Imagining national security through the human body

Conscientious objectors in South Korea

Ihntaek Hwang
IHNTAEK HWANG

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Conscientious objectors in South Korea

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Responsible supervisor
Professor Tarja Väyrynen
and Custos
Tampere University
Finland

Supervisor
Professor Roland Bleiker
The University of Queensland
Australia

Pre-examiners
Professor Young-Chul Cho
Jeonbuk National University
Republic of Korea
Professor Julian Reid
University of Lapland
Finland

Opponent
Professor Mark Neocleous
Brunel University London
United Kingdom

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Abstract

This dissertation studies how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security in the context of conscientious objectors to military conscription in South Korea. I focus on South Korean conscientious objectors because, for decades, the South Korean state has imprisoned them in large numbers for jeopardising the military and, therefore, threatening the foremost common good of national security. However, despite the persecution, conscientious objectors have ceaselessly expressed their opposition to the almost sacred belief that the military is necessary for national security. I also focus on the human body because, in many societies, the tropes of the human body’s well-being have been central to imagining the security of political communities. I identify the human body’s three qualities that shape national security imaginations: organisation, immunity, and affect. In light of the three qualities, I read textual and visual materials produced by the state and conscientious objectors. Then, juxtaposing my readings of the state’s materials with those of the objectors’ materials, I aim to expose an institutionalised mode of imagining national security and propose an alternative mode.

I argue that while the South Korean state and the public imagine national security through conventional notions and sensibilities about the human body, South Korean conscientious objectors propose alternatives that can reimagine national security. This indicates that conscientious objectors are aesthetic subjects whose personal narratives can prompt reflection on the conditions of imagining national security in South Korea. I engage the underexplored topic of how qualities of the human body can shape the imagining of national security. In doing so, I also provide a novel perspective on national security in South Korea while considering conscientious objectors’ narratives that do not immediately appear to contribute to collective survival.
**Tiivistelmä**


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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction: conscientious objectors, national security, and the human body

The main objective of this dissertation is to study how reimagining the human body can also lead to reimagining national security in the context of conscientious objectors to military conscription in South Korea. I focus on South Korean conscientious objectors because, for decades, they have been imprisoned in large numbers for jeopardising the military and therefore threatening the foremost common good of national security, which lies at the foundation of all constitutional rights of individuals according to the South Korean courts (Constitutional Court 2004; 2011; Supreme Court 2004; 2007). However, despite the prospect of persecution, conscientious objectors have ceaselessly expressed their opposition to the almost sacred belief that the military is necessary for national security. I also focus on the human body because, in many societies, the tropes of the human body’s well-being have been central to imagining the security of political communities. I identify the human body’s three qualities that shape national security imaginations: organisation, immunity, and affect. In light of the three qualities, I read the textual and visual materials produced by the state and conscientious objectors. Then,

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1 I provide a more detailed account of imagination in 1.2.
2 A conscientious objector to military service is “an individual who has claimed the right to refuse to perform military service on the grounds of freedom of thought, conscience and/or religion” (OHCHR 2001). The term ‘conscientious objection’ can also mean, for example, a medical practitioner’s refusal to perform an abortion. However, in this dissertation, the term ‘conscientious objection’ always refers to the refusal to carry out military service and the term ‘conscientious objectors’ always refers to those who refuse to carry out military service.
3 Before 2018, around 600 men per year were indicted and sentenced to 18 months in prison for refusing to enlist. For decades, South Koreans made up around 90% of the objectors imprisoned in the world (UNHRC 2013).
4 Considering the political implications of its everydayness, I take the human body as the fundamental discursive economy for representing and understanding security in a militarised place such as South Korea.
juxtaposing my readings of the state’s materials with those of the objectors’ materials, I aim to expose an institutionalised mode of imagining national security and propose an alternative mode.

The main argument of this dissertation is that while the South Korean state and the public imagine national security through more conventional notions and sensibilities about the human body, South Korean conscientious objectors propose alternative notions and sensibilities about the human body which can reimagine national security. In particular, the approach of South Korean conscientious objectors has been significant in that they reimagine bodies in terms of non-organic organisation (e.g., the Body without Organs), xenophilic immunity, and affective flight from the state. Such alternative bodies disrupt the state’s conception of national security, which is premised on the bodily notions and sensibilities of organic organisation, xenophobic immunity, and affective capture. My findings indicate that conscientious objectors’ personal narratives can prompt reflection on the conditions of imagining national security in South Korea. As such, I engage the underexplored topic of how qualities of the human body can shape the imagining of national security. In doing so, I also provide a novel perspective on security in the Korean Peninsula through the trivialised narratives of conscientious objectors that do not immediately appear to contribute to survival.

I collected two types of material through archival research and informal interviews during my fieldwork in South Korea. The first is the materials produced by the state and the public. These materials are the South Korean courts’ decisions (textual) and two military reality shows (visual). According to the decisions, given that national security is a military-centred concept and practice, those questioning the military are grave internal threats to national security. Also, considering South Korea’s ongoing geopolitical conflicts, long history of wars and colonisation, and universal male conscription, the court decisions propound the belief that the military is the foremost guarantor of national security.

The second is the materials produced by South Korean conscientious objectors.5 The materials are public announcements of the objectors (textual) and films directed

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5 This dissertation is about appreciating the objectors’ narratives in terms of providing an alternative mode of imagining national security rather than romanticising them.
by the objectors (visual). Notably, to express their opposition, conscientious objectors have often drawn from their non-mainstream views on life, love, peace, violence, family, friendship, nature, sexuality, and other experiences which can seem irrelevant to national security. Regarding archival search, ‘World Without War’, the biggest anti-militarist and pacifist NGO in South Korea, has kept good records of the activities of many conscientious objectors since the beginning of the 2000s. The state also has maintained records (e.g., court decisions) that explain why the objectors are criminalised. I limit my research materials to those produced after 2001 because conscientious objection has been publicised as a political rights issue (rather than an exclusively Jehovah’s Witnesses issue) since 2001. In Chapter 2, I provide a more detailed background of conscientious objection.

Since South Korean conscientious objectors invoke notions and sensibilities that can expose and challenge the hegemonic modes of imagining national security, I propose they are what Michael Shapiro (2013) calls aesthetic subjects. The objectors, as aesthetic subjects, disclose and encourage reflections on the dominant conditions of imagining national security, opening a new space for refashioning the self (see Shapiro 2013, xiv, 11, 13). In conceiving of the objectors as aesthetic subjects, I follow Shapiro (2013, xv)’s recommendations on thinking with aesthetic subjects. Shapiro does not aim to achieve epistemic certainty but instigates reflections on how knowledge is contingent. First, from the preliminary readings of relevant theories and materials, I offer three new concepts, organisation, immunity, and affect, through which materials can be read. This is to avoid reproducing the familiar conceptualisations of imagining national security. I discuss these concepts in three analytic chapters (Chapters 6, 7, and 8). Second, in each analytic chapter, I read my research material through the concepts to assess the material’s potential to challenge familiar ways of knowing of national security. For each concept, I produce two readings. One reading pertains to what the state and the public say about conscientious objection. Another reading pertains to what conscientious objectors say about conscientious objection. Finally, in each analytic chapter, I juxtapose these two readings. This is to stage a disruptive encounter that exposes and challenges the familiar ways of knowing the human body and national security. The juxtaposition

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6 In this dissertation, I focus on the conscientious objectors who promote pacifist, anti-militarist, and other personal convictions and are not Jehovah’s Witnesses (who have historically consciously objected to military service based on their religion).
renders contingent the conventional understandings of the human body and national security, accepted knowledge practices. Similar to Edward Said’s contrapuntal reading of imperialist experiences, the juxtaposition intertwines the state’s and objectors’ competing experiences to expose the contrast in imagining national security through the human body. I discuss the collection of research materials and analytic methods in more detail in Chapter 5. Although I emphasise ‘reimagining’, my juxtapositions do not suggest that South Korean conscientious objectors’ reimagination of human bodies and national security must be absolutely virtuous. Instead, my juxtapositions attempt to demonstrate ways to challenge despotic unity through struggles for multiplicity (see Reid 2010, 424).

Regarding how South Korean conscientious objectors, as aesthetic subjects of national security, can help us to reflect on how national security is imagined, I bring up the human body. This is because representations of the human body have been more than statements of biological facts. On the relationship between representations of the human body and imagining security, David Campbell argues that the body has been the “Discursive economy that provides the resources for representing difference as a danger to the social, where the social is understood as a (naturally healthy) body” (Campbell 1992, 75). In other words, tropes of the human body’s well-being have been central to imagining the security of political communities (see Unschuld 2009; Kuriyama 2002). Then, developing Campbell’s argument quoted above, I suggest that, if the tropes that represent the human body change, the ‘danger to the social’ can also change.

In this respect, to study how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security, I focus on the human body’s qualities which can also frame the imagining of collective bodies. In this dissertation, I suggest that these qualities of the human body are organisation and immunity. First, organisation frames the relationship between the part and the whole. Organisation is the hierarchy that defines whose interests align with the interest of the whole or the common interest and whose interests are considered partial or secondary. Second, immunity frames the relationship between the self and others. Immunity pertains to deciding who or what constitutes a threat to the common interest and how to deal with the threats. I will discuss organisation and immunity in more detail in Chapter 3. Also, in later chapters,
I analyse how the human body and national security can be imagined and reimagined in light of organisation (Chapter 6) and immunity (Chapter 7).

Additionally, I also discuss how the process of imagining the human body and national security can be affective. I follow Brian Massumi’s distinction between affect and emotion: affect is ephemeral and not-semiotically ordered intensity, automatically arising from encounters of bodies (1995, 85) and emotion is something already processed or mediated by brain or signified (1998, 88). In this regard, Massumi’s definition of affect is useful for discussing the capture, signification, or conceptualisation of affective aspects of experiences and the flight or escape from such a capture. I explore affect in Chapter 4 because imagining the human body is an affective process that involves the sensory and indescribable. Hence, in Chapter 8, I focus on how affective experiences can solidify or disrupt familiar discourses or identities, including the familiar imaginations of the human body. Overall, the human body can frame imagination of national security, and this process can be affective.

1.2 Imagination, national security, body politic, affective politic, and South Korea

I study how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security in the context of South Korean conscientious objectors. In the following text, I review five bodies of literature that have inspired my study. First, I discuss the concept of imagination for this dissertation. Second I discuss research that identifies national security as a product of imagination per constructivism and poststructuralism. Third, I point out that the human body is also a product of imagination and highlight the potential of the human body to transform the body politic, the representation of a political community (e.g., a state) as a human body. The fourth set of literature I

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7 In Understanding of Imagination: The Reason of Images, Dennis Sepper writes, “Human imagination cannot be properly conceived apart from sense perception, from memory, and from rationality—nor even from pain, pleasure, aversion, and desire” (2013, 9; cited in Sparks et al. 2022, 2; see also Elliott 2005, 7).
consider is on affective politics, because imagining the human body pertains to not only the conceptual but also the sensory and the unconceptualisable (Elliott 2005, 7). Last, I discuss the literature on everyday politics and security politics in South Korea. Taken together, this literature sets the background for my topic.

First, I discuss imagination. In international relations, imagination remains under-conceptualised and disconnected from other literatures, such as social theories (Sparks, Brinket and Aistrope 2022, 2; Mhurchú and Shindo 2016, 7). Mhurchú and Shindo (2016) discuss ‘critical imagination’ in international relations. Yet, their focus is more on being ‘critical’ than discussing imagination itself. The most common imagination in the discipline is Thomas Hobbes’ rendering of the “state of nature”, embedded in the realist imagery of order and anarchy. The Hobbesian rendering of “the state of nature” is a monological imagination which proffers a fear of the unknowable others, security dilemma, and statism in international relations (Sparks, Brinket and Aistrope 2022, 2). However, Sparks, Brinket and Aistrope point out that other disciplines have understood imagination itself as intersubjective, and this has enabled accessing “the broader spectrum of human responses, including empathy, compassion, reciprocity, and hope, as well as a wider range of possible futures” (ibid., 5).

I observe such human responses in South Korean conscientious objectors who commonly imagine a society where one can exercise more agency over one’s life. On such an imagination, I bring up David Graeber, an anarchist activist and anthropologist. To disrupt the centuries-old market capitalist system, Graber argues for actualising particular imaginations, however trivial (2015, 92). People often believe that transforming such a seemingly immutable social reality can only happen through a cataclysmic event at the level of high politics, a Hobbesian social contract-statist imagination in international relations, for example. However, through the trivial everyday events of ordinary people, Graeber points to actualised radical imagination and the possibility of reimagining society. Significantly, the imagination which Graeber refers to is more practical than ideological or transcendent. Particularly, Graeber propounds the need for “the other, immanent sort of imagination—the practical common-sense imagination of ordinary cooks, nurses, mechanics and gardeners” (2015, 92-93). Such ‘practical imagination’ can occur in the everyday routine of interpretation or production, which utilises innate human
capacities to envision and decipher the world from an alternate vantage point (Graeber 2015, 96). In the spirit of Graeber, I suggest South Korean conscientious objectors, with their provocative views on an individual’s relationship with the state and others, are the ones who practice such radical imagination.

I bring up Cornelius Castoriadis, regarding theorising imagination as innate human capacities to intersubjectively produce the self and the surroundings. For Castoriadis, the social imaginary is the creative force (rather than symbolic) responsible for answering fundamental questions which form a society. Such questions would include “who are we as a collectivity? What are we for one another? Where and in what are we? What do we want; what do we desire; what are we lacking” (Castoriadis 1998, 146-7; see also Rae 2019, 243). Castoriadis argues that, by offering practical answers to these inquiries, society shapes its identity, expression, perception of the world, interactions with the world and its contents, and aspirations (1998, 147). In this regard, the imagery, does not entail just the monologic generation of visual imagery; it involves the intersubjective construction of a human realm, extending beyond the individual psyche and encompassing the broader social and historical context (Castoriadis 2010, 81). My dissertation also understands that the human body’s imaginations and the body politic’s security are intersubjective.

Second, my dissertation’s understanding of national security builds on constructivist and poststructuralist perspectives of International Relations and security theories. Realism and liberalism do not question how states constitute their identities and, hence, do not question how states’ security interests are constituted. However, constructivism recognises that the socio-cultural environment constitutes states’ security interests and motivates security policies (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 33; see also Wendt 1999; 1994; Mitzen 2006). Particularly, constructivism is interested in how actors’ ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and discourse affect their collective understanding of security (see Bloom 1993). In my dissertation, I suggest that conventional imaginations of the human body can provide such ideas and norms for a collective understanding of national security. Constructivism recognises that such ideas and norms, which frame security interests, are changeable, and, as a result,

8 On a similar note, the ‘Copenhagen School’ of security studies has shown how various social issues, such as illness, economic crisis, or migration, can be labelled as threats to collective survival (see Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008; Hansen 2011; Williams 2003; 2015).
that security interests and security environments are changeable too (see Wendt 1999, 308–312; see also Williams 2004). Therefore, in my dissertation, I discuss how the human body can be reimagined and how this reimagined body can introduce different ideas and norms that can also reimage national security.

As such, I focus on how reimagining the human body can challenge claims to truth about not only the body but claims to truth about national security too. In this regard, I build on poststructuralist literature in International Relations which challenge universal laws or objective truths about the world (e.g., the security environment of a state). Poststructuralist analyses disclose and disrupt what Foucault called the existing ‘regimes of truth’ which arbitrarily separate ‘truth’ from ‘error’ in the name of elite/expert authorities. In the context of security studies, literature related to poststructuralism has pointed out that practices of national security are discursive practices that attempt to control the proliferation of meaning, create subjects and identities, and impose hierarchical order domestically (Ashley 1989, 263; Campbell 1992, 50; Hansen 2010, 4; see also Der Derian 1987; Shapiro 1988; Klein 1990). I primarily follow Campbell’s view that national security, rather than being a pure reflection of reality, is a product of social imaginations about ‘what to secure, against whom, by whom, and how’, a discourse of danger that imposes identities domestically (1992, 62). I build upon Campbell’s analysis of socially imagined characteristics of national security by identifying the human body as a ground for collectively imagining national security. In particular, I expose and disrupt the South Korean state’s authoritative claims of truths about the human body and national security. I juxtapose the South Korean state’s conventional mode of imagining the human body and national security with South Korean conscientious objectors’ alternative mode of imagining the human body and national security. Significantly, if national security is imagined, it can be reimagined through what Deleuze (1994, 139; cited in Shapiro 2013, 30) call ‘disruptive encounters’ that expose and challenge the conditions that enable particular imaginations. I suggest that South Korean conscientious objectors, who express the incompatibility between the ideal male

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9 The concepts of elites that wield interpretive authority, discourses, and binary oppositions that frame interpretation of the world, and the existing languages/intertexts that constitute the world, all come together to create what Foucault terms a ‘regime of truth’ that separates truth from error (McMorrow 2018; see also Foucault 1977, 23; Foucault 2003, 164; Foucault 2008, 18).
soldierly body and themselves, can stage such ‘disruptive encounters’ against the elite/expert authorities’ languages and discourses on national security.

The third literature indicates that, like national security, the human body is a product of imagination rather than purely biological fact (see Foucault 1998). For example, many feminist studies have indicated that the human body is a product of social imagination. The studies have recognised the personally felt and everyday discrepancies between what one’s body ought to be and how one dwells in the body (see Butler 2011[1990]; Preciado 2018; Halberstam 2017; Cuboniks 2018; Shildrick 2009). Many feminist researchers have argued for the potential to confuse and subvert traditionally masculine institutions like the military and war through feminised or deviant bodies (see Enloe 1990; Sylvester 2002; 2012; Belkin 2012; Yi and Gitzen 2018; Pin-Fat and Stern 2005; Weber 2016; Mitchell and Snyder 2015; Wilcox 2015). In this regard, the human body is a product of imagination and contains the potential to transform politics.

I have found such bodily potential in “Living on Borderlines”, Richard Ashley’s chapter in *International/Intertextual Relations*. Ashley brings up the highly gendered (and hence problematic) figure of the “sovereign man” or the “reasoning man” (1989, 261). The “sovereign man” is a threatened subject whose ‘problems, dangers, and fears’ are already designated by the state (Ashley 1989, 303; see also Campbell 1992, 62) and striving to remake the world in his image (George 1996, 62). In this manner, the “sovereign man” becomes an interpretive centre, the ultimate reference for interpreting what is happening and authorising all sovereign decisions in its political community (Ashley 1989, 261). Therefore, the “sovereign man” enables a state’s international political life and says much about the state’s domestic character. In this context, Ashley claims, “Modern statecraft is modern mancraft” (Ashley 1989, 303; italics in original).

However, Ashly warns that taking the “sovereign man” for granted effects problematic closures in political life, limiting how political communities are imagined. Hence, Ashley urges his readers to investigate how a particular figure has become the interpretive centre or “sovereign man” (Ashley 1989, 262; Weber 2010, 980–981). Following Ashley’s approach, in my dissertation, I seek to investigate the bodily qualities of the South Korean “sovereign man” and explore the ways in which this
figure can be reimagined. In *Queer International Relations*, Cynthia Weber (2016) notes that the “sovereign man” is a highly gendered and sexualised figure; she queers this figure through Tom Neuwirth/Conchita Wurst, the Austrian singer who, in 2014, competed in and won the Eurovision Song Contest. Neuwirth/Wurst is a border figure who refuses to pass as either traditionally male or female, masculine or feminine, heterosexual or homosexual (ibid., 159). According to Weber, Neuwirth/Wurst's 'confusing' bodily presence has provoked questions about the borders and bordering practices of gender, sexuality, race, civilisation, and religion. Significantly, in the international controversies surrounding the identity of Neuwirth/Wurst, Weber sees the potential to operationalise a queer logic of statecraft premised on the queering of the ‘mancraft’ (ibid., 144). Through Neuwirth/Wurst, Weber suggests ordering politics premised not on a singular logos (either/or logic) but on plural logoi (and/or logic) (ibid., 39). Weber suggests that the plural logoi can disrupt foundational binaries constituting the “sovereign man” such as ‘order versus anarchy’ and ‘normal versus perverse’. In Chapter 3, I develop Weber’s concept of plural logoi by introducing bodily qualities, such as non-organic organisation and xenophilic immunity, which potentially enable plural logoi to reimagine the South Korean body politic.

As such, I take the human body as something that conditions the imagining of national security. Similarly, in *The Microbial State*, Stefanie R. Fishel demonstrates the importance of questioning “what figures we think through, from, and with” (2017, 2; see also Thurtle 2018). I concur with Fishel that the statism in many International Relations theories have prevented the disclosing and reimagining of the current modes of political organisation (ibid., 10). In this regard, Fishel suggests that the symbiotic relationship between humans and microbial communities can produce good analogies for the improved imagining of how human institutions, politics, and other collective bodies are created and sustained (ibid., 5). Following Fishel’s framing of the relationship between the human body and organisation of political communities, I suggest in Chapter 3 that organisation and immunity are underexplored, but nevertheless significant, constitutive logics shared between individual bodies and collective bodies.

In addition, although the dissertation focuses on body politic, the practice of likening a political community to a body, controlling people’s fundamental constitutional
rights in the name of collective security or survival, as in the criminalising of South Korean conscientious objectors, also aligns with biopolitics, managing populations through systems of normalisation to optimise the processes of life. Particularly, when Foucault (1998, 2003; see also Esposito 2008, 55) questioned how the period that brought unprecedented improvements in quality of life also enabled Nazi concentration camps, he was also asking how biopoliticised security can pursue the enhancement of the vitality and potential of life to the extent of risking self-destruction. For the Nazis, human will and reason cannot protect life because they considered the biological aspect the dominant force in every living being (Esposito 2012, 45). Therefore, per the extreme immunitary logic, the Nazis’ primary means of promoting life (primarily the life of the German race) became directly intervening in life through death, negating life. Also, many studies have demonstrated that defining a ‘normal’ way of life and delineating what falls beyond those boundaries has increasingly become militarised (see Dillon and Reid 2001; Dean 2007; Jabri 2007). Biopolitics also merged practices of war and militarisation with bordering and security practices (see Vaughan-Williams 2009), with responding to HIV/AIDS (see O’Manique 2004; Elbe 2009; Youde 2010), and with dealing with asylum seekers (Bigo 2002; Estévez 2015). Then, through discussing South Korean conscientious objectors’ struggle against the militarisation of collective survival, this dissertation also addresses the militarised biopolitics of national security in South Korea, contributing to the explorations of biopolitical security.

The fourth literature signals that imagining the human body is an aesthetic and affective process. In the previous section, I discussed how the body politic can be imagined and reimagined through the human body. However, any imagination relies upon the pre-linguistic, pre-reason, and felt-only aspect of one’s experiences that refuses to be readily conceptualised and articulated (see Laclau 2005; Solomon 2014; Sparks et al. 2022). To begin with, I build on Terry Eagleton’s (1990) discussion of how politics processes aesthetic or felt-only aspects of experiences into familiar and recognisable concepts and texts. Eagleton reveals that there are politics in simply sensing or perceiving an object to make a judgment, bypassing logical reasonings and making the underlying principles less clear (ibid., 329). Similarly, on how one’s aesthetic experience is processed into familiar concepts (see Devetak 2005; see also Rancière 2010), I follow from Jack Holland and Ty Solomon’s theorisation of the
relationship between affect and discourse. They write, “Affect is a Biological response to an event, which is conditioned by Culture, and later named within Discourse as Emotion” (Holland and Solomon 2014, 264 emphases in original; see also Solomon 2012; 2014; 2017). In this regard, the dominant imaginings of the human body can become the conditioning cultural contexts that capture affect and reduce aesthetic experiences into familiar concepts (e.g., emotions).

However, Eagleton also suggests that attending to aesthetics, rooted in the human body, can inspire people to overcome the confines of familiar languages and concepts and to sense things differently (1990, 39). Massumi also indicates that even when affect is captured into certain emotions or national narratives, something always escapes at the moment of the capture (2002, 35–36). Such ‘flight’ of affect occurs because affect is the intensity that occurs through encounters of bodies, and the bodies are ‘viscerally’ prior and resistant to conceptualisation (Gregg & Seigworth 2010, 1). In this regard, recognising the unfixable potential of affect is politically significant. According to Roland Bleiker, attending to an aesthetic faculty such as affect can open up a new thinking space, as it provides “the ability to step back, reflect and see political conflict and dilemmas in new ways” (Bleiker 2009, 2; see also Bleiker 2017). In this regard, in Chapter 4, I discuss how imagining the human body is an affective process through the capture and flight of affect. In Chapter 8, I analyse how contrasting presentations of human bodies can facilitate the capture of affect that solidifies the familiar national security discourse and encourage the flight of affect from such discourse.

Last, to understand the South Korean politics of national security, I build on the idea that South Korea has been immersed in what Paik Nak-Chung (2011[1998]) calls

10 I am particularly interested in research that distinguishes affect from emotion. Emotion is the linguistically captured quality of experience or the signified and narrativised intensities (see Massumi 2002, 28; Holland and Solomon 2014, 264). In contrast, affect is seen to be pre-linguistic, undecided, embodied, and automatically occurring intensities (Ross 2006, 211; Shaviro 2009, 3; Shapiro 2013, 15; see also Deleuze 1997) that emerge through bodily encounters (Massumi 2002, 28; see also Ahmed 2004, 44–49; Solomon 2017).

11 On a similar note, Elaine Scarry’s (1985) The Body in Pain emphasises human bodies’ inherent resistance to language through the inexpressibility of pain.

12 I have translated the Korean language materials discussed in this dissertation. Due to its popularity among Korean studies scholars, I use the McCune-Reischauer Romanisation system for all Korean citations. However, for names (especially those of authors and locations), I do not use the McCune-Reischauer Romanisation. This is to maintain consistency with English language scholarship on Korea.
the ‘division system’. The ‘division system’ indicates the social reality that has got entrenched everywhere in the daily life of the South Korean people through more than half a century of division in the Korean Peninsula. Paik refuses to identify the division in terms of the “contradiction between the capitalist bloc and the socialist bloc,” or in terms of “the rivalry between two systems” (ibid., 7). Rather, he suggests that reunifying the two Koreas is impossible unless the division system is overcome through a sustained movement rooted in the daily lives of the people of the Korean Peninsula (ibid., 3). I develop Paik’s idea and argue that reimagining the human body to disrupt and challenge the ‘common sense’ understanding that military and state violence are necessary for national security is a movement rooted in daily life. The realm of common sense, the things that people take for granted, is at this daily level. Also, in Divided Korea, Bleiker (2005) tackles one of the most popular ideas that sustain the culture of insecurity in South Korean society: that of a lost national unity or homogeneity between the two Koreas. Bleiker suggests that any peace efforts should begin by acknowledging that one’s sense of identity and political views may be fundamentally at odds with another person’s (ibid., xxvii). Bleiker’s suggestion indicates that the reconciliation between the two Koreas cannot be entrusted entirely to diplomacy, military, or geopolitics (see also Kim Dong-Choon 2010). In this regard, in Chapter 2, where I introduce the background to this dissertation in more detail, I focus on how notions of national security and conscription have influenced South Korean society rather than the state.

In summary, my research is about imagining and reimagining the security of the South Korean body politic. The literature I have discussed indicates that national security is a product of collective imagination and is also open to reimagination. I have also discussed how the human body is a product of imagination capable of framing a body politic. I have also suggested that this imagining is affective. Further, I explained that, in South Korea, reimagining national security is a movement rooted in daily life. In the next section, I turn to the importance of the proposed research.

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13 When citing a Korean author, I use the author’s full name to avoid confusion because certain family names (e.g., Kim, Lee, and Park) are very common.
1.3 The contribution of the study

Through this dissertation, I make two contributions. First, in identifying and exploring the bodily qualities of organisation, immunity, and affect, I engage the underexplored topic of how the state and national security can be imagined through the human body’s qualities. Second, I provide a novel perspective on national security while focusing on conscientious objectors’ supposedly ‘irrelevant’ voices.

My first contribution is demonstrating that qualities of the human body, such as organisation, immunity, and affect, are significant for understanding what is happening to political communities such as states. A state is often silently thought of as an embodied person (often male, unhandicapped, young, healthy, and soldierly), particularly when presenting itself domestically and internationally. However, what bodily qualities have framed the imaginations about a state is a relatively underexplored question in political analyses. To develop the link between the human body and political communities, this dissertation shows how and why certain qualities of the body are significant in this regard. For example, I show that if the South Korean state is imagined through the human body’s hierarchical organisation of organs, it may become reasonable for the state to prioritise particular agendas in the name of the common good and deem other agendas redundant. If the state is imagined through the human body’s immune system, it may become more plausible for the state to respond violently against foreign or unfamiliar elements. I also show that imagining the human body through the concepts of organisation and immunity is an affective and visceral process whereby certain bodies make sense and become pleasurable while certain other bodies seem confusing and extreme. As such, through engaging with the qualities of the human body that are usually deemed irrelevant to national security (and political analyses in general), I seek to avoid reproducing accepted and familiar frames for understanding and representing national security (Shapiro 2013, xv), such as statism, military, and masculinity. Overall, I show how reimagining the human body in terms of organisation, immunity, and affect

14 The focus of analysis in Chapters 6, 7, and 8.

15 One exception is scholarship on gender and international relations. For example, many have pointed out that International Relations and political science are masculine disciplines (see Tickner 1992; Carver 2014; Hooper 2001; Zalewski 1995; Zalewski and Parpart 1998; Thomson and Kenny 2020; Tolleson-Rinehart and Carroll 2006).
contributes to broadening and deepening the agenda of security studies. In other words, I demonstrate how seemingly distant things are related and travel across levels of analysis for security studies. Also, such bodily qualities may develop into measures for quantitative studies.

My second contribution is showing that social minorities, such as conscientious objectors, and their seemingly redundant agendas are significant for reimagining security in a post-conflict society like South Korea. Because of its violent history and ongoing geopolitical struggles, most representations of the security issues of the Korean Peninsula (e.g., the confrontation between North and South Korea) have reproduced the statist and militaristic imaginings of national security. In particular, with a few exceptions (see, for example, Bleiker 2005; Shim 2014; Chubb 2014a; Choi 2015), most studies on the security issues have presumed that the relevant parties are only state actors with military and economic power. When imagining peace and security, such a tendency ignores the underlying local, socio-cultural, personal, and everyday relationships inseparable from the conflict. Therefore, inspired by a more holistic, local-centred, normative, and crossing levels-of-analysis approach of Finnish peace research (see Puumala et al. 2011; Väyrynen 2013; Väyrynen 2019; Lehti 2018), I discuss national security through South Korean conscientious objectors who have been dramatised as existential threats by the state and the public. Finnish peace research suggests that state-centred militaristic and diplomatic solutions alone will not promote sustainable peace. Notably, Finnish peace mediation practices have focused on transforming the conflict environment through the locals’ everyday and including social minorities as interested parties in peacebuilding. Applying this approach to reimagining national security for sustainable peace in the Korean Peninsula, this dissertation voices South Korean conscientious objectors as an interested party in South Korea, a post-conflict society. In particular, through bringing up seemingly trivial causes such as minorities’ rights, animal rights, ecologism, or personal histories, the objectors commonly have promoted the right to have rights. In other words, they have generally fought to expand the meaning of life beyond collective survival, focusing on freeing human potential from the grip of state-centrism and militarism. In this regard, they propose an alternative space for imagining less aggressive and less state-centred security politics. Overall, my dissertation demonstrates how South Korean conscientious objectors, who have been trivialised and criminalised for decades despite their
activism, can contribute to solving security problems and promoting peace at the local level. For security studies in general, my dissertation shows how matters which may appear redundant at first can be made politically significant.

1.4 Chapter outline

In Chapter 2, I provide the background to this dissertation. I discuss the South Korean politics of national security that has silenced dissident voices and military conscription, which has shaped the country’s citizenship and national security politics. Then, I discuss how South Korean conscientious objectors to military conscription have been significant for imagining national security in South Korea.

In Chapter 3, I discuss how political communities can be imagined through the human body. I also discuss how reimagining the body can reimagine political communities. I introduce conventional and alternative notions on the bodily qualities of organisation and immunity and consider how these qualities can frame the imaginations about the individual and collective bodies.

In Chapter 4, since imagination contains feelings, I discuss how imagining the human body is an affective process. After explaining how affect conveys bodily, unfixed, social, and political qualities, I discuss how affect can be captured and how affect can evade capture (the flight of affect). Then, I consider how certain ‘beautiful’ bodies can capture affect and how affect escapes through certain ‘extreme’ bodies.

In Chapter 5, I introduce the research materials and my methods for gathering the materials and analysing them. I conduct three analyses (Chapters 6, 7, and 8) in this dissertation. The materials for Chapters 6 and 7 are texts produced by the state on South Korean conscientious objectors (mostly court decisions) and those produced by the objectors themselves. The materials for Chapter 8 are two popular South Korean military reality shows and two films produced by the objectors.

In Chapter 6, I analyse the textual materials through two contrasting ideas about the human body’s organisation. In the first part of the analysis, I read the texts on South
Korean conscientious objectors in light of organic organisation. In the second part, I read the texts by the objectors in view of the Body without Organs. I juxtapose the two readings to show that the objectors propose a different mode of bodily organisation which can reimagine national security.

In Chapter 7, I analyse the textual materials through two contrasting ideas about immunity. In the first part of the analysis, I read the texts on South Korean conscientious objectors while considering xenophobic immunity. In the second part, I read the texts by the objectors with a focus on xenophilic immunity. I juxtapose the two readings to demonstrate that the objectors propose an alternative mode of immunity through which national security can be reimagined.

In Chapter 8, I analyse the visual materials through the capture of affect and the flight of affect. In the first part of the analysis, I discuss how popular South Korean reality shows can facilitate the capture of affect. In the second part, I discuss how films directed by South Korean conscientious objectors can facilitate the flight of affect. I juxtapose the two discussions to show that the objectors represent an ‘extreme body’ that resists being captured through South Korean militarism.

In Chapter 9, I summarise my findings and reflect upon the findings regarding their contributions. Then, I discuss what this dissertation offers for future research.
The main objective of this chapter is to provide the context of this dissertation, which studies how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security regarding South Korean conscientious objectors. In the previous chapter, I mentioned that the South Korean courts have made it criminal to refuse military conscription based on conscience. The courts believe that the refusal poses a threat to the military and, consequently, national security, which serves as the foundation for all other rights (see section 1.1). Considering this, I discuss three themes that make up the background for this dissertation: national security, conscription, and conscientious objectors in South Korea.

Weaving through the three themes, I argue that South Korean conscientious objectors have significance beyond being subject to a legal conflict. In particular, their activities and personal narratives have questioned the state’s status as the foremost authority on national security and the state’s disciplining of people through military conscription. The following is how I weave through the three themes. First, I discuss how the concept of national security has been understood and invoked in South Korea. I emphasise how national security has been employed to silence dissident views, positioning the state as the most prominent authority in securing lives. Second, I discuss military conscription, which is considered vital to national security. I emphasise that, through conscription, the state has produced modern conscript-citizens and surveilled and disciplined the population. Third, I discuss the significance and the background of conscientious objection in South Korea. After discussing how conscientious objection has been significant in rethinking national security, I provide the relevant background on South Korean conscious objectors. Overall, I show that South Korean conscientious objectors are more than objects of legal dispute.
2.1 National security: silencing dissident views

Premised on Campbell (1992)’s argument that national security is a social imagination, this section deals with the politics of national security in South Korea. I focus on two things. First, I focus on how, in South Korea, understanding of national security has prioritised the state’s violent capacity to respond to interstate conflicts over securing values such as human dignity. Second, I focus on how the state’s reference to national security has silenced dissident views and suppressed freedom of expression. The South Korean state and its military have claimed the most central authority in securing lives by invoking national security against dissident individuals (e.g., victims of state-sponsored massacres and conscientious objectors).

I briefly discuss how national security has been understood in South Korea from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. Throughout the Cold War, in South Korea, national security was primarily understood through the realist lens, focusing on structural threats to the state’s security. That the most significant threat came from North Korea, supported by China and the Soviet Union, has been a general perception. Since the Korean War, it has been common sense that the final guarantor of South Korean national security is the South Korea–United States alliance and South Korea’s military. In the 1950s, South Korea’s Rhee Syngman government tried to institutionalise an Asia-Pacific version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) among the anti-communist states in the region (Park Young-Joon 2017, 85–86). The Park Chung-hee government of the 1960s and 1970s

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16 The South Korean international relations (IR) scholarship’s dependence on the US has also reflected the statist, militaristic, and rationalistic approaches to understanding security. The American scientism of the 1950s–1960s in IR was ‘handed down’ to the first generation of South Korean students who studied there (Park & Ha 1995, 309; Seo and Cho 2021, 628-630). Along with the fact that the South Korean security environment has been founded upon the militarised inter-Korean confrontations and the Korea-US Alliance, it seemed adequate and natural for South Korean scholars and policymakers to adopt the Cold War frame of American IR scholarship (ibid.; see also Cho Young Chul 2023).
introduced the porcupine strategy, involving developing an independent nuclear capacity (ibid., 91–92).

The post-Cold War era has seen the proliferation of both traditional and non-traditional security agendas in South Korea. However, militarised confrontations among the old enemies remain the most tangible ‘reality’ for understanding national security. More optimism set in as South Korea became more confident in its economic and military ‘middle power’ status in the region. South Korea has accommodated the widened security agendas to seek ways to coexist with North Korea, such as establishing a Northeast Asian security consultation body to alleviate the security dilemma and address transnational security issues together (Park Young-Joon 2017, 79). Yet, pessimism also persists because the militarised confrontation in the Korean Peninsula remains unresolved. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Communist bloc, some experts predicted that this would motivate North Korea to increase provocations in various scales to assert itself (see Friedberg 1993; Buzan & Segal 1994; Christensen 1999). So far, they have been right. In both South Korea and the US, the belief that North Korea is naturally evil and untrustworthy continues to be shared by public opinion and many officials (Chubb 2014a; Suh Jae-Jung 2007).

Bleiker criticises such belief for leading to another widespread belief that, the only reasonable response to North Korea is strengthening military capacities. He adds that this makes recognising subtle distinctions difficult, thereby preventing any resolution of the security dilemma between the North and the South Koreans (Bleiker 2005, xxxiv; see also Smith 2000, 128). Hence, as Danielle Chubb (2014a, 3; see also Paik 2011[1998]; Seo and Cho 2021) points out, a better understanding of the politics of security in South Korea requires a ‘broader lens’ that can observe the intersection of the domestic and the international. As such, the South Korean understanding of national security has prioritised the state’s capacity to respond to interstate conflicts.

