University of Tampere
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SECURING ENERGY, THREATENING LIVES

An interpretative analysis of the energy security concept through the "logic" of exceptionalism

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VEIKKO MÄKELÄ: "Securing energy, threatening lives. An interpretative analysis of the energy security concept through the "logic" of exceptionalism."

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In this thesis, I will study the production of the concept of *energy security* through what I have named as the "logic" of exceptionalism theoretical approach. The purpose of my study is to problematize the naturalised energy security conceptualisation, which orders energy security policies and research. I will argue that rather than being something that we know, energy security has been produced in a historical context as a conceptual way to protect the interests of energy consuming states, particularly the United States, which simultaneously excludes not only millions of people outside the modern energy security network by naming them energy "poor", but also depoliticises their insecurities, which the aims for modern energy security produce.

The thesis leaves from the assumption that energy security scholars or politicians have not truly debated on the security or energy aspects of energy security, which has made the concept static. Basing my thesis on the critical energy security assessment of Felix Ciuta, I have built my theoretical framework, the "logic" of exceptionalism, on the security understanding of Critical Security Studies. Furthermore, the "logic" of exceptionalism is defined by a critical application of state of exception literature, particularly the thoughts of Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben.

The "logic" of exceptionalism, as a theoretical framework, focuses on how events have been made exceptional to justify political decisions and practices that enforce particular order and conceptualisation of a social issue, in this case energy security. The "logic" of exceptionalism approach studies this through three processes: securitisation, normalisation and depoliticisation. The theoretical framework is supported by constructive conceptual analysis, which emphasises the importance of studying the context of concepts, rather than seeing them as they supposedly are. The data of the study will consist of academic literature on the conceptual and social history of energy security, and case study material on Xayaburi dam in Lao People's Democratic Republic.

The analysis of the energy security history shows that the contemporary energy security understanding has been based on two principles: the maintenance of the sovereignty of the energy consuming states and upholding modernisation, continuous economic development and consumerism. These normative principles were securitised, normalised and depoliticised in the 1970s, when the oil crisis and the competing energy security order of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) threatened the unwritten national (energy) security order of the developed energy consumer states. As the security of supply was institutionalised, the built global energy order excluded both the energy producers and the people that were later named the energy "poor". This normalised energy security conceptualisation not only guides the policy-making and actions of states, but it also exclude the energy poor, who are not seen part of the modern energy security. Particularly the Xayaburi dam case study shows that the energy poor have been subjugated to severe insecurity, as they have been expulsed due to the assumed energy security that the dam construction will bring to Southeast Asia, especially to Thailand.

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Tutkimukseni käsittelee energiaturvallisuuden käsitteen poliittista tuottamista tarkasteltuna poikkeuksellisuuden "logiikan” teorian kautta. Tutkin, miten energiaturvallisuus rakentuu käsitteeksi, joka määrittää energiaturvallisuuspolitiikkaa ja -tutkimusta normaalina ja yleisesti tunnettuna asiana sen sijaan, että käsite ymmärrettäisiin sen historiallisen kontekstin kautta. Kun energiaturvallisuus sijoitetaan sen historialliseen kontekstiin ja puretaan ajatus käsitteen normaalisuudesta, voidaan nähdä, että energiaturvallisuus on pitkälti rakentunut energiankuluttajien, erityisesti Yhdysvaltojen, energiaturvallisuuspyrkimyksille. Samanaikaisesti miljoonat ihmiset jäävät energiaturvallisuuden tuottaman turvallisuuden ulkopuolelle, jossa heidät nimetään ”energiaköyhiksi”, ja heidän turvattomuutensa epäpolitisoidaan ja unohdetaan.

Lähden tutkimuksessani siitä oletuksesta, että energiaturvallisuudesta on tullut jäykkä, jopa itsestään selvä käsite, sillä energiaturvallisuustutkijat ja käsitettä käyttävät poliitikot eivät ole nähneet tarvetta problematisoida energiaturvallisuuden turvallisuusulottavuutta. Ainoastaan harvat tutkijat, kuten Felix Ciuta, ovat tutkineet kriittisesti, mitä energiaturvallisuus oikeastaan tarkoittaa. Olen rakentanut tutkimukseni teoreettisen viitekehyksen Ciutan kritiikin pohjalta kriittisen turvallisuustutkimuksen ja poikkeustilakirjallisuuden, erityisesti Carl Schmittin ja Giorgio Agambenin, varaan.

Rakentamani teoreettinen viitekehys, jonka olen nimennyt poikkeuksellisuuden ”logiikaksi”, pureutuu erityisesti siihen, miten historialliset tapahtumat nimetään poikkeuksellisiksi, jotta niiden avulla voidaan oikeuttaa poliittisia päätöksiä ja toimia, ja vahvistaa haluttua sosiaalista järjestystä. Poikkeuksellisuuden ”logiikka” perustuu kolmelle prosessille, jotka ovat läsnä poikkeustilanteen rakentamisessa: turvallistaminen, normalisointi ja epäpolitisointi. Tutkimuksen metodisena viitekehyksenä toimii konstruktivistinen käsiteanalyysi. Tutkimuksen aineisto jakautuu kahteen osaan: akateemiseen tutkimuskirjallisuuteen, joka käsittelee energiaturvallisuuden historiaa ja tapaustutkimusmateriaaliin, jonka avulla sovellan löydöksiäni Xayaburin patoprojektin energiaturvallisuusulottuvuuksiin Laosissa, Kaakkois-Aasiassa.

Analyysini osoittaa, että energiaturvallisuuden käsite on rakentunut kahdelle periaatteelle: energian kuluttajavaltioiden suvereniteetin ylläpitämiselle ja jatkuvan taloudellisen kehityksen, modernisaation ja kulutuksen edistämiselle. Nämä periaatteet olivat pitkään kirjoittamattomia normeja, kunnes 1970-luvun öljykriisi ja Lähi-idän öljyntuottajamaiden järjestö OPEC haastoivat ne, mikä johti kriisin turvallistamiseen, kirjoittamattomien sääntöjen normalisointiin ja niiden epäpolitisointiin. Normalisoitu energiaturvallisuus jätti ulkopuolelleen sekä energiantuottajien että energiaköyhien turvallisuuden ja epäpolitisoi mahdollisuuden, että energiaturvallisuus voisi tuottaa energiaköyhille turvattomuutta. Tämä energiaturvallisuuden tuottama turvattomuus on läsnä Xayaburin padon ympäristössä, jossa energiaköyhiä karkotetaan ja siirretään pois perinteisiltä elinalueiltaan kuluttajien ja valtioiden, erityisesti Thaimaan, oletetun energiaturvallisuuden tieltä.

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1. Introduction

Energy and security are some of the basic instruments of human life that transcend human activity in many levels. On one hand we need *energy* to do basic mental work - to think, to be able to work physically, to be able produce basic instruments of life in modern society, like food processing and creating electricity, and to use (what we see as) basic modern commodities, for instance the computer or television. Energy can also be understood as (less or more energy intensive) resources: wood, oil, gas, wind or water. These resources, often categorised to renewable and non-renewable energy, have been historically important in guaranteeing societal and economic development, in enabling warfare and, if interpreted widely, in allowing life itself.[1] On the other hand, we are also dependent on basic human need for *security* both on the societal level, where functioning state institutions (should) protect people from external threats and internal disorder, and on the individual level, comprising of (in its most primitive form) security from violence or bodily harm. These basic needs have been in place from the early days of human action, when individuals have started to form communities and communities have slowly developed into walled societies.[2]

As human societies have transformed from the ancient city-states and agrarian societies to industrial economies and sovereign states, which have been traditionally distinguished by their boundaries and population, the need for energy and security have also changed - and increased. Particularly the age of modernity and the simultaneous economical, industrial and military development have emphasised the significance of energy intensive materials like coal, oil/petroleum and natural gas. The constant development and the usage of new technologies has made it possible to take advantage of renewable resources such as hydro-, wind and solar power to produce defined energy for the masses. The development of the energy intensive sovereign-state has also expedited the resource excavations from deep within the Earth's crust, from major oceans and in the future most likely even from the outer space.[3] In this context, it is justifiable to claim that humans have never had such an array of available energy (re)sources - and we have never been so dependent on them.

Dependency on energy resources has also created new security concerns. State leaders, academics, economists, military officers and officials have been anxious about the sufficiency of energy

[1] Ciuta 2010.
[2] McCrie 2006.
[3] Anderson 3.6.2015; Channel News Asia 1.8.2015; Ryall 12.5.2015.

resources, in particular the possibility of running out or peaking of oil.[4] The possibility of resource depletion has enforced the narratives of future resource wars and using energy resources as political weapons for extortion.[5] Furthermore, the construction of modern energy networks have created the demand to protect the modern energy channels from disruptions, from economic shocks due to fluctuating energy prices, from technical errors in power plants, from social instability or from antagonistic events, which could cause severe damage both to the energy network and to the energy independence of the states.[6] The necessity of theorising, discussing and protecting societies against energy related security concerns has required a shared understanding of these matters - an incentive for the concept of *energy security.*

The institutionalisation of energy security as a policy discourse and academic concept has further constructed its meaning. Even though energy security scholars mostly recognise that energy security depends on the context, the concept has been commonly used to signify energy related threats to sovereign states, international society and energy consumers. Energy security scholars have often argued that all energy policies should be executed along the four "A's", namely energy *availability, accessibility, affordability and accountability*. These four "A's" imply that both states and consumers should have enough resources (to use) that are easily accessible by everyone, that they are reasonably priced and that environmental impacts of energy use are taken into consideration.[7] These principles, then, define energy policies (which some argue should be understood subjugated to broader concept of energy security[8]) and give justification to policy implementation. States generally follow these principles in their domestic and foreign energy security policies. The four "A's" have also been recognised by international institutions like the United Nations (UN), the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the World Bank.[9] Furthermore, national and global leaders constantly enforce this institutionalised conceptualisation of energy security, when they are speaking to domestic and international audiences.[10]

In spite of the institutionalisation of energy security, or perhaps exactly due to this institutionalisation, the concept, energy security practices and policies have been interpreted

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[4] In short, the peak oil narrative is about oil production rising until it reaches its peak and starts to decrease. See Bettini & Karaliotas 2013.
[5] See for example Balmaceda 2012; Humphreys 2005; Le Billon 2010.
[6] On the more comprehensive list of dangers to energy security see Johansson 2013.
[7] See chapter 5.4.1. for a broader definition of the four "A's". Other related concepts have been introduced in Sovacool 2011b.
[8] Aalto 2012, 13.
[9] IEA 2015a; UN-Energy 2015; World Bank 2015.
[10] Barroso 2014; Galluci 16.6.2014; Merkel 2015; Obama 2014.

ahistorically or left undertheorised. Energy security intellectuals and policy-makers have been accused of rarely opening up their ontologies - the reasoning why they see the world in a particular manner.[11] Furthermore, they are speaking about security and using security related language, but seem unable to understand its scope or repercussions.[12] Energy security intellectuals have produced a significant amount of literature on energy security and found up to 44 attributes associated with the global energy system[13], but they have mainly stuck to the four "A's" interpretation or its variations that have dominated the field - hence there has not been a need to problematize the security nature of energy security. Energy security and *energy insecurity*, the lack of energy security, energy resources, access to energy networks and the loss of economic welfare[14], have been mainly determined through state institutions, since the state has been seen to be both the energy security provider and the protector of the energy needs of the consumer-citizens. Strikingly, not even the so called critical approaches of security studies, whose practitioners have increasingly engaged in criticising commonly believed and institutionalised security practices within International Relations (IR), have been interested in or able to retheorise or deconstruct energy security, but have left it almost untouched.[15]

The heavy institutionalisation and the customary use of energy security on one hand and the lack of security theorisation and the minimal role of critical approaches on the other hand form a rather exceptional field of study, where energy security issues have been addressed only from a certain ontological perspective. For instance, energy security research has only recently begun to address the issue of energy poverty, which is commonly understood as "the absence of adequate, affordable, reliable, quality, safe and environmentally benign energy services"[16] mainly in developing countries, where people do not have access to modern energy services.[17] These energy services usually mean access to electricity and non-toxic cooking facilities. As the lack of sufficient energy resources has been stated an obstacle for development, the policy-makers have seen that the only way to help the "energy poor" is to include them into the modern energy service networks.[18] The

[11] Valentine 2013.
[12] Ciuta 2010.
[13] Vivoda 2010, 5260–5261.
[14] Chester 2010, 889–890.
[15] For the few critical remarks, see Ciuta 2010.
[16] UNDP 2000, 44.
[17] IEA 2015a. However, energy poverty issues have also concerned the Western states, where the questions are nevertheless different (Schuessler 2014). In fact the concept of energy poverty has originally derived from United Kingdom, where it was initially used in the 1970s (Wang, Wang, Li & Wei 2015, 308).
[18] For instance, United States' President Barack Obama launched the Power Africa Initiative in 2014 to increase the capacity of generation of energy and to improve the energy access (ONE 2015). Similarly, The UN Secretary General

work of energy security scholars has supported this view by describing a linkage between energy consumption and economic development.[19]

The problem here is not that energy poverty issues are addressed, but rather that they are addressed by assuming that improved access to modern energy services will provide people (energy) security. Assuming that energy security is initially a positive thing that should be further improved, energy security practitioners fail to see its historical context - namely the political and economic situations and the purposes it has been created for. Moreover, energy security practitioners and intellectuals have not seen it relevant to ask, what if energy security practices that are considered to create security, could actually produce insecurity? What if there are some, who fall out the scope of modern energy security framework - or worse, become victims of the energy security practices? What if, instead of some taken for granted concept, energy security is actually politically created and justified set of principles that do not benefit everyone?

1.1. Research agenda

The thought that there is something more in energy security than the institutionalised conceptualisation that meets the eye forms the basis for my research agenda. My intention is to place the dominant institutionalised understanding of energy security under question by focusing on its construction and production through its representations, policies and practices. I will argue that rather than understand energy security as something "normal" - a sin that we mostly do with predetermined concepts - it should be retheorised as a historical production that has in particular given the most influential unit of IR, the sovereign-state, a legitimisation to practice energy security as it sees fit and to use the concept to justify its selected policies. Instead of being something "normal", I claim that energy security, as it is currently understood, is a concept that has been built in exceptional political circumstances as a solution to protect the unwritten principles of energy consuming nations, particularly the US. However, as the exceptional circumstances that enabled the creation of the concept seized to exist, energy security did not, since it had been already institutionalised and normalised - made as a written rule - through political practices of powerful actors, mainly then "First world" leading states.

Ban Ki-moon has urged world's nations to help to tackle the energy poverty issue, where one fifth of the global population lacks an access to modern energy (Todorova 16.12.2012).

[19] González-Eguino 2015, 378–380; Walsh 11.10.2011.

Building my claim on the formulations of scientific literature on energy security, on the generally accepted knowledge-producers, for example scholars and institutions, and political speeches, I will try to construct the dominant history of energy security - that has been often neglected by energy security practitioners. This history I will interpret through reflexive, critical security approach that I have named the "logic" of exceptionalism, which addresses the nature and naissance of the dominant energy security threats, the exceptional nature and circumstances where energy security has been created and the often missing insecurity aspect of energy security. In my opinion, the "logic" of exceptionalism can perhaps offer a welcome interpretation of energy security that uncovers both the produced nature of energy security and that energy security does not necessarily mean security for everyone, but it can also produce insecurity. In fact, the argument that energy security might actually produce insecurity has been the inspiration for this study from the very beginning.

Keeping this research agenda in mind, I have formulated the following set of research questions to support my study:

How has the dominant approach to energy security been produced? What kind of principles, assumptions, roles and representations are internalised in the naturalised energy security conception?

Whose security are we talking about when we are using the concept of energy security? Who is included in the sphere of energy security and who is excluded? Who can act on energy security? For who does the normalised understanding of energy security produce insecurity?

It should be clarified that my intention is not to offer one-size-fits-for-all solutions, theories or methods to analyse energy security. On the contrary, I am trying to show that we should be critical of these "general solutions" or "general theories" that empower actors like states to do as they wish in energy security affairs. To support my argument of the naturalised principles and insecurity of energy security, I will introduce the case of Xayaburi dam in Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR) in South-East Asia. With this case, I intend to show that when (local) energy security is looked through critical lenses, in this case the "logic" of exceptionalism, the claimed "truth" about energy security and how it should be practiced are suddenly very different.

Being true to my reflexive methodology, which will be elaborated in the chapters to come, it should already be emphasised that the interpretations and claims built in this thesis are my productions and

therefore I am fully responsible of them. A person coming from contending ontological grounds might interpret my arguments in a wholly different way and s/he has every right to do so - as long as s/he understands that the interpretations we make are never "truer" than rivalling ones, since the "truth" is always a social construct. The strength of political or academic claims, in my opinion, does not derive from their capacity to represent the "truth", but from their ability to justify and normalise the knowledge-production they are part of. In the end, the role of accepting or denying claims lies with the audience - thus it is important that the reader will keep in mind my role in producing and shaping the contents of this thesis.

1.2. The organisation of the thesis

I have decided to organise the thesis into nine consecutive chapters. In chapter 2 I aim to introduce the contemporary energy security research, which will form the context of my study. I will introduce both the mainstream energy security approach and its variations and more critical, less written, energy security conceptualisation of Felix Ciuta (2010). Ciuta's aim to problematize the dominant way of understanding energy security without properly theorising the security aspect of it is the first attempt to build critical debate within energy security studies - an issue that I relate to. Thus, chapter 3 will deepen the discussion on critical security approaches and how they have both broadened and deepened security theories and practices. I will emphasise the reflexive nature of security, that there is no security outside our definitions, and try to politicise it by using the politics and ethics of security approach. Politics and ethics of security, rather than being a theoretical approach per se, are shared principles of most of the Critical Security Studies (CSS), which however pose important questions about the nature of security.

The reflexive security approach, which emphasises both the politics and ethics of security, will be used to construct what I have named the "logic" of exceptionalism theoretical approach in chapter 4. By problematizing the relationship between security, order and state of exception, I intend to show how the politics and ethics of security are transforming the security practices by relying on the production of state of exception. The focus is in the meaning of events, which according to the "logic" of exceptionalism are often made exceptional to justify three different processes: securitisation, naturalisation and depoliticisation. These processes are often part, when security concepts, like energy security, are detached from their historically built political context. The methodical approach, constructive conceptual analysis, of chapter 5 helps me to justify the need the need to analyse the history of energy security and it will also provide some principles that guide the analysis. Chapter 5 will also include the introduction of the data of my research.

In chapter 6, I will narrate the history of energy security concept - focusing in particular on the social context it was created in. The history will be narrated from the dominant energy security perspective by focusing in particular on global events, like the oil crises in the 1970s, which have arguable shaped the way we see energy security today. After this historical narrative has been formed, I will analyse it through my "logic" of exceptionalism in chapter 7 to show that rather than energy security being a neutral concept, it is highly political way of driving the interests of energy consuming states, specifically the US. I will also use the "logic of exceptionalism" to problematize how energy security has formed a symbiosis with state independence, modernisation and economic development discourses, which structure energy security practices and policies - and exclude the non-consumers, which can be subjected to insecurity.

The power of the "logic" of exceptionalism processes of energy security becomes even more apparent, when it is applied to the Xayaburi dam case in chapter 8. This contested dam project in Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PRD) between Lao PDR government and Thailand, is a clear example of how the energy security normalisation limits the possibilities of doing energy security policies and allows in particular Thailand to justify its energy security claims without clear reasoning. Moreover, there are clear signs of energy security produced insecurity in Xayaburi, as the people, who are not by definition included into the energy network of the state, lose their homes - and even their humanity. I will further address this problem in the concluding chapter, chapter 9, where possibilities for further studies will be presented.

2. The context of the study: the energy security "debate"

To understand the context of this thesis, I claim that it is important to delve into the concept of energy security with more precision. Even though the role of energy for security had been "known" already from the times of pre-modern history when first civilizations started to form, energy security as a concept is not actually that old, but dates academically to the 1960s–1970s. Already in the pre-modern times, energy became a security issue, since it enabled the human survival in the form of food, firewood and later materials for building walls or weaponry.[20] Energy, understood as a *resource*, needed to be protected from other societies, and as societies grew and developed, the need for energy and more intensive energy forms grew rapidly - which also increased the need for controlling those energy sources. Coal and later oil, became the foundation of modern society,

[20] McCrie 2006.

which guided many European nations to embark on foreign quests through imperialism. More and more energy intensive resources we found, and particularly the oil transformed the ability of states to develop internally and wage wars externally - fuelling two massive World Wars.[21]

Energy security scholars have nevertheless shown little interest for energy security, until energy gained a global attention during the two oil crises of 1970s. The early energy security studies were conducted in national frameworks, especially in the US, where it was in political interest to increase its energy independence - mainly cutting the dependence on foreign energy resources, oil in particular.[22] Two different albeit interrelated understandings of energy security approached from the oil era of oil crises, namely the *security of supply*[23] and the *security of demand*[24]. What differentiated these approaches was whether the focus was on energy security of the energy exporting side or on the energy production one. In principle, these approaches are the two sides of a same coin, since the threats posed by each approach are usually complementary, particularly when the unit of reference was the sovereign-state. While security of supply side was (and still is) more interested in resource availability, the affordability of the energy products and the access to those resources, security of demand side has been keen on protecting the market share, guaranteeing stable income flows for energy producers and safeguarding the continuity and sufficiency of the energy resources. Both approaches have also produced some shared threats, for example the protection of critical energy infrastructure, securing energy transports, stabilising energy markets and ensuring the continuity of energy flows.[25] However, from these two, the security of supply has been traditionally more influential of the two, both in academia and politically, since the security of supply has been in driven by big and influential consumer states, such as the US.[26]

There have also been other ways to divide energy security approaches within energy security studies: namely between the state-centric energy security models and institution-building models. The growing institutionalisation of energy from the 1970s and the impact of IR can be seen to have been the driving forces behind this division.[27] These two approaches are usually called "states and empires" approach, which is guided by political realism[28] and "markets and institutions" approach,

[21] Yergin 2006; 2011.
[22] Yergin 2011.
[23] Correljé & van der Linde 2006.
[24] Romanova 2013.
[25] Johansson 2013, 200–201.
[26] Romanova 2013.
[27] See Yergin 2011.
[28] Correljé & van der Linde 2006; Dyer & Trombetta 2013.

which has been inspired by the neoliberal institutionalism.[29] As with comparing political realism to neoliberalism, "states and empires" and "markets and institutions" do share a common belief in states as the central actors of energy security policies working in an imperfect world, where the relations between states are more or less determined by anarchy - the lack of worldly political institutions that would guide energy policies. The difference of these two approaches is rather how states deal with the imperfection: by rivalling each other and competing over the energy resources ("states and empires") or by trying to cooperate and forming institutions to strengthen the "mutually beneficial cooperation".[30] Even though the approach does not emphasise the roles of security of supply and demand, they are still deeply embedded in the approach, both in creating "states and "empires" and enabling the execution of "states and markets".

2.1. New security threats: a threat or possibility to energy security?

On one side security of supply and demand approaches and on the other "states and empires" and "institutions and markets" have despite their differences continued to emphasise the centrality of energy resources. These approaches have also maintained a central role of the state, which, despite growing institutionalisation has been seen as the main actor of energy security. Therefore, energy security was not greatly theorised outside national frameworks, until new security threats emerged to the security agenda after the demise of the Cold War. The broadening security agenda led into the creation of more complex threats, which would threaten both the states, but also vital energy systems, such as energy markets (local and global) and energy systems (like pipelines and power plants).[31] Furthermore, individual security threats, which were long subjugated to greater goals of state security, re-emerged in the form of human security. Thus, there was a requirement to include energy to human security agenda, since it was perceived that human beings need energy both as *consumers* and in alleviating poverty.[32]

This formed the basis for yet another energy security interpretation, where it was suggested that energy security could be divided to "energy security as an object" and "energy security as a subject" approaches. Rather than being rivalling approaches, the "security object - security subject" approaches built a division between the traditional view, where energy security was emphasised as exposure to security threats (security of supply and demand), and the broader energy security view,

[29] Lesage et al. 2010; Victor & Yueh 2010; Dyer & Trombetta 2013.
[30] Correljé & van der Linde 2006; Dyer & Trombetta 2013; Lesage et al. 2010.
[31] Yergin 2011.
[32] See for instance UNDP 2000.

where the possible role of energy systems in producing and enhancing threats was taken into consideration.[33] This meant that issues like environmental damage and possibilities, climate change[34], the physical and technological properties of energy[35] and energy poverty[36] (the lack of adequate, non-toxic energy) have been incorporated into mainstream energy security policies, which is often visible in the energy security policies and institutions - at least in the level of speech. For instance, Barack Obama, the current president of the US has included environmental concerns and sustainable energy solutions into his energy rhetoric, by urging on green energy projects to support common American energy security.[37]

Similarly, the recognition of the subjective side of energy security has increased urges for its institutionalisation[38] and demands to tackle energy poverty issues by making modern energy services available for all.[39] Particularly the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon has been vocal in urging states to act to reduce energy poverty in the world. Concrete action, nevertheless, has been hard to achieve, since the decision-making ability on energy security has remained within nation-states and energy has not been part of the global principles, such as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - until it was added to the agenda as the seventh Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) ("affordable and clear energy") in United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Summit, September 2015.[40] Despite it being hard to achieve, the subjective conceptualisation of energy security has enabled actors to see the impact of energy security more clearly in all levels of action (micro, macro and meso).[41]

However, the broadening of energy security to include more and more threats has not always been seen as only a positive development. Due to the growing complexity of the concept and continuously increasing indicators to measure energy security, some researchers have argued that rather than being a clearly cut concept energy security is polysemic by nature. Sovacool (2011b),

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[33] Cherp 2012; Johansson 2013.
[34] See for example Akhmat, Zaman, Shukui & Sajjad 2014; Escobar, Lora, Venturni, Yánez & Castillo 2009; Dubois King & Gulledge 2013; May 2010; Razavi 2009.
[35] See for instance Liu, Liu, Zhang, Cai & Zheng 2015; Mondal & De 2015. In fact there are several energy related scientific releases that focus mainly on the technological properties of energy. See for instance *Energy Efficiency* or *Energy Engineering*.
[36] Bhattacharyya 2013; González-Eguino 2015; UNDP 2000.
[37] Caribbean Journal 9.4.2015.
[38] Barroso 2014; Yong 2012.
[39] World Energy Council 17.10.2013.
[40] UNDP 2015.
[41] Golthau & Sovacool 2012. By meso level Golthau & Sovacool mean environmental and economic problems, for example fossil fuel depletion or the damage to ecosystems and livelihoods of human beings and communities (Golthau & Sovacool 2012, 233–234).

for instance, recognises at least 45 different approaches to energy security defined either by scholars or energy security institutions.[42] Arguably, the multiplicity of energy security dimensions, forms and approaches the concept can take in space and time, have made it slippery and extremely hard to grasp. Therefore, rather than talking about energy security as a general concept, researchers like Chester (2010) and Johansson (2013) have claimed that it should be now understood as a context specific concept, which has different meanings depending on the country or continent, professional, political and geographical background of the user, timeframe and energy source it is applied to.[43] If energy security is seen realisable on the level of states, enterprises, institutions and human beings, it will naturally take several forms, depending on whose security is emphasised. Furthermore, energy security cannot be studied without evaluating the complex web of politics and power, which it is considered to be part of, and where national goals do not always necessarily coincide with corporate or individual interests.[44]

The complexity, slipperiness and claimed polysemic nature of energy security has faced opposition from several energy security researchers, who have demanded a clearly defined concept and a return to the "old times", when energy security was a synonym for the security of supply.[45] This urge for narrowing the concept has been usually closely connected to the need for better quantification of the concept. For example, Winzer (2012) argues that the polysemic understanding of energy security created a situation, where the concept has become an umbrella term for different policy goals that can be used to argue the necessity for political solution if economic rational cannot be found.[46] For Löschel, Moslener and Rübbelke (2010) polysemy actually blurs the energy security to the extent that scholars cannot anymore tell what energy security means for different actors and therefore the manifestations of energy security cannot be properly quantified.[47] These scholars have claimed that energy security should be narrowed down to measure it more precisely (for instance to talk about the polysemy of state energy securities), to reduce the double counting of "less important" aspects of the concept and to facilitate the political use of energy security and the

[42] Sovacool 2011b, 3–6.
[43] Chester 2010, 887; 892–893; Johansson 2013, 199.
[44] Downs 2004; Balmaceda 2012; Kivinen 2012. Both Kivinen (2012) and Balmaceda (2012) are giving examples how in the case of Russian energy policy and security, companies and individuals are not always pursuing the same interests as the state, not even when building regional energy security contracts with for instance Ukraine. Downs (2004) implies similar case with China, as the state owned energy companies like Sinopec have gone global and are now as worried of their international status as Chinese national energy security.
[45] Kruyt, van Vuuren, de Vries & Groenenberg 2011; Winzer 2012.
[46] Winzer 2012, 36.
[47] Löschel, Moslener & Rübbelke 2010. Nonetheless, polysemy is not neglected when in comes to the possibility of different energy securities of state actors.

communication of authors in different fields.[48] What these "less important" aspects are I cannot tell, since they are not defined.

