

Linnea Määttä

TERRORISM AS PART OF MILITARY STRATEGY

a comparative case study of Isis and Hezbollah

TIIVISTELMÄ

Linnea Määttä: Terrorism as part of military strategy: A comparative case study of Isis and Hezbollah
Master Thesis (77s)
Tampereen yliopisto
Degree program in Politics, International Relations
May 2022

Terrorismi ilmiönä on ollut maailmanpolitiikan keskiössä lähes 20 vuotta. Terrorismin vastaisen sodan saavutukset ovat osoittautuneet pettymykseksi ja todentavat kyvyttömyyttä ymmärtää terrorismia ilmiönä. Terrorismia ei ole käsitelty riittävästi sotilaallisen strategian näkökulmasta, vaikka aihetta on jo pitkään tarkasteltu osana kansainvälisen politiikan tutkimusta. Tutkielma lähestyy terrorismia osana sotilaallisen strategian viitekehystä. Terrori-iskut ovat globaali ilmiö, mutta iskut ovat yleisiä erityisesti konfliktialueilla. Iskuihin linkittyvät ryhmät käyvät sotaa osana nykyaikaisia kompleksisuuden määrittämää konfliktiympäristöä. Terrorismista ilmiönä ei voida saavuttaa kokonaisvaltaista ymmärrystä irrallaan tästä kontekstista. Tutkielman tavoittelee parempaa ymmärrystä terrorismin funktioista ja näiden funktioiden eroista eri organisaatioiden välillä.

Tutkielma hyödyntää vertailevaa tapaustutkimusta terrorismin funktioiden ja niiden erojen ymmärtämiseksi. Tutkielma vertailee Hizbollahin ja Isisin sotilasstrategiaa terrorismin funktioiden näkökulmasta. Vertailu Shiia ja Sunni ryhmän välillä tarjoaa mahdollisuuden tutkia järjestöjä, jotka ovat muodostuneet eri konteksteissa. Tutkimuksen lähtökohdat mahdollistavat terrorismin tarkastelun osana sodankäynnin taktiikoita. Tutkielma hyödyntää pääasiassa primäärilähteitä terrorismin funktioiden analyysissä. Relevantti akateeminen kirjallisuus toimii analyysin tukena. Analysoitu materiaali koostuu järjestöille keskeisistä puheista, haastatteluista, ääniviestien ja videoiden litteraateista, kirjeistä ja lausunnoista. Kumouksellisen sodankäynnin teoriaan pohjaava kvalitatiivinen sisältöanalyysi toimii materiaalin analyysin perustana. Järjestöihin linkittyvän materiaalin analyysien vertailu paljasti selkeitä eroja terrorismin funktiossa. Tutkielman tulokset korostavat valitun sotilasstrategian merkitystä valituille terroristitaktiikoille ja terrorismin roolille.

Tutkielman tulokset tukevat näkemystä terroristisista taktiikkana, joka tarjoaa monipuolisia funktioita eriäville järjestöille. Terrorismi hahmotetaan tutkimuksen viitekehyksessä tarjoavan erilaisten taktiikoiden keinovalikoiman, joita järjestöt voivat sovittaa osaksi sotilasstrategiaansa. Ymmärrys ilmiön kompleksisuudesta jää vajaaksi, jos terrorismi hahmotetaan lähinnä sen kaikkein väkivaltaisimpien ja mediahuomiota herättävien ilmenemismuotojen kautta. Tutkielman havaintojen mukaan sotilasstrategian valinnalla on vaikutuksia terrorismin käyttöön. Terrorismi saattaa tuoda selkeitä hyötyjä osana yhtä sotilasstrategiaa, mutta osana toista strategiaa sen tarjoamat funktiot saattavat olla rajalliset. Terrorismille avautui monipuolisia funktioita osana molempien analysoitujen järjestöjen sotilasstrategioita, mutta sen hyödyt jäivät suhteellisen rajallisiksi. Terrorismi näyttäytyi keinona, jolle jaettiin tärkeä rooli sotilasstrategiassa ainoastaan muiden vaihtoehtojen puuttuessa. Terrorismi ilmeni olennaisena osana Isisin sotilasstrategiaa. Isis joutui strategiassaan nojaamaan suuremmissa määrin terrori-iskuihin ja epämuodolliseen organisaatorakenteeseen jouduttuaan muuttamaan strategiaansa maa alueiden menettämisen seurauksena. Analyysi paljasti laajan määrän funktioita terrorismille osana Isisin sotilasstrategiaa. Hizbollahin määrittä terrorismille huomattavasti rajatun roolin sotilasstrategiassaan. Hizbollah hydynsi terrorismia osana menestyksestä asymmetrisen sodan kampanjaansa Israelia vastaan, mutta sen funktio avoimien sotatoimien ulkopuolella jäi varsin rajalliseksi. Terrorismin funktiot osoittaisivat kokonaisuudessaan kapeiksi Hizbollahille verrattaessa Isisiin. Tutkielman tulokset tukevat oletusta terrorismin käytöstä laajassa mittakaavassa enimmäkseen tapauksissa, joissa aseellinen järjestö ei pysty saavuttamaan sotilaallisia tavoitteita muilla keinoin. Laajempi tieteellinen tutkimus terrorismin funktioiden monipuolisuudesta ja siihen vaikuttavista on tarpeen ilmiön ymmärtämisen laajentamiseksi. Kansainvälisen politiikan tutkimus hyötyisi terrorismin laajemmasta tarkastelusta osana sotilaallista strategiaa. Tutkimuksella tuotettu tieto voisi tarjota päättäjille paremmat lähtökohdat terrorismiin liittyvien linjausten muodostamiseen.

Avainsanat: Terrorismi, Sotilasstrategia, Isis, Hizbollah, Kumouksellinen sodankäynti

Tämän julkaisun alkuperäisyys on tarkastettu Turnitin OriginalityCheck –ohjelmalla.

ABSTRACT

Terrorism as a phenomenon has been on the center of world politics for over 20 years. The disappointing achievements of the war on terror has demonstrated our inability to understand the true nature terrorism. Terrorism has not been sufficiently studied from the perspective of military strategy, even if it remains a popular topic of research within the field of international relations. This master thesis sets out to explore the phenomena from the perspective of military strategy. The premise is to understand terrorism within the context of modern asymmetric warfare and as an aspect of warfare. Terrorist attacks occur globally but are especially common within conflict zones. Terrorism is utilized by groups engaging in warfare among the complexity of the modern conflict environments. A comprehensive understanding of terrorism is unachievable without the inclusion of this context within the analysis. This thesis aims to understand the functions of terrorism and the differences in these functions between different organizations.

A comparative case study is employed to explore the functions of terrorism between two distinct groups. The study compares Isis and Hezbollah military strategy with focus on the function of terrorism. Comparison between a Shia and Sunni group provides an opportunity for exploring organizations that have emerged in different contexts. The outset allows examination of terrorism as a tactic of warfare. Primary source material complemented by academic literature on the respective organizations provides the foundation for the analysis. The analyzed material includes hallmark speeches, interviews, transcripts of audio and video messages, letters and statements. Qualitative content analysis based on a framework provided by the theory of revolutionary warfare functions as basis for the analysis of the selected material. Comparison of the analysis results revealed clear differences in the function of terrorism between the organizations. The results highlighted the importance of the selected military strategy for the choice of terrorist tactics and role of terrorism within military strategy.

The thesis findings support the conclusion that terrorism serves diverse functions for different organizations. Terrorism provides a wide toolbox of tactics for organizations to fit into their military strategy. Basing understanding of terrorism primarily on the most violent and spectacular attacks fails to understand the complexity of the phenomena. The results suggest that the choice of military strategy influence use of terrorism and choice of terrorist tactics. Terrorism can provide clear benefits within a certain strategy, while only serving a minor role as part of another. Terrorism displayed multiple functions within the military strategy of both organizations. The analysis finds the benefits terrorism rather limited, with terrorist tactics allocated a large role within military strategy only as a last resort. Isis demonstrated a preference for using terrorism in an essential but limited role during its building and consolidation of the caliphate. The organization was forced to switch strategy and rely on terrorism attacks and a nonhierarchical organizational form only after losing capacity to control territory. The analysis found Isis to employ terrorism for a wide variety of function within its military strategy. Terrorism displayed a far more limited role within Hezbollah's military strategy. Hezbollah employed terrorism as a tactic as part of its successful campaigns of asymmetric warfare against Israel. Terrorism use outside an open state of war remained sparse. Hezbollah military forces employ terrorism for several functions, but these appear limited in comparison to Isis. The findings support the premise that terrorism is mostly used, at least in a broader extent, by organizations that achieve poor militarily success. Further research is called on the diversity of terrorisms function and the factors impacting it to expand the understanding of the phenomena. The field of international relations would benefit from a broader examination of terrorism within the framework of military strategy, which could also to provide better foundation for policymakers formulating counter terrorism policies.

Keywords: Terrorism, Military strategy, Isis, Hezbollah, Revolutionary warfare

Table of Content

1. Introduction.....	1
2. Research question	3
2.1 Relevance	4
3. Terrorism studies.....	6
4. Theoretical Framework	8
4.1 Study of military strategy	9
4.2 Revolutionary warfare	10
4.3 Terrorist as part of revolutionary warfare	13
4.4 Metatheoretical assumptions	15
5. Definitions	17
5.1 Terrorism	17
5.2 Military Strategy and Tactics.....	18
5.3 Revolutionary art of war	19
6. Restrictions of the study.....	19
7. Case selection	20
8. Methodology.....	22
8.1 Material.....	25
8.2 Operationalization of Methodology.....	27
8.2.1 Ayman al-Zawahiri	28
8.2.2 Abu Ubayad al-Qurashi	28
8.2.3 Ab al-Aziz al-Murqin	29
8.2.4 Abu Bakr Naji.....	29
8.2.5 Abu Musab al-Suri.....	30
8.3 Coding.....	30
9. Overview of Isis	35
9.1 Isis Military Strategy.....	37
9.2 Isis use of terrorism as part of military strategy.....	40
10. Analysis results- Isis.....	42
10.1 Results	42
10.1.1 Propaganda value.....	43
10.1.2 Tactic of Asymmetric Warfare	44

10.1.3 Leaderless Jihad.....	45
10.1.4 Recruiting and mobilizing function	46
10.1.5 Creating zones of Chaos	47
10.1.6 Spreading fear	48
10.2 Acceptability of terrorism as a tactic.....	49
10.3 Summary of results.....	50
11. Overview of Hezbollah	51
11.1 Hezbollah Military Strategy.....	53
11.2 Hezbollah use of Terrorism as part of Military Strategy.....	55
12. Analysis- Hezbollah	57
12.1 Results	58
12.1.1 Propaganda value.....	59
12.1.2 Tactic of asymmetric warfare	60
12.1.3 Leaderless Jihad.....	62
12.3.4 Recruiting and mobilizing function	63
12.1.5 Creating zones of chaos	64
12.1.6 Spreading fear	66
12.4 Acceptability of terrorism	66
12.5 Summary of results.....	67
13. Comparison Isis and Hezbollah	69
14. Conclusions	74
15. References	78

"The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."

-Carl Von Clausewitz

"In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity."

-Sun Zu

1. INTRODUCTION

The study aims to explore the differences between how Shia and Sunni terrorist groups use terrorism as part of their military strategy. A framework of comparative case study between Isis and Hezbollah is employed to gain a nuanced view of the function of terrorism for the selected organizations military strategy. The selected material is analyzed utilizing a theoretical framework derived from theories on revolutionary warfare. Important speeches, interviews, letters and publication by the spoke persons and leaders of the selected organizations serve as the primary source material for the study. Relevant academic literature supports the analysis and creates a context of reference. The material is analyzed using qualitative content analysis methodology developed by Mayring. The method involves creating theory-based coding system serving as the foundation for analysis of the selected materials. The analysis will be conducted on both organizations in a similar manner. Comparison of the analysis results assist in deriving similarities and differences between the organizations use of terrorism as part of their military strategy. Understanding how different armed organizations use terrorism as part of their military strategy is a subject not yet comprehensively understood. Understanding terrorism as a phenomenon intrinsically linked to warfare is central both for understanding its nature and for developing more effective ways of countering its spread and use. Exploring differences between function of terrorism for different organizations helps expand our perspective on terrorism as a diverse tool. This can avoid the tendency of viewing terrorism as a uniform phenomenon that can be responded to with pre-determined set of rules.

The study does not view the theological or ideological differences between the groups as relevant, but rather focuses on the detectable differences in patterns of terrorist tactic employment as part of

military strategy. Religion is not perceived as simply a theological difference but rather as an aspect of a different context in which the organizations have formed and are operating in. Thus, religion is not the only relevant differentiating aspect between the groups, but historical context, culture, economics and goals are elements that create differences between the groups.

After the attacks on the twin towers and the following war on terror, terrorism has received much attention, not only in the foreign policy of many nations and on the world scene, but also in academic circles (Silke 2019, 1). Looking back at the world before the attacks, one can say that the events that unfolded on 11.9.2001 have had a major impact on the international system. Another turning point in history might have unfolded in August 2021, when western countries evacuated Afghanistan amid chaos after the Taliban took back Kabul. The war on terror now appears lost. Many regard Afghanistan another pointless war, in a series of endless wars against terrorism. The recent events in Afghanistan might risk turning the country back into a safe haven for terrorism (Reuters 27.10.2021). Analysis on the causes of the failure in Afghanistan has been a relevant topic both for popular media and policy analysts.

Many of the analysts have concluded that the failures partly related to western arrogance and its inability to understand the context and phenomena they were dealing with (Feroz 23.8.2021). The launch of the war on terror and the counter-terrorism tactics employed can be seen as decisions muddled with emotion and desire for revenge in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The US seemed to have a wish to wipe out all terrorism and everyone associated with the ideology of al Qaida (Richardson 2007, 146). Similarly, much of the academic literature on terrorism has been criticized for taking a too ideological stance on studying terrorism, especially when it comes to studying Jihadism (Schuurman 2019, 643-644). The “media sexiness” of the subject has attracted self-proclaimed experts who do not always seek to contribute objective viewpoints to the academic debate (Youngman 2020, 1094).

The study of terrorism remains a relevant topic, even if the war on terror seems to be toning down. Modern asymmetric warfare predictably will continue to be closely linked with the use of terror tactics and Jihadism in the future. This is evident, for example, in the many conflicts in Africa, where different Jihadist armed groups gain support following local governments sliding towards state failure. These groups are often inspired, and sometimes swear loyalty to prominent terrorist organizations such as Isis (Engelhardt 2/2019). There is a need to learn from previous mistakes and to better understand the phenomena of terrorism. The thesis aims at providing a less morally judgmental analysis on terrorism, where terrorism is viewed from the perspective of military strategy

and as a tactic in warfare. Terrorism does not fit comfortably within modern western conception of warfare, but it has nonetheless been part of war for all recorded history. The thesis frames terrorism as a tool in warfare and consequently aims to distance itself from viewing terrorism as something only used by “the bad guys”. The study recognizes that there is no such thing as objective analysis, at least when it comes to terrorism. Every researcher makes choices influenced by their worldview. Terrorism remains a complicated subject to study, especially relating to the scant access to primary sources (Schmid et al. 2011, 470). The study aims to reflect critically on the theories and sources it uses and consider the epistemological and ontological biases that impact the analysis to mitigate these problems. A framework of a comparative case study allows for deeper and more nuanced insight.

The study does not wish to imply that Islam, whether Sunni or Shia, or Islamic culture in general contains some inherently violent characteristics that lead to violence and terrorism. The study seeks to explore terrorism as a phenomenon relevant for contemporary asymmetric warfare. Almost all cultures and religions have used violence at some point in their history. Sunni and Shia terrorist groups are chosen as objects of study for their relevance for contemporary conflicts. The study will apply a theoretical framework derived from military strategic studies to understand the use of terrorism as a tool of warfare. Explaining the root causes of terrorism remains outside the scope of the study. Rather, the study seeks to examine what functions terrorism provides, how it is used and what roles it plays in military strategy. The results provide hints on why armed revolutionary groups employ certain terrorist tactics, but this is not the main focus of the study.

2. RESEARCH QUESTION

The study seeks to explore the function of terrorism as part of military strategy and the differences between Isis and Hezbollah in this regard. The goal is to better understand what functions terrorism serves as part of the military strategy of groups involved in revolutionary warfare. The study is executed by comparing two different terrorist organizations and examining how the function of terrorism as part of military strategy differs between them. One Sunni and one Shia terrorist group is selected as the objects of the analysis. The study seeks insight into the differences of the function of terrorism for Sunni and Shia groups, but the results mainly generate knowledge on the selected

organization. A comparative case study is employed to gain a nuanced and deep understanding of the phenomena and the differences between the groups. The selected material will be systematically analyzed to examine for the function and role of terrorism as part of military strategy for both organizations. Function and role can be seen as related terminology but used for different purposes within the study. Function refers to the service or purpose terrorism provides as part of military strategy and includes the tactical consequences or benefits of terrorism. For example, one of the functions of terrorism can be to spread fear or to weaken morale of enemy troops. Function is tied to the context in which the terroristic tactic is used. The role of terrorism refers to its allocated importance as part of military strategy. The number of resources and military efforts aimed within the organization towards terroristic activities in comparison to other tactics indicates relevance of the role of terrorism.

The cases selected for the study are Isis, to represent a Sunni terrorist group, and Hezbollah, to represent a Shia terrorist group. The study seeks to answer the following research question:

“What function does terrorism serve as part of military strategy of Isis and Hezbollah, and what are the key differences?”

Supporting research questions:

- What role does terrorism play as part of the military strategy of Isis and Hezbollah and what factors impact this?
- How does the function of terrorism evolve for the organization?

2.1 Relevance

The western countries failure at understanding terrorism is evident from the whole concept of the “War on Terror”. Terrorism cannot be eradicated, since it is a tactic of war, not a creed (Richardson 2007, 176). This failure has had massive consequences, among them the recent apparent failure of the western coalition in Afghanistan. The events unfolding in Kabul call into question the practices through which the West interacts with foreign cultures, not only in the context of the War on Terror, but also through its peacebuilding initiatives around the world. Both arenas have demonstrated the westerners often condescending approach to foreign contexts and their inability to understand the local context and comprehend the realities on the ground (Autesserre 2014, 12). Complexity is a key

characteristic of most current conflict, where peacebuilding, war and counterterrorism tends to blend (Kaldor 2012, 8-12). However, counterterrorism actions have tended to see terrorism as an ideology rather than a tactic. This approach fails to appreciate the context and differences between groups and places all terrorists in the same box, to which there is only one countermeasure. US military action has in a large part consisted of different tactics to capture and kill as many individuals linked to terrorist organizations as possible (Gavett 2011). The study seeks to highlight the importance of understanding differences between groups that use terrorism. Jihadist terrorist groups and the different approaches to terrorism is a relevant subject of study, since has been in the focus in both within terrorism studies and policy approaches to terrorism. Every group has their own approach, but some general lines can be drawn by looking at Shia and Sunni terrorism. This provides a subject that has received too little attention both within policy and academic circles (Lynch 7, 2008).

Terrorism itself has received a lot of attention in academic circles, at least in the wave of the war on terror. Many scholars regard terrorism studies as its own field (Youngman 2020, 1091). Studying terrorism as a strategy has been less popular and could bring valuable insight into the phenomena. Viewing terrorism as a tactic employed in warfare throughout history can help us view it as a phenomena part of complex asymmetric warfare (Tarvinen & Puistola 2013, 261). Terrorism serves as a tool for armed groups to bring the wars in which major powers fight overseas to the reality of the public back home, who are otherwise largely untouched and uninterested in the conflict (Richardson 2007, 143).

This thesis aims to make use of the interdisciplinary nature of terrorism studies. Terrorism studies is an interdisciplinary field that has borrowed from many disciplines such as psychology, sociology, history, international relations and criminology (Schmid et al. 2011, 2). Military and strategic studies have also recently paid increasing attention to terrorism, but mostly within the context of its own field (Tarvinen & Puistola 2013, 256). Terrorism has not yet been sufficiently studied in the context of international relations from the perspective of military science and strategic studies.

In addition to understanding the differences between Sunni- and Shia terrorism, the study aims to add to the knowledge of the military strategy of Isis and Hezbollah, especially the role of terrorism within it. Isis and Hezbollah are selected as the case studies and serve as representatives of the most influential organizations of Shia- and Sunni terrorism. Isis can be seen as the spearhead of the Global Salafi Jihad movement after the decline of Al Qaida (Roy 2017, 81). Despite losing its physical caliphate, the Isis brand continues to inspire groups and individuals globally (Engelhardt 2/2019). Similarly, Hezbollah has risen to prominence with the backing of Iran and can be seen as the most

prominent and powerful Shia terrorist organization. Terilä predicts an increase in Shia terrorism and threats of armed Shia groups against the West in the future. (Terilä 2020, 175-183.) Both organizations share some state-like characteristics. Isis substituted many state functions during its rule over its caliphate, and Hezbollah is often described as a “state within a state”. This makes comparison between them more interesting, since the organizations are different in most regards but share some similar characteristics.

3. TERRORISM STUDIES

Two of the most widely cited problems within terrorism studies is the lack of consensus in defining terrorism and methodological issues, especially in access to source-material (Jones 2010, 479). These issues have to do with the interdisciplinary nature of terrorism studies. Terrorism studies is not yet well established as its own field. Terrorism is a complex, extremely controversial and politicized phenomenon, making it a challenging subject of study. The problem with defining terrorism has broad consequences for the methodological frameworks the studies employ. Depending on the definition scholars use, they end up with different ontological and epistemological understandings, which can lead to metatheoretical issues and confusion. (Ranstorp 2007, 6-7.) Many scholars within the field are exhausted by the endless debate on the definition of terrorism. Some have solved the dilemma with employing definitions that they choose based on relevance and fit for their research (Ranstorp 2007, 9-12). The second most recurring critique against terrorism studies is the lack of methodological rigor in many of the studies. Silke cites the lack of primary data, definitional problems, lack of empirical research, lack of methodological sophistication, recycling of assumptions, lack of historical awareness and use of theories lacking empirical support among the many challenges still troubling the field. (Silke 2019, 1-7.) Some of these problems stem from less qualified researchers, that the “media sexiness” of terrorism tends to attract. Another source of the problems has been the lack of a “core” for the discipline. There has been a lack of established names within the field and relatively little development of methodology and theory. The discipline is not even regarded as its own field by many. There has been a trend of borrowing methodologies from other fields with lack of real understanding of the adaption of the methodological frameworks and critical examination of them. (Youngman 2020, 1094, 1101-1102.)

Terrorism studies has been critiqued for mostly focusing on trendy topics. Terrorist organizations that attract large media attention, the MENA region and religious-and jihadi terrorism has been the subject of numerous studies while leaving little attention for other important, but poorly explored topics. Critical terrorism studies (CTS) has sought to rectify this issue. Many of the problems presented above have since received wider attention and the quality of terrorism studies has been seen as increasing steadily. Some have even claimed that the field is entering into a “golden age”. (Morrison 2020, 1-3, 14-16.) Self-critique and insights from other disciplines have been yielding benefits for terrorism studies. The quality of studies has clearly improved, but Youngman argues that there remains a lot to be rectified. Interdisciplinarity needs to be developed more systematically. Relevance of terrorism outside academia should be further developed into a strength rather than seen as a weakness. The findings of studies should be better communicated, and policy relevant studies should not only be criticized for being agenda driven, but rather focus on constructive suggestion on how to improve them. (Youngman 2020, 1096-1102.) Terrorism is a difficult phenomenon to study due to its complex nature and diverse actions and actors through which it can manifest (McAllister & Schmid 2011, 201-202). Access to interesting insight might be hidden away in government intelligence organizations and the terrorists themselves. Both sources are however often unrealistic to access (Sageman 2014, 576).