The idea of security in South Korea has been more inclined towards achieving ‘negative peace’ at the state level than achieving ‘positive peace’ that considers

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17 Through the ‘porcupine strategy’, a weaker state projects an image capable of resulting in higher cost than benefit to a hostile stronger state.

18 The widened security agenda include, for example, ‘common security’, ‘collaborative security’, mutual disarmament, and ‘human security’ (Independent Commission, 1982).

19 Negative peace indicates the absence of violence. Positive peace pertains to, for example, constructive settlement of conflicts that involve promoting sustainable social systems (Galtung, 1996).
securing values such as human dignity. This observation raises a question about what state-centric national security is capable of. Therefore, I proceed to discuss how, in South Korea, national security has been employed towards the people and society.

Until the democratisation in the late 1980s, the South Korean dictatorships actively referred to ‘national security’ to silence the victims of the state-sponsored massacres of the Korean War and other human rights abuses. The references to national security were mainly invoked to silence the ‘dissident’ views that can challenge the legitimacy of the state as the foremost protector of the life and prosperity of the nation. I focus on two cases where national security has been invoked: The National Security Law and the silencing of the Jeju Uprising (1948–49). The two cases are significant because they demonstrate that national security is a social construction and that invoking national security has suppressed freedom of expression.

The National Security Law has called upon the word ‘national security’ to silence the domestic population and promote societal reticence. The law was enacted in 1948 against the political unrest between the Right and the Left that erupted throughout South Korea even before the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 (Cumings 1997, 202–24). The stated purpose of the National Security Law has been to prevent anti-state acts from threatening the security of South Korea (National Security Act, Law No. 3318 (1980), as revised by Law No. 4373 (1991), art. 1; cited in Kraft 2006, 628). The most controversial part of the National Security Law has been Article 7, which punishes those praising or sympathising with “anti-state groups”. “Anti-state groups” are loosely defined as “domestic or foreign organisations or groups whose intentions are to conduct or assist infiltration of the Government or to cause national disturbances” (National Security Act, art. 2.; cited in Kraft 2006, 629). This loose definition left much room for interpretation and enabled successive South Korean dictatorships to use the law to silence potential opposition in the pretext of praising North Korea (Neary 2002, 82; Grinker 1995, 32). Under the National Security Law, those who proposed more peaceful or alternative approaches for dealing with the North or even those who made harmless jokes or satires while drinking were prosecuted. Throughout the dictatorships, not only political opponents but also artists, writers, bookstore owners, students, journalists, professors, labour union members, and general citizens, often along with their family members, were tortured, imprisoned, and subjected to state surveillance under the National Security Law (see
Thus, the South Korean state has invoked national security to deal with the outside and to keep citizens in line and reticent.

Also, the decades-long silencing of the Jeju Uprising (1948–49) is one notable instance where the National Security Law was actively invoked to impose control over the popular understanding of national security. An estimated 30,000 civilian residents of Jeju Island were massacred amid a series of clashes between Communist insurgents and the South Korean military and police forces. During the clashes, the South Korean military and police employed ruthless and reckless counter-insurgency tactics, such as mass arrests and detentions, forced relocations, torture, indiscriminate killings, and many large-scale massacres of civilians (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2010; Kim Hun-Joon 2014). However, after decades of dictatorships, the evidence and testimonies of the massacres have been systematically hidden from or ignored by the South Korean people. Such silencing occurred because the state killed the civilian victims as ‘communist insurgents’. The victims’ families had to silence their grievances or risk being labelled the ‘family of the Reds/the communist rebels’ by trying to seek justice. Local students, journalists, writers, and artists who intermittently took up the cause and demanded truth and justice for the victims were labelled advocates of the ‘anti-state groups’ and suppressed harshly under the National Security Law. Even after democratisation in 1987, the conservatives in South Korean politics have actively labelled the civilian victims as communist insurgents. Only after many years of graft from civil advocacy groups was the Jeju Commission, South Korea’s first truth commission, finally created in 2000 (Kim Hun-Joon 2014, 2). The silencing of what happened on Jeju Island shows that the state’s references to ‘national security’ can suspend the fundamental democratic rights of citizens while the government eschews broader public debate and scrutiny (Chubb and Kim Hun-Joon 2016, 166; Chubb 2014b, 137).

The National Security Law and its silencing of the Jeju Uprising (and other civilian massacres by the South Korean military and the police during the Korean War) are

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20 As of 2018, the official death toll is slightly over 10,000. However, the toll could rise as high as 60,000 to 80,000 because the excavation of the mass graves and identification of those missing are still underway (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2010).
ongoing. Until today, the National Security Law suppresses free speech about the North, and South Koreans are still not allowed to access any North Korean source of information without the government’s permission. The National Security Law has not only strengthened the monopoly on the knowledge about how to best deal with North Korea but also has bolstered the hierarchy wherein the voice of the government gets an absolute and automatic authority on national security issues (Chubb 2014b, 142). The National Security Law continues to exist even after the country’s democratisation in 1987. The silencing has contributed to the pervasive belief that the state can best represent the collective destiny of the South Koreans.

The National Security Law and its history of silencing dissident views show how the state claims the most central authority to secure lives by invoking national security and collective destiny. However, as I will discuss in the last section of this chapter, through their various personal causes, South Korean conscientious objectors have challenged the state’s longstanding authority on national security and the ‘common sense’ that military conscription and the military’s violent capacities are vital for securing lives. Therefore, in the next section, I discuss military conscription in South Korea.

2.2 Conscription: citizenship and surveillance

In the following text, I show how conscription has shaped the individual’s relationship with the state. In particular, I emphasise that military conscription has influenced every South Korean (and not only the conscripted men). I focus on two points. The first concerns earning citizenship, and the second concerns surveillance. Overall, refusing to enlist can result in becoming a non-citizen/internal other.

The first point concerns earning citizenship through military conscription. Military service is often deemed a ‘rite of passage’ into adulthood. Adaptation to life in a

21 To provide a brief background to the South Korean military conscription, the war between North and South Korea is still officially on despite the armistice of 1953 has been the central justification for continuing the conscription. As a ‘sacred duty’ vital to the nation’s survival, military conscription has been a ‘rite of passage’ for South Korean men for over half a century.
barrack with fellow soldiers and obedience to the military hierarchy are often considered proofs of one’s capacity as an independent adult, a ‘full’ citizen. Also, the right to own property, participate in politics, have a fair trial, and the like have been usually accompanied by the duty to enlist for military service (Turner 1994, 13–26; Kim Dong-Choon 2006, 170). Many enslaving societies, including ancient Rome, gave a chance to earn citizenship to the enslaved people who fought in and survived battlefields. Modern citizenship as a bundle of rights and duties was introduced through the wars that were fought to conceive the modern nation-states, the Napoleonic Wars and the wars in Europe and the Americas since the eighteenth century (see Mann 1987; Tilly 1986; Janowitz 1976; Young 1984; Giddens 1985). The core group of ‘citizen-soldiers’ was usually tax-paying males as full political members of the society (see Gill 1997; Dudink and Hagemann 2004, 3–21; Horne 2004, 22–40). Similarly, the Korean War abolished the caste society and introduced the more homogenous ‘gukmin’ (‘national people’ in Korean) to denote nationals (Kim Dong-Choon 2006, 175).

In three ways, military conscription has been a powerful instrument of mass political education that has produced modern citizen-soldiers. First, military conscription helped the conscripts (and their family, friends, and lovers) to strongly identify themselves as the subjects of the state. Meyer Kestnbaum (2002) claims that conscription during the American Revolutionary War (1775–83) and the French Revolution (1789–99) invented the ‘national citizen’ identity as the conscripts began to identify themselves as citizen-soldiers entitled to certain rights.22 In particular, through conscription, one becomes a citizen-soldier exhibiting specific ‘national characteristics’. Uri Ben-Eliezer (1995), in his account of early Israeli militarism, claims that Israeli conscription has been influential in the political inculcation of Zionist ideals, national identity, and a ‘siege mentality’ against its Arab neighbours. Also, both Israel and Turkey conduct military education at the high school level, preparing students for the approaching military service. Conscription has been the prime pathway for political socialisation as citizen-soldiers in Israel and Turkey (Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008, 350; Altinay 2004, 139).

22 In contrast, the Prussian conscription was more coercive. The peasants received an exemption from compulsory labour in return for conscription. Meanwhile, the Junkers saw this as an opportunity to militarise the society and educate the public to accept authoritarian control (Mjøset and Holde 2002, 41–59; see also Frevert 2001).
In South Korea, the military has also been inculcating attitudes of anti-communism and nationalism in its conscripts (and thereby in the broader society). Kwon Insook claims that the conscription period has been “a brainwashing time for the inculcation of anti-Communist nationalist ideology, the fostering of increased enmity for North Korea, and the internalisation of the logic of safeguarding the nation from the threat of possible war” (2001, 47). Political education is integral to South Korean military training, as in other states. Political education, for example, propagates the superiority of ‘democracy’ and ‘liberalism’ in South Korea, condemns the North Korean government for being an untrustworthy partner in negotiations and for leaving its people in miserable conditions, lays down the proper mindset and behaviour required in soldiers, and emphasises loyalty to one’s family and the nation. As a result, some scholars criticise the military’s political education for promoting a social atmosphere that encourages militarised confrontations with North Korea over reconciliation (see Kwon 2009; Kim Dong-Choon 2013; Moon 2007).

Second, serving in the military has facilitated the conscripts to identify themselves as equals to each other. Writing on European military recruitment, Lars Mjøset and Stephen Van Holde suggest that conscripts differ from mercenaries in that they are the ‘citizen-conscripts’ who ‘sacrificed’ themselves through the service (2002, 37–38). What logically followed is the ideal of ‘equal sacrifice, equal rights’ (ibid.). In post-revolutionary France and Sweden, protecting one’s nation and state as equals played a significant role in redirecting people’s loyalty from the church and the monarchy to one’s nation-state (see Flynn 2002; Sasson-Levy 2003; Kronsell and Svedberg 2001; Kwon 2009, 193). Also, being a military conscript has long meant exhibiting the same mentality and bodily traits as one’s fellow conscripts. For example, in the late nineteenth century, a modernising Japan adopted the Prussian military training that disciplined and standardised the conscripts’ habits (e.g. how to walk and behave like a soldier), language (e.g. how to address oneself and others like a soldier), and body (e.g. how to build one’s body and cut one’s hair) (Yoshida 2005; cited in Shin Byung-Sik 2006, 152). The same goes for many modern militaries, including South Korea.23

23 However, I also note that military conscription has been considered to create second-class citizens out of those who cannot or will not participate in the conscription (for the Israeli case, see Helman 1997, 312; Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008, 350; for the South African case, see Conway 2008). In South Korea, for example, those who refuse to be conscripted cannot apply for many jobs.
In South Korea, military conscription is also considered proof of equality among citizens. Every South Korean national has a constitutional duty to commit to national defence. Socio-culturally, society and the media actively monitor draft evasion by the sons of powerful and wealthy people or celebrities. Draft evasion is subject to severe social condemnation alongside legal punishments because it undermines the public’s confidence in equality among nationals. Equality is also a central issue in whether women should be conscripted. In this debate, equality is primarily discussed in terms of duties and rights.

Third, in many societies, military conscription has provided masculine ideals which the members of the public are supposed to imitate. Military conscription is often a rite of passage to attain proper (often militarised) manhood. A man becomes what he is supposed to be by internalising the militarised discourse: ‘the military will make you a man’ or ‘if you don’t survive the military, you won’t survive in the society too’. Enloe points out that keeping ‘soldiering’ and ‘manhood’ close reduces the public’s aversion to military conscription (Enloe 1988). It is not only manly but also romantic to fight and die in a battle. Jean Bethke Elshtain suggests that “the young man goes to war not so much to kill as to die, to forfeit his particular body for that of the larger body, the body politic, a body most often presented and re-presented as feminine: a mother country bound by citizens speaking the mother tongue” (1992, 141–42; cited in Pettman 1996, 95–96). Also, the ‘hegemonic masculinity’24 is constructed in opposition to a range of subordinate masculinities as well as their feminine corollaries (see Hooper 2001; Kittay 1988; Pettman 2005; Kimmel 1997; Zalewski and Parpart 1998; Kwon 2009). Many societies exhibit gendered relations of dominance and subordination among different groups of people exhibiting masculinity and femininity. For example, the apartheid state of South Africa employed homophobia and misogyny to stigmatise conscientious objectors and their supporters as less masculine. Hence, although the objectors and their supporters challenged the state, they had to stay within the hetero-normative framework by denying allegations of them being homosexuals (Conway 2008, 139). The South

24 Raewyn Connell defines ‘hegemonic masculinity’ as “a configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy” (Connell 1995, 77). Hegemonic masculinity is not fixed beyond time, space, and relationships. Its hegemonic position is always contestable because it is influenced by race, sexuality, ethnicity, class, nationality, and others (Berger, Wallis, Watson 1995, 3).
Korean military and the public have also imagined gay soldiers as both culprits and victims of sexual violence in the military and as ‘sexually handicapped’ or mentally ill (Kwon 2009). Gay soldiers are seen as threats to the proper manhood upon which the military (and society) stands.25

In South Korean society, the linkage between military conscription and masculinised citizenship starts as soon as a child enters primary school. South Korean boys often grow up hearing their family, teachers and friends say, ‘only military service will make you a decent man’ or ‘you’ll come to your senses once you’re in the military’.26 The boys soon learn that they must adapt themselves to military life as proper soldiers and men. Failing to do so will question not only their masculinity (Kwon-Kim 2002), but also their post-conscription adult life as workers, sons, brothers, boyfriends, husbands, and fathers. Such interpellation into militarised masculinity challenges men to reject and look down upon signs of femininity they might bear (Kim Woo-young 2015). As a result, the conscription-citizenship exchange has tacitly imposed second-class citizenship status on those exempted from, failed to complete, or refused military service. Whenever an exempted man attempts to apply for a job, find a spouse, or socialise with his peers, he must deal with suspicions about his able-bodiedness, masculinity, and social skills (see Kwon 2001). The inferior citizenship status also extends to those who fail to adapt to life in the barracks or those who refuse to exhibit the military mentality at work or on social occasions. The military tacitly categorises such men as ‘Soldiers Who Need Intensive Care’, and their number, by a conservative estimate, exceeds over 80,000 serving Army soldiers (excluding the Navy and the Air Force) (see Kim Jong-Dae 2014).27 Although the labour and student movements were at the forefront of the country’s democratisation, the

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25 However, this may be more complex than a feminine–masculine binary. As a masculine space premised upon intimate male bonding, the military finds male homosexuality simultaneously threatening and enticing (see Sedgwick 1990). Male-on-male sexual violence in the military is often trivialised, understood as a mere ‘prank’ or ‘brotherly bonding’, and openly problematising such incidents leads to the person complaining being considered a ‘sissy’. Also, the perpetrators tend to disparage and make a travesty of homosexuality to maintain that they are ‘masculine’ (see Kwon In-Sook 2010). Thus, military conscription-citizenship goes beyond the masculine–feminine binary.

26 Many studies argue that South Korean society’s unquestioning and spontaneous attitudes towards conscription are due to equating manliness with soldiering (Kwon Insook 2005; Kwon-Kim 2002; Kim Elli 2004; Moon Seungsook 2007; Moon Katharine, 1997; Kim Woo-yong 2015).

27 That is around 23 per cent of the soldiers serving in the army.
general public has been surprisingly submissive and negligent when it came to questioning military conscription and the rights of soldiers (Kwon 2001; 2005).

Overall, conscripts identify themselves as conscript-citizens who share a national character, a sense of equality, and militarised masculinity. Those who refuse to be conscripted fail to share such traits and become ‘non-citizens’ or even ‘internal threats to national security. However, being a conscript-citizen has also meant that the state has actively disciplined and pressured people to earn and maintain their conscript-citizen status. Therefore, I also discuss how the South Korean state has conducted active surveillance over its citizens’ status (e.g. whereabouts) as potential enlistees, leading to the condemnation of draft evaders.

The modern state can powerfully articulate itself to the nation through preparations for war, which require massive, swift, and effective mobilisation of violent capacities (Kim Dong-Choon 2013, 112). Such mobilisation depends on the state’s surveillance over the whereabouts of its population because modern nation-states usually rely on the military conscription of their citizens for their defence. According to Kim Dong-Choon, South Korea also took surveillance seriously over those who might deviate from the state’s war preparation. As a result, participating in military conscription became a moral obligation (ibid., 111).

In the 1950s, draft evasion and incomplete military service happened across the board in South Korean society, primarily due to the state’s lack of capacity to evaluate the demographics (Jung Yongoh 2014, 129). However, the Park Chung-Hee regime, which came to power after a coup in 1961, intensified state surveillance of the whole population and aggressively cracked down on draft evasion. In 1970, the regime established the Office of Military Manpower Administration, which took charge of conscription and related matters and intensified street interrogation, monitoring, and hunting down draft evaders. The regime also dismissed all government officials who had not completed military service, a policy that private companies also adopted. Moreover, the introduction of residential registration in the late 1960s made the discovery and prosecution of draft evaders very effective (Shin

28 Anthony Giddens points out that there is a correlation between the development of internal surveillance and the reduction of a state’s direct internal violence (1985, 12–20).
Byung-Sik 2006, 159–160).29 Under the residential registration, every South Korean has been issued an identification number and a residential registration card with a photo, residential address, and fingerprints. After introducing residential registration, it became almost impossible to evade conscription through unidentifiable whereabouts or missing residential profiles (Jung Yongoh 2014). Also, violent crackdowns on draft evaders involving street interrogations and publicly shaming their families followed (ibid., 145). Shin Byung-Sik suggests that, given that such crackdowns lingered even after the introduction of the residential registration system, the state wanted to continuously remind people that they were constantly surveilled and disciplined (2006, 163).

Through a series of surveillance policies, the ‘sacred’ duty to national defence has been imposed on the nation as an obligatory constitutional duty (along with paying tax and education) and a moral duty. Draft evasion has become a threat to the nation’s collective body (Shin Byung-Sik 2006, 150, 155). It became a social norm to think of draft evasion as a betrayal of everyone in society, deserving of legal and social stigmatisation (ibid.). As indicated earlier in this section, those who refuse conscription have become unfit to be functioning labourers or proud husbands and fathers. Therefore, it became challenging to sympathise with those resisting or questioning the conscription in such a moral frame. To summarise the section, in South Korea, conscription has been a rite of passage through which people earn citizenship rights. However, through this process, the state has surveilled and morally condemned the ‘draft evaders’ as deviants who deserve violent crackdowns. In the next section, I discuss conscientious objection in South Korea.

### 2.3 Conscientious objectors: significance and context

I discuss the significance and background of South Korean conscientious objectors. First, I discuss how the objectors have been significant in rethinking national security in South Korea. In particular, the objectors can blur the division between the self

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29 This system was primarily intended to ferret out any possible North Korean spies by clarifying every resident’s whereabouts (Kim Dong-Choon 2012).
and the other and perform more agentive individual identity in the face of the state authority which claims to represent the collective well-being. Second, I provide the relevant background on the conscious objectors in South Korea. Overall, this section shows that conscientious objectors in South Korea are more than just objects of legal dispute. In particular, their individual stories and presence can disrupt common-sense understandings of national security.

I discuss how South Korean conscientious objectors might challenge conscription and national security. To begin with, South Korean conscientious objectors challenge the sharp binary division between the self/inside and the other/outside. In an earlier section of this chapter, I discussed that the national security concept has facilitated the sharp division between the inside and the outside. In particular, the military has been an authoritative reference in South Korea for what the citizens should find problematic, dangerous, or fearful (e.g. anything that can jeopardise the violent capacity of the military). However, through their pacifist, anti-militarist, feminist, ecologist, and personal causes, the South Korean conscientious objectors and their supporters (in South Korea and other societies, too) have challenged the sharp inside-outside division. The objectors have come to embody the grey area between ‘us’ and ‘them’ or even the position of ‘internal threats’ to national security. In the case of the South African conscientious objection movement, Conway writes that, facing harsh international criticism, the apartheid regime in South Africa framed the anti-conscription campaigners as internal ‘traitors’ and ‘useful idiots’ for communists who tried to topple the country (2012, 131). As ‘strangers’ inside the state (ibid., 29), the South African objectors blurred the line separating the soldier/civilian, friend/enemy, and criminal/law-abiding. Importantly, through such blurring, conscientious objectors worldwide have imagined a ‘new civic space’ from which a new national security frame could be negotiated to define the self/inside and the other/outside (see Helman 1999b, 60). Through the next two chapters, I show how reimagining the human body can bring about such a ‘new civic space’.

30 Here, I build my discussion on Derrida (1976)’s logic of binary opposition (e.g. rational/emotional, mind/body, man/woman), where one term is always more privileged than its counterpart. In this regard, the binary opposition is defining and hierarchising. The post-structural international political analyses also have problematised the binary opposition which separates the ‘self/inside’ from the ‘other/outside’ (see Ashley 1989; Campbell 1992; Weber 2016).
Also, South Korean conscientious objectors perform more agentive individual identity. By refusing to be conscripted to defend their causes, they claim agency in the face of the state authority, which claims to represent the well-being of the collective. According to Sara Helman, through their repeated actions of agency against the state, the objectors embody the willingness to ‘democratise’ the individual’s relationship with the state (1999a, 406). An example is the Israeli soldiers who refused to participate in the Lebanon war (1982–85) because they did not see the war as necessary for national survival (ibid., 404). Especially in regions that criminalise refusal to serve in the military, objectors have often announced their objections publicly in courts and on the streets. The announcements usually take auto-ethnographic forms as the objectors reflect on how they have come to be in such discord with the world or the society in which they grew up. Through the announcements, I note the significance of personal narratives for politics. Jenny Edkins writes that when one voices personal narratives that confound existing categories, they can overcome one-dimensional ‘truth-versus-falsity’ structures and reclaim the self (2013, 285; see also Kimura 2008, 5). For example, Merav Perez and Orna Sasson-Levy write that many ‘avoiders’—those without an apparent political motive for their refusal, only personal ones—confuse the imperatives of hegemonic masculinity (2015, 464). Similarly, I also suggest conscientious objectors act as parrhesiastes who courageously speak the truth despite the prospect of persecution. According to Väyrynen, parrhesiastes’ voices and the ‘unmuted’ bodies are significant because they expose the subjectivity of the nation and problematise “the politics of the nation that seeks closures” (2014, 220; emphasis original). Therefore, listening to individual narratives of the objectors can disrupt the prevailing gendered and moralised relationship between one and one’s collective (Zehfuss 2019), upon which national security stands. Hence, in my dissertation, I collect and analyse the objectors’ personal narratives because their voices and the ‘unmuted’ bodies are more than accounts of what happened in their lives. They demonstrate to the state that they are irreducible beings and challenge the silencing that has given the state the foremost authority over national security.

31 Butler defines performativity as “that aspect of discourse that has the capacity to produce what it names” (2013, 112). Butler states that producing a social identity, such as “gender, requires tenuous, stylised and regulated repetition of that naming within that discursive space” (Butler 1990, 140).
Next, I provide a background on South Korean conscientious objection. To begin with, the Conscription Law, enacted in 1949, lacked any reference to conscientious objection. The South Korean government and the highest courts in the country have repeatedly criminalised conscientious objection because acknowledging it will ‘jeopardise the military and hence jeopardise national security upon which all other rights stand’. As of 2017, around 19,000 South Korean men have been imprisoned for refusing military service. Until 2017, each year in South Korea, around 600 men were indicted for refusing to serve in the military, and around 500–600 men were serving jail terms (Yonhap News Agency, 7 October 2017). Most South Korean conscientious objectors were sentenced to 18 months in prison. They even accounted for more than 90 per cent of those imprisoned worldwide for conscientious objection (UNHRC 2013).

South Korean conscientious objectors have given a variety of reasons for their objections. Many objectors base their refusal on their pacifist and anti-war convictions. For example, they raise concerns about land appropriation for building the US military establishments, the experiences of the Korean War, the South Korean military’s participation in the Vietnam War, the 1980 Gwangju Uprising, and the 2003 Iraq War. Others are against the patriarchal masculinity, homophobia, and gender binary in the military, which still categorises homosexuality as a ‘gender preference disorder’ and transgender people as having a ‘gender subjectivity disorder’. Others refer to childhood intra-family violence, vegetarianism-veganism, or concern for the military-industrial complex (World Without War 2014). Despite the various reasons stated, they commonly resist the state’s desire to physically and discursively mould individual subjects through military service by refusing to go against their conscience.

The South Korean conscientious objection movement has endured attacks from the conservative and militaristic South Korean society. Before the 2000s, conscientious objection was considered only a problem of Jehovah’s Witnesses, a minority Christian denomination considered ‘heretic’ by most Koreans (Mun 2012, 247). Unlike Western societies, where pacifist Christian churches have supported the right to freedom of conscience and religion, South Korean society has no such ideological or historical experience (ibid., 243). In addition, the South Korean conscientious objection movement has drawn less public support than the anti-militarist
movements in Israel or South Africa. The lack of support for the campaign is primarily due to the pervasiveness of militarism in South Korea and the hostility from the ultra-conservative Christian churches (Lim 2010, 410). Also, according to Insook Kwon, the anti-militarist element was absent even during the South Korean democratisation movements of the 1980s. The status of the military as the guarantor of national survival in the event of a North Korean invasion was unchallengeable (Kwon 2005, 213–14).

Conscientious objection has become a controversial social issue since the early 2000s. In 2001, Oh Tae-yang, a young South Korean man who did not identify himself as a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses, publicly announced his objection to military service based on his Buddhist, anti-militaristic, and pacifist convictions. He was the first widely publicised case of conscientious objection because he was not a follower of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Since Oh, the South Korean media began to portray conscientious objection as a human and individual rights issue. Also, since the early 2000s, the number of objectors who are not Jehovah’s Witnesses, those who refuse conscription on personal grounds other than religion, has increased (World Without War 2014, 8). As more people began announcing conscientious objection based on non-religious convictions, anti-war and pacifist non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as ‘World Without War’, have been launched to support the objectors.

For two decades, the South Korean conscientious objection movement struggled to have their demands recognised by the public. In South Korea, the imprisonment of conscientious objectors has been disputed in the two highest courts: the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. The disputes have been framed mainly as a choice between upholding national security and individual rights. On the one hand, those sympathetic to conscientious objectors assert that the wholesale imprisonment of the objectors must be stopped. They claim that the South Korean state is failing to resolve the conflict between the duty to national defence and the right to freedom of conscience (Constitutional Court 2004, 2011). They refer to individual rights stipulated by different authorities. Article 19 and Article 20 of the Constitution of

32 I do not believe this is related to the prospect of war. First, concern for human and individual rights in South Korean society has been increasing since the democratisation in the early 1990s. Second, due to the enormous economic and military power gap between the North and the South, the once-envisioned North Korean conquest of the entire Korean Peninsula has become difficult.
South Korea specify freedom of conscience and religion. They also refer to the international laws on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. On the other hand, the South Korean government has argued that Article 39, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, stipulates that all citizens must play their part in national defence under the law. Article 37, Paragraph 2 stipulates that the freedom of all nationals can be limited to ensure national security and allow legislative discretion to punish conscientious objection without offering an alternative service.

Until 2017, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court upheld the government’s position. The courts have negated all the arguments of the conscientious objectors on the grounds of “the foremost good of national security,” which is the “precondition of the state’s existence and all kinds of freedom” (Constitutional Court 2004; 2011). However, over the last decade, disagreements and shifts have occurred in the judiciary’s judgements on conscientious objection. More decisions sympathetic to conscientious objection have surged in the first-instance courts. From 2004 to 2017, more than 50 cases of refusal to conscription were found ‘not guilty’ in the first courts.

The historic 2018 ruling by the Constitutional Court stated that it was unconstitutional of the Military Service Act, Article 5, to rule out alternative forms of service as an option for carrying out conscription duty (Constitutional Court 2018). This ruling forced the legislative and administrative wings of the government to develop alternative forms of service that did not involve military (especially arms) training. In 2020, the government introduced the only alternative service option whereby draftees could serve 36 months lodging (in a barracks-like facility) and working in prison. They were exempted from guarding and escorting prisoners because that would require them to carry firearms. Despite this progress, pacifist and anti-military activists have criticised this option for the following reasons. First, the alternative service seems punitive in terms of its duration. As of 2023, the duration of military service, which starts as a second private in the army, the most popular option, is 18 months. Second, the alternative service requires applicants to undergo a screening process set up by the Alternative Service Commission, an arm of the Military Manpower Administration. Compared to dealing with abusive police officials and public prosecutors (even judges), the screening process offers more leeway to the conscientious objectors to explain their causes. However, some
applicants expressed concerns that the screening process forced them to frame and limit the narrative of their conscience to ‘pass’ (World Without War 2021). Entering the alternative service is considered permission by the state. An applicant must strive to win by expressing the correct form of conscience instead of being seen as an individual right (Nalmaeng 2020). Hence, those who fail to pass or voluntarily reject the screening will likely go to prison. This situation is still happening in 2023. In this regard, the South Korean state’s (and the majority of the public’s) stance that those refusing military service jeopardise the military and national security has not changed fundamentally.

**Summary**

In this chapter, I have argued that South Korean conscientious objectors are significant for understanding national security and conscription in South Korea. The objective of this chapter has been to provide the context of my dissertation by discussing the South Korean politics of national security, military conscription, and conscientious objectors to military conscription. Given its regional security environment, South Korea has promoted national security from the statist and military power perspective. However, the country has used the concept of national security to suppress freedom of expression and identify the society as staunchly anti-communist. Vital to its national security, along with the Korea-US Alliance, is the universal male conscription which has been in force since 1949. Completing the military stint meant that one had earned full political-cultural membership in society as a heterosexual, masculine, and able-bodied adult citizen-soldier-worker against whom other peoples’ lives were measured. In this respect, South Korean conscientious objectors to military conscription are troublesome to the state because they tend to cross the ethical border of acceptable identities. Importantly, they confuse the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ formulation of national security by asserting their irreducibility as human beings before the state authority. I suggest that the objectors are seen as a threat because they confuse and jeopardise the military as the interpretive centre of national security and the citizen-soldier as the interpretive centre of people’s lives. In this regard, the objectors enable travelling across levels
of analysis, from the personal to the political. As I will show in the next chapter, the human body enables such travelling.
3 IMAGINING NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH THE HUMAN BODY’S ORGANISATION AND IMMUNITY

To reiterate, this dissertation studies how reimagining the human body can lead to reimagining national security. In this chapter, my objective is to provide a theoretical foundation for the dissertation by demonstrating how the human body can frame imaginations of national security. A key link between the human body and national security is the body politic. According to Catherine Waldby, the body politic is “a term which implies imagining the nation or some other governmental unit, a city for example, along anthropomorphic or organic lines” (1996, 81; see also Herzogenrath 2010, 1). Also, in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari call for reading a body politic and a body natural on the same conceptual level (2009, 289). For example, the constitution of an individual body and the constitution of a body politic can follow the same organisational logic. However, how the human body’s qualities can prefigure a body politic has been relatively underexplored.

My main argument in this chapter is that the bodily qualities of organisation and immunity can frame the imaginations of national security. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the South Korean Constitutional Court reasoned that the conscientious objectors ‘jeopardise the military, and hence also jeopardise the national security which enables all other individual rights’. In my view, the court’s reasoning likens the South Korean state to the human body, whereby the military, considered vital for the whole body’s survival, is an incomparably vital organ and the immune system of the South Korean body politic. In this regard, I suggest that rethinking political communities in terms of the human body can open up an alternative thinking space for reimagining

33 Body politic is different from body politics. Body politics (with ‘s’) is the politics that acts upon, influences, and shapes human bodies.
organisational and immunity are the human body’s qualities which can simultaneously frame individual and collective bodies.

In this chapter, I give more detailed discussions on how the human body can inform national security regarding organisation and immunity. In each section, I juxtapose a conventional notion of the human body with an alternative notion. In section 3.1, I discuss how the organisation of the human body can frame the imagination of the political community. I juxtapose organic organisation, which assumes the hierarchical relationship between parts and the whole, with what Deleuze and Guattari (2005 [1980]) termed the Body without Organs, which assumes a more open relationship between ‘parts’. In section 3.2, I discuss how immunity can frame the imagination of the political community. I juxtapose xenophobic immunity, which excludes and polices against otherness to secure the sovereignty of the self, with xenophilic immunity, which actively engages otherness to transform the self. This chapter is a theoretical framework for the analyses in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, which respectively show that reimagining the human body through organisation and immunity can also reimagine national security.

3.1 Organisation of body: the relationship between the parts and the whole

I bring up the organisation of the human body as the first concept that frames the imaginations of both individual and collective bodies. For my study on ‘how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security’, the organisation is significant because it deals with the relationship between parts and the whole. For example, questions such as ‘What is the highest priority’, ‘Who commands and obeys’, and ‘What can be sacrificed and why’ simultaneously apply to the human body and national security.

I build my study on Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (2005 [1980])’s *A Thousand Plateaus*, where they write of the opposition between the organic organisation and the Body without Organs. Hence, I also contrast the organic organisation with the
Body without Organs to demonstrate the two competing imaginations of bodies. In the first section 3.1.1, I discuss how every sovereign power necessarily forms a body with a head that commands, limbs that obey, and organs that function harmoniously together to support the commander. Deleuze and Guattari (2005 [1980], 176) state that an organism hierarchically stratifies its constituent parts, imposing certain forms, functions, and linkages on them. In the second section 3.1.2, I discuss how the human body can resist the organic organisation by reimagining itself through the Body without Organs. In Organs without Bodies, Slavoj Žižek states that Deleuze and Guattari are fighting against the organism, the articulation of a body into a hierarchic-harmonious whole of organs, each “at its place” with its function (Žižek 2004, xii). Deleuze and Guattari also state that the enemies of the Body without Organs are not organs but the organism (Deleuze and Guattari 2005 [1980], 158 emphases added).

In my first analytic chapter (Chapter 6), I employ this oppositional frame between the organic organisation (as a hegemonic imagining of the body) and the Body without Organs (as a reimagining of the body) to read the research materials. Through juxtaposing the interpretations, I show how the organic organisation has imagined South Korean national security and how South Korean conscientious objectors’ thinking premised on the Body without Organs can imagine national security differently.

### 3.1.1 The organic organisation: assuming a vital commanding organ

I discuss the organic organisation of bodies. The organic organisation is significant for my study because it frames the popular imagining of the relationship between the parts and the whole. The critical point of this section is that the organic organisation assumes, first, the presence of a vital commanding organ that represents the interests of the whole and, second, that the constituents exist to serve the purposes of the commanding organ.\(^{34}\) The organic organisation assumes that a commanding organ imposes order over other constituents for the collective interest

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\(^{34}\) Hence, in the first analysis (Chapter 6), I read the research materials while considering such points.
(see Herzogenrath 2010, 29; Protevi 2009, 18; Žukauskaitė 2017, 247). Also, in this vein, how a constituent relates to the commanding organ and collective interest defines the constituent. Then, if a constituent is detached from the whole or loses the critical quality of being ‘this particular part’ in the whole, the constituent becomes meaningless or dangerous (2006, 8; see also Delanda 2016, 9–25).

Likening the state or nation to the human body has been traced back to Western philosophy in ancient Greece. Plato and Aristotle’s writings, such as *The Republic, Timaeus, Politics,* and *Movement of Animals,* are early examples of representing the nation (state) as an organic entity (Musolff 2016, 57). Focusing on hierarchy and functional anatomy, they have commonly drawn parallels between the political communities and the human body from the top (head) down to the bottom (feet) (ibid.). The medieval Europe also emphasised the hierarchy and function of parts that constitute the whole. According to Unschuld (2009, 157), the European medieval age started emphasising body parts’ hierarchical and functional distribution. With increased knowledge of the human anatomy, identifying each organ’s function became important. Unschuld suggests that such focus applies to public life (ibid.). For example, in *Policraticus,* John of Salisbury likens hierarchised bodily organs and limbs to the hierarchy of social entities. He emphasises that the ‘state-body’ is ruled according to natural law (Forhan and Nederman 2013, 27). In this regard, he represents a well-organised political community as a healthy human body, with the priesthood as the soul, the king as the head, the soldiers and administrators are hands, and the peasants as feet. The king should correct a poorly organised body politic in which the parts seek their end against the common good (ibid., 37–38; see also Musolff 2016, 58). Hence, medieval medicine and politic shared the ideal of harmony amongst hierarchically and functionally distributed parts. Likening political communities to a human body continues in modern Europe.

In his study of the human body as a symbol, David Le Breton and Helen McPhail claims that the image of the body that many in the West take for granted is a product of modern Europe (1991, 90). In particular, anatomic physiology has been an influential epistemic foundation for understanding the human body. Anatomy

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35 Andreas Vesalius, a Flemish anatomist of the sixteenth century, is a central figure in anatomic physiology.
explores the internal and external structures of the body and their physical relationships. Physiology studies the functions of those structures. The human body became more mechanic (closed system) and less machinic (open system) through anatomic physiology, focusing on the functional parts and their relationships. Anatomic physiology, which opened up a new thinking space, became more widespread and elaborate in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Europe (Unschuld 2009, 133; see also Kuriyama 1999, 8). In particular, a new image of the human being emerged—as a property and a function, disconnected from the totality of being (Le Breton & McPhail 1991, 89).

In *Leviathan*, Hobbes applies similar anatomic-functional distribution to his discussion of the body politic. Hobbes likens the state body to a mechanical body with a giant circulation system and a centre (2005, 200). Hobbes’ state body resembles a hierarchised and compartmented human body with a commanding centre and various levels of peripheries. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes comments that the multiplicity of the consenting individuals together creates the personal figure representing the whole state, the unified identity of the body politic (ibid., 220). Notably, in the frontispiece of the first edition of Hobbes’ *Leviathan* is the image of the sovereign, the Leviathan. The sovereign’s body comprises many minute individual figures, nameless people directing their gaze towards him. Only the sovereign’s head is staring outward. It is the only part not ‘erased’ into the one. The figure of the Leviathan is significant for displaying the qualities of the organic organisation per Deleuze and Guattari, which imposes on its subjects the forms, functions, relationships, order, and hierarchy (2005 [1980], 176).

The frontispiece has inspired important ideas or assumptions on how a body politic must be organised. The first is the presence of a vital commanding centre or organ that represents the interests or survival of the whole. For example, the security of the ‘head’, a vital commanding centre, is often equated with the survival of the whole body. The head is the king, the will or rational mind of a state, and even equated to

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36 According to Massumi in the translator’s foreword of *A Thousand Plateaus*, the closed system is not necessarily a bordered system. The open system is not necessarily a borderless system. An open system (machine) is essentially about being capable of always accessing different others and producing effects.

