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THE ROLE OF EUPM IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

EU as a Strategic Actor Fighting Organised Crime in Bosnia
through Common Security and Defence Policy

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ABSTRACT

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The Yugoslav Wars is considered as one of the Europe's deadliest armed conflicts, resulting in ethnic cleansing and fight for independence. The conflict officially ended only after an intervention from international actors such as the NATO, the United Nations and the European Union. As an aftermath of the war, organised crime and corruption thrived. This had spillover effects to European security, since the Western Balkans is considered as a transit route of smuggled goods coming to Europe. As one solution for the problem, the European Union set up a civilian crisis management mission through its Common Foreign and Security Policy instrument, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The aim of this thesis is to study did the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) succeed in one of its main tasks, in fight against organised crime. Additionally, it seeks answers how did the mission contribute to safer and more secure European Union. Theory wise the thesis adopts a concept of EU being a strategic actor, executing security strategy by carrying out crisis management operations which contribute to safer environment in the conflict region but also in Europe. Methodologically, the research is based on semi-structured qualitative interviews, where inductive content analysis method was chosen for the data analysis.

The findings of this study suggest that EUPM throughout its actions has had an effect on the state of organised crime by enhancing the capabilities of Bosnian law enforcement and improving the cooperation and information exchange of international counterparts.

Keywords: EUPM, Crisis Management, Organised crime, European security, Common Foreign and Security Policy

The originality of this thesis has been checked using the Turnitin Originality Check service.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the 90s, Europe faced its biggest conflict after the second world war, the Yugoslav wars. It was a series of ethnic conflicts, which eventually led to a breakup of Yugoslav federation. Up to 140.000 people were killed. The region could not solve its problems alone, and therefore international actors such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had to intervene (Pardew, 2018). Even today, more than 20 years later, some of the operations are ongoing, trying to restore the stability and create a safer security environment.

Even though the war had ended, problems in the region did not cease to exist. As an aftermath of the war, organised crime in Western Balkans and in Bosnia and Herzegovina strengthened and it was seen as a major security threat having spill-over effects to Europe. (Mac Ginty, Pogodda & Richmond, 2021.) Because of the weak governance structures and law enforcement, the emerging security issues could not be tackled internally, and therefore international actors had to continue the intervention. EU's solution to this was European Union Police Mission (EUPM), which was EU's first civilian crisis management mission under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), later on known as Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The mission's mandate was to establish sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia ownership in accordance with best European and international practice (Council of the EU, 2002). That included a key task: a fight against organised crime, which this thesis will focus on.

The aim of this thesis is to study did the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) succeed in one of its main tasks, in fight against organised crime. In order to find answers, the main research questions is as follows: 1. What is the contribution of the mission in reducing organised crime and 2. Did European Union succeed as a strategic actor through its Common Security and Defence Policy? The sub-research question is: What was the effect of those actions to European Security? In order to answer to these questions, I will be studying the subjective experiences and opinions of a six experts who have worked for the mission and are familiar with the European CSDP policies and organised crime trends. The study itself was conducted through semi-structured qualitative interviews using inductive content analysis method.

While selecting the topic and during the early stages of research, I noticed that the connection between organised crime, crisis management operations and the European security is studied quite a little. Therefore I wanted to know more about it, and I think it is quite important for greater audience to understand the connection and especially how organized crime affects European security. This thesis gives good insight on that matter and perhaps even gives new ideas how to implement certain measures in future crisis management operations.

The thesis begins by presenting the research problem, questions and the theoretical concepts. The third chapter explains the background of everything, namely the Yugoslav wars and the international intervention. The fourth chapter presents the concept of EU's CSDP and the relationship to Bosnia, the mission and a connection to organized crime. The fifth chapter presents the research method, what were the interview questions and the idea behind each question as well as how the actual interviews were conducted. In sixth chapter I present the results, while the two last chapters are dedicated to discussion and conclusions.

2. RESEARCH DESIGN

2.1 Previous research: crisis management and organised crime

To evaluate and understand the contributions of these EU crisis management missions and especially EUPM, a thorough literature review should be presented, which will allow us to understand what has been studied so far and where are the possible gaps. To tackle the issue, a set of reports, published articles and books are presented.

Ioannides, Juncos, & Schroeder (2007) have been evaluating EU missions in the Balkans and their success and effectiveness. They have been involved in many other books and publishes related to the field of crisis management in Balkans and especially EU missions. The findings suggest that fragmentation of the Bosnian police forces, ethnic tensions, corruption, as well as poor economy affected heavily on the implementation of the mandate and therefore the goals could not be fully achieved. However, the EU learned important lessons what comes to the EU's crisis management capabilities. If future crises occur, the EU is much more aware of the possible pit walls and is able to conduct similar operation with better and faster tools. (Ioannides, Juncos, & Schroeder 2007.) As a more concrete example of what was achieved in Bosnia, EUPM together with High Representative/EUSR established State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA). The agency proved to be valuable and important asset, but most importantly effective. It was able to froze corrupted money, investigated war crimes, human traffickers and terrorism with high success rate (Ioannides et al., 2007).

A joint report by Becirevic et al. (2013) and the European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) claim that the main lesson for CFSP and CSDP is to find a way how to protect the people in post-conflict environments and from power abuses by ruling elite. These same people are allegedly the ones who provoked the crisis and/or did not stop it. In the same context there is a clause stating that organized crime and corruption are reason for lasting instability. The bridge between these two problems is strong. As a result, people responsible for above mentioned problems should be caught instead of focusing too heavily on institutional reform while the wrong people still are free. (Becirevic et al., 2013.) However, as mentioned, in 2006 the EUPM did change its focus towards organized crime and therefore in some degree did identify the problem.

In the book *The EU and crisis response*, according to Mac Ginty et al. (2021), crises can also be resolved through critical transformative approaches. In this crisis resolution addresses the needs of populations and sees the 'bad governance' as one of the root causes of crises (Mac Ginty et al., 2021). This approach fits to the description mentioned earlier, that peoples safety and security should be the top priority. The EU has tried to tackle 'bad governance' issues in the Balkans, and especially in Bosnia, but perhaps not enough. The complex environment of the conflict may explain why. However, even though critics is given to EU and its operations, namely the EUPM not being able to tackle all the problems, it has had positive effect overall. After all, EU crisis management is aimed at preserving the integrity of the core union, and in this they have succeeded so far. (Mac Ginty et al., 2021.)

As is stands, the aim of EU's presence in Bosnia was to assist the country in reconstruction and eventually bring it closer to EU. By strengthening the law enforcement and local governance, Bosnia might have better changes applying, argues Maczynska (2012) in her graduate thesis. With every enlargement the EU strives, it wants to promote stability and improve security as well. The creation of the EU itself constituted a peace project so that the war in Europe would be unthinkable. It was generally assumed that Balkans in some stage will be included to the enlarging phase. These studies suggest that the EU is acting as planned in the case of Bosnia. (Gross & Juncos, 2011.)

Montanaro-Jankowski (2005) argue that securing stability in the Balkans is crucial for the European Union. it was highlighted that European Council stated in 2003 that Europe is the prime target for organized crime and that is one of the key threats for EU. It was noted that EU security strategy considers one of the most effective ways to deal with the issue to restore good governance is fostering the democracy and enabling the authorities to tackle the organized crime in the region itself. The paper sees that the EU has made efforts with CFSP mechanisms, such as the police mission EUPM, but not as effective it would have been possible. (Montanaro-Jankowski, 2005.)

Ioannides & Collantes-Celador (2011) argue, The EU wants to transform conflict societies, the Western Balkans in this context, into democratic and rule of law abiding states. To fulfil this goal, a CSDP mechanism was and is deployed. But despite that, the EU wants to achieve its own internal security objectives. The change was seen already in 2006, when the focus in the missions turned towards organized crime and its various side effects such as drugs, weapons, corruption and human trafficking. Of course this can be partly explained by the fact, that Western Balkans and especially

Bosnia in this context, became more peaceful region and the threat of war did not exist anymore. However, numerous EU officials admit informally that the way of thinking has shaped towards ‘we help them to help ourselves’. (Ioannides & Collantes-Celador, 2011)

Ioannides & Collantes-Celador (2011) in their article claim that the police reform in Western Balkans is heavily influenced by internal political and security issues of member states and the Union as a whole. Long-term police reforms ensuring the sustainability of the process are lacking, and therefore the true nature of CSDP missions are discovered (Ioannides & Collantes-Celador, 2011). This would roughly mean that the internal security of the EU is more important than the development of a conflict state into more democratic and sustainable society with proper tools to prosper. Being this the case or not, based on the actions of various CSDP missions in Western Balkans, the attention is targeted to threats, which have direct effect on EU’s internal security. These are: trafficking of drugs, weapons and humans, terrorism, money laundering and corruption. In most of the cases organized crime is behind these activities. (Montanaro-Jankowski, 2005.)

To highlight the problem what organized crime causes to the Western Balkan region, in 2004, 50 to 70 percent of the gross domestic product of the Balkan countries crossed through corrupted institutions and individuals. Naturally this causes huge losses to nation’s economy. But it is not only about economic losses, through corrupted border guards smuggling of weapons, drugs and people is also possible and the direction is towards Europe. (Moustakis, 2004.) The Balkan region is known to be a transit route for goods coming from the Middle East, especially Afghan opium. As stated earlier, the weak governance structure, corruption combined with organized crime, all create an ideal circumstances for criminals to practice their transnational crime networks. So in this sense, creating a CSDP missions as a ‘buffer zones’ is a solution which definitely has its advantages. ‘We help them to help ourselves’ mentality can be seen in. (Moustakis, 2004.)

The current literature related to the topic itself is presented and we can clearly see the gaps. The subject is studied but the viewpoint is usually different, but by combining the findings, assumptions can be made. Therefore the importance of this thesis becomes even more valuable since there are no exact studies available where EU is being a strategic actor in the context of organised crime. The effects of Balkan crisis management missions to organised crime should be more studied, since it has become obvious that in some degree the operations have contributed to European security by acting as an outpost in the border of the Europe and gaining intelligence what are the possible threats. To demonstrate this, an example is presented. If a leader of an organized crime group is

being caught by the help of the EUPM for instance, the activities of the criminal organization reduces at least temporary and therefore it possesses smaller threat to society, and in this context Europe, since most of the drugs, weapons and people go there.

2.2 Research questions

Aim of this study is to find out did the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) succeed in one of its main tasks, in fight against organised crime. To be able to answer to that question, the main research questions is following:

- What is the contribution of the EUPM mission in reducing organised crime?
- Did European Union succeed as a strategic actor through its Common Security and Defence Policy?

The sub-research question is:

- what was the effect of those actions to European security?

2.2.1 Concept of success & effectiveness

The two main terms which are important to understand are: success and effect. According to Britannica Dictionary, success is defined as *“the correct or desired result of an attempt”* (Britannica.com). In this case the operation’s desired attempt was fighting against organised crime and succeeding in it. Effect is defined as *“a change that results when something is done or happens: an event, condition, or state of affairs that is produced by a cause”* (Britannica.com). In this case the operation is the change of conditions. The structural changes are the cause. To put these two terms closer to context, the EU being a strategic actor through Common Foreign and Security Policy, Juncos (2013) argue that being an effective, the EU has to be able to deploy purposive actions, which are reflections of political will, and that should meet certain objectives, which are defined by Member States in EU meetings. Secondly, it should have the capacity to mobilize resources and act accordingly, which reflect the recognitions by outsiders (Juncos, 2013). Additionally, Pulko, Muherina & Pejič (2016) have divided the term *“effectiveness”* to internal and external. Internal effectiveness can be assessed by how well or to what extent the operation has

achieved the goals what EU was set to do. The fulfillment of the mandate and mission key objectives namely. External effectiveness can be measured by to what extent the operation has prevented the conflict. (Pulko et al., 2016.) Since the EUPM operation entered Bosnia after the war had already ended, in this context it is more adequate to consider the prevention of new conflicts and the spread of problems and adverse effects such as organised crime. What comes to “*success*”, the main takeaway is into what extent the operation has succeeded in relation to the EU’s politico-strategic goals as well as operational objectives. More simply whether the EU has achieved its objectives which it was set to do, both strategically and operationally. (Pulko et al., 2016.)

As the subject is studied further, the impact of OC does not necessarily limit only on Balkans. As the operations of OC groups are being complicated with various methods, their business suffers. This has an effect on Europe level as well, since Western Balkans are mainly a transit route to Europe, what comes to the smuggling of drugs for instance. This has a positive effect to the security of Europe and European Union. In big picture all this is a result of the EU acting as a strategic actor in the region, which will explain the theoretical framework.

2.3 Theoretical concept

The theoretical approach is the European Union being a strategic actor, executing security strategy by carrying out crisis management missions, which will both aim to contribute to safer environment in the conflict region but also in Europe. To understand the concept and actions, the term of strategic actor will be explained. Classically being a strategic actor one should have and cover five characteristics, which are:

1. Have an independent capacity to gather and evaluate information and intelligence
2. Formulate political goals and have a hierarchy among these goals
3. Ability to select smartly among the resources at its disposal to achieve the goals
4. Have an ability to practically implement its strategy on the ground
5. Able to evaluate conducted actions and learn for future

(Chappell, Mawdsley & Petrov, 2016, 4.)

