Tampere University

LAURI UUSITALO

A Colonial Frontier

Interethnic Interaction, Indigenous Agency, and the Formation of Colonial Society in the Gobernación of Popayán, 1540–1615

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To my mother

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ABSTRACT

In my dissertation, I investigate the formation of colonial society through the interactions that took place between the Spaniards and the indigenous peoples, focussing on the period from 1540 to 1615 in the district of Popayán in present day South-Western Colombia. My goal here is to cast new light on the formation of colonial society by studying how it was affected by conflicts and cooperation between the indigenous communities and the Spanish conquerors in a region that thus far has received less attention in scholarship than the central areas of the Spanish colonial empire.

I pay special attention to indigenous agency in the process of colonial society formation and the important roles they played in the formation of colonial society. They were by no means passive by-standers or simply objects of the Spaniards' actions, but were instead independent actors who developed different strategies in the face of the challenges brought by Spanish colonialism. However, their actions also should not be viewed as mere reactions to the actions of the Spaniards. They pursued their own aims and goals.

The aim of my study is to explore the complexity of the social dynamics and the power relations between the different actors at the grassroots level, and how this affected the local colonial society. I investigate this process and its peculiarities in a certain defined geographical area while discussing its significance in the larger context of Spanish colonialism. I put the development in Popayán into its context by looking at it as part of the larger empire building process. Therefore, while I am interested in what made Popayán special, I also pay attention in what the example of one particular frontier region can reveal about the complexity of the colonial processes in general.

This study is based on Spanish documents that are spread across several archives, namely *Archivo General de Indias (AGI)* in Seville, Spain, *Archivo General de la Nación (AGN)* in Bogotá, Colombia, *Archivo Nacional de Ecuador (ANE)* in Quito, Ecuador and *Archivo Central del Cauca (ACC)* in Popayán, Colombia. The sources include court records, inspections, demographic materials, petitions, and complaints. In addition to archival sources, I also use chronicles written by Spanish conquerors and learned men, as well as other published sources.

The documents were born during the process of the colonial state's creation and cannot be separated from it. Thus, they are not objective sources of information, but rather an integral component of the state formation process. The state needed to control its subjects, and the emerging structures were upheld through institutions based on written documents. As such, the documents do not merely describe reality, but also played a visible role in creating it.

This sets many limitations, but it does not mean that the material is not of use for a critical historian. Post- and decolonial theories offer tools for interpreting colonial documents. With this theoretical framework in mind, I piece together the social history of local dynamics from fragmentary evidence by close reading the documents. Archival material on the indigenous peoples of Spanish America is extremely rich. Their agency is often hidden but treating the documents as kind of ethnographic scenarios and always questioning the categories and classifications embedded in them it can be teased out. Therefore, I engage in a sort of thick description to try and grasp the context in which the actions made sense to the people engaged in them.

Popayán was a colonial frontier, characterized by instability, unpredictability, and heterogeneity, and the interethnic relations were conflictive. Violence was a recurrent reality that marked the relationships between the Spaniards and the very diverse indigenous population of the *gobernación*. The Spanish invasions to the unconquered zones as well as indigenous raids against the Spaniards continued for long after the initial conquest was over. In addition, everyday violence went on throughout the entire colonial period as the Spaniards attempted to harness the indigenous societies to fulfill their insatiable demands. Indigenous resistance, both active and passive, also continued, even though their societies suffered a great deal because of conquest, colonization, and depopulation. The Spanish dominion was fragile.

The colonial bureaucracy started to grip the region more strongly since the 1550s, but that process was slow and faced many setbacks. The crown enhanced its position by acting as a mediator in local affairs. It balanced between increasing its control of the region and not shaking up the status quo too much. The indigenous communities quickly to use the legal system for their benefit. However, the institutions remained weak in the region.

Spanish willingness to work through the indigenous communities' traditional leaders created the new institution of the colonial cacique (chief). The caciques became indispensable intermediaries between their communities and the Spaniards. However, they were dependent of their people and could be easily replaced, which curbed their transformation into colonial agents. The indigenous societies of

Popayán changed profoundly during the 75 years covered in this study. It was a necessity caused by invasion of outsiders, but the process of cultural transformation was carried out according to the needs of the natives themselves. While they were looking for ways to survive in the new situation, they created new cultural forms and gave new meanings to old ones.

The indigenous peoples adapted, collaborated, and resisted in many ways. Their agency played an essential role in the making of the colonial society in Popayán. However, concentrating solely on indigenous agency carries a risk of romanticizing their survival. Many did not survive, and for many, colonialism meant seriously deteriorating living conditions and loss of significant part of their culture. Colonialism is structural violence characterized by unequal power dynamics.

Nevertheless, the indigenous peoples of America were not just passive victims; rather, they were independent agents who pursued their interests in a situation in which their freedom was limited. My thesis contributes to the understanding of the fluid, diverse, intersecting, and overlapping reality of the Spanish American colonial societies molded by the agency of the colonized as well as the colonists.

The former *gobernación* of Popayán is today one of the regions in Colombia where the presence of the indigenous peoples remains the strongest. Their communities are marginalized and ridden by continuing conflicts that trouble the country. However, they also have a strong tradition of resistance and survival from which they draw inspiration in today's struggles.

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tutkin väitöskirjassani siirtomaayhteiskunnan muotoutumista espanjalaisten ja alkuperäiskansojen välisen vuorovaikutuksen seurauksena Popayánin kuvernöörikunnassa nykyisen Kolumbian alueella vuosina 1540–1615. Käsittelen etnisten ryhmien välisiä suhteita sekä sitä, miten heidän välisensä vuorovaikutus muokkasi kehittymässä olevaa siirtomaayhteiskuntaa. Tavoitteeni lisätä ymmärrystä kyseisestä prosessista tutkimalla, miten alkuperäiskansojen ja espanjalaissiirtolaisten väliset konfliktit ja yhteistyö vaikutti siihen alueella, joka on toistaiseksi saanut vähemmän huomiota tutkimuksessa.

Kiinnitän erityistä huomiota alkuperäiskansojen toimijuuteen osana prosessia. He eivät olleet missään tapauksessa vain toimettomia sivustakatsojia tai uhreja, vaan aktiivisia toimijoita, jotka kehittivät moninaisia strategioita vastauksena kolonialismin asettamiin haasteisiin. Heidän toimintaansa ei kuitenkaan pidä nähdä myöskään pelkkänä reagoimisena valloittajien toimiin, vaan he ajoivat omia tavoitteitaan.

Työni tavoitteena on tuoda esiin sosiaalisten suhteiden ja valtadynamiikan monimutkaisuutta ruohonjuuritasolla sekä tutkia, miten tämä muokkasi siirtomaayhteiskuntaa paikallisella tasolla. Tutkin prosessia ja sen erityispiirteitä tietyllä maantieteellisesti rajatulla alueella, mutta asetan Popayánin tilanteen laajempaan kontekstiinsa osana Espanjan imperiumia. Olen kiinnostunut siitä, mikä teki Popayánista erityislaatuisen, mutta myös siitä, mitä alueen kehitys kertoo kolonialistisista prosesseista espanjalaisessa Amerikassa laajemmin.

Väitöskirjani lähdeaineistona ovat pääasiassa espanjalaiset hallinnolliset ja oikeudelliset asiakirjat, joita säilytetään neljässä eri arkistossa; *Archivo General de Indias (AGI)* Espanjan Sevillassa, *Archivo General de la Nación (AGN)* Kolumbian Bogotássa, *Archivo Nacional de Ecuador (ANE)* Ecuadorin Quitossa sekä *Archivo Central del Cauca (ACC)* Kolumbian Popayánissa. Lähdemateriaali sisältää oikeustapauksia, tarkastusraportteja, väestönlaskentoja, anomuksia, valituksia sekä muita vastaavia asiakirjoja. Lisäksi hyödynnän espanjalaisten kirjoittamia kronikoita ja muuta painettua materiaalia.

Lähdeaineistoni ovat syntyneet osana kolonialismia, eikä niitä voi siitä erottaa. Ne eivät ole vain lähteitä vaan oleellinen osa siirtomaajärjestelmän luomisprosessia. Valtio pyrki kontrolloimaan alamaisiaan, ja järjestelmää ylläpitivät instituutiot, joille

asiakirjat olivat tärkeä perusta. Siksi ne eivät vain kuvaa todellisuutta vaan myös luovat sitä.

Tämä asettaa rajoitteita asiakirjojen tulkintaan, mutta ei tarkoita sitä, että materiaali ei olisi hyödyllistä kriittisen historiantutkimuksen lähteinä. Post- ja dekolonialistiset teoriat antavat työkaluja niiden tulkitsemiseen. Näiden teorioiden tarjoaman kehikon sekä lähteiden lähiluvun avulla rakennan kuvan paikallisyhteisöjen dynamiikasta fragmentaarisen aineiston perusteella. Alkuperäiskansoja käsittelevä lähdemateriaali on erittäin rikas. Heidän toimijuutensa on usein piilotettua, mutta eräänlaisen etnografisen tutkimusotteen avulla se saadaan uutettua aineistosta. Hyödynnän tiheää kuvausta ymmärtääkseni kontekstin, jossa toimijat tekivät valintojaan.

Popayán oli siirtomaaimperiumin rajaseutua, jolle luonteenomaista oli epävakaus, arvaamattomuus sekä moninaisuus, ja etnisten ryhmien väliset konfliktit olivat tavallisia. Väkivalta leimasi vahvasti espanjalaisten sekä moninaisten alkuperäiskansojen yhteisöjen välistä vuorovaikutusta. Espanjalaisten valloitusretket valloittamattomille maille sekä niillä asuvien alkuperäiskansojen hyökkäykset espanjalaisia vastaan jatkuivat pitkään ensimmäisen valloitusvaiheen jälkeen. Myös arkipäivän väkivalta oli jatkuvaa espanjalaisten pyrkiessä saamaa alkuperäiskansat kaiken hyödyn irti. Alkuperäiskansat puolestaan harjoittivat moninaista aktiivista ja passiivista vastarintaa huolimatta siitä, että kolonialismi ja väestökato heikensivät heidän yhteisöjään merkittävästi. Espanjalaisten valta oli hauras läpi tutkimukseni ajanjakson.

Siirtomaavallan byrokratia alkoi kiristää otettaan alueesta 1550-luvulta lähtien, mutta prosessi oli hidas ja täynnä takaiskuja. Kruunu vahvisti asemaansa toimimalla välittäjänä paikallisten keskinäisissä kiistoissa. Se pyrki tasapinottelemaan, sillä se halusi lisätä valtaansa mutta samalla välttää status quon liiallista horjuttamista. Alkuperäiskansat oppivat nopeasti käyttämään oikeusjärjestelmää omaksi hyödykseen. Siirtomaahallinnon instituutiot säilyivät kuitenkin heikkoina.

Espanjalaiset pyrkivät käyttämään alkuperäiskansojen perinteisiä johtajia välittäjinä, mikä synnytti uuden päällikköinstituution. Päälliköistä käytettiin nimitystä *cacique*. Heistä tuli korvaamattomia välittäjähahmoja espanjalaisille, mutta samalla he olivat riippuvaisia omasta kansastaan, mikä esti heidän muuttumisen siirtomaavallan edustajiksi. Popayánin alkuperäiskansojen yhteisöt muuttuivat suuresti tutkimuksen kattamien noin 75 vuoden aikana. Tämä johtui kolonialismin aiheuttamista ulkoisista paineista, mutta kulttuurinen muutos tapahtui suurelta osin yhteisöjen omien tarpeiden mukaan. He kehittivät keinoja selviytyä uudessa tilanteessa ja kehittivät uusia kulttuurin muotoja sekä antoivat uusia merkityksiä vanhoille.

Alkuperäiskansat sopeutuivat sekä tekivät yhteistyötä ja vastarintaa monin tavoin. Heidän toimijuutensa oli tärkeässä osassa Popayánin siirtomaayhteiskunnan kehityksessä. On kuitenkin tärkeää olla romantisoimatta asiaa. Monet yksilöt ja yhteisöt eivät selviytyneet, ja monille kolonialismi merkitsi pahasti heikentyneitä elinolosuhteita sekä oman kulttuurin osittaista menetystä. Kolonialismi on rakenteellista väkivaltaa, jolle on leimallista epätasa-arvoiset valtasuhteet.

Siitä huolimatta Amerikan alkuperäiskansat eivät olleet vain passiivisia uhreja vaan itsenäisiä toimijoita, jotka pyrkivät ajamaan etujaan tilanteessa, jossa heidän vapautensa oli rajoitettua. Väitöskirjani auttaa ymmärtämään paremmin moninaista, monin tavoin risteävää ja jatkuvasti muuttuvaa espanjalaisamerikkalaisten siirtomaayhteiskuntien todellisuutta, jota muovasivat niin kolonisoitujen kuin kolonialistienkin toimijuus.

Siirtomaa-aikaisen Popayánin kuvernöörikunnan alue on nykyäänkin Kolumbian etnisesti moninaisimpia alueita, jossa alkuperäiskansat ovat yhä vahvasti läsnä. Heidän yhteisönsä ovat marginalisoituja ja maan yhä jatkuvat konfliktit aiheuttavat niille suuria ongelmia. Niillä on kuitenkin myös pitkä selviytymisen ja vastarinnan traditio, joka tarjoaa inspiraatiota myös tämän päivän kamppailuissa.

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aims and Structure of the Study

"In what houses / Of gold-glittering Lima did the builders live?" asks Bertolt Brecht in his famous 1935 poem *Questions from A Worker Who Reads*.[1] Today, we know where the builders of the towns and cities of Spanish colonial America lived, and we know much more about their lives than those living at the time Brecht composed his poem. The builders were primarily indigenous peoples and, especially later, African slaves. The role of indigenous agency in colonial Spanish America is no longer a novelty, thanks to growing scholarship on the issue over the past few decades. Nevertheless, much research remains to be done on the topic.

The history of Spanish America has traditionally been approached as a history of the Spanish in America. It is a history in which Indigenous Americans have had, at best, a supporting role. More often, indigenous peoples have been completely omitted in the retelling of Spanish American history, mentioned only passingly, or victimized.[2] Conquest history has often turned on symbolic events, such as a certain victory or the founding of a city that marked the completion of the conquest and the transition from the pre-Columbian to the colonial era. However, the Spanish conquest of America remained incomplete for centuries. The *conquistadors* certainly claimed possession over lands as soon as they discovered them and declared their inhabitants to be subjects of the king. Yet it is important to remember that for decades, even centuries, the majority of indigenous peoples inhabiting the colonies lived in their own communities under their own chiefs, spoke their own languages, and worked their own fields.[3] The Spaniards did not control the indigenous masses directly, but only indirectly and through their own leaders.

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[1] "Fragen eines lesenden Arbeiters," translated by M. Hamburger; *Brecht, Poems*.

[2] This is part of the narrative of the Epic Spanish Conquest, to which I will return in chapter 1.3.

[3] Restall, *Seven Myths*, 65–73. J.H. Elliot and Henry Kamen have also made important contributions to understanding the fragility and incompleteness of the Spanish conquest and colonization of the Americas. See Elliot, *Old World*; Elliot, *Spain, Europe*; Kamen, *Spain's Road to Empire*.

Over the past few decades, revisionist historians have complicated the traditional narrative by proposing the concept of indigenous agency in the colonial world. Matthew Restall speaks of New Conquest History, which, beginning in the 1990s, has thoroughly changed the picture of the Spanish conquest and colonialism. Today, the indigenous are seen as important actors who played a formative role in the making of colonial societies. Scholars have also increasingly understood the heterogeneity of conquest society, the variety of both indigenous and Spanish people occupying it, and the interconnectedness of the different groups living in it. New Conquest Historians have both uncovered new or rarely used documents from the archives and re-read the traditional, mostly published sources that informed older generations of scholars. They have also introduced several new methods and approaches that have diversified the scholarship.[4] If, in the 1960s, the distinguished global historian William H. McNeill could depict the natives of America as docile people numbly submitting to Spanish power and the worldview it imposed because their own institutions and skills were "utterly inadequate," these views are now luckily out-dated in the research, if not in the public image.[5]

However, the simple dichotomy of colonists and colonized is still not sufficiently problematized. Joanne Rappaport and Tom Cummins criticize the earlier scholarship's tendency to classify the Spaniards and natives into two isolated republics, following the colonial administration's tendency to divide the colonies into two separate republics: that of the Spaniards and that of the "Indians" (*república de españoles* and *república de indios*). The reality, however, was neither so simple nor so straightforward. The different ethnic groups did not live in closed worlds separated from each other; rather, they interacted in many ways throughout the colonial era. The result was something that Rappaport and Cummins call colonial culture, characterized by multicultural, complex, heterogeneous, and fluid social formations that took many different forms.[6] This culture was really neither Spanish nor American, but rather colonial. It is important to develop these themes further to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of early colonial societies in America and of the creation of the colonial system. In doing so, we can challenge the old paradigms of Spain's rapid and complete conquest of America and its victimization of the natives.

In this dissertation, I investigate the formation of colonial society through the interactions that took place between the conquerors and the conquered, focussing

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[4] Restall, "New Conquest History," 151–156.

[5] See McNeill, *Rise of the West*, 600.

[6] Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, 28–29, 49.

on the period from 1540 to 1615 in the district of Popayán in present day South-Western Colombia. My aim is twofold. First, I examine interethnic relations between the Spaniards and the Indigenous peoples. How did they interact with each other, what kind of relationships did they form, how did they negotiate their diverse interests, and what kind of conflicts did they have? In short, I am interested in how these groups coexisted. Second, I explore how their interactions shaped the emerging colonial society. My goal here is to cast new light on the formation of colonial society by studying how it was affected by conflicts and cooperation between the indigenous communities and the Spanish settlers. My overall purpose is to open new perspectives on the history of American colonization.

I pay special attention to indigenous agency in the process of colonial society formation, but I am not writing an ethnohistorical study of the indigenous peoples of Popayán. Rather, I am studying the process of colonialism. Nevertheless, my research emphasizes the agency of diverse indigenous peoples and the important roles they played in the formation of colonial society. They were by no means passive by-standers or simply objects of the Spaniards' actions, but were instead independent actors who developed different strategies in the face of the challenges brought by Spanish colonialism. However, their actions also should not be viewed as mere reactions to the actions of the Spaniards. They pursued their own aims and goals.

I study Spanish demands for labor and tribute, their attempts to control the indigenous population, and the place reserved for the natives in the new colonial society. At the same time, I look at the indigenous peoples' response to the Spanish, their means of adaptation and resistance, their active role in the making of the colonial world, and the transformations of their societies in the face of colonial pressures. I do not explore these issues separately, but rather see them as a manifold and interconnected process of negotiation. My thesis is that colonial society was born out of the interactions, both conflictive and cooperative, of the indigenous communities, the Spanish settlers, and other groups who inhabited the colonies.

The aim of my study is to explore the complexity of the social dynamics and the power relations between the different actors at the grassroots level, and how this affected the local colonial society. The agency of the local actors appears in a different light when one acknowledges how the interests of the different indigenous communities and individuals, the Spanish settlers, the crown, and the church overlapped and intertwined. The process of the formation of colonial empire took different local forms in different parts of the empire. I investigate this process and its peculiarities in a certain defined geographical area while discussing its significance in the larger context of Spanish colonialism.

The former *gobernación* of Popayán is located in the southwest of modern Colombia. (see figures 1. and 2.) It consists of all or parts of the current Colombian departments of Antioquía, Chocó, Risaralda, Caldas, Quindio, Valle del Cauca, Tolima, Cauca, Huila, Nariño, Caquetá, and Putumayo. During the colonial era, the region was a colonial frontier, characterized by instability, unpredictability, and heterogeneity, and its development did not follow the same pattern found in other colonial centers. The gobernación also had its own centers and peripheries.

The Spanish dominion in Popayán was always contested, and a large part of the *gobernación* remained completely beyond European control throughout the sixteenth and much of the seventeenth centuries. The wars between the Spaniards, their allies, and independent indigenous groups along the frontiers continued for the entire period addressed in this study. My focus is on the Andean mountain regions, as they were the most populous, and the Spanish presence was strongest there. However, I will also deal with the Pacific lowlands, albeit to a lesser extent.

According to Pekka Hämäläinen, who has studied the Comanches, colonial frontiers or borderlands were often messy, eclectic contact points, where all actors had to adapt, regardless of the balance of power between them. The cultures of both the conquerors and the conquered underwent transformation in these regions. The Spaniards and the indigenous peoples fought for the same resources, but they also coexisted and influenced each other.[7] Looking at Popayán as a frontier helps us to better understand its specific nature and the dynamics between its different groups compared to other regions that were also part of the Spanish empire in America.

Most of the scholarship on early colonial America has concentrated on the central areas of the Spanish colonial empire. This has created an incomplete, and in some ways flawed, picture of the history of early colonial America. It leaves out vast areas and numerous peoples whose histories differ from those of the Mexicans or the Peruvians. The Spanish Empire was never homogeneous, and the different parts it had specific identities. It is therefore important to expand the focus to the fringes of the empire in order to gain a better understanding of the complex processes that were involved in building a colonial society. The development of colonial society did not follow the same pattern everywhere.

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[7] Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, 7–9.

Figure 1. *Rough outline of the borders of the 16th century gobernación de Popayán with modern countries and cities. Base map: D-maps.com.*

Figure 2. Spanish cities and towns of the Gobernación de Popayán. Source: Padilla, "Tasaciones de encomiendas," 9



My aim here, however, is not to write a local history of Popayán; rather, I seek to make the picture of the formation of the Spanish-American colonial system more complete by including a region that, while it has been studied, thus far has received much less attention. I put the development in Popayán into its context by looking at it as part of the larger empire building process. Therefore, while I am interested in what made Popayán special, I pay more attention in what the example of one particular frontier region can reveal about the complexity of the colonial processes in general.

Popayán was unique in many ways. Its ethnic diversity makes it an interesting region to study. It was also important region for the Spaniards despite being a frontier for two reasons. First, it was rich in gold. The region that is now modern Colombia produced two thirds of all the gold in America between 1550 and 1620, with Popayán being one of the principal mining zones.[8] Second, the Camino Real that connected Peru with the Caribbean port of Cartagena ran through Popayán. Therefore, it was logistically important for the Spaniards to keep hold of the region.

Furthermore, Popayán's political position was peculiar. The *gobernación* enjoyed strong autonomy, almost autarchy, but at the same time it was dependent of connections with other provinces. Popayán lived of trade both within the region and with other regions. All the ethnic groups were involved in trade, which had roots in precolonial and pre-Inca periods. The region north of Quito had long-established trade connections by the time of the Spanish arrival, and these connections continued into the colonial period.[9]

At the same time, Popayán also shared some characteristics typical to the frontiers of the empire. The Spaniards were few and vastly outnumbered despite the high mortality of the indigenous peoples, their position was very precarious, many of the indigenous societies remained unconquered or only partly submitted to Spanish rule. Therefore, the region remained predominantly indigenous, and Spaniards were forced to adapt to the situation. In addition, wars continued while the colonial centers already lived the so-called Pax Colonial[10].

The colonial process studied here took place in the so-called contact zone, a concept coined by Mary Louise Pratt. The contact zone is the space of colonial encounters, wherein different peoples and groups came into contact and establish

[8] Bakewell *History of Latin America*, 180.

[9] Herrera Ángel, *Popayán*, 80–82.

[10] Pax Colonial, or Pax Hispanica refers to the period roughly between 1550 and 1750, when the major conquests had ended and there were no large-scale indigenous rebellions in the colonial centers. However, the concept is disputed as we shall see in chapter three.

ongoing relationships. The concept invokes the spatial and temporal co-presence of subjects who previously had been geographically and historically separate. Their encounters often involved coercion, inequality, conflict, and asymmetrical power relations. Even so, the concept of contact zone helps us to look beyond the simple ideas of domination and separateness. It emphasizes the dialectic, interactive, and improvisational character of these contacts, and the need of the various players to coexist and communicate.[11]

The Spaniards, the natives, the mestizos, and the people of African descent all shared the same space and needed to coexist despite their differences. This does not mean that there was no domination, no coercion, and no conflict. Colonial societies were inherently violent, and colonialism was in itself a form of structural violence. Focusing on indigenous agency instead of victimization likewise should not create a romanticized view of colonial history. Violence was an essential part of the imposition of colonial rule, and also of resisting it. In the early colonial *gobernación* of Popayán, violence was endemic and cruelties recurrent.

While this study deals with events that took place over 400 years ago, the peoples I write about are still living. The modern Colombian departments of Cauca, Nariño, Chocó, and Putumayo, all of which are within the area that belonged to the colonial *gobernación* of Popayán, still contain a strong indigenous presence. According to the official census of 2005, more than 20% of the population in both the department of Cauca, in which the city of Popayán is located, and the department of Putumayo is indigenous. In the departments of Chocó and Nariño, the indigenous peoples also exceed 10% of the total population. In other present-day departments located in the region of the colonial *gobernación* of Popayán, the indigenous population is smaller, but not non-existent. In comparison, the indigenous peoples comprise about 3% of the total population of the entire country of Colombia. Colonial history is also visible in the region's large Afrocolombian population. In Chocó, their share of the population is 82%, and in Valle del Cauca, Cauca, and Nariño it ranges from 19 to 27%. In total, Afrocolombians form just over 10% of the Colombian population.[12]

Many of these regions are still considered peripheral in Colombia. They are home to many poor and marginalized communities, and the civil wars and the war on drugs have affected them more than other parts of the country. The Nasas (Paeces), the Pastos, the Guambianos, and the Coconucos, among other nations mentioned in this study, still form living cultures with strong identities. They still are engaged in

[11] Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*, 6–7.

[12] *La visibilización estadística de los grupos étnicos colombianos*, 28–30. These statistics are somewhat dated, but it is likely that the proportions remain largely unchanged today.

struggles for their rights. Therefore, it is important not to speak about them as if they are ancient and long-gone peoples. The processes of colonialism at the center of this study continue to have real consequences in these communities.

This study covers the time period 1540 to 1615. The first year is marked by the foundation of the *gobernación* of Popayán and the naming of Sebastián de Belalcázar as its first governor. These acts symbolized the end of the first phase of conquest and the first steps in the building of a colonial society. The study ends with the governorship of Francisco Sarmiento de Sotomayor (1607–1615), who led new conquests of vast regions that were until then beyond the Spaniards' reach. By the governorship of Sarmiento, colonial society was fairly consolidated at the center of the *gobernación* and most of its structures and institutions were in place; even so, along the frontiers the wars of conquest continued.

My work follows a thematic approach, but also reflects the process of colonialism and changes that occurred across time. The chapters overlap chronologically and while I do not follow any strict periodization, the main emphasis of Chapter Three is the early colonial period, of Chapter Five is the final decades of this study's timespan, and of Chapter Four is the period in-between.

Following the introduction, Chapter Two offers an overview of the indigenous societies in the region that would become the *Gobernación* of Popayán and of the *gobernación*'s colonial system. Chapter Three then addresses interethnic conflicts in the colonial society. I begin with the Spanish conquest and the continuing warfare between the Spaniards, their allies, and the independent indigenous groups beyond the area controlled by Spain. After that, I consider indigenous resistance within the Spanish sphere, and finally the everyday conflicts and endemic structural violence that were characteristic of colonialism.

Chapter Four demonstrates how relations slowly began to institutionalize as colonial institutions developed and society started to stabilize, some twenty years after the conquest. The most important institution in this respect was the *visita*, an inspection performed by an experienced crown official (*visitador*), by which the government tried to increase its direct control in the area. Nevertheless, colonial rule remained fragile and bureaucratization incomplete throughout the entire period covered by this study.

Chapter Five reflects on the so-called crystallization of colonial society that took place roughly between the 1570s and the early seventeenth century.[13] This was the

[13] According to Kris Lane, the crystallization or fossilization of the colonial system occurred roughly between the years 1580 and 1600 in South America (in Mexico, it happened somewhat earlier). Many of the institutions and social and cultural patterns that emerged during this period defined the rest of

period during which the early colonial society, characterized by violence and instability, transformed into a so-called mature colonial society. First, I concentrate on the emergence of the local institution of *cacique* (indigenous lord), after which I deal with the formation and dynamics of power groups in the local colonial society. Finally, I focus on the different levels of interaction that took place between the various actors at the grass-roots level.

1.2 Sources, Methodology, and Theoretical Framework

The Sources

This study is based on Spanish legal and administrative documents that are spread across several archives, namely *Archivo General de Indias (AGI)* in Seville, Spain, *Archivo General de la Nación (AGN)* in Bogotá, Colombia, *Archivo Nacional de Ecuador (ANE)* in Quito, Ecuador and *Archivo Central del Cauca (ACC)* in Popayán, Colombia. The most important source group in my work is comprised of judicial documents, such as court records, petitions, and complaints.

The AGI contains all the material of the Spanish colonies that were sent to Spain for one reason or another. These include petitions and letters to the king, reports from the royal *visitas*, the records of the *juicios de residencias* (official inspections organized when an official ended his term), copies of court cases that were deemed important enough to be sent to the Council of the Indies or that needed a decision from the king, and the so-called *testimonios de meritos*, in which the subjects related their services for God and his majesty in order to gain benefits. The last mentioned are very fruitful material, as they usually contain a questionnaire in which both Spanish and indigenous witnesses gave their testimonies about certain events.

The AGN in Bogotá contains the documents of the royal *audiencia* (colonial high court and the administrative district governed by that court) of Santafé de Bogotá, established in 1549 and inaugurated in 1550. The entire *gobernación* of Popayán was under its jurisdiction until the establishment of the *audiencia* of Quito in 1563. After that point, the *gobernación* was divided between the two authorities. The documents

the colonial period and continued into the independent states of Latin America. The term implies a stagnation of colonial society after this period. While this is a simplification of a more complicated reality, there is much continuity from this period even into the present day. However, as Kris Lane noted, a closer look at the colonial society of the time, especially at the periphery, reveals fluid dynamics that defy the idea of stagnation. Lane, *Quito 1599*, xv.

of the latter are kept in the ANE in Quito. The most important source group in both archives contains the records of court cases concerning the indigenous population. The ANE contains very little material from the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but the AGN has a relatively larger collection.

The ACC in Popayán itself contains plenty of local materials, including notarial materials such as wills and contracts, as well civil and criminal suits dealt with at the local level. These documents are important for my research as they complement the documents in the archives of the former imperial center in Seville and in Bogotá and Quito.

Researchers of colonial indigenous history have undoubtedly benefitted from demographic material. The natives were obliged to pay a tribute to the Spaniards and to do labor service, and the colonies were run by native labor. Therefore, it was important for officials to count the natives to determine their levies. Using these population censuses, demographic historians have been able to establish approximate numbers of natives and their depopulation rates.

However, Karen Vieira Powers heavily criticizes earlier population history for its uncritical use of such sources. In her own groundbreaking study, Powers demonstrates how population historians have failed to take into account the conscious manipulation of demographic material by both natives and Spanish officials. Spontaneous and organized indigenous migration beyond state control, hiding from colonial officials, official over-counting and undercounting, and fraud committed by the local elite to hide part of the tribute from the crown were all strategies used by Andeans[14], the state, and the settlers that undermine demographic accuracy.[15] In addition of what was intended to be shown, the colonial censuses also include implicit information included unconsciously and providing insight into the indigenous cultures.[16]

Among the most important demographic sources are the *visitas*' reports. However, they are not just ethnographic sources. *Visitas* were governmental tools used to learn about the situation in certain regions or institutions, and to intervene in possible malpractices. The *visitas* differed from each other in their aim and in their scope, but the most important and comprehensive of them were called *visitas generales*. The most concrete aim of these *visitas* was to carry out a census of the indigenous

[14] By Andeans, I refer to the indigenous peoples of the Andean region.

[15] Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 82.

[16] Herrera Angel et al., "Geographies of the Name," 92.

population and to determine the tributes they had to pay to their *encomenderos*[17] and to the church. The *visitadores* also reviewed the general situation of the indigenous peoples, their livelihood, and the treatment they received from the Spanish. In addition, they gave orders to the indigenous peoples, the *encomenderos*, the officials, and the clerics, and offered judgements on charges of bad treatment.

The many functions of the *visitadores* meant that their reports were very detailed and diverse. The ones that I use in this study have several hundred folios each. They include censuses, information about the indigenous peoples' livelihoods, interviews of the Spanish settlers and the Andeans, sentences, and observations made by the *visitadores*. Therefore, they contain plenty of ethnographical information about the political and commercial organisation of the indigenous societies and their ways of life, among other things. The *visitas* have been a fruitful source material for many historians and anthropologists investigating colonial indigenous societies.[18]

Another important corpus for my research is judicial documents. Negotiations related to colonialism took place largely through the judicial courts and other legal institutions. According to Brian Owensby, the law represented a privileged space of interaction and a form of political engagement for colonial peoples. Negotiation through state institutions was not only permitted, but also actively encouraged by Spanish officials and embraced by indigenous peoples. In a situation of recognized inequality, the law provided a means through which more vulnerable subjects could contest power.[19] The documents that resulted from this negotiation reveal both individual conflicts and indigenous agency in the colonial world. They illustrate the ways in which indigenous communities adapted to and challenged colonial rule. At the same time, careful reading of the documents reveals much about social relations, about power struggles, and about the formation of local networks.

The indigenous populations in the Americas eagerly used all the legal avenues at their disposal and were resilient in pursuing their rights, despite the fact that many grievances remained unresolved.[20] The Spanish empire's indigenous subjects began bringing lawsuits before Spanish judges across the continent almost immediately

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[17] Encomendero was a conquistador of high rank who was rewarded for his services to the crown with an *encomienda*, a privilege of receiving tribute from a certain *cacique* and his subjects. The natives belonging to an *encomienda* were called *encomendados*. The institution will be further explained in Chapter 2.2.

[18] For examples of the use of *visita* material, see Padilla "Tasaciones de Encomiendas;" López Arellano "Las encomiendas de Popayán;" Wachtel *Vision of the Vanquished*; Stern *Peru's Indian Peoples*; Zulawski *They Eat*; Calero *Chiefdoms under Siege*; Gamboa *Cacicazgo muisca*.

[19] Owensby, "Foreword," xii–xiv.

[20] Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 133–134.

after the conquerors arrived. This was beneficial to both parties. For the Spaniards, it offered a way to indoctrinate the natives and channel their frustration to colonial institutions. For the indigenous peoples, by contrast, it was the colonial practice that allowed them the greatest agency in pursuing their interests.[21]

Few court cases from Popayán survive in which indigenous individuals or communities sued a Spaniard. Instead, there are many cases about crimes committed against Andeans; these tended to be brought to court by a colonial official or some other Spaniard, rather than the indigenous victim. There are also many surviving cases in which Andeans were accused of a rebellion. Together with petitions by Andeans, disputes over *encomiendas*, land, or the dominions of certain *caciques*, the court cases are invaluable documents that shed light on indigenous efforts to improve their conditions and to resist colonisation. At the same time, these documents tell us about local power dynamics and disputes between different societal factions. Courts were the place where these disputes were negotiated.

In Castilian civil procedure, litigants were responsible for gathering witnesses and preparing a list of questions for them to answer in front of the judge. The questions were often leading, and although the answers were sometimes surprising and unexpected, more often the witnesses simply affirmed or denied the litigants' position or claimed ignorance to each question. As a result, the questionnaires are often more fruitful for a historian than the answers, as they reveal the carefully phrased arguments of both sides of the dispute.[22]

The letters sent by colonial officials, settlers, and the Andean elite deal with a wide range of issues and can be used to complement the legal sources. Royal decrees and other normative materials, for their part, were usually dictated as a response to a problem that subjects brought to the attention of the king and his advisers; this makes them valuable sources as well. Usually, the problem the decree was meant to solve is briefly explained at the beginning of the document. Finally, I have relied on notarial documents, especially contracts and sales documents, to trace other kinds of legal transactions between colonizers and the colonized.

Several other accounts and reports on the conquest—and the situation of indigenous peoples—provide further contextual insight. These are usually the most tendentious materials. The conquistadors wrote, or had somebody write for them, their version of the conquest. By contrast, the defenders of the natives exaggerated their misery to bring more attention to the problems they wrote about. Therefore, the accounts and reports cannot be used as realistic sources of true events. Instead,

[21] Mumford, "Litigation as Ethnography." 5–12.

[22] Mumford, "Litigation as Ethnography," 15.

a close reading of the documents reveals many interesting things about the relationship between the conquerors and the conquered and about the attitudes of the former toward the natives. A special case in this source type is *probanzas de meritos* (testimonies of merits), in which the conquistadors or their descendants related their services to the king and the church during the conquest and pacification of the Indies. The motive of these *probanzas* was to convince the king and his advisers that the person was worthy of royal favours, such as receiving an *encomienda*.

There is at least one *probanza de meritos* authored by an indigenous leader from Popayán. Don Pedro de Henao, *cacique* of Ipiales, travelled to the royal court in Spain in the 1580s to ask for a confirmation of his title of governor of the Pastos of Ipiales, Potosí, and certain other villages. He took with him a series of complaints from his people and received from the king several royal decrees in favour of himself and his people.[23] In general, Pedro's *probanza* is not especially unique, as similar documents exist from other parts of America, especially Mexico. However, in the more remote areas, like Popayán, they are extremely rare. This makes Don Pedro's *probanza* and the royal decrees he received in return very valuable sources.

In addition to archival sources, I also use chronicles written by Spanish conquerors and learned men, as well as other published sources. The most important of these is Pedro Cieza de León's four-part *Crónica del Perú*; I focus on parts one and four.[24] Cieza de León took part in the conquest of the northern parts of the *gobernación* in 1539–1541, and was present at the foundations of the towns of Anserma, Cartago, and Antioquía. He was awarded an *encomienda* in the *gobernación* for his services. In 1547, he travelled through the *gobernación* of Popayán on his way to Peru to take part in the campaign against Gonzalo Pizarro's rebellion. In 1551, he moved back to Spain, where he wrote his *Crónica*. The first part was published in 1553, but he died the next year leaving the remainder unpublished until the nineteenth century.

Another important chronicle is Fray Pedro de Aguado's *Historia de Santa Marta y Nuevo Reino de Granada*, which was first published in 1906, edited by the Spanish historian, diplomat, and journalist Jerónimo Bécker.[25] Fray Pedro arrived in

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[23] AGI, Quito 22, n. 38, Expediente de Pedro de Henao, indio principal de la provincia de Quito, gobernador de los pueblos de Ipiales y Potosí en el corregimiento de los Pastos, pidiendo confirmación de dicho título de gobernador, 1583; AGI, Quito 1, n. 16 Relación de lo que se ha hecho con don Pedro de Henao indio la vez primera que vino a esta corte y ahora, 18 August 1584. The Potosí mentioned here is not the famous silver mining center in present day Bolivia, but rather a native village of the same name in the district of Pasto in Popayán.

[24] Cieza de León *Parte primera de la chronica*; Cieza de León, *Cronica del Peru, cuarta parte*.

[25] Aguado, *Historia*.

Cartagena probably in 1561, and acted as a missionary in the *Nuevo Reino de Granada* in present day Colombia. In 1573, he was named minister provincial of the Franciscans of Santafé de Bogotá. He wrote his *Historia* in the 1570s and 1580s.[26] The third important chronicler is Juan de Castellanos, a conquistador, poet, and priest who lived the largest part of his life in present day Colombia. His main work is *Elegías de varones ilustres de Indias*, written in the form of an epic poem, which recounts the story of the Spanish conquest of Colombia and Venezuela. Prepared in the late sixteenth century, apart from the first section it too was published only in the nineteenth century.[27]

Finally, it is worth mentioning Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, who wrote several works on the history of the Indies and the treatment of its indigenous peoples. He became known as a defender of the rights of the indigenous peoples and, in 1516, was granted the official title of *Protector de los indios* (Protector of Indians).[28] Later, beginning in the 1550s, the office of *Protector de los indios* or *Defensor de indios* (Defender of Indians) was institutionalized as an advocate specialized in representing the indigenous peoples in the legal court.[29] Among his most important works were the short pamphlet *Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias* and the more extensive *Historia de las Indias*.[30]

Reading Colonial Documents

As Joanne Rappaport and Tom Cummins state, the Spanish empire was ruled by the power of the pen. The administration of the worldwide empire was made possible through a far flung network of correspondence, the legal system was based on written documents, and the notaries were instrumental in the empire's bureaucratic machine.[31] The documents were born during the process of the colonial state's creation, and cannot be separated from it. They thus are not objective sources of information, but rather an integral component of the state formation process. The state needed to control its subjects, and the emerging structures were upheld through

[26] Fals-Borda, Orlando, "Fray Pedro de Aguado," 541–547, 553–557.

[27] Castellanos, *Elegías*.

[28] Las Casas will be introduced more completely throughout this work.

[29] Cunill, "La protectoría de indios," 480–482.

[30] Las Casas, *Brevísima relación*; Las casas, *Historia*.

[31] Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, 113–114.

institutions based on written documents. As such, the documents do not merely describe reality, but also played a visible role in creating it.

The study of Spanish American indigenous peoples is largely based on sources produced by or for the state apparatus of the conquerors and the church. This is unavoidable, as very few genuine native-written sources survive. However, some of the records produced within the Spanish colonial system were written by the natives themselves. The Nahuas and the Mayas, as well as other groups in Mexico, developed a written language during the colonial period and produced many documents in their own language. Even they, however, used the genres introduced by the Spanish, mixed with their own pre-conquest genres of spoken language; their documents too were written for the Spanish officials. From the Andes, there are no sources in indigenous languages, with the exception of a very few texts in the Quechua language. Instead, the literate Andeans wrote almost exclusively in Spanish.[32]

While oral history, anthropology, and archaeology offer important tools for studying colonized peoples, documents in the colonial archives should not be dismissed despite their limitations. The indigenous viewpoint as such is beyond our reach, but their agency is not. Interpreting it nevertheless requires a decolonial reading of the documents. It is important for me, writing as a European historian about the indigenous peoples of present-day Colombia, to reflect on my position. As a historian, I obviously must maintain my scholarly integrity, but it is not enough.

Historians of the colonized peoples generally prefer genuine accounts produced by the natives themselves, whenever they are available. This is understandable and recommendable, as the colonial state's records do not offer a view of or by the natives themselves. They are always an outsider view. Does this mean that studying indigenous agency through the colonial sources is a futile exercise, as the viewpoint is distorted by the fact that the sources are not genuinely indigenous? It does not. Historical sources never tell the truth as such. They should never be read literally, and they always need to be interpreted by the researcher. Even genuine accounts by the indigenous peoples themselves must be read critically. They offer one point of view about the events they describe, not the whole truth.

Joanne Rappaport and Tom Cummins point out that the entire notion of a pure indigenous voice is romantic, but unrealistic and ahistorical. There was no pre-Columbian indigenous voice in the colonial era. The native cultures were in constant transformation, as people were finding ways to survive in new circumstances, heavily influenced by the culture of the conquerors. In fact, according to Rappaport and Cummins, many of the aspects that came to define what is indigenous in the

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[32] Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, 116–117.

twentieth and twenty-first centuries were born in the early colonial period.[33] A researches does not find pristine or timeless indigenous peoples in the documents, but ambiguous and often conflictive colonial encounters between the colonizers and the colonized.[34] Therefore, the indigenous point of view cannot be separated from the colonial experience.

Nevertheless, documents containing indigenous voice, even in a blurred form, should be used when possible. The Spanish archives contain a plethora of documents that were authored by the natives themselves or that include interviews and interrogations of them. All of these were typically recorded by Spanish notaries from oral dictation or testimony, and often through a mestizo interpreter.[35] The indigenous voice was inevitably filtered. Spanish official sources, even those written or commissioned by the natives themselves, are ethnocentric by nature. It is not my intention to speak for the indigenous peoples, or with their voice. My intention is to analyze the formation of colonial societies through interactions between the natives and the colonists. I am interested in the agency of indigenous peoples and the ways in which they participated in and resisted the colonial process, which is a completely different matter.

From Popayán, no written documents in the indigenous languages exist. Even Spanish language documents written or commissioned by the natives themselves are extremely rare. This sets many limitations, but it does not mean that the material is not of use for a critical historian. On the contrary, historians have for several decades used source material whose usefulness as historical evidence lies in the very fact that they were not meant as evidence for posterity. Court cases, parish-register entries, wills, land transactions, etc. can all be employed, with the appropriate methodology, to explore explicit actions or implicit ideas of the so-called common people.[36]

This history from below, or grassroots history as Eric Hobsbawm calls it, requires the researcher to be innovative. Sources for grassroots history are not readily waiting the historian's gaze. As Hobsbawm writes, such remnants from the past often become sources only because someone has asked a question and desperately tried to find a way to answer it. Hobsbawm mentions parish registers as an example: they were known for a long time and used by genealogists, but once social historians

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[33] Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, 257–258.

[34] Zambrano Escovar, *Trabajadores, villanos*, 31.

[35] Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, 118.

[36] Sharpe, "History from Below," 29.

started looking into them and developed new methods for analyzing them, they turned out to have a multitude of uses.[37] The sources I use in my study are similar.

As Kathryn Burns argues, document making did not take place in a social vacuum. People in relationships made documents. Court records and notarial documents are dialogic interactions between different actors in a society. They also are always in implicit dialogue with a potential litigious future. Their point was not to tell the truth, but to make sure one's version of it prevailed. Burns likens document making to chess: a process full of gambits, scripted moves, and countermoves. We, as historians, need to learn the rules of the game that underlay their production. They need not to be taken at face value, but must be placed in their appropriate context, with the ways and situation in which they were made fully visible.[38] Therefore, I do not look at my material merely as a source of information or a window to the past, but rather as part and products of the negotiation processes that were going on in society at the time. Through such material, we can look at the colonial state's aspirations and administrative practices regarding the indigenous communities, and the ways in which the natives dealt with their changing situation.

It is clear that when reading colonial documents, simple source criticism is not enough. The documents were a part of the colonialist process, and their narrative is a colonialist one. A large part of the archives used in my study were born from what Nicholas Dirks calls the colonial state's ethnographic imperative to know its subjects. The ethnographic archive was for the colonial state the principal means of governing its subjects. Later, these archives have become the principal source for historians who study colonized peoples. What we can find in the archives is determined by the contemporary needs of the colonial state.[39]

Ethnography was also part of Spanish colonialism.[40] The crown collected information about its native subjects in order to better govern them. The *visitas* especially were an essential part of this process. They gave the colonial officials important information about numbers of peoples and their livelihoods, among other things, which the officials could then use to rule. These documents have often been used as a source material for ethnohistory.

Gathering information played an important role in imposing colonial rule. The ideals of *entera noticia*, full knowledge, and an omniscient king encouraged the administration to create techniques that would provide the court and council with a

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[37] Hobsbawm, "History from Below," 16–17.

[38] Burns, *Into the Archive*, 124–128; Burns, "Notaries, Truth, and Consequences," 355–375.

[39] Dirks, "Annals of the Archive," 59–61.

[40] See Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 34.

constant supply of information from all corners of the vast empire.[41] The most effective way was to send questionnaires to gather information in an organized manner through existing bureaucratic structures.[42] *Visitas* were part of this process. However, the information was guided by Spanish epistemology alone. The Spaniards were not interested in the indigenous peoples' thoughts or in the ways they made sense of things. Instead, they were interested in governing the natives and imposing their own epistemology upon them.

To do justice to colonized peoples, it is also necessary to recognize the deficiencies of one's own thinking. I am a Westerner, and therefore the colonialist narrative is easy for me to grasp; it is much more difficult to understand the indigenous point of view. As a scholar, I need to actively question my own self-evidences. It is not possible for me to put myself in the position of indigenous peoples whose culture is not familiar to me, but I can try to decolonize my own thinking while I am reading the primary sources.

Post- and decolonial theories offer tools for interpreting colonial documents. Decolonial theory emerged, together with dependency theory, in the context of Latin America, while postcolonialism was developed primarily by Indian scholars and/or scholars researching India and is connected with subaltern studies. While there are many similarities in these different theories, they also differ in certain aspects. I find both sets of theories useful for my study, and therefore I do not feel the need to position myself in either a post- or a decolonial framework. Instead, I can—and do—use both.

Postcolonial scholar Ania Loomba defines colonialism as "the conquest and control of other people's land and goods." Colonialism was not an early modern European invention; it has been a common feature throughout global human history. Yet, modern European colonialism practices were different from those of the past, as they altered the entire planet in ways that the others did not. According to Loomba, the noticeable difference was not that the Europeans were necessarily more ruthless, better organized, of a superior race, or that they established their empires far away from their own lands. Drawing from Marxist theory, she argues that while earlier colonialisms were pre-capitalist, modern colonialism developed hand-in-hand with capitalism in Western Europe. Modern colonialism therefore did not merely extract goods or wealth from the colonized lands and peoples but actually

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[41] Brendecke, "Informing the Council," 235–236.

[42] Ruan, "Cosmographic Description," 465–466.

restructured their economies and drew them into complex relationship with their own. Human and natural resources flowed in both directions.[43]

Loomba's materialistic view can be complemented with a more culturally oriented one. Western colonialism did not only restructure the economies of the colonized and draw them into the global network of flowing resources. It also restructured the cultural, social, and religious foundations of colonized societies, and started the development toward a globalized world in which Western culture became hegemonic. The roots of the idea of Western universalism go back further than this, but through European colonialism from the fifteenth century onward, it started to have real consequences in the lives of the people across the globe.

Spanish colonialism in the Americas is often seen as the first phase of modern European colonialism. For Walter D. Mignolo, it was also the beginning of modernity itself and an essential part of it. In fact, the connection between the Mediterranean and Atlantic worlds laid the foundation for both modernity and coloniality, which for Mignolo are two sides of the same coin.[44] Colonialism created coloniality, which goes beyond the limits of colonial administration. While colonialism refers to a political and economic domination, coloniality means the long-standing patterns of power that define culture, labor, knowledge production, and the relationships between peoples. It is constantly maintained and renewed in so many aspects of our modern life that, in the words of Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "as modern subjects we breath coloniality all the time every day."[45] In decolonial theory, colonialism means not simply imposing an outside rule over a dominated country, but also imposing an outside epistemology on the colonized peoples. Therefore, the idea of decolonialism is to delink one's own thinking from the colonial epistemology.

Walter D. Mignolo sees the colonization of Americas, starting in 1492, as the beginning of the coloniality of power. Following Aníbal Quijano, Mignolo argues that the coloniality of power constitutes itself through four aspects: (1) the classification and reclassification of the planet's population, in which the concept of "culture" becomes crucial; (2) the creation of an institutional structure that functions to articulate such classifications; (3) the definition of space appropriate to such goals; and (4) an epistemological perspective from which to articulate meaning and from which the new production of knowledge could be channeled.[46]

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[43] Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, 2–3.

[44] Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs*, 51–51.

[45] Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality," 243.

[46] Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs*, 17.

Colonialism and the coloniality that it produces therefore go deeper than just the conquest of new lands. It is an attempt to impose one's worldview upon others while at the same time reducing those others to the status of servants. This is important to understand in order to really grasp the process of colonization and what it meant for the colonized societies. It was a challenge to their very way of being and understanding of the world. Modern European colonialism aimed to bring the entire world under European domination, both economically and culturally.

Anthropologist David Arnold, who has studied colonial India, however, encourages us to look beyond the simple dichotomies of colonizer/colonized and of collaborator/resister. Colonial subjects were not merely passive objects for the inscription of colonial desires, but were instead active agents who created, though not untutored, a world of their own.[47] According to another anthropologist of colonialism, Peter Pels, it is still difficult for scholars to escape this dichotomy and to see how much colonial empires were fragmented by other (sometimes pre-existing) tensions.[48] This difficulty stems from scholarly history itself. As Eric R. Wolf notes, the concept of ethnohistory was perhaps developed to separate the history of the supposedly primitive peoples from "real" history, or the history of the "civilized" peoples. However, the subjects of the two types of history are the same, that is, human societies, which are not closed systems but inextricably connected with each other.[49] The idea that the histories of the colonists and the colonized could be separated implicitly persists even today.[50]

Inherent in Arnold's idea is the fluid definition of culture. For anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff, culture is the historically situated field of signs and practices in which people construct and represent themselves and others, and hence their societies and histories. Culture is not merely an abstract order of signs, nor just the sum of habitual practices. It never forms an entirely coherent and closed system. Instead, it always contains within it potentially contestable messages and actions.[51] Therefore, cultures are constantly moving, and often the stimulus for the movement comes from encounters with others, whether peaceful or conflictive.

I combine decolonial theoretical framework with close reading of the documents. Following Giovanni Levi, I concentrate on the fragmentation, contradictions, and plurality of viewpoints that make cultures fluid and open. Individuals and groups

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[47] Arnold, "In Search of the Colonial," 41.

[48] Pels, "Anthropology of Colonialism," 176.

[49] Wolf, *Europe and the People*, 18–19.

[50] See Norton, "Subaltern Technologies," 21.

[51] Comaroff & Comaroff, *Ethnography*, 27.

constantly create and define their identities through conflicts and solidarities. This dynamic of behavior and social relations as it pertained to Spanish colonial America is the object of this study.[52] In addition, I apply the double move suggested by Gonzalo Lamana: reintroducing cultural difference while simultaneously de-Occidentalizing the conquerors, that is, questioning their universality as a way of avoiding the risk of Orientalizing the natives.[53]

Lamana's double move is intended to counter the two major narrative strategies of subalternization he identified in the Spanish texts: exotization and erasure. Exotization makes the other particular and therefore inferior, while the conqueror remains universal and superior. Erasure renders the Spanish way of making sense the only intelligible way, implicitly condemning other ways of thinking as nonsense.[54] This erasure was continued by later scholarship that tacitly designated the colonized peoples as peoples without history.[55]

Scholars have responded to erasure by stressing cultural difference. The colonialists' way of thinking was not universal, and indigenous peoples' acts that seemed nonsensical to them did make sense in their own terms. Scholars have also recognized that the language of culture and custom, understood as the natives' way, allowed the imperial agents to exercise control over the different other who only had a given set of opportunities enforced through the politics of authenticity. Responding to only one of the colonial mechanisms of subalternization may actually reinforce the other. Stressing similarity to counter exotization can support the idea of Western universality, while stressing difference to counter erasure can end up supporting exotization.[56]

Indigenous ways of seeing the world and making sense of it were obviously different from the Spanish ways, but this can be presented the other way around as well. From the point of view of the indigenous Andeans, it was the Spanish ways of thinking that were different. The colonialists' mindset was not universal, but as particular as anybody else's. In addition, neither worldview was unchangeable, and,

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[52] Levi, "On Microhistory," 105–107.

[53] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance* 5. Orientalism is a concept coined by Edward W. Said, which refers to the Western portrayal of the North African, Middle Eastern and Asian societies as essentially static, backward, exotic and uncivilized. Orientalism is inseparable from colonialism as the notion of the Orient was created in order to subjugate and control it. Here, the term the term is used more generally to refer to similar mechanisms of othering the non-Western European peoples irrespective of the geographical area. See Said, *Orientalism*.

[54] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 5.

[55] Wolf, *Europe and the People*, 18.

[56] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 5–6.

in colonial society, they blurred into each other. Neither the Spanish nor the indigenous culture remained intact. The society I am researching was a colonial society, and colonialism inevitably influenced both parties and their ways of making sense of things.

With these de- and postcolonial theories and especially Lamana's double strategy in mind, I piece together the social history of local dynamics from fragmentary evidence by close reading the documents. I use as diverse source material as possible, compare sources against each other, and look for clues that help me to dig deeper and get behind the text into the social reality of the research subjects. Often the most useful passages in the sources are those that might have seemed irrelevant at the time. These remarks tend to be less tendentious; they can also reveal things the Spanish authorities or scribes did not view as important, but that can be very relevant for a historian some four and a half centuries later.

Archival material on the indigenous peoples of Spanish America is extremely rich. There is an abundance of documentation that contains much information about the indigenous peoples, directly or indirectly, and that reveals a great deal about the reality in which they lived. Their agency is often hidden but treating the documents as kind of ethnographic scenarios and always questioning the categories and classifications embedded in them it can be teased out. The best route to indigenous agency is, evidently, through their actions. By analyzing what they did and did not do, I can make conclusions about their aims and intentions. However, more than anything they tell us how they performed their agency and how they were presented by those who made the documents. Therefore, it is important to utilize a sort of thick description to try and grasp the context in which the actions made sense to the people engaged in them.[57]

Finally, some caveats are in order. It is usually taken for granted that the colonial archives need to be read against the grain, but Laura Ann Stoler encourages us to explore the grain carefully and read along it first. Archival power was not monolithic, and the colonial archives were sites of countermand as well as command.[58] There is also a danger that trying to find indigenous agency in the colonial archive leads to interpreting everything as indigenous agency vis-à-vis colonialism. The indigenous communities continued to live their lives, and while colonialism massively changed the circumstances under which they lived, it did not determine everything they did.

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[57] For treating the documents as ethnographic scenarios, see, Rappaport, *Disappearing Mestizo*, 21–22. For thick description, see Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures*, 3–30. See also Yannakakis, *Art of Being In-between*, 24–25.

[58] Stoler, *Along the Archival*, chap. 2.

There was a possibility to remain indifferent to colonialism at least on some occasions.

1.3 Earlier Scholarship

General Historiography of Colonial Spanish America

The first histories of the Spanish conquest of America were written by the conquistadors themselves and by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century chroniclers. These writings set the tone for future historiography. The first generation of modern historians of colonial Spanish America was led by William Prescott, whose magnum opus, *The Conquest of Mexico*, appeared in 1843. Four years later, Prescott published another great work, *History of the Conquest of Peru*. He followed the Spanish chronicles and emphasized military conquests over all else. His narrative style is vivid and detailed, and the books are still valuable for their literary merits, even if their scholarly contribution is now very outdated.[59]

Prescott's works were widely read for over a century. Subsequent generations of historians brought new interpretations, but the basic narrative changed very little as historians still mostly used Spanish contemporary chronicles as their main source, and the viewpoint they offered was that of the conquistadors. The tone was triumphalist, and the Spanish conquest taken for granted. Another layer was added in the 1930s by Robert Ricard's concept of spiritual conquest that completed the military conquest. These two approaches—which Susan Schroeder has called "The Epic Spanish Conquest" and "The Spiritual Conquest"—dominated the historiography until the last decades of the twentieth century. They still live in the general public's imagination.[60]

The so-called Black Legend inspired another tendency in the early historiography of Spanish colonialism. According to Charles Gibson, this consisted of "the accumulated tradition of propaganda and Hispanophobia according to which the Spanish Empire is regarded as cruel, bigoted, exploitative and self-righteous in excess of reality."[61] The Black Legend was enforced by anti-Catholic propaganda emerging from Europe's Protestant nations that depicted Spain as a uniquely evil empire.

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[59] Prescott, *The Conquest of Mexico*; Prescott, *The History of the Conquest of Peru*.

[60] Restall, "New Conquest History," 152.; Schroeder, "Introduction," 5–9.

[61] Gibson, *Colonial Period*, 13.

In the 1930s, legal history and the history of institutions in the Spanish colonies started to gain more attention, especially with the work of the Mexican legal historian Silvio Zavala. In 1935, he published two massive works on the subject, *Las instituciones jurídicas en la conquista de América* and *La encomienda indiana*.[62] These works were based on meticulous study of documentary material, and they remain excellent basic studies of the legal foundation of Spanish colonialism and its institutions.

Another historian who has made an important contribution to the legal and institutional history of Spanish colonialism is Lewis Hanke, who set his sight on dismantling the Black Legend. According to his own words, the purpose of his book *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* was to demonstrate that in addition to being a remarkable military and political exploit, the Spanish conquest of America was also "one of the greatest attempts the world has seen to make Christian Precepts prevail in the relations between peoples." Hanke studied the discussion issue from multiple perspectives on the rights of the indigenous peoples both in Spain and in the colonies. This discussion contributed significantly to the development of modern human rights discourse, but Hanke heavily romanticized the issue. He did not deny Spanish cruelties toward natives but emphasized that many Spaniards also struggled to end those cruelties. According to him, no other European nation "took her Christian duties toward the native peoples so seriously as did Spain."[63]

Hanke had the same shortcoming as his predecessors, his contemporaries, and many of those who followed him: he paid no attention to indigenous agency. In Hanke's telling, the Spaniards killed, tortured, and enslaved the natives, and they also fought for indigenous rights. The indigenous peoples themselves were rarely seen as independent actors.

Other scholars attempted to offer a different viewpoint. Charles Gibson broke ground in 1964 with his study of the Aztecs (Nahuas) following the Spanish conquest. Gibson was interested in the changes that took place in Aztec society in the centuries that followed the conquest, and he showed that indigenous societies were neither completely destroyed nor acculturated by the Spaniards. Instead, they managed to preserve many features of their pre-conquest social and political structure. According to Gibson, the conquest may have eliminated Aztec imperial structures, but the local, less comprehensive structures survived. Spanish institutions

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[62] Zavala, *Las instituciones jurídicas*; Zavala, *La encomienda*.

[63] Hanke, *Spanish Struggle*, quotes from pages 1 and 175.

functioned through the existing structures of the Nahua city-states, creating a hybrid Spanish-Nahua society.[64]

Another important look at Spanish colonialism from the indigenous perspective was Nathan Wachtel's *Vision of the Vanquished*, originally published in French in 1971. Wachtel emphasized the crisis caused by the Spanish conquest, noting that the main indigenous survival strategy was a limited acculturation combined with fierce devotion to tradition. The survivors integrated into the Spanish colonial system at a material level but resisted mental integration. Hence, evangelisation, for example, remained superficial among the natives.[65]

Acculturation implies that indigenous peoples made changes and adaptations in response to contact with the dominating culture. Acculturation, for Wachtel, meant adapting elements of the conquerors' culture, which he portrayed as something negative and undesirable. For him, this was a symptom of a crisis, not its remedy. Wachtel also argued that the acculturation of colonial American natives remained very limited. The majority refused to accept most of the practices brought by the Europeans, and tradition prevailed over acculturation. Even when natives borrowed elements from European culture, they merely added them to elements of their own culture. In this sense, according to Wachtel, indigenous cultures remained intact in many ways and acculturation was only superficial.[66] Wachtel was one of the first scholars gave the natives center stage in his studies, but he was still confined to ideas that romanticized and victimized the original Americans. He downplayed indigenous agency and reinforced the idea that they were helpless victims. Wachtel's view of society was thus functionalist and very static. In my view, cultures are not coherent structures in which each part has a distinct function but are rather flexible systems that constantly transform and intermingle with each other.

In the 1970s and 80s, important developments appeared in the works of Steve J. Stern and Karen Spalding. Stern studied the Peruvian indigenous peoples' response to colonisation in his work *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest*. He was particularly interested in the ways by which the Spaniards were able to dominate the local indigenous populations. A swift conquest of the powerful Inca state was impressive, but to rule the empire relying on military force was not enough. According to Stern, dominance was based largely on the mutually beneficial alliances that were made between the conquerors and the indigenous elites. Some natives assimilated to the Hispanic-mestizo society and were able to accumulate wealth,

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[64] Gibson, *Aztecs Under Spanish Rule*, 1, 403–409.

[65] Wachtel *Vision of the Vanquished*, 151–154, 201–209.

[66] Wachtel, *Vision of the Vanquished*, 140–141; Wachtel, "Indian and the Spanish Conquest," 230–234.

while the indigenous population as a whole became impoverished. The tragedy of this success, according to Stern, lay in the way Spanish society recruited dynamic, powerful, or fortunate individuals to adopt their culture, therefore buttressing colonial domination.[67]

Stern also argued that the natives who adopted legal forms of struggle as a major strategy actually helped the Spanish to impose colonial rule. Using the legal system provided the indigenous peoples with a means to resist excessive exploitation and to promote their own interests, but it also promoted a dependency on colonial power and encouraged mutual loyalties between indigenous and colonial elites. As Stern demonstrated, it was essential to colonial rule that the natives were, to a point, ready to accept that colonial rule as a reality. This did not mean, however, that society was free of conflicts and contradictions. The indigenous peoples succumbed to colonial rule, but they resisted the most oppressive forms of it and were able to force reforms that set limits to their exploitation. [68]

As early as 1972, Karen Spalding wrote that if we want to understand the changing structures of colonial indigenous societies, we must avoid studying them in isolation. Instead, we must examine the societies and cultures of both conquerors and conquered and understand that the transformation of indigenous societies was a result of complex interactions between the two. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the natives were not passive agents, but instead active participants in the creation of colonial society (although, of course, they acted within the limits imposed by Spanish colonial rule).[69] Almost a half-century later, there is nothing new in these words for any critical historian of colonial Latin America, but they are worth repeating.

Spalding's book on the construction of social relationships in the province of Huarochirí, Peru before and after the Spanish conquest appeared in 1984. It was an ambitious work of scholarship in which she aimed to fulfil the task she gave to historians of colonial indigenous societies little over a decade earlier. She wove the local history of the province into the larger context of the development of European colonialism and capitalism. Spalding showed that while the colonial system was based upon violence and the organization of a political system in which the conquered provide labor and goods to the conqueror, indigenous peoples never lost their agency.[70]

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[67] Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 27–35, 158–159.

[68] Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 115, 187–193.

[69] Spalding, "Colonial Indian," 47–48.

[70] Spalding, *Huarochirí.*

The anthropologist Inga Clendinnen attempted show the complexity of the conquest in her ambitious work on the Maya and the Spanish in Yucatán during the early colonial period of the sixteenth century. The first part of the work concentrates on divergences and conflicts between the Spanish conquerors as they competed about whose vision of colonial society would prevail. It becomes clear that the Spaniards had very different interests that were not always easily reconciled. The second part focuses on the Mayan point of view of the same events. Due to the lack of sources, this latter section is inevitably more speculative, but nevertheless rigorously argued.[71]

The 1980s and the approaching fifth centenary of the conquest saw an increased interest in Spanish America among literary scholars. Most famously, Tzvetan Todorov wrote a book about the conquest of America that focuses on the question of the 'other'. Todorov suggests that the Spanish conquest of Mexico was made possible because of the Spaniards' superior communication. For Todorov, culture is a system of signs that orders experience, and the Aztecs were restricted by their culture; this left them incapable of adapting or improvising. Therefore, they failed to produce appropriate and effective messages among themselves and in their dealings with the Spaniards. The Spaniards, by contrast, were masters of adaptation, improvisation, and communication.[72] Todorov's views have been heavily criticized by historians, most notably by Keith Windschuttle, who states that Todorov saw the communication problems of the Aztecs through an orthodox version of structuralist theory and did not back his theories with empirical evidence.[73]

Among the most important figures in the colonial history of the Americas is James Lockhart, who published his doctoral thesis on the early formation of Spanish colonial society in 1968.[74] He continued his work in 1972 with *The Men of Cajamarca*, a biography of the 168 Spaniards who were present at the capture of the Inca Atahualpa. The book also contains an analysis of the Spaniards' social dynamics. After these works appeared, Lockhart studied colonial Mexico and the Nahuatl language, and became one of the founders of the so-called New Philology, a brand of colonial (linguist) history that focuses on source material written in indigenous languages. His magnum opus *The Nahuas After the Conquest*, based on two decades of research, appeared in 1992.[75]

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[71] Clendinnen, *Ambivalent Conquests*.

[72] Todorov, *Conquête de l'Amérique*.

[73] Windschuttle, *Killing of History*, 39–70.

[74] Lockhart, *Spanish Peru*.

[75] Lockhart, *Men of Cajamarca*; Lockhart, *Nahuas After the Conquest*.

According to Lockhart, the post-conquest evolution of the Nahuas of Mexico can be divided into three stages. The first stage lasted approximately one generation after the conquest (1519 to c. 1545–1550). Despite great catastrophes and reorientations, little actually changed in Nahua concepts, techniques, or modes of organization during this period. During the second period, which lasted about one hundred years until c. 1640–1650, Spanish elements penetrated into every aspect of Nahua life, often as discrete additions within a relatively unchanged indigenous framework. The third phase, which lasted until Mexican independence and in some respect even to our current times, saw the Nahuas adopting a new wave of Spanish elements, now leading to more thorough changes in the framework of organization. In some cases, the two cultures became amalgamated.[76] Lockhart notes that the transformation of the indigenous societies in central Mexico owed largely to Spanish pressures but can also be seen as a response to indigenous needs in a changing situation.[77]

In her book *Andean Journeys*, Karen Vieira Powers studies indigenous migration movements and patterns in the *audiencia* of Quito during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In doing so, she questions the traditional colonial demography. Powers shows that a more careful analysis of the demographic material reveals forms of indigenous agency and negotiation that have traditionally been left hidden. As she notes, by failing to acknowledge this fact, historians "run the risk of writing population histories that do not tell us anything about the indigenous peoples except that they died." Powers instead uses demographic material in innovative ways to study indigenous ethnogenesis and the colonial state formation process in Quito.[78]

The concept of ethnogenesis defines the process of interaction better than that of acculturation, which was more commonly used in previous studies, because it gives a larger role to indigenous agency. Karen Vieira Powers explains ethnogenesis as process in which a distinct culture continuously recreates itself, especially a culture that has experienced colonization. The concept moves beyond the juxtaposition of adapting foreign elements and being devoted to one's own culture, and instead sees the process as simultaneously reproductive and transformative. Colonialism had a huge impact on indigenous societies, but indigenous peoples were actively involved in the colonial process.[79] In other words, even though colonized peoples were forced to adapt to a situation that was largely beyond their control, the indigenous peoples

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[76] Lockhart, *Nahuas After the Conquest*, 429.

[77] Lockhart, *Nahuas After the Conquest*, 32.

[78] Powers, *Andean Journeys*, passim., quote from page 43.

[79] Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 9, 183 (note 1).

of South America were active members of the society that evolved and they created day-to-day strategies of adaptation and resistance.