37 According to Hobbes, “A Multitude of Men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented. …For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One” (2005, 220).
the whole body itself. Writing on an American body politic, Bernd Herzogenrath points out that such a Hobbesian head is a privileged part that speaks for the whole body, dissolving and funnelling the body’s complexities into an authoritative hierarchy under a single imagined wholeness (Herzogenrath 2010, 4). In other words, the presentation of Leviathan’s frontispiece presumes a single commanding origin capable of moulding a transcendent form out of the world’s chaos, controlling the proliferation of meaning. Similarly, John Protevi describes the imposition of the head or the soul that commands and “whips the body into shape” through an image of a leader descending from heaven to salvage people from chaos and impose order (2001, 8; see also Herzogenrath 2010, 29; Protevi 2009, 18). In this regard, the presence of the head, which is equated with the whole body, naturally indicates the presence of a hierarchy among the body’s parts. An organic organisation commands that each organ-parts must work to ensure the survival or protection of the most vital or the commanding organs; similarly, social institutions must also make harmony for the good of the society (Delanda 2006, 8). On the whole, the Leviathan is an organic organisation that subsumes all the constituent parts under a single entity in the name of the survival of the whole.

Second, what follows from the presence of the vital commanding centre is that each body part must be defined and organised in relation to the centre. As the state (head) distributes organ-parts in an orderly manner, it creates a stratified sedentary space, with no place for the organs to experiment or become-something-else (Zukauskaite 2017, 251). In particular, the state always demands its constituents to have an essence; such essence defines the constituent’s supposedly unified and eternal identity (Delanda 2006, xiii). Zukauskaite argues that such identification works through negation and exclusion (2017, 252). A constituent cannot reside in multiple dimensions which are not subsumed by a higher dimension. Also, if the body is only seen as whole, organised, and striated according to a centre, any move against such an organisation can be seen as a disorder, illness, decay, or even death as the body parts will not function correctly, working in opposition to each other (Herzogenrath 2010, 29; see also Terpstra 2020, 47-48). If a component is separated from the entirety to which it belongs, it loses its identity because being a distinct part is one of its fundamental characteristics (Delanda 2006, 9). Therefore, various possibilities of becoming something else which does not lead to becoming a necessity are considered illegal and heretic.
To sum up, the organic organisation of the body has framed the imaginings of organically organised political communities. I have emphasised two points about the organic organisation. First, each part of the body is subordinate to the interest of the whole (or the ultimate point of interest). Second, each body part is defined and organised in relation to the whole. In Chapter 6, I read the research materials through the two points to discuss how the South Korean state has imagined national security through the organic organisation. However, the organic organisational model of the body politic has limitations. By imposing only certain truths on different bodies, this model can reproduce the organic organisation or the same ‘Leviathan’ in the name of emancipation, progress, and equality. Particularly, if a state is imagined through an organic organisation, it can reproduce an image of the body whereby the limbs/constituents serve the head/sovereign. Concerning this, I discuss the Body without Organs which opposes the organic organisation.

3.1.2 The Body without Organs: recognising the parts’ subversive potential

I discuss what Deleuze and Guattari termed the Body without Organs. As mentioned in 3.2, the Body without Organs is opposed to the organic organisation of organs. Following Deleuze and Guattari, I propose that the Body without Organs emphasises two qualities of the human body, which pertain to the relationship between the part and the whole.38 First, I suggest that bodies convey the potential to resist the organic organisation that subsumes various constituents under a prioritised objective. In other words, every constituent can coexist with other constituents non-hierarchically. Second, I also consider that the bodies comprise equally significant individual bodies (constituents). In other words, every constituent is significant in itself. The Body without Organs is significant for my study on reimagining the human body because it recognises the potential of the body’s constituent parts to become something else, to reimagine themselves beyond extant categories (Deleuze and Guattari 2005[1980], 293). Hence, my objective in this section is to challenge the

38 In the first analysis, (Chapter 6), I read the research materials while considering the two qualities.
imagination of the hierarchical organisation of constituent parts that supposedly coordinate and sacrifice themselves to achieve a common goal.

I start discussing the Body without Organs from Spinoza, who proposes a less-hierarchical relationship between the whole and individuals. Both Hobbes and Spinoza treated politics as an endeavour to constitute a collective body. However, they pictured the collective body in contrasting ways. Hobbes projected the collective body as a powerful strongman that castrated the potentiality of people. Otherwise, an infinite ‘war of everyone against everyone’ might take over people. Herzogenrath and Delanda argue that the Hobbesian collective body will ultimately ‘overcode’ (e.g., stabilising the identity) those being represented (Herzogenrath 2010, 12; see also Delanda 2016, 22).

In contrast, Spinoza projected the collective body that preserves or increases the potentiality of each constituent. Spinoza writes that humans align their potential and comprise a larger body, a collective body, to break through the limits of one’s capacity and to handle accidents (Spinoza 2012 [1677], 4p18s; see also James 2014, 147). However, Spinoza warns that increasing one’s potential does not necessarily require sacrificing one’s potential for the larger body. For Spinoza, a body is on the path of reducing its potential when its desire is fixed, sedimented, orchestrated, and systematised. A body is on the path of increasing its potential when it remains open towards others, preserving the potential to renew itself through relations with others (Spinoza 2012 [1677], 4p73; 5p4s; 4p42). In this respect, I look for an alternative mode for expressing a body that enables its constituents to make new relationships with each other and renew themselves constantly. I suggest the Body without Organs is such an alternative mode.

A Body without Organs occurs when constituents express a body with no underlying organisational principles or hierarchy (Adkins 2015, 40; see Deleuze and Guattari 2005 [1980], 40). Deleuze and Guattari clarify that the Body without Organs is not opposed to organs but “opposed to the organism, the organic organisation of the organs” (Deleuze and Guattari 2005 [1980], 158). On the one hand, an organism imposes upon the Body without Organs shapes, purposes, relations, hierarchical

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39 This concept is also known as conatus whereby “each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being” (Spinoza 2012, Ethica, 3p6).
structures, and transcendences (ibid., 159).\textsuperscript{40} On the other hand, countering the organic organisation, the Body without Organs is infiltrated by formless, inconsistent substances, with movement in every direction, unrestrained energies or unpredictable characteristics, and unhinged or fleeting particles (ibid., 40). There are no organs that exist as disconnected pieces from a missing wholeness, nor is there a regression back to an undifferentiated state in reference to a distinct whole (ibid., 182, 164-5). For example, through training, my hands can become more apt at playing a guitar rather than writing a dissertation. It is possible that my hands are not bound by an ultimate objective; they are capable of becoming something else. Therefore, Audrone Žukauskaitė suggests that the Body without Organs proposes the disarticulating, experimental, and nomadic body which, from an organic organisational perspective, might be seen as deviant, for example, schizoid, drugged, or masochistic (Žukauskaitė 2017, 251). In this respect, the Body without Organs destroys any metaphysical notion of essence, identity, or individuality because the Body without Organs is constantly in the process of ‘becoming’\textsuperscript{41} (ibid.; see also Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 275). Also, as the Body without Organs imposes no essence that inflicts a universal identity, every constituent is significant in itself and can coexist with other constituents non-hierarchically. In this regard, in the first analysis (Chapter 6), I juxtapose my reading of research materials in light of the Body without Organs with my reading of the materials in light of the organically organised body. The juxtaposition will show how bodies can be imagined and reimagined.

\textsuperscript{40} In \textit{A New Philosophy of Society}, Delanda (2006) contrasts two modes for expressing the relationship between the parts and the whole. On the one hand, Delanda brings up the “relations of interiority”, whereby a part is defined by how it is related to other parts; the parts complete the whole altogether (2006, 9; see also Delanda 2016, 10). Accordingly, Delanda adds that if a part is separated from the whole, the part will lose its original qualities because being a constituent of the whole is the part’s defining feature (2006, 9). In this vein, a part’s assertion of independence or self-subsistence from the whole potentially jeopardises the whole’s organic unity or constitutive relation (ibid.). In this regard, the organic organisation exhibits the relations of interiority. On the other hand, Delanda also brings up the “relations of exteriority” whereby a part can be detached from a whole and attached to another where it will have different interactions (ibid., 10–11; see also Delanda 2016, 10). In an organic organisation, a part’s relation with others cannot change unless the part itself changes. However, in the Body without Organs, “a relation may change without the terms changing” (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 55; cited in Delanda 2006, 11). A Body without Organs can encourage actively exercising the parts’ creative capacities to relate with others. (Delanda 2006, 11).

\textsuperscript{41} What “becoming-woman, becoming-child, becoming-animal, becoming-molecule, and, finally, becoming imperceptible” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 275) have in common is, rather than a return to some pre-signifying state, they suggest an escape from what they are supposed to be (Adkins 2015, 118). In this regard, Deleuze and Guattari state “You never reach the Body without Organs, you can’t reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit” (1987, 166, see also 150).
The Body without Organs inflicts no essence and can render each constituent significant in itself because such a body is in a constant state of becoming. The concept of becoming, implying the ultimate unfixability of the body, is significant for imagining the Body without Organs. According to Stivale’s interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari, becoming does not demand answers to where one started, how one progressed, and where one ended (2011, 118). Instead, becoming indicates one is “always in the middle” and in-between as it spreads, grows, occupies, infects, and populates (Deleuze and Guattari 2005 [1980], 293). Hence, becoming implies a dynamism that attempts to escape any initial state, essence, or interpretive centre. In a feminist reading of Deleuze, Claire Colebrook writes that becoming can be read “not as the becoming of some subject, but a becoming towards others, a becoming towards difference, and a becoming through new questions”, removing man and human as the interpretive centre (2000, 12). Then, as Žukauskaitė points out, the human body potentially exhibits a variety of dimensions without necessarily being consumed by a higher dimension (Žukauskaitė 2017, 252). Žukauskaitė points to the possibility that bodily existence is complete or significant in itself and coexists with other forms of existence non-hierarchically. In other words, through the Body without Organs, every constituent is always something other than what one thinks and rejects transcendent and universal organising principles. In the first analysis (Chapter 6), I argue that South Korean conscientious objectors tap into the inchoateness and disorganisation of the Body without Organs for new connections and syntheses necessary for reimagining the human body (Herzogenrath 2010, 27) and the security of political communities.

To sum up this section, for reimagining the human body, especially regarding the relationship between the parts and the whole, I have brought up the Body without Organs as a counter to the organic organisation. The Body without Organs is significant for my dissertation because, as a constitutional logic that counters the typical organic organisation, it shows how to reimage the bodies and political communities. The resistant potential of the Body without Organs lies in that it recognises, first, that every individual (or fragment) coexists with other individuals non-hierarchically and, second, that every individual is complete in itself. A differently organised body may also relate to others differently. Such recognition is the premise of reading the research materials produced by the conscientious objectors themselves in Chapter 6. However, the relationship between the part and
the whole, signified by different organisations of the human body, is not the only one that frames both imagining the human body and national security. I also suggest that the relationship between the self and the other imagines the human body and national security. In particular, the human body’s ‘immunological self’, as a boundary maintenance problem, is constantly ‘haunted’ by other bodies. In this regard, I proceed to discuss immunity.

3.2 Immunity: the relationship between the self and the other

I discuss the second concept that frames my understanding and representation of both individual and collective bodies: immunity. Discussing immunity is significant for my study on ‘how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security’ because immunity deals with the relationship between the self and the other. In particular, I apply this relationship to imagining and reimagining the security of the individual and the collective bodies.

Through the birth of modern immunology, therapeutic practice for an individual human body and the political order of a collective body have come to overlap (Esposito, Campbell, Paparcone 2006, 50; Campbell 2006, 5). Roberto Esposito claims that the collective body called ‘community’ is premised on the ‘immunity’ of the human body (Esposito 2013, 342). For example, to become an object of politics, life needed to be isolated and confined within increasingly segregated environments, which aimed to protect it from any influences originating from society (ibid.). In other words, Esposito depicts a conflict between the ‘im’ (negative) and the ‘com’ (togetherness). The ‘immunity’ strives to preserve the concrete and discernible ‘self’ dwelling amongst others. However, life is enabled through existing amongst others in the ‘community’ (ibid.), which accompanies a proliferation of meanings through interactions with others. Hence, building on Esposito, I propose two contrasting pictures of immunity in this section. The first is xenophobic immunity, and the second is xenophilic immunity. I will describe the two pictures in turn through the following two sections.
The premise of this section is that the human body is a social imagination, and so is immunity. Hence, in my dissertation, I follow Donna Haraway’s depiction of immunity as “a diagram of relationships and a guide for action in the face of questions about the boundaries of the self and about mortality” (2013[1991], 286).

In other words, immunity designates the constraints and the possibility of engaging with the world through one’s body. As a result, immunity frames the relationship between the self and the other. For example, immunity imagines where the self ends and where the other begins. As Roberto Esposito suggests in Immunitas, immunity is a dynamic self-identification system that continuously generates self and non-self entities. (2011, 169). Also, according to Haraway, in a semiotic body, a disease, supposedly from the outside, becomes “an information malfunction or communications pathology” (2013 [1991], 283; see also Sontag 1990, 114). In other words, the discourse of the immune system has transformed the biomedical body into the semiotic body. This point is significant for my study because alternative semiotisations of immunity, which can reimagine the boundary dividing the self and the invasive other, convey the political potential to disrupt people’s extant sense of the self or identity. Then, maintaining individual identity becomes a carefully calibrated political operation. In other words, as a framework that distinguishes the self from the non-self is ‘semiotised’, the boundary of a supposedly independent self becomes more unstable and open to reimagining.

I propose two contrasting pictures of immunity: xenophobic immunity and xenophilic immunity. In the first section 3.2.1, I discuss xenophobic immunity. The hegemonic image of the immune system has been xenophobic: military defence and policing of the self against the invasive non-selves from the outside (see Cohen 2012; Anderson 2014; Martin 1990). Xenophobic immunity pictures the maintenance of rigid and absolute boundaries between existing bodies. In the second section 3.2.2, I discuss xenophilic immunity. I concur with Esposito (2011) and Napier (2012; 2013; 2015; 2017), who suggest that immunity need not be represented solely as a battlefield between immune cells and antigens. Immunity can be xenophilic because it is also about actively exploring the otherness amongst which one lives and creatively engaging with differences to transform oneself constantly. Hence, in my second analysis (Chapter 7), I juxtapose xenophobic immunity with xenophilic immunity. I show how xenophobic immunity thinking has imagined South Korean
national security and how South Korean conscientious objectors’ xenophilic immunity thinking can imagine national security differently.

3.2.1 Xenophobic immunity: identifying and eliminating the non-selves

I discuss xenophobic immunity. For epidemiology and immunology, the pervasive image of the human immune system has been xenophobic: military defence and policing of the self against the invasive others from the outside (see Waldby 1996; Cohen 2012; Martin 1990). Discussing xenophobic immunity is significant for my studies on ‘how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security’ because the popular imaginations on the relationship between the self and the other have presumed that the human body’s immunity is xenophobic. As a guide for identifying the self’s boundaries and relating with others, xenophobic immunity carries strong qualities that frame the security of individual and collective bodies (e.g., national security).

In particular, for reading the research materials in Chapter 7, I emphasise two ideas of xenophobic immunity that can inform the imaginations of both the individual and collective bodies. In Chapter 7, I read the research materials in light of these ideas. First, I emphasise that one’s body is always already given and identical to oneself. In other words, to live amongst other organisms, one needs a continued sense of the self and its proper boundary. Notably, this sense is the precondition for recognising any outside invasion. Second, I emphasise that the non-self which invades one’s body from the outside must be eliminated. In other words, unceasing violent battles between invaders and defenders are taking place at the boundary of my body. Hence, better defenders will ensure better health. I will proceed to discuss how xenophobic immunity came about and how it can imagine both the individual and collective bodies.

I begin with the origin of the idea of immunity and its implications. In A Body Worth Defending, Ed Cohen (2012) investigates how immunology influences the perception of both the human body and political entities. As Cohen states, when it comes to our existence as living beings alongside organisms of different sizes and scopes,
immunity and defence are not the images that easily come into mind (ibid., 67). According to Cohen, the concepts of both immunity and defence derive from Western legal and political thinking. Around 125 years ago, biomedicine fused the two concepts, reading biological ‘immunity’ as an organism’s active defence process. Cohen writes that the fusion changed forever how people imagine what it means to be an organism living amongst other myriad organisms (ibid., 68).

Cohen states that the modern body proffers a proper and proprietary body whose well-boundedness grounds an individual’s legal and political rights (2012, 71; see also Macpherson 1962). Similarly, Esposito writes that such a body is a spatial object safeguarded by solid genetic barriers. (2011, 159). I suggest that the immunity which Cohen and Esposito are referring to is xenophobic immunity, which depicts the body as always already given and identical to oneself. Xenophobic immunity prioritises the maintenance of absolute boundaries between bodies because health, in this context, means the maintenance of the self’s integrity against the non-self. In other words, the body must remain bound from other bodies to avoid falling ill. The advent of xenophobic immunity has framed life as a heated battle to maintain ‘integrity’ (Cohen 2012, 72). I point out that the assumption of the human body as tightly bounded parallels Le Breton and McPhail’s (1991, 89) account of how one’s body has become one’s own property. According to Le Breton and McPhail, in traditional communities, one’s body could not be separated from one’s surroundings. Humans were not the masters of nature. As a part of nature, the human body must harmonise with nature. However, in the modern age, as individuals have become separate individual entities, the human body has become property—hence, ‘my body’. Le Breton and McPhail states that modern societies represent the individual as a ‘stable datum’: autonomous in making choices, cut off from nature so that no accidental ‘metamorphoses’ are possible, and securely encased in ‘one’s own’ body (ibid.). Now, the body signifies the boundary of a subject, sharply articulating where the ‘self’ ends and the ‘other’ begins. I suggest erecting the boundary of one’s body, and identifying the self, is also one of immunity’s primary concerns. This process is

42 According to Cohen, the concept of immunity dates back to the Roman era. Originally, immunity exclusively referred to special rights and benefits given to individuals or groups that release them from their political duties and accountabilities (Cohen 2012, 40).
43 Cohen also points out that ‘self-defence’ is also originally a political concept. 350 years ago, during the English Civil War, Thomas Hobbes designated ‘self-defence’ as the first ‘natural right’ (Cohen 2012, 68).
significant because it identifies the self as already existing and identical to the self’s body.

Also, regarding the bounded and already-existing self, Emily Martin indicates that the body’s policing actions against the non-selves can performatively construct such self (1990, 414). Mainly, Martin brings up the image of the “body as a police state” (ibid., 412), which demands that every body cell carries ‘proof of identity’ to identify ‘native residents’ against ‘intruders’ (Martin 1990, 411-12). According to Lennart Nilsson, a medical photographer whom Martin quotes, such proof is “a special arrangement of protein molecules on the exterior…these constitute the cell’s identity papers, protecting it against the body’s own police force, the immune system” (Nilsson 1987, 21, cited in Martin 1990, 412). Nilsson suggests distinguishing between the ‘natives’ and ‘illegal aliens’ is the fundamental function of the body’s self-defence (ibid.). Martin argues that this image promotes the idea of rigid and absolute boundaries between the self and the non-selves (Martin 1990, 414).

Notably, the policing body believes that, without the distinction between the self and the non-self, one becomes a ‘premodern’ body that is difficult to recognise or identify (ibid.). In *Rabelais and His World*, Mikhail Bakhtin depicts a grotesque body not isolated from the surrounding environment. Such a body is not a self-contained, finalised entity; instead, it is incomplete, constantly expanding beyond its boundaries. The grotesque body is also continuously developing and evolving, never truly finished (Bakhtin 1984 [1965], 26; see also Cohen 2012, 71). For example, Bakhtin writes that grotesqueness lies in two bodies being present in one body, such as “the pregnant and begetting body” (1984 [1965], 26). From the perspective of xenophobic immunity that presumes a definable self, the grotesque body is chaotic, imperceptible, and even threatening. Then, in contrast to the “grotesque body”, in his study on possessive individualism, C.B. Macpherson depicts the modern body as one that propounds a proper and proprietary body, a well-bounded property. The modern body sets up “possessive individualism”, whose essential characteristic is voluntarily entering into relations with others (Macpherson 1962, 263; see also Cohen 2012, 71). In other words, the modern body’s possessive individualism refuses to recognise that it may be ontological to one’s existence and that one inevitably lives amongst others. Hence, I suggest that blaming certain groups for spreading certain diseases exhibits possessive individualism.
Moreover, such blaming produces the ‘general’ population, an already-existing body politic in jeopardy. For example, the early days of the HIV/AIDS crisis in the United States showed how the policing body produced an already-existing body of the general population. Campbell states that the allocation of the ‘AIDS risk categories’ simultaneously reproduced the identities of and cultural violence against homosexuals, haemophiliacs, prostitutes, Africans, Haitians, heroin addicts, and women (Campbell 2000 [1992], 59). Campbell suggests that ‘inflicting’ the risk categories on these groups eventually produced ‘the middle and upper-middle class heterosexual white male’ as the ‘general population’ in the United States (ibid.; see also Waldby 1996, 79; Treichler 1987, 35; Sontag 1990). Catherine Waldby writes that such categorisation can encourage ‘legitimate’ violence and the suspension of civil rights against those in the ‘risk categories’ in the name of medical responses and science (1996, 4). In this regard, I discuss the second quality of xenophobic immunity: militarised response to aggression from the outside.

According to Cohen, xenophobic immunity reduced the complex but indispensable intimacy between an organism and its environment “to a single salient type of engagement: aggression/response” (2012, 69). In other words, xenophobic immunity imagines the individual body as the space where the struggle for survival at the cellular level (disease) occurs. Many microbial agents, amongst which an organism must live, become the inimical causes of ceaseless war and death (ibid.). Also, Emily Martin (1990) depicts an image of xenophobic immunity similar to Cohen’s. The image is the body as a battlefield where endless battles between ruthless invaders (microorganisms) and determined defenders (immune cells) take place (ibid., 411–12). For example, Nilsson suggests that a site of injury becomes a ‘battlefield’ where the body’s ‘armed forces’ crush and annihilate the encroaching microorganisms (Nilsson 1987, 20; cited in Martin 1990, 411). Such is the basic idea about the immune system, which is considered scientific. For example, the United States Health and Human Services website’s “Vaccines Protect You” section states,

The immune system is a network of cells, tissues, and organs that work together to defend the body from harmful germs. When bacteria, viruses, and other germs invade your body, they multiply and attack. This invasion is called an infection. Infections cause the diseases that make you sick. Your immune system protects you from the disease by fighting off the invading germs. (Office of Infectious Disease and HIV/AIDS Policy 2022)
This direct quote describes a scientific fact, despite that an image of a battlefield might come into the reader’s mind. However, as Warwick Anderson points out in his writing on the ‘culture’ of immunology, representations of immunity can travel between biological science and social theory (2014, 607). In *AIDS and Body Politic*, Waldby writes that warfare analogies such as an attack, retreat, triumph, defeat, infiltration, and the like are employed to depict the workings of the virus at all levels of magnitude, ranging from the minuscule to the societal and national levels (1996, 1). For my study, I highlight that such xenophobic immunity imagining is essential to imagining both the human body and political communities’ security.

For my study on ‘how reimagining the human body can also reimagine the security of political communities’, I emphasise that epidemiology’s imagining of the individual body as a battlefield has also framed the imagination of collective bodies. For example, representing a state as a body allows the representation of threats to the state as bodily ailments, contagions, or cancers, and vice versa. Such threats often become existential threats that jeopardise the ‘life’ of the state (Sontag 1990 [1978], 72–87; Campbell 2000 [1992], 59; Waldby 1996, 81–85; see also Wald 2008; Elbe 2006). Mark Neocleous points out that to describe a social or political phenomenon as a ‘cancer’ or ‘plague’ is an incitement to both symbolic and physical violence (2001, 36). Such descriptions aim to recognise the ‘disease’ and violently expel it from the body politic. In addition, explaining the proliferation of warfare analogies during the HIV and AIDS epidemic, Lee Edelman parallels the military’s defence against an outside invasion and the human body’s responses to the disease. Edelman states that, as AIDS targets the body’s immune system, people and communities have tried to safeguard themselves, frequently resorting to dreadful acts of aggression to prevent any association with the disease (1994, 81). I concur with Edelman’s idea that such a militarised idea of the immune system becomes a frame for representing bodies as susceptible to external threats. In other words, as an infectious disease becomes a socio-political threat, a body politic is produced through violence against those suffering. However, simultaneously, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases suggest that the boundary of the self is never straightforward. The unclear boundary can further fuel the anxiety over boundary maintenance, inviting internal policing.

In this sub-section 3.2.1, I have discussed how the human immune system has been confined to the violent defence of the already-existing self against invasive foreign
agents. I organised my discussion around two qualities of xenophobic immunity. First, one’s body is already given and identical to oneself. Second, the non-self which invades one’s body from the outside must be eliminated. In Chapter 7, I read the research materials in light of the abovementioned qualities. As the above paragraph points out, xenophobic immunity carries strong qualities that have framed popular images of both the security of the individual body and the collective body (e.g., national security). Therefore, discussing the popular imagery of xenophobic immunity is significant for reimagining the human body and national security. However, xenophilic immunity also attends to how humans arrange their openings towards the outside. In this regard, Esposito points out that politics today has increasingly become biopolitics. In particular, Esposito suggests two contrasting tendencies of “the self-destructive revolt of immunity against itself or an opening to its converse, community” (2013, 343). Following Esposito’s juxtaposition of immunity with community, I also discuss xenophilic immunity as a counter to xenophobic immunity.

3.2.2 Xenophilic immunity: actively engaging the different and unknown

In the second section, I discuss xenophilic immunity. I study if the pervasive image of immunity can be more oriented towards tolerating and embracing the external other. I build my discussion on Esposito (2011)’s *Immunitas* and a novel take on the immune system by a medical anthropologist, A. David Napier. Napier states that the immune system is xenophilic; it is about defending the self, exploring otherness, and creatively engaging with differences to transform the self (Napier 2012; 2013; 2015; 2017). Discussing xenophilic immunity is significant for my studies on ‘how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security’ because the xenophobic immunity model only partially describes the immune system.

Significantly, xenophilic immunity carries ideas that can reimagine the security of the individual and collective bodies (e.g., national security). Through this section, I highlight two ideas through which I read the research materials in Chapter 7. First, that the body must live amongst others is ontological to the body’s existence. In
other words, one’s body is not simply given to oneself; the body must actively engage
the unknown. Second, through actively engaging others, one constantly becomes
something else. Building on Deleuze and Guattari (2005 [1980])’s concept of
‘becoming’, I suggest that immunity tends towards no particular goal or end state
other than transforming itself. Through the two ideas, I emphasise that xenophilic
immunity is an alternative guide for action on identifying the boundaries of the self
and relating with others.

Esposito raises the question of ‘acquired immune tolerance’ (a positive recognition
of the “non-self”), which can disrupt the pre-existing, proper, and proprietary body.
One can naturally acquire or artificially induce immune tolerance towards specific
allergens or microbes during life. Thus, the immune system can be actually ‘taught’
to recognise the cells of another body and still be unresponsive to them. Esposito
states that if tolerance is innate to the immune system, it actively incorporates the
other/non-self rather than simply rejecting it (2011, 167). In other words, a thriving
immune system successfully incorporates otherness. One’s immune system cannot
be only about erecting and policing boundaries around one’s body if the immune
system is constantly (ex)changing with and adapting to its surroundings throughout
life. Then, the fact that one lives amongst others is already ontological to one’s
existence. Jean-Luc Nancy states that “being is ontologically ‘with-being’—it is what
we all have in-common” (2000, 34–35). Esposito claims that the fundamental
condition of politics is that life is multitudinal, dwelling amongst others in the
togetherness of “community” (2013, 84). Hence, the co-constitution of the self and
non-self is inevitable.

Napier (2017) lists similar problems with the xenophobic immunity model. These
problems particularly challenge the foundational assumptions of the pre-existing,
proper and proprietary ‘my body’ of modernity. One problem that disrupts the pre-
existing, proper, and proprietary body is known as the “Evolutionary Paradox” (see
Silverstein 1989). The human body constantly produces a massive amount of
random ‘mutant’ immune cells (Napier 2017, 73–74; see also Silverstein 1989).
According to the theory of natural selection, this is a surprisingly inefficient and
superfluous activity because it seems that such random ‘mutant’ cells have no
potential application beyond the prospect of interacting with some or non-existent
stimulus or antigen (Napier 2017, 75). Napier also lists a similar problem with the
proprietary body, the “Repertoire Paradox”. Some organisms survive with very limited antibodies. In contrast, others fail to survive even with a considerable amount of antibodies (ibid., 75). This paradox reveals that survival depends less on erecting solid boundaries than efficiently engaging the surrounding that contains the unknown.

Napier also suggests that the immune system is as much “a search engine of difference” as a defence mechanism (Napier 2012, 133; 2017, 78; see also Anderson and Mackay 2014). The immune system ceaselessly searches for and absorbs new information, transforming the immune system’s ‘libraries’ of microbial and viral information. For example, Napier notes how the immune system interacts with viruses, potentially dangerous information which cells capture and bring to life (Napier 2017, 76). The immune system actively assimilates information, including viruses (ibid., 77). Therefore, the concept of a ‘viral invasion’ does not stand. Hence, Napier proposes that the immune system functions like a search engine so that the body can adapt and survive its ever-changing surroundings and not end up like an isolated tribe endangered by the common cold virus (Napier 2017, 76, 78). As such, Napier challenges xenophobic immunity’s cultural concept of a bounded, autonomous, and complete ‘self’ (2012, 124–25; see also Napier 2017).

Napier also points out that the immune system’s ‘search engine’ constantly transforms its evidence base— a ground, a collection of what is known, or an algorithm for informing the immune system’s decision-making (Napier 2017, 78). In other words, the grounds for defining the body’s boundaries are flexible because the immune system actively engages with the known environmental stimuli and, importantly, the unknown stimuli. Hence, the immune system must constantly change the search algorithms for antigens (ibid.). Then, changing the search algorithms would also change the ‘scenery’ in which the body stands because a different lens can reveal different modes of existence. Napier suggests that survival is more than subsisting in Darwin’s jungle; it means recognising that the environment one dwells in constitutes one’s future (ibid., 75). In this respect, engaging with the surrounding requires one to recognise differences as they are. From a Deleuzian perspective, differences constitute the world (May 2005, 114). Patty Sotirin, commenting on Deleuze’s “positive ontology”, suggests that recognising the need to affirm differences is a radical affirmation of possibilities imperceivable in familiar
logical or moralistic terms (2011, 117). Such recognition requires engaging in daring endeavours and trying new things out in ways that testify to the liveliness, vigour, and imaginative spark of existence (ibid.). In this regard, xenophilic immunity hints that a surviving and thriving life dares to engage the unknown and transform the self.

On the transformation, I bring up Esposito’s claim that the body is never complete but always the self in the process, the self-to-come, or the becoming-self because the body constantly interacts with its surroundings (2011, 17). In this regard, xenophilic immunity is in a constant state of what Deleuze and Guattari (see also Colebrook 2000, 12) call becoming. To reiterate, becoming rejects the thinking that presumes a fixed being that undergoes a becoming; becoming does not have a fixed start and end but is always in the middle or between. As a ‘search engine of difference’ that does not aim for any particular end state, I suggest that one’s immunity’s engagement with one’s surroundings is becoming. Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 248; see also Stagoll 2010, 26; Colebrook 2002, xx; Stivale 2011, 116-17) suggest that becoming demands a continuous travelling back and forth to resist linear cause-effect explanations. Then, the self that actively engages the unknown and undergoes becomings can become incomprehensible through the existing categories.

Overall, the above discussion on xenophilic immunity suggests two things about the immune system that also challenge the idea of xenophobic immunity. The first is recognising that living amongst others is ontological to one existence. The second is that through actively engaging others, one constantly becomes something else. In Chapter 7, I read the research materials through those two ideas. Napier considers the political potential of immunity as present-day human interactions are primarily understood and interpreted through the lens of immunological concepts (2003, 3). In this regard, xenophilic immunity is significant for my study of how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security because proposing alternative representations of immunity can reimagine the security of a body politic. For example, Napier points out that the most common and detrimental everyday immunological representations of far-right politics include that foreigners (e.g., refugees and immigrants) are invasive carriers of diseases that will undermine the

44 I discuss the becoming in 3.2.2.
45 This fixed being, in Western thought, has often been a privileged and grounding position of the man or a stable knower/subject (Colebrook 2002, xx).
integrity of the existing ways of life (2017, 60). I suggest that xenophilic immunity resists such xenophobic representations of the non-selves because xenophilic immunity can give voice to those that testify to the unboundedness and contingency of boundaries. They include the dissident experiences of migrants, disabled people, patients carrying life-long diseases, and the like. Therefore, as a counter to xenophobic immunity, xenophilic immunity is a powerful way to motivate one to reimagine a body politic’s relationship with the threatening ‘non-selves’ such as South Korean conscientious objectors in my dissertation.

Summary

Through this chapter, I have argued that the human body can frame the imaginations of national security in light of organisation and immunity. I have focused on the body’s qualities of organisation and immunity because they frame the imaginings of individual and collective bodies. In this regard, I have demonstrated how people have imagined a political community or collective body, such as the state, through the human body.

I have shown how organisation and immunity, the qualities of the human body, are significant for imagining and reimagining national security. I have discussed how people have conventionally imagined the human body, especially its organisation (e.g., how the parts are related to the whole or the organ deemed most vital) and immunity (e.g., how an individual body relates to other bodies). Then, I have discussed how organisation and immunity can be imagined differently. Particularly, in 3.1, I juxtaposed organic organisation, a more conventional image of the bodily organisation, with what Deleuze and Guattari (2005 [1980]) termed the Body without Organs. Also, in 3.2, I juxtaposed xenophobic immunity, a more conventional image of immunity, with xenophilic immunity, a novel take by A. David Napier. In this regard, I have suggested that reimagining the body’s organisation and immunity can open up alternative modes for reimagining the politics of national security.

So far, I have primarily focused on the conceptual aspect of imagining the human body. However, as I discussed in the introduction (Chapter 1), imagination
synthesises the sensate and the conceptual, a view shared by Aristotle, Kant, Hobbes, and Husserl (Sparks et al. 2022, 3; see also Elliott 2005, 7; Devetak 2005, 622). Hence, I should also consider the sensate or the untextualisable aspect of imagining and reimagining the human body. In this regard, I bring up affect. Affect is the transpersonal intensity that occurs through encounters of bodies and binds bodies together (Solomon 2017). Therefore, in the next chapter, I discuss how imagining the human body is an affective process.
In the previous chapter, I showed how reimagining the human body’s organisation and immunity can also reimagine national security. However, imagination is not only conceptual but also affective. Therefore, in this chapter, I aim to show that imagining the human body is an affective process. Occurring from encounters of bodies (Gregg and Seigworth 2010, 1), affect comprises the sensate and undetermined aspects of experiences. In this regard, affect is a prime political object that reinforces or contests certain discourses and identities (see section 4.1; see also Solomon 2017; 2012; 2014; Massumi 2015, ix).

Hence, in this chapter, I argue that imagining the familiar and sensible human body involves the capture of affect, and reimagining the body anew involves the flight of affect. Therefore, I emphasise two competing moves. The first is the capture of affect, and the second is the flight of affect. The capture of affect occurs when people reduce an affective experience into familiar concepts without much questioning (Massumi 2002, 34, 87-89), solidifying the existing discourses and identities (see Dawney 2019, 2; Solomon 2012, 913). However, experiences escape from being completely determined through language. Therefore, something always escapes the capture by familiar concepts and haunts the subject like a distant ‘background noise’ (Massumi 2002, 35; Shin Jin-Sook 2018, 397; see also Deleuze 2003 [1981], 56-57). Recognising the ‘background noise’ is the flight of affect.

In the second section 4.1, I highlight affect’s bodily, unfixed, social, and political qualities. I emphasise that such qualities make affect an object of capture by politics that can reinforce or contest certain discourses and identities. Then, I discuss the capture and the flight of affect. In the third section 4.2, I consider examples of how certain bodies can prompt the capture or flight of affect. I bring up the ‘beautiful body’, which captures affect, and the ‘extreme body’, which flees the capture, to emphasise that representing a body is an affective process. The ‘beautiful body’ is a
dominant institution that exhibits qualities that instantly make sense because they employ familiar aesthetic sensibilities (see Xian 2015). In contrast, the ‘extreme body’ forces the viewers to wander about in sensation and thwarts their attempt to make immediate sense of whatever is represented. On how an extreme body can be affective, I bring up the violence of sensation. According to Deleuze, an object’s violence of sensation directly hits the viewers’ nerves, disrupting their attempt to make sense of the object and the self (Deleuze 2003, x; see also Sylvester 1987, 46; Arya 2009, 150). I conclude the chapter with suggestions for how affect can also reimagine the body politic.

4.1 Affective politics: solidifying or disrupting discourses and identities

I start this section by identifying the bodily, unfixed, social, and political qualities of affect. Discussing these qualities is significant for reimagining the human body because they indicate that affect is the undetermined aspect of experiences and beyond conceptual representation. In particular, politics will try to capture affective experiences to reinforce or contest certain discourses and identities (Solomon 2017, 936). However, such qualities also imply that affect, the undetermined or unfixed aspect of the experience, conveys the potential to resist such capture. Hence, I also discuss the capture (see 4.1.1) and flight (see 4.1.2) of affect.

First, Massumi underscores that affect is fundamentally bodily. Throughout his discussion on the politics of affect, Massumi employs the Spinozian perspective on affect as the bodily capacities to affect and to be affected (2015, ix). Massumi underlines that for both Spinoza and him, affect is fundamentally about sensing bodies in movement and their potential to accomplish something (ibid., 7). Additionally, Massumi suggests that if one affects something, one also makes oneself susceptible to being affected in return, but in a somewhat altered manner than one did previously (ibid., 4). Then, affect is politically significant because it is bodies’

46 Spinoza defined affect as ‘increases or decreases in a body’s vital force occurring when the body encounters other bodies’ (see Spinoza 2012, 158).
changing potential to become something else; such potential, too, changes through interacting with others. Here, the body is not a monolithic unit but a composition of numerous other bodies which affect and are affected by other bodies (Solomon 2017, 941). In this regard, the affective experiences are unfixed.