Through these characteristics, the actions of the EU can be understood better and the theoretical framework in which the EU operates is visible. The root causes for the implementations of these

strategies and CSDP missions in whole can be found from history and especially events happening in the neighborhood. When we look closer the missions and in this thesis the EUPM, one can notice that most of, if not all above mentioned characteristics are being fulfilled and therefore a strategic actorness is being found. The attention turns into Balkans, and especially to the actions the EU has implemented in the region.

3. BACKGROUND

In order to understand certain implementations of the European Union and crisis management missions in Balkans and Bosnia, it is vital to go through the background and history, from where it started and where it ended. However, the main focus point for this thesis is the time frame from 2003 to 2012, a period when the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) officially ran. However, some actions which have been conducted during that time period, bear fruit later on, which I will discuss more on analysis part.

3.1 Yugoslav wars

The Yugoslav wars were series of military conflicts from 1991 to 2001 in Western Balkan region. Ethnic tensions and wars on independence eventually led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which consisted of six socialist republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.

Following the death of Josip Broz Tito, the leader and president of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ethnic disputes along with cultural and religious divisions began. At the same time economic conditions worsened and the popularity of communism in the world weakened as well. Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo wanted greater autonomy while Serbia stronger federal authority. (Pardew, 2018.) As political and economic agony had continued for years, it was evident that changes will happen. Violence grew as Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) repeatedly showed force suppressing demonstrators. The JNA was controlled by Slobodan Milošević, the leader of Serb regime, who tried to preserve the unity, using all means possible. (Glaurdić, 2011.)

Slovenia was the first one to disintegrate from Yugoslavia, declaring their independence in June 1991. The conflict was brief, lasting only ten days and had the fewest of casualties as well. The JNA eventually withdraw from Slovenia after facing resistance by Slovenian police and territorial defense. Slovenia could be said to have the easiest path and faced the least resistance, partly due to the fact that the population consisted of mainly Slovenians and therefore the country did not have Serb minorities. (Glaurdić, 2011.) The same could not be said with Croatia and especially Bosnia

and Herzegovina, where the price of independence was much higher, in terms of victims and destruction.

Although Croatia declared themselves independent at the same time as Slovenia, they had harder time. When the Serb-controlled JNA did not have success in Slovenia, they turned their attention towards Croatia, and with the help of local Serb forces their aim was to occupy whole Croatia. (Pardew, 2018)

The armed incidents soon escalated into full war and if the international community had not paid attention previously, now they did, as the United Nations (UN) imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. However, the problem was that it did not have that big effect, and it was mostly a symbolic action at this point and could not prevent the upcoming ethnic cleansing. (Pardew, 2018.)

The war between these two parties lasted officially for four years, from 1991-1995, but the significant fights and events happened during 1991-1992. The battle of Vukovar and a massacre taking place in the city's hospital eventually led to a peace plan and UN controlled zones. (Ramcharan, 2011.) After the ceasefire and international recognition of Croatia as a sovereign state, this brought an end to most military operations in Croatia for a time being. At the same time the first United Nations peacekeeping operation in Balkans was set up, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Its mandate was to ensure safe conditions for peace talks and ensure the security in safe-havens for civilians. the operation was active also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where crisis was emerging as well. (Ramcharan, 2011.)

As Slovenia and Croatia had somewhat successfully disintegrated themselves from Yugoslavia and declared independence, Bosnia and Herzegovina attempted the same, although with devastating outcome. Again, the JNA mobilized their forces to support the ethnic Serb territories in Bosnia, since ethnic tensions rose. Soon after broke one of the most violent European conflicts of the post-Cold War period. more than 100,000 people killed and two million refugees. the UN with the support of the European countries did try to arrange peace agreements but the fighting parties rejected them. The summer of 1995 saw the turning point of war. Attacks directly towards civilians, an infamous massacre of Srebrenica and shelling of Sarajevo's marketplace were the last straw. NATO launched air strikes on Bosnian Serb military positions, which forced the parties to re-negotiate. (Glaurdić, 2011.)

In autumn 1995 the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), also known as Dayton/Paris agreement was signed, which put an end to the Bosnian War (Juncos, Kirchner & Christiansen, 2015). In this agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina was defined as a multi-ethnic country, in which all the citizens have equal rights. The agreement also foresaw a decentralized governmental structure with two autonomous entities. The federation, which consisted of Bosniaks and Croats, and the Republika Sprska (RS) with majority being Serbs. (European External Action Service, 2012.)

3.2 International intervention

The disintegration of Yugoslavia set up a series of conflicts in the region, in where some of them became so bloody that only after an intervention from international actors stopped the blood shedding (Pardew, 2018). As the war torn region had weak governance structures, it could not tackle the various security issues emerging such as transnational organized crime, ethnic conflicts, illegal immigration, refugee flows and even terrorism to some extent. As an aftermath, a series of crisis management operations were set up, with each of them having a bit different mandate, a goal to fulfill. The aim of the operations were to stabilize the situation and provide security internally, but also externally, since the impact of weak security situation in Western Balkans could be seen affecting Europe as well, in form of growing organized crime for example. (Juncos, 2013.)

Most of the 90s, the EU was merely a side player in the Western Balkans region, while the UN and NATO called the shots. Only after the intervention of UN and NATO the EU woke up to the fact that it has to take care of its neighborhood region, since Western Balkan problems have spill-over effects on the union. (Mac Ginty et al., 2021.) Economic instability, illegal migration, organized crime and drug trafficking became threats which partly stemmed from weak governance structures and the lack of proper law enforcement. The EU could not look from aside and had to take matters in own hands, not because the UN and NATO did not have the capabilities, rather because taking part in crisis management also was a strong indicator to other international actors, that the EU was capable and interested dealing with issues causing trouble to its security (Mac Ginty et al., 2021).

3.2.1 The role of the European Union

The EU member states, especially Britain and France had the view that EU should have its own autonomous defence capabilities for such security challenges, which could be implemented to future crises as well. The European response was Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and creation of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). With these mechanisms, responding was more aligned and unified tool was presented. (Gross, 2007.)

Crisis management soon after the incidents in Western Balkans became a new frontier for the EU functions. Through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU wanted to demonstrate that it could take care of its region by itself and tackle these issues by combining civilian and military operations. The aim was to prevent future conflicts between ethnic groups, reform of the security sector, assist the police to fight against organized crime and other actions which all were aimed to contribute stronger and better democratic governance. (Skara, 2014.)

The change in culture was seen in the beginning of 2000s, when the EU evolved from civilian power towards more 'muscular', multidimensional actor resorting military instruments. The aim was to promote the values and objectives stronger and become more political player as well. (Juncos, 2013.) Perhaps the EU had learned from their mistakes, feeling guilty of not having been able to stop violent crisis in its neighborhood and felt responsibility to make things right. Being that the case or not, EU took control of the leadership in Bosnia and began practicing its CSDP, launching operations in Bosnia. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) and EUFOR ALTHEA (Skara, 2014). These two operations were the most significant ones, what comes to the credibility as an effective actor being able to use force if needed.

By the end of 2004, NATO concluded its operation SFOR in Bosnia, and the EU decided to continue where it was left. EUFOR ALTHEA was set up and in principle it took over the structures and premises. Looking from a local civilian perspective, only a patch in hand changed. The idea was to keep the number of forces roughly the same as SFOR (7000) had before the withdrawal, as an intention to show that the EU truly is taking things seriously. (Engberg, 2013.) The operation's key objectives were:

1. To provide deterrence and continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the role specified in the Dayton Agreement
2. To contribute to a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(European External Action Service, 2012.)

As one of the main objectives of the mission was to keep peace, the mandate gave room for supportive tasks as well, such as fighting against illegal activities along with local law enforcement. These included weapons smuggling, drug trafficking and logging. These activities were partly run by organized crime groups. However, this approach received some criticism, and later it was decided that the EUPM, which will be introduced in next paragraph, will take over the responsibility of planning these aspects. Progressively EUFOR's role in fighting against organized crime reduced and Bosnian police forces took over the tasks. (Juncos, Kirchner & Christiansen, 2015.)

The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was another EU operation in Bosnia. It was the first CSDP mission launched by the EU. It was launched on 1st of January 2003 and initially planned to operate for three years, however by the invitation of BiH authorities, the mission continued until 30 June 2012, with modified mandates which suit the each political situation the best. Initially the mission began with 478 international experts, from which 431 were Police Officers (PO). In the end the number had dropped to 13 POs. (European External Action Service, 2012.)

The contributing member states had identified four priority areas in civilian crisis management which were policing, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. To fulfill the task EUPM's mandate was:

1. To establish sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia ownership in accordance with best European and international practice
(Council of the EU, 2002).

The EUPM provided expert advice and aimed to help establishing multi-ethnic, professional police force. It assisted the local police with organized crime and corruption. As mentioned before, the roles did clash a bit with EUROR Althea but an arrangement was found, where EUPM did take the lead and eventually even began conducting investigations. Later in 2006 the mandate was refocused on concentrating on support in the fight against organized crime and corruption. What comes to this aspect, there are different opinions what was the ultimate purpose of this, was it because the country

indeed was needing such refocus or was it because the EU noticed that the organized crime possess the biggest threat to Europe's security, with drug trafficking, smuggling of people and weapons, and the best way to tackle the issue is where the origins lay. (European External Action Service, 2012.)

The EUPM's presence can be divided into five different periods with adjusted mandates, each having a bit different emphasis. EUPM one from 2003 to 2005, EUPM two from 2006 to 2007, EUPM three from 2008 to 2009, EUPM four from 2010 to 2011 and the last so called transition phase until the end of the mission to June 2012. The launch of the EUPM saw the mission focusing on bringing the different police forces to a point where no further permanent international supervision would be needed. The projects intended to technically develop the police forces needed political agreement from the authorities of BiH. This required legislative changes in many cases. The EUPM's action followed methodologically programmatic approach and for this a Mission Strategy Implementation Plan (SIP) was developed in 2002. (European External Action Service, 2012.)

The priorities were:

1. Development of independent police and accountability under political oversight
2. Fight against organised crime and corruption
3. Financial sustainability and viability
4. Institution and capacity building at governmental level

(European External Action Service, 2012.)

For 2004 the Office of High Representative (OHR) declared that the reform of security sector would be priority. The OHR is an international institution responsible for overseeing the implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton peace agreement, which ended the Bosnian war. OHR is still operational in 2023, and will be until to a point where it is not needed and Bosnia has achieved a successful integration to Euro-Atlantic institutions. The first years the mission was in a 'learning phase' and kind of tried to find its place. Later on the focus started to shift towards a police reform. That meant efforts towards centralization of state-level police structures, and State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) jurisdiction was extended. (European External Action Service, 2012.) SIPA is perhaps one of the most successful agencies what comes to the fight against organized crime in Bosnia and the EUPM was highly contributing to the creation of it.

EUPM two and three was a turbulent times politically. The events in neighboring countries such as the independence in Montenegro, the talks of independence in Kosovo and talks of constitutional reform in Bosnia all had negative effect to the mission itself, however the goal was kept in mind and the mission continued its duties. in 2006 the mandate was refocused towards supporting the police reform process and support the fight against organized crime and corruption. Seven state-level institutions were envisioned such as an agency for forensics and police officials complaint board, to name a few. The hope was that these implementations would continue the efforts of police reform. But throughout the process and due to the political clashes the results and achievements were smaller than hoped. (European External Action Service, 2012.)

The final phases of the EUPM, namely four and five, the political situation did calm a bit, however tension could be sensed in the atmosphere. It was also noticed that the original plans for police reform could not be implemented the way it was designed. However, the strengthening of rule of law was kept in mind, combating organized crime groups, fighting illegal migration and also improving the overall capacity of law enforcement agencies and border control. As the mission was closing to its end, it was seen that satisfactory results were gained and the EUPM had done its job, at least to a degree that withdrawal could be implemented. (European External Action Service, 2012.)

4. COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

The following chapter will explain how Yugoslav wars and especially the events in Bosnia can be seen as the birth of EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It sees how the EU started to act more of a strategic actor executing crisis management missions through CSDP methods, since Western Balkans and Bosnia had causal effects to Europe in form of weakening security situation. One of the threats was organised crime and its various methods, such as corruption, smuggling and other ways, which will be introduced later on. The chapter will also examine how they impact Europe and why it was essential to tackle these issues through CSDP missions.

4.1 CSDP in Western Balkans

The EU's joint foreign and security policy is designed to resolve conflicts. It seeks to preserve peace and strengthen the international security. In addition to these, it pursues to develop and consolidate democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. (Smith, 2017.) Though it has not always been like this, and therefore to understand the present one has to look into history what caused the creation of these capabilities and instruments. The following part will focus on the events of 90s. One could go all the way to 70s, to the establishment of European Political Cooperation (EPC), but that is not relevant and does not provide the needed information to understand the actions of 90s.

The starting steps of EU's foreign and security policy can be seen from the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. General opinion seems to be that Western powers and institutions did too little and too late to prevent the conflict. (Juncos et al., 2015.) In a sense it was humiliating for the EU to let these kind of incidents happen right next to its borders, so for future the idea was that these kind of mistakes should not happen again. However, even after the war, the EU chose more of a civilian power approach, based on economic tools as the US led NATO on the other hand focused on military missions and using more military power approach (Smith, 2017). This again painted a picture of EU as an 'economic giant' but 'political dwarf'. EU was the biggest contributor in humanitarian aid and also in terms of economic assistance, but from the local perspective the US was the leading actor in terms of peace process. (Juncos et al., 2015.)