Despite the discussion on the broadening of energy security and the contextual understanding of energy security have most likely benefitted the contestation and debate on energy security, I argue that the debate of energy security has been mainly focusing on "what energy security is" rather than asking other important questions - for instance, why do we understand it in a specific way. Studying energy security in a "hygienic", limited contexts have not always enabled a proper comparison between the different conceptualisations of energy security that actors produce, which has allowed the scholars to create different conceptualisations of energy security without actually noticing that they are variations of specific energy security approach that emphasises particular principles. These principles, called *the four A's*, are closely tied to the history of energy security and energy policies, since it is this history that gives the four "A's" approach its justification, both in academia and in politics.

2.2. Conventional energy security: the four "A's"

The demands for scientific rigour and the acceptance of the national security language, which mostly emphasises external threats for state existence, has guided many scholars to agree on general principles for energy security. These principles can be seen as conservative set of shared understandings among energy security actors - principles that all can agree on, whether they are more prone to security of supply, states and markets or energy as a subject approach. These principles or criteria for energy security have been often used to determine, whether a state has energy security or it is energy insecure in some aspects. I am of course talking about the infamous four "A's", most commonly known as the *availability, accessibility, affordability* and *acceptability* of energy security.[49] First launched as four "A's" by the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) in 2007, the four "A's" and its variations[50] are by far the most used energy security approaches, which have stabilised their place in the energy security academia[51] and institutional use[52] despite some accusations of their narrowness and their focus on fossil energy supplies and

[48] Winzer 2012, 36.
[49] There are other approaches that overlap with the four A's. These are, for example the five S's (supply, sufficiency, surety, survivability and sustainability) and the four R's (review, reduce, replace and restrict) (Sovacool 2011b, 3–6). The focus of the four R's is more on responding to energy security problems per se, while the remaining two approaches concentrate on the conditions for energy security (Hughes 2009).
[50] Some "A's" might be occasionally emphasised over the others.
[51] Kryut et al 2009; Chester 2010; Goldthau & Sovacool 2012.
[52] APERC 2007; World Energy Council 2007.

nuclear energy.[53] The reason for the popularity of the four "A's" approach seems to be its ability to penetrate the four dimensions that energy security is traditionally believed to consists of - namely: security, economic, technological and environmental. Naturally, the categorisation of these dimensions in relation to the four A's is not as easy as one would think, since each of the four "A's" includes parts of each dimension, even though some of them might be emphasised more than the others.

First of the four "A's", *availability*, refers to the "amount of supply of given primary energy resource in terms of known reserves".[54] The reference includes both the continuity of diversified energy supplies/uninterrupted energy[55] and the reliability of the services, which provide the supplies.[56] Availability is actually the oldest of the four "A's" and it can be located all the way to the age of industrialisation and colonialism, even though it was not termed as energy security at that time, but considered part of national security and the energy independence discourses of states. The availability criterion formulated by APERC mainly focused on fossil fuels, which Hughes & Shupe (2011) have seen problematic. For them availability should include all primary energy sources, including renewables, which would broaden the understanding on the availability of energy for security purposes.[57]

The second of the four "A's", *accessibility*, mostly emphasises the economic dimension of energy security. Accessibility tends to mean "the ease with which a proven energy reserve can be relied upon to supply the market".[58] This criterion can hold several meanings from market barriers of energy forms and energy accesses of states to the access of companies, industries and *consumers* that work as the end users of energy products. Thus, accessibility has both foreign and domestic political dimensions. Some authors, like Sovacool (2011a), have also added energy poverty within the accessibility indicator and have emphasised the quality of energy services in addition to their sufficient quantity.[59] Even though there are several different subjects of energy security within the accessibility criterion, they are all, in a way or another, related to the national, regional or global energy markets.

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[53] Hughes & Shupe 2011, 356.
[54] Hughes & Shupe 2011, 357.
[55] IEA 2015b.
[56] For instance, required transport and infrastructure. See Sovacool 2011a.
[57] Hughes & Shupe 2011, 357.
[58] Hughes & Shupe 2011, 358.
[59] Sovacool 2011a, 7474.

The third of the four "A's", *affordability*, can be best interpreted in relation to the technical and economic dimensions of energy security that emphasise economic costs and technical solutions. For instance, APERC (2007) and IEA (2015a) define affordability of energy as relatively fixed fuel prices, energy price projections and infrastructure costs.[60] Put in other words, energy affordability often refers to reasonable and stable prices of energy for most of the states and consumers.[61] In addition, affordability depends on the available technological solutions and the ability of energy industries to utilise current technology for more efficient energy use. One of the most recent affordability cases has included the expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) capabilities to create affordable energy. However, the technological demands, low global energy prices and high capital costs have made this economically unprofitable for the time being.[62]

The fourth, the newest, and the most contested of the four "A's", *acceptability*, has its roots in the discussion on the broadening of energy security to cover the environmental impacts of modern energy use to the world and the environment. For APERC, acceptability refers to both environmental constrains that the use of traditional energy resources like oil and coal increasingly face and to the enhanced environmental awareness in the energy sector.[63] The acceptability criterion therefore consists of environmentally friendly energy, of alternative fuels and energy mechanisms to conventional energy solutions, of management of global warming and pollution reduction.[64] Hughes & Shupe (2011) have furthermore argued that acceptability should not only focus on the environmental regulations to the energy use of states and consumers, but also include socially and politically debated issues, such as food-to-fuel debate and the impacts of energy extraction to indigenous peoples.[65] This has, however, mostly fallen to deaf ears.

In spite of the descriptions that the "A's" of the four "A's" approach include, I think it should be clarified that the approach, and most of its variations, have subjugated consumers or environmental concerns to state action. Sovereign-states are vital in both acting on energy security policies, which includes the domestic responsibility for consumers and shared international responsibility on agreed common threats (such as pipeline security), and states being the targets of energy security. Thus, states are both objects of energy security and subjects of energy security - which means that they have the possibility to actually cause threats themselves. The four "A's" emphasis on states and

[60] APERC 2007, 35–37; IEA 2015b.
[61] Bielecki 2002; Barton, Redgwell, Ronne & Zillman 2004, 5.
[62] Hughes & Shupe 2011, 358.
[63] APERC 2007, 27–30.
[64] Kemmler & Spreng 2007; Muller-Kraenner 2007; Kleber 2009.
[65] Hughes & Shupe 2011, 359.

their abilities has been influential in conceptualising energy security, since it suits the role of a strong state combined with realist policies, where threats are born and erased - but some of the great struggles will never disappear.[66] I would claim that particularly the internal realism of the four "A's" and the clear concepts that it offers for describing the different dimensions of energy security have secured that institutions, politicians and scholars have used and embraced the concept as such or varied it to better suit their context and purposes. For instance, the Chinese president Xi Jinping has emphasised energy security as a new (domestic and international) security threat, which needs cooperation to ensure "resources security".[67] Other state leaders, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, former Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and Finnish Secretary of State Pertti Torstila, have urged to "mitigate […] dependence on external energy sources and ensure energy security"[68] and called upon "[…] creating the most transparent and functional energy markets that are possible […] to increase energy efficiency and thereby reduce energy cost"[69].

2.3. The vital energy systems as an alternative approach

Influential as it has been - the four "A's" approach has not been free from criticism. Particularly energy security scholars Aleh Cherp and Jessica Jewel have been critical of the four "A's" ability to problematize or basically theorise its connection to security studies as an academic field. Using the three very basic security questions (so called "minimal" security questions) derived from Arnold Wolfers' (1952) work[70]: (1) security for whom, (2) security for which values and (3) security from what threats [71], Cherp and Jewel have argued that the four "A's" approach cannot produce a context specific responses to energy security challenges, but operates in a rather general ground, where security problems and actors often become blurred. They identify three particular reasons, why the four "A's" approach, cannot produce research or politics that would take the basic security questions into consideration:

First, it is not clear who/what the referent object of energy security is. Initially, defining the object has been relatively easy to define, since the focus of the energy security literature has been on

[66] On realism see for instance Morgenthau 2006.
[67] Xi 2015.
[68] Vejjajiva 2009.
[69] Merkel 2015. See also Torstila 2013.
[70] Wolfers 1952 in Cherp & Jewell 2014, 416.
[71] Baldwin (1997) has added four more questions to this set that closer specifications of security should answer to. These are: (1) how much security, (2) at what costs, (3) by what means and (4) in what time period.

Western[72] oil importer countries, namely the US, United Kingdom and France. Nevertheless, due to the broadening energy security, different nations, which import, export or extract energy and furthermore use differing energy sources and carriers, have been incorporated to energy security research, which has blurred the once stable referent object. In addition, Cherp and Jewell (2014) claim, non-state actors, like private companies, environmental agencies and consumers, have been considered as the subjects of energy security, despite the state arguably producing energy security in the first place. Therefore, Cherp and Jewell have argued that the four "A's" approach does not properly address the multiplicity of actors (since it mainly focuses on the state) or, in some cases, does not define the referent object of energy security at all, which leaves unclear *for whom* energy should be affordable or acceptable. Cherp and Jewell naturally argue that there are many alternatives for the "for whom", depending of course on the referent object.[73]

Second, rather than seeing the four "A's" as "human values", Cherp and Jewell argue that they are characteristics of *energy systems*. These systems can be for example army oil supplies, renewable energy sources, energy export revenues or biofuel trading systems and they can be both the referent object that should be protected and the threat that might make societies dysfunctional. The systems, which Cherp and Jewell call *vital* energy systems extend the research beyond mere analysis of the four "A's" to include broader economical, political and social issues that the four "A's" approach acknowledges, but does not analyse the links between them at all. Since the analysis is missing, it becomes harder to answer to the question: which energy systems should be protected? For Cherp, Jewel and Riahi (2014), defining energy security as the low vulnerability of vital energy systems (that vary geographically in size and the primary resource they consist of) requires a research that is both context dependent but also not limited in functioning only in either national, regional or international levels or along their sectorial boundaries.[74]

Third and final critique that Cherp and Jewell (2011a; 2014) aim to the four "A's" approach concerns its inability to problematize the energy security threats in detail. For them, the four "A's" approach does not offer any pre-emptive means of identifying, measuring and managing the vulnerabilities of energy systems or pay any attention to the energy system resilience, since it only focuses on the *already attained energy standards*. For Cherp and Jewell, this makes the four "A's"

[72] By "Western" I mean the western part of the world, in particular Europe and North America. For the definition see Oxford English Dictionary 2015.
[73] Cherp & Jewell 2014, 417. For some suggestions what affordable or acceptable energy could mean for different objects of security, see Table 1 in Cherp & Jewell 2014, 418.
[74] Examples of these boundaries include primary energy sources, energy carriers, such as electricity, or energy end-use (Jewell, Cherp & Riahi 2014, 744).

out-dated, since they see that energy security literature has already expanded from barely analysing the causes of energy system disruptions to analysis of resilience.[75] The analysis of resilience of different vital energy systems makes it possible to develop better metrics and assessment tools for both analysis and for improving the aims of energy security policies. Rather than analysing the past, the analysis of the vulnerabilities also includes measures to improve prediction, and risk and resilience assessment to identify possible future energy scenarios.[76] Furthermore, Cherp and Jewell (2011b) argue that the production of polycentric and flexible contextual mechanisms can also lead to the much-needed reorientation of global energy security regimes and more inclusive global energy security governance.[77]

In problematizing the four "A's" approach, Cherp and Jewell (2013; 2014) in principle open the energy security research for the ideas of social constructivism, since the vital energy systems approach identifies that systems and their vulnerabilities cannot only be objective phenomena due to the definitions and prioritising that social actors give them. This implies that energy security, studied from the vital energy systems approach, also consists of subjective preferences and securitisations - the context in which the question "whose security" becomes highly relevant. Cherp and Jewell see that his should also open a way for securitisation theory to enter energy security studies, which it has already done albeit quite rarely. [78] However, Cherp and Jewell (2014) do not urge securitisation theorists to come and analyse energy security, but see it as a (profitable) possibility. I think that reason behind this might be that from the perspective of securitisation theory, it is not in any ways clear who does the securitisation act in the vital energy systems. Even though their criticism of the four "A's" is justifiable, since it shows some of the assumptions that the four "A's" approach makes, the referent object in the vital energy systems approach is strangely dehumanised. I see it somewhat puzzling to talk about subjectivity if there are no subjects to give it to - since energy systems cannot work by themselves. Assumedly, the actors here are states or state leaders that make the prioritisation, but rather than voicing it out, Cherp and Jewell leave it to the imagination of the reader.

[75] Cherp & Jewell 2011a; 2014,
[76] Cherp & Jewell 2013; 2014.
[77] Cherp & Jewell 2011b, 351.
[78] Cherp & Jewell 2013; Cherp & Jewell 2014, 418–419; Jewell & al. 2014, 744. Christou & Adamides (2013) provide one example where securitisation theory and energy security studies have been combined.

2.4. "Critical energy security": going total or banal?

Despite the broadening of the energy security agenda to encompass more (and less traditional) security threats, like the environment and social needs, and the widening of the security language to include securitisation approaches to the theoretical and methodical toolkit (even though still few in number), I argue that critical security studies have still been strangely absent from the energy security agenda. Only little theoretical attention has been given to the challenge that using the term "energy" in security language or in the ever-broadening security agenda actually brings to security conceptualisation - regardless of the demands for energy security's context specifity. It has been conventionally thought that there are no reasons for this, since energy clearly refers to material energy resources that can be harnessed for the use of states. However, as Ciuta (2010) argues energy is more than resources - it can take different forms in different contexts. Economic, environmental and social questions have impacted these contexts and as they have become part of energy security research, the connection between oil security and energy security has been broken. Energy, rather than being a clearly defined material resource, actually "affects everything, everything affects energy, and ultimately, everything is energy."[79] Christou & Adamides (2013), in spite of being negative about the prospect of separate "energy security", make a similar kind of remark of the totalising nature of energy as they claim that energy securitisations function as a multiplier impact that cannot work in one sector, but should be seen influencing other securitisation sectors: the political, the economic, the societal, the military and the environmental.[80]

The different contexts of energy security make Ciuta (2010) question the ability of the conventional energy security theories to offer a clearly defined concept that suits all cases. The uniformity of the concept should not be seen as the key of defining energy security, but energy security knowledge-producers should pay more attention to the different logics that structure the way energy security is understood. These logics can be divided into three parts: (1) the logic of war, where energy is either an instrument of war or a cause of conflict and security is about survival (political realism/strategy studies), (2) the logic of subsistence, where energy becomes a commodity or a public good that everyone needs (for different reasons) and security transforms from survival to the management of dysfunctions (neoliberal institutionalism), and (3) the logics of total energy security, where energy and security have become directly connected to human life and affect everyone and everything.[81]

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[79] Ciuta 2010, 135.
[80] Christou & Adamides 2013, 509–510. The five sectors were initially presented by the influential securitisation theorists Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde in their book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998).
[81] Ciuta 2010, 129–138.

The logics are not just about the worldly context, but they also have different methodological roots, which have not been discussed nor do they talk with each other. Environment, experiences, social interaction and social statuses naturally impact on individual perceptions on the selection of the logic - but so do subjective preferences. Thus, rather than being predetermined, the logics of energy security should be seen as political, subjective and often biased choices, where revealing the ontological assumptions behind one's work does matter.[82]

What differentiates both Ciuta (2010) as a scholar and the logics of total energy security from the other scholars/logics, in my opinion, is the reflexive ontology that enables the questioning of predetermined security problems and threats. Rather than external threats, energy becomes a security problem because of our own actions.[83] This means on the contrary of being an object of energy security measures, human beings become subjects that can act on energy security matters, construct and deconstruct security threats. Similar idea about subjective and objective energy security has been presented before, but there the subject has been defined as the energy system, not as individuals.[84] I think that the problem with the energy system being the subject is that it becomes relatively unclear who actually acts for energy security related issues. Likewise, the definition of such energy system is highly problematic, particularly the more global the system is. Naturally, I claim that it should not be stated that every subject has similar opportunities to be a subject or act on energy security matters - on the contrary, this is more than biased depending on whether one is talking about a consumer of energy or a human being labelled to suffer from a lack of energy, namely energy poverty.[85]

The extension of subjectivity outside traditional energy security actors, the agency of other actors than states alone, has created a paradoxical situation where the threat to our energy security is not necessarily some external actor, but we ourselves. In the world of totalising energy security, people are not just affected by energy security as it penetrates to the most intimate parts of their lives, but people also produce security and insecurity for instance through their consumption patterns. The world of totalising energy security does not seem so secure anymore, since actors can simultaneously be subjects, objects, threats and agents of energy security.[86] The totalising aspect of energy naturally poses a threat to the concept of security, since we cannot anymore clearly define

[82] Valentine 2013, 56–57.
[83] Ciuta 2010, 135.
[84] Johansson 2013, 202–203.
[85] This issue will be addressed with more scrutiny later in this thesis.
[86] Ciuta 2010, 135–136.

security threats, which has been the main purpose of security studies and traditional energy security literature. Actually, Ciuta (2010) himself suggests that there is a banal aspect in totalising energy security - that security becomes so used that it does not mean anything anymore.

The threat of totalising security is not new to the scholars arguing for the broadening of security or against it. Security can be seen either a positive or negative attribute: on one hand the securitisation of an issue can draw more attention to it (environment and climate change), on the other securitisation can at worst depoliticise the securitised issue, making it an area of unquestionable security measures.[87] I think that it is no doubt that there is a seed of "truth" in both interpretations - which makes the totalising security more intimidating to human lives than making it banal for the academic world. However, in the case of energy security, the idea totalising nature of energy security is not necessarily a problem if it is used for critical studying of the concept. For instance, by assuming that energy is life itself, Ciuta (2010) wants to draw attention to the weak theorisation of security within energy security research and energy politics. He claims that there has not been a true attempt to conceptualise security within energy security, since energy security has unfortunately been seen as a black box that critical security studies have been unable or unwilling to challenge. This has created a paradoxical situation, where the broadening of energy security has actually strengthened the institutionalised representation of energy security and prohibited a closer conceptual and normative inquiry - no debate on energy security is needed, since we already know what the concept entails.[88]

Ciuta's attempt to retheorise energy security will function as an inspiration to this study, despite my attempt is not so much to retheorise energy security (even though this will be, at least partly, necessarily included), but to create critical tools and analyse, why do we understand energy security in the way we do, what kind of image this produces - and (most importantly) draw attention to the possible insecurities of energy security. In the next few chapters my intention is to open up my theoretical grounds for this attempt, namely the critical security studies, the politicisation of security studies and the "logic" of exceptionalism - namely, how securitisation, depoliticisation and naturalisation of exceptional historical events create a set of normalised practises that are not and "do not need to be" questioned.

[87] Fierke 2007, 6–7.
[88] Ciuta 2010, 123–124.

3. Rejecting the rigid security concept: Critical Security Studies and the politicisation of security

The short introduction on the different approaches of energy security reveals a rather exceptional security concept. On one hand, energy security is like any other security concepts: most of the knowledge-producers (scholars and politicians) endeavour for a defined concept that has shared basic criteria, clearly defined threats and (fixed) solutions for these threats. Both the four "A's" approach and the vital energy systems construct scenarios, where the energy security objects (states or systems) need to be protected - now and in the future. In a sense this has also been the goal in many other security concepts, like human, national or environmental security: to protect against the current security threats and to escape future scenarios, where humans, states and the environment are threatened. On the other hand, energy security, as Ciuta (2010) argues, has lacked a discussion on the nature of security, in particular the critical approaches that have been present in most of the other security conceptualisations. For some reason, energy security scholars and politicians have been unwilling to problematize what security actually is, who has the role of producing security and managing it and why do we see security in a specific way. Perhaps it has been perceived that this is not needed, since energy security conceptualisations already answer to all the presented (energy) security threats.

However, at the heart of the problem lies a question, how do we know that energy security answers to all the security questions it presents, if we have not problematized its connection to other security related concepts such as insecurity. Furthermore, focusing only on the definition of threats to energy security objects actually blurs the concept even more, since the once exceptional threats become normal part of energy security policies. Some traditional security scholars might see this obvious, since threat-creation is supposed to guide policies and better prepare states to protect their energy security. In the context of energy security, this nevertheless creates a problem. While energy security knowledge-producers emphasise the contextual understanding of energy security (according to some predetermined principles), they do not however see it important to discuss about the context *where the energy security concept was created.* Contextual application of energy security only applies to geography or to different energy forms - not to historical epochs that have, critically thinking, formed and shaped the way energy security is currently understood.

Addressing this problem requires a further theorisation of the concept of security, particularly from a critical perspective, where security is not necessarily what it seems to be. By applying Critical

Security Studies (CSS), my aim is to show how security issues, rather than being rigid, are highly political and always include choices - most often from those who create security threats. My application of CSS functions as the basis of my theory-formation, the "logic" of exceptionalism, which, deriving from CSS and the literature on state of exception, forms a framework that enables a more defined analysis of the historical context of energy security and its implications.

3.1. The origins of Critical Security Studies

The Critical Security Studies project (CSS) was one of the alternative approaches to traditional IR security thinking that emerged after the demise of Cold War. Traditionally, security studies (or strategic studies) as a subfield of IR focused on the threats: the management of threats, the use of (military) force against threats, threats created by wars and alliances and threat-related issues, like international anarchy that posed a threat to the survival of the nation-state - the referent object of security. In the discipline of IR in general, the era of Cold War was determined by the possibility of an all-encompassing nuclear war, bipolarity, US-Soviet Union (USSR) rivalry and the constant "hot spot" wars that the superpowers waged for or against communism.[89] As Fierke (2007) rightly claims, the focus of this "narrow definition" of security was to emphasise the possibility of the state to use force as the means of threatening, not the protection of the people, which was left in the background.[90] The nation-state could assumedly work best in the international system ordered by the ever-present anarchy where even the global institutions could not prevent the primacy of states - mostly because the principle of sovereignty was engraved in their declarations. However, maybe because of their premises of what the world looks like, the traditional security approaches, which coined with political realism, were not able to explain why Cold War ended and why suddenly nation-states that were the producers of security, actually did not always secure their citizens anymore.[91]

The moment of weakness of the traditional security approaches, where the explanatory power of its security models was severely questioned, opened up a space for broader security discussion. These traditional models, by focusing on the military side of security could not see the looming global problems that were building up regardless of national boundaries - and without clear state-military

[89] Fierke 2007, 13.
[90] Fierke 2007, 13.
[91] Dalby 1997; Fierke 2007, 14. When reading this historical narrative, one should remember its interpretative nature. The historical divisions can sometimes oversimplify things, since some critical contributions had been done already before the Cold War ended. These have been for instance feminist and poststructural approaches. (Buzan & Hansen 2009; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015, 8–9.)

machine. For instance the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) epidemic, environmental degradation and immigration caused by civil wars, did not fit into the traditional security conceptualisation, since they were not considered security problems per se. Nevertheless, these problems that paved the way for broader and deeper understanding of security, including a move away from a state centred concept of security, which focused strictly on the military sector, to a conceptualisation of environmental, economic, societal and individual aspects of security[92].

The broadening move coincided with the urge for deepening security and the claim to add other referent objects of security alongside the state. This meant a move to included human beings, gender, societies, institutions and even the environment into the scope of security - partly without even having a connection to the state. Particularly global institutions like the UN had a role in introducing a more human-centred security conception, more commonly known as *human security*.[93] IR scholars like Kaldor (2007) have described human security as being the security of individuals and societies, rather than security of states. By combining both human rights and human development agenda, human security clearly emphasised the individual security in the face of political violence (caused by the state) and constructed an argument about the interrelatedness of different type of securities and developmental agenda. Rather than being about threats, human security was about the rights of the individuals to economically and socially full life, where their political and civil rights are respected. Human security could only be realised by legitimate political authority, which often was and is the nation-state, even though some alternative governmental systems are also possible.[94] Because the state still had a central role in human security, it has received lots of critique from other security broadeners, particularly CSS scholars.[95]

The broadening of security studies and the partial paradigm shift in IR paved the way for CSS. Initially formed in criticism of the dominant IR and strategic security studies approaches, mainly political realism, CSS scholars wanted to ask fundamental questions about the nature of security that traditional security studies approaches had largely ignored, since they had already "known" what security is.[96] Considering that security was much more than a state-centred technical model used in academia and politics to create threats, CSS approaches engaged with basic questions of security, such as: "What is security?", "How is it born?", "Whose security are we talking about?",

[92] Fierke 2007. Basically, the societal aspects of security have always been there, but have not been theorised properly until very recently (see McCrie 2006).
[93] Buzan & Hansen 2009, 187–191.
[94] Kaldor 2007, 182–187.
[95] See for instance Booth 2005.
[96] Krause & Williams 1997, 43–52.