Second, Massumi emphasises the unfixed quality of affect as he argues that the body’s capacity to affect and to be affected is not fixed (Massumi 2015, 4). Instead, affect is the ongoing movements among bodies, and there are uncountable ways for how such movements can occur (ibid., 5). Notably, a comparison with emotion effectively highlights the unfixed quality of affect. On the one hand, while discussing Bacon’s paintings, Deleuze states that affect is the “sensations and instincts” at a particular moment that are yet to be processed (2003 [1981], 89; see also Shaviro 2010, 3; Shapiro 2013, 15). Similarly, Jack Holland and Ty Solomon suggest that affect is the “initial component” of experience, a physiological reaction to a situation mediated by the body, brain, and cultural background (2014, 264). On the other hand, Massumi suggests that emotion is the quality of experience which language has captured or the signified and narrativised intensities (Massumi 2002, 28). Hence, emotion reflects only a noticeable part of one’s experience, just as conscious thoughts cannot incorporate every unthought aspect of one’s experience (Massumi 2002, 5; see also Holland and Solomon 2014, 264). Simply put, as the emotional reduces and categorises, the affective confuses and surprises. The unfixed quality of affect is politically significant because, through such quality, affect becomes the object of politics that attempts to capture affective experiences into particular identities or discourses. However, the unfixed quality of affect conveys the potential to resist such politics.

Third, affect is not a private phenomenon but a social phenomenon. According to Massumi, one gets involved in a process that extends beyond one’s capacities as one affects and is affected by others (2015, 6). Similarly, Seigworth and Gregg suggest that a body extends beyond the individual by transmitting affect or intensities to other bodies (2010, 1). As a result of the transmission of affect, the affected bodies can become alike or aligned, even in terms of nervous or hormonal systems (Brennan 2004, 9). For example, on how nationalism operates affectively, Angharad Closs Stephens brings up the unity felt in a stadium or concert hall, where people sing as a group and sense the energy that flows between their bodies (2015, 182). Hence,
affective processes can exceed individual subjects and operate even at a social or national level. In this regard, the social aspect of affect is significant for reimagining the body politic. Overall, affect arises through encounters of bodies and moves through bodies, capable of influencing even larger groups. Next, I will discuss the political aspect of affect.

Last, affect’s bodily, unfixed, and social qualities suggest that affect is political. Massumi claims that affect, as bodies’ potential to transform itself, indicates freedom; people can expand their freedom/potential by implementing small, feasible, experimental, and strategic actions to broaden their emotional and mental flexibility (2015, 5-6). This point hints that affect can solidify certain discourses and identities and provides the opportunity for their contestation or undoing (see Solomon 2017, 936). For example, Solomon uses the concept ‘affective investment’ to describe how dominant discourses or identities are endowed with solid resonances (2014, 729; see also Laclau 2005, 110; Ross 2006, 210). However, the abovementioned studies also indicate that affect is unfixed potential, which can disrupt the politics of harnessing this potential in specific ways and for particular interests. Therefore, in Chapter 8, I analyse the double-move of affect: the capture of affect as imagining certain bodies and the flight of affect as reimagining the bodies. In this way, I can critically examine the process of ‘making sense’ of certain political discourses or identities through the human body. Overall, affect is unfixed, primarily about body, social, and political in ways that solidify or disrupt collectives, discourses, and identities. Regarding the last point that affect is political, I discuss the flight of affect and the capture of affect in more detail.

4.1.1 The capture of affect: reducing experiences into familiar concepts

I discuss the politics that attempts to capture affect. How one is affected is inseparable from the dominant modes of representation (Anderson 2014, 14; Ahmed 2014, 7). For example, through portraying heroic images of soldiers, states have attempted to control the disruptive and excessive potential arising from the ‘unruly’ and visceral wounded, broken, or dead bodies (see Coleman 2009; Achter 2010;
Dawney 2019). Affect has been the object of politics or devices that interpellate the public into a particular relation with the collective body or identity.

Importantly, affect is captured as soon as it is incited among bodies. Experiencing the military (e.g., through conscription) and national security (e.g., the risk of a war) can be intensely affective. In the immediate aftermath of such an experience, one is usually left with chaotic and indescribable feelings. Initially, those feelings are still to be subsumed under any order. However, with the flow of time, abstraction and narrativisation take over to make sense of things, and this process also applies to the broader population. In other words, when an affect-promoting event (e.g., a military conflict or a securitising event) occurs, the military or national security politics of affect attempts to capture, reduce, and explain away the visceral experience into certain emotions and narratives (see Hutchison 2013). The differences in individual experiences fade and eventually vanish. Then, an individual is often left with a discourse or an identity, a sense of one’s body’s place amongst other bodies.

I take a cue from studies that theorise the relationship between affect and political discourse regarding how affect can be captured. In the article “Glimpsing the Future”, Ernesto Laclau brings up ‘form’ and ‘force’ to consider why certain discourses and identities are more appealing than others (2004, 326). Laclau argues that focusing only on the ‘forms’ through which discourses structure identities cannot comprehend the whole picture whereby subjects attach themselves to certain discourses (ibid.). According to Laclau, there is the ‘force’ that endows certain discourses with resonance for the subjects (ibid.). Building on Laclau, Solomon proposes the concept of ‘affective investment’ to describe that, to convey the indescribable ‘appeal’, ‘resonances’, or the ‘force’, languages must be infused with affect (2014, 729). Hence, Holland and Solomon argue that discourse analyses should account for how the recurring labelling of certain emotions out of affective reactions to events is often a product of hegemonic discourses (2014, 265). For example, Holland and Solomon suggest that the visceral affective reactions of the American public in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, such as shock and horror, were not entirely natural and involuntary responses (ibid., 267). They point to the predominant ‘American security culture’ as a conditioning cultural context for the American public’s visceral responses to the 9/11 attacks. Through the security culture, the American public had inculcated and identified themselves with the core
assumptions, beliefs and values pertaining to security in the post-Cold-War America (ibid., 268). In my analysis, I also bring up the relevant aspects of the South Korean security culture that have conditioned people’s responses to affective events. In the context of my research, I demonstrate that the history of militarism and national security also has captured affect in South Korea. Since the militarising politics of affect also works culturally, I examine popular materials such as military entertainment shows.

In the first part of my third analysis (Chapter 8), I read the visual materials to represent the constitution of the South Korean body politic as an affect-capturing process. I particularly focus on the moment when differences vanish through abstraction. In this regard, I discuss how an individual’s affect arising through the collective experiences of military conscription is eventually captured or subsumed through certain emotions and narratives. Then, I suggest that such politics that capture affect imagines particular individual and collective bodies.

4.1.2 The flight of affect: something always escapes the capture

Following Massumi (2002; 2015)’s conceptualisation of affect as inherently unfixed and bodily, I bring up the flight of affect. In “The Autonomy of Affect”, Massumi states that affect escapes from being confined to a particular body or a subject (2002, 35). In other words, affect is the bodily capacity or the potential, which is indeterminable, unfixed, and exceeding individual bodies. If affect, which is inherently irrepresentable, is given a form or a quality, then the affect is captured. However, Massumi asserts that emotion, a result of the capture of affect, unavoidably indicates “that something [affect] has always and again escaped” (ibid., 35). Significantly, according to Massumi, even when affect is captured and reduced to certain emotions or national narratives, something always escapes at the moment of a capture; something that cannot be subsumed under the existing categories always occurs (ibid., 35–36).

I call this movement the flight of affect. Gregg and Seigworth indicate that the flight of affect can occur because the human body, from which the affective arises, is
viscerally prior to conceptualisation (2010, 1). Deleuze (2003) and Massumi (2002; 2015) underline that affect is the bodily capacity, potential, or intensity not merely subordinate to the conscious. Instead, affect ceaselessly produces differences, transitions, and new relationships or life forms. The flight of affect is significant for my study on reimagining bodies through affect because the flight highlights that, through affect, all experiences are potentially something else and that ideological structures and the system of signification cannot wholly decide the experience. Hence, the flight of affect can challenge the dominant imaginations of the human body and facilitate one’s reimagination of the body. In this respect, I structure my analysis of affective politics surrounding the South Korean military conscription (Chapter 8) through the capture of affect and the flight of affect. On the one hand, due to its ambiguous and undetermined qualities, affect is employed to reinforce existing identities or discourses (see Holland and Solomon 2014). This process is the capture of affect, which I discussed earlier. On the other hand, as I have stated in the previous section, affect, the inherently ambiguous and indeterminable potential of the human body that resists making sense of things, conveys the significant potential for challenging extant political structures: the flight of affect.

A notable work in this regard is Shin Jin-Sook (2018)’s study on the affective aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima disasters. The initial shock, fear, and confusion of the disasters suspended people’s ability to make sense of things. However, as the dust continued to settle, the Japanese society’s discourses and sentiments converged upon the heart-warming human stories and the nationalistic campaigns and reconstruction narratives (see also Massumi 2011). According to Shin, this move has limited the proliferation of the meanings and feelings the Fukushima disasters have inspired in different individuals. Mainly, the Japanese government, media, and mainstream society have rewritten the disasters through the well-known post-World War II discourse of reconstruction and development (Shin Jin-Sook 2018, 393).

However, according to Shin, even after attempting to make sense of the Fukushima disasters through narrativisation, the irrepresentable affect remained in the background. In other words, while the affect produced through Fukushima has been combined with certain consistent national narratives, the indistinct ‘noise’ that

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47 The Fukushima incident involved earthquake, tsunami, nuclear accident, and the ensuing chaos in the Japanese society.
deviates from such narratives has persisted (2018, 397). For example, Shin discusses the affect produced through the photos of the empty spaces of Fukushima, where the residents have fled from radioactive contamination. The viewers of the photos are affected by the portrayal of Fukushima’s abandoned spaces, where the original residents had to leave in a hurry. The viewers’ affect might be processed into specific emotions such as fears, anxieties, or horrors. However, such emotions are always accompanied by irrepresentable and heterogenous affects that continue to haunt the viewers who attempt to make sense of things and arrive at a closure (ibid., 400). Shin argues that the affect produced through Fukushima has not ceased “oscillating, vibrating, and overflowing” outside the narratives of humanism and nationalism (ibid., 399). In particular, according to Shin, in narrating Fukushima through the photos of the peaceful-but-radioactive no-go zones or the voices of the displaced people still in trauma, a certain depressing sensation remains like a “distant-but-certain noise” (ibid., 403). To not ignore such noise, often presented only sensually, is to attend to the feelings that cannot be represented through language. Such attention is an act against the capture of affect. In the last analysis (Chapter 8), I suggest that South Korean conscientious objectors’ films attempt similar flights of affect from the militarising narratives of peace and security depicted in the military reality shows.

Also referencing Fukushima, Massumi (2011) writes in his article on the “half-life of disasters” that if individuals can attend more carefully to their feelings and sensations, their capacity to affect and be affected can become freer from the grip of dominant discourses and identities. In particular, Massumi indicates that the aesthetic is a starting point for an alternative politics of affect by ‘carefully attending to feelings and sensations’. According to Ben Anderson, attending to the aesthetic can contribute to imagining the alternative politics that reclaim such capacities of affect (2009, 78). Similarly, Massumi (2015, 68) and Shin (2018, 399) also point out that the bodily capacity to affect and be affected by other bodies is activated through aesthetic objects and sensibilities. Affective experiences are aesthetic because the irrepresentable feelings and sensations produced through bodily encounters continue to flee from the extant emotions, concepts, and values. For example, by conveying the aesthetic qualities or the indeterminable, unfixable, ambiguous, and open-ended qualities of experiences, the photos or the stories of Fukushima are reconstituted as aesthetic objects. Ben Anderson also indicates that aesthetic forms
convey such irrepresentable feelings and produce an affective atmosphere, which is affective charging of spaces which exceed the bodies that emanate affect (2014, 79). In this regard, in my third analysis (in Chapter 8), when I interpret the films produced by the South Korean conscientious objectors, I attend to the moments of indeterminable, ambiguous, or ominous feelings as sources of a flight of affect. Through the conceptual interpretation of the films, I show how South Korean conscientious objectors propose the flight of affect from the state’s militarising narratives of conscription and national security.

So far, in this section 4.1, I have discussed the bodily, unfixed, social, and political qualities of affect. Highlighting the political potential of affect to solidify or disrupt discourses and identities, I have also discussed the capture of affect and the flight of affect. For my study on how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security, in Chapter 8, I discuss how imagining and reimagining the human body is an affective process involving the capture and the flight of affect. This leads to the question of how to deal with affective experiences. In this respect, in the next section 4.2, I discuss examples of how certain artworks, aesthetic objects that incite bodily sensations, bring out affective experiences. In particular, I discuss how the artistic representations of ‘extreme bodies’ can facilitate the flight of affect.

4.2 Affective representations of bodies: the ‘beautiful’ and the ‘extreme’

To reiterate, my objective of this chapter is to show that imagining and reimagining the human body are affective processes. In the previous section, I have framed the politics of affect through two competing moves: the capture of affect and the flight of affect. In this section 4.2, I consider examples of how certain bodies can be affective or how certain bodies are conducive to affective experiences. I bring up certain affective works of art on the human bodies (the extreme bodies in particular) because they can incite visceral bodily sensations, which are food for the flight of affect. On the artistic as a way of apprehending the world, Emmanuel Levinas writes in *Existence and Existent* that art reintroduces sensation so that one can escape the
realm of perception and intention and start “wandering about in sensation” (Levinas 2001, 53). Hence, art as an aesthetic object offers opportunities to be critical and reflective, to ‘wander about’ beyond existing concepts and into ambiguity, and to escape the clichés that reinforce the existing discourses and identities. In other words, such art incites the flight of affect to reimagine the world, including one’s own body. Therefore, I bring up examples of artworks engaging the human body that can facilitate the flight of affect.

Specifically, I juxtapose the beautiful body with the extreme body. The beautiful body is the dominant institution that exhibits qualities that easily make sense, employing familiar aesthetic sensibilities. Through the beautiful body, the viewers’ affect is captured and stabilised so that whatever is represented seems correct and agreeable. In contrast, the extreme body resists the beautiful body. The extreme body is sensational in ways that the viewers fail to make immediate sense of whatever is represented. Therefore, the extreme body can facilitate the flight of affect and encourages people to reimagine what is ideal for human bodies. Regarding my third analysis (Chapter 8), the juxtaposition of the beautiful body and the extreme body corresponds to the juxtaposition of the conventional bodily qualities (e.g., organic organisation, xenophobic immunity) with the alternative bodily qualities (e.g., the Body without Organs, xenophilic immunity).

Through examples, I also discuss how the extreme body can be affective. I refer to what Deleuze (2003, x) termed the ‘violence of sensation’ in his discussions of the painter Francis Bacon. The violence of sensation directly hits the viewers’ nerves and disrupts the beautiful bodies’ attempt to capture affect. According to Deleuze, the violence of sensation from Bacon’s extreme bodies hinders the affected subject’s attempt to narrate a coherent and sensible story. The violence of sensation also forces the paintings’ viewers to attempt interpretation on their own. The viewers reflect on their feelings and hunches, eventually reducing the distance between the seeing subject and the seen object. Such identification disrupts extant narratives of the self’s integrity (Deleuze 2003, x; see also Sylvester 1987, 46; Arya 2009, 150).
The extreme body is an attempt to construct reality anew against the dominant institution of the ‘beautiful body’. The extreme body, inciting sensations that affect those who come across it, is significant for my study on imagining bodies that facilitate the flight of affect. If the beautiful body, which fosters familiar aesthetic sensibilities, has imagined an extant body politic, then the extreme body, which fosters alternative aesthetic sensibilities, could have imagined a different body politic. I build on Zhou Xian (2015)’s work, which explores how, in modern art, the paradigm of the body has shifted from the beautiful body to the extreme body.

On the one hand, Xian writes that the concept of beauty in the West, from the Egyptian and Hellenic ages through the Renaissance and to the modern era, has offered a model for constituting an ideal body (2015, 147). Xian argues that the beautiful body has been widely accepted as the dominant institution in traditional art’s representation and paradigm of the human body (ibid., 146). In a Kantian sense, the beautiful body is the sensual body that ‘easily makes sense’, approaching generalisability, without particular pre-existing rules (ibid., 150; see also Kukla 2006, 13, 14; Wenzel 2005, 5). Similarly, in The Impossible Nude, François Jullien follows Augustine’s definition of beauty as having a form and being distinct (2019[2000], 88). Jullien suggests that the beauty of an object arises from having a form. According to Augustine, form reveals the beauty of an object by revealing the outline or boundary surrounding the matter, making the object distinct from others. In other words, for Augustine, beauty is the quality of being decided through a distinct form (ibid.). In this respect, Xian argues that although the beautiful body is self-explanatory, straightforward, and natural, it also obstructs the viewers’ contemplations about the body itself. Then, I suggest that the beautiful body resonates with the desire to correctly represent the ‘real’, discouraging one’s scepticism and wandering about in sensation. Alex Danchev and Debbie Lisle write that a predominant traditional tendency for approaching art has been to see art as merely illustrative of the ‘real’

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48 Roman Jakobson introduced the artistic component of the ‘dominant’, which specifies “the art of a particular epoch, viewed as a particular whole” (1981, 752). Jakobson asserts that it is against the dominant the remaining components are appraised. It is the dominant that ensures the coherence and completeness of the structure (ibid., 751).

49 Xian brings up examples of beautiful body from Greek sculptures such as Hermes and the Infant Dionysus and Venus de Milo, from the Renaissance such as Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa and Virgin of the Rocks, Michelangelo’s Creation of Adam and David and Raphael’s Three Graces and Sistine Madonna, and from the period of neoclassicism and formalism with works such as Ingres’ The Source and La Grande Odalisque and Courbet’s The Source and Woman with a Parrot (Xian 2015, 147).
world (2009, 777). Hence, the beautiful body satisfies the traditional tendency while eliminating viewers’ desire to reflect and probe their thoughts on their relations to the represented objects (Xian 2015, 158). I concur with Danchev and Lisle that art, especially modern art, has been experimenting with creative ways to convey aesthetic (including affective) experience rather than focusing solely on correctly representing the object.

In my last analysis (Chapter 8), I suggest that the examples of the beautiful body, the body that ‘easily makes sense’, include more conventional bodies that I discussed in the previous chapter on body politic (Chapter 3). In other words, the beautiful body can assume the organically organised body in which the head and the heart take priority over the other organs. The beautiful body can also assume xenophobic immunity, whose immune system only fights against invading microorganisms. The beautiful body that exhibits such qualities seems normal and sensible because they employ familiar aesthetic sensibility; the beautiful body exempts one from having to ‘wander about in sensation’ beyond existing concepts; the beautiful body captures affect and reinforces existing discourses and identities.

On the other hand, in the nineteenth century, modernist artists started representing extreme bodies, strange, deformed, and abstract bodies. Since then, the extreme body has been a popular mode of representing bodies (Xian 2015, 147; see also Steiner, 2001). The extreme body, according to Xian, is “a form of the body that is not beautiful, opposed to beauty, and overturns beauty” (ibid., 147). It encourages more open, varied, and complex interpretations (ibid., 148). Xian gives examples of extreme bodies from modern paintings. Salvador Dali’s Soft Construction with Boiled Beans (Premonition of Civil War) (1936) presents a strange human-like figure whose head, arm, and breast are weirdly fused (Xian 2015, 149); Amedeo Modigliani’s Reclining Nude (1917) depicts a deformed human figure expanded into abnormal proportions (ibid., 151); in Paul Klee’s Brother and Sister (1930), human figures are abstracted into geometric shapes (ibid., 153). Importantly, what is common to the extreme bodies is that they do not ‘easily make sense’; therefore, their sensational experiences refuse to fit easily into the pre-existing concepts and narratives about

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50 Due to word limitations, I cannot provide an overview of the discussion on how classical art strives to reproduce the eternally beautiful, while modern art resists the existing codes of beauty and sublime (see Adorno 2013 [1970]).
the human body. Hence, I add the ‘prostheticised body’ to a list of extreme bodies. According to Howard Caygill, the prostheticised body signals that life can be technically reorganised by matters originating from both the inside and outside of the body (1997, 51). An example of such a body is an Australian performance artist Stelarc’s performance, *Amplified Body, Laser Eyes, and Third Hand* (1986), which alters the body’s composition through a third ear, an extra hand, an extended arm, and spider-like exoskeleton legs. I claim that extreme bodies are significant because they can inspire the reimagining of one’s own body. Therefore, I suggest extreme bodies can potentially inspire a reimagined body politic.

As an example of how the extreme body is against the beautiful body, I also bring up Stelarc and Stahl Stenslie’s (2015) discussion on body suspension performances. During a body suspension performance, a human body is (or bodies are) rigged to hang from implements such as rings installed through temporary perforations through the skin. The performance is not simply about the ‘joy of pain’. The point of the performance is not to perceive that someone is hanging and in pain. According to Stelarc, the suspension performances convey the realisation that modifying the body’s architecture could potentially lead to modifications in its functioning and perception of the external environment (2015, 21). For example, in that moment of locally concentrated pain, the hierarchical organisation of the body (e.g., the structure of prioritised commanding rational mind and the secondary parts) has to rescind momentarily (ibid., 30). Also, through the perforated bodies rigged to hang in front of audiences, the usual relationship between the enclosed self and the foreign other (or between the supposedly enclosed bodies) is suspended (ibid., 24). Importantly, Stelarc’s descriptions of the suspension performances are not merely descriptions of what is happening. Rather, Stelarc implies that the overwhelming, palpable, indescribable, and chaotic sensations of becoming (and encountering) the extreme body can disrupt one’s familiar image of the self as a beautiful body. In other words, Stelarc implies that the violence of sensation, which I will describe in the following section, is taking place.

Regarding my dissertation, the *Body without Organs* and xenophobic immunity I discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 3) may comprise such extreme bodies. By making people ‘wander about in sensation’, the extreme bodies can incite non-
traditional aesthetic sensibilities; the extreme bodies inspire the flight of affect. I proceed to examples of how extreme bodies can incite the flight of affect.

Through examples, I discuss how the extreme body can prompt the flight of affect through the violence of sensation. During Stelarc’s suspension performance which I discussed in the above section, the performers and the audiences are affected by the perforated bodies in ways that almost violently disrupt their senses of bodily integrity (Stenslie 2015, 24). On a similar note, I bring up Deleuze (2003 [1981])’s discussion of how the paintings of Francis Bacon (1909–92) convey the violence of sensation. Bacon is significant because his paintings demonstrate how sensation works affectively. Deleuze claims that Bacon’s interest lies in conveying not the violent content but the violence of sensation, which is “a violence that is involved only with line and colour…a static or potential violence, a violence of reaction and expression” (ibid., x). Deleuze argues that what Bacon painted at the expense of representing objects is a sensation that directly hits the viewers’ nerves (2003 [1981], 45). Then, the painting refuses to narrate a coherent and sensible narrative. The familiar modes of representation or dominant discourses fail to capture affect.

On how the extreme body ‘hits the viewers’ nerves directly’ (Deleuze 2003 [1981], 37), I refer to Bacon’s famous Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion (1944). It is one of Bacon’s triptych paintings that depict deformed creatures in agony. People naturally recoil when facing the Three Studies, and Deleuze states that such internal stirrings signal the violence of sensation, “invisible forces that deform the flesh” (2003 [1981], x). Significantly, the Three Studies and Bacon’s many other paintings of deformed bodies/flesh refuse to be narrated or comprehended because, for example, ‘why this was done’ or ‘who did it’ cannot be deduced from the frame (Turk 2012, 30; Arya 2012, 87). In other words, the viewers, as subjects, fail to produce a coherent story about the viewed objects, the figures in Bacon’s paintings. Rather, as Rina Arya suggests, the viewer is left with nothing but oneself to deal with the painting and its sensations (Arya 2009, 157; Van Alphen 2016, 122). In other words, the viewer is suddenly forced to independently attempt an interpretation of the painting, reflecting on their feelings and hunches instead of referring to an interpretive centre. According to Arya, what Bacon probably wanted is that, when faced with the Three Studies, either the viewers are forced to place themselves at the centre of the interpretation or “they become the crucifiers” (2009, 149). In other
words, the extreme bodies in Bacon’s paintings reduce the distance between the seeing subject and the seen object. Since no other narrative easily occurs across the triptych, the viewer is forced to step in and be a part of the interpretation (Yates 1996, 24; cited in Arya 2009, 150).

How people approach the figures in Bacon’s paintings is also how I will approach the interpretation of visual materials produced by the conscientious objectors in Chapter 8. Instead of relying on a coherent and seemingly sensible interpretation of the objectors, I will attempt an interpretation on my own while focusing on my sensations and feelings from watching the visual materials and reflecting upon them through the human body.

To summarise this section 4.3, the extreme body and its violence of sensation are significant for considering how certain bodies can be affective. The extreme body affectively disrupt people’s pre-existing beliefs in the beautiful body. Hence, the human body is an affective imagination that conveys the potential to shape and reshape a body politic.

Summary

My objective in this chapter has been to show that imagining and reimagining the human body are affective processes. Affect, the bodily potential to affect and to be affected, is significant because it can reinforce or contest existing discourses and identities (Solomon 2017, 936). In the context of my dissertation, how individual bodies can be affectively reimagined becomes significant for reimagining the body politic.

Hence, my argument in this chapter has been that imagining and reimagining bodies are affective processes involving the capture of affect and the flight of affect. Particularly, I frame the politics of affect through two competing moves: first, the capture of affect, and second, the flight of affect. The idea that the human body is an affective imagination is significant for my study because, building on my previous discussion that the human body imagines the body politic, the politics of affect can
shape both the human body and body politic. After highlighting the bodily, unfixed, social, and political qualities of affect and discussing the capture and the flight (or escape) of affect, I have considered examples of how certain bodies can be affective. Mainly, I have shown that the extreme body and its violence of sensation can incite the flight of affect. They also frame how I approach the visual materials in Chapter 8.

The next chapter will discuss my research material and methodology (Chapter 5). Building on the previous two chapters, through my analysis, I aim to suggest alternative modes of imagining a body politic in the context of national security in South Korea. The alternative modes that can simultaneously frame imaginings of individual and collective bodies are organisation, immunity, and affect. Building on Michael Shapiro’s view on method, I refuse to reproduce the dominant frames for understanding and representing the world (Shapiro 2013, xv). Instead, I plan to demonstrate that reimagining the ideals of the human body can also reimagine the well-being of political communities, including national security.
5 RESEARCH METHOD: ENGAGING CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS AS AESTHETIC SUBJECTS

In Chapter 1, I stated my dissertation topic, “how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security”. In Chapter 2, I provided the context of my dissertation by discussing national security, military conscription, and conscientious objectors in South Korea. By weaving through these, I suggested that the conscientious objectors are significant for reimagining national security as they have resisted the state’s position as the foremost authority on the military and national security. In Chapter 3, I discussed how the human body is significant for imagining the body politic. In particular, I suggested that organisation and immunity are the human body’s qualities that can frame imaginations and reimaginations of individual and collective bodies. In Chapter 4, I discussed how imagining and reimagining the human body involve the capture and flight of affect. Also, I proposed that the beautiful body facilitates the capture of affect, and the extreme body facilitates the flight of affect. Building on the previous chapters, in this chapter, I aim to introduce the research material and the methodology for my analyses.

In this chapter, I suggest that South Korean conscientious objectors are aesthetic subjects who can reimagine South Korean national security. My methodology follows Michael Shapiro’s discussion of ‘thinking with aesthetic subjects’ in his 2013 book, *Studies in Trans-Disciplinary Method: After the Aesthetic Turn*. Shapiro suggests that, although people’s sensations are often profoundly affected by works of art, aesthetics does not have to be about art only. Shapiro (2013, 30) and others (see Eagleton 1990,13) point out that aesthetics originates from the Greek word *aisthitikos*, which indicates the sensory component of human perception. Hence, the aesthetic invokes sensations and sensibilities, which are often difficult to capture with familiar concepts and languages.
Significantly, Shapiro raises the need to engage subjects of political analyses as aesthetic subjects. According to Shapiro, the dominant mode of approaching subjects in politics has been premised on behavioural science, whose primary concern is to achieve cogency in explanations for specific human actions through reliable measurement and identifying and corroborating regularities (2013, 20). In contrast, Shapiro raises the need to challenge the institutionalised modes of understanding and representing phenomena through ‘thinking with aesthetic subjects’ (2013, xv; see also Seigworth and Gregg 2010, 11; Callahan 2020, 43). Shapiro’s thinking with aesthetic subjects does not stop at exposing and refusing to reproduce dominant frames of knowing. Shapiro’s engagement also aims to propose different frames of knowing (Shapiro 2013, xv; see also Shapiro 2013, 2). In other words, through thinking with aesthetic subjects, Shapiro focuses on creating spaces which disclose that the familiar ways of knowing are historically contingent and propose alternative ways of knowing the self and the world (Guattari 1995, 13; cited in Shapiro 2013, 9). In this regard, Shapiro suggests devising and applying alternative conceptual frames of knowing and producing juxtapositions that challenge the familiar ways of knowing (Shapiro 2013, xv).

Shapiro emphasises that aesthetic subjects can “articulate and mobilize thinking” (ibid., 11). For example, in terms of creative writing, aesthetic subjects are the characters whose existence, encounters, and engagements map the terrains where life occurs. The characters also sensately disclose that different ways of life are possible, potentially altering the lives of those who come across the characters (see Shapiro 2013, xiv, 11, 13). In my dissertation, I take South Korean conscientious objectors as aesthetic subjects because they can reveal and challenge the hegemonic modes of imagining national security. In particular, their textual and visual statements, which narrate their personal experiences, invoke disruptive sensations and sensibilities, sparking the understanding of the human body and national security from different lights.

In the next section, I discuss my analytic method for engaging or thinking with aesthetic subjects: devising concepts, reading the research materials through the concepts, and juxtaposing the readings. In the third section, I introduce my research materials and the methods to collect the materials. I read textual materials for the
5.1 Analytic method: disrupting the familiar modes of imagining the human body

For analyses, I read two types of materials. The first is the court and public’s narratives of or statements on the objectors. The second is the narratives or statements by the objectors themselves. Following Shapiro, my analysis is closer to a Foucauldian mode of interrogating statements, which is interpretive rather than explanatory (2013, 29). The objective of the interpretive method is neither empiricism’s establishing the validity and reliability of statements nor hermeneutics’ disclosure of a silent context of statements (ibid., 4). Hence, I am neither seeking to determine whether the South Korean state and conscientious objectors are right or wrong nor attempting to disclose the hidden context of the South Korean courts’ decisions and the objectors’ statements.

Following Shapiro, I develop and apply new concepts to read the research materials. According to Shapiro, a Foucauldian mode of interrogating statements should heed how the statements can raise “the question of power” (Shapiro 2013, 4; see also Foucault 1972, 120). And given that power is always power/knowledge for Foucault, raising the question of power should focus on avoiding the repetition of extant conceptualisations that has reproduced the old problematisations. Particularly, Shapiro suggests that such interrogation of statements should develop new concepts to understand statements anew (Shapiro 2013, 9). Devising new concepts would require the interrogator to take on new perspectives to see the ‘problems’ anew. To this end, I have turned to the body politic, likening political communities to human bodies.

I have identified organisation, immunity, and affect\(^{51}\) as lenses through which I read my research materials and challenge the institutionalised modes of understanding

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\(^{51}\) Organisation and immunity are premised on Chapter 3, while affect is premised on Chapter 4.
and representing national security. The first analysis (Chapter 6) aims to show how to reimagine the human body and national security in terms of bodily organisation. I read the textual materials through the ideas relevant to organic organisation and the Body without Organs. The second analysis (Chapter 7) aims to demonstrate how to reimagine the human body and national security in terms of immunity. I read the textual materials through the ideas on xenophobic immunity and xenophilic immunity. Through the first and second analyses, I show how the South Korean state has imagined national security through the human body and how South Korean conscientious objectors can reimagine national security through reimagining the human body.

The third analysis (Chapter 8) aims to show how imagining/representing the human body is an affective process involving the capture and flight of affect. I read the visual materials while considering if certain representations of human bodies can facilitate the capture or flight of affect. Affect is not a concept like organisation or immunity that directly frames the imagination of the body politic. However, for example, representing soldiers’ bodies, which captures affect or easily makes sense, may solidify the idea that bodies are organically organised and their immunity is xenophobic. Recognising such an affective process is significant because the human body frames the body politic.

In addition, the basic structure of the three analyses is juxtaposition. In each analysis, I juxtapose my readings of two materials: first, what the state (and the public) says about conscientious objection and, second, what the conscientious objectors say about themselves. Throughout Studies in Trans-Disciplinary Method, Shapiro presents a series of juxtapositions to show how hegemonic or institutionalised narratives, figures, and modes of knowing and perceiving can be disrupted, that the institutionalised narratives need not be taken for granted (for example, see 2013, 4-5, 9-10). Potentially disruptive encounters prompt Shapiro’s juxtapositions. According to Shapiro, such an encounter disrupts the “habitual conditions of sensible experience” (Rancière 2006, 1; cited in Shapiro 2013, 30). Shapiro adds that such a profoundly affective encounter can force thinking that does not merely confirm and reproduce familiar identities or narratives (Deleuze 1994, 139; cited in Shapiro 2013, 30). In my analyses, I stage a disruptive encounter, a juxtaposition, between the South Korean state (and the public) and conscientious objectors.
Through juxtaposition, I mobilise the objectors as aesthetic subjects that can disrupt institutionalised modes of recognising things and inspire new modes of sensing the human body and national security.

To summarise my research method inspired by Shapiro’s Studies in Trans-Disciplinary Method, I take the South Korean conscientious objectors as aesthetic subjects. From reading theories and the research materials, I have developed analytic concepts that provide new perspectives to see the ‘problems’ anew. Those concepts pertain to both the human body and body politic. The concepts are, as I have shown through Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, organisation (organic organisation vs the Body without Organs), immunity (xenophobic vs xenophilic), and affect (capture by the beautiful body vs flight through the extreme body). Then, I read the research materials in light of the concepts. I juxtapose my readings of the two materials to disrupt the hegemonic modes of imagining the human body and national security in South Korea and to propose alternative modes. The following section introduces the two materials.

### 5.2 The textual and visual research materials

In the following text, I introduce the research materials for my analyses (Chapter 6, Chapter 7, and Chapter 8). Since the basic structure of my analyses is juxtaposition, I gathered two types of research materials. The first research material is the official and public materials produced on South Korean conscientious objectors. The second research material is the materials produced by the objectors themselves. Also, I collected both textual and visual materials. I read textual materials for the first and second analyses (Chapters 6 and 7). For the third analysis (Chapter 8), I read visual materials. Regarding the scope of the research, as I have discussed in Chapter 2, I limit my research materials to those produced after 2001.

I have conducted archival searches and fieldwork to collect the research materials for my analyses. The materials from the archival search are available online or as publications. I also conducted a series of fieldwork in Seoul, South Korea. The first
fieldwork took place from April to May 2019, during which I visited the ‘Center for Military Human Rights in Korea’ to interview a conscientious objector. The second fieldwork took place from October to December 2019. I participated in several events held by ‘World Without War’ to support the imprisoned conscientious objectors and prepare people for conscientious objection. I also attended conferences on conscientious objection and seminars organised by peace activists. The third fieldwork took place from October 2020 to March 2021. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, offline public gatherings were not happening. However, I managed to meet and interview, individually, a few conscientious objectors and antimilitarist activists who work on the Alternative Service Review Committee. Although most materials were accessible online, I have learnt that personal bonding is still essential for a researcher to achieve deeper insights and respect for the interviewees’ experiences.

The research materials for the first analysis (Chapter 6 on organisation) and the second analysis (Chapter 7 on immunity) are texts. The first research materials for analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 are the official and public materials produced on South Korean conscientious objectors. This material includes the court decisions on the objectors’ cases, quotes from the trials of the objectors, and quotes from the sessions of the Alternative Service Review Committee. The court decisions are the primary source of the first research materials. I have read the South Korean Supreme Court’s decisions in 2004, 2007, and 2016 which concluded that the conscientious objectors were guilty of violating the Military Conscription Law. I have also read the South Korean Constitutional Court’s decisions in 2002 and 2008, which passed decisions on the constitutionality of the Military Conscription Law with implications for conscientious objection. The decisions from the courts are critical research materials for my analyses because they are much more than professional legal opinions. The decisions continuously reference what are considered generally applicable, common-sense, and acceptable to many to establish that those state institutions represent and are answerable to the public. I have also read the official papers of the Alternative Service Review Committee, which started reviewing the applications for alternative service which does not involve bearing arms in 2020. The quotes from the objectors’

52 Before the South Korean Constitutional Court’s decision in 2018 which found the Military Conscription Law partly unconstitutional, almost all decisions from the Supreme Court had found the objectors guilty.
trials and the Alternative Service Review Committee sessions are procured from my fieldwork: through interviews with the conscientious objectors and the handouts from the peace activist and conscientious objectors’ events. I also consulted the website of the most prominent South Korean anti-militarist NGO ‘World Without War’. The archives for the above materials are published online.

The second research material is the materials produced by South Korean conscientious objectors. This material includes announcements by the objectors explaining why they are refusing conscription, the objectors’ quotes (especially their responses to questions) from their trials in the courts and from their Alternative Service Review Committee sessions, and other documents the objectors produced to promote their causes during information sessions, conferences, and seminars. My primary sources of reading are the announcements by the objectors and their diaries and letters from prison. Sometimes, they gathered their announcements, diaries, and prison letters and published them. One such book, People Who Refuse to Hold a Gun (2008), conveys announcements, essays, and letters by 30 conscientious objectors. Another book is We Refuse Military (2014), which conveys the announcements of 53 conscientious objectors. Both books are edited by ‘World Without War’. The unpublished announcements and prison letters by the objectors, which are more recent, are accessible via the website of ‘World Without War’. I also collected research materials through fieldwork in Seoul, South Korea. The details about the fieldwork are the same as stated in the previous paragraph.

I have taken the conscientious objectors’ written announcements as the primary material for analyses because they are products of long autobiographical reflections. Many conscientious objectors have stated that they found writing the announcement difficult and took many hours to rewrite it because they wanted to convey their feelings and thoughts to their family, friends, the public in general, and the court. Such deep self-reflections might not have been readily available during face-to-face interviews. Hence, the objectors’ written announcements likely convey the objectors’ causes more consistently and articulately than interviews. Also, what makes my analysis aesthetic is not just the emotional contents of the objectors’ narratives. As Shapiro indicates, an aesthetic analysis discusses how a subject can disrupt senses and mobilise thinking to challenge the dominant conditions for making sense of things (2013, 2, 9, 11). In this regard, I have found that the objectors’ written
announcements convey reflections and sensations that can mobilise thinking in the readers. Next, I discuss the research material for my third analysis (Chapter 8) on the flight and the capture of affect.