Twenty-first-century scholarship on indigenous agency in colonial societies has been extensive. Anthropologist Joanne Rappaport and art historian Tom Cummins analyze the creation of indigenous literary culture in the Northern Andes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in their book *Beyond the Lettered City*. They understand literacy and lettered culture more broadly than just reading and writing, extending it to include visual literacy and the ability to read and understand symbols, rituals, and other such cultural expressions. Rappaport and Cummins demonstrate the complexity of the formation of a distinct Andean colonial culture, and the constant negotiations that its development necessitated.[80]

According to Rappaport and Cummins, the coexistence of different ethnicities resulted in a distinct form of colonial culture in the Andean region, one that was characterized by multicultural, complex, heterogeneous, and fluid social formations that took many different forms. They do not want to call this a hybrid culture, since the term often implies a static representation of the ethnographic present in the past whereas colonial culture constantly evolved.[81] The colonial world was not divided simply between the colonists and colonized; instead, there were many divisions within the two groups and, at the same time, many connections across different groups.

Colombian anthropologist and ethno-historian Jorge Gamboa has thoroughly analyzed the transformation of the chiefdom societies of the Muisca, who live in present-day central Colombia, during the first four decades of Spanish colonialism. He argues that although the societal superstructure changed rapidly, changes at the base of indigenous society were initially fairly small. The reorganizations of the chiefdoms during the early colonial period, however, laid the foundation of a colonial Muisca society that developed over the following decades.[82]

In addition to above mentioned works, other scholars have dealt with indigenous responses to colonialism and the transformation of their societies,[83] the role of indigenous mediators,[84] cultural mixing and the formation of hybrid colonial

[80] Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*.

[81] Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, 28–29, 49.

[82] Gamboa, *Cacicazgo muisca*.

[83] See Cook, *People of the Volcano*; Mumford, *Vertical Empire*; Poloni-Simard, *La mosaïque indienne*.

[84] See Charles, *Allies at Odds*; Yannakakis, *The Art of Being In-Between*.

cultures,[85] and colonial warfare and indigenous resistance.[86] They have corrected many false conceptions,[87] and my aim here is to follow in their footsteps.

Historiography of Colonial Popayán

Popayán has not featured as much as some other regions in the scholarship on colonial Latin America, but it has not been omitted either. One of the earliest modern works on the region was Jaime Arroyo's *Historia de la Gobernación de Popayán* written in the nineteenth century but published posthumously 44 years after the authors death in 1907.[88]

Juan Friede is a pioneer in the history of the indigenous peoples of the Colombian Andes. He scoured the archives of Colombia and Spain searching for material concerning the indigenous populations and introduced the idea of historical anthropology. His works on the Andakí and Quimbayas, published in 1953 and 1963, respectively, are classics of Colombian ethnohistory and still relevant resources.[89] In addition, he compiled two multivolume collections of documents on the history of present-day Colombia.[90] The value of his works lies in his careful work with original sources, although some of his interpretations are inevitably outdated from the point of view of modern scholarship.

Another pioneer was Kathleen Romoli, who made important contributions to the scholarship on history, anthropology, and human geography of the region. Among other things, she made enormous work in defining, naming, and mapping the different ethnic and linguistic groups who inhabited the region at the time of the Spanish conquest and during the early colonial period with the help of names, toponyms and demonyms found in the archival sources.[91]

Hermann Trimborn, Friede's contemporary, also wrote extensively about the colonial history and ethnography of present-day Colombia. One of his main works

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[85] See Rappaport, *Disappearing Mestizo*, Zambrano Escovar, *Trabajadores, villanos y amantes*.

[86] See Altman, *War for Mexico's West*.

[87] Restall, *Seven Myths*.

[88] Arroyo, *Historia de la gobernación*.

[89] Friede, *Los Andakí*; Friede, *Los Quimbayas*.

[90] Friede, *Documentos inéditos*; Friede, *Fuentes documentales*.

[91] See for example Romoli, "El suroeste del Cauca;" Romoli, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos;" Romoli, "Nomenclatura;" Romoli, "El alto Choco, parte I;" Romoli, "El alto Choco, parte II;" Romoli, "Las tribus."

was *Señorío y barbarie en el Valle del Cauca,* published originally in Madrid in 1949.[92] It was an ambitious attempt to write an ethnohistory of the Quimbayas and other ethnicities of the Cauca Valley, based on Spanish chronicles. However, Trimborn failed to read his sources critically enough to recognize them as biased narratives written by the conquerors, seeing in them instead objective descriptions of events. Trimborn therefore repeated the triumphalist narrative of the Spanish conquest and European superiority over the indigenous peoples, which fit well into the Francoist historiography of the time.[93]

Another important book based on careful archival research is Silvia Padilla, María Luisa López Arellano, and Adolfo Gonzalez' *La encomienda en Popayán*, comprised of three separate studies. Padilla and López Arellano analyzed the *encomienda* system in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, respectively, while Gonzalez focused on the *encomenderos* as a social class. Their studies are still useful as basic research but contain fairly little interpretation.[94]

Both Padilla and López Arellano took for granted the idea that the indigenous were passive victims. In her study, María Luisa López Arellano argued that one of the principal reasons for the demographic disaster was the psychological shock caused by the conquest. Accordingly, the loss of freedom caused a trauma to the natives who were not used to serving anyone. López Arellano referred to mass suicides, infanticide, and death by starvation among the indigenous population after they refused to cultivate land for the Spaniards. She downplayed the significance of epidemics as a cause of depopulation, pointing instead to the excessive use of forced labor.[95] Silvia Padilla also talked about the indigenous laborers' hard work and long hours that left them no time to work for their own sustenance. This, she argued, made the natives completely dependent on their masters.[96]

In 1978, Peter Marzahl published a basic work on the colonial society of the city of Popayán in the seventeenth century. He touched upon the indigenous peoples several times during his work but was mostly interested in the Spanish settler society and colonial administration. Nevertheless, his work remains a useful basic study of these matters.[97]

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[92] Trimborn, *Señorío y barbarie.*

[93] See Borja, "Hermann Trimborn," 13–18.

[94] Padilla et al., *La encomienda en Popayán.*

[95] López Arellano "Las encomiendas de Popayán," 161–164

[96] Padilla "Tasaciones de encomiendas," 99–100.

[97] Marzahl, *Town in the Empire.*

One of the few scholars who have focused on the region of Popayán more recently is Luis F. Calero. According to Calero, previous studies have often simply assumed that the indigenous peoples were too passive and weakened by disease to oppose Spanish rule. In his book *Chiefdoms under Siege*, Calero challenges this view and demonstrates that the natives of the Pasto region in the south of Popayán were by no means examples of docility and submission; rather, they represented nonconformity and defiance. It is true that the indigenous populations rather quickly accepted the presence of the invaders as a fact: they realized that the Spanish were there to stay and did not challenge their rule. High mortality rates combined with severe taxation inflicted social and economic destabilisation within indigenous societies and prevented them from organising effective resistance. Despite this, the natives did resist Spanish rule actively or passively all across America. There are examples of armed resistance and violent uprisings, but they were not the most common forms of opposition. The natives had many means of resistance at their disposal, such as fleeing from their villages, refusing to pay taxes or work for the colonists, disobeying the law, persisting in their own religions, engaging in selective assimilation, and using legal channels. Despite all their resistance, however, little by little the natives lost ground to the Spaniards.[98]

In his book, Calero also touches upon how the Spanish invasion affected the environmental landscape of the Pasto region. According to Calero, it underwent a tremendous transformation during the twenty years that followed the arrival of the Spanish. The Spanish introduced new plants that the natives were forced to cultivate, such as wheat, barley, garlic, sugarcane, chickpeas, onions, and carrots. In addition, the natives took to the raising of pigs. The most important indigenous food plants were corn and potatoes, both of which they were obliged to keep cropping for themselves and for the Spaniards. In addition, the natives grew cotton and agave, which became important parts of the tribute they paid to their *encomenderos*. The Spaniards also brought cattle that they raised in their own *estancias*; this had devastating effects on the livelihood of the natives as the grazing herds continuously destroyed cultivable indigenous land. Another major effect of the conquest was deforestation. The Spanish had high demand for lumber to build houses and for firewood, and the settlers consumed a great deal of wood. The local populations also had to pay part of their tributes in wooden crafts. The forest was furthermore cut down to create pastureland for cattle, sheep, and horses.[99] The investigation of the ecological effects of the conquest is an area where much work remains to be done.

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[98] Calero *Chiefdoms under Siege*.

[99] Calero *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 96–101.

Another important study of the colonial society of Popayán is Zamira Díaz López's *Oro, sociedad y economía: El sistema colonial en la gobernación de Popayán 1533–1733*, in which the author concentrates especially on Popayán as a gold mining center. Her view of the natives' situation seems much more desolate than Calero's. According to Díaz López, the main reason underlying the depopulation was forced labor in the mines. The hard work, terrible working conditions, and poor treatment weakened the indigenous population. In addition, with the Spaniards' excessive demands, the natives had no time to crop their lands, further increasing mortality levels. The Spanish did, however, make sure that enough natives were occupied in cultivating the land to secure their food supply, as the Spaniards did not cultivate themselves. According to Díaz López, the depopulation rate speaks for itself and there is no doubt that the indigenous population lived in terrible conditions. As Díaz Lopez states, the crown failed in its attempt to protect its vassals in America. In fact, the crown allowed the settlers to exploit the natives by encouraging the use of indigenous labor in the mines through the *encomienda* system.[100]

Díaz López can be criticized for disregarding the activity or agency of Indigenous peoples. She mentions some of the strategies they used, such as armed resistance, fleeing from their villages, making legal appeals, and moving to Spanish towns and adopting the conquerors' way of life. She also gives an example of an extreme measure used by natives: refusing to cultivate. That was an effective means of passive resistance, but it was also fatal for the indigenous peoples themselves as it meant that they too had no food.[101] However, Díaz López does not consider these questions any further, confining herself to the direct information given by the conquerors' sources.

During the last quarter century, Professor of anthropology and of Spanish and Portuguese studies Joanne Rappaport has done impressive work in studying the history and historical culture of the indigenous peoples of the region. Her works *Politics of Memory* and *Cumbe Reborn* study the history culture, history politics, and activism of the Nasa and the Cumbales, respectively. She shows that their historical traditions are not just stories of long past events but were instead very much related to the struggles of the present. Historical culture and historical consciousness empower people and spur them to action.[102]

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[100] Díaz López *Oro, sociedad y economía*, 174, 179–184.

[101] Díaz López *Oro, sociedad y economía*, 149–152, 181–183, 210–211.

[102] Rappaport, *Politics of Memory*; Rappaport, *Cumbe Reborn*.

Kris Lane has dealt with Popayán in his many studies on the *Audiencia* of Quito, starting with his dissertation on mining and forced labor regimes.[103] His work *Quito 1599* is a vivid account on the audiencia, including its peripheries in the *gobernación* of Popayán at the turn of the century when the colonial society had taken shape and, in a way, crystallized. However, as Lane shows, the fluid dynamics of the periphery defy the whole idea of crystallization.[104]

Marcela Quiroga Zuluaga has likewise studied the colonial power dynamics between the Spaniards and the Muiscas, Nasas (Paeces)[105] and Chimilas in her dissertation *La domination coloniale au pluruel*. She shows that the mechanisms of conquest and domination were determined by the spaces of political confrontation created by the conquered peoples. Therefore, different indigenous nations had different experiences, and their agency played a significant role in how their relationships with the colonists developed.[106]

While the *gobernación* of Popayán is not an unstudied area, plenty of research remains to be done to better understand the nature of the colonial process in the region. I will apply the recent trends of historiography discussed above to study the formation of the colonial society in the *gobernación* as a whole. Before that, however, it is in order to give an overview of the indigenous societies and the colonial system in the *gobernación*.

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[103] Lane, *Mining in the Margins*.

[104] Lane, *Quito 1599*.

[105] Paez (pl. Paeces) is the name given to this group by the Spaniards during the conquest. It is a Hispanicization of the name of a certain *cacique* in Tierradentro during the Spanish invasion. Later, in the 1990s, the group chose to call itself Nasa, which means living being in their language, Nasa Yuwe. See Rappaport *Intercultural Utopias*, 64, 286. I have chosen to refer to the group with the name they have given themselves, but for clarity, I put the name used in the sources in parentheses.

[106] Quiroga, *Domination coloniale*.

2 OVERVIEW OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF POPAYÁN

2.1 Indigenous Societies at the Time of Contact

Popayán was located in the frontier region of the Spanish colonial empire. Many of the indigenous groups in the region remained unconquered or only partly conquered, and colonial institutions were less developed. However, it was only frontier or periphery from the point of view of the imperial centers, not from the point of view of the local indigenous groups. For them, it was obviously the center of the world.[107] At the time of contact, there were dozens of ethnically distinct indigenous polities living across the entire region of this study. (see figure 3.) They spoke various languages and had distinctive cultures, yet shared some common customs and rituals.[108] Archeological evidence indicates that despite the diversity, there were long established pre-colonial structures that tied together much of the present-day South Western Colombia. Connections were upheld mainly through trade, which also enhanced the movement of ideas from one region to another.[109]

Archeological evidence indicates that despite the diversity, there were long established pre-colonial structures that tied together much of the present-day South Western Colombia. Connections were upheld mainly through trade, which also enhanced the movement of ideas from one region to another.[110] it seems that the region that now forms South-Western Colombia had a tradition dating to the first millennium AD of sharing the same vision of the world while simultaneously maintaining their own cultural identities.[111]

[107] I am aware of the negative connotations that are sometimes attached to concepts such as frontier zone or periphery, and the problems of using such concepts. Yet one cannot deny that in the context of the Spanish colonial empire, *gobernación* of Popayán was indeed a frontier zone. It is in this sense that I use the terms frontier and periphery, not in any evaluative sense.

[108] For an introduction on the multicultural variety of the region's indigenous peoples, see Villamarín & Villamarín, "Chiefdoms," 595–603.

[109] Herrera Ángel, "Las bases prehispánicas," 58–60.

[110] Herrera Ángel, "Las bases prehispánicas," 58–60.

[111] Herrera Ángel, *Popayán*, 56–57.

Figure 3. *Ethnic Groups of Colombia ca. 1500. Source: Villamarín & Villamarín, Native Colombia, 122.*



Some of the ethnic groups had paramount lords whose domain extended over other lords and principals; some of them practiced expansionist politics. In addition, the indigenous societies of the region formed political and economic relationships with each other, and the different polities were connected along long trade routes that contained bridges and stone roads, a factor that impressed the Spaniards. They also constantly waged wars against each other.[112]

Most of the groups lived in the Cauca depression located between the Cordillera Occidental and Cordillera Central of the Colombian Andes, including the Valley of the Cauca River (*Valle del Cauca*) and the highlands of Popayán south of the Valley, where the Cauca River is born. The other major concentration of population was in the Pasto Plateau south of the Popayán highland. Other populated areas were the highland regions of the Colombian Massif, also known as Nudo de Almaguer north of Pasto, the Cordillera Occidental west of Cauca, the Antioquía Massif in the northern part of the Cordillera Central east of Cauca, and the lowlands of the Amazon, the Pacific coast, and the Huilense region along the river Magdalena. These were all frontier regions, often beyond the Spanish control.[113]

The subsistence economy of the Northern Andes was molded by the natural environment, which can be divided into four life zones according to altitude. They range from lowest to highest *tierra caliente*, *tierra templada*, *tierra fría*, and *páramo*.[114] The system of vertical archipelago[115] was restricted to the Central Andes, but it seems that the practice of using different microclimates that were close to each other due to topography was extended to the Northern Andes to facilitate access to a more varied range of products. In case of Equatorial Andes, Udo Oberem called this the microvertical model: while the vertical archipelago was constituted by isles of habitation that could be within several days' walk from each other, in the microvertical model the villages had fields at different altitudes within no more than a day's walk.[116] A similar model was used by at least some of the indigenous groups

[112] Villamarín & Villamarín, "Chiefdoms," 595–598.

[113] For the geography and climate of the region and their effect on the indigenous populations, see Villamarín & Villamarín, "Native Colombia," 595–607; Trimborn, *Señorío y barbarie*, 55–67; Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 3–16.

[114] Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 10.

[115] Vertical archipelago was a concept coined by John V. Murra to describe a model in which the Andean communities maintained settlement enclaves at different elevations in order to gain access to a variety of products in different ecological zones. Murra, *Formaciones económicas*, 59–115.

[116] Oberem, "El acceso a recursos," 51; Ramírez Miranda, "Formas de Acceso," 173–175.

of the Northern Andes as well, and the communities supplemented their resources through barter.[117]

It is impossible to provide any exact figures for the region's indigenous population at the time of contact. All evaluations are educated guesses at best. Hermes Tovar Pinzón, who spent decades studying Colombia's colonial demography, has estimated that the entire indigenous population of the Colombian Western Andes was about three million.[118] When the *visitador* Tomás López undertook a census of the tribute paying (adult men) population of the *gobernación* in 1558–1559, it amounted to just 71,016.[119] If accurate, this means that the entire population of the region, including women, children, and the elderly, would have been somewhere between 210,000 and 350,000.[120] That, in turn, suggests that the depopulation rate was around 90%, in just a quarter century.

However, one needs to remember that Tovar Pinzón's estimation, although based on extensive source work, is only tentative. Furthermore, it is likely that López, despite his best efforts, was not able to count all the tribute paying population of the *gobernación*. The indigenous communities knew by then that it was wise to hide part of their population from the *visitador*, because their tributes were based on the numbers he counted. Many Andeans also moved away from their villages, either to live with unconquered peoples or to sell their labor in Spanish towns and *estancias*. Therefore, while the demographic disaster was terrible, the depopulation rate was probably smaller than has been estimated. I will return to demographics in Chapter Three.

Three main ethnic groups—the Pastos, the Quillacingas and the Abads—occupied the southernmost and most densely populated region of the *gobernación*, the Pasto plateau. While the Pastos were a highly centralized group, the Quillacingas and the Abads were much more decentralized. Even so, they too lived in fairly integrated chiefdom (i.e., hierarchical) societies with an imbued sense of ethnic unity rather

[117] Llanos Vargas, *Cacicazgos*, 49; Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 32–33.

[118] Cited in Villamarín & Villamarín, "Native Colombia," 109–110.

[119] AGI, Quito 60, Libro de tasación en la gobernación de Popayán por el licenciado Tomás López, 1558–1559 (Hereafter: Visita de López).

[120] According to Daniel E. Shea, an idealized stable population should have a total population equal to four times the adult male population; no real population ever has that exact ratio. See Shea, "Defense of Small Population," 172–173. The multipliers used by demographers vary depending on place and time, but I assume the ratio to be somewhere between 3:1 and 5:1.

than any concept of egalitarianism.[121] In the colonial era, these indigenous chiefdoms were called *cacicazgos*.

North of the Pasto plateau lie the Colombian Massif and the highland region of Popayán, where the Cauca River is born. This is also where the *gobernación*'s capital, the city of Popayán, is located. Among the most prominent indigenous groups here were the Pubenzes (Popayán) and the Guambianos, whose *caciques* at the time of conquest, Popayán and Calambás, were probably brothers. Juan and Judith Villamarín suggest that the people of Popayán had recently (i.e., before the Spanish arrival) conquered the province of Guambia. These two *caciques* seem to have exercised some sort of authority over the other *caciques* in the region.[122] Other groups here include the Coconucos, the Malvasas, the Polindaras, and the Palaces.

In the Cauca valley, located in the middle of the *gobernación*, the best-known group was the Lile. They lived in the region where the Spaniards founded the city of Cali, now the third largest city of Colombia. Other groups in the valley included the Gorrones, the Bugas, the Timbas and the Jamundis.[123]

Moving north to the lower Cauca basin, there were numerous polities, among them the Quimbaya, Anserma, Arma, Paucura, Pozo, Picara, and Carrapa. The best known of these were the Quimbayas, who lived in the region where the Spaniards founded the town of Cartago. Juan Friede studied them carefully in the 1960s. The other groups have not been studied with such detail, and thus remain less known to us. This region was hit most severely by the demographic disaster brought by colonization: by the early seventeenth century, most of the groups had almost ceased to exist.[124]

The region of Huilense in the upper Magdalena River between the Cordilleras Central and Oriental was home to several ethnicities that the Spaniards found difficult or impossible to subdue. They lived along the frontiers of the *gobernación*'s jurisdiction, mostly outside the area actually controlled by the Spaniards, but were mentioned constantly in the documents due to continuous warfare between them and the Spanish conquerors. These groups include the Nasas (Paeces), Yalcones, Pijaos, Timanás, and Esmisas.[125]

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[121] For an introduction to the indigenous societies of the Pasto region, see Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 35–46.

[122] Llanos Vargas, *Cacicazgos*, 17–19, 62; Villamarín & Villamarín, "Chiefdoms," 601

[123] Villamarín & Villamarín, "Native Colombia," 115.

[124] Villamarín & Villamarín, "Native Colombia," 114–115; Friede, *Quimabayas*.

[125] Villamarín & Villamarín, "Native Colombia," 116.

Little is known about the inhabitants of the Pacific lowlands and the Amazonian region, where the Spaniards had practically no access until the seventeenth century aside from isolated expeditions. The only exception was the harbor town of Buenaventura. The most populous group living in the Pacific lowlands today is the Emberas (Chocoes) in the province of Chocó. These peoples are probably descendants of several closely related groups that inhabited the area at the time the Spanish arrived, such as the Noanara, Citará, and Tatamá. In the province of Barbacoas, several small groups lived, such as Nulpes, Sindaguas, and Boyas. However, Spanish sources often mention the people of Barbacoas without distinguishing between their different ethnicities.[126] In the Amazonian region, the best known of the many ethnicities are the Andaquíes, whom Friede also studied.[127] The peoples of the Cordillera Occidental and the Antioquia Massif—including the Catíos, Guacas, Aburrás, and Nutaves, among others—are also poorly known today.[128]

The sheer number and variety of ethnic groups in Popayán meant that there also existed a wide variety of social organization. Most groups were either egalitarian tribes with very little stratification and minimal structure, or chiefdom societies in which a chiefly class can be distinguished but no state structures existed.[129] It seems that among the chiefdom societies of Popayán, chefs were elected by the people, so the position was not hereditary. Nevertheless, there was a certain degree of social stratification between the chiefs, subchiefs, and commoners.[130]

John K. Thornton has divided the indigenous societies of pre-Colombian Americas into three different categories: (1) egalitarian democracies or free associations; (2) mini-states, which are often referred to as chiefdom societies in anthropological literature; and (3) imperial states. I prefer to use the term chiefdom societies rather than mini-states, as these groups lacked many of the basic features of states, especially any permanent administrative bodies.[131]

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[126] For the indigenous societies of the Pacific region, see Williams, "Resistance and Rebellion," 401–405; Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 47–51.

[127] Friede, *Andaquíes*.

[128] Villamarín & Villamarín, "Native Colombia," 118–119.

[129] For a classification of the social structure of Central and South American tribes, see Oberg, "Types of Social Structure." Oberg defines six different types of social structure: (1) Homogeneous Tribes, (2) Segmented Tribes, (3) Politically Organized Chiefdoms, (4) Feudal Type States, (5) City States, and (6) Theocratic Empires.

[130] Romoli, "Apuntes," 284–285.

[131] Thornton, *Cultural History*, 100; Oberg, "Types of Social Structure," 484.

The egalitarian democracies or free associations, such as the Mapuche in southern South America or the Iroquois in North America, had neither a formal state organization nor any permanent social classes. The chiefdom societies (or mini-states in Thornton's vocabulary), by contrast, had some level of formal authority and social differentiation. They varied widely in their levels of centralization. Many showed little difference from egalitarian societies, while others, like the Muiscas (Chichbas) of present-day Central Colombia, had a fairly complex social structure. Thornton also uses the term mid-level states to describe the latter groups. Finally, the Aztecs and the Incas were examples of imperial states. While they were very different in their organization, they were both highly complex, integrated, and unequal.[132]

The Pastos and the Nasas (Paeces) serve as good examples of the different levels of political organization in the *gobernación*. The Pastos formed village federations, in which several settlements fell under a single leader who had authority over other leaders. It seems that there was a strong sense of tribal affiliation, and different Pasto federations were on friendly terms with each other. The office of *cacique* was hereditary, held for life, and probably collected some sort of tribute from the people. The *caciques* also had an important role in resolving conflicts and disputes between their subjects.[133] The Pastos' socio-political organization was similar to that of the indigenous groups of Quito in present day Ecuador, with whom they maintained regular connections. According to Frank Salomon, by the time of Inca-rule, the chiefdoms of Quito had created surprisingly centralized and internally complex polities.[134]

By contrast, the Nasa (Paez) *caciques* had a very restricted political authority based on consensus. Some kind of hierarchy existed among the leading members of society, based on kin ties, but the *caciques* were more arbitrators than rulers and their duties were largely ceremonial. Only during times of war did they make decisions that concerned the entire community. More typically, they were subject to their followers' whims. It seems that the Nasa (Paez) *caciques* neither collected tribute nor had a redistributive function, as the *caciques* of Pasto or the Cauca valley had. The settlement pattern was dispersed.[135] The pre-colonial Nasas (Paeces) did not have chiefs in the common sense of the word, as no single ruler had authority over the

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[132] See Thornton, *Cultural History*, 100–156.

[133] Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 36–38.

[134] Salomon, *Native Lords*, 139.

[135] Rappaport, *Politics of Memory*, 30–36.

people in all situations. Political authority was restricted to certain situations, and the chiefs were elected ad hoc.[136]

The Pastos thus had clearly formed complex chiefdom societies that were similar in some ways to states. Presumably, reciprocity was an essential feature that legitimized the *cacique*'s authority. Sometime before the Spanish conquest, they became under the Inca Empire's influence, but that did not have much effect on their local political institutions. The Nasas (Paeces), for their part, could be regarded as free associations or emerging chiefdom societies.

Overall, the region's political structure was fragmented and decentralized. According to Judith and Juan Villamarín, of the fifty-four ethnicities that can be identified in the Cauca region, at least fourteen had paramount lords.[137] This means that the vast majority did not have that level of centralization. The more centralized chiefdoms and the societies with minimal hierarchical structures often lived close to each other, and it was unlikely that any were isolated. The polities were connected through trade, knowledge exchange, political alliance, marriage, raids, and warfare. Some chiefs exercised regional dominance. It is also important to understand the temporal dimension of indigenous communities: the chiefdoms the Spaniards found were not primaeval in their social structure, but had changed over time—not only from less to more centralized but also the other way around.[138]

2.2 The Colonial System in the *Gobernación*

The Spanish conquistadors invaded the region of Popayán in 1535. The expedition was led by Sebastian de Belalcázar, one of Pizzaro's captains in the conquest of Peru, and the conqueror of Quito. He was eager to break loose from Pizarro's control and establish an independent regional jurisdiction that lay outside the former Inca Empire. During the next several years, the Spaniards pushed further into the region and, by 1542, they had founded six cities: Pasto, Popayán, Cali, Timaná, Anserma, Cartago, Arma, and Antioquía.[139] In March 1540, the *gobernación* of Popayán was founded and Sebastián de Belalcázar was named its governor.[140]

[136] Quiroga, *Domination coloniale*, 187.

[137] Villamarín & Villamarín, "Chiefdoms," 602.

[138] Villamarín & Villamarín, "Chiefdoms," 622–628.

[139] For an introduction to the history of the conquest of Popayán, see Melo, *Historia de Colombia*, 159–184.

[140] AGI, Patronato 28, ramo 68, n. 1, Real Provisión al capitán Sebastián de Benalcázar, nombrándole gobernador de la provincia de Popayán, Madrid, 10 March 1540.

At the time of the invasion, the project of building a colonial empire in the Americas was already well under way. Almost a half century had passed since Columbus' discovery, and the Aztec capital Tenochtitlan had been captured some fifteen years earlier. Although the colonial project was still in its very early stages, the Spaniards had already gained experience in ruling, or attempting to rule, a large variety of different peoples. The conquistadors relied on their previous experiences as they built the colonial society, but they also had to adapt to local circumstances. The chiefdom societies of the Caribbean Islands, the urban and decentralized system of city-states in Mexico, and the predominantly rural Andean region ruled by the centralized Inca Empire were all very different. Upon reaching Popayán, the Spaniards found chiefdom societies like those in the Caribbean, but the geography, climate, and culture were completely unlike anything they had encountered to date.

The Spanish American colonies were actually possessions of the Castilian crown. However, since the king of Castile was usually preoccupied with European affairs, the day-to-day administration of the overseas possessions was handled by the *Consejo de Indias* (Council of the Indies) and the *Casa de Contratación* (House of Trade), based in Spain. On the ground, the crown exercised its power—and drew the colonies under tighter control—through the viceroys of New Spain (Mexico) and Peru, the royal *audiencias* (high courts), and the growing bureaucracy.

When the viceroyalty of Peru was founded in 1542, the already-existing *gobernación* of Popayán was incorporated into it. However, the viceroy never had much control over the area. In 1549, the *gobernación* fell under the jurisdiction of the newly founded *audiencia real* of Santafé de Bogotá, which held its first sessions in 1550. The *audiencias* were judicial bodies whose duties included, in addition to settling criminal and civil cases, implementing royal degrees. They were the main bodies through which the legal system was enacted in the colonies. In 1563, another *audiencia* was founded in Quito, and the southern and more populous part of the *gobernación*—including the towns of Cali, Popayán and Pasto—was transferred to its jurisdiction. The northern part, including the towns of Cartago, Anserma, and Antioquia, remained within the *audiencia* of Santafé. The *audiencias* had more authority in the *gobernación* than the viceroy, but the governor and the town *cabildos* (councils) still enjoyed strong autonomy.[141]

The elites of Popayán took advantage of the being subjects of two *audiencias* by playing them against each other. If Quito did not approve something, maybe Santafé

[141] I will deal with the institutional and legal development more thoroughly in Chapter 4.1. Here, I offer only a brief outline of the colonial system.

did, and the other way around.[142] Popayán was therefore a quasi-independent *gobernación* within the viceroyalty of Peru. It also remained outside the system of *corregimientos*, which became the standard administrative units in the viceroyalty.[143] These governorships were usually located in the more remote or isolated areas and, since they were located in regions where some or most of the indigenous groups did not recognize Spanish authority, they usually had a military character.[144] It is not surprising, then, that Popayán had a reputation as an unruly area on the fringes of the Spanish dominions.

During the period of time covered in this study, the Spaniards effectively controlled only a narrow strip along the Cauca Depression that reached from Popayán in the south to Santa Fe de Antioquía in the north, and the Pasto Plateau south of Popayán. The main Spanish cities and towns were located within that strip; here, Spanish control was precarious but still reasonably consolidated. To the east of this strip lied the central cordilleras of the Andean mountains and the Amazonas; to the west, the western cordilleras, and the Pacific lowlands. These regions were difficult to reach—many of them still are—and some remained out of Spanish and later Colombian control well into the nineteenth century. These lands were considered untamed and dangerous for the Spaniards.

As the colonial administration was weak in the *gobernación*, the *visitas* became the most important institution through which crown officials could intervene in local affairs. The *visita* institution had originated in medieval Spain but took specific forms in colonial America. Essentially, *visita* was an administrative survey and inquiry that sought to facilitate administrative operations.[145] In addition, its function was to strengthen the central government's rule in the area where the *visita* took place. An experienced official of the crown, named as *visitador*, usually performed the inspection. The *visitador* had authority over all officials during his inspection and was able to give orders and sentence offenders. In effect, he was both the highest official and an inspector during his *visita*. The effects of *visitas* were often limited, however, because the task of simultaneously administrating and running a major inquiry was

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[142] Herrera Ángel, *Popayán*, 80.

[143] There were two types of *corregimientos* in the viceroyalty: *corregimientos de españoles* for the Spaniards, and *corregimientos de indios* for the indigenous peoples. The first *corregimientos de españoles* were founded in 1548, and the first *corregimientos de indios* in 1565.

[144] Phelan, *Kingdom of Quito*, 165–166.

[145] Pärssinen, *Tawantisuyu*, 68.

simply too demanding for one person. Settlers were usually uncooperative, and this did not make the dual role any easier.[146]

With the lack of official bureaucracy, Spanish-indigenous relations in early colonial society were organized through the system of *encomienda*. This was a colonial institution developed both to control the indigenous people and their labor and to reward the conquistadors. It referred to a certain group of natives, subjects of a certain *cacique*, who had to pay tribute to their *encomendero* or work on his farms and mines. In exchange, the *encomendero* was obligated to take care of the well-being of his natives, the *encomendados*, and to evangelize them. The *encomendados* technically were not the property of the *encomendero*, but rather were free men—although much like their feudal predecessors in Europe, they had an obligation to work and pay tribute.[147]

The *encomienda* was based on an institution developed in Reconquista Spain for frontier administration. In America, it was being adopted already in the late-fifteenth-century Caribbean to extract the surplus produced by indigenous peoples without massively altering the mechanisms of production. The natives were distributed to the *encomendero* as spoils of conquest, and the *encomendero* was free to use them as he saw fit. In exchange, he was expected to take care of their religious instruction, and to keep horse and arms prepared for defense against outside invaders. The institution spread from the Caribbean to other areas as the Spaniards advanced. It took different forms in different parts of the empire, but became the basic form of sociopolitical organization throughout the Spanish colonies.[148]

The Spanish verb *encomendar* means to entrust, which well describes the nature of the arrangement in its ideal form. The e*ncomendero* did not own his *encomendados*, they were only entrusted to his care. The *encomienda*'s main purpose was two-fold. First, it was designed to acculturate the indigenous populations, and second, to reward the conquerors by giving them access to the indigenous communities' labor and surpluses. These two aims were not easily reconciled.

The main function of the *encomienda* was to gather tribute. The basis for tribute was the idea that indigenous peoples of the Spanish colonies were vassals of the crown. As such, they were free, but owed the crown a duty. The *tributarios*, or those liable to pay taxes, were men between eighteen and fifty years of age with no physical

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[146] Bakewell, *History of Latin America*, 126; Calero *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 60–62.

[147] Silvio Zavala has written an extensive study on the *encomienda* institution: Zavala, *La encomienda*. See also Escobedo, *El tributo indígena*, 173–188. For the *encomenderos* as a social class, see Lockhart, *Spanish Peru*, 11–37.

[148] Spalding, *Huarochiri*, 124.

impediments to work; married under-age men were also included. The *caciques* were exempt from tribute. Women also were not considered *tributarios*.[149] With the institution of *encomienda*, the crown transferred part of the indigenous vassals' tribute to a private person.[150]

The *encomiendas* were not geographically delineated; i.e., natives of a certain area did not form one *encomienda*. Rather, they were administrative units, each consisting of a *cacique* and his subjects. As such, the role of the *cacique* was essential. The natives were entrusted to a Spaniard through their leader, who himself was subject to the Spanish *encomendero*.[151] Due to the nature of the arrangement, the personal relations between the *encomendero* and the *cacique* became an essential component of the *encomienda*'s institutional success. The *encomienda* system was based on quasi-feudal personal relations, and was largely beyond crown control, at least in the peripheral areas. It was not uncommon for the *encomenderos* to resort to violence to extract as much personal profit as possible from their *encomendados*.

The *caciques*, also referred to as *kurakas* in Peru, became indispensable middlemen between the colonists and the indigenous populations. The Spaniards worked mainly through the *caciques*, not with the indigenous commoners directly, rendering the *caciques* part of the colonial administration. At the same time, they represented their people's interests in colonial administration. They thus played a dual role.[152] The *caciques* were usually members of the traditional pre-colonial elite, but as the institution of *cacique* became increasingly important for colonial rule, it was imposed on those tribes that previously did not have permanent chiefs.[153]

In the early stages of colonialism, there were no laws regulating the *encomienda*. The relationships between the *encomenderos* and the indigenous peoples were established through an often violent bargaining process, in which the *encomendero* presented demands to his *encomendados*, and they either accepted or resisted until some sort of arrangement was reached. In Peru, this happened between the 1530s and 1550s, giving rise to a rough political system that lasted for more than three decades.[154] In Popayán, the bargaining process took more time, lasting until the late sixteenth century. I will deal with this bargaining process several times during the

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149 Escobedo, *Tributo indígena*, 22–24.

150 Escobedo, *Tributo indígena*, 173.

151 Trelles Arestegui, *Lucas Martínez Vegazo*, 269.

152 See for example, Spalding, *Huarochiri*, 209–238; Mumford, "Aristocracy," 44–51; Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 107–108; Gamboa, *Cacicazgo muisca*, 439–470.

153 Gamboa, "Régimen de la encomienda," 156.

154 Spalding, *Huarochiri*, 125.

course of this study. In Chapter Four, I will return to the *encomienda*'s regulation as bureaucratic institutions took stronger hold of the region.

In much of Spanish America, the *encomienda* system lost much of its significance towards the end of the sixteenth century. Those *encomenderos* of Peru who had survived the initial conquest and the Spanish civil wars had managed to gain considerable fortunes and social, political, and economic power during the subsequent decades. However, a combination of crown policies that weakened the *encomenderos* and a declining workforce caused by depopulation undermined their status by the 1580s.[155] Most of the *encomiendas* in Mexico and Peru reverted to the crown, and the institution gradually faded in significance. But it did not perish. While in Upper Peru (Bolivia) almost two-thirds of the *encomiendas* were under the crown's administration by the 1570s, in the peripheries the *encomienda* persisted for much longer. In Popayán, they remained important into the seventeenth century.[156]

The institution of *encomienda* tended toward unsustainability. Indigenous mortality was high, and the hard work forced on the *encomenderos* reduced the population even more. Because the *encomiendas* were generally not inheritable beyond a second generation, the *encomenderos* had no interest in preserving their *encomendados*. Instead, they sought quick profit, often to pay off the debts incurred by their expeditions against the natives. Nevertheless, the *encomienda* proved to be a surprisingly resilient institution in the frontier zones. This was at least partly due to the prestige attached to the title of *encomendero*. The *encomenderos* formed the political elite of local societies, and this meant that the institution continued to be important even as its purely economic value decreased. The central authorities, on the other hand, relied on the *encomenderos* in the backcountry, where indigenous revolts posed a constant threat.[157]

There also existed a non-officially sanctioned system of compulsory labor called *servicios personales*, or personal services. They were usually tied to the institution of *encomienda*, and they meant all kinds of services the *encomendados* gave their *encomenderos* without being paid. Personal services were forbidden in the so-called New Laws (*Leyes nuevas*) of 1542, but the practice continued long afterwards.[158] In the *gobernación* of Popayán, the *encomiendas* were relatively small. Popayán was a gold mining region, and many of the *encomenderos* used their *encomendados* as workers in the mines. The

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[155] Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 217.

[156] See, for example, Bakewell, *History of Latin America*, 193–196; Burkholder & Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 117–120. For Upper Peru, Zulawski, *They Eat*, 46.

[157] Lane, "Transition from Encomienda," 73–83.

[158] Silvio Zavala has written a basic work on the institution of *servicio personal*, which is still current. See Zavala, *Servicio personal*. See also Ots Capdequí, *Estado español*, 26–27. The News Laws and their impacts will be discussed further in Chapter 4.1.

system of *servicios personales* ensured that the *encomenderos* could always send the natives entrusted to them to work in the mines.

The prohibition of the *sercvios personales* was compensated by a state-sanctioned system of rotational compulsory labor called *mita*. The term was borrowed from the Incas, who used it for their own system of compulsory labor. In Quechua, *mit'a* means time or turn. In New Spain, a similar system was called r*epartimiento*, and was likened to a local pre-colonial form of compulsory public work called *coatequitl*. Both these systems of state-run draft labor replaced the *encomienda* in the central areas of the colonial empire where the *encomienda* lost its significance in the second half of the sixteenth century.[159] In Popayán, however, the system worked in addition to *encomienda* instead of replacing it.

The Spanish *mita* differed from the Inca *mit'a*, which is why historians use the Hispanicized word when speaking of the colonial system, and the Quechua word when speaking of the Inca system. In the Tawantisuyu, *mit'a* was a form of corvée. All capable citizens were obliged to perform labor on public projects, such as building roads, for a set number of days per year. In the Spanish colonial system, each community had to send a certain proportion of its male labor force at any given time for public work in the Spanish towns, estates, or mines. In reality, *mita* was extensively used to control a free workforce for gold and silver mining.

Colonial society was divided into two separate public spheres and political communities, *república de indios* and *república de españoles* (Indian and Spanish republics), which were governed by separate laws. The republics were likened to estates in the old world, and both natives and Spaniards had certain rights and obligations according to their ethnicity and their status in their own community. The natives were allowed to retain their pre-conquest laws and good customs (*usos y costumbres*), as long as they did not conflict with Christianity, but they were subject to the Spanish judicial courts.[160] This legal plurality—typical for colonial societies—was facilitated by the plural nature of European legal systems themselves.[161]

This overview of the indigenous societies and the emerging colonial system will help the reader to following analysis on the colonial process in the *gobernación* of Popayán in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In the next chapter, I will discuss the conquest, the structural colonial violence, and the indigenous resistance.

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[159] See for example Bakewell, *History of Latin America*, 193–194.; Burkholder & Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 120–121.

[160] Bakewell, *History of Latin America*, 158–159; Yannakakis, *Art of Being In-between*, 14–18.

[161] Benton, "Colonial Law," 563.

3 COLONIAL VIOLENCE

Much like the broader history of the conquest of America, the conquest of Popayán seems on the surface to have been rapid and complete. The Spaniards established themselves and the natives submitted to Spanish rule within years after the Europeans' arrival. This impression is, however, a fallacy created by an uncritical reading of Spanish accounts. In reality, the conquest and the creation of the colonial system was a slow project full of setbacks. The 1540s and 1550s were merely the beginning of the development of the *gobernación* of Popayán, founded in 1540.

In this chapter, I examine the inter-ethnic violence and conflicts that continued long after the conquest. The colonial contact zone was a space of interaction, but it was also one of coercion and conflict. My aim is to analyze how conflict shaped the *gobernación*'s emerging colonial society. Violence cannot be separated from other forms of inter-ethnic relations, but rather blended with them. Even during more peaceful forms of interaction, violence, or threat of it, was often present. At the same time, when open violence was used, it was often only one aspect of the interaction. Analytically, however, violence and peaceful interaction can be separated to some extent, and in this chapter, I concentrate on the first of these forms of relationship.

Early colonial Popayán was a frontier zone within the larger Spanish colonial empire. This affected interethnic conflicts, as the imperial centers were far away and the state institutions were weak (or, especially in the beginning, nonexistent). The emphasis of this chapter is on the early decades of Spanish colonialism; this is the era in which conflict is most visible. As Spanish control was increasingly consolidated, conflict became more hidden. However, it certainly did not disappear, and I will also deal with the later conflicts here.

3.1 Indigenous Wars and Native Resistance

Conquest of Popayán

The Spanish conquerors of Popayán were experienced men of the Indies. Their leader, Sebastián de Belalcázar, had been in the Americas already for more than twenty years, possibly almost thirty, and had been one of the leaders during the conquest of Peru.[162] As the Spaniards invaded new areas, the expedition members were usually men who already had taken part in previous conquests. This created a relay system of conquest: in each location, some of the conquistadors stayed put, while others were recruited to new expeditions. This ensured that there were always men who had previous conquest experience during each push into new territory.[163]

Another typical feature was the important role played by indigenous allies, auxiliaries, and porters. Henry Kamen goes as far as to state "the conquest of some indigenous Americans by others laid the basis of the Spanish empire."[164] The Spanish invaders looked for local indigenous allies wherever they went, identifying them as quickly as possible and taking on as many as they could acquire.[165] As a result, in any conquering expedition, the Spaniards were greatly outnumbered by the indigenous peoples who accompanied them. Popayán was no exception in this regard. As the Spaniards invaded the region, several thousand indigenous allies originally from Quito, Central Peru, and elsewhere accompanied the few hundred (at most) Spanish conquistadors.[166] During the expedition, the Spaniards struck alliances with some of the local groups, often while fighting their traditional enemies.

Although the conquistadors conquered territory in the name of the Spanish king, they were not members of the regular army, and most of them had no formal military training of any kind. Nor were they mercenaries, as they did not receive payment for their services. Instead, the Spanish conquistadors were freelancers and private entrepreneurs who took part in the conquests of their own free will and at their own cost, all in the anticipation of gaining wealth and status. From another perspective, they can be seen as investors in an expedition company. The captains of the

[162] Lockhart, *Men of Cajamarca*, 123–124. Belalcázar's name also appears as Benalcázar.

[163] Matthew Restall, *Seven Myths*, 33. For example, previous experience is recorded from 101 of the 168 Spaniards who participated in the capture of Inca Atahualpa at Cajamarca in 1532. Sixty-four of them had prior conquest experience and fifty-two had spent at least five years in the Americas.

[164] Kamen, *Spain's Road to Empire*, 113.

[165] Restall, *Seven Myths*, 23.

[166] Matallana Peláez, "Yanaconas," 21–28; Chaves Chamorro, "Los indígenas del Cauca," 60–65.

expedition were usually the companies' primary funders, and in return they expected to retain the largest share of the rewards.[167]

Relying on their previous experiences, the Spanish conquistadors adopted familiar tactics during their conquests of different areas. Among the most typical tactics were public demonstrations of violence and terror, capturing by surprise the most important leaders who controlled the communities, and searching for allies as soon as they arrived at a new location. The Spaniards consciously tried to take advantage of pre-existing disputes and rivalries between neighboring communities, promising certain benefits to those who joined the conquest. All of these tactics were later included in a manual for conquistadors written by Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, who took part in many conquering expeditions in present day Colombia in the late sixteenth century.[168] The manual was published in 1599, by which time the age of the great conquests was already long past but guerilla warfare continued along the frontiers.

In spite of many similarities, the regional conquests nevertheless differed from each other in many ways. In Hispaniola, Central Mexico, and the Central Andean region dominated by the Incas, indigenous societies were organized, and specialists conducted warfare. In these areas, the Spaniards were usually able to gain the advantage by forming alliances and targeting indigenous leaderships. In regions where the Spaniards were few in number, and the indigenous communities autonomous, mobile, and accustomed to defending themselves, the Spaniards faced a much more difficult task.[169] The chiefdom societies of the Northern Andes were generally decentralized and mobile, and they lacked the pyramidal structure of leadership typical of Central Andean communities. Here, there were no pre-existing institutions that the Spaniards could readily use to control the communities, and they thus faced more difficulty imposing their rule.[170]

The Spanish conquistador and chronicler Pedro Cieza de León described the habits of the *gobernación*'s indigenous groups, giving the impression that they were quite primitive, stubborn, and untamed. Some remained unconquered as he wrote in the early 1550s; others had been conquered despite the fierce resistance they gave the Spaniards. Some groups were depicted as docile and friendly with the Spaniards, but in general were reluctant to serve the conquerors. According to Cieza de León, this was because they were not used to doing so. There previously had been no

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[167] Restall, *Seven Myths*, 34–35.

[168] Gamboa, *Cacicazgo muisca*, 220–233; Vargas Machuca, *Milicia y descripción*.

[169] See Altman, *War for Mexico's West*, 215.

[170] Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 53–54.

masters to cause fear among the people, and therefore they would serve whomever they pleased. This distinguished them from the natives of Peru, who grew up serving the Incas.[171]

Cieza de León's descriptions reflected his prejudices and should be considered with caution. He held the Inca civilization in high esteem and considered the peoples of Popayán to be less civilized. He stated that had the provinces around the city of Popayán been subjugated by the Incas, they would have been the best and the richest in all of Peru.[172] Since they had not been under Inca rule, however, the people were uncivilized and disorderly. It is certainly not true that the natives of Popayán had no leaders or that they served whom they wished. Most of the people lived in small chiefdom societies that were connected with each other. However, it is true that there was no state structure comparable with the Inca Empire.

The Spaniards could not easily understand the indigenous societies of Popayán and their political organization. Spanish descriptions more often reflect their prejudices than reality, and although some of them undoubtedly had some degree of insight, they were not sensitive to indigenous epistemologies. Furthermore, the descriptions of pre-colonial indigenous societies are largely from the colonial period, most of them written years or decades after the conquest. Therefore, they do not accurately depict the situation before the Spanish arrival, even if they were insightful in other ways. The colonization inevitably changed indigenous societies, although some aspects remained largely intact for a long time.

Despite the European biases, misunderstandings, and exaggerations, the early Spanish accounts contribute to our knowledge of indigenous societies during the contact period, especially regarding their political complexity and level of centralization, their economic patterns, religion, and social practices. For the conquerors, it was essential to know and understand the indigenous societies, because their survival and success depended on it.[173] However, it is important to read the testimonies with the prejudices of their writers in mind. They offer us important ethnographic data of the indigenous societies, valuable for a critical historian, but the data should not be taken at face value. The Spaniards were not interested in indigenous cultures as such or in their own terms, but rather in controlling them and taking advantage in them.

The narrative of conquest was set by nineteenth-century historian William H. Prescott, who depicted Hernán Cortes as a ruthless but completely rational and

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[171] Cieza de León *Parte primera de la chronica*, passim., especially f. 15v.–16r.

[172] Cieza de León *Parte primera de la chronica*, f. 49v.

[173] Villamarín & Villamarín, "Chiefdoms," 478–579.

pragmatic conquistador set opposite the Aztec leader Moctezuma who was weak, indecisive, and constrained by irrational religion.[174] This impression is derived from contemporary chronicles and histories of conquest that represent the conquistadors' very biased view of the events. It is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to know what the natives thought about the newcomers. In the Spanish sources, the natives merely reacted, and their reactions were always interpreted through a Spanish worldview. Their motives cannot be directly deduced from the Spanish sources, but through a decolonial reading, it is possible at least to make some assumptions.

Gonzalo Lamana uses the coronation of Paullu Inca in 1537 as an example of how Spanish narratives of events dominate, even though they did not tell the whole truth. In many accounts, this coronation was almost a non-event. Agency was entirely one sided: the Spaniards acted and Paullu followed. The coronation itself was orchestrated by Pizarro's rival Diego de Almagro, who controlled Cuzco at the time, after which Paullu became merely a puppet of the colonists and a betrayer of his race. This image emerges from Spanish chronicles, and is repeated in later historiography. However, according to later nativelike[175] sources, it was actually Paullu who had the initiative, and his authority was established through Incan forms. Some Spanish sources also revealed that Paullu's authority was recognized by the *kurakas* (*caciques*), and Almargo's authority over the natives depended on it.[176]

The mechanism of dominance is clear. The conquerors narrated the events, telling their side of the story that was later adopted by historians without due criticism. The Spanish *relaciones* are often the only sources modern historians have of certain events, but they need to be read very carefully and critically. Indigenous agency is usually hidden, and the natives' role is reduced to being objects of Spanish actions, not independent subjects. Nevertheless, the sources do contain clues about indigenous agency.

Jorge Robledo, one of Belalcázar's companions before becoming his adversary, led the conquering expedition to the north of the *gobernación* and founded the towns of Anserma, Cartago, and Santa Fe de Antioquía in 1539–1541. His *relación* of the expedition offers one of the richest accounts of conquest expeditions in Popayán. Pedro Cieza de León also took part in the expedition and wrote about it in the fourth

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[174] Clendinnen, "Fierce and unnatural," 65–66.

[175] Lamana uses the term nativelike to describe sources authored by native agents during the colonial period. They are not original pre-conquest native sources, but rather are guided by Spanish colonial customs; nevertheless, they reveal more about the indigenous point of view than the Spanish sources.

[176] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 162–166.

part of his *Cronica del Peru*.[177] As the expedition occurred at the beginning of this study's timeframe, I analyze it here in more depth. Robledo had the *relación* written in his own defense after he was accused of exceeding his authority; this must be kept in mind when reading the text. Nevertheless, it offers interesting insight into the conquest of the frontier regions.

Robledo had under his command one hundred seasoned Spanish men, some on horseback and some on foot. They also had plenty of "cattle, blacks (African slaves) and *indios*." When the expedition stopped in an indigenous village called Bixes, more men joined it before the company left to conquer the lands further north.[178] It is revealing that the natives and African slaves who accompanied the expedition were mentioned only in passing, not distinguished from the cattle. In the Spanish narratives, indigenous and African allies, auxiliaries, and slaves were not given much value, and often they were not mentioned at all despite their significance to the conquest.[179] The *indios* who accompanied Robledo were both local allies and people from other parts of Spanish America who had participated in previous conquests.

Robledo's account suggests that as his expedition waged war against the pueblo of Irra, which fought hard against the Spaniards, five or six thousand indigenous allies (*yndios amigos*) accompanied it.[180] This is one of the rare mentions of the number of indigenous allies. The *relación* does not state whether these friendly natives were people from other regions who accompanied the Spaniards, or locals who had recently formed an alliance with the Spaniards, or both. It also does not distinguish between warriors and carriers. Regardless, the conquering troop was predominantly indigenous; even though he had reinforcements during the *entrada*, his Spaniards certainly represented less than 10% of the entire expedition.

The story of 168 men capturing the Inca at Cajamarca and conquering the powerful empire is very captivating, and has set the tone for many stories about the Spanish conquest of America. In truth, 168 men did not conquer Tawantisuyu in

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[177] AGI, Patronato 28, ramo 66, Relación del viaje de Jorge Robledo a Quimbaya, Antioquía, etc., 1540; Cieza de León, *Cronica del Peru, cuarta parte*.

[178] AGI, Patronato 28, ramo 66, Relación del viaje de Jorge Robledo a Quimbaya, Antioquía, etc., 1540, f. 2r. "con cient onbres de a pie e de a cauallo e honbres esforçados en la guerra de mucho tpo en estas pts e llevo muchos ganados e negros e yndios."

[179] This is a typical feature in the Spanish narrations of the conquest. The important role of the indigenous people in the conquest is already well covered, but according to Mathew Restall, there were also Africans accompanying the Spaniards everywhere they went during their conquering expeditions. However, they are usually mentioned only passingly and rarely referred to by their name. Restall, "Black Conquistadors," 183–188.

[180] AGI, Patronato 28, ramo 66, Relación del viaje de Jorge Robledo a Quimbaya, Antioquía, etc., 1540, f. 4v.

one stroke, and Robledo's expedition is one of many examples in which this blatantly false image is put forth. The conquering expedition numbered several thousand, and none of the communities in the region could gather such a strong troop to counter it. Yet the topos of a few Spaniards defeating countless numbers of natives against all odds remains powerful.

In 1559, when the first comprehensive censuses were made, the total working age (17–50 years old) male population of Anserma was 3292, and that of Cartago was 5382.[181] During the expedition almost a quarter century earlier, the population had been considerably larger, although it is difficult to make any concrete estimation. Had the natives of either region unified against the Spaniards, they would probably have been able to gather a war group capable of matching the Spanish; that, however, was never a realistic option due to the dispersed nature of the local political structure. The Spaniards—together with their allies and auxiliaries, horses, and superior arms—waged war effectively against fairly small indigenous communities.

Several times the texts mention that these indigenous allies and auxiliaries were "friendly *indios*" (*yndios amigos*) but remain silent about their motives. Such thinking was irrelevant for the narrators. However, there is a passage in Robledo's text that reveals a clue about indigenous motivation. After Robledo and his troops had conquered the province of Carrapa, the locals told him that further north there were many rich provinces with plenty of gold inhabited by the people of Pozo, their enemies. If the Spaniards wanted to go there, the people of Carrapa would be happy to help them.[182] This is an explicit example of how alliances were formed. Different ethnic groups had their hostilities, and some groups wanted to use the Spaniards against their enemies. At the same time, it was perhaps a good way to persuade the Spaniards to continue further and depart from the lands they currently were in.

According to Cieza de León, when Robledo continued his expedition against the Pozos, he was accompanied by as many as 8,000 *indios amigos* from Carrapa and Picara.[183] Cieza de León's estimate needs to be taken with due caution, of course, but it is obvious that there was a large group of indigenous allies who were traditional enemies with the Pozos.

As Rolena Adorno states, fear of the other was a weapon that both the natives and the Spaniards created, managed, and manipulated. Adorno calls this the negotiation of fear, and it included both controlling one's own fear of the others and

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181 AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, ff. 109r.–120v., 127v.–130r.

182 AGI, Patronato 28, ramo 66, Relación del viaje de Jorge Robledo a Quimbaya, Antioquía, etc., 1540, f. 5r.

183 Cieza de León, *Crónica del Perú, cuarta parte*, 28–29.

inspiring fear in them.[184] This negotiation of fear also involved natives using the fear that conquistadors provoked against other indigenous groups, thus echoing the Spanish policy of fear.[185] The Spaniards had horses and extremely efficient arms, especially steel swords that could cut a person in half. With the sword, they were able to kill many enemies while receiving only light flesh wounds and bruises thanks to their armours.[186] The Spaniards were not invincible, however, and the natives obviously knew the landscape better. This gave the local populations some advantage, but the conquistadors were formidable warriors. Having them on one's side certainly impressed the enemy.

The Spaniards demanded that their indigenous allies submit to the Spanish king and start serving the Christian God. Despite their effectiveness in the battlefield, however, they were few in number and far away from home, and so it is plausible that the natives did not take these demands seriously. Some of the natives felt it was more important to beat local enemies than to drive out the band of foreign adventurers. Others perhaps calculated that should the Spanish conquerors prevail, it was better to be on their side than to fight against them. In any case, the indigenous groups had their own political aims to pursue in a situation that was not completely under their control.

It is also important to remember that the indigenous populations did not have any ethnic solidarity or common identity. They did not have a sense of belonging to the same group, of being "*indios*." They also did not necessarily see Spaniards as the other, someone radically different against whom they needed to unite. Therefore, alliances with the intruders were not seen as fraternising with the enemy. According to Jorge Gamboa, this lack of indigenous cultural and political unity explains why resistance and rebellions by the natives of the New Kingdom of Granada never spread beyond the local level. In fact, they were usually repressed by troops comprised of the insurgents' traditional enemies.[187] Undoubtedly, the same explanation could be used for the *gobernación* of Popayán as well.

Furthermore, as Gonzalo Lamana remarks, the label of Spanish ally or friend could be problematic because it robs the indigenous peoples of agency and political project of their own. In addition, the label obscures the fact that not everything revolved around conflict between the conquerors and their enemies. There was no single way to giving meaning to things that took place during the conquest. Seeing

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[184] Adorno, "Negotiation of Fear," 167.

[185] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 48.

[186] Restall, *Seven Myths*, 143.

[187] Gamboa *Cacicazgo muisca*, 231–232, 288.

the natives who fought with Spaniards only as friends or allies (or indeed as enemies) presents the Spaniards as the only protagonists, the natives being at best the supporting cast.[188] This does not mean that one should refrain from using the term ally in certain situations—it is a descriptive term applicable in some cases—but it is important to problematize it. The indigenous groups and individuals were not merely allies of the Spaniards, but actors in their own right. Furthermore, the relationships were not always fixed, and friends could turn into foes under different situations, as will be evident on several occasions throughout this study.

As Ida Altman writes in her book about the conquest of Western Mexico, local indigenous peoples had only limited options as the Spanish troops plundered their lands. They could retreat to the mountains, organize war parties to fight the invaders, or attempt to propitiate them in different ways.[189] These same responses are evident also in the documents about the conquest of Popayán. Robledo and his troops met many ethnic groups and elicited different responses from them. Some communities resisted the Spaniards, some moved to the rugged mountain area, while others welcomed the invaders with gifts and vowed their allegiance to them.[190] But what made some take one route, and others take a different one?

All encounters were narrated from Spanish point of view that depicted the natives as either friendly or bellicose. The Spaniards asked all groups they met to accept Christianity and to submit to the king of Spain; some groups accepted the demand and others resisted. From the indigenous point of view, the encounters looked very different. Later in this study, we will see that although the Spaniards claimed that certain groups had submitted to their rule, this was not necessarily the case. Often, the Spaniards had little or no control over the indigenous communities they claimed to dominate.

According to Robledo's *relación*, although some *caciques* offered fierce resistance to the Spaniards, all submitted in the end. One *cacique* named Ocuzca was depicted as a proud man not ready to serve the Spaniards; neither he nor his ancestors had ever served someone else. At first, his resistance was successful, and he managed to beat the Spaniards. The Spanish troops had to flee, but returned with reinforcements. Ocuzca also gathered his allies and prepared for battle. The Spaniards captured some of the spies Ocuzca had sent, who said that they were determined to kill all the

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[188] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 138-139

[189] Altman, *War for Mexico's West*, 40.

[190] AGI, Patronato 28, ramo 66, Relación del viaje de Jorge Robledo a Quimbaya, Antioquía, etc., 1540.

Christians. In the end, however, Ocuzca submitted to the Spaniards and sent his people to serve them before hiding himself, being afraid of the conquistadors.[191]

Cieza de León also writes about Ocuzca, but tells a somewhat different story. According to Cieza, Robledo took Ocuzca as a prisoner even though the *cacique* had come to meet the Spaniards in peace. Robledo was afraid that the natives would betray the Spaniards. He took Ocuzca in chains to Anserma, but the *cacique* managed to escape one night. After Robledo left Anserma for Caramanta, Ocuzca gathered all the *principales* of his lineage and attacked Anserma with the aim of destroying the town. The Spaniards were on guard and managed to defend the city. Cieza de León mentions that "an Indian woman that I had" (*"una yndia que yo tenía"*)—a local—had warned him of Ocuzca's plans. After a few nights, the alliance gathered by Ocuzca was dispersed and the indigenous fighters returned to their lands.[192] Cieza de León does not tell what happened to Ocuzca in the end.

Robledo's narrative emphasizes the Spanish conquerors' heroism. They had to endure great difficulty and they faced formidable enemies but, in the end, they prevailed, because they were superior to their adversaries. It also emphasizes the stubbornness of the *cacique* who refused to submit to the Spaniards. There is, admittedly, a degree of admiration in Robledo's telling as well, but above all the purpose of his *relación* is to demonstrate the Spaniards' courage. The tone is different in Cieza de León's version. Here, Ocuzca was taken as a prisoner only because Robledo feared he could betray the Spaniards. In this light, his attack against the Spaniards becomes more understandable. Moreover, the Spaniards survived because a local indigenous woman warned them.

The chronicler Juan de Castellanos described the encounter between another conquistador Gaspar de Rodas and the Pequis during an expedition to the same region some fifteen years later. Castellanos described the Pequis as haughty and arrogant people who lived in such a rich land that they did not have a custom giving obedience to strangers. Instead, they assumed that others should give them obedience. When the Spaniards approached, they gathered their warriors together because they did not want to lose their liberty or be forced to pay tribute.[193] For Castellanos, there was no question about the legitimacy of the Spaniards' right to conquer the lands and subject its inhabitants, but despite calling the resisting natives

[191] AGI, Patronato 28, ramo 66, Relación del viaje de Jorge Robledo a Quimbaya, Antioquía, etc., 1540, f. 3v.–4v.

[192] Cieza de León, *Crónica del Perú, cuarta parte*, 18–19.

[193] Castellanos, *Elegías*, 514.

arrogant, he also seemed to hold some degree of admiration for their love of liberty. This is actually quite typical for many Spanish observers.

Despite their firm belief in their own superiority and right to conquer others, the Spaniards were nevertheless insecure and aware of their precarious position in a foreign and often hostile territory. They also were obviously dependent on the indigenous peoples' support, both those who accompanied them during their expedition and the local inhabitants. The Spanish would not have lived long without assistance. This becomes clear on several occasions in Robledo's *relación*.

After travelling for eight days, the members of the expedition needed food. When they came across an indigenous village that had an abundance of corn and fried fish, they stayed there for three or four days, convincing the natives to "come to peace" (*venir de paz*), that is, to submit to the Spaniards. They also took some indigenous women and young men with them, but promised to return them should the natives accept Spanish rule.[194] Later in the document, several similar encounters with native villages are noted, in which the Spaniards, their indigenous allies and auxiliaries, and their black slaves received food.

Robledo's *relación* does not elaborate whether the Spanish took this food by force or intimidation, or whether it was given to them as an act of hospitality. The narrative frames the food giving as voluntary acts. However, one needs to remember that the *relación* was written in Robledo's defense, and he obviously wanted to present himself and his actions in a favorable light. It is plausible that some of the natives did give food and gifts to the newcomers as gesture of hospitality, but a fully armed band of warriors could easily intimidate them into giving food "voluntarily" even if violence was not used.

Other kinds of encounters appear in the narrative as well. On several occasions, the natives had abandoned their village before the Spaniards arrived, hiding in the surrounding mountains. In these cases, the Spaniards sent messengers to look for the local inhabitants and convince them that they did not wish to harm them in any way. On some occasions, the Spaniards took some natives as prisoners in order to pressure the other people to return to their villages.[195] The Spaniards needed the natives to cultivate their fields instead of hiding in the mountains: that was the only way to secure their food supply.

The indigenous groups living in the south of the future *gobernación* of Popayán probably heard spreading news of the strangers who had invaded the Incan Empire,

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[194] AGI, Patronato 28, ramo 66, Relación del viaje de Jorge Robledo a Quimbaya, Antioquía, etc., 1540, f. 2r.

[195] AGI, Patronato 28, ramo 66, Relación del viaje de Jorge Robledo a Quimbaya, Antioquía, etc., 1540.

so the coming of the conquerors was not necessarily a surprise. As mentioned previously, the natives across the entire region were intensively connected during the pre-colonial era. The communities of Popayán had time to think about how they would react if the Spaniards came to their villages.

An interesting question would be, what did the Andeans think when they first saw the conquerors? While there are plenty of stories about the indigenous peoples of America wondering whether the Spaniards were ordinary men or some kind of supernatural creatures, no such narratives survive from Popayán. It certainly did not escape the notice of Popayán's indigenous population that these newcomers were different in many ways: they had facial hair, they dressed differently, their weapons were very efficient, and some of them rode horses. Whether they were considered ordinary men or something else is not known.

Modern scholars have often dismissed the notion that the indigenous Americans thought the Spaniards were gods. This idea comes from later sources in which, it is thought, the Spaniards and indigenous writers alike were looking for a way to explain the Spanish defeat of the strong indigenous empires. However, Gonzalo Lamana reminds us that while this assertion is intended to reject native inferiority, it makes the mistake of assuming that sixteenth-century Andean rationality was the same as the twentieth- or twenty-first-century Western rationality. In the contemporary Andean culture, there was nothing exotic about the supernatural, and it would not be extraordinary if the natives indeed did wonder not only who but also what these strange people were.[196]

In fact, the Spaniards were equally concerned with the supernatural, which is why they saw so many marks of the devil's work in the "New World." Yet, they believed that their conquest was sanctioned by God who intervened several times to help them in times of trouble. The conquest narratives have several examples of Virgin Mary or Santiago (St. James) appearing during the battles. Both the Spaniards and the natives resorted to the supernatural, and for both, it made perfect sense.[197] For the contemporary Spanish writers, the Spaniards and the natives were always radically different (with the Spaniards obviously being superior) even if there were striking similarities in their practices. The myth of rational Spaniards with a modern worldview facing primitive, superstitious, and fatalist indigenous peoples has been repeated in several modern history books and works of popular culture.[198] However, it reflects colonial attitudes and prejudices rather than reality.

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[196] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 28–36.

[197] Restall, *Seven Myths*, 133; Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 65–76.

[198] Greenblatt, *Marvelous possessions*, 130–131; Restall, *Seven Myths*, 134–137.

There are no indigenous sources in which the indigenous peoples of Popayán pondered who the invaders were, and the Spanish sources primarily reflect Spanish prejudices. However, the native reactions do reveal some clues. The formidable troop of Spanish conquistadors and perhaps thousands of indigenous warriors naturally sparked fear among the local inhabitants, and many of escaped as they approached their villages. However, others did resist, and some were successful in their resistance. They obviously did not accept that the Spaniards were invincible.

Robledo's *relación* suggests that it was his expedition that led to the land coming under Spanish control, but this was not the case. It is true that Robledo's expedition was a sort of ending point to the initial period of Popayán's conquest and, after that, the core areas of the *gobernación* were at least nominally under Spanish control. However, Spanish control across the *gobernación* of Popayán remained precarious throughout the sixteenth century and beyond.

On the surface, the conquest of Popayán seems to have been quick, similar to the conquests of other areas of the Americas. Having a technological upper hand, using indigenous allies, and the disastrous depopulation caused by European–introduced diseases all facilitated the conquest. However, in reality the conquest was neither as quick nor as complete as it seems on the surface. The Spanish conquest actually remained incomplete until late seventeenth century and even beyond.[199]

Along the frontiers of the *gobernación*, the process of conquest continued for a long time. The *gobernación* of Popayán became a base for repeated Spanish *entradas* (invasions) and *castigos* (punishment expeditions) into the rough mountains and almost impenetrable rain forests; these efforts continued well into the seventeenth century and beyond. Popayán was a periphery in which violence and warfare were part of everyday life to a much greater extent than they were in Peru or Mexico. The lands of unconquered peoples remained uncomfortably—but enticingly—close.

Continuing Warfare Between the Spaniards and the *Indios de Guerra*

After the age of the so-called great conquests, Spanish America seemingly entered into a long period of peace. During the entire colonial period up to the wars of independence, most habitants in the colonies never directly experienced war, sieges, invasions, or armies living off the land. In fact, Spain never had a standing army in its colonies. This experience differed greatly from early modern Europe, which was

[199] For the myth of completion of the Spanish conquest, see Restall *Seven Myths*, 64–76.

chronically plagued by warfare.[200] Researchers refer to this colonial period as Pax Colonial, or Pax Hispanica.

