

The Materialist of Malmesbury and the Experimentalist of Edinburgh Hume's and Hobbes' Conceptions of Imagination Compared

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1 Introduction*

In this article, I make a philosophical comparison between Hobbes' and Hume's conceptions of imagination. The article should not be taken as an examination of Hobbes' real effect on Hume's thinking. That is a historical problem I do not address. In addition to being philosophically comparative, the article is explicative. Since the subject matter is so broad, I have been compelled to confine myself to the explicative level in my examination. I unfold Hume's conception of imagination, take Juhana Lemetti's interpretation of Hobbes for granted (with some subtle alterations) and then compare my Hume to Lemetti's Hobbes. I will not go into all the details of Hume's rich and many-sided conception and many problems cannot be discussed in the paper; my intention is to shed some light on Hobbes' and Hume's thinking by comparing their conceptions of imagination and their reasons for the conceptions.

The comparison argues for the standard interpretation of Hobbes as a *materialist monist*¹. The real nature of mind is matter and its motion. Nevertheless I argue that Hobbes is a *two-level materialist monist*. The appearances of reality what Hobbes calls for example "fancies" do exist. In the level of appearances, I find a significant similarity between Hobbes' and Hume's thinking. Both endorse what is called the "Copy Principle" in Hume scholarship. All the contents of

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¹ When I put Hobbes or Hume into the category of some ism or doctrine, I do not mean that their whole body of thinking can be reduced to that ism or doctrine. What I mean is that that ism or doctrine is a correct description of some fundamental aspect in their thinking.

mind are either sensations, their copies, or compounded from the copies. There are no inborn contents. But Hobbes' and Hume's ground for their shared Copy Principle reveals that Hobbes is a *materialist* and Hume is an *experimentalist* and a *sceptic*. Hobbes grounds his Principle first on a physical and then on a metaphysical principle. Hume's ground is experience. He suspends his judgement on the real nature of mind.

I argue that the Copy Principle is the foundation of Hobbes' and Hume's conceptions of imagination. The Principle implies that they endorse *radical content empiricism*: all the contents of mind are copies of sensations or compounded from the copies. Radical content empiricism is a form of *content empiricism* held by the scholastic Aristotelians. In this respect I link Hobbes and Hume to the scholastic Aristotelians and oppose them to Platonists and Cartesians (*content rationalism*). Radical content empiricism implies that their conceptions of imagination are reproductive and productive (empiricist) but not creative in the Kantian sense I will explain below. They do not belong to the modern conception of creative imagination. Hobbes and Hume are on the threshold of modernity but still ancient in this sense.

I find other significant similarities in the analysis of what I call the 'phenomenal level'². Both Hobbes and Hume understand imagination as an intellectual, associative, free, fainter contents forming and sensations-copying faculty. In the last sense, their conceptions are traditional but the groundbreaking characteristics of their conceptions lie in the first two. First, they build up a theory of association of imagination – Hume's more developed than that of Hobbes. Second, they deny the existence of pure intellect separate from the senses, memory and imagination. The denial is in total opposition to the traditional thinking, both Platonism, Aristotelianism, and to Hobbes' contemporary Cartesianism, as I will argue. It has profound implications especially in Hume's thinking. Imagination becomes an intellectual faculty that explains many cognitive operations traditionally accounted for by pure intellect. I affirm that the denial is also an implication of the Copy Principle.

The Copy Principle is therefore the centre of the article, around which almost everything else revolves. The explication of Hume's Copy Principle and the argument for the claim that it can also be found from Hobbes form the main task of chapter 2. The explication demands that the terms in which Hume puts the Principle are accounted for. Therefore I start with Hume's terminology for

² By 'phenomenal' I refer to the appearances of things contrasted with their real nature.

the contents, states and acts of mind together with two distinctions he makes amongst them. Chapter 3 is devoted to the analysis of Hume conception of imagination. In the Conclusion I fulfil my promise to compare Hume's conception with that of Hobbes.

My primary references have been the *Leviathan* (1651) with *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic* (1640) by Hobbes and *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (1748) along with *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book 1 (1739-40) by Hume. In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, I assume that *Treatise* 1 and the first *Enquiry* are presentations of the same philosophical position although I am aware of the problems in this assumption. Additionally, I have used some commentaries. Regarding Hobbes, I rest on Lemetti's article. Among Hume scholars, my main authorities have been Garrett 1997 and Owen 1999.

2 The Copy Principle

2.1 Impressions and Ideas

Hume's general term for the contents, states and acts of mind is "perception". "[S]ensations, emotions, passions", thoughts, judgements and perhaps even reasonings³ are perceptions. Hume distinguishes two exhaustive "classes or species" within the class of perceptions: "impressions and ideas". (EHU 2.3⁴ and T 1.1.1.1) Both are perceptions, but the difference between them lies in "their different degrees of force and vivacity." "Impression" refers to "all our more lively perceptions" and "idea" to "the less lively" ones. (Ibid.) The perceptions Hume describes as more forceful and vivid or lively form the species of impressions within the class of perceptions and the less forceful and vivid or lively ones that of ideas.

Surprisingly, Hume scholars have not agreed on how the feeling of force and vivacity or liveliness should be interpreted, what the exact nature of that feeling, the distinguishing feature between impressions and ideas is.⁵ For Hume

³ See T 1.3.7.5.n.20. The references to Hume 2000a are given in the standard way of T book-number.part-number.section-number.paragraph-number. The possible footnote number is added with the abbreviation n.

⁴ The references to Hume 2000b are given in the standard way of EHU section-number.(part-number).paragraph-number. The possible footnote number is added with the abbreviation n.

⁵ For a recent contribution, see Dauer, Francis W., "Force and Vivacity in the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry*". *Hume Studies* 25 (1999), pp. 83-99. Dauer represents the first of the three dominant interpretations about the feeling of force and vivacity. He claims that it is "presentedness". Impressions are "presentations" possessing "a sense of presentedness" and ideas "representations" lacking that sense of presentedness. (86) But, as Dauer acknowledges, his reading requires that Hume does not use the term force and vivacity univocally in the *Treatise* (and the first *Enquiry*) (92). That is my reason for not accepting his interpretation.

is not strict enough in his statement of the difference. Without delving into the depths of that debate in this paper, I take the feeling of force and vivacity to be phenomenal intensity⁶, clarity and distinctness. For consider Hume's examples about the distinction:

“A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different *manner* from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion.” (EHU 2.2; emphasis mine)

In the passage, Hume illustrates the distinction between impressions and ideas with the emotion of anger and the passion of love. When one is in a fit of anger, one feels very strong emotion. The emotion is intense (forceful), clear and distinct (vivid or lively). Clarity means it is easy to identify the emotion one is in. It is therefore well bounded. It is easy to distinguish the emotion from other perceptions. Vividness or liveliness has thus the aspect of distinctness. Vivid or lively perceptions are distinct. Intensity, for one, refers to the strength of the emotion. It is even possible that the emotion is so strong that anger hinders one from having any other content or state of mind. Therefore intensity and thus forcefulness has the aspect of fulfilment. The more intense the emotion, the more it fills one's consciousness. When we afterwards think about the moment of anger, we do not feel such intense, clear and distinct anger, or not anger at all, and may even be ashamed of our negative emotions. Though love is a positive emotion, the same distinction is valid here, too. It feels different to love and to reflect love. Love is intense, fulfilling, clear and distinct – I am sure that I am in love. Afterwards the case may be different.

Though Hume takes an emotion and a passion as his examples in the Enquiry, it should be pointed out that the distinction is not limited to those contents, states and acts of mind. It also concerns outward sensations and thinking about them. The sensation of a beer bottle is more intense, clear and distinct than remembering that sensation afterwards. The distinguishing feature between impressions and ideas is phenomenal intensity, clarity and distinctness.

⁶ I therefore agree with Stroud, Barry., *Hume*. London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1977, Ch. 2 and Bennett, Jonathan., *Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1971, Ch. 3. The third interpretation is functional. Impressions and ideas differ from each other in the way (Govier) of power (Everson) of their effects on mind. See Govier, Trudy., “Variations on Force and Vivacity in Hume”. *Philosophical Quarterly* 22 (1972), pp. 44-52 and Everson, Stephen., “The Difference between Feeling and Thinking”. *Mind* 97 (1988), pp. 401-413. (Millican 2002, 424)

The feeling of force and vivacity or liveliness refers, therefore, as Hume says in the passage, to the “manner” a content, state or act is felt or conceived in mind. After the passage, Hume puts the difference between impressions and ideas in terms of feeling and reflecting (Ibid.). It does not concern the content of states or acts. All the intense, clear and distinct contents, states and acts of mind, i.e. sensations, passions and emotions are impressions and all the less intense, clear and distinct ones ideas. Their content may be the same although the intensity, clarity and distinctness of the content may vary.

The exact nature of the distinction between impressions and ideas is difficult to determine. On the one hand, in T 1.1.1.1 Hume speaks about difference in kind. Impressions and ideas seem to form the distinct and clearly determined sub-classes or species of perceptions. On the other, impressions and ideas seem to form a continuum of the feeling of force and vivacity or liveliness. It is possible that one cannot distinguish between an impression and idea when they are near to each other in force and vivacity or liveliness (Ibid.). It is also possible that an impression reduces to an idea, and an idea rises to an impression (T 1.3.5.6). Impressions and ideas seem to be different in degree only, not in kind.

Hume’s attitude towards this problem is casual. Right or wrong, he does not see it as a real problem for his system. For him the main point is that “commonly” it is easy to distinguish impressions and ideas from each other (T 1.1.1.1). In the article, I am compelled to take Hume’s disposition because the problem is not the problem of the paper. The main points I take to be that the difference between impressions and ideas is the phenomenal intensity, clarity and distinctness and that a perception can move from one species to the other. In addition, their difference is not the Aristotelian *differentia specifica*. Hume stresses that impressions and ideas differ only in their degree of force and vivacity or liveliness, not in their nature (T 1.1.1.5).