The research material for my third analysis is visual. Many studies have pointed out that visual materials are apt for discussing affect. Callahan suggests that the strong connection between visuals and affect occurs because, through visuals, people are more likely to feel visceral connections with each other than textual materials (2020, 40). In Chapter 8, I produce two discussions to show how the capture and flight of affect can imagine human bodies differently. Hence, I discuss two affective processes. First, I discuss how two popular South Korean military reality shows present bodies that capture affect. Second, I discuss how two films produced by South Korean conscientious objectors present bodies that escape the state’s attempt to capture affect. As in the previous analyses, for Chapter 8, I also juxtapose the two discussions.

The first research materials for Chapter 8 are the ‘military reality shows’ or the ‘militainment’ shows in South Korea. Roger Stahl writes that the term ‘militainment’ means “state violence translated into an object of pleasurable consumption” (2010, 6; see also McEvoy-Levy 2015; Payne 2014). Militainment can viscerally infuse common-sense understandings or ideals on soldiering, military, and war. For example, several studies have pointed out that popular media representations of soldiers with superior physical qualities can frame the imaginations of ideal individual and collective bodies (see Nagel 1998; 2017; Balaj and Hughson 2014; Miller-Idriss 2017; Alter 2000; Caso 2017). In South Korea, militainment has been around for more than three decades. From the late 1980s to the 1990s, male television or film stars who were then conscripted used to appear in drama series. In the 2000s and early 2010s, the shows often depicted comedians and other celebrities (including women and non-South Korean nationals) experiencing the South Korean military. More recently, militainment shows have expanded into the domain of reality shows.

involving private military companies and private YouTube producers. Along with the change in the platform (from television to YouTube), military reality shows have become interactive and hence more affective to the viewers.

I discuss *Real Man* and *Fake Man* in light of the capture of affect. Both are South Korean military reality shows. *Real Man* aired on MBC, a public television channel in South Korea, from April 2013 to November 2016. The show featured celebrities, including television and film stars, sports stars, comedians, and singers, who lived and trained six days a week in the barracks with soldiers on active duty. The Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense officially supported the show’s production; the producers emphasised that the celebrities receive the same training as the soldiers. The show is intended for viewing by everyone, including families. Hence, the show’s atmosphere is humorous and, sometimes, touching.

*Fake Man* is a YouTube show released in 2020. The show is co-produced by MUSAT (a South Korean private military company that runs UDT/SEAL training experience programmes) and Physical Gallery (a YouTube channel specialising in workouts and related content). The show features YouTube celebrities who volunteered to experience MUSAT’s training programme. The title *Fake Man* is a parody of *Real Man*; *Fake Man* claims that, unlike *Real Man*, which has been criticised for selective editing, it candidly conveys the rawness and brutality of UDT/SEAL. *Fake Man* is considered to be the most discussed internet content of 2020. I have chosen to read the two militainment shows for their popularity and sensational content. Given the pervasive militarisation in South Korea, I assume that the two shows must have been highly affective. I suggest that the two shows’ displays of bodies have effectively captured the affect arising from viewing the shows.

The second research materials for Chapter 8 are two films directed by South Korean conscientious objectors. In South Korea, films that deal with conscientious objection are rare, and films directed by conscientious objectors are rarer. Still, I chose to discuss the films directed by the objectors because the films’ representations of the objectors’ lives are affective in ways that prompt the flight of affect from the pervasive militarising narrative of the state. Notably, they convey immediately recognisable contents and invoke ambiguous or intense sensations.
The first of the two films I discuss is an autobiographical film called *A Silk Letter* (2010). The director, Kang Sang-woo, is a conscientious objector. The film is based on the director’s struggle to write a letter explaining why he refuses military conscription. The film’s plot follows a day of a young man who seems anxious upon receiving an enlistment note from the government. The second film’s title is *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns 2: Breaking a Taboo* (2021). Kim Hwan-tae, the director, is also a conscientious objector. The film follows the South Korean conscientious objection movement from 2002 to 2020. The movement saw several failed attempts to legislate an alternative service and many court decisions that imprisoned military refusers. All the materials are accessible through online and offline archives.

Significantly, my research materials are my notes from watching the films. In the notes, I have described what is happening in the relevant scenes, recorded what I have felt through watching the scenes and how I had been affected by sensations arising through the scenes. I chose to use such notes as research materials because a coherent, articulate, and immediately comprehensible story is unavailable as the two films’ ‘violence of sensation’ forces me to attempt interpretations independently. Also, such a note is helpful since I am discussing how the flight of affect from the state can happen, which is only felt personally and can be discussed retrospectively. As an intensity (Massumi 2002, 30), affect cannot be accessed directly; describing, representing, or reliving affect is impossible (Kolvraa 2015, 184). Hence, my notes, which record what I have felt while watching the films, might seem haphazard, spontaneous, and contingent. However, I am not merely laying out my feelings. I can still describe what an affective experience can do in terms of my objective, which is discussing the flight of affect from the state in the context of South Korean conscientious objectors resisting the military and war. Therefore, making notes of what I have felt in words is the optimal way to discuss my affective experience as long as I limit my discussion to the flight of affect from the state. In addition, following Brigg and Bleiker (2010) and other writers on autoethnography (see Dauphinee 2013; Doty 2004; Edkins 2013; Davison 2014), I also believe that it is

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To reiterate, affect is something felt through the body, which is viscerally prior to conceptualisation (Gregg & Seigworth 2010, 1); something sensed through the body at the moment of a capture that resists being easily classified through existing categories (Massumi 2002, 35); a distant ‘background noise’ that haunts the subject (Shin Jin-Sook 2018, 397); the changes in the potential of what one’s bodily movement can ‘come to do’ (see Massumi 2015, 7).
not overly indulgent to deal with subjective feelings as long as I limit my discussion to how the feelings relate to the topic. For example, I focused on how subjective feelings can facilitate the flight of affect in ways that disturb authoritative distributions of social identity (see Shapiro 2013, 9). Therefore, reflecting on my feelings and the scenes through my own words in the notes is an effective way to appreciate the sensations in excess of manifest meaning. Thus, if a scene seemed relevant, I took notes of what was happening in the scene and how I felt or was affected. Then, through the ideas relevant to the flight of affect, I reflected upon the notes.

When analysing the visual materials for Chapter 8, I concentrate on two moments. First, I describe the scenes or the moments that testify to the pervasive militarisation. In my observation, the visual materials express numerous emotions and narratives produced through military conscription and militarised confrontations. The first moment pertains to Real Man and Fake Man. Second, in the visual materials, I also concentrate on picking up the ‘violence of sensation’ that directly hits the nerve and confuses making sense of things. In this vein, according to Steve Pile, visual materials can effectively convey non-representable and disorganised feelings, which testify to the limits of reducing experiences with familiar emotions and narratives (2010, 6). I have found that the film A Silk Letter and Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns are relevant to the second moment. Still, all the visual materials I discuss convey both moments.

Summary

The objective of this chapter has been to introduce the research materials and the methodology for my analyses. In this chapter, I suggested that South Korean conscientious objectors are aesthetic subjects that can reimagine South Korean national security. Shapiro propounds the need to engage aesthetic subjects, which inspire different modes of thinking and sensibilities through sensations. The

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55 Discussing feelings is also supported by assumptions of shared understanding. For example, Barabantseva and Lawrence write that a film can be valued for its capacity to link individuals, filmmakers, and viewers by means of a mutual comprehension of the feelings, challenges, perplexities, and hardships of ordinary existence (2015, 929).
objectors have disrupted the state’s narratives and identities by narrating their own experiences despite the prospect of persecution. Through this process, the objectors have also suggested alternative modes for imagining or constituting the security of a body politic. I will show this through the following three analysis chapters.

In Chapter 6, I start by reading the texts produced by the South Korean state in light of organic organisation and the texts produced by South Korean conscientious objectors in light of the Body without Organs. I juxtapose the readings to show how to reimagine the human body and national security in terms of bodily organisation. In Chapter 7, I begin by reading the texts produced by the state through xenophobic immunity and the texts produced by the objectors through xenophilic immunity. I juxtapose the two readings to demonstrate how to reimagine the human body and national security in terms of immunity. In Chapter 8, I discuss how two South Korean military reality shows capture affect. I also discuss how two films produced by the objectors facilitate the flight of affect. I juxtapose the two discussions to show how the capture and flight of affect can imagine human bodies differently.
6 ANALYSIS 1: IMAGINING NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH ORGANISATION

The main objective of this chapter is to show, in the context of South Korean conscientious objectors, how reimagining the human body while considering the body’s organisation can also reimagine national security. This chapter is the first of the three analyses that study how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security. In Chapter 3, I discussed that the body’s organisation is significant for imagining national security because the organisation represents the relationship between the parts and the whole, and such relationship can frame the imagination of the human body and national security. In Chapter 3, I also juxtaposed two concepts that represent the body’s organisation in contrasting ways: the organic organisation with the Body without Organs. Therefore, in this chapter, following Shapiro (2013)’s suggestion on ‘thinking with aesthetic subjects’, I produce two readings and juxtapose them to reveal and challenge the institutionalised modes of imagining national security. The first is my reading of the South Korean state’s narratives in light of the organic organisation. The second is my reading of the conscientious objectors’ narratives through the Body without Organs.

The main argument of this chapter is that South Korean conscientious objectors suggest alternative modes of bodily organisation which can reimagine national security. In particular, the conscientious objectors’ narrations of their experiences imagine the Body without Organ’s a more open and less-hierarchical relationship between the part and the whole. Meanwhile, the South Korean state has imagined national security through the organic organisation with a head that commands and limbs and organs that can only obey.

In section 6.1, I read the South Korean court decisions and other relevant texts on the conscientious objectors produced by the state through two ideas belonging to the organic organisation. The first idea is that the whole body depends on a centre vital for all the constituents’ interests or survival. Second, the interest or survival of
the centre, a higher identity, defines the constituents (see sub-section 3.1.1). My reading of the decisions and texts demonstrates that the South Korean state has imagined national security through the ideas pertinent to the organic organisation.

In section 6.2, I read South Korean conscientious objectors’ announcements of their intention to refuse the military draft and my interviews with them through two ideas relevant to the Body without Organs. First, every individual coexists with other individuals non-hierarchically. Second, every constituent is significant in itself (see sub-section 3.1.2). My reading of the conscientious objectors’ narratives suggests they can reimagine national security through the ideas about the Body without Organs. I conclude the chapter by summarising my two readings and discussing the implications of juxtaposing the two readings.

6.1 The military as the vital commanding organ of national security

This section discloses a familiar way of imagining national security in South Korea. In particular, I show how the South Korean state has imagined national security through the organic organisation. To this end, I read the research material, South Korean court decisions on conscientious objectors and other relevant texts, through two ideas relevant to the organic organisation.

First, I read the research material while considering the idea that the body depends on a centre vital for all constituents’ survival or interests. As I have discussed in Chapter 3, a key to the organic organisation is that the security of the ‘head’, a vital commanding centre, is often equated with the survival of the whole body. Considering this, I start with the South Korean Constitutional Court’s 2004 and 2012 decisions on whether the government should introduce an alternative service which does not involve military training. In the Constitutional Court’s 2004 decision, the section “The Legislative Purpose of the Case” [Article 88] starts by reiterating the Constitution’s Article 37(2). The article states that the state can restrict the freedoms
and rights of citizens for national security purposes.\textsuperscript{56} Then, the decision proceeds to define national security. The court says that “‘National security’ is the indispensable precondition of the survival of the state, preservation of the territory, and protection of the lives and safety of citizens, and also the basic premise for all citizens to exercise their freedom and rights” (Constitutional Court 2004). The most conspicuous hierarchical binary in my reading of the court’s decisions is national security, which is prioritised, versus freedom of expression, which is rendered secondary. In court decisions, national security, as in the state’s survival, is consistently upheld against freedom of expression.

In the Constitutional Court decision’s section, “The Problem with Guaranteeing the Freedom to Realise Conscience”, the decision states that the freedom to realise conscience (as opposed to the freedom to form conscience) is subordinate to ‘the Constitutional order’. The decision says, “All Constitutional freedoms and rights are subject to the principal limitation that they should be exercised within the scope of enabling coexistence with others within the state and not jeopardising the legal order…” (Constitutional Court 2012). The previous quotes state that the ‘premise’ or the ‘precondition’ for exercising Constitutional freedoms is the state’s survival. As such, in court decisions, exercising an individual’s freedom of conscience is pitted against the survival of the whole political community (e.g. ‘enabling coexistence with others’ and ‘jeopardising the legal order’). I suggest this pairing indicates that the court treats national security as a transcendent interpretive centre for passing decisions on the relationship between individuals and the state. However, as I have discussed in Chapter 2, national security is an open-ended concept; the state has often invoked national security to silence dissident views.

The decisions establish that the military is central to realising national security. In the section “The Legislative Purpose of the Case” [Article 88] of the Constitutional Court’s 2004 decision, the decision states that “Hence, irrespective of whether the Constitution stipulates this, the Constitution recognises the significant legal interest in upholding national security. And the duty to the national defence is an important means the Constitution chooses to realise national security” (Constitutional Court

\textsuperscript{56} The Constitution’s Article 37(2) states: “The freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by Act only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order, or for public welfare. Even when such restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the freedom or right shall be violated”.

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The decision illustrates that the military is an indispensable guarantor of national security; military conscription lies at the foundation of national security. The decision states,

The Act disputed in this trial, by fulfilling and enforcing the implementation of the ‘Duty to National Defence’, aims to ensure the acquisition of human resources and the fair sharing of the military service duty under the military service system. The system’s ultimate purpose is to realise a Constitutional interest of national security, and conscription guarantees the continuation of the system. (Constitutional Court 2004)

The court establishes that the military’s human resources acquisition or the stable supply of new conscripts is central to realising national security. The suspension of the citizen’s Constitutional freedoms and rights in the name of national security is justified in the name of the collective body’s survival. The military becomes the indispensable guarantor of national security, a vital organ of the South Korean body politic.

The organic organisation hierarchically dissects the body into different parts that work harmoniously (see Delanda 2006, 8). South Korean conscientious objectors’ experiences with applying for the alternative service indicate that the hierarchy resembles a harmonious patriarchal household image. The Alternative Service Review Committee, an arm of the Military Manpower Administration, has been screening ‘genuine acts of conscience’ from draft evasions. For the screening, the Review Committee has required the applicants to submit statements from their parents and three close acquaintances (e.g. friends, relatives, co-workers, and the like). In addition, the applicants must submit copies of detailed records from their primary school, junior high school, and high school, including their teachers’ observations of their personalities and development. In an essay, Na Dong-hyuk, who announced his conscientious objection in 2002, spoke about the Review Committee’s document requirement. He states,

It seems that the bureaucracy understands ‘how does one form his/her conscience?’ by assuming that at the centre of the forming of one’s conscience is one’s family and school. The document requirement reminded me of my college days when I was often arrested for rioting. One day, the prosecutor summoned both my dad and me. My dad was constantly apologising and bowing to the prosecutor. I had to write a kind of apology in front of the prosecutor and my dad. The prosecutor couldn’t stop lecturing, and I only wanted to escape the room. After a long day, I got the suspension of an indictment from the prosecutor. (Na Dong-hyuk, 2020)
Na Dong-hyuk’s episode illustrates one learns to obey the different levels and positions of authority. His episode shows how the patriarchal household’s hierarchy expands to the hierarchy in public, how one subjects to the authorities outside the family, to teachers, officers, bosses, and the law. Similarly, the Review Committee’s requirement demands that the applicant must be approved within the household for the applicant to be approved by the state. This process shows that the state positions itself as the ultimate authority.

In particular, since the parental statements are among the required documents for applying, the Review Committee de facto demands agreement from the applicant’s parents. This demand has caused problems, especially for applicants whose family does not support their decision. Im Seong-min, who applied for the alternative service, said in an interview with Voice of People,

After announcing my refusal, I had a big fight with my dad, who admires the manliness of soldiers and what they do. The rest of my family was also busy criticising me; we hadn’t spoken to or seen each other for a while. My close acquaintances weren’t very enthusiastic about my refusal too. If I had to submit four statements from my close acquaintances instead of three, I wouldn’t have been able to submit my application.57

Im Seong-min’s case shows that a dissident individual has to go to great lengths, practising a degree of subordination to authorities such as parents or teachers. Whether the applicant’s intention is pure is secondary to the fact that the applicant has to practise obedience to the figures who can vouch for the applicant. Then, submitting such statements becomes a performance that exports the archetypical hierarchical relationship between the father and the son or the teacher and the student to a more public level. An implication of this is that such a hierarchical relationship is supposed to be harmonious, whereby the child is subordinate to the parents. The household becomes responsible for producing obedient individuals.

So far, I have focused on the presence of the vital commanding centre in a hierarchically organised body politic. Notably, national security and the military are such important centres whose normal functioning through conscription can

dramatically affect the lives of everyone. Also, the state understands that the constituents of the body politic must be in harmony which resembles a patriarchal household. Next, I discuss the research material through the second idea of the organic organisation, engaging how the constituent parts are identified in the hierarchical body.

Second, I read the South Korean court decisions and other relevant texts through the idea that the interest or survival of the commanding centre defines the body’s constituents. In the historic decision of 2018 that forced the South Korean Legislative to introduce the alternative service, the Constitutional Court emphasised that it should still decide whether the objector is genuinely motivated by their conscience. In other words, the state demands that individuals be definable, to have a single identifiable essence (see Delanda 2016, 12). The court suggested the criteria for deciding this, “the conscience must be deep, unshakable, and truthful” (Constitutional Court 2018). The court further articulated that a deep conscience means “the life must be entirely, rather than partially, underneath the influence of the conscience”. An unshakable conscience means “the conscience will hardly change”. A truthful conscience means “the conscience will not be compromised or bent strategically according to the given situation” (Constitutional Court 2018). The 2018 decision is a more progressive move in that it recognises an individual’s conscience (‘deep, unshakable, and truthful’) rather than demanding one’s conscience follow ‘the majority of democratic citizens’ thoughts or values’, a phrase which appears in the Constitutional Court’s decision in 2004. Nevertheless, the state is still the final arbiter on the authenticity of one’s conscience. The state refuses to recognise one’s conscience in itself, as the ‘recognisers’ must be the agents of the state. In particular, the state claims to possess the authority and capacity to assess and define an individual. For example, the Alternative Service Review Committee requires the applicants for the alternative service to submit a personal statement. Below are some parts of the instructions by the Review Committee for writing the personal statement:

The details of the applicant’s conscience: if your conscience is religious, explain in detail the religion’s doctrines, submit relevant evidence, and explain in detail how the religion’s principles run counter to the active duty, the reservist duty, or the first
reserve duty. If your conscience is based on personal convictions, explain in detail the applicant’s beliefs or the ideology (or the articles of association) of the organisation of which the applicant is a member. Also, explain in detail why the applicant cannot carry out the active duty, the reservist duty, or the first reserve duty per the contents of the ideology.

How did the applicant come to possess the conscience throughout the overall life experiences, including growing up, household, school, and work?; explain in detail the process and the motivation.

Explain in detail (including what/why/where/when/who/how) what the applicant did in a religious organisation, civil organisation, and the like, based on his conscience (The Alternative Service Review Committee 2020).

In reading the instructions, I focus on the fact that the state demands the applicant to identify one’s conscience as something consistent and tell a coherent and articulate story about it. In my interpretation, the personal statement is premised on the idea that one possesses a coherent centre powerful enough so that the centre has been consistent throughout one’s life history. And this centre must have been decisive in conscientious objectors’ refusal of military conscription. From an anthropological perspective, I suggest that the Review Committee’s demand resembles what Shinichi Nakazawa (2005, 222) terms the ‘human cannibal’ king of ancient societies. The king is a ‘human cannibal’ as it becomes the sole medium of relationship captures or ‘metamorphoses’ every individual into a homogenous identity, a constituent of the country. In addition, Nakazawa points out that although no one can relate with each other without the ‘human cannibal’ or the king, this power is neither understandable nor controllable (ibid.). Similarly, national security, invoked by the state as an ultimate interpretive centre in conscientious objectors’ businesses, is an inherently elusive concept in itself (Campbell 1992; Barkawi 2011). Even though modern societies are beyond kings and gods, being a member of a collective body requires one to perform a confession of faith. And this is a sort of capture. The state’s evaluation of one’s conscience performatively reproduces the state as an interpretive centre in personal lives.

Notably, having had to fill out their applications as per the Alternative Service Review Committee’s instructions, the objectors who appeared before the Review Committee expressed discomfort at the questions that attempted to judge the worth of their conscience. Oh Soo-Hwan, who applied for the alternative service, stated in an interview with Voice of People,
The reviewers were weirdly curious about the gap between the day that I decided to refuse being conscripted and the day that I first participated in the conscientious objection seminar. I had to answer how many times per month, for how many hours, and how actively I participated in the activities related to conscientious objection. Any ‘gaps’ must be filled with quantifiable categories. I felt that I must prove every moment of my life to them. However, one’s conscience doesn’t always remain in an expressible or tangible form.\textsuperscript{58}

In my reading of the above quote, the logic behind the questions thrown at Oh is that his core identity exists, and he must have constantly been working to sustain and develop this core identity. Particularly, through Oh’s quote, I notice that one’s conscience becomes subject to a ‘yes or no’ (or ‘stay or leave’) logic. No matter the complex process of becoming, the state functions as the final authority that demands a clear definition of the contents of one’s conscience and passes decisions on that conscience in the form of ‘yes or no’. By imposing itself over people, the state limits people from exercising their potential to become something else. The limitation happens in the name of survival, prosperity, and coexistence. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, state policing or lawful violence simultaneously captures, constitutes a right to capture, and contributes to creating what is being captured (1980 [2005], 448). For example, as one must pass through the school, military, church, hospital, and company, one is captured as a ‘student’, ‘soldier’, ‘believer’, ‘patient’, ‘man’, and ‘labourer’. From the above discussions, I suggest that, when it comes to national security, the military is the vital organ that captures or defines one’s life experiences per the logic of organic organisation.

Then, the South Korean state’s words show that resisting or rebelling against one’s place in a hierarchy makes one abnormal, dangerous, or meaningless. To reiterate my discussion in Chapter 3, in the scheme of organic organisation, for a constituent, being a part of the higher dimension should be the defining property of that part (Delanda 2005, 9). However, South Korean conscientious objectors rebel against being subsumed by a single higher dimension. In the eyes of the state, the objectors would seem contradictory and treacherous, residing in multiple dimensions. In this regard, below are the questions most frequently asked by the prosecutors during the conscientious objectors’ trials:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Why do you refuse the duty of military service?
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{58} Kang, Seok-young. (2021, May 16).
Conscription is the law’s expression of the constitutional duty to the national defence. Do you intend to refuse other constitutional duties too?

Do you think you cannot carry out military service duty, but others should carry out the duty? Who will protect the country if everyone refuses to serve like you?

You are still carrying out the duty to pay tax. What do you think about the tax being spent on the military and buying weapons? (World Without War 2019)

The prosecutors compare the objectors’ refusal to be conscripted with other duties. Through such comparison, the prosecutors assert that, since the objectors are acting inconsistently and contradictorily, the grounds for the objectors’ refusals are meaningless or questionable. To avoid falling into the prosecutors’ trap, the objectors had to ‘refuse’ the comparisons altogether.

In another case of questioning, many who applied for the alternative service at the Alternative Service Review Committee reported that the recurring questions, intended to test the authenticity of their conscience, caused the biggest stress. Kim Min, who applied for the alternative service, struggled for five hours with the same questions thrown at him repeatedly during a one-on-one interview with the Review Committee’s reviewer. Kim said,

The reviewer couldn’t understand that I coalesce with a wide variety of struggles for human rights no matter which organisation I belong to. The reviewer also couldn’t understand that, although I work part-time to make a living, I still spend time for those social movements and for taking photos of their struggles. It felt as if I was talking to a wall. For five hours, the both of us were very frustrated.59

This episode shows that the applicants are under pressure to present a story that appears linear, coherent, and consistent in the eyes of the authorities. A conscience that sounds incoherent or inconsistent will not pass the test. I suggest that such a test supposes the privileged rational head which cannot fathom the wanderings through the inherently uncontrollable and undefinable life. In this body politic, the ‘either/or’ logic forces one to choose between order and anarchy.

In addition, the Constitutional Court decision in 2004 demotes the ‘freedom of expression’ beyond the boundary of what is significant and desirable for the survival of the collective body. The decision starts with defining what the conscience is.

According to the section “The Constitutional Meaning of the Freedom of Conscience and What It Guarantees”, conscience is a subjective, personal, and minority concern. This is because “The ‘conscience’ that the ‘freedom of conscience’ tries to guarantee belongs to the internal state of an individual, which is a very subjective thing, rather than something that corresponds to the majority of democratic citizens’ thoughts or values” (Constitutional Court 2004). Also, the section “Whether the Act Disputed in This Trial Violates the Freedom to Realise Conscience” says, “What is problematic, in reality, about the freedom of conscience is the minority conscience attempting to go beyond the state’s legal order or the public morals” (Constitutional Court 2004). Here, the conscience belongs to the personal. Hence, an individual’s conscience is only secondary to the values of the collective ‘democratic citizens’. The decision presupposes that the majority of citizens hold certain unified values. Then, upholding one’s conscience above the majority’s values can become a dangerous pursuit from the majority’s perspective. Particularly, the decision refers to how making an exception can jeopardise legal order. The court states,

> To exempt those insisting on the freedom of conscience from the duty that applies to all citizens while not levying any alternative duty amounts to granting an extra-constitutional privilege to the minorities. … The state’s tolerance and making of exception should not become the privilege for the minorities. (Constitutional Court 2004)

Hence, upholding one’s conscience against being drafted can become a controversial act of tolerance. Especially in the eyes of most lay people who have completed their military service or sent their sons, fathers, and lovers for military service, the objectors have become those who shamelessly demand tolerance, forgiveness, and sacrifice. So far, I have read the texts on conscientious objectors in light of the idea that the constituents are defined through certain vital interests of the whole. The state has attempted to define the objectors’ conscience through the centre or the vital organ, the military sustained by conscription. Also, advocating individual conscience ‘against the majority’, the objectors have been made abnormal or meaningless subjects.
To summarise section 6.1, I have read what the South Korean state (e.g., the Constitutional Court and the Alternative Service Review Committee) says about conscientious objectors in light of the ideas on the organic organisation I discussed in Chapter 3. My reading has highlighted that the South Korean government understands national security through the ideas that each constituent of a collective body is subordinate to a vital commanding centre and that each constituent is defined in relation to the survival of the vital centre. In this context, the vital commanding centre is the concept of national security and the military institution, considered the foremost guarantor of collective survival. Such ideas structure the relationship between parts and the whole and frame the well-being of individual and collective bodies. Overall, my reading has shown how the South Korean state has imagined national security through the scheme of an organically organised body. However, the narratives of the South Korean conscientious objectors, who had been persecuted for jeopardising national security, suggest that different bodily organisation or relationship between the parts and the whole is possible. In particular, I recommend that the Body without Organs, which I have discussed in Chapter 3, frame the objectors’ narratives.

6.2 Challenging the state and military’s centrality in securing lives

This section proposes an alternative way of imagining national security in South Korea by discussing how South Korean conscientious objectors have resisted the organic organisation. As stated in the introduction of this chapter, I read the research material, the texts produced by the conscientious objectors in light of the two ideas pertaining to the Body without Organs.

First, I read the research material while considering the idea that, for the Body without Organs, every constituent coexists with other constituents non-hierarchically. For example, while an organic organisation presumes an ultimate and vital point of interest, the Body without Organs does not presume such a thing (e.g.,
a commanding organ or a lost unity) (Deleuze and Guattari 2005, 182, 164–65). In this regard, I focus on South Korean conscientious objectors’ challenge against the military’s status as the foremost, central, and violent guarantor of survival. Kim Moo-Seok, a conscientious objector, argues in his announcement that the military has failed to serve the majority’s interests as a tool of oppression and geopolitics. Kim states,

I believe that the military is a principal tool of oppression at the handful of rulers’ disposals against most people. …The South Korean troops dispatched to Vietnam and Iraq aided the American occupation and massacres. The dispatch was only a part of the South Korean rulers’ tactics of sustaining their power through the South Korea-US military alliance. (2014, 227)

On the same note, Choi Ki-Won, a conscientious objector, urges the public to ‘not offer yourself to their greed’ because “Those responsible for starting wars are prospering, but it’s always the people that suffer the most from those wars. Why do we need to offer our lives to the greed of those responsible” (2014, 214)? In the quotes, conscientious objectors urge to turn their eyes to what is happening to people’s lives in the name of security, a term which the rulers appropriate. While denying the military the status of the guarantor of survival, the objectors propose changing the premise of security from violence to life.

The objectors also question whether capacities for violence can achieve peace and security. Kim Dong-Hyun, a conscientious objector, states that “Violence always begets violence. …When you get punched, and if you punch back, it’s ‘both to blame’. We can start a conversation before one punches back. We can refrain from punching back even if punched” (2014, 234). In his announcement to refuse the conscription, Lim Jae-sung states, “conscientious objection tries to obtain the right not to kill others for oneself. It is also a very slow but the most fundamental way to stop the war that has continued throughout the history of humanity” (2008, 120). Invoking individuals’ ‘right not to kill’ and ‘right to peace’ directly challenges the belief that violent capacity, such as military, guarantees security. Lim is projecting a different frame of security premised on the equality of life. In this respect, Lim and other objectors suggest that, instead of taking the military as an ultimate guarantor of security, respecting everyone’s existence and desires must guide attempts to achieve security. In his announcement, Kim Dong-Hyun states,
In a sense, we’re playing variations without any instruments or scores. The stage and seats aren’t separate; everyone can be the conductor or the player. When you give up ‘the way to peace’, you realise that ‘peace is the way’… We will listen to each other’s unskilful variation while smiling at occasional off-key cracks. (2014, 236)

Kim indicates that life is a variation. Hence, rather than imposing a single ‘way to peace’, acknowledging the variation is peace. From the above quotes, I suggest that the objectors are rebelling against the organic organisation, which organises life around a vital organ. For the security of the South Korean body politic, such an important organ has been the military. For conscientious objectors, one’s security takes on a different meaning: ‘really living one’s life’ instead of living someone else’s purposes.

As such, South Korean conscientious objectors are more intent on ‘choosing one’s own life’ (even if that choice puts their survival in jeopardy by sending them to jail) than referring to an ultimate point of interest such as the military as the guarantor of survival. In the face of a pervasive norm that one must equally carry out a duty along with one’s fellow citizens as a rite of passage to ‘initiate an adult life’, the objectors question themselves about ‘what life to live’. An example is Kim Moo-Seok’s announcement,

> Beyond the choice between the military and the prison, choosing the prison forced me to raise the question ‘what life to live’? …This choice would’ve been difficult if I compromised in the face of the logic of competition and survival, which this society often imposes on us. (2014, 229)

Whatever the reasons for refusing to be conscripted, the objectors share that they have considered ‘what life to live’ despite the prospect of imprisonment and the ensuing difficulties in life. Jeon Gil-Soo, an objector, says he tries to be true to his character rather than a grand narrative. Jeon says,

> I usually compromise my own positions for what society asks of me. However, choosing an isolating and hierarchising space like the military is out of the question. If the military sustains itself by suppressing my character, it benefits neither the people nor myself. (2014, 218)

The objectors often reference their hunches, senses, and impressions in their quotes. I suggest that the objectors’ quotes pondering ‘what life to live’ and ‘choosing my own life’ indicate they pay attention to the subtle sensations. According to Michel
Serres in *Genesis* (1995, 20), the human body transforms the chaotic influx of subtle sensations into meaningful signals; “the organism serves as a translation machine and an integrative filter” (ibid., 22). Serres indicates that the subtle sensations can point to the aspects of oneself suppressed through dominant modes of representations but that refuse to disappear completely. The objectors indicate they are attending to the subtle sensations which disrupt the organism’s translation machine, an interpretive centre. In this regard, the objectors propound that their relationship is non-hierarchical. So far, I have demonstrated that conscientious objectors refuse to recognise the military as a vital organ of the body politic. Next, I discuss how the objectors refuse an interpretive centre or a commanding head, such as the military or the state.

An organism dissects the body and stratifies the constituent parts through a hierarchy. However, if a constituent refuses the hierarchy imposed by the commanding centre, the constituent will be moving, becoming, and indeterminate. Therefore, I read the objectors’ announcements as expressions of the ‘indeterminate organs’, constituents or fragments that deny the commanding centre and hierarchical organisation (Deleuze 2003, 47). As a result, the objectors appear to be fleeing from familiar descriptions of what one is. For example, in the memoir of his ‘prison days’, Hyunmin, a conscientious objector, suddenly realised he was not the free subject he had once imagined himself to be. He states,

> All of a sudden, I was frightened that all the trivial things I enjoyed before imprisonment were, in fact, the most important things. Apart from that I don’t belong to mainstream society, I felt bitter that, with my criminal record, I’d be left with minimal options for properly making my way into society. (Hyunmin, 2010, 314)

He suggests that the objectors are far from great and determined people and that the conscientious objection has hardly been about ‘proudly and devoutly fighting for one’s integrity while enduring loneliness’. Hyunmin states,

> One cannot expect an enhancement or advancement with the conscientious objection. … I used to frequently utter grandiose concepts like ‘flight’, ‘transversal’, or ‘expérience limite’. The conscientious objection made me realise that I’ve never truly experienced any of the above. I also realised they aren’t as charming as they sound. (ibid., 314–15)

From the above quotes, Hyunmin attends to his feelings so that he can reflect upon the self. He realises that he does not fit into the typical popular image of the monk-
like conscientious objector who possesses an unyielding determination and is not interested in rather worldly desires. His quotes suggest that if one tries to fit oneself into the purified, already-existing and socially acceptable categories that make sense, one’s body is bound to signal a lack or an excess.

Upon receiving such signals, conscientious objectors recognise the self as inherently divided. Notably, they realise that they harbour incomplete and divided voices. For example, in his announcement to refuse conscription, Jo Eun perceives the self is inherently far from complete. He states,

I will never arrive at the perfect, ideal, and undivided self. However, it’s still meaningful to strive to get there. At the uncountable moments of division, manifesting, revising, and developing my convictions is only meaningful to me. One does not have to be perfect. My only ethical belief is the existential self that continues to make choices although I expect them to be imperfect. (Jo Eun 2014, 174–75)

Jo Eun’s is not interested in figuring out if he is an ardent and consistent pacifist or how he can prove his conviction most effectively. He is more concerned that he decided to make choices for himself anyway. He expresses the potential to become something else as an ‘indeterminate organ’. I suggest that the objectors represent the ‘indeterminate organs’ themselves because they refuse to accept that individual actions will not go very far in transforming society. Gong Hyun, a conscientious objector, states,

Uncountable relations must have affected my decision to object to military conscription. Although it must be impossible to list them all, I want to point out that ‘I am an activist’ is the main reason behind my objection. …I understand it’s only a small and personal contribution, but necessary to transform our militarised society. (Gong Hyun 2014, 225)

Rather than being determined by society, the objectors believe that, even though they are minorities, they can still convey the potential to transform society, the body politic. Then, a critical difference between a blind conviction and the objectors’ conviction is that the latter attempts to remain indeterminate, to rescue oneself and one’s potential from being determined and limited by the dominant culture, language, and vital organs, such as the military and national security.

So far, I have read the texts produced by South Korean conscientious objectors in light of the idea that every individual coexists with other individuals non-
hierarchically. I have focused on that the objectors are against an ultimate point of interest: an imagined well-being of a collective or the apparatuses of national security such as the military. I also highlighted that the objectors imagine themselves as bodies of ‘indeterminate organs’ which escape the state’s hierarchy and society’s expectations. In this regard, I proceed to focus on how individuals who coexist non-hierarchically can define and identify themselves. I read the research material through the second idea relevant to the Body without Organs.

Second, I read the text produced by the conscientious objectors in light of the idea that, for the Body without Organs, every constituent is significant in itself. For example, in an organic organisation, a part is defined by how it functions in relation to the vital centre or the whole. On the contrary, for a Body without Organs, each constituent has no predetermined function and place. In this regard, I focus on how conscientious objectors challenge society’s rules and laws which predetermine individuals, for example, the exchange between the citizen’s duty and the citizen’s right. The conventional wisdom or the public virtue has been that rights and duties work in tandem to keep freeloaders away from law-abiding and hard-working citizens. However, this exchange has imposed on people their predetermined function and place: as future conscripts or families, friends, or lovers of conscripts. I discussed in Chapter 2 that in South Korea, as in many other societies that practice military conscription, soldiering is a ‘sacred duty’ and a ‘rite of passage’ to become a ‘normal, functioning adult’. A conscript must forgo one’s rights and carry out one’s duty because that is what everyone else has done for the collective good of survival.

However, Gong Hyun, an objector, suggests that rights and duties are not exchangeable. He states,

The duty and the right stand independently. Importantly, we must not forget that the key objective of a community should be to secure the human rights of its constituents. The duty exists to protect human rights. The duty should serve human rights and not the other way around. (Gong Hyun 2014, 223)

Through prioritising human rights, Gong Hyun rejects the predetermined function and place imposed on individuals through duty. Similarly, he argues that fighting for individual rights is simultaneously fighting against the state’s excessive demand for
an individual’s sacrifice. He says, “In my opinion, the state is neither guaranteeing individual rights as much as possible nor compensating the individuals for the damages that occurred while carrying out their duties. Yet, such are the fundamental duties of the state” (ibid.). Gong Hyun brings up that the South Korean state, taking the individuals’ sacrifice for granted, has neglected its duty to protect individuals. Regarding the relationship between an individual and the state, his raising questions about the state’s duty disrupt the taken-for-granted status of the individual’s duty to the collective. The above quotes indicate that the duty-right exchange has, in fact, sustained individuals’ sacrifice in the name of the good of the nation.

In *Nation and Sacrifice* (2008, 39), Takahashi Tetsuya suggests that whether it is making sacred the lambs on an altar, praying for white rats in a laboratory, or commemorating soldiers killed on a battlefield, the celebration of sacrifice cleanses the cruelty from their deaths and endows nobility on the sacrificed. In other words, the sacrifice gives meaning to miserable, unnecessary, and incomprehensible deaths and losses. For example, Takahashi suggests that the concept of ‘defensive war’ enables the constituents of a community to accept and treat as valuable the sacrifice needed to protect the community’s everyday life; ‘soldiers are produced to be killed first for the community’ (2008, 62). Then, the fears and misery of each soldier forcibly driven to the battlefield become endurable to the ones at home. I suggest that, through challenging the predetermined role of soldiers as sacrifices, the objectors can question the concept of ‘defensive war’.

