WHEN IS REORIENTATION SEEN AS EUROPEANIZATION?
Swedish’s development assistance to Latvia from the 1990s to 2004
ABSTRACT

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The present study discusses the Swedish policy development assistance to the Baltic states from the 1990s to 2004. The research examines the case of aid-giving policy in the context of the post-Cold War transition of the Baltic states supplemented by the perspective of their integration into the EU. The importance of the research topic is supported by that the issue of foreign aid-giving policy remains open for the analysis and discussion. Such openness allows for the concrete examination of the development assistance practice.

An attempt to put this practice in selected temporal and spatial context of the Nordic-Baltic post-Cold War development is central to the present research. From three Baltic states Latvia has been chosen as an example of the recipient country. With the provision of the example, it is hoped that this research will contribute to the deeper understanding of Sweden as a donor reflecting on the changes occurred in the immediate neighbourhood. The main hypothesis is that Sweden's aid-giving policy was acting as a tool of Swedish post-Cold War Europeanization through the support of Latvia as one of the Baltic states in transition.

The issue of interests or motives for aid-giving policy is crucial. The range of interests has been revealed as a result from the descriptions on state actor behaviour proposed by the IR theories. In this research, the interests are framed in categories for the content analysis of documents on Swedish development cooperation with CEE countries in which three Baltic ones have been included. The account of the EU enlargement is given here as an applying meaning of Europeanization. The term of 'Europeanization' is used in this thesis to define the projection of the prospective of the EU enlargement on Swedish development cooperation with Baltic states and Latvia in particular. The presence of the EU to the state of the external factor has been deliberately limited to show up its indirect impact.

The main findings have confirmed the previous knowledge on that Sweden demonstrated its willingness to support the transition of the Baltic states with their integration into the EU. At the same time, the established analysis offers some new insights in the understanding of the way in which Sweden has been constructing its interests, power, obligations and commitment to the processes taking place in their close vicinity of the post-Cold War Europe.

Keywords: Sweden, Latvia, development assistance, aid, cooperation, Europeanization, EU enlargement, Nordic-Baltic relations, Baltic states transition
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

The present Master's Thesis studies the Swedish foreign policy of development assistance to the Baltic states in their post-Cold War transition. Particularly, the case of Sweden’s development assistance to Latvia from 1990 to 2004 is examined. Through the literature review, theoretical framework and selected methodology, this work establishes a broad discussion of such major changes of post-Cold War environment as the USSR dissolution in 1991, the transition process of the new independent Baltic states and the first wave of the EU enlargement. It is important to note that the general application of certain meanings might not only be attributed to a narrowed research focus but also to a wider geographical area. For instance, the conceptual framework of Europeanization, as it will be seen below, encompasses the area of former socialist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries – including the Baltic ones – which were undergoing the common process of socio-economic and political transition on the way to democracy, market economy and EU membership (Grabbe, 2003: 304).

Sweden has been interpreted here as a state actor responding to the changes through the increase of activism and demonstration of support to the common willingness of the Baltic states to adhere to the EU. The term of ‘development assistance’ has been used to refer to the practice of aid-giving policy in which development is a purpose (Lancaster, 2007: 2). Latvia, conceptually and contextually included in a wider geographical area, has been selected for the current research as an example of aid recipient needed in some support to remove the barriers on the way to the EU membership.

Several reasons have been suggested to explain the choice of the country. Latvia, similarly to Sweden, was positioned in some of the literature work (Ozolina, 1997: 127) on the periphery of European post-Cold War developments, from which the EU enlargement was crucial. The risk of leaving out of this process was relevant for Latvia in transition if the fact of lagging behind Estonia in a state of economy and policy is considered. The presence of this risk was important for Sweden positioning itself as playing a leading role in support of the Baltics. The interest in promotion of integration of all Baltic states has become central on
several levels – domestic debates, Nordic policies (in which commonality and rivalry has been revealed), and EU/EC agenda (Ozolina, 1999; Bergman, 2006). Such international positioning from the Sweden’s side may be also seen as an evidence of foreign policy reorientation towards less cautiousness about (ex-)Soviet factor and more activism, quite new for a country with a neutrality doctrine (cf. Brommesson, 2010; Kuldkepp, 2016). Latvia has had such problems as rights provision for Russian minorities, dismantling of the Soviet military equipment, demands for in-depth reforms which are required to be taken into account by Sweden in the role of a donor state. Regarding this, I briefly discuss the role of sub-national actor of Swedish International Development (cooperation) Agency (Sida) serving as a channel of national aid-giving policy.

1.2. Literature review and conceptual framework

Several attempts have been made in this research to establish what is already known about the topic. The first is a review of a literature with provision of a wider perspective of post-Cold War development, prior to the Nordic–Baltic relations with a narrowing focus on Sweden and Latvia. I used the terms of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ or ‘internationalism’ to refer to the features giving a priority to the Nordic states in their active self-positioning in international relations (Ingebritsen, 2002; Bergman, 2006). Such positioning was a rationalisation of the essential understanding of the country’s place in the world (Ringmar, 1998: 45) as well as the rationalization of the subject of power in global politics in regard to the favourable international conditions of lower militarisation for Sweden to increase its soft power (Kuldkepp, 2016: 401).

The latter, according to Kuldkepp (idem, 424–425) has a pivotal role in shift from ‘cautious’ attitude towards the Baltic states, prior to the (ex-)Soviet factor delaying, in some sense, the process of official recognition of the Baltic independence. Consequently, the increase of activism has led to the lobbyism of the integration of all three republic into the EU. On the one hand, for Nordic that was the common expression of support (Bergman, 2006; Czarny, 2018). On the other hand, there were international and domestically prescribed debates on whether to integrate all three states or only Estonia as one that is more appropriate from the state of economy and policy (Lejins, 1999; Ozolina, 1999).
On the question of the choice of two countries, I refer to Bennich-Björkman (2002a; 2002b) who shows that Latvia politically and economically has been lagging behind Estonia, which additionally gives some priority to the country in the role of recipient of Swedish provision of assistance. I also follow Stavridis (2003: 10-11) who gave the profile of reasoning for Greece to establish the case of his study. According to what I have, Latvia has been a country located in the dynamic Baltic region, closer to the former USSR. With a risk of being on the periphery of the post-Cold War development (Ozolina, 1997: 127) it needed modernization to meet the Copenhagen Criteria (cf. Bennich-Bjorkman, 2002a: 367).

The subject of interest has been discussed in this work as a background and theoretical point of reference. In a literature review I have provided three categories of vital, essential and general interests to describe the objective of Latvian and Swedish foreign policies (Pabriks and Purs, 2001; Ozolina, 1999). The theoretical framework establishes the discussion on this question through the review of IR scholars – realism and liberalism traditions, neo-Marxism, constructivism – given as the providers of frames of aid-giving motives in country’s foreign policy. The focus has become limited to the rationalist and constructivist foundations uniting the discussion of foreign aid and Europeanization.

The concept of Europeanization has been provided in this research with an applying meaning to establish the discussion of the EU enlargement. Given as an area of common process, the CEE countries were the referent actors in general (Grabbe, 2003). Through the rationalist and constructivist foundations, the enlargement resulting in the effects of Europeanization has returned to the discussion of self-interest and ideational factors, mentioned earlier in regard to the foreign aid (e.g. Lancaster, 2007; Veen, 2011). To develop the further analysis of the narrowed research focus, I will use the term of ‘Europeanization’ in this thesis to define the projection of the prospective of the EU enlargement on Swedish development cooperation with Baltic states and Latvia in particular.

1.3. Research gap and research questions

While foreign aid is established as a common foreign policy practice, the existing body of literature recognizes that the question about the interests pursuing by the
aid-giving actor remains open for the examination (Lancaster, 2007; Veen, 2011). As the literature provides with some broad theoretical frameworks to discuss the motives of the state’s foreign aid (ibid.), they can be optionally applied to the development of the current research. Several previous studies have established that solidarity of Sweden with a recipient’s own vision on development have always been the main motive of Swedish development assistance (Schraeder, et.al., 1998; Danielson and Wohlgemuth, 2005). In other words, there is an ideological component in Swedish relations with the recipient. The research gap here is that the topic of Swedish foreign development aid policy is well-established mainly through the empirical study of Swedish relations with African countries (Danielson and Wohlgemuth, 2005; Dijkstra and White, 2002). This means that the case of Baltic states as recipients of Swedish aid has yet to be thoroughly studied, although the historical chapter on foreign aid in Lancaster’s book recognizes the support of political and economic changes in post-communist countries as one of the new purposes of foreign aid appeared in 1990s (Lancaster, 2007: 44–46).

The central question in the research is how Swedish state-led policy of development assistance has been reflecting on the post-Cold War changes in the immediate Baltic neighbourhood. The thesis is aimed at examining the Sweden’s foreign policy of development assistance towards Latvia with the help of the concept of Europeanization. The following research questions are combined with the aim of the research:

- What was the nature of the relationship between Sweden and Latvia in the context of post-Cold War development?
- What have been the objectives of Sweden’s development assistance and how they are related to the EU enlargement? When reorientation is seen as Europeanization?

1.4. Data and methods

Data for this study were collected using the official websites of Sida, Government Offices of Sweden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and Riksdag(-en) or Swedish parliament. I utilised open documents (e.g. reports of inquiry – SOU, proposals, country strategy on development cooperation with Latvia, report of analysis on Latvia from Sida) and secondary materials (e.g. Sida’s reports, foreign policy
thematic yearbook and brochures). Regarding the method, I selected a deductive way of doing qualitative content analysis, as it proposes a specific attention on the textual material while reduces the risk of overdetermination of some aspects (Julien, 2008; Schreier, 2014) and, in addition, allows for addressing the previous knowledge in testing (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008). Three research works (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Lancaster, 2007; Veen, 2011) have been used to build the categories for analysis.

1.5. Thesis structure and key terms

The Master’s Thesis will be organised in the following way. It begins by the presented introduction and then go on to review the literature, give the background information on the topic and explain the choice of two countries for the research. Chapter three begins by laying out the theoretical dimensions of the research and looks at how the Swedish foreign policy may be prescribed through the discussion of foreign aid motives in IR literature or foundations of theorising Europeanization. The fourth chapter is concerned with the methodology used for this study. Chapter five analyses the results of the documentation study and presents the research findings. The research also contains the conclusion chapter and list of references.

In the next two paragraphs, I focus on three main terms I use. The first is ‘transition’ associated with the reform process in the Baltic states initiated as a result of their willingness to leave out the Soviet legacy and become the EU members in the relevant future (cf. Isaksson, 2004; Bergman, 2006; Czarny, 2018). The second is the term of ‘development assistance’, substituting the term of ‘foreign aid’ but rather different, as it contains the self-explanation of a certain type of aid purpose (Lancaster, 2007). Additionally, the term of ‘development cooperation’ identifies more the respect from Sweden to the recipients’ vision and interests indicated in the literature (cf. Bennich – Björkman, 2002b)

The third is the concept of Europeanization associated in this study with the EU enlargement but also differentiated from that as encompasses the effects of the enlargement, while the general theory of enlargement may include the subject of reasons to be integrated into the EU (Grabbe, 2003). As was proposed above, I use this term to refer to the (in-)direct effects of the EU enlargement on Swedish
development cooperation with Baltic states, from which I give the more detailed examination of Latvia.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW: SWEDEN’S FOREIGN POLICY TO LATVIA IN A WIDER PERSPECTIVE

In the following pages, I will present a literature review to discuss the relationship between Sweden and Latvia after the Cold War in a wider perspective. This chapter begins by stating the (re-)establishment of Nordic foreign policies in regard to the process of transition in the Baltic countries since the 1990s.

It will be argued that the relationship between Sweden and Latvia has had a dual nature deriving from the changes of the post-Cold War international environment and being formed by the domestic factors in response. Mainly referring to the USSR dissolution in 1991 and the EU enlargement since its beginning from the 1990s, I also link them with the domestic process of Baltic states transition and reorientation of Swedish foreign policy. Mainly focusing on Swedish example, this research reviews the provision of the explanatory contexts of changes in the country’s policy. One of the key aspects was the account of domestic factors responding reflectively to the two major transformations of the international environment.

