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INCOMPATIBLE BORDERS AND DEAD ENDS
Migrant and refugee “crisis” in Bosnian and Croatian newsletter narratives

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis talks about the migration situation in two countries in the Balkans, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia). In 2015 Europe experienced an influx of forced migrants, leading to different types of reactions and changes in policies in European countries and in the European Union (EU). In the media, these events were titled as the migration or refugee “crisis” and the media got an important role in defining the “crisis”. Although the number of incoming migrants has decreased, there are still people leaving their homes and turning towards Europe. The journey of some of these people has stopped at the outside border of the EU, as is in the case of the border with Croatia and Bosnia. This study looks into two medias, HINA from Croatian and Bosnia Daily from Bosnia and analyzes their narratives on the migration situation in the area. The research material was collected during summer 2019, as summer is the time for increased migratory movements.

In the study, I examine the migration situation through the concept of forced migration and reflect the different terms used in the context of migration, such as refugee, asylum seeker, and illegal migrant. I also discuss migrant management, such as the refugee and migrant camps, and how it affects on the agency of the migrants and its representations in media. The previous studies have shown that instead of giving voice to the migrants, the media often uses statements of the state officials and authorities when writing about migration. These sources tend to exploit securitization arguments when justifying the policies towards migrants, and therefore I also write about the discussion regarding the securitization of migration in the media. I also talk about the reactions of the EU and its Member States by addressing the EU’s Turkey Agreement as well as the “Hot Spot Approach”, as the EU is considered as an important actor within the “crisis”.

I use narrative analysis to study the dominant narratives regarding the migration situation in the research material. As a result, I have created four dominant narratives: 1) Croatian border protection 2) Porous and impassable borders 3) Ethnically divided armed forces against migration 4) Managing migration. The first narrative portrays Croatia taking its position by the EU’s external border seriously, meaning it protects the border from irregular entries with any means necessary. The second narrative looks at the situation from Bosnia’s perspective and presents Bosnia as suffering from its neighbor countries policies. The third narrative addresses the complex administrational situation in Bosnia which effects on migration management in the country and is used as an advantage by one of the ethnic groups in the country. Finally, the fourth narrative talks about the challenges of migration management, focusing on a camp established in Bosnia.

The analysis shows that in Croatian and Bosnian media the migration situation is narrated similar to what the previous studies have shown. The forced migrants are categorized as deserving and undeserving political and economic migrants. The state authorities use securitization arguments to legitimate sealing the state, or even areal, borders and putting the migrants in camps in order to prevent them from interacting with the local population. However, the history of the area as a part of the former Yugoslavian state and Croatia now being a member state of the EU makes the situation unique, as the ethnical division of especially Bosnia makes the country and its borders difficult to handle. Croatia, and the whole EU, is blamed for closing its borders and being incapable of decision making when it comes to the migrant situation. However, the most desired solution in both countries seems to be closing the borders or bordering the migrants away from the host society.

Keywords: Refugee, crisis, forced migration, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, narrative analysis, securitization

The originality of this thesis has been checked using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service.
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1. INTRODUCTION

“Bosnia shuts down controversial camp, transfers migrants”, announced Al Jazeera’s (2019) headline on 10 December 2019. Prior to the closure, the “controversial camp” in Vucjak, near the Croatian border in the north of Bosnia-Herzegovina (later Bosnia), had drawn attention as it poses “significant safety and health risks” and “the location falls well short of international humanitarian standards”, as IOM reported in their statement for closing the camp of 16 October 2019 (IOM 2019c).

The Vucjak camp is just one example of the quick decisions the state authorities needed to make during and in the aftermath of the “2015 European refugee crisis”. The unexpected flow of people moved mostly towards Europe in 2015 which caused the countries along the way to close their borders and strengthen their border control. Although the amount of arrivals has decreased significantly since 2015, the issues related to the people's movements still remain and emerge in some parts of the world. One such place is the state of Bosnia, which became a transit country for the refugees and migrants in late 2017 (IOM 2018a).

Bosnia has its own challenges as a young, multiethnic state, and it lacks the capability to handle the refugee and migrant situation in the country (IOM 2018a; Minca & Umek 2019). Its northern neighbor Croatia is not helping: Several people have gathered in Bosnia hoping one day to cross the border to Croatia and beyond to the European Union (EU) (IOM 2018b). Aware of this, Croatia has increased the control on the Bosnian border, making it almost impossible for the people to cross it. Croatia has the right to protect its sovereign borders but at what cost? According to media and human rights organizations, Croatia has used inappropriate violence and illegal pushbacks to protect its borders (Amnesty International 2019; Border Violence 2019), which even the Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović has been claimed to admitting in the media (The Guardian 2019).

The 28 Member States of the European Union have their own internal migration policies, guided by international agreements, yet the EU finds the “refugee crisis” as a shared problem across the member states. Therefore, the EU has tried to find a joint solution to the issue by endorsing both security actions and administrative means. For example, in September 2015 the EU member states agreed on the “Hot Spot Approach”. Ten hotspots are currently located in Greece and Italy (EP 2018). Within the “Hot Spot Approach”, the EU organizations for asylum support and border control, work together with local authorities, helping them to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants, European Migration Network (EMN) (2019) explain. The “Hot Spot Approach” has gained criticism
from Non-Governmental Organizations and is claimed not to be in line with the international human rights and EU law as the hotspots have also been claimed to blur the lines between the restriction on freedom of movement and deprivation of liberty (Majcher 2018; Casolari 2015). Although the settlements where people are held under the “Hot Spot Approach” resemble ordinary refugee camps they are called detention centers due to the restrictions (DeGenova 2016; Papoutsi, Painter, Papada & Vradis 2018).

The migrant “crisis” forced the EU also to focus on the control of the external borders of the Union. As Turkey is one of the main refugee hosting countries (UNHCR 2020d), in 2016 the EU negotiated an agreement with Turkey to control the flow of people to Europe. As a response, the EU agreed on funding Turkey to support the migrants and refugees in the country. In December 2019, €4.3 billion euros had been contracted and €2.7 billion disbursed from the total Facility budget of 6 billion euros (EC 2019d). The Turkey agreement is considered a step further in the externalization of the EU’s borders making Turkey partly responsible for the management of the EU’s eastern border and it is claimed to be violating international and EU law (Ferreira 2018, 63). It has also caused critique because it shows the EU condoning totalitarian regimes in order to achieve its goals (Ferreira 2018, 63). The recent incidents on the border with Turkey and Greece have shown that Turkey may use the migrants and refugees in the country to try to pressure the EU to extend its funding or other political purposes, as the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell has said according to The Guardian (2020).

The EU has also stepped up addressing the human tragedy on the Mediterranean by funding Frontex’s missions Triton and Poseidon and identified the four main pillars to better manage migrations, such as the adoption of a relocation and resettlement scheme, however, the EU has not been able to deliver the desired results with the operations. (Ferreira 2018, 62). For example, operation Sophia has helped to reduce the migratory flow in the Central Mediterranean route, but it has also led to a change in routes towards the Eastern Mediterranean route (Ferreira 2018). Endorsing security measures such as border control and management is a fundamental part of a process called securitization (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 1998, 24–25). The change in the EU’s policies regarding border control and migration management is a sign that it has successfully securitized the migration issue. An issue has been securitized when a political actor presents it as an existential threat to the physical, cultural, or social health of the community and gains public acceptance to use extraordinary measures to combat that threat (ibid.).
The EU’s external borders, however, reach further than Turkey and Greece. One gateway to Europe is located at the border of Croatia, EU member since 2013 and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These two Balkans states have their own tug-of-war regarding migration that has emerged only in recent years. The so-called Balkan Route the migrants and refugees use on their way to the north has shifted running through Bosnia towards Croatia since 2017 (IOM 2018a). In this study, I use the case of Bosnia and Croatia to describe and understand better the situation at the borders of the EU. To study this, I investigate two news providers, HINA and Bosnia Daily, and analyze their writings regarding migration during summer 2019.

1.1 Researching news narratives on migration

The term 2015 refugee or migrant “crisis” was introduced and spread by mass media, when it covered the events related to the influx of people trying to reach Europe. Media's role within “the crisis” has been widely studied, but as the “crisis” is growing calmer, I find it interesting to turn to the areas where the movements of people have become an issue after 2015. Therefore, I focus my attention on the Balkans and especially to the inner and outer borders of the EU in order to understand what the crisis looks like from these perspectives. To be able to study this, I turn to media, as I understand the media as an important device to communicate the events to the people who themselves are not necessarily experiencing them.

I have chosen two medias to represent the view on both sides: HINA from Croatia representing the view inside the European Union and Bosnia Daily from Bosnia, which is not a member of the EU but reaching out for a membership. The migrant “crisis” has been a global phenomenon in the sense that the routes of people cover at least three continents, Asia, Africa, and Europe, but the movements of people seem to be oriented towards Europe. Europe is a continent but inside that continent, there is also the union of 28 European states. The union and its agreements, such as the Schengen area, expect the member states to make common decisions and work together in issues related to the mass arrival of people at and beyond its borders. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about “the migrant crisis” and its consequences without taking the EU in to consideration. I concentrate on news published in each media during summer (May to July) 2019, as it is the season for increased migratory movements due to the better weather conditions.

I collected my research material during my internship at the Finnish embassy in Croatia, which also covers Bosnia. I had an opportunity to read newsletters from both countries, provided to embassies
and other international organizations in the area. As a Finn and non-Croatian or Bosnian speaker, I qualified well as the target audience of these publications, since their purpose is to report the daily news to those who do not understand the local language. The target audience is also English-speaking, as it is the language of the newsletters. The audience also needs to have access to the internet, as the newsletters are spread via e-mail, and therefore they can be assumed as being educated and having migrated to Balkans for “white-collar work”.

These newsletters revealed that although Finnish newspapers have subsided from daily news regarding migrant movements in the “refugee crisis” context, it is still a relevant topic in the Balkans. The Croatian and Bosnian headlines rarely make it to Finnish news and therefore I had a great opportunity to collect research material from Croatian and Bosnian news from local publishers and authors even though I do not speak the languages.

In order to understand the research material, I use narrative analysis, that is interested in the force of events that are organized in a certain way to make sense of the actions, at the same time justifying and legitimizing them (Livholts & Tamboukou 2015, 28). The narrator, a news journalist in the case of my research material, has the power to choose how the actions are connected to each other and narrated to the audience (ibid.).

I base this study on the constructivist idea that media, among other things, participates in constructing our realities (Häkli 1999, 133). Media transmits information that we are not able to experience ourselves, making our knowledge about such events dependent on the news reports regarding it. The migration situation is one such “event” as most people have not experienced such a situation themselves. When presenting these events and naming it “crisis”, media participates in constructing our ideas regarding it as human experience is constructed by social processes, defined by power (Häkli 1999, 133). The understanding of power as diffused throughout society rather than centralized originates from Michel Foucault (Tamboukou 2008, 104). In this study, it means that the media is understood as participating in the construction of our “realities”, “truths” or “knowledge” but the truth cannot be separated from the procedures of its production. The media uses power in producing the knowledge as it can choose and leave out what and how it reports about events. For example, the news media participates in forming specific discourses regarding the migration situation by naming and categorizing things (see for example Vultee 2010; Ferreira 2018; Scuzzarello & Kinnvall 2013). Therefore, it is interesting to study how power is present in creating the possible conditions for specific narratives to become dominant and for others to be marginalized. By studying media, it is
possible to make some of the pieces, from which our reality constructs of, more visible. Therefore, my goal is to find out, how the chosen medias narrates the migrant situation.

1.2 Research questions

I am interested in the narratives that dominate the news discussing forced migration and “the refugee crisis” in the chosen medias. Therefore, my first research question is:

*Which narratives dominate the Croatian and Bosnian news discussing forced migration and “the refugee crisis” in the chosen medias?*

In order to make some of the pieces which the reality constructs of more visible, I am interested in studying the securitization in the narratives. Migrants are often presented as a treat in the media and thus securitization of migration is common (Vultee 2010; 2011), enforcing the idea of migrants as threats. I study the securitization with my second research question that is:

*What signs of securitization can be found from the narratives?*

I have noted in this introduction that the EU is an important actor in the context of the migrant “crisis”. The EU is often claimed to attract the migrants and it also aids the host countries, such as Bosnia, struggling with the migrant situation. Therefore, I am interested in finding out how the news represent the EU in the context of migration. I study this in my third research question:

*How is the EU portrayed in the context of the migrant “crisis” in the narratives?*

Before I start analyzing the research material, it is important to investigate the previous research regarding the migrant “crisis” and the elements, such as refugee and migrant camps, that are closely related to the issue. I will also give a brief introduction to Croatia and Bosnia, focusing on the relevant topics regarding this study. Before moving on to the analysis and results, I will introduce the research material and method. In the end, I write about the conclusions that I have made of the analysis.
2. “CRISIS” MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE

In our everyday life, we do not necessarily pay attention to how we refer to migrants, asylum seekers or refugees. On the other hand, the words, or concepts, can be chosen very carefully in order to express a certain message. The media can act likewise but by choosing to use one concept instead of another, it also participates in making these concepts more viable while diminishing others. Therefore, media effects how we understand the reality we encounter and especially the events that we are not experiencing ourselves. This is true in the context of the 2015 migrant or refugee “crisis” and can be already seen in the contest over labelling the “crisis” as migrants or refugees. Therefore, next I will look into the discussion of whether the people on the move are refugees or migrants. I also discuss on how certain expressions are charged with different kinds of meanings and thus cannot be considered completely neutral.

2.1 Not just words: Asylum seekers, refugees, illegal or forced migrants?

When talking about the definitions of migrants and refugees, it is necessary to investigate the context where they were created. During World War II, millions of people were evacuated, forcefully displaced, expelled and deported which lead to the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human rights, which is the base of human rights still today (UN 2020). The need for humanitarian relief after World War II also created the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which specifies in assisting assistance to refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced and stateless people (UNHCR 2020c) and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA), founded on 1949 following the Arab-Israeli conflict to carry out direct relief and works programs for Palestine refugees.

Another actor in the field of managing migratory movements is the International Organization for Migration, IOM (2020b), established in 1951 and a member of the UN since 2016. IOM and UNHCR observe the movements of people and create data that is useful when analyzing the movements and locations of people. Due to their different approaches, the data they provide may vary. For example, UNHCR separates people between asylum seekers, refugees, and internally displaced people, while IOM’s definitions on migration are more elaborate and they separate for example forced migration, irregular migration and they have also data of international students, migrant workers and other groups not relevant to this study (UNHCR 2020a; IOM 2020b).
The common terms referring to people seeking asylum in the European context came from the 1951 United Nations Geneva Convention, organized in the aftermath of World War II. The definition, used by UN-based organizations, such as IOM and UNHCR says a refugee is “[a] person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” In EU context the definition of a refugee is based on the same principles but specified as a “third-country national” or “a stateless person” “who, being outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it, and to whom Art. 12 (Exclusion) of Directive 2011/95/EU (Recast Qualification Directive) does not apply” (EMN 2019).

IOM (2019b) also recognizes refugee mandate, which refers to “a person who qualifies for the protection of the UNHCR – regardless of whether or not he or she is in a country that is a party to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol – or a relevant regional refugee instrument – or whether or not he or she has been recognized by his or her host country as a refugee under either of these instruments. In order to become a refugee, the person must be an asylum seeker, namely an individual who is seeking international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it.”

Stephan Scheel and Vicki Squire (2014, 190-194) write about the common criticism towards the Geneva Convention terminology as it is based on a dichotomy between political and economic migrants. “Political migrants” qualify as refugees based on their “well founded fear of persecution” which implies that “economical migration” is voluntary and can be clearly separated from political reasons. The Refugee mandate highlights that “[n]ot every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every recognized refugee is initially an asylum seeker.” This has led to suspicion towards asylum seekers, especially if they are from the global South and thus often imagined as deprived, Scheel and Squire (2014, 194) write. They are believed to make beneficial and informed migration choices, making them “bogus asylum seekers”, which has been a salient figure in media and policy discourses since 1990’s. This has been proven in several studies and for example, Scuazzrello and Kinnvall (2013) explain how French and Danish news media describe different target
populations as problematic. The “illegitimate” or “criminal” immigrant is juxtaposed with an imagined migrant who is really in need of help, who thus can be called the refugee. Some migrants are described as economic migrants and therefore they are not in need of protection while taking away resources from potential refugees. Some migrants should be helped while others have no legitimate reason to be “here”.

It is common to refer to the people on the move as migrants because the position of the refugee is so explicitly defined. IOM (2019b) defines migrant to be an umbrella term that is not defined under international law, unlike refugee or asylum seeker. It reflects the “the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons.” This term gathers several categories of people, such as migrant workers and international students, but also the aforementioned refugees and asylum seekers. IOM (2019b) also notes that there is no universally accepted definition for migrant and the definition does not represent any legal category. Therefore, the people in the context of the migrant “crisis” are often referred to as “asylum seekers”, “illegal migrants”, or “irregular migrants” in order to separate them from immigrant workers, who reside in the countries with sufficient working or studying permits, for example (see for example Scheel & Squire 2014; Scuzzarello & Kinnvall 2013).