However, some scholars have rightfully criticized the concept of colonial peace, since endemic violence continued throughout the period. It is true that there were few major indigenous revolts roughly between 1550 and 1750, a remarkable fact under the circumstances. In the frontier regions, by contrast, fighting continued throughout the colonial period. A common argument against the Pax Colonial reminds us that colonial empires did not reduce warfare, but rather displaced it to more distant locations along the empire's frontiers.[201] These frontiers certainly did not experience peace during much of the colonial era, unlike the more central areas of the Spanish empire (here, too, though, there were many local mutinies and acts of violence). In this sense, Pax Colonial did not differ much from the conceptual model Pax Romana: it meant peace at the center, but not along the frontiers.

Many Spaniards actually had incentives to keep the fighting going. Looting and pillaging were potentially profitable, and taking part in *entradas* and *castigos* offered an opportunity to gain favors from the king later, for example an *encomienda*. There were enough "conquistador wanna-bes," as Kris Lane calls them, who had missed out on the grand prize but who still wanted to have their share. It was in their interest to maintain the conquistador economy. Their campaigns were often unsuccessful in subduing the natives, but they managed to kill and displace many thousands.[202]

Not all conquerors managed to receive an *encomienda*, and those who did not lived in marginalized poverty, unhappy with their situation. Spanish towns resembled military camps surrounded by thousands of natives who were far from subdued. Many less fortunate poor, marginalized, and unsatisfied Spanish veterans of earlier conquests and civil wars came to Popayán in search for new opportunities along the restless frontier. They had been rewarded as they felt they deserved. This large contingent of frustrated and unoccupied soldiers caused anxiety and unrest in the *gobernación*, and formed the majority in the subsequent conquering expeditions.[203] For internal stability, it was better to keep these people occupied in wars against indigenous peoples, because unoccupied they might start a rebellion or cause unrest in other ways.

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[200] Bakewell, *History of Latin America*, 113.

[201] MacLeod, "Thoughts on the Pax Colonial," 130–132.

[202] Lane, *Quito 1599*, 208–209.

[203] Ortiz de la Tabla Ducasse, *Encomenderos de Quito*, 82–83; Montoya, "Vagabundos y peruleros," 14–21, 25.

Not surprisingly, the most important incentive for the *entradas* was gold. The search for new veins drove the conquistadors forward, even when they found the frontier regions too difficult to colonize. For example, although gold had been discovered in Chocó, a lowland region on the Pacific coast, already in the early sixteenth century, the region was effectively brought under Spanish control only during the last decades of the seventeenth century. Resistance by local indigenous peoples prevented the Spaniards from having a foothold in the area until the 1630s; even after that, it took several decades for the natives to submit to Spanish control.[204]

Conquistador culture also continued along the frontier, and taking part in *entradas* became a necessary rite of passage for young colonial men eager to prove their manhood.[205] One must not underestimate honour as a motivator for their participation in the *entradas*. In early modern Spanish culture, honour was very highly valued by nobles and commoners alike. The Spaniards strove to maintain and defend their honor and, according to a contemporary commentator, they would rather die than tarnish it. The importance of honor was strengthened during the lengthy wars against the Islamic states of the Iberian Peninsula, and it became even more highly regarded in the heterogeneous colonial world where it justified ethnic hierarchies and the Spaniards' place in the society.[206]

Medieval Castilian culture was strongly influenced by the existence of the Muslim-Christian frontier. Before the war against the Kingdom of Granada in 1482–1492, there had been two centuries of relatively peaceful coexistence between Muslim and Christian communities once the medieval Reconquista, connected with the crusader ideology, had petered out. However, the frontier between Castile and Granada remained a restless place and border skirmishes were common. Even during times of truce, both sides had to protect their positions from possible attack, and the frontier was heavily militarized.[207] In this environment, young Castilians looking for adventure, spoils of war, or the opportunity to rise socially could easily find potential here. The conquistadors then carried the cultural legacy of the Reconquista to the "New World." Taking part in the expeditions was a way to gain social prestige, even when the participants did not get rich.

Violence was not one sided, of course. The Andeans were not merely passive objects who only reacted to the actions of the Spaniards. Instead, they seized the

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[204] Williams, "Resistance and Rebellion," 397–400.

[205] Lane, *Quito 1599*, 215.

[206] Burkholder, "Honor and Honors," 18. I will discuss the ethnic and social hierarchies more thoroughly in Chapter Five.

[207] See O'Callaghan, *Last Crusade*, 197–200.

initiative on several occasions. Many indigenous groups continued warfare and attacked the Spanish settlement and roads on a regular basis. The Nasas (Paeces), Pijaos, and Barbacoas, among other groups that lived outside or at the fringes of Spanish domination, continuously attacked the Spanish settlements and the villages of the native groups who had submitted to Spanish authority. These attacks were part of the dynamics of the conquest economy. Spanish *entradas* and indigenous raids fueled each other, causing a never-ending circle of violence. The native groups that kept resisting the conquerors earned a reputation among the Spaniards as warlike and fierce peoples. The Spanish needed to justify their inability to conquer these peoples, so they unsurprisingly depicted them as natural warriors. Of course, the constant state of war molded them into natural warriors, whether or not they had been ones before. Either way, their abilities in the art of war were undisputed.

The attacks were not merely a problem for the Spaniards, but also for the natives who had submitted to Spanish rule. The Spaniards divided the indigenous peoples in two categories, *indios de Guerra* (Indians of war) and *indios de paz* (Indians of peace). Separating the two became important in the frontier zones where the unconquered nations threatened the Spaniards and their allies and vassals alike. At this point, the Spaniards also became more interested in classifying and naming their enemies with distinct name for each group instead of the generic names given to them during the first phase of the conquest. Nevertheless, the descriptions of the different groups were strikingly similar. In Spanish imagination, *indios de Guerra* were in a constant state of war of each against all as well as all against the Spaniards and *indios de paz*.[208]

As he visited the royal court in Spain, the *cacique* of Ipiales, don Pedro de Henao, asked for help against the Barbacoas who were attacking the Pastos, especially the village of Mallama where don Pedro's brother-in-law was a *cacique*.[209] These attacks might have been a continuation of pre-Colombian hostilities between various indigenous groups, but it could also be that the *indios de paz* were attacked because they were seen to be allies or servants of the Spanish enemy. The Spaniards also used native allies in their expeditions against the other groups, but these allies were not always volunteers. Often, the Spaniards took men by force to join them as auxiliaries.[210] In fact, the so-called *indios de paz* were often those who suffered the

[208] Montoya Guzmán, "Las más remotas," 99–100.

[209] AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito para que provean lo necesario para evitar las incursiones de los indios barbacoas, 10 January 1586, ff. 157r–157v.

[210] AGI, Justicia 577, Residencia de Giraldo Gil de Estopiñán, Teniente de Gobernador en Cartago, 1556, ff. 640v.–652v.

most during continuing indigenous wars. The indigenous-Spanish relations were neither simple nor a clear-cut matter.

The indigenous servants of the Spaniards were also often seen as enemies by the communities that were waging war against the colonists. Fray Pedro de Aguado mentions an incident that happened as three Spaniards and many *indios ladinos*, their servants, were on their way to the town of San Vicente de Páez. The Nasas (Paeces) attacked them. One of them, Pedro de Lizana, was dismounted at the time and killed but the other two managed to escape with their horses. The *indios ladinos* were on foot, but some of them managed to hide themselves in the small mountains nearby and stay alive until the Spaniards returned with more men the next day. Aguado does not mention how many of the servants were killed and how many survived but he notes that as the Spaniards went to bury Lizana's body, they also gathered those who were still alive.[211] For the Spaniards, they were first and foremost assets, whereas for the Nasas (Paeces) they were enemies just like their masters.

The Nasas (Paeces), probably the most famous of the warrior tribes, lived in dispersed settlements in the high mountains. From there, they always noticed the arrival of their enemies well in advance. They were able to maintain their independence for a century after the Spanish arrival, thanks to their guerilla warfare tactics and their alliances with neighboring groups such as the Pijaos and Yalcones. They also further dispersed into new smaller villages as a defense mechanism, making them more difficult to control. The Spaniards made several expeditions against the Nasas (Paeces) during the late sixteenth century, and managed to find some towns in the region, but they were not stable bases of Spanish power like the towns in the central areas of the *gobernación*. Instead, they were isolated military bases in an unconquered area. The Nasas (Paeces) successfully resisted the Spaniards until the late seventeenth century; by then, they had suffered considerable population loss through death and forced displacement.[212]

In 1544, the royal officials of Popayán wrote a letter to the *Consejo de Indias* referring to the 1542 rebellion of the Timbas, who lived on the west side of the Cauca River. The Timbas had killed all but four or five of the Spaniards who were sent to punish them for their rebellion. Later, another group of seventy soldiers were sent to fight the rebels. This expedition too was a disaster, marked by a disorderly

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[211] Aguado, *Historia*, 802–803.

[212] Rappaport, *Politics of Memory*, 30, 43; Quiroga, "Encomienda entre los pueblos," 88–89.

retreat and the death of four Spaniards. The third expedition sent by the governor finally managed to pacify the area, at least according to the letter.[213]

The governor Belacázar also sent a letter to the king regarding the Timbas rebellion. According to him, the Timbas first killed a Spanish captain and twenty-two men who had been sent to pacify the region. In response, Belalcázar gathered ninety harquebusiers and bowmen, spending a lot of his own money to do so. He could only send footmen, not horses, due to the rough terrain in the mountains. The natives were so strong, bellicose, and bold (*fuertes, belicosos y atrevidos*) that the Spaniards had to retreat after losing four more men and plenty of arms and cattle.[214]

After their victory, the Timbas persuaded other natives to join them, and launched attacks that killed Spaniards, or Christians as they called themselves, near the town of Cali. Belalcázar gathered another 120 men with more arms to fight the Timbas, joined by "some" friendly local natives. This time, they managed to force the Timbas to submit. Another four Spaniards were killed, but indigenous casualties are not mentioned.[215]

This follows a typical narrative about expeditions against indigenous populations in the Spanish sources. They often depict the natives as warlike and fierce characters, and describe the difficulties the Spaniards had to endure during their campaign. Invariably, the Spaniards prevailed and managed to pacify the territory. The Spanish *relaciones* of the expeditions thus must be read as narratives that repeat certain elements or tropes.

Why did the Timbas rebel? Who were the friendly *indios* used to subdue them? Were the Timbas actually subdued? All these questions remain unanswered—or answered only partially—because the sources were not meant to answer them. The Timbas inhabited lands where the Spanish presence remained weak for decades after Belalcázar's expedition. It is probable that their uprising should not be called rebellion, but rather resistance against intruders who wanted to subdue them.

Later, the Timbas became important allies of the Spaniards in the mountainous region where most of their neighbors continued to refuse to recognize the Spaniards as their overlords. Almost seventy years after Belacázar's expedition, the Timbas are mentioned again in a letter sent by Governor Francisco Sarmiento de Sotomayor to the king recounting how the captain Francisco Ramirez de Serna pacified certain

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[213] AGI, Patronato 192, n. 1, ramo 39, Los oficiales reales de Popayán al Consejo Real sobre alzamientos de indios, gobierno y Real Hacienda, 1544, f. 1r.

[214] AGI, Patronato 192, n. 1, ramo 37, Carta de Sebastián de Belalcázar a Carlos I, Cali 20 December 1544, ff. 1r.–1v.

[215] AGI, Patronato 192, n. 1, ramo 37, Carta de Sebastián de Belalcázar a Carlos I, Cali 20 December 1544, f. 1v.

rebelling natives. Curiously, according to Sarmiento Sotomayor, since the Timbas had always been domestic and loyal (*domesticos y fieles*), some of the rebels were repopulated near them so that they would live in peace with the Spaniards.[216]

Mentions of indigenous raids against the Spaniards and other indigenous peoples appear continuously in the documents. For example, in 1559 the governor Luis de Guzmán asked the king to give orders to populate the recently discovered lands that were still outside the Spanish dominion. According to Guzmán, these lands had plenty of gold and plenty of natives. They also served as refuges for the *indios de paz* who wanted to escape Spanish control. From there, the local populations raided the Spanish settlements.[217]

Ten years later, the *visitador* Pedro de Hinojosa tried to undertake a census among the natives of Buga, Páez, Timaná, and La Plata, but realized that it could not be done because these peoples were not yet pacified.[218] The *encomiendas* granted to Spanish conquistadors included the local peoples, but Spanish power was clearly not yet consolidated there. These towns were located on the eastern slopes of the central cordillera, making them difficult for the Spaniards of Popayán to reach. The boundaries between the "conquered" and the "non-conquered" were not very clear, and there existed a grey zone in which many natives had submitted to Spanish rule in name but not in practice. Some might have been assigned as an *encomienda* to a Spaniard, but that did not mean that they had actually submitted to Spanish rule.

In 1579, Francisco Redondo asked the king for help against the Pijaos in the name of the towns of Popayan, Cali, Almaguer, Buga, Cartago, and Anserma. The Pijaos were doing much damage all over the *gobernación* of Popayán and in the New Kingdom of Granada by attacking the towns and roads and killing both Spaniards and natives. The town of Neiva had been completely depopulated and, according to Robledo, the Pijaos had cannibalized the natives living in the town. The village of San Vicente de Páez was also depopulated, and the village of San Sebastián de la Plata had been burned twice.[219] The nineteenth-century historian Jaime Arroyo

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[216] AGI, Quito 16, ramo 12, n. 37, Carta de Francisco Sarmiento de Sotomayor, gobernador de Popayán, a S.M., Cali 20 April 1610, f. 223r.

[217] AGI, Quito 16, ramo 2, n. 5, Carta de Luis de Guzmán, gobernador de Popayán, a S.M., Cali, 7 November 1559, f. 6v.

[218] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita hecha a los naturales de la provincia de Popayán hecha por el doctor Pedro de Hinojosa, oidor de la Audiencia de Quito, 1569–1571 (Hereafter: Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán), pieza 1.

[219] AGI, Quito 18, n. 51, Francisco Redondo en nombre de las ciudades de Popayán, Cali, Almaguer, Buga, Cartago y Anserma, pide ayuda frente a los indios pijaos, 20 February 1581: "los yndios pijaos an despoblado la villa de Neiva y se comieron todos los yndios q estauan Repartidos a aquella villa y asi mismo despoblaron a la villa de sta Vicente de Paez y dos vezes an quemado la villa de sta Sebastian

mentions that while the Pijaos had made attacked the Spaniards every now and then before, in the 1570s they started a terrible war against the Spaniards which lasted for 40 years with the complete annihilation of the Pijaos.[220] When Redondo made his plea, the situation was evidently alarming.

As was the case for many other Spanish towns in the frontier zone, the town of Neiva, first founded in 1539, was rebuilt several times in different locations. In 1567, the governor Álvaro Mendoza gave orders to repopulate the town in a new location after the Pijaos had destroyed it. The new place was supposed to be safer, and was closer to newly established silver mines.[221] Evidently, the new place was not safe either, and was destroyed and depopulated just over a decade later. Neiva was finally settled in its current location in 1612.

Mendoza also reported on an expedition he had undertaken at his own expense to subdue the natives that were continuously attacking San Vicente de Páez. According to Mendoza, many of them had come to peace, but many others were still continuing their raids.[222] These towns were outposts of the Spanish empire; officials had made efforts to populate them, but they remained distant and scarcely populated locations for a long time. This is a clear indication of the fragility of Spanish presence in the area.

These examples illustrate that the conquerors faced the same problems decade after decade. They were clearly frustrated with their inability to subdue all indigenous groups in the region. But their reaction was not mere frustration: the indigenous raids caused serious problems and undermined the Spaniards' authority. The colonial empire remained a very precarious construction along its periphery.

Minutes from the meetings of the *cabildo* of Popayán also contain continuous references to rebellious *indios* and their attacks on Spaniards and other natives. The oldest surviving book of minutes, the so-called *libros de Belalcázar* from the years 1584–1588, contains twenty-seven mentions of indigenous rebellions (although some of them were multiple references to the same events).[223] Especially troublesome for the Spaniards—and from their point of view—were again the Nasas (Paeces) and the Pijaos, who kept fighting the Spanish invaders and refused to

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de la Plata y muerto muchos españoles y en toda la gobernacion de popayan y nueuo rreyno de Granada."

[220] Arroyo, *Historia de la gobernación*, 286–287.

[221] AGI, Quito 16, ramo 5, n. 11, Carta de D. Álvaro de Mendoza, gobernador de Popayán, a S.M., Popayán, 1 December 1567, f. 41v.

[222] AGI, Quito 16, ramo 5, n. 11, Carta de D. Álvaro de Mendoza, gobernador de Popayán, a S.M., Popayán, 1 December 1567, f. 41r.–41v.

[223] ACC, Cabildo, Libros de Belalcázar 1584–1588.

submit. The references to them deal mostly with attacks within or near the jurisdiction of the city of Popayán.

In 1584, there were problems in the town of Caloto, located some forty kilometers north of Popayán. Caloto had been founded in 1543, but it was relocated several times during the sixteenth century due to the Nasas (Paeces) and Pijaos' constant attacks. In the seventeenth century, it became one the main mining sites in the *gobernación*. In March 1584, *corregidor* and *justicia mayor* of Caloto, captain Hernandez, appeared before the *cabildo* of Popayán to ask for twenty men for an *entrada* against the natives of Toribío. The *cabildo* voted in favour of the decision, and by a majority assented to the petition.[224]

On Christmas Eve 1585, the *cabildo* of Popayán ordered that all horses in the city should be saddled for the night, as there were fears that the Paeces and the Toribíos might attempt to attack while people were feasting.[225] The threat was real, and even the capital city of the *gobierno* was not safe. Violence was pushed to the colonial frontiers, and despite the fact that Popayán was a regional center, it was clearly at the periphery of the larger colonial structure. Local experience differed from that of the major cities and towns in Peru, where indigenous wars were but a distant phenomenon. The situation was even more precarious on the roads, where much of the violence took place. The Spanish presence was strongest in towns, and the roads that ran through the countryside connecting the towns were not very well guarded. Despite the lack of safety, though, people still needed to travel.

When it comes to native violence against Spaniards, of course, one must always remember the sources' possible distortion and bias. Small-scale local outbursts could become a revolt in the documents simply because colonial elites were constantly afraid of an indigenous uprising. The severity of an uprising could also be exaggerated in order to justify its repression.[226] As Ranajit Guha states, colonial documents are sleights of hand that locate violence and unreason as inherent to the colonized.[227]

Nevertheless, there was a real sense of insecurity among the people of Popayán. In Lima and other cities at the core of the Spanish Andean Empire, people were used to living in relative security, and war was a thing of the distant frontiers. In Popayán, it was always present. The Nasas (Paeces) and the Toribíos did not attack

[224] ACC, Cabildo, Libros de Belalcázar, 1584–6, 19 March 1584, ff. 34r.–35v.

[225] ACC, Cabildo, Libros de Belalcázar, 1585-18, 24 December 1585, f. 95v.

[226] MacLeod, "Thoughts on the Pax Colonial," 133.

[227] Cited in Stoler, *Along the Archival*, chap. 2.

at Christmas 1585, or at least there is no information about such an attack, but the threat was real.

During a *cabildo* meeting in December 1585, the governor Juan de Tuesta Salazar told the *cabildo* of Popayán that one of the most pressing issues for the *gobernación* was ending the damages caused by the Nasas (Paeces) and the Pijaos that had continued for more than forty years. These groups continuously attacked the roads, killing Spaniards and peaceful natives (*indios de paz*) alike.[228] Already in 1542, in a letter to the king, Governor Sebastián de Belalcázar had noted that he had—with great cost and effort—subdued the rebellious Nasas (Paeces). Of interest in this letter is Belalcázar's contention that the natives of Popayán were very restless because the Nasas (Paeces) and the Yalcones attacked them constantly, burning their houses, destroying their crops, stealing their food stuffs, and capturing or killing everyone they could.[229]

Belalcázar and the Spanish *encomenderos* were worried because of the attacks, even though they were aimed mostly at other indigenous groups. The reality was that these attacks reduced the indigenous communities' capacity to pay their tributes and also potentially increased the threat that they would rebel against the Spaniards who were failing to protect them in exchange for the tribute they paid. Belalcázar mentioned that he had personally spent four months on campaign against the Nasas (Paeces), who were finally reduced to the Spaniards' service. Even if it was true that Belalcázar defeated the Nasas (Paeces), however, the peace was not lasting, and they continued to fight the Spaniards far into the next century.

Conflicts between the indigenous groups subjugated by the Spaniards and those who remained independent did not always begin with the arrival of the Spaniards. Instead, they were often continuations of earlier conflicts. The Guambianos, the most powerful indigenous group of the Popayán plateau and the western slopes of the central cordillera, accepted Spanish rule and became integrated into colonial society early on. Their *caciques* became active allies of the Spaniards in their wars against the Nasas (Paeces) and other *indios de guerra*, in exchange for certain benefits, especially political autonomy. This conflict was not a product of the Spanish conquest, but instead had its roots in the pre-colonial relations between the two

228 ACC, Cabildo, Libros de Belalcázar, 1585–15, 17 December 1585, f. 89r.

229 AGI, Patronato 192, n. 1, ramo 37, Carta de Sebastián Belalcázar a Carlos I, Cali 20 December 1544, f. 1v.

groups. They were old enemies who were fighting for control over the territory where they were both establishing frontier settlements as the Spanish arrived.[230]

As the most important and powerful allies of the Spaniards, the Guambianos received certain benefits that ensured their loyalty even as the colonial system encroached on their lands and demanded their labor. Their *caciques* belonged to the local elite. The chronicler fray Pedro de Aguado mentions a Guambiano *cacique* named Calambar, also known by his Spanish name don Diego. According to Aguado, Calambar had more than 2,000 subjects, and he helped the Spaniards during their expedition against the Nasas (Paeces) in 1573 under the orders of governor García de Valverde. He gave the Spaniards plenty of corn, sheep, and pork, as well as 400 natives, presumably carriers. In addition, he took many warriors with him when he joined the Spanish expedition. After Calambar was injured during the march toward enemy territory, the Guambianos were led by a *principal* called don Pedro.[231] Calambar was probably a descendant of the *cacique* Calambás, who was one of the paramount lords of the region at the time of the Spanish invasion.

Calambar, or don Diego, also helped the Spaniards to negotiate peace with some of the Nasas (Paeces) and other groups in the region. Calambar was apparently a wealthy man and highly regarded among the different peoples of the region. He had numerous connections too: he had spent time among the Nasas (Paeces) as a child when he was sent hiding as the Spaniards arrived. He called on the *caciques* and *principales* of different nations to negotiate with the Spaniards. During a lavish meal paid for by don Diego, all the indigenous leaders promised to make peace; don Diego then told them that should they forget their promise, he would come with his people and force them to submit.[232] It is obvious that the Spaniards held don Diego in high esteem, and without a doubt that helped him to gather his wealth and his prestige. I shall deal with his position as a member of the local elite in Chapter Five.

As the fact that Calambar had spent time among the Nasas (Paeces) as child demonstrates, the enmities between the groups were not clear-cut. Guambianos and Nasas (Paeces) were close neighbors, and they probably had peaceful

[230] Rappaport, *Politics of Memory*, 36–39. Interestingly, the rivalry between the Nasa (Paez) and the Guambiano has continued to the present day. The two ethnic groups are the most active in the present-day indigenous movements in the department of Cauca, but their rivalry has also divided the movement. The two most important indigenous organizations in the region are the Nasa-dominated CRIC (*Consejo Regional Indígena de Cauca*, Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca), and the Guambiano-dominated AICO (*Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia*, Indigenous Authorities of Colombia). The two organizations have different strategies within the indigenous movements, but their division is also partially ethnically motivated. See Rappaport, *Intercultural Utopias*, 2, 65.

[231] Aguado, *Historia*, 779–783.

[232] Aguado, *Historia*, 779–791.

communication as well as fractious ones. In 1586, the governor of Popayán, Juan Tuesta de Salazar, lamented that some *indios de paz* living in the province of Guambia sold bullets and powder to the Nasas (Paeces) to fight the Spaniards. According to Tuesta de Salazar, communication between the *indios de paz* of Guambia and the *indios de guerra* of the neighboring region was frequent.[233] However, it is not clear whether the people who communicated with the Nasas (Paeces) were Guambianos or Nasas (Paeces) who had made peace with the Spaniards and settled in the province of Guambia.

The Spaniards certainly took advantage of the old rivalries between indigenous groups, but the rivalries also changed after conquistadors' arrival. In some cases, old foes became allies in the fight against the Spaniards. For example, in a court case against a rebelling Pozo *cacique* named Norindamo, witnesses confirmed that the people of Pozo and Picara used to be enemies before the conquest, but were now fighting side by side against the conquerors.[234] The chronicler Cieza de León mentioned that during the conquest, the Pozos fought alongside Spaniards against the Paucuras and Picaras.[235] Evidently, the alliance between the Pozos and the Spaniards did not last, as the rival indigenous groups had made peace.

According to Norindamo himself, the reason for the rebellion was that he and his people did not want to serve their *encomendero* or farm his land.[236] It is probable that they first welcomed the Spaniards because they saw the newcomers as good allies against their local enemies. When they realized the Spaniards did not regard them as equal allies but instead as servants, they turned against the Spanish and forgot their rivalry with their neighbors, at least temporarily.

The Nasas (Paeces) and the Pijaos also seem to have waged wars against each other before the Spanish arrival, but quickly formed alliances afterwards. According to Marcela Quiroga, the Spanish arrival encouraged alliances between groups that once had been enemies but that now had a common "language of social construction." Nasas (Paeces), Pijaos, Guanacas, and Yalcones were all decentralized warrior tribes with a similar symbolic and social register; this made it easy for them

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[233] ACC, Cabildo, Libros de Belalcázar, 1586-11, 30 March 1586, ff. 148v.–149r.

[234] AGI, Justicia 575, Residencia de Francisco Briceño, visitador y gobernador de la provincia de Popayán, por Luis de Guzmán, n. 1, Testimonio de autos de la causa criminal contra el cacique Norindano, 1551, ff. 746r.-756r.

[235] Cieza de León, *Parte primera de la chronica*, f. 25r.

[236] AGI, Justicia 575, Residencia de Francisco Briceño, visitador y gobernador de la provincia de Popayán, por Luis de Guzmán, n. 1, Testimonio de autos de la causa criminal contra el cacique Norindano, 1551, f. 752r.

to seek alliances in the face of the common enemy.[237] Interestingly, the Pijaos language seems to have become a *lingua franca* among many of its neighbors, suggesting that they had a central role in forming or leading the political and military alliances.[238] The conquest changed the dynamics of local societies in many ways, and this is just one example. Communities and ethnic groups previously competing for same resources had found a common enemy, and this unified them. It does not necessarily mean that they put their rivalry aside on permanent basis, but at least they decided to concentrate on fighting together against the people who threatened their freedom, if not their very existence.

We have a tendency, often unconsciously, to look at history teleologically.[239] It is therefore tempting to see these events as steps in the development of the Spanish colonial empire without paying attention to the complexity that lay behind them. The Spanish intruders knew that they were building an empire, but from the point of view of the indigenous peoples, the situation was completely different. A small group of Spanish invaders who were dependent on local support did not look like empire-builders. They had efficient weapons and seemed to be immune to the diseases that were killing the indigenous peoples in large numbers, but they were far too few in number to be able to effectively impose their rule on the local societies.

The Spanish Empire did gradually increase its control over these territories, but in the mid-sixteenth century, that was not yet the case. The relationships between the *encomenderos* and the *caciques* were more complicated than they seem at first glance. The idea that the natives recognized the *encomenderos* as their lords is more a creation of Spanish imagination and arrogance than a reflection of the local reality. The early days of the empire were still a time of struggle between the colonists and the local indigenous groups. The Spaniards had by no means consolidated their power, and the outcome was not inevitable.

Having said that, one must not underestimate the effects of Spanish colonialism even in those areas where Spanish presence was weak or sporadic. For example, in Chocó, the Spanish expeditions to the region beginning in the 1570s caused an increase in intertribal warfare. Some groups collaborated with the Spaniards and facilitated their attempts to colonize the region; this provoked violent response from the groups that resisted the Spanish invasions. It is possible that this contributed to

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[237] Quiroga, *Domination coloniale*, 193–194.

[238] Paredes Cisneros, "Lengua Pijao."

[239] By we, I mean us who are used to linear conceptualization of time, which is dominant in western cultures. There are obviously other ways as well. Many cultures have instead a cyclical notion of time in which certain events repeat themselves in cycles.

the disappearance of the communities of Yngará and Tootuma that had allied with the invaders.[240] Colonialism also radically affected the lives of the peoples who remained outside or on the fringes of the Spanish sphere.

The Spanish arrival did not just unite different groups that used to be rivals, but also created new rivalries within and between communities. The Spanish officials and *encomenderos* could not always grasp the political organization of the various indigenous communities, and they often changed the political and social dynamics by dividing and unifying communities when they created *encomiendas*.[241] This caused several disputes between *caciques* over the control of certain groups and resources. These disputes created conflicts that were sometimes settled in Spanish courts. The Spaniards also played different indigenous communities against each other in the spirit of divide and rule, creating rivalries between ethnic groups where none had existed before.

Enmities between Spaniards and *indios de guerra* also were not clear-cut matter. It seems that at least some individual members of the Nasas (Paeces) and the Pijaos had moved to Popayán despite the continuing war. In February 1586, the *cabildo* ordered all the city's habitants to appear with their arms in a parade, so that the Nasas (Paeces) and the Pijaos living there would see their power and pass the news to their people. In doing so, the people would realize that it would be better to submit that to fight.[242] It is not clear whether these people were slaves captured in war or people who had moved to Popayán of their own will. Probably there were people from both groups. Whoever they were, the Spanish authorities believed they were in contact with the Nasas (Paeces) and Pijaos living beyond Spanish sphere of influence.

The wars of conquest continued throughout the period of this study and beyond. In the early seventeenth century, there were still many independent indigenous groups and some of them continued to attack Spanish settlements. The governor Francisco Sarmiento de Sotomayor (in office 1607–1615) wanted to put an end to attacks by the Pijaos, Nasas (Paeces), and other groups, and to conquer the lands that were still outside the reach of the Spaniards.

At first, his efforts seemed to bear fruit. The people of the town of Segovia de Caloto, while asking the king to send black slaves to make up for losses in the indigenous work force, praised Sarmiento de Sotomayor for personally leading the war against the rebelling natives. In their petition, they wrote that the war would

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[240] Williams, "Resistance and Rebellion," 405.

[241] See Bernal, "Relaciones entre caciques," 140–144.

[242] ACC, Cabildo, Libros de Belalcázar, 1586-5, 15 February 1586, ff. 122r.–123r.

soon come to an end.[243] A couple of months later, the citizens of Anserma wrote a similar petition also full of praise for the governor. The people had not dared to leave their homes in fear of attacks, but now they were able to move around safely as the warlike natives had been forced to submit or flee.[244] The peace brought by Sarmiento was not lasting, though. Two decades later, Caloto was still described as a frontier in Fray Antonio Vázquez de Espinosa's compendium.[245]

In a letter to the king, Sarmiento Sotomayor complained that his predecessors had done nothing to pacify the Piles and other rebellious natives who lived in the western part of the *gobernación* between the valley of the River Cauca and the Pacific Ocean. These natives constantly attacked the Spaniards and peaceful natives, causing much harm and death. The situation was particularly alarming because the passage between Cali and the harbor of Buenaventura was very vulnerable to their attacks. In order to solve this, Sarmiento de Sotomayor sent Captain Francisco Ramirez de Serna to pacify the region.[246]

During his expedition, Ramirez de Serna met people who called themselves Barbacoas. They said that no Spaniards had ever set foot in their lands, nor had they had news of such people.[247] It is not true that the Barbacoas had had no news of the Spaniards: the Spanish town of Barbacoa was founded in 1600, and several sources from the sixteenth century mention the Barbacoas attacking the Spaniards and the *indios de paz*. Nevertheless, the Spaniards did not control the Barbacoas' land. The town of Barbacoa was a bridgehead from which the Spanish *entradas* against the Barbacoas were carried out throughout the seventeenth century, but in 1610 the expeditions had not reached very far.

Sarmiento's war testifies that by the end of the period addressed by this study, almost a century after the conquest had begun and in an age during which colonial society was already fairly consolidated, the colonial frontier remained a restless place. Some of the indigenous groups continued to fight against the intruders. There was no colonial peace in this region, even in the sense that it maybe existed at the core of the colonial empire. The records of the *cabildo* of Popayán also indicate that the

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[243] AGI, Quito 7, Carta de la ciudad de Segovia de Caloto, 26 October 1609, ff. 1r.–1v.

[244] AGI, Quito 7, Carta de la ciudad de Anserma, January 1610.

[245] Vázquez de Espinosa, *Compendio*, 251.

[246] AGI, Quito 16, ramo 12, n. 37, Carta de Francisco Sarmiento de Sotomayor, gobernador de Popayán, a S.M., 20 April 1610, f. 223r.

[247] AGI, Quito 16, ramo 12, n. 37, Carta de Francisco Sarmiento de Sotomayor, gobernador de Popayán, a S.M., 20 April 1610, f. 225v.

town was under constant alert, always ready for an attack by the Nasas (Paeces), Pijaos, or other groups. Popayán was truly a frontier.

In his fascinating study of the Comanche nation of North America, Pekka Hämäläinen turns the story of colonization upside down. He shows that the Comanches were the dominant people in the south west of North America for a century, roughly 1750–1850. At the time, they were not merely participating in European expansion. Instead, they were an expansive force themselves, forcing both Europeans and other indigenous peoples to retreat.[248] This was reversed colonialism, an idea that does not fit into the dominant narrative of colonialism. The paradigm of constant European expansion has led to the idea that the indigenous peoples were always simply defending themselves from European encroachment, at best slowing down the inevitable development that eventually left them at the margins of history. However, the indigenous groups were political actors in their own right, and sometimes they were the ones who had the upper hand.

The attacks by the Nasas (Paeces), Pijaos, and other indigenous groups against the Spanish settlements and the *indios de paz* thus were not necessarily just simple raids without any deeper political aims. These natives were colonizing new territories before the Spanish arrival, and the continuing attacks can also be seen as indigenous expansionist politics. The Nasas (Paeces) and the Pijaos were not as successful as the Comanches were some 200 years later, and it would be an exaggeration to speak of Nasa (Paez) imperialism, but they were not satisfied with only defending themselves against Spanish invasion. Instead, they actively waged war against the intruders. In retrospect, they had no chance to get rid of the newcomers, but their aggressive politics helped them to keep the Spaniards in check for a century.

An evident parallel for the independent indigenous groups of the *gobernación* of Popayán are the Mapuches of Chile. These groups successfully halted the Spanish conquest at the Biobío River in the 1550s, making it a permanent frontier of the Spanish Empire. Wars between the Spaniards and the Mapuches continued on and off until Chilean independence in the early nineteenth century.

The concept of middle ground, developed by Richard White for his study of the Great Lakes region in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, might bring further clarity to the situation. The middle ground was a place between empires and the non-state world of the indigenous peoples. It was a place in which the European colonists could neither dictate to the natives nor ignore them. They were dependent on their indigenous allies and friendly neighbors, and unable to forcibly subdue their rivals.[249]

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[248] Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, 1–17.

[249] White, *Middle Ground*, x.

According to White, none of the actors was able to gain hegemony over the others or to reach their ends through force. This forced them to find other means to gain cooperation or consent. The actors in the middle ground acted in the interests of their own culture, but they needed to find ways to justify their actions in terms of what they perceived to be the others' cultural premises.[250]

In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Popayán, the situation differed from that of the Great Lakes region studied by White. The Spaniards were the strongest actors, and they were able, to an extent, to force others to their will. Therefore, White's concept of middle ground cannot be directly applied. However, Spanish hegemony was still precarious, and the Spaniards needed the support of the indigenous peoples to rule them. They had to take into consideration native ideas, and they had to justify their actions in the eyes of their new subjects.

One of the main differences was that in Spanish America, the natives always outnumbered the Europeans. In the early colonial period, Europeans were only a very small minority, and as late as 1789, natives still constituted 56% of the Spanish American population. In contrast, Europeans outnumbered natives in certain areas of British colonial North America almost from the beginning. Another difference was that the Spanish-indigenous frontiers were not drawn voluntarily. The Spaniards spread across a vast area, founding cities surrounded by an Indigenous population that was often not completely under their control. Frontiers with the natives they were unable to conquer were seen as temporary, not permanent. In contrast, the British colonists of North America cleared the land for themselves by pushing the natives away, and then drew borders to keep them out.[251] In addition, unlike the French and British colonists of North America, the Spaniards were not interested in establishing trade connections with the natives, but sought only to dominate them.

In other respects, the middle grounds are comparable. Although the Spaniards declared that the lands were theirs and the indigenous peoples were—in name—vassals of the Spanish king, in truth, the Spanish position was as precarious as it was in the Great Lakes region. The invaders could neither dictate to nor ignore the natives; they actually needed them. They did not regard the local groups as partners in trade or in anything else; instead, they saw them as inferiors who should accept their rule and adopt their religion. In reality, they were obliged to persuade the natives in different ways to help them survive.

The story of American colonization is usually told as a story of inevitable European expansion at the expense of the indigenous peoples. This is the case in

[250] White, *Middle Ground*, 50–52.

[251] Elliot, *Spain, Europe*, 150–162.

Popayán as well. In the end, the Europeans and their descendants managed to conquer the entire region, more or less, but we should not look at it teleologically, as an inevitable or straightforward process. In the imagination of the general public, "Indian wars" was a phenomenon of North America, and especially of the so-called Wild West. In Spanish America, by contrast, the wars were swift and, once they were over, the natives were completely under Spanish control. This view does not reflect reality.

The narrative of inevitable conquest and Spanish superiority is the narrative the conquerors wanted to present. It was one of their strategies of domination. Unfortunately, this narrative was adopted too uncritically by later generations. A closer view of the early colonial history in the borderlands reveals its fallacy. The conquistadors and their descendants were extremely vulnerable, even though that was not the impression they wanted to give. The indigenous peoples were not passive bystanders who quietly accepted their destruction and reduction to a colonial workforce. They confronted the colonists and gained many victories. In doing so, they managed to thwart the conquest of many areas for a long time.

3.2 Endemic Conflicts and the Structural Violence of Colonialism

Indigenous Resistance and Rebellions

Violence was not restricted to the restless frontiers. Many indigenous revolts of different scales occurred in Popayán during the sixteenth century. Some were likely just isolated events of violence, but others seem to have been more severe. Whatever the situation, it is important to problematize the concept of rebellion. To call an indigenous act of violence a rebellion instead of resistance implies that the Spaniards had subdued the "rebels." However, the indigenous groups did not always consider themselves to have been subdued, even if the Spaniards did. It is often difficult to distinguish which conflicts can be considered rebellions enacted by groups that had previously accepted Spanish rule and which were part of attempts to subdue a group that had not yet submitted.

Among the most famous indigenous uprisings were the Quimbaya revolts in 1542 and 1557. The Quimbayas formed one of the major indigenous groups in the region and lived around the town of Cartago. Juan Friede narrated the events of these

revolts in his classic study *Los quimbayas bajo la dominación española*. On the surface, they look like clear cases of rebellion amongst a previously conquered group; a closer look, however, reveals that it was not that simple.

Juan Friede claimed that the cause of the rebellion in 1542 was unknown, although he insinuated that at least part of the blame lay on Captain Miguel Muñoz, who was acting as the governor's *teniente* at the time. In 1550, Muñoz was sentenced in his *juicio de residencia* to exile from America; he also lost his *encomienda* and was fined 5,000 *castellanos* for the cruelties he committed against the natives.[252] Whether or not Muñoz's actions instigated the rebellion, it seems that the Quimbayas were ready to revolt. They formed several war councils led by the *caciques*, and attacked the Spaniards and their servants. Muñoz defeated the rebels, but they caused much damage. According to a list of casualties, the Quimbayas killed ninety-six persons, among them seventy native servants of the Spaniards, twelve slaves of African descent, and fourteen Spaniards. Of the last group, only two were *encomenderos*; the others were probably soldiers, servants, and merchants.[253]

By far the majority of those killed were other natives. The fact that so many indigenous peoples were in the Spanish retinue emphasizes the Spaniards' reliance on the indigenous population to conquer and control the territory. The leading Spanish settlers were mostly saved, while their indigenous allies and servants suffered the most damage. In this sense, the rebellions can also be seen as civil wars between rival factions in the local colonial society: party lines, so to speak, did not follow ethnic lines. We must not automatically assume that the natives who fought for the colonists were forced to do so. Without a doubt, some of them were, but at least some of them chose their side according to perceived benefits for themselves and their communities.

When the Spanish expedition led by Jorge Robledo entered the Quimbaya lands two years before the rebellion, it had faced no resistance at all. Instead, the Quimbayas came to meet the Spaniards and brought them food and presents. According to Robledo, the Quimbaya *caciques* all submitted peacefully to the Spaniards and agreed to serve the Christians.[254] The town of Cartago was founded in August 1540, and in November conquistador Jorge Robledo was named lieutenant

[252] Friede *Quimbayas*, 57–60.

[253] Friede *Quimbayas*, 47–51.

[254] AGI, Patronato 28, ramo 66, Relación del viaje de Jorge Robledo a Quimbaya, Antioquia etc., 1540, f. 6r.

governor of the province. After that, Robledo distributed the Quimbayas into the *encomiendas*.[255]

Juan Friede assumed that the Quimbayas were peaceful by nature, and that the hierarchical structure of their society eased the conquest. For him, the rebellions of 1542 and 1557 showed that the subjugation of even the more docile and pacific tribes like the Quimbayas could not have happened without resistance.[256] In his more recent study, Colombian historian and anthropologist Jorge Gamboa points out that it was very common for the natives to form alliances with the Spaniards to receive help against their own enemies, or to advance their own benefit in other ways. They often received the Spaniards peacefully, and both groups commonly exchanged gifts. The chroniclers often interpreted this as submission to Spanish rule, but the natives saw it differently. They were used to forming loose and quickly changing alliances and recognising the temporary authority of a certain chief was not the same as permanent submission. The Spaniards misinterpreted alliance as recognition of vassalage.[257]

The Spaniards placed the lands of the American continent under the Spanish crown's lordship even before they had discovered most of it. From that point forward, the conquest was—from their point of view—merely a consolidation of their possession. The pre-existing inhabitants of these lands were, by consequence, crown subjects and vassals even before they were known to the Spaniards; they were simply waiting to be informed of their new status. For this reason, all indigenous resistance to the Spaniards made them rebels in the latter's eyes.[258]

It is safe to assume that after first contact the Quimbayas did not submit as completely as has been thought. The rebellion of 1542 could be seen differently than how Friede presented it. The Quimbayas probably did not see themselves as subjects of the Spaniards or as having any obligation to work for them. From their point of view, the so-called rebellion of 1542 was not a rebellion against their "masters" at all, but rather a fight against invaders whom they had received peacefully, and who now tried to subjugate them. What is evident is that by 1542, Spanish domination was not even close to being consolidated.

In 1557, the Quimbayas revolted again, but this time they were not alone. The year 1557 was one of great turmoil in the area of present-day Colombia. The rebelling groups included at least the Sutagaos in the south and the people of Velez in the

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[255] Friede *Quimbayas*, 35–45.

[256] Friede *Quimbayas*, 22–23, 71.

[257] Gamboa *Cacicazgo muisca*, 235–240.

[258] Restall, *Seven Myths*, 68.

north of New Granada, the Gorrones and Bugas in the valley of Cauca, the Nasas (Paeces), Pijaos and Panches in the valley of Magdalena, and the Quimbayas, Ansermas, Armas, and Caramantas in the north of the *gobernación* of Popayán.[259]

The Quimbayas attempted to entice other groups in the area to join their rebellion, and apparently found an echo among at least some of the Anserman *caciques*. The Quimbayas sent a *yanacona*[260] servant of Juan de Vega to the province of Anserma under the cover of buying salt, but his real task was to agitate for the rebellion.[261] However, lieutenant Luis de Guevara, who was in command in Anserma at the time, received information about possible unrest and decided to make a pre-emptive strike by arresting twelve of the most powerful provincial *caciques*. The possible rebellion petered out. According to Guevara, the town was so poorly prepared that it would not have survived a full-scale indigenous rebellion, but thanks to his own efforts, this fate was avoided and the lives of many Spaniards and black slaves were saved.[262]

Luis de Guevara claimed that the natives of Anserma were malicious and forever ready to rise against the Spaniards; it was for this reason that he had to act quickly in the face of a revolt in the neighboring province.[263] Guevara explained his actions in a *probanza de meritos* that was meant to justify arresting the twelve *caciques* before anything had even happened; as such, his claims should be taken with extreme caution. However, it is obvious that the Spaniards were suspicious of the natives' intentions.

The relationships between the Spaniards and natives were always uneasy to some extent. The Spaniards understood that they needed the natives in order to survive in the colonies. The natives quickly realized that the Spaniards were there to stay, and that it was in their interest to be on good terms with them. However, there was also a high degree of distrust between the two groups. Fully aware of their numerical disadvantage, the Spaniards in particular were constantly afraid of indigenous rebellions.

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[259] Friede *Quimbayas*, 72, Valencia Llano, *Resistencia militar indígena*, 139.

[260] *Yanacona* was native working for a Spanish master and detached from his community. The word derives from a plural of the Quechua word *yana*, a personal servant of a lord.

[261] AGI, Patronato real 117, ramo 4, Información de los méritos y servicios de Luis de Guevara en la conquista de Perú, 1571, pieza 3, f. 2v.

[262] AGI, Patronato real 117, ramo 4, Información de los méritos y servicios de Luis de Guevara en la conquista de Perú, 1571, pieza, 6r.–7v.

[263] AGI, Patronato real 117, ramo 4, Información de los méritos y servicios de Luis de Guevara en la conquista de Perú, 1571, pieza 3, f. 2v.

During a hearing organized by Luis de Guevara for his *probanza*, a *yanacona* and *ladino*[264] named Antonio offered interesting testimony about the situation in Anserma during the Quimbaya revolt. Antonio lived in the pueblo of Yria, and although he knew Spanish, he was interrogated through an interpreter. According to Antonio, the *cacique* of Yria don Pedro had promised his help to the Quimbayas against the Christians. Don Pedro had a close relationship with the Quimbayas, since his sister was married to one of their leaders, *cacique* Iniache of the pueblo of Chinchina.[265]

There were also rumors flying around. Antonio mentioned a few *ladinos* who were eagerly waiting to kill first the Christians of Cartago and then those of Anserma. They had heard from the Panches that the Christians of Santafé de Bogotá had killed all the natives there, and they wanted revenge by killing all the Christians in their lands.[266] It is unclear where these rumors of massacres in Santafé came from. There is no evidence of any large-scale indigenous rebellions in the area since the establishment of the royal *audiencia* of Santafé in 1550. Fighting continued in the fringe areas, but not at the center.[267] There was also a messianic aspect to the rebellion, as the above-mentioned *ladinos* told Antonio that the Panches had a golden god who would help them in their war against the Spaniards.[268] The Panches seemed to have had an important role in the Quimbaya uprising and in trying to spread it to other regions.

It is clear then, that there were tensions between the Spaniards and the natives. We can also see here that various indigenous uprisings in 1557 were connected. It seems that the natives did manage to gather some sort of unified front for a common cause against the Spaniards. Even many of the *yanaconas* and *ladinos* joined in to throw the Spaniards out once and for all. In 1542, *yanaconas* had been killed by the rebels but now, in 1557, some joined the uprising.

Tensions were still high as Tomás López performed his *visita* in the *gobernación* in 1558–1559. He was supposed to investigate the situation of the natives throughout the *gobernación*, but he could not travel to all areas because they were not pacified yet. For example, the villages in the provinces of Banba and Ceyna were divided into

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[264] *Ladinos* were natives who spoke Spanish and had adopted elements of Spanish culture.

[265] AGI, Patronato real 117, ramo 4, Información de los méritos y servicios de Luis de Guevara en la conquista de Perú, 1571, pieza 3, f. 3r.

[266] AGI, Patronato real 117, ramo 4, Información de los méritos y servicios de Luis de Guevara en la conquista de Perú, 1571, pieza 3, f. 3v.

[267] Gamboa *Cacicazgo muisca*, 309.

[268] AGI, Patronato real 117, ramo 4, Información de los méritos y servicios de Luis de Guevara en la conquista de Perú, 1571, pieza 3, f. 3v–4v.

encomiendas, but López could not visit them while the natives were battling the Spaniards. He urged the *encomenderos* to do everything they could to pacify the natives "with saintly and good methods" (*por medios santos y buenos*). This included persuading them with gifts. In addition, the Spaniards were supposed to act as good examples to the natives to aid in their evangelization.[269]

López had similar problems elsewhere. The indigenous peoples living in the jurisdiction of the towns of San Sebastian de la Plata and Timana were scattered in the mountains, unprepared to submit to Spanish rule. The *visitador* wanted to move these people to Spanish style towns in order to pacify and civilize them, but the Spaniards simply had no means to do so.[270] This is an early example of the reduction campaigns that would intensify a decade later, and which will be addressed in Chapter Four.

Small-scale rebellions took place regularly. When one of the first *oidores* (judges) of the *audiencia* of Santafé, Francisco Briceño, acted as the governor of Popayán in 1550–1552, he and his *tenientes* organized several trials against *caciques* for rebelling against Spanish rule. Briceño did not win popularity among the local people during his governorship, but he seems to have been very efficient. The *juicios de residencia* of Briceño and his captains contain several criminal cases against *caciques* for rebelling against Spaniards.

For example, in July and August 1550, Antonio Pimentel, Briceño's *teniente* in Arma, held a trial against *cacique* Norindamo of the village of Pozo. Norindamo, who was also referred to as Morira, was accused of revolting against the Spaniards three or four times, despite swearing obedience to them after each act of rebellion. He was condemned to be hanged as a punishment for himself and as an example to others.[271] Similar circumstances appear in many other cases as well. According to the Spanish interpretation, the natives had submitted to the Spanish rule and later rebelled against their new masters. The natives usually explained their uprisings in terms of the *encomendero*'s excessive demands. In the hearings, they did not dispute Spanish authority, but accused their *encomendero* of acting cruelly towards them.

Native reluctance to serve the Spaniards is a recurrent theme in the cases concerning indigenous rebellions. The Spaniards tried to get as much out of the natives as possible, and the natives often deemed Spanish demands to be excessive. The communities of Popayán were not used to an extensive tribute system, and this

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[269] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, f. 68v.

[270] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, f. 73r.–74r.

[271] AGI, Justicia 575, Residencia de Francisco Briceño, n. 1, Testimonio de autos de la causa criminal contra el cacique Norindano, 1551, ff. 746r.–756r.

deepened the conflict between them and the Spanish settlers. Although the natives were usually quite humble during the court hearings, they were clearly not happy with their new position as laborers for the Spanish settlers. In this light, interethnic relations were uneasy at best.

A year after Norindamo was charged, another *cacique* of Pozo named Ungurugua was also charged of inciting repeated rebellions. Ungurugua was the *cacique* of Pozo el Chico, and the *cacique* of Pozo el Grande, Periquita, had sent a messenger demanding his obedience. Ungurugua had his men beat the messenger with sticks, after which the two pueblos fought each other, and several natives died. Periquita was an ally of the Spaniards, while Ungurugua was described as bellicose, irritable, and stubborn. The fact that he had rebelled against the Spaniards several times already did not help his case. Ungurugua was eventually subdued and imprisoned, but not by Spaniards alone. Several witnesses mentioned that many Spaniards and more than 300 natives were needed to capture him.[272]

Local conflicts among and between native communities significantly affected how relationships between the colonists and the indigenous communities developed. Especially in the early stages of colonial rule, these inter-indigenous relationships were probably more important than interethnic relations as such, given the weak Spanish presence. It seems that for Ungurugua, the main enemy was Periquita, an ally of the *encomenderos* who wanted to make Ungurugua his subject and force the people of Pozo el Chico to start serving the Spaniards in ways they were not willing to do.

Ungurugua confessed that his community had never worked for their *encomendero*. He also said that he had only given his *encomendero* gold on one occasion, and that he had never served him in any other way despite being his *encomendado* for eight years.[273] This is a quite telling statement. That these natives were entrusted as an *encomienda* did not mean that they actually served their *encomendero*. Concentrating on the *repartimientos* of *encomiendas,* the founding of towns, and other similar Spaniard-oriented activities clearly distorts the picture of Spanish colonialism. The Spaniards were a long way from actually consolidating their power in the region in the mid-sixteenth century, although they perceived their right to govern the local indigenous communities to be indisputable.

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[272] AGI, Justicia 575, Residencia tomada a Francisco Briceño, n. 1, Testimonio de autos de la causa criminal contra el cacique Unguragua, 1552, ff. 758r.–761r.

[273] AGI, Justicia 575, Residencia tomada a Francisco Briceño, n. 1, Testimonio de autos de la causa criminal contra el cacique Unguragua, 1552, f. 761v.

The colonial conflicts of this era were certainly complicated. The reasons behind them were usually a combination of Spanish colonialism and local dynamics, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to tease these two factors apart. The intruders saw their allies as their loyal servants, but the allies saw it differently. Both the Spaniards and the indigenous peoples sought alliances for their own benefit.

Ungurugua was charged with rebelling against the Spaniards despite having submitted to their power; from his point of view, though, things looked different. Ungurugua had been entrusted to the *encomendero* Antonio Pimentel for eight years and had failed to serve him, although this became an issue only later. The *cacique* had tolerated this Spaniard claiming to be his lord, as he never actually had to serve the man. According to both Pimentel and Ungurugua, the former had given several gifts to the *cacique* over the years, persuading him to serve the Spaniards. From Ungurugua's point of view, Pimentel was a guest. Only after Pimentel started making demands toward Ungurugua and his people did it become a problem.

In another case, Briceño's *teniente* in the towns of Cali and Antioquia, Alonso Diez Madroñero, accused *cacique* Quiabanisco in 1543 of murdering a Spanish captain named Bartolomé Gómez who was leading the local conquering troops.[274] An interesting point is, once again, that the *cacique* was accused of murdering a conquistador: the Spaniards clearly did not regard his actions as a legitimate resistance against invaders but rather as a criminal act against a Spanish man.

Within the jurisdiction of the town of Arma, several *caciques* were also charged with rebelling against the Spaniards despite having sworn allegiance to them previously. The hearing took place in 1552. The rebels were led by *cacique* Maitara, but other *caciques* in the region were involved as well. They were accused of killing Spaniards, *yanaconas*, and horses. According to the charges, the *caciques* had made peace with the Spaniards four times, and each time they had rebelled again. The records state that they did this because they were "bad Indians" (*indios malos*).[275]

The natives of Arma had formed a confederation despite the fact that some of them were previously enemies. The confederation was enforced through marriage: the *cacique* Maytama had given his daughters as wives to other *caciques*. All of the

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[274] AGI, Justicia 584, Residencia de Alonso Diez Madroñero, teniente de Antioquia y Cali y Bernardo de Cepeda, teniente de Pasto por Briceño - Testimonio del proceso que hizo el lic. Madroñero contra el cacique Quiabanisco sobre la muerte de Bartolomé Gómez (1543), ff. 47v.-53v.

[275] AGI, Justicia 576, Residencia de Francisco Briceño, visitador y gobernador de la provincia de Popayán, por Luis de Guzmán - Testimonio de la causa criminal contra varios caciques de la provincia de Arma (1552), f. 52r.

caciques were found guilty and were sentenced to torture, apparently on a torture rack. Maytama was exiled from the *gobernación* under pain of death.[276]

These examples lead to several conclusions. First, Spanish control was challenged by the natives, the latter not being completely subdued under the Spaniards' power. Second, from the Spanish point of view, their right to rule these lands was undisputed; all natives resisting it were, by extension, rebels. In all of these cases, Spanish witnesses emphasized that natives repeatedly rebelled despite being well treated well by conquistadors. The colonists tried to reason with them and persuade them to serve their masters, but the stubborn and bellicose natives refused. Therefore, they had to be punished.

Unfortunately, the indigenous viewpoint is more difficult to reach, because their statements have been filtered through Spanish legal documents. Nevertheless, their actions are revelatory. They did not acknowledge the Spaniards as their overlords. They did not perceive themselves as subjects of a distant Spanish monarch, but instead as free people fighting for their independence against people who wanted to make them their servants.

During the hearing organized by Luis de Guevara in response to the rebellions of 1557, the *yanacona* Antonio was asked why the natives wanted to rise against the Spaniards. He responded that they felt it was better to die than to carry cargo, to give their young men to religious teaching, to work in the Spanish mines, or to give women to serve the Spaniards. The natives had complained that the clerics had taken so many young men to be taught religion that there was no one left. These were the reasons the natives wanted to fight and to kill Christians, or to die trying.[277]

During court case on indigenous maltreatment near the town of Almaguer in 1561, a Spanish witness testified that although the natives of Almaguer were peaceful, they could cause much harm if they wished. The Camino Real between Peru and Cartagena ran through their lands, and had they not been peaceful, it would have been impossible the travel the road.[278] *Encomendero* Francisco Mosquera said to *visitador* Garcia de Valverde in 1570 that if the Spaniards left Almaguer and stopped protecting the road, much harm would come to the entire *gobernación* of Popayán, the

[276] AGI, Justicia 576, Residencia de Francisco Briceño, visitador y gobernador de la provincia de Popayán, por Luis de Guzmán - Testimonio de la causa criminal contra varios caciques de la provincia de Arma (1552), ff. 78r.79v., 106r.

[277] AGI, Patronato real 117, ramo 4, Información de los méritos y servicios de Luis de Guevara en la conquista de Perú, 1571, pieza 3, f. 3v.

[278] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, doc. 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer por maltratos, f. 88v.

Nuevo Reino, and Peru.[279] This is one more indication that Spanish authority was not unchallenged at the time. Even if the Andeans were unable to drive the colonists away, they were able to cause them plenty of harm; the Spaniards always had to keep this under consideration.

After the 1550s, there are fewer and less detailed mentions of open and violent uprisings against the Spaniards from the central areas of the *gobernación*. This does not mean, of course, that the conflicts went away. Instead, they were usually settled in a different way: the natives started to make their demands through legal channels, or to use more subtle forms of resistance. Violent attacks against the Spaniards still occurred but were usually more isolated events rather than premeditated revolts. I will return to these different forms of conflict in later chapters.

While the Spanish presence in Popayán was quite consolidated by the late sixteenth/early seventeenth century, and the number of native inhabitants significantly reduced through ravaging diseases, dangerous work, and violence, the prospect of a large-scale indigenous uprising capable of expelling the Spaniards was definitely still possible. In Peru or central Mexico, by contrast, such a prospect was far less plausible, if not completely unthinkable.[280] In the contemporary Spanish imagination, the threat of indigenous revolt was always present. This is actually a common feature in all colonial societies, but in Popayán, as in other frontier regions, that fear was actually substantiated.

The idea of Pax Colonial is based on the assumption that there were no indigenous revolts after the initial conquest phase had ended. However, that assumption clearly is flawed. It is based largely on Spanish chronicles and other easily accessible contemporary sources written by Spaniards for their own purpose; a search through the archives, by contrast, shows that rebellions by the indigenous peoples were a constant phenomenon. Usually they remained local and failed to offer a significant challenge to the Spanish colonial empire, but they nevertheless testify that the indigenous peoples in America did not submit without a fight.

Everyday Violence in Colonial Society

Spanish conquering expeditions and indigenous rebellions are the most visible forms of interethnic conflicts, but they are only part of a wider phenomenon. Not all

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[279] AGI, Quito 60, Tasación de los tributes de los naturales de Pasto y Almaguer por el licenciado García Valverde, 1570–1571 (Hereafter: Visita de Valverde), f. 138r.

[280] Lane, *Quito 1599*, 233.

conflicts were violent, and most of the violence took place in everyday situations. In colonial societies, violence was both structural and endemic. Violence was an essential component of interethnic relations, but it is necessary to keep in mind the distortion of contemporary sources. Two competing yet equally valid source critical notions are worth mentioning here: that the source material might exaggerate the level of violence, and that some violence remained hidden.

As Murdo J. MacLeod states, the Spanish American colonial system was structurally attuned to violence, but much of this violence remains hidden to us today. Although large-scale native revolts were rare, there were many other forms of daily violence, often more so in the peripheries.[281] The *gobernación* of Popayán was a frontier zone in which colonial institutions were weaker than they were in the more central areas. As result, the relationships between Spaniards and natives were less regulated. The *encomenderos* were freer of the restrictions imposed by royal officials, better able to exercise their own harsh demands. For their part, the natives were also quicker to respond to the Spaniards' excesses with violence. Before the legal institutions were developed and implemented, there were practically no restrictions on violence by either group, except fear of retaliation.

Interethnic violence was certainly under-reported, documented only when it was brought before a judicial court. Many conflicts and acts of violence were never documented at all. As a result, conflict is often also underemphasized in historical research.[282] Recent research has focused more heavily on the co-operative nature of the interethnic encounters, and modern historians are rightly skeptical of contemporary descriptions of overt colonial violence given their obvious bias. However, this does not mean that the relationships were entirely peaceful. There is enough evidence to suggest that violence was endemic, if low key.

Cruelties, by contrast, were more likely to be recorded than non-violent coexistence.[283] A large part of the everyday interaction between the ethnic groups was never recorded, and overt conflicts are thus over-represented in the archival material. That can distort the image of colonial society. Furthermore, the defenders of the indigenous peoples sometimes exaggerated the cruelties against them. No documents recorded an indigenous person being invited to dinner at a Spaniard's house, or a Spaniard purchasing fruits from an Andean in the market. However, these encounters are sometimes mentioned in passing in court records or other documents.

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[281] MacLeod, 'Some Thoughts', 142.

[282] MacLeod, "Some Thoughts," 130, 134.

[283] Gamboa, *Cacicazgo muisca*, 508.

Although documentary over-representation or under-reporting of conflict seem to be contradictory, they are not mutually exclusive, and both of these phenomena need to be taken into account. Since everyday violence against natives was very common, and also widely accepted within the Spanish society, all acts of violence were simply not deemed worthy of mention. At the same time, there was plenty of everyday interaction that did not involve violence and was never recorded because it did not interest the officials.

Finding everyday violence in the silence of the archives is a challenge for the historian, but many reports written by Spanish officials, churchmen, and other Spanish observers, as well as the few preserved court cases from the *gobernación*, do tell of serious conflict between the ethnic groups. They tell of native maltreatment and of native violence against the Spaniards. The indigenous peoples' high mortality levels also testify to an extent to endemic violence, although most deaths were not violent as such. The main cause of mortality was disease, but hard labor in poor conditions (under the threat of violence) and physical punishment meted out to those who did not comply played a part in it as well.

The best way to encounter everyday violence is through court records. These sources differ from the clearly exaggerated descriptions of cruelty written by defenders of the natives. The court records need to be read critically as well, but one can assume that while the witnesses do not necessarily tell the truth, their testimonies do in some sense reflect what they had actually seen, heard, or experienced. Therefore, these sources tell more about the everyday life and conflicts between the indigenous peoples and the Spanish settlers than the narrative chronicles or letters. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the court cases were not about finding truth, but rather about which version of the truth would prevail.

In 1552, a criminal court case was brought against Marcos Castuera, an *encomendero* from the town of Anserma in the northern part of the *gobernación* of Popayán. It is one of the earliest preserved cases from the *gobernación* of Popayán, but the incidents to which it referred had occurred even earlier, in the early 1540s.[284] There is one obvious reason for bringing the case to the royal *audiencia* several years after the event in question: the *audiencia* of Santafé was inaugurated only in 1550, and before that, Anserma was under jurisdiction of the *audiencia* of Lima, which was much further away. Another reason might reflect the dynamics in the local society. Somebody had a reason to revisit these events after so many years, indicating that there was some

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[284] AGN, Caciques e indios 37, doc. 13, Anserma, crueles tratamientos a los indios, 1552–1555. It is not known when the events took place exactly, but the documents suggest that it happened before the new laws were proclaimed in the province, meaning before August 1544.

sort of internal struggle going on in the community. That is a typical feature of the court cases of this type: they are closely tied to local power struggles that often involve both Andean lords and Spanish *encomenderos*. A closer analysis demonstrates how the case provides a very good example of the conflicts between *encomenderos* and indigenous communities in the early colonial period.

According to the charges laid against him, Castuera had maltreated his *encomendados* in many ways, including imprisoning, torturing, robbing, and killing them. He also was accused of provoking other groups of natives to rebel against their masters, and of killing the *cacique* Tanzarara, although the circumstances of the latter charge are not clear.[285] In addition, Castuera had forced the town's *alcalde* (magistrate), Pedro de Prada, to hang Tanzarara's successor Quycantro. According to Prada himself, the *cacique* was hanged after being found guilty of attempting to kill Castuera, but *cacique* Tutuy of the neighboring village claimed that the real reason behind Quycantro's hanging was that he had refused to give Castuera as much gold as the *encomendero* had demanded. Castuera had also imprisoned Quycantro's successor Cabraminima and demanded gold from him. Cabraminima did give the gold to Castuera, but the *encomendero* had demanded even more, after which Cabraminima apparently ate some lethal herbs. His body was fed to the dogs.[286] Tutuy was the *cacique* of the natives who had rebelled at Castuera's instigation.

Castuera denied all the charges, and tried to bring the witnesses who testified against him into disrepute. Castuera also stated that he had previously brought charges of maltreatment and the killing of certain natives against Gomez Hernandez and Bernaldino Ramos. Castuera furthermore accused Ramos of stealing natives from his *encomienda*[287] and claimed that he (Castuera) was actually laughed at for treating his *encomendados* so well. This good treatment had, unfortunately, made the natives very idle and reluctant to work for the tribute they were supposed to pay.[288] If any maltreatment had taken place, he argued, it had happened a long time ago before the New Laws were proclaimed in the province. Back then, the natives were reluctant to serve, and it was necessary to be strict with them since the natives were many and the Spaniards few. In any case, Castuera maintained that he had never

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[285] AGN, Caciques e indios 37, doc. 13, Anserma, crueles tratamientos a los indios, 1552–1555, hoja 572r.–575r.

[286] AGN, Caciques e indios 37, doc. 13, Anserma, crueles tratamientos a los indios, 1552–1555, hojas 609r.–610v., 718r.

[287] AGN, Caciques e indios 37, doc. 13, Anserma, crueles tratamientos a los indios, 1552–1555, hojas 639r.–640r.

[288] AGN, Caciques e indios 37, doc. 13, Anserma, crueles tratamientos a los indios, 1552–1555, hoja 648v.

done anything to the natives with malicious intent: his actions were meant only to make them obey and pay the tributes they were obliged to pay.[289]

According to one of Castuera's indigenous servants named Hernandillo, his master had complained that the natives were sometimes reluctant to pay the tributes they owed. Sometimes Castuera had to resort to tougher methods, such as imprisoning some natives, beating them with a stick or whipping them, or letting the dogs bite them. At least one person he had also tortured with fire. However, Hernandillo denied that his master had killed anybody. He also stated that usually the natives paid their tributes willingly.[290]

The common attitude here was that violence was not only justified, but also necessary to make the natives work. This reflected the paternalistic and—in modern terms—racist attitudes of the colonists. Harsh discipline was accepted as necessary because of the uncivilized nature of the natives.[291] Violence or attacks against the natives were typically excused as necessary punishments for rebellion, as the communities had refused to serve their *encomenderos*. The question was not whether it was acceptable to use violence to make the natives fulfill their obligations, but rather how much violence was acceptable. For the Spaniards, it was a given that the natives had an obligation to serve them, and that they could be forced to do so should they decline. Excessive violence was condemned, but not violence as such.

What did the indigenous peoples make of it? According to Jorge Gamboa, who has studied the Muiscas of New Granada, indigenous communities tolerated a certain amount of violence from their *encomenderos* or Spanish authorities, as long as they considered their demands legitimate.[292] It is possible that this was true to some extent in Popayán as well. However, it would be dangerous to generalize too much here. The prerequisite for "tolerating" violence was that the Spanish domination was considered legitimate. For some Indigenous, this was the case, but not for all. Furthermore, even though the source material indicates that the natives sometimes did accept a certain level of violence from their Spanish masters, careful interpretation is necessary. The indigenous peoples understood that the Spanish legal system operated based on Spanish self-evidence, and that it was not wise to question

[289] AGN, Caciques e indios 37, doc. 13, Anserma, crueles tratamientos a los indios, 1552–1555, hojas 699r.–700r.

[290] AGN, Caciques e indios 37, doc. 13, Anserma, crueles tratamientos a los indios, 1552–1555, hojas 673v.–674v.

[291] See Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, 72.

[292] Gamboa, *El cacicazgo muisca*, 285.

them in a court case; instead, recourse could be made the excessiveness of the Spaniards' violent methods.

A testimony by Martin de Amoroto, a former *vecino* (citizen of a municipality) of Anserma and a resident of Santafé, offers interesting background information for the case. According to him, Bernaldino Ramos had for years been served by the people of Tanzarara, and still was.[293] One might assume that the natives had allied themselves with Ramos against Castuera and that they had decided to file the charge for killing Tanzarara together with Ramos and his Spanish allies. This was clearly a conflict between local interethnic power groups, not just between Spaniards and natives. This was a typical feature in most conflicts. I will discuss more of the formation of local power groups in Chapter Five.

