

University of Tampere  
School of Management  
Degree programme in Politics

Whose interests does the burqa ban serve?  
An analysis of the effects of the ban on full-face veils on  
radicalisation and terrorism in France

Sanna Veikkola  
Master's Thesis  
November 2017  
Instructor: Hanna Ojanen

University of Tampere  
School of Management  
Degree programme in Politics

SANNA VEIKKOLA: "Whose interests does the burqa ban serve? An analysis of the effects of the ban on full-face veils on radicalisation and terrorism in France"

Master's thesis, 67 pages  
International Relations  
November 2017

---

In this thesis, I will analyse the European burqa ban phenomenon through the theoretical framework of terrorism as a provocation strategy. The aim is to analyse and provide insight on the effects of the restrictive legislation on radicalisation and terrorist activity. This thesis argues that by implementing restrictions on the use of the full-face veil, the European governments risk exacerbating existing grievances and offering terrorist organisations valuable message for recruitment, which could lead to increase in radicalisation and terrorist activity. The hypothesis tested in the analysis then claims that implementation of a burqa ban leads to an increase in radicalisation and terrorist activity.

The logic of provocation relies on the assumption that terrorist groups use terrorist tactics to overcome the collective action problem by goading the perceived enemy government into an indiscriminate counterterrorism response that would then lead to radicalisation of the moderates and mobilise more people to violence. The instrumental value of indiscriminate counterterrorism response, meaning that the measures would target the whole population the terrorists are part of, as a radicalising factor is the main theoretical focus area of this research and will be employed as the theoretical argument applied to the analysis of the effects of the legislation restricting the use of the full-face veils. Burqa bans, then, are understood here as indiscriminate government response targeting the whole European Muslim population.

Previous research shows that indiscriminate or particularly harsh counterterrorism measures as a response to terrorist incident cause a backlash effect which leads to increase in terrorist activity. Researchers and security experts have also indicated that the burqa ban could lead to a similar counterproductive effect in alienating an already marginalized group of people even further and might serve as a radicalising factor in the long run. This thesis will build on these findings.

The analysis, conducted as a case study on France, provided some initial support for the argument. Based on the analysis of the French burqa ban, its effects on Muslim women, terrorist propaganda material and terrorism and foreign fighter statistics, it can be concluded that the analysis supports the argument about the ban providing tools for terrorist recruitment. In addition, accounts provided by the Muslim women provide initial support for the grievances based argument. Analysis of the terrorism and foreign fighter provide some initial support for the argument, however, the data is insufficient for drawing robust and comprehensive conclusions. The methodology and data employed are unable to provide robust support for the hypothesis claiming that implementing a burqa ban leads to increase in radicalisation and terrorist activity. For comprehensive and sufficient analysis on the effects of the burqa ban on radicalisation and terrorist activity further research is needed.

Tampereen yliopisto  
Johtamiskorkeakoulu  
Politiikan tutkimuksen tutkinto-ohjelma

SANNA VEIKKOLA: "Whose interests does the burqa ban serve? An analysis of the effects of the ban on full-face veils on radicalisation and terrorism in France"

Pro gradu –tutkielma, 67 sivua  
Kansainvälisen politiikan opintosuunta  
Marraskuu 2017

---

Tämän tutkimus tarkastelee burkakieltojen vaikutusta radikalisoitumiskehitykselle ja terroristiselle toiminnalle Euroopassa. Tarkastelen burkakieltoja terrorismitutkimuksessa hyödynnetyn provokaatiostrategian avulla. Argumentoin, että burkan käyttöä säätelevät rajoitukset vahvistavat Euroopan muslimiyhteisöihin kohdistuvia epäkohtia ja heidän kokemaa epäoikeudenmukaisuuden tunnetta, mikä tarjoaa terroristijärjestöille työkaluja propagandan levittämiseen ja lisää radikalisoitumisen ja terroristisen toiminnan todennäköisyyttä. Tutkimuksen päähypoteesina on oletus, että burkakiellot johtavat radikalisoitumisen ja terroristisen toiminnan lisääntymiseen.

Provokaatiostrategian mukaan terroristijärjestöt pyrkivät terrori-iskujen kautta yllyttämään valtioita kohtuuttoman järeisiin vastatoimiin, jotka kohdistuisivat koko terroristien edustamaan väestönosaan. Kohtuuttomasti sivullista siviiliväestöä koettelevat vastatoimet puolestaan johtaisivat väestön maltillisen aineksen radikalisoitumiseen sekä väkivaltaiseen mobilisoitumiseen. Tutkimuksen pääpaino on erityisesti valtioiden terrorisminvastaisten toimien radikalisoivassa vaikutuksessa. Burkakielto ymmärretään tämän tutkimuksen puitteissa erityisesti Euroopan muslimiväestöön kohdistuvana kohtuuttomana terrorisminvastaisena toimenä.

Aiempi akateeminen tutkimus osoittaa, että kokonaista väestönosaa kohtuuttoman kovasti koettelevat terrorisminvastaiset toimet johtavat terroristisen toiminnan lisääntymiseen. Kyseessä on siis eräänlainen vastailmiö; terrorismintorjunnan nimissä toimeenpannut käytännöt lisäävät terrorismia terroristisen toiminnan kitkemisen sijaan. Burkakieltoihin syventyneet tutkijat ja asiantuntijat ovat varoittaneet samalaisen vastailmiön mahdollisuudesta burkan käyttöä rajoittavan lainsäädännön toimesta. Pro gradu –tutkimukseni rakentuu näille löydöksille.

Tutkimus rakentuu kiellon vaikutusten tarkastelulle Ranskassa. Aineiston analyysi muodostuu neljästä eri elementistä: kiellon vaikutuksista musliminaisten elämään, terrorismipropagandan tarkastelusta sekä kiellon vaikutusten tarkastelusta suhteessa terrori-iskujen ja maasta lähteneiden vierastaistelijoiden määrään. Analyysin tulokset tukevat argumenttia, jonka mukaan kiellot tarjoavat terroristijärjestöille värväys- ja propagandatyökaluja. Kiellon vaikutusten tarkastelu suhteessa musliminaisten elämään puolestaan tuottaa varovaista tukea argumentille kiellon epäoikeudenmukaisuuden tunnetta lisäävästä vaikutuksesta. Terrorismi- ja vierastaistelijatilastojen tarkastelu puolestaan tuottaa varovaista tukea pääargumentille, mutta luotettavien johtopäätöstä vetäminen tutkimuksessa hyödynnetyn aineiston pohjalta ei toteudu. Metodologia ja aineisto eivät siten tuottamaan tutkimuksen hypoteesia tukevia tuloksia. Analyysi ja tulokset antavat viitteitä hypoteesia tukevasta kehityksestä, mutta luotettavien tulosten ja johtopäätösten tuottaminen aiheen tiimoilta jää tulevien tutkimusprojektien tehtäväksi.

# Table of Contents

- 1. INTRODUCTION..... 2**
- 2. TERMINOLOGY..... 6**
- 3. BURQA BANS ..... 9**
  - 3.1. CURRENT DEBATE ..... 9
  - 3.2. BURQA BANS ACROSS EUROPE..... 10
  - 3.3. GLOBAL PHENOMENON..... 13
  - 3.4. JUSTIFICATION ..... 14
- 4. ISLAM THREAT SCENARIO..... 16**
- 5. LITERATURE REVIEW ..... 19**
  - 5.1. WHAT DO WE KNOW ALREADY? ..... 19
  - 5.2. BURQA BANS IN THE LITERATURE..... 20
    - 5.2.1. *Burqa Ban as a Champion of Women’s Rights?* ..... 20
    - 5.2.2. *The Islamic Veil as a Security Threat* ..... 23
    - 5.2.3. *Implications of the Burqa Ban on Terrorism*..... 26
  - 5.3. TERRORISM AND RADICALISATION IN THE LITERATURE ..... 27
    - 5.3.1. *Government Actions and Terrorism*..... 28
    - 5.3.2. *Identity, Social Networks and Radicalisation* ..... 29
- 6. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ..... 33**
  - 6.1. WHY PEOPLE MOBILISE FOR VIOLENCE?..... 33
  - 6.2. GRIEVANCES AS DRIVERS FOR VIOLENCE ..... 34
  - 6.3. COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM..... 37
  - 6.4. TERRORISM AS A PROVOCATION STRATEGY..... 38
- 7. RESEARCH DESIGN ..... 43**
  - 7.1. DATA SOURCES AND TOOLS FOR ANALYSIS ..... 43
  - 7.2. METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION ..... 45
- 8. ANALYSIS ..... 47**
  - 8.1. THE BURQA BAN IN FRANCE ..... 47
  - 8.2. THE BURQA BAN IN THE CONTEXT OF FRENCH IMMIGRATION AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES..... 50
  - 8.3. EFFECTS OF THE BURQA BAN ON MUSLIM WOMEN ..... 54
  - 8.4. THE FRENCH BANS IN TERRORIST PROPAGANDA ..... 55
  - 8.5. TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN FRANCE SINCE 2006 ..... 59
    - Table 1. Islamist terrorist attacks and arrests in EU countries 2006-2016 ..... 61
    - Table 2. Islamist terrorist incidents and arrests in France..... 61
    - Figure 1. Islamist terrorist incidents in France since 2006 ..... 62
    - Figure 2. Islamist terrorist incidents and arrests in France since 2006 ..... 62
  - 8.6. FRENCH FOREIGN FIGHTERS ..... 63
    - Table 3. European Foreign Fighters..... 64
- 9. CONCLUSIONS..... 65**
- BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... 68**

# 1. Introduction

Since 2014, Europe has experienced a sharp increase in both terrorist attacks and immigration. This link has not been missed in European and larger Western public and political discourse, and has even been perpetuated by recent terrorist attacks carried out by people who have entered Europe as asylum seekers or through the “refugee route” posing as asylum seekers. Terrorism has increasingly become an immigration question, and as a result, Muslims in Europe and in the West, have become under increasing scrutiny. In Europe, at the same time, attitudes towards immigration at large and Muslims in particular have hardened, and calls for tougher immigration policies and actions to preserve the Western way of life have increased. The public space is becoming more and more tolerant for discriminative policies, nationalist messages and even racist slurs and hate speech.

European governments, unprepared for the mass wave of immigrants that arrived in 2015 and 2016 are now rushing to piece together counterterrorism and counter extremism plans as well as plans for better integrating immigrants into European society and European way of life. Germany is an example of a country where the government has become under increasing pressure from the rise of right-wing parties, which has led to the government proposing and adopting tougher immigration and anti-radicalisation measures in order to contain the far-right and appease the public.

In Germany, one of the most visible and most publicised measures has been the call for and the subsequent implementation of a partial ban on full-face veils or burqas as they are referred to in the media and public discourse. Austria was another country to implement a ban on face coverings in 2017 and it was discussed in Denmark and Norway. The burqa was very visibly present in the 2017 election campaign of the German Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and earlier in 2017 an Australian right-wing politician made international headlines by wearing a full burqa in the parliament chambers.

Legal documents spelling out the restrictions or bans on the use of full-face veil usually use overly neutral language and refrain from explicitly referring to the burqa. Instead, the ban is usually phrased as applying to all face coverings. However, regardless of the country, the debate, be it political or public, surrounding the issue and the arguments made in favour of the ban make it clear that the legislation is aimed at restricting the use of the burqa. This is also a widely-shared understanding among the academic community. Better integration of immigrants to European society and women's rights are often provided as the key arguments in support of a ban. There is always, however, an underline that implies that burqas and niqabs are incompatible with the Western way of life, that they are representation of gender inequality, and have no place in Europe. There are also examples of direct linkages drawn between the veil and security, especially terrorism. The most obvious example being the short-lived burkini ban in France in summer 2016, where the local officials referred to the beachwear as being sympathetic to extremism. In March 2017, the European People's Party published a proposal for a cohesive society and countering Islamic extremism in which they called for a European Union wide ban on full-face veils. These examples indicate that the burqa and niqab are seen as security threats and as factors that prohibit integration and fuel radicalisation.

Experts, academics and security professionals have cautioned that implementing a burqa ban might be counterproductive in its efforts to speed integration and enhance security and women's rights, and might in the long run serve as a radicalising factor. Despite these warnings and the lack of evidence on the benefits of such a ban, governments across the globe have continued to adopt it as part of their counter-terrorism measures, national security policies or initiatives relating to better integration and social cohesion like in many European countries.

This study asks whether there are linkages between the burqa bans and increase in radicalisation and terrorism, and argues that by implementing restrictions on the use of the full-face veil, the European governments risk exacerbating grievances and offering terrorist organisations a valuable recruiting tool, which could lead to increase in radicalisation and terrorist activity. The analysis will focus on the effects the ban has had on the societal and individual level, while analysing the possible implications it has had on terrorist activity and radicalisation in France.

Previous research shows that state repression on religious grounds as well as minority discrimination are strong predictors of terrorist attacks in countries (Piazza 2017; Choi and Piazza 2016). Existing literature on terrorism has also established that the way regimes treat and respect

their citizens' rights and minority rights have an effect on the patterns of terrorism in countries (Piazza 2017). When it comes to responding to terrorism, indiscriminate counterterrorism measures that target whole population or a group of people instead of only targeting terrorists themselves have been found to increase terrorist activity (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Gill, Piazza and Horgan 2016).

This study will build on these findings by applying the argument of indiscriminate counterterrorism measures functioning as inducement for radicalisation and terrorism to the European context and arguing that a burqa ban constitutes this kind of indiscriminate measure that aims containing Islam at large. Further justifications will be provided later in the research. In addition, this research will contribute to the existing body of terrorism and conflict literature by employing collective action paradigm as the theoretical framework and supporting it with the literature focusing on terrorism as a provocation strategy. According to this theoretical logic, terrorists face an acute collective action problem, which they need to overcome, because they need members and support from population they are members of or perceived to represent to survive. Based on the provocation strategy, to overcome the collective action problem, the extremist organisations launch terrorist attacks against the enemy, usually a government, in the hopes of provoking the government to an indiscriminate counterterrorism response targeting the entire population or community the terrorists are part of. This would then exacerbate grievances and discontent in the community. By retaliating in a harsh and disproportionate way the government legitimizes the terrorists' agenda, radicalise more people and sometimes entirely eliminate the collective action problem. This study will then support the argument that terrorism provides the extremist organisations a powerful tool to recruit new members and to overcome the collective action problem.

The methodology employed in this research is a single-country case study focusing on France. France was chosen because it has had a burqa ban in place since 2011 and for this reason data availability is not a problem. In addition to the burqa ban, France has had a ban on religious symbols in schools since 2004. Together, these provide scope and depth for analysis. Limitations caused by the chosen method as well as the difficulties faced in formulating the argument and research design will be explained in the research design section.

There are multiple limitations to this study. Firstly, no single explanation for terrorism or radicalisation exists. Even though this study attempts to establish a theoretical and empirical link

between the burqa ban and terrorism and radicalisation, this is not an attempt to draw direct causal links between these phenomena. Nor is my intention to argue that the burqa ban alone explains terrorism or radicalisation. There are multiple causes for terrorism and radicalisation and the angle introduced in this thesis research is one way to approach the complexity of the problem. This study attempts to explore whether a burqa ban could be a factor in the radicalisation process and in determining which countries experience terrorism. Burqa ban, however, is only one factor, and can't explain the whole phenomenon.

The goal of this thesis is to make an initial attempt at analysing the relationship between burqa bans and radicalisation and terrorism, not to unveil to complexity of the issue at once. Extensive further research is needed to analyse the full-spectrum of implications the bans have both on country, society and individual level. This will be further emphasized later in this research. This study examines the issue from one angle by applying an existing theoretical framework to the question, and the conclusions drawn here represent one interpretation of the issue and the material used for analysis. Also, it should be noted, that the theoretical approach employed in this research, namely the provocation strategy, represents one approach to terrorism. Other strategies exist, but the one adopted here is chosen, because the aim of this research is to test the argumentative power of the provocation strategy in relation to the burqa ban.

This thesis paper will proceed as follows: the following section will provide definitions for key concepts used throughout the study, after which an introduction to burqa bans, the current debate surrounding the issue and recent legislative examples will be provided. The third section will provide historical and political context for the burqa ban debate and existing research on the topic will be explored in the fourth part. The fifth section lays out the theoretical framework and causal chain through which the argument and hypothesis will be formulated. The final two sections before concluding remarks include the research design and the actual analysis of the case study material.

## 2. Terminology

Before proceeding further with the research, key concepts will be defined, and their operationalisation for the purposes of this study will be offered to avoid confusion and false conclusions. Terrorism as discussed and analysed in this study should be understood as a strategy employed by a group or an organisation to reach political change (Tilly 2004: 5-6; Hoffman 1998: 43). The most corresponding definition of terrorism would be that of Enders et al (2011: 321) which defines terrorism as “the premediated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims.”

However, apart from the theoretical section which offers a general theoretical framework not particular to any specific type of terrorism, this research will focus solely on Islamist or jihadist (TE-SAT 2017) or Salafi Jihadist (Sageman 2004) terrorism. This means that the focus will be in acts or incidents stemming from or motivated by jihadist or radical Islamist ideology. Europe faces and has faced terrorism on many other fronts as well, however, due to this research focusing on the effect burqa bans have on radicalisation and terrorist activity, the choice to focus on Islamist terrorism is justified.

Since the terrorism data used in the analysis section is obtained from Europol’s European Union Terrorism Situation and Trends Reports from years 2007 and 2017 (covering all the years from 2006 to 2016), the definition of terrorism employed in the analysis is the one used by Europol. Europol’s reports in general categorise terrorist organisations by their source of motivation. For the reasons mentioned above, terrorism in the context of this research will mean Islamist terrorism. The term is adopted from the Europol reports, which until 2011 used the term. After that they switched to religiously-inspired terrorism and after that jihadist terrorism, which is used in the latest report. However, this report will employ the term Islamist terrorism because I deem it to be more representative of the whole range of actors and organisations out there.

According to the Europol definition, “Jihadist terrorist acts are those that are committed out of a mindset that rejects democracy on religious grounds and uses the historical comparison with Crusades of the Middle Ages to describe current situations, in which it is believed that Sunni Islam is facing a “Crusader alliance” composed of Shi’is, Christians and Jews.” (TE-SAT 2017: 55)

The above definition will be employed in the analysis section. However, the Europol definition is very specific, and does not cover the what, why and how of terrorism usually included in the definitions. This is why the study is based on the broader definition of terrorism presented above and the Europol categorisation will only be used in the analysis.

This research uses the term *burqa* as being synonymous to the full-face veil. This is not accurate use of terms since most Muslim women in Europe wearing the full-veil actually use *niqab* and not burqa. Niqab is the full-face veil that leaves the eyes uncovered. Burqa on the other hand covers the whole body from the head to toe and has a mesh in front of the eyes. *Hijab* when mentioned in the text on the other hand refers to the *headscarf* that covers the hair and neck, but leaves the whole face uncovered. The use of the word burqa in reference to the full-face veil is a conscious choice and justified in this context by the common use of the term *burqa ban* in media, academic literature and political and public discourse. By using the same term, this study then binds itself to the current political debate and the existing academic research. Burqa ban on the other hand, refers to restrictive legislation that in general prohibits the use of all face coverings in public. France is used as the case study here, however, burqa ban does not refer to the French legislation alone but is a general term employed to refer to all the laws that restrict the use of the full-face veil.

In this research, radicalisation is understood as “a growing readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order.” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 798). The definition for radical comes from the same Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010: 798) article, and it is understood as “a person harbouring a deep-felt desire for fundamental socio-political changes”.

