

JOSEFINA SIPINEN

Recruitment of Immigrant-origin Candidates in Finnish Municipal Elections

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ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

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Josefina Sipinen

ABSTRACT

One of the crucial questions facing countries across the world is how immigrants and their descendants can become part of a society and nation. Integration of immigrants takes place in multiple arenas, such as in the labour market, but also in the political arena. Immigrants' engagement in host country politics – including the ability to understand and influence political processes as well as having an interest in what is happening in society – facilitates their societal inclusion at both individual and group levels. One of the important factors that supports the political engagement of immigrants is their presence in decision-making bodies. It sends a message of an equal and multivoiced society in which everyone has a chance to participate and to 'have a say'.

The general aim of this study is to further the discussion of factors that facilitate and hinder immigrants' political representation by investigating the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates in Finnish municipal elections. The study draws on empirical evidence from the 2017 municipal elections and answers three main questions. First, what were the key differences in electoral engagement between different ethnic groups? Second, what influenced political parties' demand for immigrant-origin candidates, i.e. motivated parties to recruit immigrants to their candidate lists? Third, what role did immigrant-origin candidates' supply factors, i.e. their socioeconomic backgrounds, resources, and motivations, play in their decision to stand as candidates and in their selection to candidate lists?

The empirical material consists of both quantitative and qualitative data. The register and survey-based datasets form the basis for understanding the wider picture of electoral engagement and political representation of the foreign-origin population in Finnish municipal politics. They enable comparisons between native and immigrant-origin candidates regarding their personal and social resources, motivations, political attitudes, and campaigns. The qualitative interview data, in turn, sheds light on the process of political recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates from the perspective of parties and individual immigrant-origin candidates.

The findings show, first, that the level of electoral engagement varies significantly between ethnic minority groups due to factors related to their countries of origin,

reasons for migrating, and the level of integration in Finland. Second, the Finnish open-list proportional representation electoral system and a high demand for candidates in local elections result in a relatively favourable context for immigrants' access to candidacy. However, although the barrier of access to the ballot list is not high, most candidates need external encouragement before they decide to stand as candidates. Due to factors such as the language barrier and unfamiliarity with the Finnish political system and political culture, immigrant-origin candidates need even more encouragement from parties and their own personal networks. Yet, active recruitment by the parties is hindered by their lack of social ties to immigrant groups. Limited ties prevent parties from acquiring information about immigrant-origin individuals with interest and resources to stand as candidates. When recruiting candidates under a heavily personalised electoral system, in which parties' ability to win seats depends on their individual candidates' ability to attract personal votes, parties want to know that their candidates engage in active campaigning and have vote-earning attributes. Due to a lack of information, as well as the familiarity and trust related to it, parties often feel unable and unwilling to recruit candidates from immigrant communities. Furthermore, immigrants have significantly less experience with political organisations, and hence are less often in the party's inner network, from which parties begin their search for candidates. Those who are not members of parties' networks are not very likely to be personally targeted and encouraged to stand. Therefore, social networks play a fundamental role in the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates and, thus, in the political representation of immigrants in Finnish municipal councils.

The role of social networks and social capital in political recruitment has not been sufficiently acknowledged in previous studies on immigrants' political representation. Therefore, the systematic documentation of these factors is one of the main contributions of this study. The findings of this study can be used to recognise and overcome the barriers that immigrants face on their pathways to political integration.

TIIVISTELMÄ

Yksi keskeisiä kysymyksiä muuttoliikkeen sävyttämässä maailmassa on, miten valtiot ja kansakunnat kykenevät integroimaan uudet tulijat ja heidän jälkeläisensä osaksi yhteiskuntaa. Maahanmuuttajien kotoutuminen tapahtuu lukuisilla yhteiskunnan eri osa-alueilla, kuten työmarkkinoilla, mutta myös politiikassa. Maahanmuuttajien poliittinen kiinnittyminen uudessa kotimaassa – mukaan lukien kyky ymmärtää ja vaikuttaa poliittisiin prosesseihin sekä kiinnostus seurata yhteiskunnallisia asioita – edistää heidän kotoutumistaan sekä yksilö- että ryhmätasolla. Yksi merkittävä maahanmuuttajien poliittiseen kiinnittymiseen vaikuttava tekijä on heidän poliittinen edustusensa demokraattisissa päätöksentekokelemissä. Etnisten ja maahanmuuttotaustaisten vähemmistöjen mukanaolo poliittisessa päätöksenteossa viestii tasa-arvoisesta ja moniäänisestä yhteiskunnasta, jossa jokaisella on yhtäläinen mahdollisuus vaikuttaa yhteisiin asioihin syntyperästään riippumatta.

Tarkastelemalla maahanmuuttotaustaisten ehdokkaiden rekrytoitumista Suomen kuntavaaleissa tämä tutkimus syventää keskustelua tekijöistä, jotka yhtäältä edistävät ja toisaalta vaikeuttavat maahanmuuttajien poliittisen edustuksen toteutumista. Tutkimuksen empiirisessä osiossa keskitytään kevään 2017 kuntavaaleihin ja vastataan kolmeen päätutkimuskysymykseen: (1) Mitkä olivat keskeisimmät erot eri etnisten ryhmien poliittisessä kiinnittymisessä? (2) Mikä vaikutti poliittisten puolueiden *kykyyn* eli halukkuuteen rekrytoida maahanmuuttotaustaisia henkilöitä ehdokaslistoilleen? (3) Miten maahanmuuttotaustaisten ehdokkaiden *tarjonta* eli heidän yhteiskunnallinen taustansa, resurssinsa ja motivaationsa vaikuttivat paitsi päätökseen ehdolle asettumisesta myös heidän valikoitumiseensa ehdokaslistalle?

Tutkimuksessa hyödynnetään sekä määrällistä että laadullista aineistoa. Rekisteri- ja kyselypohjaiset aineistot muodostavat pohjan laajemmalle Suomen maahanmuuttotaustaisen väestön poliittisen kiinnittymisen ja poliittisen edustuksen analyysille kuntatasolla. Määrällisten aineistojen avulla on mahdollista vertailla valtaväestöön lukeutuvien ehdokkaiden ja maahanmuuttotaustaisten ehdokkaiden henkilökohtaisia ja sosiaalisia voimavaroja, motivaatiota, poliittisia arvoja ja asenteita, sekä ehdokaskampanjoita. Laadullinen haastatteluaineisto puolestaan valottaa etnisten ja maahanmuuttotaustaisten vähemmistöjen poliittista rekrytoitumista niin maahanmuuttotaustaisten ehdokkaiden kuin puolueiden näkökulmasta.

Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, ensinnäkin, että poliittinen kiinnittyminen vaihtelee suuresti eri etnisten vähemmistöryhmien välillä ja että tätä selittävät moninaiset taustamaahan, Suomeen muuton syihin ja ryhmien kotoutumiseen liittyvät seikat. Suomalainen avointen listojen vaalijärjestelmä sekä ehdokkaiden korkea kysyntä kuntavaaleissa kuitenkin luovat verrattain suotuisan ympäristön Suomeen muuttaneiden ehdokkaaksi pääsyyllä. Toisaalta, vaikka kynnyksellä ehdokkaaksi pääsyyllä ei ole korkea, useimmat ehdokkaat tarvitsevat ulkopuolista kannustusta ehdokkuudelleen. Suomeen muualta muuttaneet tarvitsevat kannustusta puolueilta ja omalta lähipiiriltään valtaväestöä useammin, sillä monet heistä kokevat oman suomen (tai ruotsin) kielen taitonsa ja/tai suomalaista poliittista järjestelmää ja kulttuuria koskevan tietotasonsa riittämättömiksi.

Puolueiden kykyä ja motivaatiota luoda ehdokasarjontaa eli aktiivisesti kannustaa Suomeen muuttaneita asettumaan ehdolle vaaleissa hankaloittavat puolueiden vähäiset sosiaaliset siteet eri etnisiin vähemmistöryhmiin. Verkostojen niukkuus tai suoranainen puute estää puolueita hankkimasta tietoa potentiaalisista maahanmuuttotaustaisista ehdokkaista eli henkilöistä, jotka voisivat olla kiinnostuneita asettumaan ehdolle ja joilla olisi siihen myös riittävät resurssit. Suomen henkilökeskeisessä vaalijärjestelmässä puolueiden vaalitulokset riippuu voimakkaasti niiden asettamien ehdokkaiden kyvyistä hankkia henkilökohtaisia ääniä, jotka kaikki menevät puolueen yhteiselle listalle ja määrittävät puolueen saamien edustajanpaikkojen lukumäärän. Näin ollen ehdokkaita rekrytoidessaan puolueet haluavat varmistua siitä, että niiden ehdokkailla on riittävästi voimavaroja ja motivaatiota aktiivisen ehdokaskampanjan järjestämiseen ja äänestäjien mobilisointiin. Tiedon ja sitä myöden luottamuksen puutteen vuoksi puolueet kokevat maahanmuuttotaustaisten ehdokkaiden rekrytoimisen haastavaksi, mikä puolestaan vähentää puolueiden halukkuutta käyttää resurssejaan vähemmistöehdokkaiden löytämiseksi.

Puolueet aloittavat ehdokasrekrytoinnin omasta organisaatiostaan edeten organisaation sisäkehältä sen ulkokehälle eli tarkastelemalla ensin aktiivisia jäseniään, sitten vähemmän aktiivisia ja tämän jälkeen jäsenten henkilökohtaisia verkostoja. Koska Suomeen muuttaneet ovat valtaväestöä harvemmin jäseniä puolueorganisaatioissa ja koska heidän verkostonsa eivät aina riittävästi risteä valtaväestön verkostojen ja elämänpiirin kanssa, he jäävät usein puolueiden rekrytointiverkostojen ulkopuolelle. Näin ollen monet Suomeen muuttaneet jäävät vaille sitä kannustusta ja tukea, jota he tarvitsisivat ehdolle asettumisekseen. Sosiaalisilla verkostoilla ja niiden eriytyneisyydellä on siten keskeinen rooli Suomeen

muuttaneiden ehdokkaaksi rekrytoitumisen esteiden ja poliittisen aliedustuksen taustalla.

Aiemmassa maahanmuuttajien poliittista rekrytoitumista käsittelevässä tutkimuksessa ei ole tarkasteltu riittävästi sosiaalisten verkostojen ja sosiaalisen pääoman merkitystä ja roolia. Sosiaalisin verkostoihin nivoutuvien tekijöiden järjestelmällinen erittely on tästä syystä yksi tämän tutkimuksen keskeisimmistä kontribuutioista. Tutkimuksen tulokset auttavat tunnistamaan maahanmuuttajien poliittiseen kiinnittymiseen liittyviä tekijöitä ja poistamaan esteitä, jotka vaikeuttavat heidän pääsyään uuden kotimaansa poliittisen järjestelmän tasavertaisiksi jäseniksi.

CONTENTS

1	Introduction	25
2	Recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates	34
2.1	Explaining immigrants' electoral engagement	34
2.2	The process of political recruitment	39
2.3	Party demand	43
2.4	Candidate supply	47
2.4.1	Sociodemographic background	48
2.4.2	Immigration and ethnic background	51
2.4.3	Motivation	54
2.4.4	Personal resources	57
2.4.5	Social resources	59
3	Immigrants' political opportunity structure in Finland	64
3.1	State-level context: Finland's openness towards cultural diversity	66
3.2	Municipal-level context: Migrant minorities in Finnish municipalities	80
3.3	Party-level context: Inclusiveness of political institutions in Finland	89
4	Data and methods	100
5	Electoral engagement of immigrants in Finland	112
5.1	Immigrant-origin voters in the 2017 municipal elections	112
5.2	Immigrants' identity orientations and voting	136
5.3	Immigrants' political trust and voting	145
5.4	Immigrants' political interest and voting	153
5.5	Immigrants' participation in civic associations	157
5.6	Conclusions	162
6	Immigrants' political representation and the background of immigrant- origin candidates and councillors	164
6.1	Immigrants' political representation in Finnish municipalities	165
6.2	Candidates' sociodemographic profile and migration background	171
6.3	Candidates' distribution across parties	183
6.4	Candidates' value orientations	194

6.5	Conclusions.....	205
7	Political recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates from party perspective	208
7.1	Organisation of candidate recruitment within parties	209
7.2	List-building strategies within parties	214
7.3	Recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates.....	219
7.4	Conclusions.....	230
8	Immigrant-origin candidates' recruitment trajectories	232
8.1	Candidate resources.....	232
8.1.1	Involvement in voluntary associations.....	233
8.1.2	Prior political experience.....	244
8.1.3	Campaign funding.....	251
8.1.4	Time spent in campaigning.....	259
8.1.5	Campaign activities.....	261
8.1.6	Support groups	265
8.1.7	Language proficiency.....	278
8.2	Candidate motivation	284
8.2.1	Sources of encouragement to stand	285
8.2.2	Dimensions of motivation	298
8.2.3	Belief in chances of election	311
8.3	Conclusions.....	325
9	Concluding remarks	326
	Appendix A: Survey weights	331
	Appendix B: Interview questions for parties.....	333
	Appendix C: Interview questions for immigrant-origin candidates	335
	References	339

List of Figures

Figure 1.1	Share of foreign language-speaking population in 1990–2017, and foreign language-speaking electorate, candidates, and councillors in the municipal elections of 2008, 2012, and 2017 (%).....	25
Figure 2.1	The electoral pyramid.	39
Figure 2.2	The process of political recruitment in the political opportunity structure context.	42
Figure 3.1	Number of foreign-origin population in Finland in 1990–2017.	67
Figure 3.2	Foreign-born population by country of birth in 2017 (%).	68
Figure 3.3	Foreign language-speaking population by language group in 2017 (%).	69
Figure 3.4	Age distribution across largest language groups in 2017.	70
Figure 3.5	Gender distribution across the largest language groups in 2017.	71
Figure 3.6	Positive attitudes towards immigrants from different countries of origin (%).	79
Figure 3.7	Share of immigrant-origin population in Finnish municipalities in 2017.	81
Figure 3.8	Share of foreign language-speaking population by size of municipality in 2017.	82
Figure 3.9	Geographical distribution of foreign language speakers by largest language groups.	83
Figure 3.10	Finns' attitudes towards proposition "The impending reduction and ageing of our country's population require facilitation of foreigners' immigration to Finland" by the number of inhabitants in municipality. Crosstabulation.	86
Figure 3.11	Vote shares in the 2017 municipal elections across municipalities and parties.	95
Figure 3.12	The number of municipalities in which the parties won at least one seat in the 2017 municipal elections.	96

Figure 5.1	Turnout among persons entitled to vote by native language in the 2017 municipal elections (%).	114
Figure 5.2	Turnout in the 2012 municipal elections among persons entitled to vote by language, nationality, and former nationality (%).	115
Figure 5.3	Immigration to Finland between 1990–2018 by countries of origin.	120
Figure 5.4	Feelings of being part of Finnish society in different language groups. 138	
Figure 5.5	Identity orientations in different language groups (%).	140
Figure 5.6	Voting intentions in parliamentary elections in different language groups.	141
Figure 5.7	Voting intentions and identity orientations.	143
Figure 5.8	Political trust and voting intentions in different language groups. Crosstabulation.	152
Figure 5.9	Following social issues in Finland by language group. Crosstabulation.	154
Figure 5.10	Self-evaluated proficiency in Finnish language in different language groups.	154
Figure 5.11	The impact of political interest on voting intentions in different language groups. Crosstabulation.	157
Figure 5.12	Immigrants’ weekly participation in exercise or sport groups/organisations by country of origin (%).	159
Figure 5.13	Immigrants’ monthly participation in activities related to own language or cultural background by country of origin (%).	160
Figure 5.14	Immigrants’ monthly participation in religious or spiritual community (e.g. a church, mosque, etc.) by country of origin (%).	161
Figure 6.1	The Representation Index in different language groups.	167
Figure 6.2	Share of foreign language-speaking persons among persons entitled to vote, candidates, and councillors in Finnish regions (%).	169

Figure 6.3	The Representation Index of foreign language-speaking candidates and councillors in Finnish regions.	170
Figure 6.4	Distribution of candidates by origin and the size of municipality.....	171
Figure 6.5	Gender distribution among native and foreign language-speaking candidates and councillors in the largest language groups.....	172
Figure 6.6	Age distribution among native and foreign language-speaking candidates and councillors in total and in the largest foreign language-speaking groups.....	173
Figure 6.7	Occupational background of native and immigrant-origin candidates (%).....	174
Figure 6.8	Occupational background of native and immigrant-origin candidates and voters (%).	176
Figure 6.9	Level of education of native and immigrant-origin candidates by gender. Crosstabulation.	178
Figure 6.10	Level of education of native and immigrant-origin population by gender.....	179
Figure 6.11	Candidates' marital status by origin and gender. Crosstabulation.	180
Figure 6.12	Share of candidates with underage children by origin and gender. Crosstabulation.	181
Figure 6.13	Age at migration among immigrant-origin candidates.	182
Figure 6.14	Years lived in Finland among immigrant-origin candidates.....	182
Figure 6.15	Immigrant-origin candidates' reason for migration.	183
Figure 6.16	Share of foreign language-speaking candidates in different parties (%).....	185
Figure 6.17	Distribution of candidates from the largest foreign language-speaking groups across the left/liberal and centre-to-right/conservative parties.....	187
Figure 6.18	Share of foreign language-speaking councillors out of country total in different parties (%).	190

Figure 6.19	The perception of ease/difficulty in choosing the right party by origin and prior candidate experience. Crosstabulation.	192
Figure 6.20	Mean values on the Pro-Minorities and Pro-Environment Index by country of origin.	201
Figure 6.21	Mean values on the Conservatism Index by country of origin.	202
Figure 6.22	Mean values on the Pro-Capitalism Index by country of origin.	202
Figure 6.23	Religiousness among native and immigrant-origin candidates across parties. Crosstabulation.	204
Figure 7.1	The process of identifying potential candidates within a party's network.	212
Figure 7.2	Candidates' evaluation of their party's motivation to recruit them. Crosstabulation.	227
Figure 7.3	Candidates' evaluation of how much his/her comprehensive local network of friends/acquaintances influenced party's recruitment decision. Crosstabulation.	229
Figure 7.4	Candidates' evaluation of how much him/her being well known in the municipality influenced party's recruitment decision. Crosstabulation.	229
Figure 8.1	Involvement in voluntary associations by origin (1). Crosstabulation.	237
Figure 8.2	Involvement in voluntary associations by origin (2). Crosstabulation.	238
Figure 8.3	Involvement in voluntary associations by origin (3). Crosstabulation.	239
Figure 8.4	Involvement in voluntary associations by origin and gender. Crosstabulation.	243
Figure 8.5	Involvement in political organisation or party by origin and gender. Crosstabulation.	244
Figure 8.6	Prior candidacies and selection in municipal, parliamentary, parish, or cooperative society elections by origin and electoral outcome. Crosstabulation.	246

Figure 8.7	Prior candidacies in municipal, parliamentary, parish, and cooperative society elections by origin. Crosstabulation.	247
Figure 8.8	Prior experience from municipal positions of responsibility by origin. Crosstabulation.	249
Figure 8.9	Evaluation of personal campaign budget in euros by origin. Crosstabulation.	253
Figure 8.10	Evaluation of personal campaign budget in euros by origin and size of the municipality. Crosstabulation.	254
Figure 8.11	Elected councillors' and deputies' evaluation of personal campaign budget in euros by origin and size of municipality. Crosstabulation.	255
Figure 8.12	The proportions of different sources of campaign funding by origin. Crosstabulation.	257
Figure 8.13	The proportion of donations in campaign budget by origin and size of municipality. Crosstabulation.	258
Figure 8.14	Perception of ease/difficulty in raising funds for the campaign by origin. Crosstabulation.	259
Figure 8.15	Spending on different campaign activities by origin. Crosstabulation.	262
Figure 8.16	Share of candidates with a personal campaign team by the size of the municipality. Crosstabulation.	267
Figure 8.17	Share of candidates with a personal campaign team by age group. Crosstabulation.	268
Figure 8.18	Access to campaign relevant resources by origin.	271
Figure 8.19	Access to campaign relevant resources via someone from the party organisation by origin.	272
Figure 8.20	Access to campaign relevant resources via family, friends, and acquaintances by origin.	273
Figure 8.21	Self-assessed language proficiency of the immigrant-origin candidates.	280

Figure 8.22	Language Proficiency Index.....	282
Figure 8.23	The perception of ease/difficulty of acquiring knowledge needed in positions of responsibility by origin. Crosstabulation.....	283
Figure 8.24	The perception of ease/difficulty of acquiring knowledge needed in positions of responsibility by origin and prior experience as a candidate. Crosstabulation.....	284
Figure 8.25	The initiative for the decision to stand by origin and prior experience as an electoral candidate. Crosstabulation.....	286
Figure 8.26	The initiative for the decision to stand by origin and gender. Crosstabulation.....	287
Figure 8.27	The initiative for the decision to stand by prior candidate experience, gender, and origin. Crosstabulation.....	287
Figure 8.28	The perception of ease/difficulty to make the decision to stand by origin. Crosstabulation.....	288
Figure 8.29	The perception of ease/difficulty to make the decision to stand by origin and prior experience as a candidate. Crosstabulation.....	289
Figure 8.30	The perception of ease/difficulty to make the decision to stand by origin and gender. Crosstabulation.....	290
Figure 8.31	The perception of ease/difficulty to make the decision to stand by prior electoral experience, origin, and gender. Crosstabulation.....	291
Figure 8.32	Encouragement received from the party by gender and origin. Crosstabulation.....	294
Figure 8.33	Encouragement received from friends, family members, relatives, and own employer by gender and origin. Crosstabulation.....	295
Figure 8.34	Encouragement received from associations and leisure time groups by gender and origin. Crosstabulation.....	296
Figure 8.35	Dimensions of candidate motivation: public service role. Crosstabulation.....	299
Figure 8.36	Dimensions of candidate motivation: Single issue versus multiple issues. Crosstabulation.....	301

Figure 8.37	The importance of influencing a single issue by origin and prior experience as a candidate. Crosstabulation.	302
Figure 8.38	Dimensions of candidate motivation: Loyalty to the party/group and its ideology. Crosstabulation.	303
Figure 8.39	Dimensions of candidate motivation: Personal utility and ambition. Crosstabulation.	306
Figure 8.40	Dimensions of candidate motivation: desire to promote the interests of the social group the candidate represents.....	306
Figure 8.41	Beliefs in own chances of election by origin and gender.....	315
Figure 8.42	Share of dominant party candidates by origin and party (%).	323
Figure 8.43	Beliefs in election by origin and party. Crosstabulation.....	324
Figure 9.1	Factors attracting and distancing parties and potential immigrant-origin candidates from the recruitment interface.	328

List of Tables

Table 3.1	The eight largest cities' share of foreign language speakers out of the country total by language group in 2017 (%).	84
Table 3.2	Ideology and electoral support of the Finnish parliamentary parties in the 2017 municipal elections and in the 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections.....	93
Table 3.3	Number of eligible voters, candidates, and councillors, and the share of candidates per council seat in 1980–2017 municipal elections.	98
Table 3.4	The demographic context for the 2017 municipal elections (1).	99
Table 4.1	Gender and age distribution by language group in the foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region survey data.	103
Table 4.2	Representativeness analysis of the candidate survey data.	107
Table 5.1	Factors influencing immigrants' electoral participation at the institutional and individual levels.	117
Table 5.2	The demographic context for the 2017 municipal elections (2).	118
Table 5.3	Distribution of persons entitled to vote in the electronic voter register data by ethnic background and demographic and socioeconomic status, % (n).	131
Table 5.4	Logistic regression analysis predicting turnout across ethnic groups by demographic and socioeconomic background. Odd ratios (std. deviations in parentheses).....	132
Table 5.5	Actual and predicted turnout by origin and socioeconomic background (%).	133
Table 5.6	Trust towards people in general, native-born Finns, and people from one's own (or parents') country of origin living in Finland. Comparison between language groups. Mean values and standard deviations.....	144
Table 5.7	Political trust in different language groups. Means and standard deviations.....	147

Table 5.8	Trust in parliament according to years lived in Finland across different language groups. Means and standard deviations.....	148
Table 5.9	The share of “don’t know” answers to questions on trust towards political institutions in Finland by language group (%).	149
Table 5.10	The share of “don’t know” answers to question about trust in political parties by the length of residence in Finland in different language groups. Crosstabulation % (n).	150
Table 5.11	Trust in parliament according to political media consumption across different language groups. Means and standard deviations.....	151
Table 5.12	Share of respondents who follow social issues in different language groups, % (n).	156
Table 6.1	The number and share of eligible voters, candidates, and councillors in the 2017 municipal elections, and the Representation Index among the largest language groups.	166
Table 6.2	The number of native and foreign language-speaking candidates in different parties.	185
Table 6.3	Distribution of candidates of the largest foreign language-speaking groups across parties (%).	186
Table 6.4	Party preferences across five language groups in the Greater Helsinki area. Crosstabulation (%).	188
Table 6.5	The absolute number of native and foreign language-speaking councillors across parties.....	189
Table 6.6	Ratio of immigrant-origin candidates elected per native-origin candidates elected by party.....	191
Table 6.7	Principal component analysis of candidates’ political attitudes. Rotated component matrix.	196
Table 6.8	Mean values on the Pro-Minorities and Pro-Environment Index by origin, gender, and party.	198
Table 6.9	Mean values on the Conservatism Index by origin, gender, and party.	199


Table 6.10	Mean values on the Pro-Capitalism Index by origin, gender, and party.....	200
Table 7.1	Candidates' evaluation of their party's motivation to recruit them. Order of importance by origin.	228
Table 8.1.	Mean scores and standard deviations on the Associational Involvement Diversity Index by origin, gender, age, and election result.....	236
Table 8.2	Resource Access Index means and standard deviations by origin, gender, age, and election outcome.....	275
Table 8.3	Party-related Resource Access Index means and standard deviations by origin, gender, age, and election outcome.....	276
Table 8.4	Friendship and familial network-related Resource Access Index means and standard deviations by origin, gender, age, and election outcome.....	277
Table 8.5	The share of "quite or very much" responses regarding sources of encouragement and the order of importance by origin and gender.....	297
Table 8.6	Mean age and standard deviation with respect to the perceived importance of the need to fill the party's candidate list.	305
Table 8.7	Immigrant-origin candidates' representative claims and the share of foreign-origin population in the municipality in 2017. Crosstabulation (%).....	309
Table 8.8	The sum of the "quite or very important" responses regarding dimensions of candidate motivation and their order of importance by origin.....	310
Table 8.9	Explaining candidates' beliefs in election. Results of a logistic regression analysis. Odd ratios and standard errors.....	319
Table 8.10	Explaining candidates' beliefs in election. Results of logistic regression analysis by origin. Odd ratios and standard errors.....	321
Appendix Table 1	Post-stratification weight for age.....	331
Appendix Table 2	Post-stratification weight for gender.....	332
Appendix Table 3	Post-stratification weight for gender and age group.	332

1 INTRODUCTION

This doctoral dissertation examines the political representation of immigrants in Finnish municipalities. More specifically, it investigates the recruitment of immigrants and their descendants onto political parties' candidate lists and municipal councils in 2017 municipal elections. The aim is to answer three main questions. First, *what were the key differences in electoral engagement between different ethnic groups?* Second, *what influenced political parties' demand for immigrant-origin candidates i.e. motivated parties to recruit immigrants to their candidate lists?* Third, *what role did immigrant-origin candidates' supply factors, i.e. their socioeconomic backgrounds, resources, and motivations, play in their decision to stand as candidates and in their selection to candidate lists?*

These questions are extremely topical, as Finnish society becomes ever more multicultural. Thus far, immigrant minorities have been underrepresented on candidate lists and municipal councils. Figure 1.1 shows that with the increased share of the immigrant-origin electorate, the underrepresentation at the municipal level has grown from previous elections.

Figure 1.1 Share of foreign language-speaking population in 1990–2017, and foreign language-speaking electorate, candidates, and councillors in the municipal elections of 2008, 2012, and 2017 (%).



Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2020a, 2017a, 2012a, 2012b, 2008.

There are multiple arguments in favour of the presence of minority representatives in municipal councils. The most traditional of them is “no taxation without representation”. The slogan of the American colonists in the 1700s entails the idea that all community members who regularly pay taxes should be represented in government bodies, which decide how public funds are spent (e.g. Smith 1998: 23). The longer the time of residence of the non-nationals, the harder it becomes to justify their exclusion from public decision-making processes. Electoral rights that enable immigrants to participate in politics should also facilitate their integration into the host society. Granting electoral rights to non-nationals and giving them access to representative bodies signals that the political system is inclusive of minority voices and that the majority society accepts – or even welcomes – diversity. Furthermore, minority representatives often articulate the interests of minority constituents; in doing so, they bring, to deliberative decision-making processes, perspectives that would otherwise remain unnoticed (e.g. Groenendijk 2008; Gutmann & Thompson 2004; Karpowitz et al. 2012; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Tate 2003; Young 2000). In the most extreme case, political exclusion of immigrant-origin minorities can fuel ethnic and class animosities and rivalries. There are examples from several liberal European democracies over time. In France, Belgium, Great Britain, and elsewhere, politically marginalized immigrant groups have taken their grievances to the streets (Bleich et al. 2010; Dancygier 2010).

An ability to understand political processes, as well as an interest in being up to date with what is happening in society, are both important personal resources supporting the development of democratic citizenship (Berelson et al. 1954: 307–308). In the framework of societal institutions, a person who is engaged in society can promote not only his or her own interests but also those of his or her community. Drifting into the margins of society weakens one’s sense of belonging and inclusion, and at worst undermines the sense of legitimacy of the political system and its guiding values (Easton 1965). Therefore, engagement in politics is a key factor that determines the societal inclusion of immigrants at both individual and group levels.

The demographic background of elected representatives has a symbolic value: The concentration of power in the hands of only a few groups does not send a message of an equal and multivoiced society, nor does it encourage underrepresented groups to seek access to decision-making bodies (Phillips 1995). According to Bobo and Gilliam (1990: 379), the symbolic value of the presence of minority representatives is that it sends a message to minorities that the benefits of participating outweigh the costs of abstaining. As Barreto (2010: 7) argues, ethnic

minority candidates increase ethnic minorities' psychological engagement and interest in elections and direct more resources to mobilise voters in ethnic minority communities.

Of course, one may ask whether perfectly socially representative democratic institutions are achievable or even desirable. Scholars, elected representatives, and citizens have differing opinions on whether elected councillors should focus on representing all residents in the municipality or only their own voters or own interest groups (Eulau et al. 1959; Kestilä-Kekkonen 2018: 30–31; Pitkin 1967; Sipilinen & von Schoultz 2020). If we believe that councillors should represent the interests of all residents, by emphasizing social representation we may undermine this duty. In theory, the preferences of the wider public could be represented in the decision-making without mirror-like congruence in the demographic and socioeconomic background between the representatives and the represented. However, in practice, representatives' background influences the substance of the policies they promote. Butler and Broockman (2011), for instance, provide evidence based on a field experiment that US legislators' responsiveness to a request for help with registering to vote depended on the race of the email sender. White legislators were less responsive to requests from the black alias than from the white alias, whereas minority state legislators responded much more frequently to the black alias than to the white alias. Bird (2011) finds similar results in her study on the Canadian House of Commons. By looking at parliamentary debates, Bird shows that visible minority MPs are more likely than other MPs to address issues important to ethnic minorities. While similar empirical studies are not available in Finland, we know from prior studies that the white majority's attitudes towards different immigrant groups vary to a great extent and that discrimination based on ethnic background in the labour market is very common, at least if a person has a name that suggests a non-European or "non-white" background (Ahmad 2020; Jaakkola 2005; Leinonen 2012). Due to such institutional racism in the labour market, we cannot expect immigrant-origin minorities' interests to be sufficiently represented in political decision-making only by representatives with a non-minority background.

Immigrants' representation in Finnish municipalities is important because municipalities constitute an essential part of the public administration in society. Municipalities are responsible for providing a wide variety of welfare services for their residents, the most important of which relate to (1) health care (basic health care and specialised medical care), (2) social welfare (child welfare, care of the elderly, and services for people with disabilities), (3) educational and cultural services (early childhood education, basic education, upper secondary education, library services,

and youth work), and (4) technical services (building supervision, environmental protection, construction of roads and other infrastructure, water services, and waste management). Finnish municipalities are responsible for many functions that most countries consider to be regional-level functions, such as public hospitals, upper secondary schools, and adult education centres. Municipalities are steered by political decision-making, and the highest decision-making body is the municipal council. Its members are elected by municipal residents for four years in local elections (Haveri & Airaksinen 2007).

In sum, marginalized groups' empowerment via descriptive representation has several positive outcomes. It increases the social and political capital of these groups (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995) as well as their level of political participation (Gay 2001), political efficacy (Atkeson & Carrillo 2007; Banducci et al. 2004), and political knowledge (Verba et al. 1997). Descriptively represented groups also demonstrate higher levels of political trust (Howell & Fagan 1988) and are less likely to feel alienated by the government (Bobo & Gilliam 1990; Pantoja & Segura 2003).

Political parties are the most influential actors in the selection of representatives. Although voters make the final selection in elections, in reality they select their candidates from lists pre-selected by parties (Hazan & Rahat 2010; Norris 1997a; Prewitt 1969). As Hazan and Rahat (2010: 6) describe:

Those who are elected to office will be the successful candidates previously selected, and they are the ones who will determine much of how the party looks and what it does. Moreover, a party's candidates will help define its characteristics – demographically, geographically, and ideologically – more than its organisation or even its manifesto. The outcome of the candidate selection process, like the results of the general elections, will affect the legislators, the party, and the legislature for a long time after the (s)election itself is over.

Prior studies from the UK (Sobolewska 2013), Germany (da Fonseca 2011; Deiss-Helbig 2019), Belgium (Van Trappen 2021), Sweden (Dancygier et al. 2015; Soininen 2011), and the Netherlands (van der Zwan et al. 2018) show that parties' attitudes towards integration and immigration may be more crucial to immigrants' access to candidate lists than their own motivation and resources. This gatekeeper role of political parties highlights the importance of studying the criteria that parties apply when recruiting and selecting immigrant-origin candidates. By focusing on the composition of elected representatives and ignoring the preceding step of candidate nomination, many prior studies fail to provide a comprehensive picture of immigrant underrepresentation (a critique raised by e.g. Bird et al. 2011, Bloemraad 2013, and Dancygier et al. 2015).

Since Gallagher and Marsh (1988), candidate selection and recruitment have often been described using the metaphor of the “secret garden” of politics. It is an obscure process, often hidden from public view, and regulated largely by internal party rules, informal practices, and power relationships (see also Bjarnegård & Kenny 2015). Thus, outsiders have very little public material other than the final ballot lists from which to draw a picture of the candidate selection process. Scholars interested in candidate selection have, therefore, conducted intraparty surveys and interviews, which require in-depth fieldwork. Likewise, the empirical evidence of this study is drawn from multiple datasets adequate to lift the veil of secrecy over parties’ internal recruitment practises: A survey for both immigrant (N=204) and native-origin candidates (N=1010) in the 2017 Finnish municipal elections, interviews with political parties (N=24), and interviews with immigrant-origin candidates (N=12). In addition, an individual-level register-based dataset is utilized to attain an overall picture of all candidates and elected councillors in the 2017 elections (N=33,618, out of which 729 were foreign language-speaking). In the analysis of the immigrant-origin electorate, two additional datasets are employed: Individual register-based data on turnout in the 2017 municipal elections (N=1,377,448, out of which 74,116 were of foreign origin), as well as a survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region (N=1527) that examines identities, values, and attitudes of Russian, Estonian, English, Somali, and Arabic speakers, i.e., the largest immigrant groups in Finland.

It is logical to begin to unravel the factors that influence immigrants and their descendants’ political representation by focusing on elections in which their political rights are most extensive and the threshold for participation the lowest. In municipal elections, Nordic and EU citizens have rights on equal terms with Finnish citizens, and other foreign residents are eligible to vote and/or run as candidates after having had a domicile in Finland continuously for two years and 51 days prior to an election. Finnish municipal elections also provide an interesting setting to examine political recruitment of immigrants because Finland’s open list proportional representation (OLPR) electoral system is exceptional in international comparison (von Schoultz 2018). The system creates a relatively open political opportunity structure for immigrant minorities’ political mobilisation compared to many other democracies. For instance, candidates’ personal vote shares—and not intraparty rank-ordering of candidates—determine whether they win seats in the council. While candidates run personalised campaigns mostly at their own (not their party’s) cost, outside of the largest cities, the campaign budgets are very modest, which means that in most municipalities, the question “yes or no to candidacy” depends not on financial resources but, rather, on personal motivation (Borg 2018a; Kestilä-Kekkonen et al.

2018). The personalised electoral system creates high-level rivalry between candidates of the same party, and individual candidates have an incentive to target primarily those voters they believe will personally vote for them. As for the parties, every vote given to a candidate on a party's list goes directly to the party and therefore, anyone with moderate vote-earning potential is a potential candidate.

Furthermore, the Finnish case also allows for comparisons between the relatively homogeneous native population and fairly recently arrived immigrant-origin groups. Ethnic diversification of the Finnish population began in the beginning of the 1990s, and the share of foreign-origin population is still quite low (7% in 2017) (Figure 1.1). Parties have only recently recognised new ethnic minorities as potential voter groups, yet their attempts to mobilise immigrant voters remain uninstitutionalized (Ahokas et al. 2011). Finnish electoral candidates' personal vote-earning attributes have been examined in several studies (e.g. Helander 2003; Ruostetsaari 1997; Ruostetsaari & Mattila 2002; von Schoultz 2016), as have intraparty candidate nomination strategies (e.g. Arter 2013, 2014; Bühler 1977; Helander 1997; Kuitunen 1997, 1998, 2000, 2008; Perälä 2018; Sundberg 1995; Tarkiainen 1971). However, because of the short history of net migration, the scientific knowledge of the recruitment of ethnic minority-origin candidates is very limited (see Ahokas et al. 2011; Weide 2009, 2011).

Several scholars have criticised single case studies that present a detailed analysis of the processes influencing minority political representation in one country (for a summary, see Bird et al. 2011: 8–9). Critics argue that studies limited to one country provide little leverage in understanding the role of political and institutional factors across time and place that influence the patterns of the political integration of groups with varying ethnic backgrounds. Acknowledging this limitation, this study tries to carefully explain how the electoral system with open-list proportional representation (OLPR) influences the process of political recruitment. Furthermore, although this study does not provide cross-country comparison, it presents two other types of comparative analyses. The data of this study allows, first, for a comparison between native-origin and immigrant-origin candidates with respect to their resources and motivation, and second, for an analysis of different municipal contexts concerning the accessibility of local elections. At the municipal level, there is variation in population structure, parties' organisation, and the implementation of multicultural policies, which presumably affects parties' demand on immigrant-origin candidates.

Approaches to observing immigration background and ethnic origin vary across countries. Both “objective” measures, such as country of birth of the individual or his/her direct ancestors, and “subjective” measures, which refer to “ethnicity”, “heritage”, or minority group membership, are used. These concepts, however, are

not easily defined, and even less easily operationalized in a manner comparable across different national contexts. This methodological issue runs through this dissertation as well. In examining the political representation of new ethnic minorities in Finnish municipalities, this study focuses mostly on immigrants, defined as persons who themselves and whose parent(s) (either both parents or the only known parent) are born abroad.

Statistics Finland compiles statistics on foreign population based on their and their parents' countries of origin, native languages, and citizenship. Currently, demographic statistics based on country of origin or native language produce only slightly different results when the focus is on foreign-origin persons eligible to vote, that is, persons of at least 18 years of age. This is because Finland has only recently become a country of net migration and Finnish-born children of immigrants are still mainly underaged. The future situation will be different when the children and grandchildren of immigrants come of age. The migration background of the immigrants' descendants cannot be detected by looking at native language, which for Finnish-born will more and more often be one of the country's official languages. At present, however, most foreign-origin people have registered some language other than Finnish, Swedish, or Sami as their native language in the census. Thus, analyses based on country of origin and native language are overlapping. Statistics Finland has tighter restrictions on providing researchers with data about individuals' country of origin as compared to native language, which is why several analyses presented in this dissertation are based on native language. For the above reasons, this should not be seen as a limitation.

In his theory of multicultural citizenship, Will Kymlicka (1995, 2010) distinguishes between the rights and demands of two different types of minorities in modern nation-states: indigenous peoples and national minorities on the one hand, and new immigrant "ethnic groups" on the other. The scope of this thesis is restricted to immigrants, which in the Finnish case means omitting the Swedish-speaking minority, the Sámi people, and the Roma from the analysis. To be very clear, the study is limited to international rather than within-country migration. This study uses the terms "(im)migrant" or "a person of immigrant-origin" in parallel with the term "foreign-origin person" (a term employed by Statistics Finland), although they obscure the motivations of migration (such as political persecution, economic needs, or family reunification), immigrants' legal status (temporary or permanent legal resident, refugee, asylum seeker, non-citizens vs. naturalised citizens), and immigrants' "visibility" in comparison to the majority population.

Sobolewska (2017) and Leinonen (2012), for instance, problematise the term “immigrant” for very well-founded reasons. According to Sobolewska, the term “race”, which is used mainly by US scholars but avoided in Europe for historical reasons, would be much more useful as a category denoting groups that suffer racism from the white majority. This is because “the categorization as a racial minority cannot be limited to skin colour or ethnicity or immigration status”. Leinonen, in turn, argues that “immigrant” is a highly racialized and class-based category in Finland. In her study on Americans in the Finnish labour market, she found that most Americans resisted being labelled as an “immigrant” because their self-image did not fit with the ideas that the term evoked in them. Instead, they preferred the term “expatriate” or described themselves simply as “Americans living in Finland”. Similar findings have been observed among Estonian-origin immigrants. As Alho and Sippola (2019) find, Estonians in Finland have a tendency to distance themselves from other “non-deserving” immigrant groups, who, in their opinion, do not contribute to the Finnish welfare state like Estonians do. It therefore seems as if the term “immigrant” is perceived as a category for non-European or “non-white” immigrants. The conceptual discussion regarding correct ways of describing persons with a migration or foreign background is complex and ongoing. It is connected to many ethical questions regarding whether immigrants are always considered “foreign”, even after decades of residence in Finland. In particular, the term “second-generation immigrant” has been heavily criticised by asking on what grounds a Finnish-born person can be regarded as an immigrant in Finland¹.

Acknowledging these aforementioned matters and understanding the problematic nature of the term, especially because, in the empirical section, the category “immigrant” is operationalised based on a person’s native language rather than migration history, the term “immigrant” is still chosen. The reason is that the aim is to explain how migration as an event that influences individuals’ and groups’ resources and identities affects immigrants’ electoral engagement and political representation in Finland. The term “immigrant” is also relevant because this study focuses mainly on “first-generation immigrants” i.e. persons who have themselves migrated to Finland. The political activity of the children of immigrants is discussed only to some extent.

The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical framework of the study. It begins by discussing immigrants’ electoral engagement at a more general level, and proceeds to describe the process of political recruitment

¹ See e.g. the Twitter discussion initiated by a Turkish-origin former MP Ozan Yanar: <https://twitter.com/yanarozan/status/956814323594223616?lang=en>

and the model of supply and demand. Chapter 3 opens up the Finnish context i.e. the political opportunity structure, within which immigrants' political representation takes place. Data and methods, as well as the structure of the empirical section, are described in detail in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, the focus turns to immigrants' electoral engagement, including turnout and attitudes towards the political system which influence the relative attractiveness of immigrant groups in the eyes of political parties. It may be expected, first, that parties are interested primarily in groups that are not only generally politically active but also active voters and, thus, have the potential to contribute to a party's electoral success. Second, electoral engagement of an immigrant group is reflected in the eagerness of its members to stand as candidates, for it influences their evaluations of whether they can leverage co-ethnic support in elections.

Chapter 6 describes in detail how immigrants' representation on candidate lists and councils varied across Finnish municipalities and across different ethnic groups. The chapter also compares the socioeconomic and party background as well as political orientations of immigrant-origin candidates and councillors to their native-origin counterparts. Chapter 7 focuses on Finnish parties' demand for immigrant-origin candidates. It first describes the principles of candidate recruitment under the Finnish electoral system and from the perspective of political parties, then explains how these principles influenced parties' motivation to recruit immigrant-origin candidates. Chapter 8 focuses on candidates' supply, i.e. their resources and motivation, by comparing immigrant-origin candidates to native-origin candidates. It also explains the extent to which candidates' resources influenced their beliefs about being elected, and whether immigrant-origin candidates differed from native-origin candidates in this respect. Chapter 9 concludes the main findings, discusses their implications, and suggests areas for further examination.

2 RECRUITMENT OF IMMIGRANT-ORIGIN CANDIDATES

This study focuses on the candidate recruitment process and, thus, finds its home primarily in the field of political recruitment studies (e.g. Gallagher & Marsh 1988; Hazan & Rahat 2010; Norris & Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997b). However, to understand immigrants' recruitment into host country politics, this study also looks at immigrants' political engagement at a more general level. Thus, this theory chapter has two parts. In Chapter 2.1, the focus is on the main theoretical arguments put forward in prior studies explaining immigrants' electoral engagement, as well as the main patterns found in the empirical research. To what extent are immigrant voters a different kind of electorate due to their migration and ethnic minority background? Then, Chapter 2.2 lays out the theoretical foundation of the political recruitment process, i.e. the demand of political parties (encompassing the demand of the voters), and the supply of the aspiring candidates. Chapters 2.3–2.4 discuss how the workings of supply and demand determine the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates.

2.1 Explaining immigrants' electoral engagement

This chapter focuses on the electoral engagement of immigrant minorities. The concept “electoral engagement” is used almost synonymously with political engagement or political involvement but is used in reference to activities involving elections (cf. e.g. Jensen et al. 2002). It is an umbrella term that covers electoral behaviour (such as voting and standing as a candidate) as well as the attitudes and beliefs that guide it. This study is interested in the political representation of immigrants and, thus, the relationship between immigrants and political parties. Extra-parliamentary forms of political participation, such as demonstrations and boycotts, are not in the outline of the present study.

Scholars have found several patterns of immigrant electoral engagement across different national settings in Western Europe and North America. These include low levels of interest in politics and electoral participation among immigrants, resource

inequality and political exclusion of ethnic and racial minorities, support for left-leaning and liberal political parties among a large majority of immigrant minority groups, and a group-based calculus of vote choice (for an overview, see Bird et al. 2011; Sobolewska 2017). Religious involvement also seems to play a more important role to immigrant minorities compared to the majority, because for many immigrant minorities it is the main form of civic involvement and, as such, is a key arena for acquiring civic skills, political information, and building motivation to participate (Jones-Correa & Leal 2001; Sobolewska et al. 2015; Verba et al. 1995).

The explanations regarding the electoral engagement of ethnic and immigrant minorities emphasise the role of (1) individual socioeconomic status, (2) racial/ethnic background, (3) experiences related to immigration, and/or (4) country context and its institutional structure. An individual's socioeconomic status can be equally used in explaining the electoral engagement of minority and majority groups (Verba et al. 1995). It is well-documented that in Western countries, immigrant minorities have a lower than average socio-economic status as compared to other voters (Eurostat 2020), which may be expected to affect their electoral engagement. It has been studied, for instance, whether this socio-economic status causes higher than average support for parties on the left (Bergh & Bjørklund 2011a; Saggat 2000; Wüst 2011). However, the support found for this hypothesis is limited. Furthermore, empirical findings suggest that immigrant voters often hold more conservative political attitudes than native voters, yet they vote for left-wing parties due to their more tolerant views on immigration and minorities (Dancygier & Saunders 2006; De la Garza & Cortina, 2007; Kelly & Morgan 2008; Tiberj 2011).

Indeed, numerous studies have found that race and ethnicity have an independent effect on electoral behaviour over socio-economic status and resource acquisition due to co-ethnic identification (e.g. Barreto 2010; Bergh & Bjørklund 2011a, 2011b; Dawson 1994; Greeley 1974). Because ethnicity is such a strong basis of group identity, especially among those minorities who are discriminated against based on their ethnic background, loyalty to co-ethnics may outweigh other sources of social identity such as social class (Barreto 2010: 9). As Bergh and Bjørklund (2011a: 313) put it: “the fact that one belongs to a minority group shapes political preferences, even if one's own experiences are untypical of that minority group”. This requires that a person self-identifies as a member of a common ethnic and/or immigrant group and ethnicity is personally a salient political issue. Identification based on ethnicity is often important because it is a sum of several overlapping identities, such as language, cultural practices, religion, and race (Barreto 2010: 8). At the same time, it is important to recognise that although ethnic background unites people, not all

individuals who share the same ethnic background, country of birth, native tongue, or religion have similar experiences and share the same values and beliefs.

For minorities, shared ethnicity may act as a heuristic cue of common interests, especially if life chances are strongly shaped by ethnic background (Dawson 1994: 61). In elections, this is reflected as group or bloc voting, whereby immigrants and their descendants vote in relatively high numbers for candidates of the same ethnic background as themselves. Group voting very often benefits left-of-centre parties because these parties are perceived as looking after the interests of minority groups (Baysu & Swyngedouw 2020; Bergh & Bjørklund 2011a; Collet 2005; De la Garza & Cortina 2007; Kelly & Morgan 2008; Wüst 2011). The intensity of bloc voting, and thereby the ability to elect candidates of the same background, differs between groups. As Vermeulen et al. (2020) argue, this capacity is largely influenced by the organisational infrastructure of groups (see also Fennema & Tillie 1999; Vermeulen et al. 2014):

High immigrant organisational density and strong inter-organisational networks correlate with an immigrant constituency that is more engaged politically, displays higher levels of political participation and more easily mobilises to support candidates from the same immigrant group.

What has been found to facilitate immigrant organisational density and, thus, group identity and group voting, is the residential concentration of ethnic minorities (Vermeulen et al. 2020). Ethnic neighbourhoods serve as “immigrant enclaves”, offering a whole spectrum of resources to those whose customs and/or language set them apart from the majority population, including local ethnic businesses, religious institutions, community-based non-profit organisations, local educational institutions, and informal social networks (Logan et al. 2002). Ethnic neighbourhoods function as settings of political socialization, where political information and cues are transmitted (Bratsberg et al. 2020; Vermeulen et al. 2020). However, while living in an immigrant enclave may ease the short-term social and economic costs of resettlement, it could also limit contacts with the host country and, thus, result in fewer opportunities to learn about the country’s political life or be mobilised into politics (Gidengil & Roy 2016).

Some studies are specifically interested in experiences related to immigration. What are the consequences on electoral engagement that result from being a migrant or a child of migrant parents? What is, for instance, the impact of speaking a language other than the dominant language at home, or having less knowledge and experience about the societal system? How responsive or resistant is an individual to a new political environment? Values and attitudes that influence electoral behaviour, such

as political interest, trust, and efficacy, are strongly shaped by childhood and early adulthood socialization, during which family, friends, school, and media transmit political information to an individual and expose her to cues that shape her political orientation throughout the life cycle (Abendschön 2013; Hyman 1959; Jennings et al. 2009). In explaining political engagement among immigrants, scholars have focused on the conditions under which socialization into a new political system is expected to have taken place (Black et al. 1987; Bueker 2005; White et al. 2008; Wals 2013). This approach considers individual- and group-level experiences both in the country of origin and in the country of settlement, for both play a role regarding the resources available for electoral participation. Wals (2013), who views immigrant political engagement from a psychological perspective, argues that:

...immigrants' political attitudes are nurtured by two pseudo-environments. One resulting from these individuals' premigration experiences and another one derived from their post-migration exposure to the political realm in the new host country.

According to Wals, immigrants' pre-migration ideological predispositions serve as a heuristic by which these individuals anchor and adjust their ideological predispositions in the new polity. Thereby, for those who have migrated as adults and have socialized into a very different political system and political culture in their country of origin, it may be difficult to transfer prior skills and political knowledge to the new context. Studies on migrants' political socialisation show that their motivation and resources to participate in politics in the destination country increase with exposure to the new political system, yet pre-migration beliefs and actions may be resistant to change even with a long time of exposure (Bueker 2005; McAllister & Makkai 1992; White et al. 2008). As Almond and Verba (1965: 15) point out, individuals' political orientation and behaviour differ greatly in participant versus subject political cultures (democracies versus totalitarian regimes), which gives the individual a very different role in society (see also Bueker 2005). When studying immigrants' electoral engagement, such variables as reason for migrating (whether voluntary or involuntary, for instance), age at migration, and length of settlement in the host country are of interest.

The fourth line of explanations breaks away from an individual and her family or cultural background and focuses on the characteristics and structure of the context surrounding the individual. Studies at this level have examined the role of both sending and receiving countries' formal institutional structures, including different citizenship rules and immigration and anti-discrimination policies (e.g. Freeman 2004). In addition, the informal societal structure has been given a lot of attention.

Together, these are defined as “political opportunity structure” (Bauböck et al. 2006; Bird et al. 2011; Koopmans 2004). Originally, the concept emerged in studies on social movements, when scholars wished to systematically analyse the political context, which triggers or makes possible engagement in contentious politics (Eisinger 1973; Kriesi 1995; Tarrow 1983). Eisinger (1973: 11–12) emphasises the interconnection between individual behaviour and the surrounding context as follows:

...elements in the environment impose certain constraints on political activity or open avenues for it. The manner in which individuals and groups in the political system behave, then, is not simply a function of the resources they command but of the openings, weak spots, barriers, and resources of the political system itself. There is, in this sense, interaction, or linkage, between the environment, understood in terms of the notion of a structure of political opportunities, and political behavior.

Later, as Bird et al. (2011: 12) note, in studies on the electoral participation of immigrants, the concept has been applied broadly when describing the constraints that determine the opportunities for and costs of participation.

Much attention in the literature on immigrant electoral engagement has also been paid to immigrant and ethnic minorities’ social capital, i.e. the resources derived from their co-ethnic (bonding social capital) and cross-ethnic ties (bridging social capital), which affect immigrant groups’ collective political identity and capacity to mobilise (Fennema & Tillie 1999, 2001; Tillie 2004; Morales & Pilati 2011; Teorell 2003; Vermeulen & Berger 2008). As Tillie (2004) argues, to investigate immigrant-origin individuals’ political participation, both individual-level social capital (measured as organisational membership, personal social network) and group-level social capital (the network of ethnic organisations) should be considered.


This study focuses on one certain form of electoral engagement, namely, running as a candidate in local elections. Unlike voting, which is a less demanding form of electoral participation, participating in elections as a candidate presupposes certain personal resources, such as time and money, but also exceptional motivation to take part in politics. Therefore, this form of participation concerns only a minor, yet an influential, share of eligible population (on Finland, see Borg 2018b: 2–8). To understand immigrants’ political recruitment in Finnish municipal elections, this study employs all approaches described above: the role of individual socioeconomic status, ethnic group identity, immigration experience, and societal context. The following part of this chapter builds on the presented literature review and outlines the theoretical framework of political recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates.

2.2 The process of political recruitment

To understand the composition of our representative bodies, we must look closely at the process through which individuals become politicians. In the literature, this is called political recruitment (Czudnovski 1975; Norris & Lovenduski 1995; Seligman 1961, 1964). While socialisation to politics produces a number of individuals interested in and able to participate in politics, not each individual with these characteristics becomes a politician. Access to political elites is controlled by a series of gatekeepers, which is why political recruitment has been described as a process of “passing filters”, “taking steps”, or “climbing ladders” (ibid.).

Scholars have often adopted a four-stage model of political recruitment, in which some aspirant or potential candidates are eliminated at each stage. The model starts with (1) a large number of citizens who are eligible to run for political office and moves to (2) a smaller pool of citizens who aspire to run for political office (those who are willing). The next stages consist of (3) a small group of citizens who are nominated to run for political office and, finally, (4) the smallest group of citizens who are elected (Denters & Rose 2012; Norris & Lovenduski 1995). An analogy of a pyramid or a funnel can also be used (Figure 2.1). Depending on the type of elections and legislative systems, scholars have distinguished between fewer or larger numbers of successive filters, steps, or stages and effective actors in the process. The idea, however, is the same: “from the many are chosen the few” (Prewitt 1969).

Figure 2.1 The electoral pyramid.



Source: Denters & Rose (2012).

Central terms used in the political recruitment literature are “recruitment” and “selection”. These two are sometimes seen as separate but closely related processes, depending on the personalisation of the political system. In the United States, parties’ role as gatekeepers in candidate selection is much weaker than it is in most European countries. As Cain et al. (1987) argue, American politicians are self-nominating political entrepreneurs who offer themselves as candidates into primaries, develop their own resources and support networks, manage their election campaigns, and cultivate their personal reputation. Despite the fact that electoral systems in most European countries now allow voters to express preferences for candidates, and not just for political parties, parties still play a central role in recruiting and selecting candidates (Renwick & Pilet 2016). However, Siavelis and Morgenstein (2008: 31) argue that sometimes it is misleading to separate recruitment and selection, for “it is often the same elites that cultivate, identify, and name candidates, beginning a process that ends with candidate selection”. Therefore, it may be hard to distinguish in practice where recruitment ends and selection begins.

As will be explained several times in the present study, in Finnish municipal elections, parties aim at full candidate lists, which requires them to be very active in seeking and persuading residents to stand as candidates (Kuitunen 2000). If the parties would rely on only persons who themselves step forward, the names on the ballot lists would be very few. However, those individuals who offer themselves as candidates are quite likely to be nominated on the list, given that the quantitative demand of candidates is higher than their supply.

The seminal study of Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski (1995), *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race, and Class in the British Parliament*, has had a great influence on the research field of candidate selection and political recruitment. Their core message is that candidate selection is an interactive process in which both selectors and aspirants affect outcomes that are organized in several sets of institutions (see also Lovenduski 2016). Focusing on power in British political parties and political recruitment in British national elections, they distinguish between two contextual settings, in which the process of political recruitment takes place. The broadest contextual framework is the level of *political system*, including the legal, electoral, and party system. Inside this framework, the second level is *party context*, which refers to those factors that set the context within any particular party, namely, the party organisation, rules, and ideology. Selection of candidates and representatives takes place within these two frameworks and is characterised by the mechanisms of supply and demand. Demand is the criteria that the parties apply when selecting candidates and that the voters consider when selecting representatives. Supply refers to the


characteristics of the individuals aspiring to political careers, including their social backgrounds, motivations, and resources (both personal and social). The supply determines which individuals come forward, and the demand dictates which of them are chosen (Norris & Lovenduski 1995: 14–15, 21, 184; Norris 1997a).

At the time, Norris (1997a: 8) called this approach “the new institutionalist research design”, for it took into account the formal but also informal structure of opportunities (thus “new” institutionalism). Formal institutions, such as candidate selection methods, legal regulations, and official party rules, are not sufficient factors to determine the outcome of the recruitment process because the attitudes and behaviour of individual actors have a significant influence on recruitment practices. In the feminist literature on political recruitment, scholars have strongly emphasised that even if the formal institutions would facilitate women’s access to candidate lists, the attitudes of the party selectors often do not (Bjarnegård & Kenny 2015; Krook 2010; Norris & Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997a).

To conclude, in order to obtain a complete picture of the process of political recruitment, it must be, first, examined from both parties’ (the recruiters) and candidates’ (the recruited) perspectives, and second, be placed in a particular context that constitutes the so-called political opportunity structure. As discussed in Chapter 2.1, political opportunity structure refers to societies’ and communities’ structural setting, which determines available options for political action in a specific context, meaning that individuals’ and groups’ strategic repertoire is dependent on the set of options available to them at any particular time and place (Bird et al. 2011; Koopmans 1999; Norris & Lovenduski 1995: 21).

Figure 2.2 shows the theoretical model applied in this study. The model is my own elaboration of the supply and demand model by Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 144, 184) and the model of political opportunities for ethnic minority representation presented by Bird et al. (2011: 13). Unlike Norris and Lovenduski’s (1995) study on British national-level parliamentary elections, the present study focuses on municipal elections and, thus, the local-level context becomes especially important.

Figure 2.2 The process of political recruitment in the political opportunity structure context.



Source: Own elaboration adapted from Bird et al. (2011: 13), Kuitunen (2000: 20), and Norris & Lovenduski (1995: 144, 184).

As the model in Figure 2.2 illustrates, contextual determinants of political recruitment take place at three different levels. Whereas the state/macro level applies to all parties and actors, there are also local-level determinants, which vary between municipalities. The meso- i.e. party level context captures the contextual impact of political parties, their practises, and their organisational setting, but unlike state and municipal-level contexts, it does not refer to a geographical context. Individual, municipal, party, and state-level determinants are interconnected and interdependent, and, thus, influence political recruitment simultaneously. Supply of the aspirants – their backgrounds, resources and motivations – together with party demand determine who become candidates in elections. Voters then make the final decision about who is elected to political office.

The model guides the proceeding of the following chapters. The demand-side analysis in Chapter 2.3 explains how party demand controls migrants’ access to candidate lists. Candidate recruitment and selection are mostly intra-party issues, often hidden from public view, but guided by certain common principles. Then, Chapter 2.4 provides the supply side analysis by describing which individual

characteristics are important to becoming recruited and selected to the candidate list. The focus here is on the intersections of ethnicity and other background variables, as well as how ethnic minority and/or immigrant background influence individual motivation and resources. Finally, in Chapter 3, the theoretical section concludes with an analysis of how the structure of political opportunities in Finland facilitates or hinders ethnic minority mobilisation.

The outline for this study is on parties' recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates. Further examination of their electoral success and voters' willingness to support immigrant-origin candidates is omitted from the thesis, although some information on the background of elected immigrant-origin councillors will be provided.

2.3 Party demand

Prior studies across Europe show that immigrant-origin candidates face higher barriers to access to parliaments and local councils due to discrimination, both on behalf of the parties selecting candidates and on behalf of the voters in the elections (Ashe 2019; Dancygier et al. 2015; Deiss-Helbig 2019; da Fonseca 2011; Sobolewska 2013; Soininen 2011). In the first stage of political recruitment, individuals either put themselves forward or are encouraged by others to standing as candidates. Indeed, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2.2, in most Western democracies, political parties are the most influential gatekeepers in the selection of representatives. Although voters make the final selection in elections, in reality they select their candidates from lists pre-selected by parties. Therefore, the chain of democratic delegation begins with candidate selection (Hazan & Rahat 2010: 12; Prewitt 1969). In the 2017 Finnish municipal elections, 97.6 percent of the candidates were on a party's list, leaving only 2.4 percent to represent other groups (constituency associations).

Parties have three major principles they follow when building ballot lists. They aim to first maximise electoral success i.e. the number of votes and seats, and second to follow the party's programme and ideology (Durose et al. 2011; Kuitunen 2008; Norris & Lovenduski 1995). Third, parties also aim to secure intraparty cohesion by fulfilling the wishes of intraparty fractions (Gallagher 1988b; Hazan & Rahat 2010). To understand immigrants' access to candidate lists, we must examine the extent to which recruiting immigrant-origin candidates is in harmony with the aforementioned goals (Ashe 2019; da Fonseca 2011; Dancygier et al. 2015; Deiss-Helbig 2019;

Durose et al. 2011; Sobolewska 2013; van der Zwan et al. 2018). To what extent do parties benefit or lose from recruiting immigrant-origin candidates in terms of vote share and party cohesion? What are parties' attitudes towards equality and diversity?

Firstly, parties may be described as rational prospectors; they make profound cost-benefit assessments on which kind of candidate list provides the desired outcome in elections, i.e. maximises the party's seats in the representative body, for seats are the currency of power (Brady et al. 1999; Downs 1957; Durose et al. 2011). Parties must make sure that the candidates on their lists can attract a sufficient number of votes and, therefore, they value such experience or characteristics in the aspirants whom they consider attractive to the wider electorate (Gallagher & Marsh 1988). Knowing that voters' electoral choice can be based upon preferred policy goal (positional voting), partisanship (pre-existing party attachment), performance of the party or its candidate (valence-based voting), or such characteristics as class, ethnicity, gender, and religion (identity-based voting) (Green & Jennings 2017: 538), parties formulate certain criteria regarding their preferred candidates.

Because the Finnish electoral system pools the preference votes across co-partisans, seat-maximizing parties benefit from candidates capable of generating preference votes (Ruostetsaari & Mattila 2002; von Schoultz 2018). Cain et al. (1984: 111) define a preference or personal vote as "that portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record". As Zittel (2017: 668) notes, it is, by definition "a non-partisan vote rooted in individual candidates rather than in partisan ideologies and policies". Thereby, parties evaluate aspirants' resources and skills for planning and running successful electoral campaigns, and also their reputation, popularity and public image, their personal social networks, and the demographic background they represent (Cutler 2002; Ruostetsaari & Mattila 2002).²

In essence, parties' existence is based on representing the interests of different social groups (Duverger 1954). Party organisations have their own historical pathways, which determine their member base, goals, and links to other interest groups. These historical developments and organisational connections³ have a direct effect on parties' current ideological premises and interests, which direct their selection of candidates. While parties differ in terms of ideology, most contemporary

² Cutler (2002) calls sociodemographic characteristics "the simplest shortcut of all" in terms of electoral choice. While irrational from a normative point of view, many voters think that candidates who share a voter's characteristics are more likely to act in that person's interest when in office.