3.2. Terrorism within military studies

As discussed above, terrorism is a complex phenomenon, that has been studied from many different perspectives within terrorism studies and international relations. Terrorism is the use of violence to reach a designated goal and hence also a tactic of warfare and part of military studies (Sinai 2007, 32). The war on terror naturally garnered it increased attention within military studies. The view on what constitutes a security threat for states has broadened significantly since the end of the cold war and the start of the 21st century. Terrorism has been increasingly framed as one of the severe security threats states are facing. Due to this development and the wars against terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, terrorism has gotten increased attention within military studies. (Raitasalo 2013, 216.) It is perceived both as a tactic of asymmetrical warfare and as a tactic relevant for the grand strategy of jihadist groups (Paronen 2016, 339). Terrorism can be seen as a tactic of warfare that employs psychological effects for military or political gains, and is hence different from other forms of violence, such as acts committed by organized crime. Terrorism is often used in combination with other tactics related to asymmetric and guerilla warfare. A rebel group fighting a guerilla campaign against military targets but simultaneously carrying out terrorist attacks on civilian occasionally is an example of this. Terrorism can be perceived as part of an overlapping strategy, guiding the means to

reach certain goals. Within military studies every goal directed action is seen as requiring a strategy. Many military strategy scholars regard terrorism as fitting within the Clausewitzian conception of war. Terrorism always has a political and psychological nature. (Puistola & Tarvinen 2013, 256-263.) This view on terrorism might conflict with the view presented by CTS, but it can still contribute to expand our view on terrorism. A complex phenomena like terrorism cannot be studied from just one perspective. Military science presents a relevant and fresh angle on the study of terrorism. Strategies employed by terrorist and how terrorist organizations acquire military knowledge are not yet understood comprehensively. (McAllister & Schmid, 2011, 259; Jongman, 2007, 266.) Military studies could contribute to the debates regarding the effectiveness of terrorism. It could also help answer the question on why some groups use terrorism and other do not.

4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

One of the strengths of terrorism studies has for long been its interdisciplinary nature (Silke 2019, 4). The study aims to continue the positive trend with the selection of a theoretical framework used in military studies and applying it to the study of terrorism within international relations. The theory of revolutionary warfare serves as the theoretical framework of the study. The theory of revolutionary warfare seeks to explain the kind of military strategies revolutionary armed groups use to reach their goals. It's theoretical assumptions are founded on principles of revolutionary warfare developed and used by scholars of revolutionary warfare. Many of these writers have themselves engaged in revolutionary warfare as military leaders. (Paronen 2016, 41-46.) The theoretical framework aims to provide insight on military strategies used by revolutionary armed groups and the role and function of terrorism within their respective military strategies. A framework outlining the principles of revolutionary warfare is useful for understanding the principles and the strategic thinking the organizations military strategy is founded on. The theoretical framework is given a central role in the analysis conducted by the study and serves as a basis for the qualitative content analysis categories. The theory provides a nuanced and deep understanding of the function of terrorism as a military strategy and the military strategy of the groups in a broader sense. The study seeks to critically evaluate the fit of the framework for answering the research question throughout the study.

4.1 Study of military strategy

The study focuses on military strategy as part of the strategic level of warfare. The theory of revolutionary warfare is a natural framework for studying the strategy of armed non-state actors fighting in contemporary asymmetric wars. Theory of revolutionary warfare is derived from general theories on the art of war relating to military strategy. The study of strategy is not a scientific field in its own right, but rather a perspective within military science. Military scholars employ a variety of methods and theories in studying strategy, and the field is characterized by interdisciplinarity. (Sipilä & Koivula 2013, 19.) The interdisciplinary nature of the military science provides added value for the frameworks suitability in studying terrorism.


The study of strategy can be linked to a modern western view on military science. Western military science has significantly been influenced by the renowned classical thinkers on strategy and war such as Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine-Henry Jomini and Sun Zu. Each of these have made their own important contributions to the field. Some regard Sun Zu as part of the eastern tradition of strategic thinking while Clausewitz and Jomini stand as the foundations of western art of war. Lintusaari argues that the western and eastern tradition should not be seen in opposition to each other. Dividing them is dismissive of the universal nature of warfare. (Lintusaari 2017, 48-50.)

Clausewitz is perhaps most famous for his view of war as the continuation of politics. He influenced the central tenet of western strategic thinking where tactics and strategy are divided. Antoine-Henry Jomini regarded war as an art, not a science (Lintusaari 2017, 54). Jomini's ideas reflect in contemporary military science. For example, the Finnish military academy calls the field of military science the art of war. Jomini has influenced western thinking of strategy as not something fixed, but a skill to be learned and modified to each situation. Sun Zu's "the art of war" is perhaps the most famous writing on strategy. It focuses more on giving practical advice than the latter. This might also be why it has been heavily cited by revolutionary warfare generals such as Vo Nguyen Giap. (Lintusaari 2017, 50-54.)

The basic tenet of western military science commonly includes a pyramid-like taxonomy of different levels of warfare. Western military science divides the art of war into three levels that are in constant interaction with each other. Tactics form the lowest level and refers to the operational level of warfare and the use of military capabilities against the enemy on the battlefield. The second level is operational. This is understood as "grand tactics", which links the tactical level of the battlefield to the grand strategy. The operational level involves the art of planning and conducting military

operations. The highest level of the pyramid is strategy. This includes military strategy and grand strategy. Strategy refers to a high-level plan for achieving high-level objectives within certain circumstances. Military strategy operates as a subordinate category to grand strategy. It is a tool deemed appropriate for achieving certain ends outlined in the strategy. Military strategy has no universally accepted definition. Scholars perceive it as paradigm on the use of military force to achieve strategic objectives. Military strategy consists of ends (objectives), ways (concepts) and means (resources). Military strategy involves the planning, preparation and execution of military force. (Rekkedal 2013, 39-41.) The study accommodates Liddell Harts definition of military strategy as the use of all military resources to achieve the military objectives of a war (Rekkedal et al. 2013,15).

Levels of warfare:




4.2 Revolutionary warfare

The model of revolutionary warfare is a military scientific theoretical framework that has been developed by both observations on practical use of strategy in diverse conflicts and the writings of practitioners of revolutionary warfare, such as Mao Zedong, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Vladimir Lenin, Carlos Marighella and Ho Chin Minh, who all developed their own theories on the conduct of revolutionary warfare. Revolutionary warfare is not a new concept, but modern conceptions of revolutionary war started to emerge after the second world war. This early tradition is most connected to socialist and leftist armed revolutionaries. Revolutionary warfare is always highly tied to the conflict and context in which it is waged, and every practitioner molds it to best fit the needs of their struggle. (Paronen 2016, 40- 47.)

The evolving nature of revolutionary warfare makes it a paradigm, one which is not easily defined. Revolutionary warfare can be described as guerilla warfare, a revolution or even a terrorist campaign. They often include elements of all these in varying degrees. (Lintusaari, 2017, 43.) Palmen sees three common nominators for forms of revolutionary warfare. Firstly, the fighting is conducted within the territory of one state, referring to intra-state conflicts. Secondly, the attacker is primarily comprised of citizens of the country in which the conflict occurs. Third, the aim of the fighting is to seize control of the state from the current government. Some definitions emphasize the temporal and political elements of revolutionary warfare (Palmen 1967, 199-202.) CIA:s Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency defines revolutionary warfare as a prolonged political-military chain of events, with the aim to partially or fully control the states resources through an irregular military organization or illegal political action. (Paronen 2016, 41.)

The study utilizes the definition coined by Antti Paronen, since he uses a similar theoretical framework in studying Jihadi terrorism and revolutionary warfare. Paronen defines revolutionary warfare as; “a prolonged political-military conflict, which revolutionary aim is to weaken the current government, occupying force or other political authorities legal position, while increasing the power of the revolutionary actor”. (translated by the author) (Paronen 2016, 32, 41.) The below model is meant to illustrate the model of revolutionary warfare and terrorism’s position within it (Seppänen, 1977, 41).

Theoretical model of revolutionary warfare:



Revolutionary warfare relies on many of the same principles that classical theories of strategy advocate, for example, the principle of utilizing your strengths and using the enemy's weaknesses against them (Rekkedal 2016, 396). The tactics employed are different and quite diverse. Small operational units, flexible tactics and avoidance of direct confrontation with the enemy are common staples of revolutionary warfare. Relying on support of the people usually has a central role in the strategy. (Lintusaari 2017, 56.) Adapting the best tactics suited for the conflict environment are at the core of revolutionary strategy. Every practitioner and strategic thinker adapted theories of revolutionary warfare to best suit the context and goals of their respective conflicts. (Paronen 2016, 97.)

Mao Zedong sees revolutionary warfare as a dynamic force operating in parallel with conventional tactics. In Mao's theory, revolutionary warfare develops in three faces, though not necessarily in chronological order. The first phase involves acquiring the support of the people for the movement and establishing bases of support. Once transitioned into the second stage the force employs use of guerilla tactics against a superior enemy, including terrorist tactics when beneficial. The third and final stage consists of crippling the enemy and developing a support base to the point where the conflict transforms into conventional warfare. (Mao 1989 (1961), 20-22). Ernesto "Che" Guevara outlines three fundamental principles of guerilla warfare in his work; 1. The force of the people can defeat conventional forces. 2. An armed rebellion can create suitable conditions for a revolution, it does not need to wait for perfect conditions to arise. 3. The countryside is most suitable for an armed rebellion in underdeveloped nations. (Guevara 2012 (1961), 1.) Each revolutionary warfare strategic thinker develops their own principles for revolutionary warfare, but each of them share the same logic of fighting from an asymmetrical position while utilizing the advantages of that position against a conventional enemy force.

In recent years, literature on revolutionary warfare has shifted focus with the evolving struggles of contemporary warfare. Revolutionary warfare has traditionally been characterized by leftist or communist revolutionary movements and intra-state conflict. The current focus of literature on revolutionary warfare has shifted to analyzing the global jihadist movement, since it has displayed many of the principles of revolutionary warfare in its strategy, while adapting them to the context of their own struggles. The theory of revolutionary warfare has always been developed in continuum with the evolution of revolutionary warfare. Globalization of revolutionary struggles can be seen as the biggest shift within this evolution. Communist revolutionaries commonly fought within the

borders of one state. Scholars argue that Salafi Jihad movements have taken on an increasingly globalized character. The struggle is framed by Jihadists as global, and groups from around the world adapt the ideology and even the strategies of influential Jihadist groups such as al Qaida and Isis. (Paronen 2016, 97-99.) The struggle is given a global dimension also through terrorist attacks committed far outside the conflict zones by individuals only loosely connected to the group in whose name the attack is committed (Nance 2016, 309.)

Several Jihadist writers have published texts or manifestos of strategic thinking aimed at outlining their ideology, but also to give strategic advice on how Jihadist campaigns should be fought. For example, Abu Bark Naji and Abu Musab al-Suri's writing have often been regarded as "blueprints" for the strategy of the Global Salafi Jihadist movement spearheaded by al Qaida and Isis. In "Management of Savagery: The most critical stage through which the Islamic Nation will Pass" Naji outlines the strategy of sowing chaos and division within an area of operation, allowing later for the jihadist groups to establish control of the lawless area. Al-Suri's manifest "The Global Islamic Resistance Call" has been regarded to have significantly influenced al Qaida's strategy. Al-Suri advocates for the use of terrorism as a rational and tactical choice against Jihadists' conventionally superior western enemies. (Lintusaari 2017, 61-63.) The mentioned Jihadist scholars have a background in Sunni Salafi Jihadism, but Shia groups can be regarded as sharing many of the same principles in their strategies, since the geographical locations, enemy and ideology remains similar to a large degree. The strong connections and support by state actors, mainly Iran, could be regarded as perhaps the biggest strategic difference between Sunni and Shia groups (Lynch 2008, 40-42).

4.3 Terrorist as part of revolutionary warfare

Revolutionary warfare has always been linked to the use of terrorism. Revolutionary warfare is characterized by use of violence for political motivations, which is also an important defining feature of terrorism and terrorist groups. The clearest difference between insurgency and terrorist groups is in the level to which they target civilians. (Shultz 2008, 13-15.) Armed revolutionary groups have regularly employed terrorist violence, among other tactics of warfare. These two phenomena have often been analyzed separately despite the apparent similarities. According to Malkki and Paastela, one explanatory factor for terrorism and warfare being framed as separate phenomena is due to terrorism not fitting within western conceptions of warfare. This might relate to an aversion against perceiving terrorism as a natural part of warfare and unwillingness to risk giving it legitimacy. Malkki and Paastela argue that this line of thinking is problematic and ignores the long legacy of terrorism

being an integral part of warfare in urban settings. (Malkki & Paastela 2007, 35- 36.) Separating terrorism from warfare also makes it easier to ignore state terrorism connected to conflicts (Selden & So. 2004, 4-5). The study aims to approach terrorism as part of revolutionary warfare and a tactic among others used by revolutionary groups. The goal is to examine the reasoning and utility of its use and how these differ between the groups. One of the aims of these choices is to distance the study from ideological conceptions that have often tainted the study of terrorism. This premise also links the study to game theoretical and rationalist conceptions of war. Modern warfare is complex and messy, and traditional divisions between conventional and unconventional warfare don't always apply (Kaldor 2013, 6-7). Non-state groups often rely on both. Non-state actors make use of the resources that are available to them and strategies that best allow them to utilize their strengths and the enemy's weakness (Rekkedal 2016, 390-396). The conflicts of the 21st century have demonstrated how effective non-state actors can be and how difficult counterterrorism or counter-insurgency campaigns can prove. Understanding the use of terrorism is important for understanding contemporary asymmetrical warfare. Terrorism doesn't cease to exist by killing as many terrorists as possible.

Many revolutionary groups employ terrorist tactics, but there are important differences in the role of terrorism for their military strategy. Shultz has outlined some of the key differences between terrorist and insurgency groups, while recognizing that the phenomena of revolutionary warfare and terrorism are intertwined. Important differences in targeting and tactics persist. Insurgent groups use a variety of military and political tactics to reach their goals. These include sabotage, guerilla warfare, intelligence operations, political action and terrorism. The important difference is that they do not rely on terrorism. Terrorist groups rely on tactics that are designed to target noncombatants or targets who would under international law enjoy special protection. They seek to stage attacks that maximize the number of victims. The tactics are designed to create and exploit fear for political purposes through the most proscribed forms of violence. Terrorist groups aspire for their attacks to have far reaching psychological effects beyond their immediate physical effects of the violence. (Shultz 2008, 6-15.)

Defining terrorism or determining who is a terrorist groups are deeply controversial topics both within policy- and scholarly debate. The political nature and real-life implications of the topic makes it even more difficult to approach analytically. The current consensus on the definition of terrorism among scholars is that there is no correct definition. Each academic should use the definition best suited for their purposes, but with clear and well-thought-out motivations. (Schmid et al. 2011, 39-43.)

Terrorism is approached from the perspective as a form of warfare and the study doesn't view a terrorist- or insurgent group as an either- or phenomena, but rather as a spectrum. Position on the scale is determined by the tactics employed by a group and their role in the military strategy. A group relying exclusively on terrorist attacks that are designed to spread fear would be in the terrorist end of the scale, whereas groups only targeting conventional forces with guerilla tactics should be considered an insurgency group. Most groups fall somewhere in between on this spectrum. Within this study Hezbollah is view as an insurgent group using terrorist tactics, while Isis can be better described as a terrorist group engaging in conventional and insurgent warfare.

4.4 Metatheoretical assumptions

The study of military strategy can be considered subscribing to positivistic metatheoretical assumptions (Sipliä 2013, 71-73). The study of international relations originally primary focused on relationships between states, power politics and war between states. The study of war relied strongly on theories related to realism, which has also had an impact on the domination of positivistic outlooks in the early days of the field of international relations. (Levy & Thomson 2010, 3, 28.) The theory of revolutionary warfare draws from the same positivistic and rationalist outlook as the study of military strategy. War, and military strategy as part of it, are seen as rationalist ventures. Actors calculate the utility of each action and base the development of their military strategy on the choices that afford them the highest utility. Within this rationalistic thinking war and military strategy is often likened to a chess game, where decisions are made based on assumptions of how to overpower the enemy and force ones will on it i.e achieved one's strategic goals (Findely & Young 2011, 17.) These rational choice- approaches have enjoyed wide popularity in the study of war (Leavy & Thomson 2010, 64-69). The theory of revolutionary warfare follows the same logic. It is based on the thinking of practitioners of revolutionary warfare that have published works outlining their strategic principles. These works often read manuals or advice on how to conduct revolutionary warfare. They also build on each other, demonstrating a lineage in which practitioners of revolutionary warfare are often inspired by the works of their predecessors. Ideological differences do not seem to matter, since most of the jihadist strategic scholars demonstrate knowledge of leftist revolutionaries and their writings on the principles of guerilla warfare. (Whiteside 2016, 16.) The scholars of revolutionary warfare demonstrate a rationalistic and utilitarian logic, at least regard to military strategy.

Following these assumptions underlining the theory of revolutionary warfare, the outlook on terrorism this study utilizes is going to follow a rationalistic and positivist approach. Terrorism is a subject that in principle is far from neutral and has a lot of historical baggage and emotions attached. Terrorism is a commonly securitized topic, a question that has been the focus of many studies within CTS (Mohamamedou 2018, 3). Like discussed before, the field of terrorism studies has not been free from the problematic relating to terrorism. The terrorist- label has historically been used to delegitimize and discredit enemies, since being labeled terrorist meant being labeled the ultimate evil against whom any action is justified. CTS has criticized terrorism studies for too often focusing on non-state groups, even if many states engage in activities that can be regarded as terroristic (Jarvis 2016, 31). Hezbollah is often labeled a terrorist organization, even though the state of Israel is rewarded the higher body count of civilians in its conflict with Hezbollah. When it comes to the subject of terrorism, objectivity can be regarded as an impossible stance. Nonetheless, this study aims to tackle some of the problems relating to the study of terrorism by looking at the phenomena from the viewpoint of military strategy, where terrorism is studied for its functionalist value.

Most would not contest labeling Isis as a terrorist organization, but the case for Hezbollah is a bit more complicated. The study does not seek to label either of the organizations at the focus of this study as terrorist organizations, even though they are referred to as such on multiple occasions. This choice is motivated by practical considerations. This study seeks to view terrorism as a tactic used in warfare and as a part of military strategy often employed in revolutionary warfare. The labels assigned to each organization are not relevant for the analysis, but rather whether some of the violence used as part of their military strategy can be regarded as terroristic. A definition for terrorism is outlined in later sections, but in general this study regard violence directed at non-combatants for a military strategic or political purpose as terrorism. This can be seen as subscribing to the clausewitzian view of war as the continuation of politics with other means. Terroristic tactics as part of contemporary urban warfare are included within the study, such as beheadings of captured soldiers or the use of suicide attacks against military targets. These tactics are meant to spread fear and chaos, are used against civilians in terror attacks, and hence relevant for examining terrorism in warfare.

These choices are motivated by a desire to study terrorism from a viewpoint that has not yet been widely utilized in international relations and to avoid some of the sensationalism the topic of terrorism is too often afforded. The public often regards terrorism as the “ultimate evil” that is only used for the perpetrators desire to spread senseless violence. Western military strategy has for several hundred years been based around conventional warfare, where principles of guerilla warfare and terrorism

have not played a central role. This can also have impacted the view that terrorism is something that only the “barbaric others” use and why state terrorism has for long been ignored within terrorism studies, perhaps even more so within military science, until recently. The study seeks to highlight the argument that terrorism has always been a part of warfare, especially asymmetric warfare. Viewing it as senseless violence does not go far in understanding and explaining the phenomena. Even though the study seeks to examine terrorism with less moral outrage, that the topic is usually afforded in the media, it still recognizes that the realities on the ground are extremely brutal and violent when it comes to contemporary warfare and terrorism.

The study recognizes that terrorism is a subject that cannot be studied from an objective and neutral viewpoint, but it nonetheless bases its ontological assumptions on those provided by the theory of revolutionary warfare. These assumptions should be noted when interpreting the results of the study. They provide only one angle to an extremely complicated and multifaceted phenomena. Definitions utilized by the thesis are discussed below.

5. DEFINITIONS

General principles outlined in this section guide the definitions applied in the study. The study employs the same definitions as used by Antti Paronen in his dissertation on the impact of Global Jihad on the evolution of revolutionary warfare (2016). Paronen’s work shares similarities with this study. The choice of the same theoretical framework motivates the choice of utilizing comparable definitions.

5.1 Terrorism

Defining terrorism is one of the most controversial topics within terrorism studies, and there exists no clear consensus among scholar for the appropriate definition. The debate has been long-standing, and most academics argue for adapting different definition depending on the focus of the study. Following this logic, the study adapts a definition that encapsulates the most important features of terrorism, and which is specifically suited for studying terrorism as a strategy. Definitions of terrorism usually include three main characteristics: 1. Terrorism targets civilians, 2. The act is aimed at creating fear, and 3. It has a political goal. (Malkki 2020, 41-44.) The study regards these as central

to its definition of terrorism. For an act to be considered terrorism, it needs to include at least two of these characteristics. The perspective employed in the study is of terrorism as part of revolutionary warfare. To capture the use and function of terrorism in contemporary asymmetric warfare, the definition used in the study consequently needs to include a broader definition of terrorism than what is usually employed within terrorism studies. For example, beheadings of soldiers and use of suicide vehicle born improvised explosive devices in combat are considered acts of terrorism within this definition. These are common tactics used as part of modern urban asymmetric warfare and hence relevant for studying terrorism as part of it (Rekkedal & Mälkki 2013, 393). The psychological effect of the act is central for its inclusion. The definition employed by Antti Paronen is included to better adapt the definition of terrorism for the study of military strategy. The definition adapted from Paronen, defines terrorism as follows; “Terrorism is understood as military actions as part of revolutionary warfare. Terrorism seeks a revolutionary impact especially by violent attacks against singular targets or persons, or alternatively by causing as much destruction as possible on unpredictable targets” (Paronen 2016, 32). Identification of terrorism is based on using these criteria in the analysis of the material.

5.2 Military Strategy and Tactics

The main objective of the study the examination of the military strategy of Isis and Hezbollah. Hence, the focus of the analysis centers mainly on strategy, but the tactics employed as part of the strategy remain relevant. Strategy and tactics are in constant interaction with each other. Understanding tactics is central for understanding strategy (Lintusaari 2017, 47). The study understands a terrorist attack as a tactic, while a terrorist campaign can be considered residing on the operational level, while the goals of the campaign are seen as strategic. Strategy refers to both military and political plans and doctrine, but the study’s focuses on military strategy. For consistency, the definition of military strategy follows the definition outlined by Antti Paronen: “Military strategy means determined coordination of military method complexes to reach overall goals. Systematic, integrated and guided use of military means and methods to reach goals. “. Paronen defines tactics as: “a method or system for reaching a military goal. The design, preparation or execution of a battle, operation or attack.”. (translated by author) (Paronen 2016, 31-32.)

5.3 Revolutionary art of war

Paronen defines the art of revolutionary war as the skill of leading, preparing, planning and coordinating premises for a campaign of revolutionary warfare. The nature of non-state actors creates conditions in which they need to express creativity and skill in conduct of revolutionary warfare. This often means the use of unconventional tactics, such as guerilla warfare or terrorism. Revolutionary warfare is highly politicized in comparison to conventional warfare. Ideology plays a central role in revolutionary warfare from the top of the hierarchy to the bottom. (Paronen 2016, 28-29.) Revolutionary war is used by actors who engage in a revolutionary war aimed at a revolution. Isis war against the states in Iraq and Syria seek to undermine and destroy the states in the region to lay the foundations for an Islamic state. Hezbollah motivates their resistance of Israel as part of their ideological subscription to *wilayat al Faqih* and the Islamic revolution inspired by Iran.