2.2 *Simple and Complex Perceptions*

Hume’s other distinction within the class of perceptions is the division “into SIMPLE and COMPLEX” perceptions. The difference between them is the possibility of distinguishing. Complex perceptions can be distinguished into their constituent parts, whereas the simple ones cannot:

“Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguish’d into parts.” (T 1.1.1.2)

Hume illustrates this distinction with an apple. Perceptions concerning the particular “colour, taste and smell” of an apple are simple perceptions and the perception of the apple is a complex one (T 1.1.1.2).

In this paper, I am relying on Don Garrett’s interpretation of Hume’s simple perceptions. Passions, emotions and unextended sensations form the species of simple perceptions. Those constructed from them are complex perceptions. (Garrett 1997, 60-62) For example, when we have a visual impression of a red apple, we have a visual impression of a red circle. This, however, is a complex extended visual impression, which is constructed from the unextended impressions of redness. When we eat the apple, we can have the simple impression of pleasure.

2.3 Comparison of Terminology

If Garrett’s and Lemetti’s interpretations are correct, Hume’s distinction between simple and complex perceptions differs from that of Hobbes into simple and compound imaginations. Although Hobbes’ distinction resembles Hume’s, and Hume may have borrowed the idea from Hobbes⁷, there are two differences in the details. Firstly, the imagination of a horse is a simple one for Hobbes, whereas Hume seems to think the idea of an apple is a complex one. An imagination of a thing is a simple one for Hobbes but Hume’s simple idea is about a quality of a thing. Secondly, Hobbes does not officially divide ‘senses’⁸ into simple and compound while Hume does. Hume’s distinction divides all the perceptions, Hobbes’ only divides imaginations. The extension of Hume’s distinction is larger than Hobbes’.

As Lemetti shows in his paper, Hobbes’ terminology for the contents, states and acts of mind is baroque. Hume is more straightforward and clear on the surface. In this respect, Hume is easier to understand. But the understanding may be superficial, for Hume’s problem is that he does not develop his theory of impressions enough. For example, what is it to have a visual impression of a tree? One has the complex visual impression of the front side composed of unextended impressions of colour, but cannot have the impression of the back side of the tree. Does the complex impression of the tree include the complex impression of the back side or at least the belief that there is another side? To the

⁷ But as Lemetti shows in his paper, the distinction, taken without strict qualification, was common and is found, for example, in Aquinas. Thus it is almost impossible to determine certainly who Hume’s source was. Neither is it not very important.

⁸ When I refer to Hobbes’ term “sense”, which is the original fancy of sensation, I mark it by ‘sense’.

best of my knowledge, Hume does not answer these questions⁹. Hobbes' theory of 'sense', for one, is more developed than Hume's theory of the impressions of the senses though I am not sure whether he discusses the problems raised above. Additionally, Hume and Hobbes differ from each other in that Hobbes explains sensation while Hume leaves this to natural philosophy and anatomy. I shall revert to this issue later when I discuss Hume's and Hobbes' grounds for their shared Copy Principle¹⁰.

2.4 Hume's Copy Principle

Hume's most exact statement of his Copy Principle (CP) is in T 1.1.1.7:

“all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.”

Hume's Copy Principle is formulated in terms of the two above-mentioned distinctions of perceptions. Let us first consider it in the light of simple impressions and ideas. I endorse Garrett's naturalist reading of the Principle¹¹. According to him, there are two theses in Hume's Copy Principle. Firstly, the “Resemblance Thesis” “that every simple idea has an exactly resembling simple impression”¹². Secondly, the “Causal thesis” “that every simple idea is at least partly caused by a simple impression”. (Garrett 1997, 21-22 and 41) According to this interpretation, there are thus two relations between every simple idea and some simple impression: exact resemblance and causality. Hume himself speaks about derivation, correspondence, and exact representation in stating the Principle. In Garrett's interpretation, correspondence and exact representation are reduced

⁹ Hume does face the questions (1) why we believe that there really is a tree and (2) why we call that object a tree. The first one is addressed in his theory of belief (EHU 5 and T 1.3) and the second in his associative theory of general ideas, which explains how we can have common nouns though all the perceptions are particular (T 1.1.7).

¹⁰ Neither Hobbes nor Hume employs the term. It is the reconstruction of Hume scholarship.

¹¹ Millican calls it naturalist since, according to Garrett, the Principle is an empirical generalisation. Other scholars who endorse naturalist reading are Robert J. Fogelin (*Philosophical Interpretations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992.), to whom Garrett acknowledges his great debt, and David Owen (Owen 1999, 71). Other interpretations are positivist (meaning empiricism: the Principle is the test of the meaningfulness of words) by Bennett (1971, ch. 3), instrumentalist (rule of conceptual analysis) by James Noxon (*Hume's Philosophical Development*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1973, pp. 138-48) and Donald W. Livingston's reading of the Principle as the criterion of 'internal' conceptual mastery (*Hume's Philosophy of Common Life*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1984, chs. 3 and 4). (Millican 2002, 426-27)

¹² Garrett grounds his interpretation on T 1.1.1.5.

to exact resemblance¹³. In EHU 2.5, Hume formulates the Principle somewhat differently: “all our ideas [...] are copies of our impressions”. If Garrett’s interpretation about the Principle is correct, the copy relation will contend both exact resemblance and causality since it is Hume’s general formulation of the Principle in the first Enquiry¹⁴. Thus, Hume’s Copy Principle is that all the simple ideas are: (1) correspondent to, exactly resembling or representing and (2) at least partly caused by some simple impression. In terms of the copy relation, which has elements of exact resemblance and causality, all simple ideas are copies of some simple impression.

The case differs with regard to complex ideas. Some complex ideas are not copies of a complex impression while some are (T 1.1.1.4). But even the former ones can be distinguished into their constituent parts, simple ideas, which are copies of some simple impressions. Another principle of Hume is that “complex [ideas] are form’d from them [simple ones]. (T 1.1.1.6) This and the Copy Principle put together imply that all the perceptions of mind are either impressions, copies of them, or constructed out of the copies of simple impressions. Simple impressions and ideas are the elements of perceptions. Contents of mind are composed of simple impressions and their copies simple ideas.

2.5 Hobbes’ Copy Principle?

For one who is acquainted with the importance of the Copy Principle for Hume, the beginning of *Leviathan* is striking. For Hobbes makes the following claim there:

“The original of them all [fancies or phantasms] is that which we call sense, (For there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived from that original.” (Leviathan, 13¹⁵)

¹³ In this case, Hume uses the obscure modern term “representation” contending only the relation of resemblance and excludes causality. But in EHU 12.1.9 representation includes causality as well.

¹⁴ Two remarks should be made about the copy relation. First, Hume uses it as a synonym for resemblance in T 1.1.1.5. Second, it is unclear to me whether the copy relation should be taken as including or excluding the relation of causality. If I paint a copy of Botticelli’s *Birth of Venus*, will the original be a cause or a part of the cause of the copy? Clearly, this question depends on the conception of causality.

¹⁵ The references to Hobbes 1996 are given in *Leviathan*, page-number.

Let us compare Hobbes' claim with Garrett's reading of Hume's Copy Principle. In the passage, Hobbes states that the origin of every conception of mind is 'sense'. Every conception is either a reoccurrence of a 'sense' or a composition of some 'senses'. So either a conception exactly resembles some 'sense' or the constituent parts of a conception exactly resemble some 'senses'. Hobbes would thus embrace the Resemble Thesis. The Causal Thesis is in Hobbes' words *expressis verbis*. All the other conceptions but 'senses' "are derived from that original." "Origin" refers therefore to both resemblance and causality. 'Senses' are both the origin of the content of conceptions and the causal origin of them.

Hobbes therefore seems to state the same Copy Principle as does Hume. The extension of Hobbes' Copy Principle is, however, uncertain. In *The Elements of Law*, Hobbes distinguishes between "the power cognitive" and "motive" power of mind as Lemetti notes. In the light of this distinction, only conceptions are derived from the 'senses', whereas motivations are not. Motivations contain feelings and passions. The Copy Principle would not be extended to feelings and passions. By the contrast, the extension of Hume's Principle is universal. Therefore, there may be a difference in the extensions of their Copy Principles though the intension is the same. Still, on the basis of Lemetti's account, Hume's use of the Copy Principle for critical purposes is more extensive than that of Hobbes.

Because of the shared Principle, on a general level, both Hobbes and Hume endorse what I call *content empiricism*¹⁶ in their conceptions of mind.¹⁷ Both thinkers deny the existence of innate imaginations and ideas (EHU 2.9.n.1¹⁸). 'Senses' and impressions are the origin of the contents of mind. The contents are generated from the 'senses' or the impressions. Before them, mind is 'like that of the tablet on which there is nothing actually written', "ὡσπερ ἐν γραμμικτῶ ὠμηθεν ἐνυπαρχεῖ ἐντελεχία γεγραμμενόν" as Aristotle (384–322 BC) writes (*De Anima* 430a1-2¹⁹). Thus Hobbes and Hume connect themselves to the long Aristotelian tradition in this sense. That tradition rejects the innate contents of soul, and nowadays it may be called content empiricism. Hobbes' and Hume's reason for their content empiricism is the Copy Principle. To be precise, in this respect they

¹⁶ I believe that both Hobbes and Hume would be at my throat if they read the paper. For "empiricism" and "empiric" were pejorative terms in the 17th and 18th centuries. Their standard significations were medical quackery particularly or any kind of imposture generally. (OED, empiric and empiricism) The references to *The Oxford English Dictionary Online*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004. are given in OED, entry.