However, the term “illegal migrant” is especially problematic, as the illegality is produced by the migration management practices, shifting policies, restrictive migration legislation and the build-up of border controls, Scheel and Squire (2014, 188-191) argue. The go on saying, that illegality has become the prevailing interpretative grid for governing of migratory movements in the European context, as well as in Australia, North America and beyond. However, Article 31 of the 1951 Geneva Convention stipulates that “The Contracting States shall not impose penalties [on refugees], on account of their illegal entry of presence” as Scheel and Squire note. Describing forced migrants as illegal migrants is highly contentious since it appears criminalizing those who have no choice but to migrate, they continue. Illegality is also ambiguous and not fixed: the same person can be an illegal migrant when crossing the border but became a legal refugee if granted asylum. Therefore, they suggest referring to forced migrants to highlight the “extremity of conditions under which certain groups decide to undertake the migratory journey”. This is a term the ENM and IOM glossaries also recognize as a broader term referring to refugees. They define forced migrant as “[a] person subject to a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and
livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine or development projects).”

As a conclusion, it can be said that distinguishing voluntary migration from forced migration can be impossible, although the Geneva Convention definition is based on this distinction (Scheel & Squire 2014, 190). The motivations for movement are mixed and economic, political, environmental, and social factors are interdependent shaping people’s decisions to move. This is not a new notion, but scholars have conceived the distinction of forced/political and voluntary/economical as an artificial construct since the 1990s (ibid.). Paying attention to the terminology is still relevant, especially in the academic context, as the choice of words puts the researcher into a certain position. Therefore, by using the term migrant I refer to forced migration, but I will also be using the terms refugee and asylum seeker when it is relevant. In the analysis, I will be using similar terminology to the original text.

2.2. The emergency narrative: The “crisis” approach, agency and power

In 2015, the main pathways to Europe crossed over the Mediterranean Sea to the coasts of Italy and Greece, as seen on the 2015 map produced by the International Organization of Migration (IOM 2015) in Figure 1. The deadly dangerous sea crossings have gained serious media attention (Basaran 2015) but after crossing the sea, the migrants’ journey did not usually end there. For those arriving in Greece and willing to continue northwards, the main route ran through the Balkan countries. This route was named the Balkan Route and it emerged as a result of various institutional and mundane actions of states (Häkli, Pascucci & Kallio 2017, 1271). International organizations, smugglers, local people, journalists, activists, and refugees were also important actors producing the route (ibid.) which is marked in Figure 1 with green lines.
The European states’ reactions to the migration situation varied and some, such as Hungary, closed its borders with fences (UNHCR 2018). IOM (2018a) observed, that when it was no longer possible for the migrants to cross trough Hungary, the Balkan Route shifted westwards to Bosnia in 2017. The country has experienced a significant increase in the arrivals of people, often on their way to neighboring Croatia and onwards to the European Union (IOM 2018a).

The closure of the Hungarian border works as an example of the emergency practices the governments have implemented after titling the peoples' movements as a “crisis”. Hungary has introduced mandatory detention in high-security camps for all asylum seekers (Häkli et. al. 2017, 1268). After the detention, they are not allowed to stay in Hungary (ibid.). DeGenova (2016, 37) criticizes the crisis approach as describing the situation as “crisis” appears to be a device for the authorization of exceptional or “emergency” governmental measures aimed at enhancing and expanding border enforcement and immigration policing. The migrant “crisis” is equated with a crisis of control over the borders of Europe, he continues.
Rajaram (2016, 6) also criticizes the crisis narrative as it is juxtaposed against normality, saying the mass migratory movements in summer 2015 were nothing exceptional, but the effect of European border management policies and the logic of exclusion and inclusion were. This suggests that the crisis can also be seen as a crisis of the institutions, such as the common asylum system and European Union as for example, the stability of the EU free border zone Schengen started to crack, DeGenova (2016, 38) writes. The concerns of migrants crossing the outside borders of the EU came reality during the “crisis” and country after another started to introduce border controls, putting the future of the Schengen zone at stake (DeGenova 2016; Papoutsi, Painter, Papada & Vradis 2018).

The institutions managing migration and refugees have had their share of the problems. Human rights are claimed to be universal, and everyone should have genuine rights to claim asylum. However, DeGenova (2016, 35) explains that when these ideas meet Europe’s border control crisis, they evolve into “military humanitarianism”, whereby European authorities rescue migrant boats from the high seas just to claim the border crossing illegal and detaining the people in to a “reception center” waiting for their deportation. DeGenova’s critique aims at addressing the situation, where the forced migrants are allowed to apply for and asylum, which is their human right, but in reality, applicants from several countries will not be granted asylum, regardless of their situation.

However, each forced migrant has unique reasons to be on the move. They are at least somewhat aware of the dangers they are about to face crossing the borders and residing in the countries without formal documents (i.e. visa), thus seeking safer routes to their destinations. Increasing evidence of the reorientation of migratory movement to land routes, such as the Balkan route, instead of crossing the Mediterranean (DeGenova 2016, 34), can be seen as an example.

The people’s movements are affected by outside sources, such as the border controls, fences and ways to pass them, as Häkli at al. (2017) explain about the Balkan route. As the borders of Europe are strengthened, the people on the move will look for new ways to pass them, often turning to smugglers and traffickers. These dynamics create the situation, where the countries on the migratory route try to manage the people’s movements with increasing measures, creating illegality, as discussed in the previous chapter. However, as humans, the forced migrants are capable of intentional actions and thus have agency over their situation. They intentionally use their agency to find new ways to cope with the changing environment, as the human agency can appear everywhere in different forms (SEP 2019), although the migrant’s agency is being restricted by the state’s actions. The states have the
significant formal power to restrict the migrants’ movements, as the example from Hungary showed, but in this study, I understand the power in Foucauldian way, meaning the power is not solely in the hands of states and high officials. Power can exist everywhere through accepted forms of knowledge: in knowing we control and in controlling we know (SEP 2008). This means, the migrants also have power over their situation as they have knowledge of their special situation and they also gain knowledge on their route. The migrants’ agency is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.4.

As a conclusion, the “crisis” approach seems to be an insufficient way of approaching the migration situation. It contradicts the universal human rights and forces the institutions to actions that harm their other functions or principles, such as the border controls on the Schengen zone. However, the increased control does not seem to stop the movements of people as they too have agency and power over their situation. They seem to be capable to cross the borders with the help of smugglers and other actors who find ways to evade control. The reason why the “crisis” approach is still the prevailing solution lays in the securitization processes of the migration, which I will discuss next.

2.3 The securitization of the migration in Europe

In Europe, certain events that happened between 2015 and 2016 triggered the acceleration of the securitization process of migration, DeGenova (2016, 38-39) explains. The securitization process starts when a political actor presents an issue as an existential threat to the physical, cultural, or social health of the community and gains public acceptance to use extraordinary measures to combat that threat, as the creators of the theory of securitization, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jeep de Wilde (1998), explain. Migration is often represented as a threat to the identity of the state, although the nature of the existential threat can vary. However, multiple identities can exist simultaneously in any given state, so it is difficult to differentiate existential threats to identity from lesser threats. Therefore, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998, 22) suggest that the securitization of migrants depends upon whether the holders of the collective identity take a relatively closed-minded or relatively open-minded view on how their identity is constituted and maintained.

A Eurojust report from 2018 explains the “jihadist attacks” have increased, causing more deaths and casualties than any other terrorist attacks (Sentse 2018). Eurojust recognizes that the attacks follow three patterns: indiscriminate killings, attacks on symbols of Western lifestyle and authority. Eurojust writes that the attacks are committed primarily by people radicalized in their country of residence in the EU and do not have links to jihadist organizations. Despite this, DeGenova (2016) claims that the
hotspots were created partly as a matter of perimeter defense against “terrorist infiltration” as the terrorists were supposed to be separated from the refugees in these facilities. According to him, the “Hot Spot Approach” was created after the terror attack in Paris between November 13 and 14 2015 that killed 130 and left more than 600 wounded (NY Times 2017). These events made the European interior and justice ministers to call in an emergency meeting where they decided on tighter external border controls and drafted the new “Hot Spot Approach”, refugee and migrant reception and processing facilities at illegal border crossing sites, DeGenova (2016) explains.

A little later, multiple sexual assaults were conducted during New Year’s Eve in Cologne. They were told to be conducted by “unruly mobs of young men” characterized as being of “North African or Middle Eastern appearance”, DeGenova (2016) writes. These events revived the racialization of “Muslims” and “Arabs” meaning they could now be represented in terms of obnoxious “cultural” differences that are hostile to the presumed “European values.” The threat ceased to be solely terrorism but expanded to a much broader projection of gendered and sexualized menace and criminality, DeGenova concludes.

The strengthened border controls and increasing suspicion leading to intensified control are all examples of successful securitization processes. Although the securitization was accelerated by the aforementioned events and several other attacks in Europe, the states’ solutions to tighten the border control and limit the movements of the forced migrants was not inevitable but a result of securitization. Securitization arguments or moves are conducted by securitizing actors, often recognized as politicians or other authoritarian figures who have sufficient power or capability (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998, 22). The news media also plays an important role as amplifying or tamping down these securitization moves, as Fred Vultee (2011, 78) explains. The security threats are socially and politically constructed by making the securitizing moves as the securitizing actors “speak security”. The security is spoken in certain contexts to a certain audience, which then may or may not accept the securitizing moves, thus making the securitizing act successful or failed.

Susana Ferreira (2018, 57-60) argues that securitization of migration in the EU happens through the securitization of identity. Immigration is seen as a threat to the “European societal identity” which is “invaded” by other identities which have led to the implementation of emergency actions by the EU, discussed in the previous chapter. European political leaders support these actions with the adoption of securitization narratives such as the emergency or crisis narrative. It is often used intentionally to create a sense of panic and call for immediate action, forceful measures and direct interventions
(Scuzzarello & Kinnvall 2013), or, as Wæver et. al. (1998) put it, “extraordinary means”. These measures aim to secure territorial borders as a way to create order from the chaos so that security becomes the only viable solution (Scuzzarello & Kinnvall 2013).

The vulnerability and threat are evident in the two main opposite axes on discourses on migration: a humanitarian and solidarity approach and the discriminatory discourses, Ferreira (2018, 65) explains. The humanitarian discourses emphasize the equal treatment of migrants and their contribution to host societies. The discriminatory discourses often link migrations with crime, terrorism or prostitution, as the cases of Paris and Cologne imply, and are based on a nationalistic rationale. The discourses often contain different types of rhetoric. Negative expressions are used as rhetorical devices in political speech and media to implicate the threat migrants pose to internal security. These dehumanizing expressions are often connected to natural disasters and take the form of “human tsunami”, “migrant flood” or “tidal wave of migrants”. The use of these practices participates in shaping the publics' perspectives about migration.

All this resonates well with the “crisis approach”, which I discussed in the previous chapter. As migration is represented as “an uncontrollable emergency”, such as tsunami or earthquake, the emergency measures are easier to accept. When tension between “the original population” and “the migrants” rises, the original population, who often is a majority, can use their more formal power to control the migrants. The humanitarian approach, which recognizes the category of refugees who need help and protection, seems to strip them from their agency and inscribe them as powerless and vulnerable, a topic that will be under scrutiny in the next chapter.

2.4 Migration management from the Second World War to the new Millennium

The architecture managing refugee and migratory flows that exist still today were created in the aftermath of World War II, as explained in chapter 2.1. The organizations managing refugee and migratory flows, IOM and UNHCR, do not only provide assistance to the refugees but also to the host communities and governments in order to secure orderly and humane conditions for those affected by migratory movements as well as collect and provide information regarding migratory movements (IOM 2020a; UNHCR 2020a). Several other organizations, such as the Red Cross, are also involved in managing the migratory flows among others, but as IOM and UNHCR are the main actors especially in Bosnia, I will concentrate on the data they provide on the topic under discussion.
According to UNHCR (2020d) data, three major refugee hosting countries are Turkey, Pakistan, and Sudan under UNHCR or UNRWA mandate. However, this does not mean that there were no other countries hosting large amounts of displaced people, asylum seekers or other people who have involuntarily left their home country of origin. 41,3 million of a total of 70,8 million forcibly displaced people in the world are actually internally displaced in their country of origin, thus not qualifying in the legal category of refugees (UNHCR 2020d).

Although the majority of forced migrants reside outside Europe, I will concentrate on the European Union’s perspective on the 2015 migrant “crisis”, as this study is concerning the media reactions in two European countries, Croatia and Bosnia. Bosnia is not a member state of the EU but the refugee situation in the country is interlinked with the EU. The EU provides material and monetary assistance to Bosnia in several fields and has identified Bosnia as a potential EU member state (EC 2019a). It is commonly believed that the migrants are trying to enter the EU or certain member states and use the countries along the way only for passing through. Bosnia falls on this category as it is positioned on the Balkan route and one reason for the EU to assist Bosnia with hosting the migrants is to keep the people from entering the EU. The EU has made similar deals to externalize the EU’s borders, as the example of the Turkey deal shows.

Turkey is a neighboring state of the EU member states and one of the top refugee hosting countries with an estimated 3,7 million refugees (UNHCR 2020d). It has been recognized as one of the pathways for those willing to enter Europe or the EU. As a response to the 2015 “crisis”, EU negotiated an agreement with Turkey on March 2016 that “aimed at stopping the flow of irregular migration via Turkey to Europe” (EP 2019) which, according to statistics from UNHCR, seems to have reduced the number of arrivals from Turkey.

The Turkey deal was the EU’s attempt to focus on the control of the outside borders of the Union. Ferreira (2018, 63) writes that the agreement with Turkey means taking a step further in the externalization of the EU’s borders by creating a new buffer state, thus making Turkey partly responsible for the management of the EU’s eastern border. The agreement has gained criticism as it allows mass returns of refugees and migrants to Turkey and denies potential refugees the possibility to request international protection in the EU. These actions violate international and EU law. It is unclear if Turkey may be considered a safe third country or if it can ensure access to effective asylum procedures for those in need of international protection. The agreement also shows the EU condoning
totalitarian regimes in order to achieve its goals, Ferreira (2018) concludes. Recently, in March 2020, the media told Turkey to open its border with Greece for the migrants (The Guardian 2020). The EU understood this as using the migratory pressure for political purposes, saying this situation at EU’s external borders is not acceptable and expecting Turkey to implement fully the provisions of the 2016 Joint Statement (European Council 2020b).

The control of external borders has not completely prevented the flow of migrants and therefore the European Union has created the “Hot Spot Approach”. It refers to refugee and migrant reception and processing facilities at illegal border crossing sites and has been so far established at the EU’s external border in Greece and Italy for the initial reception, identification, and registration of asylum seekers and other migrants coming to the EU (FRA 2020).

The “Hot Spot Approach” was designed to relieve the migratory pressure from Italy and Greece but instead, they have led to an increase in the number of asylum applicants waiting in the countries, consolidating the challenges and shortcomings already inherent in the Dublin system (Papadapoulou 2016). A European Commission (2016) factsheet regarding the Dublin regulation explains that the Dublin regulation aims at determining which EU Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application ensuring quick access to the asylum procedure. The system's core principle is that the responsibility for examining an asylum claim lies with the Member State which played the greatest part in the applicant’s entry to the EU, which, in most cases, means it is the Member State where the applicant first entered the EU. The EC notes that it has presented new options for reforming the Dublin system because it has revealed being unsustainable if current migration patterns continue, referring to the situation in 2015 and 2016.

In a 2016 study regarding “The Hot Spot Approach” written by Aspasia Papadapoulou (2016) for European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and other organizations, the hotspots were found applying practices and standards that are either inadequate or contrary to the EU asylum and immigration acquis. The responsibility for human rights protection and safeguards relates to state and EU-level, as the approach is a hybrid EU-Member States tool. The study also shows that although some individuals may have accessed the asylum procedure, many others did not but many newly arrived migrants have been trapped in prolonged detention without access to asylum. They have not received the right information in order to access the asylum procedure or have been swiftly returned as a result of the “Hot Spot Approach”.

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The study shows that the “Hot Spot Approach” has led to more repressive measures which are applied by national authorities as a result of EU pressure to control the arrivals. These measures often disrespect human rights and the Member States are held ultimately responsible for the implementation. However, the EU pressures the Member States towards these actions and the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal is considered in the study as a prime example of the EU pressure shifting responsibilities to the national level.

No universally acknowledged definition of the “Hot Spot Approach” exists, nor to what constitutes as a hotspot (Papoutsi et. al. 2018). The EMN (2019) glossary defines it as an approach where “the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol and Eurojust work on the ground with the authorities of frontline EU Member States which are facing disproportionate migratory pressures at the EU’s external borders to help to fulfil their obligations under EU law and swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants.” The notes on the definition explain, that it was developed by the European Commission as part of the immediate action to assist EU Member States located at the external EU border and presented in May 2015. Its operation concentrates on registration, identification, fingerprinting and debriefing of asylum seekers, as well as return operations. Those claiming are helped by EASO support teams that help to process asylum applications as quickly as possible. For those who are not in need of protection, Frontex helps the Member States to coordinate the return of irregular migrants not in need of protection. Any EU Member State will be able to benefit from the “Hot Spot Approach” upon request.

The “Hot Spot Approach” creates a system, where the EU’s external borders are strengthened and the freedom of movement inside the Union is granted for some while restricting it from others, namely the forced migrants (Papoutsi et. al. 2018). Papoutsi, Painter, Papada, and Vradis (2018, 4-5) write that the “Hot Spot Approach” creates a system, where the EU’s external borders are strengthened and the freedom of movement inside the Union is granted for some while restricting it from others, namely the forced migrants. This indicates the image of Europe as a fortress with wall-like borders or borders that can be completely sealed off. This idea of a fenced continent is called "Fortress Europe" although, in reality, the EU border regime is not powerful enough to seal the border. A porous border reflects more accurately the continuous mobility in and through Europe. Papoutsi et. al. (2018, 4-5) write that borders have been historically produced within the context of nation-building processes and war and therefore there has been a strong state-centric view of them. This view creates a sense of impenetrability although many people have challenged this EU border regime. The invocation of the
image of "Fortress Europe" depoliticizes the issue of migration by creating a sort of unchallenged paradigm for border control management. It obscures migrant’s agency and everyday struggles at the border by decreasing the possibilities for organization and resistance by creating the image of the absolute power of the state. Finally, Papoutsi et. al. (2018, 4-5) conclude, it creates the illusion of a clear-cut distinction between inside and outside: a safe inside of deserving and equal citizens and a dangerous outside of undeserving people.