The events in some degree gave birth to EU's foreign and security policy since the EU woke up to the fact that wars can happen in their own backyard as well. A series of changes in external action was made, namely by enhancing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP), originally known as European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). When EU entered Bosnia, it transformed its identity from a civilian power to a multidimensional international actor, capable of using military instruments as well. (Juncos et al., 2015.)

Before entering Bosnia, the EU had many 'faces'. It was mostly known as economic actor but also having civilian power (Juncos, 2013). Achieving a greater position in the world and in international community in general, the EU did not hide its ambitions of becoming a global security actor. For this to become a reality, a collective measures had to be taken, an active role in security and defence. This requires two preconditions. The first one is the ability to guarantee its own internal security and if crisis emerge, having a correct response. For this the measures were taken as explained in next paragraph. The second condition is to prevent the conflicts elsewhere in the world and assist the stabilization process. For this to be fulfilled, The EU has taken measures and participated in various operations throughout the world, in Africa and Middle-East. (Zupančič, 2016.)

In 1999 at the European Council the EU-15 decided to set up ESDP. The main goal was to participate in international crisis management. By so the EU could effectively counter the external threats to European security. The Kosovo crisis actually can be seen as the critical juncture in the development of the EU defence policy but Bosnia was the first country where CSDP missions were set up. (Juncos et al., 2015.) Though Kosovo got their own mission as well, but a bit later in the form of European Union Rule of Law mission in Kosovo (EULEX).

What is the strategic vision of the EU towards Balkans? It has become evident that the member states and institutions have clear commitment towards Western Balkan countries regarding EU membership. The deployment of several CSDP missions is a proof of this. Another foreign policy success was the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo in 2013. In 2003 the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) identifying Western Balkans as geographical area of strategic importance. (Chappell et al., 2016.) So as can be seen, with every enlargement, the EU pursues promoting stability and democracy in return of improved security. The security risks mainly stem from historical background, since weak governance structures and the legacy of past violent

conflicts create ideal circumstances for organized crime and their operations such as human, drug and weapons trafficking.

However we cannot blame Balkans for being the sole reason. According to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, at the moment at least, Balkans are mainly a transit route for narcotics and other illegal goods (UNODC, 2008). The production happens elsewhere, mainly on Afghanistan (Heroin) as mentioned, and another fact worth mentioning is that Balkan organized crime groups are not the biggest operators. They work mainly in Balkans and act as distributors and middle hands to Europe. Albanian mafia however is an exception. They seem to have wider networks and have even been linked to trafficking of Cocaine from South America, but it seems that Balkans are not the primary target for narcotics since markets in Europe are bigger and provide more revenue. (The Global Initiative, 2017.)

The crisis in Balkans was and still is a complex environment. As the Council of the EU (2002) stated a mixture of instruments is needed. Thereby one cannot assume that simple solutions and tactics necessarily work. The security environment is not the same anymore. Conventional peacekeeping missions have been mainly replaced with more complex crisis management operations (chappell et al., 2016). CSDP was designed to provide EU with adequate and appropriate tools and capabilities. These included: able to deploy 60,000 military personnel, to undertake tasks such as humanitarian and rescue tasks; combat forces to crisis management, including peacemaking, which in a sense is the new dimension of peacekeeping, where a peace is enforced (chappell et al., 2016). The world witnessed this happening in Yugoslav wars where NATO and US bombed Serbs to force peace negotiations. But equally important change was the addition of civilian crisis management capabilities, which included; police, rule-of-law, civilian administration and civilian protection. Later on border monitoring, security sector reform, police reform and monitoring peace agreement was added (chappell et al, 2016). However, the most important element was the potential to combine civilian and military conflict management capabilities with existing instruments and that itself made the EU unique, a comprehensive security actor. With this tool, the EU had the capacity to operate in wider security environment, tackling multidimensional problems. (chappell et al., 2016.) Weak governance structures, humanitarian aid and military capabilities providing protection just to name few.

Going back to the question of more complex security environment, one of the catalysts for changes was more open borders, which allowed people and goods move more freely, meaning also criminals

got more foothold (UNODC, 2020). Responding to these ‘new’ threats could not happen through purely military means. Here the above mentioned ‘mixture of instruments’ steps in. The Council of the EU (2002) identified five key threats; terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, state failure and organized crime. What comes to the Balkans, out of these five threats, the last three mentioned threats are considerable. Though there had been reports of Jihadist cells in Bosnia (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2018). However based on the reaction of security authorities, the issue is either taken care of or considered a lesser problem, since not much attention is given to it. However, this does not mean that the issue should not be given attention, vice versa, an emerging security threat should be dealt in early stages. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the other hand is far from reality and any reports dictating so are not found.

4.2 CSDP in Bosnia

The EU’s actions in Bosnia primarily began with stabilization processes. In order to provide stabilization, diplomatic actions and speeches need to be backed up with a possibility to use military instruments (Juncos et al., 2015). The EU externalized its internal security policies by deploying CSDP instruments the EUPM and EUFOR Althea respectively. The emphasis of the missions were primarily focused on fight against organized crime and security sector reform. It was explained that Balkans are the first line of defence of the EU borders and need to be dealt with adequate seriousness. (Juncos et al., 2015.) In 2002, the EU appointed an EU Special Representative, being also the High Representative in Bosnia. It got its origins from the Yugoslav wars when the Dutch decided to send an Ambassador to mediate among the fighting parties. Since then the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) have been institutionalized. Their role is to report progress on the ground and coordinate all the different EU actors in the country. (Juncos et al., 2015.)

The appointment of EUSR was highly needed, since the coherence of EU activities was in order (Juncos, 2013). Looking back in time, the EU engagement with its different methods was perhaps the most complex up to date. One example where coherence was needed was the role of EUPM and EUFOR Althea. As mentioned already, in the beginning their roles were a bit unclear and in certain occasions they stepped on each other’s toes to say, in fighting against organized crime for instance.

The EUSR had formal role in the EUPM's chain of command providing political guidance to the Head of Mission (HoM), as well as providing political advice to EUFOR commander (Juncos et al., 2015).

When talking about CSDP in Bosnia, perhaps the most important topic regarding this thesis is the EUPM. As is known, Bosnia has been the testing ground for many CSDP activities, what comes to the civilian crisis management missions (Juncos et al., 2015). EU made a commitment to develop autonomous operation and demonstrated being credible actor. Interesting fact is that in the beginning 15 member states contributed experts to the mission, however 19 nationalities were non-member states. (European External Action Service, 2012.) From the EU's enlargement perspective, this could be seen as a testing ground for stronger cooperation with other non-member states and perhaps to strengthen the EU. But according to Juncos (2013) there were difficulties, financial and legal elements required individual arrangements with each contributing states.

Another topic for discussion was the nature of the mission, more precisely the mandate, being executive or non-executive. In this case the latter was chosen, which means that the mission does not have operational role, therefore they cannot participate in police operations executing force as locals can. The role of monitoring, advising, training and mentoring was chosen, as non-executive mission happens to be. The topic was discussed later in 2005, should an executive mandate be introduced, but as it stands, it was never implemented. This can be seen clearly as a disagreement of the way the mission ran, perhaps because of the results, or the lack of those. In 2006 the mandate did have a refocus, but the executive question was sidelined. The mission initially ran nearly a decade, involving in strengthening the rule of law in Bosnia and pursued creating a modern, sustainable and professional multi-ethnic police force. (European External Action Service, 2012.) The question of was it successful will be answered later, but the key take-away is that it gave important lessons for CSDP and therefore provided an important lessons for future. After all it was the first CSDP mission and from that perspective, at least something was done correct because many other operations was set up after the EUPM and some elements implemented from the EUPM were introduced to later missions (chappell et al., 2016).

Speaking of CSDP in Bosnia, even though the thesis primarily covers actions of the EUPM, Another EU operation has to be mentioned, EUFOR ALTHEA. The operation has been briefly introduced already, but in order to understand the grand strategy of the EU, it is desirable to seek answers from other actions as well.

In Bosnia, the EU made clear expressions to take over the previous NATO operation that had been running in the country. The strategic objective was the eventual membership of Bosnia and by participating the EU made a clear commitment (Pulko, Muherina & Pejič, 2016). One can argue that the peace itself was already established by NATO and its IFOR and SFOR operations, so in that sense ALTHEA probably can be seen as more political commitment rather than full crisis management mission, although the mission surely had the capabilities if crisis would remerge. But with proper commitment, the EU established itself as a relevant foreign and security actor. One fact that supports the statement is that at the time Bosnia was already a relatively safe environment and ideal for testing ground. According to Asseburg & Kempin (2009) the operation cannot be described as crisis management, because as said by the time EUFOR took the control, the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement had been completed. The armed groups of conflicting parties had already been withdrawn and integrated to new security structures and what comes to the question of heavy weapons and ammunitions, they were either destroyed or put under international control. So as can be seen, the so called 'heavy lifting' had been done already. (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009.) Of course being a supportive element is vital and to this EUFOR Althea surely had capacities and will.

EU operation at least in this context was more political and perhaps towards civilian-military cooperation (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009). As the operation is still functioning, until this day there has not been any ethnic violence where EUFOR ALTHEA would have had to intervene with force. Is it because the operation has been a success? Perhaps so and some authors argue that ALTHEA has succeeded fulfilling its goals better than the EUPM, But those two missions should not be compared since mandates differ from each other and the operational framework for EUPM has been much harder (Becirevic et al., 2013). Everything was made ready for ALTHEA and in that sense the work is easy to continue. However from CSDP viewpoint, the EU succeeded in goals and managed to prove being worthy security actor.

From CSDP standpoint, the question is could the EU have been able to respond quickly enough to a similar situation what happened in the beginning phases of Bosnian war in 92-95? The EU has learned a lot, and become a credible security actor but in a sense the true test for EU is still lacking. Asseburg & Kempin (2009) states that the intervention in Bosnia was not crisis management in its true sense of word, because other international actors had done the heavy lifting. When security has to be first established and systems build from scratch, perhaps then one could have witnessed how it really works. However, one has to take into account the fact that this was the first operation

framework where the EU participated and from here on the work only started towards stronger security actor and despite the critique, states that success was found in form of operational and technical support (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009).

Is EU a strategic actor in security and defense field? As is stands, to be it, one has to achieve clearly defined goals through long term planning and coherent implementations. Another important step is to achieve the three main objectives, which were defined in the European Security Strategy. These are: averting security threats, stabilizing the immediate neighborhood and strengthening effective multilateralism. (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009.) Surely when analyzing the mission reports and the situation in general, one can make observations on which field the success is found. Security threats have been answered, since the Bosnian conflict has not remerged. The same goes with stabilizing the immediate neighborhood. Even though the country is still known to have heat under the surface, a peace has been established for now at least. The last part of strengthening multilateralism is well fulfilled, with various parties working together. Surely one can argue that the cooperation might not be ideal and perfect, but taken into account the complexity of the country, in that environment the best possible outcome has been reached.

4.3 Countering organised crime through CSDP

In Bosnia, the European Union operated through CSDP for greater security inside the member states but also acting as a strategic security actor within its borders (Chappell et al., 2016). One can think that CSDP is the tool, a hammer let's say, and in this context the EUPM operation is the nail, carefully selected instrument modified for the selected job. This metaphor illustrate the order how things operate.

As the mission had ran less than two years, criticism started to mount. The mission ran non-executive mandate, which meant that the operation itself cannot provide concrete results in form of arrests and seizures. Therefore the mandate was refocused so that the two main tasks are: support to the police reform process and support to the fight against organised crime and corruption. The EUPM will therefore assist the local authorities in planning and conducting large scale organized crime investigations. With the refocus of mandate, more concrete results were eventually found and the mission did gain more success. (European External Action Service, 2012.)

What were the catalysts for the change then? For 2004, the reform of security sector in general was considered as priority, where focus was laid on mostly defence, intelligence and prosecution system (European External Action Service, 2012). However, since end of the war in Bosnia, international actors have been supporting the reform of Bosnian security and police forces since they were seen as incompetent and corrupt, and the leadership was unclear as well. All these impacted to the functioning of the police and therefore a reform had to be done. Before the official launch, Ministers of Interior from participating EU member states and Western Balkans countries gathered in London, UK, to issue a joint statement. The document was called 'Defeating Organized Crime in South Eastern Europe'. As the name suggests, the task was clear. The priority of the mission will be as mentioned and the prime concern should be fighting against organized crime, in order for the country to bounce back from the effects of war. This statement did shape the mission's mandate and the selected approach. (Becirevic et al., 2013.)

One of the core tasks was to limit the political interference in police operations. Creating a clear division of tasks was necessary since the old habits were strongly influencing the activity of police. Politicians were seen to use police as an instrument of oppression and control. Democratic policing was far from it and political elites used their connections to criminals to stay in power. There is a saying that politicians are the real mafia, and in some degree this was a fact in Bosnia, and in Balkans in general. To combat this ministerial level and police administration separation was planned. The aim was that Bosnian police should be able to carry out criminal investigations on corruption cases regardless of political implications. Only then real results can be made. (Becirevic et al., 2013.)