¹⁷ Cf. *conceptual empiricism* (Garrett 1997, 33).

¹⁸ Hume confesses there that in fact his Copy Principle is a new formulation of Locke's denial of innate ideas.

¹⁹ The references to Aristotle 1964 and 1986 are given in the standard way.

differ from Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Aristotle and Aquinas do not have the Copy Principle since they accept the existence of the universals. It is not possible that universals are copies of perceptions, which are particular.

2.6 *The Foundation and Nature of Mind*

Nevertheless, there is a deep-cutting difference in Hobbes' and Hume's grounds for the shared Principle. Hume's argument is an experimental generalisation in EHU 2.4-8 and T 1.1.1.8-11. Hobbes' argument rests on two principles, a physical and a metaphysical one: the Copy Principle is founded on the law of inertia, which is in turn based on the principle "that nothing can change it selfe" (Leviathan, 15; Tuck 1989, 44-45). The difference in the argumentation illuminates a difference between Hobbes and Hume. Hobbes is a *two-level materialistic monist*. For him mind is really the motion of matter, fancies or phantasms are just appearances or representations of reality. The fundamental and real level is the matter and its motion; the non-fundamental level is what I call 'phenomenal'.²⁰ Therefore he grounds his phenomenal Copy Principle on a physical and a metaphysical principle. Yet Hobbes would not accept 20th century *eliminative materialism*, which denies the existence of mental phenomena. Somehow, appearances do exist. If one misses this, one will miss the greatest part of Hobbes' philosophy: his phenomenal analysis of mind, his moral and civil philosophy.

Hume, for one, is in sharp contrast with Hobbes. He suspends his judgement on the real nature of mind. Here it is not possible to go into detail about T 1.4.5 (*Of the immateriality of the soul*). It is sufficient to note that Hume suspends answering the question of the Section, "*Whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance*" (Ibid.6). His ground is

²⁰ Anyone who disagrees with the materialist interpretation ought to explain how these theses in the *Elements of Law* could be interpreted differently:

"That there is nothing *without us* (really) which we call an *image* or colour.

That the said image or colour is but an *apparition* unto us of the *motion*, agitation, or alteration, which the *object* worketh in the *brain*, or spirits, or some internal substance of the head." (EL I.2.4)

"the things that really *are* in the world without us, are those *motions* by which these seemings are caused." (EL I.2.10)

And:

"In the eighth section of the second chapter is shewed, *that conceptions* and *apparitions* are nothing *really*, but *motion* in some internal substance of the *head*["]." (EL I.7.1) The references to Hobbes 1994 are given in EL, I.chapter number.section number.

“the final decision upon the whole; the question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible”. (T 1.4.5.33)

Hume is therefore *sceptic* or *neutral* concerning the real nature or substance of mind. He excludes the question from his “science of human nature”, “moral philosophy”²¹. For this reason, at least partly, he bases his Copy Principle on an experimental generalisation. The basis exemplifies Hume’s limitation of examination in his science of human nature. He limits enquiry to what I call the phenomenal level, to what appears to us, to the perceptions of mind and their interrelations (see Owen 1999, 82)²². Hobbes’ enquiry of human nature is different; it endorses and examines the fundamental materialistic level as well.

²¹ Natural philosophy studied nature, moral philosophy human nature. Therefore, the former included physics, chemistry and all the natural sciences that had emerged in or before the 18th century. Moral philosophy covered philosophy, as we understand it, and the whole body of theoretical thinking concerning human beings and society. The subjects of contemporary psychology, political science, sociology, economics, aesthetics and the study of religion belonged to moral philosophy (Norton 2001, 13). It is consequently important not to understand Hume’s moral philosophy as ethics, which is its sense today. Moral philosophy also contained ethics, “morals” in Hume’s terms (T, intro.5) but its range was much wider.

²² Although these are Hume’s objects of examination, I want to stress that the basis of his examination is “daily experience” (e.g. Hume’s ground for the claim that we cannot believe what we want in EHU 5.2.11). He does not base his tenets on subjective impressions but on intersubjective daily experience, on which we can reach a consensus. For example, Hume argues the temporal priority of the impressions to the ideas by referring to the daily experience about teaching ideas to a child, to a daily practice: “To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these impressions; but proceed not so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce the impressions by exciting the ideas.” (T 1.1.1.8). Owen misses this point though he quotes the passage (Owen 1999, 70-71). In addition, note Hume’s definition of experience: it is a principle (T 1.4.7.3). Note also Hume’s claim in the second Enquiry that *rules* constitute common life, which daily experience is about. Not even murder is experienced as murder without rules:

“We may only learn from it [the comparison between “societies for play” and the “general societies of men”] the necessity of rules, whenever men have any intercourse with each other.

They cannot even pass each other on the road without rules. Waggoners, coachmen, and postilions have principles, by which they give the way; and these are chiefly founded on mutual ease and convenience. [...]

To carry the matter farther, we may observe, that it is impossible for men so much as to murder each other without statutes, and maxims, and an idea of justice and honour.” (EPM 4.18-20)
The references to Hume 1998 are given in EPM section-number.paragraph-number.

In this light Owen’s claim that experience is nothing but impressions seems dubious. Social rules constitute experiments and experience, on which we found experimental philosophy.

The argumentation for the Copy Principle reveals that Hobbes is a materialist but Hume is not. Hume's philosophy should not therefore be seen as materialistic but as mechanistic in the broad sense of the acceptance of efficient cause only. This profound difference between Hobbes and Hume is present in their account for the 'senses' or the impressions of the senses. Hobbes gives a causal and materialistic explanation of outward sensation, as Lemetti shows, but Hume does not. Hume excludes any account for the impressions of the senses from his treatise of human nature. He limits his enquiry to the phenomenal level in this question as well (T 1.1.2.1 and 1.3.5.2).

3 Hume's Conception of Imagination

For Hume, imagination is a central faculty of mind. Put in the most general way, imagination is a sensations-preserving faculty of mind together with memory. But this general statement does not do justice to Hume's conception of imagination since it makes things too simple. Hume's conception is rich and imagination has many aspects and functions in his theory. Next I will compare imagination with memory and discuss it as (1) the fainter ideas forming faculty, (2) the free faculty, (3) an associative faculty, (4) an idea enlivening faculty, (5) a reproductive and the productive but not creative faculty, and lastly as (6) an intellectual and the rational faculty of the human mind. But before that; some remarks are needed about Hume's terminology compared to Hobbes'.

3.1 Terms

Hume employs the term "imagination" solely to refer to a faculty²³; Hobbes uses it to refer to a mental content or state, too – as Lemetti shows. Indeed, in this sense Hobbes' "imagination" is near to Hume's term "idea". In addition to this difference, there is another, interesting terminological one between them. Hume employs the term "fancy" as a synonym for "imagination" without exception²⁴. But Hobbes uses it, as Lemetti argues, in reference to a 'sense', too. The difference is interesting because it can tell us that Hobbes is nearer to scholastics than Hume at least in this respect. According to *The Oxford English Dictionary*, "fancy" is the shortened form of "fantasy" ("phantasy"), apparently from the 15th century. The origin of "fantasy" is *phantasia* (φαντασία) in classical Greek. The three senses of *phantasia* translated into English were: "1. appearance [...]; 2. the mental process or faculty of sensuous perception; 3. the faculty

²³ The complete argumentation of this affirmation is not possible in this paper since I cannot go through every occurrence of the term.

²⁴ The complete argumentation of this thesis is not possible in the constraints of the paper.

of imagination.” These three senses were conveyed to scholastic psychology where “fantasy” and “fancy” referred both to sensation, the faculty of sensation and to the faculty of imagination. (OED, fantasy and fancy) As Lemetti shows, Hobbes’ use of the term is just in accordance with the scholastic use. “Fancy” refers both to sensation, the faculty of sensation, the faculty of imagination and to an imagination. In Hume, the meaning of the term is narrowed into the third sense in Greek. It signifies the faculty of imagination. Hume has departed from the scholastic terminology in the case of “fancy”, whereas Hobbes is still tied to it because he has to create the English terminology for philosophy on the basis of Greek and Latin as Lemetti argues. In Hume’s times, the establishment of the English terminology has mostly happened. An alternative explanation is that Hobbes’ early humanism and deep interest in Greek explains his use of “fancy” (Malcolm 1996, 20 and Skinner 1996, 238-240).

3.2 Fainter Ideas Forming Faculty

According to Hume, there are two faculties in the human mind to “repeat our impressions”: “the MEMORY” and “the IMAGINATION” (T 1.1.3.1; see also 1.3.9.19. n.22). They are both faculties to copy and preserve impressions, i.e. to form ideas. This is their common feature, but there are two differences between them. First, memory preserves a considerable degree of the force and vivacity or liveliness of impressions, whereas imagination loses more of it (T 1.1.3.1 and 1.3.5.3-6). Second, imagination is a free faculty while memory is not (T 1.1.3.2-4 and 1.3.5.3).

To be precise, Hume states the first difference in terms of ideas, not in terms of faculties. The difference corresponds to that between impressions and ideas. The ideas of memory are conceived more forcefully and vividly or lively by mind and are near to impressions in the phenomenal intensity, clarity and distinctness. The ideas of imagination are less intense, clear and distinct. Accordingly, in some passages Hume calls the ideas of memory “the impressions of the memory” and some ideas of imagination “perfect ideas” (e.g. T 1.3.9.7, 1.1.3.1). Since memory and imagination are the faculties that form these less intense, clear and distinct perceptions, it is justified to state the difference in terms of faculties. Imagination is thus the faculty to form the less forceful and vivid or lively ideas, and memory the faculty to form the more forceful and vivid or lively ones. Hume describes lesser forcefulness and vividness, lesser phenomenal intensity, clarity and distinctness in my interpretation, by the term “fainter” (e.g. T 1.3.5.2). It is thus justified to state that imagination is the fainter ideas forming faculty for Hume in the first place.