The hotspots have also been claimed to blur the lines between the restriction on freedom of movement and deprivation of liberty (Majcher 2018; Casolari 2015). DeGenova (2016) calls the settlements where the people are being held under the “Hot Spot Approach” detention centers, although the settlements resemble ordinary refugee camps (Papoutsi et. al. 2018). Therefore, next I will look into the literature regarding refugee camps, which are often also used to give shelter to other people on the move, such as forced migrants.

The refugee camps are the fastest temporary solution to quickly provide shelter in a situation when a significant amount of people arrives at a country in the need for humanitarian assistance. The camps provide temporary shelter in an emergency, but also food, water, and other basic necessities are distributed (UNHCR 2020b). The people are put in these camps by states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or UN agencies (Turner 2015, 139). Although the camps are meant to be only an emergency solution to help the people in need of shelter, they have been gaining critique as they can also be used to “lock up” the “unwanted people” as Michel Agier (2010) puts it. He says, that once the centrality of the right of asylum has been shrugged off, a technocratic policy of “migration flow control” can be implemented”, a process in which security policy may be combined with humanitarian intervention and a language of care. Agier’s idea of technocratic migration flow control can be applied to the EU’s “Hot Spot Approach”, as it aims at fully controlled migration flow and separation of those who are worthy of asylum from those to be deported (Papoutsi 2018).

The camps consist of tents that are easy to take down once the crisis is over but, in many cases, they have turned out to be much more permanent solutions, as well as the refugee status. Once a person becomes a refugee, they tend to remain a refugee for many years (UNHCR 2020b). Turner (2015, 140) claims that the people living in the camps are seen as an anomaly that needs a solution and the camp is one such solution. The camps are always situated in the territory of some nation state, but the residents belong “neither here nor there”. The people challenge the assumed link between nation, state, and citizen, he continues. The refugee does not only lack a home, a nation, and citizenship but
also “proper agency, proper voice, proper face” but this can be true also to other people in similar situations, also residing in the camps, such as forced migrants, Turner concludes.

The camps can be used as political devices for the countries outside the EU’s borders for gaining funding from the Union (Minca, Šantić, and Umek 2018). Minca, Šantić, and Umek (2018), who have studied the camps on the Balkan route, especially in Serbia and claim that the camps become a permanent structure as the Balkan countries outside the EU’s borders act as buffer zones, where the migrants get stranded. However, the inhabitants of the camps are treated as not belonging to host culture and society, Turner (2015, 141) notes. The camps are often located far from cities and dense habitation, stripping the residents from proper agency depoliticizing the life in the camp by humanitarian government, a situation which “paradoxically produces a hyper-politicized space where nothing is taken for granted and everything is contested”, as Turner writes.

Häkli, Pascucci and Kallio (2017) have also studied how the migrants’ agency is affected by the location they accommodate. The possibilities of the political agency are different in an urban area and in a camp located in a border zone (ibid.), indicating that one reason to locate the camps further away from the cities is done in order to limit the agency.

Stripping the forced migrants’ agency with the governing practices, such as forcing them to stay at the camp, is a commonly discussed practice in the literature. Häkli, Pascucci and Kallio (2017, 186) explain, that refugees are often described as dependent, passive, victimized, and subordinate subjects with no voice. Viewing the forced migrants as powerless subjects deprive them of any political agency, thus reproducing them as the voiceless subjects (ibid.). The voicelessness of migrants appears via news media as it rarely gives voice to the refugees and migrants themselves but often relies on the statements of officials and press briefings and (Vukasovich & Dejanovic-Vukasovich 2016; Choul iaraki & Zabarowski 2017). Official statements usually reflect the state’s official view, making it more powerful as it is repeated in the media (ibid.). However, giving someone voice in the media may entail they lose control over their voice, as Paul Gready (2008, 138-147) stresses. He explains that testimonies are written and translated into visual images by the media. Giving someone voice is not simply giving them the power to tell their version of the story but voice without control may be worse than silence as the words can be reinterpreted or used in unintended ways.

The perspective of forced migrants without agency is unnecessarily limited. Evidences of the agency are becoming more common in the forms of protests but also in less obvious ways as the migrants
become attentive to their positions and shared grievances and mobilize individually and collectively (Häkli, Pascucci & Kallio 2017).

2.5 Croatia’s Schengen accession – At what cost?

Croatia joined the EU in July 2013 and is pursuing membership in the Schengen area. Although Croatia has fulfilled the technical requirements of Schengen, there are still several political reasons, such as border disputes with Slovenia, which prevent the Schengen accession (EC 2019e). The technical conditions include, among other things, that the country must “be prepared and have the capacity to take responsibility for controlling the external borders on behalf of the other Schengen States and apply the common set of Schengen rules (the so-called "Schengen acquis"), such as controls of land, sea and air borders (airports), issuing of visas, police cooperation, and protection of personal data.” (EC 2019b.)

Human rights organization Human Rights Watch (2019) and international media, such as The Guardian (2019), have suggested that the Schengen accession process is interlinked with Croatia using excessive force to protect its borders. They claim Croatia is using unnecessary violence on the border and pushes back asylum seekers without giving them a chance to apply for asylum, a violation of international and EU law. Human Rights Watch says this is to show Croatia’s capability of protecting the external borders of the EU. This contradicts the common values all EU member states should share. The values include human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, according to the European Council (European Council 2020a).

As the common values are shared by all member states, they should have a joint approach to guarantee high standards of protection for refugees, such as fair and effective procedures throughout the EU and impervious to abuse (EC 2019e). Therefore, the EU States have committed to establishing an Asylum System (CEAS) since 1999. The Commission also says that: “The EU Member States have a shared responsibility to welcome asylum seekers in a dignified manner, ensuring they are treated fairly and that their case is examined to uniform standards so that, no matter where an applicant applies, the outcome will be similar.” European Commission has presented Policy Plan on Asylum which introduced three pillars that “underpin the development of the CEAS: bringing more harmonization to standards of protection by further aligning the EU States' asylum legislation; effective and well-supported practical cooperation; increased solidarity and sense of responsibility
among the EU States, and between the EU and non-EU countries” (EC 2019c), such as Croatia and Bosnia.

2.6 Bosnia – dysfunctional and unprepared institutions

In his comprehensive book of the modern history of the Balkans, Misha Glenny (2012, 635-652) writes about the formation of the Bosnia-Herzegovinian state and other former Yugoslavian countries, such as Croatia. Yugoslavia was dismantled starting from 1991, leading to a series of ethnic conflicts, wars of independency and insurgencies, which resulted in the creation of several new states. These events are called the Yugoslav Wars which also gave birth to the states of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The conflict in Bosnia, the Bosnian War, was particularly difficult, as the area of Bosnia consists mainly of three different ethnicities. The Bosnian Serbs especially wanted to link the disjointed Serb-populated parts, leading to massacres and ethnic cleansings between the ethnic groups (Glenny 2012, 647). The situation of Bosnia was affected a lot by certain EU states, such as France, Great Britain, and Germany, as well as The United States, which created the international community in the area. The United States was greatly involved in the creation of the Bosnian state and its political system (Glenny 2012, 647), also titled as the most complex in the world.

The Bosnian conflict ended in 1995 with the signing of The Dayton Peace Agreement, Glenny (2012, 647) explains, resulting in a partition of the country to a Bosnian-Croat Federation and a Serbian entity called Republika Srpska (RS) or the Serbian Republic. Due to these recent events and historical reasons, ethnicities still mark an important role in the area and the peace on the area is considered fragile. In fact, The Dayton Agreement is so fragile that the war will start again if the international troops ever leave, Glenny (2012, 652) write. The area of Bosnia-Herzegovina is inhabited by approximately 3,8 million people, from which 50,1% are Bosniak, 30,8% Serb and 15,4% Croat (CIA 2020). A document produced by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS 2015) explains that the power is shared between three main ethnicities in Bosnia; Bosniaks or the Bosnian Muslims, Croats who are mainly catholic and mainly orthodox Serbs. The country consists of two significantly autonomic entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is dominated by Bosniaks and Croats, and Serb dominated Republika Srpska. The country also includes a multi-ethnic self-governing independent unit, Brcko District. The country’s presidency is shared between the three ethnicities and it rotates every 8 months. The presidents are elected directly by people within the
entities. The voters in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina elect the Bosniak and Croat members of the presidency and the Republika Srpska voters elect the Serb member.

EPRS describes the political system reflecting the multi-ethnic texture and complex history of the state, fostering ethnic voting and nationalistic political agendas, resulting in political instability and dysfunctional institutions. Minca and Umek (2019) also note this, among others, as they write that Bosnian state authorities were unprepared for the influx of migrants entering the country. Bosnia suffers from institutional instability and the political situation in instable due to ethnic division, so the country had almost no plans or resources to cope with the influx of migrants who entered the country from Montenegro and Serbia, they add. The state officials have declared the state's incapacity to properly control the national territory and provide the migrants with adequate support (Minca & Umek 2019).

In May 2018, IOM (2018b) also noted that migrants have started to gather in Bosnia and are struggling to continue their journeys to Western Europe and thus becoming ever more desperate – and falling prey to criminal groups of human traffickers and smugglers. IOM (2018b) highlights that in May 2018, the official migrant accommodation capacity in Bosnia was around 200 beds when 1200 persons were reported to pass Bosnia during the past three weeks alone. The lack of facilities poses a major public health risk and the situation has developed into a humanitarian crisis, IOM worries. The lack of facilities has made the migrants and refugees finding shelter in abandoned buildings and parks around the capital Sarajevo, as well as in towns close to the Croatian border, namely Bihac and Velika Kladusa, marked on Figure 2. Figure 2 also shows the routes of main migratory flow inside Bosnia, as well as its position on the map, surrounded by Montenegro, Serbia and Croatia, all former parts of Yugoslavia.
The European Union has supported Bosnia in the current situation since 2018 through different funding instruments and programs with 36 million Euros (EC 2019). EU has also provided assistance to Bosnia in the area of asylum, migration and border management since 2007, which includes support for reception facilities, sanitation, food, clothing, and education (EC 2019). As Bosnia has also been identified as a potential candidate for EU membership in 2003, the EU has deployed considerable resources in Bosnia within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defense Policy (EC 2019a). The potential membership candidate status has also generated several joint agreements, such as visa facilitation and readmission agreements and trade agreements, The Stabilization and Association Agreement. EU is also part of a EUFOR/Althea mission with around 600 troops to maintain a stable and secure environment in the country.
3. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEWS TEXTS

3.1 Media constructing human experience

I use Jouni Häkli’s (1999) introduction to constructionism to explain, what it means for this study. I approach reality from the perspective of peoples’ everyday life as my research material, news texts, are considered to exist in the everyday realities of people. Social interaction, feelings, and other sensations also effect their experiences and ideas of the surrounding world and reality. This means people make sense of the word by constructing it within their everyday lifeworlds. This constructionist approach suggests that reality exists and is preserved by people’s own thinking and action. This entails reality does not have an independent nature but is constructed by people's attempts to make sense of the world around them.

People use language as a tool to outline their reality by naming things with words and telling stories to other people. One of the main aspects of language is our ability to communicate and describe abstract things that are beyond our current experiences. For example, news transmits information that we were not able to experience ourselves, thus our knowledge about several events depends on the news reports regarding it. News, of course, is not the only medium transmitting information, but often they are supposed to be the first ones reporting on issues that they suppose is interesting to their audiences (hence the word news). The news media can help the formation of specific discourses regarding a specific issue by naming and categorizing it. For example, something can be portrayed as a threat in media and the outcome of the contest over naming and categorizing that threat shape our understanding of it (Vultee 2010, 77).

The constructivist approach in this study resonates with the phenomenological method as it too suggests, that our experiences, ideas, values, and ways to feel and know construct the “frames” which we construct our interpretation of the world around us (Laine 2018, 30). Human experiences are considered as intersubjective, meaning they happen between subjects and connect them (Laine 2018, 31-32; Häkli 1999, 134). Phenomenology is interested in human experiences, but this study is not dealing with them precisely but attempts to address one piece the experiences are constructed of, namely the news media narratives. As telling stories is one of our ways to make sense to the world, I find it interesting to study the stories, or narratives, that are formed in the news media.
3.2 News media as research material

The research material I have chosen for this thesis consists of news agency news published 5 to 7 times a week. According to Horsti (2007), this daily news is a particular genre of routine journalism and at answering briefly to the basic questions of what, when, where, who and why. This genre usually does not provide multiple perspectives on the topic or involve investigative practices or interviews and are often based on information material or interviews of authorities and other organized sources. This type of news is mainly concentrated on the ‘facts’ and thus has especially high expectations of truthfulness. However, all stories are ultimately framed by the cultural and political ideas from which they are told and thus information published in media is assembled to form a narrative, which is understandable in the context it is published, Horsti (2007) concludes.

Therefore, it is important to look further into the narratives involved in then news and daily news are commonly used as research material. Information published in media has been studied and analyzed widely and is also a field of study. For example, professor of journalism and communications, Jack Lule (2001), has studied the media narratives and organized them as seven ‘master myths’ (victim, flood, hero, good mother, scapegoat, trickster, the other world) that can be found in news in any or historical, political or social context.

In journalistic practice, Lule’s myth of the victim is often used while telling stories about socially mistreated groups and minorities, as well as refugees and migrants (Car, Cancar, & Bovan 2019). It tries to make sense to the “seeming randomness of human existence” (Lule 2001, 53). On the opposite side, Lule’s myth of flood can be interpreted to be behind the threat narratives in the media representation of refugees and migrants. The myth of flood concerns ”an unpleasant, unexpectedly large storm or any other natural disaster but it could also be a disaster that human kind is responsible for, but is described in narratives of ‘the wave’ – a symbol of an unexpected natural disaster.” In conclusion, even if the expectation of truthfulness is filled, the journalist makes choices when organizing the facts in to a narrative that becomes the news article, participating in producing the subject (Tamboukou 2008, 104) and therefore I find it relevant to study the media representations produced in the context of the migrant “crisis”.
3.3 Newsletters from Croatian and Bosnian publishers – data collection in summer 2019

I collected the research material during my internship at the embassy of Finland in Croatia during the summer of 2019, as mentioned in the introduction. The research material consists of news articles from two publications, HINA and Bosnia Daily, from which HINA is a Croatia publication and Bosnia Daily Bosnian. They are subscribed to the embassy to provide a brief collection of daily news of the area in English, as most of the Finnish diplomatic staff do not know the local languages. During the internship, I found out that this is also the case in embassies of several other countries and the same publications are subscribed by them. During the observation period, between May and July, I collected a total of 124 news articles regarding migration, 61 from HINA and 63 from Bosnia Daily. I searched for articles concerning migration or migrants but used also other search terms, such as asylum and refugee.

HINA, or Hrvatska izvještajna novinska agencij, is a government-owned national news agency in Croatia (HINA 2019). The HINA newsletter is published seven times a week in full text form without pictures. The reporting style resembles the daily news journalism as Horsti (2007) suggests, aiming at being brief and truthful, not providing multiple perspectives or involve investigative practices or interviews. The reports are often based on briefs, press releases or interviews of authorities and other organized sources and are mainly concentrated on the facts.

Bosnia Daily is published five times a week and it comes in a pdf-form resembling a newspaper. Despite the daily news reports, it includes pictures, opinions, columns and longer, more investigative texts, harvested from different sources. For this study, I have chosen only the reports resembling the genre of daily news journalism in order to have comparable research material. However, the different types of genres are not always clearly separated in Bosnia Daily, which means that my initial research material included all stories including the investigative reports. From that material, I sorted out those articles which did not qualify as the genre of daily news, meaning the analysis of the narratives on Bosnia Daily does not include all published articles, unlike the analysis of HINA. However, I believe that for the purposes of this study this delineation of the news stories is suitable for two reasons: It makes the research material more comparable, as HINA represents only one genre and the audience in the embassies are most likely mostly interested in the daily news reports and do not have time to read longer stories with less news value. The readers in embassies are likely to be already well informed in the backgrounds of the situations and people involved in them.
It is rather difficult to find information about Bosnia Daily online despite its own web page. It introduces two online papers, Bosnia Daily and B&H Business, explaining they are independent publications, focusing on politics and economics. By the look of their web page, as seen on Figure 3, and the news stories they publish, I find it as a pro-EU publication, although it still criticizes some actions of the EU or the member states.

These are not the only news outlets providing English-language news from the area. For example, Total Croatia News, Croatia Week and Dubrovnik Times publish daily news in English, but their reporting on issues such as migration is often based on other sources, such as HINA. All of them also have more emphasis on travel than HINA, as Croatia is a popular touristic destination and many non-Croatian speakers are interested in the area for touristic purposes or work on the travel industry.

In Bosnia, Sarajevo Times and CNN backed N1 publishes daily news in English. It covers the main news topics and the stories are mainly brief, answering to the basic questions of what, when, where, who and why. I assume it would be comparable with the HINA news, but it was not explicitly read at the embassy, I find it more interesting to analyze the two chosen news publications, HINA and Bosnia Daily, as together they create a more diverse research material.

