Abstract

This chapter analyses how the conceptualisation of what is moral has broadened in recent decades and how it influences the study of moral development. We begin with a brief discussion of the definitions of morality and moral domain, and present three key theories of morality. The first one is the Big Three model of morality by Richard Shweder and colleagues (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) and it includes the moral codes of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. The second key theory is Moral Foundations Theory by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010), which includes five different moral foundations. The third is the cultural-developmental model by Lene Arnett Jensen (2008) and it focuses on the interaction between development and culture in moral thinking. The key conclusion is that the definitions of morality have gone through profound changes and become broader and varied. The three models address the diversity in the definitions of morality and its development. However, what they do not (yet) address is the context-dependence of moral concerns. Finally, we suggest new ways to study morality and moral development.

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to describe how the conceptualisation of what is moral has broadened from Kohlberg’s (1984) and Gilligan’s (1982) views, presented in the previous Chapter X, and how that has influenced the study of moral development.

Simply put, moral beliefs are socially shared beliefs about what bad/wrong or good/right is and what one thinks should or should not be done according to a code of conduct put forward in a smaller or larger group (Gert, 2015). Furthermore, it is stated that moral beliefs differ from attitudes and norms, for example, so that they appear to be perceived as more objective and universally true and are treated as morally motivating and obligatory (Skitka, 2010; Turiel, 1983). It is worth noting that it is common to differentiate between ethics and morals, and ethics is often referred to as a philosophical study of morality. However, in moral psychology, the concepts of “ethics” and “morals” tend to be used interchangeably and fairly freely, and typically both of them are used to refer to everyday views of right and wrong (e.g., Rest & Narváez, 1994).

Furthermore, moral psychology has a long tradition of defining morality and moral issues by drawing on philosophy (e.g., Blasi, 1990; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). Such research that would have been truly open to respondents’ personal views and definitions of morality has been missing. Typically, a researcher selects the issues that she or he considers to be moral questions, and then research participants respond by choosing from preselected options, as on questionnaires, for example Mäkiniemi (2016). However, there is disagreement among researchers about what should belong to the moral domain (e.g., Kugler, Jost, & Noorbalaoochi, 2014; Suhler & Churchland, 2011). For example, it has been suggested that work-related values, which are not explicitly included in any moral psychology approach, should be defined as moral values (Myyry & Helkama, 2001). It has also been noted that if the definition of morality is too restricted, relevant lay views of morality may be excluded (Blasi, 1990; Vainio, 2005). Therefore, we assume that theories and methods should be broad or open and able to capture possible novel themes and lay definitions associated with the moral domain (cf. Mäkiniemi, 2016; Mäkiniemi, Pirttilä-Backman, & Pieri, 2011, 2013).
Nonetheless, views about the principles that are considered moral ones have broadened in recent decades. In the 1980s, Gilligan’s (1982) approach broadened and complemented Kohlberg’s (1984) approach of justice-based moral reasoning by focusing on the development of care-based moral reasoning. Evidently, the above-mentioned important debate within moral psychology regarding what belongs to the moral domain has broadened the view of the criteria that characterise morality. Furthermore, a step towards the triadic view of morality was taken in the 1990s with the introduction of the big three of morality: autonomy, community, and divinity (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997), and ultimately, the fivefold view of the moral domain was presented in the 2000s by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). The need to broaden the scope of morality mainly stemmed from cross-cultural and anthropological findings indicating that justice and harm-based morality are not the most relevant aspects of morality outside of Western countries, and therefore, create too narrow a frame of reference for comparative studies (e.g., Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).

Approaches to studying moral issues can be placed along a continuum from moral universalism to moral relativism. Cognitive-developmental approaches (e.g. Kohlberg, see Chapter x) emphasise the elements that are common across different cultures and social groups and characterise morality as a domain that is perceived as universal and generalisable (e.g., Turiel, 1983). However, in practice, it has been shown that the issues viewed as belonging to the moral domain in one culture or subculture may be perceived as belonging to the personal or social domain in another, supporting the notion of some kind of moral relativism coexisting with the universal aspects of moral reasoning (e.g., Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012). Within the cognitive-developmental approaches, the universally shared structure of moral reasoning is understood to be distinct from the content, which may vary culturally (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969, 1971; Piaget, 1932), whereas cultural psychological approaches do not make a clear distinction between the structure and content. For example, Richard Shweder and colleagues (1987) suggested that, culturally, there are both universal and variable aspects in what is regarded as structure in the cognitive-developmental approach. In order to capture this variation across different approaches, we use the broad definition proposed by Lind (1992), where structure refers to the relationship of elements of moral reasoning, and content refers to the elements themselves, such as values that people use for justifying their moral views or behaviours and the issues that are discussed.

