INTERMEDIALITY AND MEDIA CHANGE

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In Tampere, November 1st, 2012, on behalf of the Intermedia research team and editors of the book

Taisto Hujanen
Project leader

JUHA HERKMAN

1. Introduction: Intermediality as a Theory and Methodology

Media change has always been a major theme in the field of communications and media research. Quite often these changes have been anchored in the developments of media technology, although they have also been connected to shifts in economic, political, social and cultural domains. Since the late twentieth century, the key words of media change have been 'computerization' and 'digitalization', which, without question, have radically transformed media and communications environments. The grand narrative of media change argues that, hand-in-hand with the spread of networks and online communication, digitalization has led to the development of a whole new social form, namely the 'information society', dependent on communication media and immaterial information networks (Castells 1996, Webster 2004).

The story of media convergence has been one branch in this grand narrative. Since the 1990s especially, 'convergence' has been among the most popular terms used to describe media change (Baldwin et al. 1996, Mueller 1999, Murdock 2000). In general, media convergence has referred to developments in which formerly medium specific content

can today be distributed and published through various media. The same news, for example, can be transmitted and consumed in paper, radio, television, and various Internet forms. This has meant remarkable changes not only for media consumers but also for the media companies, which have had to redesign their production and marketing practices for the new multimedia and cross-media environments (Cottle 1999, Hesmondhalgh 2002). The great utopia of convergence has been the assumption that various electronic communication technologies – telecommunications, broadcasting and Internet – will in the (not too distant) future merge into a single entity, a 'super-media' (Pool 1983, Baldwin et al. 1996: 2-3, Küng et al. 1999: 30, Sauter 1999: 65).

As many commentators have shown, however, there are several problems in talking about media convergence (Storsul and Stuedahl 2007). One of the most critical observations is perhaps the empirical fact that, instead of coalescing, as the term convergence suggests, there is nowadays more variation in communication and media technologies, gadgets, devices, formats and standards than ever before. In this sense, as Henry Jenkins (2001, 2008) has remarked, we have been witnessing a media technology *divergence* rather than convergence. Other critics have noted that convergence has not only meant technological change but has also been used as a general concept for all kinds of dimensions in media change, such as developments in media and communication economies, markets, systems, structures and content (Marsden and Verhulst 1999, Murdock 2000, Iosifidis 2002). It can therefore be argued that convergence 'disguises important distinctions that should still be drawn between a number of separate but interrelated processes which affect the potential impact of digitalization' (Garnham 1996: 106).

This book has been composed the above comments in mind. Its aim is to challenge convergence discourse by analysing changes of media technology without neglecting the historical continuities or differences between various media. For these purposes we suggest here the concept of 'intermediality', defined as social and cultural relationships in which different media are articulated in relation to and exercise power over

one another. We understand the difference between convergence and intermediality thus as follows: Where the hypothesis of convergence often emphasises gaps and discontinuities between the old and new, the concept of intermediality pays more attention to the continuity of media forms and to the articulation and re-articulation of the media through changes in social and cultural contexts.

With intermediality constituting the general methodological framework here, the primary theme of media change, particularly in the Finnish context, is covered through a 50-year period, from about 1960 to 2010. The analytical focus is mostly on the past two decades – on the period of digitalization and so-called (technological) convergence of the media since the 1990s, although some chapters concentrate also on the times when the relationships between radio, television and press were re-articulated during the 1960s and 1970s. Also, some articles look purely at conceptual and theoretical issues, while others consider system-level analyses of changing media identities in, for example, European public service broadcasting since the 1980s.

Taken as a whole, this book comprises a study of intermediality as a specific approach to media studies and to media change in particular. It introduces some of the main results of a number of case studies, but also invites scholars to discuss the themes and issues about intermediality more broadly. Before going on to further detail the contributions and book structure, this introductory chapter discusses the concept of intermediality as a theoretical and methodological starting point of media studies. A critical reflection of convergence discourse is developed in the next section, which argues for intermediality as a specific approach to media change. There then follows a short introduction into the history of intermediality as an academic concept. The section after that delves more deeply into intermediality as an analytical concept anchored to theoretical frameworks of media studies. Then, intermediality is examined as a specific methodology or perspective for the study of media change, before a brief summary to the various contributions of intermediality studies in the book.

From convergence to intermediality

There are several terms describing a variety of dimensions of media change. Political economists, for example, have discussed in-depth the 'concentration' of media ownership and overall 'marketization' and 'commercialization' of the media (Mosco 1996, Herman and McChesney 1999). Media economists and marketing researchers, for their part, have analyzed the simultaneous 'fragmentation' of media markets and 'segmentation' of audiences (Doyle 2002, Picard 2002). Some scholars have described the increasing blurring of media boundaries in terms of the 'hybridization' or 'multimodality' of cultural forms (Kress and van Leeuwen 2001), with journalism researchers, for example, examining the hypothesis of the 'similarization' or 'tabloidization' of media content (Sparks and Tulloch 2000). Meanwhile, the transmission of media aesthetics and forms from one medium to another in the digital age has been dubbed 'remediation' (Bolter and Grusin 2000). Some of these changes are inherently connected to technological developments of computerization and digitalization, but some of them are more structural or social in their nature. All these phenomena have also been covered by the umbrella term 'convergence'.

One may ask whether there is any problem in using the idea of convergence as a general description of contemporary media change: if 'convergence' evokes at a glance all the meanings listed above, is it not indeed a useful term? However, while critics have not been so worried about the heuristic value of the concept for descriptive purposes, they do argue against its use also as an *explanation* of media change and the consequences thereof (cf. Ampuja 2010: 10, 34). Anders Fagerjord and Tanja Storsul, for example, argue that in addition to simplifying the media and technological change, the concept of

> 'Convergence' is [also] used as a *rhetorical tool* in order to facilitate reform. The concept communicates a media landscape undergoing significant change. This has been instrumental in convincing politicians, regulators, investors and other market players that their strategies need to adapt. (Fagerjord and Storsul 2007: 28, emphasis in original)

Tony Sampson and Jairo Lugo (2003) have identified a 'discourse of convergence', the increasing use of the term 'convergence' for political and economical aims since the 1990s. According to Sampson and Lugo, this discourse has had real (and not necessarily positive) effects in national and international media and communications policies, assaulting the tradition of public service media in particular. David Holmes (2005: 11-15) has similarly criticised the employment of convergence in, what he calls the discourse of 'New Media historicism'. Holmes reminds us that communicative integration is not so much new as *internal* to a range of media which had co-existed with broadcasting long before the Internet. And again, to reiterate the emphasis here, convergence does blur the differences in media change by emphasizing the similarization processes.

The concept of intermediality may serve to overcome the problems encountered by that of convergence. Firstly, intermediality does not simplify change in the field by proposing that all media are 'coming together'. Secondly, it does not have the political or economic emphases that have come to characterise the discourse of convergence. Intermediality may, therefore, generate more fruitful soil for analytical research into media change than the reductively universalising and politically-laden concept of convergence.

As the prefix 'inter' indicates, 'intermediality' addresses not only the changes brought about by the digitalization and computerization of communication and media technologies, but it also pays attention to the historical continuities and contextual differences between the various media. Different media have always been inherently linked to each other, that is, been 'inter-medial'. The big question, therefore, is whether there really has appeared some crucial change in intermedial relations (i.e. between the media) since the rise of digitalization and so-called convergence (cf. Neuman 2010: 12-13). *Have* media boundaries eroded or even disappeared, as the term 'convergence' suggests, or is it still possible to locate and specify particular medium identities differentiating the various media from each other?

History of intermediality

Cultural scholar Mikko Lehtonen (2000) notes that intermediality as a phenomenon is quite old, but as a systematically developed concept for media studies it is fairly new. Its history dates back to the art movements and computerization of the 1960s and 1970s. As an academic concept of analysis, however, it was not considered before the 1990s.

Dick Higgins (1938–1998), a member of the Fluxus group of artists, is often mentioned as a creator of the term 'intermedia' (e.g. Bruhn Jensen 2010: 87). For Higgins and his associates in the 1960s, intermediality meant art projects in which aspects from the established art and media forms were combined to create new forms. An example of this kind of intermediality was Higgins' 'visual poetry', which married poetry with graphic design. Higgins was well aware of that there was nothing new in this kind of artistic intermediality, which basically meant anti-formalism and had been favoured by countless artists before, ranging from Samuel Taylor Coleridge to Gertrud Stein and the Dadaists (Higgins and Higgins 2001).

The term 'intermedia' was picked up as the name of hypertext project at the Brown University in 1985, although it is unclear whether there was any connection between that project and Higgins' work. A systematic conceptual analysis of intermediality certainly dates back to the discussion on digitalization and the Internet, however, and particularly to their impact on textuality, as the German text theoreticians Jürgen Müller and Ernest Hess-Lüttich started developing the concept in the early 1990s as part of their hypertext theory (Hess-Lüttich 1999: 688-689). Through the notion of 'intermediality', the theory of intertextuality was expanded to apply to the analysis of new digital, Internet-based textual forms. Intermediality has since been quite a common concept in German and Scandinavian art and communications studies, and has also been favoured by literature scholars, musicologists and information scientists (e.g. Rajewsky 2002, Heitmann 2003, Elleström 2010, Vandermeersche 2011).

In Finnish media studies the concept of ‘intermediality’ has been discussed especially by Lehtonen (2000), who refers in his definition to developments like digitalization, the concentration of media ownership, globalisation and an orientation to synergy, all of which emphasise the new relevance of intermediality as an analytical category for media studies. The above processes of transformation are important because they change the cultures of production, distribution and consumption, and, as a consequence, influence the intermedial construction of media.

Like the hypertext theories, Lehtonen (2000: 11, 16) also anchors an intermediality approach particularly to textual analysis and defines it in relation to textual theory as ‘intertextuality transgressing media boundaries’. For Lehtonen, as for many users of the term, intermediality has been a political weapon against disciplinary purism and hence for interdisciplinarity (c.f. artistic anti-formalism). However, there is no reason to reduce intermediality just to a dimension of intertextuality. Indeed, some scholars have demonstrated that ‘intermediality’ can be a productive concept if it is understood more broadly in terms of the cultural, economic and social relations between various media (Urrichio 2004, Fornäs et al. 2007).

We can now conclude that convergence and intermediality serve overlapping but different approaches to contemporary media change (see Table 1). They both have their limitations and biases. The most prominent bias of convergence has been its use as a buzzword in political and economic discourses as well as technological determinism in comprehension of media and communications culture. The mainstream of intermediality studies can respectively be criticised for cultural determinism, emphasising too much textual level and trivializing economic, social and technological dimensions of media and communications. However, some recent endeavours have demonstrated that these approaches are not necessarily as contradictory as my critical introduction above has stated (e.g. Jenkins 2008, Neuman 2010). They rather may accompany each other in the complicated context of contemporary media change.

Table 1. Comparison of convergence and intermediality as research approaches

	Convergence	**Intermediality**
Basic meaning of the term	Coming together and/or similarisation of various media	Relationships between different media
Academic background	Techno and economic sciences	Humanities, literary and media studies
Theoretical basis	Communications theory, economics	Textual theory, art theory
Social context	Information society policies and economies	Changing cultural forms and institutions
Relation to technology	Techno-orientation and determinism	Cultural orientation and determinism
Media change	Revolution, breaks	Evolution, continuity
Media in future	One 'supermedia', the concept of medium thus becoming irrelevant	Different media, but their relationships to be re-articulated

Intermediality as a theory

Defining intermediality as a combined art/media form beyond distinct art/media forms or as a mode of intertextuality does not take us much further in analysing media change than the concept of convergence. Media change contains several other dimensions in addition to that of textuality or aesthetics. In media change differentiated communicative functions and interests, politics, media economy and media's role as a social arena are emphasized in a particular manner. Therefore, it is therefore important to understand intermediality in terms of *relationships between* various media, and in which technological, social, cultural and economic dimensions have real implications.

Raymond Williams' well-known concept of 'cultural form' can be useful here. Williams (1975: 10) analyses media technologies – espe-

cially television – as particular cultural technologies, whose institutions, forms and effects are constituted historically in relation to society and the uses of the technologies. Even though the convergence theory suggests that digitalization and the Internet break down differences between particular cultural forms, it is evident that different media still have different – more or less – institutionalized forms and historically rooted traditions. The contemporary media landscape consists of the *network* of these forms rather than of some totally converged media culture (cf. Castells 1996), where media boundaries disappear or where there is no difference at all between professional and grassroots content production. Today's media industries are complex networks of huge transnational conglomerates and small enterprises which are also connected to the various grassroots activities of consumer cultures (Hesmondhalgh 2002). And the deterministic thesis that these economically, technologically or some other way *contingent* media networks are inevitably bound toward some amorphous merger is one we resist here.

We will thus define 'intermediality' as an approach that examines the relationships between various media in a particular historical context. These relationships include economic, social and cultural forms of various media technologies. In practice, this means abandoning the technological determinism common to digitalization and convergence discourses, yet taking technology seriously as one of the significant dimensions in the contemporary media change. Therefore, intermediality offers a more useful and valid approach than convergence in analysing the social and cultural impact and consequences of the technological development of the media. The concept of intermediality pays more attention to the continuity of media forms and to the articulation and re-articulation of the media through changing social and cultural contexts.

A good example of this is the historical conjunction between entertainment television and the tabloid press of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, in which television as the most popular medium of the era has set agendas and cultural forms for the tabloid

press that has tried to sell its product by using the exchange value of popular television (Herkman 2010). However, the digitalization and fragmentation of television as well as the spread of the Internet have downsized the status of television in the last few years to the extent that challenges and renegotiates the intermedial relationship between television and the press. The changes in the status of different media may also have devastating effects on political communication, which in many countries has been dominated by television and newspapers but is today increasingly reshaped by the communication networks. Yet, this change does not mean a sudden or total or inevitable transition to a converged media culture.

'Intermediality' therefore pays attention to the specific historical context in which communication is realised, not just to the utopian potential of communications technology, as is the tendency of the convergence discourse. Situated in undelineated but certainly political and economic realities, 'intermediality' thus differs also from such concepts as 'intertextuality', 'multimodality' or 'remediation' which consider media in as primarily cultural and textual forms. One can thus conclude that 'intermediality' not only brings technology to the analysis of media texts and circuit of cultural meanings, but also emphasises their historical and social contexts.

Intermediality as methodology

As a methodology, intermediality implies an approach that examines media change in a particular manner. Firstly, instead of concentrating on one medium alone, it focuses on the interfaces and interrelationships between different media. This, in turn, carries a presupposition that there are such things as different media, whose medium identities can be somehow recognized and analyzed in relation to each other. The critical reflection of medium identities is therefore one of the key issues in intermediality approaches.

Secondly, and as a consequence, intermediality does not take 'turns' or 'revolutions' of media change as for granted. Intermediality approaches media change as intermedial relationships in which no single dimension is exclusive determinant. In addition to technological developments, for example, intermediality pays attention to the continuity of media forms and the articulation and re-articulation of media through shifts and adjustments in their social and cultural contexts.

Thirdly, intermediality prefers a methodological triangulation of research materials and methods (cf. Saukko 2003, Herkman 2008). This often means the collection of empirical data from a variety of sources, such as different media, and sometimes also the use of several methods in analysing those materials. However, all triangulation does not automatically mean intermedial approach. Triangulation is just a research technique that suits some approaches better than the other, and for studying the intermedial relationships between various media it is a perfectly suitable methodological starting point precisely because it assumes differences between the forms of these media.

In a way, intermediality as an approach resembles that of historical studies. Analysing different continuities and changes through various materials and methods has been typical for research into the past and its construction. As Henry Jenkins and David Thorburn state in their book *Rethinking Media Change* (2004), if one wants to understand the ongoing media change, one has to examine the history of media changes. More recently also, W. Russell Neuman (2010: 5) has argued that if one wants to understand the current 'media evolution', it has to be considered through the recent past.

But again, the reverse does not necessarily apply: not all research into media history is similar to the intermedial approach. Intermediality provides a specific perspective on media research which emphasises the analysis of continuity and change of media as intermedial relationships (cf. Urrichio 2004). As an empirical method, it stresses intermedial relationships between the media in particular historical contexts. Thus intermediality fixes our attention onto the historical conjunctions between various media technologies, economies, societies and cultures (cf. Lehtonen 2000: 13).

The structure of this volume

The book is divided into four parts in which intermediality is viewed from different angles. The first part critically considers the concepts of 'medium' and 'mediation' as starting points of institutionalized traditions in media studies and research. Mikko Lehtonen, for example, challenges the institutionalization of media research as based on the division of different media, because media and communication have always been – and increasingly are – 'multimodal' and 'intermedial'. Also media scholar Arild Fetveit discusses the problematic concept of 'media' as an axiomatic starting point of media studies and research. Starting from the concept of 'mediation' rather than from 'media', Fetveit suggests, could revitalize theoretical discussions in media studies. Media historian Raimo Salokangas, in turn, analyses the concept of a 'medium' in historical approaches to (the) media. Therefore, all the articles in this section open up the question of why intermedial relationships are, and should be, central in contemporary media studies.

The second part considers discourses of media change from the point of view of media identities and intermedial relationships. This begins with television researcher Taisto Hujanen's analysis of the discursive identities of television. Hujanen compares the specific identity of broadcast television with its more intermedially oriented identifications. The latter, he explains, are typical of the industrialisation of television since the 1980s. The first wave of industrialisation is characterised by Hujanen as the audiovisualisation of television, followed by its digitalisation since late 1990s. Cultural historian Hannu Salmi focuses his contribution on another significant period of media change, namely the development of family television in the 1970s. In this context, Salmi also introduces an interesting case from early Finnish television, a programme entitled *World Television* (1975) that envisions the future intermedial media environment in the homes of the next (now current) millennium. Salmi's case study illustrates how intermediality has been an issue explicitly considered in the mass media for decades.

Media researcher Seppo Kangaspunta with Taisto Hujanen completes this part with a consideration of the domestication of the new media technologies, especially digital television. Kangaspunta interviewed ordinary Finnish families after the launch of terrestrial digital television in 2007; these interviews reveal continuities and changes in people's assumptions about and discourses on media identities at a time when remarkable media technological changes were – are – unfolding.

Part three contains articles focusing more on precise case studies of intermediality. Cultural historian Paavo Oinonen analyses two Finnish television hosts Niilo Tarvajärvi and Pertti 'Spede' Pasanen as intermedial public figures of the early 1960s' entertainment television. Both Tarvajärvi and Pasanen had built up their careers as famous radio voices before television, and they were also beloved characters by the popular press. Similarly, cultural historian Maiju Kannisto analyses the contemporary and extremely popular television format *Dances with the Stars* (originally *Strictly Come Dancing*, GB) as an 'intermedial event' whose meanings cannot be reduced to a single medium. The section is completed by radio researcher Marko Ala-Fossi, who examines the failure of digital audio broadcasting (DAB) in relation to the triumph of digital television in Europe. Ala-Fossi anchors media technological changes to the European broadcasting policy and contrasts them to the other, for example, Japanese and US policy contexts.

The fourth and last part of this book discusses media change from the perspective of media institutions and professions. Social scientist Kauko Pietilä opens this part by looking into the history of 'professions', from small communities to modern societies. Pietilä also examines journalism as a profession and theorises on the possibilities of journalism in the construction of contemporary civic society. Journalist and broadcasting researcher Eeva Mäntymäki focuses her contribution more precisely on the changes that technological developments as well as economic turmoil cause for journalists' professional practices. As Mäntymäki demonstrates, the transition to more intermedial strategies has been one of the key aspects in recent troubles that public service media has faced. The book ends with broadcasting scholar's

Al Stavitsky's piece on the changes in US National Public Radio in the digital era. The transition to multimedia-platforms has meant new interesting possibilities for the US public broadcasting, but at the same time it has challenged the old medium-specific identities of journalistic profession in unseen ways.

Whereas intermediality constitutes a general framework for this work as a whole, other concepts are introduced that relate to the particular phenomena discussed. These include a more specific usage of 'convergence'; some authors use the term 'convergence' to refer to those specific occasions where digitalization has had real impacts on media production and consumption – for example, in the case of same content production for different user interfaces. In some cases also, authors find it helpful to use the term 'cross-media', to emphasise the economic and marketing perspectives of intermedial processes (cf. Croteau and Hoynes 2001: 116–118). When the focus of the study is on the cultural and textual forms that transgress media boundaries, such terms as 'multimedia' or 'multimodality' are sometimes preferred (see Kress and van Leeuwen 1996: 39-40, Kress and van Leeuven 2001, Lehtonen and Herkman 2002).

Whatever concepts are used in any particular case, the main questions remain: Can we identify certain crucial changes in intermedial relationships? Have media boundaries eroded or even disappeared since digitalization, as the idea of convergence suggests, or is it still possible to find particular medium identities differentiating various media from each other, and how are media relations articulated or re-articulated in the specific context of any particular case study?

The overall view of the contributions to this book is that on the macro-level and from a historical perspective the idea of separate (in some way) medium identities is still valid, but on more specific micro-levels and in contemporary contexts a move towards converging media environments is evident. Certain changes in media production and consumption processes suggest that some sort of change towards 'convergence culture' is occurring (cf. Jenkins 2008), but there remain fundamental structural and institutional continuities which maintain

the media-specific differences. Is the change, therefore, as significant as many apostles of convergence would argue? Or is it an over-generalisation derived from the ahistoricism of contemporary perspectives? Intermediality serves as a methodology that takes into account both possibilities and emphasises the specific contexts wherein media change is realized.

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I

ABOUT MEDIA AND MEDIATION: RELEVANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF A MEDIUM

MIKKO LEHTONEN

2. Media: One or Many?

‘Medium’ and ’media’ are concepts that are routinely used but too seldom examined in media studies. As foundational concepts they are the air we breathe, part of that what is taken for granted in the field. And yet, as we know from human history, the more evident and acceptable a conception, concept or theory appears, the more strictly it has to be questioned and scrutinized.

The singular ‘medium’ and plural ‘media’ are tricky concepts, indeed. At the nominal level in media studies the plural noun ‘media’ is used more often than the singular ’medium’. In research practices, however, preference seems to be given to the singular, not the plural – to differences, that is, rather than to connections and similarities. While it is usual at the nominal level to speak of ‘media’– and especially ‘the media’, of course, naming the field as a whole – it is equally common to put ‘medium’ first in what is actually done.

What do we speak about when we speak about ‘medium’ and ‘media’? Do these two have actual references outside our conceptual systems? Or are these concepts performatives in the sense that they produce their referents? And if they are performatives, in what ways and with what effects do they produce their referents?

'Medium'

The word 'medium' has its roots in classical Latin and in its modern form has been in regular use in the English language from the 16th century. Then, 'medium' referred to middle, centre, midst, intermediate course and intermediary. Since the 17th century it has also had the sense of an intervening or intermediate agency or substance. As Raymond Williams writes in *Keywords*, three senses have converged in the word: '(i) the old general sense of intervening or intermediate agency or substance; (ii) the conscious technical sense, as in the distinction between print and sound and vision as media; (iii) the specialized capitalist sense, in which a newspaper or broadcasting service – something that already exists or can be planned – is seen as a medium for something else, such as advertising' (Williams 1976: s.v. 'media'). Hence three different semantic fields interconnect and cross-breed in this modern keyword: 'medium' as an autonomous *substance*, as a *technology* and as an *instrument*.

Common to these various meanings is that 'medium' is in them seen as a *thing*. What might from a different perspective be perceived as human practices, intercourses and relations, is conceptualized as something that exists as an autonomous entity. In other words, 'medium' is reified. As Peter Berger and Stanley Pullberg (1965: 206-208) write, reification operates in society by bestowing ontological status on social roles and institutions: 'Roles are reified by detaching them from human intentionality and expressivity, and transforming them into an inevitable destiny for their bearers.' The practical human actions that constitute 'medium' are first represented as abstract (disconnected from their actual relations).[1] This abstraction is, then, converted into something allegedly concrete in the sense that the abstract category is taken to be something that exists on its own right.

The concept of 'medium' represents certain social and cultural practices, but in a peculiar way. The practices are pictured not as practices, but as autonomous substance, a technology or a tool. To be sure, it has to be added that numerous media scholars have for

a considerable time pointed out that such reified notions are highly problematic. These scholars have not, however, succeeded in changing commonsensical conceptions. As 'medium' is seen in such ways, it is all too easy to forget that what 'medium' does – 'mediation' – is an active relation that cannot be reduced to neutral transmission of messages (and much less, of course, to the substance/technology/instrument supposed as performing this), but includes complex social relations actively involved in the shaping of contents.

The concept of 'mediation' is certainly noteworthy here. It is true, as Raymond Williams (1977: 98) wrote, that 'all active relations between different kinds of being and consciousness are inevitably mediated, and this process is not a separable agency – a "medium" – but intrinsic to the properties of the related kinds.' Williams cited here Theodor Adorno who in *Thesen zur Kunstsoziologie* wrote: 'Mediation is in the object itself, not something between the object and that to which it is brought.' To Williams, then, 'mediation' indicated an active process – albeit one inherently objectified.

The prevailing commonsensical views of 'medium' and 'media' include strong abstracting and objectifying tendencies similar to dominant Western views of language. In these views, people are thought to have thoughts regardless of language. People are then thought to transmit these thoughts to each other as the thoughts become enunciated in the 'medium' of language. Hence the constitutive human feature becomes abstracted and objectified. Words 'are seen as objects, things, which men take up and arrange into particular forms to express or communicate information which, before this work in the "medium", they already possess' (Williams 1977: 159).

Autonomy or heteronomy?

What to do with 'medium' and 'media', then? To dump them completely is evidently out of question for researchers, since their usage is

ubiquitous and has a deep impact on our social, economic and cultural realities. Perhaps the only option, then, is to put them 'under erasure'. This would indicate that 'they are no longer serviceable – "good to think with" – in their originary and undeconstructed form', as Stuart Hall (1996: 1) puts it in relation to the concept of 'identity'. As with 'identity' for Hall, so also can 'medium' and 'media' be understood as concepts that 'have not been superseded dialectically', but which are still used because 'there are no other, entirely different concepts with which to replace them.' Therefore it might well be that 'there is nothing to do but to continue to think with them – albeit now in their detotalized or deconstructed forms, and no longer operating within the paradigm in which they were originally generated' (ibid.). Yet, how to do this? How to detotalize and deconstruct 'medium' and 'media' by converting thing-like entities into active intercourse and relations?

One way to start making sense of this conceptual puzzle is to turn to a lesser known text by Raymond Williams, *Film History* (1983/1989). There, Williams asks: 'What is the history of film?' And he suggests that when answering this question, researchers 'are likely to pass lightly over "history" and put a defining emphasis on "film".' Film seems to be the noun that brings researchers to their subject, he states: 'The properties of the subject are taken as known [...] film and cinema are treated as unitary subjects.' For Williams, however, this is evidently flawed, since it involves an unquestioned assumption 'that there is a significant unitary subject, film, with reasonably evident common properties.' Such 'subject' for Williams cannot be assumed as 'independent and isolated processes and products' (ibid.: 133). For him, these are 'at best provisional intellectual identifications of significant areas of common life', but at worst 'draw hard lines around certain areas, cutting off the practical relations with other "areas".' What Williams questions here is the idea that there might be such a unitary subject as film. According to him, anyone wishing to understand the history of film has to take into account relations between film, theatre, literature, popular culture, technological change and urbanisation, et cetera.[2]

What Williams writes of film applies *mutatis mutandis* to other forms of media. To paraphrase Williams' argument, forms of media are not autonomous entities but *heteronomous* cultural practices that gain their identity not from themselves but from their relations to other practices. As a consequence, while studying various forms of media one should ask if there really is a significant unitary subject with reasonably evident properties. In studies of any media form one should not draw hard lines around certain types of texts, production practices, etc., cutting off relations with other types of texts, production practices, etc. On the contrary, a relevant understanding of any medium cannot be reached by concentrating only on that one medium. Such *media-centrism* would represent a peculiar formalism that fails to pay sufficient attention to what media forms actually do.

In his time, Williams was definitely outside of the mainstream with such ideas. Questioning the thing-like quality of film or any other media form was clearly against the media-based disciplinary logic of the post-war period. Today his way of thinking might, however, find more favourable response among researchers, not least due to the new multidisciplinary research areas of multimodality (see Kress and van Leeuwen 1996, 2001) and intermediality (Fornäs 2007, Lehtonen 2001). Another, perhaps much stronger factor contributing to changes in views concerning 'medium' and 'media' is the fact that institutions educating future journalists and other media functionaries can no longer rely on the possibility that their graduates will spend their whole careers producing (in) just one medium.

Multimodality and media

How do ideas concerning multimodality and intermediality question prevailing notions of what 'medium' and 'media' are? In order to outline an answer, let us start from the two simultaneous dimensions of

the word 'multimodality', i.e. *textual* and *cultural* multimodality (see Kress and van Leeuwen 1996).

The *textual* aspect of 'multimodality' is linked to the fact that language has always existed as just one mode in the totality of modes involved in the production of any text. To take an example, a spoken text is not just verbal but also visual, combining with 'non-verbal' modes of communication such as facial expression, gesture, posture and other forms of self-representation. And if one of the fundamental symbolic forms – speech – is always already multimodal, then multimodality must also cover the more complex symbolic forms developed on the basis of and combining speech, writing, sound and image.

The second dimension of 'multimodality', that of *cultural* multimodality, refers to the fact that all known human societies have used a variety of modes of representation. Cultures are never constructed by relying solely on one form of representation. Even the so-called 'oral' societies had other symbolic forms than speech at their disposal.

Both textual and cultural multimodality have the potential to make researchers more sensitive towards the specificities of various symbolic forms and their mutual interdependence. Each of the symbolic forms used by human cultures has different representational potentials and limitations. These can be called 'affordances', things that a certain mode can and cannot do (cf. Gibson 1986). This is also connected to the fact that some things are more easily communicated in some modes than others.

Hence, when we translate between modes (e.g. make a film adaptation of a novel), we have to add something that was not there but we also necessarily take something away from what the first mode included but cannot be represented in the second. We can, for instance, say or write that the popularity of President Obama has increased or decreased, but it would be immensely difficult to communicate this in instrumental music. Furthermore, each symbolic mode has specific social valuations in particular social contexts. This, in turn, has been one of the main obstacles in developing theories concerning multimodality. In our culture, most theories of symbols and signs are

still based on linguistics and concentrate mostly on the written word, the most highly valued symbolic form of Western modernity. In spite of, for example, vivid research on visual forms of signification, there still is not the rich theorisation on the varying possibilities and limits of other symbolic and media forms that there is on the verbal. Even less is there work on what happens when words, pictures and voices are combined. To give just one example, in film studies the study of sound is relatively new and still largely marginal. Even less central is the study of how the visual and auditory elements of film narration come together to produce meanings. These different modes are, finally, not autonomous communicational resources in a culture, nor are they deployed separately, either in representation or in communication; rather, they intermesh and interact at all times.[3]

Intermediality and media

The other key concept here, 'intermediality', refers to intertextuality transgressing media borders. 'Intermediality' characterises the formation of meanings in multimodal cultural spaces. Intermediality, then, is about the relationships between always already multimodal symbolic modes in always already multimodal cultures.

The notion of intertextuality that is the footing for notions concerning intermediality supposes that all texts are produced and interpreted in relation to other texts and the textual knowledges possessed by the producers and the interpreters. The idea of intermediality then expands this by emphasising how intertextuality is not confined to internal intertextual relationships of just one medium. The same genres, character types, plot patterns, themes and motifs and suchlike are used in, say, novels, movies, cartoons and computer games. The same celebrities circulate in tabloids and television programs.

The term 'intermediality' is, then, a healthy reminder of the fact that different forms of representation cannot be separated from each

other, either on the level of individual consciousness or on the level of culture as a whole. On the contrary, they have an effect on one another at all times. Forms of representation in use at any given time form a certain network or field that is constructed from mutual differences and similarities.

If anything, the ideas of multimodality and intermediality call into question the notion of seeing media practices as autonomous. These ideas – of textual multimodality (all modes of representation are themselves multimodal, i.e., they consist of more than one mode of representation), cultural multimodality (cultures always use more than one mode of representation) and intermediality (the same contents circulate in various media forms transgressing their borders and becoming translated from one form to another) – all question modern notions of identities of texts and media practices. In the light of these concepts and conceptions, texts and media practices are not autonomous and full in their own terms. Instead, they are heteronomous, that is, dependent on forms and contents and signs and significations and products and practices and texts and sub-texts and so on that are not derived from their 'proper' areas. If no media text or form ever exists or has existed alone or independently, we cannot successfully study any media form independently of other media forms.[4]

Media as practices

The ideas of multimodality and intermediality have been developed in conditions of late modern cultures saturated with numerous hybridities. As the cultural realities of the day are increasingly characterized by impure cross-breeds, it becomes problematic to cling to such disciplinary traditions characterised by the modernist drive towards purity. All this would seem to favour a rejection of the monomodal era in which the academic disciplines were usually limited to just one form of media. It would seem that in the current multimodal media

landscapes, such multiple fields of research and teaching as communication and media studies cannot consist solely of researchers adhering to just one medium at a time. Instead, in order to understand what is going on, it would seem necessary in these fields to look also at the simultaneity and interaction of different media forms.

As a consequence, in, say, television studies, it might become common to examine the relations between television and newspapers, drama, radio, film and computers. There would be no reason to draw hard lines around certain types of texts, cutting off relations with other types of texts. In the contemporary world a relevant understanding of any medium would seem to entail detecting the relations of that medium and other media. Instead of media-centrism, representing a peculiar formalism, greater attention should be paid to what media forms actually do, that is, what kinds of practices they are.

Differences and similarities

In addition to raising relevant new research questions, the idea of multimodality also calls into question traditional conceptions of 'medium'. The singular term, 'medium', stresses the specificity of each medium, foregrounding *differences* between different media forms. The formally plural but virtually singular 'media' hints at the important dimensions of *similarities* and *interactions* among different media forms. Yet these dimensions are only seldom made explicit in media and communication studies.

Multimodality as a new trans-disciplinary research field has become visible in studies of, for example, multimedia, the visual forms of culture, media convergence and cross-media products (Smith 1991, 1993, 1996, Walker 1987, 1994). The idea of multimodality is a challenge for the existing disciplinary and other borders in all studies concerning human symbolic forms. The ascent of questions concerning multimodality into the academic agenda seems to make topical

the question of the extent to which it is possible to get a grip on late modern culture on the basis of the prevailing disciplinary division based on the separation of different symbolic, art and media forms.

In academic studies, questions concerning cultural values and cultural power are always present, regardless of whether they are articulated explicitly or not. The matter of multimodality thus raises questions concerning values, implicit and explicit, in the studies of arts and the media. Do we prioritise the printed word over other symbolic and media forms? Do we organise academic structures along the monomodal lines, giving distinctions between various forms of arts and media priority over similarities, overlappings and mutual influences? While doing so, for what kind of future and with what kind of facilities, abilities and propensities do we prepare our students?

Differentiation or convergence of academic fields?

All this refers us toward a need to create new interdisciplinary spaces where questions concerning multimodality can be properly addressed. Academic disciplines are linked to the professions they study and educate functionaries for. Perhaps the stress on the singular 'medium' over plural 'media' has its roots in the pressures of professional training in the academic institutions. The question, then, is: Can people be trained in the future on a monomodal basis? How would the discipline that would take multimodality seriously imagine the future of what it might study and train its functionaries for?

And here, we come across another puzzling paradox. The hybridization of media has not led in the academic world to increasing hybridization, transgressions and convergences of media studies. Instead, it has led into a series of new splits. The emergence of new media forms has time and again led to the emergence of new academic sub-fields to match. Thus, after communication and literary studies had secured their positions during the first half of the 20th century, did

other fields such as film studies, television studies and digital media studies gain a foothold in academia.

It is, of course, possible to see disciplines simply as necessary means for universities to classify the reality studied, as methods to produce controlled diversity in order to grasp the world. Such a view would, however, be naïve in bypassing the fact that disciplines are historically and discursively formed, that they have a firm connection to the cultures and ways of thought and action they intend to analyse, and that they hence also produce and reproduce certain power relations (see Lehtonen 2009).

In here it is vital to notice that the formalistic and reifying notions concerning 'medium' and 'media' have had a substantial influence in the development of modern academic divisions of labour. Do we not have specific disciplines for all major forms of expression, with folklore and speech communication studying oral cultures and practices, communication and literary studies examining printed texts, art history investigating still images such as paintings, graphics and photographs, with film and television studies considering moving images and the sounds connected to them while musicology looks at auditory forms other than speech?

'Medium' and 'media' are not, of course, the only principles structuring the modern disciplines and their divisions of labour. As is well known, modernity is characterized by increasing universal differentiation 'between state, market and lifeworld, between individual and society, between spheres like art, science, religion and politics, and emotion or production and reproduction' (Fornäs 1995: 31). It is possible to see the modern disciplinary system as a consequence and expression of this universal differentiation. Hence the disciplinary divisions are marked both by the notions of differentiating socio-cultural spheres and the reifying notions of 'medium' and 'media'. As a result, the disciplines studying the 'factual' media forms are seen as a part of the social sciences, whereas the disciplines studying the 'fictive' forms of media are thought to belong to the humanities.

It may not be a coincidence that such new research areas as media studies or media culture have, at least in Finland, emerged in intersections of social sciences and humanities. 'Media Studies' was established at the University of Turku in the late 1980s (first as 'Film and Television Studies') by a crop of humanists educated in literary studies. When 'Film and Television Studies' merged with a tiny local subject called 'Communication Studies', 'Media Studies' was born. 'Media Culture' originated with a clutch of communication and literary scholars in the early 1990s at the University of Tampere (first as 'Audiovisual Culture', then 'Audiovisual Media Culture' and, from the early 2000s, as 'Media Culture').

Histories and names may alter, but the basic idea remains the same: uniting explorations of social structures and humanistic textual analysis. The result has been the formation of such interdisciplinary areas where the starting point is not any one single medium (media form), but rather the contemporary media landscape in all its diversity. This, in turn, has led to a strong emphasis on contexts of media and media texts, especially the contexts of media usage. As a result, Media Studies at the University of Turku and Media Culture at the University of Tampere are hard to see as traditional academic disciplines with distinct boundaries and profiles. Instead, both are multidisciplinary areas of research and teaching.[5]

The obvious question, then, is: Instead of differences between various media forms, why not adopt as the foundation of disciplinary division *signification as a general human (material and social) process*? This would, no doubt, lead into a total rethinking of present disciplinary systems, including convergences and fusions as well as drawing new boundaries. That the idea is not totally utopian might be evident from the fact that such a pursuit already has a name: 'cultural studies'.

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Endnotes

1. Here it is good to keep in mind that the word 'abstraction' means literally 'to draw something out from something'.
2. In *Drama in a Dramatized Society* (1974/1983) Williams makes similar points relative to theatre, writing that the 'room on the stage' has 'dissolved'.
3. Furthermore, various symbolic and media forms have in specific contexts various 'modalities', i.e. various truth-values. This version of the term 'modality' comes from linguistics and refers to the truth-value and plausibility of utterances (see e.g. Halliday 1970/2005). In linguistics, modality is linked, for example, to such auxiliary verbs as 'can', 'must' and 'may' and adjectives like 'possible', 'probable' and 'certain'. Such ideas can then be extended also to other symbolic forms. We are, for example, inclined to think that photographs do not 'lie' and that a 'report' is more true to life than a 'story'. Such modalities are social, based on shared notions concerning reality and ways of symbolizing it.
4. From this viewpoint the term 'intermediality' may appear inadequate, since the prefix 'inter' can be thought to suggest that there are independent forms of media that then enter as autonomous entities into mutual relations. Perhaps the term 'transmediality' would therefore be an even better to portray the landscape outlined here.
5. There are also several mass communication scholars who believe that mass communication studies are not a traditional discipline but a multidisciplinary area (see e.g. Pietilä 2005).

ARILD FETVEIT

3. The Concept of Medium in the Digital Era

'…despite the obvious inadequacy of the concept of medium to describe contemporary cultural and artistic reality, it persists. It persists through sheer inertia—and also because to put in place a better, more adequate conceptual system is easier said than done' (Manovich, 'Post-media Aesthetics', 2001: 4).

'Social order is a human product, or more precisely, an ongoing human production' (Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 1967: 69).

'Perhaps it was only through a trick of the mind, an optical illusion of history, fleeting like a shadow cast by the sun, that for fifty years we have been able to believe in the existence of cinema. Perhaps "cinema" was just a stage in the wide-reaching evolution of the means of mechanical reproduction' André Bazin's 'Le cinéma est-il mortel?' (quoted in André Gaudreault, 'The Culture Broth and the Froth of Cultures of So-called Early Cinema', 2012: 23).

In his third Boyer Lecture from 2008, 'The Future of Newspapers: Moving Beyond Dead Trees', Rupert Murdoch, the Australian newspaper and media mogul, offered some consoling words to journalists worried about the consequences of media convergence in times when the economy of newspapers as well as other media organisations was threatened by a drop in sales and advertisement revenues. According to Murdoch (2008), it is trust, rather than a newspaper printed on paper, which forms the basis of his business. The 2011 scandal affecting his organisation proved him right, in that it was the collapse of trust, rather than the development of media convergence, that closed his British newspaper *The News of the World* and severely damaged the standing of his holding company News Corporation. Although this curious series of events endows his words with considerable irony, they still articulate interesting points about the fate of newspapers in a culture of convergence:

> Readers want what they've always wanted: a source they can trust. That has always been the role of great newspapers in the past. And that role will make newspapers great in the future.
>
> If you discuss the future with newspapermen, you will find that too many think that our business is only physical newspapers. I like the look and feel of newsprint as much as anyone. But our real business isn't printing on dead trees. It's giving our readers great journalism and great judgment.
>
> It's true that in the coming decades, the printed versions of some newspapers will lose circulation. But if papers provide readers with news they can trust, we'll see gains in circulation—on our web pages, through our RSS feeds, in emails delivering customised news and advertising, to mobile phones (2008 unpaginated).

Murdoch characterised the change we are witnessing as a move 'from news *papers* to news *brands*' (ibid.). Similar words have been used by

the editor and director of the Danish newspaper *Berlingske Tidende*, Lisbeth Knudsen, who has noted that *Berlingske*, as it is now called, is no longer a newspaper but a media brand. *Berlingske* is also collaborating with *The New York Times* in developing strategies for adapting to the digital era, which indicates the wider relevance of this change.

There is an interesting parallel to this move in another realm; namely, that of modern art (see Fetveit 2007). The art historian Rosalind Krauss opened a discussion of what she called 'a post-medium condition', a situation in the modern art world, where artists no longer explore a single medium such as painting or sculpture like they used to do (Krauss 1999, 2000). Thus, they are no longer specialists in a single medium. The post-medium condition is partly defined by the fact that artists work across a range of different media or medialities, combining them pragmatically for various purposes and effects. This could be seen as representing a move from the singular to the plural, from the 'medium-artist', faithful to the exploration of a specific medium of expression, to the 'media-artist', defined by an promiscuous pragmatism using whatever medium or combination of media that seems to work.

Thus, what Krauss calls the 'post-medium condition' might as well be labelled the 'condition of media proliferation', because in the post-medium condition, the artist constantly chooses certain media among a seemingly growing number of alternatives. In addition to bringing about a proliferation of media, according to Krauss, the post-medium condition also leaves the artist to explore *art-in-general* rather than a specific art form associated with a particular medium.

Thus, to make the parallel I am evoking even clearer: The artist seems to become a jack- of-all-trades—just like the converged journalist who is now often taking photographs, shooting video and preparing the story for web, print and other platforms—that is, making *journalism-in-general* rather than in a single medium (see Erdal 2009, 2011). But curiously, what might seem like a proliferation of media in the worlds of artists and journalists alike has entailed an unevenly distributed success for the concept of medium. In media studies, we seem

increasingly to replace the concept of *medium* with alternate terms, such as *platform*. In the art world, however, the term 'medium' is used for all the various material means of expression the jack-of-all-trades artist utilises in order to articulate 'art-in-general'.

Ubiquity and crisis for the concept of medium

The concept of medium has probably never been so ubiquitous and surrounded by such an interest in the culture-at-large as well as in neighbouring disciplines as it is today. The interest in the concept results from a development involving at least three intertwined factors:

1. Computers, from laptops to mobile units and server parks, are refiguring various aspects of our lives, and their power to do so is closely interlinked with the fact that they have evolved into media machines. Thus, the ubiquity of computing goes hand-in-hand with the ubiquity of media (Fetveit 2013, Ekman 2013).

2. Mediatisation is reforming cultural, social and political life in several ways (Hjarvard 2009, Krotz 2008) and therefore boosting the traction of the term medium across disciplines like political science, sociology, anthropology, literary criticism and others (Corner and Pels 2003, Pauwels 2010, Eisenlohr 2011, Morris and Swiss 2009).

