HOSSEIN ALIZADEH

Re-Thinking The Politics Of

The Umma (Muslim Bloc)

The Call for Islamic Global Politics
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ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

To be presented, with the permission of
the Faculty of Social Sciences
of Tampere University,
for public discussion in the auditorium K103
of the Linna building, Kalevantie 5, Tampere
on June 12, 2024, at 12 o’clock.

TAPRI
Tampere Peace Research Institute
TAPRI Studies in Peace and Conflict Research
No. 110, 2024
ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

Peace and Conflict Research

Tampere University, Faculty of Social Sciences
Finland

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ISBN 978-952-03-3473-4 (print)


PunaMusta Oy – Yliopistopaino
Tampere 2024
Dedication

➢ To my beloved mother and late father
➢ To my lovely wife and children
Acknowlegements

After years of intensive work, today (March 3, 2024), I am finishing my research by writing these acknowledgements while precisely a century ago, the dissolution of the institution of the Caliphate in Turkey (March 3, 1924) left behind a ‘trauma’ among Muslims whom Turkish historian Cemil Aydin best describes as ‘a body with no head.’¹ This trauma is explicitly reflected in the prominent Egyptian poet Ahmed Shawqi’s dramatic ballad mourning the loss of the Caliphate:²

Minarets and pulpits mourned for you

The entire mourners wept for you

India is flabbergasted, and Egypt is sad

They cry for you with drizzled tears

The Levant, Iraq, and Persia are questioning:

Did [verily] someone eliminate the Caliphate from Earth?

Realising that the concept of the Caliphate is correlated with the notion of the Umma, the driving force behind this research dates from my lived experience when I encountered the term Umma at the age of 13, a few months before the Islamic Revolution declared its triumph over the royal system of the Pahlavi dynasty in February 1979, establishing a new political system known as the Islamic Republic of Iran, today.

In our neighbourhood, somewhere in the heart of Tehran, a young pro-Khomeini revolutionary activist stealthily handed me a banned book written by Ali Shariati (1933-77) entitled Umma and Imamate (1969). He encouraged me to read the book and tell him its crucial message. At that time, I did not know who the author was until after establishing the new political system in Iran, revolutionaries gave him the illustrious title of the ‘revolution’s martyred teacher.’

As a critic of the Shah of Iran, Ali Shariati envisaged an Islamic utopia through a revolutionary interpretation of the history and sociology of Islam and gave highly charged lectures to the young that laid the foundation for the revolution in 1979. He was among the early ideologues and pioneers

² منجبت عليك مآذن ونمائر..... ونكت عليك ممالك ولواح الهند والهندية ومصر خزينة..... تبكي عليك بدموع سحاح والشام والجزيرة والعراق وفارس..... أينما من الأرض الخلافة ماح
of political Shia teachings in Iran, as Sayyid Qutb was among the pioneers of Salafi Sunni in Egypt. Interestingly, both were praised by Iran’s revolutionary regime, which issued two stamps to pay tribute to Shariati’s and Qutb’s thoughts and martyrdom.³

As a curious teenager interested in reading, I read the entire book but did not understand a single message. It was not appropriate for my age. I was familiar with the term Imamate (also Imamate) in the Shia denomination but not the Umma. The Twelver Shia (Muslims constitute 99.4% of the Iranian population, of whom 90 to 95% are Shia)⁴ believe in twelve infallible Imams after the Prophet of Islam, considering the last one, the Mahdi (meaning ‘the Guided’ divinely), the Islamic Messiah.⁵

Shariati died before the rise of Iran’s new Islamic establishment. However, his thoughts inspired the new political system established by Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–89), who believed in the fusion of religion and politics for the sake of the Umma.

Then, at the age of 13 and in the new era in my country, I frequently heard the term Umma but knew nothing of its application in revolutionary Iran as I didn’t know anything about political Islam. I didn’t realise that the concept of the Umma, more broadly than only in Iran, has a profound resonance in today’s Muslim lexicon and has been a persistent preoccupation for almost all Muslim intelligentsia, such as Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, and for movements, beginning with the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Decades later, in 2014, with the emergence of DAESH / ISIS, a type of non-state actor and one of the most extreme and violent militant groups, destabilising the Middle East to reconstruct a new Caliphate to unite the Muslim Umma, I travelled back to the time I had read Shariati’s Umma and Imamate.

Interestingly, the centres of al-Azhar of Sunni and Qom of Shia, along with the vast majority of Muslims around the world, denounced DAESH for its extremist ideology and violent tactics. However, more interestingly, all believed in Muslim Umma. Here was the moment that head-scratching questions occupied my mind: What prompts the creation of the Umma, and on what grounds does it operate? Does it pose any threat to regional stability or the international community? However, above all these questions stood other fundamental questions: What is the

³ While Qutb was hanged by Gamal Abdul Nasser and was considered a martyr by his followers, the Iranian revolutionaries claimed that Shariati was killed by the SAVAK, the Shah’s security apparatus. However, no hospital or medical records have been found to refute his heart attack.
⁴ U.S. Department of State: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/iran/#:~:text=Section%201l.,Religious%20Demography,to%2010%20percent%20are%20Sunni
⁵ According to some Islamic traditions, the Mahdi is an eschatological redeemer of Islam who will one day appear to cleanse it of extraneous elements and restore justice in the whole world. The belief in the Mahdi is essential in Twelver Shia Islam (also Imamiyya). According to them (but not Sunnis), he is the final of the Twelve Imams, a descendant of the Prophet and in occultation (Ghayba) by Divine Will who was born in 870, is still alive, and will appear at the end of time to rule the entire world. See: ‘Mahdi’ in Britannica available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/mahdi (Accessed August 20, 2023)
notion of the Umma, and how does it function in Muslim polity? Why all seek to build the Muslim Umma but sometimes fight each other? What do they see in the notion of the Umma as an ultimate divine target despite their diversity?

The questions grew ever bigger once in light of the emergence and proliferation of excessive pan-Islamist doctrines, ideologies, and movements in the 20th century that, despite their diversity, believed in building the Muslim Umma. Astonishingly, while Shia Islam doesn’t believe in the Caliphate office and political Sunni Islam seeks to rebuild the office, both denominations look for one single united Umma. How is that possible? What do all Muslims, Shia and Sunni, perceive the Umma as a common final goal? Is it not a vague and ambiguous concept?

Here comes the role of my research in addressing these questions. Thus, my research individuates itself by employing three contributions. Firstly, by decoding the politics of the Umma. Secondly, as I noticed that the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the notion of the institution of the Caliphate are closely interconnected with the idea of the Umma, the second contribution is to examine how the term Umma, from a pan-Islamist perspective, is linked to the Agreement and the abolition of the Caliphate office. Thirdly, this research brings five theories together for the first time to address the above questions. They are textual, civilizational, state, identity crisis, and conspiracy theories.

To this end, receiving a doctoral admission to the Faculty of Social Sciences of Tampere University was an opportunity to concentrate on finding answers to my questions at Tampere Peace Research Institute, TAPRI. From the beginning, I knew that my topic was in line with TAPRI studies. I was aware that my research outcome must contribute to TAPRI’s Studies in Peace and Conflict Research.

Briefly, the central of my argument is that from a pan-Islamist Jihadist perspective, Islam, more than faith, is an ideology calling for the unity of Muslims worldwide based on their shared ‘Ummatic identity.’ In this sense, the outstanding contribution of the research is to present an anti-hegemonic new denotation - perhaps for the first time ever - for Umma to mean ‘Muslim bloc’ (similar to Western bloc vs. Eastern bloc in the Cold War) for which they prescribe Jihad to rebuild the Caliphate office in political Sunni and to institute Welâyat-e Faqih (the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) as in the example of Khomeini’s interpretation of the Imamate in Shia.

Unequivocally, the years of research have been simultaneously challenging and rewarding. Challenging because reviewing and comparing the vast amount of literature produced over the last hundred years and comparing them with each other was an intricate and complex task. However, it was rewarding because I enjoyed academic opportunities in TAPRI to flesh out my knowledge in Peace and Conflict Studies, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), as a zone of armed conflict.

As an example of these academic opportunities, I presented parts of my manuscript at several, followed by receiving constructive feedback from academicians.

III
Putting my thoughts on paper was quite a demanding, long journey that I could not complete on my own. Fortunately, I was not alone during my long journey at TAPRI. I benefited from friendly people who assisted me in completing it. I must first extend my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Emeritus Tuomo Melasuo, for his invaluable guidance, support, and encouragement throughout my research. I am particularly grateful to Professor Ahmad Alavi of Stockholm University, who, as an ‘unofficial’ supervisor, devoted much of his precious time to assisting me with his valuable suggestions. I am also grateful to the members of my dissertation committee, my pre-examiners, Professor Abder-Rahmane Derradji, formerly of the University of Reading and Professor Jamal al-Shalabi of Hashemite University, for their insightful feedback and constructive criticism. I am also thankful to Leena Nikkari, the Faculty’s kind and dedicated secretary, and all my friends for their intellectual support and advice in deepening my academic understanding. Finally, I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to my loved ones, my wife and three children, for their unwavering love, encouragement, and support throughout my academic journey.

Last but not least, as a Persian expression rightly says, ‘It is only an unwritten dictation that has no mistakes,’ I humbly admit that there are limitations to my research and that it could have been better. Therefore, all the typos, mistakes, incongruences, and constraints that the reader might find in my research are under my responsibility. As research is an ongoing pursuit, and there is always more to discover, learn, and explore to uncover new knowledge and insights, I believe no research can ever be considered complete and finished. As such, I appreciate any feedback, suggestions, and constructive criticism to improve my knowledge in the future.

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March 3, 2024 | London

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Abstract

Unequivocally, the notion of the ‘Umma’ (generally perceived as faithful Muslim society), with sixty-four references only in the Quran, has been a persistent propelling force in Islamic political philosophy from Islam’s advent in the 7th century. Notably, it has tremendous resonance in today’s Muslim lexicon and profoundly preoccupies the Muslim intelligentsia, who present Islam as an ideal sociopolitical modern system and, consequently, intend to idealise a transnational Islam (pan-Islamism). As a result, the Umma concept is central to Muslim consciousness, shaping a plethora of Islamist movements and, secondly, constitutes a dominating discourse of empowerment, a notion in motion, and a nostalgic desire in pan-Islamist literature to make Muslim collectivity stronger.

Synchronously, despite its persistent presence, the Umma is a vague labyrinthine concept, as its denotation diachronically developed, to a large extent, over 1400 years to a large extent. Whatever it is, it seems that the Umma implies a ‘homogeneous Islamic community’ and a ‘unifying bond’ for all Islamists to confront the Other. Thus, the outstanding question is: What is the politics of the Umma, and how, as a discourse, does it function in Muslim polity? Through the above question as a point of departure, the research aim is to examine what the Other is and how the Umma is contextualised and conceptualised in political Islam to function in Muslim polity. Put differently, the ultimate goal of the research is to re-think or, better to say, to decode ‘the politics of the Umma’ and its counter-hegemonic narrative from a pan-Islamist perspective, presenting it as Islam’s holistic ruling system against any other political system.

In elucidating its concept, the research scrutinizes the fact that the Umma notion constitutes an integral part of Islamic political philosophy, presenting Islam, more than faith and piety (minimalist approach), as a political ideology and polity that pursues a political agenda (maximalist approach). The agenda is collective behaviour to institute a new concrete system, i.e., the Islamic state. Additionally, the research navigates that pan-Islamism proposes the worldwide Umma to which every Muslim should adhere. Consequently, the formation of the ‘Umma-state’ as an alternative to the ‘nation-state’ paradigm is the ultimate goal of almost all -if not all- diverse Islamist movements seeking a global presence. In this sense, the Umma-state is presented as an ever-widening authority to transcend all political borders and boundaries.

To this effect, the research is a methodological approach and an analytical contemplation of the politics of the Umma and its functionality in political Islam in general, calling for Muslim unity worldwide based on the ‘Ummatic identity and dynamism’ of Islam. Additionally, through its examination, the research demonstrates the impossibility of the reclamation of the Umma in its established denotation.
The research’s second substantial contribution revolves around the Sykes-Picot Agreement from a pan-Islamist perspective, which, in a defamatory sense against colonialism, considers it the notorious cornerstone of a plot that allegedly tore the Umma apart.

As another contribution, the research explores the political genesis of pan-Islamist groups and movements in the post-First World War era, in which the abolition of the Caliphate – that of the Ottomans- left behind a lasting ‘trauma’ that led to the proliferation of a plethora of pan-Islamist groups, developing an acute longing expressed commonly in the desire of restoration of the institution of the Caliphate in the Sunni denomination and the Imamate doctrine in Shia.

The research also explores how the call to the construction of the Umma is a pan-Islamist political agenda and a nostalgic reaction to the narrative of the decline of Islamic civilisation due to increased religiosity. In order to reverse Muslim decline, decadence, and degradation (Inhibit), the research illuminates the fact that Islamic Occidentalism (viewing the West as an Occidental intruder) suggests the replacement of the ‘Middle East of the Sykes-Picot’ with the ‘Middle East of Islam’ as a remedy for the stigma of the decline of Muslim Umma. The remedy is the revival of the ‘Golden Age of Islamic Civilisation,’ in the clash with Western civilisation (Huntington’s grand alarmist theory) under one worldwide unified political entity (the Umma), which has become shorthand for a transnational community encompassing all Muslims in one Islamic ‘bloc’; a future-dominated global agenda revolving around the notion of the totality of a Muslim superstate transcending borders, races, languages and cultures. That is why, in its denotation as a supranational community, the Umma prevails in the pan-Islamist mindset to embrace maximally, at once, Islamic identity, ideology, religion, and statehood in one bloc.

Keywords:

Umma, Political Islam, Caliphate, Middle East, Sykes-Picot Agreement
Abstrakti

‘Umma[h/t]’ joka käsitetään yleisesti islamin uskovien yhteisöksi, on ollut yksiselitteisesti jatkuvasti eteenpäin vievää voima islamilaisessa poliittisessa filosofiassa islamin synnystä 600-luvulta lähtien. Jo pelkästään Koraanissa käsitteeseen viitataan kuusikymmentäneljä (64) kertaa. Sanalla on suuri resonanssi nykypäivän muslimisanastossa ja se kiinnostaa syvää usmilälymystöä, joka pyrkii luomaan ihanteen rajat ylittäväää islamista (pan-islamismi). Täten Umma-käsitteellä on keskeinen asema muslimitietoisuudessa ja se vaikuttaa lukuisiin islamilaisiin liikkeisiin. Lisäksi se muodostaa hallitsevan voimaantumisen diskurssin sekä nostalgian pan-islamistisessa kirjallisuudessa, joka tähtää muslimien yhteisöllisyyden vahvistamiseen.

Umma-käsitteen pysyvää läsnäoloa huolimatta, se on vaikeasti määriteltävä konsepti, jonka merkitys on muovautunut laajalti yli 1400 vuoden kuluessa. Onkin siis esitettävä kysymys ‘Mikä poliittiset kysymykset liittyyvät Ummaan ja kuinka se toimii diskurssissa muslimipolitiikassa?’ Tätä kysymystä lähtökohtana käyttäen, tutkimuksen tavoite on selvittää kuinka Umma on kontekstualisoidut ja konseptualisoidut poliittisissa islamissa, jotta se toimisi muslimien poliittikassa. Toisin sanoen, tutkimuksen päämäärä on uudelleen ajatella tai oikeastaan uudelleen esittää ‘Ummankonseptia’ konseptiin mukaan lukien sen vastahegemoninen narratiivi pan-islamilaisesta näkökulmasta, ja esitellä se islamin holistisena hallintojärjestelmänä.


Tämän lähtökohtdan takia tutkimus käsittää metodologisen lähestymisen sekä analyyttistä pohdiskelua Ummankonseptista ja sen funktioista poliittisessa islamissa yleisellä tasolla, ‘Ummalaiseen identiteettiin’ perustuvaa muslimien maailmanlaajuista yhtenäisyttä peräänkuuluttaen.

Tutkimuksen toinen merkittävä tavoite liittyy Sykes-Picot’n sopimuksen pan-islamilaisesta näkökulmasta. Kolonialismia arvostelevassa mielessä sopimusta pidetään tunnettuna merkkipaaluna suunnitelmassa, joka väitetysti repi Umman hajalle.
Tutkimuksen kolmas tavoite on pan-islamilaisen ryhmien poliittisen synnyn sekä ensimmäistä maailmansotaa seuranneen aikakauden liikkehdinnän tutkiminen. Tällöin ottomaanien kalifaatin lakkauttaminen jätti jälkeensä kestävän elvyttämiseen sunni-uskontokunnan sekä imamaatti-opin alaisten shialaisten keskuudessa. ryhmien lisääntymiseen, luoden voimakkaan kaipauksen erityisesti kalifaatti-instituution elvyttämiseen sunni-uskontokunnan sekä imamaatti-opin alaisten shialaisten keskuudessa.

Tutkimus myös tarkentaa, kuinka kutsu Umman rakentamiseen on pan-islamilainen poliittinen agenda ja nostalginen reaktio retoriikkaan lisääntymiseen ja itsestääntyneen uskonnollisuuden aiheuttamasta islamilaisen sivilisaation rappuutumisesta. Peruuttaakseen islamin taantumisen, rappuutumisen ja alennustilan (Inhitat), tutkimus valaisevasti tarkastelee islamilaisen oksidentalismia (länsi-islamilaisen sivilisaation rappeutumisesta. Peruuttaakseen islamin taantumisen, rappioitumisen ja agenda ja nostalginen reaktio retoriikkaan lisääntyneen uskonnollisuuden aiheuttamasta Umma vallitsee pan-islamilaisessa ajatusmaailmassa kattaen islamilaisen identiteetin, ideologian, ihonvärit ja kulttuurit. Tämän vuoksi tämänhetkisellä määritelmällä määritelmällä ylikansallisen yhteisönä Umma vallitsee pan-islamilaisessa ajatusmaailmassa kattaen islamilaisen identiteetin, ideologian, uskonnon sekä valtiollisuuden.

Avainsanat:

Umma, poliittinen islam, kalifaatti, Lähi-itä, Sykes-Picot’n sopimus
چکیده

بی‌تردید، مفهوم امت (به عربی: آمة) که عموما به معناي جهان اسلام فهم ميشود، با شصط و جهان بر اثر تکرار در قران، از همان آغاز اسلام در فرقه هاي مختلف، نيزدياد ديده پيتران در نظرگاه سياسی اسلامي نقي ميشود. اين مفهوم، به‌ویژه در ادبیات راين امروز مسلمانان بازتاب گستردگي داشته و انديشماندان مسلمان را به دنبال تحقیق بخشيشن به اسلام جهاني و تبتلي به حوزه را مشغول داشته است. از اين رو، بديهی نتیجه گراي که اين مفهوم مفاهيمي کانونی در درک مسلمانان است که اولاً، گفتگو جنیت‌های اسلامي براي راه‌因果رايي را راه‌گزاري مسلمانان را سالم داده است. اين گفتگونی نوعی گفتگو جنگ‌افزار في حب‌نصب و احتماليات و نظر اول در ادبیات پان اسلاميسن است که هدف آن است بررسی روش‌های مسالماتي برتریت: اجراي مسلمانان است.

برغ مرکزي اين آيده در فلسفه سياسی اسلام، مفهوم امت مفاهيمي گنت است که طي چهارده سده گشت. با نئو اسلام، تغيير کرده است. از اينرو، پرستي مهم اين ظوهري عبارت است از اينکه: مفهوم امت به عنوان يک گفتگو را به معناي است. و چگونه در سياست‌وزری مسلمانين سوک ميکندا؟ به‌پايه اين پرسش، هدف ظوهري آزمودن اين نكنه است که مفهوم امت چگونه در متن و مفهوم اسلامي عمل ميکندا؟ به‌خشيگرده هدف يکيي ظوهري آن است که مفهوم امت و روانيت ضد هزمونيک آن را از منظور پان اسلاميسن براياني وي رمزگشايي كند. در اين پارديشي، آيده امت  جداي يكپارچه حكيمان اسلامي معنناي مهد.

در تبين مفاهيم امت، اين ظوهري روند مساده كه امت بخش درونی و جاديدالشيزي از فلسفه سياسی اسلام است که اسلام را سپير از اين، ميكند كه واحد دستورالکاری سياسی است. اين دستورالکاری عبارت است از رفتار جمعي به منظور برقرار كردن کردن سیستم مستحکم يعنی "دولت اسلامي" است. افران بر اين، ظوهري حاضر به ان موضوع ميپردازد که پان اسلاميسن تشکيل امت هجاي را پييشندي ميكند که هر مسلماني برای تاسيس أن وظيفه دارد. بر اين مبنای "دولت،امت"، قرار است جنگي این (پاداش) شود كه هدف نهایي اغلب جنگ‌هاي متوسط اسلامي است. در اين عيده، دولت،امت عبیرت است از ابتدائي پهناورك از ته ذخريه سياسی و جغرافيايي قرار مييشه.

این ظوهري تحليلي متدولوژيک از مفهوم امت و تاثيرگذاری آن در اسلام سياسی است که اسلام مستحکم مسلمانان است. به‌خشيگرده، هدف واجد دستورکار سياسی است. اين دستورالکار عبیرت است از رفتار جمعي به منظور برقرار كردن کردن سیستم مستحکم يعنی " دولت اسلامي" است. افران بر اين، ظوهري حاضر به ان موضوع ميپردازد که پان اسلاميسن تشکيل امت هجاي را پييشندي ميكند که هر مسلماني برای تاسيس أن وظيفه دارد. بر اين مبنای " دولت،امت"، قرار است جنگي این (پاداش) شود كه هدف نهایي اغلب جنگ‌هاي متوسط اسلامي است. در اين عيده، دولت،امت عبیرت است از ابتدائي پهناورك از ته ذخريه سياسی و جغرافيايي قرار مييشه.

دورين تلاشي صورت گرفته در اين ظوهري پرتو توانا پليس -پيکو از ديدگاه يکپارچه اسلامي است که در اين، گروه به گروه، انتخاب شده به احباي نهاد خلاقانه در ماهب اهلا سيستم دکترین اين اامت از مهار نشاني پيرامون از راه امامت امت را در معنای كه پژوهش تبين ميكند، نشان مييده.

دومين تلشي صورت گرفته در اين ظوهري پرتو توانا پليس -پيکو از ديدگاه يکپارچه اسلامي است که در اين، گروه به گروه، انتخاب شده به احباي نهاد خلاقانه در ماهب اهلا سيستم دکترین اين اامت از مهار نشاني پيرامون از راه امامت امت را در معنای كه پژوهش تبين ميكند، نشان مييده.

به عنوان مشاركتي ویژه، اين ظوهري به بررسي پيمايسي در مورد آدمگردي و جنگهي پان اسلاميسن در دوران پس از جنگ جهاني اول ميپردازد که در پي اتفاق خلاقانه علمي، "تروما" ي فاندلارتيني بشده است. نتیجه آن شد که به دليل انتخاب ادیان گروههاي پان اسلاميسن، استثناييي شديد به احباي نهاد خلاقانه در ماهب اهلا سيستم دکترین امامت مهار نشاني پيرامون از راه امامت امت را در معنای كه پژوهش تبين ميكند، نشان مييده.

وجود آبده امت است.

این ظوهري همعين توحيض مييده که چگونه دوست به تاسيس امت يک برنامه سياسی و يك واكنش نوتالزيک به مدعای "اصطلاحات از" است. به تاسيس معدوس کردن أن انطورت، اين تحقق بررسی ميکنده که چگونه و چرا نتیجه پان اسلاميسن پيشنهاد جايجيكي "پراييمانيا اسلامي" را به جای "خوارمانيا اسلامي، پيکو مي، تا روشي برای جولگري از اين انطورت باشند. بناء به اين طرح، احباي "عصر طلايي تدن اسلامي" در دنیای توضيح "پرخورد نشاني" ي هاينتهگون
قرار داده و معنید است احیای تمدن طلایی اسلام تنها در تحت یک نهاد سیاسی متحد در سراسر جهان (یعنی امت) تحقق پذیر است. بدين ترتيب، مسلمانان در یک "بلوک" اسلامی؛ یک دستور کار جهانی را حول مفهوم "ایبودولت مسلمانان" در جهان باید در دستورکار خود داشته باشند که از مرزها، نزادها، زبانها و فرهنگ‌ها ورگردانی می‌کند. به همين دليل امت كه امتدادی به دین و دولت اسلامی را در یک بلوك شامل گردید.

کلید واژه‌ها:

امت، اسلام سياسي، خلافت، خاورميانه، قرارداد ساکس- پيکو
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Appendices

Glossary

Selection of prophet by God for the guidance of people.
Appendices

Glossary
(Of Arabic words’ meaning in this research unless otherwise stated)⁶

A

Amir al-Muminin  أمير المؤمنين  Commander of Faithful/leader of believers
Asabiyya[h/t]  عصبية  Hegemonic public spirit and internal coherence that keeps a civilisation running, according to Ibn Khaldun’s theory.
al-Azhar  الأزهر  The most prestigious university for Sunni Islamic studies, located in Cairo, Egypt.

B

Bay’ā[h/t]  بيعة  Pledge of allegiance to a sovereign
Bī ṭha [h/t]  بيعة  Selection of prophet by God for the guidance of people.

D

Dar al-Ahd  دار العهد  The abode of the treaty
Dar al-Harb  دار الحرب  The abode of strife, hostility, or war
Dar al-Islam  دار الإسلام  Islamdom/ the abode of Islam
Dar al-Kufr  دار الكفر  The abode of infidels
Dawla[h/t]  دولة  State, government
Dawa[h/t]  دعوة  Literally invitation/Islamic Call/ proselytising
Dhimmi  ذمي  Member of a protected minority religion

⁶ In this text, Arabic terms are italicised once and translated in the system applied by the International Journal of Middle East Studies. Secondly, for simplicity, the Arabic medial Hamza (glottal stop), as in the example of the Qur’an, is often not indicated (e.g., Quran). However, complete consistency is not possible.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic Term</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Din</td>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunya</td>
<td>World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falah</td>
<td>Prosperity in this world and the hereafter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fard</td>
<td>Obligation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Fard 'ala al-kifayah)</td>
<td>In juxtaposition to fard al-ayn, fard al-kifayah is a legal obligation that all Muslims must implement. However, if someone has implemented the obligation, the remaining Muslims are freed from the responsibility before God.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farida[h/t]</td>
<td>Duty/obligation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatwa</td>
<td>Islamic decree issued by a high-ranking qualified jurist in response to a question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiqh</td>
<td>Islamic jurisprudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Faqih)</td>
<td>Islamic Jurist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitra[h/t]</td>
<td>Individual human nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghayba[h/t]</td>
<td>Occultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadasa</td>
<td>Holiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakimiyya[h/t]</td>
<td>God’s Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadith</td>
<td>Saying of Muhammad or his companions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajj</td>
<td>Pilgrimage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashemite</td>
<td>Prophet Muhammad’s dynasty (also Qureshi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijab</td>
<td>A veil is worn by Muslim women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijra[h/t]</td>
<td>Exodus/migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb</td>
<td>Political party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

XVI
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic/English</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hukm</strong></td>
<td>حكم          (A word meaning simultaneously) sovereignty or injunction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ihyā</strong></td>
<td>احياء      Resurgence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ijma</strong></td>
<td>اجماع        Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(al-)Ikhwan al-Muslimun</strong></td>
<td>الاخوان المسلمون The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood/Brothers/Brethren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imam</strong></td>
<td>امام        Religious leader holding political office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imama[h/t]</strong></td>
<td>امامۃ        Imamate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imamiyya[h]</strong></td>
<td>امامیة    Twelver Shi’ism, the largest branch of Shia Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iman</strong></td>
<td>ایمان        Faith, belief in God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inhibit</strong></td>
<td>انحطاط    Decline, decadence, decay, degradation, passivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Insan</strong></td>
<td>انسان        Human/man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(al-Insan al-Kamil)</strong></td>
<td>الإنسان الكامل Perfect man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islah</strong></td>
<td>اصلاح       Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(al-)Islamiyya[h]</strong></td>
<td>الاسلامية Islamism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islamiyyun (or -yin)</strong></td>
<td>الاسلاميون Islamists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ittihad (also Wahda)</strong></td>
<td>اتحاد Unity/alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>J</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jahiliyya[h/t]</strong></td>
<td>جاهلیة Pre-Islamic age of ignorance/obscurantism/heathenism/dystopia/savagery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jama’ah[ht]</strong></td>
<td>جماعة Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jihad</strong></td>
<td>جهاد        Holy war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(al-)Jihaz al-Sirri</strong></td>
<td>الجهاز السری Secret apparatus/ intelligence service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>K</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kafir (p. Kuffar)</strong></td>
<td>کافر (کفار) Pagan idolater/apostate/infidel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

XVII
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic Term</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khilafa[h/t]</td>
<td>Caliphate literally means vicegerency or substitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(al-Khilafat al-Rashida)</td>
<td>The period of the first four Caliphs (632-661)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(al-Khulafa al-Rashidun)</td>
<td>The four rightly guided Caliphs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madina al-Fadila[h]</td>
<td>the Virtuous City (Farabi’s thesis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marja</td>
<td>Literally means reference, but in Shia, it is a prestigious title for the highest Shia authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(al-Marja’yya al-Islamiyya)</td>
<td>Islamic reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minhaj</td>
<td>Method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mufti</td>
<td>Islamic jurist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujaddid</td>
<td>A person who brings renewal to Islam through cleansing it of extraneous elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulk</td>
<td>The state/country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muqaddima[h]</td>
<td>Prolegomena (Abdul Rahman Ibn Khaldun’s leading masterpiece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nass</td>
<td>The pristine Islamic textual exegesis consists of scripture, tradition, and law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahda[h/t]</td>
<td>Renaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naskh</td>
<td>Superseding or abrogating the earlier revelation by the new one when the two contradict each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakba[h/t]</td>
<td>Catastrophe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quran (also Koran)</td>
<td>God’s final and definitive revelation to His Messenger, Muhammad, replacing the Bible of the Jews and Christians, according to Islamic theology.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 In some old and new Islamic scripts like in Ibn Khaldun’s famous Prolegomena, the term Imamate and Caliphate are frequently employed interchangeably as synonyms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>R</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resala[h/t] (رسالة)</td>
<td>Muhammad’s prophecy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa’āda[h/t] (سعادة)</td>
<td>Supreme felicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahwa[h/t] (صحراء)</td>
<td>Islamic awakening/reaawakening of the Muslim conscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaf (سلف)</td>
<td>Predecessor, ancestral (from here comes Salafism, Salafiya in Arabic, meaning Ancestralism, standing for Islamic fundamentalism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(al-Salaf al-Salih)</td>
<td>The pious predecessor/forefather/ ancestral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirk (شرك)</td>
<td>Attributing partners to God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunna[h/t] (سنة)</td>
<td>The tradition of the Prophet of Islam’s lifestyle and behavioural code of conduct (Minhaj al-Sunna al-Nabawiya), which consists of his practice (Sira) and sayings (Hadith), other than the Quran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sura[h/t] (سورة)</td>
<td>Chapter of the Quran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahada[h/t] (شهادة)</td>
<td>To profess with conviction the statement of the double testimony/declaration of faith by saying: I testify that there is no deity worthy of worship except Allah, and I testify that Muhammad is His messenger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahid (شهيد)</td>
<td>Martyr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaykh al-Islam (شيخ الإسلام)</td>
<td>(The prestigious title of the Ottoman’s) Grand Jurist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharia[h/t] (شريعة) (shari’ah)</td>
<td>The paramount Islamic law, derived from the Quran and the Sunna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirk (شرك)</td>
<td>Attributing partners to God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufi (صوفي)</td>
<td>Islamic mysticism, imitating the Prophet of Islam’s lifestyle for spirituality and piety through an inclination to meditation together with the rejection of wealth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahrir (تحرير)</td>
<td>Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajdid (تجديد)</td>
<td>Renewal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

XIX
Takfir  
Excommunication

Tanzimat  
Reorganisation (the name of a project by the late Ottomans to modernise the Empire)

Tawhid/Tauheed/Tawahid  
Monotheism/the oneness of God/ the unity of the creation by one Creator. From here comes the common phrase of ‘the oneness of God, the oneness of Muslims,’ rephrased as *Kalemah al-Tauheed wa Tauheed al-Kalemah* (كلمة التوحيد وتوحيد الكلمة).

U

Umma[h/t]  
Faithful Muslim society/community/followers that in a political sense is shorthand to refer to the totality of the Muslim world and metaphorically denote the Muslim bloc (one single unified political entity) as suggested by this research.

Usul  
Basis/root

W

Wahda[h/t]  
Alliance/unity

(al-)wala‘ wal bara‘  
The principle of loyalty and disavowal, which signifies loving and hating for the sake of Allah.

Welāya[h/t]  
Authority, dominion, guardianship and supervision

Welāyat-e Faqih  
The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist
**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAESH</td>
<td>The Arabic acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham/the Levant (ISIS/ISIL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS (also ISIL)</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (Levant)=DAESH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood/Brotherhood/ Brethren (Arabic: Jamāʿat al-İkhwān al-Muslimīn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME(NA)</td>
<td>Middle East (and North Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAPRI</td>
<td>Tampere Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>The journal of <em>al-Urwa al-Wuthqa</em> (the Indissoluble Link/the Firm Handhold)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1 Introduction

1.1 Research background:

**First World War:**
The outbreak of the First World War (the Great War) not only dramatically changed the political, social, and demographic landscape of large parts of the Middle East but also ended the institution of the last Caliphate in the 600-year-old Ottoman Empire.\(^8\) When the War erupted in July 1914 between the Allies Powers (also known as ‘Triple Entente,’ mainly Britain, France, and Russia) and the Central Powers (mainly Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire), the map of the Middle East looked very different to how it does today.

For many reasons, for example, the building of the Berlin-Baghdad railway,\(^9\) the Ottomans’ close cooperation with Germany was a grave concern for the Allied. From the British perspective, their close ties could cut the British sea or land access to India, the Empire’s crown jewel. The French viewed themselves as the protector of the region’s Catholic Christians, and Russia, presenting itself as the protector of the Orthodox, wanted access to the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, the Arab-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire (the Arabs of Mesopotamia, Greater Syria, and the Hejaz) became the centre of confrontation, mainly between the British and the Ottomans.

Two months after the beginning of the war, in a declaration on September 4, 1914, the Triple Entente promised only to demand terms of peace that all three parties agreed upon and not to negotiate separate settlements.\(^10\) Later, in the midst of war, the Allies came to another agreement on the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire to achieve their aims. Consequently, they secretly redrew the borders of Arab lands under the Ottomans based on a deal known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

On the other hand, almost a century after the First World War, the Middle East is remembered as the battleground of unfolding bloody events in an imbroglio of transition, referred to as the ‘Middle Eastern Question’ by the American historian David Fromkin.\(^11\) Crucially, from a pan-Islamist

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\(^9\) To link Berlin with the then-Ottoman capital, Baghdad, a 1,600-kilometre railway route that passed through what is now Turkey, Syria, and Iraq was built in 1903. If the railway had been finished, the Germans may have gained access to Iraq’s oil reserves and a link to the Persian Gulf port of Basra. Prior to the First World War, the Triple Entente expressed serious concern about the railway. The railway was thought to be an expression of the imperial competition between the Triple Entente and the Central Powers that led to the First War.


perspective, the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate played a significant role in the Middle Eastern Question. They blame outside colonisers and claim that the Agreement was a plot to destroy the Muslim Umma that existed under Caliphal leadership. The Professor of Modern Middle Eastern history, Cemil Aydin, describes the Umma without leadership as ‘a body with no head.’ Similarly, Sayyid Qutb, one of the most influential articulators of revolutionary Islam, leaves no doubt that ‘The teaching of Islam is essentially a teaching of leadership.’ He calls for the ‘attainment of world leadership,’ considering it an essential stage in the reconstruction and revival of Muslim Umma and Islam’s might and glory at the global level.

The presence of Political Islam in world politics: global agenda
One of the peculiarities of the Middle East since the World Wars is the emergence and proliferation of pan-Islamist notions, doctrines, ideologies, and movements based upon Islamic teachings due to increased religiosity.

Islam as a religion is a belief in the oneness of God and Muhammad (also Mohammad or Mohamed) as His messenger. The Quran (also Kuran) is the pre-eminent holy text of Islam. However, political Islam (also Islamism interchangeably) is a built-in political system, an ideology that engages Islam for political objectives like running a political party to achieve political power. Two characteristics of political Islam are the use of Islamic references (al-Marja’yya al-Islamiyya) as the cornerstone of their political practice and, secondly, bringing a contemporary Islamic narrative, presenting a historical dynamism for Islam. Tariq Ramadan, the Egyptian-Swiss academic and Hassan al-Banna’s grandson, points out that the terms Islamism (Islamiyya) and Islamists (Islamiyyun or -yin) were first employed by the Muslim Brotherhood to distinguish themselves from political figures such as President Gamal Abdul Nasser, who was also a Muslim politician but a nationalist one. Being on bad terms with Abdul Nasser, the Muslim Brotherhood began to refer to themselves as Islamists to emphasise the difference between their political ideologies based on Islam, in contrast to Abdul Nasser’s secular nationalism.

Nonetheless, the minor difference between Islamism and pan-Islamism is in the latter’s final goal of engaging Islam to unite the world’s Muslims in one single Islamic state. Pan-Islamism claims to be the continuation of an ideal past through the re-establishment of a new Caliphate to restore the Muslim Umma. This notion leads to a profound discourse around the concept of the Islamic Umma as a superior counter-model and counter-hegemonic discourse against the nation-state paradigm. In its most straightforward connotation, pan-Islamism (literally meaning ‘encompassing all Muslims’ like pan-Arabs or pan-Germans) means the re-institution of Islamic might in the

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world. The Encyclopedia of Islam asserts that pan-Islamism is ‘the ideology aiming at a comprehensive union of all Muslims into one entity.’ In the same vein, the Oxford Reference defines it as a political ideology ‘calling for sociopolitical solidarity among all Muslims’ imposing a universal Caliph (a loanword and the anglicised version of the Arabic word, Khalifa, meaning one who substitutes for the Prophet) to whom Muslims everywhere owe allegiance and obedience. From there comes the term Caliphatism. To that end, if Jihad is applied to build the Umma, it is called ‘Jihadism’ and ‘Ummatism.’

This was how political Islam gradually became the central point of reference in the public sphere for a wide range of cultural models, social norms, academic arguments, and political movements in the contemporary international system. The presence of political Islam became particularly evident after the Cold War to the extent that Bernard Lewis, the Oriental studies historian, describes it as ‘international pan-Islamism.’ Additionally, Bassam Tibi, a professor of International Relations, notes that in the post-Cold War era, the study of the geopolitics of Islam and the West replaced the earlier Soviet studies. Similarly, Peter Demant, an International Relations specialist, identifies Islamism as ‘the only universal, coherent, and assertive alternative to the post-Cold War Western supremacy.’ In the same vein, Muqtedar Khan, professor of International Affairs, asserts that in many ways, political Islam undermines or threatens to undermine Western political and economic interests in the Muslim world, particularly the perpetuation of the United States’ hegemony in the Middle East. This is further discussed by Peter Mandaville, professor of International Relations, in Global Political Islam and by Sami al-Khazendar in International Relations of Political Islam Movements, among many other works that identify Islam as a political religion (unlike Christianity) with its contrasting perspective on

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how the world should be ordered. It is, therefore, seen as a clear and present danger to the liberal international order and its current status quo.

Before this, in the de-colonial period after the Second War, pan-Arabism (Arab nationalism) between the 1930s and 1960s in the example of secular pan-Arab parties—such as the Nasserist party of Egypt and Ba’ath party of Iraq and Syria—overshadowed Islamism. Except in Saudi Arabia, Islam as an ideology seemed absent in all Muslim countries in that period.26

Notwithstanding, in the aftermath of the Arab armies’ defeat in the Six-Day War with Israel (June 1967) and after the Camp David Accords (September 1978), which finally broke Arab nationalism, political Islam in the form of Islamism or pan-Islamism gradually began to reverse its relative position of popularity over pan-Arabism.27 It is not coincidental that Asef Bayat, a sociologist in Middle Eastern studies, in his *Islamism and Social Movement Theory*, describes Islamism as a very dynamic movement,28 commonly utilising mosques to assemble and communicate to frame their political agenda, including in the form of Islamist militants in the 20th century. According to Reza Pankhurst, historian and political scientist, in *The Inevitable Caliphate*, all these movements track their political legitimacy to the tradition of the Prophet of Islam (*Minhaj al-Sunna al-Nabawiya*) and advocate the return to the purity of orthodox Islam, calling for the revival of Islam, and acting accordingly to implement their perception of Islam in life today.29

In other words, a close examination of the research background reveals that the Islamic revival is a narrative of nostalgia, which sometimes leads to obsessive regret for the reversal of history in the Muslim psyche. In this sense, Muslim nostalgia is a psychological defence mechanism against Western civilisation, in which Muslims revere their past. This obsessive regret is widely reflected in many Muslim thinkers to the extent that Olivier Roy, a French political scientist, calls it Muslims’ ‘discourse of nostalgia’30 and the Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman identifies the obsession with the past as a ‘peculiar psychological complex’ among Muslims.31

In this respect, Muslim nostalgia is a feeling that functions in three aspects: connection to past grandeur, the ‘marvellous civilisation,’ as described by Qutb.32 Secondly, the construction of collective identity under the Umma. And lastly, a call for resistance against Western civilisation, which they believe has humiliated the Muslim Umma.

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These three aspects are broadly discussed in *The Caliphate: Nostalgic Memory and Contemporary Vision*. Its authors elaborate on why such a nostalgic dream plays a significant role in inspiring Muslim intellectuals to quest for the glory Muslims had under the Caliphal system. As a result, political Islam aims to recreate Islamic civilisation by remembering ‘the Islamic Golden Age’ as a ‘metaphorical form of government reflecting God’s will,’ according to Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, a leading advocate of political Islam. In *Who Speaks of What Caliphate?*, the authors note that remembering the Caliphate is, in fact, a method for Muslims to alleviate their current suffering, which Peter Mandaville describes as a Muslim ‘diastric desire.’ After noting that Muhammad’s Medina pattern is an aspiration for Muslims, Mandaville states that the Medina period ‘is more than just a desire to return to the past […] Muslims see the Ummah as an object of diasporic desire […] in which all Muslims today are part of a diaspora whose home is the Ummah of the Prophet’s Medina.’ In the same vein, Sayyid, in *Recalling the Caliphate*, concludes that the ‘inability of Ummah to fully articulate itself as universal means that it is caught in the logic of diaspora,’ which Piscator calls ‘orphans of the Ummah.’

Contrary to the diasporic feeling, it is worth mentioning that the articulation of Islam as a universal faith to govern the entire world plays a fundamental role in the Ummah discourse. This is because Islam, like Christianity but unlike Judaism, presents itself as a global religion. That is why Islam, similar to Christianity, is a missionary faith asserting that the believers are obliged to convert non-Muslims to *The Straight Path of Islam* ‘until the religion is God’s alone,’ according to Quranic teachings. Given this, Western scholars like Thomas W. Arnold in *The Preaching of Islam* and Reynold A. Nicholson in *Mystics of Islam* believe that Islam was initially intended to be a universal religion. Similarly, in *Muhammad and The Religion of Islam*, John Gilchrist notes that the Quran gives Muhammad the illustrious title of ‘Mercy to the universal’ as ‘an indication of the universal

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33 The Islamic Golden Age (also Islamic Civilisation of the High Middle Age) roughly dated from the 8th century to the 13th century, beginning from the reign of the Abbasid Caliph Harun al-Rashid (786–809) and terminating by 1258 with the Mongolian Sack of Baghdad. See: ‘The Islamic Golden Age’. In: *World Civilization - Lumen Learning* at: https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-hccc-worldcivilization/chapter/the-islamic-golden-age/#:~:text=Overview,development%2C%20and%20cultural%20works%20founded.


40 The Quran 8:39.


42 The Quran in 21:107 says: ‘We sent thee not, but as a Mercy for all worlds.’
character of his ministry." Gilchrist concludes that Muhammad was not solely a voice against Arab paganism but ‘the voice of God calling all men everywhere to his religion, al-Islam.’

On top of that, the Karachi-based Muslim World Congress Declaration, one of many documents reflecting the global Muslim mindset, is probably the prime example of declaring the universality of Islam. It explicitly states that ‘Islam is neither a tribe nor a racial nor a national nor a regional religion. It is a world religion. It is more than a religion. It is a world order.’

Due to this viewpoint, James Piscatori, in *Islam Beyond Borders: The Umma in World Politics*, reiterates that the Umma’s discourse is universalist. He illustrates that the Umma effectively plays a role in world politics to the extent that pan-Islamists present Islam as a future-dominating ideology. In the same vein, Olivier Roy leaves no doubt that ‘by definition, Islam is universal’ as is ‘by definition a non-ethnic religion.’

In demonstrating Roy’s and Piscatori’s points on Islam’s universality, perhaps a forty-eight-page pamphlet entitled *The Future Belongs to Islam* authored by Egyptian intellectual Muhammad Taufiq al-Bakri (1870–1932) is one of the earliest contemporary works produced on the global aspect of Islam. In his book, he celebrates Islam as the model for global civilisation to come.

Due to this view, Andrea Mura, professor of comparative philosophy, in *The Inclusive Dynamics of Islamic Universalism*, notes that the term *Dar al-Islam* ‘somehow resonates with the universalistic notion of *Res Publica Christiana*,’ a Latin phrase for the worldwide community of Christianity or Christendom. Therefore, it is safe to say that perhaps this was behind Marshall Hodgson’s idea, who, in *The Venture of Islam*, invented the term ‘Islamdom’ to be intelligible by analogy with Christendom. The terms Islamdom and Christendom, in this respect, imply global Islam and Christianity. No similar term has been invented for Judaism.

In the same vein, in *Transnational and Cosmopolitan Forms of Islam*, Karen Leonard, professor of ethnography, notes that Islam and Muslims have long constituted a ‘world system’ known as Global Islamism; what Maududi, for instance, considers a revolutionary ideology ‘to carry out

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44 Ibid.
49 Ibid. p. 128.
51 Andrea Mura. ‘The Inclusive Dynamics of Islamic Universalism.’ *Comparative Philosophy* 5, No. 1. 2014. p. 38.
reforms for the welfare of mankind. From this perspective, Islam is not just faith but a ‘liberating religion,’ as suggested by Shabbir Akhtar, and a ‘liberation theology,’ as proposed by Hamid Dabashi.

In this sense, transnational Islamist movements postulate that Islam is universal in principle with a systematic and coherent ideology. They view humanity as a single community, a whole that is ultimately to be harmonious in the form of one universal Umma under one God. In this respect, Umma’s purpose is, on the one hand, to represent God’s oneness and, on the other hand, to serve as a ‘vehicle for realising God’s will on Earth’, commonly referred to as Kalemah al-Tauheed wa Tauheed al-Kalemah. From this account, Islam’s global agenda is to govern the entire world while believing that its rules, regulations, and message are absolute right, for it is the last divine message for humanity, according to Qutb in ‘The Universal Law’ (a chapter in Milestones). Accordingly, Islam is not confined to specific national or territorial borders. It is a transnational faith with an ever-widening capacity that can set the global Umma, embracing the globe’s whole surface with its proper rules and regulations. Gerhard Bowering, professor of religious studies, calls this Islam’s ‘universal force’ and ‘global prominence,’ whose goal, according to Abul Kalam Azad, a leading figure in the Indian Caliphate Movement, is ‘to establish an Umma on the Earth.’ Azad envisioned a universal function for the institution of the Caliphate.

Beyond that, pan-Islamists, advocating an imperial agenda and a cosmopolitan worldview, go as far as suggesting a worldwide Caliphate as a single-world government in Globalised Islam, as Oliver Roy and Salam Hawa noted in their books with a similar name. They argue that the Muslim global expansionist agenda encourages them to hold that Muslims must have one global leader. For instance, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Palestine, in his Islamic State, cites the lack of administrative structure in the Muslim world after the demise of the Ottoman Caliphate as a significant problem. His party proposes a global Caliphate as its ultimate goal for Muslims to restore themselves to a worldwide position of power.