6. RESTRICTIONS OF THE STUDY

The premises of studying terrorism are in themselves somewhat problematic. Terrorism is a term loaded with political meaning and the subject includes a great risk for bias. This risk is aggravated with the study of Jihadist terrorism. Scholars have critiqued terrorism studies for focusing on Jihadi terrorism, while leaving less attention to the study of subjects such as state terrorism and right-wing terrorism (Schuurman 2019, 464). The study recognizes its position within a scholarly framework that has not always adhered to objectivity. The framework of the study, especially in relation to military science and strategic thinking is based on a tradition of western military science and traditions of positivistic ontology. The study seeks to counter some of these problems by critical evaluation of the functionalistic values of the revolutionary warfare theory.

The study moves on with the premise that no study can truly be objective and is influenced by the experiences and values of the researcher. The author finds it important to present accompanied biases. When working as peacekeeper in Lebanon my work was closely linked to monitoring Hezbollah's activities in the region. This has given me insight into the organization and their modes of operation, but my experiences also present a clear bias against the group. Despite these considerations, Jihadi terrorism remains a relevant topic of study. Self-reflection and transparency employed during the study process assist in ensuring reliability.

The primary sources of the study are based on materials produced by central figures from the respective organizations. This poses some restrictions on the study, since the possibilities for inferences made from these materials include some limitations. As discussed previously, one of the main problems terrorism studies faces is its limited access to primary sources. Basing the analysis of the study on primary sources was a criterion for ensuring generation of new knowledge and supporting reliability and validity. Interviewing leading figures and military leaders in both the selected organizations would have provided the ideal material for answering the research question and truly determine the function of terrorism for military strategy, assuming the interviewees answered the questions truthfully. As this option is unrealistic, the study selects to use the most optimal primary sources available. The authors lack of language skills in Arabic further limited the selection of available sources. The results of the study should not be regarded as an exact representation of the military strategy of the organizations or the role of terrorism in it, but rather as a representation based on the analyzed material. It should be noted that the way the organizations present their military strategy in the material, or how they themselves perceive it, is not always the same thing as to how the military strategy is executed on the ground. Warfare is an art, not a science, where a perfectly planned strategy can still create unexpected results. Military strategy never translates directly to the field as the commander or general has planned. The fog of war and the chain of command can have surprisingly large implications. The study hence represents the inferences and analysis that can be made based on the material. Some of the texts in the material address military strategy directly, but not all. Despite this, most of the texts contained ample direct or indirect references to military strategy or strategic thinking.

7. CASE SELECTION

The case selection for the study was conducted on basis of recruiting two organizations that engage in revolutionary warfare and use terroristic tactics. The choice to select Shia and Sunni groups was motivated by the desire to compare two armed organizations with drastically different contexts and environments of operation. The organizations different religious inclinations are hence not the focus of the study, but rather serve to provide a basis from which differences in tradition, ideology, economics, culture and strategic culture originate from. Isis is connected to the movement of global Salafism Jihadism which has its roots in the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 70s (Shultz 2008, 64). Hezbollah is strongly linked with the Islamic Revolution of Iran, both ideologically, materially

and militarily, and continues to share these links to this day. Both cited historical events have also significantly influenced other Shia and Sunni armed groups (Terilä 2020, 175).

The basis for the case selection was to select organizations with differences in many areas to examine whether different terrorist organizations use terrorism differently. The main motivation for choosing Hezbollah and Isis as case studies comes from them presenting the most influential representatives of Shia and Sunni groups. The study does not seek to claim, that the function of terrorism for Isis and Hezbollah can be applied to every Shia and Sunni organization. Nonetheless, the results can give some general guidelines, since often a Shia organization is more closely related to Hezbollah in its “context” and vice versa. The military context of both organizations is at the center of analysis for its relevance to the research question. The selected organizations are divergent also within this field, anticipating clear differences in military strategy and function of terrorism. Isis engaged in an intra-state conflict seeking to undermine the state’s authority both in Iraq and Syria. Hezbollah in comparison has accepted parliamentarism and is currently advancing its political ambitions (mostly) without violence. Its main armed struggle is with the state of Israel. Hezbollah relies mainly on local fighters, while foreign fighters and supporters abroad are central to Isis. One additional differentiating factor is the differences in state sponsorship. Hezbollah has throughout its history received significant support from the Iranian state to such an extent that its status as an independent actor has repeatedly been questioned (Matusitz 2018, 1). In comparison, Isis has received rather limited state support if any at all (Ashour 2021, 10).

However, the organizations simultaneously share some similarities, making comparison between them as representatives of armed revolutionary organizations fruitful. Both organizations share various state-like characteristics. Isis substituted for many state functions during its rule over its caliphate, and Hezbollah has many times earned the label of a “state within a state” (Robinson 26.10.21; Almohamad 2021, 2). Even if both organizations share in principle the goal of an Islamic State in accordance with Sharia law, the priority and means to reach this goal differ drastically. It however provides both with the ambition to act as a proto state. These aspects make comparison between the organizations more interesting, seeing how they are similar in many aspects. Both organizations have used terroristic tactics as part of their warfare and are recognized as terrorist organizations, at least by some actors. The label of a terrorist organization is not central for the study. The focus lies rather on the use of terrorist tactics, whether limited or extensive.

Comparison of the results between the groups is used to decipher differences between the groups in the function of terrorism as part of military strategy. Differences in military strategy provide relevant

reference points for examining the distinctions in the function of terrorism. The comparison executes on a general and on a specific level and bases on the findings of the analysis of the material in accordance with the methodological framework. Focus of the comparison is centered on comparing the results of the analysis as presented by each theme in the coding system. The results of each category are initially compared, after which the general picture painted by the organization military strategy and the function of terrorism within it is subjected for comparison. Differences in acceptability of terrorism is referenced in the comparison to arrive on the final synthesis on the differences of function of terrorism for both organizations. The comparison serves to analyze the differences in the function of terrorism between the organizations.

8. METHODOLOGY

Qualitative content analysis is selected as the method of analysis for the study, specifically qualitative content analysis developed by Philipp Mayring (2000). His version uses a model of inductive category development. Mayring developed his form of qualitative content analysis in the 80s for the analysis of psycho-social consequences of unemployment (Kohlbacher 2006, 50).

Textual analysis has become one of the most popular methodologies in social- and political sciences with the increased acknowledgement of the importance of language and meaning in the age of social media (Halperin & Heath 2017, 335). Content analysis is in its essence a study of recorded human communications. Coding categories through which the selected body of text is analyzed is a central aspect of the exercise. Content analysis was spurred to popularity with the influx of mass communication during the first half of the century. Originally content analysis was mostly quantitative, focusing on the manifest content of the text. Quantitative content analysis faced criticism for its superficial nature. Qualitative content analysis was developed in the 50s following this criticism as a method that could provide tools for the analyzing the latent meaning and context of the text. (Kohlbacher 2006, 35-53.)

Mayrings model of qualitative content analysis aims to provide a systematic and rigorous model of qualitative content analysis capable of combining the positive aspects of qualitative and quantitative content analysis (Mayring 2000, 2). By following a strictly rule guided coding system the model can

evade criticism aimed at qualitative content analysis for being too interpretive and unsystematic. The model presents a good fit for being used in case study research adding a benefit for its selection for the study. The method allows for triangulation and a mixed methods approach, where the weakness of one method is compensated by another. Combining qualitative content analysis with case study research allows for combining primary source material supported by secondary sources that integrate context to the analysis and theory guided analysis. The method allows for integration of different types of material. (Kohlbacher 2006, 71-83.)

Case studies can be regarded more as a research strategy than a method of analysis. Case study models, like textual analysis, have become increasingly popular within social sciences. Case study presents a suitable model for answering “how”- and “why” questions, categories into which the study’s research question also falls. Case studies allows the researcher to examine contemporary phenomena within their real-life contexts. (Kohlbacher 2006, 8-14.) Case studies can provide context sensitive, highly internally valid insight into the mechanisms and causal processes behind the studied phenomena. Case studies are comparative in nature, and case studies comparing two cases are commonly used. The comparative features of case studies are regarded as one of its strengths, an aspect that also benefits this study. (Halperin & Heath 2017, 214.)

Quantitative content analysis involves the steps of selecting the material to be analyzed, definition of categories the text will be examined for, choice of recording unit, creation of a coding protocol, coding of the material and analysis of the results (Halperin & Heath 2017, 347-354). The development of categories and the coding system form the most central parts of the process. Mayrings model of qualitative content analysis is based on systematic, rule guided, empirical, methodologically controlled, step-by-step model of analysis. The text is seen as having primary content which refers to the themes and main ideas, and latent content, indicating information that can only be dissected when analyzed in connection with the context information. (Mayring 2000, 4.) The study conducted in this thesis first includes an examination of Hezbollah’s and Isis’s organization and development and a longer section of their military strategy, with focus on the use of terrorism as part of military strategy. This serves as the context lens through which the context of the primary material of the study is analyzed. A model of inductive category development is employed, in which the categories of analysis are developed in a close connection to the material. The categories of analysis are derived based on the theoretical background and research question and indicate for aspects of the material that are of interest for the analysis. During the analysis of the material these categories are revised through a feedback loop where their reliability is checked. These are eventually reduced to main

categories and themes. (Mayring 2000, 10-12.) The analysis of the material is primarily based on the manifest content of the materials with support of the interpretation provided by the presented context. The year of the publication of the material helps fit the entries into the context. The analysis also considers the number of entries a category receives as part of the analysis. Many entries in a category indicate its relevance for the analyzed organization.

The analysis of the text unearths references to military strategy and especially to terrorism as part of military strategy in accordance with the coding system. The entries in the categories are analyzed to build a picture of the function of terrorism and its role in the military strategy of the respective organizations. The authors of the material often state a tactical function for terrorism, refer to their strategic thinking or the strategic plan of the organization. The broader picture based on the analysis of the themes and the supporting coding categories are used to support the construction of the synthesis of the role and function of military strategy. The context provided in the overview sections helps support the analysis and explain the strategic choices made by the organizations.

The methodological analysis of the study follows the below model as closely as possible. The categories are used to identify entries that usually refer to a paragraph in the text, but on occasion to several pages or even the central message of a material. The included entries are listed in sections 10.1 and 12.1. The definition of the categories is outlined in section 8.2 on operationalization. Reliability of the coding categories was continuously checked on basis of findings in the material. The study revised categories in accordance with Mayrings model during the coding process of the material, with exclusion of some categories and inclusion of new categories. The added categories are presented in the analysis of results.




Figure. Model of inductive category development. Adapted from Mayring 2000 p.11

8.1 Material

The material used in the study is collected and analyzed while remaining critical to the sources and evaluating their objectivity. Most of the materials included are interviews and speeches with a political message aimed at influencing the audience in some regard. The context outlined in the study serves as an important supporting element in critically evaluating the source materials. The aim is to construct a view on how the function of terrorism manifests in the selected material.

Selection of material is not a simple task. The most reliable source for understanding the military strategy of a terrorist organization would be to interview the leaders and mid-, to low level military commanders of the organization. This is however beyond the practical limitations of the study, as it is for most academic research. Interviewing members of armed groups would be extremely difficult and even dangerous. Most of the material terrorist organizations produce is propaganda material that is quickly removed from the internet and is not available through open sources. (Schmid et al. 2011, 470.)

The criteria for the selection of material were to find primary sources from the respective organizations, that address the use of terrorism. Access to primary material from Hezbollah is somewhat more simple than other armed organizations since they also constitute a political party. The speeches of Hezbollah's most important leading figure, Hassan Nasrallah, are widely available with many of them having translations available in English. Access to material that can convey the military strategy of Isis is trickier. The study selected the material based on accessibility and best fit for answering the research question. The primary materials used for the study are found in "the Isis reader: Milestone texts of the Islamic Movement (2020)" by Hararo J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, Charlie Winter and "the Voice of Hezbollah: Speeches of Hassan Sayyed Nasrallah" (2007), by Hassan Nasrallah and edited by Nicholas Noe. The books contain speeches, interviews, letters, video and audio transcripts, statements and publications that have had importance for the selected organizations and that are relevant for answering the research question. The reliability of the results is ensured by strict transparency of collection and analysis of material. A list of materials and a short description of them can be found in the sections 10.1 and 12.1

Additional selection criteria for the material is comparability between the organizations, availability of data, relevance for the research question and importance of the position of the producer of the material. Top ranking generals often have important influence over the military strategy of a revolutionary group, but their identity and actual influence can be hard to pinpoint accurately, not to mention finding primary source data on their ideas. Both the books described above contain speeches by the figure heads of both organizations. As in armed revolutionary groups traditionally, both Hezbollah's secretary general and the leadership of Isis have a large role in the design of the military strategy and central decisions relating to it (Daher 2016, 153; Bastug & Guler 2018, 54-56). This makes their statements useful material to serve as the basis of analysis. Despite some of the texts not directly concerning matters relating military strategy, the analysis still displayed a surprising number of references to military strategy and strategic thinking.

Comparability remains one difference between the materials, which might present some limitations for the study. All the material on Hezbollah represents the statements of Hassan Nasrallah, while material on Isis represents a wider array of persons from the leadership, spoke persons and some materials credited to unknown authors. The centrality of the selected materials for the organization and their history remedies some of this limitation (Ingram et al. 2020, 7-8). Isis leadership has been killed more frequently in comparison to Hezbollah, making access to exactly similar materials unattainable.

8.2 Operationalization of Methodology

Qualitative content analysis developed by Mayring is employed as the methodological framework of the study. Qualitative content analysis involves analysis of selected material by outlining categories for coding that are used to find themes and narratives in the theory that help to gain a nuanced and deep understanding of the topics relating to the research question. The theoretical framework selected for the study has a central role for the analysis, as the operationalization of the method and the categories used for coding are adapted based on theoretical assumptions. The theory of revolutionary warfare is highly context sensitive and has evolved with the evolution of revolutionary war (Paronen 2016, 195). The theory of revolutionary warfare is operationalized by basing the coding categories in the strategic thinking of Jihadist scholars. A big portion of the contemporary conflict zones are located in the Middle East and Africa. The root causes of these conflict are extremely complicated with deep historical roots, among them colonial intrusions (Mohamamedou 2018, 6.) It would be an oversimplification to argue that they are fought over ethnic, identity and religious differences. Nonetheless, many of the groups and organizations involved in these conflicts subscribe to different Jihadist ideologies. The current focus in the theory of revolutionary warfare also lies with Jihadist thinkers, since the decline of leftist revolutionary movements, and rise of Jihadist groups (Paronen 2016, 287). The operationalization of the revolutionary warfare theory is thus narrowed down to the thinking of the most relevant Jihadist scholars. They are identified as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu-Ubayad al-Quarasi, Abd al-Aziz al-Murqin, Abu Bakr Naji and Abu Musab al-Suri (Paronen 2016, 191). These individual were selected based on the importance of their contributions to the strategic literature on revolutionary warfare. Jihadist strategic thinking that has emerged from contemporary conflicts is more relevant for studying contemporary jihadist groups then the writings of individuals connected to leftist revolutionary guerilla movements during the cold war. The theory of revolutionary warfare should however be seen as a continuum, where new strategists develop on the ideas of previous thinkers. The ideas of most of the Jihadist thinkers used in this study have evidence of influence by previous generations of revolutionary thinkers such as Mao Zedong. (Paronen 2016, 192, 202, 212; Brachman 2009, 94.) The selected material is analyzed with the intention of identifying reflections of these strategic principles in the material. The analysis aims to discover the function of terrorism for the selective group.

Some crucial common denominators exist in the thinking of Jihadist strategic thinkers, as outlined by William McCants. Firstly, the “grand strategy” or the primary goal of all the jihadi strategists is the

unification of the “ummah” into an Islamic Caliphate following sharia law. Secondly, all the strategists are convinced of the superiority of media victories in comparison to purely military victories. Third, their writings are focused on secular strategic outlining, focusing on conduct of revolutionary warfare in practice, not on theological or ideological issues. Fourth, all the strategic models are not focused on solely one conflict or territory but seek to give a universal blueprint on how to conduct Jihadist revolutionary warfare. Finally, all the theories rely on the assumption of American intrusion on Islamic territory. Each strategic thinker differentiates on in their emphasis of these common principles. Some emphasize the importance of regional conflict over the global agenda and see a regional stronghold as necessary for the continuation of the global struggle, whereas others see these as less of a priority in the contemporary security climate. (McCants 13.5.2007.) These ideas can be seen as reflected in the thinking of Isis and Hezbollah, at least to some extent. These will be examined more closely in sections 9 and 11, providing background on the organizations and their military strategies to serve as the context of the analysis.

The following section presents the central strategic ideas of the selected strategists. Special focus is placed on the strategists thinking on the function of terrorism as part of military strategy. The strategist’s ideas on the use of terrorism and their more general strategic thinking that is relevant for the research question forms the basis for the operationalization of the method.

8.2.1 Ayman al-Zawahiri

Al Zawahiri is generally not regarded as a strategist in his own right, but more as a presenter of Jihadist strategic principles. Al Zawahiri emphasizes both the importance of regional conflict and the global struggle against the United States and its allies. He sees the acquisition of an regional support area as important for the success of the Jihadist movement. Al Zawahiri sees the struggle against the far enemy with terrorist attacks as an important part of strategy but does not highlight it as overriding the importance of regional guerilla warfare. Al Zawahiri highlights the propagandistic value of terrorist attacks as their main function. (Paronen 2016, 193-194.)

8.2.2 Abu Ubayad al-Qurashi

Little is known about Abu Ubayad al-Qarashi, but he is thought to have been an advisor to Osama bin Laden. The central theme in his strategic thinking is the superiority of an asymmetrically fighting force utilizing principles of revolutionary warfare against a conventional enemy. Al Qarashi also

underscores the importance of the economic, ideological, cultural, social and psychological dimensions of warfare in addition to its military and political dimensions. The central principle of his strategy is to embrace asymmetrical warfare as a strength, understanding and utilizing the propaganda value of attacks and making use of classical principles of art of war. Al Qurashi was inspired by Clausewitz but also revolutionary warfare strategists. He believed that conventional forces were vulnerable to guerilla and terrorist tactics. Al Qurashi saw that terrorist attacks can be used to deny the enemies claims of the destruction and weakness of Jihadist groups. (Paronen 2016, 203-209.)

8.2.3 Ab al-Aziz al-Murqin

Ab al-Aziz al-Murqin was an experienced Jihadist and the leader of al Qaida of the Arabian Peninsula for a time. Importance of the regional conflict and the conflict phases relating to the creation of a regional jihadist state is the central theme in al-Murqin's strategy. He sees the value of the global jihadist struggle but emphasizes the importance of regional conflict over attacks abroad. Al Murqin has a Maoist outlook on revolutionary warfare, which he divides into four phases. Terrorism has a central role in the first phase of his strategy. Terrorism is meant to stir up media attention and mobilize the population to the struggle in the first phase of the strategy. The acquired recruits enable the conflict to transition into its second phase, where active revolutionary foreign politics is activated and state authority is weakened ultimately causing its collapse. During this phase the scene is ripe for the Jihadists to establish their own form of government. (Paronen 2016, 209-218.)

8.2.4 Abu Bakr Naji

It is not confirmed that Abu Bakr Naji is a single person, but the strategies outlined in his book "Management of Savagery" very closely resembles the strategic thinking of Isis. The core of these strategies is the establishment of areas of chaos and "savagery". These are meant to create a suitable environment for the Jihadist groups to take control of the area and build and expand an Islamic State. Naji connects the regional conflict to the global mission, viewing both as central. Naji divides his strategy into four phases; 1. Provocation and exhaustion, 2. Management of savagery, 3. Establishment of the caliphate, and 4. Final stages of establishing an Islamic state. Terrorism has the most central role in the first phase. Terrorist attacks are a tool of chaos used to provoke the United States into attacking the Islamic lands, and to support and expand the areas of chaos. Attacks abroad against the far enemy are meant to stretch out and exhaust the resources of the enemy and its security

apparatus. Naji also sees the media value of terrorist attacks. Naji's revolutionary warfare model frames the global jihadist struggle and the fight against regional apostate regimes as occurring simultaneously, while accelerating the processes of both. (Naji 2006, 14-16.)

8.2.5 Abu Musab al-Suri

Abu Musab al-Suri's was an al Qaida strategist with extensive experience from Jihad in Afghanistan and Syria. His strategic thinking is afforded a slightly larger role in the operationalization of the theory, since a-Suri most widely discusses the use of terrorism and is also regarded as the most noteworthy strategist by Paronen. Al-Suri criticized the use of physical training camps by Al Qaida. He saw the earlier Jihadist organizations as too hierarchical, secretive and difficult to approach. Al-Suri advocated for a "leaderless Jihad" based on individuals and small groups conducting terroristic revolutionary warfare. The cells forming the resistance should not be linked to each other or to a certain territory. Ideology provides the main connection and organizational link between the individuals, the cells and the organization. Terrorist attacks are used to exhaust and stretch the enemy's resources. The global struggle takes forefront for al-Suri since he views the current security climate as unsuited for establishing territorial bases. Al Suri admits that regional guerilla warfare should be conducted where possible, but views individual terrorist attacks as the bridge that provides the right conditions for launching a regional guerilla warfare at an optimal timing. Regional conflict in turn serves to inspire individual to join the global Jihad. Al-Suri seeks to justify the use of terrorism in his writings. He divides terrorism into just and unjust. Terrorism is unjust when aimed at innocent targets but regards it as just when aimed at the oppressor by the oppressed and righteous. (Paronen 2016, 230-244.) It should be noted that al-Suri has different conceptions of who is innocent, at least in comparison to western audiences.

8.3 Coding

The following section outlines the categories and coding rules used in the study's qualitative content analysis. The categories are derived from the research question and theoretical background and are based on the thinking of the jihadist strategists outlined above. The K and X categories are added to support the analysis of the material. The K and X categories code for entries in the material that reference the acceptability of terrorism and the military strategy of the organizations in general. The categories have been refined during the analysis as a phase in the execution of the methodological

framework. The categories connection to the theoretical framework are presented first, after which the themes and coding categories are defined, and the coding rules outlined.

Ayman al-Zawahiri	Jihadist revolutionary strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional conflict important for the global Jihadist movement, but majority of the efforts should be aimed at the far enemy and its interests. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> C1.1
	Function of terrorism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Propaganda value of the attack is important. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> C4.1 C4.2 C4.3 C8.1 C8.2
Abu-Ubayad al-Quarashi	Jihadist revolutionary strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Highlights the importance of the political dimension of revolutionary warfare over the military dimension. Asymmetrical guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics work in the favor of the weaker party. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> C3.1
	Function of terrorism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Driving the stronger party on the defensive by attacking it on its own territory. Undirect threat through attacks on allies. Avoidance of direct conflict and preference for unpredictable strikes. Use terrorist strikes to refute the enemies claims of weakness. Use of terrorist acts in propaganda. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> C1.1 C4.1 C4.2 C4.3 C9.1
Ab al-Aziz al-Murqin	Jihadist revolutionary strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prolonging and phasing the conflict, establishment of a group capable of guerilla warfare on the territory of the enemy state ->Terrorism important in the first phase. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> C5.1 C3.2
	Function of terrorism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The first phase consists of guerilla operations and terrorist attacks meant to stir media attention. These act as a recruiting force for the launch of the second phase. Does not place strong emphasis on attacks abroad. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> C6.1 C6.3 C6.4 C4.3
Abu Bakr Naji	Jihadist revolutionary strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Creating of zones of chaos and controlling them. Taking control of zones of chaos provides support areas for global Jihad. The near and far enemy are engaged simultaneously with help of terrorist strikes. Acts meant to provoke the United States to attack Islamic lands. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> C1.1 C5.1 C5.2
	Function of terrorism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Terrorism has an important role in the first phase->Creating and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> C3.2 C6.2

		<p>expanding zones of chaos, recruiting, exhausting the enemy and its resources, rendering it unable to respond to the zones of chaos.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Independent cells conduct attacks globally and locally. • Highlights the importance of small and middle-sized attacks. • Important to enlighten the masses on the legitimacy of the attacks. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C8.1 • C8.2 • C7.1 • C7.2 • C9.1
Abu Musab al- Suri	Jihadist revolutionary strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criticizes territorial commitment and hierarchical organizational structures. • Terrorist attacks central for military strategy. • Individualistic and small cell revolutionary terrorism. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C9.1
	Function of terrorism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Spread fear in the enemy, gain popular support and mobilization of Islamic world. • Providing a more approachable means to western Muslims to participate in Jihad then secret organizations. • Leaderless Jihad provides organizational form that is hard to destroy or counteract. • Framing the struggle as the “peoples war” and not the elite. • Building the brand of the organization with the mention of the organizations name in an attack or the organization claiming an attack. • Global armed struggle with ideology being the only connecting feature. • Increased popularity and recruits will eventually allow for establishment of territorial control with guerilla warfare. • Terrorist tactics can be implemented into regional guerilla warfare. • Exhaustion and withdrawal of the enemy. • Attacks primarily on the United States and their allies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C1.1 • C2.1 • C6.1 • C6.2 • C6.3 • C7.2 • C6.4 • C3.3 • C8.2

The K and X categories are added to code for the acceptability of terrorism for the respective organizations. These categories are not presented in the results but serve as supporting entries that

collect data of the material that help interpret the entries in other coding categories and answer the research question.