³ For an analysis of the party members' social and interest group connections in Finland, see Koironen et al. 2017.

parties have been described as so-called “catch-all parties” (Allen 2009; Kirchheimer 1966), which aim to mobilise a wide array of social groups. A wide selection of candidates with different backgrounds (gender, age, occupation, geographical representativeness, etc.) and social networks enables the party to attract votes from as many social groups as possible (Brady et al. 1999; Hooghe 2017).

The criteria on which socioeconomic background variables are important vary according to time and place and between parties. In Finland, aiming for lists with an equal share of men and women has become commonplace during the past decades, especially after the enactment of the Act on Equality between Women and Men in 1987 (Huttunen 2012). While during the 1950s and 1960s, the share of female candidates was only 10–14 percent, it grew rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s from 19.6 percent in the 1972 elections to 32.4 percent in the 1988 elections. After this, the growth was slower, but in the 2008 elections the share of female candidates exceeded 40 percent (Borg & Pikkala 2017: 20). Kuitunen (2008: 115) notes that after reaching the goal of gender equality in list building, the emphasis has moved to balancing the lists between age groups, that is, recruiting younger candidates. However, with the ageing of the population, the share of elder candidates has only increased. In the 1996 elections, the share of candidates of 65 years or more was four percent, while in the 2017 elections it was 16 percent. During the same period, the share of younger candidates has remained the same: around five percent were younger than 25 years, and 12–14 percent belonged to the age group 25–34 (Borg & Pikkala 2017: 21).

Lately, political parties in Finland have also recognised the growing importance of the immigrant-origin electorate, and some parties have formulated measures to mobilise immigrants into politics (Ahokas et al. 2011: 50–56). Because a growing share of the electorate consists of immigrant-origin voters, parties are compelled to reach out to them. Selecting immigrant and ethnic minority candidates has the potential to increase a party’s appeal in the eyes of immigrant and ethnic minority voters and to encourage them to vote in elections (da Fonseca 2011; Togeby 2008). Especially important from parties’ perspective is that immigrant-origin candidates act as links or brokers by providing parties with access to immigrant voters, whom parties would not otherwise reach (Ames 1995: 414).

However, the nomination of ethnic-minority candidates on party’s lists may cause a strategic dilemma for some of the parties. While minorities’ support may help the party to win elections, it may also result in the loss of native support, either because immigrant-origin candidates do not attract as many votes as native candidates, or because the presence of immigrant-origin candidates on a party’s list may result in

some native voters turning their backs on the party altogether. The magnitude of the trade-offs between minority and majority support is expected to be conditioned by political, social, and economic factors, including “avoiding the nomination of immigrant candidates in areas where high unemployment and xenophobic attitudes prevail” (da Fonseca 2011: 112). Then again, candidate recruitment is influenced not only by parties’ vote maximisation strategies but also by their values. As van der Zwan et al. (2018) show, Dutch parties with restrictive positions on integration and immigration both nominate fewer ethnic minority candidates and place non-Western ethnic minority candidates in lower list positions than do parties that are less restrictive towards migration and integration.

While the Finnish electoral system does not allow discrimination by parties via rank ordering of candidates in candidate lists (as explained later in Chapter 3), parties’ and individual party selectors’ differing attitudes towards, or at least different emphases on, equality and diversity are likely reflected in whether they encourage immigrants to run in the first place. Studies on immigrants’ access to employment in Finland show how immigrants suffer from employers’ prejudiced attitudes (Ahmad 2011, 2020; Leinonen 2012), and there is no reason to believe that the same attitudes would not influence political recruitment. Discrimination based on party selectors’ perceptions of the aspirant candidates’ abilities, qualifications, and experience is often based on very limited information. Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 14) divide discrimination into “direct discrimination” and “imputed discrimination”. With the former, they refer to “the positive or negative judgement of people on the basis of characteristics seen as common to their group, rather than as individuals”. In other words, individuals’ background characteristics and group memberships function as a proxy measure of their abilities and character. Imputed discrimination is different, as it refers to recruiting agents’ personal preference for a certain category of candidate or an individual applicant.

Finally, parties’ list building strategies are also determined by their interest in looking after intraparty cohesion. As Hazan and Rahat (2010: 112) note:

Exclusive candidacy requirements reflect an attempt by the party to control the supply side of potential candidates. This may be due to a desire to maintain party cohesion, so that those who fulfill the enhanced eligibility criteria – and are subsequently both selected and elected – will behave according to party dictates once in office.

To ensure this, parties need information on their candidates’ trustworthiness and loyalty. Recruiting candidates from new social groups such as immigrant groups may be hindered due to a lack of familiarity between the party organisation and immigrant minorities. Lack of familiarity, in turn, results in uncertainty about the political

orientation and goals of immigrant groups, and, thus, reluctance in recruiting immigrant-origin candidates. If parties are internally divided in terms of their attitudes towards diversity and multiculturalism, recruiting candidates from ethnic minority groups may create internal conflicts.

Parties are often not capable of implementing an ideal strategy in their candidate recruitment and selection i.e. selecting only candidates who are important to the party and its vote share in elections (Kuitunen 2000: 31). Achieving an optimal candidate list is constrained by parties' lack of knowledge of all potential candidates but also citizens' decreasing interest in engaging in long-term political participation and their weakening attachment to political parties – a trend that has continued since the 1970s and 1980s (to see the decline in the number of members of Finnish parties, see the Finnish Election Study Portal 2016). Thereby, while there is variation across time and context, the pool from which parties choose their candidates has diminished remarkably (Kuitunen 2000: 83–87).

Above all, existing literature on immigrants' political representation emphasizes the importance of the parties' attitudes towards diversity and multiculturalism (Bird et al. 2011; da Fonseca 2011; Dancygier et al. 2015; Deiss-Helbig 2019; der Zwan et al. 2018; Durose et al. 2011; Sobolewska 2013; Soininen 2011). If the parties do not systematically start to develop recruitment strategies for finding candidates with an ethnic minority background, the barriers to access will likely stay high.

2.4 Candidate supply

A frequently repeated observation across liberal democracies is that the representatives tend to be more often white, male, middle-aged, educated, and people with high incomes (Ashe 2019; Gallagher 1985; Norris 1997b; McKay 2017). This indicates that the presence of these background characteristics creates a more favourable environment for access to political power. Although Finland is a country with modest income disparities and a high level of gender equality in politics (OECD 2020a, 2020b), the same pattern is observed there (Official Statistics of Finland 2017a).

In short, candidate supply refers to the characteristics of the individuals aspiring to political careers, including their social backgrounds, motivations, and resources (Norris & Lovenduski 1995). This chapter discusses the importance of these factors to parties and voters, but also to candidates themselves.

The structure is the following. First, the impact of various social background characteristics is examined, including gender, age, social class, ethnic and migration background, and place of residence. In the literature, these candidate traits, which provide voters with substantive cues about a politician's competence to represent them, are also called "personal vote-earning attributes" (Cutler 2002; Shugart et al. 2005). Because Finnish parties are aware of the manifold cues on which voters base their electoral choices, parties want to offer voters a representative and high-quality list of candidates from which to choose. In the Finnish open-list system, the strategy of demographically balanced lists is pronounced (Arter 2013; Kuitunen 2000; 2008; Sipinen & Koskimaa 2020). Second, candidates' personal resources, such as civic skills and prior political experience, will be examined. Finally, attention is directed to candidates' social resources i.e. the role of their personal social networks and the resources embedded in them.

2.4.1 Sociodemographic background

Social class. The connection between socioeconomic status and prospects for becoming an elected representative are strongly emphasized in Anglo-American literature because of high income disparities in the US (e.g. Verba et al. 1995). The same does not fully apply to Finland due to significantly lower income disparities (OECD 2020a). However, socioeconomic status or social class is still a strong determinant of access to political power. In Western countries, immigrant minorities have lower average socio-economic status than natives (Eurostat 2020), which should at least partly explain their underrepresentation in local councils and national parliaments. An individual's position in the social stratum, her socioeconomic status or class, has been observed by looking at e.g. occupation, personal income, and the level of education. These are directly connected to an individual's political competence and access to resources. For parties, a candidate's social class is an indicator of his or her vote-earning potential. From voters' perspective, a candidate's education and occupation provide cues to his or her interests, skills, competence, and political orientation.

Gender beliefs, roles, and expectations structure access to political office in multiple ways. Empirical research shows that women consistently report fewer instances of recruitment and encouragement to run compared to men and consider running for office less frequently than men do (Krook 2010; Lawless & Fox 2005). In explaining gender inequality, scholars have pointed towards domestic

responsibilities that circumscribe women’s political careers, but also to the fact that women have much more restricted access than men to various resources that are linked to access to political power, such as high prestige education and jobs as well as recruitment networks (Franceschet & Piscopo 2014; Bjarnegård & Kenny 2015; Lawless & Fox 2005). Lack of female role models among elected representatives is also a major factor influencing women’s motivation to stand as candidates (Huttunen 2012; Stokes-Brown & Dolan 2010). From institutional perspective, gendered norms and practices of political parties and electoral systems influence women’s recruitment into politics (Bjarnegård & Kenny 2015; Franceschet & Piscopo 2014; Krook 2010; Norris & Lovenduski 1995; Silva & Skulley 2019; Paxton et al. 2007, of many).

Intersectionality-approach draws further attention to the fact that societal and ingroup expectations may differ between majority and minority women, which explains why conditions that encourage ethnic majority women to run do not necessarily apply to women with ethnic minority background (Silva & Skulley 2019). The idea of the theory of intersectionality is that categories like gender, ethnicity, and class are overlapping and mutually constitutive rather than isolated and distinct (Crenshaw 1989; 1991). Indeed, studies show that ethnic minority women often face even higher barriers due to their marginalised status as both women and ethnic minorities (Silva & Skulley 2019). Being a member of an ethnic minority, a female, and of a young age is even more likely to result in discrimination in political recruitment because all characteristics deviate from “the ideal aspirant candidate type” i.e. of being white, male, and middle-aged, a combination that does not trigger suspicion that a candidate will drive away a party’s potential voters (Ashe 2019; Durose et al. 2011: 21–22; Durose et al. 2013).

Nordic countries have surpassed all other regions in their levels of women’s political representation at all time points (Paxton et al. 2007). Thus, women’s barriers to access to politics should not be as high in Finland as they are elsewhere. In 2017 municipal elections, women made up 39 percent of the elected councillors (Statistics Finland 2017). Currently, after the 2019 parliamentary elections, 47 percent of the 200 MPs are female – a rate that is an all-time high (Official Statistics of Finland 2019e). During 2019 and 2020, women also stood out as key ministers in the Finnish government: as Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Justice⁴. This means that Finnish political institutions have female role models to offer. However, we still lack scientific information on the intersection of gender and ethnicity in Finnish politics. On the other hand, it could be speculated

⁴ Such a strong female presence in the top decision-making positions, however, is thus far atypical even in Finland.

that being a woman and of an ethnic minority could be an advantage because it ticks two boxes in terms of parties' recruitment criteria; if parties aim to balance their candidate lists regarding gender and ethnic background, but lack both female and ethnic minority candidates, fitting in with both categories could be beneficial.

Age is a direct measure of life experience and marks the position of individuals in their economic cycle. It also captures generational differences, as people of certain age cohorts are likely to have been affected by the same attitudinal climate when they grew up (Black et al. 1987); thus, voters may assume persons of the same age share similar worldviews. As Borg (2018: 125) shows, every other voter in the 2017 Finnish municipal elections voted for a candidate who was approximately their own age. Recruiting candidates especially from younger age cohorts has, within Finnish parties, been considered an important strategy for engaging young people, who traditionally have significantly lower levels of voter turnout compared to older age cohorts (Kuitunen 2008).

Place of residence. Place of residence has traditionally played a significant role in the selection of candidates in Finnish elections (Arter 2013; Kuitunen 2008: 124). Because the essence of politics is to distribute joint and often scarce resources that influence well-being in different geographical places, getting "our girl or boy" elected to the local council is perceived to secure that the interests of a certain area will be heard by decision-makers.

One important aspect regarding political recruitment of ethnic minorities is connected to residential concentration based on ethnic background. If parties are interested in mobilising votes in a neighbourhood with ethnic minority residents, living in such a neighbourhood is a benefit to a potential candidate. However, the study of Strömblad and Myrberg (2013) on neighbourhoods in Swedish cities suggests that the odds of being approached by mobilising activists rise and fall systematically depending on aggregate-level socioeconomic and demographic differentiation between residential areas. Because recruiters avoid areas marked by high levels of social exclusion (such as areas with a high concentration of immigrant minorities), people's access to political recruitment networks is reduced in less privileged residential areas. Although the level of ethnic residential segregation in Finland has been fairly low⁵, certain areas in larger cities have experienced a concentration of immigrant minorities and a flight of native residents in the past decades (Saikkonen et al. 2018; Vilkama 2011; Vilkama et al. 2013).

⁵ The government advised municipal authorities already in 1997 to prevent residential segregation (Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös...1997: 20).

Religion. While “religion, fatherland and family” have historically been guiding principles for several parties, with at least one exception, religion is nowadays not a cleavage that would divide political parties in Finland. As their name implies, the Christian Democrats consider candidates’ religious background in their candidate recruitment and nomination. While the growth of immigration and the increasing number of different ethnic groups with different religious orientations might potentially cause religious cleavages to raise their heads in Finland, for the time being this seems unlikely. A party that builds its support the most on religion and religiousness is the Christian Democrats (Westinen 2015: 86–87), but their share of votes in parliamentary elections in 2019 was small, only 3.9 percent. Whereas religion strongly affects niche voters, it is irrelevant to the majority of voters (Westinen 2015: 87). Although traditionally religion has played a less prominent role in Finnish politics (similarly to other Nordic countries), many immigrant groups come from countries where religion and politics are much more intertwined. Thus, religion may have a different mobilization potential among these groups.

2.4.2 Immigration and ethnic background

Finally, attention should be paid to factors related to immigration and ethnic background that have a direct effect on individual capacities and motivation to participate in politics in a new country of residence. These include at least the following: (1) reason for migration, (2) age at migration and time spent in the host country, (3) characteristics of the birth country, (4) level of integration in the host country including, for instance, language skills, (5) legal status, and (6) visible minority status (Bilodeau 2016; Bird 2011; Black 1987; Black et al. 1987; Bueker 2005; Martikainen 2013: 40; Wass & Weide 2015; White et al. 2008). The reason for migration is one of the most crucial factors affecting the settlement process. While voluntary migrants are often highly motivated to move in order to improve their economic status and social welfare, refugees, asylum seekers, and slaves are forced to emigrate, and their departure from the country of origin is often more traumatic than in the case of voluntary migration (Martikainen 2013: 40). Therefore, the reason for migration has an effect on an immigrant’s agency in the host society; it determines the resources and time it takes to integrate into the cultural, social, and political structure in the new environment.

Age at migration has a similar effect. If migration takes place at young age and the adolescent political socialisation process takes place in the host country, an

individual's political agency should be stronger compared to older migrants, who have developed their political orientation in a different political culture and are more resistant to the acquisition of new attitudes (Black et al. 1987; White 2016). With time and exposure to the new environment, however, an individual adapts and acquires new skills (White et al. 2008).

Characteristics of the birth country is a wide category, which affects an individual's political incorporation in several ways, mostly through the process of political socialisation (Jones-Correa 2016; White et al. 2008). If, for instance, the political system and political culture are very different in the country of birth and in the host society, transferability of skills may prove difficult (Black 1987; White et al. 2008). The question of persistence in political learning versus change during adulthood is a debate that continues among scholars of political socialisation. The empirical evidence on this matter is mixed, as some find continuities rather than breaks in socialisation (for a summary, see e.g. Jones-Correa 2016). Nevertheless, migrants from different political regimes have varying experiences of democratic engagement, and pre-migration political learning is likely to shape their attitudes and behaviours in the new environment.

The level of integration in the host country can be examined with several different indicators in several dimensions of life. Considering how socioeconomic status, resources, and social connections influence political recruitment, we may assume that the better immigrants are integrated into the labour market and civic life, the better the opportunities they will have to become recruited into politics. The most important skill that immigrants need in order to find their place in society, however, is mastering the host country's language. In Finland, the official languages are Finnish and Swedish. Also, the Sámi, as an indigenous people, have extensive linguistic rights in their native region in northern Finland. In practise, pursuing a career in politics most often requires knowing the Finnish language. Although knowing Swedish enables participation in local administration in bilingual and Swedish-speaking municipalities, most municipalities use Finnish in their administration.⁶

In international comparison, there are few people who speak either Finnish or related languages. This results in at least two outcomes: (1) Finnish is unfamiliar to many immigrants and, thus, often perceived as difficult; (2) Finns are not accustomed

⁶ According to the Language Act, the basic unit of the linguistic division of the country is the municipality, which is either unilingual or bilingual (either Finnish or Swedish or both). A unilingual municipal authority uses the language of the municipality unless the authority decides otherwise on request or unless otherwise provided elsewhere in law. In 2017, 33 out of 311 Finnish municipalities were bilingual and 16 were unilingual using Swedish (Kuntaliitto 2017).

to hearing and seeing Finnish spoken and written by foreigners, which, in turn, may result in a high barrier to using the Finnish language if the level of proficiency is not high (Martin 2008; Yle 2014). Another factor that complicates immigrants' learning of the Finnish language is the high level of English proficiency among Finns, and Finns' eagerness to use English when communicating with non-Finnish speakers (ibid.). Insufficient language skills hamper integration into the host society and may encourage living in an insular community (Wahlbeck 1999: 187). Leinonen (2012) shows how Americans in Finland have had discouraging experiences of speaking "broken Finnish", which seems to be a major divisive factor between foreigners who are seen as immigrants and those who are not. Tøgeby (2008) shows how immigrants have difficulties in advancing to elite positions in Danish society, especially if their Danish language skills are "less than perfect". Considering the importance given to candidates' communication skills in council work and the requirement for public appearances in electoral campaigns and political careers in general, a lack of language proficiency has, in all probability, a negative impact on aspirations for running for political office, even if working within the party would be possible in English.

Legal status is an important determinant of political participation in host country politics. Without a permanent residence permit, an individual hardly sees herself as part of the political community in the long run, and without citizenship, immigrants have a diminished political voice as well as reduced civil, social, and economic rights (Bauböck et al. 2006; McNevin 2006). According to the current legislation, Nordic and EU citizens have electoral rights on equal terms with Finnish citizens, whereas other foreign residents are required to have a domicile in Finland continuously for two years and 51 days prior to an election in order to be eligible to vote and/or run as a candidate in municipal elections. Voting and standing in parliamentary elections requires citizenship. In presidential elections, all citizens are eligible to vote but only native-borns can stand as candidates. Studies confirm the link between naturalisation and deeper political engagement (Hainmueller et al. 2015; Just & Anderson 2012). The causal pathway, however, is not unidirectional, as it may also be assumed that political engagement motivates naturalisation (Pantoja & Gershon 2006). Anyway, it may be expected that the more permanent and established one's residence in the host country is, the more engaged in host country politics he or she is.

While ethnic background intersects with many other social categories, as mentioned above, it also differentiates people in terms of visible markers. Scholars have recognised that the conditions for political incorporation may be more challenging for the so-called visible minority immigrants, and that these challenges may be amplified depending on the country of origin or the ethno-racial group (Bird

2011; Gidengil & Roy 2016). The intuitive rationale is that this takes place because immigrants with visible minority backgrounds suffer from discrimination and greater social and economic marginalization and, thus, have a reduced sense of belonging to the political community. However, visible minority status may also be an electoral asset. As Bird et al. (2011: 15) argue: “visible minority candidates may use ethnicity in a selective and entrepreneurial fashion”, for “impression management of a candidate’s ethnic identity may be [a] particularly important element of one’s political strategy”.

2.4.3 Motivation

In essence, motivational factors are the answer to the question of why individuals decide to run for political office. Yet motivation is not a concept that is easily and comprehensively defined. According to Norris and Lovenduski’s (1995: 166–182) analysis of the building blocks of candidate motivation, it consists of such elements as drive, political ambition, and interest in politics. However, the reasons for running are complex and varied, multidimensional, sometimes implicit, and to some extent subconscious, even for the candidates themselves. Although motivational factors are often considered as individual psychological processes, they are also shaped and structured by the institutional context, i.e. the structure of opportunities, which determines what is possible to achieve (see also Norris 1997a: 13).

While measuring and operationalizing candidate motivation is rather difficult, it has been done by looking at different indicators. With answers to an open-ended question about the single most important reason for the decision to stand for parliament in the British Candidate Study and a group of personal interviews, Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 168–169) distinguish between five categories of motivational factors. These are (1) a desire to enter politics as a personal career move, (2) ideological reasons, (3) a public service role or a sense of duty (“to serve my country” or “to change society”), (4) one or two single policy issues, and (5) representation of a group. Similar indicators were used in the study *Finnish Local Government 2004: Municipal Elections 1996* (Ståhlberg et al. 1996), and based on this data, Kuitunen (2000: 100–101) categorized dimensions of candidate motivation by dividing them into altruistic and egoistic motives. Instead of being a binary “either or” opposition, in practise, motivational factors often fall on a continuum between these two ends, as some motivational factors may benefit the individual and a larger group simultaneously.

Another important matter Kuitunen (2000: 101) raises, and which concerns especially Finnish municipal elections, is the presence of candidates who are on the list only as a name, filling a place otherwise empty. Demand for these so-called “top up candidates” emerges when parties face the pressure of providing full lists but are not able to recruit a sufficient number of personally motivated candidates (Arter 2013: 103). Thereby, another approach to measuring motivation is to look at the level of drive or ambition i.e. the intensity with which aspirants wish to be selected as candidates and elected as representatives (Norris & Lovenduski 1995: 174). One way of measuring drive is to look at the number of applications i.e. how many times an individual has pursued available opportunities. Building a political career is often a long-term effort, meaning that election often requires prior experience and apprenticeship. Kuitunen (2000: 71–73, 105–109) has examined the level of drive by looking at personal versus third-person initiative in running for office between different subgroups. From a motivational perspective, support networks increase an individual’s belief in her chances of getting elected. Encouragement and support from other people – party members, friends and family, employer – is an important corner stone of becoming motivated, as a career in politics is by no means a single-player game.

Candidate motivation can also be understood by examining why some choose to not pursue a career in politics (Norris & Lovenduski 1995: 170) or to not continue a career in politics (Pikkala 2007). The reasons for being reluctant to run in elections are often related to a lack of time and energy, a lack of required experience, or one’s own or one’s family’s life situation. Reasons for not being willing to continue a career in politics are somewhat similar, but also include such factors as being unable to gain personal influence. An important matter hindering candidate motivation is also a fear of negative public attention, which, according to Kuitunen (2000: 65–66), especially concerns candidates in small municipalities. This is probably because, there, candidates are personally acquainted with a large number of residents and, thus, the distance between candidates and other residents is small. Small distance, in turn, means that negative feedback may feel more personal. An often-used phrase in Finnish is that politicians are “citizens’ pissing posts” (*kansalaisten kusitolppa*), which refers to politicians being constant subjects of public scrutiny and criticism.

Sacrificing one’s privacy is a matter all who aspire to a political career must consider, irrespective of their origin (Wass et al. 2020). The current trend of personalization of politics brings individual politicians more and more into the public spotlight (Karvonen 2010), and in the media, privacy protection of politicians

with public authority is lower than average citizens.⁷ Still, it has been argued, for example, that female representatives are more often targets of hate speech than their male counterparts⁸. Given the discriminatory attitudes of natives towards immigrants (see Chapter 3.1), ethnic minority candidates are likely to have a higher risk of becoming targets of hate speech than are native candidates. Adwoa Brewu, a Ghanaian-origin candidate in the 2017 Finnish municipal elections, has stated in a news article in YLE (21.7.2020) that: “Once you put yourself out there you must be ready to hear what the public has to say about you. It can be things that destroy you, but it can also be things that you can learn from”. According to Brewu, she had to overcome her "fear of discrimination" if she was going to meet and ultimately influence as many voters as possible. She believed this was a key consideration for any foreign national looking to run in local elections in Finland.

From ethnic minorities’ perspective, running for office may have different costs and benefits compared to natives. On the benefit side, candidacy may take societal integration further, as it potentially enlarges an individual’s personal social networks and could provide, for instance, job opportunities otherwise not available. At the same time, the costs of acquiring culture-specific political skills are higher for immigrants who come from different political and social contexts (Black 1987; Bueker 2005; White et al. 2008). However, democratic rights are not available everywhere, and the availability of these rights in Finland may encourage those who cherish them.

An individual’s strategic cost and benefit calculation also includes her possibilities of winning a seat. According to Wittman (1983: 142–143):

...a candidate maximizes the following: [the probability of winning] times [the utility received from the policies implemented if elected] plus [the probability that the opposition wins] times [the utility received from the policies implemented by the opposition if elected].

Here, also, we see the symbolic value of descriptive representation: It may be expected that one’s own possibility of winning votes is evaluated higher if similar candidates have been elected in past elections. For instance, Silva and Skulley (2019) demonstrate that having women run in the past correlates with an increase in the number of women candidates in the following election cycle. This applies equally to

⁷ On the lawsuit of the former prime minister Matti Vanhanen against his former girlfriend Susan Ruusunen, see the decision of the Supreme Court of Finland (KKO 2010: 39).

⁸ See e.g. MP Anna Kontula’s statement in the newspaper *Demokraatti* (March 27, 2017), according to which female MPs are more often threatened and targets of hate mail (<https://demokraatti.fi/anna-kontula-naispoliitikot-saavat-enemman-uhkailua-ja-muuta-vihapostia-kuin-miespoliitikot/>).

ethnic minorities (Bobo & Gilliam 1990). Kuitunen (2000: 106) confirms, with data from the Finnish municipal elections context, that groups who theoretically have a higher probability of being elected are more motivated about their candidacy. Thus, underrepresentation of ethnic minorities in political office may depress their motivation to run in elections.

2.4.4 Personal resources

Studies on political recruitment distinguish between several types of resources that are important in election to parliaments and local councils. Norris (1997: 13) calls them political capital. In the present study, these resources are divided into two categories: personal and social. The latter type consists of resources not personally possessed but accessible and mobilisable via social networks for personal goal-achieving purposes (Lin 2001: 29). The utility of social resources, or social capital, is described in the following chapter. In this chapter, the focus is on those resources and skills that are limited to individuals or, in Bourdieu's (1986) words, "linked to the body". Such resources include, for instance, political interest, political efficacy, political knowledge, political experience, organisational and presentational skills, and competence, all of which accumulate over time and must be personally invested in by the individual.

Previous studies show that important personal resources in pursuing a political career include time, money, civic and legislative skills, and prior party service (McAllister 1997; Kuitunen 2000, 2008; Norris & Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997b; Ruostetsaari & Mattila 2002; Verba et al. 1995). Kuitunen (2008: 123) divides the criteria that parties apply in evaluating potential candidates into two groups: subjective and objective factors. Objective factors include the sociodemographic factors discussed in Chapters 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. An individual's known contacts with different groups and associations may also be defined as objective factors. Subjective factors, in turn, refer to individual accomplishments, such as ideological orthodoxy, achievements within the party organisation and in other societal positions of responsibility, and organisational and negotiation skills.

Holding a previous elective office is an especially important springboard to success in the next elections mostly due to public appearances, which guarantee that voters remember the candidate on election day (Gschwend & Zittel 2015; Jankowski 2016; Put & Maddens 2015; Tavits 2010). Success in previous elections is an important indicator to parties of an individual's vote-earning potential – it is like a

certification of a good quality candidate. The resource model of political participation (Verba et al. 1995) highlights the resources developed in the non-political institutional settings of adult life: the workplace, organisations, and religious communities. Participation in these settings accumulates skills that are transferable into the political arena. Further, this type of activity builds a sense of efficacy needed in politics (Kuitunen 2000: 137; 2008).

As mentioned earlier, some voters make their choice of candidate based upon the performance and competence of the candidate i.e. his or her valence (Green & Jennings 2017). While voters' evaluation of candidates' valence may be based on rather vague cues (such as the frequency of public appearances or their occupation), parties have a more thorough view of which type of competence is required in running for office and working as a representative. Candidates must either acquire these resources and skills quickly after (s)election or possess them beforehand. In their selection of candidates, Finnish parties value candidates' abilities to bring in personal votes, and, thus, want to ensure that individual candidates are able to invest time, effort, and/or money in their campaigns (Ruostetsaari & Mattila 2002; von Schoultz 2018).

Durose et al. (2011: 27–28) demonstrate traditional and new pathways to the national parliament in the UK context. New pathways also offer a chance of access for immigrants, who cannot take the early steps of the traditional pathway due to living in another country. The traditional pathway model starts with higher socio-economic background and early exposure to politics, from which it separates into two pathways: (1) joining a trade union and participating actively within the union, or (2) joining a political party, getting involved in the local party, and standing as a local councillor. Both pathways can lead to standing as an MP. The new pathway emphasizes the importance of high education and “politics facilitating” professions, which involve useful transferable skills for politics that can be gained by people from more diverse backgrounds. As Cairney (2007) notes, the term “politics-facilitating occupation” has a different meaning in the MP recruitment literature according to the country, parliament, and time period in which it is evoked. In the UK national election context, Durose et al. (2011: 26) stress the instrumental utility of such occupations as barristers, solicitors, journalists, and teachers.

2.4.5 Social resources

The idea that social relationships can be understood as potentially productive, “social” additions to personally owned resources has been welcomed as an important explanatory mechanism in many areas of social, economic, and health research. Although there is probably still no consensus about the definition of “social capital”, its role in the process of political recruitment is indisputable, for politics and political careers are highly dependent on contacts and networks. For the purpose of this study, the conceptualization of social capital by Nan Lin (1999; 2001) appears useful. He defines an individual’s social capital as “resources embedded in social relations and social networks that facilitate individual’s ability to achieve personal goals” (Lin 2001: 29). According to Lin, network resources become individual social capital when an individual can access them and, when necessary, mobilise them. Erickson (2004) has a very similar understanding of the concept, for she sees a person’s social capital as “the array of resources belonging to the person’s contact and potentially available to the person through these contacts”. As Lin (2001: 40) notes:

Differential opportunity structures emerge because embedded resources in social structures are differentially accessed by individual actors in their web of social relations.

Against this backdrop, it is relatively easy to understand how candidates with an immigrant background might suffer from their history of migration when building their political careers. Migrating to another country implies that an individual leaves behind her everyday networks, such as relatives, friends, neighbours, and other important relationships, and starts building a new personal network in the new environment. Although the network in the country of origin does not necessarily cease to exist, due to physical distance an individual can access and mobilise only some of the network’s resources from the new home country. Also, as Black et al. (1987) note, not all resources relevant in the country of origin are transferable to the country of destination. For instance, even if an individual had politically experienced network members in the country of origin, they may not be able to offer advice on how to carry out an effective political campaign in the Finnish context. At the same time, native-origin candidates have access to networks that are built over time and, often, across generations. Therefore, aspiring immigrant-origin candidates must invest heavily in networking in order to succeed in politics (Durose et al. 2013; Sobolewska 2013).

In the rest of this chapter, my aim is to illustrate the various mechanisms of how social networks influence political recruitment. The main idea is that while individuals' personal resources determine their political activity to a large extent, their social networks may play an even more important role.

Firstly, regular interaction with politically oriented actors affects individual political socialisation and potentially encourages an individual to participate in politics (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt 1998; McClurg 2003). This is because politically oriented actors are more likely to participate themselves, hence setting an example.

Secondly, politically oriented actors also recruit others from their network to participate. Thereby, an individual's close ties to parties or party members increase the likelihood of becoming a target of political recruitment. When parties are recruiting candidates, they often look at the networks in which they are already embedded, because it is most cost-efficient. As the findings of Soininen (2011) in the context of Sweden suggest, if parties' networks do not include any immigrant-origin persons, the likelihood of selecting immigrant-origin candidates is reduced. In fact, a vast number of prior studies conclude how access to recruitment networks explains a substantial part of structurally related differences in political participation (Bjarnegård & Kenny 2015; Franceschet & Piscopo 2014; Strömblad & Adman 2010; Strömblad & Myrberg 2013; Teorell 2003).

Thirdly, while parties seek candidates with appropriate experience and sociodemographic profiles, they also trace candidates who are likely to say "yes" when encouraged to stand (Brady et al. 1999). Party selectors also wish to ensure intraparty cohesion and recruit candidates whose loyalty to the party can be sufficiently confirmed (Hazan & Rahat 2010: 112). In other words, parties need information about potential candidates' reputation and capacities, and social networks are the mechanism that facilitates the flow of information (Lin 2001: 20). Information, then, results in recognition and familiarity, which is crucial in trust building and positive outgroup attitudes between majority and minority groups (Pettigrew & Tropp 2011).

Fourthly, a strategically important location in a local network should also increase the likelihood of becoming a target of political recruitment. Considering that parties are interested in recruiting candidates who have the ability to maximise support for that party, an individual with broad and diverse networks among the party's potential voters is likely seen as a valuable addition to the party's list of candidates (Brady et al. 1999; Erickson 2004). As members of either an ethnic or linguistic minority, migrant origin candidates may be expected (duly or unduly) to represent the voice of minorities (Severs & de Jong 2018). In the same way as industrial worker candidates

may expect support from other industrial workers and local politicians may seek support from their community, ethnic minority candidates can count on the fact that ethnic minority voters are well aware of their ethnicity (Ames 1995: 413). Candidates with certain attributes can mobilise voters with the same attributes by strengthening identification based on that attribute. It is also less costly to reach out to groups similar to oneself: networks and knowledge about the voter group reduce the costs of campaigning and communication. Voters who perceive that the candidate represents the interests of a group the voters identify with may consider that there is a higher probability that the candidate will keep his or her political promises to members of his or her own (ethnic) community. From voters' perspective, the costs of communicating with a candidate of one's own community are lower, meaning that more effective representation of the community's interests will likely result (Landa et al. 1995; Severs & de Jong 2018).

Parties in municipalities with a large share of foreign-origin inhabitants may feel tempted to recruit visible and well-known minority candidates who are expected to attract votes because of their background but also through their personal networks. This kind of potential individual could be, for instance, the chairperson of a migrant and minority association or a civil servant who, via his or her profession, is closely connected to foreign-origin residents in the municipality. This line of reasoning suggests that social networks have important *symbolic utility* even if an individual does not mobilise resources accessed via networks. Letting others know about one's social networks may already be sufficient to promote one's social standing (Lin 2001: 43–44). In a similar vein, being a member of an ethnic group, which constitutes an important voter category from a party's perspective, can be of value (Soininen 2011: 159). This is how personal social networks can become symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1986), making the individual visible in the eyes of the political parties. From parties' perspective, individuals' personal social networks reflect their participation potential (Brady et al. 1999), such as their ability to campaign effectively and attract votes. When building candidate lists, parties try to spend their time and effort as efficiently as possible, and thereby seek those with high participation potential.

Fifthly, social networks function as an extended stock of resources (Lin 1999; 2001; Erickson 2004). Given that many immigrant candidates have less experience and less information on the Finnish political system and political culture, someone to provide advice on how to organise a campaign and how to present oneself in public may be more important to immigrant candidates than native-origin candidates. If one has moved to Finland from another country, it may be that the helping hands of relatives and friends are in the country of origin and not accessible

in Finland. Support groups are not a prerequisite for becoming elected in Finnish municipal elections, but they are not uncommon in larger municipalities (Kestilä-Kekkonen et al. 2018: 35). Not having an official support group does not exclude the possibility of receiving informal help from friends and relatives, and it may be expected that this type of informal support and especially encouragement is very relevant in determining who decides to run for office.

Morales and Pilati (2011) have studied the role of social capital in immigrants' engagement in local politics in European cities with a focus on two types of social capital: bonding and bridging. An often-articulated assumption is that migrants' social interactions are characterized primarily by bonding rather than bridging social capital, which means that ethnic minorities engage in interactions only with their ingroup members and isolate from the rest of society. In contrast, bridging social capital in the sense of social ties between different ethnic groups and between majority and minorities has been seen as a prerequisite for social cohesion and functioning intergroup relationships (Putnam 2000). Bridging social capital has also been seen to promote political engagement, whereas bonding social capital has been expected to isolate migrants from the political arena and hinder their political integration (Portes & Landolt 1996; Putnam 2000; Marschall & Stolle 2004).

According to the initial reasoning of Morales and Pilati (2011: 88):

...if migrants are embedded in social structures where they fundamentally interact with their co-ethnics they will be more likely to be exposed to mobilization cues that relate to issues and concerns framed around their own 'ethnic' group.

Thus, Morales and Pilati expected the structure of social ties to influence what type of political issues are perceived as important. If one's social connections are formed with mostly co-ethnics, it may result in a stronger sense of representing this ethnic group in political office if elected. On the other hand, if the accumulated social capital is bridging, the likelihood of ethnic political mobilization is reduced and an individual may favour more mainstream political issues (ibid.: 90). Morales and Pilati's results, however, do not follow their initial hypothesis. Instead, their results point to the fact that:

...social relations that disconnect migrants from the general population and embed them in primarily ethnic bonds will limit their engagement in politics more generally, whereas social capital that bridges across ethnic groups has a strong positive effect on all forms of political engagement, especially in the politics of the country of residence (Morales & Pilati 2011: 107).

Morales and Pilati's study shows that involvement in organisations with a majority of co-ethnic members and an ethnically homogeneous personal network supports interest and active participation in homeland/ethnic politics. Considering these results but also the rationale behind how wide social networks make an individual visible in the eyes of the political parties, it may be assumed that a combination of bridging and bonding social capital is a favourable condition for immigrants to be recruited. Bridging connections facilitate information flows and trust building between ethnic minority candidates and parties, whereas bonding social capital is an indicator of ethnic minority candidates' mobilisation potential among their co-ethnics, who would otherwise be difficult to mobilise by the party. This assumption is supported by the empirical findings of Strömblad and Adman (2010), who conclude, based on survey data from Sweden, that political activity among immigrants is encouraged by associational involvement in general but not by associations based on ethnic origin, because ethnic associations do not create enough opportunities for mobilization through networks of political recruitment.

3 IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE IN FINLAND

Political opportunity structure refers to societies' and communities' structural setting, which influences individuals' and groups' decisions and capacities to run for political office. In other words, it refers to available options for political action at any particular time and place (Bauböck et al. 2006; Bird et al. 2011; Eisinger 1973; Kriesi 1995; Koopmans 1999, 2004; Norris & Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997a). Several scholars have successfully mobilised the theoretical framework of political opportunity structure. Especially useful for this study is the model of Bird et al. (2011: 13), who distinguish between the contextual factors at the state and local level that affect ethnic minorities' collective identity and capacity to mobilise as well as the political system's responsiveness to such mobilisation (see the theoretical model in Figure 2.2).

At the macro or state level, important contextual factors are ethnic minorities' (1) access to legal citizenship rights, (2) cultural rights of citizenship, (3) social and economic rights, and (4) historical migration/racial regime. Countries vary in terms of rules of access to citizenship as well as whether they aim for cultural assimilation or cultural pluralism (multiculturalism). Easy access to citizenship and voting rights, recognition of distinct group-specific political interests, and policies that promote ethnic minority participation and representation should, according to Bird et al., facilitate ethnic mobilisation. The same legal framework and formal rules do not guarantee the same level of collective identity and capacity to mobilise for all ethnic groups. The extent to which these groups enjoy different social and economic rights, such as lack of educational degrees or barriers to access to labour and the housing market, also plays a role in political integration. Furthermore, the historical migration/racial regime is important. Some ethnic minority groups may be subject to distinct patterns of discrimination and negative stereotypes that go back to the country's history of migration and, thus, cannot be eradicated in the short term. Both formal and informal barriers to access determine the structure of opportunities: Even though the host country's government may provide the same treatment to all newcomers, some groups are not equally welcomed by the native people. Scholars have used the terms "ethnic hierarchy" and "racial hierarchy" to describe individuals'

preferences for contact with members of different ethnic minority groups (Jaakkola 2005; Verkuyten & Kinket 2000). This is one of the reasons why integration of migrants is not dependent solely on their own cultural and social resources, nor on their own choices about whether or not to integrate. Instead, the receiving society itself plays an essential role in the integration, which is why integration is described as a two-way process between immigrants and the receiving society, or even as a three-way process acknowledging the potential role that countries of origin play in the process (Garcés-Masareñas & Penninx 2016).

At the micro i.e. municipal level, the contextual factors that influence ethnic minority groups' electoral engagement and resources are (5) size and spatial concentration of the ethnic group, (6) communication and leadership, (7) length of settlement in the community, and (8) institutions and social networks (Bird et al. 2011: 13). Different ethnic groups differ regarding the extent to which the political culture in their country of origin is (dis)similar to the host country's political culture. Time of settlement as well as size and density of the groups also create between-group differences in their potential for political mobilisation. Furthermore, communication networks, ethnic media platforms, and the degree of within-group leadership and organisation vary (Bird et al. 2011; Morales & Pilati 2011; Pirkkalainen et al. 2013; Viswanath & Arora 2000).

For ethnic minority representation to take place, the political system must be responsive to ethnic groups' collective mobilisation. There are numerous aspects that make political systems more or less open to ethnic minority candidates. Parties' willingness and interest in recruiting ethnic minority candidates is shaped by their vote maximisation strategies and attitudes towards cultural diversity, which determine whether they try to compete for the minority/migrant vote or to capitalise on xenophobic attitudes among native voters (Bird et al. 2011; da Fonseca 2011; Durose et al. 2011; Norris & Lovenduski 1995). Parties' organisational structures also determine political recruitment; parties' recruitment networks are not likely to cover all groups on equal terms (Strömblad & Myrberg 2013). According to the model of Bird et al. (2011: 13), parties' practises in terms of ethnic minority mobilisation are determined by the following contextual factors: (9) party competition, (10) party selection rules, (11) cost of campaigns, (12) openness of recruitment, and (13) electoral rules.

To conclude, estimating the role of the political opportunity structure includes a large number of moving parts. The following chapters provide the reader with information on the structure of political opportunities in Finland from the perspective of immigrant minorities. The first two sub-chapters describe the macro-

and micro-contexts i.e. Finland's openness towards cultural diversity at the state and local levels. Then, the meso-context, namely, the characteristics of the Finnish political and party system, will be discussed.


3.1 State-level context: Finland's openness towards cultural diversity

It is difficult to interpret an analysis of immigrant electoral engagement and political representation without demographic knowledge about the immigrant population, such as its size and composition. Statistics Finland compiles population statistics on immigrants' backgrounds based on citizenship, country of birth, and native language registered in the Finnish Population Information System.⁹ Lately, it has also adopted a newer origin/background classification. All persons with at least one parent born in Finland are considered to be of Finnish origin/background, whereas persons for whom both parents or the only known parent were born abroad are considered to be of foreign origin/background.

History of migration in Finland. As Figure 3.1 illustrates, Finland has only recently become a migration destination. At the end of 2017, there were approximately 384,000 persons with foreign background (6.8% of the total population), out of which 84 percent were born in a foreign country, and 16 percent in Finland. A large share (84%) of the Finnish-born children of immigrant parents had not yet come of age or gained access to electoral rights (Statistics Finland 2020a).

⁹ The Finnish manner of producing statistics based on native language is not uncommon, but in other Nordic countries, language information is not included in population statistics. The problem of Finnish language statistics is that it recognises only a limited share of the diversity of languages spoken in the population, as it is possible to register only one native language in the Finnish Population Information System. Thus, it ignores individuals' multilingualism, which is problematic given that immigrants use more languages in their everyday lives than the native-born population (OECD 2018: 68). For some immigrant groups, it may be a political question as to which language information is provided to the authorities. The obligation of choosing only one language also reflects the rank order of how languages are appreciated. Some may register the language used in education instead of the language learner at home, while the latter may be more important to an individual's identity. Furthermore, the children of immigrant parents cannot be systematically reached through language statistics, as there are differences between immigrant groups in terms of which language the parents of under-age children provide to the authorities (Latomaa et al. 2013: 166–167; Saukkonen 2019).

Figure 3.1 Number of foreign-origin population in Finland in 1990–2017.



Source: *Official Statistics of Finland 2020a*.


Until the beginning of the 1990s, Finland was a country of emigration rather than immigration. At the turn of the 20th century, Finns emigrated on a large scale to the US, and during the 1960s and 1970s to Sweden. It has been found that during the 1900s, approximately one million Finns emigrated overseas. During the Cold War era, Finland was not an attractive migration destination due to its geographical and geopolitical location. Finland also lagged behind the other Nordic countries in economic development. A more systematic migration towards Finland began along with the arrival of Russian, Ingrian, and Somalian origin migrants after the fall of the Soviet Union and the civil war in Somalia at the beginning of the 1990s. After joining the EU and the Schengen area, which ensured freedom of movement between Schengen countries, migration to Finland continued during the 2000s (Martikainen et al. 2013).

Finland differs from most Western European countries in regard to having experienced immigration through liberal policies of refugee acceptance rather than recruiting large masses of foreign workers (such as Germany) or receiving migrants from former overseas colonies (such as the UK, France, and the Netherlands) (Paananen 2005; Castles et al. 2014). While immigrants from the neighbouring countries constitute the largest foreign-origin groups in Finland, humanitarian migration also shows in the population structure. In 2014, around half (54%) of the foreign-origin population had moved to Finland for family reasons, around one-fifth (18%) had come for work, one-tenth (11%) came as refugees, and one-tenth (10%)

had moved for studies. Eight percent mentioned some other reason. Family-based immigration was more common among women than men (66% vs. 42%, respectively), whereas work-related immigration was more common among men than women (24% vs. 12%, respectively) (Sutela & Larja 2015a).

Composition of immigrant-origin population. In 2017, the largest foreign-born groups in Finland came from the Former Soviet Union, Russia, Estonia, Sweden, Iraq, Somalia, North and Southeast Asia (China, Thailand, and Vietnam), and the former Yugoslavia (Figure 3.2). One-fifth of the foreign language-speaking population had Russian as their native language, 13.3 percent were Estonian-speaking, and 7.1 percent spoke Arabic (Figure 3.3).¹⁰ Russian and Arabic speakers consist of people from several countries of origin. Most Russian speakers in Finland have moved from the Former Soviet Union, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Arabic speakers’ countries of origin include Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Syria, Turkey, Tunis, and Jordan (Official Statistics of Finland 2020b).

Figure 3.2 Foreign-born population by country of birth in 2017 (%).




Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2020c.

Notes: Shown are absolute numbers and the share of the total foreign language-speaking population.

¹⁰ Swedish is one of Finland’s domestic languages and, therefore, Swedish-speaking people are not included in the statistics on the foreign language-speaking population.

Figure 3.3 Foreign language-speaking population by language group in 2017 (%).




Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2020d.

Notes: Shown are absolute numbers and the share of the total foreign language-speaking population.

As Figure 3.4 shows, the immigrant-origin population, that is the foreign language-speaking population, was, on average, younger than the native population. Nearly 70 percent of the immigrant-origin population was younger than 40 years of age. The corresponding share among the native population was less than half (45%). In turn, nearly one-third of the native population was older than 60, whereas only seven percent of the immigrant-origin population had reached that age. The age distribution varied significantly between the different language groups. Somali-origin persons were especially young: 70 percent of them were younger than 30 years of age.


Figure 3.4 Age distribution across largest language groups in 2017.



Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2020d.

Figure 3.5 demonstrates that although gender distribution among the immigrant-origin population was relatively even, there was variation across the language groups. While some groups, including e.g. Arabic, English, and Turkish speakers, were male-dominated, other groups, such as Russian and Thai speakers, were female-dominated. The larger share of women moving to Finland from Russia and Thailand is connected to transnational marriages between Finnish men and Russian and Thai-origin women (Official Statistics of Finland 2020i).

Figure 3.5 Gender distribution across the largest language groups in 2017.



Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2020d.

Multicultural policies. Although Finland became a migration destination only recently, it quickly adopted multiculturalism at the state level after the number of immigrants started to increase (Saukkonen 2013, 2020: 60–61). In the broad sense, multiculturalism refers to a certain type of policies aimed at integrating national and ethnic minorities into the larger society. Normatively defined, multiculturalism is “an ideology that attaches positive value to cultural diversity, calls for the equal recognition of different cultural groups, and calls upon the state to support such groups in various ways” (Miller 2006: 326–327). The idea inherent in multiculturalism is the preservation of minorities’ language, culture, and identity, as it has been thought that official recognition of minority cultures facilitates the integration of these groups into wider society. Cultural diversity has also been considered beneficial in its own right: A diversity of traditions, languages, and values has been perceived as a source of cultural enrichment. Policywise, multiculturalism constitutes the polar opposite of assimilation policies, which seek for minority groups or cultures to assume the values, behaviours, and beliefs of the majority

(Kymlicka 1995: 14). Contrary to multiculturalism, advocates of assimilation value cultural unity as a prerequisite for social cohesion.

In a narrow sense, multicultural policies refer only to policies that actually grant group-differentiated rights to minority groups. From this perspective, citizenship acquisition and antidiscrimination policies do not qualify as multicultural policies, as they are directed at ensuring the effective exercise of the common rights of citizenship (Kymlicka 1995: 31). In practise, however, these are often labelled as multicultural policies in several countries (Koopmans 2013). The theory of multicultural citizenship outlined by Will Kymlicka (1995: 10–17) distinguishes between the rights and demands of two different types of minorities in liberal nation-states: indigenous peoples and national minorities on the one hand, and new immigrant “ethnic groups” on the other. According to Kymlicka, minorities in the first group often wish to ensure the survival of their own cultural traditions and maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture. Immigrants, in turn, typically wish to integrate and be accepted as full members of the wider society, but their demands relate to making the society more tolerant towards cultural differences. Kymlicka argues that these two types of minorities’ demands for group-specific rights are perceived differently. Indigenous peoples and national minorities have typically lived in the geographical area as long as or longer than the current majority population and, thus, their demands towards the state have more legitimacy compared to the demands of first-generation immigrants, who have arrived only recently and decided to move (mostly) voluntarily (*ibid.*: 95–98).

Kymlicka (1995: 26–33) identifies three types of group-differentiated rights in liberal democratic states: self-government rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights. Out of these, the two latter types touch immigrant minorities, whereas self-government rights are typically used for national minorities. Polyethnic rights concern support for minority cultures and anti-discrimination policies, which aim to integrate immigrant groups. Special representation rights may concern both national and immigrant minorities and refer to the political representation of these groups in various representative bodies. Each minority group has different political interests and faces different structural barriers or opportunities in accessing political power. Groups have differing degrees of ethnic origin-based consciousness and capacities for collective mobilisation. They have variations in access to citizenship and political rights, and they have differing degrees of societal integration with respect to e.g. language skills and access to the labour market.

Multicultural policies and the acknowledgement of minority rights became a trend in Western European democracies between the 1970s and the 1990s. It has been

argued that after this, several countries retreated from multiculturalism, because states have had difficulties incorporating pluralism while maintaining social cohesion, such as a sense of trust and reciprocity, civic ties, and collective identity (Joppke 2004; Putnam 2007). According to Kymlicka (2010: 104), the abandonment of multiculturalism has specifically occurred in politics relating to immigrant groups, whereas the question of national minorities has not been the focus of the debate. However, Kymlicka argues that the extent to which states have abandoned multiculturalism has been exaggerated. While political rhetoric might have changed towards assimilationist discourse, in reality, many countries continue to adopt and implement multicultural policies.

According to Bloemraad (2006), state-level multicultural policies influence immigrant political incorporation through at least two dynamics: they affect (1) newcomers' and native-born citizens' understandings of migrants' legitimate political standing in a host country, as well as (2) migrants' ability to participate and mobilise by providing the symbolic and material resources needed to take out and exercise political membership. In line with Bloemraad's model of structured mobilisation, government policies provide resources to ethnic organisations, ethnic community leaders, and mainstream actors, who have the capacity to mobilise ordinary migrants. Furthermore, the citizenship regime is said to influence ethnically based campaigning. In France, for instance, assimilationist policies may discourage immigrant-origin candidates from running campaigns in which they mobilise voters by appealing to feelings of a shared ethnic minority background. British multiculturalism, by contrast, has been said to favour such mobilization (Garbaye 2005; Maxwell 2012). Michon and Vermeulen (2013) describe how the "multicultural backlash" in the Netherlands has significantly diminished opportunities for immigrants' political incorporation. While the Netherlands used to be a favourable, open context for minority participation, the rising opposition to multiculturalism and especially Islam now encourages Muslim immigrants' participation much less than before.

In light of official minority and integration policies, Finland looks like a tolerant and open-minded state that has adopted multiculturalism (for a thorough description of minority and integration policies in Finland, see Saukkonen 2013). Minorities' cultural rights are strongly anchored in the constitution. The first Integration Law (*Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers* L493/1999) was instituted in 1999. Its basic aim was to promote integration, equality and freedom of choice of immigrants through measures, which help them to acquire the essential knowledge and skills to function in society. The new act on integration (*Act on the*

Promotion of Immigrant Integration L1386/2010) came into effect in 2011. The tenets of the new law remained unaltered. The ethos of the laws and policy documents regarding minority and integration policies is that neither immigrants nor their children are expected to assimilate into Finnish society. Instead, they are encouraged to maintain their language, culture, and identity with the multi-sectoral support of Finnish authorities and other parties. According to the new integration law, integration means “interactive development involving immigrants and society at large” (L1386/2010, Section 3). Finland has adopted its own word for integration, *kotouttaminen*¹¹, to avoid the negative connotation in relation to assimilation, in which immigrants are expected to abandon their old cultural identities (Paananen 2005: 177–178). As Saukkonen (2013: 290) concludes, according to official policies, Finland is the most multiculturalist country in Europe, challenged only by Sweden.

However, Saukkonen (2013) continues, that despite the aforementioned commitment to multiculturalism at the policy level, it remains largely unimplemented at the practical level due to insufficient resources. Furthermore, the Finnish way of understanding national identity has traditionally emphasized the cultural homogeneity, rather than diversity, of the state (*ibid.*). The origin of this way of thought is connected to the nationalist movements and policies during the 19th and 20th centuries, and the short history of immigration (Saukkonen 1999). Even today, compared to other Nordic countries, the share of the foreign-origin population is low (6.8 % in 2017).¹² Saukkonen (2013: 291) argues that:

...in practise it seems that the Finnish state and society do not have the political will or the administrative and financial means to really ensure that the new languages and cultural practises that arrive in Finland as a result of the international movement of people will form lasting elements of Finnish society.

According to Wahlbeck (2013: 296), multicultural policies in Finland have been introduced to preserve the unity of the state rather than out of any concern for the interest of minorities. Pyykkönen (2007a) sees that this is reflected, for instance, in the way programmatic governance has been adopted to avert the risk that immigrants with limited opportunities are perceived to pose. These “at-risk newcomers” such as

¹¹ The word *kotouttaminen* has a positive connotation of “making somebody feel at home”.

¹² In Norway, the corresponding share in 2017 was 16.8% (Statistics Norway 2017), and in Denmark 13.3% (Statistics Denmark 2018). In Sweden, the share of foreign-origin population was the highest: 24.1% (Statistics Sweden 2017). In the official statistics of the Nordic countries, persons who have foreign backgrounds are defined as persons who are foreign born, or native born with foreign born parents. Persons with a native background are defined as persons who are native born with two native born parents or native born with one native born parent and one foreign born parent.

refugees, asylum seekers, unemployed, uneducated, youth, women, and the elderly are thought to need civic education so that they can take responsibility for their own societal development. If left without governed support and assistance, they are perceived as forming a risk to the security and coherence of Finnish society. As Pyykkönen notes, Finland has a strong welfare-state tradition, which means that “the state has been the axiomatic funder, organizer, and provider of health, welfare, and cultural services”. Also, Wahlbeck (2013: 300–301) notes that in Finland, the state’s task to provide and support equality among all citizens is regarded as self-evident. According to the Nordic welfare state model, it is not the individuals themselves or their communities that bear the ultimate responsibility for providing welfare, equality, and protection. Thereby, the challenge is not how to accept equal rights for all citizens but how to accept cultural diversity and implement group-specific rights (ibid.). However, according to Pyykkönen (2007a), the perception that public administration should intervene as little as possible has become more popular during past decades, which has enforced the idea that the most rational avenues for immigrants’ societal and personal development are through their own communities. Therefore, migrants’ associations have been promoted and generously funded by the public sector.

Another outcome of the welfare state tradition in Finland is that a key indicator of immigrant integration is employment (Paananen 2005: 178–179). Maintaining the legitimacy of the Nordic model with a principle of universal rights requires that everybody who is able must participate in increasing the common “cake”. Although the emphasis on labour market integration includes strong moral arguments, it has also been expected to prevent natives’ negative attitudes towards immigrants (ibid.). Thereby, the current *Act on Integration* requires that each migrant, who either is unemployed or receives social assistance, needs an individual integration plan. The plan is drawn up jointly by the municipality, the employment and economic development office, and the immigrant. It includes in detail the measures and services that will support the immigrant’s possibilities of obtaining adequate Finnish or Swedish skills and other knowledge and skills needed in society and working life as well as promote an individual’s possibilities of participating in society as an equal member. Integration training is organised by municipalities, Employment and Economic Development Offices, and many educational institutes. While civic integration is an obligation to unemployed and welfare-dependent migrants, integration programs are not tied to residence permits (such as in the Netherlands, where the granting of permanent residence permits is tied to the successful passing of an integration test, see Joppke 2008).

The strong emphasis on labour market integration has not guaranteed easy access to employment for all immigrant groups. The employment situation has been most favourable in the case of Estonian-origin immigrants, whereas refugees from Asia and Africa have had a more difficult starting point (Eronen et al. 2014: 35–36). Although it is evident that it takes more time for people escaping persecution and war to access the labour market in their destination countries compared to persons who voluntarily migrate for work, differences between immigrant groups' access to employment are largely explained by institutional racism. Ahmad's (2020) experimental study on the Finnish labour market shows that a job candidate's human capital – i.e. personal skills and capacities (Becker 1964) – is valued only when the candidate belongs to a group that is placed high on a so-called “ethnic preference ladder”. In other words, employers discriminate against equally qualified candidates based on their ethnic background. Differences in labour market participation between immigrant and native-origin populations are also a result of immigrant-origin women staying at home (Eronen et al. 2014: 33; Larja & Sutela 2015: 72). However, immigrants' employment situation has improved over the time spent in Finland, which has especially influenced women's access to employment (Eronen et al. 2014: 37–40). When access to the labour market is limited, immigrants' integration takes place through social benefits and state-subsidised employment (Kotoutumisen kokonaiskatsaus 2013: 44; Paananen 2005: 178–179).

Nevertheless, in a cross-country comparison, Finland can be categorized as a privileged context of reception with favourable policies for equal political opportunities for immigrants (Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015; The Multiculturalism Policy Index).¹³ Municipal voting rights, including the right to run as a candidate, were extended to other Nordic country citizen residents since the elections in 1976 and to all foreign country citizen residents since the elections in 1992 (L355/1976; L1718/1991). Current legislation provides Nordic and EU citizens with electoral rights on equal terms with Finnish citizens, whereas other foreign residents are required to have a domicile in Finland continuously for two years and 51 days prior to an election to be eligible to vote and/or run as a candidate (*Local Government Act* L410/2015). In addition, non-EU residents are free to join a political party, form community associations, and create new media. However, awareness of political rights among non-citizens is low. According to a study by Jutila-Roon (2016), almost 40 percent of immigrants who abstained from voting in municipal elections in 2012 had not been aware of their voting rights.

¹³ Scipioni & Urso (2017) provide a comprehensive summary of different migration policy indexes available.

Electoral rights in parliamentary and presidential elections are restricted to citizenship, that is, naturalised citizens can vote in both elections and also run in parliamentary elections, but the president has to be a native-born Finnish citizen (*The Constitution of Finland* L731/1999). The Nationality Act (L579/2011) made naturalisation more flexible to promote social cohesion and integration. Finland accepts multiple citizenships, and citizenship can be applied after one resides five years in the country (after four years for fluent Finnish or Swedish speakers). In addition to a sufficient period of residence, the requirements for naturalisation include established identity, sufficient language skills, lack of criminal record, and sufficient means of support (Finnish Immigration Service). According to a cross-country comparison provided by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (2015), Finland ranks 10 out of 38 with respect to access to nationality.

From an international perspective, Finland also has a low level of corruption, freedom of press, and a high level of respect for democratic standards and human rights (Freedom House 2019; Transparency International 2018). International studies suggest that immigrants coming from countries with a high level of corruption and a low level of political freedom, in comparison to the opposite in the host society, express higher levels of political trust compared to citizens on average. The attitudes of the children of these immigrants, in contrast, resemble the attitudes of the native population (Heath et al. 2014; Maxwell 2010; Strömblad & Adman 2010). Scholars explain these findings with the different point of reference that immigrant parents and their children have, which affects their expectations of the political system (Adman & Strömblad 2015; Heath et al. 2014: 191; Strömblad & Adman 2010). As Heath et al. (2014) posit, children of immigrants are much more aware of discrimination and inequality in the host society. If discrimination leads to a lack of a sense of belonging in the host society and its political community, children of immigrants may have a risk of lower levels of political engagement.


The favourability of Finland as a context of reception may also be examined through social cohesion indicators. OECD measures of social cohesion include immigrants' sense of belonging to the host country and perceived discrimination, as well as host-society attitudes towards migrants (OECD 2018). Formal participation rights are not sufficient to ensure immigrants' political incorporation if they are discriminated against and lack a sense of belonging. According to a recent OECD report, the gap between immigrants and natives in terms of feeling close or very close to the national community is very small in Finland, as it is in many other European countries. Slightly over 10 percent of all immigrants in Finland reported encountering discrimination (OECD 2018: 135–137). Although negative attitudes

towards immigration and immigrants were more visible in traditional and social media after the so-called refugee crisis in 2015–2016 (Ojala & Pöyhtäri 2018), and the populist Finns party with anti-immigration public statements¹⁴ has taken its place among the largest parties in several consecutive elections (Official Statistics of Finland 2019a), Finland remains a country with the most favourable attitudes towards immigration across European countries (Avonius & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2018; Heath & Richards 2019).

Although international cross-country comparisons give a rosy picture of Finland, in reality, attitudes towards immigration vary between regions and social groups (Avonius & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2018; Jaakkola 1999; 2005), and harassment and hate speech aimed at minority groups occurs often. According to a recent FinMonik study that was collected between May 2018 and January 2019, 40 percent of men and 37 percent of women with a foreign background had experienced discrimination within the previous year (Rask et al. 2020). Studies of Jaakkola (1999; 2005) demonstrate Finnish attitudes towards different nationalities. From 1987 to 2003, attitudes towards Nordic and Anglo-Saxon immigrants were more favourable compared to attitudes towards migrants who were visibly and culturally different from the native population and who came from countries with a lower standard of living. Labour migrants received a warmer welcome than did refugees. Recent data suggest that the situation has remained the same over the years (Figure 3.6). This “ethnic preference ladder“ is reflected in immigrants’ experiences of discrimination: Immigrants from African countries experience discrimination significantly more frequently than do immigrants from countries in which the population is predominantly “white” (Rask et al. 2020). The majority’s attitudes towards minorities directly determine their opportunities for political participation and their campaigning strategies. As pointed out before, due to the fear of negative attention, ethnic minority candidates may wish to conceal their minority background, if possible, or disclaim a role as a representative of an ethnic minority.

¹⁴ One example that gained widespread publicity in 2011 was the so-called Sour Election Manifesto (Nuiva vaalimanifesti), in which the Finns Party’s anti-immigration intraparty fraction at the time listed its political agenda regarding immigration. The Manifesto’s main criticism was directed at multiculturalism as well as refugees and other migrants who were not considered as benefitting Finnish society. In 2017, the party’s MPs split after the main contributor of the Sour Election Manifesto, Jussi Halla-Aho, was elected the party’s leader. Since then, the anti-immigration fraction became mainstream in the Finns party.

Figure 3.6 Positive attitudes towards immigrants from different countries of origin (%).



Source: *Taloustutkimus 2015*.

Notes: Shown are the share of respondents with a rather or very positive view to the question: "How favourable or unfavourable do you consider immigration to Finland from the following countries?". N=1000, weighted N=4275.

While acknowledging the positive impact of multicultural policies in theory, Bird et al. (2011) expect them to play only a minor role in immigrant political mobilisation. Instead, they argue that the responsiveness of the political system makes the difference. From their perspective, the inclusion of immigrants in democratic politics is more dependent on candidate nomination procedures, electoral rules, party systems, and campaign financing, all of which have little to do with states' multicultural policies. Also, Bloemraad (2013) encourages future research to focus on the recruitment practices of political parties alongside the dynamics of group mobilisation and ideological contexts in explaining ethnic minority representation.

It should be acknowledged that political integration is part of immigrants' societal integration as a whole. By engaging in politics, an individual may establish social networks and develop a feeling of belonging in the local community. While e.g. labour market integration undoubtedly contributes to political integration, immigrants' integration process can also go the opposite way, from political integration to integration in other dimensions of society. Thus, individuals' and groups' integration in the host society should not be conceptualised as a ladder with political integration at the end of it. The more immigrants participate in the political arena and get nominated in decision-making positions, the more there are positive

role models of integrated immigrants. For natives, these immigrant-origin representatives provide examples of immigrants being interested and involved in common affairs. For other immigrants and ethnic minorities, they send a message that immigrants are welcome to take part in society as equal members, which undoubtedly facilitates immigrant integration as a whole.