"What constructs a security problem?", "Who uses the power to securitise?", "What does security do politically?", "Does security have any limits?", and "How does security produce insecurity?". With these questions, critical security studies aimed to show the constructiveness, production and the inbuilt logics of the "natural" security theorisations and practices, to reveal the political nature of security practices - and to problematize the methods and concepts used in traditional security studies.[97]

Even though the CSS studies cannot anymore be perhaps called "alternative approaches", since they have if not become part of the traditional mainstream security studies, then at least created a mainstream of their own. Since CSS has been grounded as one of the contemporary security studies approaches, it too had had to face critique about its nature. On one hand, critics within and outside of CSS have blamed the approach on relying too much on the target of its criticism, namely traditional approaches that despite their temporal weakening have redeemed themselves contemporary (foreign security) politics and academia due to global events like 9/11.[98] The usual debate within CSS shows the variation within the approach: on one hand, Welsh school scholars like Nunes (2012) have argued for detaching the traditional security studies link in order to develop a clear normative agenda and create practical possibilities for political change within CSS. Thus, critical security studies should take the attention from the "negative", deconstructive understanding of security to "positive", reconstructing security ideals.[99] On the other hand, poststructuralists like Dillon (1996) have wanted to get rid of the concept of security altogether, since they see it as a technical power discourse that justifies dominance (of states) over people over and over again.[100]

As the two security conceptualisations show, there is a broad variation of approaches within the CSS, which are based on different methodologies.[101] Critical security studies usually encompass approaches such as securitisation theory, feminist security studies, the Welsh school[102] and poststructural studies. Even these approaches can be further divided into sub-categories depending on the way they see the role of knowledge, researcher or the goals of their study. For instance, Pram

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[97] Nunes 2012, 347.
[98] Buzan & Hansen 2009; Fierke 2007.
[99] Nunes 2012, 348.
[100] Dillon 1996, 14–20.
[101] Jackson 2011.
[102] The Welsh school of security studies is actually confusingly sometimes called critical security studies as well. Browning & McDonald (2011, 237–238) state that critical security studies understood in narrow terms refers to the Welsh school, which questions the primacy of state security and turns the focus on achieving individual security through emancipation. For clarity I will refer to this approach as the Welsh school. For Welsh school see for instance Booth 2005; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015.

Gad & Lund Petersen (2011) recognise three different conversations on politics within securitisation studies that encompass the organisation of politics, relationship between ethics, politics and science, and the action and intentionality of politics.[103] Similar kinds of differences can be found within the other approaches.[104] Yet, I do not see the breadth of the different approaches as a problem, since similarly traditional security consists of different approaches, even though the scientific control is often stricter than within critical security studies.[105] Thus, the breadth is a problem only if one wants to enforce critical security studies as a limiting scientific category.

Rather than understanding critical security studies as a limited set of principles, I see it as more of a project, which shares some questions about the nature of security, but which includes several different ways how these questions can be answered. Already this shows that there is not necessarily one single answer to what security is, but rather this answer depends on interpretation. This is mostly because of the reflexivity of the security perception and the reflexive ontological thinking that concerns not all, but at least the most critical CSS approaches.[106] Rather than focusing on specific approaches of CSS, I have decided to problematize and discuss three issues that I see important for security theorisation - also in the case of energy security, where it has not been done. These there theoretical issues, in my opinion, open up the complexity and power of security representations and practices that are formulated to make certain policies possible. The first one is, the *reflexive security*, which opens up the ontological background of (some) CSS approaches. The second is *the politics of security*, which focuses on the political nature of security by asking the question "what security does". The third and final one is *the ethics of security*, where the role of scholarship, knowledge, methodological choices and practice in producing security are problematized.

3.2. Reflexive security

One of the distinguishing features of Critical Security Studies is the adoption of *reflexive* ontology that has both impacted on the understanding of security and its transformation. As mentioned above, critical approaches to security challenged the dominant rather rigid security conception in two ways: they argued for the broadening of security agenda and challenged the traditional security studies that had focused more on the military dimension of security to ask, what is security and how

[103] Pram Grad & Lund Petersen 2011, 315; 318–322.
[104] See for example Booth 2005.
[105] See Buzan & Hansen 2009; Krause & Williams 1997, 33–42.
[106] See for instance Jackson 2011.

should it be studied.[107] In addition, there was a third goal: to question the claim of the traditional security studies of the objective nature of the world, where researchers, external to the world, could examine it, seek patterns of social activity and transform them into general rules of how the world functions. The framework was actually bigger than the field of security studies, since the debate took place within the IR as well - often named as one of the "Great Debates" of IR. In the IR (and the security studies framework), this debate, or "paradigm war" was waged about the proper way of making social science within the discipline of IR and about knowledge-observation epistemologies, put in other words: how can we know about the world.[108] As usually, this has become part of the classic stories of the IR, where traditionalists/positivists and reflectivists battled over what Lake (2013) describes as "less on how to explain world politics and more on which set of assumptions best captured the inherent nature of humans as political animals or states as political organizations."[109]

Whatever one thinks of the "Great Debates" and their influence on the discipline, the reflectivist/reflexive approaches[110] have questioned the phenomenalism that has been internal in security studies for decades. I see that for phenomenalists, encompassing most of energy security scholars even today, the world is sort of a Legoland, where everything can be observed, touched and tasted - in other words, we can use our senses to build knowledge out of the world consisting of (Lego) blocks. Reflectivists (who Jackson (2011) categorises as "transfactualists") have noted that rather than seeing the world as solid Lego blocks, one should see that these Legos can have different *meanings* in different contexts and their naming can actually be a powerful act. Rather than seeing social things as a purely material phenomenon, reflectivists have emphasised their constructed nature - how the researcher has not actually withdrawn from the world to become a "neutral" observer", but a part of the world, where s/he participates in the construction and

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[107] Fierke 2007, 2. Like argued before, not all critical security scholars saw the broadening of security as an agenda to pursue for, since security could, at worst, swallow everything and lead into a militarisation of non-military fields (Dillon 1996; Fierke 2007, 5–6).
[108] Lake 2013, 568.
[109] Lake 2013, 568. Jackson (2011, 28–30; 2015) has also argued that IR scholars have created several unsolvable disputes, where representatives of different scientific ontologies are so strongly committed to their worldviews that criticism from the outside only makes them to reaffirm their own biased views - making IR a battle area about who is right. Similarly, Eagleton-Pierce (2011, 805) has claimed that IR has lacked "a sociology of itself."
[110] The reason I am talking about approaches is that there is neither common practice of using the term "reflexivity" nor one approach that would be "reflexive". On the contrary, "reflexivity" often parallels with "self-reflexivity", "self-reflection" or "reflection", which has become an internal problem of the approaches, since the differences between the variations of "reflexivity" are not properly explained (Jackson 2011, 158). Indeed, "reflect" can be interpreted both passively (something bouncing of the surface) and actively (thinking about - reflecting something) (Hamati-Ataya 2013, 674).

imagining of the world.[111] Rather than solely observing the Legos, the researcher should go beyond the facts to grasp the deeper processes embedded in them - thus moving into wonderland, where things can be imagined and interpreted beyond imagination. Hence, the researcher participates in the knowledge-production practice by producing the actual knowledge but also being "inside" the knowledge and influencing how it has come to exist in the form the scholar presents it.[112]

To put is to the context of energy security studies, I will use the example of oil. Not just energy security scholars, but we all seem to *know* that oil is an energy resource that is pumped from the ground, shipped into oil refinery where it can be transformed into different forms of fuel that keep the society and economy running for instance through transportation and energy provision. We have also observed that oil is black, not edible and easily flammable. The footage from the flaming Middle Eastern oil fields has helped us to observe this. Furthermore, we know that oil is a globally used product, it has a market value and it is prone to be a cause for crises. This is the image that most of us have. Yet, how do we come to know about the meaning of "oil"? How can we know that oil is not edible or that it can be used as a fuel?

For most of human beings, this question will most likely sound ridiculous, since we have observed oil (the not-so-solid "Lego block") for decades and decades, as long as the substance has been found. Understood through the knowledge-observation paradigm, it is more that clear that by seeing things, humans try, fail, try again and learn by doing. There is clearly a sense in this, but it does not answer to the questions "why do we try" or "why should we learn by doing". Where does this incentive come from? Human nature? Or could it be about the social context, the invisible social relations that guide us to think issues in a certain way. As the reflectivists claim, knowing is much more about being exposed to pre-existing knowledge and the "natural" ways of seeing the world than pure observation allows.

To take it to the extreme, oil is actually not oil at all. The only thing that you can know about "oil" when you find it is that it is there. If some oil is thrown on you, you can feel it. This cannot be denied, nor should it, since there are always some "Lego blocks" existing in the world. But these blocks do not get there names by merely existing, but *through social practices*, where someone has the power to give them a certain name and begin to use them for certain purposes. This naming might change depending on the context it is made - for instance those who are not part of the

[111] Chernoff 2007; Jackson 2011.
[112] Hamati-Ataya 2013; Jackson 2011.

modern Western-based economic system, but reside at its outskirts do not necessarily see oil as a fuel before they are integrated into the system and "educated" about its ways. Hence, knowledge is used as a way to build power relations and these power relations are hidden behind "obvious" concepts that we all use on a daily basis, never considering that there might be histories, social practices and social purposes behind the creation of the concept. Breaking the "obvious" shell of "solid" concepts reveals their social nature and opens up the land of wonders, where concepts are much more than they seem.

Rethinking the nature of oil, the practices and language that is used to name it, also transforms the nature it has been connected to, namely security. As Ciuta (2010) has argued with the concept of energy, when we start to understand the concept that is a determinant of security, our whole idea of security will transform. It can become totalising, banal or something in between, depending on our ontologies and interest of using the concept. For reflectivists, seeing security as an solid block might actually cause more damage for the concept than seeing it total or banal, since the discipline will not address several security concerns, because they do not fit into the predetermined field - leaving human insecurities, that the security conceptualisation might actually construct, undetected.[113] Thus, reflexive security scholars should

> […] explore processes of construction and change, the process by which identities and dangers are produced, the conceptual construction of human suffering, insecurity and hierarchy, and […] the potential for emancipation, both from the blinders imposed by static conceptions of security and from the practices they reproduce.[114]

Fierke's (2007) list what reflexive security should explore shows how reflexive security transforms the security studies agenda from the scientific search for "truths" about security to studying the power that has been embedded within the security concept and practices. This does not only mean the political power that, for instance constructions like "common security" give to the selected actors, but also the other side of the knowledge-production power that the scholars use. Rather than producing "truths" about security (among other concepts), it should be recognised that researchers actually produce *particular* interpretations that seem "true" to them.[115] In this way, researchers form power relations not only with the world they are studying, but also with fellow researchers, research

[113] These can be for example experiences of war. On studying the these experiences see Sylvester 2013.
[114] Fierke 2007, 3.
[115] In fact, Fluck (2010, 260) describes truth as "inherently a social phenomenon" that is "a matter of political rather than purely methodological significance."

participants, and the audience.[116] Power can be present in academic studies in many ways: through one's academic status, social stance or relations with other actors. These all influence on the scholar's methods, interpretations and knowledge-production practices.[117] Not even the most reflexive scholar can avoid this - but s/he can recognise it as part of her/his study (about security). This reflexive security thinking is strongly embedded in CSS (although not necessarily all approaches) and particularly the politics and ethics of security further emphasise its importance.

3.1.1. The politics of security

The problematic relationship of politics and security has been in the limelight of critical security studies from its initial phases. Particularly poststructuralists and securitisation theorists, but also implicitly the Welsh school scholars, have debated that imagining exclusive security and political sectors actually creates a situation where security is seen as a technical solution, apolitical state-of-affairs that can be realised without further analysis on its nature. Rather than making this assumption, the CSS project tends to argue that politics and political are always part of security, since security requires making choices and judgements on the situation where security is perceived an issue.[118] Security cannot be seen as a neutral or objective act, but a subjective phenomenon with inherent political implications. Security problems are always raised, interpreted and valued by someone, and someone always makes the decision on what constitutes a threat and what security measures are evoked. Security should therefore be seen as social, subjective[119] and constructed or produced phenomenon that always includes normative choices.[120]

One of the goals of *the politics of security* is to shift the attention from the assumed pre-existing patterns of social life. By asking the question "what security does", the politics of security strives to reflect the representations and discourses of security, the policy responses these representations create, their legitimation and production of particular social and political relations within a society.[121] Along with the reflexive security thinking, I argue that the politics of security does not

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[116] Ackerly & True 2008; Jackson & Nexon 2012; Sultana 2007.
[117] Klotz & Lynch 2007; Sultana 2007, 376.
[118] I am using the wording "tends to", since all critical security studies approaches are not always clear whether they see political and security integral to one another or do not. For example, some securitisation theorists make a distinction between the sphere of politics and the sphere of security, where political issues are moved from "normal politics" to "panic politics" through securitisation practices (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998; Wæver 2011). Thus, even though they see this happening through construction, we are talking about two different categories, where "normality" is not further defined.
[119] Whether security is fully subjective or partly objective partly subjective depends on the approach and the scholar's philosophical ontology. See for instance Jackson 2011.
[120] Browning & McDonald 2011, 238.
[121] Nunes 2012, 348.

make the issues under scrutiny "real" or "true", (since for most reflectivists reality is a contested concept), but rather emphasises that the world consists of different conceptualisations of security, which can gain a dominant position through the knowledge-production and political practices. In the context of energy security, this argument coincides with Ciuta's (2011) remark that there are different energy security logics at play, which are all produced in different contexts and explain different dimensions of the phenomenon.

Therefore, what is at stake is not necessary proving which of the realities is the most accurate or creating the all-encompassing security conceptualisation, but rather to problematize the performative effects of security representations and security practices that shape and name those security actors and security objects (or those affected by security). For instance, securitisation theory talks about the securitiser (as a security actor) and the audience (as the security object). The securitiser, commonly perceived as a national leader is influenced by the global security environment, which s/he interprets, evaluates and securitises, if s/he sees some use for it. The audience is used to reflect these securitisations, but they also impact them.[122] For instance, it is more than common in the US to see the Middle Eastern politicisation of oil as a threat to the national (energy) security and the consumerism that forms the basis of the American dream.[123] Furthermore, politics of security is concerned over the production and construction of identities and the justification of exceptional practices, which build the order in the society or in the realm of international.[124] When seen like this, security cannot be interpreted as a neutral state of affairs that is an attribute of nation-states that either is or is not[125], but an immensely powerful political act that can transcend worldly borders and produce and name them.

In spite of the inquiry of the politics of security into the nature of the concept of security, the central question that Browning and McDonald (2011) define for the approach, namely "what security does" needs to be problematized, since I see that it includes an assumption that security can actually *do* something. This should not be the case, since security is not an actor, but a concept, even though it has become so commonplace to speak about security that one can hardly think of a sphere of life without it.[126] Security discourses or practices can be institutionalised in a way that we cannot always see where do they come from, or we do not question them, since they have come so natural

[122] Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998; Wæver 2011.
[123] See Chapter 8 in this thesis.
[124] Browning & McDonald 2011, 236–340.
[125] Fierke 2007,
[126] Dillon 1996, 16.

parts of our lives. As such, they can be used over and over again to justify certain policies or acts in the name of something that we all agree on or that we all see as permanent. Thus, it is crucial to ask where do the concepts come from, who has produced them and what has been their initial purpose.

When something becomes a "normal" part of human lives, it usually leads to depoliticisation, or as Dillon (1996) puts it, to producing technical solutions to problems as complex as security, which covers up the relationship of knowledge and power. Dillon goes so far to state that modern politics itself has become such a depoliticised security project. For him, security is a principle of formation that does things - it is part of all politics and truly a metaphysical project where it is not necessarily important what you secure as long as security is secured. Dillon means the creation of knowledge and practices that secure the perceived foundational thoughts of security that make things certain, mastered, controllable and calculable so that we can protect ourselves from the threats created by security itself. Rather than accepting this installation, we should make security and politics questionable and to realise that there is never security without *insecurity*. This is so called security paradox, where one's strive for security may end causing insecurity for some. [127]

Dillon's (1996) claim, which I mostly agree with, that security produces insecurity changes the whole idea of the concept of security. Rather than being security for all, security practices are not necessarily able to produce security for selected groups - nor they intend to, despite the political language. A horrific example is a way in which illegal immigrants are treated in the Southeast Asia, particularly ethnic Rohingya boat refugees in the Indian Ocean, who escape the oppression of the Myanmari government. Most of these immigrants are continuously excluded outside state security both in Myanmar, and in receiving countries, where the officials want to "secure" the state from the illegal migration. Yet, by securing themselves from the migrants, Southeast Asian states cause immense insecurity for migrants who travel in smuggling boats - and thus most of the migrants end up in slave labour like conditions in the receiving countries where they do not have even the most basic rights.[128] For how I see the politics of security, this is not the act of some perceived "security", but political practices of actors who use existing security discourses, wordings and models to justify their actions. Hence, giving "security" the power to act hides the actors behind the concept, which makes it harder to understand where do security discourses and practices come from - and also harder to tackle the insecurity of the people.

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[127] Dillon 1996, 14–21.
[128] Parameswaran 20.6.2015.

Such a politicised way of seeing security immensely differs from the dominant energy security approaches, which have emphasised clearly defined concepts, measurable data and scientifically rigid tools to measure energy security. Nevertheless, even though these (energy) security representations have a dominant role in the society, I think they should never be seen totally permanent, since this reduces the possibility to debate about their nature or produce alternative approaches.[129] For instance, even though Dillon (1996) is able to question the role of rigid security concepts, I see that he nevertheless assumes certain permanency for security, which makes it almost overwhelming and inescapable, since it is the basis of human action.[130] Rather than creating such inescapable logics and enforcing the idea of security permanency, security discourses and practices should be understood to create political technologies that produce, constrain and enable human behaviour in a system of power and institutional action[131] - even though they might become so "normal" that it is possible to see them partly permanent.

3.1.2. The ethics of security

The politics of security, "what security does" thinking, already offers a substantial set of principles on what critical security can be. In the spirit of reflexive security understanding, politics of security sees security as a production of language and practices. The concept can be used to name and to justify selected policies, which does not make it scientifically rigid, but a highly political concept - even though this political nature is often covered in the language of technology and strategy. It is much easier to argue about the security implications of energy pipelines to national security than to problematize the security image that the pipelines actually produce or how the protection of these pipelines is a political choice, not a "normal" way to execute energy security policies. As already mentioned in the politics of security theorisation, "what security does" question, despite its usefulness covers up the actors behind security, since security is not an actor per se. If we change this question to "who does what with security", we can perhaps better discuss about the actors behind the security agendas - and also about their ethical choices.

In fact, Browning and McDonald (2011), who have argued for the shared politics of security approach of CSS approaches also discuss about the *ethics of security*. The ethics of security addresses questions such as "Can security be progressed?", "Does the use of security come with a responsibility?" and "What is the role of security practitioner?", which deal with the position of the

[129] Smith 2005.
[130] Dillon 1996.
[131] Burke 2007, 20.

security practitioner (or scholar) and one of the most central questions of the nature of security, progression.[132] Browning and McDonald (2011) name this critical security studies project somewhat controversial, since there is even less of a common agreement among the CSS approaches, particularly on the progression of security.[133] Rather than seeing it as the deficit of CSS approaches, their approaches to the possibility of progression - the provision of "better" and more comprehensive security images - tells us something on CSS approaches' ontological assumptions on "what security does".

There are two vague camps within CSS that have somewhat opposing views on progressive security. On one side, we have some securitisation theorists and poststructuralists, who see security as a negative attribute, something that either covers up everything or prohibits the use of "normal politics", and should therefore not cover any new areas - or should be altogether abandoned.[134] Especially poststructuralists have been reluctant to provide alternative "better" security images and have focused mainly on advancing the understanding of security dynamics and debating on the productive nature of the current security language and practices. On the other side we have the remaining securitisation theorists and the Welsh school scholars, who have emphasised the ability to emancipate from rigid and oppressive security thinking, by producing alternative images of security or "more progressive" security ideals. For instance, for securitisation theorists the progress of security is coined with desecuritisation, returning to the state of "normal" politics from security language.[135] Returning to "normal" also guides security practitioners to give up the use of security measures and return to daily politics. This can mean dismantling politically decided situations like the state of exception. For the Welsh school scholars, progress means not desecurtisation but resecuritisation - finding a better way to talk about security, which would benefit the individual, who has been subjugated to state security practices. This can be best done through emancipation that provides people freedom of choose, freedom from oppression and freedom to resist against repression.[136] Most of these targets do coincide with human security ones, even though the actors are different: for human security it is the state, who grants the security, for the Welsh school humans (ideally) themselves emancipate from restrictive security measures.[137]

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[132] Browning & McDonald 2011.
[133] Browning & McDonald 2011, 243.
[134] Browning & McDonald 2011; Dillon 1996; Fierke 2007.
[135] Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998; Wæver 2011.
[136] Booth 2005; Smith 2005; Browning & McDonald 2011, 245; Nunes 2012; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015.
[137] Booth 2005.

I think that the reason why CSS scholars have been unable to find a shared approach to the issue of progress is linked to their (mostly) reflexive ontologies. On one hand, critical security studies scholars have been cautious of not reproducing the existing security structures with another logic of security and therefore only some (for instance the Welsh school) have created security alternatives for the dominant security practices. On the other hand, critical security scholars have been partly reluctant in advancing ideas of "better" or "good" security, since there are no common standards to define them - and if there are, the standards are always created by either the security practitioner or the scholar. Here we return to the question about the role and ethicality of the researcher that structures approaches, which endorse reflexive security.

If security as a concept is not a "black box", nor are researchers objective "black boxes" that do not influence or transform the issues they study. Rather they are part of the phenomenon they study, since they decide, what questions are asked, what things are written on paper and how they speak of security. Both security researchers and practitioners thus use power to define the phenomenon they speak of through concepts like "energy security". For ethics of security, the important issue is to recognise the role of the researcher and open up the ontologies and thinking that has lead the researcher to assume/interpret something about the world. I agree with Ackerly and True (2008) as they claim that researchers should always be aware of how their own positions and experiences condition their knowledge and research, since studies are seldom free of choices or decisions, and these choices have effects on how issues are portrayed and also how lives are lived. Studies can also lead into a grave marginalisation of some groups, intentionally or unintentionally, which requires an attentive methodology that helps the scholar to be aware of the causes and constructions that the study might create.[138] For instance, Dillon's (1996) security paradox, where advancing one's security can advance other's insecurity for some, creates an ethical problem of security hierarchy, since usually the stronger (the state) have the ability to directly impact on the (in)security of the weaker (the human beings).[139] These ethical considerations should transcend the whole research process, from conceptualisation to dissemination and being attentive on the historical "realities", local particularities, differences in worldviews and ideas of producing knowledge.[140]

I claim that this setting can nevertheless also be turned on its head, since not only does the security researcher impact on the knowledge s/he produces, but existing knowledge also almost necessarily

[138] Ackerly & True 2008, 693–698.
[139] Dillon 1996.
[140] Sultana 2007, 375.

influences the researcher and the ways s/he chooses to conduct her/his inquiry. The incentive can also arise from the lack of existing knowledge or the understanding that the existing knowledge is in some ways insufficient or ahistorical (like with my study). In this network of knowledge, we have to assume something, yet it is not our assumptions that make the studies insufficient - it is the lack of ethical consideration. I see that this has been altogether missing from energy security studies, in addition to Valentine's (2013) suggestion about the missing ontological considerations.[141] The lack of given thought for the impacts of energy security conceptualisations are not accidental, but are political choices, since they are not seen important enough or needed in the first place. There are reasons, why we decide not to theorise something or neglect some views as "unfit" or "wrong". Thus, embracing reflexive security thinking, that both reveals the political nature of the concept but also talks about its progression and our role in it, could actually open up new possibilities to inquire energy security and give attention to these "forgotten" issues.

4. Building the "logic" of exceptionalism approach

Already the theorisation on the reflexive security, politics of security and ethics of security aspects that CSS approaches (in one way or another) emphasise, challenge the understanding of security as something permanent and fixed - as a phenomenon that we can extract information, observe and produce metrics and one-size-fits-all policy solutions. Take the observations into the debates on energy security and it is quite easy to notice how particularly the four "A's", the principles of energy security, transform from objective security principles into set of subjectively defined rules, how states should work their energy securities. However, the analysis of the energy security debate through the changed nature of security still leaves open questions about the nature of energy security and the concepts that have defined it. For instance, it is clear that these energy security principles have come from somewhere, but where? Who has normalised them and for what purpose? What kind of insecurity will be created through this normalisation?

What is needed, is a closer analysis of the history of energy security and the context(s) it was initially used. As I argued in the beginning of this thesis, this is one of my goals. This requires the definition of the context, which is not that simple, since we are talking about a social concept, which might have been present for several hundred years, even though it would have not been used as "energy security" until recently. To tackle this problem, I have decided to assume that energy

[141] Valentine 2013.

security, as it is commonly understood, has been modified, institutionalised and naturalised through historical events, where some of the unwritten energy security principles (like availability) have been challenged - creating a securitisation of energy security principles and order. These events have most likely been described as *exceptional* in the world history, since the (powerful) actor, who has initiated the securitisation has needed a justification for its actions and policies - for its securitisation. In order to understand the "exceptionality" of some political means, I argue that we need to take a closer look at the state of exception theories, which can help us to understand the relationship between security and exception, and the relationship between initiation of security measures and the need for justifying it with an exception. It should be emphasised here that what matters is not necessarily the event itself, but *how it has been used for security purposes*.