In his book The Idea of the Muslim World, Turkish scholar Cemil Ayden believes that ‘Muslims did not imagine belonging to a global political unity until the peak of European hegemony in the late 19th century.’ Similarly, Peter Mandaville holds that globalised Islam was an alternative

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58 كلمة التوحيد وتوحيد الكلمة
60 Pankhurst. The Inevitable Caliphate. p. 38.
63 Ayden. The Idea of the Muslim World. p. 3.
political order to Western hegemony, remembered as Islamic Occidentalism presenting a dehumanising image of the West (the Occident).

According to Mandaville, while the Muslim world has never been united, the global Muslim community’s appeal is a modern political Islamic discourse, a discourse of globalised Islam, according to Sayyid, which is so significant that ‘without a great power to anchor [i.e., Ummatic state] the Muslims’ presence in the world system, the myriad problems that confront the Umma are going to be difficult to resolve.’

1.2. Research question, method, theory, literature, and contribution:
This research endeavours to address the question of what the politics of the Umma are and how they function in political Islam. In other words, by focusing on the origin and evolution of political Islam, the research aim is to examine the function of the Umma in Muslim polity from the perspective of the pan-Islamist literature that developed from an acute longing for creating their own state model. This is because pan-Islamist literature relies on Muslim solidarity, with the Caliph occupying a central role. In this literature, Muslims have a religious duty to struggle and defend the abode of Islam.

Additionally, the research examines how the term Umma in pan-Islamism is linked to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which they consider a notorious colonial legacy. Put differently, there are extensive studies around the concept of the Umma, as there are also about the Sykes-Picot itself. However, as perceived in the pan-Islamist view, the latter’s influence on the former is one of the contributions of the present research.

The significance of this research at TAPRI’s Peace Studies can be perceived once it is in the fact that political Islam is a worldwide growing phenomenon and the source of the proliferation of dozens of Islamist groups in a complex region (the Middle East) facing complex challenges with complex dimensions that affect the region and the world.

It is also worth mentioning that there are two assumptions underlying this research. Firstly, the formation of the Umma is a common aim of almost all Islamist groups and movements –if not all. Secondly, the concept of the Umma, as in its established meaning in this research, i.e., the Muslim bloc, can only be applied if we maintain the assumption that Islam is a political ideology. Consequently, the call for the formation of the Umma can be envisaged if Islam, more than faith, is an ideology.

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64 Mandaville. Transnational Muslim Politics. p. 2.
65 Ibid. p. 71.

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As for findings, the research underlines at least six points in its examination: First, the abolition of the Muslim Caliphate created a trauma, leaving behind a ‘power vacuum’ and an ‘identity crisis.’ Second, the politics of the Umma is a discourse and an integral part of Islamic political philosophy, which dominates almost all the diverse Islamist groups. Third, to pan-Islamists, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was the first plot to demolish the last Caliphate and fragment the Umma. In the very cynical view of some pan-Islamists such as Tagiuddin al-Nabhani, it is even a sign of the new Crusade. Fourth, from the pan-Islamist perspective, the destruction of the Caliphate is commonly seen as a ‘single causal factor’ that led to Islamic civilisational decline and passivity (Inhibit). Fifth, given the above, revivalists suggest that the restoration of the Umma is the only solution for returning to the glory of Islamic civilisation. Sixth, in the same vein, pan-Islamism suggests the return to the Middle East of Islam as an alternative political order to the Middle East of Sykes-Picot, which, in the end, will shape the Muslim Umma.

It is to be noted that since the Umma, more than a concept, is a discourse, the prime method applied in this research is the discourse analytical approach to examine the religious-sociopolitical domain of the politics of the Umma in Islamic political philosophy and to investigate the representation of authority and legitimacy that comes with the Umma for whoever restores it.

Discourse, as defined by Jorgensen and Phillips, is ‘a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world).’ As such, it includes talk, text, and action formed around a notion. These three entities construct narratives, sets of beliefs, and ways of seeing the world when speaking of that notion. Thus, it is a vehicle for making meaning, doing things, or both.

In other words, discourse is a research method for studying written or spoken language in relation to its social and historical context to examine how language functions and how meaning is created in different contexts. Unlike linguistic studies of vocabulary, genre, and sentence structure, which focus only on the rules of language use, discourse analysis emphasises the contextual meaning of language. For this purpose, it employs techniques to study specific underlying reasons for specific effects of what, when, and where people say and how they say it, whether in documents, images, or verbal or non-verbal interaction, to achieve effects (e.g., to create doubt, to build trust, to evoke emotions, or to manage conflict).

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67 To understand the civilisational conflicts between Muslims and the West, see: Crusade and Jihad: The Thousand-Year War between the Muslim World and the Global North by William Polk.
70 Amy Luo. Critical Discourse Analysis | Definition, Guide & Examples. Available at: https://www.scribr.co.uk/research-methods/discourse-analysis-explained/ (Accessed August 2, 2022)
Among many techniques, the two major ones employed in this research are speech analysis and rhetorical analysis. For example, rhetorical analysis is discussed in ‘Umma: its concepts and conceptualised discourse’ in Chapter Two and ‘Discourse of building a bloc’ in Chapter Six, where the genealogy of the counter-hegemonic narrative of pan-Islamism is debated.

In the same vein, it must be further noted that in Michel Foucault’s words and his theory of power/knowledge, the two elements of ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ are intimately connected and work together to play a crucial role in a discourse that means to him, ‘an institutionalised way of speaking or writing about the reality that defines what can be intelligibly thought and said about the world and what cannot.’ To analyse a discourse requires examining questions such as: Whose interest does it represent? What power dynamic does it reproduce? What perfect schema does it project and why?

As will be discussed in Chapter Three, political Islam is ‘power-centric’ on the one hand and ‘ideology-centric’ on the other. As such, the discourse analytical approach is applied as the optimum method to interpret or -better say- to decode the politics of the Umma and its counter-hegemonic narrative in political Islam to discover how the notion of the Umma is contextualised and conceptualised to view the world.

The method illustrates how the Umma is conceptualised as a holistic system to prevail in the Islamist mindset amidst the modern nation-state system. Put differently, the method assists us in perceiving that in mainstream Islamic thought (maximalist view), conventional interpretations of the Umma as faithful Muslim society are far from its revolutionary application in mainstream Islamic thought. Therefore, the research proposes its own definition of the Umma to denote the ‘Muslim bloc’ in modern parlance in International Relations.

To decode the politics of the Umma by discourse analysis, the term is revisited in at least four categories of sources: First, in the Quran and Sunna. Second, in speeches such as that delivered by al-Banna and the DAESH leader. Third, in publications such as Qutb’s Milestones, al-Nabhani’s Islamic State, and Hizb ut-Tahrir’s The Umma’s Charter. Fourth, in magazines such as Asadabadi’s Urwa al-Wuthqa, Rida’s al-Manar, and DAESH’s al-Hayat, and lastly, pamphlets such as al-Banna’s To What Do We Invite Humanity?, al-Bakri’s The Future Belongs to Islam, Kemalist’s The Caliphate and the People’s Sovereignty, Abdul Salam Faraj’s The Neglected Obligation and Bin Laden’s World Islamic Front. These prominent individuals and their works are the most reliable sources showing how the Umma discourse has been gradually shaped.

Regarding theory, one of the peculiarities of research is to cite five theories about the politics of the Umma in political Islam. As a novelty, this research collects the five separate theories for the

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71 These include applied linguistics, rhetorical analysis, ethnography of communication, variation analysis, conversation analysis, cognitive psychology, rhetorical analysis, and speech analysis.
first time to elaborate on where the dynamism of the Umma originates. The five theories are textual theory, civilisational theory, state theory, identity crisis theory, and conspiracy theory.

Textual theory posits that the sociopolitical dynamics of the Umma originate from the early Islamic scripture. The civilisational theory is an explanatory approach to the rise and demise of the Islamic Golden Civilisation and how a new one can be restored if the Umma is reconstructed. The state theory debates the fusion between church and state in Islam and concludes that if Islamic Sharia is to be implemented, the Muslim state must be established for the Umma to be built. The identity crisis theory recognises a significant impediment in the Muslim Umma, searching for legitimacy and glory in a religion-centric identity. Finally, the conspiracy theory holds the view that there was a conspiracy and plot to destroy the Muslim Umma, as in the form of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, for example.

In contrast to the other theories, the textual theory, with widely available Islamic source texts, is as old as Islam. Secondly, it is applied by almost all Islamologists and Islamist Movements. The second oldest is the state theory, which sees the Prophet’s state in Medina as a pattern for all Muslims. By remembering the Islamic Golden Age (8th-13th centuries), the civilisation theory is a romanticised approach to the period. It is believed that Muslims were masters of the world. However, the remaining two theories, i.e., identity crisis and conspiracy, are the newest explanatory approach to the Ummatic dynamism in the aftermath of the dissolution of the last Caliphate.

Concerning the literature review, it must be noted that there are two approaches to Islam: minimalist and maximalist. As discussed in this research, two prominent early defenders of minimalist Islam who reject the divine origin of sovereignty are Ali Abdul Raziq and Mahmoud Mohamed Taha. However, their voices are less heard than the vast number of defenders of maximalist Islam. Unequivocally, the most prominent maximalist is Sayyid Qutb, whose thoughts, particularly his Milestones, played a significant role in the evolution of militant Islam and influenced the Islamic world more than any other individual.

As its title indicates, this study is very much in line with Fred Halliday’s The Politics of the Umma, in which the author looks into different aspects of the Islamic revival and the role Islam is playing in world politics today, such as calling for the unity of the Muslim Umma and fighting against the West. Although Halliday, a professor in International Relations, successfully presents various aspects of Islamic revival, he fails to decode the term Umma in political Islam and why it dominates the Islamist mindset within the modern nation-state system. Thus, the aim of this research is to re-think (i.e., decode) the politics of the Umma.

Additionally, the research tremendously benefits from James Piscatori’s Reinventing the Ummah and Oliver Roy’s Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, in which the authors present an incisive analysis of the Islamic political agenda and transnational movements that have developed in the last century in the Muslim world. Nevertheless, Halliday, Piscatori, and Roy fail
to expose the roots of dynamism hidden in the Umma notion. As such, none of them debate the Umma-state as this research does. That is the same with many books authored around the Umma notion. Except for renowned Muslim scholars like Maududi, Nadwi, Qutb, and al-Nabhani, most works written by Western scholars about the Umma fail to go to the core of conceptualised Umma rooted in the theology and philosophy of political Islam.

Furthermore, to shed light on the Umma discourse, the research immensely reviews the literature produced in English, Arabic, and rarely Persian in two categories;

First, examples of literature produced by Muslim scholars and reviewed in this research are Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (al-Urwa al-Wuthqa), Muhammad Abdu (Risalat al-Tauheed), Rashid Rida (Tafsir al-Manar), Abul A’la Maududi (Unity of the Muslim World, Towards Understanding Islam, Islam Today), Abul Hassan Nadwi (Islam and the World), Hassan al-Banna (his speeches), Sayyid Qutb (Milestones), Taqquddin al-Nabhani (The Islamic State), Ali Abdul Raziq (Islam and the Foundations of Political Power), Mahmoud Mohammed Taha (The Second Message of Islam), Muhammad Asad (Islam at the Crossroads, The Principles of State and Government in Islam), Bassam Tibi (Islam and Islamism, The Challenge of Fundamentalism), Mohammed Arkoun (Present-Day Islam between its Tradition and Globalisation), Salman Sayyid (Recalling the Caliphate).

And second, examples of literature produced by Western scholars are John Esposito (Islam: The Straight Path, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?), Peter Mandaville (Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma, Global Political Islam), James Piscatori (Islam Beyond Borders: The Umma in World Politics), Oliver Roy (The Failure of Political Islam), Bernard Lewis (Islam: The Religion and the People, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, What Went Wrong?, The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years), Fred Halliday (Sharia: Theory, Practice, Transformations, Restating Orientalism: The Critique of Modern Knowledge), Peter Demant (Islam vs. Islamism), Arnold Toynbee (Civilisation on Trial), Marshall Hodgson (The Venture of Islam), Patricia Crone (God’s Rule: Government and Islam), Thomas W. Arnold (The Caliphate), William Montgomery Watt (Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman), Antony Black (The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present), William Muir (The Caliphate: its rise decline and fall), among many others.

Moreover, the other contribution of this research is the review of the literature produced on the notion of İnḫiṭṭ (decline, decadence, decay, degradation), which dominated studies of Islam from the early 19th century onwards. A prominent example is Abul Hassan Nadwi’s The Rise and Decline of Muslims and its Effect on Mankind. Islamist narratives boldly underline the notion that Islamic civilisation lost its world-leading influence and fell into stagnation and passivity. To reverse the Muslim decline, some literature exposes the ideas of the renaissance (Nahda) and reform (Islah).
Lastly, due to the variety of Islamist groups, the research delimits its scope to tracing the evolution of pro-Umma pan-Islamist groups only and exclusively in four hierarchically well-structured, influential ones that have a profound impact on the pan-Islamist movement, namely the Khilafat (Caliphate) Movement of India, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and DAESH. They are at the top of the counter-hegemonic narrative of the Umma discourse. In contrast to other Islamic organisations with local influence, like in a specific country, the listed organisations have broad resonance across borders. In their theological absolutism, they dream of accomplishing the restoration of the Umma by re-establishing the divine institution of the Caliphate, for which each has produced extensive works used in this research. The Caliphate Movement and DAESH were the first and the last that intended to restore the Caliphate. However, the Caliphate Movement intended to keep the Ottoman Caliphate alive, whereas DAESH declared its own worldwide Caliphate. Just four years after the dissolution of the Caliphate office in Turkey in 1924 and the constitutional amendment in 1928, Turkey was considered a secular state with no official religion, and the Muslim Brotherhood was the first pro-Caliphate organisation formed in 1928. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, which influenced the entire Islamic world, Hizb ut-Tahrir gained eminence in the Islamic world and has branches in some thirty countries in North Africa, Western Asia, Central Asia, South and Southeast Asia, and Western countries like Australia, Britain, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.

Also, the research is delimitated by the fact that the Shia denomination of Islam does not believe in the Caliphate. It is thus confined to studying the Sunni perception of the Umma. This is due to the fact that the Sunni denomination wishes to form the Umma under the doctrine of the Caliphate system In Search of the Vanished Caliphate, as Alexander Orwin’s article suggests. In contrast, the Shia denomination wishes to form the Umma under the Imamate (also Imamate) doctrine, holding a fundamentally different view that Islamic leadership is decided by revelation. The formation of the Umma based on the Shia perspective is, thus, beyond the scope of this research and requires another independent study, though general elements are the same in political Shia and Sunni.

1.3. Research structure:
The dissertation consists of eight chapters, including the introduction (Chapter One) outlining the background, questions, method, literature, and research contribution.

Chapter Two sketches the method, theories, and concepts on which this study is crafted to address the research question. To answer the question, Chapter Two initially explores the Middle East’s geopolitics and man-made artificial borders that partitioned the Arab Middle East, leaving behind

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lasting crises. It also presents the concept of the Umma and how it is contextualised and conceptualised, negating the current boundaries.

Thereafter, having discussed the Umma as a Quranic term in political Islam, the pan-Islamist perspective on the state established in Medina as the pattern for all Muslims is revisited. Chapter Three is, therefore, devoted to the formation of Islam and Muslim Umma that later continued in the form of the institution of the Caliphate. The chapter also explores the new identity formed for Arabs as *Muslimness* and investigates how the new identity extended to non-Arabs when they converted to Islam. Given that Medina is seen as the Muslim pattern, Chapter Three additionally explores two fundamental questions. The first is whether Islam is essentially political, as overwhelmingly believed by Muslim jurists or accidentally politicised. The second question is whether Islam is inherently an ideology or accidentally ideologised. With positive answers to the first part of each question (maximalist view), Chapter Three narrates the pan-Islamist argument that forming Umma is an inevitable duty of Muslims after it vanished due to the defeat of the Ottomans.

Subsequently, Chapter Four briefly reviews how the Ottomans obtained, shaped, and lost the institution of the Caliphate, leaving behind a trauma that created identity and leadership crises. Chapter Four, therefore, documents one of the influential factors for the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate, which was the Anglo-Arab alliance in the First War in return for constructing Sharif Hussein’s Arab Caliphate state.

Chapter Five is devoted to the study of a parallel secret plan between Britain and France in the middle of the First War to partition the Ottoman Arab lands. The secret deal is remembered as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, followed by the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate System.

Chapter Six, entitled ‘Genealogy of the Counter-hegemonic narrative of pan-Islamist discourse; reclaiming the Umma, recalling the Caliphate,’ is devoted to reviewing the pan-Islamist genealogy through the lens of most prominent Muslim thinkers in the 19th and 20th centuries, whose thoughts shaped the pan-Islamist counter-hegemonic narrative and reactionary movements to colonialism. The notion of reclaiming the Umma is widely discussed in this chapter.

Given that pan-Islamism associates the decline of Muslim Umma with the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Chapter Seven, applying the Turkish historian Mustafa Demirci’s view, addresses two unanswered questions: Was the Agreement a conspiracy to destroy the Ottoman Caliphate? And was it the cause or the consequence of the demise of the Caliphate?

Lastly, the conclusion chapter, Chapter Eight, addresses the research’s central question. It points out that the Umma in political Islam is conceptualised to metaphorically denote ‘bloc’ as understood in modern parlance in International Relations.

The term ‘bloc’ here is borrowed from the bipolar system of the Cold War in International Relations, where the United States and the Soviet Union were the only two dominant powers.
standing face to face. In this sense, the bloc denotes an allied group of countries that work closely together because they have similar political interests.\textsuperscript{74} In the Cold War, there were two sides: the Soviet Union and the United States, with each side assembling their allies into their sphere of influence.

In this respect, the remarkable research contribution is in proposing a new perception for the term Umma to denote a world agenda for Muslim superstate.

\textsuperscript{74} Oxford Learner’s Dictionary. https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/topic/international_relations/bloc
(Accessed July 4, 2021)
History has consistently documented the fact that borders have never been static. They have never stopped changing through the centuries. Looking at maps of Africa and the Middle East, one can easily recognize many countries with artificially constructed borders, different from many other countries’ natural borders, defined by the gradual—not a day—emergence of nation-states. For example, the emergence of European nation-states has gradually been defined by the concept of self-determination and from the ashes of numerous multi-ethnic European empires whose borders were formed during centuries of wars and conflicts. Consequently, the nation-state system ultimately led to the most prolonged period of peace on the continent after the Second World War. This process did not take place in post-Ottoman Middle East states. Their unnatural borders show that the region’s people had no role of self-determination. In other words, it was not nation-making at all. Rather, man-made borders were imposed by foreign countries on the inhabitants of territories that found themselves split in different names of countries that they did not participate in crafting. This is well demonstrated in A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin. He reveals how and why the First War Allies came to make the Middle East’s geography and politics by drawing lines on an empty map that ultimately laid the first stone to shape the Middle East we recognize today. The newly crafted countries did not correspond to the actual sectarian, tribal, or ethnic distinctions on the ground. This can be traced in the given names of the newly crafted states. For instance, the French Mandate gave the name of ‘Syria’ to a part of Arab-speaking lands that became a kingdom in 1920, whereas Palestine was merely a Syrian appendage. Iraq, a medieval province of the Caliphate, became a country in 1921, whereas Jordan and Lebanon referred to a river and a mountain, respectively, when they became Arab countries in 1921 and 1943. Prior to this moment, Lebanon, with its name today, had never existed as an independent country. It is the same in the case of the Ottoman Hejaz, which in 1932 became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in its size and name today, which had never existed before.
2  Umma Discourse: Puzzle, Method, Theories, and Concepts

2.1. Puzzle: man-made-artificial borders

History has consistently documented the fact that borders have never been static. They have never stopped changing through the centuries. Looking at maps of Africa and the Middle East, one can easily recognise many countries with artificially constructed borders, different from many other countries’ natural borders, defined by the gradual -not a day- emergence of nation-states. For example, the emergence of European nation-states has gradually been defined by the concept of self-determination and from the ashes of numerous multi-ethnic European empires whose borders were formed during centuries of wars and conflicts. Consequently, the nation-state system ultimately led to the most prolonged period of peace on the continent after the Second War.

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From this perspective, demography does not determine the states we recognise today on the Middle East map. They are crafted by human intervention but not formed by war, peace, or natural borders. It was the victorious countries of the First and Second Wars who self-interestedly changed the political geography of the Middle East, not its indigenous people. What happened for Arabs, by way of example, was that under the British and French Mandate and imposed borders, they suddenly found themselves fragmented into several new states ‘that have not become nations even

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today,’ as Fromkin notes. The victorious European powers did not have much understanding of the Middle East’s maze of multiple old and deep-rooted identities. Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, Alawites, Druze, Kurds, Turkomen, Circassians, Assyrians, Zaidis, Ibadis, Nusairis, Yazidis, and Chaldeans, among others, found themselves split among newly crafted states. As a result, minority ethnic groups ruled Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, which left behind crises. In her article *Disordered Ordering*, geographist Karen Culcasi states that:

‘Neither the British nor the French had any clear plans or foreign policies in the Ottoman territories before WWI; nevertheless, they had many geopolitical interests in the region. For the British, protecting their access to India was essential, and this meant safeguarding the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf [...] For the French, preserving their long-term influence in Syria, and particularly in the Christian communities was essential.’

Straight lines, such as some of the borders of Jordan, Iraq, and Syria, for instance, are uncomplicated borders, for they are unnatural. A natural border is a complicated border between states formed through wars or is concomitant with natural features such as rivers, mountain ranges, or deserts. Accordingly, unnatural borders are man-made deformities that are usually longitudinally or latitudinally drawn by self-interested humans who drew the borders and boundaries according to their wishes. According to the authors of *Artificial States*, unnatural borders are considered artificial for non-indigenous individuals such as former colonisers drew them. In this sense, unnatural borders are faulty boundaries and not organic frontiers, which form artificial states in which borders do not match the indigenous nationalities living therein. For instance, based on post-war agreements, colonial countries ‘have often created monstrosities in

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76 Fromkin. *A Peace to End All Peace.* p. 17.
which ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups were thrown together or separated without any respect for those groups’ aspirations.\textsuperscript{79}

It is worth mentioning that there are two measures of the degree to which borders can be considered artificial. According to the authors of Artificial States, one measure is how borders divide ethnic groups into two separate adjacent counties, and the second measure is the straightness of land borders. For example, 80% of African borders follow latitudinal and longitudinal lines drawn at the Berlin Conference. According to the authors, ‘many scholars believe that such artificial (unnatural) borders which create ethnically fragmented countries or, conversely, separate the same people into bordering countries are the root of trouble.’\textsuperscript{80} They give the Sykes-Picot Agreement as an example of artificial boundaries drawn by individuals. They note that:

‘The past and current trouble in the Middle East at least in part originated from this kind of agreement between Western powers. Under the Sykes-Picot agreement between British and French during WWI, Northern Palestine would go to the French, Southern Palestine to the British, and Central Palestine, including Jerusalem, would be an allied Condominium shared by the two. After the war, the French agreed to give up any claims to Palestine to control Syria. The British abandoned their protegee (Faisal) in Syria and offered him Iraq, cobbling together three different Ottoman provinces containing Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. This set the stage for instability’ up until today.’\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{79} ibid. p. 2.
\textsuperscript{80} ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} ibid. p. 5.
Figure 2: Original Sykes-Picot map\textsuperscript{82}

Figure 3: Middle Eastern religious identities\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{82} See: ‘Sykes-Picot Agreement text’, UNISPAL. Available at: https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/232358BAC8EEB7B55852571100078477C

\textsuperscript{83} *Middle Eastern Religious Identities*. Available at: https://www.fragilestates.org/2012/05/24/middle-eastern-religious-identities/ (Accessed July 6, 2021)
2.2. Methodological approach to politics of Umma

As stated above, the main focus of this research is on the performative and discursive dimensions of the Umma in Islamic political philosophy. To explore the sociopolitical domain of the Ummitic discourse in diverse Islamist groups, the research initially addresses the two elements of ‘power’ and ‘ideology’ in the Middle East, the birthplace of both Islam and political Islam.

2.2.1. Middle East: birthplace of Islam and political Islam

The Middle East84 (ME), also known as the Near East, is a large and transcontinental region at the crossroads of western Asia, north-eastern Africa, and south-eastern Europe. It is one of the cradles of human civilisation. Some ancient civilisations that emerged in the Middle East include Mesopotamia, Egypt, Phoenicia, and Persia. The region is also the birthplace of three major religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, harbouring 400 million people, with the majority of Muslims, both Shia and Sunnis85 (one-quarter of the world’s Muslims).86 Christianity makes up 10-15% of the population in the Middle East. All the region’s countries are Muslim majority, except Israel, which is the only Jewish state in the world.

The Middle East is a region plagued by terrorism, war, weak and failed regimes, and uncertainty. While the future of the Middle East is uncertain, such an insecure region lies at the centre of the world’s strategic and economic pole. It is a geopolitically sensitive, religiously diverse, ethnically complex, and geoeconomically rich region facing complex challenges with complex dimensions to the extent that its future remains uncertain and unstable. The region is the battleground of rival religions, ideologies, and dynasties. It has been in the grip of Islamic extremism, political turmoil, faltering oil prices, and sectarian issues. As such, the renowned Muslim scholar Muhammad Asad describes it as a ‘volcanic centre’87 where, according to Peter Deman, ‘conflicts of interest threaten to mutate into a clash of civilisations’ to the extent that he calls it ‘the world’s black hole.’88

Middle Eastern history admits Asad’s description, for it is full of war and conflicts, while its economies impact the world’s major economies because of its vast crude oil and gas reserves. Because of this, every country has an alliance with global powers that actively maintain the balance of power in the region to secure their economic interests.

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84 Although a very Eurocentric name, the Middle East term (sometimes referred to as the Near East) is a common parlance and an accepted term in International Relations literature. The term is also employed in this research. The term originated from the colonial administrators of the British-India office in the mid-19th century. However, it refers geographically to a region that roughly encompasses western Asia and Egypt. The region consists of several small and major countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, and Egypt. It is noteworthy that the Middle East also has a significant place in the global economy for its vast reserves of crude oil and gas, though its economies range from very poor to extremely wealthy countries.

85 BBC. Sunni and Shia in the Middle East. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25434060 (Accessed February 21, 2022)


87 Muhammad Asad. *Islam at the Crossroads*. Dar al-Andalus. 1982. p. 34.

88 Demant. *Islam vs. Islamism*. pp. xxiv, 204.
Most important to all, the Middle East is remembered as the birthplace of the Muslim Umma, as it is also remembered as the birthplace of both Islam and political Islam, also known as Islamism. Today, 95% of the Middle East is Muslim. It is also the cradle of many Islamist movements, a challenge to existing systems in the Middle East and worldwide. In their view, political Islam is equally a ‘reaction’ and a ‘project’ premised on four interrelated critiques of colonialism, secularism, individualism, and modernism. In Demant’s words, Islamic fundamentalism is ‘an antimodern product of modernity’ that brought the four.

This is meaningful once we note that Islam exerts a significant influence in nearly every corner of the world. In his 1948 *Islam, the West, and The Future*, a long time ago, the British historian Arnold Toynbee, after describing pan-Islamism as a ‘dormant-yet’ phenomenon, meticulously predicts that ‘we have to reckon with the possibility that the sleeper may awake.’ The question is how.

The answer is in the relationship between Islam and politics. Without clarifying the inter-relation of these two concepts, one cannot explain the origin of hundreds of Islamist groups recognised by different names such as Islamism, pan-Islamism, Jihadism, Salafism, Ummatism, Caliphatism, Revivalism, and the like. Among these seemingly similar names and concepts, Toynbee identifies pan-Islamism, the centre of this research, as a dormant-yet-origin.

Given the above, one of the peculiarities of the Middle East’s post-WWI era is the emergence of a series of pan-Islamist groups proclaiming the restoration of the Caliphate. By observing several generations of Islamists, from old to modern and from conservative to radical ones, the common goal is the formation of the Umma as an alternative political order to the nation-state system, as Mandaville notes.

From this perspective, the fundamental question is: ‘How does the discourse of Umma function in Muslim polity?’ In other words, ‘How does Islamic political philosophy encourage Muslims to restore the Umma?’

These questions concern all Islamist groups, movements, and parties, notably once we note that the notion of Muslim Umma has been anchored in Islamic scripture since its advent. The Umma and its call have been an ever-continuing discourse in Islam’s history, but not necessarily as a single agreed concept.

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89 Ibid. p. xxiv.
90 Ibid. p. 191.
2.2.2. Umma as a platform against colonialism

As an established fact, Islamist movements came into existence at a time when most Muslim territories were directly or indirectly in the grip of European colonialism. In the wake of the colonial period, pan-Islamists hold that there is unquestionably an interconnection between the rise of colonial imperialism and the steady decline of the Muslim Umma. Their assertion is that Muslims were united until colonial powers tore them apart when they lost political power and their traditional Caliphate model became inoperative.

This means the primarily rhetorical narration functions as a Muslim defensive mechanism against colonial ascendance and domination. In this respect, pan-Islamism is a sociopolitical response to the colonial period. For instance, Peter Mandaville considers pan-Islamism an anti-colonial discourse that was a reaction to European colonialism that dominated 85% of the earth by 1914 as colonies, protectorates, dominions, and commonwealths, including the Muslim world through much of the 19th and 20th centuries. Similarly, Sayyid reiterates that in post-Caliphate Islamism, the Caliphate is a metaphor for Muslim aspirations to reorder the post-colonial world. In this view, anti-colonialism and sovereignty go hand in hand. If Muslims want their sovereignty, they must fight every legacy of the colonial powers that had given themselves the right to colonise the Others.

The study of colonialism (interchangeably sometimes referred to as imperialism) is a study of relations between ‘superior’ colonisers and ‘inferior’ colonised people. This attitude persisted even after the colonies gained independence. In this interpretation, colonialism has long been associated with the superiority of the Western lifestyle and thoughts over non-Westerners in general and in the regions referred to as the ‘Orient’ in particular. In other words, the civilising mission of colonisers was far from an attempt to improve and reform undeveloped people. Instead, it was an attempt to westernise the colonised people with ideals forced upon them, known as ‘assimilation.’

Assimilation was the colonial policy to impose on colonised people the use of European languages, the wearing of European-style clothes, following a European style of education, and, more significantly, the secular system of ruling, which is totally rejected in political Islam.

Post-colonial study demonstrates that the rise of political Islam in the last century was a reaction to colonialism, intended to exert pressure to end Western domination. According to Mark

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94 Ayden. The Idea of the Muslim World. p. 3.
95 Mandaville. Transnational Muslim Politics. p. 45.
97 Sayyid. Recalling the Caliphate. p. 15.
Huband, the formation of Islamist movements was essentially a call to resistance against the colonial West by applying the religious principles deeply embedded in Muslim consciousness.\textsuperscript{99}

It is worth mentioning that several renowned theoreticians, such as Edward Said, Frantz Fanon, and Homi Bhabha, further developed post-colonial studies. Their works became part of the literature of resistance, anger, protest, and hope for colonised people. They accurately described colonialism as a ‘project’ by which the West (Occident) paved its path to the East (Orient). They also analysed the process by which colonised people resisted the colonisers.

Edward Said’s trail-blazing book \textit{Orientalism} (1978) is foundational among studies. To express East-West polarisation, Edward Said masterly developed the term ‘\textit{Orientalism}.’ He distinguishes the Orient, i.e., the misunderstood Middle East and the Far East, from the Occident, i.e., the West, mainly Britain, France, and later the United States. Said does his best to show how the Occident conceptualised the Orient as the passive or decadent other of Europe.

On the contrary, long before Edward Said, Arnold Toynbee, in his 1948 \textit{Islam, the West, and The Future}, had described that the Western secular society in the eyes of pan-Islamists is an ‘Occidental intruder.’\textsuperscript{100} This is further developed by Said, who noted that the colonial West coined a dichotomy between the Occident and the Orient. By describing the \textit{us-and-them} binary relation, Said, moreover, argues that such a representation is a sort of ‘mirroring,’ i.e., the way the West represents the Others -the Middle East, for instance- as inferior Others is, in fact, the way the West posits itself as superior nations. In other words, he argues that the West intentionally coined the dichotomy of Orient against Occident to suppress them as inferior Failed States\textsuperscript{101} or backward Others. For instance, the colonial Mandate System vividly demonstrates this pejorative attitude. From this perspective, Orientalism is the Western ethnocentric bias about everything of those Others.

In her book, \textit{The Other; Key Concepts in Human Geography}, Alison Mountz, in the same vein, asserts that ‘The Other,’ or ‘Othering’ was the conceptualisation of human beings’ classification by which superior colonisers labelled people from colonised lands ‘as different or non-normal.’\textsuperscript{102} In other words, the Othering was a method by which colonial powers justified their presence in other inferior regions. In their self-proclaimed-civilising mission, colonisers claimed that their mission to the Orient was to bring development to its people. According to their self-congratulatory argument, being underdeveloped was a challenge that ‘we’ could only address. If there were underdeveloped countries, it was we who could address the problem of underdevelopment, for ‘we are the norm.’ Deviance from such an attitude was partitioning the world between the superior


\textsuperscript{100} Toynbee. \textit{Civilisation on Trial}. p. 212.

\textsuperscript{101} ‘Failed State’ is a term categorised a state that has not reached the level of being able to handle and exert its state administrative tasks sustainably and effectively because of corruption or lack of legitimacy. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/failed-state (Accessed July 30, 2021)

West and inferior East. As a sign of the colonial West’s technological superiority and remarkable development, colonialists reminded the world that the strategic Suez Canal -connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea- by way of example, was dug by Britain and France, the two colonial powers, from 1859-69; just six decades after Napoleon Bonapart’s Egyptian expedition (1798–1801). They argue that the Suez Canal would never have been constructed if France had not conquered Egypt, a claim that went hand in hand with the pretence that colonialism is civilisation.

In reaction to the colonial era, the reconstruction of the Umma is a stance against colonialism in order to unite Muslims against Occidental intruders in the Middle East and everywhere, as in the example of South and Southeast Asia. Iranian-American scholar Vali Reza Nasr gives examples of Malaya’s Hizbul Islam (Islam Party) in East Asia, India’s Jamiat-i Ulama-i Hind (Party of Indian Ulama), Iran’s Tobacco Movement (1890-92), Libya’s Sanusiyyah (led by Umar Mukhtar, 1858-1931), or Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. According to Nasr, many Muslim thinkers such as Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), Abul-Kalam Azad (1888-1958), India’s Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957), and Abul A’la Maududi (1903-79), among others, linked their anti-colonial endeavours for liberation to Islamic codes and concepts such as the Jihad and the united single Umma. In fact, in Nasr’s assessment, the link between Islam and the struggle against colonialism created a dominant paradigm, which is the precursor to the later pan-Islamist movements today. From this perspective, any form of political Islam, e.g., Islamism, pan-Islamism, Caliphatism, Ummatism, or Jahadim, is primarily an attempt to free Muslims from the notorious legacies of colonialism. By way of example, the book Recalling the Caliphate: Decolonisation and World Order is Salman Sayyid’s endeavour to point out that terms such as Caliphate, Umma, Islamic state, or Medina model are ‘a metaphor for the struggle between Muslim aspirations to reorder the post-colonial world.’

2.3. Umma: its concepts and conceptualised discourse
Despite its varied and contested meaning, the term Umma is essential in all pan-Islamist movements as it is a discourse that is deeply associated with Islamic scripture. While the term Dawla[ḥ], meaning a ‘state’ in the modern sense, has a rare frequency in early Islamic scripture, including the Quran, the Umma’s conception and reception have sixty-four references only in

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103 ibid.
105 Sayyid. Recalling the Caliphate. p. 15.
106 There is only one reference for the term Dawla in the Quran in 59:7, with the meaning of ‘property’, ‘fortune’, and ‘domain.’
the Quran. Additionally, it is frequently and extensively mentioned in the Prophet’s sayings and today’s pan-Islamist literature.

The Arabic word Umma is ambiguous lexically and semantically. Lexically, it is believed to be derived from ‘Umm’ (‘mother’ in Arabic)\(^{107}\) or ‘Am’ (‘tribe’ or ‘people’ in Hebrew and Aramaic).\(^{108}\) Moreover, in today’s Arabic, it stands for ‘nation.’ For instance, the Syrian and Iraqi Arab Ba’ath Party’s slogan was ‘one single Arab Umma,’ or the translation for the United Nations in Arabic is United Ummas (al-Umm al-Mottahida).\(^{109}\)

However, semantically, its meaning ranges from the Islamic congregation (the passive Umma in Olivier Roy’s words that comprises nominal Muslims)\(^{110}\) to the political commune or a nonterritorial international Muslim community.

In this sense, the first concept of the Umma corresponds to the community, and its broader second implication is to mean ‘nation.’ In its first connotation, the Umma implies a common connection in a spiritual non-territorial cluster of people bounded by shared values or common background as a symbol of unity in a borderless community.\(^{111}\) The background can be Arab nationalism, as in the example of the Arab Umma of the Ba’ath Party or Islam, as in ‘the Islamic Umma’ phrase.

In its Quranic connotation, the Umma endorses an ‘indispensable’ and ‘divine covenant,’ not a social contract. The four main Quranic characters of the Islamic Umma are as follows:

Firstly, it is an exclusive faith community with Islam’s global supremacy over all humanity as the Quran says: ‘You [Muslims] are the best Umma [i.e., an exclusive, blessed, righteous and perfect community] brought forth for all Mankind.’\(^{112}\) This is described as ‘the reconstruction of humanity’ by Sayyid Qutb.\(^{113}\) With reference to this verse, Qutb asserts that ‘This faith [Islam] requires the Muslim to shoulder the responsibility of humanity at large and enjoins on him the trusteeship of the entire human race.’\(^{114}\)

Secondly, the Quran promises Muslims power on earth as they are a superior community. It says, ‘You will be superior if you are true believers.’\(^{115}\)

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\(^{107}\) Piscatori. *Islam Beyond Borders*. p. 17.


\(^{109}\) The plural form of Umma is ‘Ummā’ in Arabic. Al-Mottahida means ‘united.’


\(^{112}\) The Quran 3:110. (Note: The source for translation of the Quran’s verses in this research commonly is Islam Awakened website, available at: https://www.islamawakened.com/quran/)


\(^{114}\) ibid. p. v.

\(^{115}\) The Quran 3:139.
Thirdly, it is a balanced and moderate community (Ummatan Wahidatan), as the Quran says, ‘We have made you a just community that you will be witnesses over the people.’

Fourthly, the oneness of God (monotheism, Tauheed / Tawheed / Tawhid in Arabic) endorses the ultimate goal of one Umma, which is ‘like a person’s body. If one part aches, the whole body aches,’ as a Hadith says. In this sense, the Umma is the nonterritorial unified worldwide entity with only one God as the source of sovereignty who should be obeyed. The Quran says: ‘Verily, this Umma of yours is a unified Umma, and I am your Lord. Worship Me [i.e., Obey Me].’

Given the above, pan-Islamists believe that the Umma in its Quranic context does not imply simply the Muslim believers’ communal dimension in the oneness of God’s lordship. According to Mandaville, it appeals for unity across the global Muslim community, and according to Halliday, it denotes a worldwide faith community of Muslims with its own state, i.e., a community living under a single sovereign political structure (state) in which the sovereignty belongs to God, His chosen Messenger Muhammad, and finally his successors (Caliphs).

In other words, from the pan-Islamist perspective, the Quranic passage of ‘the best Umma’ is conceptualised as far more than the best faith community. It connotatively implies a political dimension for the Islamic confessional identity, irrespective of where a Muslim resides. In this respect, Bassam Tibi considers the Umma as much ‘a political society’ as it is ‘a religious community.’

Accordingly, although the term Umma implies to mean ‘community,’ ‘nation,’ or ‘state,’ in its larger denotation in political Islam, it is manifest to imply a ‘homogeneous Islamic community’ as suggested by Reinhard Schulze or ‘nearly synonymous with the universal Islamic community,’ as suggested by Oxford Islamic Studies Online and to denote Muslim bloc in world politics, as suggested by this research. If the Umma denotes bloc, it stands as a discourse for all Islamic movements that carries the notion of a political alliance in the international system to embrace the totality of Muslims’ religious and political community worldwide at any given time. In this sense,

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116 ibid. 2:143.
118 The Quran. 21:92.
119 Mandaville. Transnational Muslim Politics. p. 71.
Peter Mandaville is right once he describes it as the politicisation of the Umma,\textsuperscript{125} and Roy calls it the de-territorialisation of Dar al-Islam.\textsuperscript{126}

### 2.4. Umma and its theories

Political Islam has many representations, and Islamist groups are rarely homogeneous since they often pursue different agendas and vary in religious interpretations and strategic approaches. However, political Islam is a comprehensive ideological discourse that embraces diverse political movements and trends. In other words, there is one single dominating ideological discourse but with diverse agenda, multiple dimensions and various ramifications\textsuperscript{127} in which Islam is the common denominator in all. Basheer M. Nafi, historian of Middle Eastern affairs, believes that political Islam is not limited by time. Islamists constantly renew themselves and develop their ideas over time in a multi-faceted phenomenon.\textsuperscript{128}

Similarly, in \textit{The Many Faces of Political Islam}, Mohammed Ayoob, professor of International Relations, posits that there are multiple, if not myriad, manifestations in Islamist movements. He defines them as ‘political activity and popular mobilisation in the name of Islam.’\textsuperscript{129} In this sense, Islam is a \textit{mobilising ideology}\textsuperscript{130} whose most actors are non-state in contemporary international relations. According to him, restoring the Islamic state (\textit{Tatbiq al-Dawla al-Islamiyya}) to restore the Umma is the main target for all.

Noting that the Umma is one single goal, but there are many manifestations of Islam, the research question can be expanded to the following: How should the dynamics of all these many faces of mobilising Islam be perceived? Where do their roots lie, and what are their sources of inspiration?

Similar to these questions, the prominent Muslim scholar Mohammed Arkoun poses the following query: What forces shape present-day Islam?\textsuperscript{131} Putting differently, the question is: What dynamics can be traced in all Ummatic movements? Here, ‘dynamic’ refers to driving in a process.

The answer to these questions lies in the politics of the Umma. Although many works comment on all aspects of political Islam, not much can be found as a theoretical framework for theorising the dynamism of the Umma. Notwithstanding, surveying the old and new available works, we may

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\textsuperscript{125} Mandaville. \textit{Transnational Muslim Politics}. p. 76.


\textsuperscript{128} Nafi. \textit{The Islamists}. p. 9.


conclude that two major categories contain at least five theories that sometimes overlap and sometimes contend. With a broad look, the two categories are textual and political. The latter contains four theories.

The five theories below are collected to better understand the numerous movements in many corners of the Muslim world as the output of internal or external factors in Islamist movements calling for the formation of the Umma. From this perspective, the following theories are presented to understand the complexities of contemporary Muslim movements revolving around the politics of the Umma.

It must be noted that as a fundamental pre-supposition in all following theories, the term Islam is a political ideology. On top of this, it is worth mentioning that there is also a third category of theories -surprisingly few- in the economics of political Islam, which examines the role of economic factors in shaping the dynamics of Ummatic movements. Nonetheless, they do not fall within the method and scope of the present research. The five theories are as follows:

**Theories of Umma**

![Figure 4: Tree of theories](image)

### 2.4.1. Textual theory: sacralising the sovereignty

Textual theory, in its most straightforward application, is scripturist essentialism. It maintains that Islam contains an essential sociopolitical core, which can be found in the early Islamic scripture. In this sense, Islamism aims to restore the primacy of the core derived from the Islamic scripture in Muslims’ daily lives. The adherents of a literal interpretation of authoritative Islamic sources are generally recognised as ‘traditionalists’ or ‘literalists.’ They firmly believe that Islamic tradition cannot be envisioned as static or frozen in time.

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It is worth mentioning that the theory is as old as Islam itself, for it goes back to the pristine Islamic textual exegesis (Nass in Arabic), which consists of three elements: scripture, tradition, and law. The scripture is the Quran, which stands in first place due to Muslim belief that it is the main sacred text and God’s final and definitive revelation to His Messenger Muhammad by the angel Gabriel to be the blueprint for life, replacing the Bible, the sacred scriptures of Judaism and Christianity. Quranically, the revelation is terminated by Muhammad’s death as the last in the series of prophets sent by God. Tradition stands second in importance. It is the Prophet of Islam’s lifestyle and behavioural code of conduct (Sunna), which consists of his practice (Sira) and sayings (Hadith), other than the Quran. Finally, the paramount law is the Sharia (also sharī‘ah), derived from the Quran and the Sunna as the two primary sources of Islam. Applied to these Islamic sources, textual theory refers to textual analysis, a method to describe and interpret the characteristics of recorded or visual messages.

Notably, the textual theory is overwhelmingly applied by almost all Islamologists, scholars, theoreticians, Muslim intelligentsia, and Islamic Movements, and this research in order to examine the sociopolitical dynamics that originate from Islamic textual sources. This is profoundly studied in The Transmission and Dynamics of the Textual Sources of Islam and Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought. For instance, the authors in the latter point out that the contemporary Islamist movements ‘attempt to return to the scriptural foundations of the Muslim community, excavating

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135 The Quran 33:40.
and reinterpreting them for application to the present-day social and political world. [...] Islamists aim at restoring the primacy of the norms derived from these foundational texts.\textsuperscript{141}

Put it differently, the textual theory’s premise is about the nature of political Islam and holds that the dynamism in Muslim Ummatic movements originates in Islamic teachings and authentic scripts. The theory views Islamic texts as God’s expectations to be fulfilled by mankind. Consequently, the dynamism of Ummatic movements comes from the exegesis of Islamic text, namely the Quran and the Sunna, which together create Islamic political theology with the ultimate goal of sacralising sovereignty.

In his book \textit{Political Theology}, Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), the German jurist and political theorist, articulates that political theology is a term to refer to politics when it is influenced by religion or, to put it differently, when politics is not secularised.\textsuperscript{142} As examples, he presents the arguments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when ideas such as ‘The omnipotent God is the omnipotent lawgiver,’ ‘The best constitutions were those that were the work of a sole wise legislator,’ or ‘Imitate the immutable decrees of the divinity’ were dominated the political debate; forming the then Christian political theology.\textsuperscript{143}

Accordingly, Islamic political theology also refers to the implications of theology for Muslim political life by the fusion of three Ds: \textit{Din} (religion), \textit{Dawla} (state), and \textit{Dunya} (the world). This fusion is based on the Islamic political theology of Tauheed (the unity of the creation by one creator), He Who created the world and sent His Din (Islam) to manage the Dunya appropriately through the Islamic Dawla for prosperity in this world and the hereafter.

\textsuperscript{141} ibid. p. 4.
\textsuperscript{143} ibid.
Four principles of Islamic political theology

1. Monotheism (Tauheed) i.e. there is only one God and sovereignty belongs to Him. He alone has the right to legislate. (“The sovereignty is for none but Allah,” the Quran 12:40)

2. Man’s vicegerency on Earth on behalf of God. (“Behold, thy Lord said to angels: I will create a vicegerent on Earth,” the Quran 2:30)

3. Muhammad’s prophecy (Resait) as God’s perfect man, vicegerent, and primary model. (“There has certainly been for you in the Messenger of Allah an excellent pattern,” the Quran 33:21)

4. The Islamic community (Umma) is “the best Umma brought forth for all mankind,” the Quran 12:110.

As seen, it is solely textual theory that makes it understood that any distinction between piety and polity, i.e., between Din and Dawla, is fundamentally denied in Islam and by Islam. The theory states that it is Muslim scriptures that motivate them to endeavour to build the Umma according to what they read in their exegesis.

Put differently, in simple terms, Islamic political theology provides Muslims with answers to two fundamental questions: ‘Who do we have to obey?’ and ‘Why do we have to obey?’

Islamic political theology provides a theological answer to the two questions: sovereignty belongs to God.144

As a substantive concept in political theory, sovereignty is defined as the supreme authority within a territory.145 By denying anthropocentrism (sovereignty of human agency) in the theology of political Islam, in the most conservative approach, textual scholars hold that the concept of authority (i.e., the right to command and, correlatively, the right to be absolutely obeyed) belongs only to God for He is the ultimate source of legislative power. They cite the Quran saying: ‘The Hukm (the Arabic word for sovereignty and injunctions) is for none but Allah.’146

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146 The Quran 12:40.
Put differently, political Islam’s theology is all about absolutism in the divinity of sovereignty. In other words, Islamic theological absolutism is all about the doctrine of the preordination of absolute decrees. According to the doctrine, God acts in an absolute manner, and consequently, the legislation should be sourced only from Him. According to this orthodox approach, no secular sovereignty is accepted in Islam, for Allah’s Hukm is divine and establishes ‘Divine law and Divine justice,’ as Sayyid Qutb states. Also, no legislation can be made by humans. Consequently, the law laid down by God cannot be changed by any human authority, for the Hukm is by none but Him. His law is immutable and unchangeable.

