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Developing Future Crisis Management

An Ethnographic Journey
into the Community and Practice
of Multinational Experimentation



ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

To be presented, with the permission of
the board of the School of Management of the University of Tampere,
for public discussion in the Auditorium A1 of the Main Building,
Kalevantie 4, Tampere,
on June 9th, 2012, at 12 o'clock.

UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
University of Tampere
School of Management
Finland

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Distribution
Bookshop TAJU
P.O. Box 617
33014 University of Tampere
Finland

Tel. +358 40 190 9800
Fax +358 3 3551 7685
taju@uta.fi
www.uta.fi/taju
<http://granum.uta.fi>

Cover design by
Mikko Reinikka

Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 1731
ISBN 978-951-44-8807-8 (print)
ISSN-L 1455-1616
ISSN 1455-1616

Acta Electronica Universitatis Tamperensis 1202
ISBN 978-951-44-8808-5 (pdf)
ISSN 1456-954X
<http://acta.uta.fi>

Acknowledgements

This study builds from my participation to Multinational Experimentation (MNE). In this study, I present MNE as a community of practice that develops new capabilities in the Western crisis management architecture. As such, this thesis illuminates, from within, how the international development of crisis management is experienced as lived practice. It naturally follows that it would not have been possible to do this thesis without gaining access to this community. Thus, the people who have admitted me to partake in the workings of MNE deserve a special thank you. As do all with whom I shared my journey in MNE6: thank you for sharing your time and thoughts with me, both in formal and informal events. I learned so much and had so much fun during this journey that you will always have my gratitude.

In addition to my journey in MNE, I have had the privilege of sharing my academic journey with many talented and inspiring people. Everything that can be considered good or worthy in this thesis is thanks to their time and vision. The camaraderie of especially Juha Käpylä, Saara Särmä, Noora Kotilainen and Harri Mikkola was a never-ending source of intellectual stimulus and academic *joie de vivre*. Further, all of the personnel of International Relations and Political Science in the University of Tampere School of Management deserve a big thank you for their support in my project and creating an inspiring atmosphere to work in. I am grateful to Professor Tuomas Forsberg, who took the time to read my manuscript and provide comments that helped me finalize it. I would also like to thank Finland's Institute of International Affairs and the esteemed Dr. Raimo Väyrynen for supporting my initial academic steps forward. Mimmy Jain deserves a big thank you for taking the time to revise my English.

Director of Research, Dr. Iver B. Neumann at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and Professor Aki-Mauri Huhtinen from Finland's National Defence University approved my thesis for publication. Their supportive commentary and profound insights allowed me to improve the quality of the initial manuscript and finalize my thesis. Gentlemen, you have my sincerest and deepest gratitude.

This thesis has been mostly funded by the “Ethics, Politics, and Emergencies” project of the Academy of Finland. This thesis has also received funding from the Foundation for Foreign Policy Research.

I am indebted to my supervisor, Programme Director Dr. Mika Aaltola whose support and vision I could always count on to give me faith and inspiration in my endeavour.

Finally, it was my mother and father who allowed me to gain a fascination of “the international” in the first place. This thesis owes much to their guidance, patience, and love.

I dedicate this work to my wife, Salla, for illuminating my soul.

Pirkkala, early spring 2012

Valtteri Vuorisalo

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'Transformation anticipates and creates the future'

(Cebrowski, 2003: 8)

'This is the first time existing future is written down'

(MNE Participant, Interlocutor 1)

Chapter 1.

Introduction

I was stabbed with a fork in Cartagena. Well, it was my fault, I had to agree: I had eaten lunch with my elbows on the table. This was unacceptable in the presence of Finnish military officers in the first place, and much more so since we were invited guests in a Spanish military establishment. Therefore, as a kind reminder on proper table manners, the Finnish officer across from me poked my elbows with a fork.¹ The ethnographic method has its peculiarities, to be sure.

Starting was not easy—I guess joining a new crowd never is. Not only was I dodging tableware, I had to internalize everything that was taking place around me, which, at least for me, was quite a lot. After all, I come from the biggest inland city in the Nordic² region and now I had to get to terms with developing multinational crisis management capability for the international, extended maritime environment and develop this capability within an international military community.

As if getting up to speed on the international, extended maritime environment was not enough, I had to understand the methodology and processes by which this environment was to be transformed. Transformation, after all, is the prime motivator for the establishment of the international military community of ‘Multinational Experimentation’ and the methodology it utilizes, ‘Concept Development and Experimentation’.

Not only that, I had to get my academic peers back home up to speed on Multinational Experimentation. This meant that its multidimensional features had to be described; its official and unofficial utility and impacts had to be illuminated; why its practitioners see it as a relevant tool in the international crisis management structure had to be articulated; and why it is a relevant instantiation of international relations and politics had to be demonstrated.

Starting is not easy. Yet, I learned a valuable lesson in Cartagena: The proper way forward is formality.

¹ No researchers were harmed in the making of this thesis.

² Tampere, Finland.

This thesis examines Multinational Experimentation (MNE). MNE is an international, United States-led, military community, which develops new capabilities in the Western crisis management architecture. By developing new capabilities, MNE facilitates the transformation and evolution of the international crisis management architecture. The way to transform is to create new crisis management knowledge. MNE produces knowledge with the Concept Development and Experimentation methodology (CD&E), which provides the intellectual association for future capabilities.

Since 2001, each cycle of MNE has provided a forum for the participating states and organizations to attempt to provide solutions to a perceived crisis management challenge.³ Instead of investigating these solutions in live operations, MNE provides a controlled, simulated scenario in which the participants may explore new crisis management hypotheses iteratively. Therefore, MNE is seen as a cost-effective and safe method to create crisis management capabilities in problem areas where the participants share a common interest.⁴

This study follows a constructivist epistemology, characterized by the notion that the social construction of knowledge and the social construction of international reality form mutually constitutive dialectics (cf. Pouliot, 2007; Adler, 1997). Moreover, this study builds on the notion that as knowledge is created, social reality is transformed. Specifically, crisis management knowledge sets the *boundaries of possible* within crisis management and influences what classic actors of International Relations (institutions and nation-states) see as worthy of pursuing (Adler, 2008: 199–200; Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 18). This being so, the academic world, and indeed citizens, deserve research where sites of crisis management knowledge creation are analysed from a constructivist framework.

Despite the fact that MNE, as an instantiation of informal, trans-governmental cooperation in crisis management, can be argued to influence the evolution of the

³ A short history of MNE and all its cycles can be found in Appendix F: A Short History of MNE (p.237).

⁴ Although MNE can be argued to be a distinct process of crisis management preparation and planning, it should not be confused as being similar to the United Nations' Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), for example. Both are certainly multinational crisis management planning processes. Yet, the IMPP is driven by assessments of *existing* capabilities and their suitability for specific operations, whereas MNE plans to create *future* capabilities (DPKO, 2008: 55–56).

international crisis management architecture, it remains a virtually unknown entity within the field of International Relations research. Similarly, the CD&E methodology and its connection with MNE have not received much scholarly attention. Even when it has been discussed, military scholars have focused on the experimentation side of CD&E (Alberts and Hayes, 2002, 2005).

This thesis fills ‘the MNE gap’ in International Relations; it describes both sides of CD&E,⁵ demonstrates the MNE-CD&E connection, and exemplifies how states, when facing complexity, uncertainty and temporal challenges, find guidance for crisis management policy and enabling legislation by cooperating informally in trans-governmental settings.

To achieve this, this thesis utilizes unique materials, gathered from within MNE’s sixth cycle (MNE6), and describes the logics that organize Multinational Experimentation. Moreover, this thesis will depict MNE’s internal activities and their trajectories. As such, this thesis illuminates, from within, how international development of crisis management is experienced as lived practice.

Accordingly, the main research question of this thesis is: ‘What are the organizing logics of the arrays of MNE activities and their trajectories?’ This question can be further broken down into several sub-questions:

- What are the rationalities of participation in MNE activities?
- How does MNE contribute to the evolution of crisis management?
- How does MNE contribute to the imposition and determination of meaning (e.g. appropriateness, what is a ‘threat’) in national and international crisis management fields?
- How does MNE constitute crisis management understandings and realities in the broader social realm?
- What are the attributes of the MNE practice?
- How does MNE constitute the normative and epistemic grounds for crisis management actions?

⁵ The ‘concept development’ side and the ‘experimentation’ side.

Very soon after joining Multinational Experimentation, I was told that I was taking part in, and indeed now belonged to, a very special type of community, gathered to conduct a common task. Specifically, the task was to create new crisis management knowledge. There is thus a social ontology of *actual doing* inherent in MNE, which aims to find new crisis management functions that identifiably work in practice.

Practice theory discusses how actual activities can be identified and delineates the characteristics of a ‘practice’. Ethnography provides the means by which to access, gather material on and interpret an activity. Hence, in order to provide answers to the research questions presented above, an analytical framework, based on practice theory and ethnography, is required. Together, practice theory and ethnography outline the boundaries of the methodology of this study. In other words, together, they form the boundaries of the style of reasoning, or the set of basic assumptions that precede and make possible the adoption of the analytical framework (Pouliot, 2007: 360).

‘Activity’ is the central defining feature of ‘practice’. In order to demonstrate a practice, the visible logics that organize an activity—or arrays of activity—must be described (Schatzki, 2001a: 11; Swidler, 2001: 85). Adler and Pouliot provide the broadest definition of a practice, when they describe practices as ‘socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world’ (Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 4–5). This study utilizes their definition when identifying and examining the *MNE-practice*.

Practices govern both the meanings of arranged entities and the actions that establish these arrangements. When meaning is imposed (negotiated, reified, internalized), it is an act of power. This imposition/ determination dynamic contains the following elements: (1) the discursive and lingual emphasis as media to (2) impose and determine (‘to embed’) meanings to a positioned subject in (3) the socially structured field where (4) constitutive understandings are cemented or reproduced via (5) the integration and institutionalization processes of practices. This thesis depicts the actions with which MNE develops (content produced and validated) its discursive products and identifies the processes with which it diffuses these contents for reproduction.

A system of knowledge production can be argued to produce/ influence the knowledge that governs the logic on which action is constituted. Mutual learning (and mutual acts of knowledge production, accumulation and diffusion) is the key emphasis, purpose and function of a *community of practice*.⁶ By acquiring and developing knowledge, which results in governing (negotiating, reifying, internalizing) meaning, a community of practice hopes to gain competence and efficiency (capacity or capability). Two features emerge. First, communities of practice constitute normative and epistemic rationalities of action. Second, they are capable of influencing events beyond the boundaries of the community, as, for example, in the political, economic and social domains. As such, they have the ability and power to transform social realities.

This thesis argues that when MNE develops new solutions for the crisis management architecture, it constitutes normative and epistemic grounds for crisis management actions and affects political, economic and social events relating to crisis management. This is especially so when these new crisis management dispositions and expectations are successfully naturalized and institutionalized. Thus, the MNE community of practice not only negotiates and reifies crisis management meanings internally, but also for the external, surrounding environment. Seen this way, the MNE-community is a privileged setting of acquiring and creating crisis management knowledge.

The analytical framework this thesis utilizes is based on Pouliot's (2007, 2008) methodology of 'subjectivism', which has three steps: induction, interpretation and denaturalization. This methodology stipulates that the starting point of research must be to gather what it is that the social agents under inquiry believe to be real. Second, the gathered meaning(s) must be interpreted. Pouliot argues that induction and interpretation together form what Geertz, following Gilbert Ryle, called 'thick description'—the interpretation of an event within its context (Geertz, 1973: 3–30; Pouliot, 2007: 364–374). Third, thick description is then placed within context and denaturalized.⁷

⁶ When discussing communities and knowledge, epistemic communities, networks of knowledge-based experts, initially come to mind (Haas, 1992b: 2–3, 1992a; Sebenius, 1992; Ikenberry, 1992). This study follows the notion put forward by Adler (2008), one of the early proponents of epistemic communities (Adler, 1992; Adler and Haas, 1992), who sees epistemic communities as a subset of communities of practice (Adler, 2008: 199).

⁷ Thus, together, they can be taken to form a 'super-thick' description of sorts.

‘Subjectivism’ underlines the two ends of the spectrum within which analysis must be conducted—the subjective and objective ends.

Gaining access to the fields of international security is difficult in the best case, and even futile in most cases. Hence, Pouliot focuses his attention on discourse analysis as a means to conduct interpretation. However, in this thesis, interpretation will be conducted via reflexive ethnography as implied, but not described, by Pouliot. Thus, this study seeks to make operational Pouliot’s observation of the utility of ethnography and, therefore, contributes to the operationalization of Pouliot’s methodology.

First, this framework is used to gain access to MNE and to gather ethnographic data from MNE. Specifically, data is gathered from the sixth cycle of MNE in which I participated as part of Finland’s contribution. MNE6 was a two-year (2009–10) multinational and interagency effort, which sought solutions to the challenges posed by irregular adversaries and ‘other noncompliant actors’. MNE6⁸ was divided into four outcomes, which were further divided into various objectives. My participation was in Objective 4.2:⁹ Multinational Interagency Situational Awareness—Extended Maritime (MISA-EM). Finland was a leading participant in Objective 4.2, together with Spain.¹⁰ The specific goal of this objective was to: ‘Develop a shared capability for coalition forces, in concert with interagency partners, international organizations, and other stakeholders to provide Situational Awareness of the Extended “Maritime Environment” to counter irregular threats’ (USJFCOM, 2010a). The data gathered from within MNE comprises of:

1. Official and training material documentation on MNE and CD&E;
2. Reflexive auto-ethnography from within MNE;
3. Official and non-official conversations held during official MNE6 meetings, for a minimum of 144 hours;

⁸ The overarching goal of MNE6 was ‘to establish and ensure a safe and secure environment, coalition forces require the ability to share information, gain situational understanding, synchronize efforts and assess progress in concert with interagency partners, international organizations, and other stakeholders when countering activities of irregular adversaries and other non-compliant actors’ (USJFCOM, 2010a).

⁹ Other Finnish participants in MISA-EM were formed from contributions from the Ministry of Defence, the US Joint Force Command, Defence Command and Navy Staff.

¹⁰ The other members were Germany, France, Greece, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, the US, CJOS COE (the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence) and NATO ACT (USJFCOM, 2010b: 1).

4. ‘Collaborative participant observation’ conducted during official MNE6 meetings, for a minimum of 216 hours; and
5. Covert observation of interactions in meetings and ‘after-work’ situations for a minimum of 360 hours¹¹ (done simultaneously with Steps 3 and 4).

Second, this framework will provide the means for interpreting MNE via reflexive ethnography. In this thesis, reflexivity is understood as an ‘examination of fieldwork as a personal and epistemological activity’. In other words, fieldwork is viewed as a method of knowledge production in which the ethnographer takes centre stage: The fieldwork experience is made transparent in a very self-conscious way (Shehata, 2006: 245–261). Thus, I, as the ethnographer, became the primary vehicle of knowledge production. In this thesis, the reflexive ethnography illuminates from within the dynamics and events that take place in an international crisis management capability development community. Further, the reflexive ethnography describes the knowledge production methodology of MNE (i.e. CD&E); the power and/ or influence that MNE wields as a security community of practice; and the ‘communal dynamic’ of MNE, and its utilization (including potential utility) of knowledge diffusion, identity construction, role definition and national interest promotion.

Third, this framework will be used to unmask and denaturalize MNE through constitutional analysis. This will provide further objectification of inherently subjective meanings and their evolution and diffusion into the context from which they were created and which they also modify. Thus, the framework is utilized to define MNE as a community of practice (‘MNE-community’), to define the practice this community executes (‘MNE-practice’) and to discuss how the MNE-community constitutes realities in the crisis management environment with the MNE-practice. The careful examination of MNE through this framework will result in the depiction of the logic(s) that organize the arrays of MNE activities and their trajectories—the main research question in this thesis.

¹¹ The 360 hours (in MNE6 alone) can be compared to Elina Penttinen’s ethnographic dissertation, which lists 62 hours of observational ethnography (not including interviews) (Penttinen, 2004).

The relevance of this study arises initially from the realization that MNE is currently a virtually unknown object within the field of International Relations—as is the methodology with which MNE produces specific crisis management knowledge. Thus, from the viewpoint of academia, depicting the inner workings of MNE and the methodology of CD&E and its utilization are contributions in themselves. Moreover, examined from a practice perspective, this analysis of MNE will contribute to the study of strategy and international security, which (1) needs to map and uncover the practices that constitute strategic interaction; (2) needs to explain where these practices come from; and (3) illustrates how practices generate transformation in international politics (cf. Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 24–28).

This study contributes to the field of International Relations and Security Studies by meeting the various requirements that have been identified in previous research. First, it provides a reflexive auto-ethnography of the military context (cf. Higate and Cameron, 2006). Second, it provides an ethnographic study of a security community of practice (cf. Pouliot, 2008). Third, it augments the three-tier methodology suggested by Pouliot (2007) for the study of practices by utilizing reflexive ethnography, instead of discourse analysis, for interpretation and it also operationalizes (provides an ‘example of’) the said methodology (cf. Pouliot, 2007). Fourth, contra ‘armchair analysis’, it provides contextual data from the field, which illuminates how global security architecture transformation is experienced as lived practice (cf. Neumann, 2002). Fifth, it identifies an international practice of crisis management capability development, its formation process and the influence it wields on other practices (cf. Leander, 2008).

The structure of study is as follows. After the Introduction in the first chapter, Chapter 2 (p.19) will first discuss practice theory, which is based on a social ontology of doing, and examine practices (p.21) and communities of practice (p.35) and their characteristics. Chapter 2 will then discuss the ethnographic method (p.42), the specific tool of inquiry, which is used to gain access to and data from MNE. Chapter 2 will conclude with the presentation of a three-tier analytical framework (p.50) with the help of which data is gathered from MNE and then contextualized. Specifically, this study will build on practice theory and utilize a methodology with three tiers, moving from the most subjective to the most objective. Within this methodology, *collaborative ethnography*

will be utilized in the first, most subjective tier to gain access to a security community of practice and gather data. In the second tier, *reflexive ethnography* provides the vehicle for the interpretation of this data. The aim of the third and most objective tier is further denaturalization via *constitutive analysis*. The three tiers provide ample means to conduct and frame the research of MNE. It is argued that full analytical value comes from the combination of the three tiers, which together form a whole greater than the sum of its parts.

Chapter 3 (p.65) will provide an ethnographic account of the MNE experience. The main body of this experience is formed through the materials gathered and experiences gained during MNE6 (2009–10) in which I participated as Finland's contribution to the MISA-EM concept development effort.¹² However, as I also played a role in MNE7, some details from my experiences in MNE7 will emerge from the ethnographic account. In order to provide a full account of my ethnographic experience and the multidimensional creature that is MNE, Chapter 3 is presented in temporal segments that relate to my experience. The prologue (p.68) will provide an account of who I am, what my purpose was in MNE and how I was able to negotiate and gain access to MNE. My early experiences are gathered under the first phase, 'Initiation' (p.73), which illustrate the plethora of dynamics I encountered in MNE, while I was still not able to contextualize them.

The ethnographic account will then trace the categorizations and sequence of the knowledge development methodology, CD&E, with which MNE applies and produces crisis management knowledge. Accordingly then, the next two segments are titled 'Concept Development' (p.92) and 'Experimentation and Analysis' (p.122). In these segments, I will further illustrate events and observations that are relevant to illuminating the characteristics of MNE as a community of practice and the practice it constitutes. In the last segment, 'Finalization' (p.154), I will present events from the final stages of the MISA-EM concept development process and finally conclude the ethnographic account with 'Epilogue—MNE7' (p.162), in which I discuss my 'fading out of' MNE6 and MISA-EM and emergence into MNE7. Throughout all the phases, I will present witnessed events and episodes pertaining to the general evolution of crisis management

¹² Dates and places of these encounters can be found in the fieldwork outline on p.231.

and its characteristics—as seen from within a community of international military professionals—which I have interpreted as relevant or interesting.

It should be noted that because it is presented in this way, the ethnographic account is possibly longer than it could have been. However, since one of the motivations for this study is to make the characteristics and sequences of MNE visible in the most transparent way, I have purposely chosen to provide a temporal account of my MNE experience. Clearly articulating different temporal phases and the events therein makes MNE more visible for readers who are not familiar with its characteristics and results in a clearer and truer account of my ethnographic experience. Similarly, in the name of clarity, I have chosen to present the knowledge development methodology, CD&E, which governs actions and roles within MNE, in different segments of the ethnographic account. The first segment (p.73) will provide a general introduction to CD&E, the second segment (p.92) will discuss concept development, and the third segment (p.122) will present how MNE understands experimentation and analysis.

Regarding CD&E, it should be noted that although many formulations of CD&E exist in the world, the official documents I will mostly refer to while presenting CD&E here are from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Allied Command Transformation (NATO ACT) and the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). This is due to the fact that during my ethnographic experience, my training in CD&E was conducted by NATO ACT and MNE was led at the time by USJFCOM.¹³ This study does not claim to give a ‘comprehensive’ picture of CD&E and its finer characteristics, the purpose, rather, is to introduce CD&E to the reader from the perspective of my ethnographic experience within MNE. Finally, it should be noted that since the intent of this study is to define and analyse the MNE-community and the MNE-practice it constitutes, it will not analyse MISA-EM specifically, nor will it examine MISA-EM through the framework of CD&E.

Chapter 4 (p.167) will present the analysis of the ethnographic data, formed by:

1. Official and training material documentation on MNE and CD&E;
2. Reflexive auto-ethnography from within MNE;

¹³ It should be noted that during MNE6, USJFCOM ‘owned’ MNE. However, USJFCOM has been dis-established as of 31 August 2011. See: <http://www.jfcom.mil/> [Accessed 15 September 2011]. Current MNE ownership resides with the US Joint Staff, Deputy Director J7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting (USJS DDJ7 JCW).

3. Official and non-official conversations held during official MNE6 meetings, for a minimum of 144 hours;
4. ‘Collaborative participant observation’ conducted during official MNE6 meetings, for a minimum of 216 hours; and
5. Covert observation of interactions in meetings and ‘after-work’ situations for a minimum of 360 hours¹⁴ (done simultaneously with Steps 3 and 4).

More specifically, Chapter 4 will analyse the ethnographic data from within three main themes: (1) the CD&E methodology and its meaning for MNE and the larger crisis management architecture; (2) action-constituting logics and crisis management meanings that MNE was seen to utilize and promote to actors in crisis management; and (3) my own ethnographic experience. Chapter 4 will then advance into a more theoretical discussion in which MNE is defined and examined as a community of practice (MNE-community), which constitutes a specific practice (MNE-practice) (p.195).

Finally, in Chapter 5 (p.218), this study will conclude by underscoring how MNE encapsulates the characteristics of a ‘community of practice’ and ‘a practice’. As such, this study argues that MNE contributes to the constitution of social realities through logics, which play a role in how the international crisis management environment is interpreted and what actions are seen as appropriate within this environment—both on the operational level (how crisis management missions are implemented) and on the political level (crisis management policies, doctrines, strategies). This study articulates that MNE is a multidimensional creature, acting in the space of international relations and politics. Defined and analysed through the lens of practice theory, MNE is both an actor within the field of crisis management and a node where crisis management knowledge flows are gathered, evolved and diffused.

These discussions crystallize the nature and characteristics of MNE and the logics that organize MNE activities and their trajectories. Moreover, by examining how states, when facing complexity, uncertainty and temporal challenges, find guidance for crisis management policy and enabling legislation by cooperating informally in trans-

¹⁴ The 360 hours (in MNE6 alone) can be compared to Elina Penttinen’s ethnographic dissertation, which lists 62 hours of observational ethnography (not including interviews) (Penttinen, 2004).

governmental settings, these discussions illuminate MNE for the reader, and especially the field of International Relations. It is particularly argued that MNE, through CD&E, creates crisis management knowledge, which then harmonizes crisis management capabilities, organizations and mindsets in the crisis management environment. This is achieved by transforming *operational needs* into *political needs* to which political decision-makers must react in order to create an environment in which the (potential) capability can thrive.

Since MNE is such a multidimensional array of activities, it provides fertile ground for further research. Chapter 5 will conclude with suggestions for further MNE investigations.

Chapter 2.

Research Framework

Very soon after joining MNE, I was told that I was taking part in, and indeed belonged to, a very special type community: the community of Multinational Experimentation and its maritime instantiation. This notion underlined the fact that all the participants of MISA-EM, who already initially shared many things in common (affiliations, experiences, etc.), were now joined together to conduct a common task. Specifically, the task was to create knowledge that would hopefully facilitate transformation in the maritime domain.

Yet, knowledge creation was not specific to MISA-EM. Rather, the whole MNE experience followed this rationale. MNE was a community of people brought together to create new crisis management knowledge. Mostly, these people were subject matter experts (SMEs) in crisis management and their sources of expertise were experienced events in ‘the real world’. Their role was to ensure that the suggested solutions actually worked in practice. As an outsider to the process, I was told by one participant that it was indeed crucial that I had decided to physically join the process because:

‘We know so much more than we are able to describe....’¹⁵

(MNE Participant, Interlocutor 1).

Hence, my participation in and observations of the actual workings of MNE were seen by my fellow participants as invaluable in the proper depiction of MNE. This statement serves as a great starting point for MNE and this study. First, the ‘we’ refers to the community that has gathered to work together in order to produce solutions that work in practice. At the same time, there is something in this community, some special type of knowledge of the world, that is difficult, if not impossible, to describe.

There is thus a social ontology of *actual doing* inherent in the MNE-community. This chapter will discuss practice theory, which shares this ontology, and the characteristics of ‘a practice’ and ‘a community of practice’. These characteristics

¹⁵ While this is an actual quote from the ethnographic material, it is, in essence, almost identical to Polanyi’s (1983: 4) famous quote: ‘We can know more than we can tell.’

include, among others, actual doing, as also *background knowledge*, which is a type of knowledge that is very hard to describe. The discussion on practice theory will sketch the outer boundaries of the methodology of this study. In other words, the boundaries of the style of reasoning, or the set of basic assumptions that precede and make possible the adoption of method (the concrete tool of inquiry) (Pouliot, 2007: 360), will have been sketched.

Then, this chapter will discuss the ethnographic method, which is used to gain access to and evidence from MNE. This chapter will conclude with the presentation of a three-tier analytical framework, which forms the concrete tool of inquiry in this study.

This framework is used to, first, gain access to MNE and to gather materials from MNE. Second, this framework will provide the means for interpreting MNE via reflexive ethnography in Chapter 3 (p.65). Third, this framework will be used to further denaturalize MNE—to define it as a community of practice (MNE-community), to define the practice this community executes (MNE-practice) and discuss the constitutional mechanism of the MNE-practice in Chapter 4 (p.167). The careful examination of MNE through this framework will result in the depiction of the logic(s) that organize the array of MNE activities and their trajectories.

2.1. Practice Theory

Social sciences, and the field of International Relations, have witnessed various turns, as, for example, the linguistic, rhetorical, narrative, historical, metaphorical and argumentative turns (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006: xi). Since the publication of *Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory* (Schatzki *et al.*, 2001), scholars have increasingly focused their attention on practices (Kangas, 2011: 44).¹⁶ This ‘turn’ gives practices major constitutive weight in explaining phenomena (Adler, 2008: 195–196) instead of discourse, the analysis and highlighting of which is a dominant product of the linguistic turn. Moreover, in contrast to theoretical emphases, in the practice turn, empirical work is seen to take centre stage (Neumann, 2002: 627, 651). Even academic research in general

¹⁶ In addition to Schatzki’s (2001) contribution, other key thinkers who have advanced the practice theory framework include, but are not limited to: Taylor (1985a, 1985b), Giddens (1984), Bourdieu (1990) and Foucault (1982, 1980). For a compact genealogy of practice theory, see Rasche and Chia (2009) and their depictions of Foucault and Bourdieu, especially Rasche and Chia (2009: 717–718). This study is framed by Vincent Pouliot’s (2007, 2008, 2011) Bourdieu-inspired research in particular.

has been identified as a practice (Pouliot, 2007: 375) and, within, for example, the study of International Relations, has been treated and studied from a practice framework (Büger and Gadinger, 2007; Büger and Villumsen, 2007). Practice theorists contribute to various issues and fields,¹⁷ while opposing ‘numerous current and recent paths of thinking’¹⁸ (Schatzki, 2001a: 10–11).

2.1.1. Practices

When conceiving what ‘practice’ is, the general agreement is that ‘activity’ is the central defining feature of ‘practice’. Some focus on what the given activity is based on, which is often tacit ‘background knowledge’. Others focus on the actual activities of people, making ‘practice’ an array of human activities, while others do not limit their inquiries to humans and include non-humans as well in their analysis. A general agreement exists that activity is embodied and mediated (via artefacts, natural objects). However, disagreement persists when discussing ‘the nature of embodiment, the pertinence of thematizing it when analyzing practices, the sorts of entities that mediate activity, and whether these entities are relevant to practices as more than mere intermediaries among humans’ (Schatzki, 2001a: 11).

Swidler (2001) illustrates what practice is by discussing practice in contrast to ideas and values, which are two main terms of ‘old sociology’. Theories of practice de-emphasize the inner workings of the actors’ mind and, instead, emphasize their everyday activities. Practices are thus understood as the observable actors’ routines (cf. Mitzen, 2006), which are by nature unconscious or unthought-of, as, for example, in the actors’ taken-for-granted ‘sense of space’ or everyday habits. Practices are executed by individuals and organizations alike, the latter of which utilizes practices to process people by taken-for-granted criteria and arrange them in hierarchies¹⁹ (Swidler, 2001: 83–85).

¹⁷ Including the ‘philosophical and social scientific significance of human activity; the nature of subjectivity, embodiment, rationality, meaning, and normativity; the character of language, science, and power; and the organization, reproduction, and transformation of social life’ (Schatzki, 2001a: 10–11).

¹⁸ For example: ‘Individualisms (e.g., rational choice theory, methodological individualism, network analysis), structuralism, structure-functionalism, systems theory, semiotics, and many strains of humanism and post-structuralism’ (Schatzki, 2001a: 10–11). For a critique of representationalism especially, see Pouliot (2008: 260–265).

¹⁹ For example, humanitarianism has been discussed to arrange suffering into a hierarchy of victims (Fox, 2001).

Two things happen when moving away from ideas and values. First, attention shifts to the physical and habitual—this is understood as the practice domain. Second, attention is also paid to the discourse domain, which Swidler presents as an impersonal arena where discourse is not the content, but rather the system of meanings that allows and enables communication. Together, these two domains of practice and discourse are more concrete, more observable, than ideas and values and thus provide a more fruitful point of entry when studying phenomena (Swidler, 2001: 83–85).

Building on Swidler (2001), Neumann (2002) discusses the interrelated dynamics of discourses and practices. Practices are discursive in nature in at least two aspects: a speech act may be a specific feature of a given practice, which is to say that no practice can be thought outside of discourse. However, a practice approach does not focus on the debate on whether anything exists beyond language, nor does it make any claims to that end. Rather, the focus advocated by Neumann is the question of how best ‘to *analyze* social life given that social life can only play itself out in discourse’ [emphasis mine]. Instead of the ‘armchair analysis’ of International Relations, Neumann calls for ‘different kinds of contextual data from the field, data that may illuminate how foreign policy and global politics are experienced as lived practices’ (Neumann, 2002: 628). One of the contributions this study is argued to make is that it provides contextual data from the field of MNE, which illuminates how global security architecture transformation is experienced as a lived practice.

Adler and Pouliot provide the broadest definition when they see practices as ‘socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world’. For them, practice is different from action and behaviour. Practices are patterned action and action is behaviour with meaning. Adler and Pouliot illustrate their point: To run along the street is behaviour, but to run and chase an escaping thief is action. The socially structured and patterned actions of police chasing criminals are a practice (Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 4–5). This study utilizes the definition put forward by Adler and Pouliot when examining the MNE-practice in Chapter 4 (p.195), which especially articulates how the MNE-practice can be seen as an ‘international practice’, where MNE activities can be argued to pertain to the larger

international environment, and a 'corporate practice' as an MNE-practice, born and structured in the MNE-community, has elements of coordinated activities. Adler and Pouliot state that a major epistemological consequence of examining international practices is to bring scholarly debates within the field of International Relations 'down' to practical levels in order to empirically examine in detail phenomena that produce effects of a world political nature (Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 6–8). Thus, it is argued, this study 'fleshes out' and empirically makes concrete an international phenomenon, which produces effects of a world political nature and can be a source of multifarious scholarly debate in International Relations.

2.1.1.1. Action-Constituting Logic

For Swidler, it is the action, formed by practices and discourse and organized according to a visible logic, which analysts need to describe (Swidler, 2001: 85). The formation of this *action-constituting logic* is influenced by background knowledge. The background knowledge that constitutes practices and the environment in which practices are performed 'make possible political actors' socialization and persuasion and ultimately their rational calculation' (Adler, 2008: 196). Moreover, background knowledge, via 'political embodiments', imbues world events with sensations of clarity (Aaltola, 2009: 4–5). Observing it (the logic) is a major challenge, however (Swidler, 2001: 85). The challenge arises from the fact that background knowledge is unconscious or unthought-of in nature, but, at the same time, it is seen as absolutely integral, as, for example, in the implementation of any public policy. It is background knowledge, rather than any bureaucratic model, which forms the basis of our 'everyday life' (of the quotidian) (Pouliot, 2008: 270).

Background knowledge²⁰ is 'unspoken know-how learned in and through practice and from which conscious deliberation and action become possible'. This background knowledge has three main characteristics. First, background knowledge is local and situated. In other words, it is a contextualized form of knowledge, influenced by actions

²⁰ Also referred to as practical knowledge, *mètis*, tacit knowing or experiential way of knowing (Pouliot, 2008: 270). See also 'taken-for-granted facts' (Adler, 1997: 340), 'authoritative knowledge' (Behr, 2007: 242) and 'unthinking action' (Mitzen, 2006: 346–347).

in the material dimension. Second, background knowledge is fluid and essentially ungoverned since any governing structure that a practice might have changes as the practice does. Third, background knowledge is very hard to describe out of its actual practice. Forms of background knowledge can be so inscribed in the mind, so seemingly natural, that conveying this knowledge outside of the actual practice may seem near impossible²¹ (Pouliot, 2008: 270). Bearing in mind the quote presented at the beginning of this chapter, I was told during the early stages of my MNE experience that MNE was a container for a special type of knowledge.

Pouliot presents how the practical way differs from the thinking of representationalism (cf. Schatzki, 2001a: 10–11). Previously, it was described how background knowledge (practical knowledge for Pouliot) is tacit and inarticulate in nature; background knowledge is ‘know-how’. Representational knowledge, on the other hand, is conscious and intentional ‘knowing that’. One gains representational knowledge, which is rational and abstract, via formal schemes. Background knowledge, which is reasonable and contextual, is learnt ‘experientially, in and through practice, and remains bound up in it’ (Pouliot, 2008: 270–280). The fact that I had decided to physically join MNE was hailed with these same logics. The quoted participant saw that MNE could only be understood experientially.

Moreover, inferences differ between representational knowledge (explicit and justified) and background knowledge (implicit and self-evident): ‘Representational knowledge factors in reflexive cognition (in situation X, you should do Y—whether for instrumental or normative reasons), whereas practical knowledge remains unsaid (in situation X, Y follows).’ Therefore, ‘a defining feature of the practices informed by the Background is that their rules are not thought but simply enacted. Inarticulate, concrete, and local, practical knowledge is learned from experience and can hardly be expressed apart from practice. It is ‘thoughtless’—what popular parlance calls commonsense, experience, intuition, knack, skill, or practical mastery.’ Practice is ‘doing’ (activity), while representation is observational and seeks to depict enacted practices in words or other forms of representation. Moreover, practice facilitates implicit learning. Pouliot

²¹ However, although practices may be deep, habitual and taken for granted, they may, at times, be very public in nature; ‘Some public ritual practices seem able to create and then anchor new constitutive rules’ (Swidler, 2001: 99).

uses state elites, who are rarely formally trained in matters such as international laws, as an example and claims that international rules (sovereignty and non-intervention in Pouliot's example) are mastered through the dynamics of implicit learning. As a further example, Pouliot asserts that the practice of diplomacy²² has its basis in tacitly learnt practical knowledge (Pouliot, 2008: 270–280).

Having studied the basic characteristics of background knowledge, we will now discuss the formation of a 'practical sense'. This discussion will further illustrate the characteristics and role of background knowledge specifically, and of practice theory generally. It will also introduce concepts that will be referred to later when presenting the analytical framework of this study. Utilizing Bourdieu's theory of practice, Pouliot presents how the actors' 'practical sense' is created from the interplay between 'habitus' and 'field' (Pouliot, 2008: 275).

A 'habitus' is a 'system of durable, transposable dispositions, which integrates past experiences and functions at every moment as a matrix of perception, appreciation, and action, making possible the accomplishment of infinitely differentiated tasks'. As such, there are four main dimensions of habitus. First, habitus forms historically through experience, which is embodied habitus. 'These dispositions are acquired through socialization, exposure, imitation, and symbolic power relationships.' Symbolic power is defined as 'the imposition of meanings in and through social relations' (Pouliot, 2008: 282; cf. Bourdieu, 1991: 163–170). Second, background knowledge, the recently discussed practical mastery, is the building material of habitus. Third, habitus is relational in nature—the embodied inclinations of a habitus are formed via inter-subjective interactions. Although habitus is embodied at the subjective level, it can be argued to constitute the crossing of structure and agency. No individual disposition is without its social element. Fourth, habitus is dispositional, inclining or disposing an actor's action, creating 'inclinations, propensities, and tendencies' (Pouliot, 2008: 272–274; cf. Rasche and Chia, 2009: 717–718).

A 'field', in turn, is a social configuration, which is structured along three main dimensions: relations of power, objects of struggle and taken-for-granted rules. First, the agents' positions on the field are unequal: Some are dominant and others are dominated.

²² The practice of diplomacy is especially studied by Neumann (2002, 2005, 2008b).

The control of capital—economic, social or symbolic—defines the structure of power relations. Fields are thus relational as are different forms of habitus. Second, agents on the field are engaged in a social game in which the objectives (political authority, prestige, profit, reputation) are commonly agreed upon. The key aspect of the ‘game’ is that all the players are born into the ‘stadium’ where the game is played, with the ability to play and with little option other than to play. Third, fields are constructed by background knowledge (as are habitus), by taken-for-granted rules (e.g. what is ‘important’), which are obeyed by the dominant, benefiting agents especially, but also the dominated. Thus, the ‘meaning-imposition’ dynamic (i.e. of symbolic power) is operationalized on the field (Pouliot, 2008: 274–275). The interactional ‘meaning-imposition’ takes place between different actors, their positions on the field and their habitus.

Thus, for Pouliot, ‘the field’ is a cluster of relations within which agents, with their embodied ‘habitus’, are positioned (Pouliot, 2008: 276). Schatzki (2001a), in turn, sees the field (of practices) as ‘the total nexus of interconnected human practices’, forming the foundation²³ of the practice approach. Then, the boundaries of the ‘practice approach’ can be determined as analysis that (1) develops an account of practices or (2) examines transformation and the nature of their subject matter in the field of practices (Schatzki, 2001a: 11).

Practical sense (created from the interplay between ‘habitus’ and ‘field’) is then neither individual nor structural—rather, it is a relational creation from the ‘constitutive dynamic between agency and structure’. Practical sense, as the crossroads of embodied inclinations and relative structural positions, helps actors judge the appropriateness or sensibility of practices. Past experiences, that is, a learned practical sense, play a big role when facing new phenomena; for example, the past actualizes in the present when actors ‘make sense’ of a phenomenon and judge what is to be done. Due to practical sense, ‘agents do what they could instead of what they should’ (Pouliot, 2008: 275–276).

Leander, similarly influenced by Bourdieu, echoes Pouliot by underlining the relational aspect of practices: Practices capture what people actually do in a given

²³ ‘Practice accounts are joined in the belief that such phenomena as knowledge, meaning, human activity, science, power, language, social institutions, and historical transformation occur within and are aspects or components of the field of practices.’

relational context. Moreover, practices are ‘generative’ in the sense that they create meanings, entities and power relations. When studying practices, the focus of inquiry should be on identifying practices, their formation processes and the influence they wield on other practices (Leander, 2008: 18). It should be noted that the logic of practicality has ontological priority over other logics of the social action theories of International Relations, such as the logics of consequences, appropriateness and arguing: ‘To state it simply, it is thanks to their practical sense that agents feel whether a given social context calls for instrumental rationality, norm compliance, or communicative action.’ These three logics of social action (consequences, appropriateness, arguing), all of which share the representational bias,²⁴ are interwoven with the fourth logic of practice since ‘any reflexive action stems from the practical sense’ (Pouliot, 2008: 270, 276–277).

2.1.1.2. Constitutional Effects

As the logics of practice constitute its action, this action has constitutional effects. For Neumann, practices are integrative (organize human relationships); reflective (relative to the actions of others); commonplace (or quotidian); performative (‘they are (also) their use, and are stylized’) (Neumann, 2002: 637–638). Summarizing Swidler (2001: 89), Adler defines practices as ‘knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines and organizations that structure experience’. Practices are learned from others and can be imitated successfully or unsuccessfully (unlike habits). Adler claims, ‘Practices, therefore, evolve and can spread together with knowledge and discourse. Practices are simultaneously “objectified” meanings and discourse that congeal in physical matter, and activity, as in a state of permanent becoming; stability within change’ (Adler, 2008: 198–199; cf. Neumann, 2002).

As discussed, the purpose of this study is to analyse one mechanism (MNE) and methodology (CD&E) of crisis management knowledge production. This knowledge then contributes to the evolution of the crisis management practice as we understand it. Moreover, as the logic of practicality has ontological priority over other logics of social

²⁴ ‘[I]nstrumental rationality [logic of consequences] is premised on calculated interests; appropriateness derives from normative judgment [logic of appropriateness]; and communicative action [logic of arguing] is informed by explicit notions of truth and deliberation’ (Pouliot, 2008: 277).

action, this evolution contributes to our understanding of crisis management reality, what is seen as ‘proper’: what are good results, accepted conduct and the ‘correct’ way of discourse. Simply put, this evolution contributes to the ‘boundaries of the possible’ in international crisis management.

Practices constrain and organize activity (as attributed to structures), yet practices are created by individuals and are thus subject to individual influence. This dynamic differentiates practice thought from interpretations, which specifically emphasize the role of either the agents or structures; practice thought instead emphasizes the reciprocal dynamic of the two. Thus, instead of focusing on agents or structures when analysing social and political phenomena, practices provide a viable and alternative approach to analyses (Kangas, 2011: 44). The practice approach transforms individualist explanatory premises and grounds them in macro (supra-individual) phenomena that can differ significantly from those of conventional social thought. Analyses can focus on a variety of cases; they can focus on (a) communities, societies and cultures; (b) governments, corporations and armies; and (c) aspects of power (e.g. domination and coercion) as either features of, collections of, or phenomena instituted and instantiated in practices.²⁵ Moreover, the focus of analyses can be placed in features that order the ‘field of practices itself, that is, the patterns and interdependencies (etc.) that appear there’, as, for example, if and how some practices organize and/ or constrain others (cf. Swidler, 2001: 83–101; Schatzki, 2001a: 14–15).

After examining my ethnographic journey to the MNE process and the observations made therein, this study will examine a multinational, primarily military, community, its practices and its features of power, which are argued to influence patterns and interdependencies in—and understandings of—the field of crisis management.

²⁵ It should be noted that organizational studies have also picked up on the practice turn and have begun to investigate and analyse organizational Strategy as Practice (SAP) (cf. Jarzabkowski, 2004). These investigations emphasize the relevance of narratives as a way to establish meanings (Fenton and Langley, 2011) and, often, empirical SAP research focuses on discursive aspects (what people claim to do) (cf. Mantere, 2005). Rasche and Chia (2009) point out that although the function of ‘bodily sayings’ has been correctly identified, SAP research often lacks analysis on ‘bodily doings’. More specifically, SAP research lacks focus on 1) patterned behaviour; 2) material aspects of practices; 3) recognition of background knowledge; and 4) the investigation of how identities are constituted through practices. In response, they emphasize the need for ethnographic approaches, rather than relying primarily on detached observation and documentary approaches, such as interviews and questionnaires (Rasche and Chia, 2009: 714–721). The call for the utilization of ethnographic methodologies in SAP research is echoed by Splitter and Seidl (Splitter and Seidl, 2011).

Social practices govern both the meanings of arranged entities and the actions that bring about the arrangements. This governance is the basis of social order (order as arrangements of people, artefacts and things). Thus, practices can be analysed as ‘open sets of non-regularized actions that are organized by practical understandings, rules, and teleoaffectivity’ (social norms). Practices, when they govern the meanings and establishment of arrangements, also determine order (Schatzki, 2001a: 16, 2001b: 50–63). ‘When the relationship between two agencies [arrangement] is being reconfigured, power is at work. Let us call the kind of power that determines its field of discourse²⁶ by establishing new practices or maintaining already established ones “conceptual power”. It is this conceptual power that allows for the extension of authority’ (Neumann, 2002: 636–639). Practices have the capability of transforming or maintaining systems and structures, or innovating new ones (cf. Swidler, 2001).

This study analyses how MNE, by creating, enforcing and reconfiguring crisis management meanings, contributes to the direction and intensity of the system/ structure transformation dynamic—the transformation that is the primary function of MNE. The global security architecture is seen as the ‘system’ and crisis management as the field—an instantiation of the global security system.

When a new practice is adapted into the system, two processes take place. First, in order to *integrate* with existing practices, some features of the new practice are altered (some features left out, some added). These modifications are fine-tuning in nature. Second, in addition to integration, a new practice is *institutionalized*. With institutionalization, Neumann refers to the practice becoming ‘a regular aspect of the social’. Thus, it is further *naturalized*. When naturalized, a practice governs and establishes narratives, meanings and definitions of things. In doing so, a practice is further embedded in its social environment and its authority is increased further. By influencing and potentially even dictating what people do, a practice utilizes power: ‘In this case, it is a power that makes it possible to govern people indirectly and from afar, by impinging on their schemes of action by instituting a new practice’ (Neumann, 2002: 636–637). Adler echoes Neumann by emphasizing that the adoption of a new practice can (1) be self-transforming and also (2) ‘constitutive of the ability to change social

²⁶ Recall from before that discourse is understood as a system of meaning(s).

structure'. This occurs via social collaborations that result in a 'community of practice',²⁷ where the processes of meaning and identity negotiation are hosted. Adler goes on to assert that preferential expectations, dispositions and identities are thus empowered. Moreover, as practices innovate and stabilize, consciousness and intention are structured, agency constituted and the evolution of social structure advocated (Adler, 2008: 196).

Neumann articulates 'the practice of the statesman', which 'centers on gauging the scope for taking actions which initiate changes that may forestall problems and create new interfaces, so that future system maintenance may run more smoothly' (Neumann, 2002: 642). Thus, positions of power constantly seek possibilities to innovate 'better' practices, making 'practice-crafting' a feature of statecraft. Actualization of innovative practices may have to be initialized from a position of power and its implementation must be managed and supervised (Neumann, 2002: 644)—a position of power has the required 'naturalization capability' to actualize a new practice. The ethnographic journey, described in Chapter 3 (p.65), will illustrate how the MNE process is initiated and owned from a position of crisis management power, the US, and how the purpose and intent of MNE specifically is to develop 'better' or 'improve' current crisis management practices.

Of course, some practices are more influential than others. Swidler identifies 'anchoring practices', which influence and reproduce a larger collection of discourses and practices. Hence, analyses of practices should focus on cases in which 'practices anchor or reproduce constitutive rules, rules that define things as what they are'. After the analysis of such cases, the constitutive nature of (some) practices on structures becomes visible. This will help gain 'a better understanding of when and how practices anchor or organize systems of practice, discourse, and action' (Swidler, 2001: 95–100). When analysing the ethnographic journey in Chapter 4 (p.167), it is argued, with examples, how the MNE process, at that stage defined as a 'Multinational Experimentation-practice', contributes to the contents of international crisis management practices, discourses and actions.

²⁷ Communities of practice will be discussed in detail later (p.35).

2.1.1.3. Constitutional Power

By governing and establishing narratives, meanings and definitions of things, a practice wields constitutional power. Earlier, Pouliot and Neumann have most explicitly discussed the power-element of practices, and this notion is certainly identifiable in other authors' understandings as well. Pouliot discusses Bourdieu's (1991: 163–170) 'symbolic power', 'the imposition of meanings in and through social relations' (Pouliot, 2008: 282), whereas Neumann uses the term, 'conceptual power', by which he refers to 'power that determines its field of discourse by establishing new practices or maintaining already established ones' (Neumann, 2002: 636–639). Both terms (symbolic and conceptual) and the notions of the other discussed authors share elements: (1) the discursive and lingual emphasis as media to (2) impose and determine ('to embed') meanings to a positioned subject in (3) the socially structured field, where (4) constitutive understandings are cemented or reproduced via (5) integration and institutionalization processes of practices.

This study then examines:

- How MNE contributes to the imposition and determination of meaning (capacity) in national and international fields of crisis management via the development of crisis management concepts; and
- The integrating and institutionalizing intent and motive of MNE to constitute crisis management understandings and cognitions on an international and national level.

Power-of-practices results in a plethora of power-sources, depending on agent and context; Pouliot mentions political authority, material riches, scientific credibility and cultural prestige, for example, which can be understood as capital, which defines the structure of power relations. Whatever the power-source of a dominant position, this position is able to, or rather has the power to, mould dispositions and inclinations in others. Moreover, a position of power has the power to establish order when its practices are iterated in the field. In this case, the dominant determines how things are done and these methods (and their meanings) eventually become self-evident and seemingly natural for the dominated—they become background knowledge of sorts. Accepting a 'best-practice' becomes learning and doing by example, and thus a submission to

authority (Pouliot, 2008: 282–283). The naturalness of practices can be so accepted that actors are in fact unaware of their dominated condition. According to Barnett and Duvall, this is a feature of constitutive power at work, particularly structural power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 53).

More specifically, Barnett and Duvall conceptualize power and provide a taxonomy of different kinds of power. In it, power is defined as ‘the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate’. The authors’ analysis focuses on the two kinds of social relations (interactional and constitutive) and the ‘specificity of social relations through which effects are produced’, specificity which can be direct or indirect. The four concepts of power (compulsory, institutional, structural and productive) are then situated in a taxonomy, which is developed using specificity and relational types. The authors make the point that these concepts of power are not mutually exclusive, but intertwined, and they urge scholars of International Relations to examine how these powers interact (Barnett and Duvall, 2005).

To examine constitutive social relations is to examine ‘how particular social relations are responsible for producing particular kinds of actors’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 46). These constitutive social relations are not controlled by any actors, but are ‘effected through the meaningful practices of actors’. In addition to focusing on how the actors’ social capacities are produced, constitutive analysis focuses on how these productions shape the actors’ identity and perceived interests (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 55).

Structural power (direct) and productive power (indirect) are forms of power that work through social relations of constitution and tend to consider ‘how social relations define who the actors are and what capacities and practices they are socially empowered to undertake’. For example, an analysis of constitutive relations can focus on how types of action are made possible, how community or collective actions are facilitated, or how constitutive relations can develop actors’ self-regulation. Barnett and Duvall stress that there is no reason to exclude power working through interactional social relations when examining those that work through constitutive relations; interaction can also have effects on identity, and constitution affects meaningful practice (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 46–

48). Structural and productive power ‘emphasize structure relative to purposeful agency, even while recognizing that meaningful practices, and hence, human agency, are essential in producing, reproducing and possibly transforming these structures’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 49).

Structural power is defined as the ‘direct and mutual constitution of the capacities of actors’. Actors are positioned socially and these relational positions affect capacities, subjectivities and interests, which determine the actors’ boundaries of possible action. Structural power shapes the capacity of actors’ ‘fates and conditions of existence’ in two ways: (1) structural positions are not socially equal—rather, it is more typical to observe unequal social capacities, privileges and positions; and (2) the social structure affects self-understanding and subjective interest. Positions—or roles, forming a role structure (Wendt, 1999: 257)—in the social structure may be so ‘natural’ that actors may be unaware of their dominated condition or accept it as ‘reality or fact’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 52–55). The later examination of MNE in Chapters 3 (p.65) and 4 (p.167) will reveal how it underlines and facilitates the creation of unequal social capacities (facilitates the boundaries of possible actions) and how it steers the development of identities and interests.

