

UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE

Tania Moilanen

On “Improving Russia” and other motives -
A Study on Investigative Journalists in Putin’s Russia

Master’s Thesis
School of Communication, Media and Theatre
European and Russian Studies Master’s Program
Journalism and Mass Communication
February 2014

UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE

School of Communication, Media and Theatre

MOILANEN, TANIA: On "Improving Russia" and other motives - A Study on Investigative Journalists in Putin's Russia.

Master's Thesis, 118 pages + appendix, 1 page.

Master's program in European and Russian Studies, majoring in Journalism and Mass Communication

February 2014

This Master's thesis is a study aimed at gaining insight into why Russian journalists specialize in investigative journalism. Since the 1990s, international and Russian media monitoring systems have shown that Russia is one of the more dangerous countries in which to practice journalism, especially when it comes to investigative journalists unearthing information that corporate, political or military forces would rather be kept away from public attention. Given the circumstances, why do Russian investigative journalists continue to practice such a risky profession?

While investigative journalism is often considered a bi-product of a democratic spirit to maintain a healthy citizenry by bringing public attention to any wrongdoings by societies' elites to in turn compel the latter to behave responsibly, a study on investigative journalism as practised in Russia holds particular interest given the tumultuous conditions the Russian Federation continues to develop in, not to mention current president Vladimir Putin's conservative attitude towards the media's press freedom.

This study is based on interviews with seven Russian investigative journalists – collected in the autumn 2012 and summer 2013 in Moscow, Petrozavodsk and Helsinki. While the main goal of this study is to assess why these journalists have specialized in investigative journalism, the research also explores the assets the profession has to offer, as well as the challenges the journalists face when practising this riskier type of journalism.

In addition to identifying the reasons why the participants of this study are drawn to practising investigative journalism, this research suggests that there is a continuation between the motivation exhibited by today's investigative journalists and the 'sense of duty' expressed by Soviet journalists in prior studies. Additionally, this study shows that investigative journalism is considered to be an exemplar of professionalism among these Russian journalists. Finally, this research proposes that the audience, as readers and viewers of investigative reporting, play a potentially crucial role in the perpetuation of investigative journalism now and in the future.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	6
1. Introduction.....	7
1.1 Overview.....	7
1.2 The ‘large’ context and research process.....	7
1.3 The research questions	12
1.4 The structure of this research	13
2. The Russian context.....	14
2.1 A brief history of Russian journalism.....	14
2.1.1 Early history.....	14
2.1.2 Soviet Era.....	16
2.1.3 The 1990s.....	19
2.1.4 Putin and contemporary journalistic practices.....	22
2.1.5 Notes on investigative journalism.....	24
2.2 Changing Russian journalists, a changing relationship with the audience	26
2.2.1 The changing role of journalists	27
2.2.2 A changing relationship with the audience	30
2.3 Other factors relevant to journalism in Russia.....	32
2.3.1 Freedom of the press	32
2.3.2 Civil Society.....	34
3. Theoretical framework.....	38
3.1 Bourdieu’s field theory and the concepts <i>illusio</i> , capital, and ‘internal struggles & external sanctions’	39
3.1.1 <i>Illusio</i>	41
3.1.2 Capital	42
3.1.3 ‘External sanctions’ and ‘Internal struggles’	44
3.1.4 Critiques of and holes in ‘field theory’	44
3.2 Investigative journalism.....	46
3.2.1 An Anglo-American perspective: ‘Custodians of Conscience’	48
3.2.2 A Chinese perspective: ‘Watchdogs on a leash’	52
3.2.3 A French perspective: ‘scoop-chasers’ or <i>enquêteurs</i> ?	56
4. Research methodology: interviewing	61
4.1 The participants.....	61
4.1.1 Samples	63
4.2 The process	63
4.3 Security and ethics	65
4.4 Reflections	66

4.4.1 On the participants	66
4.4.2 On interviewing	66
5. The investigative journalists	68
5.1 The professionals	68
5.1.1 Olga	68
5.1.2 Sergei	70
5.1.3 Maxim	70
5.1.4 Ksenya	71
5.2 The trainees	72
5.2.1 Lyudmila	72
5.2.2 Katya	73
5.2.3 Larisa	74
6. Analysis	75
6.1 Illusio: motives for investigative journalism	76
6.1.1 For professional ‘idealism’	76
6.1.2 To help fellow-man	78
6.1.3 For Russia and society	79
6.1.4 Notes on talent, ‘in the blood’ and ‘sense of duty’	81
6.2 Capital: acquiring and maintaining skills, networks and recognition	81
6.2.1 Economic: money & “hits”	82
6.2.2 Cultural: skills & practice	82
6.2.3 Social: support, new stories, feedback and recognition	84
6.2.4 Symbolic: reputation	85
6.3 External sanctions and internal struggles: the challenges of the job	86
6.3.1 The authorities	86
6.3.2 The public	90
6.3.3 Lack of time and/or money	93
6.3.4 Reluctance in participation of external bodies	94
6.3.5 Corruption	95
6.3.6 Battling against ‘Kremlin’ journalism	95
6.3.7 Bloggers	96
6.3.8 From financial dependency to publications’ limitations	96
6.3.9 From a lack of cooperation to a decline in professionalism	97
6.4 Additional general observations	98
6.5 Summary of Analysis	100
7. Discussion	102
7.1 Findings	102
7.1.1 Inherited Soviet professionalism reflected in motives for investigative journalism	102
7.1.2 Investigative journalism as an exemplar of ‘professionalism’	104
7.1.3 The public’s key role in the successful function of investigative journalism	106

7.2 New professional trends?	108
7.3 The future of investigative journalism in Russia	109
8. Conclusions	112
Bibliography	114
Appendices	119

Acknowledgements

This project has been a long journey. I would like to thank the people that contributed to its realization: my supervisors, Jukka Pietiläinen and Svetlana Pasti; Arja Rosenholm, Risto Kunelius, Iris Ruoho, Vera Zvereva, Laura Ahva, Olga Kryasheva, Ia Kldiashvili, Anastasia Ermashova, Nana Nikolaeva, Yulia Bakhtina, Robert Hollingsworth, Ian Mac Eochagáin, Cai Weaver, Ronald Anderson, Anssi Moilanen and last but not least, the seven investigative journalists that took time to tell me their stories.

1. Introduction

1.1 Overview

The following study is on Russian investigative journalists. Based on interviews with seven investigative journalists – collected in October 2012 and September 2013 in Moscow, Petrozavodsk and Helsinki – this study investigates these journalists’ motivation for practising investigative reporting. As such, the main question this work poses is: **Why do some Russian journalists specialize in investigative journalism?** Bourdieu’s field theory, and particularly field theory’s concepts of ‘*illusio*’, ‘capital’ and ‘external sanctions and internal struggles’ are used to explore and identify the motivational factors that drive the journalists, the assets they possess and strive to acquire, and the challenges – both external and internal to the field of journalism – they face. This research aims to explore the world of investigative journalism from the perspective of these seven Russian investigative journalists and in doing so, looks at the particularities of the Russian context with the overall aim of assessing why and how investigative journalism is practised in contemporary Russia.

Keywords: Investigative journalism, Russia, journalists, motivation, Bourdieu

1.2 The ‘large’ context and research process

To date, Russia remains one of the most hostile countries for journalists to practise their profession. While the world’s “deadliest” countries for journalists tend to be represented by countries that have been overrun by war and military conflict (e.g. Syria, Iraq, Egypt¹), other countries, including Russia, show signs of continued press freedom repression and violence against journalists. Indeed, Russia made the Committee to

¹ According to CPJ’s (Committee to Protect Journalists) 2013 statistics

Protect Journalists' (CPJ) 2012 and 2013 'risk list'² – 10 countries in which “journalism suffered the greatest setbacks” in these years, factors of which include fatalities, impunity, imprisonment, restrictive laws, censorship and exile for journalists – largely because of Putin’s passing of new restrictive laws that target journalists and the media. Specifically, in July 2012, Putin signed legislation that re-criminalizes defamation, threatening journalists and media outlets with imprisonment of up to 5 years and fines for “moral damages” of up to 500,000 rubles (approx. \$15,000), effectively undoing the DUMA’s vote in 2011 to decriminalize ‘libel and insult’ under Medvedev’s presidency. Moreover, since Putin’s return to power in May 2012 as president of the Russian Federation, more laws were passed that threaten freedom of speech/press, including a new ‘internet bill’ allowing authorities to shut down websites deemed “unlawful”, a bill that imposes fines of up to 5 million rubles (approx. \$150,000) on those who hold unsanctioned protests, and a restrictive law on non-government organizations, compelling those which receive international funding to register with the authorities as “foreign agents”.

Besides the afore-mentioned newly implemented legal restrictions, physical violence continues to be exercised against journalists in connection with their work. According to the Glasnost’ Defense Foundation (GDF)’s monitoring system, hardly a day goes by without a journalist or member of the media being verbally threatened or physically attacked somewhere in Russia. Despite the steady decline of murders of journalists’ per year from 8 in 1993 and 1995 to 1 in 2011 and 2012³, two journalists died last year in 2013: Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev – known for his investigations of ‘sensitive topics’ such as local Dagestani government corruption and arbitrary detentions by local and federal authorities – was shot in front of his house on July 9th, while Mikhail Beketov whose death on April 8th was largely connected to his coverage of local Khimki government’s nepotism and corruption, as well as his critical reporting of an administrative move to replace parts of a local forest with a freeway.

² The CPJ 2012 Risk List: Turkey, Brazil, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iran, Pakistan Somalia, Syria, Vietnam and Russia

³ According to CPJ (see also, Reporters Without Borders). The Glasnost Defence Foundation’s statistics however register much higher, numbering a total of 232 since 1992, as well as the Media Conflicts in Russia monitoring system associated with International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) which count 341 murdered or missing journalists since 1993. CPJ’s more modest estimation of killed journalists since 1992 counts 56.

According to CPJ, those journalists murdered in connection with their work covered mostly topics of war and politics, which indicates why the North Caucasus, where armed conflict has raged steadily since the start of the Second Chechen War (1999 – 2009), is currently Russia’s most dangerous region for journalists. Another highly sensitive topic covered by journalists who become victims of work-related murders has been corruption. While impunity remains high as murders often go unsolved, monitoring organizations frequently suspect that the authorities are behind the crimes. In an interview, William Horsley, the International Director of the Centre for Freedom of the Media, explains that “a large proportion of killings and assaults have been carried out by ‘hitmen’ [as] contract killers or hired thugs” and suggests that “in Russia, the main threat [against journalists] comes from powerful, unaccountable and lawless elements within all the power structures, in politics, state security, insurgency and organized crime – which are often intertwined” (02.04.2013). While journalists working in regional Russia are more at risk because of their vulnerability to local authorities (Oates 2007, Becker 2004), journalists working in Moscow have also been subject to attacks and murder, for example Oleg Kashin (beaten in connection with his oppositional stance to the government) and of course not least, Anna Politkovskaya (murdered in her apartment block in 2006).

Given the antagonistic climate in which journalists – especially those covering sensitive topics – must practise their profession, a natural curiosity led me to ask the question: ‘Why are these journalists putting themselves at risk?’ This was the starting point of my research and the question that has spurred this study forward. One could presume that these investigative journalists, like war correspondents, “are motivated by a genuine wish to expose oppression and wrongdoing by the power even at risk to themselves” as Horsley described (interviewed 02.04.2013). Although such a presumption was logical, I wanted to get the story from the investigative journalists themselves.

Defining ‘investigative journalism’ and understanding who qualifies as an investigative journalist was the first matter to resolve. Despite the fact that investigative journalism as a concept and practice is considered to be an Anglo-American invention – which has been heralded across the English-speaking world as the prime example of

journalism's dual responsibility of keeping citizens informed, on the one hand and scrutinizing the country's elite, on the other – I nevertheless do not understand there to be *one* 'ideal' form of investigative journalism. Rather this study understands investigative journalism to be a discourse that varies according to the context in which it is practised. The origins and definitions of investigative journalism are provided nonetheless as points of reference for the research. After reading several books on the matter and scanning various media monitoring organizations online, I came across UNESCO's definition of investigative journalism: "the unveiling of matters that are concealed either deliberately by someone in a position of power, or accidentally, behind a chaotic mass of fact and circumstances – and the analysis and exposure of all relevant facts to the public"⁴. This definition suits the purpose of this work as it is broad enough to cover a wide range of topics, and specific enough to differentiate investigative journalism from a broader understanding of journalism. From the literature I had read, I found that investigative journalists tend to investigate topics such as 'government corruption' and 'corporate fraud' (Ettema / Glasser 1998, de Burgh 2000), which led me to question whether investigative journalism could be applied to a wider range of topics. In order to resolve these queries, I came back to the start of this research, which was to explore investigative journalism from the perspective of Russian investigative journalists *themselves*. As such, it was essential for me and for the purpose of study, that the participants of this study consider themselves to be 'investigative journalists'. Consequentially, the question about the range of topics considered 'real' issues worthy of investigations was also resolved once the participants of the study could tell me about the topics they investigate.

The next major step – identifying the investigative journalists who would be willing to participate in this research – was accomplished thanks to a combination of 'luck' (or 'fate') and contacts. Since journalism is shaped by the people who practise it, the aim from the start was to base this study on interviews with investigative journalists who would be willing to talk to me about their work face to face. I found my first participant thanks to several online searches, while a couple more were found thanks to my supervisor, Jukka Pietiläinen, and his contact working at the Moscow State

⁴ <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/freedom-of-expression/investigative-journalism/>

University's Faculty of Journalism. In another online search, I identified a peer-to-peer programme on investigative journalism, 'SCOOP Russia'⁵, organized by the International Media Support (IMS)⁶ – a non-profit organization that aims to provide training, assistance and financial support to journalists around the world. After speaking with several people in the IMS, I was eventually put into contact with the local coordinator of SCOOP Russia and she assisted me in setting up the interviews with three journalists who had participated in the programme the previous year. Although the initial aim was to randomize the selection of participants, the fact that most of my participants were found either through contacts who have links to Finnish universities or through an international organization, means that the study is somewhat 'skewed' in the sense that all of the participants in this study are to varying degrees linked to wider international communities of journalists.

Once I had identified these 6 investigative journalists – 3 'professionals' and 3 'trainees' – I began drafting my interview questions and conducting research on the background and contextual information. I travelled to Russia eventually in October 2012, where I interviewed the 3 'professionals' in Moscow and the 3 'trainees', who had recently 'graduated' from the SCOOP programme, in Petrozavodsk, Karelia, one of Russia's most northwestern regions. Back in Finland, I transcribed and translated the interviews, and pursued my quest for information by reading books and articles on the subject matter. Sheer happenstance led me to read an article in a Finnish magazine in the summer 2013 about a particular investigative journalist living in Finland. After contacting her and setting up an interview – more out of curiosity than with the intention of including her in the study – it soon became apparent that this investigative journalist's experience in the field would be important to include in this research. As such, the number of participants in this study grew by one, which is how the research became the study of seven investigative journalists.

⁵ <http://i-scoop.org/scoop/russia/>

⁶ <http://www.i-m-s.dk/>

1.3 The research questions

As mentioned, the purpose of this study is to explore the motivation investigative journalists have for their profession. With the main question **‘why do some Russian journalists specialize in investigative journalism?’** I discern and examine the elements and recurring themes in the participants’ response that indicate the underlying reasons why they believe their job is worth doing.

In order to better understand why investigative journalists are motivated to do their work, this study also explores the professional assets the journalists possess or strive to pursue, as well as the challenges the journalists are faced with. By ‘professional assets’, I refer to the concrete factors that make the job of investigative journalism worthwhile – e.g. other people’s support, acquiring investigative skills, gaining professional recognition. These ‘assets’ are discussed in this study in terms of ‘capital’ and further grouped into categories of economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital – to borrow Bourdieu’s terminology. With the sub-question ‘what are the elements that contribute to the journalists’ motivation?’ I assess the ‘capital’ the participants strive to maintain or gain as they practise investigative journalism.

The challenges the investigative journalists face will also be examined in this study. As one can imagine, investigative journalists working in Russia are put under a lot of pressure, whether this pressure takes the form of financial survival, or government regulations, threats, corruption. These sources of pressure or ‘challenges’ will be discussed in this work in terms of ‘external sanctions and internal struggles’. Bourdieu’s concept helps to identify these challenges by grouping the pressures that comes from outside the professional sphere of journalism under ‘external sanctions’, while the pressures felt by the journalists that originate from the practice of investigative journalism itself, those pressures innate to the profession, are grouped as ‘internal struggles’. The second and last sub-question ‘what are the external and internal pressures of the profession?’ explores the challenges these journalists have to face and overcome on a daily basis. Understanding what these investigative journalists are up against brings further insight into the journalists’ motives for practising the craft of investigative journalism.

1.4 The structure of this research

This study is structured in the following manner so as to allow the reader to understand this topic as fully as possible. As such, Chapter 2 will discuss The Russian Context in terms of the history of Russian journalism from the first newspaper to Putin's approach to the media, the changing roles of Russian journalists throughout the eras, and the current states of 'freedom of speech' and 'civil society' in Russia. In Chapter 3, on the Theoretical framework, necessary theoretical concepts for comprehension of this study are defined. The major theoretical concepts are 'investigative journalism' and Bourdieu's terminology of '*illusio*', 'capital' and 'external sanctions and internal struggles'. In Chapter 4, Research methodology: interviewing, interviewing both as method and its specific use in this research process are discussed. In Chapter 5 entitled "The investigative journalists", the reader meets the participants that made this work possible, as 'vignettes' present how the investigative journalists came to choose their profession. Chapter 6, Analysis, constitutes the analysis of the participants' responses, whereby segments of the interviews – selected by the author – are examined in order to answer the main question, '**why do some Russian journalists specialize in investigative journalism?**' and sub-questions – 'what are the elements that contribute to the journalists' professional motivation?' and 'what are the external and internal pressures of their profession?' – of this work. In Chapter 7, Discussion, the main findings of this research are discussed, as well as possible trends developing in the profession of investigative journalism, and the participants' viewpoints on what future investigative journalism has in Russia. Finally in Chapter 8, Conclusions, the author offers a few closing remarks and recommendations for future research.

2. The Russian context

This chapter will look firstly at the history of journalism in Russia and the changing relationship of journalists vis à vis the audience so as to provide the reader with a better understanding of why and how journalism is practised today. The current applicability and states of existence of ‘freedom of the press’ and ‘civil society’ in Russia will also be discussed to show the circumstances under which journalism is carried out. An awareness of the historical, political, economic, legal and societal dimensions of the national context is necessary to realize the challenges of contemporary investigative journalism in Russia.

2.1 A brief history of Russian journalism

2.1.1 EARLY HISTORY

Peter the Great was the creator of the first newspaper in 1703, and throughout the 18th and most of the 19th centuries the press continued to be dominated by tsarist governments (McReynolds 1991, 18). The “Great Reforms” by Alexander II in the 1860s directly affected the press as he “deliberately encouraged an increase in the number of privately-owned daily and weekly newspapers” (Ruud 1981, 379). Thus appeared the first mass-circulation newspapers in Russia (McReynolds 1991).

An important aspect of journalism’s development is that its history is inextricably linked to that of literature (Pasti 2007, 34; see also Zapadov 1963). Indeed, many writers – including A. Chekhov, M. Gorky and F.M Dostoevsky – “used journalism as a public tribune for their activities and perceived their mission in producing mental pabulum for the satisfaction of the intellectual demands of the citizens” (Pasti 2007, 35). As 19th century writers worked by and large in a “censored environment” upheld by “vast network or state-run agencies [that] would issue permission to publish any sort of information on anything relegated by the state”, Arutunyan explains that the journalistic scene was built on a “vigorous exchange of didactic thinking” by “the best pens of the age” (2009, 90).

The importation of first steam and then electric powered presses from Europe in the 1880s (Ruud 1981) enabled daily newspapers to be produced much faster and cheaper therefore making them more available to a greater audience. The result was the birth of a ‘new’ journalism that “emphasized more than ever the importance of the reader as a consumer with interests to be satisfied and the ability to make choices” (McReynolds 1991, 97).

Journalists consequently had to accommodate the growing and diverse readership. The first independent daily after the Great Reforms reflected the gentry’s interests, the boulevard press in the late 19th century integrated the merchants, artisans, and petty bureaucrats into the newspaper audience. By the early 20th century, the commentaries on international events and common concerns about national and civic issues, “significantly expanded the base of readership from the educated middle groups” (McReynolds 1991, 283). In fact, as McReynolds indicates, “the Russian newspaper played essentially the same role in modernization as did its Western counterparts: it provided information, interpretations, and space for advertisers to grease the wheels of commerce” (1991, 284).

Censorship by the tsarist regime continued until the early 20th century when journalists began to see themselves as “objective mediators directing the flow of information without personal bias (...) [and transferring] the formation of the political agenda out the elites’ jurisdiction and put it into the public domain” (McReynolds 1991, 155).

Following the 1905 Revolution – which saw mass nation-wide political and social unrest among workers, peasants and military troops – the long-held censorship statute was revised, and Russia enjoyed a freer press until 1907.

The press became a “crucial instrument in the ‘class struggle’ (Ruud 1981, 379) during the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the years after. V.I. Lenin, in his 1902 ‘work on tactics’ *What is to be done?*, described the press as “a staff of professional writers, professional correspondents, an army of Social democratic reporters who establish contacts everywhere” that would produce papers to establish the broad network needed for revolution (Lenin 1902, 169, quoted in Ruud 1981, 380).

2.1.2 SOVIET ERA

The Bolsheviks had two distinct visions of the Party's relationship with the "masses" – a tutor in class-consciousness and as a military leader in the class struggle (Lenoe 1998, 3). As the Party's chief means of communication with the populace were the newspapers, the Bolsheviks desired to establish a singular unified press that effectively fulfilled both visions (Ibid). They consequently disabled it from the old regime by banning the circulation of non-Party information.

By the end of Civil War in 1920, the press focused on educating a socialist citizenry (Ibid). The premise of "Cultural Construction" was incorporated into mass journalism, as a means to "raise the masses' cultural level and prepare them for the complex political and productive tasks they would have to fulfill in a modern society" (Lenoe 1998, 19).

The early Soviet newspaper editors were therefore faced with the task of implementing a new form of journalistic reporting that brought the news 'closer to the public' while at the same time educating and mobilizing the masses. As such the Soviet press was modeled on Lenin's theory on the press's role, namely "educating the readers, motivating them to actions with emotional appeals, and organizing them for political action or economic production", or known respectively as "propaganda", "agitation" and "organization" (Lenoe 1998, 13).

New practices were incorporated to keep in line with the Party's vision that foresaw "collaboration with shop-floor 'correspondents' to clear production blockages, keep an eye on management, and publicize the achievements of ordinary workers" (Lenoe 1998, 55): (1) working closely with a network of worker-peasant correspondents, (2) seeking stories from 'the shop-floor' and (3) publishing letters to the editor (Lenoe 1998). According to Lenoe, "ordinary laboring folk who wrote to the newspaper with accounts of disorder in their factories and villages were supposed to serve as a check on the arbitrary power of state and Party officials" (1998, 9). Also, in order to cover 'the

facts from the life of the broad masses who are building the state'⁷ journalists got their stories 'on the shop-floor' of the factories where 'ordinary people were building communism' (see footnote) in efforts to bring the news closer to the reader (Lenoe 1998, 54 – 57). The publishing of readers' letters to the editor was part of the system of 'self-criticism' expected to "to serve as an instrument for controlling the activities of the Party and government bureaucracy (...), to function as a method of mass participation and to serve as a channel of communication between the Party and the people" (Inkeles 1950, 215-216). Whereas the widespread public letter-writing was essentially a form of communication with the authorities on subjects both private and public (Fitzpatrick 1996, 80) and came "as close to a public sphere as one is likely to get during the Stalin period" (Ibid), it is unclear as to whether or not the publishing of letters "about abuses", used as "a sanction and a tool for better action" (Pietiläinen 2002, 106) with the goal of keeping local authorities in check, was actually effective (Ibid; see also Arutunyan 2009, 98).

Journalism practised during the Soviet-Era had some special features. First, was its 'timelessness', in the sense that it was not time-sensitive since "[the social process of building communism] was going on all the time, and the particular point at which they picked up the thread of events was secondary" (Inkeles 1950,141). Secondly, the notion of objectivity was rejected, on the premise that the journalist "who sought to be 'objective' in explaining any set of facts (...) always ran the risk of acting as an apologist for the facts he was explaining" (Inkeles 1950, 139). According to Inkeles, journalism should rather evaluate societal (political and historical) events "from the point of view of the revolutionary proletariat" (Ibid). Thirdly, the role of official censorship limited journalism's scope of reporting by keeping "forbidden items" from being mentioned (Pietiläinen 2002, 113). And lastly, self-censorship came to be common amongst journalists. As Downing described, the process of cultural production "was not a jerky, crisis-ridden, confrontational epic" but rather "simple, strong and smooth, because just as in corporate media, the rules of the game were very well understood, to the point of

⁷ During the Moscow Conference of Information Personnel in March 1926, delegates discussed ways of improving reporting, of bringing it 'closer to life'. In praise of Lenin's 1918 article "On the Character of Our Newspaper", which criticized the press for publishing too much 'political chatter' and too little concrete news of how ordinary people were building communism, the writer Mezhericher, from *Rabochaia Gazeta*, called for the covering of "facts from the life of the broad masses who are building our state" (Lenoe 1998, 54)

untroubled, ‘instinctive’ compliance” (1996, 67).

Although the tight control and regulations over the press of the 1930s and 40s loosened with Stalin’s death, and the once “unified press” pluralized (most visibly in youth papers, evening newspapers and literary newspapers), the Party apparatus continued to flex its muscles through ‘softer limitations’ – e.g. reducing the paper supply to media that challenged the status quo (Downing 1996, 70) – throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras.

Under Brezhnev, the authorities maintained restrictions on the flow of information, partially as a reaction to *samizdat*, a movement in which individuals reproduced and circulated censored materials (Downing 1996, 75; Pietiläinen 2002, 112). Although *samizdat* media had “no dramatic instant impact,” writes Downing, “they represented a gradual burn into the deep fabric of power. Given the speed with which during Glasnost era people seized upon hitherto banned communications, we may infer that samizdat reflected a much wider public opinion ” (1996, 76). While changes in Russia were “more muted” than in other Soviet states during Brezhnev’s last years and the short-lived successions of Andropov and Chernenko (Downing 1996, 78), Gorbachev’s policies of *perestroika* (rebuilding) and *glasnost* (openness) triggered irreversible changes in journalism, the role of the press in society, and for Soviet society in general.