Foreign fighters on the other hand are understood here as individuals who have left their countries of residence to join the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Most of the foreign fighters joined Islamic State even though a small minority is believed to have fought for other rebel factions and even the government side (The Soufan Group 2015: 5). Since this research focuses solely on the foreign

fighters travelling to Iraq and Syria, the above definition is used. However, a number of researchers have offered definitions to describe the wider phenomenon that is far older than Islamic State and the Syrian conflict. David Malet (2015: 6) for example proposes foreign fighter to be defined as “a non citizen of a state experiencing civil conflict who arrives from an external state to join an insurgency”.

French model of cultural assimilation is mentioned multiple times in relation to the burqa ban, and while it will be explained in greater detail in the analysis section, I will offer a brief description of the term here. Cultural assimilation approach is a cultural integration theory that aims at “gradual disappearance of original cultural and behavioural patterns in favour of new ones” (Algan et al. 2012: 4). In the end, as a result of complete assimilation, “diverse immigrant groups are expected to ‘melt’ into the mainstream culture through an inter-generational process of cultural, social, and economic integration” (Algan et al. 2012: 4).

Islamophobia is another term frequently used in the text, especially in the literature review, and requires clear definition. According to Oxford English Dictionary definition, Islamophobia mean “dislike of or prejudice against Islam or Muslims, especially as a political force” (Oxford Dictionaries). Douglas Pratt, whose research will be referred to in the literature review, defines Islamophobia as “a manifestation of fear of an exclusionary Islam” which is manifested as “exclusionary or negatively reactive behaviours with Muslims and Islam as the target” (Pratt 2015: 205).

This research is heavily relying on the concept of indiscriminate counterterrorism measures carried out by government forces. When the measures are indiscriminate, it means that they target a whole group of people or population without making distinction between people supporting terrorist cause or the perpetrators themselves and the rest of the population. Indiscriminate measures usually affect innocent bystanders and cause collateral damage, as further explained later in this research. Discriminate response to terrorist attack, on the other hand, entails targeting only the perpetrators in the counter effort and avoiding causing any kind of damage to the general public or innocent civilians (Kydd and Walter 2006: 70). According to Lake (2002: 19) an indiscriminate response to terrorism “punishes the broad population of which the terrorists are part.”

## 3. Burqa Bans

### 3.1. Current Debate

Burqa seems to be an increasingly hot topic in political and public discourse in contemporary European society. Rarely has a piece of women's clothing raised as much controversy and as many opinions as the burqa does today. One only needs to look at the recent political events to see the political, religious and cultural symbolic the garment carries.

In Germany, for example, the burqa was well represented in the run-up to the September 2017 federal election. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party ran a highly visible anti-immigration election campaign with adds picturing bikini-clad women and a text indicating that in Germany women wear bikinis and not burqas (Petzinger 1.9.2017, Quartz). In September 2017, right before the German election, a niqab-clad woman, representing the Chancellor Merkel and her immigration policies, was leading a far-right Pegida march in Dresden (Kauhanen 17.9.2017, HS). This highlights the political symbolic the burqa bears as a representation of the Islamic "Other" that threatens Europe.

In August 2017, Australian right-wing politician Pauline Hanson made international headlines when she entered the Senate chamber dressed in a burqa in an attempt to draw attention her call to ban the burqa due to national security concerns (Murphy 17.8.2017, The Guardian). Earlier in August 2017, a prank picture of empty bus seats posted on a Norwegian nationalist anti-immigration Facebook group caused the group to be publicly mocked after the group mistook the empty seats for six burqa-clad women. The picture sparked a furious debate amongst the group members, various people describing the sight scary and calling for the garment to be banned (Pasha-Robinson 1.8.2017, Independent).

One of the most controversial burqa debacles took place in the summer of 2016 when several French cities Muslim women from wearing the full-body swimsuit, burkini, on their beaches. Burkini is a full-body swimsuit that leaves the face uncovered. Shocking pictures and videos of

male police officers standing around a Muslim woman on a beach in Nice and ordering her to remove the garment (Winer 24.8.2016, Times of Israel). According to the Mayor of Cannes, the burkinis were banned because they are both “not respectful of good morals and secularism” and a dangerous “symbol on Islamic extremism.” Another official told Time that the burkini makes “reference to an allegiance to terrorist movements who are at war with us.” (Huckerby 24.8.2016, Time).

Burkinis were seen to be too provocative in the aftermath of yet another terrorist incident on French soil during Bastille Day celebrations in July 2016 (BBC 1.9.2016). These comments drew a straight line between some Muslim women wearing a full-body swimsuit to a beach and terrorism. France’s top administrative court ordered the beach towns to lift the ban in its ruling in August 2016 (BBC 1.9.2016).

### 3.2. Burqa Bans Across Europe

On October 1<sup>st</sup> 2017 Austria became the latest European country to ban full-face veils and other face coverings and masks that cover the whole face. On the same day that the legislation prohibiting face coverings in public places entered into force, news articles across Europe featured a picture of a Muslim women being asked to remove her veil by Austrian police officers. Defying the new ban will result in a fine of 150 Euros (Nianias 1.10.2017, The Telegraph). Proponents of the new legislation cited security reasons and claimed face covering veils are anti-social and hinder integration of immigrants into the Austrian society (King 31.1.2017, Politico).

In late September 2017, the upper house of German parliament, Bundestag, passed a new traffic legislation prohibiting full-face coverings while driving (Chase 22.9.2017, Deutsche Welle). This follows another legislation from April 2017 banning civil servants, judges and soldiers from wearing Islamic full-face veil while at work (Walsh 28.4.2017, Deutsche Welle). Following the approval of the Austrian burqa ban, the general secretary of Angela Merkel’s Bavarian sister party CSU called for a similar ban in Germany, stating that “the Burqa does not belong in Germany” (Belson 2.10.2017, Politico).

In early October 2017 Denmark looks set to become the next European country to adopt a ban on burqas and niqabs as most parties in the Danish parliament have decided to support a proposal for a ban (Reuters 6.10.2017). Denmark's Nordic neighbour Norway in June 2017 proposed a ban on full-face Muslim veils in kindergartens, schools and universities (Reuters 12.6.2017). In Switzerland, a group advocating for a burqa ban have collected more than 100 000 signatures in support of the ban and they will propose the federal government to set up a referendum on the issue. According to the campaign leader, full-face veils are "a symbol of radical Islam" and representation of oppression against women (Reuters 15.9.2017). This follows an unsuccessful attempt to advance the ban in the Swiss parliament, where the upper house voted down a proposal for a burqa ban in March 2017. One Swiss canton, Italian-speaking Ticino has had a burqa ban in place since it was passed in a referendum in 2016 (Wicki 9.3.2017, Politico).

France and Belgium were the first European states to pass a law on full-face veils in 2011. In Belgium, there had been bans on concealing the face on the local administration level even before 2011, but after the proposal was passed into federal level law violations of the law would be met with a fine of 15 to 25 euros or imprisonment of one to seven days. Exceptions to the ban included situations where concealing one's face was justified for health or safety reasons or on the occasion of public festivities (Amnesty International 2012: 93).

In France, the legislation prohibiting any form of dress aimed at concealing the face in public entered into force in April 2011. The law basically allows wearing of full-face veils only at home, in private cars or in places of worship. Exceptions to the law included existing safety and health regulations and public festivities, similarly to Belgium (Amnesty International 2012, 95). In addition to the 2011 ban on burqas, France already had in place a 2004 legislation prohibiting students from wearing religious symbols in school. This legislation has been widely interpreted as directly targeting the Muslim headscarf (Chrisafis 13.4.2016, The Guardian).

The French and Belgian burqa bans have both been challenged in the European Court of Human Rights on the grounds that the bans were in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights and especially its articles 8, 9 and 14 guaranteeing right to respect for private and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion and prohibition of discrimination. In both cases, first in a complaint issued against France in 2014 and then against Belgium in 2017, the court found that the legislation was not in violation of those above-mentioned articles (ECHR 2014, S.A.S. vs. France no. 43835/11; ECHR 241(2017)). A press release from July 2017 concerning

the Belgian case states, that the Court found that the restriction “sought to guarantee the conditions of “living together” and the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” and that it was “necessary in a democratic society”” (ECHR 241(2017) which in the court’s eyes made the ban justifiable.

In late 2016, the Netherlands joined the group of European states banning burqa and niqab in public transport, educational institutions, health institutions and government buildings (The Guardian 29.11.2016). The government had already proposed a ban on face coverings as early as in 2012 and during that time argued that the “prohibition would guarantee the social order in the Netherlands and that concealing the face constituted an obstacle to open communication and social participation.” Regardless of an existing legislation requiring a person to remove face coverings for identity checks, the Dutch government argued that “concealing the face may pose a threat to security.” (Amnesty International 2012, 98).

The Bulgarian parliament, on the other hand, approved legislation banning burqas and niqabs in public in September 2016. Supporters of the ban said it would “boost security after Islamist militant attacks in Europe” while opponents of the ban, like the ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms, said the ban would incite ethnic and religious intolerance (Krasimirov 30.9.2017, Reuters). In the UK, the burqa ban has been on and off the political debate for quite a while, but after a surge of terrorist attacks in the country in 2017 the debate resurfaced once again and banning the burqa had been presented as one solution to curbing extremism in Britain after it was struck by terrorists three times in less than four months’ time in 2017 (McKay 4.6.2017, FoxNews). In April 2017, Ukip leader Paul Nuttall called for a burqa ban in the UK due to threats, security risks and concern over integration. Nuttall also made references to terrorism by saying that veils that cover the whole face rendered CCTV ineffective (Williams 27.4.2017, Channel4).

In their report from 2012 Amnesty International noted that debates over possible burqa bans in several European countries including Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the UK have contributed to “strengthening stereotypes and prejudices against Muslims.” (Amnesty International 2012, 91). In 2017, this debate spread to the European Union level when In March 2017, European People’s Party, a centre-right coalition of European political parties in the European Parliament called for a Europe-wide ban on full-face veils in public places, “both for reasons of security and because seeing one another’s faces is an integral part of human interaction in Europe”. This call was one point on

their list of actions to combat “Islamic extremism” in Europe and to build more cohesive European society in the face of Muslim immigration (EPP 3/2017: 2). It is clear from the wording of the resolution that burqa is seen as a security question and that banning burqas would enhance security in Europe.

### 3.3. Global Phenomenon

Despite being frequently made to be about the difference between Islam and the West, burqa is not striking controversies only in the Western world. Local or nationwide bans have been implemented in multiple countries from Africa to Asia. According to a Pew Research Centre report from 2016, more countries globally have restrictions on women’s religious dress or symbols than require women to dress in a certain way (Pew Research Centre 5.4.2016). Europe is in the lead with 40 percent of the countries having had at least one restriction in place in 2012-2013 (Pew Research Centre 5.4.2016). This does not apply to the burqa alone, but all women’s religious attires.

Whilst in Europe the bans have been articulated in a manner that makes them about women’s rights, secularism, integration, identity checks and European cultural traditions, on a global scale it’s more often about security. The Chadian government instituted a burqa ban in 2015 after an alleged Boko Haram suicide bomber disguised in a burqa detonated his suicide vest in a crowded market, killing more than 15 people (Blair 2.5.2016, The Telegraph). Only a month after the Chadian ban came into effect, Cameroon banned the garment in its northernmost region bordering Boko Haram infected areas in Nigeria after it was struck by suicide bombings carried out by people clad in burqas. Niger’s government instituted a ban in its southern region of Diffa for similar reasons. Even Nigeria has considered implementing a ban on burqas after Boko Haram started using burqa-clad girls as suicide bombers (The Economist 11.2.1016; The Guardian 16.8.2017).

Congo-Brazzaville is another West-African country that moved to ban the burqa in 2015 to “prevent any act of terrorism” and Senegal is considering a ban for similar reasons. In December 2015, all 15 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formally endorsed a ban on “clothing that prevents the clear identification of persons” (Blair 2.5.2016, The

Telegraph). In early 2017 Morocco banned the sale and production of burqas due to security concerns. Niqabs are still allowed however (Rothwell and Pigaglio 12.1.2017, The Telegraph).

In March 2017, as part of their new “anti-extremism” regulations, China moved to prohibit full-face veils in their western Xinjiang province that is home to the predominantly Muslim Uighur minority. Other anti-extremism measures included prohibition on long beards on men and too religious names on babies (Al Jazeera 1.4.2017). Tajikistan is another example of a country where preventive counter-terrorism policies require women to remove their headscarves and men to shave off their beards (Lain 2016: 392). Turkey on the other hand is moving to the opposite direction by officially lifting the ban on headscarves in all state institutions in 2017 after decades of them being prohibited (The Guardian 22.2.2017).

### 3.4. Justification

The list of examples provided above is not exhaustive since partial or local bans on hijabs, niqabs and burqas exist in a number of countries globally. However, the point made here through the examples proves that the burqa is being used to combat terrorism and extremism and can be as such researched in a wider counterterrorism framework. Even in Europe there are examples of clear references being made between the garment and terrorism, most notably in the French short lived ban on burkinis. Beydoun (2016: 1299) has argued that even though the French 2004 and 2011 bans on headscarves and full-face veils are not counterterrorism measures per se, “the State enacted the bans as immediate policy response to terrorist acts committed by Muslim and the escalating fear of home-grown, masculine Muslim radicalization.”

Despite constant claims by the European politicians and government officials that the bans are against all face coverings and not directed against Muslim women, it’s a common consensus amongst the academics, researchers and human rights advocates that it is clear from the texts and especially from the debate surrounding the issue, that the bans are specifically meant to target the Muslim headscarves and veils (e.g. Howard 2012: 148; Bleich 2009: 373; Davis 2011: 117-118; Nanwani 2011: 2; Cesari 2012: 444; Idriss 2016: 126-127; Amnesty International 2012: 93). One of the most used arguments promoting the ban state that a legal ban on face coverings is necessary in order to promote gender equality and fight the oppression of women who are forced to cover

their heads and faces by men. This makes it clear that the intended target is the garments worn by some Muslim women.

## 4. Islam Threat Scenario

The various bans on religious symbols, headscarves and Islamic dresses are relatively new to the European public debate, at least when it comes to the volume, frequency and ferocity of the voices calling for restrictions on Muslims ability to practice their faith or manifest their religious identity. These bans and debates do not appear in a vacuum, but are heavily influenced by the growing fear of Islamic fundamentalism and the increasingly common interpretation of Islam as a threat. The restrictive legislation we now witness being implemented throughout Europe is a result of or a continuation of a long historical narrative constructing Islam as a threat to the West.

In European public debate, terrorism is increasingly linked to Islam. In the post-9/11 space us Westerners have learned that “terrorism” is something foreign that threatens our western societies and way of life from the outside. There is a growing general perception of Islam as a threat to the Western liberal-secular order (Mavelli 2013: 159—160, 165). For example, Bleich (2009: 362—363) writes that the general association between Muslims and violence in Europe today coupled with concerns about cultural adjustments have functioned as catalysts for significant policy changes in many European countries. Europe and especially France have witnessed a shift towards stricter immigration policies that often demand increasing attention paid to integration and assimilation of immigrants and minorities (Freedman 2007: 29; Cesari 2012: 430). Burqa bans constitute one piece of this puzzle, but the issue is often accompanied by a wider discussion concerning Islam’s role in European societies. Debates about building minarets or mosques as well as the correct way and venue for teaching religion are other examples (Bleich 2009: 364).

Muslims are increasingly seen as something that needs to be contained and their behaviour better governed (Amiriaux 2016: 37). Especially in France, Islam has become a source of fear, which is frequently fuelled by the perception that Islam threatens modernity and the survival of the Western values of freedom, equality and secularism (Doyle 2011: 485; Mavelli 2013: 172). Islam, and the burqa as a visible representation of Islam, are sometimes even viewed as the “antithesis of European values” (Edmunds 2012:73-75; Wiles 2007: 699).

In contemporary European and North American societies, previously marginal extreme views about Muslims and immigrant are becoming mainstream. Right-wing nationalist voices are becoming louder and ideas promoting harsh immigration policies and counter-terrorism measures, such as Donald Trump's Muslim ban (e.g. BBC 10.2.2017), are increasingly tolerated. This is manifested not only by the normalisation of hate speech in the Western public space but the rise of right-wing parties and the success of political candidates who know how to exploit fear, divide and anger existing in society (Pratt 2015: 216). In some cases, mainstream political parties have had adopt more right-wing policies or make harder immigration initiatives in order to contain the rising far-right movements and court right-wing voters. In France, this courtship took the form of President Sarkozy starting the highly immigration centred debate about what it meant to be French in 2009 (Laurence and Goodliffe 2013: 35—37).

More recently in late 2016, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel backtracked in her earlier open doors immigration policy, and demanded that ban on Islamic full-face veils should be adopted wherever possible. This has been largely interpreted as an obvious nod towards the right-wing voters in the run up to the 2017 general election (Karnitschnig, 6.12.2016, Politico; BBC 6.12.2016). Edmunds (2012: 68, 74) writes that due to the increasingly prominent threat picture linked to Muslims and all things visibly Muslim the “social cost of being a European Muslim” has increased. Secular European governments often regard them as Muslims first and citizens second while drawing a line between good Muslims who choose to assimilate and discard their visibly religious and Muslim identity and bad or distrustful Muslims who wear headscarves and grow beards and visibly choose to manifest their Muslim identity.

Even though the events of 9/11 played a major role in painting the picture of Islam as a security threat, the perceive linkages between Muslims and violence in Europe go further back in history. The meaningful association between Islam and terror in the aftermath of 9/11 was only possible because there was an already existing narrative through which the message could be interpreted (Mavelli 2013: 165). This narrative, according to Bleich (2009: 264—265) is the increasing association between Muslims and violence since the 1980s. Honicker (2014: 271) on the other hand argues that especially in France, the issue with the burqa dates back to their colonial experiences in North Africa, especially in Algeria. Bleich (2009: 264—265) argues that since the 1980s, the association between violence and Muslims has emerged in three different areas: violence against women, immigrant criminality and religiously motivated violence. Together these three topics have paved the way for the idea about violent Islam.

According to Mavelli (2013: 161, 165) the threat association is a result of the historical and political formation of Western and European modernity, in which Islam was pitted against the West due it being seen as a totalitarian system of religion and politics. This is of course in direct conflict with the Western secularism that separates politics and religion. Especially in France, religious symbols such as hijabs, niqabs and burqas represent refusal to confine religion to the private space, which consequently makes them a threat to national security. Muslims who choose to grow a beard or wear a veil are interpreted to threaten national security because they refuse to conform with the “secular and civilizing French culture” (Edmunds 2012: 73). In Australia, the most pessimistic views see Muslims as a threat to the Australian “democracy, its system of government, separation of church and state, laws, basic rights and the freedoms of worship, dress and movement; and the ‘general level of peace and harmony’”(Yasmeen 2013: 254). This combined with the “war on terror” framework has made it possible to indiscriminately target all Muslims in hunt for terrorist suspects and at the same time grant “justification for the suspension of rights on the grounds of national security, enabling increased use of surveillance and erosion of citizenship rights” (Edmunds 2012: 76).

European nations today face a paradox: guaranteeing national security and sufficient response to growing terrorism concerns seem to require a trade-off between civil and minority rights and sufficient resources directed to integration efforts on the one hand and robust counterterrorism measures on the other (Garcia and Geva 2016: 30—32; Cesari 2012: 437; Shor et al. 2017: 1—2). Restricting Islam from the public space is a visible and desirable response in that it offers a relatively easy short-term response to increasing security concerns. At the same time, however, integration efforts are severely harmed and seeds for long-term discontent are sown. The perception of Muslims as the enemy has resulted in government sanctioned restrictions on Islamic religious practices from limitations on establishing places of worship to bans on specific religious dresses (Cesari 2012: 437).