Productive power, in turn, is defined as ‘the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope’. While structural power was direct, productive power works indirectly within social relations of constitution. More specifically, the production of meaning via discourse and systems of knowledge is a concern of productive power. Discourses are understood in line with Swidler—as an impersonal arena where discourse is not the content, but rather the system of meanings that allows and enables communication (Swidler, 2001: 84–85), which thus are ‘sites of social relations of power’ as they set the stage of the imaginable, possible and appropriate. Moreover, discourse constitutes subjectivities and their ‘identities, practices, rights, responsibilities, and social capacities’. Thus, the ‘analysis of productive power in international relations refer[s] to the discursive production of the subjects, the fixing of meanings, and the terms of action,²⁸ of world politics’. Categories of classification often result in unequal social

²⁸ Setting the boundaries of the possible.

capacities.²⁹ Therefore, analysis of productive power focuses on how subjects are produced, meanings and categories fixed, and how the taken-for-granted, quotidian world politics is created. Hence, it ties into the International Relations discussions on global governance,³⁰ for example, and highlights how bodies of knowledge produce subjects³¹ with particular capacities for ‘self-understandings, and performative practices’, and how these subjects are ‘self-regulating and disciplined’³² (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 55–62).

To recap, then, this study looks at the structural and productive power in the practice of MNE while examining:

- How MNE contributes to the imposition and determination of meaning (capacity in the form of effective capability) in the national and international fields of crisis management via the development of crisis management *concepts* (new crisis management meanings, created with a system of knowledge, encapsulated in discourse); and
- The integrating and institutionalizing logics of MNE to constitute crisis management meanings (understandings and cognitions relating to the management of crisis) on an international and national level.

In consequence, MNE is argued to influence identities, other crisis management practices, responsibilities, and social capacities, self-understandings and subjective interests relating to crisis management.

²⁹ As an example, the question of who is ‘western and civilized’ has tremendous impact in the humanitarian field (cf. Belloni, 2007; Fox, 2001; Douzinas, 2007).

³⁰ Barnett and Duval point out that ‘[a]nalysis of global governance needs to be attentive not only to the interactions of actors but also to the constitutive reproduction of the subjects of global social life’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 60).

Duffield examines especially how the ‘security complex’, the intertwining of militaries and humanitarian agents, facilitates the spread of global liberal governance (Duffield, 2001a, 2001b, 2007).

Military transformation and network-centric war have also been discussed as mechanisms of governance: see Reid (2009) and Dillon and Reid (2009).

³¹ For a concise discussion on Foucault, creation of subjects, forms of power and governmentality, see Allen (2008: 48–60).

³² See Foucault (1995).

2.1.2. Security Communities of Practice

While MNE is a practice, it is also a community gathered together to execute the official practice of MNE and, simultaneously, other practices as steered by the participating state's or individuals' interest. Thus, MNE as a community of practice (a community executing the practice of MNE) is its own object in the sphere of security debates and its own agent in the international security architecture realm. Next, we will discuss the characteristics of a (security) community of practice.

Earlier, we looked at Pouliot's outline of a theory of practice and its utilization while examining the workings of a security community. Pouliot thus offers a commentary on the security community discussions and, while doing so, criticizes the earlier security community writings of Deutsch (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957) and Adler and Barnett (Adler and Barnett, 1998a) for showing a bias towards the study of representational knowledge. More specifically, Pouliot asserts that these writings tend to focus on the security communities' *modus operandi* (mode of operating), rather than on its *opus operatum* (enacted practice), although he credits Adler and Barnett with correctly identifying the dynamic of trust in a security community as a 'background feeling' (Adler and Barnett, 1998a: 29–66; Pouliot, 2008: 278).

Pouliot arguably makes a valid point, but this should not be interpreted so as to purposefully exclude representational observations. Rather, it should be interpreted as to not exclude the logics and functions of enacted practices in analyses. More recently, Adler has incorporated the 'background(s)' of practices to security communities when writing about change in, and expansion of, security communities of practice. Specifically, he claims to synthesize the analytical mechanism of community of practice 'to the substance of the social structure we are trying to explain', the substance being security communities (Adler and Barnett, 1998b; Deutsch *et al.*, 1957) as security communities of *practice*. Security communities of practice spread, in Adler's argument, through the co-evolution of background knowledge and subjectivities of self-restraint (cf. the evolution of habitus (Pouliot, 2008: 282)). This coupling accounts for (1) the social construction of

rationality as expectations³³ are constituted; and (2) normative evolution (Adler, 2008: 197–198).

The concept of ‘communities of practice’ has been developed by Lave and Wenger, who define it as ‘a set of relations among persons, activity, and world, over time and in relation with other tangential and overlapping communities of practice’. They continue that ‘a community of practice is an intrinsic condition for the existence of knowledge, not least because it provides the interpretive support for making sense of its heritage’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991: 98). Whereas this approach treats communities as more or less stable entities, Wenger places more emphasis on areas such as knowledge creation and evolution, and identity, resulting in a more informal and self-organizing notion of communities of practice (Wenger, 1998b). Knowledge creation and the evolution of a knowledge practice is also the focus of Snyder, who defines communities of practice as a group of people ‘who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice’ and emphasizes its relevance for ethnographic research in particular.³⁴ The focus of communities of practice is on learning and building competence and performance (Snyder, 1997).

For Wenger, practice should be understood as and on the level of the discursive act of negotiating meaning. This act of practice must be associated with community in order to create a community of practice. This association does two things. One, it provides ‘a more traceable characterization of the concept of practice’, differentiating it from culture, activity and structure, for example. Two, this association defines its own particular type of community. There are three dimensions in which practice forms the coherence of community (Wenger, 1998b: 72). First, *the joint enterprise* dimension, the enterprise aspect of which is defined and understood by its members and continuously renegotiated. Thus, the joint enterprise dimension is characterized by mutual accountabilities and different interpretations. Second, membership is a function of mutual *relationships of engagement*, which increases social cohesion among the members of the participating community. Social complexities and engaged diversities characterize this dimension. Third, a community of practice creates a shared *repertoire of communal*

³³ ‘Peaceful change’ for Adler (2008).

³⁴ Snyder’s ethnographic research interest is in the gap between organizational learning and strategy (Snyder, 1997).

resources, resources that members have developed over periods of time. These resources can be routines, sensibilities, artefacts, words, stories, actions or concepts that are used to negotiate meaning. The repertoire of communal resources fuses the dynamics of reification and participation. Discourse provides meaningful conceptualizations of the world, expressions of membership and, thus, membership identities as well (Wenger, 1998a, 1998b: 72–85; cf. Adler, 2008: 198–199).

At first glance, MNE, as a community of practice where different crisis management meanings are negotiated, creates coherence in all three dimensions. In the joint-enterprise dimension, the enterprise aspect of MNE (the overarching intent and motive of the community towards which work is conducted) is mutually defined and understood by its members and continuously renegotiated. In the MNE6 context, the enterprise of the community was to find crisis management solutions with which irregular threats could be countered. The meaning of ‘irregular threat’ was itself under constant renegotiation by its members, who provided a plethora of interpretations of this theme. Second, active engagement is a requirement for access and membership to MNE. Third, the resources of the MNE community, such as know-how, technology and management, are what the participants provide.

Mutual learning—and thus mutual acts of knowledge production, accumulation and diffusion—becomes the key emphasis, purpose and function of a community of practice. ‘Doing’, or contributing to a community of practice, becomes its defining feature; membership is defined by contribution and participation, which can be on various levels. Entering a community of practice thus also means to concretely learn and adapt a given practice (cf. facilitation of implicit learning (Pouliot, 2008: 270–272)). Still, it is knowledge rather than the task that is the key and participation must have knowledge-value for its participants. A community of practice should not be viewed as a network (Castells, 1996) since a community of practice is not just relational, but has an identity of its own, thus also shaping the identities of its members (Wenger, 1998a).

Adler elaborates on the differences between network and community of interest when he, just like Wenger, sees the role of networks as that of information transmitters. Communities of practice certainly do this as well, but they also involve the formation of identities through which negotiations of meanings are conducted, practices learnt and

political control exercised (Adler, 2008: 200). Moreover, communities of practice function as information exchange and interpretation nodes, knowledge retainers (especially tacit knowledge), competency stewards and homes for identities (Wenger, 1998a). Adler further sees that in addition to the functions of knowledge production, accumulation and diffusion, a community of practice importantly engages in knowledge validation as well (Adler, 2008: 224).

MNE, as a community of practice, negotiates the meaning of crisis management events and applies and creates knowledge in attempts to find durable and effective solutions to crisis management challenges and thus facilitate transformation. During this process, the participating members of MNE are 'indoctrinated' in its practice. As will be described in more detail in Chapters 3 (p.65) and 4 (p.167), steps of knowledge production, accumulation, diffusion and validation are incorporated in the practice of MNE, which the MNE-community executes.

Communities of practice thus incorporate the discursive aspect and the concrete 'doing' of social change. In addition, communities of practice can be viewed as social spaces 'where structure and agency overlap and where knowledge, power, and community intersect'. Communities of practice, therefore, have two main features. Firstly, they are 'intersubjective social structures that constitute the normative and epistemic ground for action' (cf. Adler, 1997: 343–344). Also, 'they are agents, made up of real people, who...affect political, economic, and social events. As such, communities of practice help mediate between structure and social action, especially when background knowledge becomes reified in practice'. Despite the strong avocations that communities of practice have the ability and power to transform social realities, communities of practice are not viewed as formal actors in the international arena. Still, they unarguably coexist and overlap with the most classical actors of International Relations. It can be further argued that these classic actors have a tendency to focus their attention on issues that communities of practice introduce to 'collective consciousness and attention' (Adler, 2008: 199–200; Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 18) This point can be emphasized further by asserting that communities of practice even steer the development of state interests as they influence the conceptual frameworks within which these interests are viewed in the first place (Rochon, 1998: 23, cited in Adler, 2008: 200).

In this study, MNE, as a community of practice, is seen as a social space where knowledge, power and community intersect. As such, MNE hosts an inter-subjective social structure that constitutes the normative and epistemic grounds for crisis management action. Yet, as will be argued later in more detail, not only does this social space host social structure, the products of the MNE practice, executed in this social space, affect a larger social structure—namely, the surrounding crisis management structure—on an international and national level. In doing so, MNE affects political, economic and social actions and understandings relating to crisis management.

As stated, mutual learning—and thus mutual acts of knowledge production, accumulation and diffusion—becomes the key emphasis, purpose and function of a community of practice. This means that new knowledge must be internalized by individuals in the first place, and also that ‘dispositions and expectations in and by means of practice’ must be institutionalized. Previously, we looked at how Neumann (2002) similarly discusses the naturalization and institutionalization of new practices. Communities of practice, through the negotiation and reification of meanings, thus contribute to identity formations via conceptualizations of self and other, to provide a simple example. In line with Barnett and Duvall (2005) and Neumann (2002), Adler emphasizes that the ‘ability to negotiate and reify meaning is one of the highest forms of power’ (Adler, 2008: 201).

Thus, when the products of the practice of MNE, executed in a community of practice, are successfully implemented, the assumptions, perceptions and interpretations of durable and effective crisis management challenges and solutions become internalized, naturalized and institutionalized in the larger social structure of crisis management. Hence, the MNE community of practice not only negotiates and reifies crisis management meanings internally, but also for the external, surrounding environment. Therefore, it can be argued that the MNE community of practice wields power, especially constitutional power.

In ideal cases, communities of practice are privileged settings for acquiring and creating knowledge. One ‘gets to’ acquire the knowledge of a specific community of practice by gaining membership via competence, a membership that is then a contribution to the competence of the community as it creates new knowledge (Wenger, 1998b: 214).

Dimensions of competence thus become dimensions of identity. (1) In the mutual engagement dimension, ‘we become who we are by being able to play a part in the relations of engagement that constitute our community’, whereas (2) in the accountability dimension, ‘the forms of accountability through which we are able to contribute to that enterprise make us look at the world in certain ways’, influencing our actions, choices and interpretations of a valued experience. Finally, (3) individuals’ identities set relations of negotiability with respect to the repertoire of a practice in the repertoire negotiability dimension (Wenger, 1998b: 152–153).

Three modes of belonging follow, all constituting identity: (1) Engagement is active involvement in the negotiation of meaning, characterized by relationships, interactions and practices. (2) Imagination modes are extrapolations from experience, which influence understandings of world events, time-space connections, self and the realm of possibilities. (3) In alignment, activities are coordinated to fit structures and contribute to broader enterprises. This mode is affected by discourses, complexities, styles and compliances (Wenger, 1998b: 173–174). As a knowledge domain, a community of practice ‘constitutes like-mindedness’. While not forgetting that they are inter-subjective social structures that constitute the normative and epistemic ground for action, communities of practice ‘are also agents, made up of real people, who...affect political, economic and social events’ (Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 18–19). Communities of practice thus influence structures (setting standards of action) and agents (‘like-minded’ actors who translate these standards into acts with meaning) (cf. Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 16).

This ‘like-mindedness’, which the MNE community of practice is argued to facilitate and constitute in the field of crisis management, is, in other words, the *harmonization of crisis management interpretations and understandings*.

2.1.3. Implications of Harmonization

This facilitation and constitution of ‘like-mindedness’ can be argued to contribute to the homogenization of security imaginaries as identified by Pretorius (2008), to the Westernizing of military imaginaries as identified by Lawson (2011), and ‘[s]pecifying the preconditions for thinking about military and defense policy (grand strategies)’, as

discussed by Neumann and Heikka (2005). This facilitation and constitution of ‘like-mindedness’ follows the logics of norm diffusion and empowerment as identified by Farrell (2001), who discusses how transnational military norms spread into the national level and the different organizations within. When militaries base their actions on interpretations that are similar to the interpretations of other nations, the result is military isomorphism,³⁵ where military policies, doctrines and capabilities resemble each other (Pretorius, 2008).

It is important to realize that these imaginaries—conceptual groupings of military, technology, supporting societal functions, interpretations of war and optimal military organizations—that shape the military’s actions (Lawson, 2011: 41) are constructions, not objective realities, where meanings are fixed and relative identities assigned (Pretorius, 2008: 100). It follows that the bases of military actions are substantiated by political and social discourse and result in action and resource allocations today. In other words, an immaterial, potential conception is the source for the materialization of actual action. In this way, *they create the world they examine* by translating a constructed threat into actual preparedness (cf. Martin and Simon, 2008).

Thus, actors in a position to author these norms (Pretorius (2008) takes the example of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and ‘transformation’) are in the position of constitutional power posited by Barnett and Duval, which we discussed earlier (p.on page 31). Actors in a position to author security norms and knowledge define the concept-technologies that enable interaction in, and the action of, the system for the rest. This study argues that the MNE practice authors and interprets ‘threat’ and ‘weaknesses’ to actors in the security architecture: Through the products of MNE, we learn new proportions of threat, its temporal and geographical attributes, the classification categories of the actors in relation to it, and the modalities of crisis management.

MNE sets the stage of the imaginable, possible and appropriate within the security architecture. As this ‘like-mindedness’ diffuses, resources are allocated and created in order to align with this ‘like-mindedness’. As such, this study argues, the MNE-practice has the capability to contribute to the material moulding of the (Western) security

³⁵ Resende-Santos (2007) examines military isomorphism from a neo-realist frame when discussing military emulation. Emulation is not restricted to material emulations, but include ‘best military practices’ as well (Resende-Santos, 2007: 4).

architecture according to its conceptualization. To put it simply, it is argued that the MNE-practice helps create the world it examines.

Moreover, in the international humanitarian field, it has been argued that a consequence of the harmonization of communal mindsets is the emergence of *transnational professionalism*, where the foremost interest is in the international communal domain, rather than the mission domain (De Waal, 2010; Douzinas, 2007: 8–10; Duffield, 2002: 1065; Pugh, 2001: 346–351). This phenomenon is characterized by a detachment from the originating organization, which allows the humanitarian professional to not hold organizational allegiances, the emergence of a profession-specific technical language, for example, and articulation of expertise in relation to management skills rather than in relation to the needs of the humanitarian field. Moreover, Belloni (2007) identifies that after the focus of execution is in the ‘proper’ execution of technical skills, the humanitarian professionals are left with few capabilities to assess the political impacts of their actions. The technical conceptualization of politics can effectively blind the humanitarian professionals from assessing the impacts of their actions on political realities (Belloni, 2007: 467–470; Duffield, 2001b: 317).

2.2. Ethnography

As discussed, practical knowledge is ubiquitous and embedded in practices. While this thesis does not subscribe to the philosophically realist idea that it is possible to ‘get things right’ about social reality and its various practices (Käpylä and Mikkola, 2011, 2010), one nevertheless needs a way to discuss and investigate them. In other words, to be able to discuss and investigate practices, something must be said—or ‘found out’—about them. This, the thesis suggests, must be done through interpretation from ‘contexts and practices as well as through agents' dispositions and subjective meanings’ (Pouliot, 2008: 284). This, in turn, means that access must be acquired to the practice in question and the agents involved. In addition, knowledge of the context in which the practice functions must be gained.

Access to a practice—especially in the field of international security—is often out of the reach of scholars. This is due to the sheer size of the field and the fact that the international security field is extremely secretive and thus often requires security

clearance, which is simply beyond the grasp of researchers. Even if a required clearance is given, researchers quickly run into legal issues, as, for example, national laws may prohibit public discussion (cf. Pouliot, 2008: 285). Yet, it is possible (albeit infrequently) to gain access to an international security practice via the ethnographic method, which is especially geared to permit ‘a particular mode of access’ (Rancatore, 2010: 72; cf. Gusterson, 2008: 96–99).

More specifically, the ethnographic method, in addition to providing a vehicle for gaining access, is a method of data collection (Jackson, 2008: 91). As data is gathered from within phenomena, the data collection technique is *emic* (from an insider’s perspective), rather than *etic* (from an outsider’s perspective). The data that is hoped to be gained include ‘human beliefs, values, and practices’. The main data collection method of ethnographic research is participant observation, which argues that the researcher must both observe and participate to the fullest extent possible in the social action that is under scrutiny—only then can the ‘insider’s point of view’ be understood (Hume and Mulcock, 2005: 11; cf. Gusterson, 2008: 99–103). This makes ethnography, for some, ‘the most empirical of methods’, best suited to gain understandings of meaning, ideas, and concepts (Shehata, 2006: 260).³⁶

Ethnography’s ‘empirical focus, theoretical underpinnings, and narrative styles’ is (re)gaining ground in political analysis due to its ability to penetrate ‘the foundations of political institutions and their attendant sets of practices’ and its power to explain ‘why political actors behave the way they do and to identify the causes, processes, and outcomes that are part and parcel of political life’. Still, among political scientists, ethnography is by no means as popular as secondary data, for example, or surveys and statistical approaches (Auyero, 2006: 257–258). This is puzzling, for one would expect that ‘direct contact with political processes instead of filtering that knowledge through other people’s testimony, written records, and artifacts of political interaction’ would be an alluring alternative and a preferred one (Tilly, 2006: 410).

³⁶ A good example of a case where quantitative data is simply ‘not good enough’, a failure of technocratic data almost, is in the world of central banking. As these institutions seek to gain a quick understanding of the economy, they conduct ethnography of their own within their social networks to gain a better, more real-time understanding of the economic context; this context is then influenced via discursive statements, forming an ‘economy of words’ (Holmes, 2009; cf. Holmes and Marcus, 2006; Smart, 1998).

Understandably, access to ‘major’ political social fields can be stipulated to hinder the realization of ethnographic contact. However, in cases where access is acquired, political ethnographers collect data through many procedures, ranging from the intrusive to the discreet and graceful: (1) in-depth interviews; (2) conversation; (3) participant observation; (4) passive observation of interaction; (5) covert observation of interaction; and (6) unobtrusive observation concerning residues and consequences of interaction. These procedures, most often a combination of procedures (i.e. triangulation (cf. Valtonen, 2010: 96)), enable and engage the ‘analyst in looking at social processes as they unfold rather than reasoning chiefly from either the conditions under which they occur or the outcomes that correlate with them’ (Tilly, 2006: 410). More specifically, ethnography offers political analysts, and indeed the field of International Relations, a view into the microphysics of power (Neumann, 2007: 192) and, via descriptive interpretative methodology, provides ‘examples of’ or ‘support to’ prevailing theories (Jackson, 2008: 91). Moreover, ethnography is uniquely positioned to scrutinize, rather than reproduce, the taken-for-granted entities within the field of political analysis, as, for example, the individual or the state (Brigg and Bleiker, 2008: 89).

It is not all smooth sailing for political ethnography, however. For example, it has been criticized as being ‘too’ subjective in its analysis, although it is simultaneously argued by others that that is its ultimate strength (Shehata, 2006: 260–261). Vrasti (2008) observes an ‘ethnographic turn’ in International Relations, which has recently produced an increasing amount of ethnographic discussions: Barnett (1997) on UN bureaucracy, Neumann (2005, 2007, 2008b) on Norwegian diplomacy, Pouliot (2007) on methodology, Wolford (2006) on social mobilization, and Wood (2006) on ethical challenges, to name only a few.³⁷ Vrasti stipulates that this ‘turn’ ‘employs a selective and often instrumental notion of what ethnography is and does’. More specifically, Vrasti argues that ‘the complexity of ethnography has been reduced to (1) an empiricist data-collection machine, (2) a writing style, or (3) a theoretical sensibility’ (Vrasti, 2008: 279–281). This critique has, in turn, been met with counter-criticism by Rancatore (2010), for example. This debate initiated by Vrasti can be seen as a positive example of

³⁷ For a listing of feminist and postcolonial ethnographies, see Vrasti (2008).

ethnography gaining vigour in the field of International Relations, which continuously welcomes new perspectives for analysis (Eckl, 2008: 185).

2.2.1. Collaborative Ethnography

A variant of participant observation, ‘collaborative ethnography’, has emerged through long debates within anthropology, which have been initiated from the concern over the reliability of data and the researchers’ responsibility to the studied field. Early anthropologists would base their studies on second-hand information brought to them by colonialists. When the need for more first-hand information was realized, the researchers would send questionnaires with the colonialists, which would be given to possible informants. Participant observation emerged onto the scene after Bronislaw Malinowski’s *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1922). Eckl describes Malinowski’s argument, which was that ‘in order to understand a foreign people, one had to live with it oneself’. However, after researchers’ need to penetrate foreign lands and cultures was realized, concerns grew over the researchers’ responsibilities to the field. After establishing that ethnographers should ‘do no harm’, the anthropological community soon realized that the researchers’ responsibility did not lie solely in the realm of intended action, they were also (possibly) responsible for unintended action, as well as inaction. Moreover, not only should the field stay unharmed, but in the spirit of reciprocity, the field should also gain something from the researchers’ presence. And not only should the field gain something, the field should have a say on what it actually was that it needed. This, what Eckl calls ‘action anthropology’, is collaborative research with two goals: to solve problems and to gain knowledge (Eckl, 2008: 185–203). Action anthropology is close to what is meant by collaborative ethnography.

Defining what collaborative ethnography is, Rappaport (2008) states that collaborative anthropology, or more specifically collaborative ethnography, treats the field as a place for co-creating conceptualizations, as opposed to neutral or unaligned data collection, which was the spirit of participant observation. Collaborative ethnography is thus joint creation, where the goals of the studied subject are achieved together (Rappaport, 2008: 7–8). Holmes and Marcus (2008) particularize this notion further through their conceptualization of ‘para-ethnography’. They wish to explore epistemic

communities, which conduct ‘research’ (in the broad meaning of the term) that seeks to gain understanding of their surroundings. The experts and their communities are a preferred subject of inquiry because cultural forms are devised and enacted within them. Collaboration with the ‘expert’ and ‘community’ is overt, epistemic and mutually invested in—it is not an ideology of collective practice, manifested in a technological-organizational process (Holmes and Marcus, 2008: 85).

Lassiter (2005) underlines an important element of collaborative ethnography when he states that the main goal of collaborative ethnography-research should be to include the subject of study in the whole writing process—that is, not only stating what they want (as in ‘action anthropology’) and reviewing the final product, but already participating in the initial phases of research. Nor is collaboration the same thing as reciprocity where the subjects (or, to use Lassiter’s term, ‘consultants’) receive something for their favours; in collaboration, the subjects and researchers work together towards a mutual goal. Using the metaphor of dialogue, Lassiter traces the genealogy and meaning of collaborative ethnography: Ethnography has moved from ‘reading over the shoulders of natives’ to ‘reading alongside natives’ and, finally, with collaborative ethnography, to the ‘collaborative reading and interpretation’ (and via joint interpretation to joint creation) of ethnographic text (Lassiter, 2005: 3–17). Thus, collaborative ethnography, when used to gain a thorough understanding of the subjects and their environment(s), is also an interpretation-validation process for the researchers. It is distinct from Eckl’s ‘action anthropology’ because collaborative ethnography clearly underlines the notion of the subjects’ constant participation in the research process, leading eventually to publication, whereas ‘action anthropology’ can be understood to mean only a process where the subjects state what they want and then wait patiently to get it, or a process in which the researchers and subjects do not share a common goal or objective.

2.2.2. On Ethnographic Ethics

Gaining (often privileged) access to a social field burdens researchers with many responsibilities, requiring ethical guidelines (Eckl, 2008: 185–203). Lassiter suggests using the American Anthropological Association (AAA) code of ethics as a mutually

agreed guideline (Lassiter, 2005: 79–97). The AAA code articulates the researchers' main responsibilities to (1) the research subject(s); (2) scholarship and science; (3) the public; and (4) students and trainees (AAA, 1998). Collaborative ethnography is argued to be ethical in itself as it presupposes 'reciprocal informed consent', which underlines the 'joint-ventureness' of collaborative ethnography, where both the researchers and the subjects have the right to participate in (or not), contribute to and review the outcomes of the research. Moreover, it is argued to be morally preferable to the historical models of research because it offers richer, polymodal interpretations, more reliable research results and authenticity of voice (Fluehr-Lobban, 2008: 175–182).

Eckl focuses the researchers' responsibility to the scientific community and raises a few important points, the first of which is the demand of transparency in published writing. Due to the fact that participant observation is not easily reproducible, the evolution of research, participants, perspectives and events—everything that influences and shapes the research—must be diligently made as transparent as possible. Further, since field researchers (unlike 'armchair' researchers) both gather and interpret data, they gain a unique monopoly on events: What was observed and what was derived from it must be clearly described. Second, there is an extra demand for researchers to treat the field well: No action should be taken that could hinder the possibility of future researchers entering the same field in attempts to duplicate findings (Eckl, 2008: 185–203). Third, researchers must enjoy 'freedom of inquiry', which Peacock recognizes as a potential problem when dealing with information that is protected by classification levels, and he discusses how this can be viewed by some as censorship (Peacock, 2008: 168–171).

Fourth, there is the problematic of 'studying up' to power, which political scientists, in particular, face.³⁸ This notion of 'studying up' holds the danger of cooption or even blatant interference in the research itself. Cooption can be avoided by transparently reflecting the consequences of the cooption in the research, but interference is much more difficult to avoid. Open interference might still be manageable, but hidden interference is almost impossible to detect. Also, there is a difference between

³⁸ Political scientists face this phenomenon more often than anthropologists, who are traditionally better off than their subjects of study and in a position of power in relation to them.

interference and influence: Power has the potential to lure researchers to ‘think correctly’ about a given matter. A position of power acts as a gate-keeper, allowing or prohibiting or hiding access to data even after the initial approval of researchers into a phenomenon. Finally, researchers have a responsibility to the scientific community to keep a certain distance from the field and avoid the risk of ‘going native’—that is, to lose the capacity to act as translators between the field and the scientific community (Eckl, 2008: 185–203). This last point is stressed time and again by ethnographic scholars, who underline the need for simultaneously observing ‘with the eyes of an outsider as well as the eyes of an insider’ (Hume and Mulcock, 2005: 11). Indeed, researchers must be ‘both alien and native to the interpreter’s system of meanings’ (Pouliot, 2008: 284).

2.2.3. Summary

So far, the characteristics of practices, power and communities of practice and their constitutional dynamics have been presented. It has also been shown how the *primus motor* of constitution for all three is knowledge, which was established to govern (create, reinforce, fix) meaning. Meanings, in turn, govern subjectivities (*habitus*) and their relational arrangements in a given field. *Practice theory* sees the role of knowledge in most detail: Background knowledge affects the configurations of *habitus*³⁹ and field and the interplay between *habitus* and field results in practical sense. A practical sense, together with background knowledge, affects the assignation of meaning to a given situation—in other words, they form the action-constituting logic that is applied when faced with phenomena (e.g. judging appropriateness). When meaning is imposed (negotiated, reified, internalized), it is an act of power, especially constitutional power. Moreover, meaning-imposition arranges the relationships between actors, constituted by *habitus*, in a field where the actors have relational capacities—capacities that can be seen as capital.

Constitutional power argues that a system of knowledge governs meanings. The meaning-imposition/ determination process follows the logic depicted above by practice theory. A system of knowledge production can be argued to produce/ influence the background knowledge that governs the logics on which action is constituted, as, for

³⁹ *Habitus* constitutes the intersection of structure and agency.

example, the logics with which phenomena are interpreted. Capacity-constitution is the functioning of productive power, whereas the fixing of relational arrangements is the functioning of structural power. *Security communities of practice* focus on learning to gain competence and efficiency (i.e. capacity or capability), thus acquiring knowledge that results in governing (negotiating, reifying) meaning. Similar to meaning-imposition, meaning-internalization (learning) follows the logic depicted above by practice theory.

In this study, the MNE-process, which is mainly composed of states, is seen as a security community of practice. As such, it influences⁴⁰ crisis management meanings through its system of knowledge.⁴¹ As it influences and constitutes crisis management meanings, MNE exercises political control and contributes to the direction and intensity of the global security architecture transformation dynamic that created it.⁴² MNE-influenced crisis management meanings are institutionalized (and naturalized) and integrated in various fields. These meanings constitute relational capacities, identity and perceived interests, and the normative and epistemic ground of crisis management action. Thus, it can be argued that MNE wields constitutional power over international crisis management actors, their relationships and arrangements (relational positions) in the international crisis management field.

More specifically, when meaning is imposed (negotiated, reified, internalized), it is an act of power. This imposition/ determination dynamic has been recognized to contain the following elements: (1) the discursive and lingual emphasis as media to (2) impose and determine ('to embed') meanings to a positioned subject in (3) the socially structured field, where (4) constitutive understandings are cemented or reproduced via (5) integration and institutionalization processes of practices. This study then examines:

- How MNE, as a community of practice, contributes to the imposition and determination of meaning (capacity) in national and international fields of crisis management via the development of crisis management concepts—concept development, which is the main feature of the MNE community's practice; and

⁴⁰ Negotiates, creates, enforces, reconfigures, imposes and determines ('indoctrinates').

⁴¹ A system of knowledge here is a methodology for the production, accumulation, diffusion and validation of knowledge.

⁴² Interplay of agency and structure.

- The integrating and institutionalizing intent and motive of the MNE practice to constitute crisis management understandings and practices on an international and national level.

In consequence, the ethnographic examination of MNE extends to examining how it influences identities, other crisis management practices, responsibilities, and social capacities, self-understandings and subjective interests relating to crisis management. Thus, the examination of MNE as a community of practice further extends to examining how it facilitates and constitutes ‘like-mindedness’ in the field of crisis management, which is, in other words, the *harmonization of crisis management understandings, which constitute the basis for crisis management action*.

In order to answer these questions and specify MNE as an epistemic security community of practice,⁴³ access to MNE data must be acquired and analysed. The methodological framework with which access was ensured and data acquired and analysed will be presented next.

2.3. Analytical Framework

How then to frame an ethnographic research of a security community of practice, how to be simultaneously alien and native in a practice in practice? Going too native results in blindness to events; distancing oneself too far results in a false understanding of relevance. As a way forward, Pouliot suggests a methodology combining Kohut’s (cf. Geertz, 1987) ‘experience-near’ and ‘experience-distant’ concepts (Pouliot, 2008: 284; cf. Pouliot, 2007: 368).⁴⁴ ‘Experience-near concepts are developed through phenomenological⁴⁵ inquiry with the goal of grasping as accurately as possible a reality that is known by the agents under study. By contrast, an experience-distant concept is constructed by the scientist in order to break with commonsensical experience and provide an outsider viewpoint, different from the ones that are practically engaged in the situation at hand’ (Pouliot, 2007: 368).

⁴³ To establish MNE’s material/ meaningful, structural/ agential, reflexive/ background, stability/ change attributes (cf. Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 18).

⁴⁴ ‘Experience-near’ and ‘experience-distant’ are Kohut’s concepts; see Geertz (1987).

⁴⁵ The description of phenomena.

Pouliot argues that a process-centred methodology is required when conducting research on the constitution of knowledge and reality. He suggests an approach that has three steps: induction, interpretation and denaturalization. First, the starting point of research must be to gather what it is that the social agents under inquiry believe to be real. Second, meaning(s) must be interpreted and, finally, meaning(s) must be placed in context and denaturalized.⁴⁶ Pouliot argues that induction and interpretation together form what Geertz, following Gilbert Ryle, called ‘thick description’—the interpretation of an event within its context (Geertz, 1973: 3–30; Pouliot, 2007: 364–374). Thick description is then placed within context and denaturalized.⁴⁷ Pouliot calls his methodology ‘subjectivism’, a title that underlines the two ends of the spectrum within which analysis must be made—the subjective and objective ends. ‘Subjectivism puts in dialogue the insider and the outsider perspectives so as to mutually enlighten both stories and gain in interpretive incisiveness. Prior to theorization and objectification, it is thus necessary to “go to the village” and recover the logic of practicality in social life’ (Pouliot, 2008: 284–285).

2.3.1. Step 1: Induction

As stated, Step 1 in Pouliot’s process-centred methodology of ‘subjectivism’ is induction. The purpose of this first step is to recover subjective meaning(s) from the field under inquiry. Thus, it serves as a necessary starting point for a constructivist research, especially as it is argued that initial theorization and category imposition, marked by a deductive starting point, destroy meanings as they exist in the social field under inquiry. ‘[C]onstructivism’s foundations of knowledge rest not on a set of a priori assumptions but on agents’ taken-for-granted realities. In order to recover such meanings, the analyst must avoid superseding them with theoretical constructs. In addition, as the construction of social reality hinges on the social construction of knowledge, analysts also need to refrain (within the realms of possibility) from imposing their own taken-for-granted world onto their object of study.’ Therefore, the researchers’ initial task is to gain access

⁴⁶ It should be pointed out, as does Pouliot (2007: 374–275), that these three steps do not have to be taken in strict order; rather, each step provides information to the others; for example, Step 3 may enlighten a meaning in Step 1.

⁴⁷ Thus, together, they can be taken to form a ‘super-thick’ description of sorts.

to the social field(s), composed of actual agents, of International Relations and Politics and recover meaning(s) as they exist within this field. The point is not to enter this field with a predefined set of classifications, although one can never be fully immune to one's 'reality' from which research is initialized. Nevertheless, this kind of 'immunity' where researchers face phenomena with open minds should be attempted to the largest possible extent. The requirement of transparency dictates that the researchers' initial inclinations and understandings should be made as transparent as possible (Pouliot, 2007: 364–370).

Furthermore, the inductive starting point, with its prerequisite of accessing 'the local', guards against the temptation of seeing the practice under investigation as a spectacle. It should be remembered that the researchers' external and god-like view is fundamentally and categorically different from the practice in question. Thus, researchers need to gain access to the practical field under examination (via ethnography when possible) and become immersed in it in order to gain 'cultural competence'. Through 'cultural competence', researchers are able recognize understandings and meanings on the field—understandings and meanings from which the foundation of the field's frame of reference is constructed (Neumann, 2008a: 63–65). In other words, via ethnography, researchers develop subjective knowledge of the field, through meanings in the field. Triangulation, the gathering of data through different methods (cf. Tilly, 2006: 410), is a requirement of the inductive step as is the requirement of placing the experience-near findings into context (Pouliot, 2007: 364–370).

2.3.2. Step 2: Interpretation

The purpose of the second step, interpretation, is to objectify subjective meanings in an inter-subjective context (be it cultural, inter-textual or practical); the purpose is to develop meaning about meaning (cf. Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Certainly, interpretations of meaning belong in the realm of the subjective, but they are at least the 'description of a clearly observable empirical object: the ritual, practice, symbol, story, or game treated as "text"' (Swidler, 2001: 85). Since gaining access to the fields of international security is difficult at best, and even futile in most cases, Pouliot focuses his attention on discourse analysis as a means to conduct interpretation. Yet, at the same time, he recognizes that interviews, for example, unfortunately, result in creating distance

between the researchers and the researched phenomena. However, when access to the fields of international security is available, interpretative methodology can be conducted and implemented via reflexive ethnography (Pouliot, 2007: 365–372, 2008: 284–285). In this study, interpretation will be conducted via reflexive ethnography as implied, but not described, by Pouliot (who, as discussed, focuses his discussion on the variations of discourse analysis for interpretation). Thus, this study seeks to make operational Pouliot’s observation of the utility of ethnography and, therefore, contributes to the operationalization of his methodology.

Reflexivity

‘Old’ ethnography, such as Malinowski’s *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1922), attempted to portray an objective account of phenomena where the visibility of the ethnographers was minimal at best—more often, the ethnographers’ presence was strikingly absent. These positions were questioned in the late 1960s and gained voice and momentum in the 1980s ‘under the guise of reflexivity and postmodernism’ (Shehata, 2006: 246). Reflexive ethnography, which has also been called interpretative ethnography, ‘aims to chart the network of shared meanings that constitute reality within a community’ (Smart, 1998: 113–114, 124).

There are two ways in which to understand reflexive ethnography. The first view focuses on the produced text; the focus is on the ‘narrative structure, trope, metaphor, language and rhetorical style’ of the produced ethnographic text, how they function and convince (cf. Brigg and Bleiker, 2008). The second way of understanding reflexivity is to view it as an ‘examination of fieldwork as a personal and epistemological activity’. Understood like this, fieldwork is viewed as a method of knowledge production where the ethnographer takes centre stage. Reflexivity then is about making the fieldwork experience transparent in a very self-conscious way (Shehata, 2006: 245–261).

Shehata (2006: 246) summarizes this understanding to the point: ‘Thus, in ethnography, the ethnographer’s self becomes a conduit of research and a primary vehicle of knowledge production.’ The point is to learn the field through the self, thus strengthening ethnography through reflexivity; researchers engaged in fieldwork become a source of knowledge of the field and participate directly in the production of the

phenomena under inquiry (Brigg and Bleiker, 2008: 89–90; Jackson, 2008: 91–92)— participation, which, in this study, is achieved through the logics of collaborative ethnography (Shehata, 2006: 245–261).

Moreover, reflexivity is used to gain ‘cultural competence’: ‘to recognize the shared understandings that create a common frame of reference’ (Neumann, 2008a: 64). Although Neumann calls for ‘cultural competence’ in order to understand text, reflexivity reveals shared understandings and a common frame of reference in a practice. Thus, it can be argued that after reading a reflexive account or an auto-ethnography of a practice, one can advance one’s understanding of a culture. This understanding can later be utilized in discourse analysis, as has been done in Neumann’s argument.⁴⁸

Leander (2008), credited with providing ‘much needed guidance as to how to methodically analyze the meanings of practice’ (Pouliot, 2007: 372), lists three ways to utilize reflexivity. First, she articulates that researchers should reflect on the validity of the study—they should reflect on the ‘evidence’ they provide to support the study’s conclusions. Although conventional and seemingly self-evident, this point should be taken seriously (Leander, 2008: 23–26). The call for validity is echoed by Higate and Cameron, who call for reflexive ethnographic research in military research especially. Their argument is that articulating the researchers’ habitus and making the ‘access negotiation’ and expectations of military sponsors (sponsors in the literal or rhetorical sense) transparent increases accountability and, thus, research validity (Higate and Cameron, 2006: 219–220).

Higate and Cameron’s argumentation is also in accordance with Leander’s second point on reflexivity, the need for ‘epistemological prudence’. By ‘epistemological prudence’, she means that researchers should reflect on how their self and their habitus influence what is told, what information is accessible, and what they are able to understand in the first place. This step can never be implemented to its purest level—never can all impacting factors be understood, much less communicated, to the full.

⁴⁸ It is interesting to compare Neumann’s ‘cultural competence’ with a similar understanding in the military world. In this case, the British military sees culture as ‘the shared concepts that guide what people believe, how they behave and how this behaviour is interpreted’. Cultural understanding made operational creates ‘cultural capability’, which is ‘[t]he ability to understand culture, and to apply this knowledge to effectively engage in any environment. Cultural capability comprises 3 levels: awareness, understanding and competence’ (DCDC, 2009: 1–2).

Nevertheless, their impact should be limited as much as possible. Third, Leander argues that ‘natural and objective’ research actually sustains the powers-that-be by effectually concealing the functioning of power. Thus, through the ‘realpolitik of reason’, reflexivity should be used to support ‘serious scientific work’ with emancipating potential and denaturalize, unmask and provide historical contextualization. As was already articulated in the second point, all of these aspects of reflexivity cannot be written down exhaustively in any research. This, however, is the fate of most methodologies and theoretical constructs in studies. ‘Non-exhaustiveness’ does not diminish the importance of reflexivity, but it does make the assessment of other researchers’ reflexivity more challenging (Leander, 2008: 23–26).

2.3.3. Step 3: Denaturalization

Pouliot’s third step, adding historical context to set ‘meaning in motion’, is in tune with Leander’s demand for denaturalization, which, in turn, is a disposition of constructivism. To quote: ‘Recall that to say that X is socially constructed means that X is neither natural nor inevitable: X is historical. X can be shown to be socially constructed in part because it has a history of its own and results from social processes that are traceable over time. The historicization of X leads to its denaturalization: X need not be, for it has not always been (or has not always been as it is).’ Via empiricism, this historical emphasis creates emancipating potential for constructivism, the same emancipation that was called for by Leander, as noted earlier. Further, historical examination maps the processes that ‘make possible the constitution of specific social contexts. As no social realities are natural, they are all the result of political and social processes that are rooted in history.’ These processes are traced by examining the evolution of meanings in order to map a given social context; it is not about explaining causality in the positivist sense, causality which is seen as subordinate to the meaning-mapping process. In other words, the historical meaning-mapping should be done in a manner in which the researcher ‘stands back’ from current meanings, maps the context’s evolution and thus provides further objectification to analysis. Moreover, it reveals the dynamics of how a form of knowledge can make a claim to represent reality (Pouliot, 2007: 366–374).

Constitutive analysis is a way to conduct such diachronic interpretation (Pouliot, 2007: 372). The objective of constitutive analysis is to be able to explain ‘how systems [natural and social] are constituted’ by attempting to paint a snapshot view of a system (Wendt, 1998: 105). Thus, constitutive analysis is an attempt to paint a picture of how a social fact comes into being: ‘What inter-subjective context makes a social fact possible?’ (Pouliot, 2007: 373; cf. Wendt, 1998).

Pouliot further argues that the inter-subjective, evolving context ‘makes it possible for social facts to be socially constructed. In order to provide a dynamic account of the social processes that lead to C, one needs to identify what can be called “constitutive mechanisms”—heuristic [intuitive judgments or simply common sense] devices about the social processes that lead to the constitution of Y by X. Constitutive mechanisms bring about context C, thus rendering possible the constitutive relation.’ Pouliot’s understanding differs slightly from Wendt’s; Pouliot sees Wendt focusing on X and Y at the expense of context C. Contra Wendt, Pouliot sees constitutive analysis as a dynamic, instead of a static, research strategy (Pouliot, 2007: 373–374; Wendt, 1998: 105).

Constitutive analysis is typical for interpretative research, which usually favours descriptive ‘explication of constitutive relations’, rather than causation (Jackson, 2008: 92). Jackson (2008) comments that there are two main costs when causation is abandoned. In the first place, forecasting becomes unreliable. Patterns and arrangements can be identified, but little can be said about how they will stand the tests of time. In the second place, not much can be said about the effects these patterns and arrangements will produce in the future. These costs are true in a ‘pure’ ethnography, which Jackson suggests may not even exist, nor may it even be possible for it to exist as ‘even the most forceful advocates of ethnographic approach still seem to want to make causal claims’ (Jackson, 2008: 92).

For Wendt, the description (constitution)-explication (causality) divide is not as clearly drawn as suggested by Jackson. For example, Wendt (1998) discusses how descriptions (typical results of constitutional theory) of the social also explain the social (explanations are traditionally understood as belonging in the causal domain). Wendt illustrates his point via the master and slave relationship: Both acquire their properties

through a causal process (birth, socialization, etc.) and their roles are constituted within (one must realize to be a ‘master’). ‘But if we want to explain how a master can sell his slave then we need to invoke the structure of shared understandings existing between master and slave, and in the wider society that make this ability to sell people possible. This social structure does not merely describe the rights of the master; it *explains* them, since without it those rights by definition could not exist’ [emphasis in original] (Wendt, 1998: 113).

2.3.4. Framework Operationalization

2.3.4.1. Step 1: Induction

As already discussed, in the first tier of the three-tier methodology put forward by Pouliot, the prerequisite is to gain access to the social field under investigation. In this research, a variant of participant observation, collaborative ethnography, was utilized to gain access to MNE and to gather data from it.⁴⁹ In the ethos of collaborative ethnography, my research was initialized together with my main collaborative partner, the Secretariat of Finland’s Security and Defence Committee (Turvallisuus—Ja Puolustusasiain Komitean (TPAK) Sihteeristö).

From the beginning, my research was seen as a ‘joint-venture’: I would gain valuable and unique—indeed, privileged—data from MNE and directly participate in the ‘doing’, the production of the phenomenon under inquiry. The defence bureaucracy would gain useful research on the nature, relevance, utility and importance of MNE. In other words, both parties initialized a mutual investment. Thus, from the very start, the motives of my inclusion⁵⁰ in MNE were discussed and crystallized between the Finnish defence bureaucracy and me. In an ideal collaborative ethnographic case, the research subject is included in the whole writing process. This is not the case in my research: The literary task is my own. However, my collaborative counterparts have had the option of commenting on and criticizing all aspects and stages of my research. This journey will be discussed below in detail in Chapter 3 (p.65).

⁴⁹ For a historical discussion of MNE and its genesis, its nature and purpose were discussed in the Introduction.

⁵⁰ Reflections on my inclusion process, how it was conducted and what factors (including my habitus) contributed to it are discussed in Chapter 3 (p.65).

The purpose of such detailed discussion relates to ethical ethnographic conduct. As already discussed, transparency is called for in ‘everything’ relating to the research. In addition, the mutual agreements made between the defence bureaucracy and me will be presented (for example, the utilization of the Chatham House Rules)⁵¹, agreements that ensure that no misunderstandings and harm occur to either party during the research process. Moreover, such agreements, together with international military procedures, define the limits within which I have enjoyed ‘freedom of inquiry’. The detailed account of my habitus will provide information for the analysis of my cooption—was I (or am I) ‘in too deep’ with the ‘natives’ or have I been able to create the required distance from the research. It should be reiterated here that the purpose of the three-tier methodology utilized is to ensure such ‘distancing’.

In the context of the global (Western) security architecture, I have thus established access to the international military community tasked with facilitating international crisis management transformation (i.e. MNE). The more I penetrated MNE, the more I saw a constitutive process of meaning, a womb of terminologies and concepts that, when implemented (if implemented), would feed at least into (1) the discourse of International Security Politics and (2) the policy-making processes of nations. I had penetrated a process, which, if it had not created, then had at least in part influenced the knowledge, and thus also the understandings and meanings, which exist in the realm of international crisis management. Thus, I came to be personally aware of what MNE, as a security community of practice, utilizes as its knowledge production methodology. Moreover, I became personally aware of MNE’s constituting background knowledge; MNE’s constitutional power; MNE’s processes to diffuse constitutive knowledge among other actors⁵² within the global security architecture (including potential obstacles to diffusion and implementation); and MNE’s utility of community for a nation-state in identity construction, role definition and national interest promotion.

In addition to my personal experience, I started to gather material relating to these themes of knowledge, power and community since a community of practice was argued

⁵¹ ‘When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed’ (ChathamHouse. 2010).

⁵² These other actors include actors that exist within MNE, outside of MNE, states, international organizations and civil government bureaucracies.

to be an intersection of these. In order to provide as rich an account as possible (of what MNE is and what it does, including its background knowledge and practical logics), I gathered evidence by using a variety of techniques, the synthesis and the triangulation (cf. Valtonen, 2010: 96) of which are presented in this study. More specifically, the data from which evidence has been extrapolated are:

1. Official and training material documentation
 - a. On the official process and intent of MNE;
 - b. MNE's knowledge producing methodology: CD&E; and
 - c. MNE products, mainly MNE6, in which I was initially and primarily situated, but also of selected MNE7 products, in which I played a role;
2. Reflexive auto-ethnography, describing 'my journey' to and in MNE, and my habitus relating to MNE and the characteristics of the habitus of different groups within MNE as interpreted by me (see Step 2: Interpretation);
3. Official and non-official conversation among various subjects, held during official MNE6 meetings, for a minimum of 144 hours, documented in field notes;
4. Collaborative participant observation conducted during official MNE6 meetings, for a minimum of 216 hours, documented in field notes; and
5. Covert observation of interactions in meetings and 'after-work' situations for a minimum of 360 hours⁵³ (done simultaneously with Steps 3 and 4), documented in field notes.

2.3.4.2. Step 2: Interpretation

As already discussed, the goal of interpretation is to objectify subjective meanings in an inter-subjective context. In other words, the purpose is to develop meaning about meaning. This goal is reached with a reflexive ethnography, charting shared meanings that constitute reality within a community. In my study, reflexive ethnography is understood as a personal and epistemological activity of the fieldwork examination. With reflexivity, the fieldwork experience of MNE is made transparent in a very self-conscious way, a transparency that also links this step to Step 1 (ethics involved in ethnography, source of data). The purpose and goal is to learn the field through experiences of the self,

⁵³ The 360 hours (in MNE6 alone) can be compared to Elina Penttinen's ethnographic dissertation, which lists 62 hours of observational ethnography (not including interviews) (Penttinen, 2004).

thus strengthening the ethnography. I, as a researcher and ‘field-worker’, am a source of knowledge of the field, more so as I have directly participated in the production of the phenomenon under inquiry. Reflexive ethnography then is the *description* of a clearly observable empirical object, in this case the community and practice of MNE, characterized by ‘action organized according to some more or less visible logic, which the analyst need only describe’ (Swidler, 2001: 85). Reflexivity is utilized on three levels as promoted by Leander (2008) earlier:

1. On the level of data/ evidence acquired and gathered with various techniques (see Step 1 for the techniques of data/ evidence collection): Validity of data/ evidence should be especially reflected upon;
2. On the level of habitus: First, on the level of my habitus—what it is, how it is perceived, and how these perceptions influence issues such as access to data and trust among the other participants. This description emerges in Chapter 3 (p.65), the reflexive ethnography. Yet, briefly, it can be commented that my habitus was perceived (at least) along the categorizations of:

- a. Male, Finnish, civilian, ex-military, analyst, researcher, ‘unknown’, free labour; habitus-in-change;

Moreover, it makes most sense to treat MNE as a collection of different ‘group-habitus’ in order to avoid a watered-down description of a mass of individual histories, yet illustrating the inner workings of MNE (thus not to treat MNE as a single habitus), which comprises the whole (cf. Leander, 2008: 21–22). The habitus of various groupings, descriptions of which emerge in Chapter 3, can be categorized briefly (at least) as:

- b. Technologically focused, process focused, observational, contributing,⁵⁴ national interest focused, coalition interest focused, operational theatre focused, career focused,⁵⁵ habitus-in-change; and
3. Denaturalize, unmask and provide contextualization. More specifically, contextualization and denaturalization are the content of Step 3 in the three-tier

⁵⁴ Observational and contributing roles are specific roles that are defined in the MNE process. However, I wish to use these terms with the intention of illustrating actual observation and contribution (instead of organizational roles).

⁵⁵ By which I refer to the collection of individuals whom I saw as driving their careers via MNE. Thus, self-interest forms an identifiable collage, a grouping, of action.

methodology. Denaturalization can be argued to be achievable via historical contextualization, and also through subjective, 'outsider' experience. Unmasking MNE is the purpose of this study, an unmasking that is conducted using the three-tier methodology.

Reflexivity will be conducted within three dimensions: knowledge production, power, and community (as described above). The purpose of reflexivity is to describe the transformational methodology of MNE, with which transformational knowledge is produced; the power and/ or influence MNE has as a security community of practice (symbolic, conceptual, structural, productive, and the interrelationships of these); the 'communal dynamic' of MNE and its utilization (including potential utility) of knowledge diffusion, identity construction, role definition and national interest promotion.