Regarding the process of reorientation in policies, the question of interests has become essential. On the one side, it has been reflecting on the vision of changes occurred in the immediate environment. In case of Sweden, it has required questioning of the traditional doctrine of neutrality, especially in policy towards the Baltic states. On the other one, it has become the domestic question covering the crisis of welfare state and ongoing debates on the willingness to support the reforms in Baltic states as well as the prospective of their EU membership. Consequently, this has become also the issue of Sweden’s international positioning in its dynamic relations with Baltic and Nordic neighbours and the EU.

In the second part of the chapter, I will attempt to explain from the wider perspective what determines the choice of two countries, Sweden and Latvia for the conduction of this research. Latvia has been chosen as an example of Swedish cooperation and assistance with the Baltic states. Following the
argument on the maintenance of the donor and recipient’s interests framing in the immediate vision of internal socio-economic development (cf. Danielson and Wohlgemuth, 2005: 518) I will consider two key aspects of the choice. The first is that Latvia was behind Estonia consequently risking not to get involved in the first wave of EU enlargement. The second is the dynamic of the Swedish reflective attitude towards the Latvia’s risk articulated both in domestic debates and inter-Nordic state-led rivalry on the scale of negotiations with the EU.

2.1. The explanatory contexts on the question of Sweden’s interest in post-Cold War cooperation with Baltic states

The literature review identifies two key aspects of Sweden’s foreign policy reorientation after the end of the Cold War in regard to the initiation of cooperation with the post-Soviet Baltic states. It will go on to suggest that the preferable international conditions in concordance with the common interest in this from the side of Sweden’s Nordic neighbours has led to the setting of the Swedish activism towards the Baltics on agenda. In addition, there has been an attempt to show the increase of interest as domestically prescribed. The interest itself can be defined as a dynamic process initiated specifically by the presence of domestic debates and international competition. The first section of the chapter pre-establishes the topic of the research from a wider perspective. The second section moves on to continue the review and explain in greater detail the choice of Sweden and Latvia relations addressing as the transformation of the international environment in Europe as the development assistance policy from the Swedish side.

2.1.1. The Baltic and Nordic states in the post-Cold War European environment

As far as the present research concerns about the (re-)emergence of the Baltic question in Sweden’s post-Cold War policy, I resort to the general discussion of the Nordic states’ role in a new international environment. Epistemically, such questions as ‘Who are we?’ or ‘What is our role in the world?’ can be defined as essential (Ringmar, 1998: 45, italics added). The issue of power in global politics referring to the end of the Cold War has received considerable critical attention, in which such small states as the five Northern European states of Denmark,
Finland, Sweden, Norway and Iceland have been given a priority (Ingebritsen, 2002: 11–12).

Adding to the abovementioned issue, Kuldkepp (2016: 401) states that the relevant possibility of any military intervention was becoming lower to the end of the Cold War. As he concludes out, Sweden found itself in a favourable domestic and international conditions encouraging the relative strength of its soft power (ibid.). It is also necessary to mention that the international reputation of the Nordic states comprises the geographical proximity, respect to the international order and institutions, commitment to the promotion of values through the internationalist behaviour and domestic reformism (Ingebritsen, 2002: 13; Bergman, 2006: 73).

Generally, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the consequences to which it led further framed the common condition having a considerable impact on the development of a new political system in the end of the Cold War (Agh, 1998: 24). From the side of the Nordic states, this collapse and the following process of transition in Baltic states may be seen as what gave them the opportunity to establish the cooperation and dialogue with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania based of the willingness to support of political, economic and social development in neighbouring countries and, thus, revise the pre-developed practices and innovations in domestic and foreign policies (Bergman, 2006: 74).

Kuldkepp (2016: 398), on the other hand, uses the terms of ‘ambivalence’ and ‘cautiousness’ to highlight the historical existence of (ex-) Soviet factor, which had been playing a determinant role in a relative passivism of Swedish foreign policy towards the Baltic states. This may lead to the conclusion that the purpose of leaving out the Soviet system pointed by the Swedish journalist and Sida’s project-coordinator David Isaksson (2004: 211) has had its importance not only for Baltic states (e.g. Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 134) but also for Sweden, as the presence of ex-Soviet troops was prescribed in terms of ‘long-destabilizing’ factor and ‘expression of age-old Swedish cautiousness’ (Kuldkepp, 2016: 424–425). Dating back to the 27th of August 1991, Kuldkepp (2016: 424), conversely to Czarny (2018: 269), states that Sweden was not the first country to recognise the Baltic independence and (re-)establish diplomatic relations. According to the Embassy of the Republic of Latvia in the Kingdom of Sweden (2014), the date of
recognition of Latvia’s independence by Sweden was that one mentioned by Kuldkepp (ibid.).

However, on a scale of negotiations with the EU, the Nordic neighbours have been evaluated as the ‘energetic’ lobbyists, involvement of which prevented the Baltics from being dropped off from the rest of Central and Eastern European (CEE) post-socialist countries integrating with the Union (Lejins, 1999: 16). The future EU membership has been identified as the top priority as for Baltic states as for Nordic ones with their expression of support (e.g. Bergman, 2006; Czarny, 2018: 269). Czarny (2018: 262) points out that, while the enlargement has provided new opportunities for cooperation and agenda-setting, it has been found difficult to make decisions satisfied for all members and particularly have a voice of small states heard. What can be defined here as ‘opportunity-and-problem’ duality in a nature of EU membership has likely intensified the Nordic-Baltic cooperation.

At the same time, it is necessary to give more contrast to the presentation of commonality in Nordic foreign policies. Ozolina (1997: 127) and Bergman (2006: 82) establish the presence of realpolitik in Nordic policies of Baltic transition support resulting in rivalry and competition. In the same vein, Lejins (1999: 16–17) considers the negative attitude of the major European powers (Britain, Germany and France) towards the integration of all Baltic states into the EU in the first wave of enlargement to show up that Sweden was switching its side either to Finland with support of Estonia as the only EU member state in the future or to Denmark standing for the integration of all ten Central European applicants with inclusion of three Baltic ones.

By September 1997 the consensus between Finland, Denmark and Sweden on the integration of all Baltic states into the EU was collapsed. The strict position of Sweden, similar to Denmark, on the integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was strongly criticized by a variety of Finnish press publication for the exacerbating of ‘political positioning or image’ (Ozolina, 1999: 96–97). Although Denmark and Sweden came together in their support of Baltic states integration into the EU, they were competing, for instance, in trade and development – here Sweden’s position was stronger (Ozolina, 1999: 98). On the international scale Sweden, unlike Denmark, was transmitting its vision of EU as a top priority in
cooperation with the Baltics on the strengthening of the regional security (Ozolina, 1997: 130). Throughout the discussion of the security patterns and changes on the European level, the real challenge of being in a ‘gray zone’ occurring from some lack of adaptation to the mainstream post-Cold War developments in Europe has been faced by Sweden and Latvia encouraging their cooperation (Lejins, 1999: 16; Ozolina, 1997: 127).

In regard to the comparison of Sweden and Denmark on the vision of the EU enlargement, Ozolina (1999: 102) raises the question of Sweden’s potential NATO membership as a matter of domestic political debate and less popularity on the level of officials. The account of it explains why the country has limited its support to the Baltics with a more respect to the EU (cf. Ozolina: 1997: 130). At the same time, whereas Sweden had a strict position on the integration of all Baltic states into the EU in negotiations with the European Commission in 1997–1999, that was also a part of parliamentary debates inside the country. In these debates, as Ozolina (1999: 103) writes, Moderates Party and former Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Lena Hjelm–Wallen rejected this proposition from Carl Bildt to integrate all three Baltic countries into the EU. As the author concludes, the evidence of the debates illustrates a lack of unanimous opinion on the Baltic’s EU membership within the national political forces (ibid.).

2.1.2. Stating the interests and risks in Swedish and Latvian policies in the end of the Cold War

Before proceeding to examine the risks, it is important to address the issue of interests in the discussion of Swedish and Latvian policies. The following presentation of interests in this paragraph has been established in several studies (e.g. Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 125–126, Ozolina, 1999: 93–94) with reference to RAND researcher James Tomson. Ozolina (1999: 93) explains the role of Baltic states in foreign and security policy of Nordic states with the focus on EU membership. She follows the Swedish security expert Ingemar Dorfer, who has also used this classification. The interests have been divided into three categories – vital, essential and general. They serve as the explanation of immediate Swedish and Latvian objectives of foreign policy, prior to the end of the Cold War and the major transformation of international or even supranational relations in Europe.
Vital interests are defined as the interests in defence and independence from either the country or its neighbours. In relation to Latvia as one of the Baltic countries, integration into the EU is what assists the country to reach its vital interests in sovereignty and security (Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 125). The term of essential interests is associated with the influence of international developments on the country’s domestic policy and international position. Ozolina (1999: 94) identifies the cooperation with the Baltic states and the support of their efforts to join the EU as part of the Nordic essential interests. The energetic support of the Nordic countries in the EU membership with a real prospective of domestic changes and international positioning was a part of Baltic’s essential interests. Finally, general interests are defined in accordance with the actions of the state in the provision of security, stability, peace, etc. on regional or global scale. Consequently, the general interests were common for Baltic and Nordic states altogether, as they were used in terms of participation in the different aspects of European transformation from the position of small states (Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 126; Ozolina, 1997: 113).

Describing in a greater detail some determinants of the Swedish risk in a given temporal context, I refer to the argument of Kuldkepp (2016: 400), who notes that the ‘geopolitical context’ is not only one to explain sufficiently the reorientation of Swedish foreign policy towards activism in Baltic matters. He proposes ‘a more nuanced’ view on domestic factors, prescribing geopolitics as a subject to changing interpretations, despite they seem to be given or eternal at a first glance. Here I can also refer to Bergman (2006: 76) with her argument about the long-standing existence of ‘close connection’ between the provision of ‘universal welfare’ at the domestic level and internationalist behaviour in foreign policy practice of development assistance. In the post-Cold War reality this connection has been transformed. On the one side, the change of Swedish politics comes from the relative state crisis, in which the dilemma of saving the Social Democratic provision of economic wealth and neoliberal U-turn appeared (Kuldkepp, 2016: 418; Ringmar, 1998: 45). For instance, contrasting with the fears of welfare state crisis in Sweden, those who were supporting the Sweden’s EU integration had a positive attitude towards the belonging to the EU common market (Ringman, 1998: 52).
Turning now to the Swedish foreign policy reorientation, it is important to consider that the traditionally existing neutrality has been domestically moving on to its post-status. The neutrality has been identified by the Prime Minister Carl Bildt as less adequate in new reality specifically revealed in his interest in Baltic matters (Ringmar, 1998: 45; Brommesson, 2010: 235; Kuldkepp, 2016: 419). On his criticism to the Sweden’s neutrality Bildt addressed the issue of historical guilty associated with the extradition of people as well as transfer of resources from the Baltics to the Soviet Union (Czarny, 2018: 269). As a conclusion, Agius (211: 379) points out that Sweden ‘would have the option to be neutral in the event of a war in its vicinity’, for instance in the event of a possible military threat to the Baltic states. The same shift has taken place in relation to the interpretation of norms. Whether Sweden’s promotion of norms has been regarded as a domestic product of welfare innovation projected on the international level, the more welcoming attitude towards the EU has interpreted the same through the sense of commitment to the EU or wider ‘Europe’ (see: Bergman, 2006; Brommesson, 2010).

Before summarising this section, it is necessary to give a small note on chronology and research gap. Isaksson (2004: 211–212) divides the Swedish cooperation with the Baltic states into three phases identifying a driving force for each of them. Czarny (2018: 270) also uses this division in his work. According to them, the first period from 1990 to 1992/1993 covers the reform process on market economies with leaving the Soviet system behind. The second period from 1992/1993 to 1995 was the time of institutional building and increasing work on environmental and social issues. The final period from 1995/1996 to early 2004 involved cooperation into the problems of adaptation and continuation of reforms to facilitate the EU membership for the Baltic countries.