Glasnost, however, was never meant to be revolutionary for journalism. Newspapers were to remain under the control of the authorities to aid the government in establishing “a political culture of debate and difference rather than uniformity and regimentation” (McNair 1993, 57) and support the political and economic changes of *perestroika*. In effect, the press acted as a conduit for hitherto stifled public opinion. Pietiläinen writes, “*Glasnost* brought problems and popular dissatisfaction to light: they were related to services, ecology, ethnic issues and the rise in prices” (2002, 121). Letter-writing to newspapers, which had continued to be practised to ‘air grievances’ throughout the post-Stalinist decades, exploded during 1986-88, while certain newspapers which were charged with raising public debate, saw a surge in circulation around the same time (Downing 1996, 71, 78). “The concept of glasnost had to a large extent been equated with (...) the notion of free speech (Benn 1987, 1992 quoted in Pietiläinen 2002, 120).

The newly found freedom was a double-edged sword for journalism. While the

press “developed a growing self-confidence” and “more and more newspapers decided their own agenda” (Voltmer 2000, 472), Lipman points out that the journalism of the *glasnost* period was “mostly about opinion or essay (...), not reportage or investigation. (...) Those early authors of free-speaking Soviet press were too eager to express their own ideas and share their own thoughts than to cite somebody else’s” (1998, 2).

2.1.3 THE 1990S

Glasnost’s most significant contribution to journalism was the passing of a new media law in the summer 1990 which granted freedom of the press, banned censorship and gave citizens the right to establish newspapers and other media channels (Pietiläinen 2002, 122 & Belin 2002, 139; see also Voltmer 2000, Zassoursky Y. 2001, Zassoursky I. 2004). Within a year, “the newspapers and magazines that had been previously in the hands of the party were taken over by journalists”, writes Zassoursky (2001, 161), and a new media model emerged, which was “independent of the state, trying to serve the public interest, to promote objectivity, depoliticization, and independence” (Ibid).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a “brief period of romantic attachment” between journalists and the new politicians in power ensued. Lipman describes further:

They belonged to the forces of good that had jointly defeated the forces of evil, both sides were open-hearted and eager to help each other. Government sources were anxious to share everything with a reporter who was also a fellow-liberal, and the reporters were genuinely interested, shared the politicians’ enthusiasm and were motivated by nothing else but a genuine desire to tell the exciting story to the reader. The story was indeed exciting, and the investigative instincts emerged promptly and naturally (1998, 4).

The new Russian government’s initial support of an independent press (Zassoursky I. 2004, 189), together with journalists’ increased sense of professionalism and an unprecedented access to a variety of sources (Fossato 2001, 344), has led many journalists and researchers to consider the period from as early as 1989 to the early 1990s as the ‘Golden Age’ of Russian journalism (Pietiläinen 2002, 122; see also Voltmer 2000, 472).

This period of fraternity was furthered by the fact, as Lipman describes, that in 1991 “everything (newsprint, rent, et.) was cheap” (1998, 3). But in 1992, “suddenly, everything was expensive” (Lipman 1998, 5). An economic collapse hit in 1992, triggering hyperinflation that led to a sharp rise in newspaper production and distributions costs, as well as a drop in wages (Voltmer 2000, 472). The state’s lack of investment in the media (Zassoursky Y. 2001, 157), coupled by “money becoming increasingly important” for individuals (Lipman 1998, 4), meant that individual journalists, as well as “most print and broadcast media [were forced] to seek outside financial support from corporations, wealthy individuals, and political patrons” (Belin 2002, 139).

While many Moscow-based media survived the early 1990s thanks to state subsidies, the ‘less developed advertising markets outside the capital’ made the media “even more dependent on local or regional political bosses who rewarded political loyalty with financial support” (Belin 2002, 141).

Despite media companies’ financial struggles, the first Chechen War (1994 – 1996) put journalism’s professionalism and newly found fervor to the test. Russia’s first private television network NTV – founded and financially backed by an emerging Russian media mogul Vladimir Gusinsky – conducted systematic critical coverage of the war (Lipman / McFaul 2001, 117 & 119). Such critical reporting changed public opinion by 1996, which culminated in Yeltsin declaring a ceasefire (Lipman / McFaul 2001, 119). The coverage of First Chechen War was described as “a remarkable achievement of Russian democratic journalism” (Zassoursky Y. 2001, 161). Moreover, the boost in professionalism experienced during the early 1990s “led many media professionals [to see] their social place in terms of the ‘fourth power’ (...) equal with other branches of power – the executive, legislative and judicial” (Zassoursky I. 2001, 74).

However, the ‘fourth power’ soon morphed into ‘corporate authoritarian media model’ (Zassoursky Y. 2001, 162) as media moguls joined forces with politicians in tactical formations to bare deliberate influence on the Russian Federation’s socio-political scene. A prominent illustration of this phenomenon is exemplified by Gusinsky’s liberal Most Media holdings joining forces with other prominent media tycoon conservative Boris Beresovsky to get president Yeltsin reelected. Although “many journalists viewed their co-operation with the Yeltsin campaign as a short-term tactic that would do no

lasting harm to editorial independence” (Belin 2002, 145), journalists were “increasingly viewed as mouthpieces of their owners” (Lipman / McFaul 2001, 119).

Between 1996 and 1998 the Russian media’s reliance on outside financing became “firmly entrenched” as “powerful corporations and political heavyweights set about building their own media empires” (Belin 2002, 145). The media owned by private corporations were often subsidized by auxiliary businesses (e.g. oil and gas companies), from which the proceeds are used to cover the losses from the media outlet (Belin 2002, 142). The media was then used to promote the interests of the auxiliary businesses, which in turn enabled the owners to increase political clout (Kolstova 2001, 322). As Zassoursky observed, the Russian media saw themselves re-adopt their ‘instrumental role’ (Zassoursky Y. 2001, 162) as political and business groups used their media assets “to undermine their rivals and settle political scores” (Belin 2002, 145-146). ‘Information warfare’ became commonplace and replaced the critical journalism of the early 1990s.

By the time Yeltsin’s presidency drew to a close, Russia’s ‘most influential media magnates’ had grown too big to be brought into ‘the Kremlin fold’ as a means to ensure the elections of the president’s successor. Despite the media moguls’ divided stance – Berezovsky’s media “faithfully promoted Prime Minister Vladimir Putin” (Belin 2002, 147), while Gusinsky’s Most Media gave airtime to the opposition (Lipman/McFaul 2001, 120) – socio-political circumstances played in Putin’s favour.

The outbreak of the Second Chechen War in 1999 caused Putin’s ratings to ‘take off like a rocket’ (Zassoursky I. 2001, 82) as he emerged as a “war premier” – “an energetic man in his forties (...) bold enough to seize the opportunity and [who] produced a tough stance demanding a nationwide war effort” (Ibid). Any critical media with an independent stance, notably Gusinsky’s, was branded as ‘unpatriotic’, ‘pro-fascist’ and ‘pro-western’ (Lipman/McFaul 2001, 120).

While Yeltsin’s electoral campaigns had been defined by “democracy” and “freedom of the press”, Putin’s political slogans for the 2000 presidential elections centered on “patriotic appeals” of “law and order” and “national interests” (Zassoursky Y. 2001, 158).

Shortly after this landslide victory in becoming President of the Russian Federation in March 2000, Putin acted swiftly to ‘rein in the media’. Gusinsky’s

persistent critical stance on the new Chechen war and by default, Putin himself, cost him his media empire, which he was forced to sell in large portions to the government, and caused him, and those in his association, to be branded as ‘enemies of the state’ (Lipman/McFaul 2001, 121). Zassoursky claims that such a crackdown was meant to “reassure” Russia’s citizens, that “the new power is not going to tolerate dissent” (2001, 83). The issuing of *The Doctrine of Information Security* followed a few months later and called for “the prohibition of media distortion” and the “deliberate circulation of false information” (Belin 2002, 152). Putin successfully framed his media policies, without any institutional opposition, as “a campaign against corrupt ‘oligarchs’ who he repeatedly accused of using the media to serve their own narrow interests” (Belin 2002, 155). While the president retained the majority of the population’s support with his anti-corruption campaigns, the media lost credibility and significant amounts of public’s trust (Ibid).

2.1.4 PUTIN AND CONTEMPORARY JOURNALISTIC PRACTICES

Putin’s approach to the media can be compared to that of his predecessors (Becker 2004, De Smaele 2007). While Gorbachev spoke frequently on the importance of a free press, but who, at the same time, “believed fervently that the press should support him and his reform programme” (Becker 2004, 148), Yeltsin had expected the media’s support “in the building of a democratic society” (De Smaele 2007, 1309-1310). Putin, in turn, seems to believe that the media ought to assist him build a “strong Russia” (Ibid) and “[bring] order back to Russia by strengthening central institutions” (Becker 2004, 148). This attitude is further reinforced by an anecdote in which Putin’s spokesperson is reported to have told *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* journalists in 2000: “The media should take into account the challenges the nation is facing now. When the nation mobilizes its strength to achieve a goal, this imposes obligations on everybody, including the media” (quoted in Becker 2004).

Since Putin came to power, the Russian state has increasingly limited media autonomy by way of three intertwined factors (Becker 2004, 152): (1) ownership, in part or in total, of a large segment of media (e.g. television channels RTR and ORT (Ibid)); (2) interlocked relationship with big business and the financial sectors; and (3) a weak

judicial system, “that may be pliant to the interests of the political leadership”, that cannot protect the media (Ibid). The “legal grounds” to “manage disloyal media” comprise wide-ranging tax audits of media companies by federal agencies, investigations of privatizations, the denial of press credentials and access to media pools, limited access to sensitive areas (like Chechnya), libel suits and criminal complaints against reporters for violating anti-terrorism laws (Ibid). With regards to regional and local media, the weakness of the federal law makes them vulnerable to local politicians (Oates 2007, 1286). “At its worst,” writes Becker, “the regime uses, condones or tolerates violence against opposition journalists and editors” (Becker 2004, 149).

The state-business run climate under which journalists must work has bred corrupt and ‘unprofessional’ journalistic practices. “Black PR”, or ‘*dzhinza*’ in Russian journalistic slang – the practice of producing imbalanced material to promote a particular politician’s policies or provide ‘hidden advertising’ for a company’s product (Zassoursky I. 2004, 93; see also Oates 2007, 1289-1293) – is considered by many post-Soviet journalists as normal practice (Oates 2007, 1289-1293). Other practices include “*Kompromat*” (Russian abbreviation for ‘compromising materials’) – essentially ‘mud-slinging’ against political figures, often based on “dubious facts”, or sometimes even “groundless” material – and self-censorship. Self-censorship, claims Oates, “is strongly correlated with government influence (...) [and] with crime, which suggests that it is part of the atmosphere of fear and control of journalists” (Ibid). It follows that those powers that exert influence over journalists and their media see them as ‘political players’ rather than ‘political observers’ (Ibid).

During the last decade of Putin (and briefly Medvedev’s) rule, the government “has shown no interest in protecting journalists as a group” (Roudakova 2009, 424-425). From “the silent approval of the growing number of lawsuits against journalists” and “the lack of enthusiasm for solving the crimes already committed against journalists” (Ibid), to the passing of new “broadly worded laws” that prescribe criminal and civil penalties for journalists (Becker 2004, 149) as well as Kremlin media policies serving as “de facto censorship” on certain topics (Roudakova 2009, 425), are some of the ways in which the Russian government have suppressed journalistic expression.

While some researchers describe that Russia's media system as "Neo-authoritarian" (Becker 2004) and "Neo-Soviet" (Oates 2007) because of the many new, often indirect, pressures on journalists to comply with elitist powers, others explain that the Kremlin's relationship to the media directly reflects how the government deals with Russian society as a whole, as a 'managed democracy' where democratic institutions such as elections, political parties, and a civil society formally exist but in reality have a limited capacity to influence (Lipman / McFaul 2001).

2.1.5 NOTES ON INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM

Although most research concurs that the emergence of investigative journalism coincided with Russian journalism's 'Golden Age' in the 1990s (Konstantinov 2010, Arutunyan 2009, Lipman 1998), some studies (Konstantinov 2010) suggest early signs of investigative work became apparent as early as the 19th century. The "historical investigations" of the 1830s, such as Pushkin's *Pugachev's Rebellion* (Konstantinov 2010, 71-74), as well as the satirical pieces published during the 1870s such as Saltykov-Shchedrin's *History of a Town* (Ibid, 67 -70) – both of which were considered to be investigations of sorts– emerged onto Russia's literary and, by default, journalistic scene. Perhaps the journalist of the 19th century most worthy of note is Vladimir Gilyarovsky, "the King of Reporting" (Ibid, 80; see also McReynolds 1991, 151-153) who investigated Moscow's underworld of poverty and crime (Ibid, 80 – 82). Later, the popularization of information-based journalism in the beginning of the 20th century, encouraged the development of "investigative adversarial [interviewing]" for journalists to "[obtain] the reasons for certain actions taken or policies executed by political leaders" (Maslennikova 2009).

During the Soviet era, a subversive type of reporting occurred whereby the "more critical journalists, for whom investigative reporting was not a real possibility, developed the skill of writing in such a way as to enable their audience to read between the lines" (Lipman 1998, 34). At the same time, journalists frequently undertook investigations in light of readers' letters they received reporting misconduct or abuse by the authorities (Roudakova 2009; Fitzpatrick 1996). More often than not, investigative methods in

journalism were controlled by and used to support “the party apparatus” (Konstantinov 2010, 107), as “all the material and documents had to be approved”, explains Konstantinov and “investigations had to be predefined” and given to a select few journalists to carry out, while “their results were adjusted to suit the general party line” (Ibid). For example, a type of investigative reporting approved by the authorities was that which provided the “final seal on a *nomenklatura* decision” that had been “already carefully planned out in detail” (Downing 1996, 71). Downing explains: “If a given factory, or city Party secretary, has been identified as a problem (...) then at that point one or more journalists would be assigned to amass negative ‘investigative’ details on the situation and write them for the newspaper” (Ibid). The authorities, in turn would take “prompt action” shortly after and the factory director or official would be removed from his position (Ibid). This type of investigative work is reminiscent of the contemporary journalistic practices of “black PR” and “*Kompromat*”.

In the 1980s during *perestroika*, and even more defiantly during the 1990s journalists’ “investigative instincts emerged promptly and naturally” (Lipman 1998, 4). Namely Arkadii Vaksberg and Yuri Shekochikin are credited to have established the first investigations desks in the Soviet press in 1980s (Konstantinov 2010, 120). During the late 1980s and 1990s especially, controversial television programmes (e.g. *Vzglyad*) emerged that challenged the authorities by investigating topics such as government corruption (Ibid, 131 – 136). Several investigative journalists gained repute during the early 1990s – Artyom Borovik, Larisa Kislinskaya, Larisa Yudina, Dmitriy Kholodov and Grigory Pasko, to name a few – by tackling a range of topics from local government corruption, to organized crime, to corruption among the military’s high-ranks and illegal environmental abuses (Konstantinov 2010, 131- 172). As many of these daring journalists’ work cost them imprisonment (e.g. Pasko) or their life (e.g. Kholodov, Yudina, Shekochikin) (Ibid), journalists became discouraged and the investigative spirit eventually faded (Lipman 1998, 8).

However, despite adverse political, economic and societal challenges investigative journalists have continued to work through the rise in corruption in the late 1990s to the present day. In 2013, the Kennan Institute invited five Russian investigative journalists to discuss the present state of investigative journalism in Russia today and to

offer insight into what the future might hold for the practice. While Elizaveta Osetinskaya, editor-in-chief of the Russian edition of *Forbes Magazine*, attributed the ‘remarkable increase in quality of investigative journalism’ over the past fifteen years to a wider access to information made possible by the internet, she also warned that the main threat to Russian investigative journalism is “a lack of financial resources and support”. Osetinskaya explained that neither turning to private sponsors, nor to news organizations funded by the government offer viable solutions as both exert forms of censorship and threaten the independence of investigative journalism. Svetlana Reiter, a freelance journalist for Moscow publication *Bolshoi Gorod*, mentioned that another challenge to investigative journalism is “editor politics”, by which “shorter news snippets” are chosen over “lengthier investigative stories” as they enjoy greater public appeal. In a similar vein, Ivan Ninenko, Deputy Director of Transparency International, Russia and co-anchor of the TV program, *Korrupsiia na dozhde* (Corruption on rain) indicated that “the problem is to make people care”, which suggests a wider societal obstacle to investigative journalism.

The lack of training for new investigative journalists appeared as a major concern. Osetinskaya noted a need for greater access to international training programmes. One such programme in 2009 took place under the auspices of the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), and ‘SCOOP Russia’, resulted from the cooperation since 2010 between the Swedish Association of Investigative Journalists (FGJ) and the Danish Association of Investigative Journalism (FUJ) with International Media Support (IMS).

2.2 Changing Russian journalists, a changing relationship with the audience

As Russian society went through and emerged out of the USSR and into the present Russian Federation, journalists like everybody else adapted to new systems of government, leaders, socio-economic conditions etc. Journalists’ roles – which have largely depended on journalism’s standing with government, authorities and elite of society – as well as their relationship to their audience (readers, viewers, listeners, consumers) have changed as a matter of course. This section takes firstly a brief look at the major changes in journalists’ main roles in society from the Soviet era to the mid-to-

late 2000s, and secondly at the evolving relationship between journalists and ordinary citizens.

2.2.1 THE CHANGING ROLE OF JOURNALISTS

In her observations of journalists in contemporary Russia, Arutunyan remarks “journalists have internalized their subordinate role” (2009, 6). She elaborates, “they can hardly be blamed, for in the 300 years of the Russian mass media’s existence, that media has been, with a few exceptions, directly dependent on the state in terms of funds, means of production and even editorial initiative” (Ibid). Indeed, “the defining feature of Russian journalism”, Arutunyan continues, “is that it emerged from its start in 1702 as a top-down, government endeavour” (Ibid). This “subordinate role” or that of working in collaboration *with* the state, depending on researchers’ point of view, is a clear motif throughout the history of Russian journalism.

In the Soviet era, journalists and the press were the “Party’s chief means of communication with the populace” (Lenoe 1998, 3). Indeed, journalists were charged with the task of playing the roles of ‘propagandist’, ‘organizer’ and ‘agitator’ as envisioned by Lenin. As active participants in the bringing about social reality of ‘a society building communism’ (Lenoe 1998, Inkeles 1950), journalists “took the responsibility for supporting the social order and rendering practical guidance to citizens” (Pasti 2005, 107). Many former Soviet journalists understood themselves as “the moral ‘leg’ of the State as well as its most ‘humane’ branch, to which the average Soviet person wronged by the bureaucracy or by the courts could actually turn to for help, particularly when no other channel (e.g., complaining to local Soviets or to party representatives) yielded results (Roudakova 2009, 415). Although the enormity of citizens’ letters received by newspapers meant that relatively few ‘letters to the editor’ and resulting journalistic investigations were published (Roudakova 2009, 416), journalists nonetheless endeavoured to deal with citizens’ problems and complaints (Ibid, see also Fitzpatrick 1996, 81). As such, they employed several mechanisms for “redress of injustice”, other than writing articles (Roudakova 2009, 417):

shaming the guilty official (on the phone or in private conversation) on behalf of the citizen, threatening the guilty official with a publication of the wronged

person's letter in the newspaper, threatening to conduct a journalistic investigation into the case of injustice, actually conducting an investigation and never publishing it, and conducting an investigation and making multiple attempts to publish it (Ibid).

While aspiring to be part of the *intelligentsia* "...always connoted [with] impeccable moral integrity and a perceived duty to put one's education and social and cultural capital to the use for the betterment of society" (Roudakova 2009, 417), journalists were not autonomous from the state (Pietiläinen 2002, 114) and were naturally expected to toe the party's editorial line by exerting self-censorship (Pasti 2005, 99).

Pasti (2005) found from her research based on interviews from 1998 to 2001 concerning the changing roles of Russian journalists that even after the collapse of the Soviet Union practitioners who were working in the Soviet era continue "to hold a cultivated view of journalism as an important societal task in natural collaboration with those in authority" (Pasti 2005, 89). Their 'sharing of the leadership with state officials' could explain why Russian journalists are less likely to rate investigating government claims as important as journalists in the United States (Wu et al. 1996, 538).

The transitional period of perestroika and the early 1990s saw increased individualism as well as disagreements among journalists as to what 'good' or 'virtuous' journalism meant (Roudakova 2009, 417). Working individually rather than collectively led to their estrangement from one another (Ibid). Due to economic conditions, journalists had to rely on 'patrons' once again. In the 1990s, their values shifted from 'pro-State' to 'pro-market' (Pasti 2005, 101 and 106) and their efforts were increasingly directed towards the interests and preferences of consumers and advertisers. By the end of the 1990s in a climate of political and business dependency, journalism and journalists had become a commodity (Pasti 2005, 106).

Putin's entrance on the political scene marked a new era in journalism. As journalists continue to be financially dependent on their sponsors, political practices have further limited their ability to criticize the realms of the financial and political elite. Pasti nicknamed Putin's era as the 'meek' era of the 2000s, "when to criticize or to protest is considered unpatriotic, with no need to 'rock the boat'" (2010, 71).

In her latest study on Russian journalists, Pasti (2010) noticed that the profession of journalism has recently enjoyed a surge in the popularity, as seen from “the number of journalism schools and the large number of applicants” (p.55). Pasti identified three types of new generation journalists – the ‘mercenaries’, the ‘artists’ and the ‘experts’ (2010, 61). The ‘mercenaries’ mostly work in government-oriented media and are characterized by an attitude of ‘what the boss wants, the boss gets’; the ‘artists’ are attracted to commercial and PR media, where they can express themselves creatively and where job satisfaction is derived from moving in elite circles, expanding their contacts, gaining positive reader-feedback and publishing materials that ‘enrage officials’; lastly, the ‘experts’ tend to work for quality newspapers and magazines, in which producing diverse and factual information to ‘actualize the topic taken by a journalist’ is important (Pasti 2010, 61). All three ‘types’ however succumb to the practice of ordered articles (*dzhinza*, ‘black PR’) written in political or commercial interests because such writings have become a “professional norm” (Ibid). As one of Pasti’s informants responded:

Professionalism is when you are bought by money. They want to use your professionalism for their own aims. They do not turn to just anybody but to the professional who competently organizes the black PR campaign, who is competently able to raze a character and his business to the ground (2010, 66).

What distinguishes the new generation of journalists from previous ones is their ‘lack of common ideals’, “as it was with the journalists of the Soviet epoch (the happy future with communism) and with those of the liberal 1990s (the happy future with capitalism)” (Pasti 2010, 71). Their ‘ideology’ is rather “pragmatic individualism and concern for their own fate” (Pasti 2010, Ibid) while at the same time journalistic culture is dominated by conformism (Ibid). Rather than being “[the state’s] investigators and critics” (Pasti / Pietiläinen 2008,128), many journalists view themselves as political players (Oates 2007, 1288), as ‘collaborators of those in power’ (Pasti 2005, Pasti / Pietiläinen 2008).

Beumers et al.’s research on contemporary post-Soviet Russian media (2009) shows that “a return has taken place to simple information rather than challenging news and investigative journalism, reflecting a lack of interest in politics that bespeaks a certain satisfaction with the status quo” (2009, 21-22). The fact that “Russian journalists

do not view themselves as political watchdogs and challengers of the political status quo”, is largely due to “practical issues” such as ‘keeping their jobs, and sometimes their liberty or even their lives’ (Oates 2007, 1287). Such conformism can also be justified by the fact that young Russian journalists are simply trying to get ahead in life, like any professionals are around the world. In her recent findings, Pasti wrote “young journalists do not want to be losers, they want to be winners and get all the rewards from life as soon as possible in the frame of their individual freedom” (2010, 72). As contemporary journalists’ “readiness to serve the present order” is inextricably linked to professional and economic survival, there is little show of wanting “to change the conditions of their profession and to reach political independence in journalism” (Ibid).

In light of this research, the question begs: have Russian journalists fundamentally changed from their role as cogs in the Soviet Union’s party-run system? While Pietiläinen suggests that journalists have “reverted to the role they played under the soviet rule: the government’s propaganda machine” (2008, 366), Pasti perceives both continuities and discontinuities from the soviet era. Rather than fulfilling the roles of ‘propagandist, organizer and agitator’, Pasti suggests that the government and economic elite compel journalists to now fulfill the roles of ‘propagandist, organizer and entertainer’ (2005, 109).

2.2.2 A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AUDIENCE

Research to date shows a distancing between Russian journalists and the general public. While in the Soviet period journalists were charged by the State with the responsibility “to react to situation of social suffering brought to their attention and to use their resources and skills to put an end to that suffering” (Roudakova 2009, 416), their relationship to the general public was mainly positive, and one of support, albeit paternalistic. Their duty of liaising between citizens and the state (e.g. by responding to letters to the editor with advice) was a task that most took extremely seriously (Roudakova 2009, 416), which “earned them the trust and respect of the Soviet citizens” (Ibid). Similarly, the press’s stabilizing force as one with the intention of “leading”

society right up until *glasnost*' explains why Russians report "a surprisingly high level of approval of their mass media" (Oates 2007, 1295).

With exception to the brief period following collapse of the Soviet Union when journalists were held in high regard (Roudakova 2009, 424), public opinion polls have shown the level of citizens' trust in the media plummeting since the 1990s (Roudakova 2009, 424), as "it became less and clear to readers and viewers and colleagues in other outlets whose civic-political ardor was genuine and whose was 'bought' or 'paid for'" (Roudakova 2009, 422).

Even though the public is taken into account in media production in as far as its demographics' capacity to consume various media products matters (Pasti 2005, 100-101), journalism is fast losing the role of providing a public service. According to Zassoursky, the public continue nowadays to perceive the media as "a continuation of politics by 'dirty means' (...) for the squaring of account in the struggle between the power of the world, people who are indifferent to the everyday needs and cares of ordinary readers" (Zassoursky I. 2004, 98).

The alliance to the State and big business has meant a rise in a self-interested commercial and PR journalism, and a marginalization of public-interested 'quality journalism' and a loss of the public's trust (Pasti 2010, 70). The direction taken by journalists of diverting attention away from serious problems, towards providing entertainment in the pursuit of ratings (Pasti 2010, 68), has meant a fundamental change in the relationship between journalists and their audience.

