Veikko Pietilä:

# ON THE SCIENTIFIC STATUS AND POSITION OF COMMUNICATION RESEARCH

(2nd, revised edition)

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FOREWORD

This paper has its origin in the Research Policy Programme endorsed by the Board of the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Tampere in October 1976, after being prepared by a team composed of Professors K. Nordenstreng, P. Hemánus and V. Pietilä as well as post graduate students H. Himanen and M. Perähuhta-Åkerlind. In fact, my initial purpose was simply to translate into English the core of the Programme - that is, Chapters 3, 4.1 and 4.2 of it, based mostly on my drafting. It is these chapters that present the views as to the nature of communication research adopted in the Programme - views that crystallize in the notion that what is at issue is an integral part or a moment of the general social science and, as such, a particular social science concentrating upon the relationship between the ideal and the social.

In order to get a background and a point of comparison for these views it proved necessary, however, to consider briefly the main other views as to communication research. Consequently, the first part of the paper begins with the presentation of the development of the thinking characteristic to the communication research in the United States. This beginning with the American views is only natural, since the bulk of the actual research into communication is carried out there. This is succeeded by a similar presentation of the development of the corresponding (West-)German views. These were chosen to be presented chifly because the German scientific tradition differs in certain interesting respect from the Anglo-American one. This first part of the study is closed with a chapter trying to account for the characteristics of the American social sciences in general.

In the second place, it also proved necessary to broaden the views as to the nature and realm of communication research as they were presented in the Research Programme, as well as to make them more exact. This consideration is included in the first chapter of the second part of this paper. Because this consideration is done in rather general terms, the second chapter of the second part of the paper tries to get it more concrete in a certain respect, by considering the relationship between the ideal and the social from the point of view - or in form of - how the functions of social communication and mass media are determined by the form of society. The basis for this consideration is made up of the Research Programme's suggestions for a number of points of departure arranging communication research as a moment of general social science.

Anyway, the subsequent suggestions concerning the question, how communication research as a discipline or science could be conceived, must be considered rather tentative than conclusive. I personally feel that the view about the subject included in the subsequent pages is still to a great extent incomplete and defective. Nevertheless I am convinced that the outline, along which the view has been shaped, is fundamentally adequate. It seems to me that only in keeping with this outline it becomes possible to free communication research from the dominating positivist paradigm and to transform it from a pure empirical field of research to a substantive discipline.

Tampere, March 1977
Veikko Pietilä

## FOREWORD TO SECOND EDITION

Since my view about the subject of this paper has, so I think, become more organized and coherent in the meanwhile, I have, in this second edition, rewritten the core of this paper - that is, chapter 2.1.2. and 2.1.3. This revision does not bear so much upon the substance than upon its form of presentation. I hope that my view will now be more readable than before.

Tampere, May 1978
Veikko Pietilä

# 1. THE 'COMMUNICOLOGICAL' THINKING IN THE UNITED STATES AND (WEST-) GERMANY

## 1.1. The 'communicological' thinking in the United States

### 1.1.1. The general characteristics of this thinking

It is all but an easy task to try to outline a clear and coherent picture about how communication research is conceived in the United States. In the first place, there seems to be no general agreement or consensus about the scientific status of it. Perhaps the most widespread conception as to this question is that communication research is not a science or scientific discipline of its own but only an interdisciplinary research area, where researchers representing different sciences proper (as, for instance, sociology, economics, history, psychology, etc.) work on the same phenomenon - that is, on human communication as it is realized in different forms such as personal face-to-face communication, mass communication, etc.[1] From this point of view the most problematic question is, what is communication. After this problem has been successfully settled - that is, after the definition of communication has been met with success - communication research can simply be defined as research dealing with communication.[2] In this case it does not matter, what kind of communication composes the object of study or from which viewpoint it is studied (sociological, economic, historical, psychological or what).

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[1] This conception is most illustratively represented by Schramm in his comment on Berelson's famous 'funeral speech' of communication research. As is known he said that communication research is not a discipline but only a field of research - "a crossroad where many pass but few tarry" (Schramm et al. 1959, 8; cf. also Schramm 1963, 1-2). This opinion is shared for instance by Sereno and Mortensen (1971, 1-3).

[2] For instance Schramm (1968, 4) defines journalism research and communication research simply as follows: "Journalism research is concerned primarily with the mass media of communication, whereas communication research deals with the communication process." - As McQuail (1975, 1-5) remarks, it is often difficult to distinguish between communication and other phenomena - as, for instance, between communication and human interaction in general.

There are, however, other voices arguing that communication research is no longer only a multidisciplinary field of study but it has matured to an academic discipline in its own right.[3] It is, of course, more than understandable that the knowledge about communication resulting from sociological, economic, etc. studies into it calls for a need to systematize this knowledge exactly from the point of view of communication itself. This, again, is likely to make it necessary to consider communication in general from its own point of view, to try to find out invariances characterizing it or to detect laws determining it, etc. - or, shortly, it is likely to raise a need for an independent science or discipline of communication. The conception about communication research as a discipline or science of its own is, however, a much more problematic one than the conception of it as a field of study. With respect to the latter conception the only problem is the definition of communication.[4] The former conception, for its part, raises besided this a lot of other questions bearing in particular on the question of the identity of communication research as a discipline or science.

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[3] This view has been expressed more and more emphatically over the years. For instance Lazarsfeld wrote in 1948 that "within the past ten years 'communication research' has developed into a field of its own, similar to such areas as criminology or vocational guidance, which crystallized in previous decades" (Lazarsfeld 1951, 218). Also Schramm spoke in 1959 about a field as can be seen from note 1. In 1966 De Fleur, for his part, wrote that "the study of mass communication seems to be emerging as a new academic discipline in its own right, although at this point it is by no means clear what its eventual organization, boundaries, and destinies will be" (De Fleur 1966, xiii). He repeated these words in 1970, too (De Fleur 1970, xiii). In 1973 Lin drew near the view of discipline by introducing the term "scientific field". He wrote as follows: "Thus, it (communication as a scientific term - V.P.) should properly be defined as a scientific field in which the nature of human symbolic exchange is studied" (Lin 1973, 9; italics omitted). And in 1975 De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach finally declared that communication research as a discipline was born: "In the United States the study of mass communication has emerged as a full-fledged academic discipline in its own right" (De Fleur & Ball-Rokeach 1975, vii).

[4] That neither is this a simple problem, however, can be seen from the review of different definitions by Nilsen (1971). See also Lin (1973, 3-9).

The term science is commonly used to mean that systematic, continually amplifying body of knowledge which grows out of the scientific research of the different aspects or moments of reality.[5] Therefore the particular sciences are customarily distinguished from one another on the basis of the particular aspect or moment of reality which they deal with. That aspect or moment of reality, which a scientifically acquired and systematized knowledge making up a particular science concerns, composes its object of study. Now, how is the case with communication research? Superficially considered it sounds downright ridiculous to ask, whether or not there is an object of study required to give communication research an identity as a discipline. If one looks at the world it seems that every sphere of human life is full of communication - it may even seem that the human life is fundamentally made up of communication. So, what there could be that would question the conception according to which communication research is a real scientific discipline whose object of study is composed of human communication in its diversified forms?

The objection, most difficult to turn aside, against this conception is the following one. If one outlines in his mind a schematical picture about the human communication taking place in society, by distinguishing between its various means and forms, he inevitably will come to note that the vast majority of these forms and means are already concerns of different established sciences. For instance linguistics is concerned with language, the most important means of communication. Psychology, again, is concerned with the mental processes as thinking, motivation, etc. underlying the human communication acts. Further, overt communication, as it takes place in groups of different kinds, has customarily been included into those group processes that belong to the domain of social psychology. And if we move to the societal or mass communication, we cannot but note, that there

[5] In the most general sense the term science refers, not only to the body of scientific knowledge, but to the entire social system who has the charge of producing this knowledge. On the different ways of conceiving this term see e.g. Hartikainen (1976, 18-28).

is the science of economics taking care of the economic aspect of it, the administrative and juridical sciences taking care of its organizational and legal aspects, etc. and, at last, there is sociology which takes care of those aspects that do not belong to other sciences. Consequently, it is difficult to avoid the idea that communication entirely dissolves in other sciences or disciplines - forming, at the most, only special subfields within them.[6]

Does this state of affairs deprive communication research of all hope for the status of a discipline or science in its own right? Not necessarily. In the first place one can argue that although communication would dissolve in already established sciences, it, nevertheless, is a particular social phenomenon departing, at least in some respects, from other phenomena. In order to understand this phenomenon we need all that knowledge dealing with it that exists dispersed within different sciences. To satisfy this need we must collect this knowledge together and systematize it according to the means, forms, and processes of communication. This knowledge would then make up the discipline of communication. From this viewpoint it can be enriched not only by looking up research results dealing with communication in the sciences 'proper' but also by exercising scientific research departing from the particular needs of the communication discipline itself. I will call this the eclectic conception, because it ultimately bases on the idea that communication can be conceived as a rather mechanical collection of 'relevant' aspects of linguistic, psychological, technical, economic, etc. data and theories.[7]

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[6] As a formally defined subfield communication research exists, however, primarily only in sociology and social psychology (cf. e.g. Dennis 1951 and Inkles 1964 or some of the common textbooks or readers of these sciences - as, for instance, Merton, Broom & Cottrell 1959 and Lindzey & Aronson 1968 etc.). In sociology, for instance, it was established as such a subfield in the late 30's and 40's (see e.g. Hinkle & Hinkle 1954).

[7] As a consequence of this eclecticism the Americans have been rather reluctant to develop an exact definition of the domain of communication research. As Schramm (1968, 5-6) puts it: "The truth is that there is no frontier. There is only communication research. All parts of it are re-

(The footnote continues on the following page)

In the second place one can argue that although communication would to the greatest part dissolve in other sciences there still remains something that does not dissolve.[8] What, then, would this something be? It is, of course, that very thing common to communication acts of all kinds - namely that somebody transmits a message to somebody else. Always when such a transmission takes place we are apt to say that a communication act took place. The act of transmission or, more generally speaking, exchange of messages seems to characterize all kinds

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(Footnote 7 continues)
lated to all other parts, and the landscape is marked off only by the fact that some scholars are centrally interested in one part, some in another... The task ahead is rather to break down such barriers as already exists; to cross the imaginary borders, ... to make use of the training of the psychologist, the sociologist, and others; to drawn on the insights of the learning theorist, the psycholinguist, the psychiatrist, the specialist in small group research, the student of propaganda and public opinion, the student of decision theory ... This is no time for secluding or restricting our research interests and our field but rather for the widest possible exploration in other fields where our problems are under study, and for the maximum number of interchanges and alliances, with other scholars working on these problems." Or as Driessel (1968, 19) puts it: "Human communication has captured the interest of researchers in such a variety of disciplines that it might be a contradiction in terms to speak of boundaries for the field." It is, of course, more than understandable that those looking at communication research as a field of study will keep the boundaries open - or will, in fact, deny the existence of such boundaries. However, also those regarding communication as a discipline of its own are inclined to do the same. So for instance De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach (1975, x-xi) write as follows: "If the field of mass communication seems widely inclusive, then, or if there does not seem to be any sharp line of demarcation that separates it from other fields which study social behavior, it is because mass communication occupies such a central place in the attentions of many related disciplines. As a result, it has developed many trends, many interests, and many directions. To conclude that this important area of knowledge should make its boundaries more rigid or should concentrate upon a narrower set of problems is simply to ignore the importance of the communication process to such a wide variety of interests. One can only hope that in its new disciplinary status mass communication will retain the flexibility it has had in the past."

[8] As De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach (1975, xi) rather carefully formulate: "Yet, in spite of the need for diversity and the advisability of keeping the boundaries of the field (of mass communication research - V.P.) open-ended, there is a growing need to begin some type of theoretical integration. This does not imply that the interests of many fields should not be represented; it simply suggests that certain persistent problems seem to lie at the center of almost everyone's interest." These common problems are reduced to the reciprocal relationships between society, media, and audience (De Fleur & Ball-Rokeach 1975, 261-275).

of communication. Consequently, the definitions of communication are almost without exception based on such a transmission or exchange model.[9] On this basis it would sound only natural to define that the object of study in communication research is made up of these message transmission acts as they occur in different spheres of human life. I call this the schematic conception, because the fact is that what does not dissolve in other sciences is, at most, only the outer form or scheme of communication. This scheme is in broad lines illustrated by the following model:




In most cases the eclectic conception and the schematic conception merge into one. In fact, the most typical American presentation of the field of communication research would be a book which begins with the identification of the phenomenon of communication on the basis of its above sketched formal properties - that is, by utilizing some of the numerous variations of the basic 'communication model' - and considers then eclectically the different linguistic, psychological, technical, economic, etc. aspects of communication process using the point-of-departure-model as an organizing scheme.[10] The emphasis laid on these conceptions may, however, vary even greatly affecting, correspondingly, the overall conception as to the nature of communication research. For instance, the more the schematic conception gets emphasis, the more the nature of communication research draws near to a 'structural' or 'crosscut' discipline.[11]

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[9] See the definitions presented by Nilsen (1971).

[10] An example would be, for instance, Berlo (1960; cf. also Schramm 1955; Lin 1973 etc.). It seems that in particular the West-Germans have adopted this way of presentation (see e.g. Maletzke 1963; Silbermann & Krüger 1973 etc.).

[11] A 'structural' or 'crosscut' science means such in which the subject matter is composed of certain characteristics, mechanisms or structures that are found in different parts or moments of reality. Examples of such sciences are, for instance, mathematics, logics, semiotics etc. (see Autorenkollektiv ..., 182, 186). In the form of information theory communication research would be a pure example of a 'structural' science.

And the more the eclectic conception gets emphasis, the more its nature, of course, draws near to a multifaceted, 'interdisciplinary' discipline.

### 1.1.2. The development of this thinking

Let us now take a look at the background and development of this 'American view' of communication research. To do this we must briefly outline the main characteristics of the social science - or, in fact, of the social sciences that gradually differed from one another - in the United States in its (or theirs) early phase. The characteristic discriminating it most clearly for instance from the corresponding European social science was the heavy emphasis it laid on empirical research.[12] As many scholars agree, this emphasis can be understood as a response to the challenge resulting from many social problems caused by the rapid urbanization, growth of industrialization, etc.[13] This state of affairs accounts mostly for that the social science in the United States dispersed to different research areas that were not - and have not as yet succesfully been - bound together by any grand theory of society. In fact, the social sciences in the United States have since their birth distictly had a character of atheoretical, fact-finding research.

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[12] See for instance Merton (1958, 440-454), according to which this was (and is) the most essential aspect distinguishing the American mass communication research from the European sociology of knowledge. According to him "the sociology of knowledge belongs for the most part to the camp of global theorists, in which the breadth and significance of the problem justifies one's dedication to it, sometimes quite apart from the possibility of materially advancing beyond ingenious speculations and impressionistic conclusions. By and large, the sociologists of knowledge have been among those raising high the banner which reads: 'We do not know that what we say is true, but it is at least significant'. The sociologists and psychologists engaged in the study of public opinion and mass communications are most often found in the opposite camp of empiricists, with a somewhat different motto emblazoned on their banner: 'We don't know that what we say is particularly significant, but it is at least true'."

[13] This will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 1.3. See also note 85.

Communication research in the United States got started distinctly as empirical research on mass communication. Like the birth of other branches of social sciences also the birth of mass communication research can be understood as a response to the challenge of a particular issue generally felt to be a social problem. In this case it was the enormous expansion of the press at the end of 19th century - as well as the birth of new mass media (motion pictures, radio) around the beginning of 20th century - that raised much worried speculation about the potential demoralizing effects of these media on their audience. It was feared, for instance, that reading the lurid details of crime news in newspapers would mean the same as living in the society of criminals.[14] In view of this concern it is not surprising that the moral point of view heavily guided for instance the category formation in the first general content analyses of the press.[15]

Although the empirical research in the area of mass communication, as well as in other areas of social research, developed in a rather atheoretical way, the whole research activity itself rested on certain implicit assumptions or downright axiomatic views about the nature of society, on the basis of which mass media seemed really to be a morally questionable phenomena. These assumptions or axioms traced their origin in the view that the change of societies from traditional agricultural communities, with close relations between people, into modern industrial societies - so-called mass societies - resulted in the break-up of close human relations and, consequently, led to the atomization and isolation of individuals from one another.[16] Because

[14] This characterization has been presented by Hawes according to McCron (1976, 17). See also Bauer & Bauer (1960) or De Fleur & Ball-Rokeach (1975, 162-166).

[15] The study of Speed dating to 1893 is reported to be "one of the earliest attempts" by Willey (1926, 25). See also the categories by Matthews as they are reprinted by Willey (1926, 26-27).

[16] On the conception of mass society as a background of the early thinking in the field of mass communication research see e.g. Katz & Lazarsfeld (1955, 15-17), Bramson (1961), Brown (1970, 45-47) or De Fleur & Ball-Rokeach (1975, 133-161).

of this 'dissolution' people were feared to be rather susceptible to the influence of the wide-reaching mass media. In other words, it was feared that in a mass society mass media were powerful enough to direct the opinions of single individuals and, thus, the public opinion in whatever direction they wanted.

Such a conception was not a theory to be tested but an axiomatic view underlying most of the early research into mass communication. The belief in the truthfulness of this view was strengthened above all by the observations made during the World War I, according to which the propaganda intending to get people to maximize their commitment to the war effort was highly efficient. In view of this it is understandable indeed that in the growing empirical research the content and effect of mass media became often equated. That is, conclusions concerning the effects of mass communication on public opinion or its ability to fulfill certain functions - for instance the socialization of men - or to arouse reader's interests were drawn on the basis of the analysis of its content.[17] This indicates that in this early tradition mass communication was conceived and studied largerly as an isolated phenomenon itself. Although the main interest concentrated on its effects on audience, the audience itself was not subjected to research - just because the content and effect were equated and the effects, thus, taken for granted.

[17] This somewhat uncertain conclusion is drawn above all from Allen's (1930 and 1931) classifications concerning contemporaneous research in journalism and mass communication. A 'paradigmatic' study in this respect is that of Willey (1926). See also Bauer and Bauer (1960, 8), who with respect to this question write as follows: "Most communication research prior to World War II was concerned with the structure of the media, with their content, and with the nature of their audience or readership. The study of effects was much more poorly developed. It is highly improbable that any one of these researchers in response to a direct question, would have said that there was a direct linear relationship between the content of communication he was studying and the effect of his content on the audiences he studied. Yet, either this assumption was built into his work, or he had to question it directly by studying effects rather than taking them as granted. Needless to say, effects were studied and the more they were studied, the more vulnerable became the notion of the omnipotence of the mass media. Effect studies date back to well into the early twenties. However, it was not until approximately the beginning of World War II that their full impact was felt..." (italics V.P.). Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955, 20), again, write as follows: "One might say that the intellectual history of mass media research may, perhaps, be seen best in terms of the successive introduction of research concerns - such as audience, content, and the like - which are basically attempts to impute effects by means of an analysis of some more readily accessible intermediate factors with which effects are associated."

Therefore the traditional research of public communication was naturally tended to emphasize the communicator's direct efforts to persuade, the content of the message itself, and the audience as a mass of unrelated recipients.[18]

Although this early mode of thinking was later subjected to a heavy criticism[19] and has largerly disappeared from today's American mass communication research, the early focus of interest - that is, the question to what extent mass communication is able to influence people's opinions - has, in turn, largerly been preserved as its chief focus. As was stated above, this focus of interest originated in the worried speculation about the demoralizing influence mass media may have. And it has been maintained largerly because of other social pressures. In the first place, the commercial nature of American mass media and the huge rise in advertising business have in a very decisive way shaped the American communication research - not only research carried out in private research institutes but also that carried out at the university level.[20] In the second place, in war times the needs to get people to commit themselves to the war effort caused an interest in the war propaganda and in its efficiency.[21] Thus, both military needs and needs of the big

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[18] See Riley & Riley (1959, 538).

[19] This early mode of thinking was crude and unsophisticated, it is quite evident, but still its critique has often obtained exaggerate forms. For instance when Brown (1970, 46) or De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach (1975, 159-160) claim that for instance the observed effectiveness of propaganda during the World War I offered an apparent or seeming proof for the view that mass communication was powerful, they are flagrantly underestimating the significance of such observations. Admittedly, this underestimation is supported by numerous empirical studies - empirical in the positivistic sense of the term - whose research methods, however, have been inadequate as far as the real influence potency of lengthy, continuous, and extensive flows of information is concerned (cf. e.g. Mills 1967, 52). Actually, the view of the relative inefficiency of mass media, which later took the place of the early conception of powerful mass media, is today itself being pushed aside by a view stressing again their potency of influence (see e.g. V. Pietilä 1977).

[20] See e.g. Schiller (1974). Cf. also Autorenkollektiv... (341-343).

[21] For instance the famous research work of Hovland and his collaborators (Hovland, Lumsdaine & Sheffield 1949; Hovland, Janis & Kelley 1953; Hovland et al. 1957 etc.) got its impetus from military needs and was started in the Research Branch of the U.S. Army's Information and Education Division (Brown 1970, 48). - On the effect of market and military needs on American mass communication research see also Merton (1958, 450-453).

business account for the American interest in the effects of mass communication on the opinions of single individuals or, because public opinion is considered a mechanical sum of individual opinions, on public opinion.[22]

In the 30's particularly the research into public opinion grew fast.[23] Also this resulted, in the form of commercial consumer studies, largerly from the marketing needs of the big business.[24] Mainly it is these marketing needs that account for the development of the so called survey techniques or methods of collecting data through personal interviews or questionnaires and methods of processing and analyzing them.[25] They made it possible to study 'empirically' the public opinion - that is, to gather data on individual opinions of members of extensive representative samples, on the basis of which public opinion was then constructed by summing up or averaging the individual opinions. Because the study of public opinion was from its very beginning - excluding, however, the pre-empirical, broad 'theoretical' treatises written by the scholars of the 19th century[26] - closely related to mass communication research, it was only natural that these survey techniques became the normal way of data collection within mass communication research - as they, in fact, did in most other fields of social research, too.