Figure 3: The banners on the front page of Bosnia Daily's web page indicate the pro-EU stance (Bosnia Daily 2020)
As a national news outlet, HINA seems to follow the national stand on issues. It does not directly criticize government actions but publishes news where outside sources critique them if the critique has raised further conversation and thus became newsworthy. Other news outlets in the region also use the HINA’s news as a source (HINA 2019), which gives and impression on well-established news agency that other agencies trust. Bosnia Daily brings out the critique towards the officials more clearly, although it seems to concentrate mainly on the officials with pro-Serb stance.

Bosnia Daily’s target audience is the foreigners living and working in Bosnia (Bosnia Daily 2020). HINA does not define any specific audience but as it is the national news outlet, the target audience for the daily Croatian-language news can be assumed to be all Croatians who follow the news. The English-language newsletter probably has a similar target audience to Bosnia Daily due to the language. However, the daily news in general often do not have a very focused audience and therefore I can only assume who the audience could be, despite the fact I collected them in a very specific environment. I base my assumptions of the target audience on my experiences in the embassy where also news from other sources was circulated, and the diplomats were using other sources, such as personal networks, to gain information on issues of their specific interest. For example, they worked together with human rights organizations and other non-governmental actors to gain a perspective on human rights issues.

The targeted “foreigners” are likely a limited group, as they need to be able to read and understand English and have access to the internet. In Bosnia Daily’s case, they even need to be able and willing to pay for the content unless it is provided by their employer or other sources. Therefore, I define the target audience for my research material in question to be middle or upper class, mainly Western people residing or having close connections to the area. This target group is likely educated and able to find information from different sources, which is important to keep in mind. The news does not solely construct anyone’s idea of the issues in question, but they participate in the construction. In this study, I study only the news narratives and not the possible affects they have on people.

3.4 Thematic narrative analysis

Narratives can be understood as one of the fundamental ways of communicating for human beings (Hyvärinen 2006). There are several ways to define narrative depending on the discipline the researcher is engaged in (Riessman 2008, 4-6). I base my understanding of narratives and narrative research on Catherine Riessman’s (2008) writings. She explains that the classical definition of
narrative, made by Aristotle, says narrative needs to have a beginning, middle and an end. The incidents are organized around a plot. Aristotle examined Greek tragedy, but the modern study of narratives has expanded to several kinds of stories, interviews, historical and archival documents, and even pictures.

As the definition of narrative varies, so do the means of making narrative analysis. From this variety of narrative methods available, I have chosen to use thematic narrative analysis to analyze my research material. As Riessman (2008, 53) writes, thematic narrative analysis is applicable for a variety of texts other than just interviews so I have chosen it to help me to understand my research material. Thematic narrative analysis is close to other qualitative methods, such as grounded theory and interpretive phenomenological analysis. However, it attempts to keep the “story” intact, rather than separating thematical coding segments. Defining stories and their boundaries can be difficult and highly interpretive, Riessman notes. Therefore, I find it important to define what is a narrative in this study. I understand narratives as a part of the accepted, dominant public discourses that appear in the research material, as Esin, Fathi and Squire (2014) explain. These discourses help us to understand the social reality around us and by using them, individuals are positioned in relation to the discursive resources they deploy. Discourses construct our social realities and provide meaningful interpretations of the narratives (Wetherell 2011).

The narrator organizes the events in a certain way to make sense of the actions, at the same time justifying and legitimizing them (Livholts & Tamboukou 2015, 28). In this study, the narrators are the news journalists who have written the articles. They have the power to choose how the actions are connected to each other and narrated to the audience. The narrator organizes otherwise random and disconnected events or ideas as meaningful patterns, or stories (Riessman 2008). In this study, I consider the journalists constructing the narratives by making chronological or causal connections between events, thus creating a story-like chain of events. The journalists can choose what they include in the narrative and what they leave out, as well as what type of language they use and whose voice can be “heard” in it.

According to my understanding of narratives in news texts, one complete news story contains at least one narrative. However, depending on the style and length of the text, one news story may contain several narratives. For example, the story can give background information that creates its own story inside the actual news, or it can elaborate on the topic with interviews or observations, which may be organized as a story. In the bigger picture, the news stories published in the same publication form a
general view on the topic. Although every news story needs to be informative on its own, I assume that every publication has some policies or guidelines to make sure they maintain certain standards. Therefore, I have looked for common patterns of embedded assumptions and common thematic elements across the material in my analysis. For example, I have looked for themes such as governance, migration management, and the EU, in order to answer my research questions.

I concentrate on what is said in the research material, paying attention to the broader context where the narrative is produced. This is further explained in chapter 2. I also focus on macro concepts, such as power relations, hidden inequalities, and historical contingencies. This makes narrative analysis case centered and it does not strive for generic explanations.

Riessman (2008) explains, that in thematic narrative analysis, the analyst develops her own thematic through which she then interprets the research material. The thematic narrative analysis gives prior theory and concepts for analyzing the material. I started to collect the main topics the newsletter publishes news of. After I had collected the topics, I started to analyze the narrative based on the topic in order to find out what themes I can recognize as prevalent/dominant and understand what is the “dominant narrative”. After that, I turned to the original research material again and read it through these themes in mind to find other articles talking about them, to support my assumption of the dominant narrative. This is how I collected the primary and secondary articles from which the narratives consist of. The primary articles are articles explicitly discussing the topic, forming “the backbone” of the narrative and the secondary articles talk about the themes prevalent in the narrative.

3.5 Critical observations of the study

This thesis is a qualitative case study and its goal is to define, analyze and understand the narratives regarding migration in the selected material to better understand the narratives that appear in the Croatian and Bosnian news (Häikiö & Niemenmaa 2007, 45). As I aim to produce a balanced, well-argued and scientifically sound study, as a researcher I am required to continuously reflect my personal, social and cultural positionings as a researcher (Häikiö & Niemenmaa 2007, 41; Esin, Fathi & Squire 2014, 7-8).

My study is concerning the forced migration situation in Croatia and Bosnia. As a citizen of Finland, born in Finland, I do not have personal experiences on forced migration. My experience from the studied countries is also limited and based on travelling in the region and living three months in
Croatia in 2019. Therefore, my understanding of the case of forced migration and the context of Croatia and Bosnia is limited and may pose challenges for the study. However, I consider my position as an “outsider” also giving opportunities for the analysis of the research material.

The challenges include the fact that I am not as familiar with the local context of the area as, for example, a local resident speaking the language would be. I have been familiarizing myself with the context by reading the history of the area and keeping up with the events in the societies by reading other news outside the migration situation. Therefore, I consider myself having a little more knowledge of the area than an average Finn, for example. However, the “outsider” position is also an opportunity as the research material I am using is targeted to people in my position: non-Croatian or Bosnian speaker with an interest in the daily news on the area.

As not a long-term resident in the area, I also lack information and certain ideas surrounding events or specific persons. In this study, I mention several people by name, mainly important political figures in the two countries. Usually, such persons appear in the media and the audience already has some ideas about them. I, however, have not had access to such discussions entailing I did not have strong ideas regarding the people I mention in the study beforehand. As already stated, making research requires continuous reflections from the researcher and during the research process, my idea of the people in question, and the research topic in general, has changed and developed.

Even though I am an outsider, I still have general values and ideas which do affect my interpretation of the research material and as a researcher, I need to be aware of them. However, as my study follows the constructionist ideas, my role as a researcher is to participate in the definition and production of the knowledge regarding the research topic by making choices and interpretations of it (Jokinen 2016, 253). When producing knowledge, I am also using power by naming and defining things under study, by participating in the discussion of forced migration.

The researcher, I, have a strong role in interpreting the data and creating the narratives (Riessman 2008). Therefore, the study relies on my interpretations and I, as an analyst, need to make assumptions about the meanings in the research material because I am unable to understand the complete conditions where the news articles under scrutiny were produced. However, all researchers lack access to another’s unmediated experience (Riessman 2008, 76) and therefore this is common to all qualitative studies.
The research material has also its limitations. It consists of news articles from the two chosen publications, HINA and Bosnia Daily which do not fully represent all the possible medias in the two countries. They may even be a biased representation of the media as their target audience is different from the local language medias and do not fully represent all possible news medias, such as television news. However, as explained, the audience for these medias is targeted more specifically and as representative of that audience, I consider this research material to be suitable for the purposes of this study. As the English language media is limited in this area, I also believe this research material is a good representation of it in order to make a qualitative case study.
I have created four narratives from the research material. These narratives work as an example of the topics related to the migrant “crisis” discussed in HINA and Bosnia Daily during summer 2019. The narratives are created in order to recognize the dominant narratives in the research material. Based on these narratives, I analyzed the signs of securitization in the research material, as well as portraying the EU. In the analysis I reflect the research material with the discussion presented on chapter 2.

The first two narratives are made separately from HINA and Bosnia Daily to analyze the publications’ ways of writing and publishing the news articles, which I call the “style” of the publication. I assume that the style is similar within the publication regardless of the narrative and therefore the last two narratives are combining and comparing both publications within the same narrative, keeping in mind the different styles.

In the HINA newsletter, a brief, informative news article on the incidents that are the topic of the news is often on top of the letter. If the officials have something to say about the topic, another article follows with the officials’ comments. Sometimes brief comments from the officials are already in the first article.

When talking about forced migrants, HINA uses the word migrant combined with words illegal or irregular, whether it was a quote from a politician or part of the news story written by the journalist. Refugees are also mentioned by the journalists but usually only if the news were about people with lawful refugee status, for example, Syrian refugees who are being relocated to Croatia as a part of the European refugee relocation program. The only person in formal power position talking about refugees in HINA is the Ombudswoman who disputes the other officials’ stance on Croatia’s policies regarding the forced migrants.

Bosnia Daily refers to the forced migrants often as “refugees and migrants”, however, the politicians quoted in Bosnia Daily often use the terms illegal or irregular migrants. The differences of the terms between HINA and Bosnia Daily show that HINA uses similar terms with government officials while Bosnia Daily has more variation. One reason for this can be the fact that Bosnia Daily uses many different authors and news published by other news agencies and therefore there is less of a clear line, which terms are used. HINA, on the other hand, is the national news agency and therefore they most likely have more defined policies and better resources to maintain it.
The term illegal migrant is problematic as discussed in chapter 2.1. The usage of such a term is not a neutral way to separate the forced migrants from immigrant workers, for example, as it criminalizes those who have no choice but to migrate (Scheel and Squire 2014, 188-191), although the Geneva Convention stipulates that “The Contracting States shall not impose penalties [on refugees], on account of their illegal entry of presence”.

Both HINA and Bosnia Daily give explanations for why the forced migrants are in the area as background information attached to some of the news articles. This information brings out the idea that the migrants are on their way to the European Union and not willing to stay in Bosnia nor Croatia, although Croatia does not need to emphasize this as they emphasize more the facts on how they cannot even get in. This is a prevailing narrative of the migratory movements in both, Bosnia Daily and HINA. In Bosnia Daily it has three aspects: It presents the EU as a desirable destination for the migrants, due to the “strong economies” (in opposition to unstable Bosnian economy). Secondly, it highlights the “closed borders” of the Union, that Croatia is mainly to be blamed, which leads to the third point. Bosnia is presented as weak and incapable to take care of the migrants. No direct solution to the situation is given but as several articles also talk about the porous Bosnian borders, the unspoken solution seems to be the EU’s support to Bosnia.

In HINA the migrants’ willingness to enter Croatia and the EU in unjustified and therefore Croatia must protect the borders carefully. Croatia is simply forced to act like this due to Bosnia’s incapability of taking care of the issue. The interesting thing here is the justification of the peoples' movements, which Bosnia Daily does not take as a clear stance as HINA, where the forced migrants are systematically denounced as economic migrants, “illegal” and not refugees.

The migrants themselves are rarely interviewed and thus given voice in HINA and Bosnia Daily. HINA often contents to keep with answering briefly to the questions of what, when, where, who and why and does not analyze the news topics further. Although not interviewing the migrants, Bosnia Daily does bring up different comments and notions in the news stories. These comments, however, tend to support Bosnia Daily’s stance on the issues. For example, Bosnia Daily accuses Croatia of illegal pushbacks from the Croatian border to Bosnia, the topic of the first narrative. Croatian authorities deny these allegations but, unlike HINA, Bosnia Daily does not concentrate on writing about Croatian authorities’ explanations but quotes sources that also consider Croatia being guilty of such actions, thus enforcing its stance.
4.1 Narrative 1: Croatian border protection – “The Bosnian asylum”

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<th>Newsletter</th>
<th>Primary articles</th>
<th>Secondary articles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HINA</td>
<td>May 13, May 16 (x2), June 2, June 5, June 21, July 4 (x2), July 17, July 18</td>
<td>May 10 (x2), May 15, June 4, June 11, June 13, July 13 (x2), July 17</td>
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This narrative consists of the news stories published in HINA regarding the claims that Croatian border police are using unnecessary violence towards the people who are attempting to cross the border from Bosnia to Croatia without using the official border crossing facilities. It also includes articles where officials answer to such claims and stories that talk about the border and its functions, such as guarding the border and capturing people smugglers. These news articles form the narrative of a strong Croatian border that is being controlled seriously although some sources claim the border police is indulging in so called pushbacks, also titled as illegal on unlawful. The term pushback is used when the news refers to accusations of the border police delivering back the migrants who have crossed the border. This act is considered illegal or unlawful when the person pushed back has not been given a chance to apply for international protection.

The news in this narrative follows a pattern where HINA publishes a news article about the accusations made by Bosnian authorities, organizations and foreign media. Then HINA writes an article of the officials' response, often quoting the Interior Minister, Davor Bozinovic and/or Police Spokesman Milina. The accusations include claims of the border police using violence against the people on trying to cross the border and/or that they deliver them back to the Bosnian side of the border without giving them a possibility to seek asylum. The state officials reassure that the Croatian border police works effectively in accordance with the international and EU law. The officials also make clear that Croatia is not only protecting its own border but also the external border of the EU.

The narrative denies all misconduct by the officials at the border. Although it is not explicitly stated, this practice makes the ones making the accusations seem untruthful or even lying. Croatian officials also legitimize their actions on the border by claiming they work in accordance with the law and protect not only their own citizens but the whole European Union.
An important actor sparking conversation of the border practices was a Swiss broadcaster SRF. On May 16 HINA reported SRF was showing “footage of Croatian police pushing migrants back to Bosnia – and migrants saying that police had seized their mobile phones and money.” The report quoted the SRF video, where a migrant told Croatian police destroyed their mobile phones, took their money and used force against them. “When asked if they could seek asylum in Croatia, a police officer told them that they would get "Bosnian asylum".” HINA wrote:

“The Croatian Ministry of the Interior said in response to -- that the footage showed "an official operation that is in line with the Schengen Borders Code and is designed to prevent illegal entries into the EU."

However, not giving the possibility to apply an asylum is a violation of European and international law. HINA notes this as in a quote from SRF where a German migration expert Marcus Engler says, that group expulsions are not allowed without a prior procedure. Therefore, if the border police deliver the migrants from Croatia back to Bosnia telling them they will get “Bosnian asylum”, they are deliberately breaking the law and probably guaranteed they will not get punished.

HINA also notes Engler saying:

“Croatia is not the only one to blame for such practice and that the entire EU is responsible. Croatian border police are financed with European money. Other countries support such conduct because they profit from it politically.”

The Engler’s quote brings out similar situation that was discussed in the ECRE study (Papadapoulou 2016). The EU pressures the Member States to control the arrivals with repressive measures which are applied by national authorities. the Member States are held ultimately responsible for the implementation of the border control measures, which often disrespect human.

The article also told that the Croatian police had been facing such accusations “for some time”, implying this type of news was nothing new. It also included a brief comment from the Minister of Interior, Bozinovic, and was followed by another article with his and the Police Director’s comments. On the article that followed, Bozinovic pleads on Croatia as protecting its sovereign borders while it was also protecting the whole EU from “illegal migrants”:
“Croatia's Interior Ministry said [the SRF footage] showed "official action in line with the Schengen code, aimed at preventing illegal entry into the EU." Speaking to reporters, Bozinovic said the TV report "was conceived so as to show that Croatian police use violence, and it's not the first time." He said the footage showed "everything but violence," and called it "another futile attempt to accuse the Croatian police which, I repeat, are enforcing national (and) European legislation."

In the article Bozinovic and Police Director Nikola Milia emphasized that the police acted in line with the legislation, as the quote from the news shows. They also expressed their concerns about the safety of the migrants, as the areas where they were trying to cross the border contain leftover landmines. Here the border practices are not only justified but the irregular border crossings but are also presented as a threat to the migrants, implying the crossings should not happen at all.

Similar justification to the border polices work by Bozinovic is found throughout the research material, making it a typical feature of the narrative. On an article from June 21, Bozinovic was told inspecting a border monitoring center as a response to a letter regarding the misconduct of the border police. The Interior Minister was quoted saying:

“The fact that [the migrants] managed to enter Croatia fairly easily speaks more of the countries along the way -- Croatia is a serious country that implements its laws. -- It was obvious that local authorities [in Bosnia] were sending a message to the migrants "head towards Croatia".”

Bozinovic’s comments position Croatia in the group of “serious countries” and blames Bosnia of sending the migrants towards Croatia. It is not explained what such a serious country is but, in these contexts, it seems to refer to countries with strict border control. However, on June 5 HINA told the Bosniak Presidency member of Bosnia blaming:

“Croatian police were sending all illegal migrants to [Bosnia], including some that had not come from [Bosnia], and in that way "amassing" them in the country.”