In addition, on what facilitates the duty-right exchange, I also bring up Ernst Kantorowitz’s discussion of the ‘King’s two bodies’ (see Kantorowicz 1957, 193–272). As individuals, the conscripts are also endowed with two bodies: first, the political body, which is physically invulnerable and often prioritised and second, the natural body, which is vulnerable to violence and often concealed. The conscripts are expected to possess different, non-civilian, and soldierly bodies ready to take orders and sacrifice themselves. In this regard, I suggest that national security is premised on concealing the conscripts’ natural body, which is fundamentally

60 According to Kantorowicz, the medieval monarch had two bodies: the natural body and the political body. As an immortal public personality, the political body embodied the whole political community. Also, the political body concealed their natural body so that the constituents saw the monarch primarily as a public person. Therefore, even when the monarch’s natural body passed away, the political community was able to survive (Herzogenrath 2010, 53; see also Kantorowicz 1957).
unknowable and uncontrollable. National security is also premised on worshipping the conscripts’ political body on which predetermined roles and places are readily imposed through an interpretive centre (see Crane-Seeber 2016). As the above quotes indicate, conscientious objectors such as Gong Hyun attend to human fears and misery to question the distinction between the political and natural bodies.

Moreover, the objectors disrupt the scheme of the duty-right exchange through pointing out that such exchange, which can impose predetermined functions for individuals, is inherently vague. I discuss the quotes from Ahn Ji-Hwan, who announced his objection in 2010. He expresses his anarchist view on the law,

> The rights exist on their own. …Everyone has rights. However, one’s rights can infringe on others’ rights. … The law supposedly protects the ‘majority’ right or the ‘public’ good. However, above all, these are naturally vague concepts. …To obtain genuine equality, we must come up with something better than law. (Ahn Ji-Hwan 2014, 191–92)

The vagueness of the laws governing life produces a predicament where the exchange between duties and rights is not straightforward. Then, I suggest that such a predicament calls forth the ceaseless questioning of the presupposed sense of obligation and justice, which can constantly rebel against the predetermined functions and places. Ahn argues that one needs to be able to question even the things decided through majority rule. He states that

> However, in fact, the law is agreed upon by only the majority of the nationals. More importantly, the premise of this majority rule is that the majority exercises actual physical power over the minority. The premise is the biggest violence…. The coercion of law is a terrifying thing. One cannot just drop the name of law in the face of others, saying that ‘because it’s the law’, and hide behind it like a coward. (Ahn Ji-Hwan 2014, 189–90)

In challenging the law, Ahn refuses to treat sacrifice as inevitable or inescapable. However, the objectors propound that, without the desire to achieve this impossible task of sacrificing no one, responsible decisions cannot exist. The point is not to predetermine one’s functions and places as a citizen-conscript.

South Korean conscientious objectors have rejected a predetermined function and place for each constituent of the body politic. So far, I have focused on the exchange between duty and right, which imposes on people predetermined functions and
places as citizen-conscript. The objectors reject this exchange, arguing that rights and duties are not exchangeable. They also protest that the state has appropriated this exchange to demand the predetermined sacrifice from people as citizens. Instead of accepting soldiers’ sacrifices as just or inevitable, the objectors call for a critical attitude that questions the sacrifices. In this regard, they propound that one is significant in oneself without resorting to the state.

In particular, for a Body without Organs, the constituents still convey significance even if detached from the whole. In the same vein, South Korean conscientious objectors find meaning in identifying their objection as an inevitable choice, indicating that being an obedient constituent of the state cannot be their defining property. Deulkkae, who announced his objection in 2013, stated that the objection is not a product of logical reasoning or a sacred cause. For him, the objection is an unplanned product of his life experiences naturally piling up. He states, “I still find the objection a serious matter, but I believe that it’s not just for someone who has held a strong conviction during one’s entire life” (Deulkkae 2014, 254–55). He indicates that his objection has been an unstoppable and natural choice. Similarly, Ahn Ji-hwan states,

Some people consider us daydreaming idealists. However, we cannot forget the things we saw, the things that were thrown at us, and the things we had to endure with all of our bodies, the ‘realities’, the images of the enemy. We couldn’t stand aside idly because we saw and felt them. (Ahn Ji-hwan 2014, 196)

Deulkkae and Ahn speak as if their objection has been a natural course of action. From the above quotes, I suggest that conscientious objection conveys a certain sense of inevitability that cannot be reduced to a fateful decision or utility. I find a similar sense of inevitability in Japanese philosopher Sasaki Ataru’s discussion on how reading is a revolutionary act. Sasaki writes that

As I cannot but have read, as it cannot but have been written there like that, as I cannot but think that line is anyways right, as I cannot but have found those words shining black on the white surface, my life cannot but be dragged by those words. (2012, 87)

From the perspective of mainstream politics, the objectors’ words appear simply idealistic and incomprehensible. However, as Sasaki had no choice but to be affected by what he read, Deulkkae and Ahn’s words show that they have no choice but to
be affected by their irreversible ‘readings’ or life experiences. Hence, I argue that if conscientious objectors detach themselves from the whole or distance themselves from the interpretive centre, they will remain significant in themselves because their choice is inevitable.

Along with this sense of inevitability, the objectors defy the common sense that a mere individual action will not go very far in transforming society. In a letter to his friends, Kim Hoon-tae, a conscientious objector, tells how he fights the triteness of the everyday and how this is significant for him. He writes,

Above all, I try to live wholeheartedly. Hence, I keep a diary, meditate, and pray. Every day, I desperately struggle to go beyond the trite daily life. …Is there really any hope? I don’t know. Probably I’ll always end up losing. But it’s okay because, through this endless game, I can feel that I’m alive. Whether I win or lose doesn’t matter much. (Kim Hoon-tae 2008, 161)

Conscientious objectors, including Kim, defy the social utility approach to explain their motivation because living their lives according to their rules matters to them. In this vein, the objectors constantly flee from the familiar way of perceiving and representing things. I argue that the objectors resemble the ‘war machine’ by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus (2005 [1987]). The ‘war machine’ does not worry about its function, place, and utility in society. Instead, the ‘war machine’ brings out its potentiality and proclaims its inevitability through its actions. In contrast, the state has no ‘war machine’ but “it can only appropriate one in the form of a military institution” (2005 [1987], 355). Even if the state persecutes, the objectors still find significance on their own.

So far, I have read the text produced by conscientious objectors in light of the idea that, for the Body without Organs, every constituent is significant in itself. I focused on two points. First, there is no predetermined function and place for each constituent. Second, even if detached from the whole, the constituents still convey significance. Through my reading, I have suggested that the objectors reject one’s role of serving, being defined by, and becoming significant in relation to the vital organ, such as the military, which acts in the name of the survival of the whole.
In the section 6.2, I have read the texts produced by the South Korean conscientious objectors through the ideas on the Body without Organs, which I discussed in Chapter 3. In the first section of this section, I have read the texts produced by conscientious objectors in light of the idea that every individual coexists with other individuals non-hierarchically. In the second section, I have read the objectors’ announcements to refuse military conscription while considering the idea that, for a Body without Organs, there is no predetermined function and place for each potential constituent. Through this section, I argue that the objectors propose alternative imaginations of bodily organisation, which can also reimagine the security of the South Korean body politic by challenging the military’s centrality in securing lives.

Summary

I have juxtaposed my interpretation of what the South Korean government says about conscientious objection with my interpretation of what South Korean conscientious objectors say about their lives and decisions. Through the juxtaposition, I have shown that the South Korean state imagines organically organised individual and collective bodies. For the state, each constituent of a body (as an organ-part) is subordinate to a vital centre and defined in relation to the survival of the vital commanding centre.

I have argued that, against the state, South Korean conscientious objectors suggest alternative modes of bodily organisation which can reimagine national security. I have demonstrated that the objectors imagine individual and collective bodies, organised in accordance with Deleuze and Guattari’s the Body without Organs. For the objectors, this body politic is based on the premise that every constituent coexists with other individuals non-hierarchically and that every constituent is complete in itself. The juxtaposition of my readings has shown that, at a personal level, the objectors disrupt militarised national security, a social imagination and a prioritised interpretive centre for understanding and practising domestic and international politics. In this regard, what makes the objectors politically significant is that, instead of participating in prioritising the state’s interpretive centre, such as the military
conscription as the rite of passage, they propose different interpretive centres premised on their life experiences.

Imagining bodily organisation is significant for securing a body politic because it is a quality which pertains to the hierarchical relationship between the part and the whole. This quality also simultaneously frames individual and collective bodies, such as the military and the state. In Chapter 3, I also suggested that immunity is significant because it is a physical quality which pertains to the relationship between the self and others, which applies to both individual and collective bodies. Therefore, in the next chapter, I juxtapose my reading of the South Korean state’s narratives with my reading of the objectors’ narratives through the concept of immunity.
7 ANALYSIS 2: IMAGINING NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH IMMUNITY

The main objective of this chapter is to show, in the context of South Korean conscientious objectors, how reimagining the human body while considering the body’s immunity can also reimagine national security. This chapter is the second of the three analyses that study how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security. In Chapter 3, I discussed that the human body’s immunity is significant for imagining national security because, like organisation, immunity represents the relationship between the self/inside and the other/outside (see section 3.2). Such a relationship can simultaneously frame the imaginations of the human body and national security. In Chapter 3, I also juxtaposed two concepts that represent immunity in contrasting ways: xenophobic immunity with xenophilic immunity (see section 3.2). Therefore, as in the previous chapter, this chapter also produces two readings and juxtaposes them to reveal and challenge the institutionalised modes of knowing national security. The first is my reading of the South Korean state’s narratives in light of xenophobic immunity. The second is my reading of the conscientious objectors’ narratives through xenophilic immunity.

The main argument of this chapter is that South Korean conscientious objectors suggest alternative modes of immunity that can reimagine national security. In particular, the conscientious objectors’ narrations of their experiences indicate xenophilic immunity’s less self-centred ontology and more flexible and engaging relationship between the self and others. Meanwhile, the South Korean state has imagined national security through xenophobic immunity obsessed with a tightly bounded self’s violent defence against foreign invasions.

In section 7.1, I read the South Korean court decisions and other relevant texts on conscientious objectors produced by the state in light of the two ideas derived from the literature on xenophobic immunity. The first idea is that one’s body is always already given and identical to oneself. The second idea is that the non-self, which
invades one’s body from the outside, must be eliminated (see sub-section 3.2.1). My reading of the South Korean state’s texts demonstrates that the South Korean state has imagined national security through the ideas of xenophobic immunity.

In section 7.2, I read South Korean conscientious objectors’ announcements of their intention to refuse the military draft and my interviews with them through the two ideas derived from the most current thinking on xenophilic immunity. First, living amongst others is an ontological condition of existence. Second, through engaging others, one constantly becomes something else. (see sub-section 3.2.2). My reading of South Korean conscientious objectors’ texts suggests that they can reimagine national security through the ideas of xenophilic immunity. Then, I wrap up the chapter by summarising my two readings and discussing the implications of juxtaposing the two readings.

7.1 Securing boundaries with capacities for violence

I aim to disclose a familiar way of imagining national security in South Korea. In particular, I show how the South Korean state has imagined national security through xenophobic immunity. To this end, as stated in the introduction of this chapter, I read the South Korean court decisions on conscientious objectors and other relevant texts through two ideas pertinent to xenophobic immunity (see sub-section 3.2.1).

First, I read the research material in light of the idea that one’s body is always given, autonomous, and identical to oneself (see Napier 2013, 22; Esposito 2011, 159). In particular, the South Korean state’s texts propound the state’s sovereignty within the boundaries of the South Korean body politic (Martin 1990, 411; Schmitt 1985). I focus on the Constitutional Court’s decision that the government can take extra-constitutional measures to protect the prioritised ‘national security’. The decision states,
The Constitution Article 37(2) stipulates that the freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted for national security purposes. In particular, the Constitution Article 76(1) allows the President “to take urgent measures for the maintenance of national security or public peace and order”. The Constitution identifies the ‘national security’ as a vital constitutional benefit. (Constitutional Court 2004)

The above decision endows the concept of ‘national security’ with a sense of emergency, justifying the government’s violation of the freedoms and rights of citizens. In addition, the Constitutional Court diagnoses that the international environment also warrants exceptional measures to protect the state’s sovereignty. The court’s decision states,

For the law to recognise conscientious objection, certain minimum conditions should be met. Such conditions would include establishing a peaceful co-existence system between North and South Korea and, in the long term, creating an international security order that does not call for an arms race. However, the prospect for meeting such conditions is currently negative. (Constitutional Court 2004, 28)

I suggest that since the court’s ‘certain minimal conditions’ are unattainable with South Korean conscientious objectors’ capacity, they are left in a precarious position, subject to exceptional measures. In light of the above quotes, I bring up Carl Schmitt. In Political Theology, Schmitt claims that the “sovereign is he who decides upon the exception” (1985 [1922], 5). According to Schmitt, the sovereign declares an emergency or the state of exception to overtake the law (e.g. the constitutional rights and legal procedures) in the name of protecting the law (see Agamben 1995; Murray 2010, 65; Huysmans 2008, 176). Similarly, in the court’s decision, freedom of expression, a basic constitutional right, is suspended in the name of promoting national security. Yet, promoting national security is supposed to guarantee citizens’ constitutional rights better. Hence, I suggest that the court’s decision signals a predicament in which national security is ultimately unattainable in the conflict between ‘national security’ and ‘freedom of conscience’.61

In my interpretation, this predicament calls for imagining a pre-existing state-person with which people can identify, sympathise, and prioritise. For example, to justify the suppression of freedom of expression, the South Korean Supreme Court’s 2016

61 Campbell indicates such paradox through stating that “with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming” (1992, 12).
decision on a conscientious objector references tragedies of Korean history. The decision names those who lamented the country’s demise as if they lost their own body or parents and committed suicide when Korea became a protectorate of Imperial Japan in 1910. In South Korea’s Confucian culture, imagining a parent figure of a state is not difficult. The decision also brings up the Korean ‘Comfort Women’ and forced labourers of Imperial Japan to emphasise the need to prioritise the security of the collective body. The court’s comment seems to project the image which children who lost their parents are being violated by other adults. I suggest that what underlies the decision is the image of a state-person who dwells and competes in a world filled with threatening other state persons; it can die like a person; when it dies, its constituents will be subject to the same destiny. Then, individuals should equate their sovereignty with the survival of the pre-existing state-person, even when the state-person confiscates their rights. As such, the South Korean state claims sovereignty within its boundaries by referencing an emergency to national security, an emergency to the pre-existing state-person or a parent figure which supposedly guarantees the subjects’ sovereignty. In this process, the South Korean state upholds the survival of the collective body as the ultimate reference for violating individuals’ sovereignty.

The South Korean state’s texts and actions also underscore that the body politic is the policing body which identifies the native or legal residents against alien or illegal intruders (see Martin 1990, 412; Nilsson 1985, 21). I focus on how the state attempts to control the objector’s potential to become something else by demanding consistency and imposing categories in their experiences. During my fieldwork in Seoul in December 2019, I attended trials of several objectors at the Seoul Western District Court. At the trials, the prosecutors posed direct questions about the contents of the accused’s conscience, for example, challenging religious doctrines, often in a didactic manner. According to Lee Yong-Suk, a peace activist and conscientious objector at World Without War, the prosecutors tend to go beyond their prerogative when, per legal principles, they should have only determined whether the accused’s actions were guided by the accused’s conscience (2021, 56). Also, during the trial, if an accused objected to conscription based on religious beliefs,

62 World Without War is a South Korean non-governmental organisation (NGO) which started in 2003 to promote pacifism and anti-militarism. One of its main activities has been to support the conscientious objectors to military conscription.
the prosecutors asked the accused to submit their mobile phone GPS records to confirm that he had been attending church regularly. The prosecutors also investigated the accused’s FPS (first-person shooter) gameplay records and requested them to submit the records of movie ticket reservations or movie downloads. Such demands are made to, according to Kim Hyung-Soo (2021), whose hearing I attended in the winter of 2019, “figure out if the accused had enjoyed violent contents”. In my interpretation, such violations mark the desire to impose boundaries to render something understandable. With the imposition, the state can ‘understand’, identify, and categorise who fits into what.

In addition, the Constitutional Court suggests that the society must achieve a certain degree of unification, a ‘national community’. Meeting this demand would require policing against ambivalence in the community. For example, in 2011, the court’s decision discussed how introducing an alternative service would affect the military’s combat capacity. To answer this, the court questions if the sense of the ‘national community’ is strong enough to withstand challenges. According to the decision,

> It is questionable if the sense of national community or the sense of belonging together, that is, one's willingness as a member of a nation to honourably devote oneself for the survival and security of the nation and sacrifice oneself for other members, is mature enough. (Constitutional Court 2011, 54)

The decision continues to propound that draft evasion by politicians, businesspeople, high-ranking officials, and their children has caused social division. The decision also brings up the long-standing ideological, generational, and regional conflicts in South Korean society. The court signals that introducing an alternative service for the objectors will exacerbate all these social divisions. Hence, according to the court, the boundaries of the national community should be clearly defined and fixed rather than be subject to constant negotiation by the community members.

Then, in the eyes of the state, recognising individual conscience can become a potentially dangerous pursuit that can create divisions in the ‘national community’. The Constitutional Court’s 2004 decision correctly states that the conscience escapes easy signification or conceptualisation.63 However, when it comes to “balancing the

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63 “In case of the freedom of conscience, balancing the freedom of conscience with public good and relativizing conscience...through the principle of proportionality do not correspond with the nature of the freedom of conscience. If conscience is reduced to correspond with the public good in the
legal benefit between the duty to the national defence and the freedom to realise conscience”, the conscience is reduced to being the antithesis of the public good or clashing with national security. The Constitutional Court’s decision states,

Hence, what is at stake with the freedom of conscience is not harmonising and balancing the freedom of conscience and the public good to realise the legal benefit for the both. The only consideration should be choosing between the ‘freedom of conscience’ and ‘public good’. (Constitutional Court 2004, 12)

Additionally, the court suggests that the decision “comes down to deciding whether the common good of national security can be achieved efficiently despite the alternative service is legislated to make an exception to the citizens’ duty to military service” (ibid., 13). In the above statements, the court avoids considering whether the human conscience is a fundamental human condition rather than a certain quality a person might or might not have and to be weighed by the state. In this regard, I suggest that the court’s refusal to balance the legal benefit between the public good of national security and the freedom of conscience is an attempt to police against ambivalence in understanding military service duty and national security that minority conscience can raise. By refusing to recognise conscience as a fundamental human condition, the court renders the minority conscience secondary and even dangerous to the conscription system. Overall, my reading shows that the South Korean state makes the objectors’ minority conscience a source of uncertainty for the military conscription, which needs to be policed.

So far, I have read the South Korean courts’ decisions and other relevant texts in light of the idea that one’s body is always already given and identical to oneself. My reading has shown that the South Korean state claims sovereignty within its boundaries by prioritising the security of its imagined collective body over individuals’ sovereignty. My reading has also suggested that the South Korean state polices against ambivalent elements that can blur the boundaries of its identity. I have focused on the character of the body politic as sovereign and pregiven in the scheme of xenophobic immunity. Therefore, I proceed to shed light on the character of the relationship between the self and the others. I read the research material while considering the second idea pertaining to xenophobic immunity.

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course of balancing the legal benefit or if conscience is distorted and refracted, it is no longer recognisable as ‘conscience”’ (Constitutional Court 2004, 11).
Second, I read the texts produced by the South Korean state and other relevant texts through the idea that the non-self which invades one’s body from the outside must be eliminated. (see Martin 1990, 421; Cohen 2012, 69; Nilsson 1987, 2; see also subsection 3.3.1). The questions thrown at South Korean conscientious objectors liken the state or the collective body to a battlefield or an imperilled nation whose boundary is constantly besieged and threatened by alien invaders who only intend destruction. Lee Yong-Suk, tried 20 years ago for refusing to enlist, recalls the prosecutor’s question, “Isn’t the military needed for not only invading others, but also for protecting oneself and one’s family from such invasion?” “A robber tries to rape your younger sister, but you see a gun next to you. What will you do?” (Lee Yong-Suk, 2020). Through his question, the prosecutor indicates that capacities for violence and survival are inseparable. From a body politic perspective, the prosecutor’s comment parallels the belief that one’s immune system, as the soldier-like guarantor of security, ensures the integrity of one’s body against invasive germs, viruses, parasites, and cancerous cells.

According to World Without War, prosecutors have repeatedly raised similar questions during the trials of other conscientious objectors. Also, the Alternative Service Review Committee raised identical questions during interviews. I list a few examples of these questions.

What are your opinions on self-defence? How will you handle the danger if you or your family’s lives are in danger due to violence from the outside?

Is the violence to resist an invasion from the outside against your conscience? What are your opinions on the Korean independence movement’s armed resistance against Imperial Japan?

What are your opinions on the violent resistance? How do you see the armed civilians of Gwangju in May 1980? If you were there, what would you do? (World Without War 2021)

The prosecutors and the reviewers are not only looking for contradictions in the answers of the objectors. I suggest that the questions promote the idea of ‘peace and security through violent capacities’ or that violence or capacities for violence are the best or the only way to achieve peace and security. The questions demand conscientious objectors to identify the existential threats (e.g., antigens) and the
threatened or vulnerable regions (e.g., wounds and openings), deliberately painting the picture of conscientious objectors as standing confused on a battlefield.

Gender often plays a significant role in such repeatedly asked questions which propound the idea of ‘peace and security through violent capacities’. During Lee Yong-Suk’s trial, the prosecutors often mentioned the “Comfort Women” to make their case. They asked, “Can the accused be sure that your ‘peaceful method’ will prevent the cases like the Comfort Women from happening again?” Similar questions are asked repeatedly, such as “Why does the accused think Imperial Japan victimised the Comfort Women?” Or worse, “What will the accused do if the Japanese military takes the accused’s female friends to make them sex slaves?” (Lee Yong-Suk, 2020). These explicitly gendered questions are asked to scratch the conscience and sincerity of the objector both in terms of gender and loyalty to one’s country. Such either/or format questions can condition and pressure conscientious objectors to choose from only two answers as if he has to choose a side in a battle. However, either response will undermine the sincerity of his conscience (for example, non-violence). The possibility of acting and reasoning in numerous ways is unthinkable if one is standing on a battlefield. Also, as the questions depict a battlefield in which one cannot but kill the non-selves invading from the outside, they invoke strong emotions and a sense of urgency. Overall, the state presents the conscientious objector’s situation as if he is on a battlefield and makes it easier for the ‘peace and security through violence’ idea to rule out as ideological or unrealistic any non-violent and non-military solution.

The research materials hint that the South Korean court decision’s logic parallels the idea that more immune cells will ensure better health and a chance of survival against the non-selves. For example, in the frame of xenophobic immunity, different immune cells are treated as ammunitions, vigilant soldiers, reconnaissance squads, or intelligence services protecting one’s body (Nilsson 1987, 24). The Constitutional Court’s 2018 decision demonstrates that the number of conscripts in the South Korean military is the most crucial criterion to consider when deciding whether to introduce an alternative service. The decision states,
We must consider the natural reduction in potential human resources due to the rapidly declining birth rate. … Hence, the state cannot risk a significant loss in military human resources by a blind belief in scientific and technological developments. … Although the proportion of conscientious objectors among the potential conscripts is currently small…this proportion could rise when the military tension rises between South and North Korea. (Constitutional Court 2018)

The court’s decision adds that, even when sympathetic to the introduction of the alternative service, an important precondition is that its negative influence on the number of potential conscripts should be minimal. The decision states, “the introduction of an alternative service should not have a significantly negative influence on our defence, even though the number of the conscientious objectors slightly rises” (Constitutional Court 2018). The court is indicating that the number of potential conscripts is in direct proportion to national security and that the introduction of an alternative service has the potential to disrupt the conscription.

The above quotes expect the conscripts to function as soldiers who can defend the collective body irrespective of any odds they might encounter. In other words, the decision indicates that the conscripts’ soldierly bodies, uniform and unyielding, must overwrite their natural bodies, which are chaotic and vulnerable. The decision adds that

…if conscientious objectors are removed from the line of defence and carry out their alternative service in places that have nothing to do with national security, people's perspective on national security and the morale of the soldiers who are bearing arms at the forefront and risking their lives to fulfil their duty might be severely damaged. Also, as a result, the number of people dodging conscription under the pretext of conscience might surge. (Constitutional Court 2011)

In terms of quantity, this quote indicates that the number of soldiers bearing arms directly relates to the military combat capacity. In terms of quality, this quote promotes the image of an ideal soldier whose most important function is to carry out his duty acquiescently and with high morale, even in the face of the horror and violence of war. Such an expectation of the conscripts’ character parallels what people commonly expect the human immune system will do while defending the body against invasive external pathogens—that a sufficient quantity of immune cells

64 This also relates to the formula of a soldier possessing both the political body and the natural body which I discussed in Chapter 6 while quoting Kantorowicz’s ‘King’s two bodies’ (1957).
will mechanically fight and kill with the sole purpose of the body’s survival without thinking for themselves.

In particular, the South Korean court’s decisions express concern over the potential conscripts coming to possess their own strong convictions. One of the concurring opinions in the decision states that

…after the introduction of an alternative service, … there is the chance of a surge in the number of people who justify their objection based on their own private worldview and conviction or on their religion, no matter the religion demands the objection. This is problematic because most religions teach to respect life. (Constitutional Court 2018; 2004)

The court is wary that, through the introduction of an alternative service, concern for individual convictions will overwhelm the willingness to carry out military service. Similarly, in popular belief, the immune system is not supposed to relate independently and unexpectedly with the antigens. Therefore, I borrow from the politics of using HIV/AIDS as a metaphor for ‘social evil’ (see Sontag 1989; Edelman 1994, 81; Waldby 1996, 81–85). I suggest that the above quotes can imagine the conscientious objectors (their actions and ideas) as a threat that can potentially ‘disarm’ the military’s morale, jeopardising the collective body as if infected by HIV.

So far, I have read the South Korean court decisions and other relevant texts in light of the idea that the non-self which invades one’s body from the outside must be eliminated. My reading has suggested that the South Korean state has represented the body as a battlefield, whereby it is easier to rule out any non-violent and non-military solutions as unrealistic. I have also shown that the South Korean courts’ decisions resemble the belief that more immune cells will provide better health parallels the idea that the number of conscripts who will carry out their tasks without questioning is vital for security.

The section 7.1 is the first part of this chapter’s juxtaposition of the imaginings of xenophobic immunity with those of xenophilic immunity. I have read the texts on conscientious objection in light of the ideas on xenophobic immunity. In the first part of the section, my reading has been centred on that one’s body is always already
given and identical to oneself. In the second part of the section, my reading has focused on that the non-self which invades my body from the outside must be eliminated. Overall, my reading of the texts in this section suggests that the South Korean state has imagined national security through the ideas pertinent to xenophobic immunity. However, xenophobic immunity only partially describes the immune system, a frame for imagining national security. In the next section, I discuss how conscientious objectors can reimagine national security in light of xenophilic immunity.

7.2 Constantly regenerating boundaries open to differences

This section aims to propose an alternative way of imagining national security in South Korea. In particular, I show how the South Korean conscientious objectors has imagined national security through xenophilic immunity. To this end, as stated in beginning of this chapter, I read the research material, the South Korean conscientious objectors’ announcements and other relevant texts through two ideas pertinent to xenophilic immunity (see Napier 2012; 2013; 2017; Esposito 2011; see also sub-section 3.2.2).

First, I read the research material through the idea that living amongst others is an ontological condition of existence. In other words, as stated in sub-section 3.2.2, one’s body is not simply given to oneself because one must actively engage the unknown and the ‘non-selves’, bringing heterogeneous elements together. To begin with, South Korean conscientious objectors’ writings indicate that one travels in and out of various environments and relationships. For example, many conscientious objectors have suggested that being implicated in the lives of uncountable others is inevitable. In his announcement in 2013, Park Jeong-Hoon stated that, by refusing conscription, he intended to become friends with the people who were alienated and violated by the state. He writes that
I cannot live peacefully alone. Peace is not merely the absence of war. Peace must be the absence of fear in our bodies and minds and between you and me. …Workers are being abruptly fired from factories, the poor are being expelled into the streets, speechless beings of nature are dying, and women, sexual minorities, and the disabled are alienated and discriminated against. All these amount to silent massacres committed on the battlefield of everyday life. To refuse forced enlistment by the state is the most active peace action I can carry out. (Park Jeong-Hoon 2014, 239–40)

Park expresses his willingness to sympathise and link his life with the othered, which relates to the realisation that seemingly distant entities, such as the abruptly fired workers or the dying nature, can constitute each other’s lives. Similarly, Deulkkae, who announced his objection to the conscription in 2013, also indicates that others are not simply something other than the self. In his announcement, Deulkkae reflects upon the unintended consequences of his life, inevitably journeying in and out of various environments and relationships. He writes,

Albeit little, we share the profit when a South Korean weapons company sells death to others. The profit may be direct, such as an increase in my stock price or my pension, or indirect, such as economic growth. Apart from weapons, the meat I eat, the car I drive, the electricity I’m using now, and many more are the products of violating others’ rights. They destroy the environment, create inequality, and start conflicts and wars somewhere on Earth. All of us are implicated in the tragedies of Milyang (where elderly people fought to protect their rural hometown against electricity transmission towers being erected without proper consultation), Orissa (where the native farmers lost their land to POSCO, a South Korean steel manufacturer), and Iraq (where lives were lost to the war over oil). (Deulkkae 2014, 254)

Deulkkae suggests that his objection is motivated by being aware of his responsibility for any suffering or sacrifices of others, that his everyday might depend on destroying someone else’s life. Similarly, in The Tree of Knowledge, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1992) suggest that no life lives entirely according to genetic plans, irrespective of environmental changes. Instead, Maturana and Varela argue that life is about continuously coming across others who ceaselessly transform one’s thoughts and body within the structural limitations (1992, 180, 193). Thus, one’s responses to others fuel one’s incessant becoming into something different from just before. Similarly, in the above quote, Deulkkae conveys a visceral sense of inevitability, that his existence inevitably influences and impacts other lives and the surrounding environment, no matter intentionally or unintentionally.
Also, Deulkkae shows that such realisation is a strong motivation for change. Realising that he cannot help but implicate himself in the sufferings of others, Deulkkae had to act. He writes that

I could have blamed the structure or the capitalism. However, individuals like myself comprise such a system. Once I became aware of my contribution to this system, however small, I found my life a lot more uncomfortable. As I became more conscious of the implications of my actions for others, particularly the tragedies that others are suffering, I could no longer look the other way for my convenience. …To continuously reflect on my relationships and thereby make efforts to change my life are also the practices for opposing war and violence. (Deulkkae 2014, 254)

Upon such realisation, some might ignore such involvement, strengthening the sense of the self. Yet, Deulkkae indicates that conscientious objection was an attempt to balance out such influence as his existence is bound to influence others negatively. I suggest Deulkkae acted in the scheme of xenophilic immunity, in which interactions with the non-selves constantly renew the self’s immunitary boundaries. Similarly, Napier states that remaking the self’s boundaries occurs “not only as a matter of protection but as a matter of creation” (2013, 39). Overall, beyond sympathising with others’ predicaments, the objectors find themselves inevitably involved in others’ environments and relationships. This realisation can change their relationships with others.

Also, South Korean conscientious objectors’ writings demonstrate that one must make new productive connections and syntheses out of the inescapably inchoate and disorganising qualities of others (see Napier 2020a, 2). In particular, I see a parallel between, on the one hand, unconditionally sympathising with others, be it an enemy, foreigner, or the part of the self that one is supposed to suppress, and, on the other hand, understanding the immune system works actively with uncertainties such as viruses. For example, conscientious objectors express alternative modes of relating with others by unconditionally embracing the unfamiliar. For instance, Kim Dong-Hyun, who announced his objection in 2013, suggests that one can be peaceful by opening oneself to the unknown and recognising that people are eventually the same. He writes that

What is the idea of pure Korean ethnicity? There are no people that didn’t witness wars. Also, during wars, different people are bound to mix blood. The idea of ethnicity is false and illusory. … Everyone is the child of their mothers who carried
the baby for nine months. There’s neither a not-precious nor a not-dignified life. (Kim Dong-Hyun 2014, 235)

Kim’s quote suggests more than a simple emotional appeal to overcome ethnicity or nationality or that people are pretty much the same everywhere. Instead, from the perspective of xenophilic immunity, he points to the precondition for exploring the othered, which is the unconditional acceptance of the foreign as an equal counterpart. I suggest that the objectors’ unquestioning acceptance of incomprehensible others relates to Emmanuel Levinas’ discussion on hospitality. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas states that the others manifest themselves through the ‘face’, an unmediated, ambiguous, and incomprehensible expression. Instead, the ‘face’ is an ethically appealing call for recognition of and response to their vulnerable humanity (2018 [1961], 35). Levinas believed that one’s encountering the other’s face calls for hospitality or welcoming others into one’s life, something that inevitably arises from the existence of others (ibid., 37, 152). Similarly, I suggest that the objectors’ reflections on their sympathising with the seemingly distant, unrelated, and disorganised others lead to the realisation that one is not separate from the sufferings of others.

As such, the objectors express that their primary action in relating with others is deliberately sympathising with others. Through this process, the objectors prioritise discovering the self in others over sacrificing others for survival. For example, Jeon Gil-Soo, who announced his objection in 2011, says that he realised how the military could blind him from seeing that the othered are humans just like him. He states,

> Even if I only need to deal with the enemy soldiers, the soldiers are not the decision-makers, but rather humans like myself who were dragged to the battlefield. However, the military is where I should forget that the enemy is just the same human as me. (Jeon Gil-Soo 2014, 218)

Jeon discovers the self in the ‘enemy’ soldiers as both are subjugated by the powerful. Such realisation can destabilise the self’s supposed boundaries.

> Also, the disorganising others can express the qualities within the self which should have been eliminated. For example, Lee Joon-Gyu, who announced his objection in 2011, states that his ‘cowardly and feeble heart’ made him sympathise with the suffering of others. He writes,
I hated my cowardly and feeble heart that can neither break away from nor confront painful memories. However, now I know it’s the same cowardly and feeble heart that made me face my friends suffering from violence, my miserable share in such violence, and my potential to become a murderer during a war. Now I understand that such heart is the most valuable, because it enables me to sympathise with the others in pain, although I might not understand them completely. (Lee Joon-Gyu 2014, 205)

Many conscientious objectors celebrate values such as the ‘feeble heart’, usually considered ‘unmanly’ from the perspective of ideal soldiers. Still, the objectors celebrate such qualities as naturally present in human beings and discover the potential for resistance in vulnerable human bodies. In this respect, the objectors celebrate how uncertainty and disorganisation can potentially blur and challenge the familiar boundaries of the supposedly consistent and coherent self.

In the first part of 7.2, I read South Korean conscientious objectors’ announcements while considering the idea that living amongst others is an ontological condition of existence. Through the reading, I have shown that South Korean conscientious objectors find themselves deeply affecting and affected by others and that such realisation can transform their relationships with others. My reading has also shown that the objectors unconditionally find humanity and vulnerability in others, which can change the self’s boundaries. Overall, my reading has shown that conscientious objectors propose a xenophilic immunitary body that is not completely autonomous and sovereign since one cannot coexist with others and actively engage their otherness. Next, I focus on the implications of encountering others or what those xenophilic encounters can do through engaging otherness.

Second, I read the texts produced by South Korean conscientious objectors while considering xenophilic immunity’s idea that, through taking the risk of actively engaging the non-selves, one constantly becomes something else (see Napier 2017, 75). Xenophobic immunity posits that the non-selves are invading the body, a battlefield between the self and the others. However, the conscientious objectors’ writings indicate that one transforms the grounds for defining the self’s boundaries through engaging otherness (see Esposito 2011, 17; Napier 2017, 78; see also subsection 3.2.2). For example, Nalmaeng, who announced his objection in 2010, shared
how engaging with peace activists motivated him to object to the conscription. He states,

Thanks to the people I met at the World Without War, I’ve become a vegetarian and started riding a bike. I also started thinking about the lifestyle of earning less, spending less, and doing as little harm to the world as possible. … However, the objection isn’t the result of my doing only. Even a timid and hesitant person like myself could have confidence in the objection mostly because I was motivated by the people leading a non-violent lifestyle. For now, it’s more accurate to say that the objection is, rather than something special, an honest answer drawn from the context of my life. (Nalmaeng 2014, 201)

Nalmaeng transformed himself after he encountered the non-violent lifestyle of peace activists. His quote suggests that he has come to accept that he was not separate from the things he learned. This indicates that, through peace activism, he did not just change his lifestyle; his reference points for understanding and representing the world have also changed.

Similarly, in his announcement in 2017, Park Sang-wook gives an account of how reflecting upon his relationship with his father’s dark revelation made him aware that whatever is taken for granted may not be for granted. Park’s father had served in the South Korean special force for fourteen years. Park believed that serving was honourable until, one day, his drunk father told Park he was one of the martial forces leading the Gwangju Massacre in 1980. And he said to Park that this was to crush the rebellion ‘instigated by the North Korean spies’. Park’s father’s understanding of history completely differed from what Park had learned in school. Park began to wonder if his father’s violent temper towards different political views is closely related to his experience in the military and the Gwangju Massacre. This episode also made Park reflect upon his school days too. Although he was a victim of bullying, he also bullied those weaker than him. He stayed under the radar at high school to avoid bullying, but he also stood aside when others were bullied. His teachers were also violent. He realised that schools surprisingly resemble the military. At the announcement’s end, he states,

Now I’m going to be free from my father. … [through the conscientious objection] I came to raise questions by being aware that whatever is taken for granted may not be for granted. I raised such questions several times since I began pondering about the objection and, until now, am awaiting trial and imprisonment. I will continue to improve myself as long as I keep raising such questions. (Park Sang-wook 2017)
In the quote, Park’s reference points for understanding and representing the world are changing through reflecting upon his relationships with his father and with his school days. I suggest that Park’s questioning ‘whatever that is taken for granted may not be for granted’ is a way of letting his grounds or reference points for defining his boundaries be affected by others. In this regard, Park demonstrates an ethics of coming across differences, a radical affirmation of possibilities for engaging something that we can neither anticipate nor process through the existing logic, morality, and aesthetics.