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[22] That the effects of mass communication composed the chief area of American mass communication research, as it was constituted in the work of its four 'founding fathers' - according to Berelson (1959) they were Lasswell, Lazarsfeld, Lewin, and Hovland - is pertinently illustrated by the fact that three of these men (Hovland, Lasswell, and Lazarsfeld) studied directly the effects of mass media and the fourth of them (Lewin) was at least indirectly interested in it. His studies, for instance, gave the decisive impetus to the theory of cognitive dissonance developed actually by his student Festinger (see Silbermann & Krüger 1973, 17). - It should not be forgotten, however, that besides this tendency there were also other tendencies in the early American mass communication research - for instance the journalistic approach represented in the first place by the professional schools (see Berelson 1959).

[23] See Berelson (1957).

[24] See e.g. Schiller (1974).

[25] Cf. e.g. Berelson (1957, 308-310) and Lazarsfeld (1973, 11).

[26] Among which the most known is perhaps Tocqueville (see e.g. Berelson 1957, 303-305).

It was in the beginning of 40's that the early mode of thinking began to wither away - and this was most decisively caused just by the new survey techniques. The milestone in this respect was the famous research on voting behaviour carried out by Lazarsfeld and his collaborators in 1940.[27] It was precisely this study where the old view as to the omnipotency of mass communication was in the first time seriously questioned on the grounds of palpable empirical data having an aura of real scientific validity. Its results gave rise to the ideas that were later subsumed under the heading of selective mass communication behavior,[28] according to which people expose themselves selectively to mass communication, perceive it selectively, and store it selectively in their memories. This selection is determined by what these people think beforehand about the issues, by the norms and thinking customs of the small groups they belong to, etc.

This study and its successors forced the thinking within - and concerning - mass communication research toward a new orientation in two respects. In the first place, the traditional thinking was based on simple stimulus-response -model,[29] where mass communication represented the stimulus, and its believed effects on audience - effects, that were taken as granted and, therefore, not generally subjected to empirical scrutiny - represented the response. Because of the latter fact mass communication was conceived as rather isolated phenomenon, leading to that mass communication research, too, developed as an isolated field of research with no explicit links to other fields of social research. The study of Lazarsfeld et al. did not only show that the response R must not be inferred from the stimulus S but it, too, must be subjected to research. It also showed

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[27] Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet (1944). On the evaluation of this study in the respect in question see e.g. Bauer & Bauer (1960, 9-11).

[28] The views inherent in the idea of selective mass communication behavior have, perhaps most thoroughfully, been summarized by Klapper (1960). The 'theoretical foundations' of this idea were laid down by the theories of cognitive dissonance, cognitive consistency etc. (see Festinger 1957; Zajonc 1968 etc., cf. also V. Pietilä 1977).

[29] See e.g. De Fleur & Ball-Rokeach (1975, 153-161).

that the response R is not an immediate result from the stimulus S, but, at the most, a result mediated through numerous intervening variables describing the stimulus-receiving organisms - that is, people - and their environment. So it turned out to be inevitable to substitute the more complicated S-O-R model for the simple S-R model.[30] Consequently, mass communication was no more conceived as an isolated phenomenon in the similar way as before. Also the research into it became connected with other fields of research - connected, however, only in a more or less formalistic manner, without fundamental theoretical integration.

In the second place, besides upsetting the view, according to which the effect of mass communication is as direct as an inoculation, and highlighting instead its nature as mediated through organism variables, the results of Lazarsfeld et al. also indicated that perhaps the most adequate way to conceive it would be to see it as a diffusion process. There were namely signs indicating that in many cases a certain mass communicated message catchs people up through other people. This observation was the bud of the famous two-step-flow -hypothesis that was rather intensively studied in the late 40's and 50's.[31] According to it mass communicated information reaches in the first phase the so-called 'opinion leaders' through which it will then be disseminated further to other people. This affected the thinking within - and concerning - (mass) communication research so that researchers began to pay attention besides mass communication also to face-to-face and other forms of communication. If the findings of the importance of organism variables attached phenomena of mass communication to various psychical and social phenomena, the finding of the two-step-flow enlarged the view about communication itself from mere mass communication to communication in general.

[30] See e.g. De Fleur & Ball-Rokeach (1975, 202-206).

[31] The best-known examples of these studies are perhaps that of Merton (1949) and that of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955).

These changing views did not yet, however, give rise to a conception, according to which (mass) communication research could be conceived as a discipline of its own. Rather they implied, perhaps even stronger than before, that (mass) communication research only makes up a special field of research where the interests of, above all, psychologists, social psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists met one another. The 'foundations' for the development of the view about communication research as a discipline of its own were actually laid down in two rather different quarters in 1948 - that is, in the birth year of communication models.[32] In the first place, Shannon,[33] a communication technologist at the Bell Telephone Laboratories, presented his model, called the "schematical diagram of a general communication system", in the context of his mathematical theory of communication. In the second place, Lasswell,[34] a political scientist, presented in an article, actually concerning the structure and function of communication in society, a "convenient way to describe an act of communication" - a way, which was, of course, the by now famous Lasswellian formula: who/says what/in which channel/to whom/with what effect. These 'stimulus-models' brought about a real flood of suggestions for communication models.[35]

The idea that communication could be considered with the aid of a model affected the thinking within - and concerning - (mass) communication research in two ways. In the first place, it called the researchers' attention to the fact that mass communication is, from the formal point of view, a particular case of communication in general. In doing this it 'forced' them to pay attention to the fact that besides mass communication there is

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[32] It would be more truthful, however, to say that this year witnessed the revival of the old ideas of Aristotle and Quintilian, who, with respect to rethorics, had already distinguished between the basic elements of communication - that is, the sender, the message, and the receiver (see Noelle-Neumann & Schulz 1971, 89). - It needs perhaps to be added that the year 1948 also witnessed the birth by cybernetics in the form of Wiener's famous book "Cybernetics".

[33] Shannon (1964, 33-35).

[34] Lasswell (1960, 117).

[35] The best-known ones among them are perhaps those created by Schramm (1955), Gerbner (1964), Westley & McLean (1957), Maletzke (1963), and De Fleur (1966).

a huge quantity of other communication taking place in society and human life. Together with the idea of the two-step-flow of communication this, of course, affected amplifyingly the old view that fixed only on mass communication. In the second place, while bringing forth the formal aspects of communication - aspects that are distinct to communication in all spheres of the whole life organization - the communication models led the researchers to think about the status of communication research from a new point of view. Ominous in this respect is, for instance, the suggestion, made precisely on grounds of the ubiquitousness of communication, that the historically derived cleavages which at present define discipline boundaries are harmful from the point of view of such a phenomenon as communication is.[36]

What the preceding pages have brought forth is, in broad lines, the author's conception about the historical background and development of the today's American views as to communication research. Although there is, as was noted earlier, a wide variety of such views, these views tend to share certain characteristics in common. These characteristics are, as put forth already before, eclecticism and schematicism. Of these two the former one, eclecticism, seems to have resulted above all from the observation that it was a mistake to conceive (mass) communication as an isolated phenomenon or, in other words, that is was a matter of necessity to study the phenomena of (mass) communication in relation to different psychical, social etc. phenomena. The latter characteristic, schematicism, is, again, a consequence of the discovery of the fact that communication, as it appeared in different spheres of life, included certain common features - features that were 'eternalized' in the form of the various communication models.

### 1.1.3. The major variants of this thinking

The statement that eclecticism and schematicism compose the common background of the various American views as to communica-

[36] Driessel (1968, 19). See also Thayer (1967, 559).

tion research does not tell, however, very much about these views themselves. In fact, as put forth earlier, their description is not an easy task - because of their diversity, on the one hand, and because of their implicitness, on the other. For in most cases the views are not explicitly formulated but they must be implicitly inferred from what is said. This is, of course, due to the fact that communication research is so seldom conceived as a discipline, inviting some discussion concerning its identity precisely as a discipline - that is, its nature, its domain, its eventual boundaries, the approach or the point of view distinct to it, etc.[37]

Despite the problems caused by these two things an attempt will be made in the following to reduce the diversity of the implicit views to certain clear patterns. Three typical variants or 'grand-views' may be singled out that are capable of depicting the various 'minor-views' as to the nature and realm of communication research. They have been coined below as the behavioral view, the structural-formal view and the all-embracing cybernetic view. Further, within the behavioral view there can be discerned two subvariants differing somewhat from one another, viz. a simple behavioral view and a behavioral-formal view.

[37] If the question about the identity of a discipline in the field of social sciences is a problematic one in general, it is particularly problematic if the disciplines are looked at from a positivistic, exterior point of view. From this viewpoint it namely seems that each one of the social objects (or subject matters) of study is, in fact, a subject matter of many different disciplines. This accounts for the reluctance to identify disciplines on the basis of their subject matter, and this often manifests itself in the American thinking. It is rather usual to try to solve the dilemma by taking that particular angle of view, from which a certain discipline looks at its subject matter, as the characteristic that most distinctly defines its identity. For instance Freides (1973, 14) writes about this question as follows: "These groups or 'fields' (i.e. scientific disciplines - V.P.) are often assumed to be distinguishable in terms of their subject matter... In each instance a given subject matter can be viewed as a part of the subject matter of several branches of science. What distinguishes one field from another is not subject matter as such but a distinctive approach that relates particular concept and ideas to the subject... Each discipline views its subject matter through the unique lens provided by its history as a field of study... In consequence, each raises its own questions about a subject ... and relates what is found to its own body of cumulative knowledge."

These 'grand-views' are not logical constructs and they do not exclude one another but, in many times, they or some of them 'co-exist' in the thinking of a certain author.[38]

(1a) The simple behavioral view. This subvariant is most tellingly descibed by the following quotations from an elementary American textbook about mass communication:[39]

> Mass communication research ... is usual (though not always) considered as behavioral research - the study of human beings ... It is a branch of the behavioral sciences such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology.
>
> Thus we see it is also interdisciplinary research... It does not confine itself to any particular point of view or theory or subject matter. It may borrow from linguistics, general semantics, philosophy, economics or any other discipline which may help communication effectiveness.
>
> And, of course, the subject matter of communications research is communication. More specifically, it is concerned with mass communications, the communication behavior of large numbers of people, particularly those who make up the audience for the different media. But other groups can be studied, too, of course - newspaper reporters, news sources, magazine editors, or public relations men, for example. In order to understand the behavior of groups, however, it is usually necessary first to understand individual behavior.
>
> To summarize the definition of mass communication research: It is generally the scientific study of mass communications behavior of human beings, usually in current situations requiring the gathering of primary quantitative information. It also includes the study of the communicators, their media, and the content of their messages.

Despite its slight inner inconsistencies this quotation highlights the typical characteristics of the simple behavioral view: that (mass) communication research is interested in people's (mass) communication behavior, that it is by nature interdisciplinary and non-theoretical research etc. These char-

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[38] There is, however, as far as I know, only one author in whose writings (although not contemporary thinking) all these three 'grand-views' friendly 'co-exist'. And he is not an American but a Finn, viz. Nordenstreng (1975).

[39] Emery, Ault & Agee (1973, 381-382).

acteristics indicate that this subvariant is, in a certain respect, an offspring of the traditional views according to which communication research is only an (interdisciplinary) field of research. Today, however, this view springs above all from the emphasis laid on the believed practical applicability of behavioral research in the solution of vital social problems. This emphasis tends to put theory and practice against each other and to 'absolutize' the latter at the expense of the former - that is, to 'absolutize' the efforts of solving problems at the cost of promoting the science.[40] Because of this communication research does not gain any clear and coherent identity. For instance its domain as a field of research is often defined by giving varying lists of up-to-date problems that are more or less directly related to communication.[41] Within this 'problem-focused' perspective the interdisciplinary nature on communication research follows from the demands put forward precisely by those problems, that is, competence in different disciplines is needed to solve them.[42]

(1b) The behavioral-formal view. A common denominator to the views under this subvariant is a conception about (mass) communication as a many-sided but at the same time organized phenomenon which must be viewed, precisely for the sake of its many-sidedness, as a subject matter of different disciplines. Because of its organized nature, its characteristic features can be depicted with the aid of a model. Consequently, some communication model - based on the triunion of the sender, the mes-

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[40] A typical way of thinking inherent in this emphasis is nicely illustrated by the following Berelson's sentences (quoted according to Nordenstreng 1968, 210): "The wrong way to go about sociology in action tends to concentrate on contributing to the theory or the techniques of the discipline. The right way concentrates on contributing to the solution or amelioration of the problem. The former is ready to work on any problem, since any problem is, at least in principle, equally applicable to theoretical or methodological interest. The latter prefers to work on problems having important social consequences." Nordenstreng (1968, 212-214), for example, criticizes American (mass) communication research rather strongly for its lack of theoretical precision.

[41] See e.g. Halloran (1974, 8-9).

[42] In fact, interdisciplinary research is many times demanded for the sake of getting vital social communication problems solved (see e.g. Proposals for..., 5, etc.).

sage, and the receiver - always makes up the core of a behavioral-formal view about communication research. The various sides of the phenomenon of (mass) communication are then separated and systematized departing from the elements of the chosen model. For instance, with respect to the sender one customarily distinguishes between his personality and other psychological traits, his socio-psychological characteristics etc.[43] Precisely the standpoint that the phenomenon of (mass) communication is an organized one and that, accordingly, the field of study of communication research can be systematized in the respective way, separates this subvariant from the preceding one, according to which this field was more or less diffusely made up of various social problems having a 'communicological' aspect. Therefore, the behavioral-formal view is a more systematic one than the simple behavioral view. On the other hand, they are similar in reducing (mass) communication simply to a behavioral process.

(2) The structural-formal view. The views that can be subsumed under this heading originate, in part, in the sociological tradition of functionalism. Like the behavioral-formal view also the structural-formal one considers (mass) communication a many-sided but organized phenomenon, subject, just because of this many-sidedness, to sciences like psychology, sociology, or political science. But, what is more, in the structural-formal view (mass) communication is conceived, not only as a socio-psychological interplay between the sender and the receiver, but also as a social system serving certain social functions.[44] Consequently, a functional analysis of (mass) communication system focuses upon specific phenomena occurring within this system or between it and other social systems, attempting to show how these phenomena contribute to the stability of the system itself

[43] A 'paradigmatic' model in this respect is that of Maletzke (1963, 37-41), albeit almost all presentations of the field in terms of the trinity of the sender, the message, and the receiver can serve as examples of the behavioral-formal view (cf. note 35).

[44] As far as I know, Lasswell (1960) was the first one paying attention to the functions of mass media in society. His ideas have been taken up and advanced above all by Wright (1959 and 1964).

or of the other social systems. This analysis is sometimes accomplished with the aid of model construction or it leads to models explicating how the inner elements of communication system are related to one another and how the communication system is related to other social systems or to society in general.[45]

(3) The all-embracing cybernetic view. The common characteristic of the preceding 'grand-views' is the manner to look at communication as a more or less limited phenomenon. They base, more or less explicitly, on mass communication, although above all the behavioral-formal view encompasses conceptions looking at communication in more general terms.[46] The all-embracing cybernetic view, for its part, bases on the conception that communication is not any limited but in fact an ubiquitous phenomenon and, moreover, that it is the most fundamental element of society or at least one of the most fundamental ones.[47] Because there appears to be communication in all spheres of human social life, it is, of course, tempting to suggest that not only there is in society a certain communication system besides many other systems or institutions - as the structural-formal view tends to see - but that communication is the basic characteristic of all other systems or institutions or even that the whole society in

[45] Cf. e.g. models of De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach (1975, 160-181 and 276-280). In Finland particularly Wiio (e.g. 1971, 103-120 and 1975, 17) has developed corresponding models. A short summary about this 'systemtheoretical' thinking has been presented e.g. Silbermann & Krüger (1973, 83-96, cf. also Autorenkollektiv..., 357-360).

[46] Cf. e.g. Berlo (1960).

[47] For instance Mead (1952, 253) writes as follows: "The principle which I have suggested as basic to human organization is that of communication..." Schramm (1963, 1) puts it followingly: "Communication ... is one of the busiest crossroads in the study of human behavior, which is understandable, because communication is a - perhaps the - fundamental social process." And Fauconnier (1975, 107) states: "Psychology, social psychology, sociology, and communication theory have all served to show that communication is in fact the most basic process, the crux of society." Wiener (1969, 33), for his part, regards communication as the cement that unites the society to a whole. About the critique of this kind of views see e.g. Bisky (1976, 36-38).

itself is nothing but an enormous communication system.[48] Because of the fundamentality of its subject-matter communication research would be, according to this 'grand-view', one of the basic social sciences - if not the most fundamental one of them.[49]

### 1.1.4. Some critical remarks on this thinking

What is wrong with the above 'grand-views' is that no one of them - neither alone nor in combination with others - is able to catch communication as it really is. This, again, is due to certain features that characterize the American social sciences in general - above all to their tendency to look exteriorly at the phenomena under study. Owing to their strong positivistic tradition the most of American social sciences look at reality, so to say, in an everyday fashion.[50] When looking at

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[48] For instance Nordenstreng (1975, 138) singles out in society a particular information system, on the one hand, but adds that the other systems of society - that is, economic and administrative systems - are to a large extent 'communicative' by their nature, on the other. Deutsch (1966), for his part, thinks that communication makes up the nerves of society. He also presents a particular cybernetic communication model with respect to foreign policy decisions.

[49] Although these 'grand-views' may seem quite different, it would be a mistake to conceive them as fundamentally different lines of thinking, since they, after all, are only variants of thinking originating in the same basic manner of looking at society. This manner is described in broad lines in the next chapter (1.1.4.).

[50] By saying that the peculiar characteristic of the social science in the United States is to look at society in an everyday fashion I do not mean, of course, that there is no difference between the thinking of the common man and that of the social scientist. What I mean is that their starting point is the same - in other words that the scientist as well as the common man relies on the conception that the things are such as they appear to be in the immediate everyday observation and experience or that all what we can become aware of is but the things as they appear to us. The difference between their thinking is that the goal of the scientist is to form general statements expressing the similarities and differences between the things as they appear, their exterior relations to one another, etc. In short, the goal of the scientists is to systematize the phenomenal world or the world of the things as they appear. In so doing he does not make these systematizing generalizations on the basis of a few accidental observations, as the common man is used to do, but on the basis of extensive masses of observations collected in a systematic, objective, and quantitative way. It needs to be emphasized, however, that this naive everyday fashion of looking at society has been characteristic only to the mainstream of the social science in the United States.

reality in this way one easily observes that there are myriads of occurrences and phenomena, among which, on the other hand, some occurrences and phenomena show certain similarity with some others. For instance there is a huge quantity of occurrences showing similarity in the particular respect that someone transmits a message to someone else. These occurrences can be brought together by calling them by the name of communication. What is more, from these myriads of occurrences showing similarity in this respect one can abstract those features that are common to all of them. This gives rise to a conceptual tool, to a model, which seems to depict all the essential features of communication and, therefore, to define it. Communication, then, means the transmitting or exchange of information between two or more actors.

When looking at reality in an everyday fashion one observes further that the actors engaged in the exchange of information are people. Also when the other part is a mass medium this same holds true, because, in the last instance, a mass medium is composed of people. Therefore, if one wants to find out, why there is communication or why its content is in some occasion what it is, he must look for the people engaged in the communication, their needs or other psychological variables. Besides this individual realm he, on the other hand, must pay attention to different socio-psychological variables, because the psychological ones are often mediated through group norms or other corresponding factors. If he, again, wants to understand the functioning of a mass medium, he should not stop only on psychological or socio-psychological variables, because a mass medium as a social system is not the simple sum of the persons working in it, but something more. It is, so to say, an organization, that employs certain resources or inputs to bring about certain outputs according to those more or less explicit rules steering its functioning. Therefore, one must pay attention to economic, organizational, sociological, etc. variables.

On such a basis it is evident that the reason for the eclecticism inherent in the American views in communication research lies in

the everyday fashion to look at reality. It is just this manner which makes one believe that it is possible to arrive at a real understanding - and at a real knowledge and theory - of communication by assembling relevant pieces of psychological, socio-psychological etc. knowledge and theory together, mechanically in the way as these 'fields' seem to be related to communication according to the everyday perception. Is there, then, any resque from this eclecticism? In fact, there is a seeming alternative to that 'rough vulgarism' just considered. It is the attempt to arrive by way of abstraction at such general, 'purely theoretical' concepts that are not burdened by particular everyday meanings giving rise to eclecticism. For instance system, subsystem, boundary, function, process, etc. are examples of such concepts.[51]

No doubt the passing over to this kind of concepts helps thinking to relieve from eclecticism but, at the same time, it becomes relieved from its real substance, too. Because in abstraction real differences between things are left unnoticed - or the things are made similar, because what is different becomes similar at a sufficiently high level of abstraction - the high 'abstractions' are actually rather emply concepts. They perhaps qualify to reproduce, at least to certain extent, the formal characteristics of reality, but its substantial processes - things that really matter - become, in general, banalized to equilibrium-maintaining processes, which, then, become conceived as making up indiscriminately the basic motion force of human beings, groups, societies, etc.[52] If the two first ones of the above presented 'grand-views' were burdened by eclecticism, the

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[51] Perhaps it needs to be noted that the triunion of cybernetics, information theory, and general systems theory (see e.g. Kybernetik..., 19-20, or Reimann 1974, 1) have occupied an increasingly important role in Western attempts to bring about an unified general theory of human behavior. These attempts employ systems terms of the presented kind (on the early attempts toward this direction see e.g. Miller 1957). Also see note 149.