These comments show the countries have difficulties in agreeing on what is happening on the border. Is Croatia pushing back the migrants, giving them the “Bosnian asylum” or is Bosnia sending them to Croatia? The next narrative tries to shed light on the Bosnian stance on this issue.
The pushbacks are unlawful if the person pushed back is not allowed to apply for asylum despite his or her will. In the article from June 21, Bozinovic also “underscored that these were not asylum seekers but illegal migrants who wish to find work in western EU countries.” In the article, the Police Director Milia accused the migrants from lying about the misconduct of the border police as they are frustrated from being denied access to the EU.

“Asked about the misconduct of some police officers toward migrants, Milina said that some officers had been punished, however in most cases these were false accusations, recalling a Syrian refugee who had falsely claimed that he had been separated from his daughter and who was later charged as a result.”

By this statement Milia is further justifying the actions on the border and presenting the migrants as untrustworthy “bogus asylum seekers” making beneficial and informed migration choices, thus not deserving help as Scheel and Squire (2014) write. This brings out the dichotomy between political and economic migrants. Scheel and Squire (2014) say “economical migration” is considered voluntary and can be clearly separated from political reasons. Wishing to find work from the EU countries is considered as beneficial and informed migration choice which does not entitle for asylum, thus they become “illegal migrants” in Bozinovic’s speech. Bozinovic juxtaposes the “illegitimate” or “criminal” immigrant with an imagined migrant in need of help, similar to what Scuzzarello and Kinnvall (2013) have found in their studies. The Police Director Nikola Milina also enforces this image with his words about the lying Syrian refugees.

The migrants were not able to express their stance on the issue in any of the HINA’s stories during the research period leaving the reader only with the Interior Minister’s and Police Director’s, both government officials, testimonies, which is typical for news concerning migration, as mentioned in chapter 2.4. By not giving the migrants voice, they are stripped away from their agency and they can be portrayed in the way that fits to the current narrative.

The control over one's voice can also be lost, as Gready (2008) explained in chapter 2.4. The media follows closely those in power, such as the President of Croatia Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, who gave an interview on Swiss television in July regarding the actions on Croatian border with Bosnia. HINA wrote about it on July 16. In the interview, Grabar-Kitarović was quoted saying:
"— all [officials] assured me they have not been using excessive force --. Of course, a little bit of force is needed when doing pushbacks."

The article talked about the Swiss and other foreign media interpreting the President’s statement as admitting the violence of Croatian border police at the border. In the article, the President “strongly dismissed attempts to reinterpret her statements on defending Croatia's borders against illegal migrations.” The interview was conducted by SRF, the same broadcaster that published the footage of Croatian police making pushbacks in May.

The article is based on the President’s statement, which she issued after a human rights organization, the Human Rights Watch (HRW), sent an open letter to her, calling on Croatia to "immediately stop summarily returning migrants and asylum seekers to Bosnia and Herzegovina, in some cases with force." HINA wrote that the foreign media and human rights organizations grasped Grabar-Kitarović’s statement, saying:

"Foreign media outlets interpreted Grabar-Kitarović's as confirmation of reports about the mistreatment of migrants passing through Croatia."

This works as an example of HINA taking the president's side on the issue, blaming "the foreign media" of misinterpreting Grabar-Kitarović's statement. Without the President’s statement to HRW, HINA would not even have made a news about the SRF interview.

On July 17 HINA reported on The Centre for Peace Studies (CMS) stance on an anonymous complaint by border police officers about systematic unlawful actions on the border. CMS said it was the first confirmation of unlawful police conduct on the ground and added that the Ombudswoman had been warning for months that she was being denied access to data on the treatment of migrants. This story does include critique towards the government's actions. However, all critique is presented in CMS's words and HINA does not take a stance on CMS's accusations. In the case of misinterpreting the president's words, it did show it is on the president's side by backing up her claims of misinterpretation. This example shows HINA supports the official stance and those in power but at the same time it can publish critique towards the current policies. This practice keeps up an image of balanced journalism not biased too much in favor of the ruling elite.

A similar theme continued the next day, July 18, when HINA reported about a press release by The Croatian Journalists Association (HND):
“[HND] said on Thursday it was appalled by President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović's scandalous statements, unworthy of the office she holds, in which she shamefully instructs journalists how to do their job.”

The HND claimed the president gave instructions to journalists not to follow foreign media, referring to the interview on Swiss television and continued that the president is trying to discipline journalists in Croatia "in a very perfidious way to do their job by blindly believing only one side, representatives of the authorities, and not their colleagues." According to the HND, the President ended her statement with an instruction to journalists:

"'As Croatian media you must present the Croatian side of the story. Don't follow foreign media which work in who knows whose interest.' This reminds [the HND] of the 1990s when some journalists, apologists of the then authorities, publicly said: 'If necessary, I will lie for Croatia'"

The HND is referring to the 1990’s, when Yugoslavia collapsed leading to ethnic disputes and the Yugoslavian war. “Journalists' job is not to work in the interest of any policy but in the public interest”, HND concluded.

This article reports the HND's view on the president's instructions and does not include HINA's comments but by releasing the article based on HND's press release, HINA is supporting their stance as they do not present critique towards it. The discussion between the president and the media that started from the president's interview for SRF can be interpreted as an example of losing power over one’s words (Greedy 2008). Grabar-Kitarović tries to correct her words and uses her official power to instruct journalists. While this is not directly linked to the migrant situation, it works as an example of the power positions in the press. The president can lose her power over what she said as any individual giving testimonies in the media. However, she can also make a press release to explain her words and at least some medias will grasp on it. Furthermore, she can also instruct the journalists to write news according to her interests but lead to a backlash from the journalist's association.

A similar power struggle with the journalist's interpretations would be harder for someone not in a prominent position in society. It would be harder for them to make the press interested in the corrections of their words not to speak of instructing the press. The migrants nor the border police, the topic in the news that started this whole power struggle, have not been able to express their experiences from the border at all. The Police Director Nikolai Milina speaks for the police, but
nobody speaks for the migrants, leaving the readers with the authorities' interpretation of their actions and intentions. If the authorities are to believe, the migrants lie and do not have the right reasons to try to access the country. When this narrative relates to the secondary articles I do not analyze here explicitly, it is clear HINA presents the migrants as “economic migrants” and “bogus asylum seekers” not deserving the access to Croatia or the EU. Therefore, it is better to justify any means necessary to keep them away that justify them getting in. As Croatia, on behalf of the EU, keeps their borders closed from the “economic migrants”, their only chance is to get the “Bosnian asylum.”

4.2 Narrative 2: Porous and impassable borders – Bosnia between a rock and a hard place

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<tr>
<td>Bosnia Daily</td>
<td>May 21, June 12, June 14, July 3, July 17</td>
<td>May 10, May 14 (x2), May 23, June 10, June 11, June 25, June 26, July 1</td>
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The following narrative consists of Bosnia Daily’s stance on the migrant situation in the country, focusing on the Croatian border. It also includes examples of other challenges in the country as they are intermingled with the migrant situation. Unlike in HINA’s narrative, which presented the officials as having the situation under control, Bosnia Daily clearly shows the country and its political system are having difficulties dealing with the situation. The challenges in Bosnia are mainly connected with the ethnic division in the country, as it is divided between the three ethnic groups, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The Bosnian presidency is shared between the ethnicities and during the data collection, the Serb member of the Presidency, Milorad Dodik, was heading the presidency.

This narrative presents Bosnia in “between a rock and a hard place”: strong Croatian borders prevent the migrants from leaving Bosnia but the porous borders with Serbia and Montenegro let them in in increasing amount. According to Bosnia Daily, the reasons for this situation are not only the practices on the Croatian border but also the ethnically divided political field which makes decision making and implementation very difficult. Bosnia Daily condemns the Croatian actions on the border as “a violation of the international law and European Union rules”, as seen, for example, on the news about the Swiss SRF’s video “showing the Croatian border police illegally returning refugees and migrants to Bosnia”. The video, which also was a topic of the news in HINA, grasped Bosnia Daily’s attention on May 16. The Bosnia Daily’s version of the news only talks about the incidents on the video and
does not show any comments from politicians, unlike HINA that published an article on the Interior Minister’s comments on the same day.

May 21, a report regarding a ministry’s brief where the Bosnian Minister of Security, Dragan Mektic addressed the current situation in the field of migration, governance, and challenges faced by institutions in charge of the migration issues and the activities planned in the upcoming period:

“Minister Mektic highlighted the key problems, primarily that there is no common solution at the EU level common solution at the EU level, stressing that migrants are passing through EU member states, Greece and Bulgaria. He stressed that the strengthening of the protection of the eastern border was crucial to the management of the migrant situation, and asked the lawmakers to support the engagement of the needed number of police officers – [The lawmakers] concluded that the relocation of the centers from urban areas is necessary. Minister Mektic said that the relocation of migrants from Bira and Miral centers to a new location will begin as soon as the conditions in the field allow it.

Mektic’s message was that the neighboring countries in the eastern border, Serbia and Montenegro, are the cause of the problem and Bosnia needs to stand up and protect its borders, similar approach that Croatia has already taken. Therefore, Mektic’s arguments resemble the stance of the Croatian officials as he considers the solution to the situation being the strengthening of the borders. However, he also blames the EU for the situation, something that HINA did not report the Croatian authorities doing. Although not explicitly explained, he is referring to the narrative that the migrants are on their way to the EU and that is why the EU is responsible for making a common solution to deal with the migrant, as they usually first arrive to the EU Member States Greece and Bulgaria. The EU is responsible for solving the migrant problem on its behalf by other means than keeping the migrants in Bosnia, as in Bosnia Daily’s narrative they do not want to stay in Bosnia. The lack of the EU’s common solutions will be discussed further in chapter 4.6.

The reason why Bosnia has not already strengthened its border with Serbia and Montenegro is the Serb Presidency member, Milorad Dodik, according to Bosnia Daily. This was evident on 12 June, when Bosnia Daily covered the Presidency’s session, where the three Presidency members “failed to agree on ways to tackle the migrant situation.” The Croat member of the Presidency proposed deployment of Bosnian Armed Forces to the border with Serbia and Montenegro to prevent migrants from entering the country. The idea was rejected by Dodik, who said he cannot accept the deployment
of the army on the border with Serbia and Montenegro. He also rejected a proposal to deploy the European border and coast guard agency, Frontex, as it would only make the border with Croatia “harder.” The reason, although not explicitly expressed in this article, for Dodik to oppose the deployment of army at the Serbian and Montenegrin borders, is that a significant Serb minority resides in Montenegro (CIA 2020) and Dodik supports the idea of “greater Serbia”, annexing the Republika Srpska with the Serbian state, Serbia proper. This was explained in another article from June 14, where Dodik was described as “the Bosnian Serb hard-line leader -- who has repeatedly pressed for Serbs to separate from multi-ethnic Bosnia and unite with Serbia proper”. It claimed that he “has been using the crisis to promote his Serbian-first attitude, including by refusing to accommodate any migrants in Republika Srpska.”

While HINA almost handled those in power with kid gloves, Bosnia Daily is especially critical towards the incumbent President Dodik. Bosnia Daily describes him as only watching the interests of the Serb minority residing mostly in the area of Republika Srpska. About the migrant situation in the country, Bosnia Daily quotes him saying “Republika Srpska shouldn’t be collateral damage in all this”. Therefore, he refuses to share “the migrant burden” throughout the country by establishment of migrant camps and facilities to the autonomous Serb area, although the Bosniak member of the Presidency asked for this in the Presidency session. He asked the migrants to be shared throughout the entire country as it is not fair that the burden is on two or three cantons. His proposal was dismissed by Dodik. Dodik’s explicit stance on the migrant situation is that the migrants “damage” Bosnia and that the Serb part of the country should not be affected, putting the Serbs in a different position compared to the rest of the Bosnians.

Bosnia Daily presents the Serb member of the Presidency as damaging the country’s migration policies, as these news show. It does not comment a lot on the Bosniak or Croat leader’s stances in this research material and no critique towards them was found. Therefore, I interpret Bosnia Daily positions itself on the Bosnian Federation side, which is also supported by most of the international community, such as the US that has been helping to create the country of Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Yugoslavian war (Glenny 2012).

These news also show Bosnia as a difficult country to govern due to ethnic differences. The fact that the country has not had a government since October 2018 elections also speaks for this. This fact was brought out in Bosnia Daily’s news article from July 3. It explains the Serb representative for Council of Ministers denies supporting Bosnia’s NATO accession, a decisive issue for the Bosniak
representatives for forming the government. The difficulties of forming a government are also due to the complex political system, the article suggests.

The topic of the July 3 article was a Session of the Council of Ministers, where they also discussed the migrant situation. It was decided to task the Defense Minister “to urgently send a decision to the Presidency on deploying engineering units of Armed Forces to the border in order to prevent migrants from entering the country.” The news told 10 most frequent border crossing locations had been identified from the border with Serbia and Montenegro and border control cooperation will be increased with these countries. The Council of Ministers agreed with the Bosniak and Croat Presidency members about the strengthening of the borders, but the decisions were considered unlikely to proceed as the Presidency is headed by the Serb member who would likely deny the deployment.

The Defense Minister and The Chairman of the Council of Ministers noted that Bosnia will not take in more migrants than it can sustain:

“We still want to respect international law, but there is no money in the world that the EU can give us so we would become a migrant reception centre. Bosnia will humanely treat all the 5,000 migrants which are our maximum capacity.”

This statement resembles the ones from the Croatian officials, who also highlight the humane and lawful treatment of the migrants, although the narrative 4 will show, the humane treatment is not an unambiguous concept. The quote also resembles Croatia’s position to the EU’s “Hot Spot Approach”, as under the approach the Member State is funded by the EU as it takes care of the migrants on its territory. In the previous narrative, Croatian politicians clearly said Croatia will not become a hotspot, similar to the Bosnian politicians here refusing to take more than 5000 migrants, “the maximum capacity”. Yet Bosnia is willing to accept monetary and material help from the EU to manage the migrants.

The EU was again brought out in the news, as on July 17 Bosnia Daily tackled the Croatian president’s interview on Swiss television. The EU was already on the headline: “In Croatia, EU Border Guards Use 'a Little Bit of Force’”. The news explains the backgrounds:

“Croatia -- is aiming to join the border-free Schengen area. But it has become increasingly clear to what lengths the government will go so Croatians can enjoy this freedom of
movement. Over the past year, many refugees trying to cross into the EU through unofficial border crossings between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have reported brutal treatment by Croatian border police. Media reports have shown refugees -- including children — with wounds they say were inflicted by police.”

This explanation shows the typical narrative for Bosnia Daily, where it combines Croatia’s aims to join the Schengen area and the “brutal treatment” of the Croatian border police. The article goes on saying Croatian media is ignoring these reports and the Interior Ministry rejecting reports of ill-treatment of refugees and denying border police have been carrying out so-called pushbacks. This interpretation seems true in the light of the previous narrative, where the Minister of Interior and The President were anxiously defending the Croatian border police. HINA’s news about this SRF interview was also only made because of the response from the President. Without the statement the President published regarding the foreign media’s interpretations, HINA would maybe have ignored the accusations altogether, proving it ignores such issues.

Bosnia Daily seems to be taking the stance that Croatia is willing to go to extremes in order to be accepted in the Schengen area. Croatia is protecting its citizens and borders from the migrant burden to promote its own interests. This approach puts not only the migrants but also Bosnians and the Bosnian Croats in a different position than the Croatians.

The article quotes human rights organization Amnesty International’s statement from March, where it demonstrates the pushbacks happen and criticizes the EU officials for prioritizing border control over compliance with international law. As seen in narrative 1, state officials defending their actions and claiming them to be “lawful” while human rights organizations (and other actors) blame them for breaking the international law is a prevailing theme in the narratives. Although Bosnia Daily does not say it straight, its reporting portrays Croatia being guilty of these accusations.

Bosnia Daily quotes the Croatian President debunking the accusations by saying: "When someone travels through this difficult terrain, it's normal for them to get scrapes, bruises, and injuries --.". Grabar-Kitarović also insisted that police were not pushing refugees back over the border, claiming the people trying to cross into the EU were simply economic migrants. This quote is different than what HINA used in its article regarding the same issue. As Bosnia Daily portrays Croatia as guilty to the accusations of border violence and pushbacks, the president’s quotes seem untruthful in this context. Grabar-Kitarović admits the people have injuries but for claims, they came from the “difficult
terrain”, not from the violence. She also says Croatia is not pushing back refugees but economic migrants, but they are pushing back someone. To Bosnia, it does not matter if the people who are not let in are “economic migrants” or “refugees” as they will still end up back to Bosnia. The article does not address the fact that the people do not most likely have refugee status, but they could be willing to search for asylum. This leaves the question, how does The Croatian President know if they were not refugees if they are not even given the chance to express their willingness to seek asylum, meaning the president has used the terms carelessly. She, however, is not the only one but throughout the research material, the terms are used in a similar manner.

The story also includes a quote from a German paper, Deutche Welle, where an Amnesty International researcher says that under international and EU law, collective evictions and pushbacks are always illegal. The story finishes with a short chapter telling that the European Commission no comment to make on Grabar-Kitarović’s interview, highlighting the EU’s unwillingness to take a stance on the issue. It also discussed Croatia’s aims to become a member of the Schengen Zone. These issues will be discussed in chapter 4.6.

