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BEYOND THE POLITICAL RHETORIC
The UK's Position on its Participation in EU Civilian Crisis Management Post-Brexit - A Qualitative Content Analysis

ABSTRACT

Utilising the qualitative research method of document analysis, specifically employing an inductive form of qualitative content analysis, this study delves deeper in to the UK Government's position on the future of UK participation in EU Civilian Crisis Management (CCM) post-Brexit.

The UK's House of Lords' European Union Select Committee Inquiry Report of 2018 entitled: Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations laid the foundation for the study; with the UK Government response to it being systematically analysed in the expectation that it would provide further insight in to the UK Government's position on EU CCM and assist in understanding what the future of UK-EU CCM may look like in a post-Brexit world and why. The inquiry report which set in motion the response is briefly examined in this paper and similarly, the most recent full-scale review of UK foreign policy published by the UK Government in early 2021, entitled Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy is also considered.

The study found three underlying common themes because of their noticeable consistent recurrences throughout the response document, both explicitly and interpretatively. They encapsulate the most relevant points in the document when attempting to better understand the UK Government's standpoint. One theme was the UK Government's positive assessment of EU CCM and reiteration of shared UK-EU foreign policy interests; the second, its focus on the utility of other multilateral organisations aside from the EU; and the third theme, the UK Government's reluctance to accept anything other than an unprecedented Third State model. The alternative being the proposed participation on a case-by-case basis of which no real detail has yet been presented. In summary, this study suggests that the UK Government is 'hedging its bets' in an attempt to secure a role in EU CSDP and CCM matters akin to its role pre-Brexit either as standard practice or on a case-by-case basis. In a scenario where this was not to materialise, it seems likely that the UK would rather utilise the position it holds as part of the UN and NATO than participate directly with the EU within the current Third Country framework.

Keywords: civilian crisis management, qualitative content analysis, European Union, United Kingdom, Brexit

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCM	Civilian Crisis Management
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (EU)
CMPD	Crisis Management Planning Directorate (EU)
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (EU)
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy (EU)
EEAS	European External Action Service (EU)
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy (EU)
EU	European Union
EUSC	European Union Select Committee (UK House of Lords)
EUMC	European Union Military Committee (EU)
EUMS	European Union Military Staff (EU)
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council (EU)
HoL	House of Lords (UK)
HR	High Representative (EU)
MCM	Military Crisis Management
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability (EU)
MS	Member State (EU)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
PSC	Political and Security Committee (EU)
QCA	Qualitative Content Analysis
RoL	Rule of Law
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since the turn of the millennium, the value of utilising civilians in the area of civilian crisis management (CCM) (or conflict stabilisation) has become increasingly clear (Juergenliemk, 2011) and the demand for civilian expertise across the world is on the rise (Faleg, 2020). Over the two decades that have followed and with this developed understanding, the European Union (EU) has established an ever-growing number of international civilian missions and thus deployed an ever-growing number of civilians, working under mandates concerning policing to rule of law to security sector reform (SSR) and more. However, these civilian-led operations have received next to no attention from mainstream society or much of academia (Chivvis, 2010). This is most likely due to the relatively small scale of them and the ancillary nature of the work, with military operations having historically taken priority in terms of crisis prevention, peace building as well as post-conflict stabilisation (Nowak, 2006). Regardless, and despite some shortfalls specifically in Afghanistan, these missions are largely considered in a positive light (Chivvis, 2010) albeit modestly (Whitman, 2020). In recent years, EU Member States (MS) have proven their willingness to maintain and increase investment in CCM and are set to increase its capabilities moving in to the future (Smit, 2020). Given the United Kingdom's (UK) departure from the EU, the investment and practical aspects of EU-led CCM as well as UK CCM will, for better or worse, be strongly impacted (European Parliament, Policy Dept. for External Relations, 2018). The fact that there are at the time of writing, no ongoing negotiations on the future of EU-UK foreign, security and defence policy relations (Whitman, 2020), the situation is even more fraught with uncertainty.

Brexit

In a referendum held on the 23rd June 2016, the majority of voters in the UK chose to leave the European Union (EU) (Walker, 2021). It was three years prior that the UK Prime Minister of the day, David Cameron, discussed the future of the UK's membership of the political union, declaring that he supported an in-out referendum on the basis of a refreshed settlement for the UK, within the union. It was not until the 25th June 2015 at the meeting of the European Council that he would outline his proposal for the referendum to take place. The UK government referendum proposal became The European Union Referendum Act on the 17th December 2015 with it receiving Royal Assent (for readers unfamiliar with the UK's parliamentary procedures, "Royal Assent is the Monarch's agreement that is required

to make a Bill into an Act of Parliament. While the Monarch has the right to refuse Royal Assent, nowadays this does not happen; the last such occasion was in 1707, and Royal Assent is regarded today as a formality." UK Parliament, 2021). On the 22nd February 2016, Prime Minister David Cameron announces the 23rd June 2016 as the official date of the referendum. The outcome is widely known. Of the 33,551,713 votes, 48.1% (16,141,241) voted Remain whereas 51.9% (17,410,742) voted Leave (Walker, 2021). However, the matter was from far organised in actuality and it would take prolonged negotiations and numerous politicians to secure the democratic will of the British people on the 31st January 2020, the date when the UK officially left the European Union – Brexit: the British exit from the EU. A transition period lasting from 1st February – 31st December 2020 followed.

Brexit and EU Security, Defence and Foreign Policy

With the UK having been an integral member of the EU, the acts, policies, treaties and laws have had to be disentangled and decisions made as to what is kept and what is discontinued. The legislative and administrative repercussions of Brexit were and are, understandably widespread; it is no straightforward task for a country to separate from any political contract let alone from an entire political union and one as vast as the EU. This especially given the fact that the UK has been legally bonded to some form of European multilateralism for 47 years, including the years spent as an EU MS. Along with Germany and France, the UK was one of the three most significant members of and contributors to, the EU (Lehne, 2012), so its departure from the union will be noticeable across every aspect of the EU's mandate, both economically and practically.

The UK remains a major player and investor in the area of security and defence, not only within the EU where it has the largest defence budget and has in previous years contributed as much as 20 percent of the EU's force catalogue (Parliament. House of Lords, 2021) but on the global stage. The UK's retired EU membership status may well have substantial implications on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and more specifically in relevance to this thesis, the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), its Civilian Planning Conduct Capability (CPCC) and CCM endeavours.

The immediate implications of the UK now being a Third State (a country that is not a member of the European Union as well as a country or territory whose citizens do not enjoy

the European Union right to free movement (EEAS Wesbite, 2021)) with no formal agreement were noticeable from the outset. The UK is no longer has to support agreed EU CFSP positions; is no longer represented in EU institutions and is not a part of the decision-making process and although able to participate in discussions deemed relevant to the UK (by the EU), it will have no voting rights; the UK is no longer contributing financially to any CSDP initiatives; the UK can participate in EU-led missions and operations but it would require the EU's permission and would not be permitted to provide Commanders or heads of mission; the UK can no longer provide operational headquarters for CSDP activities, or serve as a framework nation (the nation providing the core command, staffing and logistics) for EU battlegroups; and it cannot provide the head of any operational actions taken under CFSP Council Decisions (Mills, 2020). Any potential inclusion of the UK as a decision maker is wholly unprecedented and threatens the very autonomy of the EU as a global actor (McArdle, 2020). This situation is further complicated then should the UK wish to be a part of the decision-making process and although at the time of writing this seems unlikely, this potential outcome is also considered and analysed in the study. It is clear that there are numerous challenges ahead regarding all aspects of the continued future of UK-EU relations and the area of foreign policy is no different.

Thesis

Given this unsure and unprecedented situation, this paper hones in on the civilian apparatus and capabilities within the CSDP specifically, attempting to understand the UK Government's standpoint aside from the officially stated and proposed 'ad-hoc' position, in that the UK will collaborate and cooperate with the EU's CSDP and CCM on a case-by-case basis where there are common interests (UK Govt, 2018). What does this mean for EU CCM in actuality? Is there more to the UK's official position that can be interpreted through its publications?

The evolution, current structure and aims of the CFSP, CSDP and all relevant EU CCM tools are explicated in the Background section to provide a contextual foundation. The comprehension of the relevant organisational and operational structure of the EU's civilian capacity, along with an understanding of the contributions made to it by the UK assists the reader in grasping the bigger picture. A recent report by the UK House of Lords European Union Select Committee (EUSC) entitled *Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy*

Missions and Operations is briefly evaluated in this paper. It lays the foundation for the study with the UK Government response to it being systematically analysed in the hope that it would provide further insight in to the UK Governments view of EU CCM and assist in understanding what the future of UK-EU CCM may be in a post-Brexit world and why. The most recent UK Government foreign policy review that followed and entitled *Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy* is also discussed.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. What is Civilian Crisis Management (CCM)?

The term 'civilian crisis management' has been in common use by the EU in both its documentation and rhetoric since 2000 when the European Council began to differentiate between military and civilian elements of crisis management (Santa Maria da Feira Summit Conclusions, 2000). Despite this, no concrete definition has been recognised or formulated by the EU (Kuhn, 2009); as such, it remains a somewhat malleable term/concept open to interpretation, something different depending on who it is discussed with and to which organisation you ask. Even the EU sanctioned handbook *In Control* which is provided to all personnel deployed on CCM missions does not include a definition but instead comments on 'crisis management', which can be either military or civilian in nature. Nowak (2006) notes that in part, the lack of an official EU-defined notion of CCM is potentially due to the lack of clarity when it comes to civilian peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities at the international level. In the same text, the sheer number of possible policies and instruments related to the civilian side of crisis management is another reason given for the lack of clarity. Nonetheless, 'civilian crisis management' as a concept was outlined in 2003 with the formation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); it referred to all non-military capabilities to be used in the completion of the European Union's foreign policy objectives. Again, nothing definitively specific. Greco, Pirozzi and Siklvestri (2016) explained CCM as primarily concerning the assisting in reforming of a state's security sector as well as rebuilding and/or developing the administrative capacity of that state. It was also noted that CCM missions range from assisting, monitoring, training or advising to performing executive functions in lieu of the local authorities. In an early EU report on CCM, it was described as 'the intervention by non-military personnel in a crisis that may be violent or non-violent, with the intention of preventing a further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its resolution' (Lindborg, 2002, p.4). Nowak (2006) highlighted that professionals working in the field of

CCM often distinguish between conflict prevention and crisis management with the former referring to activities before hostilities have occurred and the latter concerning activities after hostilities have occurred. What is meant by 'hostilities' is a whole other debate of definition and subjective interpretation that this paper will not fully address due to the tangent nature of the debate but it is worth touching on as this is yet another example of the difficulty of defining actions in this field. When does an action or behaviour *become* hostile? Who is authentically in a position to be the neutral arbitrator of when that action or behaviour becomes hostile? Unfriendliness and opposition are considered hostile according to its official definition but in the realm of conflict and interventionism hostilities are most likely perceived as armed conflict or the realistic possibility of armed conflict. Similarly, CCM itself is a term that has not existed without debate. How can one manage a crisis? Is a crisis something that can even be managed? According to official definitions, a crisis or crises, are times of intense difficulty or danger. More often than not, times of intense difficulty or danger are susceptible to significant volatility, changes in direction, and influenced by a whole host of unstable and unpredictable factors, including the emotional instability, unpredictability and reactiveness of human beings. Management and stabilisation are the terms used almost interchangeably when talking of CCM, to the point where the UK have called its department concerning CCM the 'Stabilisation Unit'. Attempts to stabilise a situation occur before, during and after a conflict and the word denotes the idea that attempts are being made to make a situation *more* secure or stable or *more* unlikely to change, fail or decline. Stabilisation does not suggest that everything is under control whereas management seems to suggest just that, or that everything being under control is achievable.

Regardless of the lack of a universal and official definition, it is important for the reader to know that the term CCM is particular to the EU and has no equivalent term in the lexicon of other international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) but is often interchangeably used with terms such as 'non-military crisis management', 'stabilisation', 'peacebuilding', 'resilience building' (Tardy, 2017). CCM is inclusive of a whole host of different elements and the subject matter a process, often consisting of multiple stages and multiple actors (Nowak, 2006). The fact that there is no agreed upon definition has caused some misunderstanding and confusion at the EU level though (ICG, 2001 in Nowak, 2006) and remains a label fraught with ambiguity outside the field itself. It is worth clarifying in regards to this paper then that although the UK does not use CCM as the term for its activities in the same field, to ensure

ease and understanding, CCM will be the term used for both the EU and UK. That said, there are occasions where actions that are stabilising and crisis managing in nature are used concurrently or interchangeably. It is also worth being aware of the fact that the EU seems to differentiate between crisis management missions and crisis management operations, with the former being civilian in nature and the latter having a military component (Kuhn, 2009). In Kuhn's (2009 p.253-254) writings, 'civilian crisis management is an instrument for international actors to help create the structures and capacities that enable the state to provide for the security and safety of its population. It is not a soft option for intervention but a fundamental element in building sustainable peace'.

For the purpose of absolute clarity, this study considers conflict stabilisation and CCM as per Tardy's (2017, p.9) succinct description: 'Civilian crisis management (CCM) describes a policy which involves the use of civilian assets to prevent a crisis, to respond to an ongoing crisis, to tackle the consequences of a crisis or to address the causes of instability.'

2.2. The development of a European foreign policy

In response to the horrors of the Second World War and the ever-present threat from an expansionist Soviet Union, a number of European nations (including the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg) recognised a need for a united European defence and foreign policy and formed the Western Union (WU) in 1948. This initial military alliance paved the way for further European integration. As Kaplanova (2016) documents well, a 1950 French proposal which came to be known as 'the Pleven Plan' was the initial attempt to build a multilateral European defence capacity and called for the establishment of a European army with troops from different nation states that would be under the control of a European ministry of defence and part of a European Defence Community (EDC). She explains that it was ultimately rejected as it was seen to discriminate against Germany, owing to the fact that its entire army would have been embedded with that European army with no allowance for its own. Despite such-like setbacks, the push for shared European defence and foreign policy capacities continued with the birth of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952 and the WU becoming the Western European Union (WEU) following the admittance of Germany and Italy in 1954. In 1970 the European Political Cooperation (EPC) brought in to being the European community's first coordinated foreign policy with it 'institutional[ising] the principle of consultation on all major questions of foreign

policy' (Bindi and Angelescu, 2012). This was by no means a centralised defence policy or foreign policy advocated for by states from all corners of Europe (Bindi and Shaprio, 2010) but it was the beginning of significant European powers beginning to transfer foreign policy-related powers from the national to the supranational (Dinan, 2014). It was not until the Cold War came to its final close in the early 1990s that an integrated defence and foreign policy truly began to come to fruition. Interestingly, the signing of the Petersburg Declaration (or Petersburg Tasks) in 1992 by the European powers of the Western European Union (WEU), the precursor to the EU - UK, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy, Spain, Portugal - included rescue and humanitarian tasks. Although this was meant in terms of military capabilities and played out with the deployment of joint European military units (Cameron, 2007), it arguably paved the way for significant civilian inclusion in overseas crisis management initiatives, with humanitarian and rescue objectives more than overlapping with the civilian world.

