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**Testing Waltzian Neorealism
in a rhetorical analysis of India's power
in post-Cold War world politics.**

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This thesis probes the concepts of Kenneth Waltz's neorealism in a rhetorical study of India's power position in world politics, in the post-Cold War era. This theoretical study concentrates on whether Indian acts and acquiring more power on a global scale can be interpreted in neorealist terms. With a comprehensive and thorough elaboration of Waltz's theses I have chosen to test four core concepts of neorealism in India's rhetoric: anarchy whether it rules in India's political realm, self-help, balance of power, and the changing nature of India's capabilities. Alexander Wendt's social constructivist thoughts of anarchy have been taken into consideration complementing to the notion of anarchy presented by Waltz.

Thematically the analysis is divided into four different *époques* characterising the ongoing global trends of politics and India's change in those *époques*. The four neorealist concepts serve as the basis of the analysis of India. The analysis begins with India's adoption of liberal reforms due to globalization's effects in 1991 with the Congress party in power. After the reforms put into effect I move on to analyse a more nationalist, BJP-led India and her moves to acquire power through self-help. This *époque* is highlighted by the remarkable nuclear tests conducted in 1998. The third *époque* focuses on the analysis of the balance of power in global politics in the aftermath of the nuclear tests. Lastly, the analysis focuses on the return of the Congress-led India in 2004, willing to grow India's capabilities in global politics and reflecting on the developments taking place from 1991 up to 2006. The aim of the analysis is to interpret India's policy outlines and the appearing change(s), the implementation and implications of these changes during 1991-2006 in India's power position in the post-Cold War world. The methodology used is Chaïm Perelman's argumentative rhetoric. Different kind of argumentation techniques are used to analyse India's rhetoric, especially the rhetoric's effects to India's universal audience. The choice of method was logical as the primary material subject to analysis is compiled of a variety of high-level addresses, an interview, speeches and statements delivered by Indian statesmen.

The analysis reveals that all four neorealist concepts focused on have had to undergo a change of application and adaptation due to non-conventional, hence transnational threats evolving in the era of increasing globalization. Findings show that the neorealist interpretation mostly survives in India's arguments of power. The anarchic structure of post-Cold War world politics modifies the outcome which units like India produce in a system theory which neorealism claims to exist. The power equity cannot be measured separately anymore in only certain capabilities of a state like India, in e.g. economical terms and political terms. India's power position greatly depends on the character of India's dynamic relations with other global power states. Resulting from this, India is taking a stand on the global stage of world power politics and is beginning to contribute - as an international stakeholder - to the global system, when required. This is a consequence of the changed balance of power in the post-Cold War world politics and of India's changed political realm.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Introduction to Neorealism

I have chosen Kenneth Waltz's theory of neorealism to analyse contemporary world politics and in particular India's position as a much debated emerging power house in Asia and globally. In the broad framework of International Relations¹ theories this theory is also referred to as structural realism. Neorealism has occasionally been viewed as a loop-holed theory to apply in analysis, as some critics have claimed it has discrepancies when analysing contemporary world affairs. This is because scholars of IR are often discussing different issues with identical terms, attempting to tackle topics that are at times seen as useless or at least difficult. Quoting Waltz himself, "theory is a construction by which we select facts and interpret them"², this is exactly what I will attempt to do by discussing the role of Indian power in the post-Cold War era. The primary focus is to interpret India's power relations with other states through the process of a rhetorical analysis. As for neorealists, the specific internal structure of states is claimed to be largely irrelevant to their international behaviour. Hence the emphasis will be on India's relations with other states instead of just examining India's particular characteristics as a nation-state in IR specifically.³

Waltz acknowledges the possible weaknesses of his theory in the theoretical study of IR. This includes Waltz being aware that his own theory may seem incomplete, such as power is a prerequisite to any dominant state in IR. To support this approach to his theory Waltz's includes an element of *uncertainty*. Therefore a neorealist approach has to undergo sharp-tongued critique about its epistemological content on how knowledge is generated within it.⁴ The critique presented is, however, justified especially when questioning the relationship of terms used in IR theories.⁵ Yet providing an adequate framework for an analysis on post-Cold War India and its supposed power quest, it is possible to view Waltz's theory in the political sector of the international system. A system theory such as neorealism has states operating as units and Waltz encourages this kind of approach by stating that:

"concern with international politics as a system requires concentration on the states that make the most difference [...] and is necessarily based on the great powers".⁶

¹ Hereinafter referred to as IR.

² Waltz in Kegley 1995, 68.

³ Burchill in Burchill et al. 1996, 81, 86.

⁴ Ibid. 17.

⁵ Waltz 1979, 11.

⁶ Ibid. 73.

Therefore it is logical to introduce and to focus on India as a hypothetical major state and developing great power, though perhaps not yet widely recognised as one which *makes a significant difference* within the system in IR. India has considerable potential in the different sectors of the state unit system and to strongly influence the global market in economic terms. India also has the potential to be a serious player in the arena of world politics. According to neorealism the state's motivated behaviour is driven by the desire to maximise its power. In the case of India, especially as it is an emerging trade state, the market forces can potentially challenge the prevailing traditional politico-military state. The power of the market now rivals and can even overtake the power of the (political) state in historical terms.⁷

Realist theories rely heavily on the structure of the international system, in particular focusing on the distribution of power as the key factor in accounting for states' foreign policies and their international outcomes. Further assumptions in the core of any realist theories consist of a perpetuating characteristic of international politics, the collective (in terms of the system structure) approach instead of individual, and the concept of security and how to maintain it.⁸ In this regard, choosing neorealism as an analytical framework, it is worthwhile bearing in mind that realist theories are reminded to be certain type of research programmes bound by a core set of shared assumptions from which hypotheses and explanations of IR can be generated, rather than one fixed theory.⁹

The purpose of this thesis is to focus on such core concepts of neorealism as anarchy, power and the balance of it, and India's capabilities in relation to power and self-help. Additionally, Alexander Wendt's social constructivist definition of anarchy is used to contribute to the Waltzian notion of anarchy. Waltz's neorealism dismisses explanations developed at the individual and state level of analysis and argues that explanations on the global system level are sufficient enough to account for the main trends in world politics emphasizing the influence of the global power structure on the behaviour of states within it¹⁰. Therefore India will be analysed on a global level, which the selected research material reflects. Theories, as neorealism in this study, are introduced only when they make explanation possible and when theoretical notions enables one to make sense of the data focused on.¹¹ This is the prime argument leading to the analysis of this thesis.

⁷ Buzan et al.1993, 31; Waltz 2000, 14.

⁸ Buzan et al.1993, 8-9.

⁹ Mastanduno & Kapstein 1999, 4-11.

¹⁰ Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 35.

¹¹ Waltz 1979, 10.

The collapse of the Soviet Union disrupted the until then habitual bipolar balance of power dominance during the Cold War. As a result almost every government around the globe had to reassess their foreign policies within the new world order.¹² In this thesis I have chosen to analyse India in the post-Cold War world, from 1992 until 2006. India has not experienced major internal struggles since setting its feet on the reformed path of democratization in 1992, and opening up to the world in the early 1990s. Hence, a neorealist rhetorical analysis may well be a valid and an efficient exercise to analyse India's position in global politics.

As previously mentioned, neorealism is currently often referred to as the contemporary mainstream approach among different scholars of IR per se, trying to define and analyse the current setting of IR. Keen to apply neorealism to the researched topic, I am guided by the Waltzian thought of "being inclined to see what one is looking for, to find what one's sense of the causes of things, lead one to believe being significant"¹³. Bearing this statement in mind I attempt to demonstrate and argue with the help of the selected material and argumentative methodology, that India is hypothetically a significant state in world affairs.

1.2. Research Task and Methodology

*"A theory [neorealism] can claim to be purely conventional and on this claim it can base the right to define its symbols as it wishes. But as soon as it tries to deal with the real world, as soon as an attempt is made to apply it to situations which have occurred before, the problem of identifying the notions it defines with those of ordinary language cannot be avoided."*¹⁴

Following Waltz, I will try to deal with the real world, analysing and interpreting the symbols of neorealism in India's rhetoric. This quotation above leads me to the introduction of the chosen methodology, Chaïm Perelman's argumentative rhetoric. The aim, through rhetoric, is to analyse selected and compiled official addresses, an interview, statements and speeches made by Indian high-level representatives. This is done by diving into the rhetorical ocean of meanings in the power political context of IR within the approximate time-frame of the last 15 years. With this methodology the purpose is to find out how India positions and views itself vis-à-vis its rhetorical audience as well as how the audience looks at India in the realm it operates in as a unit, testing the chosen concepts of neorealism. The argumentative rhetoric consists of all linguistic tools one could

¹² Mastanduno & Kapstein 1999, 2-3.

¹³ Waltz 1979, 12.

¹⁴ Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 212.

come to think of working towards justifying India power rhetoric's cause.¹⁵ In addition, I wish to examine whether there indeed is a causal relationship between the arguments of India's political power and how India actually presents and acquires this power, if any. To argue one's case (for one's foreseen acts) is one thing, and to finally act accordingly is another. Referred to as the new rhetorical approach, Chaïm Perelman's theory of argumentation enables me to see how India has created its stance in the increasingly global world affairs and how India's statements reflect the role and stance of IR's actors in post-Cold War politics.¹⁶

1.3. The Outline of this Case Study and the material subject to research

The central research question is on the theoretical study of India. I do not see a particular research problem as such to tackle, but what is at stake is a clear-cut theoretical case study. As mentioned before, I use rhetoric as the method of analysis, whether neorealism exists in India's rhetoric, in a chronological survey.

The analysed primary material starts from 1996 and other literature, think-tanks and previously published material on the studied topic is used to contribute and to support the analysis of India's international awakening from 1992 until 1996 as well as to support my analysis from 1996 to 2006. The primary research material in analysis has been selected based on the criteria of significant policy changes or remarkable Indian policy implementations taking place in the given 15 years on the global scale. Additionally the locations where the rhetoric has been delivered and the audience have been taken into account on a global scale. There may not be a speech from each year, but the chosen research material illustrates such rhetorical samples which together build a picture of India's policy changes, reflecting a desire of increasing Indian power in world politics. The adoption of new policy implementations in India as a result of the system structure's changes dealt with are also well illustrated in the selected quotations incorporated into the analysis. The analysis consists of the assumption of change taking place in the system structure resulting from the collapse of the bipolar system, and change per se represents a variable throughout this analysis and thus challenges the static nature of neorealism.

In the following chapter, my aim is to present the theory and its application in elaborating Waltz's neorealism as my thesis' foundation. This is done by opening up neorealism's essential concepts and definitions, and applying them to India as a case study in the field of IR. Methodology follows

¹⁵ Ibid.1-19, 509-515; Perelman 1982, 153-162 op cit. Kuusisto in Summa & Palonen 1998, 270.

¹⁶ Kuusisto in Summa & Palonen 1998, 271.

theory, carrying India along the way after which I move on to analysis, with the goal of building a synthesis of the theory and the method stemming out of the research material.

I acknowledge certain weaknesses and possible distractions in my interpretation, even discrepancies while addressing India's role in the global context of power play. Theory presents the case of the thesis throughout the study, dominantly introducing itself. Finally, the conclusions are revealed to the reader, hopefully satisfying any further queries from arising.

2. *The theoretical framework: Neorealism*

2.1. Waltzian Neorealism defined

Kenneth Waltz's neorealism differs from the traditional realism in several ways although Waltz's theory is based on the foundations and core concepts of realism. "Reality emerges from our selection and organization of materials that are available in infinite quantity"¹⁷. This is Waltz's response to the empirical knowledge of theories being applicable while explaining IR. His neorealist theory stems from his benchmarking writings in "Man, the State and War" published in 1959, in which he drafts and gives birth to neorealism as a new approach drawn from the previously pessimistic realist thought. From the three images which he names Man, the State and War, Waltz has further developed the understandings of society, in which states exist as units in a world of states without a higher ruling authority. Against ancient Greece's Thucydides, classical realists such as Hobbes, Rousseau and even Machiavelli, Waltz criticises the claim of the internal structure of the state explaining its external behaviour, as he claims the state's likeness to other states to depend on its relations to others.¹⁸ Thus the state system is what dominates states' acts.

Uncertainty shall be accepted as a defining fact in neorealism, as the reality in which states operate indeed is out there and cannot be captured, no matter how greatly scholars use theses' as hypotheses' as tools of interpretation of states' acts. Uncertainty characterises the life of states and nowhere is it greater than in international politics.¹⁹ According to Waltz, a theoretical notion may be a concept, such as neorealism's core concept of power or an assumption, but neither explains nor predicts anything, or to that matter is false or true. The key for interpretation of events is the concept of explanatory power.²⁰ Thus explanatory power will be the result of the rhetorical analysis of India's power positioning in the given framework. While using Waltz's theoretical approach to analyse the case of India, a core notion to keep in mind is that a theory, despite relating to the world where explanations are sought for in understanding it, always remains distinct from that actual world (realm). The so-called reality will not be any more consistent neither with a theory nor with a model representing it due to the above mentioned uncaptured reality and its character of uncertainty.

¹⁷ Waltz 1979, 5.

¹⁸ Waltz 1959, 1-17.

¹⁹ Waltz 1993, 60.

²⁰ Waltz 1979, 4-6.

The above mentioned explanatory power is achieved by moving away from this reality.²¹ By discussing the sectors of the anarchic international system structure of neorealism, important to keep in mind is also the emphasised fact of the autonomy of the political from the economical as well as societal or to that matter any other sector²². Ideally, India could be strictly studied in a power political context in this study. However, due to globalization's effects and challenges, politics cannot be kept separate from economics. An addition to the theoretical analysis will be Alexander Wendt's constructivist approach. Wendt compliments to the collective characteristic of the neorealist analysis with his logic of a broadened anarchy prevailing in the system structure.

Based on the traditional findings of classical realism, neorealism continues to repeat the fundamental concepts founded by Machiavelli in its own customized fashion. It derives from the idea that the realm of international politics requires interest, necessity and different moral and international political rules than those which apply in domestic (national) politics, despite these rules being far from anything normative. The founding heritage of realism brings along the need to protect the state at all costs by maintaining its capabilities of acquiring power and thus its existence (sometimes with heavy sacrifices). This is a heavy burden for each state leader to bear but nevertheless necessary.²³

2.2. System theory

Already in Waltz's "Man, the State and War", the society of states forms a system. Defining a system theory, firstly one has to define what a system is. A system is herein understood as consisting of units, mostly states, their interactions and their structure. These interactions take place within the system structure and are determined as significant enough to view these interactions as a coherent set, as Barry Buzan neatly summarizes it.²⁴ A system theory qualifies as a tool of interpretation only if the structure of the system and its interacting units mutually affect each other²⁵. This is how states in international politics operate, and of which India is one of the interacting units. However, the international system has no specific purpose of why it operates the way it does nor does it follow any conscious pattern in its function determining the effect of the interaction of units.²⁶

²¹ Waltz 1979, 6-7.

²² Buzan et al.1993, 10.

²³ Ibid. 39-40, Waltz 1979, 117.

²⁴ Buzan et al.1993, 29.

²⁵ Ibid. 58.

²⁶ Buzan et al. 1993, 29.

In IR a system theory deals with the forces playing on the international system-level, not on the national unit-level - enabling the describing and understanding of pressures states are subject to. System theory enables us to understand the forces of the system which influence the units. In India the influence of these forces are a core variable in the analysis of developing the power quest. What makes any system approach appealing to use in an analysis of IR, is its characteristic to try and conclude some expectations about the outcomes of states' behaviour and their interaction from the knowledge of systems-level elements. Take India as a subject of analysis in an attempt to analyse its behaviour with respect to the influencing forces of the system.²⁷ One is led to suspect that a system theory approach may indeed be beneficial to use as a tool to explain similarity of outcomes prevailing despite changes in the units (such as ruling ideology of states) or agents that seem to produce the outcomes on the international level. This above described benefit of using a system theory approach will be demonstrated in India's policy analysis throughout the compiled research material, by describing the results of the outcomes of policy changes of major states in global politics. Some issues in the system work as constraints on the agents or units, or are imposed among them and on the outcomes of their actions. These constraints can be seen in India's bilateral relations, in India's interaction with major powers and especially in the outcomes of these actions.

Simultaneously I acknowledge that several scholars continuing to develop, advance and customize Waltz's neorealism further to suit their goals better claim that Waltz's system theory approach tends to be too static. These scholars emphasize the relatively static continuity compared to change (in the system).²⁸ Nevertheless in this study India's overall development in the chosen time-frame has been rather slow in pace but increasingly stable in terms of growth curve. However, as later argued, even the current system of world politics has some characteristics of continuity operating in a completely different realm than what the world order was when Waltz's "Theory of International Politics"²⁹ was introduced three decades ago, not to mention at the time of his "Man, the State and War" was published.

As previously mentioned, structural realists accept many assumptions by the traditional realists believing that power³⁰ (force) remains an important and effective tool of the states and

²⁷ Waltz 1979, 50, 55.

²⁸ To gain further insight into the critics mentioned, see e.g. Buzan, Jones & Little (1993) *The Logic of Anarchy*.

²⁹ Hereinafter referred to as TIP.

³⁰ With '**power**' I refer to what social science and IR analysts usually present as the comparative power of states according to their capabilities (most significantly military and economic capability) or resources presumed necessary to achieve influence over other states or else producing an intend effect (functioning in the system) but not directly equating power with control. (Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 457; Waltz 1959, 205.)

actors in the international system, and that balance of power is still the core mechanism for order in the anarchical system³¹. Balancing power strategy for survival is a means of maintaining a state's autonomy³². Though power remains in the central focus of the IR debate, also other key nuances of neorealism are explained in the following, in order to deliver a complete overview of the theory wished to apply in analysis.

2.2.1. The unit of the structure

Firstly, the most important actors in international politics are nation-states, theoretically referred to as the agent or unit. They are seen as territorially organized entities.³³ India is such a unit in the system framework of global politics. Realist frameworks do nevertheless acknowledge other additional actors involved in world politics, such as international organisations or other similar agencies. Realists assume that more can be understood if focusing on the behaviour of, and the interaction amidst nation-states instead of analysing the behaviour of individuals within these units, or for instance international organizations operating in the system.³⁴

To begin with, Waltz's framework of the system structure expands the traditional view of realists. Waltz emphasizes the structure as the framework where units such as states or other likely actors interact, broadening the conventional dimension of the interpretation of states' actions. Neorealists emphasize (inter)actions of states taking place in the system by differentiating between the structural and unit-level causes and effects, and their results. However, the system structure has two tiers: on one level the system consists of a structure understood as anarchy, while on the other level the system consists of the interaction of units. The core aim of the Waltzian system approach is to show how these two levels collide, operate and interact in a dynamic causal relation. These tiers must be distinguishable from one another otherwise there is neither a system approach nor an eventual theory to be applied. In other words neorealists' means and ends are viewed differently along with their causes and effects.³⁵ Units such as India and other nation-states involved therefore create the system altogether. In order to understand and interpret IR, neorealists believe that the effects of the structure must be predominantly taken into consideration³⁶. In a system structure of the insecure rule of anarchy without any higher authority ruling, the nation-states seek to survive

³¹ Lamy in Baylis & Smith 2001, 188.

³² Waltz 2000, 38.

³³ Mastanduno & Kapstein 1999, 7.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Waltz in Kegley 1995, 77.

³⁶ Lamy in Baylis & Smith 2001, 185.

as one of the principal goals in the system. The goal of survival has to be met in order for a unit to carry out any other goals pursued in the two levels of the system structure.

In utilizing Waltz's neorealism as a useful system theory in this study, there is the favourable ontological nature of the comprised theory. Waltzian neorealism is quoted as a heavily deductive theory in comparison to its predecessors of the more classical realism. For Waltz, the truth of knowledge is indeed "out there" in the field.³⁷

"...[a problem in] global politics can not be defined without presupposing a certain basic structure consisting of the significant kind of entities involved and the form of significant relationships among them".³⁸

This quotation is a concise summary of the explanation of the structure given above in which India operates with other units. This represents the starting point for the analysis later in the thesis. Habitual to the neorealist system it is clear that unit interaction is emphasized. Continuing on the issue of knowledge and it being "out there", theory such as neorealism takes the world today as it finds it with its prevailing different sectors' relations, as the given framework for action (analysis).³⁹ Placed into a practical framework, emphasizing the empirical aspect of knowledge which here will be applied by a case study, Waltz concludes that as changes in e.g. military technologies are available to states, perhaps these developments will result in a change of character of systems but not in a change in theory by which states' operations are explained.⁴⁰

2.2.2. Neorealism's critique

Prior to Waltz there has been numerous interpretations and system-like theories composed as tools for interpretation of world politics. Stanley Hoffmann's definition seems to come closest to the one of Waltz with recognising "an international system as a pattern among the basic units of world politics [...] the pattern is largely defined by the structure of the world"⁴¹. Hoffmann states that an IR student should search for reality, believing in the existence of the certain "real" domestic level as well as what he calls hypothetical international level, by looking for a particular and distinct international component which is separable from the internal affairs of a unit⁴². This definition resembles the previously discussed two-tier system by Waltz. However, Waltz argues the domestic level not to be taken for granted as a certain

³⁷ Burchill 1996, 17, 19.

³⁸ Cox op.cit. Burchill 1996, 17.

³⁹ Cox op.cit. Burchill 1996, 19.

⁴⁰ Waltz s.a. in Kegley 1995, 77, 81.

⁴¹ Hoffmann 1961 op.cit. Waltz 1979, 43.

⁴² Ibid.

existing level – reality can not be argued to be certain due to the accepted, uncertain character of neorealism.⁴³ Furthermore, to endorse a system approach one must be able to say which changes represent the normal operation of the system's levels and which changes mark a shift from one system to another. In other words one has to be able to distinguish changes taking place *within* the system instead of interpreting changes *of* the system. Changes of the system make a fundamental difference per se, but changes in the system do not shake the existence of the system.⁴⁴ According to Waltz in an attempt to turn a system approach into a theory, one is required to move from the identification of systemic forces and effects to their more detailed specification. This is to indicate what a unit system actually comprises of, to show the comparative weights of systemic (and sub-systemic) causes, and additionally to show how forces and effects within a unit system vary from one system to another⁴⁵.

