HIV positive people. Njeri's narration calls into question the black and white thinking in relation to these people and a reader of Njeri's thoughts can understand that these people are neither unambiguously guilty nor guiltless to their fates. These people are, in the first place, just people, each with their own faults, strengths and different situations in life.

Especially, the reader of Njeri's story can experience catharsis in relation to HIV positive people who face travel and residence regulations. Njeri's narration illustrates a very different reality than the viewpoints to which these regulations are based. Njeri cannot be seen just as a risk or threat. Njeri is an unhealthy individual who, nevertheless, could still continue to pursue her dreams, as many other unhealthy individuals are allowed to do. However, for some reason this option is not available to Njeri anymore, even though her story expresses her intelligence, sense of responsibility and determination. From the perspective of Njeri's story, Njeri seem more like a valuable individual than a threatening villain who has to be policed.

In addition to questioning the travel and residence regulations, Njeri's narration also brings out the hypocrisy inherent in the travel and residence regulations of HIV positive people in two ways. Firstly, Njeri has lived in difficult circumstances that have been affected by policies of the developed world and these circumstances have played a big role in the infection of Njeri. Now, however, the developed world, despite all the rhetoric that claims otherwise, does everything it can in order to stop Njeri in bringing the bad consequences of its own policies to its core areas. Secondly, the restrictions that Njeri now faces just further contribute in the creation of favorable circumstances to the spread of HIV/AIDS by increasing the stigma attached to the disease. In this way the restrictions just create new 'Njeris' which, then, call for further policing. Thus the vicious circle has been born.

From the perspective of this research, however, the greatest value in Njeri's narration lies in its ability to point to the limits of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in the case of

gender. When Njeri's narration is viewed from the perspective of biopolitics of gender, Njeri seems to be almost exactly that ideal subordinate African woman to whom the biopolitics of gender refers to. Njeri seems to be a woman who has absorbed biopolitical knowledge and thus she should be the one who is supported by the international community. However, in the case of Njeri this just does not happen. Njeri is caught at a wrong place; outside the limits that border the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. Outside these limits one is not anymore supported regardless of who one is or what one does. Outside these limits one is not anymore subject of biopower but sovereign power. Hence, Njeri's tragedy is at the same time tragedy of liberal governance in general. Despite the existence of the positive liberal ethos that stresses liberty, freedom and rights, in practice this ethos is backed up by constraints, authoritarianism and violence as there always seems to be people who are not fit enough to govern themselves within the liberal framework. In this way liberalism seems to always promise more than it can actually give. There always seems to be people who understandably do not cope with the demands of liberalism which results that the promise and the reality faced by these people do not meet. In these instances liberalism creates suffering, fear and anxiety – it creates a tragedy.

As Njeri's narration is able to point to all of the above-mentioned dimensions, it should be treated as having a very high political value. In this respect it is again possible to compare Njeri's narration to Fanon's writing, as done already earlier. As already written, Fanon found himself in the web of legends, stories and history that proclaimed his inferiority in relation white colonialists. All the knowledge was 'white' and thus anything 'black' was always on beforehand labeled as irrational. It was, then, impossible for Fanon to bring out his experience in a way he would have wanted. It was impossible for him to express himself within the prevailing rationality. Regardless of this, in the end, Fanon was able to find a voice for himself. This voice was irrational voice from the perspective of white colonialists, but it nevertheless was a *voice*. It was the voice of the Negritude writers and poets that celebrated everything that was labeled as primitive by the colonialists. Within the Negritude movement tradition, emotion, primitivism and irrationality were all seen as positive aspects and these aspects were treated with pride. Fanon saw that the Negritude movement was very important in the struggle against colonialism as it created a position for the colonized through which it was possible to distance oneself from the prevailing rationality.[278]

In a similar criterion as Fanon celebrated the Negritude movement, Njeri's narration can be celebrated. As Negritude movement was able to question the prevailing rationality at colonial times, Njeri's narration is able to question the prevailing rationality in relation to the contemporary global

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[278] Fanon 1970, 53.

governance regime that manages the sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS epidemic. Thus, as it was written earlier that Njeri's position in some ways resembles the position of the colonized people of the past, it is justified now to write that in some ways Njeri's narration resembles the work of the Negritude movement. Njeri's narration creates a position through which it is possible to distance oneself from the prevailing rationality of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS in the case of gender; a position through which it is possible to refuse and resists unjust practices of the global liberal governance.