In 1993, from what was the European Economic Community (EEC), the Treaty of Maastricht founded the EU and introduced the 'three pillar system', as explored by Wagner (2005): 1. European Community; 2. Common Foreign and Security policy; and 3. Justice and Home Affairs. The EPC was replaced the by the second pillar, the CFSP, although this seems to have introduced no real changes to the EU's actions in the realm of foreign policy (Kaplanova, 2016). (The pillar system was the framework that all EU activities were allocated and worked within up until the EU obtained a legal personality and institutional structure in 2009 through the Treaty of Lisbon (EEAS Website, 2021); note, despite the dissolving of the three pillars framework the focus of these three pillars remained.) Three years post-Maastricht Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) agreed to the formation of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The ESDI was not part of the EU however and has drawn criticism from policy makers and academics alike with it being suggested that the ESDI was the EPC in all but name and by no means a European-wide, comprehensive, security, defence and foreign policy (Bindi and Angelescu, 2012). It is worth noting that even during these initial stages of centralising defence and foreign policy matters the UK were cautious if not reluctant partners (Cardwell, 2017), likely due to the aforementioned military prowess that the UK mustered individually, as well as its membership of a global community in the Commonwealth and the perceived threats to nation state sovereignty through closer political union with other European nations. An intriguing consideration given the political story of Brexit. In 1998, despite this political

caution, vocal opposition from a number of MPs and a faction of British media outlets, the UK signed the St Malo Declaration and agreed to the establishment of autonomous defence structures in situ and under the flag of the EU. This all but ushered in the incorporation of the ESDI by the EU and the renaming of it to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999. The justification for the St. Malo Declaration was explicit in its wording but alludes to the envisioning of a united EU military force in the future and thus, some form of expanded civilian apparatus to either support that force or to act autonomously in matters of foreign policy (Chivvis, 2010). As Deighton (2002) clarified, the EU must be capable of playing a full role on the international stage and in light of this, it needs to be able to operate autonomously, have the option to deploy a credible military force and a readiness as well as a willingness to do so, competent enough to act alongside other organisation such as NATO, thus honouring the obligations to those organisations and the international community when a crisis arises. The creation of the ESDP was fundamental in the furthering of the EU's capabilities in regards to planning and executing its crisis management enterprises (Grevi, Helly,, and Keohane, 2009) both militarily and civilian. This paper focuses on the civilian aspects of crisis management/post-conflict stabilisation but mentions military-related elements where necessary.

The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) was established at the turn of the millennium, made up of Member State (MS) dignitaries, it was to serve as an advisory body to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (Santa Maria da Feira Summit Conclusions, 2000). The PSC were ultimately responsible for civilian ESDP missions (Chivvis, 2010). In the first year of CIVCOM's existence it presented four core areas of priority in regards to CCM: policing; upholding and instilling the rule of law; strengthening civil administration; and strengthening civil protection. Chivvis (2010) describes the two additions of 2004 which were and are monitoring and the supporting of EU Special Representatives; there has also been a further addition of security sector reform (SRR) and other priorities as explored in Section 2.4. These core precepts have influenced and directed EU CCM missions ever since. It is worth noting that the importance of CIVCOM has come to be its aiding in furthering the appreciation and importance of civilian contributions to post-conflict stabilisation/civilian crisis management efforts (Dijkstra, Petrov and Mahr, 2008).
Enter, the Berlin Plus Agreements. With the memory of the September 11th 2001 Twin Towers terrorist attack in New York, USA, still vivid in the collective global imagination, by December 2002 the EU and NATO had introduced measures to govern their relations in all

aspects of crisis management (Kaplanova, 2016). With NATO now somewhat of an official partner to the EU in matters of security and defence, the Agreement broadened the scope of potential for EU operations and missions overseas.

> "Under these arrangements … the EU can either conduct an operation autonomously by making use of the operational headquarters of one of the member states or use NATO assets and capabilities. If it opts for the second alternative, the EU can ask for access to NATO's planning facilities, can request that NATO make available a NATO European command option for an EU-led military operation, and can request the use of NATO capabilities."
>
> (Keukeleire, p. 57, in Bindi and Angelescu (eds), (2012)

This was evident only a matter of months later as in 2003, the EU formulated and established its very first overseas mission with its civilian-led Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH), taking over from the UN's International Police Task Force which had been present since late 1995 (Di Mauro, Krotz and Wright, 2016). Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2010) highlight the primary objective of the EU mission as being centred on the mentoring, monitoring and inspecting of local Police methods and performance. Outside of the UN, this was the first CCM mission and thus, a period of testing for the EU: of relevant EU CCM concepts, procedures, capability and apparatus (Juncos and Blockmans, 2007). It is worth noting that in these early years, the EU CCM apparatus took over missions already established by the UN and in regards to the military element of crisis management, took over operations already established by either the UN or NATO. It is logical then that these early EU crisis management missions organised under the ESDP are deemed to have been complementary and supportive in their modus operandi and linked to the international security organizations of whom they replaced (Kaplanova, 2016).

As well as the first EU CCM deployment, 2003 saw the EU devise the European Security Strategy (ESS). The main focus of the document was to further and clarify EU foreign policy but in reality, it was more of a conceptual document than anything else (Kaplanova, 2016). The ESS officially defined global threats to the EU such as organised crime, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state collapse/failure, and regional conflicts. It defined the EU institutional framework in matters of foreign policy too. The ESS also outlined the three strategic roles of EU foreign policy more broadly: maintaining security for the

European region; the prevention of threat and conflict; enhancing the sustainable implementation of rule-based, multilateralism, within the EU and the wider international community (Sperling, 2014). The creation of an EU rapid response military force known as 'battlegroup' was another step forward in the EU's ambition to create a centralised, unified foreign policy as it would become the most significant aspect of military-led crisis management (Kaplanova, 2016).

Numerous ESDP missions both military and civilian in nature were established in the six years that followed. In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a new body by the name of the European External Actions Service (EEAS) which essentially acts as the EU's diplomatic service, and altered the name of the ESDP to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). A change in name reflecting the progress (depending whether you are for or against the centralisation of EU power that is) in regards to the political integration of MS when it comes to EU security, defence and foreign policy as now directed by the EEAS. The Treaty of Lisbon also ratifies the establishment of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which has been described as the most significant institutional innovation of EU CCM (Chivvis, 2010). Employing seventy CCM experts, the CPCC is the EU CCM headquarters, pivotal to the planning of missions and also responsible for operational support. It also provides constant tracking of mission development and situational analysis for its benefit as well as for reporting back to the PSC and High Representative. Although separate from the civilian-military planning unit situated on the EU Military Staff (EUMS), they coordinate closely. EU joint military-civilian operations have not yet materialised but there is aspiration to establish exactly that (Whitman, 2020). Nonetheless, by the work of the CPCC and a general consensus that the civilian missions thus far have largely been successful, the civilian missions continue to be established and professionals continue to be deployed. The scope and reach of EU CCM missions has broadened and increased since their inception; Graph 1.1 provides a visualisation of that growth evidenced by the increase in staff numbers from the inception of the first CCM mission in 2003 up until Brexit in January 2020. Di Mauro, Krotz, and Wright (2016) document civilian mission-related data up to 2015 well.

Figure 1: Increase in EU Civilian Personnel Deployments Jan 2003 -Jan 2020 by Mission
(Data from 2003-2004 sourced from Chivvis (2010, p.10). Data from 2005-2020 sourced
from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.)

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2.3. The UK as one of 'The Big Three'

Right up until its departure, the UK was one of the most significant and important members of the EU in terms of financial contribution, international diplomacy and foreign policy (both its unofficial leadership and direction). To someone unfamiliar with the inner workings of EU foreign policy, seemingly, it acts as a unified bloc with all 27-member states negotiating and discussing the relevant issues before unanimously making decisions; behind the scenes however there lies an unspoken agreement that the most powerful states with the most resources take the lead (Lehne, 2012). Pre-Brexit, the most powerful states with most resources were the UK, France and Germany – these three MS came to be known as 'The Big Three'. However, 'despite the UK's military power, it is not the biggest contributor to EU defence missions. UK engagement in CSDP missions has been relatively modest in comparison to its defence capabilities – ranking just fifth amongst contributors to CSDP military operations and seventh for CSDP civilian missions' (The Institute for Government, p.1, 2021).

Of all the member states within the bloc, The Big Three have the largest populations, largest economies, and in terms of foreign policy specifically, are in their own right three of the most powerful countries on the planet (Koenig, 2016). Aside from the EU or any other political union across the continent, these three MS are already global actors in their own right. This is why despite being one of the initial drivers behind a united European defence pact and then becoming a cornerstone of the EU, the UK has always remained steadfast in its scepticism and reluctance to fully endorse a united European defence mechanism (such as a European Army) or a legally binding EU foreign policy (Cardwell, 2017). All three countries can rely on their own international position, military might, technological capabilities, intelligence services, diplomatic networks and finances that are simply not available to the vast majority of MS. The UK and France are both founding members of the United Nations (UN); permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC); are prominent members of NATO sitting second and fourth in the rankings of military spending within the organisation (McCarthy, 2021) – the UK is the fifth highest spender globally (SIPRI, 2021); are nuclear weapon holding states; maintain regional influence in far flung areas of the world due to their colonial links remaining post-empire (with the UK's Commonwealth being of particular importance); and have vast, first-rate diplomatic networks (Koenig, 2016).

Additional factors compounding the international position of the UK in particular is that its native language of English is the language of international business and diplomacy; its Foreign and Commonwealth Office is regarded as the most effective of all European countries; its Department for International Development (DFID) is a key player in the international development sector; and, London is a financial centre of the world competing with any other international financial hub (Beard, 2021). As Hill (2019) notices, there has long been a feeling in the UK of: how does the UK and the British people benefit from being a member of the EU? In regards to foreign policy even more so.

In regards to Germany, despite its inhibitions in this area (Lehne, 2021), although it does not share each one of the assets in which France and the UK benefit, as well as the fact that recent historical trauma has actively constrained its foreign policy discounting it from the UNSC for example, according to McCarthy (2021) it remains the fourth biggest economy; a prominent member of NATO, sitting third in in the ranking of military spending within the organisation; and it also is the third biggest export nation in the world, bringing with it global prominence and influence which competes with any global power. Its military is vast, Frankfurt's financial district robust, and is a serious player on the global political stage as a member of the G7 and its presence across an array of international bodies from the UN to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and others.

> "Compared to the other member states, the Big Three have a clear lead in most categories. Together, they represent more than 40 percent of the EU's population (Germany with 16.3 percent, France 12.6 percent, and the UK 12.5 percent) and nearly half of the EU's GDP (Germany has 20.3 percent, France 15.8 percent, and the UK 13.8 percent). [At the time of writing], Germany seems to be economically in a preeminent position. This is likely to be a passing phenomenon, however, with longer term projections putting all three countries close together in the global economic rankings. With almost 60 percent, the three have the largest share of the EU's military expenditures—Germany at 16 percent, France at 21.4 percent, and the UK at 21.4 percent. In terms of foreign policy assets, just under 40 percent of the EU's diplomats work for the Big Three (Germany 12.5 percent, France 12.1 percent, the UK 14 percent), and those countries' diplomatic networks are the most extensive with together more than 750 bilateral and multilateral

diplomatic missions.' (Lehne, p.11, 2012, The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy)

Although the quoted study was conducted almost ten years prior to this thesis, the quotation intends to provide the reader with a basic awareness of the historical significance of the EU's Big Three (the UK in particular) in its broadest sense and ergo, more specifically, in regards to EU Foreign Policy (the CFSP) and EU CCM activities.

2.4. EU CCM Apparatus

To achieve a clearer and more in-depth understanding of the EU's foreign policy and what it is that the UK may or may not be a part of in the future, the following section takes the most relevant bodies and policies, explicates how each operates and what it is responsible for. Readers unfamiliar with the organisational structure of the EU may initially find its foreign policy arm complex; it is not necessarily essential to comprehend the intricacies of it when considering the UK's position but this study helps the reader in beginning to grasp what the UK has been a part of and what it is that the document being analysed is referring to.

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The CFSP is the most important apparatus to the European Union in achieving its wider objectives as an international actor. Established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the CFSP aims to preserve peace, strengthen international security, promote international cooperation as well as to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Directorate-General, European Commission, 2020). As well as it including the detailing of the overarching foreign policy strategy of the EU, it houses the institutions, tools, and personnel who plan and execute that strategy. The five priorities for EU foreign policy are: 'the security of the Union; state and societal resilience to the East and South of the EU; the development of an integrated approach to conflicts; cooperative regional orders; and global governance for the 21st century' (EEAS Website, 2021).

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

Originally known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as it has been known since the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 is a crucial element of the CFSP, providing a framework for political and military

structures (Vara, Wessel and Polak, 2020). It is specifically relevant to military and civilian operations and missions abroad whilst more broadly being key in the strive to achieve the EU's foreign policy objectives. The European Council (EC) makes the decisions in regards to the direction of the CSDP. As described on the EEAS website (2021), 'the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enables the Union to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of international security. It is an integral part of the EU's comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.' As with all elements of the EU's official foreign policy, the protection of international law, human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles are the main motivational factors behind any action, whether it be diplomatic or economic in nature (EEAS Website, 2021). This is reflected in the work undertaken through the CSDP both historically and currently, and either one or a combination of those elements is always the underpinning when deciding to establish overseas CCM missions.

As of late 2020/early 2021, roughly 2,000 staff work in the EU's CCM field, with 100 at its operational headquarters. The total cost of the civilian CSDP Missions is currently around €281 million/year (EEAS Website, 2021). CCM CSDP Mission Mandates are agreed unanimously by EU MS.

Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy Compact

The Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy Compact (CSDP Compact or The Compact) is a key initiative formulated by the EU in 2018 and ratified by all MS. The Compact plays an important part in fulfilling the EU's ambition in becoming a more effective contributor to security and peace on the global stage, done through its annual review process of CCM activities and individual MS contributions and commitments (Bottcher, 2020). The Compact's annual review process assesses implementation and performance of EU CCM missions whilst identifying shortfalls to help improve overall performance. It therefore assists in holding MS accountable for their support of civilian aspects of the CSDP. It also proposes how MS and the EU as a whole can improve on their CCM performance and contributions moving forward (Fiott and Theodosopoulos, 2020). As Faleg (2020) well documents, recent Compact conclusions have outlined three main commitments to be met by the summer of 2023. First, an increase in MS contributions to civilian CSDP activities (in all areas including staffing, training, and equipment) based on National Implementation Plans which includes an increase in the percentage of seconded national experts to at least 70% across CCM

missions. Secondly, the development of a more flexible, more effective and more responsive civilian CSDP by allowing: (a) modular and scalable mandates and tasks; (b) streamlined processes allowing for faster planning and decision-making steps; and (c) a reinforcement of the budget for missions. This has also seen MS commit to enhancing the EU's CCM responsiveness through the ability to launch a new mission deploying up to 200 personnel in only 30 days following a council decision (EEAS Website, 2021). Thirdly, the furthering of a more joined-up civilian CSDP. This has two main dimensions: one relates to the role of civilian CSDP within the comprehensive approach to EU crisis management. The other dimension relates to the reinforcing of cohesion and complementarity between the civilian CSDP, the Commission, and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) actors. The idea being to reduce work duplication and establish a clear division of labour and tasks between the two.

Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)

Responsible for the European External Action Service (EEAS) and all elements of EU foreign policy, defence, security, trade, development co-operation and humanitarian work, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) comprises of foreign ministers from all EU MS. It often also includes defence, development and trade ministers. Chaired by the HR, the council's main focus is defining the CFSP whilst ensuring unity, consistency and effectiveness of the bodies tasked with executing it. The FAC ultimately holds responsibility for the establishing of both military operations and civilian crisis management missions. The FAC meets monthly.

High Representative (HR)

December 1999 saw the European Council establish the 'High Representative' (HR) for the CFSP. A position held by one individual. Utilising numerous internal advisory bodies, the HR plays a key role in identifying relevant crises and is pivotal in making the decision/s in regards to the founding of crisis management missions both military and civilian (Chivvis, 2010). The HR is appointed by the European Council through a qualified majority vote (EEAS website, 2021).

European External Action Service (EEAS)

The European External Action Service (EEAS) is the diplomatic service and function for the EU, running the EU Delegations and offices around the world as well as assisting the HR to execute the CFSP (Vara, Wessel and Polak (eds), 2020). Introduced as part of the Lisbon

Treaty in 2009, it is divided in to five geographical areas of the world – Asia Pacific, Africa, Europe, Central Asia, the Greater Middle East and the Americas and its work covers global and multilateral issues including, for example, human rights, democracy support, migration, development, response to crises, plus administrative and financial matters (EEAS Website, 2021). The EEAS also has important Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) planning and crisis response departments (more on the CSDP in section 2.3.7.). The head of the EEAS is the HR.

Political and Security Committee (PSC)

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is a permanent body tasked with monitoring the everchanging international situation and recommending strategic approaches and policy options to the European Council (EC) (Vara, Wessel and Polak (eds), 2020). It ensures political control and strategic direction of civilian and military crisis management operations, discussing and providing guidance and advice to the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM – more on CIVCOM in section 2.3.5.); the Military Committee; and Politico Military Group (EEAS Website, 2021) – the latter two will not be explored further in this thesis due to being non-civilian in nature. The PSC was made a permanent fixture of the CFSP by the Treaty of Nice in 2003.

Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD)

The umbrella under which CCM missions and military operations are planned and conducted, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) ensures civil-military coordination (EEAS Website, 2021). The CMPD comprises of the Civilian Planning Conduct Capability (CPCC), responsible for oversight and planning of CCM missions, and the EU Military Staff (EUMS), responsible for oversight and planning of military operations (Gross, 2013). Housing both the civilian and military planning groups in the same department enhances civil-military coordination and enables a smoother, more comprehensive approach to not only joint civilian-military endeavours but to each individually as it promotes an understanding of what the other is doing and an awareness of the capabilities of the EU foreign policy toolkit (Gross, 2013).

Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)

The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) is a working body concerned with all aspects of the EU's civilian crisis management (CCM) activities. Working

parallel to the EU Military Committee (the advisory body regarding military aspects of EU crisis management), it is in regular contact with the PSC, providing expertise, recommendations and general information on all aspects of CCM (EEAS Website, 2021). The development of strategies and civilian capabilities more broadly that are to be utilised in CCM missions is also an aspect of its work. CIVCOM was established in 2000 by the European Council and is comprised of EU member state representatives (Tardy, 2017).

Civilian Planning Conduct Capability (CPCC)

As the EEAS Directorate, the Civilian Planning Conduct Capability (CPCC) serves as the permanent operational headquarters for the EU's civilian crisis management (CCM) endeavours (EEAS Website, 2021). Under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and the authority of the High Representative (HR), the CPCC is pivotal in regards to the planning and practical elements of setting up CCM missions and the implementation of all mission mandates and related tasks through effective coordination with all stakeholders of the CSDP (EEAS Website, 2021). The CPCC Head and Director is the EU's Civilian Operations Commander and exercises ultimate control and command for the operational planning and conduct of all CCM missions. The CPCC communicates with and often works alongside the Military Planning Conduct Capability (MPCC) - the military equivalent of the CPCC.

Committee of the Contributors (CoC)

The Committee of the Contributors (CoC) are regular meetings designed for MS representatives to discuss all problems relating to day-to-day mission management as well as oversight of missions. They can also be called in times of an emergency. They include representatives of all MS; representatives of those Third Countries participating in the mission and/or contributing to it; and provision for a representative from the Commission to attend if required. Important discussion points are shared with the PSC. The HR is the chair of the CoC.

**Additional point of interest: European Peace Facility (EPF)**

An EU initiative established in 2021, the European Peace Facility (EPF) is described in Fiott and Theodosopoulos (2020) and on the EEAS Website (2021) as a new financial instrument that will contribute to the EU's foreign policy capabilities, focusing on strengthening international peace and security by complementing CSDP activities. It has been allocated a

separate budget of five billion Euros from 2021-2027, meaning that there is now a single source for the financing of all CFSP actions relating to military and defence. Despite this military and defence focus, it is not entirely clear that CCM activities will not be impacted especially considering the civil-military integrated approach moving forward. 'The EPF closes a gap in the EU's ability to provide military and defence assistance, improving the capacities of partners to address crises, prevent conflicts and cater for their own security and stability – to the benefit of their population' (EEAS EPF Factsheet, 2021).

2.5. EU CCM Missions

Every ESDP/CSDP mission/operation ever established has followed an invitation from the host country (Tardy, 2017). Ultimate responsibility over the decision to launch a CCM mission lies with the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) which is chaired by the High Representative (HR). The FAC meets monthly for updates on and to discuss the ongoing global situation and ongoing mission/operation performance as well as information concerning whether there be the necessity for any other CCM mission/s, which is then debated and discussed. The FCA is in close contact with a number of advisory bodies who are tasked with the constant monitoring and assessing of the international situation, most importantly the PSC. The PSC is supported by a whole host of expert committees and advisory bodies itself. These committees and bodies monitor the international situation and any possible crisis within the framework of the EU's foreign policy objectives, knowing that the justification for a mission must support the overall aims of the CFSP. The PSC then debate and consider the information presented. Following this, a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) is drawn up by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) detailing the strategic vision and environment for which a mission or operation will exist. This strategy is then presented to the PSC who consider and debate the matter further before seeking a firm political decision to be taken by the FAC. This decision made by the FAC supports the proposition advised by the PSC and acts as the official call for the establishment of the mission/operation. The FAC's decision on whether to launch or extend a mission is published in the Official Journal of the European Union (Stabilisation Unit, 2014). Following this decision, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is established by the EEAS, officially outlining the justification of the mission. Finally, a phase of detailed operational planning is undertaken by the Head of Mission and the appropriate expert committees. This process can be summarised in four stages: (1) political assessment of potential crisis area

followed by the discussions at the PSC and FAC level; (2) the drafting of the Crisis Management Concept; (3) CONOPS; (4) the detailed planning of a mission or operation followed by its establishment. At the time of writing, the total number of CSDP CCM missions number eleven (EEAS Website, 2021) but 'the days of large civilian missions such as the ones the EU deployed to Kosovo, Georgia and Bosnia are now behind us. These have given way to smaller advising and capacity-building efforts' (Pietz, p.1, 2018). Figure 2 demonstrates the wide array of civilian missions in 2020, the deployment date of each and rough staff numbers (Figure 2 sourced from EEAS Website, 2020, in Fiott and Theodosopoulos, 2020):

Mission Mandates

The justification for the establishment of an EU CCM mission becomes its mandate (Chivvis, 2010). What the mission is there for, what it aims to achieve and who it supports, plus how

it benefits the EU and its MS are the key considerations to be met before a mission receives approval. There are numerous Civilian CSDP Priority Areas (Juncos, 2020) with now four key mandates in which EU CCM missions have and are justified by, with some missions tasked with working either one of them or a number of them. This is entirely dependent on the situation (or crisis) in question and the needs of the relevant organisations within that conflict. Figure 3, below, reflects the change in priority of the civilian CSDP over time followed by the key mandates being outlined.

(Figure 3: Data Council of Europe (2019),
in Juncos (2020). 'Beyond civilian power? Civilian CSDP two decades on')

Policing

The most important EU CCM missions thus far have been those with a policing mandate - this is observable by the fact that there have been more police missions than any other type of CCM mission and that there has been more police advisors deployed than any other

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professional (Chivvis, 2010). As the EEAS website (2021) reflects, the sheer number of police missions demonstrates the focus that the EU gives to policing and in turn, the rule of law. These types of missions are centred on advising and mentoring local police in regards to their day to day practices and overarching direction. They are also attentive to building the confidence of the local police, helping to develop interethnic police forces and nurturing a cooperation between those ethnic groups, fighting organised crime and just as importantly, assisting in furthering the professionalism and overall quality of that local police force/service (Juncos and Blockmans, 2018). The EU has sent police missions to Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Central, Western and Northern parts of Africa, and the Middle East (specific mission locations can be found in Graphic 1.1 at the end of Section 2.4).

Rule of Law

Missions with a full Rule of Law (RoL) mandate or with an inclusion of RoL aspects have been established in Georgia and Iraq with the Kosovo mission also including RoL elements (Chivvis, 2010). Those missions with this mandate are concerned with aiding the democratisation process of the country in question which incorporates advising and strengthening local government as well as judicial and prison reform. It has also included the combining of police training and training of judicial and prison officials, demonstrating EU efforts to provide a comprehensive approach to its CCM efforts. Efforts in a joined-up fashion that increase the capabilities of the local organisations tasked with implementing and upholding the RoL, and if necessary, attempting to eliminate any adversarial or competitive culture that can exist in a country that may be struggling or overwhelmed by conflict and/or law and order issues.

Civilian Administration

Missions with mandates of Civilian Administration related objectives are often smaller in scale and rely on EU civilian or military advisors being placed in third country government administrations for advisory purposes (Chivvis, 2010). The concept centres on the EU providing well-seasoned, expert personnel to contribute and/or lead capacity building ventures which improve efficacy of Civil Administrative bodies.

Security Sector Reform

The EU has engaged in Security Sector Reform (SSR) since the very inception of its CCM ambitions. Gross (2013 p.7) defines the EU's SSR actions as 'strengthening and reforming

those institutions that are key to maintaining security and the rule of law under conditions of local ownership and democratic accountability … representing a holistic approach to the reform of state security institutions.'. The EU conducts its SSR through the EEAS; its crisis management apparatus both military and civilian; as well its financial instruments (such as the European Development Fund, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, and the Instrument for Stability) funding salaries through the UN; support[ing] police reform; or funding capacity building organisations e.g. the African Peace Facility (Gross, 2013). The intent is improving, updating, modernising, streamlining a country's security apparatus addressing issues such as corruption, efficacy, institutional instability and incapacity, weak governance and institutional resilience.

Additional Priorities:

The CSDP Compact has also added new specific priorities that CSDP civilian elements should be prepared to tackle (Faleg, 2020), 'as it strives to craft future mandates which are tailor-made, flexible, modular and scalable thus finally providing missions in the field with the means to react to changing circumstances' (Pietz, p.2, 2018). These are as follows: countering **organised crime,** furthering **border management**, preventing **terrorism and radicalisation**, **violent extremism**, **irregular migration**, enhancing **maritime security**, tackling **hybrid threats**, improving **cyber security**, and preserving and protecting **cultural heritage**

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section is a review of the pertinent literature related to the research topic. As with any literature review, this is an evaluation and understanding of the existing relevant work to aid the researcher in identifying gaps to focus the study on, or identifying areas to further, given the passing of time in which more evidence and knowledge has come to light (Arshed and Danson, 2015). It also ensures that work is not being repeated and that the study attempts to add something original to the existing literature (Bryman, 2016).

Literature not considering EU CCM

There is not a substantial amount of literature on the repercussions of Brexit on both UK and EU CCM activities specifically. Foreign, external security and defence policy barely featured in the 2016 Brexit referendum campaign or the British government's lengthy pre-referendum report (UK Cabinet Office 2016a, 2016b in Bond, 2020) and given the fact that the UK has decided not to pursue further negotiations with the EU on anything related to future foreign security and defence policy relations post-Brexit (Whitman, 2020; Bond, 2020), the position of both governments is somewhat vague and unspecified. Other talking points such as trade and commercial relations take priority and even within the realm of CFSP, when crisis management is discussed the focus is more often than not on matters concerning its military elements and operations (Juncos, 2020). Given the UK's strengths in areas concerning foreign policy, global resources and military resources, there was an early recognition that this could be used as a means of facilitating negotiations in other areas (Cardwell, 2017). This vagueness and military-focus from both parties understandably make it difficult for any commentator either academic or otherwise to draw a forgone conclusion on the future of CCM post-Brexit. That and the obvious hurdle of the future being rather difficult to call, by its very nature.

It is noticeable when researching the existing literature on this topic that most studies employ a more general approach than this one, in that they usually tackle the subject by starting with the effects of Brexit on the wider CFSP, CSDP, then military crisis management (MCM) individually before possibly touching upon the CCM aspect. Even within these more general studies, at times CCM is ignored entirely, or alternatively, they discuss 'crisis management',

failing to consider the differences between military operations (MCM) and civilian missions (CCM).

Faleg (2020), among other writers, explains how crisis management is rarely prioritised in political debates – even more so the element of CCM. He is also yet another commentator to highlight how the field is forever overshadowed by conversations concerning the defence sector, with CCM fading in to the background, falling down the list of priorities. The less political direction on the matter the more difficult it becomes to ascertain what the future holds for UK-EU CCM. Aside from this but of importance, he adds that the EU's CCM strategic ambitions are chronically undermined by capability limitations with the focus being on military manoeuvres; these capability limitations in themselves are a contributory element to the lack of CCM prioritisation it seems.

Separating the military and civilian elements may not be of as much importance in the future if the EU continues to emphasise a more integrated approach to crisis management but historically and to the present day they seem to largely remain separate endeavours with often overlapping elements, as opposed to a cohesive unified tool. Despite the existence of the CMPD, as highlighted in Section 2.4.6., and more recent closer civil-military working ties, the utilisation of the military in some pre-mission civilian training spheres and parallel efforts to stabilise a given situation, there are still two distinct and separate modus operandi and chains of command, and likely, two distinct and separate outlooks on what crisis management or stabilisation efforts should look like. Serrano (2020) discusses at length the ever-growing importance of a further civil-military integrated approach for the EU that may change this.