Attitude on attacks against civilians K1	Acceptable (K1.1)/ Acceptable in certain circumstances (K1.2)/ not acceptable (K1.3)
Division into civilians and combatants K2	Clear (K2.1)/unclear (K2.2) /no division into civilians and combatants (K2.3)

Category	Description	Coding
X1	Reference in the text towards the use of terrorism. The category gathers entries that relate to the organization views acts of terrorism.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • X1.1 reference to attacks on civilians and non-combatants. • X1.2 reference to use of extreme violence to spread fear. (ex. burning alive, beheadings exct.) • X1.3 reference to use of terrorist tactic. (SBVIED, reference to martyrdom operations exct.) • X1.4 Generally making a statement that links the group to terrorist activities.
X2	Denying link to terrorism.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • X2.1: Denying being a terrorist group. • X2.2: Denying use of terrorist tactics. • X2.3: Denying blame for terrorist attacks.
X3	References to the respective organization's military strategy in general.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Referencing the military strategy and tactics of the organization.
X4	Indications on the importance of popular support for the organization.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • References to gaining the support of the people, or entries demonstrating that popular support is important for the organization.

The themes, categories and coding rules are derived from the Jihadist strategists as presented above. The coding system used for the analysis of the material is outlined below.

Theme	Category	Description	Coding
Propaganda value	C4	Attacks are meant to prove the capability and virility of the organization.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C4.1: Speaking about attacks as proof of the capabilities and life force of the organization. • C4.2: Speaking about the attacks in a boasting and threatening manner. • C4.3: Speaking about the importance of propaganda and media operations.
	C8	Seeking to legitimize the attacks through propaganda.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C8.1: Arguing for the legitimacy of terrorist attacks. • C8.2: Legitimizing terrorism as the revenge of the oppressed on the oppressors.
Tactic of asymmetrical warfare	C1	Attacking the United States and its allies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C1.1: Speaking about attacks or attacking against the United States and its allies.
	C3	Terrorism as an effective tactic against a stronger opponent and a means to exploit the enemy's weaknesses.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C3.1: Speaking of the use of terrorism or striking against civilians to utilize the weaknesses of the enemy or to even the playing field. • C3.2: Talking about the exhaustion and stretching thin of the enemy's forces. • C3.3: Talking about expelling and destroying the enemy by attacks against civilians/the people.
Leaderless Jihad	C9	Individual and small cell revolutionary terrorism. -Difficult to destroy or counteract. -Easier for the individual to engage than approach secretive organizations. -Informal organizational structure: ideology the only uniting factor.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C9.1: Attacks against civilian conducted by individuals or small groups are presented as important.
Recruiting and mobilizing function	C6	Recruiting and mobilizing the population and the "Ummah" globally.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C6.1: Speaking about a call to Jihad in connection to praise of terrorist attacks. • C6.2: Speaking about the importance of conducting independent attacks or praise of individuals who committed independent strikes. • C6.3: Speaking about everybody's duty to do their part in the struggle. • C6.4: Speaking about the peoples/Ummah's war (Jihad)

Creating zones of chaos	C5	Terrorism an important part of the strategy in this phase of revolutionary warfare, the goal is to establish zones of control in the second phase.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C5.1: Speaking of the need to establish a state in the future, but referencing the importance to conduct strikes before that (against civilians).
	C7	Attacks stretch the capabilities of the enemy and its security apparatus to the limit.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C7.1: Talking about the enemy's inability to respond to strikes or chaos in conflict zones. • C7.2: Talking about the enemy's inability to destroy the cause and its fighters.
Spreading fear	C2	Attacks are meant to strike fear in the enemy and function as a show of force.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C2.1: Reference to a terror attack or committing acts of terror and connecting it to spreading fear.

9. OVERVIEW OF ISIS

The following section provides a short overview of the jihadist organization referred to as Isis in this study. The organization has been referred to by many names, such as Daesh or the Islamic state movement. The organization itself has changed its name many different times during its history. For simplicity, the study refers to the organization by its most commonly used name, Isis. The organizations history, its military strategy and use of terrorism as part of military strategy briefly outlined in this section serve as context to the analysis of the material.

Isis was founded as by Jordanian Jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999 in Afghanistan. After the United States invaded Iraq Zarqawi led his followers into Iraq, where the group quickly got involved into both sectarian war and attacks against Americans. (Ingmar et al. 2020, 3.) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, who would declare the notorious caliphate in 2014, are perhaps two of the most central figures in the history of Isis. Al-Zarqawi founded Isis with the financial support of Al Qaida and Osama bin Laden. Al-Zarqawi was known in the beginning of his career as a petty criminal and for his intense hatred of Shias. The organization committed brutal attack against American troops in Iraq but focused primarily on targeting Shias. Al-Zarqawi's background and his brutality towards Shias made bin Laden vary of Zarqawi from the beginning. Despite this Isis was swore loyalty to al Qaida in 2004 and was named al Qaida in Iraq. The new leadership of the

organization sought to distance itself from al Qaida, after al-Zarqawi was killed by an US airstrike in 2006 (Gerges 2014, 339-341).

Isis tried to establish its first caliphate in 2008, but this first attempt failed miserably, and the organization was almost wiped out in the process. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was named the new head of the organization in 2010, when the previous leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was killed in an US airstrike. The Syrian civil war that erupted in 2012 provided a new opportunity for the organization. During this period Isis friction with al Qaida started to worsen, with later the organization breaking off as a consequence of fighting breaking out between Isis and another al Qaida offshoot, al Nursa. The civil wars raging in Iraq and Syria provided Isis opportunities to expand. By 2014 Isis had gained such military success and territorial control that al Baghdadi saw a new opportunity to create a caliphate and declared himself the caliph in the infamous speech in al-Nuri Mosque. The brutality of Isis version of the Sharia law, its propaganda videos of beheadings, the terrorist attacks in Europe and the Yezidi genocide shocked the world. As a reaction to the atrocities and the threat posed by the organization a large international coalition was formed against it. In a few years the attacks of the coalition forces, the Kurds, other Syrian and Iraqi armed groups and Assad's and Russian forces started to take its toll and the caliphate began its decline in 2016. Isis had lost Raqqa by 2017 and the caliphate collapsed a short while later. Isis as a proto-state actor was regarded defeated by 2018. (Kaleva 2018, 183-193.)

Isis shares many similarities with other jihadist groups. Its ideology is closely related to Saudi Wahhabism. The strategic choices Isis has made for realizing its vision of an Islamic State can be described as relatively unique. The group regards the al Qaida's strategy of capturing hearts and minds as ineffective. Despite this view it has managed to attract an unprecedented number of recruits with brutality, puritanism, sectarianism, apocalypticism and a promise of caliphate where "true" Muslims can live as intended by God. (Roy 2017, 51-55.) The groups intense hatred of Shias, uncompromising ideology and brutality where from the beginning the features that differenced Isis from other jihadist groups. These are also among some of the reasons that ultimately led to its split from al Qaida. Isis continued its incitement of sectarian war despite Al Qaida leadership questioning attacks on Shia civilians. Bin Laden warned against alienating local Sunni tribes with acts of violence against uncooperative tribal leaders. Al Qaida did not publicly denounce Isis until 2014, but the seeds for the rift between the organizations was sown from the beginning with al Qaida's leaderships distrust of Zarqawi. Isis saw as its right to kill everyone they deemed in opposition to them or their ideology and

would on occasions kill Sunnis who would not pledge alliance to the group. Consequently, Isis alienated many Sunni tribes and Jihadist groups. (McCants 2015, 7-18, 35.)

This policy was eased after Al Baghdadi was appointed the new leader of the organization and purged Isis leadership. Al Baghdadi appointed many of Saddam's former generals into important positions (Solomon 2016, 27). He realized Isis needed to co-opt local Sunni tribes and courted them with money and weapons. After the split with al Qaida, Isis strategy of going at it alone and controlling territory started to pay off. In contrast to the caliphates announced by other Jihadist groups, Isis had money, fighters and territory. Masses of recruits from both foreign fighters and other Jihadist groups joined its ranks. Isis apocalyptic vision, referencing Islamic apocalyptic beliefs combined with the turmoil left in middle-east after the Arab spring, the war on terror and the declaration of the caliphate resonated with many distressed Muslims that came to believe the end times were near. (McCants 2015, 68-70, 100, 122-126.) The differences between Isis and al Qaida can further be seen reflected in Isis choices of military strategy.

9.1 Isis Military Strategy

Isis would rise to world fame in 2014 through the declaration of the caliphate. The success of the caliphate can be mostly credited to the organization's military success. This was not the first time Isis had declared a caliphate nor was it the first Jihadist organization to do so. However, managing to do it with such success was unprecedented. At its height the organization controlled a 600-mile-wide area and ruled over 8 million people. Isis managed to uphold this position while constantly fighting its enemies outnumbered both in fighters, resources and weaponry. Approximately 800 to 1100 Isis fighters conquered Mosul from tens of thousands of Iraqi troops defending it. Isis fighters in Egypt and Sinai were found to have fought many battles outnumbered 100 to 1. The organization showed significant resilience despite amounting high casualties. By the end of 2017, Isis could count losses up to 50 men a day. (Ashour 2021, 1-4.)

The groups success can in some measure be seen as part of a trend where non-state forces have increasingly achieved victories against conventional forces. Often these actors rely on unconventional strategic and tactical adaptations. Isis military strategy and its success is based on a combination of conventional, guerilla and terrorist warfare and constant innovative use of them. It was able to successfully combine these warfare strategies, shift between them and to adapt to shifts in the combat

environment. (Ashour 2021, 20.) Outlining every phase of the war or Isis military strategy in detail is not desirable within the scope of this study. The following section aims to give an overlook on factors that form the basis for the organization success and make Isis military strategy different from other insurgency strategies. Isis started out as an organization relying mostly on terrorist tactics but developed to an insurgency utilizing guerilla tactics and finally to a strategy of conventional warfare mixed with terrorist and guerilla tactics. (McAvoy 2017, 1-3.) The principle of adapting strategies and tactics to the security environment at hand is a theme present in the thinking of Jihadist scholars. Their assessment on the role of terrorism can be seen as linked to their assessment of the conditions of the security environment.

Isis regularly deploys conventional, guerilla and terrorist tactics, depending on their goal and the security environment. It has demonstrated excellent ability to combine different tactics in innovative ways. Tactics of guerilla warfare proved invaluable when the organization was forced to engage enemies with better resources and more advanced technology. Skirmishes, ambushes, hit-and-run tactics, the element of surprise, local intelligence gathering, assassinations, alliance building and infiltration operations were all part of tactics regularly employed by Isis. Innovation and adaptation were central for the military strategy to gain an advantage over a stronger enemy. Isis adapted tactics used in urban terrorism to their advantage in different types of environments. (Ashour 2021, 202-206.)

Isis perfected the use of suicide attacks, especially improvised explosive devices (IED) and suicide vehicle born improvised explosive devices (SVBIED), as part of conventional warfare. These tactics were previously mainly used in terrorist attacks. Suicide attacks would play a key role in most of Isis complex operations, providing an effective and low-cost weapon. Isis is especially innovative in developing different types of SVBIED and using them to support their conventional assaults. SVBIEDs would be constructed using almost any vehicle, outfitting it with improvised armor to protect the driver until detonation. SVBIEDs afforded Isis essentially a human guided precision missile. A SVBIED attack would penetrate enemy defenses, disorienting the enemy and creating an entry point for the assaulters to push through. The second wave would often consist of *mujaheddin* with suicide vests, followed by highly mobile vehicles and foot soldiers. (Beccaro 2018, 214-218.) About 40-60 % of Isis fighters were found to be carrying suicide vests in conventional operations. These could also be used as improvised grenades. IEDs have become a staple of contemporary asymmetric warfare, and Isis has relied heavily on them. Almost half of US casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted from IEDs. Isis IED tactics involve employing large numbers of small,

unsophisticated, homemade, victim initiated IEDs, often placed in pressure points, such as doorways. IEDs are used to slow down enemy troops and tie up forces on mine sweeping missions. (Cancian 2017, 54-59.)

Isis makes extensive use of modern technology in its military strategy and has found innovative ways to adapt it to its needs. Isis has well understood the utility of social media and psychological warfare, exploiting both in its conventional and terrorist activities. Internet and media attention provide a way to spread fear by showing enemies what they are to expect from the organization and convey propaganda that can potentially result in recruits. Isis displays technological adaptability with using civilian drones for reconnaissance and shows innovation in repurposing them into flying IEDs. Snipers constitute a staple piece of Isis strategy. There has even been records on use the of tele-operated sniper rifles. (Beccaro 2018, 214-216.)

Several additional factors noted by Ashour help explain Isis combat success. The Arab armed forces the organization fought are generally not regarded as effective combat forces. The combat environment in combination with the failing state structures provides Isis an ideal environment for revolutionary warfare. These conditions are also optimal for recruiting fighters, with many young men drawn to violent armed groups. Isis has an impressive record of being able to attract and train fighters. Its fighters are regarded as brave and displaying excellent combat moral. Especially its leadership has been credited as experienced and skilled, which features an important explaining factor for its military success. The well-known brand and brutality of the organization grants it an edge in psychological warfare. Autonomy of smaller units and decentralized leading structure of the organization provide it with agility in decision making. The leadership is well familiar with the fog of war and understands that no plan survives contact with the enemy. Hence, leaders of small units where regularly allocated much responsibility. Isis operates with relatively small units that enables flexibility, improvisation, operational-level planning and rapid reactions to adapt to changes in the environment. Units where usually not immobilized even if cut off from leadership. Isis had access to many units with high specialization and fighters with multitude of experiences, owing to the diverse origin and experience of Isis recruits. Isis tended to rely on tactics it had perfected, such as SVBIEDs, even after having captured conventional weapons such as tanks and artillery. Isis organizational structure has been a key to its success since it allows for rapid transfer of knowledge and the strategic shifts between tactics. Constant use of unconventional combined arms tactics was central for advancements. (Ashour 2021, 197-209.) The type of military strategy described here is an excellent fit for the combat environment that contemporary asymmetric conflicts exhibit, or what Mary

Kaldor's "New Wars" represent. These types of environments favor innovative and adaptive revolutionary groups (Beccaro 2018, 209).

9.2 Isis use of terrorism as part of military strategy

Terrorist attacks retain an important role in Isis military strategy in their own right, in addition to combining them with conventional and guerilla warfare. The organization has been responsible for more than 5000 terrorist attacks worldwide since its inception. During the past 15 years terrorism has become an increasingly popular tactic by insurgent forces. (Maurer 2017, 62-63.) Insurgent revolutionary groups have always employed guerilla and terrorist tactics interchangeably depending on the local, strategic, tactical and economic context (Beccaro 2018, 220). Isis has shifted from relying almost solely on terrorist attack, to warfare employing mostly conventional tactics and again back to terrorist warfare (Hashim 2016, 53). It has employed terrorist attacks both in the regional conflict in the Middle East and as part of its global strategy in orchestrating attacks on civilian targets globally. Terrorist attacks are meant to terrorize the population, harass the enemy, create insecurity and project the organizations power globally. Terrorism provides an accessible, cheap, effective and difficult to counter weapon that spreads significant psychological effects. (Beccaro 2018, 212.)

Terrorist attacks regionally, but especially globally, provide shock value and media attention. Isis uses terrorism against both the local population and the security forces. Attacking civilians serves as a warning for opposition and is meant to coerce the local population into supporting the organization. (Beccaro 2018, 217-220.) Isis uses assassination and suicide attacks against tribal leader and other gatekeeper of the local societies who refuse to align. Cases of attacks on former allies have also been recorded. (Ashour 2021, 203.) Terrorist attacks simultaneously exhaust the resources of the security force. Isis commonly used urban terrorism in Iraq to route the attention of Iraqi security forces to unimportant small urban centers, in order to gain more space to consolidate a foothold in rural areas (Beccaro 2018, 219).

Mass executions of captured soldiers by beheading and crucifixion were among the terrorist tactics brought to the scene of conventional warfare with Isis. These actions aim to spread fear and demoralize the enemy. They partly explain why small numbers of Isis fighters were successful against much larger conventional forces defending cities. Iraqi security forces combat effectiveness suffered and desertion was common. On the operational level, terrorism was used both as a means to ignite the sectarian war al-Zarqawi desired and to create zones of chaos and anarchy, as recommended by Naji. The insecurity and anarchy created by the attacks would sever the populations connection

to the government, creating favorable conditions for Isis. Terrorism provided a weapon of retaliation for Isis. Isis carried out retaliatory terrorist attacks against the civilian populations, followed with public executions of peshmerga soldier after losing Fallujah and Mosul to peshmerga and Iraqi troops. This pattern of revenge terror attacks was additionally employed against international troops. Terror attacks served to provide shock value and spread fear before the launch of major combat operations. (Maurer 2017, 63-64.) Isis excelled in amassing the propaganda value and psychological effect of its terror attacks by garnering media attention to its atrocities and spreading material of the attacks online (Beccaro 2018, 214).

International troops operating in Syria or Iraq witnessed retaliatory terrorist attacks within their countries. Turkey has great strategic importance for Isis as the main passageway for its foreign fighters, smuggling operations and weapons. Turkey was hit with a series of major terrorist attacks after siding with the Syrian government against Isis and limiting the movement of Isis activities within its territory. Iran and Russia faced similar waves of terrorist attacks after engaging in the fight against Isis. Isis demonstrated its capabilities by orchestrating some of the most devastating terrorist attacks in Europe in decades. These attacks serve not only a retaliatory function, but also as statements of the prowess and capability of the organization. They are meant to both invoke fear and inspire potential recruits. The attacks represent a front of the global Jihadist battle against the West. Isis sees much value in the global Jihadist struggle, even if it views Shias as the main source of evil. Isis employs two types of operational strategies in its global terrorist attacks. The Paris 2015 attacks were performed by a highly trained and professional small terrorist cell that was able to travel between Syria and Europe multiple times before the attacks. The other type of attack is the “lone-wolf type”. Attackers do not necessarily share any connection to Isis, except being radicalized by its ideology on the internet or by friends. Isis has increasingly encouraged and provided instructions for these kinds of attacks. (Maurer 2017, 65-71.)

The style of urban asymmetric warfare where terrorist tactics plays a large role is well suited for contemporary asymmetric warfare, where complexity defines the battlefield (Beccaro 2018, 209). Mary Kaldor has named contemporary wars as “new wars”, comparing them to conventional warfare that was still mainstream before the second World War. Kaldor describes these new wars as long, low intensity, small arms focused and present in the context of the erosions of state institutions and monopoly of violence. Civilians often suffer the largest toll of the new wars and divisions between civilians and combatants becomes blurred. Terrorism is a phenomenon that is an integral part of new wars. (Kaldor 2012, 4-10.) Many of the main features of new wars are present in the environments

where Isis engages in warfare. The tactics and type of warfare Isis employs is ideally suited for this kind of environment.

10. ANALYSIS RESULTS- ISIS

The overview presented in the previous section serves as a context supporting the analysis of the results. Entries are coded in accordance with Marying qualitative content analysis and the outlined coding system. Entries in the categories provided a picture of Isis military strategy corresponding well with the military strategy outlined based on academic literature.

10.1 Results

The results of the analysis are presented below and analyzed separately according to each theme. A list and brief description of each material analyzed is provided below.

Material	Description
A1. Deposition of a captive, 1994, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.	Speech at a Jordanian court when Zarqawi was sentenced for activities against the state.
A2. Untitled Speech, 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.	Speech as the Amri of Jamaat al-Tawhid al-Jihad, first public speech in a decade.
A3. Letter to al Qaida leadership, 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.	Intercepted by American troops in Iraq.
A4. Statement and video message, 2006, Muharib al-Jubouri.	Isis spokesperson announcing the formation of "Alliance of al-Mutayyabin".
A5. Truth has arrived and falsehood has perished, 2006, Abu Umar al-Husayani al-Quaryshi, al-Baghdadi.	Statement posted in al-Furqan media by newly selected amir of the Islamic State in Iraq.
A6. Letter to al Qaida leadership, 2007. Abu Sulaymanal Utayabi.	Letter by chief Sharia Judge of the Islamic state.
A7. The harvest of the years at the land of the monotheist, 2007, Abu Umar a-Husayani al-Quaryshi al-Baghdadi	Audiotape posted in al-Furqan media.
A8. The Islamic state in Iraq will remain, 2011, Abu Muhammad al-Adani.	Speech by Islamic State official spokesperson, posted on al-Furqan media.
A9. Advice for the leaders and soldiers of the Islamic State, 2007, Abu Hamaz al-Muhajir.	Texts by former prime minister and minister of war of Islamic State of Iraq, made available online by the organizations printing press al-Himmah library.
A10.The Fallujah memorandum, 2009. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A10.1, A serious quest to unite efforts. • A10.2, Balanced Military planning. • A10.3, Establishing the awakening Jihadi councils. • A10.4, Considering the importance of the political symbols. • A10.5, Reassuring the dissidents. 	Author identity unknown, containing a strategic plan to improve the political position of the Islamic State in Iraq.
A11.Give good news to the believers, 2013. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.	Speech announcing the declaration of the Islamic State in Iraq an al-Sham.
A12. Message to the Mujahidin and Muslim Umma in the month of Ramadan, 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.	Speech announcing the establishment of the caliphate.
A13.Exclusive coverage of the Friday Khutbah in grand Masjid in Mosul, 2014, al-Khalifah Ibrahim, Amir al-Muminin of the Islamic State	Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's speech at grand Mosque in Mosul.
A14. Indeed your Lord is ever watchful, 2014, Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adani ash-Shami.	Speech by Isis spokesperson, after which a series of terrorist attacks in Europe occurred.
A15. The Extinction of the Grayzone, 2015, unidentified author.	Article published in Daqib.,

A16. Women in the Islamic State: a Manifesto and a Case study, 2015, the Khansa Brigade.	Uploaded on a password protected forum for Jihadists, attributed to an all-women policing unit of Isis.
A17. Media operative, you are also Muhajidin, 2016, al-Himmah publication.	On the importance of media operations. Published on Isis official propaganda channel on Telegram.
A18. The structure of the Kilafah, 2016, video narrator unknown.	Transcript of video published in al-Furqan media.
A19. That they lived by proof, 2016, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani ash-Shami	Speech by official Isis spokesperson.
A20. And give glad tidings to those who are patient, 2019, Amirul-Muminin Saykh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi	Extract from an hourlong address. Official Isis al-Hayat media center translation.
A21. He was true to Allah, and Allah was true to him, 2019, Abdul Hasan al-Muhajir	Transcript of audio statement by Isis spokesperson.
A22. In the hospitality of Amirul-Muminin, the Kalifah of the Muslims, 2019, Amirul-Muminin Saykh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi	Transcript and description of video of address by Baghdadi.