Crediting even Rousseau as steering some ideas for the system approach in his days, the bottom line of Waltz's neorealism is that states create their own situations in the system as they are subject to the influential forces of the system. A fundamental research argument of Waltz stands out as he discusses system level factors in the following quotation.

*“Viewing IR from the system level is not to argue that the system determines the attributes and the behaviour of states but rather to keep open the theoretically interesting and practically important question of what, in different systems, the proportionate causal weights of unit-level and of systems-level factors may be.”*⁴⁶

Contributing to Waltz's neorealism as a central notion in the theory, it is not surprising that the balance-of-power system is highlighted when reflecting other scholars' ideas of systemic approaches.⁴⁷ Balance of power in the case of India will be briefly discussed later in this thesis in further detail.

2.3. The system structure

The structure of a system is a theoretical framework. Structural realism as neorealism is sometimes referred to, is built on restrictive assumptions including, importantly, that states are rational actors without trying to explain other actors' motives, but taking them as given. Hence India has to be thought of as rational rather than a radical unit. Unit structure (the

⁴³ Waltz 1979, 44.

⁴⁴ Waltz 2000, 5-6.

⁴⁵ Waltz 1979, 40-41.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 48-49.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 50-51.

structure of states) mediates the outcomes which a state as a unit produces⁴⁸. As previously argued quoting Waltz, structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts (sectors) and only changes of arrangement of these parts are addressed as structural changes. In analysing the structure per se, one needs to first take an objective approach and view units without their mutual relations, focusing on each unit's positioning bilaterally vis-à-vis another unit in the structure. I will herewith consciously and purposefully focus on the previously mentioned international system level of the structure on which India operates in.

Waltz believes that the international system can be characterised in three different ways: in the ordering principle, the character of the units in the system, and in the distribution of capabilities of the units in the system.⁴⁹ As a core concept of neorealism, the power position of units is influenced if changes in the units' relative capabilities take place, i.e. in performing their functions in the system resulting in gaining or loosing more capabilities.⁵⁰ The distribution of capabilities, and in particular India's capabilities, will be further elaborated at a later stage. Discussing structure and the principle of arrangement it is necessary to consider which phenomena or influences guide the arrangement for instance in a political system - in the system in which India is operating in. Though no higher authority rules in the anarchical world political order, a certain hierarchy exists in this international system arranging and differentiating the units respectively vis-à-vis each other. As Waltz argues, historically the units become accustomed to their respective behaviour which centres on mutual distrust, self-reliance (self-help) and the pursuit of (national) security, no difference to the rule (ideology) of the state.⁵¹ This is presumably one of the points where Alexander Wendt launches his constructivist arguments on anarchy which will be dealt with later. By hierarchy it is meant that the units are mostly centrally governed on the domestic level contrary to the decentralized international system level. In this regard, it means that unlike in the case of several other IR theory approaches, normative rules do not apply as dominant means of a code of conduct among the units in Waltz's international system.

Political structure produces a similarity in process and performance of units as long as a structure endures, also constituting the habitual code of conduct.⁵² With process I refer to explanations in terms of interaction among units and how units respond (behave) to each

⁴⁸ Waltz s.a. in Kegley 1995, 80.

⁴⁹ Burchill et al.1996, 86-87; Glaser 2003, 408.

⁵⁰ Waltz 1979, 80-82.

⁵¹ Burchill et al.1996, 87.

⁵² Ibid. 87.

others interaction.⁵³ Similarity of units should, however, not be interpreted as homogeneity in process which is demonstrated in e.g. looking at the various, differing compositions of ruling political governments represented in world power politics. Structure plays a role in influencing the process and in the performance of units, but there is obviously more defining characteristics to play a role as well as to take into consideration. Different behaviour patterns of units do emerge and they derive from the structural constraints of the system.⁵⁴

2.3.1. The terms of the political structure

It is necessary to point out that Waltz firstly states that “International Politics is more nearly a realm in which anything goes”⁵⁵. Hence, no wonder there are no true normative terms applying to the political structure. This can be seen as the fundamental challenge and fascinating characteristic of IR theory interpretation as such, as it is impossible to predict what will happen in the system structure as much as neorealism tries to explain it. This unpredictability is demonstrated in the analysis of this study through discussion of international power politics and its uncertain nature.

According to Waltz authority rapidly reduces to a particular expression of capability, such as building up a state’s military capability. With the lack of an authority, any formal types of relations fail to develop among units. Structure is purely a spontaneously born organizational concept in this respect, determined by the self-regarding units operating and coexisting within it.⁵⁶

Secondly, units are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform as anarchy brings along relations of coordination among the system’s units. Anarchy and the resulting relations of coordination characterise the units’ identity such as size, form, wealth and power. The third notable term underlines some of the essential emphasis of this thesis: distinguishing the number of power players within an international political system. The ideal number of major powers having an impact on the world’s political structure will be discussed later in this study. However, India is hypothetically considered as one of them and I will later argue why and how. Additionally the political system structure emphasizes the changes in the structure along with the changes in the system-wide distribution of units’ capabilities. Capabilities will be discussed in detail in the following paragraph. Finally, power, the key term of the political

⁵³ Keohane & Nye 1987 op. cit. in Buzan et al.1993, 48.

⁵⁴ Waltz 1979, 86-88, 92.

⁵⁵ Waltz 1979, 91.

⁵⁶ Ibid. 88-91.

structure and a focal concept of neorealism, is seen as the defining characteristic estimated by comparing the capabilities of a number of units.⁵⁷ Power, in this context, is also seen as a potential use of means with states (units) running risks according to how much power they have.

2.3.2. Stable vs. dynamic structure and the capabilities of a unit

Many long-lasting structures of IR have up to now appeared to be static ones. The period of the Cold War can be seen as such a structure. While examining structures thoroughly, they seem in fact to be dynamic in how they change the behaviour of actors and units and affect the outcome of the actors' and units' interactions⁵⁸. The stability of a system, as long as it remains anarchic is closely linked to the fate of its primary (great power) actors and units⁵⁹. Contemporary structural realists such as Waltz leading the way, emphasize the concept of power in the context of states' capabilities as dictating their fate. Waltz suggests that these capabilities, material as well as abstract and not exclusively "hard power" military-related any longer, can be ranked according to their strength in the following areas. Firstly, the size of population and territory, secondly resource endowment followed by economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.⁶⁰ The view of Joseph Nye brought to support Waltz's view is that the nature of world power today underlines factors such as technology, education and economic growth.⁶¹ From these above mentioned capabilities competence seems to be the most difficult to measure objectively. In the analysis India, strengthening her capabilities in the above areas particularly in technology and economic growth, can be seen trying to persuade other units in the system to believe India's competence in a convincing manner.

Waltz broadens the traditional realist perspective of exclusive military policy called hard security to cover so-called soft security issues. According to Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt the problematic paradigm of this definition of power in the neorealist scope is that "resource strength does not automatically lead to military strength"⁶². This is the case of the contemporary trend of a broader analysis of a state's capabilities.

⁵⁷ Ibid. 95-98; Waltz s.a. in Kegley 1995, 80.

⁵⁸ Waltz 1979, 70.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 162.

⁶⁰ Waltz 1979 op.cit. Dunne & Schmidt in Baylis & Smith 2001, 151.

⁶¹ Nye 1990 op.cit. Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 460.

⁶² Dunne & Schmidt in Baylis & Smith 2001, 151.

2.4. The rule of Anarchy

The anarchical (rather than hierarchical) ordering principle of the international system that lacks central governing institutions or instruments above units, defines the structure and how units operate in it as well as the distribution of capabilities across these units. Most importantly, there is no effective authority available to prohibit the use of force among units.⁶³ The mutual relations of units that prevail in the international structure rarely shift dramatically overnight in type or in quality. Instead the relations have been characterised by a remarkable continuity. This continuity can be expected to last as long as none of the competing and coexisting units are able to change the anarchical realm into a hierarchical one, be it sometimes characterised by reductionism or (extreme) revolutionism.⁶⁴ This said it is noteworthy that though relations may not change rapidly, the structure itself might change as Waltz states: “[...] because it gives rise to new expectations about the outcomes that will be produced by the acts and interactions of units whose placements in the system varies with changes in structure”⁶⁵. Again in the analysis, this above mentioned quote represents the core notions of this thesis and how India positions herself in the post-Cold War system’s scene. Additionally, across the systems, a theory explains change as important discontinuities take place. If these changes occur within a system that lasts, their causes are found at the unit level – within the states.⁶⁶ While changes may take place in the assumed anarchic IR structure, the outcomes of these changes can be seen in the states (units) operations in the anarchic system.

Furthermore as previously discussed, anarchy means that states or actors on the unit-level have no common authority to enforce any (normative) rules or laws steering their behaviour. State behaviour should, according to Robert Keohane (quoted in Waltz’s TIP), be defined by rational decision-making presuming that states are rational actors and India being one of them.⁶⁷ Yet in a large system such as in international politics, anarchy strongly affects the likelihood of co-operation, the extent of arms agreements, and the jurisdiction of international organisations to name a few practical examples of its influence. Waltz claims that there is no difference of function between different units.⁶⁸ In any event, this claim strikes out ideal. However, historical experience has shown that the units operating in the structure are not functioning on equal terms, thanks to the anarchic rule above them. Hence as a result the

⁶³ Waltz 1959, 205.

⁶⁴ Waltz 1979, 66.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 70.

⁶⁶ Ibid. 71.

⁶⁷ Keohane 1979 op cit. Mastanduno & Kapstein 1999, 8.

⁶⁸ Waltz 1979, 115-116.

anarchic international system structure shall shape all outcomes of the policies driven by a single state (unit), like India, on an unequal basis. In the conclusions I will attempt to respond to whether this indeed is the case in the major powers' power play.

In an attempt to broaden Waltz's views of anarchy, Alexander Wendt's social constructivist approach to anarchy is welcomed into the discussion. Regarding Wendt's anarchy in the Waltzian framework, Wendt mainly accepts the ideas and endorses the thesis of neorealism to a large extent. The aim of introducing Wendt's concept of anarchy is to incorporate his elaborative and state-centric notions of anarchy into understanding India as a unit which *makes a difference*, constructively "socializing" itself in the system of world politics. However, I do not fully agree with Wendt's claim that a system shapes state identities and interests, and thus will not go into extensive detail of this view.⁶⁹ I do support Waltz's view of the use of force that shapes states into what they are (as units/actors), including a nuance of Wendt's social interests.⁷⁰ For Wendt structural change goes together with collective identity, and in the view of realism there is no causality taken into consideration. Against the realist assertion anarchy forces states to worry constantly about survival (self-help) and relative (balance of) power. Wendt seeks to show that these security concerns spiral, hostility (in terms of constructing the unit's Self and the potentially hostile Other), arms race and war are not inevitable in an anarchic system. Wendt's notion of anarchy offers a less pessimistic view of units' destinies in the anarchic system, giving an input of somewhat dynamic hope and posing a challenge to the assumption of a static anarchic system.⁷¹

*Anarchy is what states make of it*⁷² is the argument for which Wendt is known for, in his attempt to elaborate neorealism's established explanation of the constant logic of anarchy in a post-Waltzian fashion.⁷³ Fundamentally, one should understand that Wendt is bringing the social aspect of variables affecting the system of IR to our knowledge and he argues that this should not and cannot be overlooked when trying to understand the structure and how it operates. Social or to that matter other sectoral constraints are exactly what Waltz tries to keep separate from the political sector in his analysis, making his approach very individualistic instead of the earlier claimed-to-be collective approach. Assuming that neorealism can be noted as individualistic and materialistic, Wendt blends in some less mechanical approach to the interaction between the units in the system with his social

⁶⁹ Wendt 1999, 11.

⁷⁰ Ibid. 309, 370-373.

⁷¹ Wendt 1999, 17-18, 21-22; [www-document] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Wendt>

⁷² Wendt 1992, 391. Italic added.

⁷³ Wendt 1999, 19.

constructivist theory. By doing so it softens the conflictual nature that Waltz has given to anarchy.⁷⁴ In other words, the effects of anarchy and of the material structure depend on what units want. Waltz does not elaborate further on units' (ideas of) interests, since domestic politics (unit-level analysis) do not affect the units' behavior in the system structure.⁷⁵

Responding to Waltz, Wendt argues that the core definition of anarchy needs to be elaborated. As a constructivist he opts for a more idealist and holistic view to obtain a successful interpretation of the international structure's change at the end of the Cold War.⁷⁶ Contributing to neorealism Wendt shows to some extent that material variables such as power and interest are actually shaped by social practices of states. These variables should be considered as idealist variables consistent with a constructivist view of world politics, simultaneously not prioritizing them to Waltz's preferences of variables. According to Wendt, feud, interdependence and capitalism that come out in the explorative real life examples of Waltz demonstrated in TIP, are to a large extent examples of cultural forms. Hence, these above mentioned examples in TIP are seen as a materialist explanation that presupposes cultural forms being vulnerable to any sort of idealist critique posed against Waltz.⁷⁷

The second remarkable contribution to neorealism from Wendt is his strong positioning of the state as a well justified and eligible actor in the systemic theory. This comes in as a practical argument as I intend to view how significant of an actor and eligible in terms of power India, often quoted as a rising power, is in international politics. This claim supports hand-in-hand Waltz's argument of the major power states *making a difference* in the system structure per se.⁷⁸ If this is the case, the state, like India, needs to be carefully analysed as a contributor to the system since the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War also shaped the system structure of international politics therefore influencing India's position in power politics.

Despite the earlier emphasis added onto statism in the structure, international politics' power play has indeed become more dynamic. As I will later argue, not only has the structure where the states operate in changed, but India has also changed in becoming more active in taking a constructive, dynamic and proactive stand in international power politics. This is what I will try to demonstrate through the rhetorical lenses of analysis. Hence, as a variable change repeatedly plays a leading role in the system structure in which India operates in.

⁷⁴ Ibid 6.

⁷⁵ Ibid. 106-107.

⁷⁶ Ibid. 4.

⁷⁷ Wendt 1999,136.

2.5. The concept of power

A fundamental distinction is necessary to be made between the interpretation of the traditional realists and Waltz's neorealism concerning the concept of power. Consideration of power goes hand-in-hand with considerations of a state's ideology governing power.⁷⁹ These different positions and locations of power in the system help to explain the behaviour of units and thus their fates in the system. I would even dare to say that the special character of power described above and further below affects the units' and agents' functions as an objective of their means. With respect to previously mentioned units' capabilities, according to Waltz power is seen as combined capabilities of a state in relation to other states. It is not only tied to military resources as described by realist forefathers such as by Hans Morgenthau. Today some state actors may still believe that conflicts can be resolved by the use of force, as well as by controlling other states in the system with force.⁸⁰ For neorealists force in terms of power is not considered to be an end itself as traditionally thought amongst realists. Instead, states pursuing power as a mean of survival, as Waltz explains, fall into two categories in doing so: internal and external efforts (of survival).⁸¹ Internal efforts are understood to increase economic capability thus competitiveness, to increase military strength and to develop beneficial strategies to open to the global market. There are traces of internal efforts to be found in the development of India and these internal efforts characterise the chosen timeline in which the analysis takes place. The internal efforts of growing power pave India's way to developing external power on a global scale. External efforts are moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken an opposing one (as a relative gain in the quest for power).⁸² The ways in which India pursues her external efforts in the name of power are briefly covered in the outcomes of the analysis, as India remains partially neutral between alliances.

Whereas Waltz assumes that units in the system are generally not differentiated, perhaps the only key point differentiating them is the power in the anarchic system, not the units' individual function as such. Another key distinction to be made between traditional realism and neorealism is of how states react to the rule of anarchy. Neorealists are in favour of anarchy defining the system unconditionally. In this way all the states are functionally similar

⁷⁹ Waltz s.a. in Kegley 1995, 75.

⁸⁰ Lamy in Baylis & Smith 2001, 185.

⁸¹ Waltz 1979 op.cit. Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 37.

⁸² Ibid.

units in the system experiencing all the same pressures posed by anarchy and strive to maintain their position in the system respectively in order to survive.⁸³ Hence, neorealists explain states' differing policy settings and actions by differences in the distribution of power or capabilities to cope with the challenges posed by anarchy. In neorealists' eyes anarchy poses the essential challenge of the survival of a state or an actor on the unit-level, which leads to the units always viewing other units (states) as potential (hostile) enemies and therefore threats to their national security. The resulting distrust and fear creates a security dilemma that shapes the policy setting of many states and actors, including India's. International organisations are accepted as actors, collective actions undertaken somehow as well, but only if the (neo)realist state is a winner with a relative gain under circumstances given. Win-win situations among states are not recognised.

Regarding power neorealists take a state-centric view of foreign policy. They recognize IR as a world of co-operation and conflict, and see foreign policy dominated by issues of national security and survival⁸⁴. States must continue to look after their own (self-)interests in the globalized world. Waltz accepts that globalization presents new challenges for national leaders as such, though he refuses to acknowledge that the state would be pushed aside by new arising actors born by globalization⁸⁵. The realists insist that the state is not going to be eclipsed by global forces operating below or above the nation-state. The militarization of the international system is accepted, as well as the patterns of political control and domination which extend beyond borders. What is not accepted is the associated rejection of the idea that globalization is accompanied by a deepening sense of community.⁸⁶ New challenges and previously unknown actors are, however, encountered in the analysis of India when dealing with new, transnational threats and non-state actors as threats in securing national security. Waltz claims that the states are able to adapt to new environments (system structures) and to transform their power and authority in response to new policy issues when needed⁸⁷. These results, contrary to Waltz's view, in the state-centric view of foreign policy have to be broadened and external efforts of pursuing power have to be strengthened in a new IR order such as the post-Cold War time can be thought to be.

⁸³ Lamy in Baylis & Smith 2001, 186.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid. 194.

⁸⁶ Dunne & Schmidt 2001 in Baylis & Smith 2001, 159.

⁸⁷ Waltz 2000 op.cit. Lamy in Baylis & Smith 2001, 194.

Alexander Wendt's thoughts come in useful in relation to the concept of power in international system structure as well. Wendt asks a justified question challenging Waltz on the concept of explanatory power and the status quo positioning: whether a state's motivation is in fact more driven by fear of others' actions or by power itself?⁸⁸ Having to consider this question, the international system in which India also operates in, is determined by beliefs and expectations which states have on one another. These beliefs are largely constituted by social rather than material structures. Waltz acknowledges that only structure regulates the states' and actors' behaviours in this system. Thus, if states find themselves in a self-help system, it is because their practices lead them into such an environment, and these practices are influenced by the structure they operate in. Changing practices will change the inter-subjective knowledge which the system is made of.⁸⁹

In this respect the main point Wendt aims to make is that though not underestimating the material power and interests of a state, states' meanings and effects depend on the social structure of the system. In particular, on what type of anarchy is understood to be dominant in relation between the structure and the units.⁹⁰ In this context I do not go into further detail covering Wendt's thoughts with the influence of the English school and the social constructivist interpretation. Nor do I plan to include Wendt's view of the different cultures explicitly theorizing anarchy, stemming from the classical realist scholars such as Hobbes, Kant and Locke.⁹¹

2.5.1. The logic of balance of power

The concept of the balance of power can be and has been interpreted in numerous ways into different assumptions by various scholars and theorists. According to Waltz, the system of balance of power gives a state a certain position in the international system that is the key issue influencing a state's behaviour in the anarchic system. The balance of power is not so much imposed by states' leaders in international politics' events, than by how much events and the dynamics of these events impose on the leaders of states.⁹² However, it is important to understand that this concept of the balance of power is not as such a theory to apply in IR in order to explain e.g. actions taken in international politics. It should rather be applied as a realist sub-theory based purely on realist assumptions.

⁸⁸ Wendt 1999, 117-118.

⁸⁹ Wendt 1992, 407.

⁹⁰ Wendt 1999, 20, 22-23, 30-31.

⁹¹ More detailed analysis can be found in Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) 246-312.

⁹² Waltz 1959, 209.

Balance of power politics rule wherever two and only two requirements are met. Firstly the order is anarchic, and secondly the system structure is populated by units wishing to survive without having to meet more complex conditions.⁹³ This balance of power politics is understood as the assumption that the players in world politics (units in the international system) are willing to follow the same rules of the game though uncoordinated from one another. States arguably act strategically and instrumentally in an anarchic system structure. In this realm there seems to be a problem with chronically incomplete information in circulation, as states or actors have incentives to conceal or misrepresent data to gain a relative strategic advantage maximising their power. Information plays an important role, as variations of it influence the choices made in policy outlines for either competitive or co-operative policies, influencing the severity of the security dilemma.⁹⁴ As a result balancing states' power in relation to one another, they may miscalculate the moves of each other which are thought to be based on rational assumption(s).⁹⁵ The balance of power is the driving force of states' intelligence services in the anarchic realm they operate in international politics.

The balance of power system ideally requires four states to operate within it, even a fifth state is welcome with a role of a balancer.⁹⁶ The suggested number can be traced down to political history when looking at the number of great powers ruling at different times, as well as looking at the number of wars fought or the peace in effect in the respective eras. Take for instance the international community striving for collective security measures, an example of which is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The UNSC consists of five permanent members thought to be great powers of current days and it is a forum where India is hankering after a permanent seat.

It is worth noting that the balance of power has always been constructed among the units in the system. Power is relative: a state has power over another actor only when it enjoys domination over that particular actor to some extent. An adversary has to know its assumed enemy's capabilities and willingness to mobilize them for coercive purposes. Thus an adversary must view the potential enemy's threat to use military and other defensive capabilities as credible tools of force. Observations made of the use of these tools are vitally important, as the balance of power is preserved as long as the adversaries believe in the use of

⁹³ Waltz 1979, 121.

⁹⁴ Glaser 2003, 406.

⁹⁵ Mastanduno & Kapstein 1999, 8.

