MATTI PESU

Introducing Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis
Explorations of the Underlying Ideas of Finnish Foreign Policy

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
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Tampere University, Faculty of Management and Business
Finland

Responsible supervisor
Professor
Hiski Haukkala
Tampere University
Finland

and Custos
Professor
Tuomas Forsberg
Tampere University
Finland

Supervisor
Pre-examiners
Assistant Professor
Tommi Koivula
National Defence University
Finland

Opponent
Director
Dr. Kristi Raik
Estonian Foreign Policy Institute
Estonia

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True, the Finns have usually had no more than marginal control over the external circumstances of their country; their freedom of choice in foreign policy more often than not has been freedom to choose between two evils. But ultimately it has been their own decisions, not decision imposed over others, that have determined their fate. Just as in shooting a rapid in order to steer one must keep rowing, however futile or even absurd that may seem to someone watching from the shore, so have the Finns kept control over their own affairs, even at times when the current of events may have seemed irresistible.

Max Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality, 1968

The passage above is from the English edition of Max Jakobson’s 1968 book, presenting the fundamentals of Finnish foreign policy to an international audience. His observation about Finland’s fate and agency in the streams of international politics became engraved in my mind while I was completing an internship at the Finnish Embassy in Vienna in 2012. This was the same year that I finished my bachelor’s thesis on Finnish national identity, and my interest in Finnish foreign policy was growing rapidly. I was so impressed by Jakobson’s writing – which, as I later understood was part of the larger effort to institutionalize the idea of Finnish neutrality in the West – that I decided I wanted to dedicate my professional energy to analyzing international politics from a Finnish vantage point. So far, I’ve abided by my decision.

This dissertation is the latest stage in a longer continuum, namely my long-lasting interest in the ideas guiding Finnish external action. As said, my bachelor’s thesis took stock of Finnish national identity, more specifically the representations of the Finnish national self-image in the 2010 country brand report. My master’s thesis, in turn, scrutinized how Finland’s Cold War “small state-democratic” national identity influenced Finnish decision-making vis-à-vis the Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the re-independence processes of the Baltic states in the early 1990s. Finally, this doctoral dissertation is my most extensive effort to understand how ideational factors have shaped the actions of my native country. Having an ideational perspective on foreign policy has always felt natural to me. A sociologist would probably emphasize the effects of socialization, since the constructivist literature has held such a prominent place in the curricula of my dear alma mater.

The story of how I ended up pursuing a doctoral degree is far less straightforward than this short reminiscence about my academic journey might suggest. In spring
2014, a few weeks before my graduation, Professor Tuomas Forsberg offered me the chance to work at the University of Tampere. The opportunity sounded interesting. I had no plans to start pursuing a PhD immediately after graduation, although doing a PhD appeared a realistic option sometime in the future. But consequential decisions are often made without special deliberation, and after a brief meeting in Tuomas’s office in Helsinki, I was already outlining my research plan. I have zero regrets.

The journey has taken five years. It goes without saying that I feel indebted to a number of people. First, I want to thank Tuomas Forsberg and Hiski Haukkala. I have been very lucky to have you as my supervisors and mentors. You remain my most important professional role models. The sheer extent of what I have learned from both of you is something that has crystallized in my mind quite recently. I hope our rapport will outlast this dissertation project.

I am also grateful to Tommi Koivula and Kristi Raik, who were willing to act as the preliminary examiners of the dissertation. Your constructive feedback and critical insights were of crucial importance in the final stages of the work.

Occasionally, pursuing a doctoral degree has been a lonely process. But periodic solitude is not the whole story. Fortunately, I have had the chance to tap into the knowledge of a number of different communities along the way.

First, I would like to thank all of those with whom I have worked at the University of Tampere – today known as Tampere University. I began my IR studies in 2010 and from the early undergraduate years to PhD work, I have had the privilege to learn from and work with many kind and talented people. Warm thanks go to Aino Hakovirta, Anni Kangas, Anne Nykänen, Hanna Ojanen, Eero Palmujoki, Hannes Peltonen, Mikko Räkköläinen, Tarja Seppä and many others for their overall support and constructive comments on the texts that I have presented at multiple seminars in Tampere. Furthermore, I owe a special debt of gratitude to “meta-man” Tapio Juntunen, who is not only a sharp theoretical mind and observer of international politics, but also an incredibly diligent colleague and co-author.

The Academy of Finland project “Reimagining Futures in the European North at the End of the Cold War” in 2013–2017 afforded an excellent opportunity for me to delve into the recent history of Finnish foreign policy. Multiple seminars with scholars and decision-makers, roundtables and gatherings all stimulated my thinking and pushed my tentative ideas forward. The project was multidisciplinary, and it was exciting to experience how historians and IR scholars can team up in knowledge production. I must say my respect for historians soared. Their craftsmanship and attention to detail are truly admirable. Moreover,
I also understood what distinguishes political scientists like myself from historians, and I feel that the project enhanced my identity as an IR scholar. During ‘Reimag’, I met a number of impressive people. Juhana Aunesluoma, Suvi Kansikas, Kari Möttölä and Kimmo Rentola deserve special thanks for their contribution to my work.

I joined the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in September 2017 as a visiting research fellow. The last two years at the institute have easily been the best days of my professional life so far. The institute offers top-notch facilities for conducting research on international relations. But the best resource at FIIA has to be the amazing colleagues, who are always ready to exchange ideas on professional and not-so-professional subjects, ranging from great-power politics to the previous evening’s NHL results. The list of people that deserve thanks is long. First and foremost, I would like to thank director Teija Tiilikainen and program director Juha Jokela for their support and encouragement during the finalization phase of the dissertation. The fact that I was granted permission to complete the dissertation during my working hours was immensely helpful and speeded up the revision process considerably. Moreover, the directorship’s kind decision to financially support the language review of the dissertation eased my personal financial burden. I am also grateful to Mika Aaltola, Katja Creutz, Tuomas Iso-Markku, Juha Käpylä, Harri Mikkola, Anu Ruokamo, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Marco Siddi, Ville Sinkkonen, Antto Vihma, and Mikael Wigell for their various inputs into my doctoral work as well as other projects. Furthermore, as a not so tech-savvy person, I would also like to thank Olli Hulkko and Matti Sneck for providing a helping hand in technical and practical matters. Finally, Johanna Meltti was always ready to assist me with my random research literature needs. Go FIIA!

Then there is The Ulkopolitist. I cannot underscore enough just how important this community is to me. I joined the gang in 2012. I have been privileged to witness how an ambitious and iconoclastic outlet of less than 10 volunteers developed into a full-fledged and highly professional online magazine run by over 90 passionate experts. Without The Ulkopolitist, I would not have become so burningly enthusiastic about international affairs and, frankly, it is unlikely that I would have ended up pursuing a doctoral degree without the group’s profound influence. Although I am not an active member of the community today, there is a special place in my heart for The UPT. There are numerous people that deserve my gratitude, but I particularly want to acknowledge Jussi Heinonkoski, Mikko Patokallio, Christopher Rowley, Juha Saarinen, Timo R. Stewart, Anna Tervahartiala, Tomas Wallenius and Elina Ylä-Mononen. Thank you for countless inspiring moments along the way.
Finishing the project in less than five years would not have been possible without generous funding. I am grateful to the Finnish Cultural Foundation, the Foundation for Foreign Policy Research and the Kone Foundation for the scholarships awarded to my work. I am also indebted to the Library of the Parliament and its very professional personnel for providing me not only with concrete facilities to do my daily work, but also fantastic access to relevant research literature and material. Lynn Nikkanen in turn did tremendous work in making my manuscript readable.

Last but certainly not least, I want to express my gratitude to my nearest and dearest.

First, I have been blessed with an extensive circle of friends. “The Gamblers” from my Ulvila/Pori times, the Saalem people in Tampere, and the UCC folks in Helsinki – your friendship means a lot to me. I am happy that I have so many wonderful memories to cherish.

I would not be here without the encouragement of my family. I am especially grateful to my father and mother, Kari and Kirsi-Maria, who have helped me in countless ways. A supportive homelife molded me into the person that I am today.

My dear Anna, you have shared this whole journey with me, but it has been only a fraction of our voyage as husband and wife. You have shared with me all the disappointments and also the times of joy. I am particularly thankful for all those times when you have reminded me that life is not only about my personal interests. There is life beyond Twitter, news and books. I sincerely apologize for those (all too many) moments when I have been distracted or not been present. I love you to the moon and back.

Finally, I want to dedicate the dissertation to our dear little Evert, who was born in the centennial year of Finland’s independence. I look forward to watching you grow up to be the kind, upright and smart young man you are destined to be.

Helsinki, August 2019
Abstract

This doctoral dissertation seeks to demonstrate how personal and collective ideas affect foreign policy. The five original publications making up the dissertation all investigate Finnish foreign policy from various ideational aspects. Although the publications deal with different periods of Finnish foreign affairs, the dissertation places particular emphasis on the end of the Cold War and early post-Cold War years.

The dissertation’s main theoretical claim is that in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of the significance of ideas in foreign policy, one must concentrate on both individual and intersubjective ideas and that this approach is applicable at multiple levels of analysis. In other words, the dissertation suggests that one must harness the respective strengths of cognitive psychology and constructivism, and adopt an integrative approach to the analysis of foreign policy. The rationale behind the integrative approach is the viewpoint that psychology and constructivism support each other’s weaknesses.

The dissertation builds its theoretical argument on a research program initiated by Vaughn P. Shannon and Paul M. Kowert in their book Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance. However, instead of an ideational alliance, the dissertation speaks of Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). There are two main reasons for this choice. First, IFPA incorporates additional theoretical perspectives and levels of analysis into the realm of ideational dialogue. Thus, it serves as an umbrella for the various ideational approaches of FPA. Secondly, the decision to use another concept is a matter of semantics. To imply that a theoretical construct is against something sends a strong signal, and it is perhaps unnecessary to see material/rational and ideational views as polar opposites.

Moreover, “idea” is too broad and vague a concept to be employed as an analytical tool, since ideas are practically infinite and ubiquitous. In order to conduct a sound and theoretically solid analysis, one needs more specific concepts to simplify the world of ideas and to make it understandable. This research taps into the vocabulary of constructivism and political psychology, particularly cognitive and social psychology. More precisely, the dissertation applies the principles of IFPA to four levels of analysis, and sheds light on four different theoretical approaches.

The first section of the theoretical chapter explains the importance of individual belief systems in foreign policymaking, and highlights the significance of the social environment as a source of individual beliefs. The second theoretical contribution relates to national identity. The dissertation advocates a bottom-up
view of national identity, in which the basis of collective national self-images is in fact individual identifications with a nation state. Furthermore, national identity is divided into three components: worldview, political purpose and status. The third theoretical question under scrutiny is the public opinion-foreign policy nexus. The dissertation outlines three dynamics between public opinion and foreign policy. In the bottom-up model, public opinion clearly influences foreign policymaking, whereas the top-down dynamic refers to a situation whereby leaders actively try to shape public views. The third model is disconnection, which describes a condition where there is either a public disinterest toward foreign policy, or where decision-makers neglect the opinions of the public. In this context, the principles of IFPA elaborate the public opinion-foreign policy link in two central ways. Firstly, the beliefs of ordinary citizens come about in a process akin to elite opinion formation – that is, in the interplay between inherent dispositions and the social environment. Secondly, the manner in which decision-makers understand the importance of public views is partly dependent on their belief systems.

After treating the three intra-state levels, the dissertation moves on to inter-state relationships. More precisely, it discusses the issue of trust from three theoretical perspectives, and points out how intra-state ideas of trustworthiness may affect inter-state interaction, namely foreign policy. In other words, the section’s main purpose is to show how certain ideas can affect bilateral relations between two states.

The dissertation consists of five publications, which all deal with different aspects of Finnish foreign and security policy and which to a varying degree apply the principles of IFPA. In addition to the overarching theoretical objective of promoting the synthesis of psychology and constructivism, every publication has its own theoretical objectives that serve the broader goal of ideational integration. The aim of Publication I on the belief system of Mauno Koivisto is to understand the effects of the social environment on individual beliefs. It claims that Koivisto’s belief system is best described as great-power empiricist. Moreover, the article argues that the great transformation caused by the end of the Cold War did not considerably change Koivisto’s belief system.

Publication II links the schools of thought approach to the intra-state competition between different national identities, and promotes a bottom-up view of national identity rooted in psychology. It outlines the Finnish foreign policy schools of thought at the beginning of the post-Cold War era: small state realism, integrationism, euro-atlanticism and globalism. Integrationism, which was based on a “eurorealist” worldview, was clearly the most powerful school. Finnish early post-Cold War foreign policy nevertheless contained elements from all four schools.
The focus of Publication III is on the historical nexus between public opinion and Finnish foreign policy. It claims that three different models of the public opinion-foreign policy nexus have prevailed in Finland during its independence: a disconnection in the years of early independence, the top-down model of the Cold War, and a stronger bottom-up dynamic of the post-Cold War era. In other words, in the post-Cold War era, public opinion has become a stronger force in Finnish foreign policymaking.

Publication IV unpacks Finnish beliefs on the untrustworthiness of Sweden as a defense cooperation partner and is thus interested in the interstate-level manifestations of individual and collective ideas. The study lays out three main theoretical arguments. Firstly, it differentiates between distrust and mistrust. The second point the article drives home is that trust is a scalable phenomenon. Thirdly and lastly, the article suggests that a sense of disappointment and a feeling of being betrayed must be separated. Its chief empirical argument is that the Finnish experiences of misplaced trust from October 1990 and Sweden’s surprise announcement of its ambition to join the European Communities have now manifested as elite-level mistrust towards Sweden as a defense cooperation partner. In order to intensify mutual defense cooperation, Helsinki and Stockholm must overcome the looming mistrust in their defense relationship.

The final publication, Publication V, explores different aspects of Finlandization. The analytical approach to the phenomenon is historical, but it nevertheless contains elements from the four levels of analysis. The publication treats Finlandization first and foremost as a political culture, which was born in part to support the official foreign policy line vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. One can argue that the foreign policy strategy of Finland was rather successful but that the political culture of Finlandization had excessive features. It is therefore too naïve to interpret Finlandization only as a successful foreign policy strategy, as some international commentators have done. In fact, it can be said that some of the features of the culture actually eroded the hard core, namely Finnish sovereignty, which the foreign policy strategy tried to preserve.

As implied, in addition to the interests in the original publications, the dissertation has an interest in the end the Cold War and in the early post-Cold War years. More specifically, it aims at understanding what the end of the Cold War meant in terms of the ideational foundations of Finnish foreign policy. The study suggests that it signified three things in particular. First, it led to an adjustment from small-state realism to integrationism as the primary orientation of foreign policy. In other words, Finland enthusiastically adopted a pro-European integration policy, but did not forget the core tenets of geopolitical realism. Thus, the approach was based on a “eurorealist” worldview. Secondly, the end of the era vindicated Finland in terms of its Western-ness in the minds
of decision-makers. To put it differently, Finland was finally released from the stigma of Finlandization, and was free to pursue its ambitions as an accepted Western nation. Thirdly, the ideational milieu of Finnish foreign policymaking became more relaxed, as the attempts to shape public opinion and control societal debate diminished and as ideas about Finland’s position in the world were able to compete more freely. Ever since the end of the Cold War, there have been genuine alternatives to the existing policy orientation, and attempts to impose a consensus have been less considerable.
Tiivistelmä


Työn keskeinen teoreettinen väite on, että kattavan näkemyksen ideoiden vaikutuksesta ulkopolitiikkaan voidaan saavuttaa vain lähestymistavalla, joka yhdistää ulkopoliitiikan analyysin subjektiivisiin sekä intersubjektiivisiin ideoihin keskittyvien teoroiden pääperiaatteet. Tutkimus korostaa, että integroiva menettelytapa on sovellettavissa eri ulkopoliitiikan tutkimuksen analysintasoiilla. Yhdistävän lähestymistavan soveltaminen perustuu näkemykseen siitä, että yksilökeskeiset psykologiset teorian ja sosiaalisuutta korostavat konstruktivistiset lähestymistavat täydentävät toistensa heikkouksia.


Väitöstutkimuksen ensimmäinen teoreettinen osio selittää yksilöiden uskomusjärjestelmien merkitystä ulkopoliitiikan tekemisessä ja korostaa sosiaalisen ympäristön merkitystä yksilön ajatusmaailman lähteenä. Työn toinen
teoreettinen panos liittyy kansalliseen identiteettiin. Se kehittää alhaalta ylös kumpuavaa kansallisen identiteetin mallin, jossa kollektiivisen kansallisen omakuvan perusta on yksilön identifioituminen tiettyyn kansakuntaan. Tämän lisäksi tutkimus jakaa kansallisen identiteetin kolmeen komponenttiin: maailmankuviihin, poliittiseen tarkoituukseen ja statukseen.

Tutkimuksen kolmas teoreettinen mielenkiinnon kohde on yleisen mielipiteen ja ulkopoliitikan suhde, ja se hahmottaa kolme julkinen mielipiteen ja ulkopoliitikan välistä dynamiikkaa. ”Alhaalta ylös” –mallissa kansalaismielipide vaikuttaa selvästi ulkopoliitikan tekemiseen, siinä missä ”ylhäältä alas” –dynamikassa valtiojohto pyrkii muokkaamaan yleistä mielipidettä. Kolmannessa mallissa ulkopoliitikan tekeminen ja julkinen mielipide eivät ole yhteydessä johtuen kansalaisten kiinnostuksen puutteesta tai poliittisen johon välinpitämättömyydestä.

Käsitteltyään kolmea valtion sisästä analyysitasoa tutkimus kiinnittää huomiota ideoiden roolii valtioiden välissä suhteissa. Se käsittelee valtioiden välistä luottamusta kolmesta eri teoreettisesta perspektiivistä, ja analysoi, miten erityisesti valtioiden välillä koettu epäluottamus voi vaikuttaa niiden keskinäisiin suhteisiin. Toisin sanoen osiossa tutkitaan, miten valtiotoimijoiden mielipiteiden elävät ideat ilmentyvät kahden maan keskinäisessä kanssakäymässä.


Julkaisu III tarkastelee yleisen mielipiteen ja ulkopoliitikan suhdetta Suomen ulkopoliitikan historiassa. Se väittää, että Suomen ulkopoliitikasta on
löydettävissä kolme erilaista mallia kansalaismielipiteen ja ulkopoliittikan välillä. Itsenäistymisen alkuvuosina ja sotienvälinenä aikana ulkopoliittika ja yleinen mielipide eivät juuri kommunikoineet. Tilanne muuttui kylmän sodan alettua, ja kyseistä aikakautta leimasikin valtiojohdon vahva pyrkimys muokata yleistä mielipidettä. Kylmän sodan loputtua julkinen mielipide voimaantui ja se alkoi vahvemmin vaikuttaa ulkopoliitiisiin päätöksiin.


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1. Introduction

1.1 Research Objectives

One of the most clichéd slogans (if not the most) in the annals of Finnish foreign policy is J.K. Paasikivi’s assertion that the beginning of all wisdom is the acknowledgement of facts. The statement reflects the typical assertiveness of realism and the school’s claim of its alleged superiority in capturing the essential forces and features of political reality (see e.g. Bew 2016, 177–181). What the proponents of realism are perhaps hesitant to admit is that realism – like any other worldview – is a prism through which individuals, practitioners and scholars alike, interpret the world. Importantly, individual interpretations are representations of reality, containing specific biases and even distortions of the world around us. This also applies to Finnish realism, whose figurehead Paasikivi has – deservedly or not – become.¹

The quote attributed to Paasikivi constitutes an apt bridge between the two major research interests of this doctoral dissertation: the role of ideas in the conduct of foreign policy and Finnish foreign policy. The theoretical contribution of the thesis relates to the influence of ideas in foreign policymaking. Its principal assumption is that ideational factors are of utmost importance in understanding state action. In other words, “the independent effects of ideas (worldviews, social constructions, social cognitions, and so on) are central to accounts of the choices people (and states) make” (Kowert 2012, 30). Indeed, both personal and shared ideas influence decision-making. Whereas individual ideas affect the way in which a person constructs reality, collective ideas in turn constitute the societal milieu in which individuals are embedded. Thus, the wider ideational environment is a repository of shared meanings, and a key source of personal views.

The theoretical approach of this dissertation stems from the tradition of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), which is a subfield of International Relations (IR). Although the boundary between the main discipline and subfield is rather blurred (Houghton

¹ According to Osmo Apunen (2014), Paasikivi had both a long and a short line of thought about foreign policy. The short line related to both the Russification period of the early 20th century and to the immediate post-Second World War Years. The long perspective dates back to the years of autonomy in the 19th century. Whereas the short line of thought was concerned with securing Finland’s survival amid the pressure of Russia/the Soviet Union, the long insight, according to Apunen, endeavored to open windows to Europe, of which Russia was a part. The image of Paasikivi as the foremost Finnish practitioner of realpolitik stems from his short line of thought.
FPA has certain hallmarks which distinguish it from general IR theory. Put briefly, the theoretical approaches of FPA are agent-oriented and actor-specific (Hudson 2007). Ideational perspectives have constituted a crucial part of FPA from the outset. Scholars have acknowledged that individual perceptions of the security environment, the structuration of particular situations, and the norms and values reposed in the shared meanings all influence decision-making (see e.g. Snyder 1962, 5). Within FPA, various ideational theories have unquestionably constituted the strongest ideational branch. However, toward the 1990s, social constructivism and cultural theories gained a stronger foothold in the field.

Interestingly, the ideational approaches of FPA have been reluctant to communicate with each other, although they have a mutual interest in understanding the ways in which reality is represented. However, whereas psychological theories have dealt with individuals and their beliefs, constructivists have been interested in the social world. Regrettably, the absence of communication has implications for the theoretical solidity of the approaches, since the lack of dialogue magnifies the weaknesses of both branches. Cognitive theories have been criticized for reductionism, while constructivism, in turn, has been accused of neglecting the significance of human agency. Unsurprisingly, scholars across the fields of IR and FPA have called for an approach that could draw together psychological and social standpoints.

Strikingly, very few scholars have taken these calls seriously. The most notable endeavor to promote ideational dialogue is the 2012 volume edited by Vaughn P. Shannon and Paul M. Kowert, *Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance*. In the book, the authors establish an ideational alliance against the rationalist approaches of FPA, by creating an empirical and theoretical basis for a synthesis between psychology and constructivism. More specifically, the ideational alliance merges the microfoundational elements of cognitive psychology with the larger social contexts – namely the social macrostructure of human behavior.

This dissertation and its overarching theoretical objective builds on Shannon and Kowert’s work. It agrees with the aforementioned authors that it is high time to cross paradigmatic obstacles and immerse oneself in seeking common ground between the main ideational branches of FPA. However, instead of an ideational alliance, the thesis speaks of Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA).2 Whereas the original ideational alliance is predominantly preoccupied with questions of identity, this study gathers a number of ideational approaches under the IFPA label, and duly broadens the scope of ideational dialogue. It argues that the main virtue of an ideational alliance – the fusion between psychology and constructivism – is applicable to various ideational theories of foreign policy and thus to multiple levels of analysis.

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2 Benedikt Erforth (2015, 11) has used the term ideational foreign policy analysis in his doctoral dissertation. However, he uses the term only once and in an incidental fashion.
There are four levels under scrutiny in the dissertation. The \textit{intra-state levels} include the individual, the elite and the public levels – all of which should be approached through the principles of ideational dialogue. The inclusion of the \textit{inter-state level} – which is the fourth analytical tier of the dissertation – demonstrates how individual and collective ideas at the intra-state level can influence state action vis-à-vis other states.

Moreover, ‘idea’ as a concept is too broad and vague to be employed as an analytical tool, since ideas are practically infinite and ubiquitous. In order to conduct a sound analysis, one needs more specific concepts to simplify the world of ideas and to make it understandable. To that end, this research taps into the vocabulary of constructivism and political psychology, particularly cognitive and social psychology. The analytical concepts the dissertation utilizes include, \textit{inter alia}, belief and belief system, identity, worldview, status, and trust. All of these terms will be elaborated in Chapter 3 and also in the original publications of the dissertation.

The dissertation consists of five publications, which all deal with different aspects of Finnish foreign and security policy. When it comes to advancing theoretical understanding on state action, in addition to the overarching theoretical objective of promoting the synthesis of psychology and constructivism, every article in the dissertation has its own theoretical objectives that serve the broader goal. The purpose of \textit{Publication I} on the belief system of Mauno Koivisto is to understand the effects of the social environment on individual beliefs. \textit{Publication II}, which outlines the Finnish foreign policy schools of thought at the beginning of the post-Cold War era, promotes a view of national identity rooted in social psychology. \textit{Publication III} in turn investigates the historical nexus between public opinion and Finnish foreign policy. \textit{Publication IV} unpacks Finnish beliefs on the untrustworthiness of Sweden as a defense cooperation partner and is thus interested in the interstate-level manifestations of individual and collective ideas. The final study, \textit{Publication V}, explores different aspects of Finlandization, and contains elements from all four levels of analysis.

Even though the above-listed publications touch upon the entire period of Finnish independence,\footnote{It must be noted that only \textit{Publication III} touches upon the (interwar) years of Finland’s early independence. The focus of the rest of the publications is on the post-Second World War era.} the study has a special interest in the end of the Cold War and early post-Cold War years. As each of the individual articles intersect the era – some more, some less explicitly – it generates an opportunity for the study to analyze how the change of an epoch affected the ideas that underlay Finnish foreign policy during the time. In other words, by integrating the results of the five publications, the dissertation seeks to understand how the ideational foundations of Finnish foreign policy changed during this important period of transition in world politics, and how
individual and collective ideas shaped Finland’s nascent post-Cold War foreign policy.

The main claim is that Finnish foreign policy underwent an ideational adjustment in which the premises of Finnish policy were adapted to a new era. More specifically, Finland’s foreign policy orientation turned from small-state realism to integrationism, which nonetheless included certain elements of traditional geopolitical realism. This again was the chief explanation for Finland’s decision to stay militarily non-aligned. Furthermore, Finnish policymakers and the elite at large felt a certain vindication in terms of Finland’s “Western-ness” and sovereignty, upon which many commentators cast doubt, particularly during the years of Finlandization. Finally, the dissertation suggests that the ideational milieu of Finnish foreign policymaking underwent a process of relaxation. In other words, as internal and external constraints loosened, there was more room for competing ideas about the foundations of Finnish foreign policy.

1.2 Research Questions

As mentioned above, the dissertation comprises five studies, whose main features and results are summarized in Chapter 4. Each study has its own research interests, and the publications investigate different aspects of Finnish foreign and security policy. This section introduces the research questions of the publications and, additionally, the overarching questions concerning the end of the Cold War based on the integration of the results and insights of the five publications.

Publication I concentrates on the ideas of an individual, namely on the belief system of Mauno Koivisto, the President of Finland from 1982 to 1994. By using qualitative operational code analysis as a theoretical framework, it addresses three research questions:

- What kind of foreign policy belief system did Mauno Koivisto have?
- Did the end of the Cold War bring about a change in Koivisto’s belief system?
- How did Koivisto’s life experience and societal factors influence his beliefs regarding international politics and foreign policy?

Publication II again explores intersubjective ideas at the elite level, as it outlines the Finnish foreign policy schools of thought of the early post-Cold era. It seeks to understand how the Finnish foreign policy elite saw the emerging post-Cold War world and Finland’s place in it. The article poses two main research questions:
• What were the Finnish foreign policy schools of thought at the beginning of the post-Cold War era and how did they view the changing world?
• How did the ideas fostered by the respective schools influence Finnish foreign policy during the early post-Cold War years?

Publication III in turn adopts a broader perspective by investigating public opinion’s role in Finnish foreign and security policy. It simply probes the question:

• What role has been played by public opinion and its historical evolution in Finnish foreign and security policy?

Publication IV investigates how certain ideas can influence bilateral relations between two states. More precisely, it is interested in how the idea of (un)trustworthiness has influenced the contemporary Finnish-Swedish defense relationship. After identifying a curious lack of trust toward Sweden among the Finnish foreign policy elite, it poses the question:

• What are the reasons for the existing mistrust toward Sweden among the Finnish foreign policy elite?

Publication V is a reaction to the re-emergence of the model and concept of Finlandization, as it was suggested by prominent commentators as a solution to the Ukrainian crisis. The study’s aim is to clarify what the Finnish experience of Finlandization actually meant, and it addresses three questions:

• Which factors constituted Finlandization?
• Did the Finnish accommodative attitude toward the Soviet Union go too far?
• What are the lessons learnt regarding Finlandization as a national security strategy?

Publication V has a less explicit theoretical framework compared to the first four articles. However, Finlandization is perhaps one of the most well-known ideas in the history of Finnish foreign policy, and it deserves to be evaluated from a theoretical point of view as well. Thus, in Chapter 4, the dissertation sheds further light on Finlandization and evaluates it from the perspective of IFPA.

As all five studies touch upon the end of the Cold War, and as they deal with multiple levels of analysis, it gives the dissertation an interesting opportunity to examine Finnish foreign policy during the formative period of change. In other words, the dissertation seeks to understand what the end of the Cold War meant for the ideational environment of Finnish foreign policymaking. Hence, it poses three general research questions.
• What did the end of the Cold War mean for Finnish foreign policy in terms of its ideational foundations?
• What factors contributed to change on the one hand, and continuity on the other?
• Can ideas explain the key doctrinal decisions of the era such as accession to the European Union and adhering to military non-alignment?

1.3 Research Material and Methodological Standpoints

The research material that the dissertation unpacks is comprehensive, and mainly comprises textual data. Although the articles contain more specific information on the material, it is worth providing a brief overview. Publication I goes through multiple primary sources such as official statements and speeches, memoirs, newspaper and television interviews, transcriptions of interviews and other archival material from the archives of the Office of the President of the Republic of Finland. Moreover, it uses information gathered from an oral history session, and also relies on second-hand insights and existing research. Publication II again analyses op-eds and columns, newspaper and magazine articles, speeches and books from the early post-Cold War period. In Publication III, the emphasis is more on secondary sources such as historical works about various phases of Finnish foreign policy, but also on news material and memoirs. Publication IV explores news material and op-eds, official statements and memoirs. Moreover, it has analyzed archival material from the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. Lastly, Publication V examines memoirs, diaries, speeches, and material from the archives of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but it mainly bases its arguments on a thorough review of existing historiography and research literature.

The methodological standpoints of the dissertation can best be labelled as qualitative content analysis, which is simply “a method for systematically describing the meaning of qualitative material” (Schreier 2012, 1). The aim is to draw meaningful inferences from the data, namely text or other form of communication (Weber 1990, 19). The method is widely used across the social sciences, and the approach has also become popular and well-established both within IR and FPA (McDermott 2004; Pashakhanlou 2017). However, it is worth noting that there are various types of qualitative content analysis. Hsieh & Shannon (2005) categorize the method into three distinctive approaches: conventional, directed, and summative analysis. In conventional qualitative content analysis the analytical categories are derived from the textual material. In the directed method, the analysis starts with the theoretical framework of the study, which guides the systematic analytical process. The summative variant involves counting and comparison of keywords or content, and also interpretation of the underlying context.
This study employs both directed and conventional approaches, although the emphasis is on the former. The type and rigidity of the methodology vary from one article to another. In *Publications I, II and IV* the approach is directed since the analytical categories used to analyze the material stem from certain clearly defined theoretical frameworks, namely operational code analysis, national identity, and trust. *Publication III* has both deductive and inductive dimensions. Theories of public opinion provide direction for the examination, but analytical observations are deduced from the text. The method in *Publication V* is mixed. On the one hand, it identifies “models of Finlandization” in a conventional fashion but then applies one type of the phenomenon to the study of Finland’s experience. Moreover, since the article contains insights from the archives, it has applied the principles of historical criticism.

The dissertation has certain focal meta-theoretical standpoints on which the key assumptions of the theoretical framework rely. These premises again affect the way in which this study approaches theory (Kurki & Wight 2013, 14). First, the most obvious position of the work is that in the study of foreign policy, the ideational reality is analytically significant, in addition to material structures. Thus, along with observable entities, non-observable matters also have ontological significance, and are in fact the point of interest of this research. However, importantly, materialist and ideational factors are not separate entities but mutually constitutive (Tannenwald 2005, 20–21). In other words, ideas can shape material factors and, moreover, ideas give meaning to material structures. Indeed, without ideational content, the material structures are rather hollow. One of the most illuminating encapsulations about the role of ideas giving meaning to material structures comes from Alexander Wendt (1995, 73), and touches upon perceptions of nuclear weapons. As Wendt argues:

> 500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of shared understandings.

However, although ideas affect material realities, the relationship works in both ways, since a change in material realities might well result in transformation in the ideational realm. Post-Second World War Germany and its civilian foreign policy is perhaps the most illustrative example of how tangible material changes – a total defeat in a war – can profoundly transform the foundations of the principles and objectives of a nation’s foreign affairs (see e.g. Bagger 2019).

Secondly, as to the explaining-understanding conundrum in IR epistemology, the standpoint of the dissertation is on the understanding side. More specifically, instead of following scientific methods and identifying general causes, it seeks to understand internal meanings, in other words how individual interpretations of reality shape
policy and, furthermore, how shared collective understanding influences human action. This is not to say that ideas cannot have any causal significance.

The explaining-understanding conundrum has puzzled scholars for decades. Within IR, there is no unified way to approach the dilemma. Some scholars have argued that one has to choose between either explaining or understanding (Hollis-Smith 1990). Other researchers see the problem in a practical light and argue that choosing one’s approach is dependent on the research question (Wendt 1987). The third school posits that in order for a scholar to conduct meaningful analysis, both explanation and understanding are needed (Carlsnaes 1992; Patomäki 1996). Although the studies that make up the dissertation stem from the interpretative tradition, it does not mean that the study refuses to identify causal mechanisms. In fact, some of the research questions imply that an ideational approach can explain certain phenomena. One should perhaps remember that – like the levels of analysis problem (see 3.1) – the explaining-understanding dichotomy is to a great degree a heuristic tool, not an ontological question.

Finally, the third essential meta-theoretical premise of the work is the idea of structuration, which lies at the very heart of constructivism. Structuration strikes a “third way” between methodological individualism and holism or, to put it differently, between the agent and the structure. More precisely, the agent-structure debate emerges from two uncontentious truths about social life: first, that human agency is the only moving force behind the actions, events, and outcomes of the social world; and second, that human agency can be realized only in concrete historical circumstances that condition the possibilities for action and influence its course (Dessler 1989, 443).

This study does not deny that “the social world is ultimately the result of many individuals interacting with one another” (List & Spiekermann 2013, 629). However, as said in the citation above, concrete social circumstances condition and shape human action, and no insight explaining or understanding human behavior is complete without acknowledging the environment in which the actor is enmeshed. As Wendt (1987, 365) distills the idea of structuration:

Agents are inseparable from social structures in the sense that their action is possible only in virtue of those structures, and social structures cannot have causal significance except insofar as they are instantiated by agents. Social action, then, is “co-determined” by the properties of both agents and social structures.

As will be pointed out later in the study, the dissertation treats the agent-structure
relationship as an intra-state phenomenon, not as a state-international system dyad. Hence, the actors are decision-makers and members of an elite, and the structure is the ideational environment of a nation-state in which the individuals under scrutiny are embedded.

1.4 Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation consists of five chapters. The Introduction already presented the research objective and questions. It also provided an overview of the research material, methodology, and meta-theoretical principles. Chapter 2 reviews the recent IR and FPA literature on Finnish foreign policy. Furthermore, it examines how the end of the Cold War has been treated in previous studies concerning Finnish foreign affairs. Lastly, the second chapter demonstrates how the thesis in general and the individual publications in particular contribute to the study of Finnish foreign policy.

Chapter 3 presents the analytical framework of the thesis. It begins with an introduction to the FPA tradition, followed by an outline of the overarching theoretical perspective, namely IFPA. The chapter then moves on to introduce the theories applied in the individual publications. It is worth noting that the chapter presents the theories as a necessary background to the studies, which apart from Publication V contain specific theoretical frameworks. There is some inevitable overlap between the chapter and the publications, but unnecessary theoretical repetition is avoided. After the introduction to FPA and IFPA, the chapter deals with cognitive foreign policy analysis in general and operational code analysis in particular. One of the key questions will be how the cognitive and social worlds interact. The subsequent section shifts the attention to the next level of analysis, taking up the significance of collective ideas in general and the role of national identity in particular. Importantly, it sketches a bottom-up approach to national self-images. From collective ideas and identities, the chapter proceeds to unpack the relationship between foreign policy and public opinion. The section demonstrates when public opinion likely affects policy-making, when public opinion is disregarded, and when public attitudes and foreign policy are disconnected. The analysis then proceeds to the inter-state level and puts the issue of trust under scrutiny. It presents the various interpretations of trust that stem from different IR paradigms and calls for a multi-paradigmatic understanding of trust. Lastly, the chapter concludes with a theoretical round-up and reflection on how the principles of IFPA should be applied in the analysis of foreign policy.

Chapter 4 consists of summaries of the publication and also presents the key results. The sections on Publication III and Publication V contain short theoretical notes, which expand and elaborate on the theoretical foundations of the studies. The articles as a whole are included at the end of the dissertation. The final chapter integrates the results of the individual studies and duly answers the overarching research questions.
set in the introduction. The final section of the study ends with an epilogue, illustrating what the end of the Cold War signified for Finnish foreign policy in light of the turbulence in European security that started in 2014 up to the time of writing.
2. Finnish Foreign Policy and International Relations

2.1 The Six Strands of Studies on Finnish Foreign Policy

Although Finland is a minor player in international politics and the conduct of its foreign affairs rarely gains worldwide attention, there is a surprising amount of research dealing with the different aspects and eras of Finnish foreign policy. Indeed, Finnish foreign policy has interested not only IR scholars but also political scientists, and diplomatic historians in particular, most of whom come either from Finland or other Nordic states. Furthermore, popular books and memoirs are published frequently, which feeds lively national public debate on national security issues (see e.g. Aaltola 2019; Haukkala 2012; Himanen 2017; Tarkka 2013, 2015; Valtasaari 2009).

This chapter presents a brief but comprehensive overview of the recent IR and FPA scholarship concerning Finnish foreign policy, and also outlines how the dissertation contributes to the literature in question. Since there are comprehensive texts summarizing the developments of the scholarship in the Cold War and early post-Cold War era (see Aaltola 2003; Apunen 2012; Patomäki 1991), the focus of this review is primarily on the past two decades (see also Sinkkonen & Vogt 2015). It identifies six different strands of research: identity, Europeanization, strategic culture, foreign policy decision-making, foreign policy doctrine and practice-based analysis, and introduces the key works of each strand in brief. When one examines the branches, it becomes clear that studies on Finnish foreign policy have predominantly stemmed from ideational theories, namely constructivism. One can thus claim that the scholarship suffers from a constructivist bias. On a self-critical note, this study does not do very much to remedy this state of affairs, but it nonetheless fills notable research gaps in the IR/FPA literature on Finnish foreign policy (see 2.3).

The concept of identity has been widely used to unearth the ideational premises and conditions of Finnish foreign policymaking. Most notably, Christopher S. Browning has published multiple studies on Finnish national identity, with a particular focus on the developments that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. These trends include the “Westernization” of Finland’s foreign policy and identity, a more positive evaluation of Finland’s small-state identity, and the waning of Nordicity in

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4 The 2015 bibliography on the webpage of the Finnish Foundation for Foreign Policy Research is an extensive list of the various publications about Finnish foreign security and defense policy. See <https://www.ulkopolitiikantutkimus.fi/7206>.
the respective foreign policies of the Nordic states, including Finland (Browning 2002, 2006, 2007). However, his most noteworthy work on the matter covers Finnish foreign policy from the early years of independence to the first two post-Cold War decades, and pays attention to various identity narratives that have shaped Finnish foreign policy during its independence (Browning 2008).

Browning is not the only scholar to explore Finnish foreign affairs from an identity perspective. Teija Tiilikainen (1998, 2006) has examined the relationship between Finnish identity and its integration policy, particularly vis-à-vis the way in which Finland adapted its small-state and state-centric self-image to the requirements of EU membership and to the workings of the Union. Teemu Palosaari (2013), who also appraised Finnish identity adaptation to the post-Cold War environment, concluded that as an EU member Finland has adjusted its identity toward “member-state alignment” and “small-EU-member-stateness”. Mika Aaltola (2011), who to some extent echoes Browning’s views on Finland’s more positive evaluation of its national identity, has in turn pointed out that Finnish leaders have in fact defined Finland’s identity quite flexibly in order to overcome the constraints of geopolitics. In their exploration of Finnish Cold War history, Juhana Aunesluoma and Johanna Rainio-Niemi (2016) in turn argue that, in contrast to the views positing that neutrality was primarily a foreign policy instrument, neutrality became ingrained in the national self-image. Tuomas Forsberg (2016) has observed that several identity interpretations exist in the Finnish NATO debate. He claims that the supporters and opponents of Finnish membership in NATO have voiced their arguments based on some identity interpretations; whereas the supporters claim that membership in the Alliance would consolidate Finland’s Western identity, the opponents – who do not deny Finland’s Western-ness – say that the country should rather enshrine its autonomy and non-alignment and not identify with an allegedly coercive organization. Lastly, Marco Siddi (2017) has studied how the different representations of Russia have varied in Finland’s identity discourse throughout its independence.

In addition to probing Finnish national identity, scholars have paid special attention to the Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy – a phenomenon that is closely related to the formation and change of Finnish state identity (see e.g. Jokela 2011). However, since the concept has been employed so regularly, it merits closer attention as an independent analytical endeavor. Palosaari (2011, 2016), who has studied Finnish post-Cold War foreign policy comprehensively, has argued that the country’s foreign policy has undergone not only a process of “thin” but also “thick” Europeanization. This implies that Finland has not only made organizational and

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5 In the latest research on the role of “Nordicness” in Finnish foreign policy, Ojanen and Raunio (2018) argue that “Nordicness” is still an instrument in Finnish foreign policy. Moreover, the country has also stood out somewhat from the Nordic states, since it has traditionally prioritized security over traditional Nordic values.
policy changes but, through socialization, it has adopted certain aspects from the EU as part of its self-image. In practice, this has for example meant a less restricted reading of military non-alignment and more civilian and military crisis management at the expense of traditional peacekeeping. According to Juha Jokela (2011), Finland’s national identity underwent a process of Europeanization during the 1990s, and the former neutral identity transformed into a more Western self-image. However, Hiski Haukkala and Hanna Ojanen (2011) have observed that the Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy has not been a straightforward process. Rather, the development has been characterized by pendulum swings between Europeanization and persistent distinctive national features. Furthermore, Kristi Raik (2015) has interestingly claimed that in Finland and Estonia instrumental reasons outweigh the ideational standpoints in guiding the nations’ respective activities with regard to the EU’s common external policies. Moreover, their national identities and perspectives remain strong. Thus, the instrumental attitude and the preponderance of national perspectives constitute limits to a deeper Europeanization of Finland’s and Estonia’s foreign policies.

Studies on Finnish strategic culture represent the thinnest strand of ideational approaches to Finnish foreign policy. The most notable analysis of Finnish strategic culture is the one conducted by Henrikki Heikka. In his study, he identifies a long continuum in Finnish strategic thinking, which he describes as republican realism. Although the culture has had different doctrinal manifestations, Heikka concludes that the main Finnish strategic objective has been the defense of an anti-hegemonic political order in Europe – an aspiration arising from the country’s proximity to Russia (Heikka 2005). Antti Seppo and Tuomas Forsberg (2009) have again highlighted the pivotal role that national defense plays in Finnish strategic culture and also in the construction of Finnish nationhood. Historical experiences, such as the wars fought against the Soviet Union, have endowed Finland with a positive aura. These experiences continue to serve as an argument for maintaining credible armed forces to this day.

Studies dealing with Finnish foreign policy decision-making are scant, which is curious given the fairly open access to archival material and a short 25-year period of secrecy. There are, however, notable works examining different aspects of Finnish foreign policymaking process that are worthy of elaboration. Tuomas Forsberg and Christer Pursiainen (2006), for example, have analyzed Finnish crisis decision-making and concluded that it has been highly concentrated in the hands of a small elite group. Fredrik Doeser’s (2017) article about Finland’s decision to refrain from Operation Unified Protector in Libya is again a textbook case of a classic decision-making analysis. According to Doeser, the refusal was a result of two factors, election

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6 The emerging debate on the schools of thought in Finnish foreign policy has notable similarities with the literature on Finland’s strategic culture. See *Publication II*, Haukkala & Vaahutoranta 2016; Juntunen 2018.
timing and Finnish strategic culture. Robust military interventions have not been a part of Finnish strategic behavior, and decision-makers did not want to take electoral risks ahead of the parliamentary elections. Additionally, there are works clarifying the Finnish parliament’s role in foreign policy decision-making (Koivula & Sipilä 2011; Hääkkinen 2015; Raunio 2016; Raunio & Wiberg 2001). Tommi Koivula and Joonas Sipilä (2011), for example, have probed how Europeanization has featured in Finnish and Swedish parliamentary debates regarding EU crisis management. They conclude that the respective parliaments have been rather secondary players in foreign policy decision-making and that the debates were “detached from the reality of their governments’ official positions and commitments within the ESDP [European Security and Defense Policy]”. Tapio Raunio (2016) in turn argues that the Eduskunta actually plays a role in foreign policy, and Members of Parliament have multiple instruments – such as ministerial hearings and participation in the formulation of key foreign policy documents – through which they are involved in the Finnish foreign policymaking process.

Interestingly, studies scrutinizing the doctrinal aspects of Finnish foreign policy are mostly comparative. For instance, Tuomas Forsberg and Tapani Vaahantoranta (2001) sought reasons for why the “post-neutral” Finland and Sweden paradoxically accept almost everything in their security and defense policy except collective defense, and judged that possible developments in the EU can bring about change in the countries’ attitude toward alignment. In 2006, Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira aptly distilled that, in terms of their status in the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe, Austria, Finland, and Sweden were inside the fence but outside the walls. In other words, the former neutrals decided to participate in the European community-building process through their respective EU memberships and to forge cooperative arrangements to enhance their security without joining collective defense efforts (Ferreira-Pereira 2006). Ulrika Möller and Ulf Bjereld (2010), in turn, identified two institutionalized feedback mechanisms that underpin Finnish and Swedish non-alignment. They argued that as long as the two mechanisms – strategic usefulness of the doctrine and its appropriateness with regard to Sweden’s and Finland’s respective identities – do not turn negative, they continue to inform Finnish and Swedish foreign policymaking.

Lastly, there is also interesting research drawing on the practice theory of social sciences and IR. Anni Kangas (2011) offers a practice-based interpretation of Finnish-Russia relations in the interwar era and, more precisely, of how Finland learned to come to terms with its proximity to Russia. Tapio Juntunen (2016a) again applies the concepts of practice theory to the study of the history of foreign policymaking. He points out how the Finnish Cold War initiative to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northern Europe slowly grew into an almost unchallenged routine-like instrument to maintain regional stability and facilitate
security dialogue between the Nordic states, the latter of which in particular had intrinsic value for Finland.

2.2 Finland and the End of the Cold War: Change or Continuity?

Keeping the overarching research question posed in the Introduction in mind, it is helpful to briefly discuss how the end of the Cold War is seen in the existing literature on Finnish foreign policy. The emphasis in the review is on the ideational side of this policy. The key decisions of the era are well known, and there are many useful overviews of the key post-Cold War decisions (see e.g. Blomberg 2012; Tarkka 2015; Valtasaari 2009). Thus, it is not necessary to present a chronology of the turns in Finnish foreign policy in the (early) post-Cold War era. Rather, the perspective of this short review is what the end of the Cold War signified for Finnish foreign affairs in terms of its ideational foundations.

Teija Tiilikainen argues that the Cold War’s state-centric worldview transcended the new era, although Finland made a profound political choice to join the EU. According to Tiilikainen:

> The swift turn-around in official policy, and the transformation of European integration from bad to good, were made predominantly in the spirit of the old realist world-view which puts a high emphasis upon State [sic] security (Tiilikainen 1998, 173).

Thus, when it comes to the ideas guiding Finnish foreign policy, Tiilikainen saw no radical change but rather continuity; the old worldview was simply adapted to new realities. This is also the conclusion drawn by Railo (2010, 407–410), and which is further echoed by Blomberg (2011, 654). Railo claims that the political culture behind the ostensibly dramatic decisions remained almost the same as during the Cold War. More specifically, the basic underlying values and attitudes of Finnish foreign policy did not change. Rather, the transformation of world politics and the European security landscape enabled Finland to conduct a policy which was finally in line with its key societal values. In other words, Finland was able to align with the West, which had already been a tacit objective of its foreign policy. Or as Heikka (2005) points out: “Finland’s return to Europe” in the 1990s was part of a longer continuum of the republican strategic culture.

Moreover, in their study on the history of Finnish identity politics, Harle and Moisio (2001, 178) describe Finland’s EU membership as the climax of a long national identity project. After the end of the Cold War, Finland was finally able to join the reference group, namely the West – an aspiration dating back to the 19th century. A key argument in their volume is that Russia has been the most significant “other” in
Finland’s identity. The otherness of Russia grew stronger in the new post-Cold War environment where Finland had given up some of its old practices of Eastern policy.

Not all scholars have emphasized continuity as forcefully. For example, according to Jokela (2011, 46–81), the change in the security environment resulted in a notable transformation in Finnish identity discourse. The former neutrality discourse turned into speech that highlighted alignment. As part of the change, identification with the West and its actors such as the EU and NATO became stronger in Finnish foreign and security policy talk. Jokela highlights the speed of the change; the transformation in the discourse took place during less than a decade.