2.3.4.3. Step 3: Denaturalization

As discussed earlier, the purpose of Step 3 is to unmask, denaturalize and provide further objectification of inherently subjective meanings, and their evolution and diffusion into the context from which they were created and which they also modify. This is conducted through a constitutive mechanism. The research interest in this study is MNE, seen as a constitutive mechanism and an epistemic security community of practice, which contributes to the constitution of international and multinational crisis management 'reality' in the global security architecture context through the constituting practices of knowledge production, power and community. Using the example described above, we can thus observe the constitution of Y by X in context C. In this example, MNE is X, constituting the Ys in context C, which is international and multinational crisis management. At the same time, in the context of the global security architecture, MNE is Y. The constituting logic of X will also be discussed in this study.

Put in the language of practice theory, MNE's action-constituting logic(s) will be examined in this study in detail. It is argued that this action-constituting logic contributes to the constitution of the 'realities' of the larger crisis management environment. The MNE-community, as a security community of practice, focuses on learning in order to gain competence and efficiency (i.e. capacity, or capability), thus acquiring crisis

management knowledge. This knowledge results in governing (negotiating, reifying) crisis management meanings in the larger crisis management environment. More specifically, the MNE-practice—executed by the MNE-community—is argued to be responsible for creating and diffusing this knowledge.

The MNE-community is X, constituting the realities (Y) in the larger crisis management environment (C). The MNE-community constitutes with the MNE-practice. Thus, the MNE-practice is the constitutive mechanism within the MNE-community.

Therefore, the purpose of Step 3 is to provide the context and logics from which MNE is born and in which it operates. The main meaning, evolved into and evolving in the context of global security architecture, is the *transformation* of crisis management. In this study, MNE is argued to constitute the meanings and sub-meanings of transformation through knowledge production, power and community. Furthermore, MNE is argued to be (one) mechanism that constitutes the context of international and multinational crisis management, and its ‘naturalized facts’ (rules of the game, what is valuable capital). These, in turn, are used in political discourse, further diffusing the constituted meanings as the positions of power use the created meanings to tweak societal realities for the socially exposed.⁵⁶

To denaturalize then is to provide an account of how the global security architecture transforms; it is an overview of how the problem of ‘threat’ is solved; it is an overview of the changing meaning of who is an actor in international and multinational crisis management; it is an account of which solutions are ‘required’ in order to be ‘secure’.

2.3.5. Concluding Remarks

As presented earlier in this study, MNE, mainly comprised of states, owned by the US, and formed to develop international crisis management capability, is presented as a security community of practice. Thus, this study describes an agent in the realm of security studies, the defining feature of which, as a community of practice, is shared knowledge. Further, this study presents the methodology with which MNE applies and

⁵⁶ Conceptual power at work.

evolves shared crisis management knowledge in the international sphere: the methodology of CD&E. The logics of CD&E organize the arrays of actions in MNE.

As will be discussed during the ethnographic journey in Chapter 3 (p.65), the traditional aim of CD&E is to find solutions with which gaps in crisis management capabilities can be filled. While this is true, this study will argue that CD&E has another important function that has gone virtually unnoticed by scholars and practitioners alike. Thus, this study will argue that there is a built-in *transitional feature* in the CD&E methodology that influences the interpretative frames within which crisis management actors understand the world, manage crisis management policies and seek to modify national crisis management legislations. This transitional feature emerges from the logic of solution implementation: A successful solution, created with the CD&E methodology within MNE, when implemented, is transitioned from the MNE environment into the larger, international crisis management architecture. Note that documentation on CD&E only discusses processes up to implementation proposals (NAMC, 2009, 2010: §66).

Therefore, it is argued that MNE influences⁵⁷ crisis management meanings through its system of knowledge.⁵⁸ As an influencer of meaning, MNE, controls and contributes to the direction and intensity of the global security architecture transformation dynamic which has also created it.⁵⁹ Through the transitional feature of CD&E, MNE-influenced crisis management meanings are institutionalized (and naturalized) and integrated in various fields. These meanings constitute relational capacities, identities and perceived interests, and the normative and epistemic grounds of crisis management action. Thus, it is further argued that MNE wields constitutional power over international crisis management actors, their relationships and arrangements (relational positions) in the international crisis management field.⁶⁰

Moreover, MNE, through CD&E, can be seen as a mechanism of harmonization, not only in the crisis management community, but also in the (Western) international

⁵⁷ Negotiates, creates, enforces, reconfigures, imposes and determines ('indoctrinates').

⁵⁸ A system of knowledge here is a methodology for the production, accumulation, diffusion and validation of knowledge.

⁵⁹ Interplay of agency and structure.

⁶⁰ It should be noted that this study does not focus on the utilizations of meanings post-diffusion. In other words, a detailed account of how MNE-produced meanings are used in the political environment is not provided. However, the diffusion process and logic will be presented.

realm. It is a mechanism with which technologies, processes, organizations, legislation, doctrines and policies are harmonized within the liberal democratic world.

What is MNE-knowledge then and how is it produced? How is constitutional power utilized in MNE? How can cases of intended meaning-imposition be observed? In order to answer these questions and specify MNE as an epistemic security community of practice,⁶¹ access to MNE data must be acquired, interpreted and denaturalized. Above, I have presented the methodology with which these tasks can be achieved. I have also presented the methods that will be used within this methodology.⁶² How the methodology will be utilized in my study is summarized in the table below:

Tier	Level	Task	Method	Implementation in Study
1.	Most subjective (experience-near)	Gain access and acquire data	Ethnography (collaborative)	(1) Access made transparent (2) Sources of data
2.		Interpretation	Ethnography (reflexive)	Reflection on <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data/ evidence • Habitus: Personal and MNE • ‘Outsider’ experience
3.	Most objective (experience-distant)	Denaturalization	Constitutional analysis	(1) How MNE is constituted in the crisis management context by the transformational dynamic within the global security architecture (2) How MNE constitutes knowledge, power and community in the crisis management context

⁶¹ To establish MNE’s material/ meaningful, structural/ agential, reflexive/ background, stability/ change attributes (cf. Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 18).

⁶² The notion of method usually refers to the concrete tool of inquiry (e.g. discourse analysis, causal tracing, rhetorical analysis, and so on), whereas the notion of methodology is a style of reasoning or a more encompassing term that refers to the set of basic assumptions about the world (e.g. related to epistemological, ontological and axiological issues) that precede, and make possible, the adoption of a certain method (cf. Pouliot, 2007: 360).

Chapter 3.

Ethnographic Journey

This section will focus on the first and second tiers of the presented methodological framework. More specifically, Chapter 3 will demonstrate how I was able to negotiate access to MNE, introduce the data gathered and my reflexive—or interpretative—ethnography. Earlier (on page 46), it was discussed how ethnographic ethics demand transparency. More specifically, everything that influences and shapes research must be diligently made as transparent as possible. Thus, the presuppositions I brought with me when entering MNE are especially discussed and articulated in the prologue of this chapter (on page 68). This requirement is in accordance with Higate and Cameron's earlier point (on page 52) that articulating the researchers' habitus and making the 'access negotiation' and expectations of military sponsors (sponsors in the literal or rhetorical sense) transparent increases accountability and, thus, research validity (Higate and Cameron, 2006: 219–220).

Moreover, this is in accordance with Leander's second point on reflexivity, the need for 'epistemological prudence'. By 'epistemological prudence', she means that researchers should reflect on how their own selves, their habitus, influences what is told, what information is accessible, and what they are able to understand in the first place. This step can never be implemented in its purest form—never can all impacting factors be understood, much less communicated to the full (Leander, 2008: 23–26). Thus, in this ethnographic account, I cannot claim to make unbiased and uncontaminated observations; rather, I wish to depict my observations and interpretations of MNE and make my presuppositions as transparent as possible.

The purpose of reflexive ethnography especially is to chart meanings within MNE, which constitute the realities within the MNE-community. In doing so, the characteristics of the 'MNE-community' and 'MNE-practice' will be examined in detail. These characteristics will be specifically discussed in Chapter 4 while further analysing MNE.

As stated earlier, the purpose of this section is to present the material I acquired during my ethnography. The section is a reflexive ethnography describing 'my journey'

to and in MNE and is in itself material that provides a unique view into a multinational military community, which gathers together to create new crisis management knowledge using which transformation in the international crisis management architecture is facilitated. As such, it provides a unique view into the utilization of power in the international crisis management architecture.

Data from official and training material documentation will also be included in the reflexive ethnography in order to present how MNE is presented in official documentations. It should be noted that I will use some documents here, which were published at the end of the MNE6 process. This is because official presentations are—not surprisingly—very similar to each other. I have, in cases, chosen to use documentation that is more easily available to the reader (i.e. potentially more accessible from the Internet). Additionally, going through different sources discussing MNE and its governing methodology (and organizing logic), CD&E in particular, one finds a plethora of definitions and categorizations. It should be noted that my ethnographic experience was heavily influenced by NATO ACT and USJFCOM because my training in CD&E was conducted by NATO ACT and MNE was led at the time by the USJFCOM.⁶³ Hence, the official documents I will refer to are most often documents from NATO ACT and USJFCOM.⁶⁴

Moreover, data from conversations and unstructured interviews among subjects, collaborative participant observations, and covert observations of interactions during meetings and ‘after-work’ situations, gathered during official MNE6 MISA-EM sessions, will be included. It should be noted that the reference format for such ethnographic data is ‘(Location, DD–DD MONTH YYYY)’, for example, (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

In order to provide a full account of my ethnographic experience and the multidimensional creature that is MNE, this chapter is presented in temporal segments that relate to my experience. First, a prologue will provide an account of who I was, what my purpose was in MNE, and how I was able to negotiate and gain access to MNE.

⁶³ It should be noted that during MNE6, the USJFCOM ‘owned’ MNE. However, the USJFCOM has been closed down as of 31 August 2011. Available at: <http://www.jfcom.mil/> [Accessed 15 September 2011]. Current MNE ownership resides with the US Joint Staff, Deputy Director J7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting (USJS DDJ7 JCW).

⁶⁴ As might be apparent at this stage, research on a military community involves a multitude of abbreviations. To help the reader navigate through this jungle of abbreviations, Appendix E (p. on page 234) lists all the abbreviations used in this study.

Second, my early experiences are described in the sub-chapter, 'Initiation' (p.73), which illustrates the plethora of dynamics I encountered in MNE, while I was still not able to contextualize them. After initiation, the categorizations and sequence of the knowledge development methodology, CD&E, with which MNE applies and produces crisis management knowledge, and the logic which governs MNE action, will be described. Therefore, the next two sub-chapters are titled 'Concept Development' (p.92) and 'Experimentation and Analysis' (p.122). In these sub-chapters, I will further illustrate events and observations that are relevant to illuminating the characteristics of MNE as a community of practice, and the practice it constitutes. In the sub-chapter, 'Finalization', I will present events from the final stages of the MISA-EM concept development. I will then conclude the ethnographic account with the sub-chapter, 'Epilogue—MNE7' (p.162), in which I will discuss my 'fading out of' MNE6 and MISA-EM, and emergence into MNE7. Through all the phases, I will present witnessed events and episodes pertaining to the general evolution of crisis management and its characteristics, as seen from within a community of international military professionals, which I have interpreted as relevant or interesting.

It should be noted that presented thus, the ethnographic account is possibly longer than it could be. However, since one of the motivations for this study is to make the characteristics and sequences of MNE transparent and visible, I have purposely chosen to provide a temporal account of my MNE experience. Clearly articulating the different temporal phases and events therein makes MNE more visible for the reader who is not familiar with its characteristics and results in a clearer and truer account of my ethnographic experience. Similarly, in the name of clarity, I have chosen to present the knowledge development methodology, CD&E, which governs actions and roles within MNE, within different sub-chapters of the ethnographic account.

The sub-chapter, 'Initiation', will provide a general introduction to CD&E, 'Concept Development' will discuss concept development, and 'Experimentation and Analysis' will present how MNE understands experimentation and analysis. It should be noted that although many formulations of CD&E exist in the world, the official documents I will refer to while presenting CD&E are mostly from NATO ACT and USJFCOM. Furthermore, this study does not claim to give a 'comprehensive'

presentation of CD&E and its finer characteristics. Rather, the purpose is to introduce CD&E to the reader from the perspective of my ethnographic experience within MNE. Finally, it should be noted that since the intent of this study is to define and analyse the MNE-community and the MNE-practice it constitutes, it will not analyse MISA-EM specifically, nor examine MISA-EM through CD&E.

3.1. Prologue—MNE6

‘...and who are you?’

(Interlocutor 16).

This question was my first experience during my stint with MNE. In addition to hearing this question, I could feel the unspoken follow-up question, ‘...and what are you doing here?’, as I was stared down by five Finnish military professionals who had just introduced themselves to me in a hotel lobby in Madrid, Spain, on 26 May 2009. They were very valid questions indeed.

3.1.1. Who I Was

Granted, it was an odd situation—a bald, Finnish man, giving little warning before showing up in a hotel lobby in Madrid. As if that was not enough, my intent was to join the upcoming meetings. My departure had been so quick that I had not had proper time, I felt, to study up on the actual topics of the meetings—honestly, I was not certain if there was only one or many. Certainly, I knew I was about to join the MNE process, and a maritime situational awareness objective, MISA-EM, within this sixth cycle of MNE, but that was about the extent of my knowledge. Not wanting to look like a fool, I decided that the best introduction would be to recapitulate my past experiences with the military and thus hope to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the ‘natives’, whose concrete doings I would end up studying. As I hoped it would do for my audience in Madrid, this account makes transparent my initial inclinations and understandings in MNE for this study as well (cf. Pouliot, 2007).

As mentioned, I decided that the safest starting point would be to iterate my military past. All Finnish males face compulsory military service. That needed no iteration, but the fact that I was an officer of the reserve, I hoped, would gain me some points in the eyes of the natives who were active officers in the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF). I articulated that fact with another one: I had enlisted to be a CIMIC⁶⁵-officer in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 2002–03 as part of the NATO-SFOR.⁶⁶ Moreover, I had enlisted to be a Liaison Officer in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 2004–05, when the European Union (EU) took over with Operation EUFOR-ALTHEA.⁶⁷ These experiences had left me with the rank of Lieutenant (Reserved), leading to promotion to Senior Lieutenant (Reserved) in June 2010.

I decided to discuss also the other detailed experiences I had had with the FDF. I had worked as a consultant for Accenture,⁶⁸ during which time the FDF had been my client for three years or so. More specifically, I had worked with a transformation management methodology in the Defence Command. In fact, during this time, I had already had a brief, initial encounter with the previous, fifth cycle of MNE, during which I had presented a potential methodology for modelling the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). Due to my experiences, I felt I was no rookie in military affairs and I hoped these facts would ease my entry into the process as a researcher who was working on his dissertation thesis. At that time, my intent was to focus on Network Enabled Capability (NEC) and the increase of horizontality in interagency collaborations and international relations as one of its effects.

It should be noted here that since the term, ‘interagency’, will constantly come up in this study, the dictionary definition of interagency (or inter-agency) is that it is an adjective and means ‘made up of, involving, or representing two or more government agencies’. While the aforementioned was true in the MISA-EM context, too, the term was also used there to refer to the networking and collaboration of all agencies (i.e. not exclusively governmental) in a maritime operation, thus including international

⁶⁵ Civil-Military Cooperation

⁶⁶ Cf. <http://www.nato.int/sfor> [Accessed 8 July 2011].

⁶⁷ Cf. <http://www.euforbih.org> [Accessed 8 July 2011].

⁶⁸ Cf. <http://www.accenture.com> [Accessed 8 July 2011].

organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector. This study follows the latter, looser inclusion of actors for the term, ‘interagency’.

3.1.2. What I (Thought I) was Doing

I had been increasingly interested in NEC and its effects for a while. My interest had been sparked in Bosnia and Herzegovina and had intensified during my years at Accenture. I was especially interested in the harmonizing power of NEC: If all countries choose to implement the same systems, use the same information exchange standards and organizational processes, it could be argued that this would result in a new horizontal governance structure of sorts, created in an attempt to counter the limits and challenges of vertical structures. It could then be argued that this horizontal structure could place small states especially in a more rigid bind, where an individual state could not move as freely.

However, this initial research interest eventually evolved quickly as I tried to come to terms with the MNE process. Constantly I would ask myself: ‘What is MNE actually?’ It finally took one thesis to begin to answer this seemingly simple and innocent question. Granted, in detail, the answer was longer than I expected when I was introducing myself in the hotel lobby. Nor was I aware of the weight and uniqueness of my admission to MNE.

3.1.3. How I Got There

Old contacts and working at the Finnish Institute for International Affairs⁶⁹ (FIIA) helped me gain admission to MNE. This was primarily due to the fact that it is easy to contact government officials when working at FIIA since the institute is a part of the Finnish Parliament’s organizational structure (or at least *easier* than when one is simply affiliated with a university). Initially, while still ‘NEC-inspired’, I had called a contact I had previously worked with on FDF’s transformation management methodology. This contact gave me a hint that MNE’s sixth cycle had just started and that MNE6 had some activities going on that were related to my initial research interest.

Finland’s activities in MNE were coordinated from the Secretariat of the Security and Defence Committee (TPAK). Contacting them made even more sense after I was told

⁶⁹ Cf. <http://www.fia.fi/> [Accessed 8 July 2011].

by a senior colleague in FIIA that the Security and Defence Committee was looking for research topics relating to Finland's Security Strategy for Society;⁷⁰ some of these research topics resonated with my initial research interest. After a few phone calls and a couple of meetings, it was agreed that I was to join MNE and gather public material in support of my thesis. In exchange, I would participate and work, for free, as part of Finland's delegation in MNE6, Outcome 4, Objective 4.2. It should be noted that offering to work 'for free' is a powerful negotiating tactic when dealing with organizations.

More specifically, I was informed that the problem statement of MNE6⁷¹ was: '[In order] to establish and ensure a safe and secure environment, coalition forces require the ability to share information, gain situational understanding, synchronize efforts and assess progress in concert with interagency partners, international organizations, and other stakeholders when countering activities of irregular adversaries and other non-compliant actors.' Moreover, I was told that MNE6 was divided into four outcomes, which were further divided into various objectives (Interlocutor 3).

My participation would be in Outcome 4: 'Coalition forces, interagency and relevant partners possess an improved ability to gain shared situational understanding of the operational environment during employment of direct and indirect approaches to countering irregular threats and the activities of non-compliant actors.' As stated, in Outcome 4, my participation was specifically in Objective 4.2: Multinational Interagency Situational Awareness—Extended Maritime (MISA-EM).

In MISA-EM, the goal was: 'Develop a shared capability for coalition forces, in concert with interagency partners, international organizations, and other stakeholders to provide Situational Awareness of the Extended "Maritime Environment" to counter irregular threats.' Finland was a leading country in Objective 4.2, together with Spain. The other contributing members were Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Sweden and NATO ACT.

⁷⁰ Cf. <http://www.yett.fi/en> [Accessed 8 July 2011].

⁷¹ On MNE6, see 'Norge i MNE-6 presentasjon'. Available at: http://mne.oslo.mil.no:8080/Multinatio/?Briefer_state=max [Accessed 8 July 2011].

From the start, it was agreed that this study would follow the Chatham House Rules⁷² with regard to people in order to provide anonymity and thus hide potentially harmful details. This decision complies with Eckl's point, when discussing ethnographic ethics, that researchers bear a responsibility to treat the field well, that is, cause the field no harm. Thus, I will refer to all individual sources as 'Interlocutor'—whether the individual was a member of the military or not and whether the individual was male or female. Yet, at the same time, researchers should aim to maximize transparency (Eckl, 2008: 185–203). Therefore, the interlocutors are numbered in order to allow the reader to identify⁷³ the different voices of sources.

Moreover, in order to gain mutual trust, I consistently emphasized—in the spirit of collaborative ethnography—that my project was also the defence bureaucracy's project, and defence personnel were welcome to contribute and comment on the study. Thus, it was made very clear to the other participants that while I was participating in MNE, I was also simultaneously conducting research on it.

A plethora of outcomes and objectives, in addition to the history of MNE, was injected into my brain post haste prior to my departure in my attempt to contextualize what I was entering. As a consequence, it would be bold to claim that this information had formed a logical and clear presentation of historical events in my mind. Rather, I was under the impression that MNE was going to develop something and that I would attempt to find the NEC (my initial research interest) elements in it for my thesis. Still, MNE itself had sparked my curiosity. This was due to the observation that as MNE creates international crisis management capabilities (whether they are related to NEC or not), there was a political element to this process since MNE was also said to influence doctrines and strategies. Initially, I was attempting to form a picture of MNE in my mind, if not for any other reason than to be fluent in future conversations with its practitioners.

To be honest, at the time, I had no idea what MNE was. That did not hinder my eagerness for conversation though.

⁷² 'When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rules, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed' (Chatham House, 2010).

⁷³ A mapping of all interlocutors can be delivered separately.

Before moving in to examine MNE in more detail via ethnographic analysis, two final disclaimers will be presented. First, due to my various experiences at different levels in the defence sector, concerns could be raised that I was too much of an insider already when I entered this process, much more so after I had participated in the actual MNE work. While I certainly understand this concern and doubt, it is worth mentioning that if the academia, for example, has sometimes viewed me as ‘a military insider’, the military folk most certainly have not: For them, I was an outsider from beginning to end and never fully accepted as ‘a core member’, which I, of course, was not (Interlocutor 2). Moreover, as a brief example, when introduced to other nationalities, my organizational (i.e. outsider) affiliation was always stressed. My interpretation of this act was that it served to sink in the point that I did not ‘belong proper’ 1) in the military and 2) in the FDF.

Second, it is simply impossible to talk about MNE and not use its terminology. Traditionally then, one would, prior to talking about MNE, introduce the terminology of MNE. This, however, is not how I came to understand these terms and methodologies—thus, such a presentation would not be true to my ethnography. Therefore, I ask for the reader’s patience and trust; although a seemingly familiar term is used in a perhaps odd context (e.g. ‘concept’), all things will become clear(er) in the end, just as they became clear(er) to me.

3.2. Initiation

This first sub-chapter will ‘set the stage’ for the coming phases of the ethnography. I will illustrate here the internal dynamics I faced when entering MNE—dynamics that I shall articulate better in later phases. Following a similar logic, an overview of CD&E will be presented in this sub-chapter and more detailed accounts on the specifics of CD&E will be presented in the sub-chapters, ‘Concept Development’ (p.92) and ‘Experimentation and Analysis’ (p.122).

After explaining who I was and my purpose for being there, I assumed that my answers had proved satisfactory as the group dispersed and a few of us headed for the warm Spanish terraces to discuss matters relating to the tasks at hand. I was eager to utilize the expertise I had gained in the past and frequently promoted the principles of

NEC as I had learned them. More specifically, my point was that NEC-categorizations are needed to situate military entities and activities. I advocated categorizations into four domains—the physical, information, cognitive and social (EvidenceBasedResearchInc, 2003: 10–11; cf. Alberts *et al.*, 2001: 10–14). I argued that this categorization, along with rigid Enterprise Architecture (EA) modelling (process-modelling especially), would help identify tasks and issues relating to improving technologies and processes and identifying key organizational actors when attempting to gain maritime situational awareness (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

Although I sometimes wondered how these NEC/ EA comments were received, I learned later that these sometimes unwarranted and passionate monologues proved to be immensely beneficial; I was told later that my early ‘expert comments’ not only justified my presence, but proved my utility during the overall experimentation process among all participants (Interlocutor 2).

3.2.1. Madrid Workshop 2

It should be remembered that the specific content of the MISA-EM concept is not the focus of this study. Nor is the detailed examination of the evolutionary process of the MISA-EM concept, or how the concept evolved over time. However, since the MISA-EM concept development process is my window into the characteristics of MNE, parts of MISA-EM will emerge during this study⁷⁴. More specifically, these emergent parts are relevant for the evolution of my understanding of MNE. In his UN ethnography, Michael Barnett includes pictures of his security clearance card(s) (Barnett, 1997: 553). Similarly, when possible, I shall include identifiers for extra touches of authenticity.

⁷⁴ For the full text of the MISA-EM concept, see: (USJFCOM, 2010b), whereas the executive summary can be found in Appendix A.

As stated, the goal of MISA-EM was to ‘[d]evelop a shared capability for coalition forces, in concert with interagency partners, international organizations, and other stakeholders to provide Situational Awareness of the Extended “Maritime Environment” to counter irregular threats’ (USJFCOM, 2010a). The second concept development workshop of MISA-EM in Madrid was a step to meet this ultimate goal. This workshop was held in Spain’s Defence Staff Headquarters (EMAD) in Madrid from 27 to 29 May 2009. Entering EMAD (in hindsight, ‘naturally’) required identification, which I, as a victim of MNE sensory overload, had forgotten at the hotel. I found this somewhat embarrassing because I was attempting to blend in with a crowd of people for whom it was second nature to have identification readily at hand when entering military premises—even more so a military facility abroad. After a quick dash back to the hotel, I got my driver’s licence, was allowed to enter and was awarded my pass for the next three days (cf. Figure 1).




Figure 1: My pass in EMAD

I immediately came to learn that ‘to develop a shared capability’ in an international military collaboration project means to play a fantastically complex game. Entering the site where the game was to be played, I had no idea of the rules. I could do little more than observe and hope to pick it up and start playing with the professionals soon. I did understand that the official objective statement (above) was the goal that all the participants, the players, were hoping to score. I wondered what my position on the field was and found others were wondering that, too. I had introduced myself the night before, but now I faced a series of ‘name-organization’-type introductions. At the time, my organization was the FIIA.⁷⁵ My interpretation was that since I did not belong to a military organization, yet was present in all my enthusiasm, the other participants were puzzled by my ‘true’ status or position (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

This feeling was further strengthened during the development sessions when I was asked questions such as: ‘Does the representative from the Foreign Ministry think this approach is feasible?’ Since the maritime environment was alien to me, I barely understood the questions, much less was I able to provide inputs on feasibility. Instead, I

⁷⁵ Cf. www.fiaa.fi [Accessed 8 July 2011].

talked more about NEC and the importance of modelling. It might be due to the fact that I have watched too many Hollywood movies, but since I clearly had a military past (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and represented an exotic organization, my initial feeling was that the non-Finnish participants thought they should not inquire in too much detail about me and my role—as is customary and polite when it is known that no answer can be given.⁷⁶ Or it could just be that no one was overly bothered (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

Whereas my role was ambiguous, the roles and relationships among the other participants were clearer. This was natural for, after all, this was already the second workshop and some participants were even older acquaintances. Moreover, *organizational similarity* was a strong source for bonding—perhaps, even more so than nationality; the sailors (people in the Navy) of all nationalities immediately had a common language and bond in contrast to members of other branches or civilians. *Women* were so clearly outnumbered that it was striking for me as I had always worked in fields where it was normal to have somewhat equal and stable gender percentages. Although I can understand that this is ‘normal’ in military structures, I could not help but wonder if there were females actually ‘inside the organization’, although they most certainly had official roles and positions in participation. My interpretation was that to be a military-affiliated woman in MNE was somewhat similar to being a civilian male in MNE—neither was ever ‘truly inside’ (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

The specific agenda for the workshop was to 1) conduct conceptual work (reviews of existing works and drafting the MISA-EM conceptual framework); 2) define a set of Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA);⁷⁷ and 3) draft scenario requirements for Limited Objective Experiments (LOEs) in the offing. The scenario requirements were based on a scenario vision that I found telling and informative of MISA-EM at this stage: An interagency environment sharing Situational Awareness (SA) immediately means a multitude of actors ranging from the governmental (civilian, police, military) to the non-governmental (IOs, NGOs, businesses). Moreover, there was talk of transitioning the achieved SA to the local government or administration through the Security Sector Reform (SSR) frameworks, which were assumed to be present. The plethora of actors

⁷⁶ In my experience, in cases where one deals with classified information, intelligence, etc.

⁷⁷ EEAs are the principal elements of analytical focus in the CD&E methodology.

MISA-EM would influence, one way or another, became even clearer following discussions on key coastal and maritime infrastructure (e.g. oil platforms or pipelines) and irregular or Non-Compliant Actors (NONCAS) (e.g. terrorists or pirates) (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

These were phenomena clearly linked to meeting the requirements of the objective.⁷⁸ Although I was, due to my past, quite fluent in Three Letter Acronym (TLA) talk, I still struggled to understand the specifics of the concept and things seemingly revolving around the concept and the methodological process developing it. Apparently, the former was not something that was clear to everyone else either. For one, there was a clear need to define terms (such as ‘anomaly’ and ‘security’). The intensity of debate when defining the concept’s terminology, for me, resembled how I had imagined high-level political negotiations: seemingly never-ending debates about how words are actually documented in the final treaty, which, for us constructing MISA-EM, would be the concept document itself (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

In addition to debates on terminology, there were contesting visions when it came to the actual content of the MISA-EM concept (Interlocutor 16; Interlocutor 10). These contestations could be summarized with the question: Who is in charge of a MISA-EM operation? One end of the spectrum would answer ‘the military’, whereas the other would answer ‘the one in charge of the operation’. The key difference thus was that supporters of the former answer saw MISA-EM as a distinctively military tool, where the military was in control of its implementation, whereas the supporters of the latter answer would emphasize the fact that the military was certainly not always in charge of international crisis management operations. Since the leader of an operation could be a civilian, and even a civil organization, MISA-EM should be tailored—thus worded—to incorporate this possibility (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

Especially since a main motive and goal of MISA-EM was interagency,⁷⁹ the collaboration of all actors⁸⁰ in the crisis management project, the concept could not be

⁷⁸ As a reminder, it was to: develop a shared capability for coalition forces, in concert with interagency partners, international organizations and other stakeholders to provide Situational Awareness of the Extended ‘Maritime Environment’ to counter irregular threats.

⁷⁹ Remember that MISA-EM stands for Multinational Interagency Situational Awareness—Extended Maritime Environment.

written ‘in military lingo’. If it were, it was argued, the concept would ‘scare away’ non-governmental actors in particular from the moment they read it, and thus the goal of interagency would fail. The failure of interagency would be especially unfortunate as this notion is integral to Comprehensive Approach (CA) frameworks—frameworks, which, it was argued, would be utilized to plan, implement and assess future operations even in ‘non-permissive’ environments (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

In addition to the military versus comprehensive approach debates, a debate of a more technical nature was advocated between the participants. Specifically, the question was how to categorize the internal workings of the MISA-EM solution that was under development. One debate proposed using technology, processes, information requirements and social aspects. Since, at the time, I had a strong interest in NEC and its categorization of four domains (the physical, information, cognitive and social), I found myself arguing for the proposal, which I honestly saw as a ‘good enough’ framework (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

Especially during breaks between the official MISA-EM sessions and while spending quality ‘after-work’ or ‘ice-breaking’ time with other MNE professionals, it became more and more apparent that MISA-EM was not the only topic of conversation during, nor was it the only motive for, these meetings. In other words, the development of new maritime situational awareness solutions was not the only goal the players were aiming for—situational awareness of the motives and agendas of the ‘other’ participants were also frequent topics of conversation. For example, some participants were there to advance their careers (and thus were very eager and energetic), whereas some saw MNE and MISA-EM as a fun international forum where one could take it easy, travel, see the world and drink some wine. Then there were the ‘super-professionals’—technocrats who were basically the only legitimate sources of knowledge in some matters and were thus super-employed in all kinds of tasks, MNE, national and international. The comments and visions of these participants were hard currency and hard to come by, busy as they were (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

⁸⁰ Including governmental (civilian, police, military) and non-governmental (IOs, NGOs, businesses) actors.

Moreover, these ‘unofficial’ conversations further emphasized that MISA-EM was just one piece in the bigger puzzle of maritime situational awareness. I began to understand that MISA-EM had direct linkages to projects in NATO, the US, the EU and the Baltic states. These linkages worked both ways, it seemed: The US Interagency Shared Situational Awareness (IASSA) project⁸¹ provided valuable information that could be utilized in MISA-EM work and, similarly, the MISA-EM product would serve as information for the US project (cf. Kenyon, 2010). Although I use the US as an example here, it should be remembered that such linkages exist(ed) among all countries. The spill-over could range through technical, academic, organizational or procedural insights and innovations. For example, I learned quickly that MISA-EM had a technical spill-over element to NATO’s Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (CWID) as well (cf. NATO, 2010b: §3-b). Moreover, it was argued that MISA-EM’s interagency perspective provided added value for NATO’s Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) project⁸² (and Tide Sprint’s MSA track)⁸³ (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

Although close connections provided valuable information and venues for intensified multinational collaboration regarding maritime situational awareness, at the same time, there was concern over how MISA-EM could be distinguished as unique in relation to these other projects. A duplication of effort was perceived as a real risk in addition to the clear benefits of synergy between the projects. In hindsight, I am near certain that the EU and Baltic States linkages were also discussed, but my brain was not prepared to take in any more information on any additional maritime situational awareness projects. I would learn of these projects later in more detail (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

In addition, national interest aspects were debated. More specifically, concerns were voiced on how to maximize the benefit of the MISA-EM concept in national organization(s). During these discussions, the benefits of the previous MNE cycle, MNE5, were mentioned. These included lessons learned on situational picture analysis and technical interoperability, for example. It was seen that these elements were to be

⁸¹ An experiment designed to promote information sharing among US military, government and state organizations (cf. Boyer, 2010).

⁸² (cf. NATO, 2011). See also Kościelski *et al.* (2007) for a short overview of the NATO MSA.

⁸³ (cf. C2COE, 2009).

found in MNE6 as well. However, a special benefit from MISA-EM, as discussed (in Workshop 2), was the modelling of interagency processes in an extended-maritime environment. Again, as an advocator of EA modelling, I could easily participate in this discussion and fully support it (Madrid, 27–29 May 2009).

With all of these new observations and materials, I was seriously flabbergasted. What was this ‘Multinational Experimentation’ I had entered? How to achieve an interagency, comprehensive approach in a maritime environment? I certainly understood how interagency worked on land as I had conducted it personally in my missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Implementing it on the high seas was another business altogether—that much was certainly clear. Unfortunately, things would become more complex with my introduction to MNE’s governing structure, the logic which organizes its actions: the knowledge application and producing methodology of CD&E. Luckily, I was able to attend training in Tuusula, Finland, from 1 to 3 September 2009.

3.2.2. CD&E Methodology Training

‘Developing a coherent, multinational force starts with aggressive concept development, as well as robust operational experimentation’

(NATOACT, 2005: 3, §2.1.2).

MNE certainly cannot be understood without gaining an understanding of the Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) methodology—after all, MNE implements and utilizes CD&E. Hence, CD&E organizes the logics of the array(s) of MNE actions (cf. Swidler, 2001: 85). Before going into detail on the methodology, a few disclaimers will be presented.

First, it should be noted that this is a vast and detailed methodology. In addition to CD&E training, I have gone through the official documentation on 1) Concept Development; and 2) Experimentation. This was quite a task: The documents are difficult to find, much less understand, and are, at times, very difficult to compare as my impression is that terminology tends to evolve depending on the background (nationality,

education, training, branch) of the document's author. Moreover, documentation tends to deal with either concept development or experimentation—I never found a document dealing with both. Although my initial intention was to present a section which would explain concept development and experimentation as a whole, it would (at least, I assume so) have ended up being a very heavy read.

Therefore, I have divided the presentation of the CD&E methodology into three sections. The first is an introductory segment to CD&E, which will be presented shortly below; this introduction on methodological content will serve to illustrate my 'training ethnography'. The second section, CD&E's methodological notes on concept development, will be presented in the sub-chapter, 'Concept Development' (p.92) as I will go through the concept development phase of my ethnography. CD&E's methodological notes on experimentation will be presented in the sub-chapter, 'Experimentation and Analysis' (p.123), where I will go through the experimentation phase of my ethnography. CD&E's methodological notes on analysis will be presented in the same sub-chapter as I have tied in the ethnography of the analysis phase with the experimentation phase.

Second, going through different sources discussing CD&E in general, and experimentation in particular, one finds a plethora of definitions and categorizations that exist within concept development and experimentation. For example, there are no overarching definitions and categorizations within the English-speaking world alone (Ekström, 2010: 4–5). Thus, it should be noted that many countries have their own understandings of 'proper' CD&E. My understanding of CD&E, presented below and in the following phases, is heavily influenced by NATO ACT and USJFCOM. This is due to the fact that during my ethnographic journey with MNE, I was trained in CD&E by NATO ACT, with the support of USJFCOM. Moreover, MNE's sixth cycle was led by USJFCOM.

Before going to Tuusula and entering the FDF International Centre (FINCENT) on 1 September 2009, I had little knowledge of the CD&E methodology. Quite honestly, I was under the impression that it was more a synonym of sorts for MNE than its own unique entity, the logic of which governs MNE actions. Nevertheless, I eagerly joined the training, the purpose of which was to 'train and educate the invited audience to the

Concept Development & Experimentation practice as currently conducted in MNE-series' (Tuusula, 1–3 September 2009).

This introductory segment to CD&E is based on training material from the CD&E training course and references identified during the course and during the overall ethnographic journey (official documents, studies, books, articles, etc.).

3.2.2.1. Key CD&E Definitions

It was mentioned earlier that not even the English-speaking world has a unified understanding of the definitions and categorizations within CD&E (Ekström, 2010: 4–5). Here, due to the primacy of NATO ACT in my training, I will refer to the NATO definitions as they were also present later during MISA-EM's CD&E process. Moreover, in the case of defining 'military experimentation' especially, I will use The Technical Cooperation Program's (TTCP) definition as TTCP material forms a strong basis in NATO ACT's CD&E. Furthermore, TTCP material was identified as one of 'the core documents' during the course (Tuusula, 1–3 September 2009).

- The *CD&E process* is a 'structured development of creative and innovative ideas into viable solutions for [future] capability development' (NAMC, 2009: §5; cf. NAMC, 2010).
- A *concept* is a 'solution-oriented transformational idea that addresses a capability shortfall or gap'. A capability gap refers to a recognized and required capability that does not exist yet (NAMC, 2009: §5; cf. NATOACT, 2007: B-3, §3).
- *Concept development* is a 'process aimed at identifying conceptual solutions to capability' (NAMC, 2009: §5).
- *Experimentation* is 'controlled investigation to discover information, confirm or disprove a hypothesis or formally validate a concept' (NAMC, 2009: §5). Further, '[e]xperimentation may consist of a series of related experiments' (NATOJWC, 2006: Annex B).
- *Defence experimentation*: '[T]he application of the experimental method to the solution of complex defense capability development problems, potentially across the full spectrum of conflict types, such as war fighting, peace-enforcement, humanitarian relief and peace-keeping' (TTCP, 2006: 3).

- *Experiment*: ‘A controlled and directed activity designed either to discover new information about a concept, test a hypothesis or validate a solution’ (NATOJWC, 2006: Annex B).

It should be noted that the North Atlantic Military Committee’s (NAMC’s) definition of a concept used by NATO ACT differs from the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-6), which offers another definition of a concept. The Glossary defines a concept thus: ‘A notion or statement of an idea, expressing how something might be done or accomplished, that may lead to an accepted procedure’⁸⁴ (NATONSA, 2010: 2-C-13). Ekström points out that not only are there several definitions of concepts, there are also various categorizations, ranging from temporal and institutional dimensions to categorizations that focus on purpose and maturity (Ekström, 2010: 4). It is worth noting that AAP-6 does not provide any definitions for CD&E, concept development, experimentation, military experimentation or experiments (NATONSA, 2010).

All concepts, however, share the aspect of problem-solving, which is the key element of a concept. This ‘problem’ might be a non-existing military capability or an identified need to improve an existing capability. Also, a need can be anticipated, for example, when change is observed in any combination of politics, social aspects, economic situations, technological or doctrinal developments, by new objectives in an existing situation (due to altered political expectations, for example) or ‘other’ factors. The problem may be solved through any needed action and the perceived better solution may similarly be available due to developments in technological, organizational, tactical and societal understandings, for example. Thus, a concept in the military world focuses on how a capability might be used in the future. The future-looking feature of concepts is underlined by the notion that a concept can be developed ‘in advance of policy or may envisage changes to current policy’. The purpose of concepts is thus to be transformation-enablers and provide solutions to perceived problems (NATOACT, 2009g: 5–7; NAMC, 2009: §11). This overall requirement of transformation was stressed throughout my ethnographic experience.

⁸⁴ Granted, the content of the two definitions can be argued to be similar. However, I found it surprising that NATO had two different working definitions internally. One would have expected coherence.

The ability to transform is seen as an essential requirement for contemporary militaries, which are perceived to be in a state of constant adaptation (and thus transformation) (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 109). Indeed, the 2010 NATO strategic concept states: ‘...Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernization and transformation’ (NATO, 2010d: §6). This reform is a requirement of flexibility, which is necessary for performing efficiently (Rasmussen, 2010). It was identified that a catalyst for today’s transformational need was the 1991 Gulf War, which identified the need to use information technology as a basis for military development. The promotion of this vision to Europe started in the late 1990s (Raitasalo, 2008: 44–45, 49). At the 1999 NATO summit, the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was launched to ensure interoperability amongst allies and to update capabilities in the face of perceived threats. The perceived change in the security environment after 11 September 2001 (9/11) led to a more intense transformational process within the Alliance (Raitasalo, 2008: 51; cf. NATO, 2001: 50–52). Although the transformation process had already begun before 9/11, it led to a new sense of urgency.⁸⁵

The transformational approach focuses on the technical RMA; effects-based approach to operations (EBAO); and network-centric warfare (NCW) (Nurmela, 2010: 18; cf. Smith, 2002; Alberts *et al.*, 1999). Military establishments especially wish to leverage the promise of RMA (i.e. concepts and capabilities of the information age) as soon as possible (Alberts and Hayes, 2005: 21). In addition to new technologies, RMA creates a new way of thinking—not only are technology-driven capabilities transformed, but so are also military cognitions (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 110; cf. NATOACT: §5). Despite the fact that the technological RMA is not a straightforward conceptualization⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Exemplified in a speech by President George W. Bush: ‘The need for military transformation was clear before the conflict in Afghanistan, and before September the 11th...What’s different today is our sense of urgency—the need to build this future force while fighting a present war. It’s like overhauling an engine while you’re going at 80 miles an hour. Yet we have no other choice’ (Bush, 2001).

⁸⁶ One particular problem is the logic of the consolidation of information flows, which, in turn, requires organizational, procedural and technical transformations to ensure interoperability. This logic blurs the notion of insides and outsides, when the rationale is to share all relevant information with all actors. Thus, Huhtinen and Rantapelkonen (2008: 108) point out that the system, which is created to counter complexity, is in itself so complex that it might enable consequences that are not able to be seen. For further discussion on the implications of connectivity and liberal governance, and how transformation and network-centric war can be seen as mechanisms of governance, see Reid (2009) and Dillon and Reid (2009).

Moreover, although information flows can be seen to enhance activities, simultaneously, an actor’s dependency in information collaboration increases. Theile (2005) argues that national level

(asymmetrical threat, expenses, interests among coalition members), advanced information technology remains one of the most, if not *the* most, important indication of military capability today (Raitasalo and Sipilä, 2008: 57–58).

The US (the leader of MNE) vision sees transformation as a continuing process. The purpose of transformation is *to anticipate and create the future*. Profound changes in a concept, process, organization or technology were seen to necessitate changes in all. Moreover, transformation was seen to identify and leverage new sources of power. The purpose of military transformation was to transform culture, processes and capabilities through four pillars, which constitute the essential elements of the force transformation strategy: 1) strengthening joint operations; 2) exploiting intelligence advantages; 3) CD&E; and 4) developing transformational capabilities (Cebrowski, 2003: 8–20; 2004).

These developments naturally affected NATO as well, where it was seen that success in the new security environment meant that military actions should be coordinated and supported with political, civil and economic instruments (NATOACT, no date: §5). The key elements of the NATO transformation were encapsulated in the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) and the NATO Response Force (NRF), which have been used by European powers to increase their technological capabilities and by the US government to encourage European governments to do so (Raitasalo, 2008: 52). The US and NATO transformation go closely hand in hand. NATO ACT is even located close to the US military's transformational command (Raitasalo, 2008: 53; NATOACT, no date: §1–4).

The utilization of military, political, civil and economic instruments in crisis management requires a collaborative (or 'comprehensive') approach. The military, political, civil and economic instruments have to work together in environments characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change and persistent conflict

procurement policy options are effectively constrained when future capability development is led by an international network of actors—despite the fact that they all share common goals.

Further, although 'RMA is as much an exclusively American way of making war, as capitalism is an exclusively American way of making a living' Dillon (2002: 73), Pretorius (2008) talks of how RMA and the concept of transformation can be seen as US-sponsored military isomorphism. Further, Lawson (2011: 41–43) discusses how NCW was used to define a specific type of Western military imaginary, which 'helped to empower certain foreign policy options while constraining or completely disempowering others'.

(USJFCOM, 2009a: 2). CD&E facilitates adaptations to security challenges and the extraordinarily large number of variables, and their possible combinations, in crisis management operations. A particular purpose of it is to be able to react to and drive organizational transformation more quickly than a normal, traditional military capability creation process would allow (Zappata, 2009).

CD&E methodology ‘was adopted as an Alliance tool to explore, demonstrate and evaluate future operational concepts that will drive changes in NATO's capabilities’ in 2000. After 2000, CD&E has been credited with contributing to meaningful capability development (Theile, 2005; NAMC, 2009: §1–5, 31; Alberts and Hayes, 2002: 1). For example, the US Department of Defense (DOD) recognized experimentation as one of the most important processes that would assist in the effects-optimization of its joint force to achieve its vision of the future (CJCS, 2000: 33–34). It was also seen that experimentation (along with field exercises) ‘provide[d] an indispensable means for solving emerging challenges’ (DOD, 30 September 2001: 36).

Consequently, CD&E is ‘a real measure’ in NATO ACT’s transformational agenda, which, today, is as intense as it ever was (cf. NATO, 2010d: §6, §37). More specifically, as part of a capabilities-based approach to defence planning,⁸⁷ CD&E is the fifth key step of the Capability Development Process (CDP). For ACT, a NATO-based CD&E programme is in a unique position to develop new capability initiatives adequately, especially those with a view to multinational applicability and interoperability. Moreover, there is increased experimentation at the political/ military level as well, which aims to address the challenge of multinational and interagency engagement, the results of which are guiding the development work of future capabilities (NATOACT, no date: §29–31, §46).

As a transformational tool, CD&E serves primarily to provide fillers to capability gaps. The NAMC sees that in order to maintain NATO’s relevance in the security

⁸⁷ A capabilities-based approach to defence planning: ‘In response to this new strategic environment and its complex array of threats, NATO has begun a shift in its military planning from one solidly based on known threats to a more flexible and adaptable approach based on capabilities. In military terms, a capability is the ability to produce the operational outcomes necessary to accomplish a given military mission. At its core, capabilities-based planning recognizes that, both today and in the future, there is uncertainty in trying to identify who or what may threaten Alliance interests’ (NATOACT, no date: §28).

environment, continuous transformation is required. Agility—organizational or conceptual—is a key element of NATO transformation, along with the actual development of capabilities. These capabilities must be robust and they should be ‘deployable, sustainable, interoperable and usable for future operations and missions’. CD&E is inclusive and iterative in nature and aims to test and validate the best potential ideas through experimentation. The NAMC sees that this can be done by NATO or as a group venture among countries (NAMC, 2009: §6).

CD&E thus serves to develop new information and/ or solutions that enable capability. Capability is defined as ‘[t]he ability to execute a specified course of action or achieve a certain effect. Within the transformational arena, the definition includes one or more elements of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability (DOTMLPFI) spectrum’ (NAMC, 2009: Annex B).

Capability development covers strategic analysis, identification of capability requirements, solution identification and solution implementation (De Nijs, 2010: 3). Capability requirements can be identified from assessments of potential future requirements such as Long Term Requirement Studies (LTRS), Crisis Response Operations Urgent Requirements (CUR) and Lessons Learned (LL), informed by the Multiple Futures Project (MFP). The Capability Requirements Review (CRR), as a step of the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), also identifies Minimum Capability Requirements (MCR) and the shortfalls to which CD&E may offer solutions. The Lessons Learned process has recently gained in influence as incidents from operations or exercises—coupled with strategic and operational analysis—identify gaps (NAMC, 2009: §7–9; cf. De Nijs, 2010: 3; cf. NATOACT, 2009b: D-3-3, §1). The sources of capability requirements are illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Sources of capability requirements (NAMC, 2009: Annex A)

CD&E is seen to be especially important when innovative answers to capability gaps are required, particularly when ‘new approaches to operations, new procedures, new organizational structures and the application of new technologies’ are identified and implemented. This is the primary sphere for CD&E (NAMC, 2009: §8). Figure 3 depicts CD&E’s spheres of influence in the capability development process (NATOACT, 2009g: 3).

CD&E Influence	Capability Development Stage
	1: Analysis of strategic environment
Secondary	2: Identify capability needs
	3: Develop capability requirements
Primary	4: Conduct gap analysis and fulfilment
	5: Identify and select solutions
	6: Conduct implementation

Table 1: CD&E input into capability development (NATOACT, 2009g: 3)

CD&E primarily develops conceptual solutions for capability shortfalls that have already been identified by other processes. However, CD&E can also contribute to capability development through the introduction of previously unknown capabilities. In other words, CD&E might discover a novel capability on its own, or it might examine whether a totally new technology or technique is suitable for a military capability (NAMC, 2009: §10; De Nijs, 2010: 3). There is some debate on which of these two functions of CD&E should be primary (cf. Wah *et al.*, 2006). During my involvement, some participants felt that current problems should dominate in MNE, while others felt that the focus of internationally conducted CD&E should be on future problems—and public ones at that. It was seen that there were different mechanisms, quicker ones, to deal with classified problems (Interlocutor 3).

A set of six principles further illustrates the characteristics of CD&E as a facilitator of capability development and, eventually, transformation (NAMC, 2009: §19):

- First, *innovation*: CD&E is seen as an established, ‘innovative and flexible’ methodology for capability development within the coalition.
- Second, *resource efficiency*: CD&E is seen to ‘ensure the greatest benefit for a given investment’ in an environment characterized by rapid change and limited resources.
- Third, optimally, for maximum influence, CD&E provides *linkages* to other processes, primarily to other capability development processes.
- Fourth, the CD&E process should be fully *transparent* and involve multiple stakeholders from within NATO, EU and contact countries.
- Fifth, *coordination and integration*: CD&E is a cooperative approach that is seen to contribute to the cohesion of the Alliance.
- Sixth, *flexibility and balance*: CD&E should be able to react quickly to CURs, without abandoning long-term challenges.

The NAMC oversees NATO’s CD&E and can task NATO ACT to initiate it at any time. The NAMC assesses the military validity of CD&E projects and activities, as part of the overall NATO ACT programme in the Headquarters of Allied Command

Transformation's (HQSACT's) Comprehensive Campaign Plan (CCPlan). At the Strategic Command (SC) level, HQSACT⁸⁸ has the lead in organizing and managing NATO's CD&E programme and process. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) supports this activity when appropriate (cf. NATOACT, 2009b: D-3-6, §4). In addition, HQSACT provides a clearing house function designed to identify Alliance high-value CD&E requirements. This function also harmonizes, aligns and coordinates NATO CD&E requirements and activities with individual nations' projects. Moreover, the aim of the function is to 'promote multi-national participation in national and NATO CD&E events' in order to improve the 'synergy of Alliance efforts, maximize the exchange of best practices, and ensure the principles of resource efficiency across NATO and its member nations'. More specifically, multinational collaboration on CD&E is seen to 1) create venues/ sites for information exchange; 2) provide access to small nations/ minor crisis management players; 3) facilitate 'ownership' via participation of developed capability; and 4) leverage, create synergy and avoid duplication in capability development efforts (NATOACT, 2005: 24).

Furthermore, the clearing house function assists countries in developing their own CD&E capabilities and processes. The objectives of assistance are 1) increasing situational awareness on NATO and countries' CD&E programmes; 2) sharing of best practices; 3) enhancing interoperability within the Alliance; 4) avoiding duplication of efforts; 5) achieving Alliance focus and synergy through promoting collaboration; and 6) establishing a spirit of 'ownership' in Transformation (NAMC, 2009: §26-28, Annex C; De Nijs, 2010: 4-5).

External, 'other-than-NATO' countries are welcome to be involved in NATO's CD&E activities as well: Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and/ or any specific contact countries can be involved. Internally, the main 'customer' for CD&E products is Allied Command Operations (ACO) and its subordinate commands (NAMC, 2009: §24-30).

Thus, I had learned that to conduct CD&E, and experimental science in general, is to search for a solution, pattern or law. Fair enough, but when we start discussing crisis management activities as having to be harmonized among actors through concepts, and

⁸⁸ For the organization of ACT see NATOACT (§36-45).

that concepts have the ability to change policy, we are discussing a political process, framed in technological and rational logics. The multinational and interagency focus of concept development highlights the *aim, scope and location* of the preferred harmonization. I had started my research process with the hypothesis that when crisis management actors seek agility, mobility, information sharing and harmonization of actions on the field with the doctrine of NEC, they are simultaneously creating rigidity and interdependencies. Now, rationalities of synergies and harmonization were being placed right in my face (Tuusula, 1–3 September 2009).