It is necessary to point out here the limited time frame for cooperation of Sweden with the Baltic states in transition. In the Introduction the research gap regarding the well-established topic of Sweden’s aid policy to Africa has been stated earlier. Isaksson (2004: 217; 228) gives two reasons to differ the aid promotion to the Baltic states from the same policy to Africa. The first was an intention to have this dimension of Swedish aid separated from each other and avoid any possible, particularly ethic, restrictions. The second was that the geographical proximity as
well as the EU enlargement created a favourable top-down pressure within the sides of cooperation.

### 2.2. Note on the example of Sweden’s aid to Latvia

#### 2.2.1. The explanation of choice

Considering the personal interest in promotion of the validity of the research topic, let us turn now to the following section of the literature review. This is a starting point of the attempt to explain the choice of two countries, Sweden and Latvia, for the further discussion of development assistance policy in theoretical and analytical chapters.

To begin with, I refer to Stavridis (2003: 10–11) who provided a list of the reasons to explain why Greece is the case of his study. I adopt the proposed logic of reasoning for the argumentation of the choice of Latvia below:

- The presence of (ex-)Soviet Russia as a matter of cautiousness, previously mentioned with reference to Kuldkepp (ibid).
- A country with the risk of becoming peripheral as lagging behind Estonia (cf. Lejins, 1999: 16).
- Democracy, security, and economic problems and the importance of modernisation.
- A country located in a dynamic region, the dynamism of which has been supported by the Nordic countries (Ozolina, 1997: 113–114).

Some of the reasons have been partly explained on the previous pages. Here I make the additional notes.

The peripheral position has been previously explained as the risk for Latvia to remain outside the EU/EC agenda in the first wave of the enlargement. After the USSR dissolution, the problems in domestic reforms and EU membership accounting their interdependence became critical to Latvia. The lack of strong domestic institutions, national economy and guarantees for the provision of human rights for Russian-speaking minorities and recognition of their civil status were the main domestic factor negatively contributing to the international recognition (Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 122; Bennich–Björkman, 2002a: 367).

Returning briefly to the subject of interests in this sentence, the Copenhagen
Criteria requirements for the candidate countries to develop market economies, respect the rule of law and be functioning democracies played an essential role in addressing the issue of preparedness to join the EU in general (Agh, 1999: 44; Bennich–Björkman, 2002a: 367).

Giving some details, I refer to the comparison of Estonia and Latvia established in the work of Bennich–Björkman (2002b: 345–360). Analysing the state of their post-Cold War development he concluded out that Estonia, both politically and economically, was leading over Latvia. The author uses the term of ‘state capture’ (2002b: 345) defined as ‘the predominantly illegal impact of powerful economic interests on the formation of laws, regulations and decrees<…>’. According to the author (2002b: 346), it encompasses a set of such illegal practices of ‘sale to the private interests’ as sale of votes in the parliament or illegal sponsorship to the political parties, sale of court decisions, etc. In addition, Bennich–Björkman makes an important note on the distinction of ‘state capture’ from what he calls ‘formalised corporatist arrangements’ by highlighting the illegal manner of the provision of interests in the first term he uses.

Through the given figure, he shows that the Latvia’s state capture index was approximately 30, while Estonia’s one was approximately 10 (ibid.). Further, addressing the demographic issue, the researcher shows up the relevant importance of this for Latvia in comparison with Estonia - 61.5% Estonians and 30% Russians, 52% of Latvians and 34% of Russians (Bennich–Björkman, 2002b: 350). It may be seen as that the demand for respect of the Russian minorities might be relatively more visible in case of Latvia and require a little bit more international attention, in particular, from the EU and Nordic neighbours.

On the question of Swedish policy to Latvia, some features associated with the importance of adjusting to the EU should be highlighted. As discussed above, the issue of integration of all Baltic states into the EU had the international significance, was the topic of state-led competition and domestic debates. At the same time, following the previous reference to Isaksson (2004: 217), the inclusion of all three Baltic republics was a matter of ethics demanding for the consideration of attention to all dimension of development cooperation, while attributing to them separately. Regarding this, Ozolina (1999: 103–104) describes the Sweden’s official position as based on the following argument: ‘if the Baltic states are split
up and some countries are raised above others, this will not promote the pace of reform and will cause some countries to fall behind’. She continues the discussion by noting that the raise of some integrating states above others was strongly unfavourable, as it may cause the negative attitude towards the EU.

In addition to the previous point, Latvia missing out of ‘a similar early invitation into EU accession negotiations to the one that Estonia received in 1997’ has been declared by the Latvian Prime Minister as a deliberate breaking-up of a Baltic unity, in regard to which Estonia, referring to the Estonian Prime Minister, ‘distance itself from the other two Baltic states in favour of a Nordic orientation’ (Aalto, 2006: 81). Conclusively, according to the Prime Minister, it ‘dissociates the country from Estonia also in the context of EU enlargement’ (ibid.).

To continue the reasoning of the specific-oriented study of two countries, I turn to the subject of the features characterizing Sweden as a donor in relation to Latvia.

### 2.2.2. The relevant features of Swedish aid-giving policy to Latvia

Before providing a theoretical discussion of foreign aid in the next chapter, it is necessary to give a brief review of the relevant features of Swedish aid-giving policy. According to Danielson and Wohlgemuth (2005: 518), what has characterised Sweden as a ‘soft’ donor is the primary account of the recipient’s interests and design of the aid-giving policy in concordance with that. Furthermore, as the researchers (2005: 519) claim, foreign aid was neither the matter of interference in the recipient’s own development vision nor the export of the Swedish model.

As it has been stated further by the authors, however, the question of interference itself was changed over time, when Sweden’s policy of aid shifted from ‘donor-driven’ aid with technical assistance to the sectoral support with implication of the full integration into the recipient’s economy (idem, 2005: 524). Similarly, Dijkstra and White (2002: 494–495) in their broad analysis of Swedish relations with the recipient countries in Africa concluded that Sweden has been able to influence the recipients’ policies via activities of like-minded groups, formal and informal channels, as well as through the maintenance of its expertise and networking capacities.
In relations with Latvia, Sweden might have been keeping the relatively traditional approach of the primary consideration of the recipients’ interests and vision on development, as it “did not take the opportunity to make their [Nordic] state models accessible to the Latvian politicians and civil servants to nearly the same extent as was done in Estonia” (Bennich–Björkman, 2002b: 354). In addition, Latvia’s orientation and identity lie within the Baltic Sea region – in the sense of identity, the country has been defined as the only Baltic (Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 131; Aalto, 2006: 89). In other words, neither Sweden nor Latvia seemed to be willing to incorporate the Nordic model more than get focused on the engagement in European affairs. Additionally, it was obvious for Sida the work in the Baltic Sea States to be organized separately from the work in developing countries, and for a short of time (Isaksson, 2004: 217–219). Generally, this point contributed to the notion that Swedish–Latvian bilateral cooperation was, in simple terms, limited.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The third chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the thesis. Taking into account the context provided in the literature review, in this chapter I move on to theorise the bilateral relations. I give this focus using the terms of foreign policy of aid-giving and Europeanisation. The main assumptions from IR theories have been reviewed, and this has led to seeking the balance between realism and constructivism addressing the question on how the state policy is determined – through the objectives given by the environment or through the process of self-redefining and / or redefining the reality.

The theoretical model applied here was proposed by Van der Veen (2011: 39) who used seven broad categories to propose the varieties of thinking about aid-giving policy. These categories or frames are security, power and influence, wealth and commercial interests, indirect or enlightened self-interest, reputation and self-affirmation, obligation and duty, and humanitarianism. The research gap about the (in-)adequacy of each IR theory to give an overall explanation on what drives the state actors to behave as they do in aid-giving policy has been presented above with the reference to Lancaster (2007:4). The necessity to fulfil the gap has led to the proposed model of Veen (2011: 10; 45; see also Table 1; 2 in Methodology), who encompasses the all dominating interests in IR theories and gives them as the whole complexity.

As for the concept of Europeanization, it is given in the applied meanings of rationalist or constructivist behaviour of state-led actors. I suggest that the logic of rationalism encompasses the assumptions on the state actor behaviour from realism, commercial liberalism, and partly neo-Marxism in terms of economic rationale. On the other hand, constructivism is about the sense of commitment to certain universe (in a name of Europe), values and norms in relation to the enlargement.

Regarding Sweden as a donor-driven actor, I associate the frames with either the self-interest or internationalist commitment in aid-giving policy in a provided temporal and spatial context. In other words, I use the proposed model to examine why, when and how the country demonstrates its intention to support the transition process in three Baltic states. Through the applied meaning of Europeanisation, I intend to explain how the prospective of the EU enlargement
projected on the provision of development assistance from Sweden to CEE countries and particularly Latvia in terms of self-interest (or rationalism) or belonging to certain area of Europe with commitment to the common values (constructivism).

3.1. Foreign aid in theories of International Relations: defining the terms, understanding the motives

As was stated in the previous chapter, the interests on the national level occurred as the immediate necessity to get adapted to the new post-Cold War developments in Europe: being out of the USSR world superpower but with such a supranational power as the EU. What follows is a (re-)establishment of the subject of interests in Swedish and Latvian policies. The subject considered to be given throughout the broader discussion of the aid-giving policy. Such policy may be seen as a long-term practice in interstate relations and foreign policy with a range of purposes developing over time (cf. Lancaster, 2007; Veen, 2011). Central to the entire work is the in-depth analysis of interests in policies throughout the discussion of foreign aid in theories of International Relations (IR).

Throughout the literature each frame of motives can be defined as a response to the given changes and challenges of the international system. For instance, realism and liberalism operate within their strong orientation on the system change. Neo-Marxism and commercial liberalism postulate differently the economic importance of interstate relations. ‘Idea’ is a broader term receiving a considerable attention from constructivists, which encompasses both the international system and state–society relations in the process of interpretation of the changes occurred inside and outside. The account of all IR theories allows for setting a wide range of purposes of aid-giving policy and describing the inside and outside impacts on their formation. However, as was pointed earlier, the explanation of the complexity of aid purposes is still problematic.

This section will discuss the conceptualisation of foreign aid policy in bilateral relations. Foreign aid is a question of interest in this research because it has been used in the literature (e.g. Bergman, 2006) to refer to the initiation of support from Nordic to Baltic states. Moreover, it will be explained below why it is important to distinguish ‘development aid / assistance’ from ‘foreign aid’ when discussing the foreign policy practice of aid-giving.
The term ‘foreign aid’ has been used in such fields of study as political science, economy and international relations. In regard to this, one more problem should be highlighted. While the shift from objective motives in realist and liberal models to the (re-)constructing ideas in constructivism provide with a wider range of motives for account, there is a degree of uncertainty on a concrete definition of foreign aid. The more general definition is limited to the economic and social progress leading to reduction of poverty and better human conditions. Such generalisability is problematic for the narrowed focus of the current thesis.

In the present study of bilateral aid, I will use the definition suggested by Lancaster (2007: 9; 10) who saw it as a ‘transfer of public resources from a government to another independent government’ identifying that the primary goal of the donor’s policy is ‘to better the human condition’ in the recipient country. He also proposes a limited definition of ‘development’ referring to ‘economic and social progress in poor countries, sustained by economic growth, and leading eventually to a reduction in poverty’ (Lancaster, 2007: 10). This view is supported by Berthelemy (2006: 184) who identifies ‘poverty alleviation’ as an objective of aid-giving and measure of its efficiency, while, according to the author, it depends on the governance and quality of economic policies.

However, as was previously mentioned, such generalisability of the purposes of aid-giving in terms of ‘economic and social progress’ or ‘economic growth and reduction of power’ leads to the missing of some other purposes (Lancaster, 2007: 2). The author concludes that not only the issue of ‘why’ should be at the heart of our understanding of foreign aid but also ‘how’ this practice has been developed or changed over time. At the same time, the general provision of the term of ‘development’ does not fully explain whether it is always used to define the economic and social progress. Consequently, in the literature the IR theories provide the ways of identification of the motives or goals in foreign aid policy (e.g. Lancaster, 2007: 3–4; Veen, 2011: 24–27). In other words, the theories will lead to the framing of the state-centric reflections on how and why to behave in a certain manner through the aid-giving policy.