It must also be noted that the Russian audience's media consumption has also changed over the past two decades. The higher cost of production and acquisition of publications on the one hand and journalism's lack of "widely accepted common value" on the other have contributed to Russia changing from being a nation of readers to a nation of TV viewers (Pietiläinen 2008, 379-383). Moreover, the Internet has by and large replaced newspaper consumption among the middle and elite classes (Pietiläinen 2008, 383).

2.3 Other factors relevant to journalism in Russia

2.3.1 FREEDOM OF THE PRESS⁸

Officially, the right to information and the inadmissibility of censorship are included in the 1993 Constitution (article 29)⁹ and the 1991 *Russian Federation Law on the Mass Media* (article 1) (De Smaele 2007, 1299; Oates 2007, 1286; Azhgikhina 2007, 1252). The *Law on the Mass Media* “assigns the right to receive official information only to the mass media,” while “Russian citizens have the right to receive true information on the activities of state organs [and] public organizations” (De Smaele 2007, 1300). Moreover, in the 1995 Federal Law on *Information, Informatisation and the Protection of Information* guarantees the citizens’ – and the media consequently – rights to access state information resources other than security secrets (Ibid; Voltmer 2000, 452). It must also be mentioned that officially, Putin endorsed the notion of a free press by admitting that “if Russian aspires to become a modern society in must ensure that the press is free” (Lipman/ McFaul 2001, 121)

Censorship in Russia was officially abolished only twice: for a few months in the spring of 1917 by Decree of the Provisional Government, and in 1991 by the first Russian Law on Media (Azhgikhina 2007, 1255). Nevertheless, such laws guaranteeing freedom of the press continue to be limited by more subtle forms of censorship (De Smaele 2007, 1301). According to Simonov, head of the Glasnost’ Defense Foundation, there are 6 current practices of censorship in the Russian Federation: (1) administrative, (2) economic, (3) censorship from editorial policy, (4) censorship from editorial ‘taste’, (5) censorship resulting from criminal actions or threats and lastly, (6) self-censorship (Dewhirst 2010, 28 – 30). While administrative censorship constitutes ploys such as

⁸ ‘Freedom of the Press’ is used throughout the work to refer to the ‘Freedom of Mass Communication’ referenced in the Constitution (see footnote 9)

⁹ Article 29 of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation reads: “1. Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of ideas and speech. 2. The propaganda or agitation instigating social, racial, national or religious hatred and strife shall not be allowed. The propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic supremacy shall be banned. 3. No one may be forced to express his views and convictions or to reject them. 4. Everyone shall have the right to freely look for, receive, transmit, produce and distribute information by any legal way. The list of data comprising state secrets shall be determined by a federal law. 5. The freedom of mass communication shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be banned.” (from <http://www.constitution.ru/en>).

accusing media organizations or individuals of libelous or slanderous allegations, closing down media that don't support the authorities "with enough zeal" discovering financial irregularities, economic censorship refers to businesses being discouraged from advertising in or backing certain 'disapproved' media (Ibid). Censorship from editorial policy differs depending on the media and happens during the editing process, whereas censorship from editorial taste refers to the editor-in-chief's decision to not publish anything s/he considers 'distasteful', or rather 'different' to his his/her taste (Ibid). While censorship resulting from criminal actions and threats include beatings or murder (Azhgikhina 2007, 1249), self-censorship results from the fear of all of the above (Lipman 2005, Azhgikhina 2007). In addition, the 2000 *Doctrine of Informational Security*, was brought in by Russia's active anti-terrorist campaign to "[enhance] state control of the flow of information by barring "irresponsible coverage of events and the spread of 'false' information" (Chebankova 2009, 399).

Rather than using freedom of the press to 'increase the public's access to information, to understand what is going on in society' (Zassoursky Y. 2001, 159), 'freedom of the press' has come to mean 'permissiveness', whereby freedom of the press has been treated as "a license to gain profits by attracting huge audience with sensationalism and cheap entertainment, by presenting sexism and violence with little regard for humanistic values, for moral and ethical standards" (Ibid).

Although Azhgikhina estimated there are "hundreds of courageous, independent publications in the Russian regions [that] tell their readers the truth" and "thousands of journalists [who] understand their duty as that of serving justice and their readers", Pasti indicates however, that "freedom of the speech is diminishing" (Pasti 2010, 68) as journalists continue to seek professional security through conformity.

It has been suggested (Lipman / McFaul 2001) that freedom of the press can only be respected under certain conditions: (1) when the media are financially independent from the government and corrupt elite, (2) when "Russia develops an independent and uncorrupt judiciary system that can defend not only state interests but also minority shareholders' rights"; (3) when "the Kremlin believes in the norms of free speech and democracy generally"; and (4) when an independent media gains more popular support (2001, 124 - 125).

2.3.2 CIVIL SOCIETY

In turning to ‘civil society’, its main purpose, according to a prominent theorist of the subject, is “to limit the reach of the government while representing public interest” (Evans 2006, 153). While the role of the media is frequently understood as “a facilitator of civil society” (McIntosh Sundstrom /Henry 2006, 314), a better understanding of civil society’s evolution and present state in Russia is important to better assess the climate under which journalism is able to work. Before we look at the specifics of Russia, let’s define the concept of civil society.

Edwards (2004) considers that civil society is comprised of three parts. First, on a socio-political level civil society is made up of citizen-initiated organizations (e.g. clubs, associations and networks) that stand between the individual and the state; secondly, on an ethical-civic level, civil society represents “the pursuit of positive norms, values and beliefs, as well as [the protection of] universal humanistic values, freedom and equality”; thirdly, civil society refers to the public sphere as the “non-legislative, extra judicial realm that facilitates public communication, free exchange of opinion, and critical argument” (in Chebankova 2009, 396) which can be found in the state-supported norms and forms such as internet-access, think tanks, referenda, universities and independent media (Ibid). White adds to Edwards’s definition of civil society by including the aspects of civic engagement and trust between citizens and between citizens and the state (White 2006, 284).

One of the reasons that Russia’s civil society today is generally weak is due to the country’s totalitarian past (McIntosh Sundstrom /Henry 2006, Evans 2006, Gibson 2001, Zassoursky I. 2004, Chebankova 2009). Stalinism effectively eradicated civil society by ‘destroying almost all independent organizations that had furnished mediating links between citizens and the state’ and ‘channeling all organized, overt public activism into structures that were controlled by the party state regime’ (Evans et al. 2006, 38). Organizations left standing were “either created by the Communist Party or had been brought under the domination of the party” (Evans et al. 2006, 48) which effectively turned them into “transmission belt organizations whose purpose was to monitor society, mobilize it behind the leadership’s program, and convey orders from the top downward”

(Bernard 1996, 314)".

Not until the late 1980s, when Gorbachev's perestroika proposals towards democratization allowed "the founding of 'informal' groups which were created by the initiative of citizens" (Evans et al. 2006, 45) did an embryonic civil society begin to take shape (Gibson 2001, 28). However, as many such groups began to openly press demands for actions by the state, they discovered that influencing public policy still "depended heavily on winning favour of individuals in powerful positions within the state" (Evans et al. 2006, 46), which in turn "perpetuated the arbitrariness and dependence on figures of authority which marked the Soviet period" (White 1999, 168). The burgeoning civil society was further eroded in the late 1990s by economic decline and political leaders' deliberate efforts to discourage citizen mobilization and reward inside connections (Evans 2006, 147). Enhanced by people's inherent distrust of social organizations, inherited from Soviet times, "independent, social and non-governmental organizations [were] consigned to a marginal status in society and politics" (Ibid).

Recent studies (Chebankova 2009, Evans 2006) show that developments of a "quasi-" or "pseudo-" civil society (Evans 2006, 149) under Putin have persisted in the same top-down vein, whereby "the Kremlin (...) seems to place a particular effort on stifling and suppressing the public sphere" (Chebankova 2009, 397). While Putin has made statements of "token endorsement for the development of civil society" (Evans 2006, 149), Evans writes that "it is also part of Putin's mode of operation to offer rewards for organizations that are integrated into his pyramid of support, while he makes it possible for him to deny responsibility, that there will be penalties for resisting subordination to centralized authority" (Evans 2006, 148).

Following his state of the nation address in 2004, in which he made public his suspicions of NGOs¹⁰, Putin established in 2005 the 'Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation' (*Obshchestvennaya palata*) – "a platform for extensive dialogue, where citizen's initiatives could be presented and discussed in detail" (Evans 2006, 151) –

¹⁰ In his state of the nation address to the national parliament in May 2004, though he repeatedly endorsed the idea of civil society and acknowledged that "many citizens' associations in Russia are working constructively," Putin complained that for some social orgs the priority is "obtaining funding from influential foreign or domestic foundations," and for others it is "Servicing dubious group and commercial interests" (Putin 2004/ Full Text of Putin's state of the nation address to Russian Parliament " RTR Russia TV, BBC monitoring May 26 (Evans 2006, 149)

whereby Putin appointed 42 “Russian citizens who had performed special services to the state and society”, who in turn elected 42 national Russian NGOs, who all together (84) chose 42 representatives from regional and inter-regional organizations¹¹. However, as Evans comments, the Civic Chamber is “evidently a controlled forum that will serve as a substitute for the articulations of citizens’ demands by independent social groups” (2006, 151). Putin’s latest initiative in this trend of the Kremlin’s to reinforce the ‘vertical chain of command’ (Evans 2006, 151) by controlling independent civic action was the passing of legislation 102766-6¹² – better known as the ‘Foreign Agents Law’ – in July 2012. This new law obliges NGOs that receive sponsorship from abroad to register with the authorities as ‘foreign agents’. Moreover, Putin signed a measure in June 2012 that imposes steep fines, running as high as (approx. \$18,0000) on those who organize or participate in “unapproved demonstrations” (CPJ website)¹³.

In spite of the Russian authorities’ obvious proclivity towards ‘stifling the public sphere’, some research (Evans et al. 2006, White 2006, Gibson 2001) indicates that a ‘citizen-grown’ civil society is possible. In their research, Evans et al. indicate that it was through Soviet citizens’ distrust of the system that they became adept at “evading authority and subverting the rules of the system” and thus fostered an “underground popular culture pervaded by cynicism” (2006, 46-47). Recent research on the Russian blogosphere and Russian citizens’ usage of the Internet indicates a parallel phenomenon, whereby a Russian civil society and public sphere are emerging online (Alexanyan et al. 2012; Etling et al. 2010). Similarly, White writes about Russian regions that despite citizens’ mistrust of institutions (2006, 299) and the fact that the media are rarely independent from local administration (2006, 290) there were clear signs of “civic culture, in the sense of a social responsibility and a commitment to the well-being of the community” (2006, 285), as seen in part through informal networks inherited from Soviet times, all of which “could in some respects be quite promising for [Russia’s] democratization” (White 2006, 285).

¹¹ Information taken from the official website: <http://www.oprf.ru/en/>

¹² Information taken from the official website:

<http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28SpravkaNew%29?OpenAgent&RN=102766-6&02>

¹³ Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) website with the 2012 report on Russia: <http://www.cpj.org/2013/02/attacks-on-the-press-in-2012-russia.php>

Although little research (Volkov 2012) has yet been made public on the significance of the mass 2011 and 2012 protests in Moscow and in regional capitals during the State DUMA elections and in response to Putin's reelection respectively, it is the author's suspicion that such collective action, with the intention of limiting Kremlin pervasiveness, represents a landmark in Russian civil society's history and may be indicative of change in the country.

In spite of the 'grassroots' signs of civil society development as seen in regional Russia and Russian cyber-space, which may be early signs of greater societal change to come, this section largely demonstrates that civil society, as defined by Edwards, is weak in Russia today. "The new power actors," as De Smaele perceives it, "still tend to reproduce the old form of hegemony (...) and [are] not readily allowing adversary power actors and civil society to participate in the decision-making and to control the activities of the state" (De Smaele 1999, 177). On the one hand, the government persistently undermines and controls citizen-initiated organizations, whilst merely paying "lip-service" to the idea that government supports the growth of a civil society and protects 'universal humanistic values' (Evans 2006, 149). On the other hand, the Russian media's inability to facilitate a public sphere of debate (McIntosh Sundstrom /Henry 2006, 314) can be explained by the tendency of officials in government structures to view the media as a collection of 'friends' and 'enemies' (Oates 2006), further compounded by post-Soviet citizens acceptance and distrust of the media, "as a tool that power elites use to engage in state building" (McIntosh Sundstrom /Henry 2006, 314). In other words, the weakness of Russia's top-down 'civil society' and the media's weakness to act as a facilitator of a civil society dialectically reflect and affect each other.

3. Theoretical framework

This section provides the reader with the definitions of concepts that constitute the theoretical framework of this study.

With this research I explore chiefly the motivational reasoning Russian investigative journalists express when interviewed about their profession. As such, I have chosen to frame my work within the ‘grand theory’ of Bourdieu’s field theory – or the study of power relations and their structuring of human action (Benson/ Neveu 2005). In particular, Bourdieu’s concept of *illusio* – which refers to an [individual]’s emotional or cognitive ‘investment’ in the stakes involved in any particular field, or simply the belief that the game is worth playing (Benson/ Neveu 2005, 3) – is used as a theoretical tool to better understand why Russian investigative journalists do what they do. Bourdieu’s concepts of *capital* – financial, cultural, social and symbolic– and his concepts of *external sanctions and internal struggles* are used to contextualize the motivational factors of this study’s participants.

Moreover, the concept of *investigative journalism* is also discussed in this section in terms of its interpretation and usage in several national contexts with differing journalistic discourses. Investigative journalism is thus defined in this study as a *discourse* and its particular usages in namely U.K./U.S.A, China and France are discussed to further frame this study on investigative journalists in Russia. The concept of *truth*, so central to investigative journalism, is also defined as a journalistic term in this section.

To honour the research tradition that supports this study, the section firstly presents the *constructivist* approach that frames this academic work.

Notes on constructivism

In its aim to explore Russian investigative journalists’ motivation for their job from their perspective, this study belongs to a constructivist tradition. Constructivists understand the world of lived reality and situation-specific meanings to be construed by social actors (Schwandt 1994, 120). The question that drives a constructivist’s research is therefore ‘How do people construct their reality?’. “The goal”, explains Schwandt, “[is] of

understanding the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it” (Ibid).

3.1 Bourdieu’s field theory and the concepts *illusio*, capital, and ‘internal struggles & external sanctions’

Pierre Bourdieu, French sociologist and philosopher, wrote “to think in terms of field is to think relationally” (Benson / Neveu 2005, 3). Bourdieu developed his grand theory, ‘field theory’, during the latter half of the 20th century, to analyze how individual human beings are intricately connected to each other and how they relate to the social reality of which they become innately a part. Put simply, Bourdieu’s field theory seeks answers to these questions: How do people relate to each other? How do they relate to the world around them? How do they relate to the professional paths they have chosen?

In this section, I firstly provide a brief overview of Bourdieu’s field theory to show how this grand theory provides an insightful backdrop to the subject of journalism and the world journalists inhabit. Secondly, I will take a closer look at three of Bourdieu’s concepts – namely at *illusio*, *capital* and *external sanctions and internal struggles*– as tools to meet this work’s main objective: to gain deeper understanding into what motivates Russian investigative journalists to practise their profession.

An overview of field theory and its application to the field of journalism

Field theory sees people as inhabiting different social and professional spheres. Each sphere, or *field*, is ordered with unspoken rules that individuals who inhabit that given field learn to respect and follow. As field-members perpetuate the rules and the knowledge of what it means to belong to a given field, the field continues to exist and its boundaries reinforced.

To briefly illustrate this, here is a familiar example: going to the cinema. When watching a film at the cinema, cinema-goers follow a set of rules, some of which are explicit, such as ‘Turn off your mobile phones’, while others are implicit, such as ‘Don’t munch or slurp your snacks too loudly’. We all silently follow these rules, and yet we may also be pushed to remind others to adhere to them. In this sense, the way people act within a given situation (i.e. ‘going to the cinema’) *is formed* by an unspoken ‘know-

how' (i.e. being quiet, turning off one's mobile, etc.) and *forms* the unspoken 'know-how' (i.e. by following the 'quiet' rules and encouraging others to do the same). An overly simplistic example perhaps, but the concept of an implicit know-how lies at the heart of field theory.

Within society, or the wider social field, a multitude of fields exist. According to Neveu, sociologist and expert on Bourdieu's grand theory, there are, in principle, "as many fields as there are specialized realms of human activity: literary, artistic, religious, scientific, state bureaucratic, economic, journalistic"- to name a few (Neveu 2007, 336). Within each field, people (*agents*) interact and struggle to establish themselves (*positions*) within the field by differentiating themselves from other agents and by acquiring / maintaining capital (e.g.: *cultural, social*). In order to function in the field, agents possess tacit knowledge of how to act within the field (*doxa*). Consciously, they know that what they are doing is worth doing (*illusio*) and thus willingly follow the field's implicit and explicit rules (*nomos*). The unspoken knowledge, or know-how of what it means to be a field-member, is what is called *habitus*.

The journalistic field is a 'microcosm within a macrocosm' (Benson / Neveu 2005, 5). Within society's overarching social field, which encompasses all social interaction, is the field of power. Within the field of power lies the field of cultural production and within the field of cultural production, lays the journalistic field. As each field can only exist in relation to other fields and forces, the journalistic field exists in contention with two influential, or 'magnetic', poles: the *cultural* pole and the *economic* pole. On the one hand, journalism is pulled towards the *cultural* pole, or the 'autonomous' pole as Neveu calls it (2007, 337), which is perpetuated and upheld by those agents most dedicated to the values, skills and resources that characterize the field and set it apart from other fields (e.g. disseminating objective information to the public). On the other hand, journalism belongs to large-scale cultural production and is thus intrinsically subject to pressures of commercialization and the forces of the market – or the *economic* pole (Benson / Neveu 2005, 5).

While the *cultural* pole represents journalism in a state of autonomy, in which journalists are free to uphold core journalistic values, the *economic* pole enslaves journalism in a homogenous state, which conversely compels journalists to write

something ‘that sells’. As Bourdieu argues, the journalistic field has “very low autonomy” (Bourdieu 2005, 41), because its activities mostly depend on external heteronomous powers, such as market forces. As journalism succumbs to these external financial and political pressures, journalism reinforces the status quo of how society is run. Precisely because of the role journalism plays in producing and reproducing societal norms, transformations within the journalistic field can potentially transform power relations in other fields (Benson / Neveu 2005, 9 -10). Bourdieu sees journalism holding a central position in the larger field of power, which thus acts as a “mediator among all fields” (Benson / Neveu 2005, 5).

3.1.1 *ILLUSIO*

“*Illusio* is the fact of being caught up in and by the game [of a given field], of believing the game is... worth the effort,” wrote Bourdieu (1998, 76 – 77). The concept of *illusio* suggests that agents, or journalists, make a conscious investment in the “game” of their profession – believing that their profession is worth practicing – or, as logic dictates, they would simply not do it. If we take a field to be a “social space” in which “the institutions and characters who enter it are trapped in its stakes, values, debates, [where] one cannot succeed in it without a minimum of practical or reflexive knowledge of its internal rules and logics” (Neveu 2007, 338), *illusio* is what makes the stakes worth enduring, the values worth defending and the debates worth having – and, what ultimately attracts and keep journalists in their field. For some journalists, *illusio* might be the belief that the media represent the fourth estate (Jensen 2010, 624) and therefore compels the journalist to provide an accurate image of societal affairs by acting as a ‘watchdog’. As such, belief in an *illusio* might inspire the investigative journalist to keep stockpiling documentation despite bureaucratic hurdles.

One of the more questionable aspects of *illusio* is its applicability to ‘new media’, to the world of blogs and Twitter. Bourdieu suggests that *illusio* “is a kind of knowledge based on the fact of being born inside the game, of belonging to the game by birth: saying that I know the game this way means that I have it under my skin, that it plays in me, even without” (1993, 44), implying that journalistic *illusio* is best grasped by agents

whose kin are journalists. De Barros Filho and Praça's study on Brazilian journalistic bloggers disputes this argument by asserting that there exist different types of agents, with different levels of engagement to the journalistic field (2009, 16). As the study also reveals, the journalistic field may distinguish between 'dominated agents' (e.g. political bloggers) who "propose strategies of subversion" in efforts to belong the journalistic field and 'dominant agents' (e.g. news agency journalists) who "support strategies of conservation" in efforts to preserve the status quo in what defines 'real journalism' (De Barros Filho / Praça 2009, 15). Nonetheless, the study concludes that what ultimately defines an agent belonging to the journalistic field is their knowledge and recognition of the 'rules of the game', as well as a shared sense of *illusio*. "A blogger who is a political journalist is aware that he or she is dominated, knows he or she is subversive, and demands autonomy, but paradoxically alludes to the founding fathers, to the principles of the profession, to what is pure, to a discourse which is commonly enunciated by those who are conservative, i.e., by those who dominate the social space of struggle and enunciation" (De Barros Filho and Praça 2009, 17). Indeed, the Brazilian study suggests that it is the struggle of up-and-coming idealistic and determined bloggers for the unmitigated dissemination of information that pulls the journalistic field in an autonomous direction, away from market-demands, precisely because of their peripheral position to the field.

This 'journalism for journalism's sake' described by De Barros Filho and Praça parallels Bourdieu's own apparent admiration for French author Flaubert, who heralded art for art's sake (Neveu 2007, 337). Such authors – whether journalists or artists – whose staunch belief in *illusio* eclipses all other purposes and whose work are most closely reflective of the 'autonomous' pole in their field, tend to write for their peers, other authors, rather than for consumers (Ibid).

3.1.2 CAPITAL

Although the term 'capital' is itself familiar to us all, its Bourdieuesque connotations are worth examining. According to Bourdieu, journalists possess and strive to acquire various types of capital to further and distinguish themselves in the field – namely

economic capital (financial assets), *cultural capital* (education, awards, knowledge), *social capital* (networks, connections to others in the field) and *symbolic capital* (reputation) (Hummel et al. 2011, 4).

Belief in the intrinsic value of the forms of capital that the field has to offer (e.g. working for a reputable newspaper, being well-connected, getting a Pulitzer, having a good income, acquiring a press-pass and being in a position to disseminate information) constitutes *illusio* (Jensen 2010, 618). At the same time, the acquisition of such capital naturalizes and justifies both the hurdles that come with the job (i.e. ‘internal struggles’) and the pressures that come from outside the field of journalism (i.e. ‘external sanctions’) (Ibid).

In their study of young Austrian journalists striving to carve out a career for themselves in journalism – the number of which is increasing despite the field being overcrowded as it is – Hummel, Kirchhoff and Prandner applied Bourdieu’s field theory and in particular, the concept of capital and *illusio* to their collected data and discovered a curious phenomenon among their informants. Despite the fact that, in most cases, their informants could not officially call themselves journalists according to Austrian law¹⁴ and regardless of the little and infrequent pay they received as many of them were freelancers, three quarters of the young Austrian journalists talked about their work as a *Traumjob* (‘Dream job’), as they listed the ‘perks’ gained on the job, from having privileged access to information, to making contact with a great variety of people, to boosting their social status among friends and family – in other words, the *social* and *symbolic* capital (Hummel et al. 2011, 7). As Benson and Neveu indicate, “... professional gratifications which make people believe in the purpose of what they are doing and stick to the field in spite of personal back draws can thus be explained by their ‘illusio’...” (2005, 3). As we can see, notions of ‘capital’ and *illusio* are closely linked.

¹⁴Hummel & Co report that according to Austrian Journalism Law, “a Journalist is only a person who earns the majority of their living by creating and processing topical information within a media enterprise.” (2011, p. 2)

3.1.3 'EXTERNAL SANCTIONS' AND 'INTERNAL STRUGGLES'

Bourdieu asserted that a field is never stagnant, but rather “in permanent revolution” (Bourdieu 1996, 239). The forces that create change are grouped into what Bourdieu calls *external sanctions* and *internal struggles*.

Bourdieu likens the power of other fields (e.g. politics, market forces) to “huge stars or black holes” deforming the space around them (Neveu 2007, 339). Such ‘external sanctions’, writes Neveu, “are visible in the growing weight of market logics, which transform both the contents of newspapers as well as indigenous visions of professional excellence, when ratings and sales figures become more powerful proof of excellence than the depth of analysis or the art of investigation” (Ibid). ‘Internal struggles’, on the other hand, are largely determined by journalists’ *position* in the journalistic field vis à vis others, as well as their disposition towards possessing and acquiring capital (Bourdieu 1996, 239). It is the combination of these two sources of pressure, both the ‘external sanctions’ and ‘internal struggles’, according to Bourdieu, that triggers changes in the journalistic field and keeps it in “permanent revolution” (Bourdieu 1996, 239). Hallin comments nevertheless that, “there is no reason to assume that change [within a field] will result in greater rather than lesser autonomy of fields” (2005, 231). Hallin refers to Champagne’s argument that “[journalism’s] history could well be in large part the story of an impossible autonomy” (Ibid). Champagne understands journalism to be that of an unending story of an autonomy that must always be re-won because it is always threatened. In other words, the history of journalism does not possess a ‘natural history’ that moves inevitably towards the autonomy of journalism away from other fields (Ibid).

3.1.4 CRITIQUES OF AND HOLES IN ‘FIELD THEORY’

Bourdieu’s field theory, along with his concepts of *illusio*, *capital*, and *external sanctions* and *internal struggles*, all seem credible on paper, but are they applicable to Russian investigative journalists? Perhaps the most candid and imperative critique comes from Marlière, who judiciously points out that Bourdieu fails to determine what journalism is.

“‘Journalism’,” writes Marlière, “seems to refer to a unified category created by the illusion that necessarily speaks and acts as one individual would” (1998, 223). Indeed, Marlière accuses Bourdieu of stigmatizing journalists as ‘an undifferentiated category’ (Ibid). “It would be fairer to say, that in its heterogeneity, the journalistic field – like the academic field – has a variety of brilliant and dull members, or hard-working and ineffective members” (Marlière 1998, 224). Marlière is echoed by De Barros Filho and Praça with their study of Brazilian bloggers (2009), which highlights the same weaknesses in field theory’s application to journalism as Marlière pointed to – namely, Bourdieu’s seemingly narrow vision of ‘journalism’ and ‘journalist’. As such, the De Barros Filho and Praça research suggests, however, listening to agents’ self-proclamation and self-evaluation as journalists. The results from the research indicate that not only do their informants ‘know and recognize the rules of the game’ but also share the same *illusio* as those dominating the field. In other words, *illusio*, the principled motivation for practising journalistic work, could be seen as demarcating field-members from non-field-members. De Barros Filho and Praça’s research also brings to light, that it is precisely these peripheral members of the field and their struggle to become part of the journalistic field, that creates the social conflict and perpetual debate about journalism’s ‘esprit de corps’, which ultimately ensures the survival of the field itself.