3.3 Free Faculty

The second difference distinguishes free and determined manners to form ideas. Memory is not able to vary the “order and form” of the “original impressions” while imagination is (T 1.1.3.2). Memory is the preserving faculty of mind that repeats the corresponding impressions deterministically. It cannot vary the order of the constituent parts of an idea and thus the form of the idea. Nor can it change the order of occurrence of ideas. Impressions determine the ideas of memory and their order of occurrence²⁵. (Ibid.3) For example, memory can only form the idea of a particular white horse of which we have had an impression before. But imagination can join the idea of that horse with the idea of white wings and thus form the idea of a white winged white horse. In Hume’s conception, imagination has “liberty” in relation to its ideas (Ibid.4²⁶ and EHU 2.4). Impressions do not fully determine its idea forming. Firstly, it can separate simple ideas from complex ones. Secondly, it can unite ideas into perceived or unperceived complex ones. Thirdly, imagination is able to change the order of occurrence of ideas. Lastly, it can “augment” and “diminish” ideas, which can be read as their degree of phenomenal intensity, clarity and distinctness or (inclusive) as changing their size (extension) or duration. (EHU 2.5) Imagination can, to sum up, form the materials produced by sensation into parts; new combinations; sequences; sizes or durations, or degrees of phenomenal intensity, clarity and distinctness. It is able, for example, to join the idea of gold to that of a mountain and form the idea of a golden mountain (Ibid.). For Hume, imagination is thus, secondly, the faculty free to separate complex ideas; to unite ideas into complex ones; to change their order of occurrence; and phenomenal intensity, clarity and distinctness, or size.

The second difference can be articulated in terms of activity and passivity though Hume does not do so²⁷. Memory is a passive faculty of mind. It just preserves impressions, it is in a sense the object of the activity of inward and outward sensation. It receives impressions and copies them to ideas. Imagination, for one, is both a passive and an active faculty of mind. Its acts can form ideas we both have and not had impressions of before. On the one hand, it is able to repeat impressions as such. I can, for example, imagine a pint of bitter I am going to have after work that is just like the one I had yesterday. On the other, I am able to imagine a golden mountain.

²⁵ This must imply that memory-mistakes are actually ideas of imagination in Hume theory (T 1.3.5.5).

²⁶ “The same evidence follows us in our second principle, *of the liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas.*”

²⁷ For sometimes one reads claims that Hume’s model of mind is passive and/or deterministic.

Before moving to the next point, it is possible to make a historical comment on Hume's conception of imagination. Its one side is that it is the capacity of mind to form fainter ideas, objects of which are not present to the senses or memory. It is a passive preserving faculty of mind that makes it possible to contemplate the objects of sensations when the objects are no longer present. In this general sense, Hume shares the conception of imagination or *phantasia* with Aristotle²⁸, St. Thomas Aquinas²⁹, Descartes³⁰, Hobbes³¹, Locke³² and many others. Yet there are three other aspects in Hume's conception of imagination that distinguish him from his predecessors. Firstly, imagination is an associative faculty (as in Hobbes). Secondly, it is an idea enlivening faculty. Memory shares both these aspects with imagination, but not the third one: imagination is an intellectual and the rational faculty in Hume's conception.

3.4 Associative Faculty³³

Though imagination is free, Hume observes that there is universal regularity in its workings. Unlike in T 1.1.4, in EHU 3.1 he argues the regularity by four observations. The first three observations ground the universal regularity in the order of occurrence of ideas, the last one in forming complex ideas from simple ones³⁴. The

²⁸ *De Anima* III.3, 428a2-5 and 429a1-5 and III.8, 432a9-18

²⁹ *Summa Theologiae* Ia, q.78, a.4, r. The references to Aquinas 2001 and 2003 are given in part-number, q.question-number, a.article-number, o.objection-number or *sed contra* (sd) or response (r) or ad.response-number.

³⁰ *Meditationes*. – Sexta., AT VII, 72-73. The references to Descartes 1964a are given in the standard way of AT the Adam and Tannery volume-number, its page-number.

³¹ See Lemetti's paper.

³² Garrett 1997, 17

³³ For the criticism of associative concept theory, see e.g. Fodor, Jerry A., *Hume Variations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2003, pp. 112-116.

³⁴ Firstly, he refers to "our more serious thinking or discourse", where the "tract of chain of ideas" is regular. Ideas "introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity." Secondly, the same regularity can be found "even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our dreams [...], if we reflect". Thirdly, "[w]ere the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something, which connected it in all its transitions." Hume's main observation in order to show the regularity in the workings of imagination concerns, however, languages totally foreign to each other:

"Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the least connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, expressive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other: A certain proof, that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind." (Ibid.)

First of all, Hume rests the regularity phenomenon on experience concerning causally unconnected languages. Though the causal relation between languages is excluded, the words of

universal regularity in both passing from one idea to another and uniting simple ideas into complex ones is what Hume calls “the association of ideas”³⁵.

According to Hume, based on the four observations, the phenomenon of association is thus a fact. Supposing, as Hume does, that nothing can happen without a cause (every-event-some-cause) (T 1.3.3.1 and 9), he takes the phenomenon as a “certain proof” for the following³⁶. (1) There is a “principle”, a cause for the phenomenon of association. (2) This cause is “universal”, it has “influence on all mankind”.³⁷ (EHU 3.1)

“The principles of association” are the cause for association phenomenon. There are three principles of association according to Hume, “namely, *Resemblance*, *Contiguity* in time and place, and *Cause or Effect*.” (EHU 3.2) Hume carefully and experimentally proves the existence of the cause for association in EHU 3.1. With respect to the three principles of association he is not so careful at this stage. Hume states openly that he will not go to a careful experimental generalisation (EHU 3.3). He will not prove that there are exactly three principles of association. He will not show that they are just the ones he claims them to be. He merely proves by particular events that resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect serve in fact as the principles of association. (Ibid.) The case is the same in the Treatise (T 1.1.4.2). So he concludes: “To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas” (EHU 3.2). I agree with Owen’s claim that Hume postulates, does not prove, the three principles of association in T 1.1.4 and EHU 3. Hume’s whole theory would be a “proof” of these “explanatory postulates”. (Owen 1999, 77)

the most complex ideas correspond to each other. Since words represent ideas for Hume, the correspondence of words implies the correspondence of ideas as well. Simple ideas tend to be compounded into correspondent complex ideas regardless of the time and place. There is regularity in the uniting function of imagination.

³⁵ It is justified to read Hume in the way that passing from one idea to another is also forming a complex idea. A complex idea is formed by joining two ideas with an associative relation. In this reading, association is regular complex idea forming only. But I distinguish passing from idea to another from complex idea forming because it emphasises the movement of imagination from one idea to another.

³⁶ Hume’s argument is challenged by the note that, at this point of the first Enquiry, he has not established his theory of “proof”, i.e. that of inductive inference based on experience without anomalies (EHU 6.n.10). The causal principle every-event-some-cause is also a problem for Hume. In T 1.3.3.9, he affirms that it “must necessarily arise from observation and experience.” But he does not answer to the question he proposes just after the affirmation: “*How experience gives rise to such a principle?*” Therefore Hume affirms the origin of the belief in the causal principle but does not explain it.

Though the principles of resemblance, contiguity and causation are causes for association, this should not be taken as determinism. The working of imagination is not determined by the three principles. In T 1.1.4.1, Hume stresses this:

“This uniting principle among ideas is not be consider’d as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from the imagination: Nor yet are we to conclude, that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty: But we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails[.]”

Earlier Hume has claimed that imagination has liberty. In this passage, he repeats the claim. The associative principles are a cause, a force, but they are “a gentle force”. The power of imagination is superior in strength to them. “Gentle” in the passage refers to “weak”, when the power of the principles is compared to that of imagination. In normal cases, “commonly”, the principles are the force that dominates, “prevails”. But imagination is stronger and can dominate anytime one want. The regular succession of ideas or the regular compounding of complex ideas can be broken by it. As Hume says in the passage, there is no “inseparable connexion” between ideas. Imagination can separate ideas from their associative sequences and compounds. Thus, Hume’s conception of imagination is not deterministic³⁷. Imagination is a free power in the sense that it can work without the interference of other faculties and the associative principles³⁹. Yet the associative principles *regulate* the workings of this power and the flow of ideas. The principles of resemblance, contiguity and causation are causal and regulative principles. They make the succession of ideas and the compounding of complex ideas regular. Association is regularity.

³⁷ Though Owen claims that “ in [T] 1. 1. 4 [...] causal language is carefully avoided” (Owen 1999, 78), this is not the case, neither in T 1.1.4 nor in EHU 3.1-2. In the above cited passage, Hume speaks about “influence”. In T 1.1.4.1, he describes “this uniting principle among ideas” as “a gentle force” and “the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other”. “Influence”, “force” and “cause” are causal terms in Hume’s vocabulary. There is a principle or principles that is or are the cause of the association between ideas.

³⁸ T 1.3.6.13 also supports the indeterministic reading of Hume’s association.

³⁹ In his recent admirable book, Louis Loeb understands Hume’s imagination as an associative faculty (Loeb 2002, 59). I think I have shown that Loeb’s understanding oversimplifies Hume’s conception of imagination. There is regularity in its workings, the associative principles regulate imagination - and associative movements and complex ideas belong to imagination. Yet Hume stresses that the imagination of man is free. It can break the associative principles and move to any idea or unite any ideas. Imagination for Hume is capable of association but is not limited to it. It is an associative faculty but not merely that. Hume’s conception of imagination is associative and free.