The following chapters will delve into the state of exception literature, where my intention is not only to show the constructed relationship between security and state of exception but also to discuss how the exception, like the security, has transcended and spread outside state borders, even though it has been traditionally defined as a state property.[142] The state of exception theorisation also is the other side of my "logic" of exceptionalism approach, which I will use to analyse the historical production of energy security, its normalised principles and limited security coverage. The "logic" of exceptionalism will be opened up in the end of this chapter. However, before starting to analyse the state of exception literature, it is important to bring forth my subjective, political selection to name the literature. State of exception is only one name for the security phenomenon defined by exclusion, lack of judicial order and subjugation of other norms to security. Other variations include the state of emergency, emergency powers, martial law, the state of siege or the state of necessity.[143] The reason why I have decided to use state of exception is that it resonates with both traditional realist literature in the level of the state[144] and more critical approaches that have taken the exception beyond the state to global politics and structures. Furthermore, exception captures both the idea of an emergency, where exceptional measures are used, and the idea of necessity - that exception necessarily has no law, since it creates its own laws.[145]

[142] Schmitt 1985.
[143] Agamben 2005, 4.
[144] See Buzan & Hansen 2009.
[145] Agamben 2005, 24–31.

4.1. Exception, sovereignty and order - the (territorial) state of exception

One of the earliest (political) theorists that have addressed the state of exception concept has been the (in)famous German philosopher Carl Schmitt. Known particularly for his 1922 published book *Political Theology*, and his connections to the Nazi rule during 1930s, Schmitt has been a controversial character particularly in the Anglo-American academia, and his political preferences still shadow his work. Schwab (1985) has argued that Schmitt's compliance with the Nazi rule rose from his ontological logic and preference of political realism. For Schmitt, it was more important that "the one who has the authority can demand obedience" without this authority having to be the legitimate sovereign[146] - meaning the rule of the strongest over others, despite the rule being accepted as "lawful" or it having gained international acceptance. This preference to authoritarian power made Schmitt's reject the liberal form of politics, since he saw that liberalism would allow the most extremist parties to exploit the electoral methods in their quest for power and, at worst, define the sovereign.[147] Thus, Schmitt preferred a strong rule, which would enable the survival of the state against external threats - even though it would mean the neglecting of ideal concepts about democracy.

Whatever one thinks of Schmitt's ontological assumptions behind his state of exception theorisation, his theories have strongly impacted on the construction of the concept and its relation to order and sovereignty. Addressing sovereignty first, it is quite clear that Schmitt constructs a symbiotic relationship between the sovereign and the (state of) exception. By claiming that "sovereign is he who decides on the exception"[148], Schmitt sees that exception is a top-down approach, where the powers to determine and define a state of exception are given to the sovereign.[149] Sovereignty itself is the highest power that can determine public safety, *security* and order, particularly through the possibility to use violence. In the modern times, the place of sovereign has generally been given to the state when the political power has been transferred more and more from the divine realm to the secular political space and its elected or non-elected rulers.[150] The rule of the sovereign is not necessarily absolute, since different political systems, for instance

[146] Schwab 1985, xiii.
[147] Schwab 1985, xxii.
[148] Schmitt 1985, 5.
[149] Prozorov 2005.
[150] Schmitt 1985.

liberal democracies, hold different check and balances to limit the power of the sovereign. In authoritarian or dictatorial systems, these balancing actors are mostly missing.[151]

The powers that the sovereign holds - through material force and prestige - enable the sovereign to make a decision on the (state of) exception, a "borderline space" where law is either replaced or removed, and "normality", which is maintained by order and law. Schmitt (as a jurist) sees that the defining factor of the "normal" state-of-affairs is the judicial order and law/norms that regulate behaviour of state's subjects but also the state. The sovereign-state has a dual role here. On one hand it needs to be able to provide stability and guarantee that the legal norms are transcended to facts by making the political decision.[152] The state therefore practices politics that enforce the norms, and constructs them as part of the "reality". On the other hand, the sovereign-state subjugates itself to following these rules and tries not to undermine them, since otherwise the order (created and maintained by the state) looses its significance, which can lead to anarchy or state of nature at worst.

However, according to Schmitt (1985), the sovereign can never be fully subjugated to the "normal" order it creates, since otherwise it cannot decide on the exception. Here, I will argue, one can detect the other side of Schmitt's most famous phrase: the ability to decide the (state of) exception defines sovereignty. The sovereign can only be determined through its ability to maintain order and replace it with exception, when needed - and if the sovereign does not have this ability, it cannot be called sovereign at all. Furthermore, sovereignty and (state of) exception share similar attributes, or as Schmitt sees it: both sovereignty and the exception are *borderline concepts* that can be found at the outermost sphere of "normal" order.[153] This further builds the relationship of the exception and "normal" order, since Schmitt argues that the exception should be determined in relation to "normal" (judicial) order, since even though it resides at the outskirts of normality (at its most external point), (state of) exception is still internalised in the order, because it usually leads to the preservation of some order. State of exception does not mean sliding into a void of anarchy or chaos - which for Schmitt is the worst possible alternative.[154]

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[151] Agamben 2005; Schmitt 1985, 7–9.
[152] Huysmans 2008, 167–168. Huysmans describes Schmitt's position decisionist, where the power to impose decisions becomes more important than the normative procedures emphasised by liberal systems. The sovereign must have the have the political capacity to decide how to transgress the procedures when the circumstances require it.
[153] Schmitt 1985, 5.
[154] Lane Scheppele 2004, 1011; Schmitt 1985, 6–12.

As a "borderline case", (state of) exception defines the limits of the applicability of the order, norms and law and through this process constitutes the meaning of order, its shape and character. [155] In some cases the possibility of the exception has also been institutionalised to the "normal" order through constitutional and legal procedures. For example, many liberal or democratic states (like France and Germany) have enabled the use of exception in urgent situations, when the national security is threatened. Others (the US or Italy) have not included the exception into the constitution, but have nevertheless institutionalised it for the sovereign's use.[156] These powers have been used several times, also in the 21st century - not necessarily to secure the order in the society, but also to seize power or to seek justification for one's sovereignty from the international community.[157]

The constitutionally defined state of exceptions in principle require either an internal or external threat to the societal order - which is usually defined from the sovereign-state's perspective. Schmitt (1985; 2007) reduces this, or in fact all political action and motives, to the realistic friend/enemy dichotomy, which separates other states and also citizens within the state to friends, who respect the order in the society, and to enemies, who are strangers, alien by nature and threaten the societal order. For Schmitt these enemies are only public ones, either a collective of people or a political enemy (another state), and one should never define an individual adversary as an enemy.[158] In the extreme case, conflicts are possible with this produced enemy - especially if the state of exception is used during wartime, which most likely creates a required exceptional situation/event.[159] Using these events, defined exceptional situations and producing the image of a "public enemy", the sovereign-state can suspend national order and liberties for absolute authority without necessarily having to justify its actions too much.[160] This transforms enmity from Schmitt's conceptualisation to a discursive strategy, where the use of enmity in language to justify particular politics constructs an image where state of exception is seen as a logical continuum of "normal" politics, rather than ethical choice.[161] Thus, in the end, the definition of an exceptional situation and declaration of a state of exception are subjective decisions, which require a powerful enough actor (the sovereign-state) to execute them.

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[155] Agamben 1995; Lane Scheppele 2004, 1011; Schmitt 1985, 6–12.
[156] Agamben 2005, 11–22.
[157] Neocleous 2006; Walker 2006.
[158] Schmitt 2007, 26–29.
[159] Schmitt 1985.
[160] Walker 2006, 76.
[161] Neal 2006, 32.

The power of the sovereign-state to decide on the exception derives from its ability to be both outside and inside the order it maintains. By using the (state of) exception, the sovereign gets powers to act outside the (judicial/societal) order - to replace the order temporarily with a state of exception to protect it or to supplant the "normal" order with the sovereign's new order. The first of the two, where the law is temporarily suspended to be later implemented, Schmitt (1985) names *commissarial dictatorship*, and the second, where no law or judicial order applies other than the sovereign's decision itself, *sovereign dictatorship*. Thus, in a state of exception, the sovereign can, if it is not constrained by the checks and balances of the liberal state system, exercise full constituent powers.[162] I think Agamben (2005) best describes these situations, when he names them as "force-of-~~law"~~, where the sovereign upholds a force of law, but it is without law, since the judicial order has been abandoned.[163] For instance, the military coup in Thailand in May 2014 led into the replacement of the existing order (the constitution) and to its replacement by emergency degree and interim constitution, which has been completely defined by the reigning military junta.[164]

Exception, for Schmitt (1985) is more interesting than the rule, because it goes deeper than the generalisations of "normal" order. Exception confirms "normal" order, but at the same time breaks its mechanisms, when it produces a space where the sovereign decides its own limits, but is not restricted by them.[165] Furthermore, like in the case of Thailand, the sovereign can move the order it produced in the state of exception to the realm of "normal" order - for instance through constitution-building practices. Even though Schmitt does not argue it himself, I argue that it is clear enough that setting up a new order through a state of exception requires depoliticisation, normalisation and routinisation of the political decision that the sovereign has made. Prozorov (2005) describes this as a sort of constitutive transgression from exception to constitutional order, where the attention is turned from the political to politics - where things can be debated within the existing order without questioning its depoliticised existence. Thus decisions made in a state of exception that have a constitutive nature are naturally political, since they create societal foundations of their absence.[166]

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[162] Humphreys 2006, 680; Schmitt 1985; Schwab 1985, xix.
[163] Agamben 2005, 39.
[164] Panda 24.7.2014.
[165] Schmitt 1985, 15. This space is further enforced by judicial and scientific knowledge producing practices that Schmitt is part of.
[166] Edkins 1999, 123–126; Prozorov 2005, 94–95.

I see that Schmitt's theorisation on the (state of) exception, despite drawing to the ontologies of political realism, actually can be easily interpreted to have some features of more critical security approaches, since he goes quite far in theorising the relationship between the sovereign, "normal" order and exception. State of exception, for Schmitt, is clearly about the survival of the society for it can create a space where the sovereign can maintain the societal order by measures exceptional to the "normal" order - or even construct a new order. Even though Schmitt does not define why in particular the right to define the exception defines sovereignty, he gives some critical insights to the dual role of the sovereignty both inside and outside the order. However, from a reflexive security perspective, I feel that Schmitt does not properly explain the knowledge aspect of state of exception. How can we actually know whether the situation at hand is "exceptional" or "normal", or has the societal order we have used to been built in a state of exception and later depoliticised? Without the sovereign defining the state of exception, can we know that are the daily measures practiced by the people in power justified by a historical exceptional situation? Can we actually never speak of a "normal" (judicial) order, since it is normalised, rather that normal per se? From a reflexive security perspective, defining this is almost impossible, since there is no general "truth" that would tell us the difference between the "normal" and the "exceptional". Some scholars, like Agamben (1998; 2005) have therefore argued that exception has been normalised to the extent that there is a permanent exception in the world. This will be addressed next.

4.2. Blurred lines: Exception-as-the-rule

If Schmitt has been considered as the "grand old man" of state of exception scholarship, Giorgio Agamben (1998; 2007) has been almost as influential in the modern state of exception academia. Both relying and criticising Schmitt, Agamben has been less interested in the separation between "normal" order and exception and has rather problematized the blurred lines between "normality" and exception. For Agamben, powers to decide on the exception have originally belonged to the state, which could use it for its security or to replace an order it did not see fit. This allowed the state to have the power to define its security (threats) and decide on the measures to uphold security. However, the commonplace use of state of exception power of states, particularly democracies (who have constitutionalised state of exception), during and after the two World Wars has actually transformed state of exception and created a situation, where it is no longer possible talk about state of exception and "normal" order as two distinct categories.[167] By acting continuously inside and outside the "normal" (judicial) order, the sovereign-states have made it

[167] Agamben 1998, 28; 2005, 7.

impossible to separate the exception from the order produced by law, which has created a crisis of the juridico-political tradition.[168] When the relationship between "normal" (judicial) order and exception/anomie is no longer operating efficiently, it becomes irrelevant to talk about how the sovereign uses politics to diminish the gap between law and exception, even though Schmitt saw this important.[169] This unravelling of the two arguably distinct categories he names a situation of *exception-as-a-rule*.

The exception-as-a-rule is possible for Agamben (1998; 2005), because he assumes that exception (as the "other" of order) has transgressed the clear spatiotemporal boundaries that Schmitt set for it. What this means is that the (state of) exception overflows outside its defined borderlines as the outermost sphere of order and moves inwards, where it collides with the "normal" order. As they collide, the (state of) exception becomes normalised and what was formerly seen as "normal" becomes exceptionalised. Not only this makes it difficult to make a distinction between the two, but it also empties the law of content, since the dialectic relation of law and anomie, judicial order and the exception ceases to structure the societal and political practice.[170] For Agamben, this necessarily leads to abolition of the distinction among legislative, judicial and executive powers, putting the sovereign-state and its politics above these, which leads into a creation of empty judicial space.[171]

The emptying of judicial content relates to the use of power. For Agamben (1998; 2005), the merging of the exception into the "normal" creates a situation, where everything becomes possible for the one who has power - namely the sovereign-state.[172] As the dialogue between law and anomie has been broken and an empty judicial space was created, the order that previously limited the sovereign (who is both inside and outside the law) now enables politics of the powerful free from every ban.[173] What this means is that the sovereign-state does not need to seek justifications for its actions, not even the use of violence, since it has all the power to decide what to do, when the situation is "exceptional". These acts, often justified by the state security or through securitisations produce a space of insecurity, as no one is safe from the sovereign's physical violence or repression. Even insecurity can become depoliticised, when the violence becomes normalised as a daily routine of the societies to discipline and punish, because violence is not lawful on unlawful - but just means. Agamben argues that the national socialist Germany in the 1930s–1940s, is a prime

[168] McLoughlin 2013, 11.
[169] Agamben 2005; Huysmans 2008, 172–173; Prozorov 2006, 88.
[170] Agamben 1998, 28.
[171] Agamben 1998; 2005, 7.
[172] Agamben 1998, 28.
[173] Agamben 1998, 38.

example of a society where the law and the (state of) exception meant the same thing and violence was a natural part of the state machinery.[174] Here the clear division between judicial practices of the "normal" and the state of exception that Schmitt proposed cannot be made, since the normal is produced with the exception.[175]

Partially agreeing with CSS approaches' emphasis on human security and insecurity, Agamben (1998) is taking *life* as the object of state security practices. Rather than talking about human emancipation, the I claim that the perspective of Agamben on life is fairly negative, since he sees that exception-as-a-rule changes the way the life is lived and maintained. In the state of exception that is connected to (judicial) order, life is mostly connected to the law, even though it is subjugated to the sovereign rule.[176] The checks and balances of the "normal" liberal democratic order should limit the sovereign from using illegal violence against human beings and to guarantee that humans enjoy the rights internalised in the judicial order. However, when the law becomes obsolete in content, the rigid normative system (that enabled rights to the human beings) ceases to exist and lives are only linked to but exceptional politics giving the sovereign-state the ultimate power to determine, which lives/forms of life what forms are acceptable and includable into the society, and which lives should be excluded as insignificant, exceptional or unfit. In this way, life becomes the utmost category of politics that the state uses to differentiate between citizens (included) and the others (excluded)[177], producing a space where human security is a privilege of those the state decides give it.

Nevertheless, the excluded ones need to be included too, in the outskirts of the society and security, where they can work as an example of the state's ability to exercise its power on human bodies and as an identity construction object. Agamben names these people *homo sacer*, who are both outside the society and judicial laws, and therefore killable, and inside, in the outskirts as contaminated bodies that cannot be sacrificed. Homo sacers are not human anymore, just bodies to be killed and tortured, or subjected to an extreme exclusion and bodily control, an issue that has taken place both in concentration camps around the world - latest in Guantanamo Bay, which for Agamben was an exception-as-a-rule space.[178] Milder versions of similar bodily exclusion and control can also

[174] Agamben 1998; 2005.
[175] Abamben 1998; McLoughlin 2013, 10.
[176] Agamben 1988; Schmitt 1985.
[177] Agamben 1998; Huysmans 2008, 174–176.
[178] Agamben 1998; 2005; De Larringa &Doucet 2008, 521. For other studies that have discussed about war on terror and camps, see Neal 2006. Other camps that have been determined as such are external Palestine camps (Hanafi & Long 2010) and refugee camps (Levy 2010).

happen outside the camps, when the sovereign-state dislocates (its) people or does not recognise them as human beings at all.[179] This, I claim, forms a violent relationship, where the naming of the excluded - for instance, calling them "energy poor" - is a method of control, which defines the roles that "subjects" can take outside and inside societies.

4.3. Exit territory: when the (state of) exception becomes international

Both Schmitt's and mostly Agamben's theorising focus mainly on the (state of) exception that is created within a specific territory/area and that subjugates the people of that area to a rule where the connection of judicial order and security politics (drawing from the perceived state of exception) is dismantled. However, when most of the defined security threats have become international (or have been constructed so), I see that it is necessary to study the possibility of the state of exception pulling itself outside the territorial boundaries of the state. For instance, energy security needs and threat images often have regional and global dimensions - not the least because the energy infrastructure and transportation has to cross several defined borders. I claim that Schmitt (1985) and Agamben (1998; 2005) in principle have this international dimension in their theories. Schmitt sees that the external forces (like the "enemy") can impact on the state of exception created within a state.[180] For Agamben, the state of exception is structural: it has become so "normal" that states use it as a common means to justify their policies and subjugate the people, especially the excluded (homo sacers) under their rule.[181] This, nevertheless, does not include the possibility of state of exception gaining a momentum in the international and global politics, where global problems, like environmental dangers, health hazards, humanitarian crises and economic tumult are constantly threatening human existence.[182]

Depending naturally on one's theoretical approach, international relations/politics can be considered to be in a state of exception by nature - as political realists, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists have argued with anarchy, the constant exclusion of order of any kind, from international relations. The argument of anarchy arguably impacted on the formation of international institutions like the UN to both maintain the privileged legitimacy of sovereign-states

[179] One of the most outrageous examples can be found in Myanmar, with the people called Rohingya. Rohingyas, who form the Muslim minority in Myanmar, have been often referred to as the "most persecuted minority in the world" due to their genocide-like treatment in the South-Western Myanmar. They are harassed and discriminated, their villages bordered and they are not accepted as an ethnic group in Myanmar. The dire circumstances have driven thousands of Rohingyas to seek refuge from other Southeast Asian countries through smuggling rinks that sell the people for human trafficking. (BBC 10.6.2015; Heijmans 29.5.2015; Mohamed 2014; The Economist 13.6.2015.)
[180] Schmitt 1985; 2007.
[181] Agamben 1998; 2005.
[182] Neocleous 2006, 192–193.

and create the rules for defining systematically accepted sovereignty - the practices of inclusion and exclusion in the state system. With the introduction of new security threats, like environmental threats and human security, the state-centrism was initially challenged, but soon the state became both security providers and threats, gaining the dual role that was recognised internationally.[183] Nevertheless, this recognition again depended on the state system, where the states work as members, but are also subjugated to it - at least in principle.

Particularly Walker (2006) has argued that this creates a situation, where Schmitt's famous words about the sovereign deciding on the exception become somewhat questionable. For Walker (2006), Schmitt has underplayed the role of the state system in his state of exception theorising, since Schmitt does not see the it in the production of sovereignty - that in the first place enables the state to decide on the exception - but sees sovereignty as a stable historically inherited quality that moved from the church and the king to the state. However, the states do no exist in void, but are part of the international system that has gained a role and power to form rules and norms that impact on the actions of states, in spite of this system being initially designed by the states. Walker has identified at least four systemic rules: (1) no empire should exist in the system (the system should not collapse into a single imperial form), (2) no religious wars between the states (thus the creation of secular modern sovereigns), (3) keep the political inside territorial boundaries (a proper, sovereign nation-state must be maintained within spatial and legal borders) and (4) no "barbarians or non-moderns" should be included (meaning that modern political life must involve decisions about who is fit to participate and who is not recognised as a legitimate member of international system). These rules form the basis of modern politics, where the system allows the states to practice their sovereignty and proclaim the state of exception, but also subjugates states and monitors the produced rules.[184]

Walker's (2006) arguments about the definition of the sovereignty and the state of exception outside state territorial borders have also spurred some debate regarding the transformation of sovereignty. The international system has not only given states the possibility to use and define the state of exception as sovereigns, but these powers have also been transcended to prestigious global institutions that have been founded to deal with particular security threats, like globally spreading diseases. For instance, Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014) have studied how World Health Organisation (WHO) can bestow upon itself the power to decide on the global state of exception in global health issues through securitisation of issues as global threats and acceptance of the states for

[183] Walker 2006.
[184] Walker 2006, 65–75.

the institution's legitimacy on the field it is working. When the number of globally infectious diseases has grown constantly, WHO has gained more prestige from its original agenda that included the creation of limited legal instruments to predefined diseases such as cholera and yellow fever. Especially during the SARS epidemic in 2002-2003, WHO securitised the disease as a global threat that needed exceptional measures from all states and publicly shamed and criticised states who did not comply the agency's guidelines and recommendations.[185] Hence, the WHO has used its power to securitise disease, such as the Swine Flue (H1N1) and Ebola, which have lead into declaring state of exceptions that have impacted on the lives of millions of people. However, institutionally declares state of exceptions often differs from the state-level use of the exception, since global institutions seldom have direct enforcement capacities.[186] Therefore, it seems that global institutions may not have the ability to use the means included in the state of exception, but they nevertheless hold a significant role in narrating it.

I think that i would be nevertheless perhaps too reductionist to argue that the state has subjugated itself fully to the global institutions and the international state system. On the contrary, especially the most powerful states in the system have the ability to try to transform the system and reproduce it trough their state of exception definitions. These definitions usually determine events that shake the whole system to its roots, which makes it possible to question and redefine the systemic qualities and norms. For instance, one of the most common global events that have been claimed to challenge the international system and bring back the traditional military security thinking to the global security arenas[187] has been the terrorist attacks to New York on 11th of September - more commonly referred as 9/11. The events of 9/11 did not only lead to a declaration of state of exception in the US, which has still continued to these days[188], but also to the creation of the infamous War on Terror, which challenged the existing norms of the international system and further subjugated the broadened security agenda, for instance the inclusion of human rights, to state territorial security.

The US also claimed a systemic change, where anyone threatening free and liberal democracies must be considered adversaries and exceptional measures should be allowed to deal with these enemies, for instance terrorists, Islamists or rogue states like Iraq.[189] In a sense, the US argued for

[185] Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen 2014, 331–339.
[186] Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen 2014, 331–336.
[187] Buzan & Hansen 2009; Fierke 2007.
[188] Korte 23.10.2014. For the US state of exceptions see Neocleous 2006.
[189] De Larringa 2008, 518; Mavelli 2013.

freeing the restriction of state of exception as a security means from the international system's institutions (the UN) surveillance, to be freely used to deal with exceptional events and their perpetrators. The US could argue this, since it was the most powerful state in the system, who, like the sovereign-states in the state of exception, was both inside and outside the international system - defined by it and defining it. The US claim did, nevertheless, face some resistance from other sovereign-states (while some supported the claim) and the institutions that had been tasked to maintain the international system and its norms. Particularly the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan opposed the US challenged and argued that the situation is as decisive in world history as the end of World War II, since the world is at exceptional crossroads, where a choice has to be made to either maintain or abolish the existing system.[190]

The events of 9/11 and the War on Terror have increasingly interested state of exception scholars. Not only the state of exception was internationalised outside the state borders due to US demands, but also the historical period was seen exceptional in international politics.[191] I claim that there have been two notifications related to the internationalising of the state of exception. First, the nature of the threat changed from Schmitt's clearly defined enemy to human being's - that the system was supposed to protect. The human beings that caused a threat were named accordingly (terrorists). Rather than being easily defined territorially, the threat was "exceptional", since it could be anywhere, a terrorist could be anyone and the targets could be anything. The perceived transformation of the nature of the threat justified and legitimised the use of state of exception policies and practices internationally, and the installation of almost permanent state of exception nationally.[192] The development of stricter and more supervised border control systems is an example of the "normalisation" of the state of exception means as part of the societal order.[193]

Second, there is still a clear relation between the state and the state system, when exceptions are declared. On one hand, it seems that states cannot declare state of exceptions or the means the use of the (state of) exception allows if they break internationally accepted norms or ideals - if they do not have enough power to interpret these norms in their liking or to try and change them. For example, as mentioned before, the US state of exception has been permanent after 9/11 and has been reinstalled several times without any attention, while for instance in Thailand the martial law

[190] Huysmans 2006b, 136.
[191] Huysmans 2006a, 11; 2006b, 135.
[192] Neal 2006, 31; Neocleous 2006.
[193] See for instance Gordon 2007; Häkli 2008.

that was declared after the Coup on 22nd of May 2014 has been widely criticised.[194] This example also tells something about the politicisation of state of exceptions, where they can be interpreted differently depending on their agenda and the status of the sovereign-state/actor in international hierarchy. In fact, interpretations play a central role in how exception is seen in international politics in general. Whether one thinks that 9/11 did not challenge the international system and the global security landscape or that it was a radical change in it, depends on one's ontological assumptions.[195] In my opinion, what this tells us is that exception, like security, should not be interpreted as a pre-existing fact, but a political act that can, and most likely will, appear outside national borders.

4.4. The "logic" of exceptionalism

The politicisation of the exception from a normal, semi-legal state-of-affairs to a subjective means of securitisation, which not only justifies rule-of-~~law~~ policies but also the production of security threats, transforms the way exceptions should be interpreted. Rather than seeing for instance 9/11 exceptional per se, it is important to see the role of the US government in creating the exception, when it initiated security measures both domestically and internationally. Perhaps due to the difficulty to securitise a particularistic group, the exception that was created enabled the securitisation of "terrorists" (even though al-Qaida was the top security threat), since they could be, like said, anywhere. It seems that the non-territorial nature of the security threat has enabled the continuation of the exception, since the threats have not diminished, despite the main culprit, Osama bin Laden, was annihilated in 2011.[196] The state of exception has been thus normalised, at least in the US, and it has lead into a creation of global security norms on aviation and border control - which are "normal" things for human beings, because they arguably improve "our" security.