Another questionable aspect is whether or not the Bourdieuesque concepts are applicable to the context of Russia. Inspired by the academic and artistic environment he inhabited, Pierre Bourdieu chiseled out his grand theory whilst living in Paris, thus one can only deduce that his theories are most pertinent to French fields of social interaction. Contrary to expectation, “the best contributions to an understanding of journalistic practices considered as work relationships (in the newsroom, with sources) are probably Anglophone” (Neveu 2007, 344). Neveu indicates that, while Bourdieu’s concept of *illusio* and *capital*, are valid when it comes to different media systems¹⁵, he suggests “rethinking the variables” when it comes to applying the concepts to those different media systems (2007, 344). As such, I pay heed to Neveu and Marlière’s (and De Barros Filho and Praça) previous experience in applying field theory to journalism by keeping a

¹⁵ Erik Neveu refers to Hallin and Mancini’s *Comparing Media Systems* (2004) in which they distinguish three main media types: (1) The Mediterranean or ‘polarized pluralist’ model, (2) the North /Central European or ‘democratic corporatist’ model, and (3) the North Atlantic or ‘liberal’ model.

open mind in my approach to the variables that constitute and shape *illusio*, ‘capital’, and ‘external sanctions and internal struggles’ within the Russian context.

While very little research has explored the subject of journalism in Russia with Bourdieu’s field theory (Erzikova / Lowery 2012), let alone the subject of Russian investigative journalists, I contend that the applicability of the Bourdieuesque concepts of *illusio*, ‘capital’, and ‘external sanctions and internal struggles’ to Russian investigative journalists is plausible – if for no other reason, than because my informants are people, like you and me, striving to do something meaningful with their professional lives.

My assumptions are basic. I assume that Russian investigative journalists have a motivation for what they do, or *illusio*. My assumption is that they believe, to a greater or lesser extent, that the ‘game’ of investigative journalism is worth playing; or else they wouldn’t play it. I also assume that in order for them to be motivated there is capital to gain – whether it is economic, cultural, social or symbolic, or a combination of these. Additionally, I assume that Russian investigative journalists have to do their job under pressure – whether that be pressure that comes with the nature of their work (‘internal struggles’) or from outside their profession, such as ratings and consumer demand (‘external sanctions’). The research is conducted in such a way as to expand Bourdieu’s theory to get a clearer idea as to why Russian investigative journalists practice their profession.

3.2 Investigative journalism

Notes on investigative journalism as discourse

Barbie Zelizer, communications researcher and former journalist, suggests we consider journalists as interpretive communities, “united through [their] shared discourse [of journalism] and collective interpretation of key public events” (1993, 219). Zelizer argues that definitions of journalism can be better achieved “by focusing on how journalists shape meaning themselves” (Zelizer 1993, 219). A key aspect, therefore, of this argument is that the discourse of journalism changes with its historical and geographical context. Weaver (1998) writes, “in a global scope we have many different systems of journalism

as journalism does not exist independently outside of social context and specific journalism genres are produced and shaped in specific social environments”. One such journalism genre is investigative journalism. Although it originates in Anglo-American journalistic tradition, investigative journalism has since been adopted by other communities of journalists who have interpreted the practice to suit specific national contexts. Given the nature of the study, I have chosen to extend Zelizer’s discourse analogy to investigative journalism. The Anglo-American discourse of investigative journalism therefore offers us primarily a point of reference from which to discuss other discourses of investigative journalism.

Notes on ‘truth’

The concept of ‘truth’ is just as elusive in a journalistic context as it is any other. As the subsequent sections suggest, one of the main aspects and purposes of investigative journalism is exposure of the truth, or as de Burgh puts it “going after what someone wants to hide” (2000, 15). Closely linked with the issue of truth, are the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity. Schudson defines objectivity within the context of journalism as “the belief that one can and should separate facts from values” (1978, 5). According to Schudson, facts are “assertions about the world open to independent validation”, while values are “an individual’s conscious or unconscious preference for what the world should be” (Ibid), which can also be described as ‘subjective’. A logical implication in defining ‘truth’ is to equivocate it with facts and objectivity. At the same time, it is claimed that while regular news reporters do not have to believe what is true in their reporting, investigative reporters have to decide what is true and what is not (Ettema / Glasser 1998, 159). But do not a belief in truth and decision-making about what is true imply subjectivity? Is not the standard ‘Who, What, When, Why and How’ style of daily news reporting in this sense *more* objective, more *truthful*, because it deals purely with ‘facts’? Yes and no.

Investigative reporting is expected to go beyond and behind what officials claim to be ‘true’, whereas daily news reporters are compelled to write up the information, the ‘facts’ as seen at first glance, for the simple reason that they are under time pressure. Investigative journalism, instead, takes a second look at the ‘truth’ issued by the

authorities. Investigative reporters are expected to take time compiling documents from a variety of sources that dispute or prove different aspect of the official version of the truth. In this sense, they are both ‘deciding’ what is true *and* unearthing documentation “open to independent validation”. In Schudson’s analysis, he remarks “the investigative tradition distinguishes its aggressiveness from objective reporting’s passivity” (1978, 169). Whereas daily news reporting, as it is understood in an Anglo-American context, could be said to be passively concerned with official truth, the ideals of investigative journalism call on investigative reporters to be actively, even aggressively, in pursuit of truth.

3.2.1 AN ANGLO-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE: ‘CUSTODIANS OF CONSCIENCE’

The origins of investigative journalism can be traced back to the mid-19th century. According to de Burgh, the first journalist to be considered an investigative journalist by contemporary standards was W. T. Stead, editor and journalist for the *Pall Mall Gazette*. In an undercover stint, Stead sought a girl in East End London for sexual purposes and when procured with a 12 year-old-girl, his suspicions were confirmed. On the 6 July 1885, his five-page detailed article *Violations of Virgins, The Reports of Our Secret Commission* was published in the gazette. Although Quaker human rights activists made earlier attempts to inform British police and diplomats about the sex slavery of English girls in London, nobody had given it the attention it deserved until Stead’s article and the subsequent public stir it caused. The article’s ‘high moral tone’ combined with its ‘sensational description’ changed the style of reporting, while the espousal of ‘rational observations and moral empathy’ gave way to a new genre of journalism: investigative journalism (de Burgh 2000, 26).

While Stead’s story was an isolated case of investigative journalism, the movement of investigative reporting is most frequently attributed to the early 20th century American Muckrakers. The first investigative works published in 1903 examined the working conditions in the nation’s coalmines and the shortcomings of the union the workers had joined. The common theme in these early publications that came to be adopted by the entire muckraking movement was: the threat to democracy from good

people doing nothing (Aucoin 2005, 32). Almost two thousand investigative articles appeared in American magazines between 1903 and 1912, including *The Jungle* written by the most well-known muckraker, Upton Sinclair. Sinclair's undercover work led to a horrifically detailed exposé of the food processing industry in 1906, which became an immediate best-seller, and directly contributed to the Congress passing the 'Pure Food and Drug Act' six months after the booklet had been published (de Burgh 2000, 81). More than simply reporting, early investigative journalists founded a genre of journalism that aimed at pushing overlooked or intentionally ignored issues onto the public agenda, and thus contributing to what Ettema and Glasser call the 'crafting of the moral order' (1998, 185).

After the world wars and the timely birth of media propaganda and the mass media (McQuail 2005), investigative journalism made a comeback in the 1960s. "There was a climate [in the 1960s] conducive to skepticism and irreverence," writes de Burgh, "that made investigative journalism attractive. These factors may account for its eruption" (de Burgh 2000, 48). Some of the most eminent of stories emerging in these eruptive times were Seymour Hersh's exposure in 1969 of the *My Lai Massacre* of 500 unarmed Vietnamese civilians by US Army soldiers. Later, in 1972, Phillip Knightley exposed the Thalidomide Scandal, while *Washington Post*'s Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein published *All the President's Men* in 1974, which brought to light corruption in the presidency and which culminated in Richard Nixon's resignation a couple of months later (Aucoin 2005, 17).

In short, investigative journalists go after "what someone wants to hide" (de Burgh 2000, 15). By "going after the truth that has been obscured, uncovering wrong doing and persuading the rest of us to take them seriously" (de Burgh, 2000, p. 17), investigative journalists aim to converse simultaneously with the authorities and with the public. On the one hand, investigative journalists dialogue with society's ruling elite by scrutinizing and exposing their wrongdoings, justified by the democratic spirit of keeping a close watch on the authorities for their own and society at large's benefit (de Burgh 2000, 66). In this sense investigative journalism differs significantly from daily reporting, as investigative journalists actively try to "change the public agenda by prioritizing certain events and issues regardless of what the authorities want or think" (de Burgh

2000, 67). On the other hand, investigative journalists rely on their audience to act as ‘the head judge’ in their exposes of misconduct. The reporters primarily inform the audience of something that went ‘wrong’ by drawing upon existing public standards of morality and secondly, ask their fellow citizens to judge whether it was ‘wrong enough’ for something to be done about it (Ettema / Glasser 1998, 70). As investigative reporter Jon Sawyer explains “to have an impact, the story must reflect the community’s consensus on those values and how they apply in particular instances (...) If the story does not uncover something that is ‘really wrong’, the story will sink without a trace” (in Ibid).

Although investigative journalism does not intend to ‘correct’ a situation (e.g. by suggesting new policies), but rather aims to “sustain interaction” about certain issues and stimulate public debate (Ettema / Glasser 1998, 189), alerting the public to the system’s failures by exposing information can, in the most successful of cases, lead to action by politicians (or lawyers, policemen, etc.) and may even result in new legislation or regulation, as did *All the President’s Men* and *The Jungle*. As de Burgh puts it, investigative journalists are ready to “look beyond what is conventionally accepted, behind the interpretations of events provided for us by authority and the authoritative, and appeal to our sense of justice, or to the spirit of our laws if not the letter” (de Burgh 2000, 3). As such, by “pointing out [society’s] failings by its own standards” (de Burgh 2000, 23), investigative journalists are often heralded as “custodians of conscience” (Ettema / Glasser 1998) in Anglo-American discourse on journalism.

Investigative journalism today – as practiced in the United States and in Europe – faces a crisis over which journalists and academics alike have expressed concern (Houston 2012, Biel 2011, Aucoin 2005, Lavrov 2011). According to some, the crisis began as early as the 1990s when newspapers “pushed for high profit margins” to compete with the Internet (Houston 2010, 46-47). Investigative journalism is considered financially the riskiest form of journalism since the skilled work – often including the maximization of interviews with sources, the retrieval and analysis of a large range of documentation and possibly, undercover or ‘sting’ operations (Ettema / Glasser 1998, 37 and 42; de Burgh 2000, 19) – can take weeks, months, even years while the outcome is always uncertain (de Burgh 2000, 7). In light of investigative journalism’s expense, coupled with trends in the last decade of newspapers closing, declaring bankruptcy or

slashing staff to stay in business (Houston 2010, 46), “investigative journalism is first to go”, explains Laura Frank (in Ibid). Houston remarks that concerns over the “pending death of investigative journalism” have been further raised by “the deterioration of the mainstream media, particularly in the sometimes overly partisan and amateurish practice of journalism on the Internet” (Ibid). Alain Lallemand – a long-time investigative journalist on organized crime – comments: “How do you Tweet Mafia stories? Suddenly I realized that our Western newsrooms (...) [are] suffering some kind of attention deficit disorder resulting from a lack of money and a loss of our deep commitment to such stories” (Lallemand 2011, 15).

Despite the financial challenges it currently faces, investigative journalism *does* have a future, claims Brant Houston, the former long-standing executive director of Investigative Reporters and Editors (IRE). Houston writes: “although investigative reporting has drastically diminished in traditional and mainstream newsrooms, it has rapidly expanded into different forms and combinations in Web ventures and at universities through the world” (Houston 2000, 45). The latest development in such ‘collaborative’ investigative journalism is “Computational journalism”, whereby ‘mash-ups’ of journalists, computer scientists and developers work together to seek large government data sets in order to detect favoritism, incompetence, and corruption through the visualization of data (Houston 2000, 51). Other models envision a future of investigative reporting that include collaborating with “crowd-source experts and potential citizen muckrakers” and making use of “latest technology to do investigations around the world and quickly distributing them” (Houston 2000, 54). In guise of such international collaboration, Houston has suggested that, “the future of valuable investigative journalism rests in the ability to do hyper-local reporting and/or international reporting, sometimes in the same story” (Ibid).

The question of funding, however, still remains (Houston 2000). Suggestions for financial support have included foundations’ grants, citizen donations, increased advertising and subscriptions fees (Houston 2000, 53), yet many remain skeptical that such means can address the needs of investigative journalism when the cost of an investigation ranges from a “few thousand to hundreds of thousands [of U.S. dollars]” to cover staff salaries and legal costs (Ibid). Another proposition for financial aid has been

direct government support, an idea that US journalists resist although Europeans are more open to it (Ibid).

Mark Feldstein from George Washington University has proposed that investigative journalism is “cyclical”. He suggests that investigative journalism flourishes “when both its supply (stimulated by new technologies and media competition) and its demand (by an aroused public hungry for exposés in times of turmoil) [are] high” (quoted in Houston 2000, 54). David Boardman from Seattle Times subscribes to the theory and therefore suggests, that “we may be entering a period of renaissance as the struggles crystallize in the public mind about essential service of investigative journalism and create an awakening and concern of what democracy would be without it” (quoted in Houston 2000, 54).

Whether or not investigative journalism in the US and Europe continue to have a financial standoff or whether, as Boardman claims, a renaissance is imminent, investigative journalists have shown to “persist in the worst of times”, because of “the dedication and zealotry they bring to their work” (Houston 2000, 47). As Tom Casciato, executive producer of PBS series *Exposé*, put it “they got into it because they think it is important. They can’t *not* do it” (in Ibid).

3.2.2 A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE: ‘WATCHDOGS ON A LEASH’

Investigative journalism plays a significantly different role in China than it has in the Anglo-American contexts. Rather than supporting the democratic process by sparking public debate on certain topics, investigative journalism in China – where the One-Party reigns – is expected “to reveal problems and the pitfalls within society in order to correct them”, so as to maintain, legitimize and reinforce the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Tong 2012, 29).

Investigative journalism became a recognised strand of journalism in the 1990s, as a result of the economic reforms of the late 1980s. The decision of the leadership to pursue a more liberal economic path towards ‘marketization’ led to massive economic growth (Tong 2012, 32, -33). However, economic growth brought with it prominent

social problems - from social injustice and the corruption of political officials, to the abuse of power by local government and human rights problems (Ibid).

The CCP instigated the practice of investigative journalism “to reveal the wrongdoings of the rich and powerful, to stop the abuse of power (especially at the lower levels) by revealing information that some people wanted to know but which other people wanted to conceal, and by revealing the hidden problems that Chinese society was facing” (Tong 2012, 41). Investigative journalism was used as a mechanism to ‘weed out the black sheep’, which often culminated in the central government ‘solving the problem’ with the overall goal of enhancing the public's confidence in the CCP’s rule (Ibid). As Zhao wrote (2000), by practicing investigative journalism, Chinese journalism changed its image from being the Party's ‘lapdog’ to becoming the Party’s ‘watchdog on a leash’.

Investigative journalism in the 1990s was mainly the product of propaganda as “instruction news” characterized by the revelation the individuals’ and local organizations’ wrongdoings that were contrasted to the correctness of the Party's overall policies. But by the early 2000s, investigative journalists began to put central government policies themselves and its administration under scrutiny (Tong 2012, 50). According to Tong, this shift in focus can be explained by the impact a decade of practising investigative journalism had had on Chinese journalism as a whole (2012, 46). Firstly, the investigative practices adopted by many media organizations initially for commercial purposes began to “break down the dominance of Party Journalism in China” (Ibid). The long-accepted Party’s ‘tongue and throat’ journalism (Tong 2012, 94 – 95), which had enjoyed a monopoly over the market for decades, began to lose credibility among the public. Secondly, Tong suggests that in the covering sensitive topics such as AIDS, investigative journalists began to rethink their role and made a shift from exclusively serving the government to serving the people as well. Thirdly, the practice of investigative journalism encouraged Chinese journalism to adopt and develop more professional practices such as the ideas of criticism, investigation, the separation of facts from opinion, and objectivity (2012, 48).

The case of the SARS outbreak case exemplifies how investigative journalism began questioning CCP policies. As the government “prioritized political stability as usual” (Tong 2012, 50) in face of the outbreak in 2002, the media initially pursued the

‘traditional censoring and controlling information tactics’ expected by the authorities (Ibid). However, by February 2003 investigative reports appeared that “strongly questioned the government’s diagnosis of the disease” and by April 2003, more reports challenged the central government's claim that China had “effectively controlled the spread of the disease” (Tong 2012, 50-51). The persistence of the media with 38 investigative reports questioning the CCP's handling of the crisis, led to the dismissal of two high-ranking Chinese officials (2012, 51).

By 2003, which Tong estimates “the peak of investigative journalism”, many challenges had been posed to the authorities by the media (2012, 50). The CCP realized that investigative journalism could be a threat to the legitimization of the Party, as much as it was a force to help reconstruct a positive image of the CCP (Tong 2010, quoted in 2012). In early 2004 and 2005, the CCP ‘cracked down’ on investigative journalism by punishing the “over brave” and the “rebellious” media as a warning to others and by imposing bans “that instructed on what can and cannot be investigated and reported on” (2012, 223). One such ban that has seriously affected the practice of investigative journalism was the ban of ‘cross-regional journalism’, which means that only local media are permitted to investigate local issues, thus limiting the reach of regional and national media. The ban also gave power to local authorities to interfere in everyday reporting (2012, 56).

Several researchers (Zhao 2000, Pan / Chan 2003) support the prevailing view that investigative journalism in China is nothing more than a political tool that “would not survive in a country that believes in tight propaganda control” if it were not for the authorities initiating and supporting investigative journalism (in Tong 2012, 220 - 221). Tong's more recent research shows, however, that investigative journalism is still very much alive despite the Party State's attempts to contain and direct it.

Tong attributes the current existence of investigative journalism in the 21st century to seven factors: (1) the central authority’s paradoxical attitude to the practice; (2) investigative journalism’s continued usefulness to the CCP in identifying corrupt Party politicians, and thereby constructing “a better and purer image” of the government (2012, 65-66); (3) the press’s continued profitability in the media landscape thanks to investigative journalism; (4) the incorporation of the ‘watchdog’ style of investigative

journalism into media organizations' professional practice (2012, 68); (5) investigative journalists and newspapers' exploitation of legislative loopholes (e.g. racing against new report bans) (2012, 69); (6) the cooperation amongst investigative journalists (e.g. sharing information, dividing up workloads) to cover more ground and to circumvent cross-regional journalism bans by getting stories republished across the country; (7) and last but not least, the massive direct and indirect public participation – made possible by the internet – that both provides a pool of story ideas and allows for the dissemination of investigative reports (2012, 69 and 193), and thereby magnifies the influence of investigative journalism (2012, 69).

“The public show their enthusiasm for investigative reports and have high expectations for [them],” because, Tong writes, “Chinese readers are keen to know what is happening in the political arena and in society” (2012, 67). Indeed, Tong stresses the fact that it is the public support given to investigative journalism that allows for its influence in China. “Investigative reporting cannot have strong influence without the outrage of the public (...) investigative reporting can have influences over society only if able to mobilize the public and rally public opinion, which catalyzes social and political changes” (Tong 2012, 198). The public have expressed ‘outrage’ by primarily sending letters to newspapers and making phone calls to press agencies in 1980s and 1990s (Tong 2012, 200), while nowadays the relationship between journalists and the public is maintained online (Tong 2012, 69, 206-219). By needing to become financially more self-reliant during the ‘marketization period’ of the 1980s and by being encouraged by the media's promotion of opinion-vocalization, Chinese people have learned to make their voices heard, especially in appeals against injustice (2012, 226).

Tong proposes that the validation of investigative journalism runs deeper than the changes in society that triggered its flourishing in the late 1990s. She suggests that the practice of investigative reporting is supported culturally by three philosophies that have been enforced in China's various historical periods: (1) Confucianism, (2) the liberalist tradition introduced during the Qing dynasty and (3) Maoist ideals of ‘criticism and self-criticism’. Firstly, the relationship investigative journalists have with the public and the CCP echoes the relationship Confucian intellectuals have traditionally had with the masses and the ruling powers, in that Confucian scholars have had “the responsibility to

ensure that society follows the right way and that the rulers govern humanely” by assessing political activities and advising authorities when abuses of official powers happened, as well as the mandate to petition for the people and make the popular voice heard (Tong 2012, 16). Secondly, the Qing Dynasty in the early 20th century initiated press freedom and literacy campaigns in order to keep their citizens informed and thereby counteract the imperial powers and foreign media invading China at the time (Tong 2012, 20). Thirdly, the encouragement of ‘criticism and self-criticism’ at all levels of society during the Maoist years in particular were aimed at reinforcing the CCP’s rule with the continuous provision (or show) of constructive criticism to avoid fundamental revolution (Tong 2012, 25-26).

Investigative journalists believe that by providing accounts of ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ that differ to those constructed by the Party, they can “help to enlighten the consciousness of the public and therefore gently reform China” (Tong 2012, 223). As such investigative journalism is seen as “a reforming force for social change, serving both the ruling authorities and the people” (Tong 2012, 220).

3.2.3 A FRENCH PERSPECTIVE: ‘SCOOP-CHASERS’ OR *ENQUÊTEURS*?

Despite a few isolated yet significant cases of investigative journalism¹⁶ in the 1960s and 1970s, academic consensus indicates that the rise of investigative journalism came in response to the parallel rise of corrupt practice upon the political scene in the 1980s (Pujas / Rhodes 1999, Chalaby 2004, Marchetti 2009). As the practice of investigative journalism in France is as much a product of its environment and history as the Anglo-American and Chinese practices, the author has deemed it necessary to provide the reader

¹⁶ While *L’Express* exposed several compromising stories on France’s police force and secret services (1962 ‘Police violence against civilians and secret alliance with pro-Algeria organization’, 1965 ‘Secret Services involvement in kidnapping and murder of Moroccan opposition leader Barka’), *Le Canard Enchaîné* revealed government corruption (1973 ‘Le Canard’s Plumbers’ / ‘France’s Watergate’, 1979 ‘Giscard D’Estaing’s diamonds’) (Chalaby 2004, 1194 –1196). *Le Canard*’s exposure of President Giscard D’Estaing accepting diamonds as a bribe from the African dictator Bokassa inspired other publications – *Le Monde*, followed by *Le Point*, *Le Nouvel Observateur* and others (Den Blink / Kruk 2005, 80) – to establish their own investigative teams.

with a little background information on France's journalistic tradition, out of which investigative journalism eventually sprung.

Journalism in France has traditionally been “unfavourably” compared to “higher” literary genres (Chalaby 1996, 315). Authors of the 19th and 20th centuries – Victor Hugo, Emile Zola and Albert Camus to name a few – contributed to the ‘temporary occupation of journalism’ (Chalaby 2004, 1201) as “a step towards a brilliant literary career” (Chalaby 1996, 314). “Not surprisingly,” writes Chalaby, “journalists were influenced by discursive practices that were purely literary in character” (1996, 316). As such French journalistic tradition has not drawn “a sharp line between facts and comments”, while “a high proportion of articles in the French press played the double role of presenting the news and interpreting it” (Chalaby 1996, 311). Only by the end of the 19th century did French newspapers begin to adopt what were considered ‘American’ journalistic methods that focused on the gathering of information and news of local and international relevance (1996, 317 – 318).

Moreover, French journalism has traditionally been partisan as national newspapers have acted as ‘mouthpieces of a nationwide political movement’ or echoed ‘specific political sensibilities’ (Chalaby 2004, 1201). Close affiliation to parties and politicians has limited journalists’ ability to report objectively on the political scene and bred high levels of corruption. Indeed, before WWII, it was considered the norm for journalists to receive “large sums of money from the government, political parties, financial institutions and foreign embassies” (Chalaby 2004, 1203). Additionally, the State’s control over the media from WWII until the 1980s – indirectly, with subsidies and tax concessions, and state-controlled newsprint, newspaper distribution and sales of advertising space (Chalaby 1996, 1203) – meant a lack of competition among news agencies. Chalaby explains: “whereas competition forces newspapers to bring out news and exclusives, noncompetitive press systems are not conducive to the uncovering and publications of facts” (2004, 1202). As media costs increased and state monopoly started loosening in the early 1980s with the appearance of the first commercial television channels, competition grew. “It is no coincidence that investigative reporting developed

in France when the media field became more competitive,” explains Chalaby (2004, 1203).

The “competitive mobilization” experienced by the media was reflected in parallel surges in competition amongst the political and judicial elites (Pujas / Rhodes 1999, 42). The government’s decision to decentralize power in the 1980s encouraged rivalry among politicians, which led to Parties’ taking recourse to ‘dubious and illegitimate means’ of financing their rising campaign costs (Pujas / Rhodes 1999, 55 and 60). A rise in judiciary independence from the world of politics also marked the 1980s (Marchetti 2009, 371), as prosecuting magistrates intervened more frequently in the politicians’ affairs (Pujas / Rhodes 1999, 56). The prosecutions of high-ranking ministers produced revelations of corruption that the media helped to brand as ‘scandalous’. As seen, the State loosened its grip on the media during this same period. As the press and broadcasting services were driven to compete for the public’s attention, investigative journalism became a “weapon of competition” (Marchetti 2009, 375). While several newspapers established ‘investigation’ or ‘enquiry’ sections in their editorial offices in the early 1980s, this trend went beyond the printed press. “These days,” writes Marchetti, “radio and especially television stations in both the public (*Envoyé special* on Antenne 2 and later France 2) and the private sector (*Le droit de savoir* on TF1, *Capital* on M6 and especially *Le vrai journal* and *90 minutes* on Canal +) also carry out their own investigations, with programmes broadcast at peak listening and viewing times” (Ibid).