3. A third aspect involves the success of the concept in the aesthetic field, where artists now work as much in various *media* as in various *arts*. The literary scholar John Guillory (2010) discusses the gradual replacement of the term 'art' with 'medium', which by now seems so complete that it sounds almost quaint to describe artists as working in 'the art of painting', for example. They all now seem to work in various 'media'. The post-medium condition—which has artists venturing

beyond painting, sculpture and graphic work in favour of exploring a host of medialities—may well have accelerated the movement from arts to media and thereby solidified the success of the term in the art world (see Lütticken 2004, Weibel 2005).

In light of this tremendous interest across disciplines in the concept of medium, it is noteworthy that in the discipline of media studies itself, there is a tendency to replace it with a host of alternate terms like 'platforms', 'devices', 'terminals', 'services', 'gadgets', 'channels', 'applications', 'formats' and more. Thus, while the mediating means for the jack-of-all-trades in the art world are called 'media', in the world of media studies, the mediating means seem increasingly to be a host of alternatives to the term 'medium'.[1] How can this be? What looms behind this apparent crisis of the term in the midst of its success?

A first and consoling explanation, suggesting that the frequent replacement of 'medium' with alternate terms hardly represents a crisis for the concept, could be that detailed investigations in media studies often require more specialised terms. While this may indeed be the case, there are also an increasing number of other signs indicating a crisis, one of them being the growing interest in defining the term in articles, books and special journal issues. Paradoxically, it seems, media scholars no longer seem clear about what the term 'medium' means.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*) defines the term 'medium' in the following way, in its meaning *4. a.*: 'An intermediate agency, instrument, or channel; a means; *esp.* a means or channel of communication or expression. Freq. in *by* (also *through*) *the medium of*'. The *OED* also has two separate entries pointing to the art world and to the world of mass media, respectively. *4. c.* is tailored to the art world: 'Any of the varieties of painting or drawing as determined by the material or technique used. Hence more widely: any raw material or mode of expression used in an artistic or creative activity'. *4. d.* is tailored to the world of mass communication: 'A channel of mass communication, as newspapers, radio, television, etc.; the reporters, journalists, etc., working for organisations engaged in such communication. Freq. in pl. with *the*'.

So how viable do the *OED* definitions seem to be for coping with the present proliferation of means of mediating? The new materials used in the art world may easily comply with the characterisation, 'any raw material or mode of expression used in an artistic or creative activity'. For the new means of communication more relevant to media studies, however, the characterisation, 'channel of mass communication, as newspapers, radio, television', may easily leave new formats such as SMS, DVD and communication devices such as RSS-feeds short of the requirements needed to qualify as media. In contrast to this, the gluttonous term 'new media' has tended to incorporate most new technologies relevant to mediation. Thus, divergent implicit definitions of 'medium' have come to operate in *new media studies* and in *media studies*.[2] This has caused confusion. However, the insatiable urge to incorporate almost any new media technology under the term 'new media' seems now increasingly to be countered by a sense of awkwardness in calling them by the term 'medium'.

The sense of awkwardness now associated with the use of the term 'medium' for naming new means of mediation may indicate that 'new media' are also increasingly understood to be 'media' in a more encompassing sense than mere media technologies, and therefore that the understanding of the term 'medium' is becoming less divergent. The growing perception that 'new media' are in fact also 'media' is supported by the loss of traction for the distinction between new and (for lack of a better term) 'not new' media. When some of the 'new media' get older, at the same time that the 'not new media' migrate to digital platforms and take on the digitally based characteristics that used to be reserved for 'new media', the distinction initially provided by the adjective 'new' gradually becomes less meaningful. In spite of this approximation, the term 'medium', now assigned to the task of designating all these different media, has been left in a condition of considerable uncertainty as to what it actually means. Consequently, media researchers actively start debating how it should be defined and what should be named 'media'. They may wonder whether SMS, MMS and RRS-feeds are to be called 'media' and if, for example, the

Internet is better thought of as a 'meta-medium', capable of handling all other media, than as a 'medium'.[3]

What adds to the problem is that there is limited help in back-tracking to the seemingly well-established concept of medium that has helped ground media studies. It is becoming increasingly clear that, rather than being a well-defined and clear analytical concept, the key term at the basis of media studies has tended to operate as a floating signifier invoking shifting meanings. A passage from the opening of the British media scholar James Curran's recent book on the power of media exemplifies well what has tended to be business as usual in media studies: '…this body of widely overlooked research … provides insights into the influences that shape the media, both past and present. It also offers alternative ways of thinking about the media's relationship to society' (2002: 3). The meaning of the term 'media' here seems to carry a fundamental ambiguity. It is unclear to what extent it refers to mediating technologies with specific qualities and affordances and to what extent it refers to the organisations making use of such technologies. This ambiguity suits Curran's text fine, just as it has suited media scholars over the years, although it has also operated to dodge and marginalise what arguably should be one of the key concerns for media studies; namely, questions concerning the difference the medium makes, questions that are implicitly urged by Marshall McLuhan's (2001) catch phrase 'the medium is the message'. Traditional media studies has, by means of its floating signifier, conveyed an impression of taking media and the differences between them more seriously than has actually been the case.[4]

What has most effectively teased out the fundamental ambiguity in the concept now and rendered it more dull and awkward as an analytic tool is, as I have hinted to above, that 'media' (like newspapers, television and radio on the one side) and 'new media' (like CD-ROMs, email, SMS, DVDs, and the Internet with its websites, blogs, 'social media' and so on) appear to be construed as 'media' according to divergent ideas of what 'media' are. Whereas these first kinds of 'media' have largely been construed as *media organisations* with working operations,

technologies and reception patterns vaguely factored in, the latter media forms making up 'new media' have most often been construed as *mediating technologies* with specific qualities and affordances.

When, on such a background, a comparative project aimed to assess the influence of 'old' versus 'new' media is launched, drawing on a conceptual framework construing 'the media' of the older kind largely as *media organisations*, while at the same time assuming that the gluttonous term 'new media' also construes 'media' largely as media organizations, the project might soon find itself in trouble. It might appear difficult – verging on the meaningless – to compare the influence of media organisations pursuing the political goals of dominating British or Italian politics, as those of Murdoch and Berlusconi, with the influence of new media like the SMS or the mobile application. The futility of such exercises is likely to alert media researchers that the concept of medium can leave them standing on treacherous ground. The conceptual ambiguity that curiously in some ways worked to the advantage of media studies, although important questions were dodged, now becomes the source of a conceptual breakdown urging scholars to either leave the concept or rework its meaning and use.

Attempts to clarify the meaning of the term 'medium'

This may provide an explanation of why the concept of medium is not so much used when we account for convergence or, in the words of the media researcher Henry Jenkins (2004: 37), how media companies 'are learning how to accelerate the flow of media content across delivery channels to expand revenue opportunities, broaden markets and reinforce viewer commitments'. It also provides an explanation of the conceptual work we are now seeing. Responding to the new situation, Jenkins proposes a conceptual move, which in a curious way parallels that of the movement towards what we can call 'the journalist in general' and 'the artist in general'. He lifts the concept of

medium itself up to a general level in which it will hardly be affected by changes, much as Murdoch sought to rescue the activities of the journalists from historical change by asserting that 'readers want what they've always wanted: a source they can trust'.

In his short but potent article 'Convergence? I Diverge', Jenkins proposes to distinguish between media, genres and delivery technologies. He claims, 'Recorded sound is a medium. Radio drama is a genre. CDs, MP3 files and eight-track cassettes are delivery technologies. Genre and delivery technologies come and go, but media persist as layers within an ever more complicated information and entertainment system' (Jenkins 2001). As I have briefly argued elsewhere, these distinctions might appear to be clarifying (Fetveit 2007). But if recorded sound is a medium, and the CD a delivery technology, what other media are there, and is it possible to invent new ones? These questions are implicitly answered by Jenkins five years later as he lists the following media: 'spoken words', 'printed words', 'cinema', 'theatre', television', and 'radio' (Jenkins 2006: 14). One could try to continue this list by adding, for example, 'books' and 'newspapers'. But these seem partly superfluous when 'printed words' are already mentioned. In fact, 'books' and 'newspapers' could well be regarded as mere delivery technologies for the medium of 'printed words'. Likewise, radio might be regarded not as a medium, but as a delivery technology for the medium 'spoken words' or, perhaps even better, for 'recorded sound'. In short, the framework proposed by Jenkins is not coherent, and I do not believe that it can be amended well on its own terms. Jenkins is right that it represents a problem to conflate media with mere delivery technologies. However, it is also problematic to separate media from the materiality of their delivery technologies as well as to conflate media with more abstract medial modalities like 'recorded sound'. Even if such problems are amended, I believe any taxonomy of this kind will invite inconsistencies. This may be due to the rigidity created by the ontologising tendency inherent in the taxonomy, which, rather than a heuristic tool adjustable for specific analytical tasks, seems to project a picture of how things are. Rather

than ontologising models of how things are, we need flexible heuristic models outlining productive conceptions adapted to specific analytical tasks and an understanding of how we productively fit conceptions in this realm to the analytical challenges we meet.

The strategy behind making an item like 'recorded sound' a primary example of what a medium is could be to protect the concept of medium from the creative turmoil that takes place in the realms of technological and social inventions on the one side and cultural and aesthetic inventions on the other. But the outcome is not so much to protect the concept of medium as to undermine its relevance. For if it merely designates allegedly stable medial forms like 'recorded sound' and 'printed words' and traditional media like radio, television and cinema, it need not be on everybody's lips like it is today. Besides, 'recorded sound' and 'printed words' may well be called *medial modalities* rather than media. Making 'recorded sound' a primary example of what a medium is also negates the multiple aspects operating in our everyday use of the concept.

I have suggested that the concept of 'medium' in the way it ordinarily operates is not only multidimensional, but also contains a migratory flexibility in which different aspects of the concept come to the fore at different times (Fetveit 2007; 2011a). Any attempt to reduce the concept to merely one dimension—be it technical device, cultural or aesthetic practice, form of perception, socio-economic mode of circulation or medial form like 'recorded sound'—belies the complex multiplicity of the concept. I illustrated this multidimensionality and migratory flexibility by an example of how discussions of 'the death of film' may run. In such discussions, the multifaceted nature of the concept of medium can be actualised in almost paradoxical ways.

It has been noted that the medium of film is dying, because film stock is being replaced by digital video. In this case, the medium of film is invoked in terms of its technical support. If we counter that films will survive, because people simply love stories told in an audiovisual format, what is invoked is the medium of film as a cultural and aesthetic form. If we say that films will still die, because the theatres

that show films are losing their audiences and will soon have to close, we are invoking the medium of film in terms of its primary viewing practice more than in terms of technology, culture or aesthetics. The conflicting conceptions of the medium to which I have already pointed, between media organisations and the media as evoked in McLuhan's proposition that 'the medium is the message', may well be seen as instantiating the migratory flexibility made possible by the multidimensionality of the concept.

Other attempts to articulate the multidimensionality of the concept have also appeared. Inspired by the system theory of Nicholas Luhmann, the German media theorist Siegfried J. Schmidt proposes a conception of medium that integrates the following four dimensions:

- communication instruments (such as languages, non-verbal behaviour or gestures)
- technological devices (such as print, TV or Internet technology on the side of receivers and producers)
- social systems or bodies of such devices (such as publishing houses or television stations)
- media offers which result from the coalescence of these components and can only be interpreted referring to this complex context of production. (2008: 93)

Schmidt notes the usefulness of distinguishing communication instruments such as languages from media. He suggests that we can productively 'observe and describe the differences in the uses of these instruments in the different media' (ibid.). Schmidt's model seems, however, only partly convincing. Where are the genres that form predictable patterns in photographic portraits, television news and horror movies and help to give producers, media offers and audiences a sense of stability in times when technologies change? This is just one of the questions we could pose to demonstrate how the model might be differently construed. The question serves to point out how any

construal of dimensions like this is *contingent on our interests* as much as derived from the empirical developments it purports to map.

A related divide is offered by the media and communication scholar Klaus Bruhn Jensen (2010: 15), who presents 'a three-part definition of media as material, discursive, as well as institutional phenomena'. The simplicity of such a divide may have the advantage that it is easier to perceive the conception as heuristic and therefore to amend it according to specific analytical tasks – though Jensen does not explicitly make a point of promoting such flexibility.[5]

Conceptions of the medium as multilayered, as exemplified in Schmidt's and Jensen's models, represent an improvement as compared to Jenkins' effort to construct a one-dimensional conception of 'medium' fitted into a layered taxonomy distinguishing media from delivery technologies and genre. Jensen's three-part model (when disentangled from its imbrication with the less clear conception of 'media of degrees') has the pedagogical quality of keeping things simple. Jenkins' taxonomy and the multilayered models of Schmidt and Jensen, however, all have the disadvantage of potentially inviting us to ontologise certain dimensions of the concept of medium that would more productively be thought of as heuristic. Schmidt seems alert to this problem in the introduction to his discussion. Before coming to his four-layered concept, he notes that in 'the philosophy of science it is widely accepted that definitions of concepts should not be judged by their truth but by their acceptability and usefulness in relevant discourses' (2008: 91) If we subscribe to this view, and I believe Schmidt is right in suggesting that we should, do we not need to model the multilayered concept of medium according to its 'usefulness in relevant discourses', and does that not require flexible conceptions, where the stipulations of layers are attuned to the particular research task at hand? Such conceptual flexibility and the awareness that comes with it, as we adjust our analytical categories more to our specific tasks rather than merely relying on standardised models, is fundamentally attuned to a situation in which media as empirical realities become more malleable and liquid. Simultaneously, the uses of the concept of

‘medium’ also become more fluid and migratory. In such a situation, how can we more precisely envision a flexible conception of ‘medium’, which escapes the ontologising tendencies we have seen and instead embraces a more heuristic approach?

A heuristic model of the multilayered medium

Drawing on the earlier discussion about ‘the death of film,’ a heuristic model of the concept of ‘medium’ might be given the following three layers:

- Technical support
- Particular cultural and aesthetic forms
- Particular circulation and reception practices

‘Technical support’ here refers to the technical and material support system that provides the physical basis for the medium. For the medium of film, this has traditionally contained recording and screening apparatuses adapted to the analogue film roll in various formats (size, colour etc.) as well as various sound systems. It also involves a set of apparatuses that have gone into producing films, from matte paintings to editing desks. The technical support has been overtaken step-by-step by digital technologies, which allow for changes to the affordances of the medium, involving a less clear boundary between live action and animation, for example. However, these digital technologies are largely aimed at keeping within the bounds of the traditional modus operandi of the medium so that the two other layers, the cultural and aesthetic forms and the traditional circulation and reception practices, can largely be maintained. The cultural and aesthetic forms are articulated in key works that set the standard for works within a medium, either for the first time or anew (Cavell 1979, Gaudreault and Marion 2005). Such standards are then maintained and developed in a host

of later works. The particular circulation and reception practices for film have traditionally been a darkened movie theatre in which films could meet their audiences, but television and later increasingly mobile digital devices have changed this situation.

Confronted with such a list, it should immediately be evident that we can add to the list as well as re-describe the three layers. We could split the last entry by dividing economic and social circulation and reception practices from the aesthetic perception of the product. Thus, in a number of different ways, such a model may be amended to fit more precisely the aspects most relevant to our analysis. The simplicity of the model is also its strength, in that it is difficult to confuse what the model is offering with anything aspiring to the full picture of how things are, and in that it is easily amended and expanded for performing particular analytical tasks.

The model may also help to put Jenkins' attempt to distinguish between media and delivery technologies in perspective. Rather than seeing delivery technologies as distinct from media, the model I am proposing conceives of delivery technologies as more or less integral to the medium, as the aspect of a medium which may be called its technical support. However, there have been important developments in this field. In the case of cinema, for example, with digitalisation, the medium is de-coupled from its original technical support, the chemical filmstrip, which is now replaced by digital storage and projection systems. This also allows a host of digital distribution options to possibly expand the portfolio of delivery technologies available for the medium, which again might support an accelerated flow of 'media content' across delivery channels, to echo Jenkins. Likewise, the technical support of the traditional newspaper is also modified and expanded by additional delivery channels, more or less central to the medium. Thus, whereas media like newspaper, television and film have largely been associated with one delivery technology, a major change to contemporary media based on digital technologies is a multiplication of delivery channels, whereof some will be central and integral to the

medium, whereas others may operate on a more ad hoc basis and be subject to considerable flux.[6]

In fact, current media are characterised by flux and upheavals rather than business as usual. While media change and crisis does not in itself represent anything new, digitalisation with its complicated and long-lasting repercussions, nurturing the present convergence culture, represents a truly game-changing development. It does not merely involve the invention of a number of new media. It also involves what we could call a re-constitution of already-established media. And perhaps as important, these pervasive and complicated re-constitution processes are still very much ongoing. This may be ascribed to the fact that the complex ecology of production and consumption making up our media culture is being remade. Such institutionalised practices do not change overnight. Rather, this complex ecosystem remains in the midst of continuous adjustments and readjustments.

In many ways and areas, we are likely to see greater stability, like more well-functioning and long-lasting business models for what we still call newspapers, but it is also possible that a more permanent condition of ongoing change will come to define the media culture of the future. Lev Manovich has argued that new media continues to be new, because their software keeps being updated, which allows features and affordances to be continuously changed (2007). Though this is an important point, its impact should not be overestimated. It must be filtered through an assessment of how human mores change – reaching from economic business models to aesthetic preferences via the social and cultural practices that inform the media culture.

In view of the nature of such ecological adaptations, it could seem reasonable to assume that the current crisis and impasse represents a temporary *entr'acte* in the various media histories waiting to be overcome by the establishment of new consolidated medial forms secured by new forms of balance in the ecosystems. However, the point Manovich makes suggests that whatever new forms of balance are produced, the media culture supported by digital technologies may

prove to be more volatile than the media culture supported by analogue media. But to what extent technical potential for change undercuts the stabilising factors of economic, social and aesthetic practices and what volatility this in the end will produce in various fields remains to be seen. However, we should not overestimate such technically induced volatility. In any case, the current change and upheaval, the 'de-solidification' and remaking of media and media-related practices, is likely to be with us in the years to come.

Liquid media

There is a growing sense that we are on our way to, if not already deep into, a post-medium condition of some sort, where not only artists have left traditional media behind but also what used to be a 'newspaper' we could hold in our hands increasingly seems like 'content'[7] circulated on various 'delivering technologies' and 'platforms' by a multimedia news brand. Thus, the changes we are in the midst of seem to de-solidify media, to make them more malleable and fluid, to produce what we could call 'liquid media'. This development may offer a less solid vantage point for media studies in the term 'medium'. Jenkins' answer to the problem, as we have seen, is to redefine the concept in a way that removes it from where the changes are taking place.

However, we have seen how his bid leads to inconsistencies and to lost relevance and how it is unproductively ontologising. It is interesting to note that the concepts of *art-in-general* and the *jack-of-all-trades*, as well as Murdoch's point that making newspapers is not about printing on dead trees, but about building new brands, all tend to move away from the medium. A parallel move is also suggested by Jensen (2010: 14), who suggests 'a shift of focus from media to communication'.

In view of the empirical as well as the conceptual turmoil that currently affects the concept of 'medium', such a move could seem to provide a more stable vantage point for exploring various uses of

media, but it actually risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The more instrumental and rationally inflected term *communication*, invoking intentions, efficiency and possibly a longing for transparency, risks inviting us to lose sight of the compelling power of fascination embedded in and addressed by the more material, sensuous and aesthetically attuned concept of *medium*. But rather than merely staying with the concept of medium, we might also productively engage the more meta-disciplinary challenge of getting to grips with the impasse of the concept of medium and explore the nature of the process it is going through. In order to support these efforts, I suggest that we interrogate the relationship between 'medium' and 'mediation' and seek to understand the dynamic between the two.

Mediation processes produce media

As a vantage point, we can note that no matter how destabilised, unruly, malleable and liquid media become—and with this, no matter how much our established concept of medium loses traction—mediation processes in various forms will still go on. If the post-medium condition, fuelled by the repercussions of digitalisation, to a considerable degree comes to dissolve media as we know them, people will still engage in mediated exchanges.

It may seem as though mediation processes are dependent upon media but I want to suggest that we may be better off by turning the tables and instead asking if it is not true that mediation processes produce media. Of course, the relationship between mediation and medium is not defined by one-way traffic; rather, mediation processes and media mutually co-constitute each other. Without these mediation processes, the institutionalization of the medium and the complex shaping of its various layers involving both social practices and genre expectations might not take place. Yet, without an initial media technology, the mediation processes required to institutionalize

new media would, in many cases, not get started. A potentially promising media technology, which is not taken up and used in mediation practices that may help institutionalize it as a medium, may risk, at best, winding up in a collection like 'The Dead Media Project'. Here, according to its website, we can find a selection of 'the deceased, the slowly-rotting, the undead, and the never-lived media'.[8] Historically, starting with the term mediation also sets the record straight in a sense, since, according to the *OED*, mediation is the older term that was later followed by medium and media.

The move to seeing media from the vantage point of mediation could be construed as one that provides us with a more stable point of observation, but it may be even more productively considered as a move that can help us understand the institutional solidification of something into a medium. If something can solidify into a medium, a reversal of the process may also take place whereby a medium is de-solidified. Let us imagine media as coming into being through repetitive mediation processes supported by the making and adoption of specially-designed mediating technologies, the development of cultural forms often adapted from mere oral traditions or from other media—the two being what M.M. Bakhtin describes as primary or secondary speech genres (1986). Developing out of such mediation practices also come practices of circulation and reception.

Conceiving of media as products of such mediation processes also allows us to see how changes in such mediation processes would yield changes in the media resulting from such processes. What has coagulated from a liquid and less solid form to a more firm and reliable structure—supported by a solidification of technologies, cultural forms and practices—could equally de-solidify and become more liquid. We are in the midst of such processes, but we are also witnessing new practices on their way to being solidified.

In his initial discussion of speech genre, Bakhtin (1986: 60) notes that 'each separate utterance is individual…but each sphere in which language is used develops its own *relatively stable types* of these utterances'. The idea that 'relatively stable types' are developed from

repeated instances of mediation is interesting, and I believe that it is highly transferable to the establishment of relatively stable forms of mediation, which by consequence would produce 'relatively stable types' of media. This way of thinking also seems to be well in tune with how the maintenance of social practices has been theorised in the social sciences; for example, in Anthony Giddens' (1984) theory of 'structuration', whereby actors confirm and solidify norms by acting in accordance with certain social practices and may contribute to the modification of such norms by acting differently.

Also interesting in this regard are Peter L. Berger's and Thomas Luckmann's observations about the extent to which repeated actions can be institutionalised and solidified into what we tend to take as given parts of the world, akin to natural things like rivers and mountains. They argue that social order exists 'as a product of human activity…. Both in its genesis (social order is the result of past human activity) and its existence in any instant of time (social order exists only and in so far as human activity continues to produce it) it is a human product' (1967: 70). But in spite of the social origins in human activity, they point to how habitual and typified human activities crystallize, thicken and harden into 'institutions…experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as external and coercive fact' (ibid.: 76). Could the solidification of media, resulting from repeated mediation processes, aided by inventions and supporting practices on the various layers of the medium, be compared to the solidification of human mores addressed by Berger and Luckmann? I believe it can. Such processes do indeed underpin our inclination to reify and hence to ontologise media, that is, to understand media as things. Now, in this post-medium condition, liquid media are encouraging us to think otherwise. They are inviting us to construe frameworks wherefrom we can better understand the dynamics involved when media change.

The early film historians and media theorists André Gaudreault and Philippe Marion offer a structure in which the mediation practices producing media might be located. 'The history of early cinema leads us, successively', they write, 'from the *appearance* of a technological

process, the apparatus, to the *emergence* of an initial culture, that of 'animated pictures', and finally to the *constitution* of an established media institution' (2002: 14). What is particularly helpful in their conception is a combination of meticulous historical research into the birth of, or rather, the constitution of a particular medium combined with an effort to identify patterns that may productively be generalized to a wider set of cases. Drawing on their rich historical data, they point both to groups having special roles in the phases of the emergence of a medium, as well as to how the intermedial relations and the autonomy of the medium changes:

> On the level of production, the social agents responsible for the medium's appearance are its numerous *inventors*, while those responsible for its emergence are the camera *operators*, and those responsible for its constitution are the first film *directors*. After the recording device appeared, film production *defined itself* as a practice, making it possible to pass to the next step, the emergence of 'animated pictures'. This is the first 'cinematic' culture, although it is still only tenuously institutionalised. This culture was of necessity intermedial and was characterised by an ongoing institutionalisation by a hodgepodge of neighbouring institutions which by definition were not 'cinematic'. It was by means of this unstable culture that the *cinematograph* began the process of becoming an *autonomous* medium of expression. This subsequently led to the cinema's constitution, to its *establishment as a unique medium*. This in turn allowed the cinema to pass into a second culture, its second birth. A culture, this time, that was truly 'media-centric'. (Ibid.)

Gaudreault and Marion describe the complex process of emergence as involving two births of the medium in question, the first of the initial media technology and the second of the institutionalised medium. Thus, while the rudimentary technology of cinema was famously made public in 1895, the constitution of cinema as a medium, they claim, came much later when film directors, on the background of an

emerging culture of filming and screening, managed to establish an autonomous medium of expression by using the medial possibilities in unique and productive ways.

In this long process of emergence, Gaudreault and Marion see the intermedial relations of the medium as changing through the following three stages: a 'subordination to neighbouring institutions…a movement towards detachment…[and] a period of insubordination' (ibid.: 15). This picture is consonant with models proposed both by the new media theorists Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin (1999), as well as by David Thorburn and Henry Jenkins (2004), where new media are described, respectively, as *remediating* or *imitating* earlier media, before developing more autonomy. But if this research adds more details to how media are constituted, can it also add to our understanding of how such constitutional processes are reversed, how media may de-solidify, dissolve and become more liquid, as well as how they may be re-constituted in new forms?

Several aspects may be similar in a medium in the process of being constituted and one in which this process is being reversed. In both cases, the medium will be liquid in many important respects. This means that the mediation processes producing the medium will not be as stable and institutionally well-grounded as those characterising fully fledged media. Rather, an institutional void, an awareness of potential identities cloaked within it, as well as an uncertainty as to what its future may entail, may be observed. Such traits are easily recognisable in today's 'newspapers' turned 'media brands'. However, while media that become de-solidified show similarities to those not yet solidified, the differences may be as great as the similarities. Therefore, there are limitations to how helpful Gaudreault and Marion's framework is for understanding de-solidified media.

For furthering our understanding in this area we need to aim more precisely at understanding what aspects of its fully-fledged version the medium in question has lost, if its loss relates to its technical support, to its cultural and aesthetic forms losing traction, or to its circulation and reception practices which are breaking down for some reason. In

several cases a cocktail of such losses come into play. We also need to understand what parts of such a loss are sought compensated and by what means and strategies. If the money streams of its business models are intercepted, for example, attempts may be made to re-constitute the circulation and reception practices of the medium supported by a new business model. But such attempts may also have repercussions for the cultural and aesthetic forms defining the medium. More meticulous comparisons of historical data about media of various kinds are needed to construct even more accurate and powerful models of such constitution and re-constitution processes.

The current status of media, their liquid condition, the somewhat chaotic situation of upheaval and change, de-solidifies not only media, but also our naming practices. For various reasons to which I have already pointed, a host of alternative terms for naming media have taken hold. This does not only mean that we are less prone to call something a medium. It also means that naming practices have become more evidently a matter of deliberate choices. A case in point is how new intermedial practices seem to involve a stronger presence of media in supporting roles, as auxiliaries to other media, whereby they take on the function of delivery technologies, perhaps even in set combinations that we could call 'cluster media'. New situations like this raise the issue of naming. Should we conceive of something as a channel, a medium or a delivery device? When such alternatives all seem viable, they start appearing as strategic choices where we need to ask: what gains are there to be won from this or that conception?

Thus, the identification of a mediation process and thereby a medium (or several media) serving that process becomes a result of *conceiving something as* such a process. It does not follow from discovering 'the nature of' something, or from finding out that something is ontologically a medium. Instead, to conceive of it as a medium becomes a choice we make, though, of course, the sum of many such choices comes to define cultural perceptions to which we cannot be blind, as such perceptions may solidify into what Berger and Luckmann discuss as coercive facts making up the worlds in which we live. However, in

the interest of productive analysis, we need to free ourselves from such coercive powers, to interrogate them rather than being ruled by them. This might appear easier in a time when institutionalisation processes are reversed and media become liquid.

We have seen how starting with mediation invites us to see media as more fluid and historically changing entities. It should provide us with a theory of media that is more dynamic and capable of handling the current changes. To see the concept of medium as multi-dimensional – involving a series of layers, where changes may be initiated and develop within particular layers and only to some extent influence other layers – should also help to create a conception of 'medium' capable of handling the dynamism to which the current process of media convergence is subjecting contemporary media.

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Endnotes

1. I am throughout the article using the form 'medium' with its plural form 'media'. The conflicting interpretations of this basic term, however, have even penetrated in between the singular and the plural form of the term itself. While 'medium' tends to be associated with mediating technologies and being addressed by means of approaches from the humanities, 'media' (especially in the form of 'the media', as noted by the *OED*) tends to be associated with media organisations and is more likely to be addressed from a social science perspective. In order to free themselves from associations to the latter perspectives, some scholars, especially those associated with art history, have started to use the plural form 'mediums'. Even if this may be regarded as a grammatical perversion, conceptually, it actually amends a problem by substantially putting to a halt the ambiguity of the concept. Unfortunately, at the same time, this conceptual practice silently installs a wall between media associated with 'the art world' and with 'the media world' and thereby implicitly promotes questionable hierarchies of value. It also risks discouraging comparative studies of media across domains. Therefore it hardly represents an attractive alternative.
2. The early film historians and media theorists, André Gaudreault and Philippe Marion, make a similar point when they write: 'The label "new media" is quickly tossed around – too quickly perhaps… But each time we hail a new medium, this does not mean that the medium in question has managed to leave the cocoon of its first birth and leave its emergent phase behind' (2005: 13). As I will come back to, they see the media technology of a medium like cinema as quite another thing than the fully-fledged medium developed later. Mixing the two, they implicitly suggest, invite unwarranted conclusions.
3. Unfortunately, such questions tend to be discussed in an ontologising manner, asking, *is* SMS a medium, rather than asking, *what does it* yield to conceptualise it as a medium. It seems often to be implicit in such debates that it should close so that the practice of grasping and understanding the Internet as medium or meta-medium can become institutionalised as established practice and no longer an active choice of *conceptualising it* as one or the other. Academic paradigms are created in this way, by unifying conceptions and by creating common ground. However, inherent in such a move may also be a less productive tendency to reify analytical concepts, to ontologise and thereby ascribe a more solid nature to something than is both merited and productive. Such processes, in which alternate conceptions are replaced by institutionalised doxa, tend to move entities from a

situation in which they can be conceived in different ways to one in which they solidify and coagulate as defined entities, aspiring to the condition of things.

4. Questions about media differences tend to be more interesting to scholars drawing on the traditions of film studies and visual culture as well as 'new media' (Bolter and Grusin 1999; Manovich 2001) and the emerging tradition of 'media aesthetics' (Hausken 2010; Fetveit 2011b).
5. Jensen complicates the model by seeking to combine it with a model of media of three or four 'degrees'. However, it is less than clear on which parameter or scale these degrees are localised.
6. Media history is fraught with changes in the medium's technical support that do not spill substantially over to other aspects of the medium, like genre and aesthetics. It is the changes that create repercussions in other aspects of the medium that make a difference beyond production processes and economy and thereby come to change cultural forms.
7. Of course, 'content' is an abstract category. When perceivable to us, any 'content' is instantiated in a medium, and as McLuhan reminds us, media are not transparent, although we easily come to act as if they are.
8. See 'The Dead Media Project'. http://www.deadmedia.org/ (8.6.2012)

RAIMO SALOKANGAS

4. The Media – Material for Historical Studies, and a Research Object

Asa Briggs and Peter Burke start their *A Social History of the Media* with a programme declaration: 'The aim of this book… is to show the relevance of the past to the present by bringing history into media studies and the media into history' (Briggs and Burke 2002: ix). They imply that there is mass communication research that is not historical research, but would gain through a supporting historical approach – and, conversely, that historical research 'proper' sufficiently values neither media as a research topic nor communication as a point of departure for research. The quotation also implies that media history is not just 'history' or just '(mass) communication research', but rather an interdisciplinary research area connected by media and communication as the object of research, and the historian's multitude of materials and methods as the general approach.

Academic disciplines are institutionalized as 'disciplines', 'departments', 'schools' et cetera, but in research on media there is an inbuilt need to cross borders. 'Crossroads' or 'crossing' has been often used as a metaphor: a location to be reached from many directions, equipped with a number of different methods. Another popular metaphor is 'field':

> If the study of media represents a 'field', it is a field with indistinct boundaries; a playing field, marked out for a variety of different games, subject to distinctive titles and rules, each game with its own painted lines, but the lines of each game overlapping those of others. Each game also has its own spectators, and among these there are some who came just for the game in which they have most interest, and there are others whose attention spans the field for sight of any match that looks interesting or exciting. (Boyd-Barrett and Newbold 1995: 2.)

The 'field' of media studies in general, and media history specifically, is elusive, as is the content of 'media' itself. This article attempts to sketch the field of media history by exploring the meanings of the concept 'media', and how 'media' (or any of its components) has been used in historical research. 'What is media?' is a question that has decisively influenced how 'media history' (or historical research into what presently is called media) has been perceived.

The home field here is predominantly that of Finland, where 'bringing media into history' is presently a more challenging task than 'bringing history into media studies'. But the field is never still, games are constantly being played.

First there must be 'media'

Almost two decades ago, the theme issue of *Media, Culture & Society* on 'Media History' was opened by Hans Fredrik Dahl's article *The Pursuit of Media History* (Dahl 1994). He was asking for the research object of media history and wanted to recognize 'a discipline on its own merits', as opposed to one intellectually regarded and institutionally positioned as an offshoot of e.g. cultural history.

It is easy to understand that Dahl's questions were just those, because media history, if anything, even now continues to hover

around the insecure zone where the 'social sciences' and 'humanities' (history) meet each other, and a number of other disciplines, all carrying on along their own traditions and negotiating about how they might best be combined in 'interdisciplinary' settings. There is also a more pessimistic way to put it: media history is still, all too easily left standing between the stools, rather unfamiliar to all, institutionally nobody's own, and therefore not regarded as important.[1]

Dahl pointed out that the perspective of historians proper to media has usually been narrow. The media has been approached from the point of view of source analysis, and the researchers have been interested mainly in how to use media content as material for research on non-media topics. As an example Dahl refers to the 1991 Conference of Nordic Historians, where one of the two main themes was 'non-written sources', and where still photos, moving pictures, radio (Dahl himself!) and television were approached as material for historical research – but not as objects of study in their own right.

Mass media itself is a fairly recent concept. Dahl noted that the American *Random House Dictionary* registered the earliest cases of 'mass media' in approximately the present meaning in the early 1920s. Although in 1994, the *Oxford English Dictionary* still had not registered the term, OED Online did later list the earliest mention similarly, as in 1923, and referred also to some other cases in the 1920s (always in the context of advertising). Even in American sociological research, the term 'mass media' appeared only in early 1950s, Dahl writes. On the basis of the Random House Dictionary entry, he concludes that the term 'news media', as an umbrella expression referring to newspapers, radio and television as providers of news, was adopted in the United States as late as the early 1960s. If 'media' is such a latecomer, should we distinguish between the history of communication and history of media, Dahl asks, noticing a difference of focus: 'media' often marks the interest in media institutions, while 'communication' refers to the communication process.

For Dahl, media history, as separated from communication history, is 'a branch of history dealing with institutions of a particular

type that are distinguished by much more specific purposes than the overall quality of "communication".' The collective 'media' is 'both a structure and a system', an entity composed of single mediums that are tied together in a number of ways (Dahl 1994: 554, 559).

The standpoint is reproduced in Dahl and Henrik G. Bastiansen's *Norsk mediehistorie* (Bastiansen and Dahl 2003): there is press history, film history, radio history, television history (or the two together as broadcasting history), and finally, computer history. But none of these alone are media history proper, because media is a collective concept (and, indeed, grammatically a collective noun, 'the media'). In Bastiansen and Dahl's opinion, media history proper implies a cross medial look into the totality of (mass) mediums, media. There are medium histories, and there is media history.

In the same issue of *Media, Culture & Society*, Paddy Scannell made another kind of distinction, that of empirical and conceptual histories. The basic difference between these was that empirical studies of particular mediums are based on primary sources, while the more synthetic and conceptual media histories rely largely on secondary sources, e.g. previous research. As an example of empirical research Scannell names the five volume history of the BBC by Asa Briggs (1961–1995), and of conceptual research the classic *Empire and Communications* by Harold A. Innis (1950). An example of a joint approach is *A Culture for Democracy* by D. L. LeMahieu (1988), dealing with newspapers, magazines and radio as well as popular literature (Scannell 1994).

Dahl asked whether there should be separate historical research on communication processes and communication contents on the one hand, and on press, radio, television, etc. institutions on the other hand, and Scannell replied that historical research of the media might gain by combining both emphases (Scannell 1994). This is what he did himself in *A Social History of British Broadcasting* (Scannell and Cardiff 1991), based both on primary sources and the works of Asa Briggs.

Dahl and Scannell agree on media history being history, and both recognize that it cannot overlook other disciplines. Scannell puts it more emphatically: 'the study of modern media is essentially interdis-

ciplinary, and requires of its practitioners in any one discipline a more than superficial knowledge of what is going on in cognate fields.'

Marshall McLuhan's *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (1964) was among the first books to combine different forms of communication into 'media'. The title of the (1968) Finnish language edition was translated as '*The New Dimensions of Man*', the word 'media' failing to appear. Even in the preface by a scholar in the history of learning and ideas, 'media' was not discussed, and the original title was translated as 'understanding instruments' (i.e. the Finnish for 'media' apparently unavailable). Thus, in the 1968 edition, McLuhan's slogan 'the medium is the message' was translated as 'the instrument is the message'. In a 2004 article by media studies professor Veikko Pietilä, the Finnish word '*viestin*' or 'instrument of communication' was used for '(communication) medium' (Pietilä 2004: 151). The main reference of 'medium' in the Finnish language had thus transformed during the intervening quarter century from a (general) 'mediating instrument' towards a (particular) instrument of communication.

In his *Communication as Culture*, James Carey (1989: 40–43) describes a meeting in London in the early 1970s. Present were dignitaries from the world of British cultural studies, such as Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall. Williams had remarked that 'the study of communications was deeply and disastrously deformed by being confidently named the study of "mass communication".' Hall had continued that several labels including the word 'communications' had been considered for what finally became Centre for the Study of Contemporary Culture at the University of Birmingham, and that they had done wisely by connecting the Centre to 'contemporary culture' instead of 'communications', let alone 'mass communication'.

For Williams there were three reasons for abolishing the 'disastrous' 'mass communication' from names of departments, research programmes and conferences. First, it limited research into some narrow areas, while there was 'the whole common area of discourse in speech and writing that always needs to be reconsidered'. Second, Williams had said that 'mass' made a reference to 'mass audience' and therefore

stood in the way of analysis of 'specific modern communication situations and of most specific modern communications conventions and forms'. Third, if the audience was regarded as a mass, the only question worth asking was how – if that was happening – did cinema, television or books influence people, or corrupt them?

Carey's interpretation of Hall followed the same lines: the word 'communication' narrows and isolates study in terms of both substance and methodology. In terms of substance, the problem was that if the scope of study were just 'products explicitly produced by and delivered over the mass media', it would isolate the study of communications both from the study of literature and art and from the range of 'expressive and ritual forms of everyday life', spanning from religion to sports. Emphasis on 'culture' would do the contrary: broaden the scope to 'an entire way of life'.

For his own part, Carey (1989: 42–43) stated that it was possible to dismiss the criticism as a misunderstanding, and claim that in many cases the focus had been narrowed for practical reasons. His way of solving the problem was 'to suggest that intellectual work on culture and communications derives from different intellectual puzzles and is grounded in two different metaphors of communications': namely, transmission and sharing.

In Carey's influential ritual model of communication, 'communication' becomes 'culture'. Communication is not about transmitting messages, but creating communities and strengthening their cohesion. The ritual interpretation of communication also helps to get a grasp on communication preceding mass communication 'proper', and seeing communication as culture actually broadens the scope of communications studies in a significant way (Newbold 1995: 329–330).

On the other hand, the main idea of John Durham Peters in his history of the idea of communication is the very failure of communication. The Latin verb '*communicare*' means sharing or making common, but human communication tends to fail to produce genuine dialogue. Instead, Peters attempts to rehabilitate communication as 'dissemination' to unspecified targets. Dialogue, aiming towards

mutual understanding, forces the participant somewhere, but the one-way dissemination leaves the user a choice about what to do with the disseminated.[2] 'Miscommunication is the scandal that motivates the very concept of communication in the first place', Peters (1999: 7) declaims, during a passage (ibid.: 4–10) containing the important observation that 'communication' is (itself, also) a historically late item and that 'media', or mass communication, was necessary for the idea of applying the concept of communication to the past.

Finland: medium histories

In the Finnish context, not only 'media' but also 'media history' is a newcomer. Of course there was some early research that would now be labelled 'media history', but which then was called something else. In Finland, where medium histories were written by historians and the objects were newspapers, it all started as 'press history'.

In 1973, history professor Päiviö Tommila, the most eminent figure in Finnish press history research, held a method course in 'Newspaper History' the lectures for which he worked up into a small book entitled '*Newspaper History and its Research*' (Tommila 1973). Around 1970, he had been finishing the second of his four-volume *History of the Press in Central Finland* (Tommila 1970–1979), and looking back to earlier press studies became cognisant of a history of research in ideas and opinions. Thus did he come to deal with the history of one medium, the newspaper. And thus also did Tommila (1970: 17–18), as Dahl above, take the stand that 'from the perspective of historical research the press is one of the sorts of source materials', and that, therefore, this research was basically an 'investigation into the contents and reliability of one particular historical source material'. The 'reliability' of newspaper contents was central: in the spirit of traditional Rankean source analysis, the precondition of using the press being to unearth historical 'truth'. As it was so extensive, the press had become

a research area of its own, 'which is an honour that only few groups of source material have received', Tommila noted.

Tommila divided research into press to two categories: investigation of the institutional history of the paper (or, writing a newspaper monograph), and studies that ask 'what, how and why the paper has written on some specific issue'. He emphasized, however, that writing a monograph and researching 'opinion history' did not exclude each other, and, indeed, that the final product should include both. Nevertheless, 'investigation into opinions' was the most important part, and a newspaper monograph had to be able to conclude 'how much and what the paper has written about different matters in different times', Tommila prioritized. Consequently, in his early studies on newspaper history, Berelsonian content analysis had a central role, and for the researcher, the most valuable part of the newspaper was the editorial, the institutional site of opinions. In any Finnish university and in any academic discipline, the typical 1960s/1970s thesis using the press was of the formula 'the attitudes of this paper or these papers on this or that matter in a chosen period of time', and the material consisted of editorials (see also Vuorio 2009).

Actually, the collective 'press' did appear in the title of Tommila's *History* (as 'the press in Central Finland'). The volumes are constructed by placing the individual histories of different papers one after another, but as a whole they patently do make a history of 'the press' in the town of Jyväskylä: the contents of different papers have a relationship to one other, the papers compete in the same regional market, and they are parts of the same press system. Thus, when Tommila founded the massive research project *History of the Finnish Press* (SLH) in 1975, it was natural to start using 'press history' instead of 'newspaper history', as the intention was to write the history of an institution, that of the entire Finnish press as a collective system (from the late 18th century to the then present). The change of terminology was facilitated by the fact that the Swedish word for the field was '*presshistoria*', like the English 'press history'. The final result (SLH 1–10, 1984 – 1992), however, was not characterized by a cross media approach, but consisted

of three volumes on 'dailies', a volume on local 'non-dailies', three volumes of reference books on both, and three volumes on the vast flora of magazines and other periodical publications. Other forms of publishing and certainly broadcasting were hardly mentioned.

While research on 'opinions' had still been the main focus in the early 1970s, in the later, big project the press truly emerged as itself, as a social institution. The most important part of that institution, the full service dailies, had such close connections to politics and political parties that the opinion-building approach remained central. But there was a distinct change of emphasis: the explicit analysis of opinion carrying newsprint was given less attention, while the background and basis of opinions came to the fore. The focus was turned on the relations of the newspapers and groups of newspapers to political parties and other background circles.