⁹⁶ Waltz 1979, 163-165.

force the enemy state possesses.⁹⁷ Weaknesses in some strategically thought capabilities may trigger an attack that a greater power would trigger an adversary from launching - hence the security dilemma.⁹⁸ In this study the balance of power as an approach seeks to explain India's foreign policy agenda and what results different methods applied produce – what kind of power distribution is exercised and vis-à-vis whom.

What follows is system structure's states' policies aim to uphold the balance in a multipolar power setting. If the balance of power is maintained, the initial aim of balancing power was accurate. If the balance of power is not maintained the assumption of power distribution was false.⁹⁹ In this thesis I aim to analyse the effect of India demonstrating herself through rhetoric as one potential poles of power. Yet due to India's power politics subject to analysis, it is most likely impossible to test balance of power assumptions within international politics as such since the arena of IR politics is dynamic. Thus, the distribution of power and any drastic changes in the distribution allow neorealists to explain the structure of international system accordingly¹⁰⁰. In this regard the assumption is that states will seek to maintain their position and a specific status quo in the system believing that the balance of power is the best guarantee for the security of states and global peace.¹⁰¹ In other words, states dislike unbalanced power. This is why some states try to increase their own strength, or as a second choice in terms of self-interest, even opt for an alliance with another state to bring the overall international level of distribution of power to balance. However, one does not have to engage in balancing power if a state is not willing to yet such disengagement may lead to a state isolating itself from core power politics.¹⁰² As for Waltz, these power balances in the system are produced with a conscious policy towards it or not.¹⁰³ The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union especially rocked the global balance of power, previously thought to be maintained (static) in the anarchical system. Consequently neorealists urge that this event increased uncertainty and instability in the international system.

As a hypothesis of neorealism, aiming for balance of power proves to be correct in the case of India. As epistemological critique posed in the question of relative gain, Waltz's approach may defend itself in the name of the balance of power. How one state can dare to defy the

⁹⁷ Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 460.

⁹⁸ Waltz in Kegley 1995, 79.

⁹⁹ Waltz 1979, 118-123.

¹⁰⁰ Waltz 1979 op.cit. Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 37.

¹⁰¹ Waltz 1979, 117.

¹⁰² Waltz 2000, 27-28, 38.

¹⁰³ Waltz 1997, 914.

status quo after the description of the rule of anarchy, when each and every states power in relation to and over other states is ultimately their key to survival¹⁰⁴. This defiance can not be seen forthcoming with serious means in contemporary IR, without having to bear the consequences in the shifting power balance.

2.5.2. The crucial goal of the survival of the unit

Without survival of the state and its aim to assure survival in the anarchical system, any goals, domestic or international of acquiring more power can not be met. Under anarchy the goal of survival dictates the units' behaviours and them being subject to mutual competition and to socialization pressures in the system. Essentially, neorealism assumes that states give top priority to achieving security. The neorealist theory does not say where to draw the line between security and non-security issues; hence what issues can be securitized. However, one may assume that once a unit's security is maximized, the unit (state) will most likely begin to pursue other objectives rather than only security related objectives.¹⁰⁵

Only if survival is assured, can states safely seek other goals and above all power.¹⁰⁶ Quoting Waltz: "[...] beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied."¹⁰⁷. Leaning towards the so-called defensive realism¹⁰⁸, Waltz argues that states have security as their principal interest and as a result of this they only seek a provisional amount of power to ensure their own survival.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, in terms of survival the defensive realist view claims that the existence of the status quo powers decreases competition for power.¹¹⁰ Though this is not the case in looking at the status quo states in contemporary international politics, maintenance of their status quo requires rather dynamic efforts from these states to effectively create the status quo they already enjoy.

2.6. Self-help vs. power share and the security dilemma

Following survival, as the international anarchic system has no higher authority ruling, the uncertainty of the balance of power nourishes suspicion towards other states as described previously. A state's or actor's security on the unit-level can only be assured through self-

¹⁰⁴ Waltz 1959, 210.

¹⁰⁵ Glaser 2003, 412.

¹⁰⁶ Waltz 1979, 126.

¹⁰⁷ Waltz 1979 op cit. Dunne & Schmidt in Baylis & Smith 2001, 152.

¹⁰⁸ The Defensive realists' approach concentrates more on what is know as the prisoner's dilemma and more complex security dilemmas.

¹⁰⁹ Dunne & Schmidt in Baylis & Smith 2001, 152.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., Buzan et al. 1993, 39-40.

help. In other words, self-help and self-sufficiency drive the state to maintain its position in the international system in relation to the other units (through interdependency) operating in this system. As a result this causes the increasing insecurity in the system.¹¹¹ Units try to ensure the best position in the game of interdependence and integration of each other. However, in a strategic alliance formation, in trying to do so the possible cost of breaking an interdependent relation with another unit can be high. These balance of power politics are risky, but trying to ignore them can be even riskier¹¹². Even today in the 21st century, the interdependence of the current international order in some ways promotes sustaining peace by multiplying contacts among units which is likely to contribute to mutual understanding. At least this is what one could assume. Yet simultaneously in some cases conflicts arise due to intense collaboration resulting in promoting possible irritation among units.¹¹³ Waltz describes the matter of power share versus self-help within the context of self-help and elaborates his point with empirical examples of the economic sector and by applying them to states in IR. Therefore the following quotation serves for describing the Waltzian interdependence. “Persons and institutions depend heavily on one another because of their different tasks in perform and different goods they produce and exchange”¹¹⁴ - especially in the ongoing era of globalization’s strong influence.

Born from internal efforts of gaining power, the global market has a significant role in building up India’s potential of a super power state. In a self-help system, the considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest. Units may define goals and develop means for reaching them, acting together in the anarchic realm in the quest for their power share.¹¹⁵ As in any self-help system, units are considered for their survival in the system and the constant worry conditions their behaviour due to the uncertainty they are surrounded by. A constant worry of becoming dependant on others through co-operative aims and exchanges (of e.g. goods and services mentioned by Waltz) is present in the system in order to survive. This factor limits the co-operation of the states in international politics. Naturally, as a result states strive to control the levels of their dependency to other states in the structure. For instance two states competing for the favour of a third state may be driven by the competition to provide more and better political, economic and military goods and services. This competition, also seen as a desired balancing act serves primarily as an incentive for each of the states to promote their own interest. The fate of the units is what is

¹¹¹ Dunne & Schmidt in Baylis & Smith 2001, 153.

¹¹² Waltz 1959, 221.

¹¹³ Waltz 2000, 14-15.

¹¹⁴ Waltz 1979, 104.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. 104-107.

judged within the IR system. A state can not avoid the influence of the structure's constraints. Sometimes some action needs to be taken (by the state) for the sake of the system, as international interest needs to be served. This means that national interests of a unit are to subordinate the international interest if they are in the position to provide necessary means for such action in the first place. This is the groundwork laid for the playground of the major power states in world politics (e.g. UNSC) into which they are called into due to their extensive capabilities to complete significant tasks.¹¹⁶ The structure's constraints, internal and external, were also the triggering effects of steering India to the path it has followed in the post-Cold War era.

In the neorealist interpretation of today's globalized world, the anarchical system has witnessed a tendency of states (perpetuating themselves) to ally among themselves in order to check and balance the power against potentially threatening states. Though this cordial alliance formation is only endorsed under the assumption that a realist state stands to gain more than other states in the possible coexistence. Is so, a balance will be established through the interactions of different sectors of the structure e.g. military - arms trade, knowledge transfer or capacity building of the states. India as a previously active non-aligned group representative has now established close military ties as well as noteworthy bilateral trade relations with what are considered to be current major power states, while simultaneously partially hanging onto some of its non-aligned past e.g. the G-77 countries' forum. The anarchic structure of the system where states function in urges them to carefully consider their relative position in the distribution of power.¹¹⁷ The balance of power is not fixed or a stable condition in any of the structural realist frameworks, as ultimate trust among states does not exist in the system where states fear the dependence on others as previously described.

Especially in the focus of military capabilities, what would the relative gain for a nuclear state such as India be if it joined an alliance? A formal agreement which ties it to coordinate its behaviour in relation to another state in the event of a severe military incident occurring.¹¹⁸ In this regard the behaviour of an ally is not controllable in the predominantly suspicious anarchic system. The timeless cliché still remains applicable: today's ally could turn out to be tomorrow's enemy. Hence, in the neorealist world the realist assumption stands: no-one (state) is your friend but is considered to be a natural enemy with a prospect of escalating conflict among each other. In neorealists' minds alliances or coalitions are thus undermining

¹¹⁶ Waltz 1979, 108-109, 137.

¹¹⁷ Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 37.

¹¹⁸ Waltz 2000, 34.

one of neorealism's fundamental rules of statecraft: to independently increase one's military capabilities.¹¹⁹ Though allies offer an alternative to counterbalance threats in the anarchic global system, history has proved alliances to dissolve or at least easily stagnate in their function once common, serious threats appear on the horizon. Additionally, peace-time alliances may in fact provoke another state to form a counter alliance and actually hence worsen the security dilemma to which the choice of alliance was first opted for, with the aim of increasing (national) security.¹²⁰

A security dilemma is what is commonly referred to as the arising insecurity issue among realists, classical or neorealists altogether. Structural realists like Waltz believe that the security dilemma is an essential condition of international politics, linked to the balance of power. States, like humans, are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom. The security dilemma is applicable under specific conditions. When security is fragile states cannot signal their true intentions thus spreading suspicion when there is no true aggressor recognised or else identified¹²¹. Yet if sovereign freedom is the states' goal and is to be maintained, insecurity must be accepted and dealt with. The force which states use is used for the sake of their own protection and advantage with no particular justification of its rule, subject to acceptance of other states.

In this regard if one looks at the recent news headlines of states, including India and China, increasing their defence budgets, one can begin to see some sort of security dilemma emerging. These military preparations of states send a signal of potential uncertainty in the system to other states. As to whether these preparations are for defensive security purposes only (maintenance of a state's status quo) or whether these actions undertaken are for purposes of an attempt to acquire more power (to change a state's status quo) remain to be determined.¹²² The mutual suspicion among states (units) and actors resulting from this kind of actions understandably underline the notion of the security dilemma. In fact according to Steven L. Lamy, neorealists are truly of the opinion that "states are increasing their expenditures and their jurisdictions over a wide variety of areas in the globalized world"¹²³ in the 21st century. This may signal an increase of self-help in material and social capabilities of units and actors in avoiding finding themselves facing a security dilemma, in an alliance of on their own.

¹¹⁹ Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 552.

¹²⁰ Snyder 1991 in Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 553.

¹²¹ Schweller s.a. in Mastanduno & Kapstein 1999, 28-29.

¹²² Ibid., Waltz 1979, 112-113. See also an article related to defence spending in *The Economist* 2007b.

¹²³ Lamy in Baylis & Smith 2001, 194.

As a key concept self-help literally emphasizes a state's self-reliance in its capabilities. In the anarchic system, states do not easily trust one another and therefore they follow other states' actions through reserved actions. By saying that, in this context the suspicious minds of states accumulate to the security dilemma as mentioned military preparations feed inexistent expectations of rivalry between the states. As a result states often feel no more secure than previously, undertaking measures to increase their own security by responding to opportunities and constraints of the environment (system).

2.7. Polarity defined by capabilities

The balance of power is associated with the definition of polarity. In the scope of this study, power can be distributed in different ways – an idea which scholars call polarity.¹²⁴ Polarity can be defined along the words of Kegley & Wittkopf: “[...] the degree to which the global system revolves around one or more extremely powerful states or ‘poles’ [...]”¹²⁵. Traditionally great powers were measured solely according to their military capabilities¹²⁶ referred to as hard security capabilities. As the world's political order has changed, other conditions, alternatively soft security issues have also become acknowledged as measurements of a state's capabilities, status and fate. Natural resources, sustainable development, technology and strategic know-how in various fields are examples that can be considered to be soft security issues. States have different combinations of capabilities which are difficult to measure and compare. However, the system theory requires one to define the structures partly by this distribution of capabilities across units in the system.¹²⁷

Concerning the nature of capabilities, India has been quoted in a recent article as a soft power in relation to seeking regional power in the multipolar post-Cold War world.¹²⁸ The analysed research material also supports this argument as shown later on, confirming that India builds its power on more unconventional measures of capacity and capabilities.¹²⁹ Interpreted in (neo)realist terms, politically India can be thought to be in a relatively weaker position vis-à-vis the traditional great powers which are rather competitive in all conventional areas of power capacity and capability measurement.

¹²⁴ Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 560.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Such as economic, military and political potential of one state.

¹²⁷ Waltz 1979, 131.

¹²⁸ The Economist 2007a.

¹²⁹ Waltz 1979, 129-131, 139, 163.

Neorealists have expected unipolarity to quickly give way to multipolarity as other powers (other than the hegemony United States¹³⁰) move individually and some collectively to adjust to the reality of the U.S. dominance.¹³¹ As findings will show in the forthcoming analysis it can be seen that India is in the process of balancing power against the U.S. Bipolarity, according to realists, would ideally offer a more self-sufficient model resulting in reducing the vulnerability among units. Two (power) poles could find it easier to cooperate in contrast to numerous powers involved in managing the challenges in world affairs.¹³² As to realism's capability of possibly predicting continuity of the balance of power, Waltz suggests a bipolar continuity in IR in the 21st century. Taking the argument to another level, Waltz might be wrong and narrow-minded arguing that a habitual bipolar continuity would remain in the field of IR. The U.S. seems to have been in its own league in terms of military as well as economic power ever since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Yet recently the European Union¹³³ has developed into a potential competitor at least on the economic sector. However, bipolarity is no longer a reality that states and actors today live in.

In the system, a great deal of time and effort is put into estimating one another's capabilities among the units, in the sphere of uncertainty of one's intentions to potentially harm another. Shifting from only looking at capabilities to the assessment of states' relations also enables the world to be viewed as multipolar. This is because the relations of states in international politics mostly tend to be multilateral. In securing one's best power position more than two shifts in alignment provide an additional mean of adjusting a unit's behaviour to a multilateral system. Hence shifts in power alliances enhance the possibility of flexibility in operations of a unit within a multipolar system. On the other hand this also means a growing interdependence among states in their multilateral relations as states may become tangled in one another's affairs, whether intentionally or not. Supporting this argument is the historical evidence of the Cold War era's strict East and West bloc division. One could say that the world affairs in which India has been operating in for the last decade have become in some sense more heterogeneous compared to the Cold War era, not only in the above mentioned traditional terms of power measurement but also in taking the impacts of the rapid pace of globalization as well as the dissolution of the bipolarity into consideration.

¹³⁰ Hereinafter referred to as 'the U.S.'.

¹³¹ Mastanduno & Kapstein 1999, 15.

¹³² Wendt 1999, 103.

¹³³ Hereinafter referred to as EU.

Polarization is characteristically strong when power is spread across three or more poles. When seeking increased capacity to compete in multipolar systems on equal terms with other (sub)centres of power (such as in regional power centres), power is indeed sought by major powers. With the efforts of above mentioned example of India challenging traditionally strong power states in i.e. the economic scope and as a rising Asian regional power player, the power game of rivalry and balancing has become rather different from the pre-analysis era strategies and alignments exercised in unipolar and bipolar systems.¹³⁴ Traditionally, the serious game of power politics drove the players into two rival camps resulting in bipolarity despite a rather multilateral system. This can be seen clearly in the attitude of the U.S. towards Asia, trying to counterbalance emerging China and to observe who is forming alliances with whom, almost as if the U.S. was playing chess. More recently, an excellent example of the process of polarization was the agreed nuclear pact between the U.S. and its strategic ally India. The U.S. saw India as a rising hard power capability in the global balance of power setting.¹³⁵ This example of two states functioning in a multilateral system elaborates exceptionally well Waltz's explanation of structural causes and power shifts among the major units in which actions tend to determine the moves taking place in the system.¹³⁶ Major states, even status quo ones, can have serious worries in strategic issues concerning their national security as demonstrated above.

This concludes the detailed definition of neorealism's core concepts chosen for this analysis and demonstrates some examples of how neorealism is materialized in the case of India. The following chapter will present the methodology, which in analysis will act as a tool of interpretation of these above described concepts.

¹³⁴ Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 568.

¹³⁵ See more for instance in *The Economist* 2007a.

¹³⁶ Waltz 1979, 163-167.

3. Methodology

3.1. Chaïm Perelman's New Rhetoric

The methodology in this study, new rhetoric, deals with analysing communication. Referring to the politics of thinking, Kari Palonen has claimed many modern political theorists' texts simply to be context-related addresses which are tied to the prevailing political questions.¹³⁷ Rhetorical approaches to social science research are here to stay.¹³⁸ In analysing India's power positioning in post-Cold War world politics, I have chosen to use Chaïm Perelman's rhetoric analysis as the method to apply and test neorealism's existence in official statements made by Indian leaders. Social scientists, and among those political scientists, tell the story of rhetoric whichever context it may be applied to. The story of this study is India.

The first form of political science was in fact rhetoric, the earliest systematic study of politics on part of the Greek Sophists. Thus speech and its persuasion as aspects of rhetoric are too vital for politics per se for the connection between them ever to loosen to greater extent.¹³⁹ Rhetoric is indeed conceived as a theory of persuasive communication¹⁴⁰. Rhetoric focuses most importantly on winning its addressed audience to its favour be it verbally, in writing or through mimics in value judgements. Truth of an argument is not the most prioritized value. It is no wonder that rhetoric's ancient trails are rooted in judicial procedures. The ultimate target in argumentative rhetoric is to support one's case. The purpose of this study is to analyse the power political communication given out through rhetoric, prior to analysing the acts which might have resulted as outcomes from given rhetoric.

Discussing rhetoric in the 21st century, Barry Brummet, a Professor of Communication, has made an appropriate remark about rhetoric's relation to politics: "Political rhetoric is increasingly played out in terms of "commodification" in several senses. The terms of struggle are collapsing into terms of the market."¹⁴¹ Even though Brummet made a very commercial argument of political rhetoric, the remark he makes is applicable to the research approach in this study. In elaborating neorealism earlier, Waltz gave numerous "commodified" examples of states exercising neorealism's concepts. The findings of the analysed research material will demonstrate commercialism's strong weight in power politics.

¹³⁷ Palonen in Palonen & Summa 1998, 143-144.

¹³⁸ Palonen & Summa 1998, 13.

¹³⁹ Nelson 1998, 10.

¹⁴⁰ Perelman 1982, 162.

¹⁴¹ Brummet 2004, 297.

A certain degree of commercialism comes out in India's rhetoric, in the peculiar political language which is used in arguments, and moreover which lies hidden between the lines. Whether Chaïm Perelman's new rhetoric proves to be an efficient and rational tool of an analysis remains to be seen in the following, and in the utmost theoretic framework this thesis falls into. I acknowledge my choice of method may very well face critics.¹⁴²

3.2. Argumentative rhetoric

Since the birth of rhetoric in Ancient Greece the notion of it in contemporary research has developed into a so-called new rhetoric guided by prominent theorists, above all by Kenneth Burke, Chaïm Perelman and Stephen Toulman. I have chosen to apply Perelman's method of argumentative rhetoric to analyse India's ambitions of power, taking the language as a conscious way of India expressing its political will. Characteristic of the former British colony is the use of the so-called Queen's English. This language is charged with a tendency of a politically correct rhetoric output.

The late Chaïm Perelman, a Belgian Professor of Philosophy, was initially a scholar in the field of law and his judicial background is reflected throughout his work. What led Perelman to rhetoric, and particularly to focus on argumentation, was the problematic nature of analysing the rationality of value judgements and their good or bad character.¹⁴³ Noteworthy is that Perelman's theory of argumentation has an implicit nature of explaining the rhetoric of politics and going beyond Perelman's logic of judicial analysis in rhetoric. This implicit nature of explaining politics through rhetoric may offer some other scholar further heuristic tools of analysis.¹⁴⁴ Ultimately Perelman is out to prove his theory of a new rhetoric, and how the credibility of these value judgements is built on a skilful use of language.¹⁴⁵

From the theses of Perelman, I am interested finding out how India's argumentation is justified in practise and how the rhetoric establishes credibility (acceptance) in world power politics, if the rhetoric succeeds to do so. This is the main tool of analysis, kept in mind when analysing the selected material and when looking at how India argues its case of becoming a credible and serious power state in world affairs.

¹⁴² Summa in Palonen & Summa 1998, 51-52.

¹⁴³ Ibid. 62-63.

¹⁴⁴ Palonen 1995, 15-16.

¹⁴⁵ Summa in Palonen & Summa 1998, 63-64.

3.2.1 Argumentation

In order to work, the least argumentation requires is the existence of a common language such as the political language, and a technique allowing communication to take place. What is meant with technique is basically a tool of having the possibility of using the common language. These techniques may vary in large numbers. Argumentation is an action which always tends to modify a pre-existing state of affairs. What this study focuses on is how India's arguments act as tools of modifying the concept which India's audience has of the state in world politics. The goal of argumentation is to create or enhance the adherence of minds amongst the audience to which the argumentation is addressed to. In this study the audience consists of all other states in world politics, and especially the major states. Theses incorporated into rhetoric, of which the argumentation consists are presented for the audience's acceptance, and they hopefully amend the pre-existing assumptions of the audience in a positive way.¹⁴⁶ In other words, with argumentative rhetoric India is aiming to develop and enhance its (power) relations with its audience.

Argumentation may appear persuading and/or convincing, and by using the some selected theses' of Perelman I will attempt to analyse India's reflection of this. In analysis of this study one will find that India's argumentation proves to be merely *convincing* instead of persuasive. It's a very thin line differentiating convincing and persuading argumentation. The distinction made depends on the idea the speaker or author has formed from the materialization of an argumentation's cause.¹⁴⁷ A negotiative argumentation is persuading whereas political rhetoric tends to be formed using very convincing language (in the form of presenting the rhetoric as a monologue). Perelman's argumentative rhetoric as a method recognizes knowledge and will interdependent and paired together in argumentation, and focuses on their points of attach in language.¹⁴⁸ Thus the analysis may concentrate on tracing knowledge and will together in a convincing manner.