Consequently, anything parallel to Allah’s Hukm is denied and, according to the Quran, ‘whosoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed, such are the Kafirun’ (disbelievers who would go to Hell). In short, the basis of Islam’s message, as Qutb asserts, for example, is that ‘one should accept the Shari’ah without any question and reject all other laws in any shape or form. This is Islam. There is no other meaning of Islam.

The outcome of Islamic political theology appears in Qutb’s pathological political thought in which, with reference to God’s absolute and exclusive sovereignty, Qutb employs the term ‘Hakimiyya[h/i],’ meaning all sovereignty belongs to God, and only God should be obeyed. Consequently, Tauheed, the most essential and central element of Islamic political theology, does not mean only God’s oneness but one Umma under one God. However, the question is how. Here comes the role of a Perfect Man. Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam and the Messenger of God, representing God in His people, according to Islamic theology.

In Islam, one can be considered a Muslim simply if he/she professes with conviction the creedal statement of the double testimony/declaration of faith (Shahada[h/i]) by saying: Ashhadu an la ilaha illa Allah wa asshadu anna Muhammadar Rasul Allah (I do testify that there is no deity worthy of worship except Allah, and I testify that Muhammad is His messenger.)

At first sight, such testimony seems to have nothing to do with politics. Nevertheless, from the Islamist viewpoint, this is precisely the reason why state and church are not distinct. For example,

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148 Qutb. Milestones. p. 44.
149 ibid. 5:44.
150 The Quran in verses 5: 44, 45, and 47 makes it clear that those who do not judge and rule according to the Hukm made by Allah are disbelievers (Kaafiroon), wrong-doers (Zalimoon), and deviators from the right path (Fasiqoon). The Quran says: ‘whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the disbelievers’, ‘whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the wrongdoers’, ‘whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are defiantly disobedient.’
151 Qutb. Milestones. p. 49.
152 ibid. 57.
according to Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, the founder of the Islamist political party *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, the testimony is ‘moulding people into one Ummah’ when they enter Islam.\(^{154}\)

Similarly, the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abdu, in *Risālat al-Tawḥīd* (Theology of Unity) – one of the most influential Muslim theological writings - argues that Islam, through the absolute emphasis on the Muslim’s submission to God’s will, in fact, emphasises the absolute obligation of adherents to follow any order of Muhammad; he is simultaneously God’s Perfect Man on Earth (religious leader) and a statesman who constructed the Muslim Umma (political leader).

Abdu argues that after God’s oneness, the testimony to Muhammad’s prophecy is the second essential part of Islam’s theology, for he is seen as the infallible ordained representative of God on Earth. According to the Quran, Muhammad is ‘mercy to all creatures,’\(^{155}\) ‘Islam incarnate,’ and ‘the Perfect Man,’\(^{156}\) whose every behavioural code of conduct - his practice and sayings - are the teachings and lifestyle of Islam. This is crucially inspiring to Muslims once they consider the Quran and Sunna as Muhammad’s two divine legacies to Muslim society and the two primary sources in Islamic legislation, which obligates to obey Muhammad as it is obligatory for Muslims to obey God Himself.\(^{157}\) There are certain verses in the Quran that convincingly leave no doubt about the direct association between obedience to God and absolute obedience to Muhammad, stating firstly that, ‘He who obeys the Messenger, indeed he has obeyed Allah’\(^{158}\) and secondly, ‘if you obey him [Muhammad], you will be [rightly] guided.’\(^{159}\) This fundamental association between obedience to God and Muhammad leaves no room for Islam’s adherents to doubt that

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\(^{155}\) The Quran in 21:107 says: ‘We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a mercy to the worlds.’

\(^{156}\) The Quran in 33:21 says: ‘There has certainly been for you in the Messenger of Allah an excellent pattern.’


\(^{158}\) The Quran. 4:80.

\(^{159}\) ibid. 24:54.
God’s and Muhammad’s commands are essentially identical to such an extent that even love for God passes through obedience to Muhammad. The Quran says: ‘If you [O people] love Allah, then follow me [Muhammad] so Allah will love you’ \(^\text{160}\) and ‘You might be graced with mercy.’ \(^\text{161, 162}\)

Up until now, we have addressed two points: what textual theory is about and how strongly it can theorise and postulate the dynamism in Ummatic movements. Moreover, the theory’s inevitable outcome makes textual theory significantly crucial and individuates it from other theories. The direct outstanding outcome of textual theory -and only textual theory- is that Islamism and Islam are identically equal concepts with no distinction. Islamism is just a neologism, a modern term, and nothing else. In other words, Islamism (i.e., political Islam) is Islam, and Islam is Islamism. Islamism is just a modern interpretation of Islam, as asserted by Mehdi Mozaffari, professor of political science. Mozaffari notes that the notion of Islamism as a political ideology had not been applied even towards the end of the 19th century.\(^\text{163}\)

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\begin{align*}
\text{a. Islamism} & = \text{Political Islam} \\
\text{b. Political Islam} & = \text{Islam} \\
\implies \text{c. Islamism} & = \text{Islam}
\end{align*}
\]

\textit{Figure 8: Islamism and Islam}

This outstanding conclusion can be accessed only by textual theory, according to which Islamism as a political ideology refers to nothing but what can be traced back to Islam itself. This argument and reasoning that Islam and politics are inseparable means that everything in Islam simultaneously has both religious and political dimensions. Gerhard Bowering, a scholar of Islamic Studies, in \textit{Islamic Political Thought}, notes that ‘The foundations of Islam neither allow for distinctions between spiritual and temporal [...] nor envisage the same duality of authority accepted in Western political thought as standard, such as God and Caesar, church and state.’\(^\text{164}\)

No better reason can be cited than the fact that absolutely none of the renowned Shia and Sunni Islamist figureheads such as Muhammad Abdu, Rashid Rida, Maududi, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Quth, Khomeini, among others, ever employed the term Islamism. The only word they employed was Islam, not Islamism. This vividly indicates that, in their perception, the term Islamism (a term coined by Western scholars) is simply Islam. This is due to the fact that they hold that all the sociopolitical implications of Islam derive from its foundations, i.e., from the life and times of the founder of Islam himself. Perhaps one of the best expressions of this significant outcome is what

\[^{160}\text{ibid. 3:31.}\]
\[^{161}\text{ibid. 3:132.}\]
\[^{162}\text{The Quran in 4:59 says: ‘O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you.’ Based on this verse, Sunni Muslims commonly consider the obedience of the Caliph in line with the obedience of the Prophet, whose obedience is in line with the obedience of God.}\]
\[^{163}\text{Mozaffari, \textit{What is Islamism}? p. 17.}\]
\[^{164}\text{Bowering, \textit{Islamic Political Thought}. p. 4.}\]
Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic in Iran, once explicitly asserted: ‘Islam is political or it is nothing.’165

**Political theories:**

According to Andrew Heywood, political theories are an explanatory category to the analytical study of ideas and concepts such as forms of government, political culture, political ideologies, political philosophy, and political systems, which are central to political thought.166

The political theories collected below are the leading ones but not the only ones. They indicate that the Umma’s dynamism originates from Islamic scripts and various other factors such as elements, norms, processes, and/or mechanisms in Muslim societies, which gradually became an established discourse, leading to various social movements. The theories explore how they fuse Muslim communities and where these factors are derived from.

### 2.4.2. Civilisational theory

The civilisational theory is an explanatory approach to the rise and fall of civilisations. The theory is employed by many Muslim thinkers, such as Sayyid Qutb, who entitles Chapter Seven of his *Milestones*, ‘Islam Is the Civilisation.’ In referring to the Islamic civilisation, Gerhard Bowering, professor of religious studies, asserts that Islam created a splendid cosmopolitan civilisation during the Abbasid Empire’s ascendance (750–1258).167 In contrast, Mohammed Arkoun holds that the period between the thirteenth and the eighteenth centuries was a period of decadence, lethargy, and the retreat of underdeveloped societies into Islamic civilisation, while European societies were rapidly heading towards modernity.168 Similarly, Ali Allawi, in *The Crisis of Islamic Civilisation*, notes that Islamic civilisation has undergone monumental degradation for over two hundred years.169

Notably, civilisational theory remains a central theme in the pan-Islamist reaction to the legacy of colonialism, which had claimed for itself a mission to ‘civilise’ non-civilised people. Put differently, in the pan-Islamist view, the idea of Muslim civilisation is Muslims’ defensive rhetorical discourse to counteract the incursions of Western colonialism that constructed the

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165 Bernard Lewis. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. New York: Random House Trade. 2004. p. 7. Also see Khomeini’s official website in Persian at: [http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/c76_138321/%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%B4 %D9%88 %D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF/%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C/%D9%86%D8%8B%8B/%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%AE %D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C_%D8%AF%DB%8B1_%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF %D8%AC%D8%AF%D8 %A7%D8%8C%DB%8C %D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%86 %D8%A7%D8%B2 %D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA _%DA%86%DB%8C%DB%83%DB%AA%DB%9F](http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/c76_138321/%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%B4 %D9%88 %D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF/%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C/%D9%86%D8%8B%8B/%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%AE %D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C_%D8%AF%DB%8B1_%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF %D8%AC%D8%AF%D8 %A7%D8%8C%DB%8C %D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%86 %D8%A7%D8%B2 %D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA _%DA%86%DB%8C%DB%83%DB%AA%DB%9F)


167 Bowering. Islamic Political Thought. p. 2.


‘Orient’ to serve as its distinct and inferior *Other*. Secondly, it is Muslims’ goal to pursue a sociopolitical project to construct or revitalise an Islamic civilisation.

The *Ummah’s Charter* by Hizb ut-Tahrir, for instance, states that ‘The Islamic civilisation contradicts the Western civilisation [...] The basis of the Islamic civilisation is the Islamic *Aqeedah* (belief in God). This is contrary to the basis of the Western civilisation, which is the separation of religion from state.’\(^{170}\)

Having said that, beginning with Ibn Khaldun’s theory of *the rise and decline of civilisations* to Huntington’s theory of *The Clash of Civilisations*, there are three narratives about Islamic civilisation:

Firstly, Islam was a cradle that created a civilisation based on the Islamic creed, which, according to Antony Black, makes it different from Western secular civilisation. He notes, ‘The combination of religion and the state has almost always been a characteristic of Muslim civilisation.’\(^{171}\)

Secondly, and overwhelmingly, from the Islamist viewpoint, the upsurge of Western civilisation is seen as the cause of the stunning reversal of Islamic civilisation (Inhitat). It should be noted that this second narrative obsessively shapes the impulses underlying contemporary Islamist rhetoric on Muslim anguish and frustration today.

Thirdly, the trajectory of civilisational theory can be traced in many old and new Muslim thinkers’ and theoreticians’ arguments, both in Shia and Sunni denominations of Islam, starting from Ibn Khaldun.

*Ibn Khaldun’s Asabiyya*

One of the earliest civilisational theories is the one developed by the renowned historiographer Abdul Rahman Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) in his leading masterpiece *Prolegomena* (*Mugaddima*), composed in 1377. Because of his theory of the cyclical rise and fall of civilisations, Ibn Khaldun is regarded as a father of social sciences. To him, civilisations are like humans, so they are born, grow, and die. He is also the focal point of debates on Muslim civilisation extending geographically from North Africa to Central Asia. He witnessed the end of this rise. He states that sovereignty belongs to mankind –not God- and presents a sociological and historiographic account of the cyclical rise and decline of civilisations. He is best reputed for considering the complex intersection of social, economic, environmental, political, and moral factors that a civilisation may face. However, his central thesis is what he calls ‘Asabiyya[hi]’. He holds that Asabiyya is the foundation of cohesion for a civilisation to function efficiently.

In a modern interpretation, Asabiyya stands for a hegemonic public spirit and internal coherence, which keeps a civilisation running. The weaker the Asabiyya, the closer a civilisation is to falling,


\(^{171}\) Black. *The History of Islamic Political Thought*. P. 306.
according to Ibn Khaldun. In this sense, Asabiyya signifies people’s capacity for sociopolitical affiliation, which holds a community together and makes it move as a single organism. According to Oxford Islamic Studies Online, Asabiyya suggests the concept of social solidarity with an emphasis on group consciousness, cohesiveness, and unity. In this respect, Ibn Khaldun is very close to John Stuart Mill’s definition of civilisation. To Mill, civilisation signifies a massive ability to cooperate. In his essay ‘Civilisation,’ Mill states, ‘Whenever […] we find human beings acting together for common purposes in large bodies, and enjoying the pleasure of social intercourse [for ex. agriculture, commerce, and manufacture], we term them civilized.’ Ibn Khaldun’s Asabiyya, in Mill’s words, means ‘the ability to act in concert’ as opposed to savagery, a situation in which each individual acts for himself. As ‘it is only civilised beings who can combine’ and cooperate.

Contrary to the textual theory, which sacralises political power, Ibn Khaldun’s theory is notably appreciated for two innovations he crafted: desacralising politics and depoliticising religion. He views neither the Caliphate nor the Sharia as indispensable for social order. To Ibn Khaldun, the institution of the Caliphate is a political -and not religious- authority that has the duty to facilitate the Asabiyya among Muslims. In his treatise, he argues that political authority is an entirely secular affair.

Contrary to the textual theory, which considers Islam essentially political, Ibn Khaldun posits that ‘Man is political’ by nature, not religion. He holds that political authority is not derived from

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173 Yenigun. The Rise and Demise of Civilizational Thinking. p. 201.

174 Han Hsien Liew. Writing Away the Caliph: Political and Religious Legitimacy in Late Medieval Islamic Political Thought. Wesleyan University. 2012. p. 114.
As such, his theory as a powerful metaphor is sometimes applied to firstly explain the essential role of Muslim unity—Asabiyya in Ibn Khaldun’s words—on the creation of Muslim civilisation, and secondly, pro-Umma pan-Islamists view the stagnation, passivity, and decline of Muslim civilisation in missing the Muslim unity (Asabiyya), which if returns will end up in the restoration of Muslim civilisation under one single Umma again.

The second point is commonly applied by pan-Islamism to interpret Islamic revivalism. By way of example, the Malaysian Muslim scholar Syed Farid Alatas suggests that Ibn Khaldun’s work is a vital theoretical resource for studying Muslim revival. Similarly, the Australian branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir applies Ibn Khaldun’s civilisational account in its debate on why forming an Islamic state beside the religion of Islam is necessary for the revival of Muslim society. Also, according to Fred Halliday, the effect of Ibn Khaldun’s Asabiyya on contemporary Muslim advocates of pan-Islamism, such as Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (also al-Afghani), is clear. As a specialist in International Relations, Halliday notes that Asadabadi uses ‘Umma’ to refer to the idea of national unity (Asabiyya) in the modern sense, which, according to Alatas, transcends tribalism, class, and ethnicity.

**Huntington’s prediction of civilisational Clash**

Arnold Toynbee believed that “the Islamic civilisation is one of the last in the world to survive Westernisation.” It is safe to say that his notion led to Samuel Huntington’s grand theory of *The Clash of Civilisations* (1993, 1996), itself a developed thought from Bernard Lewis’s ‘Clash between Civilisations,’ a speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University in 1957. Lewis’s speech raised a few debates. However, Huntington’s controversial prediction of irreconcilable antagonism among human civilisations has raised heated debates in both public and academic spheres from the 1990s until today.

When the gradual modern Islamic resurgence gained international attention in the late 1970s, there were heated debates about whether distinct values, norms, and beliefs could live side by side in an increasingly globalised world. Coinciding with the return of the religious factor to international relations, Samuel Huntington, in 1993, released his post-Cold War alarmist theory predicting that the global conflict trend after the end of the Cold War would not be ideologies—that of secular

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175 ibid. p. 103.
178 Hizb ut-Tahrir in Australia. *Rise and Fall of Civilisations.*
ideological polarisation, i.e., liberal democracy vs. global communism— but the emergence of civilisations that will inevitably lead to conflict.\(^{182}\) He argues that if there is a war, the fault lines are between civilisations, including what he identifies as the rejuvenation of two “challenger civilisations”: Sinic (Chinese) and Islamic, as two counteroffensives against Western predominance, a “dynamic form of antagonism” in the latter in Andrea Mura’s word.\(^{183}\) As a result, according to Huntington’s prediction, Western and Islamic civilisations are bound to conflict with one another. In his prediction, the fault lines between the two civilisations will dominate global politics and possibly be grounds for war. In referring to the existing dynamism in Islamic movements, Huntington notes that Islamic civilisation as an imaginary Muslim Golden Age is fuelling instability both on Islam’s borders and in its interior, where fundamentalist movements seeking their glory in the past are becoming increasingly popular.\(^{184}\) He observes that the Islamic faith has “bloody borders.” Whenever the Islamic world clashes with other civilisations, conflicts occur through a war of incompatible civilisations, a life-and-death war of cultures.\(^{185}\)

In almost the same vein, Salman Sayyid describes Islamism as “the most prominent political discourse that rejects the claim of Western exceptionality.”\(^{186}\) Also, Bernard Lewis—like Huntington— in his 1979 *The Return of Islam*, presents his prediction of the rapid growth of Islamist movements and ideologies in the Arab territories and even in the broader scope of the Muslim world.\(^{187}\) In his 1990 article *The Roots of Muslim Rage*, Lewis later alleges that the conflict between Islam and the West dates back to the emergence of Islam fourteen centuries ago as a “clash of civilisations.”\(^{188}\) In his radical view, fourteen hundred years of Islam and Christianity history demonstrates that during this long period, Islam and Christianity have been the other’s other.

It goes without saying that Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations, in essence, is not an independent theory, besides other theories that identify where Umma’s dynamism originates. However, its significance is in his understanding of the outcome of the dynamism in Islamic movements calling for the restoration of the Umma, which, in his assessment, would result in a clash between Islamic and Western civilisations based on Muslim identity-seeking.

**2.4.3. State theory**

Muslim scholars maintain a belief that, according to Islamic theology, Islam is a complete package sent by God in which every aspect of a Muslim’s life, including politics, is touched by his faith.\(^{189}\)

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183 Mura. *The Inclusive Dynamics of Islamic Universalism*. p. 43.
185 Demant. *Islam vs. Islamism*. pp. 128, 204.
188 ibid. p. 233.
In this sense, Islam, like Judaism and unlike Christianity, regulates its adherents’ behaviour in their daily life via two institutions: the religion of Islam and the Islamic state.

By seeing the Prophet as the head of state in Medina, the fusion between church and state becomes evident to the extent that Islamologist Shabbir Akhtar, in his book *Islam as Political Religion*, describes Islam as ‘a compulsively political faith.’ Similarly, Bernard Lewis holds that ‘Islam from its inception is a religion of power.’ What is noted by Abdu, Akhtar, Lewis, and many others is well developed by Antony Black, professor of the History of Political Thought. He gives examples of the Prophet fulfilling all government functions by sending governors to different regions, sitting in judgment, appointing judges, dispatching emissaries to foreign states, and taking command in battle. Above all, he notes that the ‘ratio of the Quranic verses concerned with the affairs of society to those concerned with ritual worship is greater than a hundred to one.’ This indicates the state’s significant role in Islamic political philosophy, which is best reflected by the state theory. It is one of the most potent theories employed by almost all Muslim theoreticians to maintain the viability of the Umma.

The state theory is about a state-centric explanatory approach to Umma’s dynamism, which elaborates that Islamic governance constitutes an integral part of Islam’s belief. In the words of legal theorist Hans Kelsen, the Umma-state is the Grundnorm, a foundational principle from which all norms’ validity can be drawn.

One of the earliest advocates of the restoration of the Caliphate, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, was founded in 1928, giving birth to the first Islamist movement of the 20th century. It was the first affirmation of political Islam just four years after the dissolution of the Caliphate in 1924. However, what is significant in their literature is that the Society did its best to justify the inevitability of the Caliphal office based on the state theory.

The state theory can be traced back to the early centuries of Islam. The prominent early Muslim scholar who developed the theory is Abu al-Hassan al-Mawardi, known in Latin as Alboacen (d. 1058). Besides his *Kitab Nasihat al-Mulk* (‘The Book of Sincere Advice to Rulers’) and *Kitab Aadab al-Dunya w’al-Din* (‘The Ethics of Religion and the World’), al-Mawardi is most reputed for his treatise *al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya wal-Wilayat al-Diniyya* (The Ordinances of Government).

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195 The book’s title can literally be translated as ‘The Rules of Governance and Faithful Guardianship.’ However, the book is translated and published under the name *The Ordinances of Government* by Garnet in 1996.
Hamilton Gibb, the Scottish Orientalist historian, in *Al-Mawardi’s Theory of the Caliphate*, states that al-Mawardi’s book is recognised as the most authoritative exposition of Islamic political theory, the earliest and most comprehensive classical reference and highly influential theoretical work on the doctrine of the Islamic state in the form of the Caliphate. Therein, al-Mawardi portrays Islam as much more than religious rituals.

Al-Mawardi was designated the chief judge over several districts near Nishapur in Iran and Baghdad by the Abbasid Caliphs al-Qaim and al-Qadir in negotiations with the Buyid emirs at a time of political turmoil. According to Hamilton Gibb, al-Mawardi composed his treatise when the Buyid (also Buwayhid) dynasty of Iran seriously threatened the power of the Caliph al-Qadir Billah (d.1031) in Baghdad. Realising this threat, al-Mawardi was commissioned to write an exposition on the Caliph ‘to whom it is obligatory to render obedience.’ In the book, al-Mawardi points out that establishing the Caliphate was an Islamic obligation agreed upon by all Muslim jurists. He believes that the Caliphate’s purpose ‘is for the succession of prophecy in safeguarding religion and leading the world.’

From this perspective, al-Mawardi’s treatise on the doctrine of the Islamic Caliphate is, in fact, the earliest endeavour to portray the details of maximalist Islam and create an order that is more than just religious rituals. According to his maximalist view, the establishment of the institution of the Caliphate is an essential part of Islam’s message, reflecting the duty of all Muslims to avoid chaos and anarchy. This idea is overwhelmingly accepted by all jurists, who believe that the Caliphate is essential for the Islamic state leader and all Muslim people.

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199 See: *Maximalist view of pan-Islamism*, in Chapter Three.
Interestingly, to justify the unjust Caliphs who ruled the Umma, like those of his time, al-Mawardi, like other Muslim jurists, quotes the Prophet as saying: ‘A despotic Imam -i.e., Caliph- is better than turmoil.’ This is always Muslim jurists’ justification for the institutional role of the Caliphate. In this respect, al-Mawardi leaves no doubt that the Caliphate is the cornerstone of Islam and Muslim public life. He states that:

‘God [...] ordained for the People a Leader through whom He provided for the Deputyship of the Prophet and through whom He protected the Religious Association, and He entrusted government (al-Siyasa) to him so that the management of affairs should proceed (on the basis of) right religion.’

Al-Mawardi’s very orthodox view was later developed by many other Muslim thinkers, such as Bayhaqi (d. 1077), Nizam al-Mulk (1018-1092), al-Baqillani (d.1013), Imam al-Haramayn al-Jewayni (d.1085), Imam Ghazali (1058-1111), Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), Shah Waliullah Dihlawi (1703-1762), among others.

Among these prominent figures, Nizam al-Mulk, in his treatise Siyasatnama (written in Persian, meaning ‘a treatise in politics’), advocates religious polity by holding that religion (Din) and government (Dawla) are twins. He holds that their fortunes are intertwined, and they need to support one another. Al-Jewayni and al-Baqillani hold that the state has its roots in the Sharia, while Ghazali holds that the institution of the Caliphate is Ijma-e-Umma (i.e., Muslim Umma’s consensus/unanimous decision). Ibn Taymiyya proclaims that religion and state need one another because religious law needs to be enforced by a leader, an idea adopted by the Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century. Shah Waliullah, a prominent Indian Muslim theologian, considers establishing the Caliphate a Fard ’ala al-Kifayah (collective religious obligation of the Muslim community).

Beyond these, the state theory can be found in numerous Muslim figures’ thoughts in the contemporary Muslim world. Some of the many are Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, Muhammad Abdu, Rashid Rida, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abul A’la Maududi, Abul Hassan Nadwi, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Muhammad Asad, Muhammad Iqbal, Abdelmadjid Charfi, and Ruhollah Khomeini (Shia). For instance, among contemporary Muslim scholars, al-Nabhani broadly discusses the state theory in the Party’s Draft Constitution of the Khilafah State and his The Islamic State. Other examples are works such as Milestones by Qutb (1965), The Ruling System in Islam issued by Hizb ut-Tahrir, or Islamic Constitution Making (1948), and The

200 Black. The History of Islamic Political Thought. p. 87.
201 ibid.
203 Bowering. Islamic Political Thought. p. 11.
Principles of State and Government in Islam by Muhammad Asad (1961). These works set out the details of the Islamic ruling system.

Consequently, the state theory is based on two propositions; each, in circular reasoning, supports the other: firstly, ‘The purpose of Islam is to set up a state based on its own ideology’ and secondly, ‘Allah’s rule on earth [the ideology of Islam] can be established only through the Islamic system.’

![Figure 11: Political ideology of Islam](image)

However, it must be noted that when the term ‘state’ is discussed in Islamic political philosophy, it is not applied exactly in the Weberian sense. In the Weberian definition, the state is a centralised governmental body that maintains the exclusive right to the legitimate use of physical force in order to exercise authority over a particular geographical territory. In other words, Weberian state theory is based on the Social Contract Theory developed by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. They believe that people in a social contract surrender some of their freedom and give the government authority to enforce laws upon them. In this sense, the Social Contract Theory is a sort of deal or understanding between two parties: the rulers and the ruled.

However, in the Islamic political philosophy of state theory, man cannot have such a social contract with a man, for it is Shirk (attributing partners to God). According to the Islamist interpretation of the Quranic teachings, man’s contract is with God. A believer surrenders all—not some—of his freedom to God in return for a paradosical life in this world and the hereafter. Such a contract is administered by the Prophet of Islam on behalf of God. Al-Nabhani, for example, states that:

‘How are they to be safe from His punishment if they do not establish a state that would prepare its military might, defend its territory, implement Allah’s rules and rule by what Allah has revealed?’

In a narrow sense, the state theory is all about a grounded fact that the distinction between faith and the state, on the one hand, AND piety and polity, on the other, is denied in Islam. Unlike the Weberian definition of secular sovereignty, the Islamic state’s ultimate goal is exercising

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209 Al-Nabhani. The Islamic State. p. 3.
sovereignty in God’s name—not that of the nation—in Muslim Umma, for creatures belong to their Creator, Whose sovereignty denies any role for the nation and consequently democracy.

In a narrow sense, the state theory is all about the fact that the distinction between faith and the state, on the one hand, and piety and polity, on the other, is denied in Islam. Unlike the Weberian definition of secular sovereignty, the Islamic state’s ultimate goal is exercising sovereignty in God’s name—not that of the nation—in Muslim Umma, for creatures belong to their Creator, Whose sovereignty denies any role for the nation and consequently democracy. Accordingly, in such a narrowing of understanding from its Weberian definition, the state in political Islam is not a modern Weberian secular state, but rather it is a surrendering to God, as in the example of the state founded and shaped in Medina by Muhammad, a state with a man of God at its head. In this respect, Medina is the pattern. Naming this the ‘Muslim religious project,’ Antony Black holds that ‘Muslims have throughout history seen political power [in the form of the state] as a necessary part of their religious project.’210 Black’s Muslim religious project is, in other words, the rejection of statelessness.

2.4.4. Identity crisis theory

A crisis is an impediment for individuals who cannot find adequate coping skills. Any crisis usually goes through specific patterns such as recognising not being coping, struggling to solve the barriers, and emotional blockages such as fear, anxiety, anger, and grief once they do not solve the situation.211 With that definition in mind, identity crisis theory recognises a significant issue in Muslim Umma. In The Islamists: A Contextual History of Political Islam, Basheer Nafi states that the primary force in forming political Islamic ideology is the ‘preservation of an embattled identity’ against invasive modernism.212

Muslim identity crisis theory takes the ‘politics of identities’ as its starting point as an explanatory approach. Accordingly, the Muslim incongruence of identity is the starting point in searching for legitimacy and glory in a religion-centric identity, called ‘return to self’ by Muslim sociologist Ali Shariati of Iran.213 The theory rests upon an argument that Muslims are more likely to identify themselves with a transnational religious identity than as members of a particular nationality in a country. For example, according to one of the basic principles of Tauheed, i.e., the principle of al-wala’ wal bara’ (loyalty and disavowal, which means loving and hating for the sake of Allah), Qutb explicitly denies any relationship with mother, father, brother, wife, and other family members except through their relationship with God. In the same vein, he rejects the idea of nationalism or loyalty to territorial boundaries. He argues that ‘a Muslim has no nationality except his belief, which makes him a member of the Muslim community in Dar-ul-Islam.’214 Hence, the

210 Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought. p. 306.
214 Qutb. Milestones. p. 133.
Umma denotes a collective Islamic identity in a non-territorial entity, as suggested by Salam Hawa, and a global Muslim Identity, as noted by Olivier Roy. In his book *Ummah or Nation? Identity Crisis in Contemporary Muslim Society*, Abdullah al-Ahsan refers to a crucially significant matter, pointing out that ‘all Muslim nation-states have fallen victim to this crisis of identity.’

The key concept in the identity crisis theory is the distinction between ‘us’ as Muslims and ‘others’ as non-Muslims. This is because identity is often constructed by contrast. As Raymond Hinnebusch, professor of International Relations, notes, identity is a double-sided concept for ‘it presupposes an other against which the self defines itself and its construction excludes others.’ For instance, Salman Sayyid notes that to pan-Islamists, an individual is a Muslim only in relation to the Umma. Without the Umma, being a Muslim is impossible ‘for being a Muslim can never be a purely private act; it has to partake of the social.’ Thus, the Umma, according to Cemil Ayden, is ‘the voice of an imagined Muslim collectivity,’ and *Muslimness* itself is an identifier by which, accordingly, the ‘us’ is the Umma and the ‘others’ are the non-Umma. In his book, *The Power of Identity*, sociologist Manuel Castells argues that ‘For a Muslim, the fundamental attachment is not Watan (homeland) but to the Umma.’

However, the terrifying outcome of the ‘us-others’ topological dichotomy in pan-Islamism appears as they divide the world into two categories in three ways: first, *Dar al-Islam* (Islamdom, literally house/abode/dwelling of Islam) and *Dar al-Kufr* (the abode of infidels); second, *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Ahd* (the abode of the treaty); and third, *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb* (the abode of strife, hostility, or war).

The latter dichotomy can be traced in Qutb’s thoughts. A prominent example is when he stated that ‘There is only one place on earth which can be called the home of Islam (Dar-ul-Islam) […] The rest of the world is the home of hostility (Dar-ul-Harb).’ Additionally, he holds that a Muslim is either at war with Dar al-Harb or at peace based on a contractual treaty. The implicit outcome of Qutb’s ontology is that any region entitled Dar al-Harb is actually or potentially ‘a seat of war for Muslims until by conquest it is turned into Dar al-Islam.’ This is also clearly reflected in *The Ummah’s Charter* of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which states that ‘The whole world according to the ruling of the Sharee’ah [Sharia] is divided into only two types, and they are: Dar ul-Harb (or Dar ul-kufr); and Dar ul-Islam. So, every country ruled by Islam and whose security is that of Islam is considered

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216 Roy. *Globalised Islam*. p. 120.
Dar ul-Islam, even if its inhabitants are non-Muslims. While every country ruled by other than Islam and whose security is not that of Islam is considered Dar ul-Harb or Dar ul-Kufr even if its inhabitants are Muslims.\(^{224}\)

In the same vein, Andrea Mura states that the term Dar al-Harb, from the viewpoint of Islamist universalism, is ‘something that appears temporarily but, sooner or later, will necessarily be absorbed by Dar al-Islam’\(^{225}\) either by adopting Islam or accepting the status of the tolerated religions; the Dhimmi.\(^{226}\) But, as stated by Peter Mandaville, this terrifying outcome, according to which the fundamental assumption in Islam-West relations is to consider the West Dar al-Harb, was behind an event in the early 1990s in which, at a meeting at Château de Chinon in France, a group of distinguished Muslim scholars declared that non-Muslim states are no longer classified as Dar al-Harb, ‘instead the West was to be considered Dar al-Ahd (the domain of the treaty).’\(^{227}\)

2.4.5. Conspiracy theory

In The Hidden Hand, Daniel Pipes reveals how the conspiracy theory determines the political life of the Middle East and why it is applied by many. Placing it in a historical context, he portrays why the conspiracy theory is key to understanding the region’s complicated political trends. From the pan-Islamist perspective, the theory is widely applied in two significant cases of destroying the Muslim Umma: the dismantling of Muslim leadership and the Crusades.

Dismantled authority

While, in fact, Muslims were never politically united during the previous millennium,\(^{228}\) pan-Islamists hold that the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate led to the removal of Muslim unity worldwide. Nevertheless, the proliferation of Islamist groups suggests a widespread struggle to compensate for the loss of political leadership and revive the unitary point of leadership for the Muslim Umma.\(^{229}\) For instance, according to many Muslim thinkers, including al-Nabhani, leadership is compulsory, as emphasised by the Prophet of Islam. He quotes a Hadith from the Prophet saying, ‘Whoso takes off his hand from allegiance to Allah will meet Him on the Day of Resurrection without having any proof for him, and whoso dies while there was no Ba’yah (oath of allegiance to Muslims’ leader) on his neck dies a death of Jahiliyya.’\(^{230}\)

For Sunni Islam, the leadership of the Umma is embodied in the Caliphate, which most Muslim jurists see as an indispensable divine institution. Al-Nabhani describes the absence of the Caliphate as one of the greatest sins for which God would punish Muslims if they neglected its restoration.\(^{231}\)

\(^{224}\) The Ummah’s Charter. p. 82.

\(^{225}\) Mura. The Inclusive Dynamics of Islamic Universalism. p. 39.


\(^{227}\) Mandaville. Transnational Muslim Politics. p. 1.

\(^{228}\) Ayden. The Idea of the Muslim World. p. 190.

\(^{229}\) Al-Rasheed. Demystifying the Caliphate. p. 245.

\(^{230}\) Al-Nabhani. The Islamic State. pp. 151, 222-4.

\(^{231}\) Ibid. p. 3.
Pan-Islamists hold that the absence of central leadership— that of the Caliphate—left behind a power vacuum. Surprisingly, they do not see the cause of this loss as the deficiency of the Caliphate for the post-intellectual and industrial revolution of the modern world that led to internal fissures in the Empire. Believing in a single causal factor, they hold that the Caliphate’s destruction was a plot that led to today’s Muslim humiliation, political weakness, social instability, and cultural ignorance. To perceive Muslim Inhitat, a video by the pro-Caliphate Islamic party of Hizb ut-Tahrir of Britain tells us much about how they view the Umma after the dissolution of the Ottoman Caliphate. It states:

‘Brother and sisters! Ever since the destruction of our Caliphate system in 1924, our Umma has not witnessed a single day of happiness. Our lands were divided. Our fathers humiliated. Our brothers disheartened. Our mothers and sisters dishonored. Our Umma had to face occupation, disunity, and colonialism. Brothers and sisters! The problem is the lack of a Caliphate system. It is not that we lack resources. It is not that we lack people. It is the absence of Islam. It is the political system that exists today [...] You never solve the problem without the Caliphate.’

Also, a similar voice can be observed in the DAESH declaration of the establishment of their Caliphate entitled This is the Promise of God, released on June 29, 2014:

‘so rush O Muslims and gather around your khalifah, so that you may return as you once were for ages, kings of the earth and knights of war. Come so that you may be honoured and esteemed, living as masters with dignity. Know that we fight over a religion that Allah promised to support. We fight for an Ummah to which Allah has given honour, esteem, and leadership, promising it with empowerment and strength on the earth. Come O Muslims to your honour, to your victory. By Allah, if you disbelieve in democracy, secularism, nationalism, as well as all the other garbage and ideas from the West, and rush to your religion and creed, then by Allah, you will own the earth, and the East and West will submit to you. This is the promise of Allah to you. This is the promise of Allah to you.’

Because of such an approach today, Thomas Arnold, the narrator of the Ottoman Caliphate’s demise a long time ago in 1966, had been right in predicting that the Caliphate ‘is likely to survive as a hope in the hearts of Muslim peoples for many generations to come.’ In other words, he rightly predicted that the Caliphal office is embedded in Muslim culture and history and enjoys a

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broad consensus among people and scholars from various Sunni sects as an indispensable institution.

The indispensability of the Caliphate for Muslims is slightly presented in a public poll conducted by the Gallup Company in its 2007 research, indicating that an average of 65% of those interviewed across four Muslim countries—namely Morocco in North West Africa, Egypt in North East Africa, Pakistan in South Asia, and Indonesia in South East Asia—agreed with the goal of unifying ‘all Islamic countries into a single state or Caliphate.’

This attachment to the Caliphate is because it is seen as a divine institution to replace the holy Prophet of Islam’s leadership by instituting the Sharia laws and safeguarding the Islamic community. A Caliph, in this sense, is a successor to the Prophet. However, Caliphatism (pro-Caliphate pan-Islamism) is somewhat different from the Caliphate. It is a movement that started in the 20th century to re-establish the institution that existed from the 7th century. Caliphatists—as named by Salman Sayyid—see it as the strength and unity of Muslim leadership that shaped one of the world’s biggest empires and can revive Muslim honour and prosperity. According to them, the Muslim identity crisis today is, in fact, the outcome of a lack of leadership. In their eyes, the Caliphal office is the most potent symbol of Muslim unification. In *Recalling the Caliphate*, Sayyid describes it as the ‘voice of Umma and its eco…[which] makes space for the cultivation of Muslim autonomy.’

Rashid Rida in *The Caliphate*, and al-Nabhani in *The Islamic State*, developed this postulate well, doing much to lay the foundations of Caliphatism. According to Rida and al-Nabhani, Muslim unity cannot become a reality as there is a leadership crisis. In their eyes, the abrogation of the last Caliphate is seen as a conspiracy of the colonial West’s cultural and political invasion to alienate Muslims from Islam. Therefore, the pro-Caliphate movement strives for emancipation from the trauma of the leadership crisis, of the contrast between past grandeur and present humiliation. In this doctrine, the Caliphate is a mechanism for implementing and practising Islam, which will again take up its leading role in the world order. Sayyid describes a Muslim without Caliphate as a ‘Muslim without history.’ However, Piscatori formulates it as ‘no Umma without leadership’ and ‘no leadership without the Umma.’

That is why in his 1920 *Masla-e-Khilafat* (The Issue of Caliphate), Maulana Azad, the leader of the Caliphate Movement in British India, expresses that ‘without the Khilafah, the existence of Islam is not possible.’ In the same vein, in November 1923, two Indian Muslim leaders, Ameer Ali and Agha Khan wrote a warning letter to Ataturk, who was determined to dismantle the

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237 ibid. p. 131.
238 ibid. p. 2.
Caliphal office, citing the urgent necessity of maintaining the religious and moral solidarity of Islam by keeping the Caliphate alive as Muslim leadership.\textsuperscript{241}

As an apocalyptic duty, therefore, Caliphatists see it as the Muslims’ obligation to endeavour to bring back the Caliphat office to fulfil a statement by the Prophet of Islam, who once said: ‘[E]ventually there will be Caliphat (once again) upon the method of the Prophethood.’\textsuperscript{242} Further to this, they believe that bringing Muslim leadership back will eventually lead to what the Quran promised: ‘Allah has promised those among you who believe, and do righteous good deeds, that He will certainly grant them succession to (the present rulers) in the earth.’\textsuperscript{243}

\textit{Crusades}

For pan-Islamists, the memory and legacy of the Crusades\textsuperscript{244} are the notorious cornerstones of a plot and the dominating narrative of conspiracy that allegedly tore the Umma apart.

In their view of history, Western colonial interventions in Muslim lands represent a continuation of the Crusades’ long history, seen as the historical hostility of the infidel toward Islam, referred to as Islamic Occidentalism. Occidentalism is best defined as a dehumanising image of the West (the Occident),\textsuperscript{245} sometimes referred to as the Occidental intruder.

From this perspective, the Crusades are not events of the past but rather an ongoing conflict between Islamdom and Christendom. This is highlighted in Sayyid Qutb’s view. For him, the Crusades never ended and did not stop in 1291. Imperialism is a ‘mask for the crusading spirit.’\textsuperscript{246} For instance, pan-Islamists consider the destruction of the Ottomans a conspiracy against Islam’s vanguard and flag holder via the Sykes-Picot Agreement that became a symbol of fragmentation in the Middle East.

In light of this, it is not surprising why, by way of example, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed DAESH Caliph, in his July 2014 speech at the Grand Mosque of Mosul, stated that

\textsuperscript{243} The Quran 24:55.
\textsuperscript{244} The Crusades are a series of religious bloody, violent, and ruthless wars between European Christians and Muslim Seljuk Turks from 1096 to 1291 to secure control of the Holy Land. Those wars erupted once Pope Urban II, in 1097 for the first time, addressed a council of bishops in the French city of Clermont, calling for Christians everywhere to retake the Holy Land from ‘enemies of God’, by which he meant the Muslim Turk army. Pope Urban’s call was met with a remarkable response from military forces as well as ordinary citizens who wore crosses as a symbol of the Church. In 1099, the knights of the First Crusade captured Jerusalem from the Muslim Turks. See: Lockman. Contending Visions of the Middle East. p. 27.
\textsuperscript{246} Qutb. \textit{Milestones}. p. 177.}
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‘this blessed advance [the DAESH Caliphate] will not stop until we hit the last nail in the coffin of the Sykes-Picot conspiracy.’

The conspiracy theory is widely accepted among pan-Islamists, who lay the blame on Crusaders for allegedly intending to terminate Muslim supremacy. This increases the importance of the Crusades in Muslim eyes, in that, according to Mussadiq Ghumman, ‘ever after, the hate originating in the Crusades remained the driving force at all times in every effort of the Western world to dismantle Muslim unity,’ which eventually took shape against the Ottoman Empire. He refers to Thomas Edward Lawrence (known as Lawrence of Arabia), who plotted the Arab revolt.

However, Fauzi M. Najjar, the Egyptian historian, goes further; he identifies new Crusades. To Islamists, secularism or liberalism are new forms of the Crusades, bringing a more hazardous challenge to Islam. He states that ‘Compared to the Westernisation in the modern age, the Crusades were less threatening because they [the Crusaders] brought nothing that was attractive to Muslims.’

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249 Ghumman. Towards the Unification of Muslim Umma. p. 66.

250 ibid. p. 74.

Formation of Muslim Umma

3.1. Advent of Islam

According to the pan-Islamist reading of history, during Europe’s Dark Ages (roughly 6–14 AD) after the fall of the Roman Empire, Islam emerged in the 7th century as a new Abrahamic religion beside Judaism and Christianity—crafting a small community in Mecca, now a city in Saudi Arabia. Muhammad (570–632), the Messenger of Islam, emphasised monotheism, eschatology and ethics and declared his prophecy, albeit as the final of a series of prophets, in the Arabian Peninsula, a peripheral steppe and desert area to the two civilisations of the Byzantine and Persian empires. This was the early manifestation of a new religion known as Islam (literally submission/surrendering to God) that emerged in a land that lacked any centralised political authority. Islam ruled life in the Muslim World and presented itself as the only true faith, the perfection of Judaism and Christianity. The adherent of Islam is called Muslim (also rarely Mohammedan or Mahometan). The term ‘Muslim’ means one who submits or surrenders to God in order to gain his pleasure. In this sense, permanent peace of mind cannot be achieved without surrendering to God, as Muslim scholar Taqiuddin al-Nabhani asserts.

No one could predict that Muhammad’s new faith—like Christianity—had the potential to mobilise the people who would soon change history. In Bernard Lewis’s assessment, Islam—unlike Judaism—in its worldwide distribution, its continuing vitality, and its universalist aspirations can be compared with Christianity.

During his lifetime, Muhammad united the Arabs in the name of his faith and constructed a commonwealth of faithful followers (Umma) in the name of his new religion, which changed the plight of Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula. Seeing Muhammad as God’s special envoy, Muslims do not credit his successful leadership as his genius but as God’s divine providence. After that, his successors (the Caliphs), in the name of the new religion, formed the largest pre-modern empire until that time, with a territory of more than 13 million square kilometres. The prominent Algerian Islamic studies scholar Mohammed Arkoun named the period of expansion of the Caliphal state ‘the imperial moment.’ Astonishingly, in a short time, i.e., hundred and twenty-eight years after its advent, Islam conquered and converted an unprecedentedly vast area...
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stretching over three continents from the Arabian peninsula, across the Middle East and North and Sub-Saharan Africa and also from Spain in the West to Central Asia and China in the East, i.e., towards both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans.

In the same vein, Muhammad Asad makes three striking points about the rise and fall of the Islamic Empire in comparison with the Roman Empire; he observes that: ‘It took the Roman Empire nearly one thousand years to grow to its full geographic extent and political maturity, whereas the Islamic Empire sprang up and grew to its fullness within a short period,’ i.e. thirteen decades, and secondly ‘In contrast with the one century which was needed to destroy the Roman Empire, the Islamic Empire of the Caliphs needed about a millennium of slow decay until its ultimate political breakdown, represented by the extinction of the Ottoman Caliphate, became a fact, followed by the signs of social dissolution which we are witnessing at present.’ Thirdly, he argues that the Quran’s teachings gave a solid foundation to the Muslim Empire, whereas ‘The Roman Empire had no such spiritual element to keep it together, and therefore it broke down so rapidly.’

To perceive Muhammad’s significant role in history, Michael H. Hart, in his book The 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Persons in History, ranks him in first place. Hart explains that:

‘He [Muhammad] was the only man in history who was supremely successful on both the religious and secular levels. Of humble origins, Muhammad founded and promulgated one

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256 Early Muslim conquests. Available at: https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Early_Muslim_conquests#cite_ref-2 (Accessed March 31, 2021)

of the world’s great religions, and became an immensely effective political leader. Today, thirteen centuries after his death, his influence is still powerful and pervasive.\textsuperscript{258}

The adventure of Muhammad’s lifetime can be traced in two crucial phases:

a) \textit{Pre-Hijra}\textsuperscript{[h/t]} (exodus/migration -sometimes appears in the Latin form \textit{hegira}-) in his birthplace, Mecca (570-622), a city with a sizeable pagan population, where, after declaring that he had received revelations from God at the age of 40 (610), he proclaimed his divine prophecy \textit{(Dawa)} inviting people to profess belief in the oneness of God (monotheism) and to avoid idol worship. Doubtlessly, his prophecy was against the reigning Meccan pagan oligarchy’s interests, who rejected his call and reacted with sneers, ridicule, and eventually persecution\textsuperscript{259} His first phase in Mecca is characterised as a period of preaching peace and tolerance. Nevertheless, the situation became intolerable to Muhammad and his few followers therein. Dispossessed, isolated, and stigmatised, Muhammad and his companions were forced to leave the city to escape a plot to assassinate him.

b) \textit{Post-Hijra}, from when Muhammad and his companions left Mecca until his last day (622-632). In Medina, a city with a sizeable Jewish population, some 300 kilometres north of Mecca, he constituted the primordial Umma. Al-Nabhabi calls this phase the establishment of the Islamic state, which led to the formation of Islamic society\textsuperscript{260} in which Muhammad changed course and became a public figure as a prophet-statesman\textsuperscript{261} and ‘the Head of State, the judge, and the Commander-in-Chief’\textsuperscript{262} all in the name of a new religion that he brought to the people. Significantly, the word ‘state’ was never mentioned in his message.