In the early days of the SLH project it was necessary to define what was meant by press history: 'press history is research into the background and content of a medium and into the position of this medium in the totality of society' (Salokangas 1982: 14). There was one medium (the press), and the implicit knowledge that there are also other media; there was 'background and content', or the understanding that a newspaper exists to produce its content, which, however, does not come about independently of the processes that precede publishing; there is 'position in the totality of society', or the point of departure that a medium interacts with the rest of society. Nevertheless, in the 21st century it is easy to recognize that this approach did not encourage researchers to look across media, but to dig deeper into the one specific medium that was in the focus.

The word 'content' did appear in the 1982 definition of press history (above), yet there was a conscious attempt to distance the focus from a Berelsonian quantitative approach. The emphasis was on 'the background', even if the semi-official 'doctrine' of SLH, illustrated in 'the research scheme for party press' (originally Salokangas 1982: 26, reprinted in Tommila 1988: 498), included also 'readers' – albeit as just one, and by no means prominent, relation among many, and

in the research the party affiliation of the readers was emphasized more than their readership. The question 'what does the reader do with media?' did not seem interesting for a historian in around 1980, and remained only latent: there was a mention of the 'interaction of sender and receiver by means of a medium in a certain environment' (Salokangas 1982: 27), but little more.

In the 1980s in Finland, what now is called 'media history' was in the hands of historians. 'Bringing history into media studies' was topical even then, but not under the label of media history; expressions like 'information studies' and 'historical mass communication research' were used. Terhi Rantanen, a media historian grounded in media studies (i.e. not history), wrote that from the early 1960s, historical research within media studies had been pushed aside by Anglo-American content analysis in media studies departments, as the social scientists now regarded the former as 'unscientific' storytelling. Historical research of (the) media prevailed only at certain history departments, mainly under the umbrella of the SLH project. Rantanen also pointed out that even the Marxism of 1970s and 1980s had a negative attitude towards historical research, and that still in 1996 the role of history in media studies was too small (Rantanen 1996, Salokangas 2005: 485–487).[3]

In the Nordic countries generally, the concept 'media history' first became popular during the first half of the 1990s. In articles of a thematic publication of the Norwegian Society of Media Researchers, it was used already in 1990 (Myrstad and Rasmussen 1990), although it did not appear in the title of the history group of the biannual Nordic conference for mass communication research until as late as 1999 (when the title changed from '*Historisk massmedieforskning*' or '*Historisk medieforskning*').

In a seminar arranged in 1995 at the University of Helsinki on history writing of 'medias', at least one of the speeches had 'media history' in its title. Not a year earlier, an issue of the journal *Tiedotustutkimus* [appr. 'Mass Communication Research'] had concentrated on historiography of the field and the term failed to appear, but a history

issue in 1996 referred to a recent 'media history and historiography group' at the University of Helsinki, and the term appeared in several articles. It was introduced into Finnish especially through writings of Paddy Scannell. In 1996, when a Nordic seminar was being planned and arranged at the University of Jyväskylä, it was self-evident that 'media history' should be used as the label (Tiedotustutkimus 1/1995: 59 and 1/1996: 2, Salokangas, Schwoch and Virtapohja 1997).

In one and a half decades the situation appears to have changed, about face, in fact: research on media history has gained ground in media/communications/journalism departments at different universities in Finland and the Nordic region generally, while within history departments, research on media is only sporadic. For press history, this has been documented in Kaija Vuorio's (2009) doctoral dissertation.

Towards a cultural history of media and communication

In the first section of this piece, points made by Williams, Hall, Carey and Peters were exploited in discussing the temporal and thematic scope of 'media history'. Over the years, the practical decisions of different Nordic scholars and research projects in respect of this have varied. In the Danish *Dansk mediehistorie* (1996), for example, Klaus Bruhn Jensen presents by way of introduction five 'waves' of media history, starting from oral culture, but the chapter on prehistory of the media deals only with printed matter. The Danish project decided that it was only 'the breakthrough of the modern' around 1840 that signified the change from prehistory of the media to the commencement of its actual history. In the Norwegian *Norsk mediehistorie* (2003), Hans Fredrik Dahl and Henrik G. Bastiansen take their starting point as the country's first newsletter, in 1660, but write only briefly about communication before the era of the printing press.

The periodisation of Bastiansen and Dahl is consistent with the previous positions of Dahl. In 1994 he made a distinction between

communication history and media history, and repeated the standpoint in his speech in the Nordic conference of 2001, and once more in his guide to research in media history (2004). In 2001 he said:

> To me, the object of our scientific interest should be the media as institutions. Not institutions defined as companies and firms, certainly, but as social institutions – arenas where roles and modes of activities develop through the mechanism of repetition into growing professionalism. Communication itself is a much less substantial, much more elusive object of study, according to my experience. (Dahl 2002: 83.)

In the same session Klaus Bruhn Jensen entitled his speech 'From media history to communication history', and I 'Media history becomes communication history – or cultural history?'(Jensen 2002, Salokangas 2002); the approach was different from Dahl's.

The conference session was motivated by the fact that in the Nordic countries, many medium history projects had been finished or were in their final phases. What next, Jensen asked, and answered that there was no point in writing the next round of 'media history', but that we should start writing 'communication history', and do it taking advantage of multidisciplinary, broad-scoped cultural studies. He noticed that with the advent of computer-based communication which covers the entire media environment, communication research has made a full circle and returned to the similarities and differences of mass communication and interpersonal communication, mediated and non-mediated communication.

In Jensen's well known chronological-thematic model of three degrees of the media, the first degree refers to non-mediated communication, the second to traditional media from print to broadcasting, and the third to 'the digitally processed forms of representation and interaction which reproduce and recombine all previous media on a single platform' (Jensen 2002: 97). More recently, Jensen (2010) has created an entire book on the division of three degrees – and suggested

a fourth, based on 'ubiquitous computing' integrated into everyday life. In the spirit of the third degree, he rephrases McLuhan's 'the medium is the message' with the statement that 'the message of digital media is all previous media, and then some' (Jensen 2010: 84).

For Jensen (2002: 98), the computer promoted a rethinking of concepts, not only those of the present media environment but also those of cultural history. He pointed out that it was important to return to sources of both media history and communication history and cultural history, and pay special attention to how different eras are characterized by current media technologies. His message was that 'media and communication research is poised to take a central role in a redefinition of the study of communication and culture', and that 'we will have [to] move definitely beyond media history, to communication history, in order to produce a record of how diverse communicative practices accumulate as culture' (Jensen 2002: 98). In his book on media convergence, Jensen (2010) then takes a look at the history of media and communication from the perspective of the digital, computerized and mobile era.

In the same session in Reykjavik, Monica Djerf-Pierre (2002) suggested that the next round could be comparative media history within the Nordic area to complement the national media histories intended for domestic consumption. Ib Bondebjerg (2002) had read the recent Nordic broadcasting histories and compared their approaches. Bondebjerg preferred medium histories that connect to culture and everyday life, rather than basic studies focusing on institutional (political) media history. Admittedly, Scandinavian media history research had 'taken a giant leap', but there was still plenty to be done: more foundational research on individual media; integrative media history focusing on the non-institutional; comparative global studies (Bondebjerg 2002: 72, 77).

Classics meet the present

Support for the thematic and temporal expansion of media history can be found in the classic work by Harold A. Innis. Painting on a large canvass, *Empire and Communications* starts in ancient Egypt and Babylonia, progresses through the oral tradition of ancient Greece to the written culture of the Roman Empire, to parchment, paper, and finally the printing press. In the foreword of the 1986 edition David Godfrey (1986: vii–xiv) compares Innis to a modern novelist: he invites the reader to participate, he may be wrong, he admits his fallibility, but continues to gather dynamic 'facts', sorts out this information to resemble knowledge, is bemused by details and theories, plays with them but yet tries to keep all the balls in the air at the same time.

For Innis, Godfrey emphasizes, societies are dynamic structures cultivated over time in tension and interaction with a variety of forces. Innis arranges these forces into meta forces in order to better grasp their marks in history. He also continuously pays attention to the contrast between oral and written, and its impact on societies. For Innis, oral represented democracy, the spiritual and the human, while the making of empires required, in addition to violence, written culture. Innis sees empires as evidence of efficient communication and notes that in empires one culture always dominates over the others and forces its own values on them. The relationship between time and space is important for Innis. First the empires conquer space by means of military power, and then they conquer time by means of religion. In the latter phase, which involves conquering people's minds, the role of communication is particularly important. However, communication is not the 'reason' for dynamic processes, but one of the influencing factors.

Another of Innis' widely-known students (along with the more famous McLuhan), Walter J. Ong (1982) emphasised the different mentalities of oral and written culture, and how they produce different societies. Significant for Ong is the notion that cultures exist side by side and within each other: oral culture did not disappear when people learned to write, or when they printed the writing on paper using a

machine. The emphasis changes, but old forms of communication culture persist and adjust to become part of the new situation. Also, just as Williams and Hall above, Ong was of the opinion that the concentration just on media overlooks the idea of interaction – that communication between people, mediated or otherwise, cannot exist without some degree of mutual understanding.

But the one that really hit the bull's eye was McLuhan with his visions of the global village created by electronic culture. The triumph of Anglo-American popular culture (film, television, popular music) was one phase, communication satellites an accelerator, and finally the Internet has completed the development. What seems to have transpired with what has been labelled 'social media', however, is the global village exploding into bits and pieces, fragmenting into innumerable hamlets of the likeminded, and with rather few connections; and although for McLuhan the global village was never uniform but consisted of tribes and dialects, the present situation is probably far more than even he actually envisioned. Here though, from the perspective of this article, the primary thing about McLuhan is the broadness of his concept: electronic *culture*, not just electronic *media*.

The wordings differ, but not uncommonly there seems to be a quest for media and communication history as a perspective on (cultural) history in general. That means bringing history into media and communication studies and media and communication into history, as well as a broader role for media and communication studies. There is, however, no consensus on quite how to do it. Defending 'institutional' media history, one may say that there is an obvious marching order: basic research on the object itself first, then its relation to the rest of the world. But there is also the more impatient approach: jumping directly into the said relationship. This resembles the classic divide: is the focus on 'the sender' (institution) or on 'the content' (texts, programmes) and 'reception' (audiences), or can there be a balance between them.

In 2001 Jensen (2002: 98) concluded his speech in Reykjavik by noting that there would presumably be a Nordic research conference

in Iceland in 2021, and suggested that there be ‘a session taking stock of *communication* history’. Now, in the halfway station to that session, it seems that much is still undone. There are individual studies in different countries that can be characterized as cultural history of the media, or even communication history, so the emphasis has been changing to some extent – but still there is no large scale comparative Nordic media history, for instance, and more integrative national media histories remain unwritten.

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Endnotes

1. Similar concerns, of course, beset the non-natural, or 'social' sciences during their (latter nineteenth century) development, and within them similarly betwixt-and-between 'orphans', such as anthropology.
2. The duality of genuine dialogue and one-way dissemination is not actually in conflict with the original Latin, it may be noted, insofar as dissemination does make something common.
3. Actually the Marxism of that period did show some interest towards historical research, and Rantanen's remark might be best interpreted as a collision of approaches: The problem with Marxist research was that it often merely used historical material to prove the great man's theories, while historians proper were supposed to do the contrary: analyse the material and build up their own 'theories' (research results) of what the object of study was about.

II

INTERMEDIALITY IN DISCOURSES ABOUT MEDIA CHANGE

TAISTO HUJANEN

5. The Discursive Transformation of Television and the Paradox of Audiovisualisation

Introduction

This essay is about the discursive transformation of television and consequent identity of television as a medium. The intention is not to search for the essence of television in terms of its medium theory, but rather to demonstrate and analyse the variety and status of the numerous discourses about television. Basically, these can be divided into two main categories: one group of discourses focuses on the specific features of television as a medium, while the other constructs television more contextually as a part of some broader structure or institution. The search for the specific in style, 'What is television?' or 'This is television' was typical during the introductory phase of television, as the medium sought its identity as a new form of broadcasting. But this became and remains incorporated in television's professional and managerial discourses and practices, assumed as a taken-for-granted dimension of our everyday understanding of television and of what in the 1980's was identified as 'television culture'.

Broadcasting as the historical combination of radio and television is one of the main contextual discourses about television. It is the discourse which connects the institutionalization of television with that of radio broadcasting, and in this sense it represents a basically intermedial approach to television. As the Finnish radio and television theorist Helge Miettunen points out in his classic work (1966: 63), technologically television is a form of radio, a signification which is strengthened by television's institutional linking with radio broadcasting. In Miettunen's interpretation, television was a visual radio which was as much based on talk, music and noise as on display and vision (op. cit.: 64). As the later research has shown (Silvo 1988, Kortti 2007), the notion of visual radio corresponded to the professional and public understanding of early television.

Broadcasting represents an aspect in the signification of television which Raymond Williams in his classic work (1974) on television calls a 'cultural form'. His emphasis on the combination of technology and cultural form is beautifully expressed in a summary view of broadcast television formulated by Elihu Katz (2009: 7) in his introduction to a recent book discussing the forecasted end of television (Katz and Scannell 2009). According to Katz, 'classic TV' may be said to have been (1) a technology providing several audiovisual channels of over-the-air broadcasting, (2) publicly regulated as a near-monopoly operated by highly trained professionals, (3) charged 'to inform, educate, and entertain', and (4) characterized by national audiences dispersed in their homes.

The problem with this kind of universal definition of broadcast television is that it neglects the important cultural differences in the institutionalization of broadcasting. As Williams noted in his comparison (op. cit.) of the American commercial television and the European public service tradition, these two models of television were clearly distinct in values and programming traditions. According to Lunt (2009: 132), the ideals of social purpose have been the cornerstone of the traditional European public service, demonstrated by dissemination of knowledge to a mass audience through quality

programming with the purpose of social cohesion (cf. Hujanen and Lowe 2003: 20–21). Clearly this was never the case with American commercial television, for which the third of Katz's four points is thus invalidated – and the stipulation of regulation as monopoly means the second fairs no better.

The development of national audiences confirmed television's position as the dominant broadcast medium and created the basis for what was later identified as television culture. Television dominated the discourses about and became the symbol of broadcasting. Newspaper critique and reporting on radio and television presents impressive evidence on how drastic this change of discursive hierarchy was (Hujanen and Weibull 2010). In Finland and other Nordic countries in the late 1950s, television was a short appendix or curiosity in radio critique. Within ten years, towards the end of 1960s, radio pages turned to television pages, and radio became an appendix to the review of television.[1]

To sum up, one can say that at first the tradition of broadcasting dominated the understanding of television, but later on television started dominating the signification of broadcasting. Historically, it is important to notice that the later technological innovations of television in the form of cable, satellite and video were not, any more, incorporated in the discourse about broadcasting. The change of discourse is demonstrated by the new title of the leading journal of broadcasting research, the former *Journal of Broadcasting*, which added the notion of electronic media to its identification in 1985 (cf. Schafer Gross 2010). 'Narrowcasting' is another signification of the same transformation and, as the name suggests, it is at least in a dialogical relationship with broadcasting. Such a dialogue between broadcasting and narrowcasting continues in the context of digitalisation, as Hirst and Harrison (2007) demonstrate in their book about communication and new media. Holmes (2005) is an example of recent analyses that combine newspaper press with radio and television in the same discourse about broadcasting.

About the paradox of audiovisualisation and the academic discourses on television

As the title of this article indicates, the discursive transformation of television is characterized here in terms of the 'paradox of audiovisualisation'. Thinking of television as a combination of sound and vision, it might appear odd to speak about audiovisualisation of television. As a technology, television has always been a part of what is a 'discourse on audiovisuality', or, of a field which Ellis (2000: 178) identifies as 'the audiovisual'. However, audiovisuality has not always been a central dimension in public discourses and signification of broadcast television (as suggested by the above consideration of broadcasting). It was 'broadcasting' that headed the discursive hierarchy of television until the 1980's, when the new (cable, satellite, etc.) technologies and the parallel de- and re-regulation of media markets began to challenge the dominance of broadcast television. In other words, when speaking about the paradox of audiovisualisation, the point is to say that in the course of the 1980s the former discursive hierarchy about television started to collapse, and television became dominantly signified in terms of audiovisuality and the audiovisual. That is the kind of discursive transformation which is analysed and discussed here, and positioned in relation to other discourses on television.

In the academic scholarship the dominant mass communication research including broadcasting research did not pay any particular attention to the audiovisuality of television (e.g. Dominick and Fletcher 1985), so the academic interest in audiovisuality grew mainly from the humanities. The above mentioned Finnish radio and television theorist Helge Miettunen ended up describing television's form of expression as 'audiovisual'. Television uses both sound and image as its means of expression, its composition is both auditive, based on hearing, and visual, appealing to sight (Miettunen 1966: 64). Miettunen's interest in audiovisual expression came from his academic background in aesthetics and film theory. Unlike the typical discourse on broadcasting, he approached television, and to some extent even radio, as a form of art.

The interest in television as audiovisual expression was shared by other film scholars who later contributed to the discussion on televisual discourse in the circles of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham and of the British film journal Screen. Heath and Skirrow (1977) in particular were critical in the move towards dealing with television as language, in the style of semiotics of television. In their analysis of current affairs programming, the emphasis moved to the practices of production and representation that contributed to the ideological effect of televisual discourse, television as a window to the world. One of the main followers of this tradition has been John Ellis, whose book *Visible Fictions* (1982) concentrated on comparisons between television and film, which he considered not only divergent and complementary but increasingly interdependent. The book incorporated a semiotics of sound and image, but methodologically it represented a move from language to the textuality of television in terms of narrative structures and the psycho-semiotic constitution of the spectatorship, the viewer position (cf. Steinbock 1983, as a Finnish example).

Issues around the textuality of television change to a demonstration of intertextuality and polysemy of television in John Fiske's classic *Television Culture* (1987). This work represents a culmination of optimism about television with its view of a television culture unrestricted to television alone but symbolized more broadly with the circulation of popular meanings in the so called 'post-modern' society. It represented television as a medium whose codes and conventions were widely shared by media-literate audiences and whose producers and practitioners were highly conscious of its style and generic requirements. The post-modern image of television was playful and hybrid. Television had become everyday and was not considered such a serious issue as before. Through de- and re-regulation, the formal political and cultural control over television loosened, leading to an increased consumer orientation that shifted more power to audiences (for a review of post-modernism, see Harvey 1990). The highly trained professionals who operated television (see Katz's definition of broadcast

television, above) did not lose their power, but they were forced to become more attentive to their audiences.

Television studies as an academic field represents another dimension of cultural optimism about television parallel to Fiske's discussion on television culture. Developing under the notion of media studies, which in practice developed as the study of television, a lot of academic critique on television, including Fiske's book, looked at the medium without paying very much attention to the academic institutionalization of the field (see, for example, Newcomb 1976, Allen 1987, Goodwin and Whannel 1990, Vande Berg et al. 1998, Corner 1999). However, as *The Television Studies Book* edited by Geraghty and Lusted (1998) shows, a constituency of scholars and students in the field did develop over the course of time which began to ponder an independent identity for the field.

A recent example of the continuing discussion about television studies is Toby Miller's (2010) fresh text book. Like many other recent analyses, the book ends up by considering the numerous new forms of television which make it complicated to agree on a continuing identity for the medium (cf. Allen 2004, Katz 2009). The question is whether the new forms can be seen to represent television after television (Spigel and Olsson 2004) or whether they constitute a re-born television. Towards the end of the 1990s, it became impossible to speak about television without a reference to the Internet, as Miller (op. cit.: 177) points out in his story about the launch of an academic journal on television studies which the publisher wanted to market as '*Television & New Media*'.

Methodologically, television studies and media studies in general represented the critique of the information and social science orientation of mass communication research, including broadcasting research. Their emphasis on culture and intertextuality encouraged scholars and students to question the values and norms of broadcasting institutionalized in dichotomies like information vs. entertainment, serious vs. popular, masculine vs. feminine. This intertextuality, as Urrichio (2004: 26–30) concludes (in relation to film studies) enabled an ap-

preciation of the popular circulation of meanings and texts, and (thus) the perspective of an intermedial construction of media identities. This contributed to the growing awareness of the historicity of media forms and to their consideration as media history.

Where broadcasting research developed and institutionalized in a close connection with the managerial and professional practices of broadcasting (Hujanen 1997), television studies aimed at a broader social and cultural analysis of television. One of the consequences of this change of perspective was that the interest in television as such decreased, and the emphasis moved to a consideration of television as an aspect of a broader media culture and of the history of mediation. In this way, paradoxically, television studies contributed to the marginalization of television and the gradual loss of its hegemonic position in the study of broadcasting. So, although television studies were born in the wake of television's cultural dominance, in the high time of television culture, it became later a part of the discourse on television's marginalization. This is the point of interconnection where the discourses of television studies and audiovisualisation meet. That encounter is further considered below, as I concentrate on positioning audiovisualisation and the 1980 transformation of television.

Contrasting old and new television

According to the Finnish sociologist Heikki Kerkelä (2004), social change is typically framed in terms of a transition from old to new society. A lot of social theory is about the transition from traditional to modern society, Emile Durkheim's work being a classic example. Kerkelä characterizes these kinds of conceptualisations as transition models consisting of 1) a hypothesis about clear demarcation lines between periods of social change, 2) a comparison of these periods, and 3) bipolar conceptualizations to identify the differences between periods. The study and analysis of media change is similarly rich in

transition models which concern a periodisation of media development and/or create a dichotomic contrast between periods, especially between present and past media (as in the discourse about digitalisation). Media theory in the style of Marshall McLuhan's (1964) analysis of oral, literary and electronic cultures is an example of a long-term transition model. A more dichotomic view of transitions is offered by recent visions of media convergence which Jenkins (2006) characterizes as 'convergence talk' and Holmes (2005) as 'new media discourse'.

In the conceptualisation of the 1980s structural changes of European television, it was typical to construct the transformation as a dichotomic contrast between the old national television and the new de-centralised, audience and consumption oriented television. One of the most influential dichotomies was Umberto Eco's distinction between the old and the new as paleo television vs. neo-TV (Eco 1984a and b). Eco's text was soon published in Finnish (in 1985), leading to Hellman's (1988) book about the era of neo-television, (employing '*uustelevisio*' for 'neo television') – and whose undermining question mark appended to neo television era title suggested, in fact, important continuities between the old and new television.

One of the classic figures of Finnish sociology, Erik Allardt, refers to Eco's idea of paleo television in an article discussing the relationship between broadcasting and forms of society (Allardt 1989).[2] Allardt related paleo television to the constitution of industrial society and its need for a common culture (op. cit.: 192–194): the introduction of television in the 1950s and its quick diffusion during the 1960s represented the same centralizing process. But already in the 1970s, internationalization and increased cultural pluralism had started challenging the common culture, a transition Allardt identified in terms of socio-cultural change as the constitution of an 'information-technological society', and which served to characterise the new values and norms of the 1980s. As to television, Allardt concluded that hardly anything symbolised the new society better than the plurality and ambivalence that people expressed in their relationship with television (op. cit.: 197).

Allardt's contextualisation of paleo television and its collapse in the 1980s with deregulation and the consequent privatisation and commercialisation represents the typical Western European siting for the first loosening and breaking of centralised public service broadcasting. It is important to remember that similar a construction of distinctions between the eras of broadcasting and narrowcasting made the 1980s a symbol of new television also in the United States, despite its fundamentally different history of radio and television. The old television was there symbolized by national networks (network television) which encountered increasing competition from cable and satellite television. In contrast to Allardt's sociological emphasis on social change, it was the cultural contrast between modern and post-modern that characterises analyses of the 1980 American television (see, for example, Feuer 1995). As demonstrated above in relation to John Fiske's notion of television culture, the cultural transition from modern to post-modern was important also in the constitution of television studies more generally.

As the overview sketched here suggests, these changes might equally well be characterised in terms of economics (in the case of Europe) and technology (for the USA) – or, the economic and technological might be equally emphasised with the social in fashioning the idea of 'cultural' (and its aesthetic). Thus Caldwell (1995) characterises the value transformation of American television in the 1980's as televisuality which, on the level of production, was grounded on a practice he characterised as a 'post-production culture', fuelled by continuous technological innovation. The new technology behind this transformation was the computerization of production which contributed to a new televisual aesthetics based on copying and versioning. An interesting consequence of this digital aesthetics was that, through computer programming, it increased the standard and (thus) audience credibility of low-cost productions – and thereby contributing, for example, to the success of local news channels. In this way, televisuality contributed to the assault on the dominant position of network television.

What makes Caldwell's analysis of televisuality particularly useful for my positioning of audiovisualisation is his overall approach in combining the aesthetics and technology of television with an analysis of production cultures and practices as well as the economy of production. The development of televisuality required a new combination of competencies which Caldwell identifies as an alliance of aestheticians and engineers, symbolizing the move from the contents to aesthetics of television. One may conclude that this combination of competencies remained relevant in the later digitalisation of television, complemented by informatics and market-oriented managerism. The economic rationality of televisuality was grounded on the need to reduce the costs of production in a situation which combined a continuous growth of output with stagnated budgets for production.

Although televisuality offered a solution to the credibility of low-cost programming, it was not enough to guarantee the visibility of programming in the increasingly competitive market. That is why, according to Caldwell, a clear division between low-cost programming and boutique programming developed. The latter category was important in the branding of channels and production companies. In boutique programming, the traditional industrial authority of commercial television was re-negotiated for the purposes of branding, and the identity of individual producers, writers, and actors received renewed relevance. Overall, the need for marketing competencies in the management of television increased, including customisation and individualisation in audience orientation. The lowest common denominator programming for mass audiences based on the principle of least objectionable programming (LOP) was replaced by a more targeted orientation which tailored programming with an emphasis on plurality of tastes and life styles (cf. Ytreberg 2002). All this fits well with the development that Allardt connected to, or envisioned as the constitution of information-technological society (above).

However, when trying to understand a similar change in Finnish television in the 1980s and early 90s, I prefer to speak of the *audiovisualisation* of television and media culture in general than to stick to

Caldwell's notion of televisuality. This is not to say that televisuality is not relevant in the context of Finnish or European television. It certainly became relevant, for example, through the imported American programming. And as an aesthetics, televisuality was connected with a number of changes in programming and production practices as well as in television economy that date back to the 1980s. But it was still not that relevant then, or even in the early 1990s.

My argument is that in Finland – as in other European countries, although not necessarily to the same extent – televisuality is first of all a feature of digital television rather than the old analog context. Essentially, in the pre-digital 1980s the commercialisation and industrialisation of television were new phenomena in the European context, whereas in the United States televisuality represented re-negotiation of values and norms of a long established commercial system; or, where the commercial-industrial systems and values were in place and even well-ensconced in Europe, still the state-sponsored cultural aesthetic played the dominant role in determining the broadcasting landscape.[3]

There is also an important difference of research interest between my identification of audiovisualisation and Caldwell's discussion on televisuality. Caldwell's view can be understood as a theory of changes in American television. In contrast with this type of overall theory, my focus is on tracing the variety of *discourses* on television and considering the changes in their (discursive) hierarchy. So my point about audiovisualisation is that during the course of the 1980s it started dominating the signification of television (in Finland, at least) and, accordingly, affected the public image of television and the construction of its identity.

The above change of discourses is effectively demonstrated by the creation of several Finnish university programmes in audiovisual culture and the turn to audiovisual policy in the regulation of television; the latter an impact of the EU's audiovisual policy as symbolised by the Television Without Frontiers directive from 1989. In her analysis of European media policy and governance, Michalis (2007) links the 1980s on the one hand to the introduction of industrial policy and,

on the other, to liberalisation and re-regulation. In Finland, the notion and development of the audiovisual field became a central dimension of a task force (the *Viestintäkulttuuritoimikunta*) which the Ministry of Education set up to investigate the structures and funding of audiovisual production and education and training for the field. During the years 1987–1991, the group produced six reports in total, one of them including a proposal for a national audiovisual archive (which was eventually implemented, in the new millennium).

In the context of broadcasting history, audiovisualisation constructed a strong contrast between the informational, content-oriented television of the late 1960s and 70s, and the new television with its emphasis on subjective experience and aesthetic values, reminiscent of Caldwell's description of televisuality. In an analysis of the interrelationships between politicians and journalists, Aula (1991) noted that the political identification of broadcast journalists diminished in the 1980s, and that their new orientation emphasised a professional independence from politics. Similar distancing from the political past is strongly demonstrated by my own data from the early 1990s on current affairs producers and journalists in the Finnish Broadcasting Company, YLE (Hujanen 2007). Instead of political balance and the abstract idea of truth, these professionals now emphasised personal responsibility for their work in orientation towards audiences.

Structurally an important reform in Finnish television was the introduction in 1987 of the first totally commercial television network (*Kolmostelevisio*, translated to 'TV3'); before that, the only commercial operator acted as a programming company inside the two networks of public service television (YLE).[4] The new television network had no in-house production facilities, which was supposed to encourage the creation of a sector for independent production (Soramäki 2007). This trend was strengthened in the 1990s, as the oldest commercial operator, since named MTV3, outsourced its entertainment production; and through introduction of new commercial operators as well as the launch of producer choice inside public service television (Hujanen 2002 and 2004).

To summarise, not only did the audience orientation to television change in the 1980s, as demonstrated by Allardt's reference to pluralism and ambivalence (above), but also important structural changes in television acted to take the medium in the same direction. As in Europe generally, the 1980s witnessed the introduction of an industrial approach to media production and policy as well as liberalisation and re-regulation of structures of broadcasting and the audiovisual field (as described).

In the next section, I move on to positioning the audiovisualisation of television as part of a major discursive formation which the German film scholar Siegfried Zielinski (1999) identifies as 'audiovisual discourse'. Cinema and television represent the dominant media in the constitution of that discourse, but as a historical continuity the discourse on audiovisuality dates back to much earlier efforts to produce illusions of motion in space and time. After this historical positioning of audiovisuality, I concentrate on making conclusions about the consequences of audiovisualisation as a dominant discourse on television, and how it relates to the latest major discourse about this medium, digitalisation.

Television in the discourse on audiovisuality

The historical constitution of audiovisuality is the theme of the 1989 work by the German media theorist Siegfried Zielinski published in English ten years later (1999) as *Audiovisions: cinema and television as entr'actes in history*. As the title suggests, audiovisual mediations like cinema and television are considered as intermissions in the longer continuum of audiovisuality, a reference to changing hierarchies of the discourse. The audiovisual discourse is characterized by Zielinski as follows:

> In a condensed form and without evoking the intellectual ancestors that have all shared in influencing it, my conceptual starting point is: over the past hundred and fifty years, in the history of industrially advanced countries, a specialised, tending to become ever more standardised, institutionalised area of expression and activity has become established. I call it *the audiovisual discourse*. It encompasses the entire range of praxes in which, with the aid of technical systems and artefacts, the illusion of the perception of movements – as a rule, accompanied by sound – is planned, produced, commented on, and appreciated. (Zielinski 1999: 18, emphasis added)

One should not confuse Zielinski's notion of audiovisual discourse with the discussion on languages of audiovisual expression, the semiotics of film and television, or the later debate on the textuality of television as televisual discourse (see the paragraph on academic discourses, above). The point here is that audiovisual discourse is a specialised, an ever more standardised, institutionalised area of expression and activity through which individuals and their collectives make sense of the audiovisual. According to Zielinski, this special discourse is both embedded in and defined by the superordinate process of an ongoing attempt at culture-industrial modelling[5] and subjugation of subjects – those who are (supposed) to use the artefacts and the messages appropriated by these. Which is to say that if one considers audiovisuality as a changing hierarchy of discourses in time and space, the culture-industrial dimension remains the driving force of the process.

In the historically different arrangements, writes Zielinski, the audiovisual overlaps with other specialist discourses and partial praxes of society, such as architecture, transport, science and technology, organisation of work and time, traditional plebeian and bourgeois culture, or the avant-garde. The particular constellations that arise in this way under the hegemony of the culture industry, structure the process historically. According to Zielinski, four different arrangements, each possessing the characteristic features of a dispositif[6], can be distinguished in the history of the audiovisual thus far. The first

category is identified as early audiovisions, the second is the cinema and the third television; the fourth arrangement is that of 'advanced audiovision' which Zielinski characterises as a complex construction kit of machines, storage devices and programmes for the reproduction, simulation and blending of what can be seen and heard, where the trend is toward their capacity to be connected together in a network (op. cit.: 19). This last category connects Zielinski's view of the audiovisual with the process considered below as 'digitalisation'.

These four arrangements, warns Zielinski, should not be reconstructed chronologically; in history they interlock, overlap and periodically attract and repel each other. To understand them as historically distinguishable dispositifs means, according to Zielinski, first and foremost, to characterise the socio- and techno-culturally dominant arrangement of a particular time and, at the same time, to bring out the social and private relations that have led to this type of hegemony, including how it came to establish itself (op. cit.: 19–20). This is the idea behind the title of Zielinski's book, the characterisation of cinema and television *as entr'actes* (intermissions) in history – both arrangements, cinema and television, had their golden period as the dominant discourse of the audiovisual. For cinema that was between the world wars, and for television in the 1960s and 70s.

If one agrees with Zielinki's argument about the change of television's position in the discursive hierarchy of audiovisual discourse, one can say that by the 1980s television had lost its hegemonic role in the construction of the audiovisual. One might conclude in relation to the earlier discussion on the contrast between paleo television and new television that in the era of nationally broadcast television it was this that dominated the discourse on audiovisuality. In addition, because of its dominance in the discursive hierarchy, it also had considerable power to define its own signification. When reviewing the postmodern discourses on television (above), I have noted how the emphasis on the intertextuality of television contributed to a marginalization of the specific in the context of new television of the 1980s. The increasingly hybrid nature of television as a medium of

popular culture caused people to experience it less as a medium itself and more as a forum for sharing and consuming popular pleasures and expressing identities.

The above kind of image of television as a playful and hybrid forum of popular culture fits well with the transformation that I characterise as the audiovisualisation of television. The point is that television is considered less as a medium itself and increasingly in terms of and in relationship to something else. That something else in my interpretation is the audiovisual, or what Zielinski constructs as audiovisual discourse. With reference to Zielinski's articulation of audiovisual discourse, my point is to argue that through the process of audiovisualisation television started loosing its dominance in the construction of the audiovisual and, parallel to that, audiovisual discourse more generally started to dominate the signification of television. Or, to put it in another way: *audiovisualisation started constructing television more in the context of the general audiovisual discourse than in terms of its own specificity*. This conclusion opens up an interesting paradox in the history of television. As soon as the medium and its users became aware of its nature and character as a medium, it started loosing its hegemony and the control over its own meanings through audiovisualisation, or through hybridisation and popularisation as represented in the idea of post-modern television.

In the context of the present book and its focus on intermediality, one of the important consequences of audiovisualisation is that it increases the relevance of intermedial references in the construction of television. John Ellis' book on visible fictions, discussed above, is an illuminating example of this. With reference to Urrichio's (2004: 31) description of media evolution, one could say that these kinds of intermedial redefinitions of media are typical in times of transition and turbulence. As Ellis' book demonstrates, audiovisualisation constructed television through its interrelationships with other audiovisual media, first of all cinema, secondarily video. But through culture-industrialization, television became integrated in the broader construction of

the audiovisual field and electronic media. Overall, that is the most important and long lasting consequence of audiovisualisation.

As to television as a cultural industry, the most relevant aspect of Zielinski's argument is the way he links the history of audiovisual discourse with what he calls 'the superordinate process of an ongoing attempt at culture-industrial modelling and subjugation of the subjects.' Such a culture-industrial modelling and subjugation is, as Zielinski interprets it, the driving force in the historical constitution of audiovisuality. Although it connects all dispositifs of the audiovisual, it has been less relevant in the constitution of television than of cinema. As Zielinski (op. cit.: 19) points out, the culture-industrial element came to dominate cinema from the beginning. Television, on the other hand, became institutionalized as a broadcast flow, less affected by culture-industrialisation. So, as indicated in relation to the introduction of television (above), for a long time broadcasting dominated the discourse about television.

The marginalization of broadcast television and the loss of its cultural dominance changed television's position in the discursive hierarchy of audiovisuality. My interpretation of the consequences of this change is that television was now less defined as television and more as an aspect of the audiovisual. That is the historical condition which opens up television, as an *institutionalised area of expression and activity*, for increased and intensified *culture-industrial modelling and subjugation*. In other words, the subjectivities typical of broadcasting are altered to more culture-industrial identifications. In the literature on broadcasting, this transformation is most often described as a move from citizenship to consumer orientation (Scannell 1989, Dahlgren 1995, Tracey 1998). In the context of European broadcasting history, this means that the identity of public service television as a social and cultural institution of enlightenment and citizenship is weakened, and is challenged by the discourse on television as a cultural industry.

Audiovisualisation and digitalisation as phases in television's cultural industrialisation

Following Zielinski's model, one could conclude that culture-industrialisation as the driving force of audiovisual discourse connects the transformation of television with the latest discursive formation of the model, named 'advanced audiovision'. This is the least developed but at the same time most visionary section of Zielinski's analysis, because at the time of his writing computerisation and the consequent networking of media and communication were still rather new phenomena. As mentioned in relation to Miller's new text book on television studies (above), by the end of the 1990s it seemed impossible to speak about television without a reference to the so-called new media (cf. Gunter 2010). 'Television and the Internet' is the characterisation which Gripsrud (2010: 87–89) uses as a label for this development, which he identifies as the fourth phase of television. With reference to my analysis of audiovisualisation, it is worth of noting that Gripsrud characterises the 1980s and 90s as two decades of 'commercialism and diversification'.

In more policy-oriented analyses of television, the recent change in the medium is discussed in terms of digitalisation (Papathanassopoulos 2002, Brown and Picard 2005; cf. Søndergaard 1998, Jääsaari 2007). As a discursive formation, digitalisation and digital television refer, first of all, to the digitalisation of television's distribution networks and the consequent changes in reception. As demonstrated earlier with reference to Caldwell's discussion on televisuality, the digitalisation of production had had an impact in the form of computerization of production in the1980s. As the earlier cited book by Katz and Scannel (2009) demonstrates, the academic discourse on television and the Internet has often led to pessimism in respect of television's future. Against this, the early visions of digital television especially had represented optimism about the future of television as a kind of the multimedia centre of individual homes (Kangaspunta 2006: 15–36). Reminiscent of television's former cultural dominance, television was

supposed to lead the development towards the new Information Super Highway.

The crisis of broadcasting economy created by the equation of continuously growing content supply and stagnated funding is one of the main reasons why broadcasters have been forced to look for solutions to increased cost-effectiveness (cf. Caldwell's analysis of televisuality above). That was a promise which made digitalisation an urgent issue for public service broadcasters in particular. Naturally, a part of the promise was that if taking a leading role in this transformation, the PSB organisations would be guaranteed a major role in the constitution of the new information society. That is the background to why many European governments and broadcasters were eager to start digitalising even their terrestrial networks, even though the feasibility and availability of required technology was insecure and the process seemed to demand a high investment rate (for a general review, see Papathanassopoulos 2002, Brown and Picard 2005). The Finnish government was one of the early birds; the principal decision on the digitalisation of broadcasting networks was made in spring, 1996.

The development of digital television has shown that digitalisation produced first of all more television in terms of output and channels, while the wild visions of new interactive, enhanced television have not materialised (as an example of these visions, see Van Tassel 1996). Once again, and similarly to the 1980s and 90s, the market for television became increasingly competitive with continuous problems of economy. Against this kind of continuity between analog and digital television, I would prefer to characterise digitalisation as a new phase of the cultural industrialisation of television. Accordingly, one could conclude that the cultural industrialisation of television has taken place in two consecutive phases; first, as audiovisualisation, and since late the 1990s, as digitalisation. As Deuze's recent (2011) book about media work demonstrates, the latter kind of cultural industrialisation is increasingly signified under the label of 'creative work and industries' (see also Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010).

In fact, on the basis of Zielinski's reconstruction of the history of audiovisions, one could argue that culture-industrial dimension has always been part of broadcasting and television. In Europe, that primarily concerns the technological aspects of broadcasting. My point, however, is to emphasise that cultural industrial logic and practices were widely adopted and applied by European public service broadcasters as they responded to the 1980s crisis created by the loss of their monopoly and the consequent challenges of increased competition. And further on down the line, a similar development manifested in the context of digitalisation. I acknowledge the relevance of periodisations which characterise differences between the 1980s television and the later digital television (in style of Gripsrud's third and fourth phase, above). But basically they represent phases in the same process which can be labelled the 'cultural industrialisation of television'.

Looking back to the most optimistic visions for television as the multimedia platform of digitalised homes, one can now conclude that television did not reach that role. On the contrary, television is increasingly re-constructed in terms of what Zielinski identifies as 'advanced audiovision'. However, if one compares that new field with what Caldwell said about the potentials of digitalisation for post-production and cost-effectiveness, one can say that digital dreams have come fully true. And by the same token, the network character of the new field has opened up forms of co-production and now, social media, which challenge the professional tradition and practices of broadcasting (see, for example, Mäntymäki 2010). Organisationally, the present public service media institutions are clearly structured according to the logic of content producing industries and less according to the old media divisions (Küng-Shankleman 2000, Küng 2008). The present challenge is to combine the tradition of programme production and distribution with the role of partner and facilitator of communication in the context of networked communication and social media (Bardoel and Lowe 2007, Aalto 2010, and Mäntymäki in this book).

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Endnotes

1. In other European countries similarly. In Britain, for example, and demonstrating institutional interrelationship as much as discursive weight, the (top-selling) BBC magazine listing of program details for its radio channels, the *Radio Times*, incorporated BBC television listings from the early 1960s, which within a few years had expanded to include photos, feature-boxes, etc. and totally dominate the publication, relegating radio to a small, dull, purely functional back-section in the process.

2. The article was published in a book (Heikkinen 1989) where a group of sociologists and cultural analysts discussed the changes of life style and everyday life of Finnish people and the consequent changes in broadcasting, this work itself part of a project initiated by the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE and whose first collection of articles (Heikkinen 1986) was published to mark the 60th anniversary of the Company.
3. In the UK, for example, the private network (ITV) had been in operation since the 1955 and with national coverage since the early 60s; but still, it was closely regulated by American standards and defined from its establishment by reference to the state BBC, to which it played the role of inferior (in all senses) until the 1980s, when its greater income gave it a competitive edge in purchase rights to events coverage, 'new' films, etc. (thus, for example, the key American imports – mostly crime and drama series formats – of the 1970s almost all went to the main state channel, not the private network).
4. Commercial radio had been introduced two years earlier in 1985.
5. Zielinski uses the singular forms 'culture industry' and 'culture-industrialisation' when referring to the industrialization of culture. His use of language reflects the Frankfurt school tradition of culture industry, as opposed to the emphasis on cultural industries in the political economy of media and communication. For example, Hesmondhalgh (2007: 16–17) follows the views of cultural sociologists who consider cultural industries as a contested area where the struggle over commodification continues and adopts new directions and innovations. As Hesmondhalgh points out in his summary view of cultural industries, the tension between creativity and commerce is not resolved but remains a characteristic feature of the area (op. cit.: 18). I share Hesmondhalgh's view of cultural industries and prefer to use the plural notion in relation to the transformation of television, but when referring to Zielinski continue to speak of 'culture industry'.
6. Zielinski uses the term 'dispositif' in the Foucauldian sense of reference to the various institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and knowledge structures that enhance and maintain the exercise of power in society and culture.

HANNU SALMI

6. Intermediality in the Visions of 'World Television' in the 1970s: A Cultural Historical Approach

In the middle of the summer, on Wednesday 9 July 1975, the Finnish Broadcasting Company (FBC) aired a documentary entitled *World Television*.[1] According to the FBC's programme information, the aim was to present 'thoughts and images of the communicational role of television in the future'. In addition to fictional sequences, the documentary showed studio discussions between three communication researchers, Kaarle Nordenstreng, Osmo A. Wiio and Tapio Varis, whom the newspaper *Aamulehti* (11 July 1975) ironically referred as the 'scientist augurs of our communication policy'.[2] The scholars debated Marshall McLuhan's idea of global village and the future of television, but what makes the documentary especially worthy of attention is the fact that it draws strongly on fictional scenes. The audience were presented – perhaps consciously parodic and clichéd – images of Finnish family life in the year 2000, with children and parents moving around in unisex costumes, living in a windowless apartment and receiving all their information about the outer world through television sets.