Argumentation contains both abstract and concrete values, and the presenter of arguments will subject one to the other depending on the situation. Every argument gives a hint of a pre-selection of facts and values, their specific description in a given language, and an emphasis which differs with the importance given to them.¹⁴⁹ For a social science, such as IR, this thesis of Perelman is a great point of interest due to its *argumentative approach* of rhetoric,

¹⁴⁶ Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 14-15, 45, 54.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. 26-28.

¹⁴⁸ Summa in Palonen & Summa 1998, 64-65.

¹⁴⁹ Perelman 1982, 28, 34.

and by presenting the factors in detail which a successful argument is made of. Therefore, the following chapter of analysis focuses on the particular analysis of India's pre-selected fact and values and how they act convincing in differing contexts along the post-Cold War years. Perelman bounds together the historically separately treated and hence oppositional components of the text: the content (substance) and the lay-out, making them a symbiotic element of reasoning in argumentation. All aspects of language are therefore subject to argumentation and the analysis of it. In this regard i.e. metaphors, the order of appearance of issues and emphases in a text treated as separate, altogether turn out to be elements and tools of assurance of a coherent argument.¹⁵⁰

Argumentation is primarily meant to take action through discourse in the audience addressed. Moreover, argumentation aims to gain a meeting of minds in the audience, orienting the audience's future action as a result, instead of imposing its will through constraint or conditioning.¹⁵¹ Thus India's arguments aim is to steer her audience's actions to her benefit in a convincing manner. Argumentation can nevertheless become hierarchical between India and her audience. That could happen in the case of an abstract ruling principle (e.g. hypothetically thought in demonstrating superiority of cause, such as in acquiring power) the result is a hierarchy between concrete issues. India is willing to raise her stakes in the global power play, but not in a superior overruling manner in relation to other units in the system. In this study, what can be seen is a rather equal setting between India and her audience. This is due to the realm (system) where states operate and in which the rule of anarchy applies. Therefore the argumentation in analysis will not display any clear hierarchic setting.

Regarding the interpretation of the selected rhetoric, there is a distinction to be made between the choices of interpretations. From two frequent equal interpretations, they should not be used together at the same time. The choice of interpretation, a so-called general interpretative scheme, is the method used in this study by which one proposes to describe reality.¹⁵² This general interpretative scheme is India's reality described in rhetoric. In delivering an ideally rational analysis, it is interesting that as a method, Perelman's new rhetoric shall be underlined as argumentation of probabilities rather than facts. The aim of new rhetoric is to support or question a given assertion's credibility.¹⁵³ My choice of interpretation enables me to concentrate on how India supports her given assertion of power, how the assertive power is

¹⁵⁰ Summa in Palonen & Summa 1998, 65.

¹⁵¹ Perelman 1982, 11-12, 20.

¹⁵² Ibid. 29-32, 41; Perelman 1996, 37.

¹⁵³ Summa in Palonen & Summa 1998, 66. For more on probabilities in argumentation see Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 255-260.

linguistically expressed in the research material as well as how the analysis of the probability of the asserted power is being exercised by India in world politics. The analysis of India's rhetoric moves forward chronologically in time from the beginning of the 1990s to the recent years tracing significant policy changes taking place, reflecting the developments in global power politics.

3.2.2. Facts, truths, presumptions and values in argumentation

What fundamentally interests one throughout the entire process of analysis, is what could be accepted as an argument. Therefore argumentation is always based on the presumption that adherence (of the arguments made) has some preconditions of agreement with the audience. These preconditions of agreement are based on the idea that presumptions equal normal procedure of politics (in this thesis).¹⁵⁴ These presumptions tied to common political experience and to common sense allow the author or speaker to act reasonably well in building up an argument. However, the presumptions can be contradicted by facts because the unexpected in rhetoric can never be excluded just like states' actions in politics, despite the appeal of common political experience and common sense forming a logical basis for an argument.¹⁵⁵ In analysing India's rhetoric, the unexpected arguments may pop up in the case of e.g. ad hoc interviews.

In each case presumptions are concerned with what is considered normal and likely in common political argumentation. Normal presumptions refer to a whole category (reference group) for whose benefit the presumptions were established, implying an agreement between the speaker and the audience. In other words normal presumptions and agreements are reflected in the arguments heard in political rhetoric considered to be acceptable and "appropriate" by the audience. The way in which the universal audience (defined in detail in the following subchapter) is thought of and what this audience is actually imagined to be, is a determining factor in deciding what shall be considered to be a fact alias a starting point in argumentation. For India, these are most of all the major states in world politics, and the starting point is to address them in a convincing manner. Therefore a political argument is carefully built on the prevailing facts and on the values each particular audience addressed accepts.

¹⁵⁴ Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 65.

¹⁵⁵ Perelman 1982, 25.

Truths in argumentation are applied to more complex systems relating to connections of facts. Hence, the question is not whether the presumptions are viewed as correct or false. Thus in this study there will be no judgements made in political argumentation of whether an argument is right or wrong, as the argument always comes from an independent point of view of one state. As mentioned earlier the unexpected may occur even in argumentation. In fact the relationship between presented facts and truths in an argument characterises the conceptions that various audiences form from the received rhetoric.¹⁵⁶ Additionally the most immediate effect of an argument based on a presumption is the burden of proof upon the audience or upon another speaker who wants to oppose the argument's application.¹⁵⁷ The claim of unexpected argumentation taking place further supports the typical neorealist suspicion of states acts towards other units in the system structure, in the conduct of power politics in this study. As much as political communication may be predictable, surprises and moreover unexpected action resulting from surprising argumentation can take place as discussed e.g. in relation to the security dilemma.

But then again by whom or on what terms are the presumptions of an argument based upon, as they do provide a sufficient foundation to rest a firmly held belief on? The presumptions of India's argumentation should be understood as the environment that the anarchic system structure of states and similarly functioning units cater for. In this study this refers to the analysis of India's arguments which are based on the preconditions of the realm that states' global power relations produce.

Perelman further emphasizes the "who is speaking and to whom- situation" as a function between the speaker (India) and her audience (other states). In this regard Perelman underlines the ancient concept of co-operative rhetoric as argumentation, to have a mutually agreed upon end result (between the speaker and the audience) in the case of a common goal.¹⁵⁸ Clearly, in the context of this study this evocation with the common goal aspect seems to represent a type of "taken for granted"- politics of argumentation. The language of the research material represents characteristics of the used language, i.e. diplomatic communication, typical in political rhetoric in world politics. Perelman has had to face critique with the presumed common goal herewith referring to world politics' rhetorical preconditions. As it may seem, Perelman's thesis of argumentation readily consists of how politics is conducted (a code of conduct for politics) without questioning the political

¹⁵⁶ Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 67-69, 71-72.

¹⁵⁷ Perelman 1982, 25.

¹⁵⁸ Summa in Palonen & Summa 1998, 66-67; Perelman 1982, 24-25.

rhetoric's originality, or the choice of argumentation, or their meaning.¹⁵⁹ In his defence Perelman points out that there simply are some rules of procedure in politics, thought to date back to the birth of what we know as politics in Ancient Greece, and that is the way the game is played by the IR actors. Thus the rhetoric of politics may be viewed as self-evident, merely based on presented facts and argued abstract and concrete universal values (codes of conduct), sharing the self-evident truths in an argument.¹⁶⁰ However, interestingly enough, unexpected deviations of this particular code of conduct in political rhetoric can be found in argumentation. This will indeed be demonstrated in the reviewed arguments in the analysis of India's rhetoric.

Finally, the above mentioned values and their judgements enter sooner or later into every agreement. Universal values play an important role in argumentation. They allow a speaker or an author to present specific values upon which specific groups reach agreement as more determined aspects of the universal values.¹⁶¹ Particularly in the field of law, politics and philosophy, values enter at all stages of rhetoric's development as a basis for argument. Thus, one appeals to values in order to persuade the hearer or reader to make certain choices rather than others and to justify those choices also for other's approval.¹⁶² Values are strongly represented in power politics, defining policy settings in the code of conduct of politics. From the source of argumentation: the speaker or author, I will now move on to the receiver – the audience.

3.3. The universal audience, agreements and techniques of argumentation

In the process of delivering an argument Perelman emphasizes the role of the universal (international) audience and holds a case with it: why would states in IR give analytical and strategic statements about their intentions even if the true meanings of their rhetoric are left occasionally to be interpreted between the lines? There is no point for a state to give out power political messages or signs unless there is an audience to which the message is addressed to. Argumentation is always a presentation and a statement made, consciously keeping the audience to whom it is addressed in mind, aiming to convince and/or impress the

¹⁵⁹ Palonen 1995, 15.

¹⁶⁰ Perelman 1982, 9-10, 17; Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 77-79.

¹⁶¹ Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 27.

¹⁶² Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 75.

audience with a prevailing consent.¹⁶³ Each author or speaker, such as India as a state, has its own conception of the universal audience. India's interpretation of her universal audience lies in the formulation of her arguments, as the formulation is based on the previously explained presumptions (agreed upon between the speaker and its audience). It is noteworthy to keep in mind throughout the analysis is that India's concepts of the status of the audience may vary from time to time.¹⁶⁴

An unspecified audience which Perelman names a *universal audience* is truly an appropriate term to use for the universal crowd of states in global world affairs. This is the audience which India addresses with her argumentation. Vitally important for India is for her to realize where she stands among the other states, in order to pick the right words for arguments. This also requires giving the audience a historical context and what Perelman calls a content of locality. The historical context serves as a red line throughout this study as the main cause (triggering this study) is the change in the content of locality in the post-Cold War era of IR and global power politics. Though in this context, Perelman underlines that one shall not exclusively view and generalize (political) history to be a rational process representing each world politics era's highest possible reasoning.¹⁶⁵ Moreover the universal audience should be seen as accepting each of the so-called prevailing rational values' bid posed by the speaker. This is the tool by which one can investigate whether neorealist theses may be traced in the values' bid posed by India in her rhetoric.

Contrary to the universal audience, if the audience is known to the speaker and further specified, it is called a special audience. The special audience, with its own nature of agreements, could herewith be understood as e.g. a regionally addressed audience. However, I wish to focus on the *universal audience*, keeping to a macro-level analysis and taking the broader global power political crowd into consideration as the audience of India's argumentation. The distinction made between the universal and the special audience is Perelman's way of attempting to make the difference between earlier mentioned convincing and persuasive rhetoric, an issue already debated amongst the Ancient Greek philosophers.¹⁶⁶ The universal audience is subject to appealing rational argumentation with the aim to *convince* by overcoming possible conflicts of interest and opposing factors of the audience. The specific audience then again may be subject to a more persuasive, often empirical

¹⁶³ Perelman 1982, 9, 18.

¹⁶⁴ Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 33-34.

¹⁶⁵ Summa in Summa & Palonen 1998, 67-69.

¹⁶⁶ More on the birth of rhetoric explained by Aristotle, see for instance Perelman 1982, 18-20.

argumentation appealing to e.g. common interests of the speaker and the crowd.¹⁶⁷ Thus the specific audience may better suit a micro-level research of India.

Perelman's theory of argumentation analyses the means of how reasoning and credibility of various texts are built. A distinction is made among these means into the *basis and techniques of argumentation*.¹⁶⁸ With the so-called starting point of an argument, Perelman refers to the author's or speaker's hypotheses (of facts) of how to address its audience. Value judgements define agreements, and techniques of argumentation depend on real or presumed adherence of the addressed audience¹⁶⁹. The presuppositions are also referred to as (preliminary) *agreements* which the author or speaker has with the addressed audience. These agreements are kept in mind when structuring a speech or statement. Ideally, this baseline creates a certain rhetoric which will be used for an effective outcome on the audience. This means that an author or speaker needs to "think how the audience will think" in building an argument in order to successfully orient the audience's mind with its argumentation. The sets of agreements can also be seen as proof of what is taken for real by the audience and for what is highly valued in the rhetoric and in the argument's goal as such. This is called *factual reasoning*.¹⁷⁰ While the speaker is arguing, the audience has the tendency to argue silently on its own account in order to take its own stand and to weigh the credibility meant to attach to the speaker's argument. In fact, the audience receiving the argument(s) understands them in its own way, silently modifying the final results of the argumentation through their own interpretation of the message delivered.¹⁷¹

Another method introduced by Perelman is the *technique of argumentation*. This is the resource of the used language with which an author or speaker may boost up an argument's rhetorical credibility. To be specific and not to leave too much room for interpretation, Perelman specifies that this credibility is essentially built on the speaker's or author's chosen causal relations, objective-mean -relation, illustrated examples, comparative demonstrations, metaphors and juxtapositioning in the argument. With these tools the author or speaker can adjust the arguments accordingly to the addressed audience. In India's rhetoric one can primarily see the use of the causality-factor, objective-mean relation, comparative demonstration (vis-à-vis other states) and some juxtapositioning.

¹⁶⁷ Summa in Summa & Palonen 1998, 67-69; Perelman 1982, 17. Italic added.

¹⁶⁸ Summa in Summa & Palonen 1998, 69.

¹⁶⁹ Perelman 1982, 26-27, 48.

¹⁷⁰ Summa in Summa & Palonen 1998, 69-70. Italic added.

¹⁷¹ Perelman & Obrecht-Tyteca 1969, 189.

Perelman further divides argumentation techniques into four categories: quasi-logical arguments, argumentations based on the structure of reality, argumentation of example, illustration and model as well as the dissociation (of antitheses), and comparisons. Exclusive of dissociation, as more of an original philosophical thought and comparison, the three above mentioned techniques are all associative ones. Due to their combined nature the associative techniques liaise together, establishing unity among their separate elements in argumentation. Associative and dissociative techniques are complementary and are always simultaneously at work. Their elements are tied and presented together, or alternatively already presented as a whole.¹⁷² These subcategories of argumentation techniques will be briefly covered in more detail.

3.4. Quasi-logical arguments

Quasi-logical arguments are common to formal reasoning. Characteristic to a quasi-logical argument is making arguments large-minded instead of specific. Though common to formal reasoning, one will occasionally have to take quasi-logical arguments' controversial nature into consideration. A quasi-logical argument's non-formal character requires the effort of a thought to formalize it.¹⁷³ The ultimate idea of a quasi-logical argument is that there are no absolute correct or incorrect demonstrations available to be made by the author or speaker. However, the author or speaker can back up quasi-logical arguments additionally with further arguments if needed – in this way formalizing the reasoning.¹⁷⁴ The broad-minded framework which the quasi-logical argument allows us to brainstorm in enables an author or a speaker to find himself dealing with what Perelman calls incompatibilities. This is the case in which the claim of a rule (as in the political code of conduct), assertion of a thesis or adoption of an attitude involves us (sometimes against our will). Incompatibilities can also occur in a rhetorical conflict with either previously presented thesis or rule, or with a generally accepted thesis to which the audience is expected to adhere, bringing the presumptions and agreements discussed earlier back into the picture.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² Summa in Summa & Palonen 1998, 70-71; Perelman 1982, 49-53; Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 190-191.

¹⁷³ Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 193.

¹⁷⁴ Perelman 1982, 53.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. 54.

Incompabilities are not formal, existing only in certain situations described above.¹⁷⁶ In India's rhetoric incompabilities may be dressed into quasi-logical arguments in relation to India's capacity of creating and absorbing a power status. In order to solve an incompability, a state may take action for a feasible solution. In a politically conflictual situation or in likely situations of tension India may be forced, when facing such conflict, to argue which rule (of political procedure¹⁷⁷) it will follow and which one of the available solutions may be yield up or at least ruled out for that occasion to avoid loosing its prestige. In analysis it will be shown that there are traces of these choices made, particularly demonstrated in India's argumentation vis-à-vis her rivalries in the context of assuring its prestige. Incompabilities force a state to make a difficult choice, which usually includes a sacrifice – also known as an unfeasible compromise. Perelman refers to above described types of incompabilities as *autophagia*, and calls *retort* an argument which attacks a rule making autophagia evident^{178, 179}.

From different attitudes arising from autophagia, the *diplomatic attitude* appears to complement best the analysis of India. As one may presume, in the power game of politics in IR, a state would not want to sacrifice a rule or show an incompability at an awkward time. Instead, a state would try diplomatically to arrange and solve an incompability in a delicate manner so that the conflictual issue does not show itself, and the issue dealt with does not have to be brought to other states' knowledge nor attention. In this relation it is notable that the associative argument technique known as *diplomatic sickness* can be diagnosed when delays in making a disagreeable choice or a painful (political) sacrifice occur at the cost of a lie in a conflict between two incompatible principles in a particular situation.¹⁸⁰ This poses the question of the price of a state's prestige: what it may be at different times when acute decisions need to be made or when one's opinion needs to be addressed instantly? Furthermore, what may be the cost having to be paid by a state which is known by its effects? Prestige is rightfully known to influence arguments. Nonetheless, for a state, avoiding any incompability in the moment at hand can create new and more serious ones in the future¹⁸¹. Avoidance of an incompability even in rhetoric is clearly not an option to exercise in power politics, at least most likely not to be a beneficial one if aiming for any kind of balance of power.

¹⁷⁶ Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 197, 200.

¹⁷⁷ The nature or the characteristics, in which the rules or procedures "applicable" are described, determine whether they appear compatible or not. Then again, the rule or procedure may become incompatible depending on the conditions or consequences of their assertion or application.

¹⁷⁸ Perelman 1982, 57.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. 55-57, 94-95.

¹⁸⁰ Perelman 1982, 59-60; Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 198. Italic added.

¹⁸¹ Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 201.

Furthermore, Perelman features transitivity, inclusion and division as types of quasi-logical argumentation. Especially transitivity allows for some food of thought when applying it in this study. Loosely described by Perelman as the formal property of a relationship: if a certain relationship exists between states A and B, between B and C, then the relationship also exists between A and C. The nature of this formal property remains nonetheless precarious – again resembling the suspicious nature of neorealist thought, touching the concept of the balance of power.¹⁸² This type of quasi-logical argumentation is interesting to measure: to see whether transitivity appears in India's relations to other power states, and whether there are any logical conclusions to be made from India's hypothetical friends, and whether friends of the hypothetical friends could also be India's friends (and how genuine at that). The precarious and iffy nature of the relationship between B and C is a supportive reflection of the neorealist frame I am generally analysing India's arguments in.

Inclusion is a type of argumentation seen ruled out in this study, as Perelman states that "[...] inclusion of a part in the whole allows us to say that the whole is greater than any of its parts"¹⁸³.¹⁸⁴ This claim also applies to Perelman's division of argument. In the scale of this study's macro-level analysis and the broad-minded nature of quasi-logical arguments, single parts of India's arguments do indeed form a whole. Yet the parts are considered to be just as independent and significant to be taken into consideration as the whole. The inclusion of the whole is, finally, what results from the analysis of all the arguments included in the research material.¹⁸⁵

Concerning weights, measures and probabilities, these quasi-mathematical as well as quasi-logical aspects of argumentation are supported by verification.¹⁸⁶ Winning and losing in an argument of an uncertain or certain nature is all relative. Here, it is not useful to go into much analysis of the probabilities of mathematical nature. They may be left alone for a further research task in a future study. However, as I have mentioned earlier, the analysed rhetoric of politics is merely about certain probabilities rather than certainties, as one cannot know for sure what will occur next in argumentation despite the guiding code of conduct, agreements and presumptions made in the rational political realm or world affairs.

¹⁸² Perelman 1982, 70; Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 227-231.

¹⁸³ Perelman 1982, 71.

¹⁸⁴ More on inclusion of an argument see Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 231-242.

¹⁸⁵ More on division of argument can be found in Perelman 1982, 73-75.

¹⁸⁶ Perelman 1982, 77-79.

3.5. Argumentation based on the structure of reality

The previously described quasi-logical arguments require support from arguments which are based on the *structure of reality*. Trying to make a point concerning particularly political rhetoric, Perelman expresses the core of this attempt in the following.

“As soon as elements of reality are associated with each other in a recognized liaison, it is possible to use this liaison as the basis for an argumentation which allows us to pass from what is accepted to what we wish to have accepted (adhered)”.¹⁸⁷

Hence, arguments based on the structure of reality use the structure to establish solidarity between accepted judgements and other judgements which one wishes to promote among the audience.¹⁸⁸ The weight of the structure of reality is very much present in India’s rhetorical arguments, and in this fashion India structures its convincing appeal(s) to the audience concerning arguments it wishes to be accepted.

Perelman lays out two different types of liaisons: *liaisons of succession* and *liaisons of coexistence*. The liaison of succession is known as the relationship between the principle of argumentation and argumentation’s consequences. To understand the meaning of (liaisons of) succession one needs to start from the claim of a causal link between phenomena taking place in reality, argumentation directed toward search for causes of the phenomena, the determination of effects of the phenomena, and the evaluation of a fact by its consequences. In intentional acts determining the cause goes hand in hand with determining the motive for the action in argumentation. Thus argumentation is clearly a causal act. A simple example of the liaison of succession is demonstrated in the case of India announcing its nuclear test, Pokhran II, in 1998¹⁸⁹. In this event one can see that the cause (becoming a nuclear state) determined the action undertaken which was intentional: aiming for the universal audience to show more respect towards India and take India more seriously through its power political demonstration of capabilities (motive for action). This proves that an argument stemming from consequences seems to be so obvious that it needs no justification per se.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. 81.

¹⁸⁸ Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 261.

¹⁸⁹ Vajpayee 1998.

¹⁹⁰ Perelman 1982, 83.

Furthermore, a so-called pragmatic argument based on the structure of reality allows one to assess a fact through its consequences. There is no justification needed for the argument to be accepted by common sense amongst the audience. Thereby the truth of the fact can only be judged by its effects.¹⁹¹

3.5.1. Liaison of succession and liaison of coexistence

Returning to the once mentioned means- objective, in the liaison of succession the means only have a relative value depending on the value assigned to them in a quasi-logical argument. It may sometimes transform the means into more subjective rather than objective ones arguments. Effective means in an argument allow one to realise a rhetorical desire and to give the desire a sufficient enough stability to transform it into an end result, e.g. through actions based on an argument made. This could be interpreted in India's acts of nuclear tests, which were powerful enough to make the ends of India's argumentation means and vice versa.¹⁹² Summing up the so far explained structure of reality, I quote Perelman once again to clarify the explanations of the two liaisons.