The literature that does consider CCM (whether that be alongside MCM and the issues concerning defence or as mentioned prior, as an after-thought to MCM and defence) highlight the difficulty in attempting to ascertain what the revised specifics of the relationship could be and how that relationship may come to work in practice. Although much of the work does not focus on the repercussions for CCM specifically they do offer informed assessments to help in understanding the wider picture (i.e. financial repercussions of Brexit on CFSP-related activities) as well as implications regarding directly linked issues (i.e. the effects on military operations and/or Frontex and issues relating to border management). The common approach implemented in most of the work on the subject is to utilise the minimal available information and grey political discourse, analyse and interpret both before

presenting potential scenarios in which the author deems the most likely of outcomes. These scenarios can then be applied to CCM if they do not already consider it explicitly but this can only provide us with limited insight as many facets of EU MCM are not quite comparable to its CCM, as explored in earlier sections. The scenarios are useful for envisioning not only what the future of the EU's crisis management activities may look like but to a certain extent what CCM as a foreign policy tool may look like in a post-Brexit world for both the UK and EU, in partnership, as well as for them both individually. Some of these scenarios are discussed in the remainder of the paper.

Interestingly and in spite of the main body of literature mentioning a more important role for CCM in the future, Pietz (2018, p.2) inadvertently proposes that why there seems to be a lack of focus on CCM (at least in more recent years) is because of its lesser importance going forward. He comments that EU CCM missions 'have been a key instrument for international crisis management' but as highlighted earlier in the paper, follows up his positive observations by stating 'the days of large civilian missions such as the ones the EU deployed to Kosovo, Georgia and Bosnia are now behind us. These have given way to smaller advising and capacity-building efforts, such as EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUTM Somalia or EUTM in the Central African Republic (all with less than 200 personnel)'. He clarifies his position that EU CCM is expiring as its missions are fewer in number and significantly downscaled and writes 'It is therefore high time for the EU and its member states to think carefully about the future of civilian CSDP' (Pietz, 2018, p.2). Contrastingly, Serrano (2020, p.26) takes a different view as in his description of the CSDP, including its civilian elements, described it as 'a powerful instrument in the EU toolbox and … a very flexible and versatile tool that very few international actors possess', going further, following up on his glowing remarks, by stating: '20 years since the establishment of the civilian dimension of the CSDP there are still reasons to believe that this will continue to be a key instrument in the EU's toolbox and might even achieve a more equal status to that of the military dimension over time. Civilian CSDP chimes well with the EU's goals of developing an integrated approach to conflict and crises.' Acknowledging and justifying the fewer missions and downscaling of them when writing that 'even though we have witnessed fewer deployments, the EU has done much to deepen the effectiveness of its CSDP missions and operations.' (Serrano, 2020, p.53). At odds with Pietz's (2018) point of view and offering an opinion that would suggest *more* literary and research interest in CCM not less due to its growing importance in to the future. Aside from interpreting Pietz's writing as to why there may be a lack of CCM-

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focused literature, when compared with the sheer amount of literature and research that focuses on the CSDP's military arm and the EU defence sector more broadly, CCM quite clearly receives nowhere near as much attention and analysis.

UK's modest contribution to EU CCM

The UK House of Lords EU Select Committee (HoL EUSC) reports document the UK's personnel and financial contribution to the CSDP using figures provided by the UK Government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Other personnel figures collated by Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) have also been studied. It is made clear that in regards to personnel, the UK has not supplied numbers in proportion to its population size. The HoL EUSC report (2018) calculate that the UK has contributed staff to 25 of the EU's 35 past CSDP missions with its average personnel contribution per mission being 15.72. It was measured that across all CSDP missions and operations from 2003-2019, only 2.3% of total MS personnel contributions were British; when a mission or operation did have British personnel contributed, on average they made up 4.3% of staff. These contributions are deemed modest in the report and thus by the Upper House of the UK Parliament with the figures comparable to Greece in terms of overall staffing contribution since 2003. Significantly, the reports concede that there was 'no doubt that many Member States have brought a greater contribution than the UK' and that the UK's 'practical contribution in terms of personnel [was] limited' (House of Lords EUSC Report, p.38, 2019). The reports consider the reasons for such low staffing contributions noting increasingly scarce national resources and the opportunity cost of deploying UK experts – specific reference is made to this being the case in regards to EU CCM missions with the opportunity cost being the loss of expertise that could be utilised towards other national objectives and priorities. It is suggested that the low personnel contribution could also be due to the activities that the UK is involved in apart from the EU, either of its own volition, through other coalitions and/or through NATO and the UN. Serrano (2020, p.22) highlights the viewpoint of the UK in regards to EU military ambitions and the existence of NATO, with the UK arguing that the expansion of an EU military 'would create unnecessary duplication with NATO ... clear in wanting to limit the scope of the EU's ambitions.' Although not explicitly written, parallels can quite possibly be drawn on the UK's viewpoint of EU CCM and the civilian activities of the UN, hence the lack

of commitment. Even more telling is the inclusion of the possibility that the lack of personnel contribution is actually political. In line with what has already been mentioned in this study and what has become somewhat of a recurring theme, the UK Government's scepticism of EU security, defence and foreign policy has materialised in a lack of willingness to commit serious resources and personnel numbers to EU CCM. Raised in a 2016 HoL debate, the case was presented that the UK has always valued the flexibility of EU membership in the area of foreign policy which permitted the UK to 'use those tools in pursuit of [UK] foreign policy priorities where they are most appropriate and to pursue other routes where they are not' (House of Lords EUSC Report, 2016). Below, in Figure 4, the UK's rather small personnel contributions make up but a minor percentage of the EU total:

Figure 2: EU Crisis Management Personnel Contribution by Year, UK/Non-UK Split 05-20. (Data sourced from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.)

The Global Europe Centre, a UK-based research centre concerned with Europe and its challenges noted that as the UK's personnel contribution levels to CCM missions have been 'relatively low', the UK's departure from the EU would not be burdensome as it would not significantly impact personnel figures (HoL EUSC Report, 2018). If the matter was exclusive to personnel figures then this statement would be understandable but the qualitative and financial contributory factors are too much to ignore so their conclusion is questionable.

It is important to understand that the UK Government's view is that its primary contribution to CSDP civilian missions has been advisory and guiding in nature. As per the *UK House of Lord's European Committee Inquiry Report: Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations* discussed in Section 6.1*,* it has been suggested that the UK has been more of a 'manager' than a 'player' when it comes to CSDP activities, with the UK having provided a small number of personnel to fill the most senior and influential roles; whilst leveraging its role on the UN Security Council, of which it is a permanent member, to secure authorisation for EU missions and operations (House of Lords EUSC Report, 2018). Its participation in EU foreign policy then also coming in the form of utilising its own independent standing and authority on the world stage – a strategy simply unavailable to the vast majority of other MS.

CCM missions have historically been financed directly by the EU budget and are included in the FAC's final authorisation to establish a mission - revised if propositions are put forward to alter or expand a mission (Fiott and Theodosopoulos, 2020). According to that same HoL EUSC Report (2018) the UK contributed approximately 15% to the funding of EU CCM missions. A substantial contribution. As an additional point of interest, much like the EU's CCM missions, EU-led military operations receive fewer UK personnel in comparison to other MS too but UK financial contributions account for 16% of the entire budget of military operations. Again, a substantial contribution. It is important to remember then that the contribution to EU crisis management in its broader sense encompasses not only quantitative measures in the form of staffing but finance too; as well as qualitative contributions, which are always more difficult to ascertain. Koenig (2016, p.4) is convinced that UK contributions are considerable enough to describe their lack of involvement going forward as 'the loss of an experienced diplomatic heavyweight and active driver behind EU foreign policy.' Despite this, given its population size, economic prowess and global presence, it seems fair to assert that the UK has contributed to EU CCM less than other MS in relation to their population sizes, economies and international standing.

The UK's historical reluctance to support further centralised EU foreign policy

Within the literature there is consensus on the UK's historical reluctance to support further centralised EU foreign policy. Lehne (2021) recognises this incidence highlighting the UK's general reservations about the objective of an EU CFSP as well as the fact that 'over the last decade, with an increasingly Eurosceptic Tory party in charge in London, the UK

downscaled its conceptual and operational involvement … [and] as for civilian and military operations … the UK disengaged long before Brexit'. Cardwell (2017) draws attention to the consistent historical claims made by the UK that EU foreign policy should only go so far and must exist alongside national policy. He adds that even prior to the Brexit referendum, the UK has been one of the MS actively preventing further integration of EU foreign policy and has done so very publicly. Despite being one of the original European states that pushed for a unified and united defence and foreign policy post-World War Two, as detailed in Section 2.3, even as a MS the UK has historically shown reticence in conforming to a comprehensive EU foreign policy (Tonra, 2019). And despite the UK having generally played a positive role in the recent evolution of a European-wide foreign policy, having been a key player in what was the ESDP and now the CSDP (Whitman, in Brummer (ed), 2006), they have nonetheless remained been steadfast in this aforementioned reticence to conform to a comprehensive EU foreign policy. As George (2000) makes clear, the UK has always been against parts of integrational processes that it deems to threaten its national sovereignty, with its historical Euroscepticism having been a consistent position to the point in which it has earned itself the title of 'awkward partner'.

UK-based reluctance to sign up to further political integration with the EU is widely acknowledged in political circles, academic literature and popular culture. The reasons behind *why* this may be the case are deemed of secondary importance to this study and will not be explored in serious detail. It is worth noting however that the reluctance to further integrate in to the political union of Europe resulted from a whole host of factors: the idea of maintaining national sovereignty, as written by Gee (2016), Auer (2017) and Hobolt (2016); of British exceptionalism as noted by Daddow (2018), Crozier (2020), Nedergaard (2018); the idea of a forgotten UK working class who have suffered the cons of the EU project as highlighted by McKenzie (2017; 2018), Outhwaite (2017), Telford and Wistow (2020); the implications of a Eurosceptic UK establishment described by McCrary (2016) and Cornelissen (2021); the independent might of the UK as described in Section 2.3; as well as numerous other factors. In regards to CCM specifically, it seems that this was of little importance in the UK's reluctance to further integrate in to the EU with military matters superseding its civilian. CCM makes up but a part of the UK-EU CFSP and CSDP activities and with the UK deciding not to contribute to EU CCM, in-line with the its capacity to do so anyway, it just simply is not of that much of a priority when compared with other mechanisms

at its disposal in achieving its foreign policy objectives as well as its other endeavours with other international actors (House of Lords EUSC Report, 2018).

Interestingly, it is important to note, as Allen (2005) does in his work, that the UK has not been the only reluctant MS when it comes to centralising more EU foreign policy capabilities. In areas where France and Germany were concerned that their domestic concerns would be affected they vetoed the application of qualified majority voting and it became clear 'that they had been 'free riding'; that is, hiding behind Britain's obstruction of further integration. Of just as much interest is the data obtained by the European Social Survey (Fitzgerald and Sibley, 2016) in the immediate run-up to the Brexit vote which found numerous interesting insights that show the general view and perception of the EU by the European public. Figure 4 shows an example question from the European Socialurvey:

Should European unification go further or has it already gone too far?

Country	Mean score (0 = Already gone too far, 10 = Should go further)
Spain	5.7
Lithuania	5.6
Poland	5.6
Israel	5.4
Slovenia	5.3
Portugal	5.3
Germany	5.3
Denmark	5.1
Netherlands	5.0
Belgium	4.9
Estonia	4.8
Hungary	4.7
France	4.7
Sweden	4.6
Switzerland	4.6
Ireland	4.6
Norway	4.4
Czech Republic	4.3
Finland	4.3
United Kingdom	3.9
Austria	3.6

(Figure 4, ESS, *The UK in the European Context,* p.2, Fitzgerald and Sibley, 2017)

What can we understand from such-like surveys? The UK was not and is not alone when it comes to general scepticism of further integration of the political union that is the EU. It may also tell us that nation state governments within the EU do not always reflect the view of the

general public – most surprisingly, the low placing of Finland in response to the given question. Finland seem as pro-EU as any other smaller nation in the bloc and along with its Nordic neighbours has pushed for the development and growth of the EU, particularly its CCM projects since partaking in its inception. According to this survey, after Austria and the UK, the Finnish public is the most likely to believe that the EU has gone too far in its efforts to integrate the European continent. In essence, what this does show is that there is scepticism or an amount of reticence across Europe when questions of further integration are posed.

Separately, but along the same lines, Cardwell (2017) highlights mixed messages coming from the EU as well as the UK since Brexit and references the EU negotiating guidelines for Brexit highlighting that the EU states that it 'stands ready to establish partnerships in areas unrelated to trade… against terrorism and international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign policy', which for him demonstrates that CSDP matters, including CCM, are not primary areas of concern during any Brexit negotiations which suggest a reluctance on the part of the EU to partner with the UK. Much like the UK's reluctance to integrate or partake as a MS. The political rhetoric alludes to cooperation, collaboration and unity with the UK post-Brexit but with no proposition of how to go about it. Similarly, he discusses the one of seven 'future partnership' papers on foreign policy, defence and development published pre-2017 by the UK Government which envision a deep, new and special partnership with 'the UK and EU's foreign policy priorities appear[ing] to be almost completely aligned' (Cardwell, 2017, p.21) but each fall entirely short of setting out an actual arrangement. Is this reluctance but on behalf of the British as a non-MS just as it had been as a MS? One may argue that the onus is on the UK to propose the way forward seeing as they left the union however out of the respect for the democratic process of Brexit, two professional political bodies, the UK and EU Governments, representing the people, should come together for the benefit of all Europeans and organise how the future will be. Whether they agree with Brexit or not. This also intersects with the next section on the gap between political rhetoric and actual real political action.