3.2 Municipal-level context: Migrant minorities in Finnish municipalities


According to the previously presented theoretical model (Figure 2.2), important local-level contextual factors influencing an ethnic group's collective identity and capacity to mobilise are its size and spatial concentration, the completeness of its social institutions, and its resources relating to social networks, communication (via networks but also via ethnic media, for example), and leadership. A group's resources and the completeness of its institutions are, of course, dependent on the length of settlement in the community. In this chapter, I will provide an overview of the distribution of the immigrant-origin population across Finland and briefly discuss the regional variation in public opinion towards immigration, immigrant and multicultural associations, and the role of municipalities' integration programmes.

Geographical distribution. Finland is a sparsely populated country with around 5.5 million inhabitants. Its bordering states are Sweden (in the west), Norway (in the north), and Russia (in the east). The eastern border shared with Russia is especially long (1,300 km). Finland also has a close relationship with Estonia (in the south). There are only 80 kilometres of distance by sea between Helsinki and Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, and regular and frequent ship connections enable active cross-border commuting between the cities. Finland's population distribution is very uneven. The population is concentrated mainly on the small southwestern coastal plain. About 85 percent of the population lives in towns and cities, with 1.5 million living in the capital, Helsinki, and the cities surrounding it (Official Statistics of Finland 2020e).

Ethnic diversity is commonplace mainly in the Greater Helsinki area, which covers the cities of Helsinki, Espoo, and Vantaa (Official Statistics of Finland 2020e). Almost half (48%) of the country's foreign-origin population resides in these cities. Some clusters are also located in the coastal area in the west of Finland, and close to the Russian border in South-East Finland. Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of the immigrant-origin population in Finnish municipalities in 2017 measured by origin

and language. Slight colour changes are explained mainly by the fact that the Swedish-speaking foreign-origin population is not considered foreign language-speaking, and thus is not included in the map on the right. Otherwise, the categories of being of foreign origin and having another language registered as a native language than Finnish, Swedish, or Sámi are highly overlapping. In the empirical section, the categorisation of voters and candidates as immigrant-origin is based on being a foreign language speaker.


Figure 3.7 Share of immigrant-origin population in Finnish municipalities in 2017.



Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2020f.

Figure 3.8 illustrates the proportion of the foreign language-speaking population in municipalities by their share of the total population. It shows that, in most of the 295 municipalities on Mainland Finland, both the amount of the population as well as the share of the immigrant population is low (note the exclusion of the autonomous region, Åland Islands, in the presentations; the region organises its own local elections and, thus, is omitted from the focus of this study).


Figure 3.8 Share of foreign language-speaking population by size of municipality in 2017.



Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2020e.

Different ethnic groups are differently distributed across Finland (Figure 3.9; Table 3.1). For instance, Somali speakers are heavily concentrated in Helsinki. In 2017, half of all Finland’s Somali speakers lived in the capital city. Most Estonian speakers are distributed across the Helsinki-Uusimaa region, especially in the Greater Helsinki area. Russian speakers (which constitute a relatively heterogenous group consisting of people from several Former Soviet Union countries) are located in the large cities in Southern Finland as well as close to the eastern border in the North and South Karelia regions. Labour-related migration also shows in smaller municipalities, whereas humanitarian migration is more concentrated in the largest cities, where the chances of finding employment and interacting with one’s own ethnic group are better (Dhalmann 2018). From immigrants’ perspective, it may be easier to settle in a municipality or neighbourhood where people with the same ethnic background already live. As described in Chapter 2.1, co-ethnicity can provide direct access to a group’s resources, which facilitates not only post-migration settlement but also political action. This is because residential concentration facilitates ingroup mobilisation (Cutts et al. 2007) and increases the likelihood that political parties recognise the members of the ethnic group as potential voters (Sobolewska et al. 2013).

Figure 3.9 Geographical distribution of foreign language speakers by largest language groups.



Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2020g.

Notes: Darker colour indicates a higher degree of residential concentration.

Table 3.1 The eight largest cities' share of foreign language speakers out of the country total by language group in 2017 (%).

	Russian	Estonian	Arabic	Somali	Kurdish	Persian, Farsi	Chinese	Albanian	Turkish
Whole country	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Eight largest cities in total	57.1	59.5	71.5	88.7	76.3	67.9	76.5	74.3	58.8
Helsinki	23.5	23.1	25.6	51.1	25.2	21.6	29.9	13.3	22.4
Espoo	8.6	12.2	12.4	13.0	12.3	12.0	20.9	17.8	8.4
Tampere	3.8	2.0	7.2	2.8	4.9	11.4	6.4	3.6	5.4
Vantaa	9.9	16.2	9.7	12.1	9.9	6.9	7.7	21.1	12.3
Oulu	1.3	0.4	2.7	2.1	2.5	3.0	4.0	1.8	2.5
Turku	4.0	3.3	9.2	7.1	13.9	6.8	4.4	13.8	3.5
Jyväskylä	2.2	0.6	1.3	0.4	2.8	4.8	2.1	1.7	2.0
Lahti	3.7	1.8	3.3	0.2	4.7	1.4	1.2	1.3	2.3

Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2020g.


Public opinion. In many municipalities, the population structure remains very homogeneous, which directly affects, inter alia, the public opinion towards immigrants. In the countryside, attitudes towards immigration are generally less favourable than they are in cities, where the attitudes are much more accepting (Jaakkola 2009). Comparative international studies provide evidence of at least two mechanisms that explain regional variation in attitudes towards immigration. In line with the so-called contact hypothesis (Allport 1954), positive contact with immigrant minorities has been shown to reduce native residents' negative perceptions (McLaren 2003; Pettigrew & Tropp 2011). In demographically homogenous areas, where personal contact with immigrant minorities is rare, attitudes towards immigration are more likely based on discussions in the media, which tends to give a rather negative view of immigration (on the Finnish media's immigration discourses, see e.g. Maasilta 2018). However, according to the realistic group conflict theory, a larger (perceived) immigrant presence may induce more anti-immigration attitudes if natives feel that they themselves are turning into a minority and, thus, losing their prerogatives (Quillian 1995; Sherif & Sherif 1979). Thereby, living in an area where some cross-ethnic contact is possible is often a more favourable condition for positive inter-group attitudes than living in an area with "too little" or "too much" contact. Public opinion towards immigrants influences their sense of belonging,

which, in turn, affects their political integration by strengthening or weakening their perception of whether they are welcome to take part in public discussion. Figure 3.10 illustrates the association between immigration attitudes and the size of the municipality. Public opinion poll data collected by The Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA) between 2002–2017 show that immigration attitudes were the most tolerant in large cities.

Immigrant associations. It is a well-established finding across the world that organisational involvement has a positive impact on political action (Putnam 2000; Verba et al. 1995). The popular explanation is that this type of participation yields returns in human capital – i.e. personal skills and capacities – that enable political action. Scholars of migration have been especially interested in the role of immigrants’ own associations in explaining their political mobilisation (Fennema & Tillie 1999; Morales & Pilati 2011; Tillie 2004). Similar to residential concentration, ethnic associations support the development of ethnic group identities and, therefore, build potential for political mobilisation of ethnic minorities as a group. This, in turn, gives political parties more incentives to balance their candidate lists in terms of candidates’ ethnic background in municipalities where the potential for ethnic mobilisation is larger.

In Finland, there are roughly 700–1,000 immigrant associations in total (Ekholm 2015: 9). This estimate refers to associations founded by immigrants or associations that work among immigrants. The geographical distribution of immigrant associations is very uneven: active associations are concentrated mainly in the largest cities with diverse populations. The work of immigrant associations covers most areas of life. The most typical services immigrant associations organise include work among children, adolescents, and families, counselling in one’s own language, and cultural activities. Some associations also support their members’ participation in political decision-making. Typically, this takes place in the run-up to elections, when the associations organise panels and other discussion events, inform their members on relevant issues, and provide guidance on how to participate in elections (Ekholm 2015: 9, 39–41; Pyykkönen 2007b: 74–75).

Figure 3.10 Finns' attitudes towards proposition "The impending reduction and ageing of our country's population require facilitation of foreigners' immigration to Finland" by the number of inhabitants in municipality. Crosstabulation.



Source: Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA) 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017.

Notes: The proposition in Finnish: "Maamme väestön ikääntyminen ja uhkaava vähentyminen edellyttävät ulkomaalaisten Suomeen muuton helpottamista". Pearson's chi-squared test was significant at the .05-level in all cases except for year 2006/2007. Data is weighted from year 2009 onwards. Datasets from 2002/2003 and 2006/2007 did not include a weight variable.

Pyykkönen (2007b: 77–78) provides a typology of nine different types of immigrant associations in Finland with different foci: ethno-cultural associations, multicultural associations, religious associations, women’s associations, youth associations, sports associations, art associations, integration associations, and coalition associations¹⁵. He further divides religious, women, youth, sports, and art associations into co-ethnic and multi-ethnic associations: The former focus on cherishing communality, traditions, and well-being within one ethnic group, whereas the latter aim at building positive intergroup relations between immigrant groups as well as between immigrants and the wider society. Pyykkönen’s typology is based on an analysis of the member structure and the main focus and target group of associations’ activities.¹⁶

Participation in immigrant associations is more common among immigrants who face difficulties in societal and labour market integration (Pyykkönen 2007b: 72–73). For instance, labour migrants from the Far East have founded significantly fewer associations compared to Somalian-origin immigrants, who are either refugees or family members of refugees, and among whom the employment rate is substantially lower. Pyykkönen argues, first, that if one’s culture and visible appearance differ from the natives, the barriers to access to different networks in the society are higher compared to those of immigrants who have the possibility of “blending in”. This discrimination encourages the establishing of associations with co-ethnics. Second, it may be that those migrants who have set up several associations have been more active to begin with in their countries of origin and transfer a similar type of activism to the new context.

According to a report commissioned by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, specific strengths of services provided by immigrant associations are the understanding and peer support that derive from a shared ethnic background, which makes their services accessible and approachable. Immigrant associations get hold of individuals otherwise difficult to reach. Some immigrant associations apply and receive public funding, but most of them work on a voluntary basis. According to Ekholm (2015: 50–55), the full potential of immigrant associations remains largely unexploited in several municipalities even though practically all integration policy documents highlight the importance of immigrant associations in integration work. Immigrant associations lack the resources to participate in the calls for competition over organising outsourced public services due to a lack of knowhow in organising

¹⁵ Coalition associations focus on representing the interests of the local immigrant associations with respect to (local) authorities.

¹⁶ See also Saksela-Bergholm’s (2009) different type of typology of immigrant associations in Finland.

operational coordination, finance, and communications. This is where public administration and established immigrant associations could provide more support (ibid.).

Municipalities' integration services. *The Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration* obliges municipalities to take responsibility for developing, planning, and monitoring integration at the local level. Municipalities need to ensure that the municipal services are suitable for the needs of refugees and other residents with an immigrant background. Given that municipalities are in very different positions in terms of demographic structure and resources, we can expect a high level of local variation in how the promotion of immigrant integration and cooperation between public sector and civil society actors is implemented at the local level. Under the Integration Act, municipalities draw up, individually or jointly with other municipalities, an integration programme in which the ways of promoting integration and multi-sectoral cooperation are set in more detail. The programme is approved by the municipal council of each municipality and reviewed at least once every four years. Municipalities' integration programmes can be accessed, for instance, via the webpage (www.kotouttaminen.fi) of the Centre of Expertise in Immigrant Integration, which operates under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. One of the main objectives of the Centre of Expertise in Immigrant Integration is to coordinate and support the work of professionals working with immigrant integration at national, regional, and local levels.

To conclude, municipalities differ in terms of ethnic residential concentration, activity of multicultural and immigrant associations, and resources invested in integration work. Furthermore, public opinion towards immigrants differs in municipalities where diversity is part of everyday life versus municipalities where contact with people of a different ethnic origin is very rare. The extent to which diversity is present and recognised in the local community is also likely to affect the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates. The more diversity in everyday life the party recruiters experience, the more likely they are to seek candidates with diverse ethnic backgrounds.

3.3 Party-level context: Inclusiveness of political institutions in Finland

This chapter clarifies the electoral rules, party competition, party selection rules, and openness of recruitment, as well as cost of campaigns in Finnish municipal elections. These contextual factors have a direct effect on the process of political recruitment at the individual level.

Electoral rules. The electoral system used in the Finnish municipal elections is the open-list proportional representation (OLPR).¹⁷ It combines proportional formula and multimember districts with fully open lists and mandatory preferential voting. Each voter has only one vote, and the object of the vote is an individual candidate and a party simultaneously: A voter must select a candidate, but the vote also goes to the party list. The D'Hondt method determines how many seats each party gets. The number of votes won by individual candidates then establishes which candidates receive those seats. Votes are not transferable, nor are there legally mandated thresholds that a party must exceed before it is eligible to receive seats. Party lists are considered as "open" because voters indicate their preferred party and their favoured candidate within that party. This rule, however, also means that each voter must choose a candidate – it is not possible to vote for a party only.

The order of candidates who get elected depends fully on the personal (preference) votes of the voters. This means that the parties do not rank order the candidates, which is the case in closed list systems. Usually, the names of the candidates on a party's or group's list are presented at the polling booths in alphabetical order under the nominating party or constituency association (sometimes the order is based on the results of parties' primaries, which are quite rare). Because the Finnish parties cannot determine the order of selection of individual candidates, they cannot discriminate by placing immigrant-origin candidates at the bottom of the candidate list without real possibilities of getting elected.

In Sweden, for a comparison, a vote is primarily a vote for a party list and not for an individual candidate, and parties are almost the sole gatekeepers regarding in which order the candidates from their list get the seats the party wins in the elections (Soininen 2011). Intraparty nomination committees formulate party lists and the rank ordering of candidates. Formal party networks such as youth or women's

¹⁷ For a thorough description of the Finnish electoral system and an analysis of its consequences on how elections are played out, see e.g. von Shoultz (2018).

associations as well as networks that are more informal play an important role in the nomination process. However, as Soininen points out, immigrants are less likely to be involved in these established social networks, which is a major hindrance to their nomination and election to Swedish municipal councils. Another factor Soininen highlights is that, nowadays, parties have fewer incentives for active member recruitment because they are less dependent on their members. Instead, parties have become professionally run organisations with employed staff. The lack of incentives to recruit members from heterogeneous social groups, such as immigrants, is even higher because they are seen as being costly to reach both as voters and recruits (see also Bäck & Soininen 2004; Soininen & Etzler 2006). In Sweden, being elected to a political position requires that an aspirant win the support and trust of the political party.

The Finnish system differs significantly from the Swedish system regarding candidate centeredness. Finnish parties play an important role in encouraging and recruiting people to run as candidates, but individual candidates may build much of their success upon their own resources and campaign independent of their party. However, as will be demonstrated in the empirical part of this dissertation, Finnish parties do not necessarily equally target immigrants when recruiting candidates, which has a significant impact on immigrants' access to the electoral arena.

In each municipality, every party and party coalition can nominate 1.5 times as many candidates on their list as the number of seats in the council. While not every party can realistically aim at full lists in every municipality due to lack of resources (such as effective local organisations), the incentive for full lists is strong because it facilitates parties' electoral success: Every vote given to a candidate on a party's list goes directly to the party and each candidate brings at least the votes of his or her personal network including relatives, friends, colleagues, and other acquaintances. This lowers the barriers to access to candidate lists in municipal elections. Because parties need a large number of candidates, they are not too strict about candidate's supply i.e. their capacities and qualifications.

Finland is an example of a heavily candidate-centred system, in which the electoral system creates intense rivalry not only between parties but also between candidates of the same party. Compared to party-centred systems, candidate-centred systems increase the probability that politicians will highlight their personal characteristics and voters will rely on them in their vote decision (Arter 2013; Carey & Shugart 1995; Karvonen 2010; Shugart et al. 2005; von Schoultz 2016). For Finnish parties, it is important that all candidates engage in active campaigning and attract personal votes to the party list. While in party-centred systems, party

leadership and candidates try to maximise their party's support based on the party's reputation (e.g. policy platforms and broader values), in candidate-centred systems like Finland, the mobilisation of party support takes place through candidates' personal reputation (Robbins 2010). Thus, in candidate-centred elections, the mobilisation of voters depends more on the campaign skills and efforts of individual candidates (Tavits 2009).

Descriptive candidate lists, namely, lists that have candidates with diverse sociodemographic backgrounds, are an important strategy in voter mobilisation in Finnish elections. Whereas in party-centred systems, parties and candidates have a greater incentive to mobilise everyone everywhere, in candidate-centred systems, there is less coordinated mobilisation by the parties, which often means that some groups of voters are not activated at all (Söderlund 2017). This means that if parties lack ethnic minority candidates, they likely lack candidates who target ethnic minority groups in their campaigns. Furthermore, because candidates compete against their co-partisans, they may even prefer to stage campaign meetings with candidates from rival parties (Arter 2013: 111). For ethnic minority candidates, this might be a wise strategy. First, campaigning together with a fellow party member with (the same) ethnic minority background could result in the dispersion of (co-)ethnic votes between the candidates, meaning that neither would be elected. Second, campaigning together with other candidates with an ethnic minority background and, thus, joining forces may provide wider recognition among ethnic minority voters, who generally are less informed about elections and candidates compared to native voters. It should be noted, however, that the Finnish system does not encourage candidates in negative campaigning against co-partisans because it could weaken the aggregate party list vote and, thereby, each individual candidate's possibilities of election (Karvonen 2010: 96).

As Hazan and Rahat (2010: 11–12) note, individual personalised campaigns and intra-party competition of votes between candidates may result in a weakening of partisan discipline and cohesiveness within parties. As they argue, “the focus on the individual is increasing at the expense of the collective, the ideological, and the organizational – in other words, the party”. The rise of individual-based politics and the weakening of parties' ability to control their candidates enhance the significance of candidate selection, as parties may be more careful and set certain types of criteria for which kind of candidates they want to nominate. From this perspective, it may be speculated that while parties might be eager to win the votes of ethnic minorities, they may hesitate to nominate ethnic minority candidates if they are not certain that the candidate's personal goals match the goals of the party.

Party competition. At the time of the 2017 municipal elections, there were eight parliamentary parties in the Finnish parliament (Eduskunta), which carried the main responsibility of fielding candidates. These parties represent various political cleavages – i.e. long-standing and broad social divisions within society (for a more precise definition, see e.g. Westinen 2015: 9–16) – most of which are found in other western democracies. In his study on political cleavages in contemporary Finland, Westinen (2015: 236) argues that the most solid cleavage bases in the Finnish electorate are native language, type of residential area, and occupational class. More recent and less established cleavage bases are denomination, gender, education, and age cohorts. Westinen (2015, viii) summarizes political cleavages in the electorate of the parliamentary parties as follows:

The cleavage that is based on the type of residential area and reflected in regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions concerns primarily the voters of the Centre Party and the Coalition Party. The linguistic cleavage concerns mostly the voters of the Swedish People's Party. The classic class cleavage reflected in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension concerns in turn first and foremost the blue-collar voters of the Left Alliance and the Social Democratic Party, the agricultural entrepreneur voters of the Centre Party and higher professional and manager voters of the Coalition Party. The conflict with the most potential as a cleavage is the one based on social status (occupational class and education) and it is reflected in sociocultural and EU dimensions. It sets the voters of the True Finns¹⁸ against the voters of the Green League and the Coalition Party.

It is evident that these cleavages determine parties' member and supporter base and, therefore, are reflected in candidate recruitment. To succeed in vote maximisation, parties need to ensure that their candidate lists attract votes from their existing support base but also have the potential to bring in votes from new voter groups.¹⁹

Table 3.2 summarizes Finnish parties' ideologies and support in the latest elections. Parties' rank order varies across elections, which is partly explained by the fact that some voters support a different party in local and national elections, which is often a very practical question, as not all parties are active in every municipality. It takes money and time to engage citizens in local politics, which is why the largest and oldest parties have the most established and regionally representative party organisations (Sundberg 1995).

¹⁸ The Finns Party was formerly known in English as the True Finns.

¹⁹ To obtain a wide-ranging presentation of the history of political parties in Finland, see Mickelsson 2015. On political cleavages in Finland, see also Paloheimo 2008.

Table 3.2 Ideology and electoral support of the Finnish parliamentary parties in the 2017 municipal elections and in the 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections.

Party	Ideology	2017 municipal elections	2015 parliamentary elections	2019 parliamentary elections
National Coalition Party (NCP)	Liberal conservatism	20.7	18.2	17.0
Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP)	Social democracy	19.4	16.5	17.7
Centre Party (CENT)	Centrism; Agrarianism	17.5	21.1	13.8
Green League (GREEN)	Green politics	12.5	8.5	11.5
Finns Party (FINNS)	National conservatism; Social conservatism	8.8	17.7	17.5
Left Alliance (LEFT)	Democratic socialism; Eco-socialism	8.8	7.1	8.2
Swedish People's Party of Finland (SPP)	Minority interests; Language cleavage; Social liberalism	4.9	4.9	4.5
Christian Democrats of Finland (CD)	Christian democracy; Social conservatism	4.1	3.5	3.9


Source: Nordsieck 2020; Ministry of Justice Information and Result Service; Westinen 2015: 41.

The maps in Figure 3.11 demonstrate how parties' support in the 2017 municipal elections varied across municipalities. They show, for instance, how the Centre Party gained a vote share of 25 percent or more in almost every municipality in Eastern and Northern Finland as well as in Ostrobothnia. As Borg (2018a: 95–99) shows, the exact number of municipalities in which the party's vote share exceeded 25 percent was 208, which is equivalent to over two-thirds of all municipalities on Mainland Finland. In 95 municipalities, the Centre Party's vote share was 50 percent or more. However, most of these municipalities are in rural areas, where the share of the overall population is small. The National Coalition (NCP) and the Social Democrats (SDP) gained a vote share of 25 percent or more in 56 and 81 municipalities, respectively. The corresponding number of municipalities for the Swedish People's Party (SPP) was 24 (Borg 2018a: 97). SPP's support is strongest in the Swedish-speaking municipalities on the western and southern coasts of Finland. When the parties are examined by looking at the number of municipalities in which

they were able to win at least one council seat, we find that the Centre Party, the NCP, the SDP, and the Finns were most spread out nationwide, whereas the support of the SPP was focused on the most narrow geographical area (Figure 3.12). The NCP, the SDP, and the Greens were most popular in urban municipalities (Borg 2018a: 96), in which most of the immigrant-origin population resides.


The majority/minority status and resources a party has in a municipality have a direct effect on its ability to recruit candidates. As the previous examination shows, in some municipalities, only a few parties were able to offer their candidates realistic access to political power. The candidates may choose a party not only on ideological grounds but also after considering what the party has to offer its candidates – be it potential access to power or a network of likeminded persons aspiring to reach the same goals. The smaller parties without an established local support base may not be able to attract locals to run as candidates on their lists because, from their lists, the odds of being elected to the council or gaining any other positions of trust are very low.

Figure 3.11 Vote shares in the 2017 municipal elections across municipalities and parties.



Source: Information and Result Service of the Ministry of Justice.

Figure 3.12 The number of municipalities in which the parties won at least one seat in the 2017 municipal elections.



Source: Borg (2018a: 97).

Party selection rules and openness of recruitment. In Finland, as in other countries in general, there are very few formal rules for parties to select candidates. The right to stand in elections to the Finnish municipal council is enacted in the Local Government Act. Eligible to stand as a candidate in municipal elections is a person (1) whose municipality of residence is the municipality in question, (2) who is entitled to vote in municipal elections in some municipality, and (3) who is not without legal capacity (L410/2015 § 71). Finnish and EU citizens, as well as citizens of Iceland and Norway, are entitled to vote in Finnish municipal elections if they have reached the age of 18 by the day of the election and have a municipality of residence in Finland on the 51st day before the election day. Other foreigners are required to have had a municipality of residence in Finland for an uninterrupted period of two years before the election day. (L410/2015 § 20.)

Eligibility for election to the municipal council is restricted from (1) public servants in central government who perform supervisory tasks concerned directly with local government administration; (2) persons employed by the municipality who are in a senior position within an area of responsibility of the local executive or of a local authority committee, or in a comparable position of responsibility; and (3) persons employed by a corporate entity or foundation under the control of the

municipality who, in terms of their position, are comparable to persons employed by the municipality. (L410/2015 § 72.)

The aforementioned regulations leave a lot of room for parties to define their own criteria for qualified candidates. Because the situation is very similar in other countries, candidate selection and recruitment have often been described as the “secret garden” of politics (Gallagher & Marsh 1988). In the words of Bjarnegård and Kenny (2015), this means that it is “an obscure process, often hidden from view, that is regulated largely by internal party rules, informal practices, and power relationships”. Unlike in parliamentary elections, in municipal elections primaries are not mandatory even if the number of aspiring candidates would exceed the number of candidates a party is allowed to nominate.

The recruitment process requires a lot of effort from the parties because, in most municipalities, parties’ demand for candidates is higher than the supply of potential candidates. Parties’ job of recruiting candidates has diminished since the mid-1990s, when an amendment to a law limited the maximum number of allowed candidates per party or group from two times to 1.5 times as many candidates as there are seats in the council. However, as Table 3.3 demonstrates, the number of candidates began to decrease before the amendment. One of the important reasons behind this decrease was municipal amalgamations, as a result of which the number of municipal positions of responsibility, and thus, the number of candidates, decreased remarkably (Borg 2018a: 18–19; Pikkala 2015). As will be shown later in the empirical section, from the parties’ perspective, the formulation of candidate lists in Finnish municipal elections is not about selecting from a wide group of highly motivated and capable aspirants, but instead is about investing effort in finding a sufficient number of suitable candidates who more or less engage in the party’s values and objectives. Therefore, parties’ strategies, practises, and networks have a significant impact on the final composition of the candidate lists.

Table 3.3 Number of eligible voters, candidates, and councillors, and the share of candidates per council seat in 1980–2017 municipal elections.

Election year	Number of municipalities in year after the elections	Number of eligible voters	Number of candidates	Number of elected councillors	Share of candidates per council seat
1980	445	3,530,447	66,776	12,777	5.2
1984	445	3,666,750	64,878	12,881	5.0
1988	444	3,762,623	63,642	12,842	5.0
1992	439	3,801,449	52,712	12,571	4.2
1996	436	3,941,019	43,104	12,482	3.5
2000	432	4,014,611	39,744	12,278	3.2
2004	416	4,099,864	39,906	11,966	3.3
2008	332	4,191,662	38,504	10,412	3.7
2012	304	4,303,064	37,125	9,672	3.8
2017	295	4,397,098	33,618	8,999	3.7

Source: Borg 2018a: 19; Pikkala 2015: 35.

Cost of campaigns for municipal elections. The nature of the elections varies substantially depending on the size and location of the municipality. The level of competition for seats and the costs of campaigning are significantly higher in the largest cities, whereas in the smallest municipalities most candidates do not run campaigns at all but instead rely on their personal networks and name recognition among the local electorate (Borg 2018a; Borg & Pikkala 2017; Kestilä-Kekkonen et al. 2018). Information provided in Table 3.4 helps to evaluate the level of inter-candidate competition in small versus large municipalities. It shows, for instance, that while 11.6 percent of the country’s residents live in Helsinki (the only municipality with 85 councillors), the city has less than one percent of the country’s councillors. In contrast, 23.1 percent of the total number of councillors is elected in municipalities that have a maximum of 5,000 residents.

Individual effort and resources required in effective campaigning depend largely on the size of the municipality. Helsinki (with more than 637,000 inhabitants at the end of 2016) was a different universe compared to a municipality with only a few thousand residents. There, campaign budgets are often worth several hundreds or thousands of euros, whereas in small municipalities campaigning does not necessarily demand any financial investment (Kestilä-Kekkonen et al. 2018; Venho 2015).

To sum up, the barrier of access to candidacy in Finnish municipal elections is not high, first, because parties' demand of candidates is higher than their supply, which means that they welcome nearly all aspirants who engage in a party's values and goals. Second, parties cannot predetermine the order of selection of their candidates by allocating them fixed list positions. Third, the campaign budgets are very modest, at least outside the largest cities, meaning that one does not need to be extremely wealthy to be able to stand or get elected. However, the system's candidate centredness requires individual candidates to take responsibility for their personal campaigns, which demands political competence from either the candidate and/or his or her support network. As will be brought up in the empirical section, however, most parties provide some training to their candidates in terms of planning and organising campaigns. While access to the council in small municipalities does not necessarily require any campaigning, as votes from relatives and friends may already be enough, in medium-sized towns to large cities it is necessary in order to gain recognition among the wider electorate. Further, due to parties' varying levels of local support, they have varying possibilities of offering their candidates realistic access to political power, which, aside from ideological motivations, is likely to influence an aspiring candidate's calculus on which party to choose as well as intraparty competition for seats.

Table 3.4 The demographic context for the 2017 municipal elections (1).

Number of seats in municipal council	Size of municipality	Number of municipalities	Residents in total	Share of residents out of total population on Mainland Finland (%)	Number of councillors	Share of councillors out of total number of councillors (%)
13–25	–5,000	110	290,674	5.3	2,076	23.1
27–39	5,001–20,000	117	1,002,915	18.3	3,541	39.3
43	20,001–50,000	34	776,425	14.2	1,462	16.2
51	50,001–100,000	21	971,140	17.7	1,071	11.9
59	100,001–250,000	6	551,523	10.1	354	3.9
67	250,001–500,000	5	974,936	17.8	335	3.8
75		1	274,425	5.0	75	0.8
85		1	637,684	11.6	85	0.9
Total		295	5,479,722	100.0	8,999	100.0

Source: Borg & Pikkala 2017: 9.

4 DATA AND METHODS

Altogether, six sets of data, both quantitative and qualitative, are employed to solve the research questions set for this dissertation. The aim is to answer three main questions:

- (1) What were the key differences in electoral engagement between different ethnic groups?
- (2) What influenced political parties' demand for immigrant-origin candidates i.e. motivated parties to recruit immigrants to their candidate lists?
- (3) What role did immigrant-origin candidates' supply factors i.e. their socioeconomic background, resources, and motivation play in their decision to stand as candidates and in their selection to candidate lists?

The analysis of immigrants' electoral engagement in Chapter 5 is based mainly on datasets 1 and 2, which are described below.

DATASET 1: Individual-level electronic voter register data for the 2017 Finnish municipal elections

The individual-level electronic voter register data for the 2017 Finnish municipal elections were compiled from those electoral wards that utilized the electronic voting register. The data does not cover all persons entitled to vote, because the electronic voting register has been adopted to varying levels in different municipalities and voting districts. The use of the electronic register is voluntary, and depends, for instance, on the willingness of the local election committee (Huotarinen et al. 2020, 46–47). The voting districts, where data on voting on the actual election day are available, had 1,377,448 persons entitled to vote, whereas altogether there were 4,391,558 persons entitled to vote in the 2017 municipal elections. As such, the data apply only to the municipalities, voting districts, and persons entitled to vote for

which data are available.²⁰ The data, administrated by the Ministry of Justice, were released to Statistics Finland after the elections. In Statistics Finland, the information on whether a person voted or not was linked to various indicators of the individual's socioeconomic status and migration history with the help of personal identification numbers. A great advantage of the register data is that it allows for a reliable analysis of voter turnout, whereas similar analyses with survey data systematically suffer from over-reporting of turnout due to social desirability bias, meaning that some respondents intentionally misreport that they voted because this behaviour is socially desirable (Karp & Brockington 2005). The compilation of the dataset was funded by the Ministry of Justice. Aside from the Ministry, I also thank Adjunct Professor Hanna Wass for the opportunity to use the data in this dissertation.

DATASET 2: Foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region: Identities, values and attitudes of Russian, Estonian, English, Somali and Arabic speakers – Survey

In 2018–2019, a consortium of the Finnish Cultural Foundation, e2 Research (a multidisciplinary research institute), the cities of Helsinki, Vantaa, and Espoo (in the capital region of Finland), and the Ministry of Justice implemented a data collection among the members of the five biggest foreign language groups in the capital region (speakers of Russian, Estonian, English, Somali, and Arabic). The survey data (face-to-face interviews in the respondents' native language, N=1,527) were gathered between October 2018 and March 2019. The data consist of approximately 300 interviews from each language group. The survey includes questions on respondents' identities, political values and attitudes, sense of belonging in Finnish society, socioeconomic background, language skills, and migration background.

The main findings of this survey have already been reported by Pitkänen et al. (2019a, 2019b, 2020), who initially designed the questionnaire and planned the data collection. While their summary is very comprehensive, they have left uncovered some aspects that I find relevant to include in my dissertation. Reporting the findings of this survey in Chapters 5.3 and 5.4 will therefore be a mix of a reference to the findings of Pitkänen et al. as well as further analysis based on their data. I am very grateful to Karina Jutila, Ville Pitkänen, Pasi Saukkonen, Jussi Westinen, and other board members of their research consortium for granting me access to this dataset. It is a valuable addition to this dissertation, as the data are the first to provide

²⁰ For a further description of the voter register data on the 2017 municipal elections, see Official Statistics of Finland 2017b.

information on political attitudes of the new ethnic minority groups based on a representative sample – although limited to five language groups and the capital area.

Some further notions should be made regarding the limitations of the dataset. Pitkänen et al. (2019b: 14) discovered differences between the language groups in their style of using the response scale regarding statements concerning their identity and attitudes. While Russian, Estonian, and English speakers did not differ from the native population in their way of using the response scales, Somali and Arabic-speaking respondents tended to select values at the extreme end of the scale, which may reflect the groups' varying habits of filling out this type of survey.²¹ As Pitkänen et al. conclude, due to cultural and language-related reasons, the interpretation of the questions and the response scale may vary between the examined groups. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with care, and the focus should be on within rather than between-group differences.

Furthermore, the socio-demographic background of the surveyed groups differs as it does in real life, as shown in Table 4.1. Around 70 percent of English and Arabic speakers are male, whereas 60 percent of Russian speakers are female. With respect to Estonian and Somali speakers, the shares are closer to being half male and half female. The average age is the highest among English speakers (46.2 years), as 80 percent of them are 35 years or older. Somali speakers form the youngest group, their average age being 33.5 years. Age composition among Russian and Estonian speakers is somewhat similar, although, on average, Russian speakers are a bit older.

²¹ The finding that response distributions in attitude surveys differ from one country to other is not new. E.g. Brulé and Veenhoven (2017) have studied personal happiness and found that, while in most countries the highest frequencies on a 0–10 scale (0 representing extremely unhappy and 10 representing extremely happy) are set between 5 and 8, in some countries, the share of 10 responses stands out. This is particularly common in Latin America and in the Middle East. Although this may be explained by varying survey techniques with respect to scaling and labelling and variation in societal factors (such as income or income equality), it is also explained by cultural factors i.e. what is valued in a society. They also speculate that a country's grading culture at schools (how often top grades are used) may influence response habits but lack data to test the hypothesis.

Table 4.1 Gender and age distribution by language group in the foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region survey data.

	Gender (%)		Age group (%)				Mean age	(n)
	Male	Female	18–24	25–34	35–49	50–	(Std. Dev.)	
RUS	40	60	13	23	35	29	41.7 (13.9)	(301)
EST	47	53	12	27	40	21	38.6 (11.5)	(310)
ENG	72	28	2	18	41	40	46.2 (12.7)	(314)
SOM	55	45	31	28	29	13	33.5 (12.2)	(302)
ARAB	67	33	12	41	31	16	36.3 (11.6)	(300)

The group of English speakers includes immigrants born in Western English-speaking countries (the UK, Ireland, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand). Sixty-eight percent of Arabic speakers were born in Iraq and 12 percent in Syria. The rest were from other Middle Eastern countries. A large share of Arabic speakers were recent arrivals. While the average number of years lived in Finland was around 15 among English and Somali speakers, 11 among Russian speakers, and 9 among Estonian speakers, it was around 6 among Arabic speakers. The relatively short period of time spent in Finland has clearly influenced the Arabic speakers’ competence to respond to the survey questions: The share of “don’t know” answers is the highest among this group.

In Chapter 6, the focus is shifted to immigrant-origin candidates and councillors, more specifically, to their sociodemographic background and distribution across political parties in the 2017 municipal elections. The empirical analysis in this chapter is based on datasets 3 and 4:

DATASET 3: Candidate register data

The open-access candidate register data provided by the Ministry of Justice includes information on the 2017 municipal election candidates’ background (including age, gender, occupation, party/constituency association, candidate number, and municipality), previous political experience (current member of municipal council or a member of the Parliament) and electoral success (elected/elected in reserve seat/not elected, number of votes per each voting district in the municipality). Upon a request of the author, The Population Register Centre²² delivered the information

²² From the beginning of January 1, 2020, The Population Register Centre is called The Digital and Population Data Services Agency.

on foreign language-speaking candidates' native language, which in the open-access data is limitedly available.

The register data provides a possibility of drawing a complete picture of all 33,618 candidates, out of which 729 were foreign language-speaking. In other words, the basis for classifying a candidate as immigrant-origin in the candidate register data is based on the candidate's native language registered in the Finnish population information system (in Finnish: *väestötietojärjestelmä*); if it is other than Finnish, Swedish, or Sami, the candidate is considered as immigrant-origin. This classification produces more or less the same result as classification based on country of birth because, currently, most adults speaking a foreign language as their mother tongue have themselves moved to Finland from another country rather than having been born in Finland. Figure 3.7 in Chapter 3.2 illustrates how the classifications based on country of birth and native language produce only slightly different results. While the Finnish practice of recording information on native language in the population information system has its problems (for instance, only one language is allowed, which does not reflect the multilingualism in the population), for now it produces a fairly exact outline of persons who themselves or whose parents are born abroad (Saukkonen 2019).

DATASET 4: Municipal Elections 2017 Candidate Survey

The candidate survey was collected before the election day (9 April 2017), so that the election outcome would not be reflected in the survey responses. The survey questionnaire was designed, and the data collected, by a team of five researchers at Tampere University, including the author²³. Data collection was funded by the Ministry of Justice. By utilizing the candidate register data described above, our team was able to ensure that all candidates were included in the sample frame. Political parties and constituency associations submitted their lists of candidates (candidate applications) to the central municipal election board by the 40th day before election day. The central municipal election board confirmed the nomination of candidates on 9 March 2017, after which I requested that officials at The Election Unit of the Ministry of Justice assign the candidates' social security numbers directly to the officials at The Population Register Centre (1.1.2020 onwards, The Digital and Population Data Services Agency), who drew a random sample of 3,000 Finnish,

²³ The authors of the candidate survey data are Josefina Sipinen, Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen, Aino Tiihonen, Sami Borg, and Anna-Riikka Aarnio. Several students of political science at Tampere University volunteered to pilot the electronic questionnaire as well as mail the cover letters to the candidates.

Swedish, and Sami-speaking candidates and a full sample of foreign language-speaking candidates and provided me with their street addresses. This process required a research permit from The Population Register Centre, which was applied in January–February 2017.

On 22 March 2017, a cover letter including a link to an electronic survey was sent via mail to 3,000 Finnish, Swedish, and Sámi-speaking candidates as well as to all 729 foreign language-speaking candidates. A reminder letter was sent one week later (although, as it later turned out, mail delivery to some areas was so slow that a few candidates received the cover letter and the reminder on the same day). The deadline for filling the survey was 8 April 2017, which was the day before the election day. Those candidates who did not want to fill out the electronic survey were, by request, sent a paper questionnaire and stamped addressed return envelope to their home addresses. In the end, a few dozens of (elderly) candidates preferred a paper questionnaire. The questionnaire for native language-speaking candidates was in Finnish and Swedish, and the questionnaire for foreign language-speaking candidates was in Finnish, Swedish, and English. The data have been stored in the Finnish Social Science Data Archive (FSD), from which the data and the questionnaire are available upon request for research, teaching, and study.²⁴

The survey included questions on candidates' sociodemographic background, political attitudes, and motivation and resources to stand as candidates. The questionnaire designed for foreign language-speaking candidates was slightly longer than the questionnaire for Finnish and Swedish-speaking candidates because it included questions on the candidates' migration background (such as country of birth, age at migration, reason for migration, and Finnish/Swedish language proficiency). The response rate among Finnish, Swedish, and Sámi-speaking candidates was 33.7 percent ($n=1,010$). No Sámi-speaking candidates responded to the survey, meaning that it is more appropriate to speak of Finnish and Swedish-speaking candidates when referring to the survey data. Among foreign language-speaking candidates, the response rate was 28 percent ($n=204$), which means that although all foreign language-speaking candidates were invited to fill out the survey, due to nonresponse the final data are not a full sample. Altogether, 196 foreign language-speaking respondents reported having been born abroad, leaving eight Finnish-born candidates in the data.

²⁴ Persistent identifier for the candidate survey with respect to the native speaking candidates is: <http://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi:fsd:T-FSD3280>. Survey for the foreign language-speaking candidates is in embargo until the publication of this doctoral dissertation.

An analysis of the representativeness of the candidate survey data is displayed in Table 4.2. It shows that, overall, both samples are fairly representative of the target population. The main concerns regarding the data on Finnish and Swedish-speaking candidates include the over-representation of female and elderly candidates. With respect to the data on foreign language-speaking candidates, bias may potentially originate from the under-representation of younger candidates and the slight over-representation of candidates from small versus large municipalities. My strategy regarding post-stratification is that I employ weights to control for the effect of age and gender only if I have reasonable grounds to assume that these variables significantly influence the results. In these cases, I will conduct parallel analyses with weighted data and compare the results to analyses with non-weighted data. If differences occur, I will report them in the text. Calculation of post-stratification weights is reported in Appendix A.

Chapter 7 answers the first of the two main research questions i.e. what directed parties towards recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates. This analysis is based mainly on dataset 5, but it also draws from dataset 4.

DATASET 5: Party interview data

Party interview data consists of 24 thematic semi-structured interviews with parliamentary parties. In 2018–2019, I interviewed three officers/municipal council chairpersons from each parliamentary party. Eight interviews were conducted at party headquarters in Helsinki, eight at local offices in the city of Vantaa, and eight in the city of Turku. Both cities have a large proportion of foreign-origin population (the shares of the foreign language-speaking population in 2017 were 11.1% and 17.7%, respectively), which makes immigrant political representation a locally important matter. Most of the interviewees were personally involved in the candidate recruitment of the 2017 elections. Two of the national-level interviewees working at the party offices had not been responsible specifically for the 2017 elections but had been involved in numerous previous elections. The interviews covered topics such as how candidate recruitment was organised, by whom, and according to which criteria (see the interview questions in Appendix B).

Table 4.2 Representativeness analysis of the candidate survey data.

	Finnish and Swedish-speaking candidates				Foreign language-speaking candidates			
	Candidate register		Survey data		Candidate register		Survey data	
	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>
All	100	32,889	100	1,010	100	729	100	204
Election result								
Elected councillor	27.2	8,933	27.6	279	9.1	66	7.4	15
Deputy	25.5	8,396	25.8	261	18.8	137	18.6	38
Not elected	47.3	15,560	46.5	470	72.2	526	74.0	151
Gender								
Male	60.2	19,794	55.0	556	56.7	413	58.3	119
Female	39.8	13,095	45.0	454	43.3	316	41.7	85
Age								
18–24	4.2	1,384	4.1	41	6.0	44	4.4	9
25–34	12.0	3,932	10.2	103	22.1	161	15.7	32
35–44	20.4	6,710	15.9	161	29.2	213	30.4	62
45–54	23.5	7,726	21.5	217	26.1	190	29.9	61
55–64	23.2	7,617	25.8	261	13.9	101	14.2	29
65–	16.8	5,520	22.5	227	2.7	20	5.4	11
Language								
Finnish	94.2	30,974	93.5	944				
Swedish	5.7	1,877	6.5	66				
Sámi	0.1	32	0.0	0.0				
Russian					22.4	163	18.6	38
Estonian					9.9	72	12.3	25
Arabic					5.8	42	4.9	10
English					5.5	40	5.9	12
Turkish					5.3	39	4.9	10
Kurdish					5.1	37	3.9	8
Somali					4.1	30	1.5	3
Party								
National Coalition	17.1	5,635	14.4	145	14.3	104	14.7	30
SDP	18.3	6,007	20.6	208	17.1	125	15.2	31
Centre	22.4	7,365	20.9	211	13.2	96	12.3	25
Greens	7.6	2,492	8.6	87	14.8	108	18.6	38
Finns	9.5	3,116	9.5	96	11.9	87	6.9	14
Left Alliance	11.4	3,762	11.0	111	9.5	69	11.8	24
SPP	3.9	1,280	4.3	43	6.0	44	6.4	13
CD	5.8	1,904	6.2	63	9.2	67	10.3	21
Other party	1.5	500	1.7	17	1.7	13	2.5	5
Constituency association	2.5	828	2.9	29	2.2	16	1.5	3
Number of residents in municipality								
–5000	16.1	5,304	16.1	163	9.2	67	10.3	21
5001–20 000	35.2	11,583	33.8	341	21.5	157	27.0	55
20 001–50 000	19.9	6,556	22.5	227	18.7	136	19.1	39
50 001–100 000	11.6	3,830	11.2	113	17.0	124	14.7	30
100 001–250 000	11.9	3,900	11.5	116	19.9	145	16.7	34
250 001–500 000	2.1	689	2.5	25	5.9	43	5.4	11
500 001–	3.1	1,027	2.5	25	7.8	57	6.9	14

The interviews were not recorded because it was presumed that this way the interviewees would be more open to discuss the unofficial practises that guided candidate selection within their party. In retrospect, this strategy seemed fruitful because a few interviewees told me not to write down something they said “off the record”. During the interviews, I made notes, which I wrote up immediately after the interview was over. The duration of the interviews was approximately one hour, the range varying from 40 minutes to 1.5 hours. The interviews were conducted both face-to-face and via phone. It is expected that the phone interviews were not weaker in quality compared to the face-to-face interviews. While I told the interviewees on the phone that I would be making notes, they did not see me doing this, which could potentially have had more positive than negative effects. Phone interviews were a flexible way of reaching e.g. party secretariats, whose daily schedules were rather full and variable, and the risk of them cancelling a face-to-face meeting was high.

When selecting interviewees, I targeted those individuals with the greatest personal experience in political recruitment in the 2017 municipal elections. The interviewees had a double role as both experts in the phenomenon under study and research subjects.²⁵ They were experts in their party’s recruitment practices and decision-making structures, but also gatekeepers who had personally made the decisions about whom the party had recruited. As Gallagher and Marsh (1988) and Bjarnegård and Kenny (2015) note, candidate selection and recruitment are often hidden from the public view and determined by the party’s internal rules, informal practices, and power relationships. Three interviews per party can hardly give an exhaustive account of this multifaceted intraparty process. However, most interviewees had experience in several elections, both local and national, and thereby had expert knowledge about interactions, decision-making, and organisational constellations with respect to the process of political recruitment under study. Hence, their viewpoints, however subjective, were based on long-term first-hand experience. It should be noted that the interviewees were all accustomed to giving interviews and conveying political messages to media and academics. Although I found the interviewees very approachable (as politicians often are) and I believe that they were motivated to provide me with honest answers to the best of their knowledge and belief, it cannot be said that they would not have embellished their and their party’s accounts.

The findings derived from the semi-structured interviews should have some level of generalizability. First of all, the process of political recruitment is not significantly different between the parties that operate within the same state and municipal-level

²⁵ For more insights on expert interviews and their analysis, see e.g. Alastalo & Åkerman 2010.

political opportunity structure. The parties naturally have differing emphases with respect to their candidates' background characteristics, but overall, the enabling and disabling mechanisms in mobilizing a municipality's residents to stand as candidates are common, which means that to this question all 24 interviews do give insights. Second, selecting interviewees from the cities of Vantaa and Turku gives access to the local-level reality in municipalities, in which immigrant political representation is a salient issue. However, the question regarding the context in small municipalities or municipalities where immigrant political representation is not a salient issue was not ignored. Interviewees in the party headquarters were asked to describe the differences in the political recruitment process in large, medium-sized, and small municipalities. This question emerged in the interviews with local party actors in Vantaa and Turku as well, as they also had several opinions on how the context of recruitment is dependent on the size and population structure of the municipality. Therefore, I did not see added value in further interviewing parties in municipalities, where the political representation and participation of the foreign-origin population is a less salient issue. In retrospect, however, it might have been feasible to include the perspective of party actors in a small municipality with a relatively high share of foreign-origin population. After completing approximately two-thirds of the interviews, I began to feel that there was less and less new information for me to learn with respect to the main research questions. This was a signal of reaching the saturation point.

Chapter 8, which is the last empirical chapter, answers the second of the two main research questions, namely, what resource and motivation-related reasons were important in immigrant-origin candidates' decision to run for office in the 2017 Finnish municipal elections. This chapter is based primarily on datasets 4 and 6.

DATASET 6: Candidate interview data

Candidate interview data cover 12 interviews conducted in 2018 among immigrant-origin candidates of the 2017 municipal elections. The primary aim of the interviews was to collect narratives of the individual pathways these candidates had taken in seeking election to municipal councils in Finland. The interviews encompassed topics such as the role of social networks in the interviewees' political engagement in the country of origin and in Finland, the process of becoming a candidate in municipal elections, and the resources invested in campaigning (see the interview questions in Appendix C). To grasp the various push and pull mechanisms along their pathways, I selected candidates with different types of sociodemographic and

migration backgrounds from different municipalities with and without a substantial foreign-origin population. The interviewees were born in different countries and had different ethnic backgrounds (Russian, Estonian, Somalian, Nigerian, Kurdish, Turkish, Bosnian, Indian, and Vietnamese). One of them had been born in Finland to immigrant parents. Five interviewees had a background as involuntary migrants; they had been forced to flee due to civil war or another type of persecution. Three were women and nine were men. Because the candidate interview data are not used for generalisations, the gender imbalance is not a major methodological issue. All parliamentary parties of the time were represented among the interviewees. Six of the interviewees were elected to the municipal council, one was a deputy, and five were not elected. The youngest of the interviewees was 28 years old and the oldest was 53 years old. The interviews were conducted face-to-face. One of the interviews was held in English, while the others were in Finnish. The duration of the interviews ranged from 35 minutes to two hours, and they were recorded. The interviews were transcribed by a company called *Tutkimusitie Ltd.* The interviews were held in the interviewees' homes, workplaces, and public places such as cafeterias.

The role of the candidate interview data is to incorporate qualitative insights into the analysis of candidates' motives and resources based on the candidate survey. While no generalisations can be made based on the interviews, they have filled the gaps and increased my understanding of the most important connections in the quantitative data. The interviews were conducted after the collection of the survey; thus, I was able to test my preliminary ideas and results by feeding them into the interviews and seeing whether the interviewees found any points in common with their own experiences. This process then led to the addition of new independent variables to my descriptive and explanatory analyses or coding the variables differently. To some extent, the interviews were also instrumental in validating the indicators selected for the quantitative analysis. The interviews also verbalise and illustrate the phenomena behind the statistical tables. When the candidates told their stories about their pathways into politics, it provided me with an understanding of the diverse trajectories, crossroads, and milestones in their political experiences and careers.

By integrating the two approaches to data collection – quantitative and qualitative – I hope to develop a more complete understanding of my research problem. Quantitative data is the key to broader trends and generalizations with a large population. The register and survey-based datasets form the basis for a wider picture of electoral engagement and political representation of the foreign-origin population in the municipal councils in Finland. They allow for comparisons between the native

and immigrant-origin candidates regarding their personal and social resources, motivations, political attitudes, and campaigns. The qualitative interview data sheds light on the process of the political recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates from the perspective of parties and individual immigrant-origin candidates. It encapsulates the accumulated experiences of the interviewees and enables a more in-depth analysis of the phenomenon.

In the analysis of the quantitative register and survey data, the focus is on understanding between and within-group dynamics regarding electoral engagement and access to political representation between different immigrant groups and between the immigrants and the native population. I compare different groups and subgroups by looking at the mean values and distributions of several dependent variables across the categories of the explanatory variables. More specific methods include, for instance, crosstabulation and logistic regression. Appropriate statistical tests including Pearson's chi-squared test, one-way ANOVA, and t-test are employed to analyse whether the observed associations and relationships among the survey respondents are likely present in the population.

The interview data is analysed by means of qualitative content analysis. In practise, this has meant that I have interpreted the content of the interview data by systematically coding the transcriptions and identifying themes and patterns regarding, for instance, parties' recruitment practises and candidates' motivation to stand in the elections. The analysis was mainly deductive, i.e. it was directed by the theoretical model presented in Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2.2.

5 ELECTORAL ENGAGEMENT OF IMMIGRANTS IN FINLAND

This chapter investigates the electoral engagement of the immigrant-origin population in Finland and asks, *what were the key differences in electoral engagement between different ethnic groups?* The examination is conducted by, first, examining immigrants' voter turnout in the 2017 municipal elections and the variation in turnout across the largest language groups. After this, the focus turns to whether immigrants' group consciousness, their trust towards the Finnish political system, and their interest in social issues are associated with their willingness to vote in Finnish elections. Finally, Chapter 5 ends with an investigation of immigrants' participation in civic associations, which foster political participation and are important arenas for political recruitment. Understanding the level of political activity and political interest of different immigrant groups enables further evaluation of their capacity to aspire for political representation in the 2017 municipal elections.

In Finland, there are still very few representative data sources on the electoral behaviour and political attitudes of immigrant minorities. For instance, although we have detailed register-based information on immigrants' turnout, there is very little we know about their attitudes towards the Finnish electoral system and their vote choice. Those things we know are reviewed in this chapter.

5.1 Immigrant-origin voters in the 2017 municipal elections


Voter turnout is the main form of political participation that makes some social groups more attractive than others in the eyes of political parties. It may be expected, first, that parties are interested in recruiting candidates from large ethnic minority groups who, if mobilised, have the potential to contribute to a party's electoral success. Second, although a group of regular non-voters signals untapped potential, parties are rational prospectors i.e. interested primarily in using their limited resources efficiently by targeting persons who most likely turn out to vote (Brady et al. 1999). Therefore, parties should be interested in groups that actively take part in elections. Third, aspiring immigrant-origin candidates may also closely evaluate the

extent to which they can leverage co-ethnic support or support from other ethnic minorities. Knowing that the level of turnout among immigrants and/or people of their own ethnic group is high or low is likely to influence the motivation of immigrants to stand as candidates. Therefore, this chapter investigates immigrants' turnout in the 2017 municipal elections. First, it shows how turnout varied *between* immigrant groups. Second, it examines the variation in turnout *within* the largest immigrant groups by employing individual-level voter register data.

In the 2017 municipal elections, four percent of all persons entitled to vote were foreign citizens and around 1.7 percent had dual citizenship. Persons of foreign origin, that is, persons for whom both parents or the only known parent were born abroad, represented 5.7 percent of those entitled to vote. Examined by native language, the result is identical to the examination by origin: Foreign language speakers constituted 5.7 percent of the persons entitled to vote (Official Statistics of Finland 2017a).

The turnout of foreign language speakers was clearly lower than the turnout of Finnish, Swedish, and Sámi speakers: 23.9 percent in contrast to 57.5 percent. In total, the difference was 33.6 percentage points. Figure 5.1 presents the turnout rates of the 15 largest language groups in Finland. As the figure shows, the turnout was highest among Swedish speakers (70.9%). This group includes both Swedish-speaking Finns and foreign-origin Swedish speakers. The turnout of Finnish and Sámi speakers was 58.9 percent. The highest voting percentage among foreign language speakers was among Somali speakers, 53 percent, which was nearly as high as the turnout among Finnish-speaking voters. Among other foreign language-speaking groups, only German speakers' voting turnout reached 50 percent. In all other groups, the turnout was remarkably lower. Among the two largest immigrant-origin groups, the Russians and Estonians, the voting turnout was 19.7 and 11.1 percent, respectively.

Figure 5.1 Turnout among persons entitled to vote by native language in the 2017 municipal elections (%).




Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2017b.

The trends with respect to turnout among the largest immigrant groups have mostly stayed the same between the 2012 and 2017 municipal elections. As Figure 5.2 shows, Russian and Estonian speakers also had a low turnout compared to Somali speakers in 2012. It seems that Somalis’ turnout increased by 13 percentage points in the 2017 elections as compared to the 2012 elections. Because the voting districts where data on voting on the actual election day are available were not the same in 2012 and in 2017, it cannot be concluded with full certainty that the increase in turnout indeed was this high, though it is safe to assume that, for some reason, Somali-origin voters were more active in 2017 than in 2012 elections.²⁶ Figure 5.2

²⁶ I have personally requested the information on the voter districts from the Legal Register Centre of the Ministry of Justice. The socioeconomic characteristics of the voter districts, from which information on turnout are available, may influence the findings. If, for example, the districts included in the 2017 data had immigrants with a higher socioeconomic status than the districts in the 2012 data, the increase in turnout of a group may be explained by SES rather than a change in the contextual setting.

further demonstrates the effect of naturalisation on turnout: Naturalised persons voted more actively compared to foreign country nationals.

Figure 5.2 Turnout in the 2012 municipal elections among persons entitled to vote by language, nationality, and former nationality (%).



Source: Wass & Weide 2015.

Notes: The information on turnout in the 2012 elections is drawn from the individual-level voter register maintained by the Ministry of Justice.

What explains these large differences in turnout between the foreign language-speaking groups? Borg (2018a: 84–90), who has conducted a detailed study on voting behaviour in the 2017 Finnish municipal elections, concludes that, overall, most persons who considered voting important turned out to vote. As he continues, perceiving voting as important is an outcome of two main motivations: voting as a way of influencing political decision-making and voting as a civic duty. Overall, an individual’s decision to vote is often explained with a very similar model as their decision to participate in elections as candidates. While the barrier of participating as

a voter rather than as a candidate is significantly lower, it is a sum of personal motivation and resources, as well as mobilisation via social networks at home and workplace, religious communities, and leisure-time activities (Verba et al. 1995: 16–17; Wass & Borg 2016; Wass & Blais 2016). Wass and Weide (2015: 19) provide a summary of variables at the institutional and individual levels that prior research has found to have a significant impact on immigrants’ voting behaviour. Their summary is presented in Table 5.1.

In Finland, regulations regarding voter registration should not be a barrier to electoral participation. An individual does not need to do anything to be entered into the voting register, which is maintained by The Digital and Population Data Services Agency (formerly known as The Population Register Centre) and the local register offices. A person only needs to show his or her personal identification card at the polling station, where the eligibility is checked.²⁷ All eligible voters are also automatically notified about their eligibility around three weeks before the election day, when the local register office sends a polling card to all those who are entitled to vote and whose addresses are found in the voting register. However, the polling card sent to eligible voters is in Finnish and Swedish and, thus, may not be accessible to non-Finnish or non-Swedish speakers.

Although voting is technically made accessible (for instance, during the advance voting period there are several polling stations in libraries and supermarkets, in which it is very easy to drop by), voting in Finnish elections may be more difficult than in many other countries due to the electoral system. Because the Finnish open list system requires a voter to choose not only a party but also a candidate within that party (and only one candidate is allowed), the choice between multiple options may be perceived as cognitively demanding (von Schoultz 2018). To give an example, the number of candidates per municipality in 2017 varied between the minimum of 21 and the maximum of 1084 candidates. As Table 5.2 shows, around one-third of the total population and two-thirds of the foreign-origin population resided in municipalities, in which there were more than 500 candidates from which to choose. Thereby, an individual’s personal resources (that relate to e.g. age and the level of education) and group attachments (based on shared ethnicity, for instance), which help to overcome this cognitively demanding task, determine to a large extent his or her decision to cast a vote (e.g. Berelson et al. 1954: 54–76; Borg 2018a: 84–91; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 102).

²⁷ For more information on the organisation of Finnish elections, see the elections website of the Ministry of Justice (www.vaalit.fi).

Table 5.1 Factors influencing immigrants' electoral participation at the institutional and individual levels.

INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL	
<i>Characteristics of the country of origin</i>	<i>Characteristics of the host country</i>
Level of democratization	Public services available for immigrants Regulations regarding advance voter registration Voter identification requirement on election Possibility to vote in absentia Residential concentration of own ethnic group Political representation of own ethnic group
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL	
<i>Migration-related factors</i>	<i>Social background</i>
Migration generation Access to citizenship Length of settlement in the host country Age at migration Membership in an ethnic association Integration in the new home country: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - having a native spouse - children's schooling - studying - access to employment - language skills - trust in the political system - identification with the host country - interest in host country politics - following social issues - association membership - friendship relations with citizens of the host country - psychological engagement with own neighbourhood - experiences of discrimination based on ethnic background 	Religiosity Gender Marital status Interaction between gender and marital status Age Parenting Education Income House ownership Internal migration (length of residence in municipality)

Source: Wass & Weide 2015: 19.

Table 5.2 The demographic context for the 2017 municipal elections (2).

Number of candidates in municipality	Number of municipalities	Total population	Share of total population (%)	Foreign-origin population	Share of total foreign-origin population (%)
–50	85	215,510	3.9	5104	1.3
51–100	112	691,962	12.6	17,305	4.6
101–150	41	606,447	11.1	18,421	4.9
151–200	23	540,613	9.9	20,734	5.5
201–300	14	571,351	10.4	26,350	6.9
301–500	13	948,895	17.3	52,340	13.8
501–	7	1,908,863	34.8	239,553	63.1
Total	295	5,483,641	100	379,807	100

Source: Candidate register data; Official Statistics of Finland 2020e.

Immigrants’ reasons for abstaining from voting were examined recently in an extensive national survey conducted by the *Finnish institute for health and welfare (THL)*.²⁸ Based on this *FinMonik* survey data, Kuusio et al. (2020a) show that lack of information was the most important reason for abstaining (see also Jutila-Roon 2016). Altogether, 30 percent of immigrant-origin non-voters reported this as one of the reasons for staying home.²⁹ Approximately one-fifth of the respondents reported a lack of interest in elections and voting. For around 15 percent of the respondents, lack of trust in politics, difficulties in finding a suitable candidate, a sense of not being able to influence things by voting, and being abroad during the elections were reasons for abstaining. Protesting was rarely a cause for not casting a vote.

Kuusio et al. did not find large differences between men and women. However, men reported feeling distrustful towards politics more often than women, and women reported not having enough information more often than men. Kuusio et al. do not provide much information regarding how the country of origin influenced

²⁸ FinMonik 2018–2019 is the most extensive survey (n= 6836) so far carried out among the population with foreign background born abroad and living in Finland. It used a representative sample to collect data on the 18–64-year-old population with foreign background at the county level (Kuusio et al. 2020b).


²⁹ Recognising this problem, public authorities have initiated some actions to spread information about elections among immigrants. For instance, under the 2012 and 2017 municipal elections, the Ministry of Justice funded immigrant associations, who organised democracy education activities for immigrants (Moniheli 2020).

the answers. They mention, however, that lack of trust towards politics was much more common among Estonian-origin immigrants compared to other groups³⁰. One-third of Estonians also reported that they cannot affect things by voting. Lack of information was reported most often among Asian immigrants, among whom 40 percent considered not having had enough information. It may be expected that while there is large individual-level variation within a group of co-ethnics, the country of origin may in several ways impact the conditions for considering voting in Finnish elections meaningful. We cannot, for instance, expect a person from a non-democratic country to have the same experiences as a democratic citizen compared to a person from a country with a political system similar to Finland's.

The individual-level register data on turnout in the 2017 municipal elections allow for an in-depth examination of turnout between and within the largest immigrant groups based on individuals' socioeconomic background. Therefore, the rest of Chapter 5.1 focuses in more detail on the voting patterns of Russian, Estonian, Somalian, and Swedish-origin immigrants, from which Finland has received the largest share of immigrants since the beginning of the 1990s (Figure 5.3). While these groups are selected due to their large share as well as the availability of research data, the four groups also represent interesting cases research-wise. Russia, Estonia, Somalia, and Sweden each have a different political context to which their citizens have socialized, and migration trajectories from these countries towards Finland differ greatly. The idea of focusing on these groups is to demonstrate how immigrants' electoral engagement is influenced by multiple dimensions of life both in Finland and in the country of origin, and therefore, predictors of electoral participation differ by ethnic background. It is also important to understand from what type of communities immigrant-origin candidates of the 2017 elections arose. Some of the immigrant minority groups form tight co-ethnic communities, while others are less attached to their co-ethnics (as will be shown in Chapter 5.2).

³⁰ The comparison was made between immigrants from (1) Russia and Former Soviet Union, (2) Estonia, (3) Middle East and North Africa, (4) Rest of Africa, (5) Asia, (6) EU, Efta, and North America, and (7) all other regions including Latin America and Former Yugoslavia.

Figure 5.3 Immigration to Finland between 1990–2018 by countries of origin.



Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2020h.

Notes: The figure shows, on a yearly basis, the share of immigrants from different countries of origin out of immigrants in total. For instance, while immigrants from Russia formed the majority during the 1990s, Estonians became a majority from the mid-2000s onwards.