Castuera was found guilty by the *audiencia* of Santafé and was sentenced to lose his *encomendados* to the crown and to be exiled from Anserma for three years. In addition, he was to pay for the expenses of the lawsuit against him.[294] Castuera complained and maintained his innocence, demanding the verdict to be revoked. This did not happen. Instead, the *audiencia* of Santafé found the verdict just and even extended the exile from Anserma to the rest of Castuera's life, adding for good measure a one-year exile from the city of Santafé.[295]

Castuera's case is an illustrative example of the everyday violence that was typical of the relationships between indigenous communities and their *encomenderos* in the early colonial period. The case was at the same time both typical and rare. In early colonial Popayán, violence between natives and Spaniards was recurrent, and this case contains several typical elements of it. The *encomendero* wanted to make as much profit as possible at the expense of the natives, and used harsh methods to make them obey. From his point of view, the natives were lazy and reluctant to work without pressure. The natives responded with both open and hidden resistance: violence, escape, and refusal to work. The case was also typical because it was not merely about an *encomendero* mistreating the natives entrusted to him, but a more complicated example of local power struggles. However, although these issues happened regularly, very seldom were they brought before a court of law.

The archives contain plenty of other examples of Spanish violence against natives. For example, in 1552 the first bishop of Popayán, Juan del Valle, performed

[293] AGN, Caciques e indios 37, doc. 13, Anserma, crueles tratamientos a los indios, 1552–1555, hoja 647r.

[294] AGN, Caciques e indios 37, doc. 13, Anserma, crueles tratamientos a los indios, 1552–1555, hoja 683r.

[295] AGN, Caciques e indios 37, doc. 13, Anserma, crueles tratamientos a los indios, 1552–1555, hoja 736r.

a *visita* among the natives of the *gobernación*. During the *visita*, del Valle listened to the natives' grievances about crimes committed against them by the Spaniards. Many of the *caciques* complained about their *encomenderos*. Some complained that their *encomenderos* forced every working age man to work in the mines or in their *estancias*, leaving no one to work the fields of their own communities. Others claimed that they had been whipped and humiliated for not being able to give their *encomendero* what they demanded.[296]

Del Valle gathered other testimonies from indigenous peoples as well. Among them there is a testimony from cacique Yunbo of the *pueblo* called Las Baracas. He accused Sebastián Quintero of hundreds of abuses and maltreatments against himself and other natives. Quintero seemed determined to find the gold he assumed the natives were hiding. When the natives said they had no gold, Quintero had them tortured, and some of them killed. He was not satisfied with the little amount the people of Las Baracas did give him as he was convinced that they had a hoard of gold somewhere. Yet he failed to find one.[297] The Spaniards' lust for gold is indeed a recurrent theme in many of the grievances.

Del Valle received incriminating testimonies from several of *encomendados* against their *encomenderos*. This is interesting because generally native witnesses were very reluctant to testify against their masters. Del Valle was a powerful figure in the local society, and he seems to have been able to convince the natives that he would make their *encomendero* pay for his crimes and set the natives free from him. Does this add to the reliability of the testimonies? Perhaps so, if the natives felt they were free to tell the truth without fear of retaliation. They knew that the bishop was an enemy of their *encomenderos*, and so they may have exaggerated the cruelties to please him.

Either way, they obviously had a conflictive relation with their *encomenderos*, and they chose to take their grievances to del Valle. This a clear example of indigenous agency and ability to grasp the colonial system and the tensions within the Spanish colonial society. They took advantage of the bishop's conflicts with the *encomenderos* and his strong position in a time when the Spanish bureaucracy and judicial system were still weak in the *gobernación*.

It seems that the violence was often directed toward the *cacique* and it often included humiliation. For example, in the Valley of Lile near Cali, the bishop visited the house of certain Juan de Tolile, who was said to a Christian native. Together with

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[296] AGI, Justicia 1118b, no. 2, ramo 6, Procesos que se hallaron en poder del obispo de Popayán, pieza 1, Visita de Indios, 1552, 1r.–4r.

[297] AGI, Justicia 1118b, no. 2, ramo 6, Procesos que se hallaron en poder del obispo de Popayán, pieza 2, 1553, ff. 1r.–2v.

Chenchuga, the wife of *cacique* Coche, Juan complained that Antonio Redondo's *yanacona* called Alonso, who was from Nicaragua, had put his foot in the *cacique's* neck and whipped him in public because he had not gone to Cali as his *encomendero* Redondo had ordered. When Chenchuga had tried to release his husband, Alonso beat her with a stick.[298]

The *caciques* role as mediators meant that they also were the main targets when the Spaniards attempted to get what they wanted by force. Imprisoning, torturing, or, in extreme cases, killing the *cacique* was easier than attacking the entire community. The *encomendero-cacique* relationship was important, and the *cacique* was the easiest way to get to the people. Publicly humiliating a *cacique* in front of his people with physical punishment sent a powerful message to others. The Spanish *encomendero* clearly was more powerful than the native leader and could do what he liked.

Judicial sources also contain plenty of examples of very brutal violence against indigenous commoners, often cited by several witnesses. A court case from 1561 against Martín Muñoz and Álvaro Gudino, two *encomenderos* from Almaguer, records that the defendants were, among other things, accused of attacking natives in the village of La Cruz together with *caudillo* Anton Andero, one of the local *alcaldes*. The men cut off the noses and hands of several natives as punishment for rebellion. They were also accused of cutting off women's breasts. During the same expedition, Andero and some of his men had also attacked other villages belonging to the *encomiendas* of Damian de Paladinas and Gonzalo Gomez.[299]

The purpose of these punishments was to leave a permanent mark on the punished, showing forever that this person had taken part in a rebellion or been disobedient against his or her master. It was also meant to remind all members of their community what would happen if they rose against their master. These acts of violence thus were not random, but part of the *encomenderos*' strategy of controlling the natives through violence and humiliation. Cutting off women's breasts is a rare example of explicitly gendered violence. References to such acts of brutality are not common in my source material.

Juan del Valle's several reports on the state of the natives in the *gobernación* paint a very desolate picture. In 1555, he sent his loyal servant, *bachiller* Luis Sánchez, to Spain to present a memorandum on the situation in Popayán to the *Consejo de Indias*. According to the bishop, the country reminded him more of Babylon than the land

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[298] AGI, Justicia 1118b, no. 2, ramo 6, Procesos que se hallaron en poder del obispo de Popayán, pieza 1, Visita de Indios, 1552, 2v.

[299] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 58v.–60r. This case will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 5.2.

of Don Carlos (Emperor Charles V), and the natives were more fatigued than the Israelites in Egypt. He accused the *encomenderos* of treating their natives like slaves and of impeding the bishop's efforts in their conversion.[300] Del Valle took extreme methods by excommunicating all the *encomenderos* who were mistreating their natives.[301]

Del Valle's descriptions of the violence against natives were at least partly based on what he saw and heard on the ground. He spent a lot of time with the natives and knew the situation firsthand; his accusations certainly did not come from nowhere. However, one should not take his reports at face value. They are likely exaggerated, and reflect the cleric's patronizing attitude toward the indigenous peoples.[302] Del Valle was a follower of the famous protector of the *indios*, Dominican friar and future Bishop of Chiapas, Bartolomé de las Casas, who was a leading figure among the Spanish defenders of the natives. Both men were very dedicated to defending the natives against the *encomenderos* and advocated their evangelization. They were also advocates of peaceful evangelization under the tutelage of the Church and the Crown, and strongly against the *encomenderos*'s autonomy.[303]

Spanish violence against and general mistreatment of the natives were not restricted to the early colonial years, but continued throughout the century. In 1582, Augustinian friar Jerónimo de Escobar wrote a report on the situation regarding the natives of the *gobernación* of Popayán. He called himself the *procurador general* and a companion (*compañante*) of the bishop of Popayán, a position he had held for several years.[304] Fray Jerónimo was a loyal assistant of the bishop. He was professed in Lima in 1566, but had probably spent several years in Popayán as a missionary before that. In 1582, he travelled to Spain in the name of Bishop la Coruña and presented the report in question to the king and the *Consejo de Indias*.[305]

Fray Jerónimo offered an overview of the situation in and around all the *gobernación*'s towns. According to him, natives throughout the *gobernación* lived in poor

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[300] AGI, Quito 78, no. 2, Obispo Juan del Valle al Consejo de Indias sobre mal trato de los indios y la pobreza de la iglesia, 1554, f. 1r–1v.: 'paresce esta t(ier)ra mas t(ier)ra de babilonia q(ue) de don charlos [...] es cierto son mas fatigados q(ue) los israelitos en egipto'.

[301] AGN, Caciques e indios 11, doc. 10, Juan del Valle, obispo, excomulga a quien maltrate indios, 1554–1555, hojas 667r.–667v.

[302] Juan Friede has written an eloquent biography on Del Valle: Friede, *Vida y luchas*. I will return to Del Valle and his influence in chapter 4.1.

[303] I will return to Juan Del Valle's role in the colonial society of Popayán in Chapter 4.1.

[304] AGI, Patronato 27, ramo 13, Memorial de Fray Jerónimo de Escobar al consejo de Indias, 1582, f. 1.

[305] Alonso, *Agustín de la Coruña*, 98–100.

conditions under hard labor and maltreatment, and without enough evangelization. It seems that not much had changed since the times of Juan del Valle, although, just like del Valle, Escobar might have exaggerated the natives' misery. His description was based his on firsthand experiences in the *gobernación*, but the purpose of the report was to demonstrate the natives' poor condition, and this has to be kept in mind while reading the text.

The situation was especially poor in places like Almaguer, a mining region away from the center of the *gobernación*. According to fray Jerónimo, the system of *servicios personales* was still commonly used, and the *encomenderos* used the natives for every type of work. The Spaniards claimed that the natives worked voluntarily and were paid for their services but, according to the friar, they were actually forced. The natives of Almaguer were completely dependent on the *encomenderos*, and this made them like slaves. Almaguer had rich gold mines where the natives had to work very hard in poor conditions; this caused many deaths among them.[306] Although there were malpractices in larger towns like Popayán and Pasto as well, the situation was better there. Certainly, in the most intense mining regions like Almaguer and Anserma, the mortality rate was much steeper.

In 1587, a court case was brought against Captain Cristobal Garcia for several excessive crimes committed against the natives. According to the charges, he had bought or received as gifts several *encomiendas*, and with his excessive demands and cruelties he had "consumed" them, meaning that the *tributarios* had all died. He had also personally killed a *cacique* named Zara, a man who was entrusted as *encomienda* to Francisco Medina.[307] The case contains plenty of very explicit violence, but while it might be exceptionally cruel, it is at the same time typical.

Selling *encomiendas* was an illegal but widespread practice. This case and the alleged crimes are a good example of how the indigenous peoples were treated above all as assets or commodities that could be bought, sold, or given away; they were not free people. This was not necessarily the attitude of all the *encomenderos*, but based on their behavior, they were generally more interested in making profit from the natives than taking care of their welfare.

The court case sounds familiar. Like many other *encomenderos*, Garcia used dogs to intimidate the natives. According to the charges, at least one person had died, and another was severely wounded after Garcia had set his dogs on them. *Cacique* don

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[306] AGI, Patronato 27, ramo 13, Memorial de Fray Jerónimo de Escobar al consejo de Indias, 1582, ff. 2v.–3r.

[307] AGN, Juicios criminales 14, d. 18, Causa criminal contra el capitán Cristobal García Montaño, Cartago 1587, hojas 410v.–411v.

Diego Amarrua testified that one of the natives of Garcia's *encomienda* had come to his village with infected dog bites on his legs. When the *cacique* asked who had bitten him, the man replied that Garcia had set a dog on him.[308] Another crime that Garcia was accused of was killing an indigenous child whom he had wrenched out of its mother's arms in the midst of being breastfed. One of the town's *vecinos*, Diego de Paredes, testified that *cacique* Carrapira had told him the story, noting that Garcia had thrown the baby into a river.[309]

Cristobal Garcia was depicted as an extremely cruel and violent man, just like Marcos Castuera had been in the case thirty-five years previously. We do not know to extent to which the accusations were true. As in similar cases, this incident also seems to be tied to local power struggles. At least some members of the local community wanted to be rid of Cristobal Garcia and accusing Spaniards of maltreating the natives was a useful way to attack an enemy. Violence was so common that there was always something to be used, and it is likely that the accusations were based at least in part on real events

Most of the interethnic conflicts stemmed from excessive Spanish demand for labor, goods, and gold that was tied to their role as a small number of conquerors who were attempting to subjugate and exploit the indigenous peoples. This created structural conflict. The fact that the Spaniards were such a small minority and had such a precarious position helped upholding the conflictive relations. Had the Spanish hegemony been stronger, open conflicts would most likely have been less frequent, although not entirely eliminated.

The *encomenderos* used violence to make the natives obey them, but quite often, it was counterproductive because it prompted resistance from them. For example, the *encomendados* of Marcos Castuera reacted strongly to their master's cruelties. They tried to kill him at least twice by attacking him with sticks. The first time they hit him once or twice on the head, but he managed to escape on his horse. The second time his dogs saved him. The natives also refused to serve him or pay him tribute and escaped from their village.[310] Both Castuera and his *encomendados* confirmed that these events had taken place. Despite Castuera's claims to contrary, relations between the *encomendero* and the *encomendados* were extremely tense.

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[308] AGN, Juicios criminales 14, d. 18, Causa criminal contra el capitán Cristobal García Montaño, Cartago 1587, hojas 424v., 435v.–436r.

[309] AGN, Juicios criminales 14, d. 18, Causa criminal contra el capitán Cristobal García Montaño, Cartago 1587, hojas 424v., 437r.

[310] AGN, Caciques e indios 37, doc. 13, Anserma, crueles tratamientos a los indios, 1552–1555, hoja 576v.

The reaction of those maltreated by Cristobal Garcia were similar. The *cacique* Carrapira, who was entrusted to Garcia, escaped with his people to foreign lands beyond Spanish control. Several witnesses testified that Carrapira had complained many times of the cruelties committed by Garcia before he took his people away. Some of the witnesses also mentioned that the people of Carrapira had killed a Spaniard after their escape, and they were now rebelling despite being among the finest people in the province before.[311]

Perhaps this was the motive behind the court cases, which in effect pitted the Spaniards against each other. It seems that Castuera and García had crossed the line with their cruel treatment of the natives. This caused the indigenous peoples to flee and rebel, which in turn harmed and threatened all the Spaniards in the region. The numerical and power imbalance between the natives and the Spaniards was sensitive and easily jeopardized. The Spaniards used force to keep the natives in check, but excessive use of force could be counterproductive, as the cases related to Castuera and Garcia show.

Violence during the colonial era was not just one isolated incident following another. It was structural and institutionalized violence created by the colonial situation itself. Violence in itself was obviously not a colonial invention, having existed between and among the various indigenous groups before the Spaniards' arrival. So, what was distinctively colonial in the violence examined here?

Structural colonial violence can be understood more widely than just acts of violence. Forcing people to work in inhumane conditions, depriving them of their freedom, imposing a foreign belief system, and extirpating local religions and traditions are also violence. Not all groups and individuals suffered equally from the violence of colonialism, and some might have even benefitted from it, but in its inherent configuration, colonialism is structural violence.

The system of *servicios personales* is a case in point. Despite being illegal, it was widespread. It reduced the natives to an unpaid workforce for the *encomenderos*, and severely reduced the time they could use to cultivate the fields of their own communities. In addition, excessive tribute demands meant that the communities owed a large part of their harvests to the Spaniards. It was common for the natives, their defenders, or even crown officials to complain that the natives did not have enough time to provide for themselves, take care of their sick, or receive religious education. The role reserved for a native in colonial society was mostly that of a servant to the Spanish *encomenderos*.

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311 AGN, Juicios criminales 14, d. 18, Causa criminal contra el capitán Cristobal García Montaño, Cartago 1587, hojas 424r.–439r.

A distinctively colonial form of structural violence was the extirpation of native forms of idolatry and forced baptism. The aim was to wipe out the indigenous religions and all aspects of their culture that were not readily reconciled with Christianity. I will discuss the Christianization of Andeans further in subsequent chapters.

Nathan Wachtel argues that while the Inca government was not lacking in cruelty, the Incas had founded their empire by adapting traditional institutions to their own advantage and preserving a certain coherence. The development of the Inca Empire was the product of internal dialectic. The Spaniards, by contrast, ruthlessly imposed the rule of an external social group and an external culture, forcing the subdued indigenous peoples to adapt to a system that was completely foreign to their traditions. This was done through the mechanisms of violence and domination.[312] As a result, European colonialism differed distinctly from Inca colonialism. Wachtel's view of the nature of Spanish colonialism is too simplistic: as later studies have shown, Spanish colonialism was not based solely on violence, but also on adaptation and cooperation. However, Wachtel is correct that the nature of the two forms of conquest and domination was different, because the Spanish attempted to impose their social structure and worldview on the natives.

The Incas did not subdue Popayán, apart from its southernmost region, but Wachtel's views hold true there as well. Pre-colonial violence, warfare, and conquest did not aim at complete social and cultural domination. The Guambias and other expansionist groups likewise did not try to force the other groups to assimilate to their social forms.

Some of the Spanish sources portray the natives as weak and in need of protection, while others present them as bellicose and troublesome. The natives and their defenders certainly wanted to present them as docile, because it suited their interests. The natives were legal minors, vulnerable human beings who needed special protection according to the law. The natives and their defenders consciously used this to their advantage by emphasizing their vulnerability to Spanish abuse. Other sources suggest that the natives were not always as weak and vulnerable as they are pictured. Native rebellions and attacks against the Spaniards and natives serving the Spaniards are obvious examples of this, but those natives who had submitted to Spanish rule also had ways to deal with the situation for their own benefit.

All in all, the sources indicate that colonial violence against the indigenous peoples was widespread and common. Excesses were often condemned, and the

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[312] Wachtel, *Vision of the Vanquished*, 86.

poor treatment of the natives lamented by many observers. Yet violence and the threat of it were the norm in interethnic relations. As subsequent chapters will demonstrate, this was only one aspect of the relationships that must be considered.

3.3 Consequences of the Violence

Depopulation

The effects of the conquest and subsequent violence on the indigenous communities were devastating. The loss of indigenous population is one indicator, even if it was not caused by violence directly. It is well known that one of the main causes of native depopulation was the deadly effect of infectious diseases unfamiliar in the Americas prior to the arrival of the Europeans. In Europe, diseases such as smallpox or measles afflicted mostly children, but in America, where the indigenous peoples had no resistance to them, they took their toll on adults as well. Some diseases were more deadly than others, but when several different new diseases hit a single community within a short period of time, the mortality rates exceeded fifty, sixty, or even seventy percent.[313]

Just how much of the mortality was caused by disease per se, and how much was man-made, is a matter of modern debate. The demographer Massimo Livi Bacci argues that a demographic catastrophe on the scale seen in the Americas was not an inevitable consequence of newly introduced diseases, but rather the product of a combination of natural factors and patterns of human and social behavior. This argument is supported by the fact that there was no single model for depopulation. The relocation of populations, restructure of production, hard labor, and intrusion into family and community organization all contributed to depopulation. Certain defense mechanisms of the indigenous population, such as high fertility, spontaneous migration, reinforcement of community solidarity, or formation of new unions, might have softened the impact of disease .[314] Although it is undisputable that the epidemics were a major killer, human behavior affected the mortality rate. This includes both the actions of the colonists and the social organization and reactions of the indigenous communities themselves.

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[313] Cook, *Born to Die*, 207–208.

[314] Livi Bacci, *Conquest*, 231–236.

Hard work, terrible working conditions, and poor treatment certainly weakened the Indigenous population and contributed to depopulation. Especially devastating was forced labor in the mines. In addition, the Spaniards' excessive demands meant that the natives had no time to crop their own lands, which further increased mortality. The Spaniards did, however, try to make sure that enough natives were occupied in cultivating the land to secure the food supply for the conquerors, as they did not cultivate themselves. As Díaz Lopez states, the crown failed in its attempt to protect its vassals in America. In fact, the crown allowed the exploitation of the natives by granting the use of their labor in the mines through the system of *encomienda*.[315]

Furthermore, demographic decline was not restricted to areas effectively colonized by the Spaniards, but extended also to the regions that remained beyond their control. For example, the native population of Chocó seems to have declined between the early sixteenth and late seventeenth centuries at a similar rate to what was witnessed in many regions within the Spanish empire, despite not being conquered until the late seventeenth century. Diseases did not stop where Spanish advancement stopped, but continued to spread further. Intertribal warfare intensified with the Spanish *entradas*, and this too contributed to the decline.[316] The continuing Spanish *entradas* against natives at the periphery also consumed the indigenous population in the central areas of the *gobernación*, as large proportion of expedition members were recruited from among them.

Demographic development is best witnessed by the *visita* reports. I will deal with the *visitas* more comprehensively in Chapter Four, but here I will analyze the censuses they provided. The *visitas* prove the serious decline of the indigenous population, but some critical commentary on their reliability is in order before they are analyzed in more depth.

Censuses are not the objective sources that they seem to be at first glance. Instead, their information is filtered through a particular classification system. This does not make censuses any less worthy as sources, because the classification system itself is informative about how the ruling class perceived the different societal groups.[317] For example, the *visitadores* were above all interested in the tribute paying population, that is, working age males (roughly 18–50 years of age). The amount of tribute a community had to pay was determined by the number of tribute payers who lived in it. Of the sixteenth-century *visitadores* to Popayán, only Pedro de Hinojosa counted

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[315] Díaz López *Oro, sociedad y economía*, 174, 179–184.

[316] Williams, "Resistance and Rebellion," 402–405.

[317] Burke, *Historical Anthropology*, 27.

the entire population instead of just the tribute payers. Since the other *visitadores* were not interested in women or children, we can only make some estimates about the total population based on the *visita* material.

The censuses were never completely reliable in any event. Karen Vieira Powers has shown that both the natives and the Spaniards attempted to manipulate the counts. The indigenous communities sometimes hid part of their adult male population during the count, while corrupt officials added non-existing persons to the count so that the community would have to pay more than they were obliged. It is unclear whether the *visitadores* did the entire count themselves, or whether they sometimes settled for second hand information. In the early colonial period, the *caciques* played a central role in the inspections, and the size of the hidden population was probably considerable.[318]

Even when there were no obvious attempts to manipulate the count, the censuses are still not completely reliable: the task of counting every single male of a certain age was simply too difficult. Even today, a census can only provide an estimate of the population, not an exact figure. Nevertheless, even if they are unreliable, the *visitas* and their censuses do reveal demographic trends, and clearly show that indigenous communities faced a steep depopulation.

There are no comprehensive population counts from Popayán before Tomás López's visita of 1558–59; all estimates of the native population living in this region before the conquest and over the following two decades are educated guesses, at best. In a letter dated November 1564, García de Valverde, then *gobernador* of Popayán, stated that 60,000 natives had originally been divided into *encomiendas* in the *gobernación*'s capital city; at the time he wrote the letter, only eight or nine thousand (meaning adult male tribute payers) remained.[319] The latter figure corresponds with the number given by Tomás López's *visita*: 8,320 tribute payers within the city's jurisdiction. Valverde unfortunately does not say on what information his earlier figure was based.[320] If Valverde's figures were correct, the working age male population fell by more than 85% in just over twenty years. This seems exaggerated, although not impossible. The demographic collapse was severe during the first decades after contact with the Spaniards and their diseases. According to Noble David Cook, Peru's aboriginal population fell from an estimated nine million to just over one million between 1520 and 1570, a depopulation rate of almost 90% in just

[318] Powers, *Andean Journeys*, passim., esp. 82.

[319] AGI, Quito 16, ramo 3, n. 8, Carta de García de Valverde sobre la residencia de Pedro de Agreda, 3 November 1564, f. 2v.

[320] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López.

fifty years.[321] Even if we need to be skeptical of Valverde's figures, it is clear that the region suffered the same level of severe depopulation that affected every region conquered by the Spaniards.

Only López attempted to count the tributaries of the entire *gobernación* during the sixteenth century. Since he was not able to visit all villages, some of his figures are based on second hand information. According to his censuses, the total number of *tributarios* (tribute paying adult male natives) in the *gobernación* in 1559 was 71,016.[322] In some towns, information survives from two different *visitas*, making it possible to estimate the depopulation rate. For example, the *tributario* population within the jurisdiction of the city of Popayán fell from 8 341 (López's *visita* in 1559) to 6 025 (Hinojosa's *visita* in 1569) in just ten years.[323] In Pasto, the decline was much greater: Lopez recorded 23 157 *tributarios* in 1558 but Valverde's *visita* counted only 12 877 *tributarios* in 1570.[324] (See Table 1.)

Table 1. The tribute paying (adult male) population in the major towns in the sixteenth century counted by the *visitadores*, and the entire *gobernación*

	López (1558–59	Angulo de Castejón (1568–69	Hinojosa (1569–70)	Valverde (1570–71)
Popayán	8 341		6 025	
Pasto	23 157			12 877
Cali	3 491			
Cartago	5 382	2 876		
Anserma	3 292			
Almaguer	3 600			3 200
Whole *gobernación*	71 016			

Sources: AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López; AGN, Encomiendas 28, d. 16, Retasa de tributos por el Licenciado Diego Angulo de Castejón en Cartago, 1568; AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1; AGI, Justicia 639, n. 3, Visita hecha a los naturales de la ciudad de Cali hecha por Pedro de Hinojosa, oidor de la Audiencia de Quito, 1570 (Hereafter: Visita de Hinojosa a Cali; AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde.

Unlike the other *visitadores*, Hinojosa counted the entire population of Popayán's indigenous villages, not just the tribute payers. According to him, the total number of natives within the jurisdiction of the city was 18 210.[325] This means that roughly

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[321] Cook, *Demographic Collapse*, 114.

[322] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López

[323] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López; AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1.

[324] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López; AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde.

[325] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, f. 124v.

one third were *tributarios*, and that the entire population of a village could be estimated by multiplying the number of *tributarios* by three. Such results would be only tentative, of course. Daniel E. Shea estimates the multiplier for the Central Andean population in 1580 to have been between 4.18 and 4.38.[326] However, an exceptionally high child mortality rate could also explain the smaller ratio of total population compared to *tributarios*.[327]

Later, in 1607, Pedro de Armenteros y Henao conducted a census among the indigenous peoples of Popayán, Pasto, and Almaguer. He did not count *tributarios*, but rather "souls" (*almas*), meaning the entire population. According to this census, there were 6,967 natives in Popayán, 20,104 in Pasto, and 1,023 in Almaguer.[328] Although he did separately count the "vagabond" natives of the city of Popayán, other than that, he seems to have counted only those who were attached to communities entrusted to someone as *encomiendas*. As such, his census does not include all the *yanaconas* and other natives who had cut ties with their communities and migrated elsewhere. Even though Armenteros de Henao's census figures are not directly comparable with the previous ones due to their different methods of counting the population, it is clear that the number of the *encomendados* continued to decrease into the seventeenth century.

These numbers also should be taken with caution, but they do indicate that the indigenous population continued to decline as it had done throughout colonial Spanish America. Depopulation was not caused merely by deaths; many natives might also have run away from their home to avoid tribute. Many natives from Popayán moved south to the *corregimientos* (administrative units) of Otavalo and Quito in modern Ecuador, where the abuse of indigenous populations was less severe (the central authorities more closely controlled the area). Here, the indigenous peoples filled the growing textile industry's growing labor demand. Sometimes migration was also orchestrated by the powerful *caciques* of Quito and Otavalo, whose authority was partly based on the number of subjects over whom they ruled, and who could use migrants as a work force to fulfill their communities' tribute quota.[329]

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[326] Shea, "Defense of Small Population," 173–174.

[327] According to Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, nuclear families of indigenous peoples of different regions in present day Colombia were small during the colonial era. It is possible that the number of children was already restricted by different mechanisms in pre-colonial times, but high mortality, exploitation, and the breaking down of traditional family structures probably further reduced fertility. See Jaramillo Uribe, *Ensayos*, 143–149.

[328] AGI, Quito 9, ramo 10, n. 76d, El oidor Diego de Armenteros sobre la visita a Popayán, Cali, Buga y Roldanillo, 1607, ff. 1r.–2r.

[329] Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 35–37.

This could explain why the depopulation rate was so much higher in Pasto than in Popayán. For the Pastos, it was easy to move south to Quito or Otavalo, where many locals spoke their language. The Andean communities would have also learned by then to manipulate the population censuses by hiding some of their people.

Immigration within the *gobernación,* for example to the mining districts where the indigenous workforce was in demand, also affected the population counts. These people were not included in the censuses because they neither paid tribute nor were attached to communities that were entrusted to *encomenderos*. It is important to remember that the censuses tell of a steep decline of *tributarios* and indigenous peoples attached to *encomiendas*, but they do not show the full picture of indigenous demography. Depopulation was quite possibly not as harsh as the censuses indicate. Due to migration and disintegration of communities, the number of *tributarios* certainly decreased, but the number of natives who lived outside the *tributario* system possibly increased. While the total size of the indigenous population certainly diminished, then, the decrease was probably not as radical as the censuses suggest.

The *visitadores* took note of native depopulation. Tomás López found that the natives of the *gobernación* were diminishing, and that without Popayán and Pasto, the *gobernación* would soon be without natives all together. In these particular towns, there were more natives and they were better treated and less burdened with work; elsewhere the situation was alarming. According to López, there were three principal reasons for the decline in the indigenous population: First, there were too many Spaniards and too few natives in the *gobernación*, apart from Pasto and Popayán. For this reason, there were too few natives to support the Spaniards, who lived off the labor provided by the indigenous peoples, which meant that the natives had to work very hard. Second, connected to the first reason, was that natives were forced to work hard in mines and other forms of personal service, and often died doing so. The third reason was that the natives raided and killed each other.[330]

López was at least partly correct in his analysis. Hard work in mines to satisfy the insatiable demands of the Spanish *encomenderos* certainly contributed to the depopulation of the indigenous peoples, as did the wars that continued especially at the fringes of the *gobernación*. The pacified natives suffered the most from the attacks by the *indios de guerra*. However, López did not mention the most ferocious killer of the indigenous population, disease, although the *visitadores* definitely were aware of the effects of diseases. After Valverde had finished his census in Pasto, a measles epidemic broke out in the area, killing many natives. The *visitador* was already on his

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[330] AGI, Santa Fe 188, Tomás López al Rey, 28 October 1559, f. 250v.

way back to Quito, but ordered the parish priests to take care that deaths be removed from the tribute lists.[331]

The restlessness of the frontiers affected the indigenous populations on both sides of the "border." The Spanish *entradas*, while often unsuccessful in conquering the lands, killed and displaced many natives. Unfortunately, we do not have information about how the unconquered natives experienced the situation. We also do not know much about the effects of the *entradas* on local communities. The effects of continuous warfare must have been significant, but more profound analysis is difficult due to the lack of sources. There are no population statistics, for example, to show the mortality rates in the affected communities.

Nevertheless, some estimation can be made. For example, there is no doubt that the Spaniards' failed attempts to colonize the gold-rich region of Choco during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries had a devastating effect on the local indigenous groups. It has been estimated that the people of upper Chocó alone numbered between 35,000 and 40,000 in the 1570s. A hundred years later, according to a report compiled by a Jesuit missionary, the combined populations of three of the five surviving indigenous groups was 3 850.[332] Similar developments probably took place in other unconquered regions as well.

The demographic disaster had profound effects on indigenous societies. Many communities fell apart completely, while others managed to adapt. Depopulation caused problems for the Spaniards too, as they depended on Andean labor for their own survival. What does seem clear is that most Spaniards did not think of colonization as a long-term project; instead, they were motivated by quickly getting rich. The settlers were more worried about the damage caused by raiding natives than about the well-being of the original inhabitants of the land. The priests and other officials lamented the fate of the indigenous peoples, but the settlers were largely disinterested.

The Trauma of the Conquest?

The conquest, the subsequent imposition of the colonial system, and the violent conflicts that they caused were obviously destructive forces. According to Nathan Wachtel, the Spanish conquest and the annihilation of the traditional indigenous universe caused a trauma within indigenous societies. Traditional societies were

[331] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, f. 722r.

[332] Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 33–35

disorganized, their ways of life destroyed, and the people were forced into slavery. Life lost its meaning. Wachtel's view is a pessimistic one. For him, a culture is a structured and integral whole. New elements can be introduced, but in the case of the natives of Peru, their cultural system was disintegrated, and the conquerors imposed European elements on them. The new society also did not form a new coherent system; acculturation was a symptom of crisis, not a remedy.[333]

According to Piotr Sztompka, cultural trauma can occur as a result of a radical, deep, unexpected, and rapid social change, usually one that originates from outside the community. It involves cultural disorientation that affects the core areas of culture, such as basic values or central beliefs. Trauma is caused by a break in the orderly, predictable, and taken-for-granted universe, a shock that destroys one's sense of security.[334] The Spanish invasion and the imposition of a colonial system and foreign religion were certainly disorientating events for indigenous communities. Possibly even more disorientating was the extremely high mortality and huge loss of population, which caused the destruction or near destruction of entire societies. Nobody was safe from the epidemics, and with such high mortality rates, everyone lost someone close to them. Every member of the community was affected by the disaster.

Nevertheless, the concept of trauma is problematic here, as it is a modern Western concept. Can we really talk of a trauma in a premodern non-Western society? At the very least, we must be very careful how we use the term. Furthermore, Wachtel does not speak of cultural trauma, a concept probably unknown to him at the time he wrote his book (1977), but of a psychological shock (although he does state that he does not want to apply psycho-analysis to history).[335] There is no way for us to enter the thoughts and mindsets of the indigenous Americans of the sixteenth century, let alone diagnose them. Even so, I find the concept of *cultural* trauma—but not of medical or psychological trauma—potentially fruitful here. Whether or not the conquest and its consequences caused a cultural trauma within indigenous communities, it did instigate a profound and disruptive time of unrest and social transformation.

The concept of cultural trauma can also be problematic in its own way, however. It can lead to a false conclusion that the effects of the conquest paralyzed the natives, and therefore reduced their agency. This is connected with what Mathew Restall calls the *myth of native desolation*, by which Europeans have imagined and invented the

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[333] Wachtel, *Vision of the Vanquished*, 26–32, 140–141.

[334] Sztompka, "Cultural Trauma," 452–457.

[335] Wachtel. *Vision of the Vanquished*, 32.

cultural and social breakdown of indigenous societies that led to a state of anomie and despair. He sees two different and opposite threads of thought in this, both of which are based on the assumption that native cultures were destroyed after the Spanish invasion. One of the threads romanticizes pre-Colombian native cultures, seeing them as perfect and innocent, and thus unable to survive Spanish cultural imperialism. The other thread is based on racist ideas of European superiority; it argues that the Americas were mostly unused and underdeveloped before Europeans arrived, and that the life of its inhabitants was already brutish and short.[336]

Restall criticizes the idea of native desolation. Indigenous peoples certainly faced colonization and destructive epidemics, but they did not sink into depression or inactivity. Instead, they actively sought ways to improve their situation in the face of the challenges that colonialism brought; this led to radical changes in indigenous cultures during the colonial period.[337] Native adaptation to colonialism was not just passive acculturation, but instead an active process. Many of the indigenous groups either actively resisted the conquest or took part in it as allies or auxiliaries of the Spanish conquistadors. Later, they adapted many violent and non-violent strategies or tactics of resistance, adaptation, and survival. The effects of the conquest were in many ways devastating to the indigenous communities and individuals, but it did not completely pacify them.

According to Jorge Gamboa, the notion of the conquest's trauma imparts from a false idea that natives lived in a happy and innocent paradise that the invaders destroyed. This was also the idea behind the so-called Black Legend, the exaggeration of Spanish atrocities. The destruction caused by the conquest and the demographic disaster that followed it are undeniable facts, of course, but the attitude that emphasizes indigenous victimization is very patronising. It conceals the internal dynamics of local societies and the many processes that developed during the colonial era in which the indigenous peoples were active participants.[338] As Mathew Restall states, the native cultures were neither barbarous nor idyllic, but just as civilized and imperfect in their own way as their European counterparts.[339]

Gamboa also demonstrates how reality was more complicated than the so-called Black Legend has led us to believe. For some natives, Spanish rule seems to have brought improvement. Gamboa gives this example: the natives of Susa declared in 1551 that they lived better than they had done before the conquest because now they

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[336] Restall, *Seven Myths*, 101–102.

[337] Restall, *Seven Myths*, 129–130.

[338] Gamboa, *Cacicazgo muisca*, 213–214.

[339] Restall *Seven Myths*, 102.

could travel freely for long distances and trade with other people without being attacked by their enemies. There are also other examples of similar claims, alongside the many examples of the Spaniards' extreme cruelty towards the natives. As Gamboa points out, it is difficult to say if the natives were just telling the Spaniards what they wanted to hear or what suited their own agendas, or if it was true. It is clear that native experiences of the conquest were diverse.[340]

Cultural trauma does not necessarily lead to desolation and passivity. It also does not necessarily affect an entire society. Its effects can vary. Traumatizing events can be destructive and disruptive for some, beneficial for some, and neutral or insignificant for others. Strategies of coping with the cultural trauma can also vary significantly, from passive to constructive adaptation.[341] Traumatic events can also lead to powerful responses that aim to seize the initiative to restore the community's well-being.[342] This is important to remember as we consider the concept of cultural trauma in this context. It safe to say that everyone in the colonized communities was affected by the conquest and its consequences in some way, but their experiences and their responses varied.

Reaction to disasters and traumatic events also vary according to culture. One example of this is the difference in the concept of time that existed between the Europeans and the Andeans. When the volcano Huayna Putina erupted near the Spanish town of Arequipa in Southern Peru in February 1600, both groups believed that it signified the end of the world. Yet their expectation and reactions were quite different. The Spaniards' linear concept of time caused them to expect the world to end and the final judgement to come. They busily set out to absolve themselves of their sins. The indigenous peoples responded differently, because their concept of time was cyclical. They expected *pachacuti*, which means that things turn upside down. The world ends, but at the same time, a new one is born, restoring lost order in the end. They believed that their own gods would return and avenge their poor treatment at the hands of the Christians and their God.[343]

Wachtel mentions that some natives committed suicide by hanging themselves due to their despair; others starved themselves to death or took poison. Some women also killed their newborn babies to free them from the torments.[344] The chronicler Pedro Cieza de León claimed that some of the natives of the Cauca valley

[340] Gamboa, *Cacicazgo muisca*, 263–264, 277–285.

[341] Sztompka, "Cultural Trauma," 459–461.

[342] Olko & Brylak, "Defending Local Autonomy," 600–601.

[343] Pärssinen, "Trauman historiaa," 110–116.

[344] Wachtel, *Vision of Vanquished*, 94.

refused to cultivate their lands after the Spanish invasion, and therefore died of hunger.[345] This can be interpreted as a form of resistance, but in Wachtel's reading, it could also signal depression that led to passivity. I would be very careful with this assessment for two reasons. First, although it could be that this refusal to cultivate lands happened, there is no other evidence to corroborate it; in any case, it is unlikely that the practice was widespread. Second, if this did happen, we do not know the reason for it.

In his *Brevísima relación*, Bartolomé de las Casas created a picture of the natives as innocent people with no hate, who never did any harm to Christians, and always welcomed them wholeheartedly. For Las Casas, they were also weak and vulnerable people, completely devastated by Spanish cruelties.[346] Las Casas did not invent this stereotype, but he was the most influential person who spread it. The same stereotype was then repeated in countless other works, and has lived until our own times. Many crown officials and ecclesiasts writing from Popayán, such as Bishop Juan del Valle, used similar rhetoric.

The memorandum of Bishop Agustín de la Coruña's companion, fray Jerónimo de Escobar, in 1582 provides several examples of indigenous desolation. The natives were treated like slaves, fatigued by hard work, and everywhere diminishing at an alarming rate. Escobar described some of the natives as warlike people but, while he seemed to admire their courage, he also denounced them as beasts who ate human flesh. He described other groups as docile, peaceful, friendly, humble, and loyal people. For Escobar, these were good natives.[347] It is interesting that the texts of the native defenders present the indigenous peoples as essentially enslaved and mistreated yet still expected to remain humble and loyal. A good *indio* did not rebel against the Spaniards.

The sources are full of accounts of native despair and desolation, but this was of a course a rhetorical tool. These descriptions reflect the patronizing attitude of the Spanish defenders of the natives toward indigenous peoples. The documents also contain plenty of evidence that the natives were not helpless victims of all-powerful colonizers. Examples of indigenous activity are abundant, and, although they are not always explicit, they show that the Andeans were not paralyzed by colonization. Instead, they adopted several different strategies to cope, resist, or take advantage of colonialism. I have already dealt with both violent and passive resistance in this

[345] Cieza de León, *Parte primera de la chronica*, f. 30r.

[346] Las Casas, *Brevísima relación*, 72–76.

[347] AGI, Patronato 27, ramo 13, Memorial de Fray Jerónimo de Escobar al consejo de Indias, 1582.

chapter, and I will return to strategies of adaptation and attempts to profit from colonialism in later chapters.

Indigenous societies underwent massive change during the decades after the Spanish invasion as they transformed into colonial native societies. The Guambianos, the Quimbayas, and the Nasas of the late sixteenth century lived in a colonial reality, very different from that of their ancestors a hundred years earlier. That must be kept in mind when dealing with colonial indigenous societies: it is important not to think of them as some sort of perpetual and original cultures that remained the same throughout ages, but instead as the living and ever-changing cultures that they were.

Three centuries of structural violence colonialism inevitably left its mark. The long-term effects of colonialism on the indigenous peoples were invariably devastating, but to different degrees. Many peoples were completely destroyed, others significantly weakened. However, this did not happen overnight, and in the early colonial period, many groups successfully resisted and challenged colonialism and in so doing retained at least part of their independence. In the last few decades, there has been a significant renaissance of indigenous cultures throughout the Americas, and they have drawn heavily on the colonial experiences of resistance and its long tradition.

Justifying Violence

While the colonists justified their right to conquest by the act of bringing true faith and salvation to pagans, a deeper, more implicit form of justification was the Spaniards' perceived superiority. For the conquerors, there was never any doubt of their right to conquer. What is more interesting, even those Spaniards who did question the right to wage war against the indigenous peoples or to conquer their lands never questioned Spanish superiority. For them, the natives were almost perfect, but lacked true faith, and therefore, civilization.

The surviving sources reflect the Spanish way of making sense of the conflicts and the violent encounters between the Spanish and indigenous peoples. It thus is important to read them very critically so as to not reproduce the colonialist worldview. What was self-evident for the colonists was not so for the indigenous peoples. Framing violent conflicts simply as either conquest or rebellion does not do justice to the complexity of the situation on the ground; rather, it simply repeats the

Spanish narrative. We must look deeper and analyze the significance of the conflicts for all parties in different situations.

The indigenous leaders who were litigated against for causing rebellions often offered a simple reason for their actions: they did not want to serve the Spaniards. Some had welcomed the Spaniards when they first arrived, and some had formed alliances with them. Once the Spaniards wanted to force the indigenous peoples into their service, though, they fought back.

Why did indigenous peoples at first tolerate the colonists or even ally with them? A traditional explanation is that they did not immediately understand the Spaniards' intention. They did not realize that the conquistadors aimed to create an empire—in which the natives would be reduced to nothing more than servants of the Spaniards—until it was too late. There is probably some truth in this. The natives could not have known all of the Spaniards' intentions. However, one cannot assume that the rational Spaniards knew and understood more than did the indigenous peoples. Both parties were equally unaware of the end result, and both were trying to assess the other party's intentions while hiding their own.

Gonzalo Lamana argues that while the tacit and the quotidian are essential in understanding the success of colonialism, it is important to remember the prominent role played by violence and the asymmetric dynamic of the tacit and the explicit in colonial encounters.[348] As Gabriela Ramos states, death, war and violence were important aspects in the formation of the colonial society because of their communicative power and their potency in creating hegemony and authoritative system.[349] The Spanish conquerors were explicit and violent. Using force and provoking fear among the indigenous peoples was always an extremely important part of their tactics. As the colonial institutions developed, other forms of domination became more important, but the significance of violence in interethnic interactions in early colonial Spanish America, and especially in frontier regions such as Popayán, cannot be ignored.

The Guambianos, Quimbayas, Pastos, and Nasas (Paeces) all had very different experiences of the conflict. Grouping all these different ethnic groups into one hides the diversity of the colonized peoples. For some groups, conquest meant complete or near complete annihilation, while for others, the effects were much more lenient. Some might even have benefitted from it, although this is debatable. While some groups certainly found ways to benefit from the Spaniards and the new regime, severe depopulation did hit all the groups.

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[348] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 147.

[349] Ramos, *Death and Conversion*, 34–35.

Many observers wrote eloquently about the sufferings of the indigenous peoples in the Americas. Their writings offer a critical view of the colonizing enterprise, and they are therefore important documents; like all other primary sources, though, they should be read with equal criticism. The laments these texts contain were rhetorical devices designed to bring attention to the depopulation and poor conditions of the natives.[350]

While the defenders of the natives denounced the cruelties of the Spanish *encomenderos*, the Spanish conquistadors saw the situation very differently. In 1544, the *cabildo* of Popayán wrote to the king in the name of all the *cabildos* of the *gobernación* and asked him to reconsider the paragraph in the New Laws that restricted succession of the *encomiendas*. The *cabildos* claimed that the natives of Popayán were savages without reason, people who could kill their neighbors so that they could drink their blood and eat their flesh. According to the *cabildo* of Popayán, these natives should not be compared with those of New Spain and Peru, who were reasonable and more prosperous peoples. The indigenous peoples of Popayán, by contrast, were poor and lived separately from each other; this made life more difficult for the *encomenderos* compared with their colleagues elsewhere.[351]

The claim that natives ate the flesh of their enemies is a recurrent topos in the Spanish writings. At least some of the native groups in Popayán did practice cannibalism, but the Spanish descriptions of it are exaggerated. Eating a piece of flesh from a slain enemy was a symbolic rite believed to give the eater the strength of the deceased.[352] The *encomenderos* invoked native cruelty and lack of civilization to justify their harsh methods, but also their existence in the region. If their sons could not inherit their *encomiendas*, they would not be able to support themselves and would have to leave the area. And, if they were forced to leave, there would be no salvation for the natives.

The chronicler Pedro Cieza de León, who was an *encomendero* himself, criticized the Spaniards for their excesses and cruelties against the natives, but emphasized that not all Spaniards committed them. Many treated the natives well and did good deeds. He also wrote that the situation had improved after the king sent more officials to the Indies. When Cieza de León wrote his description in the 1550s, the natives were satisfied, and their treatment was good.[353] Cieza de León's account is in this regard

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[350] See Restall, *Seven Myths*, 100–101.

[351] AGI, Quito 18, n. 7, Cabildo de Popayán sobre la conquista de la tierra y estado de los indios, 22 November 1544, ff. 1r.–1v. More on the New Laws (Leyes nuevas) in chapter 4.1.

[352] Llanos Vargas, *Los cacicazgos*, 75–76.

[353] Cieza de León, *Parte primera de la chronica*, f. 1r.–1v.

obviously biased and not very credible. He was a conquistador, and his attitude toward the conquest and conversion of the natives was very favorable. However, his description is probably quite representative of the *encomenderos*' general attitudes.

During Pedro de Hinojosa's *visita*, many *encomenderos* offered testimony regarding the situation in the jurisdictions of Popayán and Cali. One of their leaders, Francisco de Belalcázar, son of the conquistador Sebastián de Belalcázar, claimed that the natives were treated well and were satisfied. He also claimed that the native population was growing, which blatantly was not true. Another *encomendero*, Juan Pablo Quintero from Cali, testified that the natives were friendly and benign people who were happy to serve the Spaniards.[354] In general, the *encomenderos* said that they favored the idea that the natives should be paid for their work and taught religion, but their actions speak for themselves. They told the *visitador* what he wanted to hear, but many used or tried to use the natives as if they were slaves.

The censuses show that Belalcázar's claim of indigenous population growth was untrue, although there is a possibility that at that particular time, there was a temporary increase. It seems that in highland Peru, the population was slowly growing in the 1560s, before it fell again during the next decade.[355] However, this was probably not true in Popayán. As mentioned before, between the visitas of Tomás López in 1558–1559 and Pedro de Hinojosa in 1569–1570, the native population dropped by over a quarter in the region.[356] Although it is possible that there were some years during which the population grew, the trend was clearly in the opposite direction. The *encomenderos* must have known it as well.

The crown's attitude toward the violent *encomenderos* seems ambiguous. Officially, it condemned crimes against the native populations, and presented itself as the protector of its vulnerable vassals, the indigenous peoples. The Laws of Burgos and the New Laws are examples of this. At the same time, the crown was reluctant to intervene too strongly in the malpractices that many Spaniards, especially churchmen, reported continuously. Spanish rule at the periphery was more precarious than it was in the center, and a certain amount of harshness was needed to keep the natives in check.

The *encomienda indios* were technically free men, but at least on some occasions the *encomenderos* treated them like slaves. In 1564, the president of the *audiencia* of Quito, Hernando de Santillán, reported to the king that the *encomendados* were being bought

[354]AGI, Justicia 639, n. 3, Visita de Hinojosa a Cali, f. 62v.

[355] Pärssinen, *Andien ihminen*, 128–129.

[356] It is important to remember that the population counts were not completely reliable, but they do probably show the trend fairly accurately.

and sold like flocks of sheep, even though doing so was illegal. There also were many excesses committed against the natives. According to Santillán, this was made possible by the distance between the seats of the *audiencias* of Quito and Santafé, which made the *gobernación* difficult to control.[357]

It is easy to draw parallels with Mats Hallenberg's concept of aggressive masculinity. He applies the concept of hegemonic masculinity to analyze the violent acts of Swedish landlords and royal officials against peasants, arguing that it was a part of the early modern empire building process. These were usually soldiers and mercenaries who were expected to prove their power and keep their subjects in constant fear by using violence. At the same time, they often publicly humiliated their tenants by attacking their masculinity and revealing their weakness.[358]

Sweden, like Spain, was building an overseas empire at the time, so comparisons between them fair. Hallenberg applies the ideas of R.W. Connell that turn the ruthless conquistadors into symbols of the new hegemonic masculinity during the early modern period. As Connell states, they were often extremely violent men displaced from customary social relations and difficult for the imperial state to control.[359] At the same time, as Kris Lane claims, the *encomenderos* were few and foreign, and therefore often more desperate and dependent on the native leaders than usually has been assumed.[360] Developing Hallenberg's idea of aggressive masculinity further, one could also suggest that sometimes this made the Spaniards even more aggressive, as they needed to conceal their weaknesses to ensure their authority.

The Spanish *encomendero* Marcos Castuera mentioned in the case discussed in Chapter 3.2 is an embodiment of this Hallenbergian aggressive male. Castuera's use of violence was an attempt to show his power and strength, to ensure that he was feared. He humiliated the *caciques* in front of their subjects a way to question their authority and ability to protect their people. The *encomenderos* were outnumbered in an unfamiliar and often hostile environment, and faced a constant threat of indigenous rebellion. Violence was a means of asserting their authority, one that they felt was especially necessary in a frontier zone like Popayán where Spanish control was still weak and precarious.

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[357] AGI, Quito 16, ramo 1, no. 1, Hernando de Santillán, presidente de la audiencia de Quito, a Su Majestad, 15 January 1564, f. 4v.

[358] Hallenberg, "Golden Age," 132–149.

[359] Hallenberg, "Golden Age," 139; Connell, *Masculinities*, 187.

[360] Lane, *Quito 1599*, 91.

Outnumbered by natives who were not eager to submit to their rule, the *encomenderos* thought that violence was needed to make the natives pay their tribute. They were most likely right. Without force, the natives would not have paid anything. However, this does not justify the violence, enslavement, annihilation, or forced acculturation that colonialism embodied.

Violence was part of creation of colonial society in Popayán. Both the crown and the settlers constantly needed to find balance between force and persuasion when dealing with the indigenous peoples. The *encomenderos* were expected to use violence to a certain extent when necessary, but it seems that there was a line that should not be crossed. Where that line exactly was depended on the situation. Castuera crossed the line several times. In the eyes of the slowly expanding institutions of the colonial empire, his methods were seen as excessive and perhaps even counterproductive. It was easy to condemn a man who was accused of such a severe crimes, and show that the crown really did protect the natives. At the same time, many other *encomenderos*' lesser crimes were given the blind eye.

Conclusions

Colonial expansion and encounters between indigenous peoples and Europeans were, from the beginning, defined by violence. The constant presence of violence shaped social and class relations in the colonial societies.[361] It is impossible to talk about interaction between the colonists and the colonized peoples without talking about violence, threat of violence, and coercion. Colonial encounters are not encounters between equals. Even when the Spaniards and the natives formed peaceful relationships, unequal power relations meant that the structural violence of colonialism was always present.

Violence was one means through which Spanish hegemony was strengthened and disputed. It was an integral part of the negotiation process by which the colonial society was created. The concept of negotiation does not, of course, rule out non-peaceful forms of interaction. In the following chapters, I will look more closely at different forms of negotiation that occurred between the various groups in colonial society; as we will see, though, violence was often present. Even in the more peaceful forms of colonial interaction, violence loomed in the background since colonialism was itself a form of structural violence.

[361] Moraña, Dussel & Járequi, "Colonialism and Its Replicants," 2–3.

In this chapter I have shown that early colonial inter-ethnic relations in Popayán were characterized by improvisation, instability, and conflict. Personal relationships were often more important than the colonial institutions, and violence was an essential part of the negotiation over the boundaries of the colonial regime.

The Spanish invaders of Popayán were motivated by gold and adventure, as were many late comers following them. They were looking for new lands and new peoples to be exploited. Despite the seemingly rapid conquest of the central areas of what became the *gobernación* of Popayán, the region remained a restless frontier and a base for continuous expeditions to the unconquered areas. This set the tone for interethnic relations in the *gobernación*.

For the indigenous communities of the *gobernación*, there was a set of strategies to choose from. They could resist the invaders, form alliances with them, flee to a more remote location, or try to adapt to their demands. In addition, indigenous individuals could make their own choices, such as move to a Spanish town or join one of the communities that kept resisting the invasion. The lines between the strategies were not clear cut, and communities and individuals could resort to more than one of them. The indigenous strategies should not be seen as mere responses to the Spanish actions. Obviously, the natives had to react to the invasion, but that is not all they did. They assessed the situation and tried to choose the course of action that best suited their interests.

While the centers of the colonial empire lived in the relative tranquility of the so-called *pax colonial* since the mid-sixteenth century, although the concept can be disputed, in the frontier zones like Popayán, the situation was much messier. The wars between the invaders and the unconquered nations continued, and in large parts of the *gobernación*, the Spanish control was precarious at best. Many of the natives were forced to work in harsh conditions to satisfy the Spanish demands, and many communities were all but annihilated. Some were able to gain wealth and leverage, but all were affected by the structural violence of colonialism and the infectious diseases.

Slowly, the colonial bureaucracy took steps to increase its control, but it was not until the last decades of the century that it really started to have a grip over the *gobernación*. In the next chapter, I turn my attention to the process of bureaucratization and institutionalization.

4 INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERETHNIC RELATIONS

The period from the late 1550s, beginning with the *visita* of Tomás López, marked the slow institutionalization of relations between the Spaniards and the natives. The personal relationships typical of the early colonial period did not completely lose their significance, but colonial officials and institutions started to interfere more than they had previously. The *visitas* and the expanding legal system were the main tools that brought law and order to the region; they also strongly influenced interethnic relations. However, violence—especially at the fringes of the *gobernación*, but also in the center—continued. In this chapter, I discuss this development further.

As this chapter deals with the ways in which the Spanish colonial institutions tried to take control of interethnic relations, the focus is largely on crown officials and their agency. Indigenous agency is not forgotten, as indigenous peoples also acted within the institutions. Indigenous agency is often veiled in the documents, but can be found through a close reading of the documents.

The main focus in this chapter will be on the *visitas* conducted in the *gobernación* between 1558 and 1607, as they were the most important tools that royal authorities used to extend their rule across the region. They also opened spaces of negotiation between officials and local actors, both Spanish and indigenous.

4.1 The Slow Process of Bureaucratization

Beginnings of Bureaucratization

Spain gained possession of its colonies through military conquest, and military government characterized the early years of Spanish colonial rule. This eventually was followed by a transition towards so-called bureaucratic domination, which happened more quickly in some areas than in others. In Mexico, the bureaucratization process started already in the 1520s, very soon after the conquest,

while in Peru, where the conquest began only in 1532, the military government lasted until the following decade.[362]

The history of the Spanish colonies can be written, among many other narratives, as a constant struggle between the metropolitan government and the local colonial magnates. The *encomenderos* elite always tried to break free of the constraints imposed by the crown; had they managed to do so, they would have quickly set up a feudal regime in the colonies. As a result, conflict between them and the crown officials was inevitable.[363]

The crown's control over the colonial Spanish elite was always incomplete, and it could not govern without their assistance. In theory, officials in mainland Spain controlled everything that happened in the colonies. The Council of Indies, based in Spain, wrote all the laws, and all the viceroys and judges of the *audiencias* were sent from Spain. In reality, the crown was never able to fully control the colonies directly. Instead, it had to rely on a "series of understandings and compromises," as Henry Kamen puts it.[364] At the same time, the conquistadors could not fulfill their ideal of ruling the "New World" as independent lords under the protection of a faraway king. Crown officials opposed the *encomenderos* most of the time, turning the colonies into a classic case of bureaucratic construction. According to J. H. Elliot, "[t]he *conquistadores*, who had been driven forward by their greed for booty, land and lordship, watched in dismay as the officials of the Spanish crown encroached on their feudal paradise."[365]

The bureaucratization of the Spanish empire was not a unique process, but one that was connected with European state formation processes in the early modern period.[366] Furthermore, it was not a uniquely early modern or European phenomenon either. Bureaucratization developed at different times and in different places around the world, beginning in ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt. An important feature in these processes is textualization, which enabled the bureaucratic machine's function. As paper became more general and writing skills spread, it became easier to produce textual documents. In a vast empire like the one created by Spain, communication through such written documents was essential.

Uruguayan literary critic Ángel Rama coined the concept "lettered city" to depict the social constellation based on the ideological primacy of the written word. This

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[362] Bakewell, *History of Latin America*, 104–112.

[363] Kamen, *Spain's Road to Empire*, 141–142; Braudel, *Perspective*, 428.

[364] Kamen, *Spain's Road to Empire*, 142.

[365] Elliot, *Old world*, 28; Braudel, *Perspective*, 428.

[366] See Ijäs & Uusitalo, "Early Modern State Formation."

characterized Spanish America. The bureaucratic machine of the colonial state was based on a constant flow of legal documents between the metropolitan center and its overseas colonies. Rama called this the empire's "documentary umbilical cord."[367] However, the messages travelled slowly. It took approximately three months to travel across the Atlantic from Spain to Cartagena de Indias (modern Cartagena, Colombia), and many more months for the message to reach Peru, Quito, or Popayán by rough overland routes.

The Spanish empire was a very bureaucratic construction, but the power of its bureaucracy was limited by circumstances. The dynamics between official control and local autonomy were complicated and ever changing. In a periphery region like Popayán, the process was inevitably even more complicated and difficult to describe. The colonial state remained weaker than at the core, but still managed to check the power of local power groups.

The bureaucratization of the Spanish colonies was a complicated and never-ending process. According to Luis F. Calero, the history of colonial Spanish America can be seen as a gradual progression from autocratic *encomendero* rule to centralized and strong metropolitan government.[368] Karen Vieira Powers complicates the matter, stating that the process of building the colonial state in Spanish America saw a multiplicity of regional variations, but, in the main, it was characterized by three steps: (1) the imposition of the state apparatus over indigenous peoples, (2) the crown's power struggle with the colonial elite and the temporary consolidation of rule, and (3) the breakdown of royal authority and the creolization of government.[369] These are naturally simplifications, but still valid generalizations of the process.

As Gonzalo Lamana points out, the imposition of central power in the colonies was not necessarily done by force, but rather by making itself available. In this context, the central power was fragile, and became effective only when it was locally invited.[370] Local actors invoked the crown when it suited them, and the crown, in turn, became an arbitrator in local power struggles, thus gaining an opportunity to enhance its position in the colonies. This was part of the very complicated negotiation process between the different actors in colonial society, where ethnicity was an important dividing factor, but certainly not the only one. Building colonial society was in this sense not a top-down process, despite the fact that it was done in

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367 Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, 3–4, 113–116; Rama, *Ciudad letrada*.

368 Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 62.

369 Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 81.

370 Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 99.

the name of the Spanish crown. Rather, it was a process in which local actors had agency as well.

According to Lamana, the internecine conflicts between the conquistadores in early colonial Peru were not only about the distribution of political power and wealth, but also about naming things and giving them meaning. While the crown was the weakest player on the ground, it was a very effective player in defining the order of things.[371] While Lamana writes about Peru of the 1530s, as colonial society was just emerging, this holds true in the context of Popayán in the much later period as well. The crown was a much weaker player here than in central Peru in the second half of the sixteenth century, but here too it was an arbitrator between rival local factions.

There were several important watersheds in the movement toward a more bureaucratic government, although none changed things immediately. Bureaucratization was such a slow process that contemporaries did not necessarily take notice. Certain events and moments certainly can be seen as important steps towards centralization, but their effects are more visible if we take a more long-term perspective. The founding of viceroyalties and *audiencias*, the promulgation of certain laws, and the undertaking of *visitas* are examples of watersheds. Bureaucratization was never completed, but it is clear that the institutions of administration did reach even the frontier zones, at least to some extent.

Among the earliest concerns that contributed to the development of colonial law were the legality of the conquest itself and the rights of the indigenous peoples. Spain's right to conquer the land was based on papal donation, but was not undisputed. Criticism of Spanish maltreatment of the natives began very soon after the conquest of Hispaniola, and many of the critics questioned the Spaniards' right to dispossess the natives of their lands and properties. A famous starting point of this discussion was the advent sermon given by the Dominican friar Antonio de Montesinos in December 21, 1511 in Santo Domingo, capital of the island of Hispaniola. In the sermon, de Montesinos accused the Spaniards of cruelty and tyranny against the innocent natives on the island. He famously asked the important questions: "Are these not men? Have they not rational souls?"[372]

The sermon caused a scandal among the Spanish *encomenderos* and news of it reached Spain, where King Ferdinand summoned a commission of ecclesiastics and lawyers to discuss Spanish-indigenous relations. The commission met at Burgos in

[371] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 119.

[372] "¿Estos, no son hombres? ¿No tienen ánimas racionales?" Montesinos's sermon is known through a reproduction made by Bartolomé de las Casas, who was in the crowd at the time: Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, libro 3, cap. 4.

1512. The outcome of the discussion was that the natives were free men, but vassals of King Ferdinand. The commission drew up a series of ordinances, known as the Laws of Burgos. They marked the first attempt to regulate Spanish-indigenous relationships in the colonies.[373]

However, the legality of the conquest continued to concern the monarch. In 1513, the Spanish jurist Juan López de Palacios Rubios drafted, in the name of King Ferdinand, an infamous document called *requerimiento*, which the Spaniards were to read aloud to the natives in Spanish before attacking them. The text demanded that the natives submitted to the king and his daughter Queen Joanna, who were the rightful lords of all the American lands and islands by Papal donation. The document also stated that all deaths caused by their resistance would be their own fault.[374] The idea that the natives would submit after this demand was read to them in a foreign language was obviously absurd, and Bartolomé de las Casas said he did not know whether to laugh or weep after hearing of the *requerimiento*. Nevertheless, it gave the conquerors a legal backing and perhaps eased the monarch's conscience.

The *requerimiento* was important for the Spaniards, because it legally ensured their right to conquer. James Krippner-Martínez's study of the famous trial of the indigenous leader Cazonci in Michoacán, Mexico in 1530—and his subsequent execution for treason—notes that it was important for the executors to deal with the matter by the letter of the law. They did not simply kill Cazonci, but went through the trouble of giving him a trial that followed all the normal legal procedures.[375] This was true throughout the Spanish colonies as the conquerors and settlers were building their colonial society. If the *requerimiento* was not read, anyone could later question the legality of the conquest and therefore the legal rights of the conqueror to any titles he might have obtained through that conquest. It was not so much about being law-abiding but about fear of losing the spoils of conquest. It was important how things seemed.

After the Laws of Burgos in 1512, interethnic relations were regulated by a flow of royal *cedulas* that gave more specific orders. They usually provided answers to concrete complaints or petitions made by different actors on the ground. A major step toward centralization was the foundation of the viceroyalties of Mexico (1535)

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[373] AGI, Indiferente general 419, libre 4, Real Provisión dando nuevas Ordenanzas sobre el tratamiento de los indios, Valladolid, 21 March 1513, ff. 83r.–96v.

[374] AGI, Panama 233, libro 1, Requerimiento a los indios de las islas y Tierra Firme del Mar Océano, Valladolid 1513, ff. 49r–50v.

[375] Krippner-Martínez, *Rereading the Conquest*, 13, 26–35

and Peru (1542). The *gobernación* of Popayán was incorporated into the viceroyalty of Peru, although it remained largely independent from its rule.

Finally, in November 1542, King Charles V issued the so-called New Laws (*Leyes nuevas*), which attempted to restrict the power of the *encomenderos* and prevent the birth of a strong hereditary feudal upper class in the colonies. This had been the *encomenderos*' aspiration. The New Laws also contained articles against the maltreatment of the natives, banning indigenous slavery and *servicios personales*. The New Laws were thus far the crown's most ambitious attempt to secure its control over the colonies.

While the promulgation of the New Laws was a direct attack against the *encomenderos*, it was also an attempt to improve the situation of the indigenous peoples. The problematic relations between the natives and the Spanish settlers were by then very evident. Native mortality rates were alarming, and reports about their maltreatment flooded the royal court. The New Laws were a major step toward regulating these native-Spanish relationships. It is a different matter altogether whether they were actually followed, but they did establish norms.

The New Laws made clear the crown's stance on the indigenous peoples' rights:

> [...] our main intent and will has always been and is conservation and augmentation of the Indians, and that they are instructed and taught in the things of our holy catholic faith, and well treated as free persons and our vassals, which they are [...][376]

The natives were free vassals of the king, and they should be treated as such; at the same time, though, they should be civilized and Christianized.

The paragraphs against maltreatment of the natives were strongly influenced by the protector of the *indios* Bartolomé de las Casas, who was at court pushing for the laws. It was at that time that he also wrote the first version of his famous *Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias* (*A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*), which was later published in 1552. In the treatise, Las Casas mixed facts and fiction in depicting the Spaniards' horrendous crimes against the natives throughout the continent, both during and after the conquest.[377] The work was soon translated into several languages and disseminated across the Protestant world accompanied by

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[376] *"[...] nuestro principal yntento y voluntad siempre ha sido y es de la conseruacion y agmento de los yndios y que sean ynstruidos y enseñados en las cosas de nuestra sancta fee catholica y bien tratados como personas libres y vasallos nuestros como lo son [...],"* AGI, Patronato 170, ramo 47, Declaración de las nuevas leyes y ordenanzas para las Indias, Barcelona 20 November1542, f. 3v.

[377] Las Casas, *Brevísima relación*.

illustrations produced by Theodore de Bry. This single publication played a significant role in creating the mythology of the Black Legend.

Charles V and especially his son Prince Philip, from 1556 onwards King Philip II, were convinced by Las Casas' claims. They took seriously the idea that the natives were the crown's vassals and in need of protection. While the main interest of the crown was to ensure its undisputed authority in the colonies through the New Laws, the paragraphs concerning the treatment of the natives were by no means irrelevant. They reflect a certain degree of concern caused by reports about the natives' poor treatment and depopulation. However, realpolitik was the most important motivator behind the king and his council's orders. The first and foremost concern was to ensure the flow of precious metals from America to the empire's chronically empty coffers. Revenue flows depended on an indigenous workforce, however, and as such preserving the indigenous peoples and filling the royal coffers were not contradictory aims.

Las Casas had many followers in the colonies, some of whom were prominent societal figures. Their legacy is ambiguous: while they have been seen as early champions of universal human rights, they also have been accused of enhancing ecclesiastical imperialism.[378] Their attitude toward the natives was patronizing, as was their insistence on evangelizing the indigenous peoples. They saw the *encomendero*'s lust for gold and their indifference toward the conversion of their *encomendados* as obstructions. Their descriptions of Spanish violence against the natives was most certainly just as exaggerated as were contemporary descriptions of native cruelty, human sacrifices, and cannibalism. The texts that both sides produced should be read with caution, although they probably contain at least a portion of truth. A more plausible picture of interethnic conflicts can be found in the archival sources, although here too one must keep in mind basic source criticism.

Enforcing the New Laws turned out to be problematic. In Peru, they provoked a rebellion by the *encomenderos* led by Francisco Pizarro's half-brother Gonzalo Pizarro; it lasted from 1544 to 1548. The article that the *encomenderos* most hated was the one that prohibited passing the *encomienda* to the next generation after the original grantee's death. The *encomenderos* wanted the *encomiendas* to be hereditary positions, while the crown saw them as grants that would last only until the end of the *encomendero*'s life before reverting to the crown.[379]

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[378] See Castro, *Another Face*, passim.

[379] For Francisco Pizarro's rebellion and the conflict surrounding the imposition of the New Laws in Peru, see for example Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 43–45.

Although the News Laws were amended in favor of the *encomenderos*, they did improve the legal position of the indigenous peoples. *Servicios personales* were unequivocally banned, and the *encomendero* was only allowed to demand the tribute ordered by the *tasa* and nothing more. The bans did not end the abuses, of course, but they did give legal protection to the natives should they challenge their *encomederos* in court at some point.[380]

The monarch and the council of Indies soon realized that enforcing the laws would be impossible and could lead to even more rebellions. They decided to back down. The crown was not prepared to grant the *encomiendas* in perpetuity but, in 1546, Charles V issued a new law that allowed the *encomienda* grant to be extended for one generation ("one life") after the death of the original *encomendero*. After that, the *encomienda* would revert to the crown. This decreased the popularity of Pizarro's rebellion and, after it was subdued, the king's authority was no longer seriously challenged. However, the paragraphs concerning treatment of natives remained largely dead letters.