*“While liaison of succession joins elements of the same nature, such as events and phenomena which are linked by a causal connection, the liaison of coexistence establishes a tie between realities on unequal level; one is shown to be the expression or manifestation of the other. Such are the relations between a person and his action, his attitudes and his works”.*¹⁹³

In a quasi-logical argument a liaison of coexistence connects the essence (substance) and its manifestations, in which the order of elements in time is not of primary importance¹⁹⁴. Perelman's argument above rightfully offers the opportunity to play with the idea that India would to be the person (unit) described in the above quote. Therefore, what shall be examined are India's relations with other persons (states) through its rhetorical manifestations laid out in arguments and in the attitudes built into these arguments. In the series of coexistence, it depends on how one views causal succession in the coexisting aspect of the 'act-consequence'- relation or 'means-end'-relation of an argument. Both relations wish to minimize an argument's effect in which it is enough to present the coexisting relation as a consequence, or if wishing to enhance the relations' importance it should be presented as an end.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹¹ Perelman 1982, 81-83; Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 264-267.

¹⁹² Ibid. 85-87.

¹⁹³ Ibid. 89-90.

¹⁹⁴ Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 293.

¹⁹⁵ Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 271.

Aiming to stress the importance of an act and its influence (consequences) upon the image of the acts' originator is what Perelman calls techniques of restraint in argumentation. Are India's arguments delivered on behalf of the country actually reflecting what herewith is understood by its (materialized) acts? In this regard, how do acts influence the (universal) audience's concept¹⁹⁶ of India? These issues will be considered in the conclusions. Contributing to the good or bad reputation which India carries amidst its audience is not only India's arguments but also its acts. Thus one cannot totally ignore the historical context of rhetoric - historical contexts influences the arguments made by today's India to some extent not only India's audience's conception of it. This is because some of India's promoted values are founded on her history and especially on the time of becoming independent. Additionally, how India expresses her stand or opinion in some political issues undeniably influences the way the audience receives India's messages.¹⁹⁷ This aspect should not be underestimated. As a result, liaison of coexistence also establishes a connection between historical essence and the acts which are an argument's manifestations, i.e. between (historical) periods from which the current arguments arise.¹⁹⁸

3.5.2. Arguing by example and illustration

Finally, a somewhat less theoretical demonstration of an argument is understood when explaining argumentation by example, illustration and model. To argue by an example is to assume the existence of certain regularities in arguments of which the examples provide a concrete reference to¹⁹⁹. In other words, political rhetoric supposes that there are certain regularities in the code of political conduct amongst the audience of politics. Examples as much as illustrations and sometimes even models appear in political argumentation with the role of boosting up the message delivered to the audience. The goal of examples and illustrations is to clarify the act (of an argument) with the help and support of this. The examples chosen to be used in an argument shall understandably play a role of incontestable support to the rhetoric, calling upon the basis of the conclusion of an argument.²⁰⁰ However, when studying India's rhetoric, India's argumentation introduces few examples and illustrations over the past 15 years.

¹⁹⁶ With 'concept', I wish to refer to Kari Palonen's notion of concept. Palonen underlines that concepts are not true or false, right or wrong, good or bad. (Palonen 1994 14-15, 20, 50.)

¹⁹⁷ Perelman 1982, 93, 96-98.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. 99-100.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. 106.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. 107-108.

The difference between an example and an illustration is a fine line in cases in which a rule in an argument is justified before being illustrated. First, the argued examples need to be generally accepted, as their role is to give the rule (referring to the code of conduct in politics) credibility. The 21st century India's argumentation includes examples such as building collective security through different examples presented in the framework of the United Nations (UN). Furthermore, the illustrations in arguments support the rules' credibility by providing some examples which clarify the general argument made. Illustrations attract attention to various applications of the arguments made and increase their presence in the consciousness of the audience.²⁰¹ For instance, these kinds of illustrations are used to support India's engagements to collective measures undertaken to strengthen security.

Moving onto the following chapter, I will use these above explained concepts of Perelman's new rhetoric as the methodological tools of the analysis.

²⁰¹ Ibid. 108; Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969, 357.

4. The Power of India in rhetorical analysis

4.1. Analysis Overview

Next, I will analyse India's power politics on a global scale and test whether the earlier presented theoretical framework of neorealism stands in a rhetorical analysis. The focus of analysis relies on neorealism's four key concepts: anarchy, self-help, balance of power and (India's) capabilities, and on whether these appear in the rhetoric. The stand point of this analysis is to review the selected rhetorical samples of India's policy outlines in a chronological order. The research material consists of interviews, speeches and statements representing India's arguments to the universal audience addressing her (power) role in world affairs.

In the beginning of the 1990s India had to unexpectedly adapt to changing power relations in the world. The analysis is divided into different époques which are dealt in a chronological order. This division reflects the change in India's overall policy outlines in international politics since the end of the Cold War based on the internal changes taking place while respective governments rule the country in its path of liberalization. With this particular division, the aim is to emphasize the strength of India's argumentation of her power position.

To support the neorealist test in India's power policy, Paul & Nayar endorse the study of security behaviour of a state as systemic in international affairs. This approach encourages going forward with the fundamental purpose and analysis of this thesis which is testing and using neorealism as a framework for analysis of a state's (power) causal behaviour which aims to secure the state's best possible existence. Paul & Nayar claim that neorealism's tension in relation to other alternative theory approaches of analysing IR and India are indeed unavoidable. Though, one could claim neorealism's success to have decreased in the recent years. Despite often being subject to criticism among scholars in IR, the accomplishments of the system approach are twofold. Firstly, tracing the different "careers" of international systems such as the post-Cold War era and secondly analysing the system's characteristics: showing how the system structure affects the interacting units and how they in turn affect the structure.²⁰² In the following analysis, I will look at the direction of the post-Cold War world of power politics and view how India is affected by the changes of the system structure of these power politics.

²⁰² Waltz 1979, 38-41.

4.2. 1991-1996: Coping with drastic changes while developing a dream

In 1991 India was forced, due to global power shifts, to take action in its policies steering the country into a new direction. The power shifts taking place in IR worldwide meant the USSR²⁰³ falling apart and the U.S. engaging into the Gulf War. This resulted in India considerably loosening out on foreign oil which it depended on as at the time the prices of oil had shot up. Geopolitically thought, the Gulf region proves to have strategic as well as political importance to India during the post-Cold War years.²⁰⁴ During the Cold War era India was “thrown” into the arms of the Soviet Union. This happened in response to the U.S. moves in the American power game in Asia and because of the U.S. support to India’s rivals Pakistan and China. As a result India fell into the Soviet camp. Despite being the world’s largest democracy and primarily a non-aligned advocate, India ended up with this side on several global issues in the then bipolar world.²⁰⁵ In 1991 with the Soviet Union diminishing India lost its most important strategic military capabilities’ market. This also meant a break in India’s ties with the Cold War’s opposing power pole, as well as with the socialist world.

In the rapidly changing and difficult political environment, India was up to its neck in foreign debt in the early 1990s. At the end of the Cold War and in the new power polarized world affairs, a unipolar (the U.S.) power distribution collided with another major significant and influential worldwide phenomenon. This was the rapidly spreading economic liberalization (globalization) leading to a capitalist-led global market. India had a lot to deal with at the time, being the least open market of the potential developing world powers-to-be. India’s market was now to expand globally at the cost of the state, subject to reforms to suit to the economic liberalization. The painful adaption process to the new world order was the only option available to assure survival in the new world order. One could say that India literally shifted directly from internal bankruptcy to international economic liberalization. This shift took place due to the acknowledgement of having to do so as well yet accompanied by reluctant will.²⁰⁶

²⁰³ United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

²⁰⁴ Embassy of India 1997.

²⁰⁵ Mohan 2006a, 19.

²⁰⁶ Nayar & Paul 2003, 205.

Regretfully, due to the lack of first hand rhetoric samples available to conduct research over the first years of India's changed political track, I will instead focus on the implications of the pursuit of India's power. This is done within think-tank's texts and in other studies produced in the early 1990s. A broader view of what actually happened in India leading her to take steps to become a hypothetical power will also serve as a solid foundation to base in-depth methodological analysis on.

4.2.1. Entry into a liberalized new world order

Elections held in 1991 brought the leftish, liberal Congress party into power even though it did not reach majority representation in the parliament. The crucial mission of adapting to the new world order was trusted to the then Prime Minister²⁰⁷ P.V. Narasimha Rao, who saw the major economic crisis fall into his hands. Globalization seemed far-fetched for the extremely regulated "license raj"²⁰⁸ state which India still was. Avoiding reforms would to some extent result in economic isolation. Nevertheless Rao was determined to avoid isolation. Shifting from state-socialism, which India had watched work in the Soviet Union, to modern capitalism seemed even more of an alien idea for Indians to deal with. Politically Rao tried to accomplish what was considered to be an overall strategy of seeking constructive engagement with the then major powers: the U.S., the Russian Federation (newly established heritor of the USSR), and China. This meant preventing any provocation and confrontation with these powers and avoiding taking an ideological stand vis-à-vis to them. Primary interests and goals of India's government, representing neorealist goals, were self-reliance and ensuring a stronger defence after bringing the country back to economic function.²⁰⁹ In 1991-1992, India had to finally come to terms with the world states' new system structure. This meant giving up the balancing in-between the Cold War's two power poles with her idealist liaison of coexistence among the non-aligned and as the general Third World's advocate claiming to be free from East-West dividend politics. India, now able to somewhat express will and desire for a power status, was willing to cope with the changed international system structure and wanted to express self-sufficiency (free from a bipolar power setting) which was of extreme strategic importance to the state. As in the course of the analysis can be seen, self-help in particular is a rhetorical value included in the majority of India's argumentation.

²⁰⁷ Hereinafter referred to as PM.

²⁰⁸ "License raj" is a commonly term used of government quotas, tariffs and permit regulations on economic activity.

²⁰⁹ Indian National Congress Party: Salient Points of Previous Manifestos 1991-1996.

In economic terms, financially India had no other choice than to swallow her pride as a traditionally neutral, non-aligned and self-sufficient state and against its principles turn to the Western capitalist-led IMF²¹⁰ to obtain an emergency loan in order to get back on her feet. This mirrored the turning point of India as it was a question of relative gain through a loan but enabled India to revive its self-reliance again. The idea of being part of modern capitalism became in fact a considerable capability, and a concrete value for India to develop, foster, and to rest its power on. The economic liberalization even became the principle national objective leading the country's foreign policy setting, especially as the government finally acknowledged the disadvantaged position India was in by comparison to other developing Asian states. Today India seems to be on track as the then Minister of Finance - current PM Manmohan Singh is still acting as an ambassador for the direction set in the early 1990s, gradually pursuing India's economic growth.

In the early 1990s India did not have a clear universal audience, at least not any significant listeners among the major states of the time. India was among the universal audience of global powers acknowledging arguments made on the current world affairs. The new realist cognition of India taking independent steps on her own liberalized path meant that India slowly but firmly realized her own power potential. This happened by positively developing India's economic growth, restructuring foreign relations - most of all with the dominant major states. India also began to hope that the economic growth would eventually lead it to a seat around the same table with the other pre-existing major powers. Opportunities were there as India had as a sovereign state always been a democracy, and most importantly merely committed to Western political values outside the Euro-Atlantic world even if shifting into the opposing Soviet camp during the bipolar Cold War. Even after adopting the liberalized policies India had difficulty to accept the need for these reforms and feared for traditions' survival and her freedom of choice when being exposed to the global market.²¹¹ At the time of the adoption of liberalized economic policies, India began to think broader than before and considered transitivity in her rhetoric as well as acts in trying to politically engage with the global power states.

4.2.2. Case for power - India in the process of selecting supporting facts and values

Once reforms were adopted and India was ushered into a world of globalization, the initially painful reforms did indeed have magnificent short-term implications. New liberalized

²¹⁰ International Monetary Fund (IMF).

²¹¹ Nayar & Paul 2003, 209-210; Mohan 2006a, 2-3; van der Veen 2006, 8.

regulations were imposed with little resistance by 1993 when the acute economic crisis seemed to be over, and the pace of policy restructuring had slowed down. The lack of active public resistance must signal that more and more policy-makers were starting to accept the new, even if unknown and uncertain direction that India was heading towards. Generally speaking India seemed to share the agreements and presumptions which the code of conduct in international politics contained in the new world order. These facts meant opening up to the world and “going global” in rhetoric as well as in action. India’s political rhetoric was from this point on tied to the arguments including hints of facts and values, such as cherishing the economic liberalization taking place. Hence it did not seem detrimental to let go of the idealist view which previously nourished the country, in exchange with the capitalist mode and more realist conduct of politics.

Having more or less stabilized the country’s economic situation, the Congress-led government did not carry out further reforms running up to 1996. This moderate push for further development might have been a move which in fact saved India from becoming absorbed into the vacuum of the Asian financial crisis towards the end of the 1990s. Status quo was endorsed after the crisis seemed to be over although the idea of enhancing India’s power potential in the future was at the time developed between the lines of rhetoric.²¹² Though no new major policy initiatives were pursued as internal efforts of growing power, on the foreign and security policy front India did actively negotiate security-related disarmament treaties i.e. at the Conference of Disarmament during 1995-1996. One of the first landmarks of Indian power politics was its opposition to the CTBT²¹³, resulting in discontent from the U.S.

Disarmament, representing vital notions of security in a neorealist realm, is repeated as a concrete value which India endorses throughout its rhetoric. It is also a very important component of India’s overall security rhetoric, which stresses the abstract value of pursued peace and prosperity. However, the CTBT would prove to be a loop-holed treaty compromising India’s national security if the much debated discriminatory order was to be removed from the treaty. Quoting from India’s statement made in June 1996:

*“[...] we cannot accept that it is legitimate for some countries to possess nuclear weapons while denying the right to others [...] under such circumstances it is natural that our national security considerations become the key factor in our decision-making”.*²¹⁴

²¹² van der Veen 2006, 7-8.

²¹³ Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

²¹⁴ Ghose 1996.

The above quotation was chosen in order to demonstrate India's immense concern over its national security. After all, India's rival neighbour is a nuclear state, Pakistan. By making this statement India is emphasizing the legitimacy of possessing arms on an unequal basis which naturally results in a strategic imbalance in states' (military) capabilities, potentially leading to unbalanced power between states. In the East, China's nuclear tests during the summer of 1996 on the eve of closing the CTBT negotiations did not contribute to India's willingness to sign the treaty either.²¹⁵ India's will and knowledge of argumentation mirrored as determination and assurance come out clear in the argumentation made against the incoherent factual reasoning (from India's point of view) of the fairness of possessing nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal of the CTBT, learning from the lessons of the Cold War's arms race, was to avoid world states been pushed for one reason or another to the edge of nuclear deterrence. India's opposition did make a fundamental difference to the treaty that was being negotiated as India had conducted a strategic nuclear test already in 1974, and by doing so gaining prestige, credibility and a status of a potential (military) power.

The fact that the U.S. had embraced India's archrival Pakistan in the 1950s and viewed India in the framework of the legacy of the USSR did not make confidence and relationship building with the major world power and the possible allies of the U.S. much easier for India.²¹⁶ Yet it was important to India to make an effort by doing so. Eventually it took only a couple of years to build up a somewhat cordial relationship, as in 1998 the U.S. began paying detailed attention to India as a potential major power. By that time India had managed to orient the minds of her universal audience not only through rhetoric but through her acts. The co-existing states in the post-Cold War system structure welcomed India as a contributing unit, taking into account its size and potential volume in various ways. This was especially the case in India's immediate neighbourhood. On the global scale, India engaged actively in the international community e.g. by deploying some troops into several countries as part of the United Nations peacekeeping missions. By doing so India supported the globally prevailing rhetoric of collective security.²¹⁷ Strategically thought India's small neighbours, also members of ASEAN²¹⁸, were now glad to have India hopefully at their disposal to counterbalance the strongly emerging China and other major states that had or had had occupancy in the region based on the structure of their rhetoric reality. By opening up to the world India became indeed

²¹⁵ Udgaonkar 1999.

²¹⁶ Ayoob 1999, 28.

²¹⁷ Indian National Congress Party: Salient Points of Previous Manifestos 1991-1996.

²¹⁸ Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

a significant balancer of power in Asia looking East, and a potential power centre in the region vis-à-vis (socialist) China.²¹⁹

In summary, the course India took in the early 1990s was a course of adaption and of persistence trying to silently “hang in there” in regional and global affairs. India mostly focused on developing her capabilities in various terms: the state’s power potential first from the inside through internal efforts towards the outside continuing with external efforts. Taking into account India’s size, the population needs at all times to be kept satisfied in order to pursue further goals engaging abroad. Also, notably there was no such tradition in publishing policy outlines in great detail during the Cold War in India. Due to liberalization, policy outlines needed to be given out in order to argue one’s competitiveness to the universal audience in the new global order. India’s ruling Congress party’s manifestation of 1991-1996 is full of traces of clearly stated neorealist concepts of capacity and capabilities’ building of India. These points are argued in abstract as well as concrete values based on factual reasoning of India’s acts undertaken on the road of development. International politics’ normal presumptions (code of conduct) are acknowledged in India’s rhetoric, and India speaks out on global issues – with her own voice. In the IR system structure of the 1990s, the shift away from a bipolar world took place without the thought-to-be hegemony, the U.S., becoming an exclusive authority of rule in the system structure of world states. Despite this change in the system structure’s power composition anarchy did not vanish. This also reflects the fact that the universal audiences’ certain adherence of arguments, coming from a claimed-to-be changing India, would not be changed overnight. At this point India could still be thought of being simply a unit, not making too much of a difference, among other units in the system.

India having moved towards the realist thought of policy conduct, and being on its own from the previously Soviet-influenced policy outlines, the state had to directly face the balance of power for the first time. This meant opening up and as mentioned previously being happily welcomed as a *balancer* by its immediate neighbourhood, as the security environment of Asia needed her to act as one. Indeed, India did engage in the name of self-help (of developing relations with other units) with regional rival and strategic border neighbour China, taking a concrete and strategic step in her immediate neighbourhood to begin its role as a balancer.²²⁰

²¹⁹ van der Veen 2006, 10–12.

²²⁰ Mistry 2004, 75.

India's economic liberalization and success in implementing implied reforms can be seen as building soft power capability on which India first of all sought to survive and then further develop her power stance in the dynamic power environment of the post-Cold War era. In comparison to prior research one could say that India did not make such a convincing appearance in the regional and world power games as several think-tanks may have argued. In the early 1990s silent and modest power rhetoric of India can be seen, as the country was observing the changed world adopting the prevailing codes of conduct in politics. The process of adapting to the world order's change shaped India's presence in global power politics in this époque.

4.3. 1996-1998 Nationalism enters the power quest with rhetoric of self-interest

By 1996 the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had grown remarkably strong. Previously dominant Congress party was viewed secular in outlook leading to a separate political Hindu party being established and renamed as BJP in the beginning of the 1990s, consisting mainly of upper cast Hindus.²²¹ This was a result of PM Rajiv Gandhi's murder (Congress) in 1989 which resulted in the change of Indian politics and rapidly forced adaption of economic liberalization. The Congress' reform rhetoric put India to foreign exposure and the unknown consequences of such argumentation was too much for many Indians to cope with. In the 1996 elections BJP celebrated as the winner except in the parliament, yet a BJP-led government was in power for only 12 days. Finally a coalition of 13 parties was established and the government became known as the BJP/National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition. The coalition was eventually accused of lack of transparency in its policy implementation. Until 1996 the forces of liberalization were working slowly but firmly, steering growing international commercial interest towards India. The Congress now feared whether the BJP/NDA government would continue those efforts initiated during the first half of the decade.

4.3.1. Continuity vs. change?

The first speech subject to this analysis was delivered in October 1996 by the Minister of External Affairs, I.K.Gujral, who initiated his own remarkable foreign policy known as the Gujral Doctrine. This first piece of primary rhetoric was delivered at the Council for Foreign Relations in New York, the U.S., where a truly universal audience was addressed. By October

²²¹ van der Veen 2006, 28–29.

1996 the new government had held office only for four months, yet the discussion of Indian foreign relations in the global scenario had become important. This growing interest towards India's relations with other major states is why this particular sample of rhetoric was chosen.

Starting from the ideological interpretation and analysis, India made a clear comment to the changes taking place in the system structure after the end of the Cold War era. Regionalism as a variable of IR was in high regard in the 1990s after the change of the system structure occurring, reflecting the vanished bipolarity. Despite the think-tank backing data, of arguments of India having fallen into the Socialist camp, India now presented herself with a relentless non-aligned image. Hanging on to the sphere of non-alignment India took her power political stand by describing its values as pointed out in the following quote.

*"India had never believed in the Cold War ethics. We were resolutely opposed to those forces that sought to align the world into competing and adversarial camps. The end of the Cold War and dramatic developments, changing the relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States, changes of governments and the systems of governance in Eastern Europe and the positive interaction between Russia and China, have opened up new vistas for Indian foreign policy. We have restructured our policies to encompass these changes, without losing continuity and balance, while firmly safeguarding our interests."*²²²

Despite previously being linked to the former USSR in terms of important trade and other strategic aspects, India claims to have always operated as an independent unit. Main drivers in India's arguments, selected facts and values in argumentation, rest on the historical goals of Gandhian and Nehruvian perspectives. Peace, disarmament, self-reliance, non-alignment and development being the bedrock's of India's relations with other states.²²³ These facts and values are rather strong reflections of neorealist theses, literally safeguarding India's interests in order to survive in the new post-Cold War world order. Less meaningful for a unit's representation in the system structure but essential in understanding India more is the rhetorical element of consensus on vital foreign policy issues, in order to overcome party connections including political parties, diplomats, academics and opinion-makers alike all of which are also keystones for India's development. Supporting the earlier interpretation and assertion of India's "Look West" policy Gujral argues:

*"India's foreign policy has assumed a positive outward orientation with new policy initiatives aimed at consolidating traditional relationships, developing new relationships with countries and regions where We have vital strategic interests, a greater emphasis on economic dimensions in foreign policy, on the need to revitalize the Non-aligned Movement and to reform and restructure the UN to better reflect the aspirations of the developing countries."*²²⁴

²²² Gujral 1996.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

At this point India was pushing for the restructuring of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in front of a major international audience in the U.S., knowing that this address of hers be observed with much curiosity amongst the universal audience. Furthermore, the above statement is fundamental in building India's relations globally in order to gain more influence in power politics. The economic angle is strongly incorporated in this view, expressing India's soft power capacity of her external efforts of gaining power. Bearing in mind that India did not have a habit of announcing its policy outlines, this above rhetoric can be considered to be to some extent ground-breaking in India's path of becoming a potential power. This is expressed in the objectives and means of the argumentation.