List of entries

Theme	Category	Subcategories (N. entries)	Entries
Propaganda value	C4	C4.1 (3)	(A10,115) (A17,225) (A22,295)
		C4.2 (5)	(A3,44)(A7,79)(A8,89)(A15,190)(A18,240)
		C4.3 (2)	(A3,48)(A17,218)
	C8	C8.1 (2)	(A3,39-42)(A3, 47)
		C8.2 (5)	(A2,23)(A3,47)(A7,82)(A19,250)(A21,203)
Tactic of asymmetric warfare	C1	C1.1 (5)	(A2,26) (A3,46)(A10.2,125)(A10.2,127)(A22,296)
	C3	C3.1 (2)	(A2, 10) (A14,186)
		C3.2 (4)	(A3,44)(A19,250)(A21,284)(A22,296)
		C3.3 (2)	(A21,280,)(A21,285)
Leaderless Jihad	C9	C9.1 (6)	(A19,250-251)(A19,254)(A19,255)(A20,264-267)(A20,272)(A20,273)
Recruiting and mobilizing function	C6	C6.1 (2)	(A2,26)(A17)
		C6.2 (8)	(A2,26)(A3,49)(A14,185)(A15,190)(A19,255)(A20,273)(A22,295)(A22,96)
		C6.3 (11)	(A1,17)(A2,23)(A2,26)(A2,27-29)(A12,162)(A12,163)(A13,167)(A15,187-189)(A19,253)(A20,272)(A21,284)
		C6.4 (5)	(A5,66)(A7,84)(A10.1)(A11,151)(A12,162)
Creating Zones of chaos	C5	C5.1 (5)	(A3,39-47)(A3,43)(A5,65-66)(A6,71)(A10,109)(A10.1,118)
		C5.2 (1)	(A3,44)
	C7	C7.1 (8)	(A3,40)(A7,80)(A10,110)(A10.1)(A10.2)(A10.3,135)(A19,252)(A21,286)
		C7.2 (8)	(A7,84)(A12,165)(A14,179)(A14,181)(A19,250-252)(A19,251)(A20,271)(A21,282-283)
Spreading fear	C2	C2.1 (7)	(A14,186)(A15,190)(A19,256) A3,44)(A10.2,126)(A14,180)(A18,240)

10.1.1 Propaganda value

The first theme includes entries that refer to attacks in a boasting or threatening manner or as proof that the group has not yet been defeated. The material contains several indications on the centrality of media strategy for Isis. A new category (C4.3) was added during the analysis to include entries on the importance of media operations. For example, the A17 publication underlines the importance of propaganda and media operations for Isis; “The media jihad against the enemy is no less important than the material fight against it.” (A17, 218).

The materials convey the importance of propaganda for Isis in spreading its ideology and radicalizing potential recruits. Propaganda serves the function of both inspiring individuals to commit attacks and encourages travel to the region for participation in Jihad. This theme had less entries than most of the other themes, indicating for propaganda value of terrorism remaining function of terrorism, but not the most central one. The categories coded for entries that present terrorist attacks as a “commercial” for the brand of Isis, by spreading the message of Isis and expanding its power and influence. It should be noted that the first theme is closely connected to the theme of recruitment and mobilization. One of the main functions of propaganda is recruitment and mobilization of the intended target audience. Terrorism acts provide material for propaganda. Much of Isis propaganda material features them committing acts with significant shock value, such as beheadings (Nance 2019, 393). These acts are often committed on civilians and their shock value can be compared to bomb attacks.

The first category C4.1 only contained 3 entries. These entries dated to the period 2009-2019, suggesting an increased importance of propaganda for Isis as its organization matured. Two of the entries were timed after the decline of the caliphate, suggesting a growing desire for Isis to show its lifeforce through the attacks. The second category C4.2 contained 6 entries. The first and last entries in these categories include reassurances for Isis followers that the fight will continue. Entries referring to attacks in a boasting manner where dated to the middle-period. The first and the last entries can be connected to the period when Isis was on the brink of defeat after the failure of its first and then most recent caliphate. The C8.1 and C8.2 categories did not gain a significant number of entries, but they indicated that the narrative of oppressed Muslims taking vengeance on their oppressors had value in legitimizing terrorist attacks.

10.1.2 Tactic of Asymmetric Warfare

Tactic of asymmetric warfare- theme was expected to measure for the function of terrorism as a tool of asymmetric warfare. The categories coded for attacks against United States and their allies (C1.1), use of terrorism to strike against an overpowered enemy (C3.1), exhaustion and stretching thin of the enemy (C3.2) and expelling the enemy with attacks against civilians (C3.3). Like outlined in the previous section, the use of terroristic tactics as part of guerrilla warfare has had a crucial role in Isis military strategy. The categories X1.2 and X1.3 had a moderate number of entries, relaying the importance of suicide-based attacks and intimidation tactics by executions and beheadings of security forces. The theme showed a clear connection between the use of terrorism and references to principles of revolutionary warfare, supporting the importance of terroristic tactics for Isis as part of strategy employed in asymmetric warfare.

The first category C1.1 did not yield many entries. These entries usually only referred to attacks on military targets, which cannot by themselves be regarded as terrorism. The result can be seen reflecting Isis strategy of focusing majority of efforts on attacks on domestic security forces and civilians. The C3 categories resulted in 9 entries, with C3.2 clearly standing out as important. The exhaustion and stretching thin of the “crusader” forces was mentioned on several occasions. The material suggest that attrition warfare was the main strategy for Isis against western forces in the region;

“They have shown their enemies that they are capable of the holding the reins of the initiative, knowing that the battle today with their enemies is a battle of attrition. We recommend all of them to fight their enemies and drain all that they have from their human, military, economic, and logistical resources and everything.” (A22, 296.)

Isis followers were called to commit terrorist strikes against all the states contributing troops to the coalition against Isis. The material represents Isis strategy as a war of attrition against the United States and its allies. Terrorist strikes are meant demonstrate the cost of the occupation for the coalition forces in Iraq and Syria. Two entries in C3.3 refer to terrorist attacks and connects them to “uprooting” the enemy from Iraq. The material presents the destruction of state institutions in Iraq and Syria as Isis priority, and the United States only as its secondary target. Based on the material, Isis recognizes the utility of this strategy by which they can expect to undermine the goals of the United States and its allies in the region while simultaneously creating zones of chaos. Terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare has an important role in Isis military strategy, but the organization also demonstrates skill in applying the core principles of revolutionary warfare. The primary function of terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare is the tactic advantage afforded by SBVIEDs, intimidation of security forces with beheadings and assassinations, and the heightened risk of terrorist attacks the coalition forces have to suffer as the cost of their politics and military forces presence in Iraq. The entries in this theme were dated relatively evenly, indicating no clear change in the function of terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare.

10.1.3 Leaderless Jihad

The theme of leaderless Jihad indicated for entries that underline the importance of terror strikes committed by individuals. The theme located seven entries despite only having one category. The category C6.2 belongs to a different theme but also indicates the importance of individual attacks. The C6.2 category found 9 entries, located within materials from A14 to A22. Noteworthy in the

theme for leaderless Jihad is that most of the entries in this category were from the materials coinciding with the period when Isis was losing or had lost control of its territories. The results show that Isis military strategy was shifting from control of territory and the establishment and control of the Islamic state into survival and a strategy of leaderless jihad. The strategy entails terrorist strikes committed by individual attackers or cells become one of the primary modes of operation. They serve to keep the “brand” of Isis alive, until they can find a new suitable conflict zone to re-engage and rebuild. Many of the materials link to the period when Isis was still controlling some territories but losing ground to the coalition. The entries encouraged members to commit terror attacks in Europe and America instead of making the *hijrah* to the land of the Islamic state, indicating efforts to drive up the cost of the war for the coalition forces and to enact revenge;

“Truly, the smallest act you do in their lands is more beloved to us than the biggest act done here: it is more effective for us and more harmful to them. If one of you wishes and strives to reach the lands of the Islamic state, then each of us wishes to be in your place to make examples of the crusaders, day and night, scaring and terrorizing them, until every neighbor fears his neighbor.” (A19, 256.)

These entries seek to downplay the importance of controlling territory and maintaining the caliphate, claiming that defeat only comes when its followers stop believing in its ideology. Isis seeks to reassure followers of the promise that the difficult times they are experiencing are only Allah’s way to test them, and that Allah has guaranteed them victory in the end. These entries provide indications for a change in military strategy. The organization’s focus is shifting from creating zones of chaos and establishing control over them for the Islamic state, to a leaderless jihad that places more emphasis on individually conducted terrorist attacks to keep the organization and its ideology alive. Leaderless Jihad only requires a connecting ideology and committed individual cells and members. This makes it harder to counteract militarily.

10.1.4 Recruiting and mobilizing function

This theme examined the recruitment and mobilizing function of terrorism. The categories coded for entries that connected terrorism attacks with the call to Jihad, and materials that included a call for every Muslim to join the Jihad either by traveling to the warzones in Iraq and Syria or by committing terrorism attacks in their own countries. This theme is also connected to the previously analyzed propaganda value of terrorism strikes, where the material showed clear indication for the importance of the media strategy for the military strategy of the organization. The C6.1 category only got two

entries indicating that, at least in the material analyzed, terrorist attacks were not clearly connected to the call for Jihad. However, the material included many entries in the C6.3 and C6.4 categories indicate that mobilization and recruitment of followers was central for the organization. Several of the speeches clearly stated that joining the Jihad is every Muslims duty and that the “grayzone” has faced extinction. The concept of the grayzone is used to convey the message that every true Muslim duty is to join the “caravan of Jihad”, or they are counted on the side of the enemy;

“The world today is divided into two camps. Bush spoke the truth when he said: either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. Meaning, either you are with the crusade or you are with Islam.” (A15, 186.)

The leaders and spokespersons of the organization were on several occasions painting themselves as just regular soldiers of Islam, likening the organization to a “peoples” movement in rhetorical terms familiar to populists. Recruiting and mobilizing followers was the central message of many of the materials analyzed in the study, but this cannot be clearly connected to terrorist attacks. However, considering the propaganda material Isis produces as part of its media strategy, it is clear that terrorism serves the function of spreading the message and notoriety of the group, with the ultimate goal to recruit new followers to either commit individual attacks or travel to the Islamic state as its soldiers. The entries in this theme were relatively evenly divided between the materials.

10.1.5 Creating zones of Chaos

The fifth theme serves to code for references of Isis strategy to create zones of chaos and later establish control over them for the creation of an Islamic state, as advocated by Abu Bakr Naji’s strategy. The theme coded for entries that signified the first stage of this strategy, where the establishment of the state was prepared by creating chaos using guerilla and terrorist tactics. The categories included indications of strategy to incite sectarian civil war, failure of the enemy to uphold security and failure to destroy Isis and its fighters. Most of the entries in the C5.1 category coincide before the establishment of the caliphate, which is logical considering they serve as indications of the first phase of the strategy, before the consolidation phase. The entries indicate that the destruction of state institutions, especially the military and police forces, were the primary targets of Isis. This lends support for the thesis that Isis strategy was to undermine the state monopoly on violence and create a sense of insecurity amongst the people. Isis acknowledged, in entries included in C7.1 that

the strategy would also serve their fight against the “crusaders”, since it undermined western goals of supporting state institutions, training security forces and creating stability in Iraq;

“These martyrs will be able to kill one or many of these leaders, which will significantly affect the stability of the political scene that the crusaders created. It will show the world and the Muslims community within Iraq that their government is weak and unable to protect even itself—so how can it protect the citizens?” (A10.2, 129.)

A new category was added during the analysis to code for entries that referred to the incitement of civil war. This category received only one entry. However, when examining it in the context of the other entries, it supports the conclusion that sectarian civil war was one of the strategic goals of Isis. One of the materials lays out Iraq as fertile ground for such a war due to its multiethnic population; “In general, Iraq is a political mosaic, an ethnic mixture, and scattered confessional and sectarian disparities that only an strong central authority and an overpowering ruler have been able to lead, beginning with Ziyad Ibn Abihi and ending with Saddam” (A3, 39).

As part of the “zones of chaos strategy” terrorism seems to serve its most important function with the intimidation of soldier’s. The material included several references to beheadings of soldiers, targeting security forces families, and assassinations of military and political figures to sow disorientation and power struggles within the enemy. The C7.2 category received 9 entries, indicating the organizations determination to continue the war and ability to endure losses. Many of the entries boastfully tell the audience of the Americans failure to destroy the cause by killing its leaders. The entries declare that martyrdom is a victory for its fighter’s, claiming that defeat can only come’s when Muslims abandon (the Isis version of) their belief. Several of the entries swear in the name of a long attritional war. These entries coincide with the later materials when the caliphate was already struggling or destroyed. The creating zones of chaos- theme finds indications that Isis uses terrorist tactics in combination with guerilla warfare to undermine state control and incite sectarian war to later seize areas and establish their rule as the sole party capable of providing security and laws for the people.

10.1.6 Spreading fear

The final theme measures for the function of terrorism as a tool to spread fear. The categories coded for terrorist attacks that the material connected to the spreading of fear. The theme had the least entries, suggesting that fear was not the primary function of acts of terrorism for Isis. The intimidation

and psychological effect of terrorism has been included in other themes, suggesting it serves a smaller function as a way to achieve a smaller goal within a certain strategy, rather than being the primary desired goal. The entries more often refer to spreading fear in security forces and their families than in connection to references of attacks on civilians;

“The goal of our policy is to increase the fear of injury and death within the Iraq forces. As a result, we can minimize the desire of individuals to join them... We must keep attacking them until the number of deaths and injuries are such that even friends and families of the individuals in the military and police fear for their lives because they are related to them.” (A15, 127.)

In regard to Isis acts of terror, especially those abroad, their message and the publicity they generate seem to be mostly aimed at potential recruits. The theme did have a couple of entries referring to spreading of fear in connection to attacks on civilians, indicating that Isis was at least pleased when the attacks had the effect of spreading fear among the general population of western countries. The entries expressed more a sense of vengeance than referred to fear as having strategic or functional value. The timing of the entries in the theme divided relatively evenly.

10.2 Acceptability of terrorism as a tactic

The X1 and X2 categories coded for the acceptability of terrorism as a tactic and serve to support the analysis. X1 coded for references in the text to the use of terrorism and X2 coded for denial of terrorist attacks. The X1 and K1.1 categories included 23 entries of references to terrorist attacks, admissions to being a terrorist group, incitement of followers to commit terrorist attacks or to the use of terroristic tactics. The entries indicated that attacking civilians with terrorist attacks and use of terrorist tactics was seen as fully acceptable by Isis. Isis saw these attacks as legitimated by their interpretation of the Sharia;

“The civilian outfit does not make blood illegal to spill, and the military uniform does not make blood legal to spill. The only thing that make blood illegal and legal to spill are Islam and a covenant (peace treaty, *dhimmi*, etc.). Blood becomes legal to spill through disbelief.” (A14, 185.)

Isis interpretation of sharia allowed it to deem almost anyone not subscribing to their version of Islam and joining their ranks as an apostate and hence a legitimate target. Only Sunni groups were exempt from this. Isis showed some restraint towards them, but it also had a record of assassinating some Sunni tribesmen for not wanting to align with them. Most of the entries in X2 category included

denials of role in terrorist acts committed against Sunnis. Isis still had to be careful to maintain legitimacy among its target audience and had to act within its own set of rules.

10.3 Summary of results

Each of the categories proved important, showing the many different functions terrorism served for Isis. The different themes had approximately the same number of entries. Only the last theme, spreading of fear, resulted in markedly less entries in comparison. The different functions seemed to vary depending on the context and date of the material. When the organization was losing territory or on the brink of destruction individual terrorism strikes and the strategy of leaderless Jihad was emphasized in the material. In the stage of building and consolidating its caliphate the strategy of zones of chaos was at the forefront. Terrorism also served an important propaganda, recruitment and mobilizing function during the whole period, but the message for the fighter wanting to do their part in the Jihad changed from emigrating to the Islamic state as fighter to staying at home and committing individual strikes and patiently waiting for a new opportunity to revive the caliphate.

Summary of results:

Theme	Function of terrorism
Propaganda value	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Material for propaganda->spreading ideology and radicalization of members.
Tactic of asymmetric warfare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tactics of revolutionary warfare: assassinations, beheadings, SVBIED. Attrition warfare: Inflicting cost on enemy by attacking civilians at abroad.
Leaderless Jihad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Individual terrorist strikes more difficult to counteract and provides an easier organizational form to uphold when compared to proto-state.
Recruitment and mobilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Alternative form of engagement for those that want to participate in Jihad but cannot travel to the region. Means to mobilization for those who have chosen inaction so far. Can paint attacks as spontaneous acts of the “peoples war”, inspiring others.
Creating zones of chaos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spreading insecurity, chaos and inciting sectarian war with terrorism.
Spreading fear	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Means of vengeance, not many entries in material.

11. OVERVIEW OF HEZBOLLAH

Hezbollah can be described as a political party, a military organization and a social force. The organization is often referred to as “a state within a state”, since it provides many services that are usually allocated to the state (Daher 2016, 3). Sometimes Hezbollah provides services that compete with the services provided by the Lebanese state. The proto-state nature of the organization is well visible within Lebanon, especially in the South, where the state has traditionally been largely absent from the lives of ordinary people. For example, two ambulance services operate in Southern Lebanon, one provided by the state and one managed by Hezbollah. The locals have learnt to rely on Hezbollah for both social services and security, creating the foundation for Hezbollah’s strong support among the local population. Especially Shia villages commonly exhibit strong support for Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s roots are in the Lebanese civil war from 1975, and the Israel invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Hezbollah emerged in the context of a fractured Lebanese state that was dominated by a collection of diverse militia groups during the Lebanese civil war. The militia group that came to be known as Hezbollah was officially founded in 1985, but it had been active since 1982 under the name of Islamic Resistance. The Mahrumin movement and Moussa Sadar played an important role in the organization’s establishment, along with Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, who is seen as Hezbollah’s spiritual father. Hezbollah identifies itself first and foremost as an Islamic resistance movement to Israel. Its roots in the civil war and the sectarian society of Lebanon also mean it maintains a strong identity as an advocate for the Shia population of Lebanon. The Arab world has celebrated Hezbollah as one of the only organizations to successfully resist Israel militarily, especially during the 2006 war (Daher, 2016, 20-30). The close connection Hezbollah has shared with Iran has been crucial for its development. The organization would not have existed in its current form without the political, financial and military support it has received from Iran. Iran and Hezbollah are ideologically closely connected. The Islamic belief system of the organization is one of its core features and the origin of many of its goals and demands. Hezbollah subscribes to the *Wilayat al-Faqih* principle, meaning it upholds the Islamic Revolution of Iran as an inspiration for its action. Hezbollah regards Ayatollah Khomeini as the “single wise- and just leader” and pursues a Sharia ruled Islamic state modeled on the Iranian example. The organization’s development and its ideology can be seen connecting to the Islamic revival during the 70s, to which Iran’s Islamic revolution and the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood coincide. Its development was impacted by the aftermath of Iran’s Islamic revolution, the decline of Arab Nationalism and weakening of progressive forces in Arab states due to increased repression and

US support for Saudi Arabia. It is no coincidence that many other Islamic Shia and Sunni movements started to gain prominence during this time. (Khan & Zhaoying, 2020, 102, 113-114)

Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has governed as the organization's general secretary and is widely regarded as most important figure for the organization. He was appointed to the position in 1992 after his predecessor was killed by Israel. The party is headed by a Shura council, which functions as its main deciding organ. Nasrallah serves as the leader of the Shura council. (Daher 2016, 153.) The shura is connected to other councils, which each have been allocated an area of responsibility. The committee of Jihad is responsible for observations, equipment, operations and collecting information. The committee of the Ulema and the Central committee are responsible for policies, culture, media, finance, social issues, planning, Mosque affairs, popular mobilization, follow-up and coordination. (Daher 2016, 28.) Hezbollah's ideology and goals were first declared in an open letter published in 1985. The letter introduces a worldview that divides the world into oppressors and the oppressed. The letter declares Hezbollah's subscription to the principle of *Wilayat al-Faqih*. An Islamic government in accordance to Sharia is the only state where justice can be achieved according to Hezbollah's beliefs. Hezbollah assert their pursuit of Jihad to liberate all Muslim territories in the letter. The destruction of the "Zionist entity" known as Israel and opposition to the aims of Israel's allies, with the US in the forefront, are declared as the main goals of this Jihad. Hezbollah publicized a new charter in 2009, that largely followed the same principles as stated in the open letter but with larger emphasis on the concept of resistance and Jihad to liberate Muslim lands and less priority given to the *Wilayat al-Faqih*. (Avon et al. 2012, 4-5.)

During its evolution Hezbollah has undergone a development from an armed militia group into a political party. The armed resistance against Israel has always remained a priority within Hezbollah with its political ambitions coming second. Identity as a resistance movement and its armed activities are still important for Hezbollah, but after the end of the Israeli occupation there has been a clear shift to increase the importance of activities concerning Lebanese politics and society. Hezbollah has shifted more focus on consolidating its position within Lebanese political life and serving the functions of a state within Lebanon than to its armed resistance against Israel. (Wiegand 2009, 669-679.) This can mostly be attributed to the withdrawal of Israel, meaning that the shift back to prioritizing the armed resistance could be quick in the event of a dramatic shift in the regions security environment.

11.1 Hezbollah Military Strategy

The military confrontation with Israel has historically been regarded the most important role of Hezbollah and still remains a main stable of its identity. The military apparatus of Hezbollah is of central importance to the party and cannot be seen as separate from the rest of the organization. For example, the EU has tried circumventing this by listing Hezbollah's military wing as terrorist organization, but not the party itself (Reuters staff 17.8.2020). The military actions of Hezbollah are coordinated by the Jihad council, which serves under the Shura. Hassan Nasrallah heads both of the organs.

Hezbollah emerged as one of many militia groups during the civil war. Hezbollah quickly became regarded as a professional and effective force, in part as a result of Iranian support, allowing access to better fighters, weaponry and finances. As discussed previously, Hezbollah's popularity in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Arab world can partly be owned to its military effectiveness in resisting Israel. Hezbollah continuously increased its effectiveness during the civil war against Israel, managing by the end of the 90s to bring up its casualty ratio against Israel close to one-to-one. Hezbollah has shifted to a more defensive strategy after the withdrawal of Israel, usually launching strikes only as retaliatory actions. The 2006 war was considered a military success for Hezbollah and sparked an increase in its popularity. (Daher 2016, 153, 159.)

Hezbollah uses its military assets both against Israel, but also on occasions inside Lebanon to gain political advancements. The 1989 Taif Agreement legitimized Hezbollah as an insurgent resistance actor, leaving it the only armed militia that was not required to disarm (May, 2019, 125) There are many examples of military actions to consolidate the organizations position within Lebanese society. The military also provides security deterrence against both actions of the Lebanese army or other militia groups. Hezbollah has used its military to control the local population on some occasions, such as in Southern Lebanon and Dahyed. The organization seeks to control all militia activates within the areas under its control, making sure there are no unnecessary provocation against Israel. The military forces and their effectiveness are central to Hezbollah. It has several times threatened any party that attempts to disarm it with the use of force. The March 14 movement, a coalition of Lebanese political actors in opposition to Hezbollah and its ally Syria, tried to weaken Hezbollah's military apparatus, but faced massive resistance from Hezbollah turning the conflict violent. Hezbollah's forces proved much more effective and well organized than its opposition and it quickly occupied key parts of Beirut. This event is not the only example of Hezbollah using its military capabilities against domestic

competitors and opposition. During its conflict with Amal, and other Shia political militia and party in Lebanon during the civil war, some 3000 fighters and civilians lost their lives. Hezbollah has also conducted assassination campaigns against domestic targets. (Daher 2016, 156-165.)