The defeat of Gonzalo Pizarro by Pedro de la Gasca in 1548 brought an end to one era and fostered the beginning of a new in the Spanish Andean colonies. De la Gasca was sent from Spain to defeat the *encomenderos*' rebellion and then was named the president of the *audiencia* of Lima. He was also the interim governor of the viceroyalty of Peru in the absence of a viceroy until January 1550. He carried out several administrative reforms in 1549 that reduced the power of the conquistador-*encomenderos* and increased the crown's control. The change was not complete—it tends not to be when speaking of Spanish colonial history watersheds—but it nevertheless marked a change from the initial institutional framework to a somewhat more concrete one.[381]

The conflict over the New Laws was part of the power struggle between the crown and the leading Spanish settlers that characterized colonial state building in Spanish America. The subjugation of Pizarro's rebellion consolidated royal authority, but the *encomendero*s did not easily relinquish the idea of perpetuity. They also wanted jurisdiction over their *encomendados*. In 1554, a group of Peruvian *encomenderos* offered a deal to the king asking for these two things: perpetuity and jurisdiction. In exchange, they offered to pay the crown 7.6 million pesos, twice the monarch's national debt as it continued to suffer from chronic cash flow problems.[382] The offer probably was not realistic, despite the richness of the silver mines in Peru; in the end,

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[380] Ots Capdequí, *El estado español*, 26–27.

[381] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 227.

[382] Mumford, "Aristocracy on the Auction," 43–44.

it went nowhere. The king was ready to negotiate about perpetuity, but not about jurisdiction. The natives were vassals of the king, and that point was not up for debate.

Feudalism had never fully developed in Castile, where people were scarce, but land was not. The lords had little means to force the peasants to stay on their lands against their will. Local autonomous communities controlled their lands independently, in exchange for an annual payment to the lord, and they had few personal service obligations. However, the lords of Castile had jurisdiction over their subjects, and that is what the *encomenderos* also wanted but failed to get. In fact, the *kurakas* of the Andean communities fared better in their claim for lordship that the Spanish *encomenderos*.[383]

Although the crown backed down from the articles that would have effectively abolished the *encomienda*, the institution still faded in significance in Peru within a few decades after the passage of the New Laws despite fierce opposition from the *encomenderos*. The *encomienda* grant could be passed on for only one generation after the death of the *encomendero*, and most of the original *encomiendas* in Mexico and Peru had reverted back to the crown by the 1570s. The crown could, of course, always regrant them to someone else.[384] After the rebellion and the civil war that followed the promulgation of the New Laws, the crown was not eager to fully suppress the *encomienda* system, but its importance was undermined by the demographic collapse of the indigenous populations in the core areas. According to Kris Lane, this was the most important factor that explains why the institution was tamed, although not abolished, within a couple of generations after the conquest.[385]

Discussion and debate about the right to conquer the lands from the natives also continued; in fact, it heated up after the conquest of the Aztec and Inca empires. The controversy provoked by Las Casas and others had an impact and, in 1550, Charles V ordered the suspension of all conquests until lawyers and theologians settled how they could be undertaken justly. The debate dragged on for more than two decades, until Philip II gave his famous orders to pacify, rather than conquer,

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[383] Mumford, "Aristocracy on the Auction," 40–43.

[384] See for example Burkholder & Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 117–120; Bakewell, *History of Latin America*, 193–196. The *encomienda* grant was extended to a third generation (*tres vidas*) in 1629 and a fourth generation (*cuatro vidas*) in 1704. However, when the later extension was made, the institution had already lost its economic significance. It was finally abolished between 1718 and 1721. Ots Capdequí, *Estado español*, 27.

[385] Lane, "Transition from Encomienda," 74.

new lands in 1573. By then, Bartolomé de las Casas was already dead, but his writings still influenced Philip II's ordinances.[386]

The ordinances had 148 paragraphs that offered very detailed instructions about the proper manner of colonizing new areas. First, the Spaniards had to investigate the area thoroughly; then they were to establish a town without causing prejudice to the original inhabitants of the land; and finally, through peaceful methods, they were to convince the natives to convert to Christianity and declare obedience to the Spaniards.[387] It is not surprising that these orders too remained mostly a dead letter. Just like the *requerimiento* before them, these orders actually gave legal backing to new conquests: it was easy for the conquistadors to claim that they had followed the ordinances in their colonization attempts and only used force to defend themselves against hostile natives who had attacked them.

Despite the suspension of all further conquests in 1550, the Spaniards did not stop their expeditions. Legally, they were a tricky matter. The Spaniards tried to justify their expeditions by claiming they were undertaken in self-defense against violent indigenous groups. Making such claims was quite easy, as the nasas (paeces), Pijaos, and others constantly attacked Spanish settlements and roads. This effects on how the sources should be interpreted. Claims of hostile natives attacking the Spaniards should not be taken at face value. However, it does not mean the events were fabricated, but viewpoint of the narrator was definitely distorted. The Spaniards believed that the lands already belonged to the King of Spain by papal donation. In their eyes, the natives were their subjects even before they had actually submitted, and those who resisted were rebels. This set the tone for the interaction with the *indios de guerra*. They were rebels, not "legal enemies."

A typical example of this ideology is seen in an *entrada* against the Gorrones in 1555, led by Giraldo Gil de Estopiñán, the governor's lieutenant in Cartago. In his *residencia*, Gil de Estopiñán was accused of attacking the natives without royal permission, of committing many atrocities against them, and thus of causing harm to the natives and engaging in a disservice to the king. Gil de Estopiñán and his men were well aware that the king did not want the Spaniards to make new expeditions against the natives, but they justified it as a punishment expedition against rebelling natives who refused to serve their *encomenderos*.[388]

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[386] See Bakewell, *History of Latin America*, 147–148.

[387] AGI, Indiferente general 427, libro 29, Ordenanzas de descubrimiento, nueva población y pacificación de las Indias dadas por Felipe II, bosque de Segovia, 13 July 1573, ff. 67r.–93v.

[388] AGI, Justicia 577, Residencia de Giraldo Gil de Estopiñán, Teniente de Gobernador en Cartago, 1556.

All these reforms and laws affected the *gobernación* of Popayán as well, although usually they were not imposed to their fullest extent. In 1544, Juan Díez de Armendáriz reached Cartagena with the task of imposing the laws in Santa Marta, Cartagena, Popayán, and Nuevo Reino. He faced severe resistance, and in 1547 decided to postpone their enforcement for two years so that the *encomenderos*' complaints could be heard in Spain. Armendáriz also soon realized the magnitude of the task in the vast lands of contemporary Colombia, and suggested that the crown should establish a new *audiencia* in Santafé. This was done a few years later.[389]

Armendáriz never visited Popayán, but the New Laws reached the *gobernación* in 1544. In August of that year, the *cabildo* of Popayán drafted a petition to the king asking for modifications to be made to the laws. According to the *cabildo*, the laws could not be fulfilled in the *gobernación* because it was only recently populated. The land and its habitants were poor, and the natives were few. The only way the Spaniards could support themselves was through *encomienda* and the indigenous labor it provided. If the Spaniards had to leave, the natives would go back to their pagan habits and forget all civilization. The *cabildo* also reminded the king of the hardships the *encomenderos* had faced conquering the land and civilizing the natives. They further reminded him that the Spanish *vecinos* were few, and therefore most of them had to occupy some office. Therefore, the orders by which office holders could not possess an *encomienda* could not be enacted in Popayán.[390]

The petition is full of typical rhetoric. The *encomenderos* invariably mentioned their hardships during the conquest and pacification of these distant and hostile lands and cited their poverty in their petitions. They usually also mentioned how important their presence was for the natives, who would remain uncivilized pagans should they leave. Nevertheless, the most interesting part of the petition is the claim that the Spaniards could not support themselves without the indigenous peoples' labor. This clearly reveals the role the *encomenderos* thought the natives should have in colonial society.

In the end, the New Laws were not truly enforced in the *gobernación*. Gonzalo Pizarro's rebellion did not spread to Popayán, and La Gasca's viceregal reforms were not imposed in full, although echoes of both reached the *gobernación*. It does not seem that the viceroys paid too much attention to Popayán, as they had their hands full in the central areas of the viceroyalty. However, there were things happening in Nuevo

[389] Friede, "Conquista del territorio," 163; Melo, *Historia de Colombia*, 226–230.

[390] AGI, Patronato 195, ramo 14, Cabildo de Popayán suplica sobre las Leyes Nuevas, Popayán 16 August 1544, ff. 17r.–19r.

Reino and Popayán connected to the New Laws and Gasca's reforms that aimed to bring these two regions under the crown's closer control.

The royal *audiencia* of Santafé was finally inaugurated in April 1550, and the *gobernación* of Popayán fell under its jurisdiction. Before this, Popayán was under the *audiencia* of Lima, which was far away and out of service during the civil war in Peru in 1544–1548. De facto, there was no high court in the region. Santafé was much closer and more accessible than Lima, meaning that it was possible to appeal to the high court there. Doing so was still difficult and expensive, but it was now a real option for local indigenous peoples.

One of the three *oidores* of the first *audiencia* of Santafé, Francisco Briceño, did not go immediately to Santafé, but was sent to Popayán instead. There he was charged first, with taking care of a *residencia* against Sebastián de Belalcázar, and second, with acting as governor of Popayán until late 1552. Briceño also held trials against several indigenous leaders for rebelling against the Spaniards while he was governor. It seems that he wanted to put an end to native resistance in the area. However, his time as governor was very controversial.

In his *residencia*, Briceño was accused of making war against several indigenous groups, and of not preventing the natives from being used to carry cargos or sent to the mines. He was absolved of the first two charges for lack of evidence. As for the charge of not preventing the natives being sent to work in the gold mines, the *juez de Residencia* Luis de Guzman left the decision to the Council of the Indies. Guzman did not doubt that Briceño had waged wars against natives, but it seemed that the royal orders prohibiting new *entradas* had not yet reached Popayán and so Briceño was not guilty of that crime.[391]

Briceño did not make many friends among Spaniards either. In his *residencia*, he was accused of disrespectfully treating several Spanish settlers when he was the governor of Popayán. For this he was found guilty and punished with a fine of 100 pesos in gold; the fine was directed against the costs of his *residencia*.[392] The Spanish settlers of Popayán filed many complaints against Briceño during his short but apparently effective spell as governor; afterwards, he was sent back to Santafé to take his post as an *oidor* of the *audiencia* in 1552.[393]

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[391] AGI, Patronato 195, ramo 20, Residencia contra Francisco Briceño, gobernador de Popayán, Cali, 31 October 1556.

[392] AGI, Patronato 195, ramo 20, Residencia contra Francisco Briceño, gobernador de Popayán, Cali, 31 October 1556, ff. 251v.–252r., 253v.–253r.

[393] Friede, "La conquista del territorio," 164.

Francisco Briceño was an important figure in the history of Popayán, but he was not a reformer. One of his main adversaries, the first Bishop of Popayán Juan Del Valle, was. The latter followed the ides of Bartolomé de las Casas, and was one of the principal figures in the history of the sixteenth-century *gobernación* of Popayán. Juan Friede has written two books on del Valle, both of which vividly recount the bishop's story. For Friede, del Valle was a champion of the rights of indigenous peoples, a brave man who fought against the *encomenderos* to save the natives from their cruelty.[394] He certainly was a vigorous man who spent a large part of his term as bishop in quarrels with the *encomenderos*. His story illustrates the power struggles that took place everywhere in the early colonial world, but he took things to an extreme.

Del Valle was named bishop in 1546, and arrived in his diocese in November 1548. He was not the *encomenderos*' preferred candidate for the position. Instead, they preferred Hernando de Granada, who had participated in the conquest. The governor Sebastián de Belalcázar had written to the king in 1543 asking for Granada to be named bishop of Popayán as a reward for all the services he had offered during the conquest, which Belalcázar had witnessed with his own eyes.[395] Del Valle, by contrast, had no previous experience in the Indies, but he was a Lascasian defender of the *indios*, which might have been one of the reasons he was elected instead of Granada. Juan Friede suggests that it is possible that Las Casas himself elected Del Valle, although there is no evidence to prove this. It is known that Del Valle's successor Agustín de la Coruña was indeed Las Casas' man.[396] However, the main reason why Granada was not elected was probably that his relations with the local elite were too close. The crown wanted an outsider.

In spite of being elected over the *encomenderos*' favorite, Del Valle was at first received well by the local society. According to Juan Friede, he spent the first years in office occupied in the conversion of the natives.[397] It was only later that he became a controversial figure and made many enemies among the *encomenderos*. In 1554, the *vecinos* of Popayán made a complaint against the bishop to the Council of the Indies. They accused the bishop of exceeding his jurisdiction and of interfering with secular justice, convicting both Spaniards and natives without the right to do so, and of excommunicating everyone who opposed him. The *vecinos* of Popayán also accused

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[394] Friede, *Vida y* luchas. Juan del Valle was mentioned already in chapter 3.

[395] AGI, Quito 16, ramo 1, n. 1, Carta de Sebastián de Belalcázar, adelantado y gobernador de Popayán, a S.M., 9 November 1543.

[396] Friede, *Vida y luchas*, 64–67.

[397] Friede, *Vida y luchas*, 81.

him of stealing their indigenous servants, and claimed that he had his own indigenous constables beat the natives who did not attend mass.[398]

Another interesting case of local power struggles involves the first bishop of Popayán, Juan del Valle. In July 1556, Lieutenant Francisco Falcón arrested the procurator and canon Francisco González Granadino, a loyal servant and companion of bishop del Valle. The man had broken to pieces a *vara* (rod) of justice belonging to a certain native in the main church of the town of Cali after a mass held for the indigenous peoples. The *vara* had been given to the native by the governor but, according to Granadino, it was not a legitimate *vara* of justice, but merely a stick with no value. He had gathered all the natives who were present in the church and told them that they should not listen to any native representative except those appointed by the bishop.[399] during the hearing, two natives testified that they had orders from the bishop to bring natives to mass, and that sometimes they forced them to do so.[400]

After a lengthy lawsuit, del Valle, under whose jurisdiction the matter was dealt (since the accused was a man of the church), released Granadino from all charges.[401] Instead, he condemned Falcón to public humiliation during a mass. The sentence was carried out during a mass the next spring, testifying to the power del Valle had even over a lieutenant of the governor.[402] The case is but one example of the tense power struggle that existed between the bishop of Popayán, the *encomenderos,* and the royal officials of the *gobernación*. It was obviously about infighting between factions of Spanish society, but again, the natives were not merely passive by-standers in the conflict. The rod of justice was a powerful symbol of authority, and who ever carried it could claim to be a representative of the Spanish monarch.

The *encomendero* Antonio Redondo had heard the bishop say that the king was not his judge and that he did what he wanted. According to Redondo, the bishop wanted to rule his diocese like king and pope. According to the *encomenderos*, the bishop never turned to secular courts, but convicted people himself even in cases that were beyond

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[398] AGN, Caciques e indios 11, doc. 10, Juan del Valle, obispo, excomulga a quien maltrate indios, 1554–1555, hojas 675r.–675v.

[399] AGI, Justicia 1118b, n. 2, r. 6, proceso del obispo Juan del Valle con Francisco Falcón, 1556–1557, ff. 4r.–5v.

[400] AGI, Justicia 1118b, n. 2, r. 6, proceso del obispo Juan del Valle con Francisco Falcón, 1556–1557, f. 18r.

[401] AGI, Justicia 1118b, n. 2, r. 6, proceso del obispo Juan del Valle con Francisco Falcón, 1556–1557, f. 102r.

[402] AGI, Justicia 1118b, n. 2, r. 6, proceso del obispo Juan del Valle con Francisco Falcón, 1556–1557, f. 112r., 130r.

his jurisdiction. The secular judges could do nothing about it except complain to higher ecclesiastical authorities, because they had no jurisdiction over him. An example of the bishop's power was that he excommunicated Francisco de Belalcázar, son of the conquistador and one of Popayán most powerful figures. At first, Belalcázar was angry and left the church swearing, but he later returned and humbly asked for the excommunication to be revoked.[403]

John Charles also tells of a similar case in early-seventeenth-century Peru. A certain priest had told natives complaining against him that he was the pope and the king of the pueblo, and that neither the Provisor of Lima nor even the Archbishop could do anything to him.[404] The ecclesiasts were powerful men in local society, and the secular authorities had little control over them. This was another local parish priest, while Del Valle was bishop, which made him even more powerful. Del Valle was nearly untouchable, and there was not much anybody could do to him.

Juan del Valle has a reputation of having been a devout defender of the natives, but the accusations made by the Spanish *encomenderos* cast a new light on his personality. He was not convicted, and we do not know how much truth there was in the charges. However, it is clear that he was a powerful figure whom the *encomenderos* both feared and hated. He had means at his disposal to make people obey him. He also had authority over the natives of his diocese. As is the case with most ecclesiasts defending the natives, he did not question conversion. The priest's role in colonial society thus was often ambiguous.

Del Valle was also a member of the local community. He was unpopular among the *encomenderos*, but had his own network. The *vecinos* of Popayán accused him of confiscating the *encomendados* of a widow named María Azevedo and giving them to his cousin Pedro Manso.[405] In a census performed by the *visitador* Tomás López in 1559, Manso had in his possession the fourth largest *encomienda* of Popayán with 650 tribute payers (adult males), making him a significant *encomendero* at the time.[406]

Del Valle presented himself as a spokesperson speaking on behalf of the natives. He had a clear idea of what was best for the natives, and he sent the king several letters containing suggestions for remedying the indigenous peoples' grievances. He also clearly had connections with the native elites, as can be seen from his *visita* of 1552 that was discussed in Chapter Three.

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403 Friede *Vida y luchas*, 122–136.

404 Charles, *Allies at Odds*, 179.

405 AGN, Caciques e indios 11, doc. 10, Juan del Valle, obispo, excomulga a quien maltrate indios, 1554–1555, hojas 676v–677r.

406 AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, ff. 55v.–71r.

The struggles in which Juan del Valle took part were not just about the treatment of the natives, as Juan Friede insinuates. Instead, they were part of the broader local power struggles. At the same time, they also were not just about struggles between the church and the *encomenderos*, but rather were tied to interethnic relations. Intra-ethnic conflicts within Spanish and native societies, and interethnic conflicts between Spaniards and natives, were all intertwined.

In the late 1550s, some two decades after the Spanish arrival, Popayán was still largely beyond the central authorities' control. The *audiencia* of Nuevo Reino was founded as an attempt to strengthen control in the Northern Andes, but Popayán was quite far away from Santafé de Bogotá, and the *audiencia* had very limited influence over the *gobernación*. Briceño used harsh and authoritative methods to change that, but with little success.

The shift from conqueror society to colonial society was still in its very early stages, and the *encomenderos* had firm hold. In Popayán, the institution of *encomienda* remained much stronger than in Peru, and interethnic relations there were still firmly based on personal relationships between the *encomendero* and the *cacique* for a long time after the institution had all but disappeared from the center of the empire. The persistence of the *encomienda* cannot be explained solely by its economic significance, but rather through the social capital it gave to its holder.[407]

The *encomenderos* were clearly a group that ensured social capital for its members. The institution of *encomienda* was generally unstable: the indigenous mortality was high, and the hard work demanded by the *encomenderos* consumed the population even more. The fact that the *encomiendas* were generally not inheritable beyond a second generation meant that the *encomenderos* had no interest in preserving their *encomendados*. Instead, they were after quick profit, often to pay the debts incurred during their expeditions against the natives. Despite of all this, the *encomienda* proved to be a surprisingly resilient institution in the empire's periphery. This was at least partly due to the prestige attached to the title of *encomendero*. The *encomenderos* formed the political elite of local societies, and this caused the institution's importance to continue even after its economic value decreased. The central authorities, on the other hand, relied

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[407] According to Pierre Bourdieu, "[s]ocial capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition [...] which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital." Social capital is relatively independent of the economic and cultural capital possessed by certain individuals or groups, although not completely. The network providing social capital is never a given, but constantly produced and reproduced. See Bourdieu, "Forms of Capital," 248–249.

on the *encomenderos* in the backcountry where indigenous revolts were a constant threat.[408]

However, in the 1550s, the central government started to show more interest in the region, and tried to remedy the hostile situation with the institution of *visita*. This was again connected to developments in the larger colonial framework. From the 1550s, the state began to interfere in the *encomendero-cacique* relationship by taking over the collection and distribution of tributes. Crown officials collected them twice a year, in June and in December, and distributed them to the *encomenderos* after the salaries for the officials, priests, and *caciques* had been deducted.[409] In Popayán, the tributary system was institutionalized with the *visita* of Tomás López in 1558–59.

The Visitas

Tomás López performed the first *visita general* in Popayán in 1558–1559. The king had ordered him to perform a *visita* and a *tasación* (determination of tributes) of natives in the *gobernación* of Popayán in 1555.[410] However, at the time he was still in Guatemala, even though he was named *oidor* of the *audiencia* of the Nuevo Reino already in 1552. He only arrived in the *audiencia*'s capital Santafé de Bogotá in the autumn of 1557, and left for Pasto in the autumn of 1558. Lopez started his *visita* in Pasto in November 1558, and travelled from south to north visiting most of the *gobernación*'s towns over the following eight months until he reached Cartago in July 1559.[411]

The initiative for López's *visita* came from the first bishop of Popayán, Juan del Valle. In an undated memorandum presented to the king and *Consejo de Indias* by Luis Sanchez in del Valle's name, probably in 1555, the bishop asked the king that the natives of the dioceses be inspected by trustworthy persons, as it had never been done before.[412] The order for the *visita* was given soon afterwards. Del Valle accompanied López during the *visita* in the towns that were within his diocese. In

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[408] Lane, "Transition from Encomienda to Slavery," 73–83.

[409] Spalding, *Huarochiri*, 162.

[410] AGI, Santa Fe 533, libro 1, Real cedula a la audiencia del Nuevo Reino sobre visita a Popayán, 9 Sept. 1555, f. 400v.

[411] Padilla "Tasaciones de Encomiendas," 21–26.

[412] AGI, Quito 81, n. 4a, Memorial del bachiller Luis Sánchez, en nombre del obispo de Popayán D. Juan del Valle, s.a., f. 1r. We know that Sánchez travelled to Spain as the bishop's representative in 1555. Friede *Vida y Luchas*, 149. See also chapter 2.2.

Pasto, the bishop of Quito, García Díaz Arias, accompanied López. One of the main motivations for the *visitas* was the alarming depopulation of the indigenous peoples.

Tomás López was a learned man and a defender of the rights of the indigenous peoples. He wrote the first instructions for the office of *defensor de indios* in Mérida, Yucatán, in 1553. In 1557, he also was named *defensores de indios* in Santafé, where he wrote new instructions (an amended version of the older ones). The office later became institutionalized, and *defensores de indios* were named in all parts of Spanish America. The Viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo, gave his instructions for the *defensores de indios* in 1575, and these were then copied and finally incorporated in the *Recopilación de leyes de los reinos de Indios* of 1680. Caroline Cunill suggests that Toledo's instructions could have been influenced by those of Tomás López.[413]

Like most defenders of natives, López thought that evangelizing and civilizing the natives was of the utmost importance. He saw the indigenous peoples as brute and bestial people who lacked reason. They were not, however, incapable of becoming civilized; they just needed to be educated. This ethnocentric view was in no way contradictory to Lopez's will to protect the natives from the Spanish *encomenderos*' maltreatment and excessive demands. In fact, he was a fierce critic of the injustices of colonial society.[414] For the sixteenth-century defenders of natives, these ideas were not mutually exclusive, but rather two sides of the same patronizing attitude. They saw the natives as childlike people who needed to be educated and protected.

In Peru, the interim governor of the viceroyalty, Pedro de la Gasca, had ordered a *visita* general and a *tasación* in 1549. He rewarded those who had joined him in suppressing the Pizarro rebellion, but at the same time, reformed the *encomienda* system. The Pizarro regime was highly exploitative, and the native depopulation was already evident. There was a sense of crisis in colonial society here. La Gasca's reforms saved the *encomienda* system, albeit with some modifications. The economic demands were still excessive, but as the tributes were assessed and documented, the natives now knew what was expected of them. This also gave them an opportunity to use the Spanish legal system if the *encomenderos* demanded too much.[415]

La Gasca's reforms did not extend to the frontier areas, but his *visita* did set an example to other *visitas*, including that of Tomás López in Popayán a decade later. The need for reforms in the *encomienda* system was evident. As the tributes were not

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[413] Cunill, "Tomás López Medel," 540–549.

[414] Ares Queija, "Oidor Tomás López," 115–118.

[415] Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 51–52, 66–67.

pre-determined there, the *encomenderos* were free to demand what they wished. The only check on their demands was the possibility of a native rebellion.

By the time of López's *visita*, the transition from the contact period and conquest to early colonial society had become a fact. Spanish power was not yet consolidated, but colonialism was a reality. Spanish rule over the entire region was still partly a legal fiction, but the Spaniards' presence was strong enough for their claim over the land and its peoples to have real consequences. In large areas of the *gobernación*, the *caciques* paid tribute to the *encomenderos* and recognized them as their overlords, although the relationships were not clear-cut nor was the *encomenderos*' lordship uncontested. The Spanish bureaucracy was also slowly taking hold of the region. Its control was at this point still quite erratic, but neither the *encomenderos* nor the *caciques* could simply ignore them. López's *visita* was an important part of the crown's project of taking control at the fringes of its vast empire.

López's *visita* played an important role in incorporating the *gobernación* into the empire, but it was obvious that its effects would remain limited if the bureaucracy were not strengthened. Once the *visitador* left the area, business continued as usual and the orders were rarely followed. Popayán was still a frontier region. A few months after López had left the *gobernación*, Governor Luis de Guzmán wrote to the king asking that he name some of the *vecinos* his *tenientes* because there was no money to hire people from the outside. Without more *tenientes*, the *gobernación* was impossible to govern because of its vast expanse.[416] Popayán was a fairly large *gobernación*, and part of it was scarcely populated and difficult to travel, at least for the Spaniards who were not used to travelling across such terrain.

Tomás López understood the situation. During his *visita*, he had found so many irregularities and so much poor treatment of the natives and problems with their Christianization that he suggested the king send more judges to the region. He suggested that a new *audiencia* be founded in Quito with jurisdiction over the Kingdom of Quito and the *gobernación* of Popayán as far as Cali. In addition, he suggested that the *audiencia* of Santafé be transferred to Tunja, and that it have jurisdiction from Cartago as far as Cartagena.[417] The first of his suggestions was carried out: the royal *audiencia* of Quito was founded in 1563 and inaugurated in 1564, and the southern and more populous part of the *gobernación* was incorporated under its jurisdiction. However, the *audiencia* of Santafé was not moved to Tunja.

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[416] AGI, Quito 16, ramo 2, n. 5, Carta de Luis de Guzmán, gobernador de Popayán, a S.M., Cali, 7 November 1559, f. 6v.

[417] AGI, Santa Fe 188, Carta de Tomás López a Su Majestad, Cali 8 May 1559, ff. 209r.–209v.

The *audiencia* of Santafé started to have more control over the northern part of the *gobernación*. There are some court cases from the 1560s that addressed maltreatment of the natives, indicating that the colonial law and order were extending their reach in the *gobernación*. The preservation of court cases in modern archives is very arbitrary, however, so one cannot make too many conclusions based on them. In any case, during the 1560s, Spanish officials on ground started to pay more attention to the viceroyalty's frontier regions.

In the late 1560s, the crown and the Council of Indies turned their eyes to the region again. Despite the founding of the *audiencia* of Quito, Spanish officials' control over the region remained weak. Then, at the turn of the decade, there were two separate *visitas* precisely in the area that had fallen under the *audiencia* of Quito. Pedro de Hinojosa visited the towns of Popayán, Cali, and Buga in 1569–1570, and García de Valverde went to the towns of Almaguer and Pasto in 1570–1571.[418] (see figure 4.) In the northern part of the *gobernación*, which remained under the jurisdiction of the *audiencia* of Santafé, Diego Angulo de Castejón performed a *visita* in 1567–1568.[419]

Angulo de Castejón was named *visitador general* of the *gobernación* of Popayán by the *audiencia* of Santafé in 1566, and apparently visited the towns of Santafé de Antioquía, Arma, and Anserma before arriving in Cartago.[420] I have not been able to find the reports of his *visitas* apart from the visit to Cartago. Hinojosa was a *fiscal* (public prosecutor) in the *audiencia* of Quito until he was appointed *oidor* in 1568. He continued to work in that office until 1579, when he was appointed as *oidor* of the *audiencia* of Santafé. He died, however, before taking office.[421] Valverde also started his career as a *fiscal*, but in the *audiencia* of Santafé, where he was appointed in 1556. In 1564, he was named governor of Popayán, and in 1566 *oidor* of the *audiencia* of Quito. After his *visita*, in 1572 he was moved to the *audiencia* of Lima, and later he worked as the president of the *audiencias* of Quito and Guatemala, respectively.[422]

[418] For an overview of these visitas, see Padilla "Tasaciones de Encomiendas," 26–36.

[419] Friede, *Quimbayas*, 115–135.

[420] Friede, *Quimbayas*, 116–117.

[421] Padilla "Tasaciones de Encomiendas," 30–31.

[422] Padilla "Tasaciones de Encomiendas," 28–29.

Figure 4. *Itineraries of Tomás López, García de Valverde and Pedro de Hinojosa. Source: Padilla, "Tasaciones de encomiendas," 27.*



The situation in Popayán has to be seen within the larger colonial context. Many scholars have argued that Peruvian colonial society entered into crisis in the 1560s.[423] There was a widespread feeling among both Spaniards and Andeans alike that the situation was deteriorating. The indigenous population was in decline, yet the burdens imposed upon them by the Spaniards increased. Diminution of the indigenous population meant that production collapsed, and this in turn caused severe problems for the Spaniards who were entirely dependent on the natives' surplus production and workforce.[424] The crisis caused disillusionment among the natives, and many of the local communities decided withdraw from cooperation with the Spaniards and started to disobey their orders. The myth of reciprocity between the *encomendero* and the *cacique* was dismantled. Consequently, the post-Inca alliances between indigenous communities and Spanish conquerors, formed during and after the conquest, fell apart.[425]

The crisis gave strength to reformist ideas among the Spanish elite who felt that it was necessary to reorganize the viceroyalty. Lope García de Castro, the governor-general of Peru who was acting as viceroy without ever having the title in the years 1565–1569, was one of the reformers. He started the process of reorganizing the colonial society, achieving some good results, and managed to stall the immediate threat of open rebellion against the Spanish rule. But he failed to solve the viceroyalty's economic and political problems. Corruption and incompetence within the colonial administration became evident and, to solve the problem, King Philip II named a committee of twenty-two men that would later be called the Junta Magna. The assembly recommended the appointment of Francisco Toledo as viceroy. He was a much more charismatic, ambitious, and skilful leader than his predecessors. During his viceroyalty of 1569–1581, he carried out a thorough reorganization of Peru's colonial society.[426]

García de Castro introduced the *corregimientos de indios*, which became the standard administrative units for controlling the indigenous peoples in Peru. The *corregidores* became rural governors who had direct authority over the indigenous peoples, thereby undermining the authorities of both *encomenderos* and *caciques*.[427] However, since the *corregimientos* did not extend to the *gobernación* of Popayán, the *encomenderos*'

[423] See for example Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 65–74; Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 76; Zulawski, *They Eat*, 43–46.

[424] Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 65.

[425] Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 44–50; Zulawski 43.

[426] Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 75–76, Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 71–79.

[427] Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 64–69.

authority remained strong. This set Popayán apart from the central regions of the viceroyalty.

It was normal for a viceroy to order a *visita* general after his arrival, and indeed Toledo had instructions to do so by Philip II. However, Toledo was not satisfied with simple tribute assessments; instead, he felt that a full-scale inspection was needed. The ultimate aim was a complete restructuring of Andean society. Toledo named more than sixty-three experienced secular and religious officials to conduct the *visitas*, and he himself spent five years away from Lima supervising his projects throughout the viceroyalty.[428]

The *visitas* of Hinojosa and Valverde occurred within the larger context of, and probably partly as a result of, the centralization of the viceroyalty of Peru, which had begun with Francisco de Toledo's appointment as viceroy. Pedro de Hinojosa was one of the *visitadores* named by Toledo in his *instrucción general para los visitadores*. He was charged with the *visitas* in the provinces of Quito and Cuenca.[429] However, he had received royal orders to perform a *visita* in Popayán already in November 1568, before Toledo became viceroy.[430] After Hinojosa had finished his *visita* in Popayán and Cali, Valverde was ordered to visit the other main towns of the *gobernación* that belonged to the *audiencia* of Quito.[431] However, it is clear that Hinojosa and Valverde's *visitas* were part of the same process of centralizing the Andean colonies.

Popayán was officially part of Toledo's viceroyalty, but his control in the *gobernación* was weak or nonexistent. The quasi-independent position of the *gobernación* ensured that the reforms were never carried out in full in the region. The effects of the reorganization of the Andean colonies were felt to a much lesser degree in Popayán than in Peru or Bolivia, and while the waves did reach the region, they were weak. While the purpose of López and Angulo de Castejón's *visitas* were mainly to determine the tributes and other obligations and to regulate the relationships between *encomenderos* and *encomendados*, Hinojosa and Valverde's *visitas* were more comprehensive. They aimed at a more thorough reorganization of the indigenous communities, just like the reforms ordered by Francisco de Toledo.

The royal orders for the *visitas* clarify their function. López's most important tasks were to count the native population and determine how much the natives could pay so that they would have enough time to support themselves and their families and take care of their sick. It was also necessary to identify with what goods they could

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[428] Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 85–94; Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 100–103.

[429] Toledo, "Instrucción general," 5.

[430] AGI, justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, ff. 125r.–128r.

[431] AGI, Quito 8, ramo 5, n. 10, García de Valverde sobre la visita a Almaguer, f. 1r.

best pay. The tributes were to be paid in products that were natural to the area in which the natives lived, not in gold. The tributes were to be lower than what the natives had previously paid to their chief in the "times of infidelity." In addition, López was ordered to abolish personal services and the use of natives to carry loads.[432] The *tasa* was written down and given to the *cacique*, and its content was explained to the local people by an interpreter in their own language, so that the natives would know exactly what their obligations were to be.[433]

Hinojosa had orders to perform a census among the natives, counting not only the tribute paying adult male population, but everyone, and to find out about their livelihoods. He was to clarify the different payments and services the natives made to their *caciques* and *encomenderos*, and to determine the tributes they could pay so that it would cause no harm and they would have enough left to provide for themselves and their families. The tributes were to be written down, with copies given to the royal *audiencia*, the *encomendero*, and the *cacique*.[434]

In addition, the Hinojosa's task was to discover how the natives were treated, and to listen to all their complaints and grievances. He was to solve all the cases presented to him concerning the natives, be they civil or criminal cases, and to punish those guilty of maltreatment or other crimes. He also had orders to look into the conversion of the natives and find out if they were still practicing idolatry and sacrifices. Furthermore, Hinojosa was to reorganize the natives so that they lived together in villages in good order and in a civilized manner. He was also to see that the roads were kept open and in good condition so that it would be easy to travel through the country.[435]

On the face of it, Valverde's commission was more straightforward than Hinojosa's. He was simply ordered to determine the natives' tributes to their *encomenderos*.[436] However, his *visita* was in fact the most comprehensive and elaborate of them all. He attempted quite a profound reorganization of government and of social relations between the natives and the Spaniards in Pasto and Almaguer.[437]

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[432] AGI, Santa Fe 533, libro 1, Real cedula a la audiencia del Nuevo Reino sobre visita a Popayán, 9 Sept. 1555, ff. 400v.–402v.

[433] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, ff. 7r.–7v.

[434] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, ff. 125r.–127v.

[435] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, ff. 125r.–127v.

[436] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde), ff. 134r.–135r., 339r.

[437] Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 64.

Angulo de Castejón's task was to review the *tasa* (amount of tributes) previously assessed by López, and to modify it if needed.[438]

In other words, all of the *visitadores* had the simple task of bringing order to Popayán. After the tributes and other obligations of both Spaniards and natives were regulated, the *encomendero*s could no longer make excessive demands of the natives or, if they did, they could not claim ignorance. The Spanish still controlled only a part of the vast terrain, and their rule was fragile; the terrain was rough, some of the natives were still unconquered, and local communities were often uncooperative. Therefore, the task was never going to be easy.

After Garcia de Valverde, there were no new *visitas* in the *gobernación* for over thirty years until Diego de Armenteros y Henao, *oidor* of the *audiencia* of Quito, carried one out in 1607. That was followed by Luis de Quiñones' *visita* in Pasto in 1616, and the *visitas* of Antonio Rodriguez de San Isidro Manrique in 1638 and Diego Inclán de Valdés in 1668, which fall out of the time span of this study. The frequency of *visitas* is not a direct indicator of the central government's interest, but it seems that for one reason or another, official inspection in the *gobernación* of Popayán was not deemed important in the late sixteenth century. The crown and its council, the viceroys, and the royal *audiencias* had their hands full elsewhere, and they let things in the periphery run their course.

In the early seventeenth century, things had changed, and the motives for the later *visita* can be seen in Armenteros y Henao's report. He stated that the land was very poor despite being rich in gold. The Andeans did not work enough, and the *encomenderos* could not sustain themselves. The *visitador* wanted to increase the efficiency of gold mining, and promised that with new *tasación*, the royal coffers would receive much more gold from *quintos* than it had before.[439] Armenteros y Henao's population statistics show that the native depopulation continued, which meant that the revenues had also dropped since the natives did most of the work. Consequently, Armenteros y Henao visited mainly the mining districts of the *gobernación*.

The *visitador* wanted to secure more revenues for the crown, but the *gobernación* also urgently needed cash. The wars against the Pijaos and Nasas (Paeces) continued, and they cost a lot of money. It was especially important for the city Popayán, which

[438] AGN, Encomiendas 28, d. 16, Retasa de tributos por el Licenciado Diego Angulo de Castejón en Cartago, 1568, f. 624r.

[439] AGI, Quito 9, ramo 10, n. 76, El oidor Diego de Armenteros sobre la visita a Popayán, Cali, Buga y Roldanillo, Popayán, 2 May 1607, f. 1r.

as the capital was responsible for protecting the entire *gobernación*.[440] The *visita* was conducted the same year Governor Sarmiento de Sotomayor took office. In the following year, he intensified campaigns against independent indigenous groups, increasing the need for more revenues.

At the time of Armenteros y Henao's *visita*, the *gobernación* did not seem to be any more governable than it had been right after Lopez's *visita* so many years earlier. Echoing Governor Luis de Guzmán's complaints almost fifty years previously, the *visitador* lamented that due to the long distances and difficulties of travelling, the indoctrination of the natives was in poor shape, and the previous governors had not done anything to remedy the situation.[441]

4.2 Regulating the Relationships

Orders and Regulations of the *Visitas*

As a peripheral region, Popayán was less integrated into the colonial economy than the areas closer to the core. The region's most important resource was gold, and mining was hard and dangerous work. López's *visita* was the first serious attempt to organize and regulate the institution of *encomienda* in Popayán. The problem was, from the officials' point of view, that there were no rules about how much a certain community should pay as tribute to their *encomenderos*, and what kind of service they were obliged to perform. The *encomienda* system was based on quasi-feudal personal relations, and it was largely beyond the crown's control, at least at the periphery. Therefore, the importance of the *visitas* studied here lies in the fact that for the first time, the relationships between the Spanish *encomenderos* and the Andean communities entrusted to them were being regulated in detail.

López's *visita* was not only the first comprehensive census of the indigenous population in the whole *gobernación*, but also the first inventory of the territory's resources.[442] The instructions for López's *visita*, given by the *audiencia* of Santafé in the name of the king, stated that tributes should be paid with tangible items that the

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[440] AGI, Quito 9, ramo 10, n. 76a, El oidor Diego de Armenteros sobre la visita a Popayán, Cali, Buga y Roldanillo, Popayán, 14 April, 1607, f. 3r.

[441] AGI, Quito 9, ramo 10. n. 71, Carta de Diego de Armenteros, oidor de la audiencia de Quito, a S.M., Popayán, 27 March 1607, ff. 1r.–1v.

[442] See Calero *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 62–63.

natives had or that grew on their land. The *tasa* should be moderate, so that the natives would be able to provide for themselves and their children, and take care of their sick. They should be lower than what used to be owed to *caciques* during the "time of infidelity" (*tiempo de infidelidad*). In addition, the instructions stated that the natives should not be used for personal services or sent to work in the mines.[443] López therefore abolished tributes paid in gold, and ordered that the tributes should be paid in kind, mostly with agricultural products and manufactured goods that the communities could easily attain.

A review of the censuses and the tribute lists allows the following observations to be made. The lists of tribute-worthy products varied from village to village and from region to region. The most important goods on the lists included corn, beans, wheat, birds (hens), *cháquira* (beads), and cotton blankets. López's tribute lists therefore offer insight into the contemporary indigenous economy and production. However, they also included items that the communities did not produce in pre-Colombian times. Either the natives had started to produce them after the Spanish arrival, or López's purpose was to introduce these products. Probably both cases were true. It seems that López did not always follow the order that the tributes should be paid in products that were easiest for the natives to attain.

López's *visita* thus also offers insight into native adaptation to the colonial economy. Corn and cotton were important items in the pre-colonial indigenous economy, and it is possible that *cháquira* was used as some sort of currency.[444] By contrast, the Spaniards introduced wheat and hens. Indigenous communities were also obliged to pay part of their tributes with headstalls and girths for a horse. The natives must have learned to make those items after the Spanish arrived. Meanwhile, clay pottery and hammocks are examples of products the natives were already making. The native communities continued to produce certain traditional products, but the Spaniards also introduced new items that the natives adopted, either voluntarily or by force.

Communities were taxed collectively, but the tribute was determined by the number of working age men. Women were not counted even though they played an important role in the Andean economy. They performed part of the labor to fulfill the tribute quotas but were rendered invisible by the colonial tribute regime. In Andean societies, the gender system was based on complementarity and parallelism,

[443] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, ff. 6r.–6v.

[444] Luis F. Calero assumes that *cháquira* had a quasi-monetary value as it was used as an item of tribute for the Spaniards and as an item of wealth in burials. Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 33. However, it does not seem that there was any kind of monetary system in the true meaning of the term in the region.

both of which permeated all aspects of life, including the economy and the division of labor. The Spaniards neither grasped this system nor took it into account. Furthermore, the high mortality and large number of men constantly performing their compulsory labor duties meant that the sex ratio in the communities was often imbalanced, leaving women in the majority. As a result, the otherwise invisible women often fulfilled a significant part of the community's obligations.[445] For unmarried women, freed from all tax burdens, this gave an opportunity seek financial independence. A few managed to gather considerable wealth through commerce.[446]

In addition to the tributes paid in kind, local communities were ordered to perform certain services for their *encomendero*, such as planting and harvesting their fields or gathering firewood for them.[447] In a way, López institutionalized the system of *servicios personales* even though he was supposed to abolish it. This was done for pragmatic reasons. The law prohibited the use of personal services, but the practice was widespread and common in the *gobernación* of Popayán. The *visitador* could not abolish services the natives undertook for their *encomenderos* because the *encomenderos* could not otherwise sustain themselves. There was no other workforce available. López did not want to order the tributes to be paid in gold, as this would have further encouraged the *encomenderos* to hire workers in the dangerous mines. The difference between the pre- and post-*visita* situation was that now the services were also regulated and included in the tribute.

In Pasto, the *tasa* included more services for the *encomendero* than in Popayán. The Pasto communities were ordered to send young men to serve in the house of the *encomendero* in fifteen day cycles. They also were obliged to repair the *encomendero*'s house every two years. In Popayán, these obligations were not included although, like in Pasto, the tribute included harvesting and gathering firewood for the *encomendero*. Silvia Padilla Altamirano assumes that the reason for the differing obligations is that in Pasto, López travelled together with the bishop of Quito, while in Popayán, he was accompanied by Juan del Valle, the bishop of Popayán. Del Valle was a fierce opponent of personal services since they increased abuses against the natives.[448]

Later, these work obligations would be defined as *mita*, a form of compulsory labor based on a rotating labor force. The term was not in use at the time of López's *visita*, but essentially, he institutionalized the system in Popayán. Hinojosa and

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[445] Powers, "Andeans and Spaniards," 531–533.

[446] Lane, *Quito 1599*, 95–96.

[447] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López.

[448] Padilla, "Tasaciones de encomiendas," 87–88.

Valverde further institutionalized it a decade later in their *visitas*. The idea was to get rid of the various forms of personal services and to replace them with a sanctioned system whereby the officials determined all services.

The mountain region of Cali was a special case. While the valley of Cauca, where the majority of the natives of Cali lived, was very fertile, the natives living in the mountains had very little agricultural products with which to pay their tributes. In addition, Cali had a peculiar position as a port town located 200 kilometers from the sea. The actual port was in the town of Buenaventura, but it never turned into a commercial center due to its unhealthy environment. All the goods and people arriving into and leaving from Buenaventura passed through Cali. To travel between Buenaventura and Cali, one had to travel across mountains at the altitude of 2,000 meters without roads that could be used by cargo animals or carts; as a result, the only way to move merchandise was on the backs of indigenous carriers.[449]

Recognizing but unhappy with this situation, López ordered that the natives of Cali's mountain region should pay their tributes by carrying loads from Buenaventura, as they had done before. Each tribute-paying native should make two trips per year between Buenaventura and the village of Vayuelos at the bottom of the mountains. The natives should not go further, because the climate of the valley of Cali was thought to be unhealthy for the mountaineers who were not accustomed to it. The carrier's wage went to the *encomendero* as a tribute, but the carrier would receive half a peso for each voyage. If the natives wanted to make more than the two trips per year, they were allowed to do so of their own will, but they were to be paid for it.[450]

Carrying loads across the rough terrain was familiar for the natives of the mountains, and apparently, they had done such work long before the arrival of the Spaniards. Without it, long-distance barter would not have been possible because there were no cargo animals used in the Northern Andes. During the colonial era, this necessity was turned into one of the many forms of personal services the colonists demanded from the indigenous peoples, since the Spanish horses also could not safely carry loads through the mountains. The officials could not prohibit the carrying obligations completely, even if the law banned it, because the town of Cali and the entire *gobernación* depended on it. There were no other ports in the *gobernación*, and there were no easily accessible sites for new ports. All that López could do here was to regulate the existing system and try to ensure that the natives were not forced to carry too many loads.

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[449] Padilla, "Tasaciones de encomiendas," 92–93.

[450] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, ff. 79r.–87r.

This serves as a good example of the development of native-Spanish relations in general. The Spaniards looked for the best ways to take advantage of the indigenous work force. They made them do the things they were used to doing, but demanded that they do more than they were used to. With the lack of regulation, the *encomenderos* tried to extract as much profit as possible, and this often created conflicts between them and their *encomendados*. The Spanish officials tried to regulate interethnic relationships, often by moderating yet formalizing existing practices. However, this was a slow process, and one that was never really completed.

The different obligations that indigenous communities owed were an essential part of the relationships between the ethnic groups. The Spaniards depended on the food supplies, other commodities, and the work force that the natives provided. The indigenous communities satisfied the Spaniards' basic needs; indeed, the Spaniards could not survive without the natives. For the indigenous communities, this meant that most of their surplus went directly to the Spaniards, sometimes making it difficult for them to accommodate their own basic needs. Some communities, of course, were successful and prosperous.

Despite being a self-proclaimed defender of the natives, López was not interested in shaking the status quo too much. The *encomenderos* were too important: if they left, the colony would have been lost. Furthermore, according to the *visitador*'s patronizing view, idleness was not good for the natives and their obligation to work was not a bad thing. However, there also needed to be enough time to rest, take care of the sick, and learn religion.

The *tasa* ordered by López was actually quite moderate. Most of the communities likely had no problem meeting the demands set by the *tasa*, and the *encomenderos* had undoubtedly demanded more before the *visita*.[451] It seems that López did not pay much attention to how much and with what the Andean communities themselves wanted to pay their tribute. His tribute lists were very diverse and contained a huge variety of products. Although the *tasa* was supposed to be comprised of easily attainable products, this rule was evidently not followed. If they had been, the lists of products demanded from each community would have differed from each other much more than they actually did.

Many Spanish observers paid attention to the very different conditions under which the indigenous peoples of Popayán lived, but apparently Tomás López did not. For example, Juan López de Velasco wrote in the 1570s that the natives of Cali

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[451] As Jeremy Ravi Mumford states, at first the tribute was basically whatever the *encomendero* was able to extort, and later, what the Spanish officials decided the communities could afford. Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 29.

lived "mostly in disorder, naked and poorly dressed, and all very poor people" (*por la mayor parte de behetria, desnudos y mal vestidos, y todos gente muy pobre*); as a result, it would be best to tribute them with gold, corn, and natives of service instead of anything else.[452] Obviously, this description reflects more the prejudices of López de Velasco than reality, but it is probably true, that the indigenous communities of Cali had less resources at their disposal then those of Pasto or Popayán.

Tomás López obviously saw things differently, as the list of products with which he ordered the natives of Cali to pay their tribute is as varied as those living in Popayán, where the indigenous people were wealthier. However, the amount of tribute owed per person, when converted to a value in gold, was twice as high in Popayán as it was in Cali.[453]

It seems that in many cases, the lists were not followed, and tributes instead were paid partly or completely with other products, such as gold, or with services of a different kind. In many cases, it seems that this was done by mutual consent of the *encomendero* and the *cacique*. Some *encomenderos* definitely continued to demand more tribute that they were due according to the *tasa* set by López, but the *tasa* supported the indigenous communities' case should they decide to challenge the *encomenderos*' demands.[454]

Some years after the *visita*, Juan Galíndez from Pasto was accused of using the natives of his *encomienda* as carriers. However, the *cacica* (female *cacique*) Ana of Tuquerresme testified that she herself had given men from her village for the task. The salary for the work was given to her *encomendero* Juan Galindez as tribute.[455] In his defense, Juan Galindez maintained that he had never ordered any natives to carry cargos, but the *caciques* had the habit of renting out their people for this purpose to help them pay their tribute. However, García de Valverde, who was at the time *gobernador* of Popayán, found him guilty and sentenced him to pay 500 castellanos in gold as a fine and for expenses.[456]

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[452] López de Velasco, *Geografía y descripción*, 208. Juan López de Velasco was a royal cosmographer and historian during the reign of Philip II. He never visited the Indies, but his *relaciones* are based on detailed questionnaires sent to different parts of the colonial empire. See Ruan, "Cosmographic Description."

[453] Padilla, "Tasaciones de encomiendas," 88–95.

[454] Most of the court cases used as sources throughout this study dealt with the legality of the Spanish demands on the indigenous communities.

[455] AGN, Caciques e indios 55, doc. 8, Pasto: empleo de los indios como acémilas, 1564, ff. 490v.–491r.

[456] AGN, Caciques e indios 55, doc. 8, Pasto: empleo de los indios como acémilas, 1564, ff. 498v.–499v.

The people of Tuquerresme were Quillacingas, and the tribute list composed by Tomás López probably contained many items they did not or could not actually produce. When Valverde later visited the area, he made a note that the Quillacingas had not been used to paying tributes at all before the Spanish arrived.[457] Therefore, they probably had little objections if they were asked to pay their tribute by carrying cargos for their *encomendero*'s benefit rather than paying tributes in kind.

There was also another case from the town of Pasto in the same year related to the use of natives as carriers. This time, Esteban Hernández Guerrero, husband of the underage *encomendero*'s mother, was accused of making the natives of Tuquerres carry cargos between Pasto and Almaguer and between Pasto and Quito. Garcia de Valverde was the judge in this case as well. This time one of the carriers named Guayxila testified through an interpreter that Esteban Hernández and his own *cacique* were the ones who gave him the loads to carry. The *cacique* don Gomez said that he had been imprisoned by Esteban Hernández because he had not paid his tributes, and that the *encomendero* had demanded carriers as tribute. He agreed, and had sent his men to carry cargos several times. However, the *cacique* claimed that this time he did not know his men were being used as carriers until the governor came and asked about it. He had sent his men to the town of Pasto to clear the land, and a *yanacona* named Chatapornugo, who was not Christian, had ordered them to carry the cargo to Almaguer.[458]

The carriers were not necessarily always taken by force, although that undoubtedly happened in some instances. Other communities rented people to carry cargos in exchange for pay. It is impossible to know whether the Spaniards forced the natives of Tuquerresme or Tuquerres to carry cargos, or whether their *caciques* voluntarily paid their tribute by giving their men for this purpose rather than by making products for which they had no tradition producing. It is possible that this use of human carriers was undertaken by mutual agreement.

When Tomás López performed a *visita* in Nuevo Reino in 1560, he found that there was a great variety of arrangements between the *encomenderos* and their natives. López confirmed many of these arrangements, finding them (in his opinion) to be favorable for the natives. According to Jorge Gamboa, the *encomenderos* were usually willing to negotiate different forms of tribute with the natives in order to avoid mutinies or escapes.[459] These negotiations do not necessarily leave traces in the

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[457] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, 157–1571, ff. 715r.–715v.

[458] AGN, Cacique e indios 57, documento 28, Causa contra Esteban Hernández Guerrero por servir de los indios como acémilas, hojas 555r.–562v.

[459] Gamboa, *Cacicazgo muisca*, 413–417.

archives: the agreements often were not written on paper or, if they were, they have not been preserved. They belong to the realm of the hidden transcript, and are often mentioned in the documents only in passing.

Collecting tribute was the *caciques*' obligation, and they were personally responsible for the full amount. When the community could not fulfill its quota, the *cacique* was sometimes imprisoned until it did. However, that created a new problem, as the *caciques* obviously could not gather the tribute while they were in prison. In 1565, two imprisoned *caciques* named Puengue and Yapone in the village of Ambalo pleaded for the officials to set them free so they gather the missing tributes. The *justicia mayor* Francisco Mosquera ordered that they be set free and gave them four months to gather the missing tributes.[460] Ambalo was the crown's *encomienda* at the time, so the personal relationships between the *cacique* and *encomendero* were not as important in this case, but still the *caciques* were personally responsible for their communities' dues.

For the crown and its officials, determining the tributes and the natives' other obligations was a balancing act between three different interests: filling the royal coffers with gold, sustaining the Spanish settlement, and protecting the diminishing indigenous population. The crown's attitude toward native labor was therefore ambiguous from the beginning of colonialism until the region's independence. It tried to protect the indigenous peoples with a series of laws and statutes, starting with the Laws of Burgos in 1512, but at the same time, it wanted to ensure the flow of revenues produced by native labor.

The tribute system imposed by Tomás López was very complicated. López was worried about the depopulation of the natives caused, he believed, by hard work in the mines. He therefore abolished tributes in gold. Angulo de Castejón, Hinojosa, and Valverde, by contrast, tried to simplify the system. They certainly were less rigorous when it came to natives working in the mines. All of them ordered the tributes to be paid partly or completely in gold just ten years after López had abolished the practice. Hinojosa justified this reversal by claiming that gold was so abundant in Popayán that it was the easiest way for the natives to pay their tribute. The real reason was more likely the fact that the gold mines could not be productive without the indigenous workforce.

African slaves later replaced the indigenous peoples in the mines, but in the sixteenth century slaves were rare and expensive. The Spanish officials thought the

[460] ACC, Colonia, Tributos, Signatura: 1158 (Col. C I -17 t), Almoneda de lo que pagaron los indios de Ambaló por cuenta de lo que debían de sus tributos del tercio de san Juan de 1565, Popayán, 20 August 1565.

climate of Popayán was better for Africans than the extremely high altitude and cold climate of the silver town Potosí, and the local settlers continuously asked the crown to subsidize slaves to work in their mines. However, while there were African slaves working in the mines of Arma, Anserma, Cartago, and Almaguer since they were founded, the poverty of the local elites and the precariousness of the Spanish control in the region surrounded by hostile indigenous peoples kept their number relatively small during the time period covered in this study.[461]

Hinojosa ordered that all the communities' tributes in the jurisdiction of the city of Popayán be valued in gold. The tribute was two and one half or three gold pesos per year for each married adult man between the ages of 21 and 50, depending on the village. Under-aged men between the ages of 17 and 21, as well as unmarried men, paid two gold pesos.[462] In addition, the natives were still obliged to sow and harvest the fields of their *encomenderos*, but the *encomenderos* were to pay for this work according to fixed rates. The salaries could also be deducted from the community's tributes. *The encomendero* had no right to demand anything further from his *encomendados*.[463]

In the mountains of Cali, Hinojosa retained López's order according to which the natives paid their tributes by carrying loads to and from Buenaventura. Like López, he did not see this to be an ideal situation, but he saw no other choice.[464] The loads had to be carried, and the mountaineers could not pay with gold or with agricultural products.

Valverde ordered the tributes of Pasto to be paid partly with gold, and partly with other products, such as cotton blankets, corn, and birds (hens). However, the number of different products was much smaller than in López's *visita*. In addition to the tribute, the communities were ordered to give their *encomendero* a certain number of farmhands. Valverde also determined the tributes the natives owed to their *caciques* and the food they owed to the priests who converted them.[465]

In Almaguer, the situation was different again, because the land there was poor for agricultural products. All the Spaniards interrogated by Valverde assured him that the only way the natives could pay their tributes was by mining gold for their *encomendero* in the region's rich gold mines. The governor of Popayán don Álvaro de

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[461] Lane, *Mining the Margins*, Chapter Five; Lane, "Captivity and Redemption," 239–240.

[462] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, pieza 1, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, ff. 91r.–92r.

[463] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, pieza 1, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, ff 92v.–93v.

[464] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, ff. 77v.–87r.; AGI, Justicia 639, n. 3, Visita de Hinojosa a Cali, ff. 79r–82v.

[465] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, ff. 352r.–704v.

Mendoza Carvajal claimed that the region's natives were poor and had very little with which to pay their tributes. If they were forced to pay in gold or in cotton blankets, they would refuse to do so. The only solution, according to the governor, was to have them send a certain number of people to work in the Spaniards' mines.[466] The natives of Almaguer were also ordered to take care of the roads and inns in the region's rugged mountains.[467] This was important, because the passage between Pasto and Popayán ran through Almaguer. Like López and Hinojosa had done in Cali in terms of native carriers, Valverde legalized the already common practice of sending native posses to the mines in Almaguer; the only difference was that it was now regulated.

In Cartago, Angulo de Castejón ordered that every married *tributario* should give the *encomendero* one hen and either one cotton blanket or one peso and one ducat (1½ pesos) of gold. The natives were to cultivate an amount of corn in the *encomendero*'s field according to the size of the village.[468] The tributes were significantly reduced from those that López ordered, and all the products apart from blankets and hens were taken off the list. This outraged the *encomenderos,* and they argued that the natives could pay more than eight pesos of gold per year and still have plenty of time to provide for themselves.[469] In response, the *procurador de cabildo* Diego de Alameda demanded that the tributes actually be increased instead of decreased[470]

A similar trend of simplifying the tribute lists occurred in Peru under viceroy Toledo. Pedro de la Gasca had institutionalized the tribute system in 1549 after a mutiny caused by the New Laws. Under his regime, the tribute lists contained a variety of different products and services. Toledo's reforms reduced them to a few items, including silver. At the same time, he stripped the *encomendero*'s economic control. The tribute was collected by the *corregidor de indios* (governor of the *corregimiento*), with the *caciques*' assistance.[471]

Viceroy Toledo's tribute reform increased the indigenous peoples' free wage labor, as the major part of the tribute was to be paid in money. This meant that the natives had to earn money in order to pay their tributes, as they could not gather

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[466] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, ff. 135r.–135v. . 158v.–168r.

[467] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, ff. 318v.–322r.

[468] AGN, Encomiendas 28, d. 16, Retasa de tributos por el Licenciado Diego Angulo de Castejón en Cartago, 1568, ff. 626v.–628r.

[469] AGN, Encomiendas 28, d. 16, Retasa de tributos por el Licenciado Diego Angulo de Castejón en Cartago, 1568, f. 655r.

[470] AGN, Encomiendas 28, d. 16, Retasa de tributos por el Licenciado Diego Angulo de Castejón en Cartago, 1568, f. 593v.

[471] Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 132.

enough just by selling their surplus agricultural products. Creating a labor market and drawing natives into a monetary economy was one of Toledo's aims from the beginning.[472] It is difficult to say whether the effects of Angulo de Castejón, Valverde, and Hinojosa's tribute reforms were the same, but they all probably enforced the emerging monetary economy in the region.

The *visitadores* categorically prohibited all forms of personal services, but they tried to compensate by institutionalizing a system of rotational labor drafts, whereby each community was obliged to provide a certain number of people to work in the Spanish mines, farms, factories, building sites, or homes for a fixed period of time. From the 1560s onwards, the system was called *mita*; it took several different forms in different places and at different times.

The Spaniards adopted the *mita* because there was a shortage of voluntary wage labor. One of the reasons for the crisis of 1560s was the indigenous depopulation and the resultant reduction in the workforce. Andeans were usually unwilling to work in the mines for the wages they were offered. From the Spanish point of view, it was necessary to organize indigenous labor to build houses, churches, roads and bridges, and to mine the precious metals.[473] Essentially, *mita* was designed to force the natives to work for the Spaniards for nominal compensation in the name of the common good.

In the jurisdiction of Popayán, Hinojosa stated that he wanted to organize native labor in a way that met all the demands of Spanish society, but no native would be forced to work excessively. Hinojosa ordered that in the city of Popayán, there should be 150 *mitayos* building houses, bringing firewood and fodder, and doing other works. The *mitayos* should serve in turns of one month, after which other 150 men would take their place. Hinojosa determined, based on each village's size, how many *mitayos* should come from each. These *mitayos* should be paid one peso of gold every month, as well as be given food.[474]

Hinojosa also saw that there would be a need for the natives to do other work apart from their *mita* duties. He ordered that the natives should practice all the necessary trades, since there was nobody but the natives to do all this work. In short, they should be occupied as masons, carpenters, farmhands, potters, grooms, cooks, laundresses, sewers, bakers, etc. Hinojosa ordered a fixed price that should be paid for each of these jobs.[475] All the *visitador* would do was to regulate the native

[472] Zulawski, *They Eat*, 53–54.

[473] Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 155–158.

[474] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, pieza 1, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, 1569, ff. 102r.–103v.

[475] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, pieza 1, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, 1569, ff. 103v.–104v.

workforce. Prohibiting it completely was never a realistic option, as the prohibition would not have been followed. If it were, the Spanish colonies would not have survived.

Forced indigenous labor in the mines thus was common despite the laws prohibiting it. The economy of much of the *gobernación* was based on gold mining by the indigenous peoples.[476] The *procurador de cabildo* of Cartago, Diego de Alameda, actually claimed that it would harm the natives if they were not allowed to pay their tribute with the gold they mined. The natives had mined gold since time immemorial, and were used to the work. Prohibiting it would apparently mean depriving them of their liberty.[477]

Alamedas claim was obviously ridiculous. It is clear that the Quimbayas of Cartago had mined gold before the Spanish arrived, and were already recognized as masters of goldsmithing. However, that they never practiced gold mining as extensively as they did during the colonial era, when they were fulfilling the insatiable Spanish demand for the precious metal.

In 1570, the *audiencia* of Santafé issued regulations on native work in the mines. According to the regulations, no native was to be forced to work in the mines against his will; as free persons, by contrast, they were allowed to do so voluntarily. In that case, each worker was to be paid six grains of gold (half-a-*tomín*) per day. In addition, the worker should be given food and tools for the work. The mineworker should pay his tribute and provide for himself and his family with the salary, but the money was his own. Only the *encomenderos* could hire their *encomendados* to work in mines, and the miners could not be forced to do any other work. Furthermore, only one tenth of the male population of a village could work in the mines at any given time.[478]

It is unlikely that the mining regulations were followed. Zamira Díaz López estimates that as much a third of the *gobernación*'s tribute paying population worked in the mines at least part of the year.[479] These workers were unavailable to cultivate the community's fields, but nevertheless paid the community's tribute. This meant that the community could use their own products how they wanted.

Most of the indigenous chiefs interviewed by Hinojosa wanted to pay in gold rather than in agricultural products. Even some of those who did not have any mines

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[476] See West, *Colonial Placer Mining*, 82.

[477] AGN, Encomiendas 28, d. 16, Retasa de tributos por el Licenciado Diego Angulo de Castejón en Cartago, 1568, ff. 578r.–578v.

[478] AGN, Caciques e indios 63, doc. 21, Reales provisiones sobre trabajo de indios en minas de oro, 5 Sept. 1570 ff. 599v.–601v.

[479] Díaz López, *Oro, sociedad y economía*, 179.

near their villages preferred traveling to mines or buying gold and paying the tribute with it. The rest wanted to work for their tributes, but none of the *caciques* wanted to pay in foodstuffs.[480] It seems that it was very common for the natives to be reluctant to give away their own products as a tribute and to prefer working or paying in gold. This reluctance to use their own fields to produce goods for outside authorities was not restricted to the natives of Popayán, but was very common all over the Andean world.[481]

An *encomendero* named Gonzalo García Zambrano testified that many indigenous groups wished that they could pay their tribute of cotton blankets in gold because they did not grow cotton. The natives had to buy the cotton, often at a high price, and then weave it; this, in turn, was also difficult for them since they were not used to it. According to the witness, it would be easier if the tributes were determined in gold.[482] This is a testimony of a single *encomendero*, but considering that the natives also stated that they preferred paying in gold, it is plausible that they had indeed wanted to pay their tribute—determined in other products—in gold.

All three *visitadores* faced resistance from the *encomenderos*, but none faced as much trouble as Pedro de Hinojosa. The *encomenderos* of Cali were especially defiant against the *visitador*, threatening rebellion if the *tasa* was not changed. The bishop Agustín de la Coruña was also against the *tasa* and refused to sign it. However, he assured Hinojosa that he would not speak against it in public. He promised to say in his sermons that the *tasa* was catholic and good, and that he would excommunicate all the *encomenderos* who went against it. This was because the alternative of having no *tasa* was worse than having a bad one. The bishop's actions caused strong objections among the *encomenderos*. In the end, the bishop joined with the *encomenderos* to demand a new *tasa*. Hinojosa finally agreed to amend the *tasa* because he was afraid of an *encomendero* rebellion.[483] The main controversy was that Hinojosa had ordered that the native carriers should be paid in full for their second annual trip between Cali and Buenaventura; this point was revoked.

The *cabildo* (council) of Cali complained in a letter to the Council of the Indies that Pedro de Hinojosa's *visita* had been a disaster and had left the city in ruins. The *vecinos* would lose their properties if Hinojosa's orders were followed. The reason for *visita*'s poor result was that Hinojosa had, according to the *cabildo* of Cali, very little

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480 AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, ff. 63r.–86r.

481 Spalding, *Huarochiri*, 172.

482 AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, f. 35v.

483 AGI, Justicia 639, n. 3, Visita de Hinojosa a Cali, ff. 3r.–5v.

experience in *visitas*; the *cabildo* asked for another *visita* to be made by a more experienced and authoritative *oidor*.[484]

The bishop of Popayán, Agustín de la Coruña, by contrast, objected when the tributes of Popayán were determined in gold. He claimed that mining was dangerous for the natives, and that it would be better for them to pay tributes in kind, as they had done following Tomás López's *visita*.[485] Agustín de la Coruña, like his predecessor Juan del Valle, was a champion of the rights of the indigenous peoples. He arrived in the Indies, or in Mexico to be more precise, in 1533 as an Augustinian friar. He was one of the first seven Augustinians apostles in New Spain, and worked there for almost three decades. La Coruña was named bishop of Popayán in 1561, but apparently, he only learned about the appointment when he was in Spain in 1562. After spending some years in Spain, he arrived in Popayán in 1566. Very soon after his arrival he fell into conflict with the local *encomenderos* and officials about the treatment of the natives. He was the bishop of Popayán until his death in 1589, although he spent several years away from the dioceses on two different occasions, first in Lima and then in Quito, when tensions with the local Spaniards forced him into exile.[486]

Hinojosa and La Coruña fell out badly during the *visita*. According to Hinojosa, La Coruña was more worried about the Church's tithes than about the well-being of the natives. He said that according to the royal orders, the tributes should be paid with what was most easily accessible for the natives; in the case of Popayán, this was gold. The natives themselves agreed. La Coruña called himself the father of the *indios*. According to Hinojosa, he was not their father but really a stepfather who did not in reality care for them.[487]

Hinojosa's *tasa* was higher than that of López, if the latter was converted into its value in gold. For its part, López's *tasa* was very complicated due to the vast variety of products that it demanded. Determining the tributes in gold simplified the *tasa* and also helped its negotiation, because the gold could be compensated by work on the *encomendero*'s estates. Thus, paying in gold meant that the communities would not have to pay with their own agricultural products. It is probable that this was the reason the natives invariably preferred the tributes being set in gold, rather than in kind.

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[484] AGI, Quito 18, n. 28, El Cabildo de Cali sobre varios asuntos, 5 January 1570, f. 1r.

[485] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, 1569–1571, pieza 1, ff. 111r–111v.

[486] Alonso, *Agustín de la Coruña*, passim.

[487] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, f. 112v.

Creating spaces of negotiation

Tomás López's *visita* was a significant watershed in the history of the *gobernación* of Popayán. The process of the *gobernación*'s bureaucratization was slow, long, and far from being straightforward, but certain events can be seen as landmarks in its development. López's *visita* brought the central government to the local level on a scale never seen before. The immediate effects of the *visita* were very limited, but its symbolic significance was enormous. López regulated all the obligations the natives had toward their *encomenderos* and abolished all other forms of service that the Spaniards might demand from them. From that point forward, no *encomendero* could claim that he did not know what he could and could not demand from his *encomendados*.