The overview of each IR theory can be divided into three categories: actors, their interests and constraints on the environment by which they operate (Veen, 2011: 24). Throughout the explanations deriving from the realist tradition in IR, states
are the main actors that operate in the anarchic international system (Lancaster, 2007: 3; Veen, 2011: 24). The nature of international system is defined as the ‘absence of a supranational coercive authority’ (Noel and Therien, 1995: 525). In accordance with that, nation states attempt to distribute their power and capabilities driven primarily by their strategic interests in national security, geopolitical positioning and ‘self-preservation’ (Noel and Therien, 1995: 525; Schraeder, et. al., 1998: 297–298; Berthelemy, 2006: 183; Lancaster, 2007: 3; Veen, 2011: 24).

This perspective, according to Hattori (2003: 229–230), has historically been relevant to the Cold War in the competition between the world superpowers referred to the Third World. Conclusively, aid-giving policy has been related to the ‘high politics’ or ‘hard-headed’ diplomacy (Schraeder, et. al. 1998: 298; Lancaster, 2007: 3). Likewise, Veen (2011: 24) assumes that sub-state actors do not play an important role in national aid-giving policy. Lancaster (2007: 3) notes that during the 1970s and 1980s researchers began the development of models accounting quantitative data on foreign aid (e.g. low per capita income or amount of trade with donor, etc.) to indicate its purposes. Considering this, he points out that these researches strengthen the realist vision on why aid is given.

Generally, Lancaster (2007: 8) underlines that realism ignores the impact of domestic factors and emphasise the dominance of the incentives from international system on which state reacts reflectively through the aid provision. This theoretical foundation provides with a limited range of interests – security and strategic advantages – minimally addressing the issue of economic development of the recipients and downplaying their humanitarian needs (Schraeder, et. al., 1998: 298). Meanwhile, unlike Schraeder and his co-authors (1998: 298) who limited the description of classical realists' views to the ‘political-military strategic importance’ of the recipient states, Veen (2011: 25) notes that classical realism theory gives state preferences and interests in broader terms by taking into account the ‘domestic qualities’ (glory, wealth, etc.). From this point, the author comes to the conclusion on that the pre-established realist limitation of preferences and interests to security and power looks inadequate and problematic (ibid.). At the same time, the state rationality is also questioned. According to Galbreath et. al. (2008: 10), the ‘defense’ realism theory states that policymakers constantly deal with ‘uncertain and unpredictable information'.
Thus, this point criticises the rationality of state as the actor or makes it bounded, implying that the state’s reflection on the internal and external outputs is biased.

For some researchers, (e.g. Noel and Therien, 1995: 525–526; Schraeder et. al., 1998: 298; Lancaster, 2007: 3–4) cooperation between states (re-)emerged in the late twentieth century have been reflected within the liberalism, which can be also defined in terms of idealism, neoidealism or liberal internationalism theory. Whereas the ongoing tendency of interstate relations is described similarly, the researchers comes differently to determine the motives. On the one side, liberalism advances the vision of economic and trade cooperation benefits which, unlike geopolitical or strategic, more states are seeking (Schraeder, et. al., 1998: 298; Hattori, 2003: 230; Berthelemy, 2006: 183).

The role of economic rationale is also central to the neo-Marxist paradigm, while it is explained in other manner. While for liberalism, foreign policy practice of aid-giving is developing on the relevant equality of all states in cooperation, neo-Marxism highlights the and economic exploitation and inequality enhanced by the developed states at the centre of world capitalism towards developing countries on periphery. On the other side, liberals understand foreign aid as “a projection abroad of national values and social forces, as well as an instrument used by states to promote interdependence and international justice” with highlighting the importance of humanitarian need in foreign aid programmes (Noel and Therien, 1995: 525–526; Schraeder et. al., 1998: 298). In regard to the widening of focus, Veen (2011: 25) points out that liberalism not only takes a developing scope of state preferences into account but also considers the sub-state actors, as they play an important role in the maintaining of state–society interaction and, thus, shaping policy choices and state preferences.

From the perspective of state–society interaction, the idea that state preferences are pre-determined and objectively given has been challenged. Hattori (2003: 231) argues that the logic of economic and strategic importance cannot absolutely explain the emergence of humanitarian and egalitarian ideas, as they are taken out of the social context. In the same vein, Veen (2011: 25), in contrast to realist and even liberal description of ‘exogenous and stable preferences of actors’, introduces the terms of beliefs and perceptions to show up the changing manner of state preferences from the more endogenous social context. Lancaster
(2007: As Veen (2011: 26) further points out, constructivism utilises explanations from realism and liberalism in determination of interests, but its interpretation of them differs from what the previously described approaches propose.

According to that, while conventional IR theories determine the interests as the instruments of foreign policy objectives, constructivism recognises ideas as determinants of the foreign policy goals or even identifies goals and approaches themselves as ideas. This description of the ideas’ role in constructivism is closer to the value-oriented version of liberalism. At the same time, constructivism incorporates two contexts, domestic and international in the analysis and explanation of actors’ preferences and behaviour. For example, Veen (2011: 26, italics added) by referring to David Lumsdaine’s *Moral Vision and International Politics* underlines that membership in an international organisation can lead to the process of internationalisation of goals and values within the framework of the organisation.

Contributing to this point, Lancaster (2007: 4) argues that policy practices followed by goals and values are turning into international norms in interstate relations, as in case of a belief about the duty of rich countries to provide assistance to poor ones for the better human conditions. At the same time, as Veen (2011: 27–28) notes, that ideas are fundamental to the (re-)framing of national identity, in particular, in international positioning and behaviour. Lancaster (2007: 4) drawing on some literature work interpret the aid-giving policy of Scandinavian countries through the presence of their social democratic tradition. This tradition is also meaningful for Bergman (2006: 76–77), when she introduces the concept of ‘adjacent internationalism’ used to refer to Nordic internationalist behaviour in regard to the Baltic states in transition to address the affection of ‘social embedding values’ on that. However, she distinguishes the broader term of liberalism / liberal internationalism from Nordic internationalism emphasising that the latter is a domestic product with the projection abroad (ibid.).

Adding more to the point of the role identity in policies, I refer to Alexander Wendt (1999: 215) who saw state as a system of relationship between political power and, society in which the shared knowledge, the common discourse, ideas and interests circulate and form the corporate agency of action. To clarify this, the relations between states and the international system, according to Galbreath et.
al. (2008: 10) can be described as connected by representation, when, for instance, small states policy-makers turn to formulate their own vision of their position in the international system, interpret the political, social, historical and some other experiences and legacies.

On the question of (in-)adequacy of IR theories Lancaster (2007: 4) states that none of them can fully explain the complexity of aid-giving purposes. Veen (2011: 26) states the lack of explanation from constructivism on the role played by ideas in preferences formation and evolution, which is also ignored or underestimated in realist and liberal models. An attempt to utilise both international and domestic pressures raises up the issue of ‘where do they [the interests] come from?’ (ibid.). Addressing the issue, Lancaster (2007: 8–9) presents several approaches to conceptualise the interaction between domestic and international developments over the provision of foreign aid. According to that, the first approach is that the feature of the international system mostly determines the range of motives in aid-giving policy, as realism states. The second mediates the international trends and framing of policy choices by taking into account the basic elements of domestic policy – bureaucracies, political institutions, interest groups, and values and identities. The third approach examines the influence of external factor on the basic elements with an attempt to explain when and how it takes the place.

The first section of the chapter has shown that the discussion of national policy of foreign aid (or development assistance, if the development purpose becomes fundamental in certain policy) by IR scholars is mainly based on the assumptions about how the state (or state-led) actors determine the origin of motives. In other words, whether they are identified as given by the external environment or interpreted by domestic actors. The next section will go on to address this issue through the concept of Europeanisation, closely linked in some studies (e.g. Jano, 2013) with the initiated process of the EU enlargement referred to the CEE countries.

3.2. The “EU enlargement-led Europeanization”: mapping the research agenda

The following part of the thesis moves on to present the concept of Europeanization referring to the analysis of the EU enlargement process from the 1990s in relation to the former socialist CEE countries (cf. Grabbe, 2003; Jano,
This section continues the pre-established discussion of realist and constructivist assumptions. It will attempt to account the realist and constructivist approaches from the previous chapter linking them with how the state-led actors regard themselves with the EU enlargement and what are the effects.

The subject of effects is important for the definition of Europeanization in a given context. The general constitution of adaptation to the EU norms or projection of national interests and influence might prevail, however, it is not sufficient. Through the in-depth analysis of some other mechanisms, for example, identity reconstruction, Europeanization describes a more multiple phenomenon of how states adhere themselves to the EU membership. While the overestimation of the EU influence is a matter of criticism, it generates some new insights in the (re-)framing of a state behaviour, whether proposing through the realist of constructivist lenses. The issue is the concept usability in the broader discussion of potential EU membership of countries from CEE (to which three Baltic states are also related – see, for example: Grabbe, 2003: 304). In this section, I will also follow the argument from Stavridis’ review (2003: 4), according to which there is a ‘common research practice’ of selecting the preferred definition with intention to apply this further to the undertaken empirical analysis.

I begin with indication of difficulties in defining the concept and then consider the subject of application of meanings. For Featherstone (2003: 12) and Wong (2011: 136) Robert Ladrech was the first who suggested the definition of Europeanisation. According to the authors, Europeanisation is a process of national adaptation to the EU norms, imperatives and politics in the way of redefinition of their own interests and behaviour. Meanwhile, comparing this school of thought with the second one provided by himself, Wong (idem, 137) raises up the question of dominance in EU–member state relations. On the one side, through the term of ‘national adaptation’ the significance of the EU as a point of political reference may be claimed (idem, 136). On the other side, however, the state actors, while being the agents of the nationally defined objectives and proponents of changes on the EU level, cannot be seen as passive appropriators of the effects from the EU membership (idem, 137). De Flers and Müller (2010) were also the proponents of the separated examination of ‘top-down’ process related to the national adaptation, and ‘down-top’ process of transmitting the national policy objectives into the EU body.
Another significant aspect countering the state’s passivism is whether the state actors automatically identify their belonging to certain values. In relation to this, Olsen (2002: 927) states the presence of challenge for ideational factor as well. He saw the challenge as that some identities, beliefs or obligations in the overall construction may not be activated, even though they may be internalised. Such considerations return us to the issue of the theoretical foundations attributing to the EU and member or candidate state relations in the process of enlargement. So far as this research is related to the years from 1990 to 2004, I suggest the question of what Sweden may project more, self-interest or commitment, on the level of development cooperation with CEE. Conclusively, I can equally refer to rationalism and constructivism.

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005: 12) refer to the rationalist theory to prescribe the determinant role of costs and benefits taken into account by state-led actors in regard to the EU enlargement. The authors claim that ‘states favour the kind and degree of horizontal institutionalism that maximizes their benefits’ (ibid., italics added). I take into account three categories of costs and benefits proposed by the authors: transaction (management), policy and autonomy (ibid.). Transaction costs, while require the organisation of infrastructure and development of communication, maximises the benefits of the provision of services and strengthening of cooperation and coordination between old and new member states. Policy costs are related to the sharing of common goods with new member states contributing to the process of their national adaptation. Lastly, autonomy costs imply the loss of policy-making autonomy as a result from the active involvement in the organisation decision-making and / or political development of the applicant countries. Consequently, the rationalist approach provides the gains of security, power, wealth, influence, etc. that the state-led actors may seek from enlargement (idem, 13).

Constructivism offers a supra-state level of analysis on which state-led actors associate themselves in a certain degree with the international community represented by the international organisation and share the values giving the sense of commitment. In a form of general hypothesis Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (idem, 15) proposes the following statement:

the more an external state identifies with the international community that the organization represents and the more it shares the values and norms
that define the purpose and the policies of the organization, the stronger the institutional ties it seeks with this organization and the more the member states are willing to pursue horizontal institutionalization with this state.