UK and EU rhetoric suggests a close partnership is desired by both parties but this does not seem to be the case in actuality

A point highlighted throughout the literature is the fact that foreign policy has not been at the forefront of the Brexit negotiations (which is a mere statement of fact as opposed to an in-depth insight) but more interestingly is that there seems to be a common and recurring theme that emphasises the difficulty in reconciling the rhetoric of the UK and EU with what is practically realistic, the direction it is taking in actuality and even what is permitted by current EU law. To all matters of foreign policy that is, including those relating to CCM. McArdle's (2020) analysis of the situation highlights how in their rhetoric the UK and EU appear to agree that continued close partnership, particularly in the areas of the CFSP, including the CSDP, is both necessary and desirable; however, she also notes that despite statements reiterating collaboration and flexibility post-Brexit on both sides of the English Channel, there remains a lack of clarity and anything concrete. There are a number of complexities to be navigated that need careful consideration (Cardwell, 2019). The fundamental tension stemming from the fact that the UK ultimately desires for disintegration from the EU whereas the EU desires to protect its integration – or, the UK seeking to 'protect' its sovereignty and the EU seeking to 'protect' its autonomy (McArdle, 2020). Cirlig and Puccio (2018) compound this view as they agree that although both the UK and the EU have publicly stated their wish to continue the partnership in to the future, a vital difference surfaced in preliminary talks. The UK has remained steadfast in calling for a special status, one which goes further and deeper than any other existing third-country partnership, whereas the EU has centred its approach on existing models with other non-EU states (Bond, 2020). The existing UK Political Declaration (PD) on the Future Relationship commits to 'ambitious, close and lasting cooperation' in Security and Defence, including matters of civilian crisis management (CCM), highlighting the desire for significant participation but there remains nothing official or legally binding. This was reiterated on the 14th January 2021, in a HoL debate on EU-UK cooperation, with a UK government spokesperson stating:

> "we have agreed with the European Union that we shall co-operate on current and emerging global issues of common interest, including co-ordinating positions and maintaining dialogue in multilateral organisations. We do not need overly institutionalised formal arrangements or a treaty framework within the EU to continue to co-operate closely with allies on foreign policy matters,

including EU member states. We shall continue to discuss shared foreign policy challenges and threats and we look forward to a future relationship based on constructive co-operation between sovereign and independent allies.

(Parliament. House of Lords, 2021, p.2)

Thus, since the 1st January 2021, the UK is under no obligation to support previously agreed upon CFSP positions (Mills, 2020). 'There is now no official framework in place through which the UK and EU can develop and coordinate joint responses to emerging foreign policy challenges' (Parliament. House of Commons, 2021, p.2). As it stands then, the UK government envisages an ad hoc approach, participating in operations/missions it deems worthwhile. As mentioned, as the UK is now a non-EU member and with the transition period having ended in 2020, officially it is but another third state when dealing with the EU. Vara, Wessel and Polak (2020) agree with McArdle's (2020) standpoint stating that:

'The United Kingdom has frequently indicated that Brexit should not lead to a complete detachment from the European Union's foreign, security and defence policy, but that in this area EU membership should be replaced by a new security partnership, 'that is deeper than any other third country partnership and that reflects our shared interests, values, and the importance of a strong and prosperous Europe'.

(Vara, Wessel and Polak (eds), p.199, 2020, The Routledge Handbook on the International Dimension of Brexit)

Wessel (2019) emphasises that the UK's wish is to continue to participate in the CFSP post-Brexit akin to their participation pre-Brexit, labelling their desire to do so as wanting a 'friends with benefits' relationship. Of importance though is the fact that his work considers the legal questions and restrictions that present themselves which are set to stifle those ambitions. EU primary and secondary law disallow the UK to maintain its prior position, especially in regards to the CFSP decision making process, which in turn implicates CSDP and CCM decision making process. Tammiko and Ruohomaki (2019) note that despite the drive for reforming the key EU security instruments, there seems to be little interest in reforming the decision-making structures regarding them. If there is little hope of decision-making structures being amended the UK is unlikely to be offered special dispensation in regards to remaining in a decision-making role. Moreover, the reality of the matter is what the UK states

as it wanting for the future is at odds with not only what the EU deems to be appropriate in light of other third countries and their participation but what is currently legal (Cardwell, 2017).

Of worthwhile consideration is Bond's (2020) and Whitman's (2020, p.224) highlighting of the 'striking characteristic of the current EU-UK relationship … that it is focused almost entirely on the current and future trading relationship… and it is notable that there are no ongoing negotiations on the future of the EU-UK foreign, security and defence policy relationship'. The latter explains how the Council of the European Union initially intended for new EU-UK foreign policy arrangements to have been agreed and come in to force well before the transition period came to an end as stated in its official Article 127.2 but that has not come to fruition. Interestingly, he also highlights the surprise of the EU when the UK decided not to negotiate the future of foreign, security and defence despite the jointly agreed upon Political Declaration drawn up before Brexit. The Political Declaration contained propositions on the terms and conditions of a foreign, security and defence policy post-Brexit in areas such as sanctioning, the defence industry and research, consular matters, UK presence at EU foreign minister meetings and even potential UK participation in EU military operations. It was seemingly the perfect foundation for negotiations that were foreign policy related to begin from. Where does the UK stand in relation to the EU in matters concerning foreign policy now then? How do they propose to work with or alongside the EU in regards to the CSDP more broadly and in CCM missions specifically? Answers that seem to be wanting even well after the UK officially left the EU and despite UK Government official statements of commitment.

Whitman (2020) noted the importance of how the EU has been explicit since 2016 about its move towards further strategic autonomy in matters concerning its CFSP. Much like the UK, its concept 'Global Britain' and a focus on non-EU partners, the EU and its publication 'Global Strategy' emphasises its ambition to enhance its position as a key global leader in security and defence; a strategy that went as far to indicate a move towards the formation of an EU defence union. However, the key point here is that these developments are progressing without the necessary consideration of the position and participation of third countries. Including the UK. Wessel (2018) also picked up on this issue and writes of how the EU is in fact more concerned about creating a precedent for working with Third States (ex-MS or not) in this field. By permitting the UK to have a role that goes further than the

roles that existing third countries are currently working to the EU may open a proverbial can of worms; a can of worms in which existing third countries begin to ask for similar treatment, access, dispensation. This is compounded by it not wanting to allow the UK to utilise its contribution to European security and defence as leverage in other areas of the Brexit negotiations, specifically trade (Whitman, 2002). The irony does not only lay with the EU's Global Strategy being published in the month of the Brexit vote, June 2016, but also the UK's forthright and repeated line of a 'Global Britain' post-Brexit. The EU pushing its Global Strategy and the UK pushing its Global Britain seems almost like a tug of war between the two and not wholly in line with their statements of wishing to act as equal partners post-Brexit.

Separately, Wessel (2019) mentions that aside from the wider questions concerning the CFSP, third country participation has proven more than possible in CSDP CCM missions and MCM operations. Third country participation is often authorised in the legal sense by treaties in the form of a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA), allowing more structural access, or a Participation Agreement (PA), for ad-hoc participation. The main stumbling block for the UK if they were to utilise an FPA or PA comes with being 'expected and required to accept the EU's schedule and procedures, and by nature, non-member states' participation … requires a certain degree of acceptance of EU practices, as well as a degree of subordination' (Vera Wessel and Polak, p. 207, 2020).

Martill and Sus (2018) debate the future UK-EU foreign policy relationship in depth too and much like Whitman (2020) commented on the shared common security interests that the UK Govt has continued to emphasise – to use as negotiation leverage most likely – as well as the alternatives available (NATO, CSDP+ or 'French connection') to the UK should the EU make it difficult for it to participate in the CSDP, as just described previously.

4.   AIM OF RESEARCH

As the literature has shown, the future of UK-EU relations in specific regard to CCM is rarely discussed in either academic or the wider literature, as foreign policy aspects that are military/defence in nature take precedence. Nonetheless, it has been considered by a minority of academics, with the conclusion being vague and even unsure but fairly consistent: the future of UK-EU CCM relations (much the same with MCM) is most likely to exist on a case-by-case basis following individual negotiations and the establishment of independent legal frameworks where it responds to the shared common interests of the UK and the EU (Whitman, 2020). However how this will specifically manifest is almost entirely unknown. It is because of this vagueness and lack of clarity and detail that this study attempts to clarify the UK Government's position on the matter. How does it actually see the future of UK-EU CCM activities? Is there more insight that can be gleaned by examining and interpreting relevant UK Government documents beyond the written word? Might this interpretation provide us with a further understanding of what is perhaps the UK Government's actual standpoint on UK-EU CCM aside from what it states publicly?

In short, through an in-depth analysis of a UK Government publication, the intention of this study is to glean further insight in to the standpoint of the UK Government in regards to the future relationship of the UK and EU, specifically concerning the CCM element of the EU's CSDP. As mentioned, it is not merely a superficial analysis of the document but an in-depth examination on both a semantic level, exploring the text itself as valuable information on offer, as well as on a latent level, providing an interpretation of the text, noticing any underlying concepts and meanings beyond what is written. In layman's terms, it is not only words that the UK Government have decided to include in their response that has been assessed. Further, it is an interpretive assessment of what they have included, where they have included it, as well as what they have not included, where they have not included it, concurrently *why* they may have decided to publish what they have and what they have not and throughout, what may well be alluded to or suggested through tacit use of language. This method is explored in more detail in Section.5.

5. METHODOLOGY

5.1. Data Collection and Analysis Methods

This study utilises the qualitative research method of document analysis, specifically an inductive form of Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA), in which documents (both printed and electronic) are systematically found, selected, appraised, and interpreted by the researcher in order to give voice and meaning around an assessment topic (Bowen, 2009). 'Document analysis involves an iterative process of superficial examination (skimming), thorough examination (reading), and interpretation' (Mackieson et al. 2019. P.4) and although often used in combination with other research methodologies it can be used as a stand-alone method of research (Bowen, 2009). Documents utilised as research for this study are materials that can be read; have not been produced or disseminated for the sole purpose of social research; are preserved and thus available for analysis; and are relevant to the subject matter (Bowen, 2009). Further, this study follows Scott's (1990) differentiation between personal and official documents and the distinction between official documents as either private or state and O'Leary's (2014) take on public records, personal documents and physical evidence. Scott's (1990) suggestion for assessing the quality of documents via four criteria was also utilised: 1. Authenticity. Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin? 2. Credibility. Is the evidence free from error and distortion? 3. Representativeness. Is the evidence typical of its kind, and if not, is the extent of its untypicality known? 4. Meaning. Is the evidence clear and comprehensible? This rigorous set of criteria was applied to the document analysed and any other document referenced in the study.

One document was ultimately selected to be analysed in this study: a UK Government's official paper published online on the 24th July 2018 which was drawn up in response to the inquiry report by the European Union Select Committee of the House of Lords entitled: *Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations*, published online on the 14th May 2018. This is the most recent wholescale analysis by the UK Government in to UK-EU relations in specific regard to EU-UK relations and the CSDP, including CCM, post-Brexit. The research has also considered the official transcript from the UK House of Lord's debate on that report which took place on the 15th May 2019, as well as the recent UK Government policy *paper Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy* published online in March 2021 and updated in July 2021. Neither of these two documents considered make up part of this

study's document analysis but where relevant and only if it has provided additional insight outside of what has been gleaned from the report being analysed, have they been mentioned.

The intention was for the bulk of the analysis to primarily be made up of EU and UK governmental documentation as, in general, 'they constitute an invaluable source of textual data for qualitative research because of their official provenance' (Danto, 2008, in Mackieson et al, 2019, p.6), which means they are trustworthy, have high validity and are largely understood as honest representations of the government in question's standpoint. However, this became challenging as the HoL EUSC Report and UK Government response are at the time of writing the most recent relevant UK government documents focusing specifically on the EU's CSDP and referring in detail to its CCM activities. As well as this, UK-EU negotiations on foreign policy have ceased (Bond, 2020; Whitman, 2020) and the official papers on the matter are not too forthcoming (as touched upon in Section 6).

Utilising an inductive form of QCA was considered an effective way to achieve the objective of finding any common themes and/or points entirely aside from the researcher's preconceptions or influence (Braun and Clarke, 2012). This would allow for an improved probability of the findings being a truer reflection of how the UK Government view the future of UK-EU CCM. This form of analysis comprises of analysing the selected documents and noticing any common underlying themes shared throughout them (Bryman, 2016). The emphasis was on allowing any common themes or categories to emerge from the documents through careful reading and re-reading of them, recognising the importance of those themes and interpreting them to understand what they might possibly mean beyond the text through consideration of what is implied or perhaps alluded to. Vaismoradi and Snelgrove (2019) explores this tactic by noting the difference in analysing documents at a semantic level or a latent level. Analysis on a semantic level takes the text itself as the only information on offer whereas analysis on a latent level explores the interpretation of the text, noticing underlying concepts and meanings beyond what is written. It was considered that utilising only one level of QCA would limit what could be understood and learnt from the document as much can be obtained from attempting to comprehend what is not written and instead alluded to or implied. Recognising Bernard and Ryan's (2003) recommendations of finding themes by looking for repetitions; indigenous typologies or categories; metaphors and analogies; transitions; similarities and differences; linguistic connectors; and missing data - reflecting on what is not in the texts - this study administered a form of QCA. The

researcher filtered the document, focusing on those responses to the numbered points that were relevant to the future of UK-EU CSDP/CCM relations only, in line with the research question. This was done by thorough examination and the discounting of those that did not contribute to the discussion. The researcher familiarised themselves with the document (data) and truly understanding it; initial codes were generated – recurring commonalities throughout the document; then the searching for themes amongst those codes and an ongoing process of reviewing them, with some changing or altering along the way as more information came to light or more clarification was achieved; these established themes were then defined and named with them being fully ordered in to a final three as evident in Section 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 before writing up what had been found (Braun and Clarke, 2012). There are concerns that a researcher should be aware of when utilising document analysis and QCA that must be noted as despite them not being limitations as such they should be considered. Bowen (2009) notes how documents are not written with a research agenda in mind and therefore objective investigative skills are required. A document does not absolutely offer up all of the necessary information required to answer the research question with some documents providing only an amount of useful information and others, none at all. Sometimes the information in documents chosen for analysis is sparser than expected which leads to more interpretation or reliance on other documents that initially expected (Bowen, 2009). To counter this, being prepared to navigate documents requiring further interpretation is useful and being both true to the themes that arise as well as flexible enough to.

It was originally planned for semi-structured interviews to be used as the prime method of data collection but this was ultimately discounted. Although semi-structured interviews allow for in-depth responses from informed individuals, as the research progressed and information was gleaned from official state documentation, academic literature and other commentary on the matter, it was decided that even experts working in the field are largely at the mercy of official UK and EU government statements. Experts working or who have worked in the field of EU CCM are, if currently employed in the field, representatives of their respective organisations and will only be at license to discuss what the official standpoint of the government is at the time of interview and those who are not currently employed in the field are likely to be as ignorant to the future state of UK/EU CCM workings post-Brexit as the rest of the general public. Neither are privy to any of the prior negotiations at the governmental level and even if they were it is extremely unlikely they would share 'insider'

information – for threat of breaching contractual and confidentiality laws that they are most likely to have signed on taking current or past employment in governmental departments or other organisations working in CCM. Questionnaires were partly discounted because of similar reasons as well as the additional fact that questions included in questionnaires are fixed and the same for each respondent, therefore they do not change according to how the replies develop (Synodinos, 2003). This would likely mean no in-depth responses that would go beyond what is accessible to the public with minimal research.