5. CONCLUSIONS

At the risk of being labelled as a Afropessimist, I think it is very sad to see enthusiastic Africans sincerely believing in their cause and having faith in a better tomorrow in a situation were their present activities are unlikely to change that much. These Africans believe in a promise made to them by internationally funded NGOs that recruit them to make a difference. However, as a couple of years go by the enthusiasm is likely to fade away as the impact of the project is harder to detect than first imagined or the aims of the project are getting old-fashioned. Either way it is likely that the project is soon going to be cancelled altogether. After this some of these people still have fate left and they volunteer for a different project. Some of these people do this for money and they start to work in a different project if they happen to get hired by some NGO. Rest of these people quit NGO work and are just anymore targets of NGO projects.

In many ways there is nothing new in the above-mentioned. The past decades of development in sub-Saharan Africa are full of different promises, programs, projects and failures. Successes seem to be rare, even though the proponents of development always have some specific example in mind. In addition, when there is success this success is usually relatively small-scale success and rarely accepted without polemics. However, despite the unlikely odds in attaining success, there always seem to be enthusiasts running new projects over and over again.

Despite of maybe some fanatics, the cyclical continuum of efforts and failures that has been present in the development of sub-Saharan Africa, at least, until now is nowadays confessed by nearly everyone. It is confessed that only aid in itself is unlikely to change the course of the region or if aid is to be the solution the amount of aid has to be magnified to a degree that many Western governments seem to not be willing to pay at the moment. At the extreme, some have given up hope almost completely and now call the whole continent as 'a lost continent' or equivalent. However, at the same time sub-Saharan African countries are all the time seen as becoming more and more important regarding the security of the contemporary liberal way of life. HIV/AIDS and other maladies that are seen to ravage these countries are perceived as risks that can lead to failed states, raise of religious fundamentalism, uncontrolled migration etc. Thus different governments, especially Western ones, have interest in sub-Saharan Africa. They want to manage the risks that the future of the continent poses. This is why it is hard at present to find a Western government that would not see its development cooperation in Africa as connected to its foreign and security policy.

The view of the Africa as a some kind of 'lost continent' and parallel importance of managing the risks that the continent poses has to be seen as intertwined with the raise of non-material issues in development of the continent. Non-material issues which are seen as transformable through different sorts of education, such as gender issues, are now buzzwords of the development in sub-Saharan Africa. This is, at least partly, because through concentrating on these issues the donor does not have to use its own resources that much for a 'lost continent' and can still participate in the rule of it. For example, as I have shown in the case of gender and sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, through concentrating on gendered effects of HIV/AIDS it is possible to render sub-Saharan Africa as governable quite cheaply and effectively. Through concentrating on gendered effects of HIV/AIDS it is possible to mobilize civil society economically and effectively to put pressure on their governments and 'traditional' authorities that somehow restrain the workings of liberal governmentality. In addition, the existence of this pressure also offers liberal governmentality evidence of an existence of legitimate referent object to which liberal governmentality can see itself responsible for. Thus actors within liberal governmentality can, then, advocate for it and also to use other means, which are seen suitable at particular time, to support it.

To Africans, and to other people as well, all the talk on gender is sold by emphasizing that concentration on gender issues is important in order to save lives and tackle HIV/AIDS once and for all. However, giving gender a role this big has a same problem as giving this big role to any non-material issue. Namely, almost every non-material issue in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries in different regions have to be connected to poverty. Usually it is impossible to solve the problems caused by these issues with just non-material development. As stressed, in relation to sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, it is hard to simply gender educate your community out of poverty, which nevertheless is the most important dimension in the HIV/AIDS crisis. Thus through non-material development issues are not solved, but issues are managed. It is not likely that issues such as HIV/AIDS could be tackled through non-material development, but it is possible through non-material development to legitimately bring areas, which contain risks, within the reach of global governance.

When mainly managing risks for contemporary liberal way of life through development policies in sub-Saharan Africa, the development, if it is about to come, can only come in a liberal way and through discrimination of other ways of life. Projects aiming for development are organized along the liberal lines as they are frequently individualizing, aim for cost-effectiveness and are organized on the basis of biopolitical knowledge. Regarding sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, for example, it seems that everything is organized in a liberal way. Pharmaceuticals are rolled out along the liberal

governmentality, prevention projects respect biopolitical knowledge, African people are expected rise above their social context, etc. The ways, customs or habits that do not go along with liberal development are simply ignored or marginalized and the success of liberal development emerges as being dependent on discriminating these ways, customs and habits. For example, in order that the HIV/AIDS projects organized along the biopolitics of gender could really become effective and change the course of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS at least the dynamism and complexity of gender and sexual relations had to be wiped out. Without this many people simply would not be responding to the education that these projects are trying to give. Needless to say this would be a tremendous loss in terms of multiculturalism and against the rights of indigenous people.