Thus, *World Television* not only debated the future but also showed things to come. It is, therefore, an exceptional platform for analysis: in addition to arguments and hypotheses, the programme tries to capture everyday exercises of the future and, at the same time, describe ways of using television without verbalising them. The programme dramatises the meaning of information in everyday life. *World Television* is of special interest also because it blurs the boundaries between television and information technology and thus serves as an interesting focal point for rethinking media relations and intermediality: the future is envisioned as something that connects television and computer technologies, although this is not clearly explicated.[3]

The aim of this contribution is to read and to interpret the television discourse of the programme from the perspective of computerisation and, more broadly, of intermediality. It seems appropriate to commence with the observation that the cultural history of technology cannot be written only on the basis of the 'new', and that everything that is presented as 'new' has to be read through other media, acknowledging the interconnectedness of media and the inevitable interplay between past, present and future. This setting can be paralleled with what David Holmes (2005: 187) writes on new media and the continuous emphasis on 'newness'. As a hypothesis, it can be proposed that the interpretation of new technology, in this case emerging information technology, can be fruitfully approached through the lens of what was labelled as 'old' technology, thus granting access to contemporary tensions and contradictory interpretations.[4]

In using the lens of the old for a perspective on the new in this respect it is, of course, essential to analyse what kind of attitudes, views and presuppositions the contemporaries (individuals, institutions, etc. of the past) had about technologies. Were they rivals, complementors, and/or socially distinct, or interpreted as such? The cross-reading of old and new can be a strategy to study how the views and structures of meaning around television and computers have changed. It is obvious that contemporaries often delved into the past in order to understand the future – indeed, new technology could not be new without the

old, by definition (see Huhtamo 1991, and also Nieminen, Saarikoski and Suominen 1999). Thus, intermediality here entails a two-fold research strategy.

Equally, however, it is methodologically important to surround the empirical corpus with other historical materials, such as press coverage, literature, cinema and technological speculation. This is a matter of triangulation that, in fact, reveals how close the intermedial research and cultural historical approaches can be to each other. They both have to stress the multiplicity of the voices of the past, in order to be able to illuminate the research object from different angles. Against this, however, intermedial relations are something that existed in the past (as practice), whereas media histories from the past intertwined at the level of discourses and practices. Here, therefore, it is particularly important to consider the heuristic status of the material used so as to make it possible to, for example, distinguish the practices of the past from those discourses that described not the prevalent situation at the time but merely something that was expected to be realised. Intermediality thus plays a double role in this article.

Although *World Television* is rather silent about the past – its own past prior to 1975 – and emphasises much more the future, history lives in understated and implied views on (the) media and also in unarticulated visions on the history of television. It might be claimed that the more obvious silence entails an argument, that the past is not discussed because it is seen as irrelevant for the future, or that the future is seen to represent something completely different, something detached from the past. Still, history is there, in its discursive absence, especially in the form of visions of the old division of labour between the media.

The focus of interest in *World Television* is on the problem of future development, which was often discussed in the late 1960s and early 70s, in both scholarly and popular discourses. Even though there are no direct references to the past, there is every reason to suspect that some kind of a feeling of changing epochs was behind the whole production of the programme. Just a few weeks before its broadcast,

two decades had passed from the first Finnish television broadcast, organised by the Television Club of the Society for Radio Engineering, on 24 May 1955.[5] This anniversary is not mentioned in *World Television*, or in its press coverage, but it is still possible that a sense of the completion of the twenty-year journey of Finnish television had directly given the impetus for the FBC to ponder the future direction of development. This could explain why the documentary was, somewhat unusually, made and shown in the summer; it was recorded on 6 June and premiered on 9 July. The programme itself did not try to see another two decades ahead but a bit further, until the year 2000, fantasies about which had already been circulating in the media for some time. The year 1955 is not mentioned in the programme, let alone the peculiarities of the Finnish television system and its early history. Anyway, 'world television' is obviously a wide theme, and hardly restricted to Finnish paths.

Global village and the network of satellites

World Television begins and ends in the (then) future. During the first minutes, the audience gets to know a family of the future that lives in an age of global consciousness: images of third world problems and the demonstrations of far-away cities flash on the TV screen. Instead of entertainment, television offers socially conscious and critical information. The audience becomes also acquainted with the TV host of the future, armoured with black sun glasses and reading news in a mechanical tone (assuming the technological premises of world television at the turn of the millennium). World television sends programmes as 24-language broadcasts, language options being hidden in TV stripes (the number of languages perhaps subliminally signalling what has become '24/7 TV'). In contrast to the video technology of 1975, year 2000 programmes can be saved 'in pulse code' ('digitally' we would say now).

Future possibilities had undoubtedly been discussed a lot in publicity in the 1960s and early 70s, and often the time span of predictions was fairly short: most things imagined would be realised (or not) in only a few decades. In the case of the TV stripes for languages here, there was already a basis in reality for this in the early applications of text television in the 1970s, in which stripes were to transmit certain information (Suominen 2001: 101–102). In the newspaper *Aamulehti* (11 July 1975), Kara (a pen name) noted that 'only a few years ago, the mass use of video cassettes, video sound records and other new means of information technology were regarded as things that would be realised any day now'. But, time spans and schedules had slowed. In *World Television*, however, these devices had finally become everyday products.

Right from the start, the programme uses the notion of 'world television' as a matter-of-course, or at least as a concept that is supposed to be widely shared. After the dramatised image of the future, an expert of the present day, Martti Tiuri, is presented. According to him, this 'world television' is in principle a simple invention and could be realised anytime. A satellite could cover a large part of the globe and send programmes directly to individual homes. Three satellites could shadow the entire planet.

After the practical vision of Tiuri, we return to the studio, where the communication researchers connect the present turmoil with the notion of 'global village'. Without doubt, the aim is to see and interpret 'world television' as a derivative of the McLuhanian concept. In the beginning of the discussion, Osmo A. Wiio mentions McLuhan (who 'presented a couple of good thoughts') in introducing an idea of the media as an extension to our senses and of a global village where people 'know other men's business'. Events in the most distant corners of the globe become familiar to us through the media, and distances are shrunk correspondingly.

In fact, the sense of 'globeness' was connected with television – and also other media – long before McLuhan's book *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (1962), which coined the concept 'global village'. Wolfgang

Schivelbusch (1984: 36–37) stresses that railway connections had already long transformed not only our understanding of time and place but also given a sense of the ability to transcend space. The smell of German linden trees became nearer to Paris, as Heinrich Heine expressed it. The concept of world television, too, was in use before the FBC documentary. After World War II, the expectations for television increased also in Finland, where it was commonly known that in Germany television activity had been high in the 1930s. The Finnish film magazine *Uutisaitta*, published by one of the leading film companies Suomi-Filmi, paid attention to television in 1946. The article 'Television is just around the corner!' gave an impression that the new technology would also be in Finland within a few years (although, in fact, the process took much longer). At the same time, the article emphasised television's potential to increase global consciousness:

> One of the pioneers of the field, the world's first television director, engineer Landsberg thinks that 'world television' [*koko-maailman-televisio*] will make future wars impossible – the interaction between nations will come so close that it will be simply impossible for any dictator to get the power or try to distort those facts that television presents. This might sound fantasy but, without dispute, television is a strong factor in generating good will. (Uutisaitta 1946: 28)

After emigrating to the US from Germany in 1938, Klaus Landsberg had become one of the pioneers of American television, and he obviously wanted to see television as an ambassador of good will. In general, the relationship between world peace and technology was a much debated issue in the aftermath of the War. Regardless of the ethics, however, Landsberg clearly conceived of television as a uniting global force of the future. It is difficult to estimate how Landsberg grounded his idea of world television or through which kind of technology the global audience might finally be reached.

From the perspective of intermediality, it is important that media technology intertwines not only with other media but also with a

wider range of technologies. In 1955, the United Nations organised an international conference in Geneva on the peaceful use of atomic energy, but events soon took the form of a technological race. This race tightened even more when Soviet Union released its Sputnik satellite into orbit around the earth on 4 October 1957.[6] Satellites could be used not only for observations (the immediate scientific aim of the Soviet mission) but also for communication and the expansion of information transmission. And artificial satellites were regarded as a political issue right from the start, as becomes obvious in analysing contemporary reactions.

The British parliament discussed the issue immediately and interpreted Sputnik more as a demonstration of political and technological supremacy than a sign of good will.[7] At the end of 1957, the US President Eisenhower went on a world tour in order to encourage the international community to trust in American economy and scientific resources.[8] This has been interpreted not only as an expression of the Cold War but also as a start to the race in space technology that became foregrounded in the US policy. This competition was also reflected in the field of communication technology: satellites offered an efficient possibility for international information sharing, and broadcasting could be intentionally targeted at international audiences. The basic idea of world television debated in the FBC documentary originated from this context.

An important step towards 'world television' was the launching of the Telstar satellite at Cape Canaveral in July 1962. The aim was to experiment with transatlantic broadcasting to both directions. This satellite made it also possible to test intercontinental phone calls.[9] Telstar was soon used to narrow the political relations between the US and West Europe as British and French TV companies received a direct broadcast through the satellite of a press conference given by John F. Kennedy on 17 July 1962. Other countries were able to see the programme through Eurovision's terrestrial network.[10]

In Britain, *The Times* wrote much on satellite projects in the 1960s. Satellites were not seen as separate entities but as a network, through

which communication became effective and broadcasting could be extended across geographical boundaries and political borders. *The Times* wrote, for example, on how spectacularly the Soviet Union took advantage of satellite technology in celebrating the 50th anniversary of the October revolution in 1967. The satellite Molnia-I was able to reach 20 new television stations bringing in 20 million new viewers from the most distant corners of the country to witness direct the festival programme from Moscow.[11]

The Nordic Tanum station, built in 1968, significantly helped the Scandinavian countries to enter the satellite age. It is clear that in 1975 – when the programme *World Television* was made – satellites already represented the highest technology in the building of global connections. The TV page of the newspaper *Aamulehti* reminded its readers on 9 July 1975 that 'already now a global TV broadcasting is possible and new information satellites increase the communication network worldwide'. According to *Aamulehti*, the new communication age was epitomised by the Nordic Tanum station, which was able to deliver 'telephone, telex and data messages as well as black and white and colour TV programmes'. The new station functioned as an intermedial relay station.

In the 1975 situation, satellite networks enabled much more efficient and versatile uses than the computer-based networks initiated in the 1960s under the project ARPANET.[12] One of the background sketches for ARPANET had been Paul Baran's plan 'On Distributed Communications', made for the RAND Corporation in 1962. In addition to centralised and decentralised networks, Baran envisioned the possibility of a distributed network (Gere 2002: 67–68). At that time, however, this option was not regarded as something that might have deeper impact on communication technology.

The idea of world television roused strong political emotions in the 1970s. The new technologies were experienced as a threat, with television and computer networks linked in the sense that the Soviet Union's satellite technology provoked fears of its communicational and military superiority. It was the United States, however, that pro-

ceeded more rapidly during the 1960s space race, which included building its satellite networks. This caused political strains. Because broadcasting is a centralised form of maintaining information and transmitting messages, the addressees are inactive recipients, especially in analogous television networks where the options for interaction are minimal. Therefore the sender always has power – and now the USA was gaining over the USSR.

In 1972, the Soviet Union asked the United Nations to act against 'world television': one should not be allowed to send television programmes to a country without permission. In his letter to Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko stated that it was necessary to 'protect the sovereignty of states against all exterior interference and not allow live television broadcasts to become a source of international conflicts.' According to *The Times* (11 August 1972), 'the Soviet move seemed [to be] motivated by fear that the United States might use its satellite network to transmit either special programmes in Russian or normal network programmes which could be picked up on Soviet television sets.' Indeed, the possibility of using satellite networks like this had been mentioned frequently in American technical magazines and, according to *The Times*, 'appears unacceptable to a country like the Soviet Union where television is considered as an essential means for transmitting propaganda.' The London newspaper even mentioned the bad experiences that the Soviet Union had had with the Scandinavian countries – 'Soviet viewers pick up foreign broadcasts'[13] – which probably refers to the fact that Estonians used to watch Finnish television in the 1960s and 70s.

The Soviet Union had not been standing still, of course, and in fact strengthened its satellite connections considerably during the 1960s and 1970s. Apart from the considerations of international politics, there was also a very real internal need for this because of the geographical size of the country: the Soviet Union extended across eleven time zones, making satellites an optimal solution to enhance the communications network with direct broadcasts to all parts of the land (Downing 1985: 468). The fight for the international satellite

connections climaxed at the turn of the 1960s and 70s.The Soviet Union sketched its own international network, Intersputnik in 1968, in a situation in which its Western counterpart, Intelsat, was already sending transmissions to 63 countries worldwide. The international agreement to found Intersputnik was negotiated in November 1971, and by 1977, in addition to Soviet Union, there were stations in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia and Cuba (Downing 1985: 465–466).

This is the background for Gromyko's letter to Waldheim, but in Western publicity, the Soviet Union was interpreted as wanting to slow down and restrict international communication. As *The Times* report put it, 'Russia Seeks Restrictions on World Television.' The debate on world television was thus contextualised as an inseparable part of an international argument about satellite systems, with 'world television' a very politically loaded concept. This is reflected in the way in which Nordenstreng, Wiio and Varis deal with the issue in the 1975 programme. The studio atmosphere is tense, and even the spectator unfamiliar with the background cannot fail to notice the juxtaposition of Nordenstreng and Wiio. The deviating views they expressed came not only from the academic frontlines behind the scene, but also from the acute political conflict.

In 1972, Nordenstreng had led the committee on communication policy, which completed its work two years later. The committee became a forum for political passions. Later, the editor-in-chief Simopekka Nortamo characterised the committee members as of two camps, the Reds (*punikki*) and Whites (*lahtari*). The media historian Raimo Salokangas (1996: 257) has summarised this division in his book on the history of the FBC: 'The leader of the former group was Professor Kaarle Nordenstreng and the leader of the latter one Professor Osmo A. Wiio. They symbolised the bipolar nature of communication research in Finland, and this dualism caused harm to the whole field for a long time.'

The programme *World Television* does not directly refer to the competition of superpowers, but the question of who, in the end, had

the opportunity to maintain a global satellite network leads inevitably to the arenas of international politics. This highly politicised theme refers to a meaning structure that simply could not be openly explicated, but clearly intermedial relations in this respect were negotiated and transformed. The audience, without doubt, understood what it was all about – that is, they could read the expressions of silence and understand the meanings of slight references. Two days after the broadcast, in the TV page of *Helsingin Sanomat*, the main newspaper in Finland, Jukka Kajava wrote that 'It was worth while listening to the different opinions of the discussants, which most certainly reflect the international division of opinion.'

In spite of this antinomy, the atmosphere in the summer of 1975 was optimistic, and the more friendly relations between the superpowers by then seemed to be opening avenues toward a better future. Even as *World Television* was being recorded, Helsinki was in the midst of making hectic preparations for the meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The leaders of 35 countries gathered in Helsinki between 30 July and 1 August 1975 to discuss and to sign the final Accords, as they are now known, and when the meeting ended on 1 August 1975, the hope of detente was certainly in the air (Hentilä 2005). Thus it was that at the end of the documentary, Nordenstreng refers to the so-called 'third basket' of the CSCE, which, in addition to dealing with human rights, cultural relations and free mobility, included issues related to communications such as the development of related technology and international rules on information exchange (Edwards 1985: 631–632).[14]

In *World Television*, Varis underlines the increase of information pollution, connected to the massive waves of 'information streams' and to the fact that new communication technologies enabled transmissions everywhere. When Nordenstreng stresses the importance of rules and normative thinking, Wiio asks, who in the end decides what 'right' knowledge is. Here Nordenstreng answers – in a not dissimilar fashion to Andrei Gromyko three years earlier: 'There is a need to define what kind of information can be permitted to enter a country.'

Already Wiio's and Nordenstreng's views tell us that the question of information and communication was a central social and political issue. The potential uses of television and especially the idea of world television, embracing global communities, aroused heated emotions. Even more heated was the discussion about what kind of information and social views could be spread through television screens. Especially in respect to this, the role of the FBC became a hot issue. In 1974, Arvo 'Poika' Tuominen (1974: 167), a famous Finnish social democrat, dealt with the issue in his controversial book *Does Finland Need a Revolution?* (*Tarvitaanko Suomessa vallankumousta?*). He thought that the FBC 'worked for those groups that openly declare that the present democratic social order should be abolished through a revolution.' The communication researcher Pertti Hemánus, on the other hand, argued in his *Rise and Fall of the Repo Radio* (*Reporadion nousu ja tuh*o, 1972: 296–297) that instead of the new left and 'the single-issue movements founded by pious amateurs', the real threat of the 1970s was the group of 'politically conscious experts, progressive technocrats'.

The debate was understandable in the sense that the impact of television was pervasive, and to all intents and purposes the FBC had a monopoly in the field. Another important point is that although information technology had gone through tremendous changes during the 1950s, 60s and early 70s (Paju 2002, Suominen 2003), computer-based networks were not yet imminent, so these did not present a political problem in the same way that television and satellite networks did. In January 1965, the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* had published an article by Nikolay Fedorenko, arguing that Soviet society would need a computer network. The interconnecting of local machines was meant to bring more efficiency to the economy by making local knowledge on the balance of supply and demand available to central government.[15] Soviet engineers knew that the building of computer networks was underway in the US. Later, when ARPANET, designed originally to be a network for military purposes, changed into a network of universities

and colleges, Finns also became interested in the subject. The real starting shot was fired, however, as late as 1984, when the Finnish ministry of education launched the FUNET network. (Saarikoski 2004: 159, 384). Before this, television had been the central technology of knowing with its advantage over computer networks of wide coverage: the one million TV licenses barrier in Finland was broken in 1969 (Salokangas 1996: 254), and there seemed to be no limits for the growth of the television network, not at least technologically.

Information systems can be analysed by scrutinising the ways they are designed and structured: how the modes of knowing are designed, how the system maintains and transmits information. In the case of analog television, the main design feature relates to the nature of communication as broadcasting, that is, the idea of transmitting information, and similar messages, from one centre to as wide an audience as possible. Often radio and television broadcasting were seen as effective means in popular enlightenment and education of the audience. These values were already obvious in the major guidelines of the FBC in the 1920s and 30s, when it coincided with the rise and contributed to the strengthening of the newly born Finnish nation-state.

The stated aim of the FBC during its foundation period was to offer 'refining and innocent entertainment especially for the people living far away from the business centres' and to spread 'knowledge and arts from the centres of [Finnish] civilisation for the benefit of the wide circles of our nation'. As this quotation reveals, the idea of centralisation was not really something that came from technology. The whole idea of culture and civilisation was as something hierarchical and centrally organised. Knowledge and information had clustered in cultural centres, from where the FBC should diffuse it to the wider public, an unquestionably uncivilised, mass audience.

In his numerous studies, the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault has paid attention to the problems of power and knowledge, developing the ideas of discourses and practices that produce and maintain these (e.g. Foucault 1982: 777–795, 1988: 83–98; see also Olivier 1988: 83–98). The centre of Foucault's attention, how-

ever, is always the subject, the individual. In 1982 he stated that his aim was 'to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects' (Foucault 1988: 777). During his career, Foucault did not write on television or information technology, but undoubtedly their history would have given him copious material on the relations between power, technology and the individual, and his 'archaeology of knowledge' seems perfectly tailored for interpreting media changes. According to Foucault (1988: 777–778), it is essential to pay attention to 'dividing practices', practices that produce internal divisions in the subject or differentiate it from the external. To follow this train of thought, a broadcasting system works as a 'dividing' force in making distinctions between producers and consumers, the centre and the periphery, civilisation and ignorance.

At the time of the production of *World Television* the relationship between knowledge and technology was coloured by the idea of the centralisation of information management and a view of information transmission that assumed the user as inactive. It can be argued, in the Foucauldian sense, that this condition fostered an internal dividedness of recipients in that it separated important and correct (sanctioned, legitimised, *authoritative*) information from that which the user could or might produce him/herself. Equally, it constructed an external divide whereby the reception of information was distanced from production, from 'cultural centres', which the FBC regarded itself to represent. If, in his *Surveiller et punir* (1976), Foucault analysed materialisations of power from an architectural perspective, it seems that there is an architecture of information transmission too. It is not only a matter of information being transmitted by link towers but also of how this information is organised both technologically and in respect to its content. Communication represents an excellent example of how essential it is to see discourses and practices as a whole.

At the beginning of *World Television*, Martti Tiuri presents an interesting, reverse interpretation of broadcasting. If traditional television network meant programmes being transmitted from one point outwards, to a large network, then in a satellite system the course of

the communication traffic could be altered. Tiuri speculates about the possibility of connecting television, satellite and telephone networks in a way that would allow television viewers with a modem to contact to the satellite directly and get answers to different questions. The satellite could host a computer incorporating all human knowledge:

> With television, in the future one will be able to receive information from a satellite that has been sent to space because it includes everything, all the information that mankind now holds. And, through a telephone connection, this information can be used and transmitted into people's own receivers. Thus, there won't be any need to go to a library to dig up information.

In this vision of the future, intermediality is a playground for the imagination, and perhaps this reveals an essential element of modern technological thinking. It seems important to visualise the potential of current solutions or those expected to be realised in the near future, and the kinds of consequences that different technologies might have when they interact with each other; and when intermediality works in relation to history, to past experiences, it also serves as a starting point for future prospects.

In Tiuri's *World Television* vision, the television set is the user interface, connected to the outer world through telephone technology. There are many points of reference in Tiuri's thought. Already in the early 1970s, there was discussion on remote work or telecommuting, with the idea that the worker could communicate with a mainframe computer via a modem (Suominen 2001: 101). There was an idea that the interaction between television and its users would increase in the future and also new kinds of connections with outer world would thus be opened (see Saarikoski 2002). In principle, this idea implies the later discourse on media convergence: television was seen as technology which could be connected to other devices and contacted by others.

Tiuri's comment also implies an idea of a mainframe computer. The process later described as the miniaturisation of information

technology[16] had already started and, according to the historian Petri Saarikoski (2004: 44), in Finland in 1971 there were around 200 mainframe computers, and 700 to 800 home computers. At the time of *World Television* these mini computers did not appear as competitors to television sets, either in respect to their volume in numbers or breadth of coverage. In fact, the idea of television as the central force of domestic information connections continued to be strong throughout the 1970s. The 1983 brochure from Salora, the major Finnish television manufacturer, stated that the latest Salora model was spiced with communication options that would well 'meet the needs of the future too.'[17]

In *World Television*, the future of television is seen through this historical and technological context, as a logical consequence of developmental lines already in place. The Finnish family of the year 2000 watches television, but carries out interactive operations through a keyboard and a visualphone. The emphasis on a keyboard refers to the remote use of a mainframe computer. In the discussion part of *World Television*, Nordenstreng argues that in the future television will develop into a 'multicommunication terminal', or into a 'transmitter that resembles the push-buttons of a typewriter' and through which the user will be able to give orders to the computer or express his or her own predilections.

The visions of *World Television* can be analysed further by comparing its views on knowledge and technology. One can ask in the Foucauldian spirit: what kind of knowing do technology and its architecture produce? According to Tiuri, as mentioned, all information could be situated in a satellite, orbiting around the earth. From this satellite, citizens could acquire the knowledge they desire. For Tiuri, information is an accumulated reserve, and the interpretation of this information does not seem to arouse any problems. The Finnish word used is '*tieto*' (something that is known) which can refer to both information and knowledge. Tiuri's understanding of *tieto* is data-like, numerical information. This is even exemplified in the programme by showing some of the answers that the satellite-computer offers (ques-

tions about history are answered with dates, see below). When the idea of information is simple, also the answers are unambiguous.

Tiuri's *tieto* is something received but not actually produced. The user of information is a remote worker and the production of this information beyond his or her sphere. In the studio discussion, furthermore, Nordenstreng stresses how important 'real information', filtered and selected knowledge is. But information is not actually knowledge, of course, and in the context of the oncoming age of information technology already named such, this value-free, objectivised, a-functional even conglomeration of the two should probably be shocking. The question of knowledge production may be too complicated to be discussed in the programme. But still, what remains is a technology that maintains anonymity, a faceless power like the family's strangely windowless world and ultimately speaking – and for whatever reason, with whatever intention – not of knowledge and access but of its lack.

Again, Martti Tiuri's interpretation of future telecommunication is interesting because it relies on a progressive view that interaction will increase. The system, on which everything is built, is a reverse broadcasting system. In the end, the 'cultural centre' is not the office of the FBC but an international satellite that sends information on demand. This interpretation can be elaborated further by arguing that the vision of the future, promoted by *World Television*, presents already on a conceptual level an idea of a computer-based, international network that would serve wide audiences, although the remote terminal is an amalgamation of television, telephone and keyboard. In this sense, the programme articulates many views that later became expressed in the Internet discourse.

If we agree that the dimensions of culture encompass, in addition to social structures and practices, also meanings or, as Clifford Geertz (1973: 5), quoting Max Weber, wrote, 'webs of significance', it is appropriate to conclude that these webs of significance always entail some kind of inertia. From the perspective of intermediality, I find it important that applications do not generate their own horizons of meaning, but that the webs of significance, and layers of meaning, are

inescapably intertwined and interlaced. Because the view of broadcasting as a system of knowledge was so strong in the mid 1970s, it is only logical to reason that this view had an impact on the idea of a computer as a centralised system of information maintenance, and even as a control machinery, despite the fact that the architecture of technology had been essentially different in practice.

Dramatised Knowledge

As stated, the piquancy of *World Television* lies in the fact that it does not only contemplate future options but aims at showing the Finland of 2000. It tries to dramatise how world television will be attached to the future everyday life. In 1975, the public was, and had been, saturated by images and fantasies about the future. The history of Finnish science fiction film in particular was rather slight, but Risto Jarva, a New Wave filmmaker, had directed the film *A Time of Roses*, released in 1969. This portrayed Finland in the year 2012 and foregrounded a world were class differences had – seemingly – disappeared, but the power of the media was complete (see Toiviainen 1998).

The future visions of *World Television* perhaps do not stem from this thin tradition. More obviously, it comments on and perhaps even parodies those views that had been circulating in the public domain for years about the epoch-marking year 2000. Contemporary critics certainly paid attention to the fictional sequences, and did not always know how to react. The review by 'Kara' in *Aamulehti* suggested that the staging of the future 'was not grounded on any sound analysis', and that in these kinds of cases it is a convention to 'exaggerate as much as possible', to show the future as a caricature. Jukka Kajava in *Helsingin Sanomat*, on the other hand, considered that there was 'a naïve utopia in the programme, where people in their tricot clothes swallow down pills and watch television.' Perhaps Kajava misses the mark – and the comment on the routine of watching television strikes

as quite odd – but he does make the more perceptive observation that the 'utopia' remained detached, isolated, in the programme, because there was no explanation as to how this kind of a development had become possible. But which of course is also another convention in these kinds of cases.

It is difficult to estimate the sense in which the dramatisation was finally planned and realised. In some places the theatrical aspect is used in order to illustrate the themes of the discussion, in other places it contrasts with the spoken word. When Nordenstreng and Varis utter their disbelief about the idea that communication could ever replace physical interaction between people, the fictional scenes particularly want to show a family that is isolated. Then again, the drama also supports the themes of the debate, for example, by demonstrating those multiple ways of communication that the future world is expected to employ.

Herbert Marcuse's book *One-Dimensional Man* had been translated into Finnish and published in 1969, six years earlier, and Marcuse, if anybody, painted a sombre picture of the influences of mass communication. Echoes of the book are discernible in Jarva's *A Time of Roses* that interpreted mass communication as essentially manipulating activity and an exercise of power. In this context, *World Television* shows the possibilities of mass media in much more positive light. Although the family of the future has four television sets, embedded in the wall, television is not a technology of hoax and window dressing (even if it is window replacement).

The very first images of the programme argue that the future family takes advantage of the new possibilities to watch critical, socially conscious programmes. Images glittering on black and white screens evidence a global consciousness, the spectators move smoothly from one continent to another and current social problems seem to be the major concern. Intriguingly, Kaarle Nordenstreng had written an article for the collection *Finland in the Year 2000*, published in 1970. In this piece, he had emphasised that 'in the year 2000, Finns will be consuming much less entertainment through the media than three

decades earlier,' and that 'the consumption of documentaries and social commentaries on current issues will have increased considerably' (Nordenstreng 1970: 137–138). By the year 2000, the overwhelming supply of needless comedy and adventure series in fact *had* disappeared, the problem that particularly concerned Joan Harms, Max Rand and Keijo Savolainen when they published their sharp report, *The Worlds of TV Series* (*Sarjafilmien maailmat*) in 1970.

The volume *Finland in the Year 2000* is an intriguing parallel text to *World Television*, partly because this versatile collection approaches the future not only from the perspective of public policy, politics and inventions, but also, for example, from that of family life and the arts. Katarina Eskola's comprehensive essay analyses the Finnish family of the year 2000. She raises a problem that comes to the fore also in *World Television*. In 1970, and obviously also in 1975, it was commonly assumed that working time would be significantly shorter in the future. Heikki Väliaho (1970: 81), to take one example, calculated that by the year 2000 Finland would have moved to a 30-hour working week with summer vacations of three weeks. Eskola (1970: 214) identified the same trend and foresaw a new problem of 'how to deal with idleness'. Albeit Eskola stated that one's own home would not be enough any more for 'abundant idleness'.

The *World Television* family does not seem to have any activities outside the walls of their own castle. The man spends most of his time lying on a divan and watching television or listening to music through his earphones. His wife takes care of the food – ordering of the pills on the videophone and their distribution to family members – and also tries to get her husband to do some physical exercise. It seems that actual housework has become minimal, although the division of labour is obviously no less gendered. The purpose of the scene is, without doubt, to illustrate what kind of activities can be accomplished in the future home without going outside: these include the ordering of television and radio programmes, shopping and educational information inquiries. The latter aspect is visualised in the scene where the father suddenly rises from the sofa to help his son solve 'problems'.

Through the television set, they pose questions to the computer and get rapid answers. The transmission of questions is made via a microphone and a keyboard, and the answers are simple numbers, years, in accordance with the questions – the father and son would like to know, for example, when mankind prohibited the use of automobiles (it seems that like the feeing duties, the interest in knowledge is also gender-specific). In sum, the dramatised episodes' portrayal of knowledge as simple and clear information, data clearly illustrates Martti Tiuri's idea of the satellite, possessing all the world's repository of important information, and accessed through one's own remote terminal.

A problem of its own is the question of whether the reference to traffic conditions implies that physical mobility in the year 2000 would be severely restricted. If so, 'world television' is a solution, through which physical mobility can be compensated. Precisely this idea had been contested by Nordenstreng (1970: 133): in the future world, business meetings could be held via television sets, but 'people will not become stationary creatures that are in contact with each other only by technological means, by telephone, radio and television.' In the studio conversation, Tapio Varis emphasises the meaning of home as a communication-free, 'warm' world, which is meant for personal relations, not designed as an office. There is no sign, however, of this vision in the fictional scenes. Perhaps this could not be depicted in the limited time of the show, but it is noticeable that these television connections to the outer world do not seem to be constructed for human relationships.

Although the fictional episodes of *World Television* are condensed, they support the optimistic views presented in the studio conversation, views that the future consumer will have a thirst for knowledge and be a friend to critical information. At the same time, however, the episodes arouse mixed feelings: the interests of knowing and the needs for communication are clearly gendered. Perhaps this is the architecture of discourses and practices that the future communication was not expected to undermine – and represents also those features of the past that will continue into the future (relatively) uncontested. This

is however not identified in the programme as 'history' or 'tradition', but it is obviously there.

Conclusion

Although the critic Jukka Kajava called the fictional episodes of *World Television* a 'naïve utopia', the end result is not at all naïve if 'utopia' is interpreted as a negation of prevailing circumstances or, in general, as a negational description (Mähl 1985: 274). The utopian passages of *World Television* are counter-images *in a particular sense*. The social order has remained untouched, but as a consumer of communication services and devices the future citizen is a complete negation of his/her present-day (1975) counterpart. Here, utopia is a description of a state of affairs that was not seen as dominant in the contemporary culture. Here lies also the political nature of the vision, despite its naïve first impression. In light of this background, and in the context of the ideal of informativeness, it is easy to understand the criticism that was directed towards home computing in the late 1970s and especially in the 80s (see Saarikoski 2004: 294–297). Hobbyism in front of a screen was seen then as simple entertainment that did not serve educational purposes. Neither did it fulfil the requirements of a desirable media technological interest.

World Television can be seen as simultaneously part and agent of the intermedial turmoil of the mid 1970s. This singular case has been used here to exemplify the two-fold methodology of studying intermediality, as both a way to cross-read different kinds of primary sources and to pinpoint those historical areas that were *inter media*. It is justified, however, to ask how far the intermedial perspective can be stretched in this case. *World Television* presented some obvious intermedial discourses and practices, and, as described here, also some inter-generic traffic between documentary and fictitious traditions. But to fully understand the problem between 'old' and 'new' technology,

it seems that it would be too limiting to focus only on *inter media*. It can be argued that there was at the same time an important exchange between cultures and crucial negotiations *inter nationes,* in a way that supports a wider cultural historical approach.

As a conclusion, *World Television* seems to capture the negotiation between different media and forms of technology while also revealing how past experiences and future expectations intersect, how new is not possible without the old, and how old is actually never old but a resource of experiences through which new things are shaped. The context of Cold War politics, the dividedness of the Finnish internal political arena, the endless armwrestling of Finnish communication researchers and the struggle about the programming policy of the FBC created a fertile soil for *World Television*'s contemplation that moves back and forth across the interface of old and new technology, *inter media* and *inter nationes* at the same time. The programme articulates questions on the politics of knowing and those technological means through which this politics could be influenced. In the end, *World Television* was an inventory of those appreciations that existed in 1975 – and thus, inductively, the impact that these appreciations had – on how 'old' television technology and the growing information technology were viewed, what kinds of technologies of knowing were seen as possible, and probable, and where they were seen to lead us.

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Endnotes

1. For programme information see *Helsingin Sanomat* (9 July 1975), *Turun Sanomat* (9 July 1975). I have also had the video copy of the FBC Television Archive at my disposal. The length of the programme was 39'18.
2. As a technological expert, Martti Tiuri, professor of radio technology, was also interviewed (Tiuri had been involved in the development of television technology in Finland since the pioneering TV broadcasts of 1955).
3. Also, in that it was presented by a television company as a television programme, television was itself subject, object and medium of the exercise – but issues around this are not the focus here.
4. See Taisto Hujanen on transitions models (in Heikki Kerkelä, this volume).
5. On the first Finnish broadcasts see, for example, 'Hypnoosia, laulua, teatteria ensimmäisessä televisiolähetyksessämme', *Helsingin Sanomat* 25 May 1955; Wiio (1955: 226–227).
6. On the Geneva conference, see Paju 2003: 18–21; on the history of Soviet space technology, see Kohonen 2003: 5–19.
7. 'Free World Strategy in the Sputnik Age', *The Times* 8 November 1957.
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11. 'Russian Television by Satellite', *The Times* 30 October 1967.
12. See, for example, Rosenzweig (1998: 1530–1552); also Gere (2002: 67–68). For a more comprehensive view on the early history of the Internet, see Abbate (1999).
13. 'Russia Seeks Restrictions on World Television', *The Times* 11 August 1972.

14. These were covered most in the fourth 'Science and Technology' section under 'Other Considerations' Part III (hence 'third basket') of the second Document of the Helsinki Declaration (following the main Principles), which dealt with the intention to improve cooperation in 'Computer, communication and information technologies', specifically in the 'Development of computers as well as of telecommunications and information systems; technology associated with computers and telecommunications, including (…) the collection, processing and dissemination of information'. At: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/osce/basics/finact75.htm.
15. Quoted in 'Soviet Computer Network Sought', *The Times* 18 January 1965.
16. E.g. Suominen (2000: 167).
17. *Salora. TV-Video 1983* 1983: 9. On the advertising of Salora in the 1970s and 80s, see Salmi (2001: 111–122).

SEPPO KANGASPUNTA AND TAISTO HUJANEN

7. Intermediality in User's Discourses about Digital Television

Introduction

This paper deals with users' experience of the main digital switch-over of Finnish television in 2007. The users' interpretation of this experience is identified here as the intermedially oriented re-articulation of television. First, the context of digital television in Finland is briefly described. Then, as a framework for the analysis of research data, the digitalisation of television is conceptualized in terms of theories about media change and related to constructions of media forms. The analysis itself is divided into two major parts; one looks at the discussion on digital TV in relation to the 'old' television, and the other at dimensions characterised as 'intermedial use' and 'intermedially oriented relationship' with the medium.

The digital switch-over of television in Finland

After a period of tests, the digitalisation of distribution and reception of television in Finland started in August 2001. That introduced a

process of transition and transformation which lasted altogether six years. In September 2007, the terrestrial distribution and reception turned fully digital and Finland became the first country in the world to switch off its terrestrial (broadcast) analog transmissions. Parallel to that, cable companies started reducing their analog channel supply. By March 2008, cable distribution and reception had also gone fully digital.

The Finnish model of digitalisation did not follow the normal process of media evolution. Like many states and international organizations, the Finnish government and authorities were active in making decisions which aimed in particular at enforcing the digitalisation of terrestrial television. As such, the process can be characterised as an enforced transition, applying Urrichio's (2004: 30–31) distinction between transition and media evolution.

As an action, the Finnish model of a total digital transition represented the hard form of media policy, especially, with respect to media technology which still was highly incomplete and untested. A lot of defective equipment was available in the market. Over 70 percent of households had some sort of technical problems in digitalisation. State authorities and other decision makers in respect to digitalisation did not listen to consumers' problems. The user research showed that digitalisation as such was seen reasonable, but people were critical to the way the process was implemented. A section of consumers responded by just fully skipping television. As a result of the switch-over, the share of households without a television set grew from five to eight per cent (Finnpanel 2009).

Digital television was considered as a part of the Finnish information society project. It was marketed as an important new dimension of information society. Digital television was characterised as an interactive medium in which television and the Internet go hand-in-hand. Promises were big and expectations high. The new media hype made 'interactivity' a key slogan for digital television which, however, turned out to be a misleading utopia and illusion.

The ground-breaking transition of digitalisation seemed to shrink to a small extension of the old television. First, a number of channels were added to antenna households. Later, the breakthrough of terrestrial-distributed pay television heralded a broader transition; the same applied to the growing popularity of recording set-top boxes and the consequent free selection of viewing time. Finally, user research reported multi-media oriented media consumption which gave birth to new media practices.

Digital television in the context of media change

When considering television as an object of study, Allen (2004: 12) constructs a strong contrast between the 'state' of television in the 1970s and 80's and the present-day digital television. Television varied considerably from nation to nation, which is why the golden era of analog television is often characterised as national television. Experientially, writes Allen, television was understood to be a private (as opposed to public) and hence domestic medium. Because of scarce programme supply and normally only one receiver per household, family viewing became a norm.

The 'state' of television changed constantly during the course of 1980s and 90s because of rapid and unpredictable technological, institutional and economic change (ibid.). Towards 2000 the changes accelerated, and a long list of new dimensions were needed when trying to define television. Allen's list includes multiple and proliferating channels, multiple transmission systems, multiple simultaneous viewing options, remote control devices, multiple television sets in the home, the use of the television set for playing video games, home production of video via camcorders, streaming of video via broadband internet… and the list continues (op. cit.: 16).

The above kind of transformation of television which, following Bolter and Grusin (2000: 184–195), could be characterized as

the ‘remediation’ of television: the change of media form is what the digitalisation of television is all about. The point of this paper is to ask how people transform the medium of television in their intermedially oriented user practices to something new which can be identified as a new media form and practice. This kind of medium theory acts in a loose sense as a framework for this paper. The question is not only about the medium of television as technical equipment, but also as a mediator and as (a collection of) social and cultural practices.

Uricchio (2004: 30–31) points out that some moments of media change are more revealing than others. He lists as examples the ‘birth’ of media forms, when technological possibility finds systematic deployment as media practice, and the dramatic re-purposing of media systems like radio’s shift from an individuated two-way communication system to a broadcast system. The most relevant of his examples for the analysis of digitalisation of television is the intermedial redefinition of media which concerns digital technology’s implications for the sound and/or image media of music, photography, film and television.

What was above, with reference to Allen, described as the change of television’s media form, can now be defined as intermedial redefinition of the medium of television. Uricchio makes also an important conclusion concerning what he calls ‘discursive evidence regarding perceived media capacities, anticipated use patterns, and intermedial relations’ (op. cit.: 31). His point is that certain moments of media change are rich in discursive evidence challenging the ‘take-for-grantedness’ that under normal circumstances tends to blind us to the possibilities inherent in a particular medium and the processes by which social practice gradually privileges one vision of the medium over others. That is exactly the point why the kind of user interviews collected in the context of the digital switch-over of television are useful material in considering television’s changing character as a medium.

Research methodology and results

The research data to be analysed and discussed in this paper was collected shortly prior to and following the digital switch-over of terrestrial television in Finland in September 2007. The data consist of interviews in 30 different families (including a total of 70 family members) in six communities, and with four mentor groups assisting people with digitalisation problems. The data can be characterised as a reception study with a focus on consumers' intermedially oriented media use and media relationship. Question topics included the ways in which people experienced the switch-over and how they constructed intermedial relationships in their discourse. The approach was qualitative in nature. In this paper, the following three dimensions of the research are considered: digital television in relation to the 'old' television, television in the context of intermedial user practice, and television in the context of intermedially oriented medium relationship.

The intermedial user practice is the point of view which opens up the link to what was above termed the 'intermedial redefinition' of television. This is also a link to the focus of the major project on intermediality, the background of the present book, within which this study was originally conducted. In the context of the major study, this study was entitled '*Intermedial Re-articulations of Television in the Digital Switch-Over*'.

A useful approach for the understanding of re-articulations is offered by Moscovici's notion of social representations, which refer to joint, everyday understandings of objects among a community of people: issues raised concern a system of values, ideas and practices. According to Moscovici, thinking is not only an internal activity of the human brain, but also, or rather, communal communicative action. He speaks of a 'thinking society' in which its members play an active and intelligent role (Moscovici 1984).

The basic function of a social representation is to make a new, alien and unknown thing or object familiar and close to people. This comprises two central processes: 'anchoring' and 'objectification' (op

cit: 3–39). In anchoring, an unknown item is connected to (as part of) the old way of understanding by linking it through familiar concepts and categories with known contexts. With objectification, sensory experiences and sensory as well as symbolic interpretations are linked with an originally alien and abstract concepts and through that the item made into an object of concrete thinking. Moscovici points out that representations are not only verbal (or, more widely, depictions using words and images [at least], and by more literal-realist or metaphorical-symbolic means) but are materialised in social practices and rituals. Anchoring and objectification, as defined by Moscovici, are useful tools for analysis for this study when considering the intermedial re-definition of television in people's media practices.

Problems feed fear of technology

Analysis of the research showed that the way interviewees described digital television in relation to old television was dependent on their age, or place in the life-cycle and, in particular, on the periods of television that they had experienced. Ellis (2000) characterises the historical periods of television as three eras, named 'scarcity', 'availability' and 'the era of plenty'. How much of this history the interviewees had lived through clearly affected their interpretations of the present. The older generations were suspicious of the reform, while the younger ones had more positive expectations. Another division was related to whether people lived in antenna or cable households. The former experienced the change as more significant.

The change of standards in the distribution and reception of television forced users to deliberate not only about digitalisation but also about the relationship between the new television and the old analog television. For many older people and for those who can be identified as 'late adopters' – the two groups coincided to a significant degree, it was older people who tended to hold out against digital later and vice

versa – digital technology appeared problematic, mysterious, unnecessary. They were anguished by the continuous technological change, and their answers reflected a distancing: 'I should not bother myself with this.' Like a 70-year old lady from the town of Nokia, they said that they were 'not keen on new things', there was 'no need for such fine things', and it was 'good enough when things work like now.'

This attitude reflects outsider experience and distancing. Older people and late adopters[1] were most often negative to the digital switch-over. They articulated the switch-over in terms of enforcement and too quick a speed of development. Even the need for a change questioned (Kangaspunta 2008: 7–8). For these people, the old was simply better. Their fatalism and fear of technology was expressed in the attitude, 'Whatever's done, everything will change'. Fears of learning and mastering the new technology intensified the problems of adoption. The mentor groups consulted for the research stated that they often met older people with this kind of technology fear.

In a study concerning the British digital switch-over, the most problematic consumer group was identified as the 'reluctant 50 percent'. This group consisted of older people, late adopters and the reluctant (Mackay 2007: 33, 43–45) Also in Finland, late adopters have been characterised by different attributes, such as with the notion of '*hidastelijat*' (hangers-back) in a report by the Ministry of Communication (Lvm 2002).

In our research, a 76-year old lady and a late adopter from the community of Pälkäne, reported experiencing digital television as difficult because 'the set was allowed to make tricks'. Her relationship with the television equipment became insecure and the whole reform became, as she put it, 'worsening'. The reason behind this was that there was no control over the retail sale of set-top boxes in Finland and, as a consequence, there were a lot of unsuitable devices on the market – and this state of affairs continued through almost the whole transition process. The loose policies and practices of actors in the digital television market and failure to intervene or regulate on the part of the authorities ensured that consumers suffered. Problems appeared

in 71 percent of households, altogether. Nevertheless, and somewhat surprisingly perhaps in the light of these implementation difficulties, research conducted by the Office of Communication found that users rated digitalisation positively (Viestintävirasto 2/2007).