This research will focus on examining the implications restrictions on the Islamic veil, more specifically the full-face veil or burqa as referred to in this research, have on radicalisation and terrorist activity in Europe. The next section will introduce existing research conducted on the topic.

## 5. Literature Review

### 5.1. What Do We Know Already?

This section will take a look at the existing research on burqa bans and terrorism and radicalisation to establish what is said about the bans and most importantly what does the research community already know about the link between burqa ban and terrorism and radicalisation. Since the aim of this study is to examine the effects of a burqa ban on radicalisation and terrorist activity, this thesis paper will contribute to both, the existing literature on the legislation restricting women's use of the Islamic full-veil and the literature examining the causes of terrorism. As burqa bans in Europe are largely affecting people with immigrant background and due it often being discussed, debated or regulated in the wider context of immigration policy, this research will also add to the existing body of literature focusing on immigration and migration studies.

In addition to exploring the existing literature on the topic of burqa bans and terrorism, the purpose of this section is to situate this particular research as part of the existing scholarship on this issue and to identify gaps in the existing literature that this research aims to fill. In addition, by going through what is already written and which kind of arguments have been made by academics and researchers, I will provide necessary academic support for the argument presented in this study and justifications for my choice to treat burqa ban as both a security issue and a counterterrorism measure, even though from the legal and political point of view it has not always been framed as such. The following sections will, however, provide support for the choices made when formulating the argument and research design of this thesis.

The section is divided into two subsections; the first one will explore the arguments and findings made by academics who have written about burqa bans, and the second part will offer a review of the existing research on how hard line government policies, indiscriminate counterterrorism measures and minority discrimination are linked to the level of terrorist activity or radicalisation in a country. The first section examining burqa bans is further divided into three subsections in

order to highlight the central themes and core question featured in the existing literature. The first subsection will feature literature focusing on the implications burqa bans have on women's rights and the second section introduces arguments with national security and threat centred approach. The last section will introduce research where the security implications of a burqa ban are more explicitly examined.

## 5.2. Burqa Bans in the Literature

The burqa ban has attracted quite a comprehensive body of researchers and academics to examine and write about it in recent years. Most of the existing research focuses on analysing either the debate surrounding the issue and the arguments made in favour of a ban (eg. Yasmeen 2013) or the civil, minority and human rights implications of the ban. Several papers have taken on the argument made in favour of the ban liberating and empowering oppressed Muslim women (e.g. Ferracioli 2013; Idriss 2016). In addition, a number of papers have analysed the possible security implications implementing a ban on burqas might cause (Madu 2015; Idriss 2016, Beydoun 2016, Cesari 2009, 2012). Surveys and interviews where Muslim women have been asked about the larger implications of the bans, how they have affected their lives and whether they think it's a useful way to advance integration have been popular research methods and a bulk of the existing research features France as the case study or a reference case due to the country having adopted both a hijab ban in schools and a blanket ban on burqas.

### 5.2.1. *Burqa Ban as a Champion of Women's Rights?*

When it comes to either public or political debate about women wearing the burqa, niqab or hijab, gender equality and women's rights is often one of the biggest arguments made in favour of restricting its use in the West, and sometimes abroad as well. In Western societies, the Islamic full-face veil is often seen as a representation of Islam's oppression of women and the traditionalist patriarchal culture where women lack basic civil and human rights (e.g. Yasmeen 2013:255—256; Honicker 2014: 271). Van Gulik (14.3.2009, Human Rights Watch) writes that to some people "wearing a headscarf is inherently demeaning." Proponents of a ban argue that by banning the garment altogether or restricting its use, Muslim women will be liberated as they are no longer forced to wear the veil by their husbands or fathers (e.g. Nanwani 2011: 5). Chesler (2010: 33—

34, 43—45.) for example calls the burqa a “moving prison” and argues that the garment represents subordination of women. She also claims that in addition to being harmful to the wearer, the sight of a women clad in burqa can be demoralizing and frightening to others. She argues in favour of burqa bans by stating that the garment is not religious but rather a political statement carrying Islamist sentiments and that the it is a threat to the Western society, way of living and even liberal democracy.

While women being forced to wear the burqa is a valid and serious concern, countering arguments often point out that some women choose to wear the full-veil (Amnesty International 2012: 91—100). Howard (2012: 153) has examined the different reasons for which Muslim women and girls wear the hijab or niqab or burqa, and even though one the reasons was pressure from the family or community, women may also choose to wear them as an ethnic or religious signal, as an affirmation of identity and as a “political act or a sign of a new and radical interpretation of one’s faith.” Killian (2003: 572) has found that for younger women, wearing a headscarf is in some cases a symbol of difference and of the pride they feel of their ethnic identity or a way to reaffirm and reclaim their ethnic identity. Howard (2012: 155-156) further argues that banning hijabs and full-face veils and other religious symbols is just as “paternalistic and oppressive of women as forcing them to wear these”. Oppression cannot be uprooted by forcing the victims to behave in a certain way through restricting legislation. Fighting for women’s rights and women’s freedom to make their own decision by taking away their autonomy and ability to choose to wear the full-face veil goes against the very core principles of gender equality (Van Gulik 14.3.2009).

Croucher (2008: 199—200) also finds that to Muslims the Islamic veil or hijab is a fundamental part of their identity. In his research, Muslims describe the hijab as being “an important and salient symbol of Islam that runs counter to France’s concept of secularism or *laïcité*.” Moreover, he writes that French Muslims see regulations like the 2004 ban on headscarves as France’s attempts to control Muslim identity and forcefully assimilate the population to the mainstream French society. Multiple research papers also note that in some cases the ban has had reverse effects when women who previously did not wear the full-veil started to don the garment as a protest against the state regulated ban (e.g. Idriss 2016: 131; Croucher 2008: 200).

For the purposes of this research, it is important to take note of the political and identity aspect of the hijab or burqa. The fact that women consider wearing them as part of their ethnic or religious identity or as a way of political protest against the government imposing dress codes on them

(Howard 2012), is of particular importance when arguing that burqa ban has a radicalising effect on wider Muslim population or community. These findings indicate that the burqa or hijab has a larger meaning in the Muslim society. It's about politics, culture, identity, ethnicity and religion, and a ban on these garments can be interpreted as an attempt to ban or restrict or silence everything that the garment represents. The importance of acknowledging the power of identity is highlighted in Beydoun's (2006) research, where he cautions that pitting the French identity against Islam risks further widening the societal divide and playing straight into the hands of Islamic State who in its propaganda promotes the idea of "clash of civilisations" and Western war against Islam (Beydoun 2016: 1334). These observations form the base for the argument analysed in this research paper.

When it comes to liberating women, the overarching theme in the existing research literature seems to argue that instead of liberating women, the bans serve to restrict them even further. For example, Ferracioli (2013: 90) has examined the justifications made in defence of the burqa ban and concludes that a ban does not in itself protect women's authority. She also notes that proponents of the ban often fail to show how exactly the burqa or niqab oppresses the women wearing them and why banning them altogether would be the best way to help the oppressed women. Turner (2007: 295), Nanwani (2011: 8) and Freedman (2007: 29) argue that instead of liberating the allegedly oppressed women, a legislation sanctioning the use of the full-veil only serves to immobilise and restrict women more by isolating them to the private sphere of their homes. Idriss (2016: 124) supports these arguments by writing, that a state imposed dress code undermines the authority of Muslim women. The French laws restricting the use of headscarves and full-face veils are also argued to have the effect of isolating Muslims entirely to the private space by regulating what is allowed in the public space (Amiriaux 2016: 40).

In her article about the Afghan women and the "War on Terror" Lila Abu-Lughod (2002: 785, 786) questions the Western liberal quest to liberate oppressed Muslim women. According to her, opposing the policies of states forcing a certain dress code on women should not lead to interpretation of veiling as inherently evil and sign of women's unfreedom. By simply denouncing the burqa or niqab as a "medieval imposition" and representation of gender inequality, critics often strip Muslim women of their agency and reduce their diverse situations, backgrounds and cultural and religious beliefs to a single item of clothing. She further argues that the Westerners need to remember to respect diversity and difference and accept the fact that, in the case of Afghan women,

even after being “liberated” they might choose to do some things differently than we would want them to (Abu-Lughod 2002: 783).

### *5.2.2. The Islamic Veil as a Security Threat*

As mentioned above, the justifications made in support of the burqa bans often stress the need to integrate immigrants better into European society and that burqas and niqabs hinder or even prevent sufficient integration of women (e.g. Freedman 2007: 29). This is because the burqa is seen as a representation of Islam, Islamic culture and traditionalist way of life where religion has a significant role in individual’s life. Burqa and niqab are quite visibly representing the difference between Muslims and others (Yasmeen 2013: 251). According to Edmunds (2012: 67, 73) religious symbols such as hijab or niqab become risks and even threats to national security when wearing them is interpreted as refusal to comply with the rules of secularism.

Immigration and counterterrorism policies across Europe in recent years have been heavily influenced by the growing association between Muslims and violence (Bleich 2009: 273). Sometimes the adoption of new legislation or hardening stances on immigration have been directly preceded by violent acts perpetrated by immigrants or Muslims and this has been admitted or acknowledged by the decision-makers to have influenced their actions. The 2004 ban on headscarves in French schools serves as a perfect example of this kind of legislation (Bleich 2009: 273, 372). Bleich (2009: 375) also acknowledges the provocative power of terrorist incidents in stating that any future attacks in Europe associated with religious motives could have the power to motivate new tougher policies or further restrictions on current regulations.

Politicisation of religion as well as Securitization of Islam and the burqa have been major themes in the research literature, whether explicitly articulated (e.g. Mavelli 2013) or simply phrased in the form of the threat and fear guiding political decision decision-making (Bleich 2009), as illustrated above. Securitization can be understood as an extreme version of politicisation, “security” being the move that makes the issue something that is above politics or special politics. *Politicisation*, simply put, means that an issue becomes part of public policy agenda and requires government regulating. *Securitization*, on the other, means that an issue is “presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 23—24). When it comes to Islam,

securitization of Islam implies that Islam is presented to the public as an existential threat that needs extreme measures to be taken care of or contained. When the issue, or in this case Islam, becomes securitized, special politics or extreme measures are always justified due to the existential threat posed by the issue.

Mavelli (2013: 159-160) writes about securitization of Islam in the European and Western societies, and notes that the idea that Islam poses an existential threat to the Western way of life and the fear stemming from it has led to the adoption of emergency measures and anti-terrorism legislation that disproportionately affects the Muslim minorities. He also notes that this same fear has been employed to carve up support and justify the attempts to restrict Muslim women from wearing headscarves and full-face veils across Europe. Fox and Akbaba (2015: 178) support this argument and write that the perceived extraordinary threat posed by Islam has legitimised policy responses that impose more control and scrutiny over Islam and undermines the freedoms and rights of Muslims on the grounds of national security. These go beyond what would otherwise be acceptable in Western democracies. Cesari (2012: 431) examines the political consequences of the “War on Terror” on the status of Islam in Europe, and argues that the restrictions of religious activities and practices are outcomes of securitization process constructing Islam as an existential threat.

Edmunds (2012: 67—68) calls bans on religious clothing or on building of minarets a form of ‘hyper-legalization’ of perceived threats to western culture. Pratt (2015: 205—206) on the other hand has argued that extreme responses, such as the Swiss ban on building minarets, to what is perceived a too strong presence of Islam in Western countries is caused by extremist Islamist acts that have been associated with Islam as a whole. According to this idea of reactionary extremism, the graphic images of atrocities committed by extremist organisations like Islamic State or Boko Haram create a sense of threat that Islam and Muslims are posing to the Western society. This is then perpetuated by the increasingly visible presence of Islam in Europe and North America. Pratt (2015: 206) further argues that Islamist extremism evokes an Islamophobic reaction through which acts perpetrated by militants become associated with Islam in general and all Muslims around us.

The Islamic dress has become heavily politicised in contemporary European society, which is highlighted by the fact that only a very small fraction of Muslim women wear burqas or niqabs, but for some reason they have become the embodiment of the threat Islam poses to the West

(Edmunds 2012: 75). Edmunds (2012: 75) further argues that European governments are increasingly linking headscarves and veils with terror and continues with the observation that attempts to curtail Muslim women's rights to choose how they wish to dress have increased especially in the wake of large scale terrorist attacks in New York 2001, Madrid 2004 and London 2005. This further strengthens the argument made also in this research that the bans are increasingly about security. Cesari (2012: 431, 447) also argues that European Muslims are often seen as "foreign enemies" and that the increase of burqa bans is directly related to the perception of assertive Muslims as an enemy. Doyle (2011: 475, 483) supports these arguments by writing that due to the Western inability to understand Islamic faith and the tendency to interpret radicalised expressions of faith as synonymous to Islamist terrorism, the burqa and niqab have become targets of Islamophobia since they are visible representations of the Islamic culture that is thought to constitute a threat to the future of Europe.

The perception of Muslims and Islam as a threat to the West is also examined in Carland's (2011) research which is based on the idea about "fear of loss of freedom" in Western liberal societies, which leads to and feeds Islamophobic sentiments, which in turn leads to loss of freedom for Muslim women in the West. Fear creates fear. The French burqa ban is an example of this chain: France fears its liberal society and basic freedoms are threatened or under attack by the fact of Muslim women wearing the burqa, so they ban it. The consequent debate surrounding the burqa ban leads to increased Islamophobia which in turn leads to Muslim women fearing a loss of their freedom, as wearing the veil in today's Europe comes with the fear of being subjected to sanctioning or abuse (Carland 2011: 472).

Nanwani (2011: 7) writes that in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq the concerns over terrorism in France has lead the state to treat its Muslim population in the "context of heightened security" and discrimination, which has been manifested for example in reactions towards the headscarf and full-face veil. When it comes to public safety, there is no proven evidence that full-face veils in European public spaces pose a risk, which means that the argument made in favour of that aspect lose credibility (Nanwani 2011: 8). Scott (2007: 3) has suggested to some Western states banning the hijab or full-veil is a symbolic gesture that represents them taking a stand against Islam and the perceived threat it poses to national integrity and harmony.

### *5.2.3. Implications of the Burqa Ban on Terrorism*

Even though the securitization of Islam in general has been discussed in multiple research papers, the actual radicalizing effects of a burqa ban have been examined by only a handful of researchers. Idriss (2016), Beydoun (2016), Cesari (2009, 2012) and Madu (2015) are to my knowledge the only ones drawing a link between legislation restricting the use of Islamic veil and radicalisation or terrorism, and arguing that a ban might serve as a radicalising factor.

In his research about the human rights implications a French style burqa ban would have in the UK, Idriss (2016: 126-129) stresses the security implications of the bans by arguing that a burqa ban might actually be counterproductive by marginalising an already unpopular minority group even further, which in the long run might lead to radicalisation. According to him, a burqa ban could be harmful for integration because it may contribute to feelings of discrimination, risk polarising a society even further and undermining social cohesion (Idriss 2016: 129). This supports the argument made in this study. Cesari (2009: 1) describes the securitization of Islam in Europe as European states both “fearing and fostering radicalisation.” While attempting to take steps towards reassuring their citizens that the threat of terrorism is taken seriously and being contained, the politicisation of religion leads Muslims fearing for the survival of their religion and religious rights and feeling resentful of the state’s interference. As a result, “the measures intended to prevent radicalization engender discontent and prompt a transformation of religious conservatism to fundamentalism” (Cesari 2009: 1).

Beydoun (2016: 1273) argues that the hard line cultural assimilation approach adopted by France undermine advancements made in vital Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policy goals. He proposes that the in order to meaningfully advance its counterterrorism and counter extremism goals France needs to curtail its hard-line cultural assimilation policies, such as the headscarf and full-face veil bans (2016: 1273-1274). Beydoun (2016: 1280-81) further argues that in France the cultural assimilation and counterterrorism policy are practically synonymous for the Muslim population and that the hijab and burqa bans are the symbolic and structural cornerstones of the cultural assimilationist and counterterrorism model. Beydoun (2016: 1333) also argues that the French government risks exposing the French Muslims with dissident political views and making them vulnerable to the propaganda and recruiting attempts of the Islamic State if it continues to target Muslims at large in their counterterrorism activities.

Madu's (2015) PhD thesis represent to my knowledge the only attempt, as off yet, to examine the effect burqa ban has on Islamist terrorist activity. Her analysis did not support the hypothesised correlation between the French burqa ban and increased acts of Islamist terrorism, however, she points out that the ban has the potential to exacerbate tensions between the French Government and the Muslim community which in turn could have implications on Islamist terrorism. The findings supported her theoretical argument about the underlying conflict, or "clash of civilizations", between "some Western countries" and Islam. She found that although the French Muslims she interviewed said the burqa is not a religious requirement in Islam, it is still an important aspect of the religion. She also found that her interviewees felt that the burqa ban in France undermines and challenges Islam (Madu 2015: 157), which is also a significant finding in support of the argument and theoretical framework employed in this research.

This research will build on these findings. However, instead of solely focusing on analysing how the Muslim community interprets the ban, this research will take a wider and more comprehensive look at the society and treat the burqa ban as something that affects the wider Muslim community, not only those who are directly affected. The burqa ban then has instrumental value in creating preconditions (Crenshaw 1981) for radicalisation. While different security implications have been explored in previous research and even though an initial attempt at examining the link between the burqa ban and Islamist terrorism was made in Madu's (2015) research, a comprehensive theory-based analysis of the effect of the legislation on radicalisation and terrorism is yet to be conducted. This study will aim at filling this gap in the existing literature.

### 5.3. Terrorism and Radicalisation in the Literature

As noted above, the burqa ban can be understood as a specific form of discrimination. Even though the link between burqa bans and terrorism remains a topic that has attracted very little research, the effects of various types of discrimination on terrorist activity have been well documented. This section will introduce existing academic literature analysing the relationship between hard-line or indiscriminate counterterrorism policies, discrimination and terrorism and radicalisation. The findings will provide support and background for the argument analysed in this research and help in the formation of the theoretical argument by situating this research in the context of existing

research on the relationship between government policies and terrorist mobilisation. The first subsection will introduce the relevant terrorism literature and the second subsection will examine what is said about radicalisation.

### *5.3.1. Government Actions and Terrorism*

Various case studies examining the effect minority discrimination has on individual terrorist movements and campaigns have determined that discrimination is a major factor in predicting terrorist activity (e.g. Bradley 2006; Van De Voorde 2005; Whittaker 2001). Crenshaw (1981: 381, 385), Ross (1993: 322) and Piazza (2011: 339) have linked minority dissatisfaction and grievances faced by minority groups with terrorism and the outbreak of political violence.

Piazza (2012: 521) has examined the relationship between minority discrimination and terrorist attacks. Through an analysis focusing on political participation and repression, economic status and religious and language rights he found that socioeconomic discrimination against minorities is a linked to the occurrence of terrorism. The idea of minority discrimination or a threat faced by a distinctive group of people is also present in McCauley and Moskalenko's (2008) research. They have determined that group identification is usually essential element in radicalisation as radicalisation tends to occur as a reaction to an issue or an actor perceived to pose threat to the in-group (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008: 415).