For the natives, the *visita* also offered an important legal backing in their defense against the *encomenderos*' abuses and excessive demands, since the *visita* recorded in writing their obligations. It is a different matter, of course, how well the regulations were followed. In many subsequent court cases, natives or their defenders invoked López's *visita* when claiming that the *encomenderos*' demands were excessive. Of course, the problem of accountability remained because there were no judges the natives could go to unless they travelled all the way to Santafé.

The *visitas* of Hinojosa, Valverde, and Castejón continued the work of López by further enhancing the bureaucratization process. They were also connected with the larger process across the Andean region. In Peru, the crisis of the 1560s was followed by a thorough reorganization of Andean society; this had profound effects on the lives of the indigenous people even though viceroy Toledo and his followers never completely succeeded in their attempt to create their utopia of docile communities dedicated to serving the Spaniards.[488] In Popayán, the effects of the central authorities' attempts at reform remained much more limited, and the region remained a periphery. Nevertheless, they were not insignificant.

The *visitas* were an arena where the conflicting interests of the crown, church, *encomenderos*, local officials, and natives intersected.[489] All *visitadores* personally visited at least some of the native villages, or ordered the native communities gather at the nearest Spanish town. The *visitadores* interviewed the indigenous population, or at least their leaders. Hinojosa's report is, though, the only one that contains interrogations of the natives about how much tribute they could pay, and with what products. The *visitadores* were representatives of the distant colonial state who came

[488] Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 82–104.

[489] Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 60.

to the local communities to investigate the situation first hand. They thus were the first major step in the institutionalization of interethnic relations. The *visitas* were places of negotiation, mediation, struggle, and coercion, institutions that created at least temporary contact zones in which all the sectors of local society were involved. They enabled interethnic relations to be negotiated under the guidance of the state's representatives. They were not situations of equal encounters, due to the patronizing attitude that existed toward the natives, but they gave the natives a chance to challenge the authority of the *encomenderos*.

One of the *visitadores*' main goals was to regulate the relationships between the Spaniards and the indigenous communities. According to the commissions for the *visitas*, all the tributes needed to be determined and written down, with a copy given both to the *encomendero* and to the *cacique* so that no one could claim ignorance.[490] The crown stressed that the tributes the natives paid should be lower than the ones they had paid to their former lord.[491] It was important to demonstrate that the natives were now better off under the benevolent guidance of the Spanish monarch and the Catholic Church, than they had been under the "tyrants" of the pre-conquest age. However, this was a sort of legal fiction used to justify the tributes. While some of the communities of Popayán had paid tribute to or performed services for their chiefs before the Spanish arrived, it is clear that they never paid tribute to the extent they did afterwards. Some communities had not paid anything at all until they met the Spaniards.[492]

The *visitadores* left orders stating the obligations and rights of both parties. They had the highest level of authority and were not afraid to use their powers. They all had a huge task on their hands, as often at least part of the local community was uncooperative. Sometimes performing their duties turned out to be impossible, and their orders were never followed in full after the *visitador* left the *gobernación*. Regardless of the difficulties, the *visitas* laid the foundation for the colonial state's penetration into the area. They were therefore important events that brought the central administration to the local level.

All of the *visitadores* denounced the *encomenderos*' excessive demands and maltreatment of the natives. They all presented themselves as protectors or defenders of the natives, but their attitude was also patronizing. The *visita* reports tell mostly of economic relationships of power and offer a top down view. The *visitadores*

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[490] AGI, Audiencia de Quito 60, Visita de López, ff. 6v.–7v.; AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, f. 126r.

[491] This can be seen in the *instrucciones* of the *visitas* dealt with in Chapter 4.1.

[492] See for example Llanos Vargas, *Cacicazgos*, 65; Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 37–38.

were not interested so much in indigenous ways of life, but rather in their ability to pay tribute. In addition, their interest was not in preserving traditional indigenous habits or ways of life. The underlying motivation was to control the Andean population, as well as the Spaniards.

Pedro de Hinojosa investigated the *encomenderos*' crimes against the natives, and he issued very severe penalties against those Spaniards he found guilty of maltreatment. Three of them, settler Hernando de Tovar, missionary Alonso Camacho y Cordero, and Andres de Betanar, were sentenced to death and half their properties were confiscated as punishment for killing, robbing, and generally maltreating the natives. All three were absent from their respective trials, and the two first mentioned had managed to hide their assets so the sentences could not be executed.[493] It is unknown whether the death sentences were ever enforced, but probably they were not. According to Juan Friede, only one Spaniard, Pedro Saucedo, was executed for cruelties against natives in the whole of Spanish America.[494]

Other culprits of crimes against the natives were also punished. Most received fines varying from 20 to 700 pesos in gold. In addition, *encomendero* Juan Diaz Carrillo was sentenced to five years exile from Popayán and his *encomiendas* were confiscated. Miner Gaspar Diaz Portugues and missionary Miguel Muñoz were sentenced to whipping and ten years' galley service. In total, thirty-four Spaniards were sentenced, among them some of the most powerful men of Popayán. For example, Francisco de Belalcázar, the son and heir of Sebastián de Belalcázar, the conqueror of Popayán, was fined 600 pesos in gold.[495]

The punishments were harsh, according to Sebastián de Belalcázar too harsh, but Hinojosa claimed that he was actually being tender. If he had condemned the *encomenderos* according to the severity of their crimes, all of them would have lost their *encomiendas*; he did not want to go that far for fear of inciting a rebellion.[496] The natives' complaints must have been plenty. Many of them saw the *visita* as a good opportunity to denounce their maltreatment and to gain some freedom from their *encomenderos*. There are no minutes of the processes in the *visita* report, so it is difficult to know how it all happened. Most likely, the natives themselves reported at least some of the malpractices.

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[493] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 2, ff. 10r., 12r.

[494] Friede "La conquista del territorio," 172.

[495] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 2, ff. 10r.–13r.

[496] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 2, ff. 5v., 7v.

The *visitadores* had to navigate between the very different interests of the local elites while also taking into account the central government's point of view. Hinojosa's problems, described above, are a good example of the challenges faced during the *visita*. Hinojosa's *visita* also offers an explicit example of successful negotiation though a state institution. Most of the natives interviewed by Hinojosa wanted to pay their tributes in gold, and said that two pesos per person per year would be a suitable amount. The *encomenderos* also wanted gold, but in their opinion the natives could easily pay four pesos per person per year. Hinojosa set the tribute in the middle, at three pesos per person per year.[497]

The indigenous peoples of the colonies were imperial subjects. As such, they were free but they also had obligations towards the empire. One of the purposes of López's *visita* was to tie the natives more closely to the colonial imperial structure. In reality, many of the native communities were imperial subjects in name only. For the crown, it did not matter. Even though the Spanish Empire was at times more a fiction than a fact in the frontier zone, from the point of view of the metropole, things were how they seemed.

Although the *visitadores* acted as though Spanish rule was consolidated and undisputed, their *visitas* also showed its limits. Building the colonial empire was a multifaceted process, and one part of it was playing a game of make believe. It is not at all clear whether the natives entrusted to Spanish *encomenderos* actually recognized their *encomenderos* as their patrons, but it did not really matter in this case. Even if the *encomiendas* were in some cases a legal fiction, the *visitadores* acted as if they were real, and therefore made them such. The documentary evidence provided by Lopez's *visita* and the later ones that followed is distorted because of this legal fiction. Although they are written in a very neutral and descriptive way, they show how things should have been from the point of view of the Spanish officialdom, not how they really were.

The significance of the *visitas* and their true effects are thus ambiguous. One can simultaneously emphasize their role in the bureaucratization process of the colonies, and claim that they did not have much immediate effect after the *visitadores* had left the area.[498] The ambiguity is understandable, because the effects of the *visitas* are difficult to assess. The local elites took them seriously, and it is clear that the *visitadores* held a strong authority over the local communities. However, it is equally clear that many of the orders were left unenforced after the *visitas*, and that the royal authorities had to return to the same issues again and again. It seems that while the *visitas* did

[497] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1.

[498] See for example Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 60–79.

not change many things immediately, they were still very important steps in the colonial state formation process. On the one hand, their short-term effects should not be overestimated; on the other hand, it is wise to not underestimate their long-term effects.

Luis F. Calero sees the *visitas* as the first challenges to the *encomenderos*' local hegemony, which was characterized by the abuse of indigenous peoples and disregard for central legislation.[499] The *visitas* indeed challenged the *encomenderos*' authority and increased royal control in the area. Yet Calero's view somewhat downplays indigenous agency. Clearly, the natives did have means at their disposal to challenge the *encomenderos*' authority. As the Spanish presence stabilized and the colonial system developed, the indigenous communities moved more and more from open resistance to more subtle forms of everyday resistance, such as absenteeism, vagabondage, and foot-dragging.

The *visita* reports and other legal and administrative sources create a picture of the Spaniards' firm and undisputed control. There were tensions and problems, but there was never a question whether or not these lands were part of the Spanish empire. The colonizers seemed very confident in their position. This also is to a large extent a legal fiction. This is how the Spanish officials and settlers wanted things to appear, but it does not necessarily reflect the situation on the ground, where colonial rule was constantly disputed, resisted, negotiated, and redefined. Reading the sources literally creates an impression of a strong and consolidated empire, but there are enough cracks in the narrative created by the documentary record to reveal the fragilities of this constellation.

Abuse and general maltreatment of the natives was widespread and common, but the natives had the means to challenge the *encomenderos* even without the help of the royal officials. The *visita* reports offer mostly the view of the Spanish officials, so the native experience is practically impossible to read from them. Regardless, we can find some hints based on their actions. There is plenty of evidence of native resistance, of refusing to work, and of flights from Spanish reach, both in the *visita* reports and in other source material.

The *visita* reports seem to offer a very straightforward view of Andean-Spanish relationships. Spanish *encomenderos* were very firmly in power, and the natives were reduced to little more than a workforce. The *encomenderos* treated the natives poorly, and the indigenous peoples were helpless in front of this bad treatment. Some, though, were still fighting the Spaniards. These were pictured as stubborn and uncivilized rebels. There is very little sign of independent and prosperous natives or

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[499] Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 62.

native groups in the *visitas*. According to Hinojosa, the *encomenderos* had so much power over the natives of Cali that it was contrary to the liberty that God and his majesty wanted the indigenous peoples to have.[500] However, it is important to remember that it was also in the natives' interests to present themselves as weak and in need of protection.

The *visitas* show that within Spanish colonial society royal authority was not publicly disputed. Although the settlers might have complained about the *visitador*, they never challenged royal authority or the institution of the *visita* as such. They played by the rules. However, the orders were not followed after the *visitador* was gone, as there was nobody there to see that they were implemented. The *visitadores* of the seventeenth century often tackled the same issues as their colleagues in the previous century; this means that the crown officials' attempts to remodel local society were never completely successful.

From the point of view of the colonial state, the *gobernación* of Popayán remained a distant frontier zone. The central government occasionally turned its eye on the region, but it either was not interested enough to permanently increase its presence there or, more likely, it did not have the resources to do so. Popayán never really crystalized as a full-scale colonial bureaucracy. There was certain development toward a more bureaucratic administration, but it was slow and never even nearly completed.[501]

The central administration worked at different levels towards institutionalizing inter-ethnic relations. It attempted to keep the Spaniards and the indigenous peoples physically separated from each other, and to ensure that their relationships were moderated through bureaucracy. This was realized only partially. There was always some interaction between the ethnic groups that was not conducted through colonial institutions, and personal relationships between the leading settlers and the indigenous elite remained significant throughout the early colonial period. In Chapter Five, I will return to this non-institutional interethnic interaction.

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[500] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 3, Visita de Hinojosa a Cali, f. 78v.

[501] After the *visitas* of Angulo de Castejón, Hinojosa and Valverde, it took almost 40 years before the next one was conducted by Diego de Armenteros y Henao. He found that many of the same problems encountered by his predecessors still persisted. AGI, Quito 9, ramo 10, n. 76d, El oidor Diego de Armenteros sobre la visita a Popayán, Cali, Buga y Roldanillo, 1607.

4.3 Taming the *Gobernación*

Bringing Law and Order

In his *visita* report, Tomás López stated that he could not fulfill the royal commission in full: he was unable to travel to some of the places he was supposed to visit because the land was too rough and lacked roads. Furthermore, the natives lived in very dispersed settlements. However, he tried to gather secondhand information from these villages to complete what he had learned from the majority of sites that he was able to visit.[502] For example, villages in the provinces of Banba and Ceyna were divided into *encomiendas*, but López could not visit them because the natives were at war against the Spaniards. He urged the *encomenderos* to do everything they could to pacify the natives "with saintly and good methods" (*por medios santos y buenos*), which included persuading them with gifts. The Spaniards were expected to act as good examples to the natives to help in their evangelization.[503]

López faced similar problems elsewhere. The natives living in the jurisdiction of towns in San Sebastian de la Plata and Timana were scattered in the mountains, and were not prepared to submit to Spanish rule. The *visitador* wanted to gather these people into Spanish-style towns to pacify and civilize them, but the Spaniards simply had no means to do so.[504] A decade later, Hinojosa was also unable to get to some of the places he was supposed to visit for the same reasons. He could not travel to the villages that surrounded the city of Buga, north of Cali, because the region was still very unstable and some of the natives were engaged in war or *mala paz* (poor peace), reluctant to serve the Spaniards. As a result, Hinojosa never performed the *visita* in Buga, instead leaving only general instructions concerning good governance of the natives.[505] These examples serve as evidence of the fragility of Spanish rule. The colonial bureaucracy faced challenges taking root in the *gobernación*.

By contrast, the *visitador* García de Valverde stated in the ordinances regarding Pasto that the natives there were starting to show signs of civilization, evidenced by the fact that they were making more and more complaints at the colonial courts. This was beginning to be a problem, though, because to make their complaints the natives had to travel to Spanish towns and this meant that they were absent from work. To

[502] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, f. 3v.

[503] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, f. 68v.

[504] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, ff. 73v.–74r.

[505] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 2, ff. 15r.–17v.

solve this problem, Valverde ordered each indigenous communities that had more than 150 inhabitants should have two *alcaldes* (magistrates), two *regidores* (councilors) and an *alguacil* (bailiff). Smaller communities should have one *alcalde*, two *regidores* and an *alguacil*. Each new year, these officials should gather, and name double the amount of candidates for each position from the *principales* of the community, their names should be written on a piece of paper, and a boy child should draw the names of the next years officials. None of these officials could be the cacique or his heir.[506]

These officials would be tasked with handling the civil cases where no more than 12 pesos were at stake and the less criminal severe cases. The more severe cases still had to be brought in front of a Spanish judge but, as the natives increasingly showed signs of being capable of handling such issues their own, the officials' jurisdiction could be increased. The officials should also punish those who have extramarital relationships and turn over those who engage in witchcraft to the priests.[507] It is not known how these orders were followed, but they clearly represent a clear attempt to interfere the autonomy of the communities to a scale previously unseen in the *gobernación*.

These orders also offer an example of how the institutionalization of interethnic relations took effect. Colonial courts were gaining a stronger role in negotiation between the indigenous communities and their Spanish *encomenderos*. This already was their role in the more central parts of the empire. The natives of Peru, for example, quickly gained a reputation as a litigious people, and by the 1550s they were already flooding the *audiencia* of Lima with their petitions and suits.[508] In Popayán, the natives used the colonial courts less frequently. The distance from the *audiencias* of Quito and Santafé meant that it was more difficult for them to appeal to the courts. The town *cabildos* were also controlled by the local Spanish landowners, which made them less appealing for indigenous litigants. Garcia de Valverde's orders imply, however, that at least some natives were actively using the legal system by 1570. Unfortunately, most of the cases are not found in the archives because the records have been lost or destroyed. Although it is not possible to make a quantitative analysis of the cases, a qualitative analysis on the cases that have survived offers some useful insight.

The colonized peoples had a variety of responses to the imposition of law by the colonists. These included accommodation, advocacy within the system, mechanisms

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[506] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, ff. 717v.–718r.

[507] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, ff. 717v.–718v.

[508] Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 115.

of delegitimation as a form of passive resistance, and rebellion.[509] The indigenous peoples of the Spanish colonies resorted to all of them.

Jeremy Ravi Mumford has noted that early modern Castile was a litigious society. He follows Richard Kagan, who has found that Castile's highest court, *Real Chancilleria de Valladolid*, issued 300 decisions per one million inhabitants each year in the sixteenth century, compared to 200 issued by the United States Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century. Both served a population of roughly the same size. Furthermore, the Court of Chancery in sixteenth-century England received only 500 cases per year, while the *Real Chancilleria*, with roughly similar population under its jurisdiction, received over ten times more. The Spanish colonists took their legal system to America, and the indigenous peoples in the colonies eagerly took part in it from very early on.[510]

For the colonial administration, native litigation was a way to channel discontent towards the judicial system and to prevent rebellion. For the natives, it offered a means of advancing their own interests within the colonial system.[511] The institutionalization of native-Spanish relationships toward the end of the sixteenth century and the strengthening role of the colonial bureaucracy did not mean that the previous direct forms of interaction ceased to exist. It did mean, however, that the legal institutions gained an important position as a forum for negotiating the differences between the ethnic groups.

Indigenous participation in the colonial legal system has been studied extensively in recent years.[512] According to Susan Kellogg, an important function of law is to provide an institutionalized means through which power, and the search for power, can be expressed, negotiated, and controlled.[513] Brian Owensby concurs by stating that law represented a privileged space of interaction and a form of political engagement among peoples in the colonies. Negotiation through state institutions was not only permitted, but also actively encouraged by the Spanish officials. The indigenous peoples also embraced it. In this situation of recognized inequality, it was a means by which the more vulnerable subjects could contest power.[514]

Written records, mostly legal documents, were one of the primary channels of communication between the natives and the Spanish. It can be said that the Spanish

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509 Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures*, 2–3.

510 Mumford, "Litigation as Ethnography," 10.

511 See Mumford, "Litigation as Ethnography," 5.

512 See Yannakakis, "Indigenous People."

513 Kellogg, "Introduction," 3.

514 Owensby, "Foreword," xii–xiv.

empire was based on the power of the pen more than the power of the sword. As vehicles for transforming the native worldview, these records eventually became the sources of legitimacy and authenticity.[515] Of course, in adopting Spanish legal traditions, the natives also learned quickly how to manipulate the system to their own benefit. The development of the legal system illustrates not only negotiation between the different parties, but also the definition of boundaries of acceptable demands and indigenous attempts to legalize own behaviour.

Most local disputes were still resolved by community leaders outside the legal system, but the more high-stake cases were usually taken to Spanish courts. The litigants were rarely individuals; instead, they were entire communities suing a neighboring community or a Spaniard over land boundaries, or a Spanish *encomendero* over excessive tribute demands.[516] Litigation was often expensive, and the results were uncertain. Indigenous witnesses were officially deemed less reliable, the Spaniards had more resources at their disposal, and the judges were part of the Spanish elite who typically allied with the colonists. Despite all the disadvantages, the natives did win many legal battles. More importantly, even if they did not win the case, they could delay the colonists and gain benefits and breathing space by taking matters to the courts. This was a conscious strategy as the natives turned legal struggles into a major strategy for protecting their rights.[517]

In Popayán, the legal system was much more fragile and indigenous participation in it much less frequent than in Mexico or the Central Andes. Court cases involving indigenous peoples are fewer, and cases in which a *cacique* or other indigenous people sued a Spaniard are almost non-existent. This is a clear sign of the natives' lesser integration into the Spanish system in this region. However, there are cases in which the native leaders' influence can be seen in the background. They are seemingly passive in these cases, but a closer look shows them being very active. These cases are very interesting as well because they reveal in a very subtle way the alliances that existed between *encomenderos* and *caciques*.

Natives typically did not sue certain Spaniards on their own; instead, they had the support of other Spaniards. Many of the cases were brought to court either by the *defensor de indios* or by the public prosecutor. The agency of the indigenous peoples is not always evident, hidden instead in the background. Nevertheless, a careful reader can find many hints of the activity of the natives involved in the disputes. It is

[515] Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, 3–4.

[516] Mumford, "Litigation as Ethnography," 10.

[517] Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 115–119.

probable that at least in some cases, the *caciques* were the real instigators of the case and Spanish officials acted at their request.

It was very common for an *encomendero* to support the legal battles of his natives against other Spaniards, rival native communities, or both. In these cases, it was typical for there to be simultaneous disputes between *encomenderos* over land or the right to gather tributes from a certain indigenous group, and between indigenous communities over farmland. The Spanish elite was not a unified block, and the *encomenderos* could use these cases to enhance their own position against other e*ncomenderos*. Alliances were evidently beneficial for both parties. By allying with one group of Spanish elite against another, the natives could gain more freedom and also improve their position at the expense of other native communities.

A court case from Almaguer from the year 1561 is a good example of such alliances. Two *encomenderos*, Miguel Muñoz and Álvaro Gudino, were accused of serious crimes against a *cacique* named Mamendoy and his people.[518] Mamendoy was a subject of the *cacique principal* Chajumbina, and the two were actively involved in the conflict. Muñoz and Gudino were, among other things, accused of capturing and torturing one of Mamendoy's subjects who was weeding a plot that belonged to his community. Gudino, Muñoz, and their *caciques* were trying to seize Mamendoy's lands and to do so they harassed the people who worked the fields.[519]

Mamendoy belonged to the *encomienda* of Juan Negrete; together with the *defensor de indios*, who acted on behalf of the natives, he filed the complaint. They accused the defendants of forcing the subjects of Mamendoy and his captain Biandaxoxoa to serve them and of sending them to gold mines even though they belonged to Negrete's *encomienda*. They also accused Gudino and Muñoz of stealing their cotton, chickens, and other things, of taking their harvests, of cutting off the noses and arms of their community members as a punishment for noncompliance, and even of killing some of them.[520] Muñoz and Gudino were further accused of attacking the natives of the village of La Cruz, which was part of their own *encomienda*, together with *caudillo* Anton Andero. They took some natives and cut off their hands and noses. During the same expedition, Andero and some of his men had also attacked

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[518] This case will also be dealt with, from a slightly different perspective, in chapter 5.2.

[519] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 62r.–62v.

[520] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, 57r.–58v.

other villages belonging to the *encomiendas* of Damian de Paladinas and Gonzalo Gomez.[521]

The case record in the archive does not contain a verdict. However, nine years later during García de Valverde's *visita*, both Juan Negrete and Muñoz and Gudino were recorded as *encomenderos* of their villages.[522] Usually in such severe cases of maltreatment, the *encomenderos*'s sentence including losing their *encomiendas*; yet this did not happen here. Either Muñoz and Gudino were found not guilty, or they faced a less severe punishment.

Spanish control in the area was not very stable, and the colonial institutions were still fairly undeveloped. Almaguer was still quite newly occupied territory for the Spaniards as these events took place. The conquering expedition entered the area in 1550 and the city of Almaguer was founded in 1551, just ten years before the above-mentioned trial took place. This lawsuit thus can be seen as part of the effort to stabilize the region. Two years before the complaint, the *visitador* Tomás López and the bishop of Popayán Juan Valle had travelled through the entire *gobernación* of Popayán, but they did not value the tributes owed by the natives of Almaguer. One of the reasons for this was that the province was still very restless and some of the natives were still at war against the Spaniards. But there was also another reason, which is revealing for its role in the aforementioned conflict. According to Tomás López, there were twenty-five or twenty-six *encomenderos* but few natives. The land was new and not well populated. López stated that it would be beneficial to reduce the number of *encomenderos* to twelve so that the land and its people could maintain them all. Before that happened, there was no use determining the tributes.[523]

In 1570, eleven years after Tomás López's visit, *visitador* García de Valverde arrived in Almaguer. He was able to make some sort of calculation of the population, although it was more likely a vague estimation. According to Valverde's count, there were 3,200 tribute-paying natives, that is, male adults, in the province of Almaguer, divided between nineteen *encomenderos*. As a comparison, Valverde counted the native adult male population in the province of Pasto to be 12,877, divided between thirty-three *encomenderos*. In other words, the number of tribute-paying natives in each *encomienda* was more than double to that in Almaguer.[524]

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[521] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 58v.–60r., 133v.

[522] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, ff. 200v.–207v.

[523] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, f. 51v.

[524] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, 1570–1571.

Fray Jerónimo de Escobar claimed that on the eve of the Spaniards' arrival, there were 15,000 adult native men living in the area.[525] The number given by Fray Jerónimo has to be taken with caution, however. There are no reliable sources for the population of Almaguer at the time of the Spanish arrival. Kathleen Romoli has deduced from documents concerning the *repartimiento* of *encomiendas* that toward the end of 1552, there were around 8,000 tribute-paying natives divided across as many as forty *encomiendas*.[526]

What all of this means, is that the *encomenderos* had to fight for scarce resources. The original *encomenderos* were people who had participated in the conquest and pacification of the land, and they expected to receive a reward for their effort. Almaguer had productive gold mines, but it was not as rich as Peru, from where the conquerors had come. These men wanted to exploit the land, and to do that they needed the natives to work for them. It seems, however, that there were not enough men to support them all, and so they fought amongst themselves.

Muñoz and Gudino's answer to this instability was strict discipline. An example of this was the hanging of a native who had robbed and murdered a *yanacona*.[527] The problem was that apparently this hanging was done without a proper hearing, which made it illegal. Likewise, concerning the punishment meted out to the natives of La Cruz, the issue from the point of view of the law was that there had been no formal hearing and nothing was written on paper. No *requerimiento* had been read to the villagers.[528] Therefore, the punishment was not legal. In this light, Muñoz and Gudino were obliged to protect their *encomendados*, but instead they had maltreated them.[529]

In this context, Muñoz and Gudino's actions were evidently attempts by settlers to enhance their position in the area by forcing reluctant natives to serve them. Their strategy was to rule by force. It was all part of the negotiation of colonial domination. The court case, by contrast, can be seen both as a way of trying to bring law and order to the area, and as way for those involved to settle the conflict and determine who should serve whom.

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[525] AGI, Patronato 27, ramo 13, Memorial de Fray Jerónimo de Escobar al consejo de Indias, 1582, f. 2v.

[526] Romoli, "El suroeste del Cauca," 254.

[527] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hoja 114r.

[528] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 99v., 109r.

[529] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hoja 60r.

It was in the colonial officials' interest to direct negotiation toward the colonial institutions, but members of local society followed their own interests. In Mexico, the judicial system was quite consolidated even in the more remote areas by the second half of the sixteenth century. In Peru, the system was also very developed. The natives had a genuine chance to gain victories, or at least to hinder Spanish exploitation. In Popayán, all this was questionable.

It was quite typical, at least in the cases that have been preserved in the archives, that both sides had resorted to violence to solve the conflict. Both had also filed charges against their opponents. The law was just one of the ways used to gain benefits and fight opponents, and usually it was not the first. In other words, natives often applied both open and more hidden resistance. Finally, they had also played a part in taking complaints to the Spanish court. The documents often do not reveal how the process was initiated, but the natives or their leaders certainly played a role. It does seem that both sides put plenty of time and effort into pushing their cases in the courts, and so the court itself was definitely seen to be important. Legal backing was necessary, even if the legal institutions were still relatively weak and the laws and regulations were not always followed.

During the decades that followed the Spanish conquering expeditions, the *gobernación* of Popayán remained a restless place. Spanish control was weak, and the situation was unstable and often chaotic because relationships between the different groups remained uneasy. The colonial institutions were also weak, and there was little restriction on violence for either side. However, the fact that some of the cases were brought to court shows that these institutions were not insignificant.

The case against Muñoz and Gudino is very similar to many other cases found in the archives, some of which I have dealt with in other parts of this study. It seems that the cases were often about the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable demands made by the Spanish *encomenderos* on the communities. These demands were usually settled in other ways—such as by negotiation, violence, or both—but sometimes one of the parties resorted to the legal system and this made royal authority the ultimate arbitrator.

The case also dealt with a dispute between Spanish *encomenderos* over the right to claim tributes from certain groups. This was another typical feature of court cases in the *gobernación* from the second half of the sixteenth century. Although they were about conflicts between members of the Spanish elite, they often were also tied to more complicated power struggles between factions of local society that included both Spanish and indigenous elites. I will deal with this theme more thoroughly in Chapter 5.2, in which I will also return to the case against Muñoz and Gudino.

Indigenous participation in colonial institutions should not be defined in terms of simple dichotomies such as collaboration/resistance. The natives used the institutions not only to defend themselves, but also to gain advantages. While their participation enhanced the system's legitimacy, it is important not to characterize the indigenous peoples as unwilling agents of the colonial system. It is better to assume that the natives knew what they were doing. They lived in the colonial society, they knew how the system worked, and they learned to manipulate it to their advantage. They used the methods they had at their disposal to improve their own position. Indigenous agency is often not very visible in the legal documents, and those who commissioned and wrote the documents were usually not too interested in indigenous agency or the natives' motives. However, both can be teased out from the records.

Organizing the Indigenous Space

For the Spaniards, the American continent was a new world that could be molded according to their own ideals. In the early sixteenth century, the Spanish humanist Hernán Pérez de Oliva wrote that Columbus left for his second journey in 1493 "to mix the world and to give those strange lands the form of our own."[530] This comment depicts the Spanish attitudes very well. Yes, there were people living there, but in the Spanish imagination these people were malleable to Spanish ideals, as different as they might have been.

However, as J. H. Elliott commented, the Spaniards were successful in mixing the world, but not so much in giving the new lands a form of their own. The conquerors and the clerics, not to mention the humanist commentators, no doubt felt a sense of disillusionment and disappointment, since the reality never quite matched their ideals.[531] The discrepancy between ideal and reality stems from the fact that while the American continent was indeed a new world for the Europeans, it certainly was not an empty world. It was occupied by millions of indigenous people who had their own ideas about how society should be structured.

The Spanish officials saw the natives as a workforce, but also as people who needed to be converted and civilized. Their attitudes echoed later civilizing missions, although they did not use that term in their language. There were several campaigns

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[530] Oliva, *Historia de la invención de las Indias*, 51: "*a mezclar el mundo y a dar a aquellas tierras extrañas forma de la nuestra*."

[531] Elliot, *Spain, Europe*, 131; Elliot, *Old World*, 28.

against idolatry across the Americas, especially during the early colonial period, and the poor state of the natives' Christianization was a constant concern for the Spaniards.[532] Nevertheless, the extirpation of idolatry was not institutionalized before the early seventeenth century. Furthermore, the indigenous peoples were exempted from inquisitorial jurisdiction.[533]

The Spanish officials were constantly worried about the Andeans practicing idolatry and pagan rituals. According to Hinojosa, one of the most severe threats to the souls and lives of the natives were the *borracheras* (parties involving heavy drinking) and *taquies* (ritual dances) they practiced for ritual purposes.[534] This was a time when the so-called *Taki Unquy* or *Taki Onqoy* (dancing sickness) movement caused fear of indigenous rebellion among the Spaniards of Peru. *Taki Unquy* was a millenarian movement aiming at expelling the Christians and returning to the old gods. It literary meant dancing sickness, as the ritual focused on apparently uncontrollable singing and dancing among the possessed.[535]

Taki Unquy was just one of several nativist movements of regeneration that emerged in the Spanish America, but it became the most famous. The Spaniards reacted by starting campaigns for extirpation of idolatry throughout the Andes, even in areas that were not affected by the movement.[536] Popayán was far away from the center of the movement in Huamanga, Peru, but the activities related to it created genuine anxiety among the Spaniards living there. This, in turn, affected attitudes toward pagan rituals, real or imagined, enacted by the natives of Popayán. In short, the Spaniards used the movement to justify employing harsh methods to repress local indigenous rituals.

The poor state of Christian instruction and native conversion and their return to traditional rites is another common topos in Spanish writing. It reflects the insecurity the Spaniards felt being surrounded by the much more numerous indigenous peoples on whom they depended. However, it does not mean that the image of natives practicing idolatry was a false one.

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[532] The concern was brought forward by all the *visitadores* and many other officials. It was most vigorously highlighted by the Augustinian friar Jerónimo de Escobar. See AGI, Patronato 27, ramo 13, Memorial de Fray Jerónimo de Escobar al consejo de Indias, 1582.

[533] Gareis, "Repression and Cultural," 231–233.

[534] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, ff. 100v.–101r. "vno de los mas notables daños para las almas e vidas de los d(ic)hos naturaes son las borracheras y taquies pu(bli)cos que hazen por los ritos y gentilidades."

[535] For *Taki Unquy* Movement, see for example Stern, *Peru's Indian People*, 51–71; Wachtel, *Vision of the Vanquished*, 175–183.

[536] Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 74–75, 207.

In his census, Pedro de Hinojosa counted the number of unbaptized natives. In the jurisdiction of the city of Popayán, there were 1,671 natives who had not yet been baptized, almost 10% of the total.[537] This means that they were a minority, but still a fairly significant one. They were not evenly divided among the different villages, though; in the village of Mestale almost 90% were not baptized, in the villages of Noanbo and Monbasbala more than half the population was not baptized, but in other villages everybody had been baptized.[538]

Even the natives living close to the main Spanish towns were not receiving proper indoctrination. According to Valverde, of the 3,000 natives living in the valley surrounding the town of Pasto, less than 500 attended church during the holy days and had been taught Christian religion.[539] In addition, being baptized did not necessarily mean adopting Christianity or even understanding it. Converting to Christianity meant taking baptism and a Spanish name, but most of the newly converted received very little instruction in their new religion, if any at all. They perhaps attended church but at the same time continued to practice their old religion. Sometimes the baptized were not even able to remember their Christian name when asked.[540] In fact, it seems that the converted natives worried the colonial officials the most. Like the converted Jews and Muslims of Spain, they were often believed to continue worshiping their old gods in secret.[541]

The Spaniards had arrived in Popayán only thirty-four years before Hinojosa's *visita*, so it is quite clear that the Christianization of its peoples was still a work in progress. The Spanish officials' solution for the poor state of Christianity and the general difficulty of governing the Andeans was the *reducción* (resettlement), by which the Spaniards attempted to resettle the natives to newly founded Spanish-style towns. There were several such campaigns already in the early colonial period. The motives for the Spaniards were both pragmatic and ideological. The Andeans lived in dispersed settlements, which made them difficult to control. The Spaniards wanted to gather them in concentrated settlements so that they could be more easily exploited as a workforce. At the same time, it would be easier to convert and civilize people who lived in one place, close to the watching eyes of the Spanish officials.

During the Reconquista, the Castilians continued a pre-existing Muslim practice by which the peasantry and landowners were grouped under the jurisdiction of cities

[537] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Pedro de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, ff. 119v.–124v.

[538] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán pieza 1, ff. 119v.–124v.

[539] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, f. 712v.

[540] Gamboa, *Cacicazgo muisca*, 471–475.

[541] Abercrombie, *Pathways of Memory*, 265.

that controlled the surrounding countryside.[542] They continued the same practice in their American colonies, where the Spanish city or town was always the center and controlled the space that surrounded it.

The typical Latin American city, town, or village—unlike the labyrinthine cities of Spain—was organized into a grid with a plaza in the middle. Around the plaza were the major administrative houses. The new indigenous villages, or *reducciones*, were organized in a similar fashion. The Spanish term *reducir* meant to order or to bring reason. The idea was to bring order into the perceived chaos the Spaniards found in the "New World." In this sense, the *reducciones* were very much connected to the larger civilization project.[543]

The king gave the first orders for settling the natives into towns in 1549. According to the royal decree, allowing the natives to live dispersed made it difficult to convert them and to introduce laws to them, all of which was done for their own benefit. The towns were to have a prison for wrongdoers, a corral for sheep and hogs, and market places where travelers could buy what they needed. All this was necessary so that the natives would understand the benefits of a civilized (i.e., Christian Spanish) lifestyle.[544]

The efforts at resettlement were intensified in Popayán during and after Hinojosa and Valverde's *visitas*, but earlier attempts had been made as well. For example, in 1565, Puengue and Yapone, two *caciques* of the crown *encomienda* of the village of Ambalo, were arrested when their communities did not pay the tribute. They pleaded for the officials to set them free because they could not gather the missing tributes if they were in prison. They explained that the tributes were delayed because they were building a new village where the clerics could better instruct them, and because they had a lot of work taking care of the roads, inns, and bridges along the Camino Real. The *justicia mayor* Francisco Mosquera ordered that they be set free and gave them four months to gather the missing tributes.[545]

The village of Ambalo was situated within the jurisdiction of the city of Popayán, and its inhabitants probably had close ties with the Guambianos.[546] In the population count made by Tomás López, the village had 240 tribute payers; Pedro de Hinojosa's

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[542] Casey, *Early Modern Spain*, 87.

[543] Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, 221–227.

[544] AGI, Santa Fe 533, Real cedula sobre hacer pueblos de indios juntos unos a otros, Valladolid, 9 October 1549, ff. 99r.–99v. Similar cedulas were sent to other audiencias as well.

[545] ACC, Colonia, Tributos, Signatura: 1158 (Col. C I -17 t), Almoneda de lo que pagaron los indios de Ambaló por cuenta de lo que debían de sus tributos del tercio de san Juan de 1565, Popayán, 20 August 1565.

[546] Llanos Vargas, *Cacicazgos*, 19

later count showed 125 *tributarios* and 414 inhabitants in total.[547] Ambalo was therefore very much in the center of the *gobernación*. In addition, it was crown's *encomienda*, and thus directly under the authority of the officials. It seems that the resettlement of the village to a more central position, where the Spaniards could more easily reach, was being followed in the mid-1560s.

The most famous of the resettlement campaigns was the viceroy of Peru Francisco de Toledo's *reducción general* (general resettlement), which started in 1569. There had been settlement campaigns in the Andes and rest of the Americas campaigns already before this, but none was quite as impressive. Toledo's ambitious goal was to transform the entire way of life of the indigenous population of his viceroyalty overnight.[548] Toledo's *reducción* was effectively carried out only in the *audiencias* of Lima and Charcas, roughly the present-day states of Peru and Bolivia, where he had strong control.

In the *audiencias* of Quito and New Granada, Toledo's control was weaker, and the *reducción* campaigns were much more limited, but similar efforts were made. Pedro de Hinojosa was one of the few *visitadores* that Toledo sent to the *audiencia* of Quito, and he founded *reducciones* in Otavalo.[549] Apparently, Toledo did not send anyone to resettle the natives of Popayán, but Hinojosa and Valverde's *visitas* coincided with his campaign, so some sort of connection to the larger scheme seems plausible. López had conducted his *visita* a decade before the start of the *reducción general*, but he too had attempted to repopulate the natives in Spanish-style villages.

The native resettlement was an attempt to change their entire way of life. Depopulation and imposition of the *encomienda* regime had already caused radical changes to the indigenous communities, but until the *visitas* of Hinojosa and Valverde they had lived in their own villages largely as they had done before. The *reducciones* were direct intrusions into the natives' social and political structures.

Toledo's general resettlement campaign was partly successful, partly a failure. *Reducciones* were established, and most of them took root. Many of them still exist today. Throughout colonial history, most natives of the *audiencias* of Lima and Charcas were affiliated with a particular *reducción*, and these settlements gave form to the political and administrative structure of the indigenous communities. However, the *reducciones* did not completely change native settlement patterns. Some were inhabited by the majority of the population affiliated with them, while others were

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547 AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Tomás López, 1558–1559,f. 57v.; AGI, Justicia 639, no. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, f. 120v.

548 Mumford *Vertical Empire*, 1.

549 Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 136–137.

practically empty and the people lived somewhere else. The Andean population continued their mobile way of life.[550]

Valverde stated in his ordinances that the natives of Pasto lived so scattered, that their civilization and conversion was difficult. For this reason, he ordered that the villages be resettled by their *encomenderos*. In some cases, several villages were to be united into one, while in other cases a single community living scattered was to be settled in one place.[551] However, Pasto was more densely populated and more firmly under Spanish control than many other areas in the *gobernación*. The resettlement was easier there than in the northern areas, and it is unlikely that it happened exactly the way Valverde ordered. His *visita* report says nothing about the implementation of the orders.

It is difficult to say how the Pastos themselves perceived the concept of space in the early colonial period. There are no sources in which they talk about these things explicitly. We have to rely on Spanish descriptions and, more importantly, on the documented actions of the Pastos. It seems evident that the Pastos were not attached to a single place, but rather moved around freely. Settling into a single village where they would stay permanently changed their way of life completely.

The problems caused by the dispersed nature of the Andean settlements were topics that came up time after time in the Spanish writings. When the governor Tuesta Salazar performed a *visita* in Cartago in 1585, he made the same complaints that many others had made before him, and that many would make after him. The natives lived dispersed away from civilization. They did not understand true faith, they lived in ignorance of their own best interests, and they practiced pagan rites and *borracheras*.[552] These were the commonly used justifications for congregating the natives into Spanish-style villages near Spanish settlements, which is what Tuesta Salazar aimed to do as well. Therefore, it is always uncertain how well these descriptions reflect reality, how much they were mere topoi that repeated themselves over and over again. With that in mind, it still is safe to assume that the Spaniards were not satisfied with how well (or poorly) the natives had adapted Catholic faith and Spanish manners, and that they were concerned that the natives living dispersed made them more difficult to control.

According to Jerónimo de Escobar, who wrote a report on the natives of the *gobernación*, the Quimbayas were docile people despite the fact that the terrain was

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[550] Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 140–157.

[551] AGI, Audiencia de Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, ff. 720v.–721v.

[552] AGN, Caciques e indios 6, d. 12, Juan de Tuesta Salazar, Disposiciones reducción y catequización de indios, Cartago, 16 October 1585, f. 184r.

difficult to travel.[553] They had rebelled against the Spaniards in the 1540s and 1550s, as we saw earlier, but they had a reputation as brave, valiant, yet peaceful people. However, even these friendly natives, according to Tuesta Salazar, still lived in infidelity some forty-five years after the conquest and the founding of the town of Cartago.

Cartago was located in the northern frontier zone of the *gobernación*, and most of the *encomendados* worked in the mines of Anserma. Native maltreatment was common, and mortality was high, as we can see from the population censuses. In 1559, Tomás López counted 4,643 tribute-paying (adult male) natives in the jurisdiction of the town of Cartago. In Tuesta Salazar's census of 1585, there were only 1,100 tribute payers, suggesting that the depopulation rate was extremely steep.[554] Native-Spanish relations were more frontier-like than in Popayán, Pasto, or Cali. Given the fact that native mortality was alarming, and that the Spanish mines depended on the indigenous workforce, it is not surprising then that Tuesta Salazar saw the utmost importance of congregating the Quimbayas.

The indigenous subjects of the crown were free to move around and live wherever they wished.[555] They also used that right and migrated often, either as individuals or communities, in search of a better life or to find relief from Spanish demands. In the words of a seventeenth-century Spanish official, cited by Karen Vieira Powers, the Andeans were *prendas con pies* (assets with feet).[556] Another official, Felipe de Godoy, quoted by Ann Zulawski, said the same thing with slightly different words in 1607: "The Indians always go where there is most to be gained."[557] The natives did not stay put as the colonists would have hoped, but continued the mobile life style they had enjoyed since before the conquest. The Spaniards feared that vagabond natives living in the mountains would practice idolatry. Therefore, *visitador* Hinojosa ordered that even though they were in principle free, they should all live in some village, and not as vagabonds wondering from one place to another.[558]

In spite of the principle that the natives were free, the Spanish officials did try to restrict their movement. For example, Valverde ordered that no native who was counted in the *visita* was allowed to move to another village. The punishment for

[553] AGI, Patronato 27, ramo 13, Memorial de Fray Jerónimo de Escobar al consejo de Indias, 1582, ff. 6r.–6v.

[554] AGN, Caciques e indios 6, d. 12, Juan de Tuesta Salazar, Disposiciones reducción y catequización de indios, Cartago, 16 October 1585.

[555] Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 32.

[556] Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 174.

[557] Zulawski, *They Eat*, 200.

[558] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, f. 98v–99r.

moving would be fifty lashes, after which the person would be returned to their designated village. If someone had a reason to move, they had to ask for a license from the judges of the city under whose jurisdiction they lived; if the reason they offered was good enough, a license would be granted "like to a free person" (*como a persona libre*).[559] The concept of freedom, or liberty, did not mean the same thing to the people of the sixteenth century that it means for us.

As the tributes to the *encomendero* or to the crown were determined by the size of the population, natives moving from one village to another were obviously a problem from the *visitador*'s point of view. However, it seems that moving around was quite common. The Pastos were a homogenous group and formed of larger federations of several villages before the Spanish arrived. For them, moving to another village was easy. Their entire way of life was mobile, and they were not attached to a certain place. Valverde's orders were an attempt to restrict their movement and tie them to one place.

The *visitadores* also gave orders concerning the natives' evangelization. Pedro de Hinojosa ordered every indigenous village to have a church with a wooden door and a lock; all churches were to be kept clean and the altars decorated. In addition, village had to have a church bell to call the natives for indoctrination.[560] The church always had a central role in the *reducción* plans. It had to dominate the space it was in, and it had to demonstrate the power of the Christian religion. The church bell also had to be heard throughout the countryside. Symbols were important in the evangelization of the natives.

The plaza in front of the church was equally important. It was the place where the processes were held. Resettlement was an effort to control space, and its practical aim was to concentrate the natives into a more physically restricted space so that the Spaniards would have easier access to their labor and goods. At the same time, resettlement made it easier to control and to convert the indigenous population. However, *reducción* was not just a practical project: it was a process of perfection. The aim was to create Christian and civilized order in the chaos the Spaniards saw in the "New World."[561]

Space was also a battlefield between the contrasting interests of the colonists and those of the indigenous peoples who did not adapt easily to Spanish forms of

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[559] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, f. 720r.

[560] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, f. 98r.; AGI, Justicia 639, n. 3, Visita de Hinojosa a Cali, f. 84v.

[561] Cummins, "Forms of Andean," 201–205, 213.

organizing space without resistance.[562] Resettlements did nevertheless change the sociopolitical and spatial organization of the indigenous societies. They created new collective identities defined not by old solidarities, but instead by the new villages created through the *reducciones*.[563]

The natives of Popayán lived in dispersed communities in the highlands, and this worried the Spaniards. It was one of the most common concerns listed in Spanish reports and letters. These reports create an image of wild and untamed mountain region where the natives were beyond the colonialists' control. There, they could freely continue their pagan rituals and evade their responsibilities toward the Spaniards.

Furthermore, Hinojosa ordered the priests to elect the most capable and suitable natives who spoke Spanish (*mas ladinos de buena ynclinacion y birtuosos e que mas pareciere que convienen*), and the governor or his lieutenants to give them staffs of justice. These natives were then to be responsible for gathering their community members for indoctrination, serving as interpreters, and seeing that the natives followed the orders given by the *visitador*. Hinojosa also reminded the *encomenderos* of their obligations concerning native conversion and education, as they did not seem to understand the importance of the task.[564]

Valverde also ordered that every native parish have a church built within one year of the *visita*.[565] More than simply places of worship, churches were also places of social control. Valverde ordered men and women to sit separately in the church; married women had to wear a white headscarf, and single women a black one. That way the priests would know whether or not the women with children were married, and they could see to getting the unwed mothers married.[566] The "civilization project" was an important part of colonialism, although it was not yet called as such, and the men of the church played a central role in it.

Valverde further ordered that every priest have a native interpreter who would also serve as *alguacil general* (general bailiff) and who would carry a *vara de justicia* (staff of justice). The *alguacil* had a duty to report to the priest all acts of idolatry and witchcraft. The *alguacil general* also had to burn down all the native houses located outside the villages to which they were assigned. In addition to the *alguacil general*, each village was to have one or two native *alguaciles* depending on its size. These

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[562] Herrera Ángel, "Ordenamiento espacial," 98.

[563] Quiroga, "Proceso de *reducciones*," 183–184.

[564] AGI, Justicia 639, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, ff. 98r.–98v.

[565] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, f. 712r.

[566] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, f. 713r.–713v.

alguaciles were responsible for ensuring that the local natives attended church. They also had to make sure that the indigenous women did not kill their first-born children, which, according to Valverde, was their habit[567]. Furthermore, the *visitador* ordered the priests to elect sons of *caciques* and *principales* (native leaders of lesser rank) and other capable young natives, and teach them to read, write, and sing so that they could assist in the mass.[568]

The Spaniards generally attempted to recruit the most capable natives and train them to serve in different tasks in the conversion and indoctrination of the wider indigenous Andean population. This literate class of intermediaries was seen to be an invaluable ally in the fight for native souls against their traditional religions and rituals. This policy was begun by the first archbishop of Lima Jerónimo de Loyaza, who in 1545 instructed the clergy to train the sons of local nobility to work as lay catechists. Later, the clergy hired lay assistants from all sectors of indigenous society. The church assistants and native officials could be members of the traditional indigenous elite or simple commoners without noble lineage or status.[569] These orders given by the *visitadores* are clear examples of attempts to increase Spanish control over the natives and to civilize them. It was done by controlling space and the indigenous peoples' social behavior.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have dealt with the bureaucratization process of the *gobernación* of Popayán as well as its limits and the local responses to it. The Spanish colonial empire was a bureaucratic construction. It was in theory directly under the Castilian crown, represented by a legion of functionaries. The early colonial empire was characterized by a power struggle between the crown and the local Spanish elites which ended in the temporary consolidation of the crown's rule. At the same time, the officials imposed the state apparatus over the indigenous peoples. However, this process was never complete anywhere in the colonies, and even less so in the frontier regions.

The rule of bureaucracy remained weaker in the *gobernación* of Popayán which was essentially a war zone or at least a restless frontier throughout the timespan of this study. The local colonial elite retained large part of their independence although the

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[567] I have not come across anybody else mentioning this habit in the sources or in literature and would not take Valverde's word for it.

[568] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, ff. 713v.–713r.

[569] Charles, *Allies at Odds*, 18–20.

crown's position as an arbitrator did enhance its power gradually. Meanwhile, the indigenous communities were brought under closer control of the state through the institution of the *visita* but the personal relationships between the local colonial elites and the indigenous leadership remained very important.

Nevertheless, the indigenous communities of Popayán also tried to use the expanding institutions for their benefit and sometimes managed to gain advantages. The conflicts between the crown and the leading settlers also gave them more leeway as they were able to play the actors against each other. Some of the communities managed to at least limit the damages of colonialism while others perished under harsh demands of their *encomenderos*. Furthermore, some of the indigenous nations resisted the Spanish invasions and kept their independence until late seventeenth century.

Meanwhile, the church had its own aspirations regarding the indigenous peoples, which were sometimes aligned to and sometimes contradictory with those of the crown and the local elites. For the indigenous peoples, the representatives of the church were sometimes good allies and sometimes adversaries. The church defended good treatment of the natives and opposed excesses by the Spaniards, but they also wanted to control the indigenous communities, convert them to Christianity and root out their old habits which they saw as contradictory to Christianity.

The crown and its agents as well as the church wanted to mold the indigenous societies according to Spanish ideals. Although Spanish domination did change the indigenous communities in many ways, the Andeans never settled for fulfilling the Spanish utopias. Instead, they adapted to colonial realities while still retaining their agency. In the next chapter I deal with the different ways the communities of the *gobernación* adapted to colonialism.

5 POWER DYNAMICS AND COLONIAL CULTURE

In the previous two chapters, I have addressed interethnic conflicts and attempts by the colonial bureaucracy to mediate Spanish-native relationships. In this chapter, my focus is on the non-conflictive direct relationships between the two ethnic groups. First, I examine the emergence of the colonial *cacique* as an intermediary figure between the colonists and his own community, and of the power groups formed by the local elites. Following that, I explore the coexistence of the ethnic groups. Finally, I look into what I call the hegemonic process of colonialism; that is, how the Spaniards were able to gain and maintain their hegemony despite being outnumbered by and dependent on the indigenous peoples.

The main focus of this chapter is the so-called period crystallization of the colonial system that took place roughly between the 1570s and early seventeenth century. I will not restrict myself to that period entirely, however. By this point, colonial society had become a fact even in a frontier zone like Popayán. Spanish dominion in America was still contested and its hegemony was fragile, but it was evident that the Spaniards were there to stay. Many of the colonial institutions were in place, and most of the natives living within the Spanish domain were born into colonial society.

5.1 Power Dynamics within Local Colonial Society

The Colonial *Cacique*

Traditional indigenous leaders became indispensable intermediary figures between the Spaniards and the local communities practically from the beginning. The crown recognized their position as natural lords, and they integrated into the Spanish colonial society more thoroughly than native commoners. However, during the first three or four decades after the Spanish invasion, the *caciques* of the *gobernación* of Popayán seemed to remain more distinctively indigenous than they were in the later period. Their transformation from a pre-colonial indigenous chief to a colonial

cacique begun immediately with the arrival of the Spaniards, but intensified during the last three decades of the sixteenth century.

In this chapter, I deal with the emergence of the colonial *cacique* and their dual position as a mediator and as a member of local power groups. I aim to reconstruct the profile of a colonial *cacique* of the *gobernación* of Popayán through one important figure, don Pedro de Henao, who was active in the 1570s and the 1580s. Don Pedro was a Pasto and the *cacique* of Ipiales in the present day border region between Colombia and Ecuador. One might say that don Pedro was an ideal type of colonial *cacique*, without disputing that he was in many ways an exceptional character. To use a microhistorical concept, he was the exceptional normal.[570] I contextualize don Pedro's actions also by referring to other *caciques* both in Popayán and elsewhere in the Spanish colonies.

In 1583, don Pedro de Henao travelled across the Atlantic Ocean to Spain to get an audience with King Philip II. The purpose of his visit to the royal court was to get a confirmation of his title: governor of the indigenous villages of Ipiales and Potosí (not the famous silver mine site of present-day Bolivia, but a small native village in the south of the *gobernación*). In addition, he presented the king with a series of complaints of the wrongs committed against his people. In return, he received several royal *cedulas* to remedy the situation. Don Pedro stayed in Spain until at least January 1586, but I have not been able to find information about what happened to him after that. His voyage to Spain has left more documentary sources behind than can be attributed to most of his contemporaries. These sources tell not only about his voyage, but also about the situation at home and his relations with the Spanish colonists.[571]

Don Pedro was definitely an exceptional figure in the *gobernación* of Popayán. Most of the other *caciques* in the *gobernación* did not learn to read or write, or even to speak Spanish fluently during the sixteenth century. While other *caciques* also travelled to Spain during the sixteenth century, I have not found other examples from Popayán. In other ways, though, don Pedro is a good example of a colonial *cacique* who emerged during the first decades of Spanish presence. Despite being more educated than most, he had much in common with his peers. The traditional indigenous leaders became intermediary figures in the colonial societies, living between the Spanish and the Andean worlds. They drew legitimacy from pre-colonial traditions, but the institution of *cacique* was transformed during colonial times.

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[570] See Levi, "On Microhistory," 108–110.

[571] I have studied don Pedro's voyage in Uusitalo, "Indigenous Lord." Here I will concentrate on his actions at home before leaving for Spain.

We know very little of don Pedro's early life. We do not know when he was born or how old he was when he travelled to Spain. We do know, however, that he became the governor of the pueblos of Ipiales and Potosí in the early 1570s, when he was given the name don Francisco de Henao. He later changed his name to Pedro when he received confirmation from the bishop of Quito, Fray Pedro de la Peña. According to the questionnaire of his *probanza de meritos*, he had been governor for ten and one half years at the time of the hearing in the winter 1582–1583, meaning that he took the office in 1572. The old governor, don Gabriel Chillaban, had passed away, and the *principales* elected don Francisco as their new leader. The royal *audiencia* (judicial court) of Quito confirmed his title in May 1574, and this confirmation was also included in the *probanza*.[572]

In his *probanza*, don Pedro is portrayed as a devout Christian who served God by building a church in his village, acting as a singer in the village church, and teaching religious music to young children.[573] The purpose of the document was to prove that he was worthy of the title of *gobernador* (governor). Evidently, he wanted to emphasize his good qualities and the services he had performed on behalf of the crown to the Spanish monarch and his advisors. The form of the document followed an established Spanish documental pattern. The most interesting question here is not whether the *probanza* is truthful or not, but how don Pedro wanted to represent himself to the king.

The church was not yet completed at the time the *probanza* was drawn up, but witnesses declared that it would be very fine when finished. It was built of brick and lime and, according to Ruy Gomez de Camara, don Pedro had gathered over 10,000 bricks for the work. Fray Bartolomé Tellez testified that don Pedro had worked very hard to build this church and had made his people work hard for it as well.[574] Don Pedro intended to return home with a master of decorative tile work and an organist for the village church.[575] All the witnesses agreed that without the effort of don Pedro, the church would not have been built.

Don Pedro sang religious music himself and had disciples whom he taught not only to sing but also to play different instruments, such as pipes and trumpets. He had been doing that for more than twenty years, long before he became the governor

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[572] AGI, Quito 22, n. 38, Expediente de Pedro de Henao, 1583, ff. 2v.–3v.

[573] AGI, Quito, 22, n. 38, Expediente de Pedro de Henao, 31 December 1582.

[574] AGI, Quito, 22, n. 38, Expediente de Pedro de Henao, 31 December 1582, ff. 4r.–4v, 10v.

[575] AGI, Quito, 211, libro 2, Real Cédula a los oficiales de la Casa de la Contratación para que den licencia de pasajeros a Pedro de Henao, indio, y a dos criados que trajo y que pueda llevar también un maestro de azulejos y un organista que puedan llevar a sus familias, Madrid, 28 December 1583, f. 111r.

of his people. According to one of the witnesses, Alonso de Zambrano, don Pedro had performed both in the city of Popayán and in other area towns.[576] In addition, he was evidently highly educated and fluent in Spanish. Another of the witnesses, Bartolomé de Chamorro, testified that don Pedro had served as an interpreter for the priests who had visited the village to preach to the natives. The king also asked the *audiencia* of Quito to name don Pedro as an official interpreter with a normal salary, as he had served the king so well in this capacity for several years without receiving any payment.[577] By emphasizing that he was a very cultivated man, don Pedro clearly hoped to show that he had served king and God effectively in many different ways for years. He was also acting as a good example for young natives by teaching them.

Despite being integrated into Spanish society, most *caciques* of the time were much less educated than don Pedro. However, don Pedro's education was no accident. He was one of the many members of the Andean elite who studied in the *Colegio de San Andrés* of Quito, although it is not clear how he ended up there. It was a school founded by the Franciscan friars in 1552 for the education of the indigenous leaders in and around the city of Quito. This was all part of the indigenous evangelization project. According to Sonia Fernández Rueda, the Franciscans' strategy was to make the *caciques* their allies and transmitters of the conquistadors' ideology and religion.[578] However, in addition to formal education, indigenous individuals had other means of acquiring knowledge and learning skills. They often built social networks and sought informal education that was not determined by what the Spanish authorities were willing to teach them.[579]

Many of the students of the school were prestigious members of the Andean elite, including offspring of the Inca Atahualpa. Don Pedro was clearly not as prestigious, but perhaps it is not that surprising that he became a student of the school. The Pastos were probably integrated into the Inca Empire shortly before the Spanish invasion, and they would have had connections with Quito. The straight-line distance between Ipiales and Quito is merely 150 kilometers. In a certain court case, an *encomendero* named Juan Galindez said that it took approximately eight to ten days

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576 AGI, Quito 22, n. 38, Expediente de Pedro de Henao, 31 December 1582, ff. 4r., 5v.

577 AGI, Quito 22, n. 38, Expediente de Pedro de Henao, 31 December 1582, f. 7v.; AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito para que den el oficio de intérprete a Pedro de Henao, cacique de la Loma, con el salario acostumbrado, San Mateo, 10 January 1586, ff. 158v.–159r.

578 Fernández Rueda, "Colegio de Caciques," 16.

579 Ramos, "Indigenous Intellectuals," 31–32.

to walk from Pasto to Quito and back.[580] Ipiales is on the route between Pasto and Quito, and if Galindez's estimate is accurate, one could have walked from Ipiales to Quito in just a few days. Therefore, don Pedro's connections to Quito are not surprising.

In Quito, don Pedro also established relationships with the indigenous elites of the Andes. When he was in Spain, he organized another hearing for a petition to ask for a confirmation of his titles as *cacique* and governor. One of the witnesses interviewed in the petition was don Alonso Atagualpa Ynga, *vecino* of the city of Quito. Don Alonso had only recently arrived in Spain, and he had brought a letter to don Pedro containing news from home.[581] Don Alonso Atagualpa Ynga was a grandson of the last Inca emperor Atahualpa, and therefore had as noble a lineage as an indigenous person could have. His father was don Francisco Auqui, who had apparently been don Pedro's classmate at the *Colegio San Andrés*.[582] Don Pedro thus was well connected in both Spanish and indigenous circles.

The Franciscan order was the main body in charge of indigenous evangelization in the area of the *audiencia* of Quito until the ecclesiastical reforms of Bishop of Quito Pedro de la Peña in 1568. It managed to gain autonomy from the Church hierarchy thanks to its alliance with the powerful *encomenderos*. At the same time, it worked for the relative independence of the native peoples in exchange for their conversion, and tried to educate the natives in a humanist tradition. The education given by the Franciscans to the Andean elite included not only the basics of Christian religion, but also the teaching of language, arts and craftsmanship, forms of government, and agricultural techniques.[583]

In don Pedro's case, the Franciscans' strategy was successful. Not only did he work for the conversion of his people, but he also requested the king to allow the return of the Franciscans to the monastery of Ipiales, because their leaving had caused problems for native conversion.[584] This alliance was not beneficial only for the Franciscan order but also for don Pedro himself. He acted as a cultural broker

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[580] AGN, Caciques e indios 55, doc. 8, Pasto: empleo de los indios como acémilas, 1564, f. 492v.

[581] AGI, Quito 7, Petición de don Pedro de Henao, Sevilla 29 October 1585, ff. 1v.–3v.

[582] See Oberem, "Familia del Inca," 180–193; Fernández Rueda "Colegio de Caciques," 15; Puente Luna, *Andean Cosmopolitans*, 242, n. 58.

[583] Fernández Rueda, "Colegio de Caciques," 8–10.

[584] AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito para que informen sobre la petición de Pedro de Henao, cacique de Ipiales, de que los religiosos de San Francisco vuelvan al monasterio que tienen en dicho pueblo, San Lorenzo, 22 August 1584, ff. 131r–131v.

between his people and the Spaniards, for which language skills and cross-cultural competence were of utmost importance.[585]

In her article on the Colegio de San Andrés, Sonia Fernández Rueda claims that the *caciques* who studied at the school were turned into transmitters of Spanish ideology for their communities. This made them allies of the colonists in their grand evangelization project.[586] This is certainly true to an extent, but the issue is actually more complicated. It was definitely the Franciscans' aim to make the native leaders their faithful allies, but one cannot forget that the *caciques* had interests of their own that they pursued eagerly. They were not simply pawns in a game played by the Spaniards, but active players themselves.

The Andeans who learned Spanish and acquired literacy often used their skills first and foremost as tools to defend the indigenous peoples within the colonial legal system, rather than for spreading the Catholic faith as their teachers would have hoped.[587] Don Pedro also used his learning to improve his own social position and to defend his people against the excesses of their *encomendero*. He learned to understand the culture of the colonists and, thanks to the education he received, he could move around in colonial society with ease. He also used his education, musical skills, and Christianity to demonstrate that he was civilized in order to gain political advantage.

Was don Pedro's religious devotion genuine? Perhaps, but in any case, it was also good politics on his part. It was an indigenous strategy to enhance their own position, but it also challenged the conquerors' dominance. The natives presented themselves as better Christians than the Christians (Spaniards) themselves, thus questioning the Spanish claim for supremacy that was to a large extent based on religion.[588]

Don Pedro's relationship with the clerics was not without conflict. In one of the royal decrees don Pedro brought home with him from Spain, the king ordered the Spanish officials to see that the clerics who lived among the natives (in order to convert them) did not treat them badly. Apparently don Pedro had complained that the natives—men and women alike—had suffered excessive punishment for misdemeanors. In order to remedy the situation, don Pedro asked the king to order that his people be punished only by regular courts and that the clerics should take

[585] Yannakakis, *Art of Being In-Between*, 11.

[586] Fernández Rueda, "colegio de caciques," 16–21.

[587] Charles, *Allies at Odds*, 38–39.

[588] See Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 24.

their cases there if the natives committed any offences. The king told the *audiencia* to look into the situation and to do as it saw fit.[589]

Whether or not don Pedro was a true Christian is probably not even a relevant question. Evangelization gained momentum in the latter half of the sixteenth century throughout the Northern Andes, and the majority of the natives were baptized toward the end of the century. However, as Mercedes López Rodríguez argues, it would be too simplistic to categorize the natives as either Christians or pagans.[590] Getting baptized did not suddenly turn the natives into "true" Christians in the sense the Spanish evangelizers understood it, but it likewise does not mean that they were false Christians. The evangelization of the indigenous peoples of the Americas was a long and complicated process, and it produced distinctly colonial forms of Christianity.

In any case, an ally like don Pedro was very important for Spanish officials and clerics. Around the time don Pedro was preparing his voyage to the royal court, the Augustinian friar Jerónimo de Escobar was traveling through the *gobernación* of Popayán to assess the conditions of the natives and to propose some remedies to improve it. According to Fray Jerónimo, the Pastos in general had very little knowledge of the Christian faith, and kept worshiping their idols and committing many offences against religion. He lamented that there were too few ecclesiastics to convert these people.[591] Fray Jerónimo might have exaggerated the paganism of the Pastos as he tried to have the officials direct more resources toward their conversion, but it is clear that the conquest and evangelization of the Pastos was still very much a work in process almost five decades after the conquest. A figure like don Pedro de Henao was an invaluable partner in this work.

An alliance is usually profitable for both sides, not only for the more powerful one. Many indigenous peoples allied themselves with the Spaniards during the conquest and the building of the colonial society. Just like the Tlaxcalans, who joined forces with Hernan Cortés in the conquest of Mexico, they did so because they thought it fit their own interests. Later they presented themselves as loyal vassals in order to get privileges from the crown, but as R. Jovita Baber has pointed out, they

[589] AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito y al Obispo de dicha diócesis para que provean sobre la petición de Pedro de Henao, indio, de que a los indios no sean castigados por sus faltas por los religiosos, sino por la justicia ordinaria, San Lorenzo, 22 August 1584, f. 132r.

[590] López Rodríguez, *Tiempos para rezar*, 153–154.

[591] AGI, Patronato 27, ramo 13, Memorial de Fray Jerónimo de Escobar al consejo de Indias, 1582, ff. 2r.–2v.

were motivated by glory, power, and wealth just like their Spanish counterparts.[592] Don Pedro followed the example of many other indigenous leaders by portraying himself as a loyal servant of the crown and a devout Christian, but he also expected rewards for his efforts. That is why he travelled to Spain.

Don Pedro was indeed a good ally for the Spaniards. According to his *probanza*, he had brought some 650 natives down from the mountains, people had previously lived there fighting the Spaniards, and introduced them to Christian faith. Among these were 150 members of the *encomienda* of Ipiales who had dwelled as unruly vagrants in the lands of Otavalo since the time of Francisco Pizarro, the conquistador of Peru. The methods by which don Pedro achieved this are not revealed, but according to the native witness don Luis Queciquil, he had been away from his people for over a year working towards this goal.[593] One can only assume that the pacifying of these natives was not a completely peaceful project.

The Pastos themselves had problems with indigenous peoples called the Barbacoas, who attacked them and caused many deaths and plenty of damage. The problem was especially severe for the pueblo of Mallama, where don Pedro's son-in-law was the *cacique*. Don Pedro asked the king to send a trustworthy person with a group of men to punish the Barbacoas and offered the help of his subjects and of those of his son-in-law.[594] The conquest of the area was by no means complete at the time of don Pedro's rule, although the Spaniards had already been in the district of Pasto for more than fifty years. There were still natives who resisted colonial rule, and the Spaniards were still dependent on their indigenous allies. Not surprisingly, the natives expected to be protected by the Spanish in an exchange for the tribute they paid.

Despite his friendship with many Spaniards and his religious devotion, don Pedro and his people had many conflicts with the colonists. These conflicts had several causes, but in general they were about the land, the use of indigenous labor, and the treatment of the natives. The conflicts become visible in the *cedulas* don Pedro received from the king, which were answers to the complaints and grievances he presented to the court.[595] Don Pedro used his prerogative as an imperial subject to bypass the local officials and appeal directly to the king when the subject suspected

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[592] Baber, "Empire, Indians," 22–23.

[593] AGI, Quito 22, n. 38, Expediente de Pedro de Henao, 1583, ff. 2r., 9v.

[594] AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito para que provean lo necesario para evitar las incursiones de los indios barbacoas, a petición de Pedro de Henao, cacique de la Loma, y de su yerno, cacique de Mallama, San Mateo, 10 January 1586, ff. 157r–157v.

[595] The *cedulas* can be found at AGI, Quito 211, libro 2.

the officials to be guilty of wrongdoings. This prerogative belonged to nobles and commoners alike, many of whom sent their petitions to the royal court if they could not travel themselves.[596] Through these complaints, don Pedro exercised his role as the leader of his community, representing its interests in front of the crown.

Presenting pleads against the maltreatment of the natives in addition to his own petition to be confirmed a *gobernador* was a clever strategy. It legitimized don Pedro's trip to the royal court. Spanish laws ensured that the crown's subjects in the Indies who could not get justice from local authorities could search for it in Spain. Many natives took advantage of these laws and justified their stay in Spain by pointing to the incapability and inactivity of the local authorities in resolving their grievances. The *caciques* who travelled to Spain presented themselves as representatives of the indigenous communities who were performing their duties as loyal vassals by travelling the long distance to denounce abuses against the crown's subjects.[597] It does not necessarily mean, however, that the complaints did not deal with real issues or that don Pedro was only using them to advance his own career. Probably the conflicts were real, although don Pedro's complaints only tell one side of the story.