Hezbollah's military wing is considered to make up the largest non-state military force in the world (Larson 31.5.2021). Its strength is estimated at around 5000-7000 active fighters with approximately 20 000 fighters in reserve. Most of its fighters serve as part time soldiers, managing their day jobs on the side. The special forces units consist of professional soldiers focusing exclusively on training and operations. The military wing is divided into four territorial commands: the South, Dayeh, Beeka valley and the Mediterranean coastline. The units operate relatively autonomously, an important factor in Hezbollah's military effectiveness. Every unit receives instructions from the central leadership, but the execution, planning and tactics are under the authority of the small unit commanders. The military wing is divided into several units. The Security Organization unit is responsible for the security of Hezbollah's members, with its activities giving priority to its leadership. The External Security Apparatus (ESA) is responsible for Hezbollah's operations outside Lebanese territory. Its main activities have been focused on supporting Palestinian militia and jihadist groups in the occupied territories with organizing and conducting strikes in Israel and the West Bank. The ESA has recorded activities additionally in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. The ESA has been active in the main conflict theaters in Middle East, such as Iraq and in Syria on behalf of Iranian interests. (Daher 2016, 154-158.)

Hezbollah's military strategy is mainly based attritional guerilla warfare almost straight from the playbook of revolutionary warfare strategists, especially Mao. Highly mobile small units and hit-and-run tactics are at the center of its military strategy. The operations are not directed at capturing territory. Rather their objective is to kill, wound and expel the enemy and consequently bring up the cost of the war (Gabrielsen 2014, 258). A captured document, written by Hezbollah's director of operations, Haj Hallil, outlines the foundation of Hezbollah's military strategy with 13 principles of warfare. The following presents the principles to provide a sense of the strategic and tactical doctrine of Hezbollah's military strategy; "1. Avoid the strong, attack the weak and withdraw, 2. Protecting our fighters is more important than causing the enemy casualties, 3. Strike only when success is assured, 4. Surprise is essential to success, if you are spotted you have failed, 5. Don't get into set-piece battle. Slip away like smoke before the enemy can drive home their advantage, 6. Attaining the goal demands patience, in order to discover the enemy's weak points, 7. Keep moving, avoid formation of a front line, 8. Keep the enemy at constant alert, at the front and in the rear, 9. The road

to great victory passes through a thousand small victories, 10. Keep up the morale of the fighters, avoid notions of enemy's superiority, 11. The media is innumerable guns, whose hits are like bullets. Use them in the battle, 12. The population is treasure, nurture it, 13. Hurt the enemy, then stop before he abandons restraint." (Ya'ari 21, March, 1996) The document includes all the basic principles of revolutionary warfare.

Hezbollah is perhaps most well-known for its use of rockets, which serve a key role in its military strategy. The resistance forces first used rockets in 1992 and they have since become a means of deterrence and coercion. Rockets were routinely used as retaliation against similar attacks by Israel or for attacks conducted against Hezbollah's fighter operating outside Lebanese territory. The rockets' psychological effect on the residents of Northern Israel molds them into an effective weapon. Israel has been forced to offer the population financial incentives to prevent civilians from moving to more safer regions of Israel. The strategic effect of the rocket attacks includes both attritional and psychological effect on the population, inducing a decline in the support for the Israeli policies in Lebanon. Rocket strikes also damage the morale of Israel Defense Force (IDF) soldiers, fostering a sense that they are fighting an endless and unwinnable war. Until the recent Iron dome purchase, Israel has lacked effective countermeasures to stop Hezbollah from launching attacks (Byman 2011, 923). Hezbollah has demonstrated excellent understanding on the value of psychological warfare. Its forces often conduct raids with no strategic or tactical value, with the primary intention to film video footage of the attack. These psychological operations (PSYCOPS) were used to undermine IDF credibility. During one of these operations Hezbollah relied only partial information of an attack against an IDF outpost to the media. IDF subsequently denied the attack taking place. Hezbollah later released footage proving the outpost was overwhelmed. This served to undermine IDF credibility in the eyes of Israeli civilians. Hezbollah is also known for keeping the population of Israel on the edge by issuing threats of attacks without going through with them. (Gabrielsen 2014, 259-261.)

11.2 Hezbollah use of Terrorism as part of Military Strategy

Terrorism plays a relatively minor role in the military strategy of Hezbollah, at least when compared to the military strategy of Isis. The role of terrorism in Hezbollah's military strategy has seen evolution, with its importance declining through the years. Hezbollah was launched to world fame in its early days by the attacks on the US embassy in Beirut killing people 63, the US Marine and French Barracks killing 307 people, high jacking the TWA flight 847 in 1985 and bombing a Jewish community center in 1994 in Buenos Aires killing 85 people (Wiegand 2009, 4). Hezbollah has been credited as the organization that pioneered suicide terrorism. Attacks on peacekeepers were also

common during its early days (Byman 2011, 917-920). After the 80s Hezbollah has evolved to rely mostly on traditional guerilla warfare tactics. Assassinations and rocket strikes on civilian targets can be seen as the main forms of terrorism the group still engages in during the 21st century. It has retained its place on the terrorist organization- lists of many countries for its support and training of Palestinian terrorist organizations. The role of terrorism in the military strategy of Hezbollah has declined significantly since the 80s, but it still serves a functions within its strategy of attritional warfare against Israel, especially by targeting civilians in Northern Israel, which in turn impacts the popularity of Israel's strikes against Hezbollah and Lebanon. The support for Palestinian terror groups is designed to drive home the psychological effect of the war over a long period of time, demonstrating the cost of the policies of the Israel state to its citizens. Additionally, Hezbollah has historically used assassinations and bomb attacks for domestic political gains. Assassinations and kidnapping campaigns were a frequently used tools against western and other foreign civilians, used to drive them out of the country. (Wiegand 2009, 672.) The declining role of terrorism in Hezbollah's military strategy can also be viewed as a consequence of its professionalization and transition from an amateur militia force into a legitimate and powerful political party and military force. Hezbollah is currently not waging an open war against Israel and is diverting its focus on its role as a political party. This can cause it to place added value on popular support and become more vary of its legitimacy, which a frequent use of terrorism could damage. (Matusitz 2018, 8.) Hezbollah has refrained from launching rockets into Israel since the end of the 2006 war (Wiegand 2009, 673).

Hezbollah's military strategy against Israel has consisted of inflicting casualties, taking hostages and otherwise destroying Israel's moral and willingness to continue its activities in Lebanon. Hezbollah seeks to influence Israelis populations support of these policies and the morale of IDF soldiers through its strategy of attritional warfare. The organization recognizes that while casualties rather strengthen its own position, Israel only has a limited political tolerance for both civilian and military casualties. Hezbollah has consistently valued the importance of information- and psychological warfare and is regarded as winning the fight against Israel on this front with a strong margin. Hezbollah's forces often launch attacks solely for the purpose of capturing video footage with propaganda value. Hezbollah has further had success in controlling the narratives surrounding the conflict. Coverage of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has naturally been quite biased for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Arab countries, but even the international coverage of the war has more often portrayed Israel as the villain. (Byman 2011, 922.)

This negative view on Israel is not surprising, considering Israel's rocket attacks result in far more civilian casualties when compared to Hezbollah's attacks. Hezbollah most often uses terrorist tactics and targets civilians as retaliatory action for Israel's rockets and shelling killing civilians. However, it should be noted that Hezbollah often deliberately hides amongst civilians and places its operational centers in densely populated areas to ward off Israel's attack, or to later collect the propaganda value of Israel killing women and children if they decide to attack. This does not negate the fact that Israel has managed to kill far larger numbers of Lebanese civilians, giving Hezbollah the moral high ground. (Byman 2011, 922.) One of the reasons for the small role of terrorist tactics for Hezbollah could be that it has discovered the current military strategy working well without the need for terrorist tactics. In 1996, during the Israeli occupation, Israel and Hezbollah agreed to not deliberately target civilians in the agreement called the April understanding. An unwritten rule of the agreement still allowed attacks on soldiers inside the security zone. This quickly backfired for Israel, with Hezbollah retaining the ability to increase the cost of the war on them with hit-and-run attacks, while Israel's ability to launch countermeasures remained limited. (Byman 2011, 932.)

Terrorism does not seem a central tactic when considering Hezbollah's military strategy overall but rather it serves specific smaller roles on the operational levels of the strategy. Hezbollah military strategy reflects classic principles of guerilla warfare and the writings of revolutionary warfare scholars, such as Mao, seems to be familiar to its military leadership and reflected in its strategy. Hezbollah's transformation from an unprofessional militia group into the largest non-state armed group and political party is also reflected in the diminishing role of terrorism as part of their military strategy. Most of the prominent Hezbollah terrorist attacks can be dated to periods during or close to the civil war. Since the end of Israel's occupation Hezbollah's use of terror tactics has been rather limited.

12. ANALYSIS- HEZBOLLAH

The following section presents the analysis of entries collected from material consisting of Hassan Nasrallah's speeches and interviews. The entries are collected using the same coding system used in analysis of Isis. Some of the categories were slightly adapted to include Hezbollah's differing strategic views on some of the themes, even when they were in opposition to a certain strategy. The

accommodation adapts the comparison of the organizations military strategies and function of terrorism to better highlight the differences between the organizations.

12.1 Results

A short description of materials analyzed in the section is provided below, followed by a list of entries included in the analysis. Entries in the X and K categories are not listed, but are included in supporting the analysis of the main themes (C-categories). Presentation of the results and analysis of the material of Hezbollah and Isis is concluded in as uniformly as possible.

List of materials analyzed	Description
B1. Civil war and resistance, 1986.	Emirati newspaper Al-Khaleej interview that positioned Nasrallah as key figure for Hezbollah.
B2. Shiite reconciliation, 1989.	Interview in pan Arab newspaper Al-Wahda Al-Islamiya, by the time Hezbollah was finishing conflict with Amal.
B3. Elegy of Sayyed Abbas Mussawi, 1992.	Elegy following the killing of Hezbollah general secretary.
B4. After the assassination, 1992.	Interview in Lebanese newspaper As-Safir, Nasrallah elected general secretary of the party only day prior.
B5. Victory at the polls, 1992.	Interview with an-Nahar newspaper following Hezbollah's first participation in elections.
B6. Hezbollah is not an Iranian community in Lebanon, 1992.	Interview with pan Arab newspaper al-watani al-Arabi.
B7. The first understanding with Israel, 1993.	As-Safir interview following Israels operation accountability.
B8. Who is Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1993.	Interview with Lebanese newspaper Nida al-Watan.
B9. The April understanding, 1996.	Interview with Lebanese newspaper as-Safir following April understanding.
B10. The martyrdom of Sayyed Hadiths Nasrallah, 1997.	Speech after Nasrallah son was killed in skirmish with Israel.
B11. On conditional withdrawal, 1998.	Interview with Lebanese newspaper al-Moharrer.
B12. On Jews, 1998.	Speech at party rally in Beirut.
B13. Towards liberation, 1999.	Interview with Syrian newspaper Tehreen.
B14. A peaceful solution is a victory for the resistance, 2000.	Interview with Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram.
B15. Victory, 2000.	Speech in Bint Jubeil after Israel withdrawal from Lebanon.
B16. The second intifada, 2000.	Interview with Kuwaiti newspaper al-Rai al-Aam.
B17. The Americans have sent us a political bomb, 2001.	Interview with al-Rai al-Aam in the aftermath of 9/11.
B18. How can you afford that? 2002.	Speech delivered on the anniversary of the assassination of the previous secretary general Abbas Mussawi.
B19. On the thirteenth anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's death, 2002.	Speech delivered on anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's death.
B20. Arabs are not red Indians, 2002.	Speech at Islamic institution for culture and education in Beirut.
B21. The impending Iraq war and the Muslim Christian alignment, 2003.	Speech for demonstrators in the Southern Suburb of Beirut.
B22. The Interview with 60 minutes, 2003.	Interview with Ed Bradley on 60 minutes, Nasrallah first and only interview for western media.
B23. After occupation, 2003.	Speech at ceremony marking anniversary of Imam Hussein's death.
B24. Prisoner exchange, 2004.	Speech in Beirut suburbs in connection to prisoner exchange with Israel.
B25. They are a group that lives in the Middle-Ages, 2004.	Speech to crowd in Karbla after a suicide bombing in Iraq and increasing Sunni-Shia sectarian violence in Middle East.
B26. Letter to the Arab and Islamic Umma's, 2004.	Letter published in a number of regional newspapers, following rumors of Israel plan to demolish al-Aqsa Mosque.
B27. Your will decide the fate of your nation and country, 2005.	Speech to 800 000 demonstrators in Beirut following prime minister Hariris assassination.
B28. Message to France, 2005.	Published in Lebanese newspaper As-Safir and French newspaper Le Figaro.
B29. We will consider any hand that tries to remove our weapons an Israeli hand, 2005.	Speech at party rally in Bint Jubeil.
B30. Al Quds day, 2005.	Speech at al Quds (Jerusalem) remembrance day.
B31. I assure you once again that your hopes are sound an in the right place, 2006.	Speech In Beirut.
B32. Interview with new TV, 2006	Interview with Lebanon based New TV station.

List of entries:

Theme	Category	Subcategory (N. entries)	Entries
Propaganda value	C4	C4.1 (1)	(B10,171)
		C4.2 (1)	(B15,234)
		C4.3 (2)	(B13,200)(B32,399)
	C8	C8.1 (1)	(B19,271)
		C8.2 (1)	(B3,55)
Tactic of asymmetric warfare	C1	C1.1 (12)	(B1,33)(B1,38)(B2,49)(B3, 53-54)(B4,57)(B8,127-128)(B12,193)(B19,268)(B21,286)(B22,291)(B26,315)(B27,3263-27)
	C3	C3.1 (12)	(B7,104-107) (B9,154) (B13,203) (B13.206) (B14,214) (B14,229) (B15,242) (B18,265) (B20,280) (B23,297) (B24,302) (B29,348)
		C3.2 (8)	(B4,63) (B9,148) (B9,156) (B9,160) (B9,181) (B13,199) (B14,220) (B32,397)
		C3.3 (2)	(B6,92) (B14,215)
Leaderless Jihad	C9	C9.1 (1)	(B4,60)
Recruiting and mobilizing function	C6	C6.1 (0)	
		C6.2 (0)	
		C6.3 (2)	(B2,42) (B14,222)
		C6.4 (1)	(B10,173)
Creating Zones of chaos	C5	C5.1 (2)	(B1,32) (B6,90)
		C5.2 (12)	(B1,27-28) (B1,31) (B2,36) (B2,40) (B2, 43) (B4,66-68) (B8,124) (B10,175) (B13,205) (B16,252) (B23, 296) (B25,311)
	C7	C7.1 (0)	
		C7.2 (6)	(B3,54) (B4,58) (B7,104) (B9,149) (B13,200) (B18,265)
Spreading fear	C2	C2.1 (1)	(B4,63) (B14,231) (B20,179) (B21,284) (B29, 341) (B29,348)

12.1.1 Propaganda value

The theme coding for propaganda value did not gain many entries from the materials, indicating that the propaganda value of terrorism is not a main function of terrorism for Hezbollah. The result can be regarded surprising, considering the importance of psychological warfare for Hezbollah’s military strategy. Psychological warfare was not referenced to significantly in the material, but Nasrallah acknowledged on occasions the importance of psychological warfare for the organization. He regards Hezbollah as succeeding on this front and winning the battle against Israel:

“We filmed those operations and showed them on television, which promoted the Israeli Commander of the Northern Region to declare: “Hezbollah can infiltrate our lines but we cannot infiltrate theirs: Hezbollah knows what is going on here and we do not know what is going on there.”... When his officers and soldiers, hunkering down on the frontlines, hear this admission their morale will undoubtedly sink even lower...” (B13, 200.)

The connections to psychological warfare were not made in reference to use of terrorism. The analysis included several entries of Nasrallah speaking of suicide attacks in a boastful manner and entries where he sought to legitimize Palestinian terrorist attacks. This suggests that he sees, at least to some extent, propaganda value in spreading the message of the group as one of the functions of these terrorist attacks. Nasrallah frames Hezbollah's struggle several times as the fight of the oppressed against the oppressors, but never in connection to terrorist attacks. The study finds no significant importance for terrorism in highlighting this narrative. The entries in the theme were relatively evenly spread, pointing to no large shifts in the theme.

12.1.2 Tactic of asymmetric warfare

The categories included in the theme "tactic of asymmetric warfare" sought to unearth the functions of terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare. They connected the use of terrorism to principles of asymmetric warfare, such as targeting the enemy's weaknesses as the weaker party, fighting a war of attrition, raising the cost of war on the enemy by attacking civilians. The theme of asymmetric warfare had clearly the most entries in comparison to other themes. Significant number of the entries focused on the use of rockets against Israeli civilian targets. The number of entries (5) referencing the use of rockets suggest that the rocket strikes against Israeli civilians was the most important function of terrorism for Hezbollah's military strategy. Hezbollah engages in other activities that are regarded as terrorism within the study. These included considerably less entries, indicating both Nasrallah's unwillingness to discuss them publicly, but also the central importance the rocket strikes against civilians serve for their military strategy. Considering Hezbollah military strategy overall as based on the entries in the category X3, it is clear that classical guerilla style warfare of ambushes, skirmishes and kidnappings of soldiers are the primary tactics Hezbollah uses as part of its military strategy. The materials suggest that terrorism does not have an important function in the strategy as a whole.

Most of these entries fall under the period of Israeli occupation of Lebanon, lasting until 2000. Hezbollah considered itself in an open state of war during this period, as it did during the shorter 2006 war. This serves as an indication that the terrorist tactic of asymmetric warfare had its most important function as part of warfare and its function diminished when the military strategy was revised for peace time. This finding supports the conclusion that during peacetime Hezbollah's focus shifted

more to politics. It had to focus more on maintaining a positive image, where attacks on civilians would no longer be seen as legitimate by their supporters, as during wartime.

Nasrallah is taking great effort and care in the materials to motivate and legitimize the rocket strikes against civilian. Nasrallah points to Israel being the party that first started shelling civilians. He regards Hezbollah's rocket attacks on civilian targets only as just retaliation and a cost inflicted on the Israeli for their shelling Lebanese civilians. Nasrallah promises in many of the entries to cease firing rockets on civilian targets when Israel does the same. He highlights the tactic as only a deterrence against attacks on Lebanese civilians. It should be recognized that Hezbollah, in comparison to Israel, has a higher tolerance for military casualty rates and even civilian to some degree. Hezbollah also has more opportunities to target enemy soldiers, while raids against Hezbollah are risky for Israelis. One of the only reliable ways for Israel to impose costs of the conflict on Hezbollah is by targeting Lebanese civilians. Targeting civilians for this reason still provides a poor excuse nor does it make it any less of an act of terrorism on Israel's side. Nasrallah admits in a couple of entries that targeting the civilian population is meant to drive in a psychological effect on the Israeli citizens and cause them to pressure their government to change their aggressive policies in Lebanon;

“It is impossible for us to fight the Israeli enemy through traditional and classical methods, but rather we must fight through a war of attrition, whereby we drain its energy, weaken it, then one day force it to withdraw... The amount of losses the enemy incurred, and the fear it lived through, created enormous pressure on the Jews in the occupied territories: they, in turn, put a lot of pressure on their own government and forced it to withdraw.” (B4, 63.)

The category of C3.2 included a number of entries that painted Hezbollah strategy as attritional warfare. Nasrallah stated clearly on several occasions that Hezbollah is fighting a long attritional war. He referenced the imbalance between the irregular army of Hezbollah and the technically and numerically advanced Israeli army in a number of the entries. In several of them Nasrallah referred to Israel as possessing the strongest army in the region. The material contained clear indications on Nasrallah's understanding of the advantages of engaging in revolutionary warfare as a nonstate insurgency force. He claims that Hezbollah's nature as a non-state actor acquits the Lebanese state of responsibility for its actions. This suggests that Hezbollah's status as a non-state actor provides it the opportunity to use terrorist tactics without has many repercussions, given it is easier to deny responsibility for attacks. By using terrorism or other revolutionary warfare tactics it does not directly destroy the relationship between the Lebanese and Israeli state. It can utilize its identity as a legitimate

political actor when needed, but also “hide” behind the identity of a resistance actor not responsible to anyone and difficult to retaliate against. Nasrallah sees the nature of his organization as a great benefit;

“Under the present circumstances, no one can blame the government for the actions of the resistance: furthermore, the situation as it is now makes the resistance more effective, genuine, and fit for the task of liberating the occupied territories” (B14, 229).

Nasrallah indicates indirectly in several entries that he views revolutionary warfare in combination with terrorist attacks as the most beneficial strategy for the Palestinian jihadist movements Hezbollah is supporting. This might help explain why Hezbollah supports and train organizations conducting terrorist attacks. In a speech in Bin Jubeil Nasrallah was addressing Palestinians, urging them to commit suicide attacks against Israel: “You do not need tanks, strategic balance, rockets or cannons to liberate your land; all you need are the martyrs who shook and struck fear into this angry Zionist entity” (B15, 242).

The entries in the C1.1 categories did not include any direct references to use of terrorism against the United States and Israel, but it did include several instances of Nasrallah using the catchphrases of “death to Israel” and “death to the United States” in his speeches. These cannot be regarded as direct calls for terrorism attacks against the US or Israel and are popular anti-west slogans in the Middle East and globally. Entries in this category frame the end goal of Hezbollah as the annihilation of Israel. This rhetoric does not see much change much during the years. Nasrallah professes on many occasions that the political ambitions of Hezbollah come second, and that the primary mission of Hezbollah is the struggle against Israel and Zionism. Nasrallah paints the struggle against Israel, or the Zionist entity as he calls it, in absolute terms. These cannot be regarded as indications of use of terrorism, but Hezbollah’s rhetoric of Israel as the ultimate “Satan” can help understand how the use of terrorism against it is perceived as legitimate. Nasrallah proclaims in several entries that he does not attack civilians on principle and prefers attacks on military targets. At the same time Nasrallah views attacking civilians as Hezbollah’s right, legitimized by the actions of Israel against Lebanon. All the entries in the theme were divided evenly among the materials, signaling not significant change in the tactics.

12.1.3 Leaderless Jihad

This theme included distinctly the least entries of all the themes. The lack of entries suggests that the strategy of leaderless Jihad, where the organizations lack hierarchical organizational structures and is only loosely connected through ideology, is not relevant of Hezbollah. According to the strategy, individuals would independently commit terrorist attacks to spread the message of the group. The only entry in this category was included to show Nasrallah's denial of the suitability of this kind of organizational form for Hezbollah:

“When we were just a small jihadi group fighting the Israeli enemy, we were able to hide underground whenever we read in the paper that there were reasons for us to disappear... this made it impossible for us to do our job underground as other military and security services were able to do. Appearing among the people, families and supporters is essential.” (B4, 60.)