Araj (2008: 284) on the other hand found harsh state repression to be a major cause of suicide bombing. This is supported by Piazza (2017: 102) who argues that state repression increases the amount of domestic terrorist activity in a country because it closes off nonviolent avenues of dissent and exacerbates discontent and group grievances. He found that countries with prominent political and economic discrimination against ethnic minorities are more likely to experience terrorism than countries without discriminatory policies (Piazza 2017: 106). He further singles out religious discrimination as a significant factor in determining which countries face terrorist attacks and which not (Piazza 2017: 112). Piazza (2017: 114) also denounces the academic papers claiming that state repression would raise the cost of violent extremism and lead to decrease in terrorist attacks. He found that repression overall is a stimulant of domestic terrorism within countries.

Choi and Piazza (2016: 39) find that domestic terrorism is more likely in countries in which certain ethnic populations are excluded from political power. They conclude that “ethnic group political exclusion is more consistent and substantive predictor of domestic terrorist activity than general political repression or economic discrimination.” Jessica Stern (2016: 105) also supports the discrimination argument by suggesting that both trauma exposure and discrimination tend to be associated with support for activism in general, both violent and non-violent. In addition, she suggests that a correlation exists between social marginalization and individual’s support for violent activism such as radical interpretations of Islam.

In their research focusing on indiscriminate counterterrorism measures and subsequent Provisional IRA (PIRA) bomb attacks, Gill, Piazza and Horgan (2016: 473) found that indiscriminate counterterrorism killings in the Northern Ireland between 1970-1998 increased PIRA bombings overall and prompted PIRA to specifically target civilians in Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks. Lyall (2009: 332) on the other hand has examined the effect indiscriminate state response has on insurgent violence in Chechnya and he found that indiscriminate violence reduced the number of subsequent violent insurgent attacks.

Woodworth (2001: 2) conducted interview among the Basque population in her quest to understand the ETA violence. She writes that “ETA’s actions are seen almost as a force of nature, an inevitable response to a politically intolerant situation” and further argues that “Nothing radicalizes a people faster than unleashing of undisciplined security forces on its towns and villages. The litany of beatings, torture, and unpunished shootings that follows becomes a recruiting catechism for an armed resistance group” (Woodworth 2001: 6). Rosendorf and Sandler (2010: 443-445) also examine the backlash effect as a reaction to too harsh pre-emptive actions by the government. They argue that the backlash arises when heavy-handed proactive or pre-emptive measures carried out by the government create new grievances among the population terrorists are perceived to be part of and increase the support for the terrorists’ agenda.

### *5.3.2. Identity, Social Networks and Radicalisation*

Radicalisation and home-grown terrorism have become the buzzwords of the terrorism debate in Europe. For Western countries, the threat of terrorism comes increasingly from the “inside” in the

form of “home grown” terrorists radicalised in the West (Sageman 2008: 71). Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010: 798-799) observes that that home-grown terrorism is a real problem in Europe, where ever younger Europeans have become radicalised in a very short period of time. Moreover, socio-economic deprivation or lack of education do not seem to be the main explaining attributes for individual’s radicalisation anymore (Bakker 2006: 36—38; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 799). Roy (2007: 55) writes that Islamic radicalisation in Europe today is a youth movement where frustration is playing a key role. Roy (2007) and Khosrokhvar (2005) are among the researchers who have argued radical Islam often offers a way for increasingly Westernized young Muslims to create a meaningful and distinctive identity for themselves. Through radicalisation they can reconstruct their self-image (Roy 2007:55). Radicalisation then arises out of a feeling of non-belonging, failure and rejection (Khosrokhavar 2005: 185; Roy 2007: 55-56).

Search for meaning and identity are also strong attributes in Sageman’s (2004) and Wiktorowicz (2004) studies on radicalisation and recruitment. However, they base their arguments more on the idea that radicalisation is about social networks, pre-existing ties and relationships through which people searching for an identity, community and a sense of belonging become radicalised. According to Sageman (2004: 152) and Horowitz (2015: 71, 80) social networks and ties play a key role in terrorist recruitment, and in determining who becomes a terrorist. Social ties and peer pressure then reinforce the emerging commitment of the new recruit. Local ties, networks and connections are also found to be necessary prerequisites for individuals to mobilise for violence (Varshney 2001: 363; Fujii 2008: 568), as individuals often need to have at least some sense of shared identity in order to mobilise for common action (Tilly 2003: 31).

This is also shared by Neumann and Rogers (2007: 16, 71) who found that social bonding can facilitate the adaption of more extreme worldviews. Grievances and discontent do not automatically lead to action. Radicalisation is a social process through which the individual become more receptive to the radical ideals and gradually sympathetic to the terrorist agenda. During the process “the individual is gradually convinced that the perceived injustices require the individual to engage personally and that violence is religiously sanctioned” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 803). Roy (2007: 55) also finds that radicalisation seems to often occur in a small local group of friends who met in university, though a participation in a gang or in jail.

Socialization, shared identity, and pre-existing social networks are also essential for the terrorist recruiters when determining who to accept as a new member (Hegghammer 2012: 3-6; Weinstein

2005: 600-601). Joining a terrorist organisation might prove difficult for a potential recruit if he or she has no existing links to anyone inside the movement. Friends, family members, and relatives often join terrorist organisations together, and when someone in a group makes a connection, the others have a “trusted way in” through an existing link (Sageman 2004: 142-143, 152; Horowitz 2015: 80). Leiken and Brooke (2006: 512) also note that when it comes to global Jihad, instead of recruiting new members based on skills, members with existing social linkages are preferred.

In majority of the radicalisation literature presented above, the central theme and arguments circled around the idea that young European Muslims become radicalised through an identity and belonging seeking process as a reaction to perceived hostility from the majority society (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 803). Even though majority of the researcher claim that radicalisation is a social process and does not happen as a direct reaction of grievances, it seems, however, that during the social process the chosen identity is formed as a reaction to the perceived Western hostility or inability to provide opportunities for a fulfilling and meaningful life. Islamists frequently frame their activities as being legitimate responses to Western aggression and attempts to undermine Islamic culture (Wiktorowicz 2004: 8, 11; Khosrokhavar 2005: 184).

Terrorists are usually not insane, crazy or suffering from neurological disorders. This has long been established by the research community (Horgan 2003: 7; Borum 2004: 3). Sageman for example argues that people do not become radicalised due to psychological disorders but by the people surrounding them, through their existing social networks. Sageman (2004), Wiktorowicz (2004), Bakker (2006) and Hegghammer (2012) all argue that radicalisation is about who you know. The importance of existing networks become an increasingly prominent channel for radicalisation for disenfranchised European youth who are seeking a sense of belonging and identity in the crosswinds of the Western liberal culture they grew up surrounded by and their parents’ generations’ more traditional culture that still holds onto the culture of their home countries and communities. Socioeconomic explanations and lack of education as a catalyst for radicalisation are unable to account for the whole extensive phenomenon. However, even though on the individual level radicalisation and mobilisation for terrorist violence is a sum of a variety of attributes, this study leans on the argument that on the society level, grievances constitute the primary cause of terrorism. The theoretical argument build around the grievances based approach will be introduced next.

According to a research by Change Institute (2008: 97, 120—121) even though a large majority of the European Muslims denounce terrorism and the ideology of violent militant Islamism, the existing grievances and societal problems are still widely shared among the Muslim population. This offers the terrorist organisations a way in, a receptive audience for their propaganda messages. According to Milton et al. (2013) individuals whose personal experience closely resonates with the terrorist propaganda are more likely to join terrorist organisations. This observation provides support for the theoretical argument presented in this study. The study further cautions against implementing counterterrorism policies that could risk adding to the existing grievances, which the militants could then exploit (Change Institute 2008: 97, 120). This point will be further examined in this research.

As shown above, the impact of hard-line counterterrorism measures or discriminative policies on radicalisation and terrorism has been examined in a number of research papers. However, there seems to be very little research conducted on counterterrorism measures and their impact on radicalisation in Europe specifically. Idriss (2016), Beydoun (2016) and Madu (2015) analysed to some extent the effects of a burqa ban on terrorist activity or indicated that a ban would risk isolating Muslim minorities even further and in the end lead to increased radicalisation. In the context of increasing number of European states adopting bans on the full-face veil, the topic needs to be research further and comprehensive analysis of the effects of the bans on radicalisation and terrorist activity needs to be conducted. This research aims to fill this gap by drawing a direct link between a ban on the full-face veils and radicalisation and terrorism, and by aiming to examine whether the ban has indeed led to increased radicalisation. The following section will introduce the theoretical framework to support the argument.

## 6. Theoretical Framework

### 6.1. Why People Mobilise for Violence?

Asymmetrical conflict has for the longest time provided a conundrum for conflict researchers. What motivates people to join armed rebellion? What drives insurgencies? What makes people mobilise for violence against stronger and more capable government forces? Or, in the European context, what radicalises young Europeans to the point that they are willing to join violent extremist organisations? Rebellions, insurgencies and civil wars are often based on unbalanced distribution of capabilities. By the logic of state's monopoly on violence, rebels and opposition forces are often considered significantly weaker than the incumbent regime, which makes the conflict asymmetrical (Lake 2002: 20—21). Same logic applies to terrorist organisations. The questions remain. “Why does high individual risk not deter participation in rebellion?” (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007: 177).

When it comes to rebellion and civil war, and terrorism, the common agreement amongst the academics acknowledges that rebels face an acute collective action problem. This is due to the asymmetrical nature of the conflict, but also because the opposition, and in case of terrorism, the extremist organisations are often more radical and hold more hostile views about the regime than majority of the population or a subgroup (e.g. Kydd and Walter 2006: 69—70; Lake 2002: 18).

This research will employ the collective action problem paradigm as a theoretical framework to examine the implications of restrictive legislation on radicalisation in Europe. The collective action paradigm has formed the theoretical base for a multitude of conflict and civil war research and the same causal chains and theoretical logic have also been applied to terrorism research in explaining why terrorist organisations do what they do. This research will combine these two bodies of literature, especially the strategic logic of terrorism as a provocation explored by Kydd and Walter (2006) and Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) to test whether the effect of burqa bans on radicalisation in France can be explained by the logic provided by provocation strategy.

The theoretical argument tested in this study assumes that terrorists are mobilised to violence because of grievances. However, grievances are not always enough to mobilise the masses, and to overcome this collective action problem terrorist organisations rely on terrorist tactics to provoke the enemy regime to respond to a terrorist attack by indiscriminately targeting a whole population or a group of people they perceive the terrorists to represent. This in turn will radicalise the moderates and cause more people to swing their allegiance to the terrorists' side. For the purposes of this research, the focus is on the government's response and the hypothesized radicalising effect it will have on larger population. In this research, the legislation restricting women's use of the full-face veil will be treated as the indiscriminate counterterrorism response.

The causal chain briefly introduced above will be formed in three parts; the first part will explain how grievances experienced by a group of people can lead to violence. The second part will introduce the collective action problem the rebels and terrorists alike need to overcome in order to gain new members and successfully proceed with their violent campaign. The logic of provocation strategy and the role it plays in overcoming the collective action problem and in mobilising people for violence is introduced in the third part. The third part also explains the reasoning behind the argument that hard-line counterterrorism measures increase terrorism, which also forms the base of the argument presented in this research.

## 6.2. Grievances as Drivers for Violence

Another often explored question is why terrorists do what they do. According to Kydd and Walter (2006: 50) terrorist organisations engage in terrorism because it works and frequently delivers the response they desired. Multiple definitions of terrorism agree that it is a way of seeking political goals by instilling fear and costs on the target audience, which is often larger than the immediate target of an attack (Enders et al. 2011; Tilly 2004; Hoffman 1998). Terrorism is often portrayed as irrational activity aiming at spreading fear. While fear is an essential factor in terrorism, it is not usually the end goal, but a means to reach the goal. Terrorism works because it causes people and governments to respond in a way that serves the terrorist organisations' cause (Kydd and Walter 2006: 50). Terrorism in itself then is a means to reach the end goal, which also indicates

that for terrorist organisations, engaging in terrorism is not irrational but a strategic tool (Lake 2002: 15) to seek change in society.

Terrorism research has traditionally focused on explaining the occurrence of terrorism based on domestic attributes (see e.g. Wilson and Piazza 2013; Enders and Sandler 2006; Findley and Young 2011; Piazza 2008). The existing research has determined regime type to have significant effect on either promoting or reducing terrorist activity (Li 2005; Wilson and Piazza 2013; Chenoweth 2013). Unstable regimes are found to be more vulnerable to terrorism (e.g. Li, 2005) and failed states more likely to host terrorist groups, have their nationals to participate in terrorism and to be targets of attacks themselves (Piazza 2008). The link between economic performance and terrorism remains contested since some researchers argue that economically advanced countries are more likely to experience terrorism because they provide more targets (Blomberg and Hess 2008; Piazza 2011) while others have found positive relationship between poverty and terrorism (Choi and Luo 2013). Migration is also found to be a strong factor in determining terrorism occurrence. Bove and Böhmelt (2016), Choi and Salehyan (2013), Milton et al. (2013), and Leiken and Brooke (2006) all conclude that there is a connection between migration and refugee flows, and terrorism.

Group grievances have been presented as one of the key drivers of terrorism and rebellion (Boylan 2014: 5). Grievances can be social, political or economic and are usually felt among “an identifiable subgroup of a larger population”. An ethnic minority being discriminated against by the majority is a typical example of group grievances. Exclusion from political power of one group by another one is another example (Crenshaw 1981: 383). Grievances alone can’t explain why some countries are more prone to conflict than others (see e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003: 75), however, in general for individuals and groups to feel unsatisfied with their government, there need to be some antagonisms in the society (Gurr 1970: 9). Crenshaw (1981: 384) argues that the existence of concrete grievance among an identifiable subgroup is a precondition and a direct cause of terrorism. According to her, lack of opportunities for political participation forms the second precondition for terrorism and unusual use of force by government as a response to dissent another precipitant or permissive precondition that precedes terrorist incidents (Crenshaw 1981: 383—385). Choi and Piazza (2016: 37) argue that for politically excluded minority groups, terrorist violence is a way to air their grievances. Oberschall (2004: 27) argues that a shared feeling of widespread discontent and dissatisfaction as the motivation for violent actions is what separates terrorist groups from criminals.

As mentioned earlier in this study, religious, socioeconomic and ethnic discrimination are found to be correlated with terrorism occurrence (Choi and Piazza 2016; Piazza 2017: 112). Discrimination and state repression lead to the formation of political grievances which makes the society more prone for conflict and terrorism. Political exclusion and collective economic deprivations faced by ethnic and religious subgroups makes political violence more likely in a society, when frustrated individuals and groups turn into violence to address their grievances (Choi and Piazza 2016: 37; Gurr 1970: 7—9). Shared experiences of grievances may lead the subgroup to develop an “enhanced sense of collective identity” and a strong sense of alienation from the perceived majority of the society, which in turn only further strengthens the group grievances. Exacerbated group grievances can then be exploited by opposition figures, rebels or terrorist groups to mobilise support for their cause (Choi and Piazza 2016: 41).

Grievances that are left unheeded by the government can lead to support for or development of a social movement and in extreme cases a group or organisation that engages in terrorism to air the frustrations of the population or a subgroup (Ross 1993: 325—326). This is supported by Klausen (2006: 92—93) who finds that political and socioeconomic exclusion combined with increasing polarization in the society induces the feeling of alienation among European Muslim minority communities which provides fertile breeding ground for radicalisation and terrorist recruitment and drives support for the extremist cause. Stern (2016: 105) has also found that individuals who had experience discrimination were more likely to support “radical interpretation of Islam”.

Crenshaw (1981) and Ross (1993) also argue that minority political exclusion is a particularly strong indicator of terrorism as regimes characterized by political exclusion are more likely to be targeted by terrorist groups. According to Stern (2016: 105, 108) “risk factors for radicalization and mobilization start with a grievance, more or less likely shared, often about some form of social injustice.” However, she also notes that this doesn’t mean that every person facing grievances is willing to take up arms and violently rebel against the government. “While terrorist groups capitalize on these socioeconomic frustrations, only a small portion of those that feel aggrieved will join” (Stern 2016: 108).

State repression has been found to provoke mobilisation in support of the opposition and violent activities of the opposition (Boylan 2014: 5—6). While some researchers have argued that state repression decreases violence by increasing the cost of participating in rebellion (for discussion

see e.g. Eyerman 1998; Lichbach 1987) the argument supporting the grievances logic holds that state repression closes off nonviolent channels for seeking change and consequently, enhances the grievances felt by the population or a subgroup (Piazza 2017: 104). In the long run, state repression and especially increasingly repressive actions as a retaliation to violent incidents risk emboldening the insurgency in their quest for political change and subsequently through its repressive policies the state also risks mobilising more aggrieved people to join the terrorist or rebel side in protest (Boylan 2014: 6). This follows the logic of provocation strategy.

### 6.3. Collective Action Problem

Grievances and discontent do not, however, automatically lead to action. This is where the collective action problem enters the picture. Collective action problem arises when the shared grievances, values and goals are unsuccessful at mobilising majority of the people to join the rebellion or insurgency. Far more people often entertain radical ideas than are willing to face risks of actually mobilising for violence (Stern 2016: 104). When it comes to terrorist organisations this is even more of a reality since they are often considerably more radical and more hostile towards the target regime than majority of the people they claim to represent are (Kydd and Walter 2006: 69).

According to the collective action paradigm, people have the tendency to free-ride when it comes to the provision of public goods, because the costs are usually borne by the individuals while the benefits are collective and the same for everyone regardless of the price one paid for them individually (Kalyvas and Kocher 2002: 180). When it comes to insurgencies, non-participation is usually relatively costless. The possible cost for individual's participation, on the other hand, is death. Relative to this, the cost of nonparticipation is usually considerably lower. Under this logic, the best option for everyone would be stay at home (Kalyvas and Kocher 2002: 180—181).

Insurgencies, rebellions and terrorist movements need supporters and followers to sustain their activities. There will always be individuals with radical views willing to initiate an action, but violent opposition will not work without resources, followers and members willing to risk their lives for the cause. And these resources are significantly harder to find due to the high individual risk associated with participation (Kalyvas and Kocher 2002: 182).

In order to survive, terrorist organisations and insurgent groups need to overcome the pressing collective action problem and find incentives that are strong enough to mobilise the moderates for violence. In essence, they need to increase the individual costs for non-participation and decrease the opportunity cost for participation (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007: 366) While shared grievances do not automatically create incentives for individuals, they can be exploited by the extremists to radicalise members of the community and mobilise them for violent opposition. Jessica Stern (2016: 109) notes that for Islamic State “finding labor is less taxing when they can recruit from an existing pool of disenfranchised Muslims.” To expand this pool of frustrated and disenfranchised individuals, terrorist organisations can, often do, use terrorist tactics. This where the salience of provocation strategy comes in.

#### 6.4. Terrorism as a Provocation Strategy

Terrorist attacks offer terrorist organisations, or rebel groups, a powerful tool for generating support for their cause and mobilising people for violence (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007: 365). The logic of provocation assumes that terrorist organisations launch terrorist attacks to provoke the enemy, usually a government, into harsh and indiscriminate counterterrorism responses which target the whole population the terrorist organisation is deemed to represent. This would then radicalise and mobilise more people to support and join the extremists (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007: 365; Kydd and Walter 2006: 51, 69—70; Lake 2002: 16). In order to overcome the collective action problem, terrorist organisations need to alter the beliefs of their “domestic” audiences, meaning the population, group or sub-group of people they regard as their constituency, about the nature of the enemy government. Provocation as a strategy is designed to persuade the domestic audience that the target of attacks, which is usually a government, is unconcerned of their wellbeing and must be resisted (Kydd and Walter 2006: 51, 69; Lake 2002: 16).