On July 17th, Bosnia Daily also reported that the heads of police and cantonal officials had made agreements “on providing assistance and operational cooperation in the process of border monitoring with the aim of more effective prevention of illegal migration”. The agreements will enable the police officers to engage with the border police in border monitoring activities for preventing irregular crossings of the border. The agreement is a step forward in making agreements on the border control the Bosniak and Croat authorities require. It shows that decision making is possible at the lower level of the administrational organization, although the upper level administration, such as the Government and the Presidency, have their hands tied due to the disagreements between the ethnic groups.

This narrative shows that strengthening the border control is the desired solution to the migrant situation, however, it is not done due to Dodik’s unwillingness. According to Bosnia Daily, Dodik’s unwillingness is not because of humanitarian reasons but because of his political goals and ideas not to strengthen the Bosnian federation’s borders with areas inhabited by ethnic Serbs. Dodik seems to be using the migrant situation to accelerate his political goals for more independent Republika Srpska. The next narrative tells more about that.
4.3 Narrative 3: Ethnically divided armed forces against migration – People as pawns

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<tr>
<th>Newsletter</th>
<th>Primary articles</th>
<th>Secondary articles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HINA</td>
<td>May 14, June 24</td>
<td>May 13, May 20, June 5, June 6, June 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Daily</td>
<td>June 11, June 2, June 25, June 28, July 1</td>
<td>May 14, May 23, June 10, June 11, June 12, June 17</td>
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This narrative consists of HINA’s and Bosnia Daily’s news covering the topic of the Bosnian Serb entity’s, Republika Srpska’s (RS), plans to establish their own reservist police. In the news, one of the main supporters of the reservist police is the Bosnian Serb presidency member, Milorad Dodik. This topic had been sparkling conversation before the research material was collected and it is not always linked to the migration issues, which can be seen on Bosnia Daily’s article from June 25 where it explains:

“Earlier this year, the RS authorities announced they would amend a law and form a reserve police unit, which was criticized by the Bosniak politicians in the Federation and a part of the international community.”

The conversation includes topics of joint federation armed forces of Bosnia and the reasons why the Bosnian Serb entity would like to establish its own armed forces, problematized by the rest of the state and by the international community.

Dodik justifies the establishment of the reservist police by protecting Republika Srpska from “escalating migration situation” and floods, as HINA reported on May 14. However, HINA told a Member of the Federation Parliament from a Bosniak Party of Democratic Action saying that floods or the migrant crisis are not the reason, the purpose is to eventually form an RS army. This statement summarizes the debate shown in the news, where the pro-Serb voices, especially Dodik, defends the plans and the rest, who are given a voice, oppose them. The opponents think Dodik is, in fact, using the migrants as pawns to create suitable conditions for his plans to strengthen Republika Srpska’s armed forces. By using the migrant situation as a reason to establish the reservist police and not agreeing with other solutions, such as tightening the borders, he is aiming to gain more power and
autonomy for Republika Srpska. These actions, however, would also shake the sensitive balance between the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia.

This narrative highlights the importance of the ethnicities in Bosnia. The ethnic identities are considered threatened and therefore the securitization of the ethnic identities is the most prominent from all the narratives. When Dodik is saying the migrants “damage” the Republika Srpska, as Bosnia Daily told on July 12, he is describing them as a threat to the Republika Srpska. The “damage” refers to the narrative of the migrants stealing and breaking into the local’s properties, as some other articles have suggested has happened. In the context of ethnic division, the “damage” can also be more abstract and refer to parts of identity, such as religion. The Serbs are mainly Orthodox while the majority of the migrants are expected to be Muslims. The Bosniaks are also Muslims and strengthening the Muslim population, even with migrants, can be seen as a threat to the Orthodox Serb identity.

Security arguments are also used by the opponents of the reserve police. The Bosniaks, Croats and international community, such as the US Embassy compare the situation to the 1990s when the Yugoslavian war escalated and stressed that “a reserve police force would only increase tensions and lead to an escalation of distrust.”. The reservist police forces were disbanded under the Dayton peace agreement which was established at the end of the Yugoslavian war, HINA explained on May 14. The plans to establish the reservist police are equally condemned by HINA and Bosnia Daily, as they mainly support the current borders on Balkan states and do not wish for multiethnic Bosnia to divide. Apart from the politician’s statements, HINA and Bosnia Daily do not publish any comments supporting the plans for establishing the reserve police. Yet, the supporters most likely exist, as Dodik and other Bosnian Serb politicians are elected officials and therefore at least their voters and party members likely support their plans.

The Bosniaks and Croats also appealed to security arguments. On June 11, Bosnia Daily reported the Federation’s Interior Ministry saying:

“Because to this day, the Office of the High Representative [Bosnia’s international overseer] and the international community have not taken concrete measures to prevent the introduction of reservist forces in the Republika Srpska, the Federal Interior Ministry has taken measures and actions to restore the shaky security [situation] and maintain the balance of police forces in the entities,” the Federation Interior Ministry said in a statement on Sunday.
This meant the federation entity started planning similar forces in response to RS plans. The plans were seen as a security threat towards the Croat and Bosniak minority living in the entity, sparking “a negative spiral”, Bosnia Daily wrote on June 11.

Bosnia Daily also quoted political analyst Tanja Topic, who told BIRN (the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network) that the reservist force was not needed in the Republika Srpska and it was intended to provoke reactions and to encourage divisions in society. If this was the RS goal, it seemed to have succeeded as the federation reacted with the announcement to start planning the establishment of their own reservist forces and the move sparked reactions even in the Croatian news.

Almost two weeks later, Republika Srpska’s police ministry said it dropped the plan to form a reserve police unit. The existing support police unit would be transformed into gendarmerie, Bosnia Daily reported on June 25. The news told that RS police ministry said this transformation was necessary for “a faster and more efficient response to the security threats in the RS, including a large number of illegal migrants”. Milorad Dodik said:

“The only purpose of forming a reserve police unit is the better protection of the territory and citizens of the RS, especially because of the inability to deal with the migrant crisis”

Dodik claims the migrants pose a security threat to the Republika Srpska, which is an obscure statement from the head of the Bosnian federation. Although he is currently heading the presidency of the whole federation, Dodik clearly drives the advantages of the Serbs and the RS, not all the citizens on the federation.

In the article, it was not explained what transforming the support police unit to a gendarmerie means in practice or what the gendarmerie is. This is likely because the press nor anyone else, except those who were involved in the plans, were not given this information. This can be seen in an article three days later, where Bosnia Daily reports that the decision to drop the plan regarding reserve police unit became a surprise to the opposition MPs in Republika Srpska Assembly. They were confused at the beginning of the session as the government had decided a day before to withdraw the proposal for the establishment of a reserve police force in the entity. Bosnia daily added:

“The confusion was caused by the fact nobody knew the government made this decision and what it means that the police support forces would be renamed “gendarmerie”, which is

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HINA also reported about the cancellation of the plans. On June 24 it said that “Bosnia Serbs cancel the plan for reserve police forces amid growing criticism”, highlighting the criticism towards the plans. As HINA had not been following the developments as closely as Bosnia Daily, its news collected some events and comments from the previous weeks. The article told the Croats and Bosniaks reacted differently to the plans. As soon as the Serb authorities started speaking of their reserve police, Bosniak parties announced the establishment of such police forces in the Federation, as a countermeasure. The Croat politicians had called for closer coordination and cooperation of all police agencies in the country “in a bid to improve the efforts to address the migrant crisis”. HINA also reminded that international diplomats have warned against the establishment of such formations as they resemble the period ushering in the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar to what Bosnia Daily reported the US Embassy saying earlier.

This report from HINA shows how the narratives in HINA and Bosnia Daily separate. Both emphasize the criticism towards the plans but as the issue considers more Bosnia than Croatia, it is obvious that Bosnia Daily pays more attention to them than HINA. However, the way HINA reports about them points out how the Croat politicians in Bosnia make proposals in accordance with the international policy and Dayton peace agreement, while not only Serbs but also Bosniaks are willing to establish the reservist police. Bosnia Daily portrays the Bosniaks and Croats being more united in their decisions. As narrative 1 showed, HINA portrays Bosnia as less able to solve the migrant issue in the country and this narrative furthers strengthens this image.

As mentioned earlier, on June 28, Bosnia Daily reported the decision to change the plan from establishing the reserve police to changing the existing support police unit to a gendarmerie. In the article, the Interior Ministry of Republika Srpska was told deciding to reorganize its intervention forces “for a more efficient response to the security challenges in the RS, including a large number of illegal migrants”.

Bosnia Daily also published two comments regarding the decision. The United States Embassy to Bosnia-Herzegovina welcomed the decision and stressed:
'The establishment of reserve police units in any entity in Bosnia does not contribute to resolving a transnational issue, such as the migrant crisis. A greater degree of coordination and interoperability would contribute to a more stable and secure Bosnia and a reserve police force would only increase tensions and lead to an escalating of distrust.’

Another comment was from the Bosniak vice president of Republika Srpska, Ramiz Salkic, who was more skeptical.

‘The establishment of the gendarmerie is not a good decision. [Salkic] pointed out that the withdrawal from forming a reserve unit, with the announcement of the formation of a gendarmerie, does not really mean giving up the idea of forming an armed formation, “with the aim of using it for the realization of political ideas and goals at a given moment”.’

With the “political ideas and goals” Salkic probably referred Dodik’s political objective of reinforcing the autonomy of Republika Srpska, or even Bosnia falling apart, as he claims being possible in another

He claimed that the formation of a gendarmerie from regular police officers may be a more dangerous idea than a reserve force, bearing in mind the operability, training and equipment of such a unit, Bosnia Daily wrote. Salkic thus considers the gendarmerie is even more dangerous than a reserve force, securitizing any idea to strengthen the police forces in RS. Finally, Salkic and the US Embassy require a more joint approach to the armed forces, where the ethnic representation is considered.

On July Dodik commented that the establishment of the gendarmerie is not an issue for foreign diplomats in Bosnia, Bosnia Daily reported, adding that there will be no migrant centers in the Republika Srpska. He also criticized The Peace Implementation Council, as its High Representative had said that the RS can accommodate migrants. Bosnia Daily makes it clear that Dodik opposes the international community’s approach of ethnic representations on the armed forces and in solving the migrant issue. Dodik also said:

‘[I]t is a misconception to believe that Bosnia can’t fall apart as that has already happened due to the country’s inability to succeed, adding that the Serbs have never had anything from Bosnia. The biggest failure was “faith in foreigners” and that Bosnia should have been divided between its main three groups in 1995.’
The division of Bosnia, or at least partition of the Republika Srpska, may be the political goal Salkic referred to earlier. As Dodik is using the migration situation to provoke reactions and to encourage divisions in society by planning to enforce the RS armed forces, as Tania Topic was quoted saying earlier in the narrative. This narrative clearly shows how the issue of forced migration can be used in national politics. The Bosnian Serb politicians use the migrant crisis to justify the strengthening of the armed forces in Republika Srpska using security arguments, as they talk about the “damage” and “security threat” the migrants pose to Republika Srpska. The opponents also use securitization arguments to oppose the RS’s plans by referring to the bloody Bosnian war which included plenty of violence between the ethnic groups (Glenny 2012). The current political system and areal division are a product of the Dayton peace agreement that ended the war and supported largely by the international community (ibid.).

Dodik’s comments about Bosnia falling apart and references of the Bosnian war bring up the possibility of a new violent conflict. As the latest conflict is still likely fresh in the minds of most adults, referring to it is a strong statement for national security. Most people in Bosnia unlikely want another war and the international community, which is the likely audience of Bosnia Daily, does not want it either. As everyone knows it is an existing possibility, any strengthening of armed groups with ethnic representations is considered a serious threat. Dodik, however, works as an example of a person with significant political power, who opposes the current situation in Bosnia. He is doing his best to accelerate this division and he has seen the migrant crisis as a possibility to push his goals forward. Thus, he is using the Bosnian people and the forced migrants in the country as pawns by blackmailing the locals to accept his plans while struggling with the migration situation. Yet Dodik was not giving anything back to the rest of the federation, as he refused to take migrants to Republika Srpska and strengthening the borders.
4.4 Narrative 4: Managing migration - Out of sight, out of mind?

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<th>Newsletter</th>
<th>Primary articles</th>
<th>Secondary articles</th>
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<tr>
<td>HINA</td>
<td>June 1, June 5, June 13, June 16, June 21, June 25, July 4,</td>
<td>May 3, May 10, May 11, May 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Daily</td>
<td>May 10, June 3, June 6, June 10, June 11, June 17, June 18, June 26, July 3 (x3)</td>
<td>May 14, June 10, June 17</td>
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This narrative consists of the news from HINA and Bosnia Daily that deals with the migrants' location and accommodation. The migrants are described as a problem in the urban areas especially in the secondary articles and accommodating them outside the towns and further away from habitation is seen as the best solution. This approach is similar to what Turner (2015) writes: By locating the camps in uninhabited areas, the attempt is to strip the residents from proper agency and depoliticize the life in the camp using the humanitarian government to manage the migration.

As Croatia is keeping its borders closed, the biggest migrant pressure is on Bosnia. The number of migrants present in the country fluctuated between 5,000 and 8,000 throughout the research material. Approximately 4,500 are accommodated in the formal reception facilities while the rest are squatting in abandoned buildings, sleeping rough or in their own tents. Some have been able to rent their own accommodation. Over 33,300 refugees and migrants have entered Bosnia since January 2018 until the summer of 2019. On the contrary, no numbers of people arriving irregularly to Croatia were given in neither of the publications during the data collection time, although, for example, Bosnia's Security Minister Dragan Mektic said in HINA on June 26: "There are currently about 4,000-5,000 migrants in the country, which means that the others have managed to leave Bosnia and continue on their way to EU countries", implying that most of the migrants entering to Bosnia eventually reach Croatia, too.

It is explained neither in HINA nor Bosnia Daily, how these numbers are produced and no other sources, such as IOM statistics, are used to compare them with the government security agencies estimations. However, as narrative 2 showed, it is likely that the authorities are not aware of every individual that has crossed into Bosnia but within this research material, it is impossible to analyze how correct these estimations are.
This narrative explains how the inability or unwillingness to make decisions on the national level in Bosnia leaves one canton, the Una-Sana, to deal alone with most of the migration pressure. The forced migrants are portrayed as a problem in the urban area, so the authorities need to relocate them further from the residential areas and towns, as was already hinted on Narrative 2. The relocation is accelerated due to certain incidents in another reception center, called Miral, which is located in a town. The Bosnian authorities use securitization arguments to justify the relocation but the conditions in the center are ultimately not supported by the international aid groups, IOM and the Red Cross, and the EU.

On May 10 Bosnia Daily wrote that the city council of Bihac, a city where many of the migrants stay, was told designating a remote location for future reception centers for migrants who will be relocated from the current center in the city. The city council said the new site is located at a foothill of a mountain, near the border with Croatia and was to be called Vucjak. The location was suggested by the Mayor of Bihac, saying:

"I suggested this location because it is owned by the City of Bihac and it fulfills minimum conditions for a temporary shelter."

The city authorities were told to prepare the location within 60 days, with the help of the IOM and Red Cross. The article does not elaborate on what the minimum conditions for temporary shelter are, so it remains obscure what needs to be prepared before the site is ready to accommodate people.

May 21 Bosnia Daily reported the Security minister Dragan Mektic saying the relocation of the migrants from urban areas, such as Bira and Miral centers, is necessary. The relocation will begin “as soon as the conditions in the field allow it.”

Less than two weeks later, on Saturday, June 1, a fire destroyed a part of the Miral center. The 60 days preparation time for Vucjak was soon forgotten, as the fire sped up the plans to relocate the migrants. Bosnia Daily reported about the fire on June 3, as the newsletter is not published during weekends. Due to the delay, they had more information on their story than HINA that briefly reported about the fire on the next day it happened. It was mentioned briefly again on the next day when Croatia’s Interior Minister commented there had been no increase in illegal migrants on the Croatian-Bosnian border, a comment that highlights Croatia’s policy on migration: No matter what happens in Bosnia, Croatia will not be letting any migrants in.
Bosnia Daily reported the blaze started in the morning at the Miral reception center. It started likely by an accident from a cooking device and spread swiftly. IOM staff successfully evacuated the migrants from the burning part of the building and shortly after that, the Velika Kladusa fire brigade put out the fire. 19 migrants were taken to a hospital and 8 of them stayed there for further treatment. IOM told in the article that their staff and partners are working on ensuring that the migrants and refugees will get new accommodation and everything else they need. Additional staff is available if needed to get that part of the center back in function as soon as possible.

Bosnia Daily’s report highlighted the proper actions taken to end the fire and that is ensured that the people will get new accommodation HINA’s report explicitly said:

“The local authorities have been warning for months that they can no longer handle the migrant flow and seek greater assistance from the state authorities and the international community”

HINA choose to emphasize Bosnia’s weak capacity to handle the migrant situation as a whole. This contradiction shows how the two medias select and decide how they present the situation in question. As Bosnia Daily portrays Croatia in unfavorable light regarding the pushbacks and border violence, HINA highlights the incapability of the Bosnian authorities, as the Narrative 1 showed. However, also Bosnia Daily brings up the lack of capacity to deal with the migrants on its articles.

The Miral center was in the news again on June 6 when Bosnia Daily wrote: “Riots at the Miral center”. The article quoted the Police Spokesman Ale Siljdedic explaining:

“The police faced 100 migrants at the scene. They pelted the police with stones, metal bars, and bottles, and three officers were injured. Tensions in the center had been running high after a fire last weekend that torched the building’s top floor and forced many migrants to sleep outdoors.”