Christopher S. Browning (2008) in turn argues that the end of the Cold War was a formative period for Finns and their identity project. The collapse of the bipolar system effectively cut the ground from under neutrality, and suddenly there was more room for novel representations of Finnish identity. Moreover, Browning posits that a dominant Westernizing narrative emerged, which depicted Finland’s new Western identity against the Finlandized past. A key element of the narrative was the claim that Finland was finally able to “come home” to the Western community—a place where it belonged due to its identity and social system.

In conclusion, there are two common denominators in the existing ideational interpretations of what the end of the Cold War meant for Finnish foreign policy. First, the aforementioned scholars did not see any radical break from the Cold War era. Although scholars have various opinions on the scope of the change, no one has identified a complete re-evaluation of the ideational basis of Finnish foreign policy. Secondly, and interrelatedly, many of the previous studies observed a degree of “Westernization” in the Finnish self-image, but they saw it as a part of a historical continuum and unfulfilled aspiration. In other words, the end of an epoch empowered ideas that were bubbling under the official surface during the Cold War years.

2.3 Contributions to the Study of Finnish Foreign Policy

Given the inclination toward constructivist and ideational research in Finnish foreign policy scholarship, it is worth justifying the kind of novel insights that the dissertation could bring to the table. Firstly, one of the most interesting and curious gaps in the IR and FPA literature is the lack of studies about the key individual decision-makers of Finnish foreign policy. Traditionally, Finnish foreign policy is sequenced according to presidencies. Illustratively, the Finnish Cold War foreign policy line—the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line—bears the name of the two Cold War presidents. Publication I about Mauno Koivisto’s foreign policy belief system fills part of the gap by putting a key decision-maker under the analytical spotlight. There is
definitely room for further interpretations that investigate the thinking and actions of individual Finnish policymakers.

Secondly, *Publication II* helps paint a more accurate picture of a vital period in Finnish foreign policy. Although studies on Finnish identity are plentiful, the concept and its subcategories — which have evolved during the past decade — are useful in analyzing Finnish foreign policy thinking in a systematic way. The early post-Cold War period, which has again garnered increasing scholarly interest, was formative for Finland in terms of situating the country in the new post-Cold War world, and it is important to decipher the kind of options that existed and were promoted among the Finnish elite. Now, with the benefit of hindsight, it is also possible to see whether Finnish decision-makers and commentators were on target with the visions of the future and where the decisions made during the time actually led the country.

*Publication III* is the first organized theoretical effort to probe the public opinion-foreign policy nexus in Finnish foreign affairs. Furthermore, it elaborates on the circumstances that led to either higher or lower relevance of public opinion in Finnish foreign policy. Fourthly, Finnish security policy has changed profoundly during the post-2014 years, as new forms of defense cooperation have been introduced and as ambitions regarding security and defense collaboration have clearly grown. This change remains under-conceptualized and under-theorized. *Publication IV* thus seeks to understand the particular features of the increasingly important defense cooperation between Finland and Sweden, and duly sheds theoretical light on the recent steps taken in Finnish security policy.

Fifthly, and lastly, a critical and analytical treatment of re-emerged historical concepts is essential, which is what *Publication V* aims to do by evaluating the Finnish experience of Finlandization (see also Juntunen 2017). The term is occasionally used not only in the Finnish but also in international debate on a range of security issues, and it is often treated as a theoretical ideal type not associated with Finnish foreign policy. Thus, it is in order to inform the potential audience of the Finnish experience of Finlandization, and it is also useful to theorize the Finnish experience.

In terms of the larger research question on the end of the Cold War, the study is well-equipped to shed additional light on the matter, owing to its multi-level approach to Finnish foreign policy. Previous research has painted the broad contours of the developments of the era, which this study does not challenge per se. Rather, this study can inject more nuance into the literature by unpacking changes

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7 Aino Hakovirta’s (2019) study on Kalevi Sorsa’s operational code is one notable exception in this regard.

8 There are some noteworthy exceptions: Aaltola 2016; Juntunen 2016b; Möttölä 2019; Pesu 2017b, 2018; Salonius-Pasternak 2018.
and continuities in individual and collective ideas that shaped Finnish foreign policymaking at the intersection of the two eras of world politics.

On a final note, one could also argue that by studying Finland, the dissertation advances a broader theoretical goal. More precisely, FPA is to a great extent a US-centric endeavor, and there is a need for a broader outlook that widens the scope of analysis beyond the US. Indeed, after the waning of the comparative perspectives of FPA, foreign-policy scholars increasingly conducted single-country studies, often focusing on the United States (Kaarbo 2003, 157). As a result, studies on American foreign policy have duly proliferated, and FPA’s theoretical and methodological preferences have reflected the North American intellectual predominance in the study of foreign policy (Brummer & Hudson 2017). In addition to US-centrism, FPA has to a great extent explored the policies of great powers. Although small-state action rarely has systemic implications, cases of lesser power strategic behavior “might help explain how each copes with security issues in its own neighborhood and place within the global economy” (Balzacq et al. 2019, 77). Hence, studies on small states do have something to contribute to the FPA literature.
3. Introducing Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis

3.1 What is Foreign Policy Analysis?

Before elaborating on how one should study foreign policy, one must first understand the analytical focus of the research tradition, namely foreign policy itself. There are obviously numerous ways to define the essence of foreign policy. Deborah J. Gerner (1995, 18), for example, describes foreign policy as “the intentions, statements, and actions of an actor – often, but not always, a state – directed toward the external world and the response of other actors to these intentions, statements and actions.” According to Christopher Hill (2003, 3), foreign policy is “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations.” A Finnish textbook describes foreign policy as a state action that is oriented toward other states or international organizations or a country’s action in the international system (Forsberg & Vaahktoranta 1993, 11). This study subscribes to the definitions above and, thus, understands foreign policy as a state’s interest-based interaction with state or non-state actors in the various domains of the international system.

However, although conceptual definitions matter, this study is primarily interested in how the action itself takes shape. These processes have long fascinated historians, political scientists, practitioners and other commentators. Hence, research and analysis on foreign affairs existed long before a field dedicated to the scientific analysis of foreign policy – that is Foreign Policy Analysis – was born. FPA textbooks abound and, therefore, it is not necessary to go through the field in detail. Some remarks are in order, however, to provide an intellectual and theoretical context for the research.

In its early years, FPA was dominated by behaviorist insights. Valerie Hudson (2013, 17–27) categorizes the history of FPA into three partly overlapping eras. Classic FPA scholarship, which flourished from the late 1950s to the early 1990s, laid the foundation for the field. Hudson further splits classic FPA scholarship into two generations. The first generation took stock of group decision-making, organizational process and bureaucratic politics, comparative foreign policy and events data, whereas the second generation brought up questions on the

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9 In his study on the history of foreign policy as a practice concept, Halvard Leira (2019) treats the term critically. According to him, the concept was first used in 18th-century Great Britain and France. Leira argues that the term was employed to guard the sphere of foreign affairs from the public eye and to secure the executive’s sole rights to conduct policy in the international realm.
psychological and societal milieu of foreign policy decision-making. The second important era for FPA was the 1970s and 1980s, when FPA underwent a period of self-reflection. In particular, Comparative Foreign Policy’s scientific methods, the negligence of non-quantifiable explanatory values, and the failure to produce policy-relevant results were heavily criticized. Contemporary FPA, according to Hudson, is again committed to looking below the nation-state level, to building middle-range theories, to pursuing multi-causal explanations, to utilizing social science as a whole, and to viewing the decision-making process as being as important as foreign policy outputs.

Introductory books to FPA often present the subfield in a rather uniform fashion. These works, for example, introduce the key individual-level theories from cognitive/psychological models to the rational actor model and game theory. Furthermore, from the state level, bureaucratic politics and group decision-making, institutions, and culture/identity are frequently incorporated as part of FPA. Other approaches considered often include public opinion, the media and the factors of domestic politics, such as the social system (see e.g. Alden & Aran 2016; Beach 2012; Hill 2003; Hudson 2013; Mintz & DeRouen 2010; Morin & Paquin 2018; Neack 2013; Pursiainen & Forsberg 2015; Smith et al. 2008).

FPA’s relationship to IR has been more complicated than one would perhaps imagine. It is important to note that FPA is not a theory of International Relations per se, but rather a subfield, consisting of a set of divergent theories that put the emphasis on processes taking place within a state actor. As Beach (2012, 5) has pointed out:

FPA investigates questions related to the impact of the international system upon foreign policy, the impact of domestic determinants like public opinion and institutions, and how different decision-making processes matter for foreign policy trends or specific actions.

Christopher Hill (2003, 22) has aptly argued that “foreign policy is a central part of our understanding of international relations, even if it is far from being the whole story”. The scope of FPA is thus much narrower compared to IR, which “deal[s] with almost all political phenomena that cannot be contained within the domestic system of a single state” (Beach 2012, 4). Interestingly, it has been hard to connect

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10 Kaarbo (2003, 157) has stated, “[i]n place of the CFP [Comparative Foreign Policy] perspective, foreign policy analysts from the late 1970s until today have tended to adopt middle-range theoretical perspectives” with the emphasis on qualitative methodologies and contextual factors.

11 There is no definitive description of International Relations. The way one defines the discipline largely depends on how one understands the object of research, namely international relations. A narrow understanding of international relations as an interaction between nation states probably
FPA to the theories of IR and, as a result, the subfield has been described as a free-floating enterprise without a logical connection to the debates of IR (Houghton 2007).

According to Valerie M. Hudson (2013, 7), FPA has six hallmarks: it is multifactorial, multilevel, interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented, and actor-specific. All six hallmarks are present in this study. First, the dissertation takes into account both psychological and social factors and, additionally, elements pertinent to domestic politics, namely public opinion. Multifactoriality is not a mere product of the multi-study nature of this dissertation; individual publications also incorporate multiple factors in the analysis. Secondly, the multifactorial approach quite naturally leads to multilevel analysis (see also Neack 2013, 16–17). In this study, there are three intra-state levels of analysis. The fourth level is the inter-state level. The operational code analysis scrutinizes the beliefs of a leader, thus paying attention to cognitive processes and personality, which are among the microstructures underlying foreign policy-making. The second level is the collective or elite tier and it deals with the elite’s intersubjective views on Finland’s self-image. The third level is the public level, namely ordinary citizens and their views on foreign policy. Moreover, Publication IV, in addition to considering Finnish elite discourse, examines how ideas can influence state action at the inter-state level, in this case ideas about the trustworthiness of a fellow state. However, as to the nature of the levels of analysis problematique, this study sides with Temby’s (2015) assertion that the question is more methodological than ontological. In other words, the levels are heuristic devices or tools for understanding and managing the subject of foreign policy (Neack 2013, 17). The number of tiers is thus not set in stone. Rather, it is up to the scholar to define the most fruitful approach to understanding the case at hand.12

Hudson’s third FPA hallmark is interdisciplinarity – an ideal to which this study also adheres. The theories utilized in the publications derive from divergent disciplines leads to a narrower definition of IR, whereas a more comprehensive conception results in a broader view of the branch of science (see Brown & Ainley 1997, 3–11).

12 Within IR and FPA, there have been a number of ways to approach the levels of analysis problem. J. David Singer (1961), for example, outlines two levels – the international system and the national state. Kenneth Waltz (1959) divides international politics into three tiers, namely Man (the individual level), the State, and War (international system). Robert Jervis (1976, 15) – one of the most notable foreign policy scholars – is more mindful of the complexities within a state. He singles out three intrastate levels, namely decision-making, the workings of bureaucracy and the nature of the state and domestic politics, the fourth level being the international environment. James Rosenau (1966 43), another FPA heavyweight, goes even further by emphasizing five factors or levels: the idiosyncrasies of a decision-maker, the roles they assume, the governmental variables limiting or enhancing the choices decision-makers make, non-governmental aspects of a society and, finally, systemic variables of the international environment.
such as psychology, social psychology and sociology.\textsuperscript{13} What follows is that the dissertation is also integrative, for it incorporates different information from numerous sources and disciplines. In the agent-structure debate (see 1.3), FPA’s focus is clearly on agency and thus highlights the primacy of individuals in explaining and understanding a state’s foreign policy (Houghton 2007, 25). This is the case with the dissertation as well. It is orientated toward agency, more specifically human agency. Moreover, it does not “black-box” individuals but rather sees them as central agents in determining foreign policy action.

\textbf{3.2 Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis}

As stated, FPA is a theoretically rich tradition of co-existing and sometimes competing views about foreign policymaking. It is, however, difficult to aggregate the field into different schools or theoretical families.\textsuperscript{14} There are not only divergent ontological and epistemological views, but also different levels of analysis within the subfield, which complicates endeavors to categorize the field. One – albeit not all-encompassing – way to categorize the tradition is to split FPA into two camps: ideational and rational/materialist.\textsuperscript{15} The ideationalist school consists of psychological theories that highlight the subjective nature of reality and the importance of ideational factors such as norms and shared identities (Shannon 2012, 7). In turn, materialist and rational approaches differ from ideational theories in crucial respects. Most importantly, they downplay the importance of the representations of reality for foreign policymaking. According to Browning (2008, 19),

\begin{quote}
dominant approaches to FPA share an acceptance of rationalism and a materialist ontology. Materialism argues that what exists in the world is what we can physically see and touch. Reality is thus viewed as comprised of tangible, palpable and perceptible things and objects, with materialism consequently often tied to an empiricist epistemology (Browning 2008, 19).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{13} Not only in FPA but also in IR, combining knowledge and tools from divergent disciplines is fruitful (see e.g. Aalto et al. 2011). However, one also has to bear in mind that IR, in and of itself, is interdisciplinary, given the fact that it is rooted in different philosophical, humanistic, and social scientific traditions (see e.g. Knutsen 1997).

\textsuperscript{14} Walter Carlsnaes (2001, 334) makes a distinction between two traditions of foreign policy analysis. On the one hand, there are theories of \textit{Innenpolitik} that highlight the role of domestic factors in the explanation of foreign policy. On the other hand, there are \textit{Realpolitik} traditions that again put explanatory weight on systemic-level factors.

\textsuperscript{15} For example, theories of bureaucratic politics or post-structuralist approaches do not necessarily fit into this typology. The former can basically utilize either one of the two views, and post-structuralist and critical theories again stem from a different ontological approach.
The idea of rationality stems from the premise that individuals are expected-utility-maximizing agents. This idea is not necessarily problematic per se, but it rests on shaky assumptions. First, according to rationalism, actors are conscious of the choices they are making. Secondly, they also engage in systematic classification of different possible options. Thirdly, actors act in line with the alternative that maximizes their utility, by taking into account the risks involved and the information at their disposal. Thus, actors should not subdue their interests to prevailing norms or cultural traditions (Morin & Paquin 2018, 218–219).

This study does not deny that actors make utility-maximizing choices based on their interests. As Kowert (2012, 31–32) has put it, “even the most botched efforts at policy-making are usually recognizable as (sometimes faint) approximations of rational choice”. However, rational decision-making does not play out similarly across the board. Rather, instead of being utility-maximizing agents, humans are social actors with limited rationality (see 3.3). In other words, their rationality is affected by their belief systems and the social environment in which they are situated. These factors should be considered in efforts to analyze foreign policy, and the dissertation pays attention to the very ideational factors that permeate rational decision-making.

To put it differently, the thesis is interested in how both subjective and collective ideas affect foreign policy and how idiosyncratic and shared ideas are related – a task that requires an integrated view of ideational theories. So far, surprisingly little dialogue and collaboration has taken place among the ideational branches of FPA. This is peculiar since there has been an understanding of the potential usefulness of such an approach from the start of FPA (Houghton 2007, 31). For example, Richard C. Snyder, in one of the classics of the FPA literature, recognized the necessity of taking ideational perspectives into account in understanding the roots of action in the realm of foreign policy. He argued that

\[ \text{it is difficult to see how we can account for specific actions and for continuities of policies without trying to discover how their operating environment is perceived by those responsible for choices, how particular situations are structured, what values and norms are applied to certain kinds of problems, what matters are selected for attention, and how their past experience conditions present responses (Snyder 1962, 5).} \]

In the decades that followed, multiple scholars have shared this conviction and called for joint analytical efforts between psychology and constructivism (see e.g. Finnmore & Sikkink 1998, 896–899; Flanik 2011; Goldgeier & Tetlock 2001, 83; Houghton 2007; Hymans 2010; Wendt 1999, 134). Houghton (2007, 27), for example, points out that “approaches that emphasize the manner in which reality is constructed are
natural bedfellows, even though…social construction and its individual counterpart clearly operate at different levels of analysis”. Tannenwald (2005, 18) again claims that constructivist and cognitivist approaches both share the view that “the way people interpret the world and define their interests is based on ideas”. For one reason or another, progress has been rather modest. Perhaps scholars have seen divergent ontological standpoints as insurmountable and, moreover, seeking and valuing inter-paradigmatic collaboration and “compatibilism” have not been in vogue in IR until recently (Lake 2013; Mouritzen 2017; Sil & Katzenstein 2010).

Although progress in the joint ideational effort has been modest, there are solid initiatives to bring psychology and constructivism closer together. The most significant contribution to promoting and developing ideational dialogue is Vaughn P. Shannon and Paul A. Kowert’s (2012) edited volume *Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance*. The book lays the foundation for an “ideational alliance” between cognitive psychology and constructivism. The introductory chapters and the ensuing articles convincingly show that it is possible, fruitful, and necessary to apply social and psychological theories in order to understand the ideational milieu in which foreign policymaking takes place.

The key insight of the opus is that even though psychology and constructivism differ in many respects, they are not incompatible. Rather, they support each other’s weaknesses, since the paradigms deal with different levels of analysis. Traditional applications of cognitive psychology in foreign policy analysis are allegedly reductionist, static, universal, and transcultural, and they are said to neglect the social and political environment in which decision-makers are situated. Constructivism can inform psychological boundaries on how certain cultural or societal values and norms constrain or direct an individual’s preferences. Constructivism, again, is often structurally biased and might lack insights into agency (see e.g. Sending 2002). Sometimes, purely social explanations fail to explain variation in state action, which can be caused by divergent individual attitudes. To put it briefly, the point of the ideational alliance is to demonstrate

how the virtues of constructivism set macrostructural boundaries on the perceptions of values and possible responses based on prevailing norms and identity, while psychology provides microfoundations\(^{16}\) for the motives behind normative behavior and identity change (Shannon 2012, 14; see also McDermott 2004, 13).

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\(^{16}\) According to Lake (2013, 573), “in the last decade or so there has been an increasing and […] appropriate demand that mid-level theories have explicit ‘micro-foundations’ or […] a ‘causal mechanism’. In other words, theories are preferred which can link the incentives and actions of real individuals or possibly groups of relatively homogeneous individuals to policy outcomes in a consistent way”. See also Kertzer & Zeitzoff 2017.
In other words, although individual policy-makers’ opinions might be rooted in social and historical circumstances and although they seek policy options from socially and politically appropriate alternatives (see e.g. Legro 1996; Weldes 1996), “actors are not [mere] bearers of structural components, but independent agents” with their own, sometimes decisive idiosyncrasies (Abe 2012, 683–685).

Furthermore, the primary concerns of the ideational alliance constitute a triangle in which obligation, identity, and choice are the vertexes of the tripod. These three themes also recur throughout the book. In other words, the premise of the ideational alliance is that both psychological and social factors are needed to understand how people make choices. Decision-making is shaped by identity, on the one hand, and by the sense of obligation, on the other. In other words, personal identity is an important guide to one’s intent and, in order to make a choice, one must also reckon with normative constraints imposed by the societal environment (Kowert 2012).

This study commends the endeavor by Shannon and Kowert and seeks to advocate and complement the dialogue between psychology and constructivism in FPA. However, instead of ideational alliance, the dissertation speaks of Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis. There are two reasons for the choice. First, Shannon and Kowert’s contribution does not encompass individual belief system studies, public opinion, or the question of trust, unlike this study, which aims to broaden the ideational horizon. In other words, IFPA incorporates additional theoretical perspectives and levels of analysis into the realm of ideational dialogue. Thus, it serves as an umbrella for the various ideational approaches of FPA. Secondly, the decision to use another concept is a matter of semantics. To imply that a theoretical construct is against something sends a strong signal, and it is perhaps unnecessary to see material/rational and ideational views as polar opposites, which is in fact something the authors of the volume note. As the study will soon elaborate, normative compliance requires strategic thinking and, moreover, psychological views are based on the idea of limited rationality. One could then perhaps state that this study rejects the utility of purely rationalist and materialist theories but not the entire idea of rationality.

As the broad theoretical contours of the work have now been drawn, it is in order to elaborate what ideas actually are. The term idea is not only vague but also too broad to have any analytical value without conceptual specifications. Obviously, in IFPA, salient ideas are confined to the world of foreign policy and international relations. For instance, ideas about the nature of international politics and its actors, and views about one’s nation’s values and position in the international system stand out as important ideas guiding foreign policy action. In this particular study, ideas refer to individual and public beliefs, collective identities and the perceived trustworthiness of other states, for example. These and other important ideational concepts will be thoroughly introduced and analyzed later in the study.
The basic assumption running through this dissertation is that ideas should be divided into individual and collective ideas. In other words, ideas are both mental and social phenomena. (Tannenwald 2005, 15). Individual ideas are subjective constructs and representations of reality, which, depending on the circumstances, might significantly influence an individual’s definition of the situation at hand, his decisions and, ultimately, his actions (see 3.3.2). Collective ideas in turn refer to intersubjective knowledge. According to Legro’s (2000, 420) description, “[collective] ideas are social and holistic” and they “are not simply individual conceptions that are shared or added together”. Individuals can influence collective ideas, but they also have an intersubjective existence that transcends the individual roots. In other words, collective ideas are typically embodied in institutions, symbols, and discourse. Another underlying stance of this study is that the individual and collective levels are related through multiple mechanisms. There is thus a link between the cognitive and social worlds. Through political action, entrepreneurship or persuasion individuals can transfer their individual beliefs and preferences to the collective level. The intersubjective world again influences the individual level, for example via socialization, social conformity and learning. All of these mechanisms will be touched upon in the following chapters of the dissertation.

One can approach ideas from two perspectives. Most scholars share the opinion that ideas have both causal and constitutive effects. From a causal perspective, ideas influence policies or “lead to changes in intersubjective understandings”. Ideas operate through either individual or collective causal mechanisms such as socialization or learning (see 3.3.2) or identity (see 3.3.3). From a constitutive perspective, ideas are those structures that define actors and their properties. According to this point of view, ideas are not mere guidelines, but they give meaning to material circumstances and they also generate conditions for action (Tannenwald 2005, 29–30, 33).

It is noteworthy that although the focus of this investigation is on ideas that exist within the “black box” of the state, it must be highlighted that ideas are transnational. Thus, the image of a purely domestic ideational landscape is a necessary simplification. States are not hermetical entities but are rather influenced by the international environment also in ideational and normative questions. Ideas penetrate borders and spread globally, for example through transnational networks and international institutions, in which policymakers and other important individual actors are involved. How international ideas take root in societies is a complex question. Their localization, acceptance or rejection can, for instance, depend on the domestic structure of the “target state” (see e.g. Acharya 2004; Checkel 2005; Risse-Kappen 1994).

Next, the dissertation will introduce the ideas that are examined in the specific studies. It starts from the individual level, and deals with the literature on cognitive
psychology and belief systems. The first section is followed by an analysis of the elite level, namely constructivism in general and the concept of national identity in particular. The third part concerns the nexus between public opinion and foreign policy, making the case for why the public level should also be included in the IFPA. The last section explores the importance of trust in foreign policy, thus moving to the inter-state level, where intra-state ideas finally materialize and turn into foreign policy.

3.3 Individual Ideas: Beliefs and Foreign Policy

3.3.1 Psychology and FPA

Theoretical approaches that build on cognitive psychology study the ideas and beliefs held by individuals. The proponents of these theories claim that these very factors are of utmost importance in explaining foreign policy behavior. Judging by their popularity, the arguments of political psychologists have held strong appeal, and the theories drawing on psychology have become a quintessential part of FPA since the inception of the tradition (Pursiainen & Forsberg 2015, 223). According to Robert Jervis (2017, 2–6), perhaps the most famous political psychologist within IR/FPA, political psychology has five distinctive elements. Firstly, it holds that in order to understand human behavior, one has to study “how people think, interpret their environments, and reach decisions”. Secondly, political psychology searches for common patterns and generalizations that also apply to individual idiosyncrasies, not only to groups. The third feature of the approach according to Jervis is its interest in the nexus between people’s behavior and their identities. Fourthly, political psychology acknowledges the importance of hot cognitions such as emotions, namely fear, anger, and pride. Lastly, political psychology appreciates the limits of a priori reasoning and is committed to empirical reasoning.

Out of several psychological approaches, the study is especially interested in cognitive psychology, an approach that emphasizes “the content of people’s knowledge structures in shaping decision-making and behavior”, in other words the dynamics of the mind. According to an apt description of the branch,

[the paradigmatic assumption of [cognitive psychology], supported by considerable empirical reality across cultures, is that humans acquire cognitive belief structures that tend to remain stable through selective memory, perception, and causal inference (Rosati 2000, 72).]

17 In addition to cognitive psychology, the subdisciplines of psychology include developmental psychology, personality psychology, social psychology, and neurological, neurocognitive and physiological psychology. See e.g. McDermott (2004, 49–50).
Cognitive approaches have dominated the field of political psychology since the early 1980s, having overshadowed personality studies and political attitudes and voting behavior studies (Houghton 2009, 26, 30). In IR and FPA, cognitive theories have also formed the backbone of psychological analysis. In short, cognitive analysis has focused not only on cold cognitions, such as beliefs and cognitive structures and styles, but also on hot cognitions like emotions. Moreover, one important strand has been perceptions, especially biases and heuristic shortcuts\(^{18}\) that individuals resort to in making sense of the world around them.\(^{19}\)

At the core of the cognitivist research program in FPA is the claim that “subjective representations of reality’ matter in the explanation of world politics” (Schafer & Walker 2006, 4). In other words, the cognitivist view of foreign policy holds that subjective representations, such as a leader’s belief system, have causal value and that beliefs as microfoundations are in fact important causal mechanisms affecting the conduct of foreign policy.\(^{20}\) Shapiro and Bonham (1973, 47) describe the primary concerns of the approach\(^{21}\) as follows:

> The cognitive process approaches [...] have attempted, in varying degrees, to map out the belief structures of decision makers and explore the implications of these structures for the way international events are understood and policy alternatives are considered.

The cognitive approach to decision-making is underpinned by the idea of bounded rationality – the term coined by Herbert Simon in 1957. Bounded rationality assumes that people are not omniscient but limited in their cognitive abilities and computational skills. Rather, when it comes to the way in which bounded rationality sees individuals, it paints a picture of

> a person who is limited in computational capacity, and who searches very selectively through large realms of possibilities in order to discover what alternatives of action are available, and what the consequences of each of these alternatives are. The search is incomplete, often inadequate, based on uncertain information and partial ignorance, and

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\(^{18}\) Cognitive shortcuts include, *inter alia*, stereotypes and historical analogies. On the latter, see e.g. Khong 1992.

\(^{19}\) Interestingly, perception research has had a normative agenda in developing methods for the ways in which decision-makers could avoid misperceptions that can potentially cause serious consequences in international politics. See e.g. Jervis 1976.

\(^{20}\) On causal mechanisms in social sciences, see Hedström & Ylikoski (2010).

\(^{21}\) In his article evaluating the explanatory power of cognitive psychology in world politics, Jerel A. Rosati (2000) introduces five basic ways in which human cognition matters in foreign policy: 1) through the content of individual beliefs and 2) through the organization and the structure of the belief system; 3) through patterns of perception and misperception; 4) through flexibility and rigidity of belief systems; and 5) through the impact on policymaking.
usually terminated with the discovery of satisfactory, not optimal, courses of action (Simon 1985, 295).

Thus, cognitive perspectives treat the decision-maker as a *Homo Psychologicus*. In contrast to *Homo Economicus*, the ideal type that the rational choice theory promotes, the former is only a boundedly rational actor, possessing not only imperfect information about the environment but also limited abilities to process information emanating from the external milieu. As a result, *Homo Psychologicus* must employ different cognitive shortcuts in order to cope with information abundance as well as shortage. Moreover, according to the cognitivist school, decision-makers are exposed to social pressure, which might drive them to behave irrationally, and even against their values (Houghton 2009, 32). Thus, within psychology, there is virtual unanimity on the fact that the human mind is susceptible to errors (Kahneman 2011, 10).22

Although psychological theories have been successful in establishing themselves as an integral part of FPA, they have also been subject to criticism. Reductionism is one of the recognized pitfalls of applying psychology to the study of foreign policy. In other words, cognitive factors alone are not sufficient when it comes to explaining a decision or political strategy. The criticism should be taken seriously and, therefore, the dissertation has adopted a contextualist approach to the cognitive world. This means that

[p]sychological arguments acquire explanatory force only when they are systematically assimilated into political frameworks that take into account the structural, economic, and cultural conditions within which policy makers [sic] work (Goldgeier & Tetlock 2001, 68).

The structural conditions in which decision-makers are situated are indeed important sources of beliefs, expectations, role perceptions, values, mind-sets, time perspectives, and cognitive and operational styles, and in general they provide the decisionmaker [sic] with the needed “symbolic sources of illumination to find his bearings in the world” (Vertzberger 1990, 260).

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22 On the other hand, when it comes to good judgement in international politics, Tetlock (1992) argues that there are three different schools. “The sceptics” think that good judgement in world politics is rare, whereas “the complexifiers” are of the opinion that good judgement is possible if cognitive biases are somehow transcended. The third school, “the fundamentalists”, view judgement as a process-oriented matter and omit short-term distractions such as heuristics and biases.
As pointed out earlier, culture and shared ideas constitute a significant contextual factor in which individuals are embedded, and their subjective ideas receive powerful stimuli not only from personal experiences but also from external ideational influences.

### 3.3.2 What Are Beliefs and Why Do They Matter in Foreign Policy?

Jonathan Renshon (2011, 171) simply defines beliefs as something we hold to be true. Belief systems, according to Rokeach (as cited in Nykänen 2016, 99), “represent all the beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious and unconscious, that a person at a given time accepts as true of the world he lives in”. Ole Holsti (1962, 245) maintains that belief systems “may be thought of as the set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received”. Compared to other concepts – such as attitudes – beliefs do not include evaluative components but are purely cognitive (see e.g. Larson 1994, 18–19). Individuals have a number of different belief systems, ranging from religion to politics. The focus of this dissertation is obviously on foreign policy belief systems, containing information and insights on the world of international politics in which states – represented by certain individuals – must navigate.\(^{23}\)

The very basic assumption of cognitive FPA is that beliefs indeed matter in foreign policymaking. Alexander L. George (1969, 191) highlights that

> [Beliefs] serve, as it were, as a prism that influences the actor’s perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations. These beliefs also provide norms, standards, and guidelines that influence the actor’s choice of strategy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action. Such a belief system influences, but does not unilaterally determine, decision-making; it is an important, but not the only, variable that shapes decision-making behavior.

In essence, George argues that beliefs influence the judgments policymakers draw from their environment, duly shaping ensuing decisions and, subsequently, policy outcomes. This is also the view held by Eun (2013, 373), who claims that

> the central political beliefs – that is to say, core views on the nature of political and social life and images of other political partners or opponents (other states or their leaders in the context of international relations) – held by individual national leaders can have a significant

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23 Contemporary cognitive psychology assumes that an individual can have multiple states of mind that activate in different situations. In other words, a decision-maker might have not one but multiple belief systems concerning foreign policy (see e.g. Walker 2003).
influence on their actions and decisions as regards how their respective nations should behave in world politics.

Due to limited human cognitive abilities, beliefs thus serve as tools for making sense of the external environment. As Brodin (1972, 99) puts it:

> [A b]elief system thus serves as an instrument that enable us to impose a degree of order on the constant stream of impulses we receive from the outer world. It facilitates our orientation towards the environment and makes it easier for us to determine our position in a given social and political context.

The influence of belief systems is greatest in novel situations, demanding more than the application of prevailing standard operating procedures. Moreover, beliefs may play an important role in uncertain, non-routine situations when the information at the disposal of the decision-maker is scarce, contradictory, unreliable, or too abundant. Stressful situations, in which the decision-maker is caught off guard, or periods of emotional pressure may also highlight the underlying function of belief systems (Holsti 1977, 16–18).

Although scholars have listed a number of situations where beliefs are assumed to play a fundamental role, it is nonetheless complex to draw a watertight link between beliefs and behavior, and the proponents of cognitive approaches readily acknowledge this fact (Jervis 2006, 657). There are situations in which the effect of beliefs can be called into question. First, people can sometimes act against their beliefs and they may have conflicting attitudes and emotions. There are also other environmental forces that can affect human behavior, and individuals have various tendencies to follow or not follow their convictions. Secondly, human action can be influenced by factors outside consciousness. To put it differently, there are many implicit mechanisms and processes influencing behavior. Thirdly, ideas are ubiquitous and pervasive by nature. Thus, scholars must recognize ideas that carry the most weight in terms of having an impact on human action. For example, beliefs and attitudes that come about from personal experience have a stronger influence on behavior than ideas that originate from observation or education. Moreover, perhaps unsurprisingly, ideas that stem from vested interests tend to be efficacious (McDermott & Lopez 2012, 198–200).

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24 Separating foreign policy beliefs from domestic policy beliefs is a simplification of the more complex and interdependent reality of individual belief systems. According to Rathbun (2007), domestic and foreign policy views might share a common basic structure, in which two basic values – hierarchy and community – guide the (American) elite’s domestic and foreign policy attitudes.
Beliefs come in various forms and they also serve different functions. Robert Jervis (206, 642) maintains that beliefs can in fact refer not only to outer realities but also inner states. Furthermore, beliefs can also be exhortatory, meaning that stating them can be used to urge others and ourselves. Thirdly, and lastly, many beliefs contain an element of commitment and faith. Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 8–11) again divide beliefs into three types, which are somewhat different from Jervis’s views. The first type is worldviews, which define the possible universe for action. They are embedded in culture, and evoke deep emotions and loyalties.25 Hence, worldviews have a broad impact on human action. The second category introduced by Goldstein and Keohane is principled beliefs, which simply refer to normative ideas, for example about justice. Principled beliefs mediate between more fundamental worldviews and policy outcomes by translating doctrines into guidance of human actions. The final category that the two scholars bring up is causal beliefs, which concern cause-effect relationships. So-called causal beliefs, drawing their authority from elite consensus, guide individuals on how to achieve their goals and objectives. Moreover, compared to more fundamental worldviews and principled beliefs, causal beliefs are prone to change.

The fact that different beliefs exist and that some views change more easily than others implies that not all of our beliefs are of equal weight. Rather, belief systems are hierarchical, meaning that some of the beliefs are fundamental in a sense that they define other beliefs of the same belief system. According to Larson (1994, 19), “belief systems are organized in concentric rings, from more central to more peripheral beliefs and opinions”. For example, Blum (1993, 375–377) identifies six “core beliefs” – ranging from the image of the individual’s own nation to images of allies and adversaries – and a number of intermediate beliefs primarily giving normative direction to policy. Blum’s third category, peripheral beliefs, includes “tactically relevant information about the political world”.26 Alexander L. George (1969), whose views the dissertation will illustrate thoroughly later in the analysis, again suggests that the individual’s belief in the nature of the political world is the “master belief” which influences the substance of other, less weighty beliefs.27

Whereas the types, structures and content of beliefs have been under the scrutiny of psychologically oriented foreign policy scholars, the formation of beliefs has garnered much less interest. Perhaps owing to the reductionist inclination of

25 Hiski Haukkala (2010, 36) argues along the same lines by pointing out that worldviews act as a bridge between cognitive processes and the cultural/social world.
26 Tetlock’s (1991, 27–31) views on the hierarchy of beliefs echo Blum’s three-level categorization. At the highest level, there are fundamental assumptions and policy objectives. The second, intermediate level comprises strategic policy beliefs and preferences. The lowest level again consists of purely tactical beliefs.
27 Importantly, foreign policy beliefs can readily be connected to other beliefs and orientations. According to Rathbun et al. (2016), general personal values also affect how people understand world politics.
cognitive psychology, the process of how beliefs come about is often neglected in the relevant research literature (Walker 1983, 180–181). Given the assertion of IFPA that the individual mind and the surrounding world are connected, the emergence of beliefs should also be studied in earnest within psychological approaches to FPA. Consequently, in order to understand belief formation, this study claims that both nature and nurture need to be taken into account; people have inherent dispositions and idiosyncrasies that are shaped and supplemented by new information from the social milieu and life experiences. As Horowitz et al. (2015, 31–32) argue, a “combination of situational incentives, life experiences, social forces and neurobiological dispositions interact to result in our actions and choices”. Thus innate dispositions, personal experiences and environmental forces – social contexts, training, schooling, parenting, and the situation at hand – influence worldviews and human behavior.28 This applies not only to people at the highest echelons of power but also to ordinary citizens.

The respective processes of belief formation and change are closely connected. In the context of foreign policymaking, it is safe to hypothesize that when a policymaker assumes an office entailing foreign policy responsibilities, he already has at least some beliefs about international politics dating back to adolescence and education. Henry Kissinger (1979, 54), for example, noted that “the convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office”.29 Therefore, when one analyzes the formation and change of belief systems, one is studying how existing beliefs evolve and how individual systems are complemented with new information. The literature on cognitive psychology views belief systems as being rather resistant to change (see e.g. Jervis 1976, 291–296). Humans are hesitant to tolerate cognitive dissonance – that is, possessing contradicting beliefs and attitudes – and, thus, have a tendency to interpret information in light of their existing beliefs and to disregard information that contradicts the prevailing views. This phenomenon is called confirmation bias and is underpinned by various processes such as information-processing shortcuts (heuristics), limited human information processing capability, social influence, and emotional and moral motivations (see e.g. Kahneman 2011; Nickerson 1998; Tversky & Kahneman 1974).

Granted, it is an impossible task to provide a firm explanation of how an individual’s beliefs develop or how they change. In fact, research has been unable to provide solid explanations for how, when and why beliefs change, and the focus of cognitive

28 For an interesting journalistic overview of how education can affect stances on political issues, in this specific case Brexit, see Kuper 2019.
29 However, even a well-developed belief system may not be useful in the world of policymaking. Justin Vaïsse (2018) has argued, for instance – not entirely convincingly – that the belief system Zbigniew Brzezinski developed in academia did not particularly guide his decisions as the national security adviser of Jimmy Carter.
foreign policy analysis has been rather on the stability of belief systems (Renshon 2008, 823). Nevertheless, it is possible to offer a partial elucidation of the matter, since we do know that certain mechanisms play a role in the formation of beliefs. Personal experiences and idiosyncrasies unarguably matter, but, importantly, the respective and interconnected processes of belief formation and change are closely connected to the characteristics and developments of the environment in which an individual operates. This study singles out three underpinning and influencing factors: personal needs to adapt to the world, learning, and socialization.

First, behind the belief systems, there is more than the mere need to grasp the complex world, although this fundamental need unarguably plays a role. As Jervis (2006, 641) notes, “[p]eople adopt opinions not only to understand the world, but also to meet the psychological and social needs to live with themselves”. In other words, beliefs, in addition to instrumental and heuristic value, have motivational foundations. According to Walker (1983), such foundations can be the need for power, affiliation, and achievement. This is to say that people develop and embrace beliefs, for example, in order to have influence; to maintain, establish or restore relationships; to perform accomplishments; and to attain long-term goals.

In addition to the instrumental, heuristic and motivational explanations, there are other, more context-sensitive views about belief formation. In the literature dealing with the cognitive-social nexus, two important dynamics are identified: (political) learning and socialization. Here the direction of the dynamic is rather from the social world to the cognitive realm. The dissertation will discuss the reverse dynamic in the next section on identity and intersubjective knowledge (see 3.3.3).

According to Levy (1994, 283), learning refers to “a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience”. He makes a distinction between causal and diagnostic learning:

“Causal learning” refers to changing beliefs about the laws (hypotheses) of cause and effect, the consequences of actions, and the optimal strategies under various conditions. “Diagnostic learning” refers to changes in beliefs about the definition of the situation or the preferences, intentions, or relative capabilities of others (Levy 1994, 285).

Another line runs between simple and complex learning (Levy 1994; Stein 1994). In simple learning, new information received by the individual leads to modification of means and methods, but not of ends. Complex learning – which recognizes conflict among values – results in a change not only in means but also in ends. In her article on learning, Stein (1994, 170–173) makes a noteworthy and important point by
underlining that “[l]earning is a subset of cognitive change: not all change is learning, but all learning is change”. Moreover, she presents two different models of learning, with the first referring to ill-structured problems becoming well-structured through a representation process. In this model, learning can be deemed successful if “the relevant community of problem solvers” accept the explanation. The second model is learning through trial and error. Failures and rounds of trial-and-error experiments can eventually bring about learning, not in a linear but in a rather messy, dynamic and interactive way. It is important to note that not all policymakers learn similarly. What matters is not necessarily the complexity and substance of their belief system,30 but their willingness and openness to adopt new ideas. Some thinkers are more “uncommitted” in questions of foreign policy and, thus, readily embrace new information to guide their thinking and policies (Stein 1994).

To date, research on socialization has mainly focused on how the international system socializes states to comply with specific roles and norms and, consequently, scholars have focused on individual socialization to a lesser extent (Murdoch et al. 2018). Moreover, there is a significant overlap between learning and socialization. Both refer to a change of individual beliefs. Socialization, however, goes further in the learning process, since “it presupposes that what is to be learnt is already practiced”. Often, socialization processes are asymmetric; internalizing new norms and ideas can happen in a master-novice/generational relationship, where newcomers acquire knowledge and practices from the group to which they aspire to belong (Flockhart 2004, 366). Thus, in essence, “socialization is aimed at creating membership in a society where the intersubjective understandings of the society become taken for granted” (Johnston 2001, 494). In other words, through socialization, intersubjective knowledge turns into subjective knowledge. Successful socialization leads the socialized individuals to internalize the suggested ideas about the nature of the world and also the purpose of their polity (Gheciu 2005, 982).

Scholars have identified mechanisms through which intersubjective understanding diffuses to the individual level. Teaching brings (new) socializees into a specific cultural framework. It disseminates particular conceptual categories and behavioral dispositions. “These meanings enable socializees to define subjects and objects that populate the world and identify ‘normal’ relations and attitudes vis-à-vis them” (Gheciu 2005, 979–980). Persuasion again refers to a more symmetrical relationship, whereby through communicative action a legitimate partner persuades an actor to accept novel knowledge (see Risse 2000). A socializee can be convinced, for example, that taking a certain action is the right thing to do. Persuasion thus does not necessarily include any coercion or rewards (Gheciu 2005, 982).

30 On cognitive complexity, see e.g. Dyson (2009); Herrman (1980).
3.3.3 How to Study Beliefs: The Operational Code Analysis

A scholar interested in beliefs and foreign policy faces at least two challenges. First, the inquiry must usually be conducted “at a distance” without direct access to policymakers and their deliberations. Secondly, decision-makers can in principle have an infinite number of beliefs, which, on top of that, might not be consistent but rather in mutual contradiction. Thus, in order to carry out meaningful research, the scholar needs to insulate the most pertinent beliefs from the policymaker’s belief system. To that end, scholars have used a host of different concepts and methods in order to grasp the essential features of political belief systems and to link the actor’s psychological and operational environments. For example, “images”, “cognitive maps” and “operational code” are not entirely synonymous but largely deal with the same questions and phenomena (Smith 1988, 12).

This study applies the framework of operational code analysis. Out of the three abovementioned concepts, it is by far the most researched and developed conceptual framework and method, around which an impressive body of literature has accumulated.31 The concept of operational code was originally coined by Nathan Leites (1951; 1953) in his two works on Soviet foreign policy and strategic thinking. Through textual analysis, he identified important strategic concepts that drove Soviet foreign policy. However, being too complex a tool to be used in other studies, Leites’s books passed into oblivion for almost two decades until Alexander L. George reformulated Leites’s key views into a more applicable theoretical framework. George’s 1969 article became the cornerstone of operational code studies, and has been the standpoint of the expanded research program ever since.

In the study, George introduced a two-level political belief system. The first level — philosophical beliefs — consists of five beliefs. Similarly, the second level — instrumental beliefs — comprises five beliefs.

**Philosophical beliefs**

1. What is the “essential nature” of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

31 Importantly, the study argues that operational code analysis is first and foremost a method for studying beliefs. In other words, there are no “operational code beliefs” per se, but the method is a useful tool for identifying relevant beliefs in terms of foreign policymaking. See Pursiainen & Forsberg 2015.
4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?
5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?

*Instrumental beliefs*

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?

The idea behind George’s grouping is rather simple and intuitive; philosophical beliefs are more general views of the political world, whereas instrumental beliefs concern the ways of navigation in the political world. Of the ten beliefs, the first philosophical belief is the master belief influencing the content of the other, subordinate beliefs. In terms of Goldstein and Keohane’s typology (see 3.3.2), George’s questions map worldviews, and principled and causal beliefs, but remain poor regarding the normative content of belief systems (see e.g. Mercer 2010). There have been some attempts to complement George’s framework. Aino Hakovirta (2015), for example, adds a question on morality to the original set to fill the vacuum.

The first generation of operational code studies used qualitative methods to analyze textual material produced by policymakers (see e.g. McLellan 1971; Walker 1977). The framework kept developing, however. First, Holsti (1977), based on George’s views, constructed a typology comprising six different ideal-type belief systems. In 1983, Walker, tapping into the progress made in cognitive psychology, paid attention to the motivational foundations behind belief systems (Walker 1983; see also Walker & Falkowski 1984). Furthermore, he streamlined Holsti’s belief system, and reduced the number of ideal types from six to four. This progress notwithstanding, the late 1980s and 1990s witnessed a waning interest in operational code analysis. However, in 1998, Walker, Schafer and Young published a study which dramatically changed the dominant methods of studying beliefs and which, subsequently, resulted in a substantial proliferation of studies utilizing operational code analysis – a trend continuing to this day. In the article, Walker et al. introduced a quantitative method – Verbs in Context System (VICS) – to analyze textual data. Instead of focusing on the substance of beliefs, the primary attention shifted to attributions retrieved and identified from speech acts. The method pays attention to transitive verbs, coding the direction and scaling the intensity of the verbs. This again yields a general view of the key features of a leader’s belief system (Walker et al. 1998; Schafer & Walker 2006).
The underlying aim of the method was laudable: to inject systematicity and comparability into the study of beliefs. At least in terms of the quantity of research, the endeavor has been a success. The number of operational code studies has skyrocketed, most likely due to VICS’s applicability. An overwhelming majority of contemporary operational code studies are indeed quantitative, and VICS has all but overshadowed the qualitative approach. Nevertheless, although the quantitative method has unarguably brought robustness to the study of beliefs, it has also generated challenges and even flaws for the research program. First, not all languages are compatible with VICS and its emphasis on transitive verbs. Second, and more importantly, the popularity of quantitative methods has aggravated the problem of reductionism, by reducing the belief system of a leader to mere attributions and by omitting the substance of beliefs, which, in fact, can be powerful indicators of the effects of the social environment on an individual’s thinking.

There have been multiple attempts to simultaneously utilize both quantitative and more socially sensitive methods. For example, Anne Nykänen (2016), in her dissertation on Angela Merkel’s operational code, not only uses VICS but complements it with the theory of Europeanization. He and Feng (2015), again, combine the quantitative approach with socialization theory in their study on China’s multilateral foreign policy. Another way forward is to revert to the original qualitative method, and analyze the text in a more interpretative manner. This decision would obviously weaken the systematicity and comparability of the studies, but it would also help highlight the social embeddedness of individuals. Moreover, a qualitative analysis can also reveal individual idiosyncrasies, and employing a qualitative more socially oriented method does not mean exclusive reliance on nurture.

3.4 Collective Ideas: Identity and Foreign Policy

3.3.1 Constructivism and FPA

Whereas the previous section dealt with the individual and subjective realm of foreign policy, this section investigates the intersubjective and social world around decision-makers. Within IR and FPA, the social realm has been the domain of constructivists. However, constructivism is clearly more of an IR paradigm than an FPA approach. It is true that the structural variants of constructivism leave very little room for the intra-state processes that fascinate FPA scholars. Nonetheless, it is

32 One factor that has further accelerated the growth in studies was the introduction of the Prolifer Plus service – a program that automatically analyzes texts uploaded into the software. Obviously, this makes research much less time-consuming and labor-intensive. See <https://profilerplus.org/>.
33 This is the case with Publication 1. See also Özdamar 2017.
equally true that agent-oriented constructivism in general and the concept of (national) identity in particular offer interesting and useful encapsulations of the social and intersubjective environment in which policymaking takes place and in which individual actors are embedded.

There is no unified constructivist theory of international politics, let alone of foreign policy. Rather, constructivist approaches have divergent views on the agent-structure debate and epistemology (Adler 2002; Bertucci et al. 2018). As Peltonen (2017, 1) points out, “constructivism has been characterized by plurality from the start”.34 As a result, constructivist scholars have adopted different approaches to analyzing a state’s external behavior (see e.g. Houghton 2007). Nonetheless, the bulk of constructivist literature has revolved around questions of identity35 on the one hand, and norms on the other (Katzenstein 1996). In addition to identity and norms, other key concepts of constructivism include deliberation, discourse, persuasion, socialization and arguing (Checkel 2005, 72) – all related to the social world and the interaction between agent and structure.

Another division within the paradigm is the one between conventional and critical constructivism. Critical, more linguistically-oriented constructivism remains closer to its roots in critical theory. Critical constructivists are more inclined to unmask the exercise of power, whereas conventional constructivism is more analytically neutral as to authority. Moreover, critical constructivists highlight self-consciousness regarding their own participation in the constitution and reproduction of the social entities that they observe, whereas conventional constructivists are preoccupied with the question to a lesser extent (Hopf 1998, 181–185). The two different strands also differ in their interpretations of identity. Cho, for example, points out that

[t]he key difference between these two constructivisms is that identities are often treated as explanatory variables for certain security phenomena in conventional constructivism, but in critical constructivism the identities themselves are to be explained to make sense of the cultural productions of insecurities (Cho 2009, 96–97).