Significantly, before his message was completed in this phase, Muhammad proclaimed political victory once he established his state. This phase of Muhammad’s life is so crucial that Peter Mandaville calls it ‘the mythical period of point of origin.’\textsuperscript{263} Thus, the Hijra must be seen as Islam’s most enduring symbol of Islamic cosmopolitanism, according to Piscatori,\textsuperscript{264} as it is in Medina that the Quran awards Muhammad the illustrious title of Mercy to the universe \textit{(Rahmatan lil ‘ālamīn)}\textsuperscript{265} as a sign of his mission’s universal character.\textsuperscript{266} He is, then, a voice against Arab Kuffar (pagans) and ‘the voice of God,’ inviting mankind to his faith, Islam.\textsuperscript{267}

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\textsuperscript{259} Al-Nabhani. \textit{The Islamic State}. pp. 4-26.
\textsuperscript{260} ibid. pp. 41-48.
\textsuperscript{262} Al-Nabhani. \textit{The Islamic State}. p. 41.
\textsuperscript{263} Mandaville. \textit{Transnational Muslim Politics}. pp. 9, 85.
\textsuperscript{264} Piscatori. \textit{Islam Beyond Borders}. p. 22.
\textsuperscript{265} The Quran 21:37. Also see: A \textit{Mercy to The Universe} by Sa’eed ibn ’Ali bin Wahf. Darussalam. 2007.
\textsuperscript{266} Gilchrist. \textit{Muhammad and the Religion of Islam}. pp. 24-38.
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid.
Hence, his migration is unlike any other. It was the beginning of tremendous political and military success in crafting a new state that lasted after his death in the form of a new administration, i.e. the Caliphate in the Dark Ages of Europe. Bernard Lewis states that:

‘In the period which European historians see as a dark interlude between the decline of ancient civilisation-Greece and Rome- and the rise of modern civilisation in Europe, Islam was the leading civilisation in the world.’

The significance of this point of origin is that the year of Hijra (622) marks both the origin of the Muslim community and year one of the Muslim calendar, from which the major events of Islam, such as the Hajj and the fasting month of Ramadan, are practised. The Islamic calendar neither began with Muhammad’s first revelation nor -as in Christianity- with his birth, but with his Hijra, which marks the turning point in his success and the beginning of the Islamic era.

According to history, there is a great distinction between the two phases, which is well illustrated in the Quranic chapters (Sura) of the Mecca and Medina phases. Islam of Mecca is piety, whereas Islam of Medina is polity. Muhammad is a powerless preacher in Mecca, while in Medina, he is a ruler who builds an army, calling for Jihad. The Meccan verses are all about God’s oneness, religious freedom, peaceful coexistence, and equality between the sexes. In contrast, the Medina verses of the period of state-building take the opposite approach. In Medina, he is assured that Islamic society is firmly founded and that the predominantly social and political Sharia laws are ordered in their final shape.

Even the language of the Quran differs in these two phases of being in and out of power. In Medina, the language changes from moral to legislative. In the chronologically earlier chapters, in Mecca, the language is soft and full of the call for adherence to sound morals, relative moderation, toleration, and pluralism, while, in contrast, the second period is characterised by state-building social and political issues such as war, peace, tax, leadership, and the like.

Pluralism and moderation, by way of example, are clearly reflected in the following verses in Mecca: ‘You [infidels] shall have your religion and I shall have my religion’ or ‘There is no compulsion in [entering into] religion.’ However, the following verses of the Medina phase show the change in language: ‘He who chooses a religion other than Islam, it will not be accepted from him, and in the Everlasting Life he will be among the losers’ or ‘Kill them wherever you
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overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you [...] If they fight you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers.276

The second phase is crucially significant to the mainstream maximalist Islamist way of thinking. They point out the fact that, according to the Quran, Muhammad is the Primary Model277 and the Perfect Man (al-Insān al-kāmil)278 commissioned by God in His mercy to lead humans to Falah (prosperity in this world and the hereafter).279 Muslims can seek the prosperity of the Umma if they adjust their lives as closely as possible to the Prophet’s lifestyle to resemble his perfection as an influential prophet-statesman.280 That is why thinkers such as al-Nabhani conclude that the Hijra means that Islam can be applied in society only through the power of a state.281

To understand the significance of the Hijra, we need to recall that Muhammad’s companions in Mecca numbered no more than 150. In Mecca, he was just a religious preacher. But after the Hijra to Yathrib, where he lived for ten years, there was no longer any polytheism and paganism in the entire Arabian Peninsula after he died. He succeeded in seeing the entire Peninsula enter the fold of Islam. He was, then, God’s apostle and the head of the fledgling state that he founded in Medina with almost 100,000 followers. ‘Physically dead, his ideological life and greatness were about to begin. After thirteen years in the Meccan crucible, a decade of success followed, the fullest that has ever crowned one man’s endeavour,’ writes Akhtar Shabbir in Islam as a political Religion.282

It is noteworthy that Muhammad’s gradual success in crafting his state is embodied in the name of his city of accommodation, i.e., Yathrib once changed to Madīnat an-Nabī (literally ‘the City of the Prophet’) or, in short, Madīnat -Medina in English- i.e., ‘the city’ to imply the autonomous state established by the Prophet. In Yathrib, Muhammad founded the Constitution of Medina,283 in which he, as the ultimate statesman -not merely a preacher- specified the rights, duties, and relationships of the city’s inhabitants.284 The Constitution is seen as a set of rules for establishing a new polity upon which the Islamic Umma was founded285 and later became the basis of an ideal pattern for all Muslims to dream, regardless of time and geographic location.

276 ibid. 2:191.
277 ibid. 33:21. ‘There has certainly been for you in the Messenger of Allah an excellent pattern.’
278 ibid. 3:32. In showing Muhammad’s perfection, the Quran says ‘If you (really) love Allah, then follow me, Allah will love you.’
279 ibid. 7:157. ‘They who have believed in him (Muhammad), honored him, supported him and followed the light which was sent down with him - it is those who will be the prosperous.’
281 Al-Nabhani. The Islamic State. pp. 41-43.
285 Watt. Islamic Political Thought. p. 5.
3.2. First Umma and its sociopolitical aspects

As pointed out before, the Quran leaves no doubt that there is an absolute association between God’s and His Prophet’s authority over people. Furthermore, in Islamic theology, Muhammad is believed to be infallible in delivering his prophecy as he receives guidance from God. Once Muhammad, the Islamic state’s paradigmatic founder, died, his legacy was ‘the perfect Umma brought forth for Mankind,’ characterised by state-building in social, political, and economic aspects such as war, peace, tax, leadership, and so forth. In other words, in the Umma formed in Medina, he addressed the issues—which are aspects of political philosophy—such as authority, sovereignty, legitimacy, law, freedom, justice, citizenship, property, rights, and the like.

In Medina, Muhammad established a government system by gathering military forces to protect his newly founded state in the name of his new religion. In Medina, he began removing almost all material impediments that had existed in Mecca during Islam’s expansion. It was in Medina that Islam as an autonomous religion, separate from Judaism and Christianity, was now firmly established. It was in Medina that Muhammad founded his Umma, which right from the beginning was at once religious and political, with the Prophet himself as its statesman. What he founded in Medina was, in fact, not just a state-church but a church-state.

In view of its sociopolitical aspects, pan-Islamists consider the Medina phase a political pattern for Muslims to emulate at all times and in all places. They interpret Medina as a role-model city-state, a virtuous unit ruled by the virtuous elite, the Prophet and his substitutes.

Beyond that, unlike in Christianity, the dichotomy between God and Caesar, between the church (spiritual authority) and the state (temporal authority), and between polity and piety has never really existed in Islam. In Muhammad’s model of ruling in Medina, ‘The state was the church, the church was the state, and God was head of both, with the Prophet as his representative on earth [...] From the beginning, Christians were taught, both by precept and practice, to distinguish between God and Caesar and between the different duties owed to each of the two. Muslims received no such instruction.’

The direct implication of such distinction between Islam and Christianity appears in Islam’s political philosophy, constituted by the Founder of Islam himself from the beginning. In contrast, Christianity’s political philosophy was shaped by Emperor Constantine (not by Jesus Christ) almost three centuries after the emergence of Christianity. Bernard Lewis notes that:

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286 The Quran 53:3, 4. ‘Nor does he speak from [his own] inclination. It is not but a revelation revealed.’
‘The Founder of Christianity bade his followers ‘ render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things which are God’s’ (Matt. XXII:21)-and for centuries Christianity grew and developed as a religion of the downtrodden, until with the conversion to Christianity of the emperor Constantine, Caesar himself became a Christian and inaugurated a series of changes by which the new faith captured the Roman Empire and transformed its civilisation. The Founder of Islam was his own Constantine, and founded his own state and empire.’ \textsuperscript{291}

Lewis’s argument is rephrased by the eminent Muslim thinker Muhammad Iqbal, who regards the split between religion and politics as something against the spirit of Islam by stating that ‘It is not true to say that Church and State are two sides or facets of the same thing. Islam is a single unanalysable reality.’ \textsuperscript{292} In the same vein, Avner Greif, professor in the Humanities and Sciences, asserts that:

‘Because the Roman Empire had a unified code of law and a rather effective legal system, Christianity did not have to provide a code of law governing everyday life in creating communities of believers. Christianity developed as a religion of orthodoxy and proper beliefs; in earthly matters, Christians followed Roman law and later other secular laws. [...] Islam rose through a very different process, in which Muhammad established both a religion and a political, economic, and social unit. Islam therefore had to provide, and emphasise the obligation of adherents to follow, the Islamic code of law, the Sharia.’ \textsuperscript{293}

\textbf{3.3. Ummatic identity: pattern and platform}

As seen, Muhammad’s Hijra successfully changed the plight of Arabs in the way in which he forged the Arabian Peninsula’s camel-breeders and scattered hostile tribes into a single Arab Muslim religious polity and brought about remarkable fundamental changes to the Peninsula in building not only a new state but also what Peter R. Demant calls it ‘Muslims collective identity.’ \textsuperscript{294} James Piscatori prefers to call it ‘Muslim communalism’ for ‘Muslims constitute one brotherhood; they are all children or grandchildren of the Ummah.’ \textsuperscript{295} This stage is described as the ‘Ideal Period’ by Maududi in one of the chapters of his book \textit{Islam Today}. \textsuperscript{296}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{291} Lewis. \textit{The Crisis of Islam}. p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{294} Demant. \textit{Islam vs. Islamism}. p. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{295} Piscatori. \textit{Islam Beyond Borders}. p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{296} Abul ‘Ala al-Mawdudi. \textit{Islam Today}. Translated and edited under the auspices of the Islamic Research Academy in Karachi by Khurshid Ahmad. (n.d.).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In fact, Muhammad’s success during the Medina period and after his death was accelerated by his success in creating a coherent independent identity (Asabiyya in Ibn Khaldun’s words) for Arabs through his religion and state. His Hijra, thus, must be thought of as a transformative move for the Arabs from their geographical tribal situation to ideological identity, in which he laid the foundation of the Muslim Umma. In other words, from a sociopolitical point of view, in Medina, he created a new identity for Arabs that had never existed before.

The new identity gradually transformed the sphere of illiterate and scattered clashing tribes with no political cohesion into a large, solid Islamic Umma, which continued in the Caliphate system. The Arabs before the Hijra were not more than separate tribes. Their first loyalty was to their own tribe. In fact, they were not in a position to recognise the necessity of a central state.

Consequently, after the Hijra, the Arabs’ tribal loyalty gradually shifted to that of a new ‘Ummatic identity,’ a unique identity with a fundamental belief in Islam’s singularity and superiority, particularly once Islam began to expand to non-Arab lands. In other words, the new identity gradually became central not only for Arabs but also for non-Arab converts who joined the community of believers soon after Islam’s army began to conquer the extensive non-Arab lands. The new converts could not consider themselves Arabs but could be Muslims. Muslimness—the term applied by Sayyid in Recalling the Caliphate—was itself a collective identity that turned Muslims into brothers in the expanded Umma and laid the foundation of universal brotherhood for Muslims, from which the caption ‘society of Muslim Brotherhood’ comes. The Quran says that ‘Muslims are nothing else but brothers.’ In universal Islamic brotherhood, the Muslim Umma is not determined by territorial locality, nationality, ethnicity, colour, language, race, domicile, or blood ties.

In the Umma formed in Medina and expanded far from the Arabian Peninsula, allegedly a Muslim (Arab or non-Arab) with the superiority of his confessional identity is a Dar al-Islam citizen. Salman Sayyid notes that being a Muslim is ‘an inheritance from Umma.’ One is a Muslim only in relation to the Umma.

As such, there was no dual identity. Muslimness itself was an identifier. In other words, Islam as an identity became a platform to the extent that the 1981 Islamic Summit Conference in Mecca affirmed that ‘All Muslims, differing though they may be, in their language, colour, domicile or other conditions, form but one nation.’

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298 The Quran 49:10.
300 Sayyid. Recalling the Caliphate. p. 164.
Because of such an understanding of the Muslim creed, Karen Leonard describes it as a ‘transnational and cosmopolitan form of Islam.’ This is well portrayed in Muhammad Iqbal’s statement, who regards the Islamic creed as the border between Muslim nationalities. He states that:

‘Islamic nationality depends on a common creed. Turkish, Iranian, Arab and Indian Muslims form a single nation, and an alien is he who has no share in Islamic privileges, even if he is a parent, a son, a neighbor or co-tenant […]. In this way the extensive nation of Islam is created from Tangiers to the Philippines, all the lands form a single nation. The universal congress of Hajj is an example of this Muslim unity of belief.’

From this perspective, Oliver Roy calls it over-politicisation of Islam by Islamists, and the Caliphate is a global Muslim empire and a universal sovereign in which Islam’s presence in the world is manifested, simply because being a Muslim became a transnational pattern, postulate, and platform for Arab and non-Arab Muslims in the early days of Islam and today. Thus, the Umma came to denote a transnational community encompassing all Muslims, no matter where they reside.

In essence, more significant than the transnationality of Ummatic identity is the potential that, in the pan-Islamist perspective, for religious unity, Ummatic identity can transcend or even delegitimise other identities even today. This is well expressed by Hassan al-Banna, who envisions Islam as a political entity, stating, ‘Islam is a comprehensive system which deals with all spheres of life. It is a country and a home or a country and a nation.’

3.4. Islam: political or non-political?

Having looked at the formation of Islam and the Muslim Umma, we now need to address the fundamental question of what Islam is to better understand the concept of the Umma and its function in Muslim polity.

Islamology portrays that Islam represents different concepts to different people, for Muslim jurists interpret the Quranic verses and Prophet’s Sunna variously. Broadly, there are two Islams: political and non-political.

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304 Roy. Globalised Islam. p. 3.
305 Sayyid. Recalling the Caliphate. p. 183.
307 Platteau. Political Instrumentalisation of Religion. p. 3.
308 Bayat. Islamism and Social Movement Theory. p. 899.
These two views of Islam are, in essence, two contrasting doctrines and approaches. Each one claims to be the true, genuine, authentic, and normative Islam exemplified by the Prophet of Islam himself.

Notably, all these debates about genuine and authentic Islam sprang up from day one of Muhammad’s prophecy, particularly after his death, when he left his followers without designating any successor according to the Sunni denomination of Islam. While his contemporaries were convinced that prophecy terminated forever with Muhammad’s death, they also established the Caliphate, which still today is the subject of Muslim political debate about whether the Muslim Umma is still necessary or not, to which there are two approaches: minimalist and maximalist.

3.4.1. Normative Islam: maximalist or minimalist?

The question about normative Islam is, in fact, whether Islam is polity or piety. In other words, it is a question about the nature of Islam, whether political Islam is merely a modern phenomenon or originates in long-standing Islamic teachings. The question of Islam’s nature is crucial when we hear Muslims dreaming of a ‘return to Islam.’ If there is a multitude of Islams, the question is, which Islam is meant when a Muslim dreams of returning to the true, authentic, and normative one?

To answer the question, the method proposed by Bruce Lincoln, professor of the History of Religions, distinguishing between a ‘maximalist’ and ‘minimalist’ understanding of religion, is appropriate, for he suggests that religion is either applied to influence the public sphere such as politics, movements, or social issues (maximalist approach) or is confined to the realm of personal spirituality, ethics, piety, or rituals (minimalist approach).

By applying Lincoln’s method, maximalist Islam—or what is called ‘official’ Islam by Mandaville and ‘historical’ Islam by Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman Malik—is an expansive view regarding Islam as a political faith endowed with the theory of the state, and a sociopolitical mission to all spheres of life. Beyond this, Sayyid Qutb believes that Islam’s political and social mission is eternal. It is not related to any particular stage of Islam, such as the first Muslim community.

In criticising minimalist Islam, Muslim thinker Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, for instance, explicitly states that viewing Islam as only spiritual and moral is far from reality. This notion is commonly

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313 ibid. 47.
asserted in the maxim phrase of *al-Islam Din wa Dawla* (Islam is both religion and state).\(^{316}\) The assumption in the maximalist approach is that Islam already has political implications within its foundations. According to the assumption, Islam and state-related issues are merged to the extent that if there is an Islamic state, then Muslims can practice their entire religion. Because of this, Patricia Crone, the renowned orientalist, believes that the Muslim Caliphate was the fusion and amalgamation of religion and politics from the beginning.\(^{317}\)

In contrast, faith and politics do not necessarily interplay in a minimalist view of Islam. It claims that Islam misuses a version of Muslim doctrines as the foundation of its political agenda. In the minimalist approach, Islam is no more than personal faith; it has nothing to do with politics, and no definitive aspects of the ruling system are defined in it. One can be considered a Muslim simply if he/she professes with conviction belief in God’s oneness and Muhammad’s prophecy as His last messenger.

Nevertheless, this is precisely the ground for the maximalist argument, too. For instance, Muhammad Asad believes that ‘Our notion of God’s Oneness must be reflected in our own striving towards coordination and unification of the various aspects of our life.’\(^{318}\)

Thus, for both minimalist and maximalist views of Islam, numerous figures have sought to present their vision of normative Islam. Surprisingly, minimalist Muslim theoreticians are remarkably few, while the number of maximalist Muslim thinkers is very large.

It is worth mentioning that Islam’s political or non-political nature was widely discussed soon after Ataturk abolished the Ottoman Caliphate. A closer examination reveals that the early debates between these two groups of Muslim intellectuals are best illustrated by the opposite views of Rashid Rida (maximalist) and Ali Abdul Raziq (minimalist) in Egypt in the early 20\(^\text{th}\) century, which continue today,\(^{319}\) by groups of unequal number, of course. The two opposing arguments are important when we note that a few Muslim theoreticians, such as Ali Abdul Raziq and Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, recently challenged the restoration of the Caliphate.

**4.1.1. Few minimalist Muslim theoreticians**

*Ali Abdul Raziq: rejecting any political system in Islam*

As illustrated, minimalist Islam does not believe in any political role for the Islamic faith. However, among contemporary and old Muslim scholars, few thinkers advocate the minimalist attitude. Ali Abdul Raziq (1888-1966), an al-Azhar and Oxford graduate, is one of the pioneers and prominent figures representing Islam’s minimalist view.
Although Abdul Raziq believes in the universality of Islam, like the maximalist approach, he goes to the heart of the matter, stating that Islam’s universality is not in its political doctrine but rather in its faith and religious guidance. The Prophet’s priority was not to found a state but to utilise political power, as required by circumstances, for religious ends. Abdul Raziq developed, in his anti-Caliphal argument, what Ataturk said when he decided to abolish the Caliphate in Turkey; Ataturk said:

‘Our Prophet has instructed his disciples to convert the nations of the world to Islam; he has not ordered them to provide for the government of these nations. Never did such an idea pass through his mind. Caliphate means government and administration [...] But let us return to history, and consider the facts. The Arabs founded a Caliphate in Baghdad, but they also established another one in Cordova. Neither the Persians, nor the Afghans, nor the Muslims of Africa ever recognised the Caliph of Constantinople. The notion of a single Caliph, exercising supreme religious authority over all the Muslim people, is one which has come out of books, not reality [...] We have held the Caliphate in high esteem according to an ancient and venerable tradition.’

Ataturk’s viewpoint was broadly interpreted by Abdul Raziq, who is best remembered for his polemical treatise *al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm* (Islam and the Foundations of Political Power). In this book, as a young scholar at the age of 37 coming from a political family whose father had founded the Umma Party (1907) and whose brother established the Liberal Constitutional Party (1922), raised a never-said-before doctrine on Islam’s non-political nature, denying the Caliphate office as any part of Islam. His doctrine aroused a volcano of outrage in Egypt that, decades later, caused Muhammad Amara to write a review on it, entitled ‘*Ma’raka al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm* (‘tumult of Islam and the Foundations of Political Power’). Therein, Amara quotes Saad Zaghloul, the leader of Egypt’s nationalist Wafd Party, saying that Abul Raziq was ignorant of the fundamentals of Islam. ‘If not, then how could he claim that Islam is not a civilisation and that it does not have a system suitable for rule?’ In the same vein, in another review by Muhammad Bakhti al-Mutec’i, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, in *Haqiqa al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm* (‘the truth about Islam and the Foundations of Political Power’), he quotes the then

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323 The English version of the book *Islam and the Foundations of Political Power* was published by Edinburgh University Press in association with Aga Khan University in 2012.
326 Ibid. 150.
Sheikh al-Azhar that the Caliphate was the Muslim nation’s ‘representative’ to ‘establish their worldly and religious matters according to the Quran and Prophets’ Sunna.'327

In addition to the denial of any religious root for the Caliphate, the volcano of outrage was due to King Fuad (1868-1936) of Egypt running for the Caliphal position, supported by al-Azhar, to fill the power vacuum left in the Muslim world.

Just four days after abolishing the Caliphate in Turkey, sixteen scholars from the venerable al-Azhar University (founded in 970 by the Fatimid Caliphate as a centre of Islamic learning) denounced the Turkish move as null and void, declaring that the Caliphal office was a vital requirement for Muslims worldwide. While launching an attack on Sharif Hussein’s proclamation of the Caliphate title and calling him a British pawn, they supported King Faud’s candidacy.328

This, while the oldest institution in Islam’s history was sinking into oblivion, with the Muslim world deeply in shock, and King Fuad was invited to a conference in Cairo to proclaim himself the Muslim Caliph, Abdul Raziq, a young professor at the al-Azhar, published his short, erudite, but highly controversial book in 1925, a year after the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished. The book ignited the fundamental question of whether political power is essential to Islam.

Arguing within the discursive Islamic tradition and locating his arguments in Quranic verses and the Hadith, Abdul Raziq’s modernist approach is seen as the backbone of the non-political theology of Islam. In addressing the question from the perspective of Islamic tradition, Abdul Raziq gives details in favour of secular Islam to illustrate the fact that governance and sovereignty are not a religious obligation. They were solely necessary for the period after the Prophet’s death. His secular doctrine argues that the Caliphate was a purely political institution later considered part of the Islamic faith.

Impressed by the European Enlightenment, Abdul Raziq was the only voice of secular Islam to argue that the Islamic faith is no more than a body of ritual spiritual precepts and practices and, consequently, does not define any form of ruling system. By mirroring the modern political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, which rejects any divine source for the legitimacy of political power, Abdul Raziq states that the Caliphate is neither holy nor sanctified.329 Like Ibn Khaldun’s desacralising of politics and depoliticising of religion, Abdul Raziq asserts that the Caliphate’s indispensability theory -i.e., state theory- is not a religious imperative. Rather, it is a fallacy by Muslim theologians. He concludes that Muslims may apply any form of sovereignty, with no detriment to the Caliphate system and no need to re-establish it.330

Additionally, he exerts all his effort into illustrating that the Caliphate’s notion is not more than a religious contingency and a historical evolution in Muslim political thought, not an integral part

329 Pankhurst. The Inevitable Caliphate. p. 53.
330 ibid. p. 203.
of Islam. He debates the confusion between prophetic primacies and the Islamic ruling system developed after the Prophet’s death to maintain the extended Muslim lands. To elaborate on the misappropriation of governance in Islam, he reiterates that ‘It is natural and reasonable to me, to the level of being obvious, that there should not be after the Prophet a religious leadership. Resultantly, any leadership is a secular type, for neither the Quran nor the Prophet saw himself as a head of state. Otherwise, the Caliphate’s practice must have been mentioned in the Quran.’

Doubtlessly, that is a never-heard doctrine against Muslim consensus on the divinity origin of the Caliphate. He does his best to portray that the Caliphate evolution differs remarkably from the ancient system [...] and build their own principle of their ruling and system of their government upon the most modern of what is produced by human minds.

Nevertheless, the most controversial part of Abdul Raziq’s debate is his conclusion, stating that the notion of an Islamic governance system is a dogma, for the Prophet neither intended to establish any political system (Caliphate) nor any social rules (Sharia). Significantly, his argument’s direct controversial outcome is that both the Caliphate and the Sharia can be subject to change, a never-acceptable notion for a Muslim.

In line with Ataturk’s argument, Abdul Raziq states that the form of government, for example, is something for Muslims to decide according to existing circumstances. To him, like Ataturk, the Caliphate ‘has nothing to do with the Din and neither does the judiciary nor anything else from the governmental position and centres of the state.’ He argues that the Din ‘neither acknowledges it [the form of government] nor denies it.’ Consequently, the dominant counterargument is false that Islam cannot find its place without the Caliphate.

Arguing that there is no specific instruction in primary Islamic sources for the mandated form of government, Abdul Raziq comes to a controversial conclusion, asserting that the institute of the Caliphate is not but a ‘temporal institution’ innovated by Muslim jurists.

As demonstrated above, Abdul Raziq’s book raised controversy and vigorous debates in religious and political circles due to the fact that al-Azhar instated King Fuad as the new Caliph. Soon after its publication, al-Azhar’s court unanimously and harshly condemned Abdul Raziq’s work, demanding that it be banned, ostracising him from the university, and dismissing him from his position as a judge. To al-Azhar and Egyptian society, it was evident that the Caliphate was the only representative of Islam. They recalled that Abul Kalam Azad, a leading figure in India’s

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332 Pankhurst. The Inevitable Caliphate. p. 220.
333 Ibid. 53.
Caliphate Movement, had authored a booklet in Urdu, translated into Arabic, and published in 1922 (three years before Abdul Raziq’s) in serial chapters in the influential al-Manar Rashid Rida journal. Therein, Azad, an Indian Muslim, firmly supported the institution of the Caliphate as ‘the leadership of the religion, general government, and complete authority on the Earth,’ whose goal is “to establish an Umma on the Earth.”335 It was a shock to Egyptian society to see an al-Azhar scholar, Abdul Raziq, reject the Caliphate while a thousand kilometres away, an Indian Movement supported the institution. Furthermore, Abdul Raziq’s view was also against British interests, who saw the Caliph (now King Fuad, if appointed) as a guarantee that a large number of Muslims under the British colonial authorities would listen to him.

**Abdul Raziq’s doctrine: a synthesis of Rida and Kemalists**

It took some eighty years after Abdul Raziq’s death for the Muslim mainstream Orthodox position to revisit his profound legacy that any belief in a ruling system is not an Islamic obligation but a dogma. It is fair to hail Abdul Raziq as the father of secularism in the Muslim world today. According to Fazlur Rahman, secularism in Islam is the acceptance of laws and other social and political institutions without reference to the Quran and the Sunna.336

Abdul Raziq’s view that the Caliphate was not an integral part of Islam was a synthesis of heated debates between anti-Caliphate Kemalists on the one hand and pro-Caliphate Rashid Rida on the other. Rida framed much of the conservative debate over the Caliphate and defended the institution as a solidly established institution in Islam and an authentic Islamic political system. Rida is considered an early contemporary and influential thinker who developed the Islamic state’s political theory to support the Ottoman Caliphate. He postulates the necessity of Muslim unity in his compilation *al-Khilafa wa’l-Imama al-Uzma* (The Caliphate and The Greatest Imamate), published on the eve of the Republic of Turkey Declaration (October 29, 1923), in which he suggests the restoration of the Caliphate to Kemalists.337 338

While criticising Kemalists’ lack of religious practice in his journal *al-Manar* at the end of 1922 (two years before the official elimination of the Caliphate office), Rida’s view was that ‘the Islamic Caliphate is the best system known to man’ through which the Muslims were the pioneer nation. Rida held that the Caliph was the political leader and responsible for governing the Umma. To him, the Caliph is ‘the representative of the authority of the Umma and its unity.’ He opposed Kemalists who ignored the role of Muslim unity (*Ittihad-i-Islam*) against the European imperial enemy. While detailing the causes that led to global Muslim civilisational decline, Rida advised the Europeanised Young Turks (rebels against the Ottoman Caliph) to restore the Caliphate for the

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335 ibid. p. 38.
return of Islamic civilisation and distance themselves from ‘the danger of nationalism’ in modern Turkey.\textsuperscript{339}

In response to Rida’s pro-Caliphate view, the Young Turk Kemalists (also known as the Committee of Union and Progress) published a pamphlet in Turkish, translated as The Caliphate and the People’s Sovereignty. As it is clear from the title, they did not see any divine origin for sovereignty. They argued that sovereignty pertains to people, contrary to the Muslim belief that sovereignty belongs to God. Furthermore, they questioned why the Caliphate issue should be the most significant Muslim affair of the day. To them, the institution was an issue for the first Muslim generation, adding that what was left was only a ‘superficial Caliphate’ corrupted over a thousand years. Also, to them, Muslim unity was an ambition that could not be realised when Muslims are so diverse ethnically and spread geographically.\textsuperscript{340} Describing it as an ‘erroneous idea,’ Kemalists believed that it was time to end the catastrophes created by dynastic despotism and the backwardness of the Islamic government.\textsuperscript{341} They gave Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) the nationalist title of Ataturk (Father of the Turks) to replace the religious title of Caliph or Sultan.

As seen, both Rida and Kemalists consider the Caliphate the most exceptional Muslim affair. However, they disagree on whether or not it can be applied in modern times. By considering their contradictory views as thesis and anti-thesis in the dialectical method, Abdul Raziq’s doctrine is a synthesis that denies that sovereignty and governance constitute a part of Islam and the Prophet’s teachings at all.\textsuperscript{342} Founding a state -i.e., maximalist Islam- according to Abdul Raziq, was not a necessary tenet of the Prophet’s holy mission. He argues that based on religious evidence -unlike the mainstream view- politics did not prevail over religion during Muhammad’s prophecy simply because he was only a commissioned preacher (Rasulullah, i.e., ‘the Messenger of Allah’) to deliver God’s revelation to mankind, and nothing else. This was an unacceptable doctrine for Rida, who, in his magazine al-Manar, was among the first scholars to oppose Abdul Raziq’s book by denouncing it as ‘devilish.’ Rida went further, asking Muslim clergy to denounce Abdul Raziq as he ignored an Islamic institution obligated by the Sharia.\textsuperscript{343}

\textbf{Mahmoud Mohamed Taha: Second Message of Islam}

As shown above, Abdul Raziq was a lonely voice in rejecting the divine origin of sovereignty in his country, Egypt. However, his modern approach was heard in Sudan and developed by the Sudanese thinker Mahmoud Muhammad (also Mohamed) Taha (1909-1985) some four decades later. In contrast with the Muslim Brotherhood’s influential role in Sudan, Taha approaches the question of sovereignty from a never-said angle. He builds his argument on a hypothesis that the

\textsuperscript{339} Pankhurst. \textit{The Inevitable Caliphate}. pp. 41-45.
\textsuperscript{341} Pankhurst. \textit{The Inevitable Caliphate}. pp. 47-49.
\textsuperscript{343} Pankhurst. \textit{The Inevitable Caliphate}. p. 54.
Quran is ethical, not constitutional. However, Taha’s conclusion is similar to Abdul Raziq’s in presenting Islam’s eternally perfect moral message, and nothing else. He calls this the Second Message of Islam. According to Abdullahi An-Na’im, Taha’s disciple, the Second Message is a call ‘for a return from the subsidiary verses to the original verses, which were temporarily abrogated because of circumstances and material and human limitations.”

According to Taha’s controversial view, the pre-Hijra Quranic revelations in Mecca are the original verses and should be granted greater importance than the later ones in Medina, for Muhammad’s message was the one directed toward mankind in Mecca and not the one in Medina.

In other words, like other Muslim theologians, Taha holds that the Quran contains general messages in Mecca and Medina. However, his revolutionary argument rests on a never-said debate that Muhammad’s message in these two phases is not one, but two, and secondly, that the two messages contradict each other.

Figure 13: Left to right: Ali Abdul Raziq and his book and Mahmoud Muhammad Taha (in Islam’s Perfect Stranger)

344 Black. The History of Islamic Political Thought. p. 333.
Taha is as clear as possible in demonstrating the distinction between the Mecca and Medina phases by stating that Muhammad brought verses of peaceful persuasion as a preacher messenger in Mecca. In contrast, in Medina, as a prophet statesman, the verses of obligations by the sword prevailed. Nevertheless, in his endeavour to justify such a tremendous distinction between the two phases of Muhammad’s career, Taha justifies it as a historical adaptation to the reality of life in the Prophet’s contemporaries in Medina. In other words, in his minimalist interpretation of Islam, Taha considers the pre-Hijra phase revelation as the original foundation of Islam while believing that the post-Hijra period of state-building in Medina is forced upon the Prophet by the exigencies of events adapted to the needs of the time.

Significantly, Taha’s method of considering the first phase superior contradicts the traditional Islamic method, which gives superiority to the second phase. Consequently, in Islamic tradition, whenever there are two contradictory verses from Mecca and Media, Muslim jurists overwhelmingly resolve the contradiction by the principle of abrogation (Naskh), saying that the verses in Medina have the power to supersede or abrogate the earlier ones in Mecca. That was not Taha’s method. He prioritised early revelation in Mecca. Thus, his method was seen as wanting to abandon the Muslim tradition of fourteen hundred years of concentration on the Medina period.

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Because of Taha’s strange stance towards the Quran, Edward Thomas, a human rights officer for the UN Mission in Sudan, called him ‘Islam’s Perfect Stranger.’ This revolutionary hermeneutic interpretation of Muhammad’s life was not tolerated in Sudan, for Muslims believe the Prophet’s words and actions, including the Medina phase, are guided by God, as the Quran states. So, like Abdul Raziq, Taha also paid a high price for separating state and religion. Abdul Raziq was isolated and fired from his position as a judge, while Taha, on a request from Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood, was executed for apostasy by President Numeiri of Sudan.

3.4.1.2. Maximalist view: mainstream Islam

As stated before, political Islam denotes the use of Islam for a political end. By seeing ‘Islam under threat,’ that ‘end’ accordingly is the power of the state. Consequently, Islamism or pan-Islamism is simply a set of political and social movements aiming to bring Islam back into politics and society, what is called Islamisation. However, the distinction is that pan-Islamism desires to unite all Muslim societies in one single state.

It is pertinent to realise that political Islam has been mainstream during Islam’s history in general and particularly in contemporary Muslim history due to the fact that the fragmentation of Ottoman Arab lands into small states left behind two dominant counter-hegemonic narratives in the form of anti-colonial ideologies in the post-colonial era: pan-Arabism (Arab nationalism/Arab unity) based on common language and shared history AND pan-Islamism based on the notion of the restoration of Muslim Umma.

Pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism are ideologies that mobilise the elite and the masses to create alternatives to the colonial period. However, both have always existed in tension with each other. Defined as supreme loyalty to the nation-state, nationalism is always opposed by pan-Islamists, who do not believe in the nation-state. Instead, they suggest that loyalty should be to the Umma state.

Peter Mandaville believes that the notion of pan-Islamism is implicitly anti-national, for it implies loyalty to the greater community, the Umma. This is because pan-Islamism is a political ideology calling for Muslim people’s solidarity worldwide based on their shared Islamic identity. On the other hand, since Arab nationalism, dominating North Africa and the Middle East with the slogan

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352 Beyond these two major reactions, there were other ideologies, none of which solved the Arab/Muslim crises. They were: socialism, Third-Worldism, humanism, along with economicist theories of developments overshadowing Muslim identities. (Ayden. *The Idea of the Muslim World*. p. 191.)


‘one nation Arab state,’ went nowhere, political Islam has gradually had widespread appeal for a wide range of social norms, political movements, and significantly militant groups in the 20th century.

The dominant perception among prominent Muslim scholars in the mainstream maximalist view is a strong belief that Islam is inherently and intrinsically political and not accidentally politicised. In this respect, if true Islam is ‘political Islam,’ a true Muslim is a ‘political Muslim.’ Accordingly, the view of people like Abdul Raziq or Taha introducing Islam as merely a non-political religion is implausible and a half-truth. As discussed before, maximalists hold that Islam is political simply because, by definition, Islam means surrender or submission to only Almighty God’s Will,356 *Who is the Giver of the Supreme Law*,357 *has the Ultimate Sovereignty*,358 and *only He has the Ultimate Authority*359 in order for a Muslim to become prosperous.360 Based on Islamic principles, this view asserts that only submission and obedience to God’s Divine Will (i.e., his single law and guidance revealed to Muhammad) can guarantee Muslims’ perpetual preservation and well-being in this world and the hereafter. According to the Quran, bowing down to God’s commands, humbly submitting, and conforming to his laws will ultimately result in the Falah.361

However, according to the minimalist approach –like Abdul Raziq’s and Taha’s– Islam is not a political entity, but it is exploited in politics. Mohammed Ayoob says that Islamism is the instrumental use of Islam in politics,362 sometimes referred to as the * politicisation, instrumentalisation, or Political Instrumentalisation of Islam*.363 Like Zionism, which is described as politicised Judaism, political Islam, in the minimalist view, is the induction of religion into politics and instrumentalisation of Islam by individuals, groups, or organisations that pursue political objectives.364

Unlike a few renowned Muslim thinkers and scholars who advocate non-political Islam, there are a plethora of names of historical and contemporary Muslim scholars, leaders, theologians, historians, intellectuals, journalists, activists, jurists, exegetes, philosophers, liberation movements, and parties, all over the Islamic world, in both Shia and Sunni denominations, who firmly hold that Islam is a political entity. They assert that Islam is a complete package sent by God that touches every aspect of a Muslim’s life, including politics.

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359 ibid. 3:154.
360 The Quran in 22:77 says ‘O you who have believed, bow and prostrate and worship your Lord and do good -that you may succeed.’
361 The Quran in 24:51 says, ‘The only statement of the [true] believers when they are called to Allah and His Messenger to judge between them is that they say: “We hear and we obey”. And those are prospering.’
Looking at the many names forming Islamic political thought illustrates how overwhelmingly advocates of the reconstitution of the Umma believe that political Islam would reverse Muslim decline. Some of the prominent historic Muslim theologians are Al-Mawardi (d.1058, the author of *The Ordinances of Government*), Bayhaqi (died 1077, the author of *Tarikh-i Bayhaqi*), Nizam al-Mulk (1018-1092, the author of *Siyasatnama*), Imam al-Haramayn al-Jewayni (d.1013), Imam Ghazali (1058-1111), and Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328, a medieval theologian and the author of *al-Siyasa al-shar’iyya* – Legal Politics– who has considerably influenced contemporary political Islam, which led to the formation of Wahhabist, Salafist, and Jihadist movements).

Among contemporary prominent Muslim jurists we may name Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (one of the leading advocates of pan-Islamic unity during the late 19th century), Muhammad Abduh (a key Egyptian founding figure of Islamic Modernism), Rashid Rida (an early advocate of Islamic state), Abul Ala Maududi (the founder of Jama’at-e-Islami in British India in 1941 and one of the proposers of establishing an Islamic state, later Pakistan), Abul Hassan Nadwi (the author of *Islam and the World*), Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (the leader of the Caliphate Movement in British India), Hassan al-Banna (the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt), Sayyid Qutb (a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt), Taqiuddin al-Nabhani (the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Palestine), Muhammad Asad (Austro-Hungarian Islamologist who converted to Islam), Muhammad Iqbal (the prominent Islamic scholar and spiritual father of Pakistan), Hassan al-Turabi (the leader of the National Islamic Front of Sudan), Mahathir Mohamad (Malaysian Muslim politician and fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia), Necmettin Erbakan (a prominent Muslim politician and former Prime Minister of Turkey), Abbasi Madani (the founder of the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria), Ali Shariati (a Shia scholar in the sociology of Islam and ideologue of the Islamic Revolution in Iran), Ruhollah Khomeini (the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran), among many others. These and many others call themselves Muslims while believing in the role of Islam in politics. Thus, all (pan-)Islamists are Muslims. However, not all Muslims are (pan-)Islamists.
Re-Thinking The Politics of The Umma (Muslim Bloc) | FORMATION OF MUSLIM UMMA

**Political**

Ali Mowafi, Bayhaqi, Nizam al-Mulk, el-Veswany,
el-Bezirani, Imam Gacari, Ibn Taymiyya, Asadabadi,
Abu Raziq, Ibn Qutba, al-Tabaqa, Nadjavi,
Abu Nazzari, Abdul Kaleem Asri, Muhammad Asri,
Muhammad Iqbal, Hassan al-Turabi, Mahathir

**Ideology**

Mohammed, Ali Shariati, Bahaustin Khomani, Niamatullin
Ereken, Hossen Al-Turabi, Abbas Madani,...

**Non-ideology**

Ali Abdul Razis, Mahmoud Mehemmed Tahra

**Non-political**


Figure 15: Schematic proportion of adherents of political Islam (maximalist mainstream) and adherents of non-political Islam

(As mentioned in this research)

**Mainstream Islam: ideology of mobilisation/liberation**

Similar to the previous question of whether Islam is political or politicised is the question of whether Islam is essentially an ideology or accidentally ideologised. The minimalist view expresses that Islam is theology and not ideology. It is ideologised during the ideologisation process of Islam.

However, unlike the minor group, the counterview presents Islam as a political ideology by nature. In other words, all debates about the ideology of Islam or ideologised Islam revolve around a substantive question of whether Islam is a religion in the same sense as Christianity or an ideology like Socialism, Marxism, and the like.

Ideology is defined as a set of ideas by which the people justify the ends and means of organised social action to preserve or reconstruct a given reality. Accordingly, if Islam is an ideology, it rejects any interpretation to be seen as a religion in the narrow sense of theological belief, private prayer, and ritual worship.

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It is worth mentioning that political ideologies are recognised by their goals and methods. Their goals are to set the most appropriate arrangements for society to work, while their methods -e.g., the form of government- can vary.

The goal of Islam’s political ideology is to form the perfect Umma brought forth for all Mankind as said in the Quran, and the method is the imposing of the political system established in Medina that continued in the institution of the Caliphate.

True, genuine, and authentic Islam, accordingly, is not merely a personal creed. It is an ideological system that can act in social and political arenas, mobilising and motivating individuals. In this sense, Islam is a ‘total project,’ -as suggested by Mark Huband- with missionary duty that the believers have an obligation to convert non-Muslims to the Straight Path of Islam.

Almost in the same vein, Hamid Dabashi and Reinhard Schulze prefer to present Muhammad as a revolutionary leader and Islam as a liberation theology that aspires to create a new political order. Also, Sayyid Qutb explicitly asserts that what the Prophet of Islam brought was not just a new religion but a social movement against the class of nobles and the wealthy. In this respect, today, Islamic movements consider themselves the reformational social trend in line with the movement that started in the 7th century.

Based on this view, the 20th century’s Islamic movements were not so distinct from Latin American movements based on Christian Liberation theology in the 1950s and the 1960s. In both cases, the religious movements mobilised in order to liberate their societies from colonialism or colonial legacy.

Significantly, if this view is admitted, it leads to a radical conclusion presenting Islam as a political ideology disguised as a religion. Bill Warner and Bernard Lewis, two critics of Islam, are among this group. For instance, Warner calls the Sharia ‘political Sharia,’ holding that not only is Islam the fusion of politics and religion but also ‘The secret of Islam is that the Quran and the Sunna… are primarily devoted to politics, not a religion.’ Also, Lewis asserts that in Islam, ‘the world is divided basically into two. One is the community of the Muslims, and the other that of the unbelievers, and the subdivisions among the latter are of secondary importance,’ which indicates to him that Islam is a political ideology, not faith.

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367 Huband. Warriors of the Prophet. p. 22.
373 Lewis. The Return of Islam. p. 44.
It is safe to say that perhaps these radical outcomes had already been touched by Abdul Raziq and Taha, who selected the minimalist approach to Islam, doing their best to separate between state and church in Islam. They knew that political interpretation of Islam leads nowhere but to considering Islam not a religion devoted to piety but an ideology dedicated to the polity, as in the example of the Caliphate.

3.6. Dawa: export of global Islam
The maximalist approach of mainstream Islam argues that soon after Muhammad’s death, his companions replaced him with a Caliph, constituting the Caliphate with peculiar characteristics that had never existed before, claiming it was a new experience for the world.

The difference between the Caliphate and other political institutions was its duty to follow Muhammad’s pattern of ruling Islam’s territory and expanding it to non-Muslim lands. Pan-Islamists argue that Muslims’ achievements were impossible without institutional leadership (the Caliphate) managing their driving force. The institution itself received its legitimacy from representing Muhammad’s rule in Medina as its role model, where he achieved remarkable success through Jihad.

According to Hizb ut-Tahrir’s teachings, for instance, once the Caliphate is established, it expands into non-Muslim territories. Interestingly, Maududi introduces Muhammad as the most exceptional revolutionary leader and Islam as a world revolutionary ideology ‘which seeks to alter the social order of the whole world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals.’

Pan-Islamists hold that since its formation, the duty of Muslim Umma is the Dawa (‘Islamic call/proselytising,’ literally ‘invitation’), which means to invite the world to the message of Islam in worshipping one God, and they themselves are envoys of Islam’s guidance to the other nations; not only individually but also if needed through employing Jihad against Dar al-Harb. This expansionist view is reflected by Mustafa Mashhur -the fifth General leader of the Muslim Brotherhood- in his book Jihad Is the Way, the last of a five-volume work titled The Laws of Dawa. He states that: ‘Jihad for Allah is not limited to the specific region of the Islamic countries, since the Muslim homeland is one and is not divided, and the banner of Jihad has already been raised in some of its parts, and it shall continue to be raised, with the help of Allah, until every inch of the land of Islam will be liberated, the State of Islam will be established.’

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375 ibid
Broadly, the Dawa is the call to export Islam. The *Ummah’s Charter* of Hizb ut-Tahrir, by way of example, leaves no doubt that ‘Indeed, Allah has ordered the Muslims to carry the Dawa to all mankind and to bring them into the Khilafah state. He has legislated the Jihad as a method to carry the Dawa. So the state must rise to declare Jihad against the Kuffar without any lenience or hesitation.’ In this respect, the duty of promulgating Islam is not just a missionary invitation to carry Islam’s message to all corners of the globe. Instead, it is a call, if necessary by Jihad, to non-Muslims to embrace Islam. For instance, the DAESH anthem, ‘My Umma, Dawa Has Appeared,’ encourages Muslims to revive the Umma and ensure Islam’s triumph, as in the statement ‘The Islamic State has arisen by the Jihad of the pious.’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the DAESH leader, stated that: ‘Islam was never a religion of peace. Islam is the religion of fighting. No one should believe that the war that we are waging is the war of the Islamic State. It is the war of all Muslims, but the Islamic State is spearheading it. It is the war of Muslims against infidels.’

Furthermore, the Dawa, like other conceptualised terms in the context of political Islam, connotatively means an institutionalised political agenda to not only invite non-Muslims to Islam but also to consolidate the Islamic State and Muslim leadership through inviting to military strength (Jihad), which according to al-Nabhani ‘has never changed and never will.’ Al-Nabhani vividly elaborates that the Dawa ‘has taken two forms: an invitation and an obligation. The first one is intended to invite people to embrace Islam, and the latter is intended to oblige people to adhere to its rules.’

Observing this maximalist approach, Bill Warner concludes that today’s Islamist military approach is the gradual annihilation of other religions in the Arabian Peninsula through the Jihad, which became their model. Similarly, Watt notes why the first bloody battle between Medina and Mecca erupted within two years after building the Muslim state. He observes that Muhammad turned to be a military commander in Medina once he stated that he received a revelation from God permitting him to fight the pagans ‘until the religion is God’s alone.’