[52] Cf. e.g. Mills' (1967, 23 and 25-49) critique of the Parsonsian grand theory.

third of them, the all-embracing cybernetic view, is burdened by the empty abstracticism just described.

Through the above presented ways of looking at reality - that is, through the everyday fashion and through the 'abstract' way - reality becomes conceived pluralistically as made up of a numerous but limited number of classes of similar-looking phenomena and of exterior - in many times statistical - relations between them. According to them reality is like an enormous chaotic surface, and in order to get this chaos under the control of the (scientific) human mind one begins to look at the similarities between the occurrences and phenomena making it up, to classify them in groups on the basis of their similarities, to 'abstract' the common characteristics that phenomena falling into same group have, and to look for the relations between these characteristics. In this work one proceeds from a low level of 'abstraction' - where that what is specific to each category of occurrences or phenomena is still present - constantly to higher and higher level so that the specific differences gradually disappear and what is left over are the most general concepts with the aid of which one presumes to be able to subordinate reality under the control of his mind. This is, however, an erroneous 'solution'. Namely what one is able to bring about when departing from the above implied customary positivistic ways of thinking is, at most, a 'map' describing reality, as it <u>appears</u> to everyday perception, in terms of general and 'abstract' concepts and relations. What one is unable to bring about is the discovery of the inner and necessary relations between the things appearing in everyday perception in certain form - as, for instance, in the form of communication. In other words, he is unable to find out the laws of society.

## 1.2. The 'communicological' thinking in (West-)Germany

### 1.2.1. The Zeitungswissenschaftliche thinking

If it was relatively difficult to describe the American views in communication research, for the sake of their diffuse development and implicit nature, the corresponding German notions, for their part, are more easy to depict. In fact, between the two World Wars - or, more precisely speaking, between the end of the World War I and the establishment of the Nazi regime - there were in Germany two rather discernible tendencies bearing upon communication research; viz. the science of newspaper (called first with the name of Zeitungskunde and later with the name of Zeitungswissenschaft) and the sociology of knowledge (Wissensoziologie). Although both of them have a prehistory which, with respect to the science of newspaper, extends to the beginning of the 18th century[53] and, with respect to the sociology of knowledge, even to the Middle Ages,[54] both of them developed to particular sciences or areas of knowledge around the end of the World War I. For instance the science of newspaper gained a status of an academic discipline in 1916 with the establishment of the Institut für Zeitungskunde at Leipzig.[55]

The German science of newspaper differs from the American communication research very essentially in the respect that it was from its very beginning an independent academic discipline.[56] It also differs from the latter one with respect to its origin. As was observed before, the American communication research was born as a more or less diffuse field of research whose subject matter was made up of mass communication. And it was born as such above all because the press and, later, other mass media

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[53] Hardt (1976, 90).

[54] Luokkala (1976, 4-5).

[55] Hardt (1976, 90).

[56] The establishment of the 'chairs' of the science of newspaper to German universities was financially strongly supported by the organizations of the publishers (Kaukonen 1976, 19-21).

were feared to be potential sources of or contributors to various social problems. The German science of newspaper, again, was not born as a response to such worries.[57] Different researchers agree that the most decisive impetus to its birth and establishment was the failure of the German propaganda in the World War I.[58]

There are, however, other factors that at least strongly contributed to its birth, if not even caused it. Perhaps the most important one of these factors was the strength of the revolutionary socialist thinking in Germany toward the end of the World War I - a strength that manifested itself in attempts to socialist revolutions for example in Bavaria and Berlin. Such occurrences, of course, called the attention of bourgeoisie to newspapers and other mass media as possible instruments for suppressing people's revolutionary thinking and for directing their opinions in general, and fed, thus, the need for their study.[59]

Although the factors giving rise to American (mass) communication research and German science of newspaper differed rather clearly from one another, these both orientations, nevertheless, became interested in the same thing - in the relationship between mass media and public opinion and in the possible effects of the

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[57] This is implied, for instance, by the fact that, contrary to the first American newspaper content analyses (cf. note 15 before), there are no signs indicating moral concern in the category formation of the corresponding German analyses (on the category systems employed in them see e.g. Groth 1928, 743-774).

[58] For instance Kleinpaul (quoted according to Kaukonen 1976, 18) wrote in 1927 in the beginning of his textbook of the science of newspaper as follows: "The confused experiences brought forth by the war and its consequences have shown us the real power, strength, and political significance of the press. Precisely these observations gave us the impetus to the scientific study of public opinion." And Heide (quoted according to Kaukonen 1976, 18) wrote in 1940 followingly: "The World War with its enormous weapon of propaganda made up the point of departure of the scientific study of the press in German universities and Hochschulen." See also Allen (1928, 14).

[59] Kaukonen 1976, 7-8 and 22-27.

former on the latter.[60] It seems, however, that, similarly as in the early days of the American (mass) communication research, the direct empirical research into these effects was in Germany, too, left mostly out of consideration. Although the prominent advocates of the German science of newspaper brought forth very emphatically that it was one of the main tasks to fix the laws of influence, this study remained predominantly at the level of speculation.[61] It has been claimed that above all the empirical-statistical backwardness of the German sociology accounts for this state of affairs.[62] In fact, it lasted up to the threshold of the World War II, before the survey techniques developed in the United States in the 1930's were brought over to Germany [63] - despite the fact that the Nazi regime rested heavily upon the manipulation of people.

As an academic discipline the German science of newspaper got started as a historical study of the press - simply because the studies published until its establishment were predominantly concerned with press history.[64] Therefore it, instead of developing to an American-type empirical social research, developed

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[60] In spite of the different origins the American and German orientations of communication research, their development was affected by certain common factors, too. For instance, if the German orientation grew out of the failure of German propaganda in the World War I, the success of the corresponding American propaganda clearly affected the orientation of the American communication research. - It should also be recalled that Max Weber, already in his address to the first meeting of the German Sociological Society in 1910, suggested the Society to undertake a survey of the press and particularly of its effects, as its first major empirical investigation (see e.g. Starke 1971, 12-15 and Hardt 1976, 92-93).

[61] According to Starke (1971, 14) d'Ester saw the task of the science of newspaper to be to study the interrelationship between the readers and the paper and "to count the coefficient of influence", while Dovifat defined it to be, among other things, the fixing of the laws of influence.

[62] Hardt (1976).

[63] According to Starke (1971, 15) it was Noelle(-Neumann) who in her dissertation in 1940 performed this task.

[64] The substantial characterization of the German science of newspaper is based predominantly on the work by Kaukonen (1976). (An addition to the second edition: Today I consider the following presentation to be unduly belittling and sarcastic.)

to a historical-speculative area of the humanities. Resulting from the German philosophical idealism the dominating 'scientific' view as to the nature of history in those days' Germany was the notion that history is a creation of a Human Spirit realizing itself through Great Men. Therefore the picture that the science of newspaper 'painted' about the history of the press described it, not as a real historical phenomenon determined by real material causes, but as a 'spiritual' phenomenon made up of different journalistic ideas that were 'carried' and 'realized' by great journalistic Spirits. In other words, the real material course of history was converted in their writings into history of great ideas, Spirits, and Men. This kind of 'writing the history' resulted in, of course, that the real historical cause-and-effect -sequences became covered and mystified.

The history of the press, however, was not alone a sufficient subject matter to a new academic discipline that was eager to become approved by the already established disciplines. Therefore the science of newspaper considered that its subject matter is made up, not only of the history of the press, but of the whole phenomenon of the press as such - that is, as a 'pure' phenomenon, purified from its economic, social etc. relations. The study of this subject matter was carried out by means of 'pure' thinking and reasoning, using classification and typology construction as its main tools. This was due to the fact that, according to the German idealism, what there empirically is in society, is, in the last instance, created by the Human Spirit, and therefore a scientific study cannot be carried out by starting with the empirically observable phenomena.[65] The point of departure must be in the human spirit itself. In result of

[65] On the German idealism in this respect see e.g. Hughes (1961, 183-191). According to him, or to Parsons on whom he rests, the idealistic tradition gave rise to two different directions in social science - to detailed, 'chronology-type' history writing, on the one hand, and to all-embracing system building, on the other. Both directions are, in a way, represented in the German science of newspaper - the latter in the form of formal typology building as will be seen in the next note.

this the science of newspaper, besides writing the history of the journalistically great minds, concentrated upon to create various typologies basing on the formal characteristics of the press.[66] This kind of an approach, because considering its subject matter immovable and 'dead', is, of course, unable to uncover the 'secrets' of this subject matter - that is, to uncover and catch its laws of development and motion.

### 1.2.2. The Wissensoziologische thinking

As noted before, the American (mass) communication research was born as a certain field of social research, and in this sense its development was related to the development of social research or empirical sociology in general. Of the two tendencies in between-the-World-Wars Germany, that are relevant from the point of view of communication research, the first one, the German science of newspaper, was born largerly independent from those days' German sociology.[67] The another of them, the sociology of knowledge, again, was born, as its name implies, as a part of sociology. To be sure, it had, as was put forth earlier, a rather long prehistory extending even to the thinking of the medieval scholastics and to that of Machiavelli, but as a special branch of sociology established in Germany in the early 1920's its proper sources of origin were temporarily much closer to its birth. It originated most closely in the notions about ideology by Marx and Engels, but it also was affected by the so called irrationalism developed through Nietsche, Freud, Pareto,

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[66] In fact, the advocates of the German science of newspaper thought, at least implicitly, that the subject matter of this science was composed of the press as a formal and not as a substantial phenomenon. For instance Dovifat (1929, 10) equalled the content of the newspaper with the mirror image and said that the science of newspaper has nothing to do with this mirror image itself, but that its task is to find out what the mirror is and what the laws of 'mirroring' are - that is, how the mirror images get formed. Traub (1933, 28-29), for his part, thought that newspaper is definiable only formally. He also outlined a lot of typologies ranging, for instance, from a typology of advertisements (Inserate) to a typology of editions (Auflage).

[67] To be sure, some of the German sociologists expressed great interest in the study of the press - as, for instance, Max Weber (cf. note 60 above) and Tönnies (see Hardt 1976, 92-93) - but this interest did not affect the German science of newspaper in any noteworthy way.

and Sorel, and by positivism through the theories of Gumplowicz, Oppenheimer, and Razenhofer.[68]

Unfortunately there is no generally agreed-upon definition as to the subject matter of the sociology of knowledge, but in broad lines this branch of sociology has been interested to dig up the social roots of knowledge, to search out the ways in which knowledge and thought are affected by the environing social structure.[69] In this tradition the concepts of knowledge and thought are conceived in general so loosely that they have come to encompass almost all what is ideal or mental - ideas, beliefs, values, opinions etc.[70] In this sense they, of course, also include those ideas etc. expressed in the mass media. In practice, however, the sociology of knowledge has been concerned with the intellectual products of scholars and scientists more directly than with mental products of other kinds.

The German Wissensoziologie differed from the American (mass) communication research not only as to its subject matter but also with respect to its scientific approach. In keeping with the manner of the classical German sociology in general it was interested in broad issues as, for instance, in the historical birth and development of certain doctrines or systems of them.[71] It was, therefore, historically oriented and 'theoretical' in the sense that it aimed not only at historical descriptions but also at the genetic or other explanation of the issues it was concerned with. Because of its historical orientation it had to substitute the scarcity of empirical evidence with the strength of thought, and therefore it seems more impressionistic and speculative that what is the case with the ordinary American mass communication research, where one normally does not even lift up his nose from the empiria.

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[68] See Luokkala (1976, 30-56).

[69] Merton (1958, 440).

[70] Merton (1958, 440-441), cf. also Adler (1957, 410).

[71] Merton (1958, 440-446).

In the German sociology of knowledge in 1920's and early 1930's one may distinguish between three different lines: the Marxist tendency, the anti-Marxist tendency, and the tendency trying to reconcile these contrasting views.[72] The Marxist tendency departs more or less directly from the wellknown notion of Marx, according to which people's social being or existence determines their consciousness and not vice versa.[73] Stated in very crude terms, the ground for the Marxist explanation of people's ideas is made up of the mode of production prevailing in society. If this mode of production is based on exploitation, it results in that the society becomes divided into antagonistic classes. In such a case people's social being or existence is impressed predominantly by the class they belong to. Consequently, the Marxist tendency sought for the explanation of the ideas of people in capitalist societies mostly from their class position, although also such aspects as the nature of work or job, etc. were employed.

According to the anti-Marxistist tendency, the social conditions or real factors do not determine people's ideas; they merely make them possible. The origin of ideas is to be found in the ideal factors - a realm of eternal truths, ideas, and values that subsist in an eternally valid hierarchy of their own.[74] The tendency trying to reconcile these views was inclined to distinguish between ideology and knowledge. According to it ideology is class-bound thinking, and because it is impressed by the class interests, it could not represent the whole truth. The real and full knowledge and truth could be found only by the unattached intellectuals, who are not tied to any existing group or class, but are free to put themselves, actively or imaginatively, into any position in any group or class.[75]

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[72] This tripartition has been presented by Adler (1957, 399-415).

[73] This notion reads as follows: "The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life processes in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" (Marx 1958a, 363).

[74] Adler (1967, 406).

[75] Adler (1957, 410-411).

### 1.2.3. Communication research in West-Germany after the World War II

After the World War II the research and teaching on communication was revived in West-German universities under various names, of which that of Publizistikwissenschaft became later most widely accepted. Straight after the war and up till early 1960's it was, however, little more than the old Zeitungswissenschaft in a modernized form. Its subject matter, for instance, was enlarged to encompass besides the press also other mass media or, in general, to include all kinds of public messages.[76] Like its 'predecessor', the old science of newspaper, also this new one presented itself as an independent discipline. This view, however, became with times more and more questioned, because, for instance, there also were other disciplines carrying out studies on communication.[77] Furthermore, those scientists familiar with the American mass communication research regarded this view as a sign of restraint.[78] This state of affairs resulted in that the new science of newspaper became largerly interested in itself, in its status and place in the system of sciences.[79] Besides deliberating these questions its representatives, adhering to the tradition of the old science of newspaper, made public studies about the history of the press and the great journalistic minds.[80]

If the 'communication science' practised and teached in universities remained for a quite long while free from American impulses, the actual research into mass communication and public opinion, carried out by commercial research institutes outside the universities, took its ideals precisely from the American

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[76] For instance the definition of Maletzke (1967, 1-2) reads as follows: "By Publizistikwissenschaft is meant subsequently the science of goal-directed public messages of goal-directed public communication." Cf. also Dovifat (1956, 3); Hagemann (1956, 15) or Prakke (1961, 83).

[77] See e.g. Bohrmann & Sülzer (1973, 93-95).

[78] See e.g. Silbermann (1973).

[79] On the discussion concerning these questions see e.g. Maletzke (1967).

[80] Bohrmann & Sülzer (1973, 99-100).

mass communication research.[81] In the late 1960's and early 1970's this American orientation clearly occupied the leading position within the West-German Publizistikwissenschaft. Because it was, in a way, compelled to compete with the new version of the old science of newspaper, it also was driven to pay attention to questions about its scientific status, its subject matter, etc. These questions were customarily settled by stating that Publizistikwissenschaft is not really or totally an independent discipline but rather an auxiliary discipline or an interdisciplinary field of study concerned predominantly with mass media and their effects on audience.[82] In other words, these questions were settled quite the American way. Of the different views, discerned earlier in American communication research, the simple behavioral view and the behavioral-formal view impressed most emphatically this West-German version of Publizistikwissenschaft.

The early 1970's in West-Germany wittnessed the birth of the so called critical orientation within the Publizistikwissenschaft. Its birth has been interpreted to be a reaction against the trivial results of the American-type empirical orientation, that were seen as unable to suggest a theory of society, within which mass communication could be conceived as it really is.[83] In fact, the birth of the critical orientation meant the revival of the broad outlook, own to the earlier sociology of knowledge, in this case in the context of mass media.[84] The scientists that

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[81] The first ones of these Markt- und Meinungsforschungsinstitute were actually established by the occupation forces (see Starke 1971, 16-17).

[82] For instance, Silberman and Krüger (1973, 12-13) state that communication research is not any independent discipline but, rather, an auxiliary discipline or a 'junction of tracks', and that is why an interdisciplinary approach is very characteristic to it. This opinion corresponds to the usual American one (cf. note 1). Noelle-Neumann, again, seems to hold an opinion about it as a partly independent discipline (see Noelle-Neumann 1970 and 1971). Also see Koschwitz & Pötter (1973, xii).

[83] Cf. e.g. Hardt (1976, 94-95) or Bohrmann & Sülzer (1973, 101-102).

[84] This critical orientation is strongly impressed by the thinking of the so called 'Frankfurt school' (see e.g. Nordenstreng 1975, 247-261). It is interesting to note that the sociology of knowledge, as it was represented particularly by Mannheim, also was impressed by it.

adopted this critical and broad outlook, rejected both the view of the traditional Zeitungswissenschaft, according to which the task of the Publizistikwissenschaft was to develop typological systems to depict the 'pure' forms of communication, and the view of American origin, according to which its task was to create empirical generalizations bearing upon people's behavior in the particular field of (mass) communication. Instead they began to consider mass media as a historically determined specific moment of the capitalist West-German society, a moment that cannot be reduced to historical sketches of eminent men, to formal characteristics of messages and media, or to behavior of people. As a moment of society, mass communication is determined by certain social laws; therefore, it cannot be studied by leaving society unnoticed, but only by taking this notion as the very foundation of the study.

## 1.3. Excursion: some speculations about the reasons underlying the 'communicological' thinking in the United States

### 1.3.1. 'Communicological' thinking as a special case of sociological thinking in general

The preceding pages have described, in broad lines, the various ways in which the nature and domain of communication research has been conceived in the United States and (West-)Germany. The following excursion will deliberate the reasons underlying the American views. The corresponding deliberation with respect to (West-)German views will be omitted, since the American views have occupied a dominating position there, too, as was seen above. This deliberation here will be quite general and, to a great part, 'speculative' by nature, since a thorough and detailed presentation of the subject would require a substantial historical study, beyond the present possibilities.

As noted earlier, the (mass) communication research in the United States was born and developed in connection with the development of the social research in general. Therefore the question to be answered here is not what gave the ethos to the

American communication research but what gave the ethos to its social research, social science or sociology in general. As mentioned before, it is most typical to the social science in the United States to look at society in an everyday fashion. Because it conceives society naively as it appears to be, it is necessarily driven to trust strongly in the immediate observation and experience. In other words, it is driven to worship the empirical, to surrender unconditionally to it. The most conspicuous other characteristics of the social science in the United States - above all its disposition to 'psychologism' and behaviorism - are fully in keeping with this naive 'ultra-empiricist' stand. The next pages will present the author's conception of what accounts for these characteristics.

### 1.3.2. The roots of the sociological thinking in the United States

As implied before, already from its very beginning the sociology in the United States drew richly from the research on various social problems. In fact, some are even inclined to think that its most decisive impetus was made up precisely of the particular problems manifesting themselves as a result of the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the country at the end of the 19th century.[85] It should be noted at this point, however,

[85] Kon (1973, 169) describes the birth of empirical sociology in the United States as follows: "Only a few sociologists were in the 19th century concerned with the empirical investigation of particular social problems. At the end of the century the situation began to change. The complicating of social life resulted in the task to study in complex ways the results of urbanization, of the growth of industrialization etc. If the sociologists had previously withdrawn from the details, so they had nowadays, on the contrary, to withdraw from the general historical relationships, because the particular problems became the object of particular research. This accounts for the inner specialization and differentation of sociological research." Lazarsfeld (1973, 22-23), for his part, writes followingly: "The study of ethnic minorities, the improvement of social services, the understanding of the huge new urban centres were the background against which sociology developed. Empirical research techniques became an indispensable tool in America and were taught in hundreds of colleges. Slowly, however, uneasiness become noticeable. Even before the Second World War some American authors called for more 'social theory'... Translations of the works of Weber, Durkheim, and Simmel made the American pioneers to look rather provincial." On social problems as the ground of American empirical sociology see further e.g. Hinkle & Hinkle (1954, 1-4); Bramson (1961, 73-95); Friedrichs (1972, 57-91) etc.

that it is not self-evident what matters become defined as social problems and what not. Besides the matters themselves this depends on, who succeed to take charge of social criticism and who, thus, become the 'official definitors' of social problems. What they will define as social problems depends, again, decisively on their relations to the matters of society or to the reality in general. It should be noted further that what matters become defined as social problems, and how, will affect in a very decisive way on the strategies to approach them and to try to solve them.

Most of American early sociologists represented rural or small town petty bourgeoisie.[86] Exceptionally many among them had a clerical background.[87] In hands of them the early American sociology developed, in keeping with their class background, not in a conservative but in a petty bourgeois reformist spirit. It was directed, above all, toward a concern with matters that could be subsumed under the heading of social disorganization. These included such matters as criminology, alcoholism, marriage problems and divorce, immigrant problems and conflicts in ethnic relations etc., which all were connected to the rapid industrialization and urbanization. As one sociologist has put it, people having come to maturity within the ethos of an agrarian protestantism were particularly sensitive to such matters.[88]

Because the early sociologists, who succeeded to take charge of the practising of social criticism and who, therefore, gained the status of 'official definitors' of social problems, originated in petty bourgeoisie, and because the existence of a capitalist

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[86] See e.g. Hinkle & Hinkle (1954, 3); Bramson (1961, 78-79) or Friedrichs (1972, 72-75). Mills (1967, 89), however, says that many of the academic men of the older generation of sociologists were either recruited from or actively mingled with urban middle class composed of men with expanding business, who were taking over instruments of production and gaining political power. Their students also have been products of such strata. According to Mills, then, the sociologists and their students did represent not only petty but also growing big bourgeoisie.

[87] See e.g. Hinkle & Hinkle (1954, 3); Bramson (1961, 79) or Friedrichs (1972, 72-73).