In short time period, according to a Bosnian police statistics, crime rates have risen since the EUPM changed its mandate. In 2004 crime increased by 22% in Republika Srpska, which is the Serbian entity in Bosnia and 32% in Bosniak-Croat Federation. (Lyon, 2005.) However, too large assumptions should not be made, since the growth in crime rates can be explained either with the fact that criminality is being paid more attention and therefore the rates are higher since reporting is better, or because in the beginning of the mission the police reform did create a bit disarray among the police. However, one thing is for sure, and that is the fact that the refocus of the mandate had some meaning.

Eventually if one looks what has been done in ten years, by 2012, 25 large scale criminal bosses have been arrested, accused of murders, drug trafficking and other criminal activities (Becirevic et

al., 2013). The number might not seem big, but taken into account the nature of organised criminal groups, the hierarchical system they possess, it is relatively good, since usually the leaders of the organised crime groups rarely get caught.

4.4 EUPM and organized crime

In the beginning phases, EUPM encountered various problems and did not provide much needed results. Partly it can be explained by the fact that the mission itself was only in the beginning phase but also because there was not clear plan and focus what should be done and how. However after the modification of mandate, many changes were introduced and the second phase of EUPM from 2006 to 2007 became more successful. (Juncos, 2013.)

As mentioned earlier about the different phases and how each mandate was updated, the police aspect was much more focused. The efforts focused on three key sectors: supporting the police restructuring process, assisting in fight against major organized crime and strengthening control and inspecting capability (European External Action Service, 2012). EUPM carried out numerous activities out of which the creation of SIPA was one of them. In addition to that it took control of Criminal Justice Interface Unit. This resulted in strengthened ties between the prosecutorial sector and police enhancing the intelligence exchange. All these activities had positive effects on fight against organized crime, especially on local level. (Maras, 2009.)

The main idea was to enhance the capacity of local police forces so that fighting organized crime can be even possible. With above mentioned elements, and with aid from international community, cracking down crime networks was made possible. As help was gained, it allowed local police tackle more tricky cases without fear of political involvement, since organized crime had connections to political parties and state level deciders. Naturally the progress again was not that rapid, and therefore problems did merge time to time, but the direction was correct. EUPM's aim after all was to develop building blocks necessary to achieve sustainable arrangements in the long run. (Muehlmann, 2008.)

What highlights the importance of fighting against organized crime is the fact that as the mission progressed, the Council further narrowed the mission mandate to focus on the support to fight

against organized crime and corruption (European External Action Service, 2012). It was highlighted that results in this particular field is needed. Later on the official website mentioned that success has been found particularly in number of large scale anti-organized crime operations conducted by the Bosnian police. However, there are no evidence or official documents which could verify the statement, and it has been suspected that they are mostly PR tricks. One of the conducted operations is actually the exact Jihadist cell operation which was mentioned earlier that there had been indications of such activity. However in this raid the results were relatively small and only few small arms and computers suspected being linked to Al-Qaida was found (Maczynska, 2012).

As the concrete results were relatively narrow during the presence of the EUPM, the focus should be directed towards future. If we look at the original plans where it was intended that the operation will build tools for future and create a sustainable structures so that the institutional elements will cooperate together, then one should look how the future will look like. In this scenario the structures have had time to adapt and learn from past mistakes. An evaluation of present state of Bosnian police should be made. This would give more concrete findings. But then again if we truly want to believe that success has and is being made, reports of Balkan current state would state otherwise.

Balkans and Bosnia as well still have strong connections to criminal activity. Organized crime is still strong in the area and corruption is nothing new. To combine this with the current state of ethnic disputes rising in Bosnia, one can only think that what if it all starts again, meaning that work of 20 years have been all for nothing, at least from the local perspective. Looking from EU, important lessons have been learned, intelligence have been gained, and much needed experience related to crisis management have been found (Smith, 2017). So in that sense even if concrete results are light, valuable information have been gained and at least to a certain degree, the theoretical framework EU being a strategic security actor has been fulfilled.

4.5 The outcomes of EUPM

In order to measure the impact of EUPM, the possible achievements and outcomes the mission has delivered, one has to look from bigger picture. From European foreign policy perspective, CSDP mission is an internal and external product of European integration (Becirevic et al., 2013).

I mentioned in the previous chapter that whenever missions are conducted, an evaluation will be made and through that element, valuable information for future is gained. This exact information is analyzed and used in upcoming operations.

Becirevic et al. (2013) present a model of internal and external impact. In this model the results are being analyzed how they have contributed the country (BiH) itself. Mostly the effects can be seen through already mentioned elements such as the creation of SIPA, the Ministry of Security and Directorate of Coordination for Police Bodies and other government level institutions relating to security sector (Becirevic et al., 2013). If we want to take it even further, then we should look for internal statistics and official government documents, in order to measure the effectiveness of certain agency or institution. Internally however, with the addition of new state level agencies, Bosnian police did become more effective against organized crime and corruption (European External Action Service, 2012).

The external effects were functional, political, societal, strategic and many more. As an example EUPM cooperated with many other international actors, and therefore strengthened the partnership. (Becirevic et al., 2013.) The United States Department of Justice (ICITAP), OSCE, NATO and the UN, to name the biggest ones. The EU proved to be a valuable partner in the field of security. (Juncos, 2013.) This gave contribution to the EU's attempts of becoming a global security actor as well, not just a political 'paper tiger' as it was suggested in the 90's, in the beginning of Yugoslav wars when EU was merely watching from aside when NATO and UN predominantly tried to solve the crisis This is something the EU did not want to witness again and therefore actions in Bosnia and especially EUPM's, proved that EU is worthy partner. (Chappell et al., 2016.)

The EUPM left Bosnia a legacy, tools to work with. Now for future it is up to the country itself to foster it. To further depoliticize the rule of law and consolidate security reform (Becirevic et al., 2013). However even ten years after the mission ended, the country is still suffering from organized crime and corruption. There are many reasons but one of the affecting element is the socio-economic situation and ethic disputes which negatively affect the progress. These circumstances create ideal surroundings for illicit activity and if there is not even a will to fix problems, not much can be achieved. Still the international community and has not completely given up. An ongoing EUFOR Althea operation is a living proof of this but at the same time it paints a dark picture on the country itself, if foreign military instruments are still needed, doesn't it raise a question, why?

Perhaps the final word has not been said yet. That would after all be a massive failure for the EU and other international actors, who have tried to foster peace and build better future for Bosnians.

4.6 Roots of organized crime

In order to understand why certain actions are being made, such as the fight against organised crime by crisis management missions, it is vital to understand from where OC stems from. Organized crime (OC) in Balkans and Bosnia is not a new thing. The trend of people getting together and cooperating to gain profit by illicit means dates back to thousands years. Historically the Balkan peninsula has and is serving as a transit route for trafficking and smuggling of people and goods by OC, all the way from Asia to Europe. (UNODC, 2020.) Geopolitically the location is ideal, in the cross-roads of Mediterranean and Europe, between West and East, a link between Europe and Asia (The Global Initiative, 2017). Because of this, Balkans have been main route for people moving back and forth for centuries (UNODC, 2020). It is no surprise that crime has found its way as well. The region sits between the world's biggest producer of opium, Afghanistan, and the biggest markets for heroin, the Europe and especially West part of it (The Global Initiative, 2017). Because of the Historical events, the Balkan route has become an important route for traffickers (UNODC, 2014).

Different events in the past have played an important role in Yugoslavia, being it social, economic or political. In early 80s, the economic crisis resulted growing inflation and unemployment, which acted as a catalyst for OC groups to seek for new opportunities to gain profit (UNODC, 2008). Another big event shaping the history was the Yugoslav wars. UN sanctions to different sides of crisis resulted to people finding new ways to support their ongoing war and OC groups became part of the war, by providing weapons and ammunition by illicit ways bypassing the sanctions. It was not only war material that was smuggled, the nurtured demand of every day goods served as a gift for OC groups because they were able to provide them and therefore local authorities were not that keen to intervene. (The Global Initiative, 2017.) The illegal markets were in some cases even politically sponsored, which gave room for corruption. Naturally, it was not only military material and other goods such as cigarettes or fuel that was transported, drugs and illegal migration found their way as well. (UNODC, 2020.)

The above mentioned political and economic conditions partly established the illegal markets in the area. These people were seen as a ‘service-providers’. The roots grew strong and because of the weak institutions, which did not in some cases have even have the interest to intervene, OC groups established themselves an ideal ground to grow. Years and perhaps decades practicing illegal activity molded Balkan crime groups to operate in such a fashion that getting caught was not a big risk. (The Global Initiative, 2017.) The ambition grew and in recent years they have increased their capacity becoming heavily involved in transnational crime as well, such as trafficking cocaine from Latin America (UNODC, 2014). Therefore, it is no wonder that the EU sees OC a massive threat to its security. Operations against organized crime have been ongoing since end of the Yugoslav wars, for instance in form of crisis management missions and in this context the EUPM. But the EU is not the only one looking for reforms, the prospect of EU membership for Western Balkans is a driver that pushes the countries to eliminate the OC, however, as mentioned the roots are deep indeed and the progress is slow as seen. (UNODC, 2020.) Each country however has their own national plans how to counter OC, what are the responses and what should be done in future. This does shed light but only time will eventually tell, if the action plans will be effective or not.

The next subchapters, namely drugs, human and firearms trafficking will present the central forms of criminality in which organised crime is heavily connected. It is essential to introduce them and explain how they impact the Balkan region and thereon Europe. It also helps to understand certain implementations what the EUPM did, for example the recreation of Border Police (BP). BP was essentially established to conduct police tasks linked to border surveillance in border crossing points (European External Action Service, 2012). During the results phase, these topics will rise from the material so the following part will act as a primer.

4.6.1 Drugs

Drug trafficking is the most important channel of income for different Balkan OC groups. There seems to be three ways contributing to it. Perhaps the most known is the so called ‘Balkan route’, which means that large volumes of heroin passes through Balkans, originating from Asia, as mentioned. The ‘local’ groups are connected to this business with various means, starting from the processing of the product to storing and further dispatching it to Europe. Estimates suggest that 60-65 tons of heroin flows into Balkans annually. The drugs are mainly moved by road vehicles and because of the poor border guard and customs, the majority of the product find to designated location. 90% of world’s opium is being produced in Afghanistan so the direction is clear.

(UNODC, 2014.) However, it has to be noted that after Taliban took control of the region, they imposed that those opium farms should be dismissed. It is hard to estimate will it have any impact or not, since much of their funding comes from that exact product, so it might have been a PR trick.

The second way is regional cannabis and synthetic drug production. Significant amounts of cannabis is being grown in Albania. The problem here is that since the production is happening inside the country itself, the corruption happens to be stronger. Since massive flows of dirty money is flowing to the country, the officials are more easily connected to the business. But despite the efforts to buy every official, time to time Albanian authorities have had success stories and cannabis plants have been burned down and corrupted officials arrested. What comes to the synthetic drug production, methamphetamine and ecstasy ‘factors’ are being reported where the biggest one was found from Serbia. However, out of total number of drugs, the synthetic ones do not play that important role. (UNODC, 2008.)

The third way is importing cocaine from South America. Although the Balkan region itself is not a major route, the nationals and organizations from the region are active. As with heroine, the main destination for cocaine is Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal and therefore it is not logistically even wise to transport the product to Balkans. But as mentioned, even if the product does not enter the region, the people running the business are residing. Although there has been reports of West African traffickers being active in the region and usually Balkan, especially Albanian OC groups are notorious of being extra violent what comes to territory disputes, so it would not be a surprise that these African traffickers would be working together/under the Albanian rule. (UNODC, 2014.)

As the next chapter will talk about human trafficking, below is a map provided to illustrate how both drugs and people, being it a migrant or a victim of sexual exploitation, use the same routes, and how the Balkan region is heavily connected to it.



FIGURE 2: Flow of heroin and migrants through Balkans (Drawn by S Ballard, The Global Initiative, 2017).

4.6.2 Human Trafficking

The trafficking of people has been one of the main types of organised crime in Western Balkans for over 20 years, starting from the Yugoslav wars. The Balkan region differs from other regions because it has been a source of trafficked victims, a transit region and a destination for trafficked women. So all the elements are found, which makes it difficult for law enforcement. The poorer Balkan states witness domestic servitude and forced begging. (The Global Initiative, 2017.) One of the interviewees explained how the forced begging functions. They are people who begged for money or forcefully washed car windows expecting to get paid, while idling in red lights. Their operations were very 'professional' and they had systematic way of doing it. They had their own sectors and from each earned money, a certain percent went to their superior. The workers were usually boys or young men. The beggars were older ladies with fake dolls, expressing to have a new born baby in need for help. As it happens no young girls or women were seen. According to Global Initiative (2017), most women are victims of sex trafficking, in private apartments or bars and nightclubs. Now someone might think that if they are forcefully made to do the job, why don't they come forward to police? There is a fear of being returned as illegal migrants. Many people sadly content with their 'destiny' and therefore remain in their position, since mostly in these cases they still have a roof above them and food to eat. Another thing is the fear for their own or family's safety. In some cases they are being blackmailed. (The Global Initiative, 2017.)