The evidence gathered by our research also showed that late adopters in particular protested by skipping television viewing altogether, at least for a while. Another (no doubt intersecting) group of consumers was identified as those who (illegally) stopped paying the television license fee (again, at least for a while). The share of people who completely opted out and did not watch or even (necessarily) own a television was reported to have grown from 5 per cent in 2002 to 8 per cent in 2008 (Finnpanel 2009).

To summarise the views of respondents in this study, the technical problems of digital television strongly characterized their dissatisfaction, and this independently of the categorizations made of interviewees. Some respondents considered the digital switch-over as part of a major process of convergence. One 60-year old lady was critical of the enforced buying of 'these digital miracle devices' and compared it with the electricity company that delivered an automatic electricity meter free of charge to her house – a comparison representing what can be characterised as 'inter-technological' argumentation.

The promise of interactivity unrealised

In the beginning, digital television was marketed in Finland as a multimedia centre for the home – an interactive, converged medium, delivering Internet services through television. The new media hype raised 'interactivity' as the key word for digital television (Kangaspunta 2006) – just as, it may be noted, 'interactive' has become a buzzword generally, including outside the media world.[2]

Many adult interviewees saw only minor results in the digital reform that finally transpired as compared to expectations, a feeling

that seemed to be generalised irrelevant of adopter category. Innovators and early adopters were more interested in the reform and enthusiastic about the new kind of interactive television, but they were doomed to disappointment. An example is the 45-year old father in the Pälkäne community who had had strong expectations of digitalisation but felt that these were realised by the Internet, not television. His family generally had a positive attitude towards technical innovations, and demonstrated what might be termed a pragmatic relationship to media; new technologies made life easier and they tended to adopt them early on. They owned several television sets including the so-called 'second-round' set-top boxes, one of which could record. The man thought that a major reform was on its way that would concern most of all the intermedially oriented user practices of television and the Internet (or computers).

Digital television was mis-marketed, said many interviewees. A 30-year old woman from the town of Porvoo thought that the interactivity argument was misleading, because one could not send information back directly, meaning an inbuilt return channel. Many informants had been keenly waiting for added interactive services, but to no avail. The marketed digital vision included three phases; enhanced television, interactive television, and television as a gate-way to the Internet. In Finland, marketing concentrated on the two latter phases, which were also what captured the attention of the mass media. The third-phase, digital television, represented a vision of a new kind of media combination, a hybrid in nature. The hype over these digital visions lasted a few years, public and consumer enthusiasm falling flat with the delay of functioning mhp-boxes and lack of a functioning return channel. Digitalisation of television remained at the first phase, enhanced television (Kangaspunta 2006).

In the middle of the digital switch-over, expectations of interactivity were still strong. A 34-year old man from Porvoo thought that the fate of interactivity might be like that of 3G mobile services. The Wap technology remained something of a bubble because of missing services and contents, although the technology was working. In

contrast, ready tailored interactive services for digital television were developed, but the technology and television operators were not ready to make use of them.

For a couple from Nokia, aged 26 and 29 years, interactivity seemed to be lost, although they thought that sending SMS messages to the *Big Brother* programme represented decently working interactivity. They would not use interactive services based on a direct return channel in the digital television, because they already had a broad-band connection at home. Having Internet services in digital television was a foolish idea, they thought. Even teletext services were only occasionally used by them.

A 34-year old man from Porvoo with work experience in television had given up on interactivity, because he saw it as 'huuhaa', a strong, disparaging expletive (something like 'rubbish' in English). Who would like to hang around teletext pages, when the Internet was available? The next feedback technology for him would be a set combining an ADSL box (giving Internet and television feeds) and a computer with a big screen and keypad. He had a friend who had constructed just such a combination for himself.

Video tape destroyed

According to Allen's (2004) list (above), the new millennium brought with it new characteristics for television like a quantitative and qualitative proliferation of channels, availability of international channels, and, especially, the dimension of theme and group-targeted channels. In addition, the new television enabled prolonged viewing, supplied on-demand and pay-TV services and offered new options for recording and archiving. Also, television viewing outside the home, in public spaces, increased. The dominant feature in Allen's view was a 'constant, rapid, and unpredictable technological, institutional, and economic change' (op. cit.: 16).

Allen (ibid.) asserted that (in the USA) video tape recorders had been surpassed by DVD only in 2001. The main commercial development of DVD came in the late 1990s and was much quicker than in the case of VCR. In five years between 1997 and 2002, more than 30 million households in the United States purchased DVD player. When this was complemented by a computer-like recording capacity in digital television, the VCR/VHS ended. In addition to recording, the digital set-top box enables prolonged viewing even in boxes without a recording capacity.[3]

VCR/VHS had a major impact on television viewing upon its arrival in Finnish homes (Kortti 2007). The rapid displacement of video tapes by recording set-top boxes, computers and DVDs surprised many people, and several interviewees regretted the change. A video tape archive or a small video library had appeared in many homes. Tapes were actively used for both recording and viewing. A young couple in Nokia estimated that they had in their cupboard more than one hundred cassettes; they also had a list of videos on their computer. The (29-year old) man thought that (pre-recorded, television company produced) videos could be completely skipped once one could search and watch the series in the net or DVD. They were waiting for more highly developed recording set-top boxes.

Although interviewees hardly had any knowledge of digitalization in other countries, many wondered about the curiosities of Finnish media policy in the digital switch-over. A father (44 years) of three from Porvoo was irritated by the solution of one set-top box per television, which became expensive and bothersome for a larger family. He preferred the solution of one set-top box per household (i.e. linking several TV sets), and thought that it should be technically possible: 'If man goes to the moon, why shouldn't such a set-top box be possible?' He pointed out that manufacturers of home appliances had an interest in speedy returns.

Enthusiasm for prolonged viewing

According to Hirsch (2004), there are both established and new forms in the domestication of consumption of technologies. Domestication normally encourages people to apply both strategies. In respect of the digitalisation of television, therefore, it is important to evaluate the extent to which this changed old practices and how much it brought in new ones.

The Finnish data introduced here shows that the use of universal channels changes slowly. At the time of the interviews of this research (in summer 2007), the older age groups typically followed four main channels, but the younger ones watched also more target oriented channels like *Subtv* and *Voice*. According to the Finnpanel (2009) data, the share of the older and established TV channels run by the public service broadcaster YLE and its main commercial competitors (MTV Media and Nelonen Media) ran to 90 percent of all television viewing. On average, Finnish people watched five channels per day and nine channels per week. In 2001, before digitalisation, the average was five channels a week.

Pantzar and Shove (2006: 13) point out that objects and practices of consumption are not only born and developed but also fade and die. The research on consumption has mainly concentrated on the birth of practices and innovations, and problems of dissolution and 'fossilisation' have stayed outside the mainstream. People create new practices, become used to them, but also abandon them.

There is a big cultural gap between the generations in media consumption and competence. Media use is in the middle of a major transition, of which the practice of prolonged viewing, which makes it possible to pause viewing and continue later, is a good example. The research evidence on this practice is still scarce, but there is already data on the impact of the recording capacity of set-top boxes. The Finnpanel (2009) survey entitles the result 'Recording set-top boxes increase television user comfort'.

The main share of television viewing continued to consist of live programming, with news, current affairs and sport as main examples. According to Finnpanel's evaluation, in the case of some programmes, watching recorded material had already increased total viewing time by 30 to 50 per cent. The most popular recorded materials were foreign and domestic series. Typically the recorded programmes were viewed within 24 hours of the original transmission. The practice was most popular among the 25–44 age group and in families with children.

In our research data, there were few direct references to the above kind of changes in viewing practices. But the visions and expectations expressed demonstrated that one could forecast a change in a similar direction. The most common vision was to connect television and computer. Many families interviewed had considered the idea of watching television through computer, and, indeed, expected to do so. Many hoped for the option of an on-demand subscription to programmes, particularly through the Internet. The connection of television and the Internet would also enable the creation and use of personal programme archives.

Towards intermedia use

The references to 'intermedia' or 'polymedia' use with a number of attributes were common in our research data. In a family from Porvoo, for example, a 34-year old man and 30-year old woman, representing late adopters, used to check the TV pages of newspapers and the web page of *Big Brother*. Both said that they had stayed with *Big Brother* despite skipping watching the programme itself. They also read about the key events in this reality show in a free circulation newspaper, *Metro*, the popular afternoon papers and weekend section *NYT* of the biggest newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*. The woman pointed out that it was important to know about *Big Brother* for making friends and following things generally. The web page information about almost

all programmes was enough, she thought, to keep one up-to-date and able to join in coffee-table chats, even if one skipped actually watching the programmes themselves.

Using the Internet for watching television was common among the interviewees, but only one reported having tried digital streaming of television channels by inserting a TV card into a PC. Following television through the Internet offered clear bonuses, like background information about programmes. The couple from Porvoo was an interesting case of intermedial use; they followed television but did not own a television set prior to the switch-over. When contacted later in February 2008, they reported having purchased a TV set.

It seems that television is an important factor in motivating people toward intermedial use. In this sense, the data reflects televisualisation, a factor, which Herkman (2005: 264–269) connects with television's impact on newspapers, in particular, the popular papers which in Finland are identified as afternoon papers. Televisualisation and audiovisualisation of the Internet are also apparent; including web versions of the newspapers. Some newspapers characterize their web pages as 'web television', but others avoid reference to television, although the content might consist of only moving images, videos or video portals (Mäenpää and Männistö 2009: 101–102). Most newspapers describe the audiovisual supply of their web pages as 'net TV' or simply 'videos'.

In our research data, the discourse on intermedial use was frequent. Television channels have brought and created services for the Internet that have accelerated the use of television services through the Internet. The consequent new user practices reflect that television as equipment has lost some of its previous importance. An interesting programme and related content is followed independent of source and technology.

The web pages of *Pikku Kakkonen* (*The Little Two*), one of the most traditional public service children's programmes on TV2, were known to many young families. One such, for example, was a three-member family from Nokia that lived in a terrace house but dreamed

of a villa. Their interest in house construction programmes and associated web pages had turned almost into a hobby, reminiscent of the cross-media interest orientation of the Porvoo family without a television (above).

The 29-year old woman in the family said that she visited the web page of the television programme *Sillä silmällä* (*Queer Eye for the Straight Guy*) just for a quick look. The man (30) explained about the web pages of the house construction programmes, like *Remontti Reiska*.[4] He had also found a good construction programme (*Paikat kuntoon*[5]) on the web page of the local TV station TV-Tampere. In *Remontti Reiska* a house is built and viewers can vote on, for example, the selection of roof material. The couple also used the web pages of food and cooking programmes when looking for recipes.

Situation in life influences viewing. In interviewed families with children, the youngest watched *Pikku Kakkonen* (*The Little Two*) and somewhat older *The Simpsons*, with adults. Digital television brought more channels and target group channels in particular. The web pages of many channels and programmes offer archives and links. In this way, the Internet extends channels and programmes to cross-media and, consequently, digitalisation increases intermedial use.

The middle-aged parents of a family in Pälkäne did not read print newspapers, but occasionally followed net versions of newspapers. Television was their dominant medium and it was on continuously. The woman watched all the soaps. They actively visited the web pages of television channels and programmes. Their use of the Internet at home was changed in part because of the increased Internet use of their teenage children (14 and 17-year old sons). Both parents had a college education and used a computer and the Internet at work.

Consumers are inventive and creative. They employ devices for several uses and make combinations of them to suit their own purposes. An example is a retired woman from Helsinki who not only was keen to use her computer to chat with friends through Skype connection, but was also able to link her computer to the television in order to screen photos of a joint event for her hobby community.

The above example not only demonstrates intermedial use but also the new role of women in the domestication of media technology. For instance, the 30-year old woman from Porvoo felt ready to skip the television set and purchase instead a digital stick for her computer. She took care of all the media equipment in the home and was considering setting up a separate media room where they would be able to watch programmes with a video projector. The idea reflected criticism towards the viewing routines of her family; television was on all night regardless of whether anyone was watching it or not. Her media use was divided according to content. When searching for daily news she turned to the net version of *Helsingin Sanomat* and to YLE's web page, but for more background she looked in the print newspaper.

Cross-over, side-by-side and parallel to each other

Established media practices represent often people's media rituals which they inherit in their childhood environment. Typically, in Finland at least, it is only when starting their own families that people may change their consumption habits. However, even inside the family setting children and young people often have clearly different media practices from their parents (Noppari et al. 2008: 30–37, 39–53, 152–154, 165–166, Inkinen 2005: 12). The new media practices are typically cross-media oriented, the older ones more media specific.

Herkman says that the media reality of Finnish children and young people changed in the 1990s both for content and technology. Regarding content, the main change concerned the role of television and film, while in the case of technology, the change was characterised by the breakthrough of three media technologies: console and computer games, the Internet and mobile phones. These new technologies now constitute the media environment of children and young people, side-by-side with (traditional) television and other media. (Herkman 2001: 60–61.)

The media use of children and young people illuminates new literacies and practices which their parents do not necessarily recognise in their own experience. Several media operate in parallel to each other, and usage of this kind of simultaneous (poly-media) facility is widespread among children and young people. When using a computer, one may listen to music from another source; when watching television one may at the same time read magazines (Noppari et al. 2008, 40). Lankshear and Knobel describe this kind of activity as 'multitasking' – although 'multimediatasking' might be better – to mean a 'poly-media' and 'poly-sense' activity based on glancing and absent-minded consumption (Lankshear and Knobel 2007: 14–15, Noppari et al. 2008: 40).

Among the interviewees, especially the younger ones, many reported using media in a cross-over and side-by–side style, including simultaneously. The under 20s reported playing music from the Internet or radio while doing their homework and other activities. Television was often on in the background. A 17-year old from Pälkäne used digital television as radio, switched it on in the morning and listened to YLE's youth channel YleX as a background for morning activities.

A retired 60-year old man from Nokia was a real TV freak, for whom television also acted as a 'cross-medium'. His outlook, despite his age, was exceptionally intermedia oriented. His media day opened by switching on the television upon waking up; during morning activities, one television set was on, normally YLE's TV1, like a radio for many others to which the man might listen simultaneously. He was the only interviewee to mention digital radio, to which he also had listened. After morning activities, the man read a local newspaper and thereafter checked teletext services. He went through all TV1's 300 teletext pages and then switched to MTV3, Nelonen and Subtv, representing commercial competitors of the public service YLE.

During the day-time the man often watched videos, but in the evening 'started the real thing'. His viewing rituals were exceptional: in the evening at least three television sets were on, and at most five. He watched mainly one of the sets, but glanced at the others also. For

a while would he put on a DVD or a video. 'Such a mixed cocktail it is.' What did he watch? His diet was of a full menu style; news, current affairs, documentaries, series, entertainment, sport, whatever.

The man articulated the significance of television in terms of intermedial and hybrid characterisation. 'That one package gives me news, music, radio programmes, morning paper (teletext) and the programmes of the day.' He consulted the web pages of television channels when a new programme was to be introduced. The man's media use practices combined in a personal way the old established rituals and newly developed practices (cf. Hirsch 2004). The man had an enormous archive of CDs and VHS tapes: video tapes were still in active use. His list of future purchases included a recording set-top box. In addition, he had a big folder of descriptions about new Nokia mobile phones, which helped him to keep track of developments in the mobile world.

About the construction of medium relationship

The background for people's medium relationship lies in their life history and, as with life itself, continuously changes and transforms. The interviews reported here showed that people's relationship to media was challenged by the launch of a new medium for the market. The same person and family might turn out to be an early adopter of one medium but a late adopter of another. The consumption culture of each generation frames their medium relationship. Our data points out that the articulation of a medium relationship varied not only by age but also by life situation. The clearest peak of television viewing appeared with the birth of the first child in a family, when the child acted as a mediator and gave a rhythm for viewing. Another peak was brought on by retirement, when the viewing became ritualised and gave a rhythm to everyday life.

Historically, the eras characterised by the long history of newspapers, radio and television each resulted in a certain level of dominant identification with a specific medium. Media-related rituals and fan relationships were formed. Consumers identified themselves as newspaper people, radio freaks and fans of television, consciously and unconsciously. The medium relationship was clear.

With new media and digitalisation, however, the variety of media proliferated and the identification changed character. It is not, any more, about identification with a particular medium but rather with certain programmes, content, services, and activities. The users follow their favourite content across different media, and the medium itself remains a pure mediator. This corresponds to what the Danish media scholar Klaus Bruhn Jensen argues about the increased importance of modalities like genres in the context of networked media and communications (Jensen 2010: 85–87).

The above transformation applies in particular to children, young people and young adults (people below 35). They follow their favourite genres and objects of interest and search for information across several media, according to varying situations and needs. Their media use is cross-media oriented and intermedial. The establishment of a new medium relationship requires continuous use. The younger generations use the Internet continuously, albeit sometimes irregularly. The signs of their changing medium relationships are clear and numerous.

The adults of the three-member family in Nokia, living in an antenna household, considered their media use and medium relationship as follows. They still followed the news through newspapers, but checked daily the net versions of afternoon papers. They thought the information in the net was quick but superficial, as often in television news. The family owned a basic DVD player, a set-top box and a PC which was due to be renewed. The wife had a communicator which offered an access to the Internet, a source mainly for checking bus time-tables.

A special feature of the argumentation among younger generations was spatiality, particularly in relation to the Internet. They visited services like *You Tube*, *IRC Gallery*, *Habbo Hotel*, identified as spaces, including chat rooms and hobby groups. Their media relationship was characterised by communication, messaging, playing games and action in the social media. Among the older adults, the relationship with new media technology depended most clearly on whether they used a computer in their work or not. For young people, the most apparent factors were their relationships with parents, school and friends and the income level of the family. In school, the young people learnt basic knowledge and practice about computers, but playing games, net surfing and similar activities opened up in the circle of friends. In our research data, all interviewed young people had that opportunity.

A typical intermedia user seemed to be acquainted and felt safe with the new media technology. Discursively the relationship was relaxed, despite the technical problems of the digital switch-over and particularly in cases of self-critical understatements, typical to many female interviewees. The use and competence defined the relationship with media technology. If computer competences were low, the relationship with technology was distant. On the other hand, intermedial use increased competence and resulted in a stronger relationship with the new media; which again reduced the resistance to and/or difficulty of adopting ever more new media and technologies.

The intermedially oriented medium relationship increased the potentials of media users for the information society. It narrowed the digital gap in which some late adopters and the old people remained because of the enforced digital switch-over. The 'consumer-citizens' of the information society are supposed to be able to use the developed information technology.

From the point of view of children's information technology competences, the media environment of the interviewed families was rather rich and multi-faceted. Children generally had good competences and their role in the family turned up-side down compared to the family viewing, where the father mastered the remote control and

dominated knowledge of technology. As our data illuminates, today the dominant role may go to the woman in the family or even more probably to the younger generation.

Conclusion

The research data presented here shows that overall, the interviewees saw digitalisation in a positive light, but at the same time the way the switch-over was implemented in Finland, with many unsolved technological problems, was strongly criticised. The unrealised promises and expectations of interactivity were a disappointment. The way interviewees articulated the relationship between the old television and the new digital television was dependent on whether they lived within the terrestrial antenna system or in a cable household. The former had, in general, a more positive view of digitalisation.

Children, young people and the younger adults articulated digitalisation in the most positive terms. Employing Moscovici's categories, one can say that they objectified digital television with references to several new media. The 60s typically preferred the old system; it was considered reliable and better. As to the categorisation of adopters, the late adopters were most suspicious of the reform. The argumentation of the older generations reflected a fear of technology and change. They emphasised the reliability and other good aspects of the old technology. The younger ones were more proactive in their relationship with technology. They wanted often to tailor digital TV and other media to their own needs. Also their media environment was more developed and multi-faceted than in the case of older generations.

Media use is changing remarkably through digitalisation. The repertoire of media use expands continuously towards a more intermedially oriented use. Our data show that the use of digital television is still based on established conventions, but that intermedial use and orientation increases parallel to that. There are big differences in the

media practices of different generations. Older people act according to the old conventions, while the young change their practices continuously. The latter ones follow television programmes through several media, side-by-side. The televisualisation of afternoon papers makes it easy to follow the events and characters of TV shows through newspapers. The use of the web pages of channels and programmes also becomes more common. In addition to age, the life situation of the interviewed families strongly framed their media practices.

The circulation of media content is increasingly participatory of nature (Jenkins 2006, 3). Rather than talking about media producers and consumers as occupying separate roles, writes Jenkins, we might now see them as participants who interact with each other according to a new set of rules that none of us fully understands. The new participatory media culture contrasts with older notions of passive media spectatorship (ibid.). This kind of participatory culture was clearly visible in the research data. The younger generations objectified digital television by linking it with attributes, images and visual as well as symbolic interpretations of the new media conventions and practices. This kind of articulation was central in their intermedial orientation. Media were used in a crossover fashion, side-by-side, simultaneously, and with a continuous comparison of uses and content.

Digital television was articulated as an 'intermedial hybrid'. The use of and talk about digital television reflected its hybrid nature in several ways; it was used for viewing and listening, as a teletext service and also as game equipment and for screening DVDs. The hybrid dimensions characterised the intermedially oriented user relationship. Television was followed not only through a television set but also through PC and the Internet, and intertextually on radio and on the web pages of newspapers. The time shift dimension of television viewing is increasing with the use of recordings, prolonged viewing and video-on-demand services as well as through DVDs. The ritualistic use of television based on the daily rhythm of the programme flow is breaking down.

Intermedial use demonstrated a relaxed medium and technology relationship. The so-called ‘Diderot effect’, of good competences in one technology making it easier to master another, was reflected in the articulation of the interviewees. The constitution of cross-media oriented media relationships and the consequently relaxed relationship with technology increased the users’ information society competence. In so far as people managed to deal with the challenges of the new technology, they remained connected, as it were, on the safe side of the digital gap which threatens to widen because of the growing speed of changes.

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Endnotes

1. The category 'late adopter' is taken from Rogers' model concerning the diffusion of innovations (Rogers 2003: 155–157, 282–286).
2. Activities for the public to engage with at museums, for example, are regularly termed 'interactive' – indicating the transposition of digital culture to the framing role of a medial discourse of society.
3. Today, TV Everywhere, a new form of Digital Video Recording is spreading based on ideas of cloud computing. It enables distant viewing of centrally stored personal video recordings through an Internet connection.
4. The name can be translated to '*Renovation Reiska*' – the notion of Reiska characterises a male who is skilled to fix things.
5. The name could be translated to '*How to Fix Your Places*'.

III

INTERMEDIAL ANALYSES OF MEDIA CHANGE

PAAVO OINONEN

8. Intermedial Hosting in the Making: A Case from Finnish 1960s Television

From presenter to host

From the earliest years of broadcasting, the presenter has been an important part of programming. In the 1930s, when the US NBC network started to adapt Hollywood films for radio, the focus was as much on the presenter as the actual play. In these transmissions, the entire structure of the programme was created around a presenting personality (Hilmes 1990: 91). Despite the differences between the organisational and financial bases of broadcasting companies in the US and Europe, they had the same need for a distinctive presenter or host. The presenter was seen as a guarantee the public would be entertained.

In Finland, the public service broadcasting company – Yleisradio – increased the supply stream of radio entertainment in the 1950s, but the crucial change came after the launch of television in the beginning of the next decade. The presenter then became more central than before. An early Finnish textbook for electronic media journalists noted, for instance, that if the presenter chooses the role of activator, he

will probably become the focus of the whole programme (Miettunen 1967: 111–112). The 1960s was the era when a presenter began to evolve into a modern media host – a character who, after a few good years, had a justifiable claim to having his or her name included in the programme title.

Many other changes followed when TV entertainment grew and producers created new programme models while making good use of the patterns from media past. Key TV practices date back to the era of radio entertainment. In this respect, I will leave aside talk-show hosts or formats, for that story has already been told, and instead focus on programmes where the host had a more ceremonial role. Referring to radio, media historian Michele Hilmes (1990: 91) calls that role the 'emcee-host'.[1] When we look at the historical roots of the host and hosting, however, we can see the basis for further changes, specified later on, in the intermedial media environment.

When television burgeoned, some radio presenters took up career opportunities on television. In this article, I will examine two Finns who switched media and soon became multifaceted entertainment performers in various media: Niilo Tarvajärvi (1919–2002) and Pertti 'Spede' Pasanen (1931–2001). These two men were of substantial significance in early Finnish television programming, hosts who were often later recalled by audiences and compared to later professionals.

Both started out their careers as journalists and presenters in Yleisradio. A former army captain, Tarvajärvi worked as a producer and a presenter in 'Light Entertainment'. After several minor assignments, he began in 1950 his most famous and successful programme series, *Tervetuloa aamukahville* [Welcome to Breakfast], an adaptation of *Frukostklubben* from Swedish radio. When Tarvajärvi moved on to work for Yleisradio's television in 1959, Pasanen actually replaced him in radio Light Entertainment. As it turned out, Pasanen worked quite differently from Tarvajärvi, who had been a garrulous radio host interviewing politicians and other members of society's elite. In contrast, Pasanen had his own style of entertainment – including segments like *Ruljanssiriihi* [Rigmarole Barn] and *Hupiklubi* [Amusement Club]

– and became an unlikely star with a somewhat ludicrous representation. His nickname Spede became an emblem for absurd comedy.

These radio presenters assuredly moved to television work because of better salaries and favourable prospects, but the shift should also be understood as a change in the media field. As television transmission expanded, the host as an employee was no longer dependent on one electronic medium; he was actually working on the expanding media market.

Although the field of electronic media was strictly regulated and operating on a small scale in Finland, the change was still important. For example, it is well known that Finnish magazines reacted quickly to the arrival of television; new TV celebrities ended up as material for their feature articles. Despite the fears of the press, the papers still sold well in the 1960s; a new kind of popular media was evolving. It grew more aggressive than the predecessor in the business (Malmberg 1991: 151–152). While the associated kinds of intrusive publicity annoyed TV personalities, it was self-evident that the phenomenon was useful and important in manifesting their market value. The Finnish media environment in the 1960s was the period when the two electronic media – radio and television – and print media began forming new and enduring synergies.

In the 1960s, TV hosting in Finland was conceived as a masculine assignment even though female announcers were equally popular. The same situation prevailed on BBC TV, where announcers were mostly women and generally selected on the basis of their visual appeal (Bennett 2011: 72). Female announcers were assigned to welcome viewers, say good night and, above all, to bind the programming together. Male performers, however, received extensive duties in entertainment programmes, in the same way as Niilo Tarvajärvi and Pertti 'Spede' Pasanen. A handsome appearance was not the key issue with them, but rather their fluency and capacity to engage audiences.

Of course, this situation dated back to Finnish radio, a male-dominated institution. Nonetheless, it reflected general employment policy and societal conditions, though these were actually in the middle of a

societal change associated with higher standards of living, workforce participation and emerging full employment (Saarenmaa 2010: 23). This aspect is not further discussed in this article, although it is important to stress that previous research has shown how the treatment of women announcers or celebrities differed from the discourse used regarding males (Elfving 2008, Saarenmaa 2003, 2010). My focus is instead on the formation of the new profession as well as how this development continued and continues in the changing media environment.

I am interested in finding out what kind of meanings evolved in the public (magazines, newspapers, including letters to the editor) around Tarvajärvi and Pasanen when they worked in Finnish media. What competencies and constituencies formed the modern TV host, and how were they articulated? These meanings were constructed in *a media sphere*, as the theories of John Hartley formulate it, where 'various media forms interact with and overlap each other' (Hartley 1996: 78–79). Even more broadly, he talks about the popular reality where journalism, modernity and popular culture encounter each other. These are my conceptual frames, but sometimes I simply use the term 'popular media' to refer to journalism focused on celebrities and media personalities. I am not examining actual programme content, but rather discourse around certain people and their activities. Intermediality is a useful focus concept to describe settings where various media connect together (Lehtonen 2001: 91–96). Methodologically, the concept offers a problem-based approach. It does not specify certain attributes to particular media. The 'intermediality' approach implements forms of analysis by triangulating sources deriving from various empirical materials (Herkman 2008: 158–159). Recognising inter-relations between media underscores the extent of the historical change (Uricchio 2004: 28–32). In addition, 'intermediality' is used here as an operational term to describe a new kind of media-sensitive actor: the intermedial host who works for several media and who is often in the eye of popular media.

Creating sociability

The 1951 annual report of Finnish Yleisradio described the programme *Tervetuloa aamukahville* as a new opening in Light Entertainment. The report said there was a freely talking presenter, short interviews, jovial chat and light music (*Yle tk* 1951: 26–27). The reference to the mode of talk was essential; that was the key change in the programme compared to the former solemn presenters. Yleisradio's children's programmes had used this kind of casual chat before in transmissions of the *Children's Hour*, but Tarvajärvi's programme was intended for an adult audience.

Tervetuloa aamukahville was also live radio broadcast in front of a studio audience. Later, Niilo Tarvajärvi reminisced about how he combined improvised and scripted parts and, as he told it, also used suspense to keep his audience observant. Additionally, Tarvajärvi managed to tease politicians – though in a playful manner – as when he joked about salary increases for Members of the Finnish Parliament (Tarvajärvi 1964: 66–67, 71–72). This kind of teasing talk was unprecedented for a presenter on Finnish radio.

What did all this represent in the context of broadcasting? It exhibited the special sociability of broadcasting, as media historian Paddy Scannell (1996: 23–24) characterises it. According to him, the emergence of sociability was fundamental in broadcasting's transition to a communicative medium. As he notes, a sociable occasion needs to be an event that is original and particular to broadcasting. The foundation of an event like this has to 'produce an interaction between people for its own sake' (ibid.: 24). It is paradoxical that such a performance has to feel spontaneous and relaxed, while achieving the impression of naturalness requires careful management. In the end, spontaneity is an outcome of considerable effort. Scannell proposes a generalisation for this kind of sociable programme format situated in some sort of intimate place. It could be a studio with live audience, and it will need a number of the essentials: *a host*, *participant–performers*, *a live audience* and *absent listeners and viewers* (ibid.: 25).

Scannell's listing reveals how the role of the host actually emerged. He or she is the main character keeping the event in motion and the elements under control. *Tervetuloa aamukahville* included all these components, but Pertti 'Spede' Pasanen's radio programmes had an even more subjective approach. Spede used some actors playing fictional characters in noisy skits, but Pasanen himself was a comic interviewer. Actually, he soon became the emcee-host par excellence remembered – warmly – as a soloist by Antero Alpola, then head of Yleisradio's Light Entertainment (Alpola 1988: 195–196). Tarvajärvi's 'breakfast' transmission needed a studio audience, whereas Pasanen used one only in his series *Ruljanssiriihi* and abandoned it in his next series, *Hupiklubi* (*KU* 19.1.1962). According to him, the influence came from American entertainers like Jerry Lewis and Bob Hope. He defined his style as playing with a crazy kind of topsy-turvy world (*Apu* 8/1969: 4).

Both hosts introduced Finnish audiences to a new kind of media performance which led to inevitable debates for and against them. Tarvajärvi was a gentleman-like and even patriotic figure, whereas Pasanen was exaggerated, noisy and graceless. In the beginning of the 1950s – when there was only one channel – the series *Tervetuloa aamukahville* was scheduled in a Sunday morning slot before the religious programme (most often, the Evangelical-Lutheran service), and some listeners were against this placement of Light Entertainment. Some people complained about the early broadcasting time or expressed their belief that the quality of the performances was not good enough, but the bulk of the feedback was very positive.[2] Years later, a similar debate polarised supporters and opponents when Pasanen began his first own-host series, *Ruljanssiriihi*, in 1959. As could be anticipated, Spede was especially a favourite among young listeners.[3]

In the 1950s, Finnish newspapers fanned discussion about the programmes. From the early years of broadcasting, the publishers had also trialled several special radio magazines. Over time, the steadiest turned out to be *Radiokuuntelija*, aimed at guiding listeners into the realm of radio: first, by offering programme schedules, and second, by

showing the personalities behind the voices. As early as the 1930s, the radio magazine started tracing interesting themes and people worthy of writing. Obviously, the magazine's own letters to the editor gave hints about interesting and irritating personalities as favourable topics for short feature stories. *Radiokuuntelija* then led the way for TV magazines, and in 1957, the publication added the epithet *TV* to its name. The next decade saw the first special TV magazine.

The beginning of 1955 was the time for the hundredth transmission of the *Tervetuloa aamukahville* and for a short feature article in which Tarvajärvi revealed details of the prearrangements and gimmicks he used with guests (*Rk* 1/1955: 6). After Pasanen made his breakthrough in the beginning of the 1960s, he also became a noteworthy main character for a story. In 1962, a feature article characterised Pertti 'Spede' Pasanen's homey, relaxed and quick-witted personality, not forgetting to include his bearded and funny appearance: 'Actually, he could search for the patent to his face: in Finland, there is only one Spede' (*Rk* 34/1962: 4).[4]

Scannell's concept of sociability of broadcasting could well include *absent listeners* and later viewers who wrote in to magazines. Listeners were becoming active, writing to newspapers and discussing programmes in public. Journalists followed, constructing the images of the emerging hosts as big names. A public was formed that found these personalities and their lives more and more interesting and, before long, the visibility in media brought them fame.

This kind of interaction is characteristic of a media sphere in which hosts can attempt to turn their 'immaterial' marketability into 'material' well-being by seeking extra freelancing activities as well as crossing over to TV or appearing on more TV. Indeed, this seems to be a step towards the 'star' intermedial host who is hard to replace. Certainly, executive producers made case-specific replacements when necessary, but programmes were more and more fixed to personalities. Even in the 1970s, the Finnish radio presenter Klaus Thomasson found it difficult to replace Niilo Tarvajärvi who had left Yleisradio (again), this time for his other freelance activities. It was so difficult

to stand in for him because, as Thomasson said, it felt like walking in someone else's shoes (Thomasson 1995: 7).

The unique structure of Finnish television

Finnish radio prospered in the 1950s. It had an almost nationwide audience and a diverse range of programming including some light entertainment. In the middle of radio's heyday, the discussion around television began, changing actions. Everything proceeded quickly, although the launch of television took place later in the Nordic countries than in most of the European states (Hujanen and Weibull 2010: 101).

From the very beginning, there has been a dualism in Finnish public service television. The first regular television transmissions in Finland started in the mid-1950s by private commercial operators on a television network called TES-TV. This action temporarily broke Yleisradio's broadcasting monopoly, and the company hurried to launch its first television channel in 1958. From the start, part of Yleisradio's revenues was based on TV advertising despite the fact that the company itself never had a right to advertising. That was conducted by a private programme company called Mainos-TV [Advertising TV], which regularly delivered a part of its revenues to the public service broadcaster as a payment for airtime (Hujanen 2002: 14, Brown 2005: 224). Finally, in 1964, commercial TES-TV was bought by Yleisradio and constituted the basis for its second channel. Then Finnish television had two channels – TV 1 and TV 2 – and the public broadcasting monopoly was, in a way, re-established. At the same time, the duopoly persisted because Mainos-TV continued its programming and used channels of Yleisradio until 1993 (Hujanen 2002: 14).

The unholy alliance was controversial because the public service company Yleisradio was from top to bottom non-commercial and shared broadcasting time with its partner channel, which was cutting up

its programmes with commercials. As cultural theoretician Raymond Williams (1975: 68) has stated, television was formed divergently in Europe and in the US. From the start, broadcasting in the US was commercial, whereas Europe used state funding. Finnish television featured a combination of both models and was distinctively amateurish, and the airings contained usual intervals including programme announcements. Yleisradio's commercial partner had its own special characteristics, programming policy and transmission with commercial breaks. In addition, Mainos-TV was not allowed to have any kind of news service.

Overall, the two channels of Finnish television were still able to produce a comparatively high number of broadcasting hours and plenty of entertaining contents (Salokangas 2003: 67). This created the urgent need for personnel with abilities as public performers. Raymond Williams has observed how a number of television programmes were based on the earlier forms of game and pastime, and how television entertainment emphasises the central role of a presenter 'who has some precedents in the older masters of ceremonies' (1975: 70–71). At that time, the term *show* – also mentioned by Williams – became a handy epithet in specifying many kinds of entertainment contents, both in the public service and commercial television. This was certainly a term from earlier pastimes, and it had repeatedly appeared especially in US radio, although in that context, the word 'show' with its referent to the visual might not have been the most suitable word for the medium. In the US context, *show* is a common term for any programme.

From the 1950s, the staples of European public service TV light entertainment programmes consisted of *show entertainment*, *quiz* and *game shows* and *talk shows*, such as those media researcher Hanne Bruun describes in her study of Danish programming (Bruun 2005: 143–144). In the 1960s, the repertoire of Finnish TV was similar. Producers were eager to find personalities to host these shows. In Finland, as in the US and Britain earlier, experienced radio comedy stars and their formats were a crucial source of ideas and talent (Neale and Krutnik 1990: 231–232).

In spite of the casual atmosphere in his programmes, Tarvajärvi was not a comedian. Pasanen was a self-schooled actor, however, with an inclination to exaggeration. Both were eager to enhance their standing and their skill-set in media, and television opened up tempting opportunities.

Activating the audience

Finns quickly became interested in the new electronic medium introduced to them. During the first half of the 1960s, the population of 4.2 million Finns obtained almost 150,000 television licences for the right to watch per year (Salokangas 1996: 144). Yleisradio and its partner Mainos-TV prospered and found themselves in great need for interesting contents for growing audiences which were at first remarkably undemanding.

As stated earlier, Tarvajärvi began his TV career in Yleisradio while Pasanen worked from the start in the commercial Mainos-TV. In 1958, Tarvajärvi started his first live TV programme series, *Palapeli* [Puzzle], which contained a game with a studio audience, guests interviewed by the host and some performer(s). One speciality of this series was a charity campaign, which soon became a characteristic of almost all of his TV productions. As a first project, the team organised the collection of Christmas gifts for poor children in the back country of Finland (Tarvajärvi 1964: 117–121). These campaigns, which were announced in the TV shows, were eagerly followed by the Finnish press.

Although the main parts of Tarvajärvi's programmes consisted of games and artistic performances, they also evoked a tendency to try to activate the home audience. The reason for this was partly tactical: it was easier to get funding for the entertainment programme in a public service TV company if it entailed an aspect of charity. This was not, however, different from the way Tarvajärvi acted on Mainos-TV in 1967, as he organised a project which purchased 60 new police cars for Finnish mobile police units (*Aviisi* 12/1987).

By contrast, Spede Pasanen dealt purely with pastimes. He wanted to activate the audience on his own terms. In 1965, in the Mainos-TV series titled *Speden saluuna* [Spede's Saloon], the host challenged an Olympic bronze medallist boxer, Pertti Purhonen, to fight against him. The scheme involved long-term advance advertising in the press and turned out to be a success. Ticket sales at the Helsinki Sport Hall were high, and the ratings of the live broadcast were excellent. As expected, Spede Pasanen suffered a defeat, but he won a boost for his show. To continue the show, Spede Pasanen challenged the winner to play against him in other masculine sports. In the end, the Finnish press got the story it needed, and the host and commercial Mainos-TV increased their audiences (*HS* 22.6.1965, *TS* 23.6.1965). Exposure of this kind was very beneficial for Pasanen. It added to the unexpected nature of the show, and both the live and the television audiences were part of a special event, although the fight had a foregone conclusion.

Antero Alpola, the executive of both Tarvajärvi and Pasanen in Yleisradio, acknowledged their special skills in mastering the action in a live studio and the home audience at once (Alpola 1988: 100–102, 198). In particular, he emphasised Tarvajärvi's talent to carry his TV show with only a few elements, while, as Alpola pointed out, no one noticed this scarcity due to his brilliance (ibid.: 102). Actually, the same quality could describe the comedy shows hosted by Pasanen.

Even so, the very fluffy lightness of these kinds of shows was a special concern for some contemporary Finnish mass communication debaters. In 1960, Veli Virkkunen, a former employee of Yleisradio, studied television production in the US and asked in the Finnish TV magazine *Katso*: 'Do these crowd pleasers have any talent because their entertainment mainly consists of trivial chitchat?' He did not name any particular person as the object of his generalisation, but it could have been, for example, directed towards the popular Finnish host Niilo Tarvajärvi, then a regular on TV. Virkkunen added with disdain that television favoured visual appearance, unlike theatre, which seeks the inner qualities of a human being (*Katso* 12/1960: 8).

The roots of discussions of this kind date back to the conflict between high- and low-brow cultures. These comments are crucial in pinpointing the birth of the modern TV host. In Finland, there has been a strong serious tradition to undervalue entertainment regardless of the medium. In the early 1960s, Finnish radio was attaining a more or less credible position as a news medium, but television seemed to be a more entertaining newcomer. Media researcher Joshua Meyerowitz (1995: 58) captures an essential aspect of TV (though he refers to all electronic media): it emphasises feeling, appearance and mood. Television is the medium for showing things and using presenters as attractions.

When Virkkunen insinuated comparisons between 'shallow' hosts and 'deep' theatre actors, he misjudged the art in the sociable qualities of the host. If we believe that television is above all about showing things and touching people emotionally, the TV entertainment host gives a performance every bit as entertaining, but also with the addition of a certain amount of interaction (Scannell 1996: 56–57). If the show is successful, the interactions impress the audience at home (those absent listeners and viewers). Furthermore, the popular press seeks evidence of the forming of an emotional link between host and audience, a connection verified in the letters to the editor.[5] Proofs of this kind activate the press writing the feature articles on the show.

It is obvious that Virkkunen and many of his contemporaries did not like this stress on entertainment in the emerging television medium. In retrospect, it is easy to see that comments of this kind reflect the elitist cultural attitudes of that time. Virkkunen was probably comparing the situation with Finnish radio, where the share of entertainment was only 2 to 5 per cent of the talk programme output (Oinonen 2004: 28). Television was always different; in the beginning of the 1960s, approximately 40 to 50 per cent of Finnish TV output consisted of entertainment (Aslama et al. 2007: 62).[6] Television expanded quickly, so the Finnish audience appreciated the breadth and diversity of the available entertainment. This was noticed by Finnish mass media researchers, who started to talk about the effects of en-

tertainment consumption even in the pages of TV magazines (*Katso* 1/1965). Though it is obvious that the popular press tried to benefit from television, at that time, the whole entertainment media were a concern of certain well-read citizens (Elfving 2008: 289–293).

Conclusion

Radio was important in creating a framework for forthcoming TV hosts. It paved the way for television talk. Some presenters maintained careers in both media (Timberg 2002: 9), but only some radio presenters ever wanted to move from audio to visual media. Media researcher James Bennett (2011: 52–53) has argued that television not only added sight to sound, it also changed performing fundamentally to emphasise certain televisual skills, like easy delivery and facial expression. In this sense, it is easy to follow John Langer's (1981, 2001) view that television formed a personality system, which rested on a certain kind of predictability and regularity of the appearances of performers. In Finland, however, television differed totally from radio, which – though it had its presenters, celebrities and entertainment contents – was most of all a news medium.

In contrast, TV highlighted the personality of the host. Some commentators thought it was excessive and unseemly, and they could not recognise the professional skills of that kind of performer. This was especially difficult when the hullabaloo around TV personalities was growing all the time, as magazines published more and more feature articles about the homes and private lives of the hosts.[7]

Early television personalities played an important role in taming the new medium. Television magazines created segmented audiences for certain stars and their followers, fanning the liking or disliking. Popular journalism became a way to gather audiences for TV as well as for its new genres (Elfving 2008: 208–209). In a way, this shift foreshadowed the emergence of future cross-media conglomerates.

This was the sphere where a new kind of TV host was in the making and where the interaction between various media and audiences intensified.

According to media scholar Jostein Gripsrud (2010: 78–79), European television had its heyday roughly between 1960 and 1980 when it, in many ways, became the lead medium as recognised by other media. At the time, TV provoked and staged debates and produced celebrities. Television became an essential source for other popular media.[8] This well-known fact specifies the time of birth of the intermedial host. It happened when the Finnish film industry was in trouble and production volumes were low. In the scarcity of film stars, the new faces of the television offered an attractive choice for the press.

What kind of commodity was this host? Was he or she a star, a celebrity or a media personality, and what are the implications if we designate the host with one or all of these words? There is a lot of useful theorising of the subject, but sociologist Joshua Gamson's (1994: 58) starting point seems most helpful.[9] He has observed how actors and stars are fused in discussion. In other words, this means that the profession and the commodity are connected, although the distinction between them is important. Both stars and celebrities could be equipped with high quality professional skills, but they must also be marketable. Being a celebrity does not mean that the person in question is necessarily a professional actor or an experienced and skilful media host.