Constructivism’s plurality notwithstanding, there are very basic premises that guide constructivist views on international relations and foreign policy. Fundamentally,

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34 Constructivism as a paradigm was introduced into IR in late 1989. Two important works stand out in this regard: Nicholas Onuf’s *The world of our making* and Friedrich Krachtwil’s *Rules, Norms, and Decisions*. The former has been recognized as the one who coined the term (see e.g Peltonen 2017, 3). The history of socially-informed analysis in IR is longer, however. The 1950’s works of Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas can also be seen as anticipations of modernist constructivism (Adler 2002, 99).

35 According to Lebow (2016), “identity is as central to the constructivist paradigm as power is to realism and wealth to liberalism”.

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constructivists assert that the world needs to be denaturalized. According to Checkel (1998, 325–326) constructivism is “based on two assumptions: (1) the environment in which agents/states take action is social as well as material; and (2) this setting can provide agents/states with understandings of their interests (it can “constitute them”). That is to say, in addition to the material reality there is a social reality that, in fact, gives meaning to the material structures of international politics. Without social meaning, material structures are – to paraphrase Wendt (1999, 249) – empty vessels that have no intrinsic logic or specific form.

Furthermore, the second assumption points to a process of mutual constitution between agents and the structure. In other words, the micro- and macrostructures of human behavior are related. Mutual constitution is a two-way dynamic in which individuals “make the world what it is” but in which “social relations make or construct us” (Onuf 1998, 59). In the context of foreign policy, this suggests that state preferences emerge from its interaction with structural factors and, importantly, state preferences have the potential to shape international structures as well. Moreover, importantly, agent-structure interaction can also take place within a state; as the study soon argues, intrastate interactions between decision-makers and the social context should be the primary concern of students of foreign policy.

For scholars practicing FPA, the lesson of constructivism is rather simple: foreign policy cannot be analyzed without acknowledging social factors such as identities, culture and norms. In order to analyze a state’s foreign policy, one duly needs to pay attention to the social context and intersubjective knowledge in which decision-makers are situated. As Kubalkova (2001, 23) puts it:

By defining both foreign policy and international politics as social, they [constructivists] see that both must start with people interacting in, and with, a world that is inextricably social and material.

Furthermore, Beach (2012, 87–88) summarizes the constructivist approach to foreign policy as follows:

Social constructivist theories examine the process whereby collectively held (intersubjective) ideas as understandings of the foreign policy interests of the state are constructed and reconstructed through processes of social interaction, meaning that they can be termed ‘endogenous’ to processes of social interaction within and between states.

In FPA, which treats decision-makers as the main agent – the agent-structure linkage is perhaps more complex than in traditional IR, which builds on the idea of a coherent, “black box” state actor. The puzzle is that decision-makers may well be
embedded in multiple social contexts such as a bureaucracy or national or international society (see e.g. Beyers 2005), and ideas are also transnational (see e.g. Sikkink 1998). Hence, the object of socialization and the “source” of beliefs might be hard to identify. However, in order to conduct meaningful analysis, one needs to simplify and isolate social contexts. Most of the constructivist research on foreign policy has understandably given priority to the national societal context (Clunan 2009; Hopf 2002), which encompasses various “sub-contexts”. However, as already highlighted earlier in the dissertation, national contexts are not hermetic, and ideas transcend national borders.

3.3.2 National Identity and Foreign Policy: From Structure to Agency

Constructivist scholars are in mutual disagreement about the formation and role of identity in foreign policy. As a result, too often, the term is used in an unspecified manner. However, there is little divergence on the basic argument, which is that before we – or the representatives of the state – know what we want, we have to know who we are (Pursiainen & Forsberg 2015, 292). As Ringmar (1996) points out, “[i]t is only as some-one that we can want some-thing, and it is only once we know who we are that we can know what we want”. Thus, according to constructivists, identities are a basis not only for human action but also national preferences (Weldes 1996).

The broader logic behind the constructivist claim about the fundamentality of self-image is the axiom that human behavior is also rule-driven. According to this standpoint, foreign policy refers to “the application of rules associated with particular identities to particular situations” (March & Olsen 1998, 951). As March and Olsen (2011, 689) summarize their concept of the logic of appropriateness:

Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a role, and identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices, and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation.

Following the rules of an identity involves thoughtful and reasonable cognitive processing, but this reasoning is not so much connected to the anticipation of consequences, the logic behind rational explanations of human behavior (March & Olsen 2011, 690). Equally importantly, the logic of appropriateness does not deny the existence of the logic of consequences, because within a logic of appropriateness there is often substantial room for agent choice. Actors may face varied conflicting rules and norms all making claims for different courses of action […] Actors often must
choose between very different duties, obligations, rights and responsibilities with huge social consequences, but understanding the choice depends on an understanding, not of utility maximization, but of social norms and rules that structure that choice (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 914).

Furthermore, it is crucial to note that identity is both a cognitive heuristic and an analytical concept. First, identities – understood as simplifying images about the self and others – are necessary for individuals to make sense of the world. Ted Hopf (1998, 174–175) crystallizes this need somewhat dramatically:

Identities are necessary, in international politics and domestic societies alike, in order to ensure at least some minimal level of predictability and order. Durable expectations between states require intersubjective identities that are sufficiently stable to ensure predictable patterns of behavior. A world without identities is a world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous than anarchy. Identities perform three necessary functions in a society: they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are.

As a tool of analysis, identity again is a well-suited concept to encompass key intersubjective ideas and beliefs that influence a state’s preferences in international politics. From an analyst’s perspective, having such an analytical tool is necessary since the number of intersubjective ideas can practically be boundless.36

The concept of identity was introduced to IR literature in the early and mid-1990s. However, the idea that self-images may have a role in foreign policy and international politics is older and dates back at least to the 1970s. In fact, Kalevi Holsti’s role theory acts as a conceptual heritage for the theories of identity, although the resemblance between the approaches is only partial (Morin & Paquin 2018, 271). In his theory, Holsti (1970)37 argued that policymakers have conceptions of their nation’s role on the world stage and these ideas influence the state’s foreign policy behavior. The theory also included initial thoughts on the agent-structure conundrum, but it took two decades for the question to develop into a major subject of debate within the IR community.

36 Identity is not the only concept suited to such a purpose. Strategic culture, for example, has the same aim but in a more limited context. See e.g. Gray 1999; Zaman 2009.
37 There is a subtle difference between a role and an identity. Whereas identities are more genuine and fundamental, roles can be a “faked” reflection of true identity. Roles can intentionally confuse true identities in order to gain benefits and advantages. Moreover, an actor can possess multiple and even contradictory roles (Pursiainen & Forsberg 2015, 300–301).
The pioneers of identity research in IR laid the foundation for future explorations. Wendt (1992, 397–398), in his seminal article, argued that identities – “relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self” – are the basis of interests. Moreover, he specified that actors have many identities whose salience depends on the context. Identities take shape in interaction with the structure – “that is collective social meanings”. In 1994, Wendt touched upon the possibility of collective identity formation between states. He claimed that we should not take the traditional argument of state egotism for granted, because interaction at the systemic level can produce collective identities that transcend narrow territorial identities and expand across national borders. Such interaction might well produce mutual interests or even security communities, where war between the members has become unthinkable (Wendt 1994; see also Adler & Barnett 1998). Neumann (1996) also took notice of the potential formation of collective identities. More importantly, he reasoned that identity gave ontological status to human collectives and, additionally, made it possible to study how those collectives constituted and maintained themselves.

However, Alexander Wendt’s *Social Theory of International Politics* is unarguably the first extensive elaboration on the role of identity in international politics. According to him (1999, 230), identities have a specific function:

> Each [identity] is a script or schema, constituted to varying degrees by cultural forms, about who we are and what we should do in a certain context. If they all pressed upon us equally at every moment we surely should be confused, but fortunately most identities are activated selectively depending on the situations in which we find ourselves.

In the book, Wendt (1999, 224–233) outlines four different identities. Corporate identities are constituted by those structures – in the case of a state or territory – that make conscious actors separate entities. The other three identities build on corporate identity. Type identity, again, refers to the special characteristics of the actor. These features must, however, have social content or meaning, which is provided by “membership rules that define what counts as a type identity”. In international politics, type identities can correspond to social systems or regime types. Importantly, type identities – or the characteristics that underlie them – are intrinsic to actors. This is not the case with role identities, which depend on culture and exist only in relation to “others”. Role identities, obviously referring to Holsti’s theory, are based on a position in a certain social structure or setting. Roles have behavioral norms which are manifested in relationships with other actors, having relevant counter-identities. For example, a small-state identity becomes relevant in an asymmetric relationship in which the other actor is bigger and more powerful. In other words, there is no smallness in the absence of bigness. Wendt’s fourth identity is the already mentioned collective identity, where the Self and Other identify:
Identification is a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction [sic] becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether...Collective identity...is a distinct combination of role and type identities, one with the causal power to induce actors to define the welfare of the Other [sic] as part of that of the Self [sic] to be “altruistic” (Wendt 1999, 229).

These first identity accounts did not have an obvious link to the FPA tradition even though identity was connected to foreign policy behavior right after it began to gain more theoretical prominence (see e.g. Katzenstein 1996). Interestingly, the concept of identity has “foreign policy-zated” over the course of recent decades (see Kaarbo 2003, 160), and it has been embraced as part of the FPA canon. This may be a result of a trend where – within the identity literature – perspectives stressing the importance of domestic factors in identity construction have proliferated. Indeed, the Wendtian approach to identity does not exclude the possibility that internal factors may also constitute state identity (Wendt 1999, 224). Nevertheless, his view is clearly more inclined to the structure and, hence, his theory has become a subject of criticism.

In 2002, Ted Hopf published his work, declaring that it was time to bring society back to constructivism. His basic argument is persuasive. Decision-makers of a state are embedded in a social-cognitive structure – a somewhat problematic concept38 – which again contains various identity discourses (see also Siddi 2017; Tsygankov 2014). As Hopf (2002, 22) puts it: “[e]very society is a social cognitive structure, every society comprises particular discursive formations that constitute that structure”. These formations shape the policy-maker’s understanding of himself and also his view of external others. From the structure, individuals embrace rules and habits, and it also guides what decision-makers see as intelligible, thinkable and imaginable.

Hopf’s work was an important step toward scholarship, which treats the individual – not the abstract state – as the possessor of national identity. Essentially, in terms of foreign policy, the individuals who act in the name of a state matter, not the imagined community of a state (Anderson 1983). However, shared meanings attached to the community do affect individual actors, and thus, studying the intersubjective context is imperative. Moreover, Hopf’s thesis was a much-needed illumination of the way in which domestic factors, not mere interaction with external others, shape identity and preferences. Indeed, state identity does “not always mirror the identity that Others [sic] have for them” (Larson 2012, 61), as the structural variant of constructivism presumes.

38 Given that the link between the social and cognitive worlds is not necessarily simple, Hopf omits to elaborate on the connection in-depth, and uses the concept somewhat unproblematically.
In addition to Hopf’s research, alternative views on the domestic sources of identity have emerged. In her theory of aspirational constructivism, Anne L. Clunan outlines a model of identity formation different from that of Hopf. Clunan (2009, 10) summarizes her argument in the following fashion:

Members of the political elite develop aspirations based on common historical memories. Motivated by value rationality and the need for collective self-esteem, they introduce competing national self-images into the political discourse. National self-images are sets of ideas about the country’s political purpose and international status. These self-images deploy an identity management strategy [...] to enhance national self-esteem. Members of the political elite propagate national self-images in an effort to define “the” national identity and interest.

Moreover, in order for a self-image to be established, it needs to pass a process of testing. More specifically, the image needs to correspond with political realities and historical aspirations. That is to say, a state cannot develop an identity that is not politically realistic. A nation with limited resources cannot be a great power, for example. Additionally, according to Clunan, an identity should also be correct and compatible in terms of historical memories.

Clunan’s theory is rooted in Social Identity Theory (SIT). According to SIT, the inherent need for status drives individuals to identify with social groups such as nation states. In order to gain status, individuals again aspire to improve their group’s position vis-à-vis their peers. This “identity management” happens through three strategies: mobility, competition, and creativity. Social mobility refers to a situation in which a negative laden group is left in order to seek membership in another more positive group. The competitive strategy aims to achieve a more positive evaluation in relation to other groups. Sometimes groups also turn to social creativity in which they try to redefine the existing attributes of their group in order to improve their relative standing (Clunan 2009, 34–36; see also de Carvalho et al. 2017; Larson & Shevchenko 2003).

Aspirational constructivism has several strengths and weaknesses. An obvious strength is Clunan’s decision to break the concept of identity into two parts, namely into international status and political purpose. In fact, some scholars have called for such a move (Lebow 2008). In and of itself identity is an inexplicit concept, which does not reveal much about the content or particularities of the different collective

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40 Mercer (1995) claims that a group’s need for status and the competition that this tendency evokes constitute the cognitive basis of an international system based on self-help.
self-images that the representatives of states hold. Political purpose and international status, however, enable a deeper analysis of the underlying social content behind identities. Moreover, they illuminate which values the actor holds important and how it perceives its role in the international context vis-à-vis other actors. A second strength of Clunan’s framework is the way in which she simplifies a state’s foreign policy discourse. According to Clunan, in national foreign policy discourse, there are multiple and competing identities – self-images – containing ideas of international purpose and social status. This competition of ideas results in identity change when alternative views become politically stronger (see also Tsygankov 2014).41

All of the strengths notwithstanding, aspirational constructivism also has its weaknesses. Clunan’s theory is partly a counterargument to Hopf’s theory, which she sees as too structural. Allegedly, Hopf’s arguments on identity lack individual agency. She herself attests that policymakers can propagate self-images for instrumental reasons. There is no denying that identity can be intentionally harnessed for political purposes,42 and indeed the advocacy of certain identity views is important in terms of identity institutionalization. However, crucially, ideas and beliefs often work subconsciously, and this is precisely where their power lies. The second weakness of Clunan’s theory is its emphasis on historical aspirations. Although it is clear that historical aspirations and memories can be powerful drivers of policy as well as identity formation, it is doubtful whether they constitute a solid basis for a general theory of foreign policy and identity. In other words, the question remains under-addressed and under-theorized in Clunan’s work, and it is therefore questionable whether strong historical aspirations always exist and are salient for identity construction.

Both Hopf’s and Clunan’s works are important contributions to the debate on the power of national identity. The domestic view is indeed crucial for understanding national self-perceptions. Nevertheless, neither author is particularly detailed when it comes to investigating the microstructures of identities, more specifically the individual and cognitive underpinnings of state identity. They do acknowledge that personal self-esteem needs, for example, drive identity formation, but they go no further in examining these microstructures. Next, the study weighs in on the question of identity and clarifies how identities come about. It starts the analysis with individual identification with a state and then proceeds to dealing with intersubjective self-perceptions and identity institutionalization.

41 Lisel Hintz (2016) points out that identity contestation can also take place in international fora, if the domestic scene is “blocked” for some reason.
42 For example, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that “strategic social construction” is part of any politically salient process.
3.3.3 A Bottom-Up Approach to Identity

The remedy for uncovering the microstructures of state identities is to rely more heavily on psychologically-informed analysis and to recognize that ideas are constructed from the bottom up (Nau 2011). For instance, Kaarbo (2003, 160) has stated that “research on identity and foreign policy could make better use of psychological research, just as studies of beliefs, images, and decision making have in FPA’s past”. To this end, concepts such as person-based identity and collective identity come in handy. Moreover, acknowledging the role of worldviews as the underpinnings of shared self-images provides necessary cognitive content for identity.

National identity is fundamentally a person-based identity, meaning that individual identification with a nation results in the acquisition of customs, beliefs, psychological traits and ideologies, which are in one way or another associated with a nation. In other words, national identification gives additional substance to the individual self-concept (Brewer 2001, 117–118). Crucially, national identification influences individual interpretations of the environment. Herrmann (2017), for example, shows how attachment to a nation brings about emotions, which again shape the way individuals interpret the unfolding of outside events. This motivational interpretation also affects the normative basis on which individuals act. It is, however, essential to understand that identification with a state does not result in similar beliefs. Rather, depending on the homogeneity of the nation, there are possibly multiple representations of nationhood with which one can identify. In other words, if one is a leftist cosmopolitan, one’s views about the nation and about oneself as a citizen of the nation likely differ from the views of a conservative nationalist. Individual worldviews are thus important factors affecting the formation of national identities.

In addition to being personal identities, national self-images are also collective by nature. This is to say that when individuals identify with a nation, they have an understanding not only about the normative and ideological aspects identification entails, but also about the values and principles their nation stands for. As Brewer (2001, 119) puts it:

[T]he concept of collective identity involves shared representations of the group based on common interests and experiences, but it also refers to an active process of shaping and forging an image of what the group stands for and how it wishes to be viewed by others.

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43 In this case, collective identity refers to shared representations between individuals. In the constructivist IR literature, the focus is on the collective identification between states.
The bottom line is that nationality potentially has a deep impact on individual beliefs and traits. However, the effects are filtered through a more extensive belief system – the worldview – and thus, the identification might cause divergent views on nationhood. Moreover, stemming from their personal identifications with a nation, individuals have opinions about the underlying norms and values of their nation and about how their nation should be seen and positioned vis-à-vis its peers.

The fact that there are varying identifications lays the foundation for Clunan’s view on competing national self-images, which are, basically, different understandings of a national self-image. The idea of the existence of rival candidate national identities comes close to a more traditional conceptualization of schools of thought. Decision-makers bear or tap into different self-images, which influences how they see the world and their nation’s place in it (Tsygankov 2013, 16). Often, but not necessarily, these competing images are also attached to political movements, bureaucracies, or epistemic communities. The members of a certain party or, alternatively, a peace movement might have a certain idea of the collective identity of their nation (see Kertzer & Zeithoff 2017).

Consequently, a nation’s domestic system and political balance of power determine which self-images influence foreign policymaking (Hopf 2012). External changes might also cause pressure to evaluate one’s self-image. In consensual societies, one self-image may be dominant, but more often a state’s foreign policy is a compromise between various identity views. However, only rarely – at least in the political mainstream – are self-images polar opposites. Rather, certain key ideas are often shared. This brings continuity to foreign policy, although certain policy emphases might change along with political winds.

One reason for the tendency of continuity is identity institutionalization. As we have learned, beliefs are slow to change. That is the case with intersubjective beliefs as well. Through action by “norm entrepreneurs”, such as politicians or other significant domestic players, identities are established and become ingrained in national discourse – that is, official white papers, national monuments, the media, education and public opinion. Eventually, certain ideas can even develop into habits, meaning that they become almost unchallenged (see e.g. Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Hopf 2010).

Moreover, and importantly, identity establishment is also external. If a nation’s external other reciprocates the state’s identity views, it reinforces the existing identity (Wendt 1999). Mutual understanding on respective identities again underlies stable interaction between the nations at hand. If there is again divergence between internal and external understandings, this identity discrepancy might even become a source of tension and conflict (Lebow 2016, 4). At a great-power level, this inconsistency can lead to devastating consequences if the competition results in a major war (see
e.g. Larson et al. 2014). With minor powers, the consequences would be less dire, but identity mismatch might cause diplomatic friction for interstate relations.

As implied earlier, identity as a concept is rather imprecise. It refers to an actor’s self-understanding but reveals little about the content of national perceptions. Breaking the term down into different “sub concepts” helps analyze the different elements of identity in a more nuanced and sophisticated manner (Abdedal et al. 2006). Clunan’s (2009) decision to divide (collective) identity into political purpose and status is consequently a sound move. Status views reveal relational comparisons and the way in which decision-makers position their nations vis-à-vis other (state) actors. Political purpose again sheds light on the values that guide and direct the policymaking process, on the one hand, and that act as constraints, on the other. However, Clunan’s division is not yet comprehensive enough. The concept of identity should also acknowledge the role of underlying worldviews. It is crucial to ask not only who we are but also who we are in what kind of world. Thus, national identity has cognitive, normative, political, and relational content, and rests on three pillars: worldview, political purpose, and (international) status.

A worldview is the cognitive content of national identity that “allows members of a group to make sense of social, political, and economic conditions” (Abdedal et al 2006, 699). Worldviews affect individual perceptions of how the world works and, consequently, of how the nation should operate in the world. As implied earlier in the analysis, members of a nation are not necessarily unanimous on the nature of the world, and varying worldviews underlie different conceptions of a nation’s collective identity. Moreover, worldviews strongly influence how policymakers see political purpose and status questions. It is hence the foundation upon which other contents of identity build.

Identities have both political and normative meaning. Political purpose refers to the purposive content of identity and “encompasses beliefs about the appropriate system of political and economic governance for one’s country and whether this system is also universally appropriate”. Moreover, in Clunan’s definition, political purpose also incorporates normative aspects such as “ideas about what values, principles, traits and symbols characterize the country and what values and principles should govern relations between countries” (Clunan 2009, 31; Abdedal et al. 2006, 698). Political purpose comes close to the idea of principled beliefs (see Goldstein & Keohane 1993), which serve as the normative basis from which the state entity conducts foreign policy, and also influence the appropriateness of specific policy choices (March & Olsen 1998).

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44 Abdedal et al. (2006) divide social identity into four elements: constitutive norms, social purpose, relational comparisons, and worldviews. In terms of policy-making and national identity, intergroup constitutive norms do not necessarily play that big a role, and hence the study understands state identity in light of three, not four elements.
Policymakers also evaluate their nation’s position vis-à-vis other states. Here, the concept of status comes into play. Fundamentally, international status can be understood as filling a place in the social hierarchies of international politics or as an actor’s membership or rank in a particular social group or society, such as an international institution (Forsberg et al. 2014; Kang 2010; Neumann & de Carvalho 2015, 4). More specifically, status can refer to an attribute of a role, social or individual, referring to a position in relation to a comparison group (Dafoe 2014 et al., 374). These valued attributes can be things such as wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position and diplomatic clout.

In international relations, the manifestation of status takes place in two distinct but interrelated ways: first, being a member in a defined club of actors and, second, having a relative standing within a club or, more specifically, in its more or less formalized positional rankings (Larson et al. 2014: 7). In terms of practiced policy, status certainly matters; it informs policymakers on patterns of deference and expectations of behavior, rights and responsibilities, and “provides a useful heuristic for actors to understand their relations with others” (Dafoe et al. 2014, 377). For example, Anne Clunan (2009, 32) argues that “international status involves ideas about the proper position, respect, deference, rights and obligations that one’s country should be accorded, based on the groups one believes it belongs to”. Larson et al. (2014, 10) again assert, echoing Clunan, that “status is [also] manifested in voluntary deference directed towards the higher-status actor”. In short, status views are key determinants of policy formation in relation to other states.

3.5 Public Ideas: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

3.5.1 From the Idea of Volatility to Stability and Coherence

An integrated ideational approach to foreign policy should not omit views on foreign policy matters held by the public. Like decision-makers and the elite more broadly, ordinary citizens have opinions on the conduct of foreign affairs, and beliefs that the public possess take shape in a process akin to elite belief formation. Public opinion simply refers to beliefs and attitudes held by the public. It can also be defined as the collective views of a group on a certain policy issue. In this study, the realm is foreign policy and international politics, and the group refers to the ordinary citizens of a state. Naturally, citizens are not unanimous and different opinions exist among the public. Moreover, the public can be divided into two categories. There is the attentive minority which “takes a persistent and knowledgeable interest in international affairs” and the inattentive majority for which foreign policy is not a major concern. The latter group is usually considerably larger than the former (see e.g. Hill 2003).
The public opinion-foreign policy nexus is not necessarily clear-cut. In fact, it is a two-way street, as the study will soon elaborate. According to Christopher Hill (2003, 262), public opinion “refers at once to an actor in the political process and to an object of influence”. In other words, public opinion is a factor that affects, constrains, and even directs foreign policymaking. However, public opinion is also something that policymakers can manipulate given that public support for a government’s or regime’s approach to foreign affairs can be a powerful source of legitimacy for power holders.

The literature on public opinion and foreign policy is extensive. The interest toward the role of public opinion in foreign policy began to surge in the post-Second World War period. Interestingly, scholars analyzing the question soon arrived at a shared understanding named after two notable commentators, Walter Lippman and Gabriel Almond. According to Ole Holsti (1992, 442), the so-called Almond-Lippman consensus revolved around three claims:

1) Public opinion is volatile and, hence, does not provide strong foundations for the conduct of a stable foreign policy.
2) Public views on foreign policy lack structure and coherence. They might thus well be called “non-attitudes”.
3) Public opinion has limited influence on foreign policy.

This consensus chimed well with the realist view of the ideal conduct of foreign policy; foreign policy was the business of political leaders, and the moody and moralistic public should not have a say on matters of national interest. Subsequent research has challenged the pessimistic consensus, however. As regards the alleged instability of public opinion, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro (see e.g. 1982, 1992) have shown – based on an extensive data set – that mass opinion is in fact quite stable. Furthermore, when attitudes change, they change as a reaction to real-world events such as wars. The fact that public opinion is stable should come as no surprise, since cognitive psychology has proved that beliefs are resistant to change. Interestingly, the applications of cognitive psychology to analyze foreign policy and earlier works on mass opinion and foreign policy did not really communicate. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that rather well-established views on the stability of belief systems would not apply to ordinary citizens.

Public views on foreign affairs are also more coherent and structured than early research, such as Converse’s (1964) seminal study, implied. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), for example, argued that (American) public attitudes toward specific foreign policy issues derive from certain distinctive core values such as ethnocentrism, the morality of war, militarism, anticommunism, and isolationism. Hence, the traditional liberal-conservative spectrum is not necessarily relevant to the structure of foreign
policy views. Subsequently, additional research has emerged to back Hurwitz and Peffley’s arguments, as will soon be pointed out.

When it comes to the third point concerning the actual influence of public opinion, scholars are still not unanimous about how public opinion exerts an effect on policy (see e.g. Kertzer & Zeitzoff 2017). In his literature review about the pre-1990 public opinion literature, Holsti (1992) concludes that “the impact of public opinion has increased during recent decades”. However, some scholars such as Risse-Kappen (1991) have been more confident about the linkage. He maintains that policymakers will not make a decision against an overwhelming majority of opposing citizens. However, there is little research on how public opinion is actually addressed in a decision-making process (see e.g. Hobolt & de Vries 2016). This is understandable, since without access to decision-making or relevant documents, conducting such research is onerous.

Due to somewhat mixed results on the influence of public opinion, scholars should perhaps accept that its significance in foreign policy varies. Thus, it is more fruitful to recognize conditions that lead to either the impotence or influence of public attitudes in foreign policymaking. To this end, the research identifies factors that affect the role of public opinion, and it discusses three models of public opinion-foreign policy linkage: top-down, bottom-up, and disconnection. First, however, it deals with the process of public opinion formation.

3.5.2 The Formation of Public Opinion

The study has already analyzed belief formation at the elite level. The principles of IFPA also apply in this process. As pointed out, beliefs take shape in the interplay of idiosyncratic factors and the social milieu. Many of the same dynamics play out at the public level, albeit with some key differences. For instance, ordinary citizens rarely have motivational needs to adopt certain foreign policy views and, due to information asymmetry, they have limited access to information. Their learning and socialization is thus more superficial compared to members of the elite, perhaps excluding the most attentive faction of the public who actively seek and adopt information about foreign affairs.

There is a good deal of research probing the structure and formation of attitudes at the public level. First, some studies – such as that by the abovementioned Hurwitz and Peffley – show that certain core values affect the emergence of foreign policy views. Basing their argument on the Moral Foundation Theory, Kertzer et al. (2014) again highlight how various moral values — harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, authority/respect, ingroup/loyalty, and purity/sanctity — drive people’s foreign policy attitudes toward certain broader orientations. Hence, importantly, moral values underpin all foreign policy approaches, not only openly normative
orientations such as liberalism. Offering a European perspective on belief formation, Irondelle et al. (2015) hold that individuals have general “strategic postures” – such as globalism or pacifism – that shape their opinions on specific foreign policy questions, such as the case handled in their study, namely that of the European Union’s security and defense policy.

Another interesting angle on the endogenous sources of foreign policy opinions concerns personality traits. Schoen (2007), who analyzes German public attitudes in his article, claims that certain traits such as openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness are linked to foreign policy opinions on various questions such as international cooperation, European integration and the use of military force. More specifically, traits are capable of affecting an individual’s worldview. Indeed, they shape people’s motivations, goals, and values, and thus have an impact on how individuals evaluate external stimuli like elite persuasion or major international events. Personality traits alone are nonetheless insufficient to explain foreign policy views. As Schoen (2007, 423) notes

Personality traits are deep-seated characteristics that are at least partially inherited and hard to change. By affecting foreign policy attitudes, personality thus tends to provide stability to them, so that it may be a factor that contributes to what nowadays is the common wisdom in the field of public opinion on foreign policy: ordinary citizens hold much more structured and stable attitudes than traditional accounts claim.

Values and traits are not the only inherent factors that influence personal foreign policy views. Sex and age may also play a role. Nevertheless, although individuals’ innate tendencies are important in the belief formation process, they are not immune to external inputs. Elite and peer persuasion and, additionally, the larger societal environment also shape the public’s attitudes on foreign policy.

Ordinary citizens can, for example, take cues from the elite. Groeling and Baum (2009) maintain that elite rhetoric is a key factor that influences public views about foreign policy. However, the persuasiveness of the rhetoric varies and depends on prevailing circumstances. Berinsky (2007) again argues that in order to avoid complex cost/benefit calculations ordinary citizens look to elites. The result is that a divided elite opinion leads to a divided public, whereas elite consensus preserves unanimity among the broader public. Paying attention only to elite persuasion and rhetoric will not suffice, however. In addition to general predispositions and elites, Kertzer and Zeitoff (2017) urge scholars to focus on the mesofoundations of public opinion – that is, the groups and networks in which they operate and are embedded. Social networks and groups – for example parties, NGOs and religious organizations – can be important sources of information and influence. Indeed, social peers might
well appear more trustworthy than elites, particularly if the receiver of information is critical of the political elite.

Lastly, like decision-makers, ordinary citizens are not immune to the influence of the social world, which again encompasses different discourses on foreign policy and international politics (see e.g. Hopf 2002). The social structure is all but inescapable and affects people’s understanding of societal matters. This fact also applies to foreign affairs (Herrmann et al. 1999). For example, school textbooks, fiction and non-fiction works, and different media outlets (see Baum & Potter 2008; Soroka 2003) all contain information on foreign policy and international politics. If certain foreign policy views dominate in the media or education, it is unlikely that the majority of citizens will adopt opinions that are in striking contrast to the mainstream views.

3.5.3 Top Down or Bottom Up: (How) Does Public Opinion Influence Foreign Policy?

As implied, existing research has confirmed that public opinion is not volatile, and that it does not lack structure or coherence. However, there is no consensus on how it actually influences foreign policy. This research maintains that the impact of the public mood on a nation’s foreign affairs actually varies; sometimes there is a bottom-up dynamic, while at other times it is the leaders who dominate and actively shape public attitudes. Furthermore, from time to time, public opinion and foreign policy are disconnected due to public disinterest or elite negligence. A number of conditions define the nature of this public opinion-foreign policy linkage. Based on a review of the literature on public opinion and foreign policy, Morin & Paquin (2018, 174–175), for instance, suggest three broad conditions that increase or reduce the influence of public opinion: a state’s independence vis-à-vis other actors, the visibility of the foreign policy matter at hand and leaders’ belief systems. Their list is not exhaustive. In addition to these variables, threat perceptions, a state’s domestic structure, and electoral threats should also be taken into account.

As to the first condition brought up by Morin and Paquin, evidence is not yet that strong. However, there are good arguments that a state’s domestic structure – political institutions, structure of society and policy networks – is a factor that has an impact on the salience of public opinion in Western democracies. Risse-Kappen (1991), for instance, says that in strong states, which have a predominant role in their

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45 Constructivist studies investigating the foreign policy-public opinion nexus are surprisingly scant. One notable exception is James Strong’s (2017) work on the British decision to join the Iraq War in 2003. The basic claim of constructivist public opinion research is that public opinion exists if the society and the elite particularly consider that it exists. The volume’s focus is, however, more on the public legitimacy of a given policy course, not on public opinion formation per se.
domestic structure, the public have more limited access to the policymaking process. This does not imply that societal demands cannot affect policy outcomes. Moreover, strong leaders have additional persuasive power and, thus, the concentration of political power can downplay the importance of public opinion.

Secondly, some foreign policy questions draw more public attention than others. Hence, salience matters. In other words, major decisions such as joining international institutions can animate the public, whereas routine and less dramatic decisions might go practically unnoticed by the broader public. Two factors in particular increase public attentiveness. First, the immediacy of the issue at hand and, secondly, the openness of the political decision-making process (see e.g. Knecht & Weatherford 2006). In other words, major events that draw plenty of media coverage arouse considerable interest. Moreover, a lively elite debate can also spark curiosity in foreign policy issues. Additionally and importantly, salience has two determinants: issues and countries. Some issues, such as important international events like the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, capture attention across the globe. However, one must also pay attention to country-specific factors. National intra-elite dissent can, for example, fuel domestic public interest in foreign policy issues. Additionally, a foreign policy question is likely to provoke interest in a country where the effects are palpable or in which the representative government is somehow involved. Thus, the salience of a foreign policy matter is the result of an interplay between issue- and country-specific determinants (Oppermann & Viehrig 2009, 928–931).

Thirdly, it is crucial to take the individual level into account if one wants to understand the public opinion and foreign policy linkage. In other words, the beliefs that policymakers hold about the desirability and necessity of public opinion as an anchor of foreign policy determine how they are influenced by the public mood in their decision-making (see e.g. Foyle 1997; Powlick 1991). Foyle (1997, 145–147), for example, points out that when it comes to considering public opinion in foreign policymaking, there are four kinds of leaders. Delegates believe that it is both desirable and necessary to gain public support for the successful conduct of foreign policy, whereas executors recognize the desirability but think that public support is not necessary. Pragmatists again do not necessarily see public input as desirable but they acknowledge that ignoring it is impossible. Those leaders who are the most lukewarm toward public opinion are guardians, who wittingly disregard public attitudes in directing their nation’s foreign policy.

Besides the aforementioned factors, the potency of public opinion might also depend on existing threat perceptions. Davis (2012, 322–323) argues that “security threats confound the establishment of an opinion-policy nexus, while relaxation of the threat environment allows for a foreign policy that more closely mirrors public opinion”. The logic behind the argument is quite simple. A government’s responsiveness to the wishes of the public is clearly an ideal in established liberal
democracies. In an era of high tensions and risks, such ideals can nonetheless be sacrificed in order to secure very basic national interests such as sovereignty or survival. However, it also seems that during a crisis people tend to “rally around the flag”46 and support their leaders. Thus, serious threats can render public opinion homogenous (Cheng & Lee 2017, 17).

What kind of issues do, in fact, determine the dynamics between public opinion and foreign policy? When is the foreign policy-public opinion nexus likely to be top-down, bottom-up, or disconnected? There are no simple or definitive answers, but tentative assertions can be made. Moreover, one should remember that such dynamics are always simplifications and the reality is much less clear-cut. In other words, the dynamics are not completely mutually exclusive, but they can co-exist to some extent.

The top-down dynamic refers to a situation where policymakers clearly drive the policymaking process and where they actively shape public opinion. The reasons for such an attitude can be manifold. First, the top-down mentality most likely prevails in nations where the role of the state is strong and civil society is clearly subservient to political leadership. Moreover, the leaders may also be pragmatists and think that they need public support for the national foreign policy line, and thus they actively seek to shape public attitudes through communication and persuasion (see e.g. Rothschild & Shafranek 2017). Furthermore, leaders consider that public support can afford official policy additional legitimacy.47

The bottom-up model is again most likely dominant under circumstances where leaders think that public support for their policies is both desirable and necessary.48 A strong civil society and a de-centralized state also can amplify the dynamic. A relaxed threat environment and the emergence of salient foreign policy cases may further play into the bottom-up pattern. As to the salience of foreign policy questions, visible matters might also gain electoral importance, which affects how elected leaders handle those issues. As Oppermann and Viehrig (2009, 926) put it:

The ability of electorates to shape foreign and security policy decision depends on the credibility of their threat to sanction the government for these decisions. Governments will only have a powerful political

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46 Rallying around the flag refers to a phenomenon in which public support of a leader increases during a major foreign policy crisis or other international event. See Mueller 1970.
47 It must be noted that political leadership sometimes fails in its endeavors to change public opinion. See e.g. Paris 2014.
48 However, from the perspective of decision-makers, due to cacophony and various channels, public opinion can be confusing. Opinion polls are useful in this regard, but particularly in media discourse, it is often difficult to recognize which opinions are representative of the majority (Hill 2003, 262).
incentive to devise foreign and security policies that are in line with the public’s preferences if they would otherwise have to expect negative consequences for their prospects of remaining in power.

When the bottom-up model prevails, it acts as a constraint for decision-makers, and they are thus less able to make controversial decisions without a public pushback. The wider the gap between elite and public preferences, the stronger the constraint (see e.g. Trumbore 1998).

The third model – disconnection – is also a result of multiple factors (see e.g. Doeser 2013). It refers either to the public’s negligence regarding foreign affairs or the leadership’s disregard of public views. Citizens may view most of the foreign policy questions as being low in salience, and more tangible and immediate issues such as social or labor policies can outweigh foreign policy matters. From the perspective of elites, consensus among the leaders on a certain matter can also lead to action irrespective of public disapproval. Furthermore, a state’s leadership can also consist of guardian-like decision-makers who disregard the importance of public attitudes altogether. Lastly, a looming threat can also lead to ignorance of public opinion; a threat perceived as existential might cause the leadership to disregard democratic ideals in order to guard territorial integrity or even the existence of their country.

3.6 Ideas and Relationships: Trust and Foreign Policy

3.6.1 Perspectives of Trust within IR

So far, the dissertation has dealt with levels of analysis within a state. This section aims to point out how individual and collective ideas at the intra-state level can shape policies toward other state actors. Hence, the analytical focus moves beyond the intra-state level to capture the inter-state-level dynamics as well. As has already been pointed out, decision-makers’ belief systems may contain views about fellow states. Furthermore, certain ideas concerning a state might have stratified over time and duly become dominant in societal discourse. These convictions can again affect policies vis-à-vis the state in question (see e.g. Holsti 1962). Depending on their content, individual and collective beliefs may either complicate or facilitate state-to-state interaction. Needless to say, negative images can seriously thwart the efforts to build a constructive relationship, whereas positive ones are critical enablers of sustainable and cordial relations between nations (see e.g. Harle 2000).

This study investigates how the specific idea of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness influences foreign policy. Trust is a rather novel subject of study within IR. It is no surprise therefore that also in the FPA literature, trust – although a relevant
phenomenon for the study of foreign policy – has thus far been all but ignored.\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, trust is an elusive concept that defies a simple and categorical definition (Booth & Wheeler 2007, 228; Haukkala et al. 2018, 1). This is partly due to the fact that different theoretical approaches have their own divergent understandings of the nature of trust. However, according to Forsberg (2018, 158), scholars from various theoretical backgrounds seem to share the view of “[t]rust as a belief that the other does what it should do and at least does not intend to cheat or cause harm”. Therefore, questions of reciprocity, risk, and vulnerability are pertinent to the majority of trust studies in IR.

Both trust and mis/distrust have real implications for foreign affairs. Trust is, for example, imperative for establishing and institutionalizing peaceful interaction between states and societies, and is thus one of the underpinnings of so-called security communities (Booth & Wheeler 2008). Conversely, the lack of trust can again further aggravate security dilemmas (see e.g. Tang 2009) and underlie enemy images between states. In diplomatic negotiations, the existence of trust between parties may lead to positive outcomes (Weinhardt 2015). Trust is also a prerequisite for interstate cooperation; the deeper cooperation becomes, the more trust it requires. Furthermore, politically sensitive action – such as defense collaboration and military alliances – requires an even more comprehensive trusting relationship, since defense issues lie at the heart of a state’s national interests (Zandee et al. 2016, 4; see also Kegley & Raymond 1990). One’s disposition to trust rather than distrust other people may also influence whether decision-makers opt for a unilateral or multilateral approach (Rathbun 2011a), which may again be consequential in terms of global stability.

Although the major paradigms of IR contain implicit assertions about the role of trust in foreign policy and international relations (see Rathbun 2009), scholars of international politics have only recently begun to pay attention to the concept. The 2000s and 2010s have witnessed a steady accumulation of trust literature within IR. For the most part, research has clustered around three perspectives – those of rationalism, constructivism, and psychology (Haukkala et al. 2018a; Ruzicka & Keating 2015). However, the first pioneers introduced the concept to IR literature in the late 1990s (see Forsberg 1999; Larson 1997a, 1997b). Although early trust studies stemmed from social psychology and constructivism, the rationalist approach gained the strongest foothold in the research program (see e.g. Kydd 2000; 2001; 2007). As a result, rationalist interpretations of trust became the benchmark toward which criticism from other approaches has most frequently been directed.

Representatives of the three paradigms all suggest their own definitions of trust, which partly overlap. However, the various paradigmatic definitions also differ in

\textsuperscript{49} One exception is a textbook by Pursiainen and Forsberg (2015), which includes trust as one of the approaches to studying foreign policy.
many noteworthy respects. A rational definition of trust highlights that “trust is a belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one's own cooperation...[t]o trust someone...is to believe that they would prefer to reciprocate cooperation” (Kydd 2007, 6–7). Ruzicka and Keating (2014, 14) crystallize the rational definition of trust in the following way:

> trust is a rational prediction about the nature or characteristics of the other state, be they its status quo orientation, the willingness to reciprocate or the compatibility of its interests. In all instances, the importance of trust rests in its direct contribution to the success or failure of international cooperation.

In the rational model – which can also be termed calculative or strategic – trust duly boils down to risk-taking and (situational) calculation. “To reduce the risk of losing, individuals seek to acquire information about the trustworthiness of others” (Wheeler 2018, 5). Acquiring information again takes place through cooperation – either inside or outside institutions. Nevertheless, in highlighting the importance of cooperation, the calculative model of trust sides with liberal institutionalism, whose key works draw their inspiration from rational choice theory (see Axelrod 1981; Keohane 1984).

The diverse constructivist approach to trust criticizes the idea of strategic rationality. Rather, it notes “how trust takes familiarity with another from the past, and instead of merely drawing inferences from it, goes beyond the information given to define the future” (Keating 2015, 7). Hence, proponents of the social approach interpret trust first and foremost as a social phenomenon and, for social theorists, trusting relationships are the primary manifestations of trust in international politics. The main argument in this respect is that trust cannot be reduced to mere risk-taking. Rather, trust involves not only taking risks but also a strong element of obligation.50 Thus, a “social conceptualization of trust implies a willingness to take risks on the behavior of others based on the belief that potential trustees will do what is right” (Hoffman 2002, 375). Socially oriented trust scholars have also paid attention to the linguistic manifestations of trust. Vuorelma (2018), for example, points out that trust narratives can be powerful sources of individual trust or mistrust; second-order representations in particular construct trusting images that are in connection with the actual foreign policy practice. Furthermore, Brugger also sees state-level trust as a discourse in which trusting images dominate and in which mistrusting ones are absent. Thus, his argument is that “trust is an idea that is proposed and defended in speech acts by individual actors” (Brugger 2015, 82).

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50 Instead of obligation, Ruzicka and Wheeler talk about a binding approach to trust and underscore the importance of promises in trusting relationships (Ruzicka & Wheeler 2010).
When speaking of trust in light of social constructivism, identities should not be omitted. There are indeed views that recognize the connection between identity and trust. According to Weinhardt, trust is in fact relational and has a social ontology. She claims that “shared values, perceived similarity, sympathy or a common vision facilitate identification more generally, and therefore the emergence of identification-based trust”. Mutually constituting identity relationships also build trust between actors, increase the willingness to take risks and, furthermore, ease cooperation processes between states (Weinhardt 2015, 36).

Lastly, scholars adopting a psychological view of trust “favor the individual actors who act on behalf of the collective units such as states” (Ruzicka & Keating 2015). Psychologically-oriented scholars of trust have mostly focused on either individual predispositions or the emotive foundations of trust. Deborah Welch Larson (1997a; 1997b) was the first IR scholar to adopt a psychological framework for trust. Her assertion was that trusting is impossible without interpretation, and one cannot make an interpretation without psychological factors – such as beliefs – affecting the process. In other words, trust – or mistrust – can be rooted in beliefs, cognitive biases, and historical analogies. According to her definition, trust is therefore “the subjective probability that the other will perform an action upon which the success of one’s own decision depends, and in a context where one must decide before the other’s behavior can be monitored” (Larson 1997b, 12).

In his multiple works on trust, Brian Rathbun draws his insights from social psychology. His “dispositionalist” account views trust as an individual disposition; some people are just more prone to trust than others. In his analysis, he employs the concept of generalized trust – an ideological belief about the trustworthiness of others in general – which he sees as a factor preceding cooperative behavior in international politics (Rathbun 2011a). Furthermore, Rathbun has also applied the term ‘moralistic trust’ in explaining the sustainability of certain multilateral arrangements. Moralistic trust is again “based on the belief that others will feel morally bound to reciprocate cooperation and comply with their agreements” (Rathbun 2011b, 327).

Another strand of the psychological trust literature concentrates on emotions. In his article, Torsten Michel makes an important distinction between reliance and trust, the latter being “an emotive attitude that precedes rational decision-making”. He contrasts this “subjective, personal, inarticulate, emotive and moralistic disposition of trust” with the “objective, structural, deliberate, rational and strategic phenomenon of reliance” (2012, 18). Mercer again perceives trust as a belief underpinned and strengthened by emotions, and he argues that a feeling of warmth helps bring about trust. Furthermore, he claims that “[t]rust based on feelings of warmth and affection allows one to go beyond the incentives or evidence and to risk being wrong” (Mercer 2010, 6).
There is indeed a plethora of views on trust within social sciences in general and IR in particular. Seeing IR trust scholarship in light of the rationalism-constructivism psychology typology is illuminating as it reveals how rich and complex the phenomenon of trust is. However, the paradigmatic presentation of trust blurs the fact that in reality studies often – implicitly or explicitly – draw on more than one paradigm (see e.g. Elhardt 2015; Rathbun 2011; Pursiainen & Matveeva 2016; Wheeler 2018). This is no surprise since different views on trust are in fact complementary to a great degree. As Rathbun (2009) has put it, it takes all types of theory to build better insights regarding trust and international politics at large. This is fully compatible with the principles of IFPA. In terms of trust as a factor in foreign policy, this implies that individuals strive for rationality, which, as pointed out earlier in the dissertation, is limited and takes place in a milieu that is stratified with intersubjective knowledge and norms. Rational decision-making surely involves calculations concerning the trustworthiness of others, but this process is also affected by societal discourse and narratives and the images they entail, experiences of disappointment and behavior, as well as cognitive factors. A “purely” rational approach is thus too parsimonious. However, no perspective of trust alone suffices to explain why states – or actors acting on behalf of a state – trust or do not trust each other. In order to conduct meaningful analysis, different approaches need to be merged.

3.6.2 Analytical and Methodological Questions Concerning Trust Research

Trust can exist in multiple tiers and, consequently, scholars have found it useful to tackle the subject at different levels of analysis. The choice concerning which level of analysis to focus upon depends on the scholar’s theoretical preferences. As already implied, psychologically-oriented scholars tend to favor the individual perspective, which is also the case with rationalists. Constructivists, again, are prone to emphasizing the societal level and collective ideas, in addition to narratives containing trusting images.

In his study, Ville Sinkkonen approaches trust as a multi-layered phenomenon. Based on extensive analysis of the literature, he identifies three layers of trust: interpersonal, organizational and societal. The interpersonal level of trust refers to a trusting relationship between two individuals, and this variety of trust manifests itself as an elite-level trusting relationship.51 Paying attention to the organizational level again acknowledges the importance of the role of organizations in the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy. Sinkkonen posits that “institutions and their concomitant norms and rules function as the vehicles through which regularized relationships and the eventual institutionalization of trust between states takes place” (Sinkkonen 2018,

51 The presence of interpersonal trust may again assist the formation of trust between collective actors, such as states (see e.g. Pursiainen & Matveeva 2016).
13–14). The third level, the societal tier, goes beyond individuals and institutions. Sinkkonen aptly notes that

it is through acknowledging that trust can only become truly entrenched between two political communities when the interpersonal bonds between leaders, established at the interpersonal and organizational levels, are transcended and trust diffuses into the domestic arena (Sinkkonen 2018, 15).

Thus, societal trust refers to collective beliefs that have been institutionalized into societal discourse. These narratives and images, as noted earlier, might affect individual accounts of trust.

Bearing the heuristic nature of the level of analysis question in mind, it is partly a matter of preference as to how multi-layered trust is viewed. Moreover, it also boils down to the selection of the case. In countries where there are strong institutions and where foreign policy is an outcome of bureaucratic power battles, such as the United States, it may be well worth paying attention to organizational cultures as the repositories of trusting images. In states such as Finland, where foreign policy is largely based on societal consensus and rather weak bureaucratic politics, seeing trust as a two-level phenomenon that is interpersonal and societal might again be encompassing enough.