Estonia. At the beginning of the 1990s, right after the restoration of independence, Estonian civil society was weak, and as in many post-communist countries at the time, an anti-political ethos was typical. Since then, however, civic engagement in the policy-making process has been promoted in several ways and politicians and civil servants have adopted more positive attitudes towards civil society organisations (Saarts & Jakobson 2019). During the past 30 years, Estonia’s political system has developed into a stable and well-consolidated democracy with free and fair elections as well as a stable and sustainable environment for civil society activity (see also Freedom House 2019).

Russia’s political system, in turn, is based on personalized authority, dependent on President Vladimir Putin to function in its current form (e.g. Robinson 2018). Political elites invest a high amount of resources in ensuring a favourable electoral outcome by removing most opposition candidates from the ballot and using state resources to back favoured candidates. Although elections are held regularly, electoral fraud is common. Russian authorities have put major pressure on civil society, and serious political challenges to executive power are absent or muted.

Today, Russia's political system may be described as dictatorial and illiberal. The terms "guided" or "managed democracy" have also been used as a reference to Russian's formally democratic government, which, in practice, functions as an autocracy (Robinson 2018; Wegren & Konitzer 2007).

Somalia is a so-called "failed state" without functioning societal or political institutions (e.g. Keating & Waldman 2019). In terms of corruption, citizens' freedom, civic liberties, and political rights, the situation is one of the worst in the world (Freedom House 2018). Currently, the country has no effective or legally recognized political parties. Instead, political power is used by clans – traditional kinship networks – that are the pillars of Somali social and political organisation. Interestingly, it seems that lack of freedom in the country of origin has not hindered Finnish Somalis' interest in participating in Finnish politics; rather, the contrary is the case.

Sweden. Coming from a well-established democracy and a strong welfare state, Swedish-origin voters represent the most similar group compared to Finnish-origin voters (Arter 2016). In terms of public institutions, Sweden and Finland are in many ways similar societies, Finland having been part of Sweden for over 700 years before becoming an autonomous part of the Russian empire in 1809 and maintaining close ties ever since. Finland's and Sweden's political and party systems, as well as societies' political cleavages, are very alike (ibid.). Finland and Sweden both became members of the European Union (EU) in 1995, and Estonia in 2004. Being members of the EU brings these countries closer together. The EU is an economic and political union, and its citizens travel freely throughout most of the continent. All EU citizens have the right and freedom to choose in which EU country they want to study, work, or retire. Every EU country must treat EU citizens in exactly the same way as its own citizens for employment, social security, and tax purposes.³¹

Language-wise, the Swedes enjoy the advantage of Swedish being an official language of Finland, which means that Swedish-origin immigrants have the opportunity to use their native language when using public services, consuming political information, and even discussing with politicians. In Swedish-speaking areas of the country, Swedes manage in everyday life almost without any knowledge of the Finnish language. While Estonian and Finnish are related languages, knowing one does not provide direct access to understanding the other. Praakli (2017: 33) estimates that, currently, a large share of Estonians in Finland come from regions in Southern Estonia, which means that they have not been in direct contact with the Finnish language before adult life. Thus, although speaking Estonian may provide a

³¹ For more information, see the official website of the European Union: www.europa.eu.

fast lane into mastering the Finnish language, it still takes time and effort to acquire language proficiency.

Migration trajectories, which differ between the examined immigrant groups, are also likely to influence attitudes towards electoral participation. For instance, those who have moved to Finland for short-term studies or employment are probably more likely to consider voting less important than those who see Finland as their permanent home country in the future. Okólski (2001) speaks of “incomplete migration”, by which he refers to temporary migrants, whose aim is to earn money in the host country and spend it in the home country. These temporary migrants live so-called split lives, being economically active in the host country and maintaining their family lives in the country of origin. Engbersen et al. (2010), in turn, use the term “liquid migration” to describe transitory migration patterns with uncertainty about the future. Due to the short-term nature of the migration, liquid migrants have a weak or non-existent residence status in the host country. In a similar vein, Berry (2002: 348) speaks of “sojourners” i.e. immigrants who are in the country temporarily in a variety of roles, and for a set purpose (such as international students, diplomats, business executives, aid workers, or guest workers). Against the knowledge that they will eventually leave, these people may hesitate to become fully involved in society, to establish close relationships, or to begin to identify with the new society.

The above descriptions fit many Estonians, who can come and go without restrictions due to free mobility between Finland and Estonia. Free mobility combined with an option for a higher income has made it very common for Estonians to travel across the Gulf of Finland without any specific intention to settle in Finland in the long run³² (Anniste & Tammaru 2014; Alho & Sippola 2018; Kährik & Tammaru 2019). Because societal integration is often measured with labour market integration, Estonians with a high employment rate are found to be much better integrated into Finnish society than most other immigrant groups (Eronen et al. 2014: 35–36). Yet, as studies of Pitkänen et al. (2019a; 2019b: 37–38) show, Estonians are the least integrated when measured in terms of interest in Finnish politics, plans for long-term settlement, intentions of forming relationships with natives, or identification with Finnish society. In other words, many Estonians in Finland have one foot in and the other foot out of the country, and many want to return to Estonia (Anniste & Tammaru 2014; Kährik & Tammaru 2019). Overall,

³² However, it should be noted that commuters, who do not register their residence in Finland, are not included in the population eligible to vote in municipal elections.

those who have migrated to Finland for work identify the least with the Finnish society (Chapter 5.2; Pitkänen et al. 2019a).

The migration patterns of Russian-origin immigrants differ from those of Estonians, even though both come from countries with geographical proximity to Finland. Whereas Estonians enjoy free mobility, Russian citizens need a residence permit in order to settle in Finland. For both groups, seeking love, employment, and/or education are the most common reasons to settle in Finland, but while employment is the main motivation for Estonians, Russians migrate most often for family reasons (Pitkänen et al. 2019a: 20; Sutela & Larja 2015a). Migration patterns from Estonia and Russia are also gendered. Women, more often than men, migrate for family reasons, whereas men migrate more often for work (Sutela & Larja 2015a). Between 1990 and 2018, altogether 35,645 female and 23,424 male Russian-speaking persons have migrated to Finland from Russia or the Former Soviet Union (Statistics Finland 2019). The ratio of around 60 percent women and 40 percent men has been stable across years. This imbalance is explained mostly by the fact that Finnish-origin men are more prone to starting a family with a Russian-origin spouse compared to Finnish-origin women (Official Statistics of Finland 2020i). This also implies that among Russian-origin immigrants in Finland, women more often have native-origin spouses than men.

Engagement in the Finnish political system should be stronger among immigrants who have moved to Finland due to family reasons. First, it often indicates longer-term settlement instead of a temporary stay. Given that political decision-making is often slow, and the outcomes of the decisions are seen in the long run rather than in the short run, those who have chosen to settle in Finland for a longer period of time have more incentives to cast a vote compared to those who see their stay as temporary. Over time and through exposure to the new environment, immigrants' political attitudes and behaviour start to resemble the behaviour and attitudes of the surrounding society (White et al. 2008). Second, having a native spouse enforces political engagement if the spouse is interested in and participates in politics. A spouse who votes sets an example, in addition to which a spouse transfers information about the Finnish political system and may provide help in deciding upon a suitable candidate.

Somalian-origin persons have migrated to Finland either as asylum seekers or refugees or as their family members (Mubarak et al. 2015; Pitkänen et al. 2019a: 20; Sutela & Larja 2015a; Tiilikainen 2014, 25–26). As refugees, they are so-called “forced” or “involuntary” migrants, who had to flee their home country and are often not able to return even if willing. However, the Somali diaspora in Finland has

extensive transnational ties to other Somali diasporas, in addition to which it actively sends remittances to and leads development projects in Somalia (Al-Sharmani & Ismail 2017; Tiilikainen 2014; see also the websites of the Finnish Somalia Network and the Finland–Somalia Association). Mixed marriages between Finnish Somalis and Finnish-origin Finns are very rare. Instead, Somalis' marriage practices and relationships are strongly shaped by their transnational family ties and relations, for spouses are often found from transnational kin-based networks (Al-Sharmani & Ismail 2017).

The tightness of the Somali community is further strengthened by their residential concentration in the Greater Helsinki area. Somali culture emphasizes community spirit and the importance of family, which has also encouraged those Somali refugees who initially were accommodated elsewhere in Finland to move to Helsinki, Espoo, or Vantaa. Residential concentration is also a result of advice and experiences on housing shared among co-ethnics. Especially those areas that are perceived as xenophobic are avoided when making decisions on accommodation (Virtanen 2008). This reflects Somalis' status as a visible minority, which has been the special focus of anti-immigration rhetoric in the media as well as attacks by neo-Nazi groups (Aden 2009; Puuronen 2011). As Pitkänen et al. (2019a: 41) speculate, Somalis' preferences to live in certain areas may also be affected by the availability of public services in their own language.

The electoral activity of immigrants depends largely on the support networks available. Finnish Somalis form a tight community with active civil associations. Altogether, they have established more civil associations than any other immigrant group in Finland (Saksela 2003: 252–255). While many of these associations have targeted their actions at improving the living conditions in Somalia, they also promote social and political integration in Finland. It has been argued that immigrant organisations play a positive role in the process of integration, and especially help marginalized groups to establish an important social space and a sense of belonging (Pirkkalainen 2013). However, as Pyykkönen and Martikainen (2013: 291) argue, participation in civic associations should not be over-emphasized, because most immigrants are not active in associations. The ability of a number of Somali associations to promote the inclusion and wellbeing of Somalis in Finland has also been questioned from within the Somali community (Open Society Foundations 2014: 108–110). Nevertheless, a dense social network of the Finnish Somali community could still be a key factor in explaining Somalis' relatively high turnout in Finnish municipal elections (Pirkkalainen et al. 2016). Communication costs in a

tightly knit network are considerably lower, which makes the political mobilisation of such a group much easier compared to a loosely organised group of co-ethnics.

Moreover, it is important to consider the conditions under which immigrants have been welcomed into Finnish society. Although international comparisons consider Finnish integration policies and public institutions as open and supportive towards minorities (e.g. Huddleston et al. 2011), legislation and official practices differ from attitudes, behaviour, and experiences of everyday life. Discrimination against immigrants is one of the major factors hindering their sense of belonging in Finnish society, and on average, Finns' attitudes towards immigrants depend largely on immigrants' country of origin (Jaakkola 2009). Discriminatory attitudes are a mix of biological and cultural racism, welfare chauvinism³³, and prejudice connected to historical events and inter-group contact (Jaakkola 2009: 78–82; Keskinen et al. 2010; Mähönen & Jasinkaja-Lahti 2013; Puuronen 2011: 7–8; 35–37).

Tensions between Sweden and Finland are very subtle, meaning that Finns have very little xenophobic attitudes towards Swedish people (Jaakkola 2005: 69). In the 1960s and 1970s, Finnish people emigrated in large numbers to Sweden for work and not vice versa, which means that probably Swedes more than Finns have felt threatened about the other taking away jobs or suppressing wages. However, while Swedish immigrants come from a culturally very similar context and often have a high socioeconomic status, the slight cultural tensions between Finns and Swedes may develop into symbolic and social barriers to participation (Wahlbeck 2015).

Discrimination against the ethnic Russians derives largely from historical antipathy towards Russia as a superpower, which poses a realistic threat to Finns' sovereignty. Estonian construction workers have been feared to replace Finnish workers due to lower salary demands. Somalis, in turn, have been accused of exploiting Finland's generous social security system without contributing to the labour market (Aden 2009; Jaakkola 2009). Unlike most Russian, Estonian, and Swedish-origin immigrants, Somalis are visually distinguishable from the majority population, and thus are not able to hide their minority status if so willing. However, this visibility could be an advantage regarding Somalis' political representation. Somali-origin politicians (as well as politicians from the Middle Eastern countries) are visibly present in Finnish media, unlike politicians with a Russian, Estonian, or Swedish background. As such, visible ethnic minority politicians show that people from these groups have a say in Finnish decision-making, which potentially empowers ethnic minority voters.

³³ Welfare chauvinism refers to a notion that welfare benefits should be restricted to certain groups, particularly to the natives of a country as opposed to immigrants.

Thus far, I have summarised factors that should explain differences in participation in Finnish politics among the largest immigrant groups. Belonging to a category of “immigrant” intersects with other important categories such as gender, age, level of education, and social class, all of which individually influence voting behaviour (see Table 5.1). While there are some connecting factors in being “an immigrant”, the groups differ to a large extent. In fact, as Alho and Sippola (2018) argue, we should not automatically expect solidarity between immigrant minorities. As their findings show, many Estonian-origin immigrants wish to distance themselves from other “less-deserving” immigrants and, rather, identify with the majority population. For these people, the motivation for voting in order to promote minorities’ rights in Finnish society should be less likely compared to those whose identity is built strongly on minority status.

On the other hand, solidarity towards co-ethnics within one ethnic group is not self-evident either. As Wahlbeck (2005: 44) describes, immigrants are members of so-called imagined communities, kept together by shared ethnic identity or political or religious convictions. Symbolic ties are especially strong among refugees, who often maintain a strong political orientation towards homeland politics. However, these transnational ties do not necessarily wholly unite a migrant group, because differences of opinion are more of a rule rather than an exception. Most ethnic groups are internally divided by several ethnic identities and political orientations. For instance, although in comparison to other immigrant groups the Somali community appears close-knit, the community is divided by clan relations as well as identities related to country of origin (Mubarak et al. 2015; Pirkkalainen 2013; Tiilikainen & Hassan Mohamed 2013). Also, the timing of migration divides the community, as it determines how life was in the country of origin and how much experience the individuals have in Finnish society. Those who fled Somalia at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s were more wealthy and educated compared to the younger generation who left the country and migrated to Finland during the 2000s. While the former had experience of peaceful times, the latter experienced more or less only war. Thereby, illiteracy, especially among women, is more common among the later arrivals. Further, those who have resided in Finland longer have adapted to Finnish customs and at times disapprove of the behaviour of those later arrivals who stand out more (Mubarak et al. 2015: 35).

Next, I will examine within-group variation among Russian, Estonian, Somalian, and Swedish-origin voters by employing individual-level electronic voter register data. The dataset includes information on whether or not persons eligible to vote used their right to vote, as well as information on their demographic and

socioeconomic background, including gender, age, occupational status, personal income (subject to state taxation), marital status, and citizenship.³⁴ As such, the data allow *an examination of the impact of SES on turnout*.

The data also contain several overlapping items that measure an individual's immigration background. These are native language, country of birth, nationality, former nationality, and origin. Origin-item has four categories: (1) Finnish-born Finnish origin, (2) foreign-born Finnish origin, (3) Finnish-born foreign origin, and (4) foreign-born foreign origin. The classification "foreign origin" refers to persons for whom both parents or the only known parent have been born abroad. The analysis focuses on persons who are both foreign origin and foreign born. It does not cover the so-called second generation i.e. persons whose parents are foreign-born but who themselves are born in Finland. As such, the analysis covers solely people who themselves have migrated to Finland.³⁵

Due to the privacy policies of Statistics Finland, relevant information on native language, country of birth, and citizenship is available in the register data only for the largest immigrant groups. These include persons who are citizens of or were born in Sweden, Russia, Estonia, or Somalia, or have registered either Russian, Estonian, or Somalian as their native language in the Finnish Population Information System. Because Swedish is one of Finland's official languages, this item alone does not indicate immigration background. The rest of the non-citizens and non-native language speakers are in the category "other".

In general, there are several problems in identifying specific immigrant groups in the population register (e.g. Saukkonen 2020: 25–26; Tammenmaa 2020). For instance, it is possible to register only one native language even if a person is multilingual. People themselves can decide which language they register, and the decision is influenced by multiple individual reasons. Acknowledging these

³⁴ The data also include information on, for instance, the number of children as well as the level of education, but these variables have a high percentage of missing values especially regarding foreign-origin persons. The information on the level of education is based on Statistics Finland's Register of Completed Education and Degrees, which, according to Witting (2019), has thus far not given truthful account of the educational background of foreign-origin population. In 2019, Statistics Finland has supplemented the register by acquiring information on foreign-origin persons' degrees that are taken abroad. This information, however, was collected after the data on turnout applied in this study was extracted in spring 2018.

³⁵ The register data includes altogether 1,377,448 persons entitled to vote. Out of these, 71,628 (5.2%) are foreign-born and foreign-origin i.e. immigrants. 2,488 (0.2%) are children of immigrants, that is, Finnish-born yet foreign-origin. In the 2017 municipal elections, 5.8 percent of all persons entitled to vote were of foreign origin (Official Statistics of Finland 2017c), which means that the register data compiled from those electoral wards that utilized electronic voting register has 0.4 percentage points less foreign-origin persons entitled to vote.

limitations and the fact that the analysis mixes groups formulated based on shared language and/or same country of birth, the turnout of the following groups will be examined in more detail:

Russian-origin immigrants (n=14,303) cover all those foreign-origin and foreign-born eligible persons who have registered Russian as their native language, excluding those whose country of birth is Estonia. Out of the compared groups, this one is most heterogeneous, as Russian is a native language of persons from several Former Soviet Union countries. However, information on country of birth cannot be utilised, as in the data, Russia as a country of birth applies only to persons born after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, whereas most Russian-speaking immigrants in Finland have been born in the Former Soviet Union. According to data from Statistics Finland (2020h), between the years 1992–2017, altogether 74 percent of those 72,214 Russian-speaking persons who migrated to Finland came from Russia. Sixteen percent of them came from Estonia. Three percent of Russian speakers who have migrated to Finland between 1992–2017 are from Ukraine, and even smaller shares are from Lithuania, Latvia, and Kazakhstan (Official Statistics of Finland 2020h). By taking into account the country of birth, it is possible to separate some of the Russian-speaking Estonian-born persons into the group of Estonian-origin immigrants. However, Russian speakers born in Estonia during the Soviet era are regarded as Russians. Overall, Russian speakers in Finland represent several nationalities and ethnic groups, including a large group of Ingrian Finnish returnees³⁶.

Estonian-origin immigrants (n=14,346) cover those foreign-origin and foreign-born eligible persons who either have registered Estonia as their native language or were born in Estonia. Thus, this group also partly covers the Estonian-origin Russian-speaking minority as long as they were born after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Somalian-origin immigrants (n=1,699) include those foreign-origin and foreign-born eligible persons who have registered Somali as their native language. Altogether, 1,667 of them have also been born in Somalia. One limitation regarding the data is that in Helsinki, where most of the Somalian-origin immigrants reside, the electronic voting register was used in only a few voting districts, which may potentially influence the results.

Swedish-origin immigrants (n=734) cover foreign-origin and foreign-born eligible persons who have been born in Sweden. The use of the origin-variable means that persons who have been born in Sweden to Finnish-born parents are excluded from this group. On the other hand, persons born in Sweden to Finnish-born

³⁶ Ingrian Finns are the Finnish population of Ingria in Russia. Ingrian Finns descend from Finnish immigrants introduced into the area in the 1600s, when Finland and Ingria were both parts of the Swedish Empire (e.g. Matley 1979). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, approximately 30,000 Ingrian Finns moved to Finland, where they were eligible for automatic residence permits under the Finnish *Law of Return*. The remigration period ended in July 2016, after which Ingrian Finns seeking residence have been granted a residence permit on the same grounds as other applicants (Finnish Immigration Service 2016).

grandparents are included. In identifying Swedish-origin immigrants, it is not possible to utilize information on native language because several foreign-born persons who have migrated to Finland – especially to the country’s Swedish-speaking areas – have good reasons to register Swedish as their native language even if they were not originally Swedish-speaking or of Swedish origin. Out of the persons in this group, 504 have Swedish, 198 have Finnish, and 32 have other languages registered as their native language.

In the analysis, the turnout of the four immigrant groups is compared to the turnout of the **Finnish-born and Finnish-origin voters**, whose native language is either Finnish or Swedish (n=1,290,251).

Table 5.3 shows the distribution of persons entitled to vote in the electronic voter register data by ethnic background and demographic and socioeconomic status. First, we see that there was a clear overrepresentation of females among the Russian-origin (62%), while among the Swedish-origin there were more males (56%). In other groups, the distribution is closer to a 50–50 ratio (see also Figure 3.5). With respect to age, we observe that Somalian-origin persons eligible to vote were significantly younger compared to other groups. Nearly 40 percent of them were less than 30 years of age. Age distribution among those of Swedish origin most resembled the corresponding distribution among the native population, meaning that the share of elder people was significantly higher in comparison to other immigrant groups.

Nearly half of the Estonian-origin immigrants were manual workers, while half of the Somalian-origin immigrants were in the category “unemployed/other/unknown”. Among the Somalian-origin, there was also a large share of students (25%), which is related to the young average age in the group. With respect to income level, it is found that more than four out of five Somalian-origin and half of Russian-origin were in the lowest decile, meaning that their personal taxable income was, at maximum, 14,000 euros per year. The income distribution among Estonian and Swedish-origin immigrants much more resembles the corresponding distribution among the native population.

The share of unmarried persons was highest among the Estonian and Somalian-origin immigrants, which is connected to the younger age structure in comparison to other groups. The share of married persons was highest among Russian and Swedish-origin immigrants, which reflects the prevalence of family reasons as a cause for migrating to Finland within these groups. Naturalisation was most common among the Russian and Somalian-origin immigrants: Nearly half in both groups had Finnish citizenship. The corresponding share among the Estonian-origin immigrants is only one out of ten, which at least partly reflects their temporary settlement in Finland. However, as citizens of the EU, Estonians and Swedes are entitled to several

rights in Finland even without applying for Finnish citizenship, meaning that the added value that comes with naturalisation is lower for them than it is for Russians and Somalians.

Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the results of logistic regression analyses run in each group separately, when the dependent variable is turnout (0=did not vote, 1=voted) and the independent variables are the demographic and SES variables presented in Table 5.3. Table 5.4 presents the results as odd ratios showing which independent variables statistically significantly affected turnout when all other variables were controlled. Table 5.5 shows both actual and predicted turnout rates across ethnic groups and independent variables. The predicted turnout rates (on a scale from 0 to 100) are obtained from the logistic regression models presented in Table 5.4 by calculating the so-called average predictive margins (also called average adjusted predictions). The idea is to show exactly what could have been the turnout across the various categories if other social categories were held equal.

Table 5.3 Distribution of persons entitled to vote in the electronic voter register data by ethnic background and demographic and socioeconomic status, % (n).

	Finnish-origin	Russian-origin	Estonian-origin	Somalian-origin	Swedish-origin
Gender					
Male	48.7 (628,058)	37.9 (5,417)	50.1 (7,184)	50.9 (864)	56.3 (413)
Female	51.3 (662,193)	62.1 (8,886)	49.9 (7,162)	49.2 (835)	43.7 (321)
Total	100 (1,290,251)	100 (14,303)	100 (14,346)	100 (1,699)	100 (734)
Age					
18–29	17.0 (218,942)	16.4 (2,347)	17.9 (2,562)	38.0 (646)	13.9 (102)
30–39	14.3 (184,068)	24.2 (3,457)	31.4 (4,502)	27.8 (472)	14.9 (109)
40–49	14.2 (183,151)	21.7 (3,101)	24.6 (3,533)	17.1 (291)	16.9 (124)
50–59	16.7 (215,409)	20.0 (2,864)	17.7 (2,533)	11.2 (190)	14.7 (108)
60–69	17.6 (227,276)	12.4 (1,770)	7.1 (1,020)	3.9 (67)	12.0 (88)
70–	20.3 (261,405)	5.3 (764)	1.4 (196)	1.9 (33)	27.7 (203)
Total	100 (1,290,251)	100 (14,303)	100 (14,346)	100 (1,699)	100 (734)
Occupation					
Self-employed (farmers and non-farmers)	5.2 (66,594)	4.7 (666)	6.3 (853)	0.4 (6)	5.0 (34)
Upper-level employees	10.8 (139,170)	8.0 (1,134)	4.1 (558)	2.7 (46)	11.2 (77)
Lower-level employees	19.4 (250,497)	14.5 (2,064)	11.4 (1,556)	6.0 (102)	13.7 (94)
Manual workers	14.7 (189,821)	21.3 (3,032)	45.4 (6,185)	11.5 (194)	11.8 (81)
Students/pupils	7.0 (90,293)	12.1 (1,725)	6.3 (860)	25.4 (431)	4.7 (32)
Pensioners	31.8 (409,536)	9.7 (1,380)	4.0 (541)	5.2 (88)	35.3 (242)
Unemployed/Other/Unknown	11.1 (143,215)	29.8 (4,254)	22.5 (3,066)	48.9 (828)	18.4 (126)
Total	100 (1,289,126)	100 (14,255)	100 (13,619)	100 (1,695)	100 (686)
Personal income € per year					
1. decile: 0–14,000	26.2 (334,355)	49.6 (6,700)	30.2 (3,904)	81.3 (1,319)	27.8 (184)
2. decile: 15,000–25,000	24.8 (316,831)	20.1 (2,716)	26.1 (3,375)	9.7 (157)	27.9 (185)
3. decile: 26,000–37,000	23.7 (302,562)	18.3 (2,466)	26.0 (3,365)	5.6 (91)	23.5 (156)
4. decile: 38,000–	25.2 (321,923)	12.0 (1,618)	17.7 (2,288)	3.4 (55)	20.8 (138)
Total	100 (1,275,671)	100 (13,500)	100 (12,932)	100 (1,622)	100 (663)
Marital status					
Unmarried	35.4 (456,919)	23.0 (3,285)	50.5 (7,242)	38.4 (653)	28.3 (204)
Married/legal separation	45.1 (581,477)	57.2 (8,181)	30.5 (4,372)	43.6 (740)	52.6 (380)
Divorced	12.8 (165,295)	16.6 (2,368)	18.1 (2,589)	15.7 (267)	14.3 (103)
Widow	6.7 (86,560)	3.3 (469)	1.0 (143)	2.3 (39)	4.9 (35)
Total	100 (1,290,251)	100 (14,303)	100 (14,346)	100 (1,699)	100 (722)
Citizenship					
Finnish citizen	99.9 (1,289,074)	49.8 (7,184)	10.9 (1,557)	48.9 (831)	41.0 (301)
Other citizenship	0.1 (1,177)	50.2 (7,119)	89.2 (12,789)	51.1 (868)	59.0 (433)
Total	100 (1,290,251)	100 (14,303)	100 (14,346)	100 (1,699)	100 (734)

Table 5.4 Logistic regression analysis predicting turnout across ethnic groups by demographic and socioeconomic background. Odd ratios (std. deviations in parentheses).

	Finnish-origin	Russian-origin	Estonian-origin	Somalian-origin	Swedish-origin
Female (ref. male)	1.196 (.005)***	1.352 (.068)***	1.601 (.106)***	.913 (.099)	1.389 (.264)
Age (ref. 18–29)					
30–39	1.126 (.009)***	1.386 (.128)***	1.620 (.193)***	1.383 (.196)*	2.790 (1.124)*
40–49	1.360 (.011)***	1.649 (.161)***	2.339 (.283)***	1.581 (.271)**	4.040 (1.643)**
50–59	1.728 (.014)***	2.206 (.215)***	3.084 (.377)***	1.145 (.222)	3.929 (1.660)**
60–69	2.839 (.026)***	2.654 (.284)***	3.783 (.538)***	2.061 (.673)*	6.535 (3.152)***
70–	2.783 (.032)***	2.747 (.430)***	3.786 (.953)***	.482 (.235)	4.572 (2.463)**
Occupational status (ref. manual workers)					
Self-employed (farmers and non-farmers)	1.718 (.017)***	1.330 (.152)*	1.297 (.167)*	1.231 (1.094)	5.008 (2.413)**
Upper-level employees	2.790 (.024)***	2.308 (.204)***	4.479 (.515)***	.931 (.319)	5.861 (2.255)***
Lower-level employees	1.510 (.010)***	1.505 (.113)***	1.848 (.164)***	1.053 (.268)	2.762 (.967)**
Students/pupils	2.169 (.021)***	1.660 (.166)***	1.756 (.253)***	1.491 (.317)	6.617 (3.625)**
Pensioners	1.351 (.012)***	1.822 (.217)***	1.667 (.276)**	1.511 (.541)	2.967 (1.392)*
Unemployed/ Other/Unknown	1.225 (.010)***	1.337 (.099)***	1.324 (.117)**	1.329 (.258)	2.000 (.695)*
Personal income €/yr (ref. 0–14 000)					
15 000–25 000	1.433 (.008)***	1.149 (.075)*	1.055 (.092)	.935 (.186)	2.050 (.497)**
26 000–37 000	1.843 (.012)***	1.074 (.080)	1.138 (.106)	1.106 (.288)	2.849 (.790)***
38 000–	2.273 (.016)***	1.168 (.100)	1.146 (.118)	1.391 (.452)	2.146 (.612)*
Marital status (ref. unmarried)					
Married/legal separation	1.760 (.009)***	1.247 (.089)**	1.565 (.107)***	1.564 (.209)**	1.212 (.287)
Divorced	.930 (.006)***	.904 (.079)	.972 (.084)	1.626 (.284)**	.509 (.156)*
Widow	.767 (.007)***	.778 (.107)	1.491 (.316)	.912 (.332)	.525 (.238)
Finnish citizen (ref. other citizenship)	2.798 (.180)***	2.130 (.102)***	3.224 (.227)***	.969 (.105)	1.842 (.372)**
Constant	.103 (.007)***	.049 (.005)***	.022 (.003)***	.689 (.145)	.046 (.022)***
N	1,275,671	13,500	12,932	1,622	662
Nagelkerke R²	.149	.092	.165	.046	.215

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Source: Electronic voter register data.

Table 5.5 Actual and predicted turnout by origin and socioeconomic background (%).

	Finnish-origin		Russian-origin		Estonian-origin		Somalian-origin		Swedish-origin	
	Act.	Pr.	Act.	Pr.	Act.	Pr.	Act.	Pr.	Act.	Pr.
All	59.6	59.9	20.7	21.7	11.1	12.1	56.7	57.6	52.0	55.4
Gender										
Male	57.8	57.9	15.9	18.6	7.3	9.6	56.7	58.7	49.6	52.3
Female	61.3	61.8	23.6	23.3	14.8	14.0	56.7	56.6	55.1	59.0
Age										
–29	37.8	47.7	10.7	13.8	4.8	6.3	48.9	52.9	21.6	28.0
30–39	52.5	50.4	17.4	18.0	8.4	9.5	60.2	60.7	44.0	49.4
40–49	61.0	54.7	20.5	20.6	11.8	12.9	65.6	63.8	54.0	57.5
50–59	64.9	60.1	25.6	25.5	15.7	15.9	57.9	56.2	53.7	56.9
60–69	72.0	70.5	28.5	29.0	21.6	18.6	73.1	69.6	62.5	67.5
70–	66.9	70.1	30.0	29.7	28.1	18.6	39.4	35.4	65.0	60.2
Occupation										
Self-employed (farmers and non-farmers)	64.5	63.4	20.3	20.4	10.4	11.2	*	*	64.7	67.5
Upper-level employees	78.0	72.9	32.3	30.2	35.1	28.1	52.2	49.7	68.8	70.4
Lower-level employees	61.6	60.7	25.8	22.4	19.9	14.9	52.9	52.7	53.2	55.4
Manual workers	47.4	51.6	15.3	16.3	7.6	9.0	53.1	51.4	30.9	33.8
Students/pupils	43.5	68.1	14.7	24.0	9.9	14.3	55.9	60.9	40.6	72.6
Pensioners	65.8	58.2	29.9	25.7	25.0	13.8	56.8	61.2	65.3	56.9
Unemployed/ Other/Unknown	44.9	56.1	18.6	20.5	9.2	11.4	58.5	58.2	39.7	48.4
Personal income € per year										
1. decile: 0–14,000	45.4	50.3	20.0	20.7	11.2	11.4	57.9	57.4	40.2	42.5
2. decile: 15,000–25,000	59.9	58.4	22.3	22.9	10.9	11.9	54.1	55.8	61.1	57.9
3. decile: 26,000–37,000	63.3	63.9	22.1	21.8	12.1	12.6	56.0	59.8	61.5	64.6
4. decile: 38,000–	72.0	68.3	26.6	23.2	15.0	12.7	63.6	65.0	60.9	58.9
Marital status										
Unmarried	44.9	55.2	12.5	20.0	7.0	10.4	47.8	51.0	38.7	56.1
Married/legal separation	72.1	67.5	23.7	23.5	17.5	14.8	62.4	61.8	61.8	60.0
Divorced	57.4	53.5	20.9	18.5	10.5	10.1	63.3	62.7	43.7	41.9
Widow	57.6	49.1	23.5	16.4	30.1	14.2	51.3	48.7	60.0	42.5
Citizenship										
Finnish citizen	37.0	60.0	27.7	27.2	32.1	24.6	56.9	57.3	64.8	62.5
Other citizenship	59.6	37.5	13.6	15.2	8.5	9.9	56.5	58.0	43.2	49.6

Notes: There were only a few self-employed persons among the Somalian-origin; thus, the turnout rates are not presented.

Source: Electronic voter register data.

Table 5.5 shows how turnout varied across the compared groups. While Russian and Estonian-origin immigrants' turnout rates were low (20.7 and 11.1, respectively), Somalian and Swedish-origin immigrants' activity was nearly as high as that among the natives. 56.7 percent of Somalian-origin and 52 percent of Swedish-origin foreign-born eligible persons turned out to vote in comparison to 59.6 percent of the native majority.

Females voted more often than males in all other groups except for those with Somalian background, among whom the participation rates were exactly the same. Aside from Somalian-origin voters, the gender gap does not disappear even after controlling for the various independent variables. This means that females' higher turnout rates are explained by factors other than their level of income, occupation, or marital status. Although it cannot be confirmed here, females may have transferred their higher level of activity from their countries of origin. At least the Russian, Estonian, and Swedish women who responded to the European Social Survey in 2016 reported more often than their male counterparts that they voted in the prior parliamentary elections of their country (reported rates being 55.2% vs. 48.9% in Russia, 64.4% vs. 59.1% in Estonia, and 89.1% vs. 86.7% in Sweden).

Turnout levels rose almost linearly with age, although it appears as if activity dropped dramatically among the Somalian-origin in the eldest age group. However, this result is not reliable given the relatively low number of observations in the group (see Table 5.3). In any case, the trend was not as linear among the Somalian-origin as it was in other groups. The young Somalian-origin persons entitled to vote used their political right much more actively than young people in other groups, including the natives. When examining the actual turnout rates of the Finnish and Somalian-origin eligible persons less than 30 years of age, we see a ten-percentage-point difference favouring the latter. Overall, when other variables are held constant, the model predicts clearly higher turnout levels for the youngest age group.

With respect to the impact of occupational status, it is found that manual workers were the least active voter group in all other groups except among those with Somalian background. As Table 5.4 shows, belonging to any other occupational category significantly increased the probability of voting even after controlling for other variables. Among the Somalis, however, the turnout rates of manual workers were similar to the turnout rates of upper and lower level employees, who in other groups stand out as very active voter groups.

Higher income has a positive linear effect on voting among the natives, but much less so among the foreign-born. As Table 5.4 shows, the odd ratios are not significantly higher in the wealthier income deciles in comparison to the lowest

among the Estonian and Somalian-origin immigrants. Among Russian immigrants, belonging to the second decile in comparison to the first increased the odd ratio significantly, but higher income did not. Table 5.5 shows that among the Swedish-origin immigrants, the turnout rate was lowest among those with the lowest level of income, but there were no differences between persons in the second, third, and fourth deciles.

Married persons had a higher propensity to vote in comparison to unmarried in all five groups (Tables 5.4 and 5.5), which is likely related to the fact that marriage often brings financial and social security, as well as someone with whom to discuss politics (e.g. Wolfinger & Wolfinger 2008). The favourable effect of marriage remains after controlling for other variables, although the result is not significant among the Swedish-origin. When other variables are taken into account, the model predicts much higher turnout rates for unmarried Swedish-origin persons than actually existed. Divorce, in turn, seems to have a strong negative effect on voting in all other groups except among the Somalian-origin immigrants (Table 5.5).

Acquiring citizenship has, in prior studies, been found to have a strong positive relationship with voting (e.g. Hainmueller et al. 2015; Wass et al. 2015), which is not surprising given that applying for citizenship signals long-term settlement in and strong identification with the host country. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that while naturalised citizens voted more actively in all other immigrant groups, there was no difference between naturalised and non-naturalised Somalian-origin immigrants. This finding once more underlines the exceptionality of the Somalian-origin immigrants, who actively participated in the 2017 municipal elections irrespective of their much lower socio-economic status in comparison to other groups. As the Nagelkerke R^2 values in Table 5.4 suggest, the SES model best explains the turnout rates among the Swedish-origin immigrants, while it has much less relevance in explaining the turnout among the Somalian-origin immigrants. An educated guess would be that Somalis' high turnout was triggered by strong ethnic group identity, residential concentration, and supply of visible co-ethnic candidates. Swedes' high turnout, in turn, is probably explained by socialisation to democratic norms, where voting is considered a civic duty. At least voter turnout in Sweden has not declined over the years as rapidly as it has in Finland, which is explained largely by the system with vertically simultaneous elections i.e. national- and local-level elections being held simultaneously (Berg & Oscarsson 2020). In contrast, Russian-origin voters' socialization in a non-democratic political system characterised by corruption, electoral fraud, and even violence towards political opposition is likely to diminish their eagerness to participate in politics in Finland. A large share of Estonians, in

turn, live split lives between Finland and Estonia without developing a sense of belonging in Finnish society (Chapter 5.2; Pitkänen et al. 2019a: 39–40), which is likely the key explanation for their low turnout in Finnish local elections.

The findings of this chapter support prior research, according to which socio-economic status has a more limited role in predicting immigrants' voter participation than it has among natives (de Rooij 2012; Wass et al. 2015). The next chapters take a deeper look at how feelings of belonging in the host country, as well as attitudes towards the host country's political institutions, affect immigrants' willingness to vote in Finnish elections.

5.2 Immigrants' identity orientations and voting

This chapter investigates the connection between Russian, Estonian, Arabic, English, and Somali-speaking immigrants' sense of belonging in and identification with Finnish society and whether these affect their willingness to vote. The investigation is based on Dataset 2 i.e. the survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region conducted in 2018–2019 at the initiative of Pitkänen et al. (for a description of the data, see Chapter 4). The survey did not include a direct question about voting in municipal elections, although it was collected after the 2017 elections. Instead, it asked the respondents which party candidate they would vote for if the parliamentary elections were right now and they were entitled to vote. Although voting intentions in parliamentary elections cannot directly be interpreted as voting intentions in municipal elections, this dataset is thus far the only one in Finland that allows for an examination of immigrants' political attitudes and voting behaviour. To understand immigrants' access to political representation in Finland, it is relevant to know, for instance, whether feelings of belonging in the Finnish society channel into participation in elections, or whether low participation rates are, in fact, a result of a lack of trust in Finnish political institutions.


The response categories to the abovementioned question included all parliamentary parties and an option “some other party”. Additional response categories were “I would not vote”, “I don't want to tell which party I would vote”, and “I don't know”. Based on these response categories, I have coded a variable that has three categories: (1) would vote, (2) would not vote, and (3) does not know. The first category includes all respondents who reported that they would vote notwithstanding whether they reported which party. The second category covers those who indicated that they would abstain from voting. The third category is the

most problematic, as the “don’t know” answer can indicate two options: The respondent does not know which party candidate he or she would vote for, or the respondent does not know whether he or she would vote at all. Given the question formulation, the answer is likely to refer more to the former than the latter, but either way, “don’t know” answers cannot be coded into the “would vote” category. An argument to support this decision can be drawn from studies showing that voter turnout is lower if party identification is weak (e.g. Heath 2007).

Although Pitkänen et al. (2019a, 2019b, 2020) describe the five language groups’ feelings of belonging in Finland, as well as their political interest and political trust across demographic and migration-related background variables, they do not connect these findings to voting intentions, which means that, in this respect, this study provides information that has not been published elsewhere. The idea here is not to only repeat the findings of Pitkänen et al. but to focus on immigrants’ electoral engagement, and especially on mobilisation potential across groups.

In the survey, Russian, Estonian, Arabic, English, and Somali speakers were asked to which extent they felt themselves as being part of Finnish society. They were also asked to which extent they felt themselves Finnish, and to which extent members of their country of origin. In each question, a four-point ordinal response scale was used plus a category “don’t know” (a five-point scale if the “don’t know” category is considered a mid-point). Pitkänen et al. (2020: 42) report that at least three out of four respondents in each language group felt that they were part of Finnish society “completely” or “quite a lot” (Figure 5.4). This feeling was especially strong among Somali speakers. The longer the respondent had lived in Finland, and the better he or she mastered the Finnish language, the stronger the feeling of being a part of society. This effect was strongest in the case of Estonian and Russian speakers but did not exist in the case of Somali speakers, who felt themselves as being a part of Finnish society notwithstanding their Finnish skills and even after a short period of residence (Pitkänen et al. 2020: 42).

Figure 5.4 Feelings of being part of Finnish society in different language groups.



Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

When the respondents were asked to which extent they felt themselves Finnish, the results were very different. Over half of the respondents in each group reported that they did not identify as Finns or identified as Finns only a little. This was most common among Estonian speakers, out of whom four out of five responded this way (Pitkänen 2019a: 28). Among Somali and English speakers, around 40 percent identified as Finns. With respect to Somali speakers, it should be noted that this group of respondents also included a fairly large number of Finnish-born persons, whereas there were practically no or very few children of immigrants in the other groups. The respondents were also asked about their identification with their country of origin. Pitkänen et al. have investigated the responses by employing a two-by-two table, in which each square represents one form of identity orientation (Larja 2017) or acculturation³⁷ strategy (Berry et al. 2002: 353–354). As Pitkänen et al. (2020: 43) describe:

For the *integration* orientation, people identify with both Finnishness and their country of origin. For the *assimilation* orientation, people identify with Finnishness, but do not feel a closeness to their country of origin. For the *separation* orientation, immigrants do not feel that they are Finnish, but instead their identity is tied to their country of

³⁷ Acculturation is a term used for describing culture change due to contact with another culture (Berry et al. 2002: 349).

origin. (...) for the *marginalisation* orientation, immigrants do not identify with either Finnishness or their country of origin. (emphasis added)

These orientations may be placed on an assimilation–integration–separation–marginalisation continuum, in which the left end represents the strongest attachment to the host country and the right end the weakest. The two-by-two table of Pitkänen et al. (2019a: 32, 2020: 44) including these four orientations by each language group is presented in Figure 5.5. It shows how separation was the most common orientation among all groups. There were, however, differences in the extent to which integration orientation was also observed. There was almost no one among the Somali speakers who would not identify with Somalia, including the Finnish-born Somali speakers. Interestingly, over 40 percent of Somali speakers also identified as Finnish. Estonian speakers, in turn, distinctively identified only with Estonia, and not with Finland. Similar to Somali speakers, there were only a few Estonian speakers (11%) who did not identify with their or their parents' country of origin. As Pitkänen et al. note, the profiles of Arabic speakers and English speakers are similar, although otherwise, the groups did not have much in common. In these groups, nearly half had a separation orientation, one out of four had an integration orientation, and around 15 percent were either assimilated or marginalised. Among Russian speakers, the separation model is the second most common after Estonian speakers. After Estonian speakers, Russian speakers reported also the least often that they would feel themselves as Finnish.

Figure 5.5 Identity orientations in different language groups (%).

RUSSIAN (n=284)		Feel themselves as Russians etc.	Don't feel themselves as Russians etc.
Feel themselves as Finnish		12	11
Don't feel themselves as Finnish		62	15
ESTONIAN (n=278)		Feel themselves as Estonians	Don't feel themselves as Estonians
Feel themselves as Finnish		5	5
Don't feel themselves as Finnish		83	6
ENGLISH (n=309)		Feel themselves as British, Americans etc.	Don't feel themselves as British, Americans etc.
Feel themselves as Finnish		26	16
Don't feel themselves as Finnish		44	14
SOMALI (n=297)		Feel themselves as Somalis	Don't feel themselves as Somalis
Feel themselves as Finnish		43	1
Don't feel themselves as Finnish		56	0
ARABIC (n=280)		Feel themselves as Iraqis, Syrians etc.	Don't feel themselves as Iraqis, Syrians etc.
Feel themselves as Finnish		24	16
Don't feel themselves as Finnish		46	14


Assimilation
 Integration
 Separation
 Marginalisation

Source: Pitkänen et al. 2019a: 32, 2020: 44; Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Notes: The identity orientations were coded as follows. “Completely” and “quite a lot” responses to questions “To what extent do you feel that you are [reference to respondent’s country of origin e.g. Estonian] at the moment?” and “To what extent do you feel yourself as Finnish at the moment?” were coded as expressions of identification (value 1). “Quite a little” and “not at all” responses were coded as non-identification (value 0). “Can’t say” answers were coded as missing. If both variables had value 1, the respondent was coded as having “integration orientation”, etc. Pearson’s chi-squared test: $\chi^2(12)=257.329, p<.001$.

Next, I will take a step further and examine the connection between voting intentions and the aforementioned identity orientations. The dependent variable, voting intentions, is likely affected by social desirability bias, meaning that the respondents may have answered that they would vote even if they knew they would not. Recognising the limitations of the variable, Figure 5.6 presents its distribution across language groups. It shows that voting intentions were strongest among Somali and English speakers. The share of respondents who were sure about their intention not to vote was largest among Estonian speakers. Pearson's chi-squared test confirms that the differences between the groups were statistically significant.

Figure 5.6 Voting intentions in parliamentary elections in different language groups.



Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Notes: Pearson's chi-squared test: $\chi^2(8)=369.299, p<.001$.

In the 2019 parliamentary elections held on April 14th, the actual turnout of the five language groups was the following (Official Statistics of Finland 2019b):

English speakers: 56.3%

Somali speakers: 52.7%

Estonian speakers: 50.3%


Russian speakers: 36.7%

Arabic speakers: 34.9%

These actual voting percentages can only roughly be compared to the voting intentions expressed by the survey respondents. First of all, all survey respondents were not Finnish citizens, which means they were not eligible to vote in the 2019 elections. Second, in the survey, the group of English speakers included persons from Western English-speaking countries (mainly the British, Americans, and Australians), whereas the group of English-speaking voters in the 2019 parliamentary elections includes all English speakers. Third, the actual voting percentages represent turnout in the voting districts that used the electronic voting register, while the survey represents persons living in the capital area. Knowing these language groups' turnout levels in the 2017 municipal election presented in Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5.1, we see that their turnout in parliamentary elections was clearly higher, which is explained by the fact that the parliamentary election voters were Finnish citizens, which, based on the previous chapter, we already know to have an increasing effect on turnout. Further, parliamentary elections may also be perceived as more important than local elections (Berg & Oscarsson 2020).

But are voting intentions related to identity orientations? Results based on crosstabulation presented in Figure 5.7 suggest that they are. Those respondents who identified both with Finnishness and their country of origin, i.e. had an integration orientation, were most interested in voting. Those with assimilation orientation were the second most interested. Respondents with separation and marginalization orientation were equally interested in voting, although the separated most often expressed intentions not to vote. Pearson's chi-squared test shows that the observed between group differences were statistically significant.

Figure 5.7 Voting intentions and identity orientations.



Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Notes: Pearson's chi-squared test: $\chi^2(6) = 40.731, p < .001$.

As described in Chapter 3.1, the ethos of the official integration policy of Finland encourages integration orientation, i.e. learning the Finnish (Swedish) language and the country's customs while at the same time maintaining the language and culture of the origin country, for this is seen as beneficial for both an individual and society. The results in Figure 5.7 suggest that this approach also supports immigrants' electoral engagement.

Another interesting area, on which the survey provides information, is trust towards co-ethnics living in Finland, which may be understood as one form of co-ethnic group identity. Quite interestingly, Pitkänen et al. (2020: 58–59) found that all other groups except Somali speakers placed more trust in native-born Finns rather than other immigrants with the same country of origin living in Finland. They explain Somali speakers' high in-group trust with residential concentration, the importance of family and relatives, and experiences of being discriminated against. The trust

levels towards people in general³⁸, native-born Finns³⁹, and persons from one’s own (or parents’) country of birth living in Finland⁴⁰ are presented in Table 5.6. Results of a one-way ANOVA are presented at the bottom of the table, showing that the differences in the group means were statistically significant.

In further studies on immigrant voting behaviour in Finland, it would be interesting to investigate the extent to which ethnic group identity has an impact on how important immigrant minority voters perceive a candidate’s ethnic background. Thus far, we can only present hypotheses on its importance based on findings from other countries (e.g. Bergh & Björklund 2011a; Vermeulen et al. 2020).

Table 5.6 Trust towards people in general, native-born Finns, and people from one’s own (or parents’) country of origin living in Finland. Comparison between language groups. Mean values and standard deviations.

	Native-born Finns	Countrymen living in Finland	People in general	
	M (S.D)	M (S.D)	M (S.D)	(n)
Russian speakers	7.4 (2.2)	6.0 (2.3)	5.7 (2.6)	(301)
Estonian speakers	6.6 (2.1)	6.0 (2.1)	5.8 (1.8)	(310)
English speakers	7.9 (1.6)	7.4 (2.1)	7.5 (1.7)	(314)
Somali speakers	6.8 (2.5)	8.3 (1.7)	7.0 (1.9)	(302)
Arabic speakers	7.9 (2.2)	6.2 (2.7)	6.0 (2.7)	(300)
ANOVA	F(4, 1522)= 24.758, p<.001	F(4, 1522)= 62.794, p<.001	F(4, 1522)= 39.150, p<.001	

Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2109.

³⁸ “Next, we would like to ask about the general trust you have towards people. Tell your opinion regarding this question by using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that you can’t be too careful and 10 means that you think that the majority of the people can be trusted”.

³⁹ “To what extent do you hold trust for the following institutions of the Finnish system? Evaluate your trust in each agent on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 = I do not trust at all and 10 = I trust completely.: Native born Finnish”

⁴⁰ “To what extent do you hold trust for the following institutions of the Finnish system? Evaluate your trust in each agent on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 = I do not trust at all and 10 = I trust completely.: People originated from the same country as me or my family living in Finland”

5.3 Immigrants' political trust and voting

In this section, the focus is shifted to immigrants' trust in Finnish political institutions. This is an important notion regarding the motivation and electoral success of immigrant-origin candidates, for it may be expected that if the level of immigrants' trust in political institutions is low, their willingness to vote in elections is likewise lower, which reduces immigrant-origin candidates' ability to pull in immigrant votes. If the eligible immigrant voters lack trust in political institutions, immigrant-origin candidates have a hard task in persuading them to cast a vote. Also, parties may find it more difficult to recruit candidates from groups in which political trust is low.

In the literature, the concepts of political trust, political support, or institutional confidence are often equated when the aim is to examine individuals' psychological orientations towards the political system and its actors (for an overview, see Norris 2017). Studies on political trust build on the seminal work of David Easton (1965, 1975), who distinguishes between *diffuse support*, i.e. confidence in the political regime and the acceptance of basic political arrangements, and *specific support*, i.e. satisfaction with the performance of political actors. Also, Norris (1999, 2017) proposes that it is important to distinguish between support given to a political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors. These may be placed on a continuum from diffuse to specific political support, where support of the political community represents the most diffuse trust, and support of political actors the most specific trust. Short-term fluctuations in specific support do not necessarily undermine diffuse support for the political system, for unreliable and incompetent incumbents can be thrown out of office in the next elections (Easton 1975). On the other hand, if a replacement of political leaders does not lead to subsequent improvement in the performance of the government, a decline in diffuse support may emerge (see also Miller 1974a; Miller & Listhaug 1999).

Norris (2017) connects political trust to specific support. According to her, political trust refers to “the general belief in the performance capacity of political institutions and/or belief in the benevolent motivation and performance capacity of office-holders”. Miller (1974a) and Stokes (1962) emphasise that citizens' evaluation of the performance of political institutions, politicians, and political parties is related to their own normative expectations.

Scholars see a sufficient level of political trust as a requisite for the functioning of democracy as well as broader social and economic processes. Lack of political trust, in turn, is expected to undermine the legitimacy and stability of democratic

regimes, prevent effective implementation of policy reforms, or push citizens to engage in illegal behaviour, among other negative consequences from a state's perspective (Easton 1965; Hooghe & Zmerli 2011; Marien & Hooghe 2011; Miller 1974a, 1974b).

Because democracies require the support of all citizens, regardless of their ethnic, cultural, or social backgrounds, scholars have expressed their concern as to whether immigrants also feel attached to the political system of their host countries. Perhaps surprisingly, however, scholars have tracked political trust among immigrants in Western Europe and in the USA to be quite high compared to the native population, especially among immigrants from non-democratic countries (Adman & Strömblad 2015; Wals & Rudolph 2019; Wenzel 2006). It seems that preadult socialization in a system hampered by a high level of corruption, together with adult migration to a country with a low level of corruption, results in high expectations towards political institutions in the destination country. Over time and with increasing experiences of how these institutions actually work, immigrants' expectations become more realistic: They become more critical and, therefore, less politically trusting (Adman & Strömblad 2015; Wals & Rudolph 2019). Wals and Rudolph (2019) have found that immigrants who have been socialized under more democratic regimes exhibit less trust in the national government of the USA compared to their counterparts socialized under authoritarian systems because their pre-migration experiences do not deviate as much. The findings of Pitkänen et al. (2019b; 2020) indicate a somewhat similar pattern among five immigrant groups in Finland, although it should be noted that in international comparison, Finns' trust towards political institutions is high (e.g. Söderlund 2019) and, as such, more difficult to exceed.

Political trust levels across five foreign language groups are presented in Table 5.7, which displays the mean scores of five trust items: trust in the president, trust in political parties, trust in the parliament, trust in the government, and trust in politicians. Trust scores among the general population have been obtained from the 2019 Finnish National Elections Study (FNES) (Grönlund & Borg 2020), which was collected approximately half a year after the survey for foreign language speakers. Each trust item was measured on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust).

Table 5.7 Political trust in different language groups. Means and standard deviations.

	President	Parties	Parliament	Government	Politicians	(n)
	M (SD)					
Native population	8.4 (1.9)	5.7 (1.9)	6.1 (2.0)	6.0 (2.2)	5.3 (2.0)	(1,598)
Russian speakers	7.7 (2.4)	4.8 (2.5)	5.8 (2.6)	6.5 (2.6)	4.8 (2.6)	(200–271)
Estonian speakers	6.7 (2.3)	3.9 (2.2)	5.2 (2.0)	5.8 (2.2)	4.4 (2.1)	(278–299)
English speakers	7.4 (1.9)	5.5 (2.0)	6.6 (1.8)	6.7 (1.9)	5.4 (2.1)	(289–311)
Somali speakers	8.4 (2.1)	6.1 (2.3)	6.9 (2.3)	7.5 (2.3)	5.7 (2.5)	(295–297)
Arabic speakers	8.5 (1.8)	5.6 (2.8)	7.4 (2.2)	8.1 (2.0)	5.8 (2.7)	(170–249)
ANOVA	F(4, 1369)= 33.954, p<.001	F(4, 1233)= 35.548, p<.001	F(4, 1337)= 43.055, p<.001	F(4, 1424)= 44.094, p<.001	F(4, 1297)= 16.152, p<.001	
Sig.	***	***	***	***	***	

Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019; The scores for native population are retrieved from FNES 2019 data (Grönlund & Borg 2020).

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; One-way ANOVA compares the mean values of the foreign language-speaking groups and does not include native population.

As Pitkänen et al. (2019b: 45–48) have already reported and Table 5.7 shows, foreign language speakers – similar to the native population – placed the highest levels of trust in the President and the least in politicians and political parties. Compared to other groups, Estonian speakers reported the lowest levels of trust in all Finnish political institutions, which may be one of the explanations for their low turnout in Finnish elections. Somali and Arabic speakers, in turn, indicated the highest levels of political trust.

An important point also raised by Pitkänen et al. (2019b: 45) is that Finnish-born Somali speakers reported lower levels of political trust compared to their foreign-born counterparts. For instance, the mean score regarding trust towards parliament was 5.3 among the Finnish-born and 7.2 among the foreign-born Somalis. This suggests that the children of immigrant parents are more critical of the political system, perhaps because their trust is based on informed citizenship i.e. critical evaluation of the system, rather than on “blind” trust. Finnish-born children of Somali parents also do not have Somalia’s broken political institutions as a reference

point to which they would compare Finnish political institutions. As Table 5.8 shows, trust towards parliament decreases over time lived in Finland also among the foreign-born in all other language groups except among English speakers. The reason for this may be that the British, Americans, and Australians, who come from established democracies, have a fairly accurate picture of Nordic political institutions from the start. From the perspective of the legitimacy and stability of the Finnish political system, trust towards the parliament is perhaps the most crucial of the observed five trust items, as it taps into diffuse political trust.

Table 5.8 Trust in parliament according to years lived in Finland across different language groups. Means and standard deviations.

	M (SD)	(n)	One-way ANOVA	Sig.
Russian speakers			F(3, 230)= 3.170, p=.025	*
Less than 5 years	6.7 (2.2)	(56)		
5–10 years	5.7 (2.6)	(67)		
More than 10 years	5.5 (2.8)	(109)		
Finnish-born	-	(2)		
Estonian speakers			F(3, 284)= 4.131, p=.007	**
Less than 5 years	5.8 (1.9)	(66)		
5–10 years	4.8 (2.1)	(122)		
More than 10 years	5.1 (1.9)	(95)		
Finnish-born	-	(5)		
English speakers			F(3, 290)= 1.081, p=.357	
Less than 5 years	6.5 (1.5)	(26)		
5–10 years	6.6 (1.9)	(88)		
More than 10 years	6.6 (1.8)	(176)		
Finnish-born	-	(4)		
Somali speakers			F(3, 290)= 12.115, p<.001	***
Less than 5 years	7.6 (1.9)	(51)		
5–10 years	7.5 (1.8)	(64)		
More than 10 years	6.9 (2.2)	(125)		
Finnish-born	5.4 (2.6)	(54)		
Arabic speakers			F(3, 218)= 5.146, p=.007	*
Less than 5 years	7.8 (2)	(121)		
5–10 years	7.2 (2.2)	(60)		
More than 10 years	6.7 (2.2)	(40)		
Finnish-born	-	(0)		

Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

An interesting observation regarding differences between the language groups is the share of “don’t know” answers to political trust questions. Table 5.9 demonstrates, first, that these were most frequent regarding the questions on trust towards parties and politicians, which may reflect the respondents’ lack of specific information on Finnish parties and politicians, while the government, for example, is more often visible in the media. Second, Table 5.9 shows that Arabic and Russian speakers felt the least competent to evaluate their feelings of trust towards Finnish political institutions. Somali speakers, in turn, did not hesitate to express their opinion. In terms of Arabic speakers, these results are partly explained by their short average time of residence in Finland compared to other groups, which means that their time of exposure to the Finnish political system is also the shortest.

Table 5.9 The share of “don’t know” answers to questions on trust towards political institutions in Finland by language group (%).

	President	Parties	Parliament	Government	Politicians	(n)
Russian speakers	11	34	22	10	23	(301)
Estonian speakers	5	10	7	4	7	(310)
English speakers	8	7	6	1	5	(314)
Somali speakers	2	2	2	1	2	(302)
Arabic speakers	24	43	24	17	37	(300)
All foreign language speakers	10	19	12	6	15	(1527)

Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Table 5.10 shows that the longer Arabic and Russian speakers had lived in Finland, the more confident they were to evaluate their feelings of trust towards Finnish parties.

Table 5.10 The share of “don’t know” answers to question about trust in political parties by the length of residence in Finland in different language groups. Crosstabulation % (n).

	Less than 5 years	5–10 years	Over 10 years	Finnish-born	Pearson’s chi-square test	Sig.
Russian speakers	48 (79)	37 (93)	23 (127)	0 (2)	$\chi^2(3)=15.430, p=.001$	**
Estonian speakers	7 (69)	15 (137)	6 (99)	0 (5)	$\chi^2(3)=6.932, p=.074$	
English speakers	10 (30)	10 (98)	4 (181)	0 (4)	$\chi^2(3)=4.235, p=.237$	
Somali speakers	0 (52)	0 (65)	2 (127)	2 (55)	$\chi^2(3)=2.692, p=.442$	
Arabic speakers	46 (164)	52 (85)	19 (43)	- (0)	$\chi^2(3)=13.539, p=.001$	**

Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Furthermore, to analyse whether immigrants’ political trust is based on “informed citizenship” or whether it may be considered “blind”, an item on the consumption of political information will be included in the analysis. This was measured with the following proposition: “I actively follow social issues in Finland”. The respondents were able to choose between the response categories “completely agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, “completely disagree”, and “don’t know”. Table 5.11 displays the mean scores of trust in parliament when political media consumption is coded into two categories as follows. Responses “completely and somewhat agree” are coded as “follows social issues”, and responses “completely and somewhat disagree” are coded as “does not follow social issues”. “Don’t know” answers are coded as missing. The results show that trust in parliament was “blind” only among Arabic speakers, among whom trust levels were high whether or not the respondents followed social issues. Among Russian, English, and Somali speakers, trust levels were higher among those who followed social issues. Estonian speakers’ trust levels were modest even among those who were interested in following social issues.

Table 5.11 Trust in parliament according to political media consumption across different language groups. Means and standard deviations.

	M (SD)	(n)	Independent samples t-test	Sig.
Russian speakers			t(231)=2.481, p=.014	*
Follows social issues	6.1 (2.5)	(150)		
Does not follow social issues	5.2 (2.8)	(83)		
Estonian speakers			t(245)=.620, p=.536	
Follows social issues	5.3 (1.9)	(107)		
Does not follow social issues	5.2 (2.0)	(140)		
English speakers			t(288)=2.186, p=.030	*
Follows social issues	6.7 (1.8)	(230)		
Does not follow social issues	6.2 (2.0)	(60)		
Somali speakers			t(282)=4.616, p<.001	***
Follows social issues	7.3 (2.1)	(207)		
Does not follow social issues	6.0 (2.3)	(77)		
Arabic speakers			t(199)=-.263, p=.793	
Follows social issues	7.4 (2.2)	(125)		
Does not follow social issues	7.4 (2.1)	(76)		

Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.


Finally, the connection between political trust and voting intentions will be examined. The coding of the dependent variable, “voting intentions”, has been described at the beginning of Chapter 5.2. The political trust variable is an index of the five aforementioned trust items. The Cronbach’s alpha value for the five variables is 0.893, indicating high internal consistency. In other words, the items measure the same underlying phenomenon, namely, political trust. This index is coded into three categories as follows. Values from 0 to 4 are coded as “distrusting”, value 5 as “neither trusting nor distrusting”, and values from 6 to 10 as “trusting”.

The results are presented in Figure 5.8, which shows, first, that a high level of political trust was associated with an intention to vote among Russian and English speakers. A similar pattern was observed among Estonian and Somalian speakers, but in these groups, there was practically no difference between those who were trusting and those who were neither trusting nor distrusting. Also, the differences between the groups were not statistically significant. Among the Arabic speakers, the number of distrusters is too small for any conclusions about the effect of political

trust on voting intentions. Indeed, using an index means that the number of observations among Russian and Arabic speakers is much lower than in other groups because only those respondents who evaluated their trust towards all five political institutions are considered.

To conclude, the findings presented in this chapter suggest that trust in political institutions plays an important role in explaining immigrants' voting intentions. Those who are more trusting are more willing to vote. Further, political trust levels vary across language groups, which is very likely one of the potential factors explaining variation in their turnout.

Figure 5.8 Political trust and voting intentions in different language groups. Crosstabulation.



Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: Russian speakers: $\chi^2(4)=11.194$, $p=.024$; Estonian speakers: $\chi^2(4)=9.071$, $p=.059$; English speakers: $\chi^2(4)=18.150$, $p=.001$; Somali speakers: $\chi^2(4)=9.140$, $p=.058$; Arabic speakers: $\chi^2(4)=6.956$, $p=.138$.


5.4 Immigrants' political interest and voting

As described in the previous chapter, the respondents of the survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki area were presented the following proposition: “I actively follow social issues in Finland”, to which the respondents gave their answer on a 4-point scale (completely agree; somewhat agree; somewhat disagree; completely disagree) or chose the alternative “don’t know”. This variable may be labelled as “consumption of political information” or “interest in politics”. This chapter examines the connection between immigrants’ political interest and voting intentions. The level of interest in Finnish politics across and within ethnic minority groups has a direct effect on immigrant-origin candidates’ ability to pull in co-ethnic or immigrant votes. As will be brought up in further detail in Chapter 8, perceived uninterest affects immigrant-origin candidates’ motivation to run in elections.

As Pitkänen et al. (2019b: 37–38) note and as can be observed from Figure 5.9, Somali and English speakers were the most active followers of social issues in Finland. Among Somali speakers, nearly as many as four out of ten completely agreed with the proposition. Estonian speakers, in turn, were the least interested in Finnish politics. Only 7 percent agreed completely and around 30 percent agreed somewhat with the proposition, whereas 50 percent disagreed somewhat or completely.