The processes of security, how it is politicised and depoliticised, the legitimation of security means and control through state of exception, and the normalisation of the exception into the order, which was initially suggested by Schmitt (1985), form the basis of my theoretical approach that I have decided to name *the "logic" of exceptionalism.* The "logic" of exceptionalism consists of combination of ideas from CSS approaches and the state of exception literature. First, it agrees with

[194] For US state of exception see Neocleous 2006. For the coup in Thailand see Bangkok Post 1.4.2015; Fuller 2015; Mazumdaru 2.4.2015.
[195] Huysmans 2006a, 12–16; 2006b.
[196] BBC News 2.5.2011.

the CSS arguments about the political and reflexive nature of phenomena like security, which transcend the original security unit of traditional security studies (the state) both vertically (across the borders) and horizontally (to macro and micro level of actors). For the "logic" of exceptionalism, security does not take place in a void, but it is always for someone and some purpose, which makes it a subjective issue, rather than an object or an attribute of a state. Since security is subjective, it is not anymore self-evident that everyone subjugated to security see or feel it in a similar manner, which might also lead to feelings of insecurity among the "secured". The subjective nature of security emphasises social dimension of the phenomenon - making it harder to think of security as a measurable concept and removing the veil of "scientific" rigidity from security perceptions that has been internalised in the security logic.

Second, the "logic" of exceptionalism approach assumes that producing security and creating security threats requires the creation of exceptional circumstances, which make it easier (for the powerful actors) to impact and shape the existing order - or enforce it if they see that option fit. As Schmitt (1985) argued, state of exception can be used to either protect and institutionalise the existing order or overthrow it with an order created by the security actor (for Schmitt the sovereign-state).[197] Rather than either-or, the "logic" of exceptionalism sees that both processes can take place at the same time as the order can be partially replaced, partially removed. For instance, defining the new order in a way that it does not question the main principles of the old order, for example the centrality of sovereign-states, but changes the way policy arguments and practices should be formulated (talking about the security of supply rather than the security of demand), will make it easier to justify the paradigm change and point the continuity between the new and old order. Furthermore, the "logic" of exceptionalism emphasises the role of political use of events that are used to frame the state of exceptions for political purposes. The events are not exceptional per se, but the exceptionality is constructed to allow security policies that can be justified with the same produced exception. Over time, the state of exception and "normal" security policies can become so closely related that one cannot anymore make a difference between the exception and the "normal" order.

Through these assumptions, the "logic" of exceptionalism tries to map out three processes that are part of building security concepts, like energy security. I have named these processes differently and they all encompass a set of questions that should be asked from any security conceptualisation.

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[197] Schmitt 1985.

However, by framing them as three processes, I do not mean that they are separate from each other, since it is extremely hard to say when and where for instance securitisation transforms into depoliticisation or normalisation. Rather, they should be understood as mutually constructive, where they all enforce each other. The three processes embedded in the "logic" of exceptionalism are:

1) *Securitisation*: How events are made exceptional? How state of exception is used as a justification for increased security measures (not necessarily military)? Who does the securitisation? What goals does the securitising actor have?
2) *Normalisation*: How does the concepts/language used become institutionalised? How does the exception blend into the order - and possibly become a rule? How the possibility for producing alternative orders is minimised?
3) *Depoliticisation*: How visible the political acts are? How does security cover the political goals? What kind of exclusions and inclusions are embedded into the depoliticisation of security? What roles are given to different actors? How insecurity is constructed - and how some insecurities are made irrelevant?

These processes need to be elaborated further in order to better understand their content. The first process, securitisation, focuses on the initiation of the state of exception and on the political choices and circumstances that "justify" the use of security language and practices either to tackle the perceived danger for the current order or the danger caused by the current order.[198] Since the goal of my study is to show how the concept of energy security has been produced in a specific context (for specific purposes), it is more relevant to focus on specific event that arguably formed the current concept, the use of exception and the security language, rather than discuss about the securitisation of for instance identities.[199] Rather than asking why some events are exceptional, the process of securitisation guides the researcher to ask how the events are made exceptional - and how they are used to build a state of exception that justifies increased security measures and language.

Furthermore, the securitisation process aims to problematize the role of the securitising actor and the political reasons for the securitisation. Since the "logic" of exceptionalism relies on a subjective security conceptualisation, it is crucial to elaborate, why does an actor initiate a securitisation and

[198] Like Schmitt (1985) theorised, the order can either be enforced or replaced.
[199] This is naturally partly artificial, since identities, like security concepts are both human productions - and actually identities do also shape how humans theorise about the world (see Onuf 1998). Thus, even though identities are not the main focus here, I do not intend to deny their importance for social science.

what goals do the securitisation and the state of exception have. The obvious answer is that actors securitise, since they see feel their security threatened. However, this answer does not elaborate the political nature of feeling insecure or where does the "feeling" come from in the case of a political entity like the state that is the most used referent object of energy security. State and national security are not simple concepts - most of all, since the broadening debate of security showed that national securities do not always comply with individual securities. Thus, it is relevant to study the policies and interests that are seen worthwhile protecting to construct an exception. This interest can be the protection of political order, economic stability or modernisation, which are itself political goals.

The second process, normalisation, guides the attention to the institutionalisation and naturalisation of the state of exception and the securitisation. As the referent object of this study is the concept of energy security, the normalisation process focuses on how the concept has become a common way to argue, to describe and practice policies, and to produce knowledge. As argued by Neocleous (2006) the strength of the exception depends on how it has been tied to the knowledge-production practices and how it succeeds in imposing "order and obedience".[200] The order and obedience produced with a state of exception is nothing new, since emergency powers have been commonly used throughout history, particularly to manage labour and economic issues - making state of exceptions almost an everyday management (of modern capitalist states), as the "political administration of capitalist modernity."[201] The initiation of such "administration" requires not only the normalisation of the security measures/norms produced in the state of exception in everyday language and practices, but also a strong institutionalisation of the concepts used. Thus, normalisation process requires going beyond the specific "exceptional" events to see how the institutionalisation has been executed after the event has ceased to exist.

Normalisation, while concentrating on the institutionalisation, should also take into account the possibility of alternative orders - or their (constant) dismissal. State of exception, particularly when it becomes a rule like state of affairs, should never be considered static, since there is a possibility that new orders will challenge it in the future. Huysmans (2008) has argued that exceptions should not be seen solely as a top-down approaches, since this will minimise the role of societal actors, who are more than bodies - they are actors as well.[202] The claim about state of exception shifting

[200] Neocleous 2006, 195.
[201] Neocleous 2006, 196–198.
[202] Huysmans 2008.

away from a sovereign-state's property to be also managed by international institutions and the role of state system in producing the state through exclusions and inclusions has made it harder to justify Schmittian state of exceptions without some kind of international approval.[203] Moreover, the creation of the "global civil society", a network of civil society actors that are no longer bound by territorial boundaries, has gained leverage vis-à-vis the sovereign-state. Particularly when the issues have a global or regional scope, the state of exceptions will most likely face some criticism from the "global civil society". Thus, normalisation process should not close the possibility of alternative orders, even though they might seem weak or unable to separate themselves from the vocabulary of the normalised order.

The final process, depoliticisation, tries to problematize the distinction that is often made between politics, security practices and language that the use of state of exception justifies. Where securitisation focused on the role of the securitising actor in trying to argue the political reasons and interests for the justification, depoliticisation focuses on the dual logic of security - exclusion and inclusion. As the state of exception theorists, like Schmitt (1985) and Agamben (1998), have argued state of exceptions or security measures are taken through creating images binary oppositions of "us" and "them", of "friend" and "enemy" that are either inside the society or outside it. Security measures, especially when we are talking about political institutions like states that are justified by exceptional events are usually for someone's security - but not necessarily for *everyone's* security.

For instance, Agamben (1998) and Neal (2006) talk about Guantanamo Bay, where the depoliticised War on Terror and perceived common security (through the state of exception) allowed the exclusion of the individual security of the "terrorists" - making their life rather bare.[204] Moreover, exclusion can also be practiced at the level of the states (which is in a constant state of exception, at least for political realists), where those states that do not fill the criteria of sovereign-states are excluded as "failed states" not eligible enough to belong in the system - determining who can act and who cannot[205] The exclusion/inclusion incorporated in depoliticisation hence not only creates discriminatory (political) practices, but leaves some outside security and also depoliticises their insecurity, which is possibly produced by the "necessary" security measures. Situating the insecurities to the security practices and policies by showing how they have been "forgotten" is part

[203] For instance, the martial law installed in Thailand in 2014 has created lots of social movement and criticism, since due to its coup d'état nature (Davidson & Weaver 20.5.2014; Mazumdaru 2.4.2015). Similarly, when the United Kingdom declared a state of exception in 2001 to allow a rushed anti-terrorist legislation in fears of being a target of attacks in the future, civil society actors criticised the decision immensely (Kamal, Barnett & Bright 11.11.2001).
[204] Agamben 1998; 2005; Neal 2006.
[205] Walker 2006.

of the depoliticisation process. Furthermore the depoliticisation process also interested in the naming that is taking place within security issues, since it often shows who we should "know" to protect and who not.

There are still some things that should be clarified in the "logic" of exceptionalism approach. First, its intention is not to produce a one-size-fit-all theory, but analyse exception-related security issues though three political processes. The relevance and manifestation of these processes should be seen as context specific, and they do not necessarily appear in all contexts in a similar manner. The roles of the actors might change, the normalisation might fail, there might not be a dominant securitisation or the exception might not bring any change to the security language and practices. Thus, it is important that the theoretical approach is flexible enough and gives space to the data analysed in the study. This also means that the "logic" of exceptionalism approach should define the level of analysis (micro, macro, meso) depending on the phenomenon that it analysed. For example, when I am studying the production of energy security and mapping its historical context, it is relevant to work in all of these levels.

Second, the "logic" of exceptionalism is a critical approach, which proclaims the influential role of the researcher in the knowledge-production. It is the researcher, in the end, who decides to use certain language and emphasise particular events and politics over others. The researcher, as reflexive scholarship presumes, is not outside the political - but is part of it from the beginning to the very end of the study. This means naturally that the interpretations that one can read in this thesis are mine only. Finally, albeit I have decided to name my approach as the "logic" of exceptionalism, I do not necessarily assume that there is some clear logical way the exception and security concept have been created or that the approach I am using would be "logical" in philosophical sense. As I have assumed, exceptions and securities are subjective phenomena that can be created for whatever reason, since they always include feelings and emotions. Hatred or uncertainty might produce security threats, even though they are not "logical" per se. Rather than arguing for security logic, it should be considered (even in the case of institutions like the state) to problematize the emotions and images of the decision-makers, who often act for the state.

5. Constructive conceptual analysis as a methodical frame

My interests in the production of the concept of energy security and in studying it through reflexive security inspired theoretical approach, namely the "logic" of exceptionalism, have guided me to rely

on constructivist conceptual analysis as my methodical framework. Constructivist conceptual analysis is a challenging, and yet giving methodical approach, since it does not necessarily offer any specific methodical tools for making scientific analysis. In fact, the different forms of conceptual analysis, at least in social science, have relied on ontological and epistemological norms that have guided them, rather than putting out generalising methodical tools. In this sense, conceptual analysis could be best described as set of principles that guide an interpretative analysis, which does not necessarily offer a new definition, a theory or technique of measurement of a particular concept. Due to its interpretative nature, conceptual analysis has been previously criticised as "pure semantics" or been neglected altogether.[206]

The criticism about the interpretative nature of conceptual analysis should be seen in its context, since most of it came from ontological positivists, who saw that humans could study the world as it is and therefore we should use as much theoretical precision as possible to define the phenomena we talk about - or as King, Keohane and Verba (1994) have argued, create descriptive or explanatory knowledge that can contribute to the "science".[207] Perhaps due to the pressure from positivists or due to the attractiveness of positivist claims about "truth" and "science", conceptual analysts did adopt positivist ideas of science and knowing, even though conceptual analysts have emphasised that meanings created in everyday language would give people similar access to "reality" as observation of phenomena.[208] Guzzini (2005) names this part of conceptual analysis as analytic/instrumental conceptual analysis, which aimed to produce a theoretically stable and neutral understanding of a concept by describing it properly to avoid misunderstandings among its users.[209] The analytic/instrumental conceptual analysis has commonly demanded at least five principles from conceptual analysis: (1) it should aim for conceptual clarity, since free or arbitrary definition of concepts is "anathema to conceptual analysis"[210], (2) the new explanations should comply with already existing ones (3) the described concepts should be operational, also outside theoretical frameworks, (4) analysis should theoretically prefer theoretically important concepts and (5) the concept should include a possibility of change, if better explanations are found.[211] However, as conceptual analysis has not necessarily produced new ways to understand concepts, their aim to answer, "what something means", has arguably often impoverished the conceptual debate, since

[206] Baldwin 1980, 472; Daigneault 2012; Huysmans 1998.
[207] King, Keohane & Verba 1994, 7–9. The "science" for King et al. is a restricted discipline, which has rules and norms, how a "good" scholarly work should be conducted.
[208] Levering 2002, 43.
[209] Guzzini 2005, 500.
[210] Baldwin 1980, 473.
[211] Baldwin 1980, 471–475.

conceptual analysis has aimed to exclude conceptualisations, which it sees (or the analysts sees) inconsistent with the other "accepted" ones.[212]

The aim for conceptual "purity" or clarification and the belief of analytic/instrumental conceptual analysts has not interested constructive conceptual analysts - in fact, constructive conceptual analysts have mostly doubted the importance of "what something means" question. Albeit constructive conceptual analysts share the understanding about the importance of language in defining concepts, they have also criticised conceptual analysis of its lack of interest for study the context or the ontological influences that the concepts might entail. Guzzini (2005), for instance, has argued that it is not possible to "isolate concepts from theories in which they are embedded and which constitute part of their very 'meaning'."[213] By this Guzzini wants to direct the emphasis of constructivist conceptual analysis away from conceptual clarification or "purity" to studies on how and in which context the concepts were actually produced. Here, he shares Jackson's (2011) claim that our ontological assumptions necessarily guide us to do choices with our studies, which often answer to different questions and are relevant in different contexts - thus the context where the concept is embedded is significant for the concept's relevance and production.[214]

Studying the context of a concept becomes even more relevant when concepts become so normal that they are not questioned anymore. This is the case I have argued in my "logic" of exceptionalism. Huysmans (1998) claims similarly that some concepts can become "thick signifiers", which makes their content almost universal (despite their original context).[215] For Huysmans, security is such a "thick signifier", since when it is used, it implies a "specific metaphysics of life"[216] - put in other words, it defines a set of norms and principles of how the life should work and what it should include. The implication of the "specific metaphysics" requires the practices of ordering, where things are put in "their place" in relation to people themselves and to the society at large - where this order is presented as "truth". Rather than seeing it as "truth", we should use the "thick signifier" approach to ask questions about the nature of the concept and lay bare the political work that has produced the concept itself.[217] This is also what Guzzini (2005)

[212] Guzzini 2005, 500; Huysmans 1998, 231.
[213] Guzzini 2005, 503.
[214] Guzzini 2005, 503–507; Jackson 2011.
[215] Huysmans 1998, 228.
[216] Huysmans 1998, 231.
[217] Huysmans 1998, 231–233.

argues as he talks about performativity of concepts and the need for understanding them through their political context, in which they take place: asking "what it does" rather than "what it is".[218]

In addition to asking, "what security does" in some context, constructive concept analysis should also aim to situate concepts not only politically, but also historically, by using inspiration from Foucault's history of genealogy. In this sense, constructivist conceptual analysis guides its user to study the institutionalised systems, where the performative acts take place, define the roles and authority positions in these systems and impact on the social production of knowledge. This means that the constructivist conceptual analyst should engage in studying both conceptual and social history, in order to understand the interplay they have on social science concepts – especially when we feel that the concept is without history or it has not been properly debated.[219] Again, here the interpretative nature of constructivist conceptual analysis and its denial of strictly defined science becomes apparent, since in the end, the reasons one begins to study the context of the concept depends on his/her feeling that there is more than meets the eye. However, studying the social and historical context of a phenomenon is a daunting task, since concepts like "energy" and "security" have appeared in the language for a long time. Thus, in the end it is again up to the researcher to decide, where s/he contextualises her/his concepts and reason the contextualisation - even though one would not search for a perfect explanation for why do we see things as we see them.

Particularly due to the never-ending history, I have decided to limit my interpretation of the (contextual) production of energy security in two ways. First, I have decided to limit the historical period under scrutiny from the late 19th century to the present, since I claim that the current energy security concept was formulated during this period. Second, as the assumptions of my "logic" of exceptionalism guide me, I will mainly focus on particular events and how they have been used to produce energy security. The processes of the "logic" of exceptionalism also work as my analytical tools as I am trying to problematize the questions they entail in the energy security historical context. The interpretation in this thesis has been done through the "logic" of exceptionalism glasses, where I will try to locate the processes into the historical formation of energy security and use them to show the production that defines how energy security is commonly seen. I have decided to do this by first narrating energy security history and then interpreting it. This interpretation on the historical formation of energy security will be then applied to a case of Xayaburi dam, where my intention is not necessarily to build a distinct case study, but to apply the interpretation that the

[218] Guzzini 2005, 508–515.
[219] Guzzini 2005, 515–516; Foucault 1977, 139–140.

constructive contextualisation of energy security that I have built through the "logic" of exceptionalism to Xayaburi to show how the normalised energy security allows, includes and excludes certain policies and practices in the dam site.

5.1. Data

The primary data that of this thesis is constructed from two different, yet connected, sets of literature. The first set of data will be used in the narration of the current energy security conceptual history - and will form the basis for the primary level of my analysis. Because I am interested in the historical production and contextualisation of energy security concept, I have decided to rely on the existing written documentation on the historical formation of energy security, which encompasses the (rare) literature that actually produces some sort of historical narrative on energy security in general and more specific literature on particular events that have gained global recognition or seen significant. Since I am focusing on energy security, the literature on events that have had a clear energy dimension, especially the two global oil crises in the 1970s, has been included into the primary energy security data. The data has mostly been produced in Anglo-American scholarly framework, particularly in the US, which effectively impacts on from which point of view the history is told in this thesis. However, this is necessarily not a deficit, since the US has (as my analysis later shows) had a central role in the securtitisation, normalisation and depoliticisation processes that have produced energy security, as we "know" it.

The first part of my primary data, thus, mainly consists of energy security, energy history and global history literature. My purpose is to use this literature to narrate, as "objectively" as I possibly can, the political and conceptual history of energy security as the main historical/energy security literature sees it.[220] I have selected circa 40 books, book chapters or academic articles that have given some insight to the energy security conceptual history. I have selected the literature with the following criteria:

1. The data has to say something about *energy security as a concept* or something about its political use. Thus, I have excluded energy security literature that has focused on the technical execution of energy security polices or on the analysis of specific issues in the energy sector, for instance the efficiency of electricity network in China. Even though I do

[220] My subjectivity is nevertheless constantly present, since I have decided to emphasise some events and parts of the history over others.

think that these scholarly works would surely produce an image on how they see energy security, I have decided to leave them out to keep the amount of data readable.

2. I have tried to include most commonly referenced energy security literature that addresses its history. I have tried to sort these studies out by searching for cross-references in the energy security literature and studying which scholars/writers are commonly used when the history of energy security is spoken about.
3. I have tried to include some non-Anglo-American literal works, so that the focus is not solely on the Anglo-American literature, even though it is by far the dominant one. Furthermore, even most of the non-Anglo-American literature has been written in English or the scholars have gotten their education from American universities, which has most likely influenced on their ways of writing and speaking.

I have also supported the history narration with political speeches and institutional texts, when they have been relevant. For instance, the political and institutional texts have sometimes deepened or cleared the "historical facts" that the literature has offered. One could quite easily include more speeches, since at least in the US context, energy independence has been widely discussed, but I have decided to keep the speeches in a supportive role. This primary data will be then analysed from the "logic" of exceptionalism perspective.

The second level of the primary data will consist of the Xayaburi dam case study material, which I will use to apply the results of my analysis. This data consists of limited scientific literature (about 10 scientific articles) and about 40 newspaper or non-governmental organisation (NGO) produced articles or informative texts about Xayaburi dam construction and its effects. Most of the articles do not necessarily study the energy security impacts of Xayaburi dam per se, but they nevertheless offer valuable information on the dam construction events and regional issues that the construction processes might cause. The newspaper and NGO articles also provide information about the events in Xayaburi and perhaps even on matters that have not been seen topical in the energy security literature, for instance the divisibility of energy security. I have tried to be as critical as possible of the information that the NGOs in particular (but also newspapers and scholars) have produced, since they do have their own political agenda, even though I might feel sympathetic for their cause. Due to the strict governmental control in Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR)[221] it has been

[221] See chapter 8 in this thesis for further information.

impossible to access local sources - thus regional newspapers or NGOs (that cover Lao PDR) have produced most of the data on Xayaburi that I have used.

6. The history of energy security concept

As stated in this thesis, contemporary energy security research has been mostly describing the world as it sees it without questioning its historical origins and conceptual construction. It has been more important to create metrics, models and exact concepts, which can help to produce future energy scenarios and find solutions to the modern energy security threats than asking where does energy security concept actually come from. The lack of historical specificity is naturally determined by the actor's ontological assumptions, but also the lack of interest of political scientists or other social sciences in energy security, which is often seen too technical of nature and thus left for statisticians, economists or security scientists, who have been able to produce wanted models. Also in IR, energy has often been seen as a secondary global structure, which has subjugated it to more pressing matters of international security and global economy.[222] Even now, when energy security issues are considered more pressing than ever, IR per se has not been specifically interested in them - even though they are commonly present in politics.

Despite energy security is often used in an ahistorical manner, the concept has not been created in void, but, determined by its political and academic use, it has as solid history as any concept. This does not mean that the concept would be continuously popularly used, rather than its production is connected to historical events, which shape its meaning and present themselves as the political context of energy security. Depending on whether we talk about the political use of energy security (how it has been used in political language and as a political goal) or the academic energy security (the first time that energy security was spoken with the term "energy security" and the knowledge-production practices were institutionalised), one can identify two different historical periods as the initial energy security contexts. Seen from the political use, energy security should be located to the late 19th and the early 20th centuries: to the era of great European powers, colonialism and World Wars.[223] From the academic perspective, however, energy security gained conceptual ground only as late as the 1960s, when the first academic texts about oil security were produced, and gained a

[222] See for example Nye 1982; Keohane 1984; Strange 1988.
[223] Yergin 1988; 2006; 2011.

momentum during the oil crises of the 1970s.[224] However, we are talking about two phases of the same continuum, since it is common that political needs often initiate academic concepts, which gain a momentum of their own if they are properly institutionalised. Thus, the history of energy security is from the very beginning a political one, even though it has been historically seen as an indistinguishable part of national security.

6.1. The political formation of energy security

The first notions of energy security can be traced all the way to the industrial revolution and the era of colonialism, where energy was framed as an important factor in national security thinking.[225] Initiated from this era, energy was considered pivotal in enabling two goals for (European) nation-states: economic development and military security/enlargement.[226] Economically, sufficient energy resources were understood as the main reason behind industrialisation, as enabling a relatively rapid social transformation from agrarian to industrial societies. These energy resources have naturally varied during as the time has passed, starting from pure manpower to wood, coal and other more energy intensive resources.[227] Having the ownership of such resources was seen to accelerate economic development and also enable the dominance of the less developed areas. For instance, vast coal resources made industrialisation possible in Great Britain and helped to guarantee the development of its military potential to dominate the world centuries later.[228]

Militarily, the need for energy resources, which coincided with power interests, created the main incentive to constantly develop the armed forces of a nation (which we seen the best way to protect against external security threats) and initiated the global quests for dominance and acquisition of resources during the 19th and 20th centuries. Economical development and interests of global dominance, especially in Western Europe, slowly created a society, which desired modernity and industrial growth and which was more and more dependent on constant flow of energy resources. This also increased the importation of energy from far away sources and led to the need to control the territories, in which the strategic energy resources (mostly oil and coal) were located. Furthermore, since energy resources were connected to the global dominance of distant land areas, military assaults and enemy occupations on those land areas were quickly seen as the major threat

[224] Cherp & Jewell 2014.
[225] In principle, energy has been important factor in security from early times (McCrie 2006). Nevertheless it became even more important during modernity, which also limits the scope of the history of energy security in this thesis.
[226] Pascual & Zambetakis 2010, 9.
[227] Strange 1988, 190–191.
[228] Smil 2004, 555.

for the national (energy) security of the colonial lord. Both the growth of nationalistic ideologies and lack of globally binding norms further accelerated these interpretations.[229] One way to name this military centred policies was to call them the politics of dominance, where in order to guarantee sufficient energy resources, one must take control over the area(s) where the supplies came from.[230]

These economic, military and national goals created the incentive for nations to start thinking about their energy securities. Soon enough, energy security was given more attention as a part of national security, where it was closely associated with national goals, national development and state survival. The political needs and interests of nation-states for energy constructed the definition for the energy (security) dimension of national security, despite the lack of academic interest. As Yergin (2006; 2011) argues, the most common way was to talk about energy as physical property (supplies of coal or oil) that were required to overpower the rivalling states and to enable sufficient resources for nation-state in question. In fact, the first of the four "A's", the *availability* of resources became the leading thought to formulate national (energy) securities. Already before the two World Wars the availability of resources was used to guide energy policies and to aim for a diversification of energy supplies. For instance, in Winston Churchill, a former prime minister of United Kingdom (UK), argued for an increased use of the Persian oil to improve the naval supremacy of the UK during and after the World Wars, changing the reliance on domestic energy (Welsh coal) to external energy sources.[231]

The two World Wars that we fought between 1910s–1940s further emphasised the salience of energy resources needed for warring economies - which continued even though the wars ended. When most of the infrastructure and national economies destroyed by intensive warfare, particularly in Europe, the role of energy in economic terms as the enabler of development was emphasised even further, as the significance of energy as a military resource weakened. Because the European nation-states had mostly lost their military power and suffered heavy casualties, it was by no means relevant (or possible) to initiate military excursions. Due to the military inability of the sovereign-states to wage major wars and normative change in the international system, that questioned the atrocities of the two World Wars through the creation of the UN, European powers slowly gave up their colonies, one by one, thus loosing the direct control of the territories where most of the energy

[229] Cherp & Jewell 2011a, 202.
[230] Bahgat (2006, 964) claims that the attempt to control the resources, particularly oil, was in fact a major reason for the Second World War.
[231] Kruse 2014; Yergin 1988; 2006, 69; 2011, 266–267. Even before, in the late 19th century, Lord Kelvin warned Britain of the exhaustion of global coal resources that had been the reason for the British world dominance and called for alternative sources of energy (Yergin 2011, 3).

resources they used resided.[232] As the independence movement cut the colonial ties, it was still seen important to tie the energy producers to the energy consuming (modern) states through some manner. Thus, regional and global energy markets were created, where particularly new players, for instance big (state-owned) energy companies, like the seven sisters, started to work between the consuming and producing states, since the producers lacked the financial capacity and know-how to manage the energy businesses in their territories - upholding the client relationship between the developing countries and the developed Western states.[233] The companies' power lasted for several decades until the power of Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) increased and caused a challenge to the energy security order leading to the oil crisis in the 1970s.[234]

It is evident that the changes in the national (energy) security sector are quite small if one compares them to the structural ones that took place in the international system. Not only colonialism transformed from physical domination to forms of structural power, but also a paradigm shift occurred, which transmitted the focus from a multipolar European order to the bipolar domination of the US and the USSR. Rather than transforming energy (security) polices, both the US and the USSR used energy resources to increase their military defences and buff up their economies - not really changing the energy (security) policies that had been previously practiced by the European states. This is not surprising, since the US had considered energy as a security problem for many decades as several Presidents from Taft to Eisenhower tried to guarantee *national energy independence* by for example designing national petroleum reserves or reducing oil imports through quota programs.[235]

6.2. The ascension of energy security research and the oil question

The energy security of the Cold War era (which dominated the world from mid-1940s to the beginning of 1990s) experienced some transformations even in the national (energy) security and energy polices of the two dominant states, the US and the USSR. As the two countries severely expanded their military capacities to outstand each other through development of more and more

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[232] However, often the control did not cease to exist, but changed its form to economic, political or cultural dominance. For instance, France and Great Britain held close ties to their colonies. This is apparent through institutions (like the Commonwealth) or the occasional need to intervene the territory of the old colony in the case of local crisis (France in its colonies in North-West Africa). Naturally one can also claim that the era of geographical intervention to energy producing or transporting nation's territory cannot be excluded from energy security agenda even today. Intervention in Iraq in 2003 (Cambell 2005; Juhasz 15.4.2013) and the recent crisis in Crimean Peninsula (Nunn & Foley 17.3.2014) can be both interpreted from this perspective.