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379 The *Ummah’s Charter*. p. 85.
383 Al-Nabhani. The Islamic State. 143-4.
384 ibid.
386 The Quran 8:39.
Fall of the Ottoman Empire, Umma’s vanguard: Role of the Anglo-Arab alliance in the Oriental Question

84.1. Rise and Fall of the Ottomans: The fall of Constantinople (Latin: Cōnstantīnopolis, meaning the city of Constantin), the capital of the Eastern Roman Byzantine Empire, in May 1453, at the hand of Muslim Turks, was a turning point in the region’s history. It marked the termination of the Byzantine Empire, an empire that had lasted for over eleven centuries and turned Mehmed the Conqueror (1432-81) overnight into the Ottomans’ most celebrated Sultan at the age of twenty-four. He made Constantinople the capital of the Ottomans (1299-1922), changing its name to Islampole (pronounced Istanbul today, meaning the city of Islam) as the hallmark of Islam’s rise and a considerable change in world politics. Remarkably, the beginning of the Ottoman rise in a new era empowered the m to become an Empire controlling the Balkans in Europe. On the other hand, when Sultan Selim I (1470-1520, the ninth of thirty-six Sultans), in 1517 conquered Greater Syria of the Arabic-speaking lands under the Mamluks (roughly encompassing the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Mesopotamia, i.e., North Africa, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula), the Ottoman Sultans gradually realized that the Caliphate, as the symbol of Muslim unity, plays a crucial and peculiar role for Muslims. As such, while the previous Sultans were not in a position to claim Caliphal authority from the beginning, in 1517 (64 years after the fall of Constantinople), Sultan Selim selected the title of ‘Protector of the Holy Places’ (Mecca, Medina, and al-Quds), then, began to apply the prestigious title of ‘Caliph’ (the successor of the Prophet of Islam) as the insignia and vanguard of Islam. By this, the non-Arab Ottoman Turks, for the first time in the Caliphate’s history, began to see themselves as protagonists of Sunni Islam in the name of Muslim Caliphs. That was taken for granted when Sultan Suleiman I (1494-1566) called himself ‘the Caliph of the whole world’ or ‘the Caliph of all the Muslims in the world.’ Thus, the Ottoman Empire turned into a theocracy rather than a Turkish state, which was reversed by Ataturk centuries later when he explicitly announced that ‘the Turkish state [...] cannot be subjugated to the service of a Caliph.’ With the conquest of Egypt and Greater Syria, the Ottomans, a transcontinental power now in the form of the Muslim Caliphate, constantly engaged in war with European powers in the name of a vast Islamic Empire. It was the stage that the English historian Richard Knolles, in his Generall
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*Historie of the Turkes*, in 1603, in a pejorative label, described the Ottomans as ‘the present terror of the world.’

The Ottoman Empire, at its greatest extent in the sixteenth century with almost 5.2 million km² (2 million ml²), was a significant military and transcontinental political configuration in three continents: namely in the Middle East in Asia, North Africa (including the strategic waterway of the Suez Canal), and Southeast Europe and Anatolia, which from a world trade perspective with l access to the Mediterranean and Black Seas made the Empire a significant hindrance in the way of European powers.

Nevertheless, prior to the First War, the Empire became much smaller than its size in the 116th century due to losses in North Africa and Eastern Europe, particularly when the Ottomans suffered a decisive defeat in the Austro-Ottoman War. In this war that lasted for fourteen years (1683-97), they failed to capture Vienna, followed by the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), which marked the end of Ottoman control in much of Central Europe and the beginning of significant territorial losses. In other words, the Treaty marked a point in the decline of Ottoman power after centuries of expansion. In Edward Freeman’s words, it was ‘one of the heaviest blow [...] that has never really recovered [...] and paved the path to the revolts against the Ottoman power.’

![Figure 16: The Ottoman Empire at its greatest extent in the sixteenth century](image)

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This was the beginning of setbacks for the Ottomans, who were gradually defeated and lost control in North Africa, namely in Egypt (1798), Algeria (1830), and Tunisia (1881) by France, in Egypt (1882) and Sudan (1898) by Britain, and in Libya (1911) by Italy. Britain already held Aden and Kuwait, and Lebanon was autonomous under France.

![Figure 17: What the Middle East looked like in 1914, prior to WWI (source: Vox)](https://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-the-middle-east)

With the Balkans in turmoil, much worse than military defeats, internal nationalist movements erupted in minorities within the Ottoman territories during the 19th and 20th centuries, such as Serbians (1804-1817), the Greeks (1821-1832), and Bulgarians (1876), in addition to Moldavia, Wallachia (Romania), Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Armenia, and Georgia, all seeking autonomy or independence. The Treaty of Bucharest (1913) marked the end of the Balkan War. Accordingly, the Ottomans withdrew from the Balkans, except for a small portion of Thrace (the Turkish territory that is geographically located in Southeast Europe), which raised the ‘Oriental Question’ about the Ottomans, now described as ‘the Sick Man of Europe’ dying. The Sick Man was a metaphor that the Europeans used in relation to the Oriental Question. Due to the political and economic instability in the Ottoman Empire from the late eighteenth to early 20th centuries, the Oriental (also Eastern) Question was the question of which European powers would inherit Ottoman territories once the Empire fell apart in its size that was reduced to the Arab East, Anatolia, and a small strip of Eastern Thrace.395

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394 Vox. "Photo 7". In: 40 Photos that Explain the Middle East. Available at: [https://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-the-middle-east](https://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-the-middle-east) (Accessed March 31, 2021)

The decline continued due to ideas such as nationalism and self-determination until the First World War ended the Sick Man’s Empire to its size (783,562 km²/302,535 mi²) today, with a change to its name under the new system of the Republic of Turkey in the new capital city of Ankara (not Istanbul, meaning the city of Islam), leaving behind no sign of Ottomanism and Islamism.

By this time, the term ‘Ottoman’ was finally superseded by the word ‘Turkish’ as the name of the state in the newly adopted Turkish constitution on March 1, 1921. Therefore, any cultural and political sovereignty over the ‘non-Turkish’ lands of the former Ottoman Empire was categorically rejected by the Ankara government. Nationalism decisively overcame Ottoman cosmopolitanism. Beyond that, from the nationalist perspective, the goal of turning the Ottoman Empire into an independent Turkish state appeared to have been achieved, even though non-Turks who lived there, such as Kurds, Lazes, and Armenians, were absorbed into the Turkish national identity.

This trend started during the mid-19th century once the Empire’s weakness led the ruling Turks to implement reforms remembered as the Tanzimat (‘reorganisation’) lasting from 1839 to 1876 to modernise the Empire, generally based on European ideas by abolishing feudalism, introducing private property, reforming tax and military services. For instance, it was only in 1826 that Mahmud II opened military academies to study the West’s military secrets to regain the Empire’s control over its minorities, whereas it was nearly bankrupt. Much worse, as Wael Hallaq, a scholar of Islamic law and history, notes, modernisation came to displace almost every sphere that the Sharia and its related institutions had occupied. The effect of these reforms was to create a new subject, the citizen, who sees the world through the eyes of the modern state.

Consequently, the New York Times Archives296

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the reform movement ended in 1876 and was replaced by Abdul Hamid’s pan-Islam project of absolutism. He closed the door to Western liberal ideas by promoting the strength of the Caliphate.399

Notwithstanding, the situation deteriorated once the European minorities seeking autonomy turned into an inspiration for the Arabs under the Ottomans to seek independence in the form of an independent Arab Caliphate. This is comprehensively portrayed in *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement* (1938) by Palestinian historian George Antonius. Applying the term ‘awakening’ implies that the Arabs had been ‘asleep’ for centuries. However, the circumstances deteriorated for the Ottomans when Britain and France, the then two major European powers, became vastly aware of an underground Arab nationalist movement within the Ottoman Empire.400 For example, James Barr, in *A Line In The Sand*, reports that French diplomat François Georges-Picot informed his British counterpart Marks Sykes of Britain that while serving as France’s consul in Ottoman Beirut prior to WWI, he had received letters from educated and ambitious young Arab nationalists requesting France to assist them with their purpose of obtaining autonomy within the Ottoman Empire401 in the aftermath of the Turkification policy of the Young Turk revolution of 1908, which gave birth to Arab nationalism in different organisations such as *Jamiyat al-Islah* (‘Reform Society’/Beirut 1912), *Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya al-Idariyya al-Uthmani* (‘Ottoman Party of Administrative Decentralisation’/Cairo 1912), *Jamiyat al-Arabiya al-Fatat* (the ‘Young Arab Society’/Paris 1911), and *Jamiyat al-Ahd* (The ‘Covenant Society’/Istanbul 1913, later changed to the ‘Arab Revolutionary Society’).402

As James Barr reports, a year prior to the War, twenty-five official Arab delegates held an Arab conference in Paris (June 18-23, 1913) for the first time to discuss the rights of the Arabs under Ottoman rule and how they could achieve their goal like the Balkans’ other minorities.403 404 Nevertheless, most Arabs generally demonstrated no problem with the Ottoman Sultan’s legitimacy as the Caliph of the Muslim Umma.405 However, this was not the case with Hussein Ibn Ali al-Hashimi, who, in 1908, had been appointed by Istanbul as the Sharif (custodian) of Islam’s holy shrines in Mecca and Medina. Hussein (also Hossein or Husayn), a direct lineal descendant of the Prophet, sought not only an Arab state but also dreamed of laying claim to the institution of

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401 ibid. 21.
405 ibid.
the Caliphate. He ultimately announced his Sharifian Caliphate just two days after Atatürk dismantled the Ottoman Caliphal office on March 3, 1924.

4.2. WWI Anglo-Arab labyrinth; Middle East transformation

Arabs against Turks, dreaming of an Arab Caliphate

When the Ottoman Empire joined the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, the British Empire, holding Egypt as her protectorate, feared the Ottomans’ attacks to retake Egypt, whose Muslim people could listen to the Caliph if he called for Jihad. Meanwhile, the Ottoman fleet’s presence in the Levant and the Mediterranean coasts of North Africa was also a concern for British control of the strategic Suez Canal. In London, they realised that if they could control the Suez Canal, they could easily access British India, the Empire’s crown jewel with a population of over three hundred million and a solid Indian army of one million. It was vital to control British Egypt to reach this strategic target. But how?

Around 1900, the Ottomans controlled no more than 10% of the Muslim population. In contrast, they ruled over at least fourteen ethnic groups: Albanians, Arabs, Armenians, Bulgarians/Pomacs,

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406 Map of British India in 1914. Available at: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/map-british-india-1914
(Accessed September 7, 2021)
Bosnians/Serbs, Circassians, Greeks, Jews, Kurds, Lazes, Macedonians, Roma, Turks, and Turcomans.\textsuperscript{407} In contrast, eleven colonial powers ruled at least 160 million Muslims (80\% of the total Muslim population at that time).\textsuperscript{408} The only independent territories were the Ottomans (20 million), Persia (Iran, 10 million), and Afghanistan (5 million). Moreover, the ethnic distribution of the Ottoman Empire made it a state ruled over at least fourteen major ethnic groups, like Albanians, Armenians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Circassians, Greeks, Arabs, and more. Each looked for independence or autonomy because ethnic pluralism did not reflect the Ottoman political system.\textsuperscript{409}

Realising these facts, during the War, London looked for allies among the Arabs to fight the Ottomans. No one was better than Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca. His story is the story of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. His choice, with his ambition to his own Caliphate in Istanbul, the Ottoman capital, and died in 1931 in Amman, the capital of the newly established independent Arab state, was to revolt against the Ottomans. He undermined the Caliph’s call to the Jihad, which could be listened to by other Muslims worldwide, including Egypt and British India.

Hussein’s ambition was due to his mistrust of Jamal Pasha, minister of the Ottoman navy, who executed by public hanging a group of Arabs in Damascus and Beirut in May 1916 on charges of being separatists and supporting the British and French to create an independent Arab state. Hussein’s two sons, Faisal (also Faysal) and Abdullah, representatives in the Ottoman parliament, mistrusted the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. They realised that the revolutionary Turks intended to depose their father based on the policy of Turkification of the old Ottoman society. Around 1913, Hussain’s sons secretly contacted the underground Arab separatists of al-Fatat and al-Ahd. During the First War, Hussein decided to deal with the British. He secretly went into negotiation with the British to stand beside the Allies in return for receiving British support for his ambition for an independent Arab state in the name of the divine Caliphate in all the Arab lands under the Ottomans, encompassing three provinces of the Arabian Peninsula, Greater Syria and Mesopotamia (approximately 3.9 million km$^2$ / 1.5 million ml$^2$).\textsuperscript{410}

\textsuperscript{408} The eleven colonial powers were: 1. Great Britain, ruling over 100 million Muslims (in Egypt, Eastern Sudan, Kenya, Persin Gulf Coast, Kuwait, Southern Arabia, Indian territories, parts of Malaya, Sarawak and northern Borneo, northern Somaliland, northern Nigeria, northern Ghana) 2. Netherlands, 30 million (in Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes) 3. Russia, 15 million (in the former Turkic Khanates, northern Caucasus) 4. France, 15 million (in Northern and Western Africa, Saharan regions, Western Sudan, Djibouti, Comores, Indochina) 5. China 3 million (in Sinkiang, Central China/Hui) 6. German, 3 million (in East Africa, Northern Cameroons, and Northern Togo) 7. Austria-Hungary, 2 million (in Bosnia, Noviparas) 8. Italy, 1 million (Southern Somaliland) 9. Portugal, 0.5 million (coastal areas of Mozambique) 10. The United States, 0.3 million (in Southern Philippines) 11. Spain, 0.2 million (Rio de Oro/Western Sahara). Ibid. p. 25.
\textsuperscript{409} Ibid. pp. 22-3.
Hussein was aware that Britain would welcome his idea of separation from the Ottomans. He knew that Britain already controlled strategic ports and coasts in Kuwait, Qatar, Maskat, Aden, and the Trucial States (a group of six tribal confederations in south-eastern Arabia that later formed the United Arab Emirates). On the other hand, from the British point of view, London was delighted to persuade the Arab tribes under Hussein’s leadership into an Anglo-Arab alliance against the Turks. To accomplish her plan, Britain pretended to favour an independent Arab state, which they did not believe. The British knew that any deal with Hussein would violate her September 1914 agreement with the French and the Russians, promising to only demand terms of peace that were agreed upon by all three.

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412 Fromkin. A Peace to End All Peace. p. 15.
An Anglo-Arab alliance was unequivocally in favour of France’s and Britain’s imperial interest in encouraging Hussein’s ambition to take the Ottoman Caliph’s place in order to protect their influence in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{413} For this, Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State of war, looked to Sharif Hussein as Britain’s Arab ally, for he was ideally the man who could undermine the Sultan’s resonant call for Jihad.\textsuperscript{414} Combating this call for Jihad was a vital matter for the British, who recruited a large number of Egyptian and Indian Muslims into their army, and for the French, who did the same in Algeria. The British and French were aware that their Muslim troops might face a dilemma regarding fighting for or against the Caliph. The dilemma could be solved with an Arab ally who had lineage to the Prophet of Islam but was a British protégé who received regular substantial subsidies from London.\textsuperscript{415} Hussein came from the Hashemite (Qureshi) dynasty, like the Prophet. Being the Prophet’s descendant gave Hussein legitimacy to proclaim himself Caliph and substitute for Islam’s Messenger. He was aware that Ottoman Caliphs lacked the qualification of Hashemite lineage.

So, on July 14, 1915, exchanging British approval for an independent Arab state for an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire, Hussein sent his first letter to Sir Henry McMahon, the then-British High Commissioner in British Egypt.

\textsuperscript{413} Barr. A Line In The Sand. p.23.
\textsuperscript{414} Fromkin. A Peace to End All Peace. pp. 108, 115.
\textsuperscript{415} ibid. p. 426.
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This was the beginning of correspondence between Hussein and McMahon, which went on until March 10, 1916, through Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence (1888-1935), who, as a British military officer speaking colloquial Arabic, played a remarkably decisive role in persuading the Arabs to revolt against the Ottomans in 1916. In an undercover operation, Lawrence’s role was to launch a counter-Jihad by uniting feuding Arab tribes under Hussein’s insurgency to attack Ottoman logistics. Lawrence is the author of Seven Pillars of Wisdom, an autobiographical account of his participation in the Arab Revolt. He is chiefly renowned as Lawrence of Arabia in a movie with the same title.

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See: Lawrence of Arabia (T. E. Lawrence) And His Legacy. Available at: https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=ZFxFTlDCSA&t=1447s (Accessed September 7, 2021)
In his correspondence concerning the future status of Arab lands under Ottoman rule, Hussein offered an Anglo-Arab alliance by deploying his large forces in a revolt against the Ottoman Empire in return for if the British 'approve the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam' in Arab territories under the Ottomans. This was precisely in line with Lord Kitchener’s idea that Britain should have her Arab nominee for the Caliphal title as Muhammad was an Arab. For this, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, on August 30, 1915, left no ambiguity regarding the British position, writing that 'We declare once more that [H]is [M]ajesty [G]overnment would welcome the resumption of the Caliphate by an Arab of true race' in an endorsing reference to Hussein’s Arabic lineage from the Prophet of Islam, in contrast to the Turks.

However, concerning the question of the boundaries of the promised Arab state-Caliphate, McMahon, in his letter on October 24, 1915, left it until an unknown time by saying, ‘The time had not yet come when that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner.’ According to James Barr, this left no doubt that McMahon was deliberately trying to mislead the Sharif, and Britain and France were aware that ‘the Arabs weren’t getting anything.’ Also, according to Fromkin, Britain ‘badly wanted to win Arab support but were unwilling to pay the price the Emir Hussein demanded; so instead, they were attempting to cheat by pretending to meet Hussein’s demands when, in fact, they were giving him the counterfeit coin of meaningless languages.’ Additionally, Elie Kedouri, the British historian of the Middle East, believes that the Anglo-Arab

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418 Fromkin. A Peace to End All Peace. p. 98.
419 Omar Khan. ibid.
422 Fromkin. A Peace to End All Peace. p. 186.
relations were not any alliance. Instead, he rightly describes the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence as an ‘Anglo-Arab Labyrinth,’ for it was deliberately written in obscure and ambiguous terms, particularly over the issue of Palestine.  

Nevertheless, soon after the last letter in March 1916, Hussein initiated the revolt in Medina by taking up a rifle and firing at the Ottoman barracks in the city. By calling about 70,000 Arab forces -about one-third of the Ottoman army’s fighting strength- to the revolt under the command of his son, Faisal, it became nearly impossible for Turks to distinguish between the Allies’ and Arab’s fronts. Consequently, within three weeks, the Ottoman garrison in Mecca fell, followed by other main cities of the peninsula.  

Crucially, Hussein’s revolt, in line with British desire, broke the Grand Ottoman Mufti’s Fatwa (November 11, 1914), calling the Muslim world in the name of the Caliph to Jihad against the attacking forces of France, Russia, and Britain. 

Figure 26: Ottoman declaration of the Jihad against Russia, France, and Britain, November 11, 1914 (Published in the Ottoman official gazette ‘Takvim-i Vakayi’ in the old Turkish calligraphy)  

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426 Encyclopedia. ARAB REVOLT .1916.
Moreover, Hussein’s ambition to proclaim himself the Caliph of all Muslims was a significant step beyond those Arabs who held the conference in Paris in 1913 without claiming the status of the Ottoman Caliph.430

Militarily, as the head of the Arab army, Faisal played a significant role in the revolt of Arab forces against the Ottomans. He not only broke the Fatwa but also, with the help of the British officer T.E. Lawrence, sabotaged the Hejaz railway, a vital strategic link and the spine of the Ottoman Empire through the Arab peninsula, which linked the Ottoman headquarters in Damascus to their garrisons in Medina and Yemen, at the entrance to the Red Sea. As a result, hundreds of Ottoman troops were killed in the Hejaz desert, and the garrisons were surrounded.431 It was an enormous advantage to British forces to open two fronts against the Ottomans: one in southern Iraq from the Persian Gulf towards Baghdad and Mosul in the north and the second through the Sinai towards Palestine and Syria under General Edmund Allenby’s command in the Battle of Jerusalem, that enabled him to step triumphantly into the city on December 11, 1917.

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430 Breuilly. *Nationalism and the State*. p. 150.
Shortly after the Battle of Jerusalem, the French troops landed on the coast of Lebanon and took control of Beirut. While Allenby was continuing his march towards Syria, the Arab nationalists in Damascus rebelled against the Ottoman forces. The city contained the Mausoleum of Saladin (also Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi), who defeated the Crusaders after 88 years at the decisive Battle of Hattin on July 4, 1187, a symbol of Muslim military strength. Saladin’s triumph led him to conquer Palestine, including Jerusalem. Now, in 1917, the city was under the conquest of the British army, thanks to the Anglo-Arab alliance, which was part of a broader scenario of which Arabs were unaware: the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

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432 See: Saladin; and the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem by Stanley Lane-Poole, RareBooksClub.com .2012.
Sykes-Picot: end of an era and beginning of a trauma

5.1. Africa and Middle East landscape prior to WWI

As demonstrated before, a century ago, the Middle East's political landscape looked different to that of today. None of the Arab countries we recognise today, with artificial boundaries, such as Jordan, Syria, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia, in addition to Israel and modern Turkey, existed a century ago. In referring to what is commonly described as the post-WWI Middle East new order, David Fromkin notes that the Middle East as we see it today was created by the Allies who 'destroyed the old order in the region irrevocably, they smashed the Turkish rule of the Arabic-speaking Middle East beyond repair.'

The new order started with the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which followed two examples. First, The Anglo-Russian Convention of August 31, 1907, on Iran. According to the Convention, London recognised northern Iran as part of the Russian sphere of influence. In return, Moscow recognized southern Iran as part of the British sphere of influence. However, this was not partitioning Iran; it was a kind of agreement to identify the sphere of influence. The second and most important one was the partitioning of Africa at the Berlin Conference (November 1884-February 1885), in which the European colonial powers gathered to manage the 'scramble for Africa' and prevent war over their claims to African lands. In a short time, i.e., over the course of twenty-five years from 1875 to 1900 and at the peak of the European competition for the entire continent of Africa, Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal all desired a part of Africa to provide an efficient workforce and natural resources for their growing industrial sectors. In the event, Britain and France (two significant powers who later secretly made the Sykes-Picot deal) were major winners who took possession of vast tracts of African lands.
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433 Fromkin. A Peace to End All Peace. p. 563.
434 The Convention eventually led to the formation of the Tiple Entente between Moscow, London and Paris in WWI.
French caricature (1885) of carving up Africa at the Berlin Conference (Nov. 1884 - Feb. 1885) by German Chancellor Bismarck among the European colonial powers

The Berlin Conference was held between fourteen nations, including the United States and thirteen Europeans, to divide Africa and manage an agreed direct European colonial influence while no Africans attended the event. By the end of the event, man-made borders were drawn to shape their colonies or protectorates in Africa, affecting the continent’s borders even today.436

Figure 28: French caricature (1885) of carving up Africa at the Berlin Conference (Nov. 1884 - Feb. 1885) by German Chancellor Bismarck among the European colonial powers

Figure 29: Shares of European colonial powers in carving up Africa

The Berlin Conference was held between fourteen nations, including the United States and thirteen Europeans, to divide Africa and manage an agreed direct European colonial influence while no Africans attended the event. By the end of the event, man-made borders were drawn to shape their colonies or protectorates in Africa, affecting the continent’s borders even today.436

Twenty-nine years after Britain’s and France’s experience in the successful partitioning of Africa at the Berlin Conference, the First War erupted in 1914. As pointed out, the Ottomans’ military weakness from the late eighteenth century was evident to the Triple Entente. They expected to pick up their pieces in the middle of the War once the Ottoman Empire fell apart. To London, British Egypt, and, notably, the safety of the Suez Canal was the key to access to British India. To Paris, as the protector of Catholics, Greater Syria was the desired land. Because of the Eastern Orthodox Church, Moscow wished to claim Constantinople (Istanbul) and the Straits of Dardanelles. Their dreams came true once France and Britain split the Ottoman’s Arab lands between themselves based on a secret colonial deal, officially recognised as the Asia Minor Agreement but colloquially remembered as the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The deal was reached by Colonel Mark Sykes (1879-1919), London’s desk man in charge of the Middle East (the author of *The Caliph’s Last Heritage*), and French diplomat François Georges-Picot (1870-1951), who worked as Consul-General in Ottoman Beirut prior to the First War. He firmly believed in France’s civilising mission.438 The two highly professional envoys were designated to draft a mutually acceptable post-war partition of Arab lands under the Ottomans into three imperial possessions.

The Sykes-Picot secret negotiations occurred between November 1915 and March 1916. Eventually, the Agreement was concluded on May 16, 1916, while almost parallel talks were going on between Sharif Hussein and Henry McMahon from July 1915 until March 1916.

The period of Hussein-McMahon correspondence for Anglo-Arab alliance (below)

The period of the Sykes-Picot secret negotiations on partitioning of Arab lands (above)

Figure 31: Overlapping of the period of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence and the period of Mark Sykes (left) and François Georges-Picot (right) negotiations
According to the Agreement, the parties agreed to carve up territories overwhelmingly Muslim, Arabic-speaking, and Turkish-ruled since the thirteenth century (sometimes referred to as the Arabs of Mesopotamia, Greater Syria, and the Hejaz) into three different spheres of influence. That took place by drawing an almost straight line on a map, extending roughly from Palestine to Iraq (i.e., to the south and east) to the British and the north and west to France. Russia was supposed to receive Armenia, the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, the Bosphorus, and Istanbul.439 440

Figure 32: The Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916 between Britain and France, with Russia’s consent for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire441

5.2. Beginning of a lasting trauma: an encounter between Crescent and Cross

As pointed out, the First War imposed a new order and alignment in the Middle East by which the major European powers at that time (Britain and France with the consent of Russia and Italy)442 effectually but secretly partitioned the Ottoman Empire. They carved up the Arab lands according to their colonial interests.

Since the Ottomans had been carrying the holy title of the Caliph, pan-Islamists consider the Agreement the cornerstone of a notorious conspiracy, shorthand for the narrative of Western betrayal, and the single cause of the end of an ‘era’443 and beginning of a ‘trauma.’

Pan-Islamists believe that the Caliphate is Islam’s insignia and light to enlighten humanity.444 As such, the dissolution of the Ottoman is seen as the destruction of an empire and the abolition of the last Muslim Caliphate, which must not be perceived as the parish of other political systems in the world. This was a shock for those under the Ottomans, whom Caliphs had ruled for centuries. They knew no other system of governing. How could they digest the abolition of a long-lived divine office to be replaced by secular systems in just over a year?

As the pro-Caliphate Hizb ut-Tahrir states, when ‘the Khilafah was destroyed, the system of Islam was abolished, and the whole of the Islamic Ummah was threatened with extinction.’445 Subsequently, a new era of politics came about due to the unfolding pro-Caliphate movements based on the politics of the Umma, impelling Muslims worldwide to restore the Caliphate that is viewed as ‘the rope stretched between God and His creatures.’446

To portray the effect of the absence of the Caliphate on Muslim public consciousness, Cemil Aydin describes it as ‘A body with no head.’ Mona F. Hassan describes it as a ‘trauma’ that occurred twice in Muslim history: first in 1258 when the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad fell into the hands of the Mongols and then in 1924 through the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate by Ataturk.447

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442 Due to the Triple Entente’s agreement on September 4, 1914, in the middle of the First War and still prior to the Russian Revolution (1917), François Georges-Picot and Mark Sykes, who drafted the Agreement in March 1916, travelled to Russia to secure their Entente Allies’ consent to their partition plan. Serge Dmitrievich Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, negotiated with them to receive western Armenia, Constantinople, and the Turkish Straits for Russia. Also, after the Italian declaration of war against Germany on May 23, 1915, Britain and France promised Italy southern and southwestern Anatolia of the Ottoman lands and any territory gained by the Allies from Germany in Africa. However, despite the initial agreement between the four parties, Russia’s defection from the war cancelled Russia’s share of the Asia Minor Agreement. Also, the Turkish War of Independence, which brought victories for the Turkish Nationalists, prevented Italy from accessing any part of Anatolia. Consequently, the remaining parties of the Agreement were Britain and France. (See: Eugene Rogan. A Century after Sykes-Picot. P. 102. Also see: Sykes-Picot Agreement in Britannica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Sykes-Picot-Agreement. Accessed February 31, 2021).

443 Pankhurst. The Inevitable Caliphate. p. 31.


446 Liew. Writing Away the Caliph. p. 122.

However, the difference is that soon after the last Abbasid Caliph, al-Mustasim, was killed by the Mongols in 1258, terminating the Abbasid Caliphate, al-Mustansir was acknowledged as a new Caliph in 1261, but this time in Cairo, due to the occupation of Baghdad by the Mongols. This means that the Mongols’ storm left Muslims only three years with no official Caliph. In contrast, at the dissolution of the Ottoman Caliphate, Muslims entered a ‘traumatic era,’ as described by Bernard Lewis. This trauma is explicitly reflected in the prominent Egyptian poet Ahmed Shawqi’s dramatic ballad mourning the loss of the Caliphate:

**Minarets and pulpits mourned for you**

**The entire mourners wept for you**

*India is flabbergasted, and Egypt is sad*

*They cry for you with drizzled tears*

*The Levant, Iraq, and Persia are questioning:*

*Did [verily] someone eliminate the Caliphate from Earth?*

The trauma seems to have had lasting consequences for Muslim politics, leaving behind two crises: an identity crisis and a power vacuum (leadership crisis). The two crises became abundantly clear in the 20th century -as Bernard Lewis’s essay of 1970, The Return of Islam, for example, suggests- when the typical perception among pro-Caliphate movements was that due to the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, the world of Islam became poor, weak, and humiliated. In contrast, they believe Muslims were the military, economic, and political pioneers in Islam’s Golden Age. This critical situation in the Muslim world, particularly after the Second War, is portrayed by Matthew Jacobs as poor, divided, headless, intellectually stagnant, and militarily feeble, leaving behind nostalgia and an enduring attachment to the dissolved institution of the Caliphate.

Notably, from a pan-Islamist perspective, its dissolution is closely associated with the Crusades. According to Carole Hillenbrand in The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, this historical event has inflicted ‘profound and lasting psychological scars’ on Muslims. Whereas the Europeans had seen the colonial period as a civilising mission, pan-Islamists see it in the Crescent versus the Cross context.

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449 Lewis. The Return of Islam. p. 49.
The Crescent stands as the symbol of the Muslim Umma (Dar al-Islam/Islamdom) and the Cross as the symbol of old and new colonial Christian West (Dar al-Kufr/Non-Umma), which allegedly launched a new Crusade once partitioned Muslim territories based on the Sykes-Picot.

Cemil Ayden views Muhammad Asad’s *Islam at the Crossroads* as an early anti-colonial work in which the author considers Western imperialism/colonialism to be a continuation of the Crusaders’ hostility.\(^{453}\) Similarly, Muslim scholar Taqiuddin al-Nabhani views the 1917 capture of al-Quds (Jerusalem) by the British army in the First War as the ‘malice and hatred has existed ever since the days of the crusades.’\(^{454}\) In the same vein, David Fromkin associates the post-war French


\(^{454}\) Al-Nabhan. *The Islamic State*. p. 188.
Re-Thinking The Politics of The Umma (Muslim Bloc) | SYKES-PICOT: BEGINNING OF A TRAUMA

desire to have the Syrian territory with the time of the Crusades.\textsuperscript{455} Similarly, in his book \textit{Towards the Unification of Muslim Umma}, Mussadiq Mahmood Ghumman, a Pakistani scholar, asserts that:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{\‘[A]nti- Islamic prejudices generated in the time of Crusades along with the colonial ambitions were now finally taking the shape against Ottoman Empire […] the hate originated from these crusades remained at the driving force all the times in every effort of the Western world to dismantle the Muslim unity afterwards. Ottomans, being the guardian of the house of Caliphate, were the natural recipient of all these hatred. Therefore conspiracies were launched to destabilize the Ottoman Empire.‘}\textsuperscript{456}
\end{quote}

This is also broadly reflected in \textit{Smashing the Borders of Arrogants}, a recurring rhetorical talking point for DAESH, in its \textit{al-hayat} magazine, dated May 2014, stating:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{\‘The ember of jihad was lit, the Crusade campaign was broken, and the Islamic State was established despite the villainous […] It left the map for the Islamic State to redraw the world in accordance with the methodology of the prophetic Khilafah.‘}\textsuperscript{457}
\end{quote}

\textit{Figure 3: A moment when DAESH smashes the border between Iraq and Syria}

\textit{DAESH al-Hayat} magazine entitled ‘smashing the Borders of Tawaghit (Arrogants)’ / May 2014

Also, a DAESH Jihadi militant, in a video entitled \textit{The end of Sykes-Picot}, referring to what he describes as artificial borders, states:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{\‘Today we are happy to participate in destroying the borders placed by the oppressors…who broke up the Islamic Caliphate and made it into countries like Syria and Iraq, ruled by man-made laws […] Today we begin the final stage after the Umma was divided […] Their plot was to divide and conquer. That is what they had done with us […]}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{455} Fromkin. \textit{A Peace to End All Peace}. p. 94.
\item \textsuperscript{456} Ghumman. \textit{Towards the Unification of Muslim Umma}. p. 66.
\item \textsuperscript{457} \textit{Al-Hayat Media Center of Islamic State}. Shaban 1435 / May 2014. Issue 4.
\end{itemize}
This –the border between Iraq and Syria- is not the first border we will break. We will break other borders. 458

Viewed from this perspective, by positioning Western interventions as part of an unfinished history of lingering Crusading, pan-Islamists view the history in such a way that a new Crusade is ‘designed to uproot the Islamic State and uproot Islam from the soul of Muslims.’ 459 This historical attitude is also key to understanding how thinkers like Sayyid Qutb developed Islamic militancy to mean resistance or a fight against Crusader interventions.

This advocacy is the attitude of pan-Islamists who oppose the post-First and Second Wars division of the Muslim territories into arbitrarily imposed nation-states with artificial borders. In this perspective, the colonial Sykes-Picot was not just a termination of an empire but also a traumatic turning point in gradually shifting from one Muslim state to several Arab-nation states.

Nevertheless, a founded fact is missing in their blame against the Sykes-Picot, which was allegedly the cause of the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate. That is the role of Arab Muslims dreaming of an Arab Caliphate in an independent Arab state.

5.3. Arabic Caliphate vs. Turkish Caliphate
As seen, on December 11, 1917, the British commander General Edmund Allenby entered Jerusalem (al-Quds, the third holiest city for Muslims after Mecca and Medina). Among his forces was T.E. Lawrence, who was assisted by Faisal remarkably. In Jerusalem, from the Ottomans to the British, Robert Mazza believed that Allenby was a religious man and liked to be remembered as the conqueror of the lands of the Bible. 460 For example, it is reported that Allenby and his forces marched into the city instead of riding horses because Christ walked into the old city of Jerusalem.

459 Pankhurst. The Inevitable Caliphate. p. 111.
Allenby was the first Christian commander to step into al-Quds since the Crusaders took Jerusalem from the Fatimid Caliphate in 1099 in the First Crusade. Therefore, Robert Mazza reports that this military success was praised by people who considered it a victory for Crusaders -not only for the British- as in a short film entitled ‘With the Crusaders in the Holy Land. Allenby the Conqueror.’ Mazz also reports that The Times described the liberation of Jerusalem as the ‘most memorable event in the history of Christendom’\textsuperscript{461} and refers to some books in the form of diaries like The Great Crusade and The Modern Crusaders, which praised the success.\textsuperscript{462} He also notes that ‘[A]lthough the imagery of the Crusades was almost forgotten in Muslim memory, they were nonetheless forced to confront the mounting ‘crusading-mania’ spreading through the press in Britain and the local Christian churches.’\textsuperscript{463}

\textsuperscript{461} ibid. p. 130.
\textsuperscript{462} ibid. p. 144.
\textsuperscript{463} ibid. p. 137.
From the pan-Islamist perspective, the capture of al-Quds not only swept away five hundred years of Ottoman rule in the city but also left a profound impact on the region to be understood as a clash-field between two civilisations of Islam and Christianity, for the Holy Land was reclaimed for the first time since the Crusades. In line with Huntington’s grand theory of the Clash of Civilisations, Olivier Roy notes that Islamist discourse is all convincing Muslims that a great Crusade has been waged against Muslim Umma since the day al-Quds was captured. Similarly, while Ghumman considers the new Crusade as ‘anti-Islamic prejudices,’ al-Nabhan firmly holds that Europeans hatched various plots to destroy the Muslim Caliphate, particularly when Ataturk, through the destruction of the Caliphate in modern Turkey, ‘fulfilled the dream of the disbelievers which they had nurtured ever since the Crusades.’ In their view, anti-Islamic prejudice was mounted by the Western world against the Islamic lands when they targeted the Muslim Umma at the last stage by targeting the Ottoman Caliphate.

It is worth mentioning that among the three European powers, Britain played a more significant role during and after the First War in implementing her wishes in the region than France, which had limited military influence in the Middle East, and Russia, which was involved in civil war and then revolution. Since the opening of her consulate in Jerusalem in 1838 as the first European country, Britain remained the dominant power in the region, particularly during and after the War.

As demonstrated, the British pretended she was the Arabs’ ally in the War in the Anglo-Arab alliance. As such, pan-Islamists view Britain as the leading role player in the new Crusade.

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465 Ghumman. Towards the Unification of Muslim Umma. p. 66.
Ghumman, for example, holds that there were two British-Zionist plots against the Ottoman Empire. As for the first plot, Ghumman reports that by the end of the 19th century, Jews opposed Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1842-1918), who refused their demand to consider Palestine, the promised land in the Torah, as the Jewish homeland. The request was presented to the Sultan on June 15, 1896, by Theodor Herzl, the father of modern political Zionism, in his effort to craft a Jewish state. He proposed that the Jews would pay the Ottoman foreign debt in exchange for Palestine as a Jewish homeland under Turkish rule. However, Herzl’s second plan was to turn to Britain. Accordingly, Herzl met with the British authorities, including Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary, which paved the way for the formation of Israel in Palestine as a Jewish homeland according to the 1917 Balfour Declaration. The initial talks between the British and the Zionist leaders took place at a conference on February 7, 1917, attended by Mark Sykes, the negotiator in the Sykes-Picot Agreement a year before in 1916, after the Hussein-McMahon correspondence in 1915. Subsequently, the British and Zionists’ negotiations resulted in the Balfour Declaration, in which there was no representation from Palestine. The declaration was a letter dated November 2, 1917, from the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour, to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, a prominent Zionist and a leader of the British Jewish community, in which Balfour expressed the British government’s support for the establishment of a ‘national home for the Jewish people’ in Palestine, then an Ottoman land with a small minority of Jewish people. The Declaration was reached in the middle of the First World War, which ended with the defeat and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the complete devastation of the Ottoman Caliphate.467 However, this was a vague commitment since it was not clear whether ‘national home’ meant ‘state’ and what the situation of the non-Jewish majority would be in practice. As a result, there was a long way to go to establish the State of Israel, until after the Second World War, when at midnight on May 14, 1948, the British Mandate in Palestine terminated. Now that the Jewish settlement in Palestine had increased, David Ben-Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency and later the State’s first Prime Minister, declared the establishment of the Jewish State of Israel on the same day.

Ghumman holds that the second plot was the British support of nationalist movements within the Ottoman Empire to defeat the Ottomans. According to Ghumman, while the Young Turks were refusing pan-Islamism and favoured the pan-Turkish movement to modernise the Ottoman Empire, the British were boosting anti-Turkish nationalist movements within the Empire, each calling for independence, such as Serbian nationalism led by the British agent Seton-Watson, Albanian nationalism led by Lady Dunham, Bulgarian nationalism led by Noel Buxton, and eventually Arab nationalism led by Lawrence of Arabia in support of Sharif Hussein.468 At the same time, the British and French colonial plan was to secretly divide the Arab territories among themselves according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916) and create Israel according to the Balfour

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468 Ibid. p. 74.
Declaration (November 1917).\textsuperscript{469} All of these became a reality when General Allenby and his British forces entered Jerusalem (December 1917) and ended Ottoman rule. Following the capture of Jerusalem, the Jewish settlement in Palestine increased. The subversive role of the British became apparent to the Arabs when Russian revolutionary Bolsheviks publicised the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement in Izvestia and Pravda on November 23, 1917.

While this was seen as treason, a much worse event occurred when, in the post-War San Remo conference (19 to 26 April 1920), the victorious Allied powers gathered to determine the fate of the Arab Middle East in their own favour through indirect control without the added expense of direct colonialism. While Arabs were absent, the victorious powers (Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) agreed that not all parts of the Middle East were ready for complete independence. Accordingly, Syria and Mesopotamia were provisionally recognised as regions under Mandatory assistance until they could ‘stand alone.’ However, in the case of Palestine, it was much worse for the Arabs because the Allies decided that the Mandate would administer Palestine under an obligation to implement the Balfour Declaration to establish a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chronology.png}
\caption{Chronology of stages from the Hussein-McMahon correspondence to imposing the Mandate System}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{469} ibid. pp. 75-6.
5.4. Mandate System for incapable of self-government Arabs

As pointed out, on June 5, 1916, Hussein commenced the revolt, which lasted until October 1918, one month before the end of the First War in November. While Hussein was dreaming of an Arab Caliphate promised to him by Britain, he was not aware that McMahon’s promises were, in fact, one of three mutual commitments made by Britain about the post-war disposition of the Arab territories. The two others were the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916 and the Balfour Declaration of November 1917. As such, David Fromkin reveals that in McMahon’s view, any independent Arab kingdom has ‘to be a British protectorate.’ Also, James Barr reports that from London’s vision, any Arab state, as desired by Sharif Hussein, was an ‘absurdity since the Arabs were a heap of scattered tribes with no cohesion and no organisation.’ Similarly, Tariq Tell, an American University of Beirut faculty member, believes that ‘McMahon deliberately injected a degree of obfuscation into his answers to the Sharif,’ for he was aware of the British secret and parallel negotiations with her French ally over the post-war disposition of the Arab territories under the Ottomans. From the French side, Georges-Picot, who was in secret talks with Mark Sykes during the War, had already informed his British counterpart that ‘To promise the Arabs a large state is to throw dust in their eyes [...] You cannot transform a myriad of tribes into a viable whole.’ In the same vein, David Fromkin states that Mark Sykes of Britain shared the same idea that Arabs ‘have no national spirit in our sense of the word, but they have got a sense of racial pride.’

According to Barr, the promise of Arab independence was, in fact, nothing more than lip service, which is why the Sykes-Picot Agreement was kept secret. ‘It was a shamelessly self-interested pact,’ James Barr comments. Also, Lieutenant-General George Macdonogh, Britain’s head of military intelligence and a supporter of the Agreement, notes: ‘It seems to me that we are rather in the position of hunters who divided up the skin of the bear before they had killed it.’

Moreover, soon after the defeat of the Ottomans, the Allies, acting entirely in their own self-interest, later in the Paris (Versailles) Peace Conference (beginning in January 1919, two months after the First War was over in November 1918), adopted what is known as ‘Mandate System,’ which came into force on June 28, 1919. Contrary to what was supposedly agreed with Hussein,  

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476 Barr. ibid. pp. 31-2.
477 ibid.
Greater Syria was not given to the Arabs. Instead, it became a French mandate, while Britain was given mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine.\(^\text{479}\) That means they first created new zones on the map, and then they claimed in the League of Nations (itself an Allied creation) that these new zones were not able to rule over themselves.

Significantly, the boundaries were drawn so that the rich Middle East oilfields went to Britain, where they had already constructed the oil pipelines. After scrapping the use of coal and replacing it with oil, the British navy needed to be able to extract oil in order to protect the land and sea lines from the Suez Canal (which, as part of Egypt, was already annexed to Britain from the Ottomans in 1882) to India, the jewel in the crown of the British Empire. India’s human resources were also the spine of the British army to control the entire enlarged Empire where ‘the sun never set.’

![Map of the Middle East Mandate System, 1926](https://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/middleeast1926map.htm)

\(^{480}\) *The British Empire*. Middle East Map, 1926 in: [https://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/middleeast1926map.htm](https://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/middleeast1926map.htm) (Accessed September 19, 2021)
Based on Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, the Mandate System authorised the reordering of the Arab territories into British and French by the common justification that Arabs were incapable of self-government and unable to function as independent states.\(^{482}\) As the article states, in territories ‘inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world [...] the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations [...] as Mandatories of the League of Nations [...] until [...] they are able to stand alone.’\(^{483}\)
Significantly, Fromkin notes that such an approach toward Arabs existed among British officials even before the League of Nations. He notes that what was once written by Gertrude Bell, the pre-war British traveller in Arabian lands, was regarded as an indisputable fact by the British when she wrote: '[T]he Arabs can't govern themselves.'

Ultimately, what was offered to Hussein—now King and Caliph Hussein—as an Arab state was no more than the Kingdom of Hejaz (a marginal region in the west of the Arabian Peninsula where Mecca and Medina are located). Nevertheless, this did not last long. On December 19, 1925, Hussein’s Caliphate in the Hashemite Kingdom of Hejaz was ousted by neighbouring rivals, the Saudi clan, which later established Saudi Arabia in 1932.

Still, in the period of colonialism, we can trace the root of the civilising mission upon which the Mandate System justified colonialist practice. The general justification was that a temporary period of tutelage was necessary for incapable Arab societies to advance to the level at which they could become capable of self-running government. Naturally, this was a fatal blow to the Arabs’ identity and was opposed by Emir Feisal, who led the Arab insurgency against the Ottomans and later represented Arabs at the Paris Peace Conference.

Figure 42: Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (as Part I of the Treaty of Versailles)\textsuperscript{485}

\textsuperscript{485}ibid.
Significantly, Fromkin notes that such an approach toward Arabs existed among British officials even before the League of Nations. He notes that what was once written by Gertrude Bell, the pre-war British traveller in Arabian lands, was regarded as an indisputable fact by the British when she wrote: ‘[T]he Arabs can’t govern themselves.’ Ultimately, what was offered to Hussein - now King and Caliph Hussein- as an Arab state was no more than the Kingdom of Hejaz (a marginal region in the west of the Arabian Peninsula where Mecca and Medina are located). Nevertheless, this did not last long. On December 19, 1925, Hussein’s Caliphate in the Hashemite Kingdom of Hejaz was ousted by neighbouring rivals, the Saudi clan, which later established Saudi Arabia in 1932.

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Despite the right to self-determination, proposed by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points (January 8, 1918), when Faisal realised that the Arabs were offered much less than what they had anticipated from the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, he rejected the San Remo decision. Subsequently, this sparked violent unrest in Greater Syria, which was easily defeated by French forces in the Franco-Syrian War (July 1920). Faisal was deposed and sent into exile like his father, who had been sent into exile in British-controlled Cyprus.

As for Palestine, the British opened up doors to Jewish migration as per the Balfour Declaration, which increased Arab outrage in Iraq in 1920. Iraqis opposed the British occupation of their lands. Like France in Syria, Britain quickly defeated the revolt but decided to designate Hussein’s sons Faisal and Abdullah as puppet kings in Iraq and Jordan, respectively, as two new small separate Arab kingdoms instead of the single large Arab kingdom promised to their father. Contrary to their father’s dream of reviving an Arab Caliphate, Hussein’s sons adopted the title of king rather than Caliph. Similarly, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud (1875–1953) chose the title of king. None of the rival Arab leaders (Faisal, Abdullah, and Ibn Saud) chose to be a Caliph.

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Emir Faisal (centre) at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 at Versailles and behind him (second from right) is Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia).

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That said, Ibn Saud later overthrew Hussein’s Hashemite Kingdom in Hejaz in 1924. Faisal’s Hashemite monarchy of Iraq was also eventually overthrown by an Iraqi army coup (the Free Officers) in 1958. The coup also terminated the Hashemite Arab Federation, which had been shaped just six months earlier between the two brothers in Jordan and Iraq. Ultimately, what was left of the promised great kingdom to Hussein was nothing but the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as the final vestige of Hashemite rule.\footnote{El Bakri. Revolutions and Rebellions. pp. 4-5.}

From this perspective, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the First War resulted in a new colonial order proposed by the Allies, seen in three events: Firstly, in the San Remo conference (April 19-26, 1920) on the administration of three Ottoman territories in the Middle East namely Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia, Secondly, in the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) on the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, and thirdly, in the Treaty of Lausanne (July 23, 1923), which defined the borders of the present-day Turkish Republic. This process took place with little regard to the ethnic, political, or religious affiliations of the region’s inhabitants, leaving behind conflicts even today.
Especially provocative to pan-Islamists, despite the secret agreement between Sharif Hussein and Britain in the middle of the First War regarding the formation of a new Caliphate over all Arab lands, the post-war order ignored Hussein’s wishes. Consequently, the Muslim tradition of holding a Caliphal system was terminated forever in 1924 by Ataturk. The last Caliph, Abdul Majid II (who was elected as the Caliph two years before the Ottoman Sultanate was abolished), not only had no influence on Turkish intellectuals but was also declared Persona Non-Grata and sent into exile. Paralely, Hussein’s Sharifian Caliphate ended nowhere.