Thornton (1964: 87), Crenshaw (1981: 385) and David Fromkin (1975: 683) all listed provocation as one of the strategies of terrorism, Fromkin even argued provocation to be the only strategy of terrorism. The logic behind provocation is, that indiscriminate violence targeting a whole group of people reduces or eliminates entirely, the collective action problem most terrorist and rebel

groups experience. This logic renders indiscriminate and too harsh counterterrorism measures counterproductive (Lyll 2009: 335). By getting provoked and punishing a larger group of people indiscriminately the government creates collateral damage, which creates a desire for revenge that in turn drives the moderates to support and join the terrorists (Lake 2002: 19).

Crenshaw (1981: 385) notes that particularly harsh government actions as a response to dissent often set the stage for subsequent terrorist incidents. The “boomerang” or “backlash” effect of harsh counterterrorism measures have been acknowledged and modelled in several research papers examining the relationship between terrorist incidents and subsequent government response (e.g. Gill, Piazza and Horgan 2016: 475; Rosendorf and Sandler 2010: 443—445).

History is also full of examples of provocation and the radicalising effects of harsh retaliation: 9/11 attacks in the US and the War on Terror that followed being one on the most pressing ones with long lasting effects. According to Kydd and Walter (2006: 59) by targeting the heart of the American success story al-Qaida attempted to both increase the cost of the US presence in Saudi Arabia and, most importantly, provoke the United States and its allies into an extreme and indiscriminate military response that would radicalise the world’s Muslim population.

In this study, bans on Islamic full-face veils are understood and treated as indiscriminate counterterrorism measures employed by European governments. European Muslims and Muslims in general, regardless of their geographical location, form the population or group of people the terrorist organisations are trying to radicalise and whose opinions they are trying to sway to accommodate more radical and extreme views. Following the theoretical framework laid out here, I argue that these same Muslims are also the ones the European governments are indiscriminately targeting by implementing restrictions on the use of the full-face veil.

For the government side, countering the threat of terrorism usually entails two approaches: defensive and proactive. Defensive measures include hardening targets and taking steps towards making it harder for the terrorists to physically reach their targets and carry out successful attacks. Proactive measures on the other hand include actions such as pre-emptive strikes and military action against terrorist strongholds for the purpose of limiting and ultimately ending terrorist operations (Rosendorf and Sandler 2004: 657—658). Proactive operations, however, may have the downside of intensifying and creating more grievances, making the government lose support and empowering the terrorists and their message (Rosendorf and Sandler 2004: 658; Lyll 2009:

335). The provocation strategy aims at delegitimizing the government by revealing to the public how unconcerned the government is of their wellbeing (Kydd and Walter 2006: 50). This again works towards promoting terrorist recruitment.

Extremist recruitment depends not only on the success of their terrorist attacks but also on the course the target government decides to take in responding to that attack. This is a crucial point to acknowledge in the context of the thesis paper at hand. Governments suffering from terrorist attacks or a credible threat of attacks are often left with an ungrateful task: something needs to be done to please the public, but at the same time, they need to be careful in their response to avoid furthering any terrorist goals. Governments who respond too softly risk appearing weak in both their enemy's and domestic audience's eyes. Governments who respond with too much force risk alienating the moderates and encouraging the opposition. In Western liberal democracies, where the politicians are often worried about their re-election, the need to appease voting public often requires visible counter measures and tough responses, which are often the ones that will more likely serve the terrorists' purpose (Buono de Mesquita and Dickson 2007: 373—374; Rosendorf and Sandler 2004: 658—659; Kydd and Walter 2006: 70).

Implementing effective counterterrorism strategies requires that the governments understand what drives terrorists to do what they do and what makes people to join them. When it comes to responding to terrorism, governments are often too quick to use the citizens fear of terrorist attacks to justify increased social control, which in the end might increase and encourage the very problem they are trying to address. Too hard pre-emptive measures could risk exacerbating the grievances in the society, which in turn gives extremist groups like Islamic State ammunition for recruitment because their message will be more resonant in an aggrieved society (Lain 2016: 386).

Jessica Stern (23.3.2016, Boston Globe) has argued that besides attempting to build and expand its caliphate and goading Western states into war in Syria, Islamic State's goal is to "eliminate what it calls the "gray zone" of moderate Islam" practiced by most Western Muslims. It aims at making these moderate Muslims feel unsafe in Western democracies as a result of discrimination and prejudice. Islamic State itself acknowledges this goal in its propaganda material, where it is stated that Islamic State attempts to eliminate this grey area by goading the enemy to target these grey areas to radicalise the moderates and sway their allegiance to the organisation (Dar al-Islam Issue 9: 65). This again follows the logic of provocation strategy.

In general, militant Islamism is built on a narrative according to which the West alongside with Israel and other corrupt regimes are at war with Islam. To overcome this aggression and humiliation, Muslims need to unite and fight the West and their corrupting influence in order to “return to a society of peace, harmony, and social justice” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 798). This is a message particularly appealing to the disenfranchised European youth who feel marginalised by their states and discriminated against by their fellow citizens. This observation brings us to the argument that will be tested in the following sections.

Based on the theoretical framework built around provocation strategy and the backlash effect of indiscriminate counterterrorism actions by government, this study argues that *by implementing legislation restricting Muslims women’s ability to wear the full-face veil European governments risk increasing grievances felt by European Muslim communities which increases radicalisation and terrorist activity*. Based on the theoretical arguments provided above, the burqa ban can affect radicalisation and terrorist activity in two ways: by (1) increasing the grievances and discontent felt by the Muslim population directly through the direct effects it has on the Muslim women unable to wear the burqa anymore and through the symbolic power the dress carries as a representation of Islam, and by (2) providing the terrorist organisation with a propaganda and recruitment tool through which to strengthen their message about Western aggression against Islam.

In the following sections, I will test the argument formulated above by analysing the implications of the French burqa ban through four different indicators. Based on the arguments and findings made in the previous literature examining the backlash effects of indiscriminate and harsh counterterrorism measures or repressive state practices and the support provided by the theoretical framework introduced above, the hypothesis of this study will assume that the burqa ban has an increasing effect on radicalisation and terrorist activity. This will be analysed in the following sections.

Before proceeding to the research design and actual analysis part, it is important to note again that even though a burqa ban directly applies to only small number of women, and even though it is not a counterterrorism measure per se, the indiscriminate nature of the ban comes from the fact that the burqa is understood to be a representation of Islam, as argued elsewhere in this research. The symbolic nature of the full-veil has been acknowledged by Muslims and proponents of the ban alike, and it provides further support for the perception that by targeting the burqa, the

European governments are targeting Islam at large. In addition, there is no proof that Muslim women in Europe form any kind of security risk that would justify singling them out in a way the burqa ban does. This provides also support for the argument that the burqa ban constitutes a measure that aims at containing the European Muslim population at large.

Also, when it comes to the main source of terrorism threat in Europe today, the radicalising effects of government counterterrorism actions are not limited or constrained by geography or national borders. Traditionally, the study of terrorism has distinguished between domestic and international terrorism. However, when it comes to Islamist extremist ideology promoted by groups like Islamic State and al-Qaida it is more feasible to talk about transnational terrorism that does not stop at any country's borders. This is manifested by the fact that international terrorist organisations keep recruiting among the disaffected communities of Europe and that either attacks by international organisations are being directed from abroad and perpetrated and planned "at home" or attacks by lone-actors are inspired by the international organisations and their propaganda (Cesari 2012: 430). Following this logic, even though this study focuses only on analysing the effects European and French counterterrorism measures, the French burqa ban in particular, have had on radicalisation and terrorist activity in Europe and France, the larger Muslim audience cannot be excluded when discussing the implications of the ban.

## 7. Research Design

### 7.1. Data Sources and Tools for Analysis

The argument and hypothesis presented above will be tested by examining the effects of the burqa ban on a set of indicators chosen to help analyse the implications from four different angles. More substantive explanation and analysis of the legislation prohibiting the use of the full-veil in France and the wider political and historical context will also be included as part of the analysis. The unit of analysis is in country, meaning that even though the analysis will also examine and analyse briefly the effects on an individual level, the main focus is to get a clear picture of the implications the ban has on the country level.

To analyse the effects or implications of the ban on the country level, this study will employ four different indicators: Islamist terrorist activity, radicalisation measured as the number of foreign fighters originating from a country, the direct effects of the ban on Muslim women and finally, how the ban has been presented in extremist propaganda. The direct effects the ban has had on Muslim women has been employed in previous research on terrorism and radicalisation as well, most notably Madu (2015). The three other indicators, however, have not been used in analysing the implications of the burqa ban before, at least to my knowledge. In that sense, this research presents a unique attempt at examining the burqa ban through these four indicators.

Islamist terrorist activity will be measured as the number of completed, failed and foiled Islamist terrorist attacks in France between 2006 and 2016. Initial comparisons between the five-year-periods before and after the restrictive legislation took effect will be performed. However, due to the small number of actual attacks in Europe and France, drawing definitive inferences is not possible. The data comes from Europol's European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports

(TE-SAT).<sup>1</sup> Europol started collecting official terrorism statistics from the EU member states in 2006, which has limited the time range of employed in this research as well.

Radicalisation will be measured as the number of foreign fighters that have left France to join extremist groups in Syria and Iraq. A number of different institutions have collected data on foreign fighters, but this research will use the updated numbers provided in the Soufan Group report from 2015 (The Soufan Group 2015). The Soufan Group first provided estimates of the number of foreign fighters travelling to Syria in 2014, and their 2015 report updates those numbers. They use official government estimates when possible, but also draw numbers from UN reports, research reports and academic sources. Even when official, the numbers need to be treated with sufficient level of uncertainty, since many governments do not release figures and even those who do, might not be very accurate in their estimations. The governments might also have an incentive to either underestimate or overestimate the figures (The Soufan Group 2015). This study will use the official figures for consistency, and supplement them with the unofficial figure if needed, in a similar fashion as done in Benmelech and Klor (2016). The figure for France is an official estimate. For Europe, apart from Serbia, Montenegro and Portugal, all countries presented in the analysis section had official figures available. For the three countries mentioned above, unofficial estimates were used.

For examining the effects the restrictive legislation has had on Muslim women this study will rely on secondary sources, and analyse the interview material provided in The Open Society Report “After the Ban: The Experiences of 35 Women of the Full-Face Veil in France” from September 2013. The research is conducted by Naima Bouteldja who interviewed 35 women who were either still wearing it in 2013 or had been wearing when the national debate on the veil had been launched in 2009. Majority of the interviewees were from Paris. As the name of the report indicates, it examines the effects the ban has had on the lives of the 35 women interviewed. The report includes multiple parameters against which the effects have been measured, and this research will briefly take a look at the effects on the women’s personal life and their families, their health, and their socialising with the outside world. Secondary source is employed for two reasons: time constraints and the importance individual testimonies have when examining the implications of the ban.

---

<sup>1</sup>All reports from 2007 to 2017: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-2>.

Finally, this research will examine how the restrictive legislation has been presented in the extremist propaganda. For the purposes of trying to analyse the implications of the French burqa ban on radicalisation and terrorist activity, I have gone through the English versions of Islamic State's Dabiq and Rumiya magazines from 2014 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017 respectively, and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) Inspire magazines from 2010 to 2017. In addition, as the focus of this research is France, I went through all ten issues of Islamic State's French language magazine of Dar al-Islam. For the analysis, I searched for mentions of France and either the full-face veil ban or hijab ban. All materials are obtained from a "clearinghouse" project website called [jihadology.net](http://jihadology.net)<sup>2</sup> created and maintained by Aaron Y. Zelin, a research fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

## 7.2. Methodology and Case Selection

The research will be carried out as a single country case study. The advantage of a case study is that it allows for an intense examination of one case while making it still possible to draw generalisations that will also be applicable in other cases. This means that while being internally valid, case studies can also be externally valid (Halperin and Heath 2012: 205).

The case examined in this study is France. Being the first country in Europe to implement a blanket ban on full-face veils and also having in place a ban on religious symbols in schools, France offers a good case for examining the effects and implications in a longer time period. As the goal of this research is to determine whether the burqa ban has had any implications on radicalisation or terrorist activity, it is of utmost importance, that the selected country has had the ban in place for long enough time to make any kind of measurement or analysis possible. In France's case, the ban has been in effect since 2011 and there is also a comprehensive body of research conducted on it already, which helps in determining what has been already found and what requires more examination. The availability and quantity of data is then one of the most important reasons for choosing France.

This study and the methodology has limitations, especially when it comes to determining whether the burqa ban affects radicalisation and terrorism or not. For this purpose, the research design of

---

<sup>2</sup> <http://jihadology.net>.

this study combined with the available data allows merely the examination of various parameters. Making definitive or robust conclusions is not possible in the framework set out by this research. However, the examination of the issue from different angles and the support provided by the theoretical framework allow bringing focus on the issue and making initial inferences as to whether the ban has been successful or not.

The original aim of this research was to argue to that a burqa ban increases radicalisation and terrorist activity in a country. The goal was to examine whether countries with bans or restrictions on the use of the full-veil in place were more likely to experience terrorism and have foreign fighters leave for the conflict in Syria and Iraq. The region of interest was specifically Europe. However, testing this argument would have required a research design with a country-year unit of analysis, a comprehensive set of control variables and most importantly, sufficient amount of data to reach robust, generalizable and relevant results.

However, most of the countries who have implemented restrictions on the use of the full-veil have done so only recently. As laid out in the beginning of this research, most bans have entered into force in 2015, 2016 or 2017, which makes running statistical models and attempts to draw conclusions not possible. There is very little quantified and comprehensive data available. In order to still be able to examine the implications of the burqa ban, the main argument was modified to one that has larger and less determinant scope. In a similar fashion, the research design was changed to a case study to allow for a broader range of parameters to be considered for analysing the implications of the burqa ban in France.

## 8. Analysis

### 8.1. The Burqa Ban in France

France was the first country in Europe to introduce the so called burqa ban, i.e. ban on full-face veils, into its legislation. Law No 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 Prohibiting the Wearing of Clothing Concealing One's Face in Public Spaces, passed the legislative process and was approved by the French Constitutional Council on October 7, 2010. The law entered into force on 11 April, 2011. According to Article 1 of the law, no one is allowed to wear a face-concealing outfit in public space. Article 2 states that the public space consists of "roads as well as places open to the public or assigned to a public service" and that the prohibition does not apply "if the dress is prescribed or authorized by legislative or regulatory provisions, if it is justified by health reasons or professional reasons or it falls within the setting of sports practices or artistic or traditional events." Articles 3 and 4 detail the punishment for violating the law (LOI n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public, [legifrance.gouv.fr](http://legifrance.gouv.fr)).

In its decision from 7 October 2010, the Constitutional Council held that:

"Whereas article 1 and 2 of the referred law has the purpose of responding to the appearance of practices, extremely rare until now, consisting of concealing one's face in public spaces; and given that the legislators have considered that such practices may constitute a danger to public security and disregard the minimal requirements of life in society; that the legislators also estimated that women hiding their faces, voluntarily or involuntarily, are placed in a situation of exclusion and inferiority that is manifestly incompatible with the constitutional principles of liberty and equality; that in adopting the referred provisions, the legislators have completed and generalized rules to protect public order that until now were only reserved to specific situations;" (Global Legal Monitor 18.10.2010)

The Council made one reservation in the law, concerning the places of worship open to public. In these places the prohibition is not applicable (Global Legal Monitor 18.10.2010).

As Amnesty International report from 2012 points out, France has had a legislation prohibiting concealment of the face in public demonstrations in place since 2009 to ensure the identification and possible prosecution of rioters concealing their faces. In addition, domestic legislation existing prior to 2010 already gave law enforcement officers powers to demand individuals to uncover their faces for identification purposes (Amnesty International 2012: 95—96). This indicates that the new legislation prohibiting face concealment is unnecessary addition to the existing legislation for the purposes of public security. In addition, the fact that these existing pieces of legislation already cover the law enforcement's need for identification also indicate that the main target of the prohibition were not rioters or people purposefully concealing their face to hide their identity.

This point is also confirmed by the remarks made by then President Sarkozy to the French parliament in 2009 where he declared the burqa is a representation of oppression of women and that it is not welcome in France. Following these remarks, the French National Assembly ordered a formation of a parliamentary commission to study the practise of wearing the full-veil and explore the possibilities to restrict its use. The commission's final report concluded that the full veil is "contrary to the values of the Republic" and that the parliament should adopt legislation that describe it as such and prohibit its use (Nanwani 2011: 6).

In addition, in the Constitutional Council ruling before the legislation was approved, the Council concludes that the new legislation is a response to appearance of practices that have been "extremely rare" until now (Global Legal Monitor 18.10.2010). The notion is further strengthened by the exceptions laid out in Article 2 of the law, which states that the prohibition does not apply to garments justified by health or professional reasons, sports practices, parties, artistic or traditional events. This basically leaves the Islamic full-face veil as the sole target of the legislation. The argument is also supported by multiple researchers who have argued that the main target of this law is the full veil (Howard 2012: 148; Bleich 2009: 373; Davis 2011: 117-118; Nanwani 2011: 2; Cesari 2012: 444; Idriss 2016: 126-127).

Both the public and political debate surrounding the legislation has largely focused on the fact that it would prohibit Muslim women from wearing niqabs and burqas, and the initial controversy

sparked debates around the world on whether banning the burqa was discriminatory or limiting the freedom of religion (Nanwani 2011: 1). The fact that the legislation is widely known and referred to as burqa ban also indicates that that is how it is interpreted around the world.

The political and public debate about the role of the burqa in French society did not start with Sarkozy in 2009. The debate first surfaced already in the 1980s and then gained real significance in early 2000s. Amiraux (2016: 45) traces the birth of the 2004 ban on religious symbols in schools and the 2011 ban on full-face veils back to two governmental reports from 2003, which argued that the mere presence of religious symbols in the society created division. Additionally, these reports designated communalism and political Islam as number one threats to the Republic and claimed that secularism was essential factor in creating social cohesion and facilitating political and social integration to the French society. The Muslim headscarf was seen to contradict the rules of secularism and gender equality, and the burqa, as a visible representation of Islam, was seen to be in direct violation of secularism and hence, a threat to the society (Parvez 2011: 288, 291; Wiles 2007: 703).

Secularism (*laïcité* in French) has a very central role in the French constitution. The French constitution, in accordance with the principles of *laïcité*, guarantees the freedom to practice religion in private instead of freedom of religion as it is understood in many Western democracies. This interpretation of secularism dates back to the law establishing the separation of Church and State which guarantees to separate the religious space from the public space. Religion can be practiced freely in religious institutions and in private while the public space is where the citizens “come together to live together” (Honicker 2014: 274; Bigea 2016: 18). This interpretation has been employed quite extensively in defence of the bans from 2004 and 2011. By choosing to wear the headscarf or the full-face veil, the women are refusing to “come together to live together”, to be part of the French society (see e.g. Freedman 2007: 30).

The European Court of Human Rights also found the “living together” argument based on *laïcité* principles to be a reasonable justification for banning the veil in its ruling in 2014 when the French ban was challenged for violating the European Convention of Human Rights (*S.A.S. v. France* [GC] (no. 43835/11, ECHR 2014); Amiraux 2016: 38). The ban was deemed a proportionate and justifiable way to preserve the conditions of “living together” and the protection the rights and freedoms of others (Lægaard 2015: 203—204).