Media and film scholar Andy Medhurst seems to think that a television performer lacks the aura of mystery typical of film stars, and for this failing, there are several reasons that a presenter is something other than a star. He says, most of all, that TV performers are 'too available [;] they're on too often' (1991: 72–73). Medhurt's analysis concerns the 1950s British TV presenter Gilbert Harding, who did not have the qualities of a star, but instead was as a paradigmatic television personality because he was not enacting a fictional role but trading his own attributes, which he had artfully heightened. However, the character of Gilbert Harding differed from his Finnish counterparts

in that he used a certain kind of rudeness as a part of his performance. Nonetheless, Harding was contemporary with Tarvajärvi and Pasanen, which is why he is worthy of observation. Both of the Finnish hosts were *on too often*, and both put their personalities at stake in their performances. Just like Harding, they were *too plain* to be film stars. Added to this, they all caused extensive interest in popular media. All were *intermedial characters*.

The mechanism described by Gamson helps us to recognise and put in context the above demonstration of two hosts who became commodities and who made the most of their fame. Clearly, they had different profiles. Twelve years older than his colleague, Tarvajärvi remained a national and sporty chap with his socially conscious activities. Pasanen was competitive and masculine, too, but he was foremost a comedian: a clownish character with everlasting inventiveness as a creator of game shows and gadgets. To put it plainly, Pasanen was not interested in radio; audiovisual media were his particular site of creativity. However, Tarvajärvi kept close links with radio and moved between radio and TV. At least part of his reasons could have been his long-standing early-career work in the sound medium.

For Niilo Tarvajärvi, working in the service of broadcasting media had a special value. Although the host moved flexibly between radio and television, he needed familiar elements around him where he could feel comfortable. One of these elements was a live studio audience. In the Finnish context, Tarvajärvi could be seen as a founder and a model for a 'decent' stage programme host, a model which will still be useful when televising national or international festivities like the Eurovision Song Contest. This kind of a host is not inevitably a star, but he or she must have a personality featured in popular media.

The career of Pasanen went in a different direction in the 1960s when he started to produce and write comical feature films. He became a media entrepreneur who liked to act in his own movies which, indeed, confirmed his iconic image in Finnish media. Pasanen was not enthusiastic about broadcasting media as such. On the contrary, he wanted to make a profit with diversified media products and operate

with his own company. This was a very intermedial strategy and, in this sense, he was undeniably ahead of his time. Despite this, Pasanen laid the foundation for a comical kind of hosting, where a presenter can not only 'lean on' fictional characters, but also has to exaggerate one's personal attributes.

It took quite a long time before Tarvajärvi and Pasanen received official recognition for their professional skills. Certainly some of their media activities and programmes were of low quality and labelled as failures. Complaints were often deserved, but most probably the main reason for the dismissal of these kinds of hosts was their pioneering role as intermedial entertainers who divined the concept of 'a show' and then just wanted to amuse their audiences.

Tarvajärvi and Pasanen started their careers in the 1950s when the cultural establishment had polarised attitudes towards entertainment. One reason for this was the substantial growth of the so-called mass culture (Peltonen 1996). After all, in the 1950s and in the beginning of the 1960s, the Finnish establishment and culture critics did not have any means to handle the change other than to uphold 'standards' and set themselves against the new contents and developing intermedial practices. What is important here is that the hosts and other emerging media personalities did not need any official approval. They derived their support from the audiences and popular media.

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Endnotes

1. Hilmes introduces live radio show hosts as masters of ceremonies, which indicates that the model for a media host dates back to staged live performances of various kinds.
2. In letters to the editor against the host or series: *HS* 2.10.1951; *US* 13.10.1951; *SS* 17.10.1951; *US*_2.12.1951. In letters to the editor on behalf of the host or series: *HS* 7.10.1951; *HS* 9.10.1951; *US* 17.10.1951; *US* 4.12.1951; [about the early hours of transmission] *Rk* 17/1955.
3. In letters to the editor against the host or series: *Rk* 30/1959, 30; 34/1959, 30; 44/1959, 38; 17/1961, 3, 7/1963, 38. In letters to the editor on behalf of the host or series: *Rk* 37/1959, 30; 38/1962, 4; 50/1962, 2, 48/1963, 46.
4. The translation of the quotation by the author.
5. Today, this kind of activity takes place on the Internet bulletin boards of certain programmes (see Elfving 2009).
6. Until the end of 1964, the commercial channel Tesvisio continued the transmission of entertainment-based programmes. The channel was then merged with Yleisradio (Salokangas 1996: 138–140).
7. Actually many articles were combinations of professional and private information. See articles of Spede Pasanen *Apu* 8/1964; *Apu* 8/68; *Anna* 46/1964.
8. See also in this book Hujanen about culture-industrialisation of TV.
9. See also Langer (1981) 2001; Bennett 2011.

MAIJU KANNISTO

9. Dancing with the Media: Finnish Case Study of Intermedial Strategies in the Media Event

Introduction

In recent years, the circulation of television programmes to multiple sites, such as radio shows, web news, tabloids and different magazines, seems to be increasing. Some popular television shows and personalities appear everywhere, even when you are not watching television. This article suggests that a popular television programme could be seen as an intermedial media event constructed by different media. The article asks how a television programme is constructed in the context of its dynamic relations to the media system. Construction of a media event is more than a corporate- or consumer-driven process; it involves other media agents outside the converged media companies. In this article, I will focus on what the role of television is in a media event. I will argue that a television programme can have certain strategies through which it offers interfaces for other media to participate in the media event.

The term *media event* refers to the academic discussion started by Daniel Dayan's and Elihu Katz's book *Media Events* (1992), which made a link to anthropological research and brought together the

traditions of social science's mass communication research with semiotics-influenced media and cultural studies. Their understanding of the term was restricted to mediated cultural performances which happen outside the media, such as the Olympic Games, the royal wedding or the moon landing. These performances could be called ritual media events. Dayan and Katz defined media events as a genre of media communication and as 'high holidays of mass communication' which stop the daily routines of audiences (Dayan and Katz 1992: 1–14).

Media researchers Nick Couldry and Andreas Hepp rethink the concept of a media event in their introduction to *Media Events in a Global Age* (2010). They refer to the model developed by Dayan and Katz and extend it to popular media events, such as outstanding reality TV events or film events. Even though Couldry and Hepp find some differences between ritual and popular media events, they argue that contemporary popular media events – like popular reality television formats – must be integrated into the concept since these popular media events contribute strongly to the process of constructing the 'mediated centre' in contemporary cultures and societies (Hepp and Couldry 2010: 3–8). By the mediated centre, Couldry references the claim that 'the media' are our privileged access-point to society's centre or core and that what's 'going on' in the wider world is accessible first through a door marked 'media' (Couldry 2009: 2).

My understanding of the media event also extends to the field of popular culture and to media events created by the media itself. What is important to my conceptualisation here is the pervasiveness of the media event in media culture and its claim to what's 'going on' in our everyday life. I agree with Couldry that the media event can be constructed around a television programme, such as *Big Brother*, not as a text, but as an event stretched across multiple sites (Couldry 2002: 283). A television programme can be constructed as a pervasive media event through multimedial strategies in production and through consumers' active participation.

'Pirkko Mannola of a dance competition: I do not know if I have the strength to continue' (*I-S* 5.3.2009) declared the tabloid cover

headline. The headline referred to the famous Finnish actress and singer, Pirkko Mannola, who lost her husband just before the first episode of *Dancing with the Stars*, a dance competition in which she was slated to star. The headline raises the question of why television – and the promotion of one particular show – is intertwined in the discussion about the death of her husband and how television and the tabloid are related.

In this article, I am going to use the Finnish version of *Dancing with the Stars* (*DWTS*) as a case study to analyse a media event. *Dancing with the Stars* is an international television franchise based on the format of the British TV series *Strictly Come Dancing*. It first aired in May 2004 on BBC1 and soon became a hit. Currently, the format of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has been licensed to over 35 broadcasters across six continents, and the show is watched by a global audience of more than 250 million viewers (BBC 2010). In fact, *DWTS* entered the Guinness Book of Records in 2010 as the world's most successful reality TV format (BBC 2010). In Finland, the national adaptation of *DWTS Tanssii tähtien kanssa* started in 2006. The first episode drew more than 1.3 million viewers, which is a figure seldom reached in a country of five million inhabitants. The show has maintained audiences in the millions, which means the audience share is around 60 per cent, with a position in the top 10 most popular programmes in Finland (MTV3 2006; Finnpanel 2011). A popular international format is an expensive investment for the Finnish commercial channel MTV3, and the channel has taken advantage of all available multimedia opportunities to promote the programme.

DWTS is a hybrid of a reality show and a competition. Moreover, it follows the classic genre of broadcast show entertainment. The show pairs a number of celebrities with professional ballroom dancers, and every week, each paired couple competes by performing dances. The couples are judged and scored by a panel of dance experts, and one couple is eliminated from the show based on the votes of the panel and the audience. Backstage interviews and training inserts are shown between the dance numbers in the glamorous ballroom. Colin Jarvis,

Director of International Format Production at BBC Worldwide, sums up the strengths of the *DWTS* format: 'The Dancing with the Stars format ticks all the boxes, it has celebrity, glamour, popular music and of course there is skill involved. Celebrities discover new strengths and weaknesses in their character, no matter what language they speak. That idea of a journey is also what keeps audiences captivated, and the show fresh' (BBC 2008). *DWTS* successfully combines the reality television genre with celebrity culture, and the idea of a journey extends the dance competition to the construction of a subject.

I analyse the relations between different texts concerning the programme, trying to investigate the intermedial interaction in a constructed media event. I approach the programme in a cultural context reflecting both historical continuity and change. The programme is an interesting case due to its huge popularity and, moreover, because it circulates across different media systems and competing media economies. My research material consists of a selection of episodes of the Finnish version of *DWTS*, *Tanssii Tähtien Kanssa* (2006-2010)[1] and an interview with Sari Valtanen, the producer of *DWTS* on channel MTV3. Additionally, my analysis will explore the relationship of the programme to the numerous other media sites on which it has circulated.

Approaching the multimedial media event

The media event of *DWTS* is constructed in different media texts concerning the programme. Therefore, the relations between the texts and different media become relevant. Intertextuality has provided a theoretical approach to study these relations (Fiske 1987). The theory of intertextuality proposes that all texts are in some relationship with others. In Fiske's definition of the concept, intertextuality exists in the spaces between texts where meanings are drawn from culture's image

bank. Fiske made a distinction between what he labels 'vertical' and 'horizontal' intertextuality. Horizontal intertextuality denotes references that are on the 'same level' between primary texts that are more or less explicitly linked, usually along the axes of genre, character or individual programme or series. Vertical intertextuality is that between a primary text and other texts of a different type that refer explicitly to it. Other texts may take the form of reviews, publicity or advertising features, or they could be the meanings produced at the level of the audience that take a variety of forms, for example, a conversation (Fiske 1987: 108), To begin, I will analyse *DWTS* in terms of intertextual relations. Following that, I will argue that meanings of the multimedial media event can only be attained through intermedial analysis which considers also cultural and economic relations behind the media text.

Horizontal intertextual references engage *DWTS* with entertainment genres, while the logo, hosts and progress of the contest connect *DWTS* to a series. Moreover, in addition to continuity in the entertainment genre, there is continuity in social traditions. Firstly, the strong tradition for social dancing in Finland has surely contributed to the long history and the huge popularity of dance shows on television, and *DWTS* can be seen as a continuation of this tradition. Secondly, *DWTS* belongs to ritual weekend family entertainment. Long before the reality television boom, Finland has enjoyed a tradition of weekend family entertainment based on dancing and music like the popular show featuring social dancing *Lauantaitanssit* (*Saturday Dances*[2], MTV 1970–1987) and the musical game show *BumtsiBum* (*The Lyrics Board,* MTV 1997–2005). These shows held an institutional position on Saturday nights for Finnish television viewers, with audiences of well over one million. However, these popular shows cannot be seen as media events – even though they were topics of public discussion, they were not produced multimedially and did not construct the mediated centre in a pervasive way. There has also been celebrity journalism before, but the brand of a programme like *DWTS* is so strong nowadays that it outruns the publicity of the individual celebrities and sets

the frame for the media event. Additionally, compared with weekend family entertainment from the 1970s to the 1990s, the media event of *DWTS* utilises new media such as the Internet.

The media event of *DWTS* extends across all multimedia platforms the channel has to offer, as well as to many other media, and these texts are vertically intertextual. *DWTS* is followed and the progress of the contest is reported in conversations, tabloids, other television shows, Internet forums and blogs, radio programmes and magazines. Conversations on the dances, the dresses and who should win and who should be voted off are extremely vigorous and extensive on many forums, and the stars are interviewed on their training and performance as well as their feelings after being voted off. Suddenly, the celebrity dancers on the show capture tabloid headlines, magazine covers and television talk shows and thus, for a short period, they seem to be everywhere. According to Fiske, the pervasiveness of television in the culture is not due simply to the fact that so much of it is broadcast and large numbers of viewers spend hours watching, but because it pervades so much of the rest of cultural life – newspapers, magazines, advertisements[3], radio and conversations (Fiske 1987: 118).

The intertextual analysis of different texts of *DWTS* reveals the pervasiveness of television in everyday life. Ten dancing celebrities, the hosts and judges are the topics of many media and public conversations during the *DWTS* season. Different viewers will have different intertextual aggregates of celebrities according to the variations in viewers' intertextual experience. However, in intertextual analysis, the relations between the different texts are seen only in two dimensions, horizontally and vertically.

The analysis of the intertextual relations of the programme neglects the more profound interactions among the media producing the media texts in the media event. In the intertextual approach, the media texts seem to be coherent entities, but I argue that in the media event, the different media are in active interaction with each other, so the media texts produced are not clearly defined entities, separate from other media. In the media event of *DWTS*, the television programme,

Internet environment, radio and tabloids are closely collaborating. The intimate relationship between the tabloid news and *DWTS* on television, thus, cannot be described as simply being between the secondary media and primary text; rather, these texts are mutually constructing each other in the totality of the media event of *DWTS*.

The concept of transmedia storytelling has been used to describe the phenomenon in which the story unfolds across multiple media platforms, with each new text making a distinctive contribution to the whole. Each medium uses its own strengths to produce its self-contained contribution to the horizontally integrated entertainment industry (Jenkins 2006: 97–98). Thus, transmedia storytelling could be seen as a particular narrative structure or narrative brand that expresses itself in different media and business areas. The same set of values is expressed in all the different texts integrated in transmedia experience (Scolari 2009: 587, 590, 600). From the point of view of the media event, however, this kind of approach does not seem adequate or even relevant to illustrate the complex process of media production in historical, economic, technological and social contexts. In the case of *DWTS*, for example, the different media texts related to the programme and its celebrities do not form a coherent narrative world, but *DWTS* could be seen as a starting point for the different texts, a way of promoting the media products which are produced according to the media's own distinctive interests. The construction of the media event of *DWTS* requires more than just individually produced media texts including the television programme and all the related media texts; it requires interaction in production.

Constructing a media event is an intermedial process where not only are different media texts linked, but the different media are connected in economic, technological, societal and cultural ways. Similarly, as in the case of intertextuality, I understand that intermediality exists in the relations between media. I consider intermediality as social and cultural relationships in which different media become articulated in relation to each other and exercise power over each other. Based on my analysis of the media event of *DWTS*, I argue that there can

be found certain strategies through which television offers interfaces for other media to participate. These strategies have effects around which certain kinds of programmes can construct a successful media event. Therefore, intermedial relations are changing the production of a television programme at the same time as television is affecting other media. I will now discuss four strategies by which television has presented interfaces for other media to participate in the media event of *DWTS*.

Intermedial strategies in the media event

1. Multimedia strategy in promotion of *DWTS*

Firstly, a multimedia strategy in promotion of the programme invites other media to participate. According to producer Sari Valtanen, multimedia strategy is applied on *DWTS* because the programme is such a phenomenon (Valtanen 2010). Official partners in co-operation with *DWTS* 2010, Radio Nova and *7 päivää*, a sensationalist popular magazine, publish interviews with the stars of the show and have their own sections dedicated to *DWTS* on their websites. The web pages of *7 päivää* are constructed around the competition and gossip about the celebrities, including the magazine's own material like blog and video interviews, but significantly they also contain interactive material like the opportunity for readers to comment and make their own votes. In addition, the tabloids *Iltalehti* and *Ilta-Sanomat* have their own sections for *DWTS* on their websites. The tabloids both work in close co-operation with channel MTV3 and publish much of their material in hard copy and online. The daily press, for example the biggest newspaper in Finland, *Helsingin Sanomat*, has also carried items concerning *DWTS* on its website. In fact, it seems that many web pages of different media have much the same kind of content related to *DWTS*.

The role of channel MTV3's own Internet environment related to *DWTS* is twofold. On the one hand, it offers a place for audience participation, but on the other hand, it is also an important way of both promoting the programme to other media and producing news material for them to use. Here, I am not so interested in the participatory culture of consumers, but wish to focus on the intermedial interaction. Nowadays, television programmes usually have web pages; on channel MTV3, every programme has some kind of web page. The web pages have information on the programme, the performers, news and polls. The web pages of domestic programmes have more interactive possibilities and dynamic content than the web pages of foreign programmes, which primarily have information on the programmes themselves. The web pages of *DWTS* are produced together with the programme; the web editors are producing content constantly throughout the season. According to producer Sari Valtanen, the role of the Internet is to provide a place for all the background and extra material which will not fit into the television broadcast. Valtanen says that even though the role of the web pages in *DWTS* is not as interactive as in *Big Brother*, the format is constructed so that part of the activity is in the broadcast and the rest is in the web pages (Valtanen 2010).

However, what is significant in the context of this article is that even though the web pages are intended to heavily supplement the television programme and its content, they constitute a different media form, the Internet. The web content of the programme creates supplementary material in interaction with the television programme, and therefore it creates other kinds of interaction with audiences and media other than the television programme itself. The web news offers readymade stories for other media to publish mostly as online news. For example, when the web page of *DWTS* produced news about the finalists seeing a ghost in the training room, this news spread rapidly through the web news of the tabloids (MTV3 2010, IL 2010, I-S 2010). The news was not connected to the broadcast, but it was an item of gossip that helped maintain a high level of audience interest in the show during the week. The nature of the Internet material seems

to be mainly entertainment and human interest stories using sensationalist and scandalous headlines to catch the audience's attention. Thus, the web pages of the show have an essential role in producing the programme and the media event of *DWTS*.

Media researcher Jonathan Gray acknowledges the value of all hype, synergy, promos, narrative extensions and various forms of related textuality in the way they position, define and create meaning for television. However, these kinds of paratexts can be seen as part of a different creative process rather than simply as marketing add-ons and ancillary products for television (Gray 2010: 3, 208). This notion seems to apply also in the media event of *DWTS*. Different media produce different texts according to their medium specificity and to the media event as a whole. For example, web news is more than just background information for the broadcast; they are telling the individual stories related to the show and the celebrities in it, although they promote the show at the same time. The Internet is one of the three lines of business in MTV Media, along with television and radio. These three lines of business work individually but co-operate on shared projects such as *DWTS*.[4] Besides, the role of the channel MTV3 in producing the media event of *DWTS* is also to promote and position the programme. *DWTS* is produced by the independent production company Zodiak Finland/ Broadcasters, which is part of the international Zodiak Media. The co-operation works in such a way that the channel MTV3 concludes the contract with BBC and handles the promotion, phone voting and Internet environment, while Zodiak Finland produces the programme.[5] Consequently, MTV Media as a whole concentrates on the promotion, which increases the amount and role of promotion around the programmes in the media system. In the media event, it is not just the programme but the extended brand that is distributed to consumers via different media at different times.

2. Live-to-air format strategy

Secondly, the live-to-air format can be seen as a strategy by which television has presented an interface for other media to participate in

the media event of *DWTS*. In media events, watching the programme simultaneously with other spectators is essential in order to follow the media buzz and share the experience with others. The media events generate talk about them before, during and after the broadcast, and this talk is an essential, constitutive feature of the event (Scannell 2002: 271–272). The live format of the *DWTS* broadcast is emphasised even though the programme includes inserts that are shot earlier. The hosts ask the audience to vote now, and they are constantly referring to the present evening, thereby inviting audiences to take part in the shared experience. The programme also constructs the idea of a journey for the celebrity dancers who learn to dance. As I mentioned earlier, the web page of *DWTS* produces news every day, so, even though the broadcast shows only fragments from training during the week, the web page constructs a sense of living continuity between the television programmes. Similarly, Couldry notes the role of the web page in *Big Brother* as central to the media event as it broadcasts footage from the house continuously. Thus, 'liveness' is a cross-media construction (Couldry 2002: 286). The audience is invited to share the live media event and the excitement of the contest, but to do so fully requires that it must keep up with the current news.

The live broadcast coverage offers a sense of 'real' access to an event and at the same time strengthens the sense of togetherness. Other media can then contribute to the sense of a televised live event through their commentaries on what has just happened, or on what is about to happen (Scannell 1996: 84, Couldry 2002: 286). Televisuality is ontologically connected to the ideas of authenticity because of 'a real-time' or 'being there' effect that television has as a medium (Herkman 2010: 126–130). Television, like radio before it, has always engaged us in live national events, such as beauty contests and sports events, which have been among the most popular programmes in Finland since the 1960s. Television has always been a broadcast medium; that is, it has been directed to a mass audience. Today, when the new digital developments provide the option of more individualised reception and the Internet challenges television as the primary deliverer of content,

it is becoming more difficult to reach large audiences, so the role of live broadcasting is still a key strategy in constructing televised media events (MTC 2008: 51–58). While liveness in all broadcasting of early television and radio was a question of technology, live broadcast is nowadays essential in popular media events such as *DWTS* for other reasons. Intermedial co-operation with tabloids, who tell the stories of celebrities side-by-side with the competition, requires this liveness. In addition, live broadcast enables phone voting, which has become an important factor in the television industry's strategies for capturing an increasingly fragmented audience (Enli 2009: 482). Therefore, a live-to-air format becomes an important strategy which separates popular media events of the new kind from early television, where it was a technological necessity, or from later entertainment shows such as *The Lyrics Board*, where liveness was not an important factor. Liveness creates a connection between the audiences and events and fills the individual's need to connect oneself with the world's events.

3. Scheduling strategy

Broadcasters can use the scheduling of their programmes to build an audience for a new show, retain that audience or compete with other broadcasters' programmes. *DWTS* fills the popular Sunday slot on MTV3 alternating with *Maajussille morsian* (*Farmer Wants a Wife* 2008–2009) and *Idols* (*Pop Idol* 2003–2010), among others. It is often this live format which is scheduled in the most desirable space, which nowadays seems to be Sunday evening for the commercial channels, at least ratings-wise (Finnpanel 2011). Besides high ratings, the Sunday slot enables efficient co-operation with the tabloids. According to producer Sari Valtanen, in Finland, because of the co-operation with the tabloids, the voting results must be announced in the same episode on Sunday evening, and not on the next day, as in the original format in the UK (Valtanen 2010). Furthermore, Sunday evening television programmes are potential topics of conversation and tabloid headlines on Mondays. The scheduling strategy for Sunday evening enables the tabloids to have *DWTS*-related headlines on Monday after the

weekend break. In contrast, Saturday evening entertainment does not generate the same level of conversation since, first, the tabloids are not published on Sunday, and, second, people are not back at school and work discussing the shows until Monday.

In Finland, there is a long tradition for family entertainment scheduled for Saturday evening. Saturday evening could be described as the time for ritualised weekend entertainment for families who gather together to watch television after the traditional Saturday sauna[6]. For example, the previously mentioned *Lauantaitanssit* (*Saturday Dances*, 1970–1987) and *BumtsiBum* (*The Lyrics Board*, 1997–2005) as well as *Napakymppi* (*The Dating Game*[7], 1985–2002) were popular Saturday evening entertainment shows on commercial television. Saturday evening is also time for another ritualised television event which gathers people in front of television: the winning numbers of the national lottery are published on television on Saturday evenings. In contrast, the Sunday evening slot has often been scheduled for movies and less popular family entertainment. However, co-operation with the tabloids has made Sunday evening attractive enough for television companies to schedule expensive and interactive format shows there. Thus, tabloid co-operation has significant cultural implications when it alters ritualised television viewing.

4. Hybrid genre strategy

Lastly, I suggest that the hybrid genre combining celebrity reality television, competition and family entertainment could be seen as a strategy for television to offer an interface to other media. Reality television is a popular genre which readily creates interesting news topics. Stories on real people, and especially on celebrities, attract audiences better than stories on imaginary characters of fictional series ever could. The competition element creates excitement similar to sporting events and thus enables interaction with the audience. *DWTS* introduces topics and celebrities in the public consciousness and for other media to circulate. Women's magazines publish stories about the *DWTS* stars, thus promoting the show and being topical at the same time. The

celebrities appear on other television programmes and radio shows and at various kinds of promotional events. According to producer Sari Valtanen, right from the beginning, the buzz around *DWTS* in Finland was much more massive than in the UK, and the popular press was a significant factor in this. *DWTS* is such a source of topics that there is much to draw for the press (Valtanen 2010). In fact, the public sphere and the number of stars are relatively small-scale in a small country such as Finland, so no popular press can afford to shut itself out of *DWTS*, and all wish to benefit from whatever is currently of interest to the public.

Media researcher Graeme Turner argues that discourses of celebrity invade all kinds of sites today, and this demonstrates the importance of publicity, promotion and exploitation of the media event (Turner 2004: 15). In the case of *DWTS*, the stars of the show, the celebrity dancers, are a natural resource of topics for other media to appropriate. Only casting which is interesting and diverse enough can ensure a large audience, and in *DWTS*, the casting has been done in order to please a wide audience; thus, the stars are evenly divided among men and women, younger and older, and from different fields. Additionally, *DWTS* casts stars to fit stereotypical screen roles such as the beauty, the Latin lover and the funny showman. These roles meet the demands to produce a dramatic and entertaining show. Richard Dyer's classic study of stars describes the market function of stars. Stars are made for profit by the media industry, but stars are also involved in making themselves into commodities (Dyer 1984: 5). The strong brand of *DWTS* gives the celebrities participating in the programme a high level of visibility and popularity, and, at the same time, raises the star dancer's visibility in other media, which in turn strengthens the brand of the show.

In Finland, as in other countries, the stars of the show are mainly actors, actresses, singers, models, athletes and television personalities. Even if they might not all have reached their peak or might have passed it, *DWTS* raises their public profile. For example, the previously unknown Member of Parliament, Antti Kaikkonen, who participated

in the contest in 2008, became a topic of general conversation. He was an entertaining character and proved to be very popular among the audience in spite of, or because of, his clumsy dancing. Audiences appreciated him as the typical Finnish man, easily identified with; thus, Kaikkonen represented both the common man and the celebrity, which made him wildly popular. On the one hand, his courage in throwing himself into the dance competition was admired, but on the other hand, his credibility was questioned (IL 2008, MTV3 2008). Star images are contradictory as Dyer argues; a star image consists both of 'image' and stage-managed public appearances and of the real person behind the image (Dyer 1984: 7). In *DWTS*, celebrities performing in the show are shown backstage training for the dances and then dancing in a glamorous setting as stars. This method of showing the contradiction between a real person and the glamorous star image can be understood as a strategy for constructing the star and reasserting the star quality of the various celebrities performing on the show, thus making them more attractive for the audience and to other media. People are fascinated by stars because, as Dyer explains, they enact ways of making sense of the experience of being a person in a particular society (Dyer 1984: 15–16). The stars of *DWTS* are historically and culturally constructed popular characters; thus, they are the embodiments of contemporary social categories such as class, gender and age.

Conclusion

While television seems to have created these strategies for offering interfaces for other media, those other media are also adapting themselves to participate in the media event. That leads us to consider the different roles the various media play in constructing the media event and the question of their relative power and significance in that process. From the advent of television, popular television programmes have

circulated across advertisements, press and radio (see e.g. Biressi and Nunn 2008: 8, Hujanen and Weibull 2010). However, the change in television-related material in other media in Finland can be dated from the late 1990s, as Juha Herkman has noted in his study on televisualization.

According to Herkman, there has been an increase in television-related material – stories, news, issues, celebrities and images – in both Finnish tabloids, *Iltalehti* and *Ilta-Sanomat*, from the late 1990s. Herkman argues that television became a central subject for the late twentieth century's popular press as a source and a topic, and therefore, this impact could be called televisualization. That process can be seen as part of the converging media market and an attempt at synergy, which is achieved by cross-production and cross promotion (Herkman 2010: 122–130). Similarly in other countries, the tightening bond between entertainment industries, consumerism and the tabloid press became increasingly apparent beginning in the 1970s. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the rise to prominence of the *Sun* newspaper in a media conglomerate headed by Rupert Murdoch made its mark in terms of its reciprocal relationship with commercial television. The *Sun* devoted substantial amounts of space to advertising, TV promotions and tie-ins (Biressi and Nunn 2008: 8–9). In the case of *DWTS*, these economic synergies are part of the buzz, but significantly, many other media outside the media conglomerate are also participating in constructing the media event.

I argue that it is not just televisualization which is taking place but that every medium is taking part in constructing the intermedial media event and reaping its own economic benefits from that. According to Bolter's and Grusin's theory on remediation, different technologies remediate each other in various ways to produce different devices and practices. Remediation is mutual; each technology is a hybrid of technical, social and economic practice, and each offers its own path to immediacy: television offers immediacy through its stream of 'live' images or sounds, while the Internet makes much the same offer but with the added value of interactivity (Bolter and Grusin 2000: 223–225).

Remediation pays attention to the individuality of each technology as they come together, whereas intermediality considers the co-operative nature between different media in the networked media system.

In *DWTS*, television is playing its own part by providing visibility and generating topics of interest. While television focuses on the show and its marketing, the different Internet platforms offer background information, places for interaction and entertainment, while the popular press tells stories related to the personal lives of the performers, so it constructs the ancillary publicity. For example, when the star dancer Pirkko Mannola lost her husband just before the first episode of the *DWTS* 2009, it was the tabloid press which told the news and quickly confirmed her participation in the show for the audience. The tabloid press and the Internet discussion forums dealt with the death of her husband and her grief as well as making both positive and negative judgements about her participation in the show as a recent widow. So, even though her personal grief was not the topic of the television show, it entered the public sphere through intermedial participation. The media event is all about ancillary publicity because intermedial strategies produce mainly media-related material in the media sphere. It can be asked where the core of the intermedial media event is and if there is a mediated centre at all in there.

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Endnotes

1. From this point forward, I will refer to my case, the Finnish version of *Dancing with the Stars,* with the abbreviation *DWTS*.
2. The translation of *Lauantaitanssit* to *Saturday Dances* is by the author.
3. The change of the popular male host Marco Bjurström to Mikko Leppilampi in *DWTS* was exploited in an advertising campaign by Elisa Viihde in which Marco Bjurström trained Mikko Leppilampi to dance. The advertisement was launched in March 2010 soon after the release of the hosts to the next autumn's *DWTS*. The advertising campaign advertised both *DWTS* and the new dance programme of the rival commercial channel Nelonen *Dance* (*So You Think You Can Dance*), both of which are part of Elisa Viihde which combines digital TV and broadband services.
4. Both the channel MTV3 and the website mtv3.fi are strong lines of business in MTV Media, and they are among the top three most popular media platforms in their field in Finland. For example, in 2010, the final episode of *DWTS* gained more than 1.8 million viewers, and there were over 1.6 million visitors at the website mtv3.fi during the same week (47/2010).

5. In Finland, the biggest commercial channels, MTV3 and Nelonen, have given up their programme production aside from the news and are concentrating on the sales of contents. In contrast, the public service company YLE has given up its distribution network and is concentrating on being the production company of the contents (MTC 2008, 62).
6. In Finland, there has been a long continuation in sauna tradition. Since the end of the 1800s, with urbanisation, the number of general saunas increased when the town's population needed the washing room. At that time, there were by necessity no washing facilities at all in small apartments, so the Saturday sauna was an essential part of the worker's weekly rhythm. Nowadays, there are nearly 1.7 million saunas in Finland, but the concept and the custom of Saturday sauna is still well-established. See, for example, http://www.saunajaapo.fi/saunan_historia.html.
7. *The Dating Game* was the name of the format. *The Dating Game* was an ABC television show that first aired in the United States in 1965.

MARKO ALA-FOSSI

10. Digital Divergence of Terrestrial Broadcasting Systems in Europe

Although the European Union's official target date for digital switchover of broadcasting in 2012 is approaching, analogue broadcasting is not in immediate danger of extinction in Europe. This is mostly because the EU digital switchover plan does not apply at all to radio. The most paradoxical case is perhaps Finland, which was among the very first to switch off analogue television in 2007, but currently has no intention to implement digital radio. Originally, in the 1980s, radio was supposed to be the first mass media worldwide to go digital using the new European technology with mobile multimedia capabilities for Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB). Research for digital radio also provided the technological basis for Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) when the development of digital television in Europe began seriously, following an American breakthrough in the 1990s. A new European system for mobile television (DVB-H) was developed after Japan had introduced its digital broadcasting system with mobile television services. This chapter seeks to examine the development of these digital terrestrial broadcasting systems from the perspective of the political economy (Mosco 1996). It studies the intermedial and international

relations between radio and television technology development projects in Europe, the US and Japan in the context of socio-political change shaped by neoliberalist policies and the marketisation of broadcasting during the last 30 years.

Besides being reactive rather than proactive and not truly comprehensive, the European project for digitalisation of broadcasting has not resulted in any significant convergence between broadcast media. Instead, if we take into account all existing and, for the most part, incompatible European broadcasting systems for terrestrial digital radio, mobile multimedia and television with their latest update versions, the number is closer to ten – and the situation becomes even more complicated if the rivalling systems from the US and Japan are also included. However, after a historical analysis, this is actually not surprising. The policies and politics for developing new digital broadcasting technologies were driven by strong economic motives from the very beginning, but not by intentions for any digital media convergence. Broadcasters in Europe – and everywhere else – were more interested in maintaining the existing structures than merging mediums together.

DVB digital television can be considered as the only relatively successful part of the European broadcast digitalisation project, especially when compared with the development of DAB digital radio (Iosifidis 2011, O'Neill et al. 2010). This is largely due to the so-called *digital television paradox* (Galperin 2004): both national governments and international organisations have in many ways heavily promoted the migration to digital television despite the simultaneous ideological, legal and regulatory transition from political to more market-driven solutions in order to ensure certain vital political and economic interests. Consequently, although these two major European digital broadcasting standards were meant to be complementary, digital radio had in every aspect less to offer than digital television, and DVB clearly defeated DAB in an intermedial competition over political support and available economic resources.

In other words, the idea of digital media convergence between 'radio bits' and 'TV bits' (Negroponte 1995: 54) was primarily just an afterthought within digital broadcasting system development. As a result of continuing divergence between broadcast media, most radio is still analogue, and DAB 'has drifted to today's inertia' (Kroes 2011). In a truly converged broadcasting landscape, only one digital switchover would have been enough.

High-tech rivalry with better analogue TV – and digital radio

The basis for profound socio-political changes reshaping European broadcasting was laid in the early 1970s, when the so-called 'golden age of capitalism' turned into 'the Long Downturn', a long-term decline of industrialised capitalist economies after the oil crisis. Earlier Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies based on the state interventions into the market did not work against stagflation, and the governments were forced to seek new ways to fight the economic crisis. By the end of the decade, when the conservative governments of Reagan in the US and Thatcher in the UK came to power, the neoliberalist approach of reducing both public spending and government control over the markets had become the new dominant economic policy paradigm of the advanced capitalist world (Harvey 2005: 18–34, Hesmondhalgh 2007: 82–86).

Germany and some other European countries like Finland had adopted FM broadcasting on a large scale as early as the 1950s, but in the US and Japan, FM radio did not become commercially significant until the late 1960s. By that time, the worldwide sales of Japanese Hi-fi sound equipment with new FM Stereo radio tuners were booming, but television manufacturing in Japan was clearly in need of a new competitive edge against even cheaper East-Asian production. Like practically all national public service broadcasters at that time, Japanese NHK had – and still has – a technical research laboratory, which was

striving to improve the quality of the delivery as well as the availability of public broadcasting services. The NHK engineers had not been satisfied with the picture quality of the American NTSC colour television during the Tokyo Olympics, so they started to develop a visual equivalent to Hi-fi sound: Hi-Vision – an analogue system for High Definition Television (HDTV). This was exactly what the major Japanese electronics manufacturers were looking for, so they formed a national coalition with NHK for developing HDTV in 1970 (Ala-Fossi 2005: 100,149, Curwen 1994: 17, Hart 2004: 84).

In Europe, the BBC R&D department was already more interested in expanding analogue services with digital systems. The BBC was able to develop the first digital audio system for relaying programme feed between transmitters in the early 1970s. A few years later, the BBC introduced a new textual data extension to analogue television – Teletext – and took part within the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) in the pre-development for textual services in analogue FM radio using 'VHF radio data', later know as Radio Data System (RDS). Further BBC technical research during the 1980s resulted in NICAM, a digital stereo broadcasting system for television sound, which, however, was suited only for fixed reception. The new digital additions were well in line with the public service organisation and ideology: they did not blur established boundaries between radio and television but provided new or better quality information services for the public, free of additional charge (Ely and Eng 1981, Lax 2010: 77, Ala-Fossi 2010: 45–46). However, implementing these new services for the public also required close co-operation with electronics manufacturers.

In the US, national public service broadcasting had been only recently (1967) established, and the formerly mighty developers of broadcast technology, Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), had severely declined since their glory days. It is perhaps illustrative that American companies had made several efforts since the 1960s to introduce an analogue home video system, but the VHS system of JVC from Japan defeated all its rivals in the US market by the late 1970s – and, within a few years,

everywhere else as well (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995, Abramson 2003: 212–216). The biggest surviving losers, Sony (Betamax/Japan) and Philips (VCR/the Netherlands), decided to join forces in developing a new digital format for audio recordings, later known as Compact Disc (CD). The new standard was introduced in 1980, although the first commercial audio recordings were not released until 1982 (Soramäki 1990: 76, Immink 1998). The rare Euro-Japanese CD project had a fortunate timing because, by the early 1980s, Japan was more commonly seen in the Western world as a threat rather than a companion (O'Connor 2009).

Interestingly enough, the original initiative for developing a new digital radio system did not come from the electronics industries looking for new markets, but again from public service broadcasters. All the new digital extensions of analogue broadcasting – and especially the possibilities created by the new CD records – obviously inspired the technical research department of German public service broadcasters, Institut für Rundfunktechnik (IRT). In 1981, they began pre-development of a digital broadcasting system that could also deliver the pure new digital sound in mobile reception better than FM. IRT was primarily working on audio bit-rate reduction, while at the same time in France, the Centre Commun d'Études de Télévision et Télécommunications (CCETT), a joint organisation of the French public service broadcaster (ORTF) and the national research centre in telecommunications, was developing a completely new digital multicarrier transmission system (OFDM). By the mid-1980s, these two organisations had created together what Gandy (2003) calls 'the embryo' of digital audio broadcasting, though they were still far away from a functional digital radio system (O'Neill 2010: 32, Gandy 2003, Schulze and Lüders 2005, Immonen 1999).

After the first public tests with the new Hi-Vision system in the early 1980s, NHK had modified its original design to match better with American requirements. So in April 1985, the US Department of State decided to support the NHK proposal for HDTV as the world standard. For American broadcasters, wide-band HDTV was a

good excuse to keep mobile radio communications out of the vacant broadcast channels – and there was not much domestic TV manufacturing left to protect, while a single global TV standard was seen as a benefit for the US movie industry (Hart 1994: 215, Brinkley 1998: 16–19, Hart 2004: 196, Alvarez et al. 1999). However, the fear of NHK's commercial allies both from Japan and the US made the European Commission (EC) and other European stakeholders like national broadcasters oppose the NHK initiative and suggest a different approach at the meeting of the Consultative Committee of International Radio (CCIR) in May 1986. EUREKA, the new pan-European organisation for research and development coordination established by 17 European states and the EC, proved to be a useful tool in this neomercantilist project for defending European electronics industries against the Japanese Hi-Vision. The development project (Eureka 95) for the European version of HDTV was launched in July 1986 as one of the largest strategic projects of the new consortium. Major European electronics manufacturers, such as the French state-owned Thomson, Germany's Bosch Group, and the main coordinator, Philips, were centrally involved in the project along with the technical research organisations of several European public service broadcasters and the EBU (Sandholtz 1992, Hart 2004: 126–127, Soramäki and Okkonen 1999: 29–30, Evain 1995: 39).

Only six months later, the same three major European manufacturers were joined by the BBC, IRT and CCETT to launch another Eureka project (Eureka 147), this time coordinated by the German Space Agency (DLR). The development project of a Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) system was, without any doubt, another part of the European counterattack (Ala-Fossi 2010: 46, Evain 1995: 39). The original Eureka project form even states that 'the drawing up of a new digital audio broadcasting standard will therefore provide a long term counterbalance to the increasing dominance of the countries of the Far East in the consumer electronics sector'. When envisioning the additional data and multimedia transmission capabilities of DAB technology, it also refers to the concept of 'integrated services digital

broadcasting' (ISDB), an idea of a multipurpose digital broadcasting system drafted at NHK in the early 1980s. However, the original main focus in DAB development was not to enhance radio with multimedia, but to create a digital replacement technology for FM radio with superb sound and robust mobile reception (Yoshino 2000, Eureka 1986, O'Neill 2009).

It seems that, in the 1980s, the future of European broadcasting was seen as strictly media-specific and even divergent. Although radio was supposed to be the first mass media to go digital, the future of television was still thought to be not only separate, but also analogue. The HDTV systems of the 1980s are often presented as direct precursors to digital television, but both Hi-Vision and European HD-MAC (Multiplexed Analogue Components) were basically just advanced analogue television systems, as their names suggest. Both systems, however, complemented analogue HD video with digital sound, in the same way as ordinary analogue TV in Europe was already using digital NICAM stereo. It should also be noted that the HD-MAC was designed to be a swift counter-proposition to block the Japanese initiative. At that time in the late 1980s, developing a completely digital television system was still seen primarily as a theoretical option for the future, which is why it could not have been seriously considered as a useful short-term defence strategy.

The unexpected end of the analogue future

The concept of an 'information society' (*johoka shakai*) as well as the idea of increasing importance of knowledge in the development of a post-industrial society had been introduced respectively in Japan and in the US by the early 1960s. But it was not until the early 1970s, when a growing need to find new ways to improve national competitiveness and the new reports commissioned by the Japanese government about the forthcoming social impacts of computerisation inspired the

first wave of the information society debate. National planning for technology development started in the advanced capitalist societies following the Japanese example, and one of the most influential results of this work in Europe was *L'Informatisation de la société* (1978) by Simon Nora and Alain Minc. They introduced a whole new concept of *telematics* to describe the increasing interconnection of computing and telecommunications. Based on the report, the French government launched a development project for Minitel, the first online videotext service, which was introduced in 1982 (Nevalainen 1999: 7–8, Huuhtanen 2001: 4–6, 34, Karvalics 2008: 29–32). It is perhaps not very surprising that broadcasting was not yet in any central role in these early European visions of an information society (Garnham 1996: 107–108).

However, by that point, the broadcasting sector had also become a target of neoliberalist, market-driven reforms reducing the earlier government control and regulatory power of the political system. The deregulation of broadcasting actually started in the late 1970s when private radio was first introduced in the UK and in Italy, while the Carter administration in the US repealed several radio and broadcast regulations. This was further intensified in the US after the Reagan administration took over and the new chair of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Mark S. Fowler, started to replace regulatory practices in broadcasting with market-oriented solutions (Ala-Fossi 2005: 104–105). In most Western European countries, the long era of national public broadcasting monopolies came to an end, and the remaining radio monopolies throughout Europe fell by the end of the 1980s. Thanks to regulatory reform, the availability of the free FM spectrum and new, relatively inexpensive FM radio equipment, the number of new private stations exploded so that, by the early 1990s, there were already about 4000 local and regional radio stations in Europe (Vittet-Philippe and Crookes 1985: 8–10, Wedell and Crookes 1991: 9–21, Humphreys 1996: 111, 125–128).

But even a significant reduction of political regulation of electronic communications was not enough for some advocates for neoliberalism

like Peter Jay in the UK, who suggested in 1981 that the development of technology would soon remove grounds for any government interference for 'electronic publishing' (Jay 2005 [1981]: 79–88, Garnham 1982: 285–286). In this political context, a like-minded media theorist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Ithiel de Sola Pool, formulated an argument for further deregulation of all media based on technological change. According to de Sola Pool (1983), new electronic technology was bringing all forms of media together into 'one grand system', and because this *convergence of modes* was making the historically developed, media-specific regulation of US communications systems obsolete, this potentially harmful practice should be completely abandoned (de Sola Pool 1983: 7–8, 28, Aufderheide 1999: 23, Comor 1999: 1056, Briggs and Burke 2005: 210). So, convergence as a force merging all media was already in the beginning an ideological interpretation of the consequences of technological development and a political tool rather than a solid theoretical concept, and its value for analysis (Fagerjord and Storsul 2007: 29) has not increased over the years (see also Herkman in this volume).