As part of a study on investigative journalism in Europe organised by the Dutch-Flemish Association for Investigative Journalism (VVOJ) researchers Van Den Blink and Kruk distinguished two strands of investigative journalism in French journalism: *le journalisme d’investigation* and *le journalisme d’enquête*. While *le journalisme d’enquête* is perhaps a closer equivalent to the conception of investigative journalism, in the Anglo-American tradition, as a ‘critical and in-depth journalism’, The VVOJ research shows that only a few of the national media have created jobs for *enquêteurs* (Van Den Blink / Kruk 2005, 81). What is more, hardly any research seems to have been conducted on *le journalisme d’enquête* as such. *Le journalisme d’investigation*, on the other hand, is well researched and is what is considered France’s answer to ‘investigative journalism’. It is commonly understood

to be “following the prosecutor, telling the public about violations of the law, or even just the suspicion the law has been violated” (Van Den Blink / Kruk 2005, 80). Once a story gets picked up by other media the story becomes *une affaire*. These ‘*affaires*’, which are preceded by a criminal investigation (Van Den Blink / Kruk 2005, 81), represent a large part of French journalism. “Almost every newsroom has a desk for *les affaires*,” observe Van Den Blink and Kruk (Ibid).

As most *affaires* or ‘scandals’ are rooted in existing court and police cases, investigative journalists have become reliant on their contacts in the political and the judicial fields, who have ‘a monopoly on scandalous information’ (Marchetti 2009, 371). Those journalists, “responsible for exposing scandals”, rely on officials – magistrates, politicians, police officers and former members of a company – for their information. Although dependence on political and judicial contacts limits the objectivity and reach of investigative journalism (Marchetti 2009, 371), such contacts are deemed necessary because of the ‘culture of secrecy’ enshrouding political and social affairs in France (Van Den Blink / Kruk 2005). Journalists’ dependency on contacts with officials is further compounded by the fact the legitimate means of gaining access to public administration documents is “regarded as an obstacle rather than an aid for investigative journalists” (Van Den Blink / Kruk 2005, 85)¹⁷.

Other characteristics of investigative journalism in France are journalists’ fast work tempo and their tendency to work alone. Marchetti describes: “The need to keep producing new stories in order to remain viable [Robert 1996 in Marchetti 2009], to work on several *affaires* at once, and especially to get there before the competition, all help to explain the new tempo” (2009, 369). In an interview in 1997, investigative journalist Jacques Derogy commented:

Some years ago, journalists would have been loyal to one another; today they are engaged in a horrible race. Investigation is reduced to a question of speed. The fear that the competitor may get there first leads them to publish any old

¹⁷ Anyone wishing to access documents of the public administration to corroborate their story has to apply to a commission, CADA (*Commission d'accès aux Documents administratifs*). “The CADA is slow, and each document that contains individual names, is automatically classified as inaccessible. The CADA is regarded as an obstacle rather than as an aid for investigative journalists” (Van Den Blink / Kruk 2005, 85).

thing. While audacity, of course, is essential, patience should also not be forgotten: investigation is precisely the opposite of speed (*L'Évènement du Jeudi*, 16-22 October 1997 in Marchetti 2009, 377)

Investigative journalism in France has come to signify 'professional honour' as a "more professional, more autonomous, more subversive, more moral" form of journalism (Marchetti 2009, 377; see also Chalaby 2004). However, Van Den Blink and Kruk promote a more skeptical view on the profundity of investigative journalists' work as most of it revolves around political and social scandals gained through illicit means (2005, 86-87). "There's an obscure collaboration between the press, the police, lawyers and magistrates (...) This form of journalism, that violates the secrecy of the preliminary investigation and the presumption of innocence, is more 'scoop-chasing' than investigative journalism" (Delporte and d'Almeide quoted in Van Den Blink / Kruk 2005). While investigative journalists' drive for information has led them to develop mutually-profitable ties to France's elite, it would appear that that which has constituted investigative journalism's making, might also be its greatest weakness. Chalaby concludes, "much of the future of investigative journalism will be decided by the power relations between the fields of politics, the judiciary, and journalism" (2004, 1206).

4. Research methodology: interviewing

The aim of the research is to investigate *both* the lived experience of being a Russian investigative journalist in Russia *and* what meaning the participants make out of that experience – or as Schutz puts it, the subjective motivational understanding (1972, 28) of being and working as an investigative journalist – as such, the research methodology of interviewing was chosen based on this research interest. Indeed, Seidman writes, “the primary way a researcher can investigate (...) [a] process is through the experience of the individual people, the ‘others’ who (...) carry out the process” (2013, 9). This study explores the factors of motivation Russian investigative journalists have for their profession, to better understand how these investigative journalists themselves feel about why they have chosen this line of work. These aims are reflected in the main research question “**Why do some Russian journalists specialize in investigative journalism?**” and the sub-questions, “what are the elements that contribute to the journalists’ professional motivation?” and “what are the external and internal pressures of their profession?” Interviewing, as “the best avenues of inquiry” into most cases¹⁸ of people’s ‘subjective understanding’ (Seidman 2013, 10), and then using the participant’s expressed experiences as the primary material for this study, was therefore a natural choice of methodology.

4.1 The participants

The research is based on interviews of seven investigative journalists all together – three working in Russia’s capital Moscow, one working out of Finland’s capital Helsinki, and three working in Petrozavodsk, in Russia’s Northwestern region Karelia. While the first four (working in Moscow and Helsinki) have been working professionally as investigative journalists for periods varying between 3 and 15 years, the remaining three (from Karelia) attended SCOOP, the peer-to-peer training programme for investigative journalists, and had just completed or were in the process of completing their first

¹⁸ Seidman qualifies ‘most cases’ by explains that, “below a certain age, interviewing children may not work” (2013, 10).

investigative piece at the time of the interview. Since I occasionally refer to the two respective groups separately, I have chosen to nickname the former group *the professionals*, and the latter, *the trainees*. To clarify, the nickname “the trainees” refers to the amount of investigative work these journalists have done, and in no way means to downplay the amount of years or experience – which is fairly extensive in a couple of cases – these journalists have.

These seven journalists were specifically chosen for this study, in part, because of the ‘voluntary’ nature of the work and in part, because of the quality of their responses. The original research design proposed a study of 6 investigative journalists – three ‘professionals’ and three ‘trainees’ – to best determine, in a balanced fashion, whether the amount of time spent as a professional investigative journalist affects motivation for the work. While four *professionals* were interviewed during the research trip to Moscow, one refused to proceed in answering the questions and the interview was consequently dropped. After interviewing another prospective and willing participant locally in Helsinki, I decided to keep all four interviews of the *professionals* for the study because of the breadth, depth and variety of experience these offer all together. Conversely, only three SCOOP participants agreed and were available to be interviewed to make up *the trainees*, so there was little dispute over which interviews were to be chosen for this part of the study.

I found five of the seven investigative journalists through contact people and contacted two of them directly. While two of *the professionals* were found through MSU Faculty of Journalism, an independent Internet search led me to another, and I contacted the last *professional* after reading an article in the Finnish newspaper *Voima*. I found all three *trainees* through staff at the IMS, who put me in contact with SCOOP’s local coordinator for Northwestern Russia. I made direct contact with *the professionals*, mostly a couple of days prior to meeting to arrange the place and time of the interviews, whereas all communication with *the trainees*, prior to the interviews, was done via SCOOP’s local coordinator.

4.1.1 SAMPLES

- City samples:

Moscow: Capital city and largest metropolis of the Russian Federation. According to The Glasnost' Defense Foundation latest monitoring results (2010), the level of press freedom among printed and digital press is considered "relatively not-free" (*Otnositel'no nesvobodna*)¹⁹.

Petrozavodsk: Capital of Karelia, Russia's most Northwestern region, bordering Finland. According to The Glasnost' Defense Foundation latest monitoring results (2010), the level of press freedom among printed and digital press is considered "relatively free" (*Otnositel'no svobodna*) (see footnote 19).

- Media samples:

Freelance: 2 (*professionals*)

Press / Digital western media outlet, independent: 1 (*professional*)

Press / Printed western glossy magazine, independent: 1 (*professional*)

Press / Federal: 1 (*trainee*)

Press / Republican: 1 (*trainee*)

Television / Republican: 1 (*trainee*)

- Participants' relevant profile samples:

Sex: 5 women, 2 men

Age range: 26 – early 50s

4.2 The process

From designing the research and the questions, to finding the participants, interviewing them, transcribing and translating the interviews, checking the information, coding the data and eventually sharing the results, interviewing as a research method is very time-consuming (see also Seidman 2013, 11; and Kvale 1996, 88).

¹⁹ <http://www.gdf.ru/map>

Because of the sensitive nature of the research topic, I traveled to Russia to meet and interview the participants face to face. In a single trip in October 2012, I interviewed *the professionals* in Moscow, and *the trainees* in Petrozavodsk. In August 2013, I met and interviewed another *professional* in Helsinki. The interviews lasted between 34 minutes and 118 minutes (or 1 hour, 58 mins). For the participants' own sense of comfort, the interviews were all conducted at a place of their choosing. The participants were also given a choice of the interview being conducted in their native Russian, or in English. *The professionals* all opted for English, whereas *the trainees* chose Russian. All the interviews were recorded with a digital voice-recorder. Back in Finland, I transcribed the interviews conducted in English, while a friend and colleague, whose Russian skills surpass mine, transcribed the ones in Russian. I then translated the written form of the Russian interviews into English.

All participants were asked to answer a list of questions organized in an in-depth semi-structured form. 'In-depth' refers to the 'open-ended questions', which "allow the participant to take the question in the direction he or she wanted" (Seidman 2013, 87) which made up the bulk of the planned questions, as well as the unplanned 'follow-up questions' during the interviews. The interviews were also semi-structured in order to produce comparative material from the participants' answers. Although one list of questions was designed for all the participants, a few irrelevant questions were omitted during the interviews with *the trainees*. Here is a sample list of the questions²⁰:

1. *When did you become interested in investigative journalism?*
2. *What type of stories are you interested in investigating?*
3. *What is the purpose of investigative journalism?*
4. *Why did you choose this profession?*
5. *What are the differences between investigative journalism and daily-news journalism?*
6. *What is considered 'good quality' or 'thorough' investigative journalism?*
7. *How do you get leads for stories?*
8. *What are the steps involved in investigative journalism?*
9. *Under what conditions are you working? What support (financial, technical) do you get from your employer?*
10. *What are the challenges / risks of working as an investigative journalist?*
11. *Positive / Negative aspects of investigative journalism?*
12. *What does the future hold for investigative journalism in Russia?*

²⁰ See Appendix A for list of questions in Russian.

13. *How are journalists thought of in Russia?*
14. *Who is your public / readers / consumers?*
15. *What are the conditions for journalists working outside Moscow and St. Petersburg? Are the conditions worse? Better?*

The data has been subsequently organized into profiles (see 5. The investigative journalists), and according to themes (see 6. Analysis) outlined by Bourdieu's theoretical concepts of *illusio*, 'capital', and 'external sanctions and internal struggles'. I read the data and organized them thematically in order to effectively answer the research questions – “Why do some Russian journalists specialize in investigative journalism?” and “what are the elements that contribute to the journalists' professional motivation?”, “what are the external and internal pressures of their profession?”. The profiles are meant for the reader to familiarize him/herself with the participants, without whom this study would not exist.

4.3 Security and ethics

As soon as the interviews had been recorded, the interviews were deleted from the recording device and saved three times – on my laptop, on a portable memory device and in a safe Dropbox account. Gmail and Google Drive accounts were avoided for security reasons. Besides the transcriber, no one has had access to the raw material.

Since this research could put the participants in an even more vulnerable position than they are in now, measures to assure their anonymity were taken: change of first name, omission of patronymic and last name, and omission of current and previous work place names. The participants are nevertheless referred to with first names so as to maintain the personal trait the study exhibits.

No payment – monetary or other – transpired between the researcher and the participants. The interviews were gained purely on a voluntary basis.

All linguistic deficiencies were dealt with in manners deemed appropriate and relevant: the interview questions in Russian, the transcription and my translation into English of the Russian interviews were checked by a native Russian speaker; grammatical mistakes in the English interviews were left unchanged; and, 'muffled'

words or fragments due to poor sound quality – fortunately these were few – were not included in the data.

4.4 Reflections

4.4.1 ON THE PARTICIPANTS

The professionals either work independently as freelancers or for western media, and live and work in cosmopolitan environments, which has no doubt influenced their outlook on life, their opportunities as journalists and their networks of colleagues and international contacts. While these factors likely contributed to the fact they chose to respond to the interview questions in English, these factors – and countless more – shaped their responses. By contrast, *the trainees* live and work in Karelia where there are limited opportunities for journalistic education and job mobility, which the participants alluded to during the interviews. At the same time, *the trainees* work out of Karelia’s capital, Petrozavodsk, so their opportunities for career development might be greater than in other towns in Karelia. Moreover, Karelia enjoys a ‘relatively free’ media (see footnote 19), and the region’s proximity to Finland has likely been a contributing factor to SCOOP’s collaboration with journalists from Northwestern Russia.

Once again, the purpose of grouping the journalists into ‘the professionals’ and ‘the trainees’ is more aimed at *referring* to the two groups – which are nevertheless distinctly different – rather than *contrasting* them. The purpose of this study is more focused on the individuals’ approach to and motivation for investigative journalism.

4.4.2 ON INTERVIEWING

In honour of the constructivist nature of this study, the researcher sees it as her duty to reflect upon this interview process. Why interviewing? Put simply, “[interviewing] is deeply satisfying to researchers who are interested in others’ stories” (Seidman 2013, 13). While, the aim of this work is to explore investigative journalism through the experience of the investigative journalists themselves, this study also reflects the researcher’s

fascination with people's ability to create meaning and 'truth'. The researcher shares the assumption that, "the meaning people make of their experience affects the way they carry out that experience" (Blumer 1986, 20); or in other words, interviewing participants is essential to understanding investigative journalism, as it is the thoughts and feelings investigative journalists have about their profession that shape the way it is carried out.

However, there are also problems with this methodology. Just as Seidman remarks that, "it is impossible to understand another perfectly" (2013, 17), I have pondered upon the sincerity and forthrightness of my participants. Were they at any point, for whatever reason (e.g. fear, malice, boredom?) dishonest with me? It is impossible to know for sure. One of the purposes of the in-person interviews was to limit any verbal misunderstandings (e.g. in intonation, expression) and to let non-verbal forms of communication (e.g. body language, facial expressions, looks) contribute to an experience of authenticity. But at the end of the day, I had to rely on my intuition and 'gut feeling'. As far as I could tell, all the interviews included in this study were conveyed truthfully and sincerely.

5. The investigative journalists

The primary material for this work is based on interviews with seven investigative journalists I collected in 2012 and 2013. *The professionals* represent the four who have practised investigative journalism professionally for 3 to 15 years, while *the trainees* are SCOOP ‘graduates’ who had just finished or were in the middle of finishing their first investigation at the time of the interview. To protect their anonymity, I have omitted any names or places of work that could identify them. However, in order to credit these individuals without whom this study would not have been possible, I refer to each of them by a first name, given in accordance with their gender.

In the following vignettes the investigative journalists share their stories about how they came to investigative journalism and/or personal reflections on the craft of investigative. While the author of the study has selected the following snippets to provide an as-representative-as-possible impression of the journalists and has inserted clarifying information for the reader’s benefit, the words belong to the journalists²¹.

5.1 The professionals

5.1.1 OLGA

It wasn’t just a one-day decision “OK, so I’m starting to work as an investigative journalist”. No, it didn’t happen like that. It was a very very gradual process and it all changed in 2003 (...)

It happened so that I encountered a very gruesome (*pause*) (...) and absolutely crazy officer who happened to be an FSB officer and we were on the tram and he started to threaten people with a gun and everybody was turned to stone, so two men tried to kick him out of the tram, so he started to resist and took out the gun and started to threaten people. He was waving the gun in front of the face of my daughter because we were blocked by the three fighting men and I had to interfere (*pause*) and I helped the men to

²¹ As interviews with *the trainees* were originally conducted in Russian, the transcribed texts were translated into English and later checked by a native Russian speaker.

remove this gun off this man. He was kicked out of the tram and he was standing, absolutely mad, screaming and shouting “I will finish you off at the entry” (...)

I recognized the words because one of my Chechen students, a girl from Grozny when she was telling me about her own experiences, she actually mentioned that the Russian soldiers used these kinds of phrases like “we will finish you off” (*pause*) (...)

I found myself on the tram with my little daughter, with a gun in my hands, with nobody eager to come to the police station with me to report the accident as a witness. And then another man approached me, he was smiling, he was really nasty. In a very low voice he kindly asked me to give the gun back to him because he assured me that his colleague had some permit to carry a gun on him. And he showed me the ID of an FSB officer. So this control actually didn't do anything to protect the people on the tram while his colleague was threatening people with the gun. He was just watching. And this was the turning point for me. Because although, even then, deep inside me I knew that Chechnya and the war and all these massacres they were not so far away from me but suddenly I realized that no, I couldn't remain indifferent. It was a very traumatic experience for me because actually I gave up, I realized that I should be afraid of this man because if I had refused to give the gun back to him, he would definitely follow me (...) So I returned the gun to him and we parted (*pause*) and actually I was on the way to my colleagues, architectural restorers, because we working on the article together with them. When I woke up the next day I was voiceless. I was diagnosed with the ‘paralysis of vocal chords and I was silent for more than a month because the stress was really great. And then when voice returned I quit my job at the university completely and I came to work to the Russian-Chechen society. That's how it began.

Olga's commitment to investigative journalism specialized in Human Rights' abuse stories emerged out of her assistance at her friends' organization, the Russian-Chechen friendship society. Her first investigation was in Chechnya in 2003. She has since conducted investigations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Lithuania, and The Netherlands. After the Russian embassy refused to issue her a new passport in 2008, she has since been living in exile in Finland. She continues her investigative work, as people from all over the world contact her to request her assistance.

5.1.2 SERGEI

Well, [my initial interest in investigative journalism] happened 12 years ago when I started writing for [X] radio station. There was lots of stuff to do here - lots of killings, lots of terrorist acts (...) It was really a tough time for Russia, with all the Caucasus issues and atmosphere in the city, in Moscow especially. I was actually reporting on the terroristic acts. I think that I started thinking about doing more investigative journalism stuff than the reporting option after the terrorist act in Nord-Ost theatre in 2003, if I am not mistaken. I should check it. It was a long time ago. I was working there for all the three days actually, when the terrorists took the hostages in the Moscow Theater with lots of kids. And then it happened, the miracle: that I was at the right place and the right time when the education of people started after the siege. There were about 140 bodies there because the Russian Special Forces used some kind of gas to get the terrorists asleep but this killed lots of people including children. I had to work in this environment (*pause*). After that I started thinking that there's lots of strange stuff happening here in this country. Maybe it would be smart and interesting to dig more for it, to understand why does it happen, not only to see this and report like a monkey, you know?

Sergei works for an online Western publication. In 2012, after being investigated by the FSO (Federal Protective Service or Federalnaya Sluzhba Okhrany), he gained access to the "presidential pool" - a select number of journalists from a variety of media who travel with the president, vice-presidents or ministers wherever they go. The new work exhausts him so he hardly has time for his investigations. He earns a living mostly by "reporting on Putin and Medvedev's activities" for the online publication's newswire.

5.1.3 MAXIM

Usually we do some monitoring of new government decrees, of presidential decrees, of documentation that might be made public officially. And sometimes you might find some pieces of information because you have a lot – because you try and see the larger picture, sometimes you might see some small pieces in very tiny documentation that might explain you what is going on. For example, for many years I've tried to understand how FSB deal with journalists.

I got interested in the subject when I understood that for journalists, it's better to try to do something with real purpose and real people, not just with PR persons who are working for the corporations. And I made quite an unusual turn and joined the crime department. Usually – I don't know how it might be in Finland – usually the crime department is the first stage for journalists. You should just be very energetic to try to start working for them but in this case I wanted to get some real experience. Not to be afraid to 'punish' people, to be able to go up to talk to policemen, to victims (...) to people who are maybe in very difficult conditions. So eventually in 2000, I decided that maybe it would be better to cover the Moscow security services. I joined the political department with the task to do more work on the secret services and carry out work on the law enforcement.

It's difficult to convince editors that it's worth publishing such stories. It's partly very risky financially and not only financially, your editor might be dismissed. It's a usual thing in Moscow now. I myself changed six newspapers in 10 years and it's not because of my bad culture – some papers just closed down, some editors were just fired. Everybody now... and this is the situation – they are very cautious.

Maxim started working as a journalist in the 1990s. After being laid off in 2009, Maxim and a colleague of his set up an independent website in 2010 where they publish their latest investigations. He currently works freelance as an 'intelligence analyst' and earns a living from selling his articles on the Federal Secret Services (FSB) to various Russian and international publications.

5.1.4 KSENYA

Right now as far as I'm working in 'health and beauty', I wanted to know what's harmful and how could I prevent people from doing different stupid stuff with their body and health. For instance for the first issue of [X], I wrote this story about lash-growth factors. You know? Usually women with short lashes want to make them curlier, bigger and there are a lot of products that promise to make them of this size, of this curl. Actually it's extremely dangerous according to the FDA. I think they disapproved of these products a year ago. So I just took the topic, when to the cosmetic chemists (...) dermatologist and asked them all about it. So I also studied that this product is made of hormones, so you

are putting hormones into your eyes! That's why girls had a lot of side effects, a lot of them. Like hair growing over their eyes, veins growing bigger on their eyes (*demonstrates*) Like this.

It's all about research. That's what I am doing right now. I'm also in research study, monitoring all the sides, talking to people. It's so funny, when I am walking in the street I'm usually listening to what people are talking about. I can't relax. In all the parties which I also visit. It's always like this. I think it's also all about curiosity. I am curious about life. Everything is interesting to me.

In 2004, Ksenya acted as the local 'fixer' for an American team of journalists conducting an investigation on the 'Dwelling of the Dawn', a religious cult in Siberia. Inspired by this experience, Ksenya worked at several "alternative magazines" after graduating from journalism school in 2009. She currently works for a women's glossy 'Health and Beauty' magazine as the senior features editor, in charge of "all the investigations and social stories".

5.2 The trainees

5.2.1 LYUDMILA

When SCOOP first came to Russia in the Northwest, the Regional Press Institute sent out an invitation for those who wished to try and get into this programme with their own 'theme'. My application was approved, that was last year, the first time round.

Let's say, that the theme of my investigation was historical. The main task was to determine whether or not there had been human rights' violations against veterans of the Great Patriotic War, invalids who came back from the war having lost legs, arms, eyesight. Right after the war, the soviet powers grabbed them off the street and put them into wards. And that's how they lived out the rest of their years. One of these wards was located on Valaam Island. That's here in Karelia.

I would say that investigative journalism is when you take one tiny topic and you start delving, looking for the pitfalls, to find something (*pause*). When I was working with the Valaam veterans, I realized, that out of that, more things came up to talk about, and it turned out that I needed to go somewhere else, and that I needed to head back to Petrozavodsk and that I needed to look for the government regulations of those times.

Investigative journalism is a very long process, very serious and a surprisingly interesting process because that feeling of finding something out yourself, of finding the link in the chain, of understanding the reason why this happened, it's of course a wonderful feeling. Whereas normal journalistic work, in which I work, it's (*pause*) information. It's the daily drill, from which it's very difficult to get out of, while investigative work, it's like a diamond: finding the exact facet you'll be satisfied with. Such investigations give journalism its name.

Lyudmila has worked as a professional journalist for 20 years. After getting a degree in journalism in Moscow she "specialized in youth publications". She now works full-time as the Karelian correspondent in Petrozavodsk for "the most important federal newspaper".

5.2.2 KATYA

My work is on the quality of drinking water, tap water in Karelia. In Petrozavodsk in particular, where scientists have made such interesting observations, they did experiments with daphnia, types of crustacean, you know – maybe you don't know – and these daphnia, after new water treatments we had here in Petrozavodsk, started to die in this water. They live less, and according to the scientists, this is an alarming signal, that must be investigated, that must be understood and dealt with somehow. Because the official structures – the Federal Services, the Water Canal – they're somehow not reacting to this. Their opinion is there is nothing wrong with our water. And generally speaking, in Karelia we have very bad water, we have bad taps, no testing is performed. We have to strictly regulate what we drink, right? We have a very lazy 'control'. Everything is terrible actually. Basically I can't come to any old village in Karelia, and drink it raw. It's fraught!

Katya started working as journalist 6 years ago, while still at university. She currently works for a local publication. At the time of the interview she was waiting for test results back from the laboratory in order to complete her investigation for the SCOOP programme.

5.2.3 LARISA

Last year I shot a programme on petroglyphs. Petroglyphs are rock paintings. Very old rock drawings – more ancient than the Egyptian pyramids – so this is human life as depicted in primitive drawing carved on stones. At that time I worked with historian and archeologist, Nadezhda [X] (...). In the 1960s they put a pavilion up on these stones to protect them from damage. Since then, nobody has done much with it and 12 years ago it was closed to everyone, to people, to scientists – it was closed to all human contact. And it was filled, the stones were covered with sawdust, and the sawdust mixed with the water. It all started to rot there, and erode the surface on which the petroglyphs are depicted. And she, Nadezhda, who works with these stone drawings, she has been struggling for 13 years, for something to finally be done: for the pavilion to be restored, or to take it down, or to put up something new, so that they would give access to scientists, to tourists, to people, because otherwise it would be a terrible loss for the Belomorskii district in which these petroglyphs are located (...). Such history is fairly typical of Russia, of these Karelian backwoods for sure. Why this happens, we don't understand (...). On the basis of her cries for help, I sent an application to SCOOP. They approved my request and a year later I came back to this issue. I wanted to know what is actually happening there. It was obvious, as Nadezhda said, nobody has dealt with this until now, either money is being thrown at the state and it disappears somewhere; it's possible that someone is making a good profit from this, but we don't know about this. Nobody is talking about this, it's a world heritage site for all of Europe, for the whole world (...) Why it is closed? This is what I tried to deal with.

Larisa had worked in television for the last 15 years. She has worked for all three broadcast companies in Petrozavodsk. She currently works with the “republican government television and radio company” where she works on her own projects, often filling the roles of producer, editor, writer, director, sound editor and presenter in the programmes they shoot.