12.3.4 Recruiting and mobilizing function

This theme sought to unravel indications in the material for terrorism attacks serving a role in recruiting and mobilizing fighters for the cause. As with the connected theme for propaganda, categories in this theme gained only a few entries, and none of which were directly connected to terrorism. Nasrallah made no re-occurring references in the material to every Muslims duty to fight in the Jihad, nor did his speeches directly seek to recruit young men to fight for the organization. On the contrary, Nasrallah boasted in several of the entries about the number of recruits Hezbollah had. This implies that recruiting new fighters was not an urgent priority for the organization. In the entries where Nasrallah is referring to a sense of duty to participate in the Jihad, he calls on Shiites duty or that of the Lebanese to defend their homeland. Nasrallah does not seek to connect the struggle to the narrative of global jihad. The material conveys that these calls are made more in the sense of legitimizing Hezbollah's struggle as the struggle for all Lebanese, not just a struggle for its own ideologies and interest. One of the entries concern Nasrallah making populist remarks, using his sons death to connect himself to the peoples suffering:

“Today, however, we wish to tell this enemy: we are not a resistance movement whose leaders want to enjoy their private lives and fight you through the sons of their loyal followers and their good and true supporter from among the ordinary citizens. The martyr Hadi's martyrdom is the proof that we in Hezbollah leadership do not spare our own sons..” (B10, 172-173.)

The categories of C6.1 and C6.2 did not gain any entries indicating that strikes committed by individual are not relevant for Hezbollah's strategy. The entries demonstrated no chronological change.

12.1.5 Creating zones of chaos

The coding for the Creating zones of chaos- theme was adapted to include references in the text to the theme even if they signaled opposition to Naji's strategy. This solution still allows to collect relevant entries that provide insight into Hezbollah's military strategic thinking, function of terrorism or the possible rationale behind why its function for Hezbollah has been limited. The category C5.2, coding for the incitement of civil war, has been used to code for entries where Nasrallah outlines the avoidance of civil war as an important goal for Hezbollah. This category included most entries from the categories in the theme, demonstrating the importance for Hezbollah to keep the internal peace in Lebanon and their lack of interest in following the zones of chaos- strategy. This finding indicates that sowing general insecurity is not a function of terrorism for Hezbollah and might be a reason to why its function appears limited for the organization.

The C5.1 category was adapted to include entries of references to creating an Islamic state, but without reference to use of terrorism now or in the future. Nasrallah makes it clear that an Islamic State is an end goal for Hezbollah, in accordance with their belief in *Wilayat- al faqih*. Nasrallah emphasizes his unwillingness to use force in pursuit of this model. These entries demonstrate how the zones of chaos strategy is not part of Hezbollah's military strategy. Several of the entries within the C5.2 category include Nasrallah underlining the importance of internal cohesion within Lebanon for Hezbollah. He believes a civil war in Lebanon would only serve the interest of Israel. Nasrallah remarks on several occasion that Hezbollah was presented with several opportunities to drag the country back into civil war or stage a military coup to grab power. Nasrallah iterates how he instead chose to restrain the organization, make compromises and play within the parliamentary rules of the multi-sectarian fabric of Lebanese political life. Nasrallah denies Hezbollah's responsibility for any of the civil strife or their violent conflict with Amal in the 80s, but nonetheless admits that the civil war showed all parties that violence leads nowhere: "We should avoid going back to infighting at all costs; for although we did take part in it, we never allowed ourselves to be sucked in." (B16, 255).

Nasrallah expresses in his speech in Karble his worry over the sectarian Sunni-Shia violence breaking up in Iraq after the American invasion. He warns against division between Muslims in connection to the aftermath of a terrorist attack in Iraq;

“We do not need to analyze these events exhaustively to arrive at the conclusion that, no matter who the perpetrators are or whose hand has committed these crimes, their main objective was to sow sedition among the Muslims.” (B25, 311.)

These entries serve as indications of Hezbollah clearly not subscribing to the strategy of attaining goals through creating unrest and anarchy and subsequently enforcing their power through provision of security. Terrorism could serve a function in this strategy, but since Hezbollah doesn't have any connection to the use of this strategy, it is not a function of terrorism for them. Most of Hezbollah's well known terrorist attacks, such as attacking the American embassy, the SVBIED against the marine barracks and kidnapping of westerners can be dated to the civil war. In the materials Hezbollah denies having anything to do with these incidents, except for a few undirect references to the embassy attack. This suggests Hezbollah is at least more recently, uncomfortable admitting their attacks publicly. It should be noted that this could be an indication that Hezbollah already experimented with the creation of zones of chaos during its early phases. Midst the civil war Hezbollah used violence and terrorism on many occasions to attain their goals. It is possible the strategy was deemed as ineffective and Hezbollah committed to the stability of Lebanon and achieving their internal goals mostly through peaceful parliamentary participation. Professionalization can also have impacted the abandoning of massive and direct terrorist attacks such as those committed against westerners. The study cannot confirm this hypothesis since the entries in the material don't provide enough substance on this.

Assassinations have been and still are to an extent part of Hezbollah's playbook. The most notable example of this is the assassination of Rafik Hariri, which kick started the cedar revolution and has had massive implications for Lebanese politics. Nasrallah paints a picture of being one of the closest friends to Hariri and Hariri assuring him of them being of the same mind regarding many policy issues. He regards the accusations of their Syrian allies being behind the assassination are utterly false. Still, two Hezbollah members were convicted as accomplices in the assassination in 2022 (BBC, 2022). This indicates that Hezbollah most likely was involved somehow, but the involvement of the leadership remains unproven. Assassinations can still be regarded as a covert means of terrorism for Hezbollah, even though they publicly strongly deny having any connection to them.

The C7.1 and C7.2 categories included a number of entries, most of which consisted of Nasrallah mocking Israel for being unable to defeat Hezbollah or the Palestinian resistance despite its strong and well-equipped military. In a context where Hezbollah is not engaging in the strategy of creating zone of chaos, these references can better be regarded as connecting to the strategy of attritional and asymmetrical warfare.

12.1.6 Spreading fear

This theme last theme included some entries. The categories sought to uncover entries in the material that presented terrorism as a weapon of fear. The entries confirm that Hezbollah regards the climate of fear their rocket strikes place on the Israelis living in the northern settlements as one of the rockets main benefits. Nasrallah clearly recognizes the psychological effect the rockets have as well as those afforded to the terrorist attacks committed by Palestinian organizations. The psychological pressure is meant drive the civilians into pressuring the government for a change in policy regarding the Palestinians and Hezbollah, but mainly to lower the popularity of the occupation: “Only God can grant the young men of the resistance peace of mind, and although we have no missiles or aircraft to shell Tel Aviv with, the Israelis live in constant fear of our operations.” (B14, 321.)

12.4 Acceptability of terrorism

The categories of K1, K2, X1, X2 indicate for acceptability of terrorism for Hezbollah and are utilized to support the analysis. The categories are not directly linked to the function of terrorism for Hezbollah’s military strategy, but they provide insight on how legitimate terrorism is seen. If an organizations materials suggest strong reservations and disgust towards terrorist tactics, it can also serve as an indication for stronger reservations on using terrorism. The use of terrorism is given a higher cost in the cost-benefit calculations made while designing a military strategy. The K1 category received 6 entries, with only one in the K1.1 category, and three in the K1.3 category, presenting Hezbollah’s view on terrorism and attacks against civilians as largely unacceptable. For example, Hezbollah denied being responsible for a terrorist attack in Tel Aviv that killed 11 Israelis, but Nasrallah still would have regarded it an honor to claim it:

“What they are saying, in other words, is that since it is impossible for a Palestinian to go over the (West Bank) wall and overcome all measures that Israel put in place, Hezbollah must be the perpetrator. We had nothing to do with this incident, and do not have the honor of claiming responsibility for it.” (B31, 374.)

The X1 category included 8 entries in total with only one directly referencing attacks on civilians. The other entries in the X1.3 and X1.4 were in reference to suicide bombing and support for Palestinian terrorist organization. The entries demonstrate Hezbollah's unwillingness to engage, or at least to admit, directly engaging in terrorism. At the same time, it does not deny acts that can be connected to terrorism, such as utilizing suicide bombing and supporting Palestinians groups that engage in terrorism.

The entries coding for denials on accusations of terrorism are far more common, with the X2 category containing 17 entries. These entries serve as the clearest indication for Hezbollah not perceiving terrorism as legitimate weapons or on a minimum not acknowledging them publicly. The entries in the X4 category indicate that public support is crucial for Hezbollah both politically and militarily. Hezbollah cannot afford to (publicly) engage in activities its follower would deem illegitimate. Attacking Israelis can be seen as more acceptable by the Lebanese, especially those having to endure their shelling. Attacks against political opponents or westerners are more difficult for Hezbollah to legitimize. The denials should not be taken as an indication that Hezbollah does not engage in any of the activities it denies, such as assassinations. Interestingly, the rocket launch attacks are exempt from the denials, since Nasrallah states on several occasions that he regards them as just. Neither does Nasrallah deny supporting Palestinian terrorist groups. He further describes Jews as the descendants of apes and pigs. These could serve as indications that he regards Israeli civilians share some of the blame for Israel's actions and hence view them as legitimate targets. His comment gives the impression that civilians are not always innocent: "We have never targeted innocent civilians" (B17, 260).

12.5 Summary of results

There are some factors that stand out when looking at the picture painted by the analysis of the material for the function of terrorism as part of Hezbollah's military strategy. Terrorism does not seem a crucial element of Hezbollah's military strategy, which primarily relies on classical principles of guerilla warfare. Hezbollah no longer engages in traditional terrorist attacks it used during the civil war and denies any responsibility for them in the material. The material presents the launching of rockets on Israeli civilian targets and support for Palestinian terrorist organizations as the main forms of terroristic activities Hezbollah engages in. It should be recognized that even these have decreased

once the Israeli occupation and 2006 war has ended. Hezbollah retains a history of political assassinations, but any involvement in them is strongly denied by Nasrallah in the material. Strategy of launching rockets on civilians during wartime presents itself as the most important function of terrorism for Hezbollah. Nasrallah admits on numerous occasions the central value of the rockets for Hezbollah. The findings include indications for a strategy of attritional warfare where the infliction of costs on the enemy over a long period of time appear central. Based on the findings, terrorism does not seem to provide an important role within Hezbollah's military strategy, with its most important functions being the deterrence and psychological effect the rocket strikes against Israeli civilians provide. The findings suggest terrorism providing some benefits for the organization's military strategy, but one which they use only sparingly. Until now the strategy of guerilla and attritional warfare has yielded good results, with only a limited need for other tactics. With Israel's new Iron Dome system, the rockets military significance predictably will diminish further, with the system being able to intercept 90% of the rockets (BBC 17.5.2021).

The entries for the themes were divided unevenly, with only tactics of asymmetric warfare-theme receiving a large number of relevant entries. The results imply that the other themes were not as relevant for the function of terrorism for Hezbollah. The themes and categories were a better fit for Isis strategy, but the material analyzed using the coding system still presented a good view of Hezbollah's military strategy and terrorisms function within it. The Jihadist scholars were more inspired by global Salafi jihadism, linked to Sunni Jihadist groups, whereas Hezbollah sees its struggle in more local terms, at least in practice, providing one possible explanation for the outcome.

Theme	Function of terrorism
Propaganda value	No clear indication of important function.
Tactic of asymmetric warfare	-Rocket attacks on civilians: deterrence and psychological effect on civilians, civilians pressure government. -Supporting Palestinian organizations that engage in terrorism: psychological effect on civilians and cost of war/policy against Palestinians.
Leaderless Jihad	No clear indication of important function.
Recruitment and mobilization	No clear indication of important function.
Creating zones of Chaos	-Might have used terrorism as part of strategy in civil war, but no clear evidence in the material. Have turned away from this strategy, no clear function within the theme. -Assassinations (denying involvement in material).

Spreading fear	-Rocket strikes on civilians and support of Palestinian organizations: creating climate of fear and diminish civilian support for government policy.
----------------	---

13. COMPARISON ISIS AND HEZBOLLAH

The analysis of the results demonstrate the premise that terrorism serves very different functions for Hezbollah’s military strategy when compared to Isis military strategy. The study finds terrorism having different functions for different organizations, depending on their choice of military strategy and how important the role terroristic tactics serve as part of that military strategy. In general, the form of terrorism Isis uses can be labeled as more “classical terrorist tactics” including for example suicide bombings or armed attacks on civilians with the intention to cause as much destruction as possible. Hezbollah’s use of terrorism can be described as mainly rocket attacks against civilians and support for Palestinian terrorist groups. Isis thus comes across as more the uncompromising and brutal terrorist organization while Hezbollah mostly uses “light” and limited selection of terrorist tactics. The study demonstrated how both organizations use many different forms of terrorism for different functions. Looking at only one type of terrorist tactic would provide only a fairly limited picture. Therefore, the study has chosen to look at both “classic” terrorist attacks, but also include tactics of warfare that can be deemed terroristic. As stated previously, the study does not seek to present an argument for which organization should be labeled terrorist or not. Rather the goal is to examine terrorism as part of military strategy of different organizations.

Based on the results, Isis and Hezbollah employ very different military strategies, which are determined largely by the function terrorism for each part of their respective military strategies. For Isis, the initial strategy was mainly based on creating zones of chaos. Here terrorism served to undermine state authority and its monopoly on violence. During the caliphate and its expansion Isis was engaging in near constant warfare, where terroristic tactics of assassinations and beheadings served an important function. Later, once Isis started losing grip on its caliphate and fighters at an alarming rate, it switched to a strategy of leaderless Jihad. It urged its followers to commit individual attacks in their home countries, instead of traveling to join their ranks physically. Terrorist attacks outside the conflict zone also served throughout the period as propaganda tools and means of spreading the Isis brand. For Isis, the strategy of creating zones of chaos and leaderless Jihad where

most prominent. Terrorism had an important function during both of its two strategic phases, in the first to create instability, and as a resilient organizational form allowing for survival of the brand, ideology and relevance of the organization in the second. Hezbollah's main military strategy continuously based on attritional and asymmetric warfare. Terrorism served a smaller role within Hezbollah's military strategy, at least in comparison to Isis. Its main function proved deterrence and the psychological impact afforded by rocket attacks on northern Israeli civilians, and support of Palestinian groups that engaged in terrorism. Based on Nasrallah views on display in the material, the rockets had an important role in Hezbollah's military strategy. He showed unwillingness to negotiate their disposal, but he was simultaneously willing to display restraint in their use.

The material demonstrated the importance of propaganda and media strategy for both organizations. Some key differences emerged between the groups. Terrorism had important propaganda value for Isis, but in comparison, Hezbollah only used their standard military operations in propaganda. Isis was keen to use terrorist attacks to promote their cause and often uses video material of terrorist acts in their propaganda. In comparison, Hezbollah denied any connections to terrorism, but recognized the importance of influencing public opinion both at home and of the enemy. Terrorism had an important propaganda function for Isis, but the same was not demonstrated for Hezbollah.

The theme of asymmetric warfare displayed perhaps most similarities between the organizations, since both engaged in asymmetric warfare with a mix of guerilla, conventional and terrorist tactics. Both Isis and Hezbollah engaged in attritional warfare strategy and demonstrate clear differences in how they employed terrorism as part of asymmetric warfare. Hezbollah employed mainly rocket strikes on civilians for deterrence and for psychological effect. Isis utilized assassinations of political and military leader, and beheading and executions of security forces. Isis also relied more on innovative suicide-based tactics. Both organizations aimed at receiving the same function of a psychological effect of terror and demoralization, seeking to impact the enemy's willingness to continue the struggle. Both Isis and Hezbollah sought to increase the costs of the war on the enemy, especially civilians, on par with principles of attritional warfare. Generally, countries have a lower tolerance for civilian deaths than they have for military casualties.

The results indicated the clearest differences between the organizations perhaps within the theme of leaderless Jihad. The strategy of leaderless Jihad is based on mainly terrorist attacks committed by individuals. It includes a loosely connected un-hierarchical organizational structure and requires only small number of individuals the willingness to commit attacks. These individuals don't necessarily

need long and intensive military training. The strategy of leaderless Jihad proved beneficial for Isis, especially after the loss of its caliphate and most of its fighters. Isis applauded individuals who committed strikes in their name and saw great value in them during the whole examined period. Leaderless Jihad turned into their primary strategy once Isis lost the ability to control territory. This demonstrates that Isis was forced to adapt its strategy to mainly rely on terrorism as a consequence of their military losses against an overwhelming enemy. A military strategy solely based on terrorism does not seem a desirable option even for an organization perceiving it as legitimate. The analyzed material for Hezbollah clearly indicated that they viewed terrorism as illegitimate, except in a few cases. Israeli soldiers, and sometimes Israeli civilians, were indicated as the only legitimate targets. Hezbollah never saw leaderless Jihad and individual strikes as a strategic option and did not display use of this strategy. Nasrallah views the hierarchical organizational model of Hezbollah its best option but wants to retain the nimble characteristics of a non-state revolutionary force. Nonetheless, the protection provided by the leaderless Jihad model was never an option for Hezbollah and not a function for their use of terrorism.

Recruitment and mobilization of fighters proved crucial for Isis, with the main goal of many of the speeches being the mobilization of potential recruits. Nasrallah called on Shia's to join the fight on only a few occasions, indicating that they had less anxiety of filling their quotas of fighters. Neither of the organization's materials indicated clear connections between terrorism and the calls for Jihad, but for Isis the indirect connections were numerous. Isis materials connected the waves of terrorist attacks in Europe to the "extinction of the grayzone" which served as a call for every "true" Muslims to join the Jihad. The theme of leaderless jihad and the function of terrorism as part of it was demonstrated to be important for the military strategy of Isis, but not for Hezbollah. Nasrallah even points out on occasion that he has many fighters begging to be recruited as suicide bombers, but he refuses them, wanting them to serve a better purpose:

"For example, we never carry out indiscriminate martyrdom operations: we have hundreds of would-be martyrs, and I come under pressure, every day from young men eager to go out on martyrdom operations... .. We do not execute operations of this kind; if the operation is not productive and effective and (doesn't) cause the enemy to bleed, we cannot legally, religiously, morally or humanely justify giving an explosive device to our brothers and telling them, "Go and become martyrs, no matter how"! " (B9, 157.)

Isis military strategy seems to require large numbers of recruits. This need was constantly increasing during the examined period, considering their losses. As for Hezbollah, they did not have similar need for masses of fighter nor the same number of casualties, leading to the nullification of terrorism as a recruitment and mobilization tool.

The material demonstrated Isis clear commitment to the creating zones of chaos and incitement of civil war, while Hezbollah leader Nasrallah warned against creating intra-state strife on many occasions. The theme pinpoints yet another important function of terrorism for Isis, which Hezbollah lacks. Different military strategies create different needs of military tactics, and terrorism can serve a function, depending on the military strategy employed. If terrorism does not serve a function in that strategy, its importance in the military strategy diminishes.

The study found, perhaps surprisingly, that spreading of fear did not seem as a highly important function of terrorism. The findings included indications on this function being more meaningful for Hezbollah than Isis, which can be regarded surprising and interesting. For Hezbollah the rocket attacks and support of Palestinian terrorist groups was the most central terrorist tactics within their military strategy. The attacks were intended to provide deterrence, create a psychological effect on Israeli residence of fear and unsafety and get them to pressure the Israeli government into changing their policies. The Isis material did also include many references to fear and terror caused in civilians by terrorist attacks. Spreading terror with the attacks was referenced in the material as more of a form of revenge than to serve any strategic purpose. Assassinations and executions of soldier were also used by Isis to discourage people from joining security forces. Fear can be seen as an important element of this tactic.

The acceptability of terrorism as a tactic provides an additional difference between the organizations, and can help explain the differences in the importance of terrorism for their military strategy and its different functions. The material demonstrates very little restrictions for Isis in their use of terrorism. Isis sees terrorism as a legitimate weapon against anyone they deem their enemy. The list of people and groups Isis does not regard its enemies is relatively short. The only cases of Isis showing restraint was against other Sunni groups. In the case of Hezbollah, the picture painted by the material is quite different. They deny any accusations of terrorism or involvement in incidents, and regard terrorism as an illegitimate tactic. The only exception is the use of rockets against Israeli civilians, which Nasrallah sees as Hezbollah's right on account of Israel committing the same crime. This stance should not be taken as an indication for Hezbollah never using terrorist tactics, but rather them

preferring to perform the acts covertly. In the material Nasrallah is open on Hezbollah's support for Palestinian groups that engage in terrorism. Generally Israeli civilians are thought of as at least sharing part of the blame for their governments policies. The difference between the organizations is that Isis sees terrorism by default as legitimate tactic with only a few exceptions, whereas Hezbollah sees terrorism by default as illegitimate, with only a few exceptions.

The findings of the study incite some interesting implications. The material demonstrated that the deterrence and psychological effect of the rocket attacks was the most important function of terrorism tactics for Hezbollah. It could be suggested that the tactic was only effective because Israel is a democracy, where the general opinion of a war can have a larger impact on politicians, at least in comparison to a more authoritarian society. Opposition politicians have the opportunity to capitalize on anti-war support, if the general atmosphere turns against the war. Strikes against civilians demonstrate the cost of war for civilians otherwise untouched by it, and can cause a turn in the public opinion of the war. This could support the conclusion, that under certain circumstances terrorism can serve a function against a democracy that it could not in a similar scope against an authoritarian state. The implications of the analysis of Isis material also call for interesting hypothesis warranting further research. Analysis showed that terrorism always had an important role for Isis, but the loss of territorial control and most of its operational fighters led it to call for more individual strikes and shift to a strategy of leaderless Jihad, where the organization could survive without a hierarchical and "physical" organizational structure. Can counterterrorist policies employing conventional warfare against an armed organization cause it to rely and focus more on terroristic tactics, after its other options have been exhausted? The leaderless Jihad strategy presents a model that is more difficult to counteract. This study cannot confirm these assumptions, but it can provide interesting hypothesis for future research.

In summary, the study concludes that different organizations with different military strategies have different functions for terrorism and with the importance of terrorism for the organization's strategy varying depending on the choice of military strategy. The main function for Hezbollah of terrorism is deterrence and psychological effect as a tactic part of asymmetric warfare. Terrorism had a more important role as part of Isis military strategy, where it served a more diverse set of roles. The importance of terrorism varied for Isis when it was forced to shift strategy from creating zones of chaos to leaderless jihad.

The analysis of the material can be seen reflecting largely what was already known of the military strategy of both organizations. The study's employment of the theoretical framework based on revolutionary warfare has brought new insight into the military strategies of both organizations, since it examined it from the perspective of military function of terrorism. Comparing the results of the analysis between the organization's demonstrated, that the different role of terrorism can partly be explained by different levels of acceptance of terrorism as a tactic, but also by the tactical needs and benefits it can afford each strategy. Choosing a certain military strategy can hence make terrorism either a functional or dysfunctional military tactic for an organization. Depending on the strategy, terrorism can provide a limited function, or a more comprehensive set of functions. The results indicate that terrorism can serve certain beneficial functions as part of a military strategy, which can be very varied, but that organizations seek to avoid relying on it too much. Isis selected to rely primarily on terrorism only after it was forced by its military defeat. Hezbollah has been militarily successful, which might explain why it has never had to allocate terrorism a central role within its military strategy. The comparison suggests that terrorism can only have limited function and that organizations start to strongly rely on terrorism only when they are forced to. Terrorism cannot achieve significant results, especially when it comes to revolutionary warfare, where the goal is often to either expel a foreign occupying force or to replace the regime and control territory. Terrorism, at least with a large role in military strategy, is not reliable tactic for a hierarchically organized group of considerable size. However, it can help an organization on the brink of defeat to survive, by keeping its brand alive.

14. CONCLUSIONS

The study set out to examine the function of terrorism as part of the military strategy of Isis and Hezbollah. The main goal was to gain better insight into the function of terrorism as a military tactic for these organization, but also to uncover how terrorist organizations with different historical, contextual and ideological background use terrorism as part of their military strategy and the different functions terrorism can serve. A qualitative content analysis based on a framework derived from the theory of revolutionary warfare was employed to analyze primary source materials by Isis leaders and spokespersons and the general secretary of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah. A comparative and interdisciplinary framework was selected to gain insight on the phenomena from a new perspective.