In 1996 there were few examples or illustrations of concrete policy outlines presented hence the universal audience most likely had no expectations of India's actions as yet, assuming India's rhetoric to have followed normal presumptions of the code of conduct in global politics. Notably in the mid-1990s India was still primarily considered to be a developing country. India had not had the capacity to maximize its volume potential to its greatest in order to be considered a major power among the others. However, with India's focus of boosting up its bilateral relationships to enable its potential to materialize, this meant having to address conflict-prone relations, such as the relationship with Pakistan. In the East, China had a great influence on India's economic and security interests, both variables of a hard power capability and abstract values in India's rhetoric.

*"India attaches the highest importance to developing cordial and friendly relations with her neighbours [...] we wish Pakistan all the best and have suggested the resumption of foreign secretary-level dialogue to address all issues of mutual concern. [...] As Chairman of the South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation (SAARC) it would be our endeavour to promote multi-faceted co-operation in all spheres with our neighbours."*²²⁵

The new multi-track as well as multilateral policy initiatives can be understood as India engaging regionally and with its fundamentally important neighbours. The above presented argument is also based on rhetorical structure of reality and a fact: geography predetermining India having close and cooperative relationship with its immediate neighbourhood. We can also see the argumentation technique of factual reasoning becoming obvious. India seems to endorse the idea of agreeing to CBMs²²⁶ structuring her rhetoric in the fragile security environment India operates in and has to deal with. With this argument India wishes to support the assertions of her small neighbours, of India coming to balance the power setting hoping to positively modify the regional power positioning with its means. In this regard,

²²⁵ Gujral 1996.

²²⁶ Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs).

cooperative measures seem more beneficial to pursue for India in enhancing national security and power in the region. India replies with the presented rhetoric to the presumptions made by its ASEAN-neighbours orienting their minds further to the favour of the audience as well as to herself. This results in a strategically significant step of being admitted as a full dialogue partner to ASEAN after engaging in a Sectoral Dialogue since 1992, and being a member of ASEAN's Regional Forum from 1996²²⁷.

This regional security engagement formed the foundation of the Gujral doctrine. The regional grouping steered India's motive for economic growth and achieving prosperity. The doctrine's rhetoric, as a quasi-logical argument underlining transitivity, renounces India's right to demand a favour or advantage for responding positively and generously to the vital economic and security concerns of its small neighbours. India believes that no South Asian sovereign state should compromise its territorial integrity. For India, the special case of Pakistan was also included in the rhetoric of the Gujral doctrine.²²⁸ The rhetoric and acts of active regional cooperative engagement reflect a conceptualised and methodological attempt to place India in the core of the entire Asia-Pacific region and global affairs with a liaison of succession in argumentation. This kind of rhetoric reflects the pre-selection made of hints and facts of India's policy setting. Firstly, India aims to develop her stance in the South Asian region realizing her balancing power potential compared to China thanks to responding to the arguments of the structure of reality posed by India's small neighbours which realized her power potential (before India herself acknowledged this). This engaging and cooperative rhetoric of strategically expanding India's ties to the East as much as to West became dominant from 1996 onwards. The relative gain in India's cooperative engagement and overall development, primarily in economic terms was thanks to this rhetoric.

In 1996 India hid her ambitions from the public regarding the concept of power on the global power scale. Having faith in the UN, India's quest for power reached up to the UNSC, as the quote below shows. It reflects the power that India wants to achieve and the importance that is given to UN's influence in channelling that power, if the targeted power position is reached. Thus, the universal audience needs to be addressed in a convincing manner.

"The representation of developing countries in the Security Council, both as permanent and non-permanent members has to be substantially augmented. Convinced of the support of others, we have expressed our readiness to serve as a permanent member of the expanded UN Security Council. On any objective criteria some countries would qualify for being permanent members of

²²⁷ Embassy of India 1997.

²²⁸ Gujral 1997a ; Ayoob 1999, 30; Sen Gupta 1997, 308-310.

the Security Council. It is our belief that India would be among them. [...] Effective global security today demands a universal approach."²²⁹

This argument of India being a UNSC member candidate appears far-fetched from reality at this time. However, India had been offered a seat when the institutional security body was being set up. In order to cater for the era's challenges in the post-Cold War world, it seems as if the above rhetoric would be an attempt (of many) to give the universal audience a historical context and content of locality when demanding a universal approach to the reform of the UNSC. Yet, at the dawn of the Asian financial crisis India did not have the credible potential to have its appeal adhered to in the universal audience's mind. It was too early to accept a developing country to the table of hard core global powers. Before even pleading further factual reasoning of her power potential, India had to focus on Gujral's underlined economic revitalization before being considered for the major powers company.

4.3.2. The emergence of multilateralism in the Indian thought

Samples of India's rhetoric in 1997 are an address and a speech, both delivered by the External Affairs' Minister I.K. Gujral in different contexts underlining the then trendy focus in international politics on regionalism. The mutual denominator of these speeches is the previously mentioned regional forum ASEAN, where India wanted to activate herself economically as well as strategically. Both samples represent the entry of multilateralism into Indian policies with other major powers.

Addressing an audience at a Centre for International Studies in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Gujral enlightens further aspects of India's foreign policy. He continues to stress in detail the importance of the NAM and its reinvigoration along with the restructuring of the UN system. The goal is to strengthen the structure of international cooperation in the era of new challenges and increasing global economic competitiveness. This is justified by the argument in a "one for all" philosophy of NAM.

*"Today, more than ever, there is need for the developing countries of the world to have a much greater voice within the councils of the UN. The Non-Aligned Movement too needs be reinvigorated. Together, we seek a renewed commitment to multilateralism, a new international partnership for economic development and co-operation against terrorism. We also seek a more peaceful and secure world for all through genuine and comprehensive disarmament including the total elimination of nuclear weapons."*²³⁰

For India, strengthening the NAM is fundamentally about claiming for her freedom and sovereign equality in the international system of the global powers. The benefit of acting in a

²²⁹ Gujral 1996.

²³⁰ Gujral 1997a.

collective style is emphasized and convincingly demonstrated in the rhetoric by building the credibility of the argument on the causal relations supporting the supposed assertions. The above argument is an objection made by India to be swamped into the strategic games of the major powers and is India's manifesto -an assertion as such.²³¹ As a promoter of pursuing this kind of constructive engagement (NAM), India seems a little lost in how to emphasize her own power alone on the global scale. India is thus looking towards the international community and to whether the community could contribute to India's development through economic and security co-operation by tying down potential rivals through careful multilateralism. This is how Gujral argues India to have found its rightful place on the international politics' arena. Contributing to the concept of units coexisting in the system structure, Gujral's argument below leans again towards the Gandhian idea of peaceful cooperation being the key to success towards prosperity.

*"I am firmly of the view that these are the very principles that should form the basis of an international order where different nations have to co-exist and cooperate to build a better future for our coming generations."*²³²

Coexistence is exactly what is sought after in the anarchic system, and India's rhetoric on the international order acknowledges this in the post-Cold War era, reflecting what India sees as her rhetorical India's structure of reality.

Gujral emphasizes the implications of the changed system structure influencing the units like India. In addition to his doctrine Gujral argues that India has to focus on building her relations with the new set ups of the major powers listed as the U.S., Russia, the EU (regarded as an equivalent unit to a state in the system) and Japan in extending her influence in her external neighbourhood. China is only mentioned in the context of India's participation in the ASEAN which in fact seems to be the primary forum for India and China to interact in.²³³ India's vision of a significant strategic influence now reaches from the Indian Ocean rim to the Gulf region and Central Asia, as well as to the Asia-Pacific. The rhetoric of India's expanded strategic significance in the above mentioned areas is based on the Nehruvist identity of India. This rhetoric of an "Asian-Indian" identity dates back half a century and thus gives the audience a historical context in which to place the argument with a notion of what Perelman called content of locality.

²³¹ Bajpal 2000, 11.

²³² Gujral 1997a.

²³³ Ibid.

*"We are of Asia and the peoples of Asia are nearer and closer to us than others. India is so situated that she is the pivot of western, southern, and of South-East Asia. In the past, her culture flowed to all these countries and they came to her in many ways [...]."*²³⁴

The argument above is based on factual reasoning, on India's rational realm and on geographical reality. It is not to underestimate that India would not have her justified say in the extended region. After all, several millions of migrants in the Gulf had to deal with India's economic turmoil in 1991 by returning back home as the Gulf war broke out in the region. Furthermore, the Indian diasporas near as further afield is a sizable one, with ability to influence. The oil ties and the strategic relationship between India and Israel as well as with Russia not to mention South Asia (seen as India's and its neighbour's common geopolitical home) are major strategic factors to take into account, though not pure factors relating to the neorealist assumptions of power.

In the late 1990s India's rhetoric of positioning herself in the structure of international politics seems to be characterised by a jungle of quasi-logical arguments and arguments based on India's rhetorical structure of reality. These discussions include arguments diverted towards a search for causes and evaluations of facts by their consequences in building India's capabilities in relation to its self-help. Concluding his speech in an international studies' forum in 1997, Minister Gujral presented samples of a realist description of the nature of India's structure of reality. He also presents the challenges India faces in achieving her goals (objects) internally as well as externally.

*"I am only too well aware of the serious difficulties that face us in achieving that object [peace and prosperity]. Internally, conflicts of a communal and of an ideological nature; externally, mutual suspicion and distrust; generally, difficulties, political, economic, administrative and strategic. But let us also remember this. On the measure, in which we succeed in overcoming these difficulties, will depend not only our own fate but that of humanity as well."*²³⁵

The quasi-logical argument may be interpreted in the light of the definition of Wendt's anarchy. India's fate will not only depend on her actions alone, but of what she makes of the anarchical realm she operates in. India's reality and the nature of international politics are described in neorealist terms including mutual suspicion and distrust. Mutual suspicion together with distrust may lead to a security dilemma. Gujral continues with a very strategic statement: *"India has already demonstrated that it will practise what it preaches"*²³⁶. This argument is very important to bear in mind as a guideline in the overall analysis of India's

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

rhetoric. The message of this argument materializes itself in the following years in many ways.

4.3.3. Factual reasoning – the case of national security

Minister Gujral's address at the United Institution of India in 1997, the year before the general elections were held in India, emphasizes the circumstances India operated in at the time – a pluralistic world where the country was pushing for multilateralism. India's multilateral will to develop peace and security initiatives with the international community of states with a regional approach is strongly presented. India's regional emphasis is to complement to the global approach in a manner that becomes feasible in the vacuum of globalization. Factual reasoning continues to be strong as shown in the argumentation below wherein abstract values also contain clear value judgements.

*"The South Asian region accounts for roughly one fourth of all humanity. If this region is to establish its rightful place in the community of nations, co-operation and mutual goodwill have to be firmly established as the basis of intra-South Asian relations. Given India's size and situation, it is natural for us to take the initiative in building up confidence and establishing co-operation in all facets of our relationships [...]."*²³⁷

*"The security of a home lies not in the bricks and mortar used in its construction but, in the ultimate analysis, depends upon the goodwill and amity of its inhabitants. India's foreign policy, specially in the neighbourhood context, reflects this simple reality [...]."*²³⁸

*"India has already established that it is ready to go the extra mile to inspire confidence and generate momentum towards a new partnership in South Asia and it is apparent that we have already achieved substantial success with this approach."*²³⁹

The rhetoric shows India's will and knowledge (awareness) of how she may contribute to the system structure, simultaneously aiming to assure her national security as a relative gain of engaging in the above mentioned measures. These selected arguments of Gujral's also signal the growing will of the multilateral-minded India to endorse CBMs among sovereign states in her neighbourhood within the international system structure. This comes out e.g. in conflict resolution measures on different levels, be it in an escalating conflict or in a conflict of interest. Rhetoric incompatibilities in relations with other states are acknowledged through the reasoning of the promotion of collective measures to increase national security. These CBMs are especially applied to disputes with neighbouring China and Pakistan as well as to the proximate neighbourhood. Below is a sample of the rhetoric on the archrival Pakistan.

"[...] you would be aware of the offer of a dialogue we made to Pakistan soon after our government took office. Even while we are awaiting Pakistan's response, we are taking unilateral steps to improve the relationship at the people-to-people level. We are also trying to preserve a

²³⁷ Gujral 1997b.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

positive atmosphere, by avoiding polemic and ignoring the occasional hostile rhetoric from across the border."²⁴⁰

India, in the process of transforming its politico-economic image, admits that the concept of security as such has also changed fundamentally. Simultaneously this is an acknowledgement of the change of the code of conduct in post-Cold War politics. This results in the disappearance of the (immediate) nuclear deterrence of the Cold War defining hard core security. In dealing with security issues, ignorance of an adversary including political hostility may lead India to suffer from diplomatic sickness in arguing if it addresses Pakistan in an ignorant ("new thinking") manner in its rhetoric.

*"Security can no longer be visualised in narrow military terms. Today, it calls for interdependence among all countries in the world, to tackle non-conventional and non-military threats arising out of international terrorism, narcotics, ethnic conflicts, fundamentalism, environmental pollution, natural disasters, etc., all of which impinge upon the overall security of nations. A redefinition of old concepts requires new thinking and fresh approaches, if we are to successfully deal with the challenges posed by an uncertain future. More so, there is a growing realisation that what is needed is a collective approach, based upon co-operation rather than competition and confrontation. [...] Nowhere is this more valid than in the area of nuclear disarmament. We are told that the U.S. and the Russian Federation no longer target their missiles at each other. Yet, there is a reluctance to accept the notion that elimination of nuclear weapons is the only practical and lasting way to deal with the scourge of nuclear proliferation, as well as to enhance global security [...]."*²⁴¹

*"Security concerns or threats have not disappeared. But today, we have more instruments and institutions available to us in order to deal with these concerns in a manner consistent with the traditional principles of Indian foreign policy. Perhaps it is easier for India to engage in such a dialogue with its various interlocutors compared to some other countries which have been members of military alliances during the Cold War. For them, a post-Cold War period requires major shifts in thinking. For us, it reflects a new opportunity and continuity."*²⁴²

India relentlessly and repeatedly strives for disarmament yet literally explodes her own nuclear bomb the very following year, rapidly shifting from opting for collective measures to exclusive self-reliance and self-help. The imbalance of India's arguments of tackling the challenges of new security threats is obvious. On one hand the previous rhetoric endorses the collective pre-emptive measures yet on the other hand one year after this India demonstrates its military capabilities in a striking manner to other units in the system structure. Maybe there were too inadequate instruments of multilateralism available therefore India is not sure which ones it would find most feasible to use to ensure her national security instead of perhaps risking it in all the collective engagements she had signed up for. Convincing rhetoric is demonstrated in the last paragraph presented above. Though not sounding too confident, the argument underlines new opportunities of the plural world order. Yet simultaneously the argument clings onto continuity in the post-Cold War era rather than focusing on change i.e.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Gujral 1997b.

²⁴² Ibid.

in the terms of security. In the rhetoric at hand a new opportunity (change) and continuity do simply not go coherently together. Die hard cooperative (collective multilateral measures) rhetoric and non-aligned self-reliance can not work together to convince any audience of its cause as a *rational* values' bid as India tried to. The underlined major shifts in security paradigm-thinking and rhetoric acquire indeed further thought. The acts resulting from this thinking can be seen demonstrated in the following.

4.4. 1998-2004 Arguments based on India's structure of reality

As previously discussed, cherishing a conservative ideology, the Hindu BJP party had grown to what can be seen as a self-defence mechanism of nationalism as a result of the liberalized economy throughout the 1990s. In 1998 the party managed to defeat the Congress in elections. In 1996 the briefly appointed PM Vajpayee formed a BJP-led 13-party coalition government. The international business world had concerns fearing that India would now close up again and head towards the old economic development pattern if the conservatives were in power. BJP's leading motto had throughout time been focused on making India strong, prosperous and self-confident²⁴³. Hence the policies that BJP pushed forward were exclusively nationally oriented (internal efforts) right from the start. However, India had by now been noticed on the global scale. There was beginning to be a curious universal audience listening to India's rhetoric output in world politics, speculating how far India's rapid economic development could actually take the country. A change in the course of development may have been a fatal decision for India's future yet the BJP rule was keen to drive its principle of *swadeshi* (self-reliance). Strengthening India's position on the global scale by assessing its self-reliance and self-help carefully through concrete values of rhetoric became a dominating characteristic of the next six years of the BJP-led India. The conservative and nationalist rule operated with a very realist and anarchic mindset. This was especially the case of the security environment which India was seen to belong to.²⁴⁴

India's initiatives on behalf of nuclear disarmament were more or less ignored by the major states in forums where they were officially presented to various audiences. India's lobbying for a good cause did not pay off, failing to attract other states within the international community. In 1998 the on/off conflict between India and Pakistan escalated. This escalation of the conflict was seen to pose a deteriorating nuclear security environment for India.

²⁴³ Advani 2005.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

Moreover, heightened tensions on the entire Indian subcontinent, increasing fears of a nuclear arms race and worse raised a materializing concern of nuclear war. This did have far reaching consequences in the region as South Asia was considered to be a nuclear-free zone.²⁴⁵ In May 1998 India's response to the growing security concerns were nuclear tests named Pokhran II.²⁴⁶ The tests pointed India on the global power map. After the nuclear tests India saw significant changes taking place in her relations with other major power states. Most of the states reacted with immediate condemnation of the tests²⁴⁷. None of India's earlier rhetoric or actions gave any hints of these tests coming up. To many observers' wonder India proved relentless facing sanctions and diplomatic isolation, demonstrating that the economy can stand up to the challenges of these posed sanctions.²⁴⁸

Had the major states response been positive towards India's disarmament initiatives, India would not have likely opted for the nuclear testing program²⁴⁹. Collective measures undertaken were not enough to assure India's national security after all. The tests, shaking the global balance of power appears to be the key event in measuring India as a potential stakeholder in world politics at least in rhetoric's concrete value judgement. India's rhetoric presumptions (keeping on the disarmament path) were indeed tied to the common experience of its statements made, and common sense of world states signalled no such thing as these tests forthcoming against all normal presumptions. What Perelman called normal presumptions cannot have included nuclear tests. However, any judicial agreement was not broken between India and its universal audience in political terms. Up to 1998, having not joined in any pacts related to nuclear test banning, India was not to be judicially judged as the tests did not violate any international treaty to which she was party to.²⁵⁰ India's audience rightfully suffered from a burden of proof when opposing India without discriminatory measures at hand further than criticism. Obviously, the unexpected can never be excluded neither in political rhetoric nor in action. In intentional acts such as the tests were, determining the cause of them goes together with determining the motive for the action. In this event, India supported its power assertion based on the structure of reality. Thus India's argumentation on behalf of Pokhran II can be defined as a causal act, based on factual reasoning (supporting its act).²⁵¹

²⁴⁵ Bahroo 2000.

²⁴⁶ Udgaonkar 1999, Vajpayee 1998, para 13.

²⁴⁷ Nayar & Paul 2003, 241.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Vajpayee 1998, para 11.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ For the presented speeches in the aftermath of Pokhran II in the next chapter.

A die-hard security issue, as these nuclear tests were, is indeed a realist security fact that major powers could not afford to neglect in the anarchic system of global politics. The tests activated and reflected realist power assumptions of self-help, strengthening one's military capability and acquiring power per se. These assumptions were to be taken into serious consideration in the political realm of the entire international community. At the same time and to some degree these realist assumptions represent universal values with the claim to sustain a unit's like India's national security in argumentation, not to mention demonstrated through the action taken. In the framework of ensuring a sufficient enough national security, Pokhran II started the era of India's promoted minimum deterrent policy (primarily thought to be against Pakistan). The nuclearization of the (Indian) subcontinent also introduced the stability-instability paradox into the readily complex relationship between India and Pakistan²⁵². This explains the minimum deterrent policy. However, the demonstration of adequate nuclear technology with Pokhran II or even a ready-made weapon does not directly equalise the power measurement of India in realist terms. Military power does not produce political control directly, never even has in IR and hence military power does not change the economic bases of a nation's power – especially not India's.²⁵³

4.4.1. Evaluating facts by their consequences- India's process of developing power after Pokhran II

In a statement to the Indian Parliament shortly after Pokhran II, PM Vajpayee argued that the exercise of Indian power demonstrates Indian leaders opting for "self-reliance and freedom of thought and action"²⁵⁴. This argument was based on the evolution of India's claimed openness and restraint nuclear policy dating back to India's becoming independent. By using an argumentation technique supporting the structure of these statements, this demonstrates India's rhetoric being a function of its acts. PM Vajpayee's statement is a good example of an evaluation of a fact (the conducted nuclear tests) by its consequences. The audience is given again a historical context (referring to the past nuclear policy) to base its adherence of the delivered argumentation on. PM Vajpayee uses a pure technique of restraint. Yet in the same paragraph, as a paradox to the evaluation of the facts and hints demonstrated, he confirms that disarmament was, is and continues to be, a major plank in the Indian foreign policy.²⁵⁵ This

²⁵² Raghavan 2007.

²⁵³ Waltz 1979, 180-181.

²⁵⁴ Vajpayee 1998, para 1-2.

²⁵⁵ Ibid. para 1.

comment on continuing opting for non-proliferation reflects the security paradigm in South Asia and the way India deals with it.