6. Analysis

The following chapter analyses the responses of the seven investigative journalists. In attempts to effectively address this study's main research question “**Why do some Russian journalists specialize in investigative journalism?**” and sub-questions “what are the elements that contribute to the journalists' professional motivation?” and “what are the external and internal pressures of their profession?”, the chapter is centered around Bourdieu's concepts of *illusio*, capital and ‘external sanctions and internal struggles’ – with each Bourdieuesque term addressing one of the questions.

As a reminder to the reader, the concept of *illusio* describes the phenomenon of an individual believing that what she or he is doing is worth doing – or as applied to this study, the phenomenon of the journalists' believing that investigative journalism is worth the effort (Bourdieu 1998, Benson/ Neveu 2005) – while, capital, refers to the various economic, cultural, social and symbolic assets journalists either possess or strive to acquire in order to establish themselves in the field of investigative journalism (Hummel et al. 2011, Jensen 2010). Conversely, ‘external sanctions and internal struggles’ refer to the pressures suffered and endured by the journalists, both coming from outside and within the field of investigative journalism. These concepts are connected to each other in the following manner: the intrinsic value of capital in its various forms constitute *illusio*, while at the same time rendering the pressures of the job, the ‘external sanctions and internal struggles’ of the profession, bearable. For example, a war correspondent might go outside a designated ‘safe-zone’ outlined by the military and therefore risk his life (‘external sanction’), in order to get statements from community members of victims of a recent attack (‘cultural’ capital) because he believes that, in order to do his job well, he needs to get ‘both sides of the story’ (*illusio*).

In looking at the responses of both the ‘professional’ and ‘trainee’ investigative journalists, the purpose of this chapter is to identify the personal motives, forms of ‘capital’ and the challenges faced by the individual investigative journalists, as well identifying trends in the investigative journalists' responses, as indications of possible aspects and wider trends of investigative journalism in Russia today.

The chapter is organized in the following manner: the section entitled “*Illusio*: motives for investigative journalism” addresses the study’s main research question ‘Why have Russian investigative journalists chosen this profession?’, while the section “Capital: acquiring and maintaining skills, networks and recognition” addresses the question ‘what are the elements that contribute to the journalists’ professional motivation?’; and the section “External sanctions and internal struggles: the challenges of the job” tackles the question ‘what are the external and internal pressures of their profession?’. A fourth section provides the reader with “Additional general observations” made by the journalists that are significant in gaining a fuller picture of Russia’s current journalistic scene. A fifth section consists of a “Summary of the analysis” to recapitulate the main arguments presented in this chapter.

6.1 Illusio: motives for investigative journalism

This section explores the journalists’ personal motives for investigative journalism by presenting selected quotes from the participants’ responses to illustrate these motives. While indications of their overall underlying motivation for the profession were found scattered throughout the interviews – some journalists seemed more aware of their motivation, while others’ indirectly addressed this issue of ‘purpose’ in an answer to a different question – three clear motives for investigative journalism emerged during the coding of the interview material: For a professional ‘idealism’, To help fellow-man, and For Russia and society.

6.1.1 FOR PROFESSIONAL ‘IDEALISM’

Analysis of the journalists’ interviews found that the journalists most frequently expressed motivation for investigative journalism in terms of putting into practice various professional ideals, namely: to uphold the media as a 4th power, to ‘tell the truth’, and to disseminate information. Indeed, during the interview process, one of the first things that became apparent was how the participants – *professionals* and *trainees* alike – often

referred to investigative journalism as “real journalism”, when compared to the “daily drill” of daily reporting.

Well, it's a very selfish thing but to be frank I just got bored with such things and actually I thought that in 1998 and 1999, that it's not real journalism (Maxim)

I got interested in the subject when I understood that for journalists, it's better to try to do something with real purpose and real people, not just with PR persons who are working for the corporations (Maxim)

(...) I started thinking that there's lots of strange stuff happening here in this country. Maybe it would be smart and interesting to dig more for it, to understand why does it happen, not only to see this and report like a monkey, you know? (Sergei)

It's the daily drill, from which it's very difficult to get out of, while investigative work, it's like a diamond: finding the exact facet you'll be satisfied with. Such investigations give journalism its name. Not information, but precisely such serious themes make journalism what it is. (Lyudmila)

Firstly, journalists expressed views on journalism in terms of an ‘ideal’ independent force in society standing as a “**4th power**” capable of monitoring the authorities and corporations, and freely setting its own agenda. Investigative journalism seemed to represent this ideal.

(...) you would like to find the guilty ones. You want to make them accountable, maybe you want to specify reasons for why something is happening. So if we dig up certain specific things, we need to talk about them, we need to publish them, so that people know why things are happening this way, and not otherwise. (Larisa)

One thing is the general idea to make the government and corporations, no matter, ‘big guys’ in society, to make them more transparent. Second thing is (...) news reporting is defined somehow by the agenda defined by the government. And investigative journalists and investigative journalism should, suggest... propose their own agenda. So they are talking, not about the last government statement, we are talking about what we found out about the government position. (Maxim)

Secondly, a few journalists expressed their motivation for the profession in terms of ‘**truth telling**’ and ‘**information dissemination**’. In Ksenya’s case, her comments on needing to tell the truth followed swiftly her condemnation of the pervasive phenomenon in Russian journalism of writing ‘*dzhinza*’, which suggests an assertion of new professional standards. Of the journalists interviewed, Ksenya is the only one who spoke about her workplace’s policies actively “prohibiting” journalists from taking bribes.

It’s actually prohibited. We had a contract, with a special line in it regarding it. In Russian, this job is called ‘Dzhinsa’ – Pisat’ dzhinsu. That means you are paid for writing this secret advertisement when you are doing that. Actually I hate it (...) For me telling the truth is a big deal, because there is too much lying – me, you, we are actually doing it on an every day basis we just don’t hear it, feel it. I mean when a friend is asking you, “how do I look today in a new skirt?” you will almost always say, “it looks nice”. So if I could say “it’s wrong, it’s bad for you, you could die”- I don’t know- “get hurt!” that’s great! (Ksenya)

In Maxim’s case he spoke strongly against the idea of investigative journalists having a “special role in society”. Rather, his personal motivation for the profession is grounded in a professional ideal of ‘information dissemination’ and the need for certain subjects to be addressed, in spite of the fact that – or precisely *because* – they are taboo.

To be frank it’s not about, you do such things (pause) it’s not about you having a special role in society. It’s not about that thing. (Maxim)

I’m just trying to fill the gap. There’s a big lack of information concerning the Secret Services. I think and I really believe that the Security Services, because of Putin, play a very important role in Russian society – not only in politics – but in Russian society (...). And these activities should be reported. And I feel that that’s important for society because you want to understand what is going on, you need to keep in mind these activities. So I think it’s my job to fill this gap. (Maxim)

6.1.2 TO HELP FELLOW-MAN

Other responses on motivation seemed to be rooted in altruistic urges to help others. While some journalists expressed desires to help people who became **victims** of some

atrocities, or to prevent people from further victimization, others discussed their desire to help others believe in change and the possibility of also helping.

In general, for me, it just takes off this iron curtain. If you don't know something, it's better to learn. It helps to live. In Russian we have a good proverb (...) "If you have been warned, you will be protected". So when I am giving useful information to people, it's usually very connected with investigative journalism. I am really happy they could improve their life. (Ksenya)

To seek the truth, in order to find ways to bring the people real help, not just to write the story, but to do something, to... to do something to change their own situation for the better. (Olga)

The goal is to clarify the reasons behind this, to understand what is there, and most importantly, if it has something to do with somebody, how can his rights be protected, how actually, should things ought to be. Because I think, that the goal is to protect people's rights in different situations. (Lyudmila)

I am aware that I am not changing the world, but I know that it's important to do what I am trying to do. Otherwise there is no hope. And hmm...No, it's just important. It also lets other people believe that they can change something. (Olga)

Another articulation of a 'desire to help' was expressed by Olga's '**battle against indifference**', which she alluded to several times. She explains, that she "couldn't remain indifferent", after her own first-hand experience of being bullied by an FSB and the show of indifference that came from fellow tram passengers.

(...) even then, deep inside me I knew that Chechnya and the war and all these massacres they were not so far away from me but suddenly I realized that no, I couldn't remain indifferent. (Olga)

6.1.3 FOR RUSSIA AND SOCIETY

Other journalists also expressed their motivation for investigative journalism in terms of 'helping people', but their vision seemed to come from a civic duty to improve society and the nation.

The purpose is to send the signal that “Guys, you can’t sleep safely, there’s somebody onto you. You just can’t do this kind of stuff”. To improve the atmosphere in the society – nothing more, nothing less. I want to live here with my children, in a great country and I hate some things about her and I love some things about her and I’m just trying to improve some things I hate.
(Sergei)

Like with the water, so that a lot more people know about his, that not everything is ok with our water, so that somebody will start to do something, to resolve the problem. But when everything is quiet, when nobody says anything, bosses think that nothing needs to be done, they don’t know, and so, let’s all sleep soundly! In general, it seems to be that the basic goal of investigative journalism is to create a discussion with society, so that all these problems are discussed and get dealt with. (Katya)

(...) when I started to work as a journalist in Chechnya and investigating the horrible things going on there, certainly I did it for the sake of the suffering people. But I also did and I’ve been doing it for the sake of Russia, because already then for me it was absolutely clear that, the situation there in the North Caucasus would have extremely negative consequences for Russia (pause) In order to prevent the worst for Russia, I tried to do something for Chechnya.
(Olga)

Olga has had very concrete experiences of how helping people, by bringing public awareness to their story and situation, can prevent the pursuit of violent behaviour. Here is a story she recounted to illustrate this point.

He asked, “Are you really from Nizhniy Novgorod?” I said, “Yes I am from Nizhniy Novgorod”. “Why? And you want to say that you care about my killed boy?” I told, “Yes, I do care about your killed boy. Because I read, I already got the news about your killed boy then in August when it happened and for me it was kind of a priority to come here and to try to do something for you”. Then the man made a very shocking revelation. Actually we came really on time because the next morning, the father was going to join the rebels and he didn’t do it. He didn’t do it. We really helped because our other colleagues from Nizhniy Novgorod from the committee against torture then took up the case and for several years the children came to Nizhniy Novgorod for rehabilitation, they even started skiing for the first time in their life and the case was taken to the European Court of Human Rights and the father never joined the rebels. So it was very important for me because for me, from the very start, it was clear that what I was doing, certainly for those people, was also to limit the violence because the father remained a peaceful man. (Olga)

6.1.4 NOTES ON TALENT, 'IN THE BLOOD' AND 'SENSE OF DUTY'

All the journalists, except for one, discussed how they have a natural proclivity towards the profession – whether they rationalized it in terms of other family members being journalists, or in terms of 'natural talent'. Although these are not motives per se for practising investigative journalism, such sentiments about one's own ability bear influence on their sense of purpose.

It's very easy. My father is a journalist. My mother is a journalist. My grandfather was a journalist. My uncle was a journalist. So I came from a big family of journalists. (Sergei)

My father was a journalist, my uncle was a very good journalist, my grandparents - were philologists. So there is probably some kind of call in the blood, probably... (Larisa)

When asked how he finds leads for stories, Sergei responded,

Here's where the magic comes I guess. If I knew, I would write a book like this Carr guy on how to quit smoking. It would probably become the most popular book in the world! Well, I think actually when you see, when you work in investigative journalism you stockpile a lot of information in your head. Lot of stuff that you will probably never use that you will probably always forget. But it will come out the moment you will need it. (Sergei)

Despite the fact that Olga regularly receives anonymous threats, she continues her work,

From time to time I felt like quitting. Like turning off the cell phone and ... I remember days when I was afraid to open my gmail account, out of fear that there would be something else in the mailbox. But, I don't know, for some reason I still can't stop. (Olga)

6.2 Capital: acquiring and maintaining skills, networks and recognition

In discussing the practice of investigative journalism it became apparent that there are certain attributes – from skills, to networks and recognition – in the world of investigative journalism that are important to acquire or maintain, if one already has them, in order to stay motivated and continue working. Such attributes of the job fit more or less into Bourdieu's own categories of economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital.

6.2.1 ECONOMIC: MONEY & “HITS”

As a reminder, economic capital in the journalistic field not only refers to financial gain, but also to “circulation, advertising revenues, or audience ratings” (Benson / Neveu 2005, 3). Although Bourdieu considered ‘economic’ capital to be one of the two crucial forms of power “in the ongoing struggle that is a society” (Ibid), only two journalists – Ksenya and Sergei – referred positively to factors that could be considered economic capital. In fact, as we shall see in the section on ‘Challenges’, most of the investigative journalists lack in financial backing and other forms of economic capital.

While Ksenya gets paid regularly for her investigative work and her company pays for samples of the health and beauty products she investigates – and in this sense referred to economic capital in terms of **financial gain** – Sergei, talked about the number of ‘**hits**’ his online articles get as a valuable mark of success:

I think there is only one criteria for every type of journalism. If it is read by lots of people, it has a great audience, then it's a good article. It can be an investigative one, or just some short report from some press conference. It's all about how many people read your work. (Sergei)

We have some great stories investigating having leaks from the Russian foreign ministry about their plans on one subject or another. That got lots of hits. (Sergei)

For Sergei, the combination of getting ‘hits’ and possibly making a difference in the process, represent the ultimate ‘capital’ for which he would be willing to risk his current job:

If I do something that would give me lots of hits and will influence on something in the country or around the world, then it is worth it. Or if it ends in nothing, maybe nobody needs to do it. So I'm thinking right now, yeah... I'm thinking about doing something that will end my career as pool reporter. (Sergei)

6.2.2 CULTURAL: SKILLS & PRACTICE

The other “crucial” form of capital, which journalists need to work, is cultural capital. According to Bourdieu, this encompasses such things as “educational credential,

technical expertise, general knowledge, verbal abilities, and artistic sensibilities” (Benson / Neveu 2005, 3). Indeed, all of the journalists discussed professional development as one of the big ‘perks’ of the profession.

Whereas the professionals talked about professional development in terms of **maintaining skills they possess through practice**, the trainees expressed enthusiasm at having **the opportunity to practice something they have known ‘in theory’**. Both groups of journalists discussed how the act of investigating something renders the journalistic work more enjoyable.

So the problem is not just to check the information provided by a press office of corporations, but to get information. It might be more difficult but it's more interesting to do it to be frank. (Maxim)

A person that is investigating something for a long time is usually not too fast in reacting but actually he understands, where to look, where to dig for the thing that will help him build a great story that will be interesting to everybody. (Sergei)

I knew the theory but I had never exercised the thing in practice. I knew how to do it, taking it upon oneself to do it... I had never done that. I understood the strength of the written word, certified by the management of the television company, so much so that even people like Nadezhda [X], an archeologist, a researcher and a professor at the Science Academy, was very surprised when it turned out that I obtained answers to my requests concerning certain funding - she thought that I wouldn't be able to pull it off! (Larisa)

The feeling of finding something out yourself, of finding the link in the chain, of understanding the reason why this happened, it's of course a wonderful feeling. (Lyudmila)

In efforts to investigate in spite of the authorities’ overall unwillingness to cooperate, Maxim has spent many years being inspired by and **emulating I.F Stone**, whom he considers, “one of the greatest American investigative journalists”:

He tried to find the small small very tiny pieces and grassroots documentation, research and some legislations. He just tried to find very small pieces of paper because he lacked the contacts in security services, in government etc, etc. His way was (...) working with documents in a very detailed way. And actually he found very big stories about the Vietnam war, about these missile things in Europe (...) Well it's the whole idea of [our website]: trying to paint the picture

of Russia's Security Services but based on small things and documentation.
(Maxim)

6.2.3 SOCIAL: SUPPORT, NEW STORIES, FEEDBACK AND RECOGNITION

The widening of one's networks – to generate support, new stories, feedback and recognition – was also mentioned frequently as an asset to gain and maintain. In writing about 'social capital', Bourdieu seemed to have in mind 'friendships' and 'networks of colleagues' (Benson / Neveu 2005, 3). However, the participants in this study spoke of other professionals, peers and the public as clear sources of **support**, necessary to the pursuit of investigative journalism.

Because here in Finland I have found quite a lot of people who have nothing to do with Human Rights' organizations – so it's not their job. They are politicians, they are diplomats, they are journalists, they are artists, they are actors, singers, publishers but they are doing quite a lot. Because I wouldn't be able to help others if I didn't have these kinds of people around who I can persuade to help others. (Olga)

I have fairly free movement in my company, because they trust me in this sense. They have not replaced me yet. (Larisa)

Larisa spoke of the trust her employers have in her. Olga, conversely, spoke of trust generated between the journalist and the person or people she writes about, which can lead to 'word of mouth' recommendations and therefore to **new stories** in need of investigating.

Sometimes I am really stunned as to how people come to obtain my contact details (...) I remember one particular case when I got a request from Egypt. Because the Egypt authorities, it was some 4 years ago, they detained a Chechen guy who studied at some Muslim university there but actually he was from Georgia and it was a very complicated story and how on earth did they get my contact details? Then I found out that they had known somebody's friends of someone I had helped some years ago. (Olga)

Very often it happens that I get people's requests to do something. (Olga)

As the journalists hoped that their work is not done in vain, an important source of social capital is in getting positive **feedback from the audience**. Lyudmila shared her story of public support:

I received a letter from a grandson, when they saw their family name on that list, which I published. They sent a letter saying that their grandmother had looked for [her husband] her whole life so there are even grandchildren of these veterans, who were there, and they want to know where the grave is, to go there and look, where they are buried, to do something, maybe place a small memorial there. That's why I think this theme was interesting for different people. (Lyudmila)

In contrast, a lack of recognition from the audience – a topic that will be further explored in ‘Challenges’ – pushed Maxim to strive after **peer-recognition** from fellow investigative journalists living in the USA or Britain:

It may be some guys in Sunday times, Guardian or New York Times who write real exposing stories. And for you it's a kind of goal to get the condition from these guys. It's just a professional thing. It's not about ethics, not about crusading. It's mostly about professionalism and being recognized by professionals. (Maxim)

6.2.4 SYMBOLIC: REPUTATION

Some journalists also seemed concerned with their **reputation and image** as ‘professional’ investigative journalists. Ksenya illustrates her satisfaction at working for a ‘professional’ publication and having her investigations being acknowledged:

[The publication's editor-in-chief] said “please forget everything like you did before because we would be the first here to change here the landscape of journalism”(…) We've received a lot of letters from ordinary readers who are writing like this: “Oh my God! I just see there is no product placement!” I see such letters that “Oh my god! You are criticizing” but we should because it's not normal that you are just saying “oh my god! This cream is so good and this is so good so good”. And this is not normal. Soo.... We are critising! (Ksenya)

6.3 External sanctions and internal struggles: the challenges of the job

Similarly to Bourdieu's observations, the challenges that journalists face can mostly be grouped into two categories: the external forces and elements that exist outside the realm of investigative journalism – but nonetheless bear influence on or obstruct the practice of investigative journalism – and current problems faced by journalists that are internal to the field of journalism. The participants were quite vocal about two major external entities that negatively affect their work, namely, the government (or “the authorities”) and the public. Other external challenges mentioned by all the journalists were lacks of time or money, or both. A less discussed external challenge, but still worthy of mention, is the reluctant cooperation of external bodies of expertise (e.g. laboratories). Although internal struggles in the field were mentioned far less, these consisted of corruption, “battling against ‘Kremlin’ journalism” and the emergence of bloggers on the journalistic scene.

In addition, it became clear from the journalists' descriptions that certain hindrances, the last two listed below – “From financial dependency to publications' limitations” and “From a lack of cooperation to a decline in professionalism” – cannot be separated into external and internal challenges. As we shall see, relations born with external forces (i.e. the financiers, corporate or political figures as sources of information) directly affect internal journalistic practices (i.e. agenda-setting, fabrication of sources to remain employable). It is precisely these vicious circles of financial dependency, corruption and poor professionalism that make the landscape of Russian journalism so treacherous for investigative journalists. These challenges have been called “Intertwined external and internal challenges”.

6.3.1 THE AUTHORITIES (OR EXTERNAL CHALLENGE 1)

The most prominent way in which the authorities obstruct the practice of investigative journalism is in their **non-cooperation**. All the participants indicated the authorities'

consistent unwillingness or downright refusal to assist investigative journalists in provision of information.

For example we have the law that the FSB must answer to requests in 10 days. But they don't. (Maxim)

I asked the Ministry of Justice or some specific penitentiary body for information about this or that prisoner and they have always responded but they never provided the information. So the letters' responses contained no information – there was one case when actually the response I got from Belgarosk department to oversee punishments, so it was more like a threat than a response. (Olga)

Not all officials were ready to answer the questions. If we did this in a direct interview, they evade the question, or they say, "I'm not authorized", "Make an official written request". All this takes time. (Larisa)

As mentioned in Chapter 2 on the context in which investigative journalism plays itself out, the authorities gave journalists a bad reputation in the 1990s and early 2000s. Maxim recalls, “the Kremlin and Putin wanted to find a scapegoat, for example, ‘who is to blame in the disaster of the Russian army in Chechnya?’, ‘journalists are paid!’, ‘journalists are just given stories by Chechens or Western press agencies!’”. Participants in this study discussed how the authorities continue to hinder journalists and investigative journalism by subjecting the journalists to **negative attention** by legal and other means.

Up until recently, Maxim explains that, “according to Russian law (...) you could not accuse journalists of disclosing state secrets because Russian journalists have no access to state secrets, so you might only accuse the guy who disclosed... something”. Maxim’s research and experience however indicate that times have changes and that “the Security Services have found a way to prosecute journalists”.

The FSB have found a way to deal with journalists: “We might say that you as journalists try to create a criminal gang and you seduced the guy with the access so in this way, you should be prosecuted!” But now comes the new legislation and now, not only the guy who has access to state secrets would be convicted but even the guys who provoked, ‘seduced’, would be the subject for these new legislations. So now it’s getting even more dangerous. (Maxim)

For Olga, the greatest challenge faced by investigative journalists is “first and foremost, the negative attention from the authorities”. She describes the legal prosecution she currently faces:

Even now, we together with some of my colleagues in Russia we are on trial because we worked for three years from 2006 to 2009 on the illegal research into the international criminal law and its possible applicability to the crimes committed in Chechnya by both sides and it was a big project – the result is two volumes of legal research which was already, which was acclaimed by even academical sources. We know, that in some universities, although we are not lawyers, this book is used as a manual and we also know that there are some postgraduate theses that have been based on our work. But now this book is on trial because the Russian authorities are trying to ban it as ‘extremist’. (Olga)

Although none of the trainees suffered from personal negative attention from the authorities, the SCOOP programme coordinator did. Lyudmila recounts what happened,

Politicians say, “here you can but not here”, barriers go up, and moreover, we already had such a situation, when the SCOOP coordinator especially came out to meet us, and after that [our coordinator] was taken in by the FSB to talk with her and questioned her a lot, because now there is such a policy [in Russia] that any projects funded by foreign governments are not very welcome. That’s why there can be such ‘not-so-nice’ moments. (Lyudmila)

Another form of negative attention, are personal **threats**. As far as the participants shared, Olga was the only one to speak about the threats she receives – from being followed for two years after she took up residence in Finland, to receiving “nasty messages via the internet”, to recently finding a Facebook page entitled ‘Hunt for [Olga’s last name]’. Although she has no way of confirming the source of these threats, she suspects they are “Russian” and of “the authorities”.

I’m still receiving threats. It’s not possible to get used to that actually. The first experience with the real death threats was in 2005 already. (Olga)

As an aside note, a couple of the journalists pointed out how the level of violent reaction against journalists depends on whom the investigation is targeting: the big guys or the small guys?

There is the human risk and in this case, the problem is... one thing is if you are tied to big guys. 'Big guys' – I mean generals, leadership of the service, the Kremlin, etc. They tend (...) to prosecute journalists. But if you attack small guys like lieutenants, captains – for example you found this possible captain did something very very bad in the North Caucasus or in Moscow – that might be more risky to you personally, because these people, these 'small' people they tend to do things like beating and killing because they have no access to government resources to accuse you officially. (Maxim)

If I come tomorrow doing something stupid about Putin, I will be shot of course. (Sergei)

As Maxim pointed out, **non-reaction** from the government can be just as harmful to investigative journalism as negative attention. He explains that before 2004, a sure sign of investigative work 'having an impact' was when the government reacted to the article, which then triggered the publication of other related 'supporting' stories from other media outlets. However, the tactics have now changed. As Maxim suggests,

We can't expect to have any impact because the problem is that the system of reaction of the government is pretty well organized now. So in the early 2000 and the late 1990s they tried to respond to the accusation or to the stories published by the newspapers but the problem was and became now, that they finally understood in 2005-2004 that the best way to forget about this story is just to not react to it. (Maxim)

With concern to regional journalism, the trainees mostly discussed the **indifference** regional authorities have towards matters of public concern, and as a consequence, towards investigative stories about such matters. Larisa recounted her encounter with the official in charge of the petroglyphs' site:

'Come on, faster faster, do it, do it, so that something happens!' And "do you, as leader of the district, need such comments?" And he answered, "You know, this is by and large an insignificant problem". So no, he does not care. One would want things to change, that someone would care about this, at the end of the day. (Larisa)

Katya came to similar conclusions during her investigation:

We have a very lazy 'control'(...) The official structures – the Federal Services, the Water Canal – they're somehow not reacting to this. (Katya)

Although Lyudmila didn't experience any form of hindrance from the authorities during the course of investigation, because "it was already a historical theme" Lyudmila explained, she was nevertheless cautious:

While those veterans who ended up in the 'invalid' homes, they were deprived of all of this, although they fought in the war just the same – they got the same honours – but from the Soviet government, they didn't receive anything. That is why, in my investigation, in this article, there is a table with all the government regulations, in full, how they sound, what is in them, so that if someone wants to, they can look into it, so that nobody can accuse me of saying something bad about the government, about how bad the Soviet Union was. (Lyudmila)

On the whole, *the professionals* felt that the situation in Moscow wasn't nearly as treacherous when it comes to government backlash against investigative journalists as they assumed it to be in other parts of Russia. Reasons for this were mainly attributed to regional journalists' lack of online and international contacts that could raise awareness of their or others' situation, and to the pervasiveness of the local government and its faculty to threaten journalists.