Considering this intentional treason and betrayal by the colonial powers, pan-Islamists hold that the plot behind the Sykes-Picot Agreement was simply to deprive the region of the glories of Islam’s medieval period, establishing instead ‘nominally independent’ Arab states, which were ‘artificially and economically dependent creations.’

The Mandatories continued until the colonial powers were exhausted by the cost of the Second World War.

Historian Rashid Khalidi reiterates that one of the impacts of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was to create a sense of grievance among people who would have managed their political life somewhat differently if they had been given a chance at self-determination.

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490 Demant. Islam vs. Islamism. p.34.
5.5. Balfour Declaration: A Jewish homeland in Palestine

In the aftermath of the Ottoman’s defeat in the First War and the division of its territories under the Treaty of Sèvres and the Treaty of Lausanne among European powers, the Middle East political shape changed beyond recognition as a result of three movements: Turkish nationalism led by Mustafa Kemal who later became the founder of modern Turkey on the ruins of the Ottomans, Arab nationalism led by Sharif Hussein, whose kingdom was soon defeated, and the Zionist movement led by Chaim Weizmann, who later became the first President of Israel.

As stated, among the three powers, London wanted to keep the Sykes-Picot Agreement classified, for the British had already promised an independent county to the Arabs under a Caliphate, whereas secret negotiations were going on between Chaim Weizmann and the British Foreign Secretary Lord Arthur Balfour to endorse the Zionist Movement in establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine, which was agreed on as an international zone.\(^{492}\) In other words, the British tried to have it both ways, i.e., support the Jewish diaspora while at the same time having the support of Arabs in their revolt against the Ottomans.

![Figure 47: Arthur James Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, who issued the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917](image)

However, within one month of the Russian revolution of October 1917, on November 23, the revolutionary Bolshevick Soviet government released the entire Sykes-Picot script in Izvestia and Pravda to reveal the former Russian monarchy’s treason against the people of the region in collaboration with other imperialist countries, namely France and Britain. Subsequently, the Manchester Guardian newspaper also published the document on November 26. The Bolshevik’s disclosure of the Agreement was soon after Britain publicised it, on November 9, and the Balfour Declaration was signed on November 2. It states that in sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations:

‘His Majesty’s government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.’ 493

In fact, from the Islamist perspective, the Balfour Declaration is seen as supplementary to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which left four consequences: First, no independence was given to the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire. Second, the Arab lands were divided between Britain and France. Third, the Arab lands went under the Mandatory System. Fourth, according to the British Mandate, Palestine was given to Jews.

Since then, the British arrangement in the Middle East has been considered a controversial alignment in the region, leading to dire consequences and severe conflicts that persist even today. Jack Straw, the British former foreign secretary, once affirmed that:

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‘A lot of problems we [Britain] are having to deal with now […] are a consequence of our colonial past. The Balfour Declaration and the contradictory assurances which were being given to Palestinians in private at the same time they were being given to Israelis. An interesting history for us but not an honourable one.494

Discourse of building a bloc: Islamic Occidentalism

Recalling the Caliphate, reclaiming the Umma: the remedy for stigmas

Genealogy of Counter-hegemonic narrative of pan-Islamist discourse

6.1. Combatting Ḥiḍaṭ: reawakening of Muslim conscience

As a matter of fact, Islam and Western civilisation have acted and reacted upon one another several times in alternating roles. However, on one Western civilisation turned to colonialism, it ended with the creation of Islamic resistance against the colonial system, renamed as 'the Problem of Islamic Occidentalism' by Marco Demichelis.

One such interaction between Islam and the West was when, with stunning ease, on July 1, 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte exposed Muslim vulnerability by conquering Egypt's Ottoman province and opening the Middle East to Western influence. This was the first time in centuries that two different cultures and societies confronted each other in this way. Consequently, Muslims understood the shortcomings in their relationship with modernised nations, realising they no longer had such an advanced past. Century by century, while living under the European colonial system, the contrast between medieval successes and more recent tribulations measured in terms of military strength, political stability, economic development, corruption, health, or literacy shaped a trauma in the form of a question for Muslim thinkers: What had gone wrong with Muslims?

With that question in their minds, believing that the flag of Islam was flying low, leading to Islamic civilisational decline, decadence, and passivity (Inḥiḍaṭ), the 19th century was a turning point for Muslims. They needed to determine their future between the two opposing trends preoccupying the Muslim intelligentsia over religious renewal. The choices were imitation (compulsory Westernisation) on the one hand or a religious reaction to Westernisation, conserving Muslim alienation on the other. In other words, the two trends were Western modernisation, a complete and speedy embrace of Western patterns, or Islamic fundamentalism, rejecting change entirely and referring to it as the onslaught of Western modernisation.

A few Muslim thinkers advocated a middle path between the two choices. They argued that it is possible to reconcile Islamic identity and Western patterns. Among them was Rifa'a Rafi' al-
6 Discourse of building a bloc: Islamic occidentalism

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496 Bowering, Islamic Political Thought. p. 3.
Tahtawi of Egypt (1801-1873), the pioneer figure of the Nahda (renaissance). After finishing his studies in France, he sought to bring about reconciliation and understanding between Islamic and European civilisations. Returning from Paris to Cairo, as head of the School of Languages and through his works, including his piece The Extraction of Gold or an Overview of Paris, al-Tahtawi held the idea that Islam’s principles are compatible with those of European modernity. However, soon after al-Tahtawi, Taha Hussein (1889-1973), the eminent Egyptian writer, explicitly stated that ‘In order to become equal partners in civilisation with the Europeans, we must literally and forthrightly do everything that they do; we must share with them the present civilisation, with all its pleasant and unpleasant sides.

It is no surprise that modernism was overwhelmingly rejected by Muslim advocates of revivalism, who offered their own blueprint for Muslim renewal through the reawakening of the Muslim conscience as the remedy for the stigma of the Muslim Umma. Fred Halliday discusses the fact that whereas social movements such as Arab socialism (Nasserism in Egypt) and Secular Arabism (Ba’thism in Iraq and Syria) seem to have become exhausted, the notion of Islamic revival (also resurgence, Ihya in Arabic) or renewal (Tajdid) became a trend and solution in the entire hundred years ago, particularly in the post-colonial era. The trend gave the Islamists the opportunity to practice their resurgence doctrine. For instance, while holding that all man-made schools of thought failed, revivalist Sayyid Qutb believed the turn of Islam and the Muslim community had arrived; this was known as Salafism (Ancestralism). In this phase, Return to Islam – like the global phenomenon of Return to Religion – was heard from Salafi revivalists as political discourse. They still suggest it as a solution to today’s Muslim economic, social, political, or civilisational decline.

**Back to basics: reconstruction of the past in the present**

The Salafist narrative of Muslim degradation is often mixed with the nostalgia of a grandeur past (Salaf) in the declining present. By applying foundational Islamic texts, the Salafist revival is, first, a religious cognitive, second, a regressive ideology, and third, a puritanical interpretation of Islamic thought and intellect that searches for its glory in the original pristine sources to avoid

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499 After the formation of the Arab League’s formation in 1945, which ended with no substantial unity between Arab states, several attempts were made by major Arab countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s to establish Arab unity between themselves. The first initiative was taken by Egypt and Syria that ended up in the formation of the United Arab Republic (1958-61), then by Egypt, Syria, and Iraq (1963), then Egypt and Libya (1973), and lastly by Syria and Iraq (1979).
Re-Thinking The Politics of The Umma (Muslim Bloc) | DICOURSE OF BUILDING A BLOC

alienation from the origin. The Salafist narrative is sometimes referred to as the Islamic Awakening (Sahwa) or what Mandaville describes as the ‘reawakening of the Muslim conscience.’

It believes the renewal process needs to be implemented through the revival (of values), reform (of society), and reinterpretation (of scripture), according to Khan, to be the solution for the ills of Islamic societies and the remedy for their stigmas.

In other words, the Salafist notion is the application of a ‘back to basics’ approach to purify and cleanse Islam from extraneous elements. The movement is featured by glorifying a mythical primitive past that dreams of a future of perfection through the resurrection of the pristine Muslim Umma established in Medina by Muhammad, Islam’s al-Salaf al-Sālih (the Pious Predecessor/Forefather), and continued in his early four successors.

In view of the above points, Salafism (interchangeably sometimes referred to in a pejorative term as Islamic fundamentalism) is the ultra-orthodox and backward-looking interpretation of Islam. For Salafis, a practised and well-understood Islam would lead to the miracle of the Muslim world recovering from its inferiority and dependence on the West. In their perception, there is no shortcoming in Islam. Accordingly, one ‘single causal factor’ of losing faith (Iman) and non-implementation of the holy Sharia led to Western influence, whereas, in its original form, pure Islam is seen as the only comprehensive political solution and path to glory and supremacy. For instance, in Islam At the Crossroads, Muhammad Asad calls for ‘a re-awakening of the Muslims’ consciousness of their being socially and culturally different from the all-powerful Western society. For instance, in the case of Muslim women, her not wearing the Hijab (veil), not to mention too-short dresses, mixed dancing, Western fashion, etc., which immediately brand her a whore, came to symbolise danger, indecency, and symptom of Western decadence, whereas her wearing of the Hijab is seen as a sign of submission to God.

Nonetheless, another view asserts that it is derived from the ‘Hadith of renewal,’ a saying attributed to the Prophet of Islam stating that God designates every hundred years a Mujaddid, a person who brings renewal to the Muslim faith and practice through cleansing it of extraneous elements. See: Charfi. Islam: Between Message and History. Also see: ‘Revival and Renewal.’ In: Oxford Islamic Studies Online. Available at: http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2009 (Accessed July 25, 2021)


Mandaville. Transnational Muslim Politics. p. 74.

Khan. The Political Philosophy of Islamic Resurgence. p. 213.


It is worth mentioning the early four Caliphs’ period lasted thirty-one years. This means that from thirteen centuries of the Caliphate's history, Salafism considers only the first thirty-one years as genuine Islamic rule. Secondly, even historical findings reveal that this short period was chaos. The four were not in full harmony with each other, and except for the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, whose term lasted only for two years, the three others, namely Umar, Uthman, and Ali, were assassinated.

Esposito. The Islamic Threat. p.8.


Demant. Islam vs. Islamism. p. 84.
The name ‘pure Islam’ is given to the period of flourishing and advancing, for it is thought that God rained down all His mercy and blessings on Muslims through economic, philosophical, scientific, cultural, and military strength, besides far-reaching mercantile networks, because Muslims practised their faith perfectly. From the Quran, they see a correlation between their faith and their worldly success as they quote from the Quran: ‘Allah has promised those who have believed among you and done righteous deeds that He will surely grant them succession [to authority] upon the earth.’\textsuperscript{511} Similarly, in \textit{Salafi Utopia: The Making of the Islamic State}, Maryam el-Shal notes that from a Salafist perspective, the notion of Inhitat means God’s displeasure with Muslims for their disobedience, and not military failure or material changes. It was a sign of their spiritual corruption;\textsuperscript{512} as a result, God abandoned Muslims because they abandoned Him.\textsuperscript{513}

Contrary to the Salafi approach, el-Shal believes that Salafis’ nostalgia for the past is an obsession with the Muslim psyche. She notes that Salafism and its search for a utopia are both products of history, the unintended consequences of colonialism, and its baby, globalisation. Moreover, she believes that obsession is a defence mechanism against the rapid changes of the last century. She argues that the call for the formation of the Umma has no roots in objectivism; instead, it is a subjective notion driven by enjoyment incarnate. It is a dream of utopia, which they think was found in the state established in Medina. She reiterates that the Golden Age of Islam is pure imagination, adding that ‘the memory of Islam’s Golden Age is complete fantasy, delusional and a product of selective memory [...] never really existed, except in the contemporary Salafi imagination.’\textsuperscript{514} \textsuperscript{515}

It is pertinent to remember that the call for Islamic revival gradually gained popularity in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century due to the colonisation of many parts of the Muslim domain. The notion of revival led smoothly to the proliferation of Islamic political movements that existed in one form or another. Some examples, ranging from the moderate to the extremist, are: the Caliphate Movement of India, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Turkey’s Refah party, Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front, Tunisia’s al-Nahda party, Afghanistan’s Islamic Movement, Nigeria’s Islamic Movement, Tajikistan’s Islamic Movement, Yemen’s Islah party, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Kuwait’s Islamic Constitutional Movement, Bahrain’s al-Wefaq, the United States’ Nation of Islam, Egypt’s

\textsuperscript{511} The Quran 24:55.
\textsuperscript{513} Ibid. p. xxv.
\textsuperscript{514} Ibid. p. 8.
\textsuperscript{515} Maryam el-Shal’s view is broadly reflected in French Orientalist and Semitic scholar Ernest Renan’s (1823–1892) argument asserting that if there were any scientific and cultural achievements in medieval Islam (referred to as the Islamic Golden Age), this was due either to Christian Arabs, whose Hellenistic Christian faith had controlled their Semitic Arab side or to Iranian Muslims whose Aryan race cancelled out the negative aspects of their Semitic faith. (Quote from \textit{Debates on Civilization in the Muslim World}. p. 150)
Islamic Jihad, Lebanon’s Hizbollah, HAMAS and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, Egypt’s Jamaa Islamiyya and Jihad, al-Qaeda, and DAESH, among many others.

![Image of Islamic movements](image.jpg)

**Figure 49: Four major Islamist movements (left to right): the Khilafat (Caliphate) Movement of India (1919-1924), The Society of Muslim Brotherhood (1924), Hizb ut-Tahrir (1953), DAESH (2014)**

While reminding us of Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations, the call for revival is, in essence, the outcome of a common belief that the existing world order is wrong simply because it does not correspond to Islamic principles. Secondly, Islam as a political power is no longer as predominant as it used to be. In other words, pan-Islamist revival polemics sometimes include a critique of almost everything of the West, e.g., imperialism, westernisation, secularism, nationalism, democracy, and modernity, elements that they consider the origins of the de-Islamisation of Muslim societies. In this sense, the reawakening of the Muslim conscience is a normative explanation of the dynamics of Islamism. It presents a view that Islamic movements result from Islam’s confrontation with Western modernity and considers Muslim societies non-Islamic until they are redeemed from cultural submission to Western secular ideals and practices.516

As a sign of ‘Arab Winter’ and ‘Islamic Spring,’ to combat the Inhitat, Islamists suggested *Islamisation*, reflected in their motto: *Islam is the solution*. On the one hand, the motto reflects an ideological response to declining leftist secular Arab nationalism as a popular ideology that gradually dominated North Africa and the Middle East between the 1930s and 1960s. The ideology of Arab nationalism was developed, for example, by intellectuals such as Sati al-Husri, Michel Aflaq, and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, who had the motto ‘one nation Arab state.’ On the other hand, in the motto lies a theocratic rejection of the West’s central values of secularism and individualism.517

### 6.2. Recalling the Caliphate: romanticised golden past

As discussed before, Islamic identity took shape through the transformation of early Arabs into ‘Muslimness,’ protected after Muhammad’s death in the Caliphal office. Additionally, according to the Sunni denomination of Islam, Muhammad designated no one as his successor and vicegerent

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516 Bowering. *Islamic Political Thought*. p. 16.

as long as he was alive.\footnote{518} Immediately after his death, Muslims followed his close companions to appoint Abu Bakr, the Prophet’s father-in-law, as the first Caliph. Abu Bakr clarified his position as the first Caliph when he said: ‘Call me not the Caliph of the Lord. I am but the Caliph of the Prophet of Allah.’\footnote{519} Therefore, the Sunnis believe that God’s divine providence is extended after the Prophet in the institution of the Caliphate, which they consider a divine institution that is sometimes called ‘the shadow of God on Earth,’\footnote{520} meaning that God’s authority was manifested and represented by men.\footnote{521}

Significantly, despite the short duration of Muhammad’s rule, the history of Islam coincided with the institution of the Caliphate with characteristics of its own, Muslims’ unique and unprecedented political leadership substituting for the Prophet in handling their issues of religion and daily life. As asserted by Sayyid, the concept of the Caliphate in its specific application gradually formed ‘the institution of politics of Islam [...] a politics in which Islam’s presence in the world is made manifest.’\footnote{522} With the rapid spread of Islam, through the leadership of the Caliphate, Muslims succeeded in establishing the then-most extensive state in the name of Islam, which lasted until the last Caliphate was demolished forever. To restore the institution, Caliphatism is the calling to the pattern of early Caliphs who were believed to have followed the Prophet’s pure style in their acts and thoughts.\footnote{523} In other words, the movement pursued the restoration of Islam’s might and glory by forming the Muslim Umma under the new Caliphate. They advocate for a single government and assert that the Muslim Umma deserves the loyalty and adherence of believers to regain their glory in the paradigm of Umma, a paradigm that consists of one God, one Prophet, one law (Sharia), one nation (Umma), one state (political system), and one Caliph (the symbol of Muslim unity).\footnote{524} Crucially, Islamologist Ahmad Souaiaia, reflecting on Salafism’s apocalyptic ideology, argues that Salafist ideologues prophesied that once a pure Islamic State is established, it will self-sustain (\textit{Baqiyah} in Arabic) and will self-perpetuate (\textit{Mutamaddidah}) until the end of time.\footnote{525}

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\footnote{518} The question of succession to the Prophet of Islam became a matter disputed soon after his death. The case is considered the first sectarian split in the Islamic Umma, dividing Muslims into the two main branches of Sunni and Shia, to this day. Unlike the Sunni denomination, which believes Muhammad designated no one as his successor, the Shia denomination believes that Muhammad explicitly designated Ali Ibn Abi Talib, his cousin and son-in-law, as his successor.


\footnote{520} Lewis. \textit{The Crisis of Islam.} p. xvii.


\footnote{522} Sayyid. \textit{Recalling the Caliphate}. p. 183

\footnote{523} Mandaville. \textit{Global Political Islam}. p. 245.


To portray the central role of the Caliphate office in the history of Islam, Patricia Crone, a prominent historian of early Islamic history, in her book, *God’s Rule: Government and Islam*, notes that ‘The Islamist posits that it is possible to re-create the Golden age in the here and now, and the political energies of Muslims should be devoted towards to achieving this goal by reconstructing Muslim politics in the image of Islam’s first polity,’\textsuperscript{526} by which she means the Umma in Medina that continued in the form of the Caliphate office and outlived Muslim historical polity. Although Muslims did not equally respect all Caliphs, the institution was always respected as a divine entity. But selectively reading Muslim history has led pan-Islamists to romanticise Islam’s history. As mentioned before, pan-Islamists often drew fantastic and exaggerated images of the early Caliphate office. They hold that Muslims under the Caliphate experienced a period of flourishing in Islam’s first six or so centuries, remembered in the history of Islam as a pattern of success, referred to as ‘The Golden Age of Islam,’ also ‘The Period of Golden Islamic Civilisation,’\textsuperscript{527} giving new birth (Renaissance) to Europe while the latter was experiencing its Dark Ages of disarray and weakness.\textsuperscript{528} In his book, *The Venture of Islam: the Classical Age*, Marshall Hodgson gives the name ‘High Caliphal civilisation’ to this period.\textsuperscript{529}

Nostalgia for or obsession with the Caliphate, particularly throughout the last hundred years, has always been for the recovery of the glory of the ideal Islamic polity that developed into multi-ethnic empires. From the Prophet of Islam’s death in 632 until the dissolution of the last Caliphate in 1924, there was almost always a Caliphate ruling Muslims over the course of thirteen centuries. This long period is sometimes called the age of Muslim empires.\textsuperscript{530}

The list of Caliphate offices below illustrates that one or another Caliphate office, and even sometimes two parallel Caliphates –mainly in the form of a hereditary monarchy– were ruling the Muslims not only throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, or North Africa but also in Córdoba (in Andalusia, Spain):\textsuperscript{531}

1. The Rashidun Caliphate\textsuperscript{532}(632-661) in the primitive Islamic community.

\textsuperscript{527} Demant. *Islam vs. Islamism*. p. 12.
\textsuperscript{529} Hodgson. *The Venture of Islam*. p. 335.
\textsuperscript{530} *Muslim empires*. Oxford References. Available at: https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191737633.timel 0001
\textsuperscript{532} Literally means ‘the righteously guided Caliphs’ in referring -in Sunni traditions- to the first four Caliphs, namely Abu Bakr (632-634), Umair (634-644), Uthman (644-656), and Ali (656-661). The term is used to distinguish the first four Caliphs from the Islamically unaccepted hereditary monarchies of the Umayyads, Abbasids, Fatimids, and Ottomans. These dynasties ruled Muslims under aristocracy but under the name of the Muslim Caliph.
2. The Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) continued as the Emirate (756-929) and the Caliphate of Córdoba in the Iberian Peninsula (929-1031).\textsuperscript{533}

3. The Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258) continued as the Abbasid Caliphate of Cairo (1258-1517)

4. The Fatimid Caliphate (909-1171)

5. The Ottoman Caliphate (1517-1924, but the Ottoman Sultanate started in 1281), the most durable Caliphal office in Islamic history.\textsuperscript{534}

The above Islamic Caliphates demonstrate that the centre of Islam moved from place to place, from Medina to Damascus, Baghdad, Córdoba, Cairo, and Constantinople.

![Map of the Caliphate of Córdoba in the Iberian Peninsula](image)

Although the Caliphate under the later Turkish office was different in many ways from that under the Arabs, the Caliphate’s central role is undeniable in all of them. This was due to the fact that the leader carrying the title of Caliph was considered a religious vicegerent to the Prophet of Islam and a political leader of the entire Muslim Umma. In \textit{The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphate}, Hugh Kennedy, the Middle Eastern historian, sees the unity of the Muslim Umma as a considerable achievement in the face of regionalist tendencies. He writes:

‘Another remarkable achievement was the maintenance of the unity of the Muslim community in the face of regionalist tendencies. Despite their differences, almost all


\textsuperscript{534} Oxford Islamic Studies Online. ‘Islamic State.’ Available at: http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/print/opr/t236/e0394 (Accessed March 31, 2021)

Muslims believed that they should be governed by a single caliph and despite the vast geographical dispersal, they kept a common religion and a common culture.\footnote{Hugh Kennedy. \textit{The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the 6th to the 11th Century}. Longman Publishing Group. 1986. p.81.}

Nevertheless, if there is such respect for the institution, a serious question is why no one celebrates the Sokoto Caliphate of Africa, which almost had the same Ottomans’ destiny.

The Sokoto Caliphate (also known as \textit{Khilafat ul-Bilad as-Sudan}) in West Africa was established during the Fulani War in 1804 by Muslim scholar Shehu Usmanu Dan Fodio (1754-1817), who declared himself the Caliph and Commander of the Faithful (‘\textit{Amir al-Muminin}’). However, His Caliphate was eliminated in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century when it was defeated by the British in 1903 (nineteen years before the Ottomans’ destruction) and replaced by the Northern Nigeria Protectorate.\footnote{See: John P McKay, John Buckler, Bennett D Hill & Patricia B Ebrey. \textit{A History of World Societies. Volume C: From 1775 to Present}. Bedford/St. Martin’s; 8th edition. 2009.} Nevertheless, contrary to the Ottoman Caliphate, the Sokoto Caliphate is never seen as Islam’s backbone. Islamist literature almost never refers to the abolition of the Sokoto Caliphate as a blow to Muslim unity. Contrary to the celebrated Ottoman Caliphate, Islamist literature never considers the Sokoto state the guardian of the Muslim Caliphate’s house. Interestingly, neither the Ottoman nor Sokoto Caliphs had Arabic lineage to the Prophet of Islam.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{sokoto_caliphate.png}
\caption{Approximate territory of the Sokoto Caliphate State (today Northern Nigeria). (The British possessions in Africa in 1913, shown in pink)}
\end{figure}
Meaningfully, in contemporary Muslim literature, the term ‘Caliphate’ refers only to the Ottoman Caliphate, which is sometimes described as ‘the flag holder of Islam,’ ‘the insignia of Muslims,’ ‘de facto leader of the Muslim Umma,’ and the like. Nadwi reiterates that ‘with the decline of the Turks, international leadership passed from the Muslims to the non-Muslim nations of the West.’

That is why the abrogation of the Ottoman Caliphate is historically the origin of the pan-Islamist movements, not the Sokoto, which was a local Caliphate and never a protector of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca, Medina, and al-Quds. Thus, the Sokoto Caliph’s name was never recited as the Muslim Caliph at Friday prayers in any country. In contrast, Ottoman Caliphs were named in Mosques from India to the Balkans and North Africa, a sign of the global power of the Ottomans. Also, pan-Islamism was launched by Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II, continued as a movement in the 20th century with the Caliphate Movement of India and continues under various names now.

6.2.1. Pan-Islamism as a project and movement

As discussed, the most significant encounter between Islam and the West occurred when Muslims triumphantly conquered the ancient thousand-year-old Hellenic civilisation in Asia and Africa. From this time, the Hellenic Middle East became the Muslim Middle East. As demonstrated, pan-Islamists hold that the elimination of the Caliphate turned the table and the Middle East of Islam then became the Middle East of Occidental intruder under Crusader domination after the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

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Pan-Islamism as a movement is a reaction to this attitude, seeking to restore the Middle East of Islam, and secondly, it is the continuation of a project that Sultan Abdul Hamid had already launched in the late 19th century. At first, the notion of pan-Islamism was a project suggested by Muslim thinker Jamal al-Din Asadabadi to the Sultan to harness Islamic universalism in the service of the declining Caliphate through modernisation (Tanzimat) of Muslim political identity by replacing Islamism with Ottomanism. In the project, remembered as Abdul Hamid’s legacy for the entire 20th century, the Caliphate’s role became globally synchronised as a polity representing all Muslims. The Turkish historian Azmi Özcan elaborates that Abdul Hamid’s initiative was ‘the practical formulation of already existent political tendencies and feeling in the Muslim world developed through centuries.’ He gives an example that in the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (often written Kuchuk-Kainarji), which ended the Russo-Turkish War of the Black Sea (1768-74), the Ottoman Sultan signed it as ‘supreme Mohammedan Caliph’ in order to show to Russians that he was not only the Sultan of Turks but the leader of all Muslims in religious matters. The treaty approved the Ottoman loss of the Black Sea Crimean peninsula to the Russians, but not the title. The autonomous Tatar Muslims in the lost territory would continue to recognise the Ottoman Sultan as their Supreme Caliph by reading his name at Friday prayers. While the notion of the Caliphate had faded under the Mamluk rulers of Egypt from 1258 to 1516/17, it was thus reintroduced into international relations after the treaty. Similarly, the 1912 Treaty of Lausanne ratified Italian sovereignty over Libya but reaffirmed the Sultan’s name to be recited as Muslim Caliph at Friday prayers and the chief judge to be designated by him. The two treaties are signs that Caliphate politics extended beyond territorial boundaries.

542 Pankhurst. The Inevitable Caliphate. p. 35.
As discussed, Abdul Hamid’s efforts came after the Ottomans had been steadily losing territory and influence in North Africa and the Balkans. By stressing his religious authority over all Muslims in his capacity as Caliph, Abdul Hamid’s main focus was that the Caliphate is the strength of Islam in the face of the West. He wanted to utilise pan-Islamism to consolidate the Ottoman state in the face of Western encroachment while emerging nationalist movements in the Ottoman Balkans were a real threat to the Empire. Nevertheless, his promotion of Ottoman spiritual sovereignty over the Muslim Umma was not limited to Muslims in Ottoman territory. He sent books and scholars and built Madrasahs (religious schools) in other regions, such as Crimea, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also dispatched missionaries to Egypt, Tunisia, Afghanistan, India, China, and Java to receive the support of Muslims worldwide,544 which, according to Sir Arnold, did not meet with much success.545 Nevertheless, his pan-Islamist project agitated the European colonial powers once they realised that the Ottoman Sultan was promoting his sovereignty to Muslims worldwide, including Russian Muslims or colonies with Muslim populations under the British, French, and Dutch.546

In response to Abdul Hamid’s provocative actions, European orientalists before and after the First World War started to challenge the legitimacy of the Ottomans’ claim to the Caliphate by arguing that according to Muslim tradition, a Caliph cannot come from Turks. For example, Russian Vasily V. Barthold, in his Caliph and Sultan (1912), George, in Le Khalifat et le Panislamisme (1919), and Arnold Toynbee, in The Question of the Caliphate (1920), argue that according to the Prophet of Islam, a Caliph must have lineage to his Qureshi/Hashemite tribe only.547

Beyond that, Abdul Hamid’s supporters’ response to the challenges came very late and only by two Turk elites: Calal Nuri in his 1913 Ittihad-i-Islam (Islamic unity) and Naci Ismail Pelister (with the pen name Habil Adem) in his 1915 After the[Balkan] Wars: The Policy on the Caliphate and Turkism.548 Adem, for instance, redefined pan-Islamism as anti-British, anti-Russian, and anti-imperial. He pointed out that the British wanted to shift the Caliphal office from the Turks in Istanbul to King Fuad of Egypt, a British protectorate, with the goal of uniting Arabs under an Arab Caliphate, knowing it would work better than Arab nationalism.549

However, despite Abdul Hamid’s efforts, his pro-Caliphate pan-Islamism project resulted in no fruition to hold the Empire together, and consequently, its destruction is seen as a landmark catastrophe in contemporary Muslim history.

During Abdul Hamid’s period, a politically independent state based on a nationalist project was more achievable than uniting Muslims from Egypt to India and West Asia under the Umma.

547 Ibid. p. 118.
549 Ibid. p. 114.
However, after the abolition of the last Muslim Caliphate, which led to a vacuum of leadership in the Muslim world, the idea of pan-Islamism, the uniting of Muslims into one Umma under one government, gradually became a movement with roots in the past (Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, and Ottoman). Consequently, the struggle to save the Caliphate after the First World War was a natural reaction for Muslims. Interestingly, the reaction occurred in Muslim India, not among Arabs.

### 6.2.2. Destruction of Caliphate in Turkey: earliest vanguard in India

The first reaction to save the institution took place in the campaign of the Caliphate Movement of India and its official publication, the *Hamdam Journal*, inviting Arab and non-Arab Muslims to be united as one Umma under the Caliphate.\(^{550}\) It was a vanguard agitation by British-Indian Muslims, allied with Indian nationalists, in the post-war-treaty-making process. Its purpose was to put pressure on London to preserve the authority of the Ottoman Caliph.\(^{551}\)

Ironically, the movement was not welcomed in the Ottoman territories and was also viewed as a threat by both pan-Arabs, who feared the Turk Caliph’s new claim to Arab territories and by pan-Turks, who aimed to establish a secular state. The Caliphate Movement was an organised reaction by Muslims of British India led by Shaukat Ali, Muhammad Ali Jauhar, Abdul Bari, Mahmoud ul-Hassan, and Abul Kalam Azad to save the institution in modern Turkey that was going to be crafted by Ataturk.\(^{552}\) They considered the dissolution of the institution as a devastating catastrophe. The Movement’s core notion was the necessity of the Caliphate for Muslims worldwide, particularly as a sign of solidarity with their fellow Turkish Muslims. Muhammad Naeem Qureshi, a prominent Movement member, recalls that in almost all the Indian Subcontinent’s mosques, the Ottoman Caliph’s name was recited at Friday prayers as a sign of solidarity with the Caliphate in Istanbul.\(^{553}\)

Due to worries about the custodianship of three holy places under the Caliphate, the Ottomans’ defeat in the First World War left deep outrage in Muslim India that if the Ottoman state were to disappear, Muslims would be like the Jews who lost their kingdom and became a diaspora.\(^{554}\) Additionally, Indian Muslims proposed that Mustafa Kemal undertake the role of the Caliph,\(^{555}\) a suggestion that Ataturk firmly refused even to consider. To him, Caliphatism was an erroneous manifestation of backwardness, which had no practical applicability in the modern world.

The Movement was launched in September 1919, ten months after the First World War ended in November 1918. Publishing the *Khilafat Manifesto*, British Indian Muslims asked London to

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\(^{550}\) Nafi. *The Islamists*. P. 82.


\(^{553}\) ibid. p. 14.


\(^{555}\) ibid.
protect the institution for India’s Muslims, followed by several conferences organised in cities in northern India. A Central Caliphate Committee was also constituted in Mumbai (Bombay), with branches in other cities, such as the Tehrik-e-Khilafat of Punjab (the Punjab Caliphate Movement). Interestingly, the Movement gained Mahatma Gandhi’s support when he joined its Central Committee as a member. Its aim was to apply Muslim influence to protect the Ottoman Caliph’s status as the symbol of Muslim unity. In essence, the abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate in November 1922 and the formation of the Republic of Turkey with Ataturk as its head in October 1923 meant that there was a Caliph left without even a tiny autonomous territory for the first time in Islam’s history. Consequently, Ataturk had no choice but to abrogate the institution of the Caliphate, which he considered a residual anomaly, in 1924. By that time, the Caliphate Movement had also come to an end. It had lasted for two years (from 1919 to 1924, i.e., after the War and before the official dismantling of the Ottoman Caliphate) and then faded from public view and came to its end, not because of Europeans but because of the Young Nationalist Turks who advocated change and reform through the establishment of a secular nation-state system, similar to the rest of Europe.

In reflecting on the fatal blow of the abolition of the Caliphate to the Muslims of British India, on March 4, 1924 (the day after the abolition), The Times newspaper quotes Maulana Muhammad Ali Johar, a leading figure of the Caliphate Movement, as saying, ‘It is difficult to anticipate the exact effects the abolition of Khilafah will have on the minds of Muslims in India. I can safely affirm that it will prove a disaster both to Islam and to civilisation.’ Similarly, in his book Masala-e-Khilafat (‘The Caliphate Question’), Maulana Abul Kalam Azad notes that ‘Without the Khilafah, the existence of Islam is not possible. The Muslims of India, with all their effort and power, need to work for this.’

Although the Movement had failed in its professed goals, its effusive religious rhetoric contributed significantly to the proliferation of anti-colonial trends inside and outside India.

6.2.3. Third endeavour to retain the Caliphate

After the failures of Abdul Hamid and the Caliphate Movement, the third attempt to restore a new Caliphate took the form of four conventions. All failed to save the institution. They were held, firstly, in Mecca (March 1924) by Sharif Hussein after he proclaimed himself the new Caliph, which received little support. Secondly, in Cairo (May 1926) by al-Azhar University for King Faud’s candidacy, which was supported by the deposed Ottoman Caliph Abdul Majid Effendi but refused by the Caliphate Movement of India. Thirdly, in Mecca (June 7-July 5, 1926) by Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. Finally, in al-Quds (December 1931) by the Grand Mufti of al-Quds, Muhammad

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558 Ghumman. Towards the Unification of Muslim Umma. p. 100.
559 ibid. p. 99.
Amin al-Husayni, in cooperation with Maulana Shaukat Ali, the leader of the Caliphate Movement of India. The last convention was the largest, with 130 delegates from 22 Muslim countries participating.\(^{561}\) Reza Pankhurst states that the conventions received British backing, believing that in any election, ‘British Islam,’ i.e., Indian Muslims, should hold the decisive vote to elect a Caliph that would be ‘friendly to His Majesty’s Government,’ \(^{562}\) but ‘to the level of the Pope,’ as advised years ago by Robert Bulwer-Lytton, the Governor-General of India, in his letter to Prime Minister Lord Salisbury in 1877.\(^{563}\)

![Reuter's report on the designation of the Caliph from the view of Indian Moslems (Muslims)](image)

However, after all of these failures -of Abdul Hamid, the Caliphate Movement, and the four serial conventions- Muslims finally successfully established an independent Muslim state in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1947, but not under a Caliphate,\(^{564}\) as reported in the book by Pakistani pan-Islamist writer Chaudri Nazir Ahmad Khan Thoughts on Pakistan and Pan-Islamism (1977). Therein, he reveals how Abu A’la Maududi became an anti-Western Islamist leader who advocated the establishment of an Islamic state. In 1941, Maududi founded the Jama’at-e-Islami, an ideal blueprint for an Islamic state that was not confined within national boundaries.\(^{565}\) Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi, in his Challenges to Religions and Islam, notes that Maududi’s Ummatist political desire to apply the Sharia to the whole human race ‘was shaped by the social decline and political frustrations that the Muslims of India had been suffering since 1857 […] In fact, his ideas were in


\(^{562}\) Pankhurst. The Inevitable Caliphate. p. 58.

\(^{563}\) Ibid. p. 59.

\(^{564}\) Ibid. p. 167.

\(^{565}\) Bowering. Islamic Political Thought. p. 22.
part the result of the failure of the Caliphate Movement to unite India’s Muslims.\textsuperscript{566} \textsuperscript{567} It is noteworthy that the most recent pan-Islamist movement in Pakistan for re-establishing the Caliphate is Tahreek-e-Khilafat (1991). Like India’s Caliphate Movement, the Tahreek-e-Khilafat Movement of Pakistan, after decades, still considers the Caliphate a vital issue for Muslims.\textsuperscript{568}

6.3. Reclaiming the Umma: the remedy for stigma

The Islamic Weltanschauung (worldview)\textsuperscript{569} conceptualises the Umma as a holistic system. This view prevails in the pan-Islamist mindset today as the utopian manifestation of a new Golden Age of Islam amid the modern nation-state system. They hold that the territorial limits of the nation-state do not bind the Umma-state. Also, it is not based on the legal notion of sovereignty, and crucially, the Umma-state does not require separation between religion and state. Moreover, in Esposito’s words, reclaiming the Umma is Muslims’ ‘quest for identity, authenticity, and community, and a desire to establish meaning and order in both personal life and society.’\textsuperscript{570}

It is pertinent to realise that the Umma in Islamist literature is a shorthand to refer to the Muslim world, now with 1.6 billion worldwide adherents,\textsuperscript{571} making up 23% of the world population, shaping 57 Muslim countries, all members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), forming the world’s second-largest religion and the fastest-growing faith over the next four decades.\textsuperscript{572} It is also the second-largest religion in Europe.\textsuperscript{573} Moreover, Muslim immigrants to Europe number between ten to fifteen million. Like refugees and labourers, many Muslims go to their former colonial countries; from Algeria and Morocco, they go to France, from Iraq, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to Britain. Secondly, this population grows rapidly due to the high birth rate. As minorities settled but not yet assimilated or integrated into secular Europe, they gradually faced the question of identity, whether they are Muslims or Europeans.\textsuperscript{574}

\textsuperscript{567} Pankhurst. \textit{The Inevitable Caliphate}. p. 167.
\textsuperscript{568} ibid. p. 171.
\textsuperscript{572} ibid.
\textsuperscript{574} Demant. \textit{Islam vs. Islamism}. pp. 64-5.
Besides such human resources in the Muslim world, the natural resources of the Middle East are 57% of all proven oil reserves and 45% of gas reserves, and three vital geostrategic waterways for international commerce and navigation (i.e., the Hormuz Strait in the Persian Gulf, the Suez Canal, and Bab al-Mandeb on two sides of the Red Sea) are located in this region.

These resources prompted Sayyid to raise a question on behalf of pan-Islamists, asking: ‘Imagine a country larger than Russia, more populous than China, with an economy bigger than Japan’s. Would not such a country qualify as a great power? This country is not purely an exercise in imaginative speculation. It would emerge if the fifty-seven current members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation were able to turn their ramshackle body into an overarching political structure.’ The structure in the pan-Islamist view is the Umma. To restore it, they proposed to restore the Caliphate simply because most Muslims worldwide were not yet mentally ready to confront the truth that the Caliphate system was dead. Resultantly and gradually, Muslims, as in the example of the Muslim Brotherhood, Jama’at-e-Islami party, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, among many others, began to reclaim the Umma, recalling the Caliphate as a form of a counter-hegemonic narrative against the nation-state paradigm. According to al-Rasheed, recalling the Caliphate even went so far as to find echoes among some from the second and third generations of Muslims living in the West, or young activists emerging from decades of Soviet rule in Central Asia and the Northern Caucuses, or among urban youths in Jakarta and elsewhere. But why and how?

Many Middle East experts hold that the crushing defeat of the Arab forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in the Six-Day War (1967) by the small newborn State of Israel was the momentum for the proliferation of Islamist movements looking for the restoration of the institution, frustrated by pan-Arabism/Arab nationalism. In the Six-Day War, with astonishing ease and few losses, Israel destroyed the entire Egyptian air force and seized the entire Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the Golan

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577 Sayyid. Recalling the Caliphate. p. 124.
Heights from Syria, and all of what had been the Palestine Mandate up to the Jordan River. The crushing Arab defeat – remembered as al-Naksah, meaning ‘the Setback’ – was perceived as the bankruptcy of secular Arab nationalism, which had grown up in the 1930s as a popular ideology and captured power through military regimes in Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Algeria. At the same time, Islamists, such as Sayyid Qutb, were either imprisoned, tortured, or executed. Nasserist pan-Arabism had already envisaged its failure when, in 1961, the Egyptian-Syrian union, creating the United Arab Republic in 1958, broke up within three years of its formation.

In this ideological vacuum, pan-Islamists throughout Muslim countries found a voice. The more secular Arab nationalism lost prestige, the more the pan-Islamism alternative gained appeal. They were now able to gather massive support by promising the revitalisation of a single Umma with no borders. They held that according to Muslim tradition, there was only one single Dar al-Islam. Therefore, there is a simple remedy to all these divisions: ‘Return to Islam,’ genuine Islam, political Islam with the central role of the Caliphate office, able to make Muslims one unified political entity. For pan-Arabs, the future is envisaged in Arab unification, while for pan-Islamists, the future is a dream of recreating the single Umma that existed before.

As discussed before, the narrative of Muslim decline is often mixed with nostalgia. Pan-Islamists firmly hold the belief that Muslims are blessed with Umma in the perfect religion of Islam. Above this, they claim that Muslims were one single united entity until European colonialism or nationalist ideology tore them apart, because of which the humiliating defeat in the Six-Day War took place. As a result, they suggest that the Muslim decline started when they lost their unity under Islam and became sects fighting among themselves.

6.3.1. Political Islam’s presence in International Relations literature: what is pan-Islamism?
While the last century witnessed the rise and fall of ideologies such as Nazism, fascism, communism, and pan-Arabism, a new ideology gradually gained popularity in the Middle East and worldwide: Political Islam/Islamism.

Upon the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, the phenomenon known as political Islam has gradually been a significant presence and the central point of reference for a wide range of cultural models, social norms, academic arguments, and especially political movements in the contemporary international system, in particular after the Cold War.

The presence of Political Islam in International Relations literature can be easily perceived in numerous invented terms in world politics literature, such as political Islam, Islamism, pan-Islamism, Islamic world, Islamic state, Islamic awakening, Islamic revival, Islamic resurgence, Islamic reformation, Islamic movement, Islamic supremacism, revolutionary Islam, progressive Islam, jihadist Islam, militant Islam, fundamentalist Islam, radical Islam, extremist Islam,

580 Demystifying the Caliphate. p. 123.
**moderate Islam, reformist Islam, maximalist Islam, political philosophy of Islam, political theology of Islam, transnational Islam, cosmopolitan Islam, globalised Islam, Islamic bloc, Islamic identity, Islamic Umma, Islamic terrorism, Islamic modernism, Islamic socialism, Islamic republicanism, Islaicate, Islamdom, and Islamophobia among many others.** These are some of the terms and names that are used to refer to a phenomenon known as political Islam as it gained popularity.

Gallup, an American analytics and advisory company, conducted a survey to help us perceive how Muslims assess the role of Islam in their lives. Georgetown University professor John L. Esposito, and Dalia Mogahed, Gallup’s executive director of Muslim studies, in *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think*, a survey published by the Gallup poll, raise a simple question: What role does religion really play in Muslims’ lives?

Based on data collected and an extensive survey comprising more than 50,000 interviews conducted in more than 35 countries, the survey demonstrates that many consider the religion of Islam as a primary marker of their identity, a source of meaning and guidance, consolation, and community, and essential to their progress. They express that Islam is a crucial part of their daily lives to the extent that ‘having an enriched religious/spiritual life’ as an aspect of life is essential that one cannot live without. When asked what they admire most about Islam, they answered: ‘people’s sincere adherence to Islam.’\(^\text{582}\) The poll demonstrates that a remarkable percentage of Muslims affirm loyalty to the Umma over national and ethnic ties and concludes that such an attitude has been fertile ground for pan-Islamists who seek the formation of the Muslim Umma. However, the sub-question is: How is this perception formed?

The answer is Islamic political philosophy, which has always revolved around three constitutional elements: leadership (Caliphate), law (Sharia), and the faithful society (Umma). In the pan-Islamist view, the institution of the Caliphate must be crafted as a first step for the Umma to be formed. In this sense, Islamic political philosophy paves the way for pan-Islamism to gain popularity.

It must be noted that the term ‘pan-Islamism’ was coined by Western scholars in the colonial era of the 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century. The term -like pan-Germanism- reflects a negative connotation of fear and dread, referring to European colonialists’ widespread anxiety about Muslim unity in their colonies. They feared that Muslims worldwide, including in Europe, had the potential to be mobilised against European colonial rule.\(^\text{583}\) It is said that Gabriel Charmes, the French journalist, was the first individual to employ the term ‘pan-Islam’ to describe Muslims’ reactions -not only Tunisians- to the 1881 French occupation of Tunisia.\(^\text{584}\) The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 further


\(^\text{583}\) Lockman. *Contending Visions of the Middle East*. p. 91.

influenced the emotional and intellectual attitudes of Muslim scholars, such as Asadabadi, toward the then-Eurocentric world order.

European anxiety was based on the reaction they expected from the Ottomans as the latter lost vast territories in the Balkans, East Anatolia, and North Africa. They witnessed struggles for resistance in a number of Muslim countries; for example, in Egypt by the Egyptian General Ahmed Urabi in 1879, who sought to end British and French influence over the country under the slogan ‘Egypt for the Egyptians,’ and in Sudan in 1881 by Muhammad Ahmad, who declared himself the Mahdi (the Islamic ‘Messiah’), and whose Mahdist State was terminated by the Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1898. A similar struggle took place in Iran through the Tobacco Boycott Movement of 1890 against British control over tobacco growth, sale, and export. These were sufficient signs for European colonialists to be anxious about Muslim solidarity. With such anxiety, Carl Becker, the German journalist, in referring to state theory, held that pan-Islamism is ‘the realisation of the Islamic concept of Islamic world integration by uniting under a sole leader of community’, meaning one Caliph in one world Umma-state.

6.3.2. Counter-Inhitat movement: early advocates

It is to be noted that, before anyone else, back in the 19th century, it was the eminent Muslim thinker Jamal al-Din Asadabadi and his disciples Muhammad Abdu, Rashid Rida, and al-Kawakebi, considered the early Muslim revivalist figures, who discussed the Inhitat notion. The starting point of their debate is the inner decay of Islamic societies and the need to push for an inner revival. They debate that the decline of Muslim civilisation resulted from abandoning Islam’s authentic teachings and embracing Western civilisation.

**Jamal al-Din Asadabadi**

After migrating to Egypt in 1871, Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (also al-Afghani or al-Husseini, 1838/1839-97) was a leader of the early Muslim revivalists whose thoughts swept across the Muslim countries during the latter part of the 19th century. Reminding us of civilisation theory, he is renowned for combining Nahda’s modernising approach with his anti-colonial civilisational approach to reviving Islam as a civilisation through his call to expel colonial powers from Muslim territories.

As already discussed, during the 19th century, most territories with a Muslim majority gradually came under colonial rule, particularly by Britain and France, two geographically tiny but militarily mighty countries. These two colonial powers exercised their influence in vast regions with a Muslim majority, resulting in a sense of humiliation for indigenous people that increased once the

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585 ibid. p. 4.
587 Yenigun. The Rise and Demise of Civilizational Thinking. p. 203.
Muslim Caliphate vanished forever. The humiliation also raised a question about how to face the ‘Western menace,’ i.e., colonial powers.\(^588\)

Decades before the last Muslim Caliphate was abrogated, two entirely opposite tendencies preoccupied the Muslim intelligentsia in their effort in the 19th century to face the influence of the West: a modernising trend, proposing to adapt Islam to Western ideals AND significant advocacy for revivalism proposing to restore the Ummatic dynamism of Islam. The distinction is that the first tendency accepts the West’s ‘recipe’ for modernisation and limits Islam’s public role to a ‘God who failed.’\(^589\) However, Asadabadi and his disciples are central figures and advocates of the second tendency in late 19th and early 20th century debates to meet the challenge of European colonialism.