Differences in language skills across the groups should play an important role in explaining who follows social issues and who does not. In the survey, the respondents were asked about their Finnish skills using the following question: “How well do you speak the Finnish language? Which of the following best describes your situation?” The response categories were: (1) Finnish is my mother language, or I speak Finnish as well as my mother language; (2) I’m on the advanced level on Finnish (I can use the language flexibly and efficiently for social and professional purposes); (3) I’m on the intermediate level on Finnish (I can cope with the most common practical speech situations both at work and at leisure); (4) I’m on the basic level in Finnish (I can ask simple questions and answer questions in conversations about familiar topics); (5) I do not speak Finnish; (6) I can't say. Proficiency in Finnish in different language groups is presented in Figure 5.10.


Figure 5.9 Following social issues in Finland by language group. Crosstabulation.



Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: $\chi^2(16)=252.245, p<.001$.

Figure 5.10 Self-evaluated proficiency in Finnish language in different language groups.



Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: $\chi^2(16)=252.245, p<.001$.

As Figure 5.10 shows, self-evaluated proficiency in the Finnish language was highest among Somali speakers, which is explained by their long time of residence as well as the large number of Finnish-born in the group. For the Somali speakers, 29 percent have Finnish as their mother tongue and only 15 percent are at the beginner level or do not speak Finnish at all (Pitkänen et al. 2020: 41). Arabic speakers, among whom the average time lived in Finland was the shortest, were most often at the basic level. English speakers in Finland are privileged from the perspective that most Finns speak English well, meaning that they do not necessarily need to learn Finnish to live and work in Finland.

Table 5.12 shows the share of respondents who reported that they agreed either completely or somewhat with the proposition “I actively follow social issues in Finland” according to their subjective evaluation of their Finnish language skills. In the table, crosstabulation between political interest and language has been run in each Finnish language proficiency level separately. Thus, the chi-squared test results in the bottom indicate whether there were significant differences between language groups’ political interest according to the level at which they had mastered Finnish. What is found is that among those who speak Finnish as their mother tongue, English speakers were the most interested in politics: 92 percent of them indicated following social issues actively. Even those English speakers who did not speak Finnish were relatively interested in following social issues in Finland. In all groups, Estonian speakers were the least interested in Finnish politics.⁴¹ The share of Russian speakers who followed social issues in Finland was rather stable despite their Finnish language proficiency. According to Pitkänen et al. (2019b: 38), this is likely explained by the fact that Russian speakers in Finland have access to news media in their mother tongue, as the Finnish broadcasting company Yle offers news in Russian.

⁴¹ For more information on the impact of gender, age, and level of education on political interest across language groups, see Pitkänen et al. (2019b, 2020).

Table 5.12 Share of respondents who follow social issues in different language groups, % (n).


	Mother tongue	Advanced level	Intermediate level	Basic level	Does not speak Finnish
Russian speakers	68 (19)	64 (66)	60 (141)	65 (65)	50 (8)
Estonian speakers	44 (34)	55 (47)	45 (114)	29 (58)	15 (13)
English speakers	92 (13)	84 (57)	83 (113)	67 (103)	70 (23)
Somali speakers	72 (79)	82 (38)	74 (128)	60 (42)	- (0)
Arabic speakers	67 (9)	78 (23)	63 (91)	57 (100)	29 (14)
Pearson's chi-square test	$\chi^2(4)=12.760$, p=.013	$\chi^2(4)=14.948$, p=.005	$\chi^2(4)=23.993$, p<.001	$\chi^2(4)=23.993$, p<.001	$\chi^2(4)=11.830$, p=.008
Sig.	*	**	***	***	**

Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

After demonstrating the variation in political interest in different immigrant groups, it is time to study the extent to which interest in politics has an impact on voting intentions. Figure 5.11 shows that interest in politics had a significant effect on voting intentions in all other groups except for Estonian speakers, among whom the results were not statistically significant. Certainty about abstaining from voting in parliamentary elections was strongest among Russian speakers. Quite interestingly, half of even those Russian speakers who followed social issues actively were sure about abstaining. Around one-third of those English and Arabic speakers who did not follow social issues in Finland indicated that they would not vote. Among Somali speakers, the corresponding share was one out of four. Estonian speakers, in turn, were most often uncertain about whether they would vote or abstain (or which party candidate they would vote for).

Figure 5.11 The impact of political interest on voting intentions in different language groups. Crosstabulation.



Source: Survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Russian speakers $\chi^2(2)=15.415$, $p < .001$; Estonian speakers $\chi^2(2)=3.471$, $p = .176$; English speakers $\chi^2(2)=12.947$, $p = .002$; Somali speakers $\chi^2(2)=30.931$, $p < .001$; Arabic speakers $\chi^2(2)=24.268$, $p < .001$.

5.5 Immigrants' participation in civic associations

Civic associations are the arena where citizens learn meaningful democratic skills and foster civic virtues and collective efficacy (Putnam 2000; Verba et al. 1995). Thus, involvement in associations is also a traditional pathway to politics. As will be


brought up in Chapters 7 and 8, voluntary associations are a common arena of political recruitment, where parties screen potential candidates.

Given the strong link between civic involvement and electoral engagement, in this chapter, I review the findings of Kuusio et al. (2020c) on immigrants' civic involvement in Finland. Their findings are based on the FinMonik survey (also referred to in Chapter 5.1). The survey questionnaire included the following question on involvement in civic associations: "During the previous 12 months, how often have you taken part in activities organised by the following types of organisations, associations, or clubs?: (1) an exercise or sport group or organisation; (2) activities related to your language or cultural background; (3) other recreational activity; (4) a political organisation; (5) a trade association; (6) a religious or spiritual community (e.g. a church, mosque, etc.); (7) children's, youth or family work association activities (e.g. the activities by schools or children's recreational activity groups); (8) the activities of an association for older people (e.g. pensioners' organisations); (9) some other organisation, association or club". The response categories were: (1) have not participated; (2) less than once a month; (3) 1–3 times a month; (4) 1–2 times a week; (5) 3 or more times a week.

Unfortunately, Kuusio et al. (2020c) do not provide a comprehensive report on the responses to this question. For instance, they do not mention anything about immigrants' involvement in political organisations and trade unions, which are the most common candidate recruitment platforms. Kuusio et al. report the findings related to foreign-origin persons' involvement in exercise or sport groups/organisations on a weekly basis, activities related to own language or cultural background on a monthly basis, and a religious or spiritual community (e.g. a church, mosque, etc.) on a monthly basis. This information is reported with regard to men and women from six country groups: (1) Russia and Former Soviet Union, (2) Estonia, (3) Middle East and North Africa, (4) Rest of Africa, (5) Asia, (6) EU, Efta, and North America, and (7) all other regions including Latin America and Former Yugoslavia. The participation rates and confidence intervals are shown in Figures 5.12–5.14.

Figure 5.12 presents different immigrant groups' weekly participation in exercise or sport groups/organisations by country of origin. Among men, participation rates ranged between 20–30 percent, with African-origin men being most active. Participation rates of women were lower, ranging between 12–25 percent. Among women, in contrast to men, African-origin women were the least active in exercise or sport groups, whereas women from Europe and North America were the most active (Kuusio et al. 2020c).

Figure 5.12 Immigrants' weekly participation in exercise or sport groups/organisations by country of origin (%).




Source: Kuusio et al. 2020c.

Notes: The black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 5.13 displays participation in activities related to own language or cultural background on a monthly basis. In this respect, there was no gender gap between immigrant-origin men and women, among whom 16–17 percent took part in such activities. Kuusio et al. (2020c) also note that there were no statistically significant gender differences within country groups. African (29%) and Asian-origin (23%) men participated more actively in activities related to their own language or cultural background than men from Russia and the Former Soviet Union (13%) and Estonia (10%). Among women, those with an Estonian background (8%) were significantly less involved in activities related to their own language or cultural background compared to women with African (28%) or European or North American (21%) background.

Figure 5.13 Immigrants' monthly participation in activities related to own language or cultural background by country of origin (%).




Source: Kuusio et al. 2020c.

Notes: The black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Finally, Figure 5.14 demonstrates that monthly involvement in religious or spiritual activities was very active especially among African-origin women (64%) and also men (47%) from the same country group. Men from Middle Eastern and North African countries (19%) were more involved in religious activities compared to men from Russia and the Former Soviet Union (9%), Estonia (3%), and Europe and North America (8%). Women of Estonian and Russian origin were least involved in religious or spiritual activities.

Figure 5.14 Immigrants' monthly participation in religious or spiritual community (e.g. a church, mosque, etc.) by country of origin (%).



Source: Kuusio et al. 2020c.

Notes: The black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Involvement in activities related to own language or cultural background potentially increases identification based on shared ethnic background. This may also be the case when participation in a religious community takes place in churches or mosques that are shared with co-ethnics. The observations reported by Kuusio et al. (2020c) suggest that immigrants with an African background – a group that covers Somali-origin immigrants – are most involved in civic activities that support identity building and political mobilisation based on shared ethnicity. This is likely a key factor in explaining their high turnout in the 2017 municipal elections. In turn, the opposite trend among Russian and Estonian-origin immigrants probably plays a key role in their low electoral turnout. Although electoral participation calls for personal resources and, thus, is closely linked to an individual's socioeconomic status (as shown in Chapter 5.1), it also calls for motivation, which can be drawn from e.g.

strong group identification. Chapter 6 moves on to analysing immigrant-origin candidates' and councillors' sociodemographic background and political orientations.

5.6 Conclusions

Chapter 5 focused on the manifold mechanisms that explain variation in electoral engagement between and within the largest immigrant groups. It showed that immigrants in Finland form a heterogeneous group with diverse skills, experiences, and reasons for migrating. These background and resource-related factors influence immigrants' political integration, including their engagement in elections. Pre-migration political socialisation and the climate of reception in Finland have direct effects on immigrant minorities' political mobilisation. While ethnic Russians, for example, form the largest immigrant group in Finland, their turnout was very low compared to that of several other groups. The data did not allow for an in-depth analysis of the root causes of electoral engagement across ethnic groups. It may, however, be speculated as to whether ethnic Russian's low level of engagement is at least partly linked to Finns' hostile attitudes towards the political activity of the Russian minority including doubts about their loyalties to the Finnish state (Ronkainen 2009: 104–108), as well as political socialization under communist and post-communist rule, which hampered and eroded civic and political engagement in post-communist states (e.g. Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2011).

Electoral engagement of the Estonian-origin population was likewise low, but the expected reasons are somewhat different compared to those of the Russian-origin population. Estonians, although being post-communist citizens and perhaps having fewer experiences of democratic citizenship, have a very unique opportunity to live a life split between Estonia and Finland due to the geographical proximity of the countries and the freedom of movement guaranteed to the citizens of the EU. Many Estonians migrate to Finland only for work and maintain a family and social life in Estonia. These people presumably have very little interest in getting involved in local-level decision-making in municipalities, where they live for only a short time. However, as the analysis in this chapter showed, the more permanent residents the Estonians were (those with Finnish citizenship, a native spouse, or an owner-occupied flat), the more likely they were to vote.

The Somalian-origin population, in turn, formed a very different group compared to Russian and Estonian-origin groups. Somalis' turnout in the 2017 elections nearly

paralleled the turnout of the native population. The results of this study pointed towards an interpretation, according to which a high level of electoral engagement within this group is connected to the residential concentration of Somalis in the largest cities, which enables effective campaigning among co-ethnics, as well as strong feelings of shared ethnicity and group identity, which motivate people to vote irrespective of their relatively low-level socioeconomic status. Prior studies have also pointed out that Finnish Somalis are institutionally well-organised compared to many other immigrant-origin groups, which presumably facilitates their political mobilisation as well (Pirkkalainen 2013; Pirkkalainen et al. 2016; Saksela 2003: 252–254).

While an analysis of the key differences in electoral engagement between different ethnic groups requires more in-depth qualitative analysis in the future, it may be concluded that, overall, electoral engagement is higher among immigrants with a higher socioeconomic status, who have migrated to Finland permanently, who have a native spouse and, thus, more cross-ethnic social ties, and who are interested in Finnish politics. In other words, societal integration in other dimensions of life supports political integration. Subsequent chapters discuss more about how the effect goes in the other direction as well i.e. how political integration may facilitate other dimensions of societal integration. Moreover, it should be further emphasised that this chapter has focused on immigrants' electoral engagement i.e. not their political integration as a whole. Although some groups are easily labelled as politically passive, this may not be the whole picture. Immigrants, like natives, have other means of being politically active than participating in elections, but these activities are beyond the scope of this study.

6 IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND THE BACKGROUND OF IMMIGRANT-ORIGIN CANDIDATES AND COUNCILLORS

After analysing the electoral engagement of immigrant minorities in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on those immigrant-origin persons, who – for one reason or another – took a step further by aspiring to a seat on the municipal council. Among different forms of political participation, running as a candidate represents something that requires high-level engagement in politics. Therefore, it is one of the least common forms of conventional political participation. As Borg (2018b: 4) shows, less than seven percent of the Finnish adult population have, at some time in their lives, participated in elections as candidates. Given how migrating to a new environment most often reduces an individual's resources, be they financial, cultural, or social capital, this form of political activity should be even less common among immigrant minorities. Some individuals nevertheless take this step, and the rest of this dissertation aims to closely investigate who these people are and why.

The examination of the background of immigrant-origin candidates and elected councillors is based on the candidate register data (Dataset 3) and candidate survey data (Dataset 4). A candidate is defined as immigrant-origin if his or her native language registered in the census is other than Finnish, Swedish, or Sámi. In the 2017 municipal elections, 33,618 candidates were nominated and 8,999 were elected. Out of these, altogether 729 candidates and 66 councillors were foreign language speakers. It should be noted, first, that this examination by native language does not allow for identification of Swedish-origin candidates or councillors, who intermix with Swedish-speaking Finns. Second, the examination may include candidates and councillors, who are Finnish by origin but are regarded as immigrant-origin due to having a foreign language registered as their native language. As pointed out earlier, this concern is not a major limitation because, still in 2017, most foreign language speakers were also of foreign origin. According to Official Statistics of Finland (2017a), 733 candidates were persons who themselves and whose parents had been born abroad (immigrants), and 23 candidates were born in Finland to foreign-born parents (children of immigrants). Thus, an examination by person's origin produces

fairly similar results compared to examination by native language: Altogether, 756 candidates were of foreign origin compared to 729 candidates being foreign language speakers. As mentioned, Swedish-origin candidates are missing from the examination based on native language. This chapter seeks to answer the following sub-questions:

- What was the level of representation of immigrant minorities on candidate lists and municipal councils?
- How were immigrant-origin candidates and councillors geographically distributed across mainland Finland?
- Were there differences in socioeconomic background between native and immigrant-origin candidates?
- How were immigrant-origin candidates and councillors distributed among Finnish parties?
- Were there differences in immigrant and native-origin candidates' political attitudes? How about across immigrant groups?

6.1 Immigrants' political representation in Finnish municipalities

The examination of immigrants' representation as candidates and councillors in the 2017 municipal elections is conducted by employing Bloemraad's (2013) "Representation Index". The index is created by dividing the percentage of immigrant-origin candidates and councillors by the percentage of people from that same immigrant group among eligible voters. A figure of 0 indicates an absolute lack of representation while 1 indicates perfect "mirror" representation. The index shows whether there is parity in the immigrant group's proportion in the electorate and their proportion in ballot lists and municipal councils. Numbers below 1 indicate under-representation; those above 1 signal more representation in ballot lists or office than could be expected based on data on the electorate alone.

Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 present the numbers and shares of eligible voters, candidates, and councillors across language groups and the Representation Index. What we see is that none of the immigrant groups reached full mirror representation, but some groups got much closer than others. For Turkish-origin immigrants, the index scores regarding representation on the candidate lists and municipal councils were 0.95 and 0.45, respectively. Regarding Somalis, the scores were 0.38 and 0.48, which means that Somali speakers were more extensively represented as councillors


than as candidates, making their candidates the most successful compared to other groups. After the Turkish and Somalian-origin groups, the Kurdish-origin immigrants gained the highest index scores, 0.60 and 0.18, respectively. Russian and Estonian speakers, who are the largest immigrant groups in Finland, had much lower scores. Russian-origin immigrants had scores of 0.37 and 0.04, whereas the corresponding scores among Estonian-origin immigrants were 0.24 and 0.06.

Table 6.1 The number and share of eligible voters, candidates, and councillors in the 2017 municipal elections, and the Representation Index among the largest language groups.

	Eligible voters	Share of eligible voters (%)	Candidates	Share of candidates (%)	Representation Index	Councillors	Share of councillors (%)	Representation Index
Finnish, Swedish, Sámi speakers	4,140,693	94.3	32,883	98	1.04	8,954	99.00	1.06
Foreign language speakers, total	250,278	5.7	729	2.17	0.38	66	0.73	0.13
Russian	57,531	1.31	163	0.48	0.37	5	0.06	0.04
Estonian	39,122	0.89	72	0.21	0.24	5	0.06	0.06
English	14,058	0.32	40	0.12	0.37	5	0.06	0.17
Arabic	10,489	0.24	42	0.12	0.52	1	0.01	0.05
Somali	10,199	0.23	30	0.09	0.38	10	0.11	<u>0.48</u>
Kurdish	8,057	0.18	37	0.11	<u>0.60</u>	3	0.03	0.18
Persian	6,267	0.14	8	0.02	0.17	0	0.00	0.00
French	6,013	0.14	14	0.04	0.30	2	0.02	0.16
Spanish	5,969	0.14	20	0.06	0.44	1	0.01	0.08
Turkish	5,380	0.12	39	0.12	<u>0.95</u>	5	0.06	<u>0.45</u>
German	5,425	0.12	21	0.06	0.51	0	0.00	0.00

Source: Candidate register data.

Figure 6.1 The Representation Index in different language groups.



Source: Candidate register data.

The success of Somalian-origin candidates in gaining seats in municipal councils is very likely connected to the high level of turnout among the Somalian-origin electorate (see Chapter 5.1), which suggests that this group gained political representation through an ethnic vote. This conclusion is supported by the interview data collected by Tiilikainen et al. for a study on Somalis in Helsinki. Their interview data covered 28 interviews among experts (civil servants at the state and city levels, community leaders, social workers, teachers, NGO employees, and a reporter), most of whom were of Somalian-origin (Open Society Foundation 2014: 144–145). The interviewees specifically mentioned how it would be useful for the Somali community for the votes of the Somalis to be concentrated on few influential community members (p. 113). This seems to have happened: Out of 30 Somalian-origin candidates, 10 were elected. The success was also based on higher electoral activity within the Somali community: While Somalis’ turnout was 39.8 percent in

the 2012 municipal elections (Pirkkalainen et al. 2016: 71), it was 53 percent in the 2017 elections. Presumably, one major factor behind Finnish Somalis' success story is their high level of residential concentration, which enables efficient campaigning, i.e. low costs of communication, among the co-ethnics.


While every third Somali-origin candidate was elected, the corresponding share of the Russian-origin candidates was only three percent. What did the Russian-origin candidates do differently? Did they not focus on mobilising the votes of the co-ethnics? Is there even potential for a co-ethnic vote among Russian immigrants through shared ethnic identity? The same questions concern the Estonian-origin electorate. English, Arabic, French, and Spanish-speaking electorates, in turn, are much more heterogeneous in terms of countries of origin, which means that loyalties based on shared nationality cannot be similarly expected.

The nature of Finnish municipal elections varies greatly depending on the size and location of the municipality. The level of competition for seats as well as costs of campaigning are significantly higher in the largest cities, whereas in the smallest municipalities most candidates do not run campaigns at all but instead rely on their personal networks and name recognition among the local electorate. Candidate register data shows that, in municipalities with a maximum of 5,000 inhabitants, on average 43 percent of all candidates were elected. The corresponding share in the municipalities with at least 100,000 inhabitants was 10 percent.

As was described in Chapter 3.2, immigrant minorities are concentrated in the largest cities in Southern Finland. Figure 6.2 displays the share of foreign language-speaking persons among persons entitled to vote, candidates, and councillors in the 2017 municipal elections in Finnish regions. Further, Figure 6.3 illustrates the regional-level political representation of immigrant minorities with the help of the Representation Index. What we see is that that a relatively high proportion of immigrant minorities in the electorate does not necessarily guarantee their representation on ballot lists, nor does their high representation on ballot lists necessarily secure their access to municipal councils. For example, Kainuu and South Ostrobothnia, both of which had a low share of foreign language speakers in the electorate, nevertheless had relatively high shares of foreign language speakers as candidates. However, neither in Kainuu nor in South Ostrobothnia was an immigrant-origin candidate elected. In the Greater Helsinki area, immigrant minorities were elected to councils in almost the same proportion as they were nominated as candidates, although their underrepresentation was still significant.


Figure 6.2 Share of foreign language-speaking persons among persons entitled to vote, candidates, and councillors in Finnish regions (%).

		Eligible voters	Candidates	Councillors
1)	Uusimaa	10.9	3.8	2.0
1a)	Greater Helsinki	13.5	5.5	5.0
2)	Southwest Finland	5.7	2.0	0.7
3)	Ostrobothnia	5.1	3.9	1.7
4)	Kymenlaakso	5.0	3.0	0.4
5)	South Karelia	5.0	3.3	0.0
6)	Päijät-Häme	4.1	1.5	0.7
7)	Pirkanmaa	4.0	1.6	0.4
8)	Kanta-Häme	3.4	0.9	0.3
9)	North Karelia	3.1	1.9	0.8
10)	Satakunta	2.7	1.2	0.4
11)	Central Finland	2.7	1.9	1.0
12)	South Savo	2.6	2.0	0.8
13)	North Savo	2.4	1.8	0.2
14)	Central Ostrobothnia	2.3	1.5	0.0
15)	North Ostrobothnia	2.2	1.1	0.7
16)	Kainuu	2.2	1.9	0.0
17)	Lapland	2.2	1.4	0.4
18)	South Ostrobothnia	1.9	1.6	0.0



Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2017a.


Figure 6.3 The Representation Index of foreign language-speaking candidates and councillors in Finnish regions.



Source: Candidate register data.

The context in which many immigrant-origin candidates ran was characterized by a high level of competition for seats, which is a major factor contributing to their underrepresentation. Figure 6.4 illustrates how altogether one-third of immigrant-origin candidates ran in municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, and around half in municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. In contrast, around 70 percent of native-origin candidates ran in municipalities with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants. The contextual setting, thereby, emphasizes the role of immigrant-origin candidates’ personal and social resources regarding access to councils, because mobilising voters in large municipalities requires campaigning, whereas in small municipalities a candidate may be able to rely only on his or her personal reputation among the local residents.

Figure 6.4 Distribution of candidates by origin and the size of municipality.



Source: Candidate register data.

6.2 Candidates' sociodemographic profile and migration background


Candidate register data allows for an examination of gender and age distribution among all candidates and councillors in the 2017 elections. Candidate survey, in turn, enables the examination of candidates' educational and occupational background⁴², as well as their marital status and number of underage children. Investigation of immigrant-origin candidates by language groups is not fruitful with the survey data due to the low number of respondents per language group.

Figure 6.5 presents gender distribution among native and foreign language-speaking candidates and councillors in total and in the largest foreign language-speaking groups. What is seen is that the gender distribution of the elected councillors is a mirror-like reflection of the gender distribution among the candidates in both groups. The gender distribution was more balanced among immigrant-origin candidates. While among native-origin candidates the ratio was 61(60)–39(40), with men being in the majority, among immigrant-origin candidates the ratio was 56(57)–44(43). When examining the gender distribution across the largest foreign language-speaking groups, we see that female candidates constituted a majority among Russian and Estonian speakers. Among candidates from the Middle Eastern countries (Arabic, Kurdish, and Turkish speakers), women made up only a small minority (10–

⁴² Candidate register data also includes information on a candidate's occupation, but analysis of this data would require manual coding of all the job titles of 33,618 candidates.

16%). With respect to the Russian-speaking minority, the gender distribution of candidates corresponded to gender distribution in the population (see Figure 3.5 in Chapter 3.1). Among Estonian-speakers, women were overrepresented. One may speculate whether this is due to Estonian-origin women in Finland being more often permanently in the country compared to their male counterparts. As Table 5.3 showed, Russian and Estonian-origin women were also more active voters than co-ethnic men. The low share of female candidates from the Middle Eastern countries, in turn, could reflect stricter gender norms, due to which women less often aspire to a public role.

Figure 6.5 Gender distribution among native and foreign language-speaking candidates and councillors in the largest language groups.




Source: Candidate register data.

Examination of the age distribution in Figure 6.6 reveals that immigrant-origin candidates and councillors were, on average, much younger than native origin candidates, which also reflects the age distribution among these groups in the wider population (Figure 3.4 in Chapter 3.1). Somali-speaking candidates were by far the youngest: In this group, nearly 60 percent of the candidates were younger than 40

years old, and only 7 percent were fifty years or older. Turkish-speaking candidates were most often middle-aged, as nearly half of them were between 40–49 years of age. Among foreign language speakers, the share of candidates and councillors older than 60 years was very small compared to that of native-origin candidates (8% vs. 28%). Overall, the age distribution of native-origin candidates and councillors is very similar. Councillors from different age groups were elected almost in proportion to their share among the candidates. The same did not apply to immigrant-origin candidates and councillors. Nearly 40 percent of the foreign language-speaking councillors were between 30–39 years of age, whereas their share among the candidates was 27 percent.


Figure 6.6 Age distribution among native and foreign language-speaking candidates and councillors in total and in the largest foreign language-speaking groups.



Source: Candidate register data.

Figure 6.7 examines candidates' occupational backgrounds. It shows that the major difference between native and immigrant-origin candidates regarding occupational status was a large share of pensioners among the former, and a large share of workers among the latter. Lower managerial and professional employees and entrepreneurs were also more extensively represented among native-origin candidates.

Figure 6.7 Occupational background of native and immigrant-origin candidates (%).



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-squared test: $\chi^2(10)=86.165, p<.001$. The data have been weighted according to age and gender. Without weighting, the share of pensioners among native and immigrant-origin candidates would have been 27 and 7 percent, in contrast to 22 and 4 percent, respectively. The shares of workers would have been 21 and 36 percent, in contrast to 23 and 38 percent. In other groups, weighting produced a one percentage point change at maximum.


By employing Dataset 1, i.e. individual-level register data on voters in the 2017 Finnish municipal elections, together with candidate survey data, it is possible to compare occupational background between native and immigrant-origin voters and candidates and, thus, examine whether the candidates were working in higher-prestige jobs than voters, which is a robust pattern across the world. In fact, we may

expect that the gap between immigrant-origin voters and candidates should be broader than the gap between native-origin voters and candidates because political participation in a new context should be easier for persons with more human, social, and financial capital, all of which are connected to working in high-prestige jobs. Furthermore, as Durose et al. (2013) suggest, local party selectors responsible for candidate recruitment may perceive immigrants in high-prestige labour market positions as “acceptably different”, for they are closer to the characteristics of the “archetypal candidate” despite their minority background.

Out of the 1,377,450 individuals in the voter register data, 1,305,085 (94.7%) were Finnish, Swedish, or Sami speakers (native voters) and 72,215 (5.2%) were foreign language speakers (immigrant voters). Among 150 individuals, the language information was “unknown”. Although information on the voters’ origin is available (see Chapter 5.1), this time, only information on native language is used so that the operationalisation of the “native-origin” and “immigrant-origin” categories matches between voters and candidates.

Figure 6.8 compares native and immigrant-origin voters’ and candidates’ occupational backgrounds. In both groups, entrepreneurs were significantly over-represented among candidates compared to eligible voters. Among the native-origin, the gap was 10 percentage points and among the immigrant-origin, it was 7 percentage points. Also, manual workers and upper-level employees were over-represented among candidates compared to voters. The gap regarding manual workers was 8 percentage points among the native-origin and 11 percentage points among the immigrant-origin. The over-representation of the upper-level employees was 5–6 percentage points. Pensioners were under-represented among native-origin candidates but not among immigrant-origin candidates. Perhaps surprisingly, none of the immigrant-origin candidates were working as farmers or agricultural entrepreneurs, although persons from this group constituted 6 percent of the immigrant-origin electorate. Students were underrepresented among immigrant-origin candidates but not among the natives.

Figure 6.8 Occupational background of native and immigrant-origin candidates and voters (%).



Source: Voter register data; Candidate survey.


Notes: Statistical distributions on candidates are weighted according to age and gender. Occupational categories do not match between the datasets, as there were fewer categories in the voter register data. Therefore, higher managerial employees and lower managerial/professional employees are combined in the category upper-level employees. Intermediate-level employees in Figure 6.7 are in the category lower-level employees. Unemployed persons, as well as persons taking care of children, home, or family members, are in the category other/unknown.

To examine the educational attainment of municipal election candidates, the candidate survey used two types of questions. If the respondent indicated having attended school mainly in Finland, he or she was asked what was the highest completed level of education or degree he or she had. The response categories were: (1) primary education, (2) lower secondary education, (3) short vocational training

(vocational school or course), (4) college-level vocational education (post-secondary), (5) upper secondary education (general), (6) polytechnic degree or equivalent, (7) university degree, and (8) doctoral degree or equivalent. This variable has been coded into three categories by following the example of the ISCED 2011 classification as follows: response categories 1–2 are coded into “primary level”, categories 3–5 into “secondary level”, and categories 6–8 into “tertiary level”. However, if the respondent had attended school mainly in a country other than Finland, he or she was asked for the number of years of education completed. These responses were then coded into the education variable as follows: 1–9 years of completed education was coded as primary level, 10–12 years as secondary level, and 13 or more years as tertiary level.

This coding scheme is problematic given that years of completed education hardly reliably match the highest completed level of education or degree. Recognising that comparing educational attainment across different school systems in different countries and across generations is difficult, the statistics presented in Figure 6.9 may be regarded as a rough estimate of the educational background across native and immigrant-origin candidates. The main observation is that immigrant-origin candidates were clearly more often highly educated compared to native-origin candidates (68% vs. 42%). Having only primary level education was as rare in both groups. Weighting the data according to age and gender did not result in changes in the distributions. Furthermore, native-origin female candidates were significantly more educated than their male counterparts, whereas such a gender gap did not exist among immigrant-origin candidates. The observation that the educational attainment of women and immigrants must exceed that of native-origin men for these groups to achieve political representation is in line with the literature that sees both gender and race as categories producing inequalities (e.g. Bjarnegård & Kenny 2015; Dancygier et al. 2015).

Figure 6.9 Level of education of native and immigrant-origin candidates by gender. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Origin: $\chi^2(2) = 46.475$, $p < .001$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2) = 28.859$, $p < .001$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2) = 3.168$, $p = .205$.


As noted before, Dataset 1, i.e. individual-level register data on voters, gives a poor estimation of educational attainment among immigrant-origin persons because the data were drawn from Statistics Finland's Register of Completed Education and Degrees before it was later complemented with qualifications attained abroad (see Official Statistics of Finland 2019c; Larja 2020; Witting 2019). Thus, the educational attainment of the immigrant-origin population must be estimated based on other sources of information. At the moment, the best available sources are Statistics Finland's complemented Register of Completed Education and Degrees (information on foreign-origin persons' degrees was collected with a survey), the FinMonik survey, and the UTH survey (see Official Statistics of Finland 2019c; Larja 2020; Sutela & Larja 2015b; Witting 2019). Information on educational attainment by origin in 2018 based on the Register of Completed Education and Degrees is presented in Figure 6.10⁴³. It estimates that one-third (32 %) of the native-origin and one-fourth of the immigrant-origin (25%) population had a tertiary level education. However, half (49%) of the immigrant-origin population had not completed secondary-level education, meaning that primary level education was two times more common among immigrants than among the native-origin population. Both

⁴³ The information represents population of 15 years and older.

immigrant and native-origin women more often had tertiary-level education as compared to their male counterparts.

By comparing the statistics in Figures 6.9 and 6.10, we see that highly educated persons were significantly over-represented among immigrant-origin candidates. Persons with only primary education, in turn, were significantly underrepresented among both natives and immigrants, although much more among the latter. This shows that education – and the increased human capital it brings – strongly facilitates political incorporation.

Figure 6.10 Level of education of native and immigrant-origin population by gender.



Source: Official Statistics of Finland 2019c.

As was demonstrated in Chapter 5.1, turnout in the 2017 municipal elections was higher among those who were married in comparison to those who were not. Support and encouragement provided by one’s spouse should also be important regarding the decision to stand as a candidate. Figure 6.11 shows the candidates’ marital status by origin and gender. Around 60 percent of candidates were either married or in a registered partnership, 11–15 percent were cohabiting, around 10 percent were single, and a corresponding share was divorced. The results suggest that being married was significantly more common among native-origin men than native-origin women (61% vs. 53%), whereas cohabiting was more common among native-origin women than men (17% vs. 13%). No marital status-related gender gap was observed among immigrant-origin candidates.

Figure 6.11 Candidates' marital status by origin and gender. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Origin: $\chi^2(5) = 5.578$, $p = .349$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(5) = 20.797$, $p = .001$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(5) = 2.973$, $p = .704$.

Prior studies suggest that having children facilitates electoral engagement because parenting usually indicates interaction with a variety of local public services, such as kindergartens, schools, and health care, which increases interest in the organisation of these services (e.g. Wass et al. 2015). Especially for immigrant parents, social networks built through children and their hobbies and other leisure activities may be crucial channels of societal integration and feelings of belonging. On the other hand, parental duties, especially having underage children, often mean a lack of time available for political participation.

Figure 6.12 presents the share of candidates with underage children by origin and gender. It shows that immigrant-origin candidates were more often parents of underage children compared to native-origin candidates. The difference between the groups also remains statistically significant when the crosstabulation is run among candidates under 60 years of age. Native-origin women were significantly more often parents of underage children than were native-origin men. The distribution is the opposite among those immigrant-origin candidates who responded to the survey. However, the difference is not statistically significant.

Figure 6.12 Share of candidates with underage children by origin and gender. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Origin: $\chi^2(3) = 48.868$, $p < .001$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(3) = 9.665$, $p = .022$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(3) = 3.300$, $p = .348$.

Almost half (43%) of the immigrant-origin candidates had migrated to Finland when they were 20–29 years old (Figure 6.13). Four percent were Finnish-born, and 16 percent had come before their 20th birthday. One-fourth had migrated after turning 30, and one out of ten after turning 40.

Nearly 70 percent of the immigrant-origin candidates had lived in Finland over ten years, and nearly 40 percent over 20 years (Figure 6.14). One-third had lived in Finland less than 10 years, and around 10 percent less than five years.


Figure 6.13 Age at migration among immigrant-origin candidates.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: N=201. Black lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.14 Years lived in Finland among immigrant-origin candidates.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: N=201. Black lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Half (48%) of the immigrant-origin candidates had moved to Finland for family-related reasons, such as getting married to a Finn or following a spouse or a parent who had come to Finland to work (Figure 6.15). Sixteen percent had migrated for work, and a corresponding share had a refugee background. Seven percent had come to study and a few were Ingrian Finnish returnees. These shares are very similar to the reasons for migration among the immigrant population as a whole (Sutela & Larja 2015a; Chapter 3.1).

Figure 6.15 Immigrant-origin candidates' reason for migration.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: N=204. Black lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

6.3 Candidates' distribution across parties

The extent to which different social groups are represented on a party's list gives a strong signal about the party's ideological and social identity. As Katz (2001: 278) formulates:

(...) a party's candidates in large measure define and constitute its public face in elections. Collectively, they manifest the demographic, geographic, and ideological dimensions of the party (...) the nomination of more women or more minority group members or more members of some religious sect or more workers or more farmers signals something about the party as a whole (...)

Considering that candidates send a public message about the party's goals and ideology, it may be understood why parties find it important to control recruitment processes. Parties not only provide access to newcomers but may also shut them out in the fear that they change not only the party's public face but, ultimately, its ideological orientation (Michon & Vermeulen 2013). In this chapter, I will examine immigrant-origin candidates' distribution across parties and provide possible explanations for their party choice. I will also look at immigrant-origin candidates' electoral success across parties by finding out which party or parties provided the best chances for immigrant-origin candidates to win a seat in municipal councils.

The absolute numbers of foreign and native language-speaking candidates across parties are presented in Table 6.2, and the proportional share of foreign language-speaking candidates in different parties is shown in Figure 6.16. What we see is that the Green League had the highest proportional share of immigrant-origin candidates (4.2%). The Christian Democrats had the second most (3.4%) and the Swedish People's Party (SPP) the third most (3.3%). The share of immigrant-origin candidates also exceeded the average share (2.2%) in the Left Alliance (2.7%).

It must be kept in mind that the size and regional presence of the parties are reflected in the number of candidates the parties recruited. For instance, while the Centre Party had by far the largest number of candidates (as Table 6.2 shows), a large share of its candidates stood in rural municipalities, in which the share of the immigrant-origin population is low. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Centre Party had the lowest proportional share (1.3%) of immigrant-origin candidates in its lists. This, however, cannot be taken as a direct indicator of the party's reluctance to recruit immigrant-origin candidates.


The Green League stands at the other end of the urban–rural division, having its heartland in the largest cities, in which most of the immigration population is concentrated. Also, the number of candidates nominated by the Green League was one-third of the candidates nominated by the Centre Party. Nevertheless, as Table 6.2 shows, immigrant-origin candidates were strongly represented on the list of the Green League also with respect to absolute numbers. While the Social Democrats (SDP) had the most immigrant-origin candidates (125 persons), the Greens had the second most (108 persons). The most likely explanation for immigrant-origin candidates' high representation in the Green League relates to the party's public face as a defender of minority rights, although aspiring candidates with a more conservative orientation may avoid the party because of its distinguished stance as a representative of not only ethnic but also sexual minorities.

Table 6.2 The number of native and foreign language-speaking candidates in different parties.

	Foreign-language-speaking candidates	Finnish, Swedish, Sámi-speaking candidates	All candidates
Total	729	32,889	33,618
SDP	125	6,007	6,132
GREEN	108	2,492	2,600
NCP	104	5,635	5,739
CENT	96	7,365	7,461
LEFT	87	3,116	3,203
FINNS	69	3,762	3,831
CD	67	1,904	1,971
SPP	44	1,280	1,324
Constituency association	16	828	844
Other party	13	500	513

Source: Candidate register data.

Figure 6.16 Share of foreign language-speaking candidates in different parties (%).



Source: Candidate register data.

Notes: The shown percentages represent the share of foreign language-speaking candidates out of parties' total number of candidates.

Table 6.3 shows the distribution of immigrant-origin candidates across parties according to their native language. What we see, first, is that the SDP was the most preferred option among Arabic, Somali, Turkish, and Kurdish speakers, who may be described as visible minorities. The SDP was especially popular among Kurds, out of whom 43 percent represented the party. Somali speakers were fairly evenly distributed across the leftist and liberal parties, namely, the Left Alliance (20%), the SDP (37%), and the Greens (27%), and distinctively absent from the candidate lists of the centre–right to right-wing and conservative parties (the Centre Party, the NCP, the Finns, and the Christian Democrats) (Figure 6.17). A fairly large proportion of Turkish speakers, in turn, were found on the lists of the NCP (23%) and the Centre Party (18%), which could be connected to Turks’ often being self-employed entrepreneurs (in the food and catering business) (Wahlbeck 2005). The Centre Party was the most popular party among candidates with Russian background. This could be connected to the fact that Russian speakers are less concentrated in the large cities of Southern Finland and were standing as candidates in municipalities where the Centre Party has strong support. Among Estonian-origin candidates, the most popular party was the NCP. As Figure 6.17 shows, around 60 percent of Russian and Estonian-speaking candidates represented the centre to right/conservative parties against 36–37 percent representing the left/liberal parties.


Table 6.3 Distribution of candidates of the largest foreign language-speaking groups across parties (%).

	NCP	SDP	CENT	GREEN	LEFT	FINNS	SPP	CD	Other party	Constit. assoc.	Total	(N)
Russian	12.3	14.1	<u>20.9</u>	8.6	12.9	13.5	2.5	10.4	1.8	3.1	100	(163)
Estonian	<u>22.2</u>	19.4	16.7	9.7	8.3	15.3	0.0	6.9	0.0	1.4	100	(72)
Arabic	14.3	<u>21.4</u>	9.5	11.9	16.7	9.5	4.8	7.1	2.4	2.4	100	(42)
Somali	10.0	<u>36.7</u>	3.3	26.7	20.0	0.0	3.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	(30)
English	12.5	12.5	10.0	17.5	10.0	7.5	2.5	<u>20.0</u>	2.5	5.0	100	(40)
Turkish	23.1	<u>25.6</u>	17.9	2.6	15.4	7.7	5.1	2.6	0.0	0.0	100	(39)
Kurdish	13.5	<u>43.2</u>	5.4	10.8	13.5	2.7	5.4	0.0	2.7	2.7	100	(37)
Other	13.1	12.1	10.5	<u>20.3</u>	10.5	8.2	10.5	10.8	2.3	2.0	100	(306)

Source: Candidate register data.

Notes: The most popular party within a language group underlined.

Figure 6.17 Distribution of candidates from the largest foreign language-speaking groups across the left/liberal and centre-to-right/conservative parties.



Source: Candidate register data.

Notes: Left/liberal category includes the Left Alliance, the SDP, and the Greens. Centre to right/conservative category covers the Centre Party, the Christian Democrats, the Finns, and the NCP. All other parties and groups, including the SPP, are in the category “other”.

It would be very interesting to examine the party distribution of candidates with different ethnic backgrounds against party choice across voters from the corresponding groups. The only dataset that gives any insights into immigrants’ party choice in Finland is the survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region (Dataset 2) (Table 6.4; Pitkänen et al. 2019b: 39–40). Given that the place of residence has a significant impact on party choice, it must be highlighted that the observations presented in Table 6.4 are limited to foreign language speakers in the capital area. In other words, these results do not say anything about the party preferences within the five language groups at a national level. What is observed with respect to these five groups in the capital area is that half of Russian and Arabic speakers indicated that they did not know which party candidate they would vote for. Half of the Somali speakers expressed a preference for the SDP, which was also the most preferred party among Somali-origin candidates. The most popular party among the English speakers, i.e. British, American, and Australian-origin immigrants, was the Green League. Pitkänen et al. (2019b: 40) argue that this is probably linked to the high level of education in this group, as this preference is

hardly a result of voting for an environmental party in the country of origin. Although Estonian speakers did not express a strong preference towards any particular party, the most popular party in this group was the Finns party, to which 8 percent of the respondents would have given their vote. This finding could be related to a high share of manual workers among Estonian-origin men.

Table 6.4 Party preferences across five language groups in the Greater Helsinki area. Crosstabulation (%).

	Russian speakers	Estonian speakers	English speakers	Somali speakers	Arabic speakers
NCP	2	2	7	4	2
SDP	5	2	12	44	4
CENT	3	2	5	7	0
GREEN	7	5	34	12	7
FINNS	4	8	0	0	2
LEFT	2	0	5	4	2
SPP	1	0	4	0	0
CD	3	0	3	0	1
Other	1	2	0	0	1
Would not vote	13	36	6	7	24
Does not want to tell	8	28	3	4	5
Does not know	51	16	21	17	52
Total	100	100	100	100	100
(n)	(301)	(310)	(314)	(302)	(300)

Source: The survey for foreign language speakers in the Helsinki region 2018/2019.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: $\chi^2(48)=972.200$, $p<.001$. Shown are the responses to the question: "Which party candidate would you vote for if the parliamentary elections were right now and you were entitled to vote?"


Next, I will examine the opportunities in immigrant-origin candidates' access to municipal councils by party. Table 6.5 presents the total number of elected councillors by party and language group. Figure 6.18 displays the share of immigrant-origin councillors out of the total number of a party's councillors. The highest share of immigrant-origin candidates elected within a party was among the Greens (1.9%), and the second-highest share was among the SPP (1.5%). Alongside the Centre Party, the Christian Democrats had the lowest share of elected immigrant-origin councillors (0.3%) even though the party had the second most immigrant-origin candidates after the Green League. As to the absolute number of immigrant-origin candidates being elected from a party's list, the winner is the SDP, with 19 immigrant-origin councillors.

Table 6.5 The absolute number of native and foreign language-speaking councillors across parties.

	Foreign-language-speaking councillors	Finnish, Swedish, Sámi-speaking councillors	All councillors
Total	66	8,933	8,999
SDP	19	1,678	1,697
GREEN	10	524	534
NCP	7	1,483	1,490
CENT	7	2,817	2,824
FINNS	7	651	658
SPP	7	464	471
LEFT	6	764	770
Constituency association	2	225	227
CD	1	315	316
Other party	0	12	12

Source: Candidate register data.

Figure 6.18 Share of foreign language-speaking councillors out of country total in different parties (%).



Source: Candidate register data.

Table 6.6 presents a comparison of intra-party opportunities of being elected between native and foreign language-speaking candidates. This comparison is conducted by examining, first, the share of native and foreign language-speaking candidates elected in each party. In other words, the number of native/foreign language-speaking councillors is divided by the number of native/foreign language-speaking candidates within a party. Then, the share of foreign language-speaking candidates elected is divided by the share of native language-speaking candidates elected. This gives us a ratio of how many immigrant-origin councillors were elected in proportion to each native-origin councillor. If the ratio is 1, immigrant and native candidates are elected in equal proportion, which was not the case in any party. This calculation shows, interestingly, that immigrant-origin candidates had the best intra-party opportunities for being elected in the Finns Party, in which 0.6 immigrant-origin candidates were elected in proportion to one elected native-origin candidate. After the Finns, the highest ratios of immigrant-origin candidates elected are found among the SDP, the Greens, and the SPP.

Table 6.6 Ratio of immigrant-origin candidates elected per native-origin candidates elected by party.

	Share of Finnish, Swedish, Sámi-speaking candidates elected (%)	Share of foreign language-speaking candidates elected (%)	Ratio of foreign language-speaking candidates elected per native-origin candidates elected
TOTAL	27.2	9.1	0.33
FINNS	17.3	10.1	0.59
SDP	27.9	15.2	0.54
Constituency association	27.2	12.5	0.46
SPP	36.3	15.9	0.44
GREEN	21.0	9.3	0.44
LEFT	24.5	6.9	0.28
NCP	26.3	6.7	0.26
CENT	38.2	7.3	0.19
CD	16.5	1.5	0.09
Other party	2.4	0.0	0.00

Source: Candidate register data.

What explains the party choice among immigrant-origin candidates? The next chapter utilizes the Candidate Survey data to examine the value orientations of the immigrant-origin candidates and whether these orientations match the orientation of the native-origin candidates from the same party. If they do, the choice of a party should be explained by ideological motivations. If they do not, immigrant-origin candidates may have other motivations for their choice of party, such as the party's public face as a defender of minority rights. Scholarship shows that left-wing parties are more open regarding minorities because they have a more egalitarian ideology "which stresses access for all political minorities" (Norris 1997a: 218). One of the candidates interviewed for this study (see the description of Dataset 6), who was an entrepreneur, had first been a member of the National Coalition, but later chose the Social Democrats for ideological reasons. The candidate explained this decision as follows:


Interviewer: How certain was your choice of party? When the [Social Democratic] party asked you to join them, was it clear that...?

C8: Well, at some point I was a member of the National Coalition. I received their letters and emails. I was interested in politics and I found out about things. When SDP asked me to stand as their candidate, I thought that okay, let's try SDP then. They told me that SDP is a [good] party for entrepreneurs. I told them that I don't

really care about that since the most important thing to me is that the party is close to my values (...) The most important thing to me was equality. Where I come from, it is totally different. There is so much more money and natural resources compared to Finland. But there is something missing that is found here. [Here] the system is the same for you and the same for me. If we drive on a road, the law is the same for both of us. If you do wrong, you will be fined. If I do wrong, I will be fined. This is one of the reasons why I moved to Finland.

According to the candidate survey, immigrant-origin candidates found it more difficult to choose a party even if they had stood as candidates in prior elections (Figure 6.19). While 66 percent of those native-origin candidates who were standing as candidates for the first time said that choosing the right party was very easy, the corresponding share among immigrant-origin candidates was 41 percent. Even among those immigrant-origin candidates who had prior experience as electoral candidates, the share of “very easy” responses was 55 percent. This reflects immigrant-origin candidates’ weaker attachment to parties, which reflects political socialisation outside the Finnish context.

Figure 6.19 The perception of ease/difficulty in choosing the right party by origin and prior candidate experience. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson’s chi-squared test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Experienced candidate: $\chi^2(4) = 48.5$, $p < .001$; Novice candidate: $\chi^2(4) = 35.1$, $p < .001$.

Given immigrants’ weaker attachment to Finnish political parties, active recruitment on behalf of the parties may be a more crucial factor for party choice than personal

partisan orientations. On the other hand, both mechanisms are likely to be important, as described by one of the interviewed candidates:

Interviewer: Was it clear that you would choose the Christian Democrats, or were you thinking between several parties?

C9: Well, I did not think of other options because they asked me to join. But if they hadn't, I would've probably joined the Finns Party, first, because it is easier to get elected from their list, and second, many of my views are similar to theirs. But the views of the Christian Democrats are also similar to mine.

This candidate had considered joining another party due to the party's strong status, but he chose the Christian Democrats because they were the ones to approach him. This quote also reflects the previous notion of how the Finns party, with an anti-immigration platform, may be a strategically wise option even among immigrant-origin candidates because it provides a realistic chance of gaining a seat on the municipal council. However, due to its recent success during the 2010s, it is also considered a party through which one can access political power:

Interviewer: Why the Finns Party?

C6: Because I felt they were close to my world view (...)

Interviewer: So, you did an investigation about the parties?

C6: Yes. I considered also the Left Alliance and the Christian Democrats, but I have realised that one is able to influence only through big parties. (...) The Finns Party platform suited my own way of thinking. Although they say that it is a racist party, it has not been. I have never felt that I wouldn't be one of them. I have always had a good feeling there, most of them are nice people.

As the following quote illustrates, ideological and strategic calculations regarding party choice went hand in hand:

C10: Minority [status] is in my DNA. I cannot get rid of that. I mean, if I move to Sweden, I will be joining the Finnish-speaking People's Party. If I go to Germany, I will be supporting the Danish Speakers' People's Party. That's something like, that is a huge crowd and there is a small one. I'm always in the small one. Family or race, gene or something, I don't know, but I cannot get rid of that. But, yes, politics is also strategy. (...) I did choose the most beneficial way for [a member of a minority] in this country, with most effective party. I said: "Do you know how many votes do you need to get elected from Social Democrats? Wrong answer, you need more than 1,540. Do you know how many votes do you need to get elected in Swedish-speaking People's Party? 400–500 will be more than enough".

Some candidates had chosen to stand as independent candidates on a party's list, which means they were not members of the party, although they represented the party in the elections. One of the interviewed candidates described how this option provided some extra time to consider one's own relationship with the party:

C11: When I stood as a candidate for the first time I was on [party's name] list, but I was independent i.e. not yet a member of the party.

Interviewer: Why were you independent?

C11: Perhaps because I needed to internalise the politics of [party's name] and their way of thinking (...) Still, I don't agree on every issue, but [party's name] feels the closest to my views and values.

This question was also discussed in the party interviews. One of the interviewees mentioned how parties offer the possibility of standing as an independent candidate in the hopes that it would also encourage those municipal residents to stand who hesitate to join a political party, for instance, due to fear of negative attention. However, this independence may seem a bit counterintuitive given that the independent candidates appear in parties' advertisements and are expected to engage in a party's values and platform to the same degree as non-independent candidates. This way, they are, in any case, profiled as representatives of the party on whose list they stand as candidates. Nevertheless, as the above quote lets us assume, this step may be necessary on municipal residents' trajectories to local elections.

6.4 Candidates' value orientations

The candidate survey data enables comparisons between the political attitudes of the immigrant- and native-origin candidates on the traditional left-right and sociocultural dimensions⁴⁴, which may further open up the motivations for

⁴⁴ At the beginning of the 2000s, political scientists began to complement the traditional left-right scale with the so-called GAL-TAN scale in measuring contestation among political parties. The capital letters indicate the endpoints of the scale, standing for Green-Alternative-Libertarian and Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist, respectively. 20 years ago, GAL-TAN was called "the new politics dimension" tapping communal, environmental, and cultural issues (Hooghe et al. 2002). This means that in addition to parties' stance on economic issues, they can be classified in terms of their views on social and cultural values. "Libertarian" or "postmaterialist" parties favour broad personal freedoms with respect to e.g. abortion rights, divorce, and same-sex marriage. "Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties reject these ideas in favour of order, tradition, and stability, believing that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.

immigrant-origin candidates' party choice. The survey included a battery of altogether 17 propositions on respondents' opinions relating to the future direction of Finland. The response scale ranged between 0 and 10, where 0 represented "a very bad proposition" and 10 "a very good proposition". The battery of 17 propositions has been reduced to a smaller number of variables by performing a principal component analysis (PCA) with orthogonal rotation method Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. The idea is to utilize PCA as a precursor to identify the value dimensions, which the propositions tap on. Bartlett's test of sphericity, which tests the overall significance of all the correlations within the correlation matrix, was significant ($\chi^2(136)=6350.28$, $p<.001$), indicating that it was appropriate to use the method on this set of data. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy indicated that the strength of the relationships among variables was high (KMO=0.849) and, thus, it was acceptable to proceed with the analysis. The first round of analysis produced four components with eigenvalues greater than one. These four components gave an interpretable solution, yet the proposition regarding the production of nuclear power did not load into any of the components with a score over 0.4. Thus, it was omitted, and the analysis was rerun with the remaining 16 propositions. The final rotated component matrix is displayed in Table 6.7. Only component loadings above 0.4 are shown.

The first component consists of six propositions and has a high internal consistency with a Cronbach's alpha score of 0.830. This component measures candidates' attitudes towards multiculturalism, immigration, minorities, and the environment. Thereby, it is labelled "Pro-minorities and Pro-environment Index". The second component consists of three items, which measure traditional conservative values. The component has lower yet sufficient internal consistency, with the Cronbach's alpha score being 0.687. It is labelled "Conservatism Index". The third component has three items, which tap the traditional left-right dimension regarding greater versus lesser government regulation of market outcomes. It has high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha=0.719) and is labelled "Pro-Capitalism Index". The fourth component seems to measure views on regional equality, but it has low internal consistency with an alpha score of 0.410, which suggests that it does not make for a reliable summative scale. As noted earlier, the regional equality dimension is especially important for the Centre Party, which is the largest party in most rural municipalities (e.g. Westinen 2015). The following analysis of candidates' value positions focuses on the left-right and socio-cultural dimensions and omits the analysis of attitudes on a centre-periphery continuum. This is justified given that

the immigrant-origin electorate resides mostly in the largest cities, where this question is less salient.

Table 6.7 Principal component analysis of candidates' political attitudes. Rotated component matrix.

	1	2	3	4
Multicultural Finland where foreigners with different religions and lifestyles are tolerated	.848			
Finland where the special status of linguistic and cultural minorities is acknowledged	.799			
Finland that has more immigration	.770			
Finland where there is more equality between men and women	.645			
Finland where the status of sexual minorities is reinforced	.606	(-.575)		
Eco-friendlier Finland, even if it meant low economic growth or no growth at all	.580			
Finland where the status of traditional nuclear families is reinforced		.769		
Finland where Christian values have a greater role		.765		
Finland with more law and order		.661		
Finland that has a smaller public sector			.765	
Finland that has a lower taxation level			.755	
Finland with more entrepreneurship and market economy			.731	
Finland where there are smaller differences in regional development				.693
Finland that has smaller income disparities				.593
Finland that is less committed/attached to the European Union				.533
Finland that has fewer municipalities than now				-.489
Eigenvalue	4.615	2.123	1.786	1.059
Percentage of Variance	28.8	13.3	11.2	6.6
Cronbach's alpha	.830	.687	.719	.410

Source: Candidate survey.

When Cronbach's alpha scores are examined separately among native and immigrant-origin candidates, the scores suggest that the indices are internally less coherent among the latter (the scores for components 1–3 being 0.762, 0.568, and 0.537, respectively), whereas they are more coherent among the former (the scores being 0.840, 0.707, and 0.744, respectively). The interpretation is that candidates who have socialized to politics in the Finnish context conceptualise the values that guide political decision-making in a much more uniform way compared to persons who have grown up in a different environment. According to Inglehart (1977: 3), the so-called “Silent Revolution” – a shift from material values towards post-material values among Western publics since the mid-19th century – was an outcome of Western populations being raised under conditions of exceptional economic security. The emphasis on the quality of life rather than material well-being and physical security became possible in the Western countries only after economic prosperity and a higher level of equality were achieved between elites and the masses. However, economic, social, and political realities are different outside the Western world. The candidate survey was designed to reflect political cleavages that shape Finnish politics. Thus, it is not surprising that the propositions, which tap values particular to Finnish society, do not produce similar component loadings among native and immigrant-origin candidates.

Table 6.8 displays the mean values on the Pro-minorities and Pro-environment Index. High values indicate positive attitudes towards multiculturalism, immigration, minorities, and the environment, and low values indicate negative attitudes. What we see is that immigrant-origin candidates have a higher mean score than native-origin candidates, which seems to be a result of native-origin men depressing the mean score among native-origin candidates. As further examination reveals, candidates differ regarding their attitudes towards multiculturalism, immigration, minorities, and the environment depending on which party they represent. Candidates of the Green League have the highest scores, whereas the candidates from the Finns Party have the lowest. In the data, immigrant-origin candidates of the Finns Party attain a higher score than their fellow native-origin party members, but the difference is not statistically significant. Immigrant-origin candidates differ statistically significantly from native-origin candidates only in the SDP, where the former attain a higher mean score than the latter (7.5 in contrast to 6.7).

Table 6.8 Mean values on the Pro-Minorities and Pro-Environment Index by origin, gender, and party.

	Immigrant-origin		Native-origin		Independent Samples t-test	Sig.
	M (SD)	(N)	M (SD)	(N)		
All	7.0 (1.9)	(191)	6.5 (2.0)	(984)	t(1181)=-3.259, p=.001	*
Men	6.9 (2.0)	(115)	6.0 (2.1)	(115)	t(657)=-4.105, p<.001	***
Women	7.0 (1.7)	(84)	7.0 (1.7)	(84)	t(522)=-.227, p=.820	
NCP	6.8 (1.8)	(30)	6.2 (1.7)	(142)	t(170)=-1.637, p=.104	
SDP	7.5 (1.6)	(31)	6.7 (1.7)	(198)	t(227)=-2.380, p=.018	*
CENT	6.2 (1.2)	(25)	5.8 (1.5)	(208)	t(231)=-1.369, p=.172	
GREEN	8.2 (1.3)	(36)	8.4 (1.2)	(87)	t(121)=.870, p=.386	
LEFT	7.8 (1.3)	(22)	7.7 (1.6)	(107)	t(127)=-.369, p=.712	
FINNS	4.4 (1.9)	(14)	3.9 (1.8)	(92)	t(104)=-.926, p=.357	
SPP	7.5 (1.3)	(13)	7.8 (1.3)	(42)	t(53)=-.739, p=.463	
CD	5.7 (1.6)	(21)	6.2 (1.4)	(62)	t(81)=-1.468, p=.146	

Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Table 6.9 presents the mean scores on the Conservatism Index. It shows that, on average, immigrant-origin candidates held significantly more conservative views than native-origin candidates. Immigrant-origin female candidates, in particular, were more conservative than their native-origin counterparts. Examination by party shows that immigrant-origin candidates were more conservative than native-origin candidates in the SDP, the Centre Party, the Green League, and the Left Alliance. Most conservative respondents are found in the Christian Democrats, among whom candidates are equally conservative regardless of their origin.

These results are similar to results from the Migrant World Values Survey (MWVS) that was recently conducted in Sweden (Puranen 2019). The questionnaire of the MWVS corresponds to the questionnaire of the seventh wave of the general World Values Survey. It was directed at non-European migrants from Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Syria, and Turkey, with the number of respondents being around 6500. The results of the MWVS show that while many immigrants have adopted some of the Western and liberal values of Swedish society, political socialization to liberal values has not reached all value dimensions. Respondents' views on homosexuality, sex before marriage, divorce, abortion, and prostitution stood in sharp contrast to those of the majority population in Sweden. While a

majority of both female and male respondents were in favour of gender equality, many also reported that gender equality had “gone too far” in Sweden. On average, trust and tolerance towards people with different opinions were lower among immigrants compared to Swedish-origin persons.

Table 6.9 Mean values on the Conservatism Index by origin, gender, and party.

	Immigrant-origin		Native-origin		Independent Samples t-test	Sig.
	M (SD)	(N)	M (SD)	(N)		
All	5.8 (2.4)	(198)	5.1 (2.4)	(998)	t(1194)=-3.691, p<.001	***
Men	5.6 (2.3)	(113)	5.2 (2.4)	(550)	t(661)=-1.785, p=.075	
Women	6.0 (2.5)	(85)	5.0 (2.4)	(448)	t(531)=-3.524, p<.001	***
NCP	5.7 (2.0)	(30)	5.4 (2.0)	(142)	t(170)=-.825, p=.410	
SDP	5.8 (2.4)	(31)	4.5 (2.0)	(206)	t(235)=-3.239, p=.001	**
CENT	6.8 (1.5)	(25)	5.9 (1.9)	(210)	t(233)=-2.145, p=.033	*
GREEN	4.3 (2.4)	(36)	2.8 (2.0)	(86)	t(120)=-3.475, p=.001	**
LEFT	5.5 (2.5)	(23)	3.5 (2.1)	(111)	t(132)=-3.996, p<.001	***
FINNS	6.7 (1.8)	(14)	6.5 (1.8)	(92)	t(104)=-.375, p=.708	
SPP	4.6 (1.9)	(13)	5.3 (1.8)	(42)	t(53)=1.344, p=.185	
CD	8.3 (1.1)	(18)	8.2 (1.2)	(63)	t(79)=-.185, p=.855	

Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Table 6.10 displays the mean scores on the Pro-Capitalism Index. It shows that the mean values were not significantly different between native- and immigrant-origin candidates. However, there was a significant difference between native and immigrant-origin candidates of the SDP and the NCP, which, in fact, are the parties that most strongly attach to the left-right dimension in Finland (e.g. Westinen 2015). Immigrant-origin candidates in the right-wing NCP were, on average, less enthusiastic about reducing government regulation compared to their native-origin counterparts. Immigrant-origin candidates in the left-wing SDP, in turn, were much more to the right than the native-origin candidates. Especially regarding the SDP, this result can be interpreted as an indication of immigrants choosing SDP for ideological reasons other than the party’s stance on economic questions, such as the party’s liberal view on multiculturalism.

Table 6.10 Mean values on the Pro-Capitalism Index by origin, gender, and party.

	Immigrant-origin		Native-origin		Independent Samples t-test	Sig.
	M (SD)	(N)	M (SD)	(N)		
All	6.0 (2.0)	(201)	5.8 (2.3)	(996)	t(317.966)=-1.034, p=.302	
Men	6.0 (2.0)	(117)	6.0 (2.4)	(546)	t(190.779)=-.249, p=.804	
Women	6.0 (1.9)	(84)	5.7 (2.2)	(450)	t(532)=-1.145, p=.253	
NCP	7.0 (1.4)	(30)	7.8 (1.6)	(144)	t(172)=2.317, p=.022	*
SDP	5.9 (1.8)	(31)	4.6 (1.9)	(204)	t(233)=-3.578, p<.001	***
CENT	6.9 (1.7)	(25)	6.7 (1.4)	(208)	t(231)=-.699, p=.485	
GREEN	5.4 (1.6)	(37)	4.7 (2.0)	(87)	t(122)=-1.735, p=.085	
LEFT	4.5 (2.2)	(24)	3.7 (2.4)	(110)	t(132)=-1.608, p=.110	
FINNS	6.7 (1.9)	(14)	7.2 (1.6)	(92)	t(104)=1.020, p=.310	
SPP	5.9 (1.7)	(13)	6.0 (1.9)	(43)	t(54)=.129, p=.898	
CD	6.2 (1.6)	(19)	6.3 (1.3)	(62)	t(79)=.301, p=.764	

Source: Candidate survey.


Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Figures 6.20–6.22 display the mean scores on the three above presented indices by candidates’ country of origin. Candidates have been coded into eight country-groups based on the survey question “In which country were you born?” Candidates with Finnish or Swedish as their registered mother tongue were not presented with this question, but their country of origin is assumed to be Finland. A sufficient number of Russian- and Estonian-origin candidates responded to the survey, so the candidates from these countries can be examined individually. Candidates from other countries are coded into country groups. The results must be interpreted with great care due to low N within each subgroup.

The main results are, first, that immigrant-origin candidates’ scores on the Pro-Minorities and Pro-Environment Index were higher than the natives’ in all other groups except among Russian and Estonian-origin candidates, although mainly the differences were not statistically significant. An examination of the 95 percent confidence intervals suggests that only candidates from the Middle East and Northern Africa received significantly higher mean scores than the Finnish-origin candidates (Figure 6.20). Second, immigrant-origin candidates across ethnic groups held, on average, more conservative values than native-origin candidates (the difference being significant with respect to Russian, Middle Eastern, and African-

origin candidates) (Figure 6.21). However, there was one exception: Immigrant-origin candidates from the Western countries were significantly less conservative than the native-origin candidates. A plausible explanation is that immigrants from the Western countries, who migrate voluntarily, are mainly people with cosmopolitan views. The more conservative Westerners are perhaps less likely to move abroad. The scores on the Pro-capitalism Index suggest that only candidates from Asian and Western countries were more to the left than native-origin candidates, but these differences were not significant (Figure 6.22).