In addition to the level of analysis question, trust research has faced a tricky methodological question on how to measure trust. How can a trusting relationship be identified? Scholars have put forward different measures and methods for identification. Hoffman, for example, has proposed three conjunctive measures to identify trusting relationships. The key indicator in his method is the acceptance of vulnerability. First, one must pay attention to whether a state pursues policies granting discretion over outcomes that it previously controlled itself. It must also be demonstrated that the rationale behind such a move is the perceived trustworthiness of the counterpart. Such motives can be identified, for example, from private statements (Hoffmann 2002, 385–387). Hoffman’s (2002, 388–389) second measure is to follow the oversight mechanisms that states use to oversee how discretion is exercised. He singles out two ways to conduct such oversight: before-the-fact oversight and after-the-fact oversight. Actors concerned about their counterpart’s behavior tend to prefer the before-the-fact method since it limits the freedom of maneuver of the actor. After-the-fact oversight again grants the counterpart more options regarding its policies. Indeed, as Chan (2017, 22) points out, “when [a state] is relatively free to behave without constraints […] it tends to reveal its true character and hence its trustworthiness”.

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The third measure proposed by Hoffmann (2002, 391–393) refers to rules. His point is that agreements between actors contain certain rules, and the rules might again indicate something about the nature of the trusting relationship at hand. Agreements themselves do not signal either trust or mistrust, but rules and codes do. The more detailed and specific the rules, the less leeway they give the signatories. Thus, framework-oriented agreements comprising basic structure, procedures, and rights are more consistent with trusting relationships than statute-oriented agreements, which consist of specific codes regulating behavior under particular circumstances.

Hoffman’s measures do not necessarily point toward any paradigm of trust, unlike Brugger’s discursive method. The latter argues that “the prominence of trusting images compared to mistrusting or neutral images” indicates the existence of a trusting relationship. He outlines two dimensions that make up “the complex of trust”. The first dimension is “a positive expectation about the feasibility of cooperation with the trusted other”. The second aspect again refers to “assumptions about the character of the other state”. Characterizations can be either positive, neutral or negative. Naturally, a trustworthy actor is attributed with positive characteristics such as honesty, credibility and peacefulness. Moreover, ingroup identifications and emotional expressions are also linked to trusting expectations (Brugger 2015, 87–91).

A third method to identify trusting relationship is to focus on so-called hedging strategies. Keating and Ruzicka (2014), having criticized the two abovementioned methods, suggest that in the absence of trust, states rely on hedging strategies. Stiles (2018, 11) defines hedging as “an attempt to limit one’s commitment to something (i.e. the degree of trust) as well as to protect against risk by diversifying one’s commitments”. The aim of hedging strategies is to reduce uncertainty and vulnerability. As Keating and Ruzicka (2014, 761) point out,

hedging strategies allow states to self-insure against possible defection or opportunism by other states, allowing them to act more securely in a risky environment because the ‘worse-case’ outcomes are both anticipated and accounted for.

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52 Keating and Ruzicka’s criticism is somewhat unfounded. It is partly true that in a trusting relationship states should be unaware of vulnerabilities. However, such a relationship would indicate the existence of a maximalist form of trust, which is a mere ideal type. That is to say, in a trusting relationship, actors can be aware of vulnerabilities, but the relationship can still be depicted as a trusting one. As to Brugger’s method, Keating and Ruzicka are right that one must be careful in drawing conclusions from political speech, since it can be highly strategic and it might conceal true motives. Moreover, political rhetoric which emphasizes trust can in fact be a sign of mistrust between two actors (see also Forsberg 2018). However, for a researcher, it should not be an insurmountable task to identify cases where political speech is strategic and when talk about trust is insincere.
Therefore, in the presence or emergence of a trusting relationship, states should not resort to but rather eliminate different forms of hedging. An analyst who seeks to recognize hedging strategies must, however, pay attention to several questions prior to drawing conclusions. First, the social meaning of a hedge needs to be understood. More precisely, the social and cultural context matters and, moreover, the perceptions of the relevant leaders must be taken into account. Secondly, “the geographical and historical situatedness” of the nation in question is also important. Furthermore, the state’s resources also determine the strategies it is able to choose in order to hedge against uncertainty (Keating & Ruzicka 2014, 763–764).

Again, the methods introduced are not mutually exclusive. Given the multifaceted and multilevel nature of trust, researchers should not neglect any of these methods straightaway. The research question, the case selection, and the level of analysis influence all direct methodological choices.

### 3.7 Conclusion: Ideas Matter at all Levels

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the key claim of IFPA is that representations of reality matter in foreign policymaking. In order to fully understand the role of ideas in the conduct of foreign affairs, one needs to consider both individual beliefs and intersubjective ideas and, thus, harness the respective strengths of both cognitive psychology and constructivism in the study of foreign policy. The objective of this chapter was to point out that these goals are pertinent to different theories and to various levels of analysis – an aspect that the previous endeavors to promote a political psychology-constructivism dialogue have insufficiently addressed.

In the chapter, the treatment of the levels was categorized into four parts: individual ideas, intersubjective ideas at the elite level, and ideas at the public level constituted the *intra-state* tiers. The fourth, *inter-state* level aimed at demonstrating how specific ideas – in this case the idea of trustworthiness – can affect state action. In other words, it presented an example of how *intra-state* ideas can manifest themselves in *inter-state* interaction, namely how they translate into foreign policy.

With regard to the individual level, the study demonstrated how every policymaker has a belief system, through which they filter the outer reality and which affects the judgments they make regarding various policy issues. Under the right circumstances, individual conclusions colored by the idiosyncrasies of personal worldviews manifest

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53 The methodological emphasis on hedging is not without its problems. Measures that can be seen as hedging strategies are not necessarily indicative of distrust. Moreover, such strategies do not necessarily point toward any specific actor. Thus the object of mistrust can be hard to identify. Furthermore, hedging does not indicate anything about personal-level trust, which might precede the emergence of trusting relationships between nations.
as a consequential foreign policy decision. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that no matter how distinct the belief systems may be, they are always constructed in a social context. Thus, in addition to personal needs and motivations, personal belief systems are formed through learning and socialization.

When it comes to intersubjective ideas, the study investigated national identity. It adopted a bottom-up view, in which an individual identification with a nation state was seen as the foundation of (collective) national identity – a shared interpretation about what the nation is and what it represents in international politics. Thus, in order to fully understand the origin of shared national identities, individual beliefs must be appreciated as essential micro-structures of collective images. Furthermore, national identity was also understood as the sum of three interrelated factors: worldview, political purpose, and international status. These elements affect how decision-makers see the nature of the world, view the values their nation stands for, and understand their state’s position vis-à-vis other actors. Crucially, all of these aspects shape policymakers’ understandings of their country’s interests and appropriate action in international relations.

The principles of IFPA should also underlie the efforts to understand the role of public opinion in foreign policy. More precisely, ordinary citizens possess beliefs, which take shape in a process similar to elite belief formation – that is, in the interplay between inherent and contextual factors. Moreover, the ways in which the decision-makers appreciate public attitudes is again partly dependent on their personal beliefs. Some policymakers regard it as necessary to consider public views an integral part of making foreign policy decisions, whereas others are inclined to disregard public guidance. Thus, ideational factors, in addition to threat perceptions, electoral threats, the structure of society, and issue salience, determine which of the three models – top-down, bottom-up or disconnection – is dominant in the foreign policy-public nexus.

Moreover, it was argued above that individual and shared ideas can profoundly influence interstate relations. The issue was approached from the angle of trust, which is essentially a belief that others do not do harm, but rather what is right and agreed upon. Unsurprisingly, various paradigms have divergent definitions of trust, which all describe part of the broad phenomenon. Rationalist theories advocate a rather narrow view of trust by seeing it as an interest-based willingness to reciprocate cooperation. Ideational theories – namely psychology and constructivism – offer more extensive views of trust and, in fact, any interpretation of trust without ideational content is unavoidably too narrow. Psychology sheds light on individual dispositions and the emotive foundations of trust, whereas constructivism underlines the social nature of trust. In other words, constructivists link trust to obligation and to the question of what is right. Moreover, they pay attention to the discursive and narrational manifestations of trust in society and, additionally, argue...
that similar identities facilitate the emergence of a trusting relationship between actors. The narrowness of rationalism notwithstanding, one should not exclude the calculative interpretation of trust from the analysis. Rather, calculations regarding the other’s trustworthiness are affected by psychological and social factors.

Lastly, it is worth asking how scholars should apply the principles of IFPA in conducting research on foreign policy. Essentially, the manner hinges on the chosen theoretical and conceptual framework and, ultimately, on the research questions. Ideational theories come in handy if one seeks to understand the premises of a decision or how a certain action became possible in the first place. If one wants to understand how individual beliefs change or come about, then one must pay attention to both inherent and contextual factors. This study has suggested qualitative analysis as a possible solution for producing a more context-sensitive analysis. Another alternative is to employ quantitative and qualitative methods in parallel (see e.g. Nykänen 2016). As to identity and foreign policy, the precept is that, fundamentally, it is individuals who carry national identities, and identities have both social and cognitive content. Moreover, one should never neglect the significance of the domestic context for the construction of institutionalized state identities. As to public opinion and foreign policy, the formation of public attitudes does not dramatically differ from the process of elite belief development. Context and personal inclinations matter. If one seeks to understand how policymakers acknowledge public sentiments, besides factors such as electoral threat or domestic structure, one must also pay attention to decision-makers’ beliefs about the necessity of taking public views into account. Lastly, although there is an undeniable element of rational calculation in a trusting relationship, one cannot simply understand the quality of a relation without considering respective identities and the shared history of the trustor and trustee.
4. Results

This chapter summarizes the individual studies in the dissertation. Moreover, it introduces the main arguments and, more importantly, the results of the publications. It also elaborates on the theoretical assumptions of Publications III and V, and places them more firmly in the context of IFPA.

4.1 Publication I. Mauno Koivisto’s Belief System

The first publication in the dissertation investigates the belief system of Mauno Koivisto, the President of Finland from 1982 to 1994. The article poses three research questions:

- What kind of foreign policy belief system did Mauno Koivisto have?
- Did the end of the Cold War cause a change in Koivisto’s belief system?
- How did Koivisto’s life experience and societal factors influence his beliefs regarding international politics and foreign policy?

Putting Mauno Koivisto’s beliefs under scrutiny is well justified. Firstly, he piloted Finnish foreign policy through an uncertain era, namely the end of the Cold War. Secondly and interrelatedly, in an era of such high uncertainty, the idiosyncrasies of a leader tend to be important in explaining his or her actions. Thirdly, Koivisto’s status as the leader of Finnish foreign policy was basically unchallenged, which obviously makes him an important subject of study.

The study utilizes operational code analysis (see 3.3.3) to identify and isolate Koivisto’s key beliefs about international politics. In order to better understand the role of the social environment in individual belief formation – a chief objective of IFPA – the article applied qualitative content analysis instead of the more popular quantitative method.

The operational code analysis systematized by Alexander L. George consists of ten questions, which also formed the backbone of the analysis in the article.

*Philosophical beliefs*

1. What is the “essential nature” of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects one and/or the other?

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?

5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?

Instrumental beliefs

6. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

7. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

8. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

9. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?

10. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?

When it comes to philosophical beliefs, Koivisto had developed fairly nuanced views on the fundamentals of international politics. His worldview was clearly centered on great powers and their role in maintaining international order and harmony, and he did not see either international politics in general or the Cold War era in conflictual terms, although he recognized that the existing and rather stable era of the 1980s would not necessarily last forever. Moreover, the fact that great powers ruled the global system was not intrinsically good or bad. Rather, Koivisto seemed to take it as a given. As for Finland’s position in a world led by great powers, Koivisto saw no major threats – not even in the tense years of the early 1980s, let alone in the late 1980s, which were characterized by optimism.

Moreover, as a small-state leader, Koivisto acknowledged that the state of great power relations determined whether minor states, such as Finland, could realize their aspirations in world politics. According to him, great-power détente does not necessarily create opportunities for small states, but rather times when great powers “are taking a breath”. Contrary to some popular views, in office, Koivisto was not particularly pessimistic. In his rhetoric, Koivisto left room for Finland’s agency and he even recognized Finland’s contributions in creating trust between great powers. Thus, in terms of foreign policy and Finland’s role in international relations, Koivisto displayed cautious optimism.

Koivisto also regarded international politics as unpredictable, and the unexpected end of the Cold War seemed to confirm his view. During his presidency, Koivisto did not publicly ponder the questions of historical development or the role of chance in international relations. However, after he had left office, Koivisto wrote that the role
of the individual in changing the course of history is rather small, but he did not fall into the
trap of determinism. Interestingly, he was of the opinion that the significance of chance
might again be high. Koivisto asserted that even minor turns and incidents could later prove to
be consequential historical events.

As to instrumental beliefs, Koivisto’s belief system was much less developed. This
did not come as a surprise, since he himself had multiple times stressed that small
states cannot have doctrines. Koivisto nonetheless had some principles that guided
his decisions regarding political action. Firstly, he called for consistency in politics.
Secondly, when it came to conducting foreign policy, he highlighted risk-aversion and
thought that one should always proceed systematically and with circumspection when making
decisions. Moreover, he stressed that one should at all times to be able to see what consequences
a decision will have and that, ideally, decisions should not be made when the information available
is scarce. Interestingly, secondary insights about Koivisto’s modus operandi tend to
support the views deduced from his own remarks.

Given this asymmetry between Koivisto’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs, the
publication chose to call Koivisto a great power empiricist. Furthermore and
interestingly, the study did not detect any major transformation in Koivisto’s belief
system, although international politics underwent a systemic change during his
presidency. Thus, the end of the Cold War was not a “cognitive punch” that would
have forced Koivisto to rethink his worldview. This may have had something to do
with the cornerstones of Koivisto’s belief system. He often referred to Finland’s
geographic location and the country’s historical experiences, both of which are rather
static benchmarks.

As to the formation of Koivisto’s belief system, the article suggested some contextual
factors that might have shaped his foreign policy views in addition to inherent
qualities. Firstly, he fought at the front against the Soviet Union in the Continuation
War. By his own account, this instilled in him a strong motivation to seek a peaceful
way of living with the socialist neighbor. Secondly, after the Second World War,
Finland underwent a significant doctrinal transformation in foreign policy. Small-
state realism was adopted as a national creed guiding the nation’s foreign policy.
Koivisto, who began to have political ambitions, had a strong motivation to embrace
cooler and less antagonistic views of the Soviet Union in order to advance in his
political career. Given the ideological circumstances in the post-Second World War
Finland, it was thus hardly surprising that Koivisto embraced the key tenets of
political realism as a part of his thinking.54

54 After the publication of the article, an interesting study by Juho Ovaska (2017) on Koivisto’s
rise to the helm of Finnish politics was published. It tells an interesting story about how Koivisto
– who during the Second World War perceived the Soviet Union as an antichrist and who was
also an adamant anticommunist – became a bridge-builder among the quarrelsome Finnish left
and, more importantly, learned to make his connections to the eastern neighbor a trump card in
4.2 Publication II. Competing Finnish Foreign Policy Schools of Thought in the early Post-Cold War Era

The second publication in the dissertation concentrates on the evolution of Finnish foreign policy thinking at the beginning of the post-Cold War era (1989–1997). Its primary objective is to systematically analyze how the Finnish foreign policy elite – policymakers, researchers, and journalists – perceived the changing world and Finland’s place in it. More specifically, by scrutinizing Finnish foreign policy discourse extensively, it identifies the competing foreign policy schools of thought of the era and explores how the ideas of the different schools were manifested in the key dimensions of Finnish foreign affairs.

The article seeks answers to two main questions:

- What were the Finnish foreign policy schools of thought at the beginning of the post-Cold War era and how did they view the changing world?
- How did the ideas fostered by the respective schools influence Finnish foreign policy during the early post-Cold War years?

During the Cold War, Finnish foreign policy was based on the principles of small-state realism, even to the extent that realism achieved a hegemonic standing. In other words, there were no genuine alternatives to the prevailing national identity and, thus, the ultimate foundations of Finnish foreign policy – the policy of neutrality and primacy of Finnish-Soviet relations, for example – were not criticized or publicly debated. The end of the Cold War, and the waning and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union generated more intellectual space for debate on the fundaments of Finnish politics. According to Ovaska (2017, 36; 47–53), in the late 1950s at the latest, Koivisto came to the conclusion that he needed to accept new domestic and international realities, and started to see the Soviet Union in a more benevolent light, although he had publicly criticized Moscow’s actions in Hungary in 1956. The so-called Night Frost Crisis in 1958 was likely one major event that revealed Finland’s limited room for maneuver vis-à-vis its neighbor. This intellectual turn almost became a personal conviction for Koivisto, and he restarted his Russian language studies, joined the Finland-Soviet Union Society, and began to visit the Soviet Union and make personal contacts with the representatives of the Soviet Communist Party. Moreover, Koivisto was determined to change the foreign policy line of his own party, the Social Democrats. He tried to convince the party leaders that the Social Democrats must improve their relations with Moscow and that the Soviet Union was not a threat to Finland. Part and parcel of Koivisto’s endeavor was also to establish a cordial rapport with President Urho Kekkonen, who was the main architect of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The primary motivation for the change in Koivisto’s thinking seemed to be aspirations to increase his own and the party’s power in Finnish domestic politics. This transformation took place through foreign policy; Koivisto and the Social Democrats had to adopt new mainstream ideas behind Finnish foreign policy in order to gain a stronger foothold in Finnish political life.
Finnish foreign policy. From 1992 onwards, multiple options appeared regarding the fundamentals of the policy. Furthermore, Finland faced concrete and consequential choices. The most important of these was membership in the European Union. Furthermore, the alternative and competing views about Finland’s place in the emerging new world clearly crystallized and stabilized as the post-Cold War security landscape began to take shape.

In IR and foreign policy literature, it is commonplace to portray competing set preferences and ideas on foreign policy held by a certain group as “schools of thought”. This has been done by various studies regarding a number of countries. Finnish foreign policy has historically been seen as a competition between two schools: the small-state realists and the more legalist and liberal constitutionalists. A contemporary study by Hiski Haukkala and Tapani Vaahtoranta has again identified three schools of thought: the small-state realists, the globalists and the euroatlanticists.

Thus far, scholarship has not theorized the concept of schools of thought, which can be seen as heuristic devices for understanding key foreign policy tensions within states. This article connects the concept with the term self-image, both of which are essentially competing views on national identity. Moreover, in order to develop the identity research program in IR/FPA and in order to shed light on the microstructures of collective identities, the study sorts identity into three subcategories: political purpose, status, and worldviews.55 Treating national identity as an aggregate of different elements also shows that collective self-images have cognitive underpinnings, which is an argument in line with the key assertions of IFPA. The publication employs these three terms – purpose, status, and worldviews – to analyze the Finnish foreign policy debate in 1989–1997, and seeks to identify the schools of thought of the era. Thus, the analysis aims to reveal the broad but focal tensions among the Finnish elite concerning the overall direction of Finnish foreign policy in the early post-Cold War years.56

The early post-Cold War years were formative for Finnish foreign policy. The hegemony of small-state realism began to crumble when it became evident that the Soviet Union was indeed declining and disintegrating. During Mauno Koivisto’s presidency, there were fewer efforts to enforce foreign policy consensus, and the so-called Finlandization slowly started to evaporate. The actual changes in Europe transformed Finland’s security landscape dramatically. The bipolar world was no

55 In the article, worldviews are related to three particular issues: whether the world is seen in realist or liberal institutionalist terms, the nature of Russia as a polity, and views on the emerging post-Cold War security architecture in Europe.
56 Tapio Juntunen (2018) echoes this by arguing that instead of having explanatory power for certain foreign policy behavior, the schools of thought approach is appropriate for revealing intra-state tensions in central foreign policy questions.
more, and for contemporaries Finnish foreign policy seemed to be a free-floating enterprise without benchmarks.

The article sides with Haukkala and Vahtoranta’s tripartite categorization and argues that small-state realism, globalism and euroatlanticism were all present even in the post-Cold War era. However, there was also a fourth school, integrationism, which in fact became the dominant school behind Finnish foreign policy. All four schools had different assumptions about the nature of post-Cold War international politics, and they suggested different ideas about how to manage the relationship with Russia, for example.

The small-state realists called for continuity in Finnish foreign affairs, and they held that Finland should also adhere to the key tenets of its Cold War foreign policy in the new era. Their worldview stemmed from geopolitical realism. Small-state realists did not give much weight to international institutions and some of them anticipated the return of traditional European great-power politics. The loss of superpower standing notwithstanding, the geopolitical realists viewed Russia as a great power, which had major implications for Finland’s status; Finland was still a small state that needed to pay deference to Russia and its strategic interests were considered legitimate. As a result, according to the realists, Finland should carry on as a neutral nation. When it came to Finland’s political purpose, small-state realists were not unanimous, but generally, the Nordic model and the values it entailed were supported among its adherents.

The integrationists were the biggest and most powerful group. In terms of their worldview, they balanced between geopolitical realism and liberal institutionalism. Thus, their worldview can be seen as “eurorealism”. For the integrationists, a qualitative change in the European security environment was a fact, and they eagerly supported European integration and Finland’s membership in the European Community/Union. However, not all power political realities had withered. Although the eurorealists did not long for neutrality or any special status within the European Union, they saw that Finland should show some respect for Russia’s interest and thus remain non-aligned. As to Finland’s purpose, the integrationists understood Finland as a Western democracy, which membership in the European Union would further solidify.

The euroatlanticists were the most pro-Western group of the era. Their worldview was a mixture of (muscular) liberalism and balance-of-power realism, which differed from the geopolitical realism of small-state realists. Like the integrationists, the euroatlanticists supported European integration. Power politics was still very much present in Europe but according to the proponents of euroatlanticism, institutions could be used to manage security. Euroatlanticists were of the opinion that Finland’s status should not be limited by Russian great powerhood, and Finland was sovereign
and free to make its own decisions without considering Russia’s interests. Concomitantly, some of them supported closer identification with the United States and, subsequently, membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In terms of Finland’s purpose, it was a genuine and full-fledged Western democracy, not a former satellite like the countries in the post-Soviet space.

The globalists were the most normative school of the era. They claimed that international politics had undergone a major qualitative transformation and that power politics had been replaced by new realities and concerns, such as the environment, migration, and the global economy. Some globalists argued that power politics had become fiction. Moreover, they were critical of great powers and European integration alike. For them, Finland’s status and purpose were closely intertwined. According to the globalists, Finland should have profiled itself as a defender of human rights and, consequently, built its status as a moral and normative power. The purpose of Finland was to be an open democracy, which respects human rights and the rights of minorities, and which builds on a strong civil society.

How then did the views of the four schools of thought manifest in Finnish foreign policy? One could argue that the integrationists called the shots generally, but every school managed to leave distinct fingerprints on the Finnish policy line. First, Finnish policy toward Russia followed the integrationist and, to some extent, small-state realist views. Finland continued to be mindful of Russia’s interests and called for Russia’s integration into the European security order. However, slowly, Finland started to give up the strict bilateralism, while multilateralism – that is, the EU’s Russia policy – became a more important framework for its Russia policy. Secondly, the main objective of integrationists and euroatlanticists was ultimately accomplished when Finland joined the EU in 1995. Moreover, Finland gave up its neutrality, and defined itself as militarily non-aligned instead.

Thirdly, Finland did not cash in the post-Cold War peace dividend, but continued to prepare for the worst under the new circumstances as well. In other words, traditional defense policy remained at the core of Finnish security policy. Indeed, the integrationists, small-state realists, and euroatlanticists did not expect power politics to just wither away. Fourthly, in certain domains of defense policy, which was mostly controlled by the euroatlanticists, Finland began to get closer to Western actors. Major weapon procurements tied Finland to the United States, and Finland also joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and became an active participant in NATO-led crisis management operations. Fifthly, and lastly, the globalists were successful in imprinting their broader security agenda as an integral and legitimate part of Finnish foreign policy. In actual fact, in the course of the 1990s, the globalist agenda grew stronger, and peaked at the beginning of the 2000s.
4.3 Publication III. The Role of Public Opinion in Finnish Foreign and Security Policy

Finland’s geopolitical position in Russia’s armpit is unarguably tricky. Throughout the nation’s history, its location has rendered the Finnish polity vulnerable, not only to Russia’s strategic ambitions but also to the reverberations of larger great-power competition in Europe. Thus, geopolitical reasoning has always been prevalent in Finland’s foreign and security policy thinking. But does this glaring geopolitical asymmetry leave any room for other policy determinants such as public opinion? The third publication in the dissertation deals with the nexus between public opinion and Finnish security policy. More specifically, it asks:

- What role has been played by public opinion and its historical evolution in Finnish foreign and security policy?

The article claims that it is possible to identify three different relationships between public opinion and foreign policy, and the models are attached to particular historical periods. First, during the interwar years of Finland’s early independence, public opinion and foreign policy existed autonomously. The Second World War changed the nature of the public attitudes-foreign policy connection and ushered in an era during which the Finnish leadership tried to shape public opinion vigorously. The top-down model lasted until the end of the Cold War and was eventually replaced by a bottom-up model in which public opinion has been a more notable force restricting and legitimizing Finnish foreign and security policy.

From Finland’s 1917 independence to the rapid deterioration of European security in the 1930s, Finland’s foreign policy was rather fluctuating. It oscillated from the late 1910’s pro-German orientation, to the short period of so-called “rimstate policy” in the early 1920s, which was again followed by a more abstract orientation toward the League of Nations later in the 1920s. In the 1930s, Finland’s aspirations toward neutrality grew, but it failed to anchor its nonalignment to a Nordic orientation, namely cooperation with Sweden. According to historians, the contemporary view driving Finland’s foreign policy was legalism and a belief in international law and justice. During the period, Finnish leaders made multiple important decisions, none of which was explicitly based on public views, let alone pressure from the populace.

As to the role of public attitudes, there are multiple reasons why public opinion – conceived at that time more or less as the opinion of the press and key interest groups – and Finnish foreign policy were largely unconnected in the interwar era, although Finland’s democratic form of governance was secured in the 1919 constitution. First, both the elite and the public were divided. There was hardly any common ground among the members of the political elite and their political sentiments. The elite’s standpoints were ideological and based on feelings of
sympathy toward different European states such as Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These sympathies were the crucial underpinnings of the preferable policy options. In other words, there was no room for considering public attitudes, which again – as a matter of fact – were indifferent to foreign policy and international politics. In the 1920s, Europe was in a rather peaceful situation and, importantly, the Finnish domestic situation – more important than foreign policy for the ordinary citizen – was still precarious and volatile.

The perils of the Second World War broke the autonomous model. As early as the Winter and Continuation Wars, Finnish political and military leaders were interested in monitoring and controlling public opinion, but key and obviously consequential decisions made during the wars were not based on public opinion. During and after the wars, Finland made decisions, such as allying with Nazi Germany and signing the 1948 Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) treaty with the Soviet Union, which were unpopular among the Finnish public. Moreover, Finnish leaders did not hold public views in high esteem, a sentiment which was embodied in J.K. Paasikivi's assertion that “the sense of political realism is not the strongest trait of the Finnish people”.

However, as early as the 1950s, previous disregard for public opinion transformed into a strong top-down model, in which the political leadership saw public support as an essential condition for successful foreign policy in general, and for the credibility of the policy of neutrality in particular. Furthermore, strong public support for the policy line allegedly acted as a deterrent, resisting possible Soviet attempts to interfere in Finland’s internal matters and, more importantly, reflecting a strong will to defend the country by armed means if necessary. In particular, President Urho Kekkonen was convinced that Finland’s official foreign policy needed the unwavering backing of the Finnish public. As a result, the Finnish foreign policy leadership bent over backwards to imprint the official foreign policy line – the policy of neutrality and a positive view of the Soviet Union – in the public consciousness. Moreover, the efforts were intertwined with the phenomenon of “Finlandization” (see 4.5), and the measures included self-censorship and control over the public debate.

The efforts by Finnish leaders were double-edged, however, and stemmed from realpolitik. Thus, the officials hoped that ordinary Finns would understand that the governmental rhetoric was not the whole truth but rather a method to pursue Finland’s interests vis-à-vis its big neighbor. Nonetheless, the endeavors to cajole the Finnish public into supporting the official foreign policy were successful. For

57 There was also a similar but less strong effort in Sweden, where the leaders educated the people about the official doctrine of “non-alignment in peacetime aiming at neutrality in war”. The substantial covert cooperation with the United States and NATO went unmentioned, however. See Yden et al. 2019.
example, in 1971, 96% of Finns thought that the conduct of Finnish foreign policy was good. In addition, in 1974, 80% of the public were of the opinion that the FCMA treaty had a positive effect on Finnish security – a notable 23% rise from 1964, when the consensus around the official policy was still less consolidated.

The end of an era in international politics again resulted in a change in the Finnish public opinion nexus. Debate regarding Finnish foreign policy intensified (see 4.2). Moreover, a more liberal mindset began to overshadow Hegelian collectivism, and public opinion polls were conducted more frequently. This time, a bottom-up model emerged and public opinion began to affect foreign policy in central questions in particular. The turning point comprised the parallel independence processes of the three Baltic republics. Finns sympathized with Estonia’s endeavors in particular, and the official circumspect policy line – which prioritized a cordial relationship with the Soviet Union and Mikhail Gorbachev – was met with considerable criticism.

The new bottom-up model has, however, truly manifested itself in two major post-Cold War issues: Finland’s accession to the EU and adherence to non-alignment. Eventually, in 1992, Finland’s leadership moved rapidly with the announcement of the country’s aspiration to seek membership in the then European Community. The decision was preceded by official caution. Throughout 1990 and 1991 Finland’s leaders, especially President Mauno Koivisto, wanted to avoid public discussion on European integration, although public opinion polls showed increasing readiness from Finns to take a step toward closer European integration. Finally, the failed coup d’état in Moscow and the collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically changed political circumstances, and the elite also started to get ready to move with the potential accession. During the process, gaining public backing was imperative for the Finnish leadership. The decision to join the EU was duly put to a referendum, and the supporters of EU membership won handsomely, by 57% to 43%. Although the top-down element was not absent in the membership process, it is clear that “no” from the Finns would have led to Finland staying outside the EU.

Concerning non-alignment, Finns have consistently remained against Finland’s NATO membership throughout the past three decades, and not even Russia’s actions in Georgia or Ukraine have served to change the public mood. Rather, the connection between Russia’s actions and Finnish public opinion is rather weak. The United States’ actions have again consolidated Finns’ negative opinions on NATO. That said, public opinion has constrained and discouraged changing incumbents to promote Finnish NATO membership in earnest. Moreover, it has been made clear by the majority of Finnish politicians that in the event that Finland ever decides to consider NATO membership, the decision should be put to a public vote. Furthermore, and interestingly, although Finns have signaled that they might support NATO membership if it was promoted by the leadership, the leaders themselves have remained doubtful. President Sauli Niinistö, for example, has mentioned on
numerous occasions that he or other leaders could not necessarily sway Finns to accept military alignment through NATO membership – an attitude which was also entertained by his predecessors.

4.3.1 A Theoretical Note on the Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Nexus in Finnish Foreign Policy

In terms of theory, the publication raised several factors that have influenced the public opinion-foreign policy link in the history of Finnish foreign policy, but it did not discuss theoretical issues in depth. In this section, the theoretical underpinnings of the three models – disconnection, top-down and bottom-up – are briefly touched upon. Here, IFPA provides valuable insights into how foreign policy and public opinion are connected. Leaders’ personal beliefs and threat perceptions are crucial determinants in constituting the link between policies and public views. However, although the principles of IFPA would be even better suited to examining how public opinion takes shape, the focus of the article lay elsewhere.

As implied, the autonomous model was the result of a number of factors. First, contemporary elites were, using Foyle’s typology, guardian-like leaders who did not place much value on public attitudes and who considered other foreign determinants more pressing and important.

Secondly, from the public’s perspective, questions of international politics were not salient compared to rather volatile domestic politics in which there were major issues that needed to be tackled.

The bottom-up level of the Cold War era again stemmed from Kekkonen’s personal belief that a credible foreign policy needs strong, almost unanimous public support. Not only Kekkonen but also Paasikivi and Koivisto – all adherents of realism – saw that public opinion should be educated to understand the realities of international politics. Moreover, Finland had one looming foreign policy challenge, the Soviet Union, which gave a powerful incentive to the Finnish leadership to steer Finnish policy, while the populace’s role was to submit to the elite’s leadership. Furthermore, due to the control of the public sphere and the general tendency of Finnish civil society and the media to support and not challenge the official policy, the conditions for the formation of alternative foreign policy views were not fruitful. Lastly, especially during Kekkonen’s reign, the Finnish system was centralized around his leadership, which was bound to limit public opinion’s independent role in foreign policy.

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58 Public ignorance in Finland reflects a more general international trend, where – after the nascent optimism of the early 1900s, the appreciation of public opinion as a positive force in international politics declined. See e.g. Speier 1950.
As to the bottom-up model, key explanations certainly include the relaxation of the threat environment, which followed the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Finland suddenly faced a number of salient foreign policy questions such as EU membership and possible military alignment, which attracted considerable public and media interest. It also seems that the new generation of Finnish leaders had slowly grown to appreciate public opinion as a genuine factor that needs to be respected, or at least they were less confident in their abilities to shape public views. With military alignment, it is also clear that too positive views on Finland’s membership also constitute an electoral threat to Finnish politicians given the critical NATO views of the majority of the Finnish constituency.

4.4 Publication IV. Trust and Finnish-Swedish Defense Cooperation

The relationship between Finland and Sweden unarguably represents one of the closest and most cordial intergovernmental relationships in the world. The countries share a border, history, identities, and interests and, moreover, Fenno-Swedish political and societal interaction is lively at all possible levels. Interestingly, one domain of interaction has traditionally been characterized by circumspection, namely defense. It is only during the past decade that Fenno-Swedish defense cooperation has gained increasing momentum. However, cooperation has thus far been pragmatic, and it has made progress incrementally. It has nonetheless intensified recently. Increased cooperation notwithstanding, there seems to exist an underlying lack of trust toward Sweden in Finland, which needs to be overcome if the states want to develop their existing cooperation even further, for example toward a military alliance. This underlying mistrust manifests itself as a fear in the Finnish political discourse that Sweden might desert the thus far fruitful cooperation in defense and apply for membership in NATO.

Consequently, this article seeks an answer to one major question:

- What are the reasons for the existing mistrust toward Sweden among the Finnish foreign policy elite?

The Finnish mistrust is indeed puzzling, since Sweden and Finland basically belong to a model security community, which represents perhaps the most mature intergovernmental relationship that is achievable in international politics. To date, the burgeoning trust research in IR has focused on conflictual relationships, often between great powers. However, it is important to acknowledge that mistrust and suspicion can also exist in profoundly non-conflictual relationships.

In the spirit of IFPA, the publication merges psychological and social approaches to international trust. It is skeptical of the claims by liberal institutionalist scholars that the formation of a trusting relationship primarily hinges on the recognition of mutual
self-interest to reciprocate cooperation. Moreover, the study holds that cooperation does not begin from a state of distrust, but some preliminary trust must actually precede cooperation. Thus, instead of focusing only on rational calculations, one needs to pay attention to relational variables that supersede the rational weighing of self-interests as the main source of trust. Importantly, interstate trust is thus not only a situationally isolated moment of calculation, but it also builds on historical experiences, beliefs, norms, and expectations that others will do what is right.

The study lays out three main theoretical arguments. Firstly, it differentiates between distrust and mistrust. Whereas distrust refers to a more general condition between states, mistrust again stems from historical experiences of misplaced trust. In order to understand the nature of trust more extensively, we must increase our understanding of circumstances in which experiences of mistrust evolve into full-blown distrust between states.

The second point the article drives home is that trust is a scalable phenomenon. In theory, the scale of trustfulness ranges from complete distrust to a habitual sense of trust. Thus, it is also possible and necessary to make a distinction between situations where trust is rather an instrument of confidence-building between distrusting parties, and where trust is, in turn, habitualized and internalized and thus an inarticulate disposition. The study calls the former type minimal trust and the latter maximal trust. A minimal level of trust exists when two or more actors believe that others can be relied upon to abstain from behavior that would be harmful to the actors’ interests and values. In other words, there is minimal trust when actors avoid inflicting harm on one another. Maximalist trust again refers to a relationship in which habitual care prevails and in which actors mutually promote each other’s interests and values. Minimal and maximalist trust are, of course, ideal types but useful heuristic devices to illustrate the nature of different trusting relationships.

Thirdly and finally, the publication suggests that a sense of disappointment and a feeling of being betrayed must be separated. A feeling of disappointment can follow when minimalist and strategic trust is broken. Importantly, disappointment does not necessarily have an impact on the general and fundamental feeling of trustworthiness felt by an actor toward another actor. Betrayal is again a deeper and more profound feeling in which a trusting relationship has been seriously broken. Feelings of being betrayed are more emotional than mere disappointments and, thus, betrayal can undermine a trusting relationship based on strong moral and even maximalist trust.

As to the history of the Fenno-Swedish trusting relationship, the seeds of Finnish mistrust toward Sweden were sown in October 1990 when Stockholm caught Helsinki off guard by announcing its intention to seek membership in the then

59 This division echoes other classifications made by previous scholars between reliance and trust, strategic and moralistic/generalized trust, and trust-as-predictability and trust-as-bond.
European Communities (EC), now known as the European Union. Finnish leaders were surprised to say the least, although they were aware of the trajectories in Sweden that were nudging the country toward the Community. President Mauno Koivisto was left shocked by the announcement and, according to his view, Sweden not only broke an unspoken promise but also fundamental tacit rules between the two Nordics by not informing Finland beforehand about its intentions. In the late Cold War years, Finnish leaders had invested a great deal of generalized and moralistic trust in Fenno-Swedish relations, which suddenly suffered a major blow. The bottom line is that the incident in October 1990 became an experience of misplaced trust or an event of betrayal for the contemporary Finnish elite. Finns truly felt that Sweden had broken some fundamental and tacit rules of Nordic cooperation. The sense of betrayal and its subsequent social stratification in the Finnish security policy discourse thus had personal and individual highly emotive origins.

The question of trust between Finland and Sweden has become more prevalent as bilateral defense cooperation has intensified considerably during the last half decade. In the late 2000s, financial pressures to rationalize expenditures initiated bilateral talks on forging deeper collaboration in defense. However, it was the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent war in Ukraine that pushed Finland and Sweden closer together in defense policy. Bilateral cooperation has made incremental and steady progress, and the way of proceeding in small steps might indicate that cooperation itself is a trust-building exercise, which can again feed a positive, reciprocal cycle of trust.

In order to understand the circumstances in which Finnish mistrust has emerged, one must pay attention to developments in the security environment. Russia’s maneuvers in the Baltic Sea region and the transformed and tense European security landscape at large triggered debate in Sweden, which had wound down its territorial defense capabilities. Polls began showing higher support for NATO membership among Swedes and, moreover, the center-right coalition closed ranks and lent their support to military alignment.

These developments in Sweden did not go unnoticed in Finland. Multiple Finnish decision-makers and commentators began to frame the existing situation as being analogous to the early 1990s. This time, however, the fear was an unexpected Swedish bid for NATO membership. Former and incumbent ministers, other foreign policy experts, columns and editorials warned that Sweden might be on the brink of a major foreign policy reappraisal. Interestingly, Finnish ministers, such as former Prime Minister Juha Sipilä and former Defense Minister Jussi Niinistö, stressed during their first visits to Sweden that the neighbors should keep each other informed and make important decisions hand in hand, which could be seen as efforts to reinforce certain social norms between the countries. In Sweden, leading political figures have noticed the unease in Finland. Not only the Prime Minister but also the
Foreign and Defense Ministers have reassured Finland that Sweden will stick to its current doctrine of military non-alignment and not apply for NATO membership.

The comments stemming from the Finnish security policy community indicate that the trusting relationship between Finland and Sweden is, in fact, not very deep. Rather, the Finnish foreign policy elite cannot exclude the possibility of Sweden potentially making a decision against Finland’s interests. Thus, the level of trust between the nations falls short of the moralistic/maximalist grade of mutual trust. Rather, one can speak of minimal or strategic trust between the parties. However, the step-by-step progress made in defense cooperation seems to point toward strategic trust-building efforts to mitigate mistrust and to increase mutual trust in the realm of national security – a goal of defense cooperation explicitly mentioned in an official Finnish defense policy document.60 The overall identification- and norm-based trust facilitates this process of consolidating trust.

Finally, the Finnish-Swedish case shows that trust, in addition to being a condition for collaboration, can also be a result of the objective of cooperation. Moreover, as argued by psychologically- and socially-oriented trust scholars, trust never starts from a historical and social void. In fact, dealing with past experiences of mistrust is crucial in forming a new relationship characterized by deeper trust and more intense cooperation.

4.5 Publication V. The Key Features of Finlandization

As the war in Ukraine commenced in 2014 and as international commentators started to ponder a possible political solution to the crisis, the concept of Finlandization – or, alternatively, the “Finland model” – re-emerged from the Cold War dustbin. Most often, Finlandization refers to a national security strategy whereby a minor state adjusts its policy to the preferences of a larger, possibly neighboring country. Finnish Cold War foreign policy exemplified that kind of strategy. However, Finlandization has also developed into an abstract ideal-type and scholarly concept without a direct reference to Finland.

The fifth publication in the dissertation deals with Finland’s own experience of Finlandization. It asks three questions:

- Which factors constituted Finlandization?
- Did the accommodative Finnish attitude toward the Soviet Union go too far?
- What are the lessons learnt regarding Finlandization as a national security strategy?

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60 See Prime Minister’s Office 2017, 16: “Trust, a necessary requisite for defense cooperation, is established through tenacious and enduring action.”
The concept of Finlandization, which in fact originates from 1950’s German-speaking Europe, has had at least three meanings. Firstly, for some commentators, Finlandization plainly meant Finland’s Cold War foreign policy of voluntarily accommodating its interests and restricting its sovereignty in the face of its mighty neighbor, the Soviet Union. This realist approach to Finlandization has viewed the phenomenon mostly in a positive light.

Secondly, Finlandization has also been regarded abroad as a political remote control. This negative view played an important role in the Western European security debate in particular. Thinkers such as Raymond Aron and Walter Laqueur and politicians like Franz Josef Strauss saw Finland as a warning example of a semi-independent state – a danger that, according to them, would also loom elsewhere in Europe if the Soviet Union was given too much ground in the process of détente. Finally, especially in Finland, Finlandization has been associated with a specific political culture, which blossomed in the country from the mid-1960s to early 1980s. Among other things, the culture buttressed the official foreign policy by promoting and ensuring abstinence from allegedly anti-Soviet manifestations.

In Finland, Finlandization was and continues to be a pejorative term. During the Cold War, Finnish decision-makers and officials fought hard against its usage. Finnish leaders, primarily President Kekkonen, did their best to imbue Finlandization with a positive meaning. Kekkonen suggested that the Finnish-Soviet relations were an example of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. Moreover, the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland reveal multiple incidents where Finnish diplomats contacted someone who had uttered the term in negative fashion. The archives also disclose how meticulously Finnish diplomats followed the occurrence of the term in various national media across the globe.

The article elaborates on two specific dimensions of the phenomenon – namely Finlandization as a foreign policy strategy and a political culture, which were closely intertwined and that partly existed in parallel. Finlandization as a foreign policy strategy simply refers to the policy that Finland practiced throughout the Cold War and practically until the early 1990s when the country’s orientation became “Europeanized”. In practice, Finland stayed out of the organization that the Soviet Union considered hostile. Bilateral economic, political, and societal tracks with Moscow were strong, and Finland also refrained from criticizing the Soviet Union’s decisions and actions. Official parlance was sugarcoated with pro-Soviet and pro-peace references. Importantly, the policy was based on the FCMA treaty, which stated for example that under special circumstances Finland and the Soviet Union, with one accord, could join forces and fight an aggressor on the Finnish territory. However, in peacetime, Finland was adamant about not cooperating with the Soviet
Union in defense. Finnish accommodative political realism has always contained separatist elements drawing red lines vis-à-vis small-state flexibility.

Whereas Finlandization as a foreign policy strategy originated in the immediate post-Second World War years – and in this sense Finland was “Finlandized” in the late 1940s – the political culture of Finlandization started to arise later, in the 1960s, reaching its climax in the 1970s when the Soviet Union became more active in tightening its grip on Finland. The culture was a multifaceted phenomenon, but it had some notable prominent features. First, to begin with, it was the objective of the Finnish leadership to bring about a culture that embraced the official friendship between Finland and the Soviet Union. In other words, Finnish leaders aimed to “de-antagonize” Finnish society and the populace with regard to anti-Soviet sentiments. The leadership fervently hoped, however, that the public would understand that the flattering pro-Soviet talk was purely instrumental.

The objective of promoting the official foreign policy line served President Kekkonen, who was eager to consolidate his status and dominance as the sole leader of Finnish foreign policy. The most tangible and politically consequential implication of Finlandization was the growing Soviet influence on Finnish domestic affairs; loyalty to the Soviet Union became a de facto necessity for pursuing a significant career in Finnish politics. Furthermore, the National Coalition Party, considered anti-Soviet by Moscow, was omitted from the government for more than 20 years. Perhaps the most obnoxious feature of Finlandization was self-censorship, however, which removed references critical of the Soviet Union from the Finnish press, television, radio, and also, to some extent, from literature.

Some Finns were more “Finlandized” than others. Many individual politicians took pro-Soviet initiatives that went a long way toward extirpating allegedly anti-Soviet policies and practices – such as the notorious peace address commemorating the signing of the 1944 Moscow armistice. Moreover, a group of Finnish baby boomers born in the late 1940s or early 1950s embraced a version of Stalinism. The group represented the minority block in the Communist Party of Finland, but gained a rather strong foothold in academia and the media. They largely failed in their objectives, but managed, for example, to undermine certain efforts to build up the civic foundations of Finnish defense. In addition to pro-Soviet elements, there was also resistance. Part of civil society enshrined patriotic and conservative values. Moreover, through different scholarship programs, thousands of Finns were educated in the United States, where they embraced Western pluralism and subsequently promoted these values in academia, for instance. Most ordinary Finns were also aware of the true state of socialism in the Soviet Union.

Finlandization began to evaporate in the 1980s. President Kekkonen was replaced by Koivisto, who was a staunch parliamentarian and less eager to control the public
debate. Moreover, a new and de-politicized generation arose and overshadowed the radical baby boomers. Furthermore, the shortcomings of the socialist system became increasingly evident, which detracted from communism’s appeal. Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies were the final nail in Finlandization’s coffin; the Moscow card lost its value in domestic power battles in Finland and, furthermore, the Soviet interest in Finnish affairs began to lessen. Notably, from time to time, accusations of Finlandization have also appeared in the post-Cold War era. In Finland, some have argued that the country is not Finlandized toward the West. Others have again asserted that Finland is still too compliant with Russia’s interests.

Did Finlandization bring success to Finland or did it go too far? If understood as a mere foreign policy strategy, Finlandization was rather successful, or at least it did not destroy Finland’s sovereignty. First, Finland managed to retain and develop its independent defense capability and, the FCMA treaty notwithstanding, was not drawn into the Soviet security system. Secondly, eastern trade largely benefitted Finland, although too heavy a reliance on the Soviet market backfired in the 1990s when it became apparent that not all Finnish products were competitive in European or global markets. Thirdly, the existing Russian emigrant minority in Finland remained critical of the communist rule and, moreover, the cultural ties between the Finnish and Soviet societies were at the end of the day weak. Finally, most of the key decision-makers understood the name of the game and even the majority of communists supported Finnish sovereignty. The bottom line is that Finlandization was not a policy of limitless adjustment, which invalidates some of the key arguments of the group who understood Finlandization as a sheer remote control.

The success of the foreign policy strategy notwithstanding, one can claim that the political culture of Finlandization had excessive features, and it is too naïve to interpret Finlandization solely as a successful foreign policy strategy. The 1970s in particular showed that a “Finlandization of consciousness” – a genuine adoption of the instrumental ideas – was potentially looming. Some acts of courtesy went unnecessarily far, however. Additionally, Kekkonen’s behavior exceeded his constitutional powers, and the arbitrary foreign policy suitability criteria were clearly a form of corruption. The Finnish media again failed to play a role as the fourth estate, as it faithfully echoed the official foreign policy. One can of course contend that the culture was necessary to implement Finnish eastern policy successfully. However, the transition from Kekkonen’s to Koivisto’s presidency, with the waning of the phenomenon, seems to suggest that the extent of domestic accommodation for foreign policy purposes was exaggerated. In fact, the culture of Finlandization was detrimental to the overall goal of Finnish foreign policy, since it ironically began to erode the hard core of Finnish sovereignty, which the very policy was intended to preserve.
What are the lessons learnt from the Finlandization of Finland? In terms of foreign policy, it was a relative success, but it came at a price and considerable risks. For small states willing or forced to pursue such a strategy, the Finnish case teaches some lessons. First and foremost, the hard core needs to be preserved. That is to say, the military and defense realm must be kept intact, too deep an economic interdependence must be avoided, and the broader society should maintain a cultural distance from the larger actor. That said, one should also bear in mind that Finland also needed luck to survive the tricky Cold War era. Had the Soviet power remained well into the 1980s and had the culture of Finlandization remained robust, the hard core could have eventually yielded and thus eroded.

4.5.1 A Theoretical Note on the Finlandization of Finland

Since the article was published in a diplomatic history journal, the analytical approach did not contain an explicit theoretical framework. Nonetheless, the Finnish case of Finlandization – and thus also the study at hand – has multiple dimensions that are interesting from the point of view of IFPA. In fact, it is impossible to fully understand Finlandization without an ideational perspective.

Internationally, the debate on Finlandization was about Finland’s status in general and its sovereignty in particular. Sovereignty is the ultimate status which, essentially, makes a state a state, and hence it is a crucial factor of recognized statehood in international politics. Whereas Finnish policymakers saw and presented Finland as a neutral democratic state having friendly relations with the Soviet Union, many influential Western security commentators understood Finland as a country with limited sovereignty. Thus, the prolific Finlandization talk of the 1970s undermined Finland’s status as a sovereign and neutral country, and actually became a stigma (see Adler-Nissen 2014) that the Finnish leadership had to bear. In other words, Finland was not seen as a “normal” Western nation, and therefore its neutrality also became tainted.