Francis Bacon was mentioned and discussed during the training as a champion of empiricism and he persisted in other training materials as well. With the notion of rigidifying harmonization in my thoughts, I could not help but think of a segment of Bacon's text, which was not discussed during training, and ponder whether Bacon was indeed correct: After an experimentation, some might have an urge to make all else 'fit'.

'There is also another class of philosophers who, having bestowed much diligent and careful labor on a few experiments, have thence made bold to educe and construct systems, wresting all other facts in a strange fashion to conformity therewith'
(Bacon, 1620: LXII).

Reading back through my field notes, a question I had written in my notebook after the training course now makes me smile: What does participation in MNE *mean*? (Tuusula, 1–3 September 2009).

3.3. Concept Development

‘The current security environment is characterized by high uncertainty, rapid technological changes, and complexity.

Simultaneously, more needs to be done with less. This necessitates novel war fighting concepts’

(Wah *et al.*, 2006).

In this section, I will first provide an overview of the concept development framework as I was trained in it. The reader should bear in mind that my experience and training was dominated by NATO materials. Other, nation-specific materials certainly exist, although, from what materials I have gathered, the overarching goal in these other materials is the same: The goal of concept development is to facilitate transformation. The purpose of this overview is to illustrate the world I had dived into, the context within which we were conducting our work, that is, the logic that organizes the arrays of MNE activities. Moreover, the purpose of this overview is to frame a methodology of knowledge application and creation, which is used in the military context to an ever-growing degree. More specifically, the concept development part of the CD&E methodology is examined.

Second, I will go over episodes I observed and encountered during my participation in developing the MISA-EM concept. As the intent of this study is to define and understand MNE, the purpose of these episodes is to provide insights into MNE—not the MISA-EM concept development as such. MISA-EM will nevertheless emerge from these observations, which provided me insights into the characteristics of MNE specifically, and its relationship with transformative evolutions in crisis management in general.

3.3.1. ‘CD’ is for Concept Development

This segment on concept development methodology is based on training material from the CD&E training course and references identified during the course and during the overall ethnographic journey (official documents, studies, books, articles, etc.).

Previously on page 82), a concept, in the context of MNE, was defined as a ‘solution-oriented transformational idea that addresses a capability shortfall or gap’, where a capability gap refers to a recognized and required capability that does not yet exist. Concept development, in turn, was defined as a ‘process aimed at identifying conceptual solutions to capability’ (NAMC, 2009: §5; cf. NATOACT, 2007: B-3, §3). More specifically, the concept development process is part of a larger process (concept development + experimentation + analysis), the aim of which is to reduce uncertainty concerning the impact of a concept when implemented, and to accumulate evidence (NATOACT, 2009c: 6).

Within the CD&E environment, capability (the gaps of which concept development seeks to address) is viewed as ‘the ability to execute a specified course of action or achieve a certain effect’. It is seen that in order for CD&E’s notion of capability to effectively enable transformation, it should accommodate one or more areas identified in the DOTMLPFI⁸⁹ acronym: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability. Furthermore, a good concept should provide an explanation of what the capability in question is and why it is needed. It should also provide ideas on how to implement the capability and how this capability is linked to other, possibly higher-level capabilities (NATOACT, 2009g: 4).

To add to the plethora of definitions, a concept is often used incorrectly in NATO ACT's point of view. In an attempt to provide clarity, NATO ACT clarifies what a concept is not. To start, a concept, as discussed above, aims to transform and create—its official intent and purpose is not to influence existing policy, nor to constitute minor incremental changes and improvements to the DOTMLPFI components or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Furthermore, it should not be confused with a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) (NATOACT, 2009d: 4–6, 2009g: 4–6, cf., 2007). AAP-6 defines CONOPS as ‘[a] clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish a mission’ (NATONSA, 2010: 2-C-13). The difference is that a CONOPS describes the commander's chosen course of action to achieve a desired end-state—it does not contain a transformational element. Nor is a concept a White Paper, the

⁸⁹ The DOTMLPFI, an acronym for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability, is used to identify areas in which capabilities should be developed or integrated, as, for example, in the JCIDS (CJCS, 2009).

purpose of which is to simply state facts or raise issues, although, as such, a White Paper may eventually lead to concept development (NATOACT, 2009g: 6).

All concepts should contain: First, a description of the future environment and the problem that this environment contains; second, an analysis of problem-influencing issues; and third, a proposal of a solution to this problem within a coherent framework. In other words, concepts can be viewed in terms of ways, ends and means as they are primarily descriptions of how things are done (should the concept be implemented). The capabilities to be employed are the means. They can be basically anything that gets the job done, as, for example, the military forces and their utilization, a weapon system, new doctrine or training. The objective is the end, which can be a strategic objective or a specific task. The methods by which the means are applied to achieve the ends are the ways. The method is the core essence and kernel of a concept (NATOACT, 2009g: 9–10).

For concept development management purposes (to help define scope, effort, content, and relationships and dependencies to other projects), concepts have been divided into different types. NATO makes a point that despite these descriptions, a rigid hierarchy of concepts should not be enforced. Rather, different categorizations of concepts should be seen as complementing each other as a whole. An outcome in any category of concept can run across the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare. The types are (NATOACT, 2009g: 8; De Nijs, 2010: 3):⁹⁰

1. Strategic-Level Concept: Focuses its application on the political and military levels of planning, decision-making, direction and execution of operations. Details of specific operational activities are omitted. For example: different comprehensive approaches, ‘defense against terrorism’ policy. NATO Headquarters conducts the majority of strategic-level concepts as it viewed that the HQ is better positioned to handle the political implications that potential changes in existing strategic concepts might bring up⁹¹ (cf. NAMC, 2009: §12);

⁹⁰ Compare this classification with Schmitt’s classification. Schmitt discusses military, institutional, operating, functional, and future operating concepts (2002). Sweden’s *CD&E Handbook* also lists different classifications and concept types (HKV, 2009).

⁹¹ Interestingly, the purpose of a strategic level concept would be to be something that the NATO ACT training says a concept officially should not be: Its purpose is not to influence existing policy, nor to constitute minor incremental changes and improvements to DOTMLPFI components or SOPs (see above).

and

2. Operational-Level Concept: Develops or improves military capabilities that will be utilized to accomplish strategic objectives in operations. For example, joint urban operations or JISR.⁹² HQSACT usually focuses on the operational level, the concepts of which are further divided into three subtypes (cf. NAMC, 2009: §12, Annex B):
 - a. Capstone Concept: Leads force development via broad operational descriptions and strategic objective requirements, e.g. Asymmetric Warfare;
 - b. Operating Concept: Provides commander-level descriptions of how to perform a military function in order to achieve the desired end state and what capabilities are needed, e.g. Cyber Defence; and
 - c. Functional Concept: Identifies solutions and methodologies to solve explicit or practical capability problems, e.g. Counter Improvised Explosive Device.

Moreover, concepts are seen to have some clearly set characteristics. First, a concept must be *consistent* with NATO's (or a country's) vision of war/ crisis and the military's role in it. If the concept development has an alternative goal to alter this vision, the concept must provide sound reasoning and evidence to support the argumentation for the alteration or modification. Second, the *provenance* (origins) of a concept should be clear; since the concept might be a reaction to a change in policy, doctrine, strategic circumstances, technology or politics, concepts should make clear what shortfall is sought and what are the contextual circumstances under which the concepts are developed. Third, a concept should seek *authority* through sufficient review and endorsement—preferably by positions of authority (in relation to the subject matter of the concept, i.e. there is no one position of authority). Fourth, a clear writing style (e.g. choice of language and terminology, style of argumentation) should be used in order to provide *clarity*. Fifth, the context of a concept should be defined in order to see the relationship between the concept and the *existing doctrine*. Sixth, a concept must be

⁹² Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

argued well and *bear scrutiny*, for which experimentation is the primary method. Seventh, the development of a concept must be done within a *realistic timeline* in order to be able to respond to a need (in capability) in time. Eighth and finally, a concept needs to justify the time and resources that were spent on developing it—in other words, it must have sufficient *merit* once developed (NATOACT, 2009g: 12).

The concrete task of developing a concept, which will contribute to the development of capability, can be started in various ways, as, for example, from the NAMC, an operational commander, or from internal direction in accordance with SACT's⁹³ strategic goals and objectives. Bearing in mind that concepts contribute to capability development in the DOTMLPFI spectrum, initiation points can also include sources such as the Defense Requirements Review (DRR), the Prioritized List of Capability Shortfalls (PLOCs), SACT's Five Year Plan, capability gap studies, the LL process, ideas emerging from experimentations, and emerging technologies that impact traditional operation methods (NATOACT, 2009c: 12, 2009g: 13; NAMC, 2009: §17).

In addition to capability requirements, the concept development process can be initiated via 'questions and ideas', especially via disruptive innovations that are revolutionary in nature, require agile, perceptive and proactive action, change the nature of the enterprise, and can even propose new values. Disruptive innovations are in contrast to sustaining innovations, which fine-tune current methodologies, leave organizations intact, and do not change core capabilities (NATOACT, 2009c: 10, 2009g: 18; Alberts and Hayes, 2005: 39–62).

After initiation, the relevance of a concept should be determined in order to optimize resources, avoid duplication of work and ensure correct task assignment. The relevance should be based on established criteria, that is, in relation to: first, the NATO Strategic Vision; second, the NATO Military Authority's (NMA) Strategic Priorities and Objectives (SPOs); third, the concept's potential for enabling transformation; fourth, coherence with existing doctrine; and fifth, other concept development processes that are taking place (NATOACT, 2009c: 10–14).

NATO ACT also lists the requirements for the concept developer and the essential elements of the concept development team. These requirements articulate innovativeness

⁹³ SACT: Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

and transformational motives. For example, a good concept developer must have ‘an open mind’ and must ‘refuse to accept accepted wisdom’. The team should be multidisciplinary in nature, comprising of academics and military specialty personnel, for example, in addition to involving people outside of the organization. Indeed, sources of conceptual thinking include academia (military, civilian); industry; government; advocacy groups (e.g. Amnesty, Greenpeace); SMEs; professionals (e.g. medical, legal); representatives of the arts; and representatives of media. Moreover, an important role in the concept development team is that of the ‘Concept Champion’, who owns the final product. However, although there is one champion, a whole network is required to champion the idea in order to successfully implement the concept (NATOACT, 2009c: 7, 2009g: 14–17). The collaboration of multiple actors is not without its issues, however. For example, from the German point of view, due to historical and legal reasons, the close collaboration between the defence industry and the military is highly problematic (Theile, 2005).

3.3.2. Cartagena Workshop 3

In October 2009, the MISA-EM team met again, this time in Cartagena, where the headquarters of the Maritime Action Force (ALMART HQ) hosted the third workshop of MISA-EM from 5 to 9 October. The primary purpose of this workshop was to outline the design of the first upcoming experiment in which the MISA-EM concept would be examined and scrutinized.

3.3.2.1. WS3 LOE1: Marketing, Collaboration and Validation

The type of experiment under preparation was to be a Limited Objective Experiment (LOE), which is a typical forum for experimentation (cf. NATOACT, 2009h: 11) and popular within the MNE context. This first LOE (LOE1) would be a discovery⁹⁴ experiment, where maritime SMEs from ‘relevant’ national and international maritime organizations would be invited to take part in MISA-EM. In short, therefore, the expected outcome of LOE1 was to further develop the maritime interagency situational awareness concept (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

⁹⁴ In contrast to hypothesis testing and validation experiments, see ‘Principles of Design’ (on page 126).

More specifically, the logics of this upcoming experiment were threefold. First, the experiment would serve as a *marketing event* where MISA-EM was to be introduced to the agencies and SMEs taking part in the experiment. In addition to gaining attention from national, NATO, EU and international agencies, the experiment would also serve to market the upcoming LOE2 (in Spring 2010), which was planned to have a more technical and procedural focus, and the upcoming MISA-EM capability demonstration (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

Second, the experiment's goal was to gain important *feedback* from the SMEs, who were given the opportunity to review the MISA-EM concept. It was hoped that the SMEs would be able to produce insights and previously unaccounted-for knowledge about the concept. Thus, the purpose was to further develop the MISA-EM concept together with representatives from the international interagency community. The purpose was also to have the SMEs conduct a feasibility study and 'reality-check' on the MISA-EM concept. This 'reality-check' would also serve to refine LOE2 (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

Third, the LOE would, if not totally *validate* the concept, at least provide the MISA-EM concept more legitimacy and credibility. In other words, if the mainly civilian group of SMEs, after analysing MISA-EM's conceptual ideas, were convinced about the concept and its areas of focus, then the concept would have more weight for a civilian maritime agency reader and not just be a product of multinational military cooperation. The buy-in of the most relevant MISA-EM customers would be important later, when the finalized concept would hopefully be transitioned into the 'real world' via implementations in various organizations (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

3.3.2.2. WS3 Crossover: MISA-EM as Node and Shaper

As in the second MISA-EM workshop in Madrid (i.e. the first workshop I attended), the word, 'transition', started to saturate my consciousness. Suddenly, it seemed, everything was going to be transitioned somewhere. The discussions on transitions only started to make sense after realizing that 'to transition' actually meant two totally different things: first, in relation to the MISA-EM concept as a product of MNE6, and second, in relation to an implemented maritime interagency situational awareness solution, which would be

implemented as proposed in the MISA-EM concept, in an actual crisis management operation (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

The first notion specifically refers to the transitioning of the concept from MNE to different national and organizational capability development and implementation processes. It thus occurred to me that MNE, and we in MISA-EM especially, were having an impact on crisis management capability creation on an international scale. Furthermore, it seemed that when successful, MNE would potentially have to be actually utilizing political influence as its concepts spread to national and international organizations and bureaucracies—first as ideas, encapsulated in concepts, and, later, through material implementations. However, in the maritime domain, MISA-EM certainly was not the only process influencing understandings of maritime situational awareness and maritime interagency situational awareness (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

As with the USJFCOM’s IASSA and NATO’s MSA projects (discussed in WS2 (on page 74)), I learned that MISA-EM influenced and/ or was influenced by various other maritime projects. Acronyms such as MARSUR,⁹⁵ SUCBAS,⁹⁶ EUROSUR,⁹⁷ MARSUNO,⁹⁸ MARISS⁹⁹ and SafeSeaNet¹⁰⁰ were all over the place. Moreover, in addition to influencing national maritime capability processes and understandings, the maritime lessons learned, as framed in the MISA-EM concept, also affected EU-level maritime governance policy. More specifically, it was rumoured that the MISA-EM concept would directly influence proposals for an EU-wide integrated maritime common operational picture (COP) in the near future (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

The second notion of transitioning the implemented MISA-EM recommended capability is captured in the concept paper itself: ‘An enduring [maritime interagency situational awareness] solution based on local and regional capacity building and regional agreements will facilitate *the transition from military to civilian to local* led maritime

⁹⁵MARSUR, EU Maritime Surveillance (cf. EDA, 2011b).

⁹⁶SUCBAS, Sea Surveillance Baltic Sea, a pilot of MARSUR (cf. SUCBAS, 2011).

⁹⁷EUROSUR, European External Border Surveillance System (cf. EUROSUR, 2008).

⁹⁸MARSUNO, Maritime Surveillance North, a pilot of EUROSUR (cf. MARSUNO, 2011).

⁹⁹MARISS, Maritime Security Services (cf. MARISS, 2011).

¹⁰⁰SafeSeaNet, a vessel traffic monitoring and information system (cf. EMSA, 2011).

security activities’ [emphasis mine] (USJFCOM, 2010b: vi) (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

Following conversations and statements supporting this idea of transitioning MISA-EM-influenced capability immediately struck me as the diffusion of an action-constituting logic with which the boundaries of rational calculation and action are determined. Was this not a situation where the coalition, the West, was directly involved in the construction of a maritime governance apparatus within another state?¹⁰¹ In other words, this was constructing a favourable (familiar and interoperable) maritime governance model and facilitating its crossover from top to bottom and outside-in. Was this not shaping a societal structure or, in Cohen-speak, ‘shaping the international security environment’ (Cohen, 1997: Section 3) and thus a ‘shaping operation’ *par excellence* where favourable conditions (for self) are created (Shalikashvili, 1997: 1)? Well, it was not, I learned, when inquiring about it from my fellow participants. ‘Shaping operation’ is terminology from the past—today, this, and similar actions, are called ‘theater security cooperation plans’ (cf. Hager, 2004) (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

These two notions of transitions, I realized, framed two recurring themes of discussion. The first discussion theme was focused on how MNE and, currently (during the workshop), MISA-EM have a role to play in national capability development, especially when facilitating technical interoperability and creating and managing external (human) relations. In other words, MNE is seen to have relevant utility in facilitating the diffusion of crisis management knowledge among crisis management actors, especially as it is seen to provide an abundance of opportunities for national crisis management calibrations.

The second discussion type focused on how the products of MNE are utilized to influence crisis management policies. It was seen that MNE5’s products (e.g. ‘comprehensive approach’) were used as the basis for initiatives for refining the EU’s security strategies, in particular its Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO). Moreover, the comprehensive approach, developed during MNE5, was seen to have influenced the content and promoted the creation of national crisis management doctrines (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

¹⁰¹ Granted, a state might not always exist.

3.3.2.3. WS3 Collaboration: Social Networks and ATALANTA

It was only natural that the EU's Naval Force in Somalia, Operation ATALANTA,¹⁰² would find its way into the conversation, given the goals and aims of the MISA-EM concept—despite the fact that some are of the opinion that CD&E should be used to examine totally new capabilities, that is to say that it should not be influenced by current reality (see 'CD&E Methodology Training' (on page 80)). In short, the discussions revolved around the EU as an actor and identified issues and challenges with the operation. First, the operation was seen to make the EU a more relevant actor in the international sphere, although it was not clear whether 'more relevant' was still good enough to be 'relevant' (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

It was seen that the EU had been rather ineffective in its crisis management previously. The reason for this was said to be the fact that the EU was forced to manage a multitude of different international actors and agendas. Oddly, the reasons for failure, or irrelevance even, were not discussed to be capability issues, although the academia often sees it as such, as we have argued elsewhere (Freire *et al.*, 2010: 36–38). Yet, one could arguably see challenges in internal management also as a capability issue (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

This time, however, with ATALANTA, experience in managing differences and internal diversity was seen as an asset and strength for the EU. Since the coasts of Somalia were filled with different actors, the management of this seemingly chaotic diversity had developed into a 'core competence' for the EU. As such, ATALANTA's networked approach was seen to demonstrate the success of the EU's comprehensive approach by being open to all actors and no actor being forced to participate in one defined way. Moreover, any (relevant) actor could join the collaboration, including people from Russia and China. The collaboration with China especially was seen as exciting (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

ATALANTA was seen as the most successful EU operation to date (no major catastrophes), and the EU was seen to have the best military (theoretical) capability in the area (most ships) at the time of the workshop. Due to the achieved successes and

¹⁰² (cf. EUNAVFOR, 2011).

openness, it was said that the EU had the military and mental leadership in a huge area of responsibility (AOR), which was (is) very difficult to monitor due to the huge number of ships in this vast geographical area. An example that was discussed: Of more than 3,000 ships, the identities of only around 150 were known. Perhaps, surprisingly, there was even some sympathy for the pirates: Many, including the EU's, fishing ships fish excessively in the area and there had been rumours of toxic waste dumping there¹⁰³ (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

What proved to be especially interesting to me was how ATALANTA utilized the Internet's social collaboration tools for managing the diverse traffic around the coast of Somalia. An ATALANTA collaboration tool (Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa)¹⁰⁴ had been set up for civilian actors, the utilizers of which exceeded 150 nations, including Somalia. Militaries were additionally able to utilize the real-time information platform between the military actors in the area—the 'Mercury'¹⁰⁵ network, which had more than 30 operational actors as users (i.e. including 'other than ATALANTA' users). These utilizations of Internet tools were interesting in themselves as I began my journey as an investigator of NEC. Accordingly, I saw them as increasing horizontal flows of information and facilitating interdependency in the name of efficiency and agility. Interestingly, ATALANTA's most important collaboration partners were not in the area; they were in the headquarters of shipping, insurance and fishing industries and the situation rooms of the military operation—all of which were physically placed in other geographies (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

However, technical processes were not the only thing being harmonized.¹⁰⁶ The discussions also brought up the notions of harmonizing mindsets, creating new crisis management cognitions or mental frames of reference, in the name of 'perceptual connectivity' (Maltz, 2007: 3). Common frames of reference that enable perceptual connectivity were needed in order to understand the information others communicated. Thus, the increase of social collaborations facilitated the harmonization of maritime crisis

¹⁰³ As an example, a recent report by ALSHAHID (2011).

¹⁰⁴ (cf. MSCHOA, 2011).

¹⁰⁵ For example, Tanzania has joined the Mercury network (EUNAVFOR, 2010).

¹⁰⁶ The increase of harmonization was an established goal of the MNE-process; see Annex F (on page 237) for the history of MNE.

management frames of reference; they facilitated the way the maritime situation in the Horn of Africa was understood and interpreted (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

3.3.2.4. WS3 Struggle: MISA-EM and Identities

Intense negotiations took place not only with regard to terminologies, but also the content of the concept. More specifically, disagreement reigned over what actually was to be the content of experimentation or, rather, the focus of experimentation. As I followed the debates, I got the feeling that it was not always clear to everyone what ‘experimentation’ actually was. This observation reinforced my understanding that if I was not totally clear on CD&E methodology, neither were some of the more official participants (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

More specifically, an observable struggle was that one group wanted the experiment to focus on the interagency process of the concept, whereas another group wanted to focus on the analysis and interpretations of collaborated information. The debates, I felt, were reflections of events beyond MISA-EM development; the official policies of the agencies guided the content of the debate. In other words, if your agency focused on interagency, interagency was what you promoted. This not only reflected the presented identity of the speaker, but also of the organization. This threw up obvious opportunities for marketing or for framing identity in a preferred way. In other words, a person or organization could use MNE for portraying ‘expertise’ in processes or technologies. This framing could later be utilized in other forums (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009).

Finland, for example, often markets itself and wants to be seen as exceptionally capable in the field of information technologies. MNE can be utilized to frame oneself within a politically preferred subjectivity—all this within a framework of major international crisis management actors (Cartagena, 5–9 October 2009). In discussions with the MNE participants, this possibility of building and marketing identity was recognized as an especially beneficial aspect of MNE. For example, when I raised this point, the other participants shared stories of how the smaller, non-aligned participants in MNE especially were able to leverage their ‘Multinational Experimentation-identity’ in their transatlantic relations (Interlocutors 4; 16; 11).

3.3.3. Madrid Workshop 4

The fourth MISA-EM workshop was hosted by the Spanish Navy at the Naval War College, Madrid, Spain, from 24 to 25 November 2009. The main reason for choosing these specific dates for the workshop was the interagency kick-off meeting (officially known as the Introductory Interagency Conference), which was held on 26 November at the same premises. While the kick-off was actively in people's minds—this was after all the 'first contact' with the interagencies that were an integral part of the concept—the workshop's specific purpose was to discuss the experiment design documents (EDSs), data collection methodologies and analysis plans of the coming LOEs, using which the MISA-EM concept would be experimented with in LOEs 1 and 2. More specifically, this meant discussions on the selection and configuration of the experiment scenarios, SOPs, and the collaborative tool, that is, configuring the experiment setup and architecture (physical and system) (Madrid, 24–25 November 2009).

3.3.3.1. WS4 MNE Dialogues: A Site of Quasi-Diplomacy

Along with conversations about the interagency kick-off and MISA-EM LOEs, I also learned that MNE has 'corridor-utility' in establishing and maintaining human relationships and promoting technologies outside of the more official interaction frameworks of international politics. For example, beyond the official purpose of MNE6, a great benefit and advantage of MNE6 (of which MISA-EM naturally was a part) was its function as a site of human relationship management. Opinions were voiced that even in a case where the official products of MNE would not prove to be tremendously beneficial, it was important to participate nonetheless just in order to be able to participate in a dialogue among colleagues, especially in situations where relationships had been established in previous MNE cycles (Interlocutors 4; 2; 5; 16). These established relationships could be taken advantage of either immediately or at a later stage to ease 'work-life'¹⁰⁷ or to gain advantageous information, for example. MNE thus

¹⁰⁷ Being assigned to participate in MNE functions was a state of exception for the officials, often burdening them with more additional work.

was seen to provide the possibility for an increase in horizontal interactions among organizational—not national—peers (Madrid, 24–25 November 2009).

In addition to managing human relationships, MNE was seen to provide the possibility for managing organizational relationships—dialogues between the EU and NATO, and NATO and non-NATO organizations, for example. Organizational relationship management followed similar logics to the human side (those conducting it would engage in information dialogue, building networks), but with a twist of *realpolitik*: MNE as a site of dialogue was also utilized to influence the other and examine the other's window of capability (note: capability, which was made public). Thus, since it was used to display capability, MNE was also a capability marketing forum of sorts. This marketing element should not be downplayed. As has occurred in the past, if a capability that is displayed or marketed in MNE is seen to be effective and beneficial to a party (national or organizational) that does not have this capability, the party can choose to adopt the capability. For example, I learned that technologies from MNE5 have directly influenced, and been utilized within, the MARSUR framework (Madrid, 24–25 November 2009).

This, it can be argued, can have huge implications. What this means in effect is that through MNE, a national capability can be spread intentionally into international frameworks. In its most radical form, this diffusion can take place from a non-NATO country to NATO, in which case a non-NATO country would have influenced how NATO operates. How easily, I dare ask, could this be achieved through traditional diplomacy? Moreover, if this non-NATO country's military doctrine was to be technically and procedurally interoperable with NATO—this would guarantee interoperability. Thus, MNE was seen to provide an agile possibility of influencing the other's actual conduct through technological capability frameworks. I could not help but wonder what the conceptual (traditionally understood) influence was—were understandings and crisis management interpretation frameworks spread intentionally? Did MNE, similar to ATALANTA's collaboration framework, facilitate the harmonizing of our mental frames of reference with regard to its study issues? This is especially valid when we remember how MNE5's comprehensive approach was utilized (Madrid, 24–25 November 2009).

In Workshop 3, I had become aware of how MISA-EM functioned as a node and shaper. In Workshop 4, I slowly learned more about this site of ‘quasi-diplomacy’ (Interlocutor 4) in international politics.

3.3.3.2. *WS4 Comprehensiveness vs. Comprehensive Mess: Conditionality*

The interagency element of MISA-EM resembles an aspect of the comprehensive approach, where ‘friendly’ crisis management actors join in an information sharing network. Ideally, local and regional actors are also connected in this network. However, in MISA-EM, similarly to ATALANTA’s collaboration network, the locals seem to have been strangely forgotten. They did appear in conversation, yet only when discussing the transitional details of the concept, that is, when the control and governance of the established maritime capability were transitioned eventually to the local environment.

Thus, to be ‘comprehensive’ in MISA-EM’s (in this workshop, WS4) case was actually to be ‘useful’; membership in and access to the collaboration network were conditional on what an actor could bring to the coalition effort. Moreover, access was conditional on the origins of the actors, who ideally originated from the coalition (typically Western) framework.¹⁰⁸ This conditionality was not an easy nut to crack and posed a number of questions. One challenge, a notion that I promoted and later got recognition for (Interlocutor 10), was that the inclusion of certain actors who are seen as beneficial might actually close some doors for the coalition: For example, if enmities exist between an included actor and another, such an actor has the potential to ‘brand’ all of the coalition’s actions as hostile for the other actor (Madrid, 24–25 November 2009).

Conditionality was not the only disruption of an ideal comprehensive approach under discussion. For example, two ‘acceptable’ agencies might have interest in joining the comprehensive collaboration network, but the membership of one might hinder the participation of the other. This might be due to the fact that the basic premise of a collaboration network is to share information. It is argued that this will lead to efficiency, agility and safety, among other things. However, in the maritime environment, this premise might pose a serious problem. The most dramatic example would be of

¹⁰⁸ The theme of conditionality emerged when discussing ATALANTA, which was said to provide assistance to *selected* humanitarian organizations, i.e. not all humanitarian organizations.

fishermen who do not want other fishermen to know the actual physical location of where they fish—the physical location being one of the most important pieces of information to be shared. Thus, it was discussed that the MISA-EM concept needs a ‘lure’ with which to ‘sell’ and motivate participation in a situation that had a serious potential to promote the conditionality of membership and access, although this time, the conditionality was set from the interagency environment to the coalition (Madrid, 24–25 November 2009).

An end result where only some of the relevant and seemingly contributing actors would join in would not be sufficient to achieve its goal. A solution that would not be able to include the relevant actors would not be able to provide more clarity (more awareness) in the chaotic mess that reigned in the areas where the MISA-EM concept would be utilized (Madrid, 24–25 November 2009).

This would also provide a challenge for the policy makers responsible for marketing the logic and legitimacy of participation in crisis management operations—the more the humanitarian organizations involved, the better, as then an operation could be labelled as humanitarian and it was seen that ‘humanitarian operations raise the level of respect militaries enjoy at home’ (Interlocutor 6). Thus, an important aspect of the interagency kick-off for LOE1 was to facilitate interagency stakeholder buy-in for the concept. In other words, the concept should be successfully marketed among different stakeholders in order to hopefully ensure their future participation in the collaboration network, the establishment of which was (is) a core notion of the concept (Madrid, 24–25 November 2009).

3.3.4. Madrid Introductory Interagency Conference



Picture 1: IAKO Flyer front pages

As stated, the interagency kick-off (IAKO) meeting was held in conjunction with Workshop 4 at the Naval War College in Madrid on 26 November 2009. The primary purpose of this meeting was to introduce the MISA-EM concept to an interagency forum. Furthermore, as discussed, the purpose was to get initial feedback from the interagencies, feedback that would be used to orientate the MISA-EM concept development efforts further. Invitations to attend the conference were sent to national agencies and organizations of the participating countries as well as European agencies and bodies and relevant international organizations. As a side note, my organizational affiliation was listed as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when it should have been the FIIA. Not that it mattered, but it was a further indication of my seemingly obscure status, first recognized during the first workshop I attended in Madrid (p.74) (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

3.3.4.1. IAKO Framing of MISA-EM: Promoting MISA-EM

In order to be able to actually work together during the conference at least, the interagencies had to be ‘educated’ about MNE, CD&E and the MISA-EM concept. One could identify a process of harmonizing mindsets, creating new crisis management

‘Please avoid planning for the past’
(Interlocutor 9).

*‘[This is] not an issue of sharing information,
[it is] more about finding the data that is
missing’*
(Comment from the crowd).

interpretations or common mental frames of reference and, thus, ‘perceptual connectivity’ (Maltz, 2007: 3) with this pedagogical goal (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

Concept Development and Experimentation

Understandably, the interagencies were mostly totally unaware of MNE, CD&E methodology and, specifically, the MISA-EM concept. To solve the issue of MNE and CD&E, an elementary understanding of these key elements was attempted to be achieved with a read-ahead package, which briefly introduced these elements. Furthermore, the conference opened with a brief overview of the situation and task that lay ahead. The need for agile and dynamic adaptation to evolving security and crisis management conditions was stressed throughout. The promoted way to adapt was agile and dynamic transformation of capability, which would ensure that future security problems could be tackled efficiently. Only through transformation could organizations remain ‘relevant, effective and efficient’. Concept development was identified as a method to propose transformative solutions, and experimentation was identified as a method to evaluate the appropriateness of the innovative solutions that concept development provided (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

MISA-EM

The need for evolution was a concern for not just the military actors—it had to be achieved by all the actors participating in a crisis management project. In the MISA-EM case, these especially included those actors who had a stake in how the governance of the seas was conducted. This governance challenge was introduced and framed as a central issue of current international politics, especially so in ‘unprepared waters’. A characteristic of these ‘waters’ was that there was no local ability to preserve the rule of law at sea. This was the challenge on which the conference focussed. When maritime forces have to operate in ‘unprepared waters’, there is a need for maritime situational awareness, which ‘unprepared waters’ are not able to provide. This awareness was needed by all: the operational commander (military or civilian) and other relevant stakeholders such as international organizations, local authorities and the wider maritime community (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

It was specifically stressed that the commander of an operation could be either military or civilian. The reason behind this strong articulation was that it was feared that the MISA-EM concept would be viewed by the civilian interagencies as an attempt by the military actors to gain access to the interagencies' information. By allowing for the possibility that the command of an operation could most certainly come from a civilian organization, it was hoped that the civilian organizations would be more interested in the concept and see it as beneficial for them as well—not just serving the needs and interests of the military actors (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

Personally, I pondered whether anybody paid much attention to how 'achieving awareness' was tied to 'maintaining rule of law' and how a local country was expected to maintain 'rule of law' and promote 'governance' in a very traditional domain of the global commons. Establishing governance with the help of interagency sounded very much like a *regional regime* building project: transforming 'unprepared waters' into 'prepared waters', where the coalition had ensured access and room and possibilities for manoeuvre. Instead of raising these questions, however, I decided to keep my thoughts scribbled on my notepad. I might have raised my hand, but my mental process was interrupted by the fantastic quote in the opening remarks of the conference: 'Please avoid planning for the past' (Interlocutor 9). Looking around, I felt others too were delighted by it as it splendidly underlined a statement that stressed the need for innovativeness and had an articulated accent on the future (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

3.3.4.2. IAKO Building Interagency: First Blood

The problem was especially seen to be the lack of 'comprehensive' capability for gathering, analysing and diffusing maritime information, which would be used as a basis for an 'effective understanding' of the maritime picture. It was seen that this understanding would enable more effective operational decisions. Moreover, a lack of an integrated mechanism (including organizations, agreements, procedures and tools) for information sharing hinders the diffusion of awareness in the crisis environment. To solve these problems, it was proposed that a federated network should be set up, including interagencies and existing multinational maritime networks, supported by 'local, deployed and opportunity assets'. Joined together, this multitude of information

sources would allow the flow and combination of multifarious pieces of information, the analysis of which would achieve effective maritime understanding. Once this federation was set up, the idea was that it would be transitioned eventually to local maritime security service providers (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

Thus, areas of improvement were seen to exist in the categories of interagency cooperation and information sharing (Madrid, 26 November 2009). The highlights of the discussions held in relation to these themes will be presented next.

Discussion Highlights

In 'home waters', it is rather easy to achieve maritime situational awareness because cooperation mechanisms and regulatory frameworks already exist (in addition to technological capabilities such as sensors). In distant and 'unprepared' waters, these do not exist and this facilitates the requirement of a different level of interagency, which had to, first, identify the relevant¹⁰⁹ stakeholders and, second, establish coordination between them.

Moreover, it was claimed that a number of features needed to be understood in order to achieve an appropriate level of maritime situational awareness, including, first, the physical environment (geographic features, oceanography, hydrographs, climate and weather, coastal facilities); second, the political, social, economic and cultural relations among the various actors; and third, the information assets (in a wide sense) available. Trust and legal issues surfaced as they were seen to hinder sharing information relating to these features (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

These initial understandings brought about the need for comprehensiveness in the maritime domain. Understandably then, comprehensiveness dominated the discussions, especially due to the perceived fact that no organization was able to achieve relevant awareness alone. In addition, the inclusion of the private sector in the comprehensive network, fishermen specifically, was seen as an important, if not vital, characteristic. Interestingly, the method to achieving an increase in horizontal information flows

¹⁰⁹ Relevant here meant those 'with global reach' and 'those local and regional actors that may have the ability to support the operation'.

(moving away from clear command structures and rigid relationships was the goal)¹¹⁰ was still a vertical, governments-led, top-down process. The goal was horizontality and fluidity, but, at the same time, the implementation methodology felt rather rigid when horizontality was planned and imagined to be implemented through a vertical structure (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

Nevertheless, the discussions recognized that processes and structures that promote maritime interagency must be put in place. Operation ATALANTA was recognized as notably successful in utilizing ‘comprehensiveness’—interagency and collaboration. However, this was only a small step in the right direction since no formal understanding on the need and the way to cooperate in the interagency world had been agreed upon (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

This lack of formality was seen to be a problem especially for the EU, which was seen to focus on and promote a civil-military approach to crisis management scenarios¹¹¹ and, as a consequence, the militaries should be aware that operations have an increased probability of being civilian-led in the future. This, however, places a burden on the civilian organizations. As the military world was struck with a need for agile transformation, now the civilian organizations must face the fact that they, too, must engage in a process of rapid transformations with a focus on interagency, if they are to be responsible for operational leaderships. Moreover, civil-military cooperation (my old forte) was not a sufficient goal; civil-civil cooperation must be radically enhanced as well (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

However, this notion brings more challenges to the surface. It can be argued that the first, most apparent problem (although not as much discussed) was the different levels of interagency implementations in different countries. The Finns are very used to sharing information between agencies, yet in some countries, this practice is legally restricted—you are bound by law to not share information. The discussion moreover focused on organizational interest and economic interest especially, as it was seen to constitute the foundation for current cooperation. It was identified that other understandings and

¹¹⁰ A goal that was very hard for an ‘old-school’ military official to accept, I might add.

¹¹¹ It was seen that the military establishment was no longer connected, at least in Europe, with interstate wars exclusively, but also with providing security and expanding stability.

interpretations of the nature of primary interest were needed (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

The lack of trust was seen to be hindering the evolution of ‘the framework of trust’ and there were seen to be misperceptions and prejudices among all the actors. Therefore, measures to build confidence needed to be taken immediately in the MISA-EM concept on a technical level. For example, technology could be used to make sure that the shared information was used only for the intended purposes. All in all, cooperation in the maritime environment, as with the comprehensive approach, requires breaking mindset barriers in addition to breaking geographical and functional barriers. For the militaries, the lack of clear command structures and civil leadership were the first barriers in line to be broken. For the civilians, the understanding that there was a benefit in exchanging information horizontally across different maritime sectors was recognized as a primary barrier (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

On top of all this were the legal challenges. In addition to data ownership challenges, proper data protection and data confidentiality protocols must be implemented in order to prevent information compromise or misuse. Legal issues were seen as especially difficult in situations where cooperation demanded sharing information between the EU and non-EU (my interpretation was that in this context and discussion, the US was mentally understood to be a part of the EU) countries, especially when operating beyond the EU’s waters of interest. My interpretation was that MISA-EM pushed for an information sharing role (or subjectivity) for the interagencies, but the interagencies were sceptical and used legal issues as a primary excuse to not agree immediately. Interestingly, while discussing legal issues, it was pointed out that all maritime actors should remember that the adversaries (criminals, pirates and terrorists) certainly do not adhere to legal frameworks, but quite the opposite. It was seen that the purpose of law should be a tool to help in the fight, not a hindrance as it often was now (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

Whether it was legalities or trust issues, it was seen that there was ‘a lack of awareness’ of the benefits of sharing information among most of the relevant stakeholders. Thus, rather amusingly, awareness must be spread at home in order to achieve awareness abroad later. The key awareness to be spread was of course that

information exchange is an enabler of maritime safety and maritime security (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

The discussion got really interesting at this point. As shown, the lack of harmonization between legal frameworks was seen as a problem for the implementation of a comprehensive maritime approach. Thus, what could be done was to promote changes in legislation that would facilitate information exchange. Gaining political will in governments, the EU Commission and among the heads of international maritime agencies was seen as key. It was seen that in order to influence changes in legislation, the interagency community should demonstrate and advertise the need for it. More specifically, a proactive and bottom-up approach was to be utilized where the benefits of sharing information were demonstrated in practice. In addition, a top-down approach where the political level was influenced by getting ‘the message across...that future maritime challenges require a comprehensive interagency approach’ was to be utilized. It can be argued that the concept could work for the benefit of the top-down approach, whereas successful experimentation of the concept would provide what was needed for the bottom-up approach (evidence on the utility and benefit of solutions). The conference could be seen as a step in the direction of influencing political will as it was stated that the interagency crowd should now attempt to engage in both bottom-up and top-down functions¹¹² (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

3.3.4.3. IAKO Crossover: MISA-EM as Node and Shaper

The role of MISA-EM as one node of the maritime community’s effort to gain situational awareness came up in the interagency conference, as it had in the earlier Cartagena workshop (p.97). The mood was that the time to act was now: ‘[T]he maritime community should not wait for a maritime 9/11 to approach maritime security from a comprehensive perspective.’ Moreover, it was felt that this future comprehensive approach should be encapsulated within the wider framework of the European Security Strategy (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

Other processes were also identified to promote the comprehensive, civil-military cooperation approach to the maritime domain, which influenced MISA-EM and which

¹¹² Regarding concept development and experimentation, but also utilizing different possibilities nationally.

MISA-EM could influence, such as the European Defence Agency's (EDA's) MARSUR project and the *Wise Pen Report*, EUROSUR's MARSUNO¹¹³ pilot and the BLUEMASSMED (BM)¹¹⁴ pilot (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

MARSUR is one of the EDA's contributions to the European Security Strategy within the maritime domain; it was developed to support CSDP¹¹⁵ operations and homeland security and it was tasked by the EU defence ministers in late 2005 (EDA, 2011a). The *Wise Pen Report* provides recommendations to the activities on the Integration of Maritime Surveillance, led by the European Commission. During the time of the conference, the *Wise Pen Interim Report* had just come out¹¹⁶ and was the topic of brief conversation, since it, and the final report, promoted a comprehensive, information sharing maritime approach in which all assets were combined in a federated maritime surveillance network, thus sharing many elements already identified in the MISA-EM concept (cf. EDA, 2010: 3–5) (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

MARSUNO and BLUEMASSMED, on the other hand, were pilot projects funded by the EU Commission's Maritime Affairs,¹¹⁷ which sees a clear need to share maritime surveillance information. The pilots were thus the means for that end. MARSUNO was a pilot project on the Integration of Maritime Surveillance in the Northern European Sea Basins. BLUEMASSMED was a pilot project on the Integration of Maritime Surveillance in the Mediterranean Area and its Atlantic approaches. No surprise then that these projects were represented in the MISA-EM interagency conference, as MISA-EM was led by Spain and Finland. BLUEMASSMED was especially interesting because its goals¹¹⁸ included information sharing elements and legal obstacles analysis and proposals. Moreover, the project would provide a proposal for a future European network for maritime surveillance. This was especially interesting since Spain held the EU presidency during the first half of 2010. Corridor gossip indicated that the lessons learned from MISA-EM would find their way into at least a proposal for a future European

¹¹³ (cf. MARSUNO, 2011).

¹¹⁴ (cf. BM, 2011).

¹¹⁵ Common Security And Defence Policy Of The European Union

¹¹⁶ It came out in October 2009 (cf. EDA, 2011c).

¹¹⁷ (cf. EC, 2011)

¹¹⁸ (cf. BM, 2011).

network for maritime surveillance. Unfortunately, examining the truth of such claims is out of the scope of this study (Madrid, 26 November 2009).

3.3.5. *Singapore Workshop 5*



Picture 2: My pass in WS5

The MISA-EM group gathered together for Workshop 5 from 18 to 22 January 2010, this time in Singapore. The concept of the workshop was ‘The Multi-national Inter-agencies Situation Awareness—Extended Maritime (MISA-EM)’¹¹⁹ and it was hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) at the Changi Command and Control Centre.¹²⁰

The venue was, among other things, a research and development facility, which, in my experience, took advantage of very innovative Information Communications Technology (ICT) solutions when exploring possibilities for usability and interoperability. I was very impressed. Moreover, we were privileged to visit additional agencies that had contributed to local maritime situational awareness: the Information Fusion Center (IFC), Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), and the Maritime and Port Authority (MPA) (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

All of these agencies utilized ICT in their information sharing and analysis processes across local and international organizations, authorities and businesses. The region needs as accurate as possible maritime situational pictures because of reports of piracy and intense maritime traffic. Singapore is one of the most utilized ports in the world: In 2008, it hosted some 140,000 visits. In comparison, the whole coast of Finland saw around 38,000 visits in the same year (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

The purpose of the event was to finalize the design of the two LOEs. As another side note on my organizational affiliation, in Singapore, I was listed as representing the FIIA. This would have been an improvement from last time (p.108), had it not been for the fact that at that time, I was affiliated to Tampere University. This confusion was understandable, however, since applications for clearance had to be sent well ahead of

¹¹⁹ Note the interpretation of the MISA-EM acronym.

¹²⁰ (cf. MINDEF, 2011).

time. When I sent in my application, I was indeed affiliated with the FIIA and my moving to work in the university framework was uncertain at the time. Again, this confusion had no significant consequence. Still, I felt that it further strengthened my obscurity in the eyes of non-Finns. I must admit that I was beginning to find the situation amusing (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

3.3.5.1. WS5 LOE+LOE+TCD: Experimentation-Dialogues

Although both the upcoming LOEs were discussed, interest was focussed in particular on the first LOE. This was due to the fact that the previous MISA-EM event, the interagency conference in Madrid, had provided feedback on the LOE's composition and scope. Furthermore, it had served as a marketing event with the aim of getting as many 'relevant' interagency representatives as possible to join the LOE and act as SMEs who would scrutinize the concept further. Moreover, the influence of LOE1 to LOE2 was discussed as was the Technical Capability Demonstration (TCD) event, which would take place after LOE2. These events will be discussed in further detail in the coming chapters (on page 140). Suffice it to say that I was happy to find that I was integrating more and more with the crowd as I was assigned to work in the planning of LOE1 especially.

More specifically, my role was to, first, contribute to the refinement of current maritime challenges when countering the activities of irregular adversaries and other non-compliant actors. Second, I was to assist in refining the presented solutions with which the activities of the irregular adversaries and other non-compliant actors were to be countered. The intent was that the SMEs would provide feedback on the correct identification and feasibility of these challenges and solutions in the coming LOE1 (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

These tasks, I felt, was a widening of my role in the process, which, earlier, had mostly been to provide commentary to presentations. Thus, being assigned felt more like being accepted. Acceptance, in turn, I took to mean being trusted. I was happy to learn that this would not be the only episode that could be understood as an indication of increasing trust among my 'natives' (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

3.3.5.2. WS5 Indications of Trust: Events of Integration

I took three scenes in the Workshop 5 episode to mean that I had been successful in my integration in MNE in general, and MISA-EM specifically, as an implementer of the CD&E methodology, which was utilized with the aim of achieving maritime situational awareness (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

These events were seemingly insignificant inside the process. After all, I was included in the MISA-EM roster and, thus, it could be assumed that I was present for a reason—whatever that reason was. More specifically, two of these events were suggestions to take on a major role in the coming LOEs. In LOE1, I was asked to take a ‘reviewer’ role (discussed further on page 141), whereas in LOE2, I was asked to take a ‘analyst supervisor’ role (discussed further on page 147) (Interlocutors 12; 7).

The third was a tentative inquiry whether I would be interested in giving a presentation on MISA-EM in a major international military focused conference dealing with ‘countering threats from terrorism, violent extremism and insurgency’ (Interlocutor 16). Granted, I was never really under the impression that I actually would be the one to go and give this presentation—not that I would not have. Yet, just to be asked, however tentatively or tongue-in-cheek, was (in my mind) recognition of my (at least theoretical) ability and expertise in that I actually might be capable of going, despite the fact that I did not have the required organizational affiliation or rank (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

Thus, personally, I did not deem these events insignificant at all; in fact, I took these events, these scenes, very seriously. Just the fact that I had been able to convince the national gatekeepers that I could be allowed to join an international military capability building process as part of Finland’s contribution was, for me, an accomplishment—after all, I was ‘only’ a civilian doctoral student from Tampere. At the end of the day, few doctoral students get to join processes of international military capability development. This accomplishment felt even bigger when, once inside, I was able to convince other national and organizational MISA-EM actors to the level that I was perceived as ‘include-able’. I felt that it was one thing to convince my own national organizations, but to convince other nationalities, who were not bound by nationality and familiarity to accept me, was a totally different thing altogether (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

Despite my growing feelings of inclusion, I was told that, nevertheless, I always bore the ‘outsider mark’. My organizational affiliation was always articulated, and no matter if it was not always a hundred per cent correct, it still was always a hundred per cent ‘not military’. Thus, I was told that there should be no academic concern over me ‘going native’ as the natives never totally saw me as a native, nor did I ever feel like a pure native (Interlocutors 2; 7). This was due to the fact that I was always aware—and made aware—that although my commentaries could be interesting, even relevant at times, I was never the one who would actually decide on any matter (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

Nonetheless, my experience was that I was more ‘in’ in Workshop 5 than I had been in Workshop 2 in Madrid (p.74). I was told later that at least two reasons for my increasing inclusion were the facts that, first, I had the relevant skills to contribute (due to my professional past), and, second, I made myself actively available for assignments and tasks. Regarding this last point, it was seen by some that my eager participation in available tasks was utilized to the extent that they felt that I was being taken advantage of. Indeed, I was investing my time and a lot of money to do a lot of work and getting ‘only’ information and further expertise as compensation, when at the same time, others were being paid to work (as one would expect) (Interlocutor 2). I, however, was very happy with my role and actually felt rather privileged (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

I was told that practitioners acknowledged my inherent ‘outsideness’ and thus were aware that, in the end, I did not have to do, well, basically anything if I did not want to, in contrast to the military professionals, who participated as required by their job descriptions. It was thus seen that I went ‘above and beyond the call of duty’ and, as a consequence, gained respect (certainly, some were more of this opinion than others). And even if all the participants did not constantly take my ‘outsideness’ in full cognition, I was told that my ‘easy-going personality’ and ‘competence in my areas of expertise’ brought added value to the concept development and experimentation phases especially (e.g. dialogues on analysis methodologies: qualitative vs. quantitative). These characteristics overrode the potential inconvenient rigidities of organizational affiliation. The most important thing after all was to get the work done, not to think about where this guy was from (Interlocutors 2; 7; 12) (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

The reader should not think that I was always listened to when I made any contribution in the process; as stated, it was always made clear in subtle ways that I was the one who did not decide on anything. I present here an illustrative anecdote: In Workshop 5 in Singapore, we heard presentations on Enterprise Architecture (EA) and its utility. I understood that these presentations were taken to be new inputs (which were, interestingly, intensively opposed by some) to MISA-EM concept development, whereas I was under the impression that I had put EA on the table already in Workshop 2 (p.74) (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

3.3.5.3. WS5 Recapping IAKO: Debriefing the Conference

The previous MISA-EM event, the interagency conference in Madrid (on page 108), was recapped in more detail as well. The most important themes were recognized to be the goal of fluidity in international crisis management, the need for understanding different stakeholders and their different interests, and influencing political decision-making (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

The implementation of clear command structures and rigid chains of command were not seen as feasible solutions to the maritime governance challenge. The preferred approach was seen to be the establishment of cooperation arrangements, which were to facilitate the creation of a comprehensive approach in the maritime environment, which would be used to resolve maritime security issues. Again, it was recognized that membership in the comprehensive network was not automatic; just being in the area was not reason enough to be accepted.¹²¹ Actors who want to join must also provide and contribute to the comprehensive network. However, it was noted that although, at first glance, it might seem that an actor wasn't 'worthy', this actor's relevance might grow in time and provide useful information later on. Thus, a key point to realize was that although benefits to the coalition might not be immediate, they could materialize in the long term or in other distant geographical locations and/ or different operations (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

Currently, the burden of creating situational awareness at sea lies with government authorities. Now, it was seen that international, regional and local

¹²¹ See the discussion on conditionality on page 106.

organizations should be brought in as well—this would ensure an even better situational awareness. I could not help but think, again, that the understanding of ‘rigidity’ was military-centric; rigidity meant chains of command to which other agencies and organizations would not submit. However, it could be argued that the required harmonization of technologies and processes, which would enable more actors to join the information sharing network, was the creation of an even more inclusive structural rigidity (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

The maritime comprehensive approach necessitates information exchange and coordination of activities at sea. Moreover, information exchange requires an understanding of the interests and capabilities of the other actors. This understanding is a prerequisite for building a mutually beneficial process. However, the legal challenges should not be forgotten, for some information was not legally shareable. Thus, political decision-making had to be influenced in order to create an environment in which the desired capability could prevail (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

This could be made possible through two approaches: a top-down one (political) and a bottom-up (practical) one. In the top-down approach, the maritime community argues its case on the political level—that future maritime challenges require a comprehensive interagency approach. Once political buy-in is acquired, technical, legal and other challenges could be resolved. Yet, simultaneously, the bottom-up approach should be utilized where the maritime community demonstrates the benefits of its case in practical terms (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

3.3.5.4. WS5 the MNE Advantage: A Site of Quasi-Diplomacy

The relevance of MNE was further discussed outside of concept development sessions. Dialogue, diffusing and gaining information—other than those related to concept development—were presented as very important aspects of MNE. I learned that some of the participants were of the opinion that the most relevant outcome of the earlier MNE cycle (MNE5) was that it was possible to use MNE as a platform to talk ‘business’ (again, business other than that related to concept development) among various actors, as, for example, NATO with EU, NATO with non-NATO countries, and EU countries with

non-EU countries. MNE was viewed as very efficient in that regard because it gathers many countries and organizations in an informal setting.