Figure 6.20 Mean values on the Pro-Minorities and Pro-Environment Index by country of origin.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: The black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. One-way ANOVA: $F(7, 1164)=3.142, p=.003$.


Figure 6.21 Mean values on the Conservatism Index by country of origin.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: The black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.22 Mean values on the Pro-Capitalism Index by country of origin.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: The black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Another aspect that potentially influenced immigrant-origin candidates' party choice is their religious background. Thereby, a question about the candidates' religiousness was included in the survey questionnaire. The response categories to the question "How religious would you say you are?" were: (1) not at all religious; (2) not very religious; (3) somewhat religious; and (4) very religious. Figure 6.23 combines categories 1 and 2 as well as categories 3 and 4 and presents the findings by origin and party. On average, immigrant-origin candidates perceived themselves as statistically significantly more religious than native-origin candidates: The share of candidates who considered themselves very or somewhat religious was 60 percent among the immigrant-origin candidates and 49 percent among the native-origin candidates. Immigrant-origin candidates were statistically significantly more religious than their co-partisans only within the Left Alliance, although a similar trend is observed within several other parties as well. Those immigrant-origin candidates who perceived themselves as somewhat or very religious were most often on the lists of the Centre Party, the Finns, and the Christian Democrats, which is quite natural given that these parties emphasise traditional values.

To conclude, immigrant-origin candidates were, on average, more conservative than their native counterparts. However, most of them held more favourable attitudes towards multiculturalism, which separates conservative immigrant-origin candidates from conservative native-origin candidates. Being immigrant-origin does not automatically result in more tolerant attitudes towards immigration. The findings suggest that immigrant-origin candidates with a Russian and Estonian background held less tolerant immigration attitudes compared to immigrant-origin candidates from other countries.

Figure 6.23 Religiousness among native and immigrant-origin candidates across parties. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; All: $\chi^2(1) = 8.246$, $p = .004$; NCP: $\chi^2(1) = 0.008$, $p = .929$; SDP: $\chi^2(1) = 3.175$, $p = .075$; CENT: $\chi^2(1) = 1.490$, $p = .222$; GREEN: $\chi^2(1) = 1.770$, $p = .183$; LEFT: $\chi^2(1) = 16.274$, $p < .001$; FINNS: $\chi^2(1) = 2.518$, $p = .113$; SPP: $\chi^2(1) = 2.565$, $p = .109$; CD: $\chi^2(1) = 1.299$, $p = .254$.

6.5 Conclusions

Chapter 6 has, first, provided an overview of immigrants' political representation on candidate lists in the 2017 municipal elections and on municipal councils after the elections. Although there was variation between municipalities and regions as well as between ethnic groups, the main conclusion is that immigrants were and are severely underrepresented as both candidates and councillors. The largest immigrant groups in Finland, namely, Russian and Estonian speakers, gained only marginal representation in municipal councils with respect to their size. As was demonstrated in Chapter 5, these groups were also the most inactive in terms of voting in elections, which indicates a low level of electoral engagement within the groups. Out of the largest immigrant groups, Finnish Somalis represented an exception. Although Somalis were also underrepresented with respect to their share of the eligible population, they were clearly better represented in comparison to Russian and Estonian-origin immigrants. With respect to smaller immigrant groups, Turkish-origin immigrants were extensively represented on candidate lists, achieving nearly mirror-like representation. They also gained the relatively highest level of representation in municipal councils after the Somalis. Understanding the varying resources and opportunities to aspire for political representation in different ethnic groups calls for more in-depth studies in the future.

Most immigrant-origin candidates ran in the largest cities, where the competition for seats was much tougher than in smaller municipalities. However, it is not straightforward as to whether the political opportunity structure was more favourable in small versus large municipalities. In large cities, the population structure enabled the mobilisation of (co-)ethnic votes, whereas in small municipalities with a low foreign-origin population, access to the council also required support from native voters. While campaigning in large cities required more effort and resources, some immigrant-origin candidates were able to draw support from other immigrant minorities.

Second, Chapter 6 examined immigrant-origin candidates' supply with respect to their sociodemographic and socioeconomic backgrounds. One of the observations was that the gender distribution varied a lot across immigrant groups. While female candidates constituted a majority among Russian and Estonian speakers, among candidates from the Middle Eastern countries (Arabic, Kurdish, and Turkish speakers), women made up only a small minority. Immigrant-origin candidates were younger than the native-origin candidates, which reflects the age distribution among the immigrant population as a whole.

Furthermore, immigrant-origin candidates were, on average, better-educated compared to native-candidates. Plausible explanations for these findings are that, first, education helps to overcome the barriers that are linked to one's migration background (such as lack of social networks and political knowledge in the destination country), and second, parties perceive highly skilled immigrants as being closer to their idea of an archetypal candidate (see Durose et al. 2011, 2013). As to occupational status, entrepreneurs and upper-level employees were clearly over-represented among candidates compared to eligible voters in both groups. Also, manual workers were over-represented. Due to the young mean age of the immigrant-origin candidates, the share of pensioners was much lower than that of the native-origin candidates.

Immigrant-origin candidates were more often parents of underage children compared to native-origin candidates. While it is true that fertility rates of the immigrant population are higher compared to those of the native population (Official Statistics of Finland 2019d), it may also be that parenting has a stronger effect on immigrants' political participation. Parents of underage children should be more concerned about social policy issues, such as schooling, as well as health and child-care services. Given that municipal-level authorities are responsible for organising these public services, being a parent potentially facilitates interest in municipal decision-making. Another mechanism of how being a parent may affect recruitment into politics is that parents of underage children may be more actively involved in their children's hobbies such as sports clubs or choirs. Voluntary associations, in turn, are natural recruitment arenas for political parties. Thereby, parenting may facilitate immigrants' political integration even if access to the labour market was limited or cross-ethnic social connections were otherwise scarce.⁴⁵

Third, Chapter 6 studied immigrant-origin candidates' distribution across political parties, as well as their value orientations, which presumably affected their party choice. What was found is that especially the visible minorities (Arabic, Somali, Turkish, and Kurdish-origin candidates) preferred the Social Democratic Party. As was discussed in Chapter 2, immigrants' left-leaning tendencies are found across Western European countries because leftist parties are perceived as looking after the interests of minority groups. Russian and Estonian-origin candidates, in turn, were much more evenly distributed across parties, which may reflect the historical legacies of having lived under communist rule and through the collapse of communism. Some members of these groups may have had unpleasant experiences with

⁴⁵ Prior studies have found evidence that having a large family substantially increases immigrants' propensity to vote in Finnish municipal elections (Wass et al. 2015: 9).

communism that manifest as a dislike of leftist ideology and leftist parties. At least in Estonia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, most parties, including the so-called leftist parties, were clearly market-economy and nationally oriented (Lagerspetz & Vogt 2013).

An examination of immigrant-origin candidates' value orientations showed that those who represented a left-wing party (SDP, the Green League, and the Left Alliance) had more positive views with regard to pro-minority and pro-environment-related policies than those who represented centre-right parties. Still, immigrant-origin candidates of the leftist parties were more conservative compared to their native-origin fellow party candidates.

7 POLITICAL RECRUITMENT OF IMMIGRANT-ORIGIN CANDIDATES FROM PARTY PERSPECTIVE

On March 9, 2011, all current Finnish parliamentary parties signed *The Charter of European Parties for a Non-racist Society*, in which they committed themselves to several principles of equality and non-discrimination⁴⁶. By signing the Charter, the parties claimed to recognize that “representation of ethnic minority groups in the political process is properly an integral part of the democratic process, since political parties are or should strive to be a reflection of society”. Further, the signing parties committed themselves...

...to strive for the fair representation of the above mentioned [ethnic minority] groups at all levels of the parties with a special responsibility for the party leadership to stimulate and support the recruitment of candidates from these groups for political functions as well as membership.

In other words, Finnish parties publicly acknowledged the principle of recruiting immigrant-origin candidates nearly a decade ago. However, given the evident underrepresentation of the new ethnic minority groups on ballot lists and municipal councils (Chapter 6.1), taking these principles into action seems unaccomplished.

In the 2017 municipal elections, 98 percent out of a total of 33,618 candidates were on a party's list and only 2.4 percent represented constituency associations. Thus, parties were the main gatekeepers influencing the ballot lists, from which voters selected their representatives to local councils. Ninety-six percent of the

⁴⁶ In Finnish: *Euroopan poliittisten puolueiden peruskirja rasismista vapaan yhteiskunnan puolesta*. The website of the Migration Policy Group (2016) describes the purpose of the Charter as follows: “[It] appeals to the democratic political parties in the European Union to act responsibly concerning discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic or national origin, and religion. This applies both with respect to the parties’ own organisation and to their interaction with the outside world. The Charter was drawn up after consultation with most of the political parties in the European Union and under the auspices of the EU Consultative Commission on Racism and Xenophobia. The final version was adopted at a European conference in Utrecht, the Netherlands, on 26–28 February 1998”. Finnish parliamentary parties renewed their commitment to the Charter on 14 October 2015 (Eduskunta 2015; Yle 14.10.2015).

candidates were on a list of parliamentary parties⁴⁷. This empirical chapter draws on the interview data among party recruiters from these eight parties (Dataset 5) as well as on the candidate survey (Dataset 6) and focuses on parties' demand for immigrant-origin candidates by answering the following questions:

- How were candidate recruitment and selection organized within Finnish parties in the 2017 municipal elections?
- What were the main principles that directed candidate recruitment? What constituted a good ballot list? Which type of characteristics made for an attractive candidate?
- Did parties deliberately aim to recruit immigrant-origin candidates? Were parties successful in recruiting them? Why or why not?

The two general-level questions on candidate recruitment must be answered before it is possible to draw a specific picture of the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates.

7.1 Organisation of candidate recruitment within parties

The party interviews drew a fairly uniform picture of the candidate recruitment and selection process across parties. Candidate recruitment in municipal elections is implemented mainly at the local level. While parties' national- and district-level actors supervise the recruitment process, i.e. make sure that local associations are successful in collecting names on the party's list, they participate in candidate recruitment only if local-level actors encounter difficulties. Parties authorize the board members of their local party associations to nominate the candidates. Local associations often further nominate separate candidate recruitment committees, which coordinate the process. Some parties have paid employees such as local secretaries to carry out candidate recruitment, but mostly it is conducted by active party members on a voluntary basis. Local party associations' financial resources and their members' political expertise directly influence how professionally the process of candidate recruitment is managed and conducted. Many parties collect data on their supporters' socioeconomic characteristics and their societal opinions, which the parties then utilize in planning the ideal ballot list (Sipinen & Koskimaa 2020). According to the

⁴⁷ This 96% covers the eight parliamentary parties, all of which have been continuously represented in the Eduskunta at least for the past 20 years. After Movement Now (Liike Nyt) was registered in the party register in November 2019, there are currently nine parliamentary parties in the Eduskunta.

interviewees, the parties rely mostly on their members' experiences and "gut feeling". A party's resources are determined largely by the size of the municipality as well as the party's support in that particular municipality, as both affect how many pairs of hands are participating in party activities.


While the board members of the local party associations or the appointed candidate recruitment committees take on the responsibility of building the ballot lists, all interviewees highlighted that finding potential candidates is the responsibility of each and every party member, as recruiting full lists is such a demanding task in most municipalities. The rule, according to which each party can nominate 1.5 times as many candidates as there are seats in the local office, sets parties in front of a major task. In the largest cities, each party can nominate altogether 100 candidates. Even in the smaller municipalities, aiming at full lists is not an easy task. However, as one interviewee said: "If you want to be big, you need to look big". By this, the interviewee meant that if parties wish to be recognised as credible and powerful actors, they must be able to attract full lists. The electoral system repays the effort put into topping up the list: Every vote given to an individual candidate counts regarding parties' electoral success – even to the extent that some of the candidates may be called "top-up candidates", who appear merely as names on the ballot list without any aspiration to get elected (see also Kuitunen 2000: 101). According to one interviewee, each candidate on an otherwise half-empty list brings "at least ten extra votes" from his or her closest familial network.

The extent to which parties' district- and national-level actors interfere in local-level candidate recruitment depends on how successful local-level actors have been or are expected to be in, first, finding candidates with high vote earning potential, and second, achieving the quantitative object of full lists. In practice, however, parties' district- and national-level actors do not have many resources to interfere. Finding the residents with vote-earning potential and sufficient motivation and, further, persuading them to run in the elections, demands solid local-level knowledge and personal connections, which the district- and national-level actors do not have. Yet, if the local-level organisation is thin and lacks resources to find candidates, the party may mobilise resources at the national or district level. For instance, party activists in the neighbouring municipality may assist, or the party may invest more money on focused advertising to attract residents to take part in the elections. Parties differ regarding how extensive and active their local organisations are, which directly affects the resources available to be allocated on candidate recruitment. Being visible and present at events and marketplaces is important, for these are the places where parties connect with residents at the grassroots level.

As the interviewees highlighted, the key to successful candidate recruitment is sufficient information about potential candidates. As outlined in Chapter 2.3, parties wish to ensure that the candidates have what it takes to win votes (such as extensive social networks and campaigning skills), that they share the party's values and goals, and that nominating them does not result in intraparty conflicts. Parties acquire this information through different channels, the primary channel being parties' own existing social networks. Because the quantity of candidates in municipal elections is so high, parties must also recruit individuals they do not know well beforehand. All interviewees mentioned that their party interviewed all newcomers, whom the recruiters did not know personally.

Party recruiters also follow local newspapers and are active in local events so that they recognise individuals who might share their party's values and be willing to run for office. Candidate recruitment begins approximately one year before the election day and accelerates at the end. In practise, as the interviewees noted, recruitment of new party members is an ongoing process and the new members recruited between elections are potential candidates in the upcoming elections. Parties start building the candidate lists by looking at, first, their current councillors and representatives in municipal positions of trust, second, their non-selected candidates in previous elections, and third, their other members. These people are well-known and found to be qualified. If and when a sufficient number of candidates is not found among these groups, parties start searching for potential candidates from the networks of the aforementioned groups. Thus, the search of potential candidates proceeds from party's inner network to its outer network (Figure 7.1). The last names on the ballot lists are often confirmed on the same day when the ballot lists must be submitted to the central election committee of the municipality (on the 40th day before the election day).

Figure 7.1 The process of identifying potential candidates within a party's network.



All interviewees stressed that candidate recruitment is a concern for all of the party's members, meaning that everyone is responsible for at least naming potential candidates. Several interviewees said that their party encouraged local recruiters to think "outside of the box" and to recognise potential candidates outside of the party's usual interest groups. The interviewees highlighted that there is always unrecognized potential, which is left unused if nobody understands to ask, as face-to-face persuasion is of the utmost importance. While some individuals came forward on their own initiative, encouragement on behalf of the parties was crucial even in terms of incumbents and candidates from previous elections. All interviewees stressed that nobody's willingness to represent the party can be taken for granted, as standing as a candidate demands, in most cases, high personal investment in terms of time, energy, and – in bigger cities – money. Being asked is also a matter of dignity; it sends a message that the person is valuable to the party.

One interviewee mentioned how recruitment resembles teleselling: if the person asking is someone you are not acquainted with, it is easy to reject the offer. Therefore, a lot depends on recruiters' personal networks and whether they have the courage to also ask people whom they do not know beforehand. Moreover, some

people are more talented at persuading others, and these skilled recruiters play an important role in candidate recruitment. The interviewees also pointed out that the person who contacts the potential candidates is not insignificant. The more leverage the recruiter has, the more likely the targeted person is to assent (see also Brady et al. 1999). Recruit agents may have at least two kinds of leverage: The best person to approach a potential candidate may be either someone who personally knows the potential candidate beforehand, such as a friend or an acquaintance, or someone with a high status in the party, such as a party leader, party secretary, or local MP. The latter kind of leverage is especially important when the party wishes to approach persons who have a high status in the local community. However, a recruiter who personally knows the potential candidate can concretely describe why the person in question would be a good candidate, and the resources that this person has access to and that are important in building successful campaigns. However, some interviewees mentioned that family members are not always the best recruit agents because they are too close.

One of the interviewees emphasized that there is a clear distinction between public and private spaces in terms of appropriate ways of approaching people. While parties' tents at public marketplaces provide a neutral place where a party recruiter can easily encourage those who willingly approach the tent to join the party's activities, such behaviour is not appropriate, for instance, at children's playgrounds or family celebrations. In the latter type of places, the recruitment must take place very subtly, because discussing politics – especially with “party colour” – is not always accepted. In these situations, an invitation to join the party or to participate in the upcoming elections may be brought up only if the interlocutor begins to take the discussion in that direction.

When asked how the recruiters persuade residents to stand as candidates, similar strategies emerged. Most importantly, the recruiter tells the recruitee that by joining the party and participating in the election campaign as a candidate, the recruitee gains an opportunity to have a say in how the municipality is governed. It also provides an opportunity to meet likeminded people and network. Some interviewees specifically mentioned how they had promised to support the first-timers in their campaigns, mostly by providing advice, but some highlighted that the party cannot support the individual candidates too much because of limited resources. Thus, parties seek candidates with sufficient resources to run a personal campaign.

7.2 List-building strategies within parties

This chapter examines the main criteria – formal and informal – that directed candidate recruitment within parties according to the party interviewees. To begin with, in municipal elections, there are very few official criteria that must be met before a resident can be nominated as a candidate. In most cases, the sufficient conditions include being 18 years of age and having a registered residence in the municipality in which one aspires to stand. EU citizens are eligible after being registered residents for 51 days before the election day, and non-EU citizens after two years of continuous residence in Finland. Parties have very few official requirements to add to this. While aspiring candidates were encouraged to join the party, practically all parties allowed their candidates to stand in their lists as independent candidates. All interviewed parties required their candidates to sign a candidate contract (*ehdokassitoumuslomake*), which, for instance, obliged them to take the seat in the council if elected and pay a share of their attendance allowance in council and committee meetings to the party (*puoluevero*). Usually, by signing the contract, candidates also committed themselves to adhering to the party's programme, combat racial discrimination, and refrain from hate speech. The latter commitment is connected to The Charter of European Parties for a Non-racist Society.⁴⁸

It is the so-called “secret garden of politics” i.e. the informal criteria that are of relevance in explaining which type of individuals parties attempt to recruit. Because the demand for candidates in Finnish municipal elections is so high – very often higher than the supply of candidates – the most important question is whom parties approached instead of whom they selected among a large pool of attractive aspirants. In other words, because there is not a sufficient pool of aspiring candidates, parties must invest major effort into recruiting and persuading local residents to stand. The informal criteria then direct which residents are targeted.

⁴⁸ Under the 2017 municipal elections, the non-discrimination ombudsman (*yhdenvertaisuusvaltuutettu*) together with the Finnish League for Human Rights (*Ihmisoikeusliitto*) approached the parties with a letter (available at: <https://sdp.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Kirje-puolueille.pdf>), in which it appealed to parties to prevent hate speech in election campaigning (The Finnish League for Human Rights 2017). Only the Finns Party did not require its candidates to sign a written commitment to combat racism and xenophobia. The reason the party secretary at the time, Riikka Slunga-Poutsalo, gave for this decision was that it is very difficult to unambiguously define what racist speech includes (Kuntalehti 23.9.2016). Based on the somewhat regular public xenophobic statements of the Finns Party candidates, councillors, and MPs in social media (for a summary of the most recent public statements, see e.g. Helsingin Sanomat 16.2.2020), the party itself is divided as to what is acceptable public speech.

Based on prior studies, parties are expected to follow three principles in list-building (Durose et al. 2011; Gallagher 1988a; Hazan & Rahat 2010; Kuitunen 2000). First, they aim to maximise their seats in the municipal council by maximising their share of votes. Second, they aim to carry out their political platform and ideology, and thus, are expected to recruit candidates who adhere to the party's values and goals. Third, they wish to secure intraparty cohesion by nominating candidates approved by the party's inner factions. Given Finnish parties' differing support bases, ideologies, and intraparty compositions, this chapter focuses on the differences that can be observed between the parties regarding their list-building strategies in general and more specifically, regarding immigrant-origin candidates. Does ethnicity serve as a selection criterion? If it does, how and why?

As was described in more detail in Chapter 3.3, the Finnish electoral system with open lists and proportional representation is a heavily candidate-centred system, which – compared to party-centred systems – increases the probability that politicians highlight their personal characteristics and that voters will rely on them in their vote decision (Karvonen 2010; Shugart et al. 2005; von Schoultz 2016). Because voters must choose a candidate – not being able to vote for a party only – their opinions about which kind of candidate is suitable to represent them become important. Thus, the parties must ensure that their ballot lists provide the voters with a wide and representative selection of candidates from which to choose. Given the decline in class-based voting and party-voter ties since the 1980s (e.g. Dalton 2018), parties cannot expect to win seats by counting on support from only one societal group. Instead, parties must build their ballot lists in a way such that they attract votes from multiple different voter groups (Kuitunen 2000: 78; Sipinen & Koskimaa 2020).

Candidate characteristics can be divided into objective and subjective characteristics (Kuitunen 2008). The former refers to candidates' socio-demographic and socio-economic background, whereas the latter refers to performance-based accomplishments such as personal reputation, political experience, loyalty to the party, and distinguished credits as an active member of the party organisation. Scholars have shown that proportional representation electoral systems encourage parties to balance ballot lists especially in terms of candidates' objective characteristics (Gallagher 1988a; Sundberg 1995). This has traditionally meant that the parties have balanced their ballot lists in terms of candidates' gender, age, occupation, and place of residence because these characteristics are seen to reflect candidates' and voters' assumed group interests. Finnish parties have only recently

begun to consider it important to have new ethnic minority candidates, i.e. persons with immigration backgrounds, on their lists.

While some of the interviewees highlighted that immigrant-origin candidates are like all other candidates, and are not exclusively seen as “immigrant-origin”, all interviewees brought up the importance of balanced candidate lists, because parties want to provide, to voters, candidates they can identify with. Therefore, candidate lists should reflect the local population structure. The interviewees systematically mentioned that balanced lists contain candidates from all age groups, in the best case, and equal share of men and women, and a good representation of different occupations reflecting the occupations among parties’ voters. Most interviewees highlighted that ballot lists must include immigrant-origin candidates at least in municipalities where immigrant-origin residents form a notable share of the population. Indeed, as Soininen (2011: 159) has found based on interviews with Swedish parties, immigrant group membership may not count as an asset unless immigrant groups form either a strong enough pressure group or an important voter category. This also seems to be the case in Finland, where immigrant-origin voters constitute an important voter category only in certain municipalities. However, although the parties emphasized the importance of the representation of immigrants in local councils and their presence in party organisation, many were reluctant to talk about numeric goals in terms of how many immigrant-origin candidates would constitute sufficient representation. In contrast, specific goals in terms of age, gender, and regional representation seemed to be much more important goals in formulating the ballot lists.

Parties are, to some extent, interested in nominating celebrity candidates, who may have no previous connection to the party, but who are known to gain votes due to their fame (see also Arter 2014). However, most interviewees emphasized that recognition and large networks in the local community are obtained mostly through active participation in voluntary associations such as sports clubs as well as through daily connections at work. From the party’s perspective, a candidate must have close links to the municipality’s residents because that guarantees the residents are willing to select him or her as their representative. Some interviewees mentioned how, especially, teachers and doctors at local public health centres are often well-known and highly appreciated among local residents and, thus, bring in many votes.

While parties differ in terms of political goals and supporters, and thus, are interested in slightly different candidate profiles, they are all interested in persons who are active in the local community in one way or another. This means that parties often target persons who have already invested a large share of their personal time

in societal activities, and often it is difficult to persuade these individuals to engage in yet another time-consuming activity, which reduces time spent with family and friends. Candidates are also expected to communicate the party's goals to the electorate, which is why communicative skills as well as courage to publicly bring out their own views are valued. Several parties provided training in communication to their candidates before the campaigning began, but mostly the candidates had to plan, finance, and run their personal campaigns on their own or with help from a personal support team.

In the interviews, especially interviewees of the Finns Party and the Green League emphasized the importance of the value congruence between nominated candidates and the party. By interviewing the aspiring candidates, the parties ensured that the party was truly their “political home”. In a similar vein, interviewees from the Christian Democrats and the Left Alliance specifically brought up the importance of candidates sharing the same worldview. In contrast, one interviewee representing the Centre Party described their party as a “big tent”⁴⁹. By this, he meant that there is a lot of room for different types of opinions, which shows how some of the parties – mainly, the most established ones – can be labelled as so-called “catch-all parties” (Kirchheimer 1966), which permit a broad spectrum of views among their members, whereas some of the parties target much more narrow voter groups and seek candidates who strictly adhere to the party's ideology.

As already mentioned, the level of professionalism in candidate recruitment depends largely on the financial resources of the party. However, because all Finnish parliamentary parties are partly state-funded, i.e. the government pays the parties a subsidy in accordance with the number of seats in Parliament⁵⁰, in theory, all parties have an opportunity to use some of their funding to opinion polls in order to find their potential support base. While all parties employ some basic list-building strategies, such as an attempt to recruit both men and women on the list, parties seem to differ in terms of how strongly their recruiters rely on information based on research versus their own “gut feeling” (see also Sipinen & Koskimaa 2020). This contrast was especially visible between the Greens and the Finns. For instance, one interviewee of the Greens mentioned that while the main idea is to recruit ordinary residents who are interested in politics and willing to use their time in advancing the

⁴⁹ It should be noted that the translations from Finnish to English are made by the author, who has no experience as a translator. Here, the interviewee used the Finnish expression: ”puolueessa seinät ovat leveällä ja katto korkealla”.

⁵⁰ For more information on party subsidies in Finland, see the webpage of The National Audit Office, www.puoluerahoytus.fi

party's goals, for the Green League, it is important to have certain "must-have profiles" on the list, which include at least one of the following: a vegan, a 7–9th-grade teacher, a member of the LGBT⁵¹ community, an immigrant, one whose age starts with the number one (a person of 18 or 19 years of age), an over-65-year-old pensioner, a person who works for nature protection, and a person who works for animal rights. If these profiles are not found in recruiters' existing networks, they must be searched for, because having these profiles on the list is important for the Green League's voters. The same interviewee concluded that those whose vote-earning potential is easily evaluated as high include (1) persons who are well known in the local community (such as teachers), (2) celebrities (such as athletes and musicians), (3) candidates from previous elections (number of personal votes as a concrete demonstration of support: incumbents often enjoy automatic or almost automatic renomination, while those with low vote-share are replaced by new faces), and (4) persons who represent special issues important to the party (veganism, animal rights, and sexual minorities).

It should be noted that the aforementioned example concerns candidate recruitment in a large city. In a small municipality, parties hardly specify as many categories as they aim at including on their lists. The example also represents a very professional approach to candidate recruitment. In contrast, for instance, the interviewees from the Finns Party did not mention any specific groups that they would target. With this data, it is impossible to say whether this reflects a lack of routine in candidate recruitment or the party's political culture. The Finns Party has become a major party within a relatively short period, and its local organisations were set up fairly recently compared to other interviewed parties⁵². On the other hand, it is a populist party whose members may find it appropriate to speak only of "the people" in general. A systematic analysis of the party's support base might be perceived as machination or "wangling" because the party claims to represent all ordinary people. This does not mean that the party would not do any research, but a viewpoint, according to which candidate recruitment should be based on refined strategic choices, did not emerge in the interviews. Another explanation is that the parties have a very different approach to science and research. While Green League members often hold a university degree, Finns Party members are, on average, much more often manual workers and small entrepreneurs (Koironen et al. 2017: 19–23). At least in theory, the former should be more likely to value information based on

⁵¹ The initialism LGBT stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender.

⁵² One of the Finns Party interviewees thoroughly described how the party organisation was built "on top of the ruins of the late SMP" (the Finnish Rural Party) starting from the beginning of the 2000s.

research, whereas the latter might place more value on one's own experience. This, however, is only speculation.

In the end, there is not one sole prototype of an ideal candidate. According to one of the interviewees, who had been active in his party for decades, it is not possible to forecast the success of individual candidates. Some persons he would have never believed would get support had been elected, even to the parliament. Based on the interviews, diversity seems to be the key to seat-winning ballot lists. Another interviewee mentioned that if there are too many aspirants with a similar profile, the candidate recruitment committee negotiates with the aspirants and persuades them to agree on someone's withdrawal. Nominating several candidates with the same profile would be unwise because they would "eat each other's votes". This also concerned candidates' ethnic background: One interviewee was very explicit in his words that too many candidates with the same ethnic minority background would result in none of them getting elected because of the likely dispersion of co-ethnic votes.

7.3 Recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates

Next, after presenting the process of political recruitment within the parties as well as the general criteria directing candidate recruitment, the focus will be specifically on the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates. As was noted in the previous chapter, the parties aim to recruit candidates who have close links to the municipality's residents. In a similar vein, as teachers and doctors are often well-known among local residents and, thus, bring in many votes, parties target immigrant-origin candidates who are well-connected and well-known in their own ethnic group and, thereby, have a high vote-earning potential. It is not that immigrant-origin candidates would be seen exclusively as representatives of their co-ethnics but having new ethnic minorities on the ballot list is important from the perspective of equal representation.

Prior studies from the United States and Europe reflect a preference for co-ethnic representatives among the electorate (Barreto 2007; Bergh & Bjørklund 2011a, 2011b; Vermeulen et al. 2019). These studies on ethnic bloc voting illustrate that people vote more frequently for candidates of the same ethnic background if the voters self-identify as members of a common ethnic and/or immigrant group and if ethnicity is a salient political issue for them (Barreto 2007). Finnish parties recognize the salience of the political representation of new ethnic minorities especially in the

large cities in the South of Finland, where the foreign-origin population is concentrated. One of the interviewees specifically mentioned that in a multicultural city such as Vantaa, the list of candidates should include new ethnic minorities. The same person also mentioned how their goal was to recruit specifically visible minorities so that their list would not be “all white”. In municipalities with a low share of the foreign-origin population, immigrants’ political representation is not a salient issue and, thereby, does not call for targeted actions. In such municipalities, immigrant-origin candidates’ ethnic background is a less important factor in their nomination, and other objective characteristics, such as occupation, become more important.

In the interviews, all other parties except the Finns Party explicitly mentioned that they had recognised the importance of recruiting new ethnic minorities to their ballot lists and that they had taken deliberative actions to implement that objective. While the register data shows that, in fact, the Finns Party had an equal share of foreign language-speaking candidates as the National Coalition (1.8%) and a larger share than the Centre Party (1.3%), the Finns Party interviewees strongly emphasized that the party had not put any effort into attracting votes particularly from the immigrant-origin electorate by recruiting immigrant-origin candidates. This does not mean that the party had closed its doors to immigrant-origin candidates. However, the Finns Party seems to have applied strict criteria to the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates – at least in principle. Being a Finnish citizen, speaking at least nearly fluent Finnish, and being “a decent taxpayer” who committed to the party’s values (such as a critical approach towards immigration) seemed sufficient characteristics to be accepted.⁵³ However, the party did also nominate at least some non-citizens as candidates.

Two out of three Finns Party interviewees were very explicit on the matter that the party did not provide any extra assistance in electoral campaigning for those who might have had difficulties due to a lack of proficiency in the Finnish language. The party organised training courses for its candidates on several relevant topics, such as campaigning communications, because, according to one of the interviewees responsible for organising training, lack of knowledge about party and organisational activities should not be an obstacle to participation. However, the courses were jointly addressed to all candidates, as everyone “should be treated equally”. Still, one of the Finns Party interviewees mentioned that he had translated at least the

⁵³ According to the Finns Party’s rules, only Finnish citizens are eligible to apply for the party’s membership (<https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/tietoa-meista/perussuomalaiset-rpn-saannot/>). The Finns Party is the only parliamentary party that requires Finnish citizenship from its members.

intraparty bulletins and emails concerning the campaign into English for his non-Finnish-speaking friends, whom he had recruited as candidates. Although any generalisations cannot be made based on three interviews, it may be expected that individual selectors' personal opinions and actions had a large impact on who was allowed to access and who was not.

According to the national-level party interviews, ethnic minority representation was considered important almost exclusively in areas with a high share of immigrant-origin population in the municipality. From parties' perspective, it is only rational to aim at recruiting immigrant-origin candidates in municipalities in which they have a recognisable reference group of co-ethnics, whose votes they can actively seek. However, the interviewees also pointed out that an ethnic minority candidate from one group does not necessarily win votes across other ethnic minority groups. Parties, however, rarely had connections to multiple ethnic minority groups in the municipality, and the interviews gave the impression that some groups were perceived as harder to reach than others. The interviewees brought up that the more politically active the new ethnic minority groups are, the more visible and more easily recognisable they become.

The most important question in the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates seemed to be the existence of bridging (cross-ethnic) social networks: If parties' networks connected to the networks of the new ethnic minority groups, recruiting candidates from these groups was possible. According to the interviewees, it was specifically the lack of connecting networks that made recruiting immigrant-origin candidates difficult. In smaller municipalities, everybody knows everybody. In large cities, in which the immigrant minorities are largely concentrated, residents' everyday networks are much more isolated, and the parties' networks do not often overlap with the networks of immigrant minorities. This is why the natural link between different groups is harder to form. However, this link – or, in other words, an interface – is necessary because parties want to know their candidates. Some interviewees brought up that nobody without party affiliation was nominated without a reference from a party member. Cross-ethnic social networks were crucial to facilitating the flow of information, which, in turn, was a prerequisite for trust-building between parties and their potential recruits. The less information the parties had on immigrant-origin minorities, the less likely they were to attempt to recruit immigrant-origin candidates.

Several interviewees brought up how recruiters who either themselves were members of ethnic networks or had access to them through their profession or other activities were very valuable in terms of bringing in new candidates. For instance,

one interviewee described that in their party, only one person was responsible for recruiting several immigrant-origin candidates to the party's list. Without her, the party would not have had any immigrant-origin candidates because no other party member had similar personal networks. The interviewee related how this person had close ties to two immigrant minority groups in the municipality due to her active participation in voluntary work. She was not a member of an ethnic minority herself, but was of Finnish origin. However, she was trusted and well-known within the two minority communities and, thus, successful in recruiting candidates from them. She had persuaded the recruits to stand as candidates by promising to help them in their electoral campaign by joining them in marketplaces and helping with communications in Finnish. Such key persons were important linkages between ethnic minority groups and parties, for they built trust between the two groups, first, by transmitting information on political rights and the political system in Finland to ethnic minority communities and second, by transmitting information on potential candidates to their party. Most often, however, the key persons were party members who themselves were of ethnic minority origin.

According to the interview data, parties were very motivated to recruit immigrant-origin candidates who were able to target their campaigns towards voters that the party would not otherwise reach. Immigrant-origin candidates were seen to play an important role in conveying information on political rights in Finland. Immigrant-origin candidates were able to spread their party's message in languages other than Finnish and Swedish and, thus, increase their interest in politics and mobilise them to vote.

However, reaching out towards societal groups who have higher barriers to political participation – such as immigrants – is not an easy task, as parties' resources in the search for potential candidates are limited. Persuading residents to participate in politics is generally a demanding task, and therefore, parties wanted to optimise their use of resources in focusing on those individuals who were expected to be easily persuaded and to say yes when asked to stand. Against this background of limited information and resources, parties were more likely to focus on the visible members of the new ethnic minority groups, such as the association leaders. There were several motivations to approach such persons. First, the association leaders were expected to have a high vote-earning potential, for they would not have become leaders of immigrant associations without support from co-ethnics. In addition to a pre-existing support-base, the same individuals were expected to attain more support due to their visibility and status in the community if they decided to stand as candidates. Individuals who had earned the community's trust in one area of life

were likely to earn it in the elections. Moreover, association leaders were also expected to have such communicative and performing skills that would appeal to the electorate. One interviewee mentioned that such persons may often prefer to remain politically independent, but if the party is successful in persuading them, expected returns are high.

Another important factor the interviewees evaluated as impacting candidate recruitment was their party's public image in the municipality, especially regarding the party's outlook on multiculturalism. In terms of the supply of aspiring candidates, parties had no lack of aspirants who fit the stereotypical profile of the party. In very broad terms, for instance, the National Coalition had a surplus of middle-aged male entrepreneurs, and the SDP of nurses and cashiers. While attracting female, young, or immigrant-origin candidates was very difficult for some parties, it was less difficult for others. The level of difficulty seemed to be connected to the party's recognizability among persons with a foreign background: If the party's ideological standing was not well-known outside the Finnish context, parties had difficulty conveying their message to potential immigrant-origin candidates, who were not familiar with the Finnish political system. For instance, the SDP, which has sister parties throughout Europe and has an internationally recognisable profile as a leftist party, found it less difficult to find potential immigrant-origin candidates compared to, for example, the Swedish People's Party (SPP), which struggled to get publicity to its pro-multiculturalism program among immigrants due to the party's unfamiliar profile. While the SPP is a natural political home for people from different backgrounds in the Swedish-speaking municipalities in Western Finland (a local catch-all party), in Southern Finland it struggled to reach out to groups other than the Swedish-speaking minority because it communicates mostly in Swedish. The interviewees' perception was that the SPP's message was not conveyed to the larger audience in the dominantly Finnish-speaking municipalities due to the language barrier.

Interviewees from the Centre Party raised the question of parties' power relations as an important factor influencing candidate recruitment. A party that is in a dominant position in the council and thereby has the most influence in local politics is seen as a potential gateway to power and, thus, has fewer difficulties in filling its ballot list. While the Centre Party is dominant in a very large number of Finnish municipalities, its dominance is strongest in agrarian areas, where the share of the foreign-origin population is low. In large cities, such as Vantaa and Turku, it struggled to win even a few seats on the council. Thereby, the Centre Party interviewees acknowledged that their party was perhaps not so attractive in the urban

areas with high shares of the immigrant-origin population, which might explain the party's relatively low share of immigrant-origin candidates.

The Left Alliance interviewees had another approach regarding the impact of a party's public face. According to them, many persons whom the party had approached had declined the offer out of fear of negative attention. Kuitunen (2000: 65–66) reported similar results in her study on the 1996 municipal elections. Already back then, parties explained their shortage of candidates by the fear of stigma, especially in small municipalities, where the distance between candidates and other residents is small. This small versus large municipalities aspect did not come up in the interviews conducted for this study, probably because no interviews were conducted in small municipalities. Rather, the Left Alliance interviewees' perception was that the party is seen as pronouncedly ideological, and therefore some people hesitated to join it, even if they adhered to the party's values. According to the interviewees, some potential candidates had declined because they were afraid that it might affect their careers or even trigger hate speech towards them. Because the party acknowledged this phenomenon, at least some of its members hesitated to recruit any persons whom they were not fully certain would say yes. Then again, the interviewees also highlighted that the party was willing to offer extra guidance and support to immigrant-origin candidates, who were hesitant to stand as candidates due to, for instance, fear of being left alone to campaign in limited Finnish language skills and be confronted by aggressive behaviour. The interviewees presumed that the party's ideology, which promotes equality, might have attracted immigrant-origin candidates.

Interviewees from the Christian Democrats mentioned that their party suffered from being labelled as a party of "Christian moral crusaders"⁵⁴. According to them, potential candidates feared being similarly labelled and, as such, the party failed to attract popular candidates. On the other hand, the party's value base is easily approachable to Christians all over the world, and the church is a fruitful arena for the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates. On the other hand, the party had struggled in deciding whether immigrants from other religious groups, such as Muslims, were welcome to join the party and be nominated on its candidate lists, as the worldviews of the two religions were perceived as being too different.

The Green League interviewees considered their party's public image to be generally favourable regarding the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates. The party has a recognised standing as a defender of multicultural society and open

⁵⁴ In Finnish: haastateltavan mukaan puolue kärsii maineestaan "kristillisyyden viittaa kantavana kukkahattutätien puolueena".

policies towards international migration. However, as one of the interviewees noted, not all immigrant-origin persons find their political home in the Green League, which strongly promotes gender equality and the rights of sexual minorities that are values openly promoted almost exclusively in Western democracies. Thereby, the values of the Green League might have felt too liberal to some of the persons from countries with a traditional outlook on gender roles and limited minority rights.

The interviewees had differing views regarding the importance of Finnish (Swedish) language proficiency. To some, the ability to speak fluent Finnish (Swedish) was an essential criterion for a person to be nominated as a candidate. Those who took this stance argued that without language proficiency it would be difficult to campaign and almost impossible to perform one's duties in the council if elected. Many, on the other hand, did not see a lack of Finnish (Swedish) language skills as an obstacle. It is impossible to say whether those recruiters who did not require proficiency in the Finnish language considered that everyone should be able to stand as candidates regardless of their language skills, or whether they wanted these persons to only stand as top-up candidates, who would pull in votes for the party without real opportunities for being elected.

Several interviewees believed that one of the major obstacles in the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates was immigrants' lack of knowledge of the Finnish political system, which makes them less likely to aspire to political careers. However, it seems that parties are also guilty of negative stereotypes, as some seemed to consider that there is a higher risk in recruiting persons without a solid understanding of the nuances of Finnish political culture. In other words, immigrants were not expected to always know what is politically correct.


In addition to the party interviews, the candidate survey data provides insights into parties' recruitment strategies by presenting the candidates' perspective. In the survey, the candidates were asked to evaluate how much various motivational factors influenced their party's decision to choose them as a candidate. The results are presented in Figure 7.2 and Table 7.1. The candidates' responses reflect very well the parties' quantitative objective in the recruitment process. Both native- and immigrant-origin candidates said that the most important reason for their party to recruit them was because the party needed candidates.

Overall, immigrant-origin candidates evaluated almost all items on the list, such as their political competence, contribution to election/party work, and position within the party, as being a less important motivation for their nomination than native-origin candidates. They rated only one item on the list as more important compared to native-origin candidates: They believed more strongly that closely

representing a social group influenced their nomination. Table 7.1 shows the order of importance of the listed motivational dimensions when calculated by the aggregated share of the “quite and very much” responses. It shows that while representing a social group was evaluated as the second most important factor among immigrant-origin candidates, it was rated seventh among native-origin candidates. It cannot be concluded straightforwardly that immigrant-origin candidates expected their party to consider them to represent ethnic minorities. However, given how native-origin candidates are equally members of different social groups, the relatively higher importance that the immigrant-origin candidates placed on this item points towards this interpretation. It thereby seems that immigrant-origin candidates, more often than native-origin candidates, presumed that their ethnic background encouraged parties to recruit them.

The third most important reason, which the candidates believed had influenced their nomination, was their professional experience. This is in line with the party interviews, in which the interviewees mentioned how important an asset it is to the party that its candidates and councillors have knowledge and expertise in such issues that are decided in municipal decision-making bodies (i.e. health care, social welfare, educational and cultural services, and technical services such as infrastructure and environmental protection). This guarantees that parties have persons they can send to various electoral events and platforms to speak convincingly about important electoral issues. After the elections, councillors’ own interests, as well as their professional experience, determines which positions of responsibility they are given. The result that professional experience was as important to native and immigrant-origin candidates resonates with the findings of Durose et al. (2011: 33–34), who show that under-represented groups, such as immigrants, can compensate for a lack of political experience in party organisation by working in a “politics-facilitating profession”, such as lawyers, teachers, or business persons.

Figure 7.2 Candidates' evaluation of their party's motivation to recruit them. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(4) = 16.065$, $p = .003$; (2) $\chi^2(4) = 5.792$, $p = .215$; (3) $\chi^2(4) = .974$, $p = .914$; (4) $\chi^2(4) = 10.845$, $p = .028$; (5) $\chi^2(4) = 7.865$, $p = .097$; (6) $\chi^2(4) = 1.652$, $p = .799$; (7) $\chi^2(4) = 13.927$, $p = .008$; (8) $\chi^2(4) = 6.552$, $p = .162$; (9) $\chi^2(4) = 11.420$, $p = .022$.


Table 7.1 Candidates' evaluation of their party's motivation to recruit them. Order of importance by origin.

	Total share of "quite" and "very much" responses (%)		Order of importance	
	Native-origin	Immigrant-origin	Native-origin	Immigrant-origin
My party needed candidates for the elections	68	57	1	1
I closely represent a social group	41	48	7	2
My professional experience	48	46	3	3
I strongly represent the values and political image of my party	57	45	2	4
I am well known in the municipality	48	41	4	5
I have a comprehensive local network of friends/acquaintances	43	38	5	6
My competence in political issues	41	28	6	7
My contribution to election/party work	29	22	8	8
My position within the party	27	16	9	9

Source: Candidate survey.

In the survey, the candidates also indicated whether parties other than the one they represented in the elections attempted to recruit them. When the candidates are divided into those who were not approached by other parties or groups, and those who were, we find that the latter – i.e. candidates who were attractive to several parties – evaluated more frequently that their local network and public image influenced their party's motivation to recruit them (Figures 7.3 and 7.4). Similar findings concern candidates' professional experience and competence in political issues: Those who were approached by other parties or groups considered more often that their professional experience and political competence influenced their attractiveness as a candidate. However, these latter results were statistically significant only among the native-origin candidates.


Figure 7.3 Candidates' evaluation of how much his/her comprehensive local network of friends/acquaintances influenced party's recruitment decision. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Native-origin: $\chi^2(4) = 16.262$, $p = .003$; Immigrant-origin: $\chi^2(4) = 12.375$, $p = .015$.

Figure 7.4 Candidates' evaluation of how much him/her being well known in the municipality influenced party's recruitment decision. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Native-origin: $\chi^2(4) = 24.823$, $p < .001$; Immigrant-origin: $\chi^2(4) = 21.080$, $p < .001$.

7.4 Conclusions

Chapter 7 has examined the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates from the party perspective. The point of departure was the notion that in Finnish municipal elections, candidate selection does not mean that parties would select the most attractive candidates from a large pool of aspirants with a high motivation to be selected on the ballot list. Instead, because parties are allowed to nominate such a high number of candidates, and because aiming for full lists is politically wise, parties must be very active in persuading municipal residents to stand as candidates. This, in turn, means that the most important question is whom the parties' recruiters decide to approach and based on which criteria. Are the recruiters interested in and able to approach new ethnic minorities?

The results showed that while parties were sometimes uninterested in reaching out to new ethnic minorities, more often they felt unable to do so. Parties' motivation to ensure ethnic minority representation on candidate lists depended on a municipality's population structure. Ethnicity was considered a salient issue only in municipalities where the share of the foreign-origin population is high. Due to the lack of social networks, however, party recruiters felt unable to acquire information about potential immigrant-origin candidates and to find a suitable person within the party to approach potential candidates. Interviewees emphasized familiarity and trust as important factors in candidate recruitment. Both elements are essential for parties meeting their goal of recruiting candidates with a high vote-earning potential and adherence to party ideology.

Parties also wished to ensure that their candidates had certain skills or attributes, which made them able to attain votes for the party. According to the interviews, parties had doubts regarding immigrants' language skills and their knowledge of the Finnish political system, which hindered parties' enthusiasm for recruiting immigrant-origin candidates. However, because the demand for candidates in municipal elections is so high, nearly all aspirants were accepted as long as the party was able to ensure their adherence to the party's goals and ideology. From this perspective, the barrier to entry was low. However, because most candidates entered ballot lists after active persuasion from the parties, the actual barrier lies in whom the parties ask to stand as candidates. Limited social ties between local native-origin selectors and new ethnic minorities result in a lack of contact and non-exposure to diversity as well as a lack of information and trust, which hinder active recruitment. Active and organized ethnic minority groups with aspiring candidates should have no difficulty in accessing parties' lists in municipal elections.

The findings of this study confirm that the attitudes of local party selectors constitute a significant barrier to candidates from under-represented groups such as immigrants. However, due to the open lists, parties cannot discriminate against ethnic minorities by assigning them non-winnable list positions. This means that those individual candidates with strong personal support have good chances of being elected. Future studies should look deeper into the question of whether elected candidates with ethnic minority backgrounds wield influence in the council and inside their parties and, if they do, on what terms.

8 IMMIGRANT-ORIGIN CANDIDATES' RECRUITMENT TRAJECTORIES

In this chapter, the focus turns to the perspective of the immigrant-origin candidates. By imbricating the results from the candidate survey data and the candidate interview data, the aim is to construct a comprehensive analysis of the resources and motivations of the immigrant-origin candidates to stand as candidates in the 2017 Finnish municipal elections. In the supply and demand model of political recruitment (Norris & Lovenduski 1995), candidate resources and motivations represent the supply side factors. The chapter has two parts: The first focuses on candidates' resources and the second on their motivations.

8.1 Candidate resources

According to the resource model of political participation introduced by Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995; see also Verba et al. 1995), essential capacities to political activity are time, money, and civic skills. With the latter, they refer to communications and organisational skills that are acquired at workplace and in non-political organisations. These resources are unevenly distributed across socioeconomic groups, which results in varying levels of political engagement and capacity to enter the electoral arena. It is an ongoing debate in the literature as to whether the underrepresentation of disadvantaged ethnic groups in decision-making bodies is caused by voters' preferences or the characteristics and resources of the candidates who compete for office. Both Shah (2014) and Strijbis and Völker (2020), for instance, propose a supply-side theory of minority representation by pointing towards ethnic minority candidates' limited access to resources such as incumbency advantages and campaign funding. Thereby, in this section, I investigate whether there were differences between native- and immigrant-origin candidates regarding resource acquisition. I examine their involvement in associations, prior political experience (such as the number of prior candidacies and positions of responsibility),

time and money invested in campaigning, support networks, and, in the case of immigrant-origin candidates, their language skills in Finnish (or Swedish).

8.1.1 Involvement in voluntary associations

The conclusion made in Chapter 7 was that parties were interested in recruiting persons who were active members in their local communities. This is because activity in voluntary associations and organisations indicates several potential aspects from the parties' perspective, such as interest in common affairs as well as teamwork, communication, presentation and negotiating skills. Active association members are also well-known and well-connected and, thus, have the potential to pull in votes for their party. All these are traits essential for political careers. One interviewed chairperson of a local party organisation related how their candidate recruitment committee searched for potential candidates by systematically going through members of local associations. A quote of one of the interviewed candidates summarises rather well how involvement in voluntary associations provides skills needed in politics:

C1: You learn a lot when you're involved in many things. You get to know a lot of people, and to understand their characters, behaviour and ways of thinking, after which you accept that yes, we are different, but still we can work together. Consensus is important in politics. No politician or party gets their way without negotiating (...) You need to convince others of why the issues you promote are important. So, basically, negotiating skills and general understanding of human nature... in depth view into people's life situations... it is very instructive to talk with people. Every day people call me and tell me about their concerns, and I try to advise them.

Candidates' involvement in the following non-political voluntary associations and organisations was studied in the survey:

1. Producer or entrepreneur organisation
2. Trade union or professional association
3. Village coalition or neighbourhood association
4. Residents' or community association
5. Sport organisation/club
6. Cultural organisation
7. Youth or student organisation

8. Voluntary national defence organisation
9. Pensioners' organisation
10. Environmental organisation
11. Charity or aid organisation
12. Immigrant organisation
13. Religious organisation
14. Parents' association (school/nursery)

Candidates were not asked about memberships, which is an often-used way of measuring associational involvement. The response categories were (1) I have never worked, (2) I have worked before, but not anymore, and (3) I am currently working. This approach was selected to distinguish active participation from passive membership. However, the question does not measure the volume of associational involvement per se, as it does not show in how many similar types of associations the respondent had worked. For instance, it does not enable one to distinguish whether the respondent had been involved in numerous sports clubs or charity organisations. As such, the item is designed to measure the *diversity* of associational involvement.

Before examining in which type of associations and organisations the candidates were most actively involved, I will compare the diversity of associational involvement by calculating an index that ranges from 0 (has never worked in any of the listed association types) to 14 (has worked in all of them). The index takes into consideration each association type in which a candidate was currently working or had worked before. In other words, the respondent was given the value of 1 each time he or she selected either of the two alternatives. If the respondent indicated having never worked in the association, he or she was given a zero. Also, the missing values are coded as zero. A systematic examination of the data matrix shows that "has never worked" is a valid interpretation of the missing values because the respondents who left some items unanswered did not use the category "has never worked" but still marked those associations they had been involved in. In other words, they responded only to those survey items relevant for them.

The results show that 10 percent of the native-origin candidates and 21 percent of the immigrant-origin candidates had never worked in any of the listed voluntary associations. Almost one third (29%) of the native-origin and one-fifth (19%) of the immigrant-origin candidates had experience from at least five types of associations.

As observed from Table 8.1, the mean score on the “Associational Involvement Diversity Index” among native-origin candidates was 3.3, while among immigrant-origin candidates it was 2.7. An independent samples t-test shows that the difference in the group means was statistically significant ($t(1212)=3.183, p=.001$). Thus, it can be preliminarily noted that, on average, the immigrant-origin candidates’ experience from civic associations was less diverse.

Furthermore, according to one-way ANOVA, the means of native-origin male and female as well as immigrant-origin male and female candidates were significantly different ($F(3, 1210)=3.465, p=.016$). However, pairwise comparisons of the means using the Bonferroni procedure do not indicate significant differences, although it seems that the difference between native and immigrant-origin candidates stems from immigrant-origin female candidates having lower scores in the index.

Accumulated experience from associations is likely to increase with age. By calculating the Pearson correlation coefficient, it is found that candidates’ ages and scores on the Associational Involvement Index were positively and significantly correlated among native-origin candidates ($r=.342, p<.001$) but not among immigrant-origin candidates ($r=.101, p=.150$). Table 8.1 shows mean scores also by age groups. According to one-way ANOVA, the mean scores were statistically significantly different between age groups among native-origin candidates ($F(4, 1005)=33.754, p<.001$), but not among immigrant-origin candidates ($F(4, 199)=1.437, p=.223$). This shows how native-origin candidates enjoyed the advantage of accumulated resources at different volumes compared to immigrant-origin candidates.

Comparison by election result and origin in Table 8.1 suggests that success in elections was related to diverse associational involvement within both groups. However, one-way ANOVA confirms significantly different group means only among native-origin candidates ($F(2, 1007)=5.421, p=.005$), and not among immigrant-origin candidates ($F(2, 201)=2.642, p=.074$). The Bonferroni procedure indicates that native-origin councillors had a significantly higher mean score compared to non-elected native-origin candidates. The difference between councillors and deputy councillors was not statistically significant.


Table 8.1 Mean scores and standard deviations on the Associational Involvement Diversity Index by origin, gender, age, and election result.

	<u>Native-origin</u>			<u>Immigrant-origin</u>		
	M	(SD)	(N)	M	(SD)	(N)
All	3.3	(2.4)	(1010)	2.7	(2.5)	(204)
Gender						
Male	3.3	(2.4)	(556)	2.8	(2.5)	(119)
Female	3.3	(2.3)	(454)	2.6	(2.4)	(85)
Age						
18–29	1.9	(1.6)	(77)	2.3	(1.6)	(24)
30–39	2.3	(1.9)	(150)	2.3	(2.3)	(47)
40–49	2.8	(2.0)	(170)	2.7	(2.5)	(64)
50–59	3.3	(2.3)	(243)	3.7	(2.6)	(47)
60–	4.2	(2.4)	(370)	3.0	(2.9)	(22)
Election result						
Elected councillor	3.7	(2.5)	(279)	3.5	(2.2)	(15)
Deputy	3.3	(2.2)	(261)	2.0	(2.0)	(38)
Non-elected	3.1	(2.4)	(470)	2.8	(2.6)	(151)

Source: Candidate survey.

Figures 8.1–8.3 present the candidates’ involvement in the different types of voluntary associations by origin. Native-origin candidates had been most often involved in sport clubs (46%) and trade unions or professional associations (47%). Immigrant-origin candidates, in turn, had been most active in cultural organisations (36%) as well as immigrant associations (32%), which, in fact, may be somewhat overlapping association types in the sense that many immigrant associations focus on preserving the cultural heritage of their members.


Figure 8.1 Involvement in voluntary associations by origin (1). Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(2) = 0.002$, $p = .999$; (2) $\chi^2(2) = 45.720$, $p < .001$; (3) $\chi^2(2) = 20.724$, $p < .001$; (4) $\chi^2(2) = 13.670$, $p = .001$; (5) $\chi^2(2) = 26.079$, $p < .001$. Missing values are coded as "has never worked", and thereby the N for native-origin is systematically 1010 and for immigrant-origin 204.


Figure 8.2 Involvement in voluntary associations by origin (2). Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (6) $\chi^2(2) = 6.212, p = .045$; (7) $\chi^2(2) = 2.158, p = .340$; (8) $\chi^2(2) = 15.446, p < .001$; (9) $\chi^2(2) = 14.837, p = .001$; (10) $\chi^2(2) = 4.360, p = .113$. Missing values are coded as "has never worked", and thereby the N for native-origin is systematically 1010 and for immigrant-origin 204.

Figure 8.3 Involvement in voluntary associations by origin (3). Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (11) $\chi^2(2) = 3.779$, $p = .151$; (12) $\chi^2(2) = 165.972$, $p < .001$; (13) $\chi^2(2) = 1.565$, $p = .457$; (14) $\chi^2(2) = 4.428$, $p = .109$. Missing values are coded as "has never worked", and thereby the N for native-origin is systematically 1010 and for immigrant-origin 204.

In the candidate interviews, one of the interviewees described how his/her pathway to politics had gone through involvement in a trade union:

Interviewer: Why did you decide to stand as a candidate in the elections?

C7: In fact, I had decided this already three years before the elections. (...) I was working in [the name of the workplace]. At the time, I did not belong to any trade union. Other employees asked me if I could represent them as their chief shop steward. I asked: "what is this thing?", as I didn't know anything about it. (...) The chief shop steward of the time told me that if I would become his/her deputy, s/he would tell me how the work is done, with whom I am supposed to negotiate and what issues to discuss. I said yes, and after two weeks s/he resigned. Thus, I had to start with a clean slate and learn everything from the beginning, although the union provided some training. Right at the beginning I also had to participate in co-

determination negotiations. I was new, I knew nothing about anything, but that's where it began. My idea [to stand as a candidate] began to form after I negotiated a better contract to single parents. We were doing continuous shift work, and single parents asked if they could do morning shifts from Monday to Friday so that they could spend more time with their children. I negotiated with our employer for several months and eventually succeeded. Then I noticed that hey, if I have the ability to contribute to people's wellbeing at workplace, why couldn't I do it at the national level or at the local level. My desire to influence, it only increased.

Interviewer: Why do you think you were asked to become a representative?

C7: I believe it was because the workplace was very multicultural. We had around 35 different nationalities. I was one of the youngest and I had grown up in Finland. The others thought that while the Finns wouldn't shun me, I would also be their advocate. The immigrants knew it for sure that I was on speaking terms with both sides. Although I shouldn't discriminate, to my opinion Finns perceive it very difficult to communicate with an immigrant who does not speak fluent Finnish. Therefore, the others supported me.

The above quote illustrates how becoming *an agent of trust*, i.e. someone who is trusted in the community and gets its support, is easier when fewer barriers to communication there exist. The interviewee emphasized how a person who is perceived as understanding and able to communicate with "both sides" has the potential to become a broker. Also, other interviewed candidates described their role as brokers or agents of trust between the majority and minority group(s):

C8: They [immigrants] live in a completely different world. For instance, if someone's child has misbehaved at school and the principal calls the child's parent, they get angry, although it's the child's fault. Then they call me and ask, "why is it like this". I tell them to calm down and that the school is not contacting you especially because it is your child but because it is the general practice. When I explain this to them, they understand it much better compared if the school's principal tells the same.

C2: When I grew up, I started thinking that... goddammit, it can't be like this, somebody must speak for us, somebody who can slither among them and us. It kind of pushed me forward.

According to the candidate interviews, becoming an agent of trust was often associated with involvement in voluntary association(s), where an individual first gained meeting and negotiating skills, then took on the responsibility of others, found it meaningful, and became interested in influencing decision-making at the municipal level or even at the national level. Some saw standing as a candidate in local elections as an important step towards a career in national-level politics.

Another aspect related to associational involvement and motivation to stand as a candidate was to gain recognition for the work that the voluntary associations do. One of the candidates described his motivation to stand as a candidate as follows:

C9: I see a lot of problems in society, which politics – the city or the government – cannot... to which they don't have solutions. They don't have answers to questions such as how to help people who suffer from depression or domestic violence, how to reduce drug use etc. But there are associations that provide answers to these [questions]. Politics, I mean the municipal executive board and other actors, should be there to support these associations who provide the solutions.

Around one-fifth of both native and immigrant-origin candidates were or had previously been active in religious organisations (Figure 8.3). As Sobolewska (2017: 223) points out, for many ethnic minorities, religious involvement is the main form of civic involvement. Thus, it is a major resource for acquiring civic skills, a sense of political efficacy, and a source of access to political messages (see also Calhoun-Brown 1996; Martikainen 2013; Sobolewska et al. 2015; Verba et al. 1995). In Finland, there is very little research on the role of religious institutions such as churches and mosques in immigrant political engagement and mobilisation. A study of Ndukwe (2016) is an exception. He has interviewed African immigrants in Finland to study whether churches and mosques are used as platforms of political campaigning. His study confirms that during elections, both native and immigrant-origin politicians have used religious attendance as a campaigning platform. An important anecdote from his interviewees is that only candidates who are “known and respected among the Muslim faithful in that mosque” as well as known to actively participate in terms of religious attendance can talk about politics inside the mosque. Based on his interview data, Ndukwe concludes that “political mobilization from politicians who are not members of the marginalized group may be fruitless because of doubts on their sincerity to deliver any promise made”. This finding reflects the salience of ethnicity as a political cleavage and the importance of ethnic minority candidates on immigrants’ electoral engagement.

However, religious institutions did not only empower people. One interviewed female candidate touched upon campaigning in a mosque, and the institutional inequality it created between men and women:

C4: Somali men gather in the mosque usually on Fridays. A male candidate can talk about his candidacy and the elections, and ask others to vote for him etc. As a woman I could not attend the Friday prayer.

Interviewer: But you had these [male] supporters who spoke on your behalf in the mosque?

C4: Yes, but it is not the same as the person herself is there to speak.


Approximately one-third of immigrant-origin candidates had experience with an immigrant association, and one out of five was active in an immigrant association at the time of the elections (Figure 8.3). Among those foreign-born candidates who responded to the survey, experience with immigrant associations was more common among those who reported that they had moved to Finland as refugees (44%) versus those who came due to family (28%), work (31%), or study (36%). Although the distributions across candidates with varying reasons for immigrating to Finland were not statistically significant, this type of finding would have a natural explanation. To refugees, who have involuntarily left their countries of origin and immigrated to Finland without a job or place to study, and who have often been separated from their families, co-ethnic and/or multicultural associations may be the only community that provides meaningful social interactions, security, and comfort in a foreign land.

Figure 8.4 shows involvement in voluntary associations by origin and gender in occasions when there were differences between the subgroups. An interesting finding is that immigrant-origin women were significantly more involved in trade unions or professional associations compared to immigrant-origin men if prior experience is also considered (27% of women versus 19% of men). The number of immigrant-origin respondents in the candidate survey data is too small for further analysis of whether this finding is associated e.g. with differences in occupational structure. Native-origin men and women did not differ in this respect. Around half of both had prior experience with trade unions. Native-origin men had more experience with sports clubs as compared to other groups, whereas immigrant-origin women were the least active in sports organisations. Involvement in voluntary national defence organisations⁵⁵ concerned almost exclusively native-origin men, which is natural given that military service is obligatory for Finnish male citizens, whereas for female citizens it is voluntary. Native-origin female candidates were more active than native-origin male candidates in charity organisations. Among immigrant-origin candidates, the situation seemed to be the opposite, although the difference was not significant. Although Figure 8.4 suggests that immigrant-origin

⁵⁵ One example of a voluntary national defence organization is The Finnish Reservists' Association, which, according to its website, focuses on "strengthening of the national defence will and maintaining reservists military skills and fitness for service" (www.reservilaisliitto.fi/en).

male candidates were more often working in an immigrant association compared to immigrant-origin females, a significant difference was not detected. Native-origin female candidates differed significantly from native-origin men by being more involved in parents' associations. Immigrant-origin men and women, in turn, were equally involved in parents' associations.

Figure 8.4 Involvement in voluntary associations by origin and gender. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test (*p*-value in bold when *p*<.05): (1) Male by origin: $\chi^2(2)=37.417$, ***p*<.001**; Female by origin: $\chi^2(2)=11.968$, ***p*=.003**; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2)=2.586$, *p*=.274; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2)=6.113$, ***p*=.047**; (2) Male by origin: $\chi^2(2)=10.101$, ***p*=.006**; Female by origin: $\chi^2(2)=18.338$, ***p*<.001**; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2)=13.654$, ***p*=.001**; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2)=7.558$, ***p*=.023**; (3) Male by origin: $\chi^2(2)=14.530$, ***p*=.001**; Female by origin: $\chi^2(2)=2.971$, *p*=.226; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2)=43.137$, ***p*<.001**; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2)=3.020$, *p*=.221; (4) Male by origin: $\chi^2(2)=3.233$, *p*=.199; Female by origin: $\chi^2(2)=11.083$, ***p*=.004**; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2)=18.139$, ***p*<.001**; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2)=4.409$, *p*=.110; (5) Male by origin: $\chi^2(2)=113.635$, ***p*<.001**; Female by origin: $\chi^2(2)=53.230$, ***p*<.001**; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2)=1.895$, *p*=.388; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2)=1.400$, *p*=.497; (6) Male by origin: $\chi^2(2)=6.799$, ***p*=.033**; Female by origin: $\chi^2(2)=4.824$, *p*=.090; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2)=33.618$, ***p*<.001**; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2)=.128$, *p*=.938. Missing values are coded as "has never worked". Native-origin male *n*=556, native-origin female *n*=454, immigrant-origin male *n*=119 and immigrant-origin female *n*=85.