The study highlighted the importance of military strategy to the tactics of terrorism the organizations employed. Terrorism has been studied from many perspectives within terrorism studies, the effectiveness of terrorism being one of the central debates (Abrahms 2012, 236). Thus far the debate has not substantially touched on the subject from the perspective of military strategy, even though terrorism is a form of violence widely used in warfare. This can be connected to western conceptions of warfare, where terrorism and asymmetric warfare were until recently widely seen as barbaric. Military strategy has so far not been a commonly used perspective within international relations. One of the contributions of the study is to highlight this perspective within the field of international relations.

The study found, perhaps as expected, differences in the functions of terrorism for the selected organizations. The results confirm the expectations of the study, with different organizations featuring different functions for terrorism. Highlighting the differences in functions of terrorism and what military strategic considerations motivated the choices of terrorist tactics helps better understand terrorism as a phenomenon. Terrorism did not have a central role in the military strategy of Hezbollah, and the analysis pointed towards terrorism only having a limited function for its military strategy. In comparison, Isis demonstrated a more central role for terrorism during the analyzed period, which only increased once they shifted their military strategy. Terrorism could be described as having a dominant role as part of Isis military strategy, especially during and after the fall of the caliphate. The functions terrorism served for Isis were more diverse in comparison to Hezbollah.

The study generated three main findings. Firstly, the analysis demonstrated how use of terrorism and its functions differentiate depending on the military strategy the revolutionary organization uses. For Hezbollah's military strategy, the function of terrorism could be connected to attritional warfare. The Isis case study also supported this conclusion. For Isis the role and function of terrorism changed with the shift in military strategy. The use of terrorism can also be seen as impacted by the political and ideological contexts but exploring the impact of it is outside the scope of the study.

Secondly, the results suggest that in the end, the function of terrorism is quite limited. Terrorism can provide diverse functions as part of military strategy. These functions can prove beneficial when used in combination with guerilla tactics, but organizations rely predominantly on terrorist tactics only when forced to. Hezbollah was militarily successful in asymmetric warfare and did yield benefits from a limited use of terroristic tactics. Their military strategy was however primarily based on

classical principles of revolutionary warfare and guerilla tactics. Isis, which ideologically had less reservations against the use terrorism, did not allocate terrorism a central role in its military strategy until it lost capacity to hold territory. Until that point, it preferred to use terrorism for diverse, but only complementary functions, while relying primarily on guerilla and conventional tactics.

Thirdly, the study demonstrated the diversity of functions terrorism can have. From the perspective of military strategy, terrorism presents a multifunctional “toolbox”. Viewing terrorism as only suicide bombings against civilians in European cities provides only a narrow view of the phenomena, and distances it from warfare, to which it is intrinsically linked. The results serve to expand the view on terrorism. The study compared two different terrorist organizations, discovering diverse functions for terrorism. The choice of limiting the case selection to only two organizations was made to contain the scope of the study. Research on different and larger number of groups would predictably yield an even more diverse array of functions. Further research on the function of terrorism for the military strategy of states is called for. State terrorism remains an understudied subject, even more so from the perspective of military strategy. Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine demonstrate that intimidation and psychological pressure on civilians through summary executions and cases of torture are common occurrences on the battlefield. The OSCE chairperson has labeled Russia’s actions in Ukraine as state terrorism (Besheer 14.3.2022). Do these actions usually constitute a clear and intentional tactics of war with a strategic function or can they better be seen as random violent outlashes of frustrated soldiers? Additionally, the studied material consistently linked terrorism or terroristic activities to the strategic thinking of the organization. This finding strengthens the validity of the results. It can also be regarded as somewhat surprising, given that most of the material analyzed was not aimed at directly discussing military strategy. The finding demonstrates the centrality of military strategic thinking for the organizations and the strategic value of terrorism for the organizations. Terrorism is not used or discarded simply for ideological reasons.

The study can be seen as diversifying and expanding the view on terrorism within international relations. This perspective avoids some of the pitfalls of the debates within terrorism studies and international relations. Within the perspective of military strategy, especially linked to revolutionary warfare, terrorism can be regarded a natural part of warfare. Thinking around counterterrorism policies could benefit from this viewpoint. For long counterterrorism policy, at least that of the United States during its the War on Terror, has prioritized killing of the leader of terrorist organizations, special forces operations against high value targets and supporting coalition and allied forces fighting terrorist organization through logistics, weapons, finances, training and intelligence assistance

(Jackson 12.5.2020). This strategy is derived from modern western military doctrine, which still firmly has its roots in conventional style of warfare the west is used to practicing. The western militaries have adapted doctrine for the crisis management style operations they have been engaged in, but they nonetheless operate as a conventional and professional military force with strategies linked to this. Fighting against insurgent and guerilla style irregular forces has not yielded much success, neither in Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq.

The Isis case study demonstrated that the strategy western militaries have used can in some sense be even counterproductive, at least when it comes to combating terrorist threats. Impairing the organization ability of sustain a hierarchical organization and access to controlling territory might cause them to shift to a strategy of terrorism. The study supports a nuanced and comprehensive understanding of terrorism, combining knowledge generated within the field of international relations and military strategy could provide a better foundation for these policies, but also benefit understanding of terrorism as a phenomenon within academia. The study has sought to expand the understanding of terrorism from the perspective of military strategy but can also provide only one angle on an extremely complex phenomenon. The findings signal that military strategy is a relevant perspective to understand why some organization engage in terrorism. Terrorism provides a diverse toolbox of function for armed insurgencies.

The study's findings can only provide data on the function of terrorism for Isis and Hezbollah. These are not directly generalizable for other Shia and Sunni terrorist organization or terrorist organizations in general. The findings demonstrate that the different contexts provided by the Sunni and Shia background of the organization impact the military strategy and hence the use of terrorism. The findings listed above provide support to assumption that already have some basis within terrorism studies, for example the premise that terrorism is used because it helps organizations survive (Fortna 2015, 519-520). The results however provide general guidelines on the function of terrorism that would benefit from further research to be confirmed and expanded.

15. REFERENCES

Primary sources

Guevara, Ernesto, 1961, “la Guerra de Guerrillas” translated by Murray, J.P, 2012, “Guerilla Warfare”, Illinois: BN Publishing

Naji, Abu Bakr, “The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass”, translated by McCants, William, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University

Tse-Tung, Mao, 1989, “On Guerilla Warfare”, trans. 1961 by Samuel B. Griffith, reprint 1989, department of the Navy, US Marine Corps.

Primary sources used in the analysis of Isis:

Abdul Hasan al-Muhajir, 2019, “He was true to Allah, and Allah was true to him”, in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abu Bakr, al Baghdadi, 2013, “Give good news to the believers” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, 2014, “Message to the Mujahidin and Muslim Umma in the month of Ramadan” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abu Hamaz al-Muhajir, 2007, “Advice for the leaders and soldiers of the Islamic State”, in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 1994 “Deposition of a captive”, in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 2004, “Untitled Speech”, in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abu Muhammad al-Adani, 2011, “The Islamic state in Iraq will remain” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abu Muhammad al-Adnani ash-Shami, 2016, “That they lived by proof”, in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abu Musab al Zarqawi, 2004, “Letter to al Qaida leadership” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abu Sulayman al Utayab, 2007, “Letter to al Qaida leadership” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abu Umar al-Husayani al- Quarryshi, al-Baghdad, 2006, “Truth has arrived and falsehood has perished” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abu Umar a-Husayani al-Quaryshi al-Baghdadi, 2007, “The harvest of the years at the land of the monotheis” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Al Himmah publication, 2016, “Media operative, you are also Muhajidin” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Al-Khalifah Ibrahim, Amir al-Muminin of the Islamic State, 2014, “Exclusive coverage of the Friday Khutbah in grand Masjid in Mosul” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Amirul-Muminin Saykh Abu Bakr al-Baghdad, 2019, “And give glad tidings to those who are patient” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Amirul-Muminin Saykh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 2019, “In the hospitality of Amirul-Muminin, the Kalifah of the Muslims”, in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Khansa Brigade, 2015, “Women in the Islamic State: a Manifesto and a Case study” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Muharib al-Jubouri, 2006, “Statement and video message” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adani ash-Shami, 2014, “Indeed your Lord is ever watchful” in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Unknown author, 2009, “The Fallujah memorandum”, in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Unknown author, 2015, “The Extinction of the Grayzone”, in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Unknown, 2016, “The structure of the Kilafah”, in Ingram, Hararo J., Whiteside, Craig, Winter, Charlie, 2020, “the Isis Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Primary sources used in analysis of Hezbollah:

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1986, “Civil war and resistance”, In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, “Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah”, London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1989, “Shiite reconciliation”, In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, “Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah”, London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1992, “Elegy of Sayyed Abbas Mussaw”, In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, “Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah”, London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1992, “After the assassination”, In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, “Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah”, London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1992, “Victory at the polls”, In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, “Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah”, London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1992, “Hezbollah is not an Iranian community in Lebanon”, In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, “Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah”, London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1993, “The first understanding with Israel”, In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, “Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah”, London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1993, “Who is Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah”, In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, “Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah”, London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1996, “The April understanding”, In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, “Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah”, London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1997, "The martyrdom of Sayyed Hadiths Nasrallah", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1998, "On conditional withdrawal", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1998, "On Jews", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 1999, "Towards liberation", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2000, "A peaceful solution is a victory for the resistance", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2000, "Victory", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2000, "The second intifada", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2001, "The Americans have sent us a political bomb", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2002, "How can you afford that?", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2002, "On the thirteenth anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's death", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2002, "Arabs are not red Indians", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2003, "The impending Iraq war and the Muslim Christian alignment", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2003, "The Interview with 60 minutes", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2003, "After occupation", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2004, "Prisoner exchange," In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2004, "They are a group that lives in the Middle-Ages", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2004, "Letter to the Arab and Islamic Umma's", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2005, "Your will decide the fate of your nation and country", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2004, "Message to France", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2005, "We will consider any hand that tries to remove our weapons an Israeli hand", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2005, "Al Quds day", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2006, "I assure you once again that your hopes are sound an in the right place" In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan 2006, "Interview with new TV", In Nasrallah, Sayyed, Hassan, 2007, ed. Noe, Nicholas, "Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah", London: Verso.

Literature

Abrahms, Max. 2012, "The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited." *Comparative political studies* 45 (3): 366–393.

Almohamad, Selman, 2021, "Not a Storm in a Teacup: The Islamic State after the Caliphate", *GIGA Focus* 3: 1-11

Ashour, Omar, 2021, "How Isis Fights: Military Tactics in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt", Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Autesserre, Severine, 2014, "Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Avon, Dominique, Anaïs-Trissa Khatchadourian, and Jane Marie Todd, 2012, "Hezbollah: A History of the "Party of God." ", Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- Bastug, Mehmet F, and Ahmet Guler, 2018, “The Influence of Leadership on the Strategies and Tactics of Islamic State and Its Predecessors.” *Journal of policing, intelligence and counter terrorism* 13 (1): 38–59
- Beccaro, Andrea, 2016, “Modern Irregular Warfare: The Isis Case Study”, *small wars & Insurgencies* 29 (2): 207-228
- Brachman, Jarett M, 2009, “Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice”, Ed. 10, London: Routledge
- Byman, Daniel, 2011, “The Lebanese Hizbullah and Israeli Counterterrorism”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34 (12): 917-941.
- Cancian, F Mathew, 2017, “Tactics, Techniques and Procedures of The Islamic State: lessons for US forces”, *Military Review* 97 (2): 52-61
- Cozzens, Jeffere B, 2007, “Approaching al Qaeda Warfare: function, culture and grand strategy”, in Ranstrop, Magnus, “Mapping Terrorism Research: state of the art, gaps and future direction”, London: Routledge.
- Daher, Joseph, 2016, “Hezbollah: The Political Economy of the Party of God”, Pluto Press.
- Findely, Michael G, Young, Joseph K, 2011, “Promise and Pitfalls of Terrorism Research.” *International Studies Review* 13 (3): 411–43
- Freilich, Joshua D., Chermak, Steven M., Gruenewald, Jeff, 2015, “The future of terrorism studies: a review essay”, *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 39 (4): 353-369
- Fortna, 2015, “Do Terrorists win: Rebels use of Terrorism and civil war outcomes?” *International organization* 69 (3): 519–55
- Gabrielsen, Iver, 2014, “The Evolution of Hezbollah’s Strategy and Military Performance 1982-2006”, *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 25 (2): 257-283
- Gerges, Fawaz A, 2014, “ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism”, *Current history* (1941) 113 (767): 339-343
- Haplerin, Sandra, Heath, Oliver, 2017, ”Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills”, ed. 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Hart, Liddell, 1967, “Strategy: the indirect approach”, London: Faber & Faber,
- Hashim, Ahmed S, 2016, “Caliphate at War: Ideology, War Fighting and State-Formation” *Middle East Policy* 23 (1): 42–58.
- Jarvis, Lee, 2016, “Critical Terrorism studies after 9/11” in Jackson, Richard “Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies”, Taylor and Francis.
- Jones, David Martin, 2010, “What’s wrong with terrorism studies”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 64 (4): 478-483.

- Jongman, Berto, 2007, "Research Desiderata in the Field of Terrorism", in ed. Ranstorp, Magnus, "Mapping Terrorism Research: state of the art, gaps and future direction", London: Routledge.
- Kaldor, Mary, 2012, "New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in the Global Era", ed. 2, Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Kaldor, Mary, 2013, "In Defence of New Wars Stability", *International Journal of Security and Development* 2 (1): 1-16.
- Kaleva, Atte, 2018, "Jihad ja Terrori", Helsinki: Otava,
- Khan, Akbar, and Han Zhaoying. 2020, "Iran-Hezbollah Alliance Reconsidered: What Contributes to the Survival of State-Proxy Alliance?" *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 7 (1): 101–123
- Kohlbacher, Florian, 2006, "The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research" *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 7 (1), n. pag.
- Levy, Jack S., Thompson, William R., 2010, *Causes of War*, Wiley and Blackwell.
- Lintusaari, Lassi, 2017, "Al Qassam Prikaatit Hamasin politiikan jatkeena: Sotilasstrategiaa Clausewitzista Bin Ladeniin", Master Thesis, Department of Warfare, National Defence University
- Malkki, Leena, 2020, "Mitä tiedämme Terrorismista", Helsinki: Otava,
- Malkki, Leena, Paastela, Jukka, Eloranta, Elina, 2007, "Terrorismin monet kasvot", Helsinki: WSOY Oppimateriaalit.
- Matusitz, Jonathan, 2018, Brand management in terrorism: the case of Hezbollah, *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 13 (1): 1-16
- May, Samantha, 2019, "The Rise of the 'Resistance Axis': Hezbollah and the Legacy of the Taif Agreement." *Nationalism & ethnic politics* 25 (1): 115–132
- Mayring, Philipp, 2000, "Qualitative Content Analysis", *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 1 (2): n.pag.
- McCants, William, 2015, "The Isis Apocalypse: The History, Strategy and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State", New York: Palgrave Mcmillan .
- McAvoy, Dave, 2017, "The Islamic States Military Strategy", *Middle East review of international affairs MERIA* 21 (3): 1–5.
- Mohamamedou, Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould, 2018, "A Theory of Isis: Political Violence and the Transformation of Global Order", Pluto press.
- Morrison, John.F, 2020, "Talking Stagnation: Thematic Analysis of Terrorism Experts Perception of the Health of Terrorism Research", *Terrorism and political violence* ahead-of-print: 1-21.

- Nance, Malcolm, 2016, "Defeating Isis: Who they are, How they Fight, What they Believe", Skyhorse Publishing.
- Palmen, Niilo, 1967, "Kumouksellinen sota", *Tiede ja Ase* 25 (25): 199-236
- Paronen, Antti, 2018, "See you in New York: Isis and the Strategic evolution of the Jihadist movement", *Finnish Defence studies* 21, National Defence University
- Paronen, Antti, 2016, "Globaali Jihadistinen liike kumouksellisen sotataidon kehittäjänä", Doctoral dissertation, Series 1, Research publications No. 3, National Defence University.
- Sageman, Marc, 2014, "The Stagnation of Terrorism Research", *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26 (4): 565-580
- Schmid, Alex P, Jongman, Albert, Price, Eric, 2011, "The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research", London: Routledge
- Schmid, Alex P, McAllister, Bradley, 2011, "Theories of Terrorism", in Schmid, Alex P, Jongman, Albert, Price, Eric (ed.), "Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research", Routledge
- Schuurman, Bart, 2019, "Topics in Terrorism: Reviewing Trends and Gaps. 2007-2016", *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 12 (3): 463-480
- Shultz, Richard H, 2008, "Global Insurgency and Salafi Jihad Movement", report, occasional paper 66, Institute for National Security Studies Occasional
- Selden, Mark, So, Alvin Y., 2004, "Introduction: War and State Terrorism" in Selden, Mark, So Alvin Y. (ed.), "War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century", Lanham, Maryland ;: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Seppänen, Esa, 1971, "Sissisota- Aikamme sota", Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä.
- Silke, Andrew, 2019, "Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism", Georgetown: Routledge.
- Sinai, Joshua, 2007, "New trends in terrorism studies: strengths and weaknesses" in Ranstorp,
- Sipilä, Joonas, Koivula, Tommi, 2013, "Kuinka Strategiaa Tutkitaan", ed.2, Series 2: Research Reports No 52, Department of Strategy and Defence Studies, National Defence University.
- Siplilä, Joonas, 2013, "Sota tutkimuksen kohteena", in Sivonen, Pekka (ed), "Suomalaisia näkökulmia strategian tutkimukseen", Series 1: Strategic Research No 33, Department of Strategy and Defence, National Defence University
- Solomon, Hussein, 2016, "Islamic State and the coming global confrontation", Cham: Springer International Publishing
- Tarvinen, Tiina, Puistola, Juha-Antero, 2013, "Terrorismi", in Sivonen, Pekka, "Suomalaisia näkökulmia strategian tutkimukseen", Series 1: Strategic Research No 33, Department of Strategy and Defence, National Defence University

Terilä, Olli, 2020, "Identiteettipolitiikka ja Sijaissota: Siia- Jihadismi", in (ed.) Paronen, Antti, Saarinen, Juha, "Karavaanin sotapolku: Näkökulmia Jihadismiin", Series 1: Research Publication No.42, National Defence University

Raitasalo, Jyri, 2013, "Sotaan varautumisesta aktiivisen asevoiman käyttöön-Länsimaisen sodan kuva muutoksessa", in (ed.) Sivonen, Pekka, *Suomalaisia näkökulmia sodan tutkimukseen*, Series 1: Strategic Research No 33, Department of Strategy and Defence, National Defence University

Ranstorp, Magnus, 2007, "Introduction", in Ranstorp Magnus, "Mapping terrorism research: state of the art, gaps and future direction", London: Routledge.

Rekkedal, Nils, Marius, 2013, ed & translation, Mälkki Juha, "Nykyaikainen sotataito: Sotilaallinen voima muutoksessa", ed. 4, National Defence University

Rekkedal, Nils Marius; Vego, Milan; Bergström, Claes; Ulfving, Lars; Wedin, Lars; Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé; Gjelsten, Roald; Grönberg, Stig-Göran, 2013, "Operaatiotaito: operaatiotaidon kehittyminen neljässä suurvallassa", Series 1: Research Publication No.1, Department of Warfare, National Defence University

Richardson, Louise, 2007, "What terrorists want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat", Random House Trade.

Roy, Oliver, 2017, "Jihad and Death: the Global Appeal of the Islamic State", London: Hurst Publishers.

Uimonen, Paula, 2003, "Networks of Global Interaction", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 16 (2): 273-286

Wiegand, Krista, 2009, "Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party", *Studies in conflict and terrorism* 32 (8): 669-680

Whiteside, Craig, 2016, "New Masters of Revolutionary warfare: the Islamic State movement (20062-2016)", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10 (4): 6-20

Youngman, Mark, 2020, "Building "Terrorism Studies" as an interdisciplinary space: Addressing recurring issues in the study of Terrorism", *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32 (5): 1091-110

Online sources

BBC, 10.3.2022, "Rafik Hariri killing: Hezbollah duo convicted of 2005 bombing on appeal", news article, accessed 10.4.2022 via: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-60691507>

BBC, 17.5.2021, "How Israel's Iron Dome missile shield works", news article, accessed 14.4.2022 via: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20385306>

Besheer, Margret, 14.3.2022, Voanews, "OSCE Chair: Russian Actions in Ukraine "State-Terrorism" ", news article, accessed 14.4.2022 via: <https://www.voanews.com/a/osce-chair-russian-actions-in-ukraine-state-terrorism-/6485037.html>

Engelhardt, Marc, 2/2019, "Terror, old and new: In Africa, militant groups swearing allegiance to the Islamic State are multiplying", Security challenge, *The Security Times*, accessed 31.10.2021 via: <https://www.the-security-times.com/terror-old-new-africa-militant-groups-swearing-allegiance-islamic-state-multiplying/>

Feroz, Emran, 23.8.2021, "Essay: Why the West failed to understand Afghanistan", essay, *DW*, accessed 31.10.2021 via: <https://www.dw.com/en/essay-why-the-west-failed-to-understand-afghanistan/a-58910239>

Gavett, Gretchen, 11.6.2011, "What is the Secretive "US kill/capture" campaign?", analysis, *Frontline*, accessed 13.4.2022, via: <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-is-the-secretive-us-killca/>

Jackson, Richard. "War on terrorism: United States History". Encyclopedia Britannica, 12.5.2020, accessed 13.4.2022 via: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/war-on-terrorism>

Larson, Caleb, 31.5.2021, "And the Award for World's Heaviest Armed Non-State Actor Goes to Hezbollah", blog, *National Interest*, accessed 14.4.2022 via: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/and-award-world's-heaviest-armed-non-state-actor-goes---hezbollah-186260>

Lynch, Thomas F, 2008, "Sunni and Shiá Terrorism: Differences that matter", report, occasional paper series, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, accessed 14.4.2022 via: <https://gsmcneal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/sunni-and-shia-terrorism-differences-that-matter.pdf>

Maurer, Thomas, 2017, "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's Terrorism: A Universal Instrument of Asymmetric Warfare and the New Battlefield in Europe", publication, accessed 14.4.2022 via: <https://www.tmm.tsk.tr/publication/datr/volume9-2017/04-IslamicStateofIraqandSyriaTerrorism.pdf>

McCants Willam, 13.5. 2007, "For the World of God to Be Supreme: Al-Qaida Strategic Thinking and its Implications for U.S Policy", Security Studies Program Seminar, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, accessed 17.4.2022 via: https://web.mit.edu/SSP/seminars/wed_archives07spring/McCants.htm

Reuters, 27.10.2021, "Islamic State in Afghanistan could be able to attack U.S in 6 months- Pentagon official", news article, accessed 31.10.2021 via : <https://www.reuters.com/world/islamic-state-afghanistan-could-be-able-attack-us-six-months-pentagon-official-2021-10-26/>

Reuters staff, 17.8.2020, "Factbox: The Heavily-armed Hezbollah is Lebanons most powerful armed group", edistors pic, Reuters, accessed 6.4.2022. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-tribunal-hariri-hezbollah-fac-idUSKCN25D1N3>

Robinson, Kali, 26.10.2021, "What is Hezbollah?", Backgrounder, *Council on Foreign Relations*, accessed 2.5.2022 via: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah>

Ya'ari, Ehud, "Hizballah: 13 Principles of Warfare." *The Jerusalem Report*. 21 March 1996. Quoted by: Daniel Isaac Helmer. 2006, *Flipside of the COIN: Israel's Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-*

2000. Combat Studies Institute Press. 2006. p 53–54, accessed 1.5.2022 via:
<https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.179.1613&rep=rep1&type=pdf>