The management of personal relations was stressed by some of the participants. One comment I heard in conversation was that the biggest advantage of MNE (note: instead of its main task of producing concepts) was the creation, maintenance and taking advantage of established personal relations. These personal relations could be used to conduct ‘business’ like above, or they could be used later in other settings for personal benefit. Others articulated information sharing, even intelligence: MNE was seen as a unique site to test technology and rather effortlessly gain ‘awareness’ of the capabilities other countries have or what capabilities exist in general. These capabilities, once learned of, could be ‘stolen’ for oneself (Interlocutors 11; 16) (Singapore, 18–22 January 2010).

3.4. Experimentation and Analysis

‘...the Empirical school of philosophy gives birth to dogmas more deformed and monstrous than the Sophistical or Rational school. For it has its foundations not in the light of common notions... ..but in the narrowness and darkness of a few experiments’

(Bacon, 1620: LXIV).

In this section, I will first provide an overview of the experimentation framework as I was trained in it. The reader should bear in mind that my experience and training was dominated by NATO materials. Other, nation-specific materials certainly exist, although, from what I have been able to gather, the basic idea in these other materials is the same: The goal of experimentation is to facilitate transformation. The purpose of this overview is to illustrate the world I had dived into, the context within which we were conducting our work—the logic that organizes the arrays of MNE activities. The purpose of this overview is also to frame a methodology of knowledge application and creation, which is used in the military context to an ever-growing degree. More specifically, the experimentation part of the CD&E methodology is examined.

Second, I will go over episodes that I observed and encountered during my participation in the MISA-EM concept experimentations. As the intent of this study is to define and understand MNE, the purpose of these episodes is to provide insights into the characteristics of MNE—not to provide insights into the MISA-EM concept experimentations as such. MISA-EM will nevertheless emerge from these observations, which provided me insights into the characteristics of MNE and its relationship with transformative evolutions in crisis management and in the comprehensive approach in particular. Additionally, I will trace episodes relating to my ethnographic journey.

3.4.1. 'E' is for Experimentation

This segment on experimentation is based on training material from the CD&E training course and references identified during the course and during the overall ethnographic journey (such as official documents, studies, books and articles).

As has been already discussed (pp.80, 92), experimentation, as a part of CD&E, is an important tool of NATO transformation, where transformation is defined as ‘a continuous and proactive process of developing and integrating innovative concepts, doctrines and capabilities in order to improve the effectiveness and interoperability of NATO and partner forces’. Although experimentation has traditionally been a national responsibility, the need for a higher level of interoperability and standardization (harmonization) necessitates an evolution in experimentation in the Alliance context. The need for evolution originates from challenges faced in recent operations. It is seen that these challenges can only be overcome by ‘continually upgrading and improving standardization within NATO and between NATO and other nations’. More specifically, standards must be set, through education and training, for example, to all units under NATO command. With a higher level of interoperability and standardization, the risk of duplication of effort is lower and resources can be used more efficiently (NATO, 2010a: 1-1-1-3).

As a reminder, experimentation was earlier (p.82) defined as ‘[the process of] controlled investigation to discover information, confirm or disprove a hypothesis or formally validate a concept’ (NAMC, 2009: §5). ‘Experimentation may consist of a series of related experiments’ (NATOJWC, 2006: Annex B). Furthermore, an experiment, in

turn, is ‘a controlled and directed activity designed either to discover new information about a concept, test a hypothesis or validate a solution’ (NATOJWC, 2006: Annex B).

As with concepts earlier (on page 92), it is relevant to define what experimentation is not. First, experimentation is not test and evaluation, which, according to NATO ACT, is a ‘planned activity designed to obtain information about the state of a projected system leading to provision of advice or support for a decision’. Further, experimentation is not research and development, which, in turn, is understood as a ‘planned activity with a fixed end-state to discover new knowledge about products, processes, and services to create new products, processes, and services’. Finally, experimentation should not be equated with long-term studies, which are understood as ‘passive—primarily observations without manipulation of the data’ (NATOACT, 2009h: 6).

Instead, to put it simply, experimentation is a ‘trial and error’ methodology. Its role is primarily to determine whether a concept will be successful or not. This determination is done by providing information on whether the concept that has been developed as a solution to a given challenge is actually successful or if it is flawed (totally or partly). Thus, experimentation reduces uncertainty in the utility of the concept and can be seen as a success if it is able to provide information on the utility of the concept. Furthermore, experimentation helps identify potential issues in the concept and potentially provides solutions for these. Experimentation can occur at each stage of concept development, including implementation. In other words, the two go hand in hand: ‘[C]oncept development provides the rationale for experimentation and experimentation provides information to refine the concept’ (NAMC, 2009: §14–15; cf. NATOACT, 2009b: D-3–5, §3).




Figure 3: Experimentation-Concept Relationship (NATOACT, 2009h: 9)

Thus, experimentation has a purpose with regard to concept development. It provides benefits by examining whether a concept causes changes in military effectiveness in reality. Specifically, its benefits are seen to include the reduction of uncertainty, intensifying innovation and transformation, problem solving and identification, and the identification of systems that might increase military capability. Experimentation is seen to be at least beneficial and, more often, crucial to the development of a new concept or capability. Typically, experimentation will initially focus on an area of concern within a complex system. The gained understanding will then be refined in contrast to solution options and various operation circumstances. The development and refinement of prototype solutions are usually experimented with. Finally, when the capability is developed, experimentation is usually employed to verify that it performs as previously predicted (NATOACT, 2009h: 8–9; De Nijs, 2010: 4).

Experiments can be conducted in various forums. They can be conducted in exercises, either virtual or live. An experiment can also be conducted in an operational theatre, if agreed to by the operational command. Other forums include LOEs, MNE, war games, battle labs, workshops and seminars (NATOACT, 2009h: 11; NATO, 2010a: 2-2–2-4).

It should be noted that in the MISA-EM case, as in other MNE objectives, LOEs are organized as a part of MNE. Thus, MNE is comprised of many LOEs and the synthesis of their results form the foundation of the MNE product (the standalone LOE

reports are products as well, of course). MNE is understood as a series, where ‘series’ is used to refer to a series of MNE cycles (NATO, 2010a: 2–3). Hence, one MNE could also be understood to be a series of LOEs.

The process of experimentation has many aspects within it. Next, these aspects are categorized into three themes. The first theme (of experimentation) sets the stage for how to design valid experiments. Within the second theme, it is recognized that a campaign of experiments (including analytical activities) will generally be required in order to achieve successful capability development. The third and final theme discusses considerations for success in order to support practical implementations of the experiments. These themes are then sub-divided into 14 principles (TTCP, 2006: vii–viii). The multifaceted nature of experimentation and experiments will be introduced through these three themes and a broad examination of their 14 principles.

14 Principles of Experimentation

Next, the 14 principles of experimentation will be introduced and their most important aspects highlighted. The first three are principles concerning the design of valid experiments. Due to the relative importance¹²² of these principles, they are elaborated in more detail. Principles four through seven deal with experimentation campaigns. The last principles, eight through 14, illustrate the considerations for successful experimentation (NATOACT, 2009i: 2).

3.4.1.1. Principles of Design

Principle 1 of experimentation states that experiments are uniquely suited to investigate the cause-and-effect relationships underlying capability development. A capability change (cause) should result in a difference in military effectiveness (effect). When change is observed under controlled conditions, a conclusion about cause-and-effect is possible (NATOACT, 2009i: 3). Thus, as already demonstrated on page 80), the need for

¹²² Their importance arises from the fact that they set the foundation for understanding experiments and experimentation; they argue for the relevance and significance of experimentation, and discuss the logic and validity of this knowledge-creation process.

experimentation is linked to the broader frame of force transformation (Alberts and Hayes, 2002: 7–8, 2005: 29–37).

Experimentation supports near-, mid- and long-term transformation. The primary function of transformational experimentation is to seek new knowledge. Its purpose is not to gain support for specific ideas. Furthermore, experimentation helps to check whether a concept is useful or not, whether the concept provides a difference in military effectiveness (NATOACT, 2009e: 4, 2009h: 5–7). It should be noted that even if the result of the experiment is that the concept does not provide the wanted effect, the experiment can nevertheless be seen as successful (since it has saved time and money on a large-scale implementation) (Interlocutors 3; 16).

NATO ACT training material credits Francis Bacon with coining the term, ‘experiment’, in the early 1600s. The essence of experimentation and what separates experimentation from other research methods is the manipulation of ‘something’ to see what happens. This manipulation should occur under controlled conditions and precise measurements should be taken (NATOACT, 2009h: 4; TTCP, 2006: 40–43; Alberts and Hayes, 2005: 15–18; cf. Kass, 2006: 13–19).

Two characteristics distinguish defence experiments¹²³ from other types of experiments. First, they focus on and analyse the determinants of military effectiveness, instead of physical phenomena (as in physics and chemistry, for example). Second, defence experiments focus on and analyse humans and their equipment in combat operations and/ or develop new military technologies. While some are in favour of conducting defence experiments with the same rigour as in industry/ academia, others do not agree that laboratory conditions can be applied to the complexity and chaos of military operations. However, although defence experiments may lack laboratory conditions, the same logic of experimentation and science can be applied to defence experiments. The aim is to produce accurate and valid tests of causality supporting the development of capabilities (NATOACT, 2009e: 5; TTCP, 2006: 39).

¹²³ For an early discussion on the characteristics of defense experiments in particular, see Worley (1999).

There are three general categories¹²⁴ of experimentation (NAMC, 2009: Annex B; NATO, 2010a: 2-1-2-2; NATOJWC, 2006: Annex B):

1. *Discovery experiments* are usually conducted early in the development cycle. They are expected to produce insights and knowledge about the innovation in question and identify the conditions under which it can be used. Empirical observation is the method of choice over quantitative analysis as the latter usually does not yield enough information at this stage. The product of discovery experiments should be actionable recommendations that address the innovation in question.
2. In *hypothesis testing experiments*, factors of interest are observed systematically in a created situation. However, due to the large number of variables¹²⁵ in a military scenario, a single experiment will often only marginally improve knowledge. Therefore, many hypothesis testing experiments are often needed in order to gain useful knowledge and resolve issues.
3. *Validation experiments* recreate known truth and display existing knowledge to people unfamiliar with it, as, for example, that a capability will improve mission interoperability. NATO technology demonstrations,¹²⁶ for example, are seen as validation experiments, whereas testing capabilities, which have already been developed on the field (field testing), are not.
 - a. It should be noted that in addition to the three general categories, NAGEP¹²⁷ recognizes an additional type of experiment, an *operational experiment*, which is '[e]xperimentation in a real (or near-real) military environment (at all levels...) involving operational staff performing active operational roles' (NATOJWC, 2006: Annex B). This, however, can also be interpreted as a form of a validation experiment.

The three categories of experiments can be further broken into several types or subtypes. The term, 'type', describes experiments in relation to their expected outcomes. These

¹²⁴ For a more detailed discussion on the three different categories, see Alberts and Hayes (2002: 19–36).

¹²⁵ Independent variables, dependent variables and control variables.

¹²⁶ During my involvement in MNE, a technical demonstration was referred to as a 'Technical Capability Demonstration (TCD)'. The TCD of MISA-EM will be discussed later (on page 150).

¹²⁷ NAGEP: NATO Guidance for Experimentation Planning and Integration, Revision 3.

stages (and subtypes of hypothesis testing) are discovery, refinement, assessment, prototype refinement and prototype validation (Table 2) (NATOACT, 2009e: 7–12; TTCP, 2006: 11; Kass, 2006: 150–154).

EXPERIMENTATION		
CATEGORY	TYPE	TYPE GOAL
DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY	Clarifies future war fighting problems and seeks potential solutions—intended to ‘discover’ information.
HYPOTHESIS TESTING	REFINEMENT	Examines and refines the extent to which concepts solve military problems. Justifies the selection of an option.
	ASSESSMENT	Ensures refinement-solutions are robust and are applicable to potential requirements in an uncertain future.
	PROTOTYPE REFINEMENT	Transitions capability surrogates into potential operational capabilities by developing prototype packages for frontline commands. Prototypes can be objects or ideas. Capability implementation-level experimentation.
VALIDATION	PROTOTYPE VALIDATION	Proves that the prototype capability can operate within theatre and will improve operational effectiveness. The objective is to validate an aspect of an experimental object. Capability implementation-level experimentation.

Table 2: Three Categories of Experiments

Principle 2 of experimentation promotes the *logic* of defence experiments along the mnemonic, ‘2-3-4-5-21’, by describing the two (2) *elements* of the experiment *hypothesis*; the three (3) *decisions* to resolve conditional propositions in the hypothesis statement; the four (4) *requirements* for a *valid* experiment; the five (5) *components* of an experiment; and the 21 general *threats* to drawing valid causal inferences from the experiment. Understanding these elements helps understand experiment interrelationships, best practices and trade-off considerations. In other words, the 2-3-4-5-21 logic paints the ‘big picture’ of experimentation and provides a rationale and a road map for experiment project management (NATOACT, 2009i: 4).

In order to understand a capability problem under experimentation, one must first understand the cause-and-effect between Capability A and Effect B, in other words the *two* elements of a hypothesis. Experimentation seeks to determine if A causes B. The two elements of a hypothesis are thus within the if-then statement, where the cause (concept) is identified in the if-clause, and the effect (problem resolution) is identified by the then-clause. The two elements identify two different starting points to experimentation. One can start with the then-statement and treat it as a requirement, or start with the if-statement to see, for example, if a technology has military applications (TTCP, 2006: 50–54; Kass, 2006: 20–23).

Hypothesis	
IF (A):	Proposed change
THEN (B):	Improved capability

Then there are *three* logical steps to take when resolving a hypothesis. The *first* logical question to ask in an experiment is did A occur; was A adequately represented in the experiment? *Second*, did B occur? In other words, did the experiment demonstrate (objectively) that the problem to be solved was, in fact, solved? *Third*, it must be observed that B was due to A; it must be clear that the observed resolution was due to the proposed solution (TTCP, 2006: 54).

Next, a good experiment has *four* requirements¹²⁸ (TTCP, 2006: 9–11, 55–58). Within an experiment, there must be the ability and possibility to:

1. Use the new Capability A (i.e. the capability under experimentation must be actually used in the experiment. Rather self-evident, but a requirement nonetheless);
2. Detect a change in Effect B;
3. Isolate the reason for the change in Effect B; and
4. Relate the results to actual operations.

¹²⁸ For a more detailed discussion on each requirement, see Chapters 4–7 in Kass (2006),.

These requirements relate to validity: A valid experiment provides information to ascertain whether A (cause) caused B (effect) (NATOACT, 2009h: 12).

FOUR REQUIREMENTS FOR GOOD AND VALID EXPERIMENTS		
Requirement	Evidence (for Validity)	Threat (to Validity)
Use new capability	A occurred	Asset did not work
Detect change	B changed as A changed	Too much noise, could not detect change
Isolate reasons for change	A alone caused B	Alternative explanations may apply
Relate results to operations	B is expected in operations	Change might be applicable

Table 3: Four Requirements for Experimentation Validity

Five components can be found in all experiments. First, the proposed capability (or the treatment/ cause) is the solution that is expected to increase effectiveness. Second, the cause which produces an effect is executed by an experimental unit. Third, the effect is a measured result in a trial situation. Fourth, all contextual conditions under which the experiment is executed are included. Fifth, analysis is conducted to compare different trial scenarios (Kass, 2006: 43–44; cf. NATOACT, 2009e: 14; cf. TTCP, 2006: 8, 59; cf. Shadish *et al.*, 2002). The 21 threats to good experiments are introduced in Appendix D on page 233).

Principle 3 of experimentation stipulates that all defence experiments should be designed to meet the four validity requirements: When (1) a capability is employed, (2) change in effect must be detected, (3) the reason for the effect must be isolated, and (4) the results must be related to the actual operations. The 21 threats (on page 233) to these requirements should be countered. However, it is sometimes hard to satisfy all four requirements as they seek to maximize statistical power and control on the one hand, and maximize free-play and real-world operations on the other. Thus, a good understanding of the rationale of the four requirements is required to make knowledgeable and rational tradeoffs among the practices to maximize the knowledge that can be gained from a single experiment (NATOACT, 2009i: 10; TTCP, 2006: 65–105).

3.4.1.2. Principles of Integrated Campaigns

Principle 4 of experimentation states: ‘Defense experiments should be integrated into a coherent campaign of activities to maximize their utility.’ These campaigns¹²⁹ should include a coherent management framework as well as an analytical programme. Experimentation should be embedded in an integrated campaign of experiments, studies and analytical activities. Moreover, campaigns should also have an integrated analytical process, which uses a variety of techniques to ensure that the weaknesses in one analytical technique can be mitigated by the results of the other techniques. The product of the campaign is advice for decision-makers on the utility, versatility and maturity of the concept and the capabilities required to implement the concept. Campaigns should include various levels of analysis, such as between the technological, tactical, operational and strategic levels (NATOACT, 2009i: 11; TTCP, 2006: 107–116).

The differences between an experiment and an experiment campaign are summarized in Table 4 (NATOACT, 2009d: 8; Alberts and Hayes, 2002: 44).

Experiment vs. Experimentation Campaign		
	Experiment	Experimentation Campaign
Threads of investigation	Single event of investigation	Multiple events of investigation
Organizing framework	Specific hypotheses	A broad goal
Analytic goal	Focused testing of specific questions	Knowledge of a broad set of issues
Number of decision points	Executes a specific design	Multiple decision points for refinement and analyses
Number of factors	Measures impact of few factors	Assesses many factors
Scenarios	Selected to provide best test of specific hypotheses	Examines a range of contexts to develop generalized predictions
Methodology	Selected methods and metrics	Broad range of methods

Table 4: Experiment vs. Experimentation Campaign

Principle 5 of experimentation articulates the iterative process of problem formulation, analysis and experimentation. Iteration is seen as a critical element in accumulating

¹²⁹ For more on experimentation campaigns, and ones that involve disruptive (rather than sustaining) innovation especially, see Alberts and Hayes (2005).

knowledge and validity within a campaign. Problem formulation is the key aspect of the process. It should aim to frame capability development issues as components, which will make them easier to analyse. Ongoing iterative analysis accumulates validity during the campaign, so analysis elements can provide information to decision-makers at any stage of the process (NATOACT, 2009i: 12; TTCP, 2006: 119–122).

Principle 6 of experimentation: Campaigns should integrate all three scientific methods of knowledge generation—studies, observations and experiments. NATO ACT sees studies as rational-deductive—as pure logic without reference to the real world, as practised by Socrates and Plato. Observations, as practised by Ptolemy and Copernicus, are empirical-inductive and focus on precise observation of events. Experiments, in turn, are framed to be empirical-deductive, where objects are manipulated and measured, as introduced by Francis Bacon and practised by Galileo, who pioneered the question: ‘If I do this, what will happen?’ (NATOACT, 2009i: 13; TTCP, 2006: 124–131).

Principle 7 of experimentation stipulates that, within a campaign, multiple methods (of measurement) are necessary in order to accumulate validity (the cornerstone for experimentation) across the four requirements for experimentation (Principle 3) (NATOACT, 2009i: 13–14; TTCP, 2006: 132–142).

3.4.1.3. Principles of Success

Principle 8 of experimentation stresses that human variability (physical attributes, cultural or societal norms and practices, or training) in defence experimentation requires additional experiment design considerations (NATOACT, 2009i: 15). Some human characteristics and their impacts are summarized in Table 5 (NATOACT, 2009d: 16; TTCP, 2006: 146).

Validity Requirements	Key Human Characteristic	Positive Impact	Negative Impact
Use the new capability	Adaptability	High adaptability. The new system can be effectively used as designed; and it can be used adaptively in ways not originally planned.	Low adaptability. The new capability is difficult to understand and use.
Detect a change in the effect	Variability	Natural human variability taken as a factor in the analysis and its effect compared with the effects of the deliberately manipulated variables.	Variability produces more noise than expected, which may impair the ability to detect any change.
Isolate the reason for the change	Cognitive and linguistic ability	Subjects understand why they reacted in a specific manner and can communicate this to the experimenter.	Subjects are not aware of why things turned out as they did.
Relate the results to the operations	Representation	Subjects represent the end-user of the capability.	Subjects do not represent the end-user of the capability.

Table 5: Human Characteristics and Their Impacts

Additional experiment considerations are also required in **Principle 9** of experimentation, which focuses on defence experiments conducted during collective training, and operational testing and evaluation. This principle points out that exploiting routine training exercises for experimentation can provide opportunities to save money. Experimentation during exercises, or even operations, provides the strongest venue for meeting the fourth experiment validity requirement—the ability to relate results to actual operations. Still, all four requirements for valid experiments must be met (NATOACT, 2009i: 16; TTCP, 2006: 152–172).

Principle 10 of experimentation points out that the exploitation of modelling and simulation (M&S) is often critical to successful experimentation. Different architectural frameworks (e.g. MoDAF, DoDAF and NAF) are employed in militaries to model the relationships between the existing assets and the desired capabilities. However, modelling and simulation often face practical problems of costs, validity, level of effort and scarcity of expert personnel (NATOACT, 2009i: 16–17; TTCP, 2006: 174–183; cf. Alberts and Hayes, 2002: 317–342).

Principle 11 of experimentation states that an effective experimentation control regime, despite its management complexity, is essential to successful experimentation and needs to have been set up already during the planning and execution phases. **Principle 12** emphasizes that a comprehensive data analysis and collection plan is required to conduct a successful experiment as they directly affect the knowledge that can be gained (NATOACT, 2009i: 18–19; TTCP, 2006: 184–204).

Principle 13 of experimentation stresses that the relevant ethical, environmental (including historical or cultural sites), political, multinational and security (mainly information security) issues must be considered. Political and multinational issues include, for example, the issue of synchronization of countries (organizing and tasking in a multinational environment). Further, the issue that different countries have (or haven't) signed various international treaties or conventions (such as anti-personnel landmines) must be taken into consideration. Political realities may preclude involvement in some types of experimentation, or even hinder agreement on certain scenarios. The importance of ethics especially is underlined in Principle 13. Finally, in **Principle 14** of experimentation, the role of frequent communication with stakeholders is emphasized. Clear communication is seen as critical to successful experimentation. Thus, a communication plan, comprised of correct communication methods and temporal utilizations, is required (NATOACT, 2009i: 20–21; TTCP, 2006: 206–227).

3.4.1.4. Management

In order to gain as holistic an understanding of CD&E as possible, the experimentation management techniques, as delineated by NATO ACT, should be briefly introduced.

Experimentation management has some interactive and interrelating aspects between experiment control, design, planning, execution and analysis. First, the degree of possible and required *control* in experimentation varies. The experiment design should clearly describe which variables must be controlled and which variables can be allowed to remain uncontrolled while still recorded. Specified control regimes should ensure that this occurs in practice. The identification of intervening variables and learning effects must be understood sufficiently. The required controls must be imposed throughout the planning and execution phases of the experiment. Second, the cornerstone of a control regime is the *experiment design* process, which is a logical journey from the questions to be answered, or hypotheses to be tested, to the detailed definition of the experiment. Experiment design sets out in broad terms what needs to be done. Successful experiment design also participates in early stakeholder engagement to establish objectives and intent. Furthermore, firm and early decision-making regarding scenarios, participation, funding, technical environments and study issues have been identified as factors that help control various variables (NATOACT, 2009d: 3).

Third, the *planning* of experiments requires a management team. The management team makes decisions to settle high-level issues, oversees the activities of the various teams and ensures that the experiment planning and organization develops toward the objectives in a timely manner. Reviews are necessary throughout the planning period to ensure that experiment preparation remains on track. Fourth, the experiment management team usually transforms into control staff during *execution*. The controllers ensure that the experiment is progressing according to schedule. The controllers also observe the players and collect input. The controllers provide feedback to the experiment director and implement changes if they are required to ensure that the event achieves the experiment objectives. Therefore, the controllers must deal with military judgement and scientific objectivity. Fifth, the *analysis* team for an experiment should ideally be derived at least partly from the experiment design team, and they should work closely with the concept developers and technical specialists. Analysis team members should know the

concept in order to be able to prepare an analysis plan to meet the needs of the experiment design. Analysts compare observations and results and begin to integrate their views of what is being learned from the experiment. As sufficient data is collected, analysts begin to form preliminary insights. However, first impressions should generally be conservative (NATOACT, 2009d: 3; Alberts and Hayes, 2002: 253–279).

In addition to the roles¹³⁰ required in experimentation, some key experimentation products should be generally understood. The *concept lead* provides overall coordination and management of the programme throughout its life-cycle. The concept lead produces the *concept development plan*. The *experiment lead* is responsible for the management of the experiment team to meet the objectives in the experimentation plan. The experiment lead produces the *experiment design*, *data analysis plan* and the *data collection plan*. The *experiment integrator*, possibly supported by a team, is responsible for integrating experiments into the Military Training and Exercise Program (MTEP), NATO operations, or standalone venues. The experiment lead often acts as an experiment integrator¹³¹. The *experiment analyst* is the person responsible for producing the data collection plan and the data analysis plan for the experiment and leading the analysis activity throughout the experiment's life-cycle. The *experimenter* is part of the team responsible for designing and conducting an experiment to support the development of the concept. The *observer* is part of the experiment team and supports the experiment lead during the experiment execution (NATOACT, 2009d: 4).

Project management is needed to map a campaign and follow it from the research and development phase to the final implementation. The project management plan defines the scope, timing and resources required for each project phase. In other words, it identifies the critical paths and actions throughout the experiment that must happen before the experiment can continue. There are several key issues that must be synchronized between the experiment team and stakeholders. For example, the stakeholders must understand what is done and why. Moreover, the stakeholders' buy-in is required. This is done by showing the stakeholders why the experimentation is in their best interests (NATOACT, 2009d: 5).

¹³⁰ For more detailed discussions on roles and responsibilities, see (NATOJWC, 2006: Annex F; Ekström, 2010: 7–12)

¹³¹ For more on integration specifically, see NATOJWC (2006).

Whereas project management methodologies can be found in all projects, the stakeholder buy-in resembles a process of military marketing. Moreover, in the MNE context, stakeholders can be seen to include agencies, organizations, businesses and political decision-makers.

3.4.1.5. Analysis

‘War is not a chess game, but a vast social phenomenon with an infinitely greater and ever expanding number of variables, many of which elude analysis’

(Galula, 1964: ix).

Once the experiment is finished, the detailed analysis begins (NATOACT, 2009d: 12). In the experimentation framework, analysis is defined as ‘[t]he study of a whole by examining its parts and their interactions’. Note that in the context of military forces, the hierarchical relationship in a logical sequence is: assessment, analysis, evaluation, validation and certification (NATONSA, 2010: 2-A-14). The function of operational analysis is to apply scientific, structured and rigorous research methods to assist decision-makers. However, Ekström discusses how the positivist, empirical-deductive notion of ‘science’ prevails in the field of CD&E, excluding other paradigms such as pragmatism (Ekström, 2010: 14). Ekström’s discussion is supported by my observations during training, where quantitative analysis dominated the understandings of ‘analysis’ (Tuusula, 1–3 September 2009).

It is stressed that the aim of analysis—to support decision-makers—should not be forgotten in the process. Analysis is needed to bring clarity to complexity which inhibits immediate understandings of concepts, situations or objects (NATOACT, 2009f: 4–5; Alberts and Hayes, 2005: 76–77; De Nijs, 2010: 5).

Analysis helps and supports concept development in solving problems which are often difficult to conceive and define, and which have conflicting goals. In other words, analysis helps study complex decision-making problems with management systems undergoing change. Such problems are termed as *wicked* problems, as opposed to *tame* ones (NATOACT, 2009f: 8). More specifically:

‘Wicked problems are problems that are un-bounded and ill-defined, are novel but difficult to conceive, and have multiple and conflicting goals and customers. A wicked problem is one for which each attempt to create a solution changes the understanding of the problem. Wicked problems cannot be solved in a traditional linear engineering fashion, because the problem definition evolves as new possible solutions are considered and/ or implemented. Most projects in organizations—and virtually all technology-related projects these days—are about wicked problems. Indeed, it is the social complexity of these problems, not their technical complexity, that overwhelms most current problem solving and project management approaches’ (De Nijs, 2010: 6).

An aspect of a wicked problem is that it is only after a solution has been developed that the problem can be understood (De Nijs, 2010: 6). I have to admit that during my research project, analysing MNE, its logics, processes, terminologies and its impact felt like the wickedest problem of them all.

Analysis supports concept development in its different stages. It occurs in the preparation phase (e.g. literature analysis), problem structuring phase (e.g. brainstorming, stakeholder analysis, workshop facilitation), the actual concept development phase (e.g. developing a campaign of concept analysis, development of metrics) and, finally, in the concept assessment phase (e.g. maturity assessment, feasibility analysis, risk analysis) (NATOACT, 2009f: 9; Alberts and Hayes, 2005: 76–77; De Nijs, 2010: 7–11).

In the experimentation phase, analysis ensures validity (sufficient evidence to prove conclusions), feasibility (applicable action in contrast to constraints), applicability (makes sense in the given situation), robustness (withstands criticism) and credibility (information gained contributes to the sum of knowledge) (NATOACT, 2009a: 4). Specifically, the tasks of analysis¹³² include supporting specifications and design, planning and executing experiment data collection, and analysing and interpreting the results and implications (NATOACT, 2009f: 10).

¹³² See Appendix C (on page 232) for more on the tasks of analysis in experimentation.

3.4.2. Helsinki LOE1: Subject Matter Experts

The first LOE of MNE6 Objective 4.2, MISA-EM, was organized in Helsinki, Finland, aboard the *M/S Silja Symphony* from 9 to 11 March 2010. The choice of venue, a cruise ferry, might seem odd at first, but it proved to be a perfect venue to host a maritime event. This was not only due to the fact that we were dealing with maritime issues while actually sailing on the sea, but also due to the fact that a cruise ferry is an outstanding way to effectively keep participants together (and thus enable effective networking) and focused on the issues at hand. The social networking which the event made possible was welcomed by the participants who saw the LOE as an opportunity to connect with a community of stakeholders who were committed to maritime situational awareness (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

Some 50 representatives from the relevant national and international agencies and organizations were present aboard the cruise ship to prioritize the most important challenges in achieving maritime situational awareness in unprepared waters. The representatives were primarily civilian—60 per cent—and the remaining 40 per cent were people who had a military background, but were currently affiliated with civilian organizations. It should be noted that this time, my organizational affiliation was correctly identified as the University of Tampere (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

Similar to the interagency introductory conference, the representatives were given read-ahead packages about MNE, CD&E and MISA-EM. The LOE started with introductory presentations on MNE, MISA-EM and the LOE at hand.

The *relevance* of the LOE and thus also of MNE were underscored by referring to the previous cycle of MNE; it was stressed that the products of MNE5 had contributed to improving information exchange procedures in various settings, including SUCBAS and MARSUR, both maritime surveillance frameworks with which most of the participants were familiar. Additionally, MNE was framed as a process that seeks to provide solutions to identified challenges. From the beginning, MNE was introduced to seek solutions to information sharing challenges. The European participants were already very aware of these challenges at home: It was established that the European integration process had facilitated a situation where national agencies tended to have working information

sharing procedures among their organizational EU counterparts, while, at the same time, decreasing the level of information sharing with other agencies at home. In other words, stovepipes and barriers were broken at the EU level, but kept intact or even grown stronger at the national level. It was claimed that MNE had helped to resolve these issues as well (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

The purpose of the LOE was to analyse the potential solutions that the MISA-EM conceptual framework had so far identified, dealing mostly with establishing a maritime comprehensive approach to sharing information among maritime actors. An increase in information sharing was seen to increase situational awareness as well (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

Further, the purpose of the event was to spread its own awareness; one goal was that a better understanding of the common challenge and the feasibility of various maritime situational awareness solutions would be gained among the concept developers and experimenters (the representatives formed the majority of the experimenters). The event also provided a minor opportunity for Finland to frame and market itself as a prime example of a country that has utilized the interagency approach within its governmental system. To that end, the recently published brochure, *The Security of Society*, was distributed among the participants. The brochure provided an overview of Finland's interagency approach to ensure security in that country (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

New innovations from the representatives were welcomed. LOE1 was thus a discovery experiment,¹³³ in which MISA-EM challenges and solutions were discussed and analysed. A partly fictitious West African scenario served as the context to frame the understandings (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

3.4.2.1. LOE1 Indications of Trust: Inside with a Step Out

I was appointed to the 'analyst' role for the LOE, within the control group of the experiment. Thus, my task was to make observations and write down the findings. After the LOE, I was to analyse and draw conclusions from these observations, the voting

¹³³ A discovery experiment is one of three general categories of experimentation. A discovery experiment is expected to produce insights and knowledge about the innovation in question (in this case, MISA-EM) and identify the conditions under which it can be used. The three general categories of experimentation were discussed starting on page 126.

results and the discussions that took place. Further, I assisted the ‘reviewer’ to sum up discussions. In addition, along with the ‘concept developer’, I was to make sure that the most important insights from the LOE would make their way into the MISA-EM concept (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

Initially, I had been due to take on the ‘reviewer’ role. The reviewers prepared and presented outcomes in two review sessions after each working day. Some saw the ‘reviewer’ role as more prestigious than the ‘analyst’ role and, thus, that my role of ‘analyst’ was a step down from that of ‘reviewer’ (Interlocutors 2; 7). My interpretation, however, was that I was privileged to be present in the first place. To be able to take part in actual MNE work was an added bonus for me. I felt that taking part in actual work gave me an even better opportunity to focus on the discussions that were taking place; had I only been observing, for example, I would not have had real-time access to the dialogues that were taking place electronically¹³⁴ during the sessions (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

The 50 representatives were split into three groups to go over three sessions: 1) the first session dealt with MISA-EM challenges and solutions relating to stakeholder information requirements and cultural aspects; 2) the second session focused on creating cooperative processes and structures among different maritime stakeholders; and 3) the third session concentrated on opportunities to utilize technologies in order to enhance situational awareness in unprepared maritime scenarios (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

Discussions, Session One

The first session, dealing with *information requirements and cultural aspects*, focused on the challenges of: 1) understanding other actors (there is a lack of motive to share information); 2) sensitive information (some stakeholder information is not shareable with all actors); 3) acquiring new information (in distant, new theatres, the capability to perform is limited); and 4) cultural understanding (there are no agreed methods for understanding the cultural aspects in cooperation and capability building). Next, I will

¹³⁴ The voting system that was utilized gave the opportunity for participants to have an online chat-type discussion on the given topics. This electronic dialogue made it possible for all participants to voice their opinion (sometimes during sessions, some individuals tended to have rather long comments).

present the highlights of episodes I encountered during the first session of the LOE (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

3.4.2.2. LOE1 The Common Good: A New Way of Thinking

It was pointed out that technology is not usually the problem with current information sharing—trust and interest issues are the real challenges. All participants recognized the old notion that information equals power. Trust and interest relating to the financial, legal and cultural aspects are, more often than not, in the way. Currently, it was seen that there were actors who did not share information because they were afraid of their information getting into the wrong hands (information misuse). Moreover, the intensity of information sharing was seen to be not on equal terms: The military and its intelligence component were seen by the civilian organizations as ‘black holes’: Information goes in, but nothing comes out. A fantastic comment relating to the military intelligence community and its utility in such kinds of information sharing environments was that the ‘intelligence’ community should collect—and distribute—intelligent data in contrast to what it is doing now (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

Moreover, it was stressed that a new way of thinking was required where personal benefit took the backseat, and the goal of the project, the ‘common good’, took the driving seat. In this session, the common good was presented along the lines of ‘no piracy’. One could wonder, however, how common good was defined and who defined it, especially when it was seen that the cooperation framework should be institutionalized and standardized among a multitude of different actors (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

3.4.2.3. LOE1 The Common Goals: Institutionalized Standards

In addition to trust and ‘what’s in it for me’ discussions, the plethora of actors relating to the maritime environment brought about the need for evolving information sharing practices away from communicating point to point into an institutionalized framework of information sharing. It was seen that a commonly agreed standard on how to share information was necessary. A process of cooperation, which does not focus only on information sharing, should be built based on common goals and interests. A global information sharing *structure* with a *scaling* information sharing *framework* was seen to

be needed in order to facilitate the achievement of these goals and interests (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

Building institutions and structures based on common standards and processes in order to meet common goals—the common good even—again seemed like increasing rigidity in a currently fluid and ambiguous place in order to create fluidity in another—moving away from military-type vertical governance mechanisms by creating an all-encompassing governance model with the characteristics of horizontal information flows and a touch of ethics (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

Discussions, Session Two

The second session, dealing with *processes and structures*, focused on the challenges of: 1) commonly agreed processes (currently, no comprehensive mechanisms exist to share information across stakeholders);¹³⁵ 2) cooperative structure (currently, knowledge is scattered among stakeholders who are not connected¹³⁶ to each other); 3) modelling¹³⁷ (without modelling, best practices cannot be fully transformed to support situational awareness in unprepared waters); and 4) preparedness for transitions (the host country should be involved early in the establishment of the situational awareness structure, the governance of which should later be transitioned to the host nation). Next, I will present highlights from the episodes I encountered during the second LOE session (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

3.4.2.4. LOE1 The Common Structure: Guidelines and Temporality

First of all, it was seen that a ‘comprehensive approach’, as understood in the MISA-EM context, was the first and primary prerequisite for establishing a cooperative structure of information sharing. However, it was seen that without modelling, a comprehensive approach was not possible. EA frameworks such as the NATO Architectural Framework

¹³⁵ These include security, safety, economic and environmental stakeholders.

¹³⁶ It was presented that, currently, the stakeholders are not connected by physical or virtual structures (centres or networks).

¹³⁷ ‘A model’ was presented as a simplified, abstract view of the complex reality. In the MISA-EM context, it could describe the actors, their interdependencies, and methodologies on how to share information and processes among them.

(NAF) and the Ministry of Defence Architectural Framework¹³⁸ (MoDAF) especially were identified as important to that end. As, during the second workshop in Madrid (p.74), I had already commented on the utility of EA, and since EA is a component of the CD&E methodology (TTCP, 2006: 24–25, 182–183), I was happy to hear these legitimizing comments from the SMEs as well. Modelling was seen to be pivotal in managing integration among actors, integration which is a requirement of the comprehensive approach. Moreover, it was recognized that historical data from the area of operations and understanding the specifics of the area’s context (such as political history, environmental conditions and culture) were required to ensure success (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

Moreover, establishing *a system of information sharing governance* was seen to be needed. This was due to the fact that the various agencies and countries operating in the area were not accustomed to sharing information amongst each other, often due to the different interests the actors had. Rather than emphasizing the need for different information sharing mechanisms (i.e. technical solutions), it was suggested that information sharing standards should be put in place. Further, a standard operating procedure should be implemented, which would ensure communications between the stakeholders. Finally, the importance of social media was stressed: ‘[T]he real power’ was seen to lie in social networking (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

It was asserted that this system of information sharing governance should have different temporal stages. Pre-crisis action was deemed crucial. The suggestion was that after successful identification of possible crisis scenarios, small permanent cells would be put in place and these would serve as the backbone for the cooperative structure if—or when—the crisis escalated. Then, competence on local conditions would already exist and be in place when more actors entered the area. Furthermore, after the crisis, the transition of the established capability to regional, rather than simply local/ host country actors, would take place. This transition of capability should be planned as part of the overarching SSR framework, since having and maintaining a recognized maritime picture (RMP) was seen to be essential for any country and an important part of nation-building (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

¹³⁸ Used in the United Kingdom.

Thus, it was suggested and seen that the information sharing governance model, based on the institutionalization of standards, should be set as part of the SSR framework. In effect then, the post-crisis region would be integrated into a global structure of common technologies and operating standards and processes (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

It should be noted that fears and doubts also entered into the discussions: Some participants were sceptical about whether the comprehensive network of actors should provide such increased capability to a post-crisis region, which could then be used against them, as, for example, limiting EU fishing along the coast of Somalia. Concerns were also expressed over the loss of control and over actors' growing dependency on technology (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

Discussions, Session Three

The third session, dealing with *technology*, focused on the challenges of: 1) information sharing (currently decision-makers do not have sufficient and relevant information); 2) interoperability (current use of different technological standards creates problems between systems); 3) missing information (limited number of sensors); 4) customer focus (lack of sustainable solutions and attractive business cases to share information); and 5) information overload (excessive data makes it difficult to identify abnormal activities). Next, I will present the highlights from episodes I encountered during the third session of the LOE (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

3.4.2.5. LOE1 The Common Structure: Technological Issues

Harmonization and the interoperability it provides were seen as pivotal. More specifically, actors taking part in the comprehensive information sharing structure should be prepared to harmonize data (formats, interfaces and contents) in addition to organizational standards and procedures and even representations of data, which provide a common frame of reference on the symbolic level. Currently, the implementation of a technological frame suffers from technological maturity and legal acceptability issues, which need be resolved before implementation (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

Thus, there is need to influence the political decision-making realm, the realm that technological networks are supposed to assist in crisis management issues, with the intent of influencing political decision-making to create more favourable conditions for information sharing technologies. Moreover, interdependencies and common interests (mutual benefits) in information sharing should be understood, in addition to emphasizing the power of networking. This calls for changes in resource allocations and education (comprehensive mindset and cultural awareness) within organizations (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

3.4.3. Cartagena LOE2: Horizontal Interactions

This section will integrate two events: the rock drill for LOE2 and the LOE itself. Both events were held in Cartagena, Spain.

The rock drill was a ‘dress rehearsal’ for the LOE if you will, in which participants were educated in their tasks and the physical infrastructure, among other such activities. The event was held at the ALMART HQ in Cartagena. More specifically, the objectives of the event were: 1) to test and refine the experiment setup; 2) to test the analysis plan; and 3) to train the audience and the control team.

3.4.3.1. LOE2 Indications of Trust: Others Convinced

The rock drill made sure that I was to carry out the ‘analyst supervisor’ role for the LOE. This was a personal accomplishment for me. This task made concrete my interpretation that I was accepted as a ‘true’ participant in the process and that I was seen as a contributing member amidst other contributing members. More importantly, Spain led this event, which I took to mean that not only had I been successful in establishing trust among my own reference group (the Finns mainly), but I had been successful in gaining the trust of others as well. This would not have been possible if I had not been able to provide useful feedback and relevant commentary during earlier meetings (Cartagena, 22–25 March 2010).

My responsibilities in this role included capturing data, performing ongoing analysis and identifying any possible opportunities for improvement during the

experimentation. Moreover, I documented the progression of the experiment in accordance with the scenario and the script. Thus, I was to make observations (this was perfect for me since I was making observations anyway as dictated by my methodology) and manage the execution of the experiment, that is, make sure the experiment was executed as specified in the Experimentation Design Document (EDD) and Data Collection and Analysis Plan (DCAP) (Cartagena, 22–25 March 2010).

LOE2 took place from 26 to 30 April 2010 at the ALMART HQ in Cartagena. The purpose of the LOE was to analyse the suitability of the MISA-EM concept. More specifically, the purpose was to examine, first, data and information fusion (technological) processes among the various stakeholders, and, second, the different organizational (human) procedures and structures that would be necessary to solve the situation awareness problems that military operations face in distant theatres in the maritime domain. The majority of the participants had military affiliations. The participants formed four groups:

1. The control group (controllers, analysts, data collectors and observers);
2. Role players acting as an interagency response cell;
3. Audience (in administrative roles); and
4. A technical architecture support group.

The first day of the experiment was dedicated to training—reiterating what was learnt during the rock drill and from the read-ahead materials (Cartagena, 26–30 April 2010).

The purpose of this segment is not to illustrate the specific details and phases of the experiment. Suffice it to say that one result of the experiment was that it validated the hypothesis that MISA-EM processes and structures were able to contribute to the level of situational awareness in the experiment scenario. That is to say that an increase in information flows across actors (horizontal information flows) and harmonized organizational processes were perceived to raise situational awareness during the experiment. In other words, we could begin to see the MISA-EM concept as a success (Cartagena, 26–30 April 2010).

3.4.3.2. LOE2 Speculations: LOE2 after Hours

The experimentation event was intense work, but there was still time for discussions in the evenings. These discussions, albeit speculations or even rumours, illustrate how MNE is not, at least for its participants, limited to the ‘business at hand’.

The scenario for the event was set in the Gulf of Aden and the eastern coast of Africa, where data gathering is difficult and conditions match the MISA-EM definitions for unprepared theatres. In the scenario, circumstances required an interagency and military effort to build up situational awareness in support of a multinational maritime operation to fight terrorism, smuggling and illegal trafficking. Thus, real/ historical vessel tracks from the eastern coast of Africa were used as data to form the experiment scenario. It was rumoured that the utilization of this data contributed to real findings in the coastal region, findings that were then utilized in the operation structure. Therefore, if true, the MISA-EM experiment, which was testing the utility of increased information flows between nodes, acted as a node in the real-world information flow structure (Cartagena, 26–30 April 2010).

Moreover, as discussed, a country has the possibility to use MNE to promote and/or frame itself as a specific actor within the crisis management structure, and this possibility is often intentionally used. During discussions, it came up that these roles are subject to *competition*. For example, it was presented that a particular country started MNE with a given role, which it saw as one of its core competencies, something it had an interest in promoting in a multinational crisis management framework. However, another country was able to ‘hijack’ this role from the original country. This, of course, caused a commotion, and also additional contributions from the ‘hijacked’ country—had it not provided these additional contributions, its role would have bordered on the insignificant. This would have been perceived as a huge loss of face. But the question that followed was why did this happen? (Cartagena, 26–30 April 2010).

No one seemed to have an answer, but as one can imagine, as the day grows darker, the theories start getting wilder. The most coherent theory started with the recognition that MNE is often used as a platform for testing technological development, technologies that are then used in larger, more lucrative frameworks. For example, one comment was that there existed an opportunity to gain access to a 150 million euro

project relating to the development of a maritime comprehensive approach, and that MISA-EM was utilized to gain access to this project and thus facilitate national business development as well as crisis management capabilities (Interlocutor 16) (Cartagena, 26–30 April 2010).

The view was that the country that had ‘lost’ its original role had done so because of the creation of a cooperative framework (which was created outside of the MNE context) between the country that was the new holder of the role and a third country. A speculated intent of this cooperative framework was that these two cooperating countries would try to gain access to this lucrative opportunity. Speculation was that the overall, grand intent of these two countries was to increase the level and intensity of military cooperation between them. The wildest, most conspiracy-oriented opinion, formulated in the wee hours of the morning, speculated that this grand cooperative framework had influenced the results of the experiment as well (Interlocutor 13). For the record, in my role as analyst supervisor, I saw nothing that pointed even remotely in that direction. At the same time, however, I cannot claim to have had a holistic, comprehensive view of everything that took place during the experiment, nor can I assume to have been informed whether such action took place (Cartagena, 26–30 April 2010).

3.4.4. Technical Capability Demonstration

The MISA-EM TCD was held internationally on 11 May 2010. This meant that the demonstration was a distributed event that had demonstration-event sites in various countries, including Finland, Singapore, Spain and Sweden. In Finland, a maritime-oriented audience was invited to observe the event in the Navy Command, Turku. My role in the demonstration was simply that of an observer among the invited audience (Turku, 11 May 2010).

The purpose of the TCD was to demonstrate how different technologies can support maritime situational awareness in distant waters and especially how technology can support the MISA-EM concept. More specifically, the event demonstrated how sensor information, gathered from various global sites, can be shared horizontally across countries with various technologies. The aim was to show how the information sharing supports creating improved maritime situational awareness at home and in distant

operation areas. The demonstration provided the concept developers and the experimenters (as well as the audience) with a better understanding of current and future technical solutions available to meet the challenges that the stakeholders might undertake in the future (Turku, 11 May 2010).

MNE and its benefits and impacts were discussed during the initialization of the TCD as well as during the actual demonstration (Turku, 11 May 2010).

3.4.4.1. TCD MNE Dialogues: Benefits and Impacts

'You cannot get all of this with money'

(Interlocutor 4, Turku, 11 May 2010).

Since MNE6 had not yet been finalized, MNE5 was used as an example to discuss its impact in the crisis management architecture.

In the first case, the products of MNE5 were seen to have been useful to countries, organizations and projects. For example, it was mentioned that an SOP that MNE5 had produced had been utilized as such by a major crisis management actor that previously did not have a SOP in that designated subject. Another actor was said to have chosen to use classifications provided by the MNE5 SOP. Furthermore, the technologies involved had contributed to different projects, as, for example, SUCBAS and MARSUR (cf. EDA, 2011b; SUCBAS, 2011) (Turku, 11 May 2010).

In the second case, MNE5 was seen to have contributed to the national strategic planning initiatives of various countries by having provided 'lessons learned' and 'best practices' information (Turku, 11 May 2010).

In the third case, the discussed MNE5 benefits included the use of MNE as a site of creating relationships and dialogue with international crisis management actors. This was seen to be especially important and relevant; MNE was seen as a site where important crisis management related matters could be discussed in informal settings among actors and persons who might not otherwise have such opportunities. These include, but are not limited to, dialogues and relations with and among countries, the EU and NATO. I learned that the opportunity to engage the 'technical people' of countries

and organizations in dialogue with each other was seen as especially fruitful (Turku, 11 May 2010).

In the fourth case, in addition to being able to ‘conduct business’, the MNE site was seen as providing an opportunity to promote products and crisis management identity. Since the different solutions are most often than not (at least partially) solved by utilizing technologies, MNE provides an opportunity to promote one’s own technological solutions. This point emerged often during MNE6: For example, Finland sees that maritime situational awareness technologies and solutions are its strong area. So, it wants to reflect that notion in relation to the other countries’ maritime capabilities. That is to say that MNE provides feedback on how Finland’s capability stands in relation to the others’ capabilities. This is not simply about framing one’s subjectivity in the international crisis management framework in a preferred way, it is also a larger issue of interoperability (Turku, 11 May 2010).

Once a technology or technological standard is demonstrated, it is simultaneously evaluated as dictated by the CD&E methodology. If the demonstrated technology or standard is seen by others as relevant or significant, there is a chance that this technology or standard will spread—there exists a chance that others will choose to implement this technology or standard. Then, it follows that interoperability will spread as the promoting country and the implementing country possess the same technology (Turku, 11 May 2010).

This point is more radical than it seems. For example, imagine the possibility of a non-NATO country influencing NATO to change its operating procedures to match the non-NATO country’s operating procedure through traditional diplomatic means. It might not be impossible, but it sure would be difficult. Compare then, the traditional process with a scenario in which a non-NATO country introduces a technical standard in MNE and, seeing that it is viable, NATO chooses to implement it within its operational framework. As an immediate consequence, the non-NATO country’s operating procedure and NATO’s operating procedure are interoperable and harmonized. This is a real world example I gained knowledge of during my involvement in MNE. Further, as technologies are introduced and thus promoted, it serves as a marketing situation for the developer of

the software, which is a business. Thus, the MNE site also serves as a platform from which to promote national businesses and increase sales (Turku, 11 May 2010).

3.4.5. Madrid Workshop 6: Analysis

After the experimentation phase, as dictated by the CD&E methodology, the experiments were analysed. To that end, a workshop for analysing the data from the experimentation events (LOE1 and LOE2) was held from 24 to 28 May 2010 in the Navy Operational Research Bureau in Madrid, Spain. The participants were mainly analysts as the workshop consisted primarily of sessions in which the data from the experimentation events were analysed.¹³⁹ The objectives of the event were to produce a draft analysis report of both LOE1 and LOE2 (Madrid, 24–28 May 2010).

3.4.5.1. WS6 Indications of Trust: Leaving My Mark

After fulfilling ‘analyst’ roles in both LOEs, I was naturally present at the workshop. I felt that the fact that I was a contributing member of the analysis team sealed the fact that I was ‘accepted’ and trusted by the natives. Moreover, contributing to the analysis workshop gave me the opportunity to leave my mark on the ‘official’ documents of MISA-EM (Madrid, 24–28 May 2010).

A multitude of data was analysed during the session, including observations, interviews, comments, system logs, recordings and surveys. Since the purpose of this study is not to provide a detailed account of the MISA-EM concept, but to provide an account of the MNE process, suffice it to say that after a lot of hard work, the workshop was a success (Madrid, 24–28 May 2010).

¹³⁹ As a side note, the invitation to the meeting stated: ‘The expected participants are mostly the analyst team, as the workshop will consist of actual on-hand working sessions.’ The wording made me smile as it hinted that since *actual work* is being done, only analysts are expected to be present (Madrid, 24–28 May 2010).