From this foundation, the fundamental question to the EU membership is where a member or candidate state is ‘European’ in its demonstration of the commitment to the organisation and values identified as common. This normative component has been prescribed by Brommesson (2010: 228) in his concept of ‘normative Europeanisation’ in relation to the Swedish post-Cold War foreign policy reorientation. The author uses the concept for two reasons.

First, he supports the understanding of the EU as a normative power which has been strengthened as an effect in member and applicant states relations, while they appropriate the EU norms and regulations with the commitment to the European centre. Second, the author examines the effects of changes in Swedish foreign policy from the 1990s expressed in a more optimistic vision of Europe by Swedish politicians and increased interest in activism which appropriates the post-Cold War developments in Europe and the immediate neighbourhood of Baltic states (idem, 233–237). Similarly, Wong (2011: 138, italics added) proposes the meaning of ‘identity reconstruction’ to refer to the redefinition of norms, values and national identity towards the prioritising of ‘European’ attitudes and objectives implemented through elite socialisation (like in case of optimism on ‘Europe’ among some of the Swedish politicians). The main difference between Brommesson’s ‘normative Europeanization’ (2010) and Bergman’s ‘adjacent internationalism’ (2006) is that while the values and norms are interpreted in the context of belonging to Europe through the first concept, they have been prescribed as a product of domestic welfare projected abroad through the internationalist behaviour.

Jano (2013: 63) uses the term ‘EU enlargement-led Europeanisation’ to refer to the overall process of EU integration, which has an impact on the candidate states. In simple terms, according to Jane (ibid.), the process of Europeanisation in regard to such applicants as CEE countries, is a process of ‘member-state building’ and becoming Europe-like through the adaption to the EU norms and practices. In a same vein, Wong (2011: 139) uses the term of ‘modernisation’ to refer to the transition to democracy, market economy on the way to EU membership. Both Jano (ibid.) and Grabbe (2003: 304) indicate that the process
of Europeanisation was relevant to the countries of CEE, as they faced the same pressure of adaptation to the *acquis communautaire*. Following Radaelli (2003: 30), Grabbe (idem, 309) presents the Europeanisation as a multitude process consisting of Europeanization consists of processes of

(a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.

Further, Grabbe (idem, 310–312) suggests three explanations to differentiate Europeanisation from some other attempts to theorise the effects from the EU. First, while Europeanisation in respect to the countries of CEE has been addressing the EU enlargement, Europeanisation is not a synonym. This term is used to represent a consequent effect of enlargement. Second, the extent of the EU influence must be interpreted with caution as it is often exaggerated by EU politicians or member / applicant state governments, who promotes the enlargement as a driving force of socio-economic transition and political reforms in CEE. Some optimism on the EU membership system development may be seen in the term of ‘policy isomorphism’ proposed by Wong (2011: 139) as describing the advanced level of socialisation and convergence. As a result, member states “begin to emulate one other regarding the particular policy choices of policy frameworks”. The third, which referred to the previous, is that not all effects of EU are intentional as they might appear in the areas of minimal EU compliance if any (for instance, constitutional model building).

The next question relating to the work of Grabber (idem, 312–317) is ‘what is Europeanised’? In other words, what measures brings the effectiveness of certain policies? On the question, the author proposes several categories of mechanisms used by the EU:

- Policies, legislative and institutional templates, ‘downloaded’ from the EU level (harmonization and *acquis communautaire*).
- Aid and technical assistance transferred to the CEE recipients.
- Monitoring of applicants’ conditionality for membership.
- Twinning and consultations in public administration.

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1 Grabbe (ibid.) defines this term as the sum of all potential rights and obligations existing in the EU institutional framework or system of EU law and or practice.
Access to negotiations on the EU membership.

In this paragraph, I refer to the conceptualisation of a degree of Europeanisation provided in some of the literature (e.g. Orbie and Carbone, 2016: 4) in terms of absorption, accommodation and transformation. Absorption is a low degree of Europeanization characterised by the appropriation of certain aspects of European policy without modification of a national policies, processes and institutions. Accommodation means ‘adapting existing processes, policies, and institutions without changing their essential features and the underlying collective understandings attached to them’ (ibid). Lastly, transformation is a high degree process of replacement of the existing components of political organization by the new ones. All the terms can be seen as a maintenance of a question of extent to which the Europeanisation took place if the national policy framework is regarded.

The research focus has been limited to the discussion of post-Cold War developments in Swedish and Latvian policies. It has also been provided with a wider account of Nordic–Baltic relations, as three Baltic states also constituted the CEE countries in a literature (Grabbe, 2003). With the provision of general information in the theoretical chapter, I attempted to narrow a focus down in the theorising. Such attempt has been made in the discussion of Europeanization concept by linking this with the enlargement of CEE countries.

The next two chapters will present a selected methodology and empirical analysis of Swedish foreign policy of development assistance towards Latvia in 1990–2004. It is hoped these chapters will establish a fruitful discussion of the topic developing what has been overviewed before.
4. METHODOLOGY

The research has been undertaken to develop the idea on Swedish foreign aid towards Latvia in 1990–2004 as a concrete practice of foreign aid policy as an empirical case of Europeanization. In other words, my hypothesis is that Sweden’s aid-giving policy was acting as a tool of Swedish post-Cold War Europeanization through the support of Latvia as one of the Baltic states in transition. The literature review provides with a background information showing up to what extent Sweden demonstrated its support to Latvia on the future EU membership. The theoretical framework addressed the issues of the motives of aid-giving policy in IR and Europeanization as conceptualization of the modernisation set for the membership purpose. As an account of the demand for testing and contribution to what has been previously given in, the following chapter is about the research design. Before proceeding the analysis, I describe the methods and collecting data.

4.1. Content analysis in documentation study

The purpose of the analytical work established in this research is a greater understanding of the topic. In following the purpose, as Frey (2018: 546) states, documentary analysis is a form of qualitative research offering a systemic procedure of study as primary as secondary sources. The term of ‘secondary types’ of documentary data is used to refer to the account of primary data developed through the process of analysis or interpretation and published to a wider audience (ibid.). Summarizing the reviewed literature C. Williams (2015: 198) builds up three ways of the usage of the documents for the research purposes: ‘as the basis for the literature review’, ‘as a source of specific evidence’ and ‘for documentary analysis’. I consider myself to be interested in utilizing of all these ways.

Previously, I have been following the systemic approach in the description of the context of Swedish foreign development aid policy to Latvia in terms of post-Cold war changes in European affairs, the EU enlargement, and, finally, the transition process taken place in Sweden and Latvia in quite different ways but for quite a similar reason. I also discussed two theoretical frameworks developed in the reviewed literature. The first is about the motives of the foreign aid policy of a
donor and the second is the concept of Europeanization I have intended to discuss in accordance with some part of the system changes in post-Cold war European affairs. The socio-economic modernization of CEE has been categorized at once as a matter of aid-giving and processes named as Europeanization (Lancaster, 2007: 15; Wong, 2011: 139). Hence, the hypothesis has the following continuation that Swedish aid-giving policy has been a contribution to Latvia’s Europeanization, whereas this policy has been also Europeanized. For the purpose of testing of the proposed hypothesis I intend to resort to the qualitative content analysis method, which is known as used for the analysis of documents (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008: 108).

There are several key features of the method provided in the existing body of literature. Generally, the researchers utilise content analysis to link the collected data with statement of the research question, establishment of the context, revision of the previous knowledge and a broader description of the phenomenon (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008: 108). While content analysis shares such features of qualitative analysis methods as ‘concern with meanings and interpretation’, in contrast to these methods, it offers an effective way of reduction the amount of textual material towards the provision of the focus on the ‘selected aspects of meaning’ with ‘making sense of them’ (Julien, 2008; Schreier, 2014).

The second advantage of using the content analysis, which some writers (e.g. Veen, 2011: 33; Schreier, 2014) indicate, is that it avoids the problem of overestimation of one’s explanation or assumption provided by the researcher. In other words, content analysis usually sets a number of alternatives for examination. In relation to this advantage, Schreier (ibid.) also describes the method as highly systematic requiring a procedural examination of every unit of textual material. In literature this examination is usually defined in terms of codifying and categorizing (e.g. Gioia, et.al., 2012: 20–24; Saldana, 2013). The third advantage of flexibility is also related to the previous one – according to Schreier (ibid.) one code may include ‘varying portions of concept-driven and data-driven categories’.

The last subject I concern about in this section is how to conduct the content analysis. For example, Elo and Kyngäs (2018: 109–112) divide the overall procedure into three categories: preparation phase, organising phase, and final
reporting which I present further. In a preparation phase, a researcher states the problem, aim and research question and hypotheses. Having formed them, the researcher collects data, frames the codes from units on single words or phrases in the text. The codes then will be combined into broader categories. After generation of categories, the researcher moves on to the abstraction, which means the general description of the research topic linking with the categories. Referring to the same phase, Saldana (2013: 41–57) uses the term of ‘analytical memos’ provided as a written reflection on the previous knowledge and complex work on data. The overall analytical, procedural and intellectual work is usually presented as a final accord in the discussion of research findings.

After the general provision of information about the selected method, I give a small note on two types of categorization in content analysis proposed by Elo and Kyngäs (ibid.). The researchers divide the analysis into inductive and deductive. The selection of type is based on whether the researcher utilizes the previous knowledge and developments putting them in a new context (deductive) or consider oneself to organize the data through coding and categorizing the research material (inductive).

This section has given a brief introduction of the research method I intend to use. It has reviewed the key features of content analysis giving reasons it was adopted. The rationalization of the selection went on the argument that content analysis as a procedural form of qualitative method allows to consider many alternatives and, consequently, reduce the risk of myopic vision of the research issue. The analysis conducted in the Master’s Thesis will be based on documentation study. As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, it allows to put some insights into the previous knowledge from the literature review. Whereas the present section introduced the method, the section that follows moves on to explain in greater detail the organisation of content analysis for the current research.

4.2. Building on the categories

I begin the following section by referring to A. M. Veen (2011: 53) who used the content analysis for proceeding with sources on foreign aid policy. The author’s choice is based on the intention to make a qualitative account of the words or
phrases related to development issues and subjectively reproduced through the
textual materials of legislative debates (ibid). The following table presents the
author’s ‘frames and goals’ model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Goals for aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Increase donor’s physical security: support allies, oppose Communism, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power / international fora</td>
<td>Pursue power: increase leverage over others, win allies and positions of influence in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth / economic self-interest</td>
<td>Further economic interests of donor economy; support export industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlightened self-interest</td>
<td>Pursue global public goods: peace, stability, environmental health, population control, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation / self-affirmation</td>
<td>Establish and express a certain identity in international relations; improve international status and reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligation / duty</td>
<td>Fulfil obligations, whether historical or associated with position in international system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarianism</td>
<td>Promote the well-being of the poorest groups worldwide; provide humanitarian relief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Veen (ibid.) describes the range of frames as a useful tool for explaining and
maintaining the significance of aid-giving policy. As the author shows in Appendix B from his work (ibid.), each frame represents a category into which certain pieces of data are combined with codifying, and the pieces themselves may be referred to several frames at once. It is necessary to note, in accordance with the previously stated problem of overestimation, the latter feature plays a critical role in provision of alternative components to address the issue of what lays beyond aid-giving policy. In addition, the author incorporates two polarised views on the dominates of development assistance in national policy: rationalism nominated as ‘self-interest’ and humanitarianism as a form of caretaking about the recipient’s needs (idem, 9).

Turning to another significant aspect, I return to the developments in the work of Lancaster (2007: 18–23), which I have already mentioned in the last section of theoretical chapter. He encompasses four categories of domestic factors in a shape of the national foreign policy of aid provision: ideas, interests, institutions and organizations. Previously mentioned ideational component is presented by the author in terms of ‘worldviews’ referred to the construction of certain values
and norms justifying the appropriate or inappropriate behaviour in accordance with social practices or international trends (idem, 18). In regard to the latter, Brommesson (2010: 231–232) defines the ‘worldview’ as a certain vision of universe (or areas of universe like ‘Europe’).