[88] Friedrichs (1972, 73); also cf. Bramson (1961, 79).

form of society is a sine qua non for the existence of petty as well as of big bourgeoisie as a class, they were able to identify as problems only matters that were clearly identifiable at the surface of the capitalist society. In other words, because of their class position it was impossible for them to discover those problems proper resulting from the inner and inevitable contradictions of capitalism, that existed 'deeper' in society.[88a] The discovery of these problems would, namely, have uncovered the historical, transient nature of capitalism and, of course, of the petty bourgeoisie itself, too. For the sake of this 'unability' they also were driven to look at the matters they identified as problems, exteriorly as rather random, detached, and frangentary disturbances,[89] the only common denominator of which was composed of social change - that is, of industrialization and urbanization. That they were driven to look at the problems as detached and fragmentary resulted, in the last instance, from the fact that it was impossible for them to connect the problems correctly to the social change, because, similarly and for same reasons as the proper problems, also the real forces behind the social change remained inaccessible to their reasoning.

### 1.3.3. The roots of empiricism as a characteristic of this thinking

There were, of course, several 'mechanisms' through which the class position of the early sociologists shaped in the above described way the realm and nature of the science they developed and practised. In the first place there were the European influences. The mode of thinking of Enlightenment with its admiration of physical science as the ideal of scientific effort had already early been carried into American colleges by the Scottish moral philosophy.[90] It is most probable that the ideas of the English empiricism were transmitted through the same way. In

[88a] This has been a distinct characteristic of bourgeois sociology ever since. E.g. Allen (1975, 20) states that "sociological literature in general depicts capitalist societies beset with problems of youth, of sex, of crime, of sabotage of various kinds, of deprivation, of exploitation without even alluding to the social relations of production - to the exploitation of resources for private gain".

[89] That the early sociologists perceived the problems in this way is vividly described e.g. by Mills (1967, 84-86).

[90] Mills (1967, 89); cf. also Jensen (1957, 39).

view of this it is very understandable that the traditional positivism as it was represented by Comte and Spencer became the great guidepost for the early American sociology.[91] As known both Comte and Spencer were of the opinion that sociology is not any derivate of philosophy but an empirical discipline.[92] It seems probable that the strong emphasis laid on empirical research in the main flow of American sociology is inherited precisely from the influence of Comte and Spencer.[93]

It has been contended that Marxism had no or, at most, only little influence on the developing American sociology.[94] This is, of course, true in the respect that the Americans did not accept Marx's ideas, to speak nothing of the adoption of them. It is probable, however, that Marxism affected the American sociology indirectly, by strengthening the modes of thinking opposite to it. There are, namely, two fundamental reasons why it is very hard for sociologists originating in bourgeoisie to comprehend or to accept the lessons of Marx. In the first place, what he says seems to be in deep contradiction with the everyday

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[91] Hinkle & Hinkle (1954, 4-7); also see Friedrichs (1972, 64-72) or Mills (1967, 23).

[92] See e.g. Kon (1973, 169).

[93] This does not mean, however, that already the 'founding fathers' of the American sociology would have been empiricists in the sense that they would have made controlled experiments or carried out large surveys. On the contrary, their work was in many times rather speculative by nature. For instance one of them (Hayes, according to Hinkle & Hinkle 1954, 11) accused his contemporary fellows of being still operating at the metaphysical level in so far as their explanations were merely asserted relationships between social phenomena and social forces. Thus, although the results were many times unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of the Comtean positivistic knowledge, it clearly composed the ideal to be pursued after. The break-through of inductive, empirical procedures dates around the end of the World War I. According to Hinkle and Hinkle (1954, 22-23) it was caused precisely just by the war - "The war provoked widespread skepticism of the most commonly employed, general, deductive progressive law - social evolution. The rejection of this 'speculative theory' and the acceptance of the more advanced and concretely-oriented social and natural sciences as models for sociology contributed to the disrepute of deductivism and the ascendance of careful description and comparative analysis of actual behavior - the basis requirements of induction."

[94] Bramson (1961, 78); cf. also Hinkle & Hinkle (1954, 54).

observations[95] - particularly with those that the members of bourgeoisie are apt to make. In the second place, if it, despite the negative everyday proof, would be adjudicated as valid by the bourgeoisie, this would mean that bourgeoisie would accept its death sentence since, according to Marx's thinking, bourgeoisie is a transient phenomenon, doomed to disappear sooner or later. This, of course, composes the most pervasive motive against the acceptance of the Marxist ideas by sociologists originating in bourgeoisie.[96]

One of the most characteristic feature of the scientific effort of Marx was his persistent intellectual strive to get beyond what is given in the immediate observations, towards the essence of phenomena.[97] In the Comtean thinking this kind of

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[95] Marx himself emphasized that a certain controversy with the everyday self-evidences is a distinctive characteristic of the results of genuine science. He has stated, for instance, that "scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive appearance of things" (Marx 1958b, 424). On the Marxist thinking in this respect see e.g. Sorokin (1974a).

[96] For instance Hinkle and Hinkle (1954, 54), with whom I disagree, are of the opinion that "the basic reason for the nonacceptance of Marxist theories (in the United States - V.P.) appears to derive from his economic determinism, which is often interpreted as a fundamental denial of American individualism and which is inconsistent with the multicausational position of the most American sociologists."

[97] It was very distinct to Marx and his suggessors to look at things as a contradictory but inseparable unity of the essence (in German das Wesen) and the appearance (in German die Erscheinung). The essence is made up of the inner, necessary relations of phenomena, while the appearance is the exterior of the essence, its form of manifestation. The appearance is accessible to the immediate everyday perception, while the essence can be caught only by subjecting the immediate observations to critical thinking and reflection. According to Marx all science would be unnecessary if the everyday observation and experience would suffice to uncover the secrets of reality - "all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided" (Marx 1976, 805, the english translation originates in Geras 1971, 70). As Geras (1971, 70) puts it: "The minimum necessary condition to be satisfied by any work aspiring to scientific status" is "that it uncovers the reality behind the appearance, which conceals it." On the concepts of essence and appearance in more detail see e.g. Sorokin (1974a).

effort was considered pre-scientific and 'metaphysical'.[98] According to him science develops through theoretical and metaphysical phases to a positivistic phase. In the metaphysical phase phenomena are explained on the basis of various forces that are believed to be hidden in things, whereas in the positivistic phase such metaphysical speculations are rejected and the true scientific knowledge is grounded on empirical observations alone. It seems to the present author that the positivism of Comte and Spencer, and the methodological principles based on it, were so readily accepted by the early and also later American sociologists, not only because the positivistic belief in progress promised that the social problems will soon be overcome,[99] but also because the principles were, in a more profound sense, in agreement with their class position. For instance on the basis of them the Marxist ideas could easily be rejected as pre-scientific and 'metaphysical'.[100]

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[98] J.S. Mill describes the epistemic or gnoselogical views of Comte (quoted in Kon 1973, 10): "We have no knowledge of anything but phaenomena; and our knowledge of phaenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. These relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phaenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phaenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, either efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us." It needs to be noted, however, that Mill interprets Comte in the spirit of English empiricism - omitting, therefore, largerly the rational aspects in his thinking. On the Comtean view of the development of science and of its different phases see e.g. Kedrow (1975, 124-134) and on the critical evaluation of his thoughts from the materialistic viewpoint see e.g. Kon (1973, 9-21) and Kedrow (1975, 113-116).

[99] This is very commonly emphasized as the chief cause for the adherence of the American early sociologists to Comte and Spencer by the American historians of sociology (see e.g. Hinkle & Hinkle 1954, 10-12 or Friedrichs 1972, 69-75).

[100] This standpoint is very clearly represented, for instance, by Martindale (1961, 160), when he writes: "The uniqueness of Marxism does not lie - as its proponents have maintained - in the fact that it is the 'only scientific form of socialism'. Its claims to scientific standing are usually based on the use of the dialectic and on the throughness with which all phenomena in society are explained economically. The dialectic, which treats scientific method, logic, life growth, physical change, and innumerable other things as if they were identical (sic!), is outright mysticism. Similarly, the claim to be scientific because every phenomenon conceivable is reduced to economics (sic!) can only be put down to a complete failure to distinguish between metaphysics and scientific theory."

### 1.3.4. The roots of 'psychologism' as a characteristic of this thinking

The methodological principles implied by positivism also offered a clear and easily understandable basis to build up a 'truly scientific' methodological canon. Its first norm is that the scientist, to be scientific, must be absolutely faithful to what is given in the immediate observation and experience. Therefore all attempts to get by way of thinking beyond the immediately given are met with great reservations. This norm, thus, accounts for the everyday fashion of looking at society.[101] In view of it one can easily understand why the social science in the United States was in 30's and 40's ready to accept the norm of the so called value-neutrality to its canon and to reject the early reformist tradition concentrated on social problems,[102] why the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle - and precisely in its most extreme physicalist form - became at the same time the dominating philosophy of the social sciences etc.[103]

Although the attempts to transcend the immediately given were generally met with reservations, in psychology, however, they were tolerated. Most certainly this is due to the fact that it is so tangibly impossible to subject mental phenomena to

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[101] The fault of this norm is that it absolutizes what is given in the immediate empirical observation at the cost of critical and creative thinking - in fact, it forbids the use of the latter. This results in that science becomes subordinated to 'what there appears to be' according to the everyday observation.

[102] See Friedrichs (1972, 77-109).

[103] The nature of physicalism is illustratively revealed by the following words of Neurath (1973, 326): "To one who holds the scientific attitude, statements are only means to predictions; all statements lie in one single plane and they can be combined, like all parts from a workshop that supplies machine parts. Physicalism knows no 'depth', everything is on the 'surface'. The scientific world-view stops at nothing. Whatever is part of life, it examines. The question always is: what can we predict about this? It does not matter whether it be stellar paths, mountains, animals, men or states. Within this framework sociology is an empirical science, concerned with the behavior of human groups." On logical positivism as the philosophical tendency underlying the American sociology see e.g. Kon (1973, 198-249).

direct observation[104] - and also that psychology does not seem to be dangerous to the existing order.[105] Actually, the fact that psychology is allowed to deal with non-observable - or 'only indirectly observable' - phenomena is very advantegous to the bourgeois social science, because always, when one runs into difficulties when trying to account for some social phenomenon on the basis of what is immediately given (and this happens more often than not in practice), he is allowed to postulate some 'only indirectly observable' psychological construct to explain or interpret it. This, for its part, may be seen to explain the 'psychologism' that is so distinct in the American social science.[106]

### 1.3.5. The roots of behaviorism as a characteristic of this thinking

Besides empiricism and 'psychologism' a third peculiar feature of the social science in the United States, worth of taking under consideration here, is the heavy emphasis it lays on human behavior or - more precisely - behavioral phenomena as the subject matter proper of it. That this emphasis was present already in the early sociology is testified by Small's paper presented at the first offical meeting of the American Sociolo-

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[104] It should not be forgotten, however, that there has been attempts to eliminate the non-observable psychical properties, too. As Hinkle and Hinkle (1954, 26) write: "Behaviorists and statisticians tended to agree that the data of science should be objective and include only observable, quantifiable, and verifiable material. Strict behaviorism excludes the concepts of consciousness, subconsciousness, will, feeling, wishes, mind, or self because they refer to phenomena which are subjective, internal, non-observable, and therefore neither accessable not verifiable scientifically. Although many sociologists were favorably disposed toward behaviorism, and some were frequently identified with this approach, no major figure in the field accepted behaviorism completely. Directly or indirectly they always attributed the final force of society and culture to man's inner, non-physical, and mental life."

[105] This perhaps explains, for its part, why Freudism has, despite its clear inclination to 'metaphysics', become so generally accepted in the United States. For instance according to Hinkle and Hinkle (1954, 49 and 52) Freud has been as important to the American sociology as for instance Pareto, Durkheim, or Max Weber.

[106] See Mills (1967, 67-69) about 'psychologism' as a special feature of the American social science.

gical Society in 1906, according to which those days' sociologists generally agreed upon that the task of sociology consists of the search for scientific laws of human behavior and that society and social behavior are constituted of individual behavior.[107] Obviously this emphasis originates in the individualist emphasis characteristic of the liberalist doctrine that dominated long in the United States. This doctrine as well as individualism as its corner-stone were determined by the interests of the rising capitalism.[108] Besides this it traces its origin in social problems as the point of departure of sociology, on the one hand, and in empiricism as the point of departure of its methodology, on the other.

In the first place, most of the matters that were identified as social problems by the early sociologists - as, for instance, criminality, alcoholism, divorce, race relations, etc. - were manifested through people's behavior. In the second place, the Comtesian doctrine that in the positivistic phase science must ground its knowledge on empirical observations forced the sociologists to concentrate on what in society was directly and immediately observable. Precisely in this respect human behavior was the thing coming most nearly up to the requirements. Both of these reasons together forced the sociologists to look at socie-

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[107] See Hinkle & Hinkle (1954, 8-9), who themselves (e.g. vii and 73-74) are apt to highlight this feature so much that they see voluntaristic nominalism - that is, the belief that "the structure of all social groups is the consequence of the aggregate of its separate, component individuals and that social phenomena ultimately derive from the motivations of these knowing, thinking, and willing individuals" - to be the outstanding persistent feature of the American sociology. This 'behaviorism', too, contributed to the 'psychologism' that has been, as mentioned earlier (see the preceding notes), a distinct feature of the American social science.

[108] The emerging capitalism was above all striving for freedom from those restraints of feudalism that inhibited the free value addition and accumulation of capital. This required the producers to be self-dependent, individual ones, who could challenge themselves freely to the competition, as well as the workers to be similarly self-dependent, individual ones, who could be hired, on the basis of freely and equally made agreement, to work for the producers. No wonder, then, that individualism was one of the corner-stones of liberalism - of the ideology of the emerging capitalism. Also see note 159.

ty as it appears in the everyday perception - as the diversity of human behavior - and this accounts, for its part, for that the 'living substance' of society, composed of people and their behavior, became absolutized and that a view about society as a formation, determined by its own laws, was never born.

Now it may be pointed out that the so-called 'social behaviorism' is only one tendency in the American sociology.[109] There is, as a counterpart to it, for instance the tendency of sociological functionalism whose key concept is the social system.[110] Because functionalism looks at society as a whole composed of different social systems and institutions, this may indeed give the impression that it looks at it as a formation. But what is meant by the term social institution in functionalism? Mills[111] states that what is called an institution is probably best defined as a more or less stable set of social roles. What, then, is meant by the term of social role? It is commonly defined as a sum of the norms and expectations defining what a person in a certain employment or position must do.[112] So, in the last instance, a social institution is a system of expected behavior, and society, as composed of these institutions, is a corresponding super-system. In view of this we could contend that the functionalist 'theory' is nothing but a highly abstract system of concepts put together to depict the uniformities of human behavior. Therefore, for the functionalist, society does not exist as a real, historical formation being determined by laws of its own.[113]

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[109] See e.g. Martindale (1961, 285-522), who in a way counterposes social behaviorism and sociological functionalism.

[110] See e.g. Friedrichs (1972, 11-23).

[111] Mills (1967, 29).

[112] This devinition originates in Allardt & Littunen (1975, 25).

[113] There are, however, the terms norm and expectation which, although defining what behavior in what role is supposed, are themselves not behavioral concepts. Therefore functionalism cannot be reduced to social behaviorism, but this does not upset the conclusion drawn concerning the functionalists' view about society. Moreover, if social behaviorism is congenitally inclined toward 'psychologism', also the terms norm and expectation seem to carry 'psychological' connotations with them - at least as far one's conformation to them is considered (cf. e.g. Hinkle & Hinkle 1954, 65).

### 1.3.6. The roots of the view of communication as an exchange of information

The above speculation has borne upon the question, why the sociology in the United States was born and developed in the form of strongly empirical social research, that was directed at phenomena of human behavior and that, when trying to account for these phenomena, was inclined toward 'psychologism'. Because the aspects of 'empiricism', behaviorism, and 'psychologism' are characteristics of the American communication research, too, the above speculation also is an answer to the question, why the American communication research has developed in the way as it has done. There is, however, a particular aspect in the American communication research that merits a particular attention. This aspect is, of course, the communication itself as it is conceived in the American communication research - that is, communication as an exchange of information, meanings, etc. between people.[114]

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[114] The manner of looking at things in terms of exchange is not limited only to communication research, however, but it is apparent also in the American sociology in general. At the micro level for instance the theory of human behavior by Homans (e.g. 1961) rests heavily upon the concept of human exchange. At the macro level, again, for instance the general theory of society by Parsons employs the concept of interchange as one of its core terms. For instance Deutsch (1966, 116-118), after presenting the four functional subsystem or prerequites - that is, pattern maintenance, adaptation to environment, goal-attainment, and inner integration - that a social system according to Parsons' theory must fulfill in order to survive, describes this theory with respect to interchange as follows: "Among these four main functional subsystems, which may be conveniently pictured as four corners of a square, there are six possible major flows of interchange, corresponding to the four sides and the two diagonals of the square, and connecting each of the four main subsystems with the three others. Thus, in the most simple case, the households (belonging to the pattern maintenance subsystem - V.P.) may be viewed as delivering labor to the economy (belonging to the adaptative subsystem - V.P.), and eventually receiving consumer goods from it... (In more developed conditions - V.P.) Household members ... exchange their labor for money wages; these wages are turned in consumer spending ... and for these consumer expenditures, goods are then obtained... The household put first labor, and later consumer spending, into the economy, while the economy furnishes to the households first money wages and then goods." Also cf. notes 159 and 179.

That the concept of communication has been connected with that of exchange is only natural because of the fact that, observed exteriorly, communication appears in the form of exchange - and the American social scientists are accustomed to pay attention precisely only to the appearances of phenomena. But there is something more symptomatic and revealing in this manner of proceeding: it is precisely exchange that gives the visible ethos to a capitalist society in general. What there seems to be in a capitalist society is but a continuous exchange of goods, commodities, services, etc. Even the whole production seems to be nothing else than an exchange process where the workers exchange their work for a wage.[115]

Actually exchange is, however, only a particular phase of the total circulation process of production. But because it is so dominantly visible on the surface of the capitalist society, because most of what people are doing bears it in one form or another, there is an understandable tendency in capitalist societies - in people's everyday cognition as well as in scientific work - to reduce society to exchange processes between people. This tendency is strengthened all the more because a view about society as an exchange process fits precisely the interests of the bourgeoisie. Why it fits them will be given an account later on. Actually the case is, however, that when one reduces society to exchange processes he at once distroys possibilities to truly comprehend society. Similarly, when communication is reduced to the scheme of an exchange act between two persons it becomes cut off from those basic forces whose manifestation it is and, consequently, its true understanding is made impossible. On the other hand, like the view about production as exchange also the view about communication as exchange fits the interest of bourgeoisie - a fact that, for its part, explains its absolutism within the American communication research.

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[115] The quotation in the above note includes precisely this view.

All in all, the general conclusion to be drawn on the basis of what was said above is that the nature of American society and the nature of the social science practised there clearly coincide. As a society imbued with the capitalist mode of production the American society has set down the general counters to bounds to which the social science has had to adapt itself. On this basis, these bounds have been determined in more detail by certain unique characteristics of the American capitalism and of its society - for instance by the ethnic heterogenity of its population accounting for the focal place of the troublesome ethnic relations in its sociology. It needs to be noted, therefore, that although the mode of production prevalent in society determines the general contours of the social science practised there,[116] the social science for instance in two capitalist countries do not necessarily grow out in the same form and develop in the same way.

For instance, although the capitalist mode of production broke through in Germany in the latter half of the 19th century, its sociology,[117] that a little later was established by men like Weber, Simmel, etc., did not in all respects take the same course as its American counterpart. Instead of developing into a dispersed field of research with strong empirical emphasis it developed more to a theoretical doctrine of society. Its scientific exposition, however, would run the risk of getting

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[116] It needs to be noted that it does not affect so much the natural science practised there as it affects the social science. This is due to the fact that, as Kelle and Kovalson (1973, 10-11) put it, "scientific knowledge of nature does not usually reflect the different interests of social classes, which is why the natural and the mathematical sciences do not have a class character", while "men tend to take a different and even opposite views of the order and its change and preservation in antagonistic societies because of the presence of the property-owning and propertyless classes, of exploiters and exploited, oppressors and oppressed, masters and servants", wherefore "men's interests have a strong influence on their assesment of social phenomena and the conclusion they draw from their analysis."

[117] On certain exterior characteristics of the German sociology see e.g. Salomon (1945).

on the wrong track, if the mode of production would be left out of consideration, because one might, then, very easily misinterpret the German sociology as essentially different for instance from the American sociology. It remains a fact that these both sociologies coincide in certain basic and essential questions, although their many exterior characteristics look rather different. And just these basic, essential questions are determined by the capitalist mode of production prevailing as well in the United States as in (West-)Germany.

# 2. ON THE SCIENTIFIC STATUS OF COMMUNICATION RESEARCH

## 2.1. A general outline for communication research as a science

### 2.1.1. Introducing remarks

As was set forth in the previous pages, one of the peculiar characteristics of the dominant way of thinking in the western social science today is its disposition to look at things in an everyday fashion, its stubborn sticking to the phenomenal world. Because this world appears as if it would have been made up of groups of phenomena differing fundamentally from one another, one is easily tempted to take a pluralist stand toward it. With respect to social science this stand implies the view that there are different independent social sciences each corresponding to a certain group of social phenomena. Besides these there can be a more general science - theoretical sociology, social cybernetics or what its name may be - concentrating upon the common characteristics of phenomena belonging to different groups and upon their general exterior relationships. Such a general science would exist independent of the social sciences proper, placing itself above them.