## 8.2. The Burqa Ban in the Context of French Immigration and Counterterrorism Policies

As has been mentioned above, the burqa ban in France has been seen to form part of both, the French immigration policies (Maillard 2005) and set of reactionary legislation formulated as a response to violent Islamist activities (Bleich 2009) or perceived too strong presence of Islam in Europe (Edmunds 2012; Pratt 2015). According to Bleich (2009: 371) several European countries have supplemented their regular counterterrorism practices with policies aimed at better integrating their minorities. According to him, the French laws restricting the use of the Islamic veil are examples of policies that compel integration of religious minorities by enforcing a certain set of cultural and societal standards on them and declaring other practices unwelcome. Beydoun (2016: 1296—1298, 1300) argues that in France counterterrorism policy and cultural assimilation policy as part of wider immigration policy are inherently linked and sees this as a result of the French approach to radicalisation as a problem of social integration.

In France, integration of immigrants is better understood as assimilation of immigrants into the French society. This assimilation approach, often referred to as the Republican Model of Integration aims at the “obliteration of any “minority” identity in favour of “Frenchness,” with the objective of achieving a sense of equality through cultural similarity” (Wiles 2007: 703). This preference of individual over community (Maillard 2005: 74) ideal is manifested in the state’s refusal to collect data on the ethnicity of its citizens. Wiles (2007: 703) cites French academic Olivier Roy in writing that Muslims who identify themselves as something else before French, are best described as “casualties of the integration process.” In general, all minority, community or localized identities are regarded as threatening the unitary idea of French citizenship (Wiles 2007: 704). The Islamic veil, be it hijab, niqab or burqa, in addition to being interpreted as a symbol of Islam (Wiles 2001: 699), is seen to symbolise community and collective identity within the French society, which contradicts the ideal of single, unitary French nation (Maillard 2005: 77—78).

According to the assimilation theory, the assimilationist process will consist of “gradual disappearance of original cultural and behavioural patterns in favour of new ones” and will inevitably lead to complete assimilation (Algan et al. 2012: 4). The cultural assimilation approach is strikingly different to that of integration and multiculturalism favoured in the United Kingdom

and the United States and the roots of the approach can be traced back to the colonial times. The French colonial administration in North Africa was built on the idea that the colonies needed to be civilized and then assimilated to make then colonies and their citizens “French” and an integral part of the “motherland”. Already then, one of the key initiatives in cultural assimilationist approach was to persuade the women to abandon their headscarves (Wiles 2007: 703—704).

Beydoun (2016: 1278—79) has further argued, that in France the cultural assimilation and counterterrorism policies are practically synonymous to the Muslim population and that their counter-radicalisation programmes are almost entirely dedicated on containing the stereotypical “Muslims terrorist” who is visibly Muslim and fits the French interpretation of masculine “Arab”. Cultural assimilation campaigns have formed the foundation of France’s counterterror program since the beginning of Jacques Chirac administration in 1995 (Beydoun 2016: 1296). The hijab ban of 2004 and burqa ban of 2011 together represent culmination of this policy.

The French counterterrorism model puts heavy emphasis on pre-emptive actions, including robust intelligence-gathering in collaboration with third countries, “aggressive prosecution to dismantle terrorist networks in formation; and removals of foreign terrorism suspects and those accused of fomenting radicalization and recruitment to terrorism” (Human Rights Watch 7/2008: 6). This model is based on a very broad definition of what constitutes a terrorist offense and flexible judicial system that allows the authorities broader powers to detain, hold and prosecute suspects than in normal criminal cases. According to Human Rights Watch this has led to a situation where the French counterterrorism laws and procedures undermine the rights the suspects (Human Rights Watch 7/2008: 1—2).

According to Human Rights Watch interviews, the broad definition of terrorism offence coupled with the low threshold for arrests strengthen the perception among French Muslim communities that all Muslims are treated as terrorist suspects. Interrogations of terrorism suspects often include religion-centred questions, including women being questioned on their choice to wear a headscarf and men asked about their opinions on gender equality (Human Rights Watch 7/2008: 75). In the scope of this research, this indicates that the Islamic veil is interpreted by the law-enforcement officials, at least to some degree, as a sign of radical or extreme views, Islamic fundamentalism or support for radical ideologies

After the state of emergency was enacted in the wake of the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, authorities were granted even broader powers to search, detain and investigate terrorism suspects. The authorities were allowed to “monitor phone and online communications, perform warrantless searches, exploit digital media found during searches, and detain suspects without charges for up to 96 hours, among other measures.” (Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, 7/2017). According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, these measures have targeted the French Muslim community in disproportionate and discriminatory manner, often merely based on their beliefs or religious practices, such as donning a beard or wearing a religious dress, and not on any kind of concrete evidence of illegal behaviour (Amnesty International 26.9.2017; Human Rights Watch 3.2.2016). The almost two-year state of emergency was replaced in late October by a new counterterrorism legislation that made many of the special powers and measures permanent, granting the police and investigators extensive powers to hunt terrorist suspects (Vinocur 31.10.2017, Politico).

A new action plan against radicalisation and terrorism from 2016 put heavy emphasis on preventing radicalisation in prisons, education institutions and sports clubs by reinforcing the state monitoring of these facilities (France in the US 13.5.2016). Under the jurisdiction of the 2014 French “Patriot Act” the authorities are also allowed to suspend passports and ban terrorist suspects from leaving the country (Counter Extremism Project 2017).

Even though it is not explicitly mentioned in the law text itself, terrorism is a very prominent factor in the burqa ban. As noted above by Beydoun (2016), cultural assimilationist policies such as the burqa ban form the core of French counter-radicalisation policies. When examined in larger world political spectrum, similarities can be detected in how each step toward the burqa ban of 2011 was preceded by violent terrorist incidents that were then used as justifications for stricter immigration and integration policies.

Terrorist incident in Madrid in 2004 preceded the adoption of the 2004 headscarf ban, and the train attack and the threat of terrorism emanating from that was used by President Chirac as a justification for the ban. In the aftermath of the bomb attacks in London a year later, the nationalist Front National party used the attacks as a prefix to push for more policies that would increasingly target France’s Muslim population. The niqab was among the issues that according to the hardliners were in the way of assimilation. The ban in full-face veils was accepted in 2010 on the premises described above (Beydoun 2016: 1293). More recently, after the Charlie Hebdo attack

in 2015 the public debate circled around the question whether the France's Muslim population could be culturally assimilated into broader society. The Paris Attacks of November 2015 on the other hand were followed by an unprecedented degree of state scrutiny and backlash focusing on the Muslim population, as manifested by the raids and detentions carried out under the state of emergency.

The most recent example of reactionary policies and what is essence can be interpreted as local French officials answering to provocation by getting provoked is from July 2016. In the aftermath of the Nice Attacks of July 2016 several French cities temporarily banned the use of the full-body swimsuit burkini on their beaches claiming that they are “not respectful of good morals and secularism” and a “symbol of Islamic extremism” (Huckerby 24.8.2016, Time). A Cannes city official also referred to burkini, which covers the head but leaves the face uncovered in a similar fashion to hijabs, as a dress that makes allegiance to terrorist movements that France is at war against. A further argument provided in the Nice Administrative Court ruling upholding the ban stated that in the light of the July 2016 terrorist attacks in Nice, the burkini could not be interpreted as just being a “mere sign of religiosity” (Le Monde 13.8.2016). The burkini ban, even though short lived, offers the most straightforward example of how terrorism and the way Muslim women dress themselves are linked in the French public and political life.

The burkini ban, implemented clearly as a reaction to the vehicular attack in Nice as proven by the remarks presented above, is a perfect example of a governmental entity reacting to terrorist attack by indiscriminately targeting all things visibly representative of the attacker. In this case, by turning their restrictive measures on Muslim women donning the burkini on French beaches and claiming that by wearing the full-body swimsuit, the women were supporting Islamic State or other terrorist groups, the officials attacked Islam. Instead of focusing solely on the culprits themselves, the officials did exactly what, based on the provocation strategy, the terrorist organisations wanted them to do.

### 8.3. Effects of the Burqa Ban on Muslim Women

An Open Society Report from 2013 interview 35 Muslim women in France and asked them how the restrictive legislation had affected their lives. Based on the interviews, only eight respondents had removed their veils since the ban took effect while 27 women said they had continued to use the full-veil despite the ban. Four women had started wearing the veil as a result of the law banning it.

According to the women who had decided to continue wearing the full-face veil, removing it would undermine their religious commitment and mean undermining part of their identity. Most of the women who had abandoned the veil had done so to comply with the law and to avoid harassment, arrest or assault (Open Society Report 2013: 2). The women who refused to remove their veils said that the ban had considerably restricted their movements, they socialised less with other people and only very rarely left their homes in fear of being subjected to general abuse by the public or being stopped by the police for not complying with the ban. Also, the women who had removed their veils told the interviewers that the law had restricted their mobility since they now feel more uncomfortable going out with their faces uncovered.

The interviewees also felt that the ban had encouraged the public to harass Muslim women donning the full-veil even more directly and openly than before. Twelve women had been physically assaulted for wearing niqab in public and some had even had their veils forcefully pulled off by members of the public (Open Society Report 2013: 3). Data provided by the French Council against Islamophobia also confirms that Muslim women are more often recipients of any kind of discrimination and that in 2016, 100 percent of all physical attacks against Muslims reported to the council were against women (CCIF Rapport 2017: 9).

The reasons the Muslim women provided for continuing to wear the veil in the Open Society Report (2013: 6—7) indicate that the women felt strongly that the veil was part of their religious commitment and identity, and that they would rather confine themselves into the “prisons” of their homes if going out would require denouncing their religion and giving up part of their identity. These sentiments echo the findings provided above about the reasons for which Muslim women in general wore the burqa or niqab. Identity was one of the factors found to be significant in women’s decision to wear the full-veil. These also indicate that by banning the garment, the

French government did not simply set restrictions on a piece of clothing or a something that can be simply characterized as a religious symbol, but rather on some Muslim's identity.

Several women also reported that their health had suffered because of the ban since they felt that they were prisoners in their own homes and feared going outside. The ban has also had a negative effect on their families and immediate circle of friends and relatives since their fear of going out restrict the activities they can do with their children and adds burden on their spouses (Open Society Report 2013: 11—13). 31 out of 35 women said that their situation had deteriorated since the implementation of the ban (Open Society Report 2013: 14).

These results indicate that ban indeed affects larger population, not merely the women that the ban directly affects. The larger societal effects, as described by the negative implications caused to the respondents' families and the negative and boldened attitudes of the general public towards Muslim women, are what make the burqa ban a potential factor in inducing radicalisation.

#### 8.4. The French Bans in Terrorist Propaganda

One part of the analysis on the implications of the burqa ban in France, this study examines terrorist propaganda and recruitment material produced by Islamic State and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (hereinafter AQAP). I have chosen four magazines, of which three is produced by Islamic State and one by AQAP. Dabiq was chosen due to its role as the forerunner of Islamic State propaganda magazines; the birth of the Caliphate was announced in its first issue in 2014 and the name of the magazine refers to the Syrian city of Dabiq where the final battle between the Western and Muslim forces is assumed to take place (Clarion Project 10.9.2014; BBC Monitoring 4.10.2016). Dabiq was later replaced by Rumiya, as was the French-language magazine Dar al-Islam. Dar al-Islam was included in the material due to it focusing on delivering the propaganda and recruitment message solely on French speaking audience. Dabiq and Rumiya are both published in several other languages in addition English, including French and Arabic. APAC's Inspire magazine was chosen to avoid limiting the analysis only on Islamic State and for its longer publishing history than the other three magazines that only date back to 2014 earliest. The first issue of Inspire was published in 2010.

Analysing the effects of the burqa ban on radicalisation and terrorist activity could also be done without analysing propaganda and recruitment materials produced by terrorist organisations. However, as part of the argument in this study states that the burqa ban provides terrorist organisations with tools for recruitment and propaganda, I deem analysing the propaganda material crucial in determining whether the burqa ban has featured at all in the material and whether it has been used to incite aggression against France and the West.

In the French language issues of Dar al-Islam, references to either the Islamic veil's importance in general or to the French legislation banning hijab's in schools and full-face veils in public places are made in at least four issues. The last issue, which dates back to August 2016, argues that the French ban on Islamic veils is an attempt to challenge Islam (Dar al-Islam Issue 10, 20.8.2016: 21). France's war against Islam is also a major issue throughout the issue and the issue claims that the terrorist attacks carried out in France show that France's assimilationist policies have failed and that France lost the war when Islamic State managed to sow fear into the French society and affect their everyday life (ibid 26—27). The ninth issue (Dar al-Islam Issue 9, 26.4.2016: 4) on the other hand points towards the controversy in banning religious symbols and states that the French politicians seem to tolerate Jewish symbols, but feel the need to ban symbols worn by Muslims. More general references to the Islamic veil is made in the issue from February 2016 (Dar al-Islam Issue 8, 6.2.2016: 4, 14).

The November 2015 issue (Dar al-Islam Issue 7, 30.11.2015: 16) discusses the French ban on religious symbols in schools and secularity argument, and states that it is clear that this ban is meant to hijabs wearing of which was regulated by Allah himself. The writing makes it clear that the French ban is contradicting and questioning Islamic principles. The second issue (Dar al-Islam Issue 2, 11.2.2015: 10) includes a long article laying out the history of France's hostility towards Islam. The hijab ban together with the secularist attempts to assimilate Muslims into the general French society are included as part of this history of hostility, and these actions are said to provide proof for all the Muslims that a true believer cannot be both a Muslim and French. The article further claims that the history proves that France is full of hatred towards Muslims.

Rumiyah and Dabiq issues on the other hand make only few references to headscarves or full-face veils. Rumiyah issue five (6.1.2017: 12) instructs men to make sure that their wives wear proper hijab at all times and Dabiq issue 15 (31.7.2016: 23—25) describes Western women as victims of immoral Western liberalism that encourages women to be the exact opposite of modest and

humble. The article then continues to offer Islam as the only salvation to the promiscuous women of the West as Islam teaches that women should not compete with men or try to behave like men and should cover their bodies with a veil instead of showing them off. Issue 15 also includes a story by a Finnish female convert who describes her journey to Islam and mentions the hijab as being an issue to her Christian parents (Dabiq Issue 15 31.7.2016: 37). Dabiq issue 13 (19.1.2016: 11) comments on the women's need to cover their heads, but makes no reference to France or Europe.

The AQAP magazine Inspire mentions both France and the legislation banning full-face coverings and hijabs. The newest issue from August 2017 (Inspire Magazine Issue 17, 13.8.2017) mentions France 42 times. France is accused of attacking Islam faith and Muslims and it is noted that France has a long history of animosity against Islam dating back to its colonial history in North Africa. The piece mentions how the collective memory of Muslims is filled by tragedies Muslims have faced in the hands of the French and how France has attempted to wipe out their culture and identity, change their customs, the language they spoke and the way they were educated. In the end, the article asks what France thinks it would have lost if it had just left Muslims alone, to practice their religion and speak their language in peace (Inspire Magazine Issue 17 13.8.2017: 32—55). The text in itself does not make direct reference to the French legislation concerning hijabs and full-face veils, however, the several pages long article takes a wider aim at France and its history with Muslims and paints a picture of a country at war with all Muslims.

Inspire Magazine Issue 14 (9.9.2015) mentions France 14 times, and continues the extremist narrative of a nation at war against Muslims and the long history of French aggression against Islam. Inspire Magazine Issue 10 (1.3.2013: 5, 16—17) mentions France 18 and makes also a reference to the legislation banning full-face veils by asking whether that is an example of the freedom France wishes to project. The veil ban is then paralleled to a French military operation in Mali and to alleged war crimes in there. The Mali intervention is also argued to be part of France's "crusade war on Muslim land and its people" (Inspire Magazine Issue 10 1.3.2013: 5) and subsequently linked to the French legislation, by stating that "not long ago you attacked the hijab of the Muslim women" (Inspire Magazine Issue 10 1.3.2013: 5).

This highlights the wider societal and transnational effects the legislation concerning hijabs and full-face veils have. The bans do not affect only the very people wearing hijabs or niqabs. By politicising the Islamic veil, the French government has given the terrorist ammunition to target

them and to use in their propaganda to radicalise and recruit ever more followers. As mentioned in the above theory section, the extremist propaganda targets the grey area of moderate Islam and attempts to radicalise their thinking both about the governments of Muslim countries and the Western governments and societies to gain more followers.

The debate concerning the bans in Europe were discussed in Inspire Magazine issue 6 (Summer 2011: 12) and it was concluded that there should be no debate about the women's need to cover themselves as much as possible, as the niqab according to the magazine is an Islamic practise that should be followed.

Western war against Islam and all Muslims is also a leading theme in Inspire Magazine Issue 5 (29.3.2011: 37), where it is explicitly laid out that the war against Muslim women's veil is part of this anti-Islam campaign. France is again mentioned explicitly in relation to Tunisia and it is said that France has "hunted the veiled Muslim women and spread immorality and corruption." In a similar fashion, also the Inspire issues four (Inspire Magazine Issue 4, 16.1.2011: 11, 17) and two (Inspire Magazine Issue 2, 11.10.2010: 35,) bear short mentions of the new French legislation that bans the full-face veils in public.

France's and Belgium's move to ban the full-face veil is a major theme in the first issue of Inspire from 2010 (Inspire Magazine 30.6.2010: 4, 7, 19—20) and the editors ask whether these moves provide enough proof that the two countries harbour "tremendous revulsion for Islam itself." The issue contains a long article on the "battle on niqab" and argues that the niqab is "today's manifestation of a clash of civilizations and an additional proof to a mounting body of evidence that the West is anything but tolerant towards its Muslim population." (ibid. 19) The article argues that the niqab is attacked in the West because it is a visible representation of Islam, and by attacking the garment the West is attacking Islam. The two-page article lays out a defence of Islam, Muslims and the niqab while arguing that by banning the garment the Western states are continuing their colonialist attack against Islam.

In addition, a propaganda video by French recruits from November 2014 makes a direct reference to the French ban on niqabs and burqas, by calling on other Muslims to travel to Syria and Iraq (Malik 20.11.2014, The Guardian).

Analysis of the propaganda material produced by Islamic State and AQAP indicates that the burqa ban has been extensively employed in French language propaganda material and in al-Qaida outreach material to strengthen the narrative about Western war against Islam and clash of civilizations. As mentioned above, the arguments pointing towards the full-face veil not being necessity in Islam fail recognise the societal effect of the ban, and how it can be employed beyond its imminent target. Muslim women in France and their families are the one to bear the daily consequences casted upon them by the restrictive legislation, however, the affected women and their families are not necessarily, or even most likely the ones that might radicalise as a result of the ban. The radicalising effect spans further away as indicated in the propaganda texts. The radicalising effect is created by the political, religious and cultural symbolism represented by the burqa, which then gives the radical groups the tools to argue that the ban is yet another way for France and the West to wage war against Islam.

The symbolic nature of the garment has been pointed out by the proponents of the ban as well, both in political and public discourse, when symbol is said to represent extremism and in the case of the burkini ban as being sympathetic to the extremist cause. This further strengthens the extremists' message and risks driving more people to support their cause.

## 8.5. Terrorist Activity in France Since 2006

In France, restrictive legislation on the use of hijabs has been in place for 13 years and on burqas and niqabs for about seven years. Since 2011 the threat of jihadist or Islamist terrorism in France has increased significantly. Based on the data collected from the Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports from 2007 to 2017 France counts for 47 percent of all Jihadist inspired terrorist attacks in Europe and for 53 percent of all terrorism related arrests. France is also the only country where the number of arrests continued to increase quite significantly. The significantly higher number for years 2015 and 2016 however, can partly be explained by the on-going state of emergency that has been in place since the November 2015 Paris Attacks.