People in the regions are a lot more vulnerable. They don't have so much international contacts. Once they are targeted by the authorities, it's very hard for them to raise awareness and to draw attention and to motivate the international community to do something on their cases. (Olga)

Outside, it doesn't happen like this. If you are an investigative journalist and investigating some plant and someone from the factory's administration doesn't like you, it might end in the coffin. That happens. Yeah. Being a good regional journalist is a lot more dangerous than being a good Federal Moscow style or something like that. And they get nothing for this. Poor people. (Sergei)

6.3.2 THE PUBLIC (OR EXTERNAL CHALLENGE 2)

This study found that the second most obstructing force to investigative journalism was the public – whether it be in their distrust of the media, their seeming indifference to public affairs, the "primitive level" of political debate, or in their seeming "fear of difficult stories". To a varying degree, each of the seven participants in the study described the significance the public plays in journalism.

The most reported obstacle the public posed to investigative journalism, was their **distrust** of journalists and media in general. Sergei sees a parallel between the public's distrust of journalists and the growing number of journalists Russia is witnessing today.

I don't remember the figures but it was significant, about 60 % thinking that "you should never drink with a journalist". So when you talk to ordinary people here, they kind of usually insult you, "Ooh you're a journalist, stay away!" Well, it can be understood because really as we already discussed, the quality and professionalism of journalists is quite poor so why should we be amused or put up with being treated like shit, if we are? And actually the trouble is the quantity of journalists is growing. Everyone is a journalist around. All these bars in the centre are crowded with journalists. Working for some media that has made 10 people audience of something, bloggers are becoming big journalists. That's the demolition of our profession. So people don't like journalists. I don't like journalists either. (Sergei)

In telling of an encounter she had with somebody "way out in the backwoods of Karelia", Larisa recalls:

They asked "What for?" When I said, "please tell me about this, how it is, about now, about that, how it was"... They said "Why? It doesn't matter, since you won't show this. Nothing will ever change". And this is the total distrust of the authorities, not just of journalists. (Larisa)

Another challenge to investigative journalism is the public's seeming **indifference** to public affairs and their lack of reaction to investigative reports. As we have seen, it was precisely incidences of public indifference that led to Olga becoming an investigative journalist.

One of the big shocks was the terrorist attacks that happened in the city of Moscow in 2002. I happened to be in Moscow at that time because of my job and I was shocked because, I was terrified not only with the violence but with the fact that Moscow remained indifferent. Tragedy was developing just a few quarters away from them but people were smiling, eating, drinking, walking so... somehow it was really weird (...) I couldn't remain indifferent. (Olga)

At the time of the interview, it had been three weeks since the airing of Larisa's investigative report and she lamented the audience's lack of response:

I would've liked to get better ratings for my work, some questions from the officials, comments or, on the contrary, some...in general, some kind of response to the publication. I haven't yet got a single response. So I have this feeling that either people don't care, or that they are accustomed to the idea that journalists just talk to themselves and we just carry on with our work no matter what anybody else says, or else we won't do it again. (Larisa)

Maxim attributes the poor level of investigative journalism in Russia to the public's **“primitive level of political discussion and debate”**. He describes,

Maybe it's quite sad but I don't believe in this audience now. We should recognize that for 10 years, the middle classes in Russia were very ignorant if we are talking about political things, political activities. They tried to avoid to think, to talk, to read about politics by all means possible and that was the general approach by all middle classes in Moscow and in other cities in Russia. And to be frank the main result of such ignorance is that now when you got this raising of activism and (...) the recreation of political discussion and debate, we got this debate on such a basic and primitive level where for example now, if you want to explain something to the Russian audience, you don't need to present facts, you don't need to present a very complicated picture of what is really going on there – for example the Russian Secret Services in the Northern Caucasus – we need to present some very simplistic critique (...) the audience mostly reads it for these simplistic arguments. They don't read it for real journalism. That's the problem. (Maxim)

Maxim concludes that, “when we have this level of political debate I don't think we will get anything good in investigative journalism because nobody is interested in it”. This fact, as he sees it, has led him to consider fellow investigative journalists as his audience.

The first thing for me is to be professional, so I don't want to talk to people at this level. I just don't know how to do it! And I don't want to. That's why for me, the main audience is this group of professionals. (Maxim)

Olga attributes the public's reluctance to support, or to respond to investigative journalism to their **“fear of difficult stories”**. She explains:

People are afraid of difficult stories. No matter what countries they are in. They want to have their normal lives. It's their right. They don't want to be disturbed. Because once disturbed or if they come across a difficult story, they are afraid of the types of emotions it can arouse. Because if they feel some emotions, they

might have a bad conscience about not doing something and it's a vicious circle (Olga).

As part of the same arguments that came out of the interviews, all the participants commented on the significance of the public's role in investigative journalism, whether in terms of access to information, or in building one's reputation and even in terms of protection.

If you have the audience... how all these things work... It works only in one way: you become more and more popular, you get more and more audience for you, and more and more people inside the government might feel that you are quite influential. For example for me, I had an access to biggest independent radio station [name of radio]. I had an every week commentary and because of this thing, some people tried to contact me to tell me something, it was a normal usual traditional way of getting information – if you became more popular then you might find more information. The problem is that after two years, [the radio] stopped to cooperate with me because they felt the subject of Federal Security Service not very safe and then you just lost this thing (...) I felt pissed off because people in the Security Services feel that you are not so useful anymore and you lose your access, your sources, people who might be sources to you. (Maxim)

There were publications last month, half a year or even a year ago, and suddenly they find out that after their publication something [in society] changed, something happened – it seems to be what holds the most value in journalistic work. If it would happen so that people in Russia would believe in journalism, its foundations would shake greatly. (Larisa)

6.3.3 LACK OF TIME AND/OR MONEY (OR EXTERNAL CHALLENGE 3)

Another significant external impediment to investigative journalism, according to the participants is **deficiencies in** either or both **time and money**. With the exception to Ksenya, the participants' main and regular source of income was in 'regular journalism'. Whereas the *trainees* were expected to investigate in their free time – “usually after work, when there is time, sometimes in the evening or on the weekend”, describes Katya – the *professionals* also complained about a lack of time to investigate, or about a lack of funding for their investigations.

As a member of the ‘Kremlin pool’, Sergei remains busy with his main job as a reporter for his publication’s newswire:

The bad sides are there is almost no time to do any investigations with this kind of travel because Putin travels almost every day. (Sergei)

Although Ksenya is the only investigative journalist whose main source of income comes from her investigations, she too lacks time:

Normally I am working too much. It’s sometimes dangerous (...) Week after week I am leaving work at 12, midnight. And we should be at work at 9. (Ksenya)

In speaking of funding for her investigative work, Olga explains:

I would like to find some financial support (laughs) but it’s not very easy to obtain (...) because now apart from what I have been doing, a kind of normal life, normal routine, I also have to raise the money to pay our lawyers because my friends who are still in Russia they can’t do that (Olga)

6.3.4 RELUCTANCE IN PARTICIPATION OF EXTERNAL BODIES (OR EXTERNAL CHALLENGE 4)

Another challenge, experienced by Ksenya, is the **reluctance of external bodies of expertise** – in this case, laboratories – **to help** with the investigative research process. This can be explained by their own dependency on financiers.

But experts... it can be difficult... and also some experts say, “I know it but I won’t comment because we work with this cosmetic brand and we blablabla and we can’t.” (Ksenya)

I called also I think the fifteen main laboratories here in Moscow, no one agreed to do that. Even at a special state laboratory, like the main one, they just didn’t agree! Even for money! Then I wrote to international laboratories and they said, “we could make it”. (Ksenya)

6.3.5 CORRUPTION (OR INTERNAL CHALLENGE 1)

In moving onto the internal challenges, the major internal challenge reported by the participants is **corruption**, and specifically how journalists freely take, or are pressured into taking money from their sources of information. Maxim explains the dilemma:

That's why some journalists become corrupt – not just because of money, but because they wanted to get this access to these big guys, to information, etc. etc. Sometimes it helps, really. There is some tension, to be frank, because you became a 'trust guy', not an agent, but you became very close to them, you come close to decision makers – sometimes you might get very good information, very sensitive information to get published – and money, for these kind of guys, it's just a means to get this access. Of course anyway, it's corruption, but the reasons might be well. (Maxim)

Maxim adds, that if one refuses or ceases to accept bribe money all contacts for information can end.

I had some relations for example with some sources in some security departments of some big corporations and all of those relations were completely broken after some months – why? Because these people who work in this department they cannot understand the nature of your relationship with them and they have got use to the kind of relationship where they could control you completely. In this way they should pay you money. That's how you can trust them. (Maxim)

6.3.6 BATTLING AGAINST 'KREMLIN' JOURNALISM (OR INTERNAL CHALLENGE 2)

Another internal challenge, as described by Sergei, is how investigative journalists find themselves **struggling against fellow-professionals** whose idea of journalistic professionalism consists of supporting the establishment.

Our work basically consists of finding the information we want to have published and they are always fighting against that - the newsmakers, the colleagues from the Russian pool, everyone. So it's always kind of on the edge. There are not even rivals but enemies (...) If I were working for Russian media I would probably think about the guy who was working for the American team as

an agent too, but we have to do something with it. We're working. So that's the main challenge to try to kind of show them that journalism is like this. (Sergei)

6.3.7 BLOGGERS (OR INTERNAL CHALLENGE 3)

In recent years, **bloggers'** entrance onto the journalistic scene has created a new form of intra-professional pressure on journalists and investigative journalists.

The usual public thinks that bloggers are braver than journalists. Of course this is just stupid because they don't follow the rules – but if you are a journalist, you have to be very cautious in your wording, not because of fear but because of the rules, because you might be prosecuted for blasphemy, etc. And the same goes for all journalists around the world. But the rules don't apply to bloggers. (Maxim)

6.3.8 FROM FINANCIAL DEPENDENCY TO PUBLICATIONS' LIMITATIONS (OR INTERTWINED EXTERNAL-INTERNAL CHALLENGE 1)

The fact that **media outlets are dependent on their owners** – and other financiers such as advertisers – poses a problem for journalists in general. As owners often have their own corporate and political agenda, **the editorial line gets skewed to suit their purposes**. The tendency towards conservative agenda setting, coupled with the owners' tendency towards volatility, further limits the space and accessibility investigative journalists have to get their stories published. As we see from the following remarks, the *professionals* rebel against this, whereas the *trainees* are more resigned to being limited by their newspapers.

Russian newspapers are now not very profitable. They rely more on the ambitions of the owners and all the owners of newspapers in Russia tend to be very unstable in their decisions. For example, an owner of the newspaper just one day decided to 'throw down' the newspaper without any explanation. (Maxim)

Now publications are more like corporations. They have their own corporate interest sometimes, and they need... for example in Russia, many editors they think that the main idea to be an editor is just to keep it going by all means. For

example, we might victimize some journalists, some stories because we need to proceed, we need to preserve our scene, etc, etc. (Maxim)

(...) they are funded by the owners who might be very close to the state or might be dependent on the state. (Maxim)

Another form of financial allegiance, as the source of editorial conflict, is media outlets' dependency on advertisers. Ksenya relays her experience of this:

For example when I wrote my 'lash' story, my sales girl who works for [the publication's name] for sales called me and told, "Oh my God! We had a very strong advertiser who wanted to make an ad of this lash curling factor and he was promising a lot of money and then he said no because you just wrote a story". (Ksenya)

Whether out of enforced resignation, or simple acceptance that the alternative to not follow the publications' editorial line is unemployment, or whether out of agreement, *the trainees* seem to accept that there is no other way than staying within the limits of their media outlet's editorial line.

The informational issues on the federal channels, for the most part, are 'hardwood' subjects and in this journalism, one can only go so far. (Larisa)

I work for this newspaper, the governmental one, and that's why we have such a policy: I can criticize the local government, but under no circumstances can I criticize the president. (Lyudmila)

If you work within a publication, then you must conform to the politics of that publication. (Lyudmila)

That is why, you can conform, if you choose your own newspaper, if you like it there, if everything about it is suitable for you, then you must conform to its policy – if you don't agree with this internally, if it disgusts you, then you must leave. (Lyudmila)

6.3.9 FROM A LACK OF COOPERATION TO A DECLINE IN PROFESSIONALISM (OR INTERTWINED EXTERNAL-INTERNAL CHALLENGE 2)

As previously seen, **the authorities obstruct investigative journalism by not responding to their investigative claims.** Maxim explains that one of consequences of this behaviour is the unwillingness of people from within corporations and political

structure to leak information to journalists, as such risky efforts often result in futile outcomes. Such lack of “whistleblowers”, as Maxim describes, **makes life difficult for investigative journalists**, especially young ones.

Now political investigations are quite difficult because it's so difficult to find sources inside the Kremlin. It became very difficult because people inside are not interested in dealing with the press because – it's not because they are scared of possible prosecutions – it's because it's completely ineffective to use the press to dig some information about (...) That's why it's not very useful to use the press to try and dismiss some officials. (Maxim)

If you are, for example, a young journalist just trying to establish your contacts in the official structure. For example you are attached to the state department, or some kind of ministry. What will they do with you from the first day? They say that if you publish something very critical, you will not be allowed to talk to them and they might refuse to give you information. And to be frank, it's a big pressure for young journalists because that's your only source of information and if you are denied this source of information, your editor would be the first guy to ask “What are you doing here?” (Maxim)

You understand that you cannot find the guy in two hours... but you need the story to be published, so you just invent him. That's the big temptation for young journalists. (Maxim)

The difficulty, and often, impossible task of establishing non-corrupt relations with corporate or political figures to access and check information during investigative research, has led Maxim to rely on I.F. Stone's method of reliance on documentation. As the saying goes, ‘necessity breeds invention’.

For example, you cannot just call now for example the FSB and ask them: “guys, could you just send me the names of all chiefs of departments?” That would be impossible because it's considered to be blablabla. But you can check some documentation and you might find for example that this guy's name in volleyball championship is the deputy director of the FSB and that you look at that guy, and that might be something, you might proceed with the next step and the next step and you might have a whole picture. (Maxim)

6.4 Additional general observations

General observations that emerged out of the participants' interviews indicate further challenges that journalists wanting to specialise in investigative journalism face today.

These are notably (1) the scarcity of investigative journalists in Russian newsrooms, (2) a general resentment against journalists, and (3) a lack of education in investigative journalism in regional Russia.

According to the professionals' observations of their field, there are only a few investigative journalists working in Russian newsrooms. As Maxim explains:

The situation is not very good because you know that we have a decline of number of investigative journalists in publications. And even the biggest publications in Russia have no investigative department (...) It's a question of figures and at one time every big newspaper in Moscow had an investigative department now they have two people in Novaya Gazeta, 3 people in Vedemosti, maybe one guy in Forbes. (Maxim)

Another observation made by several journalists, is the existence of a general open resentment against journalists in Russia from members of the public and the authorities, but also from sources of information.

If I get to a room with average people, in most cases I try to avoid talking about my job (...) in many cases I was faced with the suggestion of money "Oh you're a journalist, maybe I can pay you some money to write about our company (...) Because we, in our corporations, we do everything because of money, because of salaries, etc. because of profit. You have to find profit somewhere (...) but the difference between us and you, is that you pretend to be honest, well, that's why we hate you". And I've heard this many times. (Maxim)

'Serious' people like business or CEOs think of you like a fucking prostitute regarding writing, that you come here and do anything, that you are not professional and that you are not doing a serious job. (Ksenya)

A third inference about investigative journalism to come out of the research is the limited amount of education and training in investigative journalism in Karelia, as perhaps an indication of a greater trend in regional Russia. Both Larisa and Lyudmila, who would've gone to university some 20 or 30 years ago, had to go to Moscow even to get basic journalistic training. Katya, however, recently graduated from a journalistic programme at the local university although she indicates that she didn't receive much training in investigative reporting, which explains her enthusiasm for the SCOOP training.

6.5 Summary of Analysis

As we have seen from these interview extracts, the field of investigative journalism is a complex game journalists try to play in spite of, and most often *with*, forces that obstruct them. Accordingly, the answers to the research questions reflect the intricateness of the field, as the participants expressed numerous and varying responses to the questions. Despite the multitude of information, patterns nonetheless emerged and, as we have seen, participants' answers could often be grouped together as they presented variations on common themes.

In answer to this study's leading question "Why do some Russian journalists specialize in investigative journalism?", three motives or 'senses of purpose' emerged out of the participants' responses: (1) **For professional 'idealism'**, reflected by some participants' eagerness to uphold the media's role as the 4th estate, and to report the truth and provide information on 'taboo' subjects; (2) **To help fellow-man**, and this altruistic sentiment manifests itself in the journalists' desire to help people who are being victimized by war or product-marketing, to battle against indifference, and to inspire others to help; and (3) **For Russia and society** – born out of an apparent civic duty to improve the functions of society and the nation as whole.

With regards to the sub-question on 'the elements that contribute to the journalists' professional motivation', analysis of the participants' responses found that their motivational factors fit into Bourdieu's *economic, cultural, social* and *symbolic* categories of capital. The most significant forms of capital, in terms of numbers of responses, were 'cultural' – whereby the professionals sought to maintain their investigative **skills** and the trainees enjoyed putting into **practice** investigative methods they knew 'in theory' – and 'social', whereby all the journalists alluded to the importance of having and maintaining networks of peers, other professionals and readers/viewers for **support**, to get **new stories**, and to gain **feedback** and **recognition**.

Finally, responses to the last question on "the pressures of the profession" were best categorized as external, internal and 'intertwined external and internal' pressures. The participants were most vocal about the external challenges that consist of **the authorities, the public, deficiencies of time and money, and the reluctance of external**

bodies of expertise (e.g. laboratories) **to help** during an investigation. Internal challenges comprised of **corruption, struggles against journalists who act as servicemen to the authorities**, and the popularity of **bloggers**. Those challenges that clearly showed external forces directly affecting internal practices included **media outlets' financial dependency on owners and the consequential limitations of the editorial line** to suit the owners' agenda, and **the government's non-cooperation as a direct cause for journalists' decline in professionalism**.

Further observations made by the journalists about investigative journalism are the scarcity of investigative journalists in newsrooms, a general resentment against journalists and a lack of education in investigative journalism in Karelia.

7. Discussion

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the significant findings from the analysis, as well as the indications of possible current professional trends among Russian investigative journalists and the future of investigative journalism in Russia.

7.1 Findings

As the previous chapter informed, the findings of this study include insights into investigative journalists' motivation for practising their profession, as well as the perks they seek to gain, and the challenges they face. Of the findings, three stand out from the rest, notably, (1) investigative journalists' desire to help others as an indication of possible inherited professionalism from Soviet times; (2) the association of 'real' journalism and 'professionalism' with investigative reporting; and (3) the public's major role in investigative journalism, and as a consequence, their lack of support posing a grave challenge to the profession.

7.1.1 INHERITED SOVIET PROFESSIONALISM REFLECTED IN MOTIVES FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM

To varying degrees, all seven participants expressed motives to help others. Some see their work as helping individuals, while others direct their work at improving their community, society and even the nation. All the participants have found that they can help a given cause or person through the exposure of some hidden or unseen information or phenomenon. While Olga has sought international support for individuals by exposing their personal stories of hardship, Ksenya, Lyudmila, Katya and Larisa, have investigated unseen phenomena – from harmful beauty products, to lack of administrative regulation over water sanitation. By bringing public awareness to these issues, the investigative work is meant to then prevent individuals from further harm or to resolve problems by stimulating civic interest. Sergei, on the other hand, perceives his work as improving the

function of Russian society through the understanding and revelation of corporate and political functions, while Maxim strives to “fill in information gaps” about the Secret Services, also as a means to enlighten Russian society.

Undertaking the task of helping society through exposure of problematic issues is a common discourse held by investigative journalists the world over, as discussed in Chapter 3. However, given the history of Russian journalism and specifically, in looking at the dual role journalists were assigned during the soviet era of, firstly, leading society alongside the authorities, and secondly, assisting the masses in their difficulties with everyday soviet life, one can deduce that Russian investigative journalists are carrying on the role their Soviet predecessors were compelled to fulfill. Indeed, Soviet journalists had the responsibility “to react to situations of social suffering brought to their attention and to use their resources and skills to put an end to that suffering” (Roudakova 2009, 416) Moreover, studies (Davis et al. 1998, Wu et al. 1996) suggest that the traditions in which journalists have acted alongside the authorities in their roles of propagandists and organizers (Davis et al. 1998, 84), and in which elite journalists, as members of the intelligentsia, have considered themselves “independent social leaders” (Wu et al. 1996, 538) have influenced the way Russian journalists see themselves in contemporary Russia. As Pasti indicates, “the Russian media and their workers have developed a participatory journalism” (2005, 104), which has its roots in the Soviet school of journalism, whereby journalists were expected to actively participate in political and social processes (Ibid).

During the interview process, several of the journalists mentioned having trouble with writing up their investigations in neutral and objective manners. As Olga describes, “For me, for instance, it’s a big big problem because while, so to say, in ‘standard journalism’ you can’t write from first person singular, you can’t write from yourself but what to do if you personally interfere into somebody else’s story?” Such resistance to neutral and detached reporting (Pasti 2005, 104) supports Pasti and Pietiläinen’s observations (2008) that the most apparent Soviet-era value in journalism today is “the willingness to exert influence in society, one way or another, and a moral conviction that a journalist should not be indifferent to what s/he writes about” (2008, 128-129).

According to the information from other studies presented in Chapter 2, journalists in Russia, generally speaking, continue to act as “cogs” (Oates 2007, 1286) in

the well-oiled politico-corporate machine by supporting, rather than challenging, elite agendas. Such behaviour also represents continuity from the Soviet era as journalists embody the roles of ‘propagandist’, ‘organizer’ and ‘entertainer’ (Pasti 2005, 109).

This study suggests that investigative journalists also retain Soviet attributes – in their pursuit of agenda-setting, struggles with ‘indifference’, and aims to influence society – but precisely by *contesting* elitist agendas. In a similar fashion to their Chinese counterparts who draw upon Confucian and Maoist traditions of criticizing corrupt social and political phenomena for the betterment of society (Tong 2012), it appears that Russian investigative journalists also have deeply-rooted models of practice that support their current sense of professionalism and purpose. And, just as in the Chinese practices of investigative journalism, such imbedded professional traditions that once supported and were supported by authoritative rule now appear to be backfiring against the elite.

7.1.2 INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM AS AN EXEMPLAR OF ‘PROFESSIONALISM’

The analysis of the participants’ responses revealed that the practice of professional ‘ideals’ as a motivation, and the maintaining and acquisition of professional journalistic skills are central to the practice of investigative journalism.

In contrast to regular news reporting, which is described as “not real journalism” (Maxim) and “just information” (Lyudmila), the participants described investigative journalism in the following manners:

I think it should be facts, facts, facts before opinion. Maximum of facts. If you are doing something, please go here, go there. So maximum facts. Objectivity as this neutral position. I think this is what makes a professional. (Ksenya)

So the problem is not just to check the information provided by a press office of corporations but to get information. It might be more difficult but it’s more interesting to do it to be frank. (Maxim)

According to the participants’ responses, it appears that investigative journalism is associated with independent work, while practicing ‘fact gathering’, ‘information corroboration’, ‘understanding processes rather than relaying information’ – many of

which correspond to standards in ‘western’ practices of journalism – are means of achieving such independence. Pasti supports this observation, as she ascertains in her study on contemporary Russian journalists that, “professionalism for journalists means making independent decisions in their professional activities” (2005, 97). Such conscious desires by Russian investigative journalists to adopt more autonomous means of journalistic practice and ‘western’ standards of professionalism possibly represent a way for journalists to move away from journalism’s long-established association with the government and the promotion of their agenda.

In the same way Chinese investigative journalists have had to battle against the CCP ‘party journalists’ (Tong 2012) in order to establish new standards of professionalism, the struggle by investigative journalists to validate their perspective on what professional journalism is can be seen in Sergei’s confrontation with other journalism professionals:

That’s the main challenge to try to kind of show – the newsmakers, the colleague from the Russian pool, everyone – that journalism is like this. It’s not about just transferring the basic pieces of information they get from this guy, but it’s in explaining this guy. The society wants in particular this and wants this to be explained, right now. And please without any press secretaries! (Sergei)

Similarly, the motivations of the journalists “for professional ‘idealism’” revealed desires to establish journalism as an autonomous 4th power in society to effectively bring public awareness to issues that ought to be known, discussed or challenged. Intentions to independently engaged in dialogue with the public, the authorities and the corporate world (Pasti 2010, 70) is very much in keeping with the Anglo-American discourse on investigative journalism which aims to ‘sustain an ongoing conversation’ with the public and the authorities about given issues (Ettema /Glasser 1998).

However, despite investigative journalists’ goodwill to establish professional procedures, the reality of their work environment continuously challenges their intentions. Russian investigative journalists experience a ‘culture of secrecy’ similar to that of their French counterparts in their struggle to access information legally (Van Den Blink / Kruk 2005). Like their French colleagues, it appears that Russian journalists are often compelled to rely on corrupt relations with corporate and political figures in order

to corroborate and gain information. Just as investigative journalists in France have become “the embodiment of the good reporter” (Chalaby 2004, 1200) and investigative journalism has come to represent a “professional honour” (Marchetti 2009, 379), so Russian investigative journalists appear to have similar aspirations.

This study suggests that there is a tendency for Russian investigative journalists to think of their profession as a ‘more professional’ form of journalism, rather than being a separate specialized field of journalism. Faced by similar challenges to that of their Chinese and French counterparts, Russian investigative journalists prize their professional development and therefore appear to have adopted professional practices and perspectives on the purpose of investigative journalism that are reflective of ‘western’ standards of professionalism and the Anglo-American discourse on investigative journalism. As such, this study hypothesizes that Russian investigative journalism is an amalgamation of ‘western’ ideals and endemic features of Russian journalism inherited from the Soviet era: on the one hand, investigative journalists establish ‘job autonomy’ by adopting ‘more professional’ and western professional practices; on the other hand, they can rely on the Soviet tradition of serving the public by criticizing corrupt practices.

7.1.3 THE PUBLIC’S KEY ROLE IN THE SUCCESSFUL FUNCTION OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM

Based on the stories we hear about Russia, one easily presumes that the government, and the authorities as a whole, opposes the practice of investigative journalism. Furthermore, international media monitoring organizations (e.g. the CPJ, RSF²²) confirm such presumptions. As this study shows, the authorities do in fact continuously and, to varying degrees, obstruct investigative journalists and even stand as the guilty party for the majority of the journalists’ grievances. However, this is not the entire story. This study also indicates that the public’s lack of support and downright distrust and indifference to investigative journalists also gravely hinders the successful practice of investigative journalism.