Hume claims that the causes of the associative principles

“are mostly unknown, and must be resolv’d into *original* qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain.” (T 1.1.4.6)

The claim is another instance of Hume’s limitation to the perceptions and experimental method. He will not ask for the physical or even anatomical causes of the associative principles, even less the metaphysical ones. He has shown by experience that there is association and a cause for it. His overall theory will confirm that the three principles of association are exactly that cause. But with regard to the causes of the principles, experience is almost silent.

Still the causes of the causal association are examined at length in Hume’s theories of “probable reasoning”⁴⁰ and “causal belief”⁴¹. I will not go into the details of those theories. Suffice it to say that experience and custom or habit are the principles that make the causal association possible. The experience of “constant conjunction” between two resembling events makes it possible for mind to move from the impression of a cause or an effect to the idea of an effect or a cause (T 1.3.6.12-14).

3.5 *Idea Enlivening Faculty*

Hume’s associative theory of probable reasoning shows that it is possible to associate an impression and an idea, not just two ideas. This in turn leads us to an important characteristic of the associative relations in Hume’s theory. The associative relations can convey a degree of the force and vivacity or liveliness of an impression or an idea of memory to a connected idea of imagination (T 1.3.8.3-5 and 1.4.2.41-42). The associative principles can serve as the conduits of the phenomenal intensity, clarity and distinctness. Association has a propensity to partly convey that feeling. Since association is an operation of imagination, this propensity is a propensity of imagination as well. Imagination has a propensity to enliven some of its ideas. It can make ideas clearer and more phenomenally intense and distinct. For Hume, imagination is fourthly an idea enlivening faculty⁴².

⁴⁰ Hume’s term for the inductive inference to the unobserved

⁴¹ Hume’s term for beliefs about causes and effects

⁴² This propensity of imagination, presumably, leads Hume to make an inconsistent claim about the faculty. At the end of T 1.4.7.3, he affirms:

“The memory, senses, and the understanding are, therefore, all of them founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas.”

3.6 A Reproductive and the Productive but not a Creative Faculty

In the lecture records published under the title *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*), Kant makes the tripartite distinction between reproductive (*reproduktiv*), productive (*produktiv*) and creative (*schöpferisch*) imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) (*Ant.* §25, 466⁴³). My interpretation of Kant's distinction translated into Hume's terminology is as follows:

1. x is a formation of reproductive imagination iff x is a copy of an impression (simple or complex)
2. x is a formation of productive imagination iff x is not a copy of a complex impression but all its composing parts are copies of simple impressions.
3. x is a formation of creative imagination iff neither x nor at least one of its composing parts is a copy of an impression.

Though imagination is a free faculty for Hume, its liberty is restricted, in addition to the associative principles, by the Copy Principle as Hume elegantly states in the first Enquiry:

“But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that *all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience.* When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, *gold*, and *mountain*, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In short, *all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: The mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will.* Or, to express myself in philosophical language, *all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.*” (EHU 2.5; emphases mine)

By “the vivacity of our ideas” Hume refers to the quality or propensity of mind to enliven some of its perceptions. This quality of mind causes us to assent to the impressions of the senses and the ideas of memory as true. Now, in the passage, Hume states that this quality of mind *is* imagination. The statement is in direct contrast to his definition of imagination in the footnote T 1.3.9.19.n.22. There Hume opposes imagination with memory. But now the quality of mind to enliven ideas of memory is imagination. I think this is a clear inconsistency in Hume's conception of imagination and cannot see how it could be removed. I do not even know of any trial to explain this inconsistency in Hume scholarship. The propensity of imagination to enliven some of its ideas makes Hume to confuse it with the more general propensity of mind to enliven some of its perceptions. But the inconsistency does not shadow the following considerations in T 1.4.7 since Hume clearly returns to his stated conception of imagination.

⁴³ The references to Kant 1983 are given in *Ant.* section-number, page-number.

The passage shows that Hume's conception of imagination is founded on his Copy Principle. The Principle states that mind never goes beyond the materials given by impressions and their copies. Consequently, Hume's conception is reproductive and productive but not creative in the light of Kant's distinction. Imagination is able to form a complex idea that is not a copy of a complex impression as such, like the idea of a golden mountain. But at least the ideas of which an idea is composed of are copies of some impressions, simple or complex. There is no idea composed of at least one idea that is not a copy of an impression. When imagination forms ideas, it cannot add even one simple idea that is not copied from some simple impression. Nor can it do so when it "transposes" the order of ideas in their sequences or changes their size, duration or force and vivacity. Hume's imagination is able to form ideas that satisfy condition 2, but it never forms ideas that satisfy the third condition. According to Hume, because of the Copy Principle, human imagination is never creative in Kant's sense⁴⁴. Our mental world is composed of the simple impressions and their copies simple ideas.

⁴⁴ In the name of honesty, "never" must not be taken too rigorously. For Hume displays an anomaly to his Copy Principle with his so-called 'the notorious missing shade of blue example' (EHU 2.8, T 1.1.1.10). The scale of the different shades of blue excluding one shade is presented to a person who has for thirty years perceived all the other shades of blue except the missing one.

"Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses?"

Hume answers that imagination can create (in Kant's sense) this idea:

"I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can: And this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions[.]"

Despite the possibility that imagination can create at least one idea, Hume does not think the counter-example refutes his Copy Principle, and thus his reproductive and productive conception of imagination:

"this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit, that for it alone we should alter our general maxim."

This passage shows clearly for me that Hume does not reject his stated Copy Principle because of the anomaly. Right or wrong, this is how Hume thinks. But the commentators have not agreed. The missing shade of blue has aroused many debates among philosophers and Hume scholars (e.g. Bennett 1971, Fogelin 1992, Garrett 1997 and Owen 1999). It is not possible, however, to discuss this controversy in the paper. I only propose one possible solution.

The anomaly refutes Hume's Copy Principle only as a universal one holding in all times and places. Hume connects universality and necessity together. A causal relation is universal or necessary iff we do not have experience of any exception in it (EHU 8.5-6). Therefore, it is not necessary that all the simple ideas are copies of simple impressions since there is at least one exception to the Copy Principle. It is not a necessary principle. Yet Hume can claim, as he does in the last cited passage, that it is a general one. The Copy Principle is an experimental generalisation holding in almost all cases. The missing-shade-of-blue anomaly only shows that the creation of imagination is not impossible. Thus, according to Hume, creative imagination is not altogether impossible.

Thus in the passage Hume uses the term “creation” in Kant’s sense of production. Hume’s creativity is separating simpler ideas from more complex ones⁴⁵; composing ideas into new combinations (compounding); changing their order of occurrence (transposing); or making them larger or smaller, last longer or shorter, or phenomenally stronger, clearer and more distinct or fainter (augmenting and diminishing). His sense of creativity differs from that of Kant, which I am using in this paper in order to distinguish Hume from later thinkers⁴⁶.

In this sense, Hume belongs to the tradition of the productive but not that of the creative imagination. The tradition may already start with Aristotle⁴⁷ or Avicenna⁴⁸ (Arabic *Ibn Sīnā*; 980-1037), but it begins at the latest with Aquinas⁴⁹. Human *imaginatio* or *phantasia* is able to compose (componit) and divide (dividit) the imagined forms (formae imaginatae) of things (rēs). Therefore it can form the unperceived forms of things. In fact, St. Thomas uses the same example of golden mountain (mons aureus) as Hume (and Hobbes) to illustrate the composition of imagination. (ST Ia, q.78, a.4, r. and q. 84, a. 6, ad.2) But while imagination forms phantasms (phantasmae) or images (imago) of things, it cannot go beyond the materials, i.e. the sensible forms or images of things, given by the five senses (sensus proprii) and common sense (sensus communis). For not even intellect can go beyond them (ST Ia, q. 84, a.6, r.⁵⁰). Therefore we can nowadays, in addition to ‘reproductive’ and ‘productive’, call this conception ‘empiricist imagination’.

I am not claiming that Hume’s conception is one and the same with Aquinas and Aristotle. Though they agree on the above explained sense and the content empiricism, there are important differences between Hume and the Aristotelian tradition in the model of explanation, in the view of the real nature of soul, in the relation between sensations and their objects, in that between phantasms and concepts or impressions and ideas, for example. In addition, Hume endorses what we call mental atomism, in the Treatise at least. Perceptions are distinct or different from each other (T 1.4.5.5). This is hardly the case in Aristotelianism because formal causation, the communication of a form, makes the contents of soul logically connected. Further, Hume stresses imagination as an associative

⁴⁵ Hume does not mention this operation of imagination in this context. I take it to be justified to add it because of what I have argued Hume’s conception of imagination to be.

⁴⁶ On the other hand, Hume’s sense challenges Kant’s.

⁴⁷ See *De Anima* III.11.

⁴⁸ Aquinas claims that Avicenna had the conception of human productive imagination (ST Ia, q.78, a.4, r.). I do not consider Avicenna because I have not been able consult his works.

⁴⁹ Since Aquinas presents a developed theory of productive imagination, I discuss him.

⁵⁰ On Aristotle, see *De Anima* III.4 429b30-430a2

and idea enlivening faculty in his model of mind, which can be seen as one of his main contributions to the tradition of the empiricist imagination.

What is important in these differences or breaks is that, in a way that cannot be discussed here, they shake the ties between the human mind and reality and open up the possibilities to understand the human mind as having creative capacities and being capable of producing or creating phenomenal world or worlds. Yet it ought to be stressed that Hume's conception of imagination is still only productive and reproductive. The Copy Principle according to Garrett's interpretation denies creation in the Kantian sense. For Hume, imagination is a reproductive and productive faculty in the fifth place. When it forms ideas, it reproduces or produces but does not create.