[233] Kruse 2014, 27; Rutledge 2005.

[234] Strange 1988, 198–199.

[235] Nye 1982, 123; Pant 2010; Rutledge 2005, 69.

destructive weaponry, in particular the nuclear weapons, and engaged in further industrialisation and economic development, they slowly became more and more dependent on foreign energy resources, particularly the Middle Eastern oil. Already in the 1960s, it was suggested that the USSR would transform from a producer to a consumer country and, in similar vein, the US was losing its surplus oil-producing capacity, which had declined dramatically from the 1950s.[236] The decreasing self-sufficiency, which had been part of US national (energy) security for a good part of the 20th century, forced the US to rely even further on the global energy market, which was controlled then by the Western (mainly US) oil companies.[237] National (energy) security and energy policies thus relied even more on the availability of energy resources.

The end of the World War II nevertheless initiated two processes. Firstly, the first institutions that concentrated on energy (security) policies were founded in the 1950s-1960s. These institutions were both global in scope, like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and regional, like OPEC, which later in the 1970s became to have a global reach.[238] From these two IAEA has not and was not considered an energy security institution, since it focused in nuclear safety and to hinder the proliferation of nuclear weapons - even though nuclear energy became a commodity already in the 1950s.[239] OPEC, however, was an energy security institution that rose from the need of the energy exporting Gulf States to get better revenues from the international oil companies that created the energy markets with their oil. Furthermore, OPEC was used to further the nationalisation of the energy resources - a process, which had been initiated by Iran in the 1950s, but hindered by the Western, states by organising revolutions to topple governments, who threatened the availability and controllability of the energy resources.[240]

Second, the slow institutionalisation and the growing significance of oil as the energy source (having the best characteristics) and the dependence on it, created the initial theoretical framing of energy security as a concept of its own. The first energy security literature, dated in the 1960s, was still closely connected to national security agenda of consuming states and the energy security policies that aimed for the availability of resources. The aim for these studies was to study the past execution of energy policies and to draw policy advices for the decision-makers for their future

[236] Beaubouef 2007, 8.
[237] Kruse 2014.
[238] Deutch 2011.
[239] In fact, nuclear energy is hardly mentioned in the energy security literature or political addresses on the 1970s and before even though the first commercial reactors were created in the 1950s (IEA 2015d). This might indicate that the nuclear matter was too closely connected to nuclear weapons and not yet seen as a prominent energy form (World Nuclear Association 2015.)
[240] Kruse 2014, 28–30.

energy decision-making.[241] However, the expansion of energy security literature took place later in the 1970s, where globally influential events challenged the perceived energy (security) order - namely the principles that Western states had used to execute their energy (security) policies. Thus, what were understood as national security issues turned out global as the oil crises of 1973 and 1978 arguably initiated the push for a new energy security agenda.[242]

6.2.1. The era of oil crises

One of the most fundamental events for the development of energy security as a concept was the first oil crisis in the 1973. The roots of the crisis lead to the political enmities between majority of Gulf States and Israel, which had been supported by the US from its foundation. The surprise attack of Syria and Egypt against Israel on the 6th of October, during the national Israeli Yom Kippur holiday (supported by USSR military aid) threatened to flame the political situation in the Middle East. The US, an ally of Israel and major consumer of Gulf oil, reacted by giving an additional 2,2 billion dollars of military aid for Israel to respond to the military Syria's and Egypt's actions. Infuriated by the US policies, the six major OPEC states, Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) decided to issue an oil embargo against the US and other Western states that publically supported Israel.[243] Since OPEC countries had nationalised most of the oil resources during the 1960s, they hold a political leverage to use the oil weapon against the West, which had transformed from previous imperial states to consumers of oil to enable the maintenance of their modern economies.[244] The OPEC countries practically quadrupled the crude oil prices from 2,9 US dollars per barrel to 11,65 US dollars, which caused a political crisis.[245]

Even though the embargo was only directed against few states, which made it relatively easy to circumvent (especially with the aid of influential oil/energy companies) it directly impacted on the global energy markets and international politics. Not only did it cause massive panic and economic confusion as traders, states and companies scrambled for oil, not least the US, where constant oil flows in decent prices were seen as the fuel for economic development[246], but also meant a possible geopolitical transformation from the US lead Western world order to one dominated by the OPEC

[241] See for example Lubell 1961.
[242] See Yergin 2006; 2011.
[243] Beaubouef 2007, 16; Hamilton 2013; Painter 2012; Yergin 2011.
[244] Beaubouef 2007, 16; Painter 2012, 33–35; Strange 1988.
[245] Beaubouef 2007, 16; Hamilton 2013; Yergin 2011, 269.
[246] Cherp & Jewell 2011a, 203; Yergin 1988, 113.

countries, because they had the majority of available oil.[247] Furthermore, the whole idea of modern, industrialised economy/state was jeopardised as the oil flows, the lifelines of a modern economy became suddenly severely more expensive. The sudden embargo also revealed was the fragility of the global oil supply system, where Churchill's early strategic claims on energy supply diversification had not been considered with care.[248]

The events of the first oil crisis were central for the ascendancy of energy security studies. First, the crisis marked the first time that the term "energy security" rose to the political agenda in most of the industrialised nations.[249] Energy security became used as a concept of its own, not just emphasised as an aspect of national security, even though its linkage to national security thinking and doctrines were more than obvious, since national security concerns had created the concept in a first place.[250] Understandably, since the 1973 crisis was all about oil, energy security theorisations were limited to that particular substance - showing a clear continuation from the national (energy) security of the early 1900s.[251] As the 1973 crisis mainly challenged the order and the consumerist way of life in the Western states, political and academic debates were limited to the energy securities of the consuming rather than producing nations, since energy producers had challenged the global order and initiated the crisis - they were the "enemies". For instance, in the US the embargo was largely considered as an "oil weapon"[252] that threatened its goals for energy independence and hence energy security (without naturally questioning the role of the US in producing the crisis). Energy security gained a permanent role in the US political rhetoric as energy independence was framed as the prime objective of President Richard Nixon's "Project Independence"[253] and later articulated in the Carter doctrine[254].[255]

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[247] Kruse 2014, 33–34.
[248] Bucknell 1981; Nye 1982; Yergin 2011.
[249] Bahgat 2006, 965.
[250] See Rutledge 2005.
[251] Yergin 2011.
[252] Oil weapon is usually conceived as the purposeful behaviour of the exporting nations to manipulate the prices and/or the supplies of oil in the intention of changing the political behaviour of the consuming nations (Maull 1980, p. 3). The term is often used separately from energy weapon, which is though to include a wider array of other hydrocarbons, such as natural gas (Balmaceda 2012).
[253] This was articulated in Nixon's "Project Independence" energy policy speech with the goal of guaranteeing US energy independence in seven years (Yergin 2011, 269–270). In his national address to the American people on 25.11.2015, Nixon formulated that: "From its beginning 200 years ago, throughout its history, America has made great sacrifices of blood and also of treasure to achieve and maintain its independence. In the last third of this century, our independence will depend on maintaining and achieving self-sufficiency in energy." (Nixon 1973b.)
[254] The Carter doctrine indicates that the US will defend its national interests in the Middle East by using force if necessary to guarantee the free movement of the Middle Eastern oil (Cherp & Jewell 2011a, 203). This can be seen as the continuation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's agenda to define energy as a vital component of national security and therefore justify the protection of the Saudi Arab royal family to get privileged access to Saudi oil (Pant 2010, 33).

Second, the first oil crisis has been claimed to initiate the only great debate on energy security.[256] The word "debate" is partly deceiving, since it was not a discussion of the ontology or meaning of the concept, rather a debate on how energy security should be practiced - what kind of national strategies, economic, political and military means were needed to achieve energy security. In the consuming countries, where the embargo individual consumers and their consuming practices and industries, as energy and petroleum saving initiatives were institutionalised[257], there was a need to broaden the commonly agreed national (energy) security goal - the availability of resources. This lead to increased attempt to diversify energy supplies both domestically and abroad, and to the inclusion of the second and third of the four "A's", *accessibility* to and *affordability* of energy resources, as part of the energy security formulations.[258] In the industrial countries, the best way to achieve this was to further liberalise and institutionalise oil markets, so that national or political attempts to destabilise the energy order would not succeed again and start building national strategic reserves to protect the domestic consumption from the fluctuations of the market.[259]

Third, the oil crisis of 1973 initiated the institutionalisation and the construction of global energy order, which was based on the energy security concept. As only limited institutions existed related to energy security matters before 1970s, such as IAEA and the infamous OPEC, the Western states (led by the US) saw the construction of anti-OPEC institutions crucial. The institution would at best both connect the like-minded Western consumer-states (which shared similar concerns on adequate and diversified energy supplies) and help them cooperate and coordinate, when the access to energy (oil) was threatened - an issue that had not successfully taken place directly after the crisis.[260] Yergin (2011) argues that the first oil crisis and the desire of the US to guarantee its energy security (energy independence) led it to call an energy conference in Washington to outline an international energy regime of the consuming states. The regime, initiated by the International Energy Treaty in 1974, was created to help to prevent further energy disruptions and avert future harmful competition among the treaty partners. The institution, which the treaty established, was the International Energy Agency (IEA), which was tasked with providing the mechanisms to support the energy

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[255] Beaubouef 2007, 18; Cherp & Jewell 2011a, 202–203; Yergin 2011, 269–273.
[256] Dyer & Trombetta 2013a, 3.
[257] Beaubouef 2007, 18.
[258] IEA 2015b; Rutledge 2005.
[259] Ebinger 1982; Rutledge 2005. Ebinger (1982, xviii) also criticised the market-centred approach, since he saw that it would only create an illusion where market forces independently solve the existing energy dilemmas.
[260] Kruse 2014, 34.

security objectives of its member states and to balance against OPEC's power in the global oil market.[261]

Fourth, the institutionalisation of energy security and creating the forum to advance the energy security goals of the industrial Western countries initiated the stabilisation of "global energy security order". This order already existed prior to 1973 as the unwritten principles of availability and the favouring of the interest of the consuming Western states, but the challenge from OPEC, the "new energy order" it created and the New International Economic Order, which demanded the limitation of the powers of international corporations and OPEC-like national sovereignty on national resources, temporarily replaced these principles.[262] The newly institutionalised "global energy security order" of the Western states was formulated on the three principles: (1) state sovereignty (that adhered to the political understanding of the time), (2) security of supplies and (3) the role of stable global energy markets. In addition, energy security principles of availability and affordability were institutionalised in energy security institutions.[263] Practically, the creation of the international "energy security order" that focused on the security of the Western states, but influenced the global energy markets as a whole, justified industrial states to pursue the diversification of supplies and to slowly reduce their dependence on oil - without considering the security demand arguments of the producer side.

Due to the initiated institutionalisation of energy security, politically and scientifically, the second oil crisis, which was caused by the Iranian Revolution in 1978–1979, did not surprise the Western nations as badly as the first crisis - even though the financial losses were still severe. As the Iranian oil industry was forced to a standstill be the labourers who went to strike, the global oil production rates dropped seriously, as Iran would not produce any oil. The oil prices quickly doubled, causing economic strain, gasoline queues in the West, in particular the US, panic and outrage as the consumers had to spend a significant part of their income on petrol.[264] The newly founded IEA did not operate on its International Energy Programme (IEP) agreement to release the emergency oil reserves, since the Iranian shortage did not fill the seven per cent availability supply criteria, even

[261] Yergin 2011, pp. 272–273.
[262] Yergin 2006; 2011.
[263] For instance, IEA, one of the most influential energy security institutions that produces both monitoring and analysis of the energy markets, policies and technologies and conducts its own research, defines energy security as "the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price" (IEA 2015b). See also Lesage, Van de Graaf & Westphal 2010.
[264] Beaubouef 2007, 94–97; Carter 1980; Nye 1982; Hamilton 2013; Painter 2012, 34. Painter (2012, 34) emphasises that the revolution was closely connected to the shifting energy revenues that initially enforced the power of the shah, but brought him down, when the revenues diminished.

though Iranian production had fallen 91 per cent.[265] Thus politicians, particularly President Carter of the US had yet again to initiate unpopular programmes to cut the consumption of oil and argue for even further diversification of the energy supplies.[266]

Albeit the second oil crisis caused severe economic losses, it did not challenge the Western "global energy order" in a way the first oil crisis did. The OPEC states did use the crisis politically to collect as much revenues as they could due to the rising oil prices, but they did not propose an alternative order to the Western one.[267] Similarly, no oil weapons were used. When Western states pushed for further diversification, domestically and internationally to curb the oil prices and started to give more attention to other energy resources, such as natural gas, the influence of OPEC was actually reduced.[268] The diminishing political influence of the OPEC countries and the fear that consuming countries will try to find a replacement for oil, quickly made them take a step back, lower the oil prices in the early 1980s and modify their energy security goals from alternative order to trying to impact the Western created order from within. In particular, the OPEC countries were keen to progress the inclusion of security of demand to the energy security agenda, so that it would better take into consideration the security concerns of the energy producing countries. The security of demand did get some attention in academic and political deliberations, but it has not yet gained as important role in the energy security theory and practice as the Western-driven security of supply.[269]

6.3. The energy security order from 1980s

The tumult in the energy markets and the challenge that OPEC countries brought to the US dominated international order had been mostly taken in control in the beginning of 1980s. Due to the centrality of the Middle Eastern oil to the US, President Carter had (in accordance with his Doctrine, which implied that force would be used in the Middle East to guarantee US interests) established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), which would take care of the combats in the Gulf area if they were to be issued. Later during his presidency, Ronald Regan changed the name of the RDJTF to Central Command.[270] The remilitarisation of energy coincided with the continuing development of the Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPRs), which the US

[265] Beaubouef 2007, 95.
[266] Beaubouef 2007.
[267] Beaubouef 2007, 95.
[268] Yergin 2011.
[269] Romanova 2013, 240.
[270] Klare 2004, 1–4.

Presidents had every one in a while attempted, but now, as the founding of the reserves and stockpiling oil was institutionalised in the IEA framework, the political groundwork for SPRs had already been done. Also the marketization of energy/oil continued as Reagan saw that it was best to leave the oil to the markets, which would control the prices without state intervention.[271] Even though the logic seemed controversial in a sense as oil pricing should not be in principle controlled, but still some control was in place, it clearly followed the "global energy order" of the 1970s.

The "global energy order" remained relatively stable during the 1980s as the international focus shifted to the amelioration of the relationship between the US and the USSR. As the oil crises were past and the diversification tactics and institutional energy security framework had helped to stabilise the global oil markets, the interest of security literature shifted from energy to the strengthening international cooperation. Energy security was still theorised and theoretical knowledge turned into policy advice (particularly in the US), but since the challenge to the existing order had deteriorated, it was not as topical anymore. However, the next decade, 1990s, made energy security topical again, since the new decade produces both traditional security threats, but also newer challenges to security thinking, which required some adaptation from the constructed energy security concept as well.

First, the situation at the Persian Gulf escalated in the beginning of 1990s, as Iraq took over Kuwait and reinstalled a puppet government in the country to control its oil resources. What was initially seen as a "domestic affair" between the two states turned into an international event as it was noticed that by conquering Kuwait, Iraq took over almost one fifth of the (regional/global) oil resources.[272] Particularly US-based evaluations claimed that Iraq would soon threaten Saudi-Arabia, an ally of the US, which had been controlling the oil prices from tumult within OPEC and which also had close relations with the US.[273] As oil importing had become cheaper in the US than producing domestic oil, the US consumed more Middle Eastern oil than ever, which made the US more vulnerable for changes in the oil market. Seen as a threat also to US economic independence, US President George H.W. Bush operationalized the Central Command forces and formed a coalition to drive Iraqis out of Kuwait - with an UN acceptance.[274] Thus, Iraq, a former ally against the threat of Iran, became the enemy, since it threatened US economic interests in the Gulf area.[275]

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[271] Beaubouef 2007, 116–121.
[272] Sovacool & Brown 2010.
[273] Beaubouef 2007.
[274] Painter 2012, 37.
[275] Mahdi 2012, 26.

Kuwait was liberated, but the panic at the markets that the possibility of oil shortages and a new war in the Gulf area impacted on the energy princes at the oil market, almost tripling them. The panic was however short-lived and the prices soon stabilised, despite Iraqi forces leaving oil pipes burning as the left Kuwait.[276]

Second, the sudden demise of the USSR changed the bipolarity of international politics into unipolar state system, which was dominated by the US. Already before the demise and most certainly after it, new critical security approaches had questioned the security approaches of the strategic studies, which focused mainly on strategic weaponry, on the possibility of nuclear war and the everlasting rivalry between the two superpowers. Critical security approaches and the "victory" of the Western values over the Soviet ones brought into limelight the "other" security threats, which had been either subjugated to more important state security, like individual security (which later changed into human security) or had not considered at all, but now rose up as globally threatening security issues that could change the lives of many people for good.[277] Climate change, the enforcement of the green movement and the production of environmental security were suddenly more and more important to lots of people and global institutions - albeit there was a strong opposition to this kind of security as well.[278]

Despite the opposition, the environmental agenda directly impacted on energy security theorisation and practices, since environmentalist directly questioned the use of carbon dioxide intensive and highly pollutant oil and coal - which had formed the basis of energy security from the 19th century. To adapt to the environmental concerns, energy security practitioners and knowledge-producers stated to talk about the fourth "A", *acceptability* which included some ethical discussion on what forms of energy should be used in the face of climate change and growing impacts of energy to environment and human health.[279] Furthermore, the growing human rights agenda and the activeness of global institutions, such as the UN introduced the idea of energy poverty to the energy security discussion as part of the accessibility dimension.[280]

The conceptual challenge to energy security from the non-state actors did not nevertheless hinder the institutionalisation. During the 1990s and 2000s the energy security concept overflowed from the IEA's institutional framework into other institutions as for instance the influential group of

[276] Beaubouef 2007, 149–153.
[277] Fierke 2007.
[278] See for instance Floyd 2008.
[279] Sovacool 2011b; Dyer & Trombetta 2013a; 2013b.
[280] See for instance Bhattacharyya 2013.

industrial counties, G8/7[281] and the UN[282] used energy security concept in different levels and created plans of actions on energy security. For instance the UN declared year 2012 as the International Year of Sustainable Energy for All.[283] In addition, several institutions, for instance the International Energy Forum (IEF), were founded to discuss different aspects of energy security - in particular to bring together the key oil exporting and importing countries to enable a continuous dialogue on oil trade.[284] Nonetheless, the institutionalisation has not led into development of one global energy security institutions, but the area has stayed fragmented, since states have not been willing to subjugate their national energy securities to UN-like institution. This has been one of the reasons, why existing institutional framework has largely failed to accommodate the energy problems of the developing countries.[285]

The institutionalisation of energy security in 2000s has been coincided and defined by global events and the produced threats and estimations to energy security. These threats, which have kept the military dimension of energy security alive in the face of increasing economic importance of energy security, are both old and new, but most of all they have partially challenged or could challenge the way energy security has been understood. First, the rise of new global players, such as China to balance US in international politics and its seemingly infinite hunger for energy resources to continue its economic development has been seen as a concern to the US led order - not so much because China's energy security policies are quite similar than the US', but due to China's success in "doing business" in developing countries (outside Middle East) that are rich of resources.[286] Second, the possibility of using the "energy weapon" has remained relevant for energy security theorists and practitioners as for instance Russia has been active in cutting its gas supplies from the

[281] Lesage et al. 2010; Romanova 2013. The G8 has even formed a plan of action about global energy security in St Petersburg in 2006 (G8 2006). The G8/7 meets on energy issues on regular basis for instance on sustainable energy security (G7 2015).
[282] The affair has been discussed in several levels, for example in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and Security Council (UNSC). In addition, UN sub-organisations like United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) have made policy papers on the matter. See for instance UNIDO 2011; Wieczorek-Zeul 2007.
[283] Bhattacharyya 2013, 423.
[284] These institutions include Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC). Some global institutions like World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World Bank have also participated in energy security related discussions. Furthermore, there are other forums like Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change (MEM-16) and Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate that discuss energy security issues. (Lesage et al. 2010.)
[285] For example, only UN has addressed the energy poverty issues that have emerged in the least developed part of the world (Bhattacharyya 2013). However, since the UN institutions are fragmented and there is no one actor focusing on energy, energy security issues have not been valued as the main objectives of UN action, but ways to achieve other goals (Lesage et al. 2010, 53–54).
[286] Downs 2004; Lheem 2008; Singh 2013; Yao & Chang 2014. Victor & Yueh (2010) have even gone so far as to talk about "new energy order", where rapidly developing countries like China and India will shape the current energy order.

former Soviet states, if their policies have not been to Russia's liking. This has directly impacted the developed European states, like Germany, who have been dependent on Russian gas for their energy.[287] Particularly due to the Russian energy threat, EU states have tried to deepen their cooperation in energy security affairs.

Finally, the rise of terrorism, or its internationalisation after the 9/11, has both justified continuing interference in the oil-rich Middle East, like the War in Iraq in 2003, but also constructed sudden terrorist attacks as a looming threat for the energy infrastructure of the modern states.[288] Controversially enough, the terrorists, like the Taliban, were former allies of the US, and for instance the Clinton administration had supported them in order to promote Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).[289] Albeit the War on Terror changed the international system in many ways, the energy independence has remained an important goal for states, in particular the US. For instance, President George W. Bush signed an Energy Independence and Security Act in 2007, to reduce the dependence of the US on "foreign oil".[290] Surprisingly, due to the increased national oil and natural gas production in the US, President Obama declared in 2013: "Today, no area holds more promise than our investments in American energy. After years of talking about it, we're finally poised to control our own energy future."[291] However, the oil market prices, influenced by Saudi-Arabia, have fallen low enough that the domestic production of alternative energy sources to the Middle Eastern oil has not been profitable, which has, yet again, made Middle East the centre of global energy markets - despite the Middle Eastern nations, the Saudis including, are losing significant amount of money due to the low oil prices.[292]

7. Interpreting energy security through the "logic" of exeptionalism

The narrated history of energy security concept provides an interesting combination of events, big and small, that have had an impact on the formulation of the contemporary energy security concept. Even though the history has been told by using mainly Western and Anglo-American sources, it builds a (hi)story, where politics, power and interests have played a significant role, when energy security practices, language and concept(s) have been created. However, as it might happen with the

[287] Balmaceda 2012.
[288] Panter 2012; Sovacool & Lim 2011.
[289] Mahdi 2012, 25.
[290] Bush 19.12.2007.
[291] Obama 2013.
[292] Conca 22.6.2015.

historical value of the concept, as issues become normalised, as we "know" what something "is", it might not be relevant to talk about the political nature of the issue. In fact, too often the history is interpreted as a set of objective facts that have happened in the course of time out of some logical reason, which transforms the history from a set of political choices to obvious "truths" about the world, where the "truth" covers and makes the political redundant. This problem is at the heart of energy security, which is narrated either ahistorically (without discussing about the history of the concept) or, when the history is (rarely) addressed, it is almost always a description of the events, rather than politicising them.

Rather than asking, "what something is", with my "logic" of exceptionalism, I intend to ask, "how something became as it is", which takes the focus from the objective assessment of the "existing" concept to discussing how it became an objective concept rather than a political interpretation of the world and a way to use power. I have decided to analyse the energy security history in three parts by using the "logic" of exceptionalism processes that I have determined in chapter 4.4., namely: securitisation, normalisation and depolicitisation. Even though the analysis is divided into these three parts, it should be reminded that these processes are not in any way disconnected, but mutually constitutive, nor they necessarily take place in the order I have analysed here. In fact, proponents of each process have taken place throughout the history of energy security and they still continue to work, as the analysis should show. The analysis that I will make by using the "logic" of exceptionalism approach will be further used in chapter 8, where the findings that I have made will be applied to a case in Southeast Asia, the Xayaburi dam energy project, to problematize the way the dominant, ahistorical energy security concept guides energy security policies - and causes insecurity.

7.1. Securitisation: creating the state of exception and producing energy security

The history of energy security is not necessarily easily interpretable through the securitisation process, since energy security, albeit the emphasis would be on particular events, for instance the first oil crisis of 1973, is a process itself not a concept that just popped out somewhere. In fact, interpreting the historical narrative, I argue that the early securitisation had already started in the beginning of 20th century as European states, or at least the UK, needed to securitise the availability of energy resources in order to survive the war-torn years of the modern history. During the two World Wars, states were in a constant state of exception, since "normal" societal order and individual rights and liberties had to be subjugated to war economies, which needed to control both the materials and the manpower to guarantee the survival of the state. Energy was clearly a resource

for the sovereign-state - it was not for individual purposes but to keep the industries running in the exceptional environment and to guarantee the national security of the state. Thus, energy (security) needs to be seen early on as something more than a resource, which it is often seen, since through its existence it has determined state sovereignty in a profound way.