The ‘worldviews’ are linked with ‘principled beliefs’ or expectations of actions in accordance with behavior of aid-giving country’s identity, and ‘causal beliefs’ or sorts of policies leading to the effective development (Lancaster, 2007: 18–19). The three other categories form the organizational patterns of aid-giving dealing with the decision makers, groups of interest with their capacity to change the tangle of the aid purposes, and sectors within which foreign aid policy has been manifested presumably through the exercise of causal beliefs (idem, 19–23). I used the thematic names of codes in the process of empirical analysis generally framed in certain goals, approaches and measures in Swedish aid-giving policy towards CEE countries. In the section on Europeanization, I gave the list of mechanisms referring to the work of Grabbe (ibid). By such means, the author proceeds the explanation of how the EU provides the conditionality for membership. I apply the same logic for Swedish aid-giving policy to examine what policy measures have been introduced for the increasing of the effectiveness of development assistance / cooperation.

The second research question concerns the objectives of Swedish foreign policy of development assistance to the Baltic states and Latvia in particular and how these objectives correlate with what has been prescribed in the conceptual framework of Europeanization. I consider this question as referred to the testing of previous knowledge. This description has been given earlier in term of deductive justification. In other words, I combine the abovementioned developments from Lancaster and Veen’s works putting them in the new context which I investigate. This context is a promotion of social and economic reforms has become a part of foreign aid policy towards former socialist countries to support changes in legal system, political and economic institutions since the 1990s (Lancaster, 2007: 15). As a result of combination, I go on to suggest the following analytical framework for this research in Table 3:
Table 3. The suggested model of analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Worldview</th>
<th>Frames (Codes)</th>
<th>Beliefs</th>
<th>Causal (policy measures introduced to make a certain foreign policy course effective)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justification of certain values / international trends in foreign policy behavior</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The frames of coding:</td>
<td>Security (self-determined security, defence and safety patterns)</td>
<td>Principled (expected behaviour)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A transformative development of the indicated geographical area (CEE, Baltic states, Latvia)</td>
<td>Power (strategic importance, alliances, influence)</td>
<td>The frames of subcoding:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Changes / perception of changes in sectors / areas of action (security, economy, social sector)</td>
<td>Wealth (economic, trade importance)</td>
<td>- Purposes in each frame (except reputation); Image (related to the reputation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enlightened self-interest (related to sounds of international affection, or global public goods provision)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reputation / self-affirmation (positioning in the international system, status, national identity, value)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obligation (duties and responsibility coming from reputation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarianism / well-being (human aspects: values, beliefs, rights, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What to account:  
- Association of frames with assumptions from rationalism (three costs and benefits: transaction, policy, autonomous) and constructivism (sharing values, sense of commitment)

Sources: Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Lancaster, 2007; Veen, 2011: 10; 45–46.

4.3. Data sources

Having discussed how to construct the analytical framework for the research, I will now move on to present the data sources. I used the open data from the official websites of Swedish government addressing specifically to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Government Offices of Sweden: government.se), Swedish parliament of Riksdag(-en) (riksdagen.se) and Sida (sida.se). The choice of the open data can be explained not only by the availability. The information from the available sources reflects on the final outcomes or intermediate results from Swedish aid-giving policy to CEE countries.
All the textual information has been translated into English by the authors provided this. I used two info brochures and a foreign policy yearbook dated back to the year of 2000 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as they summarise the Swedish policy of development cooperation with CEE countries. Considering the primary sources available in English I collected a Government bill 2002 on Swedish participation in global development cooperation, and two reports of inquiry from Riksdag. In relation to Sida, I collected the evaluation reports containing information on geographical area of study and organisation of assistance in different sectors. In relation to Latvia, the most valuable source is a results analysis from Sida as it contains the information on development cooperation with Latvia, which is relevant to the lack of detailed description of Sweden’s cooperation to CEE countries (cf. Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 2).

The account of the sufficient amount of data is problematic as this is a question of language proficiency, when the non-included data is available in Swedish only. Such question is one of the aspects of the entire issue of methodological challenges. Meeting the challenges is crucial for the maintenance of the quality of the research. As it deserves some attention, I will turn to this in the next section.

4.4. Addressing the issue of methodological challenges

In the final section of the fourth chapter, I present an issue of methodological challenges indicated in the literature. Some of the challenges have already been mentioned previously, and some of them has yet to be.

One of the main challenges is related to the organisation of analysis described generally by Veen (2011: 49) as how to convert the raw textual material into the useful qualitative measures of frames. Such challenge arises as a result from that the goals of aid-giving policy are not obvious and should be interpreted from the process of measurement (idem, 2).

The second challenge is referred to the account of actors. As was mentioned in the theoretical chapter, IR paradigms attribute to this issue differently. For realism state is a main driver of process, while the other foundations allow for the consideration of sub-state actors, international organisations, etc. In the empirical analysis such risk might appear through the overestimation of the role played by certain actors. As discussed above, this risk has been caused by the
exaggeration of the EU enlargement effects on either the domestic political changes or the international environment. Returning briefly to the ‘EU enlargement’, I resort to the statement about the terminology puzzling, which is also relevant to such terms as ‘foreign aid / development assistance’ or ‘Europeanization’. The difference between all these terms was presented previously, and it is also necessary to get accounted, as we are dealing with certain purpose of development and the effects caused by the EU enlargement in term of Europeanization. Similarly, the question referred to the Swedish development cooperation of 1990–2004 with the Baltic states is in what aspects it can be identified as a provider of Europeanization and in what aspects it was Europeanized itself (cf. Danielson and Wohlgemuth, 2005: 527–528). In a broader perspective it is also challengeable to distinguish the EU impact from some other effects in the international environment prescribed in term of ‘independent variables’ (Orbie and Carbone, 2016: 5–6).

To sum the section up, the degree of uncertainty on the terms and concepts used in this research following through the review of the literature may cause a sense of ambiguity in empirical analysis. Despite that the selected method of qualitative content analysis attempt to consider all the produced alternatives, the issue of the interpretation of data results remains critical.
5. ANALYTICAL CHAPTER: SWEDEN’S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH BALTIC STATES IN TRANSITION

5.1. Reporting the results from analysis: the wider area of the Baltic states with the focus on Latvia

5.1.1. Worldview: the representation of the Baltic transition in the Swedish development assistance policy

As was previously indicated, this research considers two post-Cold War processes: the Baltic states transition and the EU enlargement. These processes have become relevant for the country of Sweden, as they took place in the immediate neighbourhood. Regarding this, I follow the argument by Brommesson (2010: 233) who stated that the account of the changes occurred in the close vicinity that time is useful for the in-depth analysis of Swedish foreign policy reorientation.

One of the main tasks of this sub-section is to represent the Swedish reflections on the major post-Cold War transformations in Europe expressed in the country’s development assistance policy. For this purpose, I use the category of ‘worldview’, which has been previously discussed in the chapter on Methodology. The term can be defined as the correlation between the international trends or certain vision of territory and the behaviour of the actor (cf. Lancaster, 2007: 18; Brommesson, 2010: 231–232).

To begin with, I indicate significance as the main theme of Swedish reflection on the Baltic transition. In other words, the process of rapid change within the Baltic states as well as their movement towards democracy in a form of governance and market economy through the reform process has been evaluated as ‘significant upheaval’ (Hedborg, 1998: 7), ‘historic transformation’ (Hedborg, 2002: 7; see also: Sida, 1997: 20), or ‘transformative development’ (Government Offices of Sweden [Government Bill 2002/03:122], 2004: 17). Whereas all CEE countries were undergoing the process of transition, some priority has been given to the Baltic states with inclusion of Poland (e.g. Hedborg, 2002: 8). These countries, according to the data source (ibid.), ‘share the same cultural heritage’ and ‘are linked by common history’.
In regard to the previous point, I introduce the next frame of coding related to the worldview. *Joining to the EU* expressed earlier as a top priority of the Baltic transition may be seen in the empirical analysis as a multidimensional frame. The first dimension notes the application of the countries for the EU membership as an important change taking place in Eastern Europe, which is equally important for Western Europe intensifying the process of the EU enlargement (Hedborg, 1998; Hedborg, 2002). Second, considering the EU membership as a goal and driving force of the efforts from donor-recipient sides of Sweden and the Baltic republics (cf. Eduards, 2004: 16–17), this may be practically evaluated as an area of indicating the transition problems (Government Offices of Sweden [Government Bill 2002/03:122], 2004) as a solution when the applicant countries have intended to join to the freedom, security and justice area within the Union (Riksdagen [SOU 1997: 159], 1997).

At the same time, the support of the EU enlargement means bringing the common goods of security, wealth, justice, etc. to old and new states in Europe (cf. Hedborg, 2002). In other words, the next coding frame I develop here derives from the previously mentioned priority to join the EU and encompasses the *changes and challenges* in a set of *sectors* on which Sweden has had expressed its worldview. The account of challenges is important, as it shows up that the nomination of significance does not fully constitute the understanding of transition. The shift from one system to another has been recognised as problematic (cf. Hedborg, 1998: 8). Regarding the subject of development cooperation, such addition is crucial, as it hints to the areas of cooperation on the problem-solving basis (ibid.).

One of the important aspects of the EU enlargement is that the transition to democracy and market economy has received the applied meaning. For instance, *democratisation*, while being the overall process revealed in transition, serves in the analysis as a frame of coding with two concrete meanings. The first meaning establishes democratisation as a form of support towards government central structures and institutions, fair distribution of resources, pluralism, increasing participation of civilians, etc. (see: Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 2000: 9). The second meaning presents democratisation as a political principle or value promoting the civil respect of law and legal system, the expression of honesty in accountability from the official structures and institutions within the
country, and, lastly, the guarantee of equal rights, constructive cooperation and security within the society (ibid.). As for marketisation, it has been understood as the establishment of economy system with the ‘freer rules’, which is easier the regulate for the interests of trade and enterprise (Hedborg, 1998: 24).

From the overall point of view, democratisation was the main change in the international system and one of the common objectives in transition and occurred, in the general meaning, as a form of structural support and ideational promotion from the Swedish side. As a result, transition to the market economy is also considered to adjust the applicant countries to the EU rules and regulations (Hedborg, 2002: 15).

The change towards democratic governance and market economy also requires the promotion of social stability. Whereas there has been a lack of institutional support and working service with respect to the rule of law, many forms of organised crime or illegal behaviour have existed to a varying extent (Sida, 1997: 20–21). The problems arising in the transiting countries have been the unemployment, deteriorating social security and gender inequality – here women and children have been recognised as situated in a zone of risk (cf. Hedborg, 1998: 25; see also: Government Offices of Sweden, 2000 [Yearbook]).

The next aspect is related to the evaluation of the new international reality through the broad term of ‘security’. The key features of the state of security provides a contradictive vision. On the one side, the security policy situation has been characterised as leaving out the confrontation from the past times of the Cold War while, on the other, it has been presented as uncertain and unforeseeable in the future (Hedborg, 2002). At the previous points, the issue of justice and home affairs is at the heart of our understanding of as the challenges within the country as the problematic state of security in the region. On the first question, the problem has been caused by the lack of independent administration in justice with the less respect from citizens to the legal system (Hedborg, 1998). On the second, the guarantees of stability in justice and home affairs is essential to fulfil obligations to the EU and promote trust and support in relations between old members and new, while the ‘soft security’ issues of safer borders and illegal migration has been also relevant (Riksdagen [SOU 1997:159], 1997).
In the first part of the section, the subject of worldview in Swedish foreign policy towards the Baltic states in transition has been discussed. In the second part I will report the more concrete aspects of Swedish aid-giving policy in a given area of action.