8.1.2 Prior political experience

In a similar vein as the candidates were asked about their involvement in non-political voluntary associations, they were also asked about their involvement in political organisations or parties. As Figure 8.5 indicates, such experience was much more common among native-origin candidates. Thirty-one percent of native-origin candidates reported having never worked in a political organisation or party, whereas the corresponding share among immigrant-origin candidates was 61 percent and vice versa: 60 percent of native-origin candidates were actively involved in a political organisation or party as compared to nearly 30 percent of immigrant-origin candidates. Figure 8.5 also indicates that men were more frequently involved in political organisations than women in both groups. However, the difference is significant only among the native-origin candidates.

Figure 8.5 Involvement in political organisation or party by origin and gender. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.


Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Origin: $\chi^2(2) = 74.373$, $p < .001$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2) = 7.658$, $p = .022$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(2) = 2.372$, $p = .305$.

Immigrant-origin candidates were less frequently members of the party on whose list they were standing as candidates. Among those immigrant-origin candidates who were on a party's list, 72 percent reported that they were party members and 28 percent reported standing as independent candidates. Corresponding shares among

native-origin candidates were 82 and 18 percent, respectively. According to Pearson's chi-squared test, the difference between the groups was statistically significant ($\chi^2(1)=11.0, p=.001$). Furthermore, immigrant-origin candidates had been party members for a much shorter time as compared to native-origin candidates, which, of course, is a natural consequence of many of them having immigrated to Finland as adults. The average number of years as a member of the party on whose list the respondent was located was 5.4 (SD=7.2) among immigrant-origin candidates and 14.2 (SD=15.2) among native-origin candidates. According to an independent samples t-test, the difference was statistically significant ($t(400)=10.9, p<.001$).

Figure 8.6 shows how much prior experience as candidates the respondents had from previous municipal, parliamentary, parish, or cooperative society elections. Nearly 60 percent of the immigrant-origin candidates had no prior experience in any type of election. The corresponding share among native-origin candidates was 34 percent. Around 70 percent of those native-origin candidates who were elected to councils or as deputies had prior experience from previous elections. The corresponding share among immigrant-origin candidates was 50 percent. To put it another way, half (51%) of the immigrant-origin candidates who were elected as councillors or deputy councillors had no prior experience in any representative elections in Finland. Among the native-origin candidates, the corresponding share was much lower (31%). Prior experience as a candidate, thereby, is not a prerequisite for being elected to a municipal council.

Figure 8.6 Prior candidacies and selection in municipal, parliamentary, parish, or cooperative society elections by origin and electoral outcome. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Origin: $\chi^2(2) = 51.115$, $p < .001$; Electoral outcome: $\chi^2(2) = 13.487$, $p = .001$.

Figure 8.7 shows from which type of elections the candidates had gained the most experience. Native-origin candidates had significantly more experience than immigrant-origin candidates in all other types of elections except for parliamentary elections, which demand many more resources compared to other elections. Only around five percent of immigrant-origin candidates had prior experience from other than municipal elections. Meanwhile, one-fourth of native-origin candidates had participated in parish elections and 16 percent in cooperative society elections. Approximately 30 percent of native-origin candidates had been municipal election candidates before in three or more elections. The corresponding share among immigrant-origin candidates was one out of ten.

Figure 8.7 Prior candidacies in municipal, parliamentary, parish, and cooperative society elections by origin. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(3) = 45.821$, $p < .001$; (2) $\chi^2(3) = 6.237$, $p = .101$; (3) $\chi^2(3) = 40.465$, $p < .001$; (4) $\chi^2(3) = 14.728$, $p = .002$.


A natural consequence of having significantly less prior experience as a candidate is that the immigrant-origin candidates also had much less experience from municipal positions of responsibility. A common practice is that those candidates who have succeeded in the elections, even if they did not make it to the council, have the opportunity to gain a seat in municipal committees (in Finnish: *lautakunta*) which operate under the municipal executive board. Parties share the committee positions according to their vote share and nominate their own representatives, who are often candidates with a high personal vote share or persons who have otherwise distinguished themselves in party work. Some candidates might have been highly motivated to gain a seat in a committee rather than on the council, which is why “electoral success” may also be equivalent to a seat in other municipal positions of responsibility than the council. Work in committees is focused on specific substances, such as social and health care services, education, urban planning, the

environment, and cultural and leisure services, whereas the council makes decisions on all these areas.

In total, 68 percent of the native-origin candidates had worked in at least one of the municipal positions of responsibility listed in Figure 8.8. The corresponding share among immigrant-origin candidates was 39 percent, and according to Pearson's chi-squared test, the difference between the groups was statistically significant ($\chi^2(1)=61.707$, $p<.001$). As Figure 8.8 shows, immigrant-origin candidates had most often worked as members or deputy members of a municipal committee. Nearly one out of three (30%) indicated having such experience, and one out of four (24%) were in such a position in the previous term preceding the elections. In comparison, nearly 60 percent of native-origin candidates had experience from committee work, 34 percent of them working in a committee at the time of the elections. Forty-four percent of native-origin candidates had experience from the municipal council. The corresponding share among immigrant-origin candidates was 17 percent.

To sum up, immigrant-origin candidates had much less prior experience with political organisations, elections, and municipal positions of responsibility, which is a very likely factor contributing to their underrepresentation in local decision-making. Parties recruit candidates from their own member base, and election to council and other positions of responsibility is more likely if the person has prior political experience.

Figure 8.8 Prior experience from municipal positions of responsibility by origin. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(2)=47.809$, $p < .001$; (2) $\chi^2(2)=29.418$, $p < .001$; (3) $\chi^2(2)=58.723$, $p < .001$; (4) $\chi^2(2)=35.979$, $p < .001$; (5) $\chi^2(2)=22.507$, $p < .001$; (6) $\chi^2(2)=21.950$, $p < .001$; (7) $\chi^2(2)=35.291$, $p < .001$.

When examining the prior political experience of immigrant-origin candidates, the experience gained in the country of origin should not be forgotten. In the interviews, the candidates were asked about their interest in and connections to politics in their countries of origin. Some had been politically active before moving to Finland, and some mentioned that politics was actively discussed at home. Politics had especially influenced the lives of the interviewees with a refugee background. Some candidates brought up how politics in their country of origin was reflected in their electoral campaigns, as it was important to some of their co-ethnic voters. In particular, this was brought up by interviewees with a Somalian or Kurdish background. One of the interviewees related how some of the Somali-origin candidates felt it important to raise issues related to cooperation between Somalia and Finland and development projects in Somalia. However, personally, the candidate wanted to focus on Finnish politics. The candidate's message to Somali-origin voters was: "you live here, the matters affecting your life happen here, you should truly focus on these matters that really affect your life". The interviewee wanted to set aside the conflicts between the clans and the corruption that, in the interviewee's opinion, reflected too much on Somalis' life in Finland. However, the same interviewee speculated that simultaneous elections in Somalia might have encouraged Somali-origin voters to participate in Finnish elections, which might have also benefitted the interviewee.

Also, the Kurdish-origin interviewees related that politics in Kurdistan unnecessarily divided Kurds living in Finland, which is why their primary focus was to improve immigrants' lives in Finland and not get too involved in the conflicts rooted in politics in their country of origin. One of them said:

C2: What happens in Kurdistan shall stay there. If I can help the party of Kurdistan here, I'll do it. But I won't do more. Because it has created pressure within our community (...) and taken capacity away from integration in Finland. (...) Ghettoisation is taking place not only between you and me, between natives and immigrants, but among our community: "that person is a Kurd, but he or she is also a leftist Kurd, which is wrong". To this you Finns have no cure until you include us [into decision-making].

The same interviewee emphasized that, due to the severe conflicts in the interviewee's country of origin, the interviewee had thought that politics in Finland would be nearly conflict-free:

C2: I thought that politics in our country is rough, whereas here it would be marvellous and beautiful, like a strawberry on top of a cake. But it was the same shit as in our country. Same symptoms and problems follow.

Interviewer: But this is something you realised only later?

C2: Yes.

Interviewer: So, when you decided to stand as a candidate, you didn't consider the negative aspects?

C2: No. I thought that it is beautiful, that I get to have a say.

Another Kurdish-origin interviewee had more confidence in Finnish political institutions:

C10: The country, for the Kurdish community I'm saying, the country we are moving from to here, we always have problem with the system. I mean, when you have no rights, the only right you have, to exist, as a servant, or as a worthless something. Otherwise you have no right. But when people move here, they are afraid to be in contact with the government. That's scary for them. I mean, the people are traumatised that much. It's not easy to explain to them that "hey, you know what, if you have a problem, you can go and talk with someone. If you are not happy with, new plan about your neighbourhood, go and complain to the city, planning office".

It may be concluded that prior experience with politics in their countries of origin had given several interviewees a perspective on policymaking in Finland. Several interviewees highlighted the significant contrast between the political system in their country of origin and Finland with respect to the level of corruption.

8.1.3 Campaign funding

Although selection to a municipal council in Finland does not necessarily require a large campaign budget, in the largest cities, election requires at least some degree of campaigning to increase voters' recognition of a specific candidate and the issues he or she represents. In small municipalities, however, the doors to municipal council may open without any official campaign if the candidate is well-known to many residents. In very small municipalities, the votes from one's friends, family, and relatives may suffice to make it to the council, as the required number of personal votes is very small. While recognition in larger towns and cities requires campaigning, the campaign costs do not have to be sky-high. At the time of the Internet and social media, gaining recognition among the wider public does not necessarily cost anything, as candidates do not need to advertise in traditional newspapers and radio, although a recent study shows that in the 2019 Finnish parliamentary elections, the best results were achieved through a combination of advertisements in both traditional and social media (Mattila et al. 2020). A lot also depends on candidates'

personal social networks, through which they may access many types of resources free of charge, such as designing webpages and brochures.

The 2017 municipal elections were held in 295 municipalities on Mainland Finland. The largest of these was Helsinki, with a population of around 640,000, and the smallest was Luhanka, with 734 residents. The minimum number of personal votes with which a candidate was selected to a municipal council in Helsinki was 457 (the median being 1191). In Luhanka, 11 votes were enough. It is clear that in Luhanka, as well as in other small municipalities, the residents had a significantly higher probability of knowing the candidates in person than they did in Helsinki. As was demonstrated in Chapter 6.1, immigrant-origin candidates were standing as candidates mainly in large cities. Therefore, if we look at all immigrant-origin candidates, we could expect that, on average, they needed more campaign resources to get elected than most native-origin candidates running in small municipalities.

Mainly, the candidates themselves were responsible for financing their personal campaigns. The money may have come from a personal sponsor, but according to the party interviews, local party organisations seldom had money to support individual candidates. Some interviewees noted that if the local party organisation had sponsored one of its candidates, it would have had to sponsor all of them, or otherwise the situation would have been considered very unfair. In fact, in some parties, the candidates paid their party a so-called “candidate fee” with which the party funded a collective campaign, often including a professional photo taken of each candidate to be included in the party’s webpage as well as newspaper and roadside advertisements. This fee was not collected by all parties, and it varied a lot (from tens to hundreds of euros). The fee was more often collected in large cities, where the need for advertising was higher. Some parties refused to collect a candidate fee because it was perceived as putting residents with a poor economic situation in an unequal position.⁵⁶


According to the law on election campaign financing (*Laki ehdokkaan vaalirahoituksen ilmoittamisesta* L414/2000) and its amendment (L684/2010), the elected councillors and deputy councillors must report the size and sources of their campaign funding if it exceeds 800 euros. Tomi Venho (2015) studied campaign budgets in the 2012 Finnish municipal elections based on these reports, which are publicly available on the webpage of the National Audit Office of Finland (www.puoluerahoitus.fi). According to Venho (2015: 41–42), in the 2012 elections,

⁵⁶ For more information on the candidate fee in the 2017 municipal elections, see the news article of the Finnish public service broadcasting company YLE (7.3.2017) “Jopa 750 euron maksu kuntavaaliehdokkaalle – puolueiden ehdokasmaksuissa suuret erot” <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9493499>

80 percent of all councillors and deputy councillors reported that their campaign budget was less than 800 euros. This means that the size of the average budgets could be reliably evaluated only in the largest cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, where the budgets were higher. In mid-sized towns (15,000–50,000 inhabitants), some councillors and deputy councillors spent over 800 euros, but in small municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants, the budgets were generally less than 800 euros. Venho (2015: 43–44) also shows that the share of external funding, i.e. funding that did not come from candidates themselves nor parties but as donations from private persons and companies, was remarkably higher in large cities as compared to mid-sized towns and small municipalities. In large cities, its share was 25–40 percent and in small municipalities only 10 percent.

Next, I will examine the candidates’ budgets and their sources in the 2017 elections with the candidate survey data. In the survey, the candidates were asked the following question: “What is your estimate of the size of your campaign budget? Do not include the candidate fee for the party. If you share your campaign budget with other candidates, please estimate your share of it”. As Figure 8.9 shows, native and immigrant-origin candidates did not differ regarding their campaign budgets. In total, 17–19 percent of the candidates reported that they did not spend any money on their campaigns. One-third in both groups indicated having spent a maximum of 100 euros. One-third spent 101–500 euros. Less than 10 percent spent over 800 euros, which was the limit, after which the elected councillors and deputy councillors had to report the size and sources of their campaign funding.

Figure 8.9 Evaluation of personal campaign budget in euros by origin. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson’s chi-square test: $\chi^2(4)=1.739$, $p=.784$.

Using Kendall’s tau-b, which is a nonparametric measure of the strength and direction of association that exists between two variables measured on at least an ordinal scale, we find that the correlation between the size of the campaign budget and the size of the municipality was positive and significant within both groups

(native-origin candidates: $r_t = .180$, $p < .001$; immigrant-origin candidates: $r_t = .194$, $p < .001$). In other words, the larger the municipality, the more money the candidates spent on their campaigns. Figure 8.10 presents the campaign budgets by origin and size of municipality. At first sight, it appears as if native-origin candidates had larger budgets in all categories. However, Pearson's chi-squared test shows that the differences between native- and immigrant-origin candidates were statistically significant only with respect to candidates in mid-sized towns with 15,000–50,000 inhabitants.

Figure 8.10 Evaluation of personal campaign budget in euros by origin and size of the municipality. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(4) = 6.941$, $p = .139$; (2) $\chi^2(4) = 15.365$, $p = .004$; (3) $\chi^2(4) = 2.043$, $p = .728$.

Figure 8.11 presents elected councillors' and deputies' evaluation of their personal campaign budget by origin and size of municipality. It shows that, in cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, 50 percent of immigrant-origin and 40 percent of native-origin councillors or deputy councillors spent over 800 euros in their campaigns. In mid-sized towns with 15,000–50,000 inhabitants, the corresponding shares were close to 10 percent. In small municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants, almost no one spent over 800 euros. Perhaps the most important observation here is that a large share of the elected councillors and deputy councillors indicated

spending relatively little money on their campaigns, even in cities. It should be noted, however, that the campaign budgets in the largest cities, such as in Helsinki, were incomparable with those in other municipalities.⁵⁷

Figure 8.11 Elected councillors' and deputies' evaluation of personal campaign budget in euros by origin and size of municipality. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(4) = 5.303$, $p = .258$; (2) $\chi^2(4) = 10.283$, $p = .036$; (3) $\chi^2(4) = 3.198$, $p = .525$.

To conclude, campaign budgets varied considerably based on the size of the municipality, as well as between candidates. Perhaps some candidates spent more money simply because they had more money – coming either from their own or their sponsors' pockets. Some were also genuinely making true efforts to make it to the council and thereby investing money in their campaign, whereas some had other motivations to stand (as will be demonstrated in Chapter 8.2). Generally, however, money is not the deciding force in access to candidacy or municipal councils in Finland. This is an important notion given that prior studies have shown that

⁵⁷ Election funding disclosures of all candidates in Helsinki and in other municipalities are available at: [<https://www.vaalirahoitusvalvonta.fi/en/index/vaalirahailmoituksia/ilmoituslistaus/KV2017.html>]. For a more detailed examination of campaign budgets in the 2017 municipal elections, see Borg 2018a: 46–51.


disadvantaged ethnic minorities' limited access to campaign funding is one of the major causes of their underrepresentation (e.g. Strijbis & Völker 2020).

The next important question is the source of campaign funding. According to Venho (2015: 43–44), in the 2012 municipal elections, over half of the campaign budgets of the elected councillors or deputy councillors was covered with their own funds. The smaller the municipality, the higher the share of one's own funds, and vice versa: The role of external funds grew with the size of the municipality. In the smallest municipalities, the share of external funding was around 10 percent, while in the largest cities it was 25–40 percent. Funding received from one's own party was generally 10 percent at maximum. Thus, candidates' skills in fundraising were more important in large municipalities, where the campaign costs were higher. While money was not the deciding force in access to councils, it did play a more important role in large cities, where the immigrant-origin candidates were more heavily concentrated.

In the survey, the candidates were asked to evaluate what proportion of their campaign budget came from their party, from donations, and from their own funds (Figure 8.12). The electronic questionnaire guided the respondents to indicate such proportions that added up to 100 percent in total. A high share (21%) of respondents left this item unanswered. It may be that the question was too demanding to answer, either because it was difficult to evaluate the shares or because the question was technically difficult to answer, as the electronic questionnaire accepted only proportions that accounted for exactly 100 percent.⁵⁸ Fifteen percent of native-origin against 24 percent of immigrant-origin candidates left this question unanswered, which might somehow be reflected in the results. Age distribution was similar among respondents and non-respondents, which means that non-response did not depend on candidates' age, which is likely associated with how accustomed to electronic surveys the respondents are (older candidates being less accustomed). Nevertheless, the main conclusion drawn from Figure 8.12 is that the campaigns were mostly covered with the candidates' own funds, and that there were no differences in the sources of funding associated with origin.

⁵⁸ If the indicated shares did not match, the system reminded the respondent of this, and the respondent was not able to continue filling out the survey. The respondent could not fill out only one field and leave the others empty. Instead, it was necessary to indicate if the share was zero. If the fields were left empty, it was possible to continue. Some respondents called me personally when they faced technical problems with this question. It is thereby likely that the non-response rate was higher because the question was not respondent-friendly.

Figure 8.12 The proportions of different sources of campaign funding by origin. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Native-origin N=814; Immigrant-origin N=143. Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(3)=6.755$, $p=.080$; (2) $\chi^2(3)=6.027$, $p=.110$; (3) $\chi^2(3)=3.235$, $p=.357$.

Figure 8.13 displays how access to donations was associated with the size of the municipality. Around one-fourth of the candidates in cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants received donations. In mid-sized towns and small municipalities, the share was clearly lower. There were no significant differences between native and immigrant-origin candidates. Among native-origin candidates, the association between the share of donations and the size of the municipality (similarly coded as in Figure 8.13) was statistically significant ($\chi^2(4)=12.537$, $p=.014$), while among immigrant-origin candidates it was not ($\chi^2(4)=3.011$, $p=.556$).

Figure 8.13 The proportion of donations in campaign budget by origin and size of municipality. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson’s chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(2) = 2.088$, $p = .352$; (2) $\chi^2(2) = 1.888$, $p = .389$; (3) $\chi^2(2) = .407$, $p = .816$.

In the survey, the candidates were also asked, on a 5-point scale, how easy or difficult raising funds for the campaign was for them. Here, we observe a significant difference between native and immigrant-origin candidates: While 43 percent of the immigrant-origin candidates perceived fundraising to be quite or very difficult, among the native-origin candidates the corresponding share was 28 percent (Figure 8.14).

Figure 8.14 Perception of ease/difficulty in raising funds for the campaign by origin. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: $\chi^2(4)=29.0, p<.001$.

This could relate to immigrant-origin candidates having much less experience in politics compared to native-origin candidates. Because immigrant-origin candidates had been less often involved in different voluntary associations and municipal positions of responsibility (see Chapters 8.1.1 and 8.1.2), their social networks and the resources embedded in them might have been of less value in terms of raising funds for an electoral campaign. Generally, it may be expected that the social networks of native-origin candidates – who have had a lifetime to build their networks – are more extensive and diverse, which means that their social connections may be more easily transformed into financial capital. However, because the budgets in municipal elections are so modest, a lack of social capital or sponsors' possible discrimination based on candidates' ethnic background is not a decisive barrier to access to the council. In parliamentary elections, in which the campaign budgets are much higher, the situation might be different. In a similar vein, as parties may be reluctant to nominate immigrant-origin candidates if they do not expect the candidate to pull in votes to the party's list, some sponsors may refuse to back immigrant-origin candidates if they consider their chances of winning elections to be small.

8.1.4 Time spent in campaigning

Time spent in political activities is time spent away from work, family, or leisure activities. Prior studies suggest that lack of time is a much more probable reason for not running compared to lack of money. Pikkala (2007), who has studied councillors' reasons for not standing for re-election, has found that one important reason to stand down is that politics takes away too much time from family and/or leisure.

According to Pikkala, struggling with time constraints is more common among women than men, and especially common among parents of small children. In the party interviews, this was brought up several times as a problem that parties faced when recruiting candidates. Some party interviewees related in detail that building balanced candidate lists regarding gender was difficult because, in particular, potential female candidates refused to stand due to lack of time. Given that parties are interested in active persons, i.e. persons who are already spending much of their time doing community work, there is a high risk that their recruits may find it difficult to fit in yet another time-consuming responsibility. The following quotes from the candidate interviews illustrate this phenomenon:

Interviewer: Was the decision to stand easy or difficult?

C9: It was not easy. I negotiated with my wife and thought for a long time whether it is worth it, because it takes my resources and my time... (...) In the end, I thought I want to be there to help [my party]. Even if I am not elected, I want to collect votes to [the name of the party] (...) Some of my friends told me that “hey, you are busy anyway, don’t go there as it takes time from your main task [at church]”. But when my wife and other close friends told me that “if you feel that you need to be there, then you must go”. I received a lot of encouragement from my close personal network.

C5: I have always been asked to participate. When people know you, they keep on asking. I have been asked but I didn’t want to go, I was so busy at work. I didn’t have time. I got into politics, municipal elections (...) But I don’t want to go further. I draw my line in municipal elections.

While prior studies give a detailed account of why e.g. women may have less time compared to men, there is no reason to believe that immigrants in general would suffer from similar disadvantages compared to natives. However, one of the interviewed immigrant-origin candidates brought up that immigrants may need to do more field work, i.e. meet the voters in person, to overcome the prejudice of the native voters or mobilise immigrant-origin voters who might otherwise not vote. According to the interviewee, native-origin voters are reluctant to vote for a person with a foreign name or a visibly different skin colour. However, doubts related to different appearance may fade away when an immigrant-origin candidate gets to meet native voters in person and show that he or she is interested in and capable of promoting the interests of all residents, and not only of his or her own ethnic minority group. Furthermore, several interviewed candidates emphasized how they spent a lot of time explaining to immigrant voters how the Finnish political system

works and motivating them to cast a vote in the first place. Thus, immigrant-origin candidates played a crucial role in informing immigrant voters about their rights to vote, which is something native-origin candidates do not need to consider in their campaigns, as practically all native-origin adults are aware of their voting rights.

In the survey, the candidates were asked how many hours per week, on average, they were going to spend on campaign work during the last four weeks of the campaign. Statistically, immigrant and native-origin candidates did not differ in this respect ($t(1083)=-1.561$, $p=.119$). Immigrant-origin candidates reported that, on average, they had spent or intended to spend 9.8 hours ($SD=10.4$) on campaign work per week. The average time reported by native-origin candidates was 8.4 hours ($SD=11.1$). Three percent of candidates in both groups reported that they did not intend to spend any time on campaigning. Seventy-one to 76 percent indicated spending 1–10 hours, 13–18 percent reported spending 11–20 hours, and 7–8 percent evaluated that they had spent over 20 hours per week on campaign work. The interviewed candidates had various ways of campaigning, but the reasons for abstaining from campaigning were most often related to lack of time.


8.1.5 Campaign activities

In the survey, the content of the campaigns was studied by asking the candidates whether they used money on the following activities:

1. Campaign advertising in newspapers, freesheet newspapers, or magazines
2. Making a demonstration video of oneself as a candidate
3. Campaign advertising on the radio
4. Campaign advertising on television
5. Campaign advertising on one's own website or blog
6. Campaign advertising on social media
7. Outdoor advertising (billboards, bridge banners, etc.)
8. Printing brochures, leaflets, and other material
9. Planned advertising strategy purchased from a third party
10. Campaign events/meetings

The difficulty with this question is that the candidates might have engaged in some of the activities without spending any money on them. Despite the problems with the question formulation, some remarks on the popularity of the various activities can be made. The results are displayed in Figure 8.15.

Figure 8.15 Spending on different campaign activities by origin. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Shown are proportions of candidates who indicated spending money on the activity in question. The data have been weighted by age. Analysis with the non-weighted data produced statistically significant differences between the groups regarding items 5 and 9, which were likely an outcome of the large share of elder native-origin candidates in the sample. Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(1) = .001$, $p = .979$; (2) $\chi^2(1) = 1.112$, $p = .292$; (3) $\chi^2(1) = 5.450$, $p = .020$; (4) no statistics computed; (5) $\chi^2(1) = 3.691$, $p = .055$; (6) $\chi^2(1) = .080$, $p = .777$; (7) $\chi^2(1) = .043$, $p = .836$; (8) $\chi^2(1) = .055$, $p = .814$; (9) $\chi^2(1) = 3.569$, $p = .059$; (10) $\chi^2(1) = .516$, $p = .472$.

The results in Figure 8.15 show that there were practically no differences between the popularity of the enlisted campaign activities between the native and immigrant-origin candidates. Most common campaign activities included distributing brochures, leaflets, and other printed material to the voters, as well as advertising in newspapers. Around half of the candidates in both groups indicated spending money on this type of advertising. Around 40 percent of both native and immigrant-origin candidates reported that they had spent money on advertising in social media. Campaign work in social media, however, was also possible for free, as was campaigning on one's own website or blog. Spending money on advertising via one's own website or blog was much less common than via social media, which could be explained by the fact that a personal website allows for less interaction with other people and is more demanding to create than a profile on e.g. Facebook.

Statistically significant differences in campaign activities were found only among 40–49-year-old candidates ($\chi^2(1)=7.106$, $p=.008$). Within this age group, 12 percent of immigrant-origin candidates purchased a planned advertising strategy from a third party. Out of native-origin candidates, only three percent did the same. Investing money in an advertising strategy indicates a high level of motivation for election. Among 30–39-year-old candidates, both of native and immigrant-origin, around one out of ten (8–9%) reported spending money on a planned advertising strategy. In other age groups than 30–49-year-olds, the corresponding rates were lower (2–4%). Three percent of 40–49-year-old immigrant-origin respondents also indicated having spent money on advertising on radio, while none of the native-origin respondents reported the same ($\chi^2(1)=3.995$, $p=.046$). In reality, several native-origin candidates did advertise on radio, and the results suggest that this quite marginal campaign activity was only slightly more popular among middle-aged immigrant-origin candidates.

Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not include a measurement of the extent to which immigrant-origin candidates targeted co-ethnics, immigrants, or foreign language speakers in their campaigns. As will be shown in Chapter 8.2.3, some of the interviewed immigrant-origin candidates evaluated that their access to municipal council depended specifically on immigrant votes. Also, an ability to campaign among foreign language speakers in their own native language and, thus, mobilise sentiments of shared ethnic or minority identity could have been a wise strategy to pull in votes that native-origin candidates did not have access to, at least in municipalities with a higher level of immigrant residential concentration.

Furthermore, as was mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, one important aspect that differentiates campaigns targeted to native versus immigrant voters is that

a large share of the latter is not aware of their voting rights, or if they are, feel that they are not entitled to use their rights. In the interviews, many immigrant-origin candidates described how one of the most important activities in their campaign was to spread information to immigrant-origin voters about their right to vote in the elections:

C7: My starting point was to awaken sleeping voters. (...) democracy is carried out when all people vote, no matter who they vote for, as long as they vote according to their own will. When [turnout] is hundred percent, then we know that it is democratic... when all have participated. But because this is not the case, I wanted to awaken them. As I said, for instance, my parents feel that they do not have a right to vote although they do. And they know nothing of... So my aim is to inform especially immigrants that they have a right, and... especially those who intend to stay here permanently and adapt here. It would be fair to them that they could have a say [in the decision-making].

Interviewer: Do you think that these [immigrant-origin] people would have known much about voting or politics without you? Are you a person who provided them with this information?

C8: Well, they didn't know much. (...) The problem is that they don't recognize the value of their vote, why to vote for, and what is the system in Finland.

C11: Many people [immigrants] are not aware of the topical issues in local politics or in politics in general, because they don't know the language. Since I know the language, I can also explain them what the issues are about. This is how these people may get interested in voting even if they'd never voted before. Or, in some cases they would've wanted to vote but they did not know whom. They do not know how to cast a vote or whom to vote for because they do not understand [the Finnish political system nor Finnish language].

(...) **Interviewer:** What is your general opinion, what could parties or anyone do more in order to get foreign-origin persons to participate actively, either to vote or to stand as candidates?

C11: Well, the field work is important. They should educate people, inform them about their rights. (...) Many are not aware [of their voting rights] either because they are not interested, they do not understand, or for some other reasons, for instance, because they cannot find a suitable candidate. There are not many of our lot as candidates, [which is why people think that] "I cannot vote for the candidates on the list, because they would not promote my interests anyway". Maybe that's how people perceive it.

Some of the interviewed candidates had even given their voters a drive to the polling station:

C8: The question is how we can reach these people and meet them. The important matter is how we can explain them [the importance of voting]. Some newspapers write about elections and voting... For sure not one of them votes. In my first elections, I thought, I need ten cars [so that I can say to people:] “Hey, where do you live? I will come and give you a lift so that you can go out and vote”. I mean we need to do something. I was enthusiastic. I told people that we will take you [to the polling station]. That’s how they got there. My party or any party could do the same. When [Alexander] Stubb was the prime minister, they rented a bus or something. Businessmen visited people’s homes. Imagine if ordinary people get a visit from Stubb, [Petteri] Orpo or even Juha Sipilä [former party chairmen and ministers], it’s a big deal. For sure they tell also ten others that “this is a nice guy, vote for him”.

The view, according to which immigrant-origin candidates benefit especially from meeting voters face-to-face, would require further investigation in the future. Based on the candidate interview data, it may be hypothesized that face-to-face interaction and contact with voters from other ethnic groups facilitates the development of cross-ethnic trust, which is a prerequisite for pulling in cross-ethnic votes. Even with co-ethnics, face-to-face contact is important because many need active mobilisation to turn out to the polls. Many interviewees highlighted the importance of personally persuading voters to cast a vote and even meeting them in their homes. Although this type of personal contact with voters is popular in many countries, in Finland a very marginal share of candidates engages in this type of activity in their campaigns. For instance, in the 2019 parliamentary elections, only one percent of the candidates considered calling up voters on the phone an important activity in their campaign, whereas 80 percent did not engage in this type of activity at all. Canvassing through door-knocking was even less common (Mattila et al. 2020).

8.1.6 Support groups


A career in politics is by no means a single-player game. Personal support groups and social networks are elemental in terms of emotional support as well as organising and planning a campaign and gaining recognition among voters. In municipal elections, official personal campaign teams are relatively rare compared to parliamentary elections, in which practically all candidates have their own campaign teams (Kuitunen 2000: 144; Mattila et al. 2020). This is quite natural, first, because of a high share of top-up candidates who are on the list only to pull in votes for their

party and, thus, not running a personalised campaign. Second, in small municipalities, election to a municipal office does not often require a personal campaign, as an individual's personal reputation in the local community, as well as kinship networks, may already be sufficient factors. Third, municipal election campaigns are much less professionalised compared to parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, support groups are also important in municipal elections because individual candidates are themselves responsible for organising their campaigns and can expect only little personal support from their party, as was pointed out in Chapter 7 (see also Kuitunen 2000: 144).

As Borg (2018a: 132) shows in his study of the 2017 municipal elections, in municipalities with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, half of the voters were personally acquainted with the candidate they voted for. In the largest cities (with more than 100,000 inhabitants), the corresponding share dropped to 24 percent, whereas in municipalities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, seven out of ten voters knew their candidate personally. This illustrates the difficulty that immigrant-origin candidates face: They are competing against native-origin candidates with whom many have had a lifetime to build relationships in the local community. It should be noted, however, that in terms of personal networks, native-origin internal migrants may be in the same position as immigrants, if their family, friends, and other acquaintances live in another municipality.

The candidate survey shows that personal campaign teams were more common among immigrant than native-origin candidates. Whereas one-fourth (23%) of the immigrant-origin candidates indicated having a personal campaign team, the corresponding share among the native-origin candidates was only 14 percent. The difference is statistically significant ($\chi^2(1)=9.7$, $p=.002$). Further examination shows that the difference between native and immigrant-origin candidates concerns only candidates in municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. As Figure 8.16 shows, in large towns and cities, one-third of immigrant-origin candidates and one-fifth of native-origin candidates had a personal campaign team. In smaller municipalities, the shares of candidates with personal campaign teams did not significantly differ.

Figure 8.16 Share of candidates with a personal campaign team by the size of the municipality. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(1) = .136$, $p = .712$; (2) $\chi^2(1) = .299$, $p = .585$; (3) $\chi^2(1) = 8.710$, $p = .003$.

There is no statistically significant gender gap within either of the groups, although in the data 26 percent of immigrant-origin women against 21 percent of immigrant-origin men reported having a personal campaign team. Age, in turn, was associated with having a campaign team (Figure 8.17). When native and immigrant-origin candidates are compared by age groups, we see that 30–39 and 50–59-year-old immigrant-origin candidates more often had personal campaign teams than native-origin candidates. The direction was the same among 40–49-year-olds, but the result was not significant at the 0.05-level. Within the youngest age group, under 30 years old, it appears as if native-origin candidates more often had campaign teams, but the difference was not significant.

Figure 8.17 Share of candidates with a personal campaign team by age group. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson’s chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(1) = 1.105$, $p = .293$; (2) $\chi^2(1) = 3.943$, $p = .047$; (3) $\chi^2(1) = 3.293$, $p = .070$; (4) $\chi^2(1) = 10.218$, $p = .001$; (5) $\chi^2(1) = .011$, $p = .917$.

There were no significant differences between the groups regarding the size of the campaign team. Out of those immigrant-origin candidates who indicated having a campaign team ($n = 45$), around one out of four (27%) reported that it consisted of a maximum of two persons, four out of ten (42%) related that it had three or four persons, and one-third (31%) said that it had more than four persons. Corresponding shares among native-origin candidates ($n = 146$) were 21, 36, and 42 percent, respectively.

Advice and support from people with vast political experience especially benefits novice candidates i.e. candidates running for the first time. For an immigrant-origin candidate who aims to gain support from native voters, it may be especially important to have natives on their campaign team to promote the candidate and speak in public on behalf of him/her. Via a personal support team, a candidate gains access to the networks of the members of the team.

The interviewed candidates described the utility and value of their support teams as follows:

C1: There were around 15 persons in the core team, around which there was a larger group of people. Luckily, there were influential people in my team, people who were able to recommend me to others and who knew how things are being handled in [the name of the municipality]. They knew what politics is, which is why they were able to talk with people (...) of course everyone decides themselves who they vote for but when people know you...

Interviewer: Why were these people in your team familiar with politics? Were they active in voluntary associations or working for the municipality or...?

C1: They had lived in Finland for a long time and knew how Finnish society works.

Interviewer: Did you have a personal support team?

C7: Yes, a small one, which told me what to do and what not to do. Mainly I had to do everything myself.

Interviewer: Did you have friends to support you or...?

C7: Yes, my friends supported me. It was interesting for them as well because most of them had never voted before, although they were entitled to. When their own friend stood as a candidate, they were like “hey, should we do something, what are you doing, can you tell as more, can we tell people to vote for you” etc. So yes, my closest network [supported me].

Interviewer: To your opinion, what was the most important help you got from them?

C7: Probably emotional support and... they participated my campaign by telling others about me. As a new face it is very demanding and time-consuming to gain visibility. Truly, it takes years.

Interviewer: Were there persons in your closest network who were able to gain you wider visibility? Do you think they had a large network of friends?

C7: Well, for example, I asked my parents to call their friends. My dad has been working as an interpreter, and many recognise him. He called to many people. Then there were several friends working in big companies with lots of employees. So, they spread the word.

As was discussed in Chapter 2.4.5, candidates’ social relationships were productive “social” additions to their personal resources. A career in politics would be impossible without this type of social capital. To further investigate candidates’ resource acquisition, a so-called “resource generator measurement” was included in the candidate survey. With inspiration from the work of Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005), who studied resource acquisition in the Dutch general population, I designed an instrument to measure candidates’ access to resources via their personal networks,

focusing on resources that are relevant in political campaigning. In the survey, the candidates were asked the following question: “Is there someone in your close social network who...

- 1) Helps with organizing the campaign (for example, scheduling, budgeting, or coordinating volunteers)
- 2) Updates your social media accounts for you (Facebook, Twitter, homepage, or blog)
- 3) Donates money to your campaign
- 4) Helps you to plan the content of your campaign
- 5) Invites people to vote for you at campaign events or meetings, etc.
- 6) Cheers you and gives you moral support
- 7) Takes care of your home/children while you are campaigning


The list of relevant resources was formulated based on previous literature on candidates and their campaigns in Finnish municipal and parliamentary elections (e.g. Helander 2003; Huttunen 2012; Kuitunen 1998, 2000; Ruostetsaari & Mattila 2002; Strandberg 2016). In terms of each resource related to campaigning, the respondents were asked to choose all the persons they could turn to: (1) someone in the party organisation, (2) spouse/partner, child, or parent, (3) other relative, (4) co-worker, (5) friend, and/or (6) acquaintance. If the respondent did not have anyone to turn to, he or she had the option of selecting “no one”. The results are presented in Figures 8.18–8.20.

The main finding is that there were hardly any differences regarding resource acquisition between native and immigrant-origin candidates. Most candidates (83–87%) reported that they had people in their social network from whom they were able to get cheer and moral support. Around 70 percent also reported that they had someone to help them with organising the campaign. Around 65 percent said that they had people who were able to help in planning the campaign. Over half had people who invited people to vote for them in campaign events or meetings. Immigrant-origin candidates reported significantly more often than native-origin candidates that they had people in their personal network who were able to help them with updating social media accounts (44% vs. 25%, respectively). Only one out of five were connected to people who were willing to donate money to their campaign.

Figures 8.19 and 8.20 suggest that native-origin candidates were more often able to access resources via someone in the party organisation, whereas immigrant-origin

candidates had better access to resources via friends and family. The differences were mainly not statistically significant, and if they were, they favoured immigrant-origin candidates. First, immigrant-origin candidates perceived more often than native-origin candidates that they could turn to their friends and family if they needed help in organising their campaign (55% vs. 45%). A larger share of immigrant-origin candidates also reported that they were able to get help from someone in the party organisation to aid them in updating social media accounts (13% vs. 7%). The most important help received from the party was in organising the campaign. Overall, however, help was more often accessible via friendship and familial relationships.


Figure 8.18 Access to campaign relevant resources by origin.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(1) = .366$, $p = .545$; (2) $\chi^2(1) = 28.220$, $p < .001$; (3) $\chi^2(1) = .002$, $p = .961$; (4) $\chi^2(1) = .208$, $p = .649$; (5) $\chi^2(1) = .041$, $p = .839$; (6) $\chi^2(1) = 1.752$, $p = .186$; (7) $\chi^2(1) = 2.624$, $p = .105$.


Figure 8.19 Access to campaign relevant resources via someone from the party organisation by origin.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(1) = 1.351, p = .245$; (2) $\chi^2(1) = 7.399, p = .007$; (3) $\chi^2(1) = 1.959, p = .162$; (4) $\chi^2(1) = 1.234, p = .267$; (5) $\chi^2(1) = .660, p = .417$; (6) $\chi^2(1) = .606, p = .436$; (7) $\chi^2(1) = 4.884, p = .027$.

Figure 8.20 Access to campaign relevant resources via family, friends, and acquaintances by origin.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(1) = 6.674$, $p = .010$; (2) $\chi^2(1) = 24.933$, $p < .001$; (3) $\chi^2(1) = .441$, $p = .507$; (4) $\chi^2(1) = 1.776$, $p = .183$; (5) $\chi^2(1) = .732$, $p = .392$; (6) $\chi^2(1) = .157$, $p = .692$; (7) $\chi^2(1) = 1.981$, $p = .159$.

An investigation by gender reveals some interesting variation in resource acquisition. First, there was a gender gap between immigrant-origin men and women regarding campaign funding. While 30 percent of immigrant-origin female candidates reported that they had people in their close network who donated money to their campaign, the corresponding share among immigrant-origin male candidates was only 16 percent. The difference was statistically significant ($\chi^2(1)=5.9, p=.015$). A significant gender gap was not found among native-origin candidates, among whom 24 percent of the females and 20 percent of the males indicated that they had sponsors in their close network.

Moreover, while 88 percent of native-origin female candidates reported that they had persons in their close network who provided them with cheer and moral support, the corresponding share among native-origin male candidates was significantly lower, 79 percent ($\chi^2(1)=14.2, p<.001$). A similar trend concerned immigrant-origin candidates: 90 percent of immigrant-origin females against 84 percent of males indicated having such persons in their close network. However, the difference was not significant.

Next, I will calculate a “Resource Access Index” based on the responses to the individual resource generator items. The index summarizes access to the first six items on the list and leaves out the item “help at home”, which was relevant primarily to those candidates who had caretaking responsibilities, such as parenting underage children. If the respondent had access to none of the resources, he or she got a value of 0, and if the respondent indicated having access to all six items, no matter via whom, he or she got a value of 6. Thus, the index is a 7-point scale.

Table 8.2 displays the index means and standard deviations by origin, gender, age, and election outcome. The mean value for all immigrant-origin candidates was 3.4, while for native-origin candidates it was 3.2. Independent samples t-test confirms that the mean score of immigrant-origin candidates was statistically significantly higher than the score of native-origin candidates $t(1164)=-1.980, p=.048$. One-way ANOVA and the Bonferroni procedure, in turn, show that immigrant-origin women had a significantly higher score than native-origin men ($F(3, 1165)=2.749, p=.042$). Table 8.2 suggests that the candidates in the youngest age group had the highest Resource Access Index score among both native and immigrant-origin candidates. However, between-group differences were not significant in either group. Councillors and deputy councillors had a significantly higher mean score than the non-elected among the native-origin candidates $t(971)=4.683, p<.001$. The difference between the corresponding groups among immigrant-origin candidates was not significant.

Table 8.2 Resource Access Index means and standard deviations by origin, gender, age, and election outcome.

	Native-origin			Immigrant-origin		
	M	(SD)	(n)	M	(SD)	(n)
All	3.2	(1.7)	(973)	3.4	(1.8)	(193)
Male	3.1	(1.7)	(534)	3.3	(1.7)	(112)
Female	3.3	(1.6)	(439)	3.6	(1.8)	(81)
18–29	3.6	(1.6)	(73)	4.1	(1.8)	(23)
30–39	3.2	(1.8)	(148)	3.2	(1.8)	(44)
40–49	3.2	(1.7)	(169)	3.2	(1.7)	(61)
50–59	3.1	(1.7)	(234)	3.8	(1.6)	(45)
60–	3.1	(1.6)	(349)	3.0	(1.7)	(20)
Councillor/Deputy	3.4	(1.6)	(520)	3.3	(1.7)	(46)
Not-elected	2.9	(1.7)	(453)	3.5	(1.8)	(147)

Source: Candidate survey.

Table 8.3 shows the modified Resource Access Index scores when resource acquisition only via party members is considered. The scores are much lower than in the previous table, which indicates that parties were not the primary source of campaign-relevant resources. Independent samples t-test and one-way ANOVA confirm that native and immigrant-origin candidates did not differ in terms of party-related resource acquisition, nor were there gender, age, or election result-related differences within the groups.

Table 8.3 Party-related Resource Access Index means and standard deviations by origin, gender, age, and election outcome.

	Native-origin			Immigrant-origin		
	M	(SD)	(n)	M	(SD)	(n)
All	1.3	(1.5)	(973)	1.2	(1.6)	(193)
Male	1.3	(1.5)	(534)	1.3	(1.7)	(112)
Female	1.3	(1.5)	(439)	1.1	(1.5)	(81)
18–29	1.5	(1.5)	(73)	1.4	(1.8)	(23)
30–39	1.0	(1.4)	(148)	1.1	(1.7)	(44)
40–49	1.3	(1.5)	(169)	1.1	(1.4)	(61)
50–59	1.4	(1.5)	(234)	1.2	(1.5)	(45)
60–	1.3	(1.5)	(349)	1.7	(2.1)	(20)
Councillor/Deputy	1.3	(1.5)	(520)	1.1	(1.5)	(46)
Not-elected	1.3	(1.5)	(453)	1.2	(1.7)	(147)

Source: Candidate survey.

Table 8.4 shows how candidates' primary access to campaign resources took place via friends, family, and other non-party related actors. Independent samples t-test shows that immigrant-origin candidates' index score (2.9) is significantly higher than native-origin candidates' index score (2.5) ($t(1164)=-2.808$, $p=.005$). This is explained mainly by the fact that immigrant-origin female candidates had a significantly higher index score than native-origin male candidates (3.0 vs. 2.4) ($F(3, 1162)=3.810$, $p=.010$). There were also significant differences in index scores between age groups among both native and immigrant-origin candidates. Among the former, the association between the index score and age was almost linear: Younger candidates indicated more frequently that they could turn to their friends, relatives, and other acquaintances for help regarding their campaign ($F(4, 968)=7.014$, $p<.001$). Mean scores were also statistically significantly different among immigrant-origin candidates ($F(4, 188)=4.386$, $p=.002$): According to the Bonferroni procedure, both 18–29 and 50–59-year-old candidates had significantly higher scores than candidates who were 60 years or older.

An independent samples t-test shows that the difference in the index score between the elected and non-elected candidates was significant among the native-origin candidates ($t(971)=4.843$, $p<.001$) but not among the immigrant-origin candidates. Among the former, the councillors and deputy councillors had a higher

score compared to non-elected candidates (2.7 vs. 2.2). This could be related to the fact that immigrant-origin candidates suffer from an “ethnic penalty”: Even if they have the resources to run an effective campaign, they may not be able to attract enough personal votes to be elected, as voters avoid candidates with an ethnic minority background.

Table 8.4 Friendship and familial network-related Resource Access Index means and standard deviations by origin, gender, age, and election outcome.

	Native-origin			Immigrant-origin		
	M	(SD)	(N)	M	(SD)	(N)
All	2.5	(1.8)	(973)	2.9	(1.8)	(193)
Male	2.4	(1.8)	(534)	2.7	(1.8)	(112)
Female	2.7	(1.8)	(439)	3.0	(1.9)	(81)
18–29	3.2	(1.7)	(73)	3.9	(1.9)	(23)
30–39	2.8	(1.9)	(148)	2.9	(1.9)	(44)
40–49	2.6	(1.8)	(169)	2.7	(1.8)	(61)
50–59	2.2	(1.7)	(234)	3.1	(1.8)	(45)
60–	2.3	(1.6)	(349)	1.7	(1.5)	(20)
Councillor/Deputy	2.7	(1.7)	(520)	2.7	(1.8)	(46)
Not-elected	2.2	(1.7)	(453)	2.9	(1.9)	(147)

Source: Candidate survey.

To sum up, the analyses presented in this chapter have shown that, on average, immigrant-origin candidates had access to more social support compared to native-origin candidates. However, when origin and gender are intersected, it seems that immigrant-origin female candidates enjoyed the strongest social support, whereas native-origin male candidates had decided to stand as candidates even though they had less access to social support. The results may be interpreted as meaning that immigrant-origin women’s candidacy is most dependent on external support and social resources. However, compared to native-origin men and women as well as to immigrant-origin men, immigrant-origin women may be the most likely group to suffer from a lack of social resources due to e.g. their weakest level of labour-market integration in Finland (e.g. Eronen et al. 2014). According to the party interviews, parties’ recruiters also considered immigrant-origin women as the hardest group to reach and persuade to stand as candidates.

8.1.7 Language proficiency

An important matter that influences parties' enthusiasm for recruiting an immigrant-origin candidate is their proficiency in Finnish or Swedish (depending on the dominant language of the municipality). Lack of knowledge of Finnish or Swedish may not be an obstacle in gaining votes if the campaign is specifically targeted to a language minority. However, without sufficient skills in Finnish or Swedish, an individual has difficulties communicating with fellow party members and participating in municipal decision-making if elected to the council or another position of responsibility. This is not to say that bureaucratic language adopted in public decision-making would not create any difficulties for many Finnish and Swedish speakers as well. Some of the party interviewees emphasized that a lack of language proficiency should not be an obstacle if an individual has the motivation to participate. Rather than being purely ideological, this may be a very strategic approach: The parties were willing to take in all aspirants who were motivated to campaign and had the potential to pull in votes and, thus, increase the party's vote share.

Also, several candidates interviewed for this study considered language proficiency to be highly important for an immigrant to be able to stand. One of the interviewees brought up how "Finns perceive it very difficult to communicate with an immigrant who does not speak fluent Finnish". Indeed, given the relatively short history of immigration in Finland and the low level of ethnic diversity in the population, it may be true that the native population is unaccustomed to hearing Finnish spoken by non-natives, which probably sets their demand for immigrant-origin candidates' language skills very high.

While a relatively large share of Finns speaks English, it seems that many expect candidates to speak Finnish or Swedish. Pedro Aibéo, a Portuguese-origin candidate who ran for Helsinki city council as an independent candidate on the Left Alliance list, has described to Yle news (21.7.2020) that he received "plenty of harsh criticism for not speaking Finnish or Swedish" from other candidates across the political spectrum. One of his policy goals in the 2017 elections was a demand that all government meetings and decisions would be translated into English because in Helsinki, a large share of the foreign language-speaking population can vote and be candidates, although these individuals are not able to access information on politics. Although Aibéo speaks English, he expected his lack of language skills to be a major obstacle to his political career.


In the survey, the candidates were asked to assess their Finnish or Swedish language proficiency (depending on which language they reported speaking most often as a second language in Finland) in four areas: understanding spoken and written Finnish/Swedish as well as speaking and writing the language. The respondents were asked to choose one out of three alternatives that best described their skills. The alternatives were formulated based on the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages⁵⁹, which has three main categories: A representing “a basic user”, B representing “an independent user”, and C representing “a proficient user”.

Ten percent (n=20) of the candidates who in the Population Information System were registered as foreign language speakers reported in the survey that Finnish was their mother tongue. One of the candidates reported being a Swedish speaker. Ninety percent (n=182) reported that their mother tongue was some language other than Finnish or Swedish. Almost half (44%) of these candidates assessed their language proficiency at level C in all measured areas and are thereby regarded as proficient users. The question lacked an alternative for not understanding any written or spoken Finnish or Swedish. Luckily, it seems that this is not a major limitation, as only four candidates (2%) assessed themselves at level A in all areas.

As Figure 8.21 demonstrates, there was some variation regarding understanding the language and being able to speak or write the language oneself. Nearly 80 percent reported that they understood almost every kind of spoken Finnish, even when delivered at fast speed. Approximately 70 percent considered that they both “read virtually all forms of written Finnish/Swedish with ease” and “speak fluent Finnish/Swedish in all situations and form complex sentences”. Writing Finnish or Swedish was perceived as most demanding: Only half of the respondents indicated that they were able to write different texts in Finnish or Swedish fluently. Ten percent considered that they were able to write only very short and simple texts in Finnish or Swedish and made a lot of grammatical errors.

⁵⁹ See the self-assessment grid here: <https://europass.cedefop.europa.eu/sites/default/files/cefr-en.pdf>

Figure 8.21 Self-assessed language proficiency of the immigrant-origin candidates.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Level A = basic user, Level B = independent user, Level C = proficient user. The black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. Those immigrant-origin respondents, who in the survey reported that their mother tongue is Finnish or Swedish, were not presented with any questions about their language skills.

One of the interviewees, who had been working as a councillor for several terms, spoke Finnish but was not able to write it. Therefore, s/he had to lean on help from others:

C8: I can speak Finnish, but I cannot write it. Every time I need [to write] a speech, I send a raw version to my friend [in politics] and ask his/her help.

Interviewer: How does it influence your work in the council that you cannot write? Is it an obstacle?


C8: Well yes it does have an impact. When I want to take a stand on something, I need to ask my friend to write my speech. Sometimes when I need to hold a speech [without the prewritten document], I use raw language, although many are not comfortable with it. But it cannot be helped. I am there for a reason and sometimes these situations come.

Interviewer: Did your language proficiency influence your decision to stand as a candidate, I mean regarding how easy or difficult it was to make the decision?

C8: I have never thought of it in that way. You see... I speak so good Finnish that I can manage everywhere. I can even go to Lappi or Karjala [different geographic regions with a different dialect]. I manage all right. But the problem is writing, I cannot write. Sometimes I take help from my son, although from time to time he laughs and says that “I am not your secretary”. When he was younger, I told him that I’ll give him ten [euros]... [laughing] but not anymore.

Figure 8.22 examines candidates’ language skills by employing a “Language Proficiency Index”. The index is obtained by giving each candidate three points each time he or she chose level C, two points for level B, and one point for level A. Thus, the index ranges between values 4 and 12, when all four dimensions are considered (understanding (1) spoken and (2) written Finnish/Swedish and (3) speaking and (4) writing the language). As we see, the distribution of the scores is skewed on the left, meaning that the candidates got mainly high scores.


Figure 8.22 Language Proficiency Index.



Source: Candidate survey.

In the survey, the candidates were also asked how easy or difficult it was to acquire the knowledge needed for positions of responsibility. The response scale ranged from 1 (very difficult) to 5 (very easy). Although the ability to acquire this type of knowledge is not limited to language skills, but depends on e.g. a person’s level of education, prior political experience, and social networks, in line with the quote from Aibéo above, it may be expected that language skills played a key role in access to knowledge. Indeed, Figure 8.23 shows that immigrant-origin candidates found it more difficult compared to native-origin candidates to acquire the knowledge needed in positions of responsibility. Altogether, 65 percent of native-origin candidates in contrast to 44 percent of immigrant-origin candidates found it quite or very easy.

Figure 8.23 The perception of ease/difficulty of acquiring knowledge needed in positions of responsibility by origin. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; $\chi^2(4) = 41.463$, $p < .001$. Those immigrant-origin respondents who, in the survey, reported that their mother tongue was Finnish or Swedish have been excluded from the analysis.

Figure 8.24 demonstrates that this difference between native and immigrant-origin candidates in perceived ease/difficulty of acquiring knowledge needed in positions of responsibility remains even after respondents' prior experience as electoral candidates is considered. Novice candidates, i.e. "first-timers", found it harder to access knowledge compared to experienced candidates in both groups. However, the contrast between native and immigrant-origin candidates was even stronger among experienced candidates compared to novices. Among experienced candidates, 71 percent of the native-origin in contrast to 48 percent of the immigrant-origin found it quite or very easy to acquire knowledge. Among novice candidates, the corresponding shares were 54 and 39 percent.

Figure 8.24 The perception of ease/difficulty of acquiring knowledge needed in positions of responsibility by origin and prior experience as a candidate. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Novice candidates: $\chi^2(4) = 19.632$, $p = .001$; Experienced candidates: $\chi^2(4) = 19.867$, $p = .001$. Those immigrant-origin respondents who, in the survey, reported that their mother tongue is Finnish or Swedish have been excluded from the analysis.

8.2 Candidate motivation

In simple terms, candidate motivation is understood as the answer to the question of why the candidates decided to run for municipal office. As discussed in Chapter 2, motivation to stand may consist of such elements as drive, political ambition, and interest in politics. These individual psychological processes are shaped and structured by the context, which determines what in reality is possible to achieve (Norris & Lovenduski 1995: 166–182). In this section, I will employ the candidate survey data to study whether native- and immigrant-origin candidates were driven by the same reasons and to which extent. One important question regarding immigrants' motivation to stand as candidates is whether it can facilitate integration in Finnish society, e.g. by providing skills, knowledge, and networks needed in working life and elsewhere. Another interesting question is, to what extent were immigrant-origin candidates interested in representing their co-ethnics or persons with an immigration background in general?

I will also utilize the candidate interviews, as they are very helpful in interpreting the results derived from the survey data as well as providing a deeper understanding of which connections in the quantitative data should be looked at further. I begin by


examining the role of different actors in encouraging the candidates to stand in the elections to municipal councils. Then, I continue by studying the dimensions of candidate motivation i.e. the most important push and pull factors that motivated the candidates to take a step forward and participate in the elections. After this, I analyse the candidates' beliefs in their chances of election by employing an explanatory model, which takes into consideration candidates' resources.

8.2.1 Sources of encouragement to stand

Party interview data clearly showed that external encouragement played a key role in many candidates' decisions to stand. In the survey, the candidates were asked a question: "Was the decision to stand for this election mostly your own, or did some person/group encourage you to do so?" Fifty-one percent of the native-origin candidates, in contrast to 62 percent of the immigrant-origin candidates, responded that they had made the decision mostly because they had been encouraged by other people. Pearson's chi-square test indicates that the difference between the groups was statistically significant ($\chi^2(1)=8.155$, $p=.004$).

Party interviewees highlighted that encouragement was also important in the recruitment of experienced candidates, namely, those who had experience from prior elections. Figure 8.25 displays the results by origin and prior experience as a candidate. Those who are coded as "novices" reported in the survey that they had never before been candidates in municipal, parliamentary, parish, or cooperative society elections. Experienced candidates, in turn, had at least been candidates in one of the aforementioned elections. As we see, 73 percent of immigrant-origin novice candidates reported that they had made the decision mostly because they were encouraged by other people. The corresponding share among native-origin novice candidates was 62 percent. Among experienced candidates, the shares were approximately 50–50 among both native and immigrant-origin candidates. These results are in line with the results from the party interviews: While the role of external encouragement is of less importance to experienced candidates than it is to novice candidates, it still plays a key role in the decision to stand.

Figure 8.25 The initiative for the decision to stand by origin and prior experience as an electoral candidate. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Novice candidates: $\chi^2(1) = 4.236$, $p = .040$; Experienced candidates: $\chi^2(1) = 0.246$, $p = .620$.

The results in Figure 8.26 concerning gender and origin show that native-origin male candidates were the most unprompted about their candidacy: 56 percent of them made the decision mostly on their own. Pearson's chi-squared test did not confirm a statistical difference between native and immigrant-origin male candidates, for also around one-half of the latter reported that the decision to stand was mostly their own. Women, however, needed more external encouragement than men in both groups. External encouragement was especially important to immigrant-origin women, out of whom 76 percent decided to stand after being encouraged by other people.

Further examination by origin, gender, and prior experience as a candidate in Figure 8.27 reveals that external encouragement was very important to immigrant-origin women regardless of whether they had experience from prior elections: 70 percent of experienced and 78 percent of novice immigrant-origin female candidates decided to stand because they were encouraged by other people. With respect to immigrant-origin men, the gap between the experienced and the novice candidates was the largest: while only one-third (32%) of the novice candidates decided to stand on their own, already two-thirds (65%) out of the experienced did so. These findings mainly illustrate that external support plays an important role, especially in women's political representation and especially in the representation of immigrant-origin women.


Figure 8.26 The initiative for the decision to stand by origin and gender. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: Male by origin: $\chi^2(1)=2.463$, $p=.117$; Female by origin: $\chi^2(1)=7.994$, $p=.005$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(1)=18.975$, $p<.001$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(1)=10.198$, $p=.001$.

Figure 8.27 The initiative for the decision to stand by prior candidate experience, gender, and origin. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$; Male, native-origin: $\chi^2(1)=10.376$, $p=.001$; Male, immigrant-origin: $\chi^2(1)=11.089$, $p=.001$; Female, native-origin: $\chi^2(1)=10.717$, $p=.001$; Female, immigrant-origin: $\chi^2(1)=6.23$, $p=.023$.

Moreover, the survey mapped the extent to which the candidates evaluated the decision to stand easy or difficult. This was measured by using a 5-point scale from “very difficult” to “very easy”. As Figure 8.28 demonstrates, irrespective of their origin, approximately two out of three candidates (62–66%) considered the decision quite or very easy. The main difference was that immigrant-origin candidates were more active to select the alternative in the middle, “neither difficult nor easy”.

Figure 8.28 The perception of ease/difficulty to make the decision to stand by origin. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson’s chi-square test: $\chi^2(4)=8.943$, $p=.063$. When the data is weighted by age and gender $\chi^2(4)=10.2$, $p=.036$.

However, when the responses are examined by prior experience as a candidate, we see that among novice candidates, those with an immigrant background reported less often that the decision was quite or very easy (Figure 8.29). The share of native-origin novice candidates who found the decision to be quite or very easy was 62 percent, whereas among immigrant-origin novice candidates it was 53 percent. The decision was easier for experienced candidates, among whom around 70 percent considered that it was quite or very easy, regardless of their origin.

Figure 8.29 The perception of ease/difficulty to make the decision to stand by origin and prior experience as a candidate. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Experienced candidates: $\chi^2(4) = 7.809$, $p = .099$; Novice candidates: $\chi^2(4) = 9.464$, $p = .050$. When the data is weighted by age and gender, Experienced candidates: $\chi^2(4) = 7.5$, $p = .112$; Novice candidates: $\chi^2(4) = 10.8$, $p = .028$.

Figures 8.30 and 8.31 include gender in the analysis. First, Figure 8.30 shows how immigrant-origin women stand out as a group to whom the decision was least often easy to make. While nearly 70 percent of men, regardless of origin, considered the decision quite or very easy, among immigrant-origin women, the corresponding share was 54 percent. Around one-fourth (21–24%) of female candidates, of both native and immigrant-origin, considered the decision to be quite or very difficult, while the corresponding share among male candidates was 11–16 percent.

Figure 8.30 The perception of ease/difficulty to make the decision to stand by origin and gender. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson’s chi-square test: Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=3.823$, $p=.431$; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=16.741$, $p=.002$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=15.670$, $p=.003$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=14.814$, $p=.005$.

Second, crosstabulation presented in Figure 8.31 stresses how prior candidate experience influenced the perceived ease of the decision to stand between men and women. Mainly, the trend is that the share of “very easy” responses is larger among experienced candidates compared to novices. This is especially notable among immigrant-origin male candidates. Interestingly, however, prior candidate experience did not uniformly make the decision easier for all. Sixteen percent of the experienced immigrant-origin female candidates perceived the decision as being very difficult, while among the novices the corresponding share was only two percent.

Figure 8.31 The perception of ease/difficulty to make the decision to stand by prior electoral experience, origin, and gender. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: Male, native-origin: $\chi^2(4)=12.849$, $p=.012$; Male, immigrant-origin: $\chi^2(4)=13.358$, $p=.010$; Female, native-origin: $\chi^2(4)=6.595$, $p=.159$; Female, immigrant-origin: $\chi^2(4)=10.267$, $p=.036$.

What could explain the above findings? Why was the decision to stand more difficult for women compared to men? One possible and often repeated explanation is that women have more time-consuming responsibilities regarding childcare or taking care of the elderly, or they have much more restricted access than men to various resources that facilitate political participation, such as high-prestige education and jobs as well as recruitment networks. Lack of skills and resources useful in politics is partly explained by the fact that men and women have different types of social networks and resources embedded in these networks (i.e. social capital). This is because men and women choose different occupational careers, take responsibility for different things, and share different norms in social interaction (Erickson 2004).

Furthermore, it could be that family responsibilities have a more negative impact on immigrant-origin women's participation as compared to native-origin women. It was brought up in both the party and candidate interviews that some immigrant-origin women confronted doubts about their ability to combine politics and family, for their place was considered to be in the private rather than public sphere of

society. Some party interviewees described how they had put forth the effort to specifically mobilise immigrant-origin women, but some of the targeted women did not get the necessary support – even permission – from their spouses and community. This type of notion concerned mainly women from Middle Eastern countries, where attitudes regarding women’s and men’s roles in the workforce, family, and public life are perhaps the strictest and, thus, hinder the recruitment of women into elected and appointed office (e.g. Norris 2014).

However, it was not only women but also men whose candidacies were sometimes criticized within their own ethnic group. One Kurdish-origin male candidate described his situation:

C2: I was in such a circle, in which it was not easy to go anywhere, because it was a very religious group. They were pretty fundamentalist, didn’t accept any outsiders intervening. It made it difficult... when I grew up, I started thinking that... goddammit, it can’t be like this, somebody must speak for us, somebody who can slither among them and us. It kind of pushed me forward. My wife is Finnish, she helped me a lot.

Interviewer: Was this the main thing you considered when running in the elections that what would your own...