By “rioting” the migrants are expressing their dissatisfaction with the conditions. This can be interpreted also as the migrants’ agency. As the previous news emphasized the correct measures taken during the fire and the actions taken to restore the center, the migrants were put into the position of subordinate objects, as Häkli et. al. (2017) explain, thus depriving their agency in the situation. Yet, they may be dissatisfied with the conditions and willing to express it but as they have no political or
other ways of affecting their situation, they end up in a position, where “rioting” is the only way to express their discontent to the prevailing circumstances.

The news also told that a dozen migrants at the center were also injured and taken to hospitals without further explanation of how these migrants got hurt showing that the news is more explicit about the violence conducted by migrants towards the police. Also, no migrants were interviewed regarding the riots, leaving the readers again only with the official’s interpretations of the situation.

HINA also reported about this incident, telling “at least 20 people were arrested after a massive brawl in the local migrant reception center.” It specifically told that six from a total of 20 arrested migrants should be isolated and deported, emphasizing the negative image of the migrants. Neither of the articles explained what the rest of the migrants in the center did during the riot, although Bosnia Daily told the Miral center is used to accommodate 700 people, meaning most of the residents did not participate in the riot. On HINA, the amount of the people in the center was not mentioned, thus the riot of a hundred people was not put in any relation with the size of the center.

Both stories also gave a little background information on the migrant situation. Bosnia Daily said:

> “About 25,000 migrants from Asia and North Africa entered Bosnia from Serbia and Montenegro in 2018, and a further 6,000 have arrived so far this year --. Only around 3,500 have been accommodated in transit centers, leaving thousands sleeping rough in the open as Bosnia lacks the resources to care for most of them.”

The lack of facilities can also be interpreted as a justification to the Vucjak center, as it seems to be desperately needed. However:

> “Many of the migrants would like to get to countries in the European Union with strong economies, but the EU’s external borders — starting with Croatia north of Bosnia — have generally been closed to them since an influx of over one million in 2015”,

Bosnia Daily explains, emphasizing the migrants do not want to stay in Bosnia but are unable to leave. HINA, however, does not provide such explanation for why the people are on the move. For example, on June 1 it wrote:
“More than 6,000 illegal migrants have entered [Bosnia] this year and most of those who arrive in the country in an attempt to reach Croatia seek temporary accommodation in Velika Kladusa and Bihac.”

The only times the reasons why people enter to Bosnia and if they proceed anywhere from there is discussed are the articles telling about opposition politics judging the government's migration policies, usually criticizing them being unable to deal with the crisis. For example:

“[T]he - Leaders of the opposition Human Shield party suggest, "There are not enough personnel and equipment at our border, we should take this problem seriously rather than ignore it. We should deploy the army".

On June 10 Bosnia Daily reported about the decision to establish a reception center in Vucjak, a location seven kilometers outside Bihac town near the Croatian border. The decision was accepted by the national government, Bosnia Daily wrote on the next day. This decision was made after one month of the decision to allocate the new site for the migrants, despite the 60 days preparation time introduced earlier. A lengthy meeting with international organizations and representatives of the Una-Sana Canton government and police preceded the decision. The officials also discussed declaring a state of emergency due to the migrant situation but dropped the idea. Instead, the authorities decided to limit the movements of migrants and expedite the work on creating conditions for transporting them to Vucjak. The national government also asked the government-controlled railway company to stop transporting migrants to the Una-Sana Canton. Bosnia Daily wrote:

“Triggered by recent incidents in temporary migrant centers in that part of the country, the cantonal authorities asked the state institutions to relocate the migrants from urban zones for security reasons.”

In this two news, the politicians use security arguments to justify the new, stronger measures to control the migrants in Bosnia. The fact that they discussed declaring a state of emergency speaks for a strong will to do everything in their power to tackle the problems by restricting the migrants, thus putting them out of sight and out of mind. The politicians refer to the “recent incidents”, leaving it vague what these incidents were, letting the reader make the conclusion. Most likely the conclusion is expected to be that the migrants are a threat to the residents and therefore these decisions are
justified. It is significant that the “security reasons” need no explanation, as it means the readers can make similar conclusions: The migrants are a threat and need to be treated as such.

The secondary articles I collected for this narrative enforce the migrants being a threat by referring to crime and misconduct by the migrants. These articles amplify the security arguments the politicians make, as Vultee (2011, 78) explained in chapter 2.3. However, Bosnia Daily has less such news while HINA has more, although according to HINA’s narrative, the migrant issue is more severe in Bosnia than Croatia. Only the opposition politicians bring it up that Croatia has a problem with migrants in the country. The government politicians only talk about the border and convince no one gets through it. Migrants, however, are still a problem elsewhere, like in Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro.

Moving the migrants to the new location in Vucjak was also justified by the fire damaging the Miral center. The fire was told damaging only one part of the center, leaving the rest usable for accommodation. The migrants were also decided to be delivered to Vucjak from another center, Bira, even though no accidents were reported happening there. This further tells about the urge to isolate all the migrants from the local population.

HINA did not report directly about the decision to establish the camp but soon after the decision, on June 13, it told that the Bosnian Croats were against the decision. The Committee for Croats Outside Croatia had received a petition with over 500 signatures by Croats from Bosnia against the decision of establishing the migrant camp in Vucjak. Member of the parliament from the ruling HDZ party asked in a session of parliament where the petition was handled:

“[I]f "everyone" in Croatia was aware of the challenges and risks the migrant crisis posed to the stability of [Bosnia] and the status of Croats in [Bosnia], and Croatia. "Tens of thousands of migrants are moving towards Croatia and the incumbent authorities in [Bosnia] neither want to nor can deal with the problem. They see a solution only in their entry into Croatia. However, those who stay in [Bosnia] become the burden of the remaining Croats, which can trigger their emigration."

This reaction brings up again the role of the ethnicities in Balkan politics. Croatia is expected to be interested in the position of Croats outside Croatia and take action to protect them. Croatia should also mitigate their will to emigrate from Bosnia, yet the news does not specify why this is a problem the Croatian parliament should deal with and how. Either Croatia does not want them to move to
Croatia or it does not want the number of Croats in Bosnia to decline. Either way, no solution to the situation is suggested, despite establishing the center to some other location. This resonates with the Serb presidency members, Milorad Dodik’s, requirements that no migrant centers will not be established in the Republika Srpska. The only solution to the migrant situation is for them to “go somewhere else”, far from habitation, to another country or area.

On June 16 HINA wrote about the forced relocation of the migrants to the new camp:

“The authorities -- started relocating migrants from the town centre to a camp in the village of Vucjak, despite the fact that the migrants oppose their resettlement and international associations' criticism about setting up that camp on a former waste landfill. Some of those relocated migrants tried to come back to the town of Bihac, but they were prevented by police forces that bar them from entering the town centre.”

The news also told that migrants who had been staying in tents put up in public spaces and those who had rented private accommodation although they possessed no documents were being relocated to that camp and the law enforcement authorities were on Sunday morning searching private homes for migrants to bring them also under the control. The Bihac Mayor was quoted in the news saying that “the town is swarmed by irregular migrants who are currently make up 20 % of the local population.”

HINA’s report talks about strong measures taken by the Bosnian police to remove the migrants from all inhabited areas and relocate them to the new, remote center. These moves resemble what Turner (2015) and Agier (2010) wrote about the refugee camps: The migrants are being isolated in a remote location and the camp is used as a solution to lock up the unwanted people.

HINA also noted that The UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has criticized the establishment of the Vucjak migrant camp. The statement was released on June 14, a week after the decision of the relocation. Bosnia Daily reported about the UN’s concerns on June 17. The statement called upon “the immediate cease of the relocation until a more suitable place is available”. It urged the authorities to “allow migrants and refugees already relocated to Vucjak to return”. The statement listed the significant health and safety risks of the site, such as the location very close to landmine infected areas also a high fire and explosion hazard due to the possible presence of methane gas underground, as the site was a former landfill. There are no sanitary facilities available on the site and no access to
running water or electricity and it does not live up to the international standards to accommodate migrants and refugees.

In the statement, the UN shows its awareness of the increasing number of migrants and refugees remaining for longer periods of time in Una Sana Canton and that the numbers exceed the capacity of the four official migration accommodation centers. The UN supports the authorities in addressing the complex situation and is aware of the protection, security and humanitarian challenges it poses. It understands the concerns of the local population and the authorities regarding migrants and refugees residing outside of the official reception centers and the need for additional accommodation space but requires such measures to be taken with full respect for migrant and refugee rights under international and national law. The statement also recognizes the efforts of the Una Sana Cantonal authorities despite the canton has borne most of the burden of this iteration of the “Balkan Route”.

Bosnia Daily also writes that the UN calls upon authorities at all competent levels to take immediate action to aid Una Sana Canton and encourages the establishment of additional migrant and refugee accommodation elsewhere in the country. The statement ends with a notion that only under those standards, the UN will continue its support to the country.

The UN statement clearly reveals that the Vucjak site is not suitable for the residents and to the people working there. The authorities who introduced the location should have been aware of the problems, such as lack of sanitation and that the location is a former waste dump, prior to the decision of the relocation. Despite the serious concerns, neither Bosnia Daily nor HINA reported of any reactions from the local authorities.

Ten days later, on June 25, the EU was reported providing 14.8 million euros to Bosnia for addressing “the needs of migrants and refugees who remain present in Bosnia.” Both publications used probably the same sources in their article, as the content was very similar. The news pointed out that the Vucjak center has been deemed unsuitable by the European Union and UN as it lacks the necessary infrastructure and creates a clear danger for the life and health of migrants. EU was told expecting effective coordination, at all levels in the authorities, of border management and migration management capacity, as well as the functioning of the asylum system. The EU requested the authorities to stop forced relocations and provide better shelter solutions, meaning it accepts neither the location nor the relocations.
Despite the UN’s statement and EU’s support, the conditions in Vucjak did not seem to get better, as on July 3 Bosnia Daily reported the Red Cross was leaving the camp if the migrants remain in there. The local Red Cross organization said it will stop assisting the local authorities and leave their tasks to some other organization because the area has no basic conditions to sustain the migrants over the autumn and winter. The news also told that the representatives of the EU Delegation to Bosnia said the EU will not finance the accommodation of migrants at Vucjak.

Leaving the camp and refusing to finance the camp in Vucjak are serious threats to Bosnian migrant management, as its problems taking care of the migrants have been made very clear throughout the research material. However, the Bosnian task force denies the accusations of the location being unsuitable for human habitation. On another article from July 3, it claims the EU is only protecting Croatia and its external borders by opposing the Vucjak camp:

“The position of the representatives of the EU Delegation to [Bosnia] that they will not finance the accommodation of migrants at the location was described by the members of the task force as unfounded and argumentative. They criticized the allegations that the site is unacceptable because it is close to the border with Croatia.”

The article clearly states on its headline that “Vucjak to Remain a Reception Center for Migrants”. No responses to the EU’s, UN’s or the Red Cross’ concerns were reported during the observation period. It is not possible to analyze the reasons why Bosnia is so reluctant to improve the conditions in Vucjak or finding another location for the people. It becomes clear that the site is used to “lock up” the “unwanted people” as Agier (2010) wrote. In the Bosnian politicians’ arguments’, the humanitarian arguments are conspicuous by their absence. The site is told fulfilling “minimum conditions for a temporary shelter” but after the centrality of the right of asylum has been shrugged off a technocratic policy of “migration control” can be implemented, as Agier (2010) wrote. This process is combined with security policy, such as restricting the migrants' movements and forcibly relocating them to the Vucjak site, justified by securitization arguments but also with “language of care”, as the establishment of the new site was made in order to enhance Bosnia’s capacities of taking care of the migrants. However, the decisions speak more about taking care of the migrant problem than taking care of the migrants as human, as they are simply isolated out of sight to a place unsuitable for human habitation.
It also remains unclear what are Bosnia’s long-term plans with the camp or if such plans even exist. It is described as “a temporary shelter” but is the shelter temporary to the people but the structure is meant as more permanent? As discussed in chapter 2.4, although meant for temporary use, the camps often remain more permanent structures. Minca, Šantić, and Umek (2018) claimed that the camps can be used as political devices for the countries outside the EU’s borders for gaining funding from the Union but by denying addressing the conditions in Vucjak, Bosnia is also denying from the EU’s support for the camp. Maybe the Bosnians hope the situation is only temporary and no long-term plans need to be made. This, however, may be wishful thinking and by making temporary solutions the problems only increase. Bordering the migrants at the uninhabited area effects on the migrants’ agency and ways of expressing it but does not take it away Turner (2015; Häkli et. al. 2017). Therefore, the migrants’ end up in a position, where “rioting” or other means of disobedience are the only ways to express their discontent with the prevailing circumstances.

4.5 Identities under a threat

The narratives have made it clear that migration can be securitized on several occasions. The ethnic divisions in the Balkan states make the situation of the researched case rather unique, as the issue of migration is tangled up with the ethnic identities of Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs. The securitization of the identities plays an important role within the complex migration situation in the area. It also effects on the securitization of the borders, which is without question considered as a good way to deal with the irregular migrant flow in the research material.

The politicians and other officials are usually the ones talking about migration in the news. They often talk about the safety of the local population when justifying policies such as establishing a new migrant center or deploying more police officers on the border. Protecting safety means there is a threat and the threat is the migrants, yet it is rarely elaborated in the officials’ speech, how the migrants are a threat. This explanation can be found elsewhere in the news, from the stories that refer to the crimes and misconduct the migrants commit. It is thus not necessary for the officials to elaborate on the threat because the narrative of the migrants being a threat already exists and therefore the audience is expected to know, what the threat refers to. This is how news participates in the building of a negative image of the migrants, thus amplifying the officials' securitization arguments, as Vultee (2011) explained. This tactic, however, does not work every time.
On Narrative 3, the Bosnian Serb member of the Presidency, Milorad Dodik, tried to use securitization arguments to justify the establishment of armed forces in the Republika Srpska. The Bosniaks, Croats and the international community did not accept the attempted securitization of migration as they responded with even stronger securitization, namely the Bosnian War. The migrants are thus considered less of a threat than any destabilization of the Bosnian state.

The Narrative 3 also brought out the securitization of identity, which can be seen especially within the two Christian groups in the area, the Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs. Croatia is concerned about the well being of the Croats in Bosnia and does not want them to emigrate. This is likely because the emigration of the Croats from Bosnia is seen as a threat to the remaining Croats’ identity. If their amount declines, their presence and power in the area would be less significant, thus possibly hurting their identity.

The Orthodox Serb identity is in danger, too. Narrative 3 shows that no migrants are welcome in the Serb dominated area. The majority of the migrants are expected to be Muslims similar to the main ethnic group in Bosnia, the Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims. The Muslim migrants would strengthen the Muslim population, thus accommodating migrants in the Serb populated area can be seen as a threat to the Orthodox Serb identity. The Muslim threat in Republika Srpska is therefore different from what DeGenova (2016) suggests. According to him, “Muslims” represent obnoxious “cultural” differences that are hostile to the presumed “European values.” However, in the case of Balkans, the Muslims are a different kind of threat but also threatened, as they are an important part of the original population of the area.

Securitization of the borders is another prevailing theme in the research material. The borders are to keep the migrant threat away and therefore mark an important role in the fight against them, yet different justifications are given to whether or not to protect them and how. In HINA, Croatia is presented as having an uncontested approach to strongly protect the border of Croatia and the EU. In Bosnia, the border is also contested due to the ethnic identities. The hard border control cannot be deployed to the Serbian and Montenegrin border as the Serb minority in Bosnia does not allow it. This does not mean the migrants crossing the border are not considered a threat, which makes this approach contradictory. The hard borders are generally considered as a good solution when it profits the group in question, but bad when they harm them. Croatia manages to keep up a unified approach to the borders while Bosnia is in trouble with its contested foreign and internal policies.
Croatia has successfully securitized the issue of migration and gained the acceptance to close its borders from the forced migrants by any means necessary, thus depoliticizing the issue. In Bosnia, however, the situation is still more complex, and it needs to deal with the migrants remaining and arriving in the country. Narrative 4 talks about the strong measures the Una-Sana Canton authorities deployed in order to secure the Canton from migrants and detain them to the new Vucjak center. The solutions to deal with the migrants are either to detain them from crossing the border or to detain them while inside the country. This talks about the comprehensive acceptance of the migrants being a threat as other approaches are not even discussed.

4.6 An agile or fragile fortress of the European Union

The 2019 European Parliament elections were held between 23 and 24 May, starting the next institutional cycle from 2019 to 2024. On May 7, HINA reported the Prime Minister of Croatia, Andrej Plenkovic calling for “more agile and not fragile EU” for the next institutional cycle at a conference organized by a think tank the European Policy Centre. By this, he meant that the EU can only deal with the numerous challenges it is facing and will face in the future only through greater unity of its member states and said:

“All the challenges require more and not less Europe because none of them can be dealt with by one country alone -- The European Union should try to be more agile and not fragile, work together and not separately, be open to the world and not introverted”.

The Union should also guarantee internal security and effectively manage migration, among other things, Plenkovic said. People are afraid of terrorism, violent extremism, cross-border threats and organized crime, he continued, noting that no country can fully defend itself from that on its own, recalling Croatia has deployed over 6,500 police officers along its border with non-EU countries to prevent illegal migration. He also said he firmly believes that the Schengen system must be fully functioning and must include Croatia.