International human trafficking draws the most opprobrium for the region. The transnational labor movement began booming strong already after fall of the Berlin wall. The wages of West Europe lured many people from Balkans and Eastern Europe and as this movement was illegal, it was organized by OC groups. As previously mentioned, the movement did also flow towards Balkans, since a domestic demand was found – the international peacekeepers. (UNODC, 2008.) Ironically the members of crisis management missions are using the services of OC groups, while also trying to cease their operations and create stability.

The 2014 refugee crisis created an ideal opportunity of OC groups to make money. It actually became one of the most profitable types of crime along with drugs. In 2015, 765,000 people illegally crossed the Western Balkan border. That is 16 times more than the previous year. These migrants were mainly from the Middle East – Afghans, Iraqis and Syrians. For OC crime groups, this was simply broadening their business, since the smuggling routes were already there. Now the same routes were used to transport people, drugs and weapons. In 2016 the EU woke up to the fact that

too many people are coming to Europe and something has to be done. The Western Balkan transit corridor was shut down and the number of illegal border crossing did drop dramatically, however, this directed the flow elsewhere and made The OC groups come up with new “business” ideas to continue their operations. False documentations and tickets, bribing the border guards and many other illegal activity continued and the money flowed to organized crime. (The Global Initiative, 2017.)

4.6.3 Firearms Trafficking

The Yugoslav wars left massive amounts of weapons and military equipment. Before its breakdown, it maintained the fourth largest army in Europe and self-sufficient production of soviet weapons from AK-47 to T 72 tanks. The WW2 left a mark, a reminder that weapons might be needed in future as well and therefore the region had stashes of weapons all over the former Yugoslav countries. As mentioned previously, when the war started an arms embargo was imposed. As Serbia was controlling the Yugoslav army, it had little effect to it, since with its massive warehouses with military resources it could continue the war easily. The effect was mostly seen in Bosnian and Croatian defence forces. From thereon, international black marketers and governments began cooperating. The first circle of organized crime corruption had been established. Weapons from all over the world started pouring in. Argentina, South Africa and Iran to name few. The weapons were smuggled into the countries using the same routes as drugs, people and other goods such as cigarettes and fuel. (Anastasijevic, 2006.)

When the war was over, most of the weapons stayed in the region. But as it happens to be, weapons are always needed, if not in former Yugoslavia, somewhere else. International arms dealers and organized crime saw the supply and demand shifting and weapons started pouring out to other conflict zones, such as Iraq. Again the same routes, which were used to transport the weapons and other illegal goods into the former Yugoslav countries, were needed, this time to other direction. The smuggled weapons were mostly military grade suitable for battles. The smaller handguns and automatic pistols found their way to Europe, to the hands of criminals and organized crime groups. (Anastasijevic, 2006.)

Most of the above mentioned happened right after the war or few years from it. But the problem is still strong and causes a clear and present security threat. In 2012 a survey was conducted stating

that there was six million privately owned firearms in the Balkans and this does not take into account the number of not reported ones. The 2015 Paris terrorist attack was conducted with Zastava AK-47, a Serbian manufacturer. The attackers of Charlie Hebdo used Bosnian made ammunition. A machine pistol from Croatia was found in a police raid to an apartment suspected of terrorism. (The Global Initiative, 2017.) Because of the money oriented business model of these OC groups, they don't care who the buyer necessarily is. Therefore radicalized individuals have fairly easy access to weapons, especially in Balkans.

Shifting focus back to Bosnia, according to the UNODC Measuring Organized Crime in the Western Balkans (2020) report, data collected during the period of 2012-2017 states that major convictions for crimes is related to firearms. A total of 76% from all convictions. The second was drug trafficking with 17%. At the time when this particular research was made, the data for proven organized crime involvement for these sectors was unavailable, but participating generally to organized crime activities was six percent. (UNODC, 2020.)

Looking closer the drug issue, no systematic conclusion can be drawn from the results. The seizures by police and other law enforcement agencies are rather low during the time period of 2014-2017, however arrests have doubled. This can mean two things, increased activity of OC groups or intensified efforts from law enforcement. Even if the number of arrested persons for drug trafficking is relatively low, the numbers were still rising, until 2018, when a decline of 26% of seizures was reported. The decline was seen mostly in heroin, cocaine and ecstasy, while cannabis and amphetamine increased. (UNODC, 2020.) As I mentioned earlier, heroin and cocaine are drugs which are mostly brought elsewhere. The final destination usually for those drugs are in Western Europe and Bosnia and Balkans in general are used mostly as transit countries. Therefore an assumption can be made that if there is a decrease of those substances, the reason might be somewhere else. Cannabis and amphetamine on the other hand are drugs which can and are being made in Balkans. That would suggest that local producers are more active and the drug markets are not decreasing locally at least. But it has to be mentioned that the usage of drugs in Balkans is relatively low compared to Europe.

The 2015 migration crisis had an impact on firearms trafficking as well. Tightened border control created problems for criminals as borders became harder to cross, criminals began the production of fraudulent travel and identity documents, and made money that way (The Global Initiative, 2017).

These three introduced organized crime activities are deeply connected to the culture of corruption in the region. Despite the ethnic tensions and political differences, OC groups seem to cooperate on regional and international level. The level of cooperation is effective, and their ties to governments makes them untouchable, in certain occasions. This has been the case since beginning of the Yugoslav wars and continues to be so even in 2023.

5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I will discuss and explain how the empirical part of this thesis was done. First I will explain the methodological part, mainly how the semi-structured interviews were conducted and how the data was collected and analyzed, as well as introduce the questions for the semi-structured interviews.

5.1 Research strategy

When choosing a right method for data collection, I quite shortly noticed that semi-structured, also known as thematic interviews suit the best. In this sense a qualitative method is good for studying complex topics in social world, such as this is. Some of the benefits include the ability in developing detailed descriptions and describe processes. (Weiss, 1994.)

When thinking of who should I interview, I came up with the idea of interviewing persons who have lived in Bosnia and especially worked for the EUPM operation, since surely they have the best perspective and experience. In qualitative interviews it should be important that the expert who will be interviewed knows as much as possible from the subject or phenomenon (Patton, 2014). These professionals, or experts if you will, have insight on how the operation worked, what was done, and what kind of effects it had. So therefore I believe, that the answers gained from these interviews have a high value what comes to the results and findings.

Since some of the topics covered in the interviews are sensitive, it was decided that the interviewees are kept anonymous. What can be said is that all the interviewed experts are EU nationals with earlier experience from crisis management operations. The positions they served are more towards higher echelon, for instance adviser level. There were small differences on their background and professional experiences, but on answers it showed only as small nuances and preferences on certain aspects. The grand vision of matters was pretty much the same.

As I had made the decision to choose interviews as my main method for data collection, the first step was to think what I'm going to ask. I created 10 questions, and each of those had a bit different angle. But I was already quite sure, that the interviews might not follow a direct path, so that by

asking direct and straightforward questions, I receive direct answers. No, it was more like I asked a question, which had a topic, for instance organized crime and corruption, and the interviewee started talking about how he/she felt about it. Of course I did also receive direct answers, but even those answers had some kind of pre-words, such as why he/she felt certain way, or why things were done as they were. This actually gave very good insight and deeper knowledge for myself about the operation. There were a lot of things that one cannot find from the internet and I believe there is a reason behind it.

Questions were selected so that they will fit my research question and topic in general but also to understand the bigger picture and how it correlates to the theory as well. Next I will go through the questions, explain each one and my idea behind it.

The first question is: “One of the main tasks of the EUPM operation was a fight against organized crime, do you think the goal was achieved?”. This particular question is very important, because it will give insight how the experts who have worked for the operation see it. It also gives room for wider conversation, since there are two important topics, the operation itself and its connection to the organized crime.

The second question: “Did the operation succeed in reducing organized crime in Bosnia Herzegovina, Balkans and in Europe?”. Here the angle is to find answers, whether a clear statistical fact could provide information, However, this question is a bit tricky, because to be able to answer this, the interviewee should have had an access to a database, which clearly dictates the organized crime rate before, during and after the operation. In later phases of this thesis, one can see how it turned out to be.

3rd question has a bit wider perspective. “Did the operation have an effect on the status of organized crime in European Union?”. The idea of this question is to get answers if the operation had positive and broader external effects to European Union’s security.

The fourth question deals with operational capabilities, or the lack of it. “The mission was non-executive, do you think the operation had a sufficient mandate to carry out the given tasks, or had an executive level mandate given better qualifications and tools, like in EULEX for instance?” I wanted to ask this question because based on the literature review, this is something that many scholars and valued researchers argue. However, I wanted to hear an opinion from someone who

has served in the mission itself and dealt with those matters on daily basis. Some say that executive mandate should have been in place, since it gives power for instance to arrest and prosecute people. The EULEX example is there, because that mission in Kosovo has executive mandate and it has similar characteristics, such as the geographical location (Western Balkans) as well as being an European Union civilian crisis management mission.

The fifth question shifts focus more towards grassroots level. “If we think about different themes of organized crime, such as corruption and smuggling of goods (weapons, drugs, people), which was the most challenging to deal with?” This question is very important because it helps to understand how organized crime is connected to almost every level of society. An example of this is a corrupted politician or a government official making decisions in favor of an organized crime group connected to real estate business, which is a popular way of laundering money. Another example is a corrupted border police who gets paid to let a smuggled cargo through. By this question I wanted to get insight view how the operation’s staff saw it.

Sixth one has a same topic, however from a bigger picture and more towards the selected theory. “During the EUPM, which type of organized crime caused the biggest threat towards the European Union, and do you think the situation is still the same or has there been a change?” By this, I wanted to know if the experts shared the same view as I did, or did they see things differently. Also it is important to know how did the experts see the situation, had they even thought about the spill-over effects to Europe and how if any, did the operation try to counter it.

Seventh question is as follows: “How strongly did the EU control and guide the work of the experts in EUPM? Were you mostly doing things by yourself and how you saw fit, or was the guidance from the EU strong?”. With this question I wanted to know the EU’s own agenda. Of course the EU has their guidelines and instructions on how the operation should function, but it was not essentially clear how much did the EU commit after all.

Number eight has a similar angle what comes to the EU’s own agenda as strategic actor and security provider. “Could one sense EU’s own agenda, that by making Bosnia safer, that would have an effect on EU’s own security in bigger picture?”. As it is known and explained in this thesis earlier, the EU has its own agenda as well. I wanted to know could that be noticed, and if so, how does it reflect. The point is to understand which actions and decisions made in Bosnia, if any, have impact on the safety of the member states. I will provide an example. EUPM contributed to the

creation of State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) on Bosnia. One of the tasks of SIPA is to fight against major organized crime. Now if the agency is successful, the operations of OC groups become harder and that has a positive effect. Later on, as I analyze the answers, one can read the outcomes and see how interviewees saw it.

The 9th question focuses more to year 2023. “The operation ended 11 years ago. If we look at this day and the situation in Bosnia now, do you think the operation was successful or should things been done differently?” This particular question is interesting since hindsight is usually the best wisdom. It is usually easy to judge mistakes done in history from the present day, knowing how things turned out to be.

Number ten is as follows: “What was the reason why you were in Bosnia? What is your opinion on what was the real purpose of the mission?” This question actually has two questions. With the first question I want to know if the experts agree with the official purpose and how EU explained the establishment of a civilian crisis management mission to the rest of the world. Some interviewees actually understood this question so that they would start explaining why he / she was selected to a certain position, which was also good to know, but I had to open up and explain that I would like to know the opinion why all of you experts were there, why the EUPM itself was there. Later on, after the interviews were done and reading the questions again, I do agree that the question is a bit misleading, but as the interviews were more thematic and conversational, it did not matter that much after all. The second part of the question I would like to know what is the personal opinion of the experts, what do they think why the operation was set up. Personally I had few different hypotheses what they might answer, but more importantly I wanted to know if they agreed with the official answer given by the EU, or did they have something else in mind.

Eventually the interviews turned out to be fruitful and the selected questions adequate. Thematic semi-structured interviews definitely was the correct method, since it gave me and the interviewees more freedom to talk and it felt much more relaxed, and I think that is the most important element in this kind of interview. In addition of answering the questions which I asked, the experts had the freedom of talking about things and matters they thought should be important to discuss. Few times did the interviewees say “write this down, I think this is very important to be mentioned”. This happened usually so that I asked a question, it was answered and after that, the conversation flowed more freely touching something related to the subject. That actually gave me new ideas as well and made me think different viewpoints and angles for future.

Interviewees were contacted either by mail, SMS or direct phone call. I introduced myself and my thesis subject. All of them agreed with the interview and suggested a date and time. The interviews were conducted by recording a phone call, which was afterwards listened again and transcribed to a text in Word document with total of 24 pages, font being Times New Roman and line spacing 1,5. The interviews lasted from 15 to 30 minutes, depending on the interviewee. Eventually the information gained from the interviews started to saturate. Data saturation is a process where no any further data will provide added value or new information (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

I used laptop's App Store app 'Voice Memos' for recording. There are other options for recording but I found it more convenient that I put my phone on speaker and put it next to the recording laptop. I explained the process for each interviewee, so that they were aware of it being recorded and that the interview is completely anonymous due to the nature of this thesis. I also explained that whenever I refer someone, I will be using term 'expert', 'interviewee' or in some cases 'he/she' This way the anonymity is being respected. Out of six interviewees, two asked if I could provide the interview questions in advance, so that they have time to prepare. Naturally this was done.