Asadabadi is renowned as the first prominent intellectual to react against European colonial powers by formulating a political debate based on Islamic grounds. Regardless of who coined the term pan-Islamism, the term –as stated before- carries the negative connotation of European fear and dread. Instead, and in referring to Becker’s definition -i.e., Islamic world integration- Asadabadi coins and conceptualises the term Islamic alliance/unity (al-Wahda al-Islamiya), in the latter half of the 1870s, which gradually became a paradigm in modern Islamic thought and continues to have resonance today. His core aim is to strengthen Muslim collectivity in the Umma against imperialist intrusions. He builds his argument on the theme of freeing Muslims from colonial domination. To strengthen Muslims, he suggests that Islam demands a ‘Protestant Reformation.’\(^590\)

His political legacy is the suggestion to craft a united Islamic ‘front’ against the colonial West. Crucially, his legacy continues to hold prominence even today. His focus is not on any particular state or region but on the world of Islam as a whole. To fight against European encroachment, he devoted his life to encouraging Muslim intellectuals by visiting influential people in Calcutta, Istanbul, Cairo, Paris, London, Moscow, and Tehran\(^591\) and publishing various works. In Calcutta, he authored \textit{The Refutation of the Materialists}. In Paris, he wrote his refutation of the French Orientalist Ernest Renan, who, in \textit{Islam and Science} (1883), stated that Islam does not accord with the spirit of modern science. Also, in Paris, from March 1883 to October 1884, Asadabadi and Abdu jointly published the first highly influential, pan-Islamic, anti-colonial journal \textit{al-Urwa al-Wuthqa} (‘the Indissoluble Link/the Firm Handhold,’ a strict quotation from the Quran 2:256), which advocated resistance to European colonialism in the Muslim world.\(^592\) After 18 issues, the journal was banned in most Muslim countries. After visiting Iran under the dictatorship of Nasser al-Din Shah, Asadabadi wrote a letter to Iranian \textit{Marja} (the highest Shia authority) Mirza Muhammad Hassan Shirazi, who resided in Samarra, Ottoman Iraq, encouraging him to stand


\(^{589}\) Demant. \textit{Islam vs. Islamism}. p. xxiv.


\(^{592}\) ‘Urwat al-Wuthqa.’ \textit{Oxford Islamic Studies Online}. Available at: \url{http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2440} (Accessed October 8, 2021)

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against a trade agreement between the Shah of Iran who granted monopoly rights on tobacco to a British company. In December 1891, Shirazi issued a historical Fatwa banning tobacco usage, known as Iran’s Tobacco Movement. The Movement is believed to have directly affected the 1911 Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution.

In his works, including the al-Urwa al-Wuthqa (UW), Asadabadi frequently employs the term pan-Islamism but in its positive connotation - not negative colonial meaning- by borrowing the term al-Wahda al-Islamiya from the Quran. Through his new application of the Quranic term, he invites Muslims to the formation of an Islamic front against European dominance. Thus, his idea of pan-Islamism is a reaction to the colonial West’s deprivation and oppression. Also, by employing the term ‘Umma’ as Islamic salvation from colonial encroachment, his idea of a unified common Muslim ‘front’ is the basis for the broader contextualising and conceptualising of the Umma to denote the ‘Muslim bloc’ - as suggested by this research- against the colonial West. In his doctrine, Islam is not seen merely as a religion but as a civilisation in which the Caliphate plays a central role. Therefore, he concludes that the Muslim front needs to be unified under the symbol of Muslim strength, i.e., Sultan/Caliph Abdul Hamid, who launched the pan-Islamism project following Asadabadi’s advice. He envisages a reinvigorated Caliphate uniting the entire Muslim world under one leadership.

It is worth mentioning that Asadabadi influences a broad spectrum of Muslim intellectuals, scholars, activists, and theoreticians. By publishing UW, Asadabadi not only leaves an anti-colonial legacy but also becomes an Islamic voice that blames Western imperialism for the decline of Muslim civilisation. He is seen as a precursor pan-Islamist who ‘succeeded in raising the alarm across the Islamic world,’ and he turns out to be the ‘chief propagandist’ for Islamic unity, as described by Gail Minault. Surveying his thoughts in the UW reveals that Asadabadi believes that he detected the essence of a severe crisis, to which he suggests the Islamic revival movement as the solution through a ‘Return to Islam.’ His revival movement was a call to modernisation, political reform, and self-improvement. Instead of relying on national or ethnic ties for his call to Islamic revival, Asadabadi suggested that Muslims should rely on their Islamic creed as common ground. Asadabadi held that ‘by uniting in the name of the Quran, Islam would be granted success’ in restoring the glory and might of early Islam. ‘Now we must go back to pure Islamic principle and revive its true meaning,’ he advocated, in calling for what we know as Salafism today. That was how many Muslim intellectuals gradually but widely welcomed his political thought. It was because they found in Asadabadi’s appeal to the Umma a call to Muslim resistance as a unified political bloc (a front, in his words) in the face of the threatening Western bloc. As in

595 Teti. Sunni Islam and politics. p. 95.
598 ibid. p. 13.

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Ibn Khaldun’s Asabiyya, Asadabadi’s *al-Wahda al-Islamiya* was a very accurate Islamic code calling on the Muslim sense of solidarity as they find it in the Quran. ‘The Quran is alive, not dead…The book is not invalidated. Return to it,’ said Asadabadi in one of his articles in the UW periodical.\(^{599}\)

It was no coincidence that Asadabadi and Muhammad Abdu launched the UW journal in 1884, the year in which the Berlin Conference, the moment of the European colonial partitioning of Africa, was held. Likely, it was in reaction to the Berlin Conference that Asadabadi called for an Islamic congress of religious leaders in Istanbul or Mecca, the political and religious capitals of the Ottomans.

Although between the 1880s and 1890s, about half of the world’s Muslims were under British rule, the broad welcome for Asadabadi’s call to pan-Islamism can be understood when we remember that by the beginning of the 20th century, the only retained independent Muslim countries -albeit only formally and weak- were Turkey (revitalised under Kemal Ataturk), Persia (Iran where the Qajar dynasty would shortly be replaced by the Pahlavis in 1923), and Afghanistan under King Amanullah. The remaining Muslim states were either under direct colonial rule or under some form of internationally recognised European protection.\(^{600}\) In fact, Asadabadi’s call to Muslim solidarity (Asabiyya in Ibn Khaldun’s words) was an endeavour to divert Muslims’ traditional religious mentality to the political ideology of Islam by calling them to rethink the reasons for the social decline and political frustrations that they had been suffering. In his view, Muslims had fallen into decay since the day they lost their unity and religious consciousness.\(^{601}\)

In his revival movement, the Sunni-Shia dichotomy was seen as a barrier to Muslim solidarity. His disciple Muhammad al-Makhzumi narrates that Asadabadi frequently argued that Sunni-Shia differences were a matter of the past, and one of his ambitions was to reconcile these two denominations of Islam.\(^{602}\) Consequently, he made exhaustive efforts in the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Iran to promote the revival of the Muslim world. He noted that the modern Islamic world was far behind Western developments. However, he ignored the fact that Europe experienced the advent of the Enlightenment in the 18th century and the Industrial Revolution in the 19th, which paved the way for its technological ascendancy. Having failed to recognise the roots of European achievements, Asadabadi diagnosed the problem as Muslims’ falling away from Islam’s true essence.\(^{603}\) His diagnostic voice is heard both in Sunni and Shia, that if only Muslims return to genuine Islam, God will grant them success in this world and the hereafter.

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\(^{599}\) Ibid. p. 10.


\(^{602}\) Ibid. p. 12.

\(^{603}\) Mandaville. *Global Political Islam*. p. 278.
Abdu, Rida, and al-Kawakebi

Asadabadi’s chief disciple was Muhammad Abdu (1849–1905), who dedicated his anti-colonial efforts to writing several theological treatises. Rida’s *Tafsir al-Manar* (a Quran commentary) is, in fact, a transcript of Abdu’s Quranic exegesis. It is regarded as the first reformist reading of the Quran, which Abdu published in instalments and later continued in the monthly *al-Manar* (‘The Lighthouse’) publication by Rida and Abdu for 37 years, becoming one of the earliest and most influential propagators of reform in the Muslim world. Reminding us of the textual theory, in his treatises, particularly *Risālat al-Tawhīd* (Theology of Unity), Abdu promulgates his reform programme by returning to Islam’s textual sources, namely the Quran and the Sunna. He believes that only a return to Muslim traditions derived from Islamic scripture can safeguard Muslim lands and peoples. 6 Abdu is the first to refer to the movement as Salafiya, believing that the Salaf is the symbol of pure Islam. If followed, then success is granted to Muslims. Put differently, his Salafi doctrine is a reaction to the loss of roots in the Umma.

Writing during Egypt’s British occupation (1882-1922), Asadabadi’s second disciple, Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935), advocated active resistance to imperialist encroachment. 6 By the time Kemalist Young Turks believed that the Caliphal system was outdated and the Western model was the only choice available for their society’s revival and progress, Rida was an early advocate of Islamic scripturist essentialism. He authored al-*Khilafa wa*l-*Imama al-Uzma* (*The Caliphate and The Greatest Imamate*), in which his thoughts on the formation of the Islamic state influenced the development of Islamic political philosophy; he did much to lay the foundations of pan-Islamism.

By publishing his compilation al-*Khilafa wa*l-*Imama al-Uzma* and launching the *al-Manar* journal, Rida promoted the restoration of the Caliphate for Islamic unity to Kemalists. Rida is generally credited with being the progenitor of the modern Salafi movement and an early influential thinker who developed the political philosophy of the Islamic state in support of the Ottoman Caliphate. 6 Disappointed with the Young Turks, Rida supported Sharif Hussein of Mecca when he declared himself Caliph two days after Turkey relinquished the Caliphate. 6 Rida also held the 1931 Islamic conference in al-Quds, inviting the prominent Shia scholar in Iraq, Shaykh Muhammad al-Kashef al-Ghita, and top Sunni scholar Hajj Amin Husayni to examine what needed to restore the Caliphal system. 6

The fourth figure among early advocates of pan-Islamism is Asadabadi’s Syrian disciple, Abdul Rahman al-Kawakibi (1854-1902). He was the author of *Umm al-Qura* (‘the Motherland’), the foundational text of modern Arab nationalism. He believed that the leading cause of widespread suffering was the Ottoman Empire’s despotism. He was subjected to persecution by the Empire’s secret agents. Like Asadabadi, al-Kawakibi borrows his book’s title from the Quran. 6 However,

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65 ibid. p. 248.
68 The Quran 6:92.
the difference between the two is that Asadabadi recognised the Turkish Caliphate, while al-Kawakibi—because of his criticism of the Ottomans—suggests an Arabic Caliphate.\footnote{See: ‘Revival and Renewal’. In: Oxford Islamic Studies Online. Available at: http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/print/opr/t236/e0682 (Accessed March 31, 2021)} He was an ardent advocate of Arab autonomy prior to and during the First World War. He believed that Arabs were qualified to lead the revival of the Islamic Umma.\footnote{Hirano. Historical Formation of Pan-Islamism. p. 28.} Hence, he can be considered an early advocate of pan-Arabism under an Arab Caliphate rather than pure pan-Islamism.

6.3.3. Genealogy of pan-Islamism: three organisations and four progenitors
As explained, Muslim puritanism presents Islam as an ideal system from the past that can fit the present and the future. Among others, this approach can best be traced to three resonant organisations and four individuals. They are Abul A’la Maududi, the founder of the Jama’at-e-Islami party, Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, both from the Society of Muslim Brotherhood, and Tagiuddin al-Nabhani, the founder of the pro-Caliphate Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party). Hence, they are known as the four progenitors and best-known proponents of pan-Islamism, whose most influential thoughts in the formation of the three organisations have had an enormous impact on the spread of political Islam at a national level and across the Muslim world. All four believed in the Islamisation of society. However, their difference lies in whether this must be done bottom-up or top-down.
Abul A’la Maududi, the founder of the Jama’at-e-Islami party (1941) in British India with the objective of making a separate Muslim state, later called Pakistan

- Tagiuddin al-Nabhani, the founder of pro-Caliphate Hizb ut-Tahrir (al-Quds-1953)

6.3.4.1. Abul A’la Maududi
Abul A’la Maududi -also Mawdudi- (1903-79) is renowned as the foremost thinker of modern Islamism in the 20th century. He is a significant force in the Islamic revival movement and one of the pioneer promulgators of return to ‘genuine Islam’ and ‘Jihadism’ to construct the Islamic vanguard.

Between 1920, when he published his first book at the age of 17, and his death in 1979, Maududi authored many books and thousands of articles. Besides his position as a Muslim scholar, he is a journalist and the editor-in-chief of The Muslim, the publication of Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind (Society of Indian Muslim Scholars) from 1921 to 24. As a Muslim scholar and journalist, his voice began to be widely heard in India and beyond. As stated, the first reaction against the abrogation of the Caliphate occurred in India. Maududi, through his writings, is among the early Indian Muslims to oppose Ataturk, naming him a chauvinist nationalist who created division within the Muslim Umma.

Additionally, when a Hindu nationalist newspaper launched a widespread attack against Islam, describing it as a religion of violence, Maududi authored his book, al-Jihad fi al-Islam (“The Jihad in Islam”) in 1927, which later became a manifesto for Qutb’s doctrine of Jihadism. Therein, Maududi holds that Jihad is Holy War for the Cause of God by the power of the sword ‘to destroy the hegemony of an un-Islamic system’ and ‘fulfil the Will of God.’

commentary (Fi Zilal al-Quran) follows Maududi’s method in Tarjuman Quran (‘Quran Exegesis’), a monthly journal that continued for 47 years from 1932 until his death. Notably, one of Maududi’s most significant works is The Four Concepts, in which he presents a definitive interpretation of the concept of al-Ilah (divinity), al-Rab (the Lord), al-Ibada (worship), and al-Din (religion). His significant innovation in the book is developing Islamic political philosophy by drawing links between God and His absolute sovereignty/authority (al-Hakimiyya al-Mutlaqa), thoughts later developed by Qutb. Therein, Maududi insists on the uniqueness of Islam and the rationality of faith, concluding that the concept of salvation in rational Islam is not an individual matter but the outcome of social acts. In Khilafa wa Mulukiyya (Caliphate and Kingship), as the propagator of political Islam, Maududi commences his book with an exposition of the ‘political teachings of the Quran.’ Through this, Maududi attempts to raise political awareness among Muslims that their religion is under threat. His vision of political Islam and Jihad is abundantly influenced by the Caliphate Movement, which played a significant role in reviving the spirit of solidarity among Indian Muslims during the colonial period. For this, his vision of political Islam was welcomed in Egypt, which had had the same experience during the French and British colonial periods.

Advocating for recapturing the purity of early Islam, to him, a true devout Muslim is an anti-colonial Muslim. In this sense, genuine Islam means political Islam to preserve Islamic culture from the secular colonial West. He asserts that Muslims under colonial powers are unaware of Islam’s revolutionary rule, which can unite Muslims into one Umma. However, he rejects even Western secular democracy as a legacy of colonialism. Bassam Tibi quotes Maududi, saying:

‘I tell you in all clarity, my brethren in Islam, secular democracy stands in all aspects in contrast to your religion and beliefs [...] Islam being your belief, and that is why you call yourself Muslims, is different from this ugly democracy [...] and therefore there can be no concurrence between Islam and democracy [...] There where democracy rules Islam cannot prevail and when Islam dominates there is no place for democracy.’

He also vigorously pursued the idea of the formation of the Islamic state, for which he founded the Jama’at-e-Islami, a vanguard Islamist political party, in Lahore, British India, in 1941. Thus, he opposed British rule in India, where Muslims formed about one-quarter of the population. The party played a significant role in the formation of Pakistan in 1947.

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613 في ظلال القرآن
614 Nafi. The Islamists. pp. 82-3.
615 ibid. p. 89.
618 Mawdudi. Unity of the Muslim World. pp. 19, 34.
619 Tibi. Islam and Islamism. p. 64.
It must be noted that Maududi’s political philosophy is based on the notion of ‘Islamisation from above’ through an Islamic state. By applying textual and state theories, we realise that, to him, politics is an integral, inseparable part of the Islamic faith and that Islam is not merely piety.620 Like many other Islamists, Maududi is motivated by the idea that all we see are Muslim societies rather than Islamic societies. To him, Islamic societies are those in which Islam, as a complete code of life, is thoroughly applied.621 He provides an example of an un-Islamic society, saying:

‘A state which does not take interest in establishing virtue and eradicating vice and in which adultery, drinking […] obscene literature, indecent films […] immoral display of beauty, promiscuous mingling of men and women, co-education, etc […] cannot be called an Islamic State.’622

Significantly, Maududi’s thoughts were also widely heard in Egypt and throughout the Arab world once his works were translated from Urdu into Arabic; the Muslim Brotherhood played an essential role in translating and circulating Maududi’s thoughts. His significant works translated into Arabic include Jihad in Islam, Islam and Jahiliyyah, The Principle of Islamic Government, and Towards Understanding Islam. In all of his works, Maududi highlights the role of Tauheed in keeping Muslims away from the danger and temptation of modern Jahiliyya,623 labelling the West as ‘decadent’ after he visited England in 1969. In this way, he presented Islam as a counter-hegemonic discourse and a superior counter-model,624 an idea that reminds us of Huntington’s prediction of the civilisational clash.

This said, there is no doubt that Sayyid Qutb was influenced by Maududi’s sociopolitical thoughts about political Islam, particularly when, in 1951, he met Abul Hassan Nadwi (1914-99), a disciple and close friend of Maududi, who in 1950 published a book in Arabic entitled Maza Khasir al-Alam be Inhitat al-Muslimeen (‘What did the world lose due to the decline of Islam?’)625 in which Qutb wrote a Foreword.

It is worth mentioning that Nadwi, like Maududi, applied the Quranic term Jahiliyya to differentiate between the ‘spirit of Islam and spirit of materialism which dominated the world before Islam and which dominates it today after Islam was removed from leadership.’626 In its Quranic context, Jahiliyya refers to obscurantism, heathenism, dystopia,627 and savagery628 in the

622 Black. The History of Islamic Political Thought. p. 337.
625 The English version is entitled Islam and the World: The Rise and Decline of Muslims and its Effect on Mankind.
626 Pankhurst. The Inevitable Caliphate. p. 87.
627 Dystopia as a standing meaning for Jahiliyya is suggested by the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: https://www.iep.utm.edu/qutb/ (Accessed March 31, 2021)
628 Savagery as a standing meaning for Jahiliyya is suggested by Halil Ibrahim Yenigun. See: The Rise and Demise of Civilizational Thinking. p. 219.
dark period before the advent of Islam, in which people did not submit to God. In short, Maududi and Nadwi extended the Jahiliyya to the old and new (modern). However, modern Jahiliyya is implied by Sayyid Qutb to refer to secular modernity in which the submission of humans is to human law, not to God’s, and secondly, he holds that the Jahili ways dominate Muslims’ minds.

Although Qutb is renowned as the father of Jihadism with revolutionising Jihad to more than defence, it was Moududi who extended Islam, Muslim, and Jihad to mean, respectively, a ‘revolutionary ideology,’ ‘International Revolutionary Party,’ and ‘revolutionary struggle.’ Maududi is as straightforward as possible in stating that:

‘[T]he truth is that Islam is not the name of a ‘Religion,’ nor is ‘Muslim’ the title of a ‘Nation.’ In reality, Islam is a revolutionary ideology and programme me which seeks to alter the social order of the whole world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals. ‘Muslim’ is the title of that International Revolutionary Party organised by Islam to carry into effect its revolutionary programme me. And ‘Jihād’ refers to that revolutionary struggle and utmost exertion which the Islamic Party brings into play to achieve this objective.’

As will be discussed, Qutb’s main thought manifested in the Jahiliyya doctrine has, in fact, roots in Maududi’s thought, who believed in two forms of Jahiliyya: internal Jahiliyya, i.e., Kafir (apostate) and external Jahiliyya, i.e., Western modernity. Borrowed terms such as Jahiliyya, Hakimiyya, and Jihad are widely applied in Qutb’s works written in the 1950s in which he quotes Maududi. In particular, Qutb’s Milestones is seen by many as demonstrating the climax of Maududi’s influence on Qutb. What made Qutb so connected to Maududi was the equally painful experiences of colonialism the two men had experienced in their homelands during the colonial period.

6.3.4.2. Hassan Al-Banna

As pointed out before, four years after the destruction of the Caliphate in 1924 and the constitutional amendment in 1928 considering Turkey a secular state with no official religion, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood (also the Muslim Brothers/Brethren), originally a continuation of Salafism, was created by Hassan al-Banna (1906-49) in Egypt in 1928. He had observed the failure of four conventions in saving the institution of the Caliphate, including the Cairo conference for King Fuad’s candidacy as a new Caliph. He also witnessed the heated debates initiated by

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629 ‘Jahiliyyah’. Oxford Islamic Studies Online.


634 ibid.

The Brotherhood’s origins may be traced back to Asadabadi’s teachings. Coming from a disenfranchised working family under British colonialism, the young Egyptian schoolmaster Hassan al-Banna was 22 when he founded the Society in support of the Caliphate to bring changes to his community. It was his reaction to the declaration of a British Protectorate over Egypt during the First World War and Britain’s right to retain control over Egyptian foreign and internal policy due to British interests in the Suez Canal and Sudan.

By its foundation, the mother party of all future Islamist parties was born to present a new political discourse, which would subsequently be recognised as Islamism. The Society became the most significant mass social movement in Egypt through a combination of social and religious credentials and the use of propaganda to integrate the emerging middle classes in the cities and other urban areas. Within two decades, the Society gained influence throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia and developed broad networks among the elite, social activists, political movements and the general population in order to bring sociopolitical reforms in Muslim countries and, gradually, to be an alternative to the dominating Western powers in Muslim countries. Richard Mitchell, the author of The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, describes Asadabadi as an ‘announcer,’ Rida as a ‘historian,’ and al-Banna, because of the organisation he founded, as the builder’ of Islamism. Interestingly, the word banna itself means builder/contractor in Arabic.

When speaking at the fifth conference of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, Hassan al-Banna asserted that:

‘some people think of us as a group of preachers, concerned only to call people to virtues and abstain from sins. Others believe it is a mystical trend. We are not any of those. We call for return to true Islam, which is a belief and application, a home and a nationality, a religion and state, a spirit and body, and a Quran and Sword.’

The two primary goals of the party, which became the objectives for almost all Islamist parties to come, were to expel foreign forces from Muslim lands (the British in the case of Egypt after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 that allowed British troops to remain in the Suez Canal), and secure the creation of a new Islamic state with the Caliphate as the mainframe and mandatory for Muslims. He is quoted as saying, ‘We want to realise these two goals in the Nile Valley and the Arab domain, and in every land which God has made fortunate through the Islamic creed: a

religion, a nationality, and a creed uniting all Muslims.\textsuperscript{639} He builds his argument on the theme that Islam is one Umma and that unity is religious holiness (\textit{al-Gadasa al-Dinyya}), no less.\textsuperscript{640}

While growing rapidly, with allegedly five hundred thousand members within ten years of its inception in 1928, and seen as a ‘state within a state’ with its own secret apparatus (\textit{al-Jihaz al-Sirri}), the organisation was then in strong opposition to the British-supported Egyptian monarchy; this was not tolerated. Al-Banna’s party was outlawed, and he was assassinated at 42, perhaps by the Egyptian secret police, when the tension between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood reached its zenith.\textsuperscript{641} But, despite his short life, al-Banna’s organisation greatly impacted the whole Muslim world by introducing Islam as a political ideology and the only means of re-constructing the Umma.\textsuperscript{642}

\textbf{Al-Banna and Qutb: from peaceful reform to armed resistance}

The other prominent figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, whose thoughts still influence the Muslim world, is Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who joined the organisation after al-Banna’s death. That indicates that he had found commonalities between his thoughts and al-Banna’s, for example, on social issues, by sharing the idea of purifying society through the application of genuine Islam.

Growing up in Egypt under the British protectorate, al-Banna and Qutb were deeply concerned about the decline of Muslim civilisation in the rising tide of westernisation and materialism, the then two dominating ideologies in Egypt. Also, frustrated with the repressive colonial powers, the two ideologues prioritised the resurrection of the Islamic state, for which they presented Islam as an ideology and a comprehensive system of life with the Quran as its constitution.\textsuperscript{643} That is, they developed Islam from faith to a political ideology.

However, the Muslim Brotherhood under al-Banna was different from the Muslim Brotherhood under Qutb. Al-Banna, advocating gradual moral reform, sought to reconstruct an Islamic society through good individual Muslims, good Muslim families, and a good Muslim society, eventually leading to the Islamisation of the state. In this sense, al-Banna was a moral reformer. However, Qutb believed in a top-down Islamised society. He was more inspired by Maududi than al-Banna. He had read much of Maududi’s work and referred to him in his books while, according to Malcolm H Kerr, Hassan al-Banna stood as a successor to Muhammad Abduh.\textsuperscript{644}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[639] ibid. Quoting from \textit{Al-Banna, Between Yesterday and Today}.
\item[640] \textit{Ila al-Umma al-Nahida} [To the Rising Umma]. Ikhwan wiki. Available at: https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B6%D8%A9 (Accessed October 14, 2021)
\item[641] ibid. pp. 27-30.
\end{footnotes}
In other words, the difference between the two was in Qutb’s revolutionary approach in seeking to overthrow any un-Islamic governments and rulers—Gamal Abdul Nasser in the case of Egypt—in order to establish an Islamic state. In contrast, al-Banna held to an evolutionary approach of gradual educational and moral reform.645 Put differently, their distinction was in bottom-up or top-down Islamisation. Because of the difference between the two approaches, Olivier Roy, in his general categorisation, posits Islamism as a movement oscillating between two poles; at one end is the top-down Islamisation of society through state power (Qutb’s approach), and at the other is the bottom-up reformist pole (al-Banna’s) who holds the view that if society is Islamised, it would gradually lead to the formation of an Islamic state.646

6.3.4.3 Sayyid Qutb: exponent of militant Islam

As already seen, if the Egyptian Muslim scholar Ali Abdul Raziq is the perfect advocate for minimalist non-political Islam, his compatriot Sayyid Qutb is unequivocally the eminent exponent of revolutionary Jihadi political Islam, Islamic supremacism,647 and intellectual authority in the philosophical foundation of pan-Islamism.648

The two men stand face to face in their contradictory interpretations of Islam. Interestingly, both paid a very heavy price for expressing their perceptions of Islam: the former was isolated in Egypt by al-Azhar, and the latter was hanged with al-Azhar’s consent. However, the difference is that Abdul Raziq’s name and his book are forgotten. In contrast, Qutb and his works are widely remembered today, particularly his famous prison-written Islamic manifesto of Jihad, Milestones, which has great influence in the Muslim world. The book has a profound resonance to the extent that it has been published numerous times and translated into many languages worldwide.

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647 Demichellis. *Sayyid Qutb and the Problem of Islamic Occidentalism*. p. 50-62
Qutb was a highly educated linguist, literary critic, poet, and novelist. Yvonne Y. Haddad, in *Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival*, is precise in stating that in the 20th century, few Muslim thinkers had such a significant impact on the reformulation of contemporary Islamic thought as Sayyid Qutb had. Similarly, in Halil Ibrahim Yenigun’s words, due to Qutb’s anti-hermeneutic stance, he is recognised as a paradigm shift in contemporary Muslim political philosophy, from a more reconciliatory attitude to Western civilisation (like al-Tahtawi) to almost total rejection of it. In this respect, Qutb stands at the top of the civilisational clash with the West. He is often associated with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and political Islam. His blueprint consists of three elements: establishing a Ummatic state, implementing the Sharia law, and rejecting Western values and influence.

During the Cold War, to Qutb, capitalism and materialism were the two faces of one civilisation that led humanity down the wrong path. In the dialectical method, Qutb’s blueprint of Islamic civilisation was a synthesis that denied capitalism and materialism. In his political philosophy, the

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human is God’s vicegerent (Khalifah/Caliphate) on earth, according to the Quran. He concludes that if human beings surrender to God’s will, a moral and sustainable civilisation –that of Islam– will ensue.\textsuperscript{651} Thus, presenting a new blueprint for Islam worldwide, Qutb is recognised as one of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century’s principal Islamists, to the extent that his thoughts influenced the Iranian revolutionaries who toppled Iran’s secular monarchy of Pahlavi in 1979, just 13 years after Qutb’s execution in 1966.

The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian revolutionaries goes back to a meeting between Hasan al-Banna and Shia Marja Ayatollah Abul-Ghasem Kashani, a noted Iranian politician and Muslim scholar, during the Hajj ceremony in 1948. The two agreed on rapprochement to bolster ties based on shared Islamist goals. The meeting was followed by an invitation from Sayyid Qutb to Sayyid Mojtaba Mir-Lohi (1924-1956), one of Kashani’s close circle, to visit Egypt in January 1954. Mir-Lohi (commonly known as Navab Safavi/Nawab Safawi) founded the \textit{Fedaiyan-e Islam} group (‘self-Sacrificers/Devotees of Islam’) in 1946 in Iran, with no connection to the Muslim Brotherhood. However, under Navab Safavi, after he met with Qutb, the group was considered an unofficial offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iran, seeking to purify Islam by ridding it of corrupt individuals associated with the Iranian monarchy by assassinating a number of top officials such as Prime Minister Abdul Hossein Hazhir, Prime Minister Haj Ali Razmara, and the Culture Minister Ahmad Zangeneh. Additionally, in separate unsuccessful attempts, the group tried to assassinate Prime Minister Hossein Alā and Foreign Minister Hossein Fatemi. The group also assassinated the secular reformist Ahmad Kasravi, a leading Iranian nationalist whose goal was to build an Iranian secular identity.

\textit{Figure 60: left to right, some of the people assassinated by the Fedaiyan-e Islam group: Prime Minister Abdul Hossein Hazhir, Prime Minister Haj Ali Razmara, Prime Minister Hossein Alā, foreign minister Hossein Fatemi, and the secular reformist Ahmad Kasravi.}

It is noteworthy that Safavi’s and Qutb’s fates were similar. Navab Safavi was executed by the Shah of Iran in 1956, and Sayyid Qutb by Abdul Nasser in 1966. However, their difference is that Safavi is known only in Iran and authored no books, only a short manifesto (November 1950)
entitled *A Guide to the Truth* (‘*Rāhnama-e Haghaegh*’ in Persian) on the necessity of establishing an Islamic state. In contrast, Qutb is considered a leading theoretician who authored several influential works remembered worldwide.

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Without Fedaiyan-e Islam’s early sympathetic approach to the Muslim Brotherhood, many of their works might never have been translated into Persian, which popularised Qutb’s thoughts in Iran. Qutb wished to initiate the Islamic revival movement in some Muslim countries. His dream did not come about in any Sunni country, but it did in Shia Iran. When Ruhollah Khomeini declared that ‘Islam was political or nothing,’ he was copying the conception that the Muslim Brotherhood had long had of Islam. Thus, Sayyid Qutb was an influential figure among Iranian revolutionaries, and his thoughts played a crucial role in shaping the discourse of Islamism in pre-revolutionary Iran. For instance, Jalaleddin Farsi, one of Khomeini’s followers, recognised the inevitability of revolution in Iran in line with Islam’s Evolutionary Revolution (1970), stating that the call for revolution goes back to the inherently renewable revolution of Islam in line with the sending of prophets (Bi’tha) by God for the guidance of people.

Significantly, on top of those revolutionaries is Ali Khamenei (b.1939), the former president and second Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, replacing Ruhollah Khomeini. Ali Khamenei is profoundly impressed by Qutb’s and Navab Safavi’s revolutionary thoughts. In his autobiography, Khamenei reveals that when he met Safavi at 15, ‘the first inspiring sparks of the Islamic Revolution were ignited in me by Navab-Safavi, and I have no doubt that the first fire ignited in our hearts was because of Navab-Safavi… His position was expressed as Islam must be

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revived, Islam must rule over the country, and those who are at the top of the government are lying. They are not Muslims.’ Years later, now as the leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, on Navab-Safavi’s memorial, celebrated him by saying: ‘Peace be upon him who he was the scout of Jihad and martyrdom in our time.’

Qutb’s profound impression on Ali Khamenei, Iran’s future leader, was to the extent that as a young cleric in the mid-1960s and early 1970s, he translated Qutb’s three works into Persian: al-Mustaqbal li-hadha’l-Din (meaning ‘The Future of This Religion’), al-Islam wa Mushkilat al-Hadara (meaning ‘Islam and the Problems of Civilisation,’ titled by Khamenei ‘An Indictment against the Western Civilisation’), and chapters from Fi Zilal al-Quran (meaning ‘In the Shade of the Quran’ translated by Khamenei as ‘Return to the Quran’).

It is significant that, while Qutb’s death was ignored in Egypt, in post-revolutionary Iran, the governmental postal company issued a stamp in 1984 as a tribute to his ‘martyrdom,’ depicting Qutb behind bars in a trial in which he was sentenced to death by the Egyptian court in 1966.

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657 Mahdi Akbari. A comparative study on Sayyid Qutb’s and Ali Khamenei’s political thoughts (in Persian). University of Religions and Denominations in Iran. December 2014. Available at: https://urd.ac.ir/fa/cont/778/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%8C%D8%B4%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%AA-%D9%88-%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%DB%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%8B1%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%82%DB%8C (Accessed October 14, 2021)

As stated, it was no surprise that the Muslim Brotherhood was among the very early groups who rushed to recognise, in 1979, Iran’s new Islamic regime, though later on, it vehemently rejected its pro-Shia constitution, accusing it of being a sectarian state rather than an inclusive Islamic state to represent all Muslims, including Sunnis, in Iran. Furthermore, the Brotherhood’s relations with Iran’s revolutionaries deteriorated during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), which was seen as a war between Sunnis and Shias. Also, when revolutionary Iran solidified its alliance with the anti-Brotherhood Syrian regime of Hafez al-Assad, which was waging war against the Brotherhood in Syria, Iranian revolutionaries’ relations with the Brotherhood came to an end.

Qutb’s pathology: modern Jahiliyya

Qutb is also remembered for what Andrew March describes as Qutb’s project, when he introduced his ‘natural religion doctrine,’ arguing that Islamic law and human nature (Fitra) are in full harmony with each other, i.e., Islam is a natural religion (Din al-Fitra). This is how Qutb proposes the Sharia as a suitable law for mankind at all times and in all places. According to his doctrine, there is full compatibility between the Sharia and individual human nature (Fitra); they are in perfect harmony since Islam is a natural religion, and consequently, the Sharia is relevant for all times and places, for Islamic values and morals are for human goodness.

Qutb’s natural religion doctrine, thus, opposes Jahiliyya (obscurantism/heathenism). In the same vein, Qutb’s doctrine is copied by Muhammad Asad, who holds that Islamic values are in accord with the ‘laws of nature,’ which God has decreed for His creation.

As stated before, by the end of the 1960s, Maududi’s concept of modern Jahiliyya was introduced through Nadwi’s lens to Qutb and thence, via Qutb’s lens, to the Arab and Muslim world. In other words, Maududi’s and Nadwi’s interpretation of modern Jahiliyya was not much heard until it was re-phrased by Sayyid Qutb, who wrote in his Foreword to Nadwi’s book that the old

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659 https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1223420/%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%8C%D8%AF-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%88%D8%8C-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3


661 March. Islam As a Realistic Utopia. p. 192.

662 ibid. pp. 189, 190.

663 Qutb. Milestones. p. 110.

664 Asad. Islam at the Crossroads. p. 18.

665 Salafists see full compatibility between the Sharia and the Fitra. Nevertheless, the false outcome of the doctrine is demonstrable when some Salafis have gone so far as to postulate that ‘any law that is Islamic is good and any good law is Islamic’, similar to Natural Law Theory stating ‘any law that is good is moral, and any moral law is good’. See: Aziz al-Azmeh. ‘Islamic Revivalism and Western Ideologies’. History Workshop Journal. 32, No. 1. Autumn 1991. pp. 44-53.

Jaliliyyah was before Islam and the modern Jahiliyya is the one ‘which has again prevailed in the world ever since Islam lost its world leadership.’ In this respect, the term Jahiliyya does not refer to a period before Islam. It is a concept ‘to identify everything in the world that was un-Islamic, insufficiently Islamic, or impurely Islamic.’

In other words, Qutb’s primary pathological political thought revolves around Jahiliyya, a term repeated four times in the Quran in reference to heathenism in Arabia before Islam, in which sovereignty did not belong to God, for Arabs were worshipping stone idols. In his Milestones, Qutb’s primary concern is the growing obscurantism, to which he assumes Muslim countries are returning due to infatuation with Western culture’s immoral elements. Qutb applied the term to his contemporaries, who worshipped the metaphorical idols of imperialism, socialism, or nationalism. He states:

‘If we look at the sources and foundations of modern modes of living, it becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in jahiliyya [...] based on rebellion against the sovereignty of God on earth. It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of Allah, namely sovereignty and makes some men lords over others. It is now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient Jahiliyya, but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behaviour, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without regard to [...] the dignity of man given to him by Allah.’

In this respect, Qutb divides societies, even Muslim ones, into two: those who obey God and those who do not. This dichotomy is reflected in his Marikat al-Islam wa al-Ra’sinalya (The Battle between Islam and Capitalism, 1952), where he denounces capitalism as a system in which God is not obeyed. He is most remembered for his conceptualisation of the modern world as an un-Islamic space of pagan Jahiliyya and for his endeavour to revert to God’s legislative sovereignty (Hakimiyya). Interestingly, Qutb’s first sentence in his preface to his Milestones starts by saying: ‘Mankind today is on the brink of destruction [...] because humanity is devoid of those vital values which are necessary not only for its healthy development but also for its real progress.’ However, what makes his doctrine very radical is his considering everything today as belonging to the ‘ocean of Jahiliyya’ such that he states:

‘We are also surrounded by Jahiliyya today, which is of the same nature as it was during the first period of Islam, perhaps a little deeper. Our whole environment, people’s beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and laws is Jahiliyya, even to the extent that what we

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668 March. *Islam As a Realistic Utopia.* p. 194.
670 ibid. p. 27.
consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also constructs of Jahiliyya.\(^\text{674}\)

Already negatively predisposed to the West-like Maududi, who once visited England- when Qutb visited the United States on a two-year educational mission in 1948 (still before The Civil Rights Movement of 1954-68 in the United States) to study pedagogy, he published his dark and gloomy criticism in an article *The America That I Have Seen*.\(^\text{675}\) Back home from the United States as a ‘born-again’ Muslim (he is reported to have been an atheist between 1925 and 1939),\(^\text{676}\) in 1949, he released his book *al-Adalah al-Ijtimaiyyah fi al-Islam* (Social Justice in Islam), offering an Islamic vision of social justice for the first time in the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century. It is reported that the book impressed Gamal Abdul Nasser and his fellow Free Officers as they decided to overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in 1952. After the coup, the Free Officers appointed him as adviser to the Revolutionary Leadership Council,\(^\text{677}\) which did not last long. At this stage, to Qutb, Islam is a source of justice, not politics or violence. However, gradually, he approached Islam as a political ideology by resigning from the civil service and joining the Brotherhood in 1953 (one year after the Free Officers’ coup) with his revolutionary Islamist attitude. Soon, Qutb, now a member of the Brotherhood, lost confidence in the Free Officers and began to question them to the extent that he suspected that Nasser and his fellow officers had links with the United States, speculating that the Americans might have backed the Officers’ coup.

As tensions between the Brothers and the Officers escalated, Qutb published in secret his al-Ikhwan fi al-Marakah (‘The Brothers in Battle’), launching hundreds of attacks on Nasser, denouncing his Arab nationalism. As a result, within two years of the Free Officers’ coup, he was sentenced to prison in 1954, like thousands of his fellow Brothers, after they exposed Nasser to an assassination attempt. That further radicalised Qutb in developing the ideology of Jihadism.\(^\text{678}\) While in prison for ten years, Qutb released his two masterpieces, *Milestones* and *In the Shade of the Quran*, respectively his manifesto of political Islam and his thirty-volume revolutionary commentary on the Quran. These works represent Qutb’s school of thought, known as ‘Qutbism.’ In this last stage of his life, Islam was not only the source of social justice but also the source of sovereignty, al-Hakimiyya, a term he borrowed from Maududi.

Qutb’s principal innovation in the *Milestones* is a radical new definition of Jihad as destroying the kingdom of man to bring about the kingdom of God (Hakimiyya), thereby legitimising Takfir (ex-communication), radically suggesting that anyone (like Nasser) who does not rule by God’s law is not a true Muslim. The book is considered one of the most radical texts, with a massive indelible impact on a new Islamist generation, as the Takfir ideology spread rapidly among them. The Takfir

\(^{674}\) ibid. p. 34.  
^{676}\) Nafi. *The Islamists.* p. 76.  
^{677}\) ibid. pp. 100-1.  
^{678}\) Demant. *Islam vs. Islamism.* p. 98.
doctrine is based on Qutb’s interpretation of the Jahiliyya. To him, society is either Islamic or Jahili (an adjective derived from Jahiliyya). A Jahili society is one whose citizens serve other humans rather than God.⁶⁷⁹ According to Qutb, it must be rejected in its entirety and requires a radical overhaul imposed from above by an Islamic state.⁶⁸⁰

After stating that ‘there is one system, which is the Islamic system and what is other than that is Jahiliyya,’ Qutb comes to a rare conclusion, saying that Muslims ‘have come to be in Jahl (ignorant) about the correct implication of the Islamic creed’ similar to that of Jahiliyya before Islam.⁶⁸¹ He further defines ‘Dar al-Islam’ by stating that ‘there is a single abode which is the abode of Islam.’ Anything that falls outside of this is the ‘abode of war.’⁶⁸²

In this way, Qutb develops the concept of Jahiliyya into al-Nizam al-Jahili (a decadent or dystopic system) and al-Nizam al-Islami (an Islamic system). He asserts that ‘The Jahili society is any society other than the Muslim society; and if we want a more specific definition, we may say that any society is a Jahili society which does not dedicate itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs and ideas, in its observances of worship, and in its legal regulations. According to this definition, all the societies in the world today are Jahili.’⁶⁸³ About Muslim societies, he says: ‘Lastly, all the existing so-called Muslim societies are also Jahili societies [...] Although they believe in the unity of God, still they have relegated the legislative attribute of God to others and submit to this authority, and from this authority, they derive their systems, traditions and customs, their laws, values and standards, and almost every practice of life.’⁶⁸⁴

Furthermore, Qutb posits that Muslims are surrounded by Jahiliyya today. He believes that the contemporary world, including all Muslim countries, is in the same Jahiliyya as before the rise of Islam and even in a darker situation because they have the teachings of Islam to hand. For example, he believes that ideologies like communism or nationalism, which at his time were seen as solutions in Muslim society, are various forms of new Jahiliyya. He also believes that the main evil of the new Jahiliyya, which he was observing in values, customs, laws, or institutions, lies in the denial of God’s sovereignty.⁶⁸⁵ He argues, ‘If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in Jahiliyya, [...] It is now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient Jahiliyya but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behaviour, and to choose any way of life, rests with men, without regard to what God has prescribed.’⁶⁸⁶ From these premises, he concludes, ‘If Islam

⁶⁸⁰ Teti. Sunni Islam and politics. p. 98.
⁶⁸¹ Pankhurst. The Inevitable Caliphate. p. 88.
⁶⁸² ibid. p. 87.
⁶⁸³ Qutb. Milestones. p. 80.
⁶⁸⁴ ibid. p. 82.
⁶⁸⁵ ibid. p. 6.
⁶⁸⁶ ibid. p. 11.
is again to play the role of the leader of mankind, then it is necessary that the Muslim community be restored to its original form.*687

Holding that current Muslim society had reverted to decadence, Qutb presents his most radical suggestion, which later became a cornerstone for all Islamist groups. The consequence of Qutb’s argument is that, in his view, the way to get rid of Jahiliyya is to take action to establish God’s full sovereignty and dominion. The law of humans should be abolished, and a unique, supreme divine law should be established by Jihad. In Arabic, Jihad means ‘to strive to one’s utmost,’ but in Islamic terminology, it denotes holy war. However, Qutb expanded it more broadly into an ideology.

Qutb’s modern Jihadist ideology against historical enmity and Crusading spirit
It must be noted that the Jihadi movements originated from pan-Islamist movements. If the Clash of Civilisations is seen as the theory of inevitable ideological conflict between Islam and the liberal West, Qutb’s modern Jihadism, doubtlessly, is the best example to justify the theory. Notably, his view on the continuation of the Crusades in our lifetime is his most distinctive doctrine in the interpretation of modern Jihadism. For example, Chapter Four of Qutb’s Milestones is devoted to ‘Jihad in the Cause of Allah.’*688 Therein, Qutb points out that ‘imperialism is but a mask for the Crusading spirit.’ He holds the belief that the crusading spirit, historical enmity, runs in the blood of the West, hiding behind a mask, for it is aware that ‘The unveiled crusading spirit was smashed against the rock of the faith of Muslim leadership’ in the past.*689 *690 In this respect, Jihad against imperialism is Jihad at a global level. To justify it, he introduced what he calls the modernised version of Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh)*691 by applying Jihad as its key element. In elaborating on this modernised Fiqh, Qutb clearly states: ‘The establishing of the dominion of Allah Almighty on earth, the abolishing of the dominion of man [...] and the bringing about of the enforcement of the divine Law (Shariah) and the abolition of man-made laws cannot be achieved only through preaching.*692

While Qutb first considers Islam a movement and, secondly, rejects underestimating it as a ‘defensive movement,*693 he interprets Jihad as much broader than defence. To Qutb, Jihad is a means to annihilate Jahiliyya.*694 In other words, by placing physical Jihad at the centre of his vision of the modernised Fiqh, he advocates that replacing the existing decadent state with an Islamic one is only possible through a combination of faith and force (Jihad).*695 In this way, the modernised Fiqh turns the Muslim believer into a Muslim militant who uses force to achieve Islam’s goals,
even sometimes at the level of the global Jihad Movement. The significance of Qutb’s radical but revolutionary modernised Fiqh is his call to Muslims to take action and join Jihad not only against infidels but also against existing Muslim societies, which he considers non-Islamic. This is exactly the meaning of Takfir. In Takfir ideology, a Muslim -a Jihadi Muslim, of course- has the right to commit violence against other Muslims who belong to the Jahiliyya.

It is pertinent to know that Qutb’s radical Fiqh has roots in the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah (1268-1328), who justified Jihad against the Mongols who embraced Islam but did not apply the Sharia. In this respect, in his interpretation of Fiqh, religion is not the opium of the people -as Karl Marx believed- to secure those in power and justify their position in society. Instead, Qutb’s Jihadism is a fight against the ruling class. That is how it was understood as regime change once he denounced the Egyptian government of Abdul Nasser as a form of Jahiliyya, for which he was executed, and his Milestones was banned as a subversive book.

Interestingly, Qutb’s death did not lead to political Islam’s downturn in Egypt, as Nasser wished. It elevated him as an intellectual martyr (Shahid) in many Muslims’ eyes worldwide, and his thoughts spread further in the Islamic landscape, particularly after the Arab defeat by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, one year after his execution. Ironically, while the Egyptian government wished to ban Qutb’s thoughts, his books were broadly distributed across the Islamic world in the 1970s and 1980s, giving birth to a plethora of Jihadi movements and, as a result, the proliferation of many individuals and groups known as Qutbists around the Islamic world, as in the example of Imam Abdullah Haron in the Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa in their struggle against Apartheid. However, Qutb’s immediate impact was felt in his homeland, Egypt, where he opposed the secular pan-Arabism of Abdul Nasser, which resulted in the formation of radical groups like Takfir wa al-Hijra (‘Excommunication and Exodus’) and Tanzim al-Jihad (The ‘Jihad Organisation,’ also known as Islamic Jihad).

Qutbism: Abdul Salam Faraj’s near and far enemy

The Arabic word Jihad means to struggle or to strive. However, in an Islamic context, in a broader sense, it refers to a struggle against the infidels (kaifir/pl. kuffar) in the path of God (al-jihad fi sabit Allah). In this connotation, it refers to armed struggle or holy war in a military sense as a religious obligation. Significantly, while modernist Muslim scholars seek to equate military Jihad with defensive warfare, Qutb, as discussed, extends it to a discourse to be applied for internal purposes against tyranny, corrupt states, and un-Islamic governments.