5.1.2. Derived from the conditions: principled and causal beliefs

The category of ‘worldview’ constitutes the official representation of the close European environment, in which Sweden had to conduct its development assistance policy since the end of the Cold War. In the following part of the section, I will turn to the subcategories related to the worldview and described in the methodological chapter in terms as principled and causal beliefs. On the question of Swedish aid-giving policy, what follows is the discussion of the expected behaviour with certain policies of the donor in accordance with the international processes and / or (re-)imagining national identity (cf. Lancaster, 2007). To consider the certain measures, which has been introduced by the Swedish aid-giving actor for the increase of effectiveness of providing assistance, I refer to the frames of coding from the work of Veen (2011: 10).

I begin with the codes of principled beliefs and turn first to frame of security. It was earlier mentioned that the understanding of security has been changed over the time. Primarily, security was associated with the support of sovereignty of the newly independent Baltic states (Eduards, 2004: 7). The new challenges and changes occurred in the Baltic neighbourhood initiated the account of non-military aspects of security: crime, border control, illegal migration, civil security, etc (Hedborg, 1998: 17; Government Offices of Sweden, 2000 [Yearbook]: 178; Hedborg, 2002: 12; Eduards, 2004: 7).

It is important to note that the Swedish objective of development assistance policy has been shifted from the primary support of Baltic states sovereignty to the security-enhancing cooperation in area of Europe. Here I use the frame of the enlightened self-interest (Veen, 2011: 10) related to the Swedish side of cooperation. This frame reflects the Swedish internationalist behaviour, revealed mainly through the commitment to the promotion of such values or global public goods as peace, democracy, sustainable development, economic growth, social development (Hedborg, 2002), and sovereignty (Eduards, 2004) in the Baltic states and their surroundings. In relation to the Baltic states, the security-
enhancing-cooperation has had an applying meaning, as it was established to remove the barriers (Hedborg, 1998: 8) and facilitate the Baltic integration with the EU (Eduards, 2004: 7–8).

The exercise of Swedish power can be prescribed through the establishment of the new political and economic ties with the Baltic recipients as well as the support of the improvements appeared in national economies and policies (Hedborg, 1998: 7). Two key aspects have been associated with the subject of influence. The first is the decentralised cooperation between parties and agencies of cooperation in Sweden and Baltic states, named also was ‘twinning cooperation’ (e.g. Government Offices of Sweden, 2000 [Yearbook]: 179). The second is exerting of influence on the international organisations for gaining more attention from them on Swedish–Baltic cooperation (ibid.). Another aspect of power which is necessary to indicate is a reduction of Swedish influence via ‘phase out’ of cooperation to a more stable form of ‘normal neighbourhood’ within the state of the EU membership (Olesen, et.al., 2001: 1; 8; Eduards, 2004: 20).

The general willingness to support the Baltic transition and accession to the EU leads to the self-affirmation of Sweden as a relevant, flexible and valuable contributor playing a naturally leading role in the Baltic development, the importance of which has been increasing under the forthcoming EU enlargement (Hedborg, 1998; Hedborg, 2002; Government Offices of Sweden [Government Bill 2002/03:122], 2004). Within the transiting countries, the establishment of decentralised cooperation has been considered as promotion of the Swedish profile in CEE countries (Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 2000: 179).

At this point, the principled obligation taken by Sweden is to support the overall process of development within the Baltic states on the way to the EU membership (Riksdagen, 1998 [SOU 1998: 86]; Hedborg, 1998; Hedborg, 2002; Eduards, 2004).

The humanitarian aspect of development cooperation may be associated with the area of justice and home affairs, which embodies several meanings. The first is the promotion of people’s faith in the rule of law and judicial system representing by police, law courts, public prosecution authorities, prison and probation service, etc. (Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 2000: 178). The second has been associated with the necessity to adhere to the EU, which has been
regulating the ‘third pillar’ of justice and home affairs via Amsterdam and Maastricht treaties (Riksdagen, 1997 [SOU 1997:159]; Cameron, 2003: 2). The latter has been specifically related to the support of the proper functioning of social system and gender equality contributing to the wealth and economic development (e.g. Sida, 1997: 22).

The causal beliefs form the second subcategory returning us to the question of what has been Europeanised (cf. Grabbe, 2003: 312–317) or committed to the theme of the EU enlargement in Swedish aid-giving policy. It is important to mention that the certain measures, which will be presented below, played a pivotal role in gaining the support from the EU in a form of technical and/or financial assistance to the municipalities of the transiting countries (e.g. Olesen, et.al., 2001: 20) and to Sweden on the basis of co-financing (Riksdagen [SOU 1998: 86], 1998: 13). Following Grabber (ibid.), I propose the coding frames of money, know-how and institutional organisation of the support.

Money has been one of the primary sources of support in each sector of cooperation. Millions and billions of SEK have been allocated for the enhancing of security cooperation, establishing networks and ties, to affirm itself as a valuable contributor (see: Hedborg, 1998; Hedborg, 2002). A considerable amount of money was channelled via the EU Phare and Tacis programmes – SEK 1,84 billion (Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 2000: 177).

The organisational support has been introduced in the sources (e.g. Hedborg, 1998; Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 2000; Olesen, et.al., 2001; Hedborg, 2002) as a form of decentralised cooperation proceeding via municipalities, administrative boards, etc. Generally, the organisational support contained the development of official programmes, institutional cooperation and involvement in the EU line (see: Hedborg, 1998; Riksdag, 1997 [SOU 1997:159]; Riksdag, 1998 [SOU 1998:86]; Government Offices of Sweden, 2000; Hedborg, 2002). Lastly, the transfer of knowledge and expertise has emerged as an important component in each area of cooperation (see examples in: Hedborg, 1998; Hedborg, 2002).

The final paragraph gives a brief introduction of the position of Sida in the aid-giving policy from the given temporal and spatial context. In general, we are dealing with a wide range of actors of governance involved in the Swedish policy
of development assistance on the national level (cf. Hedborg, 1998; Hedborg, 2002). Riksdag and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been responsible for programming and coordinating the aid-giving policy. Hedborg (1998:11; 2002: 29) acknowledges Sida as the ‘central administrative agency for Sweden’s bilateral development cooperation’ through which 40 per cent of bilateral assistance has been channelled. In addition, Sida is the executive and competent proponent of changes in the reform process. At the same time, it has been Sida that proposed the conclusions and expertise constituting the programmes of development cooperation proposed by the government agencies (for instance, cf. Government Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002:1).

Summarising this sub-section, it began by the introduction of the worldview as a reflection on the relevant changes in Swedish policy. It went on the discussion of sectors in which Swedish aid-giving policy has been implemented. The adjusting to the EU enlargement has been identified in the development cooperation revealed in principle beliefs and certain measures introduced to supplement them. In the next section I will move on further to give an example of Swedish bilateral assistance to Latvia.

5.1.3. Giving an example: Sweden’s development cooperation with Latvia

In this part of the analysis report, I turn to the concrete example of Swedish development cooperation in Latvia. I follow the same logic of giving this example as Roman and Sandgren (1998: 2) who first designed their report analysis to provide ‘a detailed description’ of Swedish development cooperation with CEE countries. Similarly to other CEE countries, some priority has been given to Latvia from Sweden in the development of the country strategy (Government Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002). Similarly to other CEE countries, Latvia has undergone the rapid process of transition after regaining its independence in 1991. By such means, it may be shown up that, similarly to other CEE countries, Latvia has been relevant for Sweden as a recipient side, which had the same interest in post-Cold War development and integration with the EU.

As was indicated in the report on the migration issue, the change of legislation, standards and practices forms the process of Europeanization for Latvia, as Latvia’s priority to integrate into the EU has been the driving force for progress (Nordquist and Schmidt, 2002: 11). What has been expressed by the EC in
opinion to the Latvia’s status, serves as an indicator of progress made towards the alignment with the Union in a given time frame (Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 7; Government Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002: 2–3). In accordance with the EC opinion, the Riksdag has identified such problems in legal sector as naturalisation of non-citizens, market economy, rule of law, democracy, etc. The steps initiated on the way to EU has been important for Latvia, as the country needed to be recognised by the Union (Nordquist and Schmidt, 2002: 11) and receive the EU financing (Government Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002: 14).

Sweden has established the development cooperation with respect to the undergoing reform process aimed at integration into the EU. The account of the EU enlargement is relevant as the general obligation taken by the Swedish Government and Swedish agencies as what constitutes Latvia’s aspiration or top priority (e.g. Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 44; Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 2000: 182; Government Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002: 2–3; Hedborg, 2002: 22). Initiating cooperation with Latvia, the Swedish parliament set out the following goals of aid-giving policy (e.g. Roman and Sandgren 1998: 3):

- to promote common security;
- to deepen the culture of democracy;
- to support socially sustainable economic transition;
- to support environmentally sustainable development.

Despite the main objectives of Swedish foreign aid policy seems to be general, they have gained the more stable form with the account of the EU enlargement. In other words, each of the development cooperation objectives has received the attention, in accordance with the main purpose of supporting the reform process towards the EU membership.

In the area of security, the western orientation of Latvia with membership of the EU and NATO, has confirmed the possibility in enhancing cooperation towards common security in Europe, to which Sweden intended to contribute (Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 4). At the same time, Sida promoted the non-military aspects of security associated with the border control, combating of crime, migration and asylum policy etc. (Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 4; 8; Government Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002: 9). In relation of the non-military
cooperation, Sida provided financial support to the dismantling of the Soviet military equipment with repatriation of the Soviet militants (Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 8).

Cooperation in the legal sector has been associating with qualification of the EU membership and increasing capacities of the state of Latvia to combat the illegal practices and provide the gender equality (Government Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002: 12–13). Additionally, in the sector of justice and home affairs cooperation between police, migration and liaison offices, etc. has been elaborated to enable international police work closer to the EU integration aspect (Cameron, 2003: 19–26).

The next subject of reporting is related to self-affirmation from the side of Sweden. The country has been affirmed as one of the largest donors to Latvia (e.g. Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 6; Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 2000: 183; Hedborg, 2002: 22). The support through the projects has been relevant to the undergoing process of transition (Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 42), and such relevance has made Sweden an important economic partner and political coordinator in support of Latvia (cf. Nordquist and Schmidt, 2002: 11).

The question of relative power is more multiple. On the one hand, the cooperation is about the increasing capacities implemented via money contribution, expertise or administration. On the other hand, Sweden seeks to make its power reduced or limited. The term ‘phase out’ used to describe the reduction of the involvement leading to normal relations (ad hoc) with its neighbours (in relation to Latvia, e.g. Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 1). At the same time, what increases the Swedish influence is the relatively small contribution from Latvia leading to the supplement-side management in projects (idem, 41).

Giving the aspect of principled belief, I refer again to the question provided by Grabbe (ibid.) on what has been Europeanised. In other words, I discuss the measures of money, projects and administrative support introduced as tools of Europeanization of Latvia. One of them was money. In general, Sweden allocated in 1990–1997 SEK 560 million to projects in Latvia (Roman and Sandgren 1998: 1), and the total amount in 1998–2000 was SEK 182 million (Hedborg, 2002: 22). Aid of the projects has been the second important instrument of cooperation for several reasons. First, they implemented the transfer of know-how or expertise
(Roman and Sandgren 1998; Government Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002). Second, they initiated and developed the new forms of cooperation, such as twinning and administrative cooperation between institutions with different competencies at the regional and local level (ibid.).

The final remark is on the question of what allows for arguing that Swedish foreign policy has been Europeanised? The first is the account of the Latvia’s aspiration for the EU membership, which has become the main objective of the Swedish country strategy on development cooperation. Second, the support of progress in many sectors has been as the support of modernization of the recipient side as a contribution to the values of security, justice, wealth, etc. relevant for the whole EU and the member states. Third, the transmission of support in the forms of money, expertise and organisational cooperation has been aimed at facilitation of the entry into the EU. Finally, through the overall process of programming and practicing of development assistance Sweden has built up the self-image of relevant actor. Such image has concorded with as the need of Latvia to integrate into the EU, whereas the Swedish policy was also contributing to the promotion of common values in Europe.