From two to three moralities

Shweder, a cultural psychologist, used the interviews he had collected in India (Bhubaneswar) and the United States (Chicago) to later develop the big three model of morality in the 1980s and 1990s (Shweder, Haidt, Horton, & Joseph, 2008; Shweder et al., 1987, 1997). According to this approach, there are three different moral codes, or ethics, that conceptualise a moral agent in different ways.

First, the discourse of the ethic of autonomy describes the moral agent as an autonomous individual who is free to make choices only with minor limits. This ethic focuses on an individual’s rights and needs: harming oneself or others ought to be avoided, and the rights of other persons ought to be respected. Within the ethic of autonomy, behaviour is assessed from the perspective of harm, rights, fairness, autonomy, and freedom. The second moral discourse, the ethic of community, defines a moral agent in relation to his/her group memberships, such as family, workplace, or society. This kind of moral reasoning is underpinned by role-based duties and obligations. The objectives of moral behaviour are maintaining social order and harmony and avoiding social sanctions. When behaviour is evaluated from this perspective, we often think about duties, role-based commitments, obedience to authorities, loyalty, group reputation, and dependency on other people, as well as including a consideration of what is best for one’s community. The third moral discourse, the ethic of divinity,
characterises a moral agent as a spiritual being who aspires to follow sacred rules. Moral rules that guide behaviour are based on sacred scriptures or a natural order of things. Moral behaviour in this ethic is defined as the avoidance of moral degradation and striving towards moral purity. When behaviour is assessed from this perspective, we often think about sin, the natural order of things, sanctity, and purity, as well as protecting one’s soul and the world from contamination or spiritual desecration. (Helkama, 2009; Shweder et al., 1997).

As a whole, research findings support the idea that three moral codes exist in different cultures (for a review, see Jensen, 2008). Between-country differences (e.g., the United States vs. the Philippines, the United Kingdom vs. Brazil) as well as within-country ones (e.g., religious conservatives vs. religious liberals) have been found in the use of these moral codes (Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Vainio, 2003, 2015; Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banaszynski, 2001), supporting cultural psychologists’ notion of cultural variability in moral reasoning. For example, North Americans seem to prefer the ethic of autonomy more often than Brazilians, Indians, or Filipinos do (Jensen, 2008; Vasquez et al., 2001), and in Finland, liberal religious and non-religious adolescents justified their moral views with autonomy and community equally, whereas conservative religious adolescents used the ethic of divinity most frequently (Vainio, 2011).

Three moralities, culture, and development

The big three model did not describe how the ethics of autonomy, community, and divinity develop as individuals grow older. However, based on the cultural psychological approach to morality and moral socialisation (e.g., Shweder et al., 1987, 1997), Lene Jensen (1997, 2008, 2011) developed a model that integrates the notions of developmental changes occurring throughout the lifespan and the differences between individuals in their cultural understandings of what is considered moral. Within this model, culture is defined as a community that shares key beliefs, values, behaviours, routines, and institutions (Jensen, 2015a). The model is based on the acknowledgment that culture-based models underestimate the role of individual development, while the cognitive-developmental models underestimate the role of culture in trying to understand the development of morality. Therefore, the cultural-developmental template integrates these two lines of research.

According to this model, the ethic of autonomy is already used in early childhood, and its use continues in more or less the same way throughout adolescence and adulthood in individualistic cultures. However, there are changes in the way autonomy is used. For example, factors related to equality and fairness seem to emerge more frequently in adolescence. In collectivistic cultures such as India, which emphasise the importance of community, the use of autonomy decreases with age, which may reveal the impact of culture (Kapadia & Bhangaokar, 2015).
In adolescence and adulthood, the use of the community ethic increases and becomes conceptually more varied and richer. In addition, the scope of what belongs to one’s community broadens with age; it begins with one’s own family and friends in childhood and eventually develops through wider consideration to embrace society at large during adolescence and adulthood (cf. Kohlberg’s idea of broadening social networks and social perspective).

According to Jensen (2008, 2011), developmental changes occurring in the ethic of divinity are not yet well known. The development of a divinity-based moral discourse appears to be more group-oriented than other moral codes, which typically means something like, for example, belonging to a liberal or conservative religious community shaping the development of divinity-based moral thinking. The ethic of divinity is used rather infrequently in childhood, used increasingly in adolescence, and is used most frequently in adulthood (Jensen, 2008; Jensen & McKenzie, 2016). This may happen because, in some cultures, the concepts around supernatural forces are so abstract that it is not possible to understand them in early childhood (Jensen, 2008, 2011).