The state sovereignty was further defined through the economic representations of energy. Interpreting the literature, it seems to me that as the imperial states initiated their excursions to conquest resource intensive foreign areas, they also defined the unwritten norms for national (energy) security and state sovereignty. National (energy) security, or as it was then defined as the availability of sufficient energy resources, should be executed through control and domination, since it was the best way to guarantee the availability of resources. Imperial states installed governments to several colonial states they acquired, which institutionalised often a very different order than the one executed in their home countries, since the people needed to be controlled. In a sense, I think that the imperialists often created a state of exception of a sort, which differentiated from the original order, since the subjugated people were seen as the possible enemy if they were to rebel against the imperial. The control and domination of people and the resource flows from the periphery to the centre defined the sovereign. Sovereign state was an energy consumer, which aimed for modernity and constant economic development. Those areas, which could not gain the control of their energy flows, would certainly not fill the criteria of the sovereign-state.

It seems that the national (energy) security, which was modified by international events, like wars, defined sovereignty in a way that unwritten norms about national (energy) security practices were produced. States, even after the WWII, had the privilege to acquire energy resources to enable their (economic) development and boost their economies from the slump that the destructive wars had caused. I see that the national (energy) security norms defined this as a quality of a consumer state, who needed the energy for the security of supply. Availability can be seen to become even stronger determinant of national (energy) security, even though one cannot necessarily talk about a normalised order, since the institutional framework that would have enforced the principle did not exist. What did enforce the principle were the practices of states, which transformed the colonial domination into economic dependence. Thus, the only truly sovereign players in this system were those who controlled the energy resources - directly or through other actors, such as companies. However, these sovereign-states had no means to securitise energy in language, since no concept of energy security existed as means to talk about energy security per se.

Despite the early securitisation of energy, influenced by the two world wars and the unwritten practices of the Western states, I intend to argue that the most crucial securitisation practices that initiated the institutionalisation and normalisation of energy security took place in the 1973, when the unwritten energy security order was seriously challenged by alternative OPEC-led order. By 1973, the world had turned from a multipolar European system to a bipolar US and USSR dominated one, where in particular the US had taken a strong role as the leader of the West. Similarly, the US took the lead in the securitisation of energy security and the institutionalisation of the international state of exception, when the oil crisis shocked the energy markets. Interpreting the literature, the issues that culminated to this event challenged the unwritten principles of national (energy) security in several ways.

First, I will claim that the oil embargo questioned the principle of security of supply as the core principle of energy security. OPEC states had struggled to gain the independence from the international oil companies that had controlled their resources for a good part of the 20th century to gain the control of the oil revenues for themselves. As they gained the control of their own resources, they used them to challenge the unwritten principles of statehood, which had been long determined by the availability principle. Suddenly, the inability of the Western, modern states to control their energy flows threatened to make them lesser states in the system, since the control had shifted to those, who had been once dominated. Energy had been so closely tied to independence that the lack of it questioned the independence as a whole. For instance, US President Nixon argued in 1973 that

> From its beginning 200 years ago, throughout its history, America has made great sacrifices of blood and also of treasure to achieve and maintain its independence. In the last third of this century, *our independence will depend on maintaining and achieving self-sufficiency in energy*.[293]

Thus, not only was the independence defined by energy security in jeopardy, but also the lack of sufficient energy could arguably make the past sacrifices of people redundant, which would dismantle the existence of a nation.

Second, the OPEC-driven oil crisis threatened the international order, which had been founded on Western principles. Not only their sovereignty was in jeopardy, but the OPEC states together with

[293] Nixon 1973b. Italics added.

the demands from the "third world" for a NIEO, a better distribution of wealth in the state system, severely challenged the international order and its principles, which were seen almost untouchable. Combined with the threat of the "second world" communist block, this would not only cause threat to the existence of the "first world" US-led states, but would also shift the main global focus away from the West to the Middle East. At worst, this could lead to the reorganisation of global institutions, such as the UN, where the claim of the developing countries was the strongest.

Third, the oil embargo challenged the economic principles about functioning energy markets. Rather than regulating energy prices, the markets suddenly became a place for severe economic tumult. Combined with the panic at the markets created a situation, where the resources where no longer available - at least in affordable price. Not only this transformed the markets into a dangerous place, the rising energy prices also jeopardised the economic growth and development of states that were dependent on oil as their primary energy resource. The access to cheap oil had been the core reason behind modernisation and industrialisation, which was now put to question. Even more than this, the sudden decrease of affordable oil questioned the consuming practices of (in particular US) citizens, who had been accustomed to infinite oil flows. As the states exited the exceptional order of the war period, energy had also become a consumer commodity, as radios, televisions and electricity mushroomed in the modern states. When the regulations hit for instance car driving, heating costs and gas stations, it became crucial for the politicians to argue for self-restraint from the citizens - and to appeal to the unity of the citizens, which in Nixon's (1973) words "is the cornerstone of our great and good country."[294]

The threat produced to the existence of modern Western states, the principles, which had guided national (energy) security policies, and the modern consumption habits were exceptional due to vast influence on the core Western values. The events such like the oil embargo had never happened before during the American reign - at least to the extent that they threatened the unwritten principles of the system or questioned the energy markets that the US had been building to counter protectionism. The events did not cause a military threat per se, since OPEC states did not use military means against the US or the West. However, I see that they did produce an enemy, which threatened the existence of modern states, namely the Middle Eastern producing states. In his national address, President Nixon (1973) claimed that because of the latest (Yom Kippur) war in the Middle East "most of the Middle Eastern oil producers have reduced overall production and cut off

[294] Nixon 1973b.

their shipments of oil to the United States."[295] Nixon did not mention the reasons for the war (nor the US interference), only a factual statement on the oil embargo. Rather than pointing to a specific state, the "enemy" was the event, where the markets, which had been for long controlled by the US, turned against it and forced a state intervention into the consumption habits of its citizens - an exceptional means in the US.

I argue that precisely the severity of the situation for the West and the exceptional nature of the events justified politically "necessary" action both domestically and internationally. As the threat domestically was the availability of energy resources, the US and other states made political choices to lessen the environmental regulations domestically and start different energy projects all around the nation. Since energy independence had become a prime value of state existence, it needed to be guaranteed at any cost. Sufficient energy resources did not only determine the independence of the state, but the also influenced on the success of the politicians (in democracies), who could be held accountable for their failure. Internationally the threat was the abolishment of the US-led international order, and also the deterioration of the Western alliance, since oil embargo severely constrained the relations of the states impacted. Not only there was the need to tackle the challenge in the international level, to maintain the existing order, but to save the Western block. The best way to save the global order - and emphasise the dominance of the security of supply approach, was to institutionalise it through IEA.

The securitisation of the exceptional event later on seems to also allow military interference to the Middle East. As described before, US President Carter initiated a military task force in the area to prevent any further tumult that the oil crises and Iranian revolution caused - hence continuing the military dimension of energy security that has been part of it from its early use. However, most importantly, the securitisation of the oil crisis required the development of a concept, which could be used to discuss about the energy related security problems of energy consumer states, to produce knowledge on the oil crisis and policies to prevent them from repeating, and to progress the institutionalisation of national (energy) security. This is the political context where energy security first appeared as a concept. It was not a neutral concept, like political concepts rarely are, but a political attempt to safeguard the challenged existing international order and sovereignty of energy consuming states, who had dominated the system before and now securitised it as a result of appearance of challenging way to practice national (energy) security - the security of demand. The

[295] Nixon 1973a.

production of energy security as a consumer centred approach was possible, since (1) there was an actor strong enough to drive it (the US), (2) the consumer energy security, the security of supply, was not a new model, but a normalised practice that the imperial states had practiced for decades and (3) the challengers, namely OPEC, did not have knowledge-production means powerful enough to challenge the construction of energy security politically nor academically.[296]

7.2. Normalisation: the institutionalisation of energy security order

The securitisation of the exceptionally defined events that the oil crisis of 1973 caused was itself strong, since the possibility of OPEC-led new energy security practices threatened the national (energy) security, the energy independence and the sovereignty of energy consuming states - and the unwritten international order that the West had maintained from imperial times. In order to understand how the energy security concept we have become to know have been produced, the securitisation would in principle be sufficient, since we can already see that the energy security concept was born as the unwritten principles of national (energy) security, like energy independence, were threatened. In the situation, I see that the Western states had two alternatives: either to succumb to the new energy security norms that rose as OPEC challenged the existing international order and alongside the energy consumerism of the West or to enforce and institutionalise those unwritten principles that not only defined their energy policies, but also their sovereignty. The West, the US in the lead, chose the enforcement of their own principles, which should be further studied here so that one can truly understand the normalisation process, where exceptional events where used to justify the energy security principles we rely on today.

As with securitisation (and depoliticisation), I claim that the normalisation process was initiated already during the colonial era of the late 19th/early 20th century. However, the normalisation was week, since it mainly relied on shared practices of imperial states to execute their national (energy) security policies, namely colonial subjugation and the deportation of resources to the imperial countries, where they were consumed. There was no proper institutionalisation of these principles, since war-prone states were not able to create such institutions. The creation of the UN and the decolonisation process that started later in the 1940s-1950s in fact made it even harder for (ex-)imperial states to produce institutions that would promote national (energy) security with military subjugation. Despite the transformed international atmosphere, the imperial states were mostly able

[296] Indeed, I have not so far found any research in the 1970s-1980s that would emphasise security of demand over security of supply.

to transform the subjugation to economic control of vital energy resources - in particular through international oil companies.

The oil crisis not only gravely questioned the way national (energy) security policies had been executed, but I see that it also threatened the normalisation process of the key principles that guided these polices - for instance the availability of resources. As the control of the resources in the Middle East had been transformed from the companies back to the state, consuming states could no longer regulate the oil production of these energy-rich producing countries. Through the securitisation of the possible resource depletion and construction of the exceptional nature of the event, it was easier to embark in executing the old Churchill principles of availability through diversification[297] and also to justify the cooperation to build an institutional framework strong enough to enable the continuing dominance of the security of supply principles in the world.

The normalisation process of security of supply principles, I claim, was thus initiated in three different dimensions. First, institutions were created to further the energy security principles of consumer states. In particular, the IEA had, and still has, an important role in the normalisation of energy security. The purpose of the institution, as the US and other energy forum participant states planned, was to (1) protect the energy security of its member states by demanding the member states to create emergency oil reserves under its supervision that were to be used if there was an attempt to control energy markets, (2) to promote security of supply by drawing equation marks between it and energy security by stating that energy security is "the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable prices"[298] and (3) to produce knowledge about energy markets, policies and practices. As no global institutions on energy security existed (and still do not exist), the IEA it was easy to gain a leading role in energy security as a knowledge-producer and energy security analyst, which has enabled IEA to gain more power as the definer of energy security, used by researchers and politician and to further promote its energy security perspectives throughout the world. For instance, other institutions, such as UNEP and G7/8 have adopted the energy security understanding, which emphasises the availability and sufficiency of energy.[299]

Second, most of the scholarly knowledge-production focused on the security of supply, which helped to institutionalise the four "A's" as the principles of energy security research. As most of the energy security research has been, perhaps due to its natural science emphasis, observing the

[297] See Yergin 2011.
[298] IEA 2015b.
[299] G8 2006; UNEP 2015.

"commonly agreed" set of energy security principles, they have tried to build and rebuild easily usable models on energy security, rather than seeing it as a political construct with a historical context. Energy security, rather than being something observable, should be seen as set of politically driven principles that emphasise only some parts of security. In particular, energy security research has not been able to question the close connection of energy security and state sovereignty, where rather than being a product of sovereignty, energy security continually enforces it and the state system we are part of. By studying the observable aspects of energy security, rather than thinking what the security actually is, energy security scholars have been part of the normalisation process and institutionalisation of security of supply as energy security.

Third, state practices have also driven the normalisation process forward. The diversification tactics that the US and other Western states, whose security of supply was in jeopardy, and their means to control the markets through IEA emergency reserves (even though it was stated that the markets should work free of any control) not only helped the oil consumers to stabilise the situation that the exceptional events had created, but also to normalise the unwritten energy security principles. As NIEO did not succeed and the OPEC oil embargo was terminated, the producing states had to subjugate themselves to the stronger institutionalised order, which had normalised it with the justification that OPEC embargo created. However, I am not talking about solely economic principles or state sovereignty, but also the normalisation of military presence in the Middle East. OPEC needed to be controlled and further oil crises avoided, which lead to formation of permanent task force in the Middle East. The task force or military strength has been often used in the Persian Gulf to topple hostilities that have threatened the independence or energy independence of energy consumers or their allies.[300]

Institutionalisation, knowledge-production and practices have been driving the normalisation process of the national (energy) security securitisation - with a great success. Several states, which are not part of the West, for example China and India, have stated to use the same energy security language and practices that has been normalised in the Western practice. For instance, Chinese minister of the Development Research Centre of the State Council Li Wei has argued that China needs to learn from the US to become energy independent.[301] Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has connected energy to independence and sovereignty, when he argued that India "[…] will be celebrating 75th year of our independence in 2022. Today, we import 77 per cent of

[300] See for instance Mahdi 2012.
[301] Li 15.11.2014.

our oil and gas. Can't we target to lower import at least by 10 per cent by 2022 to pay tribute to those who sacrificed their life for our freedom?"[302] To better promote their independence, both India and China have applied the IEA tactics of filling their stocks with cheep oil, which has been seen as threat in the West.[303] Furthermore, the energy security challengers, the security of demand emphasisers have subjugated themselves to the normalised energy security as they have tried to further their own goals within this order. This has partly led to confusing action, where for instance Saudi-Arabia, the biggest oil producer in the world wants to keep the oil prices low so that the production of crude oil in the US would not be beneficial.[304] However, this selected policy has actually both given cheaper oil to the markets, benefitting the consuming nations like the US and caused a serious strain on fellow OPEC members, who have at times voiced their discomfort on the situation.[305]

The strength of the normalisation process comes apparent, when one studies the justifications behind energy security practices or claims to advance energy independence. Due to the normalisation of the energy security concept, in particular independence as the core of energy security, states do not have to justify their energy security practices with nothing more than energy independence. For example, the US has used the energy independence argument to justify its continual existence in the Middle East from the times of President Carter. Since independence is in the core of energy security, and energy security is in the core of independence, energy security practices and policies are hard to question or to find alternatives, even they would be controversial because they are producing threats to the nature and human beings. Simultaneously, the role of markets in the energy sector has been cemented, as they are seen the best platform to do energy policies. Thus, energy security conceptualisation (though its normalisation) has also advanced liberal marketization of the "global energy order" - and made market based energy security policies unquestionable.

Mostly, because of the normalisation of the particularistic way of speaking and practicing energy security, the "global energy order" and the energy security concept has been able to absorb the "threats" that would challenge it. One of such examples is the adoption of the fourth "A", accountability, and absorbing the critique of the environmental security agenda to prevent it from questioning the energy security/energy independence goals. The "dangers" of rising awareness of

[302] IANS 27.3.2015.
[303] Blas 13.3.2015.
[304] Ahmed 8.5.2015; Macalister 19.10.2014; Stafford 12.5.2015;
[305] Middle East Eye 7.5.2015.

the global climate change and environmental pollution - caused by the extensive use of energy intensive fossil fuels, which had been the main energy sources to guarantee state energy independence from the early 20th century - was tackled by institutionalising environmental affairs as part of the energy security institutions, such as IEA, which now also focuses on "enhancing international knowledge of options for tackling climate change."[306] The environmental challenge to energy security has also been institutionalised in a way, which does not harm the functioning of the energy markets or hinder the economic growth and modernisation goals of the states.[307]

Yet, there are those environmentalists, who have not believed in the ability of states or energy security institutions to give up their emphasis on oil. International NGOs, like Greenpeace, have argued for an energy revolution, where the energy independence needs of states would be secured with renewable energies.[308] What we see here is an important discussion about the resources that ought to be used to guarantee energy security and a cleaner environment, which unfortunately does not question the processes of energy security normalisation or securitisation - but aim for "greening" them.[309] Some local NGOs, like Mekong Energy and Ecology Network (MEE Net), have been able to question the consumer and state centred energy security by emphasising the harmful effects of the energy security policies to the less well-of people. Thus, MEE Net has been arguing for an energy security approach, where people would be empowered to act for their own energy security in their spheres of life without the intervention of state or international energy institutions. [310] MEE Net, in a way, exemplifies the problem of the normalisation of energy security: there are possibilities for a better and more inclusive energy security order, but they are in the periphery, working with the people, who are excluded from the energy security in the first place.

7.3. Depoliticisation: energy security exclusions, inclusions and depoliticisation of insecurity

The exceptionality of the 1973 oil crisis events and the normalisation of the energy security concept and the "global energy order", which was institutionalised to respond to the threat that the OPEC-led possible new energy security conceptualisation produced, partly coincided, partly produced the depoliticisation process of energy security. I claim that one can already see some depoliticisation before the actual oil crisis of 1973 if one studies the unwritten norms that produced national (energy) security policies and practices from the beginning of the 20th century. These norms were

[306] IEA 2015f.
[307] The Kyoto Protocol is a prime example of this. See United Nations 1998.
[308] Dawe, Short & Aubrey 2012.
[309] Greenpeace 2015.
[310] MEE Net 2015.

political of nature, since they were often made on imperialistic purposes, where subjugation of foreign nations was seen normal practice as the powerful and modernised states ruled the world. However, as the practices became common means of executing national (energy) security policies, a process of depoliticisation was also initiated. Due to its symbiotic relationship with state-sovereignty in a war-torn world, there was no sense in questioning the depoliticisation of the national (energy) security norms, since one would have simultaneously questioned the sovereignty of the state.

The symbiotic relationship of state sovereignty and energy security should also be seen as the core principle behind the newly initiated depoliticisation process during the 1973 oil crisis. Particularly in the US, energy and independence where commonly put together in political speech to emphasise the central role of energy and the need to create a world, where the political use of energy as a weapon and the challenge to the availability principle would seize to exist.[311] As the sovereignty of the energy consuming states was under a threat, the US and its allies needed to initiate practices that would diminish the threat that lack of energy resources (especially oil) caused, and to begin policies that would make sure that their view on energy security was institutionalised and normalised. The role of diversification tactics and institutionalisation, particularly the creation of core institutions like the IEA, were central in dealing with the threat and in maintaining the security of supply at the core of energy security. The political choices that followed created a particularistic conceptualisation of energy security - a conceptualisation that has not been properly problematized.

In fact, the depoliticisation process of energy security that was used to cover the political choices and dimensions that have determined energy security decision-making from the early 20th century actually, how I see it, produced a world, where energy security, against the common belief, should not be seen as a shared security concept. From the securitisation and depoliticisation processes, which were initiated during the 1973 oil embargo, the main political goals were to ensure the survival of the unwritten national (energy) security principles: independence and economic modernity though continuous development. After the WWII *consumers* had taken an important role in energy security policies of the industrial states as they used power through democratically elected bodies and participated in the consumer-markets, which had been maintained particularly by the US. As global energy markets were largely used by states, it was considered that the state is responsible for guaranteeing the availability of resources for the consumers to use - and if the state

[311] See Nixon 1973a.

(or the politicians) could not fulfil its responsibility, the consumers had the option not to re-elect such politicians.[312] Without sufficient inexpensive energy, it was impossible to consume, and without consumption it was seen that the economy would not develop - or the society would not modernise.

Rather than being "forced decisions", the decisions to drive consumer-centred energy security concept and the "global energy order" should be seen highly political, since they excluded the energy security of those, who were not benefitting from the security of supply. The first ones excluded were those demanding for the security of demand, OPEC-states and later other energy producers. This exclusion was executed, since the US and the other developed consumer countries wanted to guarantee that the energy security concept they were driving and pushing for would overpower the alternative security of demand. Through the naming the oil crisis exceptional, the developed states could justify policies that would benefit their energy security and independence and lessen the political leverage that the OPEC states had by trying to find alternatives to the Middle Eastern oil. The production of energy security concept, which would take availability of energy resources as its core, helped to depoliticise the claims of the energy producers and subjugated them to (again) working in the institutional framework that they had not created.

The second exclusion that the depoliticisation of energy security caused has not been developed by energy security literature, since it has not questioned the *consumerism* behind energy security. Rather than talking about the energy security of individuals, energy security literature uses the work consumer. However, this is problematic, since consuming includes a supposition that a person is (1) part of some market area, where (2) s/he can make choices based on offer and (3) use money to buy the products s/he desires. But can we name all the people in the world as consumers? I would argue that we cannot, since there are at least 1,3 billion people without any access to electricity or modern forms of energy.[313] These people are not geographically limited, but can be found all over the world. These people are defined by their inability to be "modern": they are backward, often found at the periphery of power, on the outskirts of society or as the "others", the "uncivilised" of the modern society.

Rather than to talk about these people and human beings, the energy security literature and institutions have decided to name them as "energy poor" that suffer from energy poverty. Energy

[312] Matthews 2012. In the US, energy security has long been a priority (at least in rhetorically) in presidential elections, where the candidates emphasise energy independence.
[313] ONE 2015.

poverty, despite its humanising goals of making energy available for all, is actually a representation of the strength of the dominant energy security concept. Adopted by global institutions like the UN, the main goal of energy poverty policy is to guarantee energy for all by connecting them to the modern energy network.[314] Not only this policy choice echoes colonialism, since there are the "poor" that need to be saved from the lack of energy, but it also emphasises their backwardness, inability to be "modern" and savageness, as they are not (yet) energy consumers, which they desire to be. Agamben's (1998) formulation on exclusive inclusion is useful here, since those not belonging to energy security should be included, only to use them as the representation of the people or situation that we do not want to be.[315] In similar vein, energy poverty also defines states, since the inability to guarantee the energy security of its citizens questions the independence of the state - or at worse, exclusion from the state system. By naming something energy poor, we are assuming that there are energy security actors (the modern state), who can save the energy security objects (the non-modern state and the future consumers, which are today's "energy poor").

The naming practice, which originates from the depoliticisation of energy security and its production to include only certain energy related security aspects, produces an assumption that energy "poor" want to be modernised, since this is what survival is about. What the users of this energy security concept misunderstand is that the "energy security" embedded in the concept is not actually energy security of all, but of consumers. The possibility of energy security producing insecurities for some has been totally excluded, since energy security policies, like the advancing of energy poverty are commonly seen as positive goals. Nonetheless, as states use their right to guarantee their energy securities and to make energy resources available for their consumers, there are no protective mechanisms, which would prevent the states of driving for their energy security goals without causing insecurity or causalities. The insecurity that energy security policies can cause is reserved to those who are already outside or in the outskirts of the "global energy order" - namely the energy "poor". For instance, and as I intend to show in my case study, several Laotian villagers, who have lived a traditional lives outside modern energy networks, have been subjugated to immense insecurity as they had had to abandon their homes and livelihoods, since a Thai company, with the support of Laotian and Thai governments, is constructing a huge dam in Xayaburi region. Often these political choices of advancing energy security of some, in the face of producing insecurity for those excluded and deprived of human agency and the ownership their own

[314] For instance, IEA, World Bank and the UN all have their programmes for energy poverty eradication.
[315] See Agamben 1998.

energy future, are seen as an acceptable way of states to protect their sovereignty and provide energy services their consumer-citizens.

8. The case of Xayaburi dam

The construction of Xayaburi dam is one of the recent attempts to take advantage of the hydropower potential of the mighty Mekong River in Southeast Asia. Flowing from the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau in the People's Republic of China (PRC)[316] through Myanmar, Lao People's Democratic Republic[317], Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam the river extends to over 4900 kilometres before emptying to the South China Sea.[318] The potential of the river for governmental hydropower projects has already spurred seven finished hydropower dams and 21 additional projects in the upper Mekong, mainly initiated by China.[319] In the lower Mekong area, which entails Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, there are not yet finished dams, but at least 12 mainstream projects are either being constructed or under consideration, mainly in Lao PRD but also in Cambodia and Thailand.[320] The fascination for hydropower has grown steadily due to the risen power demand in the region as the countries are vying for rapid economic development. At the same time as the incentive for energy is rising, there are constant concerns that the rapid construction of dams will radically reduce other benefits gained from the river, such as cause deficits to the fishing industry by radically altering the river currents. Moreover, the control over the flowing river has been argued to directly impact on the livelihoods and food security of millions of people, who are depending on the river for their agricultural practices and fishing.[321]

One of the main dam projects in the lower Mekong area has been the (controversial) Xayaburi dam. The plans to build the 830 metres wide, 1,260-megawatt (MW) dam originate from 2007 as Lao PDR government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the construction rights with a Thai company CH. Karnchang.[322] Assumably, between October 2008 and August 2010 both CH. Karnchang and Lao PDR government together with International Centre for Environmental Management (ICEM), Thai company Team consulting and Swiss company Colenco completed a

[316] Hereafter China.
[317] Hereafter Lao PDR.
[318] Grumbine, Dore & Xu 2012, 91-92; International Rivers 2015a.
[319] International Rivers 2015b; Lewis 2013.
[320] Grumbine, Dore & Xu 2012, 91-92; International Rivers 2015a.
[321] Cronin 25.3.2015; Keskinen, Kummu, Käkönen & Varis 2012, 319.
[322] Baran. Larinier, Ziv & Marmulla 2011, 4-7.

feasibility study and social and environmental assessment for the proposed Mekong dam.[323] After the studies were finished, in September 2010, Lao PDR noted the Mekong River Commission (MRC), an inter-governmental agency working directly with lower Mekong countries on joint management and sustainable use of water resources of the river[324], about its plans to construct the dam. Lao PDR, as the other lower Mekong countries, are obliged under Procedure for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA) agreement of the MRC to participate in prior "consultations" about the impacts the proposed water use might have on the water quality or on the river flow patterns in the Mekong river.[325]

The "consultations", however, caused outrage for several reasons. First, the environmental assessment was criticized for insufficiency, since it only reached an area ten kilometres downstream from the dam and it did not evaluate the transboundary effects of the dam.[323] The assessment also lacked research on the potential earthquake risk in the area.[326] The Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) group of the river commission recommended in 2010 that the dam construction projects should be postponed for at least ten years, which would allow both the Lao PDR government, CH. Karnchang and MRC to make a comprehensive study on the possible environmental and social impacts of the Xayaburi dam.[327] Second, it was widely perceived that the construction of the dam would harmfully affect the complex ecosystems of the river, particularly the fish migration patterns. Third, the management of water and changing water levels were believed to impact the flow of sediments and nutrients that would put the agricultural practices in Mekong in jeopardy as far as in Vietnam. Finally, it was estimated that the construction of the dam would severely impact on the livelihoods of millions of people not just in Lao PDR, but also in Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.[328]

Due to the fierce resistance from Cambodia, Vietnam and non-governmental actors (from all the lower Mekong countries) and a milder resistance from the Thai government, Lao PDR agreed to engage into the assessment process of the MRC. In May 2011, Lao PRD government hired a Finnish engineering company, Pöyry, who was also working with CH Karnchang in another hydropower project, to evaluate the compliance of Xayaburi Dam with MRC standards.[329]

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[323] International Rivers 2014.
[324] Mekong River Commission 2015.
[325] Grumbine et al. 2012, 95.
[326] AsiaNews.it 18.4.2014.
[327] ICEM 2010, 137.
[328] Baran et al. 2011, 24-32; Grumbine et al. 2012, 94; International Rivers 2015c; Keskinen et al. 2012, 321.
[329] International Rivers 2014.