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Among young and early Qutbists, the most significant is Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj (also Farag 1954–1982), a leading ideologue in Tanẓīm al-Jihad. He is best remembered for his only work, a 32-page pamphlet, *al-Farīda al-Ghāiba* (‘The Neglected Obligation/Duty’), written at the age of 27.\(^{702}\) Deeply influenced by Sayyid Qutb, his path-making work is considered a paradigm shift in the intellectual history of the modern Jihadi movement, in which he presents militant Islam as a reaction to historical enmity and ever-continuing Crusader interventions in the Muslim world. In his concise pamphlet, he introduces militant Islam as armed Islam, seeking to revitalise the Islamic world to its former glory by using violence in order to expel Western intruders from Muslim lands, as in the example of al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad group and Abdullah Azzam, the father of global Jihad and the founder of al-Qaeda.\(^{703}\) The pamphlet’s content is repeated by Osama Bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda, in two documents produced in 1996 and 1998, the ‘Declaration of Jihad’ and the statement on the ‘World Islamic Front.’\(^{704}\)

Faraj believes that ‘The present rulers have apostatised from Islam. They have been brought up over colonial tables, be they Christian, Communist, or Zionist. What they carry about Islam is nothing but names, even if they pray, fast, and claim to be Muslims.’\(^{705}\) In the pamphlet, keeping the dual division of the world into *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Kufr*, and believing that if the government is not following the laws of God, then that state is not Islamic, Faraj developed Qutb’s notion of Jihad to Jihad in armed revolt against the ‘near enemy’ in contrast to the infidel, the ‘far enemy.’ He believed that ‘fighting the enemy that is near to us comes before that which is far.’\(^{706}\) The near enemy connotes the corrupt and ostentatious governments in the Muslim countries - in his case, Egypt- that had adopted Western ideas of secularism and nationalism. Precisely, in Egypt, after the signing of the Camp David Accords between Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, ‘far enemy’ was code for Israel, and ‘near enemy’ was implicit code for President Anwar Sadat, who was assassinated in 1981 by Khalid al-Islambuli of The Jihad Organisation, a group established by Faraj, whose original primary goal was to overthrow the established government of Egypt and forcibly replace it with an Islamic state.\(^{707-708}\)

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\(^{706}\) ibid. p. 21.

\(^{707}\) ibid. p. 22.

\(^{708}\) ‘Faraj, Muhammad Abd al-Salam.’ *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*. Available at: [http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e620](http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e620) (Accessed October 20, 2021)
The Jihad Organisation, a group established by Faraj, whose original primary goal was to fight the enemy near to us, be it Egypt, Jordan, Syria, or Iraq immediately attacked Israel but were defeated in the first Arab-Israel war, which left a severe, lasting trauma on all Arabs.

6.3.4.4. Tagiuddin al-Nabhani: identifying the new Crusades
Following the appearance of anti-Semitism in Europe, in Austria, Germany and France, and particularly in Eastern Europe, in Poland and Russia, Theodore Herzl, the founder of Zionism (after Mt. Zion on which Prophet Solomon’s Beth Hamidkash was built) in the late 19th century, concluded that the Jews are not safe anywhere unless they have a state of their own. In 1896, he wrote his pamphlet, The Jewish State (‘Der Judenstaat’ in German); he believed that anti-Semitism could only be avoided if a Jewish state was built in the biblical promised lands of Palestine,709 from where Tagiuddin al-Nabhani came.

Following the 1917 Balfour Declaration committing Britain to work towards the establishment of a ‘national home for the Jewish people’ in Palestine while Britain was assigned as the mandatory power by the League of Nations in Palestine, eventually, the State of Israel, the first Jewish state for nearly 2,000 years, was proclaimed on May 14, 1948, in Tel Aviv, based on the UN General Assembly resolution 181 dated November 29, 1947, splitting Palestine under the British Mandate into two: 56.47% of Palestine to the Jewish state and 43.53% to the Arab state.710 Vehemently rejected by Arab countries, they called the establishment of Israel Nakba (‘Day of the Catastrophe’), remembered as the day of dispersion and exile of 700,000 Palestinians turned refugees. The day after Israel’s declaration, five Arab armies from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq immediately attacked Israel but were defeated in the first Arab-Israel war, which left a severe, lasting trauma on all Arabs.

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In reaction to the defeat of Arab nationalist armies, the Palestinian theologian— and still a member of the Muslim Brotherhood al-Quds branch— Taqiudeen (also Taqi al-Din) al-Nabhani (1909-1977) composed in December 1950 his first work *Inqadh Filastin* (‘saving Palestine’) in which he recounts the Islamic Occidentalist response to Western imperialist conspiracies in general and British plots in particular in the 19th and 20th centuries. The book explains how the Jewish State of Israel was eventually established in his motherland. Later, in 1952, he quit the Brotherhood and, in 1953, set up his pro-Caliphate political party of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an elitist Islamist organisation, the second to gain eminence in the Arab world, with the dual purpose of establishing an Islamic state and liberating Palestine. In line with state theory, Islam was announced as the party’s ideology.
with the ultimate goal of resuming an Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic state ‘which carries out the ordinances of Islam and its message to the world.’\footnote{711} \footnote{712}

Al-Nabhani’s stand for the restoration of the Caliphate was at once a response to what he considered new Crusades, the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the fragmentation of its territories into new states, and lastly, a response to the formation of Israel, a new Caliphate in the form of what ‘existed ever since the days of the crusades.’\footnote{713}

The notion that European powers viewed a strong Caliphate as a barrier to their colonial plots in the 19th and 20th centuries is frequently repeated in al-Nabhani’s works. Also, in line with conspiracy theory, in al-Nabhani’s belief, there was a colonial plot to introduce nationalism to the Muslim world to divide Muslims and leave them vulnerable to European conquest. In his ‘Occidental’ view, he holds that Britain and France achieved their goal by sowing Arab and Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, which paved the way for them to carve up the region in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Subsequently, he concludes that the liberation of Palestine can be achieved only after reversing the effects of nationalism.\footnote{714}

Like Maududi and Qutb, al-Nabhani links the decline of Muslim Umma to the destruction of the Caliphate, which he describes as the most disastrous event in Islam’s modern history. He also links Muslims’ decline today to their minimalist, faulty understanding of Islam, in which Islam has no role in politics.\footnote{715} After the occupation of his motherland, Palestine, he published a Draft Constitution for a Caliphate State, drawn up by his party, for the restoration of the Caliphate. By doing so, he left no doubt that, in his view, the critical condition of Muslims in the region started from the day the Muslim Caliphate was abolished in modern Turkey.

Envisioning the restoration of the Caliphate after the establishment of the State of Israel, he states that:

\footnote{713} Al-Nabhani. \textit{The Islamic State.} p. 188.
\footnote{714} Fauzi. ibid. p. 195.
\footnote{715} Commins. \textit{Taqi Al-Din Al-Nabani and The Islamic Liberation Party.} p. 199.
The Islamic State is not a dream, nor is it a figment of the imagination, for it had dominated and influenced history for more than thirteen hundred years. It is a reality. It has always been and always will be. The vital elements of its existence are far greater than can be ignored or fought against by anything or anyone. The enlightened people have adopted it, and it is the wish of the Ummah, which is eager for the return of the glory of Islam. The Islamic State is not a desire that one aims to satisfy but an obligation that Allah has decreed for Muslims and commanded them to fulfil. He warned of the punishment awaiting those who neglect this duty and promised reward to those who pursue this duty.⁷¹⁶
The party holds that the implementation of the Sharia not only makes the society moral but also requires Muslims to have their own state, for which al-Nabhani authored *Nidham al-Islam* (literally ‘The System of Islam’ but also translated and published as ‘The Islamic State’) in which he set out his plan for the removal of artificial barriers between Muslim countries in order to create one transnational state. Then, he advised that Muslims abroad ‘should work towards turning their land where Islam is not implemented, and which is [thus] considered Dar al-Kufr, into Dar al-Islam.’

This implies that the existing political systems in Muslim lands cannot be considered legitimate by the party. Consequently, the existing nation-state system contradicts the unity of Muslims under one single Umma, for which the party proposed the re-establishment of the Muslim Caliphate that could stand up to communism and capitalism, the two major trends in the binary system. In line with textual theory, by providing citations from primary Islamic scriptures, he states that the Caliphate’s absence is one of the greatest sins for which God would punish Muslims. Putting it differently, although, like Maududi, Nadwi, and Qutb, the party holds that the Muslim world is living in modern Jahiliyya, the starting point for modern Jahiliyya, according to the party, is the abrogation of the last Caliphate in 1924, not secular modernity as believed by Maududi, for instance. Consequently, al-Nabhani holds that Muslims will not get rid of the new Jahiliyya until the Caliphate is restored. Similarly to al-Nabhani and his party, the Umma denotes a ‘world superpower in the face of the two major camps at the time,’ namely imperialism and Communism. This implies that to the party, the Umma is a bloc that stands in the face of the two blocs in the binary system.

According to al-Nabhani, the Umma is the perfect form of an Islamic state governed by the law revealed by God to his messenger, which has two duties: ‘to implement Islam in the whole of the land under its rule and to convey the message of Islam beyond its borders.’ In al-Nabhani’s assessment and contrary to that of Abdul Raziq, the Islamic way of governance is an integral part of Islam’s belief, by which a unique political structure is defined, and Muslims are obliged to maintain or establish this pattern. Insisting on immediate recreation of the Caliphate, he states that:

‘[T]he Muslims must establish the Islamic State, for Islam would not have an influential existence without it, and their land would not become Dar al-Islam unless it is ruled by that which Allah has revealed.’

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717 ibid. p. 240.
720 Al-Nabhani. *The Islamic State*. p. 3.
723 ibid. p. 42.
724 ibid. p. 3.
It is pertinent to note that today, Hizb ut-Tahrir is one of the largest Islamist parties in terms of its branches worldwide, including in several Western countries, especially Britain, and presents an elaborate, detailed blueprint for instituting and managing an Islamic state. In its blueprint, the party’s British branch gives eight reasons why Muslims should reunify their lands under sincere leadership. These eight reasons are 1) global power, 2) military strength, 3) economic might, 4) that their leadership eradicates poverty, 5) brings a single judicial system, 6) provides education, 7) in one Umma through the removal of colonial borders, 8) creating a new international system.

Al-Nabhani died in 1977 in Lebanon, not having restored the Caliphate office, and his party saw no success. After his death, his party’s attempt to establish the Caliphate in three countries failed at least three times. In 1978, under Abdul Qadim Zalum’s leadership, the party invited Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to embrace its blueprint of the restoration of the Caliphate by pronouncing Libya the centre of the Islamic Caliphate, an idea rejected by Gaddafi. In the second attempt, while the Islamic Revolution began to unfold in Iran under Ruhollah Khomeini’s leadership, in 1978, the party’s delegation met with him in Neauphle-le-Château (a small city in north-central France, where Khomeini resided in exile for four months) and presented him with a copy of the party’s Islamic constitution. However, soon after the Revolution’s victory in February 1979, once it became clear that the new Iranian regime was pro-Shia with no belief in the Caliphate office, the party launched a vicious attack on Iran’s new establishment, accusing it of sectarianism. Lastly, in the 1990s, when Iraq was under crippling sanctions, the party’s delegation met Saddam Hussein, calling on him to pronounce Iraq as a base for the Islamic Caliphate. This initiative produced no result, as in the past.

6.4. Seven attributes of a pan-Islamist agenda

To distinguish maximalist Islam from minimalist, the terms Islamism and pan-Islamism are coined in the same way as any other ‘ism’ to refer to maximalist Islam as an ideology like Communism. Meanwhile, Marshall Hodgson, the renowned Islamic studies academic and the author of The Venture of Islam, coined the (not widely adopted) term Islamicate -a combination of Islam and icate- to restrict the term ‘Islamic’ to Islam as a religion. Hodgson intended to indicate the social and cultural complexity associated with political Islam by this innovation. He defines ‘Islamicate’ as something that ‘would refer not directly to the religion, Islam itself, but to the social and cultural

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complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims, both among Muslims themselves and even when found among non-Muslims.’ Similarly, to avoid the usage of ‘the Islamic world,’ he coined the term ‘Islamdom’ by analogy with ‘Christendom.’

As discussed, the distinction between minimalistic Islam as faith and Islamism as an ideology is in the political agenda. Islamism’s agenda is the Islamisation of society and/or state, as clearly displayed in the discourses of the four progenitors of political Islam, namely Maududi, al-Banna, Qutb, and al-Nabhani. In short, Islamism, as presented by the four, according to Olivier Roy, is ‘a brand that claims to re-create a society, not simply by imposing Sharia but by establishing an Islamic State through political action.’ Similarly, Salman Sayyid describes Islamism as ‘the most prominent political discourse’ that ‘seeks to position Islam in the centre of any social order.’

Also, Sayyid’s reading of Umma’s discourse is that Islamists want ‘an Islamicate political order’ to be established. Thus, numerous parties or movements are formed throughout Muslim countries, either in moderate, peaceful reformist trends or violent, intolerant and/or armed ones. The means of accomplishing such an ‘agenda,’ ‘action’ –as Roy states– or ‘order’ -as Sayyid expresses- varies significantly across movements and circumstances. One approach to distinguishing between various Muslim movements is the distinction between Islamism and pan-Islamism, which are commonly applied interchangeably.

To differentiate between Islamism and pan-Islamism, we have to note that despite the fact that both are political ideologies looking for the Islamisation of Muslim societies, pan-Islamism –as discussed before– advocates for the unity of Muslims under one single Umma. Unlike radicals, moderate Islamists may suggest applying the available processes, for instance, in the form of an international Islamic organisation, democracy, and election within the current borders and countries, not necessarily by creating one single Muslim state. Some very modern revivalists argue that the Caliphate’s political mission may have passed, but the notion of an Islamic political agenda has not. Thus, the unity of the Muslim Umma is not necessarily achieved by establishing the Caliphate, although the implementation of pre-modern Sharia law is their priority.

While implementing the Sharia (Shariatism) is the final goal in both, the other distinction is that pan-Islamism, like in the Salafist Jihadi movement, commonly identifies itself by holding that Jihad is the way to rebuild the Umma. In this respect, all pan-Islamists are Islamists, but not all Islamists are pan-Islamists. It is the same with Muslims. All (pan-)Islamists are Muslims, but not all Muslims are (pan-)Islamists if the textual theory is denied. In short, pan-Islamists are, firstly, revivalists who believe in

732 ibid. p. 9.
733 ibid. p. 166.
735 Mandaville. Global Political Islam. p. 239.
736 Piscatori. Reinventing the Ummah. p. 6.
the public enforcement of the Sharia as perfect divine law. Thirdly, they are Ummatists who
believe in the Umma as a bloc. Fourth, they are caliphatists who believe in the restoration of the
Caliphate as the political system of Muslim Umma, and fifth, jihadists who believe in the Jihad as
military strength in the restoration of the Umma. Some of these elements can be traced, for
example, in the Muslim Brotherhood’s motto, declaring that ‘Islam is the solution, Allah is our
objective, the Quran is our constitution, the Prophet is our leader, the Jihad is our way, and death
for the sake of Allah is our wish.’

Pan-Islamism, moreover, can be recognised by at least seven attributes, as follows:

1. **Islam is a political ideology.** Broader than faith, pan-Islamists consider Islam inherently
political. This attribute precludes the separation between religion and state. The most
important feature of this attribute is the use of religious language, which presents Islam in
the post-colonial era as a platform against colonialism, a counter-hegemonic narrative
against Western colonialism, and a political ideology either in the form of resistance,
liberation, or protest movement.

2. **The Umma is a unified political bloc in the international system.** In political Islam, the
term Umma is applied to imply a broader meaning beyond the faithful community. It
implies Muslim unity in a Muslim bloc, which must be re-created in the globalised world.
The grand but false romantised assumption of pan-Islamism is the myth that Muslims
were historically a consolidated community under the Caliphal office, which allegedly led
to the flourishing of Muslim civilisation, referred to commonly as the Islamic Golden Age.

3. **The inevitability of the Caliphate.** In pan-Islamist political philosophy, the Caliph, as a
substitute for the Prophet of Islam, is the Muslim’s leader, and the institution of the
Caliphate is an inevitable political system in the ideal Islamicate polity in Muslim Umma.

4. **Dar al-Islam versus Dar al-Kufr.** In a division of the international system, pan-Islamists
split the world into Dar al-Islam (Islamdom) and Dar al-Kufr (non-Islamdom). In other
words, they see the world in an ’us-them’ binary relation in which the *us* is the Dar al-Islam
and the *them* is the Dar al-Kufr of non-believers, which poses a threat to Dar al-Islam.

5. **Dawa to Islamdom.** In monotheistic Islamic political theology, there is one God, and there
must be one Umma. As such, the everlasting binary *us-them* model is not admitted unless
under a peace treaty. Dawa in political Islam is a political agenda denoting propagating the
message of Islam to all mankind either in a peaceful missionary invitation or through Jihad
if needed. Given this, the *us-them* binary relation turns out to be Dar al-Islam vs. Dar al-
Harb (abode of war).

6. **The Jihad as Muslim strength.** The Jihad is a means to either rebuild the Islamic state or
to keep it safe.

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7. **Implementation of the Sharia.** Despite a plethora of Islamicate groups, they all agree on the Sharia as God’s divine decree for which the implementation of the Sharia is a sign of pure and true Islam.
7.1. Pan-Islamist perspective of notorious Sykes-Picot

In line with the conspiracy theory, from the pan-Islamist perspective, the end of the Ottoman Empire was the first step in the imposing of the new Middle East order according to the 'divide and rule' policy, plunging the Islamic World into incalculable crises and widespread disarray, fragility, instability, and humiliation through the dismantling of the divine institution of the Caliphate.

As Bernard Lewis notes, this attitude attributes all evil to the abandonment of the divine heritage of Islam. However, the fact ignored in pan-Islamist claims against the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which they consider the primary cause of the end of the Caliphate, is that the borders drawn by Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot bear no resemblance to the map of the Middle East today. In other words, the two diplomats created none of the modern Arab countries of the Middle East. Secondly, if the Agreement was the cause of the end of the Caliphate, to which Muslims had a feeling of attachment, why, astonishingly, did no one in the Muslim world try to invite Abdul Majid II, the exiled Caliph, or follow him in exile? This must be seen as a sign that the Caliphate was dead long before Ataturk announced it.

Thus, in no way can one claim that the Agreement's ultimate purpose was to destroy the institution, though its purpose was to exert European domination in Greater Syria and Mesopotamia, respectively, for France and Britain. As another sign, just two days after the Ottoman Caliphate was destroyed on March 3, 1924, Sharif Hussein declared himself a Muslim new Caliph on March 5; he received little support among Muslims outside of Mecca and Medina.

Consequently, his Kingdom and the Sharifian Caliphate ended completely in December 1925. However, the rapid end of Hussein's Sharifian Caliphate did not originate with Britain or any external source but with his principal rival in the Arabian Peninsula, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in Najd, who undermined Hussein's authority as a Muslim Caliph.

Ibn Saud successfully attacked Hussein's forces in the summer of 1924 in Hejaz, Iraq, and the Transjordan to bring all rival tribes under his Kingdom, not the Caliphate. Despite Hussein's support for Britain, when his troops were attacked, Britain decided not to help him repel Ibn Saud, who eventually took Jeddah, Mecca, and Medina, founding the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. Hussein was then forced to flee to Cyprus. But Ibn Saud showed no interest in declaring himself Caliph. Instead, he publicly supported the notion that representatives of Islam would decide the question of the Muslim Caliphate in a conference.
7 Muslim Umma Decline: Role of Sykes-Picot?

7.1. Pan-Islamist perspective of notorious Sykes-Picot

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739 Demant. Islam vs. Islamism. p. 25.
740 Lewis. What Went Wrong?. p. 5.
742 ibid. p. 137.
743 ibid.
It is worth mentioning that rather than acknowledging the weakness of the Ottomans, the ambition of Ataturk, or Ibn Saud’s attack on the newly formed Sharifian Caliphate, pan-Islamists lay all the blame on the Sykes-Picot Agreement; they believe that the Agreement prepared the dissolution of the Muslim Caliphate.

7.2. How to assess the Sykes-Picot?
It has been widely discussed that political Islam was a Muslim reaction to two threats: first, the Westernisation of Muslim societies and second, the evolving sociopolitical conditions in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration. However, two questions remain unanswered: was the Sykes-Picot a conspiracy to destroy the Ottoman Caliphate? And secondly, was the Agreement the cause of the destruction of the Ottomans, as pan-Islamists suggest, or was it the consequence?

7.2.1. Sykes-Picot: contradictory Agreement or conspiracy plan?
There are two controversial views on the Sykes-Picot. As discussed in Chapter Two, considering the Agreement a contradictory deal, applying man-made colonial mapping that did not recognise the region’s topography and demography is just one view but a mild interpretation. However, the second and more cynical attitude considers the Agreement not only a plot to partition the Ottoman Empire but also the amputation of Muslim Umma through a conspiracy against Islam. In this very cynical view, pan-Islamists say that the Allied Powers carved up the Ottoman land not only to secure their interests but also to ensure that the Muslim world remains forever divided into numerous disputing states. Peter Demant notes that for pan-Islamists, the Sykes-Picot Agreement represents not only the fragmentation of the Middle East but also the division of the global Muslim community and the creation of weak secular Arab states either in the form of conservative monarchies, one-party populist states, or military dictatorships. Among early Islamic parties, this very cynical view is highlighted by Hizb ut-Tahrir. In an article entitled The 88th anniversary since the destruction of the Khilafah, Hizb ut-Tahrir quotes Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, speaking in the House of Commons, explaining why Britain and its allies withdrew all their troops that had occupied Turkey by the end of the First War, as saying ‘The situation now is that Turkey is dead and will never rise again because we have destroyed its moral strength, the Caliphate and Islam.’

‘There are people [the Muslims] who control spacious territories teeming with manifest and hidden resources. They dominate the intersections of world routes. Their lands were the cradles of human civilisations and religions. These people have one faith, one language, one history and the same aspirations. No natural barriers can isolate these people from one

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745 Demant. Islam vs. Islamism. p. 35.
another […] if, perchance, this nation were to be unified into one state; it would then take the world’s fate into its hands and separate Europe from the rest of the world. By taking these considerations seriously, a foreign body should be planted in the heart of this nation to prevent the convergence of its wings in such a way that it could exhaust its powers in never-ending wars. It could also serve as a springboard for the West to gain its coveted objects.\(^{747}\)

In line with this cynical attitude, they -like al-Nabhani- view the Agreement as the continuation of the Crusades. Seeing the Ottomans as guardians of the divine institution of the Caliphate, in the pan-Islamist viewpoint, the Agreement, like the Crusades, is the outcome of pre-planned conspiracies to abolish it. Looking at the Sykes-Picot as a deal that prepared the ground for the Mandate System in the League of Nations, pan-Islamists consider the System a kind of humiliation for Muslims considered inferior, unable to rule their lands. This led to outrage when they remembered the agreement between Sharif Hussein and Britain to establish a new Caliphate.

However, the grievance led to a sense of profound anger when the Zionist Movement led by Theodor Herzl came to believe that the only solution for Jews was to create their homeland in Palestine -the biblical land of Israel- by replacing the indigenous Arab population with Jewish settlers. In this sense, after the colonial period of the British Mandate in Palestine, the formation of the State of Israel in 1948 is understood as another sign of the continuation of the West’s crusading mission, started by General Edmund Allenby’s capture of al-Quds in 1917 in the form of a ‘Crusader-Zionist alliance.’\(^{748}\) In demonstrating that al-Quds’ capture was a sign of new Crusades, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani in *Islamic State* quotes General Allenby as saying, as he stepped into the city, ‘Only today the crusades have ended.’\(^{749}\) To al-Nabhani, this was the sign that ‘malice and hatred have existed as historical enmity ever since the days of the crusades and it is still perpetuated today’ in forms of oppression, humiliation, colonisation, exploitation, and brutal revenge on Muslims.\(^{750}\) Nevertheless, even if that was said by General Allenby -for which al-Nabhani gives no reference in his book- what is less noticed by al-Nabhani and the other Islamists is the indisputable fact that the British could never legitimised what they did in Palestine if Allenby’s forces had not been aided by the blessing of the Arab revolt, led by Faisal, fighting beside the British for the creation of an Arab Caliphate of their own against the existing Ottoman Caliphate.

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\(^{747}\) ibid. para. 4.


\(^{749}\) Al-Nabhani. *The Islamic State*. p. 188.

\(^{750}\) ibid. p. 188.
Significantly, it was no coincidence when ‘Allenby’s forces reached the city [Jerusalem] first, they were ordered to allow Faysal [Faisal] to enter ahead of them as a liberator,’ says Yücel Yanıkdağ, professor of Ottoman history.\(^\text{751}\) According to Yanıkdağ, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was not the source of conspiracy against the Ottomans. The conspiracy was the Anglo-Arab alliance in which Hussein and his sons played a remarkable role in the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in order to establish their own Arab state of the Caliphate.

7.2.2. **Sykes-Picot: cause or consequence of Umma decline?**

*Demirci’s realistic view*

Similar to the above question, whether the Sykes-Picot was a contradictory Agreement or conspiracy plan, the other fundamental question is whether the Agreement was the cause or the consequence of the Caliphate’s demise.

As seen, Islam ruled life in the Muslim World. From there comes the origin of the confrontation with Western modernity. Believing a correlation between the Islamic faith and the flourishing past, Salafism holds that Muslims came to a halt in science and philosophy, encountered degradation and suffered deplorable circumstances (Inhitat) for not practising the Islamic faith and the Sharia law in their everyday life. In the same vein, they see a correlation between Muslim civilisational decline and ignoring real Islam; citing a single factor, they hold that the non-implementation of real Islam led to God’s dissatisfaction. Thus, the Muslim decline manifests God’s anger over their sinful way of life. They hold that God’s mercy, which led to the flourishing of Muslim civilisation,


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was due to implementing pure Islam. For this reason, they suggest a return to genuine and authentic Islam.

Some pan-Islamists like al-Nabhani see the decline of Muslim civilisation not in God’s anger but in a new crusade launched by the Sykes-Picot, representing the colonial Western bloc. In short, they advocate that the Agreement paved the way to Ottoman dissolution and, consequently, the abrogation of the Caliphate forever.

In other words, the call for the re-institution of Islamic might under the Umma is the natural reaction of Muslim intelligentsia to the colonial Western bloc. However, what is wrong is seeing evidence of Muslim civilisational decline in the rise of Europe’s success. The study of history states otherwise. Historical findings demonstrate that the Caliphate was dead long ago due to paradigm shifts in Islam. Atatürk’s decision to dismantle the institution was, in fact, a declaration of its demise, not the cause of its death.

This paradigm shift in Islam is best explained by the Turkish historian Mustafa Demirci, the author of The Question of Ages in Islamic Civilisation. He convincingly argues that the Ottomans’ demise had already happened before the First War. He observes the Caliphate’s demise in a bigger picture by considering it as the consequence of Islamic civilisational decline. Demirci thus views the decline of Islamic civilisation in general and the destruction of the Ottomans in particular differently from the pan-Islamist narrative. He holds that it was not God’s anger or a new Crusade; instead, it was the last paradigm shift, the Industrial Revolution, that paralysed the Ottomans and consequently shifted the balance of power toward Europe. He observes that the Ottomans, as a premodern culture, experienced neither an Enlightenment, Reformation, nor French Revolution. Demirci traces the following four paradigm shifts in Islamic history:

**a) The age of conquests and the foundation (610-750).** In this phase, the history of Islam was monopolised by the Arabs to the extent that Arabic traditions were dominant in all conquered lands. This is embodied in the adoption of Arabic as the official language. This period is characterised by the rapid expansion of Islam under the Caliphate, such that the old world centre and important trade routes from Spain to China came under Muslim domination within a short period. The conquests were only stopped by impassable chains of mountains or deserts. In this short span of time, Muslims laid the foundations of the Eastern and Mediterranean empires.

**b) The classical age of Islamic civilisation (750-1258).** In this phase, the Muslim world dominated almost all commercial intersections until Europeans started travelling the seas. As discussed in Chapter Two, Mohammed Arkoun named the period of rapid expansion of the Caliphal state between 661 and 1258 ‘the imperial moment.’ In this period, the Abbasid Caliphate gradually lost political authority, resulting in the disintegration of the political union. Demirci calls this ‘the age of high Caliphate,’ which ‘came to an end with the dissolution of the absolute

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In the middle of the tenth century, in this phase, the Abbasid Caliphate entirely broke up when the Iranian Buyids (945-1053) entered Baghdad in 945 and made the Caliph their vassal, leaving the Abbasid Caliphate as titular ruler only. Demirci calls the period of Buyids ruling within the Abbassid Caliphate ‘the dissolution of the absolute Caliphate,’ as it lost its political power.753

c) The zenith of Islam’s financial power and gunpowder empire age (1258-1800). This age is characterised by the rise of three non-Arab empires, i.e., the Ottoman (1281-1924) in the Middle East, the Safavid (1501-1736) in Iran, and the Mughal (1526-1857) in India. In this phase, the financial power of Islam was at its zenith. This is called the non-Arabic age because the history of Islam was under the monopoly of the Seljuk Turks, Iranians, and Mongols; the Arabs were no longer leading the Islamic world. By 1800, the world of Islam had lost its superiority because the three empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals were land empires, while European sailors started to access boundless seas. Before this phase, the eastern trade routes had been under Ottoman control since they conquered Constantinople in 1453, and they barred Europeans from them; a dramatic shift occurred in world trade routes due to European maritime power, resulting in the gradual economic decline of the three empires.754

Despite its financial zenith, as said in Chapter Two, in Mohammed Arkoun’s view, the period between the 13th and 18th centuries was a period of decadence and lethargy in Islamic civilisation. Observing such lethargy during the early 15th century, Ibn Khaldun authored his Prolegomena on the rise and decline of civilisations. In the 16th century, Muslim degradation became complete. Not one in a hundred Muslim scholars could be called a genius or produce anything to call a bold and noble intellectual achievement. In contrast, European societies were rapidly heading towards modernity. Centuries of gradual decline left Muslim societies politically, militarily, and psychologically unprepared to face the colonial challenges to come. In Demirci’s words, the Islamic world had a complex ‘head trauma.’755

d) Colonisation by the West and the age of depression (1800-present). This last phase was a narrative of the Islamic world’s current inferiority when Muslim societies started to fade in the face of the advanced West. The Islamic world thus fell under European influence. The narrative also views this phase as the darkest in Islamic history, in which the colonial West invaded the entire Islamic world except for a few countries.756 The astonishingly easy expedition to Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte (1798) marked the beginning of a new era in Islamic history at the end of the 18th century. Hodgson describes the event as ‘the Great Transformation of the West’ as Muslims became embroiled in the ‘modern Technical Age.’757 In this phase, the Islamic world -and the rest of the world- fell dramatically behind the West, which experienced the intellectual revolution of Enlightenment in the 18th century and the Industrial Revolution in the 19th. Falling behind the
intellectual and industrial revolutions led to internal fissures in the Empire and intellectually paralysed the Ottoman Caliphate in the face of European scientific achievements.\textsuperscript{758}

\textsuperscript{758} Al-Nabhani. \textit{The Islamic State}. p. 173.
Six paradigm shifts in Islam (somewhat similar to Demirci’s)\textsuperscript{759}

Figure 69: Six paradigm shifts in Islam (somewhat similar to Demirci’s)\textsuperscript{759}
Demirci’s periodisation is also developed in more detail into six paradigm shifts (figure above). No matter whether we consider it as four phases or six shifts, what matters is that according to Demirci’s view, there was no divine anger, and there was no new set of Crusades that Islamists believe were designed to uproot the Caliphate. Instead, the retreat of Muslims in science and technology led to their intellectual debilitation and vice-versa. Abul Hasan Nadwi calls this ‘intellectual sterility’ in the entire Muslim world. For instance, shipbuilding did not start until the 16th century in the Ottoman Empire. Health services and modern defence academies were introduced in the Empire only in the 17th century. It is said that when a balloon was seen flying over Istanbul at the end of the 18th century, people thought it was a magic trick. The Ottomans lagged so far behind in industry that centuries after movable-type printing had been invented by Johannes Gutenberg in 1439 in Europe, it was in 1727 that, for the first time, Sultan Ahmed III allowed the printing of non-religious books in the Ottoman Empire. Interestingly, even at this time, Muslim clerics, by issuing a Fatwa, prohibited the printing of the Quran, believing it was an insult to the Muslim holy book.

Viewed from this perspective, the success and supremacy of European powers in colonising Muslim nations -as well as other nations- one by one throughout the 19th century was the outcome of Muslims’ lagging behind in science, technology, and intellectual innovation, as Demirci states and not due to leaving traditional Islam or to a new set of Crusades, as Islamists suggest. Opposing rationalism and rejecting critical thinking were the causes of the decline of Muslim nations, which formed political movements to overcome their debilitation instead of seeking intellectual and scientific revolutions. Technological and scientific breakthroughs were unlikely to occur in Muslim societies in an environment that rejected critical thinking formed in the West due to the institutionalisation of doubt.

As seen, Demirci portrays a clear and convincing picture of how the Caliphate was long dead before its abolition. Although Demirci does not mention the Sykes-Picot Agreement in any of his debates, it is evident that in his view -admitted by this research- the Agreement is not the cause of the dissolution of the Caliphal office. Instead, the Agreement was the consequence of the Ottoman system’s death long before the First World War. Expecting the death of the ‘sick Man of Europe,’ the then-powerful countries of Europe, in view of the Oriental Question, came together to decide how to partition the Ottoman territories among themselves.

761 ibid. p. 100.
Similarly, Kemalist Young Turks were aware that the Caliphal system was already dead. When it came to forming Turkey’s modern state, they spoke not in terms of Islamic principles but in terms of Adalat, Ijma, and Mashurat (justice, consensus, and consultation, respectively). No element of Islamic teachings could be traced in the Kemalist sociopolitical manifest. Also, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk did not agree to be the new Caliph, believing the institution was dead. Thus, it was not he who allegedly destroyed the institution. In 1923, the sultanate was separated from the Caliphate. On March 1, 1924, he declared the already dead Caliphal office’s demise by submitting a proposal to the Turkish National Assembly, following which, on March 3, the Assembly issued the death certificate by abolishing the Ottoman Caliphal title forever. There was no barrier to secularisation, which began in 1925.

Secularisation was nothing but a thorough Turkification of the old Ottoman society. The Sharia courts, the Shaykh al-Islam (the Grand Jurist) office, and the Ministry of Justice and Islamic institutions were abolished in Modern Turkey, replaced by adapting the Swiss civil code to Turkish needs. In this respect, Turkey became the first and only Muslim country to renounce Islam in its constitution. Later, on November 1, 1928, the Roman alphabet replaced the Ottoman Turkish-Arabic script. In 1932 and 1933, respectively, the Quran and the Adhan (the call to prayer) were recited in Turkish. In addition, the Sufi orders (Islamic Mysticism imitating Muhammad’s lifestyle of spirituality and piety through meditation together with the rejection of wealth) were banned and driven underground. The Turkish headgear, Tarboosh (derived from Persian ‘sarpush,’ also called Fez), which had acquired the status of an Islamic cap, was abolished to be replaced by the European peaked cap.

In contrast to the secularisation in modern Turkey, Islam remained more or less the point of reference in other Muslim countries, as in Egypt, where, after just four years, in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood was formed as a political movement to resurrect the dead institution of the Caliphate, in order to restore the Umma. Neither the Muslim Brotherhood nor any other Islamic political movement realised that what their nations required was not a political system but rather the intellectual revolution that they lacked. Pan-Islamist correlation between the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate and the Sykes-Picot on the one hand, or new Crusades, on the other hand, according to Demirci’s vision, misleads Muslim nations. Pan-Islamist highlighting of issues like Western conspiracy, reviving the Caliphathe, or reclaiming the Umma are just misleading the people who do not realise that what they genuinely need is not to search for their future in the past. Instead, they need to explore their future in an intellectual revolution, creating the basis for technological and scientific progress; the experience that took place in Europe when the Enlightenment put religion on the defensive with scientific criticism of biblical narratives.

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8 Conclusion: politics of Umma

As discussed, maximalist Islam is a political ideology that acts as a mobilising factor for collective behaviour and social movement, pursuing political objectives, even globally. A social movement is a collective behaviour intending to institute a new system. In the case of Islam, the new system is the re-institution of the Umma under the office of the Caliph to be ‘the perfect Umma brought forth for Mankind’ in the Quranic language.

Also, it was discussed that the rise of European colonialism had a profound effect, creating Islamic resistance and liberation movements whose primary occupation was the call for the formation of the Umma against the colonial system and its legacy. The primary goal of the Islamic political call is to combat the Inhitat (decline/decadence/degradation/passivity) in Muslim societies, and its ultimate goal is to reconstruct the romanticised past, remembered as the Golden Age of Islam. In its ultimate stage, authentic Islam is presented as a revival movement to stand as an alternative civilisational order to the Western civilisational hegemony (Huntington’s grand alarmist theory).

From this perspective, political Islam is ‘power-centric’ on the one hand and ‘ideology-centric’ on the other. Thus, it is not just faith but a ‘liberating religion’ as suggested by Shabbir Akhtar, a ‘liberation theology’ as proposed by Hamid Dabashi, and much more broadly, a ‘revolutionary ideology’ as described by Abul A’la Maududi, in a ‘combative’ Umma, able to make social movements. In this respect, today, Islamic movements view themselves as aligned with the Prophet’s movement that started in the 7th century, forming an Ummatic identity.

Thus, the research revolved around the politics of the Umma and its function in Muslim polity to provide a convincing answer to the question: What is the politics of the Umma, and how does it function as a discourse in Muslim polity?

Outstanding result

The outstanding contribution of the research was to decode the politics of the Umma and its counter-hegemonic narrative in political Islam. Due to the Umma’s role in almost all Islamist movements, the research revolved around the dominating discourse of the Umma in Muslims’ consciousness and how it is conceptualised to function in Muslim polity to keep the Umma viable. In other words, the Muslim sense of attachment to a worldwide Islamic community of believers needed to be revisited in order to perceive what the notion of the Umma stands for.

By addressing this fundamental question, the research aimed to examine the extent to which the Umma shapes Muslim identity and sociopolitical behaviour and how it forms a transnational political consciousness. It showed that the Umma is a discourse of empowerment to strengthen Muslim collectivity, for them to conceive themselves as a single body with a shared Islamic
identity and ideology. Put differently, the Umma’s function in Muslim polity was a question about the dynamism the Umma generates in Muslim movements in their quest for a political model to strengthen Muslim collectivity in an Umma-state seen as the final stage and outcome of Islam’s puritanical interpretation.

It was also discussed that political Islam is a worldwide growing, expanding, and evolving phenomenon which has a dominant role in the contemporary international system, in particular after the Cold War, to the extent that Bernard Lewis describes it as ‘international pan-Islamism’ and Bassam Tibi notes that since the Cold War, the study of the geopolitics of Islam and the West has taken the place of Soviet studies. By remembering Huntington’s grand theory of The Clash of Civilisations in relation to the direct challenge of Islam, Tibi’s comment demonstrates that the threat of communism is seemingly replaced by the fear of Islam in the Western world.

In relation to peace studies, it was also discussed that one of the peculiarities of the Middle East since the First World War, after the abrogation of the Caliphate, is the genesis and proliferation of a plethora of pan-Islamist groups and movements around the world, proclaiming the Umma-state model (Ummatism) as a counter-hegemonic narrative against the nation-state system, even sometimes by employing military force (Jihad) to mobilise Muslims for resistance or liberation. The focus on the Umma in pan-Islamist literature demonstrates that it is an anti-colonial movement.

By suggesting the Umma-state model, doubtlessly, the authority and authenticity of sovereignty in the nation-state paradigm are being challenged as never before, particularly among those who wish to create a worldwide Caliphate through worldwide Jihad (Jihadism). In this sense, the Umma notion as a discourse precludes a Westphalian regional or world order. Therefore, Sayyid Qutb, the rector spiritus of Jihadism, and his legacy for the entire Muslim world were discussed in this research, simply because in the 20th century, few Muslim thinkers had such a significant impact on the reformulation of contemporary Islamic thought as Sayyid Qutb did.

Moreover, it is significant that the phenomenon of Ummatism is sometimes presented as worldwide, like the worldwide Caliphate (Caliphatism). As such, Ummatism and Caliphatism commonly go hand in hand. They attribute all evil to the abandonment of the divine institution of the Caliphate as an office that represented the Prophet of Islam in the 7th century until 1924, when Ataturk dissolved it.

Crucially, the research vividly demonstrated that the concept of the Umma simultaneously creates a discourse, a notion in motion, and nostalgia that connects Muslims to the romanticised past (the Islamic Golden Age), constructs collective identity, and creates resistance against what Arnold Toynbee describes as an ‘Occidental intruder’; a central aspect is that pan-Islamists consider the Sykes-Picot Agreement the cornerstone of the fragmentation of Muslim Umma and sometimes cynically the sign of a new Crusade.
To demonstrate the reason for such a cynical attitude, the research shed light on the pan-Islamist view of the Sykes-Picot Agreement for the role it allegedly played in the partitioning of Arab territories, while Arabs under Sharif Hussein were promised by Britain an independent Arab Caliphate state in return for revolt against the Ottomans. Hussein launched the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Caliph in the middle of the First World War as part of the Anglo-Arab alliance in favour of the Triple Entente, which ended the Ottomans and gradually prepared the ground to form new Arab states.

In this respect, the formation of the Middle East Arab states was not like the formation of nation-states that gradually emerged, for example, in Europe after centuries of war and conflict. The research explored how the quasi-nation state model was imposed by force on the inhabitants of the Middle East, who found themselves split among countries and flags that they did not participate in making, humiliated by the Mandate System (Treaty of Versailles), which considered the Arabs ‘not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.’ What occurred was that the region’s Arabs and Muslims suddenly found themselves humiliated and fragmented into several new states with imposed artificial borders, which are described as a ‘line in the sand’ by James Barr, creating the ‘imbroglio’ Middle East, making the region a ‘volcanic centre,’ as described by Muslim scholar Muhammad Asad.

While pan-Arabism failed to alleviate the people’s outrage, pro-Caliphate pan-Islamism, rooted in Sultan Abdul Hamid’s pan-Islam project and the Caliphate Movement of India, was introduced by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 (four years after the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate) as the Muslims’ first reaction. The Muslim Brotherhood movement was followed by many similar pan-Islamist groups, even a century later, as in the example of pro-Caliphate pan-Islamist DAESH that emerged in 2014, proclaiming a world Caliphate and starting to fight the Sykes-Picot borders as barriers between Muslims.

It was also discussed that the central argument of pan-Islamists is that Islam, more than faith, is a liberation ideology, calling for the unity of Muslims worldwide based on their shared Ummatic identity. In their argument, no ideology, such as Arab nationalism, communism, socialism, secularism and the like, can solve the region’s problems better than Islam. In their slogan, ‘Islam Is the Solution’ (al-Islam Huwa al-Hall), lies a theocratic model of an authentic Islamic society that posits itself as an alternative to the secular West. As a result, political Islam commonly identifies the infiltration of Western ideas and practices like democracy and the secular state as the cause of the disintegration of the Muslim Umma and, in response, suggests a ‘Return to Islam,’ by which they mean a return to political Islam as the solution which ultimately brings back the Muslims’ single Umma which—they believe— is under new Crusade attack. As suggested by Carole Hillenbrand, the medieval period of the Crusades has inflicted on the Muslims profound and lasting psychological scars to the extent that pan-Islamists hold a dual division of the world, the Crescent versus the Cross, i.e., the Muslim Umma versus the colonial Christian West which allegedly launched a new Crusade by the Sykes-Picot deal.
By referring to a series of theories, for the first time collected in a study, the new aspect of this research was the focus on Umma’s attributes, demonstrating that, firstly, it is an integral part of Islam, based on textual theory. Secondly, it connotes a feeling of enduring attachment to the Muslim past, the ‘marvellous civilisation,’ in Qutb’s words, based on civilisational theory. Thirdly, it is the direct and ultimate outcome of the institution of the Caliphate that replaces the nation-state with the Umma-state, based on state theory. Fourthly, it is understood as the Muslim identifier in the world, based on identity crisis theory. And finally, pan-Islamist literature often asserts that the Umma was under attack, to be dismantled and not reconstructed, based on conspiracy theory.

The textual theory was employed to demonstrate that based on the exegesis of the pristine Islamic texts, namely the Quran and Sunna, Islam is essentially a political entity in which the formation of the state is a principle. The textual theory’s premise is about the nature of political Islam and holds that the dynamism in Muslim movements originates from Islamic teachings and authentic scripts. Consequently, the dynamism of Islamic movements comes from Islamic textual exegesis, which creates the political theology of Islam with the ultimate goal of sacralising sovereignty. Accordingly, Islamic political philosophy refers to the implications of theology for Muslim political life by a fusion of faith (Din) and state (Dawla) to the extent that the distinction between the two is impossible in Islam. The theory states that it is Muslim scripts that motivate endeavour to build the Umma according to their exegesis.

The four other theories were employed to explore why and how the restoration of the Umma became a dominant post-colonial dynamism in the 20th century for Islamist movements against colonial legacies. Their widespread inaccurate assumption was the belief that Muslims were a united entity until colonial powers tore them apart. In this sense, pan-Islamism is indeed an anti-colonial discourse, and the Umma is a metaphor for Muslim aspirations to reorder the post-colonial world to keep the Umma viable. In this view, anti-colonialism and sovereignty go hand in hand. If Muslims search for their sovereignty, they must fight every legacy of colonial powers. In this sense, the reconstruction of the Islamic Umma-state is the ultimate goal that prevails in the Islamist mindset, seeking post-colonial emancipation from the colonial legacy of the secular nation-state.

Notably, the research was unique in giving an in-depth insight into the dynamism embedded in the notion of the Umma, conceptualising it to denote a unified political ‘bloc’ in modern parlance in international relations. In this respect, the Umma is grounded in a political interpretation of Islam. It is much broader than a ‘community of faith,’ ‘homogeneous Islamic community,’ ‘pan-Islamic state,’ or ‘Muslim nation.’ It denotes a nonterritorial transnational community encompassing all Muslims in one bloc, no matter where they reside.

Ultimately, by reviewing the philosophical and theological literature about the Umma by eminent Muslim intelligentsia, the research found that applying the Quranic term of Umma in political Islam’s literature has become shorthand for the political unity of Muslims as a holistic system and metaphorically denotes a ‘Muslim bloc’ (as suggested -perhaps for the first time- by this research only) to confront the Other. In this sense, the Umma is not bounded by the territorial limits of the
nation-state. It refers to the totality of the Muslim superstate in the world at any given time, an entity that encompasses all Muslims in a nonterritorial holistic transnational community. It is a global agenda and doctrine transcending borders, races, languages and cultures.

This is why, denoting a future-dominating supra-national community, the Umma prevails in a pan-Islamist mindset to embrace, at once, Islamic identity, ideology, religion, and statehood in one bloc. In this sense, the Umma discourse is shorthand for a unifying bond and a framework for a Muslim society in which there is one God, one Prophet, one law (Sharia), one nation, one state (under a Caliphate), and one Caliph (symbol of Muslim unity) at the global level, to be the remedy for the stigma of Muslim society’s decline, decadence, and degradation (Inhitat).

The end of the research


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The research contribution is to decode the politics of the Umma and its counter-hegemonic narrative in political Islam... The research individuates itself by giving an in-depth insight into dynamism embedded in the notion of the Umma, conceptualising it to denote a unified political "bloc" in modern parlance in International Relations.

That is why, in its standing denotation as a future-dominating supra-national community, the Umma prevails in the pan-Islamist mindset to embrace maximally, at once, Islamic identity, ideology, religion, and statehood in one bloc. Consequently, the formation of the "Umma-state" as an alternative to the "nation-state" paradigm is the ultimate goal of almost all diverse Islamist movements to reverse Muslim decline (inhibit).

To this end, the research illuminatingly explores that Islamic Occidentalism (viewing the West as an Occidental intruder) suggests the replacement of the "Middle East of the Sykes-Picot" with the "Middle East of Islam" as the remedy for the stigmas of the Muslim Umma decline.