C2: ...community say? Yeah, it was hard because some said I was a snitch. Some said I am a snake, totally anti-Islam, that I want to be hand in hand with Finnish decision-makers. Some naturally supported me.

Interviewer: (...) So when you said that your own community was divided, when some opposed your candidacy, did they eventually support you or not?

C2: People had very contradictory views. Some were fundamentalists (...) who did not see any other ideology except Islam and its guiding principles. But also these people were divided. (...) Some of them did not like me anymore (...) they said that “goddammit, you cannot integrate that much”, whereas some said that “we need [name of the candidate], because someone has to represent our interests and drive things forward”. Then I was even more surprised when I was opposed by Kurds who said that [by representing a “wrong” party] “you repress workers’ rights (...) you want to corporatize everything” (...) some said that our family has long represented social democrats, how can you [represent another party].

Recognising the important role of external encouragement for candidate motivation and its gendered nature, Figures 8.32–8.34, as well as Table 8.5, show how much male and female candidates of native and immigrant-origin received encouragement to stand from different actors. Figure 8.32 presents the level of encouragement received from the party. Figure 8.33 displays encouragement received from friends, family members, relatives, and their own employers. Figure 8.34 shows how much

encouragement the candidates received from different types of extra-party associations and leisure time groups. Table 8.5 summarises the findings by displaying the order of importance of the different sources of encouragement by origin and gender. Pearson's chi-square tests have been conducted in a way that enables an investigation of differences, first, among male and female candidates by origin, and second, among native and immigrant-origin candidates by gender.


Overall, party members, friends and acquaintances, and party leadership at the municipal level were the three most important sources of encouragement for all four groups. Immigrant-origin candidates considered friends and acquaintances to be the second most important source after party members, whereas for native-origin candidates, friends and acquaintances were the third most important. Native-origin female candidates reported most frequently that they had received encouragement from party members and party leadership at the municipal level. In general, native-origin men received the least external encouragement, which is likely connected to the fact that they also decided to stand most often on their own, as shown at the beginning of this chapter.

Immigrant-origin women reported most frequently encouragement received from friends and acquaintances, spouse/partner, other family members, relatives, and their own employer. Given the major role that third-party encouragement played in their decision to stand, it may be concluded that familial encouragement was the most important to immigrant-origin women. Moreover, a spouse's or partner's role was generally more important to women than it was to men.

Extra-party associations, employers, and leisure-time groups were seldom an important source of encouragement compared to parties, friends, and family. However, it seems as if immigrant-origin men received slightly more encouragement from various associations, and immigrant-origin women from their own employer.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ The results regarding support received from one's own employer remain the same when the examination is limited to respondents under 65 years of age i.e. persons of working age.


Figure 8.32 Encouragement received from the party by gender and origin. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test (p-value in bold when $p < .05$): (1) Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=3.936$, $p=.415$; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=5.617$, $p=.230$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=16.459$, **$p=.002$** ; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=1.056$, $p=.901$; (2) Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=3.359$, $p=.500$; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=7.943$, $p=.094$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=43.250$, **$p<.001$** ; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=8.598$, $p=.072$; (3) Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=7.078$, $p=.132$; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=3.453$, $p=.485$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=22.314$, **$p<.001$** ; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=.726$, $p=.948$.


Figure 8.33 Encouragement received from friends, family members, relatives, and own employer by gender and origin. Crosstabulation



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test (p-value in bold when $p < .05$): (1) Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=13.594$, **$p=.009$** ; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=4.891$, $p=.299$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=6.913$, $p=.141$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=1.003$, $p=.909$; (2) Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=12.763$, **$p=.012$** ; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=12.192$, **$p=.016$** ; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=22.961$, **$p<.001$** ; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=9.471$, $p=.050$; (3) Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=21.492$, **$p<.001$** ; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=11.210$, **$p=.024$** ; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=30.009$, **$p<.001$** ; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=3.653$, $p=.455$; (4) Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=12.499$, **$p=.014$** ; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=2.480$, $p=.648$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=25.496$, **$p<.001$** ; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=3.516$, $p=.476$; (5) Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=9.531$, **$p=.049$** ; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=11.892$, **$p=.018$** ; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=9.053$, $p=.060$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=4.638$, $p=.327$.

Figure 8.34 Encouragement received from associations and leisure time groups by gender and origin. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test (p-value in bold when $p < .05$): (1) Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=6.079$, $p=.193$; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=8.176$, $p=.085$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=9.128$, $p=.058$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=3.527$, $p=.474$; (2) Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=6.716$, $p=.152$; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=4.146$, $p=.387$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=5.220$, $p=.265$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=9.679$, **$p=.046$** ; (3) Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=7.858$, $p=.097$; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=5.943$, $p=.203$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=7.133$, $p=.129$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=7.929$, $p=.094$; (4) Male by origin: $\chi^2(4)=12.209$, **$p=.016$** ; Female by origin: $\chi^2(4)=2.144$, $p=.709$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=4.146$, $p=.387$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(4)=2.910$, $p=.573$.

Table 8.5 The share of “quite or very much” responses regarding sources of encouragement and the order of importance by origin and gender.

	The share of “quite or very much” responses				The order of importance of different sources			
	Native-origin, male	Native-origin, female	Imm.-origin, male	Imm.-origin, female	Native-origin, male	Native-origin, female	Imm.-origin, male	Imm.-origin, female
Party leadership at the municipal level	50 %	57 %	45 %	49 %	1.	2.	3.	3.
Party member(s)	49 %	67 %	57 %	59 %	2.	1.	1.	1.
Friends and acquaintances	38 %	45 %	47 %	51 %	3.	3.	2.	2.
Spouse / partner	21 %	30 %	27 %	46 %	4.	4.	4.	4.
Youth / women’s / senior wing of the party	12 %	20 %	19 %	20 %	5.	7.	6.	7.
Other family members	12 %	23 %	25 %	33 %	6.	5.	5.	5.
Other relatives	10 %	21 %	15 %	24 %	7.	6.	7.	6.
Hobby / leisure-time group	8 %	10 %	15 %	7 %	8.	8.	8.	9.
Business organisations / entrepreneurial organisations	6 %	4 %	8 %	1 %	9.	11.	11.	12.
Trade union / professional association	5 %	9 %	11 %	5 %	10.	9.	10.	11.
Other organisations	4 %	7 %	12 %	5 %	11.	10.	9.	10.
Own employer	1 %	4 %	5 %	13 %	12.	12.	12.	8.

Source: Candidate survey.

8.2.2 Dimensions of motivation

In the survey, the candidates were asked to evaluate the importance of 12 pre-formulated reasons for their decision to become a candidate on a 5-point scale from “not at all important” to “very important”. These may be placed under the following five categories (cf. Norris & Lovenduski 1995: 168–169):

1) Public service role

Desire to help people

Fulfilling civic duty

2) One or more single issues

Desire to influence the decision on a singular issue in the municipality

Desire to influence the decision on multiple issues in the municipality

3) Loyalty to the party/political group and its ideology

Implementing the political values of the respondent's party/political group

Desire to work for the party/constituency association

Electoral success of the respondent's party/political group

The need to fill the party's candidate list

4) Personal utility/ambition

Acquiring skills/knowledge needed in working life

Gaining experience for more demanding political tasks

Gaining a position in the municipal committee or some other position of responsibility


5) Representation of a social group

Desire to promote the interests of the social group the respondent represents

The analyses in this chapter examine the importance that native and immigrant-origin candidates attached to the above motivational dimensions. The results show, first, that fulfilling a public service role was clearly more important to immigrant-origin candidates than it was to native-origin candidates (Figure 8.35). Seventy-one percent of the immigrant-origin candidates reported that a desire to help people was

very important to their decision to become a candidate, while this was the case for half (53%) of the native-origin candidates. Forty-four percent of immigrant-origin candidates considered fulfilling civic duty to be a very important motivator. The corresponding share among the native candidates was one out of five (21%).

Figure 8.35 Dimensions of candidate motivation: public service role. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(4) = 21.731$, $p < .001$; (2) $\chi^2(4) = 55.086$, $p < .001$.

The above findings are likely linked to immigrant-origin candidates being much more exposed to expectations of being a “good” or “deserving citizen”, as immigrants’ deservingness with respect to social welfare and political rights is much more conditional in the public debate compared to native citizens (van Oorschot 2006). Therefore, by standing as a candidate, a person with an immigrant background may prove to himself or herself and others that he or she contributes to the common good. At least this aspect was brought up in the candidate interviews:

C4: I was grateful for being admitted and granted a residence permit. I thought that, okay, I was given all these opportunities, so somehow, I need to give back to Finnish society. Then I thought how. Okay, first, I should provide for me and my family. Second, I could become an active member of society and belong somewhere.

C11: To give an example, Zlatan Ibrahimovic has mentioned how he is not considered similarly Swedish as someone with a surname Svensson (...) although he has done so much to put Sweden on the world map. How many times has he been selected as the

best football player of Sweden? 11 or 12 times? He has also been at the top of multiple score lists across Europe. Although he has advertised Sweden worldwide, he is treated differently compared to Swedish-born Swedes. All this even though he has been born in Sweden, he just has roots elsewhere. [Ibrahimovic] sets an example that if you try hard enough, you are accepted by society. But you need to give the society something. You need to be the ideal citizen to be accepted. Not everybody succeeds in the same way [as Ibrahimovic], and I don't know if I have succeeded because I was elected to the council, but I have shown that one can succeed even if he or she is different and of foreign origin. If you do things right, you can succeed. This has motivated me.

In a similar vein, another candidate stated that his main motivation was to send a message to Finnish society:

C5: I only wanted to take part and send a message to Finnish people that we are here, that we care about common affairs. But I don't want to go further. I draw my line in municipal elections.

Interviewer: So, you thought that you were sending a message?

C5: Yeah, to the society, that this is also our business, you make decisions on our lives and we also want to be part of the decision-making.


A third candidate brought up yet another aspect that relates to candidacy as a civic duty. He also belonged to an ethnic minority in his country of origin and was very disappointed in the level of corruption and oppression that he had experienced there. He perceived Finnish society to be the very opposite, and he wanted to keep it that way:

Interviewer: So how about when you and your family (...) settled in Finland, how did you become interested in politics in [name of the municipality]?

C10: Now you're pushing me in a hard field. I have to choose the words correctly. The foreign people who live in Finland, mostly... OK, there are that kind of guys, highly educated, holding a Canadian citizenship even, but this is maybe one or two percent of the foreigners living in Finland. The rest of it... we have a huge issue here. Many do not believe in democracy. They do not share the same values. They do not agree on many cultural topics, such as the equality between men and women. (...) That scares me. That's one of my motivation behind why I participate. I wanted to prove, "dude, the best thing you have is democracy". Even though I do not agree with you, with full of my power, I will support you are gonna be able to speak what you are thinking. I want this society to stay in peace. I had a lot of trouble already in the home I left. Why should I get the same problem in the second home?

Figure 8.36 displays the perceived importance of a possibility of influencing a singular issue or multiple issues in one's own municipality. It shows that influencing multiple issues was a more important motivator, and regarding this aspect, native and immigrant-origin candidates were no different. However, immigrant-origin candidates seem to have mobilised more frequently behind a single issue. Forty-one percent of them considered this to be very important as compared to 24 percent among native-origin candidates. It could be speculated that this finding is related to immigrant-origin candidates with less experience in politics.

Figure 8.36 Dimensions of candidate motivation: Single issue versus multiple issues. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(4) = 24.613$, $p < .001$; (2) $\chi^2(4) = 4.827$, $p = .305$.

Figure 8.37 shows that those immigrant-origin candidates who did not have any prior experience as a candidate (i.e. novices) indicated more frequently than experienced candidates that single issues were quite or very important. However, a Pearson's chi-square test does not suggest that the difference would be statistically significant.

Figure 8.37 The importance of influencing a single issue by origin and prior experience as a candidate. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Native-origin: $\chi^2(4)=4.7$, $p=.319$; Immigrant-origin $\chi^2(4)=3.9$, $p=.420$.

Another interesting aspect is the extent to which immigrant-origin candidates felt loyalty to their party and its ideology. Figure 8.38 shows no differences between native and immigrant-origin candidates, notwithstanding that immigrant-origin candidates indicated more often than their native-origin counterparts that the need to fill the party's candidate list was not at all important to them.

As has been emphasized several times in this study, the reality in most Finnish municipalities is that parties struggle to top up their candidate lists, because each party is allowed to nominate 1.5 times as many candidates as there are seats in the council. Yet the incentive for full lists is high because every vote counts when the council seats are allocated to parties and constituency associations after the elections. Therefore, there is a demand for so-called “top-up candidates”, who serve to pull in votes but who do not necessarily seriously aim to achieve election (Arter 2013: 103; Kuitunen 2000: 101; Paloheimo 2007: 333–334). Top-up candidates are useful to parties from the perspective of balanced lists. Although some candidates do not aspire to be elected, they can still attract voters who identify with their demographic or occupational background, for instance.

Figure 8.38 Dimensions of candidate motivation: Loyalty to the party/group and its ideology. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(4) = 3.749$, $p = .441$; (2) $\chi^2(4) = 2.185$, $p = .702$; (3) $\chi^2(4) = 1.915$, $p = .751$; (4) $\chi^2(4) = 13.963$, $p = .007$.

Interviews with parties and candidates conducted for this study clearly show that there exist both *voluntary* and *involuntary top-up candidacies*. In Chapter 7.3, I showed how both native and immigrant-origin candidates evaluated that, on average, the most important reason for their party to nominate them is that the party needed candidates for the elections. While this is not an issue for those “loyal workhorses” who put the interests of their party above their personal interests, it leaves a legacy of bitterness among those who entered the elections with a belief that the party would support their campaign and that they would be given more opportunities to represent the party in different platforms. Nearly all interviewed candidates emphasized that it takes a lot of intra and inter-party networking before one can

achieve recognition within a party organisation. Some interviewees perceived that their immigration background had put them in an unequal position within the party. One of the candidates described their situation as follows:

C3: I got quite many votes as a first-timer (...) According to the rules, positions [of responsibility] are allocated according to the number of [personal] votes. I didn't get a position that would've belonged to me based on my personal votes because the positions were given to insiders. [The interviewee gives an example how another candidate got the position and the interviewee was appointed deputy although the interviewee got seven times more votes than the other candidate.] They have their own walled garden and practices. I have always wondered, and I still do, that we foreigners are not invited into politics, I mean actual politics. Instead, we are only wanted as collectors of votes. Then, if we come, we are not allowed access to real decision-making.

Another candidate commented on the same topic:

Interviewer: Is it clear that if one gets a lot of [personal] votes and succeeds in municipal elections, then one gets a position of responsibility?

C1: It is not always like this. I know that some who have gained less votes are given positions. Also, oftentimes when a party organises electoral events and it is decided who is sent there as a representative, it is said that we do not trust immigrant-origin politicians because we do not know them. To my opinion, they should be given an opportunity because if you don't get experience and you never get to try, you can never get forward. A person must be given opportunities.

Table 8.6 shows that “the loyal workhorses”, who feel a sense of duty instead of necessarily aspiring to a career in politics, are more often senior members of the party. One-Way ANOVA confirms that the candidates' average age differs between the groups regarding the perceived importance attached to the need to fill the party's candidate list.

Table 8.6 Mean age and standard deviation with respect to the perceived importance of the need to fill the party's candidate list.

	Mean age	(SD)	(N)
Not at all important	44.2	(11.8)	(310)
Not very important	45.2	(12.0)	(211)
Somewhat important	47.1	(12.0)	(165)
Quite important	48.4	(12.2)	(142)
Very important	48.5	(11.7)	(133)


Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: One-way ANOVA: $F(4, 956) = 5.131, p < 0.001$.

Figure 8.39 investigates candidates' individual aspirations. It shows, first, that immigrant-origin candidates perceived much more frequently that a candidacy may be beneficial in acquiring skills and knowledge needed outside politics, namely, in working life. Half of them (51%) considered this quite or very important, while the corresponding share among native-origin candidates was one out of five (21%). This shows how political activity can play an important role in the societal integration of immigrants, and that political integration is not the last out of the sequential steps towards integration. Immigrants' integration in society is a multidimensional phenomenon, in which success in other dimensions is likely to have benefits in the other.

Immigrant-origin candidates were also much more motivated by the opportunity to gain experience for more demanding political tasks (Figure 8.39), which may indicate that immigrant-origin candidates were less often top-up candidates, at least voluntarily. With respect to a goal of gaining a position in the municipal committee or some other position of responsibility, there were no differences between the groups: Half or nearly half (45–50%) considered it quite or very important.

Figure 8.39 Dimensions of candidate motivation: Personal utility and ambition. Crosstabulation.




Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; (1) $\chi^2(4) = 83.650, p < .001$; (2) $\chi^2(4) = 51.219, p < .001$; (3) $\chi^2(4) = 5.540, p = .236$. The findings regarding the motivation "Acquiring skills/knowledge needed in working life" are the same when the examination is limited to respondents under 65 years of age i.e. persons of working age.

Figure 8.40 studies the perceived importance of representing a social group. In both groups, four out of five considered it quite or very important, and around half thought it was very important. This question does not identify which social groups in particular the candidates had in mind when answering the question.

Figure 8.40 Dimensions of candidate motivation: desire to promote the interests of the social group the candidate represents.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; $\chi^2(4) = 3.051, p = .549$.

In the interviews, however, several immigrant-origin candidates claimed that one major reason for immigrants to abstain from voting is the lack of immigrant and/or co-ethnic candidates. They considered that immigrant-origin voters do not expect native-origin candidates to represent their interests. The interviewees were asked about the extent to which they got support from persons of the same ethnic background or persons of immigrant origin. The answers varied a lot. Some had close ties to co-ethnics and/or other immigrants and brought up how their community was an important push factor in their decision to stand in the elections. Some, in turn, mentioned how their personal network covered mostly native Finns, and the decision to stand as a candidate had nothing to do with the representation of minority interests. One of the candidates believed that representing only one social group is not fruitful even if one resides in a municipality where access to the council is possible with co-ethnics' or minorities' votes:

C11: I dare say that probably quite many foreign-origin persons in this town might have voted for me because they probably feel that because I have moved from elsewhere I could help them or promote their interests even though we have nothing more in common than foreign background.

Interviewer: But in your campaign you did not target foreign-origin voters?

C11: No, but I know some others who did. For instance, in [the name of the municipality], there was one candidate representing the Left Alliance who – if I recall correctly – made it to some committee. This person was very active in advertising him/herself in Facebook groups for people from [the country of birth of the interviewee] who live in Finland. By no means do I want to do the same. I want to represent all the local residents. I don't want to represent only one group. Perhaps if I lived in a large city, maybe then if I knew that there were e.g. 20,000 foreign-origin residents (...) to whom I could target my campaign and gain their votes, maybe I would do so. But not in [the name of the interviewee's municipality]. I believe I belong for everybody (...) If you only target co-ethnics, your field of view remains quite narrow. Then, if you enter municipal council or a committee, others may feel that you only represent them [co-ethnics] and not the interests of all residents (...) To my opinion, a councillor cannot only represent the interests of one group or party but the interests of all residents. We all live in this town.

Theoretical literature explicitly argues that to be successful under a personalised voting system, a candidate needs strong personal support; he or she must cultivate a personal reputation and a connection to voters, which is one reason why a candidate might take a role as guardian of a specific interest group (Thomassen & Esaiasson, 2006; von Schoultz & Wass 2016). The above quote connects well with one of the classical questions in the literature of representation, namely, the focus of representation (Eulau et al. 1959; Pitkin 1967): Should an elected representative

represent only her or his own voters or interest groups, or should she or he represent residents or citizens of the whole municipality or nation? The opinion of the above-quoted interviewee was that representatives' cooperation in municipal positions of trust does not work well if the representative is seen to represent only narrow social groups.

Mostly, the interviewed candidates considered that their party did not force them to act as representatives of immigrant-origin residents nor experts in immigration issues. However, this was not always the case, as one of the interviewees described:

C2: I'm hoping that my party would not turn to me always in issues related to immigration. They think that my knowledge covers only immigration and nothing else. I think it's sad. (...) They don't even consider me into other positions of responsibility. However, they have woken up now that I have begun to react. (...) Now they appreciate me more.

In the party interviews, some interviewees noted that it is "only natural" that candidates' skills and knowledge are also utilised in the sense that if an immigrant-origin candidate is known to have good connections in an ethnic minority community, she or he is encouraged to capitalise on these connections. Other external forces were influencing immigrant-origin candidates' representational roles. For instance, one of the candidates noted that journalists were interested in his opinions only when he wrote about immigrants and immigration. His writings on other topics were not published in the local newspaper. However, several interviewees had voluntarily taken the roles of "ethnic candidates" because it felt natural and was something that drove them:

C10: In the 2012 election, there were altogether... [in] Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa... I think five or six Kurdish candidates. But the next elections in 2017, guess what? It's become eleven. So, my job wasn't to be elected but to make them see "hey, look, there is light, there is exit, you're living here, pay attention". That's more important you now. That's why I feel successful and relieved. I did my job.

C1: I am especially interested in employment and multiculturalism, that people are seen as human beings, that they are not seen as objects but as active players. Our minorities have multiple resources that benefit the vitality of [the name of the municipality]. (...) I have a long experience in employment matters, and I know many immigrant-origin persons. I see how their resources are wasted. They need to be utilised.

In the survey, the candidates were asked, with an open-ended question, which groups they primarily considered to represent as a candidate. The respondents were asked

to list the five most important groups in order. The response rate to this question was low: Only 138 out of 204 foreign language-speaking candidates responded to the question. However, it is interesting to see the extent to which the respondents explicitly mentioned ethnic minorities or immigrants as one important group. As it turns out, 41 percent of the 138 respondents did so. It could be expected that this type of representative claim would be more common among those candidates who resided in municipalities with a high share of the foreign-origin population. Indeed, this was the case in the sample, but Pearson’s chi-squared test does not confirm this association in the population (Table 8.7).

Table 8.7 Immigrant-origin candidates’ representative claims and the share of foreign-origin population in the municipality in 2017. Crosstabulation (%).

	Does not claim to represent immigrants	Claims to represent immigrants	Total	(N)
0–3.9%	68	32	100	(53)
4% or more	54	46	100	(85)

Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: In 2017, there were 17 municipalities, in which the share of the foreign-origin population was 7 percent or higher, 47 municipalities with 4–6.9 percent of foreign-origin residents, and 231 municipalities with less than 4 percent of foreign-origin residents. Pearson’s chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; $\chi^2(1) = 2.6$, $p = .108$.

Finally, Table 8.8 summarizes the perceived importance attached to the various reasons to stand as a candidate by classifying the shares of respondents in the categories “quite or very important”. This shows that the order of importance of the items was not the same between the groups. The three most important motivations were the same, although not in the same order. There were few items in which the difference between the groups was distinctive. With respect to fulfilling a civic duty, the difference between the groups is 23 percentage points. As already noted, immigrant-origin candidates were also more motivated by a desire to influence the decision on a singular issue in the municipality. Here, the difference is 15 percentage points. The largest difference (30 percentage points) concerns the motivation of acquiring skills and knowledge needed in working life, which was clearly more important to immigrant than native-origin candidates. Finally, immigrant-origin candidates considered a chance to accumulate experience for more demanding

political tasks to be a much more important reason for their candidacy, the difference being 13 percentage points.

Overall, immigrant-origin candidates more frequently used the alternatives “quite or very important”. Native-origin candidates indicated only three items on the list as being more often important compared to immigrant-origin candidates. These were the electoral success of one’s own party/group, implementing the political values of one’s own party/group, and a desire to work for the party/constituency association. This finding is probably linked to the fact that among native-origin candidates, there are more party members, especially long-term members (as shown in Chapter 8.1.2).

Table 8.8 The sum of the “quite or very important” responses regarding dimensions of candidate motivation and their order of importance by origin.

	Native-origin	Immigrant-origin	Native-origin	Immigrant-origin
Desire to help people	82 %	92 %	2	1
Desire to influence the decision on multiple issues in the municipality	85 %	88 %	1	2
Desire to promote the interests of the social group the respondent represents	78 %	79 %	3	3
Fulfilling civic duty	49 %	72 %	7	4
Electoral success of own party/political group	75 %	70 %	4	5
Desire to influence the decision on a singular issue in the municipality	49 %	64 %	8	6
Implementing the political values of own party/political group	58 %	56 %	5	7
Desire to work for the party/constituency association	55 %	53 %	6	8
Acquiring skills/knowledge needed in working life	21 %	51 %	11	9
Gaining a position in the municipal committee or some other position of responsibility	45 %	50 %	9	10
Gaining experience for more demanding political tasks	21 %	44 %	12	11
The need to fill the party’s candidate list	30 %	32 %	10	12

Source: Candidate survey.

8.2.3 Belief in chances of election

Belief in one's own chances of being elected is an important aspect of candidate motivation. Investing time, effort, and money into a campaign is much more meaningful if one contests elections with some expected chances of success, be it maximising personal votes or votes for one's party. While chances of election are dependent on subjective personal and social resources that can be acquired and cultivated, they also depend on sociodemographic characteristics, such as sex, age, or ethnic background, that cannot be changed. Because voters rely heavily on candidates' objective characteristics in their vote choice, the candidates are not in the same position even if they had an equal amount of personal and social resources.

Some of the interviewed immigrant-origin candidates explicitly brought up how they could not expect support from native-Finns due to their minority background. One of the candidates, residing in a mid-sized town, described his situation as follows:

Interviewer: Who voted for you in the municipal elections?

C5: Immigrants. Perhaps a couple Finns, but not more. To my opinion, if I were a Finn, I would've [gotten a lot more votes] (...) Already at the age of 19 I was an entrepreneur, I have succeeded and worked hard, I have brought a lot of tax revenues to Finland. (...) But who votes for me? In [the name of the municipality] no one. (...) Those who vote immigrants, they are not supporters of the National Coalition. They support the Greens or the SDP, but not the National Coalition. (...) I got into politics, municipal elections, but I never even made it to the council. I know it for sure that Finns won't vote for me, that I know. This is a village, this is not yet a city, [the name of the municipality] is not like Tampere or Helsinki or Jyväskylä. Here everyone votes for their own acquaintances and friends. While they greet us, talk with us, deep down they don't want us.

While the candidate specifically states that an ethnic minority background was a disadvantage, the candidate also refers to two contextual level factors that overrode the candidate's personal accomplishments. The candidate lives in a town in which the population structure does not enable electoral success through the mobilization of an ethnic minority vote. Election would require support from the majority as well. Further, the interviewee expected the party that s/he represented to be a disadvantage from his/her perspective, because those native-origin voters who would be willing to vote for an immigrant would probably not consider the candidate's party.

However, other types of stories emerged as well. Another immigrant-origin candidate from a smaller town considered being perceived as “one of us” after residing in the same town for nearly 30 years:

C11: When we came to Finland, we were the only refugees in [the name of the municipality]. Of course, we stood out and were in the focus of attention after being in the local media. But when you are strongly present in everyday life and have lived in the town for such a long time, maybe people already see you as one of them.

Nevertheless, the same candidate described the consequences of having a foreign name in the local community:

C11: When I meet new people, they do not necessarily recognise my foreign background because I speak fluent Finnish and my skin-color does not differ much from the native population. But when I tell my name some may startle (...) When Josefina Sipinen [the Finnish name of the interviewer] stands as a candidate, everyone knows that you are Sipinen, that you are of native origin. They [voters] do not have to think of what kind of person you are and what kind of culture you have. They do not think about your skin colour if they do not see your photo. In turn, when someone like me presents oneself, the situation is different. Of course, when you talk with people, they see that you are no different.

Indeed, one of the main factors that differentiate native and immigrant-origin candidates is exposure to racist and hostile attitudes and behavior, and its effect on one’s desire to become a political representative. Some of the interviewees openly spoke of hate speech and prejudiced attitudes, which had influenced their decision to stand as candidates:

C4: Back then, there was one councillor who was very much against immigration and also very loud. I was thinking, if I get elected, can I tolerate and stand up to this person?

C3: A while ago, there was a war between the countries [Finland and Russia]. It leaves eternal scars, doesn’t it? Furthermore, Finns are not pleased with Russian politics (...) What is common to all Finns is [the idea of] “ryssä” [a pejorative term for a Russian]. It is in their genes. It cannot be removed like that. (...) I have been active, even when I had no knowledge of the [Finnish] language, and people were and are very kind to me (...) but I know based on personal experience that if you have a disagreement with a native Finn, then you are a “ryssä”.

Some interviewees said that they had not personally been discriminated against. However, nearly all spoke of witnessing racist and hostile attitudes and behaviour towards other immigrants or children of immigrant parents:

C11: As a child, a friend of mine experienced racism much more than I did. It was not physical but more psychological. They were calling my friend “ryssä” [pejorative word for a Russian]. Nobody has ever called me “a fucking refugee” or asked, “what are you doing here?”. I can say with my hand on my heart that nobody has ever done that when I was a child or as an adult. However, when they decided to place the reception centre for asylum seekers here in [the name of the municipality], one person asked me of my opinion about refugees. I then asked, “well what should I think, they are people like the rest of us?”. This person then told me that s/he does not like them but that s/he thinks that I am a good person and patted me on my back. (...) I was amazed about the comment. Why [this person thinks] others are bad, but I am good without even seeing these people? (...) People are so prejudiced.

C5: For example, there was an African family, and their six or seven-year-old son was bullied at school so that he no longer wanted to go there. Little kids who don't understand much about things had told him that “you are shit, we'll put you into toilet bowl and flush you down (...) you'll go to down to drain” (...) It made me think. Furthermore, last year, I asked my son “how are things at school?”. (...) I know all the teachers and principals (...) and most people in [the name of the municipality] know me. I knew my son had a problem at school and I tried to get the words out of him. He didn't want to tell me. Eventually he exploded and told what the others had done to him. Then I asked him to tell the names of the bullies. He didn't want to give the names. I guessed who they were and contacted the teacher. But he is only one child. I can tell you that 80 percent of [immigrant-origin children] experience the same. Even if you speak fluent Finnish, no matter what you do (...) Many children tell my son that “you live on social benefits” (...) These messages come from their families. All immigrant families know about these types of problems. That's why they are not interested in politics. I think that if there were more immigrants in politics, Finland would be much better off. When immigrants take part in society and labour market, everywhere, Finland will be better off. (...) Racism is so hard inside. It prevents immigrants from participating in politics.

Interviewer: And that is why it is so important that someone sets an example that it is possible. Do you think you have set an example?

C5: Yes, I have. That is the reason I went into politics.

A few candidates also referred to direct physical threats:

C2: I never bring my family into politics. Never. Because I have been threatened so many times. (...) I am not going to become afraid of the threateners, but still, I don't want my family to get involved. I have people who will back me up if necessary. They come with me to certain places. (...) You need a shield around you because if you are not a Finn, even your fellow party members may say that “s/he is not a Finn, the fuck does s/he think s/he can make decisions for me in my own country” (...) This is something you notice on weekends when you go out. (...) When a Finn gets drunk, that's when you see how difficult or easy it is to be an immigrant in politics. As I said,

you need a thick shield. (...) You must know that... I will never become a Finn. Or I will never be accepted as a Finn. (...) Some Finns say that “you speak fluent Finnish, and, therefore, it is impossible to think that you are [a foreigner]”. This ostensibly makes prejudice to disappear. But then there are those Finns.


In the candidate interviews, one’s own chances of election were considered several times against the background of only a few co-ethnic councillors having been elected previously or the willingness of co-ethnics or other immigrant minorities to vote for them:

C3: I thought that Russian speakers are very passive. No one [of the Russian speakers] has been in [Finnish] politics, I mean other than local elections. It made me think that perhaps I shouldn’t even try.

C4: I was very unsure [about my chances] when I went into politics, I mean [about] the decision to stand as a candidate. There weren’t many Somalis [in Finland at the time] and I knew that many were recent arrivals. Most of them were also unemployed. They did not want someone to stand out. There was some jealousy and also disagreements about the consequences of the war [in Somalia]. So, I thought whether the Somalis would vote for me. I had the impression that maybe they would, but that I wouldn’t get so many votes that I would make it to the council. How about the Finns then? It is possible that someone with a foreign background is interested [in local affairs].

Next, candidates’ beliefs in their chances of being elected are investigated with the candidate survey data. The survey included the following question: “What do you think of your chances of being elected?” The respondents answered the question on a 4-point scale, which included the alternatives (1) “I am certain I will get elected”; (2) “I am fairly certain I will get elected”; (3) “I am fairly certain I won’t get elected”; and (4) “I am certain I won’t get elected”. Upon a first glance at Figure 8.41, it seems as if immigrant-origin candidates were slightly more optimistic about their chances of election. However, Pearson’s chi-square test does not confirm a statistically significant difference between the groups. Further examination shows that gender played a major role regarding confidence in one’s own chances of gaining a seat: Male candidates were more confident than female candidates in both groups, although the gender gap was not significant among immigrant-origin candidates.

Figure 8.41 Beliefs in own chances of election by origin and gender.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; Origin: $\chi^2(3) = 4.543$, $p = .209$; Male by origin: $\chi^2(3) = 2.120$, $p = .548$; Female by origin: $\chi^2(3) = 2.314$, $p = .510$; Native-origin by gender: $\chi^2(3) = 22.413$, $p < .001$; Immigrant-origin by gender: $\chi^2(3) = 5.719$, $p = .126$.

When the alternatives “I am certain/fairly certain I will get elected” are given a value of 1 and the alternatives “I am certain/fairly certain I won't get elected” a value of 0, we get a binomial dependent variable that can be examined using logistic regression analysis. Independent variables that are expected to influence beliefs in election concern candidates' sociodemographic and socioeconomic background, political and civic experience, social support, and the municipal-level political opportunity structure, all of which have been examined separately in the previous chapters, and all of which have been shown to influence candidates' true chances of election in Finland (e.g. Kestilä-Kekkonen et al. 2020; Kuitunen 2000: 140–155; Ruostetsaari & Mattila 2002; Ruostetsaari 1999).

Variables concerning candidates' sociodemographic and socioeconomic background (SES) include *origin, gender, age, level of education, and years lived in municipality*. The education variable is measured by completed years of education, and it is coded into three categories: 1–9 years of education is coded as “primary level”, 10–12 years as “secondary level”, and over 12 years as “tertiary level”. As discussed in Chapter 6.2, the validity of the education variable is not robust because a large share of the immigrant-origin respondents had attended school mainly in some other country than Finland. Due to differing education systems, it is not certain that increasing

years of completed education results in corresponding outcomes with respect to the level of education. One might have studied longer yet still not reached tertiary-level education. The number of years lived in the municipality is included because it is an indicator of the time a candidate has had to formulate networks and build name recognition in the local community.

Political and civic experience is measured, first, by looking at candidates' *experience from prior elections*, which is a binomial variable indicating whether the respondent has been a candidate in prior representative elections, including municipal, parliamentary, parish, or cooperative society elections (an experienced candidate), or whether the candidate has no such experience (a novice candidate). The second variable, *experience from municipal positions of responsibility*, is formulated by examining whether a candidate was a member or deputy member of a municipal council (in Finnish: *kunnanvaltuusto*), municipal executive board (*kunnanhallitus*), municipal committee (*lautakunta*), municipal management board (*johtokunta*), joint municipal board (*kauntayhtymän hallitus*), and/or board in a municipally owned company/business (*kunnan yhtiön/liikelaitoksen hallitus*) at the time of the 2017 municipal elections. If the candidate was not currently working in any municipal position of responsibility, s/he was coded into category one. If the candidate was working in one or two positions, s/he was coded into category two. All who were working in three or more positions were coded into category three. Municipal positions of responsibility should have provided the candidates with an “incumbency advantage”: In communication with voters, they were able to refer to their incumbency as proof of their political competence and, thus, gain recognition and support. Third, civic experience is measured with the Associational Involvement Diversity Index introduced in Chapter 8.1.1. The index included in the logistic regression model ranges between 0–14, taking into account *current involvement in different types of non-political organisations* (such as sports clubs or immigrant associations). Here, only current involvement is considered, in contrast to both past and current involvement, because it is assumed that the former is more relevant to candidates' personal campaigns and their beliefs about how many votes they can mobilise.

Four variables measure candidates' social support. First is a binomial variable indicating whether or not a candidate had a *personal campaign team*. The second is the Resource Access Index introduced in Chapter 8.1.6, which measures candidates' *access to campaign-relevant resources* via party and personal social networks. The index ranges between zero (no access to resources) and six (access to all resources on a predetermined list, including e.g. help with organizing a campaign). The level of

encouragement the candidates received is measured by formulating two indices. The first measures *party support* and is a combination of encouragement received from party leadership at the municipal level and from party member(s). The second index combines *support received from friends, family, and relatives*. Support from a spouse is not included in the index because not all candidates were married or in a relationship. Both indices are coded into three categories as follows: The first category indicates that a candidate did not receive any encouragement from the aforementioned actors. The second category is a combination of the response categories “not very much” and “somewhat”. The third category combines the categories “quite much” and “very much”.

The model also considers the municipal-level political opportunity structure. The first municipal-level variable is *the ratio of candidates per council seat*, which is calculated by dividing the number of candidates in the municipality by the number of seats on the municipal council. As has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, the level of competitiveness of the elections and, thus, individual chances of election varied widely depending on the size of the municipality. In small municipalities, there were significantly fewer competitors for seats than in large municipalities. The second contextual variable is *party's share of votes in municipality*, which measures the political dominance of a candidate's party. As illustrated in Chapter 3.3, parties' support levels and their majority–minority positions differ between municipalities, which significantly affects their candidates' chances of election.

Table 8.9 presents the results of a logistic regression, which examines whether native and immigrant-origin candidates' beliefs in election differed after controlling their candidate resources. The results are presented in odd ratios. The independent variables were entered into the model stepwise in blocks. Model 1 includes only the origin variable, which is not significant. However, as Model 2 shows, the origin variable becomes significant after controlling for other SES variables and suggests that immigrant-origin candidates were, on average, more confident about their chances of election. This was also true for those who had lived longer in the municipality where they were standing as candidates. Being a female, in turn, reduced the level of confidence. Scholars have explained this gender gap – women are less confident in their chances of success in the political arena – as the result of long-standing patterns of traditional socialisation that associate men with the public realm and women with the private (Lawless & Fox 2005: 11). This study suggests that while these beliefs may prevent women from standing as candidates in the first place, they seem to also be characteristic to women who have taken the first step forward and decided to run as candidates.

Model 3 introduces variables on a candidate's political and civic experience. After these variables are included, the origin and gender variables remain significant, but the variable "years lived in municipality" does not. Model 3 shows that those who were currently members or deputy members of municipal positions of trust had significantly more confidence in their chances of election. Also, the more positions a candidate was occupying, the more confident he or she was. The variable on associational involvement suggests that the more involved a candidate was in different types of associations, the more he or she believed in being elected. In Model 3, the age variable becomes significant and suggests that elder candidates were less confident in their chances of election as compared to younger candidates.

Model 4 also considers the social support variables. What we see is that current positions of responsibility, as well as associational involvement, are still important contributors regarding beliefs in election. However, age is no longer a significant variable. With respect to social support, having a personal campaign team significantly increases beliefs in election, as does encouragement received from friends and family. Differences regarding origin and gender remain significant.

Finally, Model 5 shows the full model with political opportunity structure variables. What is found is that, indeed, the more competition there was for seats, the less confident the candidates were about their election. A party's increasing vote share, in turn, does not significantly increase beliefs in election. Findings regarding origin and gender are still significant, with immigrant-origin candidates being more confident than natives and male candidates being more confident than females. The finding on the role of current municipal positions of responsibility weakens a bit, as those who were occupying one or two positions are no longer significantly more confident than those without positions. Those with three or more positions remain significantly more confident. The Resource Access Index variable becomes statistically significant, meaning that the more campaign-relevant resources a candidate had access to, the more confident he or she was. The party support variable becomes significant, but the results are not what is expected, as the odd ratio below 1 suggests that those who received support from their party were less confident in their election. This finding is probably related to the top-up candidacy phenomenon: Several candidates whom the parties encouraged to stand probably acknowledged that the parties did so only because they needed candidates for the election and not because they expected these candidates to realistically compete for seats. Support from friends and family, in turn, enhances confidence in being elected.

Table 8.9 Explaining candidates' beliefs in election. Results of a logistic regression analysis. Odd ratios and standard errors.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)
Origin					
Immigrant-origin (ref. native-origin)	1.19 (.16)	1.54 (.18) *	1.90 (.19) **	1.66 (.19) *	1.86 (.20) **
SES and length of residence					
Female (ref. male)		.62 (.13) ***	.56 (.14) ***	.49 (.14) ***	.46 (.15) *
Age (in years)		1.00 (.01)	.99 (.01) *	.99 (.01)	.99 (.01)
Years of education completed (ref. primary / 1–9 years)					
Secondary / 1–12 years		1.55 (.27)	1.28 (.29)	1.29 (.3)	1.28 (.31)
Tertiary / 12 < years		1.29 (.28)	.97 (.30)	1.00 (.31)	1.09 (.32)
Years lived in municipality		1.02 (.00) ***	1.01 (.01)	1.01 (.01)	1.01 (.01)
Political and civic experience					
Novice candidate (ref. experienced candidate)			.98 (.18)	.94 (.19)	.88 (.19)
Current positions of responsibility in municipality (ref. no positions of responsibility)					
1–2 positions			1.55 (.18) *	1.53 (.18) *	1.38 (.19)
3 or more positions			7.98 (.22) ***	7.07 (.22) ***	5.89 (.23) ***
Associational Involvement Diversity Index (0–14)			1.17 (.05) **	1.12 (.05) *	1.13 (.05) *
Social support					
Has a campaign team (ref. no team)				1.74 (.19) **	1.99 (.19) ***
Resource Access Index (0–6)				1.07 (.04)	1.10 (.05) *
Party support (ref. "Not at all")					
"Not very much/Somewhat"				.63 (.24)	.62 (.25) *
"Quite much/Very much"				.92 (.24)	.88 (.25)
Support from friends and family (ref. "Not at all")					
"Not very much/Somewhat"				1.55 (.18) *	1.44 (.19)
"Quite much/Very much"				2.45 (.24) ***	2.28 (.25) **
Political opportunity structure					
Candidates per council seat ratio					.87 (.03) ***
Party's share of votes in municipality					1.01 (.01)
Constant	.57 (.07) ***	.37 (.36) **	.44 (.43)	.28 (.51) *	.53 (.56)
N	1171	1171	1171	1171	1171
Pseudo R ² (Nagelkerke)	.00	.05	.22	.26	.30

Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Next, a similar logistic regression model is run separately among native and immigrant-origin candidates to see whether the same variables explain beliefs in elections in both groups. The analyses differ slightly, as the logistic regression model that examines immigrant-origin candidates' beliefs in election also considers the *share of foreign language-speaking population in municipality*, which takes into consideration the extent to which immigrant-origin candidates were able to mobilise a (co-)ethnic vote. The results are presented in Table 8.10.

The results show, first, that women were significantly less confident in their election in both groups. Second, current positions of responsibility had a significant effect among native-origin candidates but less so among immigrant-origin candidates. This is perhaps related to the fact that immigrant-origin candidates had significantly less experience in positions of responsibility compared to natives, as shown in Chapter 8.1.2. With respect to social support, having a personal campaign team increased confidence in election in both groups. The Resource Access Index had a significant and positive effect only among natives. Support from friends and family had a significant and positive effect in both groups, except that among immigrants, the difference from the reference group was significant only when the candidates were encouraged "quite or very much". Contextual variables had no significant effect on the beliefs of immigrant-origin candidates. With respect to native-origin candidates, in turn, higher competition for seats significantly reduced confidence, whereas one's own party's strong support increased confidence. Pseudo R^2 (Nagelkerke) estimates suggest that the resource model better explains the beliefs in election of native rather than immigrant-origin candidates.

Table 8.10 Explaining candidates' beliefs in election. Results of logistic regression analysis by origin. Odd ratios and standard errors.

	Native-origin OR (SE)	Immigrant-origin OR (SE)
SES and length of residence		
Female (ref. male)	.44 (.17) ***	.49 (.36) *
Age (in years)	.99 (.01)	.98 (.02)
Years of education completed (ref. primary / 1–9 years)		
Secondary / 1–12 years	1.45 (.34)	1.20 (.86)
Tertiary / 12 < years	1.24 (.35)	1.10 (.81)
Years lived in municipality	1.01 (.01)	.97 (.02)
Political and civic experience		
Novice candidate (ref. experienced candidate)	.81 (.22)	1.13 (.45)
Current positions of trust in municipality (ref. no positions of trust)		
1–2 positions	1.47 (.21)	1.86 (.54)
3 or more positions	6.21 (.24) ***	3.93 (.74)
Associational Involvement Diversity Index (0–14)	1.10 (.06)	1.21 (.11)
Social support		
Has a campaign team (ref. no team)	1.90 (.23) **	2.38 (.41) *
Resource Access Index (0–6)	1.13 (.05) *	.91 (.11)
Party support (ref. "Not at all")		
"Not very much/Somewhat"	.56 (.29) *	.75 (.53)
"Quite much/Very much"	.83 (.29)	.93 (.54)
Support from friends and family (ref. "Not at all")		
"Not very much/Somewhat"	1.65 (.21) *	.78 (.45)
"Quite much/Very much"	1.96 (.28) *	3.77 (.59) *
Political opportunity structure		
Candidates per council seat ratio	.84 (.04) ***	1.04 (.10)
Party's share of votes in municipality	1.01 (.01) *	.99 (.01)
Share of foreign language-speaking population in municipality	—	.93 (.06)
Constant	.44 (.63)	3.13 (1.32)
N	975	196
Nagelkerke	.34	.25


Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

The regression analyses above open the door to the question: Why were immigrant-origin candidates more confident in their election although their realistic chances of election were lower compared to native-origin candidates? One explanation could be related to top-up candidacy. As was speculated in Chapter 8.2.2, voluntary top-up candidacy – i.e. standing as candidates only to pull in votes for one’s own party – seems to be less frequent among immigrant-origin candidates. This means that their decision to stand originates more often from a true aspiration to work in the municipal council. Another explanation may be related to immigrants having less knowledge of the Finnish political and electoral system, which is reflected in individual calculations on one’s own chances of election.

Another question is why a party’s increasing vote share had a positive effect on the confidence of native-origin candidates but not of immigrant-origin candidates. Could it be that a party’s dominant status benefitted immigrant-origin candidates less often than it did native-origin candidates simply because immigrant-origin candidates lived more often in large municipalities, where votes were more scattered across the parties and where competition for seats was higher? According to the candidate register data, one-fifth (20.4%) of the immigrant-origin and nearly one-third (31.4%) of the native-origin candidates represented a party that got 25 percent or more votes in the municipality, and may thus be labelled as “dominant party candidates”. In most of the cases, dominant party candidates represented the Centre Party (Figure 8.42), which enjoys the strongest support in rural municipalities but has only marginal support in the large cities where the immigrant-origin population and candidates reside (Chapters 3.3 and 6.1). Perhaps those immigrant-origin candidates who represented the Centre Party in rural municipalities acknowledged that the population structure did not generally favour the election of immigrant-origin councillors because access to the council would highly depend on support from native-origin voters, who in rural areas have more reserved attitudes towards immigrants than in large cities (Jaakkola 2009).

Figure 8.42 Share of dominant party candidates by origin and party (%).




Source: Candidate register.

Notes: A candidate is coded to represent a dominant party if his or her party got a minimum of 25 percent of all votes cast in the municipality.

Figure 8.43 shows that candidates' beliefs in their chances of election varied across parties. Although the difference is not statistically significant, immigrant-origin candidates of the Centre Party seem to have been less confident in their election compared to native-origin candidates. In addition to the speculation given above, it could be that those immigrant-origin candidates who represented the Centre Party in large cities acknowledged that it is difficult to get elected from the party's list regardless of one's ethnic origin because of the party's low level of support in cities. Immigrant-origin candidates were significantly more confident in their election compared to their native-origin fellow party candidates in the Green League and the

Left Alliance. The direction is also the same in the Finns Party, the NCP, and the SDP, although statistically significant differences are not detected. However, it is difficult to give any other explanation for this empirical finding other than immigrant-origin candidates having less knowledge of the Finnish political system and, on average, being more motivated by their candidacy than native-origin candidates.

Figure 8.43 Beliefs in election by origin and party. Crosstabulation.



Source: Candidate survey.

Notes: Pearson's chi-square test: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; FINNS: $\chi^2(1) = 2.016$, $p = .156$; NCP: $\chi^2(1) = 2.861$, $p = .091$; LEFT: $\chi^2(1) = 4.280$, $p = .039$; SDP: $\chi^2(1) = 1.941$, $p = .164$; GREENS: $\chi^2(1) = 7.747$, $p = .005$; CENT: $\chi^2(1) = 1.875$, $p = .171$; CD: $\chi^2(1) = .177$, $p = .674$; SPP: $\chi^2(1) = 1.122$, $p = .289$.

8.3 Conclusions

Chapter 8 has examined candidate supply i.e. the candidates' resources and motivation to run in elections. The investigation of candidates' resources showed that there were, in fact, very few differences in resource acquisition between native- and immigrant-origin candidates. This signals that mainly people who have the necessary resources or whom the parties believe have the necessary resources and capacities enter the political arena. One major factor that differentiates the groups is immigrant-origin candidates' shorter apprenticeship in political and non-political civic associations compared to native-origin candidates. This is an important factor that is a natural consequence of migration history and the shorter time lived in Finland, but which significantly affects immigrants' recruitment into politics. The stronger the attachment to parties and their networks, the better the chances of being recruited to candidate lists and, eventually, being selected to councils and other municipal positions of trust.

The results also suggested that immigrant-origin candidates, especially females, needed more external push and pull to enter the electoral arena and to stand as candidates in the first place. Still, even after receiving more external encouragement, women had less confidence in their chances of being elected. This is consistent with previous studies and underlines the intersection of gender and ethnicity in producing additional disadvantages. Persuading women to stand as candidates may need extra attention and effort from political parties.

Immigrant-origin candidates differed from native-origin candidates with respect to motivation. First of all, immigrant-origin candidates were less interested in pulling in votes to their party and, thus, they were less often so-called voluntary top-up candidates compared to native-origin candidates. Second, immigrant-origin candidates emphasised significantly more often that standing as a candidate was a way of fulfilling civic duty. This reflects immigrants' exposure to expectations of being a "good" or "deserving" citizen; by standing as a candidate, an immigrant-origin person may prove to himself or herself and others that he or she contributes to the common good. Third, immigrant-origin candidates believed more often than natives that candidacy had personal utility outside the political arena, such as in the labour market. This shows how political activity can play an important role in the societal integration of immigrants.

9 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The task set to this doctoral dissertation was to answer three main questions concerning the 2017 Finnish municipal elections:

- (1) What were the key differences in electoral engagement between different ethnic groups?
- (2) What influenced political parties' demand for immigrant-origin candidates i.e. motivated parties to recruit immigrants to their candidate lists?
- (3) What role did immigrant-origin candidates' supply factors, i.e. their socioeconomic backgrounds, resources, and motivations, play in their decision to stand as candidates and in their selection to candidate lists?

The immigrant groups in Finland differ in many ways with respect to their electoral engagement. The most obvious indicator concerns turnout, which in the 2017 municipal elections varied significantly between, but also within, immigrant groups. This study observed between-group variation not only in turnout but also with respect to feelings of belonging, interest in Finnish politics, and trust in Finnish political institutions, all of which were found to influence immigrant groups' ability to aspire for political representation in Finnish municipalities. Therefore, it was not surprising that different groups were unequally represented in parties' candidate lists as well as in municipal councils after the elections.

Both individual-level and contextual factors shape levels of immigrants' political representation. This study has emphasised that the Finnish electoral system with open lists and high demand for candidates in local elections results in a relatively favourable context for immigrants' access to candidacy. While the context is different in large cities versus small rural municipalities, standing as a candidate does not generally require a lot of money or high social status. Parties evaluate potential candidates' ideological proximity to the party's values before nomination, but this process is a relatively coarse sieve and not many are rejected. In fact, because parties benefit from a diverse pool of candidates, many ethnic minority candidates willing


to stand would be warmly welcomed. The nomination of immigrant-origin candidates gives parties a possibility of reaching out to immigrant-origin voters, who otherwise might not be targeted by the native-origin candidates. When a party fields a high number of candidates, the inclusion of immigrant-origin candidates on the list does not create a realistic risk of losing support. Rather, the contrary: Every candidate brings in the votes of her or his personal network.

However, as this study has clearly shown, most people need external encouragement before they decide to enter the political arena. One of the main findings is that the crucial factor explaining immigrants' underrepresentation in candidate lists is their absence from parties' recruitment networks. Because parties have limited ties to ethnic minority communities, they lack information about immigrant-origin persons with interest and resources to stand as candidates. Lack of information flows results in a lack of active recruitment – i.e. “pull” – into the political arena. The party recruiters interviewed for this study emphasized familiarity and trust as important factors in candidate recruitment, as both are elements that facilitate recognition of individuals' vote-earning potential and adherence to party ideology. Parties also want to know that their candidates engage in active campaigning and that their candidates can mobilise votes for the party.

As was shown in Chapter 8, immigrant-origin candidates had much less experience with both political and non-political organisations than native-origin candidates. They were less often members of political parties or at least had been members for a much shorter period. Thus, they were less often in the party's inner network, from which parties began their search of candidates. As was discussed in Chapter 7, candidate recruitment proceeded from parties' inner networks to outer networks. Parties started putting together their candidate lists by looking at, first, their current councillors and representatives in municipal positions of trust, second, their non-selected candidates in previous elections, and third, their other members. If a sufficient number of candidates was not found among these groups, parties searched for potential candidates from the networks of the aforementioned groups. Those who were not members of parties' networks in the municipality were not very likely personally targeted and encouraged to stand. Therefore, social networks played a fundamental role in candidate recruitment. Figure 9.1 illustrates how social networks attracted both parties and potential immigrant-origin candidates closer to the recruitment interface, and how the lack of social connections kept them apart. The role of social networks and social capital in political recruitment has not been sufficiently acknowledged in previous studies on immigrants' political

representation. Therefore, the systematic documentation of these factors is one of the main contributions of this study.

Figure 9.1 Factors attracting and distancing parties and potential immigrant-origin candidates from the recruitment interface.



Parties' motivation to ensure ethnic minority representation on candidate lists depends on a municipality's population structure. Ethnicity is considered a salient issue only in municipalities where the share of the foreign-origin population is high.

According to the interviews, parties have doubts regarding immigrants' language skills and their knowledge of the Finnish political system, which hinder parties' willingness to recruit immigrant-origin candidates. Thus, the attitudes of local party selectors constitute a significant barrier to candidates from under-represented groups

such as immigrants. However, due to the open lists, parties cannot discriminate against ethnic minorities by assigning them non-winnable list positions, which enables individuals with strong personal support in the electorate to compete for council seats.

An examination of the candidate's resources and motivations showed that immigrant-origin candidates, especially females, needed more external push and pull to enter the electoral arena and to stand as candidates in the first place. Even after receiving more external encouragement than men, women had less confidence in their chances of being elected. This is consistent with previous studies and underlines the intersection of gender and ethnicity in producing additional disadvantages.

Immigrant-origin candidates differed from native-origin candidates with respect to their motivation to stand as candidates. They were less motivated about pulling in votes to their party, which shows that immigrant-origin candidates were less attached to parties and, thereby, stood less often as voluntary top-up candidates. Immigrant-origin candidates also felt more often that standing as a candidate was a way of fulfilling one's civic duty. This reflects immigrants' exposure to expectations of being a "good" or "deserving" citizen; by standing as a candidate, some were able to prove to themselves and others that they contributed to the common good. Third, immigrant-origin candidates believed more often than natives that candidacy had personal utility outside the political arena, such as in the labour market. This is a direct indicator that political activity can play an important role in the societal integration of immigrants.

This study also highlights the importance of immigrant-origin candidates as "agents of trust", who have the capacity to include immigrant-origin groups in the electoral process. Due to shared language and ethnicity or shared experiences related to migration, immigrant-origin candidates form a link between immigrant groups and political parties. Immigrant-origin candidates are the key agents, who can spread information about elections and Finnish political parties within their own community in their own native language and from the immigrant voters' point of view. Thus, they play a major role in how immigrants view the Finnish political system and its responsiveness and trustworthiness. On the other hand, immigrant-origin candidates also influence parties' view of the prominence of immigrant-origin groups. The better represented various ethnic groups are in party organisations, the more likely it is that parties target these groups in their campaigns. All in all, immigrant-origin candidates play a major role in creating mutual trust between parties and immigrant groups, and from the network perspective, they connect two networks that would otherwise remain separated.

One of the major limitations of both previous research and this study has been their ability to examine only individuals who have already passed the first filter i.e. nomination to the candidate list. Although the personal reflections of the nominated candidates provide valuable insights into the factors facilitating and hindering immigrants' political representation, in the future it is important to aim at collecting data about the motivations to stand or not stand among the wider immigrant-origin population. We also need studies that investigate immigrant-origin politicians' access to parties' inner networks where the true decisions are made.

APPENDIX A: SURVEY WEIGHTS

Weights have been calculated using the following formula:

$$w_i = \frac{NK_i}{n_i}$$

Appendix Table 1 Post-stratification weight for age.

Language	Age group	Number of observations in the data (N)	Sought-after distribution (K _i)	N * (K _i)	Observed distribution (n _i)	Weight (w _i)
Finnish and Swedish-speaking candidates	18–24	1010	0.042	42	41	1.03
	25–34	1010	0.120	121	103	1.18
	35–44	1010	0.204	206	161	1.28
	45–54	1010	0.235	237	217	1.09
	55–64	1010	0.232	234	261	0.90
	65–	1010	0.168	170	227	0.75
Foreign language-speaking candidates	18–24	204	0.060	12	9	1.36
	25–34	204	0.221	45	32	1.41
	35–44	204	0.292	60	62	0.96
	45–54	204	0.261	53	61	0.87
	55–64	204	0.139	28	29	0.98
	65–	204	0.027	6	11	0.50

Appendix Table 2 Post-stratification weight for gender.

Language	Gender	Number of observations in the data (N)	Sought-after distribution (K_i)	$N * (K_i)$	Observed distribution (n_i)	Weight (w_i)
Finnish and Swedish-speaking candidates	Male	1010	0.602	608	556	1.09
	Female	1010	0.398	402	454	0.89
Foreign language-speaking candidates	Male	204	0.567	116	119	0.97
	Female	204	0.433	88	85	1.04

Appendix Table 3 Post-stratification weight for gender and age group.

Language	Gender	Age group	Number of observations in the data (N)	Sought-after distribution (K_i)	$N * (K_i)$	Observed distribution (n_i)	Weight (w_i)
Finnish and Swedish speaking candidates	Male	18–24	1010	0.024	24	24	1.02
		25–34	1010	0.066	67	55	1.22
		35–44	1010	0.110	111	70	1.59
		45–54	1010	0.137	138	112	1.23
		55–64	1010	0.147	149	144	1.03
		65–	1010	0.118	119	151	0.79
	Female	18–24	1010	0.018	18	17	1.07
		25–34	1010	0.053	54	48	1.12
		35–44	1010	0.094	95	91	1.05
		45–54	1010	0.098	99	105	0.94
		55–64	1010	0.085	85	117	0.73
		65–	1010	0.050	51	76	0.67
Foreign language speaking candidates	Male	18–24	204	0.038	8	7	1.12
		25–34	204	0.128	26	16	1.63
		35–44	204	0.163	33	38	0.88
		45–54	204	0.147	30	32	0.94
		55–64	204	0.070	14	17	0.84
		65–	204	0.021	4	9	0.47
	Female	18–24	204	0.022	4	2	2.24
		25–34	204	0.093	19	16	1.19
		35–44	204	0.129	26	24	1.10
		45–54	204	0.114	23	29	0.80
		55–64	204	0.069	14	12	1.17
		65–	204	0.007	1	2	0.70

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR PARTIES

- Who or which actors had the main responsibility for the candidate recruitment of your party in the 2017 municipal elections in your municipality?
- To what extent was the candidate recruitment of the 2017 municipal elections coordinated at your party's district- and/or national-level office? To what extent were the decisions on candidate nomination made locally?
- What type of criteria did your party follow in its recruitment of candidates? Were there any official requirements to become nominated on the list? To what extent did the strategy of balanced lists guide candidate recruitment?
- What kind of persons were potential candidates from your party's perspective?
- What kind of process was the recruitment of candidates in 2017 from your party's perspective?
- To what extent was candidate recruitment based on the personal networks of the people responsible for candidate recruitment in your party? To what extent did your party encourage non-members or people not involved in the party's activities to stand as candidates?
- How did your party persuade residents to stand as candidates?
- What is your party's view on the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates? Did your party deliberately aim at recruiting immigrant-origin candidates on its list?
- Was it easy or difficult to reach immigrant-origin persons and persuade them to stand as candidates?
- To what extent does your party see the foreign-origin population as potential voters for your party?
- What is your assessment of your party's success in attracting votes from immigrant-origin voters in your municipality in the 2017 elections? To what extent was this conditional on your party having or not having immigrant-origin candidates on its list?
- Does your party aim to support immigrants' active political participation in your municipality? How?

- Are there any challenges related to the political mobilisation of immigrants from your party's perspective? Which kind of challenges?
- Which criteria had to be met with respect to e.g. language skills before your party spontaneously encouraged an immigrant to stand as a candidate in the 2017 municipal elections?
- Aside from language skills, were there other challenging matters with respect to the recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates?
- Compared to native-origin candidates, did immigrant-origin candidates need more support from your party regarding their decision to stand and to organise a campaign? To what extent did you provide this type of support?

APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR IMMIGRANT-ORIGIN CANDIDATES

Social background

- In what country were you born and raised?
- In what country were your parents born and raised?
- *If not Finnish-born:*
 - When did you move to Finland and why?
 - How was settling in Finland in the beginning? What is it like to live in Finland now?
 - What was it like to learn the Finnish (Swedish) language?
- What is your main occupation (work, study, retired, etc.)?
- What schools have you attended and what degree(s) have you completed?

Decision to stand as a candidate

- Why did you stand as a candidate in the municipal elections?
- Was the decision to stand easy or difficult to make? Why?
- What was the most important matter that made you preoccupied with the decision to stand?
- Did you stand as a candidate for the first time in the 2017 municipal elections, or have you been a candidate before?
- Have you previously been a candidate in elections other than municipal elections?
- Was the decision to stand for the 2017/previous elections mostly your own or did some person/group encourage you to do so?
- If you were encouraged by other people, by whom? Did the initiative come from a party or from someone outside of the party?

- In your own opinion, why were you asked to stand as a candidate?
- How did the person who asked you to stand know that you might be interested in standing as a candidate?
- What is your assessment of how your personal networks influenced your nomination?
- How well connected are you with the residents of your own municipality and how did these connections develop?
- Do you think that as a councillor, you represent/would have represented some specific social group? If yes, how did this type of need to make the group's voice heard develop?
- Could you describe to me what kind of support to stand as a candidate you received from your family, friends, and acquaintances?
- What kind of people are members of your close network? Are they mainly of immigrant origin, native origin, or both?
- Do you have family, relatives, or friends outside Finland? To what extent have these people influenced your political participation in Finland?
- How does the party you represent react to racism? Did this have an influence on which party's list you chose to stand as a candidate?
- What type of resource does it take to stand as a candidate and be elected?
- In your opinion, what are the qualifications of a good councillor?

Electoral campaign

- What kind of campaign did you have?
- How much time, effort, and money did you invest in your campaign?
- Do you think it was easy or difficult to organise a campaign? What type of knowhow did it require?
- Did you have a personal campaign team? If yes, how was it formed and who were its members?
- What were the key tasks of your campaign team?
- If you ran a campaign, did you receive any help from your party, family, friends, and/or acquaintances? What kind of help?

- What type of help, and help from whom, was the most important with respect to your campaign?
- If you did not run a campaign, why not?

Prior political experience and involvement in voluntary associations

- Are you a member of, and are you active in, voluntary and civic associations? Which kind of associations?
- Do you think that involvement in an association influenced your interest in politics and your decision to stand as a candidate?
- What kind of prior experience do you have from municipal positions of responsibility? How about other types of positions of responsibility?
- Have you experienced the tasks in positions of responsibility as easy or difficult? Why?
- Has it been easy or difficult to reconcile your life with positions of responsibility?

Interest in politics

- How did you initially become interested in politics in Finland? What about party politics?
- *If raised outside Finland:* What kind of background regarding political participation do you have in Finland, on the one hand, and in your country of origin, on the other hand?
- *If the interviewee has prior political experience in the country of origin:* To what extent have the skills and knowledge you acquired in your country of origin helped you to understand politics and participate in societal decision-making in Finland?
- Who has influenced you to become interested in politics (family, friends, acquaintances, colleagues, etc.)? How?
- Is your own ethnic group or your community in Finland societally or politically active? Is this activity directed mainly at Finland or the country of origin? Are you personally involved in transnational activities? If yes, do you believe that it facilitates political activity in Finnish politics?

Support from parties and associations

- How has your party supported your candidacy?
- What could parties do to facilitate immigrants' political engagement?
- What could associations, municipalities, etc. do to facilitate immigrants' political engagement?

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