5.2 Process of analysis

As the interviews were done, the interview answers formed data. This data had to be analyzed. For this inductive content analysis method was chosen. This is commonly used in qualitative studies. It also uses the process of abstraction to reduce and group data so that a researcher can answer the selected study questions using themes, concepts or categories. (Kyngäs, 2019.) As this was done, the written material was read through again and necessary headings were written. But it is worth of mentioning that the data should not be just brought together, it should be put into a certain category, a particular group. The purpose is to create a means of describing the data. As categories are found, through interpretation the researcher, in this case me, knows which observations go to same category. (Elo, Kyngäs, 2008.) As these phases are being done, abstraction comes in play. This means formulating a general description of the research topic. Each category will have subcategories with same or similar events (Elo, Kyngäs, 2008).

In this thesis the selected themes were chosen based on the topic and under which category it falls. The themes follow a pattern from the theory, since the analysis is done theory guided. This is also

easy for the reader, since in theory part I have already presented the topic itself, and in analysis part I present the same subjects and categories, which have already been discussed earlier.

For example the results phase starts with organised crime in smuggling and corruption, sub-chapters 6.1 & 6.2 respectively. Here smuggling and corruption are means and ways of organised crime group operations, and therefore they fall into same category, a particular group. In chapter four I present the different themes of organised crime and how EUPM was connected to it, in results phase one sees the answers. This same logic follows throughout the whole results phases. Sub-chapter 6.3 presents the tools which were implemented in order to fight organised crime and tackle these issues stemming from smuggling and corruption, such as the creation of SIPA and border police. They fall in same categories, since they are the both solutions to problems. 6.4 focuses on the mandate debate, which was introduced in theory. The mandate itself falls into its own category, yet being strongly connected to the topic. Sub-chapter 6.5 has its own category as well, but theory wise is connected to the theme of enhancing European Union security, which is one of the reasons why this mission exists. Sub-chapter 6.6 presents the successes from the light of experts and how they see it. In theory part, I have presented how different institutions have seen the success of the mission, so here comparing the results will be vital. The last sub-chapter is based on the 9th question. Quite often these missions have long lasting effects to local society, as well as its surroundings. As there was no much information or data of the current situation and what have been more long lasting effects, I found it essential and enlightening including it as well.

6. RESULTS

6.1 Organised crime in Smuggling

This thesis has earlier covered how organised crime is connected to smuggling, but not essentially from the perspective of experts who served in the EUPM, and how they saw it, in the mission area. Due to the weak governance structures and law enforcement, smuggling was considered relatively easy in Bosnia. The Balkans was primary route for drugs, weapons and people coming to Europe and Bosnia was part of it. Organised crime groups were connected to each other and created links, so that the smuggled goods can be transported forward. The primary target for smuggled goods was Europe, since the markets are far more better and higher customer volume in general. During the early phases of the operation the experts noticed quite soon that Bosnia and Balkans in general is a weak link since law enforcement has its own faults, such as the weak border control and corrupted police.

“In the mission area, the starting point was that police was corrupted, border control nearly existed making it quite random and that meant smuggling of people, drugs and even weapons was possible. The goods came from East and then they were smuggled to organized crime groups in Europe. The channels were open”

Even though the primary target for drugs and other illegal goods was Europe, some of the products remained in Balkans, at least for some period of time. Bosnia was used for drug refining process, and some Balkan harbors along the Adriatic sea had warehouses, from where the products were either shipped forward or transported through roads.

“far East and Middle-East was the starting point of especially drugs. The raw materials were smuggled to Bosnia, refined to drugs and transported to European markets. Mainly Northern Italy, Trieste to be mentioned and also through Slovenia.”

“Bosnia was mainly a transit country, and the European Union knew this already”

“The weapons to Europe come from these former crisis countries, and we can still see it if we look at Sweden for instance.”

“Bosnia and Balkans is one of the smuggling routes for drugs, humans and weapons and it is going to take a long time to shut it down, if ever”

What is important to understand is the fact that criminals cooperate. Even though the Yugoslav wars were mostly based on ethnic disputes, in criminal business, money talks. Albanians and Serbs cooperated and created so called “chains”, which mean that the transported goods have a certain destination where one crime group transports it, and the other one takes it forward. Geographically it is ideal way to operate. Now the operation EUPM stepped into the picture by complicating the chaining process locally.

“Mostly it was Albanians and Serbs in EU area. In Sweden for instance they have created criminal chains, which are lead from Albania or Serbia.”

“The way how organized crime groups operate is based on chaining. When we are speaking of drugs, we can start from Afghanistan or Turkey. There is a supply chain. With the activity of EUPM, at least we could possibly get one piece of chain out of the equation.”

After the war, Bosnia had a severe problem with its law enforcement. But it was not only a problem of Bosnia, the spillover effects came to Europe as well. The security of the European Union was getting weaker and the EU with the CSDP mechanism wanted to intervene.

“It was EU’s interest to make Bosnia safe but also to reduce the flow of illegal goods to Europe”

The weak border control was a huge issue. Smuggling was considered easy and the flow of goods was constant. Corruption in the border control points played a major part, since without corruption the goods might be confiscated. Therefore corruption was needed, and it enabled the smuggling. If corruption could be eliminated, the situation would be different. The next subchapter will focus on that issue.

6.2 Organised crime and corruption

“Bosnia Herzegovina was extremely corrupted in every element. Customs, police and border police”

The ending of Yugoslavian and Bosnian war created an ideal circumstances for criminality to foster. Corruption seemed to be everywhere. Inside the government, law enforcement and major

institutes. During the war, resources were scarce, and smuggling of goods such as weapons, ammunition, petrol and food was needed. Those in command in military and politics had to rely on so called 'grey operators', which are smugglers and criminals who aid the government with their illegal activities. However, the problems occurred after the war had ended. The general consensus was that smuggling was needed in order to survive the war, but as the conflict ended, their operations did not cease. Connections built during the war continued to play part. Routes used for smuggling during the war still existed.

“The fact is that the cooperation of these actors create and ideal circumstances for corruption and cronyism, so that organised crime will be connected to the new government administration.”

“There were some doubts on certain police chiefs, on how some investigations were handled, especially if it was connected to some former war time commander, whom the chief had possibly cooperated during the war.”

“Highly likely the connections created during the war affected in early 2000s.”

Because of corruption, organised crime can so effectively operate. Criminals pay authorities to act in certain way. Such as hamper investigations by destroying evidence, let a cargo truck full of smuggled goods through border control, just to name few examples. Corruption done by law enforcement itself is very hard to prove, and this created one of the biggest problems, since the corrupted officials are part of the organised crime groups and investigations are hard to carry out.

“Corruption is a real challenge mainly because it is very difficult to prove. Just like in human trafficking and prostitution, both ends are guilty and no one has an interest to talk to authorities, therefore it requires extremely much effort and that is not simple”

“In the beginning of 2000s, Bosnia was like a wild west. Criminals played the roulette and police was bribed. Organised crime was not in control in any way.”

“ In vulnerable state situations the corruption is the first thing which should be disposed”

“One big mistake is the police salary, because one does not live with that. That creates more corruption and that way it is connected directly to everything what organised crime creates”

Corruption seems to be the biggest enabler of criminal activity, being it organised or not. If corruption can be minimized, the effects can be seen in all state levels, starting from single police to a high level official. But even if corruption ceased to exist, that does not mean that organized crime would end, it simply would make their operations harder and the volume lower. And that we can

see even in more advanced western countries, organised crime is not only a problem of weaker states.

“Criminals are always one step ahead of law enforcement”

6.3 Tools to fight organised crime

Above, I introduced what kind of problems Bosnia was facing. Criminality fostered in the region. Next we are going to look at what were the implementations the EUPM executed, in order to stabilize the situation. However, it is important to remember the foundation of the mission, it was built on principle of Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA), so in this framework, one has to understand that the process is slow. Later on, we discuss about the mandate and how it affected.

6.3.1 The creation of SIPA

As is mentioned in this thesis, the EUPM took part in creation of the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA). Based on the interviews, that seems to be one of the biggest achievements of EUPM. The reason why such an unit was established is that clearly there was a need for it. Officially one of the main tasks of SIPA is fight against organised crime and that seems to be in line with the answers as well. Even in 2023 SIPA seems to be the institution which is making the most progress, inside the country but also in international environment, what comes to information exchange and cooperation with international counterparts.

“In the beginning, we noticed that there is no any kind of serious crime unit.”

“Probably the most important achievement of this police operation was the creation of SIPA, it was investigating more serious crimes, so that might be the best thing.”

The creation of SIPA enabled Bosnia to tackle serious and organised crime more effectively and cooperate with international counterparts. What comes to transnational crime, information exchange is the key for all criminal investigations, when there are two or multiple countries included in the process. Even in 2023, SIPA is still well functioning organization, which has naturally evolved even further.

“Certain organizational reforms were made, including the creation of SIPA. It seems that it has been a correct decision, even though it was politically extremely difficult, but based on the feedback given by other Western Balkan countries, SIPA seems to be functioning organization in what comes to fight against organised crime. So in the long run EUPM has indirectly succeeded in that.”

“ The idea was to get SIPA as part of the international network, because operational international law enforcement cooperation and information exchange is a prerequisite for gaining progress in investigating and combating crime”

Major transnational organised crime groups are operating usually internationally and therefore it is essential for law enforcement to do so as well. The Balkan cooperation enhanced through these elements.

“Bosnia is connected to Serbia, Montenegro and other Western Balkan regions. The organised crime there operates quite smoothly”

6.3.2 Re-reaction of border police

“Write this down, I think this is very important to be mentioned”

The quote above highlights the importance of the following part. As I earlier explained the problems with weak border control and customs, a change to that was needed. The EUPM created a multi-ethnic border police, which was the first multi-ethnic police organization in the whole country. That meant, that police with different ethnicities were now working together. It was essential to get the border function as it should, because of smuggling, tax revenues are being lost.

“Because they were so divided, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs were mixed up on purpose.”

“Mixing up the border police was done on purpose, because of the religious and ethnic background. It prevents the creation of so called ‘clicks’”

“This was one step forward. Now they are controlling each other and no one can misuse their official position”

“The re-creation of the border police was a big change”

“Because the border also function as a customs, by doing this Bosnia’s tax revenue rises and custom taxes can be set. This took Bosnia forward.”

Once the border police was re-organised, it created a situation where different ethnicity is on the other side of border. For example in town Visegrad, which is located next to a Serbian border, a Bosniak was nominated as a commander of the border station. This had an effect on the level of smuggling, because now smuggling became harder. Corruption was now a lot harder because by mixing different ethnicities, bribing someone got a lot harder. The fear of bribing someone who actually might be 'against' you is risky. He/she can tell one's superior about it and lose job.

"If you have a relative on the other side of border, or if they happen to be good friends, one has much higher chances of letting a smuggled goods through"

"Corruption decreased and the effect to organized crime was that internal control got better and it prevented the formation of connections"

"I can say that by re-organizing the border police and making it multiethnic, it prevented organised crime in the border, but of course there were some suspicions that in some places something went through with mutual decision. For example some stolen cars went to Montenegro. Car thefts were organised in a way that criminals had a way to get official Bosnian car documents to stolen cars"

Something that has not got a lot of attention is a document fraud. Usually when speaking of human trafficking for instance, one might think that those people are hidden in a truck which is not checked at the border, or the vehicle is using unofficial roads to cross borders. This is the case in some occasions, however quite often people actually use the official border crossing points, and are being checked, but they have been using falsified documents. One of the experts said that this particular issue is a real problem, and might be even the most challenging to deal with.

"Bosnia was used as a transit country. People arrived at Sarajevo station and then just disappeared. No one knows if they stayed in Bosnia or if they crossed the border and went somewhere else. They might go to Croatia through Foca, but human trafficking is involved in this."

The problem is that no one knows who these people are. From where they came from and to where they went. In year 2023, the issue is a bit more complex, because document fraud is getting harder because of the modern technology.

To sum it up, with the re-creation and strengthening of the border police, Bosnia as a country became one step closer to Europe. The flow of smuggled goods, including drugs, humans and cigarettes decreased. This forced organised crime groups to find new ways to continue their

operations. Of course as mentioned before, it did not stop smuggling permanently, but it was a step forward for safer Bosnia and Europe.

“What is the result? Impossible to say for sure, but at least it made smuggling a bit more difficult, and that had a positive effect.”

6.4 Executive vs non-executive mandate

The mandate of the operation was a big talking point. The operation was initially started as non-executive and continued to be so until the end. To refresh the memory of the readers a mandate is basically an official document, an order, which is a permission to execute certain activities. The EUPM's mandate was: to establish sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia ownership in accordance with best European and international practice (Council of the EU, 2002). This mandate did not have executive part, which means that the police officers and other experts serving in EUPM do not have right to arrest anyone, or conduct any other operational tasks, which local police can. So this operation was based monitoring, mentoring and advising (MMA). Basically local authorities were given instructions and advices how things should be done. However, through the High Representative, they actually did have some kind of executive rights.

This topic is important to be presented because the mandate got a lot of attention. Experts and scholars have been arguing, whether the mandate was powerful enough and could better results be achieved with an executive mandate. Best way is to ask from the experts themselves, how they felt about it. The results are actually mixed, 50/50, so in this part too heavy conclusions cannot be drawn.