In many ways, don Pedro embodied colonial culture, which, according to Joanne Rappaport and Tom Cummins, was formed of multicultural, complex, heterogeneous, and fluid social formations. The different ethnic groups did not live in closed units isolated from each other, but instead intermingled in many ways.[598] He played a double role at the court: he was a civilized Christianized *indio* who had risen above barbarism, but at the same time he was a legal minor seeking protection for himself and his people. In reality he was evidently neither poor nor weak, and he knew how to take care of himself. However, he was a member of a colonized people and he had to play by the rules of a colonial society. That society, however, was by its very nature multicultural and multilayered.

In this sense, don Pedro is an interesting counterpart to his contemporary, the *cacique* of Turmequé don Diego de Torres. Don Diego was the other *cacique* from present day Colombia who made his way to the royal court in Spain. He crossed the Atlantic twice and finally settled in Spain until his death in 1590; it is plausible that the two actually met at court. Just like don Pedro, don Diego was not a member of the former Tawantisuyu elite. However, unlike don Pedro, don Diego was a mestizo, son of a Spanish conqueror and the sister of the previous *cacique* of Turmequé. Don Diego and his companion in struggle, don Alonso da Silva, the mestizo *cacique* of

[596] Puente Luna, *Andean Cosmopolitans*, 85.

[597] Puente Luna "A costa de Su Majestad," 30–33.

[598] Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, 28–29, 49.

Tibasosa, emphasized their status by resorting to their Christian and Spanish identity and high education. At the same time, however, they strongly identified themselves as members of the indigenous nobility and defenders of their Andean communities.[599] Don Pedro was not a mestizo but seems to have used similar tactics. He was an intermediary between his people and the Spaniards, a member of the local colonial elite, and a leader of his people.

Even though don Pedro invoked being an *indio* on several occasions, he still used an exclusively Spanish social and cultural register. He was a native, and therefore in need of protection, but at the same time he was just like the Spaniards and therefore equal with them. He seems to have accepted that Spanish culture was universal, and that natives aspired to be like the Spaniards. By the time don Pedro travelled to Spain, to follow Gonzalo Lamana's idea, cultural difference had already turned into colonial difference, and this could explain why don Pedro did not present his alterity as an indigenous leader, but rather emphasized his sameness with the Spaniards.[600] The colonial difference was an epistemological difference.[601] Therefore, the European/Spanish forms of knowledge were considered essentially superior to the indigenous forms, and if an indigenous lord wanted to be intelligible in front of the Spaniards, he needed to adopt the Spanish epistemology.

Don Pedro performed different roles. The colonial intermediaries typically directed different performances toward different audiences, and these performances were often multilayered. A chief could present himself as a loyal vassal when facing the crown, but at the same time perform a different role toward his indigenous peoples, a role that the Spaniards did not understand.[602] The documents drafted by don Pedro were targeted to a Spanish audience, and this affected how he presented himself in the text. The possible roles that he played in his own community are not evident in these documents, but some clues can be found. Next, I will look more closely at these different roles of the colonial *cacique*.

Another important indigenous leader and contemporary of don Pedro was the *cacique* of Guambía named Calambar, who was an important ally of the Spaniards. He is mentioned in the chronicle of fray Pedro de Aguado, who also calls him by his

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[599] Rappaport, "Buena sangre," 20–48.

[600] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 74.

[601] See Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 155

[602] Yannakakis, *Art of Being In-Between*, 40.

Spanish name, don Diego. According to Aguado, Calambar was a man of reason and authority, both feared and obeyed by his subjects.[603]

When Aguado wrote about a meal that don Diego organized as part of the peace negotiations between the Spaniards and the Nasas (Paeces), he said that it seemed to have been organized by a curious and intelligent mind, not by someone brought up among barbarians.[604] Aguado also described one of don Diego's *principales*, don Pedro, as a very Hispanicized "barbarian" who carried a harquebus, which he could use well.[605]

Fray Pedro de Aguado wanted to emphasize the good education attained by these indigenous leaders and Spanish allies while at the same time reminding their readers that the men were, at heart, barbarians. They were not quite like the Spaniards, but they were examples of good natives.

Guambia was the largest indigenous village within the district of Popayán. The *visitador* Pedro de Hinojosa counted a total of 1,070 inhabitants, of whom 321 were tribute payers. The village was located at the center of the province of Guambia, which had seven villages and an *estancia* all entrusted to Francisco de Belacázar. The total number of Guambianos (people of Guambia) was 3,779, of which 1,227 were *tributarios*. Approximately one quarter of the population was unbaptized at the time of Hinojosa's *visita*.[606]

Both the village and the entire province of Guambia were very wealthy. The Guambianos interviewed by the *visitador* Pedro de Hinojosa said that they grew plenty of corn, potatoes, *olluco* (*Ullucus tuberosus*), coca, beans, and other vegetables. They harvested enough of these foods to trade them for gold, which they then used to pay their tributes. They also traded for cotton in order to make *mantas*. According to Juan Ladino from the village of Guambia, village merchants travelled to the markets of Pasto, Almaguer and Cali. The Guambianos also had gold mines close to their lands, from which they could obtain gold themselves.[607]

The chiefdom societies of Popayán had markets and they traded with each other before the Spanish arrived. The communities produced surpluses of agricultural products, which they could store for times of need or trade with others. There were

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603 Aguado, *Historia*, 779: "[...]*yndio de mucha razon y autoridad y muy temido y obedeçido de sus sujetos e yndios[...].*"

604 Aguado, *Historia*, 789: "[...]*pareçia ser hordenado de honbre de curioso y agudo yngenio y que no se auia criado entre baruara gente[...].*"

605 Aguado, *Historia*, 783: "[...]*este varvaro fuese muy españolado, traya consigo de continuo vn arcabuz bien proveydo de la municiones neçesarias, el qual lo tirava y mandava muy bien[...]*".

606 AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, ff. 119v.–120v.

607 AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, f. 54r.

also specialized trades, such as jewelers, potters, and weavers. However, it seems that no monetary system existed. Instead, the communities bartered.[608] The Guambianos certainly had established trade relations with other groups in pre-colonial times, and continued to use them during the colonial era.

Aguado mentioned that Calambar gave Juan del Olmo 400 charges of corn, each half-a-fanega (27.75 liters), and 400 natives to carry them. The total amount of corn was then 11 100 liters.[609] A *cacique* who had such a vast amount of surplus corn available to be given to the Spaniards must have been extremely wealthy and powerful.

Don Pedro de Henao's case differs from that of don Diego Calambar, as the former had problems with his *encomendero* Sebastián de Belalcázar, the grandson of the conqueror of Popayán and nephew of Francisco de Belalcázar. Don Pedro presented himself first and foremost as a vassal and ally of the king, taking advantage of the power struggle between the crown and the local settler elite. Don Pedro was also an ally of the church, and apparently worked for the conversion of the Pastos. For don Diego, by contrast, conversion did not seem to be particularly important judging by the number of unbaptized people in his village at the time of Pedro de Hinojosa's *visita*.

Moreover, don Pedro clearly tried to undermine the Spanish settlers' power with the help of royal authority. For example, one of the *cedulas* dealt with don Pedro's complaint about malpractices in the distribution of natives for the *mita* (rotating compulsory labor) service. The remedy suggested was that the *mitayos* (natives performing *mita* service) were to be assessed by the judges of the *audiencia*, not by the *alcaldes* (town magistrates) who were closely tied to local *encomenderos*. The king also reminded the local Spanish settlers that the *mitayos* should be used only to meet the settlers' needs. They were not to be used to build houses for immediate sale or to gather firewood for sale.[610]

Don Pedro also received another *cedula* that addressed problems concerning the misappropriation of native labor for the Spaniards. The solution proposed by the *cacique* was that the natives could freely work for whoever paid them the most. The king told the *audiencia* to look into the matter and determine how they could fix the problem in a way that the natives would not suffer any grievance and that they would

[608] Llanos Vargas, *Cacicazgos*, 57–58.

[609] Aguado, *Historia*, 779.

[610] AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito para que vean la petición de Pedro de Henao, cacique de la Loma, sobre repartimiento de indios de servicio, San Mateo, 10 January 1586, ff. 158r.–158v.

not be taken too far from their homes. In addition, the natives were to be paid justly and treated according to the laws.[611]

This example quite explicitly illustrates the ways in which the governor of Ipiales and Potosí tried to use his position to advance the benefit of his people. It also illustrates, although more subtly, the patronizing attitude of the crown towards the natives. The king wanted the natives to be treated well and to be paid for their work, but he, or his council, seemed reluctant to let them freely work for whomever they chose. Therefore, the *audiencia* was told to fix the problem in a way that the natives would not be taken too far from their lands. It seems that the native governor of Ipiales was advocating the use of his subjects as a free labor force, but that the crown was not quite ready to allow it.

Despite their different position toward the crown, the church, and their *encomendero*, don Pedro de Henao and don Diego Calambar had many other things in common. The Pastos and the Guambianos were both among the more populous and wealthy groups in the *gobernación*, and both formed mutually beneficial alliances with the colonists early on. Both *caciques* evidently knew how to use their social, cultural, and material capital to their benefit and rose to prominent positions in the local colonial society.

The *gobernación* of Popayán was a frontier zone and the judges of the *audiencia* of Quito were far away. As a result, these officials were less able to restrict the *encomenderos*' excessive demands on and abuses of the natives. Contemporary reports paint a picture of a lawless district in which helpless natives were completely at the mercy of Spanish settlers. A clear indicator of this is the high depopulation rate among the natives of Popayán throughout the sixteenth century, although it was not caused only by mortality but also by indigenous migration.[612] There is certainly truth behind this image, but the examples of don Pedro and don Diego Calambar add more complexity to the reality. The natives of Ipiales and Guambia faced exploitation, but were far from helpless. We can see at least two different strategies being used here: don Pedro used his social capital in the royal court by playing the king against his *encomendero,* while don Diego Calambar allied himself with his powerful *encomendero* and sided with him in his conflict with crown officials.

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[611] AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito para que informen sobre la petición de Pedro de Henao, cacique del pueblo de Ipiales, de que sus indios puedan trabajar donde les paguen mejor, San Lorenzo, 22 August 1584, ff. 129v.–130r.

[612] See Padilla, "Tasaciones de encomiendas," 58, 79–82; Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 34–36; Calero *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 55–58.

The *encomienda* regime was exploitative, but the *encomenderos* were not interested in meddling with the internal affairs of the native communities. They had no interest in destroying the indigenous communities once the fighting was over, and they did not want to disturb the internal organization of the indigenous political structures. The *encomenderos* understood it would not be wise to try to replace the *caciques* as local lords. Instead, they tried to use the traditional leaders as their agents to collect the tribute.[613] The *encomenderos* were above all interested in reward and profit. They sometimes did try to increase their control and gain jurisdiction over the natives, but even then, they were more interested in making the *encomienda* inheritable.

The *encomenderos* were obliged to evangelize their *encomendados*. That was an essential part of the justification of the entire *encomienda* system. However, clerics and officials continuously complained about the poor state of evangelization, and accused the *encomenderos* of neglecting their obligations. From the *encomenderos*' point of view, meddling with the internal affairs of indigenous communities would have been counterproductive. The *caciques*' role as intermediaries assured them a certain level of autonomy as long as they fulfilled the tribute quota. The *encomenderos* were happy to get their tribute, and that was it.

Legitimacy of the *Cacique*

The role of the *cacique* varied significantly throughout the Spanish colonial empire. There were certain similarities due to the Spanish unifying influence, but also many differences that stemmed from divergent pre-colonial situations. The leaders of Mexico and Peru continued to perform many of the same duties they had done while at the same time adapting to the new situation.

The indigenous elites became arbiters of the colonial rule, but they had their own ideas about how society should be organized even as they accepted colonial rule. For example, in 1561, a group of Andean lords from the Cuzco area offered the king a considerable sum of money in exchange for being removed from the Spanish *encomenderos*' authority and confirmed as independent lords of their subjects. The bid was a response to an earlier bid by the *encomenderos* for the perpetuity of their *encomiendas* and jurisdiction over the natives. Yet it also signals the role the Andean nobility aspired to in the colonial empire. They claimed a political role as natural lords, freely acknowledging the supreme authority of the king but rejecting the

[613] Clendinnen, *Ambivalent Conquests*, 38 ; Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 30.

meddling of the Spanish settlers.[614] The indigenous peoples were not a unified group, and they did not have one single ideal, but this example shows that the elite of the former Inca Empire were willing to submit themselves as vassals of the king of Spain as long as they retained their autonomy. In that sense, they and the Spanish *encomenderos* had similar aspirations.

The *caciques* of Popayán were not involved in the bid by the Peruvian *kurakas*, so one cannot make assumptions on their ideals based on what happened elsewhere. However, it is evident that they also had their own ideas about their position in society and the nature of the Spanish hegemony, if they accepted it. These ideas too most certainly varied.

Karen Vieira Powers argues that the institution of *Cacicazgo* in the *audiencia* of Quito was largely a colonial invention, and so the *caciques* needed to create their own legitimacy.[615] The chiefs' role changed radically as they became intermediaries between the colonists, their communities, and, to an extent, members of the colonial administration. As we saw in earlier chapters, it was their task to gather the tribute from their communities. As part of the so-called colonial pact, the unstated agreement by which the natives provided the Spaniards tribute and labor in exchange for land and autonomy, they were recognized as lesser nobles by the Spanish colonial state. However, in order to be able to fulfill their task, they needed to retain their legitimacy within their own communities. This legitimacy was still based largely on traditional forms of authority.

Many of the pre-colonial indigenous communities of Popayán were chiefdom societies, but their level of centralization varied significantly. Some had developed a complex social and political organization, while others were much more loosely organized.[616] With the emergence of colonial society, this variety was reduced. The role of the *cacique* was in principal similar across the colonial empire. A colonial *cacique* was a distinct institution that differed from pre-colonial leadership and had similar features all across the Spanish America (with, of course, local variations).

In Peru, the *kurakas'* traditional power depended largely on their ability to manage labor and natural resources. This, in turn, depended on their ability to take care of the well-being of their subjects. After the European invasion, the shrinking population, loss of community lands, and imposition of the colonial system inevitably undermined this traditional authority, and many *kurakas* sought other,

[614] Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 53–59.

[615] Powers, "Battle of Wills," 203.

[616] The different forms organization and levels of centralization of the indigenous groups of the *gobernación* were addressed in Chapter 2.1.

non-traditional channels to regain their authority.[617] Most of the traditional leaders felt that the conquest had reduced their power, although some developed successful strategies in the new situation. However, in much of Popayán, the *caciques*' position might actually have been strengthened due to the conquest: they gained a completely new role as mediator and became members of the Spanish bureaucracy.

The early *encomienda* regime was highly exploitative. In Peru, the communities were used providing services to the lords, but there was a system of reciprocity under the Incas that was dismantled after the Spanish conquest. The *encomenderos* took what they wanted and the indigenous groups got nothing in exchange.[618] In addition, according to John V. Murra, the Incas actually never collected tribute so no household was ever obliged to give any products to the Inca officials or local chiefs. Instead, the communities were obliged to perform corvée for the Incas. This included cultivating, weaving, building roads and public buildings, taking care of the transport of goods, and other such things.[619]

In Popayán, a tribute system at the scale the new arrivals imposed did not exist. If a tribute was collected at all, it was probably done with the aim of redistributing surplus production or to store it in the community's reserve.[620] Paying tribute to new masters without a system of reciprocity was unfamiliar to the indigenous communities of Popayán, and the system was even more unpopular than in Peru. Therefore, the imposition of the *encomienda* system came as a bigger shock for the indigenous societies of Popayán than for those of the former Inca Empire. Partly as a result, these societies were more difficult for the Spaniards to control.

In his *visita* of 1570–1571, Garcia de Valverde determined the tributes that the natives of Pasto had to pay to their *caciques*. He did not mention tributes owed to the *cacique* in Almaguer. No other *visitador* gave any orders on the matter either. This suggests that among Pastos, it was customary for natives to pay tributes to their *caciques*. The Pastos were at least superficially tied to the Inca Empire, and they had a relatively high level of organization in their society, so having a tribute or a corvée

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[617] Charney, *Indian Society*, 79; Ramirez; "Cosmological Bases," 37–40.

[618] Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 66. However, the reciprocity of the Tawantisuyu should not be exaggerated. During the Inca era, a large amount of surplus goods produced by compulsory labor of the subjects was collected in state warehouses. These goods can be divided into two different groups. Most of the cloth and other goods whose ritual or status value outweighed their utilitarian value were redistributed to the servants of the state, such as officials or the military. Subsistence goods, by contrast, were gathered into provincial warehouses, where they were used to maintain these centers that were essential to the Incas' imperial policy of the Incas. Very little of it actually trickled down to the commoners. See Morris, "Storage, Supply, and Redistribution," 64–67.

[619] Murra, *Economic Organization*, 95; Murra, *Mundo andino*, 239.

[620] Llanos Vargas, *Cacicazgos*, 65.

system would not be surprising. At least some of the other groups had some sort of pre-existing tribute system as well. The reason the *visitadores* did not try to regulate it was that they saw it as an internal community affair. Even though some of the indigenous communities paid tribute or performed services to their *caciques* before the conquest, it is almost certain that the system changed in the colonial era.

Conquest and colonization created new forms of relations between *encomenderos*, the *caciques*, and the indigenous communities. The conflicts addressed above were part of the process of creating these new social forms. There were no fixed rules according to which the parties should act. The rules were created through interaction and negotiation. In the earliest colonial period, before the state institutions took a stronger grip of the territory, these were strongly based on personal relationships between the *encomendero* and the *cacique*. By the time don Pedro travelled to Spain, the colonial bureaucracy was already more developed, and the royal officials were intervening in the *encomendero-cacique* relationships. Don Pedro took advantage of the growing bureaucratization by appealing directly to the highest authority.

Both the above-mentioned *caciques* of Guambia and Pedro de Henao were allies with the conquerors. The difference is that while the Guambias directed their alliance toward their *encomendero*, don Pedro directed it toward the crown and the church. Don Pedro worked for the Church and for the conversion of his people in many ways. However, he was not merely a servant of the Church, but also a leader of his people. As such, he had a duty toward them and he tried to use the goodwill he had gained through his actions to improve their position. He did not attack the Church as such but instead supported it in many ways. He did, however, denounce the excesses of individual churchmen.

Working for the Christianization of the Pastos could also have been part of a strategy to enhance the *cacique*'s authority in a colonial situation. The pre-colonial indigenous leaders often had important religious roles as spiritual community leaders. Being a religious leader teaching Christianity to the people was a chiefly act.

Don Pedro's relationship with the Spaniards was, in the end, a complicated matter. However, this was not in any way atypical for a colonial society. Allies could quickly turn into adversaries and back to allies depending on the ever-changing dynamics in the society.[621] In the end, the Spanish settlers and the natives were competing for the same resources, and conflicts like these were inevitable despite the good relations don Pedro had with the Spaniards. There were several actors looking for their own gain, and their interests crossed. Don Pedro de Henao was one of the participants in the game, and he played it well. All these examples illustrate

[621] Charles, *Allies at Odds*, 7.

the ways in which don Pedro was able to use the social capital he had gained by his services to the king and to the Church, and through his good relationship with the Spaniards to the advantage of his people.

In his ground-breaking study on the natives of Peru and their adaptation to colonialism, Steve J. Stern suggests that the story of the indigenous elite during the formation of the colonial society was a success. However, he also notes that there was a tragedy in this success. The most powerful and dynamic faction of indigenous society was assimilated and Hispanicized, which led to weakening of internal solidarity and social stratification among the natives. According to Stern, the indigenous elite used its position to exploit the commoners, and was therefore left between two worlds without being fully welcomed in either.[622]

Was don Pedro's story an example of the tragedy of success? I would say that it is not. Don Pedro rose to a prominent position in colonial society, although he never was quite equal to the Spaniards. He was very Hispanicized and had good relationships with the Spaniards. However, there are no signs of him being alienated from his own people. On the contrary, he used the position and the social capital he had accumulated to help his own people. He tried to stop the Spaniards from taking their land, exploiting their labor, or punishing them excessively.

Among the royal decrees given to don Pedro during his first visit to the court was a letter of recommendation for the *cacique* from Philip II. In this letter, the monarch told his royal *audiencia* of Quito to help, honour, and favor don Pedro in his work.[623] Popayán was a periphery and therefore different from Peru and even Quito. Asking the crown to recognize his position as governor of his subjects was part of the colonial negotiation process in which don Pedro attempted to enhance his legitimacy in the eyes of the colonists.

However, he was not merely a Spanish administrator, but a native leader whose legitimacy in front of his own people was based on his membership in the traditional indigenous elite and on his actions with regard to the welfare of his people. Having said that, one can speculate whether don Pedro actually did put his personal interests above those of his people. He spent a lot of time away from his community and made his people work hard to build a church. He spent a large part of his energy converting his people and other natives. We know that some of his people preferred escaping to other communities over being converted to Christianity.

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[622] Stern, *Peru's Indian People*, 179–183.

[623] AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito para que ayuden y favorezcan a Pedro de Henao, indio, Gobernador de los pueblos de Ipiales y Potosí, en el corregimiento de los Pastos, Madrid, 28 December 1583, f.112v.

In one of the royal decrees given to don Pedro, the king tells the *audiencia* to deal with the problem caused by over 150 natives fleeing from Ipiales. Sebastián de Belalcázar had been able to catch them and bring them back, after which he had passed them to a merchant named Juan Gonzalez in exchange for some clothes for Belalcázar's wife. Don Pedro asked for the natives' return, and the monarch agreed.[624] Don Pedro also complained generally about natives assigned to certain *caciques* fleeing to live among the Panches to avoid paying tribute and being converted to Christianity.[625] We do not know how often this happened or how many natives had fled, but the problem was significant enough for don Pedro to complain about it to the king. Why did these people flee the village? It did not necessarily have anything to do with don Pedro's leadership, but it could indicate that there were conflicts between him and his people.

The flights were a form of indigenous survival strategy. As Karen Vieira Powers argues, migration was Andean agency at the most rudimentary level, both planned movements by the native leaders as well as the spontaneous migration of individuals.[626] Here we are dealing with the latter, and it also reveals a potential conflict between don Pedro and his people. It seems that the people had fled without their *cacique*'s approval, and that their flights had harmed don Pedro, who tried to justify the migration and put the blame on the harsh demands of the *encomenderos*. It is also possible that don Pedro had given his blessing to the escapes and modified the truth in his complaint to suit his agenda.

The *cacique* himself put the blame on the *encomenderos*. According to don Pedro, some natives had left their homes and taken their wives and children with them to avoid being forced to work for the Spaniards for a salary that was insufficient for their sustenance. Apparently don Pedro was locked in jail several times because he was unable to gather as many natives to perform services for the *encomendero* as demanded. He lamented that the flights were harmful for the conversion of the natives as they were not attending masses or receiving religious instruction.[627] Don Pedro also complained that many natives had left their homes because they had to

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[624] AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito para que informen sobre la petición de Pedro de Henao de que se devuelvan a sus pueblos ciertos indios que se llevó Sebastián de Belalcázar, San Lorenzo, 22 August 1584, f. 131v.

[625] AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito sobre la queja de Pedro de Henao, indio, de que los indios se van de sus pueblos a los de españoles para evitar los tributos y asistir a las doctrinas, San Lorenzo, 22 August 1584, f. 132v.

[626] Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 42–43.

[627] AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito para que informen sobre la petición de Pedro de Henao, cacique del pueblo de Ipiales, de que sus indios puedan trabajar donde les paguen mejor, San Lorenzo, 22 August 1584, ff. 129v–130r.

carry the tribute they owed to their *encomenderos* on their backs. Some of the groups lived twenty leagues[628], over hundred kilometers, from their *encomenderos*. Don Pedro asked that the *encomenderos* be made to come to the villages to collect the tribute with their mules since the natives did not have any.[629]

All the witnesses assured the king that don Pedro was loved by his people, but of course, it is obvious they would say that. They were all witnesses called by don Pedro. However, three of the witnesses said something on the matter that is quite interesting. According to the Spanish farmer Bartolomé Chamorro, the indigenous *principal* don Luis Queciquil, and the Dominican friar Bartolomé Tellez, if don Pedro had exercised his office poorly, the natives would have complained and asked for him to be removed.[630]

Jorge Gamboa has analyzed several cases of disputes over *cacicazgos* among another major indigenous group of present-day Colombia, the Muiscas. According to Gamboa, there were no cases of commoner subjects of a *cacique* issuing a complaint against their leader, but there were several cases of disputes between members of the indigenous nobility over the right to the title of *cacique*. The rules of succession were not always clear and it was common that there were several persons who claimed the right to be chief. If a *cacique* lost his legitimacy in the eyes of his people, they could name another leader and ask for the colonial officials to confirm the new title. A poor chief could always be displaced, so they had to maintain their legitimacy at all times.[631]

This was most likely true among the Pastos as well. It would have been difficult for Don Pedro to survive as leader for so long without conflicts if his people were dissatisfied with his leadership. We have no evidence of his people complaining about him or trying to have him demoted. He away from his community for a long time on at least two occasions, first when he was pacifying the mountain dwellers, and then when he travelled to Spain. This would have given his people good opportunities to get rid of him had they wished to do so. However, none of this means that Don Pedro was loved by his people. There might have been conflicts that were never taken to Spanish courts, or were taken there but the documents have not survived.

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628 One league originally meant the distance a person could walk in an hour. In sixteenth-century Spanish empire it was equivalent to little over 5,500 meters.

629 AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito para que provea que los indios no sean agraviados y sean los encomenderos los que vayan a cobrar los tributos en sus cabalgaduras, San Lorenzo, 22 August 1584, f. 130r.

630 AGI, Quito 22, n. 38, Expediente de Pedro de Henao, 1583, ff. 8r., 9r., 11r.

631 Gamboa, *Cacicazgo muisca*, 455–463.

It is also important to remember that don Pedro was elected to be the leader by the *principales* of the community. Presumably he was a member of the traditional elite, otherwise he would not have been sent to school in Quito. But importantly, he did not inherit his position. He was elected because he was seen to be the right man to lead the community. At the time, it did not come as a surprise to anybody that the years in Quito being educated by the Franciscans had had an effect on him. We can only speculate on the motives to elect don Pedro, but it is plausible that he was elected exactly because he spoke Spanish and was familiar with the culture of the colonists.

Gamboa heavily criticizes the claim that native leaders lost their legitimacy in the eyes of their people for their role as intermediaries between the colonial power and the natives. According to his study, the natives saw it as a positive thing that their leaders were familiar with the world of the Spaniards. That they were intermediaries between the two worlds did not mean that they were merely representatives of the colonial power: they were also representatives of their own people to the Spanish. One of their most important duties was to represent their subjects in the colonial courts. A good chief was not the one who clung to pre-colonial customs and traditions, but he who took care of his responsibilities toward his people in the best possible way.[632]

According to Gamboa, it has often simply been assumed that the local communities hated their *caciques* as they gained prestige and wealth in the colonial society and became intermediaries between the colonial officials and settlers on one hand and the native communities on the other. They have been portrayed in the historiography as colonial agents. However, these views are often originated from an uncritical reading of the Spanish sources, by which the prejudice of the colonial writers toward the indigenous leaders has been transmitted into modern historiography.[633]

Karen Vieira Powers, who has studied the natives of present day Ecuador, shares Gamboa's views. According to her, the *caciques* were integral to local power groups and formed alliances with Spaniards for personal gain, but at the same time they tried to protect their people and look after their interests as well as exercise generosity toward them. This changed toward the end of the seventeenth century as the *caciques* became increasingly alienated from their communities, but at the time of Pedro de

[632] Gamboa, *Cacicazgo muisca*, 447–448.

[633] Gamboa, *Cacicazgo muisca*, 439–442.

Henao, a successful *cacique* had to legitimize himself in both the Spanish and the native spheres by meeting two sets of diverse criteria.[634]

There was a confluence between the interests of the communities and their leaders in the Northern Andes, and the Andeans made no clear distinction between them. It was expected that the *cacique* gathered wealth and influence for himself, as that was also a direct indicator of the wealth and the prestige of the entire people. At the same time, they were expected to be generous toward their people.[635] Often the most significant response to Spanish authority did not come from championing the incorruptibility of Andean traditions but from learning and using the laws of the colonists.[636]

If the indigenous chiefs became too closely linked to the Spanish elite and worked against the interests of the natives, they risked losing the support of their people. Although some of them used their position simply for their own benefit, in general they had to maintain close contacts with their communities to preserve their legitimacy and to be able to efficiently rule. As Spalding so aptly put it, the *kurakas* were the cutting edge of colonialism, the blade that served the colonists, but the blade was a double-edged one. Alienating oneself from one's community could have been dangerous for the local elite.[637]

This is all part of the so-called colonial pact.[638] The local *caciques* played a key role in the execution of the pact and especially the cannier of them knew how to take advantage of their position. The *encomenderos* were severe men who demanded a lot from their *encomendados* and were not afraid to use violence when necessary, but they were also few and foreign and therefore depended on the *caciques*. If they stepped over a certain boundary, the *caciques* could easily plead to the crown or church officials. The *caciques*' role as middlemen made them an unfortunate necessity for the Spaniards.[639]

One can see don Pedro's strategy as managing these different sets of expectations. By being a good Christian and working for the evangelization of both his own people and other natives, he tried to get some leeway from the colonists. That gave him some freedom in handling the internal affairs of his people and helped him in representing their interests towards the Spaniards. Don Pedro was loyal toward

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634 Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 108, 151.

635 Powers, Andean Journeys, 107: Gamboa *Cacicazgo muisca*, 464.

636 Charles, "More *Ladino* than Necessary," 40.

637 Spalding, *Huarochirí*, 210–228.

638 See Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 158.

639 Lane, *Quito 1599*, 91.

colonial rule, but at the same time he served as a buffer between the colonists and his people in order to protect the latter. Representing his people toward the Spaniards was exactly what don Pedro was doing, as can be seen from the *cedulas* he got from Philip II. The complaints to which these royal decrees answer deal with some of the very typical issues in the relationship between the colonists and the natives.

Don Pedro's case points to the fact that the role of an intermediary living between the Spanish and the indigenous spheres was not unfamiliar to the native lords of the so-called colonial frontier zones. The development of this institution of intermediary *caciques* was slower in the *gobernación* of Popayán, as there was no antecedent for such an institution unlike in the former Tawantisuyu. Of course, the Pastos were among the first peoples colonized by Spaniards in the *gobernación* of Popayán, and also among the first integrated to the Spanish society. Here, the *caciques*' position in the colonial society was already institutionalized in don Pedro's times, while their role as a mediator was familiar already in the early colonial period.

Don Pedro is a good example of a colonial subject who creates his own subjectivity by combining indigenous and colonial elements. He became closely associated with the colonial project and its goals while simultaneously maintaining elements of Andean identity.[640] It was a balancing act, in which some *caciques* were more successful than others. In 1609, the *cacica* of Timbio, doña Francisca, demanded justice against Juan de Velasco for burning the sugar cane plot of her community because she had complained that Velasco's cattle had repeatedly eaten its plants. She acted on behalf of her husband Miguel, who was, according to his wife, *chontal* (did not speak Spanish) and had little capacity to deal with matters like this. Miguel and Francisca were entrusted to the *encomienda* of doña Catalina de Guzmán, who did not seem to have a role in the process.[641] Doña Francisca apparently wrote and signed her petitions herself, so she was an educated woman although there is no indication where she received her education. In any case, she is a rare example of a woman being in prominent position in a legal case.

Women played many roles in the development of the colonial society, but they are often invisible in the sources. However, a careful and gender-sensitive reading of the documents reveals that women were important. For example, many of the interpreters used in the interrogations of the indigenous peoples were native women.

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[640] See Arnold, "In Search of the Colonial," 40.

[641] ACC, Colonia, Judicial Civil 12, Signatura: 8093 (Col. J I -12 cv), Demanda de la cacica del pueblo de Timbío, natural de Quilcacé, y mujer de Miguel, cacique de la encomienda de Doña Catalina de Guzmán, a Juan de Velasco, Popayán, 23 September 1609, f. 1r.

Doña Francisca's example also shows that in the era of crystallization, it had become important for the *caciques* to be able to communicate with the Spaniards and to understand the colonial system imposed upon the local population. That was an important part of the legitimacy of the colonial *cacique*, shared by doña Francisca, don Pedro, and don Diego Calambar.

Local Power Groups

Following Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Spivak, one could divide the indigenous peoples of the Spanish colonies into three different groups: the dominant groups at the higher colonial level who were connected with each other and with the Spanish elites, the dominant groups at the local or societal level, and the subalterns.[642] The highest group consisted primarily of the old Inca and Aztec elites who had close ties with the Spanish colonial elites. In Popayán, this group did not exist, although don Pedro de Henao was an example of a person who was aspiring to be part of it. The leaders of the indigenous communities of Popayán belonged to the middle group and formed a buffer between the Spaniards and the indigenous subalterns.

In colonial Peru, the local Spanish and native elites formed power groups that dominated the local society in any given locale. Sometimes one power group controlled the society, while at other time several power groups competed against each other. The groups developed their own hierarchies, patron-client relationships, and contradictions, and they shared common interests and interdependence. This tied them together whether they liked it or not.[643] Something similar happened in the *gobernación* of Popayán as well, albeit the power groups were more eclectic and fluid here in the periphery compared to the Central Andes.

The *encomiendas* were not geographically determined territories, but administrative units each consisting of a *cacique* and his subjects. The role of the *cacique* was central: he was subject to a Spanish *encomendero* and it was through him that the other natives were entrusted to that *encomendero*.[644] Therefore, the institution of *encomienda* was based on the relationship between the *encomendero* and the *cacique*. When they enjoyed a good relationship, things usually went well. The court records, official reports, and other material contain many examples of conflicts between *encomenderos* and *caciques*, but the relationships were not always conflictive. When things went smoothly, they

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[642] See Spivak, "Can the Subalterns Speak," 284.

[643] Stern, *Peru's Indian People*, 93–95.

[644] Trelles Aréstegui, *Lucas Martínez Vegazo*, 269.

often did not end up being recorded. It is probable that in most cases the *encomenderos* and *caciques* had reasonably good working relations.

The *encomiendas* varied significantly in size. The largest *encomiendas* were mostly situated in Pasto, which was the most populous area of the *gobernación*. Captain Rodrigo Pérez had as many as 3,970 tribute paying natives in his *encomienda*, including 1,500 in the village of Sidunboy. It was far the largest *encomienda* of the entire *gobernación*. In addition, six other *encomenderos* had more than 1,000 *tributarios* in their respective *encomiendas* in Pasto; the same applied to one in Popayán. As a contrast, the smallest *encomienda* in the *gobernación*, which belonged to Andrés Cobo from Cali, had only 22 *tributarios*.[645]

The average size of an *encomienda* also varied from region to region. In Pasto, there were 23,157 *tributarios* divided amongst thirty-two *encomenderos*, meaning that each *encomendero* had on average more than 700 *encomendados*. However, the smallest *encomiendas* had less than 100 *encomendados*. In Popayán, the average size was 439 *tributarios* per *encomendero*, but the smallest had 150 and the largest had 1670 tribute-paying natives. The smallest *encomiendas* were in Caramanta, where the average size of an *encomienda* was just 88 *tributarios*; the largest one had only 150.[646]

The huge differences in the sizes of the *encomiendas* means that the *encomenderos* themselves were not equals. Having an *encomienda* gave them prestige, regardless of its size, and this set these men (and occasionally women) apart from the rest of the Spanish settlers. But their social status differed significantly. One cannot draw a direct line between the size of the *encomienda* and the wealth and power of the *encomendero*, but there is a correlation. The tributes were determined according to the size of the *encomienda*, so the larger the *encomienda*, the more the *encomendero* could claim from his *encomendados*. However, the official *tasa* did not automatically convert into tribute paid. Some of the native groups that were granted as an *encomienda* were not completely subdued by the Spaniards and did not necessarily pay their tributes in full or at all. Other *encomenderos* were able to force their *encomendados* to pay more than the officially determined tribute. As a general rule, though, it can be said that people meant prestige and wealth, and the most powerful Spanish settlers had the largest *encomiendas* situated in the best places. It is also clear that the largest *encomiendas* in the best places were awarded to the most important persons.

The institution of *encomienda* took different forms according to local circumstances. For example in Paraguay, the *encomenderos* had to internalize the

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[645] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, 1558–1559.

[646] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de López, 1558–1559.

Guaraní ideas of kinship in order to extract labor from their *encomendados*.[647] In a similar way, the *encomenderos* of Popayán adapted to the local social formations while creating relationships with the *caciques*, whose support was essential in controlling the labor of the indigenous communities. The Spanish colonists wanted to work through the *caciques* because doing so enhanced their position in colonial society. The colonial *cacique* in the *gobernación* of Popayán could have had more power over his people than did the pre-colonial chiefs.

The Inca Empire had been based on personal relationships between the Inca and the chiefs of his subject groups. Individual members of the communities, in turn, were personally attached to the chief.[648] It seems that this concept of personal relations as legitimatization of power was common throughout the Andean world, including in Popayán, although it was never part of the Tawantisuyu. The Spanish king was far away, and only very few of the indigenous leaders ever met him. Instead, they formed relations with the *encomenderos*, whom they knew personally. These relationships were often complex and involved different forms of coercion, resistance, and cooperation.

During Pedro de Hinojosa's *visita* in 1570, the bishop of Popayán, Agustín de la Coruña, told the *visitador* about an incident that had happened to him while he was preaching to the people of the village of Guambia, the largest native village in Popayán. La Coruña had talked to the village's *cacique* named Galambas, according to the bishop one of the most powerful indigenous leaders in the *gobernación*, and told him that his master was not his *encomendero* Francisco de Belalcázar but the king and the governor as the king's representative. The *cacique* had become nervous and told the bishop that he was not to say things like that to his people. When la Coruña said that it was true and that the natives needed to be told that there was only one king and one God, the *cacique* replied that for the natives there was only one master, their *encomendero*, and they would not allow anyone to come between them and their master.[649]

According to La Coruña's interpretation, this reaction stemmed out of fear. The *encomenderos* had much power over their natives, who in turn were afraid to talk against them. This is one possible explanation. At the time, the *encomenderos* were still more powerful in the area than the representatives of the colonial state, and Francisco de Belalcázar was one of their leaders. However, it was not necessarily only fear. The Guambias were among the earliest and most important allies of the

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[647] Austin, *Guaraní Kinship*, 548.

[648] Pärssinen, *Tawantisuyu*, 152.

[649] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 3, Visita de Hinojosa a Cali, f. 25r.

Spanish conquerors in Popayán, and for this reason they enjoyed a good relationship with their *encomenderos*. They also remained loyal allies of the Spaniards throughout the colonial era, especially in the wars against their old enemies Nasas (Paeces) (see Chapter 3.1). The leaders of Guambia saw their relationship with their *encomendero* as a sort of a patron-client relationship, and they did not want others to interfere. There was also a sense of mutual interdependence. The Guambiano *caciques* were part of the local power groups, together with their *encomenderos*.

It seems that they were, above all, allies of the *encomenderos*, not of the Spanish crown, although these two loyalties did not necessarily contradict each other. This *cacique* Galambas is the same person as don Diego Calambar mentioned in fray Pedro de Aguado's chronicle. He took part in the expedition against the Nasas (Paeces) in 1573. He was ordered to do so by the governor García de Valverde, but the governor did not go directly to Calambar. Instead, he talked personally to both Belalcázar and the *cacique*.[650]

Unlike Bishop Coruña, Aguado did not describe don Diego as someone who was afraid of his powerful *encomendero*. Instead, the *cacique* is pictured as a strong leader and clearly a member of the local elite. He was a subject of the Spaniards, but also an ally on whom the Spaniards depended. Don Diego Calambar was apparently the most powerful *cacique* in the district of Popayán, and his *encomendero* Francisco de Belalcázar was a leader of the *encomenderos* in the district. Together, these two men undoubtedly formed the most powerful faction in the local society, and while Calambar was entrusted to Belalcázar and obliged to pay him tributes, he was not a mere servant. The *encomendero* depended on the *cacique,* just as the *cacique* depended on the *encomendero*.

During Bishop Juan del Valle's *visita* in 1552, one of the local *caciques* named Boloy told a story about how he had saved his colleague Yunbo from hanging. According to Boloy, *encomendero* Sebastián Quintero wanted to hang Yunbo, but Boloy convinced him to refrain from doing so, saying that neither the recently deceased *adelantado* Sebastián de Belalcázar nor the bishop of Popayán would have approved. He asked Quintero how he would dare to hang a *cacique* for gold he did not have if even Belalcázar had not done such a thing. Several indigenous witnesses corroborated Boloy's story.[651] The *cacique* had the means to persuade the powerful *encomendero* not to carry out his plans to hang another *cacique* who was the legitimate leader of his people. Despite their extremely tense relations, the *encomendero* listened

[650] Aguado, *Historia*, 779.

[651] AGI, Justicia 1118b, no. 2, ramo 6, Procesos que se hallaron en poder del obispo de Popayán, Visita de Indios, 1552–1553, ff. 8v.–10v.

to the *cacique*, which indicates that the *cacique* had some leverage he could use in this situation.

In 1561, Miguel Muñoz and Álvaro Gudino from Almaguer were accused of serious crimes against a *cacique* named Mamendoy and his people.[652] However, the case was not just about Spanish *encomenderos* maltreating natives. It was above all a clear case of local power struggle between two dominant groups consisting of both *encomenderos* and *caciques*. I will now analyze this case in more detail as it offers a great insight into the complicated nature of local power relations.

Mamendoy had previously been entrusted to the *encomendero* Juan de Paladinas, who also had repeatedly complained that Muñoz and Gudino's *caciques* had seized natives who belonged to his *encomienda*, and that this had happened with the *encomenderos*' support.[653] According to a witness named Francisco Ruiz, an *encomendero* and citizen of the city of Almaguer, the constant abuses by defendants had forced the previous *encomendero* Paladinas to renounce his *encomienda* and move to Pasto. However, the new *encomendero,* Juan Negrete, continued to complain of the same abuses time and time again.[654]

The reason behind the complaint was that Martín Muñoz and Álvaro Gudino had tried to force natives who were not under their *encomienda* to serve them and brutally punished those who refused. In other words, this was a conflict between *encomenderos* over the right to demand tribute from certain natives. It was also a conflict between *caciques* about whose subjects certain natives should be, one that had its roots in the pre-colonial era and reflected inter-tribal rivalries.

In addition to the conflicts between *encomenderos* and between *caciques*, this was also a conflict between Muñoz and Gudino and some of their *encomendados* in La Cruz. The village of La Cruz was divided into three smaller villages in García de Valverde's 1570 visita: Taxamana, Xandoc, and Taxumbina. All of these were under Muñoz and Gudino's control. However, the village of Taxamana had previously belonged to the *encomienda* of Gonzalo Gomez. According to the testimony of Francisco Ruiz, Martín Muñoz and Álvaro Gudino had gained possession of the *encomienda* of Taxamana by forcing Gomez to turn it over to them. Gonzalo Gomez

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[652] This case has also been mentioned in Chapters 3.2 and 4.3.

[653] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 114r.–114v.

[654] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 68v.–69r.

himself also said that he had renounced his natives who lived together with those of Muñoz and Gudino because of their "poor neighborliness" (*mala vecindad*).[655]

The natives of Taxamana were at first not too keen with their new *encomenderos*. They ran away to hide in the mountains and refused to serve Muñoz and Gudino. This then instigated the punishment expedition. It seems to have served a purpose. In the hearing organized to rule on this dispute, the *cacique* of Taxamana claimed that he and his subjects were on good terms with their *encomenderos*, who treated them well.[656] Their former *encomendero*, however, claimed that the natives had complained that Muñoz and Gudino treated them poorly, and had even killed some natives.[657]

The people of Taxamana were not the only ones in La Cruz who were punished. It looks like the entire pueblo was reluctant to serve Muñoz and Gudino at the time. The matter was very complicated and had deep roots in pre-Hispanic times. Apparently, the natives of Gomez had been subjects of the natives of Muñoz and Gudino before the conquest, and according to the testimony of the *encomendero* Miguel Perez, the *caciques* of both groups were actively involved in the dispute. Perez also said that Muñoz and Gudino on one side and Gonzalo Gomez on the other had for a long time accused each other of using the other party's *encomendados*. The matter was by no means simple. [658]

Later, the natives of La Cruz seem to have become allies with their *encomenderos*, as they were accused of attacking the people of Mamendoy with Muñoz and Gudino's support. A *cacique* named Patangue, who was Mamendoy's son, denied that Muñoz or Gudino had done them any harm and put all the blame on Taxamana, Botinatango, and a *yanacona* called Juanillo. Two other natives of Juan Negrete, Diaguillo and Zinza, confirmed this. The natives who served Muñoz and Gudino were the ones who stole their yuca, chickens, potatoes, sugar cane, and other stuff. Patangue and his comrades were very adamant that the Spanish *encomenderos* were not guilty of any maltreatment; rather, it was their *yanaconas* who maltreated them.[659] It seems that for them, this was a conflict between the indigenous groups, not between

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[655] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, ff. 200v.–207v.; AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 68v.–69r.

[656] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 127r.–128v.

[657] AGN, caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hoja 90r.

[658] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 76r.–76v, 89r.

[659] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 139r.–143r.

natives and Spaniards. However, it could also be that the natives were simply reluctant to testify in Spanish court against the powerful *encomenderos*, and so put the blame on a rival indigenous group instead. Whatever the truth, this was not a clear-cut ethnic conflict, but rather a much more complex situation.

On surface, the *encomenderos* seem to have been the ones with the power, and the *caciques* were their subjects. However, here too the reality was not that simple. For the Spanish officials as well as the notaries who drafted their documents, it was clear that the *encomenderos* were the actors and the natives were the objects of their actions. However, it is actually quite clear that the *caciques* were also active participants in the events that affected them. This conflict was as much a conflict between the *caciques* as it was between the *encomenderos*. Therefore, it was not an interethnic conflict as such, but rather a conflict between certain factions in Almaguer's local society.

There was in general plenty of ambiguity in understanding who should serve whom. The natives lived close to each other in a small area, and there were no clear borders between the communities.[660] It is also probable that the relationships between the *principales* were not always fixed. For example, Gonzalo Gomez testified that Gudino had repeatedly stated that Biandaxoxoa and his community should serve his *cacique* as they had done in the past, although they belonged to the *encomienda* of Damian de Paladinas. He also said that Muñoz had sent his *yanaconas* to make them serve him because they belonged to his *caciques*.[661] Gomez, who was not on good terms with the defendants, seemed to insinuate that Biandaxoxoa willingly served Muñoz and Gudino, but this is not clear.

At the same time, there seems to have been a conflict between *cacique* Mamendoy and his brother Paciquya, who is titled as a *principal*. According to the questionnaire for the witnesses presented by Juan Negrete, Paciquya served Álvaro Gudino and had risen against Mamendoy, under whose jurisdiction he belonged.[662] Paciquya wanted to become independent from his brother and so allied himself with Gudino.

The ambiguity stems from the contradictions that were inherent in different ideas of social organization. When the Spaniards divided the native communities between the conquerors as *encomiendas*, they usually maintained existing sociopolitical units. However, they could not always grasp the complexity of indigenous societies, which were organized through *principles*. In many cases, the smallest units remained more

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[660] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hoja 35r.

[661] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 83v., 88r.

[662] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hoja 33v.

or less intact, but the relationships between the different units changed significantly. The social structures in the Northern Andes, like in many parts of America, were typically decentralized and there were many autonomous communities that were tied to each other in different ways. Some communities probably paid tribute to others, but the relationships were not fixed.[663] The social structures of Almaguer before and after the conquest have not been studied extensively, but it is probable that they resembled those of other regions in the *gobernación* of Popayán.

The conflicts between the different *caciques* had deep roots going back to the times before the arrival of the Spaniards. This was very typical for the colonial societies. Yet, the conflict was essentially colonial. As Alejandro Bernal states, the partition of the indigenous *pueblos* between Spanish conquistadors created new kinds of political and social dynamics that differed from those of the pre-Hispanic era.[664] That is to say, the arrival of the Spaniards profoundly changed the sociopolitical structure and balance of power in the area. We can only speculate about the pre-colonial relationships, and it is important to remember that the parties of the lawsuit lived in an emerging colonial system. Their preoccupations were different from those of their ancestors. However, although colonialism altered the ways in which the natives saw the world, pre-colonial logic still guided natives' thinking in many ways at this early stage.

The role of the native commoners in this dispute remains in the background, but it is worth pondering how they saw the situation. Tanguan, one of the natives of La Cruz whose nose was cut off, said that their *encomenderos* loved them like good Christians and treated them well. They were present when his nose was cut off, but it was Anton Andero, one of the city's *alcaldes*, who did it, not Munoz or Gudino. He also disputed that his masters had forced Mamendoy's subjects to serve them.[665] Evidently, the reality was not quite as harmonious as Tanguan claimed. We do not know if he said these things because he was afraid of speaking against his *encomendero*, and at the same time against his *caciques*, or because the differences between the mentioned *encomenderos* and their *encomendados* indeed had been solved and they were on friendly terms at the time.

We have seen that Mamendoy's authority was seriously questioned as some of his natives, willingly or unwillingly, served other *caciques*. Additionally, they were unwilling to testify against the defendants. Meanwhile, the *caciques* of La Cruz might

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[663] See Lockhart *Nahuas After the Conquest*, 26–33; Gamboa *Cacicazgo muisca*, 60–67.

[664] Bernal "Relaciones entre caciques y encomenderos," 140.

[665] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 146v.–147v.

have had problems controlling their subjects too. It does not become quite clear from the testimonies, but some of the chiefs seem to have been implying that it was their subjects who were in *mala servidumbre* (bad service), not themselves. However, on this matter one can only speculate.

The natives in general seemed reluctant to testify against Martin Muñoz and Álvaro Gudino. For example, a principal named Guaxantaxoxoa was a subject to Mamendoy and belonged to Juan Negrete's *encomienda*, but he denied that either Muñoz or Gudino had done them any harm.[666] This contradicts several other testimonies, given both by Spaniards and natives. There are at least two possible explanations for this. Either Guaxantaxoxoa was afraid of Muñoz and Gudino and their allies, or he had willingly allied with them against Mamendoy, whose subject he officially was.

They were powerful men and the *caciques* they had in their *encomienda* were equally powerful. Juan Negrete accused Gudino of threatening Mamendoy's subjects by saying that their *encomendero* was a nobody and that Muñoz and Gudino were great captains. Patangue, who served Negrete, denied that Muñoz or Gudino had said these things themselves, but testified that their indigenous subjects had done so. They had said that Negrete was merely a pig farmer while their masters were great captains.[667] Apparently, the threats were effective. According to Muñoz's housemaid Leonora, Mamendoy had very few people under his authority, and that most of them were willing to join the *encomendados* of Muñoz and Gudino.[668]

Leonora's testimony is also interesting. She was a very unfavorable witness for her master and his partner. She testified that Álvaro Gudino had gone with some natives of Chajunbina to the villages of the *cacique* Mamendoy, who had filed the suit together with the *defensor de indios*, and taken many things from them. They treated the natives poorly and forced them to work for them. She also said Gudino took two of Mamendoy's daughters, who were still maidens, although they managed to escape.[669]

An indigenous servant of Juan Negrete named Alonso testified that a chief called Gualaçaxoxoa, who is probably the same person as the above mentioned

[666] AGN, caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 128v.–130r.

[667] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 63r.–63v., 140v.–141r.

[668] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 121r.

[669] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 118v.–120v.

Guaxantaxoxoa, was ordered by Muñoz and Gudino to harvest their sugar canes and bananas while Negrete was away. They did so.[670] Likewise, Muñoz's and Gudino's *yanacona* Juanillo had taken four of Negrete's *encomendados* to work in their mines, and the two men were accused of using Negrete's natives to transport cargo between Almaguer and Pasto.[671] Muñoz, Gudino, and their *caciques* were powerful enough to order others to work for them, either willingly or by force.

The position of the Spanish conquerors was still very precarious, and Tomás López did not feel safe travelling in the area. All the *caciques* mentioned by name in the document regarding the dispute also have "pagan" names, such as Mamendoy, Chajunbina, Biandaxoxoa, Botinatango, and Paciquya. The documents mention that Botinatango was also called Don Diego, but most of the witnesses, Spanish and indigenous, referred to him with his native name.[672] Nine years later, during the García de Valverde's *visita*, all the caciques seemed to have Spanish names, meaning that they had been baptized, although the villages were still called by their *caciques*' native names.

This can be seen as an indication that the Spaniards had gained a stronger foothold in the area by then, and that the situation had stabilized. However, it does not necessarily mean that the natives had genuinely adopted Christian faith. They probably had not. For the *caciques*, taking baptism and adopting a Spanish name could have been a way to enhance their own position and demonstrate their high status. The *caciques* with Spanish names were additionally allowed to use the prefix Don, which was a mark of belonging to the elite. Adopting a Spanish name could also have been a message for the Spaniards that the *cacique* was an ally of the Spaniards. Sometimes, though, the leaders continued to use their own names when dealing with their people, and Spanish names only when dealing with the officials.[673] This serves as another example of their role between the Spanish and Andean worlds. It also shows that the imposition of colonial society was not as sudden as it might seem at first sight.

Nevertheless, taking baptism and adopting Spanish name was significant. It gave the *cacique* recognition as a lesser noble in Spanish society and access to the local power groups. It was important for a *cacique* who wanted legitimization within the

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[670] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 143v.–144r.

[671] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 141v.–144r.

[672] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hoja 120v.

[673] Gamboa *Cacicazgo muisca*, 473–482.

Spanish sphere. Indigenous Christianization also took place through the caciques: typically, the *cacique* was baptized first, and the commoners later followed.

All in all, the situation seems to have been complicated, and the testimonies are contradictory. It is evident that there was a power struggle between different interest groups, and that the interests were intermingled. It is not very clear if the real initiators of the conflict were Muñoz and Gudino or their *caciques*, but it is probable that they all played a part. Whatever the case, the conflict was not between the Spanish conquerors and the natives, but between two power groups, both of which had Spanish and native members. The court case of Almaguer took place roughly a decade before don Pedro became *cacique*, and two decades before he travelled to Spain. This was a period of Popayán's increasing bureaucratization. It was also a time during which the indigenous leaders became integrated more and more into the colonial society.

Almaguerian colonial society was only starting to take shape, but similar power groups were forming elsewhere. In the New Kingdom of Granada, it was typical for the Muisca *caciques* to make claims against each other in the *audiencia* of Santafé backed by their *encomendero*. According to Santiago Muñoz Arbeláez, the close ties between the *encomendero* and the *cacique* were evident in these cases as well.[674] Like the natives of Popayán, the Muiscas had also lived outside the boundaries of the Inca Empire, but there were two significant differences. The Muiscas had apparently formed confederations of several communities, and they were familiar with the tribute system. In Popayán, this was the case with some ethnic groups, but not all. The second major difference was that in the colonial period, the Muiscas lived in the vicinity of a royal *audiencia* and so taking their disputes there was easy. The natives of Popayán lived in a half-independent *gobernación*, and the *audiencias* of Quito and Santafé were far away. Therefore, the use of colonial courts was much less frequent.

The alliances between different elite groups were often formed on an ad hoc basis. The parties might have had completely different aims, but they shared some common ground, a mutual enemy, or something else that brought them together. This was typical all over the colonial Andes, as an example from the Colca Valley in Peru shows. In the early seventeenth century, the local *kurakas*, the Spanish elite of Arequipas, the creole faction in Lima, and the *Protector de Indios* joined forces and managed to oust the Viceroy Mendoza y Luna from his office. The *kurakas* reacted to the viceroy's relatives' excessive demands for native labor, while the Spanish elite

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[674] Muñoz Arbeláez, *Costumbres en disputa*, 42–43.

feared their access to native labor was threatened. Disturbing the balance of social relations proved costly to the viceroy, despite his close ties with the monarch.[675]

In one court case against rebelling *caciques* it is mentioned that before the rebellion, the *teniente* of the region had treated the *caciques* well, given them shirts, blankets, and hats, and had them sit with him at the table to eat.[676] This was an incriminating circumstance for the *caciques* from the Spanish point of view. The reference to the *teniente* inviting the *caciques* to eat with him at his table is interesting. The Spanish official wanted to have a good relationship with the local leaders and giving them gifts was part of this. In exchange, the *caciques* were supposed to help govern their people, but instead, they rebelled.

The Spaniards recognized the *caciques*' authority, and there are many passages in the sources indicating respect toward them. Forging good relationships with the indigenous elites was evidently one of the tactics the Spaniards used to consolidate their power, especially in situations where it was difficult or impossible to do so by force. By contrast, if the natives did not comply with the colonists, the *caciques* were responsible, and they were the ones who faced the most severe punishment. However, this is obviously a Spanish interpretation of the situation. The Spaniards gave gifts but expected submission in return. The *caciques*' viewpoint, unfortunately, it is not readily available in the documents.

In 1594, don Francisco and don Jorge, *cacique* and *principal* of the pueblo of Zupia within jurisdiction of Anserma, respectively, defended their lands that were about to be sold to pay the debts of their deceased former *encomendero*. Before presenting their case to the *alcalde* of Anserma, they asked that their new *encomendero* Gaspar Davila be given permission to represent them; as legal minors, they needed someone to defend them. The permission was granted.[677] Francisco and Jorge were evidently well aware of their rights and knew how the system worked. They were the ones who took this matter forward, but they used the prestige of their *encomendero* to advance their case.

Helping the people of Zupia was beneficial for the *encomendero* as well. It was not in his interest to have his *encomendados* lose their lands, as it would have made it more difficult for them to pay their tributes. Although the *encomenderos* were often accused

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[675] Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 163–169.

[676] AGI, Justicia 576, Residencia de Francisco Briceño, testimonio de la causa criminal contra el intérprete Gasparillo, Arma, 1552, f. 130r.

[677] AGN, Resguardos Antioquía-Cauca-Tolima 29, El cacique de Zupia sobre tierras, Anserma, 1594, hojas 808r.–809v.

of excessive demands and poor treatment of the natives entrusted to them, sometimes the *encmenderos* and the *encomendados* were allies.

5.2 The Colonial Culture

Segregation and Integration

The *república de indios* and *república de españoles* were legal entities, but the idea was to keep them physically segregated. However, while the natives and the Spaniards were in theory neatly divided into their separate worlds, they were in reality mixed from the beginning. The mixing is most clearly witnessed by the presence of mestizos. As the mestizos were not counted until the eighteenth century, it is difficult to estimate their population. They tend to disappear from the documentary records, too, because they are typically labeled as either Spaniards or *indios*, or not labeled at all. Their number grew throughout the colonial period, and they became a plurality by the late eighteenth century; but in the sixteenth century the mestizo population was still relatively small, and visible mostly in the urban areas. Nevertheless, they were always there.[678] In addition to mestizos, there were also other groups that were neither natives nor Spaniards, namely people of African descent, and people of mixed descent with African heritage (*mulattos* and *pardos*).

The African presence was always there even though people of African origin formed only a small minority of the population in the sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries. The enslaved Africans and their descendants, both slaves and free, worked alongside the natives in the gold mines of Popayán, and the pacific regions of the *gobernación* beyond Spanish control harbored settlements of runaway slaves.[679] While there were African slaves working in the mines of Popayán from the beginning, their number remained small until mid-seventeenth century largely due to the poverty of the local elites.[680]

During the seventeenth century, the mining regions of Popayán transformed from indigenous tributary to slave-based mining economy as the volume of enslaved Africans sold in Popayán grew dramatically and the use of forced native labor fell, largely due to depopulation. The transition was caused by the richness of the mines

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[678] Rappaport, *Disappearing Mestizo*, 10–11.

[679] Bryant, "Enslaved Rebels," 13–14.

[680] Lane, *Mining the Margins*, Chapter Five.

and the shortage of workforce, but it was also facilitated by the relative proximity of the slave market at Cartagena. As a result, Popayán was turned into a true slave society during the seventeenth century, but that was not the case in the sixteenth century.[681]

Segregation aimed at organizing society so that it would be clear which set of laws applies to which individuals. Rights and obligations depended on whether a person was a native or a Spaniard, and this made the existence of mestizos and other people of mixed heritage problematic to the colonial society. However, it is well known that laws that attempted to separate the indigenous peoples from the settlers were never successful.[682]

The different ethnic categories were neither homogenous nor stable, and their boundaries were never fixed. There were people of mixed origins who successfully integrated themselves into Spanish circles and who were frequently considered to be Spaniards, while others lived in native communities and were counted on the tribute rolls, effectively becoming *indios.* According to Joanne Rappaport, the heterogeneity of these ethnic assemblages means that it is not useful to refer to them as groups. Instead, it is more useful to see them as exhibiting characteristics of groupness. They did associate with one another, shared common definitions of who they were, and adopted similar behavior, but the boundaries were too porous and the categories too heterogeneous for them to be considered groups in the sociological sense.[683]

It is easier to understand to ambiguity of *mestizaje* if one remembers that the categorization was not based on modern ideas of race. Only in the later colonial period of Spanish America did categories based on phenotypes or percentage of different heritages became more rigid, although more recent scholarship has shown that even the so-called system of castes (*sistema de castas*) was never as fixed in practice as was later assumed by researchers. People were classified in order to tax them but the denominations were not stable markers of identity. Furthermore, they were not necessarily significant for most people in their everyday lives.[684]

Xenophobia is an age-old phenomenon, but modern racism was born out of colonialism and clearly articulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, in a prototypical form, racism existed already in the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries. Xenophobia can be a starting point upon which racism is constructed, but it goes beyond dislike of or prejudice toward other people. Racism is based on the

[681] Lane, *Mining the Margins*, Chapter Five.

[682] Baber, "Categories, Self-Representation and the Construction of the *Indios*," 34.

[683] Rappaport, *Disappearing Mestizo*, 9–10.

[684] Rappaport, *Disappearing Mestizo*, 4–5, 27–28.

idea of racial order, a permanent group hierarchy that is believed to reflect the laws of nature or the will of God. Unlike xenophobia, which can be found everywhere, racism is predominantly, if not exclusively, a Western phenomenon.[685]

For the Spaniards, a multiethnic and multicultural society was not a novelty. In the Middle Ages, the Iberian Peninsula was known as the land of three cultures, Christian, Muslim, and Jewish. Interethnic conflicts were common, but there was also peaceful, albeit often uneasy, coexistence. Spain's late medieval era has been coined the age of *convivencia* (coexistence), although the term has also been heavily criticized because it conceals the systemic violence that was an essential aspect of that coexistence.[686]

For sixteenth-century Spanish society, the more important system of social classification was *calidad* (quality), which was based on several different means of distinguishing individuals. It was based on birthrights and their socio-racial aspects, but also on residence, language, status as slave or free, moral or economic status, and rights and obligations in society. It was based not only on being, but also on doing, and an individual therefore had the possibility to influence on his or her *calidad*. Higher social status could also be achieved by a father recognizing his illegitimate children or by officially legitimizing them through a petition to the king.[687]

However, there was also a concept called *limpieza de sangre*, or purity of blood, which was much more essentialist than the concept of *calidad*. The statutes of *limpieza de sangre* denied access to many public offices to Christian converts of Jewish or Muslim origin and their descendants. The purity of blood therefore meant that one had to have Christian ancestors with no Jewish or Moorish blood. It was not something that could be acquired, one had to be born with it.[688] This concept could be termed racist in the modern sense of the word. However, in the colonial setting, the idea of the purity of blood was much more ambivalent, more tied to religion than the color of one's skin. This was partly dictated by necessity, because there were very few Spanish women in the colonies.

Discrimination against the Jewish and later Muslim converts to Christianity in the fifteenth and sixteenth century was arguably the first real anticipation of modern racism, although racial antisemitism had serious and often deadly medieval antecedents. Now, in the Spanish kingdom, the Jews were not persecuted because

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[685] Fredrickson, *Racism*, 6.

[686] Nirenberg *Communities of Violence*, 9. For the defense of the idea of peaceful coexistence and tolerance, see Menocal *Ornament of the World*.

[687] Rappaport, *Disappearing Mestizo*, 31–32.

[688] For *limpieza de sangre*, see Kamen, *Inquisition*, 115–133

of their religion, although it was justified with fear that they would continue to practice their religion in secret, but because of their ethnicity. By contrast, while the indigenous peoples of the Americas were seen as radically different others, the purity of blood doctrine was never systematically applied to them because racial categories remained fluid. Nevertheless, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain and its colonies are important in the history of Western racism, as they serve as links between the religious intolerance of the Middle Ages and the naturalistic, essentialist racism of modern times.[689]

This does not mean that ethnicity or skin color were irrelevant. However, the otherness of the colonized people was neither inherent nor stable. Instead, they had to be constantly defined and maintained. Social categories were moving all the time.[690] People were categorized according to their ethnic background, and skin color was one of the markers used, albeit not necessarily the most important one. However, as noted, the categories in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spanish America were fluid and moving from one to another group was in many cases possible.

The word mestizo is used very rarely in the documents I consulted for this study, but this does not mean that there were no mestizos. The family of Adelantado Sebastián de Belalcázar, the main conquistador of Popayán, included many children that he fathered with several different indigenous women. While he was in Spain in 1540, Belalcázar legitimized three of his adult children. His first-born, Francisco de Belalcázar, was the son of an indigenous woman from either Panama or Nicaragua. Francisco became one of the most powerful *encomenderos* of Popayán. Another child, Isabel de Belalcázar, married her father's fellow conquistador Hernando de Cepeda, who was one the leading *encomenderos* of Pasto. Their son Sebastián de Belalcázar later became the *encomendero* of don Pedro de Henao.[691] All these children and grandchildren of the *adelantado* were of mixed heritage, but the documentary records treat them as Spaniards.

The Belalcázars and the Cepedas were among the most powerful families in the *gobernación* in the sixteenth century. No one seems to have been bothered by the fact that Francisco de Belalcázar, who had in his possession the largest *encomienda* in Popayán and the second largest in the entire *gobernación* during the visitas of Hinojosa and Valverde, was a mestizo. The issue is almost never mentioned in the documents.

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689 Fredrickson, *Racism*, 26–40.

690 Cooper and Stoler, "Between Metropole and Colony," 7.

691 AGI, Patronato 167, n. 8, ramo 2; Lockhart, *Men of Cajamarca*, 127; Álvarez, "Mestizos y mestizaje," 67–69.

This supports the idea that the position of a mestizo depended on his or her personal situation, not exclusively on mixed heritage.

However, in some instances their background could come up in unfavorable circumstances. For example, the chronicler Pedro de Aguado criticized Francisco de Belalcázar for lacking the sense of honor of his father as he was reluctant to help the town of San Vicente de Páez threatened by unsubordinated natives that lived around it. According to Aguado, the reason for this was that don Francisco's mother was a native.[692] *Calidad* was something that could be acquired, but indigenous heritage was not necessarily forgotten even among the most powerful of the Spanish society.

Colonial hierarchies were not static, and ethnicity was not the only marker that separated or united people. According to Rappaport and Cummins, there was a multitude of cultural, racial, occupational, and even gender identities that could be altered by administrative petition.[693] The hierarchies were also constantly negotiated and reformulated in everyday interaction. Being the legitimized son of an original conquistador was in the end much more important than being a mestizo, and it ensured a position within the local elite even though the mixed heritage could be burden in some situations.

Mestizo was an ambivalent category, but the concept of *indio* also was not as clear-cut as the colonists might have wanted. It was constructed and used as a legal category to identify the indigenous peoples of the *Indias* as one of the *naciones* under the Castilian crown, to define their rights and obligations, and to standardize the laws that were applied to them. It thus was not really a racial category. Although the different native groups often asserted themselves as *indios* in order to defend their rights as members of that *nación*, they never collectively identified themselves as such.[694] Instead, they were members of their distinct ethnic groups.

The indigenous peoples of the American continent were ethnically, linguistically, and culturally very diverse, as one would expect of the peoples of the vast continent. The category of *indio* was invented by the Spaniards and assigned to all the peoples who inhabited the continent with no sensibility toward their differences. The category was above all legal, as it determined their rights and obligations in the society, but it also became a marker of social and cultural difference.[695]

Of the people mentioned in this chapter, Mamendoy, Botinatango, don Pedro de Henao, Diego and Miguel, and Leonora all belonged to the category of *indios*, and

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[692] Aguado, *Historia*, 818–819.

[693] Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, 29.

[694] Baber, "Categories, Self-Representation and the Construction of the *Indios*," 27–29.

[695] See Yannakakis, *The Art of Being*, 14–15

they were all colonial subjects, but their positions in society and their relationships with the Spaniards differed. The Spanish legal category of *indio* collapsed the heterogeneity of the indigenous peoples who inhabited the American continent before the Europeans arrived, but also concealed the very different situations in which they lived. The colonial system had a unifying effect to some extent, as the different groups all became *indios*, subjects of the Spanish crown with a certain set of rights and duties. However, their diversity did not go away, and it does not do the indigenous peoples of the Spanish colonies justice to not pay attention to their immense heterogeneity. Unfortunately, the source material very efficiently hides their diversity by grouping them all together according to their status as *indios*.

In addition to the ethnic and cultural diversity of the indigenous peoples, individuals were also separated by their social status. A member of the indigenous elite was in a very different position than an indigenous commoner; an indigenous man experienced life differently than an indigenous woman. All of their experiences of colonial society differed as well. However, for the colonial subaltern subjects, institutional practices emphasized ethnicity as the primary marker of identity above those of class, gender, or occupation.[696]

The Spaniards did understand the indigenous peoples' ethnic differences, at least to some extent. Many Spanish writers described the different habits of the various indigenous groups. They also consciously took advantage of the differences and rivalries that existed between the groups, as this study has shown. Ethnic plurality and the rivalries between different ethnicities ensured that the natives of the *gobernación* of Popayán never united themselves against the Spaniards. However, the conquistadors and later colonizers obviously lacked some sensitivity to these cultural differences, and usually did not deem them very important when dealing with the indigenous peoples as a whole.