After the European opposition had prevented the adoption of the NHK system as the worldwide HDTV standard in 1986, the US government agencies and electronic industry reconsidered their strategies and set up new initiatives for domestic HDTV technology research. In 1987, the FCC started to look for industry proposals of a backwards compatible analogue HDTV, which would provide a reduced quality picture to all standard TV receivers while delivering HD to new, advanced receivers. Within the US broadcast industry, fully digital television was seen as an impossible goal, although several MIT professors continued urging for digital solutions and the complete integration of computers into television sets (Neuman 1988, Brinkley 1998: 93–95, Neil 2010). After a small San Diego division of General Instruments (GI), VideoCipher, made a breakthrough in developing an all-digital HDTV system in early 1990, the FCC and the US industry switched their approach from analogue to digital. GI soon allied with MIT in order to develop a computer-compatible digital

HDTV system with progressive image scanning – and suddenly, the US had taken the lead in the race for the future of television. By May 1993, seven developers from four rivalling American digital systems joined forces in the Digital HDTV Grand Alliance (Brinkley 1998: 120–134, Galperin 2004: 74–78, Alvarez et al. 1999: 6–10, Negroponte 1995: 37–40).

Meanwhile in Europe, the HD-MAC system was in trouble despite its intergovernmental support and the deep involvement of the European Commission courtesy of a special mandating directive. The analogue technology was expensive, prone to interference, required a broad spectrum and was not appealing for the increasing number of private broadcasters. The first unofficial studies for digital television systems in Europe were started in 1991, quite soon after receiving the news from the US. In the Olympic year of 1992, HD-MAC was not a success, even in the consumer markets as it had originally been planned, but the European Commission was still ready to pour in more money and a new directive in order to save the project. However, the British government strongly opposed these plans, and after Martin Bangemann became responsible for the European technology policies in the new Commission of 1993, the EU finally abandoned analogue HDTV and launched a new industry–led project for Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) in Europe (Galperin 2004: 132–134, Näränen 2006: 42–43, Kemppainen 2008: 32–35).

According to Galperin (2004), the failure of the HD-MAC system was an important turning point both for European broadcasting policies and technology initiatives in general. Because an alliance of national governments, public broadcasters and major manufacturers together with the European Commission had not been able to make a migration to HDTV happen, it was obvious that a new approach was needed. On the European level, the neomercantilist high-tech rivalry of the previous decade was replaced with more market-driven, neoliberal policies drafted in the Bangemann report (EC 1994), promoting less intergovernmental arrangements with national champions over increasingly complicated broadcasting markets and more reliance on

private standards development (Galperin 2004: 133–135, Michalis 2007: 149–151). On the industry level, the failure of HD-MAC was also seen as a result of being a technology-led project, indicating a need for a more consumer-driven approach (Fagan 1994). Finally, it also made the Commission reluctant to openly support any single technology, and a few years later led to the adoption of the principle of *technological neutrality* (Lembke 2002: 227, 240).

Digital television as a strategic supplement

Despite the dramatic transition of broadcasting policies, regulatory practices and even industry structures of European radio broadcasting, changes did not happen overnight. In some European countries like France and Italy, public service radio had lost its leading position to smaller private stations very rapidly. However, in the UK and Germany, public service broadcasters BBC and ARD still dominated their domestic radio broadcasting markets in 1991 (Vittet-Philippe and Crookes 1985: 67, Wedell and Crookes 1991: 21–35, 182–200, Humphreys 1996: 159–199). In addition, the voices of new private and commercial radio broadcasters were not heard on the European level until the establishment of the Association of European Radios (AER) in 1992 and its emergence into political activity by the mid-1990s (Lembke 2002: 219–220). It is no wonder that the DAB development remained firmly in the hands of public service broadcasters and electronics manufacturers, while no private radio broadcasters were involved in either of the two phases of Eureka 147, the project developing DAB digital radio in 1987–1991 and 1992–1994 (Rissanen 1993).

The new DAB digital radio system was thought to be superior over analogue radio systems by not only improving but expanding radio: it was able to deliver several programmes for mobile reception with high-quality audio and additional services (but no video) using only a single transmitter. However, using *multiplexing* for delivering

several programme channels at the same time through one transmitting channel and the *Single Frequency Network* (SFN) for occupying only a single frequency in the available spectrum (Hoeg and Lauterbach 2003), which made sense for public service broadcasters in large-scale nationwide and regional broadcasting, were rather ill-fitted for local and small-scale broadcasters in the increasingly complex radio landscape of the 1990s. The first warning signal came when the US radio industry decided to develop its own digital radio system based on the existing frequency allocations despite the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) giving an initial endorsement of DAB in 1991. The European system design reflected the old power structures of the European public broadcasting system, and it was considered to be too risky for the economic stability of American radio markets (Ala-Fossi and Stavitsky 2003: 62–67, 74). The serious mismatch between DAB and local radio was also pointed out in a report for the Council of Europe (Gronow et al. 1992) two years before DAB was formally recognised as an official standard for digital radio at the end of 1994, but no changes were made – and even the European spectrum allocations for digital radio in Wiesbaden 1995 were tailored for national and regional broadcasting.

The early 1990s were also a turning point for wireless telecommunication, especially mobile cellular telephony. The first commercially deployed digital mobile telephone system was the European GSM standard, which soon became very successful. Within 10 years after the first commercial GSM call was made in Finland in 1991, the system had 500 million subscribers worldwide (GSM World 2011). The development of computer technologies, which later became the basis for the Internet, had started in the US in the mid-1960s, but during the 1970s and 1980s, these new technologies did not yet have any implications for broadcasting. Actually, the Internet began to have serious effects on traditional media only after the introduction of the World Wide Web in 1992 and the first web browser in 1993 (Henten and Tadayoni 2008: 49–51).

All this happened at the same time as the second coming of the information society agenda, which was primarily inspired by the US National Information Infrastructure (NII) initiative, officially launched by the newly elected Clinton administration in September 1993. The vision about the 'information superhighway' was largely based on the ideas of the development of computer technology and the Internet, but the American concept of digital TV was also identified from the very beginning as an essential part of the new US government strategy. In a society where more households had television sets than telephones or personal computers, it was expected that a new interactive form of digital television could provide a more natural gateway to the information society (Huuhtanen 2001: 24, Aufderheide 1999: 43, Galperin 2004: 37–39, Negroponte 1995: 42–43, 54). A group of MIT academics and the US computer industry, most notably Apple Computers, had been persistently promoting the compatibility of the new US digital television standard with the existing computer technology, so the NII and the new agenda inspired by it matched with the earlier visions of the electronic convergence of all media (Hart 2004: 155, 165, Neil 2010). However, US broadcasters were reluctant to abandon their traditional interlaced display formats, so the preconditions for digital convergence did not exist until the Advanced Television Systems Committee (ATSC) standard was approved by the FCC in December 1996 (Brinkley 1998: 393).

In order to protect the competitiveness of its own member states, the European Union reacted rapidly to the NII initiative, and in December 1993, the Delors White Paper suggested a large development programme for telecommunications, computer networks and other information infrastructure in Europe. The European Council warmly supported the ideas and asked for an implementation plan, which was then prepared under Commissioner Martin Bangemann. While the information society hype took over broadcasting in the audiovisual Green Paper of 1994, a few months later the Bangemann report more or less adapted the American NII programme for the European Community and gave a series of recommendations for the member states

on how to pursue the information society. In addition, the report also included the development of digital television (interactive video) into the European action plan (Michalis 2007: 164–165, Galperin 2004: 39–40, 134–135). Interestingly, digital radio was not even mentioned in the Bangemann report (1994) although it already existed, unlike digital television; even in the European Green Paper on Convergence (1997), there is only one reference made to multimedia digital radio (EC 1994, EC 1997: 5).

As already noted, by the time the DVB project for European digital television began in September 1993, DAB was almost completed as the standard for digital radio with narrowband channels and no video codec. It was thought to be superior new European digital technology for audio broadcasting, so instead of any re-evaluation or reform of the nearly finished system, it made more sense to supplement it with an equally superior digital system for video broadcasting. On the other hand, it was also reasonable to utilise all the existing European research on digital broadcasting for digital television development. This is why DVB digital television has many technical similarities to DAB digital radio, including multiplexing and SFN, and in certain conditions 'DVB-T is effectively a wide bandwidth version of the DAB system' (Laven 1998: 5–6). However, these two closely related European digital broadcasting systems were also intentionally made incompatible with each other.

There was no particular desire in Europe to merge the new digital broadcast systems despite the increasing popularity of the idea of convergence and the awareness of the Japanese concept of ISDB. The national public broadcasters still had strong and strictly separate radio and television organisations with their own distinctive development strategies, and the members of the EBU considered the two digital systems mostly as independent digital replacements of the two analogue broadcasting systems. In addition, the new consumer-driven approach led the DVB developers to aim at what the majority of consumers were expecting from television. Instead of very high quality pictures, DVB offered more channels to provide more choice (Fagan 1994),

and because most people were not watching television on the move, DVB (-T) was designed for fixed roof-top antenna reception of video on wideband channels, while mobile reception capability was ignored on purpose (Yamada 2006: 28). So, when DVB was approved as an official standard in 1995, it was intentionally inappropriate for mobile use and rather uneconomic for any radio-type services (Baumgartner 2005: 1–2, Wood 1995, Wood 2001: 2, Laven 1998: 5–6).

Converging vs. competing digital broadcasting systems

In Japan, abandoning analogue Hi-Vision after investing money and effort in it for over 20 years was a very difficult process. Although NHK laboratories set up a whole new department for research on digital broadcasting methods in 1991 (Yamada 2006: 32), by 1994 most Japanese politicians and industry leaders were officially still backing analogue HDTV (Fagan 1994, Negroponte 1995: 37–40, Hart 2004: 199–203). The head of the new NHK digital broadcasting research department, Osamu Yamada, had become interested in OFDM and the European DAB project in the late 1980s because of its capability to provide robust mobile reception. After he discovered in 1992 that both the Europeans and the Americans had intentionally left mobile reception outside of their respective standard specifications for digital television, mobile reception using OFDM was made one of the cornerstones of the new Japanese digital broadcasting system (Yamada 2006: 28).

Another new competitive advantage was found in Japan from the earlier concept of ISDB by developing the new system as an integrated digital platform instead of the media-specific approach adopted both in Europe and the US. By utilising already existing research on digital broadcasting, the Japanese were able to introduce the technical specifications of their new digital broadcasting system in 1997. ISDB-T has several technical commonalities with both DAB and DVB, but

thanks to its convergent technological approach on digital broadcasting, it was able to offer mobile reception of both radio and television in standard quality as well as in HD format, unlike its European relatives (Yokohata 2007: 1, Nakahara 2003: 5, 27, 30–33, Miyazawa 2004: 6, 26, Kim 2003). In this way, it was able to challenge the conventional conceptions of both broadcast television and radio.

The ISDB approach was possible mainly because radio and television were not treated as completely separate entities with unique identities, but rather as two forms of broadcast media based on different degrees of technical complexity. From the Japanese perspective, radio was also in every way a minor and subordinate media when compared to television (Kato 1998: 177), and there was no demand for another separate DAB-type system for digital radio, either. However, this integrated digital platform blurring the traditional boundaries between radio and television seems to be rather a common ground for both new and old types of broadcast media than a basis for a single converged medium in itself.

By the end of the 1990s, it had become obvious that the European strategy of creating two complementary digital broadcasting systems had resulted in a situation where DAB was in fact competing with DVB over political and industrial support in Europe. Some people were so impressed by DVB that they proposed it for all digital broadcasting. The EBU was able to defend DAB by pointing out that because the systems were designed to be complementary, they could not possibly substitute each other (Laven 1998, Wood 2001). The former head of the EBU technical department, David Wood, even stated that 'ultimately, radio is likely to survive and prosper better in the digital age, if it is the master of its own environment' (Wood 2001: 3). However, the odds turned against DAB partly for the same reasons, which, according to Galperin (2004: 25–27), supported the rapid implementation of terrestrial DVB and causing the *digital TV paradox*: 1) DAB and DVB were both results of a pan-European project for saving the electronics industry in Europe, but digital radio was always more like a by-product than the actual centrepiece of the European high-tech

counterattack. This is quite understandable considering the smaller economic and political importance of radio. Its increasingly fragmented markets did not help much in its competition for support with DVB, either. 2) While digital (interactive) television was seen as an ideal way to overcome the *digital divide* and bring the information superhighway to every home, digital radio was hardly even mentioned in the most influential visions of the new information society, just as there would not be any primarily audio-oriented communication in the future. 3) Migration to DVB was going to create significant a *digital dividend* for rapidly growing mobile telephony services by packing television broadcasting into smaller space in the radio spectrum, while it simultaneously provided more channels for television. Although full-scale migration to DAB could have also created some vacant spectrum in the long run, the relative benefit per channel was going to be much smaller, and the telecom industry was not very interested in taking over the FM band, where a rather wide selection of radio channels in most cases already existed in the late 1990s. In addition, the recently adopted technological neutrality principle provided a politically correct excuse for 'letting the market decide'.

These issues made EU institutions and most European governments pushing DVB not give much ideological, legal or political support for DAB by the turn of the century despite the joint efforts of AER, EBU, WorldDAB Forum and the European Association of Consumer Electronics Manufacturers (EACEM) (Lembke 2002: 212–240). For example, in Finland, when the formal decision about digitalisation of all broadcasting was made by the Council of State in May 1996, DAB radio was expected to make its breakthrough in the consumer markets many years before DVB television, which required much larger investments (Mykkänen 1995: 20–22). However, within three years, it became clear that both the stakes and rewards for successful migration to digital television were much higher, while the implementation of digital radio was in practice much more difficult than originally expected. Nokia abandoned DAB in 1997, and two years later, the Finnish government as well as most of the broadcast industry

concentrated their efforts on supporting the implementation of DVB (Heikkilä 1999: 9, Lax et al. 2008: 156–157, Ala-Fossi 2011).

By 1998, the increasing importance of the Internet as a converged digital media platform and the first ISDB field trials with mobile TV experiments in Japan made European developers of digital television understand that digital broadcasting could offer more than just traditional media concepts – and that they actually may have made a strategic mistake by excluding mobile reception from the DVB standard. The very first prototype of a European mobile TV receiver was quickly put together at Nokia's DVB unit in Turku, Finland. Nokia also participated in setting up a new EU-supported project (AC318 Motivate) to develop a European system for mobile television and to compete against ISDB (Kemppainen 2008: 23, Torikka 2007, Motivate 1998, Talmola 2005: 2).

As noted earlier, the DVB system was based on an assumption that the receivers would always have a mains connection and a rooftop antenna, so their power consumption was quite high, and mobile reception was unreliable (Torikka 2007, Högmander 2003). The Nokia Turku unit solved these problems by dividing the signal into short bursts and slightly reducing the picture quality (Torikka 2007, Vihma 2007, Lehto 2006), but after these modifications, it was not possible to receive any regular DVB broadcasts with a handheld DVB-H receiver or vice versa (Ala-Fossi 2010: 52–56).

Despite this incompatibility, the new modified version of DVB standard was considered to be a brilliant piece of European engineering, and the DVB-H project team of Nokia even received the Finnish Engineering Award in 2007. Later in the same year, the European Commission took a stand in favour of DVB-H and a year later added it to the EU List of Official Standards (Torikka 2007, EC 2007, EU 2008). For a while, both the government and industry expectations over the success of the new European mobile television system as a converged broadcast platform for digital radio and mobile multimedia were very high, but the failure of DVB-H is now unquestionable. In 2011, Finland and Italy were the last remaining countries in Europe

with commercial DVB-H services (de Renesse 2011). By March 2012, DVB-H services in Finland will be replaced with services based on another new version of digital television, DVB-T2 (MINTC 2011, Digita 2011).

Digital convergence of broadcasting in Europe – an opportunity lost?

The development and history of digital broadcasting technologies is obviously a complex series of intermedial and international relationships rather than a straightforward process towards digital consolidation. European digital radio would not have been like DAB without the Euro-Japanese project to create the CD, the European pre-development of digital radio and audio systems and the Japanese HDTV proposal, which together set separate paths for the European development of television and radio. In addition, European television would not be digital without the American impact – and it would not be like DVB without the indirect and direct influence and sheer existence of the DAB system. The European systems were both, in turn, starting points for the Japanese development of ISDB, which was designed to provide mobility unlike Western television systems. Additionally, the ISDB system provided the reason for the development of the new European antidote called DVB-H.

Digitalisation *per se* does not necessarily lead to any kind of integration of different forms of media, but it can be one of the preconditions for implementing an expansive convergence business strategy based on removing earlier technological, regulatory, political and legal barriers between existing markets. This neoliberal approach has been supported by technologically deterministic and circular argumentation: because technology was driving convergence, policies had to be changed and regulations removed, which in turn would increase and accelerate the economic process, making convergence function like a

‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 135). However, technologies are never the real driving force behind any policy changes, but socially shaped tools for certain socially defined practices, while their capacities and characteristics effectively set the limits for the political and economic goals of their use. The original idea of digital media convergence was based on a mistaken assumption that these limits would simply vanish or become indifferent through digitalisation. After it gained enough popularity and political importance, the gates for new and expanding digital business activities were opened through policy reforms.

The European project for digitalisation of broadcasting has actually not failed in increasing digital media convergence because that was not even its original goal. As long as the digital television system was considered to be impossible to design, the idea of convergence did not have much impact on the development of broadcasting technologies. On the contrary, the fundamental economic motives of European media technology projects were to protect European markets and industries by creating new technological barriers. However, this setting changed dramatically when the unexpected breakthrough in digital television development and simultaneous difficulties in the analogue HDTV project made European politicians re-evaluate their high-technology policies and adopt a more neoliberal approach. Convergence, especially the integration of television and computer, was now one of the promises of the new digital future, which would create new commercial markets and smooth the way towards the brave new information society. The brand new interactive digital television supplementing telecom and computing services seemed to be a perfect way to both avoid the *digital divide* and create more *digital dividend*, while digital radio fighting for the same resources and support was already on the road towards political and economic marginalisation.

The most crucial decisions leading into digital divergence of terrestrial broadcasting in Europe were made in the early 1990s, when the DVB specifications were drafted. Another mobile digital broadcasting system would have been a direct threat to the DAB system still in its

infancy, and there was no evidence that European consumers would appreciate mobile reception of television. Finally, there were strong cultural, economic and organisational forces inside the national public broadcasting companies maintaining separate spheres for both broadcast mediums. Together, these factors led to the development of DVB, which in practice excluded the possibility for digital convergence of all broadcasting in Europe. This was not a problem for EBU members as long as they considered themselves primarily radio and television broadcasters, but it has not really fit together with the business strategies of commercial broadcasting or the new, more convergence-oriented digital strategy of Public Service Media adopted in the 2000s (EBU 2002: 17, Bardoel and Lowe 2007).

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IV

CHANGE OF MEDIA INSTITUTIONS AND PROFESSIONS: CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

KAUKO PIETILÄ

11. Professional Journalism: An Intermediary Social Practice

Introduction

Journalism may be something more than an occupation, namely one among an elite group of occupations, the professions. The high status of professions requires that they perform functions for the benefit of society as a whole, not just for employers or customers. Journalism, too, has been held responsible for a general function in social and societal life. Journalists occupy the intermediate position between the events that make up their stories and the recipients of those stories; in one sense or another, their stories mediate between the events and the public. Ideally and logically, professionals who perform general functions, intermediaries included, determine their operations independent of other parties. However, their autonomy and, consequently, their professional status have been permanently under a threat. The *bourgeoisie*, playing 'a most revolutionary part' in history, has tried, as was pointed out more than 160 years ago, to strip 'of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe' and to convert 'the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers' (Marx and Engels 1972

[1848]: 465). At a later time, journalists, after having developed their intermediary function and achieved something like a professional standing, could have been added to the authors' list.

But trying to convert professions into wage labour is one thing, achieving it another. We shall see that professions, journalism included, had more resistance than the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* assumed. Professionalism has a long history, both as a word and as a practice. It seems to follow a path that first ascends from the beginning to a summit and finally starts to descend when afflicted by tendencies that gnaw at its roots. This trajectory is the subject matter in the second section.

The next section takes up journalism. Professionalism in journalism depends on a definite *type* of intermediation. The type – and journalism's professionalism – loses ground as journalism's position in the media world changes. The change endangers the very existence of the trade and the occupation. The final section concludes by speculating on a possibility to recreate journalistic intermediation in such a way that journalism's professional standing could be founded anew.

The trajectory of professionalism

The vocabulary and discourse of professionalism. The word *profession* and its derivatives did not exist always in language, nor did they always retain the same meaning. In Latin, the world stood for public explanations, notifications and registers (Oxford English Dictionary 2009). Its later secular meaning referred to public education and subsequently to occupations which applied the knowledge of some science. One of the word's current meanings is a calling or career, particularly one involving a long formal education (OED). The occupations originally conforming to this meaning were employments in the church, jurisprudence and medicine; the 18th century honoured 'the three great Professions

of Divinity, Law, and Physick' (Addison 2006 [1711]); a fourth was often added: 'the Profession of Arms' (Steele 2006 [1711]).

The discourse of professionalism has a developing vocabulary. The centre-piece is *profession*, a word that appeared at the dawn of modern times to denote a set of particular occupations. Adjectives, adverbs, verbs and further nouns were derived from the centre-piece over the course of centuries (Figure 1). The vocabulary and the discourse of professionalism seem to expand from bare bones into complexity, most rapidly in the half-century from the mid-19th to the opening of the 20th century.

A certain incongruity is related to the development indicated in Figure 1. Sociologically considered, professions are originally *communal* functions that are performed to realise some foundational values of the community. The development of the professionalism discourse (as reflected in the expanding vocabulary) can be taken to indicate a growing awareness of these communal functions. From its beginning in the Renaissance, the discourse gains breadth and depth at least until the first years of the 20th century, briskest in the last decades of the period. Where the spontaneous development ends, 20th-century sociology takes over. What else happens during the same period is the formation of the modern condition in which *community* retreats and gives way to the expanding *society*. These two developments do not easily agree with each other. If it is true that professions perform communal functions, then it looks as if awareness of these communal functions grows in pace with communal forms of life losing strength and societal forms becoming more powerful.

Ferdinand Tönnies gives us a clearer idea of the issue. He distinguished two forms of human life; one of them is organic. Organic life is lived in a community (*Gemeinschaft*), where occupations are practised as *professions* (*Beruf*). The opposite of community is society (*Gesellschaft*), in which life is lived as a *business transaction* (*Geschäft*; Tönnies 1922 [1887]: 134–135). *Beruf* is a communal function serving the needs of the whole; in society, people practise *Geschäft*s for



Figure 1. Formation of the professionalism terminology in English according to the *OED*

their own individual reasons. As *Beruf*s are communal forms, and as communities tend to be overshadowed by societies, how should we understand the fact that the idea of profession, a communal construct, seems to evolve and gain an expanding verbal expression alongside the advancement of the modern *Geschäft* society?

The self-protection of society. Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* (1957 [1944]) investigates the process whereby Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft*s are turned into *Gesellschaft*s and human beings' shared life becomes organised through market exchanges. In this transformation, a civilisation is born which subordinates 'the substance of society itself to the laws of the market' (ibid.: 70). The change is problematic. If the market mechanism were the 'sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power' or money, this 'would result in the demolition of society' (ibid.: 73). Society could not 'stand the effects of such a system' if it were not protected 'against the ravages of this satanic mill' (ibid.). A double movement is created in which the market tends to expand while a counter movement tries to arrest this expansion. The market mechanism provokes resistance against itself, and this resistance operates to limit the market effects on the factors of production, labour, land and money (ibid.: 131).

This enables us to put the professionalism discourse into context. With it, society adopted, at first spontaneously and later more consciously, a self-defensive posture against the satanic mill of the market. The great transformation constrained *Beruf*s into *Geschäft*s. To defend themselves as professions, occupations required and created a more advanced vocabulary and discourse; one of their designers was the sociology of professions. The question was of morality, of how anybody could even think of acting without first regarding one's own interest, in a world in which the form of life was no longer the performance of a communal function, but a business transaction. Sociology answered with a framework of communal values (Parsons 1952, Wolfe 1989: 201–204), and a modern ethos of professionalism was created.

The ethos of professionalism. The new formation was called the *social service professionalism*; its context was the 'age of planning' (Marshall 1939: 333–340). The planned object was society itself, and a key role in the project was acted by the state. The state initiated welfare programmes, whereby 'the professions are being socialized and the social and public services are being professionalized' (ibid.: 335). The social service occupations adopted 'responsibility for social welfare' and recognised their obligations to the professions, to the public, to society as a whole and to the state (ibid.: 333–336). The core ethos was to provide a service on the basis of a need rather than an ability to pay (Hanlon 1998: 49).

Journalism followed the general trend. Professionalization was the concept 'adopted to represent the factual change of journalist's role in the 20th century as it was perceived by researchers' (Nygren 2008: 10). We can discern here a self-protective movement. The professionalization of the trade was thought to ensure for journalism values other than just the market value. The motive behind the drive was the fear that the market value overrides other pertinent values. The early science of newspaper in Germany (*Zeitungswissenschaft*) was aware of the danger. It took for granted that the moral and cultural import of the press depends on the publishers' business interests, yet 'it is in the editorial staff's nature to have to follow the highest interests of humankind, and in general they even believe in this. But *can* they do what they ought to?' (Bücher 1922: 5). The science was concerned about the 'fatal dualism between the entrepreneurial and the public interest' (Dovifat 1925: 5). A remedy was suggested: journalists should be educated at universities (Bücher 1981 [1909]: 79–98). The hope was that universities turn out not just tradespeople but professionals.

Breakdown of the social ethos. Society's self-defences depended on the classes threatened by the market mechanism, most notably on the working class (aristocracy was involved in its own way, see Polanyi: 154–156). When the class structure changed, the self-defences were fractured. A general understanding in sociology is that the 'working class [...] is on the way out' (Bauman 1987: 179, also Therborn 1999:

4, and Pakulski 2005: 175). The class on the rise is the *service class* (Goldthorpe 1982, Hanlon 1998: 43) or the new middle class.

The occupations of the service class look like professions; the practitioners are physicians, teachers, researchers, accountants, lawyers, engineers, civil servants and so on. But as the new class expands and rises to domination after the 1960s, the ethos of social service falls apart and is replaced by 'commercialised professionalism' (Hanlon 1998: 50). The relation of the sociology of professions to its subject matter also changes. The orientation (e.g. Parsons and Platt 1973) that supported professionalization recedes, and the newer scholars see the professions as occupations that are concerned essentially about their own interests and unjustified power (Sciulli 2007: 35–37).

The new spirit does not inspire the practice of occupations as *Beruf*s; they should be taken as *Geschäft*s. The connection to public service is cut off, and we might speak of de-professionalization. Instead of providing a service to a need, it is essential to produce a profit to a business. The state withdraws into the background, and welfare projects are dismantled. Also journalism slides into decline, and a 'de-professionalization of the journalist's role' looms ahead (Nygren 2008).

Professional journalism, an anachronism?

The de-professionalizing turn in journalism. Although journalism may have had few other professional features, 'it has not been backward in formulating justificatory ideologies' (Elliott 1978: 189). One of the early notions was the idea of a *free press* 'forged in the long struggle between the bourgeoisie and the English aristocracy' (ibid.). The free press doctrine was counterbalanced by a theory of social responsibility (a self-defensive move). The responsibility of the press consisted of an obligation to provide 'society with a true, impartial account of its affairs' (ibid.: 190). In the same way as the medical profession adopted responsibility for the *health* of the population and the legal profession

for *justice*, journalism was burdened with the duty and trusteeship to take care of the *truth*. This spirit of professional journalism inspired a BBC editor to stress that journalists must give the recipients 'the untainted information they need to make up their own minds' (ibid.: 184). Journalists were to transmit, as intermediaries, the events in the sphere of general affairs to the public, truthfully or objectively.

This professionalism, based on a communal responsibility for the transmission of objective information about general affairs, lost ground as the class structure changed and new communication technologies appeared. As citizenship retreated and was replaced by middle-class consumerism, the professional ethos of journalism was eroded and began, as a *Washington Post* columnist titled his piece, 'journalism's slow, sad death'. What was passing was 'not only a business but also a profession – the journalistic tradition of nonpartisan objectivity' (Gerson 2009). The profession of journalism had involved a spirit of public service, and this had meant objective reportage. This was now vanishing. The profession became a business, and the public service turned into private. 'The function of commercialized media is more and more determined by the customers' demand of services and the owners' expectation of profit' (Hujanen 2006: 30). That is, *two* bourgeois groups collaborated to convert the man and woman of journalism into their paid wage labourers. Servicing the customers, even if publicly performed, is not the public service that 'belonged, alongside with independence and ethicality, to the ideals of journalists' professional self-understanding' (ibid.: 31). Public service is a communal function; customer is a private person.

Servicing customers depends on knowing the clientele's needs and desires. To address this need, media companies commission market researches which 'more and more guide newspaper reforms and inform of desirable contents and suitable journalistic methods' (Hujanen 2004: 38). Commoditized journalism has turned its back on the communal function that benefits the whole; hence, it is de-professionalized.

Adding to journalism's abject condition, the new communication technologies put journalism in danger even as a trade and an occupa-

tion. To interchange the elements in the *Washington Post* columnist's jeremiad quoted above (Gerson 2009): What is passing is not just a profession but also a business – an industry to make a living and a profit. The trade is dropping from under journalists' feet as audiences turn to new media, so publics contract, incomes diminish, staffs are reduced, stories become duller. Journalism appears as one of the smokestack industries whose disappearance has been both predicted (as by Bell 1973, Toffler 1981, and many others) and hoped for (see, for example, Lynch, who stated that the idea of 'a professional journalist who is merely an objective observer [...] will officially fade in the coming years' because 'it was a stupid fantasy that it should be like that anyway' [Lynch 2010]).

The promise and the threat of the social media. Stupid or not, the industrial modernity insisted that '[i]ndividuality under these circumstances must be replaced by categories', arrangements must be made 'to adjust the facilities and institutions to the needs of the average person' and concessions have to be made 'to mass requirements' (Wirth 1938: 17–18). If the individual wanted to participate in society at all, 'he [had to] immerse himself in mass movements' (ibid.: 18). Mass communication was an essential institution of this modernity, and an essential element of mass communication was the general public, a smaller or greater accumulation of individuals, all equal and independent of each other, all receiving the same message. It was the mass of mass communication.

The new communication technologies were received as liberations from this massed condition as 'user-centric, group-based active cooperation platforms of the kind that typify the networked information economy' (Benkler 2006: 357, Nip 2006: 218–224). Networking – and, by its side, participatory citizen journalism – allowed individuals 'to reorganize their social relations in ways that fit them better' (Benkler 2006: 367). They could have reciprocal relations that remained light and acknowledged freedom. They were given tools 'to loosen social bonds that are too hierarchical and stifling, while filling in the gaps where their real-world relations seem lacking' (ibid.). The stifling

bonds meant the 'information environment dominated by commercial mass media on a one-to-many model, which does not foster group interaction among viewers' (ibid.: 357). By means of the new media, people had the opportunity to produce contents for themselves (Miller 2005: 23); the practice was named 'journalism by the people, for the people' (Gillmor 2004).

The network communication by the people, for the people – 'we the media' is Dan Gillmor's watchword – is for the most part essentially something other than journalism. Modern news journalism, the paradigm, means information mediation based on 'nonpartisan and detached knowledge of important facts, meant to be shared by all' (Hujanen 2004: 51). A precondition for this is that an intermediary exists who is not involved in the facts but whose concern is knowledge of the facts; this intermediary is the journalist. In communication by the people, for the people, no journalists are involved, and communication without journalists is not journalism but something else.

The new media of communication tend to oust journalistic intermediation. This does not mean an end to intermediation itself. The Internet may have a capacity for intermediation that exceeds enormously the older capacities. But the nature of mediation is changed. In the new media, mediation is not (as much as it used to be) a job for human beings such as journalists. Instead of humans, it is performed by *engines*. The Internet is a tremendous intermediary engine; people use search engines to find anything on the Internet; election engines are used to identify and choose candidates; there are engines within engines.

The changeover in intermediation from persons to engines is accompanied by another remarkable development: publics tend to disappear. Journalistic media had their relatively stable publics. Even though the Internet is an enormously wide, easily and instantly accessible public sphere, it is a public sphere without publics. This follows from a certain confusion of roles. In the new forms of network communication, the producers and consumers of content are in principle one and the same set of people. There is no particular group called

journalists, hence no complementary group called the public. These *identities*, which constitute reciprocally each other and were quite clear in the journalistic media, disappear. The participants in the new media of communication are all *individuals*.

The sociological and societal consequence of this alteration is significant. I indicated above that journalism, as a profession, was in the service of society's self-protection in the face of threats generated by the market. Journalism performed a two-sided function of assembling. On the one hand, it brought together, in its objective reportage, the world as it was currently happening; on the other, it called together a public otherwise detached from that world and put it into an observer's position. Journalism was a nexus where the scattered people congregated as a unified public to meet their differentiated world of the newsworthy, of notables and celebrities, of functions and offices, of events, actions and plans and so on, as collected by the journalists. This was making society visible, in a sense, both ways: differentiations and functions to the public, and the public to the former. A visible society is, in some measure, also receptive to steering.

This is changed when professional journalism is constrained into retreat. With the rise of new network communications, a central mechanism of society's self-defence is dismembered. Its place is occupied by a dispersed condition, much like the market where actors are individuals and each pursues his or her own ends. As society's system of self-protection against the market becomes itself a market participant, society is once again exposed to capitalism's corroding influences. This is in evidence in the, as it seems, uncontrollable turbulence in the financial markets and in the growing resentment of populations whose embittered action against all sorts of estranged elites is in the homelands called – and despised as – populism; when originating from abroad, it is called – and hated and fought against as – terrorism.

Professionalism is eroded not just in journalism, but quite generally; one result is an interesting structural change. The personnel in the commercialised professions seem to be divided into two tiers, an upper and a lower stratum. A collection of studies about professionalism in

different branches shows without exception an intensified two-tier development in the working life:

- the medical profession evinces 'a process of splitting into more and less privileged groups'; an additional process is 'fragmentation' (di Luzio 2004: 443–444);
- universities and other higher education reveal a 'fragmentation of the academic division of labour […] between project employed and tenured academics' (Hellström 2004: 515, 519);
- the legal profession is segmented into an elite and those outside the elite (Boon et al. 2005: 486, also Muzio and Ackroyd 2005: 640–641);
- in schools, the 'teachers' hitherto exclusive role in taking care of classes of children is to be 'opened up' to a subordinate group of non-teachers who receive 'considerably less training, remuneration and status' (Wilkinson 2005: 430); and
- in journalism, the upper grade is composed of the 'permanent well-paid journalists, the notables among the editorial staff, who as heads of the editorial office keep the production system going'; the underclass consists of content producers, interim employees, freelancers, subcontractors and the newly graduated (Nygren: 63–64, Ursell 2004).

In journalism, the orientations of the two tiers may be significantly opposite. The higher layer tends to define the trade in terms of profit-seeking economic undertaking, while the lower stratum would base the occupation's legitimacy and authority on its 'assistance to democracy and citizenship' (Hujanen 2006: 34, 37). The latter group might have an interest to turn journalism's de-professionalization into re-professionalization – but what about its professional ideology?

The doctrine of objective reporting does not obligate any longer with its former vigour, and does not function as a source for journalists' self-confidence. The managerial layer in particular does not see any possibility to return to earlier modes of operation: 'In order to be interesting and significant journalism cannot mediate the same kind of information as in the past' (Hujanen 2004: 38, 43–46). The younger

strata of the population join in, indicating that: 'We are not going to trust objectivity' (Eaves 2009). Is there anything, then, on which the profession of journalism could be rebuilt?

A new situation, a new doctrine

The old doctrine becomes groundless. An occupation needs a generally valued goal in order to be acknowledged as a professional public service. Journalism, with its background in a class society in which class conflict was prevalent – 'the long struggle between the bourgeoisie and the English aristocracy', as in Elliott's analysis – was justified by the doctrine of objective mediation of information. Objectivity is a choice to one who wants to maintain equitable relations to all parties of a conflict. Thus journalism, turning itself into a business enterprise in the condition of class struggles, moved to an intermediary position defined by disinterested objectivism as a guarantee of honesty, integrity and determination.

When the large economic classes, defined by contradictory interests and struggles for political power, were dissolved, and the class society was replaced by a panorama of almost endlessly fragmented smaller-scale individual and group interests, objectivism lost its positive functionality, revealed its negative aspects and turned from a solution into a problem. Objectivism namely objectified, even doubly. Objective journalism treated the reality under its observation as an object, and it took its public as an object of its informational action. It was analogous to school education, where 'closely scheduled mediation of knowledge is more important than skills of problem solving and social interaction' and where pupils are 'objects of the mediation of information who are not supposed to define their own goals or to plan their own work' (Kauppinen 2004: 28).

The negative aspects of objectivism aroused the renunciation mentioned above: 'We are not going to trust objectivity'. This problematic condition is reflected in journalists' talk about their occupation. The managerial level in particular is sensitised and requires journalists to produce stories to elucidate 'the meaning the events of the world have for the everyday life', and to turn out 'content that reflects people's needs and desires'. The goal is to 'enable citizens to participate […] and to inform the decision-makers of their views'. It is imperative to look at the world 'from the ordinary people's point of view and not from the civil servant's or politician's angle, and the different perspectives must be connected and intertwined' (Hujanen 2004: 44–45). The last quotation from practising journalists identifies all parties of the journalistic configuration: the public (ordinary people), actors in the public sphere (civil servants, politicians and all other figures on the stage) and the connector in the intermediary position (the journalist and his or her medium). We can now start to define a professional doctrine based on these classes of personage.

The task redefined: bringing the public in. A task for the contemporary journalist is to bring in again the public that was exiled by journalism's insistence on objectivity. Particularly the upper stratum of journalists feels the need for a reorientation. They say that journalists should 'concentrate on issues related to people's own lives and create an interface to the readers' everyday' (Hujanen 2004: 46), and that they should produce compassionate journalism that 'looks from the bottom up' (ibid.: 48). To do this, they need sources and connections in the everyday that can be used to interpret expert information so that societal matters can be opened up with the ordinary people's narratives, words and views. The idea is that the 'intimate knowledge generated in the everyday, coupled with people's feelings and experiences, could be given […] the status of expert knowledge' (ibid.: 51). Journalism of this kind would 'give resources to the public as citizens and empower them to participate in collective action' (Hujanen 2006: 31). Also, it would 'offer people facilities to get in on the act, to exert influence on events and to be heard' (ibid.: 35). A journalist is not up to the

professional task if he or she is satisfied to describe bureaucratic and ceremonial edifices and processes; what the job requires is to chart and make public people's experiences (ibid.: 37). It is 'important that journalists clarify the connections between political decision and people's experiences and feelings'; it is important that journalism 'becomes a nexus where the public and the private meet' (ibid.: 38).

The background for these requirements is the traditional media's anxiety about changes and developments that make social media a more proper environment for the generations whose impulse is to 'claim space for one's own *self* and to build up *one's own* initiative and *one's own* subjectivity' (Vähämäki 2009: 198–199). Journalism, however, which seeks to reconstruct itself as a profession, cannot content itself with this 'self', 'one's own' and 'subjectivity' because the larger framework of general affairs stays put anyway and cannot be reduced to an individual's self, own and subjective. In this condition, the trade might ask itself a question: How is journalism constituted as communicative action?

Yochai Benkler represents people who have a good time in the social media and detest the 'information environment dominated by commercial mass media on a one-to-many model' (Benkler 2006: 357). In their view, journalism is a system of *two constitutive elements*, one of them, the content producers (relatively few), sending messages in a one-way channel to the recipients (abundantly many). Can this view, and the corresponding reality, be made more balanced, egalitarian and participatory without giving up journalism?

One evident way is to see in journalism *three constituent elements* and to define it as communication originating from (1) actors in the public domain and proceeding, via (2) journalists, to (3) the public at large, *and returning back by the same route* (the 'returning back' in particular may presuppose that journalists have an innovative approach to their occupational skills and practices). What could be expected from up-to-date public service professional journalists in this setup is that they construct meetings or encounters in their media between the general or universal, represented by the public, and the particular,

represented by the identified actors in the public domain. In Jaana Hujanen's summaries quoted above, the top-level journalists spoke of politicians, experts, public servants and other actors and agents of the public domain, and contrasted them to people in general, people in their everyday and in their own lives, people at the bottom, ordinary people, citizens and consumers (Hujanen 2004 and 2006). The *general* or *universal* is on the latter side of this setup (because people on this side make up a public in which individuals are not separated from each other but are taken into consideration in general). The *private* or *particular* (that which has been differentiated and identified) is on the structure's former side and is composed of specifically identified human beings, groups, organisations, associations and other such objects; the journalists focuses on them general attention on behalf of the public.

If journalism followed the model of three elements, it would serve both sides of the configuration without being bound to either (this is to ensure its independence); it would mediate the particular to the public (by informing the public of the actors on the stage) and the public or general to the particular (by creating the public's response or reaction). A professional journalist would not only mediate the differentiated, structured and classified aspect of the world to the public, but would also deliberate on what can be done on behalf of the public and from the general point of view in relation to the identified actors of the public domain. Both functions presuppose journalistic skills, but the tools to perform the latter function may require more innovative effort.

Investigative journalism is an example of such a two-way journalism, but we do not have to go even that far:

> Perhaps the simplest method for journalists to break away from the one-way flow of information that proceeds from public figures to audiences is to ask questions on the public's behalf. The modern media culture already 'incorporates a variety of institutional settings for verbal interaction in which the practices of doubt and disputation

are routinely relevant aspects of those setting's constituent discourse' and in which particular strategies are used by means of which one can manifestly 'be sceptical'. One such strategy involves 'the lexical format *you say X, but what about Y*' (Hutchby, 1992: 673–5). Practices of doubt, disputation, scepsis and interrogation could be practised in journalism on behalf of the public who, as a corporate body, can participate only through a representative.

If the media assume in full measure the role of intermediary, they do not just pass information from and about objects of public interest to the public but also aggregate and organize the public's retroaction. Intermediation through the mass media currently and routinely involves a sort of sociological weighing, namely a selection and presentation of events and people to the public. A next step ought to follow: the public's retroaction, preferably in excess of indications showing the public's mere presence. The retroaction can be questions, caution, suspicion, scepsis, evasion, irony, laughter, applause – whatever the public figures and actors reasonably, in the public's interest, deserve. An important problem relating to this is reported here (and a fair answer given): "One editor of a weekly newspaper wondered aloud, 'Who am I to decide what people are interested in?' – You're the editor, that's who" (Safran 2005: 23). (Pietilä 2011: 157–158.)

Journalism as sociation. What I have presented above brings to mind Anthony Giddens' reflexive modernity, where expert practices institutionalise everyday life, and everyday life and individual interpretations of meaning are introduced into the sphere of institutional order (Giddens 1994). Journalism, however, always involves more than individuals, namely great numbers. Normally the public or audience consists of a huge number of people, great in relation to the number – not insignificant in itself – of actors and agents who can be squeezed in the compass of journalistic public attention (about this, see Pietilä 2008). This disqualifies the category of the individual, and we need to think about journalism in a way slightly different from what Giddens

suggests. His contrast is between institutions, experts and knowledge on the one hand, and everyday life, individuals and meanings on the other. In journalism, the contrast is more appropriately between the whole as differentiated and the whole as a generality. Giddens' concern is the discursive formation of *knowledge*, whereas in the journalistic intermediation between the differentiated and the general, the question is of the formation of *society* (see Pietilä 2011).

The doctrine of journalism, as roughly outlined above, might call upon Niklas Luhmann, who defines society as a 'whole of experiences and actions that are present to each other and reach each other communicatively' (Luhmann 1981: 309). Society, accordingly, means a 'closure of communications that in an operative respect reach each other or take a relation to each other' (Krause 2001: 152). Society, in short, means communicative interaction. Essentially this is Georg Simmel's definition: Society exists when people start, or are made, to interact with each other (Simmel 1908: 5). If professionalism in general is a counterforce to market-based sociation, then, as a social scientist, I should counterbalance market-value with another value and goal, namely society, defined in Simmel's and Luhmann's sense. That would open up prospects for communication in general and journalism in particular, specifically an opportunity to see *communication and journalism not as taking place in society, but the other way round: to see society as happening in communication and journalism.*

In the sociological sense, journalism (although not journalism alone) makes it possible for very large numbers of human beings to interact: a lot of people as objects of public attention, even more people directing public attention onto them, and journalists in between mediating their relations to each other. The relations and interactions between public figures and the public can be regulated, within limits, by journalists, which means that journalism can still be a counterforce to market-based sociation, namely a domain in which sociation is guided by the idea of society itself.