3.7 *An Intellectual and the Rational Faculty*

The dominant traditional way of thinking before Hume was that there were three cognitive faculties in the human soul or souls: (1) the five senses (αἰσθησις (*aisthêsês*)⁵¹, *sensus*), (2) imagination (φαντασία (*phantasia*), *imaginatio*) and (3) intellect (νοῦς (*nous*), *intellectus*, understanding in some translations)⁵². According to this tradition, the senses and imagination produce sensible images of things, the former of things that are present to soul and the latter of those that are not. Imagination is therefore a sensible images preserving faculty in the tradition when "image" is understood in the broad sense of sights, hearings, smells, touches and tastes. This characterisation applies both to Platonism, Aristotelianism and Cartesianism (Hatfield 1998, 954-957 and 970; AT VII 72). The subtle difference between them was that Aristotelian Scholastics added e.g. memory (*reminiscentia*), common sense (*sensus communis*) and estimative or cogitative faculty (*vis cogitativa* or *ratio particularis*) to imagination as internal senses (*sensus interiores*)⁵³ (Hatfield 1998, 955). But what made the most significant difference between these three traditions was the theory of apprehension, judgement and inference.

⁵¹ I use the Latin transliteration of the Greek words.

⁵² An excellent example of the traditional three-partite distinction from Hume's times is in Jean-Pierre Crousaz's *La Logique ou Système de Réflexions (A new treatise of the art of thinking; or, a compleat system of reflections, concerning the conduct and improvement of the mind. Written in French by Mr. Crousaz, Professor of Philosophy and Mathematics of the Academy of Lausanne. Done into English. In two volumes. Thomas Woodward: London 1724)*, vol 1., 1.2.6.

⁵³ To be precise, the number of the internal senses varied a little between different thinkers. This list of four is from Aquinas (ST Ia, q.78, a.4, r.).

Platonists like the Renaissance philosophers Marcel Ficino (1433-99) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-94), and the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth (1617-88) claimed that intellect or rational soul is capable of intellectual intuition. It can directly apprehend non-sensible beings and Platonist Forms, i.e. essences, without the help of a phantasm (a presentation of imagination) (Ibid. 954-955).

By the contrast, Aristotelian Scholastics like Aquinas, Duns Scotus (1266-1308) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) disagreed with the Platonists in the intellectual intuition. Their theory was that intellect needs a material phantasm in order to apprehend intelligible species of things. The formation of intelligible species was called abstraction. In abstraction, everything sensible and particular in a phantasm is removed and general intelligible species is separated or drawn away from the phantasm (Latin “*abstract-us* drawn away, f. *abs* off, away + *tract-us*, pa. pple. of *trahere* to draw.”, OED, abstract a.). Thus for the Aristotelians, the faculty of intellect explained apprehension (*apprehensio*) and the formation of universals and concepts, both particular and general. (Ibid. 955) It also explained the act of judgement. After apprehending concepts, intellect can either compound (componit) or divide (divinit) concepts and thus make judgements (singular *iudicatio*) or predications. Judgements are the basis of the third act of intellect, that of syllogistic inference. Reason (*ratio*) is the sub-faculty of intellect that is capable of syllogistic inference – in fact, the Aristotelians had two senses of “intellectus”: the broad one opposed to imagination and including all the three acts and the narrow one opposed to *ratio* including only apprehension and judgement. One of the forms of reason is *scientia*, knowledge. (Ibid. 956-957) What is important for my purpose is that *scientia* concerns essence, since apprehended intelligible species are its basis. Thus, *scientia* is essence-knowledge. For Aristotelians the human soul is capable of essence-knowledge and it is intellect in the broad sense that explains this capacity.

Descartes, for one, distinguishes at least three senses of *intellectus* in his *Meditationes* and *Principia philosophiae*. The broadest one is the synonym for what he also calls ‘thinking thing’ (*res cogitans*), ‘mind’ (*mens*), ‘soul’ (*animus*) and ‘reason’ (*ratio*) (AT VII 27). The broadest sense of *intellectus* is the power of thinking (*cogitare*). According to Descartes, thinking has two modes: perception (*perceptio*) and volition (*volitio*) (Principia 1.32 AT VIII-1 17⁵⁴). The power of the latter is will (*voluntas*) and that of the former *intellectus* in the middle sense. Will has five modes: (1) desire (*cupere*), (2) aversion (*aversari*), (3) affirmation

⁵⁴ The references to Descartes 1964b are given in Principia part-number.section-number AT VIII-1 page-number.

(*affirmare*), (4) negation (*negare*) and (5) doubt (*dubitare*). Since the last three are acts of judgement, Descartes places judgement under will and not under intellect in the middle sense. In this detail he differs from the Aristotelians. Intellect in the middle sense perceives and will judges. Intellect in this sense and thus perception has three modes or acts: (1) sensation (*sentire*), (2) imagination (*imaginari*), and (3) pure intellection (*pure intelligere*). The third mode of perception, pure intellect is the narrow sense of intellect. It is correspondent to the Aristotelian broad intellect in the sense of the opposition to imagination (and the senses). That is why I will use the Cartesian term 'pure intellect' in referring to intellect separate from the senses and imagination. (Ibid.)

In the Cartesian theory, pure intellect is the only mode of perception that is capable of clear and distinct perception (*clara et distincta perceptio*) (Ibid.). The perceptions of the senses and imagination are always obscure or confused, or both. In a sense, the Platonist intellectual intuition makes a comeback in Cartesianism. Pure intellect is able to work without a phantasm and corporeal imagination (Hatfield 1998, 970). By its immaterial act, it can form general concepts and universals⁵⁵, and apprehend God, self and the basic tenets of metaphysics. It is pure intellect that apprehends that the essence of material substance is extension and that of spiritual substance thinking. (Ibid. and 980) Thus the common characteristic of Platonism, Aristotelianism and Cartesianism is that the operation of pure intellect explains and justifies the human capacity for essence-knowledge.

More generally, the dominant thinking before Hume was that pure intellect explains three cognitive operations of soul: the intellectual ones of concept-formation and judgement, and the rational operation of reasoning or inference. The shared position was that humans have these powers and that these powers are separate from the senses and imagination. Hume's radical negation compared to that dominant tradition is that there is no pure intellect in the human mind. Hume denies the existence of intellect and reason separate from the senses and imagination.

Hume's reason for the denial is his central principle, the Copy Principle. Though it is quite easy to see how the Principle implies the denial, Hume presents an argument for it in T 1.3.1.7⁵⁶. The argument has two premises: the Copy Principle, and the clarity and preciseness (distinctness) of all impressions⁵⁷. The

⁵⁵ Descartes had not much to say about universals but Malebranche had (Bolton 1998, 184-89).

⁵⁶ Though quoting from Hume, I am much indebted to Garrett in my interpretation of the argument (Garrett 1997, 21).

⁵⁷ Notice that this is in direct opposition to Descartes, who claims that only intellectual ideas are clear and distinct.

Copy Principle implies that “the ideas [...] must be of the same nature” as the impressions. For they are copies of impressions. This and the second premise put together: if an idea contains something “dark and intricate”, it will be because of “our fault”. In other words, there are no naturally obscure or confused ideas. This conclusion implies that there is no need for a separate faculty or power to apprehend obscure and confused ideas. For there are no ideas that are naturally of that kind. Imagination and memory are enough for understanding every idea. There is no need for higher capacities. Therefore Hume denies that there are ideas which “are of so refin’d and spiritual a nature, that they fall not under the conception of the fancy, but must be comprehended by a pure and intellectual view, of which the superior faculties of the soul are alone capable.”

This is the historical reconstruction of Hume’s argumentation for his denial. As I hinted above, the rational reconstruction is quite easy to see as well. The Copy Principle implies that all the perceptions are either impressions, i.e. sensations, their copies or compounded from the copies. There is no class of pure or innate ideas (EHU 2.9.n.1). Thus, there is no need for the faculty of pure intellect in order to understand those ideas. Therefore there is no reason to assume the existence of pure intellect. Since Hume endorses Ockham’s razor, this gives ground for the denial of the existence pure intellect in the human mind. In Hume’s theory, the only cognitive powers of the human mind are the senses, memory and imagination.

The denial has profound implications for Hume’s thinking. The first one – or more strictly an implication of the Copy Principle – is nominalism: as Hume argues in T 1.1.7, there are no universals or abstract ideas. Hume’s second argument for his nominalism is the following: since all impressions are particular, on the basis of the Copy Principle, so also are all ideas (T 1.1.7.4-5). Human beings have no pure intellect to form a universal or an abstract idea of a triangle, for example. They have no such idea, every conceivable idea of a triangle is the idea of a particular determined triangle. It has particular and determined angles and length of sides. (Ibid.6)

Another implication is the denial of essence-knowledge (T intro.8). Hume agrees with the tradition in that the senses do not reveal the essences of things (Forms, species, extension and thinking). It follows from this that neither does imagination. The senses and imagination only present the appearances of things (as Lemetti notes, the Greek *phantasia* originates from the passive verb φαίνεσθαι (*phainesthai*), ‘to appear’). Since Hume denies the existence of pure intellect, he also denies the possibility of essence-knowledge. There is no faculty to achieve knowledge about essences. Hume’s position is in direct opposition to the

traditional *scientia*: human knowledge concerns only appearances and thus the Humean experience⁵⁸. Thus we can see how the denial of pure intellect grounds Hume's experimentalism or methodological empiricism in modern terms.