Obviously, the stigma of Finlandization was a blow to the collective self-esteem of Finnish decision-makers. Finnish diplomats did their best to correct such impressions but their success was limited. Kekkonen’s solution was to rely on the strategy that Social Identity Theory would call social creativity (see 3.3.3). More specifically, he tried to turn the alleged weakness of overly close Soviet ties into a strength and signals of status. Kekkonen presented Finlandization in a positive fashion as successful and peaceful co-existence between two nations having different domestic systems. In Kekkonen’s interpretation, the so-called Finlandization was a success of which Finns should be proud.

One can argue that in terms of identity-building, the Finnish case represented a textbook example of a situation in which there is a clear discrepancy between
domestic and international views on a nation’s identity; Finns saw their country as a neutral nation, whereas many international commentators called Finnish neutrality and even its sovereignty into question.

Domestically, Finlandization was part and parcel of the top-down approach to public opinion formation (see 3.5.3; 4.3). Finnish officials and politicians imprinted the key tenets of the official foreign policy on the national consciousness. More precisely, the leadership strove to entrench the dominant worldview of geopolitical realism (see 4.2) in the Finnish public and society in order to render Finnish foreign policy more credible in the eyes of the Soviet Union, which underlines that identity-building can be instrumental to some extent. The norms that the culture of Finlandization entailed became institutionalized and, effectively, established as the societal context where Finns – the public and elite alike – were embedded, affecting their worldviews.

However, Finlandization did not really have a significant effect on the Finnish political purpose, which revolved around securing the democratic form of governance. In other words, the socialization effect remained limited. At any rate, Finnish leaders were rather successful in their efforts, as Publication IV suggested, since neutrality turned out to be a persistent idea, so durable in fact that it outlived the Cold War era in the minds of the public and elites.
5. Concluding Remarks: The End of the Cold War and the Ideational Environment of Finnish Foreign Policy

5.1 From Small State Realism to Integrationism

This section seeks to integrate the results of the individual publications. The aim is to present a comprehensive view of the end of the Cold War’s influence on the ideational foundations of Finnish foreign policy. To that end, the study set three research questions:

- What did the end of the Cold War mean for Finnish foreign policy in terms of its ideational foundations?
- What factors contributed to change on the one hand, and continuity on the other?
- Can ideas explain the key doctrinal decisions of the era, such as accession to the European Union and adherence to military non-alignment?

To put it briefly, the collapse of the Cold War brought about three notable ideational developments:

1) an adjustment from small-state realism to integrationism as the primary orientation of foreign policy;
2) the vindication of Finland’s Western-ness;
3) the relaxation of the ideational milieu of Finnish foreign policymaking.

The new Finnish foreign policy orientation, which was adopted in the early and mid-1990s, can be called integrationism after the most powerful school of thought of the era (see 4.2). It replaced the Cold War small-state realism, which would have provided rather different foundations for Finland’s post-Cold War foreign policy. Should the small-state realists have prevailed, it is unlikely that Finland would have become an EU member. Rather, Finland would likely have adhered to a more restrictive interpretation of neutrality resembling the Cold War policy of balancing between the East and West.

Integrationism that eventually carried the day was based on a “eurorealist” worldview. It recognized that a profound change had taken place in Finland’s security environment, but that geopolitical realities that characterized the Cold War had not vanished altogether. Integrationism contained a less restrictive definition of
neutrality, which enabled political alignment with the EU. In addition to material arguments such as economic benefit or an increase in power, ideational factors were used to argue for Finnish EU membership. As Paavo Lipponen (2001, 151–156) – perhaps the most visible integrationist and an important entrepreneur of Finnish Europeanization – wrote in his 1994 defense of Finnish EU membership, the old world no longer existed and there was no place for the old comfortable neutrality. Rather, Finland belonged to the club of stable Western European democracies, had a European identity, and was a nation equal to its peers.

Almost equally as important as the push for EU membership was the fact that integrationism contained a “pinch” of the traditional geopolitical realism. Although the primacy of Finnish foreign policy gravitated toward Europe, Finland also continued to defer to Russia’s security interests as an EU member. In other words, vis-à-vis Russia, Finland was still a minor power, and part and parcel of Finnish (small-state) realism was the recognition of this fact. This was the key ideational motivation for staying militarily non-aligned outside NATO. For instance, one of the key architects of the Finnish policy writes in his memoirs that it was “natural” that the recognition of Russia’s interests was carried over into the new era:

> During the entire Cold War, one of the key meanings of the policy of neutrality was to refrain from actions that would have violated Soviet security interests. Membership in the European Union did not remove this motive of Eastern policy, but it was accompanied by new ones (Blomberg 2011, 658).61

Although this “natural recognition” was not a quintessential Finnish phenomenon, it was absent from the consideration of former Soviet satellites and republics, for example, which were anxious about the re-emergence of Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and thus made NATO membership the absolute priority of their respective foreign policies (see e.g. Asmus 2004). Finnish leaders in turn understood NATO membership as a potentially confrontational move against Russia (Blomberg 2011, 644). It is clear that a solely materialist approach to the foreign policies of the states in Russia’s proximity cannot explain the variation in the policies. Rather, a central factor was the ideas the representatives of the states held about Russia.

As *Publication V* elaborated, Finnish leaders fought hard against the stigma of Finlandization during the Cold War. At the heart of the Finlandization talk was the questioning of Finnish sovereignty and, essentially, its status as a neutral Western power that was not a quasi-satellite of the Kremlin. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Finland’s successful integration vindicated Finland’s “Western-ness” in the minds of Finnish policymakers and the members of

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61 Translation by the author.
the country’s elite. Finally, a full-fledged identification with Europe and the West was possible. A new and weakened Russia was much less proactive in intervening in Finnish domestic politics, and the nature of the bilateral relationship between the two countries changed profoundly. The awkward label of Finlandization faded, and Finland’s sovereignty was no longer under speculation. One could argue that Finnish policymakers felt a certain status boost, which, in addition to the integrationist orientation, was reflected in key foreign policy documents such as the Government’s 1995 white paper on foreign policy:

Resting on the lessons of history and geopolitics, and seizing the opportunities offered by change, Finland’s foreign and security policy has adapted smoothly to the end of the Cold War and the subsequent transformation. Finland has worked actively and independently to clarify and strengthen its international status, and to enhance its capability to pursue its security interests and bear its share of responsibility for international security (The Council of State 1995, 65).\(^\text{62}\)

The perceptions of the increased room for maneuver in foreign policy and the evaporation of the stigmas of the past generated fertile ground for Westernization narratives, and Browning (2002, 2008) is right that the narratives were political and contained a specific reading of history against which the contemporary identity was partly built. The narratives are indeed worth unpacking, but one cannot deny that Finnish policymakers and members of the elite felt a genuine sense of justification regarding their nation’s Western identity after the end of the Cold War. This was evident in the public debate analyzed in Publication II.

Interestingly, these new interpretations of Finnish subjectivity were connected to another change that came at the end of the Cold War, namely the relaxation of the ideational environment of Finnish foreign policymaking. In practice, this meant the greater importance of public opinion and, furthermore, the emergence of various competing schools of thought with divergent visions of ideal foreign and security policy. In other words, Publication III identified a new bottom-up dynamic in the foreign policy-public opinion nexus, while Publication II demonstrated how the hegemony of small-state realism broke down and how there were suddenly opposing ideas about the very bedrocks of Finnish security. Moreover, as pointed out in Publication V, the process of relaxation had already started in the mid-1980s, when Finlandization and the practice of self-censorship associated with the phenomenon began to wane. It is possible to find internal and external causes of the relaxation. Domestically, partly owing to the personality of Mauno Koivisto and his successor Martti Ahtisaari, there was less inclination to control public opinion and debate. Externally, the easing of the threat environment, namely the collapse of the Soviet

\(^{62}\) Emphasis added.
Union, reduced the outside pressure to control the competition of ideas. Moreover, the concrete choice regarding Finland’s possible membership in the EU empowered the public, who had their say in the consultative referendum.

These changes notwithstanding, one can hardly call the ideational transformation revolutionary but rather an adjustment of old ideas to new material and ideational realities of the post-Cold War world, in which international politics was not characterized by ideological competition but rather by a consolidation of US hegemony and the benevolent liberal world order (see e.g. Brands 2016; Ikenberry 1996). In the Finnish case, a full-fledged transatlantic orientation coupled with a disregard for Russia’s security interests, or the wholehearted adoption of a normative globalist worldview would have qualified as profound ideational change.

Why did the collapse of the Cold War – a major shift in the material and ideational realities of world politics – not result in a bigger change in Finnish foreign affairs? First, and most importantly, Finland’s social system did not change, and domestic preferences ingrained in the societal value system indeed count as one pillar of national identity. As mentioned in Publication II, Finland’s political purpose – the core value system of the society – was not really debated. Thus, in a sense, Finland was like any other Western European democracy. None of the established democracies in Europe made complete reversals in their respective foreign policies. Rather, only minor adjustments occurred.63

Secondly, although the Soviet Union collapsed and a much weaker Russia emerged from the ruins of the former Soviet empire, the power asymmetry between Finland and Russia continued to be a fact to be reckoned with in the minds of Finnish policymakers. Given the success of the policy of neutrality during the Cold War in stabilizing Finland’s international position compared to the labile early post-Second World War years, the hard core of the doctrine, military non-alignment, seemed a feasible policy line in the new circumstances as well, particularly when Finland was free to realize its political and economic objectives as a member of the EU without any unnecessary flattering of its neighbor or any accusations of Finlandization.

Thirdly, the question of change and continuity ultimately boils down to individual decision-makers and their beliefs. Although some of the policymakers and members of the elite, notably those among the globalists and euroatlanticists, advocated a thorough re-evaluation of the core aspects of Finnish foreign policy based on novel ideas, neither the majority of the elite nor the public saw an urgent need for a major ideational turnaround. An adjustment was enough for most. Mauno Koivisto – the

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63 Denmark is an example of a minor policy change in a Western country. After the Cold War, and owing to an active policy by Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Denmark adopted an active transatlantic stance, which replaced the critical “endnote” policy of the Cold War era. See Doeser & Eidenfalk 2013.
most powerful figure in Finnish foreign policy and a potential entrepreneur of change – is a case in point, as *Publication I* discussed.

### 5.2 Epilogue: The End of the Cold War in Light of the Post-2014 Era

Before putting the end of the Cold War into a contemporary perspective, it must be noted that the period has by no means been the only era during which the guiding ideas of Finnish foreign policy have changed.\(^6\) In the interwar years, the foundational ideas of Finnish foreign policy oscillated as a reaction to international and domestic changes, which resulted in various foreign policy orientations. Alignment with Germany collapsed along with Germany’s defeat in the First World War. The so-called “Rimland policy” with the Baltic states and Poland was a solution almost dead on arrival. Thereafter, without clear alignments, Finland pursued rather isolationist policies and leaned on the League of Nations. When the impotence of the League of Nations became evident, Finland tried to safeguard its neutrality with a Scandinavian orientation. The only ideational factor that Finnish political factions, excluding the Communists, shared was Russia as the hereditary enemy of the country (Browning 2008, 115–168; Kallenautio 1985; Jussila et al. 1995).

As we now know, Scandinavian neutrality did not save Finland from the perils of the new war. The major shock of the Second World War and Finland’s narrow survival changed the ideational basis of the country’s foreign policy. More specifically, Finnish policy moved from “emotionalism to rationalism”, meaning the adoption of geopolitical small-state realism (Browning 2008; Apunen & Wolff 2009). In terms of ideas, the Cold War was much more stable than the interwar years. In fact, the main story of Finnish Cold War foreign policy is the stabilization of Finland’s international position by drawing on the principles of realism.

The end of the Cold War unarguably marked a profound shift in Finland’s security environment. Moreover, as described earlier, it also shaped the individual and collective ideas influencing Finnish policy. One of the advantages of this study compared to previous works is the age in which it is written. The era between the late 1990s and the early 2010s was the heyday of the ideational analysis of Finnish foreign policy. The world has since changed, as have the ideas that underlie Finnish foreign affairs. In other words, the events of 2014, namely the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine, inaugurated a new era not only in European security but also in Finnish national security policy (see e.g. Aaltola 2019). Indeed, these new realities add a new perspective to the end of the Cold War and, particularly, to the processes it set in motion.

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\(^6\) The foreign policy of independent Finland is specifically referred to here. Foreign policy questions were also debated during the Grand Duchy era, and many of the ideas that have prevailed originated in the 19th century. However, as a political entity, Finland did not practice independent foreign policy in the traditional sense of the term.
First, the decision associated with Russia’s actions, namely the sanctions the EU enacted after the annexation of Crimea and the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17, revealed the true effects and level of the Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy. Interestingly, as brought up in Publication II, the Finnish elite had already pondered prior to EU membership what Finland’s reactions would be in case the EU was forced to impose sanctions on Russia. At that time, even the supporters of membership were of the opinion that sanctioning Russia would be a bridge too far for Finland. However, when the scenario actually materialized, adopting a common stance with other EU allies was a rather uncontroversial decision for Finnish policymakers. Interestingly, in early 2019, every leader of a major Finnish party supported the maintenance of sanctions in the existing circumstances (Hara 2019).

The level of support and the indisputability of the necessity for the sanctions regime is a strong indicator of the Europeanization process (see 2.1), in which both the Finnish elite and the public have gradually adopted European views as the basis of foreign policy. Had the events of 2014 taken place a decade or so earlier, the Finnish position would have been less straightforward.

Second, the process that led to Finnish EU membership was the first occasion when Finnish decision-makers decided to redefine the country’s neutrality after the policy was incepted during Kekkonen’s first term. The old doctrine was stripped of most of its content and only the “hard core” – military non-alignment – remained. However, this was hardly the last instance when the substance of non-alignment was reimagined. In the mid-1990s and 2000s, as a response to new international developments in crisis-management, Finnish leaders amended the state legislation in order to make Finnish non-alignment less restrictive in terms of Finland’s participation in out-of-area operations. Moreover, as the Lisbon Treaty with its mutual assistance clause 42.7 entered into force, military non-alignment was replaced by a new status of “not being a member of any military alliance”. The year 2014 and Russian assertiveness were, however, also turning points in this regard – a game changer as one prominent Finnish decision-maker noted (Nieminen 2019). In 2017, Finnish legislators passed an amendment that enabled the provision of military assistance by combat forces. The new modification of the legislation and the emergence of robust bi-, mini- and multi-lateral defense cooperation, which are aimed at improving the chances of receiving military assistance in a crisis, demonstrate that military non-alignment is all but a dead letter a quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War (Pesu 2017a; 2017b).

Thirdly, although the new more benevolent post-Cold War world pushed some traumas aside, a more precarious era made them reappear. As Publication IV demonstrated, memories of 1990 resurfaced among the Finnish security policy elite, which manifested as mistrust toward Sweden in the realm of defense. Moreover, Publication V in turn pointed out how Finlandization made a brief reappearance in the international security lexicon in the form of a “Finland model”, as the foremost
experts of international politics were seeking a solution to the Ukraine crisis. In Finland, the re-emergence of the old stigma was not regarded positively. Key policymakers reminded the international audience that Finland was no longer neutral and it was thus not a feasible model for Ukraine or any other Eastern European state for that matter. Moreover, the discussion that revolved around Finlandization revealed that the reading of the past neutrality had become even more negative than before among Finnish decision-makers. In some of the Cold War neutrals, such as Austria, the situation is not the same, but the image of neutrality is still positive and politically appealing (Rainio-Niemi 2014).

What, then, does the contemporary perspective on the end of the Cold War tell us? First, ideational change can be incremental and even latent. The collapse of the bipolar world indeed forced Finnish decision-makers to rethink their country’s place in the world. The result was an adjustment of old ideas to new realities. One could also say that the ideational horizon of Finnish decision-makers was broadened, which was a crucial enabler of novel decisions. However, the end of an era initiated partly inconspicuous processes that needed more external stimuli to fully materialize. This began to happen in 2014, a quarter of a century after the *annus mirabilis* of 1989, when Russia annexed Crimea and started the war in Eastern Ukraine. Secondly, ideas can also be resilient. Old images such as neutrality die hard, particularly if one is an outside observer of Finnish foreign policy. Moreover, ideas are even more resistant if they are loaded with emotional substance – the belief about Sweden’s untrustworthiness is a prime example.

To conclude, it remains to be seen what kind of events will force Finns to re-evaluate the ideas constituting the country’s foreign policy in the future. Certainly, there will be transformative periods akin to 1944–5, 1989 and 2014, which will change the standpoints of Finnish foreign and security policy. That said, it is probably prudent to refrain from further speculation. International politics has a tendency to surprise its observers. To paraphrase Mauno Koivisto’s words in Strasbourg in 1990, in the face of the unpredictability of international affairs, even the foremost experts on the subject regularly feel like amateurs (Koivisto 1995, 329).
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Original Publications
Suurvaltaempiristi pienvaltion johtajana: Mauno Koiviston ulkopiilittinen uskomusjärjestelmä

(A Great-Power Empiricist as a Small-State Leader: Mauno Koivisto’s Foreign Policy Belief System)

Matti Pesu

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Suurvaltaempiristi pienvaikutta: Mauno Koiviston ulkopoliittinen uskomusjärjestelmä

Matti Pesu


Avainsanat: Mauno Koivisto, operationaalisen koodin analyysi, Suomen ulkopoliittinen historia, uskomusjärjestelmät

Johdanto


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1 Tutkimus on tehty sekä Ulkopoliittikan tutkimuksen säätiön avokäsitellä tuella että Suomen akatemian Reimagining Futures in the European North at the End of the Cold War -hankkeen (SA268650) puitteissa ja tukemana.


Artikkelin aluksi pohdin lyhyesti uskomusten suhdetta ulkopolitiikan tekemiseen ja tarkastelen joitain Koiviston ulkopolitiikan keskeisiä piirteitä. Seuraavaksi hahmotan Koiviston uskomusjärjestelmää ja tuon esiin sen muutoutumiseen mahdollisesti vaikuttaneita tekijöitä. Lopussa vedän yhteen keskeisimmät huomiot sekä pohdin lyhyesti mahdollisia lisätutkimuksen aiheita.

Uskomukset ja ulkopolitiikka


Uskomukset voidaan yksinkertaistaa ymmärtää asioina, joita pidämme totena. Uskomusjärjestelmä puolestaan on, hierarkkisenakin pidetty, uskomusten joukko – operationa-
lisen koodin tapauksessa joukko uskomuksia kansainvälisten politiikan luonteesta ja siinä käytettyistä toimintatavoista. Uskomusjärjestelmän eräänäkin verkosto, jossa uskomukset liittyvät sisällöllisesti toisiinsa ja jossa ne ovat keskinäisessä vaikutussuhteessa. (Ks. Blum 1993; Larson 1994; Schafer & Walker 2006b, 29.)


[Uskomukset] toimivat prismana, joka vaikuttaa toimijan käsityksiin ja diagnooseihin poliittisten tapahtumien virrasta, hänen määritelmiinsä ja arvioihinsa tietyistä tilanteista. Nämä uskomukset myös tarjoavat normeja, standardeja ja ohjennuoria, jotka vaikuttavat toimijan strategian ja taktiikan valintaan, vaihtoehtoisten toimintatapojen rakentamiseen ja punnitsemiseen. Tämän kaltainen uskomusjärjestelmä vaikuttaa päätokekkäenteen monuut muuten ei determinoi sitä yksipuolistessa. Se on tärkeä mutta ei ainut muuttuja, joka muokkaa pää
tökekkäentyymistä.2


Systemaattisia tapoja uskomusten tutkimiseen on vähän. Artikkeliin nojaa uskomusten karttoittamisessa niin sanottuun operationaalisen koodin analyysiin, jonka tarkoituksena on havainnoida toimijan keskeisiä ja yleisiä uskomuksia politiikan luonteesta sekä toimintata

Operationaalisen koodin piirissä on tehty monenlaista tutkimusta, jonka kattava esittely ei tämän artikkelin puitteissa ole mahdollista. Viitekehyn avulla on esimerkiksi pyritty enn
nustamaan uuden johtajan ulkopoliittikaa (Dyson 2001), selittämään oppimista ja adapta

Operationaalisen koodin analyysin viitekehyn rungon muodostavat viisi poliittisen elämän luonnettu karttoittavaa "filosofista kysymystä" ja viisi toimintatapoja hahmottavaa

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2 Käännös kirjoittajan.
Suurvaltaempiristi pienvaltion johtajana


Taulukko 1. Operationaalisen koodin filosofiset ja instrumentaaliset kysymykset (George 1969, 201–216)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Filosofiset kysymykset (F)</th>
<th>Instrumentaaliset kysymykset (I)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Mitkä ovat mahdollisuudet poliittisten arvojen ja aspiraatioiden lopulliselle realisoinnille? Onko syytä olla optimistinen vai pessimistinen, ja jos on syytä jom-paankumpaan tai molempii, niin milloin.</td>
<td>2. Miten tavoitteita ajetaan mahdollisimman tehokkaasti?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mikä on &quot;sattuman&quot; rooli inhimillisessä toiminnassa ja suhteissa sekä historiallisessa kehityksessä?</td>
<td>5. Mikä on erilaisten keinojen hyöty ja rooli omien etujensa ajamisessa?</td>
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</table>


Operationaalisen koodin soveltaminen Koiviston ulkopoliitikan tutkimiseen


Myös laadullisen analysisin puitteissa on kuitenkin mahdollista tehdäjäsystemaattista tutkimusta, eikä laadullisen tutkimuksen vertailu muihin operationaalisen koodin tutkimuksiin ole mahdotonta (esim. McLellan 1971; Walker 1977; Dyson 2001). Laadullisen analysisen vahvuus on se, että uskomusten sisällön esintuominen auttaa ymmärtämään päätöksenteokijän ympäristön vaikutusta hänen uskomustensa syntyyn. Sisällön esintuomisella ja töimintaympäristön merkitysten tunnustamisella onkin tarkoitus vähentää psykologisiin ulko-
politiikan teorioihin usein liitettyä reduktionismin ongelmaa, jota VICS-metodin käyttö ja taipumuksiin keskittyminen ovat omiaan uusintamaan. Samalla on mahdollista edistää niin kutsutun ”ideationaalisen allianssin” tavoitteita. Allianssin päämäärit liittyvät ennen kaikkea konstruktivististen ja (sosiaali)psykologisten ulkopoliittien teorioiden vuoropuhelun edistämiseen; ideationaalisen allianssin nähkemys korostakaan, että analyysissä tulisi huomioida sekä sosiaaliset että kognitivis-psykologiset tekijät (Shannon 2011). Pyrin tähän tutkimukseni puitteissa.


Tukeuden operaatioalisen koodin tutkimusperinteen näkökulmasta tyyppiiseen sekä myös poikkeukselliseen aineistoon. Tavanomaisen tutkimusaineiston rungon muodostavat Koiviston presidenttiukauden aikaiset ulkopoliittiset puheet ja haastattelut mukaan lukien toimittajatapaamisista tehdyt transliiteroinnit. Tukevaa tutkimusaineistoa on nostettu Koiviston muistelmista, joissa on muun muassa katkelmia presidenttiukaisen aikaisista kirjeistä ja tapaamisista sekä niitä edeltävistä ja seuranneista lähteistä, joiden avulla osoitan uskomusjärjestelmän jatkuvuuden ja kehitettymin piirteitä. Aineistossani on siis monipuolista materiaalia aina suljettuisista tapaamisista julkisiin esintymisiin, joihin sisältyy sekä spontaneja että tarkemmin hoidotuja puheenvuoroja.

Primääraineistosta nousevien tuloksien tukena on Koivistoa tutkineiden ja hänen kanssaan työskennelleiden henkilöiden havaintoja. Ottamalla operaatioalisen koodin analyysin valtavirrasta poiketen mukaan toisen käden lähteitä tarkoitukseen on paikata verbaaliseen aineistoon liittyviä puutteita. Koivisto ei ollut kovin haluaks tuomaan ajatteluansa tai visioitaan julkisuuteen, ja hänen ”linjansa” on sanottu tulleen esiin enemminkin teoissa kuin puheissa (Kalela 1993, 240; 2015). Näitä tekoja kukaan tutkija ei ole lähetäisyysdeltä päässyt näkemään, ja siksi nojautuminen aikalaisten kommentteihin on perusteltua ja potentiaalisesti hedelmällistä.

Koiviston ulkopoliittiikka


Mikä on artikkelin panos Koiviston ulkopoliittikasta ja hänen ”linjastaan” käytyn laajempaan keskusteluun? Systemaattisella analyysillä voidaan joko haastaa tai entisestään vahvistaa olemassa olevia tulkintoja ja toisaalta luoda laajempaa kuvaa sekä ymmärrystä Koiviston ulkopoliittikasta ja sen taustatekijöistä. Verbaalisesta aineistosta voidaankin osoittaa niitä kansainvälisen politiikan piirteitä, jotka Koivisto näki olennaisena ja jotka ovat kenties jääneet vähemmälle huomiolle.


Emily O. Goldmanin ja Larry Bermanin (2000, 235) mukaan yleisin tapa määrittää ulkopoliittinen doktriini on nähä se ”joukkona sääntöjä, jotka määrittävät tarkemmin, miten erilaisia keinoja voidaan käyttää strategian palveluksessa ja jotka ohjaavat päätöksentekoa”. Analyysissä huomio kannattaa siis kiinnittää erityisesti välineellisiin uskomuksiin, joiden rakentumiseen filosofisilla uskomuksilla on tosin ollut vaikutus. Mikäli niitä ei löydy, voidaan argumentoida, kuten Kalela, että Koivisto ei halunnut tuoda esiin mitään yleispäteviä keinoja ulkopoliittisten tavoitteiden saavuttamiseksi, eikä hänellä täten varsinaisesti ollut oppia.

**Koiviston uskomusjärjestelmä**

seen perustunut Koiviston ajattelumailma on pysynyt vuosien saatossa johdonmukaisena. Koiviston uskomusten muuttumattomuuden voi nähdä kertovan siitä, että kylmän sodan loppuminen ei ollut hänelle niin sanotusti "kognitiivinen isku" (Adler 2005, 75) – äkillinen tapahtuma, joka olisi kyseenalaitanut aiemmatt uskomukset niiden kanssa ristiriidassa olevan toimintaympäristön todellisuuden kanssa. Tämä voi johtua siitä, että Koivistolle maantiede ja historiallinen kokemus näyttäytyvät varsin staattisina lähtökohtina, joiden pohjalta hän hahmotti Suomen asemaa maailmassa presidenttikautensa alusta loppuun asti (Koivisto ym. 1993).

**Uskomukset ulkopoliittisen luonteesta ja toimintatavoista**


**Filosofiset uskomukset**

**Politiittisen universumin ja vastapuolten luonteet (F1): suurvaltojen ylläpitämä harmonia.**


Koiviston näkemyksen mukaan suurvalat ylläpitävät kansainvälisen tason harmoniaa. Kun kylmän sodan suurvaltajännitteet alkoivat lientyä, Koivisto alkoi nähdä uusia matalam-


ajattelunsa jatkuvuutta. Se, mitä suurvaltakeskisyys kulloinkin tarkoittaa, ei Koiviston mu-kaan ole vakió. Joskus se tarkoittaa rieppotellua, mutta toisaalta joskus suurvalat ovat myös kuuntelevalla kannalla (Koivisto 2004).


Vuoden 2004 kirjassa Itsenäiseksi imperiumin kainalosta Koivisto apikoi historiaan vaikuttamista seuraavasti:


Instrumentaaliset uskomukset
Kuten jo todettu, Koivistolla näyttää olevan vähän instrumentaalipuolen uskomuksia. Vaikka hänellä on selkeä näkemys muiden toimijoiden muokkaamasta toimintaympäristöstä, verbaalisesta aineistosta ei juuri nouse huomioita, saati sääntöjä siitä, miten Suomen itse tulisi kansainvälisessä politiikassa toimia.

Instrumentaalipuolen uskomusten vähäisyys voidaan tulkit Paakko Kalelan (1993) tavoin: Koivisto on ennen kaikkea empiristi, joka ei oppirakennelmista juuri perusta. Hänen empirisminsä voi ymmärätä suurvaltakseen maailmankuvan kautta: pienen valtion on ennen kaikkea katsottava, mihin suurvaltapolitiikan palaset asettuvat, eikä sillä tätä voi olla...


että vaikka paino alkoi siirtyä jo toiselle jalalle, niin toinenkin jalka oli vielä tanakasti tukena [...] Koivisto kokeeli varovaisesti, onko jalan alla kovaa maata, ja jos oli, niin sitten pikkulihja paino alkoi siirtyä uuteen paikkaan”. Lehtilä myös painottaa, että varovaisuus ei johtunut niinkään päätöksenteossa olevien asioiden sisällöstä vaan prosesseista, joita Koivisto monelta kannalta pohti.


Suomi ja Koiviston uskomusjärjestelmän muotoutumien


Varsinkin Kekkoson aikana poliittiseen eliittiin pääsemisen edellyttys olisi kyseisen ulkopoliittisen katsantokannan omaksuminen (esim. Tarkka 2013), eikä Koivisto ollut tässä kohtaa poikkeus. Kognitiivisen dissonanssin teorian valossa voidaan olettaa, että tärkeässä asemassa toimiminen olisi ollut mahdotonta, jos toimijan uskomusjärjestelmä olisi ollut merkittävässä ristiriidassa vallitsevien kansallisten uskomusten kanssa. Neuvostoliittoa ei esimerkiksi nähty
ekspansiivisessa valossa vaan realismin linssien läpi suurvalta, jonka legitiimit intressit voi- 
daan tutustuttavais. Toisinaan sanon intersubjektiivisilla, jaetuilla uskomuksilla on vaikutuksensa idiosynkraattisiin, yksilöllisiin uskomuksiin.

Yllä kuvattua taustaa vasten ei ole yllättävä, että Koiviston uskomuksissa korostuu esi- 
merkiksi pienvalta–suurvalta–dikotomia, joka tuli esiin niin suurvaltaksiemysydessä kuin 
penseydessä doktriineja kohtaan. Koivistosta kirjoittaneet ovat korostaneet ennen kaikkea 
hänen oppineisuuttaan ja lukeneisuuttaan, minkä vaikutus tuli jo esiin hänen muuttuneessa 
, että hänen kokemukseensa sota-ajalta sekä lähejä suomalainen ulkopoliittinen käännö 
loivat vahvaa motivationaalista pohjaa omakseen vähemmän antagonistisissä uskomuksia 
survalloista, ennen kaikkea Venäjästä. Tämä on arvetenkin osaltaan vaikuttanut Koiviston näke- 
myksiin poliittiseen universumista.

Johtopäätökset

Yllä kuvattussa analyysissä Mauno Koivisto näyttäytyy toimijana, jolla oli varsin selkeä ja joh- 
donmukainen käsitys ulkoisesta toimintaympäristöstä mutta rajattu käsitys siitä, miten tässä 
ympäristössä olisi hyvä toimia. Ulkopoliittista ympäristöä, niin sen luonneen kuin Suomen 
seiniä, määräytyvät kehitysmalliksi on suurvalta. Koiviston omassa toimijude- 
sa puolestaan korostuu lähinnä empirismi, vaikka hänellä oli pyrkinyt valtavien ulkopoliittikin 
varsinaiseen harjoittamiseen. Kaiken kaikkiaan Koiviston uskomusjärjestelmää näyttää varsin 
ristiriidatromalta kokonaisuudelta, jossa filosofisilla uskomuksilla, erityisesti suurvaltaksiemys- 
ydellä, on dominoiva ja muita uskomuksia määrättävä rooli. Uskomusjärjestelmän analyysin 
pohjalta Koivistoa voikin kutsua tohtorina ”suurvaltaempiristiksi”.

Analyysi haastaa varsin yleistä käsitystä Koivistosta pessimistinä. Koivistoa voi luon- 
nehtia varovaiseksi optimistiksi, joka uskoi Suomen ulkopoliittikan rajattuihin vaikutusmah- 
dollisuuksiin. Koiviston doktriinillisuuksia on taas pulmaisempi kysymys. Yhtäältä hänellä oli 
kehittynyt näkemys riskien tai vastaanoton ja toiminnan ajoituksesta, mutta ulkopoliittikan harjoit- 
misen keinoista ja tehokkuusyksykyistä hän ei puhunut lainkaan. Vaikuttaakin siltä, että 
Koiviston doktriinillisuuksia oli niukka. Vaikka Koivisto ei täysin sulkeneen pois ajastusta, että 
pieniillä valtioilla voisi olla ulkopoliittisia doktriineja, hänen mielestäään edes isolla mailalla oli 
harvoin niihin varaa.

Artikkelia avaa useita jatkotutkimusmahdollisuuksia Suomen ulkopoliittikan tutkimukse- 
le, ja sitä voidaan pitää lakialaakin yksityiskohtaisesti Koivistoon keskeisellä ulkopoliittikan tutkimukselle. 
Tutkimustulokset voidaan ”operationaloida” toisessa, esimerkiksi tapausetutkimuksissa 
vyö pääkaupungin toiminnan ajoittamiseen liittyvien näkemys- 
en vaikutusta ulkopoliittiseen päättöivätentoon. Ne voivat myös toimia osana monitasoisem- 
pää Suomen ulkopoliittikan analyysiä, johon artikkelini puiteissa ei ollut mahdollista ryhtyä.

3 Kognitiivisen dissonanssin näkökulmasta yksilön on vaikea kestää ristiriidassa olevia uskomuksia ja usko- 
musten sekä toiminnan välitystä ristiriidaa. Tästä johtuen hän keksi syitä ja perusteluja toiminnalleen. Täten 


Lähteet


Arkistolähteet

Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja (ULA)

Matti Pesu


*Tasavallan presidentin kanslian arkisto*

TP:n ja päätoimittajien tapaaminen. 20.11.1984.
TP:n haastattelu Suomen Kuvalehdelle 3.1.1986.
Kun pienvaltiorealismin hegemonia murtui: suomalaiset ulkopoliittiset koulukunnat kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan alussa

(When the Hegemony of “Small-State Realism” Was Broken: Finnish Foreign Policy Schools of Thought at the Beginning of the Post-Cold War Era)

Matti Pesu

Politiikka 59 (4), 280–297

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When the hegemony of “small state realism” was broken: Finnish foreign policy schools of thought at the beginning of the post-Cold War era

The study examines Finnish foreign policy at the beginning of the post-Cold War era – more specifically in 1989–1997. It concentrates on the evolution of Finnish foreign policy thinking, and the work’s objective is to outline the Finnish foreign policy schools of thought of the period. In the article, schools of thought are understood as competing national identities, or more precisely, as alternative self-images, comprising of social purpose, status and worldviews. Throughout the Cold War, “small state realism” had been the dominant tradition in Finnish foreign policy, and Finland’s Cold War foreign affairs were built on the hegemony of the realistic school stressing the importance of history and geography as the fundamental conditions for Finnish national security. The end of the Cold War – with the collapse of Soviet Union – implied a transformation as regards to the conduct of Finnish foreign policy. The structural change meant more leeway for Finland in its foreign affairs. This resulted in the emergence of competing schools of thought. The study identifies altogether four different strands of thinking: small state realism, integrationism, Euro-Atlanticism, and globalism – which all left their mark on Finnish foreign policy at the immediate post-Cold War years, integrationism having been the strongest school.

Omakuva to koostuvat sosialisesta tärkeyksestä, statuksen ja maailmankuvasta. Sosiaalinen tärkeys viittaa pääasiassa valtion sisäisiin ominaispiiriin ja status maan ulkopoliittisen asemansa ja sen mukanaan tuomiin oikeuksiin ja vastuuasuihin. Maailmankuvat liittyvät tätä tapauksessa näkemyksiin esimerkiksi kansainvälisen politiikan luonteesta, ja ne ikään kuin pohjustavat näkemyksiä sosialisesta tärkeystä ja statussa.


Suomen ulkopoliittisen muutoksen myötä kylmän sodan loppu on ollut sosiaalinen muutos ja maailmankuvan muutokset. Suomen ulkopoliittinen ajattelun näkökulma on muuttunut myös ulkopoliittisen ajattelun kuinka aikakauden jaokulassa. Suomen ulkopoliittinen ajattelun näkökulma on muuttunut myös ulkopoliittisen ajattelun kuinka aikakauden jaokulassa.

Koulukunnat ulkopoliittisen tutkimuksessa


realistista näkemystä jälkimmäisen painoittaessa liberalismistä kumpuavan oikeusajattelun soveltamista myös kansainväliin suhteisiin. (Apunen 1984; Haukkala 2012; Penttilä 2006; Torvien 1966.)


Kuten johdannossa todettiin, koulukuntia ei ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksessa ole kuitenkaan juuri teoretisoitu. Artikkelissa koulukuntien teoriapohjaa lähdetään hakemaan kansallista identiteettiä käsittelevää konstruktivistista ulkopolitiikan tutkimusta ja koulukunnan sekä omakuvan käsitteen kytkemisestä yhteen. Ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksen näkökulmasta koulukuntien mielekkyyttä keskitetään piilee siinä, että niiden avulla kyetään tiivistämään valtioiden ulkopoliittisessa diskurssissa olevia erilaisia näkemyksiä ideaalityyppiseksi linjavaihtoehdoiksi. Artikkelin ilmeisesti kasvattaneet koulukuntien sekä muutenkin yhteisön luonteestaan t précisien tapauksessa yhtä luonnonjakoista ja samalla yhtä koulukuntaa. jetsape 

Omakuvat kilpailevina koulukuntina


Käytännössä Clunanim omakuvat ovat ajatuksellista avataan hyvin lähellä sitä, mitä muissa tutkimuksissa on ymmärretty koulukunnan. Clunan näkemyksen avulla tähän mennessä varsin ei-teoretiseen koulukuntakeskusteluun on mahdollista tuoda teoretista jämäkkyyttä. Tätä avattaa erityisesti se, että Clunan on monista identiteettinäkemyksistä poiketen avannut omakuvien eli kilpailevien identiteettien sisältöä – avaus, jota kansainvälisten politiikan tutkimuksessa yhteiskuntatieteissä laajemminkin on vaadittu (Abdelal ym. 2006; Lebow 2008).

dummin sen kansalaisten ja eliitien, itsyymmärrys toisiin sanoen rakentaa sen intressejä (Weldes 1996). Konstruktivismi katsoo, että valtioiden etunäkökohdat eivät siis ole objektiivisia vaan sosiaalisesti rakentuneita.


Status taasen viittaa valtion (kuvitettuun) asemaan jossakin monista kansainvälisten suhteiden hierarkioiden. Status käsittää valtiolle sopivasta poliittisesta ja taloudellisesta hallinnosta. Sosiaalinen tarkoitus ohjaa pitkälti siitä, keiden valtio toimijoista kanssa kansakunta haluaa tulla identifioituksi, mikä taasen vaikuttaa muun muassa valtiojen välisen yhteistyön syyteen. Sosiaalipsykologisin termiin soveltuessaan tarkoituksessa useita isäntä-, sosiaalista ja ulkoryhmät.

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Clunanin sinänsä pätevää identiteettinäkemystä on kuitenkin syytä täydentää. Omakuviin voi statuskäsityksen ja sosiaalisen tarkoituksen ohella liittyä myös kognitiivisia malleja, kuten maailmankatselmia. Maailmankuvalliset eroja ja ne ovat hyvin läheisessä yhteydessä kahteen muuhun maailmankuvalliseen tekijään.


Kun pienvaltiorealismin hegemonia murtui:
suomalaiset ulkopolitiittiset koulukunnat kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan alussa

noen omaksuu Haukkalan ja Vaahtorannan kolmi-jan, mutta argumentoi, että kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan alussa Suomessa oli myös neljäs koulukunta eli "eurorealistia" linjaa edustanut integrationismi.


Integrationistit

Integrationistinen koulukunta oli kilpailevista omakuvista voimakkain. Sen piiriin kuului suomalaisia ulkopolitiittista ajattelunmaista sekä muun muassa merkittäviä tutkijoita. Monella integrationistilla oli sosialidemo-

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ollut syntynyt vielä vakaata järjestelmää, mistä Jugoslavian krisi oli osoitukseksi. Toisaalta liennyksen vuosina syntynyt yhteistyöpohjainen järjestys – toisin sanoen Etyk – ja EU näyttäytyivät vakautta tukevina tekijöinä, joiden ympärille Euroopan politiinen tulevaisuus rakentui. (Lipponen 2001, 128.)


Myös Paavo Lipponen toi hyvin selkeästi esiin mielipiteensä EY-jäsenyyden ja puolueetottomuuden suhteesta. Vuonna 1993 hän linjasi, että

Suomi ei hae erityisasemaa yhteisön jäsenenä. Puolueetottomuuden uusi muotoilu tarkoittaa yksinkertaisesti, että Suomi pyrkii ylläpitämään yhteisön jäsenistä tanssia. (Lipponen 2001, 128.)


Naapuruus ei integrationistien ajattelussa tosin enää ollut niin vahva statustekijä, mitä se oli ollut kylmän sodan aikana, mutta toisaalta uudelleenarviointia maantieteen merkityskestä ei kuitenkaan tapahtunut. Kansainvälisen politiikan professori Raimo Väyrynen (1991, 37–38) esimerkiksi totesi, että

Suomen maantieteellisellä asemalla on huonnollisesti edelleen merkitystä, mutta markkinoiden ja teknologian korostuessa geopolitiikan suhteellinen vaikutus vähenee. Suomen ja Venäjän suhteissa tarvitaan jatkossakin molempien osapuolien edut huomioivaa turvallisuuspolitiikkaa takuujärjestelyä.

Entinen pitkäaikainen pää- ja ulkoministeri Kallev Sorsa (1992, 206) taas korosti, että

on selvää, että Suomen on haettava suureen raja-naapurinsa kanssa turvallisuuspolitiikkaa käsittelevältä, järjestettävällä taloudellisella ja kulttuurisella suhteella, joka sopii uuteen Eurooppaan, mutta tulkitse samalla aidosti molempien kansojen pysyviä intressejä.

Integrationistien piirissä katsottiin, että idän-politiikan harjoittaminen olisi mahdollista Euroopan unionin jäsenenäkin. Esko Antola muun muassa arvion, että Suomi ei voisi Euroopan unionin jäsenenä osallistua mahdollisiin Venäjän vastaisiin pakotetuihin (Helsingin Sanomat 21.5.1994).

Integrationistit myös katsoivat, että Suomi toteuttaa sosiaalista tarkoituksensa, länsieurooppalaista demokratiaa, parhaiten aktiivisella sitoutumisella ja osallistumisella Euroopan integraatioon, toisin kuin pienvaltiorealistit, jotka integraatioon osallistuminen merkitsi lähinnä Suomen omallemaisuuden rapautumista. Pankinjohtaja ja entinen suurlähettiläis Jaakko Iloniemi (1992, 40–41) esimerkiksi korosti, että

[k]ansallisen identiteetin turvaaminen ja suomalaisuudesta kiinni pitäminen on meille keskeinen tehtävä. Suomalaiseen identiteettiin kuuluu se, että olemme osa euroopalaista kulttuuriperintöä ja ennen muuta sen pohjoismaista haaraa. Siähensä liittyy kansanvaltainen järjestelmämme, oikeusjärjestyksemme, yhteiskunnallisen solidaarisuuden tunnustuksemme. (Pienvaltiorealistit)

Integrationistinen koulukunta painotti, että muutetunesta kansainvälispolitiikasta tulee huoli, että Suomen tuli yhä pitäytyä perinteisellä Paasil-Kekkoslin linjalla. Tätä he edustivat näkemyksissään pitkää historiallista jatkumoa. Koulukunnan edustajat pääasiallisesti vastustivat Suomen jäsenyyttä Euroopan unionissa ja painottivat puolueetottomuuden merkitystä myös uudella aikakaudella. EU-jäsenyyden varmistuttua pienvaltiorealistit tuivat Suomen pitäytymistä sotilasliittoastojen ulkopuo-
Kun pienviitalealismen hegemonia murtui: suomalaiset ulkopoliittiset koulukunnat kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan alussa


voimapolitiikan jatkuminen uusine blokkiutumisineen ja suurvaltakilpailuineen on kaikkea muuta kuin poissuljettuja mahdollisuuksa [...] Geopolitikosta Eurooppa on palannut vanhaan normaalilaitteeseensa, jossa Saksa on keskusvalta, lännessä ovat suurvaltoja Englanti ja Ranska sekä idässä Venäjä.


Lisäksi Korhonen (1994, 29) näki, että

suhteet, jotka Saksan johtama Euroopan unioni [sic] kehittelee Venäjän ja koko itäisen Keski-Euroopan kanssa, tulevat jälleen maantieteeseen ja geopolitiikan vääjäämätömyydyllä määrätelemään Suomen aseman Euroopan suurpolitiikan asetelmassa.

Ulkoministerinä vielä vuonna 1992 toiminut Paa


Maailmankuvallisesti pienviitalealistat edustivat valtiokeskeistä geopolitiikasta, jonka lähtökohti oli Suomen maantieteellinen asema. He eivät näe eurooppalaisessa turvallisuusjärjestyksessä suurta laadullista muutosta, eivätkä he antaneet paljoa painoarvoa institutionaalislle järjestyylellä, kuten Euroopan yhteisölle/unionille. Pikemminkin he oustelivat paluuta perinteiseen eurooppalaiseen suurvaltopoliittikseen. Kansainvälinen politiikka näytti heille varsin muuttumattomalta ja jopa staattiselta.


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Matti Pesu

oli järkähtämätön sen suhteen, että Suomen on maantieteellisestä asemastaan johtuen pitäydyttävä puolueettomuudessa:

Suomen historian ja maantieen antama ehdoton ohje on, että meidän on pysyttäytyminen Keski-Euroopan suurvaltain ja Venäjän välisen mahdollisen selkkauksen ulkopuolella. Tämä on Suomen puolueettomuuspolitiikan ydin ja todellisin sisältö. Me kielitäydymme ottamasta ristiriitatiinteessä kieltä ja silti melua poliittisesti, sotilaallisesti ja taloudellisesti, kun selkkuas on syntynyt. Emme tietysti muutenkaan sekaannu kansainvälisissä ristiriitoihin, sattuivat pa ne missä tahansa maailmalla.

(Korhonen 1994, 29.)


Euroatlantikot

alkoi hiljalleen siirtyä entistä vahvemmin euroatlantisiselle linjalle, vaikkei sotilaallista liittoutumista vielä kannattanutkaan.

Euroatlantikot olivat maailmankuuvallisesti lähevällä integrationistien eurorealismia, mutta heidän voimapolitiikkapainotuksensa oli aiavuoksuksen vahvempaa, eikä heidän realisminsa ollut geopolitiissä sävytteistä ja determinististä vaan pikemminkin klassista voimasuhteita luoreva realismia. Integrationismin tavoin koulukunnan sisällä painotukset instituutio- ja voimapolitiikka-korostusten välillä vaihtelivat.

Suomalaisen ulkopolitiikan harmaa eminen Max Jakobson (1991; 1992) muun muassa näki, että Euroopassa on tapahtunut turvallisuuspolitiikassa laadullinen muutos, jossa yksilön ja arvojen merkitys on entistä korostuneempi. Hän lisäksi näki uuden tilanteen kahden erilaisen järjestelmän kamppailuna:

Eurooppa elää kahden turvallisuusjärjestelmän välimaastossa. Vanha järjestelmä nojasi vastakkaisten liittoutumien sotilaillisten voimien tasapainoon. Uusi perustuu yhteisiä arvoja edustavien valtioiden yhteistoimintaan. (Jakobson 1994.)

Suomen Kuvalehdessä ahkeraan kolumnoinut valtiotieteen tohtori Jukka Tarkka (1993) taas arvioi, että uusi eurooppalainen turvallisuusjärjestelmä on kylmän sodan maailmaa loogisempi:


Suomen Kuvalehden toimittaja Markku Salomaa (1996a) katsoi, että Natolla on keskeinen rooli uusnationalisin patoamisessa ja että jakamaaton turvallisuus vaatii valtioiden toisilleen antamia turvallisuustakuja.


Suomen osallistuminen lähitason yhteistyöhön tulee aina herättämään myönteisiä ja strategisia epäilyjä Venäjän johdosta. Suomelle on tulee tänäkin aikana voittaa Venäjän suurvaltaiseksi johdosta. (Salomaa 1994, 72.)


Suomi on osottanut konkreettisella toiminnalla ja poliittisilla signaaleilla, että se puolustautuu aina, jos sen äärimmäisiä etuja loukataan ... Tämä on lähitulevaisuuden turvallisuuspolitiikka perusta. Olemme länsimaisesti ajatteleva ja toimiva eurooppalainen kansa.

Max Jakobson (1993) oli taas huolissaan, että jos Suomi päätyisi Euroopan integraation ulkopuolelle, sen kohtalona olisi jäädä Itä-Euroopan maiden rinnalle ”jäännöserään”. Vuonna 1997 hän totesi, että


Salomaa (1996b, 4) taas näki integraatiokysymyksessä isot panokset: Suomen oli päätettävä, halusiko se kuulua aidosti länteen vai jäädä Venäjän etupiiriksi.

Globalistit

Globalismi oli koulukunnista selkeästi idealistisin ja normatiivisin. Koulukunnan edustajat näkivät kansainvälisissä suhteissa tapahtuneen merkittävän laadullisen muutoksen, jonka myötä uudet turvallisuusuhkat ja -kysymykset pitkälti korvasivat vanhat voimapolitiikat yhä enemmän. Suomen statusta tarkasteltiin moraalirivistä, ja poliittiselta tarkoitukseltansa huolimatta hänen puheensa siirtyivät eurooppalaiseen ulkopolitiikkaan. (Blomberg 2008.)