5.2. Discussing the findings

The research questions in the Master’s Thesis were about the nature and objectives of Swedish development assistance in the selected geographical area. With respect to this question, an initial objective of this research was to identify the linkage between the objectives of Swedish aid-giving policy and the EU enlargement. Partly, the answers have been given through the account of the previous studies in the literature review. This section is designed to comment on the findings resulting from the analytical work. I will also attempt to show how the findings relate to the previous observation of the literature.

As the main processes of the post-Cold War development, transition of the Baltic states and the EU enlargement has received a considerable critical attention. The (re-) emergence of the Baltic question in a form of support and cooperation in the Nordic foreign policies has been stated in the study of Bergman (2006). In the analytical part of the work, this statement has found its confirmation, as the significance of changes in the immediate neighbourhood has been indicated in the relevant official reports of the Swedish institutions (e.g. Hedborg, 1998;
Hedborg, 2002; Sida, 1997; Government Offices of Sweden [Government Bill 2002/03:122], 2004). Another significant and the most obvious finding is that the support on the transition of the Baltic states with facilitation of their integration with the EU as the principle objective of Swedish aid-giving policy. This finding is in agreement with the studies (e.g. Ozolina, 1999, Czarny, 2018) indicating that the EU membership has been essential for Swedish–Baltic cooperation.

In addition to the previous point, such evaluation has received a considerable attention in the developed programmes of development assistance. The very support of Baltic integration into the EU has taken form of obligation from the Swedish supplement side in the policy of development assistance. The continuing support of the reforms and adaptation for facilitation of the Baltic’s EU membership has already been mentioned with reference to Isaksson (2004). The EU has been previously characterised as an indicator of problems of countries in transition. This applying meaning of the role of EU in relation to the support of the reform process in the Baltic states allows for the account of areas of development cooperation (cf. Roman and Sandgren 1998; Government Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002).

The subject of cooperation areas has provided some new insights in the previous knowledge as well. For example, the vision of the ‘new’ Europe in the reorienting Swedish foreign policy (cf. Brommesson, 2010) has received the concrete understanding in the area of security-enhancing cooperation with the Baltic states. Common security has been indicated as one of the internationalist values in the work of Bergman (2006: 73), and this point may be confirmed in accordance with some of the data sources (e.g. Hedborg, 2002). It has been previously indicated that security has received the new understanding of being ‘non-military’ via the cooperation for safer borders or stable migration (ibid.).

The commitment to the common values constitutes the Nordic image of ‘internationalists’ (Bergman, 2006) or ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Ingebritsen, 2002). In regard to this, if the area of secure Europe is taken as those of removed confrontational barriers, it implies the further promotion of peace, democracy, economic growth, sustainability, justice, social security, etc. (cf. Hedborg, 1998; Riksdagen [SOU 1997: 159], 1997; Hedborg, 2002). In the same vein, in the practice of development cooperation, the nominations of values have turned into
the nominations for areas of cooperation, as may be seen from the data sources (e.g. Sida, 1997 – on the area of justice and home affairs). This leads to the conclusion that as the values as the areas of cooperation have been interplaying in the programme and practice of foreign aid-giving policy. Such conclusion may serve as an explanation of why there is a methodological challenge in coding and categorising the textual material from data sources.

The practice of development assistance also includes the shaping of stable forms of cooperation. The first is the programming of development cooperation in documents. The second is the transfer of money and expertise to the areas of cooperation. It has been indicated above that all forms of aid-transferring have been aimed at contribution to the integration into the EU (e.g. Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 1). This has led to the argument that Swedish development assistance to the Baltic states has been Europeanised.

The last finding is related to the building up of influence and self-affirmation in Swedish development assistance. Here I count more on the example of Latvia that I used to undertake the research. In the chapter on the literature review it has been pointed out that the conditions were favourable for Sweden to increase its soft power (Kuldkepp, 2016: 401). It has been also noted that Sweden is a ‘soft donor’, which less exports its model but more accounts the preferences of the recipient than its interests (Danielson and Wohlgemuth, 2005: 518). This note has been indicated, in accordance with Bennich–Björkman (2002b: 354), as relevant to Latvia.

The empirical analysis of the case of cooperation with Latvia has provided with some new insights to confirm these ideas. Through the activism in the practical support of Latvia’s transition, Sweden has indirectly demonstrated its commitment to the common values of security, peace, justice, democracy in Europe. In relations with Latvia, the country has built up the image of the relevant donor playing a leading role in the provision of development assistance to Latvia (cf. Roman and Sandgren, 1998; Hedborg, 2002). The point that Sweden has mainly initiated and run the development cooperation with Latvia (cf. Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 1) may serve as a confirmation of the relative strength of Swedish influence. The Swedish activism, as of any Nordic country, may be described in term of realpolitik (cf. Bergman, 2006). Meanwhile, the provision of
the logic of realpolitik is limited in this case of study, as the sources indicate that Sweden has been seeking the reduction of its intervention by phasing out the relations to the state of ‘normal neighbourhood’ (e.g. Roman and Sandgren, 1998; 1; Hedborg, 1998: 10; Hedborg, 2002: 8; Eduards, 2004: 20–21).

In this paragraph, I refer to the IR scholars previously discussed in the theoretical chapter of the Master’s Thesis. As was noted above, each theory proposing the dominating interest in the state actor behaviour: security, wealth, power, self-affirmation, etc. All the frames of interests have become the categories of analysis (cf. Veen, 2011). These frames may be interpreted as forms of rationalisation and / or construction what states are doing in their policies. On the one side, both theoretical approaches provide the account of the environment in which the state-led actor has to operate. On the other side, the present research seems to be operating more in terms of constructivism. The terms of ‘worldview’ and ‘beliefs’ explains here how Sweden has constructed the vision of changes occurred in the close vicinity and how it has built up the self-image in response to the changes.

To summarise the main findings, I present the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Worldview</th>
<th>Frames (Codes)</th>
<th>Beliefs</th>
<th>Causal (policy measures introduced to make a certain foreign policy course effective)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The processes of transition and the EU enlargement as the significant changes occurred in the Swedish immediate neighbourhood; - EU as the indicator of problems of transition to meet integration with the Union</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>An area of cooperation with the promotion of values: prosperity, wealth, democracy, etc.</td>
<td>The frames of subcoding: - Transfer of know-how; - Transfer of money; - Organisation a) Sectoral support via institutions with decentralisation of cooperation; b) the impact of the future EU membership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td></td>
<td>Principled (expected behaviour)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Wealth**  
| (economic, trade importance) | New economic ties and adherence to the EU **acquis communataire**. |
| **Enlightened self-interest** | Related to the promotion of values via security enhancing cooperation (see: Security) |
| **Reputation / self-affirmation** | A position of the relevant donor playing a reading role in the support. |
| **Obligation** | The facilitation of the EU’s membership for the country in transition; support of the reform process. |
| **Humanitarianism / well-being** | Mainly associated with area of justice and home affairs and related to the issues of gender equality and social stability (shared w. wealth – social stability interplays with it). |

What to account:
- The maximized benefit: self-affirmation, the prospective of economic and political ties with the newly independent Baltic states. The main costs: transaction (transfer of the forms of support) and less autonomous state with the involvement in the Baltic matters;
- The sense of commitment to the Europe via the promotion of common values in the enhancing cooperation.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of the current study was to examine Sweden's foreign policy of development assistance towards Latvia with the help of the concept of Europeanisation. With respect to the concept, it sought to determine the effect of the EU enlargement in 1990-2004 on the Swedish development cooperation with the Baltic states through giving the example of Latvia's side of recipient. Several research questions was designed in relation to the purpose and developed in the main body of the Master's Thesis. The first research question was about the nature of relationship between Sweden and Latvia, in which Latvia is one of the Baltic states undergoing the process of transition. The second research question sought to identify the objectives of Swedish development assistance to the Baltic states and particularly to Latvia.

In discussion of the nature of post-Cold War relations between Sweden and the Baltic states, it was argued that the way the relations were developing encompasses the affection from the immediate European environment, and the domestic reflection on the changes occurred. The post-Cold War development in Europe has been interpreted in Swedish policy of development cooperation with the Baltic states as significant. Consequently, the welcoming attitude towards the Baltic transition and the EU enlargement contributed much to the development of Swedish activism towards the Baltics requiring the revision of the neutrality tradition.

The favourable conditions of the environment initiated the subject of interests in Nordic and Baltic foreign policies. Belonging to the post-Cold War development of Europe was important for Sweden and Latvia with the risk to get left out of that. The latter is the primary reason of choice of these countries for the study. The account of the problems in transition also provided the explanation of the choice of Latvia.

Sweden demonstrated its willingness to support the Baltic transition through the foreign aid policy. As was mentioned earlier, the traditional understanding of foreign aid has been based on socio-economic progress and poverty reduction. The examination of the subject through the IR theories allowed for the proposition of the range of aid-giving policy motives in some of the literature (Veen, 2011). Considering the factor of the EU enlargement, I highlighted the rationalist and
constructivist assumptions (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). They were central to the entire discussion of what kind of driving forces the EU enlargement established: the varieties of self-interest seeking from the integration or the sense of belonging to the area of the EU.

The method of content analysis is particularly useful in working with textual data. It allows for the account of the all varieties of why the aid is given. The deductive approach is applicable for putting the previous theoretical and methodological developments in the new context studied in the research. In other words, from the theoretical discussion, the established motives have been turned into the frames of analysis, which I put in the given temporal and spatial context.

Hence, the context of the current examination was the Swedish development cooperation with the Baltic states. As was mentioned in the chapter on Methodology, the policy outcomes are not obvious themselves. During the analysis the main challenge was to measure the objectives and categorise them properly to one frame or another as they interplayed in the sources. For instance, security may be interpreted as a certain area as a part of enlightened self-interest on the promotion of secure environment as a common good. Giving the example of power / influence evaluation, I also indicated the uncertainty while was seeking the presence of self-interest or the sense of commitment. Whereas Sweden was the relatively influential donor, it was seeking the reduction of its involvement in the development of cooperation.

At the same time, the EU enlargement has been projected at the cooperation, partly solving the problem of uncertainty. The data sources from Sweden has shown that it has been a general objective of the development assistance. In the research, it has become a field of the concrete examination of the motives. In other words, the motives for Swedish aid-giving policy has taken shape in relation to the facilitation of the EU enlargement.

The example of Latvia, while it shed the light on cooperation and allows for the account of how the EU enlargement affected the Swedish policy of development cooperation is not very specific. The lack of information specifically related to this country confirms the previous point. On the contrary, it is the source on Latvia (Sandgren and Roman, 1998) that provided the more detailed information on the Swedish development cooperation with CEE countries. It is important that the
source has also indicated the seeking of the reducing influence on the recipient from the Swedish side. Lastly, it is hoped that initiation of this research topic provides the new insights with the further elaboration of the discussion.

I suppose this discussion is useful mainly for the academic reasons. The concept of Europeanisation is central to the understanding of the EU influence on the national policies. In this thesis, I deliberately limited the presence of the EU to the state of the external factor to show up the indirect impact. Another significant subject is about power. The case of Swedish activism shows that it does not imply the intension to exercise the power more. Lastly, there is a small provision of sub-state Swedish agencies in the activism. Associating their practical exercise with the overall number of motives in aid-giving policy, the researcher might lead to the broader discussion of who and how stay behind the increasing of state actor capacities. At the same time, even the account of sub-state actors may give another geometry of state leadership.

This year, Latvia and the other Baltic states are celebrating the 15th anniversary of their integration into the EU. After so many years, the variety of models may be suggested to study and evaluate the concrete cases of the post-Soviet transition through the interaction of the newly independent states with the other state or sub-state players in cooperation. At the same time, the topic of Swedish activism in the support of the Baltic countries is worth further attention, also with regard to the much debated issue of the (post-)neutrality.

A comparison of countries in transition via the development cooperation may bring up the question of success for both donor and recipient sides. Why some countries are more / less successful in their transition and in which areas? What benefits does the development cooperation bring to the sub-state players involved in the development cooperation? How to measure the effectiveness of cooperation for the relevant sides in a concrete case? As such, these questions do not receive much attention in the current research, they are still expecting further investigation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sources


Literature