Although this pluralist thinking may at the first sight seem to be an adequate one, it actually, as was observed in the preceding pages, has led to the breaking up of reality instead of its real holistic understanding. This is due to the fact that the world is actually not what the pluralist thinking imagines it to be - it is <u>not only</u> a phenomenal world. Therefore for instance the distinction of social phenomena or appearances from one another and their classification into groups produces results that at bottom are only artificial and seeming ones and that in many times only hinder the true understanding of the world.

Though the pluralist thinking is not aware of this its basic faultiness, it is of sheer necessity aware of some of the consequences resulting from this state of affairs. For instance although the social phenomena seem discernible from one another, offering thus a basis for the distinction between the different social sciences, these phenomena seem, on the other hand, to be related to one another in most complicated way. Because the social phenomena belonging to a certain group can, thus, be looked from the point of view of all of the other (social) phenomena related to it, it seems that there cannot be a single, independent science for each of the different groups of social phenomena. As was implied before, the dilemma originating in this state of affairs has been tried to solve within the western sociological thinking in different ways but with questionable results. And it is evidently unsolvable within the pluralist way of thinking - owing simply to the basic faultiness of this thinking.

As true representatives of this pluralist thinking the advocates of (mass) communication research have sought for and found from the phenomenal world mass communication, and later communication in general, as phenomena that in their opinion constitute (mass) communication research at least as a field of research if not even as a discipline or science of its own. In this case mass communication and communication in general are seen, truly in the spirit of the pluralist way of thinking, as they phenomenally are - that is, as a certain class of social phenomena, discernible as such from social phenomena of other kinds. In other words, in this everyday, phenomenal approach communication appears as a phenomenon sui generis. Therefore the fact that communication is always a manifestation of something else becomes obscure and easily ignored. Let us take an example. Because the wielding of power usually requires communication, the phenomenal approach easily conceives the power relations as communication relations, what they on no account are.[118] In this way the phenomenal

[118] See e.g. Ekecrantz (1975).

approach makes the true understanding of communication impossible.

Because the pluralist thinking, originating in the phenomenal, everyday way of looking at society, leads to erroneous views as to the scientific status and position of communication research, and as to its realm and nature as a science, the consideration of it as a science in the next pages will be begun with the opposite point of view, the monistic one. This is a necessary starting point, since without setting the monistic thesis of the material unity of the world one cannot set and solve the question about the subject matter - or research object that is preferred in the forthcoming - of communication research in a right way. Consequently, after this monistic thesis has been set, the most difficult question to be dealt with here - namely what will be the research object of communication research and of what kind are the laws determining this object - will be taken up.

### 2.1.2. On monism as the fundamental principle of science: a philosophical consideration

As was implied above, according to the pluralist view reality is made up of an endless variety of single elements, atoms, occurrences, etc., which are innerly independent of each other existing, thus, only in exterior relations to one another. Therefore the pluralist view is incapable of conceiving reality on the basis of a unitary theoretical principle. As an antithesis of it monism means a conception, according to which the particular - seemingly independent - 'elements', 'atoms', etc. of reality can be conceived only as products of the modification of the substance making up the world in its whole seeming diversity. A particular form of existence of this substance is called a modus.[119]

According to sophisticated monism the world as a diversity of seemingly independent 'elements' or modi is generated through

[119] This paragraph is written on the basis of Sorokin (1974b, esp. 272-273).

the self-unfolding of the substance. The dissimilarity of the modi is a necessary consequence of this self-development. The case is that the 'driving force' giving rise to it is made up of the inner contradictions of the substance. Because of this the substance and its modi compose a unity of antitheses, in which all the modi or the forms of existence, which the substance in the course of its unfolding gives rise to, manifest themselves as 'autonomous' with respect to their origin, as if they were drawn away and 'alienated' (in a Hegelian sense) from the substance and detached from one another.

It is precisely this contradiction between the substance and its different forms of development that accounts for that the modi appear in the immediate observation as if they were of fundamentally different kinds. Because the everyday mode of thinking sticks to the appearance of things, it is of sheer necessity driven to conceive the modi in an unscientific way that is in keeping with their exterior appearance but not with their true nature. Consequently, a truly scientific reflection of reality is possible only from the monistic point of view, which alone is able to free one from the notion that the seeming diversity of things is something definite.

According to the dialectical-materialist monism the self-unfolding substance, giving rise to reality in all of its various forms, is called materia.[120] In other words, dialectical-materialist monism conceives the reality as a material unity of antitheses - that is to say, as a self-developing totality, in which its different forms of development and motion exist as its moments. The basic moments of reality are stages of development of this same materia, however different and independent they may seem in the uncritical everyday observation.

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[120] It needs to be noted that materia is a philosophical concept, and as such it does not mean matter or materia in the physical sense. Materia is a larger concept including all what exists.

This development goes from lower and simpler forms always to higher and more complicated ones. From a general philosophical point of view we can say that the first great change, in this respect, took place when the animate nature was born from the unanimate one.

The living form of materia differs from the lifeless one particularly with respect to the fact that the individual living organisms are mortal, living only a short period of time. This has decisively affected the patterns of its reproduction and development. For instance, the mortality of individual organisms has called for the development of species, the continuing survival of which is guaranteed through heredity; that is, through the biological information transmission and accumulation in the course of the reproduction of the individual representatives of species.[121] Moreover, all living organisms have at least an embryonic capacity of reflection aiding them to respond to outer stimuli and to adapt themselves to the dangers of their outer environment - a capacity, which has developed further through natural selection.[122]

The second great change took place with the separation of the human sphere from the rest of animate nature or, in other words, with the birth of human society, composed of men as social beings. The development of man from a natural being into a social being was a very complicated process. Its decisive moment was, however, the development of work as a response to the contradiction between opportunities and necessity of production and reproduction of the material conditions of life.[123] It took naturally place in a dialectical relationship with its biological and psychical qualifications. It other words, the development of work both depended on the biological and psychical constitution of the primitive man and - through natural selection - affected this constitution.

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[121] See Klaus (1974, 258-259).

[122] See Pavlov (1973, 57-140).

[123] See e.g. Engels (1971, 210-227; also e.g. Grundlagen ..., 96-104).

In this dialectical process of development work gradually lost its original, instinctive, 'bestial' form and became a conscious activity. And when it became conscious work it became, at the same time, a common work laying down, thus, the foundations of society. That is, during this process men became able to make working tools, to work together with other men and to divide labor with others. From the germ patterns of cooperation and division of labor grew up a net of specific relationships between men. These relationships made up the ground for the generation and evolution of communities and societies. In other words, it was precisely the arising of these relations of production that converted the crowds, which men as natural beings composed, into organized societies.

Although the development of certain specific properties of living materia - above all those of bodily constitution and capacity of reflection, which underlies the unfolding of consciousness - to a certain level made up a conditio sine qua non for society, it did not produce it. Society was not born as a premeditated and intentional union of men, as for instance the theory of social contract supposes,[124] but it arose spontaneously as the work, the specific human form of production and reproduction of life, developed into conscious work. In other words, it was a natural result from the needs of producing and reproducing of human living - a result that necessarily emerged after its species-historical (e.g. biological) conditions had grown ripe.

At the moment of the birth of society there appeared an incident, typical to dialectical development: the object and its conditions changed place. That is, the biological maturing of the physiological basis of human consciousness composed a necessary condition for the arising of society, which, in turn, made up the conditions shaping the further development of consciousness, now as a substantial and specifically human

[124] See e.g. Grundlagen ... (97-98).

phenomenon. Thus, in the substantial sense human consciousness is a product of society and not vice versa.

Summarizingly stated, from a philosophical point of view the universal history, in the above respect, is made up of the self-unfolding, of the self-motion of materia from lower forms to higher ones. On the other hand, although the basic moments of reality - unanimate and animate nature and society - represent the same substance, materia (albeit in very different forms), and although they have grown out of one another in the above order, they are only to a certain degree determined by common laws. That is, the unfolding of a new modus or form of development and motion of materia has always meant the arising of new laws that, besides the ones determining the development of the already existing moments, determine the development of the new one.[125] This does not mean, however, that the moments of reality would exist independently of one another. The case is that although there are laws specific to each moment, these laws are - or become - more or less connected with one another. Thereby the moments of reality condition one another.

## 2.1.3. Communication research as a science: a materialistic outline

### 2.1.3.1. On the origin of communication

As has been set forth already earlier, if we look at communication in an everyday fashion - that is, as it phenomenally is - we will never be able to apprehend it in a right way. Therefore this kind of a way of thinking is, of course, also incapable of providing an adequate basis, on which communication research as a science could be apprehended in a right way. Consequently, the consideration of this question ought not to be begun with communication as such or in itself, but one should start with the evolutionary, historical process bringing it forth and

[125] See e.g. Klaus (1974, 255-256).

conditioning its development. This process is, of course, the socio-historical development of mankind.

This process grows out of innumerable: successive human activities, whose basic pattern is the following one: man, driven by the necessity to satisfy his vital needs, cognizes the objective world surrounding him and affects it through acts basing on knowledge and experience he has gained in this process. Put in more general terms, its basic pattern is the interaction between objective reality and subjective consciousness.[126] The most important form of this subject-object -dialectics is work or material production - because precisely it is the activity whereby men are able to satisfy their vital needs or, in other words, to produce and reproduce their conditions of living.

The cognition of the surrounding world by men - which, of course, began as soon as they became capable of it - has always taken place in the context of this subject-object -dialectics. Therefore, in the substantial sense, human consciousness becomes formed only in the context of men's practical activity. Indeed, men's cognitive activity has developed, initially very closely, as a means of this practical activity. Within it men have, so to say, 'dashed' against perpetually new problems demanding solution - and it is precisely the solving of them that has shaped their thinking and intellect in the substantial sense. Although the initially intimate relation of men's cognitive activity to their immediate practice has gradually - for reasons not to be considered here - developed into a more and more indirect one, it will never lose its ultimate dependency on it.[127]

As we said before, the conversion of men's initially instinctive, 'bestial' activity into conscious work meant, at the same

[126] It needs to be noted that the term "objective reality" is used here, as the counterpart to the term "subjective consciousness", to mean all what there is outside of the consciousness of a subject - therefore, by using it, I am not indicating that subjective consciousness would not be an objectively real phenomenon.

[127] See e.g. Leontyev (1977, 44-47).

time, its conversion into common work.[127a] On the other hand, its development as a common work, as a work laying down the foundations of society, made it necessary that men became able to understand each other. This problem became solved through the birth of communication. Therefore, with respect to the question about the origin of the means of communication (speech, written language etc.) only one conclusion is possible: they grew up in the context of the process converting work into common work. And what is of particular importance, they did not develop for the sake of communication in general but they developed precisely as a means to carry out work as a social enterprise.[128]

Let us return to the basic pattern of human activity, to the interaction between objective reality and subjective consciousness. From the point of view of our subject here, the most important aspect of this subject-object -dialectics is the subjective consciousness. What is it? Shortly stated it means, from the philosophical point of view, the realization of the capacity of materia to reflect itself in an ideal form. Consciousness cannot exist without its physiological basis, the brain, the nervous system, and the senses, but it in itself is nothing material in the physical sense of this term, but it is ideal.

As a real process consciousness means the production of thoughts and ideas; that is, of ideal reflections on the objective reality, on the consciousness itself, and on the unity they together compose. These ideas can be stored in the memory or they can

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127a This development that, of course, took a very long time, depended most certainly on natural selection. As Kuusela and Ranta (1977, 40) have put it, "(t)he ability of working together seems to have been a characteristic that was favored by the natural selection (...)".

128 Vygodsky (1975, 6) has stated this as follows: "Rational, intentional conveying of experience and thought to others requires a mediating system, the prototype of which is human speech born of the need of intercourse during work". Cf. also Dröge (1972, 19-20), who supports, and Beth and Pross (1976, 35-69), who criticize this view.

be objectified - that is, expressed - in some form or another. We can speak about the objectification of ideas in two different respects: (1) in the first place in the sense that one expressly wants to transmit his ideas to other men and, for this reason, puts them into words or other signs, and (2) in the second place in the sense that all what one materially does is mediated through his ideal reflections and, therefore, necessarily expresses them.[129]

All the ideas that become - in one way or another - expressed through human practice, constitute a particular sphere of society; a moment, which can be called, for instance, ideal culture. The ideas, which men 'translate', with the aid of some sign system, into messages and transmit to other men and which, in this way communicated or common-made,[130] circulate in society, make up a moment of this ideal culture - a moment which, for its part, can be called social communication. This is, however, only an exterior characterization of social communication. In effect, an adequate characterization of it can be achieved only by considering how it is determined. All the subsequent lines bear, in a way or another, upon this question.

Although the ideas making up the substance of social communication are produced by individual human consciousnesses, it, nevertheless, is social - that is, a moment of society. Why? To understand this it is necessary to understand that there is no individual human consciousness without or outside of society.

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[129] It is important to note that - as Ilyenkov (1977b, 265) puts it - "(t)he ideal, as the form of social man's activity, exists where the process of the transformation of the body of nature into the object of man's activity, into the object of labour, and then into the product of labour, takes place". Thus, the term ideal denotes not only what men think or objectify through language or some other sign system, but it denotes the distinctly human aspect in the entire relation of men to reality (cf. Ilyenkov 1977a or 1977b, esp. 251-288). In this sense ideal is the human seal that, in the course of the material practice of mankind, becomes stamped on the natural matter.

[130] According to The Oxford English Dictionary (1961, vol. II, 699) the verb communicate stems from the Latin word communicare meaning "to make common to many, share, impart, divide".

As we said before, the conversion of men's initially instinctive, 'bestial' activity into conscious and common work converted - spontaneously and irrevocably - their life and practice into social life and practice. In the course of this process men became able, through the initially crude but gradually more and more refined means of communication, to share ideas springing up from their social practice for the needs of it.[131] From this moment on new generations are always born into the middle of socially circulating ideas created by the preceding generations in their social practice - ideas which form the ground of the ideas they themselves will produce in the course of their own social practice. Because of this human consciousness is always social consciousness.[132] And it is therefore why communication is a moment of society, a socially determined phenomenon.

But what do we mean in detail by saying that communication is a moment of society, a socially determined phenomenon? To facilitate the answering we make an analytical (perhaps violent) distinction between (1) the substance of communication (i.e. the ideas that are produced and intended to be communicated) and (2) the patterns of communication (i.e. the patterned social activities or practices, through which the ideas are made public

[131] It is, namely, always through their social practice that men apprehed the things of reality or, in other words, reflect them in an ideal form (see e.g. Mehtonen 1976; K. Pietilä 1977, 81-85 or Ilyenkov 1977b, esp. 251-288).

[132] Ilyenkov (1977a, 77) writes about this as follows: "(...) social consciousness is not simply the many times repeated individual consciousness (...), but is, in fact, a historically formed and historically developing system of 'objective notions', forms and patterns of the 'objective spirit', of the 'collective reason' of mankind (...). (...) All (...) forms and patterns of social consciousness unambiguously oppose the individual consciousness and will (...) as the completely 'external' forms determining that consciousness and will. (...) It is (...) obvious that all these externally imposed patterns and forms cannot be identified in the individual consciousness as 'innate' patterns. They are all assimilated in the course of upbringing and education - that is, in the course of the individual's assimilation of the intellectual culture that is available and that took shape before him, without him and independently of him - as the patterns and forms of that culture." On the historical character of the 'collective reason' of mankind see also e.g. Sandkühler (1973, 215-225 and passim.) or Juntunen (1977, 11-13).

and become diffused to other people or put in circulation in society).[133] Let us now consider in more detail, how these aspects are socially determined.

2.1.3.2. On the determinants of the substance of communication

With respect to the first of them we must start with the materialistic theory of knowledge. As known, the core of this theory is the so called reflection theory (in German Widerspiegelungstheorie).[134] This reflection theory is sometimes seen mistakenly to represent a form of 'naive realism', according to which human consciousness reflects reality directly as it is.[135] This crude misinterpretation arises perhaps from the common meaning of the term reflection. As a philosophical term it does not mean, however, any immediate copying of reality into consciousness - neither as such as it seems nor as such as it really ("an sich") is - but it means a complex process which is determined both objectively and socio-historically.[136]

This process is objectively determined in the respect that it is always directed at reality, at what there is or has been or what there will or could be. From this point of view the ideas, which become formed in the course of this process, are determined by the objects or things at which the reflection is directed; determined in the sense that they are precisely these

[133] This distinction is really an analytical one and by making it we do not maintain that the substance and the patterns of communication are related only exteriorly to one another or that they in this sense are 'alien' to one another - being, for instance, determined by different laws. In fact, as will be emphasized later on, they compose a unity of substance and form, and it would be most interesting to study how they, from this particular point of view, determine one another in their development. Because, however, the author as yet finds himself incompetent of doing this, this perspective will be omitted here.

[134] On the materialistic theory of knowledge see e.g. Lenin (1971), Pavlov (1973), Sandkühler (1973a and 1973b), Kopnin (1975), Juntunen (1977), etc.

[135] One of these 'mistakers' is, for instance, von Greiff (1976). On 'naive realism' see e.g. Juntunen (1977, 6-8).

[136] See e.g. Gössler (1973).

things and no else that - no matter how superficially, imperfectly or wrongly - become cognized through this process.

The socio-historical determination of this process comes into sight at least at the following points:

(1) As was set forth already earlier, the necessity of the production of material conditions of living made up the initial impetus for the development of human consciousness as a 'collective reason', as well as for that of patterns of social practice as a 'collective activity' - and it has always been the ultimate impetus for them. For instance, things, which at each time have been experienced as obstacles to the development of production, have always attracted men's particular notice. In this way the needs of production have to a great extent determined which things, at each time, have made up the objects of men's cognitive activity. Moreover, besides composing the ultimate impetus for cognition men's practice - its progress - also provides the only criterion, on the ground of which men can prove the veracity of their ideas.

(2) In the second place, it is precisely the material production that, in the last instance, determines the structure of society. The case is that with the conversion of work into common work men spontaneously entered into definite relations with the means of production as well as with one another. These relations of production constitute the real foundation of society.[137] From the moment on when these relations were turned into such ones, within which a certain part of people benefitted increasingly more than other people - i.e. after the appearance of the so called surplus product[138] - they began to determine people's

[137] Marx (1958a, 362-363) has written about this as follows: "In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness".

[138] See e.g. Engels (1958b, 307-327).

interests. Human reflection, again, is always mediated through these interests. For instance those benefitting from the relations of production at each time are by nature, without necessarily even becoming aware of it itself, driven to comprehend the prevailing circumstances as natural and eternal, and to interpret reality in this light.

(3) In the third place, as was implied above, human cognition does never reach the objects and things of reality directly but always indirectly. The case is that all what mankind, at each time, has subjected to its cognition or practice, has thereby obtained a meaning. The meaning of an object or thing - condensed into a concept - presents how it is socially conceived; that is, what the 'collective reason' understands it to be.[139] Indeed, the 'collective reason' or social consciousness exists in form of meanings - therefore, as one is born into the middle of society, he is born into the middle of socially shared common meanings, through which he initially begins to grasp reality.[140]

Initially these meanings spring up, develop, and change on the basis of the practical, atheoretical reflection of objects and things taking place in the context of common work and social practice. From this point of view the meanings do not only bear upon what the objects (by themselves or "an sich") may be but always also upon what they are practically, to their users - that is, to us ("für uns").

This is of particular importance with respect to the meanings of patterned social activities and practices - i.e. of social institutions and systems. The case is that as long as men do not know the laws of social evolution, such social practices are patterned and institutionalized rather spontaneously: they are not built up on the basis of real theoretical knowledge but they arise and take shape as practical responses to conditions

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[139] See e.g. Leontyev (1977, 118-125 and 219-225).

[140] See e.g. Juntunen & Mehtonen (1977, 125-130).

felt problematic. Therefore, too, such institutions are commonly understood on the basis of what they do or what problems they take care of; that is, practically and not theoretically, e.g. on the basis of the social laws that have given rise to the problems and, thereby, to the institutions or systems in question.[141] In other words, the common meanings of such social institutions present only what they, in the everyday practical experience, seem to be but not what they, in a more profound sense, actually are.

It is important to note that although meanings exist socially, as conceptions or beliefs shared by a greater number of men about objects and things, they, nevertheless, are not unanimous but 'capricious', being, for instance, not completely the same to different groups of people. For instance what a certain object 'means' to scientists investigating it may be quite a different thing as compared with its common meaning - i.e. with that what common people understand it to be. On the other hand there is no insurmountable gap between scientific and common meanings. That is, when people learn what science has found out about an object, its scientific meaning becomes transformed into a common one. There is, however, usually a considerable lag in this process: when scientific meanings become transformed into common ones they often are already out-of-date in science.

Summa summarum: men do never cognize reality directly but always indirectly, through the socially existing meanings that have been created in the context of the material practice of mankind

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[141] In other words, in the everyday life the practical activities that become patterned and institutionalized making up, finally, an entire social system, are followed by corresponding patterns of consciousness. In this sense - as Juntunen and Mehtonen (1977, 63) put it - "the patterns of activity determine those of consciousness. The patterns of consciousness become shaped according to the 'logic' of action. The patterns of consciousness always 'rationalize' what there already has taken place". This kind of an 'afterwisdom' is always limited by its nature; and therefore the task of a genuine science is to 'transcend' it, to 'transcend' man's practice and the - necessarily limited - patterns of thought it gives rise to (cf. Pietilä & Kopteff 1978). Hence a genuine science is always critical by nature - critical towards existing patterns of practice and those of consciousness corresponding to them (cf. e.g. Marcuse 1968, vii-xiv and passim.).

and that men absorb in the course of their upbringing and life in general. There is not a hint of idealism in this statement, because the meanings are not subjective-arbitrary fancies but they arise in a completely objective way in the interaction process, within which men transform reality to correspond to their needs. The more men in the course of this process learn about reality - practically or through scientific work - the more adequately the developing and changing meanings reflect it. Without these meanings and their development and passing on from generation to generation the cognition of reality would simply be impossible.