Globalisteina voidaan pitää esimerkkejä Erkki Tuomiojaa, Tarja Halostaa, Perti Joenniemen, Jyrki Kääköstä, Pekka Haavistoa ja Heikki Patomäkeä. Koulukunnan historia ulottuu jo kylän sodan aikaan, jolloin sen edusta-


ei käy päinsä, että Suomi viestii ulkopoliitikallaan tukevansa yhteistyövaraisia Eurooppaa ja pitävänä ovat [sic] auki kaikille normit täyttäville toimijoille, mutta lähetttää puolustussektorilla täsmälleen päinvastaisia eristäviä ja jyrkkää rajoja piirtäviä peloteviestejä.


Kouluksen ja Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan linjan rakentuminen kylmän sodan loputtua


Venäjä

Kylmän sodan lopun jälkeenkin Suomen politiikassaka näkyi edelleen tietyt kunnioitukset Venäjän intressejä kohtaan, ja Suomi pitii tärkeänä Venäjän sitomista muotoutuvan eurooppalaiseen turvallisuusjärjes-}


Puolustuspolitiikka

Niin pienvaltiorealistit, integrationistit kuin euroatlantikotkin arvioivat, että voimapoliittika ja sotilaallisen voiman käyttö olivat yhä edelleen osa kansainvälistä politiikkaa. Tämä maailmankuva heijastui puolustuspolitiikan jatkuvuudessa kylmästä sodasta kylmän sodan jälkeiseen aikaan.

Suomi nimittäin päätti pitäytyä edelleen perinteisessä aluepuolustusjärjestelmässä, niin kutsutulla ”konservatiivisella polulla”. Euroopassa katsoitiin edelleen olevan potentiaalia sotilaallisten uhkien nousulle. Edes Itämeren alueen rauhanomaisesta kehityksestä ei voitu olla varmoja. Muun muassa
Venäjän epävarma demokratiakehitys ja Leningradin sekä Muurmanskin alueiden edelleen säilynyt sotilaallinen merkitys nähtiin epävarmuutu luovina tekiinä, joihin pelotepuolustuksen ylläpitämisellä oli mahdollista varautua. Puolustuksen mitoittamiin vaikuttavat uhkamallit, kuten laaja-alaisen hyökkäykseen mahdollisuuksin, pysyivät pitkälti samoina. Huomionarvoista oli se, että konservatiivisessa puolustuspolitiikassa pitäytymisellä oli lähes koko puoluekentän tuki, ja sotarääläniä tuli lähinnä globalistien piiristä. Suomen puolustuspolitiittista linjaa ei siis käytännössä kyseenalaitettu aikakauden muuttumisesta huolimatta, mikä on vahva todistus voimapolitiikkaa korostaneiden maailmankuvien jatkumisesta. (Pesu 2017.)

**Nato ja Yhdysvallat**


Suomen ilmapuolustuksen ja sen suunnittelun

**Laajan turvallisuuden legitimaatio ja globalipolitiikka**

Globalistien korostukset näkyvät ennen kaikkea laajan turvallisuuden legitimoinnissa osaksi Suomen kylmän sodan jälkeistä turvallisuuspolitiikkaa. Sotilaallisten uhkien ohella Suomessa alettiin yhä suuremmassa määrin kiinnittää huomiota uhuun laajalle laajennukselle hyökkäyksiin, jotka liittävät muun muassa inhimilliseen turvallisuuteen, ympäristöön ja kansainväliseen rikollisuuteen. (Suomen Kuvalehti 20.10.1995, 17.)

Globalismin asema Suomen ulkopolitiikassa vahvistui vuosituhannen loppuun mennessä, ja vahvimillaan sen voidaan sanoa olleen vasta 2000-luvun alkupuolella, missä globalistinen turvallisuuspoliitiikka selkeästi päihitti realismin traditionaalisemmat uhkakuvat. (Haukkala ja Vaahtoranta 2016.)

**Johtopäätökset**

Konstruktivistisen ulkopoliitikan tutkimuksen keskeisin teesi on se, että valtioiden ulkopoliitiikkia ei perustu pelkään rationaaliseen päätöksenteokoon ja laskelmaniin, vaan että päätöksenteon taustalla yhteistoimintakyky. Rauhankumppanuus antoi myös mahdollisuuden tarkastella Naton ja Venäjän sekä entistä sosialistimaiden suhdekehitystä. (Karvinen ja Puistola 2015, 78.) Jo tuolloin länsimielinen puolustusministeriö oli ajamassa kumppanuutta, johon osallistumista vastutettiin niin piennäkseenko heidän ehdotuksille, kuin globalistittemiin piirissä. Muun muassa Paavo Väyrynen ja vihreät vaikuttivat vastustavat kumppanuuteen osallistumista. (Pesu 2017.)
vaikuttaa koko joukkou ehdollistavia tekijöitä nor-
meista aina uskomuksiin nykyhetkestä ja historiasta.
Suomen ulkopoliittisessa näitä tekijöitä ovat liittyneet
muut muassa siihen, mitä Venäjän naapuruus Suo-
melle tarkoittaa ja minkälainen ulkopoliittika on
sopivaa pienen valtiolle. Sopivuusvarkannat ovat
olleet ajamassa Suomen ulkopoliittikka – aikakau-
sista riippuen – erilaisiin suuntiin.

Tämä artikkelin paneutui suomalaiseen ulkopoliit-
tiseen keskusteluun kylmän sodan lopulla ja sen
jälkeisen ajan alussa tavoitteenaan identifioida näitä
tekijöitä. Erityisesti se halusi löytää kilpailevia näke-
myksiä Suomen kansainvälisestä asemasta ja ulko-
poliittisista linjoista. Kilpailevat näkemykset ymmär-
rettii erilaisina koulukuntina. Artikkelin teoreetti-
nen panos liittyi nimenomaan koulukuntakäsitteen
teoriapohjaan vankistamiseen. Koulukuntat voidaan
kin nähdä valtion ulkopoliittisessa keskustelussa
kilpailevina omakelpotina, jotka perustuvat tietysty
maailmankuvaan ja johon sisältyy näkemyksiä val-
tion sosiaalisesta tarkoituksesta ja statusasemasta.

Artikkelin hahmottaa neljä eri koulukuntaa: integ-
rationismin, pienvaltiorealismin, euroatlantismin
ja globalismin. Sekä integrationismin ja euroatlantis-
min maailmankuvissa elivät rinnakkain realismi ja
institutionalismi. Jälkimmäisen valtasuhteita lukeva
realismi poikkeaa integrationismin liittymestä geo-
poliittisesta realismista, joka taas oli pienvaltioreal-
ismin valitseva maailmankatsomus. Globalismin
normatiivis-liberaalinen, realismin ulossulkulkea maa-
ilmanka vuoksi kolmen muun koulukunnan
maailmankuvista selkeästi.

Statuksen osalta pienvaltiorealistit korostivat Ve-
näjän suurvaltastatuskasta Suomelle aiheuttavat te-
kjöitä ja puolueettomuutta. Integrationismin hyväk-
sy suurvaltastatuskusta ja sen Suomelle aset-
tamat reunahdot, mutta kannatti Suomen jäsenystä
-va EU:ssä ja puolueetomuudesta luopumista. Euro-
atlantikot katsoivat, että Venäjän naapuruu ei vai-
kuta Suomen valintoihin ja että Suomen on hylättä-
vä puolueettomuus ja vahvistettava asemaansa län-
simaana. Globalismin halusi taas Suomen korottavan
statusaan moraalisena toimijana.

Suomen sosiaalisesta tarkoituksesta ei kylmän
sodan lopussa väännetty paljoakaan peistä. Uusi
aikakausi tarkotti lähinnä kansainvälisten toimin-
taympäristön muutosta. Pienvaalistoristit näkivät
Suomen mielellään omallemaisen ja pohjoismeise-
na toimijana. Integrationistit korostivat Suomen
demokratian eurooppalaisuutta euroatlantikkojen
painottessa Suomen yhteiskuntajärjestelmän länsi-
mainuaisuutta. Globalistille Suomi oli taasen ihmisoi-
keuksia kunnioittava ja kansalaisyhteiskuntakeskei-
nen demokratia.

Integrationistien ajatukset ilmenivät Suomen ul-
kopoliittisissa linjavalinnoissa kaikkein vahvinmin.
Suomi liittyi Euroopan unioniin mutta pitäytyi liit-
toutumattomuudessa korostaen maantiedettä ja
Venäjän erityisasemaa Suomen ulkosuhteissa. Vo-
imapolitiikan todellisuuden tunnustaneet integrati-
onistit, pienvaltiorealistit samoin kuin euroatlantikot
halusivat Suomen pitäytyvän vahvassa kansallisessa
puolustuksessa niin kuin tapahtuikin. Euroatlantis-
min painotukset näkyivät taas Nato-yhteistyön al-
kamisessa. Globalistit onnistuivat taas ajamaan laa-
- jaa turvallisuuskäsitystä osaksi turvallisuuspolitiikka.

Koska kyseinen tutkimus rajattiin kylmän sodan
jälkeisen ajan alkuunsa, koulukuntien kehitys
1990-luvun puoliväliä tähän päivään asti on vielä
dokumentoinnalla. Kehitystä olisi syytä tutkia. Mie-
lenkiintoiseksi tämän tekee se, että Haukkala ja Vaah-
toranta näkevät Suomessa olevan tällä hetkellä vähän
kolmeen puolueettomista koulukuntat, joista pienvalti-
orealismi on tällä hetkellä heidän mukaansa laskus-
sa. Suomen ulkopoliittikkaan tutkimuksen olisi syytä
paneutua siihan, mistä tämä kehitys johtuu ja mitkä
ovat olleet sen ajurit.

Haukkalan ja Vaahtorannan kolmeen ideaalityyp-
piin perustuva näkemys voi hyvin kattaa suoma-
laiset ulkopoliittiset näkemykset riittävällä tavalla.
Maan toimintaympäristö ja eurooppalaiset instituu-
tiot ovat vakiintuneet, mikä on mahdollisesti tar-
koittanut sitä, että ”integrationismi” on hiljalleen
kiihtynyt pois yleisyydessä. Yhtäläitä pienvaalistorismi ja integ-
rationistien eurorealismi ovat näkemyksissään vai-
nee yhtä EU:n jäsenyyden tultua Suomen ulko-
- ja turvallisuuspolitiikkaa. Toisaalta Nato-
ja Yhdysvaltojen yhteistyön vakiinnuttua niistä on
tullut normaalit ja hyväksytty osa Suomen ulko-
- ja turvallisuuspolitiikkaa. Euroatlantismin saattaa täten
riittävällä tavalla kattaa suomalaisen liberaalin ulko-
poliittikan perinteet. Globalismin taas on säilynyt
tunnistettavissa koulukuntana 2010-luvun mail-
maan, vaikka globaaliagendaan ja samalla globalismin
merkitys Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikassa
jaanakkin väliaikaisesti laskenut. Voinpolitiikka
kei tukekin paluun.
KIIOTOKSET

Tutkimus on tehty Suomen akatemian Reimagining the Futures in the European North at the End of the Cold War -hankkeen (SA2501268650) puitteissa ja mahdollistamana sekä Ulkopoliitikan tutkimuksen säätiö sekä Reimagining the Futures in the European North at the End of the Cold War -hankkeen semi-näteä kommentoineita sekä Politiikka-lehden kahta anniversary sekä vertaisarvioijaa.

LÄHTEET


The Role of Public Opinion in Finnish Foreign and Security Policy

Tuomas Forsberg & Matti Pesu


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CHAPTER 6
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
IN FINLAND’S FOREIGN
AND SECURITY POLICY

Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu

Introduction

When Mauno Koivisto, the President of Finland from 1981 to 1994, published a book about the “Russian national idea” after his retirement, he was asked about the “national idea” of Finland. His answer, “to survive,” reflected his internalized realist wisdom that in a system led and shaped by great powers, small states are often at risk of losing their independence or sovereignty. In such an insecure world, leaders of democratic states have to constantly steer the course between Scylla and Charybdis: on the one hand they need to make decisions that they feel are necessary for national survival, even though such decisions may not be popular among the public; on the other hand, they may act in accordance with public opinion but risk the country’s international position. President Koivisto felt that dilemma very strongly when the Baltic States were looking for assistance from abroad in their struggle for independence at the end of the Cold War.

According to Koivisto, Russia’s national idea is “greatness”. See Koivisto, Mauno, *Venäjän idea* (Helsinki: Tammi, 2001), 85–100.
The Finnish Presidents before and after Koivisto have faced the same dilemma but coped with it differently. The role of public opinion was particularly precarious during the Cold War when unanimity as regards the foreign policy line was considered *de rigueur* — both among the elite and public. For the public, the situation was contradictory. On the one hand it had to support friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but on the other hand it had to be ready to fight for its country if the worst had come true.

In this text, we argue that the role of public opinion in relation to foreign and security policy has varied in Finland during its hundred years of independence gained in 1917. From the independence of Finland to the early post-World War II years, the conduct of foreign and security policy and public opinion were not related at all, and foreign policy was an area of public opinion that existed on a somewhat autonomous level. The wartime in itself was exceptional because the moral of the people was crucial in terms of the overall war effort and it generated the basis for the second phase, starting in the 1960s, when the decision makers actively shaped public opinion. This top-down model lasted until the end of the Cold War, when it was replaced by a bottom-up model where public opinion more clearly steered foreign policy decision making. This bottom-up model has been evident both in the Finnish accession to the European Union (EU) after a referendum and in staying militarily non-aligned.

In this article we substantiate and illustrate this historical evolution of the role of public opinion in foreign policy in Finland in light of these three models (the autonomous model, top-down model and bottom-up model) by referring to relevant public opinion data, memoirs and historical research. Furthermore, we tie our argument about the historical evolution of the role of public opinion to earlier research done on the issue within the discipline of International Relations. We claim that different factors such as elite belief systems and the perceived threat

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The Role of Public Opinion in Finland’s Foreign and Security Policy

Foreign Policy and Public Opinion Disconnected — Interwar and Early Cold War Years

The early years of independence

It is commonplace to argue that Finland became a political entity under the rule of the Russian Empire as the rather autonomous Grand Duchy. Although Finland did not have a foreign policy of its own, its position and relations to the outside world were pondered and debated. The Grand Duchy had its own interest particularly in foreign trade, but in security issues its fate was intertwined with the undertakings of the Russian Empire. For example, during the Crimean War, the British and French navies bombed Suomenlinna, a fortress on an island just outside Helsinki. Finns also discussed different strategies for coping with the Russian emperor, and the positions introduced during the Grand Duchy era laid the groundwork for Finnish foreign policy after it gained independence.

Public opinion, conceived as the opinion of the press, played a role in these discussions, since the nation-builders at the time, with the Fennoman statesman and Hegelian philosopher Johan Vilhelm Snellman at the forefront, feared that if foreign countries regarded the Finnish people as being disloyal to the Czar and yearning to be back as part of Sweden, then the likelihood of foreign intervention would increase. This would be a catastrophe to Finland.

Finland became a democratic country before it gained its independence, when in 1906 a State Electoral Law guaranteeing all citizens, including women, a universal and equal right to vote was enacted. The 1919 constitution, adopted a year after the declaration of independence, stipulated that the President is the leader of foreign policy. The de facto presidential powers in foreign policy are still significant. In the constitution, which came into effect in March 2000, it stands: “The foreign policy of Finland is directed by the President of the Republic in cooperation with the Government”. The current President Sauli Niinistö has been active as regards foreign policy, and the established practice is that the President especially takes care of bilateral relations with the non-EU countries. See The Constitution of Finland <https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf>.
situation was, however, not that simple. In fact, it was the foreign minister who mainly took care of key foreign policy decisions until World War II, because the first four Finnish Presidents did not exhibit a keen interest in foreign affairs.

After the Civil War of 1918, Finnish society remained divided. Communists were excluded from Finnish politics, and the non-socialist winners eventually diverged. The Agrarian league promoted republicanism, but the Right advocated monarchism. Domestic power battles and the rift between different lines of foreign policy were closely intertwined. Especially for Finnish rightist movements, Russophobia was an integral part of their identity project, and they considered Finland and Russia as archenemies. As stated by Vilho Harle and Sami Moisio, they were rather successful in their efforts, since the image of the Russian threat was overarching in Finnish society, and the menace was one of the main themes in Finnish political life in the 1920s and 1930s. Yet, such a narrative is too simplistic: The image of the Soviet Union among the Finnish political left in the 1930s was affected by Stalin’s purges that hit the Finnish speaking socialist elite in Soviet Karelia hard. Moreover, enemy image propaganda was not overwhelming: for example, textbooks in the 1930s described Russians as glad and musical people, though lacking self-confidence.

During the inter-war period, Soviet Russia was perceived as an existential threat, and various policies were adopted to counter that. In its foreign policy, Finland first tried to lean on Germany: the government had already accepted a German intervention to the Civil War of 1918, and it even elected a German King, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse. The German orientation, however, came to an end when Germany lost World War I, and the allied powers refused to recognize Finland’s independence if it aligned itself with Germany.

At the beginning of the 1920s, the Finnish government chose to gang up with the other new eastern “rimstates”, Poland and the Baltic States. The policy was advocated especially by foreign minister Rudolf Holsti, but it was buried because Poland’s foreign policy was regarded as too adventurous and therefore risky in the aftermath of the Russo-Polish war.

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4 Vilho Harle & Sami Moisio, Missä on Suomi? Kansallisen identiteetipolitiikan historia ja geopolitiikka (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2000), 83.
of 1920. The “rimstate policy” was followed by a more abstract orientation towards the League of Nations, but in fact Finland tried to boost its relations with the leading European powers in the organization, England and France. When the League of Nations started to appear weak in mid-1930s with the rise of Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, which challenged the international security order, Finland adopted yet another new foreign policy orientation and tried to approach the Nordic countries, Sweden, in particular.

Finnish historian Juhani Paasivirta summed up the history of Finnish interwar foreign policy, by stating that a distinctive feature of Finnish foreign policy in the early years of independence in the 1920s and 1930s, was legalism. Faith in justice’s prevalence was also high with regard to international politics. At first, the elite was not familiar with the rules of great power politics, and for many the main point of reference was domestic policy. Over time, the field became fairly scattered in terms of foreign policy sympathies, and it became important to identify and discuss foreign policy orientations. The elite opinions were split in this regard. The radical elements of the society leaned either to the Soviet Union or to Nazi Germany. The Liberals were mostly anglophile, while the Agrarian League and Social Democrats preferred close cooperation with the Nordic Countries. The Conservatives had a hard time finding a direction after the Nazis took power in Germany, but they eventually grew more sympathetic to the Nordic orientation and the idea of closer cooperation with Sweden. The motives for the Nordic orientation stemmed partly from affinity, but pure realist logic drove the rapprochement with Sweden by the previously anti-Swedish Conservative Party.

In short, essential to these changes of Finland’s foreign policy orientation in the inter-war period was that none was based on the support, let alone, pressure of public opinion. Of course, during that time no public opinion polls were conducted, but public opinion was mainly equated with the opinions of the leading press and interest groups. The reason for the missing link between foreign policy and public opinion was that there was little common ground between the political sentiments of the elites, and their standpoints were ideological or based on feelings of sympathy.

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5Paasivirta 1968, 69–70; 100–107.
Moreover, in the 1920s, public opinion was partly indifferent to foreign policy due to the rather peaceful situation that prevailed in Europe as well as the precarious domestic situation in the Civil War’s aftermath. In the 1930s, this fact changed, and cooperation with Sweden gained in popular acceptance.

**The war time**

The key foreign policy decisions made during World War II were not based on public opinion either, although state leadership was interested in public sentiments and developed means to monitor and control it. Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, Chief of Defense of the Finnish Defense Forces during the war and President of Finland from 1944 to 1946, acknowledged that in a democracy public opinion sets some limits to the leadership even at times of war. Nevertheless, the decision to ally informally with Nazi-Germany against the Soviet Union in 1941 was made by a very small circle. Germany was not the favorite ally because it had de facto backed the Soviet Union during the Winter War, and aversion towards Nazism was widespread. However, it was seen as the lesser of two evils by the elite. Additionally, there were those in the background who still sympathized with Germany and remembered how it had helped Finland in 1918.

Even more crucially, the decision to conclude the peace with the Soviet Union and rebuild friendly relations with the former enemy was not supported by the vast masses. The people had been affected by the war propaganda, and public perceptions of the Soviet Union did not match reality. It was, therefore, not easy for leadership to popularly justify a U-turn in foreign policy. In 1948, when Finland concluded a treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union no opinion polls were yet carried out, but the message from the press and parliamentary groups was clear: people were either reserved or pessimistic towards the FCMA agreement. The policy change in relations

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with the Soviet Union has been described as a move from emotionalism to cool-headed rationalism, where an unsentimental pursuit of national interest prevailed, leaving no room for popular outbursts.\footnote{Browning 2008, 169–175.}

Public opinion did not matter in foreign policy decision making in those years because the leaders believed that it should not. In fact, the post-war leaders of Finland were not too convinced of the intellectual abilities of the Finnish nation. Juho Kusti Paasikivi, the President of the Republic of Finland from 1946 to 1956, wrote in his diary in 1944 that Finns are not particularly gifted people.\footnote{Paasikivi’s diary entry on September 2, 1944. See Yrjö Blomstedt & Matti Klinge (eds), \textit{Paasikiven päiväkirjat 1944–1956 1} (Helsinki: WSOY, 1985), 28.} One of his famous quotes is, “the sense of political realism is not the strongest trait of the Finnish people”.\footnote{See e.g. Osmo Apunen, \textit{Paasikiven–Kekkosen linja} (Helsinki: Tammi, 1977), 24.} He believed that Finns should be educated about the realities of foreign policy and international relations.\footnote{Tuomo Polvinen, \textit{J.K. Paasikivi, Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 4, 1944–1948} (Helsinki: Otava, 1999), 380.} Urho Kekkonen, who became President in 1956 after Paasikivi, pondered the issue of public opinion in policy making in his columns and op-eds written under different pseudonyms. In his view, public opinion is oftentimes emotional and incapable of seeing the big picture of unfolding events. Nevertheless, there was considerable ambiguity in his thinking. On the one hand, especially during times of turbulence, state leadership has a duty to guard a nation’s existence — even by conducting measures that are against public opinion if necessary. On the other hand, Kekkonen recognized that, to be credible, a foreign policy line must be supported by a majority of the people.\footnote{Urho Kekkonen, \textit{Nimellä ja Nimimerkillä} (Helsinki: Otava, 1977), 7–12; 44–46; 188–191.}

Indeed, it was during Kekkonen’s long presidency during the period 1956 to 1981, when the role of public opinion started to change in Finland. Already during the FCMA treaty negotiations, Paasikivi had used people’s pessimism as leverage in the negotiations to argue that Finland could accept only an agreement that fulfills the legitimate Soviet interests but not an alliance treaty with it.\footnote{Unto Vesa, “Suomalaisten suhtautuminen yya:han,” in \textit{YYA–Aika ja sopimus}, ed. Unto Vesa (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1998), 107–128.} For Kekkonen, too, public opinion was a
resource that could be used in two ways in the relations with the Soviet Union. Public opinion had to support him as foreign policy leader as well as friendly relations with the Soviet Union, so that Soviet leaders would be convinced of the continuity of the foreign policy line. However, at the same time it also had to be a deterrent in resisting possible attempts of the Soviet Union to interfere in domestic politics of Finland, and ultimately, had to reflect a strong will to defend the country by arms if necessary.

The Top-down Model of the Cold War

The era of Finlandization

In the 1960s, under President Kekkonen, Finland started to pursue a policy of neutrality more explicitly. The rationale for the policy of neutrality was clear. According to Kari Möttölä:

The policy of neutrality is above all an instrument for maintaining dynamic Western ties by winning the Western approval for a foreign policy which is strongly colored by the priority of Eastern policy.14

The Finnish leadership was convinced that this could not be achieved without popular support. Neutrality was to be anchored not to great power recognition but to the mentality of the people: “neutrality being under a constant test from outside, all neutral countries’ governments searched for and needed strong domestic support for their policies”.15 It was of utmost importance that the Finnish nation lent support to the official line. According to Johanna Rainio:

[Kekkonen] believed that after the Second World War, Finns had to be convinced to follow the new conciliatory foreign policy unanimously, either in such a way that they understand Finland’s delicate position and

observe rigid self-discipline by not stating their differing opinions in public.\(^{16}\)

Kekkonen’s trusted man in the foreign ministry, Keijo Korhonen, claimed in his memoirs that Finnish officials had to praise the Finnish-Soviet friendship, which was a ritual of the new eastern policy. However simultaneously, they dearly hoped that the Finnish media and citizens would understand that the official rhetoric was not the whole truth, but rather doublespeak to pursue Finnish interests such as independence and self-determination.\(^{17}\)

In his book, regarded as his political testament, Kekkonen stated that in order to succeed, the policy of neutrality needed the support of the Finnish people. Finnish neutrality aspirations in the 1930s failed because significant political spheres disagreed about the line. This failure was fateful, and eventually led to war with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Kekkonen drew a line between domestic and foreign policies. In the area of foreign policy, a single imprudent statement by a (prominent) individual could harm the entire nation, while in domestic policy such a statement could do harm only to the respective individual. Kekkonen stressed that if one wants to ponder foreign policy issues, he or she should always take the national interests into account. All in all, Kekkonen was sure that the leadership postwar reappraisal was right and justified. He asserted that since the line drawn was the right one, the people should unanimously lend their support to make it credible. That is to say, Kekkonen was on a quest for consensus.\(^{18}\)

Kekkonen exercised his large constitutional powers in the area of foreign policy in full and legitimated his domestic power position through his foreign policy leadership. The key turning point was the so-called note crisis in the relations with the Soviet Union that he appeared to solve successfully. In the course of the 1960s, he created a power vertical, where


the loyalists to the President made sure that, especially in issues related to foreign policy, dissidents were either marginalized or put in line.\textsuperscript{19} The media as well as other key opinion shapers did not challenge the official foreign policy stance in public.

The way public opinion was controlled partly through self-censorship and the marginalisation of the alleged Anti-Sovietism was an essential element of the political culture of the time called “Finlandization”.\textsuperscript{20} Media coverage was often undeniably biased, and particularly the Soviet Union was not criticized in the main press or in the TV — neither in editorials, news nor on opinion pages. Kekkonen supervised this personally and reminded editors-in-chief with immediate, stormy letters if they crossed the line. In the course of time, the Finnish media learned to live accordingly.\textsuperscript{21} Key party organs especially stressed the importance of restraint when debating foreign and security policy.\textsuperscript{22}

Although foreign policy was a sensitive issue, it was still discussed. Public debate on foreign policy focused on issues such as the association agreement with the European Economic Community and development policy.\textsuperscript{23} The rise of the so-called “new left” and their activity in foreign policy intensified discussion. The movement that consisted of young Social Democratic foreign policy experts advocated “new foreign policy” that questioned attempts to create closer relations with the West and promoted closer ties with the Soviet Union. However, the debate on foreign policy took place in a limited context, and the key foreign policy line was not challenged.

\textsuperscript{19}Osmo Apunen, \textit{Tilinteko Kekkosen aikaan} (Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1984), 22–29.


\textsuperscript{22}See e.g., Vihavainen \textit{Kansakunta rähmällään}, 119–145.

\textsuperscript{23}Although public discourse was limited mainly due to self-censorship, there was debate on many foreign policy issues throughout the 1970s. For example, the Finnish free trade agreement with the EEC, “Finlandization,” and development policy were hot potatoes of that time. The fundamentals, however, were not questioned. See Christer Sandén, “Ulkopoliittinen keskustelu Suomessa 1970–luvulla,” in \textit{Ulkopoliitiikka} 16, no. 1 (1979): 8–17.
Public opinion polls testify that the situation was rather abnormal in terms of democracy. For instance in 1971, a staggering 96 percent were of the opinion that Finnish foreign policy was “Good”. During Kekkonen’s rule, the lowest approval rating occurred in 1978, when only 84 percent of Finns considered Finnish foreign policy “Good”. Positive views on the FCMA treaty also increased. In 1964, 57 percent saw the agreement as having a positive effect, but in 1974, 80 percent perceived it as a positive thing. Yet, some had reservations; for example, in 1978, when the overall approval rating of foreign policy was at 84 percent, 34 percent of Finns still held the view that the Finnish policy of neutrality was leaning too much to the East. Nevertheless, public support of foreign policy was solid as a rock.24

Yet, Kekkonen acknowledged the limits of the political leadership even with the help of media to control the public opinion fully. Kekkonen feared that the Soviet behavior would scupper his attempt to uphold public

support for his friendship policy. For example, after the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, Kekkonen wrote in his diary:

I’ve done my best that our necessary Eastern policy would naturally grow into a definite policy of friendship and because of this it would become rooted as the common conviction of all Finns and that the mind and heart would equally establish a basis for Eastern policy. The events in Czechoslovakia have [...] torn the achievements and ground from this endeavor.

Indeed, despite the climate of Finlandization and self-censorship in the media, Finns were not entirely brainwashed. Contacts with other Nordic countries were intense, and a substantial number of Finns had visited the Soviet Union by taking part in affordable package tours. The shortcomings of socialism became evident, and the so-called “spiritual national defense policies” were successful in keeping the will to defend the nation strong throughout the Cold War. In surveys, the share of Finns who believed that “if attacked, Finland should defend itself militarily in all situations” was very high in comparison to other countries. In fact, conducting such polls and making them public was considered a cheap way to signal deterrence.

The predominant thinking during Kekkonen’s tenure with regards to the public opinion–foreign policy nexus was “top-down,” although the support of the people was simultaneously regarded as a source of legitimacy that was crucial in the relations with the Soviet Union. The era of Kekkonen continued into the 1980s, when he resigned due to health reasons, and Mauno Koivisto, a social democrat, became the new President by overwhelming electoral support. Although Koivisto was a staunch parliamentarian and wanted to dismantle Kekkonen’s domestic power system based on personal relationships and loyalty, he continued the foreign policy of his predecessor very carefully. Friendly relations with the Soviet

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Union remained the cornerstone of Finnish foreign policy, but Finland started to take small steps toward European cooperation.

**The end of the Cold War**

At the beginning, the foreign policy of Koivisto was even more popular than that of Kekkonen. At the same time the so-called “Finlandization” began to disappear, the media was no longer on a presidential leash, and the foreign policy debate became more open. Public opinion challenged the government particularly in demanding more “ethical” policy, beginning with issues not directly related to the Soviet Union, such as participating in sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa.

The turning point occurred when many Finns sympathized with the fate of the Baltic States at the end of the Cold War. The endeavors of Estonia, considered a sister nation, were watched especially closely by the Finns. Koivisto’s premises, nonetheless, stemmed from the realist tradition of Snellman and Paasikivi. For him, the core national interests included stable relations with the Soviet Union, and in the context of the Baltic struggle for independence, this manifested also in support for Mikhail Gorbachev, whose shaky position Koivisto did not want to endanger. Koivisto himself sympathized with Estonians, but he argued that Finnish foreign policy could not go along with such sentiments. The national interest was the only true moral guide for policy, and the Balts’ cause was only of secondary importance. Koivisto articulated the dilemma between public opinion and realist foreign policy that had previously only been sensed. According to him, a leader must sometimes disappoint his subjects in order not to lose their trust.

Eventually, the Soviet Union began to unravel, and the Baltic states regained their independence. The independence processes of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were in one sense the final act of the Cold War for Finland. The end of the Cold War brought a major structural change for Finland as well, whose fate had been closely tied to the superpower

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28 For Koivisto, the priority was as follows: first, relations with Moscow; second, relations with the current regime in Moscow; third, relations with the Estonians and their endeavors; fourth, protection of Finland’s image in the West. See Mauno Koivisto, *Historian tekijät. Kaksi kautta II* (Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä Oy, 1995), 322.
Subsequently, public opinion started to play a bigger role in shaping Finnish foreign policy decision making.

The Post-Cold War Era and the Growing Impact of Public Opinion

To the European Union

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed many factors related to the public opinion–foreign policy nexus. The external threat was basically gone — so was the core rationale for the policy of neutrality. A weak Russia, which was in turmoil and possibly on its way to democracy, did not appear as a potential military or societal threat. Kekkonen and his system also were long gone, and the media resumed its role as a watchdog of power. The public was of the opinion that the Finnish leadership managed to navigate through the turbulent years of the end of the Cold War quite well. In 1992, Finns were asked how well Finland has managed its foreign policy over the last few years. 64 percent of the respondents answered, “Quite well”. Figures were still high, but they were definitely more normal than during the Cold War days of approval ratings over 90 percent.

Finland entered the post-Cold War world, where public opinion mattered more. It mattered more because public debate on foreign policy intensified, more and more public opinion polls were conducted, politicians read them very closely, and they were more willing to adjust their political views with it as they were less able to shape it. Liberalism as a leading philosophy replaced Hegelian collectivism. In some issues public opinion mattered less because the forces of globalization narrowed the room for political maneuvering, but foreign policy allowed for a greater freedom of choice.

When the Cold War ended, public support for the FCMA treaty did not vanish overnight. However, the government was quick to renounce and negotiate an unconditional normal friendship treaty with Russia, and

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it was clear that public support for the FCMA treaty as a corner stone of Finnish foreign policy had been more nominal than real, as the public did not show any dissatisfaction with its replacement.

The more delicate question, however, was EU membership. When Sweden announced in October 1990 that it would apply for membership in the then-European Communities, Finland did not follow suit immediately. Swedish reappraisal of its policy came as a surprise, and some resented the Swedish policy turn, because the two countries were supposed to negotiate as a unit over the European Economic Area treaty with the European Commission (EC). Nevertheless, the Swedish government failed to inform Finnish leadership about the decision to apply for membership beforehand. For a while, the Finns felt abandoned again, but after the failed Soviet coup d’état attempt in 1991, Koivisto regarded it possible to support Finland’s membership in the EC and motivated the membership with general security policy reasons.32

In this context, public opinion started to matter. Koivisto first wanted to avoid public discussion about the EC/EU membership on tactical grounds, in order not to endanger the ongoing negotiations over the European Economic Area with the EC. But at the same time, it seemed that a majority of the Finnish people were supporting the EC membership. Already in 1989, when Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA) published its survey, 46 percent thought Finland should apply for EC membership, whereas only 12 percent were categorically against. The result was interesting, because at the time the Finnish leadership saw the membership incompatible with the policy of neutrality. At the beginning of the 1990s, more surveys were conducted, and the results were parallel: the majority of the Finns were in favor of joining the EC. Only in one poll in 1993, were the majority against membership.33 The role of public opinion was highlighted

32 Another important argument for the Finnish EU membership according to Koivisto was that as a non-member Finland would have to accommodate itself to decisions made in the EU anyway but it would not be able to have an influence on the decision. Arguing anything else than this would be hiding behind a fig leave. See Jaakko Iloniemi, Vallan käytävillä (Helsinki: Wsoy, 1999), 114.
because the decision to join the EU was put to a referendum following the practice adopted by Norway and Sweden. So when the referendum took place on November 16 1994, those in favor unsurprisingly defeated their opponents by 57 to 43 percent.\(^{34}\)

It is clear that if Finns had voted no, Finland would not have accessed the Union, as had happened in Norway. In that sense, public opinion’s role was focal. However, Finnish leadership had made their position known, which plausibly had a decisive impact on the result. President Ahtisaari, who was elected to office in 1994, spoke of Finland’s membership emphatically and considered it a necessity. Prime Minister Esko Aho from the Center Party kept a lower profile, although his role in persuading his party to support the accession was crucial. Aho, however, was not totally sure about the outcome of the referendum, and he did not want to appear too active in terms of advocating for membership.\(^ {35}\)

It has been argued that the Finnish elite was not completely sincere as regards the referendum and listening to public opinion. The referendum took place before the referenda in Norway and Sweden, where populations were more critical of the EU than in Finland. The idea of this alleged scheme was to make sure that Finns would vote yes, and the Swedes and Norwegians, encouraged by the Finnish result, would follow suit. Another common accusation is that the media in Finland was uncritical of the EU and that Finns formed their opinion in a biased environment. This again may have backfired several years later as pent-up dissatisfaction by the Eurosceptic Finns has led to the rise of populism in Finnish political life and has forced the government to take positions that challenge the former pro-integration line.\(^{36}\)


Not to NATO

Public opinion also greatly influenced the decision not to join NATO or prevented other military arrangements considered military alignment. Starting from the early 1990s when public opinion polls on the issue were carried out, a clear majority of Finns resisted the idea of joining NATO. The basic critical pattern has not changed much after Russia’s turn to more assertive foreign policy. However, after the wars in Georgia and Ukraine the support for membership has slightly increased. Finns have clearly shown their support for staying outside military alliances, but they have not been against partnership with NATO or closer military cooperation with NATO countries. The majority of Finns have supported NATO enlargement and the Finnish partnership with the alliance (see Table 1).

In the 2000s, only one party, the conservative National Coalition party, has been officially in favor of Finnish NATO membership, as have been its voters. The Swedish Peoples Party has also been considered pro-NATO, but the majority of its voters have been against. All six other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
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<td>2015</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
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Source: The data is from the annual surveys by the Advisory Board for Defence Information and it is distributed by Finnish Social Science Data Archive. Data available only on request.

The data is gathered from the annual information surveys (Opinions on Security Policy 1995 (autumn); 2000 (spring); 2003 (autumn); 2009 (autumn); 2015 (autumn)) of the Advisory Board for Defence Information. The data is distributed by Finnish Social Science Data Archive <www.fsd.uta.fi>. In this case, military alignment can also mean an alliance with Sweden or the EU’s evolution to a military alliance.
parties and their voters are against membership, and the most vehement opposition comes unsurprisingly from the Left Alliance.38

In general, the public has lent its support to Finnish foreign policy after the Cold War, but the nexus between foreign policy and public opinion with regard to NATO membership has functioned more as a constraining rather than an enabling factor. President Martti Ahtisaari, who was the first President elected by a direct popular vote that underlined the growing significance of public opinion, was positively inclined towards Finland joining NATO in principle but constrained by other leading politicians in his own party and public opinion.39 He did not have the means to influence public opinion through media; by contrast, the media was often rather critical of the President. There was a strong consensus by leading politicians that if Finland were to decide about joining NATO, it should be put to a referendum. Thus, there was no decision about applying for NATO membership under Ahtisaari’s term as President. Additionally, he also wanted to postpone the decision for identity reasons, so that Finland would not join NATO in the same group with the former Warsaw Pact countries.

The NATO issue also played a visible role during Tarja Halonen’s — also a social democrat — term (2000–2012) as President of Finland. She was elected President partly because she strongly opposed Finland’s membership in NATO.40 In fact, she saw herself as a guarantee against NATO membership, legitimated by the popular vote, contrary to the foreign policy elite who were surreptitiously favorable of Finland’s mem-


39 After his presidency, Ahtisaari has been a noticeable advocate for Finland’s NATO membership. See e.g., “Weekly: Ex-President Ahtisaari calls on Finland to join Nato with Sweden,” Yle News, 11 April, 2014. <yle.fi/uutiset/weekly_ex-president_ahtisaari_calls_on_finland_to_join_nato_with_sweden/7185872>.

40 It has been argued that during Halonen’s twelve years of presidency, Finland moved back to a more traditional policy line with Russia, highlighting the importance of good personal relations. See e.g., Alpo Rusi, Etupiirin ote. Suomen valtapeli Euroopan rajalla 1700–2014 (Helsinki: Gummerus, 2014).
bership in NATO. “According to opinion polls,” she argued in 2003, “the citizens trust our foreign and security policy as well as decision makers: internationally, this is not a bad situation”\textsuperscript{41}

Public opinion was, indeed, rather stable on the NATO issue, reaching its low points after the Kosovo and Iraq wars, but growing when the perception of the Russian threat increased. Nevertheless, the changes were not huge, and support was never much higher than 30 percent.\textsuperscript{42} Mostly pro-NATO media content did not make Finns’ attitudes towards NATO more positive over time.\textsuperscript{43} However, when asked whether the people would support Finland’s membership in NATO if the leaders so recommended, a majority supported it. This motivated some politicians and members of the foreign policy elite to suggest that politicians have to bear the responsibility of making key decisions in foreign policy, and they cannot seek cover from public opinion.\textsuperscript{44} Halonen, however, argued that, “today we have no guarantee that the people would follow the President”\textsuperscript{45}

President Sauli Niinistö (2012 to present) also has been explicitly skeptical vis-à-vis his chances to persuade the public of the benefits of NATO membership. In his view, “the membership would also require the support of the majority of the public, and we should not think that public opinion could be swayed merely by a declaration of intent voiced by the


\textsuperscript{42} For the post-Cold War generation, NATO is often associated with the hegemonic position of the United States, not to the dead and buried divide of the Cold War. The anti-NATO attitude thus stems, partly paradoxically, from the undertakings of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq that many see against the values of Finnish foreign policy. See Rainio 2003, 15.


\textsuperscript{45} Hannu Lehtilä, \textit{Tarja Halonen. Paremman maailman puolesta} (Helsinki: Tammi 2012), 143.
political leadership”. Indeed, the recent public opinion polls conducted on the issue give only mixed support to the view that Finns are loyal to the authorities and would change their opinion if the President recommended it. Niinistö has also been an advocate of a referendum in case Finland decides to seek NATO membership. As stated by Niinistö, “[t]he [NATO] issue must have a national consensus, and a referendum [is] required before a final decision could be made”.47

The post-Cold War situation has been a bit ironic in the sense that the successful endeavor of Cold War era leaders to impose a certain foreign policy thinking has had a more lasting effect than they believed possible. Johanna Rainio has asserted that the Finns are “too well educated” when having internalized neutrality during the Cold War; they have not been eager to reevaluate the position after the Cold War. This again has been a hindrance to the post-Cold War identity project, where Finland has tried to adopt a more “Western” identity.48

During Niinistö’s presidency, the change in the security environment has been drastic due to Russia’s assertiveness and revisionism in Europe. A much-debated topic in this context is “hybrid war,” which entails information warfare as a key element of advancing hostile interests. The line between war and peace is blurred, and states prepare themselves for unforeseen scenarios. It has been said that the fight for the hearts and minds of the public is underway.49 In Finland, Russian (dis)information campaigns have gained a lot of attention, and Russia-friendly news sites,

48Rainio, “A People too well Educated”. Browning highlights the importance of the politicized Westernizing narratives in Finnish post-Cold War foreign policy. One of their rationales of the narratives is to show Finland’s “natural” role in the Western world. See Christopher S. Browning, “Coming Home or Moving Home? Westernizing Narratives in Finnish Foreign Policy and the Reinterpretation of Past Identities,” Cooperation and Conflict 37:1 (2002): 47–72.
49Saara Jantunen, Infosota–“Iskut kohdistuvat kansalaisten tajuntaan,” (Helsinki: Otava, 2015), 60.
blogs and comments have been spread directly to the larger public via social media. The main goal has been to create doubt in Western news reporting, paint a gloomy picture of the West’s overall aims and to persuade Finland to have a more “independent” role as regards the EU’s policy towards Russia. The “special relationship” between Finland and Russia has been highlighted, and exhortations to stay non-aligned have been voiced. The awareness of the information war has again highlighted the role of public opinion, when direct foreign influence endeavors to target the public mind with a malign intent. The public appears as potential leverage with which to influence the leadership, which has consequences. According to President Niinistö, every Finn, as a receiver of information, is a defender of his or her country, and they have a duty to be critical and get information from multiple sources.\(^5\)

In sum, there has been a clear change in the attitudes of the Finnish Presidents with regard to public opinion. During the Cold War they were confident of their capability to shape it if necessary, which was evident during Kekkonen’s rule, and to make decisions even under

public criticism like Koivisto during the independence processes of the Baltic states. In the post-Cold War period, speaking about big questions, the Presidents have been less sure that they are able to shape public opinion, and they have felt more bound by it. This is one of the major reasons why Finland has stayed out of NATO. In general, Presidents have avoided such statements that could be considered as imprudent or rocking the boat. Thus they have earned the respect of the public, who has largely been satisfied with the conduct of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

**Conclusion**

As we have argued in our text, the role of public opinion in Finland has evolved considerably during the hundred years of Finland’s independence. Three models concerning public opinion’s effect on foreign policy have been explained and applied to the Finnish case.

The role of public opinion has changed from being unrelated to foreign policy decision making, to being subordinated to it during the Cold War, and finally to being a determining factor in the post-Cold War era. Through the years, public opinion transformed from a Hegelian collectivity that leaders could guide into the sum of privately thinking individuals. The changes depended both on the perceived urgency to make decisions on purely strategic grounds and on politicians’ own beliefs about public opinion. The Finnish case clearly demonstrates, as Douglas Foyle has suggested, that “individual beliefs about the proper role of public opinion in policy making may be one […] variable affecting how policy makers react to public opinion when making foreign policy decisions”. Using Foyle’s belief system distinction about the desirability and necessity of public opinion in decision making, the Finnish post-war leaders seemed to be pragmatists who were not that enthusiastic about the role of public opinion in decision making. However, they regarded it as essential in making the foreign policy line credible.\(^{51}\)

The Cold War Presidents, Paasikivi, Kekkonen and also Koivisto, were all different practitioners of realpolitik, which was reflected in their thinking on the role of public opinion. Kekkonen’s view on the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy conduct comes especially close to Hans Morgenthau and his classical realism. Morgenthau had argued that public support is an element of national power, and the approval of one’s own people must be secured in foreign policy. But Morgenthau, like Kekkonen and Paasikivi, was aware of alleged instability, moralism and legalism of the popular mind. Thus, public opinion needs to be informed and re-created: “the government must realize that it is the leader and not the slave of public opinion”.52

Kekkonen indeed led. Self-censorship and media control were two of the distinct features of the Kekkonen era, called “Finlandization”. Limitations to opinion-forming were set naturally when alternative views were not expressed, let alone published. If alternative views were hard to express, it is safe to assume that ordinary citizens were unlikely to adopt foreign policy stances that were inconsistent with the official line. Research has shown that the mass media’s role in determining public attention to foreign policy is considerable, and media content has an effect on the salience of foreign and security policy in the eyes of the public.53

The importance of the security environment when analyzing the nexus between public opinion and foreign policy also becomes clear in the Finnish case. In the view of William Davis, “the presence of an external threat causes political leaders to downplay public opinion”; however, in Finland public opinion was tamed and actively shaped during the Cold War rather than just ignored.54 When the threat diminished at the end of

the Cold War, the impact of public opinion on decision making grew considerably. The post-Cold War Presidents were all skeptical as to their capability to shape public opinion much. As Thomas Risse–Kappen has argued, domestic structure also matters in how much public opinion influences foreign policy making.\(^{55}\) When the President actively drives foreign policy, he becomes less dependent on support in single issues; but when political parties compete over votes, public opinion becomes more influential, particularly in key issues such as NATO membership in Finland.\(^{56}\)

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Finnish Social Science Data Archive <www.fsd.uta.fi>.


\(^{56}\)Risse-Kappen argues that “strong versus weak state distinction” is feasible with regards to the input side of the political system. However, the nexus is not necessarily feasible when the output side is in question. Risse-Kappen 1991, 511–513.


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Mistrust within trust. Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation and the ghosts of the 1990 EC application incident

Tapio Juntunen & Matti Pesu


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Mistrust within trust
Finnish–Swedish defence cooperation and the ghosts of the 1990 EC application incident

Tapio Juntunen and Matti Pesu

Introduction

Finland and Sweden are countries sharing a border, history, interests, and identities, and hence over the course of history their fates have been tightly intertwined. Interaction between the states is close-knit, and cooperation takes place across multiple domains. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up new avenues for Fenno-Swedish cooperation. Considering the status quo-oriented foreign policy posture of the two states during the Cold War, some of the most prominent opportunities for completely new forms of cooperation were found in the area of security policy. But unlike in many other policy domains and spheres of interaction between the states, bilateral cooperation in defence and security policy has only started to gain momentum in the last ten years or so.

Nordic defence cooperation, encompassing all five Nordic countries, has, to a great extent, figured prominently on the agenda after the end of the Cold War, especially since the establishment of the Nordic Defence Cooperation structure (NORDEFCO) in 2009. In Finland, bilateral cooperation with Sweden has recently begun to be seen as the most important approach to and substance of defence cooperation. Bilateral cooperation appears to provide opportunities for ambitious collaboration and, at least nominally, a way to abide by the policy of military non-alignment – a doctrine seen as upholding the balance of power in the Baltic Sea area and enhancing the region’s strategic stability in an era of notable turbulence.

Establishing a more extensive security policy partnership, or even a military alliance, is however more easily said than done. Rather surprisingly, in Finland there seems to be an underlying lack of trust, which would have to be overcome in order to take cooperation beyond its current, rather nascent and incrementally evolving state to a more mature level. Indeed, as the stakes and ambitions of defence cooperation between Sweden and Finland have increased, so have historically rooted suspicions. In particular, the impression that Sweden betrayed Finland when it announced its intention to apply for membership in the European...
Community (EC) on 26 October 1990 without consulting Finland beforehand remains vivid in the Finnish foreign policy discourse. In fact, some Finnish decision-makers, experts, and public commentators have begun to frame the current situation in light of the ‘lesson’ of October 1990. This time the fear is a sudden Swedish transatlantic reorientation, namely Stockholm applying for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) without properly consulting Finnish interests on the decision.

The underlying puzzle in this chapter, approached from the perspective of trust research in International Relations (IR), is why progress in the defence and security policy cooperation between these two historically connected Nordic states, which otherwise enjoy a mature and evolved partnership, has been so circumspect. At first glance, the Swedish–Finnish interstate relationship seems to be a rather superfluous object of study, especially from the perspective of trust research in IR; after all, the relationship between the two Nordic countries has been described as that of a model security community (see Waever 1998, 72).³

Moreover, if Finland and Sweden in fact belong to a model security community – that is, a ‘group of states among whom trust is so high and trusting relationship so robust that war between them has become unthinkable’ (Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 9; see also Wiberg 2000) – their relationship can also be presented as a paradigmatic case of what interstate trust is and how it is maintained (on security communities see Adler and Barnett 1998; Deutsch 1957).⁴ As Ruzicka and Keating (2015, 9) suggest in their explorative article on the latest developments in the IR trust research, ‘trusting relationships rarely feature as something to be explained’ in international politics. Instead preoccupying itself with questions of how to build trust between adversaries and (former) enemies, we suggest that the study of Finnish–Swedish bilateral relations should endeavour to offer valuable insights into the question proposed by Ruzicka and Keating.