The third implication is my sixth point in the analysis of Hume's conception of imagination. *Imagination is an intellectual and the rational faculty* for Hume. If he does not want to deny the possibilities of thinking on general level, judging and reasoning, he will be committed to explain concept-formation, judgement and inference by the workings of the senses, memory and imagination. Since he does not make that denial, he must render that explanation. Hume's theory of general ideas in T 1.1.7 accounts for general thinking and concept-formation from the basis of particular determined perceptions by the associative operation of imagination (general concepts are resemblance associations between a set of ideas of imagination, T 1.1.7.7-15). His theories of causal reasoning and belief in T 1.3 and EHU 4-5 explain existence judgements and inferences concerning things that are not present to the senses or memory. The senses are needed for a present impression that is the starting point of a causal inference and the source of the force and vivacity of a belief-idea (EHU 5.2.20). Memory provides the needed experience of past constant conjunction between two types of events (T 1.3.6.2). But imagination is the power that, together with custom and experience, causes the cause-and-effect association to the belief-idea (EHU 5.2.11). Imagination is therefore what makes the inference in causal inference. Hume's general theory of belief accounts for existence judgements. In that theory, the senses and memory can also make judgements (T 1.3.5.7). Lastly, a perceptive operation of imagination called intuition explains both (1) demonstrative inferences concerning proportions in quantity or number and (2) reflective judgements on resemblance, contrariety, degrees of quality and proportions in quantity or number between ideas (T 1.3.1.1-5 and Owen 1999, 85 and 107).

Without delving deep into these theories and operations, it is justified to say that all the three cognitive powers have a part in Hume's explanations of traditional intellectual operations. It is not, therefore, surprising that Hume's headings for EHU and T 1 contain the term "understanding". There are works on that faculty that consists of the senses, memory and imagination. In the headings, Hume is thus using the term "understanding" (a translation of *intellectus*) in the Cartesian middle sense – as the power of (cognitive) perception⁵⁹. In this broad Humean sense of "understanding" (intellect), the senses, memory and imagination are all intellectual faculties. Thus, imagination is an intellectual faculty for Hume.

⁵⁸ See note 22 above.

⁵⁹ It must be noted that Hume's term "perception" also includes emotions, feelings, sentiments and passions. Descartes' use is more restricted in its scope.

In the footnote T 1.3.9.19.n.22, Hume states that he uses the term “imagination” in two senses. The broader sense is what I discussed in section 3.2: imagination opposed to memory as the fainter ideas forming faculty. The narrow sense of imagination is “the same faculty” opposed “to reason”. Thus there are some operations of the broad imagination that Hume excludes from the narrow one. He says in the footnote that these operations are “demonstrative and probable reasonings”, i.e. demonstration and causal inference. The narrow sense of imagination therefore consists of all the other operations of imagination but these two sole types of inference. I call this narrow sense imagination*. On the other hand, the footnote tells the reader that demonstration and causal inference form the faculty of reason. Since they are operations of imagination in the broad sense, imagination is the rational or inferential faculty for Hume. Another implication is that reason is a sub-faculty of imagination in Hume’s radical theory. His conception of reason is intuitive and associative: reasonings operate on intuitive or associative relations.

To sum up this section, though Hume denies the existence of pure intellect in the Platonist, Aristotelian and Cartesian sense, he does not deny the existence of intellect and reason. He simply reduces them to the operations of the sensible powers of mind: the senses, memory and imagination.

4 Conclusion: Hume’s and Hobbes’ Conceptions of Imagination Compared

Conclusively, for Hume, imagination is:

1. the other impressions copying, i.e. sensations preserving faculty (together with memory)
2. in other terms, the other ideas or fainter perceptions forming faculty (vs. memory)
3. *the* fainter ideas forming faculty (vs. memory)
4. *the* faculty free (vs. memory)
 - 4.1 to separate complex ideas
 - 4.2 to unite ideas into complex ones
 - 4.3 to change their order of occurrence
 - 4.4 to change their phenomenal intensity, clarity and distinctness or size or duration
5. an associative faculty (together with memory)
6. an idea enlivening faculty (together with the senses and memory)
7. a reproductive faculty (together with memory)
8. *the* productive but not creative faculty (vs. memory)

9. an intellectual (together with the senses and memory) and *the* rational, i.e. inferential faculty (vs. the senses and memory).

Hobbes' and Hume's conceptions of imagination are traditional in the sense that imagination is a preserving passive faculty able to represent 'senses' or impressions (1). Imagination makes it possible for humans to exceed the deliveries of the senses in their thinking. They are not restricted to the present, which they would be if they had only the senses. It must be realised that this traditional conception shared by Hobbes and Hume is broader in its scope than the modern restricted conception of fictive imagination. The significant similarity between Hobbes and Hume within this tradition is that both conceive of imagination as a copying faculty. It forms copies of 'senses' or impressions (1). They both endorse the Copy Principle. Their conceptions of imagination are based on that Principle, which is one of the main points argued for in the article

Though imagination copies 'senses' or impressions, according to Hobbes' and Hume's theories it cannot copy them perfectly. My second conclusion is that both of them understand imagination as a faculty to form fancies or perceptions that are decaying or fainter copies of the 'senses' or impressions (2). For Hobbes, imagination is *the* faculty to form decaying fancies. For Hume, it is one of the two faculties to form fainter perceptions (2). He makes the distinction between memory and imagination as two separate fainter perceptions forming faculties, whereas Hobbes does not. For Hobbes, imagination and memory are just two different names for the same faculty of forming decaying fancies (Leviathan, 16). Thus they are two different names for one and the same thing that emphasise different aspects (I think that here I disagree slightly with Lemetti). Conclusively, Hume conceives of imagination as *the* faintest perceptions forming faculty in the scale of impressions – ideas of memory – ideas of imagination (3), Hobbes as *the* decayed fancies forming faculty in the scale of sense-fancies – decayed fancies.

There is, however, a qualification to be made for the second conclusion. Hume's technical term "fainter" does not mean the same as Hobbes' "decaying". Hobbes' "decaying" refers to a quality of the *content* of a fancy. It is obscuring when imagining things ("as the light of the Sun obscureth the light of the Starres") and fading in the sense of loosing content while remembering them. By the contrast, Hume's "fainter" is a quality of the *manner* of conceiving an idea. It refers to the lower degrees of the phenomenal intensity, clarity and distinctness when an idea is conceived. The content of an idea may be the same as that of an impression though it is not so intensively, clearly and distinctly presented to mind.

The first three points are the most general characterisations of Hume's and Hobbes' conceptions of imagination. The rest are subsumed under the imagination as the 'senses' or impressions faintly copying, i.e. preserving faculty. The fourth point concerns the operation of imagination to work these copies. Like Hume (4), Hobbes thinks that imagination is the faculty that can unite simple imaginations into compound ones. Based on Lemetti's paper, he does not speak about the separating function of imagination. For Hobbes, imagination is *the* faculty to form compound imaginations, for example, the imagination of a centaur or that of me as Alexander the Great. Hobbes seems to conceive imagination as *the* free compounding faculty like Hume (4) - though this seems to be in a problematic relation to his materialistic theory of the mind. On the one hand, materialism involves determinism. On the other, imagination is free to form compound imaginations. Because of his materialist theory of mind perhaps, Hobbes does not speak about imagination as free to change the order of the occurrence of ideas in their sequences. But changing the degree of faintness is possible for Hobbes' imagination. For, as Lemetti shows, Hobbes thinks that visions are stronger and clearer than 'normal' imaginations.

My fifth and sixth conclusions concern association. From the perspective of Hume's theory of belief, it is important that imagination is an idea enlivening faculty through association (6). Hobbes does not have Hume's kind of theory of belief and therefore he does not develop the theory of enlivening the perceptions. In this regard, there is no similarity. But both Hobbes and Hume understand imagination as an associative faculty or a faculty of "the trayne of thoughts" (5).

To be precise, Hobbes does not call the regularity in the workings of imagination "association". According to OED, Locke is the first to use this sense of the word in his 1689 *Essay Concerning Human Understandings* (2.33). Hobbes' terms are "*the Consequence or TRAYNE of Imaginations*", or that "of Thoughts", and "*Mentall Discourse*" in the *Leviathan* (20); "*discursion*" and "*the coherence or consequence of one conception to another*" in the *Elements of Law* (EL I.4.1-2). Strictly taken, it is anachronistic to use "association" in describing Hobbes' doctrine. Nevertheless, I think it is justified. For Hobbes speaks about the same phenomenon as Hume: the transition of imagination is regular. Even in the "inconstant" transition, as Lemetti shows, there are principles that regulate the working of imagination. The subtle difference between Hobbes and Hume is that whereas uniting simple ideas into complex ones for Hume is association, Hobbes does not consider this a "trayne of imaginations". In Hobbes, association is just the regular transition of imagination by principles, not uniting simple ideas into compound ones regularly.

In EHU 3.2, Hume claims that “I do not find, that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association”. Regarding Hobbes, Hume can be judged to be right. Hobbes does not develop any comprehensive classification of the associative principles. Although one could find the associative principles regulating the Roman Penny example and Hobbes says so, he does not go into that kind of examination. By the contrast, he names the principles that regulate the guided “trayne of imagination”. Those principles are desire or design. “The trayne of thought” regulated by desire passes from effects to causes and that by design vice versa. When an effect is desired, imagination can move to the causes or means to produce it. When a cause is imagined, it is possible to design what we can do with it, i.e. to enquire what its effects are. According to Hobbes, the guided “trayne of imaginations” by design is possible for human beings only but that by desire also for “beasts”, i.e. other animals. Human beings can imagine what to do with a thing, “beasts” can only imagine how to get a thing.

I think it is relatively clear that both kinds of Hobbes’ regular “trayne of imaginations” are reducible to Hume’s associative principle of cause and effect. Put into Hume’s theory, Hobbes’ regular “traynes” are just passing from an idea to another in the chain of causes and effects. But there is no word about resemblance and contiguity as associative principles in Hobbes. While Hume develops a comprehensive classification of general associative principles including resemblance and contiguity, Hobbes seems to be interested solely in the causal association. Hobbes finds two types of the regulated “trayne of imaginations”. Hume reduces these two types of association into one type: the association by the principle of cause and effect. Nevertheless I find it interesting that Hobbes makes a distinction within the class of causal association and distinguishes humans from “beasts” in terms of that distinction. “Beasts” are capable of finding means to a desire but not of causal design. The life of “beasts” is restricted to fulfilling needs and desires. Human beings can think further into the future.