2.1.3.3. On the determinants of the patterns of communication

We made above a distinction between the substance of communication and the patterns of it. The above consideration bore upon the objective and socio-historical determination of the first one - i.e. of human ideas. Let us now consider the socio-historical determination of the patterns of communication or of those patterned social activities through which the ideas are diffused to other people or put in circulation in society.

As we implied above, in the course of their history men's various social activities have sprung up and/or taken shape - that is, become patterned, organized and institutionalized - as practical responses to conditions experienced as problematic. Because the material production and reproduction of living makes up the conditio sine qua non for the existence of mankind, the various social institutions trace their origin - albeit often in a very mediated and complicated way - back to the sphere of material production.[142]

[142] As a matter of fact, the material production itself, because being social by its very nature, is a totality of patterned social activities; that is, a social institution. The relations of production - i.e. the relations of men to the means of production and to other men - which arise in the course of production, compose its 'institutional' form. As com-

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Obviously the influence of the needs of production proper on the other patterns of social activities was initially a very immediate and direct one. That is, it depended obviously closely and decisively on the demands of production proper what kind of social activities men brought forth and/or in what way they organized them into institutions. On the other hand it needs to be noted that men did not 'build' these activities and their organizations according to farsighted plans but they grew out of the innumerable practical responses to conditions felt problematic.

The change of the relations of production into ones, within which certain people could benefit more than others - a change which was brought forth by the appearance of surplus product as we have set forth already earlier[143] - affected naturally men's

(Footnote 142 continues)
posing a form they impose definite limits on their 'content' or the production itself. Hence the production, and the productive forces underlying it, cannot develop freely on their own account but always only in the limits of their form. Philosophically spoken production as a unity of content and form of this kind represents a contradiction between possibility and reality. That is, a certain content, a certain production, represents always a certain possibility that has become true. Within its development - which is dictated by its form or the prevailing relations of production as was put forth just above - it creates conditions for a new content: a production which, in one respect or another, is higher than the prevailing one. This possibility, however, cannot be realized within the form of the prevailing relations of production but only within a new one. That is, its realization requires the upsetting the old form or the old relations of production and the replacing them with new ones. This is a general philosophical explication of the famous notion of the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production - the contradiction which, according to common textbooks (e.g. Kelle & Kovalson 1973, 40-65 and 85-123; Grundlagen ..., 153-251 or Eichhorn et al. 1975), makes up the 'driving force' of social development, of the passing on from one socio-economic formation to the following one. - The closer examination of this contradiction will be passed by here - examination that, at least with respect to capitalism and the passing on from it to socialism, belongs undoubtly to the most difficult tasks within historical materialism.

[143] This change in the relations of production resulted lawfully from the development of productive forces. Namely the appearance of surplus product - or, in more concrete terms, the development of the productivity of work to the extent that men became able to produce more than they

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all social activities and the patterns they form. Namely the interest of those people, benefitting from these new relations of production, to keep these relations unaltered - an interest that was a natural result from this change - gave objectively rise to specific forms of social practice (the institution of law, the state, etc.), which gained the 'obligation' to fulfill this 'guarding' function. Again is to be noted, however, that people did not, within their everyday activities, 'perceive' this interest; they saw only the practical problems which 'carry' this interest or in which it is hidden. Hence such forms are raised consciously to take care of these problems and not to fulfill the above function though this is what they factually do.

In other words, after the turning of relations of production into ones, within which society became split into antagonistic classes, the patterns of men's social practice can be - quite

(Footnote 143 continues)

immediately needed - made, in principle, possible to enhance production through increasing division of labor and use of alien labor force in production. The realization of these possibilities, on the other hand, required a gradual giving up of the old forms of joined ownership and a creation of patterns of exploitation of alien labor force (of which the first pattern was slavery) (see e.g. Engels 1958b, 307-327). As can be seen the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production, mentioned in the preceding footnote, is no 'mysterious' force operating over people's heads but it becomes induced by and also solved through men's activities - activities which always go 'through their heads'. On the other hand this means, of course, that their conscious activity is always limited by what they know. And what people know is not much even today. In this sense their activities have always been more or less 'short-sighted' reactions to changing 'conjunctures', which, for its part, explains why the consequences of this activity - particularly the ones appearing in the long range - are often everything what men would have wanted them to be. Moreover, although men follow in their activity their "own consciously desired" ends, "the many individual wills active in history for the most part produce results quite other than those intended - quite often the opposite", because "in the majority of instances the numerous desired ends cross and conflict with one another, or these ends themselves are from the outset incapable of realization or the means attaining them are insufficient" (Engels 1958a, 391). In this sense the change in the relations of production was nothing that men first far-sightedly planned and then planfully realized but it grew out, a bit at a time, of what men at each time did, each one of them following what he saw, to the best of his reason, to be profitable in the changing conditions or 'conjunctures'. In other words, the relations of production - and the patterns of social practice depending upon them - did not change from equal to unequal ones far-sightedly 'on purpose' but spontaneously or, so to say, in quite a 'natural-historical' way.

roughly stated - of twofold origin: they can originate (1) in the material needs of the prevailing mode of production or (2) in the interests of those benefitting from the existing relations of production. As a rough generalization this holds true right from the societies of Antique to the modern capitalist societies. On the other hand, although these two factors suffice, as rough generalizations, to explain the initial arising of the various patterns and institutions of men's social practice, they alone do not suffice to explain their further development.

The case is that although in societies, basing on unequal relations of production, the interest of those who benefit from these relations determines - directly or indirectly - to a great extent in which way particularly those patterns and institutions develop, which are of importance in the maintenance of these relations, this interest, nevertheless, is not able to dictate the social consciousness altogether. As a matter of fact, it is precisely the unequality of these relations of production that makes it possible that there can, and will, emerge in society ideas and thoughts opposing the prevailing mode of production and form of society - and it makes it possible simply because this unequality makes up the objective basis for the class division in society.[144]

Namely, as we said before, human reflection and consciousness is always mediated through people's interests, which, again, are determined by their location in the society's gross structure of production. With respect to the members of the dominating class - i.e. to those benefitting from the existing relations of production - this means that it is their survival as a class which determines their consciousness. Because, for

[144] It is precisely therefore why in a society, basing on unequal relations of production, the contradiction inherent in the material production - the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production - becomes articulated as a contradiction between those, who benefit from the existing relations of production, and other people - that is, why it becomes articulated as a class conflict.

instance, the capitalist mode of production is the conditio sine qua non for the survival of capitalists as a class, they are by nature, without necessarily even becoming itself aware of it, driven to comprehend capitalism as a natural, eternal, definitive mode of production and to interpret reality in a respective way.

On the other hand, as stated just above, in each society basing on unequal relations of production, there sooner or later emerge ideas and thoughts opposing those of the dominating class and, thus, the prevailing mode of production - ideas and thoughts that often anticipate a new, alternative mode of production and form of society. It would be, however, too simplifying to contend that they - or at least those of them which at each time are the most decisive ones - spring up immediately and spontaneously from the injustices which those people have experienced, who are directly exploited within the existing relations of production or whose activities these relations embarrass (though without such experiences there would be no ground for them).

For instance the capitalist mode of production may produce even many different kinds of ideas and thoughts which oppose or at least seem to oppose it, but only those ones can anticipate a real alternative for it which reflect adequately the basic nature of capitalist relations of production and, thus, the essential laws of capitalist production and society in general. On the other hand, since the work within this mode of production is done in return for a money wage, the capitalist relations of production do not show their basic exploitative nature directly in the everyday experience, not even for people being most injustly exploited within them, but it can be 'caught' only laboriously by scientific and theoretical thinking.[145] This 'secret'

[145] Because in the wage form of labor all labor appears as paid labor, a way of thinking sticking to the appearance of things - to the so called 'fetish forms' (see Marx 1974, 77-88, 479-485 and passim.; cf. also Geras 1971) - cannot reveal the exploitative nature of the capitalist relations of production (this question is considered in more detail in footnotes

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was revealed by Marx when he created the foundations of scientific socialism - the theory and the world outlook making up the core of working class consciousness.

In any case, it is precisely the unequal nature of the relations production that accounts for that there will in society, basing on such relations of production, emerge ideas and thoughts opposing the existing mode of production and form of society. - Let us now return to the patterns of social practice. Because they are constituted of patterned human activities, they cannot compose any hermetically closed systems. In other words, although the interest of those, who benefit from the existing relations of production, determines these institutions, also the ideas and thoughts opposing to this interest are always penetrating into them, sometimes with a better, sometimes with a worse success. Therefore the totality composed of these patterns of social practice, the superstructure of society, is inevitably turned into the area, in which men cognize the basic conflict of the unequal society in one form or another and strive to "fight it out"[146] - which, again, affects the development of these patterns.

The patterns of social communication are constituted of organized human activities, through which ideas are diffused to other men or put in circulation in society. Because they compose a mediating link between ideas and the sphere of publicity, these patterns, of course, determine what kind of ideas and thoughts are brought before the public and to what extent. In this sense patterns cannot be considered purely as forms, exhausted of their content, but only as a unity of content and form.

(Footnote 145 continues)
159 and 160). Due to this the working class, spontaneously and exclusively by its own effort, resting on its everyday experiences, is able to develop only trade union consciousness - that is, as Lenin (1952a, 233-234) put it, "the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation etc.". On the problems of the formation of working class consciousness see e.g. Hahn (1974) or Takala (1977).

[146] Marx (1958a, 363).

When attempting to explain these patterns in a society basing on unequal relations of production we must, like with respect to other patterns of social practice, consider them, (1) in the first place, from two points of view: (11) from that of the production proper and the laws governing it and (12) from that of the existing relations of production and their maintenance. As said previously, although the different patterns of social practice seldom are planned premeditatedly and calculatedly to fulfill definite functions originating in these two spheres, that is what they actually, in a way or another, do. (2) In the second place, we must consider them as forming an area in which the basic contradiction of society comes into sight in form of class conflict. - Only by departing from these starting points we will be able to reproduce in the mind the genesis and development of the patterns of social communication: to reproduce them "as the concrete in the mind".[147]

### 2.1.3.4. Communication research - an organic moment of the scientific inquiry of society

Now what do the above considerations mean from the point of view of communication research as a science? To supply a background for the answer to this question, let us summarize the chief viewpoints, presented above, concerning society and its development. - The essential moments of society are composed of the material production, of the relations of production originating in it, and of the other patterns of social practice - with the atheoretical patterns of consciousness corresponding to them - that grow out of them. More precisely stated, it is the contradictory nature of the relationship between the first two moments, i.e. between the material production and the relations of it, that gives rise to, and pervades, the latter moments. This contradiction makes up the 'driving force' of human history.

These moments - which in itself, because being historical wholes bound together by social laws, are out of the reach of immediate

[147] Marx (1973, 101).

observation - organize and structure that particular and singular, of which society according to immediate observation is composed: men's everyday activities, interaction, social life. This does not mean, of course, that the moments would be one thing in one direction and men's activity and interaction another thing in another direction. On the contrary these moments, and the socio-historical development taking place through them, can exist and be realized only through men's activity and interaction: they exist precisely as the basic lawfulness of it, as the basic unity in the diversity of this activity and interaction.

What all science is obliged to do is to strive for the ever wider, deeper and more truthful cognition of reality. Correspondingly the scientific inquiry of society is obliged to cognize society ever widerly, deeperly and more truthfully - that is, to cognize it as it is. And the materialistic conception of history goes from the conscious, fundamental, theoretical starting point that it is basically a totality developing due to the pressure of its inner contradictions. Because of this there naturally cannot be, in the last instance, but only one single social science. And because our obligation is the total cognition of society in its historical movement, this one single social science - historical materialism - is, at each time, composed of what we have found out in fulfilling our programmatic obligation.

In other words, there cannot exist separate social sciences in any absolute and definite sense. Consequently, only in a sense of division of labor we can make a distinction between (1) a general social science, concentrating upon the most deep and essential laws of social development, and (2) particular or specific social sciences, concentrating upon different aspects or moments of society.[148]

[148] This thinking is analogical to Seve's idea concerning the relation between philosophy and particular or specific sciences (see Autorenkollektiv ..., 178-181; cf. also Kelle & Kovalson 1973, 11-12).

The general science and the specific sciences cannot, however, even in a sense of division of labor, exist apart from one another but only as forming a unity of the general and particular.[149] The case is, in the first place, that one cannot cognize the basic laws of social development without studying the particular moments of society, which are determined by them or whose development, in a way or another, manifest them. That is, the general cannot be caught without the particular. In the second place, one cannot cognize a certain moment or aspect of society deeply without knowing what kind of laws determine social development in general. That is, the particular cannot be cognized deeply without the general. It is precisely due to these reasons that the general science and the particular sciences can exist only as a unity.

As one perhaps already anticipates, the thesis concerning the scientific status and position of communication research, to be launched here, is that it is an organic moment of the scientific program attempting to the total cognition of society. As such it is, from the point of view of division of labor, a particular moment in the unity of the general and the particular social sciences: a particular social science investigating social communication. As the whole preceding consideration implies it investigates communication as a socially determined phenome-

[149] In the Western scientific thinking on society a general social science - if, on the whole, an existence of such one is accepted - exists typically apart from the particular social sciences placing itself, so to say, above them. For instance the Western theoretical sociology, as it is represented e.g. by Parsons, approaches society as a formal structure assembled together from such abstract 'parts' as institutions, roles, exchange relations, etc. This structure is abstracted from the real social patterns that are objects of different particular social sciences. Therefore theoretical sociology places itself above the particular social sciences existing, thus, apart from them. - More recently the problem of uniting the sciences has been tried to solve in the West with the aid of cybernetics. For instance Ahmavaara (1976, esp. 200-201) awards his social cybernetics the status of the theoretical social science. In uniting the social sciences cybernetics, however, does not succeed better than theoretical sociology, because it conceives society in a similar formal way (cf. e.g. Klaus 1973 or Warnke 1974; cf. also note 51).

non, not as such.[150] Put in more concrete terms it studies the production of ideas and their circulation in society, and the patterns of social practice within which all this takes place, as socially determined phenomena.

The above discussion has undoubtly been a rather general and abstract one. In order to bring the ideas launched there 'nearer to the earth' or, more precisely speaking, in order to elucidate, what we mean by the social determination of social communication, we shall next undertake an excourse where we will try, starting, in the last instance, from general laws of social development, to set forth the social functions of mass media. In other words the mass media are considered here by way of illustration, as an example, within which we can enter more deeply into the question in what way the 'driving forces' of social development determine social communication. The mass media are suitable for this purpose also in the sense that they make up the most important pattern of social communication of today.

[150] In the North there has recently been discussed whether the focus of mass communication research lies within the media themselves or outside them (see e.g. the papers and discussion summaries in Hemanus & Hujanen 1977, 70-131). As K. Pietilä (e.g. ibid., 128) has rightly pointed out, this question is posed erroneously: the focus does neither lie within the media themselves nor outside them but it lies in the lawful relationship connecting their development - or that of social communication in general - to the 'driving forces' of society.

## 2.2. Excursion to the social communication as a moment of society: on the social functions of mass media

### 2.2.1. On the origins of mass media

Above the unified general theory of society was discussed in a rather unarticulated manner. It is important to note that there cannot be any such theory of society that would be applicable to societies in general. We can talk about a general theory of society only with respect to specified historical types of societies - that is, with respect to historical socio-economic formations. Consequently, it is not possible to consider social communication as related to societies in general or to society as an abstract concept, but only as related to historically specific socio-economic formations. This state of affairs is symptomatically illustrated by the fact that the social communication has developed to its present form along with the development of a particular socio-economic formation - viz. the capitalist one.[151] Therefore, in the present form it, necessarily, must

[151] In the feudal age the social communication - if we, on the whole, can speak about social communication in feudalism in the present sense of this word - was taken care of, above all, by the priests through their sermons. This is nicely in keeping with that Christianity (in its Roman Catholic form) was the dominant ideology of feudalism, protecting the interests of the ruling class of aristocracy (see e.g. Engels 1958a, 397-401, also see Kühnl 1973, 15-21).

be dealt with by starting precisely with this socio-economic formation.

The capitalist mode of production grew ripe in the womb of feudalism. Therefore the most important means of today's social communication, the mass media, too, trace their origin to the feudal age. It were the needs of the expanding precapitalist commodity production that actually gave rise to news transmission and the early press. In order to be able to plan the production and sale of goods in a way that would maximize the profit the manufacturers and merchants were in sore need of up-to-date information about the circumstances in the world, the development of trade relations, the changing phases of wars, the shipwrecks, the exchange quotations etc.[152] This need, however, does not as such account for the fact that press production and information supply later obtained a character of commodity production. This traces its origin to the periods of economic depression when the printers tried to take advantage of the sale of more or less "loose leaflets" containing "sensational" news.[153]

Of course the audience of these leaflets was in the beginning very small because of illiteracy, and it also grew only rather slowly. Although this was an obstacle to the rapid development of press, the sale of leaflets, on the other side, yielded profit to the extent that the accumulating capital noticed it, too, when seeking for promising changes for investments. Besides illiteracy another obstacle to the rapid development of press was composed of the control and censorship that the feudal regimes almost uniformly applied to it. This indicates that the ruling class of aristocracy was clearly aware of the ideological or political potentialities of the press.[154] Namely the printers

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[152] Ahmavaara et al. (1971, 41-44). Also see Autorenkollektiv... (336-338).

[153] See e.g. Sülzer (1973, 212-225, particularly 221).

[154] To protect its interests the aristocracy followed what later has become called 'authorian press theory'. Against this the forerunners of bourgeois ideology developed the so called 'libertarian press theory', incorporating it as a part of their claim for liberty in economic and political life. Such theories and claims advanced the interests of the

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and publishers were, by reason of their enterprising activity, natural members of the bougreois class and their papers, consequently, were potential 'weapons' for this class. The fullrange expansion of the press was realized only after the state censorship was overthrown as a consequence of bourgeois revolutions and after an extensive public instruction was established. The latter was largerly due to the fact that the capitalist production was becoming more and more complicated needing more skillful and better educated labour force.

### 2.2.2. On the capitalist mode of production and on its inherent contradictions

In order to be able to understand social communication in general and mass media in particular as moments of capitalist socio-economic formation we must give a brief account of the capitalist mode of production and of the contradictions inherent in it. To begin with, in the capitalist mode of production - as well as in each mode of production - there are two aspects tightly bound to one another. On the other hand there is the production itself - that is, the specified mode of activity through which men work up the yield of nature to fulfill their needs. This can be referred to with the term of production proper. On the other hand there are the relations between men, relations that, independently of people's subjective consciousness or will, are formed in the context of production proper. These relations make up the social organization framing the production proper and determining the modes of distribution, exchange, and consumption of what is produced. These relations are customarily referred to by the term of production relations. The mode of production is, then, a specified combination of production proper and production relations.

(Footnote 154 continues)
bourgeois class. On the mentioned 'press theories', see Siebert, Peterson & Schramm (1969, 9-71). It is to be noted, however, that Siebert et al. do not explain the emergence of the press practices, referred to with these theories, on the basis of conflicting class interests.

Both of these spheres of production are characterized by deep-going contradictions which evidently cannot be solved within capitalism itself.[155] In the first place, the sole pursuit to the value-addition of capital, which is the primus motor of capitalist production, tends, particularly through unlimited free competition in circumstances where the production is becoming more and more social,[156] to lead, for instance, into severe disturbances with respect to the equilibrium between the quantitative rate of production and the consumption possibilities of people. This kind of forces account for that the development of the capitalist production proper is characterized by crises appearing, for instance, in paradoxical form of over-production and straits. And these crises form one of the reasons why the private capital has been compelled to abandon the fully free competition and to use the state to an increasing extent as a means of overcoming the crises. This has changed notably the initial free-competition phase of capitalism and is in deep contradiction with the economic doctrine of liberalism.[157]

In the second place, in order to understand the contradictions in the sphere of production relations we must pay closer attention to the value-addition of capital. This value-addition is manifested through the fact that when a capitalist invests a certain amount of money in production he normally will get a greater amount of money back. Now, what is the reason for this? Because labour is the only 'creator' of values, the explanation for the value-addition of capital must be that workers in production create a greater value than for what the capitalists pay them. In other words, in addition to that value for which they get payed the workers create a surplus-value which is taken by the

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[155] Here is no space to deal with these contradictions and to deduce them in any thoroughful way. Therefore they are presented, above all, as given phenomena. The most thorough presentation of the issues in question is, of course, Marx's "Das Kapital".

[156] The production is the more social the less people produce alone directly for the satisfaction of their own needs and the more they produce collectively for the exchange market.

[157] According to this doctrine the state was given the role of a 'night watchman', whose duty was only to guarantee the peaceful exterior circumstances for production and who was not allowed to interfere the production itself in any way.

capitalists without any compensation. This is the well-known phenomenon of exploitation. Precisely the fact that the value-addition of capital and, therefore, the capitalist production in its entirety base on exploitation leads to the fact that there are two basic classes in the capitalist socio-economic formation, viz. the working class and the class of capitalists or bourgeoisie.[158] And what is more, it accounts for that the objective interests of these classes are incompatible with one another. The production relations in capitalism are, then, antagonistic class relations by nature.

In the initial phase of capitalism, at the age of classical liberalism, the contradictions in both spheres of production existed predominantly in latent form. For instance with respect to the contradictions in the sphere of production relations this was due to the fact that before the contradictions could manifest themselves the workers had, at least to some extent, to become aware of their position as exploited class. And this was no simple task because production relations do not show their exploitative character at the outset.[159] The thorough recognition of capitalist production relations became possible only with the emergence of scientific socialism which laid bare, among other things, their exploitative nature.[160] Because the contradictions

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[158] Besides these basic classes there also are in a capitalist society certain by-classes or intermediate classes. On the definition of class see e.g. Lenin (1952 b, 244).