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EEVA MÄNTYMÄKI

12. Does the Medium Matter? Network Journalism Meets Professional Practice and Ethics

Network journalism is here to stay, no longer as a specific field but incorporated into the standard mode of media production. It is hard to imagine a newspaper or a radio station without social media services or other means of interaction via the Internet. 'The big blur' has been melting previously separate mediums into large multimedia corporations, and the distinction made in Europe between publicly organised electronic media and privately owned press has largely disappeared (Lowe 2010: 27–30). Accordingly, media-specific production chains are intertwined, and the production process of any medium is tied to a digital networked environment with elements of social interaction. Ideas like crowdsourcing and user-generated content have transformed the notion of audience as well. Now, the audience is not a mere consumer of mediated messages but appears as a co-producer of contents, which challenges the classic role of a journalist as a gatekeeper.

In this chapter, the change of journalism is addressed as a potential transformation of professional ideals and respective ethical codes and monitored in the light of interview data collected in Finnish newsrooms in the summer of 2009. The focus is not on practice as such but on

the reflections of journalists to developments in their profession. As Natalie Fenton reminds us, journalistic ideals and professional ideology have their own intrinsic value, even if they are not always fully materialised in practice:

> In a world of communicative abundance this ethical horizon is still pertinent: there remains a sense that there are many things that news journalism ought to be doing – to monitor, to hold, to account and to facilitate and maintain deliberation – that forms a line in the sand against which contemporary practice can be critiqued (Fenton 2009: 3).

In this new world, the link between democracy and journalism is as close as ever. As Cecilia Friend and Jane B. Singer remind us in their discussion on ethics in online journalism: 'Online journalism has enormous potential to enhance the democratic purpose that has been the press' social and ethical foundation for centuries. It also has the potential to sidetrack both journalists and their audience' (Friend and Singer 2007: xx).

The challenge of network journalism

Beginning in the 1980s as an outcome of deregulation in media markets and accelerating through the 1990s in the transformation process energised by developments in digital media technologies, mutually reinforcing economic, political, technological and cultural powers were creating a totally new media environment. The respective mode of making journalism has been conceptualised in a positive tone as network journalism (e.g. Beckett 2008). Whatever one thinks of the positive or negative effects of network journalism, it has become clear that the new interactive and participatory forms of journalism challenge journalism as a profession.

In his discussion on journalism as a profession, Mark Deuze (2007) proposed a schema comprised of five ideal-type occupational values which journalists employ in their professional discourse. These values are: 1) public service (explicitly referring to the public interest), 2) objectivity (values of impartiality, neutrality and fairness), 3) autonomy (being independent and free from interference in their work), 4) immediacy (actuality and 'making news'), and 5) ethics (a profession bounded by a certain system of moral values and appreciating the importance of validity and legitimacy). Different from these values, the new media culture can be characterised as a context of growing individualisation, globalisation and networked practices, all of which challenge the typical assumptions of traditional newsmaking (Deuze 2007: 170).

According to Singer (2009: 73–75), even the metaphysical presumptions of the distinctive occupational ideology of journalism, like the distance between a journalist, her audiences and her sources, collapse. Incorporating former audiences as participants in the process of journalistic production leads to a deterioration of professional authority historically based on a perception of the journalist as a representative of the audience (Witschge and Nygren 2009: 55). Thus, the basic role of a journalist as a gatekeeper loses its significance in a situation where the fence around the gate is gone and influences start coming from every direction. The general trend is most notable in social media, where everybody participates in content production (Mäntymäki 2010, Mølster 2010: 41–42).

At the same time, the amount of mediated communication has exploded, and media-related occupations have been differentiating to the extent that it is far from clear whether it is possible to talk about journalism as a single profession anymore. Instead of journalism, there may be several journalisms and different media-related occupations. Today's journalism may not be a dream profession for a lifetime but simply an example of a variety of media-related occupations which might represent only one phase in one's professional career.

On the basis of empirical data collected in Sweden and in Britain, Tamara Witschge and Gunnar Nygren (2009: 37–59, Nygren 2008)

identify a definite turn towards de-professionalization of journalism that comprises a loss of professional autonomy, growing emphasis on technological skills, weakening trade unions and blurring of ethical codes. In short, the emphasis in journalistic practice has moved 'from research and content towards production and form' (ibid.: 49), which also implies deep-going transformations in aesthetics and quality (Mäntymäki 2006). Daniel Hallin (2006) has summarised developments since the 1980s with the observation that 'journalists have lost autonomy within news organisations increasingly dominated by the logic of market, and have lost prestige within society' (see also Davies 2008).

Journalists themselves see the disappearance of deadlines and the need to work ever faster as the most remarkable changes connected to the Internet and online media environment (Hytönen 2010, Witschge and Nygren 2009, Jyrkiäinen 2008, Nygren 2008). The resistance towards these changes arises not only from an increasing workload and a growing demand for technological skills but also from the feeling that professional standards can no longer be met (Fenton 2010, Jyrkiäinen 2008).

However, the transformation of the professional ideology of journalists has not been as quick and evident as one could imagine on the basis of changes in practice. It seems rather that the professional culture, filtered through local and particular social processes, acts as a very powerful balancing force in the newsrooms (Deuze 2007: 170). Witschge and Nygren (2009: 49–50) make a distinction between the basic level of daily work, which has remarkably changed because of cross-media production practices, and the level of routines, unconscious norms and rules where it is 'slightly more difficult to pinpoint the change' (ibid.: 50).

There are also voices emphasising the new opportunities and positive effects of the changing media environment. Following Manuel Castells' concept of the network, Ansgard Heinrich (2008 and 2011) stresses that the national one-way flows of news from a news outlet to the audience have been replaced by a genuinely global network struc-

ture which creates new forms of journalistic practice equally involving professional journalists, bloggers and other content-providers.

Charlie Beckett (2008) praises network journalism as a means to re-invigorate journalism, which has lost its trustworthiness and respectability in countless scandals showing media business as a corrupt sphere of activity (Davies 2008). According to Beckett, journalism should adopt interactive practices and new values like transparency and reciprocity. They could offer a basis for networked verification processes, very different from the traditional practice based on the professional authority and protection of sources. Far roots of the emerging new professional thinking might be found in versions of hacker ethics which, as articulated by Pekka Himanen (2001), acknowledge the new basic values of the network society: sharing innovations, belonging to communities and reciprocity.

Because of the special democratic accountability of public service media, in countries like Britain and Finland, publicly funded media institutions have been responsive to renewing journalism to the direction of networked environments (e.g. Mokka and Neuvonen 2007). At the moment, an online presence with the respective skills of interaction is becoming more and more an essential part of the role of a journalist (e.g. Bunz 2010). But these new ideas of openness do not necessarily fit very well into a strong professional culture with high value premises like professional autonomy (Mäntymäki 2010).

Tuija Aalto, the Head of Internet Strategy at the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE, has outlined a new role for broadcast journalists based on the re-articulation of ethical principles. The Finnish YLE as a public service broadcaster encourages its employees to be online and open their work processes. Support and training are available to encourage the change. The company develops online storytelling, and collaboration with the public will be a routine part of all journalistic work. The goals declared imply an active reformulation of the journalistic ideology by stressing the need to contextualise the news for the net environment and to experiment with online contents which require the involvement of journalists as persons. Contextualisation is one of the main principles of traditional journalism, but the conscious

efforts to create contents on the basis of journalists' personal involvement is an indication of essentially new values.

Towards the analysis of journalists' crisis discourse

The above kinds of changes to journalism provide the background for the analysis below of what can be characterised as journalists' crisis discourse. The source of analysis is a body of interview data collected mostly in the summer of 2009 by journalism students at the University of Tampere during their internships, the periods of compulsory practical training. The data consists of 59 thematic interviews with experienced journalists in different media and in different positions.[1] The senior composition of the sample, representing many media executives, editors-in-chief, news editors and producers in addition to reporters and photographers, probably has its impact on the data. This means also that there are many who have power to carry out their ideas and define the ethos of the publications in question on a much larger scale than the average reporters.

The analysis below will focus on the tension between the relatively constant professional ideology of journalists and their changing cultural and technological environment. As demonstrated above, the practical changes in newsrooms are obvious and remarkable. Digital technology and new delivery platforms have undeniably affected newsgathering and publishing processes and the craft of newsmaking. What sometimes goes unnoticed is the influence of professional ideology and its interplay with the changing practices. Keeping that in mind, the questions to be asked in the following analysis are: Do the ethical guidelines created by and for the journalists in the traditional media apply equally to journalists who work in the online world? In what ways do the intensified inter-relationships between different media transform the professional ideology of journalists? Are the professional discourses powerful enough to guide the transformations and flexible enough to allow re-interpretations?

Cornerstones of the crisis discourse

Practicing journalists' opinions vis-à-vis current developments are varying and contradictory. Some are deeply concerned about changes which they consider threatening quality journalism, while others stress new possibilities. There are also indications that the alterations in newsrooms have been creating a generational divide based at least partly on the assumption that the ageing colleagues are incapable of keeping up with technological and cultural change (cf. Nikunen 2011: 9–21, Hytönen 2010). On the other hand, there are also more or less serious value conflicts in the background.

The interview data show that many interviewed journalists are well aware of discussions around their professional status and values which cannot be taken for granted anymore. They keep up with the professional discourse even if ambivalences and discontinuities exist in it:

> We outline the world, are some kinds of gatekeepers. And that's the noblest profession [...]. We should try to be objective and provide essential knowledge and explain how the world stands and why [...]. But this is also part of the old-fashioned view because we've now lots of situations when the journalist isn't needed at all but knowledge is still spread around. Let's take for instance school shootings when messages flied from a mobile phone to a mobile phone without one single journalist present yet. (Male editor-in-chief, age 53, local paper)

The interviewed journalists have experienced personally the diminishing distance between professionals and their audiences and the weakening professional authority of journalists as representatives of their audiences. Sometimes, the lowering status of profession is understood as a possibility that enables more equitable communication with audience members, but one can also find implications of occupational self-defence:

> Journalists are nowadays commoners and ordinary workers. When I started working, in 1970s, a journalist had a totally different role and the professional identity was much stronger. As a journalist you felt important. (Male reporter, regional paper)[2]

The interviews construct differences between stratums of journalists. It is now largely acknowledged that, in terms of career opportunities, journalists are today probably more differentiated than before (Nikunen 2011: 19, Nygren 2008: 63–64); there are stars and ordinary grass-roots workers within the professional group. However, in the professional discourses, the star status does not necessarily imply a strong professional or even occupational status. On the contrary, stars might represent those media workers whose positioning as journalists is the most insecure:

> Let's take a beauty queen who takes a job as a hostess in a TV show. I think she isn't any journalist (Female news editor, age 52, regional paper).

Identifying the criteria of true journalism and real journalists is challenging. The blurring boundaries implicate that anybody could be a journalist – but, nevertheless, is not. On the contrary, the interviewees see journalists by definition as professionals who work for the established media institutions. Besides, borderlines are generally drawn in relation to the yellow press and entertainment programmes. As to magazines, distinctions are made in relation to women's magazines, customer publications and marketing. In the news media, boundaries of journalism are wavering around online departments and user-generated contents, public or citizen journalism, social media and bloggers:

> I just can't think that every blogger for instance were a journalist. I think being a journalist means still looking at things from kind of outside, so it's not only your own experiences. (Female producer, age 47, YLE)

The journalistic organisations, too, are trying to work out where, exactly, the difference between professional journalist and collaborating citizen journalist lies. In a seminar of the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) in May 2011, the most pertinent issues dealt with questions like: 'Should bloggers be recruited into journalists' unions? What about web designers? How can freelance journalists, working in ever more precarious conditions, be organized and included in collective bargaining agreements? Indeed what criteria should determine who carries a press card?' (Atarah 2011).

In spite of growing opportunities for interactivity, the position of a journalist as a professional interpreter of the world is still considered as the core of professional identity. It is a foundation for the other elementary values in journalism, the most prominent of which are professional autonomy and independent judgment. A journalist must not let any pressure groups guide the editorial decision-making; she must not be too keen on advancing even the interests of her own marketing department or opinionated citizens. However, professional autonomy and independence are not basically individual but profoundly collective characteristics maintained and guaranteed by the established media institutions.

Among the interviewed journalists, opinions differ regarding the present situation but the criteria of performance remain the same. Professional discourse is often intertwined with crisis discourse reflecting pressures towards basic values like professional autonomy:

> I think the cornerstones are cemented now much better than before. May be formerly there was more slipping. Now the danger what might happen if editorial power is given away is present all the time. I don't believe those who say that journalists are flabbier now than before – on the contrary, they are stricter than before. (Female news editor, regional paper)

Profession as a home base for collective identity

In the interview data, crisis discourse is the red thread running through generations and mediums, irrespective of individual experiences or opinions. In practice, the generational gap in newsrooms seems to be widening for several reasons. Organisational changes have restricted the professional independence of individual journalists, technological development has challenged conventional practices and cultural shifts have questioned the generally approved priorities (Nikunen 2011, Hytönen 2010, Mølster 2010). On the other hand, the strong professional ideology seems to maintain collegial loyalty, which is apt to restrict competitiveness in newsrooms even in situations of personal conflict (Nikunen 2011: 16). Consequently, journalists emphasise the role of organisational culture and the intangible spirit of newsrooms which so effectively socialise newcomers and engage staff coming from other areas of expertise:

> It's such a pitfall in every newsroom. This profession is such that it socializes newcomers very quickly. Very soon they think themselves professionals – mostly in good but also in bad. (Male news editor, age 53, regional paper)

Notwithstanding their up-to-date technical skills, which certainly ease their pressures to produce more content in less time, some of the young journalists describe their own attitudes as conservative or idealist. These statements can also be read simply as implications of experienced stress and anxiety:

> I'm myself such an idealist, still. I'd hope that the professional identity won't change so very much, and that we'd still try to do good journalism and maintain good principles. But it seems that we've all the time gone to the direction where working faster is what matters, which inevitably has its impacts on it, how carefully and accurately you are able to work with things. (Female reporter, age 29, regional paper)

The importance of a group and collegial connections in forming professional identity is emphasised by the definition of journalists as the media workers employed on a regular basis to the established media institutions. In the course of time, this might lead to more and more diverging journalisms because media corporations are more often than before developing their own corporate ethical codes and guides, which are supposed to serve as product branding and differentiation, too.

In Finland, the differences between media companies came visible in the coverage of school shootings (Juntunen 2009: 190). The perception supports Hallin's (2006) view that the current Western notion of professional journalism is a unique phenomenon made possible by the economic and socio-cultural conditions of post-war Europe and the United States. The economies of media houses and broadcasters were relatively secure, and there was a long period of political consensus centred on progressive preferences for a social welfare state in Europe and, in parallel, the New Deal in America. These conditions encouraged journalists to see themselves simultaneously as independent and as a part of the establishment.

The trade unions, together with other journalistic organisations, maintain universal and formal rules encapsulated in the Guidelines for Journalists and solidified in the decisions of the press' self-regulation bodies. There are many journalists who still see trade unions as key players in formulating the codes of ethics and defining who is a journalist. But, regarding professional identity, the growing amount of part-time free-lance multi-skilled media workers, occupied sometimes as copywriters and sometimes as journalists, are in a very different situation than the reporters working regularly for one media house:

> I think for pretty many journalists it forms a big part of your professional identity that you belong to a collegial community where you talk through things and belong to a certain group and might be proud of your own medium, this is our paper and we do this way. If your working relations are temporary and you work simultaneously for several media, you might miss this community and be kind of an

> outsider which certainly has impacts. (Female managing editor, age 32, regional paper)

New interpretations of old values

The transformation of medium-specific journalistic practices into network journalism, which operates at cross-media platforms, is advancing quickly. But how big a difference is there between old and new journalism? Does the Internet as a medium make the difference? There are voices which declare that nothing has really changed in terms of professional values and ethics. In network journalism directions by Reuters, it is said: 'Internet reporting is nothing more than applying the principles of sound journalism to the sometimes unusual situations thrown up in the virtual world' (Roth 2010).

Journalists tend to think that professional values are universal (Deuze 2007: 132, Friend and Singer 2007, xvi). In the interview data, however, there are also double standards, one for principle and the other for practice, which is seen as an inevitable risk for professional values:

> A medium doesn't matter but ethics does. A journalist must nowadays still keep in mind her responsibility and the significance of her work. The task of a today's journalist is to distribute knowledge and also interpret knowledge. Indeed, interpreting is growing more and more important even if it is, unfortunately, losing ground in practice. (Female reporter, 52 years, local paper)

An important background factor is anxiety about the ability of the press to create a viable earnings model in the middle of free content flow on the Internet. Irrespective of interviewees' organisational positions, economic considerations were tightly mixed with ethical ones. In the newsrooms, the struggle between journalistically-oriented and

economically-oriented discourses is constructed in daily practices and individual decisions. The outcome may differ from medium to medium, but the struggle is the same almost everywhere:

> This free content which is awfully important, it puts pressure on newsmaking. May be it has weakened a bit now but some time ago it was like – ok if this click gives us 80 000 readers why on earth we wouldn't have this headline in the paper. [. . .] And I was really conservative – and still am and will always be – but it was such a pressure when we lost our readers. Well, it seemed obvious that if in the net we do it why not in the paper. And for me [...] it was so stressing and now when it is over and we have agreed that [...] the paper is for specialists and they are like this. It's totally different in the net – and it's all right. (Female news editor, age 40, national specialised paper)

In the newsrooms, the tension between economically-oriented and journalistically-oriented viewpoints is concretised in efforts to balance engaging content with relevance. Today, trying to captivate a reader's interest is more important than before because of the following of web counters as a routine part of daily work (Fenton 2010: 3). But there is a more general trend in the background. Since the 1980s, public interest has been interpreted in terms of serving consumers (Syvertsen 1992: 5–12). Reflecting this, there are no signs in the interview data that public interest was losing its ground as a rationale for journalism, even if its interpretation may be partly changing. In addition, although many journalists experience commercial pressures as the major threat to public interest, on the whole, the traditional dualism of commercialism and public interest is giving room to more comprehensive views in professional discourses:

> Whatever your job is, whether you are a plumber or a carpenter or whoever, you have to sell your work to somebody who wants to buy it. If nobody wants to read your story and pay for it, you don't have a job any more. It's a cliché but true. It's also marketing that a story

> is good, well-written and bright, readable. (Male reporter, age 52, national paper)

The emphasis on the journalist's personality is one of the characteristics which has grown in importance with network journalism. Once again, there is a need to reconcile two professional values: the personal touch as a means to reach the public, and the idea of impartial and neutral professionalism. The ability to overcome personal interests and individual opinions and keep facts and opinions apart is still highly appreciated in professional discourses, but the emphasis is not so much on non-involvement than on the ability to keep critical distance in spite of potential personal opinions:

> A personality is more like a tool now, there's really a difference. Previously, if I think of the first years of my career, you never signed a story. Even columnists used pen-names, though they were settled. But today one's own personality is really an essential part of working. (Female reporter, age 43, local paper)

The reasons behind the slow transformation of quality conceptions from a neutral mediator to a professional spokesperson as the professional ideal are multiple. Commercial interests, cultural changes and technological potential seem to go hand in hand, and the result is a transformation in the ethical code. Previously, an anonymous writer may have implied authority borrowed from her reliable publication; today, the trustworthiness requires that shared knowledge has some kind of a certificate of origin, the more detailed, the better. Here we have at play a new value, source transparency, which Friend and Singer (2007) as well as Beckett (2008) identify as an elementary part of the new ethics in journalism.

The social media has accelerated the already ongoing transformations in journalistic culture. Mutually reinforcing economic, political, technological and cultural powers are at play, creating a new media environment. In social media, journalists are not only allowed but

actually asked to act as individuals (Aalto 2010). This has raised the demand for interactivity to the top of the value hierarchy, also regarding the rules of conduct in journalism. In the USA, the Society of Professional Journalists has updated its code of ethics with the obligation to 'invite dialogue with the public over journalistic conduct' (Society of Professional Journalists 2011). So, interaction with the audience is no longer an option but a moral and democratic obligation, closely intertwined with other standards of practice.

> It's not so far off when journalists didn't accept stories to be signed. Now it's much more public work. And on the other hand, it should be even more interactive, to listen to reader's feedback and things like it. I think this is a crucial difference. We are more with the readers. (Female news editor, age 43, regional paper)

In the background, there is a profound change in audience conceptions and presumptions about how relations between media users and journalists work. In this sense, social media are different from regular websites, which are mostly one-way information delivery channels with options for feedback. But in social media, it is difficult to draw a line between a producer, a user and a publisher in a situation when professionals are collaborating in 24/7 societies with amateurs equipped with video cameras, cell phones and broadband Internet connections.

Witschge and Nygren suggest that 'a more relative and postmodern view on accuracy is developing in journalism' (2009: 46). This means, for instance, that information is published as soon as possible, before official verification, and corrections will be made later after reader's feedback or new information. The verification process in news production seems to be changing to the direction described by Friend and Singer (2007: 54–78) and Beckett (2008). Different from the traditional media, in network journalism, reciprocity and transparency are crucial in creating trustworthiness. In the interviewees' professional discourses, fact-checking stays high, but readers' contribution is reconciled with it as a complementary element:

> Well cornerstones like objectivity and accuracy stay, their meaning is by no means diminishing. On the contrary, today information we give is perhaps weighted more carefully. What is written and talked about in media comes back - boing – if the knowledge is not truthful. You've direct feedback through different discussion forums, even in your own paper; it comes back like a boomerang. (Middle-aged female reporter, local paper)

Some professionals are even ready to admit that, for instance, expert bloggers may have partly replaced professionals and adopted the traditional critical role of journalists in framing, contextualising and interpreting news when newsrooms hunting economic efficiency flow towards generalists with large-scale technical skills. It is not the medium as a technology; it is the social and economic context which rules for short order and fast news in the Internet:

> In principle a story could be just as good and analytical and critical – and it really is, too – in the net than in a paper. The problem is we don't get any money from it in the net. (Male reporter, age 30, regional paper)

Conclusion

The impact of network journalism on professional ethics is clear, even if many journalists tend to deny it. But the web as a medium cannot be separated from its economic, political, technological and cultural environment—the changes are mutually reinforcing. On the other hand, the impact of professional discourses waving the flag for media-neutrality is often underestimated. In this article above, the professional ideology was taken into account as an independent force resisting changes originating from technological and economic developments. From an intermedial perspective, professional codes of ethics represent continuity and overarching interests between different

mediums. Placed into a historical context, this is interesting because the codes now understood to be media-neutral are deeply rooted in media-specific production chains.

Compared to the traditional code of ethics, the interview data demonstrates that the most remarkable ethical turn seems to be the changing attitudes regarding collaboration with media users. In the mainstream media, interactivity is no longer an option but an essential part of the rule of conduct. The emphasis on interaction in professional discourses stems basically from the re-interpreted responsibility to serve the public interest and assist democracy, and dialogue with audiences is now understood as an essential aspect of accountability.

Another remarkable feature in professional discourses of today is the decreasing tension between public interest and commercial interests. Because of the economic insecurity in the field, the public service media are in many respects placed on the same line with commercial media; attracting users is a matter of life and death to both. In this situation, all journalists are entitled to put emphasis on captivating contents, personality and interaction. Besides, many journalists seem to accept the duty to captivate users' interests not only as a competitive imperative but also as a professional standard, which is well in line with a more general trend to observe public interest in terms of serving customers' interests. There are still, however, strikingly different attitudes towards commercial pressures in the newsrooms. Some journalists experience a constant dilemma between the obligation to provide readers with relevant information and the need to attract as many readers as possible, when others say that a story without readers is of no use at all.

When the trade unions seem to be losing ground and journalism as a profession is in flux, the individuals are more than ever guardians of their own ethical aspirations. In such a situation, the role of collegial communities in newsrooms is crucial in reconciling practices of network journalism with strong professional ideology. This reconciliation is fundamental both to journalism as a profession and to a viable democracy. The optimist would say that it will be possible to open

journalistic processes without losing journalists' professional integrity – on the condition that the established media organisations respect the ethical stance of their journalists and are able to keep their position as key operators in the field.

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Endnotes

1. Two of the interviewees have been interviewed twice (by two different students), and a couple of interviews have been made with slightly different questions.
2. The age of some of the interviewees is not known.

ALAN G. STAVITSKY

13. 'Notional Public Radio': Intermedial Change in U.S. Public Radio

The title of this chapter does not contain a typographical error. It is a play on words relating to the emergent emphasis upon multiplatform journalistic distribution at National Public Radio (now known simply as NPR), the leading U.S. public service radio programmer. 'This is an organization that's in transformation into becoming a fully functioning news content organization, not just a radio company,' said then-NPR President and CEO Vivian Schiller in 2009, not long after her arrival at the company from her previous job running the Internet operation for the *New York Times* (quoted in Roberts 2009).[1] Indeed, NPR quietly rebranded itself in July 2010, informing staff and affiliated stations to henceforth use only its initials, rather than continue to call itself by the full name, which effectively removed the word "radio" (Farhi 2010). That represents the theme of this chapter: the manner in which NPR has embraced the digital transition, and the institutional, cultural and operational challenges this has caused for its brand architecture, as well as the broader implications for theory regarding intermediality (see also Stavitsky 2010a).

The NPR case represents a challenge to new media discourse in this time of great disruption to traditional industrial practices and models. In such discourse, technological convergence augurs an end to a legacy medium such as radio (see Holmes 2005: 11–15). In contrast, intermediality as articulated in this volume emphasizes 'media convergence as a process instead of a static termination….(C)onvergence can be understood as a way to bridge or join old and new technologies, formats and audiences' (Thorburn and Jenkins 2003: 3). Viewed in this light, NPR's digital transformation, evincing both continuity and change, with aspects of old and new, is a useful test of the intermediality approach.

The Industrial Context of U.S. Public Radio

The structural differences of the U.S. model of public broadcasting are worth highlighting, specifically as pertain to radio. While European radio emerged in the form of national broadcasting systems, radio in the United States developed as a patchwork of independent stations licensed to communities of all sizes across the country (Stavitsky and Huntsberger 2010). Most of these nascent stations, for reasons of economics and federal anti-monopoly policies, were initially not connected to regional or national networks, and were intended to provide civic information and culture and to foster the democratic process at the local level (Stavitsky 1994). As the sale of advertising became the economic basis of the industry by the late 1920s, however, most commercial stations affiliated with the national radio networks to present mass-appeal entertainment. An ancillary sector of 'noncommercial educational' (NCE) stations, generally licensed to educational institutions that offered minimal financial support, struggled along for decades, broadcasting pedagogical and cultural programming to small, though loyal, audiences.

In the 1960s the U.S. government began offering federal tax-based support of noncommercial broadcasting (by now including television, and coming to be known as *public* broadcasting, rather than *educational*), most notably through the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. This led to the establishment of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), a private, nonprofit corporation designed to allocate federal funds to NCE stations and provide formative support, and of National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS, for television), both private entities developed to produce and provide programming for stations and manage a system to connect them. Neither NPR nor PBS is a network in the traditional sense (e.g. they do not own stations), but their emergence enabled public radio and TV to operate more like their commercial network counterparts in providing national programming. However, what is significant for this analysis is that the historical decentralization of U.S. public broadcast stations is deeply seated, breeding a strong sense of operational independence that colors the present situation.

Becoming "Platform Agnostic"

Public radio listenership in the United States experienced massive growth between 1980 and the early-2000s, when its cumulative audience (cume) more than quintupled. However, the size of the audience flattened in 2003, and began a slight decline as more audio competition emerged, such as satellite and Internet radio, and MP3 devices (Janssen 2005). This prompted CPB to convene a Public Radio Audience Growth Task Force to develop a strategy for audience development across multiple platforms (Everhart 2008). The task force report, entitled 'Public Radio in the New Network Age,' set a goal of doubling 'the number of people who use public radio every week,' but then added this phrase to define usage: 'on-air, online, and on other platforms' (*Public Radio in the New Network Age* 2010).

This is an approach that one NPR executive, in conversation with the author, referred to as 'becoming platform agnostic.' That's to say, don't assume that the broadcast platform is necessarily the preferred way to reach people; public radio should reach people where they are, on whichever platform was available. As this chapter will later note, that belief is not universally held. In the past, policy makers and broadcast leaders viewed universal access in medium-centric terms of making public radio available to all Americans *over the air*, which prompted initiatives to create new stations or build transmitters to extend the signals of existing stations to areas (primarily rural) that could not previously receive signals. Other initiatives were intended to increase awareness of and interest in public radio for minority communities that traditionally had eschewed listening to it. But the task force report demonstrates what is becoming the dominant contemporary conception of universal access among U.S. public radio leaders.[2]

Among the report's seven recommendations is: 'Embrace the networked environment as a primary platform.' This is the longest section of the report, in which the task force challenges the public radio system 'to move with and ahead of its audience to the unfolding platforms of the networked environment, offering listeners new choices in how to listen to public radio, and finding new listeners and creating new services by exploiting the multiple channels and participatory capacities that lie beyond broadcasting' (2010: 7). The report acknowledges that, in the short run, this will involve new distribution channels. However, the task force calls on the system 'to commit now to a longer-term paradigm shift in how public radio creates and organizes its content, moving toward new models of engagement and participation that leverage and extend public radio's mission and brands' (2010: 8). Such a paradigm implies a new conception – a new *notion*, to reflect back to the chapter title -- of public media, one that potentially opens the door to new participants and partners, among them journalism schools, commercial counterparts, and independent 'citizen' journalists and producers (Stavitsky 2010b).

Implementing NPR's Digital Strategy

While regulators in countries such as Finland have encouraged public-service broadcasters to take a leading role in multiplatform development, U.S. policy has not been explicit. Nonetheless, NPR has been aggressive in implementing a digital strategy and experimenting with online and mobile platforms (Stavitsky 2010). Of course, the company had been quick to embrace the Internet, creating an early website that offered links to audio reports that aired on the radio, and later providing access to its podcasts. In the summer of 2009, however, NPR unveiled a revamped website that privileged text over audio and emphasized breaking news. Then-NPR president Schiller described the changes as shifting its online presence 'from being a companion to radio to being a news destination in its own right' (quoted in Jensen 2009). NPR is, in effect, seeking to compete online not with other audio providers, but with the online operations of major news organizations such as CNN and the *New York Times*, Schiller's previous employer.

To bring about such a fundamental shift for a company that had evolved as a radio broadcaster requires substantial operational, structural and cultural transformation. NPR went about this in several ways: The company created a Digital Media unit, headed by a senior vice president with oversight responsibility for NPR's web, podcasting and mobile media operations. Under the Digital Media umbrella, a Social Media Desk was established to coordinate NPR's growing presence on Facebook (almost 2.4 million 'Likes' at this writing) and Twitter (more than 1.3 million 'Followers'). Concurrently, with the support of a John S. and James L. Knight Foundation grant, NPR ran nearly 400 employees, between 2008 and 2010, through digital literacy and skills training sessions. The approach was described as 'Web centric,' meaning that the reporter, considering all the media platforms available, 'figures out how best to tell each part of the story – what works best in video, in audio, in text, in graphics' (NPR Blogs 2008).

For the media consumer, in addition to the revamped website noted above, NPR created a new tool to enable listeners to 'mix your

own podcast,' in effect producing a customized podcast on topics of the listener's choice (NPR Blogs 2009). For example, someone might set up a podcast that only includes stories about Nordic countries, or about Bruce Springsteen, and have it distributed digitally to a computer or mobile device. And NPR was among the pioneering media organizations to launch applications when Apple's iPad tablet was released in April 2010. About 30,000 copies of NPR's iPad 'app' were downloaded on the day the device went on sale, representing about one of every ten first-day iPad purchasers, according to the *Wall Street Journal* (Ovide 2010).

Local/National System Integration

While the NPR initiatives described above represent digital innovation at the national, and indeed global, levels, NPR's roughly 900 'member' (i.e. dues paying) stations are also working to develop intermedial capacity.[3] There is some urgency about achieving this, as a palliative to the decline in American newspaper journalism. As cuts in newsroom staffing result in reduced local coverage, several recent high-profile reports called upon public media (and particularly public radio, as U.S. public television stations generally lack capacity for daily journalism) to step into this void (cf. Cochran 2010, Downie and Schudson 2009). 'Public radio and television should be substantially reoriented,' according to a study commissioned by Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism, 'to provide significant local-news reporting in every community served by public stations and their websites' (Downie and Schudson 2009: 14). Such a shift presents a significant challenge, because the vast majority of public stations have small news staffs, a single journalist in many cases, if they employ professional journalists at all (see Marcotte 2010).

This creates both the opportunity and the imperative to create a technical infrastructure that integrates local and national systems

to foster collaboration. Most of the major players in the U.S. public radio and TV industries are engaged in planning a joint Public Media Platform (PMP), to aggregate and share content among public media organizations and various other nonprofit journalism entities, including Britain's ITVS (Everhart 2010b). The PMP is modeled after NPR's 'open applications program interface' (Open API), which allows access to coders to create applications that interact with the system (Behrens 2008). This is similar to the API concept that spawned a wave of iPhone 'apps' in the wake of Apple's API as well as location-based web 'mashups' built upon Google Maps after Google released an API.[4]

Such cutting-edge technological planning is essential to former NPR CEO Schiller's vision that 'partnership is at the center of all we do….Everything is about the system as a whole' (quoted in Drew 2010). But it does not address the imbalance between the resources available to implement intermedial change at the national (i.e. NPR) level and the level of the member stations, particularly those in smaller communities. At this writing, NPR executives were launching a 'road show' to persuade their affiliates to outsource website management to NPR digital staff, to beef up local news offerings and add better systems for fundraising (Adams 2011). Several journalistic initiatives were also added.

Project Argo was described as an attempt 'to advance public radio's standing as an online provider of news… (by) ramping up 14 stations' local reporting capability' (Everhart 2009). It's significant that the intent was not to foster full-service local news organizations, but rather to create 'content verticals,' a new-media buzzword for subject-specific coverage. Participating stations expanded web-based coverage in areas in which they were already strong, such as environmental reporting in Oregon and health-care journalism in Boston. Financial support was provided by CPB and the Knight Foundation. CPB also supported a related but broader Local Journalism Center (LJC) project that engaged a total of 37 public radio and TV stations in ten such centers (Everhart 2010a). The LJC concept also included

a thematic reporting focus, but involved regional partnerships and includes broadcast as well as online content.

Taken together, Project Argo and the LJCs are part of the grand plan to extend public broadcasting onto new platforms, improve local service and engage new audiences in a Web 2.0 world. They will be built upon a PMP that anticipates considerable media consumption on mobile on-demand devices and incorporates sophisticated search capability of system archives. Ironically, the archival functionality maintains the history of the legacy system while, concomitantly, the on-demand functionality undermines and abandons it. Further, implementation of the complex technological and operational architecture described above implicates significant cultural and operational challenges, to be discussed below.

Clash of Organizational Cultures

In this time of intermedial transition, most major broadcast organizations are comprised of a mix of veteran staffers who were hired for their expertise as radio or television professionals, and employees hired more recently for their digital – or social – media competencies. Those in the latter category may have academic and professional backgrounds in digital arts, computer science or even sociology. Recently, for example, NPR was advertising for the following positions in its Digital Media unit: Senior Interactive Graphic Designer, Front End Web Developer, and Director of Digital Media Business Partnerships.

Given the differing educational backgrounds and professional norms, it's not surprising that a clash of broadcast-platform versus digital-platform cultures often results. 'One of the reasons the transition to new platforms is hard here is because of the dedication to craftsmanship,' said NPR Executive Editor Dick Meyer. 'NPR online is not as perfect or honed as NPR on the radio' (quoted in Drew 2010).

All Things Considered co-host Melissa Block noted: 'My fear is that we neglect radio. We can't forget what our engine is as we reach out to the new world' (quoted in Drew 2010).

One veteran NPR manager, who came up through the ranks as a radio producer, complained to the author in a personal conversation that the new hires in the digital unit could '*hear* but they don't know how to *listen*.' What he meant was, the digital staffers neither understood nor appreciated audio production as an art. While they could *hear* to edit and distribute audio on the various digital platforms, the manager believed, the 'digital natives' lacked the ability to *listen* well enough to produce the multi-layered sonic soundscapes for which NPR had become known and which are regarded as the 'gold standard' in American radio – hence the reference to 'craftsmanship' noted above. This parallels hegemonic discourses raised by Caldwell (1995) in his 1990s work on 'televisuality': emerging digital tools allowed practitioners to master aspects of production previously limited to the 'craftsmen,' which served to challenge dominant production paradigms, the professional identities of media personnel, and the construction of competencies.

This issue reflects an organizational challenge unique neither to NPR nor to public media during the digital transition. Indeed, broadcast and print cultures have co-existed at NPR for many years, albeit sometimes uneasily, as the result of a tradition of hiring newspaper journalists for newsroom leadership positions. However, the intermedial challenge is more acute with the added layer of digital technology and culture. Bolter's (2002) concept of 'remediating media forms' is useful here. 'A remediating media form always depends on the authenticity of an older (or other) form,' Bolter wrote, 'and at the same time claims to surpass it (with something 'new')' (80, parentheses in original). In this context, the older form is NPR's legacy aural production, which provides the 'brand equity' for the newer digital forms (e.g. podcasts, the web, mobile applications). The new forms could be seen as 'surpassing' the old form of broadcast radio, per Bolter's theoretical frame, by affording listeners the added agency of

on-demand control and participation. However, as the 'hearing versus listening' comment demonstrates, whether newer is better remains open to debate within NPR as an organization, as well as across the U.S. public radio system.

Local/National Dynamics: Collaboration or Competition?

Emerging tension between the broadcast and digital worlds implicates, and exacerbates, existing tension between locally oriented stations and nationally oriented organizations such as NPR. Remember that NPR does not own or control U.S. public radio stations; it is a membership organization – stations elect to pay dues to get access to NPR programming, and NPR's board of directors is dominated by station chiefs. Still, public radio is, in the words of longtime Los Angeles station manager Ruth Seymour, 'inherently anarchic' (quoted in Drew 2010). And stations have long been suspicious of NPR, for several reasons.

First, there is the 'bypass' issue. In the radio realm, listeners are reliant upon the stations to access NPR programming, and therefore NPR is beholden to the stations. But in the digital realm, listeners can access NPR directly, through npr.org or through mobile device apps. In addition, NPR contracted with Sirius Satellite Radio to provide NPR programs direct to listeners via satellite, though station representatives on the NPR board blocked the company from offering the most popular shows (such as *All Things Considered* and *Morning Edition*) on the satellite channel. Member stations fear that NPR's ability to 'bypass' them with digital platforms may render the station-as-broadcaster obsolete, especially as wireless broadband access becomes more ubiquitous and Internet access comes to automobiles. This concern is aggravated by a host of public radio iPhone apps – notably the Public Radio Player – that enable listeners to pull in distant station streams, or hear individual programs, on smartphones.

Then there is competition over fundraising. U.S. public broadcasters are dependent upon contributions from private sources – individuals, corporations, and foundations – because only about 40 percent of overall system revenue comes from public, tax-based sources (CPB 2011). However, NPR's digital expansion required infusions of cash 'and its fundraisers were making incursions into local-station territories, seeking deep-pocketed donors' (Drew 2010). Station leaders were further alarmed by plans to put a link on the NPR website that would allow people to donate directly to NPR. A compromise was reached by which the NPR website directs prospective donors to their local station's donation sites, by postal code, while also providing information on how to contribute to the NPR Foundation.[5]

Schiller's predecessor as CEO, Ken Stern, was dismissed in 2008 by station leaders on the NPR board over these competitive concerns. It's not surprising, therefore, that Schiller's rhetoric before her dismissal consistently emphasized partnership in the multiplatform environment: 'The great promise and potential in public radio is the combination of the local and national. To the extent that stations are very strong and very relevant locally, they will survive the loss of the monopoly of the broadcast' ('Why online won't kill the radio star' 2010). However, as Huntsberger (2010: 13) notes, 'What's not clear is whether NPR will be a source of strength for local providers, or a source of competition'.

The local/national tension has potential to be additionally problematic at this juncture because the U.S. public radio system (and public television, for that matter) must appear unified and speak with one voice, in response to political challenges not only to funding but to the very legitimacy of the concept of public support for broadcasting. While that support has been grounded in traditional notions of spectrum scarcity, the transition to platforms beyond radio and TV puts public media in the crosshairs of commercial media attack. The U.K. offers a cautionary tale. James Murdoch, head of international operations for News Corp. and son of the media mogul Rupert Murdoch, launched a high-profile broadside against the BBC when delivering

the 2009 MacTaggart Lecture at the Edinburgh International Television Festival. He accused the BBC of mounting a media market 'land grab,' and called the Beeb's scale and new-media ambitions 'chilling' (Murdoch 2009).

Conclusions and Implications

How then should we situate the U.S. public radio case in the body of the INTERMEDIA project research? It's clear that this study supports the project hypothesis by showing social and cultural relationships in flux, both within NPR and between NPR and its member stations, as emerging technologies are articulated into the public media ecology. Further, technological aspects are interwoven with the social, cultural and industrial considerations of media development, both in terms of what's of interest to scholars and in terms of what's important to the media leaders who must manage this transition.

Technology is not the sole driver of change here. As the DRACE group found in its global study of radio's digitization, the fact and promise of digital technology had little impact upon markets, despite the best strategic intentions of broadcasters and policy makers (O'Neill et al. 2010). Winston's theory of 'supervening social necessity' argues that a technological innovation must serve a social need if it is to be widely adopted; commercial purpose alone is not sufficient (Winston 1998). Indeed, the lack of such necessity – the 'killer application,' to use the popular catchphrase – was behind the failure of the U.S. IBOC digital-radio system (more commonly referred to as 'HD radio') to catch on (Ala-Fossi and Stavitsky 2003). 'Consumers wearing ear buds' proved more influential than industry executives and regulators in the anemic American response to HD radio (Stavitsky and Huntsberger 2010: 132).

Despite challenges to internal and external relationships as a result of intermedial change, the practical lesson from the U.S. public radio

case is that public media leaders must foreground audience needs and interests in order to unlock and exploit the promise of digitization. To do so is dependent on the character of relations with the audience. It requires both sophisticated 'knowledge management,' to understand the nature and interests of the audience, and 'customer relations management (CRM),' to deepen engagement with audience members and to view them as 'customers' (Lowe 2010). As Lowe (2010: 26) has written, 'The public in public service media matters not only as an altruistic principle; it is a practical success factor'.

NPR's increasingly web-centric approach and its emphasis upon mobile distribution indicate how well attuned it is to the audience. Plus, its social media forays demonstrate a shrewd awareness of CRM. In addition to its presence on Facebook and Twitter, the company recently started the NPR Community, a social network for its listeners.[6] However, internal considerations of organizational culture dislocation and troubled external business relationships with member stations will continue to demand substantial managerial attention. Building a network of *notional* public media, extending traditional models of public-service broadcasting across a range of platforms, will doubtless occur with discontinuity and discomfort.

From a theoretical perspective, the NPR case demonstrates that convergence wrought by digital technology is not an end state, but a process. As Pool (1983: 53) predicted in his prescient book *Technologies of Freedom*: 'Convergence does not mean ultimate stability or unity. It operates as a constant force for unification but always in dynamic tension with change'. Jenkins (2006: 14), noting in his book *Convergence Culture* that cinema did not eliminate theatre and television did not kill radio, argued that '(o)ld media are not being displaced. Rather, their functions and status are being shifted by the introduction of new technologies'. Seen in this light, 'Notional Public Radio' highlights what Fetveit (2010) has termed the 'migratory flexibility' of the concept of medium, and represents a cultural system that will persist as public-service media delivery systems come and go. This supports Jensen's (2010: 14) call for a new research agenda that emphasizes

'the recombination and reconfiguration of one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many communication'. The communicative practices implicated by the changing character of public-service media should continue to be a rich vein of research for students of intermediality.

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Endnotes

1. Schiller resigned from NPR in March 2011 after a scandal involving NPR fundraisers (Farhi 2011).
2. It remains to be seen how long it may take policy makers to adopt this conception. However, it's noteworthy that the U.S. Federal Communications Commission held an April 2010 workshop entitled "Public and Other Noncommercial Media in the Digital Age." The session included considerable discussion of serving the information needs of communities across multiple platforms. See http://www.fcc.gov/.

3. See Stavitsky and Huntsberger, "'With the Support of Listeners Like You,'" for examples of station-based innovation, pp. 262–268.
4. See, for example, http://portland.everyblock.com/.
5. See http://www.npr.org/about/place/corpsupport/majordonor.html.
6. See http://www.npr.org/templates/community/.

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