3.5. Finalization

‘This is how we see the future—this has to happen’

(Interlocutor 1, Helsinki, 4–7 October 2010).

This phase contains descriptions of the final two MISA-EM workshops and the closing seminar of MNE6, and observations made during those events. The purpose of the two MISA-EM workshops was to finalize the concept by incorporating the findings from the experimentations into the concept. The closing seminar then made public all the finalized concepts of the sixth MNE cycle.

3.5.1. Madrid Workshop 7

After analysing the experiments, the results were injected into the MISA-EM concept during a concept refinement workshop held from 21 to 23 June 2010 at the Naval War College in Madrid.

In order to present insights for concept refinement, each LOE’s¹⁴⁰ lead analyst was supposed to present the group’s findings, after which these findings were reviewed in order to produce conclusions and recommendations. It so happened that both of the lead analysts were not able to attend the workshop. My role initially was to observe and contribute to the concept refinement process. However, since no other person who had held an ‘analyst’ role was present, I was entrusted with the job of presenting the findings from the first LOE. I was honoured to do so, even if I was notified of it in the middle of the night and the presentation was the first presentation of the next day. As stated, I took this to mean that the ‘natives’ had trust in my ability to present the main findings of an LOE. I interpreted this to mean that I was as inside as I could be. Where, previously, I had tried very hard to accomplish ‘insiderness’, I now began to worry if I was too much in, and started to put an effort into mentally detaching myself from the process (Madrid, 21–23 June 2010).

¹⁴⁰ LOE1 was discussed on page 140 and LOE2 on page 147.

Moreover, the purpose of the event was to prepare *synthesis*;¹⁴¹ the purpose was to highlight how the MISA-EM concept contributes and relates to the other products of MNE6. Additionally, an outline plan for transitioning the MISA-EM concept was produced. Transitioning in the MISA-EM context meant transitioning the maritime situational awareness capability to the local country or region. However, transitioning *in this context* meant planning the transition of the knowledge found in the MISA-EM concept (how the MISA-EM concept addresses an identified capability gap) to other agencies, organizations, countries and multinational projects responsible for creating and maintaining maritime situational awareness. Thus, successful transition of the MISA-EM concept meant implementing solutions as identified in it (Madrid, 21–23 June 2010; cf. NAMC, 2010: A-19 §65).

The participants in the workshop included objective custodians (for drafting the synthesis); concept developers (for refining the concept); analysts¹⁴² (to provide support and present findings); and technicians (to present the technical solutions developed in support of the concept and provide insights for concept refinement) (Madrid, 21–23 June 2010).

3.5.1.1. WS7 MNE Dialogues: Negotiations and Debate

As can be imagined, the second last workshop for developing a multinational maritime situational awareness concept saw eager negotiations and debates. One reason for this was that there longer was the opportunity to push unresolved issues to a later date. The fact that there was no common language among the participants who came from varying national and organizational cultures, and who had different organizational and personal interests in concept development, made the debates and negotiations sound like negotiating a peace treaty, where everything was the topic of long debate, starting from the definitions of terms. It could also be that identities became blurred during the intense debates under the hot Spanish sun: It was worth observing how the non-NATO representatives used dialogues such as ‘we as NATO’. Previously, the workshops had

¹⁴¹ Defined in the workshop as ‘to combine separate elements or components in order to form a coherent whole’ (Madrid, 21–23 June 2010).

¹⁴² As stated, the original intent was to include analysts in the plural. As it turned out, it was analyst in the singular—only yours truly.

discussed the need for a common frame of reference in order to provide ‘perceptual connectivity’. Now it seemed that various frames of reference relating to MISA-EM existed in the workshop: For example, some emphasized (again) the civilian element in the concept, while others voiced opinions that MISA-EM was, in the end, a military process made for militaries (Madrid, 21–23 June 2010).

Other themes that surfaced in the realm of debate included the ‘selling’ process—how to market the final MISA-EM product. Successful marketing arguments were also seen as especially relevant for transitioning MISA-EM. The air domain and its governing structures were used as an example of successful implementation since all relevant situational data are actively shared in the air domain. The analogue was that in the maritime domain, the consequences of inaction could, similar to the air domain, have dire consequences.¹⁴³ Moreover, successful marketing was seen to be achievable by emphasizing the economical fact that with the utilization of MISA-EM guidelines and norms, access to ports would be easier. This would mean savings in time and fuel, which, especially, was seen as an interest of the private maritime sector, which was recognized as an important stakeholder in the maritime domain. It is worth mentioning here that the business sector was also present during the workshop (Madrid, 21–23 June 2010).

Additionally, the MISA-EM structure was discussed in various ways. One point that was raised was the notion of the need for an *embryonic network*, which was seen to facilitate the creation of mutual trust and interest. The idea behind it was that the network has different phases of existence. During pre-crisis, its role is minor, possibly existing only virtually, but it is able to grow in relevance as the crisis escalates—a *morping network*, if you will. Mutual trust and interest were again emphasized, this time as prerequisites for the establishment of a maritime community of interest. Again, the idea that membership in the community was dependent on what an actor was able to provide to the community was discussed, and the notion that no information contributed, no information accessed and no safety and security provided was raised again.¹⁴⁴ Interestingly, it was mentioned that the militaries themselves might have a hard time fulfilling this requirement since militaries are very good traditionally in ‘pulling’

¹⁴³ The dire event in the air domain was the events of 11 September 2001 in New York, NY.

¹⁴⁴ It was the topic of discussion in the fourth workshop initially—discussed on page 106.

information, but then this information is classified and stored and by no means shared with civilians (Madrid, 21–23 June 2010).

3.5.1.2. WS7 Crossover: Transitioning MISA-EM

Three main phases of CD&E have emerged: First, an existing crisis management problem is identified. Second, solutions that are argued to solve this problem are developed. Finally, these solutions are transitioned¹⁴⁵ to decision-makers who can affect change through the most direct, rapid and effective pathway possible (Madrid, 21–23 June 2010).

In addition to refining the solutions proposed by MISA-EM, the notion of transition was also addressed: The team agreed to draft a Plan of Transition, which aimed to chart the future national and multinational efforts that would disseminate the solutions and products that had been identified in the MISA-EM concept. As stated, successful transition and dissemination of solutions and products means implementing these solutions and products (as identified in the MISA-EM concept). When implemented, MISA-EM, as part of MNE, can be argued to drive change in the international community (one of the characteristics of CD&E, see discussion starting on page 82). It should be noted that each country voluntarily chooses the scope and depth of the transition (implementation) as dictated by its national interest—this intent is also (strongly encouraged to be) made public. Moreover, it was seen that the process of tailoring a solution or a product¹⁴⁶ to the needs of an ‘outside’ agency or ‘transition partner’¹⁴⁷ builds more effective relationships and trust amongst the multinational community (Madrid, 21–23 June 2010).

The MISA-EM concept was to be transitioned as part of the overall MNE6 transition plan, where transition partners are identified—organizations that (potentially) have capability gaps, which are resolved with MNE6 products. Further, the participating

¹⁴⁵ This *transitional feature* emerges from the logic of solution implementation: A successful solution, created with the CD&E methodology within MNE, when implemented, is transitioned from the MNE environment into the larger, international crisis management architecture. It should be noted that documentation on CD&E only discusses processes up to implementation proposals (NAMC, 2009, 2010: §66).

¹⁴⁶ A product in CD&E is anything capable of transmitting information: a concept document, architecture, framework, a ‘how to’ handbook, study reports, validated recommendations, training tools, etc.

¹⁴⁷ An ‘outside’ agency is a ‘transition partner’: An organization that has a capability gap, which is addressed in the concept, has the authority and resources to make change, and will use the products of the concept experimentation to drive change.

(or observing) countries will have a national transition plan for the identified capability gaps. One good method to provide awareness of available solutions to capability shortfalls was seen to be the utilization of a senior leader seminar, where the leadership of potential identified transition partners are invited to learn about MNE products and their potential benefits. The MNE6 senior leader seminar was scheduled to take place by the end of the year (in November) (Madrid, 21–23 June 2010).

Regarding MISA-EM, the discussed potential transitions included the utilization of the concept in (Madrid, 21–23 June 2010):

- Training events for organizations about to join an international operation;
- National capability development, for example:
 - Developing national and international information sharing (interagency) practices and policies;
- National CD&E projects;
- Establishing national maritime governance structures (federated systems);
- Arranging national transition seminars (not limited to MISA-EM);
- Identifying national technology developments:
 - Developing vessels' Automatic Identification Systems (AIS); and
 - Information collaboration tools;
- Existing and potential maritime situational awareness development projects, led by international organizations, for example:
 - UN, IMO, EU (MARSUR especially), NATO, SUCBAS-community; and
- Presentations in international maritime events held by:
 - The Global Maritime Information Sharing Symposium (GMISS),¹⁴⁸ NATO, MNE6 Senior Leader Seminar and Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM).

¹⁴⁸ Hosted by the National Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office (NMCO) to align US Government outreach to the maritime industry and improve and increase industry-government maritime information sharing partnerships.

3.5.2. Helsinki Workshop 8

'This is the first time existing future is written down'

(Interlocutor 1, Helsinki, 4–7 October 2010).

The eighth and final MISA-EM workshop was held from 4 to 7 October 2010 at the Defence Command, Helsinki, Finland. The purpose of this final event was to finalize the MISA-EM concept and the final project report for transition (supporting implementation of the MISA-EM concept in other organizations, see on page 157). Additionally, the event prepared and reviewed the presentation material for the upcoming MNE6 Senior Leader Seminar. The participants included objective custodians, concept developers, analysts and technicians. As the process was drawing to a close, my role was mainly to observe and provide contributions to any needed analyst work (Helsinki, 4–7 October 2010).

In addition to the mandatory marketing of the current maritime interagency implementations in the realm of maritime security, as with the previous workshop (p.154), the workshop was characterized by last minute urgency. There was also a keen sense of accomplishment. After all, this was the last time changes could be agreed upon before submitting the final MISA-EM product. Moreover, there was a sense of uniqueness in the air, a feeling of creating something historical. The quote at the beginning of this section underscores this mood. Simultaneously, it illuminates the notion that MISA-EM is not just a theoretical concept, but that it is also understood to be implemented in future maritime operations. To that end, it was discussed how information sharing and stakeholder analysis elements from MISA-EM had already contributed in the EU's Mission ATALANTA (Helsinki, 4–7 October 2010).

3.5.2.1. WS8 MNE Dialogues: Building Community

The final refinement of the concept was taking place, as was the finalization of how the MISA-EM concept should be introduced to external agencies. New levels of collaboration and intensified information sharing among maritime actors were naturally the driving characteristics for marketing purposes. This kind of collaboration was to be

facilitated by new technological solutions and the establishment of a maritime community. The maritime community of interest would be global (consisting of international organizations, national agencies, the private sector, military actors and non-governmental organizations) in nature during the pre-crisis period and would evolve into a ‘focused’ maritime community of interest as the crisis escalated, at which point, the level of collaboration would be more intense than during the more laidback pre-crisis phase (Helsinki, 4–7 October 2010).

Establishing a community was seen to have impacts at different levels. First, at the *organizational* level, points of contact had to be identified, as, for example, who would negotiate the required level of trust among other actors. Second, at the *training* level, different organizations had to be trained in the procedures of the community. Third, at the *technological* level, the necessary tools had to be implemented (and their users identified and trained) and the mindsets of the actors had to be transformed into seeing the utility and benefits of information sharing. Moreover, the facilities might have to be restructured (to host liaison officers, for example) and technical interoperability ensured to guarantee information sharing (common technical standards and data sets) (Helsinki, 4–7 October 2010).

3.5.3. Helsinki Closing Seminar

Although I did not have the opportunity to join the Senior Leader Seminar, I was able to attend the closing seminar for MNE6, which, in Finland, was held in Helsinki on 13 January 2011. The purpose of the event was to facilitate the transition of MNE6 concepts, including MISA-EM, to other government agencies. My role in the event was strictly to observe, although I could have had the opportunity to comment (at least in theory) had I wanted. However, I was happy to find that my intention of detaching myself from the process had been successful (in my mind at least) and I was content with observing the proceedings and discussions with a keen sense of academic interest. Since the products of MNE6 were familiar to me through my involvement in the process, the way MNE was framed (what it was and what its benefits were) for participants who were not that familiar with it got most of my attention (Helsinki, 13 January 2011).

3.5.3.1. Closing MNE Dialogues: The MNE Advantage

Since many of the attending participants were not familiar with MNE, discussion on its purpose revealed how it was framed for the participants. In line with previous discussions in this study, MNE, via the CD&E methodology, was presented as a way to identify capability gaps and develop potential solutions to fill these gaps. As such, it was especially seen to be an attempt to reduce crisis management expenditures. This argument was relevant for small countries especially: Since smaller crisis management countries have limited resources available for their capability development initiatives, every attempt to find synergies with others and cost-effective procedures in international crisis management is especially welcome (Helsinki, 13 January 2011).

As MNE produces various solutions, it was seen to provide an opportunity to collaborate with other actors in international crisis management already in the planning and capability development phases—in contrast to the actual implementation phase, or the crisis stage where the majority of collaboration is traditionally seen to take place. This collaboration, in addition to the collaboration framework itself (comprising of the MNE process and the CD&E methodology), was discussed to have the potential to provide inputs (lessons learned, best practices) to national planning and development processes. Moreover, just attending the international MNE framework—not significantly contributing to it by taking a leading role in a given objective, for example—was seen to be beneficial and to provide added value; sometimes the learning gained from participation was seen to be more valuable than the solutions MNE produced (Helsinki, 13 January 2011).

In other words, learning about potential future collaboration partners in the crisis phase (their operating procedures, emerging technologies, involvements in other related venues, personal relations) was, at times, recognized to be more enlightening and beneficial in the national crisis management context than the potential future solutions for collaboration. Additionally, mere attendance alone already offered the opportunity to ‘take the icing from the cake’ when it came to benefiting from the actual potential solutions; in other words, it was possible to gain knowledge of the solution without committing a burdensome amount of scarce national resources to the capability development process. Relevant solutions could then be utilized nationally. MNE could

thus be seen as a ‘supermarket’ for various crisis management solutions, where options are put on the shelves and countries take whatever suits them as dictated by national interests (Helsinki, 13 January 2011).

Finally, as presented earlier, MNE seeks to influence decision-making (political, organizational) with its mechanism of transitions (of which the event itself was an example). Therefore, the knowledge gained during MNE participation can be used to analyse the potentiality of future policy changes in other countries and organizations. It follows that since one of the purposes of MNE was to harmonize operating procedures for the sake of efficiency and synergy, it also has the potential to harmonize policy. This knowledge, gained early on via actual participation/ observation, can be used to prepare nationally for the transformations (in capabilities, procedures, policies) that will potentially take place in the international crisis management structure (Helsinki, 13 January 2011).

3.6. Epilogue—MNE7

The sixth cycle of MNE finished at the end of 2010. Work to transition the results of MNE6 to governmental agencies and international organizations had already begun well before the official end date (for the MISA-EM case, for example, see the discussion on page 157). The preparations for the next cycle of MNE had also begun well before the end date of MNE6, thus enabling the immediate initialization of the seventh cycle as soon as the sixth had ended. Although I was purposefully detaching myself from involvement in MNE, I was presented with an opportunity to be involved in the initialization phase of MNE7. Since I had not had the opportunity to join the initialization period of MNE6, I was happy to be involved. This involvement evolved into creating a bigger role for researchers of political science. This, I was told, had much to do with the positive experiences resulting from my involvement. This time, the FIIA was to join the process of MNE7 and provide policy-level injections when needed—especially in, but not limited to, the baseline assessment phase, where the problem MNE7 seeks to solve is mapped and finalized.

The selected theme for MNE7 was ‘Securing Access to the Global Commons’, where the commons were understood as the domains of air, sea, space and cyberspace. It

should be noted that this was not the only potential theme. The process, which ends in selecting one particular theme for an MNE cycle, starts with a variety of potential themes. These themes are then analysed in relation to the participants' perceived interests. Finally, the one gaining most support is selected (Interlocutor 3).

As with the earlier MNE cycles, I learned that the plan was to utilize the knowledge gained in MNE7 for national policy development purposes—much like in MNE6 MISA-EM, where the concept we worked on contributed to a parallel national policy development process relating to maritime interagency policy developments. The contribution of the FIIA to MNE, (I was affiliated at the time), was planned to provide injections to these parallel processes seeking to utilize knowledge gained from the MNE processes for national policy development as well. It should be noted again, however, that countries utilize knowledge gained from MNE as dictated by their national interests—there is no mechanism in place that forces countries (or observing/ contributing organizations) to do anything with this gained knowledge.

The FIIA was selected to hold the opening seminar of MNE7, where all countries contributing to MNE7 sent their representatives. To get to host the opening event of the whole process was viewed as a positive thing, signalling Finland's commitment to the process and also recognition of work well done in the previous cycles.

3.6.1. Helsinki MNE7 Opening Seminar

The opening seminar, as stated, was held in Helsinki from 25 to 27 January 2011. My role in the seminar again was to observe, but I also had to make a presentation on a contribution to MNE7 that I and members from the FIIA and the National Defence University had been working on: 'Securing Global Commons: A Small State Perspective' (Aaltola *et al.*, 2011). If there had been any doubts earlier about whether I had been accepted (as much as a civilian researcher could be) in MNE among its practitioners, the fact that we were making a presentation at the opening seminar of MNE7 erased all of them quite effectively. In our paper, we discussed global commons in general, the cyber domain especially, and, for newcomers to MNE, we provided a short introduction to MNE and the methodology it utilizes, CD&E (Helsinki, 25–27 January 2011).

My task was to present MNE and the CD&E methodology. This was an exciting opportunity for me to test if I had really gained the relevant knowledge of these elements as I was to present these topics to seasoned veterans and professionals of MNE and CD&E. Although some of the veterans found that the presentation was a review of the basics (Interlocutor 3), I was happy to get feedback from prestigious CD&E representatives that the presentation was ‘one of the best presentations on MNE and CD&E they had seen’ (Interlocutors 14; 15). There was of course the strong possibility that they were being polite. Nevertheless, I was happy on two accounts. First, there was no requirement to approach me and be polite. Second, there was the fact that I also got not-so-pleased feedback since I had suggested in my presentation the notion from our paper that for some researchers, MNE could be interpreted as ‘a pedagogical project of the great powers, whereby the methodology of conducting military transformation is taught to the small and non-influential actors’ (Aaltola *et al.*, 2011: 41). I was happy with this since my presentation had been interpreted as discussing issues outside of the official MNE credo. Thus, I was sure that I had not been totally assimilated into the MNE framework (Helsinki, 25–27 January 2011).

Moreover, the impacts and benefits of MNE in general and MNE7 in particular were discussed during and after the meetings. More specifically, how MNE can be utilized for national/ organizational benefit/ interest. As the participants were practitioners, the discussions tended to focus on the technical levels of capability development and implementation. The discussed benefits included how MNE and its experimentation events are a good way to develop technical (information technology) environments. Moreover, as the technical environments are developed, so are civil servants trained in these technologies as they are trained on the actual issue (specifics in the maritime domain, for example). Further, these sessions provided the opportunity for dialogue among practitioners. An especially important and useful fact was that MNE and its experiment events were seen to provide a platform for judicial and technical

dialogue—between the ‘law people’ and the ‘hands-on experts’,¹⁴⁹ who rarely got together in the first place, I was told (Helsinki, 25–27 January 2011).

The discussions also touched on the notion of how MNE and its experiment events especially can be utilized for observation and analysis of current and coming technical capabilities, making MNE a platform of open intelligence. Not only was it seen to be possible to learn from others, it was also seen that the MNE platform could be utilized to market a contributing organization’s capability to the top leaderships of other organizations and also to the general public, as, for example, using the MNE platform to frame a country as a forerunner in a given field. Furthermore, in accordance with acknowledging the utilization of parallel national policy processes, the MNE platform was seen to play an important role in the development of national crisis management strategies. Examples of such events were given from past MNE cycles, especially MNE5, the comprehensive approach of which was seen to have a big impact on developing national comprehensive crisis management strategies. This harmonization of different practices (an intended outcome of MNE) was actively marketed by military people as a very positive thing, especially among the representatives from smaller countries (Helsinki, 25–27 January 2011).

It was interesting to see how the knowledge gained from the seminar diffused into the public debates on national strategy after the MNE7 opening seminar. For example, an editorial in Finland’s largest newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*, in May discussed almost exactly the study themes of MNE7 and provided insights into what position Finland should take in relation to these themes within the international crisis management framework (Aaltola, 2011). Many other similar editorials and commentaries can be found internationally, which discuss access to the global commons or the characteristics of the global commons, but I cannot claim that these texts were influenced by MNE7 participation. Nevertheless, the editorial is a fantastic example of how the words MNE introduces as relevant, important or contemporary spread into public consciousness.

It is unfortunately out of the scope of this study, but it would be very interesting to see studies in which MNE could be identified as a source for action in writings, policy

¹⁴⁹ This comment was from a technical person and, thus, I must assume that this is the reason for framing the technical people as ‘hands-on experts’. How legal positions are not positions of ‘hands-on expertise’, I did not learn.

changes or capability development, for example. So also would be research on the process of how the study issues of MNE are chosen and who (or which organization) chooses its topics and the problems that an international community of crisis management professionals then seeks to solve and implement in national settings.

Chapter 4.

Analysis

First, this chapter will present the interpretation summary of the reflexive ethnography that was presented in Chapter 3 (p.65) and thus view the ethnographic findings through the first and second tiers of the analytical framework (on page 50). More specifically, the interpretation summary of the reflexive ethnography will be presented in the different themes of meaningful actions that constitute the MNE reality. This first section will also include reflections on acquired data and habitus. Through the description of the ethnographic findings of MNE actions, this section illustrates—and makes visible—the logics that organize and constitute actions within MNE and, further, in the surrounding crisis management architecture (cf. Swidler, 2001: 85).

Second, these descriptions of observed actions in MNE, and the logics constituting and organizing these arrays of actions, will set the stage for the second part of this chapter, which has its basis in practice theory. This second part will discuss the ‘MNE-community’ as a security community of practice (cf. Lave and Wenger, 1991: 98). Moreover, MNE will be defined as a practice using the definition offered by Adler and Pouliot (2011: 4–5). In addition, the generative aspects (Leander, 2008: 18) of the defined ‘MNE-practice’ will be discussed.

These discussions will further enable the examination of how the MNE-practice works as a constitutive mechanism in the international crisis management architecture—how the MNE-practice has the possibility to anchor and (re)produce constitutive norms in this architecture (Swidler, 2001: 95–100). Thus, the second part of the chapter will present a constitutional analysis in order to further denaturalize MNE, therefore fulfilling the requirements of the third tier of the analytical framework. More specifically, this second part of the chapter will utilize these action-constituting logics to illustrate how the ‘MNE-community’ (X) constitutes realities (Y) within crisis management (C) with its constitutive mechanism, the ‘MNE-practice’ (cf. Pouliot, 2007: 373–374).

4.1. Ethnographic Themes

Next, the interpretation summary of the reflexive ethnography is presented in three themes. Together, these three themes chart the meaning that constitutes reality within MNE (cf. Smart, 1998: 113–124) and discuss the logics that organize the arrays of MNE actions (cf. Swidler, 2001: 85).

The first presented ethnographic theme, ‘CD&E and Knowledge’, discusses the knowledge application and producing methodology, CD&E. In official documentation, MNE is presented as a process that seeks to identify capability challenges in the field of crisis management and then seeks to produce solutions to these challenges with the knowledge it has created. This knowledge is created with the CD&E knowledge application and producing methodology (NAMC, 2009). Thus, a discussion on the characteristics of CD&E is the first presented theme in this section. While the specific characteristics and details of the methodology were presented above (pp.80, 92, 123), this discussion will focus on CD&E’s meaning for MNE and the larger crisis management architecture.

The second presented ethnographic theme, ‘Actions, Logics and Consequences’, will discuss the action-constituting logics and crisis management meanings that MNE was seen to utilize and promote among the actors in crisis management, including the MNE participants and beyond. Specifically, such discussions as emerged from my ethnographic journey to MISA-EM will be presented.

The third presented ethnographic theme, ‘Ethnographic Journey’, will discuss the ethnographic data, how it was accessed and how ‘valid’ it is. Additionally, the third theme will discuss the different habitus observed in MNE, including the evolution of my habitus.

4.1.1. CD&E and Knowledge

One of the *contributions* of this study for academia is the examination of this knowledge application and knowledge producing methodology. As stated above, militaries increasingly use CD&E to create new crisis management knowledge and to solve capability challenges in particular. This study illustrates this logic and contextualizes it in meaning.

Earlier, it was discussed how action-constituting logic is influenced and formed by background knowledge (cf. Swidler, 2001: 85; Pouliot, 2008: 270). In consequence, knowledge (be it taken-for-granted or conscious) has a huge role to play in constituting the logics—the rationales—of crisis management actions. Therefore, in order to understand these actions, we must also understand how the knowledge constituting these actions is created—the way ‘a knowledge’ is created affects the *boundaries of the possible* contents of ‘the knowledge’. Thus, when examining crisis management actions (and later practices), the way crisis management knowledge is created and diffused deserves comprehensive analysis.

The specifics of the CD&E methodology¹⁵⁰ were examined while presenting my ethnographic journey to MNE in Chapter 3. The purpose of this first ethnographic theme is to discuss CD&E’s meaning for MNE and discuss CD&E’s meaning in the larger crisis management architecture.

4.1.1.1. CD&E for MNE

Countries that operate with and within a coalition framework in crisis management need to constantly adapt to challenges (current and emerging)¹⁵¹ that hinder the coalition’s capability to operate in a given crisis management scenario. The contemporary requirement of constant reform and transformation in crisis management emerges from the increasing number of new and innovative challenges to the coalition crisis management framework (NATO, 2010d: §6). The purpose of the CD&E methodology is to facilitate the transformation of the crisis management capabilities of the MNE participants (NATOACT, 2009g: 5–7; NAMC, 2009: §11). The starting point for transformation for the MNE participants is the identification of the capability shortfalls in the current crisis management environment. These initial identifications of capability shortfalls can be provided, for example, by studies and evaluations (NAMC, 2009: §7–9; NAMC, 2010: §10).

While the identification of ‘real’ gaps in capability is the primary initiation point for CD&E, there is another possibility of initializing it. Instead of seeking solutions to fill

¹⁵⁰ See the discussion on CD&E in general on page 80; on concept development on page 92; and on experimentation on page 123.

¹⁵¹ (cf. DOD, 30 September 2001: 36).

the capability gaps, this alternative initialization starts with the hypothesis that a new technology, for example, might be more suitable and more effective in the current crisis management framework. In this case, current demands—and thus restrictions—in crisis management capabilities are put aside temporarily. Supporters of both these starting points exist within MNE and debate persists on which of them should be the primary one (cf. Wah *et al.*, 2006). Indeed, during my involvement with MNE, it was seen that current problems within crisis management tend to dominate as initialization points (cf. Tuusula, 1–3 September 2009).

Whatever be the source of capability gap identification, it initially involves an *interpretation of the crisis management ‘reality’* within which MNE participants have to operate. In the first discussed case of initialization, this interpretation identifies the capability gap in the crisis management context (the interpreted crisis management ‘reality’). In the second discussed case, this interpretation forms the context in relation to which the suitability of the developed capability is evaluated. Thus, knowledge of the particulars in the crisis management framework is integral to CD&E, the purpose of which is to enable transformation by providing solutions to perceived problems (NATOACT, 2009g: 5–7; NAMC, 2009: §11). Specifically in the CD&E methodology, interpretations of current ‘realities’ of crisis management are articulated in identified ‘gaps’ in current capability and encapsulated as text. The purpose of CD&E is to produce valid, feasible, applicable, robust and credible solutions with which these gaps can be filled (cf. NATOACT, 2009a: 4). The rationalities of these solutions are demonstrated in concepts.

Knowledge of the issues in the current crisis management framework is also the source for the topic—or theme—of investigation within MNE. In other words, perceived challenges in the crisis management environment form the source for the theme for a given MNE cycle. For example, contemporary events in the Gulf of Aden influenced¹⁵² the contents and interpretation of MISA-EM in MNE6.

¹⁵² I do not wish to argue that it was the only reason for MISA-EM, which it certainly was not. Other factors include the rise of ‘irregular’ challenges and continuity of maritime investigations within the MNE framework. Yet, the events in the Gulf of Aden observably emerged into MISA-EM. For example, refer to the discussions in Workshop 3 in Cartagena on page 101.

These challenges are then (attempted to be) solved with MNE's methodology for producing new crisis management knowledge: CD&E. As the name of the methodology implies, it has two main parts: the concept development part and the experimentation part. The two go hand in hand. The role of concept development is to demonstrate, in written form, the rationale that justifies the experimentation of a new capability; the concept encapsulates the new knowledge as text. The role of experimentation then is to demonstrate the utility and suitability of the capability, the utility of which is demonstrated in the concept (cf. NAMC, 2009: §14–15; NATOACT, 2009b: D-3–5, §3).

Thus, the purpose of CD&E, after *utilizing current* crisis management knowledge, is to *seek new knowledge* which will impact the crisis management field. Mainly, this new knowledge determines if a new capability makes a difference in military effectiveness (NATOACT, 2009e: 4, 2009h: 5–7). It should be remembered that the purpose of CD&E is not to purposefully seek new knowledge for the sake of producing new knowledge (cf. Worley, 1999: 3). Always, however, the purpose is to provide feedback on the capability in question—feedback on its validity, feasibility, applicability, robustness and credibility (cf. NATOACT, 2009a: 4).

Hence, the CD&E methodology should be seen as a tool with which future operational concepts (capabilities) are explored, demonstrated and evaluated. As such, CD&E has been seen to have contributed to meaningful capability development (Theile, 2005; NAMC, 2009: §1–5, 31; Alberts and Hayes, 2002: 1). The weight of this tool is articulated, for example, in the US Department of Defense's (DOD's) recognition of experimentation¹⁵³ as one of the most important processes that assists in effects optimization of its joint force to achieve its vision of the future (CJCS, 2000: 33–34).

MNE thus utilizes the 'CD&E-tool' of knowledge application and production as its *intellectual framework*, which organizes MNE activities. Not only does this intellectual framework govern the 'structured development of creative and innovative ideas into viable solutions for [future] capability development' (NAMC, 2009: §5) within

¹⁵³ Although the DOD limits its wording to 'experimentation', it should be remembered that the two go hand in hand: Where there is experimentation, there is concept development, and vice versa (cf. NAMC, 2009: §14–15; NATOACT, 2009b: D-3–5, §3).

MNE, but it also defines and governs the roles and tasks¹⁵⁴ of the actors participating in MNE (NATOACT, 2009d: 4). Thus, the examination of CD&E is the examination of a framework that governs the knowledge application and production of MNE (i.e. *CD&E is the logic which organizes the arrays of MNE activities*), but it is also the examination of a project management methodology of sorts, with detailed steps and tasks relating to the tasks, roles and required outputs from the completion of these tasks.

A major perceived *asset* of CD&E is seen to be that it provides a safe framework for crisis management actors to discover and verify the applicability of a solution; instead of testing new capabilities in the field, CD&E, used in the framework of MNE, provides the opportunity to test capabilities in a safe environment without risking failure or casualties in actual operations. Moreover, it is perceived that CD&E facilitates adaptations to security challenges *more rapidly* than a normal, traditional military capability creation process would allow (Zappata, 2009).

CD&E is seen to be especially important when innovative answers to capability gaps are required—indeed, providing innovative and novel crisis management solutions is the primary focus of CD&E (cf. NAMC, 2009: §8). Therefore, MNE and CD&E demonstrate how militaries *innovate*. Thus, to study MNE and CD&E is to supplement studies that tend to focus on military reactions and/ or legitimacy argumentations. In the business world, for example, when organizations are successful, other organizations seek to emulate and imitate their forms and practices through the diffusion of ‘best practices’. When faced with the danger of poor performance, on the other hand, the tendency is to restrict innovation, increase procedural control (governance) and limit processes that require complex information processing (March and Sutton, 1997: 699–701). The military world, on the other hand, through MNE and CD&E, engages actively in innovation and experimentation when a performance gap or failure is identified. Further, the products of experimentation have a tendency to increase complex information processing (through the addition of information sources and sharing procedures, as demonstrated in the MISA-EM concept (Helsinki LOE1, p.140).

¹⁵⁴ For more detailed discussions on roles and responsibilities, see NATOJWC (2006: Annex F) or Ekström (2010: 7–12).

CD&E embraces all forms of knowledge, from various sources, including the academia (military, civilian); industry; government; advocacy groups (e.g. Amnesty, Greenpeace); SMEs—as in the Helsinki workshop (p.140); the professions (e.g. medical, legal); the arts; and media (NATOACT, 2009c: 7, 2009g: 14–17). Moreover, there is emphasis on using a scientific, structured and rigorous research method in the knowledge production process (NATOACT, 2009f: 4–5). This could be assumed to include both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies.

However, a strong *emphasis on utilizing quantitative* methods was observed in MNE (on page 138). This is especially true in the experimentation phase, whereas it is more likely to see the utilization of qualitative analysis in the concept development phase. For example, the main data gathering method in MISA-EM LOE2 (p.147), which focused on the analysis of information flows, was quantitative. MISA-EM LOE1 (p.140), on the other hand, conducted surveys and gathered comments from SMEs, with the intention of getting feedback from the experts on, for example, the feasibility of the MISA-EM concept.

Yet, in LOE1, the gathered materials were not analysed using a rigid qualitative framework, where a coherent research methodology is presented and from which a concrete tool of inquiry is derived and then used in the analysis of data (Pouliot, 2007: 360). On a similar note, Alberts and Hayes emphasize the statistical methods (cf. Alberts and Hayes, 2005: 76–77). Ekström discusses how the positivist, empirical-deductive notion of ‘science’ prevails in the field of CD&E, excluding other paradigms such as pragmatism (Ekström, 2010: 14). Ekström’s discussion is supported by my observations during training, where quantitative analysis dominated the understandings of ‘analysis’ (Tuusula, 1–3 September 2009).

Granted, quantitative technical (sensor) data is a prerequisite for the creation of situational awareness in our cyber dominated world. However, there seemed to be a contradiction in the data gathering and analysis methods of the experiments and the *intent* of the concept, which emphasized face-to-face interactions, trust and human relationships. Utilization of the ‘human interface’ was articulated, for example, in LOE1 (p.140). Thus, gaining ‘increased awareness’ was experimented with as the task of quantitative technical data, rather than the task of qualitative and human methods (finding

‘relevant’ information sources, agreeing on information sharing procedures, analysing anecdotal information gained via social collaborations), which was emphasized during concept development and later in the concept (USJFCOM, 2010b).

4.1.1.2. CD&E for Crisis Management

As established, the purpose of MNE is, by utilizing CD&E, to develop crisis management capabilities (e.g. material, procedural, organizational) and their corresponding concepts for national and multinational crisis management operations in an interagency framework. Yet, if these solutions are not implemented, the new crisis management capabilities exist only in the plane of good ideas, as text. Without implementation, there can be no capability. Thus, effort is put into the diffusion of the new crisis management knowledge created by MNE. The intent and hope is that this diffusion will lead to the implementation of the identified capability.

More specifically, this built-in *transitional feature* of MNE and CD&E emerges from the logic of solution implementation: A successful solution, created with the CD&E methodology within MNE, when implemented, is transitioned from the MNE environment into the larger, international crisis management architecture. It should be noted that documentation on CD&E only discusses processes up to the implementation proposal stage (NAMC, 2009, 2010: §66). Yet, ‘to transition’ MISA-EM, for example, was a clearly observable feature within the MNE ethnography (cf. Cartagena WS3, on page 97; Madrid WS7, on page 154; and Helsinki WS8, on page 159).

By examining the knowledge application and production methodology CD&E, the logics that organize and constitute action within MNE and its surrounding crisis management architecture are made visible. This new crisis management knowledge, created within MNE, *transitions into* (the background) knowledge of the international crisis management architecture via *actionable recommendations* (NATO, 2010a: Chapter 2, §3) and the *lobbying efforts* of officials (cf. Madrid IAKO, p.108; Singapore WS5, p.116). Once transitioned, this knowledge then influences the *interpretations of* the crisis management ‘*reality*’, which will influence crisis management actions, such as the initializations of new MNE phases and their study issues.

A characteristic of transitioning knowledge is not only to spread (diffuse) the created knowledge, but also to *create favourable conditions in the crisis management structure where the new capability can successfully prevail*. During the ethnography, observations were made, which demonstrate the diffusion of knowledge to other officials and the general public. These include events where officials were invited to learn of concept development, such as the interagency kick-off meeting in Madrid (p.108), LOE1 (p.140), the Senior Leader Seminar (p.157), and the Closing Seminar of MNE6 (p.160). Moreover, editorials were observed where the ‘new’ logics, demands and directions of contemporary crisis management were discussed with the general public (Aaltola, 2011).

Therefore, it can be argued that the knowledge gained during MNE with the CD&E methodology can be, and is in fact, utilized with the *intent to influence the transformation of structures*, in particular the structures of crisis management (structures with which crises are actually managed on the operational level) and the structures of policy and decision-making. The latter characteristic is especially interesting: During training, it was discussed how the purpose of CD&E concepts are not to influence policy (cf. NATOACT, 2009g: 6). Yet, at the same time, ‘strategic level concepts’ focus their application on the political and military levels of planning and decision-making (cf. NAMC, 2009: §12). Moreover, discussions observed during the development of the MISA-EM concept and its *transitional feature* reveal the intent and various routes to influencing decision-making and policy (cf. Madrid IAKO, p.108; Madrid WS7 p.157). As a further example, MNE4-materials state how successful MNE4-concepts were used as proposals for amending doctrine (NATOACT, 2007: 13; cf. USJFCOM, 2011a: 1).

Furthermore, it can be argued that the intent is not only to simply influence, but also to ‘make similar’ and standardize—or harmonize—crisis management methodologies, including capabilities, legislation and even interpretations and perceptions of crisis management. This is a type of harmonization, which effectively starts to treat all MNE-participants as a single entity, where information sharing standards are the same, organizational structures and processes resemble each other, and where the material capabilities of the single entity are treated as (more) common. This is achieved by promoting synergy, effectiveness and efficiency and avoiding duplications in capability development, for example (NATOACT, 2005: 24; NATO, 2010a: 1-1–1-3).

It can be even argued that the need for the harmonization of international crisis management practices is actually the main driver behind the stated requirement (in CD&E documentation) of transformation. Indeed, documentation revealed that the need for evolution in the coalition crisis management context derives from the need for a higher level of interoperability and standardization (harmonization). Thus, the way to evolve is to continuously upgrade and improve standardization—within NATO and between NATO and other countries. Education and training, for example, are ways to set standards, ways to diffuse the knowledge created within the MNE context by utilizing CD&E, for example, and thus guiding the MNE participants to upgrade and improve standardization (NATO, 2010a: 1–1: §4–5).

Therefore, harmonization can be argued to be a goal of MNE and an *implied step* within CD&E. During the ethnography, harmonization was marketed actively by the MNE participants as a positive thing, especially among the representatives of the smaller countries (p.162). This attitude echoes a purpose of MNE5, which was to achieve ‘greater harmonization¹⁵⁵ in crisis management’, and a goal of MNE6, which was to achieve greater harmonization among crisis management actors in their planning, management and evaluation procedures in complex contingencies and emergencies. Moreover, the harmonizing of effort and implementation was its own objective (Objective 1.3) in the MNE6 framework (USJFCOM, 2011a: 2–14).

In the MISA-EM ethnography (Chapter 3, on page 65), harmonization and the interoperability it provides were seen as pivotal—not only by the MISA-EM concept developers and participants in MNE, but also by the SMEs who were invited to take part in the development of the MISA-EM concept. More specifically, actors taking part in the comprehensive information sharing structure should be prepared to harmonize data (formats, interfaces and contents) in addition to organizational standards and procedures and even representations of data, which provide a common frame of reference at the symbolic level. Harmonized representations of data (interpretations, symbolizations) can be seen, following the notion of ‘perceptual connectivity’ discussed by Maltz (Maltz, 2007: 3), to advance a notion of *harmonizing perceptions* (cf. Helsinki LOE1, p.140).

¹⁵⁵ Among national and multinational civilian government agencies, military forces, IOs and IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector.

Further, the invited SMEs (a wider range of officials than ‘only’ the MNE-participants) recognized the need to modify legal frameworks in order to create favourable conditions for the successful implementation of a future MISA-EM. Thus, a discussed task of the MISA-EM implementation was to influence the realm of political decision-making (cf. Madrid IAKO, p.108). Moreover, interdependencies and common interests (mutual benefits) in information sharing should be understood in addition to emphasizing the power of networking. This calls for changes in resource allocations and education (comprehensive mindsets and cultural awareness) within organizations (cf. observations from LOE1 in Helsinki, on page 140) Thus, the task of *harmonizing perceptions*, discussed earlier, evolves into meaning the *harmonizing of mindsets*. Similar discussions were also held in Cartagena, where it was discussed that the increase in social collaborations facilitated the harmonization of maritime crisis management frames of reference; they facilitated the way the maritime situation in the Horn of Africa was understood and interpreted (cf. Cartagena WS3, p.97).

MNE and its harmonizing effects impact a large audience. In general, participation, and thus the immediate harmonizing impact, is not limited to NATO members; the Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Istanbul cooperation Initiative (ICI) and/ or contact countries can be involved within MNE (NAMC, 2009: §24). In practice, this additionally includes international organizations, NGOs and businesses that are affiliated with the participating governments. For example, MNE6 was conducted with 18 contributing countries¹⁵⁶ plus NATO ACT (USJFCOM, 2011a: v-2). Thus, crisis management knowledge, created within MNE with CD&E, facilitates the transformation, and thus harmonization, of not only the military world, but also the civilian world (either directly or indirectly), as was discussed in Madrid (p.108) (cf. USJFCOM, 2011b).

Therefore, concept development products (or concepts) highlight the *aim, scope and site* of harmonization, which is (at least to some degree)¹⁵⁷ preferred by all the actors who are affected by MNE knowledge. For example, in the MISA-EM case, and

¹⁵⁶ Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.

¹⁵⁷ Ultimately, an actor determines its degree of preferred harmonization in relation to its national/organizational interest considerations (cf. NAMC, 2010: §66).

additionally through the MNE7 study issues (p.162), the examination of concept development illustrates the growing interest in maritime crisis management characteristics, and thus also the *rise of the maritime* domain in international crisis management significance (cf. Aaltola *et al.*, 2011).

4.1.2. Actions, Logics and Consequences

In the previous theme, it was discussed how MNE, through CD&E, creates new crisis management capabilities by producing knowledge that harmonizes crisis management capabilities, organizations and mindsets. The purpose of this next ethnographic theme is to discuss further some of the characteristics of knowledge that were discussed during the MISA-EM ethnography. This is done in order to illuminate in exemplary fashion how (and what) officials contributed to crisis management transformations in the international environment—at the crisis management level and at the policy level. Through the latter observation, officials can be seen as political actors, who, through the process of transitioning solutions, also lobby for changes in regulation.¹⁵⁸

This ethnographic theme will also illustrate the utility of MNE (multinational collaboration on CD&E) as a venue/ site for its participants and how crisis management actors utilize their access in it (cf. NATOACT, 2005: 24).

4.1.2.1. In Crisis Management

As discussed in the previous theme, the MNE process uses the CD&E methodology as its governing intellectual framework (p.169). The CD&E methodology, in addition to applying and producing knowledge, is a project management methodology, with steps for concept development, experimentation, analysis and, finally, transition. To transition is to diffuse and disseminate information (knowledge or awareness) of solutions developed by MNE. Ideally, this information is then used to materially implement these solutions in different organizations (cf. Madrid WS7, p.157). As intended, this supports the transformation of military establishments and structures. Thus, it also transforms the structure with which crisis management operations are managed and drives change in the international (crisis management) community (cf. Zappata, 2009).

¹⁵⁸ Similar to the ‘small steps’ strategy of the ‘wait and see’ integration policy (cf. Hakovirta, 1975: 429).

In order to illuminate the (potential) characteristics of change in the maritime domain, the ethnographic findings from MISA-EM will be presented. Attention is especially paid to findings that illuminate MNE's considerations in relation to the aims (or intents) and scopes of change in the maritime crisis management domain.

Reflecting back on the MISA-EM ethnography, it can be argued that the MISA-EM concept promotes the establishment of a *new maritime governance structure* with new guidelines, standards and norms (technological, procedural and organizational). The purpose of this structure was to transform 'unprepared waters' into 'prepared waters', where the coalition had ensured access and room and possibilities for manoeuvre (cf. Madrid IAKO, p.108; Helsinki LOE1, p.140). The additional characteristics of the structure that MISA-EM promoted were discussed during the ethnography. One point that was raised was the notion of the need for an *embryonic network*, which was seen to facilitate the creation of mutual trust and interest. The underlying idea was that the network had different phases of existence. During the pre-crisis phase, its role was minor, possibly only existing virtually, but it was able to grow in relevance as the crisis escalated; it was a *morphing network*, if you will. Mutual trust and interest were stressed as prerequisites for the establishment of a maritime community of interest (cf. Madrid WS7, p.157; Helsinki LOE1, p.140).

Additionally, the MISA-EM ethnography can be seen to reveal a desired intent to promote a crisis management policy in which crisis management 'purposeful action' moved away from crisis nodes (moved away from attempting to 'fix' crises, or social transformations) into (inter)connections and their interfaces between countries (moved towards securing the critical 'flows' in the vicinity of the crisis). In other words, future crisis management could have ATALANTA-type *flanking characteristics*, where the primary contributions of countries were not committed to the crisis (in Somalia), but, instead, to securing the sea-lines around the crisis (the Gulf of Aden, for example). Thus, future crisis management could be about *containing the effects* of crises and making sure (securing) that these effects did not disturb 'our' way of life. Flanking characteristics, if increased, could also be seen as an evolution of the comprehensive approach, which, ideally and currently, was specifically about action within crises environments (Madrid WS4, p.104).

The idea that membership in the community is dependent on what an actor is able to provide to the community was discussed as well—if no information is contributed, then no access to information is given¹⁵⁹ and no safety and security are provided. *Conditionality* of membership in the maritime comprehensive approach, if implemented, would also be an evolution of the comprehensive approach, which, ideally and currently, does not exclude a willing (yet coalition-friendly or compliant) actor’s membership. Moreover, it requires that civilian actors, who have supposedly paid their taxes at home, have to ‘pay’ again for the protection of their armed services in crisis situations. Inclusion must also be negotiated, especially when non-coalition members participate in the network. For example, if China is a participant in a comprehensive network, could an NGO, Free Tibet, participate in the network even if both had credible goals in the given crises? (Madrid WS4, p.104).

MISA-EM promoted the notion that increased maritime awareness results in an increase of efficiencies in actions, that is, in a more agile and ‘fluid’ crisis management field, to serve the earlier mentioned ‘common good’. Contradictorily, however, the hypothetical fluidity on the field is achieved by implementing a new structure—a network with many miscellaneous actors all connected and harmonized with each other—with new additional norms, forms, rules and standards. Thus, fluidity of movement and action on the field is achieved by increasing rigidity in the governance layer (command structures), where a new ‘infrastructure of social life’ is implemented (Urry, 2007: 12–13).

This would be a move away from military-type vertical governance mechanisms by means of creating an all-encompassing governance model with the characteristics of horizontal information flows and a touch of ethics. This ‘infrastructure of the social’ has its basis in increased information flows between current actors and in the inclusion of new actors. The increase in information flows is established by utilizing the potential of the social media, for example, and also by increasing the harmonization of processes and technologies (harmonization was discussed in the previous theme (on page 174) as one of

¹⁵⁹ Interestingly, it was mentioned that the militaries themselves might have a hard time fulfilling this requirement since militaries are traditionally very good at ‘pulling’ information, but then this information is classified and stored and not shared with civilians. Specifically, the military and its intelligence component were seen by the civilian organizations as ‘black holes’—information goes in, but nothing comes out (Helsinki LOE1, p.140).

the official intents of MNE). More specifically, actors taking part in the comprehensive information sharing structure should be prepared to harmonize and standardize data (formats, interfaces and contents) in addition to organizational standards and procedures and even representations of data, which provide a common frame of reference at the symbolic level (Helsinki LOE1, p.140). It should also be remembered that CD&E is seen as a cooperative approach in itself and as such to contribute to the cohesion (technical and social) of the Alliance (NAMC, 2009: §19).

In MISA-EM, the experimentations (LOE1, on page 140; LOE2, on page 147), the TCD (on page 150) and Senior Leadership Seminar can be seen to have served to improve standardization and harmonization¹⁶⁰ of the crisis management field. LOE1 and the Senior Leadership Seminar, in particular, marketed the MISA-EM ‘standard’ of maritime information sharing to outside audiences. The MNE6 MISA-EM objective was an information sharing node in itself along with other maritime situational awareness development processes and projects led by international organizations, such as the UN, IMO, EU (MARSUR especially), NATO and the SUCBAS-community (Madrid WS7, p.157). Thus, MISA-EM, which was testing the utility of increased information flows between nodes virtually, acted as a node in the real-world information flow structure, too.

Yet, the facilitated notion of increased information sharing leads to another type of potential change within the crisis management environment: the increasing demand for contextualizing qualitative data. The need arises from the fact that the data that is ‘pulled’ from various agents are initially unstructured. This means that the gathered data are not automatically analysed and fitted into a constructed, often narrated (GIEJOEDOE) context—the specifics of which characterize ‘structured’ data. Thus, *anecdotal information* is the raw material of a crisis management ‘reality’, which forms the basis of crisis management action.¹⁶¹ The human element in this information gathering process (data is gathered by humans from humans) reveals a form of collaborative ethnography; the MISA-EM structure emphasizes the need to work together and learn from each other.

¹⁶⁰ Harmonization has been discussed, for example, in Cartagena WS3 (p.97); Helsinki LOE1 (p.140); Helsinki WS8 (p.159); Madrid IAKO (p.108); Singapore WS5 (p.116); Tuusula CD&E Training (p.80); and NATO documentation (2010a: 1–1: §4–5).

¹⁶¹ Similar to the central banking world, where situational awareness of the economy is achieved through anecdotes, forming an ‘economy of words’ (Holmes, 2009; Holmes and Marcus, 2006).

Thus, it could be stipulated that the maritime environment could have a use for ethnographic skills to analyse human data and provide ‘cultural and ethnographic intelligence’—as has been done with the counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan and the Iraq land operations (Bell, 2011: 312).

4.1.2.2. *In Policy*

As discussed earlier, the products of MNE are intended to support the transformation of military establishments and structures. Thus, it can be also argued to transform the structure in which crisis management operations are in fact managed, and to drive change in the international (crisis management) community (cf. Zappata, 2009). MNE products can also be argued to transform the structures that govern the crisis management contributions of different organizations. In order to illuminate the (potential) characteristics of change in the governing structures of the maritime domain (for example, political, legal or doctrinal structures), the ethnographic findings from MISA-EM will be presented here. Attention is especially paid to those findings that illuminate MNE’s considerations in relation to the aims (or intents) and scopes of change in the maritime domain governance structure as well as how the MNE platform is utilized as a venue/ site for information exchange and the types of information exchange that were focused on (cf. NATOACT, 2005: 24).

As recognized above, at times, the successful implementation of these solutions requires changes in policy. Thus, to transition successfully means to influence political decision-making when necessary (Madrid IAKO, p.108). MNE is thus the development of capabilities, but it is also the development (identification) of political needs, where the *operational needs*, identified in the concept, are transformed into *political needs* to which political decision-makers must react in order to create an environment in which the (potential) capability can thrive (Madrid WS7, p.157) In my ethnography, this political aspect of transition was never articulated as the most meaningful aspect of CD&E. Influencing the political (and governing) structures could be even unthought-of, where influencing the political decision-making layer is seen as a ‘*natural*’ feature and task of MNE. As a student of political science and international relations, this was extremely relevant and meaningful for me as officials conducting and promoting transition of

developed solutions can be seen as political actors who lobby for changes in regulations¹⁶² and policies.

In the MISA-EM case, the existing legal structures were seen as hindering information sharing practices that were essential for achieving an increased maritime awareness. Moreover, the ethnography reveals how MNE participants¹⁶³ discussed the different ways in which they could *create favourable conditions* in the crisis management governance structure for the MISA-EM concept. These included the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. In the former approach, the implementation logics of MISA-EM, which necessitate change in the legal structure, were advertised. In the latter approach, evidence on the utility and benefit of the MISA-EM concept was provided (Madrid IAKO, p.108; Singapore WS5, p.116).