Some experts saw that the given mandate was adequate enough, and did the job just fine. The reason being the fact that the High Representative could be used in cases where executive powers were needed. The High Representative could fire people but it was slow process. As an example if EUPM officials suspected of someone being a corrupted, and enough evidence was found, the individual could be fired or removed from that position.

“Well I think that the executive mandate was not necessary, because the presence and advisory did the same thing. We were closely tied to the local authorities and

our Head of Mission was in contact with the head of Bosnia. So the authority and command came through that. If we informed that certain individual should be superseded from his/her position because there is a reason to suspect, or has been noticed that a crime has been done, the effect was that he/she will be transferred from the position and brought to justice. So in this case the advisory was enough.”

“We had power. The direct connection to Bosnia’s chief police commissioner and the monitoring process gave us enough tools. We made sure that the right persons are being arrested, and by our own observations we gave instructions which direction should the local police head their investigations. And they did.

“If we had information that certain individuals from local police organization are corrupted, we suggested that they should be fired. Some of these papers came through my desk.”

The executive vs non-executive became a talking point especially when EULEX operation in Kosovo was set up. Executive rights were granted for EULEX operation and that brought questions if EUPM in Bosnia should have it as well. However, it is debatable whether it would have helped or not, because bringing executive rights to other country and implementing laws which are different from the host country might create more problems in the long run.

“Even though there were a lot of talks that EULEX did this and that, but if you look at the final court judgements, I would say that ‘importing a law and foreign justice’ is extremely difficult. demonstrating the effectiveness is quite hard”

“It is much more fruitful that the local colleagues learn the right practices and continue implementing them rather than someone comes and does the work for them. There are two issues: The first is having always an excuse. If something goes wrong, one can blame that it was not us the locals, it was the internationals. The responsibility of actions is missing. The second is the fact that operating in foreign legal system is difficult. language barrier for instance, there is always a risk of misunderstanding when using an interpreter. If one is not vigilant enough, the case can be lost right away.”

“The operation did not have executive mandate, but actually in practice we did have. We had the Office of High Representative (OHR), which is the supreme authority in Bosnia overseeing the implementation of the Dayton agreement. This OHR was also European Union Senior Representative (EUSR). This OHR was the hammer the EUPM could also use. OHR had the jurisdiction and implementation. He could fire police officers and chiefs.”

Even though the EU might have wanted to have an executive mandate, it might not have been even possible, since it is up to the host country to decide what kind of mandate they are willing to accept. Of course through political pressure a mandate could have been forced to undergone a change, but

if the beginning of the operation the host country and international community is facing difficulties and disagreements, it surely does not promise a good start.

“But we have to remember that when negotiating about the mandate, it is not unilateral assignment.

“There is an agreement between the host country, Bosnia and European Union. In order to operate there, it requires a status of mission agreement (SOMA) document. SOMA dictates the content of the mandate and Bosnians did not have a desire for pure executive level mandate, for one reason or another.”

“OHR through its own executive mandate was our tool to be used, and that we used a lot”

“A pure executive mandate would have changed the situation to other direction. A good example is Kosovo, where EULEX was prosecutor and judge”

The opinion of having an executive level mandate generally is as follows: It would have made things easier and perhaps more faster, since having only executive power through OHR is rather slow and bureaucratic way. Certain things would have surely been better, such as operational activities along the border. They could have showed better example on how to undergo an inspection and even in some cases an arrest. Executive mandate seemed to be more favorable especially in the border and customs.

“well intervening was slow and making a difference in local police organization was extremely slow. All the different police organizations and internal affairs administration had to be convinced to work and develop, because we could not do it since we did not have our own executive action or mandate. So it was a challenge.

“Few times we used the High Representative because some police organization was unwilling to make a change, even though changes had been agreed, so resignation from the office was possible, but it was the only tool and using it was challenging. So to say in other words, the mandate was not optimal for the implementation of the best European standards.”

“I think we should have had more executive power. Especially on borders because if we want to bring western practices in use, it does not say anything to local Bosnian what is first or second level inspection. They had a little bit different practices in use so at least in border stations EUPM personnel could have been there and say that OK guys, let's do this this way.”

“EUPM should have been there and show in practice how it [border control] is done and guide and see it works.”

“I hoped a bit less project work, it is mostly paper stuff and running from meeting to another, and hard to say if agreed matters are put in action.”

As I stated earlier, in this particular topic the answers are mixed. Perhaps that can be explained by the position of the interviewee and how it might have affected on his/hers job. Another factor can be the location where one has served. Affairs from headquarters are definitely seen differently than from more distant, field office type location.

“Non-executive mandate is completely nonsense, because it is based on the principle of monitoring, mentoring and advising. It is fully leaning on the goodwill of the counterpart. It is all based on money. They will accept the proposals when European Union is pouring tens, hundreds of millions, but when one should make organizational changes, in every mission where I have been, the changes have been only cosmetic. In Kosovo, because of the executive mandate, more order was gained.”

“Whenever the status is so that everything is up to the benevolent host country, it is only buying peace with money. That can be seen in Sweden for instance, criminals bring weapons from these warzones”

“The purpose is good, but when one [European Union] is only dependent on kindness of the host country, the means are not enough. It should not be only money, there should be more leverage. The more people have money, the lazier they become and they don't bother to fight anymore, but even that does not take away the criminality.”

Some experts saw the situation so that money has way to big role in peace building process and the host country is only interested in money and other benefits. Therefore non-executive mandate is too soft tool. Executive level mandate would have granted more leverage in decision making. Money should not be the initial tool, a carrot so to speak. If the initial problem still exists, bringing money does not take away the root causes. Once the flow of money stops, the problems rise again.

“Pouring water out of the sinking ship”

If there is hole in the system, that needs to be fixed, not the spillover effects it is causing. But it is not only the mandate that was debatable, some experts see that the real root cause was the Dayton agreement. The problem with that one was that too much was promised to everyone. All the parties got little bit of something, yet no one actually was satisfied. Another issue was the bureaucratic governmental structure. When making changes to security sector, the improvements are hard to implement. It takes time and political decisions have to be made, and especially in these cases, the High Representative was essential, because there were times when local authorities did not do

something that was agreed, or they might have done but differently from what was agreed. In these occasions High Representative had to use executive power.

“If we start from the Dayton agreement, it was a failure. Every party was promised something, and when ‘bowing to one person you show your butt to other’ so the ethnic tensions remained, and exist even today.”

“Because of Dayton agreement and the bureaucratic governmental structure it created, it made the improvement of law enforcement sector difficult. That combined with corruption connected to Western Balkan organised crime made it challenging.”

To sum up: It surely was not an easy task and what comes to the debate on mandate, one should perhaps look answers from Kosovo EULEX mission, because that is also EU’s civilian crisis management mission, and surely notes from Bosnia have been taken.

6.5 European Union and its own interest

One of the questions was if European Union’s own interests could be seen, and how. By this I mean, how did the EU guide the experts and how heavily they were involved in the decision making process. Naturally since its EU operation, the presence is strong, but the angle for the question was more security based and see if some actions of the EU could be explained. During the interviews, I did not want to lead the interviewee to certain direction, rather I wanted to him/her bring it up, if such thing existed.

Especially in upper management the guidance from EU was considered strong. The EU and Brussels as some of the interviewees refer, had certain tools implemented so that adequate measures are being taken and reported forward. The real difference actually could be seen from the position where one was deployed. Those that were closer to the headquarters had stronger guidance and those who were more on ‘themselves’ did not. One explanation is the location.

“The guidance was strong. It was a political decision from the EU, what kind of mandate and jurisdiction we will have. It was followed so, that we had to report all the time to Brussel and they oversee our actions that we stick to the given mandate.”

“Based on the experiences, the mission’s task developed all the time, mainly due to our visions and what we reported to Brussels. They gave us instructions and

sent more experts to border control, serious crime investigation and to economic offences.”

“Brussels [European Union headquarters] have always had a tendency of wanting to know certain things unnecessarily detailed way. For example unfinished investigations.”

“Of course guidance was strong, even though some who worked in these co-locations might think otherwise.”

One important fact is that even though the guidance was strong, or at least is was supposed to be, being the first CSDP mission has its gaps. It was learning by doing, especially in the beginning. In this occasion the expert’s own expertise emphasized.

“it is important to remember that this was EU’s first police operation and boundaries were sought both ways. But yes for sure in some co-locations the work was very independent, especially if the expert was good enough in his/hers original job, in home country.”

“Guidance was strong yes, but it was mostly like a ‘paper tiger’. EU officials did few inspection visits and then went through the papers and perhaps some recommendations were given, if something could be done differently”

“Completely by ourselves. Frontex is the European border agency and they did not give any advices what should be done. It was based on the experts own knowledge. Seemingly it was based on these projects, which were then conveyed forward. The projects were presented and said that this is how things are done in EU countries, and this is that you [local authorities] should be aiming for.”

On paper the EU had its own agenda visible, but the vision did not reflect to everyone and every location. In some situations even the expertise of some EU officials was questioned and the level of knowledge varied notably. One Spanish official sent to mission did not even speak English.

“Unilateral guidance to these operations increased. The aim was to track the results and keep the goals congruent. But it felt that the pressure was more to get political development further and in implementation of the peace agreement. It felt that the High Representatives and the organization behind them was not always competent enough what comes to development of the law enforcement”

In political level the guidance has been strong but security wise a bit less. A good example is the quote where Frontex was mentioned and another one where it was said that High Representatives and the organization does not necessarily understand the challenges of law enforcement. In the early stages of the EUPM perhaps the focus has been more political and based on the answers that seems

to be the case. But has to be remembered, that the shift towards organised crime came later, as it was noticed that it possesses a big threat towards the European Union and its member states.

“It felt that keeping the balance was more important than actually finding concrete solutions to develop the society more western”

When speaking of EU’s own agenda and the idea of setting up a crisis management mission to EU’s external border, so that problems could be prevented from coming to Europe, one answer was very straightforward. The EEAS paper dictates the real reason why the operation is set up. But the tools (in this case the mandate) could have been selected more carefully.

“It is very clear and is said in the EEAS papers as well, that this is one of the purposes, and it is good one, but as long as it is relying on the goodwill of the host country, means are not enough”

6.6 Successes

So far I have covered most of the findings from the interviews, but one essential part has not been covered yet. I have left it last because it is easier for reader to understand the bigger picture.

At some point during the interviews the conversation shifted towards the successes and what did they actually achieve. One of the questions was: “one of the main tasks of the EUPM operation was a fight against organized crime, do you think the goal was achieved?”, this question brought up interesting conversations and because organised crime is one of the key points in this thesis, It is vital to go through the answers and see how did the experts see the success of the mission in light of organised crime, did it have any effect or not.

Most of the interviewees think that they succeeded, at least to some degree. The actions that they implemented had a positive effect. Even though there was no statistical data available, the experts did say that they believe that organised crime reduced. Local police was directed to correct path, international cooperation enhanced, which resulted in improved information exchange.

“We did succeed. We managed to eradicate crime and oversee the process of removing these corrupted officers out of their posts and then monitored that customs, border and police execute the task they are assigned for.”

“I argue that we managed to reduce organised crime and at least make it more difficult for them, and we did catch criminal gangs.”

“I dare to say that for a time being, through our actions, we did manage to limit the operations of these criminal organisations and push the local law enforcement to right direction and get these criminals to court. What is the end result, impossible to say but at least for a certain period it did make it harder for them to operate.”

“We did damn good confiscations, and now we are talking about thousands of kilos of raw materials used for drugs. Successful arrests were made what comes to drugs and humans, guns not so much. These people were brought to justice.”

In the quote above when the expert is referring to “*We did damn good confiscations*”, he/she is referring to a situation where EUPM mentored and monitored the process of confiscation. The organization itself did not execute such operation, rather it was involved in the planning process and made sure correct measures are being made.

“To a certain degree we did manage (in fight against organised crime]. But because of such a short mission, well the fight against organised crime is ongoing process.

“Because of getting the border police more organised, I can say that yes we did succeed because it prevented the organised crime in the border.”

“Evaluating the success is extremely difficult, but through these structural changes, for example SIPA, indirectly in the long run EUPM did succeed in it.”

Some experts were a bit more careful with their answers and did not want to claim it as a 100% fact. They chose a bit more modest approach and saw that the successes in fight against organised crime was reached indirectly through enhanced cooperation of international actors and by educating and equipping local law enforcement. But if we look at the mandate and SOMA papers, that was the goal and therefore MMA aspect was chosen as a method. but there was some skepticism also, mainly due to the fact that it is very hard to verify it, as one of the interviewees said. But all of them do agree that indirectly for sure there has been a positive effect, and that itself is already a statement.

“In combat against transnational organised crime certain influence has been gained and the cooperation is better now days, and Bosnia is involved in this as well.”

“If there is any influence (to status of organised crime], it is indirectly through education, equipment and money and perhaps that way one has enabled the fight against organised crime, but that is a matter of fate. It cannot be verified.”

“if you think about it was it wasted money, answer is no.”

Even though the general consensus is that it was more of a success than failure, one interviewee did not see it that positive.