The European colonists were a diverse group as well. They often referred to themselves as Christians (*cristianos*), and that indeed was their clearest unifying factor. Reserving this denomination for the Spaniards only implied that the converted indigenous peoples were not genuine Christians, or at least not as genuine. Most of the *cristianos* were from the Kingdom of Castile, although there were members of other Spanish and European nationalities as well. However, their social statuses varied significantly.

According to the stereotypical view, the Spanish colonial towns created a Spanish sphere, while the surrounding countryside was the indigenous sphere. This was true to an extent, but there was always a significant urban native population in all the

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[696] See Tavárez, "Legally Indian," 94.

Spanish towns and cities. They were often invisible in contemporary descriptions, as well as in paintings and drawings, but in the archival sources they become visible.[697]

Indigenous migration to Spanish urban centers began the moment they were founded, but it is impossible to assess the number of native inhabitants of the towns during the early colonial era. It seems that the urban settlement patterns became more settled in the late sixteenth century. The traditional ties that kept the indigenous societies together had at least partially been broken down, and many Andeans looked for opportunities in Spanish towns and settlements. At least some of them maintained contact with their communities.

The *encomenderos* wanted to restrict the ability of their *encomendados* to move away from their communities, but the crown consistently defended the natives' right to change their residence at their own will. As they moved to the Spanish urban centers, they could integrate into the *ladino* and mestizo community by adopting their clothing, language, and customs. The criteria for determining a person's identification was flexible, and both church and crown officials accepted the community consensus in determining it. Therefore, moving to Spanish towns and adopting elements of Spanish culture awarded the natives with an upward mobility and an opportunity to make a life for themselves free of the obligations of the *encomendados,* while still retaining their identification as an *indio* or *india*. Integrating into the larger *ladino* community did not usually mean cut ties with their original communities. Even in the heterogeneous urban centers, where people of many different ethnicities lived next to each other, the natives tended to identify with the people from their village or language group that lived in their neighborhood.[698]

The permanent native populations of the cities were usually not attached to any *encomenderos*, and therefore were rarely counted. As a result, we have very little information about the number of natives living in urban areas, or about the ethnic composition of the Spanish towns. The early-seventeenth-century city of Popayán is an exception in this regard, because in 1607 *visitador* Diego de Armenteros y Henao counted the "vagabonds" living in the city of Popayán, and reached a number of 273 *animas* (souls). This means the total number of people, not just the tribute payers. However, there were probably more than that, as Armenteros stated that the *visita*

[697] See Zambrano Escovar, *Trabajadores, Villanos y Amantes*, 17–18.

[698] Baber, "Categories, Self-Representation and the Construction of the *Indios*," 34.

was not finalized. These vagabonds were *indios* who did not recognize a *cacique* or an *encomendero*; Armeteros called them *mitmas*, *criollos*, and *yanaconas*.[699]

At the time, there were around 150 Spanish households in Popayán. Peter Marzahl assumes that there were ten people attached to each household, including the slaves and servants who were either natives or black slaves. To this figure, we must add the clergy and the inhabitants of the city who were not *vecinos*; this brings the total population of the city to at least 2,000.[700] However, Marzahl does not elaborate how he calculated his figures. The majority of the city's population was non-Spanish, especially considering that some members of the Spanish families were actually mestizos or even indigenous women married to a Spanish man.

In addition, there were five indigenous villages right beside the city with a total of 835 *animas*. Of these villages, Puellemsi de Buenavista was a quarter of a league, little over one kilometer, away from the city. The distance of the others was not mentioned, but apparently they were approximately as close.[701] In other words, these natives lived on the outskirts of the city and were visible in it. This amounts to over one thousand natives living permanently inside and just next to the city of Popayán. There were always a relatively large number of natives there who were not permanent residents as well. These include the *mitayos*, the laborers residing in the city temporarily, and people who were simply visiting, for example to do business or to take care of their affairs.

The total number of the indigenous peoples living within the jurisdiction of the city of Popayán, according to Armenteros' census, was 8,135. This included everyone: men, women, children, and elderly people. Excluding the so-called vagabonds living in the city and in the villages on its outskirts, the rural indigenous population around Popayán was 7,023. The indigenous peoples were thus by far the majority of the population within the city's jurisdiction. Most of these lived within seven leagues (little less than 40 kilometers) of the city, but the city's jurisdiction also extended as far as Valle del Patia, whose villages were between twelve and thirty leagues away from the city.[702] Excluding probably Valle del Patia, these villages were

[699] AGI, Quito 9, ramo 10, n. 76d, El oidor Diego de Armenteros sobre la visita a Popayán, Cali, Buga y Roldanillo, 1607, f. 1r: "ciertos yndios bagabundos que de muchos años residen en ella y en sus contorrnos sin reconocer cacique ni encomendero que son mitmas unos, criollos y yanaconas otros."

[700] Marzahl *Town in the Empire*, 35–36.

[701] AGI, Quito 9, ramo 10, n. 76d, El oidor Diego de Armenteros sobre la visita a Popayán, Cali, Buga y Roldanillo, 1607, f. 1r.

[702] AGI, Quito 9, ramo 10, n. 76d, El oidor Diego de Armenteros sobre la visita a Popayán, Cali, Buga y Roldanillo, 1607, ff. 1r.–1v.

within two day's walk from the city, and the natives surely travelled there regularly to sell their products.

It is clear, then, that the city of Popayán was not a predominantly Spanish city even in the early seventeenth century. The majority of the people living in or near the city were not of Spanish origin. But who were the indigenous Andean population who lived in the city of Popayán and other towns in the *gobernación,* and how did they interact with the Spanish population?

Many of them remain invisible in the source material, leaving no traces of themselves in the archives, even though they were indispensable to the Spaniards.[703] The preserved notarial records from the city of Popayán contain many contracts of employment with the natives. The records begin from the year 1583, but the next six years are missing. Records for the years 1590–1593 are again preserved. These records seem too fragmentary to make any statistical analysis, and the individual contracts reveal little because they are very short and follow the same pattern. However, if we look at them together, we can make some broad conclusions.[704]

The archives for the year 1592 contain the most contracts of *indios* employment, a total of ninety-six. Other years contain a much smaller number. The majority of the contracted natives were men, but twenty-seven were women in 1592. They all had Spanish names, although it is unclear if they only used these names when dealing with the Spanish authorities.

The place of origin of these natives is usually mentioned in the contract, and mapping these places proves that there was a high degree of mobility. A small minority of these natives came from the city of Popayán, and many more were from the *gobernación* of Popayán, from Anserma, Almaguer, Buga, Pasto, and Timaná, among other places. There are also several individuals who were originally from Quito or from Nuevo Reino de Granada (present day central Colombia).

Some of the contracted women came from quite far away. These included Isabel from Quito and Ana from Yumbo. Both of these places are in the present day capital of Quito, Ecuador, some 600 kilometers south of Popayán. Even farther away from her home was Francisca, who came from Toza, Panamá.[705] It is often assumed that the men sometimes travelled long journeys and migrated far away while the women stayed closer to home, but this was clearly not always the case.

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[703] See for example Zambrano, *Trabajadores, villanos y amantes*, 17–18.

[704] The records can be found at ACC, Notaría primera de Popayán, tomos 1–4, 1583–1619.

[705] ACC, Notaría primera de Popayán, tomo 1, año 1592 I, no. 23, f. 79v.; Año 1592 II, no. 6, f. 115v.; no. 141, f. 222r.

Undoubtedly, women were more visible in the towns then they are in the archival records. Even today, women play a fundamental role in the Andean petty economy, and that was true in the colonial era as well. Indigenous and mestiza women were predominantly vendors of food, textiles, alcohol, and coca in the markets of the Andean towns. This was an important form of their agency and autonomy from men, which was often a concern for the Spaniards. Before Spanish colonialism, Andean women played important roles as professional weavers and crafts producers, but the Spaniards, with their very different gender ideologies, wanted to restrict the women's role to reproduction and care of the family and household. Of course, women continued to play an important role in the economy, but mainly in the confines of their homes or the homes of Spaniards. The markets were an exception. However, it was also often a necessity, with the women doing their part in helping their communities meet their tribute obligations.[706]

There were not many Spanish low-skill workers in Popayán. There were African slaves, but few in the sixteenth century. Therefore, indigenous peoples and mestizos performed most of the low-skill labor. If at the time of López, Valverde and Hinojosa's *visitas* the only way to attain native labor force was through systems of compulsory labor, by the end of the century, a market of free wage labor had clearly developed. The *mita* was still in place, but it was evidently no longer enough to fulfill the needs of the Spanish towns. Since the indigenous communities had shrunk and could not send enough *mitayos* to serve the Spaniards, waged workers became an important addition. The level of freedom that the native workers enjoyed is debatable, but at least in theory they were free to sell their labor to whomever they wanted. However, powerful employers could keep the wages low and prevent the development of a truly free labor market.

The contracts do not reveal who these natives were or how they ended up in Popayán. The contracts indicate that they worked by their own will, but it is difficult to say how voluntarily they signed the contracts. It is known that often in these kinds of arrangements, the natives were heavily in debt to the employer, making a certain amount of coercion inevitable. Of course, to many natives salaried labor offered a chance to escape from their duties under the *encomienda* system. Their mobility also suggests that they were at least sometimes able to leave the city if the burden was too heavy for them to carry, and to start anew somewhere else.[707] Perhaps some of the contracted natives were actually indentured servants, which would mean that we actually cannot speak of free waged labor at all.

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[706] Mangan, "Market of Identities," 76–77; Powers, "Andean and Spaniards," 533–534.

[707] See Lane, *Quito 1599*, 103–104.

These natives were mostly servants of the Spaniards, and performed a variety of duties in their houses or workshops. The contracts often do not specify the services the natives had to perform. The person was usually hired for one year for a fixed salary, which varied between ten and twenty pesos of gold dust per year. The gold dust was low-karat, containing only one and one-half *tomines* of pure gold per peso. The salaries were thus not very high.[708] It was barely enough to cover their life expenses.[709] In addition, many contracts state that the employer was obliged to cure the employee of their sicknesses and to treat them well.

In 1580, two natives named Diego and Miguel filed a suit against Spaniards who had taken away their wives, demanding that they be returned. They also demanded that their right to serve whomever they wanted to be respected. Diego and Miguel stated that they were *ladinos* and Christians, and that they had for several years served whom they wanted and whom ever had paid their wages. However, now certain persons had claimed that Diego and Miguel had to serve them, and when they refused these persons had taken their wives as hostages. Their wives, Marina and Ines, were also natives of the same province, and they had been married in a church.[710]

Diego and Miguel had other local urbanized natives testifying on their behalf, as well as one Spaniard, Francisco Ortiz Chiquillo, who testified that Miguel and Ines had indeed been wedded in a Christian way and that they lived together like a husband and wife.[711] The fact that they had a Spanish witness shows that they had connections within the Spanish sphere. However, the nature of their relationship with Ortiz Chiquillo is not mentioned. Of course, their employers were mostly Spanish. They also needed the Spanish witness because he was regarded as more reliable in court than the indigenous witnesses.

Diego, Miguel, Marina, and Ines are examples of indigenous Andeans who lived in the Spanish towns and cities working for a living. Like so many of their compatriots, they would have remained anonymous to us had they not filed this

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[708] One peso equals eight *tomines*, so less than one-fifth of the dust was actually gold.

[709] As a reference, in his *visita* Pedro de Hinojosa determined fixed prices for some products that the natives sold to the Spaniards. For example, one pound of spun cotton was valued at two *tomines*, one *arroba* of fish at four pesos, one hen at one *tomín*, a *carga* (222 liters) of firewood at one peso, and one *arroba* (11.5 kg) of sisal agave at half-a-peso: AGI, Justicia, leg. 639, n. 2, visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, f. 101v. On another occasion, it is mentioned that half-a-fanega (27.75 liters) of corn was worth ten *reales*, equaling 0.625 pesos: AGI, Justicia, leg. 639, n. 3, Visita de Hinojosa a Cali, f. 19v.

[710] AGN, Caciques e Indios 26, documento 4, Indios de Cali y Victoria: Piden se les respete, 1580, hoja 93r.

[711] AGN, Caciques e Indios 26, documento 4, Indios de Cali y Victoria: Piden se les respete, 1580, hoja 96r.

single lawsuit. Their work enabled the Spanish presence in the region. They were fluent Spanish speakers and practicing Christians, meaning that they had at least partially adopted the culture of the colonists. Their lawsuit proves that they aspired to be recognized as free people with the right to do what they wanted with their lives. They wanted to be equal members of their urban community. However, for the Spaniards settlers, or at least some of them, these people were still natives who could be forced to serve their superiors.

In addition to the indigenous workers, the notarial records of Popayán also contain transactions of land plots involving natives. The number of these increase in the seventeenth century, but there are some from the late sixteenth century as well. On September 21, 1592, Hernando de Meneses, *vecino* of Pasto and resident of Popayán, sold a plot of land in the city to a native named Juan Cañar, another resident of the city.[712] Also in 1592, an indigenous shoemaker (*zapatero*) in Popayán named Martin sold a piece of land divided into two plots to another native named Juan Mosca for 15 pesos of gold.[713] This probably means pesos of good gold (*Buen oro*). Even though the value of gold in Popayán was relatively low compared to other places, as there was a lot of it available, this was not an insignificant amount of money. An ordinary Andean attached to his community and participating in paying their tribute could not have amassed such a sum. The urban native workers were usually in debt to their employers, and so for them saving money was rarely an option. Unfortunately, there is no mention who this Juan Mosca was or from where he came. He could have been an artisan or a tradesman, and it is also possible that he had worked in the mines and maybe kept some of the gold he mined. In any case, this transaction shows that there were natives in Popayán who could afford to buy land in the city. The seller Martín was probably an independent craftsman.

These natives were part of a group that Karen B. Graubart calls *indios criollos*, or Indian creoles. *Indios criollos* practiced a kind of cultural mixing, adding Spanish elements to their wardrobe, attending church, joining religious organizations, living in new social arrangements, including the rental chambers in other people's houses, and speaking Spanish alongside or instead of an Andean language. Some also owned properties in the towns. In a way, urban natives became creolized. The most successful of them were even awarded the privilege of citizenship.[714] I have not encountered such a case in the *gobernación* of Popayán, but the right to own a plot

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[712] ACC, Notaría primera, tomo 1, año 1592 II, no. 223, venta de solares, f. 310r.

[713] ACC, Notaría primera, Tomo 1, Año 1592 II, no. 210, Martin, indio zapatero & Juan Mosca, indio, venta de solar, ff. 296r.-296v.

[714] Graubart, "Creolization of the New World," 490.

could be attached to citizenship. The laws did not restrict citizenship according to ethnicity, so indigenous people were eligible. However, towns could exclude natives from citizenship.[715] It seems that in Popayán, citizenship was not very clearly defined and the term *vecino* was used quite loosely. The town *cabildo* did not have a register of citizens.[716]

Although some Andeans became urban dwellers, the vast majority of the indigenous population lived in the countryside throughout the colonial period. However, the line between the two spheres—urban and rural—remained fuzzy. Some natives never even visited the towns, but many lived there for a while during their *mita* shift or for some other purpose, and many more visited the towns for a variety of reasons. Spanish colonial towns became true contact zones in the most concrete meaning of the term. There, Spanish settlers and natives intermingled with each other, and so the natives who lived most of their lives in the predominantly indigenous countryside were in regular contact with the colonists.

The rural indigenous communities could use the laws of separation to their benefit, or at least to protect them from the worst. One example of this is the *resguardo* system, which aimed to protect some of the indigenous lands from Spanish encroachment. It also limited the power of the *encomenderos* over the indigenous communities, and gave the communities a certain degree of self-government. The r*esguardo* lands became communal property that could not be bought or sold, and the title to the lands was vested in a *cabildo* comprised of the community's *cacique* and *principales*. The members of the *cabildo* had the privilege of using the title don or doña, and of wearing European clothing. The *resguardo* was part of the centralization of power in the colonial empire, and at the same time an attempt to isolate the indigenous communities from Spanish and mestizo elements, so that they could live peacefully in sedentary communities. The system was established in the *Nuevo Reino* during the second half of the sixteenth century.[717]

The term *resguardo* implies protection, which describes quite well its purpose. As the Spanish settlers set up *estancias* for cultivating and raising cattle, the native communities gradually lost large parts of the lands that used to be at their disposal. The system of *resguardos* was meant to protect some of their lands so that they could maintain themselves and pay their tribute. Like much else in the colonial system, the *resguardos* was patronizing and legitimized the appropriation of indigenous lands. In an exchange for losing large parts of their cultivable lands, the native communities

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[715] Herzog, "Early Modern Spanish Citizenship," 213–220.

[716] Marzahl, *Town in the Empire*, 70–71, 163.

[717] Rappaport, *Politics of Memory*, 45–46.

were handed the protection of certain lands and internal autonomy within the colonial structure. It also, however, offered the natives a means to advance their interests in the judicial system.

Although land grants for the Spaniards were to be made without harming a third party, that is, the natives, in reality the Spaniards encroached on the indigenous communities' lands. The right to appropriate land for the settlers was in the hands of the town council, the *cabildo*, which granted vacant land to settlers. The high mortality rate of the natives ensured that land became vacant, but the Spaniards also took hold of lands that were being effectively cultivated by the natives. The Spaniards used many different methods to appropriate indigenous land. Sometimes they simply drove the natives out of their lands; sometimes they let their cattle destroy the crops, forcing the communities to abandon their land; and sometimes they took hold of seemingly unoccupied land that was actually being used by the indigenous communities. Especially the highlands of Pasto gradually transformed into a tapestry of Spanish *estancias* interwoven with native settlements. This constricted the natives' freedom of movement and made their traditional ways of life impossible. In the pre-Colombian era, the Andeans had lived a mobile life, taking advantage of vast territories for different purposes, including cultivation, hunting, and fishing.[718]

A royal *cedula* issued to don Pedro de Henao, *cacique* of Ipiales, illustrates one of the ways in which the Spaniards took hold of indigenous land. It was a common custom that once the natives had reaped their crop, they left the land uncultivated (fallow) for a year to give it a rest. The Spaniards took advantage of that, claiming that the land was vacant and that this justified taking hold of it. Don Pedro also complained that the Spaniards let their cattle roam across cultivated land, significantly damaging it and forcing the natives out. The king ordered the *audiencia* of Quito to look into the matter and ensure that no harm was being done to the natives.[719]

In 1594, *cacique* don Francisco and *principal* don Jorge of the village of Zupia filed a petition to the *alcalde* of Anserma. Their former *encomendero* Alonso de Loaysa had passed away, and his debtors were selling all of his possessions, among them the lands that belonged to the people of Zupia. Don Francisco and don Jorge asked the *alcalde* to protect their lands because they were the property of their community, not

[718] Calero *Chiefdoms Under Siege*, 103–112.

[719] AGI, Quito 211, libro 2, Real Cédula al Presidente y oidores de la Audiencia de Quito para que atienda la queja de Pedro de Henao sobre que los españoles quitan las tierras a los indios y les meten ganados en sus sembrados, San Lorenzo, 22 August 1584, f. 133r.

of the former *encomendero*. The *alcalde* accepted their demand and prohibited anyone from selling the community's lands.[720] These community lands were *resguardo* lands.

In the above-mentioned case of Zupia, the *caciques* claimed that the lands had belonged to their fathers, grandfather, great-grandfathers, and all their ancestors.[721] There was a legal category widely used in the colonial era called *time immemorial* (*tiempo inmemorial*). This was an epistemological convention used by the Spanish notaries to express a form of indigenous memory. The term was sometimes used to refer specifically to pre-Colombian times, also referred to as the times of gentility (*tiempos de la gentilidad*), but more often it meant any point in the past. The Spanish legal convention defined time immemorial as at least twenty years.[722] Here, the category was not explicitly used, but the *caciques* of Zupia implicitly invoked it.

It was important for the claimants to be able to show that the lands had been inhabited and cultivated by the ancestors of the people of Zupia for generations, and that nobody could remember a time when this was not the case. A Spanish resident of the town of Anserma named Miguel Morillo testified that he had lived in the region for twenty-three years, and that during all that time the natives of Zupia had inhabited, cultivated, and raised animals on the lands in question.[723] The Zupians testified that the lands had belonged to them for far longer, since before the arrival of the Spaniards, but for the judicial system, it was important that a Spaniard could testify that he had seen them living on the land and actively using it for more than twenty years.

Morillo and other two Spanish witnesses, captain Hernán Benitez and Juan de Chinchilla, testified that if the natives of Zupia were driven out of their lands, they would have no place to go and make a living.[724] Anserma was a mountainous region, and fertile land was not abundant there.

Deceased *encomendero* Alonso de Loyasa's brother-in-law Pedro Guillermo Marmolejo claimed, however, that the lands had been in Loyasa's possession for

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[720] AGN, Resguardos Antioquía-Cauca-Tolima 29, El cacique de Zupia sobre tierras, Anserma, 1594, hojas 810r.–813r.

[721] AGN, Resguardos Antioquía-Cauca-Tolima 29, El cacique de Zupia sobre tierras, Anserma, 1594, hoja 810r.

[722] Rappaport & Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, 167.

[723] AGN, Resguardos Antioquía-Cauca-Tolima 29, El cacique de Zupia sobre tierras, Anserma, 1594, hoja 810v.

[724] AGN, Resguardos Antioquía-Cauca-Tolima 29, El cacique de Zupia sobre tierras, Anserma, 1594, hojas 812r.–812v.

more than thirty years.[725] Marmolejo does not seem to have provided any evidence to back up his claim. There is no document proving that his brother-in-law owned the land, and he did not call witnesses to testify on his behalf. Perhaps he did present evidence, but it is not preserved in the archives. In any case, in these situations it was often one word against another. The Zupians naturally did not have land ownership documents before the Spanish arrived either.

The indigenous peoples used Spanish courts to gain official recognition that they owned the lands they had used for generations. Doing so also meant that the natives had resigned themselves to the facts that they were subdued and that they lost some of their lands. They were looking for ways to take advantage of the colonial system, to use it to protect some of what had been theirs before the Spanish arrived.

While the *resguardo* system legitimized the colonization of indigenous lands, it was sometimes the only way for an Andean community to secure possession of their own land. They inevitably lost large swathes of it, but under the circumstances, it was better to retain possession of some of the lands than to lose all. The indigenous groups had their own ideas of land ownership that were in many ways incompatible with the Spanish concepts, but they had to adapt to the system brought and imposed by the colonizers.

Hegemony and the Hidden Transcript

Despite the fact that the Spanish domination was far from being absolute, the Spaniards formed the hegemonic party in interethnic interactions. It is debatable, however, whether there existed a hegemony in a Gramscian sense, because the Spaniards' actions were openly violent and arbitrary.[726] While most of the indigenous communities living within the Spanish dominated region did accept the colonizers' rule and consent to paying them tribute, they did not necessarily accept these things unconditionally. The Spanish hegemony was not undisputed.

According to Antonio Gramsci, hegemony can never be genuine if it is based only on military or economic dominion: the ideological consent of the ruled is also required.[727] John Agnew develops on Gramscian ideas, arguing that hegemony is not simply the exercise of raw military, economic, and political power, nor is it a simple

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[725] AGN, Resguardos Antioquía-Cauca-Tolima 29, El cacique de Zupia sobre tierras, Anserma, 1594, hoja 811v.

[726] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 147.

[727] Gramsci, *Vankilavihkot*, 64–70.

continuation of military and political power that is exercised territorially. Instead, hegemony is the enrollment of others in the exercise of your power by convincing, persuading, and coercing them that they should want what you want. Hegemony thus represents the binding together of people and institutions around cultural norms and standards, but it is never complete and often resisted.[728]

There is usually a complex unity of coercion and consent in situations of domination. These situations are characterized by hegemonic fragility, struggle between the hegemons and the subalterns, and lack of unity within either group. Following William Roseberry, it is therefore more accurate to speak of a hegemonic process rather than of a static state of hegemony.[729] Gonzalo Lamana refers to the same phenomenon with the concept of "colonial normal." This invokes an implicit definition of relations between people based on a series of configurations of what is usually done without thinking and beyond words. Through these actions, the cultural and political fragmentations became workable without any claim (or need for claim) of consensus.[730] The hegemonic process involved constant negotiation and tested the limits of hegemony and the degree of freedom of the subalterns. Conflicts arose from this negotiation and were part of the process.

According to the traditional view, the Spanish conquest was quick and complete. This myth has not gone away, but it is no longer the predominant paradigm in modern scholarship. This view has been countered with another that stresses the incompleteness and weakness of colonial rule.[731] The Spaniards were the hegemonic group, but they could not rule without the consent of at least some of the ruled, nor was their rule unquestioned. However, it is important to remember that the strength or weakness of colonial rule was always relative, never absolute. In some regions and in some fields of life, the colonial state was stronger than in others.

The debate over the extent to which colonial empires were ruled by force and to what extent through persuasion is not restricted to the Spanish colonial empire. There are different interpretations of the colonial regime in other places. Research on colonial India has been particularly interested in this theme. Some scholars see the colonial presence in the Indian subcontinent as weak and dependent on consent of and compliance by the colonized. Here too, European hegemony was not absolute. Others dispute the idea that colonialism was based on an Anglo-indigenous

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[728] Agnew, *Hegemony*, 1–2.

[729] Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," 360–366.

[730] Lamana, *Domination without Dominance*, 155.

[731] See Restall, *Seven Myths*.

partnership in which the subjugated took part in their own subjugation, and instead emphasize the violence, exploitation, and racism of colonial rule.[732]

I argue that colonialism was always based on both violence and persuasion, but the influence or dominance of each varied according to place and time. Also, the strength of colonial hegemony differed not only between colonial empires, but also within them, again depending on time and region. While Spanish hegemony was always contested in Peru and other central areas, it is clear that the colonists exercised some sort of control over the indigenous societies. However, it happened largely through the *kurakas*, and the Spaniards took advantage of the existing Incan institutions. At the frontiers, these institutions were far more difficult for the Spaniards to utilize. The fragility of Spanish hegemony is key to understanding interethnic relations and the creation of the colonial system all over the colonies, and especially in the frontier regions.

Steve J. Stern has argued that an enduring exploitative system depends on two things: the rulers' capacity to organize coercion, and the system's ability to make the exploited "need" their exploiters. The colonial regime in Peru consolidated by Viceroy Toledo was to a large extent upheld by physical force, as it was based on exploiting economically self-sufficient communities. Here, the exploited did not depend on their exploiters. Over time, the colonists managed to create dependencies that pressured the natives into a more voluntary compliance, but the colonial elites' ability to mobilize their superior power remained an essential part of their control over the colonized peoples.[733]

However, the declining population and the ability of the indigenous peoples to resist coercion undermined the systems of tribute and *mita*. In the early seventeenth century, the economy was based much more on the indigenous peoples' wage labor than it was in the early colonial period. The Toledan regime combined severe economic demands on the indigenous communities and the commercialization of relations. Many communities as a result had to rely on occasional wage labor to meet the monetary demands made on them. In addition, many individuals opted to escape the burdens of the community by emigrating to the Spanish towns and farms and detaching themselves from their communities. Consequently, there were enough natives who were obliged to enter into exploitative labor relations with the more powerful colonists without any formal need for coercion.[734]

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[732] Arnold, "In Search of the Colonial," 30.

[733] Stern *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 138–139.

[734] Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 139.

Wage labor was introduced to Popayán as well, but here the tribute system was more resilient than it was in Peru. The economic pressures of the tributes determined in gold as well as the mining *mitas* forced the natives to work in the mines, but upholding the compulsory labor systems always needed at least some degree of coercion based on violence or the threat of violence. Dangerous work in the mines for notoriously poor compensation was unpopular, and many chose to flee instead. Therefore, competition for labor was fierce.[735] On the other hand, as the indigenous communities became more integrated into the colonial economy, their dependency on the system actually increased and less coercion was needed.

How strong was Spanish hegemony in sixteenth-century Popayán? How much was it based on coercion and how much on consent? The answers to these questions are not straightforward. They depend on the region, time, and point of view. It has become evident throughout this study that Spanish control was precarious at best, and sometimes virtually nonexistent even in the areas it had claimed as colonies. However, it is clear that the Spaniards were in a hegemonic position.

Spanish hegemony was far from absolute even in their strongholds, but they did manage to turn a large part of the indigenous population into their *tributarios* and workforce, and convert them to Christianity at least in name, if not in practice. Their dominance was always challenged, but one cannot altogether dispute their hegemony, which was upheld by a combination of violence and its threat on one hand, and persuasion, compliance, and consent on the other hand. In the context of Popayán as a frontier, the Spaniards also provided the so-called *indios de paz* protection against the so-called *indios de guerra* who attacked their settlements. This factor should not be underestimated as a guarantee of the Spanish hegemony.

Spanish hegemony was evident in the case of don Pedro de Henao. Don Pedro emulated the Spaniards in several ways. He did not seem to question the Spanish king's right to rule over him and his people, but rather embraced it. He used the crown as an arbitrator in the conflicts he had with his *encomendero*. At the same time, there were areas where the Spaniards claimed hegemony, but failed to realize it. One cannot overemphasize the fragility and precariousness of the Spanish position in sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century Popayán. The Nasas (Paeces), Pijaos, and Barbacoas seriously challenged Spanish hegemony. They did more than just resist Spanish invasion of their lands; they also constantly raided the Spanish domain. It seems that they were not just reactive toward Spanish colonialism, but active in their own power politics. There was no clear border between the areas where the Spanish hegemony was strong or at least clearly existent, and those where it was weak or

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[735] See Lane, *Quito 1599*, 101–103, 128–129.

nonexistent. It was more a sliding frontier, where communities and individuals negotiated and renegotiated their position vis a vis the colonial state in different ways.

In 1592, don Felipe Soma, *cacique* of Tatudaca near the frontier town of Toro in the region of Chocó, sued an *encomendero* named García Suero de Cangas for removing one of his *principales* (lower ranking chiefs) named Bocorri from the community. According to don Felipe, Suero de Cangas had incorporated Bocorri and his subjects into his own *encomienda* without any legal grounds, although the *principal* had always served don Felipe. Don Felipe was backed by his *encomendero* Benito Suárez, but he acted on his own behalf.[736] In its verdict, the *audiencia* of Santafé ordered that Bocorri and his subjects be returned to don Felipe. García Suero de Cangas tried to get the sentence revoked, but the *audiencia* maintained that its original decision was correct and just.[737]

Don Felipe and Benito Suárez had a mutual interest. The *cacique* obviously did not want to lose subjects, while his *encomendero* did not want to lose the tributes of those subjects. It was another example of *encomenderos* quarreling over *encomendados*, but one can also wonder about the relationship between don Felipe and Bocorri. Did Suero de Cangas force Bocorri to pay tribute for him instead Suárez, or did Bocorri want to break free from don Felipe? The local dynamics would be interesting to unpack further, but the source remains silent on the matter.

María de los Ángeles Romero Frizzi has studied court cases in San Ildefonso de Villa Alta in Sierra Zapoteca north of the present-day city of Oaxaca in Southern Mexico. It was a remote colonial outpost with less than 200 Spanish inhabitants surrounded by 110 indigenous communities with 20.000 inhabitants in 1622. Yet the leaders of the indigenous communities constantly took their grievances and conflicts to the *alcalde mayor* of San Ildefonso. Romero Frizzi suggests that Spain's success in building an empire was based largely on its ability to impose a set of laws and juridical norms over people of different cultural traditions. The king's new vassals, the indigenous peoples, used the colonial courts to settle their internal disputes and to gain more prestige even in the most remote areas; paradoxically, at the same time they helped to bolster the Spanish judicial system.[738]

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[736] AGN, Encomiendas 16, d. 20, Cacique de Tatudaca (Toro) demanda por despido cacicazgo, 1592–1593, hojas 672r.–674v.

[737] AGN, Encomiendas 16, d. 20, Cacique de Tatudaca (Toro) demanda por despido cacicazgo, 1592–1593, hojas 810r., 821r.

[738] Romero Frizzi, "Power of the Law," 107–109, 127.

Popayán differs from Sierra Zapoteca, and there is a lot less court cases from the former in the archives. Nevertheless, the fact that there are these cases at all indicates that the Spanish legal system did reach to the frontiers of the *gobernación* at least to some extent. Toro was one of the more remote Spanish towns in the *gobernación*, founded only in 1573 and then relocated a few times. It was basically a military outpost in Chocó, which was effectively colonized only about a century later, apart from the immediate vicinity of the town of Toro itself. Attacks by the surrounding indigenous groups made the Spanish presence precarious, but still the *cacique* decided to take his case to the Spanish court. This example illustrates how Spanish hegemony spread even to the frontiers of the colonial empire. By taking the dispute to the Spanish court, the *cacique* actually legitimized colonial rule and the *encomienda* system.

Spanish hegemony could not have existed without indigenous collaboration or cooperation. As we have seen in this study, some of the native groups forged alliances with the Spaniards and took part in their wars against other groups, but some groups and individuals opted for more subtle collaboration by facilitating colonial rule in everyday situations, usually for their own benefit.

Collaboration with the colonized was a typical feature of European colonialism. In hindsight and from our perspective it would be easy to condemn these collaborators as traitors, but looking at the situation from their perspective, things look different. For them, local rivalries were often more important than the threat of colonial rule by a faraway power. For them, it was not a racial conflict.[739] There was no sense of indigenous unity among the peoples of the Andes. In fact, the concept of *indio* was a colonial invention, and therefore working with the Spaniards was not a treason against "their own" people. Other indigenous groups were not their people any more than the Spaniards were. A good example of this can be seen in the Guambianos and Nasas (Paeces), dealt with in Chapter Three. They were fierce enemies of each other before the Spanish arrived, and they continued their hostilities well into the colonial era. The Guambianos became the Spaniards' most powerful allies, while Nasas (Paeces) remained their most formidable opponents.

Many indigenous individuals also became agents of the colonists, either willingly or because they had no choice. These included especially the *yanaconas* who served directly their Spanish masters cutting all ties to their communities. It is usually impossible to say whether they did it by choice or whether they were forced to do it, but often they were the ones who implemented the *encomenderos*' orders, and carried out punishments against non-compliant natives.

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[739] Streets-Salter & Getz, *Empires and Colonies*, 343.

When the Quimbayas revolted in 1542, over 70% of the people they killed were *yanaconas* and other native servants of the Spaniards.[740] This illustrates the *yanaconas'* position in colonial society. They were indispensable allies of the Spaniards, and they were the people that carried out Spanish orders within the native population. When the natives rose against the colonists, they were the first and hardest hit targets. In spite of their important role, however, they are often invisible in the surviving documents.

Some few examples of them can be found. In the case of Almaguer, dealt with earlier in chapter 5.1., one of the main actors was a *yanacona* named Juanillo who was a servant of Muñoz and Gudino. Mamendoy's son Tangan, who gave testimony in the case, claimed that Muñoz and Gudino never did them any harm, and put the blame on Juanillo.[741] According to a native witness called Francisco, who was a subject of *cacique* Mamendoy, Juanillo was a powerful figure. Francisco testified that Juanillo had killed one of the *principales*, and that all the natives were afraid of him and waited for the *oidor* to return so that they could file complaints against the *yanacona*. Francisco also mentioned that Mamendoy had told him with tears in his eyes that Juanillo had forcefully taken the *cacique*'s daughter to his lodging.[742]

The sources do not tell us who Juanillo was or where he was from. He could have been a local, but more likely he had come from somewhere else, possibly Peru. He lived among the natives of La Cruz and acted as an executive of his masters Muñoz and Gudino, both of whom who lived in the town. Juanillo is depicted here as a classic collaborator. He was actually portrayed as the main culprit in the maltreatments. There are three probable explanations for this. First, he was the person who carried out the demands of his masters, the one who in a way was the face of the maltreatment. Second, the natives might have been reluctant to testify against their Spanish masters, an issue that can be seen in other cases as well. Third, Juanillo probably did indeed act independently to an extent, using his power against the natives without restrictions. However, Juanillo was also an easy scapegoat. People living in-between the Spaniards and the natives were often seen as suspicious by both parties.

The indigenous servants of the Spaniards were not always loyal to them. In 1552, several *caciques* from the province of Arma were accused of rebelling against the

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[740] Friede, *Quimbayas*, 50. See also Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

[741] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 139r.–139v.

[742] AGN, Caciques e indios 67, documento 2, Indios de la provincia de Almaguer demandan por maltratos, 1561, hojas 121v.–122v.

Spaniards. However, one of the defendants was not a *cacique*, but an interpreter called Gasparillo, who was also known by his indigenous name Xicama. He was born in the region, but he was a Christian and a *ladino*, and had served the Spaniards since he was a child.[743] Apparently Xicama was one of the instigators of the rebellion despite not being a leader of any community but rather a servant of the Spaniards. He was also a kind of agent within the enemy of the *caciques* who were plotting the rebellion. The difference between Xicama and the many *yanaconas* who served the Spaniards was that Xicama was a local, and he undoubtedly was in contact with the local indigenous society even though he had been with the Spaniards since he was a little boy.

The Spanish pursuit of hegemony also met with very subtle forms of everyday resistance. Everyday resistance does not publicly challenge or confront those in power. It can mean evasion and concealment instead of tax riot, shirking, and slowdowns instead of labor defiance, sabotage instead of direct assault, etc. The advantages of hidden resistance include the smaller probability of apprehension and the possibility of backing down easily through disavowal, as no formal claims are made.[744] The difficulty for a historian trying to interpret hidden resistance is that it is often not recorded at all for the obvious reason that it is hidden. However, the archival material does contain hints of this kind of action.

James C. Scott makes a distinction between public and hidden transcripts. Public transcript means open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate. It does not tell the whole story of power relations, because the subordinates' public performance is usually shaped to please the expectations of the powerful. Impression management is one of the key survival skills of subordinate groups. Hidden transcript is the discourse that takes place behind the scene and beyond the power holders' observation. It consists of practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript. Therefore, the public transcript can be described as the realm of necessity, and hidden transcript as a realm of freedom.[745]

A large part of the public interaction between the Andeans and Spaniards was non-confrontational. The natives paid their tributes and fulfilled their work obligations without visible resistance. There were occasional open actions against the *encomenderos*, which also belong to the realm of public transcript, but they were rare after the first phase of conquest. However, there were also many forms of

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[743] AGI, Justicia 576, Residencia de Francisco Briceño, Testimonio de la causa criminal contra el intérprete Gasparillo, f. 145r.

[744] Scott, "Everyday Forms of Resistance," 24–25.

[745] Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 2–5.

hidden resistance that took place in the realm of the hidden transcript. This does not mean that hidden transcript only consists of hidden resistance. It also means gestures that confirmed the colonial power relations and hegemonies discussed above, but next I will deal with the actions that can be interpreted as everyday resistance.

Before going deeper into the subject, we need to determine which actions can be called resistance and which cannot. Does resistance need to be organized and premeditated to be counted as resistance? What is the distinction between simple non-political acts of self-help and politically motivated forms of resistance? Some forms of indigenous agency were clearly means of everyday resistance. These include fleeing from home or hiding working age people during population counts. However, it is questionable whether the projected laziness was always a conscious form of hidden resistance, or something else.

Modern scholars have a tendency to regard the subordinates' poor performance in work as resistance, but it is impossible to verify whether that actually was the case. It was not necessarily a conscious act of resistance against exploitation. Perhaps it was merely a sign of disinterest in the result of their work and alienation from the masters' interests in this situation of oppression.[746] Subaltern people are usually willing to work harder when there is a functioning system of reciprocity between them and their masters. When reciprocity does not work or does not even exist, subalterns' motivation for work is understandably lower.

In his classic study of African slaves in the United States, Eugene D. Genovese convincingly argues that the slaves' "laziness" was not rooted in African modes of labor, like their masters and European-born observes claimed. Instead, their attitude towards work rose from the conditions of the plantation life itself. The slaves were often ready to work on Sundays and holidays in exchange for money and goods and, after abolition, they worked extraordinarily hard on their own land if they could acquire some. They also usually worked harder for kind masters than for cruel ones. When they were forced to work excessively or under poor conditions, they were less industrious. It was this that gained them the reputation of being lazy and idle people.[747]

The Spanish *encomenderos* used similar language to describe their *encomendados* as the North American slaveholders later used when speaking of their slaves. For example, the *encomenderos* of Peru often blamed production shortages either on the flight of the workforce, or on the supposed inborn laziness of the native peoples.[748]

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[746] See Thornton, *Africa and Africans*, 274–275.

[747] Genovese, *Roll Jordan Roll*, 295–313.

[748] Cook, *People of the Volcano*, 65.

The natives' supposed idleness was a common topos in Spanish writings that justified the use of force against them. They were lazy people by nature, such writings claimed, and would only work if they were forced to do so. The same justification was used in Europe as well by feudal lords who used tough methods to make the peasants work or pay their dues. Often the notion of the subordinates' laziness reflected more the ruling elite's prejudices than reality, but the subordinates sometimes were disinterested in their work for obvious reasons. The natives, like the peasants of Europe, were not lazy or idle, but reluctant to meet demands they did not feel were justifiable.

Encomenderos were not the only ones who claimed that natives were not quite like Europeans. A priest named Alonso del Peral testified to *visitador* Pedro de Hinojosa that the natives lacked reason, and that they were sloppy and uninterested in their work.[749] The Spanish comments almost invariably reflect their patronizing attitude toward the natives. For some, the indigenous peoples were idle, and needed discipline to encourage (or force) them to fulfill their obligations to their masters. For others, they were like children who needed not only protection, but also education so that they would become civilized. Although these notions appear to contradict each other, they were based on the same idea that natives were less perfect than the Spaniards. As such, all the Spanish notions of poor work results are not necessarily examples of actual poor work results, but rather a topos that was repeated over and over again.

Without a doubt, the natives of Popayán used passive resistance against the Spaniards, and without a doubt engaging in slow and sloppy work was one of the methods they used. There is no reason to assume that natives actually were lazy or careless in these cases. There is no reason to assume, however, that all of the examples in which native idleness or carelessness are mentioned in the sources are examples of passive resistance. We have no way of entering their thoughts, and so it is in the end often a matter of speculation when these were acts of resistance and when something else was going on. We can, however, trace some clear patterns that suggest consciously used tactics were in play.

A case in point appears in a court case from 1607, in which the *alclalde ordinario* of Almaguer, Francisco Caicedo, sued the natives of the district for deceit. According to Caicedo, the natives had given the Spaniards impure gold. Apparently, they had mixed something called Juan Blanco, or Johnny White, into the gold. This substance was probably pyrite, better known as fool's gold.[750] These kinds of cases are

[749] AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, f. 25v.

[750] ANE, Popayán, caja 1, exp. 4, Francisco Caicedo contra indios por minas de Marmato, 1607.

interesting, because they represent cracks in the common narrative that portrays the natives as merely passive victims or bystanders. Here, they were active agents who consciously cheated the Spaniards. These cracks do not appear very often, unfortunately.

In his report on the condition of the natives in the *gobernación* of Popayán, Fray Jerónimo de Escobar wrote that a large part of the gold excavated from the province went missing from the official books, resulting in the king not receiving the fifth to which he was entitled. Mostly the blame lay with the Spaniards, but Fray Jerónimo mentioned that the natives also took some of it. He also claimed that many of the natives still made sacrifices of the things they valued most to their old gods, despite the hard work that had been done to convert them. They had always held gold in high esteem, but since arrival of the Spanish, their lust for gold had increased; therefore, they sacrificed it to their gods.[751] While it can be true that the Andeans did sacrifice gold to their gods—we have seen that they continued to practice their pre-colonial religions—it is also possible that it was simply inconceivable for Fray Jerónimo that the natives would have cheated in order to gain economic advantage. His attitude toward the natives was patronizing.

In this case from Almaguer, the issue was clearly not about sacrificing gold to gods but about lost economic profit. Apparently the practice of mixing the gold with something else was widespread in the important mining region. The archival record of the case contains neither interrogations of the accused natives nor a verdict. Instead, only statements made by Spanish witnesses survive. By the early seventeenth century, the natives of Almaguer were well integrated into the colonial economy. Some of the miners were still *mitayos*, but more of them would have worked for a wage. It is not known if they kept some of the gold for themselves or if they just excavated less gold. While we do not know the motives of the accused, this case definitely belongs to the hidden transcript and serves as an example of the natives not complying with their expected role as a humble workforce.

The court case against Marcos Castuera, which was dealt with in detail in Chapter 3.2, provides an example not only of active and violent resistance, but also of more passive action. After Castuera's pigs had eaten the corn and other plants of his *encomendados*, they refused to serve him or to pay him tribute, instead escaping their village to live in other *repartimientos*. This was corroborated by all the witnesses,

[751] AGI, Patronato 27, ramo 13, Memorial de Fray Jerónimo de Escobar al consejo de Indias, 1582, ff. 8v.–9r.

Spanish and indigenous alike.[752] Castuera's use of violence thus turned out to be counterproductive, at least on some occasions. For his part, Castuera claimed that without the use of force, the natives would not work at all. In Popayán, the natives were not used to an extensive tribute-system, and did not always recognize the Spanish authority; sometimes, perhaps, the use of force was indeed the only way to make them work. The natives worked more willingly for a more lenient master but the lack of real reciprocity might have made violence or threat of it the only incentive for the natives to fulfill their tribute quota.

The *visita* reports also contain many hints of hidden native resistance. Some of the natives of Popayán told the *visitador* Pedro de Hinojosa explicitly that they would only pay their tribute with work, not with any products. If the tribute were ordered in products, they would refuse to pay.[753] During Garcia de Valverde's *visita* in Almaguer in 1570, the governor of Popayán, don Álvaro de Mendoza Carvajal, and other notable Spaniards assured the *visitador* that if the natives were forced to pay tribute with something they did not have, they would simply refuse to do so and flee from their villages, because that is what they usually did.[754]

The natives were also accused of hiding part of their population, since the tributes were determined according to the number of working age males in the community. This happened in Cali when Tomás López visited there. The *visitador* explicitly accused the *caciques* and *principals* of lying, and ordered a new count to be made.[755] The communities could easily find hideaways in the mountains because Spanish control in the countryside was weak and there were many places the Spaniards could not enter.

This is part of what Karen Vieira Powers calls the struggle for and against demographic accuracy. Indigenous strategies to hide the true size of their population took many forms. The *caciques* played a central role in the *visitas* of the sixteenth century, and they often used their position to conceal a large number of their tributary population. It is impossible to quantify the number of the hidden population in hindsight.[756] The *caciques* knew the region well, and the *visitadores* did not. Therefore, the *cacique* had an advantage in these situations.

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[752] AGN, Caciques e indios 37, doc. 13, Anserma, crueles tratamientos a los indios, 1552–1555, hojas 596v.–618v.

[753] AGI, AGI, Justicia 639, n. 2, Visita de Hinojosa a Popayán, pieza 1, ff. 67r.–67v.

[754] AGI, Quito 60, Visita de Valverde, ff. 135r.–138r.

[755] AGI, Quito, Visita de López, f. 78v.

[756] Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 82.

The chronicler Pedro Cieza de León claimed that one of the reasons for the depopulation of the Cauca valley was that the natives refused to cultivate their lands after the Spanish invasion, and therefore died of hunger.[757] This was another form of passive resistance. It is difficult to say, however, how much truth this statement contains. Such action has sometimes been used as a form of resistance, but it does seem extreme since it resulted in the death of the resisters. The practice was certainly not as widespread as Cieza de León claimed, but it is plausible that something like this took place in at least some locations.

Another common form of non-violent resistance was migration. According to Karen Vieira Powers, migration constitutes the most rudimentary level of Andean agency.[758] Mobility was natural for the peoples of the Andes. According to Pedro Cieza de León, there was an abundance of cultivable land in Popayán. If the Spanish destroyed a village and its crops, or if the local population did not want to submit to the demands of the Spanish conquerors, they merely burned their houses and moved to another place. There they would build new houses and plant their corn and, within four months, they would be able to harvest the fields.[759] Cieza de León claimed that this was one of the reasons that the natives of Popayán were not as docile as those of Peru. Moving from one place to another was easy for them because there were enough places where they could build new homes and cultivate new crops. It seems that such action was culturally easy as well: it was typical for many Andean cultures to not be attached to one certain place, and this made it easier for them to move around.[760]

Many natives from Popayán migrated south to the *corregimientos* of Otavalo and Quito. Abuses against the natives were probably less frequent in these areas, and there were more opportunities for them to earn a living without being forced to work in the mines. Especially the Pastos moved in large numbers because they lived close to Otavalo and Quito, where many natives spoke the Pasto language.[761] Without a doubt, the Pastos of the *gobernación* of Popayán had had intensive connections with their southern neighbors subjugated by the Incas during the pre-Colombian era, and the border of Tawantisuyu was not strict.

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[757] Cieza de León, *Parte primera de la chronica*, f. 30r.

[758] Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 43.

[759] Cieza de León, *Primera parte del chronica del Perú*, f. 16r.

[760] See Powers *Andean Journeys*; Mumford, *Vertical Empire*.

[761] Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 35–36.

The natives of Quito and other towns in present-day Ecuador also migrated to the city of Popayán. They can be found in the city's notarial records.[762] Again, it is important to remember that not all migration can or should be considered as resistance. Often, it was simply a personal choice with the aim of improving one's own living condition. The Spanish towns and *haciendas* were magnets that drew the indigenous population, as they offered a chance to earn a living and freedom from paying tribute to any master. Entire communities could also choose to escape from the Spanish sphere to unconquered areas in the frontier simply to gain freedom from exploitation. In a sense, migration was a political act, but one that was not necessarily consciously political.

In my view, the concept of hidden resistance implies that the acts were consciously directed against the colonial administration or the Spanish settlers. Otherwise, we cannot talk about resistance in these cases. However, resistance does not always have to be organized. There can also be individual spontaneous acts. In addition, the aim of resistance can be very limited at times, and does not have to seek the overthrow of the whole system.

Compared to open rebellion, hidden resistance is usually more cost effective. Rebellions were always suppressed in the end, and the rebels heavily punished. Hidden resistance, by contrast, did not necessarily have any direct negative repercussion. It thus was sometimes a more effective way to resist the most outrageous demands made by the colonial overlords.

It is not always easy to draw a line between collaboration and resistance. Often the same communities engaged in either or both practices under different circumstances. Once again it is important to not think about the indigenous participation in colonialism through simple dichotomies, but rather it is necessary to understand the flexibility of their agency. They pursued their interests in different ways, depending on the situation in which they found themselves.

Massive external pressures forced indigenous societies to transform during the colonial period. They needed to redefine who they were by reworking pre-colonial cultural categories in an entirely situation. The results of this process were varied.[763] By the turn of the seventeenth century, about three generations after the Spanish arrival, most of the inhabitants of Popayán knew nothing else but colonial society. The colonial world was the world into which they had been born. This was true also for those natives who had not submitted to the Spaniards. Constant warfare and

[762] ACC, Notaría primera de Popayán.

[763] Ogburn, "Becoming Saraguo," 312.

contacts with Spaniards, colonized natives, and African slaves cause profound changes to indigenous American societies.

Michel Foucault distinguishes two different meanings of the word "subject." First, it means being subject to someone through control or dependence. The second meaning is tied to building one's own identity through self-knowledge. According to Foucault, both meanings relate to power that subjugates the subjects.[764] The indigenous peoples of the Spanish colonies became colonial subjects through different mechanisms. It happened through coercion, but also through the more subtle processes of hegemony. The indigenous peoples also took part in the process as active agents, not merely as passive objects.

Don Pedro de Henao was clearly a subject in the sense that he was actively engaged in forming his own identity as an educated and Christian indigenous chief. Yet he was also a subject of the Spanish king, and to an extent, of his *encomendero*. The Foucaultian notion of subjectivity applies not only to men like don Pedro, who left more traces of himself in the archives than most, but also to the subalterns. The problem is that studying the ways in which the subalterns lived their subjectivity is much more difficult because they are, to a large extent, invisible in the surviving records.

As Karen Vieira Powers says, the colonized peoples not only resisted, adapted, and survived, but also reinvented their cultures.[765] This was facilitated by the elasticity and resilience of the pre-Colombian Andean cultures and social organizations. According to Ann Zulawski, the remarkable ability to stretch and adjust to extremely different social arrangements under the same principles was a striking aspect of Andean culture.[766]

Conclusions

In this chapter I have shown how the institution of colonial cacique developed in the *gobernación* of Popayán, how the power dynamics of the local societies took shape, and what kind of distinctively colonial culture was formed as a result of the processes studied in this dissertation.

The indigenous leaders became intermediary figures between the colonists and the indigenous communities everywhere in the Spanish Empire, and the unifying

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764 Foucault, "Power and Subject," 781.

765 Powers, *Andean Journeys*, 12.

766 Zulawski, *They Eat*, 12.

pressures of colonialism meant that the institution of the cacique had similar features everywhere. Nevertheless, there were regional variations. The frontier conditions affected to the development of the institution, and the caciques of Popayán were not as integrated to the Spanish society as their colleagues in Central Andes. Nevertheless, they did develop personal relations with members of the Spanish elite. While it was their responsibility to take care that their communities paid their tributes and performed their labor duties, they also used their position as mediators to further their communities' interests.

The Spanish and indigenous elites formed local power groups held together by mutual interests and competing with each other. The conflicts in the local colonial society did not follow ethnic lines. However, the power groups were not homogeneous nor uniform. There was an imbalance of power and competing interests within them as well. The power groups were also less coherent and more fluid than the ones found in Central Andes. The caciques of Popayán did not lose their link with their communities during the sixteenth and early seventeenth century but remained their representatives in front of the Spanish bureaucracy, the church, and the *encomenderos*.

The colonial culture developed gradually after the conquest in a unique process through interaction between the Spanish invaders and settlers, and the indigenous peoples. The colonial society was inherently multiethnic and multicultural, and despite the crown's attempts to keep the Europeans, the Indigenous peoples, and the people of African descent physically separate, they always interacted and intermingled. However, their coexistence was never peaceful nor equal. The power imbalance was an irremovable feature of the colonial society everywhere.

Indigenous cultures were constantly transformed as the conquered tried to find ways to survive in a completely new situation. Their transformation did not mean merely assimilating into the dominant culture or imitating their ways. Instead, it meant a process by which the natives continuously redefined their culture, adapted their traditional forms of society to new situations, and gave their cultural practices new meanings. Transformation of their society was profound, and no single feature of the indigenous cultures remained intact. However, transformation happened only partially, and largely according to the needs of the natives themselves.

6 CONCLUSIONS

For a historian, studying a colonial society can be frustrating. It seems that it is impossible to say anything with absolute certainty, because society was so eclectic that it defies all simplifications and neat categorizations. That is also what makes it so fascinating. It is difficult to fit the development of Popayán's colonial society into a clear narrative. However, I hope I have been able to make sense of the process despite all the uncertainties. Overall, it is important to understand that dichotomies or simplifications do not reflect entangled colonial realities.

In this dissertation, I have studied the formation of colonial society in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century *gobernación* of Popayán. I have paid special attention to the agency of both the Spaniards and the various indigenous peoples, as well as their interconnectedness. My aim has been to show that the colonial society was formed through constant interaction between the indigenous peoples, the Spaniards, and other groups, such as the Africans, their descendants, and the mestizos. The Spaniards were the hegemonic party, but they could not mold colonial society completely to their liking. Instead, the agency of other groups contributed significantly. Popayán's indigenous population was very diverse, consisting of dozens of different ethnic groups. Their experiences thus were also very diverse. Throughout this work I have kept that in mind, although I have searched for general patterns that were shared by several ethnicities.

I have divided the process into three phases which can be analytically separated, but which overlap each other: interethnic conflicts, meddling of the colonial institutions, and the dynamics of the local entangled colonial societies in which the different groups coexisted with each other.

The *gobernación* of Popayán was a colonial frontier in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and its society was highly militarized. Interethnic relations were largely characterized by conflict and violence. Many groups on the fringes of the *gobernación* continued fighting the Spanish conquerors throughout the period of this study and beyond; Spanish towns in the region became military bases from which these attacks were conducted. Some indigenous groups, such as the Barbacoas, Pijaos, and Chocos, among others, also made constant raids into the Spanish dominated sphere, forcing the Spaniards and their allies on the defensive.

The *gobernación* was part of the viceroyalty of Peru, but in reality, it was quite autonomous. The viceroy was far away and had practically no leverage in Popayán. The *gobernación* was first under the jurisdiction of the royal *audiencia* of Santafé, but in 1569, with the foundation of the *audiencia* of Quito, it was divided between the two. The judges of these *audiencias* had a greater grasp of the situation in the *gobernación* than the viceroy did, but they did not fully control the area either. Popayán was a frontier zone, and colonial institutions were weaker there than in the more central areas of the Spanish empire in the Americas.

Violence was a recurrent reality that marked the relationships between the Spaniards and the very diverse indigenous population of the *gobernación*. The *encomenderos* were relatively free of the royal officials' restrictions, and this enabled them to exercise their harsh demands, but the natives were also quick to respond with violence to Spanish excesses. Indigenous rebellions were common during the first decades of colonialism but became rarer after the 1550s. Local outbursts occurred after that as well but were not very common. This does not mean, however, that violence came to an end. Everyday violence continued throughout the entire colonial period as the Spaniards attempted to harness the indigenous societies to fulfill their insatiable demands. Indigenous resistance, both active and passive, also continued, even though their societies suffered a great deal because of conquest, colonization, and depopulation. The so-called *Pax Colonial* never really extended to Popayán.

The colonial bureaucracy started to grip the region more strongly in the 1550s after the inauguration of the *audiencia* of Santafé de Bogotá. However, that process too was slow and faced many setbacks. The *visitas* performed in the region between 1558 and 1571 opened spaces of negotiation between the state and different actors in the local society. They also brought the region under closer bureaucratic control. The aim of the *visitas* was to regulate relationships between the Spanish settler society and the indigenous communities. They simultaneously attempted to increase the state's control over the indigenous communities and to restrict the power the local Spanish elite had over them.

Luis Calero suggests that in Pasto, the *visitas* restricted the virtually unlimited power of the *encomenderos* and represented a modest victory of centralism over regionalism.[767] This is true to an extent, but with some reservations even in Pasto, and does not apply as such to the whole *gobernación*. Calero seems to downplay the indigenous agency in curbing the power of the *encomenderos* without the help of the *visitadores*. This study shows that they did have means at their disposal to do so.

[767] Calero, *Chiefdoms under Siege*, 78–79.

Moreover, while the *visitadores* had almost absolute power during the inspection, the immediate effects of their *visitas* were restricted after they left the region. Even so, their work marked important watersheds in the region's bureaucratization process.

The crown enhanced its position by acting as a mediator in local affairs. The crown balanced between increasing its control of the region and not shaking up the status quo too much. It took interest in the wellbeing of the indigenous peoples, its new vassals, and wanted to prevent the birth of a strong feudal upper class that would challenge its central power. However, the Spanish imperial court also knew that the colonial empire would crumble without the settlers. Therefore, it was willing to grant the settler society a certain amount of freedom. In the end, securing the crown's revenues and the continuation of its colonial enterprise overweighed its concern for the natives. In a militarized frontier zone like Popayán, where the bureaucracy was weak, this decision was even more evident.

In this situation of instability and violence, it might seem strange to speak of legal institutions as an arena of negotiation. The situation was certainly different than that in Peru or Central Mexico, where the legal system became well established early on. The *gobernación* of Popayán was not, of course, a completely lawless district, as can be seen from the numerous lawsuits that did enter the courts of different levels. There were fewer cases here than there were in the more central areas, but nevertheless their survival shows that the colonial subjects did take the legal aspects of their actions very seriously.

Studies have shown that in Peru and in Mexico, the indigenous peoples channeled large part of their grievances to the judicial system trying to gain victories within the colonial system. It was an effective way to challenge the colonial powers, but at the same time, it helped legitimizing the system.[768] My study shows that the colonial state and its institutions became an arbitrator in the local conflicts in Popayán as well, but usually it was not the first resort. The parties used other methods, including violence but also more subtle means that belong to the realm of hidden transcript, before taking the matters to the court. The indigenous communities, who acted usually via the *defensores de indios*, learned quickly to use the legal system for their benefit, but as the institutions remained weak, they remained less attached to them.

In Central Andes, the period of my study saw the pinnacle and demise of the post-Inca alliances between Spaniards and kurakas, the crisis of the indigenous societies and the consolidation of the colonial political economy.[769] While this is a

[768] See Mumford, "Litigation as Ethnography," 5; Romero Frizzi, "Power of the Law," 107–109, 127; Owensby, "Foreword," xii–xiv.

[769] See Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 27–113.

simplification, the colonial system took strong roots after the general resettlement of Viceroy Toledo. Although the Spaniards were able to directly control only a fraction of the region even in the core areas of the former Inca Empire, and they depended on local leaders to extract surpluses from the local communities, there were structures and institutions in place for this kind of indirect use of power, since the Incas had used them as well. Inca was not a ruler of the people but a ruler of rulers.

In Popayán, these institutions and structures did not exist. Therefore, setting up the colonial system required more innovation and adaptation to local circumstances. Spanish willingness to work with the indigenous communities' traditional leaders created the new institution of the colonial *cacique* which had common aspects all over the empire. The *caciques* of Popayán had in general more power over their communities that the pre-colonial chiefs had enjoyed. The indigenous communities of the *gobernación* were chiefdom societies or egalitarian societies before the Spanish invasion, and most of them had only very limited stratification. In the colonial society, the chiefs became indispensable intermediaries between their communities and the Spaniards.

From the Spanish point of view, the local *caciques* were probably less reliable than the *kurakas* of Peru, because they were not used to be ruled by outsiders. For that reason, the *encomenderos* believed that they needed to keep the indigenous leaders in check by violence and the threat of it. On the other hand, the Spaniards were forced to accommodate their institutions of control to fit the decentralized structures of the local societies. They still needed the local *caciques* to control the indigenous labor. However, the *caciques* were dependent of their people and could be easily replaced, which curbed their transformation into colonial agents. The colonial pact, the unstated agreement by which the natives provided the Spaniards tribute and labor in exchange for land and autonomy, was less straightforward in Popayán, where the native commoners had more leverage.

The towns and their vicinities were usually controlled by local power groups consisting of members from both Spanish and indigenous elites. However, these groups were more transient and volatile in Popayán than their counterparts in the Central Andes. Mutual interests held these power groups together, and yet they also competed with each other because their membership was not always rigid or fixed. Instead, alliances could change according to the situation at hand. Many local conflicts were tied to power struggles between the power groups, rather being simple Spanish-indigenous affairs. The functioning of local societies was much more

complicated than it seemed at first glance, and there were usually members of both ethnic groups in each side of every conflict.

Colonial officials were eager to keep the Spanish and indigenous societies separate from each other, but that was never a realistic option. The ethnic groups started mixing and intermingling from the very beginning, creating a fluid and often messy colonial culture. Ethnic hierarchies were in theory clear, but in practice much more ambiguous. Colonial society was inherently multiethnic and multicultural. Spanish hegemony was always contested, and the boundaries of the struggles did not follow strictly ethnic divides. There were both tensions and alliances within, between, and across all the different ethnicities.

My study shows that the relationships between the Spaniards and the natives in the *gobernación* of Popayán were always in some ways uneasy. The Spaniards understood that they needed the indigenous workforce to survive in the colonies. They also needed the indigenous leaders to be on their side to secure the communities' willingness to pay tribute and work for the Spaniards. The natives quickly realized that the Spaniards were there to stay, and that it was in their interest to be on good terms with them. However, there was also a high degree of distrust between the two groups. Especially the Spaniards, being aware of their numerical disadvantage compared to the indigenous peoples, were constantly afraid of indigenous rebellions.

Conflicts between natives and Spaniards, as well as among different groups of Spaniards and natives, were very common and took place at several different levels. For the most part, conflict was about the struggle for power and defining the limits of acceptable demands for tribute and labor. On the other hand, colonialism created contact zones where people of different ethnicities negotiated their interests. They were not encounters between equals, and they often involved violence, coercion, and asymmetry of power, but also mediation and improvisation in a situation where different groups had no choice but to find ways to coexist. My dissertation shows that colonial *gobernación* of Popayán was a textbook example of such contact zone.

The Spaniards created the colonial empire through military conquest but would not have been able to uphold it by mere force. They remained a small minority in their colonies despite the severe depopulation of the indigenous peoples. Their hegemony was always fragile even in the central areas of their colonies, but especially so in the peripheries. Nevertheless, Spain managed to uphold its colonies and increase its control of them over time. This was accomplished largely when the crown made itself available and acted as an arbitrator in local conflicts.

While Spanish colonial hegemony was not based on sheer force, colonialism was essentially structural violence. Many of the indigenous societies were annihilated and their cultures to a large extent destroyed. They were forced to adopt a foreign belief system and reduced to a workforce that served the colonists. Colonialism is based on exploitation, and there is no need to embellish it. Spanish colonialism was often very cruel, as many contemporaries well knew. Colonialism also gave birth to modern racism, which still divides peoples into horizontal categories based on their ethnicity. The effects have been devastating to the indigenous communities and, even today, the effects of colonialism continue to influence the lives of the present-day indigenous communities in independent countries of the Americas.

It is also important, however, to bring forward the agency of the colonized peoples and the multifariousness of colonial society, especially in the frontier regions. The indigenous peoples adapted, collaborated, and resisted in many ways, but their actions should not be seen simply as reactions to Spanish aspirations. Instead, indigenous communities and individuals actively attempted to enhance their positions in the colonial reality. Their agency played an essential role in the making of the colonial society in Popayán, as well as elsewhere in the Spanish empire. However, the agency was not the same everywhere. In Popayán, it was less attached to the colonial institutions and probably more dependent of existing local traditions.

While it is important to emphasize indigenous agency, it should not divert attention from the violence and unequal power dynamics of colonialism. Concentrating solely on indigenous agency carries a risk of romanticizing their survival. Many did not survive, and for many, colonialism meant seriously deteriorating living conditions and loss of significant part of their culture. Nevertheless, the indigenous peoples of America were not just passive victims; rather, they were independent agents who pursued their interests in a situation in which their freedom was limited.

The indigenous societies of Popayán changed profoundly during the 75 years covered in this study. Their participation in the colonial economy and the legal system inevitably transformed societies that had previously been mostly independent and self-sufficient, although they did trade with each other before the conquest. They were altered by outside pressure, changing from independent communities into the workforce of the Spaniards and vassals of a far-away crown. Similar changes occurred throughout the Spanish American colonies, but their outcomes varied greatly according to the local circumstances. Indigenous agency and experience of colonialism was obviously also gendered. That has not been the focus of my study, but that would deserve further inquiry in the future.

However, the indigenous peoples did not simply assimilate or adopt, but actively reinvented their cultures. It was a necessity caused by invasion of outsiders, but the process of cultural transformation was carried out according to the needs of the natives themselves. While they were looking for ways to survive in the new situation, they created new cultural forms and gave new meanings to old ones. Colonialism was a unifying force reducing the diversity of the indigenous peoples, but each group and individual adapted in unique ways. Popayán retained its cultural heterogeneity. On the other hand, the interconnectedness of the different ethnic groups in pre-colonial times continued into the colonial period shaping the colonial society of the *gobernación*.

I have made many references to the peripheral nature of the region studied here, but what did it actually mean for the colonial relationships? In what sense was Popayán a periphery, and what was the difference between it and the perceived centers of the colonial empire? As a frontier, Popayán's colonial society had a distinctive character compared to the more central areas. Its integration into the empire was slower and less complete. If the concept of crystallization can be questioned even in Peru, in Popayán it is even less clear. Here, colonial society remained fluid, dynamic, and eclectic throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Colonial institutions had less control in Popayán, and interethnic relations were less regulated. In addition, Popayán had its own frontiers, where Spanish authority was not only contested but often nonexistent. The relationships between the local core and its peripheries was always fluctuant. Nevertheless, certain patterns appear here that were similar to those in the colonial centers.

As Kris Lane has pointed out, the quick fall of the powerful indigenous empires in what became the core of the Spanish Empire, and the implementation of the seemingly peaceful and undisputed colonial rule has led many historians to ignore the continuous conflicts and precarious nature of Spanish presence in the peripheries. However, in the minds of the contemporary colonists, it was the violence and uncertainty that most preoccupied them in every part of the empire.[770] Turning ones focus to the peripheries, where the violence and the uncertainty were concrete and tangible helps to comprehend the experiences of the indigenous, Spanish, and other groups alike more comprehensively. This is the aim of my thesis: to contribute to the understanding of the fluid, diverse, intersecting, and overlapping reality of the Spanish American colonial societies molded by the agency of the colonized as well as the colonists.

[770] Lane, *Quito 1599*, 231.

The former *gobernación* of Popayán is today one of the regions in Colombia where the presence of the indigenous peoples remains the strongest. Their communities are marginalized and ridden by continuing conflicts that trouble the country. However, they also have a strong tradition of resistance and survival from which they draw inspiration in today's struggles.

My dissertation is not an ethnohistorical study of the colonial society of the indigenous nations of Popayán, but instead a social historical study of colonialism as a process. Nevertheless, my aim has been to shed light to indigenous agency as part of that process. It is not a straightforward story of resistance, collaboration, or submission, but a more complicated and nuanced one. Indigenous communities chose different strategies in the face of colonialism, but they never completely lost their agency. It is also important to note that the different indigenous strategies were not merely reactions to the actions of the colonists. Instead, they acted according to their own aims and understanding of the situations at hand.

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