Although not in regards to EU foreign policy and CCM specifically, the topic of Brexit has always been tempestuous, especially in the UK, thus, focus groups were also discounted as a viable research tool because it was considered highly possible that members of the focus group would alter their responses and lose the willingness to be forthright should their opinion not be of the majority in the group (Bryman, 2016). This is not to mention the Covid-19-related issues of practicality that would make focus groups impossible at the time the research took place. Observational practices were also discounted because it was considered unlikely that the research question would be addressed sufficiently, if at all, and would in fact be even more time consuming than any other method. Bryman (2016) describes the pitfalls regarding time consumption in observational practices in detail.

5.2. Validity, Bias and Limitations

As with any academic research study, there are validity, bias and limitation concerns that the researcher and reader need to be aware of and that need to be taken in to consideration when attempting to accurately analyse text-based data. Generally, the topic of this thesis has not been considered to be contentious or provocative outside of EU/UK political circles but instead, a matter of fact. The topic was expected to be difficult to source detailed information on because of no ongoing negotiations, the fact the UK and EU do not wish to publicly acknowledge in full their respective positions and plans for the future, as well as the fact that the CFSP is not as high on the priority list for either government when compared with economic and trade matters for example.

It is important to note the background of the researcher for matters concerning transparency. The sole researcher is from the UK and has undertaken a portion of this study whilst living and studying in Finland and a portion whilst living and studying in England. Additionally, it is

worth highlighting the fact that the researcher spent six months interning at the Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland) based in Helsinki. CMC Finland is a department within the Finnish Government responsible for the recruitment, training and seconding of professionals and experts in the field of CCM and the researching of any topic relevant to the field of peace, conflict, mediation, and CCM, with regular publishing on these matters. As Mehra (2002) notes, more often than not, researchers select a topic because of a personal connection to it and although researchers must strive for objective research, they are to be keenly aware of their personal biases. This concept has been understood by the researcher throughout. Norris (2007) highlights the potential issues of validity and bias that should be considered and addressed in order for research to be as objective and accurate as possible. He suggests trying to accommodate for any known or unknown bias by sharing any findings with critical friends or colleagues to test the researcher's judgements and confirm that any analysis is as fair and as open as humanly possible. The researcher utilised regular seminar groups with fellow Master's students, a supervisor in the form of Dr Marko Lehti, based at Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere University, Finland, as well as family members with critical outlooks to aid with critique and maintaining of objectivity.

The highly publicised issues of Brexit have been considered of no relevance throughout the study other than it being a point of fact and a democratic political decision which will impact the CCM activities of both the UK and EU in some form or another and to some degree. Any debate of Brexit as a political event, the question surrounding the use of referendum, any view on how the campaigning was or was not carried out, the involvement of the media, the wider implications of Brexit outside of its impact on the CFSP or CCM, or any other conversation that goes beyond acknowledging it as a matter of fact are of no relevance to this study. There is therefore as little bias as humanly possible in the representation of the qualitative data that stemmed from the QCA process.

A consistent theme throughout the research was 'reflexivity', as highlighted by Hellerman in his education-related study (2008 p.11) noting that 'most experienced commentators recognize that this ability to objectively stand outside one's own writing, and to be reflexive about it, and about one's own relation to it, are some of the hallmarks of a good thesis'. Conscious self-scrutiny in relation to the study was constantly employed throughout by the researcher.

6. DATA ANALYSIS

This study is an analysis of the UK Government's official paper published online on the 24th July 2018 which was drawn up in response to the inquiry report by the European Union Select Committee (EUSC) of the UK House of Lords (HoL) entitled: *Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations,* published online on the 14th May 2018, as described in Section 6.1. This is the most recent wholescale analysis by the UK Government in to UK-EU relations in specific regard to matters including CCM and all other CSDP-related issues. The researcher has also read the official transcript from the UK House of Lord's debate on that report which took place on the 15th May 2019 to better understand its findings. The most recent UK Government policy paper on foreign policy entitled *Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy* published online in March 2021 and updated in July 2021 is also explored in Section 6.3. Note, it is only the UK Government's response to the EUSC's inquiry report which is part of this study's document analysis. The other two documents are of additional interest because one was the prelude to the response and the other came sometime after. They have been included as additional documents of interest deemed of use in further understanding the bigger picture and adding relevant insight in to CCM matters outside of what has been gleaned from the report being analysed. It is important to note that the paper entitled *Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy* lacked any explicit reference to the CFSP, CSDP and CCM which in itself is noteworthy and is discussed.

6.1. UK House of Lord's European Union Select Committee Inquiry Report: Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations

The UK House of Lord's EUSC report *Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations* (and the debate that followed a year later) is the document that prompted the UK Government Response paper that was analysed in this study. In short, it summarises and critically discusses both the pros and cons of the UK's involvement in EU foreign policy but its CSDP specifically, including CCM, since 2003.

Among many other useful insights, it highlights the UK's scepticism of matters concerning EU foreign policy and despite acknowledging some of its successes, shows the sceptical outlook on the utility of CSDP initiatives both military and civilian, with questions around what

the CSDP has even added to British foreign policy (this scepticism is also noticeable in UK politician's rhetoric and widely understood by interested parties as discussed in the Literature Review). The report includes comments made by members of the House of Lord's that state traditional foreign policy instruments such as the use of economic sanctions has probably had more influence on the EU's crisis management endeavours. Further, that CSDP efforts were nothing more than tokenism, had never been central to the UK's defence effort and had never been as significant as to what the UK does independently, through coalitions or through NATO and the UN. The general consensus throughout the report and subsequent debate was that despite some positives (specifically in regard to input – i.e. increased comprehensive joint civilian-military action) the EU had not and is most likely unable to, match the UN's capabilities to maintain international security and uphold peace, and was unable to even remotely match the capabilities of NATO when it came to defending Europe. The inquiry report conclusions echo Faleg (2020) who described the EU's missions and operations as being successes when it comes to their output (in that EU operations and missions were delivered) but the question of success regarding outcomes (the value and impact of those operations and missions) was questionable. A balanced summary of EU foreign policy, CSDP efforts and CCM work by a senior reviewing committee from the upper house of the Parliament of the UK. It does however need to be remembered that some of the issues raised have been addressed or at least acknowledged by the CSDP Compact since 2018.

In the broader context of foreign policy, it is mentioned throughout the report that the CSDP does add value to the efforts of individual MS and complements the work undertaken by NATO and the UN. There is also a consensus that CSDP missions have brought value in the form of mobilising a plethora of civilian, military, political, and diplomatic tools and that 'since the first deployment in 2003, CSDP missions and operations have made a meaningful contribution to EU foreign policy priorities, including the strengthening of the rule of law, security sector reform, conflict prevention, and the tackling of privacy' (UK Government, 2020). Despite the less than central position that the CSDP operations and missions hold within the UK's foreign policy, nonetheless, and as already detailed prior, as one of The Big Three the UK was a significant contributor to EU foreign policy and UK involvement can be found in EU CCM activity since its inception especially at the top level (Lehne, 2012).

In attempting to comprehend the contributions made by the UK to the EU's CFSP, CSDP, and CCM activities, it became clear that it is rather difficult to source exact figures of how

much the UK contributed to EU CCM missions in terms of finance, personnel, equipment and expertise. This makes understanding the UK's contribution as well as the comparison pre and post-Brexit difficult. Lain and Nouwens (2017) noted the same predicament explaining that:

> 'it is difficult to find exact figures of how much the UK provides to EU missions and operations in terms of spending, UK personnel, equipment and expertise as numerous government departments and law enforcement agencies, such as the Ministry of Defence, National Crime Agency (NCA), Foreign Office and Department for International Development work on EU-related missions and operations, but also provide bilateral support to host countries. Often the differentiation between EU and bilateral contributions is not clear.'
>
> (Lain and Nouwens, p.29, 2017, The Consequences of
> Brexit for European Security and Defence)

It seems also to be the case that there are no figures consolidated in one place for the entire history of EU CCM activities which adds further complexity when attempting to fully comprehend individual MS contributions. Regardless, there are recorded personnel figures available via the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reaching back to 2005 (two years after the first EU CCM mission) and is graphed in Section 2.3.

The report is a well-rounded and thorough examination of the CSDP, the UK's relation to it and contribution to it, finalising with an in-depth summary in its Chapter 5: Future UK-EU Co-operation. The summary of conclusions and recommendations that end the report are the key points in which the UK Government acknowledge and respond to. The following section 6.2, details what was found in that response through the QCA process described in Section 5.

6.2. The UK Government's response

The UK Government's Response takes each of the EUSC's conclusions, recommendations and observations (as they are sometimes to referred to), as laid out on Page 72 of the Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations section of the EUSC Inquiry Report. Altogether, there are 28, with some grouped together. A filtering process saw only those points with responses deemed relevant to the research question analysed, as described in

Section 5. Those points deemed relevant and as they are grouped were as follows: 5; 8 and 10; 11, 12, 13; 14, 15, 19 and 22; 16; 17; 18; 20, 21 and 23; 24 and 26; 25 and 27; and 28. The Appendix includes the report and the breakdown of these points is clear.

Throughout the UK Gov Response document there were three underlying common themes that were highlighted by the Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). They encapsulated the most relevant points when attempting to better understand the UK Government's standpoint on the future participation of the UK in EU CCM activities post-Brexit. One theme was the UK Government's positive assessment of EU CCM and reiteration of shared foreign policy interests; the second, its focus on the utility of other multilateral organisations aside from the EU; and finally, the third theme, concerning the UK Government's reluctance to accept anything other than an unprecedented Third State model. Each is explored in detail in sub-sections 6.2.1., 6.2.2., and 6.2.3.

Although not categorised as a theme in itself, the analysis of the document highlighted the shortness of the response, both in length and in style, along with a lack of in-depth critique, failing to consider some of the specific pros and cons of no longer being a member state on CSDP-related matters, specifically CCM. Instead, most of the responses were found to be merely agreeing with the conclusions, recommendations and observations followed by a very short example of why and/or how the UK fulfils or has fulfilled that conclusion, recommendation or observation, along with a short description of the benefits of EU cooperation within the CSDP framework. They are statements of what the implications will be but not necessarily whether those implications will be of benefit or detriment to the UK or EU. Despite the response consistently reiterating the importance of UK-EU relations when it comes to foreign policy and the security of Europe specifically, the shortness (again, in length and writing manner) and lack of in-depth assessment of the potential and very realistic post-Brexit implications suggests that the UK is not particularly worried about the affect its departure from the EU will have on its future involvement in the CSDP or EU-led CCM activities. It also suggests that it is not particularly that interested either, or at least, places it far down the list of priorities when considering its foreign policy.

It is worthwhile noting that yes, the UK Gov Response has considered and responds to all 28 conclusions, recommendations and observations but considering the report containing them is 74 pages long, with numerous appendices which add an additional 18 pages, the

UK Govt Response paper at 9 pages (same font and size), comes across as a short, obligated formality rather than an in-depth prioritised response that has had serious time and thought invested in it. This remains the case despite the UK Government's White Paper: *The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union*, published in July 2018 and the fact the UK Gov Response points the reader in the direction of it numerous times. It is also not to say that an in-depth and considered response must be long as brevity is most definitely encouraged however given the complexity of the matter and wide array of points to be acknowledged and explored it would be fair to expect a lengthier paper. Nonetheless, through the interpretative process of QCA, some insightful analysis has been drawn.

6.2.1. A positive view of EU CCM and reiteration of shared foreign policy interests

A common theme discovered through the QCA process was the consistent complimenting and praising of past EU CCM endeavours by the UK Govt, highlighting among other positives the effectiveness, comprehensiveness, utility and productiveness of individual missions. Alongside this was the repetitive reiteration of the common interests regarding European security shared between the UK and EU both in the past and in to the future. A commonality explored by Martill and Sus (2018) in regard to the wider political situation aside from the document being analysed here. However, given the fact there is no agreement going forward and with the UK ceasing to be a part of CCM activities, these responses that acknowledge and agree with the inquiry report observations of past successes essentially become but merely an exercise of reminiscence. They make the reader wonder why the UK Government is not prioritising this post-Brexit issue.

The responses to Point 5 as well as Point 8, 10 are of significant interest as they are entirely positive summaries of how useful the CSDP missions and operations have been. Point 5 response specifically draws attention to the CSDP's utility in 'draw[ing] together military, political, diplomatic, economic, and legal lines of operation in a comprehensive approach'[1]. It states how 'unique' the CSDP is with its flexibility and capacity to deliver a wide range of activities and technical expertise, acting in places 'where other multilateral organisations cannot due to the host government's preference, where there are sensitivities to the

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[1] UK Government Response to House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report Point 5

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presence of other organisations, or they are unable to agree a mandate'[2] making particular reference to the CSDP's CCM mission in Georgia 'where the UN and OSCE were unable to agree support for a monitoring mission'[3]. This is a clear understanding that the CSDP and its CCM does have serious utility and its option as an alternative to the UN and OSCE is important. Point 8, 10 response immediately agree with the EUSC Inquiry Report's statement that 'CSDP missions and operations have made a significant contribution to a number of the UK's foreign policy priorities – including tackling piracy, promoting the rule of law, and peacebuilding in post-conflict states'[4]. Following this, it highlights the CCM efforts of note 'such as building stability in Somalia, Libya and the Occupied Palestinian Territories; supporting security reform in Ukraine and Iraq; combating organised crime and building resilience in Kosovo; supporting efforts to manage conflict, promote peace, and build space for dialogue in Georgia'[5]. Notably, it states the UK's 'strong commitment to European defence and security is not just about military presence, but also how civilian efforts contribute to day-to-day stability'[6] which is one of the most resounding statements of support for CCM throughout the document. On the whole and although they are short and lack real depth, these are somewhat glowing analyses of the capabilities of EU CSDP and CCM. Highlighting the utility of its CCM aspect specifically is important because, as mentioned earlier in the paper, CCM is often overlooked in favour of military operations (Juncos, 2020). Similarly, despite the fact that the response to Points 1, 2, 3 highlight the 'challenging condition in the countries in which missions are situated [which] can slow mandate delivery'[7] - the very nature of the field - it highlights the 'meaningful EU external action across a range of issues and locations'[8]. Beginning with complimenting the military operation Atalanta (which is a common occurrence throughout the document) which involved substantial leadership and direction from the UK, it describes the utility of a number of CCM missions specifically: among other positives, the creation of Rule of Law structures in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo); the advancement of Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine); and furthering the professionalisation of the police in Occupied Palestinian Territories (EUPOL OPT). Yet, as mentioned earlier, it may well be true that despite challenges these missions

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[2] ibid
[3] ibid
[4] ibid
[5] ibid
[6] ibid
[7] UK Government Response to House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report Points 1, 2, 3
[8] ibid

and other CCM missions like it were successful and that the UK and other EU MS contributed to their success but the UK is now in the position of looking at these missions as endeavours they were previously involved in and successes they previously contributed to. Granted, the conclusions/recommendations/observations made in Points 1, 2 and 3 as well as 5, 8 and 10 are of themselves not related to the future situation of UK-EU CCM but what it still highlights are actions and cooperation that the UK Government, as explicitly written in their responses, seem to view as rather successful endeavours. Yet, as it stands at the time of writing in 2021, something that the UK will no longer be able to contribute to in the same way, if at all.