MNE was utilized thus to influence the evolution of crisis management on the operational and the political levels—influence that was articulated as one of Finland’s goals¹⁶⁴ in its involvement in MNE, for example. This influence can focus on either the national or international crisis management levels—or both. During discussions with MNE participants in MISA-EM, it was seen that MNE had been very successful earlier in influencing crisis management policies. As an example, Finland’s crisis management strategy (FinMFA, 2009) was said to have been influenced by MNE5. As another example, the comprehensive approach product from MNE5 was seen to have influenced the US Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy (ARMYHQ, 2006) in Afghanistan.¹⁶⁵ As a further example, in relation to EU policy, it was commented that MNE5 products had directly influenced EU’s information collaboration mechanisms in crisis management operations (Interlocutor 3).

Moreover, it was discussed how the findings and products from the current MNE cycle—that is, through MISA-EM—would feed into the European Defence Agency’s

¹⁶² Similar to the ‘small steps’ strategy of the ‘wait and see’ integration policy (cf. Hakovirta, 1975: 429).

¹⁶³ In this case, the MISA-EM concept development team members and the invited SMEs.

¹⁶⁴ Some of Finland’s goals in its MNE participation were articulated in the chapter, ‘Introduction to Multinational Experimentation’. These include: 1) supporting national capability development; 2) improving national research and development; 3) developing international interoperability; and 4) influencing the evolution of crisis management (Interlocutor 3).

¹⁶⁵ ‘COIN’ and ‘comprehensive approach’, although at first glance very different terms, have been equated to be (almost) the same. When in Munich, speaking about the US Counterinsurgency (COIN) policy (ARMYHQ, 2006), then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Ambassador Eric Edelman stated: ‘If I... say “counterinsurgency”, please just pretend that you heard “comprehensive approach”’ (Edelman, 2007).

MARSUR project on maritime situational awareness, for example. Thus, crisis management knowledge, developed in the MNE context, would eventually find its way into and feed into the ESDP¹⁶⁶ framework (Madrid IAKO, p.108). The maritime lessons learned, as framed in the MISA-EM concept, would also potentially find their way into EU-level maritime governance policy: It was discussed in Cartagena that the MISA-EM concept would directly (that is, it had the potential to) influence proposals for an EU-wide integrated maritime COP in the near future (Cartagena WS3, p.97).

The study issues—not just the products—of MNE influence the governing structures of crisis management. Earlier, it was discussed how the products of MNE (potentially) influence governance structures through the built-in logic of solution implementation (the *transitional feature* of MNE and CD&E). Yet additionally, knowledge gained already *during* the MNE experience influences the governing structures (such as the political, legal or doctrinal structures) of crisis management.

During the ethnography, this was observed to occur on the national level. In the Finnish case, processes aiming to develop national strategy, were launched in parallel to the MNE study issues. More specifically, knowledge gained when MNE6 focused on the development of maritime situational awareness fed simultaneously into the national process aiming to develop a (potential) national maritime interagency policy. Similarly, processes aiming to develop national policy relating to the cyber domain have been aligned in parallel to the study issues in MNE7 (securing access to the global commons—one of these being the ‘cyber dimension’ (cf. Aaltola *et al.*, 2011; Helsinki MNE7, p.162).

Thus, knowledge gained during participation already supports national capability development (one of Finland’s goals in MNE, for example). The sources of knowledge in this case can include studies relating to the given theme (such as maritime situational awareness and the cyber domain), information from other related process¹⁶⁷ (in the MISA-EM case, MARSUR) and information from the solutions and best practices of other participants.

¹⁶⁶ European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)

¹⁶⁷ Bear in mind that there exists the possibility that access to the information of these ‘other related processes’ might otherwise (without MNE participation) be limited or even restricted.

Yet, in the MISA-EM case, ‘to transition’ actually meant two totally different things. So far, emphasis had been placed on the discussed *transitional feature* of MNE and CD&E, where governance structures were influenced through the built-in logic of solution implementation. In this case, the MNE product, developed with CD&E, was transitioned to other crisis management organizations, many of which were directly or indirectly involved with the development of these products in the first place. However, in MISA-EM, ‘to transition’ also referred to the notion that when (if) the implemented maritime situational awareness solution was no longer needed (as in a post-crisis environment), the solution and its administration would be ‘transitioned’ to the host country or region (of the crisis) (Cartagena WS3, p.97).

Thus, the host country gains the capability of the ‘prepared waters’ (in contrast to ‘unprepared waters’) where the coalition had ensured access and room and possibilities for manoeuvre. What seems (and arguably is) a generous gesture on the one hand is transforming the regional governance structure into one that is immediately interoperable with and friendly to the coalition on the other—for whom and for what are the waters now ‘prepared’? Further, even the most specific of details of this structure is known to the coalition (it could be argued that the best intelligence is when others use what you yourself have created). Further still, as a consequence, the host region has to adapt its governing structure (such as policies and legislations) to enable—to ‘fit’ in—this transitioned capability (Madrid IAKO, p.108; Singapore WS5, p.116).

Transitioning, in this sense, is the coalition setting the boundaries of rational calculation and action for the host region. In other words, this was constructing a favourable (familiar and interoperable) maritime governance model and facilitating its crossover from top-bottom and outside-in. This is action that resembles ‘shaping the international security environment’ (Cohen, 1997: Section 3) and, thus, a ‘shaping operation’ par excellence where favourable conditions (for self) are created (Shalikashvili, 1997: 1). Despite the resemblance, the ethnography revealed that these days, such actions are called ‘theater security cooperation plans’ (cf. Hager, 2004; Cartagena WS3, p.97). In a sense, the logics where the coalition in essence ‘helps’ the host region to turn ‘unprepared waters’ into ‘prepared waters’ resembles those encountered in the realm of humanitarianism: The ‘elevated west’ helps turn the

‘barbaric’ towards the light of civility and civilization (Fox, 2001: 281–288; Belloni, 2007: 455–468; cf. Duffield, 2001a).

In addition to influencing governance structures via concrete MNE concept development, other forms of influence can also be achieved by participating—gaining access to—in MNE. For example, when participants act professionally, it increases the *image* and *credibility* of the participants’ organizations. This can result in gaining more leverage in different international crisis management settings (that is, other than MNE), which can then be utilized according to organizational interest.

Further, by offering and promoting one’s know-how, for example, in technical standards in information sharing, a participating country can influence the standards of others (if they choose to implement the promoted standard, of course). This was seen as an easy way to ensure and increase interoperability between actors, as, for example, between a non-aligned country and an aligned country (or even the whole coalition). This was compared to the official process of joining an alliance: When joining, huge amounts of technical and procedural standards come from the outside-in and they make systems more rigid. If, on the other hand, these standards can be influenced (standardization takes place) before membership, adaptation to the new situation will be much easier (Madrid WS4, p.104) Finally, MNE’s products serve an intelligence purpose of sorts. For example, when Country A chooses to implement a solution developed during MNE, the advantage to Country B is that it is immediately aware (at least partly) of the details and characteristics of this solution (Helsinki MNE7, p.162).

4.1.2.3. Diplomatic-Social Structure

One of the identified advantages of MNE (as international collaboration on CD&E) is that the coming together of crisis management actors creates a venue or site for information exchange (NATOACT, 2005: 24). It can be assumed that the type of information exchange that this identified advantage focuses on, relates to exchanging information that relates to the study issue at hand. While this takes place identifiably, at the same time, MNE serves as a site (or venue) for other types of information exchange in the form of social transactions in general. The importance of MNE-promoted social transactions is not to be underestimated—especially if NEC is a goal. Social transactions

count for half of the doctrine of NEC, and it is often the culmination point of problems when attempting to create organizations-wide situational awareness (cf. Garstka and Alberts, 2004; Maltz, 2007).

MNE, as a multidimensional site (or venue) for information exchange, thus acts as a framework of *pseudo-diplomacy* in the international field. For example, gestures resembling diplomatic courtesy were witnessed by the participants—acts that were not motivated by the needs of MISA-EM or other rationalities. For example, if a country participated eagerly in MNE, it was seen as a ‘must’ to participate in the events that were organized by this eager country, even if it required long-distance travel or increased expenditure (Interlocutor 16). In addition, countries were politely given opportunities to organize ‘side-events’ to the experimentations, which did not necessarily directly advance the main task of concept development—events that were seen to primarily serve local interests (Interlocutors 8; 16).

Indeed, the representatives sent to MNE can also be seen to act as types of *representatives* to organizations—especially those to which there was no possibility of sending an ‘official’ representation (the closed door discussions of the EU or NATO, for example, to manage transatlantic relations).¹⁶⁸ Thus, an advantage of MNE is that it *involves* and *provides access* to develop international crisis management capabilities, especially to those who might otherwise be too small or ‘irrelevant’ (NATOACT, 2005: 24). As such, this pseudo-diplomatic framework supports the transitional feature identified as integral in MNE and, thus, the impact of the structural transformations discussed earlier.

As with any diplomatic structure, driving organizational interest was a prime motivation. *National interest* was especially articulated when it was underlined that countries utilize the products of MNE as dictated by their national interests (cf. NAMC, 2010). For example, the four goals of Finland’s MNE participation can be seen as directly supporting national interest acts. These goals included: First, supporting national capability development; second, improving national research and development; third, developing international interoperability; and fourth, influencing the evolution of crisis management (Interlocutor 3). Moreover, MNE was seen as a forum that could be utilized

¹⁶⁸ Similar to the ‘small steps’ strategy of the ‘wait and see’ integration policy (cf. Hakovirta, 1975: 429).

to support different business projects. It was mentioned earlier how MISA-EM contributed to applying for a 150 million euro maritime comprehensive approach project; information gained in MNE could (would) be utilized in other, more lucrative settings, too (Cartagena LOE2, p.147). Thus, the MNE platform can be utilized for identifying business opportunities and for providing valuable information for the selling and implementation phases once (if) a project is won.

Further, since the products of MNE are used to influence political decision-making, and thus political and crisis management realities, managing the contents of MNE (which later have a potential impact on the said realities) is a method of driving these realities in a preferred direction—as dictated by national interest. Then, MNE would act as one structure with which international crisis management frameworks are ‘shaped’. As such, since MNE is ‘owned’ by the US,¹⁶⁹ it cannot be seen to do much that goes against the US’ interests. It was commented that, in effect, although MNE had declared itself as ‘eternal’, the US held the process hostage; if the US pulled out, ‘there is no point in continuing’ (Interlocutor 3).

The study issues were agreed on collectively, but here as well, the US effectively acted as first among equals. Thus, like any diplomatic framework, MNE *reflects power-political realities*. In MISA-EM, however, NATO was much more present than the US. Indeed, to me, it initially seemed to be owned by NATO. This notion was recognized in observed commentaries by other participants, for example, at Workshop 7 in Madrid, where the non-aligned participants made comments such as ‘we as NATO’ (Madrid WS7, p.157; Cartagena WS3, p.97).

Identities were also negotiated during the social transactions in MNE. The crisis management *capability-identities* of countries were promoted and constructed, as were the professional identities of its participants. For example, Finland actively marketed its capabilities in comprehensive crisis management and interagency approaches during the MISA-EM events (Helsinki LOE1, p.140). This contributed to the construction of a crisis management identity and, thus, also a potential role and perceived rank in a future (other

¹⁶⁹ It should be noted that during MNE6, USJFCOM ‘owned’ MNE. However, USJFCOM has been dis-established as of 31 August 2011. See: <http://www.jfcom.mil/> [Accessed 15 September 2011]. Current MNE ownership resides with the US Joint Staff, Deputy Director J7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting (USJS DDJ7 JCW).

than MNE) crisis management setting. At the same time, however, identity and role constructions were also items of struggle. For example, the question of the identity of the MISA-EM concept was intensely debated—does MISA-EM have a military or civil ‘identity’? Moreover, the role of a participating country in MISA-EM, a role that could be used as material for later identity construction, was observed to be an object of contestation (Cartagena WS3, p.97; LOE2, p.147).

Further, if participants were successful in completing the tasks assigned to them, this served as an advantage when applying for new roles in their organizations. The personal relationships that were established during the interactions were seen as important. These relationships made work easier in MNE in the first place, but served as an advantage in other forums as well (Madrid WS4, p.104). For example, there were not too many people working on maritime situational awareness and chances were high that someone working with MISA-EM would also work in other related projects such as MARSUR. Moreover, these personal relationships served as new sources of information on capabilities and policies—it was much easier to talk to someone you knew.¹⁷⁰

MNE also facilitated the establishment of *new ways of thinking* and actively promoted these new mindsets. In MISA-EM, this was especially the case when advocating the creation and requirement of an ‘information-sharing’ mindset comprised of harmonized frames of reference—drilling all the way down to the symbolic level. Moreover, it was stressed that a new way of thinking was required, where personal benefit was not the driving force, but the goal of the project, the ‘common good’. This new way of thinking would be characterized by fluidity of movement and action on the field, thus creating a new ‘infrastructure of social life’ (Urry, 2007: 12–13). This infrastructure of the social has its basis in increased information flows between current actors and in the inclusion of new actors. This would be a move away from military-type vertical governance mechanisms by creating a maritime crisis management governance model, which encompasses a plethora of actors (military and civilian) with characteristics of horizontal information flows and a touch of ethics (Helsinki LOE1, p.140).

¹⁷⁰ Similarly, the importance of ‘face-time’ was also articulated in the MISA-EM concept when establishing relations among the different maritime actors.

4.1.3. Ethnographic Journey

'We know so much more than we are able to describe—that is why you¹⁷¹ had to participate and share in the work'¹⁷²
(Interlocutor 2).

This section will summarize my ethnographic journey to MISA-EM in MNE6. It will also discuss my habitus and how it evolved and what kinds of different groups of habitus were observed on the field. It will examine the types of data I was able access and reflect on the validity of this data. Thus, the purpose of this section is to fulfil the requirements of reflexive ethnography and the analysis of practice, identified earlier in Chapter 2 (p.19) by Leander (2008) and Higate and Cameron (2006).

As discussed in Chapter 3 (p.65), I began my ethnographic journey with an initial interest in NEC and the impacts NEC might have on the field of international politics, as, for example, whether NEC increases dependencies and rigidities. Once I was able to join MISA-EM as an assigned Finnish participant and learnt of the plethora of features in MNE, my initial research interest evolved into examining MNE, its characteristics and its potential impacts on the field of international politics and, in particular, crisis management.

First, however, after negotiating access with the Finnish gatekeepers (see the sub-chapter, 'Prologue', on page 68), I had to legitimize myself in the eyes of the MISA-EM participants. By actively seeking any role and task, and by identifying opportunities where my past professional expertise could be utilized to the benefit of the MISA-EM concept development, I was slowly able to establish my presence in the process. In other words, I made an effort to make myself an asset to the development process, instead of a hindrance or a dead-weight.

It must be assumed that I was deemed an asset of sorts. First, for example, during LOE1, I was part of the control group of the experiment as I was appointed to the 'analyst' role. This was seen by some to be a step down from my planned 'reviewer' role

¹⁷¹ The author of this study.

¹⁷² MISA-EM concept development.

(Interlocutor 2). However, the ‘analyst’ role gave me an even better opportunity to gather data during the event: I was better able to focus on the discussions that were taking place. Had I been only observing, for example, I would not have had real-time access to the dialogues that were taking place electronically¹⁷³ during the sessions (Helsinki LOE1, p.140).

Second, the fact that I got roles and tasks from other nationalities (who were not ‘required’ to even acknowledge me) was also evidence to me that I had been successful as an asset. This was exemplified in LOE2, where I was assigned the ‘analyst supervisor’ role. This was a personal accomplishment for me. This tasking made concrete my interpretation that I had been accepted as a ‘true’ participant in the process, that I was a contributing member among other contributing members. More importantly, Spain led this event, which I took to mean that not only had I been successful in establishing trust among my own reference group (the Finns), but among others, too. This would not have been possible if I had not been able to provide useful feedback and relevant commentary during meetings. My responsibilities in this role included capturing data, performing ongoing analysis and identifying any possible opportunities for improvement during the experimentation. Moreover, I documented the progression of the experiment in accordance with the scenario and script. Thus, I was again in a perfect position to make even more observations and gather data (Cartagena LOE2, p.147).

My offer to join the process and work in it for *free* was a significant contributing factor in my gaining access to tasks and roles once in the process. My offer was eagerly accepted to the extent that it was seen by some as being taken advantage of (Singapore WS5, p.118). Yet, since my motivation was to gain as much data as possible, doing as much as possible was a good way to get it. Indeed, I was told later by a participant that had I not conducted actual work on MISA-EM, I ‘never would have gained a coherent picture’ on what the work was about and that simply observing would never have yielded the relevant results (Interlocutor 2). Interviewing would not have yielded the relevant results either as was exemplified in the quote at the beginning of this section.

¹⁷³ The voting system that was utilized gave the participants the opportunity to have an online chat-type discussion on the given topics. This electronic dialogue made it possible for all the participants to voice their opinion (sometimes during the sessions, some individuals tended to make rather long comments).

Thus, my habitus evolved during the journey. At first, I was an unknown anomaly for virtually all of the participants in MISA-EM. Slowly, my habitus evolved from researcher to a participant who was trusted with assignments and tasks in MISA-EM concept development. Yet, I remained partly ambiguous to some of the participants, as was exemplified by the misunderstandings of my organizational affiliation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it was in fact the FIIA (Madrid WS2, p.74; IAKO, p.108) and the FIIA when it should have been Tampere University (Singapore WS5, p.116). These insignificant misunderstandings did not influence my tasking, but can be taken as examples of my seemingly obscure status. Yet, despite the fact that my habitus evolved (from researcher to analyst, for example), I always stayed an outsider, male, Finnish, civilian, ex-military and, above all, free labour.

Eventually, as discussed, through time and the evolution of my habitus, I got so much access to MNE and its events that, at times, I feared I was 'going native'. However, despite my growing feelings of inclusion, I was told that I always bore the 'outsider mark'. Thus, I was told that there should be no academic concern over me 'going native' as the natives never totally saw me as a native ('Prologue', p.68; Singapore WS5, p.116).

Through this access, I was able to gather data for this study, which aims to examine MNE, its characteristics and potential impacts on the field of international politics and, in particular, crisis management. More specifically, the data which I was able to collect through my participation were:

1. Official and training material documentation
 - a. On the official process and intent of MNE;
 - b. MNE's knowledge producing methodology: CD&E; and
 - c. MNE products, mainly MNE6, in which I was initially situated, but also of MNE7, as I have a role within that cycle as well;
2. Official and non-official conversation among various subjects, held during official MNE6 meetings, for a minimum of 144 hours, documented in field notes;
3. 'Collaborative participant observation' conducted during official MNE6 meetings, for a minimum of 216 hours, documented in field notes; and
4. Covert observation of interactions in meetings and 'after-work' situations for a

minimum of 360 hours¹⁷⁴ (done simultaneously with Steps 3 and 4), documented in field notes.

As discussed in Chapter 3 (p.65), when negotiating access to MNE, I had agreed that the observations used as material for this study would abide by the Chatham House rules: ‘When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rules, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed’ (Chatham House, 2010). Hence, with the intent to ‘do no harm’ to my field as demanded by ethnographic ethics (discussion on page 46), my purpose in this study has been to intentionally hide the affiliations of the characters behind the episodes observed during participation and documented in this study. When the utilization of a given quote has been seen to provide additional value for this study, the authors of these quotes have been referenced as ‘Interlocutors’.

Hiding the affiliations (such as names, nationalities, organizations and titles) makes the reflection of the participants’ habitus more difficult. The informed reader might be able to uncover the affiliations I had agreed to hide. Suffice it to say, however, that different classifications of habitus can still be extrapolated from the ethnographic experience. Thus, it can be said that were one to participate in MNE, one could expect to encounter habitus-groups, the primary defining characteristics of which are identifiable through the following heuristic:

- *Technologically* focused habitus whose defining feature is their formidable technological expertise;
- *Process focused* habitus who deem that organizational processes and governance structures are the most important things to focus on;
- *Observing* habitus who take part in MNE only to gather information for the host organization or ‘are there’ just to enjoy a trip abroad;
- *Contributing* habitus who are keen to do a lot of work, motivated by the concept development at hand;

¹⁷⁴ 360 hours (in MNE6 alone) can be compared to Elina Penttinen’s ethnographic dissertation, which lists 62 hours of observational ethnography (not including interviews) (Penttinen, 2004).

- *National interest* focused habitus whose actions are primarily motivated by national interest issues and not, for example, the concept development requirements as such;
- *Coalition interest* focused habitus who see and analyse events and possible solutions through the interest of the whole coalition;
- *Operational theatre* focused habitus who give primary importance to military activities during concept development;
- *Comprehensive approach* focused habitus who emphasize the civilian aspect during concept development; and
- *Career* focused habitus who are keen to do a lot of work, motivated by ambitions of career advancement.

It should be noted that these discussed habitus are not temporally stable. A participant can begin concept development by being driven by coalition interest and evolve later into being driven by national interest. Nor are the discussed habitus mutually exclusive. A participant can portray a career focused habitus, while, at the same time, portraying a national interest habitus.

Despite the minor challenge to discussing the different habitus that exist within MNE, the ethnographic data was straightforward enough—my task was to paint a coherent picture of MNE and what it means. Nevertheless, executing this seemingly simple task was a challenge in itself. Primarily, the challenge emerged from the abundance of data gathered during many sessions from various sources. Reading the field notes was an adventure in itself—at times, the field notes were neat and comprehensible, while, at other times, it took me lots of time to decipher my handwriting or the notes made on my mobile phone; the reader might be able to guess which type was gathered during formal sessions and which were spontaneous episodes documented in ‘after work’ situations.

The written documentation that I had been able to gather proved a bit more problematic due to classification considerations. Many were classified obscurely and it was not clear to even the Finnish Defence Command what status and usability these documents held for research purposes. The most confusion was over the classification of

'NATO Unclassified'. Is 'unclassified' the same as 'public', for example? Eventually, the situation was sorted out and all the official materials presented in this study have been deemed as usable for research purposes. In the spirit of cooperation, I wanted the issue resolved as was seen in the best interest of the FDF, the sponsor of my MNE experience. Without their backing, I would not have been able to participate in the first place, so I felt I owed it to them to not use any materials that would put the FDF in a bad light. I must admit, however, because the issue remained unclear for quite some time (it took almost a year to resolve), that I started to ponder the hypothetical question: What was my legal status if I indeed had decided to use NATO classified materials as a civilian and citizen of a non-NATO country? Fortunately, this question remains of no significance in relation to this study.

In closing, the *access to materials* was vast, in my opinion; at no point during my experience did I feel that information relating to MNE and MISA-EM was withheld from me. On the contrary, I was staggered by the abundance of it (observations and documentation). Moreover, the other participants were kind enough to provide any additional documents or sources I felt were relevant. For example, if I had got a document that referred to a document I did not have, this document would be provided to me. Regarding the *validity of data*, I have no reason to doubt the official documentation I was able to get my hands on, especially after the confusion over the classification of these documents. Regarding the validity of the ethnographic observations, it could be asked whether I was valid myself as I made these observations. However, the real question to be asked is whether my ethnographic experience was indeed a valid experience of developing concepts by MNE? Since I took part in nearly all of the official meetings of MISA-EM concept development and in the work (and after-work) sessions, I cannot easily imagine a more valid experience.

4.2. MNE as Community and Practice

Next, MNE will be denaturalized. In other words, a constitutional analysis of MNE will follow. As discussed in Chapter 2 (p.19), the purpose of constitutional analysis (Step 3 of the analytical framework on page 50) is to unmask, denaturalize and provide further objectification of the inherently subjective meanings found in MNE. Moreover, it is

argued that these meanings evolve and diffuse into the context from which they were created and which these meanings also thus modify. A ‘constitutive mechanism’ is responsible for this evolution and diffusion of meaning.

It is argued that MNE is a community which constitutes a practice. Further, it was earlier (Chapter 3 on page 65) established that participants in MNE consist of international security professionals tasked with developing security knowledge for new international security solutions. Thus, MNE is seen as an *epistemic*¹⁷⁵ *security community of practice* (henceforth, ‘MNE-community’). This study argues that the MNE-community is an actor in the international domain, which constitutes a *specific security practice* (henceforth, the ‘MNE-practice’), which organizes the arrays of activities in the MNE-community.

Thus, this section presents a constitutional analysis of how the ‘MNE-community’ constitutes realities within crisis management with its constitutive mechanism, the ‘MNE-practice’. Previously (Chapter 2 on page 19), Pouliot argued how the constitutive mechanisms of X constitute Y in context C (Pouliot, 2007: 372–374). Here, the MNE-community is X, constituting the realities, Y, in the larger crisis management environment, C. The MNE-community *constitutes with* the MNE-practice, that is, the constitutive mechanism.

The logics of this action-constituting mechanism were introduced while examining the ethnographic themes (see ‘CD&E for Crisis Management’, especially on page 174). Defining MNE as a community which constitutes a practice will provide the terminology with which the features of MNE become clearer—as do the logics of this action-constituting mechanism.

First, this section will examine MNE as a security community of practice. Second, the defining characteristics of MNE-practice, constituted by the MNE-community, will be discussed. Thus, the generative aspects of the MNE-practice will be examined—how the MNE-practice creates meaning and power relations (Leander, 2008: 18) in the crisis management architecture. Moreover, the MNE-practice is argued to function as a constitutive mechanism in the larger crisis management architecture—MNE anchors and

¹⁷⁵ Epistemic in the sense of pertaining to conditions for acquiring knowledge.

(re)produces constitutive crisis management norms in the international crisis management architecture (Swidler, 2001: 95–100).

4.2.1 MNE as a Security Community of Practice

It has been established that the transformation of the Western security environment—the way the social structure of ‘the west’ handles its security and crisis management issues—is facilitated by MNE and the logic that organizes MNE activities, the CD&E methodology. It is argued that MNE contributes to the evolution of the Western security environment by constructing the rationalities of crisis management (what is feasible, preferable or efficient) and the expectations of future threats and responses. Moreover, as demonstrated, MNE seeks to contribute to the evolution of security related norms (changes in legislations, for example) within the Western security architecture. These rationalities, expectations and norms are new crisis management knowledge, encapsulated in new crisis management concepts.

Previously, the concept of ‘communities of practice’ was defined as ‘a set of relations among persons, activity, and world, over time and in relation with other tangential and overlapping communities of practice’, which, more specifically, are ‘an intrinsic condition for the existence of knowledge, not least because it provides the interpretive support for making sense of its heritage’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991: 98). Moreover, communities of practice, which tend to have informal and self-organizing characteristics, are sites of knowledge and identity creation and evolution (Wenger, 1998b). Often, the focus of communities of practice is on learning, building competence, and performance (Snyder, 1997).

MNE can be argued to demonstrate the characteristics of a specific community of practice, which focuses on applying and evolving (creating new) crisis management knowledge. Increasing competence and performance in crisis management are reasons and motivations to develop new crisis management knowledge in the first place. The discussed CD&E methodology holds the central role as the methodology with which new crisis management is created. Moreover, in addition to the functions of knowledge production, accumulation and diffusion, importantly, MNE as a community of practice engages in knowledge validation, too. As with knowledge production, knowledge

validation is also governed by the CD&E methodology (cf. Adler, 2008: 224; NAMC, 2009: §5). Competence emerges primarily in the interest of developing more competent and thus efficient (effective) crisis management capability—that is, the performance of international military crisis management *and* the performance of national organizations responsible for security.

Furthermore, MNE contributes to the interpretation of past security events when assessing the events and situations of past crisis management performances. Situations in which crisis management performance (capability) has failed expectations in the past and the factors that are responsible for these failures form the basis of an MNE study theme (for example, irregular threats in MNE6). In other words, these interpretations form the crisis management ‘reality’ within which development efforts are situated. In addition to contributing to the interpretation of past security events, MNE specifically seeks to create new crisis management knowledge through concept development.

This new crisis management knowledge contributes to the evolution of the crisis management interpretations—what are ‘efficient’ and ‘better’ means to respond to the perceived failures in past crisis management capability? In short, MNE’s focus is on learning how to solve a perceived problem by addressing the capability gaps that have hindered the solutions of these problems in the past. Moreover, MNE is informal (membership is voluntary and organization not institutionalized (Singapore WS5, p. 116)) and self-organizing (study issues are—at least in theory—chosen together (Interlocutor 3) and roles and contributions to MNE are voluntary).

Hence, MNE can be viewed as an ideal case of a community of practice since it is a privileged setting of acquiring and creating knowledge. One ‘gets to’ acquire the knowledge of the MNE-community (its methodologies, study issues and knowledge from other projects) by gaining membership via competence, membership which is then a contribution to the competence of the MNE-community as it creates new crisis management knowledge (Wenger, 1998b: 214).

As a community of practice, MNE influences interpretations of a valued experience, that is, the study issue at hand—the constructed setting within which new, better capabilities must be developed. By identifying gaps in capabilities, MNE simultaneously influences understandings of world events, time-space connections, self,

and the realm of possibilities. When concepts are transitioned (fitted into structures or modifying structures so that they fit), these interpretations and understandings diffuse within the broader social environment (Wenger, 1998b: 152–174).

So, the MNE knowledge domain constitutes *like-mindedness* and thus advances the *harmonizing of mindsets*. This like-mindedness emerges within the community as the specifics of the identified crisis management challenge, the solution(s) to which are constantly negotiated. Further, MNE constitutes like-mindedness in the broader social dimension of crisis management when its knowledge is transitioned to the ‘outside world’. Therefore, MNE contributes to the *harmonization of the social realm* by constituting the normative and epistemic grounds for crisis management actions—in addition to contributing to the establishment of standardizations in the technical and organizational dimensions (cf. Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 16–19). Hence, it can be argued that MNE contributes to military isomorphism by homogenizing/ Westernizing security imaginaries and articulating the boundaries of military thinking as discussed earlier on page 40. Moreover, by setting the terms of actions, fixing of meanings and empowering capacities, MNE can be seen to contribute to a system of governance in the crisis management sphere.

Therefore, MNE, as a community of practice, has two main features that affect the social realm outside of the community. First, MNE, as an inter-subjective social structure, constitutes the normative and epistemic grounds for crisis management actions (cf. Adler, 1997: 343–344). Thus, second, MNE is an agent in the international crisis management field, affecting crisis management events and reifying crisis management (background) knowledge. Although, therefore, MNE can be argued to have the ability and power to influence and even transform social realities, the acronym, ‘MNE’, is virtually unknown within academia and especially in the field of International Relations. Much like other, similar communities of practice, MNE has not been viewed as an actor in the international arena. Nevertheless, it does advance notions and understandings of crisis management implementations and deliberately seeks to bring these notions and understandings to the attention of the more classical actors of International Relations.

It can be argued that when bringing the arguments of ‘required’ actions into the foreground (by introducing MNE developed crisis management knowledge into the

collective consciousness and attention), MNE steers the development of the interests of these more classical actors of International Relations. Specifically, the MNE community influences the conceptual frameworks (pun intended) with which these crisis management interests are viewed (cf. Rochon, 1998: 23, cited in Adler, 2008: 200). Communities of practice thus influence structures (setting standards of action) and agents ('like-minded' actors who translate these standards into acts with meaning) (cf. Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 16).

Adler emphasizes that the 'ability to negotiate and reify meaning is one of the highest forms of power' (Adler, 2008: 201). Thus, MNE can be argued to utilize power as it collectively negotiates crisis management meanings and then reifies them with the intention of institutionalization and naturalization. This *transitional feature* of MNE can be argued thus to utilize *productive* and *structural* power especially. Hence, it can be argued to have the ability and power to transform social realities, in particular crisis management realities. As argued, MNE does this especially by influencing the conceptual frameworks within which these crisis management (state) interests are interpreted (cf. Rochon, 1998: 23, cited in Adler, 2008: 200). Therefore, MNE also constitutes the normative and epistemic grounds for crisis management action and thus affects world political, economic and social events. This especially takes place when the transitioned normative and epistemic crisis management notions are naturalized and institutionalized by MNE's transitional feature (cf. Neumann, 2002).

Additionally, MNE evolves and influences crisis management *identities* (of its participants and of their organizations). Yet, to argue for the existence of an MNE-identity would be a rather bold suggestion: The personal relationships gained during participation are certainly 'MNE-stained', yet the core feature of these relationships is the mutual areas of expertise that are not dependent on MNE as such. For example, in the MISA-EM case, these mutual areas of expertise included the technical experts on maritime situational awareness. Thus, in the case of MNE, it is hard to pinpoint an MNE-identity, although all those who have participated naturally know of it, and many think back on it fondly. Yet, the identification of technical expertise resembles the phenomenon of transnational professionalism discussed from the humanitarian point of view on page 40; it is perhaps safe to say that a transnational communal mindset with a basis in

technical expertise appears in MNE. It was earlier (on page 40) discussed how an emphasis on technical executions effectively blinds one from seeing the political consequences of humanitarian actions. In parallel to this insight, all observed MNE activities strikingly dismiss any political considerations.

Still, MNE, as a community of practice, creates *coherence* in three dimensions in which practice forms the coherence of community. First, it is a *joint enterprise*, the enterprise aspect of which (the MNE study issue, the overarching intent and motive of the community towards which work is conducted) is mutually defined and understood by its members and continuously renegotiated. As is usual with a joint enterprise, MNE is characterized by accountabilities and a plethora of interpretations. In the MNE6 context, the enterprise of the community was to find crisis management solutions with which irregular threats could be countered. In MISA-EM, continuous negotiation of the intent and meaning of the motive and the intent of the concept was exemplified by long debates on the wording of the concept (Madrid WS2, p.74). Second, *active engagement* is a key requirement for access and membership to MNE. An organization that wants to partake of MNE must also conduct work in MNE. Third, the *resources* of MNE are *communal*; the only resources that exist are the ones that the participants provide, such as know-how, technology and facilities (cf. Wenger, 1998a, 1998b: 72–85; Adler, 2008: 198–199).

Earlier, Wenger (in Chapter 2 on page 19) reminded us that participation in a community of practice must have knowledge value for its participants (Wenger, 1998a). The question is knowledge of what? As we have seen, knowledge of the specific subject matter may not always be the prime motivation for participation in MNE (Helsinki MNE7, p.162). This, as also witnessed in the closing seminar of MNE6 in Helsinki (p.160), suggests the existence of other motivations, such as learning the motivations, capabilities and solutions of others or mental preparations for potential changes in the larger crisis management environment, especially those relating to potential changes in policy, changes that MNE was argued to influence earlier. Or alternatively, since MNE facilitates the flow of information—and thus also controls it and is, therefore, potentially able to inject MNE-influenced meanings to this information—participation can be motivated by the possibility of influencing (and learning of) information in forums other than MNE (cf. Adler, 2008: 200; Wenger, 1998a).

4.2.2. MNE as Practice

As stated, this study argues that the MNE-community is an actor in the international domain, which constitutes a *specific security practice* (henceforth, the '*MNE-practice*'). Next, the characteristics and the generative aspects of the MNE-practice, constituted by the MNE-community, will be discussed.

In order to define MNE as a practice, this section will utilize Adler and Pouliot's (2011: 4–5) definition of practices as 'socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world'. Thus, this section will 1) discuss MNE as a socially meaningful pattern of action; 2) examine how MNE is performed; 3) articulate 'competence' in the MNE context; and 4) illustrate how MNE embodies, acts out and reifies background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world. Regarding the last point, it should be noted that MNE as a practice is seen to act out and reify not only existing background knowledge and discourse, but also new, transformative knowledge and discourse, which it itself has produced.

Therefore, this section will analyse and present the material/ meaningful, structural/ agential, reflexive/ background, stability/ change attributes of MNE (cf. Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 18). Further, this section will analyse and present how MNE integrates, institutionalizes and naturalizes new crisis management practices and interpretations. Moreover, the MNE-practice is argued to function as a constitutive mechanism in the larger crisis management architecture, which means that MNE anchors and (re)produces constitutive crisis management norms in the international crisis management architecture (Swidler, 2001: 95–100).

4.2.2.1. MNE as a Socially Meaningful Pattern of Action

The meaning in 'MNE behavior' derives primarily from the acknowledgment and recognition of gaps in crisis management capability. These gaps must be filled or militaries will not be able to provide security for the state and its way of life (seen as the primary function of militaries). Moreover, the underlying assumption behind MNE is that military capability is inherently and always insufficient—new ways must be found

constantly to provide security and counter the ever-intensifying evolution of security threats. Thus, militaries must engage in constant adaptation and transformation, which is facilitated by MNE. Through such facilitation, MNE contributes to the anticipation and creation of future crisis management (cf. Cebrowski, 2003: 8) and the creation of cohesion and harmonization among its participants (cf. NAMC, 2009: §19).

Therefore, MNE contributes to the constitution of social meanings in the broader social environment. In the MISA-EM case, it was seen how the contents of the MISA-EM concept diffuse into *other maritime security practices*. And if the transition of MISA-EM goes successfully, it contributes to how a maritime crisis management scenario should be resolved (Cartagena WS3, p.97; Madrid WS4, p.104, IAKO, p.108, WS7, p.154).

In such a case, MISA-EM contributes to the understandings and interpretations of efficient crisis management and, thus, also to what is understood as more ‘effective’ and, therefore, ‘better’ and ‘proper’ crisis management. Moreover, by contributing to the evolution of crisis management understandings and interpretations, MNE contributes to changing *mindsets* and ways of doing work in organizations; for anyone who does not see change as a preferable option by definition, the change initiated by MNE undoubtedly has a meaningful impact (Helsinki LOE1, p.140).

As MNE contributes to transformations in crisis management methodologies, understandings and interpretations, it constitutes meaning for the *observers* of crisis management. Interested citizens attach a lot of meaning to how their tax euro is envisioned to be spent in crisis management operations, for example. MNE also contributes to *national debates on security strategies*, thus providing meanings to crises and, following from that, interpretations of contemporary crisis management phenomena (cf. Aaltola, 2011).

The ethnographic analysis of MNE revealed that it, as an international collaborative CD&E project, contributed to: first, the creation of venues/ sites for information exchange; second, providing access to small countries/ minor crisis management players; third, facilitating ‘ownership’ via the participation of developed capability; and fourth, creating leverage and synergy and avoiding duplication in capability development efforts (cf. NATOACT, 2005: 24). The importance of access to

MNE was emphasized as the key meaning for the participating actors (states, organizations, individuals and businesses). After access, it was possible to create and then partake of sites of information exchange after the implementation of the MNE products. Yet, MNE itself was also seen as a site where, often, more relevant information than concept development information was exchanged. Ownership of capability was interpreted as being able to influence its execution. Avoiding duplication, of course, means saving money, which leaves more room for manoeuvre within ever-tightening budget frameworks. Thus, MNE ensures ‘the greatest benefit for a given investment’ in an environment characterized by rapid change and limited resources (NAMC, 2009: §19).

For *states*, the successful construction of a crisis management *identity* in the MNE context was seen to provide opportunities to gain leverage in other crisis management forums (Madrid WS4, p.104; Singapore WS5, p.116). Moreover, if a state is able to push the implementation of a nationally developed solution to a wider crisis management context, participation would then have meant successful influencing of crisis management. A successful example of the above was identified in Madrid, when a state was able to promote its standards in crisis management. This was seen as an enormously meaningful act by the participants (Madrid WS4, p.104).

In addition, participating in MNE means having the possibility of ‘building image’, constructing a specific type of crisis management identity among a selected group of crisis management actors; it also means having the possibility of promoting and pushing the implementation of crisis management solutions, which can be state or business owned and driven. As an example, Finland’s goals in MNE participation reveal what it means for Finland to participate. MNE involvement for Finland means, among other things, to, first, support national capability development; second, improve national research and development; third, develop international interoperability; and fourth, influence the evolution of crisis management.

For *organizations*, participation in MNE means gaining the possibility of building valuable relationships with military actors and learning about and preparing for new, potentially upcoming crisis management solutions, which militaries would implement and to which organizations dealing with crisis management would have to adapt. Thus,

MNE participation meant the facilitation of transformation in crisis management organizations and agencies as well (Helsinki LOE1, p.140).

For *businesses*, successful marketing of their products would naturally mean more business. Monetary issues are not beyond the interest of states either: It can be argued that as national capability development budgets decrease, opportunities to gain access to lucrative EU-wide development projects through contributions to MNE focus areas, for example, would also be in the states' national capability development interests. Further, like with organizations, participation in MNE means gaining the possibility of building valuable relationships. It also means learning and preparing for new crisis management solutions, which militaries would implement and to which organizations dealing with crisis management would have to adapt—all valid business opportunities for businesses operating in the crisis management field.

Participation holds meaning for the participating *individuals*, too. For example, in some circles, MNE is seen as a way to promote one's own career. In addition, the personal relationships gained during participation can mean that conducting work is much easier when dealing with the same individuals in other forums. All in all, most participants see MNE as meaningful without exception. However, when discussing the meaning and relevance with people outside of the process, alternative views were presented, the most radical of which see MNE as a waste of time.

Although the importance of influencing political decision-making was articulated in the process, political meanings were not discussed. This was rather interesting because if crisis management activities should be harmonized among actors through concepts, and those concepts have the ability to change policy, we are, in the end, discussing a political process. In the MISA-EM case, political meaning is found in the multinational and interagency focus of the maritime situational awareness concept, which highlights the aim, scope, legitimacy and location of preferred harmonization in technical and organizational—and political—rationalities.

The *pattern* of 'MNE existence' is easily established by examining the historical account of it presented in Appendix F (p.237). The internal patterns of MNE are identifiable when examining the knowledge application and producing methodology,

CD&E, presented earlier. In addition to providing an internal pattern to MNE, CD&E governs how MNE is performed—it organizes the arrays of MNE actions.

4.2.2.2. *MNE Performed*

The CD&E methodology and process set the boundaries of the stage where MNE is performed. Thus, it influences the MNE-performance, but also identifies the primary audience of the performance. As stated, the purpose of an MNE-project is to address an identified shortfall in capability. The CD&E methodology identifies potential sources, which identify shortfalls, including Long Term Requirement Studies (LTRS), Crisis Response Operations Urgent Requirements (CUR), Lessons Learned (LL), and the Capability Requirements Review (CRR). (NAMC, 2009: §7–9; NAMC, 2010: §10). Once the capability gap is identified and selected as a study issue as part of a CD&E project or campaign, different project management phases can be identified within the stages of initiation, research, development, validation, approval and, finally, implementation (NAMC, 2010: §37–38). Implementation was argued earlier to contain the *transitional feature* of MNE (p.174).

The initiation and research phases are characterized by, first, various kinds of studies conducted in order to set the baselines of current knowledge on the given topic. Second, the initiation and research phases are characterized by project management considerations. These are captured in the campaign plan, and include, for example, timelines for development and the identification of specific roles, such as which countries choose to lead, contribute or just observe. Oversight for the project, in the MNE context, is provided by an international steering committee. The development phase is concept development, whereas the validation phase is characterized by different experimentations. Once the project is finished and its products approved, the new solutions with which capability shortfalls are addressed are potentially implemented.

When implemented, concepts are seen to drive change in the international community (cf. NAMC, 2009: §1). It was also seen that the process of tailoring a solution or product¹⁷⁶ to the needs of an ‘outside’ agency or ‘transition partner’¹⁷⁷ builds more

¹⁷⁶ A product in CD&E is anything capable of transmitting information: a concept document, architecture, framework, a ‘how to’ handbook, study reports, validated recommendations, training tools, etc.

effective relationships and trust amongst the multinational community (Madrid WS7, p.154).

The intended audience of the MNE performance is formed of ‘outside’ agencies, ‘transition partners’ and, eventually, the whole crisis management architecture. Regarding the intended audiences of MISA-EM, the concept was to be transitioned as part of the overall MNE6 transition plan. In this plan, transition partners are identified—organizations that (potentially) have capability gaps, which are resolved with MNE6 products. Further, participating (or observing) countries will have a national transition plan for identified capability gaps, which exist on a national level. One good method of providing awareness of available solutions to capability shortfalls was seen to be the utilization of a senior leader seminar, where the leadership of potential identified transition partners is invited to learn about MNE products and their potential benefits. The MNE6 Senior Leader Seminar took place in November 2010 (Madrid WS7, p.154).

As shown earlier, the lack of harmonization between legal frameworks was seen as a problem for the implementation of a maritime comprehensive approach. Thus, what could be done was to promote changes in legislation, which would facilitate information exchange. Gaining political will in governments, the EU Commission and heads of international maritime agencies was seen as key. It was seen that if an the interagency community wanted to influence changes in legislation, it should demonstrate and advertise the need of it. More specifically, a proactive and bottom-up approach was to be utilized where the benefits of sharing information were demonstrated in practice. In addition, a top-down approach, where the political level is influenced by getting ‘the message across to the political level that future maritime challenges require a comprehensive interagency approach’, was to be utilized. It can be argued that the concept could work for the benefit of the top-down approach, whereas successful experimentation of the concept would provide what was needed for the bottom-up approach (evidence on the utility and benefit of the solutions) (Madrid IAKO, p.108).

The potential transitions discussed in MISA-EM included its utilization in (Madrid WS7, p.154):

¹⁷⁷ An ‘outside’ agency is a ‘transition partner’: an organization that has a capability gap, which is addressed in the concept, has the authority and resources to make changes, and will use the products of the concept experimentation to drive change.

- Training events for organizations about to join an international operation;
- National capability developments, as, for example
 - Developing national and international information sharing (interagency) practices and policies;
- National CD&E projects;
- Establishing national maritime governance structures (federated systems);
- Arranging national transition seminars (not limited to MISA-EM);
- Identifying national technology developments
 - Developing vessels' Automatic Identification Systems (AIS)s; and
 - Information collaboration tools;
- Existing and potential maritime situational awareness development projects, led by international organizations, as, for example
 - UN, IMO, EU (MARSUR especially), NATO, the SUCBAS-community; and
- Presentations in international maritime events held by
 - The Global Maritime Information Sharing Symposium (GMISS),¹⁷⁸ NATO, MNE6 Senior Leader Seminar and Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM).

Thus, MISA-EM specifically, and MNE generally, with its intent of harmonization, aims to *synchronize* the crisis management performance of the organizations taking part in a crisis management project. For example, this is done by removing legal obstacles as identified above. It is also done by improving standardization between NATO and the countries taking part in NATO missions, and by educating or guiding experimentation in order to improve standardization (NATO, 2010a: 1–1: §4–5). Synchronization is also achieved by harmonizing and standardizing data (formats, interfaces and contents) in addition to organizational standards and procedures and even representations of data, which provide a common frame of reference at the symbolic level (Helsinki LOE1,

¹⁷⁸ Hosted by the National Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office (NMCO) to align US Government outreach with the maritime industry and improve and increase industry-government maritime information sharing partnerships.

p.140). It should also be remembered that CD&E is itself seen as a cooperative approach and, as such, is seen to contribute to the cohesion (technical and social) of the Alliance (NAMC, 2009: §19).

In addition to the official script of the MNE performance, the ethnographic analysis revealed that participants have a tendency towards *improvisation* as organizations and individuals. More specifically, these improvisations revolved around identity or role building, learning interests and influencing other MNE and crisis management performers to perform in a fashion that was seen as preferable to the participating organization (Cartagena WS3, p.97, LOE2, 147; Helsinki Closing, p.160; Madrid WS7, p.154).

4.2.2.3. Competence in the MNE Context

Competence in the MNE context emerges primarily from the perceived requirement of more competent and, thus, efficient crisis management capabilities. The products of MNE are thus remedies of past crisis management incompetencies in a given area. In the implementation, or transition, phase, the authority to change crisis management policies and capabilities derives from the *competence of the concept* itself. In other words, the concept solution must be perceived as a competent solution. This requires that the solution address a relevant capability gap and that the solution be developed with convincing scientific rigour and presented with convincing argumentation.

In addition to the external demands on competence, internally, too, the different phases of the MNE project require different kinds of competence. Competence can be limited to expertise on CD&E or on the subject matter at hand (in the MISA-EM case, maritime security challenges and situational awareness, for example). Moreover, it can be limited to mastering research methodologies (qualitative and quantitative) or writing project status reports to observers at home. The study issue,¹⁷⁹ which forms the underlying framework of concept development, and the type of experimentation¹⁸⁰ and its data gathering plan place requirements on the competencies that are required for

¹⁷⁹ For example, countering irregular threats in a maritime environment, as was the study issue in MNE6 MISA-EM.

¹⁸⁰ For example, a discovery, hypothesis testing or validation type of experiment (NAMC, 2009: Annex B; NATO, 2010a: 2-1-2-2; NATOJWC, 2006: Annex B).

successful execution of the MNE sequence. Yet, simply identifying the requirements of competence, while important, is not enough—competence must also be contributed by the participating nations.

Moreover, it was discussed how the competence of an individual and/ or organization is used and promoted to gain *specific crisis management subjectivities* (identities and roles) in the crisis management environment—subjectivities that can later be used to gain leverage and drive organizational or personal interest issues.

4.2.2.4. How MNE Embodies, Acts out and Reifies Background Knowledge and Discourse in and on the Material World

First of all, it should be noted that the MNE-practice is seen to act out and reify not just *existing* background knowledge and discourse, but also *new*, transformative knowledge and discourse that it itself has produced. To put it in simple terms, existing knowledge forms the rationale of the study contents of MNE; existing knowledge is applied within MNE; the outcomes of MNE are products that embody existing and new crisis management knowledge.¹⁸¹ Put in the MISA-EM context, first, existing knowledge identified the need to be able to counter threats deriving from irregular actors in the maritime environment. Second, the MISA-EM process gathered and applied maritime knowledge during the process, which it used to create a solution for increased awareness in the extended maritime environment.

How MNE embodies (and ‘is made to embody’) and acts out knowledge can be identified within this simplification. However, the process of how knowledge is reified is influenced by the transition-process: by influencing the form and shape of operational capabilities on the crisis floor; by influencing the contents of policies, doctrines and strategies; and by influencing the contents of national debates on crisis management. Moreover, the concept, the textual output of MNE can be seen to reify crisis management knowledge just by existing: In its existence, it demonstrates how the MNE-community ‘sees the world’ and as such reifies this knowledge. In other words, new crisis management knowledge is articulated in the products of MNE (the published concepts), which seek to influence and tweak the background knowledge of the international crisis

¹⁸¹ Thus, one could argue that the products are always new knowledge.

management architecture. In turn, this tweaked interpretation of ‘reality’ forms the background knowledge, which forms the basis of the subject framework for new MNE cycles, within which new knowledge will be created in the future. This reification of crisis management background knowledge is enabled by the transitional feature of MNE—reification, which facilitates like-mindedness and the harmonizing of mindsets, as argued above.

As demonstrated earlier in Chapter 2 (p.19), background knowledge is unconscious or ‘un-thought-of’ in nature and forms the basis of our quotidian. As such, this very local and situated knowledge must be interpreted from within the practice it informs and with which it evolves (cf. Pouliot, 2008: 270). Interpreted from within MNE, I argue that the *opus operatum*,¹⁸² the embodied, governing social norm, of MNE is *transformation*, which is achieved through the development of concepts. Concepts, in turn, are defined as solution oriented transformational ideas (cf. NAMC, 2009: §5; NATOACT, 2009g: 5–7).

Transformation is primarily addressed with regard to capabilities (capabilities must be transformed), but also with regard to the transformation of obstacles hindering the successful execution of the transformed capability (obstacles must be transformed). Obstacles include, for example, national or international legal issues and policies, which are in the way of the institutionalization and naturalization of transformation. As such, the MNE-practice not only anticipates future events, but also *creates future events by moulding the frameworks that govern the boundaries of possible events*. This notion was underlined by Cebrowski earlier¹⁸³ (2003: 8) and by MISA-EM participants in comments such as: ‘This is how we see the future—this has to happen’ and ‘This is the first time existing future is written down’ (Helsinki WS8, p.159).

The CD&E methodology is always lurking in the background when conducting action within the MNE context. CD&E, thus, structures and organizes the various actions and choices which the participants take and see as acceptable or feasible—CD&E

¹⁸² The ‘enacted practice’ as translated by Pouliot (2008: 278). His translation, in my mind, puts too much emphasis on enactment, which, I argue, can be seen to always contain the subjective nuances of the actor’s ‘acts’, that is, for me, ‘enactment’ is not as objective as it should be. I would prefer to translate the *opus operatum* with more objectivity, but since that would give the translation almost religious undertones, I will restrict myself to ‘enacted practice’ (cf. Benhabib, 1995; Butler, 1995).

¹⁸³ The purpose of transformation is *to anticipate and create the future* (Cebrowski, 2003: 8).

organizes the arrays of MNE actions. The ‘current security situation’ is also always looming in the background. For example, ‘current reality interpretations’ (in the MISA-EM case, the events in the Horn of Africa) set the parameters of the possible, relevant and meaningful when deliberating CD&E governed action, aiming ultimately for the development of solutions that enable transformation.