In addition, I show how conscientious objectors can be affective in a way that transforms the grounds for defining the self. Choi Joon-Ho announced his objection in 2003. He shared how respect for and coexistence with nature enable different representations of peace. He states that,

> These days, I cut down on meat consumption. I also hand wash my clothes with almost no detergent. I’m not a vegetarian, but I will not sacrifice my livestock, which I raised and looked after, just for my own survival. …My reasons for the objection are ‘to live a life that coexists with the nature and to protect my conviction about ecological life and community’. In other words, I want to respect the nature itself as a god and create a small community where its members do honest farming. …I don’t know how to put things more eloquently. (Choi Joon-Ho 2008, 168–69)

With Choi’s quote, through which beliefs and wishes are simply set out, I focus on what the quote can do to the readers. In my interpretation, his vision does not demand that his readers accept his ideals, nor does he attempt to persuade them. However, his vision is still affective in that it firmly expresses his ideals as legitimate and valid to himself. Through Choi’s words, one might be able to sense that peace may be something more than an absence of physical violence from the outside. Hence, I suggest that the readers of his announcement are encouraged to explore a different ground where his vision can seem worth considering. Next, I discuss how the self will transform through actively engaging otherness.

Xenophobic immunity focuses on boosting the self’s capacity to resist the invading non-selves. However, South Korean conscientious objectors’ writings suggest that, as one engages in otherness, one can become incomprehensible through the existing categories. Such a becoming does not posit a fixed start and end (see Napier 2017, 79; Colebrook 2002, xiv; Stagoll 2010, 26; see also section 3.3.2). For example, Oh
Soo-Hwan, a conscientious objector, felt this unintelligibility of the self when filling out the documents to apply for the alternative service. He writes,

I wondered if I could present an articulate, coherent, and consistent story of myself and my thoughts. Unlike many other objectors who have openly participated in peace activism since they were young, I’ve never considered myself an activist. I didn’t object to the conscription because I was an activist. The duty to military service was levied on me, and only then did I object whilst still wondering what to do. The objection is only a part of my pacifist conviction, still in the making. What can I say about those intermittently ‘blank’ periods when I wasn’t outwardly expressing my conviction? How can I pick out, categorise, and convey my sudden feelings and thoughts that just came to mind while walking on the street, making small talk with people, or struggling to sleep during sleepless nights? Through what spoken words and written texts could I express my conscience, which has been expressed and refined only bit by bit through how I think, read books and study, befriend and communicate, and how I got to know the society? (Oh Soo-Hwan 2021)

Oh is frustrated that he has to develop coherent testimonies that culminate in a simple picture of himself. He indicates how difficult and confusing it is to ‘become recognisable’ in a consistent, readable, and articulate form.

Similarly, others often question the objectors about why they objected to conscription. Some find it difficult or uncomfortable to give a clear answer because it was simply a natural or an inescapable choice. In another example, Gong Hyun, an objector who announced his objection in 2011, expresses that his objection has been a natural and self-evident choice, which he cannot explain precisely why. He writes,

My life has been ‘self-evident’ in that I hardly spent too much time making choices like this. After assessing the overall situation, I chose whatever I wanted and could. I never separated myself from my life. Hence, I haven’t felt the need to justify or make excuses for myself. Most of my decisions have been natural and self-evident. That’s probably why I didn’t have much to say when people asked me why I objected to the conscription. (Gong Hyun 2014, 221)

I suggest that Gong’s ‘not having much to say’ captures the state’s predicament that fails to determine his cause. Both Oh Soo-Hwan’s and Gong Hyun’s objections emphasise that there is neither a clear starting point (e.g. exactly why one objected) nor a clear ending point (e.g. precisely what one will become through the objection) for their objection. They refuse to give clear cause-effect explanations to their objection apart from that it is a result of their undefinable life experiences and that
it is a choice that will affect their future. Hence, from the state’s perspective, they become incomprehensible through the categories that depict human action, such as determinism, efficiency, and selfishness. They are beyond the state’s demand to know ‘why something happened’.

I also add that, with enhanced individualism and human rights in South Korean society, since 2010, many objectors have started giving ‘personal reasons’ for their objection instead of pacifism and anti-militarism. Many objectors have disclosed their very human and personal fear of violence or their femininity and boldly declared they are not fit to be soldiers. For example, Yoo-Jung Min-seok, a conscientious objector, writes that

As a feminist and a gay who opposes and is beyond gender compartmentalisation, I refuse the military that only teaches, infuses, and re-socialises uniform masculinity. …The timid and awkward woman warrior in me refuses with all her heart and body the militarism and male chauvinistic military that promote comradeship and competition over sisterhood and co-existence. (Yoo-Jung Min-seok 2014)

Similarly, many objectors state that their overwhelming and fundamentally non-representational personal experiences have motivated their objection. For example, Choi Jin, who announced his objection in 2004, shared the experience of losing his son. He linked his experience with an Iraqi father who lost his son,

My son lived for 32 days. He spent most of his life inside the incubator, ambulance, and surgery. …There was nothing I could do for my son. My only job was to pay for the hospital bill. I have never been so powerless in my life. His death was something no human could help, but so was my grief. Then, what would it feel like to lose a child because of some people, war, or oil? Whenever I stood before the nursery window to see my child, the crying Iraqi father holding his dead child’s body flashed across my mind. That image didn’t feel very distant. If I was in that situation, I cannot say that I would still do nothing. …If the dearest things in my life are destroyed and killed for incomprehensible reasons, and if I had to experience the powerlessness in the face of the heart-breaking sight…. (Choi Jin 2014, 185, 186–87)

Choi conveys the powerlessness in the face of losing a child, which is an overwhelming experience that one can only feel for oneself and fail to represent or process through words directly. Then, a distant other, such as an Iraqi father who had also lost his son, suddenly crosses into Choi’s mind. Like the father who lost his

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65 Napier suggests that, as ‘a search engine of difference’ that takes risk to regenerate the self, the immune system directly denounces determinism, efficiency, and selfishness (Napier 2013, 27).
son, the objectors fear becoming a perpetrator or a machine that can only obey orders. I suggest that such personal experiences can challenge the politics of memory—often, the blind belief in the purity of state violence which deserves sacrifices. In this regard, the objectors become incomprehensible to the state because their personal narratives escape categories such as an independent and sovereign self which acts upon others.

In the second part of section 7.2, I read the texts produced by the objectors through the idea that one constantly becomes something else through engaging the non-selves. The conscientious objectors’ writings demonstrate the propensity to engage otherness to continually define the self’s boundaries anew and become indeterminable in the eyes of the state. I have shown South Korean conscientious objectors have demonstrated that, instead of attempting to eliminate otherness, transforming and regenerating the body through engaging otherness is necessary for the inevitable coexistence with others.

The section 7.2 is the second part of this chapter’s juxtaposition of the imagining of xenophobic immunity with the imagining of xenophilic immunity. I have read the texts produced by South Korean conscientious objectors in light of the ideas on xenophilic immunity. My reading has demonstrated that conscientious objectors propose a body not simply given to oneself as the body, living amongst others, actively engages with otherness. I have also shown that the objectors propose a body that constantly transforms and regenerates itself. Overall, my reading of the objectors’ texts suggests that the objectors can reimagine national security in ways that resemble the tendencies of xenophilic immunity.

Summary

The objective of this chapter has been to show that reimagining the human body in terms of the body’s immunity can also reimagine national security. I juxtaposed two readings. The first is my reading of the state’s narratives on conscientious objection
in light of the ideas derived from the literature on xenophobic immunity. The first reading has shown that the state understands national security through the ideas that one’s body is always already given and identical to oneself and that the non-self which invades one’s body from the outside must be eliminated. The second is my reading of South Korean conscientious objectors’ narratives on their decision to object the military conscription in light of the ideas derived from the literature on xenophilic immunity. The second reading has demonstrated that the conscientious objectors propose an alternative mode of understanding national security. The alternative mode understands that living amongst others is ontological to one’s existence and that one constantly becomes something else through engaging with others.

Through the juxtaposition, I have argued that South Korean conscientious objectors disrupt the familiar imaginations of national security premised on xenophobic immunity and propose alternative modes of immunity that can reimagine national security. The alternative modes of immunity provide more open frame for how to secure lives. This chapter has also shown that immunity, along with organisation, is a concept that frames both the human body and national security. However, to reiterate, the main objective of my dissertation is to study ‘how reimagining the human body can also reimagine national security’. In this chapter on immunity (Chapter 7) and the previous chapter on organisation (Chapter 6), I mostly focused on the conceptual aspect of imagining the human body. However, imagination synthesises the sensible and the conceptual (Sparks et al. 2022, 2; Elliott 2005, 7; Devetak 2005, 622). Hence, I should also consider the sensible or the untextualisable aspect of imagining the human body. In this regard, in the next chapter, I discuss body politic through affect, the transpersonal intensity that occurs through encounters of bodies and that binds bodies together in specific ways (see Solomon 2017).
8 ANALYSIS 3: AFFECTIVE IMAGINATIONS OF HUMAN BODIES

The previous two analyses (Chapters 6 and 7) have indicated that (re)imagining the human body in terms of organisation and immunity can also (re)imagine the security of the South Korean body politic. Yet, imagining the human body is an affective process as much as a conceptual process. Also, unlike organisation or immunity, affect is not a concept that directly frames individual and collective bodies (see section 5.1). Instead, as I have suggested in Chapter 4, affect is the bodily, unfixed, social, and political capacity to solidify or disrupt certain discourses and identities (see section 4.1).

My main objective for this chapter is to show how imagining the human body is an affective process involving the capture and flight of affect. In particular, I read the visual materials while considering how certain imagination/representations of human bodies facilitates the capture of affect or the flight of affect. In this chapter, I juxtapose my reading of two popular South Korean military reality shows with my reading of two films directed by conscientious objectors. I read the military reality shows in light of the capture of affect. Also, I read the films produced by the objectors through the flight of affect. Recognising that imagining the human body is an affective process is significant because the human body frames the body politic.

The main argument of this chapter is that the bodies which the conscientious objectors’ films imagine can facilitate the flight of affect from the capture of pervasive militarism in South Korean society (see sections 2.1 and 2.2). On the one hand, I suggest that the two military reality shows imagine bodies that quickly make sense. For example, the shows display the bodies that exhibit ideal masculinity and those that strive to get closer to such masculinity. Such bodies are the ‘beautiful bodies’ (see section 4.2) which can facilitate the capture of affect in highly militarised South Korean society. On the other hand, I suggest that the two films directed by the objectors imagine bodies that refuse to easily make sense from the perspective
of military masculinity and make the viewers wander about in sensation. Such bodies are the ‘extreme bodies’ which can facilitate the flight of affect from the state (see section 4.2).

In section 8.2, I show how the capture of affect occurs through popular visual materials, the South Korean military reality shows such as Real Man (2013-2016) and Fake Man (2020). Affect produced through the military is soon captured and processed or invested into certain familiar discourses and identities (see sub-section 4.1.1). In this regard, I discuss the shows while considering how they capture the viewers’ affect by presenting the bodies that seem sensible. From watching the shows, I have identified two devices that facilitate the capture of affect: the contagious celebration of brutal military masculinity and the repeated narratives of rehabilitation and growth. I also discuss that the shows’ capture of affect constitutes the ‘beautiful bodies’ which solidify the organic organisation and xenophobic immunity.

In section 8.3, I show how the flight of affect from the South Korean state happen through two films directed by South Korean conscientious objectors, A Silk Letter (2010) and Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns 2: Breaking a Taboo (2021). Given the unfixed quality of affect, the affective experience cannot be entirely captured (see sub-section 4.1.2). In this regard, I discuss the films while considering how they facilitate the flight of the viewers’ affect through the presentation of the bodies which refuse to make sense easily. From watching the films, I have identified two devices facilitating the flight of affect. The first is assuming a defensive posture in the face of approaching violence. The second is asserting the irreducibility of the self. Also, at the end of the section, I show how the flight of affect involves reimagining bodies or becoming the ‘extreme bodies’, which can make the viewers wander about in sensation. The ‘extreme bodies’ disrupt the organic organisation and xenophobic immunity.
8.1 Militarising capture by masculine soldiers’ bodies

This section is the first part of juxtaposing my reading of popular South Korean military reality shows with my reading of films produced by South Korean conscientious objectors (section 8.2). My objective for this section is to show how the capture of affect occurs through popular visual materials such as military reality shows. I read two popular South Korean military reality shows, *Real Man* (2013-2016) and *Fake Man* (2020), while focusing on the capture of affect. I have chosen the shows for their popularity and content promoting the military and soldiering.

First, I point out that the shows capture the viewers’ affect through the contagious celebration of brutal military masculinity. In particular, I attribute the shows’ popularity to ‘affective contagion’. The contagion works by provoking challenge, ‘stirring up trouble’, inviting the opponents “to come out and play”, and drawing forced responses from the receivers of the challenge. (Kolvraa 2015, 196; see also Brown et al. 2019; Closs Stephens 2016; Merrill et al. 2020). I highlight how the viewers are drawn into the shows’ affectively charged political space, premised on the show’s portrayal of the South Korean military. For example, what stirred up the most trouble in *Real Man* was the glorification and distortion of reality, and this has produced an affective community of viewers. Across news articles and social media, the three seasons of *Real Man* have seen plenty of complaints and debates about the discrepancies between people’s military experiences and what was depicted in the show. *Real Man* glorifies and over-represents what the military wants to show off (e.g., exercises, weaponry, facilities). Throughout the three seasons, the show presents life in the barracks, its state-of-art facilities, and its humorous and friendly atmosphere without hazing across the ranks. Meanwhile, the show surely under-represents the absurdities happening in the military. The military facilities and individual equipment are usually not as new and promising as touted in the show. Also, it is no secret that some conscripts die yearly, become handicapped, or fall victim to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Many reservists suffer from recurring back, shoulder, and knee pain and injuries dating back to their military service. On the surface, such distortions have exacerbated South Korean society’s distrust of and discomfort towards the military. However, I emphasise that the show,
however problematic, has produced affective communities of viewers who try to make sense, however haphazard, of the violence of the conscription system and their own experiences of violence during the service. And in this ‘making sense’, militarisation and masculinity come into play, which I will discuss shortly.

Figure 1. A screenshot from an episode of Real Man (photo by the author)

Similarly, Fake Man also sparked huge controversies throughout its two seasons. A big part of the controversies focused on the sadistic violence of the drill instructors. If Real Man stirred up trouble by under-representing reality, Fake Man provoked it by over-representing reality. According to an analysis of almost 280,000 comments on Season 1 of Fake Man, the most frequently used (26,963 times) word was ‘jinjja’ (‘real’ in Korean) (PD Journal 2020). Such a keyword signals that the viewers found that the show’s brutality better reflects their experiences and imaginations about the military than Real Man. Also, building on Kolvraa’s thoughts, I suggest that Fake Man’s brutality creates an affective residue that is not directly signified but is still present and palpable, an excess of what is presented (2015, 192). Whether the shows’ depictions of ‘reality’ adequately duplicate the ordinary people’s military experience is irrelevant for stirring up trouble. Instead, Fake Man was more of a ‘military pornography’ because it lacked a clear and justifiable reason why the participants had to undergo such sadistic training or why their sufferings needed to be recorded and
shown to the public. During an interview, a drill instructor asks a participant, “You might wet and poop your pants; do you accept?” But, like many pornographic videos, no clear explanations are offered for why one has to roll in the mud until he poops his pants. The viewers are to marvel at the sadistic scenes. In this regard, the sadistic display of violence in *Fake Man* draws the viewers into an affectively charged space. Hence, I argue that *Real Man* and *Fake Man* display the ability to be affectively contagious, encouraging the public to form an “affectively charged political space” (ibid., 195; see also Callahan 2020, 2).

Related to how the shows are affectively contagious to their viewers, I could easily notice that the shows consistently present a visceral and persuasive dichotomy between the instructors that exhibit ‘superior’ masculinity and the clumsy recruits. For example, through the three seasons of *Real Man*, the awkwardness and mistakes of the celebrity recruits were contrasted with the skillful and masculine drill instructors. However, in *Real Man*, aired on a public television channel, the presentation of military exercises and life in the barracks was pretty much watered down and staged. They stand no comparison to *Fake Man*’s raw and unedited verbal and physical violence.

*Fake Man* gained popularity by taking the recruit-instructor contrast to an extremity. The recruits (mostly YouTube celebrities) are constantly shouted at (mostly swearing and other verbal abuse to apply more mental pressure) and physically punished almost non-stop by the drill instructors. Most importantly, the new recruits and the drill instructors form an easily recognisable dichotomy in *Fake Man*. As a result, the instructors, the ‘perfect male specimen’, naturally catch the viewers’ attention. The celebrated subjects of *Fake Man* are the drill instructors who are former UDT/SEAL officers and employees of a military consultation company. The instructors embody the robust masculine features that most military propaganda aspires to promote—handsome, manly, muscular, possessing high stamina, and displaying the ability to kill enemies with towels or chopsticks. The YouTube celebrity recruits are the exact opposite. With their lack of physical and mental prowess, they display the degeneration of masculinity and represent what one should avoid becoming. In this regard, the harsh military training presented in *Fake Man* is an amplified version of hazing in the barracks. The sadism of *Fake Man* is staggering. For example, a participant with aquaphobia is forced to remain immersed in the sea—he is shown
shivering and drooling and passes out several times, but he is not allowed out of the water.

Figure 2. A screenshot from an episode of Fake Man (photo by author)

I suggest that such abuse affectively reinforces celebration and submission to military masculinity. In the comments section of Fake Man, many viewers attempted to compare their own military experiences to the training depicted in the show, trying to prove that they also underwent indescribable hardships when training as conscripts. It seemed they were demanding some respect for their experiences to get as close as possible to the instructors’ ‘superior masculinity’. Also, in response to the complaints against the sadism and the reproduction of military culture presented in Fake Man, the commentators responded: ‘If you don’t like it, go somewhere else’; and ‘The participants voluntarily agreed to this, and they can always stop if they want’. Other comments focussed on assessing the recruits: how someone endures, how someone is a slacker who feigns sickness in the hope of sitting it out, how someone is a ‘buddy fucker’ whose inability adds to the miseries of his co-recruits.

In this regard, I argue that many viewers of Fake Man had been loosely grouped under a certain partition of the sensible or what is readily sayable or visible (see Shapiro 2013 30; Rancière 2004). In this respect, they have formed an affectively
charged space which is ‘invested in’ (see Holland and Solomon 2014) the celebration and praising of military masculinity. In such a space, including military institutions, unquestioned ‘submission’ to authority is a virtue. I believe that a militarised setting becomes the most legitimate place to take pleasure in such submission (see Nicholson 2011; Gueta et al. 2021; Stewart-Steinberg 1998). In particular, brutality becomes enjoyable and respectable through praising militarised violence and masculinity.

So far, I have discussed the capture of affect through two military reality shows, Real Man and Fake Man. The shows capture the viewers’ affect through the contagious celebration of military masculinity. Notably, the show has grouped the viewers into an affectively charged space that celebrates military masculinity through the instructors’ sadistic violence towards the recruits.

Second, I discuss that the military reality shows capture affect through the schematised narratives of rehabilitation and improvement. According to Kwon In-Sook, the military is the most convenient place for individuals to incorporate the logic of joint liability (Kwon In-Sook 2006, 22). In the military, it is not uncommon for everyone to be punished for a mistake made by one member of a group. Hence, individuals are continuously pressured to improve themselves to avoid being labelled a ‘buddy fucker’. For example, the ‘buddy fucker’ in Fake Man was Gong Hyeok-joon, a YouTube webcaster infamous for laziness and obesity. Gong often got himself and his co-recruits into trouble with the instructors due to his lack of capacities. His name was the second most frequently appearing keyword in the comments on Fake Man. Yet, at the show’s end, even this ‘buddy fucker’ finally showed some improvement. As the show’s first season proceeded, his attitude during the training ‘improved’ to the point that he was no longer faking injury or abandoning his co-recruits. Public opinion about him also shifted accordingly. Since appearing in Fake Man, his webcast content has changed from doing absurd things to working out and dieting. The viewers of his webcast also see him as improved and praise Fake Man for changing him. Over time, the brutality Gong had to undergo has been processed into a success story.
Importantly, as the case of Gong shows, the improvement and rehabilitation of the self should happen by testing one’s limits and enduring extreme physical and mental suffering. The brutality of *Fake Man* is simulated, but building on Kolvraa, the simulated brutality is still highly affective. Kolvraa distinguished between the plane of signification and the plane of affect (2015, 183; see also Grosberg 1992) to show that insincere representations of things can still have a considerable impact. For example, on the plane of signification, the viewers acknowledge that the shows are staged. However, on the plane of affect, the viewers can sense and get accustomed to the brutality of military violence. *Fake Man* immediately reminded me of the South Korean military junta’s re-education camp of the 1980s. The military junta recklessly dragged the homeless, beggars, prostitutes, day workers, unemployed people, loners, mentally handicapped, petty criminals, and random unlucky people who had caught the police’s eyes into the camp. Those dragged to the camp were subjected to brutal military training and battering in the name of ‘rehabilitation’. Many died or became handicapped in the camp. I suggest that the logic of the 1980s re-education camp returned in the 2020s through a hardcore self-help narrative that would supposedly help one rise through the cut-throat competition in a capitalist society. The recruits of *Fake Man* testified that they joined the show because they ‘wanted to change themselves completely’, ‘wanted to be reborn’ and ‘wanted to prove something to the self’. The show’s drill instructors keep shouting something supposedly enlightening about the right attitudes or mindset for survival. The recruits of *Fake Man* are fake, but by undergoing ‘actual’ (albeit watered down) UDT/SEAL training for a few days, they can transform into ‘real adults’ who have passed a rite of passage and have become ‘real men’. Violence has become something worthwhile or positive, a necessary evil for transforming one’s mentality for a better future.

In my interpretation, in the plane of affect, the viewers get accustomed to the brutality of the sadistic military training. And what facilitates this tendency is the old South Korean narratives of improvement and rehabilitation of the self. In other words, *Fake Man* has invested indescribable appeal, force, or affect occurring from the brutality against the ‘buddy fucker’ into the narratives of improvement and rehabilitation without much objective validation (see Laclau 2004, 326). Yet, as I have discussed in Chapter 4, affect and narrative can infuse each other. Hence, I also suggest that, at the same time, the narrative of improvement and rehabilitation has been the ‘conditioning cultural context’ (see Holland and Solomon 2014, 268), which
induced somewhat positive biological responses towards brutality. In this regard, *Fake Man* has captured the affect through the familiar narratives of self-improvement from the 1980s rehabilitation camp.

I discuss how such narratives of improvement and rehabilitation have become more appealing. I identify that the schematised narratives, events, and characters of *Real Man* and *Fake Man* can facilitate the capture of affect arising from the shows. The multiple seasons of *Real Man* and *Fake Man* have repeatedly staged similar events and characters. To study the schematisation of narratives, events, and characters of *Real Man* and *Fake Man*, I turn to Theodor Adorno’s critique of the ‘cultural industry’. Adorno criticises the capitalist planation of the cultural sector for quantifying, in the name of ‘efficiency’, every qualitative difference that comprises human life; the wholeness of experience is lost to capitalist exchange values (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 128). In this vein, according to Adorno, the only things presented to us are the mechanically repeated productions of empty laughter and realities supposedly without any contradictions (ibid., 112). This trend imposes on society a certain aesthetic sensibility of perceiving and representing things, and hence the aesthetic reproduction of social order (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002; 130; Lee 2016, 38). A ‘social’ laughter that challenges the existing social order will not be allowed or praised on stage since it will be considered ‘extreme’. The cultural industry’s mechanical repetitions of empty laughter and realities without any contradictions have alienated late capitalism’s suffering and labouring body (Lee 2016, 12). I suggest that the military reality shows’ schematised characters and events have alienated the body’s potential to become something else.

For example, following the formula of the ‘cultural industry’, the narrative of *Real Man* repeats itself through similar characters and events in all three seasons. Every new batch of celebrity recruits in *Real Man* follows in the footsteps of a typical army conscript: before entering the boot camp, entering the boot camp, being assigned to a unit, and finally, transferring to other units (or honourable discharge). Before entering the boot camp, the show focuses on the celebrity recruit’s nervous or confident mental state. This is to emphasise that the show is the real deal. Upon entering the boot camp, the new celebrity recruits meet other co-recruits, undergo training, and build friendships. The celebrity recruits, for whom this is the first experience of military life, have difficulty adapting to life in the barracks and the hard
training. The celebrities receive the same military training as soldiers to stress that the show is real. This is supposed to give future conscripts some idea of military life and induce ‘fond’ memories in the reservists. The show repeats this process across the seasons.

Also, each celebrity recruit, rather than displaying their personality, seems to fit into a particular schematised character. Real Man supposes different characters, and the celebrity recruits fit into those characters. A similar replacement shows up even when a celebrity recruit breaks away from the show. Also, as in Fake Man, the binary opposition structures the characters’ relationships in Real Man. Examples include celebrity recruits versus the drill instructor or the senior recruits and competent celebrity recruits versus the ‘buddy fuckers’. The first person the new celebrity recruits encounter is the drill instructors. The instructors’ strictness and the recruits’ laziness constitute a binary opposition. Also, some celebrity recruits appear geared up and adapt quickly, while some appear awkward and unfocused. Each recruit fits into the binaries of competent/‘buddy fucker’, strong/weak, adapted/maladapted, reservist/future conscript, or Korean/foreigner. As the season proceeds, some recruits improve their performance through training, learning to endure, adapting to the military culture, and building friendships. In addition, through the sounds (e.g. canned audience laughter) and captions (e.g. words or symbols that indicate people’s emotions), the repeating narratives instruct people on where to be impressed, where to be infuriated, and where to laugh. The sounds and captions suggest who should be laughed at or praised. Overall, I argue that, by instructing people what to feel in ‘typical’ situations in the barracks or during military exercises, the repeated narrative structure of the show captures the affect arising through the military experience encounters.

To summarise, I have discussed how the schematised narratives of rehabilitation and improvement, appearing in Real Man and Fake Man, capture affect. Particularly, Fake Man has captured affect through the familiar narratives of self-improvement dating back to the 1980s rehabilitation camp in South Korea. Also, the shows have infused empty laughter and ‘smooth’ realities that make sense to the viewers. Overall, I argue that, through the schematisation of events and characters, the shows’ narratives of improvement and rehabilitation become more powerful devices of affective capture.
So far, in section 8.1, I have shown how *Real Man* and *Fake Man*, two popular South Korean military reality shows, can facilitate the capture of affect. Through the shows, I have suggested two devices that facilitate the capture of affect. The first device is the ‘contagious celebration of brutal military masculinity’. The second device is ‘schematised narratives of rehabilitation and improvement’.

Now, I suggest that the shows present the ‘beautiful body’ that captures affect (see section 4.2). Then, I discuss how the beautiful bodies presented in the shows are conducive to imagining national security through the South Korean state’s more conventional notions of organic organisation and xenophobic immunity. In this regard, I show that imagining the human body and national security can be an affective process.

The bodies presented through the shows are the ‘beautiful bodies’. To reiterate my discussion in Chapter 4, the ‘beautiful body’ does not indicate a particular body. Instead, the ‘beautiful body’ is seemingly natural and normal. In this respect, normalising the ‘beautiful body’ prevents viewers from wandering about in sensation. Therefore, the ‘beautiful body’ can discourage the viewers’ scepticism about their ways of seeing and prevent them from reflecting upon their visuality. For example, as discussed above, *Real Man* and *Fake Man* repeatedly promote masculine and soldierly ideals through contrasting recruits and instructors. Therefore, I suggest the instructors comprise the ‘beautiful body’ in that their masculine qualities are ideal reference points for uncountable and uncategorisable experiences. Also, as I have discussed above, *Real Man* and *Fake Man* frequently propound that, if needed, one should improve and rehabilitate themselves through brutality. Hence, I suggest that those who successfully improve themselves through harsh military training are considered the ‘beautiful body’ people are encouraged to imitate. Next, I discuss what such ‘beautiful bodies’ can do.

In the context of imagining national security, I discuss that the presentation of the ‘beautiful bodies’ through the military reality shows captures affect and reinforces the ideas of organic organisation and xenophobic immunity. First, I suggest that the presentation of the ‘beautiful bodies’ through the military reality shows captures
affect and reinforces the idea of organic organisation. The shows convey the celebration and desire for submission to the aspired military masculinity. Particularly, through the presentation of joint liability, one of the key recurring themes of the military reality show genre, the shows present that submission is conducive to the survival of the whole and that one should strive to be an infallible part for the sake of others and the self. In this regard, the bodies in the shows capture affect or make sense in light of organic organisation.

Second, I also suggest that the shows’ presentation of the ‘beautiful bodies’ captures affect in ways that reinforce the idea of xenophobic immunity. As I have discussed in Chapter 3, in the scheme of xenophobic immunity, one’s body is always already given and identical to oneself. Then, for example, underlying the desperation for improvement and rehabilitation (extreme self-help) is the assumption that one only cares for oneself. Also, the pressure to improve and rehabilitate conveys the desperation for more capacity for survival in competition with others. Hence, the show pressures one to improve and prove the exchange value to others. Overall, in my interpretation, South Korean military reality shows can impose on the viewers the recognisable and predictable “beautiful bodies” of masculine soldiers. Such ‘beautiful bodies’ exclude inherently heterogenous bodies’ potential to become something else, the potential which I will discuss in the next section 8.2.

### 8.2 Bodies fleeing from the militarising capture

In the previous section (8.1), I read popular South Korean military reality shows for the capture of affect by the South Korean state’s militarism. I read two films directed by South Korean conscientious objectors. The main objective of this section is to show how the flight of affect from the South Korean state’s attempt to capture affect through militarism can happen through discussing the films produced by the conscientious objectors. The two films are *A Silk Letter* (2010), directed by Kang Sangwoo, and *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns 2: Breaking a Taboo* (2021), directed by Kim Hwan-tae.
For the analysis of the films, my research materials include my notes, where I have recorded what is happening in the relevant scenes and what I have felt through watching the scenes. I refer to my notes because an easily articulable story is unavailable for films such as *A Silk Letter*. Also, affect is only felt personally and can be discussed retrospectively (see section 5.2).

First, I discuss how the film *A Silk Letter* (2010) facilitates a flight of affect from the South Korean state’s militarism in light of ‘assuming a defensive posture in the face of approaching violence’. Kang Sangwoo, the director, submitted this autobiographical film to the court to publicly explain why he was refusing military conscription. In the film, Seongwoon, a man probably in his early twenties, receives the enlistment slip. He will have to leave his younger boyfriend behind. He struggles to write a letter explaining why he is refusing conscription. I chose this film because it conveys ‘assuming a defensive posture’ and ‘approaching violence’ without imposing familiar narratives and emotions. As I have explained earlier, after watching the film, I made notes to describe what is happening in relevant scenes and what I have felt in light of the flight of affect from the state. The note attempts to convey my affective experience and what such experience does.

After watching and reflecting upon the film, I have decided to discuss how ‘assuming a defensive posture in the face of approaching violence’ can facilitate the flight of affect from the South Korean state’s militarism. I reference Tomiyama Ichiro (2009, 2015)’s discussions on how one has an indescribable hunch for approaching violence and assumes a defensive posture. This process affectively resembles the passivity conveyed through the film. Tomiyama questions, ‘when does a violence really start taking place?’ He answers that violence is already taking place in the state of being exposed to the violent scene next to myself, waiting for my turn, and breaking into a cold sweat (ibid., 25). According to Tomiyama, assuming a defensive posture, such

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66 For example, certain affect arises when the site of violence is represented peacefully. For a similar case, I reference photographer Hong Jinhwon’s 2014 exhibition, *Crimson, Green*. Hong’s photos depict the peaceful landscapes of Fukushima, which suffered both natural and nuclear catastrophes. The photos of Fukushima do not appear to narrate or depict anything in particular. However, the visuality of the photos can be visceral in that the viewers feel that ‘something is off’ or ‘something is definitely happening’.
as sweating and crouching in fear, is not an action but passivity towards approaching violence (Tomiyama 2009, 96). Generally, people are taught to praise the sagas of fearless life-risking determinations and to scorn those who ran away or crouched in fear. The military reality shows I have discussed in the previous section 8.2 praise demonstration of fearlessness and ridicule ‘acting like a coward’. However, Tomiyama suggests that rather than overcoming fears, the greatest potential to constitute a society lies in being fearful of getting hurt or killing a person (Tomiyama 2015, 7). For example, Tomiyama points out that, for most of those who refused to serve in the Imperial Japanese military during World War II, it was not a solid political determination which made them refuse to serve amidst a war. Rather, it was fear, the compelling need to avoid pain and death at all costs (ibid., 6). Tomiyama adds that sensing the coming violence from the position of overwhelming weakness or next to the corpse, he assumes a defensive posture. And, as long as he assumes the posture, the possibility to ponder how to cope with the sensed violence can survive (ibid., 63). He suggests that, instead of arriving at a conclusion, one must not cease to ponder; in the defensive position’s passivity, in its undeciding, lies the opportunity for the self and others to continue living.

Through the notes I have taken while watching the film *A Silk Letter*, I discuss the affective experience of ‘assuming a defensive posture in the face of approaching violence’. I emphasise that the film does not depict or indicate a certainty, pride, or resolution present in the military reality shows, which I have discussed in the previous section. Instead, *A Silk Letter* tells the story of assuming a defensive posture, a passivity. I show how the passivity conveyed through the film can facilitate the flight of affect from the state’s militaristic discourses and identities.

The following is my note from watching the film. My note on the beginning of the film states,

> At dawn, it’s the time of the day when everything turns blue before assuming colours. The moon shines dimly above the city, and it seems a bit chilly. The scene shows the wide Han River that cuts across Seoul. The sounds of the cars driving fast on the bridge fill the air. Seongwoon is burning his enlistment slip. His face is rather flat, emotionless. Two people are in the scene, Seongwoon and probably a younger person.

I could feel the anxiety and the ‘weight’ of the body that anticipates the approaching persecution (and prosecution) like the returning dawn. I suggest that this scene
conveys what Tomiyama terms a ‘hunch for violence’, a realisation of what is happening next to me, but is already not someone else’s concern (2009, 27). The anxiety and ‘weight’ indicate certain indiscernibility between what is happening on the screen and, to me, the viewer. Hence, I am affected by the scene. Specific words or direct representations of violence cannot convey this experience. The experience is instead conveyed indirectly through the atmosphere created by the scene. Describing a scene in the film, I wrote

A snail moves slowly. Seongwoon is taking a nap. I feel the air in the room heavy, stuffy and dim. A postman arrives. “It’s a registered mail,” he says. After opening the letter, Seongwoon goes outside and sits on the refrigerator in the street. I guess it’s an enlistment slip. He stares at the stray cats with unfocused, tired eyes. He lights a Marlboro Red cigarette. The screen shows that it’s a poor residential neighbourhood on a hill. Seongwoon walks down the street while smoking. He seems aimless. Only the unanimous noises of the city fill the air.

In the scene, Seongwoon finally receives the enlistment slip. Although it is likely that he already decided to refuse conscription a long time ago, now he has to really make the decision and take action. However, the film shows that what he can immediately do is aimlessly stare at the cats and suddenly walk down the street with a cigarette. He does not express some firm resolution that people usually expect from a conscientious objector. The unanimous noises of the city seem to add to the sense of aimlessness and anxiety. In Seongwoon’s actions and the scene’s atmosphere, I sense the passivity in the face of the approaching predicament.
My note describes and reflects Seongwoon’s response to the enlistment slip.

Seongwoon just walks into the noisy streets. He assumes a blank face, but reading anger is not difficult. His slender body is swaying like a paper man amidst the bustle of the city. His unkempt hair and the camera are shaking. Violent noises fill the big street. While walking, Seongwoon mostly keeps his eyes on the ground. He doesn’t seem to have a set destination. He walks like a worn-out soccer ball randomly thrown into a street, not to be picked up later. He keeps walking into the orange and blue evening. He is panting and mumbles something incomprehensible. All I could hear was, ‘You’ll beat me for sucking at soccer. If I sit, am I a homo?’ This is probably related to his family or his school days. A ripping sound fills the scene. Yet, he cannot just disappear into thin air. Only the noise of the cars and the subway try to fill some indescribable gap between the screen and myself.

The background, the prop, the music, and Seongwoon’s actions comprise the scene’s violence of sensation in that I cannot easily make sense of things; I am forced to attempt an interpretation on my own. I see nothing protruding in the scene where Seongwoon aimlessly wanders into the chaotic cityscape, not knowing where to go. The scene conveys the feeling of being lost and having no exit. Yet, in the scene where he mumbles something incomprehensible in the dark, through a strong outburst of emotion, the scene temporarily destroys the public persona of Seongwoon. The previously discussed military reality shows have imposed a firm sense of having a clear direction for the plot (e.g., achieving military masculinity,
improving oneself). However, *A Silk Letter* does not allow the viewers such sense or anticipation. I suggest that Seongwoon’s aimless wandering about is his assuming of a defensive position; through wandering into the bustling city and darkness of the night, he ‘crouches’ in anxiety, fear, and anger towards the approaching violence of the state. Through such wandering, the film indicates the flight of affect from the South Korean state’s militarism which preaches a clear direction.

I discuss my notes depicting the scene of him in his dwelling and how I felt while watching it.

Alone in the room, Seongwoon writes on a notepaper, explaining why he refuses to enlist. It seems that he finds it difficult to write beyond the first sentence. He lives in a semi-basement room. He coughs occasionally. Urban noises from the outside—mostly motorbikes and cars—penetrate ears. Ample light seems to enter this semi-basement during daytime. He is lying, cocooned in a blanket. His eyes are closed for a bit, and then his eyes are open. When his eyes are open, they gaze somewhere above, probably the window. He is slipping off to sleep or not.

Specific words cannot define the atmosphere of the scene. The film depicts the body of Seongwoon that remains passive in the face of the approaching persecution. Although the scene gives a sense of idleness amongst the urban noises, it does not seem like a resolution or completion. Compared to military reality shows, which signal a strong sense of a centre or an ideal to refer to, *A Silk Letter* transmits a sense of loss and undecidability that resists being captured or defined. In particular, I have found that the film conveys anxiety, and I have also found myself unable to decide the source of anxiety through coherent and sensible concepts and language. To borrow Tomiyama’s words, what I am sensing might be that the expressing subject is not myself but rather the language (2009, 18). Yet, I argue that the possibility of escaping the capture of language lies in this puzzling over the language. Seongwoon wanders into sleep while writing as if he is going to ponder how to endure the approaching state violence in a dream. He does not make a decision or promise a result. Instead, I suggest that the scene’s seemingly trivial background and the atmosphere convey his defensive posture, suggesting a space where he can hold on to the capacity to consider and make the next move on his own (see Tomiyama 2015, 63).
In the first part of section 8.2, I have discussed how the film *A Silk Letter* can facilitate a flight of affect from the South Korean state’s militarism. Building on Tomiyama’s discussion (2009, 2015), my interpretation of the film focused on the implications of the film’s ‘assuming a defensive posture in the face of approaching violence’. The film also conveys a sense of passivity towards an approaching predicament. Since I am discussing my affective experience, my analysis of the film has relied on the notes that I made while watching the film. The notes describe certain scenes and how I felt. The military reality shows I discussed previously directly propounds a firm resolution and clear objectives. However, my analysis suggests that *A Silk Letter* conveys, sensually and affectively, that an opportunity for the continuity of life may lie in the passivity, undecidedness, ‘crouching’ in anxiety, or fear towards the approaching violence of the state. In this regard, the film can facilitate the flight of affect from the South Korean state’s militarism.