In the spirit of analytical eclecticism, we approach the Finnish–Swedish case through the lenses of social and psychological approaches in IR trust research (see Haukkala et al. 2015, 4).⁵ This means that we highlight the centrality of shared norms and political values when understanding the general identification-based conditions of trustful relations between collective units (e.g. Weinhardt 2015, 32). That said, conceptions more familiar from the psychological approach to international trust also need to be considered – the role of cognitive biases, beliefs, emotions, and, especially in our case (collectively shared) historical experiences and narratives – if we want to explain the role and effect of mistrust and suspicions even within generally trustful interstate relationships (see especially Michel 2012). In other words, whereas the constructivist orientation’s focus on shared norms seems to highlight mutual trust in Swedish–Finnish bilateral relations, the role of suspicions (or even the historical experience of ‘betrayal’) in the context of this essentially non-conflictual small-state
relationship seems to provide clues how factors more familiar to psychological approaches can at the same time have negative effects, especially when stratified into collective narratives of mistrust.

Moreover, our study aims to broaden the existing discussion on international trust by avoiding the prevalent inclination towards studying trust in the contexts of profound tensions, disagreements, disputes, and processes of post-conflict reconstruction, with the usual addition of a great power being at least one part of the dyad (see for example Brugger 2015; Brugger et al. 2013; Hoffmann 2002; Larson 1997; Rathbun 2011a; Wheeler 2009). Our study shows how historically rooted suspicions regarding another’s intentions, together with the general feel of uncertainty stemming from the immediate geopolitical environment, can have decisive effects in generally trustful small-state relations where interdependencies between states are high. Indeed, there are myriad levels of trust and variations of trusting relationships in world politics: the potential benefits of building trust are not only significant in inherently conflictual dyads but can also play a major role for the security policy interests of states that have profoundly non-conflictual relationships.

Finally, Finnish–Swedish defence cooperation offers an interesting case illustrating what Keating and Ruzicka (2014, 22) describe as ‘complex relationships where trust varies across different issue areas’. Questions of national security policy seem to form a domain that can be separated historically from the wider bilateral issue areas such as questions of cultural, social, and economic integration in Finnish–Swedish relations. Indeed, the case of building cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy and coordinating grand strategy at large between Finland and Sweden shows that there can be deeply rooted and historically sensitive sources of latent mistrust and other asymmetries within bilateral relations that are otherwise understood to be based on a high level of an institutionalised, functional, and even mundane sense of reciprocal trust.

The study applies qualitative content analysis to research material consisting predominantly of statements and comments given by relevant foreign policy figures in Finland and Sweden. The outline of our chapter is the following. We first introduce the theoretical contributions, followed by the presentation of the social-psychological standpoints of the study and further elaboration of the theoretical framework. Then, we briefly review the October 1990 incident, before proceeding to an examination of contemporary defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden. Prior to exposing the latent misplaced trust in Sweden found in Finland, we concisely evaluate trajectories within Sweden and in the Baltic Sea region that have resulted in the (re)appearance of mistrust among Finnish decision-makers and the Finnish political elite. Lastly, we sum up our arguments and findings, and suggest avenues for further research.
Trust research in IR and its application to the relations between Finland and Sweden

We introduce three key conceptual distinctions that help to understand the dynamics of trust in the post-Cold War bilateral defence and security cooperation between Finland and Sweden. First, it is important to separate the general condition of distrust between states from the historically sensitive experiences of mistrust (or misplaced trust). Indeed, we suggest that a more profound understanding of the mistrust-distrust nexus is needed in IR trust research. Essentially, it is important to increase our understanding of how and where historical experiences of misplaced trust have evolved into full-blown distrust and where they have not.

Second, we suggest that the distinction between experiences of betrayal and disappointment seems to be especially salient in the Finnish–Swedish case. Here we follow the lead of the trust researchers who have drawn a distinction between, on the one hand, conceptions of strategic trust inspired by the rational choice theory, in which a breach of trust leads to a more nonchalant and ‘calculated’ sense of disappointment, and, on the other, emotionally and morally loaded conceptions of general trustfulness and moral trust, in which a breach of trust leads to a sense of betrayal and a more comprehensive re-evaluation of the relationship itself (see Rathbun 2011a, 2011b; Michel 2012).

Finally, we claim that interstate trust should be understood as a complex phenomenon that can have competing manifestations even within a single interstate relationship. There can exist a high level of institutionalised trust within certain policy sectors between states A and B, but for some reason this mundane trust that characterises certain everyday practices does not translate into trust that would pervade the relationship at large – a situation we can clearly sense in the Finnish–Swedish case. In more general theoretical terms, this leads us to consider the idea of scaling trust along an axis that moves from minimal trust towards the ideal type of maximal trust among states (see Booth and Wheeler 2008, 230). But before we introduce these conceptual innovations, a few preparatory words are in order on the theoretical standpoints informing the different approaches to trust research in IR and the theoretical and analytical commitments our approach builds on.

Merging psychological and social approaches to international trust

There is no conclusive way to define trust in interstate relations. Ruzicka and Keating (2015), for example, trace three interrelated approaches to studying trust in IR – rationalist, social, and psychological paradigms. In an eclectic spirit (see Sil and Katzenstein 2010), we combine elements from both the social and psychological approaches in our analysis, rejecting the...
consequentialist and deterministic formulations of trust derived from the rational-actor framework, developed in international settings by neoliberal institutionalists (see for example Keohane 1984; Kydd 2001). As Rathbun (2011b, 2) observes, in the rational institutionalist conceptualisation ‘trust emerges when [actors] have information that leads them to believe that specific others have a self-interest in reciprocating cooperation rather than violating their commitments’. We agree with Rathbun’s criticism of the rather counterintuitive idea proposed by the neoliberal institutionalists that cooperation starts from a state of distrust. Trust must precede cooperation and institution building.

Instead of tracing the calculation of costs and benefits in ‘mutually advantageous arrangements’, we opt to focus on the role of non-rationalistic and relational ‘variables’ relating to trust such as the burden of historical experiences and their stratification into collective lessons (see for example Jervis 1976, 220–222; Rasmussen 2003; Snyder 1991, 13–14; Weinhardt 2015). In social approaches to trust the fiduciary nature of trusting relationships supersedes the rational weighing of self-interests as the ultimate source of trust: a trusting relationship emerges from the ‘confidence in expectations that others will “do what is right”, not (necessarily) from cool calculation of mutual benefits’ (Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 16).

Here the verb ‘to trust’ relates to being able to make a series of (generally successful) judgements about the other parties involved even where direct information on their intentions is scanty. Social trust is thus not understood as a situationally isolated moment of calculation of pros and cons but as ‘a belief that one will not be harmed when his or her fate is placed in the hands of the other’ (Rathbun 2011b, 10). Any sense of being exposed to opportunism should be transcended or suspended in a trusting relationship beyond the moments of isolated decisions. Indeed, to paraphrase Rathbun (2011b, 11): ‘Trust is critical for cooperation when there is no simultaneous exchange for benefits’ (see also Larson 1997, 19; Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 19).

Scaling trust – from minimal trust-as-reliance to a maximal sense of habitual trust

Although difficult to establish in absolute terms, the scale of trustfulness can be imagined as going all the way from complete distrust (an example being the Soviet Union and the United States bilateral relationship during the early 1980s) to a habitual sense of trust-as-bond between states, reflecting the Deutschian notion of ‘amalgamated security communities’ (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 184, 229; Deutsch 1957). For example, confidence-building as a strategic instrument of enhancing predictability in order to avoid conflict between states implies a profound lack of trust. Michel (2012, 879), for example, labels this as mere reliance, juxtaposing it with a
praxeological sense of trust that ‘does not derive from a calculated deliberative process but describes an inarticulate disposition which manifests itself in a social orientation with a strong moralistic element that carries an inarticulate belief about how others should behave’.

The distinction between moral trust and mere reliance echoes Rathbun’s (2011a, 2011b, 3–6) distinction between generalised and strategic trust. According to Rathbun’s reading, inspired by social-psychological trust research and the work of Ulsaner, generalised trust, that is, ‘the belief that others are largely trustworthy’, differs from the institutionalists’ rationalistic assumptions of international cooperation as a calculative mode of behaviour activated to cope with distrust. The idea of generalised trust, which Rathbun (2011a, 245) applies to the settings of multilateral cooperation, reverses the order of trust and cooperation: by definition, social trust must precede cooperation. Unlike strategic trust, general/social trust ‘allows actors to make more binding commitments and to reap the gains of cooperation without the protections that rationalism expects’.

The crude dichotomy between generalised/moralistic trust and strategic trust/reliance shares features with Booth and Wheeler’s distinction between minimal (trust-as-predictability) and maximalist trust (trust-as-bond). For Booth and Wheeler (2008, 230), a minimal level of trust exists when two or more actors, based on the mutual interpretation of each other’s attitudes and behavior, believe that the other(s) now and in the future, can be relied upon to desist from acting in ways that will be injurious to their interests and values.

In the maximalist conception of trust the goal of avoiding inflicting harm on the other is not enough. Instead, it requires more than functional cooperation, a sense of habitual care where the ‘actors mutually attempt to promote each other’s interests and values, including in circumstances that cannot be observed’ (ibid.). Minimal and maximal trust are, of course, ideal types, not empirical but analytical categories. We deploy the scale from minimal to maximal trust as a heuristic device to illustrate how experiences of misplaced trust can linger on even where bilateral relations between the states are highly functional as a whole.

To return to the Finnish–Swedish case, the discussion on the possibility that Sweden could once again leave Finland high and dry revolves around the question whether Sweden might apply for NATO membership alone without consulting Finland properly before making such a move. Interestingly, as we point out later in this chapter, the foreign policy elite in both states have recently made reassuring comments, highlighting the interdependence between the states in the area of security policy. From the perspective of moralistic/maximalistic trust, however, this signals that there are at least doubts as to whether Sweden will take Finnish interests into consideration in making its key national security decisions. In this respect,
where security policy is concerned, the relationship between Finland and Sweden does not fulfil Booth and Wheeler’s definition of maximal (habitual) trust or Michel’s notion of phronetic trust.

Indeed, there are constant suspicious voices in the Finnish public debate on whether Sweden will commit itself fully to the promotion of both countries’ interests and values. More specifically, we go on to claim that the case of Finnish–Swedish defence cooperation and Finland’s experience of misplaced trust in 1990 indicate how important a role historical precedents and learned lessons can play in trust building. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that the maximalist reading of trust as an all-encompassing moralistic disposition has difficulties when it comes to explaining why the wider framework of bilateral relations between Finland and Sweden is clearly based on a high level of confidence and everyday cooperation. In this respect, the significance of the aforementioned historical experience of misplaced trust should also be interpreted against what we term, following Deborah Welch Larson (1997, 714), the overall expectation of benevolent intentions in the bilateral relations as a whole. As Larson (ibid., 714–715) argues:

This form of trust need not correspond with credibility; the other person may not keep all her promises and undertakings toward us, because of competing demands, or circumstances beyond her control, but we nevertheless trust her because her actions and words are well-intended. Similarly, we may trust another state because we believe that it has fairly benign intentions and will not take advantage of use (emphasis added).

The problem here, however, is that this kind of relationship should be based on the idea that any conflicts of interests between the two states ‘should concern only minor issues’ (ibid.). From the perspective of small states, the future orientation of one’s foreign and security policy is not a ‘minor issue’, but a core matter of national interests. And if, in the present case, we agree that the fates of the national security policies of Finland and Sweden – two small states – are intertwined, the level of trust specifically perceived within the realm of security becomes a defining element in relation to the expectations of benevolent intentions in the states’ bilateral relations as a whole. As Larson suggests (ibid., 709):

More trust is needed for large decisions, where the potential losses from betrayal would be devastating […] the extent to which states must trust each other to enter into an international agreement depends on how catastrophic would be the consequences of betrayal […]. Agreements affecting the relative balance of military power between two states require more trust than cultural exchanges.
Historical experience of misplaced trust and centrality of promises – disappointment or betrayal?

Honouring promises and obligations indeed proves to be an important element in the Swedish–Finnish case. It was, as the popular sentiment in Finland suggests, the informal agreement not to surprise its neighbour to the east in terms of foreign policy that Sweden ‘broke’ when announcing it intended to apply for EC membership in autumn 1990 without informing the Finnish foreign policy elite of its intentions beforehand. According to Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010, 73; see also Nicolaïdis 2007), who follow Martin Hollis, ‘[t]he binding approach to trust rests on the notion that actors will honour their promises’. Moreover, as Ruzicka and Keating (2015, 17) suggest, ‘a trusting relationship [...] leads states not to hedge against the potentially negative consequences of other’s actions because such actions are cognitively considered to be zero’. In the following observation, one particularly salient to the case at hand, Hoffmann (2002, 394) expresses how important honouring obligations seems to be in maintaining a trusting relationship:

Trusting relationships are behavioral manifestations of trust. They emerge when actors leave the fate of their interests to the discretion of others with the expectation that those actors will honor their obligation to avoid using their discretion in a manner harmful to the first.

Moreover, the scope of actions and decisions that can lead to injurious consequences in small-state relations is not exhausted on issues of war and peace. Small states play a different game from that played by great powers, especially when it comes to defining what is and what is not a matter of core national interest (see for example Elman 1995; Hey 2003). The point here is to problematise what ‘injurious effect’ means and how it can have different manifestations in different contexts, whether they are measured against great power politics, asymmetric power relations, or symmetrical relations between small states. Even within the context of peaceful and trustful relations between small states A and B, a unilateral decision made by state A – a decision that need not even be directed against state B – can have injurious consequences for the latter and weaken the trust between the states.

We suggest, as the case at hand shows, that it is important to make a distinction between a sense of disappointment and of betrayal. According to Michel (2012, 881), a sense of disappointment ‘can be caused by both animate and inanimate entities in response to a specific let-down following a rational and conscious process of decision-making after [...] which we decide to rely on someone or something’. Understood in this way, a feeling of disappointment follows when calculated strategic reliance is somehow misplaced or broken. It might not affect the fundamental feeling of
trustfulness felt by actor B towards actor A. The feeling of being betrayed, on the other hand, indicates that a deeper, more profound trusting relationship has been undermined: ‘[T]he experience of betrayal is attached to a moral judgment about the respective other as compared to a strategic judgment in cases of reliance’ (ibid.). Moreover,

the experience in cases where our normative belief in the trustworthiness of the other is violated, that is, in cases of betrayal, the form of harm we suffer exceeds disappointment qualitatively as it involves a deeper emotional as well as existential challenge.

(Ibid., 882)

The question remains whether the Finnish experience of misplaced trust in autumn 1990 would fulfill the description of either disappointment or betrayal. And against the present puzzle, we might ask whether the incremental deepening of the Swedish–Finnish security policy cooperation amidst the Ukraine crisis is used as a mere hedging strategy, or whether we should see it as an indicator of a genuinely (morally) trusting relationship at work. Our analysis suggests that the level of trustfulness between Finland and Sweden in matters of defence and security policy has only reached a rather minimal level. If the experience in October 1990 (and the reiteration of this experience as a common narrative) falls into the category of being betrayed, this indicates that the Finnish foreign policy elite did not have any prior ‘strategically held reservations’ before Sweden ‘broke’ its promise in autumn 1990, in which case the experience can be seen as signalling a more serious rupture in the states’ bilateral relations.

Here we can discern that the ability of at least some members of the Finnish foreign policy elite to brush aside a latent and historical source of mistrust might be crucial even for the fate of bilateral relations between Finland and Sweden as a whole. Moreover, the stakes of reaching an agreement on these terms are even higher amidst the post-Ukraine crisis geopolitical environment in the Baltic Sea area. The inability to mitigate this predicament would echo what Larson (1997, 702) describes in her social-psychological reading of interstate trust as ‘a missed opportunity for agreement’ (see also Rathbun 2011a, 246, 2011b, 5).

‘The seed of mistrust’ was sown: October 1990 and Sweden’s EC announcement

The good relations between the neighbours almost broke down because Sweden played a two-faced game: first by concealing its intentions, then by betraying the promises given to Finland and finally by trying to sneak into the EC. This was the sentiment held by the Finnish state leaders, president and cabinet. Sweden’s chicanery has left its
mark on our national memory; it is an event that is always brought up when friction emerges between the neighbours.\textsuperscript{11}

(Hämäläinen 2015)

The quotation above is taken from Unto Hämäläinen, an eminent Finnish journalist and popular historian who analysed the October 1990 debacle in which Sweden announced its intentions to apply for membership in the EC. In his article, Hämäläinen traced the Finnish foreign policy elite’s sentiments regarding Sweden’s surprise decision in late October 1990 using material in the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. His somewhat unnecessary mystification of the classified archival material aside, Hämäläinen corroborated the popular understanding that Sweden indeed seemed to have taken Finnish foreign policy elite by surprise, although the surprise was not as total as the popular memory in Finland seems to suggest.

Helsinki in fact knew that something was going on in Sweden. Finnish diplomats informed Finnish state leaders of Sweden’s internal discussions throughout the summer and early autumn in 1990. The general expectation was that the Social Democratic government of Sweden was preparing to announce its plan to apply for EC membership soon.\textsuperscript{12} Pressure from industry and commerce on the Social Democrats was especially high and widely known in Finland (Blomberg 2011, 213).

In addition, Finnish foreign policy commentators, such as Max Jakobson, a renowned former diplomat, took note of the evolving opinion and process in the neighbouring country in his much-read op-eds (see e.g. Wahlbäck 2011). If Sweden’s tendency towards unilateralism as such did not come as a major surprise, the fact that it did not even keep its promise to inform Finland before making the announcement got under the skin of the Finnish foreign policy elite, especially the then-President Mauno Koivisto. The Finnish foreign policy elite felt that Sweden had jumped the gun (Jakobson 2003, 367–372).

Sweden had promised Finland that it would continue the negotiations on establishing the European Economic Area (EEA) between the EC and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) – an initiative by the then-president of the European Commission Jacques Delors. The Finnish foreign policy elite, in particular President Koivisto, prioritised EEA negotiations over the EC membership process. According to his memoirs, Koivisto felt strongly that the process would involve too many uncertainties, although Koivisto’s discussions with François Mitterrand earlier the same year indicated that the prospects of the EEA negotiations were also perceived somewhat pessimistically by the Finnish president (Koivisto 1995, 517–529).

Moreover, even though Austria had already applied for EC membership in 1989, Finnish bilateral relations and commitments vis-à-vis the Soviet Union remained an obstacle, notwithstanding the constant decline of the eastern superpower. The proximity of the Soviet Union, even if badly
crippled, as well as the official Finnish policy of peacetime neutrality, reinforced these tendencies towards self-restraint when it came to choosing the appropriate strategy for western integration in 1990.

Things looked very different from Sweden, where the tide started to turn in favour of the EC track. The Swedish government, led by the Social Democrats, came under increasing pressure by the Liberals and the Conservatives, especially after their respective leaders Bengt Westerberg and Carl Bildt announced already in May 1990 that they would make EC membership a theme in their forthcoming election campaign in autumn 1991. Together with the deteriorating economic situation, the domestic political pressure towards the Social Democratic government pushed Ingvar Carlsson’s government to hasten the prospects of EC membership, eventually leading to the ‘shock’ announcement on 26 October 1990 (Blomberg 2011, 213).

Koivisto was left shell-shocked when the information on Sweden’s breakaway reached him. It was a ‘complete surprise’, as Koivisto (1995, 522) describes his sentiments in his memoirs. Koivisto made his disappointment known in his emblematic and discreet style. In an interview given immediately after hearing about Sweden’s actions, he contemplated Sweden’s break with tradition in the Nordic cooperation whereby states give one another an opportunity to express their views when it comes to making statements on matters of shared interests so ‘that we would not be forced to face a fait accompli time after time’. Koivisto continued by noting that it would be desirable, considering that it had just been agreed in the EEA negotiations, that promises made on how to proceed would be kept. In other words, Koivisto’s initial reactions implied that Sweden had not only broken a promise but also fundamental tacit rules, or codes of conduct, among the Nordic countries on how to proceed in such matters. The sense of betrayal and its later social stratification to the Finnish foreign policy discourse thus had personal and individual origins, something the psychological approach to trust would emphasise. On the other hand, to understand the later depth and significance of the experience of misplaced trust on the collective level, one should take into account the wider cultural context – shared social norms and expectations between the two Nordic countries – in a way that also incorporates a constructivist understanding of the conditions of trust into the analysis.

The Finnish experience of misplaced trust seems imminent. Eventually, Finland and Sweden joined the European Union (EU) hand in hand in 1995. But this clearly did not do enough to dispel the underlying and latent sense of mistrust in Finland. As Jaakko Blomberg (2011, 214), head of the Foreign Ministry’s political department in 1990, recalls in his memoirs regarding the overall mood in Finland, the true lesson of Sweden’s behaviour was to think about international politics increasingly from the perspective of pure self-interest. This was especially true inasmuch as it had become apparent that ‘one could not trust that others would care about us’.
Thus, the experience of October 1990 was more than a blow to what could be defined as strategic trust and a sense of reliance on functional cooperation with Sweden. The blow evidently penetrated deep, implying that Finland had invested a high amount of generalised/moralistic trust into the countries’ bilateral relations with Sweden in 1990. Indeed, reliance came to be seen more as a challenge than as a solution. It is in this context that any parallels with the events of October 1990 and the experience of misplaced trust during the Ukraine crisis should be understood.

Bilateral defence cooperation in a security community

As we have described in our introduction, the Nordic countries, including Finland and Sweden, often serve as a standard example of a security community where the predictability of peace and degree of integration are high and where mutual contacts on different levels of society are abundant (see e.g. Waever 1998, 72; Wiberg 2000, 133–135). The common labour market and language community, cultural affinities, cooperation in taxation, and the agreement on social security, inter alia, facilitate close norm- and rule-based interaction on the official level and, also, between civil societies and individuals. In short: the elements of identification-based trust between Finland and Sweden are strong.

Despite the extremely close relations, practical cooperation in security and defence policy is a rather new field for Finland and Sweden. During the Cold War both took active part in the United Nations’ (UN) peacekeeping efforts and, along with other Nordic countries, endeavoured to find ways to coordinate their policies and find benefits on the ground (see e.g. Forsberg 2013). Yet, this cooperation did not incorporate territorial defence or any other integral area of national security. For Finland, abiding by absolute sovereignty and autonomy in national security was considered sacred (see Möttölä 1982). Sweden again cherished its alliansfrihet, while nevertheless cooperating closely with the United States (Holmström 2009).

For Finland, geographical location, namely proximity to the Soviet Union, mattered greatly. Although both countries pursued policies of neutrality, albeit with different variants (see Karsh 1988), there was not enough common ground for substantial cooperation on security, since their standpoints were so different (Forsberg and Vahtoranta 2001). As Max Jakobson (1983; see also 1980, 97–98) has aptly described the differences between Swedish high-profile and Finnish low-profile neutrality, Sweden could afford to feed its people the caviar of moralising foreign policy, whereas Finland forced its citizens to swallow the oatmeal of realpolitik.

The end of the Cold War opened up new possibilities in Nordic defence cooperation. The nature of neutrality changed and was eventually replaced by a much less restrictive policy of military non-alignment in both Sweden and Finland. Until the end of the 2000s this cooperation encompassed rather low-key issue areas such as peace education and training. Financial
difficulties at the end of the decade changed the name of the game; nations in Europe, allied and non-allied alike, had to reconsider how to make the most of the available resources in an era of shrinking defence budgets. The time was ripe for initiatives such as *Smart Defence* within NATO or *Pooling and Sharing* within the EU. Cost-efficiency became a guiding principle of the Nordic collaboration as well.

In 2009, the NORDEFCO was established, bringing the existing forms of cooperation under one umbrella. The initiative encompasses all five Nordic countries, and it has five cooperation areas: capabilities, human resources and education, operations, armaments and training and exercises (NORDEFCO 2017). Cooperation has yielded new results. One well-known achievement is the cross-border training (CBT) between the Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian air forces, in which fighter jets convene in joint exercises in the High North on a weekly basis, utilising the air spaces of all the three countries.

However, due to different defence choices, robust and deeper cooperation between all five states has not made headway. The allied Nordic countries, Norway and Denmark at the forefront, have little reason and interest to extend Nordic cooperation. Since 2013, at least in the Finnish debate, Nordic defence cooperation has predominantly referred to bilateral cooperation with Sweden, and it is ‘the Stockholm way’ where the most promising opportunities lie (Valtioneuvosto 2017). Indeed, throughout the last decade it has become clear that Sweden and Finland are increasingly in the same boat in terms of their national security concerns. Back in 2008, Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva stated that Finland and Sweden should make focal foreign policy decisions hand in hand, while Swedish Defence Minister Sven Tolgfors endorsed Kanerva’s statement by underscoring that Sweden would not join NATO without Finland joining as well (Giles and Eskola 2009, 23).

One of the most striking features of Finnish–Swedish defence cooperation – distinct from the outset – has been its practicality. For quite some time, the main and exclusive driver was cost-efficiency. Hence, Nordic cooperation has not been threat-driven, and the Russian menace did not play a significant role in pushing the states to cooperate until the overall security situation in Europe became aggravated in 2014. The fact that two states are cooperating does not yet indicate that a trusting relationship exists, at least in the phronetic sense of the term presented earlier (Keating and Ruzicka 2014, 758; Michel 2012). As we will soon point out, there are clear signs in the Finnish public debate of latent mistrust as regards to collaborating with the western neighbour on defence policy. This mistrust and its significance has already been identified by Finnish security policy commentators. Salonius-Pasternak (2014, 6) has pointed out that trust in defence cooperation between Sweden and Finland is in short supply.

In addition, a well-known Finnish journalist Olli Ainola (2015) has stressed the significance of trust, or rather the lack of it, in Finnish–Swedish
defence cooperation. Ainola suggests that both the Finnish and Swedish foreign policy elites should trust each other if the states are to cooperate not only in time of peace but also in time of crisis. The tentative and incremental style of the defence cooperation implies a shortfall of trust (cf. Michel 2012, 873; Wheeler 2009). Indeed, the small steps taken regarding defence cooperation may indicate that proceeding in an incremental manner is itself a (strategic) trust-building exercise. Recent reassuring comments made by the Finnish and Swedish politicians in this context, analysed in the next section, further corroborates this conclusion.

Then again, the negotiations on the evolving defence cooperation between the two states have thus far proceeded without major disagreements, implicating an underlying sense of trustworthiness. A good track-record, even incremental in nature, might not only erase the experiences of mistrust but also ignite a positive spiral of deepening partnership, echoing Rathbun’s (2011b, 12) idea of the *reciprocity circle* of social trust. On the other hand, for Finland, deepening cooperation on security policy is not taken for granted given the historical policies of autonomy, and for Sweden new commitments in the East would indeed indicate a profound reorientation from ‘The Policy of 1812’, that is, nearly 200 years of *alliansfrihet*.

**Minimal trust in defence cooperation**

*Swedish defence policy and the Russian aggression: implications for bilateral cooperation*

In order to understand what created circumstances for mistrust to surface in Finland, one must pay attention not only to the aggravated state of affairs in the Baltic Sea area but also to the impact of domestic trajectories in Sweden that played a significant role also in Sweden’s decision in autumn 1990. At the end of the year 2012, the then commander-in-chief of Swedish Defence Forces Sverker Göranson dropped a bombshell. According to Göranson, Sweden would have been able to stand its ground and defend itself for only a week should it encounter military aggression (Holmström 2012).

The statement was given against the backdrop of defence reforms where Sweden considerably scaled down its conventional military capabilities and discontinued conscription in favour of recruiting professional defence forces. These decisions were a logical continuation of Sweden’s post-Cold War defence policy, which has put an emphasis on expeditionary operations instead of old-school territorial defence, the latter being one of the cornerstones of the Finnish defence policy.

More fuel was added to the fire in the spring of 2013, when Russia allegedly carried out a simulated nuclear attack on Stockholm in the early hours of Good Friday. Swedish planes were not prepared, and eventually Danish fighter jets from Lithuania were sent out to intercept the Russian
planes conducting the manoeuvre (Holmström 2016). Various incidents kept occurring in the Baltic Sea region (see Frear et al. 2014), and in August 2014 Sweden hunted an assumed Russian submarine in the Stockholm archipelago. No intruder was found, but commander Göranson was ‘convinced’ that a foreign submarine had indeed violated Swedish territory (The Local 2015).

The cases cited are the result of increased Russian assertiveness in European and global politics. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine crisis at large have been a game changer in the post-Cold War European security architecture. In his annual New Year’s speech in 2016, Finnish President Sauli Niinistö (2016) stated that ‘Russia’s reprehensible actions in Crimea and Ukraine disrupted our oasis of peace’, referring to the Baltic Sea area. The disruption has not gone unnoticed in security policy debates in Finland and Sweden or elsewhere in security policy communities. Rather intense speculation has begun among security policy experts as to whether Helsinki and Stockholm will discard the policy of military non-alignment and apply for NATO membership, and arguments have been put forward for and against Finland’s and Sweden’s membership (see e.g. Bertelman 2015; Braw 2015; Dempsey 2014; Gay 2015; Giraudo 2014; Lucas 2015; Moreland 2015; Seip 2015).

In Finland, public opinion has remained critical of NATO membership irrespective of Russia’s actions (see e.g. Forsberg and Pesu 2017). Support for membership has not surged. The foreign policy leadership has also underscored that, for the time being, Finland will remain outside NATO, maintaining the possibility of military alignment in the future (Valtionneuvosto 2016, 19). Sweden’s official policy, on the other hand, is even more explicit in that it intends to postpone NATO membership during the current government’s term. However, the centre-right opposition now unanimously advocates Sweden joining (Dahl 2017, 84; Reuters 2015b). Hence, the ruling Social Democratic Party is the gatekeeper as regards Swedish NATO membership application.

To top it all off, Swedish public opinion is more positive toward military alignment, and some recent polls have indicated that there are more Swedes supporting than opposing the country’s NATO membership (Milne 2014). In liberal democracies, public opinion tends to matter in foreign policy if certain conditions are met (see e.g. Davis 2012; Foyle 1997; Risse-Kappen 1991). Therefore, the trajectory of public opinion understandably sparks speculation concerning Sweden’s future actions.

The turbulent environment has given an extra boost to defence cooperation – between Finland and Sweden and in Norden at large. In May 2014, Finland and Sweden took considerable steps forward in their partnership when Defence Ministers Carl Haglund and Karin Enström signed an action plan outlining how the two countries should deepen cooperation. Several possible areas for bilateral cooperation were identified, including enhancing the interaction between the defence ministries
and exploring the possibilities to deepen cooperation between the countries’ navies, armies, and air forces. The final reports, made in accordance with the action plan, were published in February 2015. According to the report by the Defence Forces of Finland and Sweden,

[The long term commitment to deepened defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden aims for better security in a regional context and strives for the better use of resources and cost-efficiency in defence-related areas. Furthermore, the cooperation increases interoperability and the capability to act jointly both domestically and internationally. (Swedish Defence Forces and Finnish Defence Forces 2015, 2)

Again, many opportunities for cooperation were recognised – most notably the combined units of the navies and air forces that had been mentioned in the 2014 action plan. The report also stated that cooperation is a ‘significant signal for the surrounding region’. It also suggested the countries should study the possibility of extending cooperation to cover not only peacetime but times of crisis as well (ibid.). This argument was reiterated in a joint op-ed written by the Prime Minister of Finland Juha Sipilä and his Swedish colleague Stefan Löfven in winter 2016 (Sipilä and Löfven 2016). Along with the report, there are other indications of increased ambition as regards the partnership between Helsinki and Stockholm.

A possible defence alliance looms on the horizon. For example, Finland’s Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö has argued that the possibility of an alliance between Finland and Sweden should not be excluded (Itälehti 2016). The former and the longest-serving foreign minister in the history of Finland Erkki Tuomioja also expressed the same opinion, although he did not see the alliance as a realistic possibility at the time (Uusi Suomi 2015). In Sweden, the chair of the Defence Committee, Allan Widman, has advocated the idea of a defence alliance, but in Finland enthusiasm seems generally higher.

When it comes to the changed reality in the region, the Nordic countries have also reacted on the multilateral level encompassing all five states. In an opinion piece and joint declaration published in various Nordic newspapers and signed by the defence ministers of the Nordic countries in April 2015, the ministers made known their respective countries’ readiness to deepen cooperation in the face of Russia’s aggressive policies. For the first time, Nordic defence cooperation publicly echoed deterrence against Russia and cooperation was no longer merely a pragmatic way to achieve cost-effectiveness (Reuters 2015a).

To sum up the recent developments in defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden, one could argue that both the stakes and the level of ambition are higher than ever, and collaboration has become an integral part of Finland’s and Sweden’s national security policies. There is a will to proceed in tandem, and cooperation is not only a matter of cost-effectiveness.
Mistrust within trust

in a time of austerity but also one of reacting to the worrisome and worsened state of affairs in the Baltic Sea region. The increased stakes and ambitions also mean that if they are to go forward on the road of defence partnership, Sweden and Finland need to build trust, as has already been suggested.

The ‘lesson’ of October 1990 as an indicator of misplaced trust

Instability in the security environment and uncertainty stemming from the domestic debate as regards Swedish foreign and security policy moves have brought back the bitter memories of October 1990 in Finland. The recollection is evident when one examines various statements in Finnish foreign policy discourse suggesting that the present situation is analogous to that which prevailed in 1990. Several foreign affairs notables have voiced their concern that Sweden might desert what thus far has been fruitful bilateral cooperation and seek security guarantees from NATO without consulting Finland. A peculiar feature of the analogy is that it is invoked rather latently; the memories of the lesson from October 1990 seem to loom in the background.

The case of trust between Finland and Sweden differs greatly from the stakes at hand in superpower relations, where actions fuelled by distrust might lead to consequences threatening the existence of humankind. In the case of Finland and Sweden, the stakes of possible disappointment or betrayal are not weighed in a context of mutual hostility and conflict. Instead, being betrayed means facing the possible negative repercussions for security policy of being abandoned by the other state should it make a unilateral move to reorient its foreign policy. However, the relevant Finnish stakeholders are aware that the future of Fenno-Swedish cooperation is integral to Finnish national interests and that Sweden’s feared jumping the gun or unexpected foreign policy reappraisal might have even more direct security policy implications than the rather optimistic race towards European integration in the early 1990s.

Mistrust towards Sweden, usually hidden in the analogy of the 1990 EC incident, is easily observable in the Finnish foreign policy discourse. According to former defence minister and leader of the Swedish People’s Party of Finland Carl Haglund, for example, Sweden might apply for NATO membership soon and if it did, Finland would find itself in a position similar to that in 1990, when Stockholm ‘rather surprisingly’ decided to announce its EU bid (Ilta-lehti 2015). The former chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and a Member of Parliament Pertti Salolainen, who personally experienced the October 1990 as a member of the Finnish foreign policy decision-making elite, has again implied that Sweden’s position towards NATO could turn unexpectedly if the country’s Social Democrats change their foreign policy orientation (Suomenmaa 2015). Alpo Rusi (2015), a former ambassador and professor, has also joined the chorus by warning that the pro-NATO stance of the Swedish centre-right opposition
may soon spill over into the left–green government, bringing about the anticipated change in Sweden’s position on NATO membership.

Moreover, the various reassuring statements being made signal that the issue troubles not only heavyweights and pundits but also incumbents. When Finland’s Prime Minister Juha Sipilä paid his first official visit to Stockholm in June 2015, he reassured all concerned that Sweden and Finland have agreed not to surprise each other regarding NATO and that Helsinki and Stockholm will keep one another informed on matters of foreign policy. In the same breath, he asserted that Finland would refrain from any unexpected actions in terms of foreign policy (Yle Uutiset 2015b). Sipilä’s assertion can be seen as an effort to reinforce certain social norms between Finland and Sweden. An understanding of the social prerequisites for a trusting relationship are clearly present in Sipilä’s concerns; enhancing predictability is seen as a virtue in the present uncertain security environment.

In June 2015 during his visit to Sweden, the new Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö underscored that if Finland and Sweden ever joined NATO, it would be ‘natural’ to do so hand in hand (Helsingin Sanomat 2015a). However, Niinistö has since stated that Finland should ‘unceasingly’ monitor what Stockholm is up to in its relations with the United States and NATO and that it is not self-evident that Finland and Sweden would submit their applications to Brussels simultaneously. To avoid any surprises concerning NATO, Finland and Sweden have decided to keep each other up to date and, according to Niinistö, the parties have better chances of doing so today than in 1990 (Helsingin Sanomat 2015b).

The Finnish media’s role in invoking the lesson of October 1990 and hence reproducing the ‘mistrust narrative’ cannot be underestimated. For instance, former Prime Minister Alexander Stubb was once asked in a live interview to predict what his reaction and subsequent policies would be should Sweden catch Finland off guard by announcing its NATO bid (Yle Uutiset 2015a). The article by Unto Hämäläinen, mentioned earlier, is an example of the reproduction of the mistrust narrative through overt speculation that Sweden might take Finland by surprise yet again (Hämäläinen 2015). The most widely circulated daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (2016) has also speculated, in direct reference to October 1990, whether ‘a surprise from the other side of the Gulf’ is due in the near future.

The Finnish discourse of mistrust has not gone unnoticed across the Gulf of Bothnia. In the annual Folk och Försvar defence conference in Sälen in January 2016, Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström recognised Finland’s anxiety. However, she pleaded for military non-alignment as the best way to uphold the balance in the Baltic Sea area and reassured Finland that Sweden’s existing foreign policy line will hold fast – irrespective of the worsened state of affairs in its security environment. In addition, Wallström referred to the joint op-ed of the Finnish and Swedish prime ministers, published just before the conference, as an act of alleviating suspicions.
In the piece, Prime Ministers Sipilä and Löfven emphasised the feasibility of non-alignment and ever-deepening cooperation and information sharing between the militarily non-aligned Nordic countries (Hufvudstadsbladet 2016; Sipilä and Löfven 2016). Moreover, in autumn 2016, Prime Minister Löfven himself, echoing Wallström, underlined that Sweden rules out such a surprise move, and further highlighted that a change in the Swedish foreign policy line would be irresponsible and would bring about a change in the status quo (Ilta-Sanomat 2016). The message from Sweden to Finland was once more amplified later on in autumn 2016 when Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist strongly emphasised that his nation’s NATO membership is not in the cards (Helsingin Sanomat 2016).

What is important to note here is that Wallström’s, Löfven’s, and Hultqvist’s comments can be interpreted as reassuring signals towards Finland, implicitly reminding it of the unresolved historically rooted suspicions. The level of trust between Helsinki and Stockholm, at least in the moralistic/maximalist sense proposed by Michel, Booth, and Wheeler, is not as high as it could be. This does not imply that the relationship as a whole would be distrustful, but the puzzle remains of how to explain the latent experience of misplaced trust within a generally trustful partnership.

The fact that the experience of misplaced trust in 1990 pops up recurrently in the Finnish debate is not that surprising if one considers how heuristically strong historical analogies, lessons, and myths generally are in world politics (see especially Rasmussen 2003 and Juntunen 2017). There are superficial similarities between the present and the latter days of the Cold War – namely an unsettled security environment inciting deliberations regarding the feasibility of existing foreign policies. Moreover, in the 2010s, Sweden is once again being governed by the Social Democrats, and it has an opposition challenging the present foreign policy line.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden went through economic difficulties. This time, Stockholm has encountered a national security challenge in terms of capabilities. In addition to exhibiting a number of parallels with the present, the incident of October 1990 is a recent episode, and therefore it is rather available to the generation of Finnish politicians in power now. But there are also differences: whereas in 1990 the dilemma was essentially ‘positive’ in nature – a European-wide race towards western integration – the present case, marked by the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s provocative behaviour, is even more about leaving a friend out in the cold.

What do all these statements tell us about the trusting relationship between Finland and Sweden? It gives the impression that Finnish foreign policy elites cannot exclude the possibility of Sweden potentially acting against Finnish interests. Thus, following Michel’s reading of trust as a moralistic commitment, we should contest the idea that there is a habitual sense of trust at work in Swedish–Finnish bilateral national security cooperation. Rather, the pragmatic and incremental step-by-step progress made in the defence cooperation in recent years points towards strategic
trust-building efforts to mitigate the lack of trust in the sphere of national security using the ‘social trust capital’ inherited from the wider identification-based framework and expectations of benevolent intentions between the states. Indeed, the Finnish–Swedish case shows that trust can be understood both as a result or objective of cooperation (to overcome historically stratified mistrust within a certain policy area) and as a condition for cooperation (in the form of a general affective identity relationship between the collective units) at the same time (Weinhardt 2015, 32–35; see also Möllering 2006, 79).

Conclusion

Because the amount of trust required for an agreement varies, states can overcome the barrier of mutual suspicions by starting with small agreements where less is at stake so that each state can test the other’s intentions without putting too much at risk. In this way, states can acquire more information about the other’s values and reliability, before they move on to riskier agreements.

(Larson 1997, 716)

As regards to questions of national security, the overall framework in Finland seems to start from the appreciation of the social prerequisites and the overall value of identification-based trust with Sweden. This sense of trust and its social value is overshadowed by the shared and mediated experience of misplaced trust dating back to October 1990, thus implying that there is also a psychological dimension at work in the Finnish perception of cooperation with Sweden. Indeed, the gradually evolving style of the countries’ defence cooperation – visible in the way it has concentrated on building peacetime defence interoperability and coordination – indicates that there are background suspicions and issues that affect the depth and pace of the cooperation.

Moreover, the way in which the scope of this cooperation has been incrementally but constantly widened might be interpreted as a trust-building exercise in itself, at least on Finland’s part. Therefore, the question is not about pre-existing trust but (strategic) trust built in piecemeal fashion. It is interesting to note that in the above quotation Larson, together with the majority of trust researchers in IR it seems, mainly focuses on the nature of trust building in dyads that can be easily described as hostile or otherwise conflictual.

From the perspective of small states, where countries’ security policy orientations and decisions are usually highly interdependent, we need to weigh the significance of trustful relations and cooperative endeavours against the wider (sub-)regional security environment. In other words, the stakes of mutually reinforcing trust between small states should be measured against the question of how the level of trust and cooperation might
affect the wider international position and posture of these states. To measure the stakes of small-state trust building from a purely conflictual perspective is to succumb to what could be called the ‘great power fallacy’ (see also Juntunen 2017).

Put in more analytical terms and looked at from the perspective of trust-theorising in IR, the Finnish–Swedish case poses an outright paradox: as the illustrations in the analysis show, there is historically rooted mistrust within the Finnish foreign and security policy elite towards Sweden’s future foreign policy decisions. Both high-level policy-makers, such as the Finnish prime minister and defence minister, and experts seem to fear that Sweden might suddenly make a security policy reorientation – something similar to what happened in October 1990, causing disappointment that, having left unresolved, has since evolved into a narrative of betrayal.

This time Stockholm would however join NATO – a move that, from the Finnish point of view, would render Finland strategically vulnerable and hence violate the spirit of the close-knit relationship between the two Nordic neighbours. It, therefore, seems that the Finns cannot be totally doubtless about the benevolence of Sweden’s intentions and its recognition and consideration of Finnish interests. As a result, the Swedish foreign policy leadership has tried to reassure Helsinki of Stockholm’s adherence to the shared sense of interdependence and common fate.

How should we then explain this seemingly deeply ingrained Finnish suspicion towards Sweden in the realm of security and defence policy within the framework of bilateral relations that could be described as being as trustful as one can imagine in world politics, framed as they are in a general expectation of benevolent intentions and even held up as a model example of a security community? To unlock this paradox or tension, we have made three analytical and conceptual moves.

First, we distinguished historically engrained and socially stratified experiences of misplaced trust (mistrust) from distrust as a more comprehensive depiction of the overall condition of the relationship between states and political units. This distinction gives us clues on how the Finnish experience of mistrust in autumn 1990 can linger on even in mature relationships where social norms and mutual expectations maintain a profound sense of trustfulness. Second, and closely related to the first distinction, our analysis on the latent suspicions on Finland’s part towards Sweden in the realm of security policy shows that it is important to distinguish the experiences of betrayal and mere disappointment. Whereas disappointment fits better into a situation where the motives of the actors are more strategic and calculated (reliance), the sense of betrayal implies that something more profound and deeper in the relationship itself has been violated (moral trust).

Moreover, because the sense of disappointment was not dealt with properly in the early 1990s, it gradually stratified into a narrative of betrayal in the Finnish foreign policy discourse and now overshadows the
prospects of defence cooperation with Sweden. Additionally, the role of historically significant experiences of misplaced trust, especially in relation to sentiments of disappointment and betrayal, demonstrates that the puzzle cannot be approached from a purely rationalistic standpoint without reducing the role of history to the strategic and situational calculation of states that are acting with full information on the intentions of other parties.

Third, our analysis supports Booth and Wheeler’s (2008, 230) idea on placing trust on an ideal scale from minimal to maximal trust. This is to say that the conditions and nature of interstate trust are highly context-dependent and relational (see also Weinhardt 2015). This is accompanied by the notion of sectoral trust, or what Ruzicka and Keating (2014, 22) describe as ‘complex relationships where trust varies across different issue areas’. This seems especially relevant in small-state contexts as the Finnish–Swedish case quite well illustrates. Defence and security policy seem to form a sector of cooperation between Finland and Sweden where all the elements in the otherwise mature and fully evolved trusting relationship do not yet fully apply.

Moreover, coming back to the question of how to dispel the latent mistrust and its potentially harmful consequences between Finland and Sweden depends on how we define (and value) trust in international relations in the first place. If we define it as a form of strategic calculation, the way forward might well be the already established incremental process in defence and security political cooperation. This would indicate that a rather modest level of trust would be enough to steer the states towards a framework that enhances a reciprocal sense of credibility as regards this relationship. Theoretically this would point, in the words of Larson (1997, 714), to a mere reliance ‘on a state to fulfil its commitments and promises’ without further expectations of enhancing mutual trust and interests beyond explicit agreements.

We therefore go on to suggest that the sense of strategic trust – or trust-as-reliance – describes the nature of Finnish–Swedish bilateral defence cooperation, therefore making the case that the level of trust is closer to minimal than maximal trust. And if this is the level of trust that can be reached between two states within a model security community, this conclusion tells a great deal about the levels of achievable trust in international politics in general, that is, not very high above the minimalistic level. Moreover, coming back to the Finnish–Swedish case, during an era defined by turbulence in the external security environment, the level of trust experienced in the realm of national security is in danger of ‘spilling over’ to define the overall expectations of benevolent intentions between the states. One should remember that the incremental process can also take on a negative spin. This implies that the latent experience of mistrust, once left unresolved, might have even deeper ramifications than first acknowledged.

But the demands of this relationship could also be read from the perspective of maximal/phronetic trust. Here, a mere signing of agreements
and pragmatic-functional forms of everyday cooperation are not seen as significant enough developments, especially if read against the changing geopolitical environment in the Baltic Sea region. Maximal trust and its emotive basis echoes the idea of perceiving one’s partner in the general framework of benevolent intentions in all possible sectors of cooperation. Here it becomes crucial that any experience of misplaced trust should be dealt with accordingly (Michel 2012, 881). The Finnish–Swedish case shows that the ability to deal successfully with past experiences of misplaced trust (and thus the explicit acknowledgement of latent mistrust in the present) can have a crucial role in pushing the interaction between states from a mere pragmatic hedging strategy towards a genuine process of trust building – a process that never starts from a historical and social void.

A moralistic leap into uncertainty, as Booth and Wheeler (2008, 234–243) describe the effort that is needed if one wants to pursue maximalist trust, should be made so that the bilateral security political cooperation could thrive beyond the pragmatic understanding of trust as mere reliance. Even in its maximalist reading it should be acknowledged that the existential sense of future uncertainty in international politics can only be transcended, or suspended – the possibility of being let down, even betrayed, cannot be fully escaped (see also Brugger et al. 2013, 443; Möllering 2006, 111).

Notes

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2 In the recent white paper on defence policy, published by the government of Finland (Valtioneuvosto 2017, 17) in February 2017, bilateral cooperation with Sweden is described as having a ‘special status’ (erityisasema) in the totality of Finland’s international cooperation on defence policy. Moreover, the white paper explicitly says that no limitations have been set in advance on the depth of this cooperation in the future.

3 According to Wiberg (2000, 133–135) the forces behind the Nordic security community are predominantly internal. Mutual contacts with migration, a language community – Swedish is second official language in Finland – and the long tradition of neutralism are the core features underpinning the community. There are no indications of military contingency plans made against the other members of the community and the idea of a military conflict between the nations sounds utterly unthinkable. Moreover, over 600,000 people of Finnish ancestry live in Sweden. In addition to a common history, Finland and Sweden both adhere to the same social system, the Nordic welfare model. According to
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (Ulkoasiainministeriö 2015), ‘Sweden is the closest partner of Finland in the world’, and the relationship and connections between the states are described as ‘unique’.

4 Booth and Wheeler (2008, 183) highlight that the defining features of a security community are, *inter alia*, the predictability of peace, a high degree of integration, the delegitimized use of force, transparency, and trust.

5 According to Sil and Katzenstein (2010, 412) analytical eclecticism attempts to generate ‘[…] complex causal stories that forgo parsimony in order to capture the interactions among different types of causal mechanisms normally analyzed in isolation from each other within separate research traditions’.