However, Lao PDR, against the MRC rules, initiated the implementation of the Xayaburi Dam project even though the assessment was not completed, and did not engage into public consultations with Lao PDR civil society, unlike the other three governments. In addition, the Lao PDR government agreed on a power purchasing agreement with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), the most influential Thai energy actor. The agreement allowed EGAT to buy up to 95 per cent of the overall electricity that the dam produced to bolster Thailand's supposedly growing need for energy (independence) and to achieve its sustainability goals.[330] For a short while it seemed that Thailand was playing with two sets of cards, until in late 2011 the Thai government decided to back up the contested construction project and fund it through four big Thai banks.[331] Thailand also began to invest on other hydropower projects in Laos.[332]

Due to the mounting pressure from environmental groups and the governments of Cambodia and Vietnam, the Lao PDR government agreed to suspend the construction of the Xayaburi dam in May 2012.[333] The MRC had decided in December 2011 that the assessment finished by Pöyry would not fully comply with MRC standards - thus MRC argued for a further inquiry on the transboundary impacts of the dam, which the governments of the four lower Mekong nations agreed on. However, the construction process was still continual, before international pressure forced it to a halt.[334] Because of the threat of seizure of the construction process, Lao PRD engaged into public relations campaign to allow external visitors to visit the construction site and (together with Pöyry) redesigned the fishing passes to comply more with the MRC standards.[335] According to Lao PDR government, redesigning the dam and allowing site visits had addressed the worries of the neighbouring countries, which had stopped the resistance to the project.[336] Lao PDR energy minister also claimed that some electricity produced in Xayaburi dam would actually be sold to Cambodia.[337]

Already in June 2012 some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) complained that the dam project had not been stopped, despite its agreed suspension.[338] In August 2012, a CH Karnchang representative argued that they had not received any notification from Lao PDR government to

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[330] Amraapali 2011; Goichot 2015.
[331] Asia Sentinel 29.2.2012; International Rivers 2014.
[332] Matthews 2012, 392-393.
[333] Radio Free Asia 9.5.2012.
[334] Thanhnien News 27.4.2012.
[335] The Economist 26.7.2012; Xinhua 19.3.2013.
[336] Tandem 30.4.2012.
[337] OOSKAnews 17.9.2012.
[338] Radio Free Asia 27.6.2012.

suspend the project.[339] In September 2012, Lao PDR "allowed the project to continue" and finally in November 2012, Lao PDR government held a construction ceremony in the dam area, where the representatives from all the lower Mekong countries were present - supposedly indicating a support for the project.[340] Cambodia, Vietnam and environmental groups nevertheless continued to demand further studies on the environmental impacts of the dam.[341] In December 2012, the Lao PDR parliament approved the project. In March 2014, Lao PDR Deputy Energy and Mines Minister Viraponh Viravong announced that the dam is now 30 per cent complete and should be functional in 2019. He also emphasised the sustainability of the project and its beneficial impacts for the people of Lao PDR.[342]

The continuation of the Xayaburi dam project has not silenced the criticism from the civil society and NGO actors, who have demanded the Lao PDR and Thai governments to stop the construction. They have been extremely critical for the repercussions of the dam construction and argued on the negative impacts of the dam to the ecological stability and livelihoods in the lower Mekong. In 2014, in their joint declaration to stop the Xayaburi dam constructions before February 2015, 40 international and national NGOs and civil society groups named Xayaburi as "one of the most damaging dams currently under construction anywhere in the world."[343] Moreover, NGOs have pursued to show that Thailand's EGAT, who buys 95 per cent of the energy from Xayaburi, has grossly overestimated the energy need of the country.[344]

NGOs and civil society groups have offered alternative "new Power Development Plan" for Thailand that would build public and more sustainable way of covering Thailand's energy security needs.[345] In 2012, a group of villagers filed a lawsuit against EGAT in Thailand's Administrative Court in Bangkok and claimed that the power purchase agreement between EGAT and Lao PDR government is illegal, and it had not assessed the environmental and social impacts beforehand.[346] In June 2014, the Thai Supreme Administrative court decided to hear the villagers' lawsuit, which would nevertheless not halt the construction of the dam, although it was argued that the lawsuit would put a serious strain on the dam financing and question EGAT's authority.[347] The Thai

[339] Changplayngam & Jittapong 2012.
[340] BBC News 6.12.2012; International Rivers 2014.
[341] Radio Free Asia 8.11.2012.
[342] International Rivers 2014; Worrell 2014.
[343] Barron 31.3.2014; "Joint NGO declaration in opposition to Xayaburi Dam" 2014.
[344] Tandem 30.4.2012.
[345] Sangarasri Greacen & Greacen 2012.
[346] Deetes 8.8.2012.
[347] Radio Free Asia 24.6.2014; Save the Mekong 15.10.2014.

military junta under Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha has not been pleased about the events, which has lead into military supervision and intimidation of the Thai villagers, who initiated the claim.[348] Despite NGO attempts, the construction of Xayaburi dam has reached a second phase in January 2015 and it will most likely be continued uninterrupted until the Thai court decides on EGAT.[349]

8.1. The normalised energy security and the Xayaburi dam

The case of Xayaburi dam offers interesting insights to the securitisation and normalisation processes of energy security, which are present and guide the way energy security policies are executed and discussed in the region. One should perhaps start the analysis from the two central state actors, namely Lao PDR and Thailand, which both have driven the construction of the dam. In fact, Lao PDR and Thailand make the analysis interesting, since their energy security interests are quite different. On the one side there is Lao PDR, one of the poorest countries in the world, which, due to its geographical location, has an easy access to the vast hydropower potential of the Mekong River, which flows through the country. The energy security interests of Lao PDR concern energy production, as Lao PDR could potentially be one of the biggest hydropower producers in the Southeast Asia, which would benefit it economically, because the acquisition of financial assets from its energy production could be (potentially) used for the social and economic improvement of almost 5,9 million Laotians. From these people, estimate 25 per cent have been categorised as "energy poor", who have no access to general energy networks and who live under the national poverty line.[350] Furthermore, using energy production for economic growth, development and modernisation of the state apparatus would most likely help Lao PDR to better participate to the global energy and commodity markets - despite its communist governmental system.

On the other side, there is the Kingdom of Thailand, a middle-income economy that does not have sufficient energy resources of its own to maintain its energy security in the face of growing energy demand. The insufficiency of energy resources has made energy independence an important topic in the national agenda - often emphasised by leading politicians.[351] For instance, current Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha has continuously stressed the need for Thailand to become "regional business centre and develop energy independence to secure its economy."[352] Thai politicians, who

[348] Prachthai 12.11.2014.
[349] Vannak & Shafik 6.1.2015; Wangkiat 16.2.2015.
[350] Brady 12.8.2011; Changplayngam & Jittapong 16.8.2012; Fortin 5.11.2012.
[351] Jikkham 16.1.2015; Shinawatra 2012; The Nation 8.11.2014; Vejjajiva 2010.
[352] Jikkham 16.1.2015.

have been making decisions on energy security policies, have often emphasised the need for a mix of both domestic and foreign energy, mostly relying on hydrocarbons and renewable energy. Thailand has aimed to secure its energy independence with the aid of its regional neighbours, in particular the resource rich Lao PDR, by connecting them into a web-like energy network through Thai financing and energy infrastructure.[353] In particular, the dam projects in Lao PDR, particularly the Xayaburi dam, have become important tools for Thailand to improve its energy security and achieve its energy goals, when similar projects conducted in Lao PDR have not received the support from the public domestically.[354]

Rather than seeing the energy security practices of Thailand and Lao PDR as "normal" ways of doing energy security, I claim that one needs to look how the political construction of energy security has impacted on our analysis of the Xayaburi dam. There are things that have been criticised. For instance, Lao PDR as the territorial owner of the project has been blamed for damaging the delicate environmental system in the region and impacting on the livelihoods of millions of Cambodians and Vietnamese that live on the riverside. Particularly environmental groups have been vocal in questioning Lao PDR's justification for building the dam, even though Lao PDR government has argued that the revenues will be used for poverty reduction and to improve the livelihoods of Laotian citizens. Lao PDR has nevertheless refused to subjugate its sovereignty to civil society claims, since it is after all constructing the dam in its own territory for its own economic development and modernisation.

The role of Thailand is more interesting, since it is the energy consumer, who has not only funded the project, but is also going to buy most of the energy produced in the dam, nearly 95 per cent. [355] Unlike Lao PDR, Thailand's energy security claims have received only minimal critique, if any. First, Thailand's reasoning for energy security has not been questioned. Due to the normalised energy security conceptualisation, Thailand, like any other nation, should be able to pursue its energy security, particularly if the energy security is connected to energy independence, economic growth and development. The energy security concept and the "global energy order" allow this in principle without further justification, since the concepts "independence", "sovereignty", "development" and "modernisation" already justify the selected energy security policies. Since these are seen "normal" ways of justifying energy polices, they are immensely hard to question. For instance, environmental organisations have found out that EGAT, the state-owned energy authority

[353] Wongnapapisan 17.5.2012.
[354] Matthews 2012, 398.
[355] Matthews 2012, 396.

in Thailand (that also is the only electricity distributor within Thailand), which has been actively driving the construction of the dam and which has been responsible of doing the energy security assessments in Thailand, has severely overestimated the need for the Xayaburi dam energy for Thai energy independence - which would actually increase the overproduction of energy in Thailand.[356]

Furthermore, the normalisation has impacted on the argumentation of even the most vocal opponents of Xayaburi dam. NGOs, who have argued that the dam is not actually beneficial for Thai consumers, since alternative options are cheaper and Thailand should emphasise energy efficiency to reduce energy costs[357], have only been able to promote the "greening" of Thailand's energy security, not to problematize the assumption that underlie energy security concept. It seems almost unthinkable to question the energy independence arguments of Thailand, since it would require questioning its sovereignty as well, because the mutually productive relationship between on one hand energy security, on the other sovereignty and independence. When this is the perceived "reality", where states and people have to work - and to believe in it - actually questioning or discussing about the significance of energy security is immensely hard, if not impossible. In fact, the "greening" arguments are problematic in the case of Xayaburi as well, since hydropower is usually considered as a form of sustainable, green energy - as Thailand sees in its sustainability strategies.

The vicinity of energy security and state independence has also justified both Lao PDR and Thailand to use coercive means to keep the possibility of alternative order in its minimum. As a closed, centrally governed, communist country, Lao PDR has not allowed an active civil society that would work against "national security" or "stability", or be "nationally harming". In the case of Xayaburi, Laotian NGOs have not been participating in criticising the dam, since they cannot work against the state machinery, which controls their existence through regulations and the one-party system. Even in Thailand, which is in principle a "democratic" country, albeit "selective democracy" would perhaps describe the situation better due to the tendency of the military to replace democratically elected governments that are not their liking, the civil society actors have been subjugated to state control as the reining military junta has monitored those, who have worked against the goal of building Xayaburi.[358] From this perspective, energy security is more than means of "securing" the availability of energy resources - it is means to control the population and the civil society.

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[356] Bangkok Post 15.10.2014; Deetes 19.5.2015.
[357] International Rivers 2011; Sangarasri Greacen & Greacen 2012, 40–42.
[358] Prachthai 12.11.2014.

The institutionalization of the other principle of "global energy order", the significance of markets and liberal economic policies has also impacted the way energy security policies are done in Xayaburi. As the provision of cheap energy for Thai consumers has traditionally been important for Thai politicians to enforce their grip on power (and to control the people through their energy consumption), the Thai government has tried to provide as cheap energy as possible to the people, particularly by using EGAT to make beneficial energy deals and to take the control of a significant share of regional energy markets. In fact, Thailand has been using EGAT in a similar manner than the US led "first world" block used big international energy companies before 1970s. EGAT has been significantly involved in the Xayaburi construction process, not only because of Thailand's believed need for energy independence, but also since it has its own goals as an economic actor. Not only does EGAT want to retain its supremacy over Thai energy markets, but it is also looking for financial benefits from the dam projects outside Thailand, which would both allow the EGAT to control the overproduction of energy for its own benefit and sell it outside Thailand and proceed with the plans for further regional energy integration.[359] EGAT has been criticised of its role, but the economic "order" that guides energy security policy-making have not been, again, questioned.

8.2. Securing energy, threatening lives: insecurities of energy security in Xayaburi

The "global energy order" that defines energy security policies and practices in the case of Xayaburi also includes unwritten principles about who can benefit from it. As I have interpreted in chapters 7–7.3, energy security, which has been initially seen only as state's right to guarantee its survival and development, has through liberal economics and the US influence, transformed to also encompass consumers, persons who use commodities, purchase goods or services and are opposite to producers.[360] Furthermore, energy security vocabulary has recently stated to name those, who are not consumers, since they have no access to modern energy services, which they nevertheless assumedly want to be part of. These people, suffering from energy poverty are often named the "energy poor". Through the inclusion of consumers, the "energy poor" that cannot be yet included but not also fully excluded (since they are the bodily images of non-modern), become subjugated to "global energy order", which can, at worst, create insecurity for their lives.

The insecurities of energy security - that energy security does not entail the security of everyone is part of the everyday energy security polices and practices that are executed in the Xayaburi dam. Both consumers and energy poor are present in the region. On one hand Thailand uses the needs of

[359] Matthews 2012, 396–400.
[360] Oxford English Dictionary 2015.

consumers, who demand more available and cheaper energy on a daily basis, as a reason to increase its energy independence through dam construction projects - since cheap energy also guarantees a political grip on power. On the other hand, Lao PDR has justified the dam construction with poverty arguments, where energy revenues could be used to improve the living standards of many people and to develop the country. Already these arguments on energy security (whether it is the security of supply or demand) show who is thought to be able to act for energy security. The dividing categorisation of people into "consumers" and "energy poor" has not only created a situation where the others can act on their own energy security and the others cannot, but it has also prioritised the security of the modern "consumers" over the "energy poor". Thai consumers can act, they can demand better and cheaper energy services from the Thai government and challenge their energy security policies (within the "global energy order") by voting - to the extent of the military taking the power, when democracy does not provide "good" enough leaders. The Laotian "energy poor" cannot, since they are subjugated to state and energy consumer practices, which try to "save" them from themselves, for their inability to modernise and be part of energy security. Thus, the "energy poor" do not necessarily have the ability to decide for their own energy security, even if their energy security demands would be different from the modern consumerism.

In addition, the Xayaburi dam project is an evidential case about the insecurity that the drive for energy security causes. There are two different insecurities at stake. First, as the NGOs, and Cambodia and Vietnam have criticised, the Xayaburi dam project can potentially damage the environment and endanger the livelihoods of several million people, who are depending on the vitality of the Mekong River.[361] Thus, energy security does not necessarily increase food and water security, but energy security acts can produce insecurity, where basic human needs become subjugated to energy security goals. Second, the energy security policies and practices, particularly the dam site construction projects are gravely putting people in jeopardy, as they lose their homes, livelihood and the security that their village communities have produced them. The dam site construction has required the removal of several thousand villagers, who have been practicing their traditional lifestyles in the riverbanks, where the river has provided them their nutrition, livelihood and also religious site. The expulsions, which have been mostly gone unnoticed from the international and regional actors, have included both Lao PDR government officials and the workers and security forces of the Thai company CH Karnchang, who have gotten rid of entire

[361] Herbertson 11.9.2012; Ward, Foran, Smajgi, Bouapao, Pech & Xing 2012, 364.

villages and forced to merge with other villages outside the dam vicinity and leave their homes, belongings and traditional spheres of life that they might have lived for decades.[362]

Even though it has been argued that the Lao PDR government has paid a small compensation to the expulsed villagers, who have lost not only their homes, but also their social orders, livelihoods and traditions[363], the Xayaburi dam construction is a sad example of selective security that the energy security provides. The people, who are facing insecurity due to the expulsions are not energy consumers, but the "energy poor", who, by being non-modern, are in the case of Xayaburi not only seen as targets of energy projects, but also the threat to their execution. The threat that the people cause for the execution of the energy project is simply that they live in a "wrong" place - even though they have been there for decades. The expulsions of the people are seemingly easier, since Lao PDR governmental system allows stricter direct control over the people, which has not been the case in "selective democratic" Thailand, where the control is more subtle. Due to public resistance, Thailand has not been able to execute such projects in its own territory, but doing them in Lao PDR is justifiable, since the projects improve both Thailand's energy security and Lao PDR's economic growth, which could be used to help Laotians. However, at the same time the "energy poor", who are moved might lose everything they have, making them extremely vulnerable for forced labour and structural human trafficking of Southeast Asia[364] as the people, when they have to move from the riverside to urban slums to seek for income. The energy security concept and energy security knowledge-production excludes these human insecurities, since energy security is seen outright positive thing, which makes it futile to study the relationship between the energy security conceptualisation and forced labour, for instance in the Xayaburi dam case.

9. Conclusion

The insecurity that the Laotian villagers have to face in their everyday lives due to the attempts of states, consumers and energy companies to enable their energy security is just one manifestation of the dominant energy security conceptualisation - and an example how security policies, practices and processes can lead to bodily insecurity of the people, who do not belong within the security framework of energy security. My intention in this thesis has been to problematize the ahistorical production of one such security concept, namely energy security, which has impacted on the policy-

[362] Bangkok Post 5.8.2012; Radio Free Asia 1.7.2013.
[363] Radio Free Asia 18.6.2013.
[364] On human trafficking see for instance Ford, Lyons & van Schendel 2012.

making and academic practices - and also been produced as part of those practices and policies. I have argued that the dominant energy security concept, no matter which interpretation of it one uses, emphasises certain "commonly accepted" energy security principles, which I have named the four "A's": availability, affordability, accessibility and acceptability. Rather than seeing the political nature of these principles, energy security literature mostly embraces these, without asking profound questions on the nature of "security" of energy security - which is understandable if one believes on the particular predetermined security principles.

As I noticed early in this thesis, one of the problems of energy security literature is that for some reason the critical security approaches have been almost totally absent from the energy security field, despite them having an influential role in security studies. Seeing that Critical Security Studies can offer much needed insights to energy security, especially to its political nature, I decided to build my theory on ontologically reflexive security and the politics and ethics of security. The strengths of these approaches build on the weaknesses of the conventional energy security: they see that security, on the contrary of being something permanent, is a political concept, which not only defines what security is, but also who security is for. When security is seen political by nature, also the selections made by using security become more apparent. The fact that energy security has mainly been thought as a state security rather than being an eternal truth has been built in a historical context, where the (exceptional) events and specially how they have been securitised have influenced on people's energy security policies and practices. The subjective nature of security that becomes emphasised as policies behind security are revealed also raises the question about the ethicality of security as people in different roles, as politicians or scholars for instance, argue that they produce knowledge on specific security questions, without necessarily influencing their own role in the production process.

The role of decision-makers and scholars as the producers of security threats has enabled them to use particular events to justify energy security policies without boundaries - almost like working in a state of exception. I see that the role of exception in building security threats and enforcing security policies is important, since creating the state of exception, and particularly normalising it, transforms the security powers to certain groups, most often the leaders of sovereign-states, who will use the exception either to maintain the existing order, replace the existing order with a new order or replace parts of the old order for a new one. The order can be national judicial order, but it does not have to be, since state of exceptions have gained global dimensions through powerful global actors (the US) or through a partial transformation of exceptional security means to

institutions (WHO). Especially these powerful actors have been sometimes able to produce an order with an exception and to normalise it, as the normalised border controls after the War on Terror reveal.

The presumed political nature of security and the assumed role of exceptions in producing particular orders and political settings (including concepts) has guided me to build my theoretical approach, which I have named the "logic" of exceptionalism. Consisting of three mutually constructive and simultaneous processes - securitisation, normalisation and depoliticisation - the "logic" of exceptionalism offers a defined set of theoretical tools and questions that have enabled the analysis of energy security as a historically specific security conceptualisation, not a "black box". The "logic" of exceptionalism is but just one way to analyse the historical context of security concepts, but its usefulness is in its ability to open up the whole process from securitisation to depoliticisation - particularly when the history of the concept is either "forgotten" or it is seen as an objective timeline of events that "just" took place. In addition, the "logic" of exceptionalism, by focusing on particularly influential events, can help in politicising their "exceptionality" and showing the way that they are formed, and the way that we use them, are full of political choices that benefit some and leave the others outside.

As I have studied the history of energy security, it has quickly become apparent that particularly the events of the first oil crisis in 1973 and the rise of OPEC and the challenge of NIEO have influenced on the way energy security concept has been produced. The role of the West and later the US have been significant in forming energy security as it is now "known". Not only has energy security been used to preserve the independence and sovereignty of energy consuming states, but it has also promoted an idea of continual economic development, modernisation and economic liberalisation through energy markets. These principles were particularly important for the US, which fought for the global dominance with the USSR and drove its "neoliberal democratic" world order. Not only has the institutionalisation and normalisation made the energy security principles of the West and the US the "energy security" of our times, but they have also depoliticised the energy security claims of those, who are not energy consumers or security of supply states. The "energy security" that was created in this historical context did not only leave those driving for the security of demand outside, but also lifted the "consumer" to the centre of energy security, leaving most of the people in the globe outside energy security. Later, as the "global energy order" and the energy security concept was normalised, these energy security outsiders were named to suffer from energy poverty - they became the "energy poor" that needed to be saved from themselves - due to their

non-modern nature. Excluded from energy security, the "energy poor" could be included in it through bringing the modern energy network to them, without evaluating how the endeavour to modern energy security actually caused them insecurity in the first place.

The Laotian villagers in the Mekong riverside, who are facing the consequences of Xayaburi dam construction, are a clear example of both the selective security nature of energy security, which is mostly neglected in the political and academic world. There are reasons, why critical security approaches, like the "logic" of exceptionalism should be used in energy security research, not only because they can politicise the depoliticised security, but also because they can bring much needed debate on the (in)security dimension of energy security. Rather than sticking to their perceived ontologies about what energy security is, scholars should be more prone to question, where has this ontological energy security come from, what kind of security does it actually produce and what kind of roles does it determine for different actors. The conquest for "truth" or determined energy security should not overpower self-criticism of the scholar or the politician, since the decisions that we make and the concepts that we build on them do produce security walls, which might be just thick enough to leave someone outside into the realm of exception. I would argue that we need both pluralism in energy security knowledge-production to allow different energy security conceptions and discussion about their construction and meaning, and embracing the people as energy security actors, who do not necessarily need to be modern, if they self decide to stay outside it. Furthermore, we need to be able to question the meaningfulness of the core principles of energy security, namely independence and economic development, if we want to critically evaluate the concept or to extend it to the "energy poor" or others excluded.

9.1 Possibilities for future research

The study that I have conducted on the insecurities of energy security offers several possibilities for a future research. First, one could apply the "logic" of exceptionalism to other case studies or contexts. This can mean for instance studying the energy security "logic" that the US has used in its Middle Eastern policies in general and particularly in Iraq after the 2003 war, especially after the extremist organisation ISIS has taken control of areas in Iraq, which produce energy (oil). Similar cases could be found for example in China, where the acquisition of oil from Africa to Antarctic has become central for Chinese foreign policies. China is an interesting case in other sense too, since China, even though it complies with the principles of "global energy order", has been seen as a threat, since it has been too active in collecting oil emergency stocks abroad, which has reduced Western influence in those areas. The study of the contexts, where energy security is realised should

also include studying the nature of the governmental system in the production of energy security policies. The role of communist one-party system in Lao PDR and China might produce a different setting in how energy security decisions have been justified - and who they need to be justified to: domestic audiences or international state system.

To test the "logic" of exceptionalism, one could also use it in analysing other security contexts than energy. The "logic" of exceptionalism could for example be used to analyse environmental security, a security concept that has a very different history than energy security. Environmental security, being much more debated than relatively stable energy security, would most likely produce a very different order than energy security. Furthermore, the specific critical security approaches could be used to make the "logic" of exceptionalism more detailed. For instance, feminist research could give more focus on the possible gendered impacts of the energy security concept and on women's energy security experiences. In addition, biopolitical approaches could emphasise better the subjectivities and subjugations of energy security and to further elevate the interesting idea of Ciuta (2010) about the totalising effects of energy security to people's lives.

One could also deepen the constructive conceptual analysis by taking a closer and more specific look, which I have done here, on how the dominant energy security framework has been securitised and normalised in US-led institutions and political speeches and to interpret how the state practices of energy security have shaped the dominant understanding. For instance, contextualising energy security would benefit from analysis of domestic policies, including the possible alternative discourses and representations, an issue, which has not been done in this thesis. Alternatively, it would be interesting to study the challenging energy security concepts and why they did not achieve a dominant position as the "global energy order". This could be executed with for instance a counterfactual analysis of the 1973 oil crisis and the rise of OPEC. Another possibilities would be to see, how the security of demand states function in the "global energy order" - have they been subjugated to it or are they perhaps building an alternative order.

Perhaps the most interesting road for future research for me would be to further scrutinise the connections of human rights and energy security. This could be studied in several levels. One could, for instance, interpret the (international) energy security related institutions and their representations of energy security and human rights. Do they see energy security as a human right? Does this human right belong to all and who can advance it? Do the institutions evaluate the connections of energy security policies to human rights abuses? One could also take a regional or state context where the connections between rights, insecurity and energy security practices could

be investigated further. How do states for instance assess the negative impacts of their energy security policies? Do they even know the repercussions of their energy security policy practices? Finally, one could take people at the centre of energy security and study their personal experiences on energy security. This can include the consumer-citizens and their experiences, but particularly interesting would be to map the experiences of the "energy poor" and those living at the borderlands of modern energy security network. If we put people at the centre of energy security, we should also be able to know how they see it, what do they think is the best way of advancing it and what kind of roles they want for themselves. In the world of "global energy security" this seems yet not to be the case, since in energy security policies, we fail to highlight the need for the *people* to decide and determine their energy securities - not to be subjugated to a predetermined energy security conceptualisation, which does not take them into consideration.

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