[159] The relations between workers and employers in capitalist societies manifest themselves in so called fetish form which covers their true essence. The basis of this is the mode of wage labor. Due to this the value of labor-power (for which the workers in reality are paid) is transformed in such a way that it takes on false appearance of the value of labor (for which the workers in reality are not paid). In other words it appears as if the capitalist pays, not for the labor-power of a worker, but for his all labor. This creates the illusion that workers and employers are equal or that their relation is an equal exchange relation. As Geras (1971, 80) puts it: "... the inequality of the exchange is falsely disguised as an equal exchange", which "conceals the essential feature of capitalist relations, namely, exploitation."

[160] The emergence of scientific socialism necessitated the bourgeoisie to counteract it by means of the so-called ideological regulation and control, exercised predominantly through mass media. Above all this ideological regulation, connected with the fetished nature of the apparent social reality, accounts for the fact that it is not easy for the working class in capitalist societies to avoid adopting bourgeois way of thinking (cf. e.g. Dröge, Egger & Streese 1973, 186-189). Also see note 145.

existed in latent, undisturbing form, it was only natural that the liberalist doctrine of laissez-faire dominated over the economic life. As implied earlier, for instance the state was given only a 'night watchman's' by-role. Also with respect to social communication in general and mass media in particular we can conclude, on the basis of the above standpoints, that most of their later functions existed only in a latent form.[161]

When the inherent contradictions of the capitalist mode of production gradually came into sight the capital had, naturally, no other choice than to try to adapt itself to them. This adaptation took place, for instance, in the form of monopolization.[162] To overcome the disturbances caused by the inherent contradictions the state, too, was given a far more central role than before. In the first phase the activities of the state were extended to the sphere immediately framing the production proper. So the state, for instance, undertook to care to an increasing extent for the reproduction of the labour power by means of various social measures, public education etc. These measures not only contributed to the production proper by relieving the burden of the capital but they also functioned ideologically by contributing to the keeping of class conflicts under control. In today's state-monopoly capitalism the state has already intervened directly the production proper.[163]

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161 After the bourgeois rule became settled the press turned gradually from the libertarian press, which had educated men in the bourgeois spirit and struggled for bourgeois rule, into 'routinized' party press. In this phase it, however, also contributed to the formation of national states by creating feelings of national affinity (see e.g. Ekecrantz 1975, 52). The formation of national states, again, manifested the need of the capital to more extensive markets. - Only at the end of the 19th century the commodity function overcame the other functions and the press was, as it is often expressed, commercialized (see e.g. K. Pietilä 1978).

162 On monopolization in this respect see e.g. Kosonen (1976, 195-242).

163 This is described by Holzer (1973, 116) as follows: "With the development of capitalism to its monopolistic and imperialistic stage the relation between economic and political sector changed in the respect that the protecting function of the bourgeois state - that is, the removing of the outer-economic obstacles to the value-addition of capital with the aid of civil law and measures of public order - made room for an (intended) long-range regulative function of the political sector - that is, the removing of outer- and inner-economic obstacles to the value-addition of capital with the aid of a conjuncture-political equipment for the steering of economic processes."

To conclude, it is the above outlined development of capitalism that has determined the functions which social communication in general and mass media in particular have in today's capitalistic societies. Consequently, these functions cannot be understood without keeping in mind that the development of capitalist production is dominated by inner contradictions leading to continually recurring crises, and without relating mass communication to this production. In this perspective mass communication can be viewed from two different angles. In the first place, it as such is a certain branch of production proper. In the second place, it is in a specified way related to the total production and reproduction taking place in society - that is, to the production proper of society, on the one hand, and to the production relations prevailing in it, on the other.[164] In the following we shall consider the functions of social communication and mass media from these points of view.[165]

### 2.2.3. Social communication as a special branch of production

As a special branch of production the production and circulation of ideas or information[166] in society has with times obtained an industrial character. As such it is usually divided into privately and publicly operated sectors, the latter including in most cases broadcasting institutions (in Europe) and the former covering the remaining forms of mass communication. While the publicly operated sector strives in most cases only for the maintenance of its functioning the purpose of the privately operated sector is the value-addition of the capital invested in it.[167] This means that the private enterprises of the publishing branch produce their information products, above all,

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[164] The term "in a specified way" in the sentence means that the relation of mass communication to the two moments of production is to a great extent indirect and often mediated through other social systems and processes.

[165] Holzer (1973, 129-137) has presented in broad lines the same functions, albeit his point of departure is somewhat different as compared with mine (cf. also Cheesman & Kyhn 1975, 133-152).

[166] The term "information" refers here to all kinds of thoughts and ideas, extending from the highest intellectual or artistic forms to the most 'primitive' forms of entertainment, produced and circulated in society.

[167] Cf. e.g. Dröge 1972, 113, or Holzer 1973, 138-139.

for sale because only through the sale the surplus-value embodied in them can be realized and the value of capital added. The private publishers offer, in fact, two 'articles' for sale. The first one is composed of column space or broadcast time sold to advertisers, while the second one is composed of the final products - newspaper copies, books etc. - sold to common consumers.

From this point of view the information products of private publishers are commodities by nature. As such they have two values: a use value and an exchance value. In a usual case the capitalists are not genuinely interested in what kind of a use value their products have - they are interested in the use value only because without it the products would have no exchange value. With respect to information products the situation is, at least in the present author's mind, different since information products are, from the point of view of the maintaining of the existing mode of production, not as 'neutral' as for instance shoes or clothes. Therefore it is, for instance, quite unusual that private capital would invest to the production of information products the content of which is against the capitalist mode of production.[168] Therefore, too, the private capital can afford the production of information supporting the prevailing order even in cases where the profit is lower than on the average. That an information product is not a common but a particular commodity does not, however, turn down the fact that the private production of information, precisely as production,

[168] When such investments take place, they in most cases are undoubtly done for tactical purposes - for purposes to create dissolution among the anticapitalist forces, to show the 'plurality' of the capitalist mass media, etc. - Incidentally, it is a difficult question whether or not the information products of anticapitalist publishers are commodities in the real sense of this word. This question is difficult because the anticapitalist publishers must bring their products on the market like other private producers do, on the one hand, although they, on the other, may operate entirely on the cost price principle. In this latter respect their products resemble those of the public sector. Anyway, the most important thing is that because they do not try to catch profit, the anticapitalist producers are more free to move within the bounds of the laws of capitalist production, although they cannot escape them altogether.

is, in the last instance, determined by the laws of capitalist production.[169] At the most it can only modify the effect of these laws.

The fact that the laws of capitalist production give a commodity nature to the information products of private publishers does not mean that the public sector would never produce 'information commodities' or that this sector would have no immediate significance from the point of view of the value-addition of the private capital. To the extent that the agents of the public sector - usually broadcasting institutions - produce or bring their programmes on the market for sale, their products also obtain a commodity character. Furthermore, the public broadcasting sector is significant for the private capital at least in the following three respects. Firstly, broadcasting in general has given rise, particularly through the birth and development of television to the colour age, to a considerable quantity of electronic and chemical industry[170] - just like the print media have given rise to special branches for instance within paper industry. Secondly, it has given rise to various private programme-producing enterprises making profit by selling their products to both privately and publicly operated broadcasting institutions. Thirdly, private capital can take advantage of broadcasting institutions by selling them such information or cultural products that actually are distributed and 'sold' through other channels, above all motion pictures with respect to television and records with respect to radio.

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169 This is indicated, for instance, by the fact that a concentration and monopolization process corresponding to that one in other production branches has taken place in the publishing branch, too (see e.g. Diederichs 1973 or Holzer 1973, 138-145). - In addition, it needs perhaps to be mentioned that a considerable part of information products as commodities differ from more customary commodities in the respect that they lose their use value or become 'spoiled' quite rapidly. This holds true particularly with respect to newspapers, because newspaper copies are out-of-date usually already within a day after their production. Therefore there are many particular features in the newspaper industry. The production concentrates upon certain few hours which accounts for that the machinery is often used with reduced capacity and that the branch needs relatively much labor force. Further, newspaper enterprises do not need stores, the distribution of products (copies) must take place rapidly and is expensive, the newspapers aim at long-term subscriptions etc. (see Laaninen & Lappalainen 1974, 35-36).

170 See Holzer (1973, 143-144).

### 2.2.4. Social communication as related to the total production proper of society

The question about the relation of social communication to the total production proper of society is more complicated than the above one. This is due to, in the first place, that the total production proper is no single moment but a whole consisting of various sub-moments. The constituting ones of them are, of course, the sub-moments of the circulation process of capital that begins, when money is invested in production, and ends, when the produced goods are sold and the initial capital plus the surplus-value are gathered. There also are a number of specific sub-moments - as, for instance, the planning and managing of the circulation process, the general conditions of production or the material and ideal infrastructure, the labour force needed in production, etc.

In the second place, the different sub-moments of the ideal culture are of different importance with respect to these sub-moments of production proper. For instance with respect to the production process itself science would perhaps be the most decisive sub-moment of the ideal culture, as it has become an immediate productive force.[171] This raises the question, whether or not the functions of other sub-moments of ideal culture with respect to the production process itself are determined on the basis of what their relation is to science or, in other words, how they contribute to the application of the science as an immediate productive force.

Because of these difficulties it is possible here to give only an overall account of the possible functions of social communication in general and the mass media in particular in this respect. The significance of the mass media as contributors to the production proper of a capitalist society is perhaps greatest with respect to the sub-moment of the general circulation process of capital. In other words, by functioning as advertising

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[171] On science as an immediate productive force see e.g. Man-Science-Technology or Hartikainen (1976).

media the mass media, particularly the privately operated ones, give a vital contribution to the general value-addition of capital by speeding-up of commodity circulation and realization of surplus-value.

The case is that always a certain part of total capital is inactive, fixed to delivered raw materials, to ready-made but not as yet sold commodities, etc. With respect to the value-addition of capital this inactive part of it is, of course, useless so far as it stays inactive. Therefore it is only natural that capitalists strive for that the time needed to get the commodities sold would be so short as possible. The shorter this time is, the smaller is, at each moment of time, the inactive part of capital, and the greater is, in circumstances unchanged as to the rest, the surplus-value taken over by the capitalists.[172] This is the prime motive of advertising, along with the need of getting people internalize a 'consumerist' life philosophy and style, to create new needs that must be satisfied through the increasing purchase of goods etc.[173]

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[172] Marx (1976, 79). Also see Holzer (1973, 132-133).

[173] The significance of commodity advertising is based on the fact that the real use value of a commodity as such is not a decisive factor in its purchase. The decisive factor is what kind of expectations as to its use value the commodity is able to give (cf. Ilmonen & Partanen 1975, 40). These expectations are created through advertising. Because advertising aims at heightening of the anticipated use value of a certain commodity, in order to speed-up the sale of such commodities, it creates, according to Ilmonen and Partanen (1975, 40-42), a looks value for the commodity. - As a historical phenomenon commodity advertising traces its origin to the contradiction between the increasing rate of capitalist commodity production and the limited consumption opportunities (and needs) of people. As Ilmonen and Partanen (1975, 41) state, "the expansion of production as compared to the market raised obstacles to the way of the realization of surplus-value, at the same time as the growth of capital fixed in the production machinery strengthened the economic significance of the speeding-up of commodity circulation. This resulted in the emergence and expansion of different forms of looks values... As particularly produced, as a particular aspect of use value the looks value is ... an attempt to an apparent overcoming of the contradiction between the use and exchange values of a commodity." - From the point of view of mass media it needs to be added that advertising is a vital condition particularly with respect to newspapers and magazines. For instance advertising is responsible of 70-75 per cent of the incomes of Finnish newspapers today (see Kom.miet. 1973: 91 I, 54).

Another sub-moment of the total production proper of society with respect to which mass communication is in a certain way of importance, is the reproduction of labour power. This sub-moment is a complicated one consisting, for instance, of an adequate supply of labour force, of an adequate production and reproduction of the physical and mental abilities of individual workers etc. Furthermore, for instance the mental reproduction of workers does not mean only their vocational training and retraining but it extends to mean for instance their ideological adaptation to the prevailing production relations, too.

Anyway, although mass media may have some significance with respect to all of the different aspects of the reproduction of labour force, its most important function in this respect is simply to contribute to the mental reproduction of the workers - and not only in the sense of ideological reproduction (which will be considered later) but also with respect to mental relaxation. The tiresome, forced-phase manual factory work which is not unusual in capitalist production, is not very stimulative for creative, intellectual activities at leisure time but, rather, compels the workers to seek for mental relaxation from light mass media entertainment. This is one reason accounting for the fact that light entertaining programmes, magazines, etc. are in better demand in the market than their counterparts - which, again, contributes to that the former ones are produced in larger quantities than the latter ones.

With respect to other aspects of the reproduction of labour power - or in general of the other sub-moments of the production proper - the functions of mass media are either secondary or of smaller importance than those mentioned above. Mass media contribute, no doubt, for instance to the regulation of the supply of labour power both directly, by selling space for announcements whereby the workers are seeking for employment and the employers for labour force, and indirectly, for instance by influencing, through news about employment situation and labour market trends, to the motion of labour force or to the choice of vocational

training and occupation, but this is absolutely not any central function.[174]

Further, as said before, the need of planning and steering of the precapitalist production in its time gave a very decisive push to the development of news transmission and the press. When the circulation of the press widened, however, the information satisfying this need was gradually moved over to closed, non-official information channels.[175] Nevertheless, the information disseminated through the mass media may still today have some significance in aiding the capitalists to adapt their production to the greatly and rapidly varying conditions of the capitalist market.

### 2.2.5. Social communication as related to the production relations

As said before, the press had already at an early stage a political function. Therefore, one of the chief causes championed by the fore-runners of the bourgeoisie was the freedom of press, and the passing on from feudalism to capitalism brought forth the conception of the press as a 'free marketplace of ideas'. This was a logical extension of the liberalist maxim of economic and political freedom.[176] Of course the press affected ideologically in favour of bourgeoisie in these times, too, although bourgeoisie was not yet at that time in a vital need of such a

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[174] With respect to certain research problems this aspect is, however, an important one. It is impossible, for instance, to understand the phenomenon of migrant information without taking into account the nature of today's migration as a motion of labor force and the function of (migrant) information as one of the means contributing to the regulation of this motion (see Hujanen 1976, 105-111).

[175] Cf. Ekecrantz (1975, 51).

[176] In the beginning of capitalism the share of those enjoying the rights of political freedom was very limited - for instance the right to vote, and the number of votes one hand, depended on the quantity of one's property (see e.g. Kühnl 1973, 37-41). The general and equal suffrage was largerly a result of the struggle of working class. Its introduction resulted in, however, that "the use of state power began to move from the public part of state machinery, controlled by representative bodies, into its executive branch" (Ilmonen & Partanen 1975, 12; cf. also Kühnl 1973, 41-43).

support. This need arose only after the workers began to recognize their position as an exploited class - only after the scientific socialism was born to show that capitalism is not any eternal phenomenon but only a historical one, which sooner or later is bound to disappear to give way for a new, socialist era.

In order to understand social communication in general and the mass media in particular as related to production relations we must, again, take a look at the historical development of capitalism. That the capitalist socio-economic formation took the place of the feudalist one was basically due to the fact that the capitalist mode of production corresponded better to those days' development stage of productive forces than did the feudalist one. The particular factor in the capitalist mode of production opening the way for an unexampled development of productive forces was the emergence of capital.[177] Or, more exactly speaking, it was its 'ability' to get its value added, because this added value, besides the initial quantity of the capital, could then be utilized as a new capital. This process of value-addition does not, however, take place because of a free will of the capitalists, but it is forced by the capitalist competition itself. That is, in order to survive the capitalist is forced to act so that his capital accumulates. That's why the value-addition of capital is the capitalists' most central interest.

This determines the capitalists' social being or social existence and denotes, thus, the bounds of their consciousness.[178] In other words, the forms of the capitalist or bourgeois consciousness are determined above all by the fact that the existence of exploitation - that is, the opportunity of private capital to

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[177] It needs to be noted that although the birth of the capitalist mode of production released the productive forces to an unexampled growth, the intrinsic contradictions of capitalism have gradually begun to constrain their optimal development. To be sure, the production forces are still growing, but unevently and slowly. For instance Kelle and Kovalson (1973, 95) write about this as follows: "Consequently, when we say that capitalist relations of production have become a drag on the development of productive forces we do not mean that the development of the latter comes to a stop. It only means that under capitalism production is highly uneven and one-sided, with the productive process developing through crises and cataclysms."

[178] Cf. note 73.

add its value in the only way through which it is possible - is a sine qua non for the existence of bourgeoisie as a class. Would this opportunity be deprived, there would be no class of capitalists. In other words, a capitalist cannot escape of being an exploiter otherwise than by ceasing of being a capitalist. The exploitation relation in itself is a deeply contradictory one. As said, in order to survive the capitalists need workers, whose objective interests are diametrically opposite to the value-addition of capital and who, therefore, compose a continuous threat to the existence of bourgeoisie. It is paradoxical indeed that the sine qua non of the existence of bourgeoisie, the exploitation relation, contains at the same time the germ of its fall.

It is precisely this contradiction that at bottom determines the forms of bourgeois thinking. Because the exploitation relation contains the germ of its fall, the bourgeoisie cannot recognize and accept it as it actually is: its recognition and acceptance would namely mean that bourgeoisie would recognize and accept the end of its own existence. Due to this the bourgeois thinking naturally and self-evidently tends to apologize, justify, and eternalize the capitalist mode of production.

Initially this thinking had a spontaneous character resulting from the fact that the capitalist production relations did not appear in the everyday perception as they actually were. And it still has a good deal of this spontaneous character, due to the same fact that reality, when considered superficially in everyday fashion, seems to disqualify for instance the claim according to which the capitalist production is based on exploitation. Indeed, if one looks only at the exchange act, where a worker exchanges his labour force for an agreed-upon wage, it does seem that he gets paid for all the work he does.[179] This, again, seems

[179] The exploitation remains obscure as long as the attention is paid only to the exchange acts and as long as these acts are considered in formal terms - that is, as acts where a commodity (labour force) is exchanged for another commodity (wage). It is discovered only after one realizes that the commodity brought by workers on the market, their labour force,

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to upset all claims as to the antagonistic nature of class relations, the class-character of the state, etc.

Because the vast majority of the owners and shareholders of privately operated mass media are forced, like capitalists in general, to aim at the value-addition of their media-invested capital, they belong to the class of bourgeoisie and their existence, like that of other capitalists, is based on the relation of exploitation. In the first place, as said before, the most important income source for most privately operated media is advertising. In other words, their existence is based on the surplus-value exploited by other capitalist from the work of their workers, because the costs of advertising can be covered only through it. And the greater is the total surplus-value produced in society the better are the media capitalists' opportunities for profit-making.[180] In the second place, they also make profit by exploiting their own workers.[181]

Consequently, the media capitalists can be nothing but deeply interested in the preservation of the capitalist mode of production. Therefore one - and maybe the most important one - of the objective functions of privately operated mass media, with some anticapitalist exceptions, is to apologize, justify, and eternalize this mode of production or, in other words, the production and reproduction of people's consciousness, through ideological regulation and control, in favour of it. This

(Footnote 179 continues)
is the only commodity capable of creating values. This capacity, again, is employed only in the production, not in the exchange process. Therefore, only by examining the production process one may comprehend that the workers are not paid for all the value they produce. In view of this it is self-evident why the reduction of society to exchange processes benefits the bourgeoisie. Cf. also notes 114 and 159.

180 See e.g. Knipping (1963, 24-25); cf. also Laaninen & Lappalainen (1974, 46-47).

181 The fact that media capitalists can make profit from two different sources does not mean, however, that this branch would get double pay. In fact, because of the advertising income for instance the newspaper copies can be, and actually are, sold to consumers at price often lower than the production costs (see e.g. Beglov 1971, 71-73; cf. also Laaninen & Lappalainen 1974, 32-33).

function exists objectively regardless of whether the publishers and editors act as conscious manipulators or whether they are doing their daily job sincerely with good intentions, in a way they have learned during their training and job.[182]

But how is the case with publicly operated mass media? As a part of the state (in a wide sense), which is brought forth by bourgeoisie for purposes to protect its interests, they cannot be really impartial but are - sometimes more closely, sometimes more loosely - submitted to the interests of bourgeoisie. In the first place, they have to reflect reality 'impartially' or 'objectively', which means that they must reflect the surface of reality and interpret the things from this point of view, but not get rid of this surface and submit it to critical scrutiny.[183] In the second place, if they even are trying it (at least

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182 It is sometimes argued that the job the bourgeois publishers and editors (or even the ones working on the publicly operated sector) are doing is nothing but altogether conscious manipulation (cf. e.g. Starke 1971). This does not hold true, however, except with respect to directly political editorial work. That is, for instance the bourgeois press prints its ordinary news material largerly without conscious calculations as to its manipulative efficiency. Nevertheless this material manipulates. The case is that the ordinary news material usually contains only superficial observations and facts, that accustom the reader to look at reality and to think about it in corresponding superficial terms. This kind of reporting is a deeply-rooted routine in the Western journalistic practice and it has largerly been approved as the only right way - no doubt because it cannot jeopardize the capitalist order. (The predominance of pure empiricism in bourgeois science can be interpreted similarly, too.) To regard this kind of reporting as conscious manipulation leads to simplification and vulgarization of the things and easily to false conclusions.