When compared the five years since the adoption of the burqa ban in 2011 to the five-year period before the implementation of the new legislation, the difference in numbers is quite clear. All the Islamist terrorist incidents recorded in France since the Europol data collection started in 2006,

have taken place after the year 2011. From 2006 to 2011 the Europol did not record any Islamist terrorist attacks in France. From 2012 to 2016, there were altogether 26 incidents, 15 of the them in 2015 alone. This is quite significant difference. Similar trend can be detected in terrorism related arrests, as demonstrated in Figure 2. From 2006 until 2011 number of arrests kept decreasing in general, apart from a sharp increase in 2010. After the dip in 2011 with only 46 arrests, the number of arrests doubled in 2012 with 91 arrests and have been quite radically increasing since. The numbers can be seen in Table 2. Table 1 contains statistics for the whole EU.

This doesn't mean that the increase can be traced back to the implementation of the burqa ban in 2011 or that the increase is solely caused by the ban. These kinds of inferences could be only drawn from a larger data set that would include multiple observations and a set of control variables. The aim here is to simply observe the difference in numbers between the two five-year periods before and after the implementation of the ban in 2011. The start of the Syrian conflict in 2011 and the sharp increase in incoming immigrants and refugees from 2014 onwards and the rise of Islamic State to the banner man of global Jihad are other significant phenomena that can explain the increase in both arrests and attacks.

However, the numbers do indicate that the burqa ban has not decreased terrorist activity in France. As was mentioned earlier, the burqa ban as a policy measure is aimed at attempting to better integrate and assimilate Muslims into the French society. Cultural assimilation on the other hand, is an essential part of France's counterterrorism policies aiming at reducing radicalisation and curbing terrorism through assimilating Muslims into the mainstream society. When analysed against this framework, it could be assumed that the restrictive legislation was intended to play its part in curbing terrorist activity in France. Based on these premises, it can be argued that the burqa ban has indeed failed and the exact opposite has happened.

Table 1. Islamist terrorist attacks and arrests in EU countries 2006-2016

	<b>Attacks</b>	<b>% of total</b>	<b>Arrests</b>	<b>% of total</b>
France	26	47%	1713	53%
Netherlands	9	16%	121	4%
Belgium	7	13%	264	8%
Germany	6	11%	127	4%
Denmark	5	9%	38	1%
Italy	1	2%	201	6%
Sweden	1	2%	20	1%
Austria	0	0%	120	4%
Bulgaria	0	0%	67	2%
Cyprus	0	0%	4	0%
Czech Republic	0	0%	12	0%
Estonia	0	0%	2	0%
Finland	0	0%	11	0%
Greece	0	0%	15	0%
Ireland	0	0%	10	0%
Lithuania	0	0%	1	0%
Luxembourg	0	0%	1	0%
Poland	0	0%	10	0%
Portugal	0	0%	1	0%
Romania	0	0%	51	2%
Slovakia	0	0%	5	0%
Slovenia	0	0%	3	0%
Spain	0	0%	434	13%
<b>Total</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>3231</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 2. Islamist terrorist incidents and arrests in France

<b>Year</b>	<b>Attacks</b>	<b>Arrests</b>
2006	0	139
2007	0	91
2008	0	78
2009	0	37
2010	0	94
2011	0	46
2012	4	91
2013	1	143
2014	1	188
2015	15	377
2016	5	429
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>1713</b>

Figure 1. Islamist terrorist incidents in France since 2006





Figure 2. Islamist terrorist incidents and arrests in France since 2006



## 8.6. French Foreign Fighters

In addition to the raw number of terrorist attacks and arrests alike, this study will employ the number of foreign fighters who have left France to join the conflict in Syria and Iraq as another variable to measure the level of radicalisation in France. Since the start of the conflict in Syria and especially after Islamic State announced the creation of its caliphate in 2014, academics, politicians and political analysts have been trying to explain why so many people born and raised in the West have decided to join the fighting. Therefore, the foreign fighter phenomenon offers a convenient way to observe and analyse and draw some conclusions of the overall level of radicalisation in a country.

As shown in Table 3, it is estimated that France has produced around 1 700 foreign fighters. That accounts for 30 percent of the total estimated number of European foreign fighters. The second biggest foreign fighter sending countries are Germany and the UK which both have seen around 760 people to leave the country to join different organisations in the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq. France is then overwhelmingly biggest “producer” of foreign fighters in Europe. On a global scale, only five countries – Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey and Jordan – are estimated to have produced more foreign fighters than France. This is a significant observation when taking into account, that apart from Russia these are all Muslim countries.

When it comes to foreign fighters, France provides a unique case in the European context. Even though the extend of the radicalisation problem experienced by the country is partly manifested by the large foreign fighter contingent, the causes can't be traced down to one or two attributes. Just like it can't be done with terrorism. However, even though the real effects of the burqa ban on radicalisation cannot be determined by merely looking at the raw numbers of foreign fighters, the numbers, once again, serve to indicate that a country with a restrictive legislation in place experienced an unprecedented mobilisation for violence in support of radical elements in Iraq and Syria. The comparison to fellow big European countries without similar country-wide legislation in place also highlight the significant difference in the numbers. Germany and the UK especially. When compared to the UK, a country that shares similar background as an old colonial power but where a burqa ban has not materialised despite it being debated from time to time, the difference is quite clear with France having a contingent of 1700 foreign fighters and the UK one of 760

fighters. On the other hand, it should be noted, that countries like Sweden and Finland with no bans on full-face veils in place, still feature quite on the foreign fighter statistics when the total number of fighters is adjusted to the population and to the size of the Muslims population (Soufan Group 2015; Benmelech and Klor 2016). This goes against the hypothesis when it comes to only analysing radicalisation in the context foreign fighters. Once again, no definite conclusions can be drawn merely based on these numbers, but examination and initial comparison can be made. Producing definite and statistically significant results will be the quest for future research.

Table 3. European Foreign Fighters

	<b>Foreign Fighters</b>	<b>% of European Total</b>
France	1700	30%
Germany	760	13%
United Kingdom	760	13%
Belgium	470	8%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	330	6%
Austria	300	5%
Sweden	300	5%
Netherlands	220	4%
Macedonia	136	2%
Spain	133	2%
Denmark	125	2%
Albania	90	2%
Italy	87	2%
Norway	81	1%
Finland	70	1%
Switzerland	57	1%
Serbia	50	1%
Ireland	30	1%
Montenegro	30	1%
Portugal	12	0%
Moldova	1	0%
Romania	1	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>5743</b>	<b>100%</b>

## 9. Conclusions

The aim of this study was to examine and analyse the effects of burqa bans on radicalisation and terrorist activity. This study argued that by implementing legislation restricting the use of full-face veil the governments risk exacerbating existing grievances and providing terrorist organisations with tools for recruitment, which increases radicalisation and terrorism. The theoretical framework used in this study assumes that terrorist organisations use terrorism as a tool to overcome the collective action problem and to e people for violence. This is achieved by launching terrorist attacks against, in this case, European publics to provoke the Western governments into an indiscriminate response, which in turn would increase the grievances, alter people's beliefs and allegiances and in the end increase radicalisation.

Analysis of the data collected from four different sources provides initial, albeit not definitive or robust, support for the argument. Examination and analysis of the testimonials of French Muslim women, the propaganda material, number of Islamist terrorist incidents and arrests, and foreign fighters originating from France indicate, that the burqa ban has had a negative effect on clear majority of the 35 women interviewed by the Open Society Report and their families. This provides support for the argument about the ban increasing grievances felt by the Muslim community. In addition, the French burqa or hijab ban was frequently mentioned in the extremist propaganda, reiterating their message about Western hostility and aggression against Islam. The increase in terrorist incidents and arrests in France together with the high number of foreign fighters who departed France to join the conflict in Syria and Iraq provide further support for the argument, even though their contribution needs to be approached cautiously.

This thesis does, however, provide justification for arguing that a burqa ban can be interpreted to constitute an indiscriminate response on terrorism and radicalisation. Based on the analysis of existing literature, the empirical examples of existing or debated bans on the full-face veils and the case study of France, it can be concluded that the logic of provocation does materialise in the case study. This is especially clear when examining the burkini ban case from 2016 where it is

clear that the ban was instituted as a reaction to the July 2016 terrorist attacks in Nice. Another case in point comes from analysing the terrorist propaganda material, where it is clearly stated that the aim of the terrorist organisations in question is to goad the Western governments into a counterterrorism retaliation that would eliminate the grey zone of moderate Islam and mobilise Muslims to violence.

The analysis of the propaganda material also provide support for the argument that by implementing bans on full-face veils European governments provide terrorist organisations with propaganda and recruitment tools. This is clear from the way the French bans are featured in the material and how they are used to underline the hypocrisy and anti-Islam nature of France and its policies. However, whether these tools have led to actual radicalisation cannot be determined based on this analysis. While the analysis of the terrorism and foreign fighter statistics, the Change Institute interview material and the propaganda material provided some support for the overall argument, it cannot be reliably said that the results of the analysis supported the hypothesis, which assumed that implementation of a burqa ban increases radicalisation and terrorism. The collected data and the results of the analysis are simply not robust enough to draw this conclusion.

Even though the number of attacks and arrests after the ban was adopted in 2011 is higher with 26 failed, foiled and successful attacks in the period of 2011-2016 compared to zero attacks in the five-year-period preceding the ban, the data is still very limited for drawing definite conclusions. Also, this research was based simply on observation of the figures and no control variables were used to create statistically significant results. Despite not being definite and robust, the data still offers an opportunity to observe patterns and changes. These indicate, that if understood as an attempt to curb terrorism through more efficiently integrating the minorities, the burqa ban has failed in its purpose. The testimonials of the Muslim women describing how they barely leave their houses anymore now that they cannot wear the full-veil and out of fear for being confronted or attacked by fellow citizens provide further support for this observation.

Even though no concrete conclusions about the radicalising effects of the burqa ban could be reached in this research, the analysis of the literature and the case study materials in the context of the theoretical framework provide valuable insight on what kind of negative implications a ban on full-face veils might have and how both the legislation itself and the negative societal effects caused by it can be exploited by terrorist organisations in their quest to mobilise more people to violence. This study also managed to highlight the possible counterproductive nature of hard-line

counterterrorism policies. These are all observations that policy-makers should consider when formulating both, immigration and counterterrorism policies.

As concluding remarks and suggestion for future research, I would return to the beginning of this thesis and repeat how relevant and timely this topic is in today's Europe. Increasing number of countries is in the process of implementing a ban on the burqa or are considering it. This means that the effects of such legislation and whether it has indeed had any of the desired effects on the society need to be properly examined. For this reason, comprehensive data that allows thorough analysis of the issue is needed. This study, albeit very narrow and limited in its ability to provide results and draw conclusions, indicates that the burqa ban has had a negative effect on some Muslim women and that it has provided terrorist organisations a powerful propaganda message for dissemination. These findings should be further examined and additional analysis and methods should be applied in future research to answer the original research question of this study: are countries with existing legislation restricting the use of the full-face veil more likely to experience terrorism and increased radicalisation than countries with no such legislation? This thesis work provided valuable insight and initial analysis on this question, but the answer, if there is one, is left for the future research to provide.

# Bibliography

## Research Literature

Abu-Lughod, Lila (2002), "Do Muslims Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others", *American Anthropologist*, 104(3), 783-790.

Algan, Yann, Bisin, Alberto and Verdier, Thierry (2012), "Introduction: Perspectives on Cultural Integration of Immigrants". In *Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe*, ed. Algan, Yann, Bisin, Alberto, Manning, Alan and Verdier, Thierry. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1-48.

Amiriaux, Valérie (2016), "Visibility, transparency and gossip: How did the religion of some (Muslims) become the public concern of others?", *Critical Research on Religion*, 4(1), 37-56.

Araj, Bader (2008), "Harsh State Repression as a Cause of Suicide Bombing: Te Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 31, 284-303.

Bakker, Edwin (2006), "Jihadi terrorists in Europe, their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an exploratory study", *Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael*.

Benmelech, Efraim and Klor, Esteban F. (2016), "What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?", *NBER Working Paper No. 22190*, April 2016.

Beydoun, Khaled A. (2016), "Beyond the Paris Attacks: Unveiling the War Within French Counterterror Policy", *American University Law Review*, 65, 1273-1334.

Bleich, Prof Erik (2009), "State Responses to 'Muslim' Violence: A Comparison of Six West European Countries", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 35(3), 361-379.

Blomberg, Stephen B. and Hess, Gregor (2008), "From (No) Butter to Guns? Understanding the Economic Role in Transnational Terrorism". In *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*, ed. Keefer, Peter and Loyaza, Norman. (Cambrindge, MA: Cambridge University Press), 83-115.

Borum, Randy (2004), *Psychology of terrorism*, (Tampa: University of South Florida).

Bove, Vincenzo and Böhmelt, Tobias (2016) "Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?", *Journal of Politics*, 78(2), 572-588.

Boylan, Brandon M (2014), "What drives ethnic terrorist campaigns? A view at the group level of analysis", *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 1-23.

- Bradley, John R. (2006), "Iran's Ethnic Tinderbox", *The Washington Quarterly*, 30(1), 181-190.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan and Dickson, Eric S. (2007), "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization", *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(2), 364-381.
- Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole and de Wilde, Jaap (1998), *Security. A New Framework For Analysis*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.).
- Carland, Susan (2011), "Islamophobia, fear of loss of freedom, and the Muslim woman", *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 22(4), 469-473.
- Cesari, Jocelyn (2009), "The Securitisation of Islam in Europe", Research Paper No. 15, CEPS Challenge programme. Available: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/da9a/15d387b0e55b3f0b760a2736d2327ade0929.pdf>. Accessed: 21.11.2017.
- Cesari, Jocelyn (2012), "Securitization of Islam in Europe", *Die Welt des Islams*, 52, 430-449.
- Chenoweth, Erica (2013), "Terrorism and Democracy", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16, 355-378.
- Chesler, Phyllis (2010), "Ban the Burqa? The Argument in Favor", *Middle East Quarterly*, Fall 2010, 33-45.
- Choi, Seung-Whan and Luo, Shali (2013), "Economic Sanctions, Poverty, and International Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis", *International Interactions*, 39, 217-245.
- Choi, Seung-Whan and Piazza, James A. (2016), "Ethnic groups, political exclusion and domestic terrorism", *Defence and Peace Economics*, 27(1), 37-63.
- Choi, Seung-Whan and Salehyan, Idean (2013), "No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Refugees, Humanitarian Aid, and Terrorism", *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 30(1), 53-75.
- Crenshaw, Martha (1981), "The Causes of Terrorism", *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379-399.
- Croucher, Stephen M (2008), "French-Muslims and the Hijab: An Analysis of Identity and the Islamic Veil in France", *Journal of Intercultural Communications Research*, 37(3), 199-213.
- Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja (2010), "Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know", *Studies of Conflict & Terrorism*, 33(9), 797-814.
- Davis, Britton D. (2011), "Lifting the Veil: France's New Crusade", *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, 34 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 117, 1-29.
- Doyle, Natalie J. (2011), "Lessons from France: populist anxiety and veiled fears of Islam", *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 22(4), 475-489.

Edmunds, June (2012), "The 'new' barbarians: governmentality, securitization and Islam in Western Europe", *Contemporary Islam*, 6, 67-84.

Enders, Walter and Sandler, Todd (2006), *The Political Economy of Terrorism*. (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press).

Enders, Walter, Sandler, Todd and Gaibulloev, Khusrav (2011) "Domestic Versus Transnational Terrorism: Data, Decomposition, And Dynamics", *Journal of Peace Research* 48(3), 319-337.

Eyerman, Joe (1998), "Terrorism and democratic states: Soft targets or accessible systems", *International Interactions*, 24(2), 151-170.

Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David D. (2003), "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War", *The American Political Science Review*, 97(1), 75-90.

Ferracioli, Luara (2013), "Challenging the Burqa Ban", *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 34(1), 89-101.

Findley, Michael G. and Young, Joseph K. (2011), "Terrorism, Democracy, And Credible Commitments", *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(2), 357-378.

Fox, Jonathan and Akbaba, Yasemin (2015), "Securitization of Islam and religious discrimination: Religious minorities in Western democracies, 1990-2008", *Comparative European Politics*, 13, 175-197.

Freedman, Jane (2007), "Women, Islam and rights in Europe: beyond a universalist/culturalist dichotomy", *Review of International Studies*, 33, 29-44.

Fromkin, David (1975), "The Strategy of Terrorism", *Foreign Affairs*, 53(4), 683-698.

Fujii, Lee Ann (2008) "The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide", *Security Studies*, 17 (3), pp. 568-597.

Garcia, Blake E. and Geva, Nehemia (2016), "Security Versus Liberty in the Context of Counterterrorism: An Experimental Approach", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28, 30-48.

Gill, Paul, Piazza, James A. and Horgan, John (2016), "Counterterrorism Killings and Provisional IRA Bombings, 1970-1998", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(3), 473-496.

Gurr, Ted R. (1970), *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Halperin, Sandra and Heath, Oliver (2012), *Political Research. Methods and Practical Skills*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Hegghammer, Thomas (2012), "The recruiter's dilemma: Signalling and rebel recruitment tactics", *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(1), 3-16.

Hoffman, Bruce (1998), *Inside Terrorism* (London: Victor Gollancz).

- Honicker, Nancy (2014), "The "Headscarf Affairs": French Universalism Put to the Test", *Journal of Research in Gender Studies*, 4(1), 271-279.
- Horgan, John (2003), "The search for the terrorist personality", in *Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences*, ed. Silke, Andrew, (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.), 1-27.
- Horowitz, Michael C. (2015), "The Rise and Spread of Suicide Bombing", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 18, 69-84.
- Howard, Erica (2012), "Banning Islamic veils: Is gender equality a valid argument?", *International Journal of Discrimination and the Law*, 12(3), 147-165.
- Idriss, Mohammad M. (2016), "Criminalisation of the Burqa in the UK", *The Journal of Criminal Law*, 80(2), 124-137.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. and Kocher. Mathew A. (2007), "How "Free" is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem", *World Politics*, 59(2), 177-216.
- Khosrokhavar, Farhad (2005), *Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs*, translated by Macey, David, (London: Pluto Press).
- Killian, Caitlin (2003), "The Other Side of the Veil: North African Women in France Respond to the Headscarf Affair", *Gender and Society*, 17(4), 567-590.
- Klausen, Jytte (2010), "Counterterrorism and the Integration of Islam in Europe", *Revista de Stiinte Politice*, 25, 86-93.
- Kydd, Andrew H. and Walter, Barbara F. (2006), "The Strategies of Terrorism", *International Security*, 31(1), 49-80.
- Lake, David A. (2002), "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century", *Dialogue IO*, 1(1), 15-29.
- Læegaard, Sune (2015), "Burqa Ban, Freedom of Religion and 'Living Together'", *Human Rights Review* 16, 203-219.
- Lain, Sarah (2016), "Strategies for Countering Terrorism and Extremism in Central Asia", *Asian Affairs*, 47(3), 386-405.
- Laurence, Jonathan and Goodliffe, Gabriel (2013), "The French debate on National Identity and the Sarkozy Presidency: A Retrospective", *The International Spectator*, 48(1), 34-47.
- Leiken, Robert S. and Brooke, Steven (2006) "The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration", *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18(4), 503-521.
- Li, Quan (2005) "Does democracy promote or reduce transnational terrorist incidents?", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2), pp. 278-297.