6 For example, on the face of it, it seems to be quite hard to apply Hoffmann’s rules for measuring trusting relationships to the context of peaceful small-state relations, as the rules are heavily influenced by empirical examples taken from settings of multilateral institutions or power relations involving great powers (see also Rathbun 2011b).

7 Although it provides a compelling critique of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the rationalistic mainstream in the IR trust literature, Torsten Michel’s (2012) *phronetic* and emotion-driven conceptualisation of trust also relies on empirical examples based on conflictual dyads (such as that of Brazilian–Argentine relations in the 1970s) (ibid., 877–878; see also Wheeler 2009).

8 Whether this suspicion is well-grounded or not is an empirical issue and beyond the scope of this chapter. From the perspective of trust research, the mere existence of this suspicion amongst the foreign policy elite in Finland, whether latent or explicit, is already an indicator of a certain level of historical pathologies clouding the bilateral relationship.

9 Joining (or forming) a military alliance and thus abandoning the long history of military non-alignment policy could be interpreted as an *international orientation change*, although membership in the EU already imposes security policy requirements on Finland and Sweden that would make NATO membership a less sweeping change, one that would operate on the level of reorienting one's foreign policy programme or its driving goals. See Hermann (1990, 5) for a typology on major foreign policy changes.

10 Larson uses US–Soviet/Russian post-Cold War arms control discussions as a prime example of this kind of missed opportunity that might eventually increase mistrust.

11 Naapurimaiden hyvät välit menivät melkein poikki, koska Ruotsi pelasi kaksinaamaista peliä: ensin se salasi aikeensa, sitten petti Suomelle antamat lupaukset ja lopulta yritti yksin livahtaa Euroopan yhteisön jäseneksi. Tätä mieltä oli Suomen valtiojohto, presidentti ja hallitus. Ruotsin välistä veto jätti kansalliseen muistimeen jäljen, johon aina palataan, kun naapurimaiden väleissä ilmenee kitkaa.

(Translation by authors)

12 For example, on 19 October 1990, seven days before Sweden made its announcement, Finnish ambassador to Stockholm, Björn-Olof Alholm, informed Pertti Salolainen, then Minister for Foreign Trade of Finland, that ‘the social democratic government [in Sweden] is probably intending to take the initiative into its own hands before the opposition parties move forward [on the EC question].’ Alholm further highlighted that the reasons for this lay in Sweden’s domestic politics and economy, thus implying that Finnish interests did not matter that much in the equation. On the other hand, on 24 October, only two days before Sweden’s announcement, Undersecretary of State Veli Suncbäck wrote a confidential background paper to President Koivisto, Foreign
Minister Pertti Paasio, and Secretary of State Åke Wihtol in which he stated that Sweden’s minister for foreign trade, Anita Gradin, had just promised her Finnish counterpart, Salolainen, that Sweden would inform Finland before making any declarations concerning Sweden’s position vis-à-vis the EC and ETA processes. See archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (UMA) 35–00 EY, Ruotsi 1990, telegram from Stockholm ‘Ruotsin mahdollinen lähentyminen EY:n’, 19.10.1990 (two pages) and UMA 35–00 EY, Ruotsi 1990, memorandum no. 936 ‘Ruotsi/EY-jäsenkyvyys’, 24.10.1990 (three pages).

13 In April 2016, an expert group commissioned by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a study on the effects of possible Finnish NATO membership which argued that Sweden and Finland constitute a common strategic space. Therefore, the countries should make their decisions concerning NATO hand in hand. According to the report, different choices, especially Swedish accession to NATO, would render Finland vulnerable, (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2016).

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The “Finlandisation” of Finland: The Ideal Type, the Historical Model, and the Lessons Learnt

Tuomas Forsberg & Matti Pesu

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The “Finlandisation” of Finland: The Ideal Type, the Historical Model, and the Lessons Learnt

Tuomas Forsberg & Matti Pesu

Abstract

“Finlandisation” has become a buzzword and suggested solution to the on-going Ukrainian crisis. However, in Finland, Finlandisation tends to be a pejorative term because of its negative effects on Finnish domestic politics. Negative effects notwithstanding, Finland’s Cold War experience often appears as a success: it preserved its democratic system, prospered economically, and strengthened its international status. This analysis examines the historical evidence of what role Finlandisation—understood as a policy of collaboration and friendship with the greatest potential security threat to a country’s sovereignty and as a political culture related to that policy—played during the Cold War era. Did the strategy of accommodation go too far and was it superfluous to Finland’s survival and success? In this context, the article also discusses the “dangers” of Finlandisation and the gradual end of the policy.

“Finlandisation” has become a buzzword and a potential, suggested solution to the Ukrainian crisis after 2012. American foreign policy veterans like Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger have proposed that Finland could serve as a model for Ukraine’s international position.1 Ukraine would stay outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] and avoid hostility with Russia, benefit from close economic cooperation with both the European Union [EU] and Russia, whilst nobody would question its independence and status as a sovereign nation. Robert Kaplan and Bruce Gilley, in turn, have talked about the Finlandisation of China’s neighbours in East Asia.2 Armenian scholar Sergei Minasyan has considered the model concerning his own country, contending, “Finlandization is not the ideal or most advantageous foreign policy line, yet it is the safest method at the very least”.3 Moreover, some Russian pundits have seen Finland as a desired model: Alexander Dugin – the geopolitical ideologue behind the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 – has supported the Finlandisation of all of Europe.4

In most cases, Finlandisation refers to a foreign policy strategy where a smaller state adapts its policy to the interests of a bigger neighbouring country, typically a Great Power.5 During the Cold War, Finland’s relations with the Soviet Union exemplify this kind of adjustment.6 However, debates on Finlandisation often occur in terms of an abstract ideal-type without referring directly to Finland. Some scholars have even used the notion to build a generalised theory of political adaptation.7

Talk of Finlandisation was most intensive in the 1970s when it emerged as a highly politicised concept. During the process leading to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe process, some conservative European politicians and American “Cold Warriors” identified the Finlandisation of Western Europe as a threat looming large if promoting détente.8 Domestic debates used the notion. For instance, in West Germany, Christian Democrats warned of the potential consequences of the Social Democrats’, Willy Brandt’s, collaborative opening to communist Eastern Europe – Ostpolitik. In the 1980s, the concept started to acquire both connotations that were more positive and suggestions
that the Finnish model – “Finlandization in reverse” – was a potential solution for the Eastern European states.9

This analysis, nevertheless, focuses on the Finnish experience of Finlandisation. It assesses the historical evidence of what the Finnish policy of collaboration and accommodation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War era actually meant.10 In this context, Finlandisation constituted not only a foreign policy strategy but also a political culture with questionable features peculiar to Finland, especially in the 1970s. Did Finland’s success depend on the extensive nature of the collaborative strategy or did it unnecessarily go too far in its “appeasement”? Analysing Finlandisation also helps to retrieve some of its original meanings and, perhaps, increase historical sensitivity when certain elements reminiscent of the Cold War are returning and related analogies are applied.11

There is a relatively broad consensus that Finnish foreign policy was successful during the Cold War. Yet, some emphasise that “survival” was enough for success, whilst others see success in much broader terms, including economic growth, social welfare, and political freedoms.12 Compared to alternative histories, that is, the fate of the Eastern European countries that became communist-led Soviet satellites or, like the Baltic States, incorporated into the Soviet Union with much reduced political freedoms and lower economic well-being, the Finnish case clearly is a success but not without a price. The criticism relates to details – the negative side effects and, in particular, to the process. Could Finland have been able to survive the big game without the negative side effects?

This analysis finds basis on a thorough review of existing research literature and memoirs dealing with the Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War – much of which outside of Finland remains little known because of language barriers. Furthermore, the collaborative policy of friendship worked; but structurally embedded in the policy were many negative side effects, and there was the potential of danger when the strategy was close to turning from an instrument to an end in itself.

Even though this exegesis focuses on Finland, Finlandisation as a notion is not homespun; rather its roots lay in Central Europe. Richard Löwenthal, a professor at the Free University of Berlin, is usually considered the father of the notion, and the debate dates back to the 1960s.13 The Soviet Union’s sway over Finland became evident in Western Europe during the so-called 1958 “Night Frost” and 1961 “Note” crises. “Night Frost” was an episode when Moscow refused to accept the newly formed Finnish government and withdrew its ambassador from Helsinki resulting in the new government’s resignation. The “Note” crisis in turn emerged when Moscow requested military consultations with Finland on the basis of the 1948 Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance [FCMA] referring to the supposed increased military threat posed by Germany and its allies. A political meeting in Novosibirsk in late 1961 between Urho Kekkonen, the Finnish president, and Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet chairman of the Council of Ministers, resolved the “Note” crisis.14 These cases contributed to the negative image of Finland in the West, which saw them as a cautionary tale of what collaboration with the Soviet Union could potentially cause. The concept became popular in the 1970s when West German opponents of Brandt’s Ostpolitik adopted it for their domestic debate on West German policy.15

There are many definitions of Finlandisation and the above-mentioned pundits did not use it in a uniform manner. For some, Finlandisation meant a policy of voluntarily
accommodating interests and restricting sovereignty to preserve the independence of a country and avoid causing political tensions with a more powerful neighbouring country. From such a realist perspective, represented amongst others by George Kennan, the architect of United States containment policies towards Soviet Russia in the late 1940s, Finlandisation appeared as an honourable way to solve challenging security problems and, in that sense, interpreted as a beneficial, legitimate, and justified strategy.16 Some have also stressed the role of economic benefits that the policy of friendship brought as a positive factor.

On the other extreme, Finlandisation can appear as political remote control from abroad.17 This argument played a significant role in the security debate in Western Europe in the 1970s. Raymond Aron, the French political scientist and philosopher, saw Finland as a semi-independent state, whilst some regarded it as a de facto province of the Soviet Union.18 Walter Laqueur, the American historian, stated that Finland, although managing to preserve its freedom, lacked independence “in any accepted sense of the term”.19 The final negative depiction of Finlandisation comes from Alain Minc, a French political advisor, who in the mid-1980s envisioned three possible futures for Europe in the 2000s. One contemplated a bleak “Finlandized” “Hong Kong-Europe”, with preference given to neutrality and good relations with the Soviet Union.20

Another way to comprehend Finlandisation is to see it as a political culture, one that blossomed especially in the 1970s and was idiosyncratic to Finland, closely related to but not necessarily part of a general appeasement strategy. The professor of Russian history, Timo Vihavainen, who wrote a seminal work on the phenomenon, described Finlandisation as a pseudo-morphism – a political culture that embraced the ideals, conventions, and principles of totalitarianism without being totalitarian.21 Jukka Tarkka, a Finnish historian and journalist, as well as a former Member of Parliament, argued that Finlandisation bore resemblance to the “Stockholm Syndrome” to the extent that it was a way to react to pressure by acting sympathetically towards its source.22 Because an integral part of Finlandisation was its denial, the subject itself could neither see its own Finlandisation nor prove claims of Finlandisation incorrect.

In Finland, Finlandisation remains largely a pejorative term.23 During the Cold War, Finnish diplomats fought hard against its usage, trying to convince others of Finland’s neutrality and arguing that for Finland, Finlandisation did not exist. For them, the only acceptable way to see Finlandisation attached to Finland was to perceive it as an embodiment of peaceful co-existence between states with different political systems. If Kekkonen tried to give Finlandisation a positive spin and argued that Finland should be proud of it, the former Finnish diplomat, Max Jakobson, admitted that Finland was “Finlandised” to the extent that it tried not to antagonise the Soviet Union. However, the point of Finnish foreign policy, according to Jakobson, was not to antagonise the United States or any other important Power.24

From the 1970s until 1987, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was very active in reporting on and responding to accusations of Finlandisation internationally. At the beginning of the 1970s, the Ministry archived almost every reference or mention on Finlandisation no matter how minor the source. When discussion increased, the archiving became more selective, but the Ministry formed a working group that sketched a strategy to respond to the accusations.25 A part of Finnish policy was to be active. If some eminent foreign politician mentioned Finlandisation in an unacceptable way, Finnish officials
brought the issue up with the respective state’s officials or the individual.\textsuperscript{26} Newspapers, researchers, and other commentators also separated into sheep and goats depending on how they used the term.\textsuperscript{27} In 1987, a Ministry memorandum, which summed up the usage of the term from the 1970s until to the end of the 1980s, circulated and reporting on the issue gradually ended.\textsuperscript{28}

Understood as a policy of collaboration and friendship with the source of the highest potential security threat to a country’s sovereignty and independence, Finlandisation should be regarded as an instrumental policy and not in terms of identity politics. In Finland, too, debate on policies towards Russia often finds basis on identity: some suggesting that Russia is an archenemy or needed as a “negative other” for the construction of Finland’s identity. Equally, claims exist that neutrality and a realistic but friendly attitude towards Russia is a part of Finland’s identity.\textsuperscript{29} It follows, however, that if Finlandisation stands primarily as a policy based on identity, it is flawed as an instrumental strategy to safeguard a country’s sovereignty.

After all, the policy of collaboration and friendship is historically not the only Finnish strategy \textit{vis-à-vis} Russia – tsarist, Soviet, or otherwise. Ever since mid-nineteenth century, Finland has adopted two policy traditions: a more political realist approach seeking to balance Finnish and Russian interests, and a more liberal and legal approach defining the interests of Finland on the basis of Western values and legal sovereignty. The foundations for the policy of collaboration were laid by the thought of Johan Vilhelm Snellman, a Hegelian philosopher and statesman in the 1800s, a period when Finland was still a Grand Duchy and an autonomous part of the Russian Empire. The nineteenth century Hegelian Fennoman nationalist movement in the Grand Duchy emphasised that Finland should not abuse temporary Russian weakness to widen its room for manoeuvre. The counterpart of this realist approach was constitutionalism advocated by Leo Mechelin, an academic and senator. This more liberal camp underlined that as Finland was a society based on legality, Russo-Finnish relations embodied, in fact, a question moulded by principles of law – not a question of power, history, or prevailing circumstances.\textsuperscript{30}

The policy of friendly relations with Russia entertained perceptions, however, as an instrument to strengthen domestic sovereignty by the Fennomans and not as an end in itself. With the approach labelled “separatist loyalism”, it saw good relations with the tsarist regime as a means to maximise domestic political room for manoeuvre – an idea that then became predominant in Finnish thinking toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War era.\textsuperscript{31} The idea of separatist loyalism was that collaboration and obedience had their limits. When preserving core interests proved impossible by showing loyalty, then active resistance would come into play. Although maintaining good relations with Russia was of utmost importance, Finland did not have to accommodate itself to the potential arbitrariness of St Petersburgh. For Finland, it was also vital to distant itself economically and politically from \textit{Russia}, but preserving a loyal relationship with \textit{the tsar} – irrespective of Russia’s relative strength. According to Jakobson, “loyalty to the ruler paid off in terms of freedom of action in internal matters”.\textsuperscript{32}

The Fennoman policy of collaboration ended when a period of Russification of Finland commenced with the manifesto of Tsar Nicholas II in February 1899. The manifesto placed most Finnish legislation under the direct surveillance of St. Petersburg, with the previously granted constitutional rights of Finland successively scaled down, for example, Nicholas ordered that Russian was the principal administrative language in
Finland. However, this period of Russification ended with the Russian revolution of 1905. Nevertheless, a new period of Russification started soon afterwards, in the context of anticipating the coming war, but this effort ended with the October Revolution in 1917, after which Finland declared its independence. In the first decades of independence prior to the Second World War, Finnish policy towards the Soviet Union was clearly antagonistic although, by the late 1930s, based on the idea of neutrality along the Swedish model. However, the declared policy of “strict neutrality” did not save Finland from the Second World War that started with the invasion of Finland by Soviet forces in November 1939.

There was no real strategic choice for Finland after the Second World War, and it had to re-orientate its foreign policy: in the Finnish self-narrative, the reappraisal marked a shift from the pre-war emotionalism to rationalism. The war was lost and a new relationship with the Soviet Union needed building on that basis. Finland’s relative position was weak: the East was even closer and the West out of Finland’s reach. Finland had limited connexions with the West and was at the mercy of the Soviet-dominated Control Commission that monitored the implementation of the Moscow Armistice. The obligations of the treaty included some contested and unpopular issues such as prosecuting wartime leaders as war criminals based on retroactive legislation. Finland was also obligated to pay war reparations, which subsequently formed the basis for extensive trade relations with the Soviet Union.

In 1948, Finland and the Soviet Union signed the FCMA treaty, which is fundamental to understanding Finlandisation. According to Tarkka, the treaty became a basic reality, which had an influence on daily political life and repercussions in general societal behaviour, academic analysis, civic activity, and customs. The treaty was the bedrock of Finnish-Soviet relations throughout the Cold War. Finns saw the FCMA treaty as the guarantee of Finland’s democracy and, still in 1983, one prominent Finnish politician called the treaty “the Magna Carta of Finland”. In 1988, when Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms started in the Soviet Union, 80 percent of the Finns still supported the treaty.

Signing the FCMA treaty symbolised Finland’s adaptation to the new foreign policy line. An essential part was the critical evaluation of pre-war foreign policy, seen as irresponsible despite based on neutrality between the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The new line did not emerge from a vacuum but had inspiration from the old realist tradition of separatist loyalism. Juho Kusti Paasikivi, the Finnish president from 1946 to 1956, was an apprentice of Yrjö-Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen – a Finnish politician who had been a follower of Snellman.

During the immediate post-war years, Finland needed to fulfil its peace treaty obligations and convince the Soviet Union that it did not pose a threat. However, gaining trust was not easy when the Soviet Union, led by an ever more paranoid Josef Stalin, still assumed that in the event of a general war, Finland would take the Western side. Stalin nevertheless respected Finland because it fought hard for its independence, one reason why Finland avoided harsher measures by the Soviet Union and managed to keep its independence. At the same time, a more benign image of the Soviet Union was easier to accept by the Finnish people: because Finland remained unoccupied, the civilian population did not encounter Soviet atrocities of the magnitude that would have left deep traumas, unlike the Baltic States or Poland.
In Finland, there were similarly suspicions towards the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Union. After the war, the Finnish communists controlled the Finnish Security Intelligence Service and Ministry of Interior: hence, the period between 1944 and 1948 still remembered as the “years of danger”. Eventually, Finland did not take the “Czechoslovakian road”. Dominated by communists, the Finnish People's Democratic League lost its position as the biggest party in the 1948 elections, were ousted from the government, and the security police was reorganised. Subsequently, enhanced democracy created stability and a solid ground for a Cold War foreign policy based on neutrality. Paasikivi stressed the importance of good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union but also thought that with the acceptance of the FCMA treaty, Finland had gone as far as possible. It was conceivable to develop further economic relations but avoid creating economic dependence. Moreover, Paasikivi thought that Finland was lucky because Finnish culture was so different from Russian and few Finns spoke the Russian language. Finally, it was important that the Finnish parliament and president decided who formed the government and served as ministers; otherwise, it would be a slippery slope, although consideration of Russian opinion remained possible.40

In many ways, Finnish policy towards the Soviet Union was consistent until the end of the Cold War, although the strategic room for manoeuvre did increase when compared to the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The Finnish paradox, as explained by Kekkonen in a speech at Washington in 1961, was that the better Finland succeeded “in maintaining the confidence of the Soviet Union in Finland as a peaceful neighbour, the better were our opportunities for close co-operation with the countries of the Western world”.41 The core idea of this policy of “maintaining confidence” was not to violate Soviet interests, which meant however that Finland stayed out of international organisations when the Soviet Union resisted. Whereas Moscow’s “no” to Finland joining organisations labelled anti-Soviet, such as NATO and the European Economic Community [EEC], was clear, participation in Nordic co-operation was acceptable – others like the formation of a Nordic Economic Union the late 1960s, seen by Moscow as a stepping stone to the EEC, was not. Moscow also accepted that Finland could conclude a free trade treaty with the EEC in 1973, but this agreement contained special provisions that included a shorter time than normal for abrogation and no political development clause. Furthermore, Finland did not publicly criticise Soviet domestic or foreign policy, for example, no Finnish condemnations of the Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979). Hence, in foreign policy Finland “Finlandised” immediately after the Second World War when the new line of policy was embraced; the strategy lasted until Finland started to steer its foreign policy towards Europe and especially the EU.

There were, nevertheless, ritualistic elements in Finnish-Soviet relations that only belonged to the worst era of Finlandisation. Kekkonen was keen to have close personal relations with the Soviet leadership and visited the country frequently. Flattering and talk of friendship, irrespective of the actual state of affairs, sugar coated official Finnish-Soviet interaction. The key word was “trust”, so often repeated that it started to raise questions whether its use was meant to hide its non-existence. In a banal way, the production of a joint motion picture on Finnish-Soviet relations entitled “Trust” elevated the semantic status of the concept.42

Yet, Finlandisation was also a political culture that affected the entire society. Directly after the war, public opinion remained generally unaffected and, in any event,
Paasikivi believed that he had to conduct his friendly policy towards the Soviet Union despite public opinion. But after the “Note” crisis, Kekkonen wanted public opinion more actively to support his foreign policy. It resulted in a top-down endeavour to imprint official foreign policy ideas onto the whole society – from the top ranks to ordinary citizens. Yet Kekkonen feared that the Soviet Union could spoil the attempt to uphold the friendly image. For instance, after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, he was shocked because the hard-won devotion and popular support for his policies could evaporate through the unpopularity of the Soviet behaviour.\(^4^3\)

As a political culture, Finlandisation reached its climax in the 1970s when the Soviet Union – despite the general détente in East-West relations – tried to tighten its grip on Finland. During this period, Moscow – and particularly its two active ambassadors at Helsinki, Alexei Beljakov and Vladimir Stepanov – were increasingly hostile toward the policy of neutrality and eager to intervene in Finnish domestic affairs. Simultaneously, Finnish governments were short-lived, and speculation over Kekkonen’s successor was intense.\(^4^4\) The 1972 CIA report asserted,

> the very existence of [the Soviet tools of leverage], no matter how remote the possibility of their use, has created a state of mind in Finland which is now as important as the leverage weapons themselves: the Finns tolerate considerable Soviet influence over their national destiny, accepting the need to do so as a fact of life.\(^4^5\)

During that period, the negative side effects of Finlandisation were most palpable, increasingly inter-woven with Kekkonen and his dominance and the consolidation of his hegemony in the Finnish political life.\(^4^6\) Kekkonen’s domestic position was shaky at the beginning of his time in office but his victory in the presidential elections in 1962, held in the aftermath of the “Note” crisis, sealed his position as a guarantor of good relations with the Soviet Union. Kekkonen’s dominance went unchallenged until 1981 when Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto refused to accept his call to resign.\(^4^7\)

Kekkonen produced many questionable practices of Finlandisation like conducting undemocratic measures by exceeding his constitutional powers, working through personalised networks, and concealing relevant information from others as a means of control.\(^4^8\) On the other hand, the élite as well as the populace were willing to grant these rights and allow him to continue his pre-eminence because continuation would uphold the system where the alternatives seemed worse.\(^4^9\) Kekkonen’s dominance was most evident in 1973 with an emergency law enacted – as part of a package deal together with the EEC free trade agreement – to extend his presidency by four years.

At times, Soviet influence on Finnish domestic affairs is called the key aspect of Finlandisation. Unarguably, the Soviet Union held considerable sway over Finnish domestic policy, the eastern neighbour often referred to with euphemisms such as “headquarters” or “the great eastern constituency”.\(^5^0\) The Soviets were particularly concerned over what they considered aspects of “revanchism” in Finnish society, like publishing maps of the Karelian areas of Finland lost to Russia in the 1939-1940 Winter War. Yet, it is unclear what the Soviet Union really demanded, and what the competing political forces within Finland interpreted as such for reasons of political expediency.

Soviet influence manifested in a myriad of ways. The most notable instance was the exclusion of the conservative National Coalition Party from the government for 21 years. Although well known, the main reason for doing so – Soviet objection – was not
often expressed publicly. Another sign of Moscow’s influence was Kekkonen’s refusal to appoint officials who did not enjoy Soviet trust to occupy key government positions.\textsuperscript{51} In Finnish political life, loyalty to the Soviet Union was not necessarily a trump card, but if stigmatised as “anti-Soviet”, politicians were black balled and their chances of pursuing a significant career in politics and government became slim. Kekkonen had the final word with regard to this issue. For instance, the Agrarian League – later Centre Party – chairmain, V.J. Sukselaenain, was ousted from that position in 1964 because of his alleged connexions with Estonian emigrants. The Party made the decision bending to Kekkonen’s will for reasons of foreign policy, but others suspected that Kekkonen also torpedoed the career of his potential rival.\textsuperscript{52}

A significant feature of Finlandisation, seen as obnoxious by critics, was the self-censorship of the Finnish media.\textsuperscript{53} In the 1950s, there were still critical comments about the Soviet Union and Finland’s foreign policy orientation towards its neighbour, but then self-censorship started to rear its head. Not necessarily a champion of the liberal understanding of freedom of speech, Kekkonen demanded that Finnish media reports accord with the official foreign policy line. It meant no criticism of the Soviet Union – either in editorials or on opinion pages. Kekkonen supervised this personally and reminded editors-in-chief immediately if they crossed the line. Over the course of time, the Finnish media learnt to live accordingly.\textsuperscript{54} In 1973, Finland and the Soviet Union issued a declaration wherein the media in both countries acquired a special responsibility in sustaining friendship and trust between the two nations.\textsuperscript{55}

The joint declaration made the climate for self-censorship even more favourable. Self-censorship spread from publishing and journalism to culture in general. The fate of the Soviet dissident’s, Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s, \textit{The Gulag Archipelago}, published in 1973, became a \textit{cause célèbre} in the era of Finlandisation. The Finnish publishing house, Tammi, which planned a translation, refused to publish the book because of the pressure put upon it and, eventually, the Finnish edition appeared in Sweden.\textsuperscript{56} Another example of the sensitivities was the cancellation of a concert by a Canadian choir consisting of Estonian emigrants.

Yet, there are a number of counter-examples and everyday resistance of the culture of Finlandisation. Civil society remained strong and many associations including the church, most sports clubs, the boy scouts, girl guides, and Rotarians and Lions represented patriotism and Western values. Additionally, over 2,000 Finnish academics, awarded with the American Society of Landscape Architects and Fulbright scholarships, travelled to the United States between the 1950s and the 1980s to visit different universities and research institutions. A number of the scholarship holders educated in the United States later served in senior positions in academia and the government, which enhanced the Western ideals of pluralism in Finland, at least as a one factor.

A peculiar part of Finnish Cold War history was the appeal of Moscow-led Marxism-Leninism amongst the generation born in late 1940s and early 1950s. A considerable number of the youth were members of the so-called “Stalinist” minority bloc of the Communist Party of Finland and found themselves in opposition to the “patriotic communists” who had fought against the Soviet Union in the Second World War. The “Stalinists” had particular influence in cultural and academic spheres as well as in journalism. Hence, the communist-led student movement lobbied for an equal amount of Western and Eastern textbooks, and they tried to ban textbooks that were, according to
their interpretation, anti-Soviet or included research findings that contradicted the results of communist studies. The movement was not successful in driving through their agenda in toto, but there was hardly any Finnish research literature critical of the Soviet Union, and only a couple of Finnish researchers were part of the Western community of Soviet studies.

Another somewhat successful agenda of the radical left was in their resistance to nationalist ideals related to the support of Finnish security. In particular, the leftist radicals undermined attempts to build up a “spiritual national defence”. For them, the ideals of national unity sustaining spiritual defence were bourgeois. Due to public criticism towards its work, the government Committee for Spiritual National Defence was eventually discontinued and replaced by another committee that was politically composed but had more moderate goals. Afterwards, many former members of the “Stalinist” movement did show signs of self-criticism. A former radical and subsequent minister and Member of Parliament of the Green Party, Satu Hassi, has said that “we indeed tried really hard [to create a revolution], but luckily we did not succeed”. However, some have also defended their actions. The former editor-in-chief of Tiedonantaja, the organ of the so-called minority communists, believed that the radicals did not really defend the Soviet Union for the sake of glorification of the totalitarian Soviet state but because of it being a counter-force to American imperialism.

With regards of its own history, Finland adjusted the official interpretation of key historical events. Kekkonen explained that Finland was partly culpable for the Winter War, not to mention the so-called “Continuation War” along with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union after June 1941. Or that Vladimir Lenin, a great friend of Finland, granted independence to the Finns – a construction that Kekkonen held dear because he thought that subsequent Soviet leaders would not dare challenge Lenin’s decisions. Yet, the writing of history remained nationalist, and when an attempt to introduce the Soviet approach into the education curriculum emerged, it fostered a quick renunciation. The memory culture related to the Finnish war history was alive and vivid.

If passive assimilation had continued and the radical left had been more successful in driving its agenda, the consequence would have been catastrophic. Although avoided in the end, a Finlandisation of consciousness was therefore potentially looming. There was indeed a peculiar and distorted political culture regarding the Soviet Union in Finnish society, but it was layered and many of its features were not wholeheartedly accepted or, let alone, embraced by the majority of Finns. The strategy of collaboration with the Soviet Union would have failed if the public had not understood that it was just an instrumental strategy to preserve the core of sovereignty. The diplomat and short-term foreign minister, Keijo Korhonen, explained in his memoirs how the Foreign Ministry worried over the effects of the liturgical “friendship” talk. It pondered over how to convince the public that what the leadership was saying was not what it was doing. If the “kitchen talk” – or in the case of Finland, the “sauna talk” – had changed into the official canon, then it thought independence had been lost.

So where did Finland succeed, what was the red line that protected the hard core? First, Finland retained its independent defence capability and rejected joint military exercises with the Soviet Union, not to mention accepting Soviet bases in Finland after the return of Porkkala in 1955. The most famous event came in 1978, when Marshal Dmitri Ustinov, the Soviet minister of defence, visited Finland to pressure Kekkonen into
accepting joint military exercises. Kekkonen tacitly but clearly refused to respond to the initiative.\textsuperscript{65} The leadership, however, did not want to boast about these successes. Second, efforts occurred to ensure that the economic relationship with the Soviet Union did not become too dominant, although the eastern trade largely benefited Finland. An illustration of the sensitivities related to trade was the Soviet Union wanting to sell two nuclear reactors to Finland in the 1970s and making an offer that Finland could not refuse. However, Finland developed nuclear engineering to be able to rebuild the Soviet model to match the Western standards, to “transform a Moskvitch into a Mercedes” as it was said at the time. Moreover, no significant Russian migration to Finland ensued and the existing minority consisting of a few thousand-tsarist era emigrants were rather critical of the communist rule in their former home country. The cultural contacts between the societies were, despite the rhetoric, rather thin. Finally, the hard core of Finlandisation included the principle that the key decision-makers should be patriotic Finns who would instinctively understand the name of the game. The majority of Finnish communists, who were otherwise willing to support socialism in Finland, turned out to be rather patriotic in any crisis concerning Finland’s sovereignty.

Finlandisation began to evaporate in the late 1970s and early 1980s, one key explanation for its decline found on the leadership level. Kekkonen, born in 1900, was showing visible signs of aging, and he started to lose his former authority. His successor as president, Mauno Koivisto, had a twofold role, both a cause as well as a consequence, of the process. On the one hand, a popular movement transcending party lines backed Koivisto’s rise to the presidency and drew people fed up with the old élit and its practices; on the other, Koivisto used his power to normalise the political system. He was interested in Russia but not seen as a candidate supporting the old power structures.\textsuperscript{66} Another clear sign of the changes in the political climate during the 1982 presidential elections was that in the run-up to the election, the Centre Party presidential candidate, amongst all candidates seen as a candidate supporting the old power structures, Ahti Karjalainen, lost the race to his competitor Johannes Virolainen. The Soviet leadership regarded Virolainen as having a bad reputation towards the Soviet Union and none of the Soviet favourites found nomination even as candidates. In fact, dissatisfaction with the political establishment had been visible already in the 1979 parliamentary elections when the National Coalition Party gained a considerable electoral victory. Although excluded from the government at that time, it eventually formed a coalition government in 1987. Indeed, as a staunch supporter of parliamentarianism, Koivisto revised Kekkonen’s presidential power system without changing the constitution. Unlike Kekkonen, he did not construct a personalised network of power but preferred to run day-to-day business through official channels.\textsuperscript{67} Nevertheless, Koivisto’s role in the collapse of Finlandisation was not straightforward, since he also had a tendency to control public discourse in foreign policy matters.\textsuperscript{68}

Another factor in Finlandisation’s disappearance in the political culture was simply the change of generation. Finnish youth who had embraced Moscow-led communism in the 1970s moderated their ideology whilst getting older and, in youth politics, a new, more “apolitical” or environmentally engaged generation replaced it. The change was gradual, but eventually the intellectual claim to hegemony of the “Stalinist movement” and its influence in cultural and academic circles was broken.\textsuperscript{69} According to the renowned journalist, Unto Hämäläinen, the self-censorship of the Finnish press began to loosen in
1984-1985, but the Finnish political élite still occasionally saw the press’ behaviour and comments as irresponsible if critical of the Soviet Union.70

Moreover, the change in the Finnish political culture was dependent on the real progress of socialism in the Soviet Union. The shortcomings of the socialist system in terms of its economic and technological performance became evident in the late 1970s, which took away its appeal. When affordable package tours to the Soviet Union became popular, Finns were able to see the realities of socialism – although often interpreting the realities through thick ideological lenses.71 In particular, the arrival of computers and the shift in technology that the Soviet Union could not match made the gap between the West and the East plain to the public. Gorbachev’s glasnost was the nail in Finlandisation’s coffin: the Moscow card lost its value in domestic politics as Soviet interest in Finland’s doings simply began to lessen due to Gorbachev’s new thinking in foreign policy.

As a foreign policy strategy, however, Finlandisation continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 and allegedly in some aspects thereafter. Koivisto was very cautious in his foreign policy, not wanting to test the limits of Finland’s freedom of action.72 He avoided using the term “neutrality” too often, preferring instead “hold the positions from where we do not need to withdraw”.73 Public opinion changed slowly and did not challenge the leadership. For example, a clear majority of Finns supported the FCMA treaty until the end of the 1980s.74 Koivisto himself stated that he was doctrinally closer to Paasikivi than Kekkonen, who had personified the era of Finlandisation; his ideas may explain the continuation of the foreign policy line and the changes in the domestic political culture.75 Vihavainen, the professor of Russian studies at the University of Helsinki, interpreted Koivisto’s actions as discarding the mechanisms of Finlandisation, not only in domestic politics but also in foreign policy; still, they continued along the well-tried historical line of collaboration and friendship towards Russia.76 Although Finland joined the European Free Trade Association and the Council of Europe, it did so belatedly and, although starting European Community membership negotiations during Koivisto’s tenure, the major features of traditional realism such as prudence remained at the core of Finland’s foreign policy thinking. During the independence processes of the Baltic States in 1990-1991, in one instance, Finland was reluctant in expressing support publicly; rather, it gave advice that the States should negotiate first with Moscow and, after their independence, reminded them of the principles of political realism as understood in Finland vis-à-vis Russia.

The Finnish debate on Finlandisation continued after the end of the Cold War. Some commentators alleged that by that time, Finland became “post-Finlandised”: a better term actually would have been “counter-Finlandised”, meaning that Russia now appeared in a negative light and the media refrained from reporting positive news on Russia.77 Others have claimed that Finland is now “Finlandised” towards the EU or the United States; it is obeying them loyally without the capacity for expressing public criticism.

Furthermore, there have also been claims of “re-Finlandisation” in Finland. The main argument in these claims has been that Finland has been naïve and too cautious in its relations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia after 2000.78 The principal target of critics was former Social Democrat President Tarja Halonen, in office from 2000 to 2012, who saw herself as a guarantor of Finland’s militarily non-allied status and an interlocutor with Putin. Yet, the same foreign policy line has continued despite the change of the state leader. Sauli Niinistö, who succeeded Halonen in March 2012, has also argued that Finland has
not joined NATO because it would damage good relations with Russia, which are prerequisites for Finland’s security.70 According to the critics, this “re-Finlandisation” also reflected the fact that Finland has not properly addressed Russian problems with democracy and human rights. Moreover, these pundits stress that the root problem is that the era of Finlandisation requires critical examination. They have even suggested the establishment of a truth commission to disclose the wrongdoings of the Finlandisation era.80

Finlandisation has also emerged as a political weapon in environmental and energy issues as well as in foreign policy during the Ukrainian crisis. The Green Party left the government in 2014 because the government decided to build a joint nuclear power plant with the Russian nuclear energy company, Rosatom, in northern Finland, whereby characterisations of the nuclear decision as a dangerous move in creating vulnerable dependencies invoked accusations of Finlandisation.81 Furthermore, one of the most visible critics of this Finlandisation was the author of historical plays and novels about Estonia, Sofi Oksanen, who emphasised that appearance does matter: “That Finland looks ‘Finlandised’ suits Moscow, because it makes Finland look like an unreliable partner to the West”.82 Otherwise Finland’s policy on Russia during the Ukraine crisis was in line with and backed the key EU decisions, that is, condemnation of the annexation of Crimea and the imposition of sanctions but also supporting continuous dialogue and negotiations with Russia.

For the contemporary advocates of good neighbourly relations with Russia, Finlandisation was positive to Finland. Although it limited Finland’s de facto sovereignty domestically and room for manoeuvre internationally, with negative side effects beyond these restrictions, it was nevertheless a success as a foreign policy instrument. Regardless of Kekkonen’s role in Finlandisation, he had an interest in strengthening Finland’s international position that the West would also approve. Finland also tacitly enhanced its defence capabilities and avoided military co-operation with the Soviet Union. Most importantly, Finland avoided the worst problems of becoming either internally dysfunctional or Sovietised by a “fifth column”. In this sense, Finland pursued its national interest by the means of realpolitik, and it endeavoured to satisfy the Soviet Union’s defensive security interests.83 Yet, loyalty towards Moscow had its limits. A former Finnish ambassador to the Russian Federation has called the Finnish Cold War policy “containment” whereby Soviet initiatives on closer collaboration were rejected.84 As Ketjo Korhonen Korhonen, a former foreign minister, has put it, behind the scenes of flattering, a constant war was fought on the formation of joint Finno-Soviet communiques. The Finnish goal was to preserve references about its neutrality, whereas the Soviets tried to remove such references – especially after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.85 Another clear sign of Finland’s ability to put limits to Soviet influence was denying entry into Finland of the former Finnish communist leader and head of the wartime puppet-government, Otto-Wille Kuusinen.86

For the Soviets and later Russians, the relationship with Finland worked as a model case. Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader from 1964 to 1982, asserted that Soviet-Finnish ties were an illustration of “good, correctly established relations” between a big Power and a comparatively small neighbour.87 Moreover, the views of Viktor Vladimirov, a highly influential former KGB resident and liaison to the top ranks of the Soviet leadership who served many years in Finland, are instructive. The Soviet leadership were of the opinion that the cordial and functional relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union was a
showpiece for the entire world of peaceful co-existence between a communist giant and a small democratic state.88

A former American ambassador to Finland, James Goodby, has emphasised two characteristics of the Finnish political culture that helped Finland survive: “[O]ne is a stubborn defence of national positions”; “another is a willingness to be accommodating on small things”. Goodby emphasised that “If you put these two admirable traits together you’ll get what foreign critics have shortsightedely called ‘Finlandisation’”. According to Goodby, Finland’s strategy was not subservience to the Soviet Union – it was quite the opposite.89 Another former North American ambassador to Finland, the Canadian Paul Malone, argued that Finland is a country that has gone through much, and it is a success story in terms of economy and foreign policy. Malone emphasised that Finland has nothing to apologise for to the outside world.90

Therefore, Finlandisation was not simply a policy of limitless accommodation. It is clear that various Soviet demands were regularly blocked. Moreover, sometimes it was wise to resist accepting all the smallest demands of the Soviet representatives, particularly if they came for the lower levels of hierarchy.91 This course occurred because it would then have opened the doors of increasing political pressure and, from this, secondary but morally detrimental consequences initiated by all kinds of people who were able to act in the name of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Finlandisation was not a policy that would have led to radical gains – like Kekkonen unable to restore the lost parts of Karelia, although that goal seemed to be part of his agenda when building the relationship on trust.

However, some political manoeuvres and initiatives undertaken to please Russia were clearly excessive, even in terms of courtesy such as the nation-wide campaign to collect signatures for a peace address commenced in 1974 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the peace treaty with the Soviet Union. The purpose of the campaign was to unite all the “peace forces” in Finland to support friendly relations and co-operation between Finland and the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen then presented the peace address to the Soviet president, Nikolai Podgorny, in May 1975. Another famous case of such obsequious initiatives was Eino Uusitalo, the deputy prime minister and minister of interior in the 1970s, suggesting that the date of signature of the Moscow Armistice should be elevated to the second Independence Day.92

In addition, Finlandisation definitely led to some undemocratic and unhealthy practices on the domestic scene, which eroded social cohesion and morale. Kekkonen often exceeded his constitutional powers, political corruption was rampant as career promotions depended on arbitrary foreign policy suitability criteria, and the media failed to fulfil its role as the Fourth Estate. The 1973 emergency law enacted to bypass regular presidential elections, as well as the 1978 presidential elections, regarded commonly as a farce, undermined the electorate’s trust to the political system.93 The exclusion of the National Coalition Party from the government for two decades despite electoral victories also signalled that voting did not really matter. However, the way that the communists found integration in the coalition governments appears generally as a positive practice that fostered the building large coalitions in the left-right divide in Finland.

The question is therefore whether, or where, the policy went too far or was superfluous. The moral evaluation of the phenomenon depends upon whether one considers Finlandisation forced or not. There is no easy answer, as any counter-factual analysis on what would have happened if Finland’s strategy had been different rests on a thin ice. Yet,
the fact that little happened in Soviet-Finnish relations when Koivisto was elected president and the political culture of Finlandisation ended suggests an exaggeration of the extent of domestic accommodation. Moreover, other factors shaped Moscow’s policy towards Finland beyond its collaborative policy concerning the Soviet Union. Realpolitik, Finland’s independent defence capability, the threat that Denmark and Norway would abandon the restrictions in their NATO policy, and Sweden’s possible move closer to NATO if Finland faced too much Russian pressure were factors that the Kremlin had to consider.

Whilst the role of economic benefits was never a key to the success or failure of the policy of Finlandisation with the Soviet Union, the trade relationship had some bearing. It kept part of the establishment satisfied and explains why the business lobby was slow to support EC membership for Finland before Soviet trade collapsed at the end of the Cold War. Russia’s first post-Soviet ambassador to Finland, Yuri Deryabin, described the Finnish-Russian relationship in terms of the comic book figures, Tom, the cat, and Jerry, the mouse, implying that Finland was driving the relationship although it was the weaker party. Although, Finland economically benefitted from trade, particularly in the 1980s when the price of oil went up and with trade based on bilateralism, economic dependence was far from being the ideal choice. Indeed, Finland paid the price, as the 1990s recession hit very hard after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it quickly became clear that the sectors dependent on Russian trade were not competitive enough in the European or global markets. Moreover, during the Cold War, Finland was not able to participate fully in many Western co-operative programmes in the field of new technologies.

What are the lessons learnt from the Finnish case of Finlandisation? It was a relative success but not without a price and involving considerable risks. The naïve interpretation of Finlandisation as simply a policy of friendship towards Moscow combined with military neutrality as the keys to success is misleading. It needs understanding in that the image of friendship involved more as a tool than an objective in itself. Some of the negative side-effects – over-extended self-censorship, general political corruption based on the importance of having a reputation of being not anti-Soviet, as well as the habit of actively using the Moscow card for tripping up otherwise honourable political competitors – could certainly have been possible to avoid. But these tendencies were not just individual choices; they were in-built in the structures of Finlandisation as a political culture.

Besides friendly relations in foreign policy, the success of Finlandisation as a strategy for survival in an anarchic international system for the small state with a potentially offensive Great Power neighbour depended on the preservation of a hard core: keeping the military intact, avoiding economic dependence, a patriotic spirit of the leadership, and the society at large with cultural distance. Perhaps Finland was lucky that the limits of Soviet material resources started to become evident in the 1980s and the ideological offensive died down when the political objectives in Moscow changed with Gorbachev’s new thinking; but before then, the worst era of Finlandisation in terms of political culture that had started to challenge the hard core had already ended. In any case, care is indispensable when transferring any lessons, even if correct when applied to Finland during the Cold War, to a different era, a different place, and different people. As far as drawing parallels between Cold War Finland and present day Ukraine, some key differences need highlighting. First, Finland is a much smaller Power than Ukraine but, second, it also is, and was, much more homogeneous than Ukraine as a nation. Moreover, if present day Finland would work as a model for solving the Ukraine conflict – as Brzezinski and
Kissinger seemed to suggest – Moscow should be willing to accept Ukraine’s deeper integration with and even a membership in the EU.

Notes

1 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Russia needs to be offered a ‘Finland option’ for Ukraine”, Financial Times (1 February 2014); Henry Kissinger, “To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end”, Washington Post (5 March 2014). There have also been comments arguing the contrary: “Finlandisation” is not a solution for Ukraine. See Mark P. Lagon and Will Moreland, “‘Finlandisation’ abandons Ukraine”, Foreign Policy (3 November 2014): http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/03/finlandization-abandons-ukraine/; and James Kirchik, “Finlandisation is not a Solution for Ukraine”, American Interest (27 July 2014): http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/07/27/finlandization-is-not-a-solution-for-ukraine/.


5 For instance, according to Max Jakobson, a former Finnish diplomat, “The term has been defined as a process by which a democratic nation living in the shadow of a militarily powerful totalitarian state gradually submits to the political domination of its neighbor and finally loses its internal freedom”. See Max Jakobson, Finland in the New Europe (Westport, CT, 1998), 88.

6 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Containing Coexistence: America, Russia and the “Finnish Solution”, 1945-56 (Kent, 1997).


9 George Quester, “Finlandization as a Problem or an Opportunity?”, ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 512/1(1990), 33-45.

10 Max Jakobson, “Substance and Appearance: Finland”, Foreign Affairs, 58/5(1980), 1034–44 has described Finnish foreign policy towards the Soviet Union as collaboration by citing a comment by Kissinger on Metternich’s policy vis-à-vis France.


12 Hiski Haukkala, Suomen muuttuvat koordinaatiit (Helsinki, 2012).

13 Arguments exists that the former Austrian minister of foreign affairs, Karl Gruber, is the father of the notion of “Finlandisation”. Gruber admonished his country in the 1950s not
to follow the path of Finland. See Johanna Rainio-Niemi, *The Ideological Cold War: The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland* (NY, 2014).

18 Hakovirta, *Suomettuminen*.
23 “‘Finlandisation’ makes a polarising comeback in Finland”, *Financial Times* (24 September 2014): [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cbb17c76-435c-11e4-be3f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Li97jEm](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cbb17c76-435c-11e4-be3f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Li97jEm).
26 For instance, Finnish officials brought up the issue with the West German Christian Social Union’s former president, Franz Josef Strauss, and on other instances with Chinese, Belgian, and Portuguese officials.
28 Alpo Rusi, a diplomat, wrote the comprehensive document. Then see Alpo Rusi, “Finlandization without Finland? Turning Points in the Finlandization Debate: From a Political Insult to a Key Concept in Computer Games”, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy* (Helsinki, 1988), 13-16 based on that document

31 Penttilä, *Moskovasta Brysseliin*.

32 Jakobson, *Finland in the New Europe*, 15.

33 Browning, *Constructivism*.


37 Penttilä, *Moskovasta Brysseliin*.


39 For example, Kirby, *Finland*, 242.


46 Vihavainen, *Kansakunta rähmällään*, 293; Nevakivi, *Miten Kekkonen pääsi valtaan ja Suomi suomettui?*

47 Max Jakobson, *Vallanvaihto* (Helsinki, 1992), 244.


50 Ibid., 136.

51 Well-known cases are the hesitance to appoint Max Jakobson to secretary of state of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ousting of Keijo Korhonen as minister for Foreign Affairs.

52 For example, Vihavainen, *Kansakunta rähmällään*, 84–86.

53 Jakobson, *Finland in the New Europe*, 86.


55 For example, Mansala, *Kohti kaaoksen pitkää yöta*, 196.


57 “Spiritual national defence” – *henkinen maanpuolustus* in Finnish; *Geistige Landesverteidigung* in German – refers to policies in neutral countries, such as Finland, to
build new national ideologies and endorse popular will to defend core values such as democracy and neutrality. See Raino-Niemi, *Ideological Cold War*.

58 Ibid., 144-46.
66 After his presidency, Koivisto even authored a book on “the idea of Russia”. See Mauno Koivisto, *Venäjän idea* (Helsinki, 2001).
68 Vihavainen, *Kansakunta rähmällään*, 269.
69 Ibid., 258-63.
74 Alanen and Forsberg, “Evolution of Opinions”.
75 Koivisto, *Witness to History*.
76 During Koivisto’s tenure of office, he also quit attending festivities organised in Helsinki to celebrate Finnish-Soviet relations. Over the years, there had been an asymmetry of ranks between Finland and the Soviet Union in terms of participation. After Koivisto’s decision, officials and politicians from lower positions represented Finland. See Hannu Lehtilä, *Tuntematon Koivisto* (Helsinki, 1998).


Luukkanen, “Tutuuskomissio lustraatiota toteuttamaan”.

“Finlandisation’ makes a polarising comeback”.


“Finnish Leader, in Moscow, Vows to Maintain Close Ties to Soviet”, *NY Times* (10 March 1982).


Goodby, “Survival Strategies”.

Malone, “‘Finlandization’”, 21-23.

Daniel Treisman, “Rational Appeasement”, *International Organization*, 58/2(2004), 345-73 argues that “appeasement” may be on some occasions the most rational choice the actor has at its disposal.

For example, Korhonen, *Sattumakorpraali*.

In the 1978 presidential elections, all the major parties rushed to lend support to Kekkonen, whose electors got over 82 percent of the votes cast.