The cultural-developmental template assumes that individuals in all cultures share these three ethics or moral codes. However, the model does not assume that age-related development follows the same trajectory in all cultures or communities, as cognitive-developmental models suggest (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984). More specifically, Jensen (2018) identifies two lines of moral development that differ in terms of how moral codes are hierarchically related to each other. These two lines are linked to whether an individual’s approach to religion is liberal or conservative (e.g., Bellah, 1987; Jensen, 1998, 2000, 2006). Religious conservatism is associated with the view that a moral code is created by a transcendent authority as well as a concern that contemporary societies are distancing from God. Conversely, religiously liberal individuals are more likely to regard moral issues as being subject to change due to societal developments. Therefore, it is expected that differences between religiously liberal and conservative individuals are such that conservative adults use the concepts of community and divinity in their reasoning more often than autonomy. Religiously conservative individuals emphasise the ethic of divinity as their main moral code, whereas religiously liberal individuals place more emphasis on the ethics of autonomy and community equally (Jensen, 2008, 2011, 2018; Vainio, 2015).

Furthermore, cultural communities may shape an individual’s course in life, which in turn, may eventually influence which moral codes the individual regards as most relevant. For example, individualistic cultures such as those in North America emphasise youth and a prolonged phase of concentrating on oneself, which means that the autonomy-based moral code may be used rather than the community-based moral code during adolescence and young adulthood (Jensen, 2008, 2011).

Jensen’s (2008, 2011) cultural-developmental and Shweder et al.’s (1997) big three models were empirically tested across five national samples from Brazil, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. A total of 792 emerging adults between the ages of 18 and 23 participated. The novelty value of this study is increased by the fact that there are but few (intercultural) studies of moral thinking among young adults. In practice, it was explored whether, in the course of emerging adulthood, young adults differ in their moral thinking due to a cultural context and age. The key findings indicated that all three ethics were used by young adults in all the countries. However, the level of endorsement varied between countries. For example, Japanese young adults endorsed the ethic of divinity significantly less than did young adults from other countries. However, the researchers suggested that one explanation for a lower endorsement may be an effect from the type of items included in the method used (CADS divinity subscale; see Jensen, 2015b) which may not necessarily cover some important aspects of Japanese folk and formal religions. Thus, more
longitudinal studies focusing on the development of moral codes in different cultural contexts are needed.

From three to five: moral foundations theory

Moral foundations theory (MFT) was developed by Haidt together with Joseph and Graham (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). The earliest formulation of it was published in 2004, and this first conceptualisation included only four independent modules of morality: suffering, hierarchy, reciprocity, and purity. However, in the footnote of that article, a potential fifth module was already cited as the ingroup/outgroup dimension. MFT was based on the analysis of different studies in social science (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). According to the authors’ own words, they wanted to find the common foundation of morality. In practice, the model was based on existing models of morality (in particular, Shweder’s three ethics model) and values (Schwartz’s Theory of Basic Values). The version of MFT that included five moral foundations was published in 2007, although Haidt and colleagues have considered adding a sixth moral foundation to their model (e.g., Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). In addition, the names and contents of the foundations have been slightly modified in that time. For instance, ingroup/loyalty is nowadays also called loyalty/betrayal. So, it seems that MFT is currently more like a developing project than a stable theoretical formulation.

MFT supposes that humans have innate moral intuitions that are instinctive predispositions, or quick gut feelings or “decisions” that come into consciousness within seconds for approval or disapproval (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). According to this theory, these instinctive intuitions cannot be directly observed, but it is possible to study moral reasoning that is based on these intuitions (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Even if MFT assumes that moral foundations are intuitive, this theory does not exclusively focus on intuitions but rather on the way moral foundations are expressed in moral discourse or thinking. Despite their intuitive origin, it is assumed that moral foundations occur in moral thinking in general as well as in the moral reasoning that individuals use for resolving moral problems.

MFT also assumes that moral foundations are universal psychological systems enabling people to perceive actions and actors as right or wrong. Therefore, these foundations do not describe only morally right issues but also include more generally morally loaded issues. The fact that cultures and social groups can prioritise them in different ways explains why there are differences in moral norms and practices between and within countries. The five foundations are the following:

1) The care/harm foundation describes an individual’s capacity to feel compassion towards other people and their willingness to avoid harm. Moral virtues that are based on this foundation are kind-heartedness and compassion. When behaviour is evaluated from this perspective, we ask, for example, whether the behaviour harmed someone.