- Lichbach, Mark I (1987), "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 31(2), 266-297.
- Lyall, Jason (2009), "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(3), 331-362.
- Madu, Ifeanyi V. (2015), "The Burqa Ban in France and Its Potential Implications on Islamic Terrorism", *Walden University ScholarWorks*, 1-172.
- Maillard, Dominique (2005), "The Muslims in France and French Model Integration", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 16(1), 62-78.
- Malet, David (2015), "Foreign Fighter Mobilization and Persistence in a Global Context", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 0, 1-20.
- Mavelli, Luca (2013), "Between Normalisation and Exception: The Securitisation of Islam and the Construction of the Secular Subject", *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 41(2), 159-181.
- McCauley, Clark and Moskaleiko, Sophia (2008), "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 20(3), 415-433.
- Milton, Daniel, Spencer, Megan and Findley, Michael (2013) "Radicalism of the Hopeless: Refugee Flows and Transnational Terrorism", *International Interactions*, 39(5), 621-645.
- Nanwani, Shaira (2011), "The Burqa Ban: An Unreasonable Limitation on Religious Freedom or A Justifiable Restriction+", *Emory International Law Review*, 25 *Emory Int'l L- Rev.* 1431, 1-55.
- Neuman, Peter and Rogers, M.B. (2007), "Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe", *ICSR, King's College London*.
- Oberschall, Anthony (2004), "Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory", *Sociological Theory*, 22(1), 26-37.
- Parvex, Z. F. (2011), "Debating the Burqa in France: the Antipolitics of Islamic Revival", *Qual Sociol*, 34, 287-312.
- Piazza, James A. (2008), "Incubators of terror: Do failed states and failing states promote transnational terrorism?", *International Studies Quarterly*, 52(3), 469-488.
- Piazza, James A. (2011), "Poverty, minority economic discrimination and domestic terrorism", *Journal of Peace Research*, 48(3), 339-353.
- Piazza, James A. (2012), "Types of Minority Discrimination and Terrorism", *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 29(5), 521-546.
- Piazza, James A. (2017), "Repression and Terrorism: A Cross-National Empirical Analysis of Types of Repression and Domestic Terrorism", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(1), 102-118.

Pratt, Douglas (2015), "Islamophobia as Reactive Co-Radicalization", *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 26(2), 205-218.

Rosendorf, B. P. and Sandler, Todd (2004), "Too Much of a Good Thing? The Proactive Response Dilemma", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(5), 657- 671.

Rosendorf, B. P. and Sandler, Todd (2010), "Suicide Terrorism and the Backlash Effect", *Defence and Peace Economics*, 21(5-6), 443-457.

Ross, Jeffrey I. (1993), "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model", *Journal of Peace Research*, 30(3), 317-329.

Roy, Olivier (2007), "Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation in Europe", in *European Islam – Challenges for Society and Public Policy*, ed. Amghar, Samir, Boubekour and Emerson, Michael (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies), 52-60.

Sageman, Marc (2004), *Understanding Terror Networks*, (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia).

Sageman, Marc (2008), *Leaderless Jihad*, (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia).

Scott, Joan W. (2007), *The Politics of the Veil*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Shor, Eran, Baccini, Leonardo, Tsai, Chi-Ting, Lin, Tai-Ho and Chen, Titus C. (2017), "Counterterrorist Legislation and Respect for Civil Liberties: An Inevitable Collision?", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 1-26.

Stern, Jessica (2016), "Radicalization to Extremism and Mobilization to Violence: What Have We Learned and What Can We Do about It?", *ANNALS, AAPSS*, November 2016, 102-117.

Thornton, Thomas P. (1964), "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation", in *Internal War: Problems and Approached*, ed. Eckstein, Harry, (London: Free Press of Glencoe).

Tilly, Charles (2003), *The Politics of Collective Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Tilly, Charles (2004), "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists", *Sociological Theory*, 22(1), 5-13.

Turner, Bryan S. (2007), "The Enclave Society: Towards a Sociology of Immobility", *European Journal of Social Theory*, 10(2), 287-303.

Van De Voorde, Cecile (2005), "Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)", *Policy Practice and Research*, 6(2), 181-199.

Varshney, Ashutosh (2001) "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond", *World Politics* 53 (3), pp. 362-398.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2005), "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(4), 598-624.

Whitaker, David J. (2001), *The Terrorism Reader*, (New York: Routledge).

Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2004), "Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory", in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).

Wiles, Ellen (2007), "Headscarves Human Rights, and Harmonious Multicultural Society: Implications of the French Ban for Interpretations of Equality", *Law & Society Review*, 41(3), 699-735.

Wilson, Matthew C. and Piazza, James A. (2013), "Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks", *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4), 941-955.

Woodworth, Paddy (2001), "Why do they kill? The Basque conflict in Spain", *World Policy Journal*, 18(1), 1-12.

Yasmeen, Samina (2013), "Australia and the burqa and niqab debate: the society, the state and cautious activism", *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 25(3), 251-264.

### Legal Sources

LOI n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public, NOR: JUSX1011390L. Available: <<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911670&categorieLien=id>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

ECHR 241 (2017), Press Release, "Ban on wearing face covering in public in Belgium did not violate Convention rights". European Court of Human Rights. Available: <[http://unia.be/files/Judgment\\_Belcacemi\\_and\\_Oussar\\_v.\\_Belgium\\_-\\_ban\\_on\\_wearing\\_face\\_covering\\_in\\_public\\_areas\\_\(Law\\_of\\_1\\_June\\_2011\).pdf](http://unia.be/files/Judgment_Belcacemi_and_Oussar_v._Belgium_-_ban_on_wearing_face_covering_in_public_areas_(Law_of_1_June_2011).pdf)>. Accessed: 21.11.2017.

ECHR 2014, S.A.S. vs. France no. 43835/11, "Case of S.A.S. v. France", Judgement. 1.7.2014. European Court of Human Rights. Available: <[https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":\["001-145466"\]}](https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{)>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Global Legal Monitor 18.10.2010, "France: Law Prohibiting the Wearing of Clothing Concealing One's Face in Public Spaces Found Constitutional". Available: <<http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/france-law-prohibiting-the-wearing-of-clothing-concealing-ones-face-in-public-spaces-found-constitutional/>>. Accessed: 21.11.2017.

## Reports and Additional Research Material

Amnesty International 2012, “Choice and Prejudice. Discrimination against Muslims in Europe”, Amnesty International. Available: <

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR01/001/2012/en/>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Amnesty International 26.9.2017, Marco Perolini, “France’s permanent state of emergency”.

Available: < <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/a-permanent-state-of-emergency-in-france/>>. Accessed: 19.11.2017.

CCIF Rapport 2017, Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France. Available: <

<http://www.islamophobie.net/rapport-2017/>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Change Institute (2008), “Studies into violent radicalisation; Lot 2. The beliefs ideologies and narratives”, a study carried out by the Change Institute for the European Commission.

Available: < [https://ec.europa.eu/home-](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_ideology_and_narrative_en.pdf)

[affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/doc\\_centre/terrorism/docs/ec\\_radicalisation\\_study\\_on\\_ideology\\_and\\_narrative\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_ideology_and_narrative_en.pdf)>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Clarion Project 10.9.2014, “Islamic State’s (ISIS, ISIL) Horrific Magazine”. Available: <

<https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Counter Extremism Project 2017, “France: Extremism & Counter-Extremism”, Report.

Available: < <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/france>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, 7/2017, “France”. United States Departments of State Publication, Bureau of Counterterrorism. Available: <

<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

EPP 3/2017, “For a cohesive society: countering Islamic extremism”, European People’s Part,

EPP Congress – Malta 29-30.3.2017. Available: < [http://www.epp.eu/files/uploads/2017/04/1-](http://www.epp.eu/files/uploads/2017/04/1-EPP-Resolution-1.pdf)

[EPP-Resolution-1.pdf](http://www.epp.eu/files/uploads/2017/04/1-EPP-Resolution-1.pdf)>. Accessed: 21.11.2017.

France in the US 13.5.2016, “Manuel Valls announces new measures against radicalization”.

Available: <https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article5493>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Human Rights Watch 7/2008, “Preempting Justice. Counterterrorism Laws and Procedures in

France”. Available: < [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/france0708\\_1.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/france0708_1.pdf)>.

Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Human Rights Watch 3.2.2016, “France: Abuses Under State of Emergency. Halt Warrantless

Search and House Arrest”. Available: < <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/03/france-abuses-under-state-emergency>>. Accessed: 19.11.2017.

The Open Society Report (2013), “After the Ban: The Experiences of 35 Women of the Full-Face Veil in France”, Research Report. September 2013. Available: <

<https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/after-the-ban-experience-full-face-veil-france-20140210.pdf>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Oxford Dictionaries, “Islamophobia”. Available: < <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/islamophobia>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Pew Research Center 1.8.2017, “Globally, People Point to ISIS and Climate Change as Leading Security Threats”. Available: < <http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/01/globally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leading-security-threats/#interactive>>. Accessed: 27.10.2017.

The Soufan Group (2015), “Foreign Fighters. An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq”. Available: < [http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG\\_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf](http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf)>. Accessed: 22.11.2017

TE-SAT 2017, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Europol. Available: < Europol’s European Union Terrorism Situation and Trends Reports>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

TE-SAT 2007-2017, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Europol portal displaying reports for each year. Available: < <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-2>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Van Gulik, Gauri, 14.3.2009, Human Rights Watch, “Headscarves: The Wrong Battle”. Available: < <https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/03/14/headscarves-wrong-battle>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

### Propaganda Material

Dabiq Magazine Issue 13, 19.1.2016, Islamic State magazine. Available: <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/the-islamic-state-e2809cdacc84b1q-magazine-13e280b3.pdf>. Accessed: 15.11.2017.

Dabiq Magazine Issue 15, 31.7.2016, Islamic State magazine. Available: < <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/the-islamic-state-e2809cdacc84b1q-magazine-1522.pdf>>. Accessed: 15.11.2017.

Dar al-Islam Magazine Issue 2, 11.2.2015, Islamic State’s magazine. Available: < <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/the-islamic-state-22dc481r-al-isl481m-magazine-222.pdf>>. Accessed: 15.11.2017.

Dar al-Islam Magazine Issue 7, 30.11.2015, Islamic State’s magazine. Available: < <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/dc481r-al-isl481m-magazine-7.pdf>>. Accessed: 15.11.2017.

Dar al-Islam Magazine Issue 8, 6.2.2016, Islamic State’s magazine. Available: < <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/dacc84r-al-islacc84m-magazine-8.pdf>>. Accessed: 15.11.2017.

Dar al-Islam Magazine Issue 9, 26.4.2016, Islamic State’s magazine. Available: < <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/dacc84r-al-islacc84m-magazine-9.pdf>>. Accessed: 15.11.2017.

Dar al-Islam Magazine Issue 10, 20.8.2016, Islamic State's magazine. Available: < <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/dacc84r-al-islacc84m-magazine-10.pdf>>.

Inspire Magazine Issue 1, 30.6.2010, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula's al-Malahim Media. Available: <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/aqap-inspire-magazine-volume-1-uncorrupted.pdf>. Accessed: 15.11.2017.

Inspire Magazine Issue 2, 11.10.2010, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula's al-Malahim Media. Available: < <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/inspire-magazine-2.pdf>>. Accessed: 15.11.2017.

Inspire Magazine Issue 4, 16.1.2011, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula's al-Malahim Media. Available: <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/inspire-magazine-4.pdf>. Accessed: 15.11.2017.

Inspire Magazine Issue 5, 29.3.2011, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula's al-Malahim Media. Available:< <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/inspire-magazine-5.pdf>>. Accessed: 15.11.2017.

Inspire Magazine Issue 6, Summer 2011, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula's al-Malahim Media. Available: < <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/inspire-magazine-6.pdf>>. Accessed: 15.11.2017.

Inspire Magazine Issue 10, 1.3.2013, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula's al-Malahim Media. Available: <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/inspire-magazine-issue-10.pdf> . Accessed: 15.11.2017.

Rumiyah Issue 5, 6.1.2017, Islamic State's magazine. Available: <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/rome-magazine-5.pdf>. Accessed: 15.11.2017.

### Online News Sources

Al Jazeera 1.4.2017, "China Uighurs: Ban on long beards, veils in Xinjiang". Available: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/china-uighurs-ban-long-beards-veils-xinjiang-170401050336713.html>. Accessed: 8.10.2017.

BBC 1.9.2016, "French resorts lift burkini bans after court ruling". Available: < <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37243442>>. Accessed: 8.10.2017.

BBC Monitoring 4.10.2016, "Dabiq: Why is Syrian town so important for IS?". Available: < <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30083303>>. Accessed: 18.11.2017.

BBC 6.12.2016, "Angela Merkel endorses burka ban 'wherever legally possible'". Available: < <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38226081>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

BBC 10.2.2017, "Trump's executive order: Who does travel ban affect?". Available: < <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38781302>>. Accessed: 19.11.2017.

Belson, Rosemary 2.10.2017, Politico, "Bavarian official calls for full-face veil ban in Germany". Available: < <http://www.politico.eu/article/germany-coalition-election-bavarian-official-calls-for-full-face-veil-ban/>>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

Blair, David 2.5.2016, The Telegraph, "Why West Africa's Muslim-majority states are banning the burqa". Available: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/02/west-african-states-with-181-million-muslims-support-banning-the/>. Accessed: 8.10.2017.

Chase, Jefferson 22.9.2017, Deutsche Welle, "German Bundesrat approved 'burqa ban' for drivers, beefs up road-race sanctions". Available: <<http://www.dw.com/en/german-bundesrat-approves-burqa-ban-for-drivers-beefs-up-road-race-sanctions/a-40642060>>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

Chrisfis, Angélique 13.4.2016, The Guardian, "French PM calls for a ban on Islamic headscarves at universities". Available: < <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/13/french-pm-ban-islamic-headscarves-universities-manuel-valls>>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

The Economist 11.2.2016, "The Veil in west Africa. Banning the burqa". Available: <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21692902-why-more-countries-are-outlawing-full-face-veil-banning-burqa>. Accessed: 8.10.2017.

The Guardian 29.11.2016, "Dutch parliament paves way for approval of partial Islamic veil ban". Available: < <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/29/dutch-parliament-paves-way-for-approval-of-limited-ban-on-islamic-veils>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

The Guardian 22.2.2017, "Turkey lifts military ban on Islamic headscarf". Available: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/22/turkey-lifts-military-ban-on-islamic-headscarf>. Accessed: 8.10.2017.

The Guardian 16.8.2017, "Women suicide bombers kill 27 in north-east Nigeria". Available: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/16/suicide-bombers-kill-dozens-north-east-nigeria>. Accessed: 8.10.2017.

Huckerby, Jayne 24.08.2016, Time, "France's Burqini Bans Put Muslim Women in Danger". Available: <http://time.com/4463743/frances-burkini-bans/>

Karnitschnig, Matthew 12.6.2016, Politico, "Angela Merkel makes her pitch, calls for burqa ban". Available: < <https://www.politico.eu/article/cdu-party-conference-angela-merkel-speech-makes-her-pitch-calls-for-burqa-ban/>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Kauhanen, Anna-Liisa 17.9.2017, Helsingin Sanomat, "Saksan äärioikeisto päivitti rasismin tälle vuosikymmenelle – 'Nyt sanotaan asioita, joille ei ole ollut keskustelussa tilaa sitten natsi-Saksan' ". Available: < <https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000005371191.html>>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

King, Esther 31.1.2017, Politico, “Austria bans the burqa”. Available: < <http://www.politico.eu/article/austria-bans-the-burqa/>>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

Krasimirov, Angel 30.9.2017, Reuters, “Bulgaria bans full-face veils in public places”. Available: < <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-religion-burqa-bulgaria/bulgaria-bans-full-face-veils-in-public-places-idUSKCN1201FV?il=0>>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

Le Monde 13.8.2016, “Interdiction des burkinis: la justice conforte l’arrêté de la mairie de Cannes”. Available: < [http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/08/13/le-tribunal-administratif-valide-l-arrete-municipal-bannissant-le-burkini-a-cannes\\_4982397\\_3224.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/08/13/le-tribunal-administratif-valide-l-arrete-municipal-bannissant-le-burkini-a-cannes_4982397_3224.html)>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Malik, Shiv 20.11.2014, The Guardian, “French Isis fighters filmed burning passports and calling for terror at home”. Available: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/20/french-isis-fighters-filmed-burning-passports-calling-for-terror>. Accessed: 23.10.2017.

McKay, Hollie 4.6.2017, Fox News, “London terror attack: British officials eye burka ban and stripping citizenship”. Available: < <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/06/04/london-terror-attack-british-officials-eye-burka-bans-and-stripping-citizenship.html>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Murphy, Katharine 17.8.2017, The Guardian, “Pauline Hanson wears burqa in Australian Senate while calling for a ban”. Available: < <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/aug/17/pauline-hanson-wears-burqa-in-australian-senate-while-calling-for-ban>>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

Nianias, Helen 1.10.2017, The Telegraph, “Women forced to remove the veil on day one of Austrian burqa ban”. Available: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/01/austrian-burqa-ban-comes-force/>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

Pasha-Robinson, Lucy 1.8.2017, Independent, “Norwegian anti-immigrant group mistakes empty bus seats for women wearing burqas”. Available: <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/anti-immigrant-fedrelandet-viktigst-norway-empty-bus-seats-muslim-women-burqas-a7871941.html>>. Accessed: 8.10.2017.

Petzinger, Jill 1.9.2017, Quartz, “Germany’s far-right party hired an ad agency that worked on the Trump campaign”. Available: < <https://qz.com/1067764/germanys-far-right-afd-party-hires-harris-media-an-ad-agency-that-worked-for-the-trump-campaign/>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Reuters 12.6.2017, “Norway proposes ban on full-face veils in schools”. Available: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-religion-burqa-norway/norway-proposes-ban-on-full-face-veils-in-schools-idUSKBN1930WY>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

Reuters 15.9.2017, Skynews, “Switzerland to vote on burqa ban”. Available: <http://www.skynews.com.au/news/world/europe/2017/09/15/switzerland-to-vote-on-burqa-ban.html>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

Reuters 6.10.2017, New York Post, “Denmark could be the next to ban burqas and niqabs in public”. Available: <http://nypost.com/2017/10/06/denmark-could-be-the-next-to-ban-burqas-and-niqabs-in-public/>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

Rothwell, James and Pigaglio, Remy 12.1.2017, The Telegraph, “Morocco ‘bans sale and production’ of the burka”. Available: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/12/morocco-bans-sale-production-burka/>. Accessed: 8.10.2017.

Stern, Jessica 23.3.2016, Boston Globe, “ISIS targets ‘gray zone’ of moderate Islam”. Available: < <https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/03/23/isis-targets-grayzone-moderate-islam/p9Uiv35DEnHSt7Fzk9SL1K/story.html>>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Walsh, Alistair 28.4.2017, Deutsche Welle, “Bundestag bans face veils for civil servant amid security measures”. Available: < <http://www.dw.com/en/bundestag-bans-face-veils-for-civil-servants-amid-security-measures/a-38619204>>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

Wicki, Florian 9.3.2017, Politico, “Switzerland: No burqa ban (for now)”. Available: <http://www.politico.eu/article/switzerland-no-burqa-ban-for-now/>. Accessed: 7.10.2017.

Williams, Martin 27.4.2017, Channel4, “In the burqa really a terror threat?”. Available: < <https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/is-the-burqa-really-a-terror-threat>>, Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Vinocur, Nicholas 31.10.2017, Politico, “New French anti-terror law to replace 2-year state of emergency”. Available: <https://www.politico.eu/article/new-french-anti-terror-law-to-replace-2-year-state-of-emergency/>. Accessed: 22.11.2017.

Winer, Stuart 24.8.2016, Times of Israel, “Woman on French beach ordered to remove burkini”- Available: < <https://www.timesofisrael.com/woman-on-french-beach-ordered-to-remove-burkini/>>. Accessed: 8.10.2017.