India demonstrates her power in Cold War-like realist terms, meaning building up its defence capabilities. Simultaneously India is willing to commit to enhance a further disarmed world by pursuing her minimum deterrent policy²⁵⁶. This seems like an argument appealing to neorealism's thought of the Self (India) and (the potentially hostile) Other. India argues her case appealing to the (potential) Pakistani provocation over her territorial integrity though simultaneously willing to build a universally disarmed system of units coexisting. This sends out a message of India struggling between committing to universal new policies of disarmament and simultaneously assuring its national security even with harsh measures projecting self-sufficiency if needed. A confusing rhetorical incompatibility lies in this kind of arguments, within the content of locality of PM Vajpayee's statement. India should avoid feeding her universal audience further suspicion due to her already surprising acts.

PM Vajpayee presents further convincing arguments on India's newly achieved power status, justifying the nuclear tests and the continuation of the development of nuclear capabilities, based on the country's political history:

*"In 1974, we demonstrated our nuclear capability. Successive Governments thereafter have taken all necessary steps in keeping with that resolve and national will, to safeguard India's nuclear option. This was the primary reason behind the 1996 decision for not signing the CTBT [...]"*²⁵⁷

*"At a global level, we see no evidence on the part of the nuclear weapon states to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world. Instead, we have seen that the NPT has been extended indefinitely and unconditionally, perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the five countries [...] under such circumstances, the Government was faced with a difficult decision. The touchstone that has guided us in making the correct choice clear was national security. These tests are a continuation of the policies set into motion that put this country on the path of self-reliance and independence of thought and action."*²⁵⁸

The argumentation shows that the system of states in which India exists did not offer enough security guarantees in a collective manner to safeguard India's national security. Major power states are addressed critically on this matter in the above rhetoric. In Perelman's interpretation this is India's retort against the autophagia from which it found a way out by testing her nuclear capabilities. The above examples of quasi-logical arguments claim to have no right or

²⁵⁶ Vajpayee's Foreign Minister J.Singh defines minimum deterrent as follows: "It is the enunciation of a fixity. The principle is in contrast to cold-war phraseology. It is to be determined in accordance with the reality of an assessment of the security situation. And as the security situation alters with time, the determination of a minimum deterrence also alters." (Singh 1999)

²⁵⁷ Vajpayee 1998, para 6.

²⁵⁸ Ibid. para 8-9.

wrong, nevertheless PM Vajpayee argues the tests to have been a *correct choice* made. As an act these tests were a direct cause of the lack of collective security building in the international system structure which also drove as a motive for India to conduct the strategically meaningful tests. This argument also proves neorealism to serve well as an interpretative theory of Indian power showing that collective measures have primarily inadequate results. Furthermore, these pragmatic arguments are based simply on India's view of the structure of reality. This reality seems in 1998 to appear very much similar to the anarchic realm of where states operate in the system structure. Showing off one's military capabilities by materializing its self-help in advanced nuclear technology demonstrates the serious security dilemma which India experienced. The message of Pokhran II to the universal audience is clear:

*"India is now a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers. It is India's due, the right of one-sixth of human-kind. Our strengthened capability adds to our sense of responsibility. We do not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for mounting threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defense, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion. We do not intend to engage in an arms race."*²⁵⁹

Through this value judgement India now announced herself to be a de facto nuclear state making this fact an unquestioned appeal to her universal audience. India directly appeals to the adherence of minds of the audience as PM Vajpayee states "the series of tests recently undertaken by India have led to the removal of doubts"²⁶⁰. These doubts refer to the doubts of the universal audience. This convincing argument is sought to increase respect from the other states towards India, raising her power status amongst the global powers.

Though going solo by conducting Pokhran II, India nonetheless wishes to further enhance multilateralism. Rhetorically, the nuclear tests are phrased as if they were a wake-up call to stimulate multilateralism (worldwide), and to further boost India's integration into the world economy to stimulate her development.²⁶¹ It became publicly clear that India is on a major power quest, building her stakes, and wanting to make a difference among the world power states. A challenge was thrown by the largest democratic state in the international system structure, waiting to develop and realize its entire power potential politically as well as economically. In other words India would now, demonstrated by liaisons of coexistence in argumentation, be willing to interact together (with other states) towards a shared objective on various issues. The aim was to ensure that in moving towards a new millennium "India

²⁵⁹ Ibid. para 10.

²⁶⁰ Ibid. para 13.

²⁶¹ Ibid. para 12.

will take her rightful place in the international community”²⁶², supporting the created power-assertion.

After the dust of the nuclear tests had settled down, it was time to assess India’s relationships with the other units. In an interview provided by the Indian Times the External Affairs Minister Singh confirms India’s foreign policy to have changed along the “most defining event in the last quarter of a century to a more overt policy attitude, taking a more pragmatic and problem-solving approach”²⁶³. Singh’s comment supports the previous argument on India willing to work towards shared objectives with other units in the system. The reasoning of this argument includes India to have achieved the much needed strategic space, measuring strategic autonomy²⁶⁴. Quasi-logical arguments seem to dominate in India’s rhetoric from now on, as the argumentation reveals a broad mindset of global politics in which India now operates in. This would leave one to believe that India’s rhetoric credibility is now been built on the causal relations achieved through her acts as Singh claims: “You have had a series of five [nuclear] tests which spoke louder than any voice can speak.”²⁶⁵ Singh lends another quasi-logical argument and comparative demonstration from former French president Charles de Gaulle in which de Gaulle claims there to be a great truth: France. Singh asks, quoting de Gaulle, to recognise another current (great) truth: India, viewing her greatness from a broad perspective with an internationally raised profile and prestige amongst the global universal audience.²⁶⁶

Practise rather than preach characterises Singh’s policy. The Gujral doctrine is left in retrospect in the background as India signed a joint agreement, the Lahore declaration, with Pakistan in 1999. Further substantial investments in the military sector made clear from the military and political point of view that India would no longer be overlooked. This rhetoric and these actions were created by a liaison of succession with the new raised power profile principle and its consequences.²⁶⁷ The ruling Indian government preferred implementation of policies prior to pursuing further power rhetoric, signalling India being on the power move. This move was a step towards successful economic development and capacity bringing India closer to increased political power. At this time, a new mindset of self-sufficiency can be traced again as a fixed notion in the goals of India’s foreign policy, this time emphasizing

²⁶² Ibid. para 16.

²⁶³ Singh 1999.

²⁶⁴ Singh 1999.

²⁶⁵ Ibid. See also National Security Adviser Mishra 1999 op.cit. Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 483.

²⁶⁶ Singh 1999, Advani 2005.

²⁶⁷ van der Veen 2006, 34.

energy sufficiency.²⁶⁸ Energy sufficiency would support the above mentioned development. On the eve of the new millennium India began clearly to acknowledge a broader view of security, including soft security issues argued to be based on her structure of reality. Established Indian think-tank C. Raja Mohan supports India's new direction with his claim of India switching in the aftermath of Pokhran II from argument of power into power of argument, which is very well justified and truthful in the analysed rhetoric samples on hand.²⁶⁹

In the framework of the structure of reality and discussing the balancing power of India, one cannot ignore the India-Pakistan conflict. In the dynamic process of globalization, the effects of the on/off conflict became in fact less and less relevant to India's relationships with great powers. This opened a door for a silent willingness of India to begin to work out a solution for a peace process, as mentioned already in previous arguments presented.²⁷⁰ Here naturally, lies the issue of relative gain from the perspective of India – a growing awareness that normalising the relationship with Pakistan would help India's regional and global stand as a causal rhetorical link between phenomena taking place. As an evaluation of a fact by its consequences, progress in the peace process would indeed free India's political as well as diplomatic energies so that the country could play a more significant role in contemporary world politics.²⁷¹ To raise the stakes as a confirming gesture in presented liaisons of succession in argumentation, the current Indian PM Singh made it clear that India was willing to risk political capital in finding a satisfying solution to the dispute with Pakistan.²⁷² Focusing on India's military capabilities with regard to the dispute, if solved, it would also allow India's strong armed forces to expand their active engagement elsewhere. For instance the armed forces' engagement could be involved in expanding peace and in stability operations around the Indian Ocean if not also further afield, instead of the ongoing constrained predominant mission of territorial defence.²⁷³ However, the neorealist interpretation understands and supports the primary focus on national defence which is the case with India.

²⁶⁸ Further details on energy security see Chaturvedi 2006, 4-5.

²⁶⁹ Mohan 2006b.

²⁷⁰ Mohan 2006a, 20-21.

²⁷¹ Ibid. 22.

²⁷² Ibid. 20-21.

²⁷³ Ibid. 22.

Furthermore, regarding security and managing crises, India has been active in defence diplomacy²⁷⁴ and economic diplomacy by exploring rhetoric transitivity in her relations with other states. Due to the warming of the U.S. and Indian common political interests: fighting terrorism and countering fundamental Islamic radicalism among others, these interests have been marked on the defence diplomacy agenda.²⁷⁵ India's reality of a large Islamic population – approximately 150 million people – has always been an important factor in India's foreign policy with a strong value judgement added to it. Since the end of the Cold War India's relations with the Islamic world became stronger. India's good relations with The Islamic Republic of Iran are based on e.g. economic and commercial co-operation, energy security as well as co-operation in combating religious extremism and terrorism.²⁷⁶

4.4.2. Modifying India's status in the minds of her universal audience

Engaging into allies and balancing between strategic alliances are tools for all great powers in the balance of power game. India has primarily chosen to acquire arms and develop its arms technology instead of allies supported by a careful component of selective engagement. Forming an alliance with any of the current great global powers would be a courageous move from India as such, taking into account the differing historical context it has operated in. In 1999 there were already signs of the adherence of the universal audience's minds towards India's call to recognise her relative significance as a unit per se in the system structure. Perhaps due to adopting a methodologically defined diplomatic attitude, the U.S. hegemony of the 1990s finally turned its head towards India. The India's rhetoric following Pokhran II did indeed cause a meeting of major powers' minds, orienting them for taking future action. Witnessing significant nuclear tests taking place in the Indian Ocean - a strategic logistics route for 50 strategic materials of the U.S.- must have made a difference resulting in the U.S. finally becoming willing to cooperate with India²⁷⁷.

After decades of rather cool relations, the strategic Indo-American-relations' seed was planted at the turn of the millennium as a result of India's strategic nuclear tests which acted as a demonstration of India's cause. After all it was only in the aftermath of the Gulf War when the U.S., referring to its policy and prospects in South Asia, stated that India was to be prevented from dominating its neighbours including previously the U.S.-supported

²⁷⁴ A British concept created by the Strategic Defence Review in 1998, which intends to better integrate military and diplomatic tools operating with a view to prevent conflicts or to manage crises. [www-document] <http://www.afri-ct.org/article.php3?id_article=447>

²⁷⁵ Mohan 2006a, 23.

²⁷⁶ Mohan 2006b.

²⁷⁷ Berlin 2002 op.cit. Chaturvedi 2006, 4.

Pakistan.²⁷⁸ Until then the Indo-American relationship seemed to be strictly issue-based and prone to conflict. The U.S. was now advised to recognise the capabilities of the South Asian rival neighbours, of India and Pakistan, and to work towards a stable state of these strategic capabilities with a view of preventing further expansion of conflict and thereby to prevent nuclear usage in the Asian region.²⁷⁹ Additionally, regarding the balance of power setting, the U.S. sought for India's sympathy in acquiring further regional power vis-à-vis China in Asia.²⁸⁰

The symbols of both India's and The United States' status quos were exchanged with reciprocal state visits. The time frame is argued to be the cause of change of relations due to this particular change in both parties' diplomatic attitude. India actively engaged in a highly important and strategic bilateral relationship with a lot of power at stake, and where rhetorical transitivity of statements became very crucial for both parties. Coincidences of interests and objectives are not adequately reflected in the "new beginning" of Indo-U.S. relations. Therefore what is needed is a clear strategic vision and political wisdom including argumentative will and knowledge, as well as competency in addition to immense rhetorical restraint.²⁸¹ This is reflected in questions addressed to Minister Singh in an interview regarding the shift of the status of the Indo-U.S. relations. In order to maintain any kind of rhetorical transitivity and stability India needs predictability and this is ultimately never granted in arguments or in foreseen acts.²⁸² As an acknowledgement of uncertainty there is no sign of India letting go from its minimum deterrent nuclear policy and no change in the attitude towards joining the CTBT: "Weapons of mass destruction are meant for the role of deterrent"²⁸³. This is India's official argument given despite her being on the move and despite a transition taking place in the nature of her bilateral relations with global powers. For India, minimum deterrent policy is seen as a normal presumption in the code of conduct in order to pursue power politics. After Pokhran II, India indeed aimed to formalise her rhetoric power arguments. The neorealist mindset of ensuring self-help and military capabilities has not been buried as the conditions for a security dilemma are not "removed" in rhetoric even in the 21st century. Again, the neorealist interpretation allows for created power assertion of India. The rhetoric sounds very much as anarchy would still be ruling in global politics and that anarchy is literally what states make out of it feeding power assertions to some limit. Singh states: "In

²⁷⁸ Singh 2002.

²⁷⁹ Sen Gupta 1997, 312-313.

²⁸⁰ Perkovich 2003, 138.

²⁸¹ Ayoob 2000, 38-39.

²⁸² Singh 2000.

²⁸³ Ibid.

terms of the balance of power, in India we have always known that the essence of power is to know the limits of power²⁸⁴. Possessing nuclear weapons does narrow the purposes for which strategic power can be used - a fact that needs to be taken into consideration regarding the limits of power.²⁸⁵ An examination of national budgets shows an unmistakable pattern of today's trend in acquiring power and assuring national security. Although the sources of world political power may be changing many of those considered to be stakeholders seek security by spending a notable amount of their budget on arms²⁸⁶. India seems to follow in a similar fashion in increasing military spending in the new millennium.²⁸⁷ The high military spending does not seem too much of a burden for states to finance as it seems to build up their self-reliance and national security.

4.4.3. The 21st century: from India's external neighbourhood to the entire global universal audience

In addition to the previously emerged relationships with the major powers, the first ever Indo-EU Summit was held in 2000 signalling a new dialogue with Europe as well as with the EU as recognition of India's commercial powerhouse potential. In the EU's security framework a highly important shared view was the EU's support for India to claim a permanent seat in the UNSC. Generally, there was now a new trend to be traced in the Indian attitude in her approach towards contemplating and strategically strengthening ties with not only her neighbourhood but the entire world, convincingly touching base with the global universal audience. This is a reflection of the problem-solving diplomacy adopted in the recent years by India and even applied to relations with Pakistan. Among others, a changing Africa provided new areas for cooperation and interaction for the mutual benefit of India and for some of the African states.²⁸⁸ India had to convince the universal audience that the strategic nuclear tests were not conducted towards any particular potential rival. The suspicious minds of these adherers needed to be changed in a beneficial way. A few years after Pokhran II had taken place India's argumentative tools of assurance began slowly but firmly to bare fruit. India's extended universal audience began to be convinced, slowly accepting the presented rhetoric of rational values bid albeit with a fading suspicion.

In a 2001 presentation to an international academic audience by the National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra, Mishra builds an argument on causal relations of key strategic

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Waltz 1993, 53.

²⁸⁶ The Economist 2007b.

²⁸⁷ Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 462.

²⁸⁸ Embassy of India 2001.

events that took place in the past two years. Hereby India's rhetoric credibility is built with a technique of an argument addressing more than just the notions of IR's security framework, featuring comprehensive examples of other actors involved. It is argued that India is to be placed in a paradoxical security environment with special challenges. Mishra acknowledges India's need to address a diverse audience starting from her multi-characteristic neighbourhood.

*"[...] this cultural heterogeneity coexists with a widely differentiated pattern of economic development - a legacy of different experiences of colonialism and of Cold War economic arrangements. This means also that, unlike in North America or South America or in Europe or Africa, where single overarching security frameworks exist, Asia cannot be defined within a single security paradigm. The security concerns of West Asia (what you would call the Middle East) are addressed very differently from those in Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, or East Asia. The inter se relationships between Russia, China, Japan, India, ASEAN, Central Asian Republics and the Gulf countries have been in a state of some flux in the Cold War period and its immediate aftermath and this has obviously affected the security environment in the continent."*²⁸⁹

This argumentation is an obvious materialization of India's continued acknowledgement of an anarchic structure of her security environment. This kind of rhetoric is built on supportive comparative demonstrations. The notion of an anarchic realm and its unique security environment is supported further with factual reasoning. The region (Asia) includes four nuclear states, some of the largest armies in the world, a considerable number of missiles and exporting countries in the countries not to forget the strategic non-Asian navies operating freely in the Asian waters.²⁹⁰ Additionally, to contribute to the argument based on a truly anarchic structure of reality, India has strategic partnerships established regionally. Those relationships are among others those with the Islamic Iran and not always pro-western Russia. Asia, a region with immense potential and will of surviving in the system with self-help of units, with crucial power dynamics and suspicious rivalry among units, has a certainly unique security paradigm to deal loaded with value judgements vis-à-vis other units. A rhetorically defined diplomatic attitude is what is needed in this realm.

*"The belief that strengthening of regional co-operation both for security and economic development is a crucial input in the promotion of regional stability [...]. Balanced economic growth with regional economic integration, and a multipolar political order rooted in pluralism are the prerequisites for a stable security equilibrium in Asia. India is committed to working with other Asian countries for this."*²⁹¹

The above statement includes the input of regional forums which India participates in. The participation is endorsed as long as there is a relative gain for India to achieve. Suspicion and

²⁸⁹ Mishra 2001.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

a certain instability and uncertainty supports India's stand on continuing the minimum deterrent, in facing the volatile region India operates in. This is a fact which India's universal audience has begun to understand when trying to take India's view in approaching her immediate neighbourhood. This defines the call again for rhetoric transitivity in relations with global powers, from where on India may start building her way towards becoming a stakeholder on the global major powers' level.

Continuing on India's role in the 21st century, some changes in the power shift took place in the system structure of the new millennium. This is a common argument often made in India's rhetoric but also a de facto factual reasoning in recent debates of IR. From 2001/2002 onwards a notable change of Indian rhetoric takes place. Namely, India's argument tends to carry more weight in addressing the system structure and the capabilities within the structure, rather than addressing changes taking place in the units, as in India, and in the capabilities of the states. Thus in future rhetoric there is a trend of moving towards common goals instead of national/ individual goals and partnership instead of going solo. Does this mean neorealist concepts lose their justification?

4.4.4. Addressing the system structure – 10 years after the launch of India's liberalization

In the first years of the new millennium India's rhetoric, particularly on the topic of an emerging global world, is increasingly about the change of the system structure. The selected samples of India's rhetoric focus on the globalized, multipolar world, where India herself reflects in retrospect back on the past 10 years after the end of the Cold War and the previously habitual bipolar world.

*"Ground realities of interdependence and globalization cannot be ignored [...] India's vision of a multipolar world is one of partnership and not confrontation."*²⁹²

This comment is the factual reasoning coming from the Foreign Secretary Sinha in 2003. C. Raja Mohan states that India is now emerging as the swing state in the global balance of power – at least beginning to *make a difference*²⁹³. In a convincing manner, Mohan continues to argue that in the coming years India will have the opportunity and capacity to shape outcomes on vital issues of the new century (in power politics), among others on the construction of Asian stability, the political modernization of the greater Middle East, and managing the challenges of globalization.²⁹⁴ This would mean building up Sinha's projected

²⁹² Sinha 2003.

²⁹³ Mohan 2006a, 17.

²⁹⁴ Mohan 2006a, 17.

partnership in order to succeed in shaping these mentioned outcomes. Therefore yet again, there is a call for rhetoric transitivity and transparency in India's relations with other states. Mr Mishra in his role as National Security Adviser stated in 1999 that:

*" [...] in the 21st century a new security order is likely to arise in the Asia-Pacific region, one in which India should be granted as much respect and deference by the United States and others as in China today."*²⁹⁵

Mishra's rhetoric reveals that in the new global security order India finds it justified and acceptable to develop nuclear capacity for deterrence (security dilemma), political influence and prestige (at least maintaining the status quo).²⁹⁶ This quote is to show how governments allocate their revenues revealing their priorities in their argumentative rhetoric with an objective-mean relation. New, soft security threats or at least concerns with an unknown character such as transnational terrorism led by non-state actors have arose in the new millennium. Addressing this issue is high on the agenda in the global politics.

Already earlier on, India became more active in her actions as well as in her rhetoric addressing new security threats. This was due to several terrorist attacks posed to the country itself.²⁹⁷ The terrorist attack of 9/11 in the U.S. changed the view in which India saw the world. The massive attack made India realize that it could not go completely solo in looking at territorial borders as lines of defence against new security threats. This wake-up call influenced India's conduct of global diplomacy. It became civil servants' task to win international understanding and support amongst the universal audience with quasi-logical arguments for India's national interests, priorities, aspirations and concerns within the changing international system structure.²⁹⁸ India realized her development potential in the system structure and was not keen to remain viewed as a regional buffer for the West's (mainly the U.S.) influence towards China. Not merely because of India's own ambitions and regional prestige were at stake. Nonetheless in increasing her power stand India did acknowledge that the U.S. support is vital and strategically necessary for India's rise to be successful.²⁹⁹

Nonetheless, the suspicious mind of a friend or foe may never be wiped away even in countering terrorism as the forces of global terrorism have proven difficult to be yield and to

²⁹⁵ Mishra 1999 op. cit. Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 483.

²⁹⁶ Kegley & Wittkopf 2001, 483.

²⁹⁷ Suicide squad attacking the parliament in New Delhi 12/2001, bomb blasts in Mumbai 8/2003, bomb attack in New Delhi 10/2005, bomb attacks on trains in Mumbai 7/2006, explosions outside a mosque in Malageon 9/2006 and bomb blasts on a train service between New Delhi-Lahore 2/2007 to name a few terrorist attack incidences.

²⁹⁸ Embassy of India 2002.

²⁹⁹ Mohan 2006a, 32.

halt this kind of proliferation of unbalancing forces³⁰⁰. Claiming earlier with the support of several scholars that South Asia was to be or become a very volatile region in contemporary global politics in IR, the argument proves in many ways to be an accurate one. For instance the disputed Jammu and Kashmir territory's tension led to a potential conflict escalating to a critical point between the two nuclear powers of India and Pakistan. This is due to a lack of any constructive dialogue and surely unaddressed rhetoric incompatibilities between the communications of these two states. Though being a regional conflict and both parties of conflict being relevant stakeholders in the volatile region, the universal audience made of world states watches even today India's and Pakistan's moves in detail, not least the major powers.³⁰¹

Addressing the system structure and in reference to India's past nuclear actions' claims, the assertion is that the years after Pokhran II have created

*"[...] a greater understanding of the compulsions behind our nuclear tests and a realization that a secure and stable India will be an asset to the emerging world order"*³⁰².