What is the reader to glean from such responses then? The UK Government values the CSDP and its CCM and sees utility in the collaborative efforts of MS when doing it, proud of the successes that came from it… but is willing to sacrifice those positives unless it can retain essentially the same role as before Brexit but now as a non-EU member; all the while stating its 'commitment to European security and defence'[9] as written again in Point 25. Despite the UK's global influence, top level operational experience, expansive diplomatic network, one of the most powerful intelligence services, and other assets as described in Section 2.3. it cannot 'have its cake and eat it'. The UK is no longer a member of the EU club and cannot expect to have the access and privileges of the members of that club. Members who continue to pay their membership fees in which grants them access to certain initiatives and activities. On the other hand, surely European security, the promotion of European liberal values and the stabilisation of conflict zones is more important than membership of any club and is it not better to utilise a non-member's significant and world leading assets if it in fact benefits and furthers the progress made in attempting to achieve those objectives as well as benefiting those states who have remained members who are also striving to complete those objectives. Further, given the fact that responses to Points 20, 21, 23 and Points 24, 26 suggest proactive work on behalf of the UK Government to reach a deal best suited to address the security of Europe, emphasised by statements such as 'The [UK] Government is unconditionally committed to European security'[10], one would expect a prioritised attempt to compromise on the matter. Through further analysis, as explored across the next two themes, that does not seem to be the case. Despite this,

[9] UK Government Response to House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report Point 25
[10] UK Government Response to House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report Points 20, 21, 23 and Points 24, 26

throughout the UK Gov Response the idea that the UK shares the interests and concerns as wider Europe and the EU is arguably treated as a given - and rightly so. The threat to European security and to stability to the stability of the European continent are shared and the concerns regarding organised crime, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state collapse/failure, regional conflicts and overwhelming migration both now and in to the future (especially given the precarious situation of climate change and further conflict particularly in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan regions of African as well as the Middle East) will need to be faced systematically and with cooperation between all European nations both members and non-members of the EU. These issues supersede membership of a political union and it may be of benefit to the peoples of Europe if the politicians based in Brussels put those issues and the people whom they represent ahead of playing politics in which they stubbornly do not offer the UK terms which they deem respectful and fair in regards to what it has to offer.

6.2.2. A focus on the utility of other multilateral organisations aside from the EU

One of the clearest points common throughout the UK Gov Response was that of the UK Government ensuring the reader notices the significance that it attaches to other multilateral organisations and their capabilities in this field aside from the EU. Given this, it is important to remember the significance of the UK on the global stage despite its non-membership of the EU. As detailed in Section 2.3, it has 'a seat in every major multilateral organisation' (UK Govt, 2021, p.8) including NATO, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), OSCE, the UN: the UN Human Rights Council, and is a permanent member of the UNSC. It also has the fourth largest diplomatic network in the world, and within Europe it is only France who truly competes with the UK militarily and in matters concerning foreign policy. It is because of this prowess that it seems the UK Government seems to be 'hedging its bets' in the document, not wanting to come across as having turned its back on the EU's CSDP and CCM but also making the reader more than aware that the EU is not its only option in this line of work - a point here that directly impacts and becomes more relevant in line with what is explored in Section 6.3. Specifically, the two points the UK Government repeatedly emphasises is its position and influence as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and as an important member of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Serrano (2020) describes the reluctance of the UK to embrace EU military

expansion because of the existence of NATO and similarly this logic can be applied to EU CCM because of the existence of the UN.) The UK makes clear that it does not necessarily need the EU to undertake its foreign policy activities and complete its foreign policy objectives, arguably alluding to the notion that in this sphere at least it is perhaps even the EU that needs the UK more than the UK needs the EU. It is highlighting to the EU Government that the UK does not *need* to be involved directly in the EU's foreign policy to operate in either military or civilian endeavours across the globe; that it is a significant asset not to be lost; and thus ultimately, that it would be in the best interest of the EU to offer an unprecedented Third Country model for involvement in CSDP and CCM manoeuvres. The alternative is to risk losing a close relationship with a substantial player in this field – again, this also becomes relevant in Section 6.3.

The response to Points 8, 10 and as is repeated almost verbatim in Point 18, as well as being complimentary of the benefits of CSDP missions to the UK's foreign policy priorities as explored in Section 6.1., is the first response that explicitly documents the influence and capabilities of the UK as well as the options available to it external of the EU: 'The UK uses its permanent membership of the UNSC to support CSDP, including securing UNSC resolutions for Operations Sophie and Althea'[11] followed by explaining how 'the UK has long championed closer EU/NATO cooperation'[12], using the example of Operation Althea as a 'joint EU-NATO Operation …demonstrate[ing] the many benefits both organisations can bring to security and stability'[13]. What is added to Point 18 is what could be described as a caveat that as outlined in 'the [UK] Government White Paper on the Future Relationship … the UK will remain a committed partner, including a leading NATO ally and a permanent member of the UNSC'[14] – in other words, the UK Government is affirming that regardless of the future agreement the UK will support the EU as a partner. (This rhetoric is understood and discussed by McArdle (2020), Hill (2019), Whitman (2020) and the literature at large.) This seems to compound the earlier point that the UK is somewhat 'hedging its bets' as the constant pushing of the idea that alternative multilaterals to the EU and the might of an independent UK are as capable as the EU *but* the UK still wants to be part of the EU's CSDP and CCM through a special Third State agreement. It just does not quite ring true with the

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[11] UK Government Response to House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report Points 8, 10 and Point 18
[12] UK Government Response to House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report Points 8, 10
[13] ibid
[14] UK Government Response to House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report Point 18

manner in which the majority of the document is written. It is true that the UK's position on the UNSC is of great importance and the influence and leverage it has as a result is unparalleled by any other MS other than France – not even Germany is a permanent member. Therefore, with the loss of the UK from the EU, the latter has lost a seriously influential player at the UNSC. Yes, the European community share the same goals and security issues but as the UK Government mentions at least twice in the responses to the EUSC Inquiry Report Points, they will only involve themselves as a Third Country in the actions of the EU where there are mutual interests. Thus, if the UK does not feel there are mutual interests or in fact wants to 'play politics', the EU cannot rely or even necessarily count on the UK utilising its individual influence and sway in its favour anymore. In theory then, the commitment to remaining a committed partner is sound, however, in actuality, it is not legally worth anything and there is to be no obligation for the UK to be that committed partner or to stick by its statement of such a commitment.

By Point 16, the UK Government is explicitly highlighting the ability to continue participating in EU foreign policy activities as a member of NATO and the same exact point is emphasised in Point 25, once again using Operation ALTHEA as the example. Although no specific mention is made of CCM, the common track of thought here is the importance of NATO as a means for the UK to maintain involvement in areas of EU operations and missions as a non-member state if required to do so. The fact joint EU-NATO collaboration already takes place and will continue to do so may be somewhat of a precedent for similar collaborative efforts between the EU and UN or OSCE for example. There is no obvious reason preventing cooperation and joint efforts between the EU and other multilateral organisations and this may just be a way in which the UK envisages itself partaking with a similar remit to what it had pre-Brexit, especially if the EU remains reluctant to allow the UK's involvement in its CCM missions and/or military operations to go beyond that of other non-MS. Martill and Sus (2018) explore this post-Brexit UK-EU security cooperation in depth looking at the options to the UK of NATO, CSDP+ or a 'French Connection' as they call it.

The final response to the EUSC Inquiry Report is to Point 28 which speaks of influencing the EU as a non-MS, using the United States as a successful example of it being possible. It emphasises the need to invest significant resources across the continent but specifically Brussels and other MS capitals in order to maintain influence of European nation states and the EU but from outside the EU framework. In a strong show of the UK Government's serious

understanding of this point as well as its serious commitment to proactively enabling the influencing of the EU as a Third Country and utilise its global influence on international organisations that can and do act as alternatives to the EU, the UK Government states:

> "The UK has a successful record of influencing other international organisations and has planned for continuing our strong relationship with the EU. In recognition of the need to support a successful EU exit, the FCO has strengthened its diplomatic network in Europe. Since 2017, the FCO has upgraded seven Ambassador posts and created 50 new diplomatic positions in Embassies in Europe."
>
> (UK Government Response to House of Lord's
> EUSC Inquiry Report Point 28)

Despite not being specific, this response is quite clearly emphasising the UK's historical record of successfully influencing and utilising other international actors aside from the EU to achieve its own foreign policy goals. As a global heavyweight player in all forms of international diplomacy and political matters it is fair to presume that the UK Government is factually speaking here. It reiterates the preparation and proactiveness of the UK Government should it not reach a settlement in which it is striving for. The investment of capital and resources in to doing so proves both the integrity and preparedness it is showing towards its EU-related foreign policy post-Brexit; for not being granted a Third Country special status; for not being involved as a MS in the EU's CSDP, military operations and CCM. Questions do arise with the UK Government making a direct comparison of itself post-Brexit to the United States. The latter remains a serious global superpower if not *the* global superpower (a global superpower seemingly on its way out to be replaced by China but a superpower no doubt, just currently in a transitional period), matching the largest economies, militaries, import/export nations on the planet. The UK does not have the influence or power that the Unites States does. The comparison may be slightly out of tune then but in all fairness and as described, the capability to influence other European nations is still a great asset to the UK and as real as ever.

6.2.3. Reluctant to accept anything other than an unprecedented Third State model

Throughout the document, the UK Government's position comes across as one in which its plan is to negotiate a foreign policy relationship, specifically regarding collaboration on CSDP and CCM activities, that goes further than any other relationship a third country has with the EU. Following on from the analysis in Section 6.2. which evidenced the 'hedging of bets' tactic that the UK Government is arguably employing. A tactic that not only reminds the reader of the other options that lie outside of the EU, championing their successes and the opportunities that they bring, and that remain available to the UK to assist in it achieving its foreign policy goals but a tactic that also explicitly celebrates past successes that UK-EU cooperation has brought, in the form of military operations and CCM missions alike asserting its wish to remain an active partner of the EU for the sake of shared ventures of, and threats to, the European community. What this tactic also shows is that if the UK Government does not agree a special status as a Third Country allowing involvement akin to its past remit then it is ready to walk away from wider EU-led foreign policy activities as well as its less prioritised CCM and that it is capable of doing so.

An important argument presented throughout the report and throughout the UK Gov Response, but in specific detail in Point 18 is the argument that the UK's role in the CSDP has been more of a 'manager' than a 'player'. This logically implies that it would be extremely unlikely that the UK would be willing to accept a position of involvement in the future that would be less than this. The crux of the matter here then is the fact that no third country state involved with the CSDP and its CCM has held any role in regards to decision-making/planning (or as it is referred to here: 'management') and with the EU less than willing to amend its decision-making structures the UK may well be froze out of collaborating with EU CCM if it is not willing to take a role on par with all other Third States. As Bond (p.10, 2020) points out, 'the EU argues that its decision-making autonomy could be compromised by offering third countries more influence'. The UK's position is that it has 'contributed expertise to operations and missions since the inception of CSDP… has provided intellectual leadership in the development of missions and operations and CSDP initiatives… us[ing] [its] permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to support CSDP, including UNSC security resolutions'[15] which is, as described, predominantly top-down in nature and

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[15] House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report's Point 14 referred to in UK Government Response

thus predominantly managerial in nature. In the very same response it is recognised that 'the scope of the UK's participation in CSDP, including decision-making, remains under negotiation … [and that] the UK has proposed [in a White Paper] a tailored partnership with the EU that includes consultation and regular dialogue on geographic and thematic issues and the global challenges the UK and the EU face'[16]. The expectation of the UK Government it seems is that they will be offered a role in CSDP activities post-Brexit that best utilises its capabilities and experience as proven in almost two decades of CSDP and CCM involvement and that it should equate to a managerial role. Contrastingly, in response to Points 20, 21, 23 it is stated by the UK Government that "it is also not yet clear how negotiations on foreign policy and defence cooperation will structured, whom they will be conducted, or how far they will be separated from the negotiations on future trade and other issues". The problem here is that the EU has shown by its hesitance and thus its potential reluctance to offer the UK a role in its CSDP activities post-Brexit that matches its previous role or that offers any special status that goes beyond the roles that other third countries are entitled to. This despite France's Macron suggesting otherwise (Brattberg, 2020). We understand the UK and the EU position then, and at the time of writing it remains that those positions cannot be reconciled. It therefore is all well and good that at the time of the UK Gov Response publication that "the scope of the UK's participation in CSDP, including decision-making, remains under negotiation" but roll forward to 2020 and negotiations concerning foreign policy have all but ceased (Bond, 2020; Whitman, 2020). Surely if the CSDP and CCM was of any serious interest and of importance to the UK Government it would want this matter addressed sooner rather than later and be willing to compromise more so than it currently is. Lehne's (2021) understanding of the UK's reservations about the direction and even necessity of an EU CFSP suggest the UK would only partake in CSDP activities should it be on its terms, however, he also argues that 'the UK's departure left a somewhat smaller hole in EU foreign policy than the country's formidable capacity would lead one to believe'. Given this, the EU is once again less likely to offer any form of unprecedented access to the UK as a Third Country simply because it may not deem its participation as required or necessary.

Of any of the EUSC Inquiry Report conclusions/recommendations/observations, Points 14, 15, 19, 22 are some of the most direct in referencing the future UK-EU relationship and any

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[16] ibid

model that may be required for the UK's future participation in CSDP, CCM. As explored throughout this thesis already but specifically made clear in these points, it is the view of the EUSC that whilst 'third countries are well integrated into the CSDP missions and operations in which they participate, and have some influence at an operational level… [they] have no formal role in decision-making or planning, and the Committee of the Contributors model – designed to facilitate consultations between the EU and contributing third countries – does not work well'[17]. It states explicitly that 'the existing third model for third country involvement in CSDP missions and operations would not give the UK the input and influence that it currently enjoys as a MS'[18]. It also criticises the UK Government White Paper on the future of UK-EU foreign policy relations which included 'a role in "mandate development" and "detailed operational planning" … [which] goes well beyond the existing third country model offered by the EU'[19]. Most significantly it states 'the prospects for changes to this model are uncertain'[20]. In response, the UK Government accepts that the existing model would not offer the UK the input and influence it had prior to Brexit but argues that it does allow for operational level participation, 'but it has not translated into a formal role in decision making and planning'[21]. Interestingly, the way the UK Government has decide to phrase its response with particular focus on the idea of there not being no *formal role* in decision making and planning seems to suggest that it will continue (as every nation does) to use its influence and soft power in order for the EU decisions it wishes to see become a reality. It also adds credence to the idea of not yielding on anything other than unprecedented access as a Third Country to the EU's foreign policy activities as it is content with not having that *formal role* in decision making and planning.