2) The fairness/cheating foundation describes the quality of interaction between individuals, and corresponding moral virtues focus on the unbiased treatment of individuals. When behaviour is assessed from this perspective, it is asked whether someone behaved fairly or unfairly, for example.

3) The loyalty/betrayal foundation is based on the idea of favouring one’s own ingroup, possibly at the expense of outgroups. Moral virtues include loyalty and trustworthiness, group solidarity, patriotism, and heroism. When behaviour is evaluated from this perspective, it is asked whether someone who was mistreated was a group member or not.

4) The authority/subversion foundation describes an individual’s willingness and capacity to respect authorities and operate in hierarchical groups. Moral virtues may include showing respect for people
with high status or authority, fulfilling duties, and obedience. When behaviour is assessed from this perspective, it is asked whether individuals involved in a situation had the same status or different ones.

5) The sanctity/degradation foundation focuses on bodily functions, their purity or impurity, and especially religious activities. From this perspective, carnal desires such as overeating, where animalistic desires control behaviour, are perceived as morally despicable. For example, seeing someone who is overweight would, in this case, raise feelings of disgust. In contrast, controlling one’s bodily functions is perceived as morally acceptable. When this moral foundation is used for evaluating behaviour, it is asked whether that behaviour elicited feelings of disgust or not. (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010.)

Together, the fairness/cheating foundation and the care/harm foundation are called the individualising foundations, whereas loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation are named the binding foundations (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010.)

According to MFT, these moral intuitions or foundations shape an individual’s political orientation (Graham et al., 2013, 2009; van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). Findings suggest that liberals (i.e., typically, supporters of left-wing politics) are likely to consider the individualising foundations more morally relevant than the binding foundations, and conservatives (i.e., typically supporters of right-wing politics) are likely to consider the binding foundations more important from the moral point of view. The existence of the pattern has been demonstrated in different countries, such as in the United States and Finland (Graham et al., 2013, 2009; Mäkiniemi et al., 2013; McAdams et al., 2008; Vainio & Mäkiniemi, 2016; van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). It is worth noting, however, that the liberal/conservative distinction does not match to a left-wing/right-wing distinction in all societies, because the political left may in some cases privilege the welfare of the group over the individual liberties (Graham et al., 2009) and therefore, that ideological preferences are often very heterogeneous (Weber & Federico, 2013). For instance, in a Finnish study of moral foundations in food-related moral thinking, there were differences between supporters of left-wing, right-wing, and centrist politics (a common list of political identities in the Finnish context; Mäkiniemi et al., 2013).

Five moralities and development

Although MFT is currently actively utilised in moral psychology studies, there have not been many attempts to relate or integrate MFT with the theories of development. In other words, there have been no serious attempts to describe or conceptualise how moral thinking develops from the perspective of moral foundations, such as whether or not there are common changes in the use of foundations as individuals grow older. This likely stems from the fact that basic assumptions about the nature of morality and moral decision-making differ between the cognitive-developmental approaches (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984) and MFT (cf. Maxwell & Narvaez, 2013). In addition, MFT has a focus on the content of moral thinking and reasoning, whereas cognitive-developmental approaches focus on the structure.

However, there are actually some studies measuring the associations between moral foundations and moral schemas as measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT). The DIT is a method used in the neo-Kohlbergian approach that corresponds to Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning (for the description of the stages and their relationships, see Chapter x). Baril and Wright (2012) found an overlap between the DIT’s personal interest schema and Kohlberg’s stages 2/3 with the loyalty/betrayal foundation, and another association was found between the maintaining norms schema that corresponds to Kohlberg’s stage 4 and to the authority/subversion foundation. In
addition, in a study by Glover and colleagues (2014), the binding foundations positively predicted the maintaining norms schema and negatively predicted the postconventional schema, which represents Kohlberg’s stages 5 and 6. However, there were no significant associations between the individualising foundations and moral schemas.

The above findings suggest that moral foundations may be more representative of conventional reasoning (Kohlberg’s stages 3 and 4) than postconventional reasoning (stages 5 and 6; Glover et al., 2014). Indirectly, these findings may also indicate that a Kohlbergian definition of morality is not as narrow as commonly assumed. This issue also warrants further research because Kohlberg’s model of moral development has been accused of favouring Western liberal traditions (e.g., Graham et al., 2013).