Within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS there is, then, not only biopower at play but also sovereign power. As we are dealing here with a deadly condition, discrimination of other ways of life than the liberal one will mean death to many. Discrimination of ways of life will mean that there are people who cannot benefit from the workings of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. On the contrary, the workings of this governance function against these people as within this governance it is actively made sure that people who do not act according to liberal governmentality are neglected and thus, in some extent, left to die or even killed.

In addition, the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS has not only strictly defined limits in terms of what kind of life it values but also in terms of place and identity. This is easiest to grasp through the collision between the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS and the management of migration. This collision is a result from the fact that the same actors who support the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS are at the same time making sure that if an African does not stay within the given limits the African is not anymore supported, regardless of what the African does. In other words, if one is an African HIV positive person and stays put this African is supported, but if one is an African HIV positive person who does not stay put this African is policed in an authoritarian manner. Thus the place one is caught at and who one is matters also in the case of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. The global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS clearly has outer limits and these limits involve deployment of 'illiberal' means in order to ensure the continuity of these limits. If one is outside these limits one faces sovereign power that tries to make sure that one stays still and dies slowly, but certainly, without disturbing the security of the liberal way of life.

However, the undesirable outcomes of liberal development policies in sub-Saharan Africa can be resisted. This can be, and is at present, done in many different ways. For example, people to be

developed can simply ignore the education that targets them or deliberately misinterpret this education. In addition to resistance practiced by individuals, different groupings of people can practice resistance as well. Groupings that can do this most influentially and saliently in relation to liberal development policies are NGOs. As shown in relation to sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS, within liberal development the costs are economized through granting autonomy to NGOs. Also, NGOs, which liberal development sees as been equivalent to civil society, provide the compatible 'local voice' which liberal development needs in order that it can be seen as responding to needs of people to be developed. In these ways NGOs are highly important pieces in the liberal policies. Without NGOs contemporary liberal development policies could not function. This importance also gives certain elbow room to NGOs that can be at times used to do things which do not completely go along with the original goals of the liberal development policies. However, as NGOs are monitored and evaluated consistently they have to very careful in this use of their elbow room. NGOs cannot completely stop working in accordance with liberal development policies and thus step outside the subject position which makes their agency possible. This is simply impossible for NGOs to do without loosing their funding/agency. Thus when practicing resistance NGOs have to always perform a balancing act between conformist and resistance positions.

Furthermore, resisting liberal policies has one persistent difficulty: the flexibility of liberalism as a way of governing. Good example of this is the transformation of once revolutionary ideas of gender and the position of women to domesticated parts of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS. As shown, within the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS gender and the position of women are with considerable success made to serve the mission of contemporary liberal biopower. Thus when practicing resistance against liberalism one has to be very careful as it is likely that sooner or later liberal governance finds a way of organizing itself in accordance with this resistance. This is because liberal governance does not have a strictly fixed way of functioning, but it changes itself constantly according to efficiency calculations. This makes genuinely resisting liberal governance very difficult within the limits set by this governance.

To genuinely resist liberal governance it is, then, necessary to go beyond the limits set by this governance. One particular way to do this– and a way applied in this research – is to stretch liberal governmentality to its limits in order to bring out the sovereign excess that exists within liberal governmentality. In this way it is possible to reveal the true contingent essence of this form of governmentality. When this stretching succeeds liberal governmentality loses its anti-political nature as the selectivity inherent in this governmentality is revealed. This unnaturalises liberal governmentality and exposes it to politics. This is something that I have tried to bring out in relation

to the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS by highlighting experiences and viewpoints that do not unambiguously conform to the ready-made ideals of liberal governmentality, but also refuse these ideals. The existence of these experiences and viewpoints reveal that the workings of the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS do not benefit everyone equally and thus the workings of this governance should be treated as political activities.

There should be no doubt about that the acknowledgement of politics inherent in the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS is highly important. Through politicization of this governance it can be seen that the contemporary way of governance is not the only possible way of governance and certainly not an unproblematic way of governance at all. The realization of this can expose the global governance of sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS to a political debate and encourage presentation of all kinds of viewpoints about this governance. This would be most welcomed as through political debate there is a possibility that new ways of dealing with HIV/AIDS could open up. In the best possible scenario there would open up a new path that would in the end lead to tackling of HIV/AIDS without the undesirable consequences that the contemporary way of governing sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS produces.

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