When a transformative solution, identified in an MNE-concept, is successfully transitioned, the background knowledge of ‘current security environment reality’ is reified¹⁸⁴ to other crisis management actors, national security debates and observers of crisis management. Yet, as stated, background knowledge evolves with the practice which it informs. Thus, it can be argued that the background knowledge, the taken-for-granted crisis management ‘reality’—or rather ‘imaginary’—of a crisis management observer, for example, potentially transforms. Then, also bearing in mind MNE’s transformative goals, MNE can be identified as ‘creating the world’ in which it operates. This diffused crisis management imaginary (how to better conduct maritime crisis management operations, for example) then informs other knowledge producing and applying practices, which potentially end up forming the initial injections of knowledge for, and in, future MNE iterations.

Background knowledge is the building material of a ‘habitus’, which was earlier presented as embodied dispositions, created through historical events and social interactions, which inform an actor’s inclinations and tendencies. Moreover, background knowledge constructs the taken-for-granted in the social configurations of ‘fields’, which host power relationships and objects of struggle (cf. Pouliot, 2008: 272–275). In the MNE context, different groups of habitus were observed, as, for example, those with technological or CD&E methodology dispositions and inclinations, those inclining to only observe or to actively contribute to the study issue, those with tendencies to take participation as a way to advance national or coalition (military over civilian) interests or personal career interest developments. All observed habitus were (more or less) conscious of the transformational aspect and intent of MNE, yet the *impact* of the

¹⁸⁴ For example, ‘better’ action must be taken in the Horn of Africa environment—thus articulating the need for improvement in the first place, but also locating the site where ‘better’ action is needed in the second place. Moreover, it forms the basis for the evaluation on how we are doing it.

transitional feature of MNE into the larger crisis management field remained, if not unthought-of, at least unspoken-of.

There are two fields that are the topics of discussion here. First, and primarily, MNE is a field in itself. Yet, second, when discussing the transitional feature of MNE, the field is the larger crisis management architecture. During the ethnography, it was observed how MNE hosts power relationships and objects of struggle. For example, by observing cases where the US was in effect equated as an EU nation, or when the US was seen to have the power ‘to hold the MNE process hostage’,¹⁸⁵ or when non-NATO members make statements such as ‘we as NATO’ (Madrid WS7, p.154), these actions demonstrate the dominance (as well as their taken-for-granted position in the power structure) of these actors within the MNE environment.

Moreover, although countries have their own CD&E frameworks, the dominance of NATO CD&E in the MNE ethnography was distinct, giving, in effect, NATO some leverage in structuring MNE. This dominance (US security dominance and friendship, NATO structuring) can be interpreted to be so internalized that it is already background knowledge and an example of *structural power*, where the positions or roles of the US and NATO are so ‘natural’ that other actors may be unaware of their dominated condition or accept it as ‘reality or fact’ (cf. Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 52–55). Thus, different objects are left to ‘be struggled over’. For example, in the MISA-EM case, the content of contribution (what is the contribution and, thus, the role of a country in MISA-EM) was seen as an object of struggle (Cartagena WS3, p.97).

In addition, fields, as social configurations, host various social games with commonly agreed objectives. I encountered this concretely when I entered MNE and was faced with a plethora of phenomena, which slowly started to make sense through my observations as I was socialized into the background knowledge of MNE (cf. Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 8). MNE naturally has commonly agreed objectives, yet some are more distinctly in view than others. For example, the official objective is clearly stated (to be able to counter irregular threats, as was the case in MNE6), whereas objectives such as being able to influence international crisis management (one of Finland’s objectives) was not as openly stressed, though still public. In other cases, it could be speculated that

¹⁸⁵ If the US pulls out, ‘there is no point in continuing’ (Interlocutor 3).

certain objectives were only agreed upon by some, as, for example, the speculations held during LOE2 (Cartagena LOE2, p.149).

Moreover, to partake in the social game of MNE is also to play other games driven by national or personal interest. These include using MNE to gain or advance access to lucrative project development projects, to develop personal professional relationships and to advance one's career development. Thus, with regard to the last point especially, the field where the social game of MNE is played affects the self-understandings and subjective interests of its participants and so it can be argued that the field hosts *structural power* (cf. Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 52–55).

When an MNE solution is successfully transitioned, it enters the larger field of international crisis management. There, the solution is a contribution to the struggles over capital (economic, social or symbolic), which defines the structure of unequal power relations. The transition of a concept is an injection of crisis management meaning into the international crisis management ecosystem. Thus, when MNE imposes meaning, it can be argued to wield *symbolic power*.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, the rationale of the need and urgency of the solution, encapsulated in discourse, has the potential to establish new practices and determine a field—or new fields—of discourse. The study content of MNE7 was earlier seen to inject itself into debates on national crisis management strategy, for example (cf. Aaltola, 2011). So one could argue that MNE wields *conceptual power* (cf. Neumann, 2002: 636–639).

Transitioned MNE solutions can thus be argued to utilize the concept as a discursive component. With new concepts, new crisis management meanings are imposed and determined. Different subjects in this larger socially structured field 'fall victim' to this imposition (such as officials, academia and casual observers) as constitutive understandings are cemented or reproduced via the integration and institutionalization processes of the transitioned solutions. By setting the stage of the 'imaginable, possible, and appropriate' through discourse (the diffusion of the concept solution, created with a specific system of knowledge) in crisis management, the transitional component of MNE

¹⁸⁶ Symbolic power is defined as 'the imposition of meanings in and through social relations' (Pouliot, 2008: 282; cf. Bourdieu, 1991: 163–170).

is a utilization of *productive power* and a contribution to the constitution of quotidian world politics (cf. Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 52–55).

This latter larger crisis management field is where the MNE practice is most material: Capabilities emerge as material only when implemented and used in ‘the real world’. Although MNE is unarguably material already in the first, MNE-specific field (meetings and experimentation events take place in the material dimension), implemented solutions have tremendous potential for impact, which underscore their relevance and the power of MNE. For example, if the implemented MNE capability allows for greater destruction and dominance in the material world, MNE has directly taken part in the genesis of this capability (as *productive power*) and can thus be identified as the source for this instantiation of *compulsory power*¹⁸⁷ and can be seen to affect the relational capacities of the crisis management actors and thus wield *structural power* (cf. Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 52–55).

Some practices are more influential than others. Swidler (2001) identifies ‘anchoring practices’, which influence and reproduce a larger collection of discourses and practices—and thus also understandings. Moreover, analyses of practices should focus on cases where ‘practices anchor or reproduce constitutive rules, rules that define things as what they are’. After the analysis of such cases, the constitutive nature of (some) practices on structures becomes visible. This will help gain ‘a better understanding of when and how practices anchor or organize systems of practice, discourse, and action’ (Swidler, 2001: 95–100). As the MNE-practice was observed to influence and reproduce a large collection of discourses, practices and constitutive rules, it can be treated as an anchoring practice.

Earlier, this influence and reproduction have been argued primarily from the standpoint of MNE’s transitional feature. However, it should not be forgotten that the ethnography also examined different flows of discourse, flows in which MNE acted as an *information node*. For example, identified products of MNE5 were seen to have provided

¹⁸⁷ ‘Power as relations of interaction of direct control by one actor over another’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 43).

useful products (such as SOPs,¹⁸⁸ systems of classification) to nations, organizations and projects, among them SUCBAS and MARSUR (Helsinki, 9–11 March 2010).

The fifth cycle of MNE was seen to have contributed to the national strategic planning initiatives of various countries by having provided ‘lessons learned’ and ‘best practices’ information (Turku TCD, p.150). Moreover, in the MISA-EM ethnography, it was revealed how other maritime projects influenced and were influenced by MISA-EM. This exemplifies the flows of maritime discourse in which MISA-EM specifically acted as a node, dam and shaper (embodying and reifying knowledge). These flows included other nodes, such as USJFCOM’s IASSA and NATO’s MSA projects, MARSUR,¹⁸⁹ SUCBAS,¹⁹⁰ EUROSUR,¹⁹¹ MARSUNO,¹⁹² MARISS¹⁹³ and SafeSeaNet.¹⁹⁴ Moreover, it was rumoured that the MISA-EM concept would directly influence proposals for an EU-wide integrated maritime COP in the near future (Cartagena WS3, p.97).

4.2.3. MNE Practice Attributes

This section will summarize MNE’s material/ meaningful, structural/ agential, reflexive/ background and stability/ change attributes (cf. Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 18) and how MNE integrates, institutionalizes and naturalizes new crisis management practices and cognitions.

It can be argued that, primarily, the purpose and motivation of MNE and its participants is to ensure the *stability* of the international crisis management system—as understood and defined by its participants. MNE contributes to this stability project by identifying threats to the system (*change* in stability) and then *reflexively* identifying areas that require *change* in order to meet the challenges posed by these threats, that is, identifying capability gaps. In the MNE and CD&E context, ‘to change’ means ‘to transform’. Transformation was presented as the *opus operatum* of MNE and thus an

¹⁸⁸ Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).

¹⁸⁹ MARSUR, EU Maritime Surveillance (cf. EDA, 2011b).

¹⁹⁰ SUCBAS, Sea Surveillance Baltic Sea, a pilot of MARSUR (cf. SUCBAS, 2011).

¹⁹¹ EUROSUR, European External Border Surveillance System (cf. EUROSUR, 2008).

¹⁹² MARSUNO, Maritime Surveillance North, a pilot of EUROSUR (cf. MARSUNO, 2011).

¹⁹³ MARISS, Maritime Security Services (cf. MARISS, 2011).

¹⁹⁴ SafeSeaNet, a vessel traffic monitoring and information system (cf. EMSA, 2011).

integral component of its *background knowledge* together with current security situation ‘reality’ (international and national) interpretations.

Gaining the possibility to increase one’s capabilities, and thus security, is the primary *meaning* for an actor—although ‘to participate’ additionally means many more things to various actors. MNE is enacted, and its solutions of new capabilities potentially implemented, in the *material* world. Participants are *agential*, yet there were different types of agents that were discussed: the *internal* agents on the MNE field (the MNE participants), and the *external* agents on the broader international crisis management field (such as officials, academia and casual observers). It should not be forgotten that in this study, MNE, as an ‘MNE-community’, acts as an agent in the international field. MNE has an intellectually formed internal *structure* (CD&E methodology), which governs methodologies and sequences of capability development actions. Moreover, it was argued that through its transitional feature (diffusion of knowledge which leads to capability), MNE influences external structures, be they institutional, physical, social or mental.

The analysis of the inner workings of MNE and presenting them through a practice framework is the intent of this study. This is done in order to be able to define a *new security object* within the crisis management research framework. Additionally, the external impact of MNE has been discussed as it is this impact which underscores MNE’s influence and exemplifies its relevance. More specifically, the transitional element of MNE has been discussed as it was argued to contain processes of power: It harmonizes structures of activities and assigns subjectivities and their relational capacities. As such, in line with Adler and Pouliot’s understanding of practices, ‘MNE-practice’ can be argued to influence the social structures of crisis management and politics and introduce new crisis management understandings in people’s minds (cf. Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 20).

Chapter 5.

Conclusion

When I first entered MNE, what I now call the ‘MNE-community’, in Madrid on 26 May 2009, I was asked to explain who I was and what I was doing in Madrid and MNE. Were I to be asked these questions now, after gathering and analysing a multitude of data, I would provide a somewhat different answer to the one I gave then. Now, I would say that my purpose in Madrid was to join an international community, which methodologically develops new crisis management knowledge and solutions, which are to be introduced in the wider crisis management architecture. I would argue that although the grounding logics of the existence and purpose of MNE are guised in *instrumental rationalities*, MNE wears another face, too. With this other *political face*, the MNE-community contributes to the harmonization of the social realm by constituting the normative and epistemic grounds for crisis management actions: MNE transforms *operational needs*, identified in the concept, into *political needs* to which political decision-makers must react in order to create an environment where the (potential) capability can thrive.

Certainly, this argument would not be received as easily as the answers I originally provided and would require some explanation. First, I would have to discuss the defining features and characteristics of definitions such as ‘community of practice’ and ‘practice’, and how MNE embodies the characteristics of these definitions. Second, I would have to provide an account of how MNE contributes to the constitution of social realities. Specifically, the transitional logics of MNE would have to be presented and discussed—logics which play a role in how the international crisis management environment is interpreted and what actions are seen as appropriate within this environment. Consequently, third, I would have to argue that MNE is a multidimensional creature, acting in the space of international relations and politics. Defined and analysed through the lens of practice theory, MNE is both an actor within the field of crisis management, and a node where crisis management knowledge flows are gathered, evolved and diffused.

First, making the argument that MNE is a community of practice should be easily accepted because the main function of a community of practice is the development of knowledge, competence and performance. The primary purpose of MNE is to find solutions to identified capability gaps in the crisis management environment. Thus, the motivation of MNE is to develop and evolve the competence and performance of the crisis management community. In other words, competence emerges primarily from the interest to develop more competent and, thus, efficient (effective) crisis management capability, that is, the performance of international military crisis management *and* the performance of national organizations responsible for security. Yet, at the same time, to gain access to MNE, an organization must be willing to contribute competence; only after this initial contribution can an organization presume to gain access to MNE, a privileged setting for both acquiring and creating crisis management knowledge.

The methodology with which new crisis management knowledge is developed would not require emphasis with the recipients of my alternative explanation. For them, as participants in MNE, the characteristics and position of the CD&E methodology is a given. The dominance of NATO CD&E as *the* methodology to produce crisis management knowledge is so taken for granted that its ‘taken-for-granted-ness’ can only be rivalled by the intended outcome of CD&E: transformation of capabilities in the crisis management environment. Thus, although countries have their own CD&E frameworks, the dominance of NATO CD&E in the MNE ethnography is distinct, giving, in effect, NATO leverage in structuring MNE. This dominance (along with US security dominance and friendship) can be interpreted to be so internalized that it is already background knowledge; it is an example of *structural power*, where the positions or roles of the US and NATO are so ‘natural’ that actors may be unaware of their dominated condition or accept it as ‘reality or fact’.

My source of CD&E excitement would arise from the realization that the starting point for CD&E, the identification of a capability gap, is an interpretation of the crisis management ‘reality’ within which the participants see themselves as operating. This observation would not cause excitement within my imagined audience, for whom this, too, would be a given. Yet, I would go on and assert that since the CD&E methodology is the methodology with which an international military community develops knowledge, it

is interesting in itself: It is the framework which governs the knowledge application and production of MNE and it *organizes arrays of MNE activities and their trajectories*. It not only illustrates how knowledge is to be produced in relation to the *philosophy of science*, it also illustrates how the development of knowledge should be managed—for example, what steps are required and what kinds of roles are available for the taking. Having a role is not insignificant: Taking on a role (the requirement of which is competence) offers the opportunity to frame oneself within a politically *preferred crisis management subjectivity*, in a setting of major international crisis management actors. This perception of competence, and the information and the personal contacts thus gained, can provide leverage in other crisis management settings, which can be used to one's advantage.

Discussing this advantage might stir some interest within my imagined audience. Yet, my imagined audience might not want to see the methodology of CD&E as such a politically loaded tool as I would continue to explain it. For them, MNE and CD&E are purely *instrumental tools*, that is, purely about finding specific solutions to specific challenges and discussed and framed in the logics of operational efficiency. However, since an MNE solution (developed via CD&E) is ideally implemented, MNE and CD&E host a *transitional feature*: MNE knowledge must be transitioned into the larger crisis management environment.

The rationale of transition is not given nearly as much weight in MNE and its governing documents as is the rationale of instrumentality. Yet, there are identified ways to conduct transition, including actionable recommendations and lobbying for favourable conditions (in legislation, organization structures and interpretations) in the crisis management structure. Thus, a purpose of transition is to establish favourable conditions in the crisis management environment in which the developed capability is able to prevail successfully. The notion of transition closes the hermeneutic of CD&E and MNE. The MNE-community initializes its CD&E actions with an interpretation of reality and concludes with a step to diffuse developed knowledge into the larger social realm, where it governs the interpretations of crisis management realities, which form the foundation for new MNE cycles.

Therefore, my hope would be that my imagined audience would start to understand that the MNE-community, the actions of which are organized by epistemic logics, conducts very specific actions. In other words, the MNE-community, as an epistemic security community of practice, constitutes a specific practice, with attributes of stability/ change, reflexivity/ background knowledge, meanings/ materials and agents/ structure. I would briefly have to recap these *attributes of the MNE-practice* for my audience, although they would already be intrinsically aware of them. The purpose and motivation of MNE and its participants is to ensure (or at least contribute to) the *stability* of the international crisis management system—stability as understood and defined by its participants. MNE contributes to this stability project by initially identifying different threats to the system (*change* in stability) and, then, *reflexively* identifying capability-areas that require *change* in order to meet the challenges posed by these threats, in other words, by identifying capability gaps. In the MNE and CD&E context, ‘to change’ means ‘to transform’. Hence, it is argued here that *transformation* forms the *opus operatum* of MNE and, thus, an integral component of its *background knowledge* together with current security situation ‘reality’ (international and national) interpretations.

Gaining the possibility to increase one’s capabilities and, thus, security is the primary *meaning* for an actor—although ‘to participate’ additionally means many more things to various actors. I would point out that MNE is enacted in and its solutions of new capabilities are to be implemented in the *material* world. Participants are *agential*, yet there are different types of agents within MNE: the internal agents in the MNE field (the MNE participants), and the external agents in the broader international crisis management field (such as officials, academia and casual observers). It should not be forgotten that via the logics of transition especially, MNE, as the ‘MNE-community’, acts as an agent in the international field. MNE has an intellectually formed internal *structure* (the CD&E methodology), which governs the methods and sequences of capability development action. Moreover, through its transitional feature, the MNE-community influences external crisis management structures, be they institutional, physical, social or mental.

Second, I would linger on the last point. I would continue to evoke the notion that the MNE-community constitutes realities within the larger crisis management environment

with the MNE-practice, making the MNE-practice the constitutive mechanism of the MNE-community. As a community of practice, MNE influences interpretations within crisis management. By identifying gaps in capabilities, MNE simultaneously influences understandings of world events, time-space connections, self, and the realm of possibilities in crisis management. When concepts are transitioned (fitted into structures or modifying structures so that the concepts fit), these interpretations and understandings diffuse within the broader social environment.

So, the MNE knowledge domain constitutes *like-mindedness* and thus advances the *harmonizing of mindsets* within the realm of crisis management. This like-mindedness emerges within the community as the specifics of the identified crisis management challenge and the solution(s) to the challenge are constantly negotiated. Further, MNE constitutes like-mindedness in the broader social dimension of crisis management when MNE knowledge is transitioned to the 'outside world'. Therefore, MNE contributes to the *harmonization of the social realm* by constituting the normative and epistemic grounds for crisis management actions, in addition to contributing to the establishment of standardizations in the technical and organizational dimensions. Moreover, this is a type of harmonization that effectively starts to treat all MNE-participants as a single entity, where information sharing standards are the same, organizational structures and processes resemble each other, and where the *material capabilities of the single entity are treated as (more) common*. As an international communal effort, in consequence, this results in contributing to crisis management *isomorphism*.

Therefore, facing my imagined audience, I would argue that MNE, as a community of practice, is a tool that can be used to affect the social realm outside of the community. MNE, as an inter-subjective social structure, constitutes the normative and epistemic grounds for crisis management actions. Thus, MNE can be argued to utilize power as it collectively negotiates crisis management meanings and then reifies them with the intention of institutionalization and naturalization. This *transitional feature* of MNE can be argued to utilize *productive* and *structural* power especially.

Hence, MNE can be argued to have the ability and power to transform social realities, and crisis management realities in particular. As argued, MNE especially does this by influencing the conceptual frameworks with which these crisis management

(state) interests are interpreted. Therefore, MNE also constitutes the normative and epistemic grounds for crisis management action and thus affects world political, economic and social events. This especially takes place when the transitioned normative and epistemic crisis management notions are naturalized and institutionalized by MNE's transitional feature.

Thus, MNE, with its intent of harmonization, aims to synchronize crisis management performance by, for example, removing legal obstacles. Further, harmonization is achieved by improving standardization between NATO and countries taking part in NATO missions through education and experimentation guidance. Moreover, harmonization is achieved by harmonizing and standardizing organizational standards and procedures, data (formats, interfaces and contents) and even representations of data that provide a common frame of reference at the symbolic level. Thus, I would argue that to study MNE and CD&E is to examine how organizations participating in MNE highlight the *aim, scope and site* of preferred crisis management harmonization in technical and organizational—as well as political—rationalities.

Third, I would highlight the *actor-ness* of MNE—how the MNE-community influences the social realm outside of the community. Specifically, I would argue that *the MNE-community is an agent* in the international crisis management field affecting crisis management events and reifying crisis management (background) knowledge. Although, therefore, MNE can be argued to have the ability and power to influence and even transform social realities, the acronym, 'MNE', is virtually unknown within academia, and the field of International Relations in particular. Much like other, similar communities of practice, MNE has not been viewed as an actor in the international arena.

Nevertheless, MNE does advance interpretations and understandings of crisis management implementations. It also deliberately seeks to bring these notions and understandings to the attention of the more classical actors of International Relations. It can be argued that when MNE brings arguments of 'required' actions into the foreground (by introducing MNE developed crisis management knowledge into the collective consciousness and attention), it steers the development of the interests of these more classical actors of International Relations. Specifically, the MNE-community influences

the conceptual frameworks (pun intended) within which these crisis management interests are viewed. The MNE-community of practice thus influences structures (setting standards of action) and agents ('like-minded' actors who translate these standards into acts with meaning).

Yet, the MNE-community is not only an actor, it is also a unique type of information exchange and interpretation node. As such, its influence and, therefore, relevance increases. The specific knowledge the MNE-community needs for its concept development and experimentation is gathered not only from the world of science and academia, and lessons learned from actual crisis management situations, but also from other, similar communities of practice. Not only does the MNE-community gather this knowledge, but it also immediately evolves it and diffuses it. For my imagined audience, this would be a given; naturally crisis management professionals share information amongst themselves, especially as many of them are assigned to MNE and these other communities, processes or projects. However, this characteristic gives MNE more influence. As the MNE-community diffuses the knowledge it has created at the end of the CD&E sequence, it does so already during concept development and experimentation. This makes MNE a node with actor-type characteristics in a constellation of communities of practice, all of which are focused and resolved to solve similar crisis management challenges.

As a privileged site for learning and as a node for exchanging information, MNE offers many identified benefits for its participants—*collateral benefits*, which are gained over and above the 'official products' of MNE. These benefits, I would argue, further underscore the rationale of participation.

One, as a unique site for *learning*, MNE participants do not only learn about the specific concept under development, but also of currently available products (which may, of course, have been originally developed in MNE). Identified examples include SOPs and classifications. The crisis management lessons learned in MNE can be identified to provide useful feeds into other capability projects. Just learning about potential future crisis phase collaboration partners (their operating procedures, emerging technologies, involvements in other related venues, personal relations) can sometimes be enough reason to participate—it can even be more enlightening and beneficial for the national

crisis management context than the potential future MNE solutions. This feature makes MNE a platform with characteristics of open intelligence. MNE can be seen as a ‘supermarket’ for various crisis management solutions, where options are put on the shelves and countries can take whatever suits them as dictated by their national interests.

Two, MNE products and knowledge, both gathered and developed, have been seen to have *contributed to national strategic planning initiatives*. For example, countries can choose to develop a national policy that relates to an MNE study issue. Then, the knowledge MNE gathers and develops feeds directly into a parallel national policy development process. Furthermore, in accordance with acknowledging the utilization of parallel national policy processes, the MNE platform is seen to play an important role in the development of *national crisis management strategies*. Examples of such events were given from past MNE cycles, especially MNE5, the comprehensive approach of which was seen to have had a big impact on developing national comprehensive crisis management strategies. I would probably leave out the notion that accepting a ‘best-practice’ becomes learning and doing by example, which can be argued to be a submission to MNE authority. This notion might not fare that well with an audience of national interest centred people.

Three, MNE benefits include its use as an informal site of creating relationships and dialogue with international crisis management actors. These include, but are not limited to, dialogues and relations with and among countries, the EU and NATO. Moreover, the MNE site offers the opportunity to engage the ‘technical people’ of countries and organizations in dialogue with each other. MNE thus provides the possibility for an increase in horizontal interactions among organizational—not national—peers. Organizational relationship management potentially has a twist of *realpolitik*: The MNE site can be utilized to influence the other and examine the other's window of (public) capability.

Four, this logic can also be used the other way around, where MNE is used to display capability, making it a *capability marketing forum* of sorts. If a marketed capability is displayed at the MNE site and seen as effective and beneficial, this capability can spread internationally. For example, imagine the possibility of a non-NATO country influencing NATO to change its operating procedures to match the non-

NATO country's operating procedure through traditional diplomatic means. It might not be impossible, but it sure would be difficult. Compare the traditional process with a scenario in which a non-NATO country introduces a technical standard and, perceiving it to be viable, NATO chooses to implement it within its operational framework. As an immediate consequence, the non-NATO country's operating procedure and NATO's operating procedure will become interoperable and harmonized.

Further, as technologies are introduced and thus promoted, it serves as a marketing situation for the developer of the software, which is a business. Thus, the demonstrations also serve as opportunities to promote national businesses and increase sales. Further, by offering and promoting one's know-how, for example, in technical standards in information sharing, a participating country can influence the standards of others. This ensures and increases interoperability between actors, as, for example, between a non-aligned country and an aligned country (or even the whole coalition). Capability marketing can be done intentionally where a capability is, via MNE, marketed to the top leaderships of other organizations. For example, MNE can be used to frame a country as a forerunner in a given field, much like Finland did in LOE1. Marketing is potentially easy: When participants act professionally, it increases the *image* and *credibility* of their organizations. This can result in gaining more leverage in different international crisis management settings (other than MNE), which can then be utilized according to organizational interest. Thus, the MNE-site can be used to *promote crisis management identities*.

Five, even observing the developments within MNE enables an observing state to speculate and potentially prepare for *emerging transformations* in the crisis management architecture. As MNE seeks to influence decision-making (political, organizational) with its mechanism of transitions, the knowledge gained during MNE participation can be used to analyse the potentiality of future policy changes in other countries and organizations. One of the purposes of MNE was to harmonize crisis management operating procedures for the sake of efficiency and synergy. Yet, through transitional logics, it simultaneously potentially harmonizes policy. Knowledge of potential future harmonization, gained early on via actual participation/ observation, can be used to

prepare nationally for transformations (in capabilities, procedures, policies) that will potentially take place in the international crisis management structure.

For example, MISA-EM promoted the notion that increased maritime awareness results in an increase of efficiencies in actions, that is, in a more agile and ‘fluid’ crisis management field to serve the earlier mentioned ‘common good’. Yet, the hypothetical fluidity on the field is achieved by implementing a new structure—a network with many miscellaneous actors all connected and harmonized with each other—with new additional norms, forms, rules and standards. Thus, fluidity of movement and action on the field is achieved by increasing *rigidity* in the governance layer (command structures).

As another example, it could be stipulated that the maritime environment could have a use for ethnographic skills to analyse human data and provide ‘cultural and ethnographic intelligence’—as has been done with the counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan and in the Iraq land operations.

Six, MNE, via the CD&E methodology, was presented as a way of identifying capability gaps and developing potential solutions to fill these gaps. As such, it was especially seen to be an attempt to reduce crisis management *expenditures*. This argument was relevant for small countries in particular, which have limited resources available for their capability development initiatives. Hence, every attempt to find synergies with others and cost-effective procedures in international crisis management is welcome.

Seven, CD&E provides a *safe framework* for crisis management actors to discover and verify the applicability of a solution. Instead of testing new capabilities in the field, CD&E and MNE provide the opportunity to test capabilities in a safe environment without risking failure or casualties in actual operations. Moreover, as CD&E facilitates adaptations to security challenges, it is argued that it facilitates these adaptations more quickly than a normal, traditional military capability creation process would allow.

Finally, I would tell my audience that who I was and what I was doing in MNE and Madrid become illuminated through these three broad features of being and doing—as do the *organizing logics of the arrays of MNE activities and their trajectories*. Moreover, they describe how MNE contributes to the evolution of crisis management, determines

and constitutes crisis management meanings and reality, and constitutes the normative and epistemic grounds for crisis management actions. Further, they outline the attributes of the MNE practice and touch upon the rationalities of participation in MNE activities.

By volunteering free labour, I had ensured my access and participation in the first place, access in which I would contribute to the development of a specific type of crisis management knowledge. In addition to learning how this knowledge is created methodologically, I would also learn that this knowledge is very influential and thus powerful. Already, during the CD&E sequence, this knowledge I would contribute to create would influence the development of crisis management policies, solutions and perceptions on an international scale. After we concluded our development of the MISA-EM concept, this knowledge would be systematically diffused into the larger crisis management knowledge domain. As a consequence, legal, organizational and mental structures of crisis management would be moulded to appropriate the knowledge we would create.

Thus, I would answer that for a brief while, I was to be an actor within an actor of international relations and crisis management. Bearing in mind the quote this study started with, ‘This is the first time existing future is written down’, I would explain how the knowledge we would write down directly impacts the future of crisis management by potentially providing solutions to identified crisis management challenges—or potentially creating new ones.

*

For the final conclusion of this thesis, I will introduce a few themes of further research, which emerge from the discussed multidimensional crisis management object, MNE.

The theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 demonstrates how innovative practices can or may even have to be initialized from a position of power. MNE is led and heavily influenced by the US—are the study themes of MNE in reality a collective effort? Or are they, in essence, what the US wants them to be? How do they originate?

It was argued that the transitional logics of MNE and CD&E diffuse crisis management knowledge to the broader crisis management architecture and, in doing so, influence the realm of political decision-making. How, in fact, does the new crisis management knowledge get diffused? For example, how does it diffuse in a small, non-

aligned country? As a further example, in MNE6, the corridor gossip indicated that the lessons learned from MISA-EM would find their way into at least a proposal for a future European network for maritime surveillance—did they?

It was observed that to be a military-affiliated woman in MNE was somewhat similar to being a civilian male in MNE. This gives rise to the question of gender and influence in the MNE community.

What is the governance challenge in the global commons and how is it addressed? MNE7 materials could be used as sources. In the MISA-EM case, the governance challenge was introduced and framed as a central issue of current international politics, especially in ‘unprepared waters’. What kind of societal transformation measures are taken to transform the unprepared into the ‘prepared’, and how does this ‘preparedness’ articulate power politics (who actually are the waters prepared for)?

Is the comprehensive approach under heavy evolution? For example, in discussions during MISA-EM, it was understood that the main interest in Operation ATALANTA was to ensure access and movement in the maritime domain. This gives a comprehensive maritime crisis management approach the characteristics of a flanking operation. The approach can be seen to evolve through the observation of discussions on conditionality: Actors cannot assume to be automatically welcomed to a maritime security network—or can they?

Has harmonization gone too far? MNE must be assumed to be just one international practice that aims, and partly achieves, the harmonization of international crisis management practices. How does the increase of harmonization affect national sovereignty? Is a new, international horizontal governance structure under development (intentionally or unintentionally), the purpose of which is to undo and replace the national vertical structures of crisis management capability governance?

MNE is a joint venture in which tasks are completed among participants. Is this an opportunity or a threat since the activities are not in national control? Granted, MNE has been argued to save money, for example, but it also burdens individuals. If an MNE concept does not yield relevant new crisis management knowledge directly and immediately, are the ‘collateral gains’ enough reason for participation?

Appendix A: MISA-EM Executive Summary

‘The maritime environment is crucial for the security, prosperity, and stability of many nations, as well as for the logistic support of most operational theatres. Maritime Security is therefore a key element in time of both peace and crisis, and is necessarily enabled by maritime situational awareness.

‘Various current maritime situational awareness concepts and capabilities addressing the problem in domestic waters are already showing some promising results, but the challenge in remote or distant areas, where indigenous capabilities barely exist and the environment is not well understood, is yet to be resolved. New affordable, sustainable, scalable, deployable, and flexible situational awareness capabilities have to be developed, taking into account the multinational and interagency nature of the maritime purview.

‘The problem to achieve situational awareness in unprepared waters includes the current lack of a workable and comprehensive end-to-end capability for detecting, identifying, analyzing, fusing, and distributing maritime information to develop an effective understanding of the anomalies, changes, and trends in the maritime picture, necessary to make sound operational decisions. Furthermore, there is no integrated mechanism for joint, interagency, and international organizations to alert each other for the purposes of protection, safety, cooperation, and interdiction as required.

‘The detection of and response to maritime threats need to integrate efforts across the maritime community, and is inherently an interagency and multinational effort. The Multinational Interagency Situational Awareness within the Extended Maritime Environment (MISA EM) is expected to answer this challenge.

‘To compile a shared awareness within the maritime environment in distant or unprepared waters, it will be necessary to create a federation of interagency and multinational networks, supported as required by local, regional, deployed and opportunity assets within an environment where non-compliant actors will certainly attempt to blend into the lawful maritime background.

‘The combination of diverse pieces of data and information coming from the interagency environment with those coming from indigenous or/and deployed assets, will allow analysts to recognize threats operating under the cover of the regular maritime activity, therefore facilitating the decision making process. An enduring solution based on local and regional capacity building and regional agreements will facilitate the transition from military to civilian to local led maritime security activities’ (USJFCOM, 2010b: vi).

Appendix B: Fieldwork Outline

This outline includes official events relating to the MNE processes in which I took part.

MNE6 official meetings:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Madrid 27–29 May 2009: | MISA Concept Development |
| 2. Tuusula 1–3 September 2009: | CD&E Training |
| 3. Cartagena 5–9 October 2009: | MISA Concept Development |
| 4. Madrid 24–26 November 2009: | MISA Concept Development |
| 5. Singapore 18–22 January 2010: | MISA Concept Development |
| 6. Helsinki 9–11 March 2010: | MISA LOE1 |
| 7. Cartagena 22–25 March 2010: | MISA LOE2 Rock Drill |
| 8. Cartagena 26–30 April 2010: | MISA LOE2 |
| 9. Turku 11 May 2010: | Technical Capability Demonstration |
| 10. Madrid 24–28 May 2010: | MISA LOE Analysis |
| 11. Madrid 21–23 June 2010: | MISA Concept Development |
| 12. Riihimäki 17 August 2010: | MISA Concept Development |
| 13. Helsinki 4–7 October 2010: | MISA Concept Development |
| 14. Helsinki 13 January 2011: | MNE6 National Closing Seminar |

MNE7 official meetings:

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| 1. Helsinki 1 December: | MNE7 Info |
| 2. Helsinki 25–26 January: | MNE7 Opening Seminar |
| 3. Helsinki 25 May: | MNE7 National Points of Contact Meeting |

Appendix C: Analysis in Experimentation

(NATOACT, 2009f: 11)

Preparation	Phase	Task	Product
	1. Experiment Formulation	Structure Objectives; literature search	Experiment Model
	2. Initial Experiment Plan	Identify Analysis Objectives	
	3. Detailed Experiment Plan	Refine objectives, Develop DCAP, Assess Risk	
Experimentation	Phase	Task	Product
	4. Rehearsal Setup	Setup rehearsal environment	Empirical Data
	5. Rehearse	Rehearse data collection and analysis	
	6. Experiment	Data Collection	
Analysis	Phase	Task	Product
	7. Analysis & Interpretation	Analyze, 'Hot-wash' report, Final Report	Revised Experiment Model; Experiment Products

Appendix D: 21 Threats to Experimentation

<u>21 Threats to a Good Defence Experiment</u>					
5 Components	4 Requirements				
	Use New Capability	Detect Change	Isolate Reason for Change		Relate Results to Operations
			Single Group	Multiple Groups	
Treatment	1: Capability not workable	5: Capability variability	11: Capability changes over time	N/A	18: Non-representative capability
Unit	2: Player non-use	6: Player variability	12: Player changes over time	15: Player differences	19: Non-representative players
Effect	3: No effect in output	7: Data collection variability	13: Data collection changes over time	16: Data collection differences	20: Non-representative measures
Trial	4: Capability not exercised	8: Condition variability	14: Conditions change over time	17: Condition differences	21: Non-representative scenario
Analysis	N/A	9: Low statistical power 10: Violation of statistical assumptions	<i>The purpose of an experiment is to verify that A causes B. A valid experiment allows the conclusion, A causes B, to be based on evidence and sound reasoning by reducing or eliminating the 21 known threats to validity.</i>		

Table 21 Threats (Kass, 2006: 44–46; TTCP, 2006: 60–62)

For a detailed discussion on how to *counter* the 21 threats, see Appendix A in Kass (2006).

Appendix E: Abbreviations

AAP-6	NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
AIS	Automatic Identification System
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CC2C	Changi Command and Control Centre
CCPLAN	Comprehensive Campaign Plan
CD&E	Concept Development and Experimentation
COP	Common Operational Picture
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CRR	Capability Requirements Review
CUR	Crisis Response Operations Urgent Requirements
CWID	NATO Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration
DCAP	Data Collection and Analysis Plan
DCDC	Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
DOD	US Department of Defense
DoDAF	Department of Defense Architecture Framework (US)
DOTMLPFI	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability
DRR	Defense Requirements Review
EA	Enterprise Architecture
EBAO	Effects Based Approach on Operations
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEJM	Effective Engagement Joint Manoeuvre
EMAD	Spain's Defence Staff Headquarters
EUROSUR	European External Border Surveillance System
EDD	Experimentation Design Document
HQSACT	Headquarters of Allied Command Transformation
HKV	Armed Forces Headquarters (Sweden)
HQSACT	Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
IAKO	Interagency Kick-Off
IASSA	US Interagency Shared Situational Awareness
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

ICT	Information Communications Technology
IFC	Information Fusion Centre
IMO	International Maritime Organization
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command (US)
JISR	Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
LL	Lessons Learned
LOE	Limited Objective Experiments
LTRS	Long Term Requirement Studies
MARISS	Maritime Security Services
MARSUNO	EU Maritime Surveillance North, a pilot of EUROSUR
MARSUR	EU Maritime Surveillance
M&S	Modelling and Simulation
MC	North Atlantic Military Committee
MCR	Minimum Capability Requirements
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
MFP	Multiple Futures Project
MISA-EM	Maritime Interagency Situational Awareness—Extended Maritime
MNE	Multinational Experiment
MoDAF	Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework (UK)
MPA	Maritime and Port Authority
MTEP	Military Training and Exercise Programme
NAF	NATO Architecture Framework
NAGEP	NATO Guidance for Experimentation Planning and Integration
NATO MSA	NATO Maritime Situational Awareness
NCW	Network Centric Warfare
NDPP	NATO Defence Planning Process
NMA	NATO Military Authority
NONCAS	Non-Compliant Actors
NRF	NATO Response Force
PCC	Prague Capabilities Commitment
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PLOC	Prioritized List of Capability Shortfall
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
RMP	Recognized Maritime Picture
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RSN	The Republic of Singapore Navy

SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SC	Strategic Command
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOA	Service Oriented Architecture
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPO	Strategic Priorities and Objectives
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SUCBAS	Sea Surveillance Baltic Sea, a pilot of MARSUR
TLA	Three Letter Acronym
TTCP	The Technical Cooperation Program
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
USJFCOM	US Joint Forces Command
USJSDDJ7JCW	US Joint Staff, Deputy Director J7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting.
VPKK	Verkostopuolustuksen Kehittämiskeskus

Appendix F: A Short History of MNE

'Transnational problems...require multinational solutions'

(Rasmussen, 2010).

This appendix provides a brief introduction to Multinational Experimentation (MNE) and its history until MNE6. The source of this introduction was the ethnographic experience outlined in Chapter 3 (p.65). It should be noted that the historical presentation of MNE has not been made known in academic circles, so this introduction is also an initial first step towards a historical examination of MNE.

In general, each cycle of MNE is an attempt to provide solutions to a given crisis management challenge—a challenge that is collaboratively decided upon by the participating organizations, which are mainly states. As such, MNE is seen as a superior element of the United States Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM's) multinational concept development and experimentation (CD&E) programme¹⁹⁵ (USJFCOM, 2011a: v). Despite the fact that the USJFCOM effectively governs MNE, it is seen that the experiment's strength comes from the collaboration of multiple participants in the analysis of specific crisis management challenges, which coalition forces are faced with in actual operations (cf. USJFCOM, 2009c).

The official purpose of MNE is to facilitate transformation and, thus, the evolution of the crisis management system. Transformation is conducted by creating new crisis management knowledge, which will lead to transformation. This production of knowledge is governed by the CD&E methodology. CD&E, defined as 'structured development of creative and innovative ideas into viable solutions for [future] capability development' (NAMC, 2009: §5), was presented in more detail in the ethnographic account in Chapter 3. Suffice it to say here that the most important function of CD&E is to provide the intellectual association for future capabilities (DCDC, 2011).

¹⁹⁵ It should be noted that during MNE6, the USJFCOM 'owned' MNE. However, the USJFCOM has been dis-established as of 31 August 2011. See: <http://www.jfcom.mil/> [Accessed 15 September 2011]. Current MNE ownership resides with the US Joint Staff, Deputy Director J7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting (USJS DDJ7 JCW).

MNE intensifies cooperation and collaboration, and smoothes opportunities of complicity. For example, participation in NATO's CD&E activities is not limited to NATO members; Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and/ or contact countries can be involved in MNE (NAMC, 2009: §24). In practice, this includes international organizations, NGOs and businesses that are affiliated with the participating states. It is also argued that MNE enables the creation of crisis management capabilities (material, procedural, organizational) and their corresponding concepts for multinational and interagency operations. Thus, it is an attempt to provide standardization and interoperability in multinational civilian and military crisis management operations (cf. USJFCOM, 2011b).

Although MNE can be argued to be a distinct process of crisis management preparation and planning, it should not be confused as being similar to the UN's Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). Whereas both certainly are multinational crisis management planning processes that emphasize collaboration among different actors, civilian and military, the IMPP is driven by assessments of *existing* capabilities and their suitability for specific operations (DPKO, 2008: 55–56). MNE, on the other hand, plans to create *future* capabilities. Still, it can be argued that both processes are and promote collaborative and, thus, 'comprehensive' or 'integrated' approaches to crisis management—approaches that have been seen by NATO as 'the best means for responding to complex security challenges' (NATO, 2010c: 41–42). Through comprehensive utilizations of various networks and security knowledge creation processes, the characterizing purpose of MNE is to contribute to the evolution of the response methodologies of the 'security complex', that is, all the actors participating in 'managing the crisis' (cf. Duffield, 2001a).

Since 2001, MNE has provided an opportunity and forum for participating states and organizations to investigate crisis management concepts and capabilities within a common interest frame. Instead of investigating these concepts and capabilities in live operations, MNE provides a controlled experiment scenario in which the participants can test new crisis management hypotheses iteratively. Thus, it provides a virtual scenario-setting, which may be based on reality in some aspects—or completely artificial to current events. Moreover, MNE facilitates the development of multinational interagency

operation models or procedures already in the planning phase of a crisis management operation, utilizing the know-how and material resources of the participants. Therefore, MNE is seen as a cost-effective and safe method to create crisis management capabilities in problem areas where the participants share a common interest (USJFCOM, 2009b).

MNE has steadily increased its popularity in creating crisis management capabilities for the future. For example, the US Department of Defense (DoD) emphasizes the role of experimentation as a method to establish and optimize the US' future vision of operations (CJCS, 2000: 36). The knowledge production methodology of MNE, CD&E, is rapidly gaining relevance in many military structures, including in Finland. Finland's Network Enabled Defence Development Centre¹⁹⁶ held its opening event on 1 October 2010. A main purpose of this centre is to facilitate concept development and experimentation and, through them, to eventually influence doctrine and the networking of different actors (FDF, 2010; Takkunen, 2010). To offer another example, in Singapore, CD&E is seen to provide 'great competitive advantage, yielding great operational advantages and providing its practitioner with a management tool to optimize finite resources' (Wah *et al.*, 2006).

In addition, MNE can be seen as a process to develop the capabilities with which a coalition accomplishes its political goals and influences its adversaries' activities with the full force of the coalition's capabilities, including diplomatic, information, military and economic activities (Blank *et al.*, 2006: 4–1). The MNE series began with just four countries in 2001 and has steadily grown in participation since then (USJFCOM, 2011a: v).

It should be noted that the lists of states mentioned as having taken part in MNE cycles include only those states that have played a 'participating' role in the given cycle. Thus, most notably, those states that held an 'observer' role are excluded. This filtering has been done for clarity's sake and to spare the reader with massive listings of states (and organizations and businesses).

¹⁹⁶ My translation from Finnish of: 'Verkostopuolustuksen Kehittämiskeskus (VPKK)'.

As mentioned, the MNE-process began in 2001 with MNE1.¹⁹⁷ Then, the focus of investigation was a joint force's capability to conduct collaborative military planning in a technically distributed environment. Australia, Germany, the UK and the US participated in MNE1 (USJFCOM, 2009b: Chapter I (1–2), Chapter II (8–11)). From April 2001 to February 2002, MNE1's solution compiling scenario took place in the Southern Pacific (USJFCOM, 2011a: 1; USJFCOM, 2011b).

The second cycle, MNE2, began soon after MNE1 in May 2002 and lasted until April 2003. In addition to the original members, Canada and NATO ACT also joined the process (USJFCOM, 2011a: 1). The research interest of MNE2 was to examine what influences the effectiveness of information distribution in a multinational environment (USJFCOM, 2009b: Chapter I (1–2), Chapter II (8–11)). As with MNE1, the scenario of MNE2 was the Pacific, more specifically the Pacific Rim (USJFCOM, 2011a: 1).

MNE3 (May 2003 to February 2004) changed the solution compiling scenario from the Pacific to Afghanistan (USJFCOM, 2011a: 1). Using Afghanistan, a real-world scenario, in MNE3 was seen to give the experiment greater credibility (TTCP, 2006: 302). France joined the members of the previous cycles in MNE3, where effects-based planning was the centre of the investigation.¹⁹⁸ A result of MNE3 was that stability operations are indisputably multinational in nature and require the utilization of all resources at national disposal (USJFCOM, 2009b: Chapter I (1–2), Chapter II (8–11)). In addition, it was seen that the effects-based planning concept, which was a product of MNE3, had the 'potential to make the coalition task force and NATO Response Force more effective instruments of power' (TTCP, 2006: 301; cf. USJFCOM, 2003).

Finland¹⁹⁹ and Sweden joined MNE4 (April 2004 to May 2006), which examined how a multinational coalition can coordinate effects-based military planning with a multinational interagency coordination group, and how this coordination can be utilized

¹⁹⁷ Hardcore MNE-professionals might be tempted to argue that MNE1 and MNE2 were actually Limited Objective Experiments (LOEs), rather than 'proper' MNE cycles. However, since these steps are the first in a series that later evolves into 'proper' MNE, these steps are also labelled as 'MNE' for the sake of clarity and consistency.

¹⁹⁸ Effects-based planning was at the core, yet not the only concept used in MNE3, which also included concepts such as effects-based operations (EBO), coalition interagency coordination group (CIACG), and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (JISR) (USJFCOM, 2003).

¹⁹⁹ Although Finland's participation is usually seen to have started in 2004 and MNE4, USJFCOM's collaboration site (authorized login required) acknowledges Finland's participation in MNE3.

to the maximum. Moreover, concepts relating to logistics, information operations and medical support were involved (USJFCOM, 2005) in the exploration with international power that would be used to influence adversaries (Blank *et al.*, 2006: 4–2). MNE4 was the first significant attempt in the MNE-process to expand ‘comprehensiveness’ and the number of actors in coalition operations (USJFCOM, 2009b: Chapter I (1–2), Chapter II (8–11)). Like MNE3, MNE4 used Afghanistan as the reality-based scenario (NATOACT, 2005: 33). Successful concepts were used as proposals for amending doctrines, creating capability packages, and training, while the non-successful elements of MNE4 were re-examined in MNE5 (NATOACT, 2007: 13; cf. USJFCOM, 2011a: 1).

Finland’s goals in its MNE participation included and currently include: 1) supporting national capability development; 2) improving national research and development; 3) developing international interoperability; and 4) influencing the evolution of crisis management.

In MNE5 (June 2006 to December 2008), the participating MNE-community grew with the addition of Austria, Denmark and Spain. The purpose of MNE5 was to consolidate previous MNE results and experiences from operations. More specifically, the goal was to examine the interdependencies between the different actors within a comprehensive framework. Moreover, the goal was to develop effective interoperability between all the crisis management actors for the purpose of crisis management planning and implementation. Eighteen countries in all were involved in MNE5, along with NATO and the EU (USJFCOM, 2009b: Chapter I (1–2), Chapter II (8–11)).

The purpose of MNE5 was especially to broaden (utilizing national and international capabilities) the understanding of: pre-crisis assessment, strategic policy development and planning, and implementation planning, management and evaluation. This broad and comprehensive experimentation campaign was developed in order to increase rapid and coordinated response capabilities to complex ‘situations’ (USJFCOM, 2007). The scenario used as the MNE5 experiment was an imagined regional crisis in West Africa (USJFCOM, 2009b: Chapter I (1–2), Chapter II (8–11)). More specifically, the purpose was to situate the experimentation in an economically disadvantaged and politically unstable region, where ‘responsible’ interagency organizations operated (USJFCOM, 2007). MNE5’s comprehensive crisis management framework, the purpose

of which was to achieve ‘greater harmonization²⁰⁰ in crisis management’, significantly fed into MNE6 (USJFCOM, 2011a: 2).

My first interaction with the MNE process started with MNE5. At the time, I was working at Accenture, with the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) as my client. My task was to be completely conversant with an enterprise architecture framework being utilized at the time by the FDF. Through this interaction, I was asked to join an MNE5 working meeting in Helsinki and make a presentation relating to the enterprise architecture framework and Service Oriented Architecture—in particular, modelling. I only participated for a day, but I remember to this day the international and integrated feeling I had when socially mingling with the participants. At that time, just knowing what the abbreviation, MNE, stood for was to be extremely competent in the MNE process among my social peers (outside of MNE, of course).

The underlying assumption of MNE6 was that a comprehensive approach is essential when countering irregular adversaries, especially in today’s complex crisis management environment. Again, the goal was to achieve greater harmonization among crisis management actors in their planning, management and evaluation of coalition interventions in complex contingencies and emergencies (USJFCOM, 2011a: 2). MNE6 was conducted with 18 contributing nations²⁰¹ plus NATO ACT (USJFCOM, 2011a: v-2).

MNE6 was a two year (2009–10) multinational and interagency effort, in which the comprehensive approach’s harmonizing role was to provide means of countering the activities of irregular adversaries and ‘other noncompliant actors’ (USJFCOM, 2010a). This impact was gained via outcomes in the study segments of cultural awareness, strategic communication, crisis management operations’ evaluation and situational awareness (USJFCOM, 2009c; USJFCOM, 2011a).

I participated in MNE6 as part of Finland’s contribution. The problem statement of MNE6 was: ‘[In order] to establish and ensure a safe and secure environment, coalition forces require the ability to share information, gain situational understanding,

²⁰⁰ Among national and multinational civilian government agencies, military forces, IOs and IGOs, NGOs and the private sector.

²⁰¹ Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.

synchronize efforts and assess progress in concert with interagency partners, international organizations, and other stakeholders when countering activities of irregular adversaries and other non-compliant actors’ (USJFCOM, 2010a).

MNE6 was divided into four outcomes, which were further divided into various objectives. My participation was in Outcome 4: ‘Coalition forces, interagency and relevant partners possess an improved ability to gain shared situational understanding of the operational environment during employment of direct and indirect approaches to countering irregular threats and the activities of non-compliant actors’ (USJFCOM, 2010a).

In Outcome 4, my participation was in Objective 4.2:²⁰² Multinational Interagency Situational Awareness—Extended Maritime (MISA-EM). Finland was a leading country in Objective 4.2, together with Spain. The other contributing members were Germany, France, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, the US, CJOS COE (the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence) and NATO ACT²⁰³ (USJFCOM, 2010b: 1). The specific goal of this objective was to: ‘Develop a shared capability for coalition forces, in concert with interagency partners, international organizations, and other stakeholders to provide Situational Awareness of the Extended “Maritime Environment” to counter irregular threats’ (USJFCOM, 2010a).

²⁰² Other Finnish participants in MISA-EM were formed from contributions from the Ministry of Defence, US Joint Force Command, Defence Command, and Navy Staff.

²⁰³ It is not always clear who actually is a ‘contributor’. For example, according to the USJFCOM external MNE collaboration site (authentication required), contributors are in fact (in addition to Finland and Spain): [CJOS COE](#) (the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence), France, Germany, Greece, NATO ACT, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Sweden and the US. To compare these two listings to my experience, Greece I remember, Norway, on the other hand, stayed out of my sight. It should be remembered, however, that this is no guarantee that Norway was not involved, or ‘contributing’.

Primary Sources

Field Notes

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