“I think we only managed to scratch the surface of organised crime. We were completely outsiders and we cannot go in to that world because we do not know the language, culture and they (local police] on purpose kept us in dark what is going on in the criminal world”

“Well I could say that we did not succeed that well to be honest, but it was not that big of a catastrophe as Afghanistan”

When talking about EU–Bosnia security relations the interviewees did have the vision that by enhancing the security situation in Bosnia, it has positive effect to EU security as well. As I asked why were you in Bosnia, the answer was following:

“To make Europe safer. And also make Bosnia more safer and fair for its citizens. Erase the corruption, or at least decrease the amount of it, and prevent the operations of organised crime and smuggling of goods to Europe.”

Generally it was considered as a good thing that the operation was set up. There are many positive effects, which are already listed earlier. However, it has to be understood that Western Balkans should be seen as a whole, since everything is connected to everything.

“For sure it had an impact. Because it boosted the cooperation and there was a high ranked police officers from almost every EU country and they could do direct contacts between the sending and receiving countries. That had an effect to information exchange and for sure these contacts remained even after the operation ceased to exist.”

“Albania and Serbia. From there the operations are ran. Bosnia not so much. There (Bosnia] are more these smaller players who smuggle the goods to next border.”

“The experts from various law enforcement who served in EUPM and came from different countries, they gained more experience and became more aware of the situation in Bosnia. The local law enforcement and SIPA was connected to international network and that helped, because operational international law enforcement cooperation and information exchange is a requirement for

successful prevention of criminality. So from this standpoint, I want to see that it had an positive effect to whole European Union.”

“Western Balkan criminality has to be looked as a whole. Different Western Balkan organised criminal groups are doing close cooperation. Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia and even some EU countries nearby, so in this sense the changes are hard to evaluate”

The interviewees did see the operation as a positive thing which brought more security to not only Bosnia, but to whole Europe. The main take away is the enhanced cooperation between different countries in EU and Bosnia. Through the cooperation intelligence information exchange got better, which is vital for criminal investigation, as one of the interviewees said.

“Many times these organised crime groups become apparent through intelligence and correct preparations”

The knowledge and skills of the experts who served on the mission got better. Their Balkan situation awareness enhanced and the experts brought valuable information back to their own country.

6.7 Looking back in time

The operation ended in 2012. That is 11 years ago when writing this thesis. One of the best wisdoms in world is hindsight. If we look at the situation in Bosnia now, what has changed? Has things changed actually? What should have been done differently, or was it a successful mission and nothing should be done differently. To these answers and thoughts I want to dedicate the last part of this analysis. The answers have a bit of variation, because some experts who I interviewed are following the Balkan situation more than others. This means that the input what one can give might be better than the other. Some experts did have a wider understanding what comes to the situation in 2023.

The biggest challenge to day is Bosnia’s complex state administration which the Dayton peace agreement created. The two entities the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Because of the decentralized administration the process is slow and takes time.

“Compared to our input the results and changes have been slow. The challenge is still the state administration and in a sense the Dayton agreement. But yes some kind of positive development has been. “

“If we start from the Dayton agreement, that was a failure. The situation in Balkans has not calmed down and the ethnic tensions are still there. The Serb side still does not accept the Federation setup and Croats as well, they have their own ambitions, so the Bosnian Federation side is pretty alone in that scenario. So in that sense we did not do very well.”

“Trust has been built over the years, which is rare these days. It means that the work has not been for nothing. It is slow but not wasted.”

By saying that *“Trust has been built over the years”* the expert refers to a situation where different Balkan states are doing more cooperation in fight against cross-border crime. These CSDP missions play big part in that.

7. DISCUSSION

The hypothesis of this thesis was that European Union Police Mission (EUPM) has had an effect on organised crime and therefore enhanced the security of the European Union. In this case the operation has made changes to Bosnian law enforcement structures, which had an effect to the state of organised crime and therefore enhanced the security of the EU. The earlier literature suggested that one of the key problems for Bosnia was the fragmentation of law enforcement structures. That created a situation where corruption together with organised crime had the possibility to operate quite freely without intervention from authorities, partly because corruption was state level activity. The problems spread to Europe and therefore the EU wanted to intervene with its CSDP mechanism. Theory wise the EU acted as a strategic actor executing security strategy in its neighborhood and therefore it is necessary to evaluate and discuss the outcomes of this thesis through that element. The aim was to contribute to safer environment in the conflict region but also having an input to Europe's security. As a result, Bosnia became safer, since its law enforcement structures enhanced. That had an impact on the state of organised crime, which essentially meant that the EU itself became more secure, since the flow of smuggled goods at least temporarily could be hampered by confiscations and cutting down the supply-chains in Bosnia and generally in Western Balkans.

One of the EU's agenda was to become more credible global security actor. In 2023, the EU's High Representative for Bosnia is still in place, even though it was deployed already after the war in 1995, after the Dayton agreement. The EUPM operation did end in 2012, but the EU's presence in Bosnia and in Western Balkan region has not stopped. The foundations for international cooperation were built to last, and based on the analysis, this seems to be case, since the experts who served in Bosnia shared the same vision. A concrete example is the way how SIPA was connected to international counterparts.

As moving on to hypothesis, the observations from earlier literature and analyzed data from the interviews support it partly. Why partly then? First one is the fact that the operation did not eliminate organised crime completely. It had an effect by making organizational and structural changes to Bosnia's administrative structures, which played a big role in fight against organised crime. The enhanced coordination in investigations also had a big role. The second fact is a bit more straightforward. The international law enforcement cooperation got better, which enhanced the security of the European Union. The experts who served in the mission gained valuable experience from the area itself but also how Balkan organized crime groups operate. That information was taken to their own home countries and distributed forward. This is highly essential when international cooperation is launched and new operations are being planned, being it civilian crisis management missions or cooperation agreements between two countries.

Combining the earlier research together with analysed interviews, the thesis hypothesis can be reached. The thesis examined how the operation succeeded in some of its goals and general consensus is that the operation was somewhat successful what comes to the fight against organised crime. It did not remove the problems completely but after all that was never the intention. Every mission might have ambitious goals to fulfil but rarely they are all met and in these situations one has to be realistic and understand the facts. In 2023 Western Balkans is still a talking point. Especially ethnic disputes which are the root cause. The history of former Yugoslavia haunts even this day and only time will tell the real answer. Is Bosnia closer to EU? Perhaps yes, but as some interviewee said: the final word has not been said yet and the Dayton agreement will not be the final form. This means that some kind of changes could be seen in future, and perhaps that is the reason why the High Representative is still in place. After all, it is generally much faster and smoother to continue ongoing mandate than creating a new one since the foundation has been made.

Looking from the bigger picture, what has been the sole reason for the instability, weak governance structures and organised crime? As we compare the findings from the interviews to the presented literature, ethnic disputes seem to be one of the main catalysts. That also happens to be the sole reason for Yugoslav wars. It cannot be changed, so the region has to live with it, which means that the role of European Union as a negotiator will continue in future as well. In this sense EU as a strategic actor executing security strategy in Balkans has succeeded and as the interviews pointed out, the EU's own interest as a safe guardian of the region can be pointed out.

From hindsight perspective, what is then the biggest achievement and the contribution for safer Bosnia and Europe? One thing that popped out of almost every interview and earlier research is the creation of SIPA. That is the biggest success what the interviewees said to be. It also happens to be the tool that was intended to fight against serious and organized crime. SIPA enabled better cooperation between European counterparts, exchange of information and coordination. If we put that into the context of strategic actor, The EUPM civilian crisis management mission's biggest contribution was an action aimed for fighting against organised crime, which has spill-over effects to European security. Another important element is the re-creation of Border Police. The weak border control enabled effective smuggling and therefore a tool to reduce it was introduced, in form of enhanced and more Western border control.

all these above mentioned factors contribute to European Security Strategy, so that crises do not reemerge in the European neighborhood and have spill-over effects, as this has been one of the key elements and points of being a Strategic Actor using CSDP mechanisms. The operational goals are in line with the strategic goals and this can be seen from the mandate of the operation as well as perceptions of the interviewed experts, as I illustrated in results part. As an observation for future CSDP missions with similar background, perhaps a more flexible and executive level mandate could be a good option, since it gives more tools for EU officials.

8. CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to find out did the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) succeed in one of its main tasks, in fight against organised crime. The research was conducted by interviewing former experts who served in the mission and analyzing their experiences and opinions. I provided an overview where I explained the Yugoslav wars, the birth of Balkan CSDP crisis management missions and how organized crime is affecting European security. Through data-analysis the semi-structured interview material was analyzed and put into context. The central research questions were: What is the contribution of the EUPM mission in reducing organised crime? Secondly, did European Union succeed as a strategic actor through its Common Security and Defence Policy? A sub-research question was what was the effect of those actions to European Security.

According to the conducted research, the main findings are that the operation did partly succeed in one of its main tasks, in fight against organised crime. However, because organised crime did not cease to exist and there is no actual data to compare, the results are open to interpretation. The biggest impact can be seen indirectly through other elements, such as enhanced cooperation and information exchange between international law enforcement agencies, administrative changes and reforms in border control and the creation of SIPA. In addition to these, the expertise of local and international law enforcement got better. These elements contribute to the fight against organised crime and according to the research, they have seen to be well functioning, and this is the operation's main contribution.

Based on the analysis, the general consensus of the EUPM operation as whole was that it was somewhat successful. It had its limitations, such as the mandate, but overall given the circumstances, such as the Dayton agreement, it was not a failure. This thesis supported those statements and found reasons why that was the case. As mentioned, the host country got new tools to fight organised crime, measures against corruption and smuggling were taken, and at least to those aspects positive results were gained. This had an impact to enhanced European security, which answers the second research question and concludes that EU did succeed as Strategic Actor through CSDP, because it was able to execute security strategy next to its borders, while contributing to safer Bosnia as well. The conflict did not re-escalate and important security elements were implemented in peacebuilding process.

The sub-research question asked what was the effect of those actions to European Security? The main answer is that the security situation in the neighborhood of the European Union enhanced. The threats stemming from both organised crime and armed conflicts decreased, so in that sense a preventive actions were effective. However as stated earlier, organised crime cannot be shut down completely, but the operations of different criminal groups can be made harder and that contributes to safer Europe since the smuggling chain of drugs, weapons and humans can be tracked better. This automatically has an effect for the availability of illegal goods in European markets.

The importance of this study comes as a two-fold. First one is the security of the EU. By researching the topic, we can see if there have been any concrete results how the Union has become more secure, in this case impacting organised crime. It also explains the importance of EU's CSDP policy. The second one is if the implemented measures have been adequate and what should have been done differently. In this case the operation did enhance the security of the EU by fighting against organised crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even though the circumstances were difficult due to the nature of the region and its ethnic disputes.

The thesis also outlined the importance of CSDP missions as a whole. The results also give tools for future operation planning. Corruption should be the first issue to tackle, since it widely enables the operations of organised crime. Another conversation is the mandate, should future missions have executive mandate in order to intensify the effects of legal and administrative changes. When the Ukraine war will end, there will probably be another crisis management operation. Time will tell if lessons have been learned, and the EU will launch a mission where all the previous mistakes have been fixed, and those issues that have been proven to be good, will be enhanced. However, every conflict is unique in its own way, so something that works somewhere else might not work.

This thesis covered only one CSDP mission in Western Balkans, the EUPM. A suggestion for further research is to study all the operations and their impact to the selected topic including European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA), which briefly was introduced earlier and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). This way one could obtain even better and wider understanding of the selected topic and whole Western Balkans, because organised crime is connected to whole region having spill-over effects to rest of the Europe.

8.1 Limitations

The thesis succeeded in its objective and through the analysis one can better understand what kind of contributions a civilian crisis management mission under a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) can have. However, even though that main questions were answered, this thesis did have its own limitations. There is no data of before, during and after the operation on what is the level of organised crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so comparison of statistical data could not be made. Another limiting factor is the inaccessibility to the classified periodic reviews and progress reports of the operation. There is room for speculation whether an access to those documents would have provided better overview. However, taken into the consideration the fact that the interviewed persons were all experts serving in the mission, it is highly likely that they have had access to those documents during their time in mission and would have brought something for discussion, if it would matter. Last limiting factor is the number of interviewed persons. If there would have been more experts to interview, the analysis part might have been even more complete, however, taking into consideration the fact that already with six interviews the results started to saturate, the outcome would not have highly likely been different.

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ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1: Thematic semi-structured interview questions

1. One of the main tasks of the EUPM operation was a fight against organized crime, do you think the goal was achieved?
2. Did the operation succeed in reducing organized crime in Bosnia Herzegovina, Balkans and in Europe?
3. Did the operation have an effect on the status of organized crime in European Union?
4. The mission was non-executive, do you think the operation had a sufficient mandate to carry out the given tasks, or had an executive level mandate given better qualifications and tools, like in EULEX for instance?
5. If we think about different themes of organized crime, such as corruption and smuggling of goods (weapons, drugs, people), which was the most challenging to deal with?
6. During the EUPM, which type of organized crime caused the biggest threat towards the European Union, and do you think the situation is still the same or has there been a change?
7. How strongly did the EU control and guide the work of the experts in EUPM? Were you mostly doing things by yourself and how you saw fit, or was the guidance from the EU strong?
8. Could one sense EU's own agenda, that by making Bosnia safer, that would have an effect on EU's own security in bigger picture?
9. The operation ended 11 years ago. If we look at this day and the situation in Bosnia now, do you think the operation was successful or should things been done differently?
10. What was the reason why you were in Bosnia? What is your opinion on what was the real purpose of the mission?