With the world's biggest democracy's impressive economic growth in economy and PPP³⁰³, India is complementing all the previously presented economic examples of the slogan launched by the former External Affairs' Minister Singh, of *practicing what it preaches* based on rhetoric rational values and factual reasoning. Perhaps the political power is slowly but firmly truly built into rational realizations of the rhetoric, at least on the scale of India's relative gain.³⁰⁴ These findings are significant in retrospect as this analysis begins from the loans provided by the IMF. 12 years later India establishes herself as a fiscally reliable state and a net creditor to the IMF itself. This is with no doubt not only a rhetorical boost but a remarkable status to promote India's self-sufficiency and self-reliance. As a result India also announced in 2003 of no need of bilateral (development) aid anymore.³⁰⁵ This is a sign that the potential power giant is indeed getting on its feet, on to a self-sufficient ideological move.

Not only is India creating some solid ground for economic growth, it has also been taken seriously as a political entity within important channels of constructive partnerships such as within ASEAN, the recently founded East Asian Summit (EAS), the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) and in the African Union

³⁰⁰ Sinha 2003.

³⁰¹ Dixit 2002.

³⁰² Sinha 2003.

³⁰³ Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).

³⁰⁴ India's middle class alone is estimated to grow into the size of the EU's consumer volume in the next years.

³⁰⁵ Sinha 2003.

(AU). As said, India turned itself into a development aid donor instead of being an active receiver of this aid, As seen in the example of the tsunami relief politics in 2004. India has been trying to establish a firm relationship with several developing (among others especially African) countries, in offering them aid in various sectors.³⁰⁶ This new economic diplomacy can be seen as a second phase of the reforms undertaken in the era of globalization and multilateralism in a pluralist order. This reflects India's focus on the external efforts of pursuing power and cherishing prestige of self-sufficiency.

4.5. 2004(-2006) Return of Congress: arguments for a greater and stronger India

In 2004 the Congress party was back in power after an overconfidently campaigned BJP. BJP campaigned with the slogan of "India shines". Yet the realm India was in internally did not shine to all those millions of people living in poverty. Even on the United Nations Human Development Index India still ranks near the bottom of the list. The electorate proved BJP's claimed shine wrong by supporting the Congress party which campaigned with rational value arguments.³⁰⁷ The Congress party took a more transparent approach in setting its agenda to further boost India's international profile. These policy outlines included taking up action where India's interests are strongly expressed, without compromises in strategic interests in partnerships, thus clinging on to the freedom of options and supporting positive assertions of India. In the rhetoric, liaisons, of succession and of coexistence, can be traced in the supportive arguments.

The new government sought to take a greater presence in command of the country's nuclear and missile capabilities, to safeguard them in the acknowledged context of a changing security environment, in particular in the Asian region. For the first time, a broader concept of securitized issues is also addressed in blueprint in a comprehensive and multi-dimensional security policy. The arguments on "India's best" continue to be quasi-logical and thus broad-minded. The backbone of the policy guidelines remains founded on the historical context of Nehru's India. Therefore with Congress in power, non-alignment – strong since Nehru's rule - raised its head again and proved not to be only a policy of the past. In foreign policy, despite India's primary focus on the immediate neighbourhood, the new leadership declared giving special attention to cultivating relations with African states, Latin America as well as the Asia

¹⁰⁷ Mohan 2006b, 20-22; Carter 2006, 33-44.

³⁰⁷ Lal 2004.

Pacific region and other regional cooperative multilateral bodies and institutions. Hence, India continued to enhance her strategic space operating efficiently than before.³⁰⁸

In India's rhetoric, reaching out to major powers with a liaison of coexistence, with the Congress in power India took an even closer look towards her immediate neighbourhood. This meant continuing the momentum of the Gujral doctrine previously implemented.³⁰⁹ Giving some room of manoeuvre to China, India further sought to normalise and strengthen her relation with the East Asian giant who was and still is a crucial power factor affecting the Asian region's security and stability. Given the recent American convergence and Indian interests in promoting democracy and countering i.e. previously mentioned terrorism in the region, India was now willing to cooperate with the U.S. and other Western powers on new, non-traditional security issues. This positively charged multilateralism was thought to be endorsed as long as India would be taken seriously as a powerful player and not given the impression of another state trying to undercut India's influence in the region. The U.S. especially endorsed Indian leadership in regional security issues, most of the region's states being non-aligned, and as it believed firmly in India's influence across the region.³¹⁰

The multilateralism India supported has a non-opposing factor built into. This is to avoid favouring of a certain ideology which was customary to the Cold War era. India's diplomatic (political) interaction with major powers is now balanced differently than before due to India's economic rise. Hence, India tends to put weight on the rhetoric determination of (economical) effects in argumentation. Central to neorealism's teachings to take into account, Waltz acknowledged the changing variables of the balance of power. The warm-up of the Indo-U.S. relationship described earlier is exactly what Waltz describes in his remarks some 15 years ago.³¹¹ Indian diplomats are now not only pleading for the adherence of minds of foreign states or units who form the universal audience, but also recruiting the significant sized Indian Diasporas around the globe. The aim is to orient their minds into taking part in the building of a new powerful India, "attaining her rightful place in the world and making her full and willing to contribute to the promotion of world peace and welfare of mankind"³¹².

³⁰⁸ Indian National Congress: Security Agenda 2004, Shashank 2004, Singh 2004.

³⁰⁹ Embassy of India 2004.

³¹⁰ Mohan 2006b, 20; Carter 2006, 33-44.

³¹¹ "Economic competition is often as keen as military competition, and since nuclear weapons limit the use of force among great powers at the strategic level, we may expect economic and technological competition among them to become more intense." (Waltz 1993, 59)

³¹² Nehru 1947 op.cit. Embassy of India 2004.

Engaging actively in multilateralism such as establishing the 'Group of Four aspirants', aiming for a UNSC permanent seat together with Brazil, Germany and Japan, India seeks to cherish her bilateral relations with other global major powers in addition to the U.S. With its former colonizing power the United Kingdom, India looks for a dynamic partnership. With the EU India seeks for a strategic partnership through a broad range of discussions. In India's immediate neighbourhood India is looking into increasing cooperation with Pakistan, a sustained dialogue and understandably working on CBMs between the two archrivals. In ASEAN India is working for a new economic alliance dimension to her Look East-policy. India is looking at efforts to resolve disputes with other smaller neighbours, and finally with Russia India is looking into e.g. strategic technology cooperation. Energy security was high on the agenda with a particular focus sending a message out of enhancing India's self-sufficiency with strategic petroleum agreements.³¹³

The previously mentioned rhetorical factual reasoning regarding taking care of relations with these states sounds too good to be true in the context of contemporary power relations. However, as the new government took office in 2004 the simple conclusion to draw out of the built ideal relations (with the U.S.) mentioned in the argument by PM Singh, was that India needs to raise her power profile. Furthermore India needs to fill the gaps of the past between her and her universal audience as an obviously result-oriented, proactive and self-sufficient state with power potential in world politics. India, in building her profile amongst the universal audience with the help of the above mentioned liaisons as factors of global stability, is a model of plural as well as secular democracy and moreover an economic powerhouse destined to play a greater role in international affairs. The way in which India has dealt with various issues shows as if she was ticking the boxes of a (neo)realist check-list of how to grow its power.³¹⁴

4.5.1. Re-orienting the minds of others with the proof of self-help

India's call for self-sufficiency by ending most of the international aid agreements in effect as well as sending off the smaller donors from the country proved to show that India's structure was no longer interdependent from another state in the system structure. India was to be self-reliable and self-sufficient in cases of emergency. The refusal of further development aid sent out a clear power statement. With this modification of factual reasoning India would take care of any internal problems and crises by herself whilst actively expanding economic and

³¹³ Singh 2004.

³¹⁴ Embassy of India 2004.

political ties to the major states. In December 2004 forces of nature decided to challenge India's self-sufficiency as it had to cope with the disastrous tsunami hitting the southern coasts of the country. Though natural disasters are not considered to be traditionally a turning point of watching a state cope in a case of tragedy, for India the domestic relief actions based on the earlier mentioned "ground realities" were exactly the strategic proof to the universal audience of self-sufficiency of an emerging power. Refusing aid from international donors such as states and NGOs³¹⁵ was found strange and criticised in the international community of states. Responding herself as an aid donor to Sri Lanka, India sent a crucial signal to the universal audience regarding her credibility and capabilities in such circumstances. This was India's reference for survival in a large scale disaster, showing the potential to even become a permanent UNSC member. Surely these political moves were made with careful consideration to what kind of reaction the behaviour would prompt abroad in other countries, in major states, perhaps to their surprise and against the prevailing presumptions. In rhetoric, India argued against the value judgements of most of the universal audience and indeed pulled itself through the aftermath of reconstructing the tsunami-affected areas thereby scoring crucial power credibility points. On a quest for power India could also not afford to appear weak – as assumed in the minds of the universal audience. This explains India's pro-active and convincing rhetoric and attitude regarding coping with the catastrophe despite the criticism.³¹⁶

Seeing India's significance in the above mentioned action taken, the country shifted her rhetoric into the fixation of seriously recognising her potential contribution to the Asian region for a stable balance. Long-awaited international recognition of this potential was underscored in March 2005 with the U.S. officially announcing its support to India in her efforts to move towards the status of a global power in the 21st century. This was the first ever acknowledgement of a major state and from the universal audience encouraging India to pursue power as the U.S. did. India first further made herself a notable public power by signing a nuclear pact with the United States in July 2005, adding heavy weight onto her credibility as a great power to-be and in this very particular context as one of the members of the strategic nuclear state's club. For the U.S. India is a vitally needed partner for the future. Yet the U.S. is widely not recognised to have the same importance for India amongst Indians. There is mounting scepticism about American prologue and a tendency to think of the U.S.

³¹⁵ Non-Governmental Organization (NGO).

³¹⁶ See for elaborative examples on India's response to the tsunami in the Indian media [www-document] <<http://www.meaindia.nic.in/opinion/2005/01/04op02.htm>>, and official statements on India's tsunami policy such as [www-document] <<http://www.meaindia.nic.in/speech/2005/01/06ss01.htm>>.

policy's shifts in traditional realist (Cold War) terms.³¹⁷ However, the recognition of India from the U.S. boosted a clear-cut speech of the PM Singh on India's Independence Day in 2005 with powerful but rational value rhetoric steering India to overcome future challenges in power politics.

*"India is on the road to progress. The whole world is watching us with expectation. It is possible for us to eradicate poverty, ignorance and disease within our lifetime. This has been made possible by the advances in science and technology."*³¹⁸

*"There comes a time in the history of a nation when it can be said that the time has come to make history. We are today at the threshold of such an era. The world wants us to do well and take our rightful place on the world stage. There are no external constraints on our development. If there are any hurdles, they are internal."*³¹⁹

*"We must seize this moment and grab this opportunity. We need to have the resolve to make our country prosperous. We must have the self confidence to realise that we are second to none, that Indians are as good as the best. Our political system and leadership must show sagacity, wisdom and foresight so that we are able to make the best of this moment and make India a truly great nation."*³²⁰

The universal audience (as well as India's domestic front) was now waiting whether and how India would respond to the acknowledgements made above on the global stage. There is no such precedence for the above argued power setting in India's historical context. In a world of several balancing powers India has proved to be a fast learner with her newly established dynamic relations with the major powers. In addition to India's minimum deterrent policy, increasingly, they are the factual reasoning of abstract and soft capabilities such as knowledge that drives inventiveness and competitiveness, which are suggested to be other currencies of power. Hence the global focus was on India's capabilities: the economical ties, technological knowledge and intellectual property rights.³²¹

4.5.2. Factual reasoning of a core state for stable global security and market

"India is a core state for Asian security"³²² was a statement made by the Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee at the annual (regional) Shangri-La Dialogue in 2006. It is an argument that leaves no room for further interpretation to debate whether India is or is not a global stakeholder in the fragile region. India is one. This argues power status is boosted by rhetoric's factual reasoning as well as comparative demonstration vis-à-vis China in the Asian framework, India clearly having a balancing role.

³¹⁷ Subrahmanyam 2005.

³¹⁸ Singh 2005.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Mohan 2005, Subrahmanyam 2005.

³²² Mukherjee 2006 op.cit. Suryanarayana 2006.

Supporting previous research done on India's emergence the results show and even this study may confirm that India's core role is no longer limited to Asia alone despite her firmly looking towards the East as well as the West in foreign policy. Basing this analysis on the previous years, as India enters current world affairs no more significant policy changes take place neither in rhetoric nor in India's actions. Change as a variable and a value in rhetoric no longer dominates India's argumentation. The rhetoric has shifted from the system change towards boosting the appearance of the developed India. It seems that India now considers her mature enough for the capitalist market and moreover able to compete in it with a high competitiveness. Steered by globalization, consistent and intensive interaction with other states is the driving factor of India who is representing "Team Democracy" in world politics. India must now show that it is willing to deal with the problems that are a part of being a global power both micro and macro level challenges, as well as system structure level ones posed to it.³²³ Especially the micro-level issues within such a heavily populated country will ensure that India does not overheat in its external development.

India's policy objectives after 2004 have been characterized not only by the high priority given to closer political and economic ties, but also to cultural ties to expand the network of global relationships in a constructive manner following Alexander Wendt's thoughts. Particularly in her immediate neighbourhood, the rule of anarchy has been constructed in such fashion, what the states in the volatile region make out of it. Anarchy applies even in the framework of building bridges amongst each other in various issues e.g. by actions under taken such as the SAFTA³²⁴. While avoiding commitment to any alliance, capacity building on a wide range of issues dominates India's interaction with strategic partners. Simultaneously the developing world's South-South cooperation is still going strong within the NAM and in the framework of the G-77 in which India operates as well. The multilaterally oriented rhetoric remains open and changed with a clear trace of neorealist policies which the new rhetoric allows one to interpret.

³²³ Dormandy 2007, 117-130.

³²⁴ South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA).

5. Conclusions

Due to its immense size in various terms and the power potential lying within it, India is an interesting subject to study at the time when worldwide power equations in IR were changing in the beginning of the 1990s. C. Raja Mohan, an IR think-tank who I have used to support my findings in this thesis, has concluded: “it is not often that a country finds itself on the verge of multiple breakthroughs on foreign policy”³²⁵. India is at one of those rare moments”³²⁶. This change started from the ‘Golden Summer’³²⁷ in 1991, and now India faces managing tempering nationalism and balancing ends and means as major challenges that accompany each other with her rising potential on the world stage. Since India’s forced adaption to the changed era of globalization’s influence and the dramatic, the new balance of power shifts in the 1990s power politics, challenged India to reorganise herself and her foreign policy accordingly. These circumstances triggered my interest in the study of India.

The theory framework was founded on the theses of Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism with Alexander Wendt’s elaborative notion of anarchy in a system structure approach. The neorealist concepts of anarchy, self-help, balance of power, and the changing nature (of India’s) capabilities were tested whether they stand in a rhetorical analysis of India’s power politics in the post-Cold War world. The analysis answered the following questions. Are India’s acts representing a unit operating in an anarchic realm, does India take part in balancing power and is India willing to develop her capabilities in the view of self-help? The answer to all of these questions is yes.

This thesis represents a theoretical analysis applied to empirical research material. Quoting Waltz in the first introductory chapter, theory is a construction by which we select facts and interpret them. The findings throughout this thesis and the conclusions now at hand reflect my interpretation. Resulting from the analysis, I may conclude that India carries the neorealists’ ontological worry about concern of other states in a threat perspective all through the analysed rhetoric. Thus neorealism can truly be traced India’s power arguments. Findings show that India’s argumentation is rational and based merely on the structure of reality addressed to her universal audience. The most argumentative rhetoric is presented in relation of India’s key political events taking place. The four tested theoretical concepts in focus, reveal us that the

³²⁵ Mohan 2006b.

³²⁶ Mohan 2005 op.cit Chaturvedi 2006,1.

³²⁷ van der Veen 2006, 13.

concept of power does indeed define the characteristic of India's acts. The structure of world politics in which India was operated throughout the analysis modifies the outcome which states like India produce. The post-Cold War world is an environment where states and actors interact still following the anarchic rule where no higher authority, hegemony or unipolar power or force rules. Thus, the power political (and survival) struggle in the anarchic system still exists and proves neorealism's broadened concept of anarchy to have survived the test, with Alexander Wendt's constructive input.

In the post-Cold War world India's security concerns and potential security threats are evolving, as much as all other global states' concerns. There is still no assurance by other states or institutions of one's national security, proving self-help and self-sufficiency to be vital. Indian leaders have used realist terms in reflecting the state's positioning in 21st century world affairs.³²⁸ In the analysed neorealist elements are nonetheless presented as well as in India's various actions some of which are a result of the presented power political rhetoric³²⁹ India builds her capabilities concentrating, on the traditional hard power issues, later on soft power issues once the economic situation has reached certain stability in development. Soft and hard power capabilities combined create India's power.

Traditionally neorealism has concentrated on the international system structure with the decentralized rule of anarchy, focusing on the distribution of capabilities. Now, soft security regimes are slowly put into place in the post-Cold War era. However, my rhetorical analysis shows that India has acknowledged that a broader definition of security is needed. In this regard let me emphasize that above all this study measured India's relational and explanatory power. The balancing effect of power has changed since the Cold War and the aim is no longer to oppose (and balance) another state. Collective measures are also not completely abandoned, as IR shifts from unilateralism towards multilateralism in the global world order. Self-help of a unit now faces unconventional challenges to deal with, reaching further than the realist sovereign notion of a unit's territorial integrity.

"A foreign policy based on the image of International Relations is neither moral nor immoral, but embodies merely a reasoned response to the world about us."³³⁰ Unlike some great powers in global world politics, India did not have a tendency of announcing its foreign policy doctrines. Following Waltz's quote, India's response to the world began with the power of

³²⁸ Nayar & Paul 2003, 22-23, 251.

³²⁹ Ibid. 257-258.

³³⁰ Waltz 1959, 238.

argument in developing herself into a potential major power. Today, we can already see a tendency of India using the argument of power in her rhetoric in engaging more and more into international issues. This is a measure of India taking a stand on the global stage, overcoming diplomatic sickness in rhetoric, stepping up when needed as an international stakeholder.

An erosion of state sovereignty and change of power equations have characterised the post-Cold War era in terms of ideology. Globalization has a notable part to play which can be seen in India's last 15 years of development as well. In fact, the analysis of this thesis demonstrates that the events taking place during the respective ruling eras of BJP and the Congress well reflect the struggle of tradition (conservatives) and modernists (liberals) in India's policy-making. Democracy has been on some sort of crusade in the recent years especially supported by the U.S. vis-à-vis others seen to be opposing and fundamental ideologies.

The current trend of IR suffers from a growing mismatch of theory and of the theory being applied in practise. Likewise, IR theory debate has seen to be muddling through the post-Cold War time span. From the 1990s onwards there has been discussion about a "Fourth Debate". Taking the outcomes my analysis into account, a new round of a neo-neo-debate may be raising its head, in the debate between constructivism, rationalism and radicalism with new-born characters in the realm of security among states. Capabilities of states, material as well as social become underlined in IR.

In the light of this kind of possible developments in IR research, the analysis of events becomes challenging and it becomes difficult to judge right or wrong causal-relations. In this thesis, this is the case especially in a rhetorical analysis as quasi-logical arguments do not recognise any correctness or a falsification in argumentation. In a power political analysis power equity can not be measured separately anymore in e.g. only economical terms and political terms as traditionally done. The different dynamic sectors seem to be intermingled in the system structure, not separated as purely different sectors like Waltz claims.

The time period subject to analysis is itself searching for answers due to the change of circumstances in world politics. As shown previously, India's relations with the world in the last 15 years have gone through a crucial transformation due to a number of factors presented in the analysis. India's future (power) position in world politics will very much depend on the character of her relations to other major states. Another remarkable change observed in the analysis of my chosen material, was that like individuals (humans), the sociology of a state

may change, shown as significant changes in the state's point of views in becoming a responsible world power. A major power status brings along further national and international constraints and it remains to be seen whether India will have the capacity to bare these. One of the biggest future challenges for India is to cope with even more competitive and dynamic circumstances than it had to adapt to in 1991. The challenge will be transform to respond to new opportunities and persistent challenges emerging, and to restructure policies which may have continued further on with the legacies of the past.

Lastly, there is no doubt about whether research on India should to be continued. The theoretical case study at hand was purposefully meant to be an empirical one in a broad and general view. One could argue whether studying India's policy changes and testing neorealist concepts in a rhetorical analysis of India's power arguments is useful in IR. The findings of this thesis may not be striking ones yet the analysis reveals that my chosen theory's interpretation of power politics stands its test in most parts. One could easily choose a different theory approach, alternative methodology and research material applied to India resulting in different findings and conclusions. In an IR system theory approach which I opted for, taking the unit-level into account and hence going more into detail in national developments taking place on which international representation of India rests on, is an example of a research task to pursue. There is reason to do so, as the world's most populous nation is most certainly not speaking with a unanimous voice on many issues, in any recorded rhetoric. Liberalization, privatization and other Western capitalist ideas are still not considered overall popular to brag about on the domestic level in India³³¹. The rapid opening up to the world in 1991, due to the implemented reforms, has been felt as a sort of neo-colonialism in parts of India. Hence, if the immensely diverse crowd India represents is not listened to, any possible uprisings may threaten India's development and disable her to mobilize all of her global potential. This could also give a reason to continue research on India, studying in-depth interaction of the national and international level, e.g. looking more into the internal efforts of India pursuing power in detail. Looking back on a different time span of the developments of India in e.g. 10-20 years may offer a completely different perspective.

³³¹ Ibid. 14.

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