In the second part of section 8.2, I discuss how the film *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns 2: Breaking a Taboo*, directed by Kim Hwan-tae (2021; hereafter, *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns*), facilitates the flight of affect from the state. The documentary film follows 18 years of the South Korean pacifist and conscientious objection movement from 2002 to 2020. As in the previous section, I made notes describing what was happening in certain scenes and what I felt watching the scenes. Through the notes, I discuss what my affective experience can do regarding the flight of affect against the South Korean state’s militarism.

I focus on ‘asserting the irreducibility of the self’. My focus derives from my impressions from watching the film, but I believe that it is also commonly felt through the objectors’ announcements and actions depicted in the film. I have found that the film *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns* asserts the irreducibility of the self by conveying the impression that the objectors are doing what they must do and become minorities who are incomprehensible to the state. In the film, even when facing the long and stressful process of conscientious objection, which involves public announcements, trials, imprisonment, and criticism from family and friends, the objectors give an impression of ‘I do what I must do’. Hence, on how *Men Who
Won’t Pick Up Guns asserts the irreducibility of the self, I focus on the affect arising from sensing ‘I do what I must do’. Below is my note from watching the film.

In the film, the sight of the conscientious objectors’ backs caught my eye. They seemed to tell me, ‘I do what I must do’ through their backs. There was a scene showing a series of brief moments of the objectors saying goodbye before entering the courtroom (where they will be arrested right after the trial) and the moments when the objectors are handcuffed (right before entering a convoy headed towards the prison). Some are smiling, and some seem nervous and sad. One objector says, ‘Oh, anything I want to say? Just…I’ll stay healthy until I’m released. Please write to me often, cause I’ll be bored’. He tries hard to smile. They smile and say goodbye before turning their backs on the camera as if they are only going somewhere to get a job done. I am stuck with the backs that confidently walk into the courtroom.

I find it difficult to describe this scene other than by talking about the confident stance of the objectors’ backs. This scene is not about their determination in the sense of either refusing the military or accepting it. Rather, I suggest that the backs of the objectors convey the impression of ‘I do what I must do’. It is a feeling that the objectors are just doing what they do, making natural choices, not holding a grudge against anyone, and keeping their hopes high for a brighter future. However, ‘I do what I must do’ is far from being a teleological self-promotion. ‘I do what I must do’ is focused on constantly refusing to surrender one’s potentiality to the state or the popular narrative which incessantly captures differences and capacities. In this regard, the attitude or the impression of ‘I do what I must do’ renders the objectors ‘war machines’.
In particular, I suggest that the objectors’ back, which gives an impression of ‘I do what I must do’, affectively resembles the quote, ‘I would prefer not to’. The quote is from Herman Melville’s 1853 novel *Bartleby the Scrivener*. It resists the pressure to have a determination, the epistemic violence that expects and forces one to choose or not to choose. In *The Parallax View*, Žižek argues that Bartleby’s passivity distances himself from resistance and protest, which rely on the existing hegemonic structure that one had vowed to overcome. Asserting ‘I don’t want to’ still hangs on what it negates. In this regard, Žižek claims that Bartleby’s passivity opens up a new political space beyond supporting and opposing the hegemony (2006, 381–82).

Similarly, through their prison-wards turned backs, the conscientious objectors reject the choices set out by the state, for example, having to choose between ‘to do’ and

67 In analysing the famous “I would prefer not to” phrase from *Bartleby, the Scrivener*, Deleuze (1997, 68) points out that the phrase refuses the existing grammatical categories, as it neither affirms nor denies. He suggests that Bartleby achieves ‘becoming-minority’ through the phrase.
‘not to do’. Through their backs that assert ‘I do what I must do’, I have felt a strong sense of inevitability or inescapability, which is different from a strong resolution of an individual. In this regard, through the objectors’ backs, the film transmits a powerful affective expression of a Deleuzian ‘war machine’ which renders the speakers incomprehensible to the state and not subordinate to the objectives of the others (Deleuze and Guattari 2005 [1987], 355). In this respect, the impression of ‘I do what I must do’ can render the objector minorities in the eyes of the public and the state.

I also discuss how *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns* asserts the irreducibility of the self through the affect arising from the impression ‘I will remain a minority’. I focus on how one can remain significant in oneself through the flight of affect. Hence, I bring up the part of *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns* which tells the story of auxiliary police, Lee Gil-joon. He announced his conscientious objection in the middle of his service in 2008. Lee emphasised that the conscience he wanted to preserve was the marker of an independent life free from others’ interests and values. He wanted to assert his individuality before state power. In the film, Lee states,

> Whenever my freedom was suppressed, I couldn’t stand it. The same goes for being dragged around by someone else’s will or cause while failing to become myself…. Also, I needed to listen closely to myself and resist, through my clear voice, the things that suppress myself. I want to constitute the rest of my life independently. I was afraid that if I continued to obey the orders that I found unjust and look away from my wounds, I’d be a self-contradictory person with nothing left, an empty shell.

In the scenes where Lee explains his freedom and being himself, I sense his abhorrence against the creeping presence of the state. Notably, Lee seemed to be wary of the standardising system of the state in which an individual is at risk of becoming something repeatable, copiable, and replaceable. Lee also states in the film that

> Exposed in front of the invisible power of the state, an individual is powerless. When I stood in front of the protesting people with my shield, when I committed the violence, and when I worked to sustain the violence, I didn’t even dare to think about refusing the order. Hence, I had no choice but to take all the wounding as normal. It happens to all of us. While the power that drives us to death remains invisible, tacitly, we release violence at the protestors who are labelled enemies. We cover up our wounds and justify what we did.
Lee indicates that wounding the self is like sacrificing the self and others to become intelligible by the state. I suggest that what is wounded in such a process is the ‘aura’, stipulated by Walter Benjamin (2018[1935]). According to Benjamin, how an individual remains significant depends on the preservation of the ‘aura’⁶⁸, and this is primarily about keeping distance. Benjamin emphasises that such distance is crucial for the capacity to affect others and to be affected by others (Benjamin 2006, 338).⁶⁹ For example, as a riot police, Lee had to commit violence against the protestors. Lee says his riot police role was like being an eye of the state that labels the protestors as enemies and being an arm of the state that quells the protestors with violence. Then, the distance or the remoteness⁷⁰ between him and the state disappears. He may become ‘something already known’ or ‘something no longer inspiring curiosity’. Through Lee’s comments, Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns conveys the impression that one will remain a minority in the face of the state and its militarism.

In the second part of section 8.2, I have discussed how the film Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns facilitates the flight of affect from the state. Particularly, I have focused on ‘asserting the irreducibility of the self’, which is derived from my impressions from watching the film. The film conveys the impression that the objectors will do whatever they must do and hence, that they will remain minority. In this regard, the film can incite the flight of affect from the South Korean state’s militarism. Through indicating the irreducibility of the self, the objectors in the film preserve their capacity to affect others, be affected by others, and transform themselves through encounters as they constantly flee from the unchanging norm-centre stipulated by the state.

So far, I have shown how the films directed by South Korean conscientious objectors can facilitate the flight of affect from the state’s attempt to capture affect.

⁶⁸ According to Benjamin (2018[1935]), ‘aura’ is not something one exerts independently, but something that occurs through one’s authenticity, uniqueness, remoteness, and the capacity to exchange gaze. In this manner, aura is also something that enables one to affect others and to be affected by others.

⁶⁹ Benjamin writes “The person we look at, or who feels he is being looked at, looks at us in turn. To experience the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the ability to look back at us” (2006, 338).

⁷⁰ According to Benjamin, the remoteness means mental distance. He states that “we define the aura of the latter [natural objects] as the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be” (Benjamin 2018[1935], 5).
In particular, through the films, I have suggested two devices that facilitate the flight of affect. The first device is ‘assuming a defensive posture in the face of approaching violence’. The second device is ‘asserting the irreducibility of the self’.

Building on the above discussions, I suggest that the films present the ‘extreme body’ that facilitates the flight of affect, which I have discussed in Chapter 4. Then, I discuss how the ‘extreme bodies’ presented in the films are conducive to imagining national security through the Body without Organs and xenophilic immunity. In this regard, I also show that imagining the human body and national security can be an affective process.

In the previous section 8.1, I have shown that the South Korean military reality shows repeatedly represent the ‘beautiful body’ of masculine and self-improving soldiers, which easily makes sense and captures affect. In contrast, the ‘extreme body’ is opposed to the ‘beautiful body’ in that the former refuses to fit easily into the pre-existing concepts and narratives. As a result, those who encounter the ‘extreme body’ are left with nothing but oneself to deal with the body’s sensations (see section 4.2). I have shown that the films directed by the objectors imagine the ‘extreme body’. The films depict the bodies (or the bodily qualities) that assume defence postures towards approaching violence and assert the irreducibility of the self in the face of the state. Particularly, A Silk Letter’s ‘violence of sensation’ thwarts the attempt to make sense and encourages more open, varied, and complex interpretations. Also, the impressions of the objectors heading towards the prison in Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns arouse sensations that cannot be processed through familiar aesthetic sensibilities premised on militarism. Hence, such impressions can incite alternative aesthetic sensibilities premised on, for example, the irreducibility of the self. In this regard, the ‘extreme bodies’ of the objectors appearing in the films are ‘opposed to’ and ‘overturn’ the ‘beautiful bodies’ of the military reality shows. Next, I discuss what such ‘extreme bodies’ can do in view of imagining national security.

In the context of imagining national security, I discuss that the presentation of the ‘extreme bodies’ in the films facilitates the flight of affect and supports the ideas of the Body without Organs and xenophilic immunity. First, I suggest that the
presentation of the ‘extreme body’ of Seongwoon through *A Silk Letter* facilities the flight of affect. The film supports the idea of xenophilic immunity, which becomes something else through engaging the non-selves. As discussed earlier in this section, the ‘extreme body’ presented in *A Silk Letter* assumes a defensive posture in the face of approaching violence. Hence, I borrow Tomiyama’s concept of the ‘coward’ who crouches in fear and is usually looked down upon in disdain. However, in the ‘coward’, Tomiyama sees the possibility of resisting violence from the position of an overwhelming or absolute vulnerability (2009, 60). Tomiyama argues for normalising the ‘coward’ since the coward’s body might be a rich source of imagination on the bodily wounds (ibid., 6). Therefore, to reiterate my discussion earlier, rather than overcoming fears, being fearful of getting hurt or killing a person—being a ‘coward’ in the eyes of the public harbours the potential to constitute a society (ibid., 7). In this regard, assuming a defensive posture in the face of approaching violence enables engaging others from the position of vulnerability, as xenophilic immunity proposes.

Second, I suggest that the presentation of the ‘extreme bodies’ of the objectors through *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns* facilities the flight of affect, and the film is relevant to the idea of the Body without Organs. As I have discussed in this section, the ‘extreme body’ presented in *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns* asserts the irreducibility of the self. This assertion aligns with resisting one’s potential being subordinated to others—especially the state’s—interests. I suggest that such ‘extreme bodies’ are ‘nomadic’ within the state. In *Anti-Oedipus*, and Guattari state that the nomads are the ones who resist being stipulated and who constantly transform themselves through affecting and being affected as new situations arise (2009[1972], 799). As they constantly move away from a commanding interpretive centre, they are the biggest threats to the state, which tries to subordinate the subjects’ potential. In this vein, *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns* affectively assert significance in itself, exhibiting a quality of the Body without Organs. Overall, in my interpretation, the films directed by the objectors present the confusing bodies of conscientious objectors. Such ‘extreme bodies’ encourage the bodies to become something else.

**Summary**
Imagining the human body is not only a conceptual process but also a sensible process that resists textualisation. Therefore, my main objective for this chapter has been to reimagine the human body through affect in the context of South Korean conscientious objectors. Reimagining the human body through affect is significant in that the human body frames the body politic. In accordance with the main objective, I have juxtaposed my reading of two popular South Korean military reality shows with my reading of two films directed by South Korean conscientious objectors. Building on my discussion about affect in Chapter 4, I have discussed the military reality shows in light of the capture of affect and the films directed by the objectors while considering the flight of affect.

The main argument of this chapter has been that the two films directed by the South Korean conscientious objectors can facilitate the flight of affect from the state’s attempt to capture affect. In section 8.1, I have shown how the capture of affect occurs through popular visual materials, such as *Real Man* and *Fake Man*, while focusing on the capture of affect. I have discussed the military reality shows in light of the contagious celebration of brutal military masculinity and the repeated narratives of rehabilitation and growth. Then, I have discussed how the shows’ capture of affect constitutes a ‘beautiful body’, which can be conducive to imagining organic organisation and xenophobic immunity.

In section 8.2, I have shown how the flight of affect from the South Korean state can happen through the films directed by the conscientious objectors, *A Silk Letter* and *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns 2: Breaking a Taboo*. I have focused on what an affective experience can do regarding the flight of affect from the state. After watching the films, I have identified two devices that facilitate the flight of affect. I have discussed my notes from watching the films through ‘assuming a defensive posture in the face of approaching violence’ and ‘asserting the irreducibility of the self’. Then, I have shown how the flight of affect involves reimagining bodies or becoming the ‘extreme bodies’, which is conducive to imagining the Body without Organs and xenophilic immunity. In the next chapter, I conclude my dissertation by summarising how remaining the human body can also reimagine the security of body politic.
My conclusion is comprised of three parts. In the first part, I summarise the findings from the analysis. In the second part, I reflect upon the findings regarding their contributions. In the third part, I discuss what this dissertation offers for future research.

9.1 Summary of findings

My main objective of this dissertation has been to study how reimagining the human body brings about reimagining national security in the context of South Korean conscientious objectors. While working to achieve the objective, this dissertation has made two contributions to understanding security. First, this dissertation has engaged with the underexplored topic of how to imagine national security through the human body’s qualities, for example, organisation, immunity, and affect. Second, this dissertation has also provided a novel perspective on national security by focusing on the supposedly trivial voices of conscientious objectors.

My main argument of this dissertation has been that, while the South Korean state and the public imagine national security through more conventional notions and sensibilities about the human body, the South Korean conscientious objectors propose alternative notions and sensibilities about the human body which can reimagine national security. The analyses showed that South Korean conscientious objectors have been significant for reimagining national security in that they reimagine bodies in terms of non-organic organisation (e.g., the Body without Organs), xenophilic immunity, and affective flight from the state. Such alternative bodies disrupt the state’s conception of national security, premised on the bodily notions and sensibilities of organic organisation, xenophobic immunity, and affective capture.
Importantly, I am not simply indicating that the Body without Organs and xenophilic immunity are absolutely better than organic organisation and xenophobic immunity. As Julian Reid emphasises in his reading of Deleuze’s ‘nomadic unity’, it is through the contestation against the unity that struggles to arrive at multiplicity become fruitful (Reid 2010, 424-425). Similarly, one should be able to change or leave the ground as unforeseen situations arise, but one also needs a firm ground to launch an idea and live. Hence, constituting or imagining a body capable of interacting with others involves preserving the potential to become something else. In the context of reimagining national security in South Korea, the Body without Organs and xenophilic immunity enable such potential.

Therefore, this dissertation achieves its aim: challenging the institutionalised modes of imagining national security and opening an alternative space to reimagine national security (see Shapiro 2013, xv). The analyses indicated that South Korean conscientious objectors are aesthetic subjects who instigate sensibilities and reflections which reenvisage the self (see Shapiro 2013, xiv, 11, 13). In other words, conscientious objectors’ writings and films potentially invoke sensations and contemplations that disrupt the hegemonic modes of imagining national security and propose alternative modes.

My analyses followed Shapiro’s ‘thinking with aesthetic subjects’. I brought up organisation, immunity, and affect because they simultaneously frame the human body and national security. Then, I read the two sets of research materials through each concept. The first research material was what the state or the public says about conscientious objection. The second research material was what the objectors say about the objection. Then, I juxtaposed the two readings to show how conscientious objectors can reimagine the human body and national security. Next, I summarise and discuss the findings from each analysis chapter (Chapters 6, 7, and 8).

In Chapter 6, the first analytical chapter, I discussed how national security could be (re)imagined through the organisation of the human body. I suggested that the bodily organisation can frame the imagination of both the human body and national security because the organisation represents the relationship between the parts and the whole. I juxtaposed the two readings to expose an institutionalised mode of imagining bodily organisation and propose an alternative mode. The first was my
reading of the texts produced by the state in light of organic organisation. The second was my reading of the texts produced by South Korean conscientious objectors in light of the Body without Organs.

To read the court decisions with a focus on the organic organisation, I started by reading the decisions through the idea that the whole body depends on a centre vital for the survival of all the constituents. My reading showed that a hierarchical binary occurs between national security and an individual’s freedom of expression. Overall, according to my reading, the decisions consider that suspending the citizen’s constitutional rights in the name of national security is justified for the survival of the collective body. My reading of the decisions also showed how the state hierarchically dissects the organism into various organ-parts that supposedly work harmoniously. For example, I suggested in the reading that the private hierarchy within a patriarchal household expands into the public’s hierarchical structure, in which the state wields militarised and patriarchal authority.

Then, I discussed the court decisions through the idea that the constituents are treated as an organ-part, defined through the interest or the survival of the whole. In my reading, the South Korean courts’ decisions are premised on the idea that the constituents are defined through (or forced to define themselves through) the centre or the vital organ. For example, the Alternative Service Review Committee demands a ‘personal statement’ premised on having a consistent and coherent centre in a person’s history. Then, I discussed how resisting or rebelling against one’s place in the hierarchy makes one abnormal and meaningless. I pointed out that, as the prosecutors of the objectors’ trials have constantly referenced survival, fairness, and the legal order against ‘an exemption’, the minority conscience becomes a dangerous pursuit that jeopardises the collective’s survival.

For reading South Korean conscientious objectors’ texts in light of the Body without Organs, I started by reading the conscientious objectors’ texts through the idea that every individual coexists with other individuals non-hierarchically. In particular, the objectors resist an ultimate point of interest (e.g., military) by resisting the pressure to give up their individuality to an undifferentiated totality. I also discussed how the objectors imagine a body comprised of ‘indeterminate organs’. Instead of fitting themselves into the purified and acceptable categories that make sense, the objectors
appreciate the potential to become something else by acknowledging that they are always in motion, becoming different, affecting others, and being affected by others.

Next, I offered a reading of the conscientious objectors’ texts on the understanding that every constituent part is significant. In my reading, conscientious objectors indicate that each constituent part resists predetermined function and place. For example, the objectors argue that the exchange between military duty and citizenship rights has imposed a predetermined function and place on individuals. The objectors also signal that the constituents remain significant even if detached from the whole. My reading suggests that the objectors still find significance on their own by conveying the sense of inevitability and defying the common sense that mere individual action will not go very far in transforming society. What matters for the objectors is rescuing one’s potentiality from the state.

In the first part of Chapter 6, my reading indicated that the South Korean state has imagined national security through the organic organisation. The organically organised body propounds that there is a head that commands and limbs that obey. Such a body is considered common sense and has framed the imaginations about national security. However, in the second part of Chapter 6, my reading showed that the objectors challenge the organic organisation through imagining a freer relationship between the part and the whole when constituting individual and collective bodies (e.g., the military).

In Chapter 7, the second analysis, I discussed how national security could be (re)imagined through immunity. Immunity is an interesting concept in this context because it represents the relationship between the inside and the outside. In this regard, immunity can frame the imagination of both the human body and national security. I juxtaposed two readings to disrupt the institutionalised modes of imagining immunity and open an alternative space that enables reimagining immunity. The first is my reading of the research materials produced by the state through the prism of xenophobic immunity. The second is my reading of the research materials produced by South Korean conscientious objectors in light of xenophilic immunity.
To read the court decisions through xenophobic immunity, I started by reading the decisions through the idea that one’s body is always already a given and identical to oneself. In my reading, the court decisions signal that the state is sovereign within its boundaries, just as the immune system works to preserve the sovereignty of one’s body. My reading also suggests that the state presumes the sovereign body is a policing body, just as the human body’s police corps can easily distinguish between bona fide residents and illegal aliens. In general, the ideas of xenophobic immunity produce the concept of the proper bounded ‘self’, which is the precondition for dwelling in a world alongside others.

Then, I read the court decisions through the idea that the non-self which invades one’s body from the outside must be eliminated. My reading showed that the decisions are premised on the xenophobic immunity model, representing the human body as a battlefield where the ceaseless life-and-death battle between the invaders and the defenders occurs at the boundaries. I suggested that such a perspective rules out non-violent and non-military solutions to security as unrealistic. My reading also showed that the decisions are premised on the idea that more immune cells will ensure better chances of survival. Such an idea parallels the view that the number of conscripts is vital for combat capacity and national security. Nevertheless, security is more complex than the volume of immune cells or the number of soldiers.

To read the texts produced by South Korean conscientious objectors in light of xenophilic immunity, I started by reading the texts through the idea that one must live amongst others is ontological to one’s existence. In my interpretation, the objectors’ texts indicate that immunity travels in and out of various environments and relationships. Many objectors are inevitably involved in others’ environments and relationships, just as immunity brings heterogeneous elements together to express certain qualities instead of only defending the boundaries of the ‘self’. The objectors also indicated that one constantly produces one’s boundaries anew through exploring and being affected by others who might appear inchoate and disorganised. Similarly, one cannot simply state the correct next move for immunity as it carries out non-centralised functions.

Next, I read the conscientious objectors’ texts in light of the idea that immunity is also about becoming something else through encountering the non-selves. In my
reading, the objectors are open to transforming the grounds for defining the self’s boundaries. They have dealt with differences through unconditionally recognising and exploring different grounds for imagining the world, just as xenophilic immunity, as a ‘search engine of difference’, actively seeks out the unknown to expand and transform the grounds for identifying one’s boundaries. In addition, my reading also suggested that the objectors become incomprehensible from the state by engaging otherness. The objectors resist being wholly captured by the state’s narratives by foregrounding their personal narratives of fear, loss, and frustration. Notably, they disrupt the widespread belief in the necessity of state violence.

In the first part of Chapter 7, I showed that the South Korean courts’ decisions and xenophobic immunity share the understanding that the self and the non-self must be clearly distinguished, and the non-self, naturally hostile and invading my body from the outside, must be eliminated. In the second part of Chapter 7, I showed that the objectors offer alternative imaginings of the body premised on xenophilic immunity, such as that one must live amongst others, which is ontological to one’s existence, and that through engaging others, one constantly becomes something else. As such, the objectors indicate an alternative relationship between the inside and the outside (or the self and the other), which is crucial for imagining national security.

In Chapter 8, the third analytical chapter, I discussed how representations/imaginations of human bodies are affective in the context of South Korean militarism and conscientious objectors. The human body is not only conceptual but also an affective imagination. It can facilitate the capture of affect, solidifying discourses; it can also facilitate the flight of affect, disrupting discourses. I juxtaposed my reading of two sets of visual materials to disrupt the institutionalised modes of imagining the human body. First, I discussed two popular South Korean military reality shows to identify the capture of affect by the state’s militarism. Second, I discussed two films directed by the objectors, representing a flight of affect from the state’s militarism. In analysing visual materials, I focused on what was happening and being enabled through certain scenes and what I felt through the scenes.

In the first part of the analysis, I read two military reality shows, Real Man and Fake Man, considering the capture of affect. In my reading, the shows capture affect by
portraying a contagious celebration of brutal military masculinity. Through their displays of clichés and brutalities in the military, the shows draw the viewers into an affectively charged political space, in an ‘affective contagion’. Military, a wielder of violence, is a particularly affective realm. Also, by consistently praising the characters that convey a ‘superior masculinity’ and ridiculing the awkward or effeminate celebrity recruits, the shows capture the viewers into an affectively charged space that celebrates military masculinity.

I then discussed how schematised narratives of rehabilitation and improvement, which appear in the military reality shows, capture affect. In my reading, the shows capture the viewers’ affect through the narratives of improvement and rehabilitation. The celebrity recruits are represented as being physically and mentally inept ‘buddy fuckers’, and they are expected to improve themselves by enduring brutality from the instructors. Furthermore, for both shows, such characters, events, and narratives occur across the seasons. I suggested such schematisation captures affect by limiting the proliferation of meaning and sensation.

In the second part of the analysis, I discussed the films directed by the South Korean conscientious objectors, *A Silk Letter* and *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns 2*, for the flight of affect. Here, I relied on the notes I took contemporaneously when viewing the films, describing what was happening in the relevant scenes and recording what I felt while watching the scenes. I chose to make such notes because an easily articulable story is unavailable in the films. Additionally, an affective process is only felt personally and discussed retrospectively. Hence, I focused on what an affective experience can do in terms of my objective, which is discussing the flight of affect from the state.

I discussed how the film *A Silk Letter* could facilitate a flight of affect from the South Korean state’s militarism in light of ‘assuming a defensive posture in the face of approaching violence’. My analysis suggests that, unlike the military reality shows which praise bold life-risking decisions, *A Silk Letter* conveys, in a sensate and affective manner, that an opportunity for the continuity of life may lie in the passivity, the undecidedness, the ‘crouching’ in anxiety, or the fear towards the approaching violence of the state. In this regard, the film refers to the flight of affect from the South Korean state’s militarism.
Following that, I discussed how the film *Men Who Won’t Pick Up Guns 2* facilitate a flight of affect in light of ‘asserting the irreducibility of the self*. My analysis suggested that the objectors in the film give the impression that they will do whatever they must do, conveying a strong sense of inevitability which invalidates the choices set out by the state, such as to become a soldier or not. Through this, the film’s objectors indicate that they will remain a minority by refusing to become intelligible in the face of the state. In this regard, I suggested that the objectors, who assert the irreducibility of the self, are like Deleuze and Guattari’s (2005) ‘war machines’ that resist the state’s attempt to capture their capacities to affect others, be affected by others, and transform themselves.

In Chapter 8, I discussed how the imaginations of human bodies are affective. My reading of the shows suggested they present the ideal bodies of soldiers or the beautiful bodies that quickly make sense and capture affect in the context of more conventional imaginings of national security. Notably, the bodies presented through the shows are conducive to imagining organic organisation and xenophobic immunity. Second, the films present the confusing bodies of the objectors or the extreme bodies that refuse to easily make sense, facilitating the flight of affect in the context of imagining national security. Particularly, the bodies in the films are conducive to imagining the Body without Organs and xenophilic immunity. My two readings showed that imagining national security through the human body is an affective process.

To provide a comprehensive summary of my dissertation, I proposed that three qualities of the human body, organisation, immunity, and affect, can frame imaginations of national security. From the South Korean state’s perspective, national security is imagined through familiar imaginings of the human body, such as the organic organisation and xenophobic immunity. Additionally, the state captures affect through imagining the bodies that seemingly make sense in view of pervasive militarism. However, South Korean conscientious objectors’ narratives propose the Body without Organs and xenophilic immunity, which can reimagine national security. Also, the objectors facilitate the flight of affect from the state’s militarism through imagining the bodies that make the viewers wander about in sensation. The Body without Organs reimagines the relationship between the whole and the parts. The xenophilic immunity reimagines the relationship between the self
and the other. The extreme body is about facilitating the flight of affect, which can be prompted by the Body without Organs and the xenophilic immunity. Overall, I demonstrated that South Korean conscientious objectors, as aesthetic subjects, have the potential to reimagine national security in both conceptual and affective manners.

9.2 Reflections upon the findings

I reflect upon the findings regarding their contributions. First, I reflect on the significance of the human body’s qualities for reimagining national security. Second, I reflect on the implications of South Korean conscientious objectors and their ‘redundant causes’ for national security and peacebuilding in South Korea.

First, I demonstrated that qualities of the human body, such as organisation, immunity, and affect, are significant for imagining national security. The human body is generally considered irrelevant to ‘macro’ issues, such as national security. However, throughout history and societies, communities and collectives have often been likened to a body. For example, to revisit my literature review, more than three decades ago, Ashley introduced a gendered (and hence problematic) concept of the “sovereign man”, an incarnation of a state and an interpretive centre for a state’s international and domestic political lives (1989, 261). Further developing Ashley’s problematique (see also Weber 2016; 199), this dissertation addressed the relatively underexplored problem of the bodily qualities through which people have imagined collectives. I suggested that such bodily qualities are organisation, immunity, and capture/flight of affect. They are references through which only certain things are made sensible and perceptible when imagining the security of the body politic. Hence, through the three qualities, I also probed what alternative ways of sensing and knowing can be enabled. The probe’s significance lies in unsettling the familiar conditions for sensing and knowing national security and proposing the alternative (see Shapiro 2013, 11; see also Rancière 2008).

I highlighted that organisation pertains to the hierarchical relationship between parts and the body politic as a whole or the vital organ of national security. For example,
an organically organised body is aligned with the public criticism of those exempted from the military service or those who refuse to serve in the military, equated with the vital organ. However, the Body without Organs aligns with South Korean conscientious objectors’ attempt to find themselves or their life as significant on their own, their denial of the hierarchical standards of life set by the public, and their detachment from the ‘vital organ’ by refusing the military conscription.

I also emphasised that immunity pertains to the relationship between the self/inside and the others/outside, a fundamental problem for national security. For example, xenophobic immunity is present in the pervasive belief that minority voices that challenge the military or disrupt the state’s ethical boundaries are dangerous. In contrast, xenophilic immunity is present in South Korean conscientious objectors who find themselves inevitably involved with others and are open to seemingly inchoate and disorganising differences. The objectors, promoting various pacifist views, consider the differences as opportunities to enrich their worldview by being affected by others.

Additionally, I underscored through visual materials that affective representations of bodies can solidify or disrupt militarisation. For example, in my analysis, the affect-capturing beautiful bodies are masculine soldierly bodies that obey orders from the vital organs and sacrifice the self while fighting the invaders. As the beautiful bodies are mostly taken for granted or even praised by the majority, they can be reminders of organic organisation and xenophobic immunity. In contrast, the bodies crouching in fear upon sensing an approaching threat represent the extreme bodies, facilitating the flight of affect. As the extreme bodies cannot find adequate words to describe themselves and have become somewhat unapproachable from the state’s perspective, they can be reminders to the Body without Organs and xenophilic immunity. Overall, through organisation, immunity, and affect, I engage the underexplored topic of how state and national security are imagined through the qualities of the human body.

Second, I focused on the political potential of South Korean conscientious objectors’ ‘redundant’ causes that do not immediately appear to contribute to survival. Throughout the analytic chapters, I presented the various causes of conscientious objectors, such as the right to peace, animal rights, or personal histories. It is not difficult to imagine that these causes are considered ‘individual and redundant’ or
even ‘dangerous’ in the face of the militarised confrontation with North Korea and the long history of wars and violent deaths in the Korean Peninsula. The relevant parties are mostly state actors wielding military and economic power. However, informed by Finnish peace research’s normative and crossing levels-of-analysis agenda, I suggested conscientious objectors are significant for changing the conflict environment.

I highlighted the fact that conscientious objectors commonly promote the right to have rights rather than the right to biological survival, expanding the meaning of life beyond the notion of survival. In this respect, my research signals that the objectors’ seemingly redundant demands can contribute to fostering the conditions for imagining sustainable peace and security. For example, I pointed out in Chapter 6 that the hierarchical relationship between the parts and the vital organ implies ‘survival at all costs’ or ‘survival of the vital organ by sacrificing redundant parts’. I suggest that such an attitude facilitates human beings’ reduction into mere bodily existence, commodities, or expendables. According to Agamben (1995), such existence is stripped of all possible relations except those necessary for biological survival. As I discussed in Chapters 4 and 8 through the concept of the ‘beautiful body’, such an attitude also renders the body easily comprehensible instead of respecting the body’s inherently incomprehensible potential. However, through their personal narratives, South Korean conscientious objectors’ reimaginations of the human body escape the state’s attempt to make sense of what they are. The objectors’ reimaginations of what a body can do challenge the claim to general ‘reality’ about the human being. Therefore, if the state focuses more on defining ‘what someone is’, the objectors focus more on exploring ‘what someone can do’ beyond survival.

In this regard, I suggested that South Korean Conscientious objectors can approach the conflict-ridden relationship between the two Koreas from the perspective of what people can achieve and become instead of focusing too much on defining each other. They can imagine an alternative space for peace and security premised on securing and maximising human potential. 71 As such, taking the objectors’ ‘redundant’ causes more seriously, one may imagine more humane, less militaristic,

71 I also suggest asking ‘what someone can do’ beyond survival is in accordance with Weber’s suggestion of turning to ‘and/or’ logic and moving away from ‘either/or’ logic (2016, 3; see also section 1.2).
and less confrontational security politics. This observation shows why the conscientious objectors’ seemingly ‘redundant’ causes, expanding the meaning of life beyond survival, are, at the end of the day, significant for peace and security in a post-conflict society such as South Korea.

9.3 Future research

Based on the findings, I discuss what this dissertation opens up for future research. As pointed out through the reflections, I showed how seemingly distant things are related. For example, the human body and national security share qualities like organisation, immunity, and beauty. I also demonstrated how supposedly trivial or redundant matters become politically significant. For example, conscientious objectors’ personal stories can imagine collective bodies differently. Overall, this dissertation encourages finding ways to travel across levels of analysis, from the micro (e.g., the individual) to the macro (e.g., the state and, potentially, the international).

On the basis of my findings, I emphasise that the human body will remain a key ingredient in future research on imagining political communities. Also, in line with linking seemingly distant things, this dissertation inspires reflection on what other familiar bodily qualities can unconsciously frame understandings of political communities beyond organisation and immunity. Such qualities include the unconscious, reproduction, digestion/metabolism, or development/growing up. For example, technological advancement has rapidly transformed the imaginations of ideal bodies – their capacities and shapes. In this respect, I suggest prosthetics (e.g., artificial limbs and organs, drugs, artificial intelligence, and metaverse), which rethink and reorganise the limits of the human body, can also rethink and reorganise visions about political communities. Also, the enthusiasm and resistance towards future prosthetics may constitute an affectively charged space where the body and politics entangle. As such, new bodily qualities will continue to frame individual and collective bodies.
I suggest that findings from this dissertation indicate the pluripotent characteristic of the body and its biopolitical life (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 287). In this regard, future research employing this dissertation’s findings can explore the implications for biopolitical security when politics increasingly associates life with its pluripotent qualities, such as versatility and adaptability, rather than prevention and preservation. Notably, biopolitics will engage strategies for resilience, self-renewal, and regeneration and the potential for creating new life forms (ibid., 288). Also, another direction in which the new biopolitical potential of life can influence our understanding of security is its relationship with the violent imposition of the capacity for freedom. In the name of promoting life and its freedom, biopolitical security might violently control the aleatory characteristics of life (ibid., 292). The Body without Organs, xenophilic immunity, and affective flight can suggest how such control might unfold in previously unthought or oppressive ways.

Based on the results I obtained, it would be possible to carry out conceptual interventions by more explicitly feminist and non-Western theories of the human body for reimagining political communities. In the future, I can specify how the Body without Organs, xenophilic immunity, and the extreme body can be feminist endeavours to confuse and subvert traditionally masculine political bodies or institutions like the military and war through feminised or deviant bodies. Also, in this dissertation, I have relied on the ideas rooted in Europe to read the research materials produced in South Korea. However, for example, East Asian medicine has propounded images of the human body significantly different from modern Western medicine’s images. Some recent studies have linked East Asian medicine and international or regional politics (see Chen and Chen 2021; Krickel-Choi et al. 2022; Seo Jungmin 2021; Ling 2016). Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, which have shaped Asian cultures for over a millennium, also imagine bodies differently. International relations will benefit from more studies employing non-Western theories of the human body (see Seo and Cho 2021; Cho Young-chul 2023).

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72 I suggest this is because South Korean society is a largely Americanised or Westernised society, and law and medicine are no exceptions. Also, I often refer to the thoughts on the body by Deleuze, Derrida, Esposito, and Napier. Whether their thoughts are wholly ‘Western’ is also debatable. It might be interesting to compare Oriental medicine with theories of Esposito and Napier.
My findings point toward other conceptual interventions that can recognise how supposedly trivial or redundant matters can become politically significant. For example, future research can consider the significance of other minorities in imagining political communities. I suggest that minorities such as the disabled, gay soldiers, or people in drags are often considered irrelevant to international conflict or security. Yet, they can become aesthetic subjects like South Korean conscientious objectors that inspire reflections on the conditions of imagining the human body and political communities. Future research can also explore the persecuted conscientious objectors in other regions that practice conscription, such as Turkey, Israel, and Russia. Studying the objectors’ often-trivialised narratives in such ‘hot zones’ can provide creative insight into the ongoing conflicts.

Moreover, similar studies can proceed in methodologically different directions based on my dissertation. For example, an experimental research design may strengthen the importance of reading politics while considering aesthetics, which resists being exhausted via language. As Immanuel Wallerstein (2006, 80) indicated, politics attempts to unify the true, the good, and the beautiful. In Wallerstein’s spirit, devising creative ways to discuss the untextualisable will enrich future explorations of politics.
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FOR DECADES, the South Korean state has imprisoned conscientious objectors in large numbers for jeopardising the military and, therefore, threatening the foremost common good of national security. However, despite the persecution, conscientious objectors have ceaselessly expressed their opposition to the almost sacred belief that the military is necessary for national security.

To expose an institutionalised mode of imagining national security and propose an alternative mode, the author pays attention to the fact that, in many societies, the tropes of the human body’s well-being have been central to imagining the security of political communities. Reading conscientious objectors’ and the South Korean state’s textual and visual materials side-by-side, this thesis shows how to reimagine national security through reimagining the human body. In particular, the author identifies the human body’s three qualities that shape national security imaginations: organisation, immunity, and affect.

This thesis engages the underexplored topic of how qualities of the human body can shape the imagining of national security. In doing so, the author also shows that conscientious objectors’ voices, which do not immediately appear to contribute to collective survival, may lead to imagining more humane, less militaristic, and less confrontational national security in South Korea, a post-conflict society.