Furthermore, at least theoretically, it is possible to assume that developmental changes also appear within moral foundations. As presented in detail below, Jensen (2008, 2011) proposed that there appear to be developmental shifts in the use of Shweder’s three ethics that share similarities with moral foundations. It seems that there are developmental changes in the types of concepts used within autonomy, community, and divinity. However, again, the development of the ethic of divinity is still rather unexplored (Jensen, 2008, 2011; Jensen & McKenzie, 2016). The three ethics are conceptually very close to the five moral foundations. More precisely, the care/harm and fairness/cheating foundations share similarities with the ethics of autonomy; the loyalty/betrayal and authority/subversion foundations with the ethics of community; and finally, the sanctity/degradation foundation with the ethics of divinity (Mäkiniemi, 2016; Sverdlik et al., 2012) (see Table 6.1). Consequently, one could assume that moral foundations develop in similar vein given that they have so much in common with the three ethics. However, this assumption should be validated with empirical data. It is worth noting that, with this approach, it is possible to find out only how the content of moral thinking varies and changes across individuals since the three ethics and the foundations refer to the content of moral thinking.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Care</th>
<th>Conformity</th>
<th>Social order</th>
<th>Divinity</th>
<th>Does the model or theory describe development of moral thinking?</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gilligan (1982)</td>
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<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Divinity</td>
<td>no</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Care/harm</td>
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<td>Authority/subversion</td>
<td>Sanctity/degradation</td>
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<td>Community</td>
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<td>Divinity</td>
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Table 1. Five types of moral issues. Adapted from Sverdlik et al. (2012) and Mäkiniemi (2016)
So, are there any potential theoretical approaches for a researcher who is especially interested in a more structural development of moral thinking and wants to take into account the possibility that there are at least five different types of moral issues? As mentioned earlier, the common view is that with Kohlberg’s (1984) theory, it is possible to explore justice-based morality, which corresponds quite closely to the fairness/cheating moral foundation. Similarly, Gilligan’s (1982) model fits well for measuring the development of care-based morality, which is conceptually close to the care/harm moral foundation (cf. Chapter x; see Table x).

However, there are three other moral foundations left, and it is likely that the above-mentioned approaches are not able to cover their special aspects.

The first solution could be to develop three new models for describing the development of the remaining foundations. This assumption is in line with the existence of many domain-specific developmental models. These kinds of models imply specific development patterns relative to particular issues; in other words, morality does not necessarily develop in the same way as critical thinking or logical reasoning, for instance. The second — and likely more promising — option could be to apply more general approaches for measuring the development of morality and moral foundations. This assumption can be justified with the notion that cognitive development appears to be quite similar within many domains (Mäkiniemi, 2016). For example, based on the work of Kramer (1983), Kallio (2011) has suggested that, in many models, cognitive development proceeds from youth to adulthood through three phases, which are single perspective, multiperspective, and integrative thinking (see Chapter X). In practice, thinking develops in these models from the “either-or” type of thinking, which is typical in youth, to the “both-and” type of thinking, which is assumed to be typical in adulthood. Integrative (or relativistic-dialectical) thinking combines these two types of reasoning.

Moreover, Myyry and her colleagues (Myyry & Helkama, 2007; Vartiainen, Siponen, & Myyry, 2011) examined the complexity of moral thinking in moral conflicts utilising the theory of integrative complexity, which can also be seen as a general type of approach. Integrative complexity refers to an individual’s cognitive style and ways of information processing. Integrative complexity incorporates the two cognitive structural properties of differentiation and integration. Differentiation refers to the number of characteristics or dimensions of a problem that an individual figure out, and integration refers to the development of complex connections among the characteristics (Suedfeld, Tetlock, & Streufert, 1992). Integrative complexity emphasises the structure of moral thought rather than its content, and therefore, it can be used to analyse the integrative complexity of any issue. From the developmental point of view, it is also possible to measure how integrative complexity of moral thinking develops or changes due to aging, or for example, due to ethical training or education. In line with the previous notions, Dawson and Gabrielian (2003) have proposed that one potential approach for investigating the structural development of moral thinking would be a domain-general method called the Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System (for more information, see Commons, 2008; Commons, Gane-McCalla, Barker, & Li, 2014; Fischer, 1980; see also Mäkiniemi, 2016; see Chapter x).