“Among the priorities, Plenkovic cited reform of the common asylum system so that no member state would find itself in trouble because of its geographical position. -- The EU’s future will depend on how it will respond to a number of questions that require answers, such as whether it will be able to enhance the safety of its citizens and border protection, while at the same time protecting European values and freedom of movement.”
How do the Croatian Prime Minister’s visions look like in the light of the research material? Plenkovic talks about the challenges of the EU but also gives solutions. Migration is one such challenge and Plenkovic proves Croatia is doing its share to tackle the problem, as Narrative 1 also showed. Still, cohesion and common solutions in the form of a Common Asylum System are needed. Bosnia, too, expects more joint approach to migration from the EU as a solution, as mentioned in Narrative 2, when Bosnian Minister of Security Dragan Mektic highlighted the key problems in the field of migration:

“[P]rimarily that there is no common solution at the EU level, stressing that migrants are passing through EU member states, Greece and Bulgaria. He noted that the signed readmission agreements, i.e. the possibility of returning illegal migrants to the countries through which they already passed, are not being implemented at all.

The lack of actions of EU does not limit only on decision making: For example, on 16 July, when Bosnia Daily was tackling the Croatian president’s interview on the Swiss television, it wrote:

“In response to a request for more information on Grabar-Kitarović's comments, the European Commission said it had no comment to make. A year ago, it was already clear that Croatia intended to take its new role as the EU’s border guard seriously. During -- 2018 Interior Minister Davor Bozinovic proudly proclaimed that "Croatia...has the strongest border police in this part of Europe." In return, he campaigned for his country to become a member of the Schengen Zone”

Bosnia Daily emphasizes the connection between the hard border practices of Croatia and its attempts to becoming a member of the Schengen Zone. As seen on Narrative 2, in Bosnia Daily’s narrative of Croatian border policies is that they are inhumane and illegal, meaning such a country is not worthy of the Schengen membership, as it breaks the international and EU law and the EU values. Bosnia expects the EU to defend these values but having “no comment” on the issue is a disappointment. The inability to make unified decisions and refraining from commenting on the alleged unlawful practices of one member states are examples of the problems the EU has with respecting its own values and laws. The lack of reactions from the EU makes it look like the EU is “looking away” and letting Croatia do whatever it takes to keep the migrants out of the EU in order to prevent a new migrant “crisis”. By looking away from the EU also ends up accepting such practices. Bosnia expects higher morals and respect of law from the EU, but Croatia does not live up to these expectations.
The study regarding the “Hot Spot Approach”, introduced in chapter 2.4, explained that the “Hot Spot Approach” has led to more repressive measures towards the migrants applied by national authorities of the Member States (Papadapoulou 2016). These findings can be applied to the border with Croatia and Bosnia even though Croatia is not officially a hotspot. The study explains the repressive measures are a result of EU pressure to control the arrivals and the measures often disrespect human rights. The EU is shifting responsibilities to the national level, meaning it does not need to comment on a single Member State’s actions on its borders.

Narrative 2 showed also, that in Bosnia Daily’s narrative migrants are on their way to the EU and therefore the EU is responsible for solving the migrant problem on its behalf. The solution cannot be pushing the migrants back to Bosnia, as they do not want to stay in Bosnia.

“Many of the migrants would like to get to countries in the European Union with strong economies, but the EU’s external borders — starting with Croatia north of Bosnia — have generally been closed to them since an influx of over one million in 2015.” (Bosnia Daily July 6)

Before the EU has solved the problem, it should help Bosnia to take care of the migrants who are “stuck” in Bosnia. However, Bosnian politicians make it clear that “there is no money in the world that the EU can give us so we would become a migrant reception centre.” Therefore, Bosnia is unlikely planning to make the migrant facilities in country permanent structures to gain funding from the EU, as Minca, Šantić, and Umek (2018) suggested has happened in some other Balkan countries. Bosnia promises to “humanely treat all the 5,000 migrants which are our maximum capacity” but if the “human treatment” means the conditions in the Vucjak camp, the EU is likely unwilling to fund it, as Narrative 4 explained.

Referring negatively to more permanent accommodation for the migrants or to the EU’s “Hot Spot Approach” is common for both publications. Although the EU presents it as one solution to the migrant problem, it is not a desirable solution in Bosnia or Croatia. Bosnia could not even become an actual hotspot, as only EU Member States are able to benefit from the “Hot Spot Approach” (FRA 2020). In HINA, the opposition uses the hotspot even as an example of political horse-trade:

“The Bridge party -- wondered if the government's decision to lease an eight-hectare warehouse -- meant that Croatia had to become a migrant hotspot so that it could enter the
Schengen area. -- "The facility can take in 10,000 to 15,000 migrants. – Will a hotspot be here? Is this something Croatia must agree to so that it can enter the Schengen area? Who is paying for that, Croatia or the EU?" “(HINA May 11)

The Croatian Schengen accession and the migrant situation seem to go hand in hand in good and bad. Narrative 1 explained the hard work Croatia is putting up to protecting the border and its face by not admitting any accused misconduct at the border. In HINA, Croatia is presented as the heroic guardian of the EU’s external borders that should be rewarded for its hard work. The means of the fight can be criticized but never the prize: Croatia’s accession to the Schengen Zone is never questioned in HINA. The Schengen membership is as good for Croatia as the migrants are bad and these opinions need no further explanations in HINA. Therefore, keeping the migrants out of the EU, by any means necessary, is important.

Croatia, however, supports the enlargement of the Union to other countries in southeast Europe, such as Bosnia. The Croatian President supports the enlargement because “that would resolve the pressure of migrants to some extent.” She did not explain how this would happen. The president also wanted “to invite EU officials to come out into the field to talk with residents on the Croatian side and see what the conditions on the Bosnian side are like”, emphasizing the Croatian citizens' role in the migrant situation. These types of quotes show, how the citizens of the EU member states are considered as more important than the people who are in the role of the forced migrant. The EU officials should listen to the citizens, not the migrants, and make their decisions based on that because the EU is for the EU citizens only. The EU and the Schengen Zone create a free travel and trade zone for some but raise even harder borders to others or as Papoutsi et. al. (2018) wrote, the EU’s external borders are strengthened and the freedom of movement inside the Union is being granted for some while restricting it from others. The “Fortress Europe” can expand but it will still remain closed for some.
5. CONCLUSION

In this study, my aim was to address the dominant narratives regarding forced migration in Croatian and Bosnian medias HINA and Bosnia Daily. I recognized several narratives with one overcharging factor, the migrants being a problem and a threat. This is the reason behind all the four narratives introduced in the previous chapter. Narrative 1 and 2 talk about state borders and their protection. In Narrative 1 Croatia is presented successfully protecting its borders but it confronts resistance as it is blamed for unlawful actions at the border. In Narrative 2 Bosnia expresses its will to make its borders harder but these attempts stumble to internal policy struggle. Narrative 3 shows how the “migration problem” can be used for political gains and internal power struggle, as the Bosnian Serbs are justifying the establishment of their own armed forces with the migrant flow. Narrative 3 shows another solution to the “migrant problem”, despite the hard borders: detaining them to an isolated area, far from habitation and forcing them to stay there.

I also pursued to understand the signs of securitization found from the narratives. According to other studies (Ferreira 2918), securitization is a prevailing theme in the news regarding migration. The threat the migrants pose was occasionally explained in the news by referring to the crimes and misconduct of the migrants. In the actual securitization arguments, however, the migration was simply considered as “threat” and actions were justified by “security issues”, with no further explanation of the nature of the threat. My interpretation is that the narrative of the migrants as a problem and a threat is so prevailing, that the ones speaking security trust that the arguments will be accepted. However, Narrative 3 showed that this is not always the case.

Lastly, I wanted to address, how is the EU portrayed in the context of the migrant “crisis” in the narratives. There are a lot of expectations towards the EU and it is easy to blame it for not being able to live up to them. The EU as an institution is not questioned and Croatia wants to deepen its membership to the EU by joining the Schengen Zone. However, Bosnia criticizes Croatian and the EU for this, as it considers the EU to sell its principles if it lets Croatia join. Bosnia blames Croatia for breaking the EU laws and common values with its intense border practices. Bosnia expects the EU to be morally superior and condemning Croatia’s actions. When not doing so, the EU proves itself as being incapable of common solutions in the field of migration.
I used narrative analysis to analyze my research material. With narrative analysis, I was able to create a more comprehensive picture of my research material and understand the news texts in the big picture. I consider narrative analysis to be a good tool for analyzing this type of research material, as news is usually read daily from the same sources. Therefore, the narratives of these sources become familiar to the readers and it is relevant to analyze them as a whole. The readers are constantly constructing their idea of the migration situation, based on the information on the news and other sources, thus every reader has a unique understanding of the situation. Therefore, although the study limits to only two publications, it is relevant as it improves our understanding of the issue on behalf of these publications.

The study was conducted by using the case of Croatian HINA a Bosnian Bosnia Daily as an example to analyze the news narratives regarding migration management on the internal and external borders of the EU. Therefore, broad generalizations cannot be made from the results, but the study aims at improving the understanding of the issue of forced migration in Europe. The analysis is also highly dependent on my interpretation and another researcher could interpret the research data differently. However, the analysis has shown that many of the findings of other researchers presented in the theoretical framework applied to the case of Croatian and Bosnian media.

5.1 Unique case sounds familiar

Forced migrants are divided into “economic migrants” and “political migrants” who qualify as refugees based on their “well founded fear of persecution”, as Scheel and Squire explained (2014). This implies “economical migration” is voluntary and can be clearly separated from political reasons. This dichotomy was clear especially in HINA, where the Interior Minister, Police Spokesman and the President claim the migrants trying to get to the Croatian side “are not refugees but illegal migrants”. Scheel and Squire (2014) also argued that illegality has become the prevailing interpretation of governing migratory movements in the European context. The term “illegal migrant” was popular especially in HINA but also used on some politicians’ and officials’ speeches in Bosnia Daily.

The illegality of the migrants is produced by the migration management practices, such as the build-up of border controls, Scheel and Squire (2014) argued in chapter 2.2. DeGenova (2016) talked about “military humanitarianism” when the ideas of human rights and the right to apply asylum meet Europe’s border control practices, hardened by the migrant “crisis”. He claims they evolve into “military humanitarianism”, whereby people are rescued only to detain them in to a “reception center”
waiting for their deportation. While HINA conveyed the impression of impassable Croatian borders, Bosnia seemed to be heading towards the military humanitarian approach to deal with their migrant problem when they started relocating people to the isolated center in Vucjak. The people are taken in and “humanely treated”, according to the officials, but at the same time, they are forced to stay in this location and not enter the towns.

The news relied very much on the officials and authorities reports and speeches, not giving voice to the migrants, as the previous studies have shown (Vukasovich & Dejanovic-Vukasovich 2016; Chouliaraki & Zabarowski 2017). They were considered as a mass of “illegal migrants” or “migrants and asylum seekers” who come from “Africa and Asia”, thus diluting the fact that each forced migrant is an individual with their own reasons for being in the position where they are. By diluting the individuality, the publications also dilute the agency of the individuals. When the people are portrayed as a homogeneous mass, it is easier to portray them in a role that best serves the current agenda.

As a conclusion, this unique case from Croatia and Bosnia confronts with the theory presented in chapter 2. However, it would be interesting to study further the local media to gain better understanding from the narratives in the news produced in the local languages. The understanding of the media could also be tested by comparing the found media narratives with interviews of the readers to see if they make similar interpretations. However, as has become clear within this study, the operational environments in Croatia and Bosnia vary, thus gaining deeper knowledge from both countries separately would be worth studying. In this study one challenge has been handling both countries equally as for example the Bosnian administrational structure has required special attention in the study. Therefore, in order to understand the different stances presented within the Bosnian state, a study comparing the medias popular within the different ethnicities could illuminate their positions regarding the migrant situation.

5.2 Whose crisis?

In chapter 2.2 I explained, based on the readings from DeGenova (2016), Häkli, Pascucci and Kallio (2017) and Rajaram (2016), that the migrant “crisis” cannot simply be limited to the migration as an outside threat but it is more of a crisis of institutions. Croatia works hard to prevail the image of a unified approach towards migration but the accusations from the foreign media, ombudswoman and even police forces of misconduct at the border suggest that the institutions guarding the border and
deciding on the border policies may have their own crisis to tackle. This crisis reaches all the way to the top of the EU.

The modern humanitarian architecture was created after the Second World War, as chapter 2.4 showed. It is based on the dichotomy to economic and political migrants, from which only the latter deserves international protection (Scheel & Squire 2014). Humanitarian architecture is based on the current situation after a world war, yet these conditions no longer exist. The forced migrants have several different, but no lesser, reasons to leave their homes than only a war. Europe and the EU are closing their gates from the forced migrants and acting as if this “crisis” was something temporary that can be overcome fast. Still, five years after the “2015 migrant crisis” started, the migration makes into headlines and decision makers speeches, as this study has shown. It is a smaller scale but a recent incident on the Greek border with Turkey shows that the Turkey deal or the “Hot Spot Approach” have not been able to solve the issue of forced migration.

In chapter 2.3 and 2.4, The EU’s “Hot Spot Approach” and the agreement with Turkey represented solutions to mitigate the crisis. The “Hot Spot Approach”, however, has not gained popularity among the Member States of the EU and Croatia’s clear opposition against becoming a hotspot speaks for that. Bosnia as a neighboring state of the EU expects more cohesive measures from the EU in regard to the migration situation. The EU, however, seems unable to make joint decisions that reveal the shortcomings of the EU migration policy. The Croatian Prime Minister brings out the fact that the EU has still not been able to decide on the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which the EU has been planning since 1999, enforces the idea of the EU’s inability to make joint decisions. The Prime Minister hopes “no member state would find itself in trouble because of its geographical position”. Greece, for example, is suffering from its geographical position next to Turkey as Turkey blackmail the EU with the forced migrants in the country at the beginning of March 2020 (European Council 2020b). The press reported thousands of refugees had gathered in Turkey, near the border with Greece where Turkey was keeping its side of the border open, suggesting the people can enter the Greek side (Parkkinen 2020). This sudden move forced the EU to react fast and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, was quoted saying, that people cannot be used for political gains. Yet, as long as the EU is using the neighboring states as buffer zones against migration, as Ferreira (2018) indicated, they will also be in the position to pressure the EU with them.

The internal struggle in Bosnia proves that the leaders in Turkey are not the only ones who are ready to use the migrants as pawns for political gains. Therefore, even though Bosnia is a minor actor as a
host and transit country for the forced migrants compared to Turkey, it could be possible to understand better the challenges the migratory pressure poses to societies with studying the situation in Bosnia further, for example with tracing the underlying aspirations of the people in power. Understanding these underlying aspirations could also help in understanding the Balkan context better. This is especially relevant to the EU because the Balkans are the direction where the EU will enlarge.

One way to understand the Balkans is to study their borders and border practices. As the study shows, the borders are highly politicized in the region. Not only due to the migrant situation but also due to the ethnic divisions. The internal conditions in the country effect on the borders, as the case of Bosnia and Croatia has shown. Croatia is implementing the “Fortress Europe” approach by blocking the external borders of the Union. This approach may seem tempting also to Bosnia but raises the question where the walls of such fortress should be erected?

As a conclusion, I see that the area consists of incompatible borders and dead ends, both politically but also to many of the forced migrants in the area. Croatia and Bosnia have their own narratives on the actions happening at the border: Bosnia blames Croatia for illegal pushbacks and violence, Croatia considers Bosnia as incapable of dealing with the migrant pressure, thus encouraging the migrants to try crossing the border. Although the situation at the border between Bosnia and Croatia is quite unique due to the ethnic makeup and history of the area, and its effects on the overall picture, it conforms with the previous research regarding forced migration.

### 5.3 Different narratives, new policies

Forced migration has been a contested issue and it will remain as such for the immediate future. I will not be easy, if even possible, to create Common European Asylum System or other comprehensive, global scale solutions to address migration if they are based on the current situation and the immediate political gains or losses in mind but the focus should be in a sustainable and universal model that does not need to be changed according to every “crisis”. The good thing is, that there are plenty of studies and writings regarding forced migration and therefore it is possible to make educated decisions, yet this does not mean more work should not be done.

One major influencer to the discussions regarding forced migration are the narratives that define the phenomenon and ultimately construct our idea of the issue. Therefore, it is important to understand what the narratives are and what they consist of. The narratives are produced by people for people
and therefore we can also participate in changing or refusing to enforce damaging or false narratives. Initiatives to reframe the public narratives on migration already exists. Narrative Change (2020) aims at more emotionally smart responses to reframe the public narrative on migration. United Nations Office For High Commissioner (OHCHR 2020) has also noted the need for new narratives and brought together journalists and other media professionals, social media experts, visual professionals, academics and representatives from NGO’s and other organizations to discuss the public narrative on migration and the way that migrants and migration are being framed in the public narrative, and to examine efforts to re-frame the current toxic narrative on this issue.

Changing narrative and renewing policies, however, does not help those who are currently trapped in the system of migration management and border controls, like in the Vucjak center in Bosnia. After the pressure that came from the UN, the EU and the Red Cross, the Vucjak camp was decided to be closed as told in the Introduction. The camp was finally closed and abandoned on December 11, Emma Wallis from a news and information site intended mainly for migrants, InfoMigrants, write (Wallis 2019). The migrants were transferred to a new location near the Bosnian capital Sarajevo and accommodated in proper buildings to protect them from the freezing temperatures. Each migrant got a warm meal and the IOM staff told they were working very hard to make sure people are comfortable in all of the new camps. However, an IOM representative told some migrants had already left the new camps in the direction of Bihac and the Una Sana canton as that is where most migrants attempt to cross the Croatian border.


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**Internet references:**