183 In a capitalist society the principle of 'impartiality' normally supports the presentation of bourgeois view and suppresses opposing views. This is due to the fact that in the capitalist society bourgeois views coincide with the reality as it is experienced in everyday fashion. Moreover, they are also otherwise in a dominant position within it. Therefore only the views differing from the 'everyday truth' and from the dominant views are experienced as 'partial' ones. In other words, since the vast majority of people already ever since their childhood become accustomed to the dominating bourgeois views, they are seen by them as 'normal', 'apolitical', 'colourless', etc., while the different or opposing views are seen as 'abnormal', 'political', 'coloured', etc. (cf. e.g. Littunen & Nordenstreng 1973, 18-23). The struggle for a real 'impartiality' is, of course, an improvement, although there is a danger hidden in it. For instance the Finnish Broadcasting Company took in the late 60's steps

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to a disturbing extent), the privately operated bourgeois mass media, which totally overshadow the really socialist ones, will put them in general in order again.[184] On the other hand, as the state so the publicly operated mass media are to some extent - albeit perhaps to a very small one - self-dependent. In this respect one must not identify the publicly operated mass media with the privately operated bourgeois ones.

Because the workers compose the exploited class in capitalism, their objective interests, as said before, are diametrically opposed to those of the capitalists. In other words, the workers' chief objective interest is the overthrow of the bourgeois rule. To do this they must be conscious of themselves as a class and of the historical task of this class. Therefore, the objective function of socialist mass media in capitalism is to struggle against the dissemination of bourgeois ideology and to contribute to the construction of working-class consciousness.

In these pages a sketchy attempt has been made to deduce social communication in general and the mass media in particular as moments of the capitalist socio-economic formation or, in other words, to demonstrate how they are tied to the mode of material production of capitalist societies. Particular emphasis was given to the necessary functions that social communication and the mass media are, so to say, 'obliged' to fulfill: how these

(Footnote 183 continues)
toward this direction by approving that "a principal aim of broadcasting ought to be to offer the public a view which changes as the world changes and as our knowledge of it increases, changes or becomes more perfect". The aim at 'impartiality' was presented in the official Broadcasting Regulations in the following words: "Different, even opposed views of life and the world can and should be presented in the programmes, but the evaluation of these views does not belong to broadcasting but to each member of society" (cf. Littunen & Nordenstreng 1973, 25-26). That is, in the name of impartiality the Broadcasting Company is obliged to present truthful as well as false views and to abstain from any evaluation of them in terms of truthfulness or falseness!

184 For instance the effort of the FBC described in the preceding note were met with strong disapproval by the Finnish bourgeois press, resulting in that people, too, began to look at FBC as a 'coloured', 'red' institution (see V. Pietilä 1973; cf. also Littunen & Nordenstreng 1973). As a consequence of this certain measures of 'normalization' were undertaken that suppressed its progressive development.

functions and their changes inevitably result from the basic motion forces of capitalism and from the 'changes' it must pass through in order to counteract on the disturbances that are caused by its inherent, in the last instance non-solvable contradictions.

The purpose of this consideration has been to outline and fix those points on the basis of which we can get an insight into how communication research may be organized as a particular moment of the general social science. This consideration does not present any theory as such but, at the utmost, a basis on which a real theory could be built. For instance, although it sets down the bounds for the functioning of social communication, it does not state in what ways it, at each time, fulfills its functions.[185] Neither does it state the laws determining its effectivity in fulfilling these functions. All this is the task of communication research - a task that cannot be fulfilled by any positivistic versions of it but only by it as a science which has its roots in the dialectical and historical materialism.

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[185] Perhaps it needs to be mentioned at this point, however, that a certain content of mass media may fulfill several functions at the same time. For instance an advertising piece may not only fulfill the function of speeding-up the circulation of commodities but also the ideological function. Similarly an entertainment programme may not only get people relaxed but also serves ideological purposes, etc.

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KESKEISIMPIEN KÄSITTEIDEN SUOMENNOKSET JA SELVENNYKSET

to absolutize= absolutisoida, asettaa yksinvaltaiseen asemaan

antagonistic= sovittamattomasti vastakkainen

antithesis= vastakohta; unity of antitheses= vastakohtien ykseys

to apologize= apologisoida, puolustella

appearance= ilmiö (ilmenemismuodon merkityksessä), ilmiasu (ks. myös käsitteitä essence, fetishism ja phenomenon)

atheoretical= ateoreettinen, käytäntöön sitoutunut, (tiedostukseen liittyen) arkipäiväinen (ks. myös käsitteitä everyday, phenomenal, practical, superficial ja vulgar)

to benefit= hyötyä

capital= pääoma; accumulating capital= kasautuva pääoma; accumulation of capital= pääoman kasaantuminen; invested capital= (tuotantoon) sijoitettu pääoma; value-addition of capital= pääoman arvonlisäys (ks. myös käsitteitä value ja surplus-value)

capitalism= kapitalismi, kapitalistinen tuotantotapa

circulation= kiertokulku; to circulate= saattaa kiertokulkuun, kiertää

class= (yhteiskunta)luokka; class conflict= luokkaristiriita; dominating class= hallitseva luokka; class division= luokkajako, luokkiin jakautuminen

cognition= tajunta, tietoisuus; tiedostus; to cognise= tiedostaa

commodity= tavara (so. vaihtoa varten valmistettu työntuote, jolla on käyttöarvo ja vaihtoarvo, ks. myös käsitteitä use value ja exchange value)

common= yhteinen, yleinen, tavanomainen; common work= yhteinen työ; common meaning= tavanomainen merkitys

communication (ks. social communication); patterns of communication (ks. pattern); substance of communication (ks. substance)

condition= ehto, edellytys, myös olosuhde; conditio sine qua non= välttämätön edellytys; to condition= olla ehtona tai edellytyksenä (ja määrätä tätä kautta jotakin)

conscious= tietoinen; conscious work= tietoinen työ; consciousness= tietoisuus, tajunta; social consciousness (ks. social); subjektive consciousness= subjektilla oleva tietoisuus

contradiction= ristiriita; contradictory= ristiriitainen

diversity= moninaisuus

'driving force'= 'liikevoima' (so. tekijä tai laki, joka määrää jonkin objektin liikkeen, kehityksen, muutoksen)

essence= olemus (so. ilmiön sisäiset ja välttämättömät suhteet, jotka määräävät, mikä ilmiö perimmältään on; näitä suhteita ei tiedosteta, mikäli ajattelu rajoitetaan pelkästään po. ilmiön ilmiasuun, ks. myös käsitteitä atheoretical, appearance, everyday, fetishism, phenomenon jne.)

everyday= arkipäivä(inen) (ks. myös käsitteitä appearance, atheoretical, fetishism, phenomenal, practical jne.); everyday fashion or mode (e.g. of looking at society)= arkipäiväinen, pinnallinen, epäkriittinen tapa (esim. tarkastella yhteiskuntaa)

exchange= vaihto, vaihtaminen; to exchange= vaihtaa; exchange act= vaihtotoimitus; exchange value (ks. value)

existence= oleminen, olemassaolo; to exist= olla olemassa; form of existence (ks. form); social existence (ks. social being)

exploitation= riisto; to exploit= käyttää hyväkseen, riistää; exploitation relation= riistosuhde

fetishism= fetishismi, palvonta (liittyy tässä olemuksen ja ilmiön dialektiikan nimenomaan siihen puoleen, jossa ilmiasu eroaa olemuksesta, 'peittää' sen, ja jossa asiasta näin syntyy väärä kuva mikäli ajattelu rajoittuu pelkästään po. ilmiasuun, ikään kuin alistuu sille sitä 'kumartaen' tai 'palvoen' sen sijaan että problematisoisi sen, asettaisi sen kyseenalaiseksi ja siten kriittisen ajattelun kohteeksi, ks. myös käsitteitä appearance, atheoretical, essence, everyday, phenomenal, phenomenon, practical, superficial ja vulgar); fetish form= fetissimuoto (ilmiömuoto nimenomaan olemusta 'peittävänä' muotona, joka tällaisena on omiaan kiinnittämään arkipäiväisen ajattelun itseensä ja näin johtamaan sitä harhaan)

form= muoto; form of existence= olomuoto (so. muoto, jossa jokin on olemassa, ks. myös käsitteitä modus ja moment); form of development= kehitysmuoto; form of motion= liikemuoto; form of social practice (ks. pattern of social practice); form of society= yhteiskuntamuoto

function= funktio, tehtävä (joka jollakin on ja joka määräytyy tietyistä lainalaisuuksista käsin); to function= toimia (po. tehtävässä)

general= yleinen; general science (ks. social science)

genesis= genesis, synty ja kehkeytyminen

ideal= ideallinen, tiedostuksellinen, ideoista ja ajatuksista koostuva (joka perustuu inhimilliseen heijastusprosessiin ja joka on olemassa subjektin tietoisuudessa ajatuksina tai jonkin merkkijärjestelmän avulla objektivoituna esityksenä taikka - yleisemmin - inhimillisen toiminnan ja sen tulosten nimenomaisesti inhimillisenä muotona, ks. myös käsitettä material); ideal culture= ideallinen kulttuuri (niiden ideoiden ja ajatusten kokonaisuus, jotka - muodossa tai toisessa - tulevat ilmaistuiksi); idealism= idealismi (filosofinen käsityskanta, jonka mukaan henkinen - siis ideallinen - tavalla tai toisella edeltää aineellista ja näin määrää sitä, ks. myös käsitettä materialism).

ideology= ideologia (so. ideallinen tarkasteltuna edun käsitteen näkökulmasta); ideological practice= ideologinen käytäntö; ideological regulation and control= ideologinen sääntely

interest= etu, myös kiinnostus

intermediating (or mediating) links= välittävät tekijät (joiden kautta jonkin määräävä vaikutus johonkin toteutuu, ks. myös käsitettä to be mediated)

law= lainalaisuus tai -mukaisuus; lawful= lainmukainen

to manifest= ilmentää, tuoda esiin

material= materiaalinen, aineellinen (sen kysymyksen puitteissa, onko aineellinen ennen henkistä vain päinvastoin, tämä käsite asettuu vastakohdaksi

käsitteelle ideal (ideallinen) siinä mielessä, että fyysisessä mielessä hyvin aineellinen eläminen, sen tuottaminen ja uusintaminen sekä tässä prosessissa vääjäämättä syntyvät tuotantosuhteet määräävät tietoisuutta eikä päinvastoin, joten tämän kysymyksen puitteissa käsite material (materiaalinen) viittaa ideallisesta eroaviin, sitä edeltäviin ja määrääviin ja tavanomaisessa mielessä aineellisempiin materian liike- ja kehitysmuotoihin - sen sijaan kehityshistoriallisessa mielessä ideallinen on materian kehityksen tulos ja siten täysin sen piiriin kuuluvaa, ks. myös käsitteitä ideal, monism, social being ja social consciousness); materialism= materialismi (filosofinen käsityskanta, jonka mukaan aineellinen edeltää henkistä tuottaen sen ja näin määrää sitä, ks. myös käsitettä idealism); material conditions of life= elämisen aineelliset edellytykset

meaning= merkitys (tietyn objektin tai asian - ja siten sitä ilmaisevan sanan - merkitys on yhtä kuin käsitys siitä, mikä tuo objekti tai asia on)

to be mediated= välittyä

to modify= modifioida, muuntaa (mutta ei muuttaa); modification= muuntuminen

modus= muoto (jossa substanssi - todellisuuden osalta siis materia - on olemassa, ks. myös käsitteitä form, material ja substance)

moment= momentti (so. tietyn kokonaisuuden, totaliteetin, tietty puoli tai elimellinen osa, joka voidaan ymmärtää vain tuon kokonaisuuden puitteissa, ks. myös käsitettä totality)

monism= monismi (käsityskanta, jonka mukaan todellisuus on yhtä substanssia, ks. myös käsitteitä material, pluralism ja substance)

motion= liike (ennen muuta kehityksen ja muutoksen merkityksessä)

'naive realism'= 'naiivi realismi' (käsityskanta, jonka mukaan tietoisuus heijastaa todellisuutta välittömästi sellaisena kuin se on)

natural selection= luonnonvalinta

negation= kieltäminen, kumoaminen

object= subjektin vastakohta, kohde, myös esine (ks. myös käsitettä subject); research object, object of study/research= tutkimuskohde (ks. myös käsitettä subject matter); objective= subjektin tietoisuudesta riippumatta olemassaoleva, myös tosiasiallinen (ks. myös käsitettä subjective); objectively= objektiivisesti, (tietoisuuden määräytymiseen liittyen) tiedostuksen kohteen kautta; to objectify= objektivoida, esineellistää, antaa aistimellinen muoto

particular= erityinen (ks. myös käsitettä specific), particular science (ks. social science)

pattern= muoto, malli; pattern(s) of communication= tiedonvälityksen muoto t. muodot (tarkoittaa niitä kulloinkin määrättyihin muotoihin kiteytyneitä yhteiskunnallisia toimintoja, joiden kautta ideat välittyvät yhteiskunnalliseen kiertokulkuun); pattern(s) of consciousness= tietoisuus- tai ajatusmuoto t. muodot; pattern(s) of social practice= yhteiskunnallisen käytännön muoto t. muodot (ks. myös käsitettä social practice); to pattern= kiteytyä määrätynmuotoiseksi

phenomenal= fenomenaali(nen), elämyksellinen (joka määräytyy välittömän havaitseminen ja kokemuksen puitteissa); phenomenal approach= fenomenaali lähestymistapa (joka korostaa pitäytymistä välittömästi havaittavaan); phenomenal world= fenomenaali maailma (eli todellisuus sellaisena jollaisena

se elämyksellisesti välittömän havainnon ja kokemuksen puitteissa ilmenee, ks. myös käsitteitä appearance, atheoretical, essence, everyday jne.)

phenomenon= ilmiö (olemassaolevaa tarkoittavassa merkityksessä; ks. myös käsitteitä appearance ja essence)

pluralism= pluralismi (käsityskanta, jonka mukaan todellisuus on useampaa substanssia; ks. myös käsitteitä monism ja substance)

practice= käytäntö, praksis; social practice (ks. social); practical= käytännöllinen, käytäntöön sitoutuva, (tiedostukseen liittyen) arkipäiväinen (ks. myös käsitteitä atheoretical, everyday jne.)

production= tuottaminen, tuotanto; production proper= varsinainen tuotanto (tuotannollinen toiminta ja tuotannon teknologinen puoli); productive forces= tuotantovoimat; production relations (ks. relations of production); social (e.g. capitalist) mode of production= yhteiskunnallinen (esim. kapitalistinen) tuotantotapa; means of production= tuotantovälineet; commodity production= tavaratuotanto (ks. myös käsitettä commodity)

to realize= realisoida, toteuttaa, myös oivaltaa

to recognize= tiedostaa (ks. myös käsitettä to cognize)

to reduce= palauttaa (joksikin tai johonkin, yleensä monimutkainen yksinkertaisemmaksi tai yksinkertaisempaan - toimenpide, joka ei yleensä vastaa monimutkaisemman luonnetta ja on siten sen kannalta väärin)

reflection= heijastus, heijastaminen; reflection theory= heijastusteoria

relation= suhde; inner, necessary relations= sisäiset ja välttämättömät suhteet; exterior relations= ulkoiset suhteet (jotka monasti ovat satunnaisia); relations of production= tuotantosuhteet (tuotannollisen toiminnan yhteydessä tuotannon yhteiskunnalliseksi organisaatioksi syntyvät subjektien väliset suhteet, joiden perustava momentti on tuotantovälineiden omistusmuoto, ks. myös käsitteitä material ja social being); equal relations of production= tuotantosuhteet, joiden puitteissa ihmiset ovat tasa-arvoisia; unequal relations of production= tuotantosuhteet, joiden puitteissa ihmiset joutuvat eriarvoiseen asemaan

reproduction= uusintaminen, (saman) uudestituottaminen; ideal reproduction= todellisuuden tiedostaminen (eli sen 'uudelleentuottaminen' heijastusprosessin kautta ajattelussa, ajattelun voimin, ks. myös käsitettä ideal); ideological reproduction= ideologinen uusintaminen (so. määrättyä etua edustavan tiedotuksen avulla tapahtuva subjektin tietoisuuden tahallinen tai tahaton pysyttäminen sisällöltään tuota etua vastaavana, ks. myös käsitettä ideology); mental reproduction= henkinen uusintaminen (subjektin henkisten kykyjen ja voimavarojen uusintaminen eli niiden 'uudestituottaminen' kun ne kuluvat)

self= itse; self-development, self-unfolding= itsekehitys tai -kehkeytyminen

sine qua non (ks. conditio)

social being= yhteiskunnallinen oleminen (joka määräytyy aineellisten hyödykkeiden yhteiskunnallisen tuotannon ja tässä prosessissa syntyvien tuotantosuhteiden perusteella, ks. myös käsitteitä ideal, material, relations of production ja social consciousness),-myös yhteiskunnallinen olio, ihminen

social communication= yhteiskunnallinen tiedotus t. tiedonvälitys (teoreettisesta näkökulmasta tarkasteltuna kaikki tiedotus - ollessaan yhteiskunnallisesti syntyvien ideoiden ja ajatusten 'yhteiseksi tekemistä' ja 'yhteiseksi tulemista' - on yhteiskunnallista; termi "yhteiskunnallinen" termien

"tiedotus tai tiedonvälitys" edessä painottaakin juuri tätä seikkaa - seikkaa, joka kommunikaation tavanomaisessa positivistisessa tarkastelussa säännönmukaisesti unohtuu; tämän näkökulman puitteissa tiedotuksesta tai tiedonvälityksestä on (ulkokohtais-muodollisessa mielessä) siis kyse aina silloin kun on kyse ideoiden ja ajatusten tuottamisesta ja välittämisestä muille ihmisille eli siirtämisestä yhteiskunnalliseen kiertokulkuun; syvällisemmässä mielessä tiedotus tai tiedonvälitys tulee käsitetyksi vasta ymmärrettäessä ne lainmukaisuudet ja 'liikevoimat', jotka tämän yhteiskunnallisen käytännön muodon synnyttävät ja sen kehitystä määräävät)

social consciousness= yhteiskunnallinen tietoisuus (teoreettisesta näkökulmasta kaikki inhimillinen tietoisuus - perustuessaan objektiivisen todellisuuden heijastukseen, jota välittävät yhteiskunnallis-aineelliset tarpeet ja edut sekä yhteiskunnallisesti olemassaolevat merkitykset - on yhteiskunnallista ja niinpä termi "yhteiskunnallinen" termin "tietoisuus" edessä painottaakin tätä tietoisuuden yhteiskunnallista määräytymistä; toisaalta käsite yhteiskunnallinen tietoisuus viittaa myös (määrätyssä laajuudessa) yhteisinä - so. ei-yksityisinä, vaikkakin tietysti vain yksityisissä mielissä, dokumenteissa jne - olemassaoleviin merkityksiin, ideoihin ja ajatuksiin)

social institution= yhteiskunnallinen instituutio eli laitos (so. yhteiskunnallisen käytännön tai käytäntöjen muotojen organisoitunut kokonaisuus)

social practice= yhteiskunnallinen käytäntö (tarkoittaa laajassa mielessä erilaisia yhteiskunnassa tapahtuvia toimintoja, jotka usein ovat kaavoittuneet määrätyiksi vakiintuneiksi toimintamuodoiksi tai -järjestelmiksi, instituutioiksi)

social science, sciences= yhteiskuntatiede, -tieteet; general social science= yleinen yhteiskuntatiede; particular or specific social science= erityinen yhteiskuntatiede

social system= yhteiskunnallinen järjestelmä (so. yhteiskunnallinen instituutio tai niiden organisoitunut kokonaisuus, ks. myös käsitettä social institution)

socio-economic formation= yhteiskuntataloudellinen muodostuma (jota nimitetään myös taloudelliseksi yhteiskuntamuodostumaksi)

socio-historical= yhteiskuntahistoriallinen

species= laji; species-historical= lajihistoriallinen

specific= erityinen (ks. myös käsitettä particular)

spontaneous= spontaani, 'luonnonvoimainen', 'luonnostaan kehkeytyvä'

substance= substanssi (eli se, mistä jokin koostuu), aines, sisällys, sisältö (ks. myös käsitteitä form, material, modus, monism ja pluralism); substance of communication= kommunikaation sisältö (so. ne ideat ja ajatukset, jotka tuotetaan kommunikoitaviksi); substantial= substanssia koskeva, aineksellinen, sisällöllinen, myös huomattava

subject= subjekti (toimijaan viittaavassa merkityksessä, voi tällöin olla yksilö, luokka jne., jopa yhteiskunta), tietoisuuden kantaja, myös aihe (ks. myös käsitettä object); subject matter= se, mihin tutkimus kohdistuu, sen aihe (ks. myös käsitettä research object); subjective= subjektilla oleva tai subjektin tietoisuudessa oleva, myös subjektiivinen ei-objektiivisen merkityksessä (ks. myös käsitettä objective)

sui generis= omaa lajiaan

superficial= pinnallinen (ks. myös käsitteitä atheoretical, everyday, vulgar jne.)

superstructure= päällys- tai ylärakenne

surface= pinta (se, mitä todellisuudesta välittömästi havaitaan; ks. myös käsitteitä appearance, essence, fetishism ja phenomenal)

surplus= lisä; surplus-product= lisätuote (se osa tuotetusta, joka jää välittömästi tarvittavasta yli ja joka esim. voidaan asettaa vaihdettavaksi); surplus-value= lisäarvo (jonka sisällöstä ks. s.

tendency= tendessi, määrätynsuuntainen kehityspyrkimys tai sellaiseen ohjaava seikka, myös ajatussuunta

theory of knowledge= tietoteoria

totality= totaliteetti (kokonaisuus, joka koostuu momenteistaan, mutta joka ei ole niiksi - esim. niiden summaksi - palautettavissa, ks. myös käsitettä moment)

unity= ykseys; unity in diversity= moninaisuuden ykseys; unitary= ykseydellinen

value= arvo (jonka lähde on työ); use value= käyttöarvo; exchange value= vaihtoarvo; looks value= ns. näyttöarvo (jonka sisällöstä ks. alaviite

vulgar= arkipäiväinen (ks. myös käsitteitä atheoretical, everyday, phenomenal jne.); to vulgarize= arkipäiväistää, (perusteettomasti) yksinkertaistaa