Similarly, in the next paragraph of the same response and although in direct relation to any would-be UK-EU military operations/deployment (but just as applicable to civilian deployments), it is made clear that for the UK to partner with the EU and 'to enable the EU to make best use of UK assets, the UK would require sufficient insight, including access to planning documents. The UK could bring its significant expertise to support EU operational planning. This would not undermine the important principle that only EU MS have a formal

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[17] House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report's Point 14 referred to in UK Government Response
[18] House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report's Point 19 referred to in UK Government Response
[19] House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report's Point 22 referred to in UK Government Response
[20] ibid
[21] UK Government Response to House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report Points 14, 15, 19, 22

role in the decision-making process and a vote over the launch of EU operations'[22]. On the one hand the UK understands that officially, or 'formally', it will not have the rights of a MS as a decision maker but that it is in the interest of both the UK and EU to utilise UK capabilities to achieve its goals. Additionally, the response to Points 24, 26 notes how 'Third States make valuable contributions of personnel and assets to almost all EU military and civilian operations and missions. Before [the UK Government] can agree to continue to contribute to EU operations and missions after Exit, we will need to establish consultation mechanisms with the EY that are commensurate to our proposed contributions'[23]. The UK is being clever in leveraging its soft power and influential capabilities as well as its measurable contributions of capital, assets and personnel – in the same manner as examined in Section 6.2. with how it is leveraging its position in, and relationship with, non-EU multilaterals such as the UN and NATO, in an attempt to receive the access it desires. Reiterating its White Paper of July 2018 and the message seen time and time again in its rhetoric, the UK Government 'makes clear that the UK-EU foreign policy, defence, and development cooperation is likely to require a combination of formal agreements enabling coordination on a case-by-case basis where it is in the mutual interest'[24]. This sense of the new relationship being "likely" to require this ad-hoc approach suggests the contentment in which the UK would step back from its role in EU CSDP if it is not to be offered an unprecedented special Third State status.

In final response to Points 14, 15, 19, 22, it is noted that 'the EU is developing an enhanced strategic approach to partnerships with third countries on security and defence by taking a more coherent and systematic approach'[25], with the Committee of Contributors mechanism singled out as being the recipient of reforms 'for better consultation and information sharing with contributing third states'[26]. Finishing with the understanding that the 'overall initiative to strengthen strategic partnerships with third countries'[27] is labelled "ongoing". In a sense this is an attempt to allay the fears of the EUSC that withdrawing from the EU will not have generally a negative impact on the UK's involvement and input in the CSDP and CCM as it describes, and that despite the future being uncertain, it can navigate these uncertainties

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[22] ibid
[23] UK Government Response to House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report Points 24, 26
[24] UK Government Response to House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report Points 14, 15, 19, 22
[25] ibid
[26] ibid
[27] ibid

especially with the EU reforming its modus operandi. (The mention of the possibility that 'the EEAS is also considering an overarching structure, such as an EU Partnership Forum, for regular or extraordinary discussion of issues of common concern'[28] sounds like an attempt to make the EUSC and the reader believe the EU is going all out to stretch Third State rules; arguably, this is already what the Committee of Contributors does and is.). There is this ever-present notion that the UK will remain a successful EU partner whether it is permitted access to the CSDP like no other or not, but that it is not the UK Government's intention to accept anything other than access that matches its involvement when it was a MS. The implication is that the UK is genuinely unwilling to compromise or negotiate. It wants the unprecedented access. If this is not something that becomes reality then it will simply use its position "informally" to achieve what it wants, push for the EU to introduce reforms to open up what third countries are entitled to partake in and ultimately, go it alone/use other multilaterals to command its own CCM endeavours. This interpretation is compounded rather explicitly and as a matter of fact by the response to Point 16, which states 'what is important is the method by which the UK will seek to achieve its objectives, be that through a new form of engagement with CSDP or enhanced bilateral activity and engagement with other multilateral actors'[29].

6.3. UK Government Policy Paper: Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

The most recent full-scale publication by the UK Government on its wider foreign policy post-Brexit is entitled *Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy* and was published in March 2021, updated in July 2021. Of particular interest to this thesis question is Section 5: *The UK in the world: a European country with global interests.* As the most recent full-scale document in to foreign policy, the information included, and discounted, is worth studying.

 The UK has continued to officially state their willingness to work with the EU on all matters concerning internal and external threats to Europe and this is reiterated consistently throughout this policy paper. However, nothing of any detail on how post-Brexit UK-EU

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[28] ibid
[29] UK Government Response to House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report Point 16

foreign policy-related cooperation is given away nor even merely suggested. In it, the UK Government declare how they will 'continue to support closer practical cooperation between NATO and the EU… and will cooperate with the EU on matters of security and defence as independent partners'[30]; but that is as much detail as is presented in regards to what the future of UK-EU foreign policy relations will look like in actual practice, with the focus being on the individual relations between the UK and members of the EU as opposed to the EU as a bloc – somewhat justifying the section's subtitle: *The UK in the world: a European country with global interests.* In this section the order of explanation is presumably (and logically so after examining it) in order of how the UK prioritises its allies concerning foreign policy. Beginning with describing how 'The United States [remains] the UK's most important strategic ally and partner… across the full spectrum of defence, intelligence, cyber power, counter-terrorism and nuclear, the US-UK partnership underpins [its] security and saves lives.'[31] Interestingly and what may be rather telling is that the report recognises secondarily and only in passing the importance of the 'European neighbours and allies … [and] the important role played by the EU in the peace and prosperity of Europe'[32]. As explored by Tsertsvadze (2017), the UK dilemma of trying to balance its American and European interests seems to be as relevant as ever. The mentioning of the US then Europe is swiftly followed by highlighting in further detail the importance of relationships with individual European powers, such as the 'deep and long-standing security and defence partnership with France'[33], with specific strengthening of this relationship as noted by Whitman (2020); 'the essential ally in Germany with whom there is a 'growing foreign policy partnership'[34]; the 'particularly close relationship with Italy'[35]; the 'vital partner on European security'[36] in Poland; before listing Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. The section offers an interpretive insight in to the UK's post-Brexit global view and it may well be suggesting rather inadvertently the order of focus for the UK's foreign policy and its allies post-Brexit: the US first and foremost followed by individual European nations and the EU bloc as of non-importance, perhaps an afterthought; an

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[30] UK Govt (2021). Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy
[31] idib
[32] idib
[33] UK Govt (2021). Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy
[34] idib
[35] idib
[36] idib

international player the UK does not necessarily have to engage with as it would gain little from a 'contractual external security relationship with the Union' (Bond, p.5, 2020). The concept of an independent 'Global Britain' however, according to Martill and Sus (p.849, 2018), 'does not fit with the reality of international politics in the 21st Century', noting the waning UK-US 'special relationship' with it having being based on the UK's promotion of the US to the EU in the first place; and arguing that there is not much demand from China, Japan, the Commonwealth for a revised relationship. The questioning of the UK-US relationship seems justified but the recent UK-Japan free trade deal and separate AUKUS deal scuppers his predictions of a lack of non-US interest in a new 'Global Britain'.

It is perhaps even more telling that neither the CFSP nor the CSDP is mentioned once anywhere in the entire report. It would be fair to have presumed that given the close foreign policy cooperation the UK and EU have had for over half a century and since the turn of the millennium specifically that the CFSP and CSDP would be addressed or at least acknowledged. Yes, the UK will no longer be a direct and active of part of or contributor to the EU's CFSP activities but as an ex-participant and contributor, and as an existing neighbour and global partner, the UK will still cooperate with the EU in line with its CFSP objectives. One would consider it an area of importance and worthy of inclusion in a comprehensive policy paper on the future of the UK and its relationship to its allies in a post-Brexit world. It is quite possible that the very absence of commentary on the CFSP and CSDP specifically is in fact more insightful than not. Not only in the sense of it not registering too high in the priorities of UK foreign policy but also given the fact that negotiations concerning other elements of post-Brexit life are yet to be settled upon, the UK may have considered it a conflict of interest to do so - a political play. Its absence may have been a political decision made in light of the UK not wishing to be perceived in one way or another by the EU, who are the same group still being negotiated with in all aspects outside of foreign policy.

The term crisis management is worthy of one mention, however somewhat ironically given the fact the term originated at the EU, it is in regards to the future partnership between the UK and the African Union (AU) in which the UK states how it 'will partner with the African Union on climate and biodiversity, global health security, free trade, crisis management, conflict prevention and mediation, the Women, Peace and Security agenda, and promoting

good governance and human rights'[37]. The exact areas the UK and EU have worked on since 2003 across the numerous missions and operations they have jointly conducted and funded. Considering the lack of explicit reference and examination given to CCM not just in the academic and wider literature but the lack of reference to it at the political level, plus the aforementioned absence of the CFSP and CSDP, the term 'civilian crisis management' is not included in the report at all and nor is any specific information given in reference to it. Essentially, the EU is absent from this full scale, comprehensive review which may inform us of the UK's focus post-Brexit, the partnerships and organisations it prioritises post-Brexit, and the direction in which it is headed that does not seem to necessarily require the EU for.

7. CONCLUSION

The analysis of the UK Govt Response to the UK House of Lord's EUSC Inquiry Report, *Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations*, suggests that the UK Government is quite possibly 'hedging its bets' in an attempt to secure a role in EU CSDP and CCM matters post-Brexit akin to its role pre-Brexit, which would require an unprecedented Third State model of participation. In a scenario where this was not to materialise, it seems likely that the UK would rather utilise the position it holds as part of the UN and NATO than participate directly with the EU within the current Third Country framework. A scenario that it is seemingly more than preparing for as evidenced by their consistent championing of the capabilities and utility of the other non-EU multilateral organisations working in the field. The alternative option of partaking in EU CCM on a case-by-case basis as explicitly mentioned by the UK Govt would be its least preferred outcome despite its willingness to do so. Concurrently, despite the fact that CCM is most definitely of secondary importance to both the UK and EU after military endeavours, the document in question speaks highly of the civilian elements of the EU's CSDP, and references specific CCM missions as successes throughout. The UK Govt's view of its contribution to these missions is significantly higher than how the relevant literature considers it with the former focusing on its qualitative contributions. In short, the conclusion that the UK Govt is 'hedging its bets' is because of the fact it speaks so highly of both the EU's MCM and CCM as well as the capabilities of other multilaterals, both in terms of its military and civilian activities, making clear that it would succeed should either outcome materialise. A situation viewed as win-win for the UK perhaps.

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[37] UK Govt (2021). Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

As covered in Section 2.2 and 3, despite being one of the original European states that pushed for a unified and united defence and foreign policy post-World War Two, even as a MS the UK has historically (especially in more recent years) shown reticence in conforming to a comprehensive EU foreign policy (Lehne, 2021; Whitman, 2020; Tonra, 2019; Cardwell, 2017). Now with the UK a non-MS it is clear that not only does it remain reluctant to forward a comprehensive EU foreign policy, it is now unable to fully partake even if it wished to do so. This is the case for all matters concerning the EU's CFSP, CSDP and thus, its CCM. However, despite this and as mentioned, the UK Govt Response document at the heart of this study is consistently complimentary of EU CCM and highlights the UK Govt's desire for it to partake in both EU MCM and CCM under the same remit it had as a MS but only whenever and wherever it so chooses. Unsurprisingly, this does not seem realistic. There already exists a framework for non-MS/Third Countries to partake in EU crisis management endeavours but it does not permit real participation in selecting the missions and operations nor planning and leading those missions and operations. Non-MS Third Countries are contributors to EU foreign policy endeavours and do not direct it. Players not managers, to use the language of the UK HoL and Govt. The UK Govt Response (2018) document argues that what it brings to the table is not only substantial financing of EU crisis management but a qualitative contribution unmatched by any other MS. It considers itself to have been more of a manager than a player since the inception of EU CCM and that it is in the best interest of the EU that it agrees to an unprecedented Third State framework for the UK because of its ability to lead, plan and manage overseas missions and operations that in the European community only it has the expertise and experience of doing to such a high level and standard; owing to its significant capabilities as a global player in regards to both its hard and soft power.

Yet, the UK Govt Response analysed in this study was published in 2018 and yet the points raised through the QCA process are just as valid and just as relevant now, in 2021, highlighting the lack of priority that the EU CFSP and CCM is for the UK. Recent comprehensive UK Govt publications on its foreign policy do not sufficiently address its relationship with the EU's foreign policy, let alone specific elements such as its CCM, or MCM for that matter. The UK Government has never been forthcoming with specific information on how future involvement would play out in actuality, as highlighted by the HoL EUSC Inquiry Report itself.

It seems pragmatic for the UK to play some sort of role alongside the EU in its CCM given the shared security interests concerning the Eastern and Southern borders of Europe, the Middle East and Africa in particular but any notion of pragmatism may be overruled by politics. It seems unrealistic for the EU to grant the UK the unprecedented Third State model that it is hoping for. Not only does 'the EU argue that its decision-making autonomy could be compromised by offering third countries more influence' (Bond, p.10, 2020) but the UK and EU are arguably pulling in different directions. The EU pushing its 'Global Strategy' and the UK pushing its 'Global Britain' – which is something of a tug of war between the two and not wholly in line with their statements of wishing to act as equal partners post-Brexit - it is completely possible that as Tonra (2019 p.229) concluded:

> 'the relationship can only deteriorate. Even with the best will in the world on both sides and an entirely (and unlikely) benign geostrategic context, the EU and UK must negotiate a relationship that will be less close, less integrated and less mutually reinforcing than that which they currently enjoy … there is no significant added-value to either party'.

(Tonra, 2019, Brexit and Security, p.229)

Recent events which further and may just evidence this notion, or at least events that can be expected to negatively impact would-be UK-EU foreign policy negotiations, have already taken place. The AUKUS nuclear security deal has frustrated one of the leading members of the EU, France, which adds complexity to future UK-EU deliberations; the Afghanistan withdrawal debacle of 2021 and the inevitable migrant situation which it contributed to, which is now playing out on the Polish-Belarusian border will no doubt add further strain to the already fraught UK-EU relationship; and the public discussions in Italy, Greece and even France in recent times of following the UK's precedent and leaving the EU, as well as with seriously disgruntled MS such as Poland and Hungary becoming ever disillusioned with the bloc's direction, the last thing the EU wants to do is provide an example of an ex-MS making gains in areas under direct EU control. Setting a precedent of special status for some Third States over others will no doubt alienate those other Third State partners and it would be logical to assume that those states would expect similar treatment. Despite this, the stalemate continues, and it seems that the longer the UK and EU do not resolve their relationship concerning foreign policy the more complex it is going to be to do so.

8. REFERENCES

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9. APPENDIX

A. UK House of Lords European Select Committee Inquiry Report. Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations. 2018

UK House of Lords
EUSC Inquiry Report

B. UK Government Response Document to Appendix A. 2018.

UK Government
Response to House

C. UK Government Report. Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. 2021.

Global Britain in a
competitive age The