It is likely that Hume knew Hobbes’ theory of “the trayne of imaginations”. Though Hume could have taken the idea from Locke or Leibniz⁶⁰, it is possible that he used Hobbes in developing his theory of association. On the phenomenal level, there is the significant similarity with regard to the causal association. Nevertheless, there is again a significant difference in the explanation of and ground for association. Hume explains association by the principles of associa-

⁶⁰ See *Monadologie*, §26-28 (Leibniz 1954). I am indebted to Dr. Peter Kail (Edinburgh) for informing me of Leibniz’s theory of association in his presentation at Hume Studies in Britain III conference, St. Catherine’s College, Oxford, 9 September 2004.

tion, but regarding the principles he is more cautious. Regarding the ground, Hume bases the phenomenon of association on experiment. Hobbes, for one, observes first that there is regularity between imaginations:

“Not every Thought to every Thought succeeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts [CP]; so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our Senses.” (Leviathan, 20; italics mine)

Like Hume, Hobbes grounds the phenomenon of the regular “trayne of imaginations” on observation and the observation on the Copy Principle. Since all imaginations are derived from ‘senses’, all transitions of imaginations are derived from the transitions of ‘senses’. As in the case of the Copy Principle, Hobbes’ ground and the account for this implication of it is materialistic (Ibid.). “The traynes of imaginations” are really the same sequences of the motions of matter that were perceived by the senses. So when a motion becomes present to mind as an imagination, the next motion in the sequence might become apparent to mind as well. The same imagination may, however, occur in many sequences of motion. There are thus many possible motions that can follow it. On the phenomenal level, this implies that there are many possible following imaginations. Thus Hobbes concludes that “in the Imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what we shall Imagine next”. “The trayne of imaginations” varies because of the variance in “the traynes” of ‘senses’. The motion of matter determines “the trayne of imaginations”, but we cannot know what it determines. On the real level, Hobbes’ “trayne of imaginations” is deterministic, but not on the phenomenal level. Hume agrees with Hobbes’ analysis on the phenomenal level. Association is not deterministic. Regarding the physical level, Hume again suspends his judgement.

Hobbes analyses the causes of association to the physical level whereas Hume does not. It is nevertheless common to them that they develop the theory about the regularity of the workings of imagination. Imagination is a free faculty for both of them but still the associative principles regulate its workings. Hume mentions three: resemblance, contiguity, cause and effect; Hobbes two – desire and design. In fact, Hobbes’ principles are reducible to Hume’s third, cause and effect.

For Hume, imagination is *an* associative faculty together with memory (5). Since Hobbes does not distinguish memory from imagination in my reading, for him imagination is *the* faculty of “the trayne of thoughts”. Further difference is that Hume’s theory of association is more comprehensive than Hobbes’ conception of “the trayne of thoughts” – at least in the *Leviathan* and *The Elements of Law*.

My combined seventh and eighth conclusion is that both Hobbes' and Hume's conceptions of imagination are reproductive and productive but not creative. For Hume, imagination is one of the two reproductive faculties (7) and *the* productive faculty (8). For Hobbes, it is *the* natural reproductive and productive faculty. The negative element of the eighth conclusion is that neither Hobbes' nor Hume's conception of imagination is creative. Put in Kant's terms, imagination is not able to create in either Hobbes' or Hume's theory. That is an implication of their shared Copy Principle. There is no simple imagination or idea that imagination can form without copying a 'sense' or simple impression.

There is an agreement between Lemetti and me in this point. The point is not important just for the criticisms (aesthetics) of Hobbes and Hume. Since imagination is a central faculty of the mind in their theories, and both thinkers intend to found their philosophy on the study of the mind, the reproductive and productive conception of imagination is important for understanding their whole body of thought. For example, both Hume and Hobbes link their (modal) concept of possibility to conceivability⁶¹. Since conceivability is related to imaginable, the conception of imagination is connected to the concept of possibility.

Both Hobbes and Hume ground their reproductive and productive conceptions of imagination on the Copy Principle. Along with the reproductive and productive or empiricist imagination, it implies the position I call *content empiricism*. The position can be stated either by an affirmation or by a negation. The affirmation is that the origin of all the contents of mind or soul is in 'senses' or impressions. The negation is that there are no innate (inborn)⁶² conceptions (Hobbes) or ideas (Hume). The opposite position is *content rationalism* held by the Platonists and Cartesians. It does not deny the existence of innate conceptions but affirms them. *Conceptual empiricism* is the restricted form of *content empiricism*. It affirms that the origin of all concepts is in 'senses' or impressions. There are no innate concepts. Both positions can also be called Aristotelian, for Aristotle and Aquinas, as I have shown, deny the existence of innate contents of intellect. The difference between Hobbes' and Hume's position and the Aristotelian one is in the Copy Principle. Hobbes' and Hume's content empiricism is more radical since they endorse the Principle. The Principle affirms that all the contents of mind are copies of 'senses' or impressions – in their constituent parts at least. For Aristotle and Aquinas the contents of intellect are not copies of sensations. They are abstracted from the representations of sensations, from phantasms. Hobbes and Hume endorse *radical content empiricism*: all the contents of mind are either 'senses' or impressions or their copies or compounded from the copies.

⁶¹ Hume in his so-called Conceivability Principle (T 1.1.7.6) and Hobbes in *Leviathan*, 23-24.

⁶² Cf. Hume's analysis of the different senses of the word in EHU 2.9.n1.

Radical content empiricism implies Hobbes' and Hume's common denial of the existence of pure intellect. Since all the conceptions or ideas are fundamentally copies of 'senses' or impressions, there is no set of natural purely intellectual ideas. Thus, there is no reason to assume pure intellect in order to apprehend supposed purely intellectual ideas. The denial makes another difference between the Aristotelians and Hobbes and Hume. The Aristotelians endorse the existence of pure intellect and that of natural purely intellectual ideas. Their content empiricism is not so radical than Hobbes' and Hume's.

Since there is no pure intellect in Hobbes' and Hume's theories, imagination is a central faculty in their theories. It no longer stands between sensation and pure intellect as in the traditional model. Thinking consists of the workings of memory and imagination. The view might have three implications: (1) there are no universal fancies or perceptions (with other premises), (2) the denial of essence-knowledge, and (3) imagination is an intellectual and a rational faculty. Hobbes and Hume seem to agree with the first implication but not with the second. They are both nominalists (Leviathan, 26; EL I.5.6; Lemetti). Hume does deny the possibility of essence-knowledge, but Hobbes' denial of pure intellect does not prevent him from endorsing materialistic metaphysics.

In the third place, although Hobbes and Hume deny pure intellect, they both accept the existence of reason. There is, however, a significant difference between their conceptions of reason. Hobbes' reason is demonstrative though, as Lemetti argues, based on "the trayne of thoughts", imagination. Since Hobbes' conception of reason requires the invention of language, Hobbes needs a comprehensive theory, a philosophy of language. Language makes it possible for human beings to rise from the particular level of imaginations and "trayne of thoughts" into the general level of demonstrative reason – for Hobbes is a nominalist. Hume denies the existence of universal perceptions, too, but includes probable reasonings in his conception of reason together with demonstration. Hume's ground for the inclusion of probable reasoning is clear: matters of fact and the existence of things are not demonstrable (EHU 12.3.28). Since there is no higher faculty than imagination, Hume needs to explain probable reasonings as an operation of imagination. He does so by the cause-and-effect association. Reason is thus a sub-faculty of imagination for Hume. It is not a separate faculty in its own right. Hobbes also explains a kind of inference he calls "prudence", from the Latin "*prudentia*", by "the trayne of thought" that passes from causes to effects and vice versa. He does not, however, include prudence in reason. Thus reason is not a sub-faculty of imagination for Hobbes. Imagination is not a rational faculty for him, in contrast with Hume. For Hobbes reason is an acquired, not natural, faculty, separate from imagination but linked to it. Thus in a sense,

imagination is the classical intermediate faculty in Hobbes as Lemetti argues. It stands between sensation and reason but not between sensation and intellect. For Hume imagination is an intellectual faculty together with the senses and memory. The traditional operations of pure intellect, apprehension and judgement are operations of these three faculties in his theory. Those faculties form the faculty of understanding in the broad Humean sense derived from the middle Cartesian sense. As Lemetti shows, according to Hobbes, understanding is imagination. Therefore for him imagination is the intellectual faculty. *Summa summarum*, although there are differences in the details, there are significant similarities between Hobbes' and Hume's analyses of the mind, of imagination, of concepts, and of association or "trayne of thought" on the phenomenal level. Both share radical content empiricism, the conception of imagination as a reproductive and productive (empiricist), an associative, free, copying (sensations preserving) and intellectual faculty of mind. Both base these on the Copy Principle. The first three chapters of the *Leviathan* appear familiar when one has read Hume. The differences become more visible and significant when one passes to chapters 4 and 5. In chapter 4, Hobbes develops his theory of language and the fifth chapter is devoted to demonstrative reason and science. In a way, Hume's Treatise 1 and Enquiry 1 could be read as a development of the phenomenal analysis in the *Leviathan* I.1-3 (and *The Elements of Law* I.2-4). Still a profound difference between Hobbes and Hume ought not to be missed. The foundation of phenomenal analysis and that of the Copy Principle reveals the difference in their metaphysical commitments and view of the real nature of mind. Though we have discussed two British (content) empiricists, we have compared the Materialist of Malmesbury and the Experimentalist of Edinburgh.

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