Conclusions and challenges

To sum up the discussion, we can say that earlier theories in moral psychology clearly distinguished between the structure and the content of moral reasoning and focused mainly on the structure, describing how moral reasoning develops universally. Later theories have, instead, identified different sets of moral codes or ethics that are applied in different ways in different cultures (Graham et al., 2013; Shweder et al., 1997), with recent openings that characterise potentially
different developmental pathways for the content of moral reasoning (Jensen, 2011, 2018). In practice, the definition of morality has broadened from one or two key principles to at least five. While the view of morality has expanded, the conventional models used to study the structural development of moral thinking do not necessarily cover all the new dimensions of morality. As a result, there is a need for new empirical and theoretical openings that take the approaches used to measure the structural aspects or changes of moral development and combine them with the approaches used to study the content of moral thinking (Mäkinemi, 2016). We assume that so-called domain-general models such as the models of integrative complexity and the Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System could be used to study the complexity and development of any kind of moral thinking given that they are not focused on any specific type of moral issues or dilemmas.

As presented in this chapter, the definition of morality has gone through profound changes and become more varied as a constructive response to criticism. How, then, can the definition of morality still be improved in moral psychology? In our view, one issue common to these theories is that they have paid less attention to the context dependence of morality. In all the models, moral reasoning is thought to be a relatively general phenomenon. This careful avoidance of discussing contextual influences is closely related to the lack of discussion about how the concrete issues, behaviours, or topics being discussed shape the criteria or justifications used for evaluating each concrete case. There is some evidence that the characteristics of a concrete moral problem affect the complexity of reasoning used in its evaluation (Myyry & Helkama, 2007). Moreover, it has been shown that different contexts elicit different kinds of criteria, justifications, or principles. For example, moral dilemmas that involve other persons’ needs are likely to elicit care-based reasoning, whereas rule violations are likely to elicit justice-based reasoning (Juujärvi, 2005). Furthermore, Jones (1991) suggested that moral decision-making is issue contingent. In other words, issues can be distinguished based on their moral intensity so that some issues are more likely to elicit moral reasoning than others.

We explored the difference between general and issue-specific endorsement of moral foundations in the context of climate change (Vainio & Mäkiniemi, 2016). When the foundations were measured at a general level, individualising foundations were associated with climate-friendly behaviours, and binding foundations were associated with the avoidance of these behaviours. This finding suggests that climate change is likely to be associated with the endorsement of individualising foundations by Finnish young adults. However, the participants also evaluated moral foundations applied to the context of climate change (e.g., sanctity/degradation was measured with a statement as to whether or not climate change causes moral degradation in the world). In this case, both individualising and binding foundations were associated with climate-friendly behaviours. Hence, this result indicates that individualising moral foundations are more likely to be associated with climate change than binding foundations. However, once individuals view climate change as a moral question from any perspective, they are likely to engage in climate change mitigation. These kinds of results can be used to inform the media and politicians on how societal issues should be framed in communications.

The insights of studies applying cognitive-developmental models of moral reasoning have been used extensively for developing school curricula and communities that promote the development of moral reasoning. However, the societal impact of cognitive-developmental models has become less visible (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). The extensive body of research using the cultural psychological theories of Shweder, Jensen, and Haidt has focused on describing the multitude of moral discourses and their relationship to sociopolitical problems in society. The broad definition of morality is thought of as being especially useful for studying group-based moral understandings and differences
between groups (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). This line of research carries enormous potential for supporting societal development by trying to solve a wide range of societal challenges, such as the moral roots of prejudice, inter-group conflicts, climate change denial, and populism (see also Lapsley & Carlo, 2014). We assume that analysing everyday situations or even bigger societal challenges from the viewpoints of different moral foundations may enhance perspective taking, and that this kind of capacity to analyse, understand, and integrate divergent moral perspectives can be seen as a type of wisdom (cf. Rakoczy, Wandt, Thomas, Nowak, & Kunzmann, 2018).

Moral psychology carries an enormous potential, but how can it respond to societal needs in ways that can have a real impact? In our view, one of the challenges lies, again, in the definition of morality. For too long, moral psychology has had a close and exclusive relationship with moral philosophy, which may have resulted in increased isolation from multidisciplinary endeavours. Societal challenges are often complex issues that require multidisciplinary, and even transdisciplinary, approaches where non-academic partners play an equally important role together with academic researchers. In such a situation, moral psychology’s current philosophical underpinnings can become a burden that hinders productive collaboration with non-academic stakeholders who do not share the philosophical language. This general transformation in science is likely to change research settings in moral psychology as well – moral psychology has to open itself to new methodologies, types of data, and collaborative relationships.

References