²² Committee to Protect Journalists (<http://www.cpj.org/>) and Reporters Without Borders (<http://en.rsf.org/>)

This study has shown that journalists lost the public's trust in the 1990s, as media outlets and individuals became financially reliant on owners with their own politico-corporate agendas, which journalists have been compelled to promote. This research shows that investigative journalists perceive their profession being challenged not only by the public's distrust, but also by the public's indifference to public affairs, and consequently, by a poor current level of political debate. Coupled with the government's recent tactics to diffuse the impact of investigations by ignoring them, it begs the question: how can journalists establish themselves as a 4th power, as a platform for public debate, if nobody is listening?

As Ettema and Glasser (1998) suggest, there is no investigative journalism without the public. In their studies on Anglo-American investigative journalism, investigative journalists draw upon existing standards of morality held by the public as a threshold to measure the significance of the subject of their investigations. In this way, the public traditionally acts as the "head-judge" (Ettema / Glasser 1998) to discern whether the malfunction of society that is being investigated is 'wrong enough' for something to be done about it. Investigative journalist Jon Sawyer explains, "to have an impact, the story must reflect the community's consensus on those values and how they apply in particular instances (...) If the story does not uncover something that is 'really wrong', the story will sink without a trace" (in Ettema / Glasser 1998, 70). Chinese studies on investigative journalism supports this view, as Tong indicates that the success of investigative journalism is largely due to the audience's receptiveness to investigations and their cooperation in acting as an "endless primary source of story leads" and in helping to disseminate investigative reports by sharing them online (Tong 2012, 193). Tong writes that, "investigative reporting cannot have strong influence over society without the outrage of the public" (Tong 2012, 198).

According to the findings of this research, which is supported by previous studies on Russian journalism (Roudakova 2009, Oates 2007, Zassoursky I. 2004, Pasti 2005, 2010) Russian investigative journalism is still far from enjoying public interest, let alone public support of their endeavours. In following Pasti's indication that journalists are by and large providing "entertainment" for the masses (Pasti 2005), a plausible course in development for Russian investigative journalism could follow France's example

whereby investigative journalists have supplied media content with a steady flow of popularized ‘scoops’ on the scandalous behaviour of society’s elite. Arutunyan supports this supposition, as her own research on Russian media has shown that “when journalism as a profession is not trusted, the effect that investigative reporting can have on society is diminished precisely in its social function: it becomes little more than a condiment to celebrity tabloids” (2009, 80).

While the fate of investigative journalism is largely assumed to be tied up with the authorities and the government’s attitude towards journalism, development in public interest and the impact this could have on journalism remains to be seen.

7.2 New professional trends?

From the analysis, indications of new – and potentially lasting – trends became apparent, notably, (1) online sites as investigative journalism’s main space for publication, (2) change from being a solo profession to becoming a ‘group effort’, and (3) the increase in public activism as another cause for decline in professionalism.

Firstly, *professionals* and *trainees* alike referred to online sites accepting investigative pieces, as opposed to publications that employ them to write newswire content.

In Russia now it’s very difficult to find a newspaper, which is not biased so to say, but the internet media is more open. (Olga)

We sense and felt that this is no place for us here in Russian media (Maxim)

Even now Russian publications are not very keen to suggest me or my co-author to write stories. That’s why we have the opportunity to write it on our website and to write in English for British and American publications. That’s all. (Maxim)

Although the *trainees* got their investigative pieces published / aired by their respective media outlets, Lyudmila, however, had to compromise her work slightly in order to get it published. She explains: “the article was published on the [name of publication] website and an abridged version was published in the actual paper”.

Secondly, further indications suggest that investigative journalism is moving away from being a ‘solo job’ towards becoming a collaborative effort.

It became clear that in order to become more efficient it was necessary to invite other journalists to start writing about this story so I found two Russian journalists, and I motivated them to raise this story as well and they also came to Lithuania and they also started to dig deep. So we started to work as a team and there are also people here who were motivated to write about it and all together we managed to release these people from prison. (Olga)

Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the recent increase in political activism in 2012 and 2013 has led to signs of decline in professionalism, according to some journalists. As a couple journalists referred to the poor state of Russia’s civil society and the low level of political debate, an increase in civic interest in the form of political activism is not seen as bad occurrence in of itself. As Maxim suggests: “Well, maybe because of new politics activism now, maybe one day people will once again be interested in real information.” However, it would seem that as the public has become more politically active, so have journalists begun to ‘pick sides’ and align themselves with ‘the opposition’.

Because the new generation of journalists, they are kind of, it’s considered very cool and very professional to be at the rally with some banner and press card (...) It’s normal for the young journalists to be a political activist too. That’s absolutely insane for anyone who has worked for normal media, which prohibits journalists from mixing it up with their jobs. (Sergei)

The problem is that many journalists now, after we got the rise in political activism, they become very easily biggest with the opposition because you might get some information from the opposition about the opposition electors. Well that’s good. You might get access. But you cannot write about the opposition based only on information provided by the opposition. And well, there’s a temptation there. That’s the problem. (Maxim)

7.3 The future of investigative journalism in Russia

The participants’ outlooks on the future of investigative journalism spanned the range from very optimistic to gravely pessimistic. Interestingly, but perhaps unsurprisingly,

those journalists who deal most closely with political elite and the authorities – Maxim and Sergei – have the most pessimistic views on investigative journalism’s future.

I would say specifically Russian investigative journalism has no future because it’s not about only Putin himself, it’s about journalists, it’s about self-censorship here. There are lots of attempts to do investigative journalism – the Kommersant newspaper, Vedemosti, Novaya Gazeta and all this stuff – but when you look close you understand that they did it for some reason, they have a pact with somebody who will do this and you’ll get this information. It’s always about some pacts when you’re working in journalism (...) There are no rules in Russian journalism at all so I think it’s decaying to the state where we will produce nothing. (Maxim)

I think that the journalism here is dying... It will resurrect of course. But it has to die first. It’s like the phoenix bird. I hope my son will witness or my grandchildren will witness some time the resurrection of Russian journalism but at the moment I see that we are less and less professional here. (Sergei)

The more optimistic outlooks on investigative journalism in the future come from both the personal experience of younger journalists acting responsibly and faith that the visible increase in political activism will create more interest in and opportunities for investigative journalism.

Well, I am hopeful about that because I see that there are more and more young journalists who are really daring. (Olga)

Well, I think it’s very connected with the change in the society. What I have noticed, I hope that it is true. A year and half ago, people and the atmosphere started changing. After this wave of protests, which I participated in, I just saw many more people who are conscious about what they are doing, where do they live. They are all very intelligent. They know, they travel, sometimes they are, they’ve lived in Europe for some time so they know how people are living. They are quite tolerant, modern, highly educated. And as far as I see them, young people, sometimes really young, I hope that it will change. That’s why maybe in investigative journalism starts (...) the number of journalists are growing. I hope so, really. People who are interested in it. (Ksenya)

Katya also expressed her outlook on the future of investigative journalism, and whether she meant to express optimism or whether she attempted to cover up sentiments of resignation about the difficult situation journalists find themselves in, Katya smiled and added: “In our country, everything is unpredictable!” As such, there is little one can do

other than to wait and see how investigative journalism will continue to develop in Russia. As Ksenya correctly pointed out, “there is no ‘if’ in history”. In the meantime, researchers will continue to do what they do and Russian investigative journalists will continue to do what they do – but hopefully not in vain.

8. Conclusions

In this day and age of new and ‘smart’ technology, of financial crises, of ‘shorter and faster’ infotainment-style easily consumable news pieces, of information-saturated societies, and of government crackdown on whistle-blowers because of wars on ‘terrorism’, it is no wonder why the expensive, time-consuming and probing craft of investigative journalism is near obsolete in mainstream media.

However, it also seems that it’s precisely because of this ‘day and age’ that conferences such as “The Wikileaks effects: the rebirth of investigative journalism” (GEN’s News! World Summit 2011²³, Hong Kong) and annual Global Investigative Journalism Conferences organised since 2001 are popping up to question and possibly counteract the apparent “war on journalists and journalism”²⁴, that American investigative journalist Jeremy Scahill suggests has been a continuous and purposeful marginalization of critical, in-depth and investigative journalism by forces who would rather keep mainstream media as ‘state media’ that reflect and promote national and international elitist agendas.

Whether our times are witnessing some sort of “rebirth” in investigative journalism or whether it is in fact a dying craft, investigative journalists continue to work in many countries and provide in-depth reports, books and documentaries. Russia is no exception.

Bringing attention to the efforts of these individuals who often risk their jobs and in some cases, their lives, to shed more light on ‘what is really going on’, to really *see* them when others are doing their utmost to eclipse them, is crucial to ensure the survival of journalism – as a source of information free from corporate, government or other elitist agendas so as to support individuals make informed-decisions in their lives, neighbourhoods, communities and on this planet with that information – all over the world. As such, this is what this study has attempted to do in serving as a witness to what

²³ Global Editors Network (GEN)’s NEWS! World Summit 2011, took place in Hong Kong. For the programme list and videos from conference: <http://www.globaleditorsnetwork.org/programmes/gen-summit-2011/>

²⁴ *Nations of Change* article 07.12.2013: <http://www.nationofchange.org/there-war-journalism-jeremy-scahill-nsa-leaks-and-new-investigative-reporting-venture-1386433228>

Olga, Sergei, Maxim, Ksenya, Lyudmila, Katya and Larisa have done and are doing to shed more light on ‘what is going on’.

While this research was successful in achieving insight into the world investigative journalists face on a daily basis, the scope was quite limited. Regardless of how knowledgeable and perceptive the participants for this study are, there were only seven of them. Moreover, the cases of journalists from Karelia – a region which enjoys a ‘relatively media’ according to the Glasnost’ Defense Foundation’s transparency map (*karta glasnost’i*), mostly likely encouraged by its proximity to Finland – meant to represent, albeit weakly, examples of ‘regional journalism’, did not provide enough of a contrast to the Moscow journalists.

For future research on investigative journalism in Russia, I would recommend conducting extensive survey and interview-based research in regions throughout the Russian Federation, including the capital cities Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Additionally I would recommend working in a team with Russian researchers to limit dependency on working with international institutes and organizations. Under such conditions, research could produce a more extensive assessment on the state of investigative journalism in Russia. Other ideas for research are to enquire into the public’s seeming distrust and indifference to journalism by conducting extensive survey and interview-based research of audience members with the intention to discern changes in levels of civic awareness and interest, especially now, as Russian society continues to undergo tumultuous political and social changes.

Bibliography

- Alexanyan, Karina, Vladimir Barash, Bruce Etling, Robert Faris, Urs Gasser, John Kelly, John G. Palfrey, and Hal Roberts (2012) Exploring Russian Cyberspace: Digitally-Mediated Collective Action and the Networked Public Sphere *Berkman Center Research Publication* No. 2012-2. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014998>
- Arutunyan, Anna (2009) *The media in Russia*, Open University Press.
- Aucoin, James L. (2005) *Evolution of American Investigative Journalism*, University of Missouri Press
- Azhgikhina, Nadezhda (2007) The Struggle for Press Freedom in Russia: Reflections of a Russian Journalist, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 8 1245 – 1262
- Becker, Jonathan (2004) Lessons from Russia: A Neo-Authoritarian Media System, *European Journal of Communication*, Vol 19 (2) 139-163
- Belin, Laura (2002) The Russian Media in the 1990s, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 18:1, 139 – 160
- Benn, David Wedgwood (1987) Glasnost in the Soviet Media: Liberalization or Public Relations? *Journal of Communist Studies* 3:3, 267-276
- Benson, Rodney and Erik Neveu (2005) *Bourdieu and the Journalistic field*, Cambridge
- Bernard, Michael (1996) Civil Society after the First Transition: Dilemmas of Post-Communist Democratization in Poland and Beyond, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 29:309-330.
- Beumers, Birgit, Stephen Hutchings and Natalya Rulyova (eds) (2009) *The Post Soviet Russian Media: Conflicting Signals*, Taylor & Francis
- Biel, Beata (2011) In Poland, Pressures Plague Investigative Reporting, *Nieman Reports* (Spring)
- Blumer, Herbert (1986) *Symbolic interactionism: perspective and method*, University of California Press
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1993) “Intéret et désintéressement” in *Cahiers de recherche du GRS*, n. 7, Lyon.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1996) *The Rule of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field*, translated by Susan Emanuel, Cambridge Polity Press
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1998) *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*, translated by G. Shapiro and R. Johnson Cambridge: Polity.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (2005) The Political field, The Social Science Field, and The Journalistic Field in Benson, Rodney and Erik Neveu (2005) *Bourdieu and the Journalistic field*, Cambridge
- Chalaby, Jean K. (1996) Journalism as an Anglo-American Invention: A Comparison of the Development of French and Anglo-American journalism, *European Journal of Communication*, vol. 11 (3) 303 - 326
- Chalaby, Jean K. (1998) *The Invention of Journalism*, London McMillan
- Chalaby, Jean K. (2004) Scandal and the Rise of Investigative journalism in France, In *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 47 (9) 1194-1207

- Chebankova, Elena (2009) The Evolution of Russia's Civil Society under Vladimir Putin: A Cause for Concern or Grounds for Optimism? *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 394 - 415
- Davis, Howard, Philip Hammond and Lilia Nizamova (1998) Changing identities and practices in post- soviet Journalism in Tatarstan. *European journal of communication* Vol. 13:1 77 – 97.
- De Barros Filho, Clovis and Praça, Sérgio (2011) Ethics in old and new journalism Structures, *Brazilian Journalism Research* - bjr.libertar.org
- De Burgh, Hugo (2000) *Investigative Journalism: Context and Practice*, London Routledge.
- De Smaele, Hedwig (1999) The Applicability of Western Media Models on the Russian Media System, *European Journal of Communication* 14(2), pp. 173–89.
- De Smaele, Hedwig (2007) Mass Media and the Information Climate in Russia, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 8, 1299 – 1313
- Dewhirst, Martin (2002) Censorship in Russia, 1991 and 2001, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 18:1, 21-34
- Downing, John D.H. (1996) *Internationalizing Media Theory: Transition, Power, Culture. Reflections on Media in Russia, Poland and Hungary 1980-1985*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.
- Edwards, Michael (2009) *Civil Society*, Polity Press
- Erzikova, Elina, and Wilson Lowrey (2011) Managed Mediocrity? *Journalism Practice* DOI:10.1080/17512786.2011.633792
- Etling, Bruce, Karina Alexanyan, John Kelly, Robert Faris, John G. Palfrey, and Urs Gasser (2010) Public Discourse in the Russian Blogosphere: Mapping RuNet Politics and Mobilization, *Berkman Center Research Publication* No. 2010-11. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698344>
- Ettema, James S., and Theodore L. Glasser (1998) *Custodians of Conscience: Investigative Journalism and Public Virtue* New York Columbia Press
- Evans, Alfred B. Jr. (2006) Vladimir Putin's Design for Civil Society, In Evans, Alfred B. Jr., Laura A. Henry and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom (eds.) (2006) *Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment*, M.E. Sharpe Inc. pp147 -160
- Evans, Alfred B. Jr., Laura A. Henry and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom (eds.) (2006) *Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment*, M.E. Sharpe Inc.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila (1996) Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s, *Slavic Review*, No. 1, pp 78-105.
- Fossato, Floriana (2001) The Russian media: From popularity to distrust, In *Current history* 100 648 pp. 343- 348
- Gibson, James L. (2001) Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition, *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1:51-68
- Hallin, Daniel C. "Field Theory, Differentiation Theory and Comparative Media Research" in Benson, Rodney and Erik Neveu (2005) *Bourdieu and the Journalistic field*, Cambridge
- Houston, Brant (2010) The future of investigative journalism, *Daedalus* Spring
- Hummel, Roman, Kirchhoff, Susanne and Prandner Dimitri (2011) "We used to be

- queens and now we are slaves*” – *Working Conditions and Career Strategies in the Journalistic Field*. PDF from Caerdydd University
<http://www.caerdydd.ac.uk/jomec/resources/foj2011/foj2011-Hummel.pdf>
- Inkeles, Alex (1950) *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*, Harvard University Press / Cambridge
- Jensen, Eric (2010) “Between credulity and skepticism: envisaging the fourth estate in the 21st-century science journalism” in *Media, Culture & Society*. PDF from Warwick University
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/sociology/staff/academicstaff/jensen/homepage/between_credulity_and_scepticism- mcs-published_version.pdf
- Juskevits, Svetlana (2002) Professional Roles of Russian Journalists at the End of the 1990s. A Case study of St. Petersburg Media.
- Kolstova, Olessia (2001) New Production in Contemporary Russia: Practices of Power, *European Journal of Communication* 16: 315
- Konstantinov, Andrei (2010) *Zhurnalistskoe Rassledovanie – Istorija metoda i sovremennaja praktika*, OOO Astrel’-SPb
- Kvale, Steinar (1996) *Interviews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Lallemand, Alain (2011) The Challenge: Investigating ‘Russian’ Mafias in a Time of Twitter, *Nieman Reports* (Spring)
- Lavrov, Vlad (2011) Libel Laws Pose Obstacles to Ukraine’s Investigative Journalism *Nieman Reports* (Spring)
- Lenoe, Matthew E. (1998) Agitation, Propaganda and the ‘Stalinization’ of the Soviet Press 1922-1930, *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies* 1305
- Lipman, Masha (1998) Political Journalism in Post- Communist Russia. Paper presented at Conference “Russia at the End of the Twentieth century” Stanford University, October 1998. Available at:
<http://www.stanford.edu/group/Russia20/volume/index.htm>
- Lipman, Masha (2005) Constrained or Irrelevant: The Media in Putin’s Russia, *Current History*
- Lipman, Masha and Michael McFaul (2001) Managed Democracy in Russia – Putin and the Press, *Harvard Journal of Press / Politics* 6 : 3, 116 – 127
- McIntosh Sundstrom, Lisa and Laura A. Henry (2006) Russian Society: Tensions and Trajectories, In Evans, Alfred B. Jr., Laura A. Henry and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom (eds.) (2006) *Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment*, M.E. Sharpe Inc. pp 305 - 322
- McNair, Brian (1993) Reform and restructuring in the Soviet media. Before and after the August 1991 coup. In Eldrige, John (ed.) (1993) *Getting the Message*, London: Routledge, 53- 72.
- McQuail, Dennis (2005) *McQuail’s Mass Communication theory*, Sage Publications Ltd
- Marchetti, Dominique (2009) The Revelations of investigative journalism in France, *Global Media and Communication*, vol. 5 (3) 368 – 388
- Marlière, Philippe (1998) The Rules of the Journalistic Field – Pierre Bourdieu’s Contribution to the Sociology of the Media” in *European Journal of Communication* Vol 13 (2)

- Maslennikova, Anna (2009) Putin and the tradition of the interview in Russian discourse, In Beumers, Birgit, Stephen Hutchings and Natalya Rulyova (eds) (2009) *The Post Soviet Russian Media: Conflicting Signals*, Taylor & Francis
- Neveu, Erik (2007) Pierre Bourdieu, *Journalism Studies* Volume 8, Issue 2 pp 335 – 347
- Nordenstreng, Kaarle (2001) Role of the Media in Society: Lessons from Russian in Zassoursky, Yassen N. & Vartanova, Elena (eds.) *Media for the Open Society*. Moscow: Faculty of Journalism / IKAR publisher, 216 – 224
- Oates, Sarah (2006) Media, Civil Society, and the Failure of the Fourth Estate in Russia, In Evans, Alfred B. Jr., Laura A. Henry and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom (eds.) (2006) *Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment*, M.E. Sharpe Inc. pp. 57 - 72
- Oates, Sarah (2007) The Neo-Soviet Model of the Media, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 8, 1279 - 1297
- Pan, Z. & J. M. Chan (2003) Shifting journalistic paradigms: How China's journalists assess 'media exemplars', *Communication Research* 30 (6): 649 -682
- Pasti, Svetlana (2005) Two Generations of Contemporary Russian Journalists, *European Journal of Communication* 20:89
- Pasti, Svetlana (2007) *The Changing Profession of a Journalist in Russia*, University of Tampere, Juvenes Print Tampere 2007
- Pasti, Svetlana (2010) A new generation of journalists in Rosenholm, Arja, Kaarle Nordenstreng and Elena Trubina (eds) (2010) *Russian Mass Media and Changing Values*, Routledge.
- Pasti, Svetlana and Jukka Pietiläinen (2008) Journalists in the Russian Regions: How Different Generations View their Professional Roles, in White, Stephen (ed.) (2008) *Media, Culture and Society in Putin's Russia*. Palgrave MacMillan.
- Pietiläinen, Jukka (2000) Changing Society and Changing Journalism in Russian Regional Press. In Ekecrantz, Jan & Kerstin Olofsson (eds.): *Russian Reports: Studies in Postcommunist Transformation of the Media and Journalism*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 105 – 138
- Pietiläinen, Jukka (2002) *The Regional Newspaper In Post-Soviet Russia – Society, Press and Journalism in the Republic of Karelia 1985-2001*, University of Tampere
- Pietiläinen, Jukka (2008) Media Use in Putin's Russia, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 24:3, 365-385
- Pujas, Veronique and Martin Rhodes (1999) Party finance and political scandal in Italy, Spain and France, *West European Politics*, vol. 22 (3) 41- 63
- Roudakova, Nathalia (2009) Journalism as "Prostitution": Understanding Russia's Reactions to Anna Politkovskaya's Murder, *Political Communication* 26 : 412-429
- Ruud, Charles A. (1981) The Printing Press As an Agent of Political Change in the Early Twentieth-Century Russia, *The Russian Review* Vol. 40, Issue 4, pp. 378-395
- Schudson, Michael (1978) *Discovering the news: a social history of American newspapers*, New York: Basic books
- Schütz, Alfred (1972) *The phenomenology of the social world*, transl. by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert, Evanstone, IL: Northwestern Univ. Press
- Schwandt, Thomas A. (1994) Constructivist, interpretivist approaches to human inquiry, In Denzin, Norman K. *Handbook of qualitative research*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, pp. 118 - 137

- Seidman, Irving (2013) *Interviewing as Qualitative Research*, Teachers College Press
- Tong, Jingrong (2012) *Investigative Journalism in China: Journalism, Power, and Society*, The Continuum International Publishing Group
- Van Den Blink, Pieter and Marjin Kruk (2005) "France at a glance" in *Investigative journalism in Europe*, vvoj.nl / http://www.vvoj.nl/cms/docs/reporteurope2005/eu_france.pdf
- Vartanova, Elena (2001) Media structures: Changed and Unchanged, In Nordenstreng, Kaarle, Elena Vartanova and Yassen Zassourky (eds.) *Russian Media Challenge*. Helsinki: Kikimora, 21 – 72.
- Vartanova, Elena (2001): Post-Soviet Media Model in Russia. In Zassoursky, Yassen N. and Elena Vartanova (eds.) *Media for the Open Society*, Moscow: Faculty of Journalism / IKAR publisher, 121 – 138.
- Volkov, Denis (2012) The Protesters and the Public, *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 55-62
- Voltmer, Katrin (2000) Constructing Political Reality in Russia: Izvestiya – Between Old and New Journalistic Practices, *European Journal of Communication* 15: 469
- Weaver, David H. (1998) *The Global Journalist: news people around the world*, Hampton Press.
- White, Anne (1999) *Democratization in Russia under Gorbachev: The birth of a voluntary sector*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan
- White, Anne (2006) Is Civil Society Stronger in Small Towns? In Evans, Alfred B. Jr., Laura A. Henry and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom (eds.) (2006) *Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment*, M.E. Sharpe Inc. pp 284 - 304
- Wu, Wei, David Weaver, and Owen V. Johnson (1996) Professional Roles of Russian and U.S. Journalists: A Comparative Study, *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, Vol. 73, No.3, 534-549
- Zapadov. A.V. (ed) (1963) *Istoriya Russkoi zhurnalistiki XVIII-XIX vekov*. Moskva: Vysshaya Shkola.
- Zassoursky, Ivan (2001): Media and Power: Russia in the Nineties, In Nordenstreng, Kaarle, Elena Vartanova and Yassen Zassourky (eds.) *Russian Media Challenge*. Helsinki: Kikimora, 2001, 73 – 92
- Zassoursky, Ivan (2004) *Media and power in post-Soviet Russia*, Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe
- Zassoursky, Yassen N. (1997) Media in Transition and Politics in Russia. In Servaes, Jan and Rico Lee (eds.) *Media & Politics in Transition*. Leuven & Amersfoort: Acco, 1997, 213 – 221.
- Zassoursky, Yassen N. (2001) Media and the Public Interest: Balancing between the State, Business and the Public Sphere, In Nordenstreng, Kaarle, Elena Vartanova and Yassen Zassoursky (eds.) *Russian Media Challenge*, Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, p 155 – 188.
- Zelizer, Barbie (1993) Journalists as Interpretive Communities, in *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, Vol. 10, 219- 237
- Zhao, Yuezhi (2000) "Watchdogs on Party leashes? Context and implications of investigative journalism in post-Deng China", *Journalism Studies* 1 (2): 577-597

Appendices

Appendix A

Interview questions in Russian:

1. Когда Вы заинтересовались журналистским расследованием?
2. Какие темы вам интересно расследовать?
3. Какова цель журналистского расследования?
4. Почему Вы выбрали именно эту профессию?
5. Как журналистское расследование отличается от обычной журналистики?
6. Что считается хорошим, качественным (тщательным) журналистским расследованием?
7. Какие этапы включает в себя журналистское расследование?
8. Каковы условия Вашей работы? Получаете ли Вы от Вашего работодателя какую-нибудь поддержку (финансовую, техническую)?
9. Каковы плюсы и минусы журналистского расследования?
10. С какими проблемами и неожиданностями может столкнуться журналист при проведении расследования?
11. Каковы плюсы и минусы журналистского расследования?
12. На Ваш взгляд, каково будущее журналистских расследований?
13. Что люди думают о журналистах в России? (Престижная ли это профессия?)
14. Кто Ваши читатели/ аудитория?
15. Каковы условия работы журналистов за пределами Москвы и Санкт-Петербурга? Существенна ли разница между этими двумя городами и другими регионами России для работы журналистов? Условия хуже? Лучше?